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Maori Activism Across Borders, 1950-1980s

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Abstract

This thesis examines Maori activism across borders and is structured around two key themes, the creation, use and control of space, and New Zealand’s race relations reputation. It is set against a backdrop of global currents, events and ideologies which entered New Zealand and stimulated Maori activism. The overarching argument in this thesis is that Maori activists progressively created a space for themselves internationally in a variety of venues, to have their claims, grievances and realities accepted. To do so they had to subvert and challenge the discourse which confined and defined them as a privileged indigenous people who lived in a position of equality with Pakeha in a country reputed to have the best race relations in the world. I argue that the ‘privilege’ discourse shaped the form which their activism took and how, in the process of successfully contesting that discourse, they created a space for Maori in an emerging indigenous people’s activist network.

A key purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the importance of New Zealand’s good race relations reputation as a determinant of both government policy and Maori actions. I demonstrate the lengths that the New Zealand government went to in order to maintain an image of ‘one people’. Threading through the thesis are the actions of the government in restricting or mediating space in order to stifle any oppositional discourse and present a positive image of race relations. Alongside this is the agency and actions of Maori and the ways in which they subverted the dominant race relations discourse and created space for an oppositional narrative, first in New Zealand and then internationally. While Maori agency played a major role in this process, they were also the beneficiaries of a global shift which prioritised the elimination of racial discrimination, the liberation of colonised peoples, and saw a growing recognition of the oppression of indigenous people and the abrogation of their rights. All played a role in opening up a space for Maori activists to use and take their claims into international forums including the United Nations, the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, and the Russell Tribunal.

This thesis demonstrates the centrality of racial discrimination in opening up New Zealand to international scrutiny, and national discussion. Through an examination of three key events in the late 1950s and early 1960s I argue that this raised a political
awareness and politicised many Maori which was reflected in a less accommodating attitude, growing unrest and discontent. Race relations shifted to a central position in New Zealand. Discontent was exacerbated by proposals designed to accelerate integration and bring to a satisfactory close the 'one people' imperative. It played a part in the emergence of radical Maori activism. Internationally, the opposite occurred and for much of the 1960s New Zealand’s reputation was enhanced. From this contact was made with indigenous people who came into New Zealand to study race relations and New Zealand’s integration policies. With this came identification between Maori and indigenous peoples, understandings of similar historical and contemporary experiences, and a similar world-view. At the same time Maori began moving out across borders and making contact with indigenous people and communities. It was a soft activism and it can be seen as the first stage of awareness of each other and their place within an indigenous world.

Finally, this thesis demonstrates the movement of radical Maori activists into a variety of international spaces and venues. It sheds light on how they used international spaces, the geographic extent of their activism, and the shift from mainly single issue events into an emerging independence movement across the Pacific. Thus they became part of a large network of indigenous activists who came together at conferences, and provide support and solidarity at protest actions. Moderate Maori activists moved along a different route which took them into the first transnational pan-indigenous organisation with a global perspective, the World Council of Indigenous Peoples. Collectively, as a result of these actions, Maori activists created a variety of spaces in New Zealand and internationally where they gained recognition for their grievances. Moreover they played a significant role in creating and sustaining organisations which advocated on behalf of indigenous peoples.
Acknowledgements

Ehara taku toa I te toa taki tahi engari taki mano.

My strength lies not in my right hand but in those who stand around me.

First I thank my supervisors, Kerry Taylor and Geoff Watson for their support and constructive criticism throughout the process. Moreover, despite my many crises of confidence they were always encouraging, believed that it was a topic well worth doing, and had faith that it was achievable. Without doubt I caused major frustration, but they hid it well.

I owe much to those who agreed to be interviewed either in person or by email. For me the interviews and contact with people were the most enjoyable and interesting part of the thesis process. Some became friends. I thank them and am grateful for their willingness to spend time discussing issues, explaining and sharing their knowledge and experiences. I hope that this thesis is worthy of their time, knowledge and support that they all so generously gave me.

Thanks are due to the staff at the many archives and libraries I visited in New Zealand, Australia and Canada. Staff at the Alexander Turnbull Library (Wellington) were especially accommodating, and often helped facilitate my access to restricted records which were proving difficult to obtain. At times they went an 'extra mile' and rushed through information, photocopies of articles and photos by email at very short notice. My research in Australia was an excellent experience and the staff at National Archives Australia, National Library of Australia, AIATSIS, and the National Film and Sound Archives were all superb. I am especially indebted to the many times they facilitated access to records at short notice (including restricted records), and suggested records and publications which could be of use. All the archives in Australia were a pleasure to use and staff went out of their way to assist on many occasions. The New York Central Library staff were also helpful in pointing me to indigenous publications, newspapers and magazines which would likely be useful. A special thanks must go to the staff at Library and Archives Canada who were aware of my time constraints and rushed through restricted material which could only be ordered in person and not in advance. They were extraordinarily helpful and patient.
Thank you to Viv Cook for proof-reading. At times chapters were sent at short notice and I needed them back quickly. She was truly excellent and always obliged. Thanks go to Tania Taitoko (Maniapoto) who over many years has given much advice and help. She has always been willing to explain and assist when necessary. Had Tania been in my life at an earlier age I have no doubt that I would possess much more than fragments of te reo.

I owe much to friends and family who have kept me in the real world and supported when things threatened to unravel. They had to listen to a mixture of rants, self-doubt, and enthusiastic renditions about particular issues which, to me, were riveting and of supreme interest but which possibly held little interest for them. Being away from university environs, and with no contact with others doing theses, was a solitary experience. Although my supervisors were available whenever needed, there were no opportunities to bounce ideas off others, have discussions and clarify ideas with other students. So I thank my family and friends, who listened, plied me with black coffee and support, made me laugh, and kept me fairly well grounded. I am also grateful to those friends who never let me hibernate for too long and made sure via phone calls, or 'just popping in to check', that I never became totally consumed by the thesis. I reserve a special acknowledgement to Whetu who started off as an interviewee. Over time a friendship developed. She was generous with her time, was always encouraging, made incisive comments and gave good advice. We planned to meet, but it was not to be. I went to Tania and explained what I needed to do and wanted to say but I had no words with which to say it. Tania understood immediately.

He maimai aroha

E te rangatira, tōku hoa pūmau, e kore e warewaretia
Kua riro rā koe ki Paerau, ki te huinga o te kahurangi, ki tua o te ārai
Ki te okiokinga i o tuupuna, haere atu rā, oti atu.

I acknowledge and am grateful for the Top Achiever Doctoral Scholarship which enabled me to do much more extensive research in New Zealand and abroad than was originally envisaged. Moreover it allowed me, for a time, to focus on the thesis and not have to cope with work distractions and pressures.
The thesis journey has been marked by highs and lows. Some excellent times have been had and I have met some truly wonderful and amazing people along the way. At times it came to a grinding halt only to be resumed when crises were resolved. Through it all was Mike. He will know precisely why this thesis is dedicated to him.

Lin Johnson
October 2015
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<tr>
<td>AAL</td>
<td>Aborigines Advancement League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACL</td>
<td>Auckland City Library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACORD</td>
<td>Auckland Committee on Racism and Discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADMC</td>
<td>Auckland District Maori Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIM</td>
<td>American Indian Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASIO</td>
<td>Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATL</td>
<td>Alexander Turnbull Library</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATOM</td>
<td>Against Testing on Moruroa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CABTA</td>
<td>Citizens' All Black Tour Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>Citizens' Association for Racial Equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHOGM</td>
<td>Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCAA</td>
<td>Federal Council for Aboriginal Advancement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCAATSI</td>
<td>Federal Council for the Advancement of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HART</td>
<td>Halt All Racist Tours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICERD</td>
<td>International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International labour Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAC</td>
<td>Library and Archives Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAAAA</td>
<td>Maori Affairs Amendment Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOOHR</td>
<td>Maori Organisation On Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>MWWL</td>
<td>Maori Women's Welfare League</td>
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<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>National Archives (Wellington, New Zealand)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAA</td>
<td>National Archives Australia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCC</td>
<td>National Council of Churches</td>
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<td>NFP</td>
<td>Nuclear Free Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>NFIP</td>
<td>Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZMC</td>
<td>New Zealand Maori Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZRFU</td>
<td>New Zealand Rugby Football Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZSCM</td>
<td>New Zealand Student Christian Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCR</td>
<td>Programme to Combat Racism</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCRC</td>
<td>Pacific Concerns Resource Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPSEAWA</td>
<td>Pan Pacific and South East Asia Women's Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPWA</td>
<td>Pan Pacific Women's Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Polynesian Panther Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASA</td>
<td>South African Sports Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAL</td>
<td>University of Auckland Library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDHR</td>
<td>Universal Declaration on Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UWL</td>
<td>University of Waikato Library</td>
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<tr>
<td>WAA</td>
<td>Waitangi Action Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>WAC</td>
<td>Waitangi Action Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>World Council of Churches</td>
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<tr>
<td>WCIP</td>
<td>World Council of Indigenous Peoples</td>
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## Glossary

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Term</th>
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<tr>
<td>Haka</td>
<td>posture dance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hapu</td>
<td>descent group within an Iwi; sub-tribe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>meeting or gathering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iwi</td>
<td>tribe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korero</td>
<td>a talk, discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mana</td>
<td>prestige, respect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maoritanga</td>
<td>Maori culture and beliefs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marae</td>
<td>courtyard of a Maori meeting house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mihi</td>
<td>to greet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powhiri</td>
<td>ritual ceremony of encounter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take</td>
<td>reason, topic of discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te Reo</td>
<td>the Maori language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tikanga</td>
<td>protocols and practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waiata</td>
<td>song</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whakama</td>
<td>embarrassment, shyness, shame, humiliation, inferiority, self-doubt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whanau</td>
<td>family</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Introduction

This thesis begins during a period of rapid urbanisation and immense social change for Maori as they shifted from rural communities into the towns and cities of New Zealand. To the outside world, New Zealand was a shining example to other states with minority indigenous populations, for the manner in which it treated its Maori population. What the world believed was that Maori and Pakeha were all ‘one people’ and thus Maori lived in a state of complete racial equality and harmony alongside the dominant Pakeha population. It was an enviable position and one which indigenous activists and leaders in Canada and Australia pressed their governments to emulate. Three decades later, Maori activists were central players in a vast international radical indigenous activist network which stretched across the Pacific. Maori also had membership in the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, and they participated in forums and conferences across the world. The discourse from radical Maori activists was searingly anti-colonial, and at times anti-Pakeha, as they spoke of a treaty that had never been honoured, of land theft, Pakeha duplicity, continued colonisation and oppression, institutional racism, and in historical terms of having the Maori language and culture thrashed out of Maori children. Clearly ‘one people’ had been laid to rest. The thirty years in which this transformation took place is the subject of this thesis.

This thesis examines the development of Maori activism, the increasing contact between Maori and indigenous peoples, and the progressive movement of Maori into international spaces. The creation, control and use of space, and New Zealand’s race relations reputation for racial equality and harmony, lie at the centre of the events which took place, and are the main themes which structure the thesis. The general overarching argument is that from the late 1950s race relations in New Zealand were opened up to international scrutiny and Maori progressively made contact with indigenous people. At the same time a new political consciousness developed and by the late 1960s Maori activism had developed nationally. The following decade saw activists shift across borders and into a large number of international venues. Many of these were indigenous based and by the early 1980s Maori were part of a large indigenous activist

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1 In 1936 11.2% of Maori lived in urban areas, by 1951 this had risen to 19%. In 1961 29% lived in cities with a further 21% living in town districts and country townships. See D. Ian Pool, The Maori Population of New Zealand 1769-1971, Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1977, p.23.
movement which came together at meetings and provided support and solidarity at major protest actions. Maori also took part in a variety of single event forums and conferences across Europe, Asia and the Pacific, courtesy of an increased global commitment to racial equality and the increasing acknowledgement of the struggles of indigenous peoples.

A central proposition in this thesis is that New Zealand’s good race relations reputation determined the form which much of their activism took. Maori were aware of the oppressive ‘one people’ construct which positioned them as a privileged in comparison to other indigenous peoples, and they often faced a difficult task of convincing others to the contrary. This thesis demonstrates how radical Maori activists repeatedly challenged and subverted the dominant race relations narrative in international forums including the United Nations, by presenting an oppositional narrative, and thus they carved out a space for Maori within an evolving indigenous activist movement. It also examines the different form that moderate activists took to navigate a path between perceptions of Maori as privileged and elite, and yet also raise awareness that Maori also had legitimate historical and contemporary grievances.

**Locating Maori in an International Context**

This thesis is situated during a period of immense social change for indigenous peoples globally and nationally. Internationally it locates Maori within international currents, events and ideologies coming into New Zealand and which influenced Maori activism. Liberation, racial discrimination and inequality became central issues across the world. The call was for decolonisation and freedom from colonial rule, and civil rights and racial equality were demanded and became central issues across the world. In the United States of America the civil rights movement demanded equality and segregation was increasingly challenged, and in South Africa the demand was for an end to apartheid. Within the United Nations racial discrimination and inequality became a central issue to be addressed, and it responded with the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in order to force states to address racial discrimination. Later in the 1960s anti-colonial and Black Power ideologies entered New Zealand where they influenced Maori activism and re-formulated racial discrimination to ‘white racism’ and ‘institutional racism.'
Maori were also part of a post-war urbanisation of indigenous peoples in the settler states of Canada, Australia and the United States of America where they created significant populations within the context of contemporary colonialism. Most relocated for similar reasons: for employment and economic opportunities, the education of their children, and the social advantages of city life. In the cities they tended to congregate in the poorer areas where housing was less expensive and they formed indigenous communities. A web of indigenous organisations were formed which encouraged connections across tribal lines, sought to sustain identity, and provided assistance to deal with city life. Contact with the dominant European populations brought difficulties, especially those related to racial discrimination. The urban experience, coupled with government policies which failed to take into account the aspirations of indigenous peoples, led to rising discontent, a new political awareness of subordination and marginalisation, and the subsequent politicisation of many indigenous peoples. Thus the urban environment provided the bedrock for the development of domestic activism. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, indigenous activist organisations emerged. These were a response to domestic issues both in an historical and contemporary context, and they were influenced by the many global events, ideologies and trends which were sweeping across the globe during the 1960s, especially black liberation and anti-colonial ideologies. Activists sought domestic social transformation, to have historic grievances acknowledged and attended to, and they looked across borders for support. Over the 1970s indigenous activists began to come together and by the early 1980s a strong indigenous activist network had formed.2

**Purposes of the Thesis**

This thesis has four key purposes. First I demonstrate the centrality of New Zealand’s race relations reputation during this period and the extraordinary lengths the government took to maintain its ‘one people’ image. I argue that three key events involving racial discrimination served to raise a political consciousness and politicised many Maori which was reflected in a less accommodating attitude and growing unrest and discontent. Race relations were moved to a central place in New Zealand and there they stayed. Growing discontent was exacerbated by proposals designed to accelerate integration and bring to a satisfactory close the colonial 'one people' imperative. Internationally the view was the reverse and New Zealand's race relations reputation was enhanced. The outcome was that New Zealand was opened up as various indigenous and non-indigenous people came in to study New Zealand's successful race relations model.

The second purpose is to demonstrate the development of an indigenous community. Post-war contact between Maori and other indigenous people was almost non-existent, but from the mid-1960s government officials, people working in Aboriginal Affairs, community workers and indigenous peoples all came in to study the position of Maori and New Zealand’s integration policies. Contact was made, and with it came identification with each other, understandings of cultural commonalities, similar historical and contemporary experiences, and a similar world-view. At the same time Maori began moving out across borders and making contact with indigenous people and communities. In many ways it was a soft activism and it can be seen as the first stage of awareness of each other and their place within an indigenous world.

The third purpose is to examine the movement of radical and moderate Maori activists into international places and venues and the shed light on how they used the new spaces, the networks which formed and the constraints and difficulties which appeared. Moderate activists employed a different approach to radical activists, and the extent to which perceptions of Maori as a privileged indigenous people and how they navigated a position between this perception and their lived reality threads its way through the chapters on both moderate and radical activism. In relation to the latter, demonstrated is a shift from single issue events into established organisations, such as the Nuclear Free
and Independent Pacific movement, and a vibrant Pacific people’s network which
formed, and which aimed at providing solidarity and support,

The fourth purpose is related to the issue of racial discrimination and examines how the
imperatives of the government and the United Nations conflicted and provided a space
for Maori activists to challenge the government, and eventually take their claims into
the United Nations. Also examined is the engagement by radical activists with the
United Nations and how they used the spaces which opened up to present an
oppositional discourse and place Maori grievances in front of a United Nations
delegation.

THEMES
The thesis is structured around two themes of New Zealand’s race relations reputation
and the creation, use and control of space.

_Race Relations Reputation and ‘one people’_

New Zealand’s national identity, predicated on its race relations reputation, stretches
back to the Treaty of Waitangi and the assumption that Maori and Pakeha were forged
into ‘one people’. As each Maori chief signed the treaty he shook hands with
Lieutenant Governor William Hobson who uttered the words, ‘He iwi tahi tatou’ – ‘We
are now one people’. It was the rhetoric of assimilation and it served to advance Pakeha
interests, priorities and values, and to support the doctrine of assimilation.³

Coming in to the 1950s, two persistent and entrenched myths lay at the centre of the
national imaginings of Pakeha New Zealand. The ‘one people’ paradigm provided a
vision of national homogeneity and was central to the government imperative of
assimilation and then integration. In reality the two were similar, the main difference
being a slight nod to the retention of Maori culture. ‘One people’ was premised on a
central ideology of egalitarianism: Maori and Pakeha had equal opportunities, status,
and access to the same institutions upon which society rested. Racial equality suggested
racial harmony. The view that New Zealanders enjoyed the best race relations in the

³ P. Hohepa, ‘Maori and Pakeha: The One People Myth’ in M King (ed), _Tihei Mauri Ora_, pp.98-111,
world was one which had been gained by comparing the treatment of Maori and their position in society with that of indigenous peoples in other countries, especially in Australia. In this respect there was never any doubt that Maori were treated better than Aborigines. New Zealand was proud of its good reputation and the government strenuously defended it against any suggestions that racial discrimination may exist, or that New Zealand’s claims may be overstated. Thus Maori were confined within the ‘best race relations’ narrative and the imperative of the government was to control and maintain that image.

‘One people’ was never popular with Maori. As John Rangihau explained:

> You see, when Pakeha say we are one people, they seem to mean that you’re brown and a unique feature of the indigenous scene. But they want you to act as a European provided you still retain the ability to poke out your tongue, gesticulate and do your Maori dances …I can’t go along with this because I can’t feel I can be Pakeha. What’s more, I don’t want to be Pakeha…But I’m asked to become a Pakeha so that I can be counted as a New Zealander. Cor blimey, I am a New Zealander, a Maori New Zealander.4

There is no doubt that Maori wanted social and economic equality and the removal of discriminatory practices. They had the same rights as Pakeha and therefore had equality under the law, but that did not guarantee racial equality. However, they also wanted cultural equality and to retain their own institutions which promoted and preserved Maori identity. What Maori wanted was a truly bi-cultural society in which they had social, economic, political and cultural equality. From a Pakeha perspective this position flew in the face of the ‘one people’ ideology, and of the very notion of equality. New Zealanders could never be ‘one people’ while Maori claimed special rights and a degree of autonomy. All New Zealanders must be treated the same.

During this period, the struggle for Maori was to retain their cultural forms and identity, to take their place as equal partners in the political processes of New Zealand. The rejection of ‘one people’ is clearly demonstrated in Chapter One when the Maori Women’s Welfare League (MWWA) challenged the Pan-Pacific Women’s Association (PPWA) for an autonomous position in the organisation and the right to represent Maori

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women at international conferences, rather than the women of New Zealand. ‘One people’ also edited out Maori experience in both historical and contemporary terms, and this thesis demonstrates how Maori progressively found ways to claim a space, present an oppositional discourse and thus subvert the ‘one people’ paradigm. This found its fullest expression in the 1970s when Maori activists repeatedly rejected that Maori and Pakeha were ‘one people’, or that Maori occupied a position of equality with Pakeha. As I explain, the ‘one people’ paradigm and associated ‘best race relations’ discourse positioned Maori as being in a privileged position in comparison to other indigenous people. It was this perception which activists had to contest. The difficulty for both radical and moderate Maori activists was that Maori were in a better position. How they navigated this tension and made a space which acknowledged Maori grievances and claims was reflected in their different forms of activism.

The Creation, Use and Control of Space

One of the many outcomes of postmodern and postcolonial scholarship has been the deployment of a spatial perspective into social and cultural analysis. There is a diversity of spatial approaches and concepts, but all take as their starting point the premise that space is first and foremost the result of, and ground for, social relationships and interactions. As Lefebvre states, 'space is at once result and cause, product and producer' of social relations and connections with each other and to change one is to change the other. As a product of social interaction, space is 'simultaneously the medium and outcome, presupposition and embodiment, of social action and relationship'. Thus all social connections and relationships have a spatial form and location and are created out of a web of relations.

In terms of power, it follows that the creation and control of space is a fundamental component of hegemonic power. As Doreen Massey says, 'it is both the message and the medium of domination and subordination' for it 'tells you where you are and it puts you there'. Everyone inhabits a space and has an identity that commands recognition of

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7 Soja, *Postmodern Geographies...*, p.129.
that position in terms according (hopefully) to one's desires. 'Other' spaces, of those who are marginalised and which become the sites of contentious political action, are 'strategically spatialised from the start'.9 These, notes Feldman, are 'especially critical for those who have been silenced or marginalised, for they mark one's existence or non-existence, visibility and non-visibility; one's 'place' and all that springs from it'.10 Soja and Hooper analyse the 'Other' from a spatialised binary of centre/margin and locate those marginalised - a community of 'Others' - within a third space, or 'the space that difference makes'. This space allows 'strategic alliances between those on the margins and creates a liberating space of resistance'.11

This is similar to the conceptions of bell hooks who identifies the margins as a site for resistance and a place of radical possibility. Rather than simply a place of oppression and deprivation, hooks sees the margin as a 'space of radical openness' where a person can 'say no to the coloniser and the oppressor'. Thus it becomes a 'place of resistance ...for oppressed, exploited and colonised people'. It is a place where one wants to stay because it sustains and strengthens the capacity to resist. As such it is a central location for the production of a 'counter-hegemonic discourse that is not just found in words but in habits and the way one lives.' The point is that when in the centre there is no longer the need to be positioned 'on the edge of the colonising mentality' and subject to oppressive strictures related to race, sex and class. Rather, in choosing to be positioned on the margins, a person chooses a space of 'radical openness'. A stand is taken to engage in political resistance and speak the language of the margins – an oppositional discourse – which is presented throughout daily life. The site of radical openness at the centre of society is a space which envisages and seeks social transformation.12

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10 Alice Feldman, 'Making Space at the Nations' Table: mapping the transformative geographies of the international indigenous peoples' movement', Social Movement Studies, Vol.1, No.1, 2002, pp.31-46 (33).

11 Soja and Hooper, p.190.

The theorisation and concepts from both Soja and Hooper and bell hooks are useful when looking at the radical activism of Nga Tamatoa, and later activist groups such as the Waitangi Action Committee and Maori People’s Liberation Front. They were marginalised within mainstream and by many within Maoridom, and they deliberately marginalised themselves through discourse, actions and ideology. In placing themselves in the centre of society and speaking the language of the margins, they chose a space of radical openness which was liberating and dove-tailed with Maori aspirations for self-determination. Similarly, in Chapter one I demonstrate how the MWWL and other indigenous delegates located themselves on the margins at times for support, and to centre their common indigenous identity.

Bringing concepts of space into this thesis mostly focuses on new relationships, new understandings, and a rise of political consciousness. Concrete spaces are transformed into spaces for a new consciousness via action, discourse or symbolism which is inscribed on this space. This can be as simple as discussions and meetings and through to protest actions. For example, the 1960 ‘No Maoris No Tour’ protest marches, which protested the exclusion of Maori from the All Black tour of South Africa, transformed urban streets and public places into temporary anti-racism spaces. The transference of the symbols and messages inscribed on placards, banners and pamphlets - ‘No Maoris No Tour’ and ‘Only One Race, The Human Race’ – to the mental processes of the viewer had the potential to engender a new consciousness about domestic racism. The hopes of activists who deployed such messages were that a new consciousness would be translated into political action and thus lead to social change. In terms of power, the control of space is pertinent to the efforts which the government took during this period to maintain New Zealand’s reputation, and for most of the 1950s and 1960s it controlled the race relations narrative. The implementation of a heavily mediated visitors’ circuit was designed to confine Maori within a ‘one people’ image, as were its efforts to intervene and control media publications on race relations. The control of space can be challenged and as will be demonstrated, Maori were able to subvert a visitors’ circuit and present a different discourse. Ultimately the emergence of radical Maori activism from the late 1960s was a challenge to political power and the control of space by the government. The challenge by radical activists was not only to the government, it was to the ‘one people’ ideological construct upon which Pakeha New Zealand’s identity rested.
SOURCES

Archival and Published Sources

This thesis draws on a large number of sources to examine ‘Maori Activism across Borders’. The following will not be an in-depth commentary of the sources used but rather will give a broad indication of the sources consulted. Government records, particularly the files from the Department of Maori Affairs and the Department of Foreign Affairs, formed a core resource. These were invaluable for information related to racial discrimination, visits of indigenous people to New Zealand, the engagement of Maori activists with United Nations bodies, correspondence between the government and the Department of Maori Affairs over various issues including the discussions on whether to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination, and the involvement of Maori in the World Council of Indigenous Peoples. These records were supplemented by files from the Department of Internal Affairs, and the Hon. Matiu Rata Papers. Collectively they provided a substantial range of reports and studies on race relations, inter-departmental correspondence as well as correspondence with government departments abroad, newspaper clippings, speeches and submissions.

The Alexander Turnbull Library held a great many records of which the New Zealand Maori Council Records were useful for minutes, and discussion of issues related to the World Council of Indigenous Peoples. The Student Christian Movement Aotearoa Records gave information on the contact between the Rev. Don Borrie and activists, and the efforts to initiate contacts abroad. Information on the Pan-Pacific Women’s Association was gleaned from several series of records including the Maori Women’s Welfare League, Pan Pacific and South East Asia Women’s Association New Zealand Branch Records and the papers of Miria Simpson.

At the Auckland City Library the CARE archives provided newsletters, information on the activities of CARE, and two valuable addresses that had not been sighted elsewhere. The first was a copy of a speech given by Hana Jackson (Nga Tamatoa) to the Programme to Combat Racism in the Netherlands. The second was a copy of a paper presented by Titewhai Harawira to the first Nuclear Free Pacific conference in Fiji in 1975. At the University of Auckland, the Auckland District Maori Council Records
were an important resource for discussions about a visit by Patu Hohepa to the United Nations, and discussions over issues related to the World Council of Indigenous Peoples.

The National Archives Australia provided a wealth of material and much is also digitised and on-line. There are extensive files on the work by the Maori Women's Welfare League in Aboriginal communities setting up family/play-centres; files on race relations which contain correspondence and reports from the Australian Embassy in New Zealand to Canberra; and single issue files which contain correspondence and reports on visits by Aborigines to New Zealand. The embassy correspondence is valuable in providing material about discussions which took place with Maori leaders and their perceptions on race relations. The archives also hold the Australian Security Intelligence Service (ASIO) files on radical activists in Australia and some are freely available on-line. As files from the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service are almost impossible to obtain, the ASIO activist files were valuable as they contained information on Maori activists and other indigenous activists who travelled to Australia (and on to other countries), who they made contact with, and what actions they participated in. The Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies (AIATSIS) archives in Canberra hold the records of the Federal Council of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders (FCAATSI) and records of the 1980 Fourth Russell Tribunal held in Rotterdam. Included in the latter is a full address presented at the tribunal by a Maori activist, Colin Clark.

In Canada, the Library and Archives Canada (LAC) provided core resources in correspondence between Canadian and New Zealand government departments, and reports from the Canadian Embassy in New Zealand, and it also holds an extensive collection of records of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples. In New York, the Central City Library archives provided access to a comprehensive range of North American Indian newspapers and magazines.

Newspapers, magazines and newsletters from leftist activist groups formed a key resource. International newspapers were crucial in gaining information on the reportage of specific events in New Zealand, how race relations were perceived internationally, and in identifying shifts in perception. Indigenous people’s newsletters and newspapers,
including Northian, Akwesasne Notes and Kainai News in North America and Identity and Messagestick in Australia, were useful in gaining information on specific issues and in identifying the perceptions and understandings of Maori which indigenous people held. They were especially helpful in relation to the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, a visit to New Zealand by a Canadian delegation in the early 1970s, and points of contact between Maori and indigenous activists during the 1970s.

New Zealand newspapers, magazines and newsletters were crucial in charting how attitudes of Maori changed. These came from Maori leaders but also from ordinary folk who wrote in 'letters to the editor' columns. They are also essential in showing the shift in society as race relations and especially discrimination began to assume a central space. Magazines such as Te Ao Hou and newsletters from activists groups and organisations provided a significant resource in a myriad of ways: gaining information on the key issues being contested, dominant discourses at the time, information on links which were being formed and perceptions held of other indigenous peoples. Above all, national publications gave a strong sense of the international currents and ideas which were coming into New Zealand and influencing activism and the attitudinal shifts taking place. Te Ao Hou was especially useful for its reports by MWWL members on their activities in the PPWA and their work in Aboriginal communities in Australia.

Very little information on transnational activism was reported in the mainstream media but some was reported in the newsletters of Maori activist organisations and leftist newsletters such as Socialist Action and therefore these were invaluable resources. Some appeared in neither and it was through overseas publications that information became available. Many sources only revealed snippets of information, but cumulatively these snippets in newspapers, newsletters, magazines, and archival sources yielded a significant body of information and made it possible to piece together events, attitudes towards race relations and changes which were taking place, and the motives, concerns and the agenda of the government, especially over issues of race relations legislation and its reluctance to engage with the United Nations.
**Oral Sources**

The second major source was interviews I conducted with indigenous and non-indigenous activists, mostly in New Zealand and several in Australia. While it was possible to construct various events from archival material, newspaper and magazine reports, the interviews were crucial in gaining an in depth understanding of the events during that time. Interviews were supplemented with radio recordings of interviews held at the Radio New Zealand Sound Archives. This is a rich resource and yielded interviews with Maori and indigenous people who visited New Zealand during the 1960s, and with representatives of the MWWL who worked in Aboriginal communities during the same period. This added a layer of authenticity and richness which newspaper and magazine articles and reports often lacked. They were also particularly useful to place alongside contemporary interviews and written material from a later date when recollections of events may have changed, or different perspectives may have been gained over time. A series of interviews conducted by Paul Diamond with members of Nga Tamatoa were a valuable source of information on the ideologies, motivations, aims and activities of the group, and also gaining insight into the perceptions and experiences of individual ex-members during a tumultuous period in New Zealand’s race relations history.

**STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS**

This thesis begins in the late 1940s and finishes in the early 1980s. The decision to finish the chapter in the early 1980s was a difficult one to make as there was considerable international activism during the decades of the 1980s and 1990s. The period I have focused on should be seen as a foundation period in the development of transnational activism, when contact was being made between Maori and other indigenous peoples and a gradual shift of Maori through the Pacific took place. However, it was also a period when opportunities came for Maori to visit conferences and forums outside the Pacific as the world began to respond to indigenous peoples’ concerns, as well as issues of human rights and racial discrimination which also affected indigenous people. Indigenous peoples also began organising their own international

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13 Ethics approval was given for interviews to be conducted.
meetings and forums, such as the World Council of Indigenous Peoples and regional conferences across the Pacific.

Chapter One examines the participation of the MWWL in the PPWA, and especially in international PPWA conferences during the 1950s. It argues that the relationship became a site for active intervention as the MWWL challenged the ‘one people’ imperative of the PPWA and demanded an autonomous space for Maori within the organisation. It also argues that Maori subverted the ‘one people’ narrative at conferences by presenting an oppositional position on race relations. At the same time, connections were made with other indigenous peoples at conferences and so created an indigenous space. This served a number of purposes including support and refuge in an organisation which contained remnants of Eurocentric power structures, and notions of indigenous ‘place’, and engendered a new consciousness between indigenous delegates.

In the second chapter, Maori are located within a global ‘wind of change’ in which liberation ideology spread across the globe and people demanded liberation from oppression and the right to self-determination, civil rights, equality, and many other freedoms throughout the 1960s decade. In New Zealand race relations, and especially racial discrimination, shifted to a central position in society and opened race relations up to national and international scrutiny. At the same time the Government sought to introduce its ‘wind of change’ which was to speed up the integration process and finalise the imperative of making ‘one people’. The chapter examines key events and argues that it was a pivotal period in the development of Maori activism in generating space for a new political consciousness and a growing discontent amongst many Maori. Internationally, the opposite was the case and Maori remained confined within a space defined by New Zealand’s good race relations reputation. This is essentially a foundation chapter which led onto the development of Maori activism and an indigenous community, and thus it is a springboard for the chapters which follow.

It leads directly into Chapter Three in which indigenous people and those involved in indigenous affairs came into New Zealand to study New Zealand's race relations model and the new integration policies put in place by Government. I argue that Maori subverted a visitors’ circuit which was set in place by government departments and which provided visitors with an idealised image of race relations. New Zealand was
opened up for scrutiny and for the first time placed Maori in significant contact with other indigenous peoples. This shifted Maori from a previous position of insignificance when dealing with visitors, to a space in which they and indigenous people met, shared experiences and found commonalities. Indigenous space expanded as Maori began to travel abroad and forge further links with indigenous peoples. I argue that despite a more informed understanding of race relations, Maori were still regarded as privileged in relation to other indigenous peoples.

Chapter Four locates the development of radical Maori activism within an international context. Rising national discontent intersected with international currents, events and ideologies coming into New Zealand, which helped shape and provided a framework within which radical activism developed. The focus of the chapter is the movement of Maori activists across geographical spaces, the connections which were made and how they used the new international spaces which became available across many diverse places. It argues that the oppressive ‘one people’ construct and the perception of Maori as a privileged people shaped the form which their activism took. The period is seen as a foundational period in the development of transnational radical activism and an indigenous radical activist community began to emerge. I demonstrate the geographic movement of Maori activists from initial contact with Australian Aboriginal activists, then into the Pacific Islands and contact with indigenous independence activists, and finally into the International Indian Treaty Council in North America. There was an accompanying progression from single issue and local events to participation in forums and formal organisations such as the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific organisation. Arising out of contacts and networks which had been forged, a large international activist community had been formed by the early 1980s.

Within the context of racial discrimination nationally and internationally, Chapter Five examines the intersection between the imperatives of United Nations, the New Zealand government and Maori. Within this nexus, and stimulated by international influences, spaces opened up for Maori activists to engage with the United Nations where they challenged New Zealand’s race relations narrative and placed their grievances before United Nations bodies. Additionally this chapter demonstrates the centrality and importance of New Zealand’s international reputation to the government and its reluctance in having domestic race relations held up for international attention.
Chapter Six examines the involvement by Maori in the creation and governance of the first transnational pan-indigenous organisation, the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP). Two major conferences are examined, the inaugural conference of the WCIP at Port Alberni in 1975, and the third WCIP conference in Canberra in 1981. The superior position of Maori in society in comparison to that of other indigenous people was the impetus for their initial involvement in the organisation and it shaped the form which their involvement took. This chapter examines the shift of Maori into the WCIP and how, during the inaugural WCIP conference in Port Alberni they navigated a place amidst perceptions held of Maori as privileged or elite. How Maori used the spaces at the two conferences and whether they were able to use these as a political resource in identifying the needs and claims of Maori is explored. The events which took place in Canberra included a forum for radical activists and was a reflection of a decade of involvement by Maori activists with similar groups in the Pacific, and the radical activist network which had formed.

DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN FORMS of ACTIVISM

When discussing Maori activism it is usual to make a clear distinction between radical and moderate or conservative activists. As was discovered while researching this thesis, such categorising was not unproblematic and there was no simple distinction as the categories blur and fold into each other according to different situations and actions. Activists regarded as moderate and radical often joined together in a range of public protests which could be seen as radical actions. The land occupation of Bastion Point is an example: it was deemed illegal by the state and therefore, from a government perspective, all activists occupying the land could be seen to be participating in radical activism. The early activist group Nga Tamatoa was seen as 'radical' by many Maori and Pakeha from the moment they organised their first demonstration on Waitangi Day 1971. Yet Nga Tamatoa also initiated many self-help schemes for the benefit of young Maori which were hardly radical actions. However the notion that they were a radical group remained.

A person could wear many activist labels at different times: a leader who promoted and advocated change; a ‘soft’ activist who worked actively to bring about improve conditions and bring about change, or who sought to raise awareness over an issue; a
moderate activist who used conventional methods of gaining satisfaction for grievances; and a radical activist who employed anti-colonial rhetoric and took part in radical protest actions.

Mostly I simply use the term ‘activist’. At times I use the term ‘soft activism’ for specific events. This is generally applied to consciousness-raising actions, or when Maori were working actively behind the scenes to improve the lives of others. For example, the Maori Women’s Welfare League worked in Aboriginal communities for several years setting up play-centres and family centres, and at the same time they sought to instil pride and confidence in Aboriginal women. Both are soft forms of activism. I make a clear distinction in Chapter Four and use the term ‘radical’ with reference to the activists from Nga Tamatoa and later in the decade activists from the Waitangi Action Committee and Maori Peoples Liberation Movement of Aotearoa. In Chapter Six those who participated in the World Council of Indigenous People have been termed as moderate activists.

Whilst acknowledging ambiguities and the cross-over between radical and moderate activism, and other categories, for the purpose of this thesis, a radical activist employed vigorous, dramatic and contentious forms of protest, was prepared to break the law if necessary, and placed an anti-colonial discourse uncompromisingly before the public. A moderate activist was someone who more often employed a conciliatory and less abrasive approach, and generally used conventional avenues of protest such as lobbying, petitioning, marches, the press, and negotiating or establishing dialogue with government or authorities to have grievances and claims recognised.

_locating myself in the thesis_

In this thesis Maori are located within a broad indigenous narrative and response to colonisation which shaped the lives of countless indigenous peoples. I locate myself within this narrative. My Pakeha descent lines lie in Scotland and England and their arrival in New Zealand during the 1860s. My grandmother, of Scottish descent, was part of the 'civilising mission' and worked as a head teacher at Whakarara Native School (Matauri Bay) for many years during the early 1900s. She believed that Maori had to 'uplift' themselves to the Pakeha way of life in order to progress as a people. Christianity would do it, and so would hard work. Access to a Pakeha education was
crucial. Although she was a product of her time and the ideologies which prevailed, there were some significant oppositional beliefs which blunted the sharp edges of intolerance and white superiority. This is evident as not only did she believe that Maori should retain their language and cultural forms, she was happy for her only daughter to marry my father.

At the same time as my grandmother was engaged in the civilising mission, my father was being educated at another native school near Kaeo. Being a product of a Maori mother and Pakeha father there was supposedly less 'civilising' to be done. His father, my grandfather, was born in a London work/poor house from which he absconded as a young child and onto a ship which sailed between England and the colonies. After several decades he sailed down the Whangaroa harbour where he met Mereteana, my grandmother. They married, settled and raised a family. Life on the ships was abandoned for a life spent taking Kauri trees out of the forests in the north. Mereteana died a few years before I was born and yet has been a significant influence on my life. Through her I have descent lines to Ngati Kahu ki Whangaroa, Nga Puhi and Ngati Rua and Ngati Rehia hapu. There is much more to be uncovered and understood. My place in this history is in fragments, and in line with the many shifts and dislocations that took place: of land dispossession in the early 1900s; of Mereteana trying to fit into the Pakeha world; of dislocation from my Maori roots through a series of circumstances which split up my immediate family and saw the eventual shift from a rural area into the city in the 1960s. As a child growing up in small town New Zealand my life was shaped to some extent by issues of 'race', and by many negative societal expectations, and prejudices that children of mixed Maori/Pakeha heritage were often subject. There were, however, also a great many positive outcomes and privileges. The reclaiming of family history and Maori roots is an ongoing project and I see this thesis as part of that process.
Chapter One:

Maori Women's Welfare League and Pan-Pacific Women's Association, 1950s:

A Site for Active Intervention, Creating Indigenous Space

In 1951 two disparate women’s organisations, the Maori Women’s Welfare League (MWWA) and the Pan-Pacific Women’s Association (PPWA), came together. Involvement in the PPWA gave the League access to an international community of women from across the Pacific through their participation in international conferences. This chapter examines the participation by the MWWL in the PPWA during the 1950s decade and especially in relation to the international conferences in 1952 and 1955.

The creation and use of space and New Zealand’s ‘one people’ race relations reputation provide the framework for this chapter. It is argued that the relationship between the MWWL and the PPWA became a site for active intervention as the MWWL contested and subverted the ‘one people’ paradigm to demand an autonomous space for Maori within the organisation. Internationally, at PPWA conferences, the MWWL delegates also subverted ‘one people’ by introducing an oppositional race relations narrative. It is further argued that indigenous spaces were created which formed variously in response to Eurocentric structures and attitudes which unwittingly persisted, the legacy of colonisation, and an affinity and identification between indigenous delegates from across the Pacific. The gathering together of indigenous peoples served as spaces of refuge, resistance, support and a place where indigenous peoples gained an understanding and new consciousness of the lives and position of a diverse range of indigenous peoples.

The PPWA and the MWWL were dissimilar organisations and unlikely partners. The PPWA consisted mainly of well-educated liberal Pakeha who had a social reformist agenda, had an international focus, and promoted ‘friendship and understanding among Pacific peoples’ in order to maintain world peace and address issues of racial
inequality. The focus of the PPWA was on international exchanges and conferences where their ideals of cultural internationalism - the building of cultural understanding based on respect for cultural diversity and a commitment to racial equality - were put into practice. Domestically, much of their work involved research and study group discussions about current issues in New Zealand and how these could contribute to world peace. Their involvement with Maori communities appears to have been sparse.

In September 1951 the MWWL was formed with Whina Cooper elected as its president and Mira Petricevich as secretary. It was non-sectarian, non-political and non-tribal and was grounded firmly in grass-roots Maori communities where it worked to address their needs and concerns. During the 1950s - a period of rapid urbanisation and immense social change- the MWWL provided the only Maori national platform where the needs, problems and aspirations of Maori could be articulated and acted upon. Its stated aims were to 'promote fellowship and understanding between Maori and Maori and European; to take an active interest in all matters concerning the health and general well-being of Maori women and children; to preserve, revive and maintain the teaching of Maori arts and crafts and to perpetuate the Maori culture'. Funded by the Department of Maori Affairs, the League was expected to attend to domestic matters - the home, women and children - and to provide advice, opportunities and create the conditions necessary to ensure that Maori took their place alongside Pakeha as healthy, progressive and integrated citizens. Much of their work was initially focused on the difficulties which new migrants to the cities faced in areas of housing, employment, health and welfare, and discrimination. Further, they encouraged social activities, provided support and budgeting advice, established cultural clubs and pre-school sessions, and assisted families in need.

The engagement between the MWWL and the PPWA was the result of different priorities. From its inception the League aimed to promote friendship and understanding between Maori and Pakeha. With Maori moving into urban areas and coming into significant contact with Pakeha, it was important that negative perceptions and

1 Lea, E.B, ‘Pan-Pacific Women’s Association, History of the PPWA’, Pan-Pacific and South-East Asia Women’s Association New Zealand Branch Records, 90-028, ATL
stereotypes about Maori were addressed. Particiation in Pakeha organisations would allow a Maori point of view to be presented and thus engender new understandings and a positive perception of Maori. The PPWA was keen to attract Maori to their organisation. It was committed to cultural diversity, racial unity and equality, but had few Maori members and therefore it failed to demonstrate such ideals.

The MWWL wanted to contribute and be part of the wider community of Pakeha women's organisations but they also wanted to do so as Maori women. As Aroha Harris notes, Whina Cooper prefaced all her speeches with the statement that 'they were women, but they were also Maori women'. The preservation and primacy of cultural identity and self-determination lay at the core of the MWWL ideology. By contrast, the PPWA was committed to ‘one people’ and insisted that all people were equal and must be treated equally as New Zealanders. Being New Zealand women together was unifying and the ideal, but the insistence by the MWWL that they were Maori women with the right to represent their people as a distinctive group became a source of tension. The MWWL wanted social and economic equality with Pakeha but they also wanted cultural equality. In effect the MWWL called for a bi-cultural delegation at international conferences. The actions and stance taken by the MWWL was part of a wider resistance to ‘one people’ and its assimilative purpose.

This chapter is focused mainly on two main international PPWA conferences in 1952 and 1955. Both conferences generated spaces for active and radical intervention. Maori delegates politicised conference spaces, and challenged the dominant ‘one people’ discourse which spoke of inter-racial equality and harmony, and benign colonisation. They claimed the right to speak for their people, and in some instances they questioned the authority and assumptions of Western delegates who made pronouncements about

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4 Public opinion and perceptions were reflected in the press, and Richard Thompson conducted a survey of negative stereotypes of Maori featuring in the press from October 1949 to September 1950. Prevalent were articles and statement which portrayed Maori as lazy, morally and socially irresponsible which was reflected by a high Maori crime rate, heavy liquor consumption, uneducated and ignorant, content to live in dirty and overcrowded homes, and they were not to be trusted. Bearing in mind the widespread discrimination against Maori across a range of social settings, and in relation to employment and accommodation, it was crucial that these stereotypes were broken down. See, Richard H.T. Thompson, ‘Maori Affairs and the New Zealand Press II’, Journal of the Polynesian Society, Vol.63, No.1, 1954, pp.1-16.

Maori. Delegates presented a new narrative of the historical effects of colonisation and its contemporary legacy. Examined also is the clash between the 'one people' ideology of the PPWA and the desire of the MWWL for cultural equality and to maintain their identity as Maori women of New Zealand.

I also argue that indigenous spaces were created at the conferences. The PPWA worked hard to be all-inclusive and carry out its ideals of racial equality and create a forum which generated friendships and new understandings between delegates. This undoubtedly occurred. However no place is ever devoid of past experiences, ways of looking at the world, or ideological imperatives. Eurocentric notions of superiority, power structures, priorities and assumptions were identifiable at the conferences. Indigenous people also carried a baggage of negative experiences and the legacy of the colonial relationship which was not easily cast aside. Thus indigenous delegates positioned themselves in indigenous spaces for support and refuge, and where they could centre indigenous priorities and experiences. These spaces contained layers of meaning and outcomes, not least in generating at a new consciousness of the position of other indigenous peoples, and recognition of cultural commonalities and experiences.

Moreover, the Pacific was criss-crossed with historical journeys and indigenous connections, and in contemporary terms a Pasifika community was being established in New Zealand with labourers coming in, and increasing numbers of young people were attending secondary schools and forging friendships with Maori. Peoples of the Pacific, at the conferences, were connected as much through mythology, oral histories, and ancient lineages as they were by the planes carrying their whanau to cities, workplaces, schools and universities in New Zealand. At the conferences indigenous spaces were familiar and safe places.

This chapter takes the position that in the context of the 1950s the MWWL can be seen as radical in some situations, and this was reflected in their demands for self-determination, and their discourse and the position they took at international PPWA conferences. The MWWL has often been seen as a conservative organisation, although a much more nuanced position of the organisation has recently been articulated by
Aroha Harris.\(^6\) Like Harris, I take the position that the MWWL was constructed as ‘conservative’ with reference to the radical activist organisations which emerged from the late 1960s.\(^7\) Abrasive rhetoric, terminology and public pronouncements, and highly visible direct protest action defined the radical label. The MWWL displayed none of these features. Nevertheless, many members were formidable and in the context of the 1950s some of the actions of the MWWL can be seen as radical. As Harris points out, they pressed for the teaching of Maori language and history in schools, they suggested that Maori wards be set up in hospitals to cater for whanau who liked to visit in numbers, and they sought to address racial discrimination.\(^8\) None of these were safe or ‘conservative’ causes. Moreover, the MWWL virtually stood alone in 1956 when they opposed the Springbok rugby tour of New Zealand because of the policy of apartheid.\(^9\)

In the context of the universal support for the tour and the wave of adulation which enveloped the country, the MWWL was radical and courageous. The MWWL showed that their government funding did not necessarily generate complicity or compliance.

The PPWA has been studied extensively by Fiona Paisley and she has left few openings to fill.\(^10\) However the engagement between the PPWA and MWWL is an important passage in the development of transnational activism, and this chapter expands on some of Paisley’s scholarship in a historical and spatial context. My focus is narrow and on indigenous spaces, how conference spaces were created and used, and how the MWWL overturned the ‘one people’ paradigm and claimed an autonomous place for Maori women. Paisley sees the PWWA as a space of ‘radical potential’ in that the PPWA conferences provided a place where ‘white and black women from colonies’ could

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8 Ibid.


gather together as equals, and away from the discrimination to which they were subject
in their countries.\textsuperscript{11} I argue that the conferences, especially the first conference,
contained remnants of Eurocentric notions of ‘place’, superiority and power structures,
and thus the conferences were also a site for active intervention by Maori delegates.

The events in this chapter are set against an international climate whereby racial
inequality and discrimination were becoming central issues of contest across the
western world. Increasingly liberal voices were demanding human rights and equality
for all peoples. A sign of the times was the ground-breaking photographic exhibition,
‘The Family of Man’ which was transported around the globe over a period of eight
years.\textsuperscript{12} It was designed to show the fundamental equality of mankind and conceived as
a platform for the promotion of peace following two world wars. At another level the
Cold War was generating apprehension and fears that another world war was imminent.
The desire for world peace was heightened and reflected in the aims and ideologies of
the PPWA. Across the Pacific, in the settler states of Australia, Canada, the United
States of America and New Zealand, the urbanisation of indigenous peoples was
underway and producing similar problems, benefits, communities and a new political
consciousness. Urbanisation was rapid in New Zealand and brought benefits and
problems, and racial discrimination was pervasive.\textsuperscript{13} It is against this international and
domestic backdrop that the MWWL and PPWA came together, and Maori gained a
voice in an international women’s organisation.

\textbf{New Beginnings: The Re-formation of the PPWA}

The PPWA was an international organisation which originated in Hawaii under the
auspices of the Pan-Pacific Union and became constituted as an independent body in
1930. By the 1950s, the international PPWA agenda, in broad terms, was to work for
peace through 'social reform, the end of racial prejudice, education towards international
understanding and cross-cultural exchange, and the friendly exchange of information
between peoples across cultures'.\textsuperscript{14} It was closely linked with UNESCO and supported

\textsuperscript{11} Paisley, ‘Glamour in the Pacific: Cultural Internationalism...’; p.81.
\textsuperscript{12} Guardian, 5 July 2013.
\textsuperscript{13} Melissa Matutina Williams, \textit{Panguru and the City: Kainga Tahi, Kainga Rua: An Urban Migration
\textsuperscript{14} Fiona Paisley, \textit{Glamour in the Pacific: Cultural Internationalism and Race Politics in the Women's Pan
its agenda of education to promote international understanding as well as 'human and social relations, health, welfare, race relations, minority rights and land tenure.\textsuperscript{15} In New Zealand the PPWA had local branches, a national executive and it sent delegates to international conferences. A number of groups affiliated to the PPWA, which gave them the opportunity to attend conferences under the PPWA umbrella.

In 1949 the PPWA, which had suspended international activities during the war years, reconvened in Honolulu. The conference theme, 'Pacific Women Unite for the United Nations', included the topic on the 'Status of Women and Education for International Understanding'. This reflected a shared ideology with UNESCO which viewed the exchange of knowledge and culture as the basis for global peace.\textsuperscript{16} A significant theme for discussion was that of 'race relations' and the related issues of prejudice and discrimination. This mirrored the focus of the United Nations on human rights. The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights had been signed on 10 December 1948 and an international political climate whereby civil rights abuses and racial segregation, particularly in the 'Jim Crow' States in America and apartheid South Africa, were becoming highly visible and commanding world attention. Australia was also coming under scrutiny. Aboriginal Rights organisations and trade unions began referring issues of mistreatment, discrimination and the lack of human rights for Aborigines to organisations abroad such as the World Federation of Trade Unions and the United Nations. In one complaint to the United Nations in 1950 they spoke of a 'flagrant breach of the basic principles of human rights' and called on the United Nations to study the mistreatment and human rights abuses of Aborigines and press the Federal government into conforming to the principles of the Declaration of Human Rights to which it was a signatory.\textsuperscript{17} New Zealand generally escaped international scrutiny or comment, either at the United Nations or in the media. Its reputation for racial equality and harmony stood

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{16} E.B. Lea, 'Pan-Pacific Women's Association', 17 April 1952, p.5, Pan-Pacific and South East Asia Women's Association New Zealand Branch, Records, 90-028, ATL. See also, Fiona Paisley, 'Glamour in the Pacific: Cultural Internationalism and Maori Politics...'; P.60. The PPWA and UNESCO forged strong links and the PPWA gained consultative status in the 1950s.

\textsuperscript{17} Bain Attwood, \textit{Rights for Aborigines}, Crows Nest (NSW): Allen & Unwin, 2003, pp. 133-134. See also, \textit{Courier Mail}, 16 Dec 1946. This article outlines the intentions of the West Australian Committee of Defense of Native Rights (and supporting organisations) to approach the United Nations and World Federation of Trade Unions following allegations of ill-treatment of Aborigines in the Northern Territory. It also sets out a list of Aboriginal rights which were being claimed.
almost unchallenged. Media reports abroad, mostly in Australia, regularly compared Maori and Aborigines and this cast New Zealand in an excellent light.  

Nevertheless a few reports were beginning to be broadcast internationally which suggested that New Zealand’s claim to inter-racial equality may have some flaws. The first indications came in 1948-1949 with the decision of the New Zealand Rugby Football Union (NZRFU) to exclude Maori from the All Black team to tour South Africa in 1949. This generated national debate and was also reported by the international media, especially in South East Asia and Australia. Although the majority of reports failed to make any link with racial discrimination in New Zealand, a few suggested that the problem lay in the attitudes towards Maori and even that racial discrimination was a feature. For example, the *Morning Bulletin* (Rockhampton) printed the views of the New Zealand Waterside Workers Union which claimed that the issue was one of racial discrimination. Sir Peter Buck (Te Rangi Hiroa) also aroused some controversy, which was picked up by the Australian media, when he called for ‘the abandonment of racial antagonism in New Zealand.’ Major General Howard Kippenberger, who had commanded the Maori Battalion at Monte Cassino, was reported widely at home and abroad for his fierce opposition to the exclusion of Maori and his statement that if it was good enough for Maori to fight and die on the battlefield, they were good enough to play rugby for New Zealand. He would not ‘acquiesce to any damned Afrikanders saying they cannot go…To hell with them’. However, his accompanying comment, which criticised race relations, was omitted from most (although not all) media reports, nationally and internationally: ‘we cheerfully boast that there is no native problem in New Zealand and no colour bar but we’re quite wrong. You do not see it down here (Christchurch) but you should go up North.’

Apart from the rugby issue, other reports and claims were beginning to appear internationally. In 1949 the High Commissioner for Australia reported back to Canberra that, ‘Generally European New Zealanders believe in equality so long as it does not affect them personally…[most]… accept the principle of equality… but on the other hand,

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21 *Press*, 2 Sept 1948; *Singapore Free Press*, 3 Sept 1948; *Indian Express* (Madras), 10 Sept 1948.
show no inclination to invite the Maori into their homes'.

Voices were raised, albeit sporadically, within United Nations bodies, which challenged the dominant view. Six months prior to the 1949 PPWA conference, the Soviet delegate (Mr Novikov) at an ECAFE session argued that Maori were discriminated against and he provided statistics to support his claim. Novikov, who objected to claims by the United States delegate that New Zealand was a fine example of a country with a high living standard, stated that the delegates should be told about the poor living standard of Maori. The New Zealand delegate, Brigadier Hunt, responded that 'racial equality was more respected in New Zealand than any other country...we are all New Zealanders, and we enjoy the same privileges and standard of living, and education'. In 1950 the World Federation of Trade Unions submitted a report to UNESCO which alleged that Maori suffered significant discrimination in employment and wages. A few years later the International Labour Organisation heavily criticised the poor standard of Maori housing. Finally, an Asian Study Conference in Lucknow, convened by the World Council of Churches, found 'growing racial and social tension' between Maori and Pakeha. The Permanent Representative for New Zealand to the United Nations, Leslie Munro, was annoyed that the report was printed in a public document and available for widespread readership. He considered lodging a complaint but in the event the issue was never pursued.

Thus, on the eve of the reconvening of the PPWA, racial discrimination was shaping up to be one of the central issues across the Western world, a fact which was not lost on the PPWA which had links with UNESCO and sent delegates to UN and other international forums. In preparation for the 1949 conference, delegates were asked to conduct research within their own countries on the measures taken to 'combat ignorance and prejudice'. In a report, following the conference, a pointed reference to the lack of racial prejudice at the conference indicates the concern felt over the issue and the need to reinforce the PPWA as an organisation founded on equality and respect for cultural diversity.

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23 Report by the High Commissioner for Australia in New Zealand (A.R. Cutler) to Department External Affairs, Canberra, 10 Feb 1949, A1838, 370/7, Part 1, NAA.
24 Sydney Morning Herald, 3 Dec 1948. ECAFE (Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East) was established by the UN in 1947 to encourage economic cooperation among its member states.
26 West Australian, 26 Jan 1950; Courier Mail, 7 Jan 1954.
27 Correspondence, L. K. Munro (Ambassador to the United Nations) to Secretary of External Affairs, 9 Jan 1953, MA1, Box 656, Record 36/1/21, Part 1, NA.
28 Ibid.
diversity. Ellen Lea (New Zealand, and International Secretary of the PPWA) noted, 'the women showed they could differ in a friendly way' and all felt 'that racial prejudice should be spread by delegates in their home countries'. Equality and respect for all peoples, regardless of race or class, were the cornerstones of the PPWA and were seen as the route to maintaining peace in the world.

There were no Maori representatives in the New Zealand delegation, and there appears to have been no indigenous delegates or observers from Australia, North America and the Pacific Islands, except Hawai‘i. Miraka Raharuhi (Mira) Petricevich (later Szaszy), who was a student at the University of Hawai‘i at the time, attended as an observer and made contact with the New Zealand delegation. Undoubtedly they cultivated this association eagerly. While the New Zealand PPWA was committed to racial equality and cultural diversity, this was not visible in the organisation as few Maori were involved. Mira Petricevich was especially acceptable: she was highly educated and articulate, had been a finalist in the 1947 Miss New Zealand contest, and she moved easily within Maori and Pakeha worlds. Therefore, not only did she validate New Zealand's good race relations reputation, she was visible proof that colonisation had been benign and successful.

With New Zealand selected to host the next international conference it became even more crucial to address the awkward situation of the lack of Maori representation in the PPWA. Immediately after the 1949 conference, the Department of Maori Affairs was approached by the PPWA about the inclusion of Maori women in the conference to be held in Christchurch in 1952, and asked for suggestions on suitable candidates. Tipi Tainui Ropiha (Under-secretary of Maori Affairs) was enthusiastic about Maori women becoming involved in international conferences, and he supported the aims of the PPWA. In a note to Charles Bennett he indicated that membership of the PPWA would be beneficial and 'desirable' in 'forging another link in our cooperation with the Pakeha policy'. Moreover, participation in international conferences would allow a

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30 E.B. Lea, 'Pan-Pacific Women's Association', 17 April 1952, p.5, Pan-Pacific and South East Asia Women's Association New Zealand Branch, Records, 90-028, ATL.
31 Support for decolonisation appears to have been with reference to the decolonisation of Asian and African nations.
32 Correspondence T. Ropiha (Under-secretary Maori Affairs) to Mary Seaton (International Programme Chairman), 22 Nov 1949, MA1, Box 368, 19/1/291, NA.
33 Tipi Ropiha became the Under-secretary for the Department of Maori Affairs in 1948 and held the position for nine years. He was the first Maori to hold the position.
view 'of the problems of other Polynesian peoples', an issue of growing importance, as
the immigration of an unskilled workforce of Pacific Island peoples to New Zealand
was under way.34 While Maori Affairs thought that Mira Petricevich and Dr Rina
Moore would be suitable Maori representatives, the decision was to be left to the
MWWL which was in the process of being constituted.35

Crucially, the PPWA made it clear to Tipi Ropiha that Maori delegate’s would not be
identified as a separate group representing Maori women, but would be part of the New
Zealand delegation representing all New Zealanders.36 In this the PPWA was following
international human rights standards which demanded equality, and the liberal position
which was seeing a corresponding shift across the western world towards demands for
racial equality. It was also the central plank of New Zealand’s ‘one people’ identity
which was premised on racial equality. To identify Maori as a separate entity, and allow
them a separate position within the international activities of the PPWA, signified
separatism. This went against the ideals of the PPWA for it challenged the ‘one people’
ideology and all that was encapsulated in the ideal of equality itself.

The nod to 'co-operation with the Pakeha' which Ropiha articulated was part of a
complex strategy by which Maori leaders sought to negotiate a relationship with the
state during a period of rapid Maori urbanisation and social change, and amidst Pakeha
imperatives of nation-building, progress and the 'one people' integration policy.37 'One
people' was essentially a one way policy and more assimilationist than integrative for it
prioritised Pakeha imperatives and concepts of nation into which Maori were expected
to fit. The Government expected Maori co-operation, especially in dealing with 'the
Maori problem', but this was to be dealt with within the framework of the policy of
integration. At the same time the Government devolved a limited autonomy to Maori

34 A note, dated 6 Dec 1949 written by Tipi Ropiha to Charles Bennett on the back of correspondence,
Mary Seaton to Tipi Ropiha, 1 Dec 1949, MA1, Box 368, 19/1/291, NA. Charles Bennett was the
Assistant Controller of Maori Welfare.
35 Ibid; Department of Maori Affairs Memo, T. Ropiha to Michael Jones, 9 Jan 1951, MA1, Box 368,
19/1/291, NA. Rina Moore was Tipi Ropiha's daughter and was the first Maori woman to qualify as a
medical doctor.
36 Correspondence, Mary Seaton (International Programme Chairman, Pan-Pacific Women's Association)
to T. Ropiha (Under-secretary, Department of Maori Affairs), 1 Dec 1949, MA1, Box 368, 19/1/291,
NA.
37 For an in-depth account of Maori/state relations during this period see, Aroha Harris, 'Dancing with
the state: Maori creative energy and policies of integration, 1945-1967', (Unpublished PhD
dissertation), University of Auckland, 2007.
leaders but retained a paternalistic hold over positions of power. Maori leaders were willing to contribute to the nation-building project. They wanted integration in terms of social and economic equality with Pakeha, and they wanted a place in the decision-making processes (particularly in relation to matters affecting their people) within the institutions and political structures upon which New Zealand rested. However they also wanted to stand apart in order to retain their cultural integrity and their separate identity as Maori. This was a growing imperative as Maori were beginning to move into urban areas. The task was to negotiate a path within state imperatives of integration, between tradition and modernity, and yet advance the aspirations of Maori and provide a network of Maori cultural and social institutions for the benefit and support of their people.

In the case of the MWWL, as later events will reveal, while they wanted to contribute to the PPWA as women, they also wanted to do so as Maori women. The PPWA had little difficulty with this at a domestic level: the MWWL was but another affiliated group amongst many representing their particular constituency within the organisation. The situation whereby Maori were working as a group alongside Pakeha was integrative. Moreover the PPWA had no problem with the MWWL as a separate Maori organisation and acknowledged, albeit in patronising terms, that it was to be commended for they knew what the problems were that Maori faced and 'they could do a very great deal for [their] people'.\(^{38}\) The PPWA also acknowledged that they had much to learn about Maori and they relied on the MWWL representatives to 'help us..., advise us...and guide us'.\(^{39}\) However at an international level the PPWA insisted that there be no separation between Maori and Pakeha. Rather, Maori delegates were to be at one with Pakeha in representing all the women of New Zealand. To be women together was integrative, but for the MMWL delegates to represent Maori women, was separatist and divisive. The tensions between being 'part of' and yet 'standing apart', and between modernity and maintaining cultural integrity and traditions, was a situation which Maori leaders had to negotiate throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The insistence by the PPWA that Maori delegates participate in international conferences as representatives of New Zealand women rather than Maori women thrust the MWWL into the nexus of such tensions and

\(^{38}\) Address, Miss A. Kane (Chairwoman, Dominion Branch of PPWA), in 'Report of First Dominion Conference MWWL, 1952', (p. 18), Maori Women's Welfare League: Records, MS-Papers-1396, Folder 001, ATL.

\(^{39}\) Address, Miss M. McLean (Secretary, PPWA), in 'Report of First Dominion Conference MWWL, 1952', (p.71), Maori Women's Welfare League: Records, MS-Papers-1396, Folder 001, ATL.
negotiations. The PPWA integrative stance was to generate a site for active intervention by Maori delegates from the newly formed MWWL. The League also wanted to 'cooperate with the Pakeha' and contribute to the internationalist agenda of the PPWA, but they wanted to do so as Maori women. 'A part yet 'apart' was the tension which underpinned the politics of race relations in New Zealand during the period under discussion and in relation to the PPWA this tension was to be played out in national and international sites.

The MWWL establishes a space in the PPWA: Separate and Supportive

At the inaugural conference of the MWWL there was discussion on affiliation to the New Zealand PPWA, and participation at the forthcoming international conference. Victoria Te Amohau Bennett, who was a current member of the New Zealand Dominion Executive, pushed strongly for maximum involvement. Bennett invoked the work of the PWWA as at one with the United Nations in the campaign 'to promote and strengthen the bonds of peace'. Moreover the PPWA had established influence within this prestigious organisation: 'We have got a wonderful body set up in the United Nations and that is the backbone of the Pan Pacific Association. We can all use it and must use it and that is our hope'. With the PPWA committed to equality for all people and world peace, Maori women could contribute to this cause and indeed, stated Bennett, it was their 'duty' to do so and they should take the opportunity 'with both hands and use it'. Participation at international conferences, meeting peoples from different cultures and forging friendships across borders was an important avenue towards maintaining world peace, and one in which Maori could participate. Moreover, Maori could both contribute to and gain from such conferences: 'We lay down our problems and they tell us theirs. The problems are the same in every country'.

Victoria Bennett, who was one of the few Maori in the PPWA, was an enthusiastic supporter and had an enduring association which stretched back to at least 1934. In that year she attended the international PPWA conference in Hawaii, and in the late 1930s she was reported as being 'appointed leader of a study group concentrating on Maori

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40 Victoria Bennett address, 'Inaugural Conference of the MWWL, 1951- Addresses to the Conference', Maori Women's Welfare League: Records, MS-Papers-1396, Folder 001, ATL.
41 Ibid.
culture' within the New Zealand PPWA. This was in preparation for the PPWA Conference which was to take place in New Zealand in 1940, but was cancelled upon the outbreak of World War II. Victoria Bennett was from the elite Bennett family and married to a brother of Frederick Bennett, Bishop of Aotearoa. She had been educated at Queen Victoria School in Auckland, an exclusive boarding school which aimed ‘to train girls of the Maori race in all domestic duties, so as to fit them to become good wives and mothers, and to be an influence for good’ in their communities. Another reason was to educate Maori girls who were expected to marry educated Maori who were coming out of the boarding schools, Te Aute College in Hawkes Bay and St Stephens School near Auckland. These young men were expected to take leadership roles in society and the education gained by Maori girls would fit them for duties as wives of future Maori leaders. Apirana Ngata thought that only good could come out of marriage alliances between educated Maori from the Maori boarding schools and the women would speed up the reform efforts of their husbands. Apart from the PPWA, Bennett had become heavily involved in the Young Women’s Christian Association and had taken on leadership positions. In 1929 she was reported as being on the national executive, she was recognised for her contribution to the organisation by the governor general in the early 1930s, and she was acting president in 1936. Thus Bennett had status and influence and both allowed her easy access to Pakeha and Maori worlds and she moved confidently through both.

In the event, the majority of MWWL delegates were in no rush to affiliate to a Pakeha organisation and they voted against the proposal. Their preference was to put their energies into learning to organise and run their new organisation and establish their own identity before becoming directly involved with an established Pakeha organisation. They took the same position with the National Council of Women which also coveted

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42 E.B. Lea, 'Pan-Pacific Women's Association', 17 April 1952, p5, Pan-Pacific and South East Asia Women's Association New Zealand Branch, Records, 90-028, ATL.
44 Lange, May the People Live...., p.115; ‘Queen Victoria School Jubilee’, Te Ao Hou, No.5, Spring 1953, p.58.
45 Lange, May the People Live...., p.115.
affiliation by the MWWL. However they agreed to support the PPWA and to fund Maori delegates to conferences beginning with the 1952 conference in Christchurch. The latter decision was significant as it removed the power of Government to control representation and make decisions about who was the most suitable to represent Maori in international forums. While the government could not prevent Maori from travelling abroad, by withholding monetary support for those considered inappropriate it effectively prevented participation.

This form of government control had occurred in 1937 when the PPWA sought to include Maori within their delegation to the PPWA conference in Vancouver. Frank Langstone (Acting Native Minister) was approached by the PPWA to assist with funding for Guide Rangi (Rangitiaria Dennan) to attend the conference as a Maori representative. The delegation to the 1934 conference in Hawaii had included two Maori delegates (Victoria Bennett and Jean Hammond) and had been a resounding success in presenting an example of inter-racial harmony to international delegates. In this respect, non-white people carried considerable currency and, as Paisley points out, were 'desired commodities'. No doubt the New Zealand PPWA was eager to have the vision of inter-racial harmony replicated in 1937. Te Puea Herangi had been the PPWA’s first choice for the Vancouver conference but she was unable to attend and had recommended that Guide Rangi take her place. However financial assistance was necessary. In her request for funding, J. Greville of the PPWA wrote:

Rangi is well educated, and has considerable mana among her own people. She is of good Maori stock with not a drop of pakeha blood. Next to Te Puea...I know of no one who could represent New Zealand so well...One of the subjects to be discussed is government in the various countries, and I think it is important that there should be a woman from New Zealand capable of stating the Government's aims, and a representative of the Maori race.

48 Correspondence, Frank Langstone (Acting Native Minister) to O. Campbell (Under-secretary Native Department), 17 May 1937, MA1, Box 368, 19/1/291, NA.
51 Correspondence, Frank Langstone (Acting Native Minister) to O. Campbell (Under-secretary Native Department), 17 May 1937, MA1, Box 368, 19/1/291, NA. This correspondence contains an excerpt from the request by Greville.
Owen Campbell (Under-secretary Native Department) thought Guide Rangi was unsuitable and 'not qualified to state the Government's aims in relation to the Government of New Zealand or the Maori race'. There were others 'equally (if not better) fitted' to represent New Zealand in international forums than Te Puea or Guide Rangi. \(^{52}\) Langstone also opposed funding Guide Rangi as it was 'questionable whether, if the Government were selecting a person to represent the Maori race at the proposed conference, that its choice would fall upon Guide Rangi as being best fitted to act in that capacity'. \(^{53}\) It is also clear that had Te Puea Herangi been able to attend, the Government would not have supported her involvement. Campbell wrote:

> Te Puea is a woman of ability, character and personality but I doubt her suitability to be the representative of the race capable of stating the New Zealand Government's aims in relation to the Maori Race in particular or New Zealand in general.\(^{54}\)

Therefore, the refusal to assist with funding ensured that there was no Maori representation at the PPWA conference in Vancouver. The reality was that most Maori, as with other indigenous peoples, suffered from economic hardship and rarely had any discretionary income to fund their participation in international events. This constraint, to a significant extent, continued to inform the participation by Maori in international forums and the level of transnational activism during the following decades.

Arguably it was because both women were too capable and qualified to present a Maori point of view and comment on Government policies that Langstone and Campbell considered them to be unsuitable. Te Puea Herangi, awarded a CBE in the 1937 King’s Birthday Honours List, was highly respected, politically astute and an influential Maori leader. Although she worked closely with some Pakeha politicians, this was on her terms and for the benefit of her people. She was also a strong advocate for Maori rights and an outspoken critic of Government when necessary. By the mid-1930s she had clashed with the Government many times, most famously by encouraging Waikato Maori not to enlist during the First World War, and by providing support for those arrested by mounting visible displays of passive resistance. She also vehemently opposed the Sim Commission recommendation on confiscated Waikato lands. \(^{55}\)

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\(^{52}\) Correspondence, O. Campbell (Under-secretary Native Department) to Frank Langstone (Acting Native Minister), 20 May 1937, MA1, Box 368, 19/1/291, NA.

\(^{53}\) Correspondence, Frank Langstone to Miss A. J. Greville, 21 May 1937, MA1, Box 368, 19/1/291, NA.

\(^{54}\) Correspondence, O. Campbell (Under-secretary Native Department), to Frank Langstone (Acting Native Minister), 20 May 1937, MA1, Box 368, 19/1/291, NA.

\(^{55}\) The Sim Commission recommended that 3,000 pounds be paid annually to the Waikato as
than that, she worked tirelessly at grass-roots level in the Waikato implementing schemes and strategies to help alleviate the grinding poverty her people faced. Nor had she any liking for the ‘one people’ ideology. In response to a comment made by Eric Ramsden (journalist) about the inevitability of Maori and Pakeha becoming ‘one people’, Te Puea remarked: “But I am truly thankful that I shall not live to see that day!”

Guide Rangi, a tourist guide at Whakarewarewa, was also acutely aware of the widespread deprivation, poverty, ill-health and high infant mortality which affected many Maori. In 1937 she was instrumental in the formation of the Women's Health League which sought to provide a wide range of health initiatives for Maori and she lobbied forcefully for better housing. Likely, the two women were too knowledgeable, confident and outspoken to be considered as appropriate representatives in international forums.

The decision by the MWWL to fund delegates ensured that the participation of MWWL delegates in international forums was no longer dependant on the generosity of the government, and it was free from any interference or conditions that it may seek to impose. Thus the MWWL decision took back the right of Maori to define and make their own decision on who was best suited to represent Maori, and their financial support ensured that Maori representatives had a voice in the PPWA. The delegates to the first conference were funded by the MWWL and topped up with a Maori Affairs grant, and following conferences were funded from a levy placed on every member.

Most importantly it gave Maori a place within an organisation which was being rapidly transformed from one which consisted overwhelmingly of wealthy leisured western women, into an organisation which was more representative of the Pacific region, and which included indigenous peoples as well as delegates from poorer countries. This was largely due to UNESCO who facilitated the shift by providing funds to delegates from undeveloped countries to attend conferences. Within a cold war context, the

compensation for land confiscated during the 1860s.

56 Sydney Morning Herald, 3 Feb 1934.
58 In fact, from the late 1950s the MWWL did struggle to raise funds and were once again forced to apply for supplementary financial assistance from the government.
59 Paisley, 'Glamour in the Pacific: Cultural Internationalism and Maori Politics...', pp.60-61); Paisley, Glamour in the Pacific: Cultural Internationalism... Ch.2 is a detailed account of decolonisation and
PPWA benefited from an era of aversion to communism. Non-governmental and inter-governmental organisations proliferated, and economic assistance, education and exchange programmes (such as the Colombo Plan exchanges) were being poured into undeveloped countries lest their poor living standards facilitate unrest and the subsequent growth and spread of communism. UNESCO viewed education and the forging of transnational friendships as crucial for the development of poorer nations and thus the avenue for world peace. The PPWA adopted a similar philosophy. At the 1952 international conference the delegate from Australia (Mrs Kiek) stated that 'the challenge of communism was not to suppress its propaganda but to remove its causes', such as low wages and the lack of education. Moreover, it was important to foster friendships between nations and to provide practical assistance and educational opportunities for people in poorer nations. Social unrest would thus be alleviated and communism would become irrelevant.\textsuperscript{60}

The funds provided by UNESCO had a major impact on the PPWA. Whereas 70 delegates from 10 countries had attended the 1949 conference, 112 delegates from 19 countries were present at the conference in Christchurch in 1952. The increases continued throughout the 1950s and the 1958 conference in Tokyo recorded 175 delegates from 22 countries.\textsuperscript{61} Increasing numbers of indigenous women from the Pacific Islands and from countries which had decolonised after the war began appearing at PPWA conferences. For the first time indigenous women from the Pacific Islands, (including New Caledonia, Samoa, Tonga, Fiji, and Papua), along with women from countries which had gained their independence from colonialism such as Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Indonesia and the Philippines, took advantage of UNESCO funding and participated in international conferences. Maori were not included in the UNESCO funding initiative which targeted under-developed countries and took no cognisance of the economic hardships of indigenous peoples within the developed settler nations. Thus it was into a transformed international PPWA that the MWWL funded their delegates.

\textsuperscript{60} Press, 25 Jan 1952.

Christchurch Conference, 1952: Creating an Indigenous Space within the ‘One People’ Paradigm

In 1952 MWWL representatives attended the international PPWA conference at Christchurch as delegates, observers, hosts and as part of a cultural entourage. A powhiri for the delegates was given by Whetu Tirikatene, Eruera Tirikatene (MP Southern Maori), and Ngeungeu Te Irirangi Zister, who was Te Puea's representative at the conference, welcomed the delegates on behalf of Maori women. The cultural component and high profile of Maori was visible confirmation to international delegates of New Zealand's reputation for racial harmony and equality, and with Mira Petricevich being affirmed an 'excellent speaker' and voted 'glamour girl' of the conference, the image imparted was that the colonisation process in New Zealand had been a success. This was further consolidated within the social spaces outside conference when international delegates were entertained at a variety of functions which often included a Maori cultural display, entertainment and hospitality by local Maori groups.

However, during the conference sessions Maori delegates introduced a different perspective. There, they used the spaces available to introduce, at times, an oppositional narrative which spoke of the negative impact of colonisation and the effects in contemporary terms. Mrs Emery, a Maori Welfare Officer, explained:

After the first contact between Maori and European there had followed a period of transition for 100 years and transition was often a painful process. At the present time 10 times more Maoris were dying of tuberculosis than Europeans in New Zealand, and inter-race relations were nowhere near perfect. There was a danger of the native language dying out.

Moreover, she made it clear that it was Maori (especially the MWWL), and not Pakeha who had taken up the task of attending to the many social, health and welfare difficulties which Maori faced. They had no alternative, for 'they must meet the problems before them or perish'. This suggested a lack of commitment on the part of the government, but also reflected the 'self-help' component based on the expectation of the government that Maori should solve the 'Maori problem'. Emery's address was

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64 See for example reports in Press, 25 Jan 1952.
65 Press, 22 Jan 1952.
featured in the local *Press* newspaper, and although there was no further comment on the issues she raised, a Maori perspective of the situation of Maori was transmitted into the community.

During the round-table discussions the Maori delegates centred Maori concerns, and in some instances they challenged the positions held by western delegates. In these, the lack of understanding by western delegates and Eurocentric notions of superiority were made obvious. The Maori delegates pointed out that while their views may have merit and validity for Europeans, they should not be considered for Maori and may even be harmful. In other words, they indicated that Western delegates made pronouncements and sought to impose their beliefs on people about which they knew nothing about. As an example, during a round table discussion on 'social unrest' a Maori participant opposed the reform of the liquor act and the new legislation, which gave Maori women the right to enter hotels and drink alongside their menfolk. She argued that this was wrong and a 'grave cause of social unrest among her people', and harmful 'repercussions had followed in Maori life'. Members of the MWWL were actively involved in welfare and social work amongst their people and especially within a family situation, and they had seen the damaging effects of alcohol on families and communities.

Many western delegates failed to understand the situation. All they could see was gender inequality which must be addressed. All should be treated equally. They argued that it was discriminatory to distinguish between Maori men and women and this was 'a step backward preventing the adult Maori from making free choice. Such a process would retard the growing-up process, bringing a basic loss in the development of personality'. While a focus of the PPWA was on universal social reform, including gender equality, this example demonstrates a disparity between the aspirations and beliefs of the Western PPWA delegates and those of Maori women who led vastly different lives and experiences on the ground.

To her credit, Mrs Whitelaw (National Council of Churches, New Zealand), who presented a report on the discussion, suggested that PPWA members should contact the

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MWWL in order to gain their perspectives and discuss the issue.\textsuperscript{68} While she indicated that their task was to 'co-operate with them and give them support in their undertakings', she also observed that 'no nation rises higher than the standards of its women'. With observations that Maori were in the midst of a 'growing up process' (which may be 'retarded' if free choice related to alcohol availability was denied), the sub-text was to 'educate' Maori women towards acceptance of Western ideals. With this would come progress and integration. The place for Maori to diverge or maintain separateness was not an option, and it was 'time we thought of ourselves not as Maori and Pakeha but in terms of New Zealanders'.\textsuperscript{69}

In terms of negotiating a space within a white women's organisation, Maori were clearly treated in subordinate terms and the meaning of 'one people' shifted according to Pakeha priorities. Although Maori attended and contributed to the round-table discussions, there is a sense that their usefulness was principally as cultural ambassadors and to confirm that the New Zealand PPWA was committed to the ideals of racial equality and unity. There is no doubt that the liberal Pakeha women did believe in equality and they were keen to include Maori as equals. However, it was a patronising form of equality which merely meant 'to include as delegates' and not in terms of decision-making or equal opportunity. When the choice was between Maori and Pakeha, the latter took precedence.

This was demonstrated during the most important part of the conference, when delegates presented reports and placed their concerns and problems before delegates, the press, observers and other interested parties. It was an important space for indigenous delegates, most of whom had never had the opportunity to speak before an international body, and whose people had been spoken for in the past by western delegates. It was during this session that they gained a space to place their issues and concerns before the PPWA, observers and the public, and have them recognised. There is no knowing what the MWWL delegates intended to say in their presentation as their participation was heavily restricted. All other delegates, including indigenous people, presented full reports whereas Maori were marginal to the proceedings. Ruiha Sage reported:

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid.
The coloured races...our cousins from overseas... presented their respective problems and outlined the actions taken. The Maori delegates on the other hand received little consideration as their time for speaking was severely curtailed. Mrs Ross M.P. used her influence ...and the delegates from here were allowed 5 minutes in which to deliver a prepared half hour speech.  

Without intervention from Hilda Ross, Maori would not have been given any speaking-time. Why Maori were marginalised is unknown. It could be interpreted that the PPWA leadership did not consider their presentation necessary. Perhaps they were running out of time. Whatever the reason, the Maori presentation was considered dispensable. While the PPWA professed equality and a decolonising agenda, had there been a commitment to these ideals, the speaking-time would have been shared between the Maori and Pakeha delegates. Colonialism was played out at the conference, a feature that will be revisited later. For now, it is enough to note that it was acceptable to have Maori present the cultural components, to act as hostesses and to take part in the discussions of conference. However, in terms of political space, Maori were expendable and subordinate to Pakeha decision-making, preferences and priorities.  

Despite the restricted nature of their official presentation, the conference was important in a number of ways which the MWWL Executive Committee later identified. Its real value lay in the experience gained by their delegates as well as the contacts and affiliations made, all of which would benefit the MWWL in the future. Also of value was the recognition of the position of other indigenous peoples. For the Maori delegates the round table discussions, meeting with other delegates and the official speeches all contributed to a new awareness of the struggles and problems of others. Delegates from countries still under colonial regimes, tutelage, or had recently gained independence, identified the problems they faced. The Indonesian delegate, for example, spoke of the impact of colonisation in relation to education and the policies which had been 'deliberately created by the Dutch’ prior to independence who considered an educated indigenous people would be a threat to their safety. They had  

70 Mrs Sage, 'Report on Pan-Pacific Conference', 3 Feb 1952, in Hamilton City Tribal Committee Annual Report, MA1, Box 368, 19/1/291, NA.  
72 The status of women, social unrest, interdependence of nations and education were the round table topics for discussion. See, West Australian, 15 Feb 1952.
'deliberately aimed to keep the level of education for native people as low as possible', and there was now a 'big battle ahead to fill the gap in education'.

No doubt this situation was readily identifiable to Maori delegates and observers: colonisation had been similarly devastating for many Maori, resulting in a gulf in educational achievement between Maori and Pakeha and the creation of a large Maori menial labour force. Reducing the educational divide was a major platform of the MWWL and so too was recovery of the Maori language. Historically the colonial assimilative agenda had suppressed the Maori language in schools, and the recent urbanisation of Maori into predominantly Pakeha communities was leading to a loss of fluency across generations, especially children.

Thus the conference, from the perspective of Maori, was successful in terms of the contacts made and the understandings gained of other indigenous peoples from the round-table sessions. Despite the disappointment and annoyance about being side-lined from the final presentation, an important outcome was that Maori had gained a voice at an international conference and they made a space for their concerns and perspectives to be placed on the table. From the vantage point of sixty years later, and with the knowledge of the rhetoric, terminology and discourse of the new wave of Maori activists which emerged in the late 1960s, the statements and voice of the MWWL delegates seems tame by comparison. However in the context of the early 1950s they were strong and significant, not least as it was possibly the first time (or at least it was a rare occurrence), that Maori had presented an oppositional narrative on race relations, colonisation, and the negative realities of Maori life to an international conference. Mrs Emery's comments indicate the outspoken and forceful side of the MWWL, as did the manner in which they challenged western delegates who made pronouncements about what was best for Maori which were at odds with the realities of Maori life. In this respect, the discourse and the positions that the MWWL delegates took were radical in the context of the 1950s.

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73 *Sydney Morning Herald*, 18 Jan 1952.

74 In 1960 the Hunn Report stated that there was a 'statistical blackout' of Maori at higher levels of education. For example whereas 3.8% of Pakeha reached the 7th form only 0.5% of Maori did so. See Walker, *Struggle Without End...*, p.203; Hunn, J.K., *Report on the Department of Maori Affairs with Statistical Supplement*, Wellington, 1961.

75 Maori Language Commission, 'History', www.tetaurawhiri.govt.nz/english/issues_e/hist/index.shtml accessed 2 Nov 2012. A national survey in the early 1970s showed that approximately 18% of Maori were fluent speakers and most were elderly.
Indigenous Space: Resistance, Identification and Support

Significantly the indigenous delegates aligned and identified with each other, and an indigenous space was generated at the conference. This can be interpreted in many ways: as a place of resistance, for support and refuge, and simply because there was identification between indigenous peoples. There is no doubt that there was an affinity between the indigenous peoples. For Ruhia Sage it was the contact with other indigenous peoples which was 'the most noticeable feature, from a Maori viewpoint [and] the cohesive atmosphere prevalent among the coloured races...our cousins from overseas'.76 Alice Wedega, an indigenous Papuan delegate and the first Papuan woman to attend a conference abroad, recalls that she felt 'very lonely the first day of the conference, though I felt happy with the Fijians and Samoans and Maoris'.77

Paisley argues that the PPWA was a space of 'radical potential' where 'black and white women from the colonies' could simply meet on equal terms thus overturning the discrimination to which they were exposed in their home countries.78 It is true that the conference was devoid of overt racial discrimination and delegates mixed freely in social spaces in an atmosphere of friendship. Nevertheless, the 1952 conference also contained remnants of the colonial project (albeit unintentionally) with suggestions of superiority/inferiority, coloniser/colonised, notions of ‘place’, and power structures which were overwhelmingly in the hands of western women. For example, Alice Wedega was cast by a New Zealand delegate, Mary Seaton, as one step away from savagery having come from the jungles of Papua and who could even 'track people through the jungle'.79 Moreover Wedega, who was nearly 50 years of age, recalls being severely reprimanded and spoken to 'very strongly' by an official during the first day if the conference about an insignificant issue.80 The events surrounding Wedega were laden with colonial discourse and stereotypes of inferiority and natives living in a child-like state. Wedega was reprimanded as if she was a naughty child, even though she was a middle-aged woman with authority and status in her homeland. The reference to Maori 'growing up', during the round table discussion on alcohol, also reflected the same stereotype. Despite the PPWA commitment to the fundamental equality of

76 Mrs Sage, 'Report on Pan-Pacific Conference', 3 Feb 1952, in Hamilton City Tribal Committee Annual Report, MA1, Box 368, 19/1/291, NA.
78 Paisley, Glamour in the Pacific: Cultural Internationalism..., p.81.
79 Ibid, p.80.
80 Wedega, Listen, My Country, pp.77-78.
mankind and 'all one people' of the world, stereotypes and Eurocentric notions of superiority and the ‘place’ of indigenous people remained within the psyche of some western PPWA members.

The coming together of indigenous people, besides being underpinned by kinship and affinity, also represented a space where indigenous people were not laden with feelings of shyness, uneasiness and inadequacy, all of which were a legacy of colonialism. This was especially so in relation to contact with western delegates, and indigenous peoples came together for support and refuge. In her biography, Alice Wedega spoke of how she finally 'gained the courage' to speak, and in a report on the conference she explained that she showed slides before her presentation to give her 'confidence to speak as it was difficult for her to say much in English'.81 Her address indicated feelings of inadequacy:

I am not so well educated as most of the women here, but I have come to learn and to pass on that learning to my people, I want you to give me all you can in knowledge so that I can go back and help my people.82

The reluctance of many indigenous peoples to speak out within a forum dominated by non-indigenous peoples was a common feature, not only at the conference but also in a societal context. While the MWWL spoke out publicly and forcefully when necessary, and they did so at the Christchurch conference, many Maori experienced feelings of inadequacy and shyness when engaging with Pakeha at meetings or in Pakeha dominated institutions and organisations. Mary Penfold (secretary of the MWWL in 1960) explained it as an outcome of colonisation and noted that it was a 'failing of the modern Maori which must be overcome if we are to play our part fully in the future'.83 Clorinda Lucas, an indigenous Hawaiian delegate, similarly observed that 'we have an innate shyness...an uncertainty. We are not sure...except we are sure everybody else knows more than we do or can do things better'.84

Rather than the conference being a space of radical potential, arguably for indigenous peoples it was also a site for radical or active intervention. Western notions of

81 Ibid, p.78; Christchurch Press, 22 Jan 1952.
82 Paisley, Glamour in the Pacific: Cultural Internationalism., p.80.
83 Meri Penfold. 'Address to the Young Maori Leaders' Conference (1959)', Te Ao Hou, No.30 (March 1960). pp. 61-63. (p.63).
superiority and control were subverted and indigenous authority and priorities were centred in indigenous spaces, and at conference sessions. This was clearly demonstrated in the discussion on alcohol previously mentioned. The experience of Maori was clearly articulated and this rejected western knowledge and notions of progress as being advantageous to Maori. Mrs Emery's address was also significant. In this she stressed that colonisation had not been benign, but rather had been a 'painful process' and its legacy was manifested in the negative social indicators of Maori in comparison to Pakeha, and the dilution of cultural integrity.

Indigenous peoples came together and formed a collective identity linked together by indigeneity and the experience of colonisation. Linda Tuhiwai Smith notes that 'the need to tell our stories remains the powerful imperative of a powerful form of resistance'. In the context of the 1952 conference, resistance lay in the margins. It was a place where indigenous peoples could exchange experiences and tell their own stories free from the constraints and feelings of inadequacy or shyness which accompanied participation within a western-dominated organisation, in which 'they received little consideration'. It is not known what was discussed in these informal and social settings, but most likely the colonising experience and its legacy would have featured. Comments made by New Zealand delegate Mary Seaton indicate that the meetings between indigenous peoples from the Pacific islands were an important feature and space for discussion of their respective experiences:

This meeting together also meant much to the delegates of the South Pacific Islands. When the first shyness wore off it was noticed that they had much to say to each other, and from various hints gathered, it was the set up of their own societies that was discussed.

While this experience linked them together, so too did historical ties of ancestry: they were, 'cousins from overseas', from Hawaii, Samoa, Papua and New Caledonia, to be reconnected and integrated into a wider family of indigenous peoples.

87 For indigenous delegates see Sydney Morning Herald, 10 Jan 1952. It is worth noting that Maori had a long history of contact with Pacific peoples from at least the 1860s. Beginning in the early 20th century, many groups travelled to New Zealand to participate in events and cultural displays. More recently, from the mid-1930s Te Puea fostered strong relationships within the Pacific and particularly with the royal families from the Cook Islands, Tonga and Samoa. Moreover in the 1950s the movement
It is important however to qualify the above and make clear that indigenous peoples did not spend all their time clustered together and completely separate from white delegates. There was considerable interaction and inclusiveness, at round-table discussions, in the social spaces of conference, and during organised social events. Nevertheless, even some social events were loaded with Eurocentric notions of a ‘place’ for indigenous peoples. An item in the *Press* gave an account of a luncheon party for leaders or representatives of women's organisations both in New Zealand and abroad. Of those identified as attending there was only one non-white delegate, Senator Cooray from Ceylon. There was no representative from the Maori Women's Welfare League.

**MWWL and PPWA 1952-54: Affiliation and Advocating for Maori**

The MWWL affiliated to the PPWA in 1952 but for reasons which did not necessarily coincide with those of the PPWA. The latter had long sought to include Maori and have a 'representative' organisation and 'the association could not possibly be complete without the Maori women'. If the PPWA was to integrate with Maori they needed to have a better understanding of the Maori world. Moreover they had a dearth of Maori in their organisation and the presence of Maori at international conferences would demonstrate the PPWA values of racial equality and inclusiveness. The PPWA executive apparently knew very little about Maori and this was probably true of most of their membership. At the meeting it was apparent that the executive members had scant knowledge. Mary McLean (PPWA secretary), who sought to convince the MWWL to affiliate, revealed a lack of knowledge:

> If you will allow me to say one word...I heard years ago...Mrs Babbington speak at a conference in Dunedin. We were talking about establishing community centres, and Mrs Babbington...got up and made one of the most remarkable statements I have ever listened to. She told us the Maori had a community sense, the community spirit, and they lived in a community centre until we came and put doors on our living houses, and doors you had to knock at before you went in, and all sorts of things. She made me feel a community centre [was] something a very great deal different.

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89 *Press*, 22 Jan 1952.
91 Miss M. McLean, address, to MWWL Conference, 1952, Addresses to the Conference', Maori Women's Welfare League: Records, MS-Papers-1396, Folder 001, ATL.
McLean, like most Pakeha, had no Maori words for the 'community centre' and she clearly had never been on marae. Instead she claimed identification with Maori based on a relationship with Maori stretching back to the arrival of her grandmother in New Zealand when 'the very first person to welcome her was the Chief from Rapaki. We have been friends ever since'. Which of course was undoubtedly true. Nevertheless McLean pointed to the necessity of having Maori in the PPWA for the knowledge they had and the embracing of the 'one people' concept:

In this Pan-Pacific work you people will have to help us; you will have to show us how to be one Pacific community, and I know I can rely on you during the coming years, to advise us and to guide us, and to help us.\(^92\)

Ellen Lea also stressed the need to 'learn from the Maori women', a position possibly sharpened by the experiences of the Christchurch conference when it was apparent that the aspirations and aims of the white delegates failed to accord with some of the needs and priorities of Maori.\(^93\) At an international level it is clear, as Paisley notes, that they envisaged Maori as being the bridge towards the forging of a Pan-Pacific community and facilitating their intended work in Pacific communities.\(^94\) In 1954 Ellen Lea felt it important to learn about the MWWL and what they were doing for their people in order to help further her international aspirations:

'It ...would be of great use to her in her international work, because she could pass on news of what was being done in New Zealand to women of other countries, in a way in which they could raise the living standards of their countries.'\(^95\)

The MWWL wanted to co-operate with the PPWA but they wanted to do so principally to work for the interests of Maori. Participation in local PPWA meetings was considered important for it provided the opportunity to draw attention to the problems which Maori faced, rectify any misconceptions which Pakeha may hold, and to ensure 'that the Maori point of view may be brought forward'.\(^96\) Also important was that affiliation

\(^92\) Ibid.
\(^93\) Address by Miss Lea, 'Report, 3\(^{rd}\) Annual Conference MWWL, 1954', Maori Women's Welfare League: Further records, 88-131-19/08, ATL.
\(^96\) 'Minutes of the 6\(^{th}\) Annual Conference MWWL, 1958', (Remit 54, p.13), Maori Women's Welfare League: Further records, 88-131-19/08, ATL.
gained the MWWL access to international organisations and thus the means of drawing international attention to the difficulties which Maori faced.

Our League should continue to take a deep and active interest therein and in their programme, especially that part concerning study groups is one which is of great interest to us. The Maori groups make definite studies of some Maori theme and the results of such studies are forwarded to the Pan-Pacific Association for its information and transmission to the Associations Headquarters overseas.97

By 1954 the MWWL had submitted a case study to UNESCO although what the study entailed is unknown. However Te Ao Hou noted, the case studies were of importance for Maori for they generally focused on the problems and difficulties which groups or individuals faced 'in their living' and how these were solved.98 The international arm of the PPWA gathered and collated information from the studies conducted by member countries, and the information was useful for their representatives who regularly attended United Nations conferences. This was particularly so in relation to UNESCO which had forged a close relationship with the PPWA and the latter had gained consultative status in the 1950s.99

Despite the benefits of affiliation, and the obvious currency which Maori carried, participation by MWWL representatives at local and national meetings waned. Maori had sought to negotiate a place within the PPWA for the Maori voice to be put forward, but there was a gulf between the experiences and priorities of Maori and those of the PPWA women:

Sad to say our representation...over the past two years was rather poor. The fault of course is ours, but our delegates indicate that much of what is discussed at these meetings are so wide of the mark as far as our interests are concerned that they can hardly scrape up enough interest to stay the distance. This does not indicate a fault on the matters discussed ...as they are usually of national interest to women, but a difference perhaps in need – ours are so immediate and theirs seem so remote and far removed from us.100

97 Report on Kindred Organisations in 'Report, 2nd Conference MWWL, 1953', (p.36), Maori Women's Welfare League: Records, MS-Papers-1396, Folder 002, ATL.
99 There are classes of consultative status which define the relationship between an NGO and UNESCO and the rights an NGO is accorded. This includes the right to speak at designated meetings, have documents translated, have input into various issues, and attend meetings.
100 MWWL Dominion Executive Report, 1956, (p.6), Simpson, Miria’, 1922-2002: Papers, (MS-Group-
While the New Zealand PPWA may have failed to meet the expectations of Maori in a local context, it was arguably the opportunity to internationalise their cause and connect with other peoples across the Pacific, including indigenous peoples, which provided a strong motivation to remain affiliated to the PPWA. In 1954 the League discussed sending representatives to the PPWA conference in Manila. Barring a few reservations including a view that the League should focus on 'cleaning up their own “little Maori backyard and New Zealand's backyards”', the MWWL voted to fund delegates to attend the 1955 conference in Manila.¹⁰¹ Ellen Lea, pleased to have a 'fully representative delegation', happily informed the MWWL that Maori would have equal status with Pakeha at the forthcoming conference in Manila:

One point I would like to make is that although we want to have Maori women and Pakeha, we will not be going as two separate races; we will go as women of New Zealand and represent all the women of New Zealand.¹⁰²

Thus the parameters were laid down: MWWL delegates would not be going to the conference representing Maori women but would be contained within a space which ascribed them a position in a homogenised group, 'women of New Zealand'. There, they and Pakeha delegates would demonstrate inter-racial harmony to the world.

Manila Conference 1955: Subverting the ‘One People’ Paradigm

Figure 1.1 Pan-Pacific Women’s Association Conference, Manila, 1955 ¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ ‘Report, 3rd Annual Conference MWWL, April 1954’, (p.43), Maori Women’s Welfare League: Records, MS-Papers-1396, Folder 002, ATL.
¹⁰² Address, Miss E. Lea, address,’Third Annual Conference of the MWWL, 1954’, Maori Women’s Welfare League: Records, MS-Papers-1396, Folder 002, ATL.
Mira Petricevich and Victoria Bennett represented the MWWL at the conference in Manila which took as its theme 'Social and Economic Interdependency'. The effect of the financial backing from UNESCO was clear with the greatest number of delegates and indigenous delegates to date - 129 delegates from 20 countries. Mrs Phineas, who was the delegate from Western Samoa (which was under New Zealand mandate), also joined the 13 members of the New Zealand delegation. Fanny Taylor, in an address following the conference, commented that the Maori delegates 'went as New Zealanders...we were a happy team...we were working as women of New Zealand'.

For the Maori delegates this was not entirely true. The conference became a site whereby identity politics were played out and Maori delegates challenged the imposition of 'one people' by the PPWA, and claimed their right to represent their people. At issue was the submergence of Maori identity into 'one people', and more specifically into 'the women of New Zealand', and the failure of the PPWA hierarchy to allow any form of representation by Maori.

At the welcoming ceremony the leader of the New Zealand delegation responded on behalf of all the women of New Zealand and thus spoke on behalf of the Maori people as well. Mira Petricevich felt that Maori had been diminished and marginalised for neither she nor Victoria Bennett were given the opportunity to greet their hosts on behalf of the Maori women of New Zealand. Petricevich claimed that they should have had that opportunity as only they 'could convey the thoughts and feelings of our people towards the people of the Phillipines'. This was based on their identification with the Philippine people through a common experience of colonisation and the participation and heavy losses sustained during the two World Wars. Maori had also 'suffered throughout their history' and could therefore 'well understand the sufferings of people such as the Filippinos'.

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103 'International Conference, Pan-Pacific and South East Asia Women's Association Conference, Manila', 1955, PAColl-1187-04, ATL.
Petricevich claimed the right of the MWWL to self-determination and to represent the Maori women of New Zealand. Having been side-lined from the welcoming ceremony, and feeling strongly that Maori had not been represented in the appropriate manner, nor had sufficient respect had been paid to their hosts, Mira Petricevich sought to communicate the greetings and feelings of her people. In private and 'in the stolen time I had, I tried to convey to the Filipinos the feeling that way down in the South Pacific lived a people who, having undergone great losses during both World Wars, had the deepest sympathy for them'. This included a greeting that she had written for the people of the Philippines:

I come where a new sky is over my head,
Where a new land is under my feet
Here on this land I stand, O spirit of the earth
The stranger offers her heart to thee.107

In response a welcome poem was given by the Philippine people and thus a relationship was formed based on respect, empathy and identification. More importantly, Maori had intervened, subverted the 'one people' model, and claimed a space for Maori, albeit unofficially, unnoticed by the Pakeha delegation (or indeed any other delegation), and on the margins.

Identity politics continued as Maori were again side-lined and denied a place at the official table which included the leaders of all the delegations. In the normal course of events this would in all probability not have been an immediate issue as Maori were not members of the PPWA hierarchy. In other words, it would have been an issue to be contested after conference. It became a problem when the Samoan delegate was given a place at the official table. If the Samoan delegate, who was part of the New Zealand delegation, was granted a place in the PPWA hierarchy and able to represent her people, Bennett reasoned that 'we should have been put on the same footing as Samoa'.108

The written record related to the events which transpired and discussion of the issue is elusive. However, it is clear from Petricevich's report of the Manila conference and the ensuing discussion at the annual conference of the MWWL, that there had been some

107 Ibid.
ill-feeling and even suggestions of racial discrimination. During the MWWL conference, Fanny Taylor framed it as, 'I know something happened that was unfortunate', but she was unable to articulate such a sensitive issue, and was unable to use the terminology, ‘racial discrimination’. The idea that the PPWA had acted in a discriminatory manner would be especially upsetting and abhorrent. At Manila the Maori delegates, supported by the Samoan delegate, complained about what amounted to discriminatory treatment, and argued that they had a right to separate representation - to represent the Maori women of New Zealand. The PPWA hierarchy refused to move and the matter rested. As will be seen later in the chapter, it was revisited during the 1955 MWWL annual conference and used by Maori to press for separate representation and identification as Maori women in the PPWA.

Mira Petricevich asserted her Maori identity at the important opening luncheon for the conference. In a sea of delegates, dressed in formal attire, Petricevich sat at the head of the New Zealand table wearing traditional Maori clothing and adornments. It is impossible to know whether other delegates wore traditional dress. Possibly some did, although the photographs surveyed have not shown this to be the case. Nevertheless, as the photograph indicates, Petricevich made a clear statement about Maori identity. The New Zealand organisation embraced cultural diversity as it signalled their commitment to interracial equality and harmony, and as such Petricevich’s actions would have been welcomed. The issue is, whether Petricevich was also making a political statement for cultural equality.

109 Address, Miss Taylor, 'Report, 4th Annual Conference MWWL, 1955', (p.70), Maori Women's Welfare League: Records, MS-Papers-1396, Folder 002, ATL.
What her intentions were is a matter of conjecture. In the context of the identity politics which were being played out it is tempting to consider that Petricevich was making an overtly political statement. There is no doubt that she was annoyed and upset that the MWWL delegates had not been given a place within the delegation to represent their people. To be regarded as representatives of the ‘women of New Zealand’ did not accord with the MWWL aim of self-determination and their central principle that they were ‘Maori women of New Zealand’ and not ‘women of New Zealand’. Petricevich was also annoyed that the Maori delegates had played no part in the welcoming ceremony and they had no place at the official table. However, it could be reading too much into the event to ascribe deliberate subversion. It may have been as simple as showing respect for an important occasion, or it have been tied up with pride in Maori identity and the desire to portray this to the international delegates.

Nevertheless, there is no denying that by her action, Petricevich made a deliberate statement to the international delegates and the New Zealand contingent. Whether her action was deliberately political with dissenting undertones or not, Petricevich subverted the 'all women of New Zealand' constraint placed on the MWWL delegates.

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111 ‘Opening Lunch’. Pan-Pacific and South East Asia Women’s Association Conference, Manila, 1955, PAColl-1187-04, ATL. Note, the PPWA changed its name to Pan-Pacific and South East Asia Women’s Association during this conference.
and she commanded a space to be recognised as a Maori woman of New Zealand with a distinctive indigenous identity. She announced that while she was a part of the PPWA delegation she stood apart as a representative of her people. In effect she demonstrated the self-determination which lay at the heart of the MWWL.

Both Mira Petricevich and Victoria Bennett were designated special speakers and presented papers at conference. While their papers were on the MWWL and Maori handicrafts respectively, they linked it with the violence of colonisation. Thus, whereas some Pakeha delegates promoted New Zealand's good race relations model and spoke 'of the many things that had been done for Maori' and how Maori and Pakeha lived together side by side in harmony, Petricevich spoke of the work and necessity of the MWWL with reference to colonisation.\footnote{112 Address, Mira Petricevich, 'Report, 4th Annual Conference MWWL, 1955', (p.68), Maori Women's Welfare League: Records, MS-Papers-1396, Folder 002, ATL; Paisley, 'Glamour in the Pacific: Cultural Internationalism and Maori Politics...', p.71.}

In order to understand the real purpose of the [MWWL] ...it is necessary to know the present-day setting of the Maori race within New Zealand - its stage of progress in modern civilization...The bewilderment and disillusionment created by the clash both in culture and in aims resulted in the breaking up of Maori society and with it the mind and character of the people. An overwhelming sense of hopelessness and fatalistic resignation set in and the race literally began to die.\footnote{113 Paisley, 'Glamour in the Pacific: Cultural Internationalism and Maori Politics...', p.71.}

In contemporary terms she centred Maori women as instrumental in providing support for Maori communities, both isolated and urban, and working to solve the many problems Maori were facing. She deliberately chose the MWWL as a topic as it was an organisation based on self-help and therefore an example for 'similarly situated groups of women to follow'. Moreover, the MWWL came into existence because of the 'very fundamental needs of our women, the most important of which was to identify themselves as self-determining individuals'.\footnote{114 Address, Mira Petricevich, 'Report, 4th Annual Conference MWWL, 1955', (p.68), Maori Women's Welfare League: Records, MS-Papers-1396, Folder 002, ATL.}

Bennett similarly drew on the devastating effect of colonisation and spoke of the 'clash of cultures' which resulted in a decrease in population and 'a spirit of fatalism' that had spread through Maori communities.\footnote{115 Paisley, 'Glamour in the Pacific: Cultural Internationalism and Maori Politics...', p.71.} The regeneration of Maori had been largely due to the work of the
Young Maori Party in practical and cultural terms, and the MWWL sought to continue this work to maintain cultural integrity and reinforce Maori identity.

Thus while the Pakeha delegates had spoken of the various things that had been done for Maori, Bennett and Petricevich marginalised this notion and placed Maori women as the central force in alleviating and dealing with the negative social outcomes for Maori which had been wrought by colonisation. That the League had been formed to combat and work towards relieving the severe difficulties which Maori faced; that it sought to restore cultural integrity and hence promote Maori identity; and that a fundamental aim was for self-determination, all suggested that Maori and Pakeha relations were not nearly as equal as the Pakeha delegates chose to portray. Moreover, while the PPWA spoke of living 'side by side' with Maori and the assistance that had been given to Maori, and while not disputing that their concern was genuine, the suggestion by the Maori delegates was that their efforts were superficial and inadequate. The sub-text was that had racial equality and harmony been a reality in New Zealand, the MWWL would never have come into existence.

Nevertheless, many delegates at conference viewed the position of Maori in society as superior to either their experiences or that of other indigenous delegates. So did the Maori delegates. For Mira Petricevich one of the main values of conference lay in generating a new consciousness of the conditions and standards of living in poorer countries, the struggle for equality by women, and in general the difficulties which people faced in order to merely survive. New Zealand was viewed as ‘particularly outstanding [and] an example worth emulating. Our standards of living, education and especially our social security system came in for much envy’. This, in turn led to the ‘realisation of our own great good fortune in being blessed with so much’. Therefore, while the Maori delegates had presented a narrative which exposed injustices, low socio-economic status, the fragmentation of traditional Maori society and loss of cultural forms, when compared to other indigenous peoples they held a position which was far in advance of others. It was a position which was worthy of emulation for its standard of living and the opportunities which were available to its indigenous population. New Zealand’s good reputation was constructed by reference to the way

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coloured or indigenous populations were treated in other countries, and this was confirmed in Manila.

As in Christchurch, an indigenous community was brought together by a shared indigenous identity, and experience. However there was more opportunity to forge new contacts and friendships with other indigenous people as well as those from countries which had recently gained independence. The numbers who attended as delegates or observers, or who were part of the audience, was large. Over 600 Philippine women were in the audience and listened to the conference presentations and discussions.117 The Manila conference was the first to be held in South East Asia and as a result of the large number of delegates from the region as well as the obvious interest from the general population in Manila, the PPWA changed its name to the Pan-Pacific and South East Asia Women's Association (PPSEAWA).118

The indigenous and non-European delegates spent considerable time together outside the formal conference setting where they socialised, made contacts, formed friendships, and reconnected with old friends. European women did the same, and there was also much mixing and socialising across indigenous and European lines. As Victoria Bennett recalled, they discussed issues of concern: 'They talked with other women, comparing notes and studies. That helped to solve many problems – we learned their methods and gave them our methods'.119 As indigenous peoples coming together the affinity between different peoples – some who knew little about each other - was cemented by common experiences and 'race'. The Philippine people, for example, accepted the Maori delegates 'wholeheartedly' and commented that Maori were 'no different from us'. Moreover the President commented that his people and Maori 'belonged to the same race' and 'they were [all] a branch of the Polynesians'.120

That same affinity was also experienced by the Maori delegates and included recognition of a shared experience of colonisation. Mira Petricevich recalled travelling to Manila where 'awaited a people whose history has been one of subjugation for over

118 For formatting purposes, PPWA will continue to be used.
119 Address, Victoria Bennett, 'Report, 4th Annual Conference MWWL, 1955', (p.69), Maori Women's Welfare League: Records, MS-Papers-1396, Folder 002, ATL.
120 Ibid, pp. 68-69.
500 years... The Maori people have suffered throughout their history and would therefore well understand the sufferings of people such as the Filipinos'. Most importantly, it was the social contacts made and the 'friendships, sympathy and understanding fostered among the delegates were to my mind, the worthwhile things about such conferences'. And it was the contact with indigenous peoples – people with similar experiences and a shared indigenous identity, and the friendship and understanding – which made an impression on the Maori delegates.

It was blighted by the manner in which the Maori delegates were side-lined during the welcoming ceremony and denied a place at the official table of delegation leaders. Clearly the issue was discussed within indigenous circles, and the Samoan delegate intervened in the issue and supported the call by Maori delegates for self-representation on behalf of the indigenous people of New Zealand. Thus while the conference provided a space for the development of an indigenous community it also became an expanded space for active intervention. With a failure to gain satisfaction from the New Zealand PPWA hierarchy, the Maori delegates transferred the issue back to New Zealand and the Fourth Annual Conference of the MWWL.

4th Annual Conference MWWL: Demanding a separate self-determining space for Maori in the PPWA

In his opening address to conference, Ernest Corbett (Minister of Maori Affairs) congratulated Victoria Bennett and Mira Petricevich who 'full of their equality in citizenship' had represented New Zealand. Corbett's comments reflected his strong commitment to 'one people'. The PPWA delegates and observers attending the conference were also satisfied with the Maori delegates who '...went as New Zealanders... working as women of New Zealand'. Both Corbett and the PPWA were to be presented with a new narrative by Bennett and Petricevich which reflected the

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121 Address, Mira Petricevich, 'Report, 4th Annual Conference MWWL, 1955', (pp.64, 67), Maori Women's Welfare League: Records, MS-Papers-1396, Folder 002, ATL.
125 Address, Miss Taylor, 'Report, 4th Annual Conference MWWL, 1955', (p.16), Maori Women's Welfare League: Records, MS-Papers-1396, Folder 002, ATL.
long-held aspiration of Maori for cultural equality, and a measure of self-determination within a bi-cultural framework.

The addresses of both women pushed for separate Maori representation within the national PPWA organisation thus giving them independent representation at international conferences. In effect they called for the New Zealand PPWA to abandon their 'one people' model, which for Maori merely meant 'inclusion' as women of New Zealand, and adopt a bi-cultural organisation which included separate representation and power-sharing at an international level. Bennett stressed that “Maori should have their own identity and a seat at the official table' and therefore a place in the decision-making hierarchy of the PPWA. The organisation 'had a chance to be magnanimous and bring in everybody - the individual must be recognised'.

Hinting at discrimination against Maori, but also adding weight to her argument, she noted that Samoa had been given an official place at the New Zealand official table at Manila and therefore Maori should be placed 'on the same footing as Samoa'. If the PPWA was unable to grant this request then she would no longer be a part of the organisation. This was highly significant in the light of Bennett’s long association with the New Zealand organisation and the status she brought to the PPWA.

Petricevich spoke of the decision made by the MWWL to send delegates abroad as a 'momentous occasion in the history of our people; momentous because it marked a forward step in our thinking, in the broadening of our horizons and the awakening to a consciousness of the need to participate in world concerns'. In order to press for separate representation she drew on specific events at Manila to highlight the cultural gulf between Pakeha and Maori, and that the Pakeha way of doing things did not accord with the aspirations, cultural values and traditions of Maori. The welcoming ceremony in Manila, for example, during which 'the greetings of our people' were given by the PPSEAWA hierarchy, failed to convey or reflect 'the thoughts and feelings of our people' and thus induced in the Maori delegates a sense of shame and embarrassment. They

126 Address, Victoria Bennett, 'Report, 4th Annual Conference MWWL, 1955', (p.69), Maori Women's Welfare League: Records, MS-Papers-1396, Folder 002, ATL.
128 Ibid, p.69.
130 Ibid, p.67.
had been deeply hurt that they had been side-lined from the official table, from the welcoming ceremony, and that no recognition or concessions had been made to their position as Maori women of New Zealand. Petricevich spoke of the lack of goodwill, understanding or sympathy, all of which were contrary to what she had expected:

I did sincerely believe that every delegate proceeding to this conference carried within her ...peace and goodwill and a sincere hope for greater understanding and sympathy among the peoples of the world.....Unfortunately in some ways the conference was not entirely successful and many of these hopes and desires, feelings of friendship...nurtured for so long were unrealised...It would seem that technical skills are comparatively easy to come by, but in handling human beings one can only conclude that until would-be leaders acquire as much understanding of the feelings of the human heart and mind as the master surgeons have in their knowledge of the physical structure of these human organs, then alone can understanding and justice be brought about and truth prevail.131

This was directed specifically at the Pakeha PPWA delegates, as Petricevich spoke positively about other delegates: 'the friendships, sympathy and understanding fostered among the delegates which were to my mind, the worthwhile things about such conferences. 132 Moreover, she noted there had been some ill-feeling between the Maori delegates and PPWA hierarchy.

Therefore, Petricevich argued that Maori women had to have the right to represent themselves. The MWWL had come into existence because of the fundamental needs of Maori women to 'identify themselves as self-determining individuals, with the right to choose what was best for themselves'.133 Moreover, an indication of the desire of Maori women for a separate identity as a people was reflected in the considerable support which Maori women gave to the MWWL. In relation to the PPWA, 'somehow, somewhere they must be permitted to identify themselves' as Maori women. Petricevich then challenged the MWWL to 'consider whether they are prepared to sink their identity as a people within the larger group of New Zealanders'.134

131 Ibid, pp.64-65.
134 Ibid, p.68.
She also challenged the PPWA to pay more than lip-service to their 'one people' imperative and the unity they advocated. Although they had spoken at the conference of the many 'things that had been done for Maori' and how New Zealanders all lived together in racial harmony, it was necessary for the PPWA to give 'tangible evidence' and demonstrate that this was the case. She suggested that as the aim of the PPWA was to strengthen bonds of peace in the Pacific they would do well to start at home: 'If the PPWA could help to overcome the discrimination which exists in the different sections of the community then they will have gone a long way in putting their objective in place'. As education was the most important area for the advancement of Maori, and although this raised the question about the 'uselessness of being educated and then being discriminated against', this was perhaps an area in which the PPWA could intervene.

It was a hard-hitting address and not surprisingly the PPSEAWA representatives responded with hurt and bewilderment. Fanny Taylor who had previously spoken of a harmonious happy delegation participating as New Zealanders, now felt 'decidedly upset by the implications of some of the things that have been said'. Clearly what she was principally upset about was the suggestion that racial discrimination had been practised by the PPWA against Maori and she referred many times to the issue. Racial equality was a fundamental ideology of the PPWA and to be accused of practising racial discrimination was shameful and upsetting. She implored the MWWL members not to believe that any form of discrimination had been practised at Manila: 'Please take my word for it that we love having you in and I would hate to think anyone went away from this meeting feeling that discrimination had been made.

At the same time she also refused to entertain the idea of separate representation and she defended the stance of the PPWA at Manila. The women of New Zealand were affiliated with the New Zealand Pan Pacific organisation and within this all were 'women of New Zealand' and there was no room for separate representation. In Manila, 'We went as a New Zealand delegation....we cannot have two separate people in a delegation like that. We could not all have a say. We had to be represented by one

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135 Ibid.
136 Address, Miss Taylor, ‘Report 4th Annual Conference MWW, April 1955, p 70, Maori Women's Welfare League: Records, MS-Papers-1396, Folder 001, ATL.
137 Ibid, p.70.
Moreover, with regard to the position of the Maori delegates at Manila, there had been ‘a misunderstanding' about the whole situation, and moreover the Maori delegates 'had more fuss made of them...than most of us'.

In other words, Fanny Taylor and the PPWA entirely missed the point of cultural equality and the bi-cultural model which the MWWL delegates were demanding. From their perspective the inclusion of Maori as representatives of the ‘women of New Zealand’ signified equality between Maori and Pakeha. There was therefore no room for Maori to be a part of the organisation and yet stand apart by representing themselves as Maori women. To stand apart signified a lack of unity and separateness, and went against the ‘one-people’ ideology (and indeed it subverted the very notion of equality) which was central to New Zealand's national identity. The idea that ‘one people’ was inherently a form of inequality, in that it denied Maori cultural equality and a measure of self-determination, was not considered or even mentioned.

At the 5th Annual Conference of the MWWL in 1956, Whina Cooper (President) again referred to the issue of separate representation by League delegates in the PPWA. The MWWL, she stated, existed because of the needs of Maori women for self-determination and it was also part of the Pan-Pacific Association and therefore had a standing in the world that no other Maori organisation had ever had. Bearing these two things in mind, 'should we not try to establish our real independence, linking ourselves more closely with the women's organisations as an autonomous body among our Pakeha sisters'? The following year, at the 6th MWWL Conference, the Waikato/Ngatiporou branch put forward a remit that 'an expression of our appreciation' be sent to the PPWA 'for granting what we have striven for so many years - to gain our identification as Maori'. The New Zealand organisation had finally acceded to bi-cultural representation at international conferences which allowed Maori delegates a space as representatives of the Maori women of New Zealand.

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138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
Canberra 1961: Creating a Bicultural Space

At the PPWA Conference in Canberra (1961), the New Zealand delegation included six MWWL delegates who represented the Maori women of New Zealand. The welcoming address by Senator Robertson (president of PPWA Australia) was responded to by the leaders of the delegations of each country present. Amy Kane and Miria Logan each replied to the welcome on behalf of New Zealand. Logan spoke in te reo Maori and English and filled the space with a Maori identity through use of tikanga and te reo. She represented New Zealand Maori women and the separate place Maori now had within the PPWA delegation, which was, at least for now, a bi-cultural institution.

On behalf of the Maori women of New Zealand and the Maoris of the New Zealand delegation, we greet you this day with peace and love in our hearts and are grateful for this opportunity of being able to do so. We feel too that New Zealand has a special contribution to make to this conference in that she has proved that two races can live together in peace and harmony. It is certainly something that we have had to strive for and it can be made perfect if we have the mind to. Mutual respect for one another will always bring its own reward'.

The bi-cultural space was extended during the 'International Night' of entertainment when the evening was opened by the New Zealand contingent. Maori sang *Hoki Hoki Tonu Mai* which they had adopted as their official PPWA song, and they performed poi, an action song and haka. Thus the cultural identity of Maori was imprinted onto the spaces of conference and affirmed the PPSEAWA as a bi-cultural organisation which acknowledged equality and respected cultural diversity.

In many ways, and in comparison to other indigenous people, Maori were seen as an indigenous people who had succeeded in society. The cultural representations gave visible recognition of New Zealand's reputation for inter-racial harmony and the round-table discussions provided a more substantial indication. During these sessions, when delegates laid their difficulties and problems on the table, the standard of living in New Zealand and access to various institutions which were available to all citizens was 'the


143 The song was originally a lament for Maori killed in World War One, but became song of joy that others had returned safe and could take their place in creating the new generation. See 'New Zealand Folk Song, http://www.folksong.org.nz/ho-kihoki/index.html accessed 22 Nov 2014.
envy of all'. Possibly it was the good position of Maori which induced Malcolm Adiseshiah (Assistant Director of UNESCO), who was present at conference, to specifically request the presence of a Maori representative at a seminar that he held following the conference. Whetu Tirikatene attended as the Maori representative. Although the record of the seminar has not been located, the point is that the status of Maori as an indigenous people who had achieved success, and who were in a position of equality, was increased.

Whetu Tirikatene played her role in promoting this perception. A strong and confident speaker and with a wealth of political activity gained from assisting her father, Sir Eruera Tirikatene (MP, Southern Maori), acting as his representative, and being involved in recent protests against the All Black tour to South Africa which excluded Maori players, Whetu commanded authority and respect. She recalled that her presentation to conference used the example of Maori and 'was intended to show how a people group, although a minority, could make an impact on government policies, and why an indigenous group ought to claim the right to participate in the law-making process which had the possibility of affecting them over several generations'. In brief, her message was, 'Get in and participate. It's your inheritance and your right to do so. Take it and improve life for you and especially for the following generations'.

In Canberra the shyness and timidity apparent in the earlier conferences had largely disappeared, and indigenous delegates participated with 'quiet but powerful effect'. Whetu recalled that there was no question of non-indigenous delegates speaking on behalf of Polynesians or representing their situation in any manner: 'The Polynesians spoke for themselves' and the Pakeha delegates 'most certainly did not speak for Maori'. Moreover the Polynesian delegates were not intimidated in any way and each made their case with 'dignity, authority and power and something I would describe as caring'.

Professor Jim Davidson, who observed the conference, remarked that the Maori and

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145 Ibid. Adiseshiah was, at that time, seeking to implement educational innovations throughout the Pacific and Asia.
146 Between 1958 -1960 Whetu had been involved in the 'No Maori No Tour' protest against the exclusion of Maori from the All Black rugby team to tour South Africa.
147 Email interview with Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan, 21 July 2010.
148 This paragraph and the following are based on an email interview with Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan, 21 July 2010.
Pacific Island delegates made their cases 'very effectively without grandstanding, screeching, posturing or confrontation and with organised brevity'. Whetu noted that Davidson 'had been used to moving among Pacific island male leaders'.

As in previous conferences there was a particular friendship and affinity between Maori and indigenous peoples of the Pacific: 'Lovely, caring women...Lily Malietoa was the leader of the Samoan delegation who articulated the concerns of her women. Then there was Ofa OtaOta from Tonga – an older more serious woman who expressed her concerns about her women. And younger thoughtful women from the Cook islands...'. The point to recognise is that there were increasing points of contact between Maori and Pasifika peoples and the Pacific was criss-crossed by social networks, historical ties of kinship and educational and employment opportunities. For example Pacific Island students had long been sent to the church boarding schools such as St Stephens and Wesley College and the state school, Northland College. When Benjamin Pittman attended Northland College from the early 1960s, he recalled that there were students from Tonga, Western Samoa and the Cook Islands with the majority coming from the latter. Previous pupils had also come from Niue and Tokelau. Strong bonds were formed between Maori and the Pasifika pupils and the fact that the language of the Cook Islands was very close to the Maori, language 'was another common point we had'. In employment, more migrant workers were being brought in to fill chronic work shortages on the industrial production lines and in the service sector. Moreover some Pacific Islands delegates maintained contact with Maori outside the PPSEAWA organisation. Lily Malietoa for example, spent much time in New Zealand, gaining Red Cross qualifications and also visiting family including her son who worked for the Department of External Affairs. At the same time she renewed associations with Maori she had met previously through the PPWA.

While there was an obvious affinity between the Polynesian delegates the conference was inclusive and harmony between delegates was a feature. Whetu Titikatene-Sullivan later recalled the friendliness between indigenous and non-indigenous delegates and the 'caring' and 'support' which existed between Maori and Pakeha in the New Zealand delegation. Pakeha were 'just as spontaneous in their praise' for her address as were the

149 Email interview with Benjamin Pittman, 17 Nov 2014.
150 Age, 9 Jan 1961.
indigenous leaders. Miria Logan commented that 'the social contacts and friendships made there I am sure will be remembered for a long time by Europeans, Asians and Polynesians alike. The friendship, sympathy and understanding fostered among the delegates are to my mind the worthwhile things about such conferences'.

Conclusion: A Site for Active Intervention, Creating Indigenous Space

The principle reason for the involvement of the MWWL in the PPWA was to ensure that that the Maori point of view was ‘carried forward’. Involvement also brought access to an international community of women during the 1950s. Although Maori delegates participated in international conferences as part of the PPWA delegation, they never saw themselves as part of an organisation which represented the ‘women of New Zealand’. To do so would submerge their identity into ‘one people’ and also remove Maori autonomy. They were leaders in a pan-national Maori organisation and were empowered by Maori communities throughout New Zealand to articulate the needs, difficulties and concerns of Maori. The MWWL delegates carried that status, authority and position as members of a self-determining organisation into international conferences.

This chapter has argued that the relationship between the MWWL and the PPWA became a site for active and at times radical intervention. When necessary Maori delegates challenged and intervened in the discourse which spoke of benign colonisation and racial equality, and thus they challenged and subverted the ‘one people’ paradigm which informed New Zealand’s good race relations reputation. At international conferences they created a space to present an oppositional narrative of colonisation in historical terms, and they articulated the current needs and difficulties of Maori who suffered disproportionately in socio-economic terms. Eurocentric assumptions of superiority inflected the conferences, and the agency and authority Maori carried was reflected in their rejection of the assumption that western notions of progress were to be accepted unquestioningly as progressive and necessary for Maori.

The MWWL sought to cooperate with the New Zealand PPWA and it also sought to maintain their organisation as a self-determining Maori women’s organisation with a

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151 Email interview with Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan, 21 July 2010.
separate cultural identity. Cooperation with the PPWA was desired, but acceptance and participation in the PPWA was not to be gained at the expense of the loss of cultural identity and self-determination. The PPWA was committed to racial equality and it promoted cultural diversity, but it made no room for cultural equality. The clash between the 'one people' ideology of the PPWA and the desire of the MWWL to maintain their identity as Maori women of New Zealand was played out internationally and nationally. Maori demanded a separate place within the organisation at international conferences in order to represent Maori women rather than the ‘women of New Zealand’. This chapter has demonstrated how Maori challenged the PPWA decision in Manila and created spaces to represent Maori during the proceedings and in the ‘stolen times’. The issue was re-ignited back in New Zealand. By the end of the decade they had gained their right to representation as Maori women, and thus they gained a space of cultural equality within the PPWA, and in a bicultural delegation. It was also argued that indigenous spaces were created which served a variety of functions. They were places of refuge and support and, in part, can be seen as a form of resistance. Despite being committed to racial equality, the western-dominated leadership carried within it remnants of colonialism including power-structures, attitudes, and notions of indigenous ‘place’. Moreover, many indigenous peoples carried with them a legacy of colonisation expressed in shyness, and feelings of inadequacy. They were also places where indigenous peoples identified with each other, made new connections, learned about each other and found commonalities. Of the many comments made by MWWL delegates of the value of conferences, it came down to 'people'. While the PPWA conferences were a site for active intervention when required, it was also a place of vibrancy, excitement and friendship. It was a place of meeting, learning about and socialising with people from all countries; of linking and learning about indigenous peoples of which little was known; and especially it was a place for connecting and reconnecting with our 'cousins from overseas'.

During the early 1950s criticism on race relations in New Zealand was rarely voiced internationally. As the following chapter will demonstrate, most New Zealanders, including Maori were keen to preserve New Zealand’s international reputation. In this respect the actions of the MWWL in presenting an oppositional race relations narrative to an international audience; in rejecting western notions of ‘progress’; and by calling
the PPWA to account and demanding a separate self-determining space within the organisation, were radical actions in the context of the 1950s.
Chapter Two:

New Zealand and the ‘Wind of Change’

Opening up Race Relations:
Domestic Discussion and International Scrutiny

Between 1959 and 1961 three significant events took place which levered open New Zealand’s race relations reputation to national discussion and international scrutiny. The Bennett incident highlighted racism from a commonplace and everyday perspective; publications on race relations by an American academic, David Ausubel, criticised race relations from within academia; and the 1960 rugby tour to South Africa, which excluded Maori from the national team, highlighted racism within New Zealand’s national sport of rugby. At the same time the government published the Hunn Report which aimed at removing the barriers to economic and social equality and sought to integrate Maori into mainstream New Zealand.

Globally, liberation had become a central ideology as people demanded freedom from oppression, and called for civil rights and equality. As New Zealanders were in the midst of a nationwide protest for racial equality, the civil rights movement was reinvigorated when four black students sat down at a segregated Woolworths lunch counter in Greensboro and asked to be served. Two days later, in South Africa, British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan made his famous ‘wind of change’ speech which called for decolonisation across the continent of Africa. New Zealand was not immune to international events and ideologies and this chapter positions the events which took place within a global ‘wind of change’.

Using the twin themes of the thesis, the creation of space and New Zealand’s race relations reputation, this chapter argues that the three events cumulatively levered open race relations in New Zealand to national discussion which challenged New Zealand’s ‘One People’ paradigm and shifted race relations to a central position in New Zealand. The events were pivotal in the development of Maori activism and this was reflected in a new or renewed political consciousness which was expressed by increasing
dissatisfaction and unrest, and a new outspokenness and forcefulness by many Maori. This was given further impetus by the integration proposals in the Hunn Report which for many Maori suggested assimilation rather than integration, and the destruction of Maori language and culture. The events explained in this chapter led directly into the formation of Maori activist organisations in the late 1960s.

Internationally, the opposite happened. New Zealand was opened up to international scrutiny and despite some weakening of New Zealand’s reputation, the 1960 rugby tour protests played a major role in re-confirming the dominant race relations narrative. The integration proposals in the Hunn Report were also greeted with enthusiasm, especially in Canada and Australia as indigenous peoples, governments and a range of people involved in Aboriginal affairs were looking at ways of integrating indigenous people into mainstream society. Thus, whereas the events led to increasing politicisation and the eventual formation of radical activist groups, another route led to the entrance of indigenous people into New Zealand, who were drawn in by its reputation for racial equality and the integrative measures of the Hunn Report.

Prior to the Bennett incident, racial discrimination was rarely acknowledged and most Pakeha New Zealanders were apparently unaware that it existed. Most were shrouded in two powerful and enduring myths which defined New Zealand’s identity. The 'one people' paradigm provided a vision of homogeneity and was premised on an ideology of egalitarianism which held that all citizens were equal: all had the same opportunities and access to the same institutions within society. Racial equality suggested racial harmony. That New Zealanders enjoyed the best race relations in the world was widely shared by Maori and Pakeha. Internationally it was also believed and international commentators and media regularly reinforced the view by contrasting the position and status of Maori with that of indigenous peoples in other countries, especially Australia. Thus New Zealanders generally accepted that they had the finest race relations in the world and they resented any suggestions to the contrary.

In comparison to other countries, race relations were good. There was not the hard racial segregation of apartheid in South Africa, or the segregation, lynching’s and hatred which was taking place in the America, and nor was there the same brutal social and economic discrimination and racial oppression to which Aborigines in Australia were
subject. However there was racial discrimination which was damaging, humiliating and oppressive. Arguably, a feature of racism in New Zealand was that it had slipped into the social fabric of society and had become normalised. Even though some citizens may have felt instinctively that a discriminatory action was not right, they were co-opted into perpetuating its existence. Thus, segregation in picture theatres might have been unnoticed, or at best seen as unfair, but it was a generations old practice and was ‘normal’.\textsuperscript{1} It also explains why many Pakeha claimed to be unaware of racial discrimination even though signs stating ‘No Maoris’ were often displayed outside hairdressers and boarding-houses.

The first section examines the Bennett incident, Ausubel’s publications and the 1960 rugby tour protest as the levers which generated a space for national discussion and international scrutiny of race relations. It shows how the three events challenged the assumption of racial equality, as they did abroad. It is argued however, that the rugby tour protest was one for ‘one people’ and thus reinforced New Zealand’s reputation for racial equality and harmony abroad, whilst politicising many Maori at home.

The second section examines the Hunn Report, and the reaction by Maori to this document, which added another layer of dissatisfaction and political awareness. By the mid-1960s, I argue, race relations had become centralised, reflected by the formation of anti-racist organisations, and a public focus on race relations which shifted Maori leaders into a central position as race relations were discussed and debated. At the same time the government had become sensitive to claims of racial discrimination and sought to reassert New Zealand’s good reputation abroad.

\textbf{The ‘Wind of Change’ and a Watching World}

On 3 February 1960 Harold MacMillan, Prime Minister of Britain, addressed the Parliament of South Africa and spoke of the inevitability of decolonisation across the continent of Africa.

\textsuperscript{1} An interviewee described segregation in the picture theatre in Piopio during the 1950s. She recalled how she felt that it was ‘unfair’ that her school friend had to sit in the ‘Maori section’. It ‘became a game’ to try and smuggle her friend into the Pakeha section, ‘but of course we were always caught and she was sent back to the Maori seats’. However, beyond thinking that it was ‘unfair’, she did not think too much about it as ‘it was just the way things were in those days’.

Interview with E. Voyce, 11 Nov 2011.
The wind of change is blowing through this continent and whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact, and our national policies must take account of it.²

It was a watershed moment in the struggle for Black Nationalism, as MacMillan signalled Britain's intention to grant political independence to its African colonies, and he indicated that colonialism must come to an end. MacMillan made it clear that South Africa was included in the 'wind of change' and the policy of apartheid would no longer be tolerated.

Liberation ideology spread and people across the globe demanded freedom from oppression, and the right to self-determination, civil rights, equality, and many other freedoms throughout the 1960s decade. The winds bringing change were seemingly everywhere. They were 'blowing across Araby' where a revolution overthrew the monarchy in Yemen, and in the Vatican which implemented new measures to promote racial equality and Christian unity.³ They were 'rattling the gates' that had long imprisoned 'strong and gifted Russian people', and were blowing through the Communist Movement with debates on polycentrism and the Maoist claim to leadership.⁴ They were 'blowing in America...for civil rights and an end to bigotry and race prejudice', and President J. F. Kennedy informed students in Berlin that 'the winds of change are blowing across the iron curtain as well as over the rest of the world'.⁵ In short, the winds of change came to be attributed to many forms of change, but especially in relation to issues of liberation, human rights, racial discrimination and inequality. It epitomised the sense of the 1960s but it also became the most hackneyed expression of the decade.

At the same time the phrase, 'the whole world’s watching', slipped into popular usage. The idea had been there for some years but was articulated and popularised at the March on Washington, 28 August 1963, when Bob Dylan and Joan Baez performed Dylan's newly penned song, When the Ship Comes In. This contained the lyrics, 'the whole

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³ Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 7 Nov 1962; Lewiston Morning Tribune, 8 June 1963; Eugene Register Guard, 27 Sept 1964.
⁵ Observer-reporter, 2 Nov 1967; Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, 26 June 1963.
wide world is watchin’. The song was about social change. It was coming, it was unstoppable, and a new and more just society was in the making. The 'whole wide world is watchin', referred to a new world of people who rejected racial discrimination and injustice, were watching those who perpetuated it and would hold them to account. In particular, from Dylan's perspective, the eyes of the world were on racist America. Later in the decade the phrase became the iconic 'shout of shame' for leftist and radical groups involved in the anti-Vietnam war and civil rights movements, who were engaged in the politics of embarrassment.

This chapter locates New Zealand in the global ‘wind of change’ and a watching world. As MacMillan was speaking to the South African parliament of decolonisation, New Zealand was in the midst of a lengthy nationwide protest against racial discrimination. Maori were to be excluded from the forthcoming national rugby team to tour South Africa in deference to South Africa’s policy of apartheid. Two weeks after MacMillan's speech the main protest group located the issue in the 'wind of change': a 'fresh wind...blowing across the maraes of Maoridom'. At the same time the government was setting in motion its ‘Winds of Change’ which was to integrate Maori as quickly as possible into mainstream New Zealand.

In the light of New Zealand's international reputation for racial equality and harmony, the world was also watching New Zealand closely and the three main events involving racial discrimination gave cause for reconsideration of New Zealand’s reputation. In Canada and Australia, governments and a range of people involved in Aboriginal or Native Affairs were also watching New Zealand in terms of its new integration proposals articulated in the Hunn report. Both Australia and Canada were in the midst of seeking ways of dealing with their indigenous people 'problem'. In this respect 'New Deals' were regularly spoken of or implemented. Maori were also acutely aware that race relations were being scrutinised as Matiu Te Hau indicated:

> It could no longer be claimed that race relations was a temporary, isolated or local phenomenon because in terms of communication and international contact alone, the world had shrunk to such a degree that peoples of all nations lived under a global spotlight...New Zealand found itself in this global spotlight because it was the country's proud boast that the relationship between Maori and Pakeha was a pattern for the world

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6 'Submissions of CABTA deputation', p.3, O'Regan Family - Diaries and Papers, 89-097-5, ATL.
to follow...the country tried to take steps by all means at its disposal to make this proud boast a reality.7

Underpinning the chapter is the acute awareness of all New Zealanders, whether Maori, Pakeha or the government, that the world was watching. New Zealand's international race relations reputation was such that most New Zealanders sought to have it maintained or repaired.

For many Maori, it was a period of politicisation and at the least it generated a new awareness of race relations in New Zealand. It was not so much about overt acts of racial discrimination and issues of subordination and injustice – these were known and the experienced reality of many Maori. It was more of an opening up, a confidence and a sense that they could speak out publicly and protest. It was also a period that brought an understanding of the unequal power structure, and that no matter how much they cooperated with the Government, when Maori aspirations and Pakeha priorities collided, the latter took precedence. The events created a number of politicised Maori who would become leaders and play a significant role in the future development of Maori activism, nationally and internationally. At the same time the Government began implementing their 'wind of change' for Maoridom. The Hunn Report sought to speed up the integration process and the imperative of making 'one people'. This added another layer of discontent as many Maori perceived that integration was merely assimilation under a new name.

Although the Hunn Report and the three main events have been subject to considerable academic attention, this chapter deals with them differently in bringing in an international dimension. In this, the focus is on changing perceptions internationally about race relations in New Zealand and whether they were altered or sustained. Similarly in New Zealand I examine how the events opened up New Zealand and led to an increased awareness of racial discrimination (and by extension race relations) and also led to a rise in political consciousness of Maori.

7 Bay of Plenty Beacon, 10 April 1963. Comments made by Matiu Te Hau, tutor and organiser of the Adult Education Department at the University of Auckland, at a Whakatane Lions Club meeting.
This chapter should also be seen as a foundation chapter for the development of Maori activism which would become explicitly public and forceful from the late 1960s, and the entry into New Zealand by indigenous peoples from the mid-1960s.

**Levering Open New Zealand’s Race Relations Reputation:**

**Generating a space for national discussion and international scrutiny**

In 1957 an article appeared in the Singapore press which accused New Zealanders of practising racial discrimination. It alleged that Asian students at teacher training colleges had been shunned by New Zealand students and treated with disrespect at boarding houses, and it claimed that discrimination against Maori was widespread.8 The New Zealand Government moved quickly. The Acting Minister of External Affairs, Ronald Algie, issued a press statement denying the charges and emphasising New Zealand’s good reputation for tolerance and equality:

The great majority of New Zealanders resent any manifestation of a colour bar... relations between our two peoples are justifiably a matter of national pride...Sir John Kotelawale, then Prime Minister of Ceylon, said after a visit to New Zealand in 1955, that “New Zealand offers the most perfect example of communal harmony in the world. The European and the Maori live together as one single people in the completest accord, like brothers”.

The allegations, while seemingly a small matter, were not easily brushed aside. Complaints of racial discrimination were rarely reported abroad, but the current allegations came at an awkward time: the 1960 rugby tour of South Africa was beginning to be discussed and while there had been some protest in 1948, it was likely that if Maori were omitted from the All Black team, protest would be much more widespread. Also of significance, the Government was keen to stifle talk of racial discrimination for political reasons: Labour held only a slim 41-39 majority in the House and retaining the four Maori seats would be crucial for Labour to retain power at the next election. At another level Prime Minister Nash was concerned not to upset the South East Asian countries, important for New Zealand’s security strategy, and a decision had been made to send an infantry force for the defence of Malaya.

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8 ‘Press Statement’, Acting Minister of External Affairs (Mr Algie), 20 June 1957, ‘New Zealand Native Affairs-Reports’, 2907-40, LAC.
In 1958, the Labour Government announced that the High Commissioner to Malaya would be Charles Bennett, a former commander of the Maori Battalion. Bennett was the first Maori to be appointed as a High Commissioner. The appointment sent a message to Asia that there was racial equality in New Zealand and that racial barriers did not exist. It demonstrated to the Maori electorate that issues of racial discrimination were superficial and that Maori had an important and valued place in society. However any feeling that negative issues had been smoothed over were short-lived.

The Bennett Incident: Exposing Racism at Home and Abroad

On 31st January 1959, Dr Henry Bennett was refused service in the lounge bar of a Papakura hotel. During the 1940s and 1950s an informal system of segregation or exclusion had been used against Maori in a range of public facilities including boarding-houses, hairdressing establishments, picture-theatres and hotels. Inappropriate 'behaviour' or 'social' issues, mainly related to a low standard of clothing and poor hygiene, were reasons given to justify the actions of proprietors. Segregation in hotels appears to have been introduced to appease Pakeha patrons who objected to the behaviour of Maori and their children. 'Behaviour' and 'social' were comfortable labels for they eliminated 'race' and placed the responsibility on Maori for their exclusion. In the case of Bennett, neither could be applied. Despite an appeal to the publican by his wife (a Pakeha) who explained his impeccable credentials, the decision stood. Clearly the issue was one of racial discrimination.

Bennett complained and the issue was immediately spread across mainstream newspapers. Arguably this was more a reflection of his status rather than an act of discrimination. He was a senior medical officer at a psychiatric hospital and, as the Auckland Star noted, he was from 'New Zealand's most distinguished' Maori family. His father, Frederick Bennett, had been the first Bishop of Aotearoa (1928-1950), his 16 siblings were mostly high achievers in high-status occupations, seven had been commissioned in the Second World War, and his brother was Colonel Charles Bennett (DSO), ex-Commander of the 28th Maori Battalion and the new High Commissioner to Malaya. A week prior to the Bennett incident, newspapers had covered the departure of

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9 Newspaper reports indicate that segregation or exclusion was also prevalent from the early 1900s, especially in relation to picture theatres and boarding houses.
10 Manchester Guardian, 5 Feb 1959.
Charles Bennett for Malaya. This was front page news in the *Auckland Star* which presented Bennett as an exemplary Maori: apart from his stellar war record, he was the first Maori to be given a diplomatic post, and he was presented as 'a Maori with no chip on his shoulder against the European'. The Bennett family were regarded as an eminent family: they were part of a small elite group of Maori who held leadership and influence in religious, cultural, educational and social reform positions, and they moved easily in the Pakeha world. Thus the family was a success story: they were proof that colonisation had been benign and they confirmed New Zealand's claim to inter-racial harmony and equality. Given the previous dearth of significant media attention to acts of discrimination, it was Henry Bennett's personal and familial status which gained him access to media coverage. As one correspondent noted, the incident was 'more deplorable than was immediately apparent, for it raises this question: would there have been as much concern expressed had it been plain Johnny Taihoa involved?'

The Bennett incident was the first step in a process whereby race relations in New Zealand were opened up for national and international scrutiny. It caused a national furore and was the first time that an act of discrimination had received widespread and significant public and government attention. Prime Minister Nash condemned the incident, and stressed that Maori and Pakeha were 'all one people – New Zealanders', and all were equal before the law. He ordered a full report, and an investigation into allegations of sub-standard housing for Maori market-garden workers was also carried out. Public debate took place through a deluge of letters to newspapers, and reports and editorial columns added to the discussion. Some Pakeha had witnessed racial discrimination previously and had been 'angry', 'ashamed' and 'disgusted'. Many more were unaware and shocked that discrimination existed - even though boarding houses routinely displayed 'European Only' signs and many picture theatres had been segregated throughout New Zealand for many decades. Maori were surprised that

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13 Victoria Bennett, who featured in the previous chapter, was married to a brother of Bishop Frederick Bennett.
14 *New Zealand Herald*, 6 Feb 1959, Letter to the Editor from 'Junius'.
15 *Evening Post*, 4 Feb 1959.
16 *Evening Post*, 7 Feb 1959. The Minister of Labour, Fred Hackett, launched this investigation. Public discussion of the issue had suggested poor housing resulted in issues of hygiene and was a causal agent for the exclusion of Maori from public establishments.
Pakeha were unaware, after all 'humiliating experiences are not uncommon and one
does not have to go far afield to find places where it is a practice to bar Maoris'.

Discussion brought to light reports which indicated that racial discrimination was
widespread, and Maori spoke out. Few had previously used the press to complain about
issues of discrimination or other issues of contention, perhaps due to feelings of
whakama, but more likely because it was not worth the trouble. One Maori
correspondent explained, 'the average Maori doesn't look for trouble, and when he is
refused a drink his attitude is “What the heck”. He doesn't complain because he realises
it's a matter of ignorance.' Priorities of the Pakeha press also played a part as even the
MWWL, which identified discrimination in housing and employment, often received
cursory media attention. The voice of Maori came through 'Letters to the Editor'
columns and provided a counter to a widely-held view that race discrimination was rare.
One correspondent noted that if the incident succeeded in bringing the widespread
discrimination 'concerning Maoris of less note to the public eye, it will be regarded by
members of my race as a most fortunate occurrence'. Hopefully it would 'inspire
Pakehas to have a close look at their racial prejudices'.

Maori leaders spoke out, adding weight to the issue. Rev. Maake Mete, a chaplain at St
Stephens College, told of being refused service at barber shops in Pukekohe, and
Materahua Wikiriwhi, a senior officer in Maori Affairs, spoke of being refused service
in the same hotel in Pukekohe, separate lounge bars for Maori and Pakeha women, and
segregation in the picture theatre. He thought the 'colour bar' was originally 'social
and aimed at excluding dirty and noisy Maoris. Now it appeared to have become racial'.
Frank Winter (Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board) pointed to the contradiction between the
stated principle of racial equality and the reality on the ground. On this, he criticised
Prime Minister Nash:

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17 New Zealand Herald, 6 Feb 1959, Letter to the Editor from 'Hinemoa'; John Harre, 'A Case of Racial
260 (259).
18 Whakama has a range of meanings including feelings of embarrassment, shyness, shame, humiliation,
inferiority, and self-doubt.
19 New Zealand Herald, 5 Feb 1959.
20 New Zealand Herald, 6 Feb 1959.
21 Age (Melbourne), 6 Feb 1959. Materahua Wikiriwhi was a highly decorated Captain in the Maori
Battalion (DSO, MC). In 1944 he received the Military Cross for gallantry during the battle of
Monte Cassino.
... it is high time steps were taken to ensure that the long-established principles of racial equality...were observed in fact, as well as in law... It would have been more helpful had Mr Nash, as an ardent supporter of the universal declaration of human rights, stated unequivocally that breaches of the principles of that declaration would not be tolerated in this country and that immediate steps would be taken to ensure that the law was enforced.22

The reference to the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) indicates the new political space that was being created as international influences entered New Zealand. In response to a UN request the UDHR was publicised widely on radio and in written form. In 1951 it was translated into the Maori language by a committee which included Michael Jones, Pei Te Hurinui Jones and Charles Bennett.23 Maori leaders had clearly recognised that they could use UN treaties and declarations which New Zealand had signed, such as the UDHR, to place alongside the Treaty of Waitangi and strengthen issues they were contesting.

Discussion quickly expanded to broader issues. Whether discrimination had a social or racial basis, whether either was acceptable, and how racial discrimination could occur in a country famed for racial equality, were all debated. Surveys of hotels were conducted by newspapers to ascertain the practices of hotels. A Dominion survey indicated 'the existence of a class bar rather than a colour bar'.24 Many were outraged that racial discrimination was practised, and a few were less so and thought the incident trivial and overblown by the media. One thought that there were 'good reasons' for 'minor' racial discrimination and New Zealanders should be 'thankful that their nature is not harsh'.25 Another thought it acceptable as Maori were 'uncooperative' and inferior.26 Some worried that race relations could degenerate to the level of that in other countries, and a feature article in the Auckland Star reported that 'pockets of apartheid' had existed for many years in Pukekohe in barber shops, picture theatres and hotel lounge bars.27 Others spoke of reverse discrimination and Maori privilege, especially in relation to

22 Evening Post, 7 Feb 1959.
25 New Zealand Herald, 13 Feb 1959, Letter to the Editor, 'V.A.Hetherington'.
26 Harre, ‘A Case of Racial Discrimination...’, p.259.
27 Auckland Star, 5 Feb 1959. See also Lloyd Jones, 'Images of Maori in the Pakeha Press...', p.18.
separate parliamentary representation and special land privileges.\textsuperscript{28} Watching the chaotic and multi-faceted debate from the side-lines, the Canadian High Commissioner reported on the intense 'soul-searching' about race relations which was taking place in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{29}

That the world was watching and the incident could harm New Zealand's good reputation was a concern of Maori leaders, the government and the public.\textsuperscript{30} A particular worry was that New Zealand might be identified with other countries where racial discrimination was strong, and one correspondent asked, 'Are we starting a “Little Rock” here in New Zealand?'\textsuperscript{31} In 1957 the town of Little Rock, Arkansas, became a focus of the international media when nine black American students sought to integrate into the former 'whites only' Central High School. Violent clashes ensued between state and federal authorities and President Eisenhower was forced to order troops in to protect the students. The reference to Little Rock indicates how international events of racial discrimination and segregation were entering the country. Through the 1950s decade, New Zealanders had become sensitised to international issues on race segregation – in South Africa and more especially in the United States of America – as apartheid, racial discrimination, segregation, and a burgeoning civil rights movement in America were increasingly reported by the print media. The radio too was significant, especially the BBC World News broadcasts, which were arguably the most important and popular source of international news in this respect.

Prime Minister Nash was acutely aware that the eyes of the world were on New Zealand and feared the Bennett incident would have international repercussions:

Racial discrimination can be fought within the country, but the problem may be to repair the damage caused to prestige overseas...the publicity arising...and subsequent disclosures of a “colour bar”...could have harmed New Zealand's reputation overseas as a champion of racial harmony...New Zealand was trying to set an example to the rest of

\textsuperscript{31} See for example the selection of Letters to the Editor in \textit{New Zealand Herald}, 6 Feb 1959.
the world in establishing racial equality, and incidents of this sort could lead to New Zealanders being termed “Humbugs”. We are not humbugs in this country.  

The fear of New Zealand’s reputation being called into question, and being seen as 'humbugs' (dishonest and deceptive), saw Prime Minister Nash and the Governor-General (Viscount Cobham) emphasise 'one people' at the official Waitangi ceremony in February. Nash also drew attention to Waitangi Day being made a public holiday from 1960, and stated that 'Waitangi would… show the world that New Zealanders, comprising two races could live together in amity'.  

Viscount Cobham spoke of the Treaty of Waitangi as having given Maori 'all the rights and privileges of full citizenship. Today they bear the proud name of New Zealanders'.

Nash was concerned about the Bennett incident, not least as a potentially serious situation was developing in relation to the All Black tour to South Africa in 1960. It seemed likely that Maori players would be excluded from the team which would cause considerable international comment. With the revelations surrounding the incident suggesting entrenched race discrimination, it was likely that this would be grafted onto any rugby tour protest. While past protest had not spun out into discussion of racial discrimination in a wider societal sense, the heightened awareness and revelations of widespread racial discrimination made it a possibility that this would become a prominent feature.

Maori leaders were generally quiet about international implications, although Henry Bennett stated that if New Zealand 'is going to tell the world that Maoris have equality in New Zealand, this sort of thing is untenable'. The final words on the issue came from the Bishop of Aotearoa, Wiremu Netana Panapa, who soothed the situation by employing a 'better than' position: despite unpleasant incidents, race relations were 'very much further forward than that between Europeans and any other native race in the

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32 New Zealand Herald, 6 Feb 1959; Evening Post 7 Feb 1959.
35 Straits Times, 5 Feb 1959.
world'. This shifted the issue into a more comforting position which took the sharp edges off race discrimination and made it, if not acceptable, at least more palatable.

Internationally the incident levered open New Zealand’s race relations reputation and generated a space for scrutiny and criticism. In Canada the *Ottawa Citizen* commented that while New Zealand was cited as a model for other countries to follow, a 'sharp reminder' had been given that the situation was 'not perfect'. Much work was needed before New Zealand could claim that Maori had full equality with Europeans. Similarly the *Sydney Morning Herald* noted that although New Zealand was proud of its race relations record, recent events had called into question New Zealand's reputation for racial equality. Further, current revelations combined with the high employment of Maori in low-skilled jobs, and an infant mortality rate three times that of Pakeha infants, suggested that New Zealand had a problem. In Malaya and Singapore, while the issue was front page news, the focus was on Charles Bennett. No doubt he was embarrassed. He took a prudent course and returned race discrimination to the margins:

> Such isolated incidents do not reflect the true position. Maori and European enjoy equality in all things. There is no law in any field whatever which discriminates between the two. It is the outcome of faulty and irresponsible individual judgement...which entirely contravenes accepted and established practice.

While small cracks had appeared in New Zealand's reputation, the incident was short-lived and slipped off the media radar when the hotel owners satisfactorily revised their policy. In New Zealand the incident was significant in that it created a heightened awareness of inequality and discrimination, it had generated space for public expression from some Maori, and race relations were placed centre-stage. Had it been an isolated incident, in all probability the issues raised would have quickly slid into obscurity. Maori leaders showed no great desire to have the issue carried on or internationalised and they down-played the incident: Charles Bennett relegated it to the usual ‘isolated incident’ category, and Bishop Panapa spoke similarly with the added reminder that race

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36 *Sydney Morning Herald*, 26 Feb 1959.
37 *Ottawa Citizen*, 10 March 1959.
38 *Sydney Morning Herald*, 26 Feb 1959. The article was titled, 'Racial Questions Disturb New Zealand'.
39 *Singapore Free Press*, 4 Feb 1959; *Straits Times*, 5 Feb 1959. Both newspapers are from Singapore but the report in *Straits Times* came directly from Kuala Lumpur, and the other was a *Reuters* report. See also follow up reports, *Straits Times*, 7 Feb 1959; *Singapore Free Press*, 6 Feb 1959.
40 *Straits Times*, 5 Feb 1959.
relations were 'better than' in other countries. Instead, events contemporaneous with the Bennett incident added to the new public awareness and cemented race relations into a central position in society and signalled the beginning of a new relationship between Maori and Pakeha.

**David Ausubel: Exposing racism from within the academy**

At the same time, into New Zealand came David Ausubel, an American Fulbright scholar who spent eleven months (1957-58) at Victoria University. Backed by stellar academic credentials, and supported by Ernest Beaglehole who arranged his tenure, Ausubel intended to study Maori educational under-achievement and vocational motivation.\(^{41}\) Beaglehole had another motive. He, and other academics, had attempted to raise public awareness of racial inequality and had challenged the idealised view of race relations. Little traction had been gained within a complacent population and Beaglehole hoped that Ausubel's perspective, as an outsider, would stimulate discussion.\(^{42}\) Ausubel did not disappoint and between 1958 and 1961 he produced three publications in which he expanded his initial research aim. In his most controversial work, *The Fern and the Tiki*, he exposed the self-serving myths upon which New Zealand's identity was constructed and presented a blistering critique of race relations.\(^{43}\) This was followed by *Maori Youth* which furthered the discussion.\(^{44}\)

In *The Fern and the Tiki*, Ausubel exposed social, economic and political inequality and a host of discriminatory practices to which Maori were subject. This he attributed to ingrained Eurocentric notions of white superiority.\(^{45}\) Widespread discrimination was found in 'employment, housing, accommodation, hotels, obtaining credit, and ordinary social interaction', a situation reminiscent of the discrimination against black Americans in the northern areas of the United States.\(^{46}\) Ausubel identified negative stereotypes by

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\(^{41}\) Harry Kersey, 'Opening a Discourse on Race Relations in New Zealand: The Fern and the Tiki Revisited', *Journal of New Zealand Studies*, Issue 1, Oct 2002, pp. 1-18 (p.4). Ausubel's academic credentials included an MD (psychiatry) and a PhD (psychology).

\(^{42}\) Kersey, 'Opening a Discourse....'; p. 4.


\(^{46}\) Ibid, p. 174.
which Pakeha defined Maori and argued that Maori were 'not judged on their merits but prejudged on the basis of stereotypes'. What alarmed him was the 'national self-delusion' which blocked recognition that a problem existed. He warned that unless recognition replaced delusion, a 'brown proletariat' would emerge, 'segregated in the urban slums and living in a chronic tension with their white neighbours'.

Public criticism came from government ministers, academics, and through editorial columns, and in private his works were the focus of intense discussion. John Orbell recalls discussions in the student body: 'Ausubel was very aggressive about the inequalities of the race situation in New Zealand. We thought he was simply transferring his experience from one unique situation to another, perhaps without too much knowledge'. His methodology was criticised in academia, and the media regarded his work as an unwarranted attack on Pakeha. However, there were also many who were receptive to his findings: racial inequality and discrimination was difficult to dispute in the face of blatant acts of discrimination such as the Bennett incident and the exclusion of Maori from the All Black team. Pearson declared that the *The Fern and the Tiki* should be read by 'everyone who believed that racial equality was a fundamental premise of the New Zealand social code', and Phillip Smithells viewed his work as 'valuable and unique'. Brian Souter, commenting on *Maori Youth*, suggested that before Ausubel's assessment was rejected 'as a distorted caricature...we should pause to search our hearts to be sure that there is not a substantial element of truth in what he says'. Others claimed he had exaggerated the extent of prejudice and discrimination. A reviewer of *The Fern and the Tiki* argued that instances of discrimination were a 'minute fragment of our way of life and not evidence of a general

50 Email interview with Professor John Orbell, 17 August 2006. Orbell was an Auckland University student and active during the 'No Maoris No Tour' protests.
53 B.E.Souter, Book Review - *Maori Youth*, *Te Ao Hou*, No.36 (September 1961), pp.34-55. Souter was Assistant-secretary for Maori Affairs.
colour bar'. For Ralph Hanan (Minister of Maori Affairs), 'unhappy incidents' occurred occasionally but the situation had been 'distorted beyond all recognition' and compared to other countries New Zealand deserved its high reputation.

While there was little public response from Maori, Ausubel added another layer of political awareness. The lack of public comment was, in part, because his books were not widely read outside academia, but also he said little about discrimination that Maori did not already know. Moana Jackson recalls discussion amongst Maori students who saw 'nothing surprising' in *The Fern and the Tiki*, whereas for Pakeha it was 'an attack on their myths'. There was also discussion in private, in homes, on marae, at conferences, all of which added to a growing politicisation. Ross Himona recalls that *The Fern and the Tiki* came at a time when he was becoming politically aware and he and his father read the book and discussed it in depth. It was a topic for discussion at the Young Maori Leaders Conference (1960), although Ausubel's prediction of future racial strife was 'treated lightly': the common view was that education would promote mutual understanding and lead to the elimination of racial prejudice.

As with the Bennett incident, the effect on New Zealand's international reputation was a concern. Pat Lawlor, writing in *Freelance* noted that New Zealanders resented Ausubel's 'unwarranted and unwise attempt to create in the minds of people at home and abroad the impression that there is brewing here a colour problem of comparative Little Rock dimensions'. When *Maori Youth* was published, Hanan rounded on Ausubel:

> From the day he arrived here, perhaps even before, he set out to debunk us in all ways in grim relentless fashion. Already he has devoted two books to our undoing...but he will have to work a bit harder yet to make it into a Little Rock.

Perhaps, but by then the *New York Times* had already identified Pukekohe as 'the Little Rock of New Zealand'. Ausubel's publications caused the Government some anxiety.

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54 For example, G. Kemble Welch, 'Books - *The Fern and the Tiki*, Te Ao Hou, No.33, December 1960, p.52. George Kemble Welch was a Pakeha pathologist who had worked in Maori communities.
55 'Race Relations - Minister's Comments', 24 April 1961, MA1, 36/1/21, Box 654, Part 3, NA.
56 Kersey, 'Opening a Discourse...'.p.1.
59 Cited in Kersey, 'Opening a Discourse...'; p.9.
60 'Race Relations - Minister's Comments', 24 April 1961, MA1, 36/1/21, Box 654, Part 3, NA.
At the time, it was under pressure to become a signatory to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 'Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention'. The Department of Maori Affairs feared that Ausubel's work could be transmitted around the globe and even 'translated into other languages'. Should New Zealand become a signatory to the Convention, other nations could use the information to 'quote against this country' and cause embarrassment. However, Maori Affairs also noted that claims could be contested and at that point the 'truth' could then be 'brought into focus'.

Ausubel's research spread abroad, occasionally as information to support articles in the media, but mainly through academia. In the media it emerged intermittently in articles on race relations in New Zealand and after the publication of *Maori Youth*, the *Guardian* in England gave it a central space. It was quickly picked up by academics and spaces opened up for an oppositional discourse on race relations to be spread along academic lines of study. The first were researchers from the University of Hawaii who presented a report, 'The Maori Affairs Program', which cited *The Fern and the Tiki* extensively. The Department of Maori Affairs was sent a draft for comment, a task which fell to Brian Souter. Believing that Ausubel had a 'jaundiced' and 'false impression' of race relations, Souter refuted many of Ausubel's assertions. Despite this, the published report was essentially unchanged, although Souter's comments were included, thereby allowing some control even if only by denial.

Ausubel’s research was also transmitted through his position as a university professor, his academic publications, seminars and conferences. For example, a chapter he contributed to *Problems of Youth*, in which he spoke of racial discrimination, prejudice, inequality and denial, was based on his address at the Fifth Social Psychology

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62 Department of Maori Affairs, 'Race Relations in New Zealand and The Indigenous Populations Convention', May 1961, MA1, Box 654, 36/1/21, NA. The ILO was a specialised agency of the United Nations.
64 Carl V. Bloede (Associate Researcher) and Herman S. Doi (Researcher), 'The Maori Affairs Programme', Report No. 1d, 1964, Legislative Reference Bureau, University of Hawaii.
65 Brian Souter, 'Comments on draft of “The Maoris and the New Zealand Government”, 2 October 1963, MA, Acc 2499, Box 2, 1/1/51, Part 1, NA.
Symposium held at the University of Oklahoma in 1964. Such avenues were significant in spreading his research through academic networks and presenting a new discourse abroad which challenged the race relations narrative within which Maori were confined. In North America, a review of *Maori Youth* spoke of:

...a surprisingly pervasive system of racial discrimination that directly contradicts the complacent official view of a country without racial prejudice....I suspect that although Ausubel makes first-rate contribution...to theories of achievement motivation, his book will gain acceptance primarily as a critique of the myth of racial equality in New Zealand.

Ausubel had influence in academic circles, and he raised public awareness for a brief time, but the effectiveness of his work lay in the long term. This proved to be enduring and effective in raising awareness of racial discrimination during this period in history, and that New Zealand’s claim to racial equality was more mythical than real. It continues to be used to this day, and any research on race relations during this period invariably cites David Ausubel’s work. His immediate contribution was in bringing an oppositional discourse of race relations into focus nationally and internationally, generating discussion, and adding to the politicisation of some Maori which had begun with the ‘Bennett incident’, and which was to be further expanded when race and rugby collided.

**Discrimination on the Rugby Field: A Space for discussion on domestic discrimination, and reinforcing New Zealand’s international reputation.**

Six months prior to the Bennett incident, the New Zealand Rugby Football Union (NZRFU) accepted an invitation to tour South Africa in 1960. Cuthbert Hogg (NZRFU chairman) indicated that it was likely that Maori would not be included as they would be ‘exposed to embarrassing incidents in South Africa’. For a year the issue was discussed, mainly by Maori leaders and church representatives. Finally, on 12 June

1959, the NZRFU announced that Maori would be excluded from the All Black team and in doing so set in train one of the largest and most sustained protests ever witnessed in New Zealand. Lines were drawn between the NZRFU, which insisted that their decision was in the interests of Maori and refused to reverse their decision; the Government which took a position of non-interference and hid behind a Maori Advisory Board which supported the NZRFU decision; and the public, the majority of whom demanded that the tour be cancelled if Maori were not included. The NZRFU decision contradicted the national narrative of racial equality and harmony: New Zealanders were not all 'one people' for they had been segregated by race. In essence the protest was for 'one people' and in this it was extraordinarily successful.

A Protest for ‘One People’: Opposing discrimination on the rugby field

Following the announcement, action was immediate. The Government attempted to stifle discussion and banned all reporting of the controversy through the state-owned radio broadcasting service. This was lifted in February 1960 but remained in place for Maori News broadcasts which meant that Maori speakers in remote areas had limited knowledge of the full extent of the protest. Both political parties refused to make the controversy a political issue, and Nash placed a caucus ban on any discussion within parliament and MPs were banned from speaking out publicly. The Opposition followed suit. Eruera Tirikatene (MP Southern Maori) broke ranks, said that no longer would Maori 'suffer in silence', and he claimed the right to speak 'as a chief and spokesman of the Maori race' and not as a MP. He called for the tour to be abandoned if the decision was not overturned, and issued a challenge to 'our Pakeha brethren...to show us where they stand' and demonstrate that New Zealand's race relations reputation was deserved. He paid a heavy price and was 'treated as the proverbial leper by his own Labour


70 Tom Newnham, who was living in the largely Maori community at Te Araroa, recalled that although they knew about the protest, 'the true extent of this debate largely escaped us...we had no idea of the way it was sweeping across the country'. See, Thomas Newnham, *Interesting Times*, Auckland: Graphic Publications, 2003, pp. 126-127.

71 Hon. E.T. Tirikatene, 'Press Statement', 16 June 1959, O'Regan Family-Diaries and Papers, 89-097-5, ATL.
However, he subverted Labour Party constraints by enlisting his daughter, Whetu Tirikatene, to act as his representative and channel to the main protest organisation, the Citizens' All Black Tour Association (CABTA).

Tirikatene's statement provided the impetus for the issue to be taken out of the closed spaces of marae, tribal meetings, and communities where debate traditionally took place. Tribal leaders, individuals, tribal executives and Kingitanga all came out publicly in support of Tirikatene and to oppose the NZRFU decision. With the floodgates opened, Maori protest increased – coming from Maori organisations including the MWWL, individuals, sportsmen, trade unionists, the student body at universities and training colleges, and Maori sections of church organisations. The majority, especially younger Maori, were 'solidly behind the protest movement'. Pakeha opposition followed similar lines and for the first time since the onset of the Maori /Springbok controversy large numbers joined Maori in protest. In June 1959, polls conducted by the Auckland Star and New Zealand Truth revealed that sixty-two percent and seventy-five percent of New Zealanders respectively wanted the tour abandoned. Support grew, especially when a petition was launched which apparently few people were unwilling to sign. It eventually gathered over 160,000 signatures making it the second largest petition at that time. The events and feelings aroused, observed the Australian High Commissioner, 'would be matched only by that of events leading to an imminent outbreak of war'.

CABTA co-ordinated protest action and acted as a pressure group to combat racial discrimination in the selection of the 1960 rugby team to tour South Africa, and to demand the abandonment of the tour if absolute equality of treatment cannot be
assured’. A Wellington Executive administered the Association's affairs and a National Council was formed with representatives from sports teams, trade unions, churches, student groups, Maori leaders and organisations, and academic institutions. CABTA expanded quickly and established twenty major branches across New Zealand, and a web of less formal groups in small towns and rural areas. Maori involvement was strong: the Executive and many of the branches were Maori-led, and the large protest marches and public meetings were fronted by Maori. The *Guardian* observed that the actions of CABTA 'roused the conscience of the nation'.

CABTA located the controversy within the global 'winds of change'. Harold Macmillan had used the phrase to refer to the rise of a national expression of black consciousness that was sweeping across Africa, unstoppable and demanding accommodation. For Maori, those same winds which spoke of racial equality, respect and recognition, had reached New Zealand. In the context of the rugby tour protest, the winds of change referred to a growing consciousness of subordination and inequality and the contradiction in the national narrative which spoke of racial equality but was not backed up by action. Change was demanded.

There is a fresh wind blowing around the world. It is blowing also across the maraes of Maoridom. It is bewildering to a young Maori to reflect that he can represent his country abroad as a diplomat and ambassador... but, by a decision of a private sports body, he is denied the right to represent his country in the field of sport...it is customary for political persons, when referring to pakeha-Maori relations in this country, to take pride in the fact that our two peoples dwell together in peace and harmony. It is true race relations here are good, but they could be better...Were they as they should be the action of the Rugby Union, in barring Maoris from selection, would be unthinkable.

The rugby tour protest signalled the beginning of a new outspokenness and forcefulness by Maori which had seen stirrings during the Bennett incident and was to find fuller expression during the tour protest. The demand was for equality and the indications

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78 CABTA, *No Maoris No Tour...,* p.6.
79 CABTA, *No Maoris No Tour...,* p.6. Holding the main positions on the Executive Committee, was Rolland O'Regan (Chairman) a Wellington surgeon with links to Ngai Tahu through his wife; Joan Stone (Secretary) a welfare officer in the Department of Maori Affairs and Dominion Secretary of the MWWL; and Frank Winter (Treasurer) Chairman of the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board.
81 'Submissions of CABTA deputation', p.3, 26 Feb 1960, O'Regan Family-Diaries and Papers, 89-097-5, ATL.
were that in the future Maori were not going to be as accommodating of Pakeha priorities as they had been in the past.

Figure 2.1  'No Maoris No Tour' protest, Meyers Park, Auckland, 1960.  

CABTA drew on a mix of international and domestic 'rights', an indication of how the world had changed over the past decade and had influenced public thinking in New Zealand. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was invoked and reflected in banners such as the above - “Only One Race: The Human Race”. CABTA insisted that the actions of the NZRFU were contrary to the UDHR, especially Article 2 which stated that: 'All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights...and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood'. Decolonisation was highlighted - the 'new world' whereby coloured people across the globe were demanding and gaining political freedom, respect and power. The NZRFU policy belonged to an old world 'that was rapidly passing away' and did nothing to promote harmony and peace. The Treaty of Waitangi was invoked and while most Pakeha had scant knowledge of the treaty articles, one concept was deeply embedded - that the treaty had

83 Loose pages with the heading, 'Here are ten reasons why you should sign the petition and get others to sign', CABTA Papers (Auckland Branch), MSS & Archives A-245, Folder 1, University of Auckland Library (UAL). These sheets were hand-outs to accompany CABTA’s petition.
84 Ibid.
made 'one people of mixed race: New Zealanders'. The NZRFU, noted CABTA, had decided that 'we are a white society, plus “natives”'.

The protest which consumed New Zealand for twelve months was unlike any before. While some smaller country towns mounted protest marches, the extent and spread of Maori participation was facilitated by the large numbers who had shifted into an urban environment. Maori tended to reside in specific areas which drew people from diverse iwi groups together and created an urban whanau. To provide support and assist with adjustment to an alien environment a web of groups, clubs and organisations were formed which linked with each other and played an important role in generating political awareness. These networks were crucial in spreading information about the controversy, protest actions and meetings, and the contained urban environment made protest events and actions easily accessible. A new form of protest came into being, not so much replacing the old, but adding a new dimension. No longer was protest solely in the hands of Maori leaders who spoke for their people, and whose opposition was expressed as words in newspapers. It was that too, but actions and words were also inscribed and chanted on streets and public spaces, banners and placards, and expressed in words and song in pubs, clubs, halls, and parks.

Figure 2.2  Frank Haig, Doc Paewai and Arapeta Awatere lead a protest march in Auckland.

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85 Ibid.
86 March in Auckland on the eve of the All Blacks departure to South Africa. Frank Haig, Doc Paewai and Arapeta Awatere lead the march up Queen Street. New Zealand Herald, 7 May 1960.
Framing the CABTA campaign was the slogan 'No Maoris No Tour'. It was an effective frame for it simultaneously identified an injustice and suggested a solution. The slogan broadcast a moral issue which threatened the fundamental identity of New Zealanders: Maori and Pakeha were not 'one people' for they had been segregated according to race. This was especially pertinent to the place which rugby held: the rugby field was historically a level playing field and arena of Maori/Pakeha participation, and it was one in which 'one people' was exemplified. Thus the parameters of protest and the solution were made clear: New Zealanders could be 'one people' through 'No Maoris No Tour'. Banners and placards, 'One People - New Zealanders', were held aloft during protest marches and reinforced the message. The protest for 'one people' explains why there was significant Pakeha support, no opposing groups, petitions or protest actions, and marches and meetings were mostly dignified and without ill-feeling.

Despite over a year of significant protest, on 10 May 1960 an All Black team minus Maori departed for South Africa. The campaign had been doomed to fail from the beginning. CABTA's strategy was too narrow: it had counted on gaining massive domestic support through public meetings, pamphlets and flyers, marches and a petition in order to place pressure on the Government to intervene and cancel the tour. In this it miscalculated, for while it had considerable public support, and despite 1960 being an election year, the Government and the opposition party spoke with one voice on the issue and neither were willing to make it a party political issue. Thus CABTA had no political leverage.

The CABTA Executive refused to enlist international support which could have provided some leverage to pressure the Government, even if only through embarrassment. The United Nations was an obvious forum and CABTA was aware of the efforts being made by the United Nations to promote the principles of equality and deal with racial discrimination through the United Nations Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights. Moreover, after the Sharpeville massacre there was increased activity with the Security Council taking unprecedented action against the apartheid

87 CABTA, *No Maoris No Tour...*, p. 12.
88 MWWL, 'Submission in Support of Petition, No.21 (1960)', MWWL Papers, 88-131-19/8, ATL; *Dominion Sunday Times*, 14 April 1968, 'This Time the Wife's been Invited', (reflections by Rolland O'Regan on the 1960 CABTA protest.)
regime and demanding an end to racial segregation.\textsuperscript{89} However, the United Nations was not considered. Nor did CABTA enlist support from South Africa which the South African Sports Association (SASA) was eager to provide.\textsuperscript{90} SASA campaigned vigorously in South Africa against the tour, made objections to the NZRFU, and both SASA and the African National Congress launched petitions similar to the 'No Maoris No Tour' petition.\textsuperscript{91} Arapeta Awatere and Maharaia Winiata (Auckland CABTA) established contact with SASA activists including Dennis Brutus (Secretary of SASA), and information was exchanged with a view to strengthening their respective campaigns.\textsuperscript{92} However Rolland O'Regan (Chairman of CABTA) was dismissive of SASA as 'onlookers' and 'not relevant' to the New Zealand protest which was about racial discrimination in New Zealand and not apartheid in South Africa.\textsuperscript{93}

There was, nevertheless, one attempt (outside CABTA) when all efforts to have the tour cancelled had been exhausted. In the time-honoured tradition of appealing to the British Crown, Hone Heke Rankin, paramount chief of the Northern Maori Tribes, made an appeal to the Governor-General (Lord Cobham) that the Queen intervene and prevent the discrimination against Maori. He requested that the Queen extend her protection over the Maori people as was guaranteed under the Treaty of Waitangi.\textsuperscript{94} In the time-honoured tradition of the British Crown, there was no intervention by the Queen or the Governor-General.\textsuperscript{95}

The crux of the reluctance to internationalise was that while CABTA believed it was entirely a domestic issue, it also sought to 'uphold the national honour of the country' and New Zealand's reputation.\textsuperscript{96} This could be achieved by protesting at home in order

\textsuperscript{89} The Sharpeville massacre occurred on 21 March 1960 when South African police opened fire on non-white South Africans who were protesting the pass laws. Sixty-nine people were killed and over 400 were injured. See, Mandela, Nelson, \textit{Long Walk to Freedom}, London: Abacus, 1995, pp.280-281.

\textsuperscript{90} SASA was formed in 1958 to fight racism in sport and to seek international support and recognition of the non-racial sporting codes in South Africa. It also worked for an international boycott of sporting contact with racially selected South African teams.

\textsuperscript{91} The majority of the petitions fell into the hands of the South African security police. However some escaped detection and were smuggled out of South Africa to New Zealand where they were passed onto Prime Minister Nash who ignored them.

\textsuperscript{92} For example see, Correspondence, Dennis Brutus to Arapeta Awatere, 15 October 1959, CABTA Papers 1959-1960 (Auckland Branch), MSS & Archives A-245, UAL.

\textsuperscript{93} Richards, \textit{Dancing on Our Bones}, p.27.

\textsuperscript{94} CABTA, \textit{No Maoris No Tour...}, p.13.

\textsuperscript{95} No record has been located of any correspondence from either the Queen or the Governor-general on this appeal.

\textsuperscript{96} CABTA, \textit{No Maoris No Tour...}, p.11.
to demonstrate to an international audience a commitment by citizens to the ideals for which New Zealand was recognised. The CABTA leadership was essentially conservative and it had no intention of embarrassing the Government internationally. Thus it steadfastly refused to take the issue to the United Nations or seek support from the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa and have race relations exposed to even more scrutiny. The latter would immediately involve CABTA in the politics of apartheid and the calls by activists in South Africa to have the tour called off irrespective of whether Maori were included or not. As CABTA had no issue in maintaining sporting contact with an apartheid regime, the relationship was not viable.97 CABTA was also aware that the eyes of the world were on New Zealand and it wanted to maintain its international reputation, not tear it down by internationalising the issue.

The idea that the 'world was watching' and the tour controversy could harm New Zealand's reputation was an enduring and widespread concern. From the beginning of the controversy Te Ao Hou noted that 'the whole world is watching' how New Zealand handled its 'race relations problems' and the principal of racial equality should not be compromised.98 No-one wanted New Zealand denigrated internationally, no matter where they stood on the issue, and especially not in South East Asia which was important to New Zealand's foreign policy. CABTA was concerned that 'in Asia...the reaction has been adverse, and the country's reputation...has been greatly damaged'.99 Ronald Algie (National Party MP) cautioned a CABTA deputation to be careful of their actions which would be 'very closely watched in South-east Asia. It will be a very great pity for us if our actions are regarded in those countries as a departure from our boasted principles of racial equality'.100 The Auckland university student magazine Craccum similarly warned that the Asian and African countries were watching and New Zealand could be 'tainted with prejudice and her famed reputation would be exposed as a mere façade'.101 In Malaysia, Charles Bennett cautioned Prime Minister Nash and External

97 In later years many ex-CABTA members, including Rolland O'Regan and Doc Paewai opposed the anti-apartheid movement which sought to boycott sporting contact with South Africa. O'Regan believed that by maintaining sporting contact, South Africa could learn from New Zealand the value of having a bi-cultural society, and the barriers of apartheid could be broken down. Paewai supported apartheid and claimed it was 'what the black people want'. Further, there was 'nothing wrong with apartheid', and South Africa was the 'victim' of international misunderstanding. See, Dominion Sunday Times, 14 April 1968; Evening Post 9 Feb 1973.
99 CABTA, No Maoris No Tour... p.10.
100 New Zealand Herald, 29 Feb 1960.
101 Craccum, 5 June 1959, p.2.
Affairs that unless the tour was cancelled New Zealand would be 'condemned and branded, not as we profess to be, with some justification, advocates and champions of race equality, but rather as partners and sympathisers in South Africa's policy of apartheid'.

In another take on the issue, Jack Marshall (Acting-leader of the Opposition) accused CABTA of creating 'unnecessary antagonism' and generating an impression abroad that race relations were not good. Out in the public similar concerns were often expressed. The Ngati Otautahi Tribal Committee, for example, charged the NZRFU with 'destroying our world famed reputation of racial equality'.

Eruera Tirikatene too worried that the protest had presented a 'false illusion to the world' and had 'masked the harmonious race relations that have prevailed and which still do exist in New Zealand'. They need not have worried. The eyes of the world were indeed on New Zealand but, in general, what they saw did New Zealand's reputation more good than harm.

'The Whole World is Watching': Generating international space yet reinforcing the 'good race relations' paradigm.

The protest was covered extensively in international newspapers, especially in Australia, North America, England, South East Asia and Africa. However, for the most part, reports had the effect of confirming New Zealand's reputation. If doubts had been held about any deterioration in race relations as a result of preceding issues, the protest went some way to papering over the cracks.

That Pakeha had joined with Maori in protest, and in greater numbers than Maori, was confirmation of New Zealand's good reputation. The Australian High Commissioner noted that New Zealand could call itself a leader in the development of racial harmony with 'justifiable pride' and the large numbers of Pakeha who opposed the tour.

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104 *Press*, 29 June 1959.
105 Hon. E.T. Tirikatene, 'Press Statement', 22 March 1960, O'Regan Family-Diaries and Papers, 89-097-5, ATL.
demonstrated that Pakeha had a 'conscience towards their Maori brethren'. Similarly the Canadian High Commissioner observed that the controversy was 'vigorous and healthy' and an indication of the 'vigilance' of New Zealanders against 'any threat... to the practice of complete racial equality'. Newspapers across the world reported similarly, including *Time* magazine which spoke of racial equality as:

'...a cherished article of national pride' in New Zealand which had 'the happiest multiracial situation anywhere in the world'. When Maori were excluded from the All Black team 'All New Zealand was aroused... Significantly, the bulk of the outcry has come from white New Zealanders'.

In Australia the *Sydney Morning Herald* noted that the NZRFU decision had 'offended white people who, in fact, were more active than any Maori'. The *Guardian* observed that a large number of Pakeha were 'dissatisfied with treatment which puts Maori on an inferior level', and the protest to pressure the NZRU into changing its decision 'was organised and conducted largely by Pakeha'.

Additionally, the idea that the NZRFU had excluded Maori from the tour in order to protect them from the humiliation and distress they would suffer under apartheid laws was widely broadcast, albeit merely as a statement of fact and with little critical analysis. Nevertheless this signified respect and concern for Maori and reinforced the dominant understanding of the relationship between two peoples. In Canada, for example, the *Montreal Gazette* reported on race relations as:

...something of which New Zealanders...are justly proud. The fine qualities of the Maori race... have won for them a respect seldom conceded by white settlers to a non-European people. Maoris live side by side with the white population on a basis of full equality under the law and socially there is no color bar...Maoris may have to be excluded in order to protect them against possible embarrassing incidents arising out of South African racial politics.

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107 Correspondence, J.E. Collins, High Commissioner for Australia to Canberra, Despatch No.3, 20 Aug 1959, ‘An All White “All Black” Team to South Africa’, Ref: A 1838, 370/7, Part 1, NAA.

108 Correspondence, Canadian High Commissioner to New Zealand to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 18 Sept 1959, ‘New Zealand Native Affairs Reports’, Ref: 2907-40, LAC.


Similarly the *Sydney Morning Herald* noted that no request had come from South Africa to exclude Maori but the NZRFU decision was made to spare them 'unpleasantness' they would face in South Africa. Prime Minister Nash (under pressure to intervene at home and to counter any negative perceptions abroad) played a major role in pressing this point. Time and again he stressed that both he and the NZRFU held Maori in high regard and recognised that it would be 'cruel and foolish' to allow them to visit South Africa where they would be subject to distressing insults. At a press conference in London prior to the 1960 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, Nash claimed that there was 'not a shadow of racialism' in New Zealand and the decision to exclude Maori was simply 'because of the respect in which we hold them.'

However, the NZRFU were more often the villain of the controversy and the claim that they were acting only out of consideration for Maori was rarely accepted. Most saw the NZRFU decision for what it was – nothing to do with consideration for Maori and everything to do with maintaining the rugby tie with South Africa. As the *Manchester Guardian* summed it up, 'The kindly men in the Rugby Union Council have only one interest – Rugby'. In New York the *Schenectady Gazette* noted the 'public outcry' and wide debate because 'the natives will be barred in deference to South Africa's segregation' policies. The *Sydney Sun* chose to satirise under the title 'This hurts me more than it hurts you!' which derided the NZRFU and was laden with suggestions of duplicity, paternalism and self-serving interest.

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114 See for example *Canberra Times*, 6 April 1960.
117 *Schenectady Gazette* (NY), 17 Dec 1959.
In the majority of media reports there was little suggestion that the exclusion of Maori was an indication of deeper problems of racial antagonism and discrimination within New Zealand. Rather, the entire controversy was attributed to the NZRFU which was prepared to sacrifice racial equality and acquiesce to the racial dictates of South Africa in its zeal to maintain the rugby tie. Their supposed consideration for Maori was merely a smokescreen, and the NZRFU was seen to have single-handedly tarnished New Zealand's reputation. The *Times of India* noted that the decision was 'not only morally indefensible but incredibly stupid. It is not that the NZ Rugby Union has anything against Maoris; it is simply that they consider the tour so very important that consideration of justice and racial equality are not allowed to stand in the way'.  

In Canada, the *Windsor Star* wondered how this could happen in a country which was 'as perfect an example of racial adjustment [as anywhere] in the world. But now comes the NZRU to pull the rug out from under the Maori out of deference to, of all people, the South Africans'.  

Over in England the *Manchester Guardian* referred to the decision as 'shameful' and 'deplorable'.

'Friends of New Zealand everywhere have held her up as an example of how an invading and occupying white people should collaborate with a native population, treat it with respect, and bring it to full partnership...the New Zealand Rugby Union could have followed the example of the President of Brazil in forbidding a Brazilian Association football team to play in the Union if coloured members of the team had to

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120 *Windsor Star* (Ontario), 6 May 1960, p.54.
be omitted. A great chance to assert ...that racial discrimination must not be shown in sport has been lost, and with it a respect which New Zealand had earned'.

Some newspapers presented more in-depth coverage of race relations. Many drew on historical as well as contemporary examples to sustain an argument of racial equality and harmony. Thus Maori had achieved high honours as doctors, bishops, lawyers, politicians, academics, and most recently as New Zealand's ambassador to Malaya, thereby denoting equality of opportunity and acceptance. Race relations were not perfect, but were 'better than' in other countries and although discrimination was not entirely absent, these were infrequent and petty. Moreover, as The Citizen explained, when such incidents do occur, 'they usually bring an indignant response from the white community and... rapidly addressed'. Additionally, Maori were privileged and had advantages and special rights denied to Pakeha, such as their own separate electorates and parliamentary representation. Comments by Maori also played some part in promoting New Zealand's race relations. An excerpt from Tirikatene's first press release was printed, which included the claim to racial harmony:

...if there exists this incredible state of affairs where New Zealand, with the most harmonious bi-racial relations in the world, is forced, even by way of implication, to accede to the policy of racial segregation in another country, have we not a most excellent opportunity as a people...to show the world where we stand, and to thereby exemplify the principles of racial equality for which New Zealand has been lauded?

And in the New York Times 'a Maori leader' commented on racial harmony, special Maori privileges and discrimination against Pakeha: 'generally we get along pretty well. But there is one blatant manifestation of discrimination I would like to see abolished – the four Maori electorates'.

Nevertheless there was some critical comment which suggested disharmony and inequality and placed a few superficial dents in the good race relations paradigm.

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121 Manchester Guardian, 13 June 1959. For similar expressions, see Liverpool Echo, cited in CABTA, 'No Maoris No Tour', p.14; Shenectady Gazette (New York), 17 Dec 1959.
122 For example see, Ottawa Citizen, 10 March 1959; Calgary Herald, 28 April 1960; New York Times, 22 Jan 1961.
123 See for example, Calgary Herald, 28 April 1960; Citizen (Canada) 26 April 1960; New York Times 22 Jan 1961.
125 Sydney Morning Herald, 17 June 1959.
Conrad Bollinger, a former member of the New Zealand Communist Party who was residing temporarily in England, appeared in the *Manchester Guardian* and debunked the myth of racial equality:

Nothing can excuse the decision, but the irrelevant reasons being advanced by apologists are eloquent testimony to the feebleness of New Zealand's alleged racial equality and of certain aspects of the New Zealand character in general...it must be understood that the intensity with which New Zealanders hold their national faith in Rugby football resembles that of religious mania...Principles which as a nation we boast of holding... are easily swept aside in such a mood ...New Zealand has to face the fact that it is not free from the cancer of racialism as it often asserts. There is a huge job to be done...\(^\text{127}\)

Similarly in the *Spectator* Bollinger took issue with an article by a New Zealand correspondent who pronounced on the rugby tour but focussed on Maori short-comings and privilege. The 'colour problem' was entirely due to successive governments which had 'squandered state funds' and lavished Maori with 'praise and perquisites', hand-outs and privileges. For all this, they remained 'sub-standard citizens', living in 'sub-standard shacks', on low incomes and responsible for most of the crime. In order to solve the 'colour problem' it was time to stop pandering to Maori by removing special privileges (especially separate parliamentary seats) and bringing them to equality with Pakeha.\(^\text{128}\)

In refuting these claims, Bollinger identified the destructive effects of colonisation and its legacy of inequality, negative crime and health outcomes – all of which were proof that despite 'squandering state funds', full redress had never been made to Maori. Moreover:

Tory bad-temper at Maori loyalty to Labour, the fury of the inheritors of plundered Maori lands submitting to revaluation of leaseholds, and such increasingly common incidents as the recent refusal to serve a Maori doctor of distinguished family in a hotel near Auckland - all point to the certainty that ...if anything needs pulling up sharply it is not so much Maori bootstraps as the moral socks of certain Pakeha. New Zealand has quite a way to go to achieve the racial equality she sometimes boasts about.\(^\text{129}\)

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\(^\text{127}\) *Manchester Guardian*, 20 June 1959.

\(^\text{128}\) *Spectator*, 29 May 1959, Letter from John Moffett titled ‘All Black-All White’.

\(^\text{129}\) *Spectator*, 18 June 1959, Letter from Conrad Bollinger titled ‘All Black-All White’
A correspondent in the *Daily Telegraph* (London) also challenged a benign colonising legacy and the happy relationship between two peoples:

In the expansionist warfare of last century...Maoris were robbed of most of their land and two-thirds of their numbers...New Zealand might pause to reflect that they owe their present prosperity and immunity from racial strife to measures so brutally effective as to make Sharpeville look like a vicarage garden party. The Africans of South Africa may not think themselves lucky in many respects. If they study the fate of the...Maori, they may think themselves lucky to be alive at all.130

Geoffrey Moorhouse in the *Guardian* took Keith Sinclair to task for stating in his 1959 publication, *A History of New Zealand*, that there was nothing resembling a colour bar in New Zealand and only minor antagonisms are present. An incredulous Moorhouse stated that surely the Bennett incident and the rugby tour protests were more than minor racial antagonisms. Thus he charged Sinclair for his perpetuation of the false but 'comfortable notion of a country whose two races live in amity and equality'. Moorhouse proceeded to give an extensive analysis of race relations and the rugby tour protest finishing on the note that 'Whatever the magnitude of New Zealand's racial problem today, it is only in its infancy'.131

Nevertheless, such forceful challenges and a more in-depth view of the colonising legacy were infrequent and criticism generally appeared in brief opinion pieces or 'Letters to the Editor' columns. Taken overall, New Zealand came out remarkably well from the tour protests, and consolidated her international reputation. It was in sharp contrast to the situation at home where the controversy was a significant force in changing the face of race relations in New Zealand.

*Creating a Space for National Discussion on Race Relations*

While the protest failed to force the cancellation of the tour it succeeded in other ways, not least in opening up a vigorous national discussion on race relations. As Rolland O'Regan stated:

I don't think any other issue could have made the question of race relations debated over every bridge table, over every bar, every hairdressing salon, almost in every shop, in every house, in every family. You couldn't have picked on an issue which wasn't more

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130 This was reprinted in the *New Zealand Herald*, 4 April 1960.
universally concerned and I believe that this great national debate did an enormous amount to clarify our thinking in New Zealand on race relations, not only among Europeans, but among Maoris also.132

Public discussion was added to by the print media with magazines, newspaper editorials and columns being the main sources of public comment. The issues raised during the 'Bennett incident' were revisited time and again - such as overt discrimination, and whether discrimination had a social or racial basis. Also coming in were comments related to the negative qualities of Maori which prevented them integrating into society and which to some extent encouraged social discrimination. As one correspondent noted, through their work ethic and desire for success Europeans had carved a 'nation from the wilderness'. Maori had none of these qualities and were inherently lazy, and had neither the 'inclination, will, nor the emotional stability to stick at a trade or profession'.133

Yet others believed that the tour protest demonstrated that race relations were harmonious. That Pakeha had supported Maori was proof that New Zealanders were 'one people'. Eruera Tirikatene concurred and noted that Pakeha support was evidence of 'their appreciation...of the Maori people' and of the 'harmonious race relations that have prevailed and which still do exist in New Zealand'.134 An editorial in the New Zealand Herald observed that 'at least the agitation has proved to the Maoris that they have honest Pakeha friends...The controversy has disclosed in New Zealand a high sense of racial tolerance which is all to the good'.135 The Government too, despite having reservations about the protest for the harm that it might have on New Zealand's reputation, had reason to be pleased. Jack Hunn (Assistant Secretary of Maori Affairs) stated that the rugby controversy had 'mobilised public opinion as never before on the side of Maori and against racial discrimination' and was a clear 'indication of the improvement in race relations'.136

132 Rolland O'Regan in 'My Old Man's an All Black', Deborah Nation (producer), Radio New Zealand, 1 April 2005, Radio New Zealand Archives, Christchurch.
134 Hon. E.T. Tirikatene, 'Press Statement', 22 March 1960, O'Regan Family-Diaries and Papers, 89-097-5 ATL.
136 Covering letter, Jack K. Hunn to Secretary of External Affairs, 31 May 1961, in 'Report to the Secretary of External Affairs - "Race Relations in New Zealand and the Indigenous Populations Convention"', MA1, Box 654, 36/1/21, NA.
Then there were those who recognised the myth of the 'one people' narrative. A range of people spoke of witnessing discrimination, and becoming more aware of its prevalence. The leftist *Monthly Review* was quite clear that racial equality and harmony was a myth:

...the most gaily painted of the hypocrisies that serve to prop the national ego is the myth of Maori -Pakeha brotherhood. Our politicians have been fattening their overseas reputation on it for years...

The article went on to speak of 'racism' in accommodation, housing and employment with the worst aspect of racism being the stereotypes attributed to Maori:

'...ill-fed, ill-housed, ill-nourished, tubercular, shiftless, superstitious, improvident, sexually promiscuous, delinquent, untruthful... [and as] a complimentary balance... they are happy-go-lucky, generous, personally loyal, good operators of machinery.'

However it was the issue of Maori privilege and differential treatment which received much sustained and negative comment, and the issue crystallised into the view that Maori were privileged and Pakeha suffered from discrimination. Much of the comment on this issue came out of a statement by Ralph Love, representative of the Maori Advisory Board on the NZRFU, who declared that he was 'in favour of discrimination in rugby'. Essentially Love's statement revolved around differential treatment and the retention of cultural identity. He argued that Maori had separate institutions, including a Maori rugby team, through which they preserved their identity. Therefore to demand equality on the rugby field would spell the end of the institution of Maori rugby. They couldn't have it both ways: they either maintained their separate institutions which strengthened identity or, in the pursuit of equality, they assimilated into Pakeha institutions which would result in the 'submergence of the Maori'.

The reaction from Maori to Love’s statement was immediate and fierce and he was condemned widely across Maoridom. The Raukawa tribal executive found his views ‘repulsive’, and called on Tirikatene to reprimand Love, who was his private

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137 For example, 'Letter to the Editor', from 'Margaret', *New Zealand Herald*, 10 March, 1960.
139 *Dominion*, 13 June 1959; *Evening Post*, 13 June 1959.
140 *Evening Post*, 13 June 1959.
secretary.\textsuperscript{141} Ngati Kahungunu stated that Love’s views were ‘belittling to Maoridom’; James Henare was ‘compelled to dissociate…as strongly as I possibly can from that statement’; and the MWWL also ‘strongly disagreed’.\textsuperscript{142} Love’s brother, Wi Hape Love, acted as spokesperson for the whanau and stated that they were ‘perturbed to think that my brother’s personal views should be accepted as the family’s in sporting, educational and social circles…and I wish to dissociate myself and my people from such views’.\textsuperscript{143}

A week later Love made another statement in an attempt to clarify his view and quell the uproar.\textsuperscript{144} His argument was that Maori were not treated equally in that they had special privileges over Pakeha. Therefore their arguments for equality on the rugby field fell on ‘hollow ground’ when legislation giving Maori preferential treatment was considered. This included statutes dealing with ‘Maori land, Maori housing, the Maori Land Court, Maori Tribal Committees, Maori Welfare Officers, Maori schools,…the Maori Affairs Department and the Maori parliamentary representatives’. He noted that Maori would not be happy if all these were expunged in the name of ‘equality’ and suggested that they consider the outcome on private Maori schools and other separate Maori organisations. Would they be ‘utilised for the general community? Indeed, would there be any more Maori rugby teams, let alone representatives in the NZRFU?’\textsuperscript{145} He was not against special treatment for Maori, but they could not on the one hand demand equality in Pakeha social institutions such as the rugby field and yet retain their special privileges which were in themselves discriminatory.

He argued that separate Maori institutions were vital for the promotion and maintenance of Maori identity, and it was a ludicrous situation that Maori, who were opposed to racial discrimination and demanded equality, were in fact arguing for something that ‘was unfavourable to the Maori race’.\textsuperscript{146} He opposed ‘any move which might bring these drastic changes about …because I honestly and seriously believe that Maori activities in social life at least, must be kept intact and separate if the people so desire. I

\textsuperscript{141} Dominion, 16 June 1959. Ralph Love was Eruera Tirikatene’s private secretary.
\textsuperscript{142} Dominion 16 June 1959; Northern Advocate 19 June 1959; Dominion 18 June 1959.
\textsuperscript{143} Dominion, (no date), O’Regan Family-Diaries and papers, 89-097-5, ATL.
\textsuperscript{144} Evening Post, 22 June 1959; New Zealand Herald, 22 June 1959. This paragraph is taken from these two sources.
\textsuperscript{145} New Zealand Herald, 22 June 1959.
\textsuperscript{146} Evening Post, 22 June 1959; New Zealand Herald, 22 June 1959.
will continue to support the special preferment of Maori activities, the increase of Maori members in parliament in keeping with the growth of the Maori population.  

Love’s statements made an opening for sustained discussion. A New Zealand Herald editorial, ‘Equality Means an End to Privilege’, observed that only the government could invoke the principle of racial equality and cancel the tour. However if it did so there would have to be a review on the ‘many instances in which Maori were “more equal than others”’. This included Maori parliamentary representation, special land laws and taxation privileges, special Maori schools and their own government department which attended to Maori issues. The editorial thought that a review may be advantageous if special privileges were abandoned as it would bring about full racial equality in New Zealand. The issue crystallised into the view that Maori were privileged and Pakeha suffered from discrimination. A letter by 'Kiwi' - typical of the current discourse - argued that it was time to 'end the generations-old discrimination against the pakeha' and cited Maori privilege as having separate fishing rights, separate Maori electorates, the four Maori parliamentary seats, and separate Maori institutions such as the Maori All Black team.

From a Pakeha perspective, Maori were privileged in that they had special rights which were racially discriminatory as they were not available to Pakeha. With the liberal position of equality entrenched in New Zealand’s identity, special rights for Maori flew in the face of the ‘one people’ ideology. New Zealander’s were not one people while some had special rights according to their race. All New Zealanders must be treated the same. From a Maori perspective it was not so clear cut. Maori wanted social and economic equality and access to the same institutions in New Zealand, but they also wanted to retain their own institutions which promoted and preserved cultural continuity and Maori identity. What Maori wanted was a truly bicultural society in which they had social, economic political and cultural equality. While the Hunn Report gave a nod to the retention of cultural forms, it made no allowance for the inclusion of these within the fabric of society, and instead it was to be perpetuated by the efforts of Maori on the margins of society.

147 Ibid.  
148 New Zealand Herald, 22 June 1959.  
149 Dominion, Letter to the Editor, 'Kiwi', 18 June 1959.
If anything, the special Maori rights or ‘privileges’ were a reflection of the injustice and discrimination to which Maori had been subject, and the colonial assault on their language and cultural forms, and their political, economic and social marginalisation. As Clare Charters points out, ‘it would cause an injustice, an inequality, not to recognise Maori rights’. Special Maori rights or ‘privileges’ were a means of bringing Maori to some form of equality in a Pakeha dominated society, in the face of the inequality and injustice to which they had been subjected to historically, and which continued to be played out in contemporary terms. The struggle for Maori was to retain their cultural forms and identity, to take their place as equal partners in the political processes of New Zealand. The special rights and institutions were the means bringing Maori to social, political, cultural and economic equality with Pakeha and the basis for a bicultural nation.

Thus, the combination of the Bennett incident, Ausubel's research and the 'No Maoris No Tour' protest opened up race relations in New Zealand. Rather than dying down following the tour protest, as will be seen later, race relations remained central and contested.

**The 1960 Tour and the Development of Political Consciousness**

A significant outcome of the tour controversy was the development of a new political consciousness and an accompanying outspokenness and forcefulness of many Maori. This had little to do with the recognition of historical and contemporary injustice. Maori knew and lived these issues. While many leaders spoke publicly about racial equality and harmony, and Maori at grass-roots level rarely said anything publicly, this was merely the public face of Maoridom. Out on the Pakeha margins and in the centre of Maori society - in many Maori communities, homes and on marae - the talk was often of historical and contemporary grievances, of discrimination and inequality, of Pakeha duplicity, and of resentment. Donna Awatere-Huata recalls spending time with Ngati Porou whanau in Ruatoria during this period and becoming 'imbued' with political issues:

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They wrote so many waiata about the treaty. I used to hear them sung at parties... They were followers of Kotahitanga, the movement that believed there should be a separate Maori parliament. They believed very firmly in holding fast to the Maori language and that not a single acre more should leave Maori hands... The favourite song in those days was Te Matauranga o te Pakeha - “The wickedness and deviousness of the Pakeha have been inspired by whom? Why by Satan of course. So beware of this lest you be swayed by their slithering ways”.151

The new political consciousness was more the realisation by some Maori that 'co-operation with the Pakeha' and of being a good citizen was not enough to grant equality and respect. Nor was the Treaty of Waitangi: although its terms guaranteed equality, it was easily ignored when a moral issue collided with Pakeha priorities. That Maori had racial equality were merely words not backed up in actions, and there was a brutal sense of betrayal. Reverend Whakahuihui Vercoe recalled:

We were particularly conscious of what the Maori Battalion had done in the war. Very conscious of the sacrifices they had made and the losses they had sustained. And yet our Maori players weren't allowed to go on the tour. They were excluded from our national team. I think we were woken out of our sleep by that really. It became apparent that something had to be done. That's when I became politically conscious of what was happening around me.152

CABTA spoke similarly of betrayal:

We have always taken for granted that this policy [race relations] could be summed up in the words, “We are one people” which were spoken by Governor Hobson, as each chief signed the Treaty of Waitangi,...we have followed this maxim...the ideal has been clear, and this is the star we have followed. We thought that this was New Zealand's racial policy. Now ... we are not so sure.153

It was also a realisation that protest could be taken out into the public and was not confined to spaces away from mainstream New Zealand. Participation in the 'No

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153 'Submissions of CABTA deputation' to Prime Minister Nash and acting-Leader of the Opposition (John Marshall), 26 February 1960, pp.3-4, O'Regan Family - Diaries and Papers, 89-097-5, ATL.
Maoris No Tour' protest shifted Maori from the margins into the centre of a highly political issue. Active participation in marches, taking leadership roles, organising protests, attending meetings, demonstrating in public places with others, and gaining new perspectives and ideas, were more effective means of politicising than merely reading about the issue in newspapers. Many had rarely registered any form of dissent publicly and participation in CABTA generated an awareness of the power of active public protest, and importantly, that they could protest publicly. This was a marked shift from the traditional position of 'suffering in silence'.

In some instances it was an act of defiance to the common admonition by older Maori, 'Don't rock the boat'. Pam Wall, who was on the CABTA Executive Committee, reflected that it was also an act of courage at a time when protest was frowned upon, when protesters were defined as the 'lunatic fringe of the population', and when 'to dissent is to be disloyal' was a pervasive and prevailing discourse. For some, these constraints, along with the fear of repercussions from employers, authorities, workmates and friends resulted in a lack of participation in visible protest actions, and dissent was registered only by signing the CABTA petition. Even this was a significant step to take. Ranginui Walker recalls the apprehension he felt when he signed the petition:

I was a mature student at the time and petitions were being circulated...And when this petition came along I felt very brave putting my name to this and thinking this might go to the government. You had to be brave because we had such a repressive society.

Thus the rugby tour controversy was a significant moment which generated a new political awareness amongst many Maori. It also marked the beginning of a division between older Maori who advocated 'Don't rock the boat' and many Maori leaders who continued to 'co-operate with the Pakeha' (although this position did not necessarily signal compliance or preclude them from publicly contesting government actions, especially from the late 1960s), and a younger generation who were prepared to address injustice publicly and vigorously call the government to account. A core of young

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154 Pam Wall, interviewed in 'My Old Man's an All Black', Deborah Nation (Producer), Radio New Zealand, 1 April 2005. Pam Wall (Ngati Taiwa) was a founding member of CABTA.
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid.
157 Interview with Ranginui Walker, 8 September 2006.
politicised Maori emerged – people like Patu Hohepa, Koro Dewes, Ranginui Walker, Whetu Tirikatene, Tipene O'Regan and Whakahuihui Vercoe – who would later become Maori leaders, activists or a combination of both when necessary. From the late 1960s they became instrumental in the new and various forms of Maori activism which emerged, including transnational activism and networking, and in mentoring roles where they provided support for a new younger generation of Maori activists which emerged later in the decade.

**Expanding an international outlook: Developing an awareness of apartheid**

A third outcome was the contribution to a growing awareness of apartheid and the oppression of non-white South Africans. It subsequently played a significant role in the development of Maori activism. Coming into the tour protest, knowledge about apartheid was probably not widespread, but it was better understood by many Maori leaders and pockets of educated young Maori within universities and training colleges. Apartheid had shifted into consciousness during the 1950s and especially amongst academics. Ranginui Walker recalls first becoming 'conscientised' when the All Blacks toured South Africa in 1949:

> I was taken aback by the radio commentator talking about the blacks who were not cheering for their country. They were cheering for the All Blacks. So that indicated to me that something was wrong in South Africa'.

For many young students, literature was the opening to an awareness of apartheid. *Cry, the Beloved Country*, was a text for senior students at High School in the 1950s and while written just prior to formalisation of the policy of apartheid, Alan Paton vividly depicted the segregation of black South Africans. Coming out in the mid-1950s was Trevor Huddlestone's book, *Naught for Your Comfort*, which for Ranginui Walker 'filled in the gaps' about the situation in South Africa and 'laid the apartheid system on the

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158 Ibid.
line. However, there was also a long historical lineage between Maori and South Africa, of incidents, hurts and humiliations which were woven into the fabric of the remembered history of iwi and hapu. The exclusion of Maori on the rugby field stretched back to 1919 when Parekura Tureia was excluded from a New Zealand Services team to play in South Africa on the grounds that if Maori were included 'immense harm politically and otherwise would follow'. This was followed by hostility from the Springbok team to New Zealand in 1921 who objected having to play a Maori All Black team (which Tureia captained), subsequent exclusion from tours to South Africa and controversies surrounding Maori and the Springboks during their visits to New Zealand. Adding to the rugby history were single events such as the discrimination which King Rata experienced while in Cape Town in 1914, and the actions of Ratana who, while also in Cape Town, recognised the appalling oppression of black dockworkers and put on a meal for them. More recently and best remembered was the discrimination against Maori Battalion troops during the Second World War who were denied the same shore leave as Pakeha while berthed in Cape Town.

Therefore by the time of the 1960 tour, many Maori were aware that South Africa imposed some form of segregation on the non-white population, and some had a deeper knowledge of the system of apartheid. While there was little indication of any identification with their struggles or oppression (that would come later), there was an expressed empathy and abhorrence of apartheid. Eruera Tirikatene made it clear that Maori people 'empathised' with their 'dark-skinned brethren in South Africa whose
dignity and worth are so down-trodden by the cruel, destructive policy of apartheid'. Tirikatene mounted his own private protest against the segregation policies of South Africa. An avid rugby player in his youth and an equally keen supporter in later years, Tirikatene vowed that he would never again attend a Springbok game or offer support. The MWWL maintained an anti-apartheid stance which it had adopted during the 1956 Springbok tour, and the Maori section of the National Council of Churches called for the abandonment of the tour, not only because of discrimination against Maori but because of 'the disservice done by the tour' to those who were campaigning against apartheid sport in South Africa. In the Manawatu, the Maori Missioners also opposed apartheid and called for a sporting boycott: not only was the exclusion of Maori unjust, if a team went to South Africa New Zealand would be 'deserting the African natives who badly need some champions'. And, as mentioned, Auckland CABTA members, including Arapeta Awatere, maintained links with anti-apartheid leaders in South Africa. This was perhaps not surprising in the case of Awatere, as he was with the Maori Battalion which was denied shore leave in Cape Town in 1940. Lastly, at the final demonstration of the 1960 tour protests at Myers Park a resolution was adopted which condemned apartheid and pledged to support ‘South African nationalism’. Thus in 1959/60 apartheid reached across borders into New Zealand and added another layer to the ongoing relationship.

The protest was never about the racial policies in South Africa, but apartheid was central and referred to in speeches, on banners, at meetings and in the press. After all, the application of apartheid policies to Maori was the reason for protest. In 1960 apartheid went beyond the banners and abstract notions of what apartheid meant. Any gaps in the knowledge of New Zealand citizens were filled in when reports of the Sharpeville massacre reached New Zealand and the details were made available. The

165 Hon. E.T. Tirikatene, 'Press Statement', 16 June 1959, O'Regan Family-Diaries and Papers, 89-097-5, ATL.
166 Email interview with Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan, 21 Aug 2009.
167 Thompson, Retreat from Apartheid, p.19.
169 In support of the Maori Battalion, Pakeha troops (principally officers and NCO's) refused to take shore leave and they declined official invitations, thereby causing the South African government some embarrassment. Eventually a compromise of sorts was reached and the Maori Battalion was permitted to go ashore and attend a luncheon hosted by the Mayoress of Cape Town. Afterwards they were given less than an hour to see the city. See, 'Once were warriors – the 28th Maori Battalion of the New Zealand Army', Axis History Forum, http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=59&p=1670656 - accessed 23 Nov 2012.
170 New Zealand Herald, 9 May 1960.
massacre epitomised oppression, repression, and revealed what apartheid meant with stunning clarity. This one event had international and national significance: it marked a turning point in the political resistance against apartheid and was the springboard for the subsequent development of the anti-racism and anti-apartheid movements in New Zealand. Internationally, in 1966 the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed the 21<sup>st</sup> March, the anniversary of Sharpeville, to be the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. In New Zealand in 1969 it also became Race Relations Day, a designation which exists to this day. By 1968 Maori activists were not only opposed to apartheid, but had made an ontological leap and identified their struggle with that of black South Africans.

**Jack Hunn's 'Winds of Change': Contesting Integration**

The increased public discussion on race relations was added to by the publication of the Hunn Report which was, for Maori, the most significant report of the decade and was responsible for the introduction of policies which were to have far-reaching effects. This has been well-documented and will not be revisited. Rather, a brief cover of the Hunn report, how it fitted into the 'Winds of Change', and the key issues which are pertinent to the development of transnational activism and subsequent links with indigenous peoples will be the focus. A significant issue related to land will be covered in a later chapter.

In the midst of the rugby tour protests, Prime Minister Nash appointed Jack Hunn to the position of Acting Secretary for Maori Affairs to 'review the aims and policy of the Department along the lines indicated by Government'. Nash, concerned about the fragmentation of Maori land, instructed Hunn to 'arrive at an accounting of Maori assets and find a way of using them for the good of the Maori people as a whole'. Hunn interpreted Maori assets to include both material and human resources and conducted 'a

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new look at Maori affairs from every angle'. His report, submitted in August 1960, was side-lined by Nash who was occupied with the forthcoming general election. With the change of government, the new Minister of Maori Affairs, Ralph Hanan, picked up the report, endorsed and published it in 1961.

The Hunn Report was a comprehensive study on housing, education, health, population, employment, land settlement, land titles, crime and legal differentiation and included statistical comparisons with Pakeha. In this it laid bare Maori disadvantage and inequality in education, health, crime, employment, housing and land development. The recommendations put forward by Hunn reflected an imperative to bring Maori to a position of socio-economic equality. This would minimise potential race relations problems in the face of a growing and increasingly urban Maori population, and their participation in this as a largely unskilled workforce. Inequality bred resentment and unrest and thus the solution to inequality and disadvantage was to be found in the integration of Maori into the mainstream social and economic structures of society. The aim was to 'close the gaps' and raise Maori to the same level as Pakeha, thereby making 'one people'. While the national narrative spoke of 'one people', and there was a degree of unity, New Zealanders were not yet 'one people' and Hunn's recommendations were designed to bring this about.

The commissioning of the Hunn Report can be seen in the context of wider international and national considerations. Race equality had assumed centrality across the globe both nationally and internationally in organisations such as the United Nations and the International Labour Organisation. Concerns for the equality of indigenous peoples were also making an appearance through the United Nations with the ILO 'Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, 1957'. This recognised the rights of indigenous peoples to complete equality, and it sought the integration of indigenous peoples into the dominant mainstream population. The Convention charged signatories with developing programmes in collaboration with indigenous leader to bring about equality and the same opportunities that the mainstream population enjoyed. While this will also be covered in a later chapter, it is enough to say here that New Zealand was under some pressure to sign the Convention, not least as it was noted for its good race relations

174 Ibid.
record and the supposed equitable treatment of Maori. Hunn was clearly influenced by the ‘wind of change’ and international developments. In an address to the New Zealand University Students’ Association in 1963 he placed New Zealand’s changing race relations within the context of decolonisation and the evolution of the rights for ‘coloured people’, especially through the United Nations.175

The recent events in New Zealand too had placed race relations centre-stage and had sent out warnings to the Government that all was not well in the area of race relations. The protests against apartheid in South Africa and the civil rights protests in America were topical and well-covered by the mainstream press. The message for the Government was clear: inequality and discrimination had the potential to lead to civil unrest and radical protest action. New Zealand academics had been warning of future strife for the past decade, and more immediately so had David Ausubel. Therefore it was vital that the potential for future racial conflict be minimised as much as possible. Simply put, a Maori population living in complete equality and able to enjoy the same fruits of society as Pakeha, would inhibit the development of racial tension and disunity. Thus the Hunn Report, while no doubt concerned with lifting Maori to equality for reasons located in the national interest, was also influenced by events occurring across the world. Prime Minister Nash hinted at this when he announced the commissioning of the report:

> Relations between people of different racial backgrounds present one of the greatest problems of the world today...for this country integration is not only the best path to follow but ultimately and inevitably the only path that will lead to the development of a happy, harmonious and progressive community.176

Hunn's report was framed in the press as the 'New Deal' for Maori and the solution to Maori inequality and disadvantage. The *Evening Post* viewed the 'New Deal' as a 'blue print of great potential' for the Government to take to Maori people, discuss their problems, and offer imaginative approaches to solving these problems.177 In fact integration was not new and had become the preferred policy of Government during the 1950s. What was new was the extent and speed to which integration was to be effected. Based on the appalling statistics of disadvantage, and a rapidly growing Maori

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175 Megan C. Woods, Integrating the Nation…’, p.85.
population, speed was essential. Thus Hunn aimed at accelerating integration wherever possible including an aggressive and deliberate campaign to encourage Maori to relocate from rural to urban areas. This was ‘the quickest and surest way of integrating the two species of New Zealander’. With the acceleration of urbanisation and the recommendations put forward to mainstream Maori, Hunn claimed that in two generations Maori ‘should be well nigh fully integrated’.

Integration was ‘To combine (not fuse) the Maori and Pakeha elements to form one nation wherein Maori culture remains distinct’. Ultimately he envisaged the emergence of ‘a new New Zealand race, light chocolate in colour...which will be mindful of the best traditions of both its European and its Maori heritage’. Thus there was a nod to some cultural continuity. What this culture was and what constituted the ‘Maori heritage’ in the ‘new New Zealand race’ was unknown, for it would be directed by an evolutionary process based on the Darwinian concept of the ‘survival of the fittest’. Much of Maori culture had failed to survive the onset of colonisation and only the ‘relics’ including language, arts and crafts and the marae (the ‘fittest elements’) had survived thus far. Whether these would be retained in the future was entirely in the hands of Maori: if they considered them useful or important they would survive and if not they would die away. Government had no part to play in promoting preservation of culture. With the lack of involvement by Government to make provisions and support cultural continuity in an urban environment, Government policy can be seen as more aligned to assimilation rather than integration, a fact which was not lost on Maori critics. However, neither Hunn nor Hanan were concerned about issues of cultural continuity. The imperative was to urbanise Maori and integrate them into Pakeha New Zealand as speedily as possible.

Education was an immediate priority and pivotal to Maori advancement and progress. It was the driver of integration and ‘the one thing, more than any other, that will pave

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179 Ibid.
181 Correspondence, Office of the High Commissioner for Canada (Wellington), to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, 3 April 1962, RG25, Vol.16938, File:45-NZ-13-3, Part1, LAC. This sentiment was expressed by Hunn in conversation with the Canadian High Commissioner.
182 Hunn Report, p.15.
the way to further progress in housing, health, employment and acculturation.\textsuperscript{183} It was also fundamental for racial harmony: educational inequality bred social inequality, a separation between people, and accompanying tensions and feelings of resentment.\textsuperscript{184} Hunn's study revealed a 'statistical black-out' at post-primary level with few staying on into the 6\textsuperscript{th} form or going to university.\textsuperscript{185} The problem was not the education system, nor the quality of teaching, but parental apathy and indifference of young Maori to post-primary and university education. The challenge was to close the gap in educational achievement between Maori and Pakeha and shift Maori into tertiary education. The plan was to work across the entire education spectrum, from pre-school to postgraduate university studies by disbursing funds, support and encouragement. To this end, Hunn proposed a Maori Education Foundation (MEF) which was founded in December 1961.

Hunn sought to effect an almost complete shift away from the Maori world. His plan was to encourage and assist migration through a range of actions, and inducements were provided for Maori to sell their land interests in order to qualify for assistance to relocate to urban areas. This removed the basic concept of turangawaewae and ties to the land.\textsuperscript{186} Moreover the lack of provision for cultural continuity within an urban environment shifted urban Maori away from traditional cultural values and institutions and impacted on cultural integrity. Housing was to be pepper-potted within Pakeha housing areas, and was designed to break down enclaves of Maori, and embed them in a Pakeha world.

It was through the reconstitution of the role of Department of Maori Affairs that Hunn sought to shift the department away from the Maori world and its close relationship with Maori people. He proposed to mainstream existing activities with other departments taking over the main responsibility for particular aspects such as health, welfare, employment, education and housing. Maori Affairs was to be restructured with its role being reduced to that of a co-ordinating body with a semi-supervisory function over other departments, thus retaining residual influence and responsibility. As Harris notes, the weakening of the role of the Department of Maori Affairs cut away the

\textsuperscript{183} Hunn Report, p.22; \textit{Te Ao Hou}, No. 39, June 1962, p.7.
\textsuperscript{184} \textit{Te Ao Hou}, No.39, June 1962, p.7.
\textsuperscript{185} In 1956, 75 Maori students attended university compared to 10,988 non-Maori. See Hunn Report, p 25.
support base from Maori families and communities who had built close relationships with the department. Maori were therefore abandoned to mainstream departments which possessed only a superficial understanding of Maori, and did not have the enthusiasm to work with them in the same manner as Maori Affairs.\(^{187}\)

A jaundiced view of the capabilities of Maori within the Department of Maori Affairs played some part in Hunn's determination to restructure the department. In a conversation with the High Commissioner for Canada (R.B.Edmonds), Hunn claimed he had been forced to step in previously and assume a direct role in Maori welfare as Maori showed 'no great willingness to tackle their own problems'. Even the MWWL, which 'should be accepting responsibility for maintaining and improving Maori health and housing standards, were not fulfilling this role'. In short, according to Hunn, 'Maoris are long on talking, but short on action'. The role of Maori within the Department of Maori Affairs and in district offices needed addressing for the situation was dire:

> Few Maoris have developed European standards of executive responsibility. Mr Hunn admitted, confidentially, that the administrative efficiency of his department was hampered...particularly by the number of Maori Welfare officers in district offices. These Maori Welfare officers were “used” by their people for their own purposes and, on the whole, were Maoris first and civil servants only second. In a number of instances where trouble had occurred in Maori communities, it had been discovered that Maori welfare officers had been at the bottom of it. Mr Hunn suggested that there were too many Maoris in the Maori Affairs Department and not enough in other government departments ....many Pakehas in administrative authority had become annoyed with evidences of Maori inefficiency and nepotism...\(^{188}\)

The task of implementing Hunn's recommendations fell on Ralph Hanan, who deferred to Hunn's knowledge about Maori, and was an enthusiastic supporter of both Hunn and his integration policies. Although a well-regarded and able politician and cabinet minister, Hanan admitted 'he knew nothing about Maoris' prior to taking up his Maori Affairs portfolio. However he had 'read and re-read the Hunn Report and believed he now understood all their problems....He had...made it his bible and Jack Hunn ...his


\(^{188}\) Report written in 1960 by Mr R. B. Edmonds (High Commissioner for Canada), included in Correspondence, High Commissioner for Canada (Wellington) to Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, 3 April 1962, Ref: RG 25, Vol.16938, File: 45-NZ-13-3, Part 1, LAC.
expert on all things Maori' In fact, Hanan understood very little about either historical or contemporary issues and he cared less for Maori aspirations. Neither did Hunn. His knowledge was sparse and he had minimal contact with Maori. At a United Nations cocktail party in New York, Hunn was embarrassed when an American social worker pointedly asked how many Maori he had entertained in his home during the past year, to which Hunn had to admit to only two.

Hunn and Hanan promoted the integration policy around New Zealand and presented it as Maoridom's 'Winds of Change'. In his 1961 Waitangi oration, Hanan identified Maori disadvantage encapsulated in the Hunn report, urged integration to avoid race conflict and create 'one people' whereby 'two ways of life became one'. Integration was equated with progress and modernity and in line with modern New Zealand and people the world over: 'You live with other men of the twentieth century now and must sail alongside them'. Integration was critical and the process needed to begin without delay. Therefore Hanan urged Maori to 'Hoist the sails to catch the winds of change and increase the pace'.

Shifting Maori from the Maori world involved more than a shift in geographical terms. It involved changing attitudes. Maori students, the new generation which would likely join an urban workforce, were a target. In the end-of-year speeches at two Maori schools Hunn pointed out that while the 'Winds of Change' were blowing across the world, they were also 'wafting' through Maoridom as Maori shifted 'from its old rural and communal way of life in primitive surroundings to an urban and individual way of life in a modern environment'.

190 Ibid.
191 Correspondence, Canadian High Commissioner to New Zealand to Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, 3 April 1962, 'New Zealand Native Affairs - Reports', File-2907-40, LAC.
193 Ibid.
He urged them to 'trim your sails to the winds of change' and become modern Maori. This, he assured them, did not mean that they would lose their Maori identity:

[They] wonder if it’s a good thing...if they are really Maori any more...they feel they have unwittingly renounced their Maori heritage and abandoned the true life...they fear they are losing their Maori identity...you are not being unfaithful to the Maori race when you change with the time. You are simply becoming a modern Maori instead of an old-fashioned one. And a modern Maori is still a Maori, not a Pakeha....Don't pine for the “good old days” and mourn the loss of Maori culture. Maori culture is still very much alive if you know how to recognise it. Maori culture is simply the way of life of Maori people and their way of looking at things'.

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**Maori React to the Hunn Report: Support and Opposition**

The reaction from Maori to the Hunn Report, and more generally the concept of integration, was mixed with expressions of support as well as extensive opposition. All Maori, including the MWWL, prominent Maori leaders and tribal boards and committees, wanted social and economic equality and they welcomed the social, economic and educational reforms being proposed to 'close the gaps' and remove the

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194 J.K.Hunn, "The Winds of Change in Maoridom', end of year address to students at St Paul's Maori Boys College (5 Dec 1962) and St Joseph's Maori Girls College (6 Dec 1962), J McEwen Papers, MS-Papers - 6717-111, ATL.

195 Ibid.
barriers to inter-racial equality. For many, the problem with the Hunn Report lay with integration, and what it meant with regard to retaining cultural forms and identity. With no commitment by the government to assist in the preservation of te reo or other cultural forms, Maori were concerned that integration was a one way street, travelled along solely by Maori towards assimilation. Opposition in this respect was significant and many took the view that integration was merely another name for assimilation, and a continuation of the colonial assimilation project. For example, Canon Rangiihu, an Anglican minister advocated for integration provided it was a two way process. The Maori Synod of the Presbyterian Church of New Zealand criticised the assumption that Pakeha had a right to decide the form which integration would take without consultation or any consideration of Maori 'hopes and intentions'. Many took the view that integration simply meant the assimilation of Maori into Pakeha New Zealand and the accompanying loss of Maori identity. Puti Tipene Watene (Steve Watene), the chairman of the Maori Policy Committee of the Labour Party, publicly condemned the report and argued that the intent of the report was aimed at 'integrating the Maoris, as a people, out of existence'. A Dominion editorial noted that in the absence of a clear statement from Labour, the question to be asked was, “What is the alternatives to integration? Separateness, with all that that entails?”

Fears for the loss of Maori language and culture was a principal cause of opposition. Te Ouenuku Rene (paramount chief of Ngati Toa, Ngati Raukawa), viewed the report with misgiving for its assimilative thrust and the gradual obliteration of Maori culture under the banner of 'progressive'. He noted that the Hunn Report spoke of the 'development of culture' and asked Hanan to explain:

...to what type of culture does he refer? Would it be Maori culture? ...Reforms for the social and economic development of the Maori people are to be welcomed but they should not be used as a cloak to disguise the point of a dagger aimed at annihilating the spirit of a race.

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196 Cited in Megan C. Woods, ‘Integrating the Nation…’, p.93
The loss of Maori language and culture caused many to fear the worst. This especially applied to the thrust of the MEF. Although this educational initiative was overwhelmingly supported by Maori, there was also considerable apprehension and opposition, and more so when the chairman, Douglas Ball, remarked that if Maori wanted to preserve their language 'it was their responsibility entirely to teach it to their children in the home'. As John Booth (former research officer in the Department of Maori Affairs) noted, this did little to allay the fears of Maori who feared that the work of the new MEF was an 'intensification of the same old policy of assimilation'. Many parents did not speak the language, having been punished for speaking it at school and secondly, the MEF wanted Maori children to improve their English-speaking skills by speaking more English in the home.201

In Raglan, at a public meeting called to discuss the MEF, Moana Raureti (Maori Welfare Officer for the Waikato) was asked if he thought that the MEF would assist in preserving the Maori language and culture. As far as Raureti was concerned,

The sooner the maori forgets his culture and traditions the better, as he has to learn to integrate fully with the white man and education is the first step towards this living together as one people.202

This was not well received. A member of the audience stated:

We are distinct people in colour and creed. We, as Maori people have learned the language and culture of the white man. How much more do we have to give? There are good and bad but they have not learned from us ...My culture and traditions should be preserved. I will support the foundation if the funds are used to preserve my culture. Education cannot change a black man into white. There will always be a social barrier between a Pakeha and a Maori.203

Some objections to the MEF came from prominent Maori leaders and centered on the issue of Maori privilege. Peter Love argued that Maori were already the most 'privileged native race in the world' and the MEF merely heaped 'more generosity upon a race already over-burdened with privileges and handouts'. Rather, there should be no separation between Maori problems and Pakeha problems. Love suggested that many

201 New Zealand Herald, 9 Oct 1962.
203 Ibid.
European children also required assistance, perhaps more than Maori children, and therefore there should be no discrimination. Instead, an education foundation for New Zealanders should be created.\textsuperscript{204} Similarly Doc Paewai argued that the MEF was yet another avenue whereby hand-outs were disbursed to Maori which were detrimental to Maori achievement, and which removed the desire and determination to succeed and the accompanying feelings of personal satisfaction. Paewai advocated that advancement for Maori lay in taking responsibility for their own lives through 'work and thrift'.\textsuperscript{205}

There was little opposition from Pakeha to the Hunn Report and most thought the MEF was critical in closing the gaps between Maori and Pakeha, and the route for the social and economic advancement of Maori.\textsuperscript{206} The removal of Maori privilege was raised, especially in relation to Maori parliamentary representation. The \textit{Tablet} noted that 'If the Maori are to be equal to the rest of the community, as they claim to be, then the Maori seats should have been abolished long ago and, for all the good the Maori members seem to do, very little would be lost'.\textsuperscript{207} In anticipation of future dissension and claims of 'privilege' and racial discrimination against Pakeha, the MEF committee created an annual post-graduate scholarship (Queen Elizabeth Post-Graduate Fellowship) to benefit Maori but which was available alternately to Maori and Pakeha. Hanan explained that this was 'to mollify those who claimed the MEF was another example of Maori privilege and that any education foundation 'should be available to both races'.\textsuperscript{208}

\textbf{Centering Race Relations: Debate, discussion and a central space for Maori}

The Bennett incident, Ausubel's analysis, the 1960 rugby tour, and the Hunn Report centralised race relations. At the same time urbanisation was in full force and Maori were shifted into a prominent position in society. There was a discernible change in the Maori-Pakeha relationship, and race relations generated discussion and debate. Not only was there a new willingness by Maori to speak out openly and forcefully, at grass

\textsuperscript{204} \textit{Evening Post}, 16 June 1962.
\textsuperscript{205} \textit{Te Ao Hou}, No. 52, Sept 1965, pp.5-7 (6); \textit{Tablet}, 22 Aug 1962.
\textsuperscript{206} See for example, ‘Editorial’, \textit{Dominion} 14 Jan 1962.
\textsuperscript{207} \textit{Tablet}, 22 Aug 1962.
\textsuperscript{208} Correspondence, Minister of Maori Affairs (Ralph Hanan) to Prime Minister Holyoake, 30 Nov 1962, ABHS 950, W4627, Box 117, 33/7/1, Part 2, NA. The award was instigated to commemorate the visit of Queen Elizabeth to Waitangi during her visit to New Zealand in 1963. Rather than give a gift, the scholarship was considered a fitting and lasting tribute.
roots levels anti-Pakeha and anti-colonial discourse began to be openly stated. As a Maori correspondent stated in the *New Zealand Listener*:

To all those who think that our racial garden is growing beautifully... All our major problems such as crime, education, health and instability are the result of European contact...I think the biggest problem for the Maori is not how we can master the European way of life, but trying to decide whether or not it is a way of life worth mastering. And a lot of us are convinced that it isn't'.

In *Te Ao Hou* a Pakeha teacher complained about the common occurrence of anti-Pakeha statements and comments directed at him by students and observed that it was a reflection of the attitudes of parents. In response, a correspondent suggested that:

I feel he does not fully understand the true cause of Maori hate for the Pakeha. It is not to be found in the attitude of no-good parents living in no-good houses in Freemans Bay. We must go back...to the land wars, the confiscations and the disintegration of tribal life. The mana was broken but the hate lived on, our sense of history does not allow us to forget....

A report on discrimination by the Department of Maori Affairs found widespread resentment and anti-Pakeha sentiments including the refusal of Maori who ran shearing gangs to employ Pakeha, and a lack of enthusiasm for mixed marriages. Older Maori stated outright that they would not enforce Pakeha laws and that they were robbed of their lands or it was taken from them for 'a piece of coloured ribbon or beads'.

An indication of the centralisation of race relations and the rising discontent amongst Maori can be seen in the increase of newspaper articles on race relations which were seeking answers to the friction which was becoming apparent. The *New Zealand Listener* asked, 'What's wrong with the Pakeha?', and a *Dominion* editorial asked whether race relations were improving or deteriorating. The latter came to the conclusion that, while there was no comparison with the situation in other countries, 'it would be idle to pretend that there is not, in some quarters, prejudice against Maoris'.

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210 *Te Ao Hou*, No.39, June 1962, p.15.
212 Department of Maori Affairs, 'Race Relations in New Zealand and the Indigenous Populations Convention', May 1961, MA1, Box 654, 36/1/21, NA.
213 Ibid.
The origin, however, lay in social status and not race. Maori had failed to take advantage of the opportunities available through higher education to improve their status and therefore were regarded by Pakeha as socially inferior.\(^2\)\(^1\)\(^4\)

There was an increase in meetings, conferences, panel discussions and addresses on race relations with Maori in demand as speakers. In 1962 one of the earliest race relations workshops was held at an Ardmore Youth Conference led by Rev. Kingi Ihaka.\(^2\)\(^1\)\(^5\) In Hamilton a panel convened under the auspices of the Hamilton English Association which included Koro Dewes, Dr Joan Metge, and Noel Hilliard (author) discussed the problems faced by Maori as they moved to the cities. This included social adjustment, racial discrimination in employment and accommodation, and the attitudes of Pakeha who held negative stereotypical views of Maori and failed to understand the difficulties which they faced in a new urban environment. Hilliard bluntly stated that there was no Maori social problem in the cities. Rather it was ‘essentially a European one. The Maori people have been left to cope with the European problem’.\(^2\)\(^1\)\(^6\)

In other examples, Matiu Te Hau spoke at the Whakatane Lions Club and Dr Rina Moore at the Palmerston North Coffee Club.\(^2\)\(^1\)\(^7\) The former spoke of race relations and the need for Maori and Pakeha to recognise differences and to work together to create harmonious race relations. He reminded the audience that while there was ‘sentimental’ talk of the ‘white man’s burden’, largely unrecognised or forgotten was that ‘the Pakeha had been the brown man’s burden for a number of years’.\(^2\)\(^1\)\(^8\) Moore spoke of historical and contemporary grievances, of racial discrimination and the ‘colour bar’ which continued to be practised. This brought indignation and denial from offended Pakeha who rejected Moore’s assertions.\(^2\)\(^1\)\(^9\) Despite the high profile Bennett incident, the Ausubel debate and the 1960 tour protest, all of which opened up New Zealand to discussion on domestic discrimination, many refused to accept that discrimination was a


\(^2\)\(^1\)\(^5\) *Upper Hutt Leader*, 15 March 1962.

\(^2\)\(^1\)\(^6\) *New Zealand Herald*, 22 April 1963.

\(^2\)\(^1\)\(^7\) *Bay of Plenty Beacon*, 10 April 1963. Mat Te Hau was a tutor and organiser of the Adult Education Department at the University of Auckland; Newspaper clipping, (No name, no date, Circa June 1961), MA1, Box 657, Record 36/1/21, NA.

\(^2\)\(^1\)\(^8\) *Bay of Plenty Beacon*, 10 April 1963.

\(^2\)\(^1\)\(^9\) Newspaper clipping, (No name), 6 June 1961, MA1, 36/1/21, Part 2, NA.
significant problem. However, in all the meetings and discussions there was a clear new
forcefulness and strong message to the public from Maori and their Pakeha supporters,
about race discrimination and the need for Pakeha to begin to recognise the unequal
position of Maori and the discrimination to which they were subject. As Matiu Te Hau
stressed, the coming together of two peoples in an urban environment required a change
of attitudes, recognition and understanding of differences. It was a relationship which
needed working on. No longer could race relations be left ‘to chance’.\textsuperscript{220}

Several academics, and experts on 'native' people, entered New Zealand and always had
an opinion on race relations. Dr Louden came in from Canada and immediately
pronounced that the situation with Maori was the same as that of 'Indians and Eskimos'
in that they were overly 'protected': they got so much given to them by the government
that they had no need to strive and as a consequence they had no need to help
themselves. Moreover there was no racial discrimination in Canada and there was none
in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{221} Lord Cobham who had finished his term as Governor-General,
similarly thought Maori 'had it a bit too good'. Speaking on 'Asian Club', a programme
broadcast in the General Overseas Service of the BBC, Cobham noted that while Maori
had full equality with Pakeha they were privileged in that they received monetary
payments for children and rent without having to work for it. There had been 'a bit too
much hand-out'.\textsuperscript{222}

Maori were becoming more politically active and confident. In 1963 the headmaster of
Wairoa District High School complained that Maori school leavers were discriminated
in the job market in the area. Maori reacted by forming a credit union which threatened
to place a boycott on the firms which were guilty of discriminating against Maori.\textsuperscript{223}

Not long after, the Education Department produced a booklet 'Washday in the Pa'.\textsuperscript{224}
The publication was commended by Pakeha for its representation of a ‘happy’ rural
Maori family living in the pa. Many Maori, however, criticised it for its portrayal of
Maori as backward, and the MWWL demanded that the booklet be withdrawn from

\textsuperscript{220} Bay of Plenty Beacon, 10 April 1963
\textsuperscript{221} Christchurch Press, 2 Nov 1962.
\textsuperscript{222} Evening Post, 13 March 1963.
\textsuperscript{223} Ranginui Walker, Address to the International Friendship League, ‘Race Relations in the New Zealand
Situation’, 28 Sept 1968, Rata Papers, ABAF, 2/21, NA.
\textsuperscript{224} See, Barbara Brookes, ‘Nostalgia for ‘innocent homely pleasures’: The 1964 New Zealand
schools and destroyed as it was a stereotypical depiction of a poor and backward Maori family. The use of the word ‘pa’ was also seen as a mistake by many Maori as it was a
term which for Pakeha had ‘negative connotations of poverty, primitive conditions, and
material and moral bankruptcy’.

The action by the MWWL can be seen as Maori asserting their right to define their culture, tribal spaces and experience, and to correct any misconceptions or inaccuracies. This was especially pertinent at a time when Maori were shifting into urban areas, and the MWWL was attempting to break down the negative stereotypes of Maori that were held by many Pakeha.

**Pakeha support through anti-racism organisations: the formation of CARE**

The new political awareness, the centralisation of race relations, and awareness of apartheid and global events occurred similarly within segments of the Pakeha population. Out of this nexus came the formation of two anti-racist organisations with the specific aim of tackling racial discrimination at home and abroad. In 1961 the Canterbury Association for Racial Equality was formed to 'maintain a constant watch for evidence of racial discrimination in New Zealand... to record evidence of racial discrimination throughout the world and record the progress of those who fight against it'.

The Christchurch group was followed in 1964 by an Auckland-based organisation, Citizens' Association for Racial Equality (CARE), which was to become the public face of anti-racism in New Zealand. A small CARE group had originally formed in Auckland in 1960 as a protest group opposed to the All Black tour but went into abeyance soon after the All Blacks departed for South Africa. In 1964 it reformed on a much broader basis 'to oppose racial prejudice in all its forms both in New Zealand and abroad' and to 'help educate public opinion on matters of racial equality'. In this, and as will be demonstrated in a later chapter, CARE also raised awareness of the struggles of the indigenous people in Australia and North America and thus had a role to play in the development of Maori transnational activism. A central CARE figure, Tom Newnham, explained that the re-activation of CARE, the growth in membership and a wider focus was related to racism becoming 'the great social issue

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225 Aroha Harris, Hiko...p.20.
226 Christchurch Star, 30 March 1961, and newspaper clipping, no name, 30 March 1961, MA1, 36/1/21, Part 2, NA.
across the world' and while 'we opposed apartheid, we knew racism existed in New Zealand as much as anywhere in the world'.

While CARE eventually positioned itself as a critic of race relations from the 1970s, during its earliest phase (1960s) it aligned itself with new integration policies being implemented by the Government. It employed a class-based analysis with reference to discrimination: socio-economic factors placed Maori at the bottom of the economic ladder rather than racial distinctions or racial hierarchical ideology. CARE did not seek to tear down the widely held view of racial harmony. Rather it worked to sustain the vision which most members believed existed and to turn the cherished ideal of 'one people' into a reality. The challenge was to ensure that discrimination, wherever it existed, was eliminated and to tackle socio-economic inequality, the central cause of discrimination.

Although CARE was largely a Pakeha organisation, some Maori including Matiu Rata (Labour MP for Northern Maori), Hone Tuwhare, Whetu Tirikatene and MWWL representatives were involved either as supporters or members from its inception. Later in the 1960s as Maori activism developed, many Maori, while not members of CARE, were involved in a loose arrangement of support for various CARE protests and initiatives. However the relationship between Maori activists and CARE was never easy and in some ways CARE failed to live up to Maori expectations. Ranginui Walker was disappointed:

I had high hopes, knowing about domestic racism as I did...However there was no thought of addressing domestic racism...It was a bit of a disappointment... Instead it was focused on racism in South Africa...I think that the cause that they espoused was a worthy one, but it was an all-consuming one, and domestic racism was left on the side.

The accusation that CARE focussed more on apartheid rather than domestic racism was one which was made increasingly by radical Maori activists during the decades of the 1970s and 1980s. While the charge was overly harsh in view of the myriad of

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229 Tom Newnham, interviewed by Megan Wishart, MSC 4171, Oral History Centre, ATL. Newnham was a central figure in CARE from its inception through to its demise in the 1990s.
230 Interview with Ranginui Walker, 8 September 2006.
pragmatic domestic initiatives it introduced and anti-racism work with which CARE was involved, it was a perception shared by many Maori activists.  

Reasserting Equality and Promoting the Hunn Report Internationally

At the same time the Government had come out of the rugby tour protest especially sensitive to international criticism over race relations, and increasing national unrest, public discussion and debate added to its anxiety. Its sensitivity and desire to maintain New Zealand's reputation was evidenced by its extraordinary reaction to an article published in the Guardian. In August 1960 a Guardian editorial entitled 'Long Black Cloud' discussed an issue of race discrimination which had featured in the newly published The Story of New Zealand by W. H. Oliver. In this, Oliver claimed that Pakeha accepted uncritically the doctrine of complete racial harmony and equality and were unaware of the enmity which was directed at Maori. Moreover, he claimed that Pakeha hostility and negative perceptions of Maori had been so severe that segregated schools had been created in Papakura (an Auckland district). The editorial noted this was 'startling news from a country which has been at pains to build a reputation for strict legal parity between its two races'. Phillip Skogland (Minister of Education) stepped in and defended the situation as being due to 'exceptional' circumstances and Oliver was forced to publicly acknowledge that he had not been in possession of the full details which had led to the formation of separate schools.

Concerned that the Guardian would continue to publish articles which showed New Zealand in a poor light, the government decided that some intervention was necessary. The Department of External Affairs suggested that the High Commissioner meet with the Guardian reporter responsible for New Zealand news to 'ensure subsequent articles are based on a proper appreciation of the situation which exists and of the attitudes of most people towards it'. In other words, it wanted the Guardian to publish articles only if they met with government approval. A meeting took place between John Scott

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231 See Newnham, 25 Years of CARE, for a view of some of the work with which CARE was involved. The voluminous archived CARE records at the Auckland Public Library, and Tom Newnham's records at the Alexander Turnbull Library in Wellington leave no doubt of the extent of CARE's anti-racism work as well as their work of a more pragmatic nature.


234 Correspondence, Secretary of External Affairs to Acting High Commissioner for New Zealand, 5 Sept 1960, MA1, Box 656, 36/1/21, Part 1, NA.
(a senior diplomat) and Geoffrey Moorhouse who wrote the editorial and who was the specialist on New Zealand affairs. At the meeting Scott reported:

We told Mr Moorhouse that...we felt the tendency to publicise and comment on isolated instances of bad race relations in New Zealand, when read alongside the numerous articles on racial problems in Africa, and in the context of the Guardian's well-known opposition to racial discrimination, might be misleading to British readers. We suggested that the Guardian's policy, and specifically the editorial “Long Black Cloud", presented a rather one-sided picture of that particular event...

Moorhouse refused to tailor his articles or omit news items to suit government preferences and he insisted that it was the duty of the Guardian to raise public awareness, both in New Zealand and England, of racially discriminatory practices. It was clear to Scott that Moorhouse had a deep interest in race relations and he would not hesitate to bring to public attention instances of racial discrimination. Thus he concluded that the best course of action was to take active steps and provide Moorhouse with explanations and supplementary material should any race relations issues occur in the future.

While some Maori leaders and spokesmen were less willing to support Government policies without question and more inclined to express their concerns publicly, there were many who continued to co-operate with the government and Pakeha authorities. However, wherever they stood, there was a desire to support New Zealand's international image. Even though they were aware of the contradiction in the discourse of racial equality and the reality on the ground, few Maori leaders were prepared to have New Zealand's international reputation smeared. As Charles Bennett noted, it was New Zealand's race relations policy and practice which was a major asset on the international scene:

235 Geoffrey Moorhouse was well versed in historical and contemporary issues, and had a particular interest in Maori/Pakeha relations. He was married to a New Zealander, and during the 1950s he had worked in New Zealand for 4 years as a journalist with the Grey River Argus and the Auckland Star. During the meeting with John Scott a range of race relations topics were discussed, questions posed and opinions given by Moorhouse which indicated a thorough grasp of the issues which had evolved over the past decade. See Correspondence, Acting High Commissioner for New Zealand to Secretary of External Affairs, 12 Oct 1960, MA1, Box 656, 36/1/21, Part 1, NA.

236 Ibid.

237 Correspondence, Acting High Commissioner for New Zealand to Secretary of External Affairs, 12 Oct 1960, MA1, Box 656, 36/1/21, Part 1, NA.
It redounds to our credit in the major political forums of the world, and it creates a fund of goodwill in our relationships with sovereign non-European nations and with our Asian neighbours in particular.  

Nau Paraone Kawiti Puriri (Brownie) who was Assistant Controller of Maori Welfare in the Department of Maori Affairs played his part in promoting New Zealand abroad. In the light of current Government sensitivity, to have a Maori promote race relations was welcome. In 1962 Puriri was selected as a New Zealand delegate to the Duke of Edinburgh Second Commonwealth Study Conference in Canada, and he incorporated this into a world tour visiting numerous countries in an official capacity. Throughout his travels, and especially in South East Asia and North America, Puriri spoke often and at length of race relations in New Zealand and stressed racial equality, harmony and New Zealand's good record.

In Hong Kong he was interviewed on radio, and spoke extensively to officials (especially in the health and social welfare sector), and the press. The New Zealand Trade Commissioner in Hong Kong noted that Puriri 'made a good impression...All found him most interesting particularly for his views on race relations and New Zealand Herald, 7 May 1962.

Zealand’s record in that regard’. In a press interview Puriri pointed out that there was no racial discrimination in New Zealand, all were equal, and the integration of Maori and Pakeha was such that ‘in a few years time the average New Zealander would be more suntanned in complexion, like himself, but ...it would not be due to the sun’. Puriri was a strong supporter of Jack Hunn’s integration policies and promoted these to indigenous peoples in Canada. In the United States he spoke similarly about New Zealand, Maori and inter-racial harmony on the *Voice of America* which was broadcast across America and South East Asia. Hunn was satisfied with the impression that Puriri had made: 'He certainly gave race relations in New Zealand a good boost wherever he went and proved a good advertisement for the integration policy'. When he arrived back in New Zealand Puriri was interviewed for an article in *Te Ao Hou* and stressed his support of integration, noting that while he was 'so much a Maori', he went overseas as a New Zealander first and a Maori second.

The Hunn Report, or abbreviated excerpts and proposals, (and later the subsequent implementation of the recommendations), found their way abroad throughout the 1960s, mainly to Australia and North America. Few identified the contradiction between New Zealand's reputation which spoke of absolute racial equality and the position of Maori identified in the report which spoke of entrenched inequality. Generally the proposals in the report confirmed New Zealand's reputation as a nation which was committed to racial equality and harmony and was devoting its energy to making this a reality for all Maori.

In Australia and North America the print media gave significant coverage, which reflected an increased awareness of their own indigenous peoples and the current shift in policy of their governments towards integration. Most focused on education and the MEF. In Canada, *Prince George Citizen* spoke of the Hunn report almost entirely in terms of the MEF and the need to lift the achievement of Maori who were 'an

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240 Correspondence, J Costello (New Zealand Trade Commissioner in Hong Kong), to J. Hunn, 28 June 1962, MA1, Box 657, 36/1/21, Part 5, NA.
241 *South China Sunday Post-Herald*, 24 June 1962, MA1 Box 657, 36/1/21, Part 5, NA.
243 Correspondence, J.Hunn to J. Costello (New Zealand Trade Commissioner in Hong Kong), 23 July 1962, MA1, Box 657, 36/1/21, Part 5, NA.
244 *Te Ao Hou*, No.40, September 1962, pp.7, 42.
outstanding example of a native race adapting to Western civilisation' and which had full equality but lagged in educational achievement. The Sydney Morning Herald claimed that the New Zealand Government's assimilation proposals 'showed the way' and provided 'reasonable encouragement' for other countries with 'coloured people' to follow. The Canberra Times abbreviated a paper prepared by Jack Hunn and John Booth (ex-Maori Affairs research officer), 'Integration of Maori and Pakeha', which laid out the aims of the Government policy on integration. The paper claimed that discrimination was not a serious threat to inter-racial harmony but there was an element of truth in the claim that harmony was 'more the result of self-delusion and lack of contact between the groups than the result of genuine tolerance'. The paper stressed integration as a two-way process in which history, games and race relations were encouraged in schools; Maori would have access to all facilities available; and they had legal right to full equality. In a later article, the Canberra Times suggested that Australia could 'profit from welfare programmes in other communities such as the New Zealand Maoris'. Later in the decade, following the implementation of Hunn's recommendations, various reports came out about the efficacy of the new policies in closing the gaps between Maori and Pakeha. The Canberra Times, for example, noted that finally 'Maori were moving ahead' and spoke approvingly of the campaign over the past few years to 'fully integrate Maori and European peoples'. Especially significant was the MEF which was 'breaking the vicious cycle of ignorance and poverty'.

The High Commissions to New Zealand from Australia and Canada sent reports, news clippings and either copies of the report or information on it back to Canberra and Ottawa. Federal governments in both countries were occupied with finding the quickest and most effective means of integrating indigenous peoples into mainstream society, and the Hunn Report and the subsequent implementation of its proposals were viewed with particular interest. The Canadian High Commissioner to New Zealand

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248 Canberra Times, 1 Nov 1962.
249 Canberra Times, 30 Jan 1965.
250 Canberra Times, 6 Feb 1967.
251 High Commissioner for Canada (Wellington) to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Ottawa), Correspondence and Report on 'The Maoris of New Zealand', 3 April 1962, RG25, Vol.16938, File: 45-NZ-13-3, Part 1, LAC; Correspondence, Office of Australian High Commission (Wellington) to Secretary, Department of Territories (Canberra), 3 May 1961, A 1838, 370/7, Part 1. This archive also contains further correspondence and clippings on the Hunn Report.
provided a comprehensive account of race relations, and especially the position of Maori, based on his own experiences and conversations with Jack Hunn and Maori leaders, as well providing information on the main proposals in the Hunn Report.252 The Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, which was responsible for Indian affairs, thought it valuable to have a first-hand perspective on native problems in other parts of the world. Moreover, many of the initiatives in New Zealand had been proposed for the Canadian North and the assessment of their success was 'useful'. So too was the assessment of the situation of Maori which was 'somewhat different and perhaps less optimistic than our ordinary conceptions'.253

In Australia various proposals from the Hunn Report, along with more general information on the position of Maori, became available to networks of non-indigenous and indigenous activists, including FCAA (later FCAATSI) and organisations concerned with Aboriginal welfare. This came via meetings and conferences, newsletters and periodicals such as On Aboriginal Affairs which had a wide readership and was sent to government authorities, Australian politicians, Aboriginal groups, welfare organisations, education departments, churches and significant individuals working for Aboriginal rights.254 Information about Maori was sometimes printed in the periodical or its supplements, often as a means of making comparison between the situation of Maori and Aborigines. One aspect of the Hunn Report which was viewed with particular interest was the MEF and calls were made for an Aboriginal Education Foundation to be set up along the same lines as the MEF.255 Later, FCAATSI made the same call and the MEF was the single most important idea which was taken and promoted from the Hunn Report.256 However FCAATSI also called for a national Aboriginal arts and crafts board to encourage Aboriginal artists and craftsmen and protect their work, and a

252 High Commissioner for Canada (Wellington) to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Ottawa), Correspondence and Report on 'The Maoris of New Zealand', 3 April 1962, RG25, Vol.16938, File: 45-NZ-13-3, Part 1, LAC.
253 Correspondence, Deputy Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources (R.G.Robertson) to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (N.A.Robertson) 1 October 1962, 'New Zealand Native Affairs – Reports', Ref: 2907-40, LAC.
255 See for example, On Aboriginal Affairs, No.4, Aug-Oct 1962. For an example of the comparison between Maori and Aborigines, see W.R. Geddes, 'Maori and Aborigine; A Comparison of Attitudes and Policies', in Aboriginal Affairs Information Paper, No.1, April 1962.
national secretariat involving all state Aboriginal authorities which appeared to have similarities to the NZMC.257

In Canada, indigenous leaders learned of the Hunn Report and its proposals for integration. Metis leader, Joe Keeper, met Brownie Puriri by chance at a Duke of Edinburgh Conference in Winnipeg and had a lengthy conversation about New Zealand's integration policies, and race relations in general.258 Within a week Keeper had written to Jack Hunn and requested 10 copies 'of your paper on integration'.259 It is likely that these were disseminated around an extensive network of indigenous leaders and organisations. Keeper was a liaison officer with the Community Development Services in the province of Manitoba, and on the committee of the recently formed National Indian Council (NIC), a national lobby organisation which represented three of the four major indigenous groups.260 His contemporaries were George Manuel (Shuswap), President of the North American Indian Brotherhood who was also on the committee of the NIC, and Thomas Kelly (Haida), who was senior officer in the Department of Indian Affairs. Both made their way to New Zealand - Kelly in 1965 and Manuel in 1971.

**Conclusion: Contesting race relations, the rise of political consciousness, and maintaining New Zealand’s international reputation**

This chapter has demonstrated how race relations were opened up nationally and internationally in response to the Bennett incident, David Ausubel's publications, and the ‘No Maoris No Tour' protest. While these generated discussion abroad, and Ausubel's work was significant in international academic circles, the rugby tour protest went some way towards papering over the negative cracks which had appeared, and confirmed New Zealand’s reputation for racial equality and harmony. It was not total, and there was some criticism, but it was much more positive than negative. Crucially, the fact that large numbers of Pakeha came out against the discrimination of Maori on the rugby field was proof that New Zealand’s reputation was deserved.

257 *Canberra Times*, 29 May 1967.

258 Correspondence, J.L. Keeper (Department of Welfare, Manitoba) to J.Hunn (Secretary of Maori Affairs), 4 June 1962, MA1, Box 657, 36/1/21, Part 5, NA.

259 Ibid.

In New Zealand the three events opened up space for a national discussion on racial
discrimination, especially in relation to the rugby tour protest. These coincided with the
global ‘Winds of Change’ and placed New Zealand within a global phenomenon
whereby coloured and indigenous people began to demand equality and civil rights. An
important effect amongst some Maori was the development of a new political
consciousness and the realisation that Maori could speak out, take protest into the public
arena, and protest collectively. Moreover, they became aware that racial equality and
Maori aspirations were dependent on Pakeha priorities and preferences. It was a pivotal
protest in this respect, for out of this came a new generation of young Maori activists,
leaders or both, who were prepared to speak out forcefully, and a more politically aware
Maori population. Many would encourage and support the new radical protest groups
which would emerge in the late 1960s.

Jack Hunn's 'Winds of Change', designed to make 'one people', added another layer of
discontent, as it was perceived that integration was simply another form of assimilation,
and with that would come the loss of Maori language and culture. Internationally, the
reverse occurred. The Hunn report spread to Canada and Australia where it was passed
around networks. Of particular interest was the formation of the MEF which was seen
as an exciting innovation and the means of lifting socio-economic status and integrating
indigenous peoples into the mainstream.

As a result of the events in New Zealand, race relations shifted to a central position in
society. Maori at grass-roots level as well as some leaders began speaking out publicly
and were more politically engaged. Newspapers began featuring articles about race
relations, Maori were in demand as speakers and to give lectures on race relations, and
the anti-racist organisation, CARE, was formed which allied itself with Maori. There
was no radical protest in the streets but there was a discernible shift as Maori became
more forceful and inclined to speak out publicly. A striking feature was the reluctance
of Maori, Pakeha and the Government, to have New Zealand held up for criticism
internationally. No-one wanted New Zealand’s reputation smeared, and Maori were
acutely aware of a ‘watching world’. So too was the government and although it had
come out of the tour fairly well, it remained sensitive to criticism of race relations, or
perceptions that they might not be as rosy as portrayed. This sensitivity was evidenced
by its reaction to the *Guardian* 'Long Black Cloud’ article, and the promotion of race relations and the new integration policies by Brownie Puriri during his visit abroad.

Thus, the events during the period constituted a game of two halves. Nationally it was a period of substantial change during which race relations were shifted into a central position in society and characterised by growing awareness of discrimination, discontent, some dissent and politicisation. Important foundations were laid which would assist in the development of radical protest at the end of the decade. Internationally, however, a watching world saw a mostly positive image of race relations. In 1965, as the following chapter will demonstrate, indigenous people began entering New Zealand to study New Zealand’s integration policies and to study race relations in a country reputed for the equitable treatment of its indigenous population.
Chapter Three:

Generating Space across Borders:

Contact, Community, Mediated Realities and Maori Privilege

1965-1970

During the 1960s a large and diverse range of people who were working in the broad area of Aboriginal affairs, came to New Zealand. Their visits were the outcome of government policies which had shifted from assimilation to integration as the means of dealing with the ‘problem’ of their indigenous populations, and addressing fundamental issues of inequality and low socio-economic status. New Zealand, with its reputation for racial equality and harmony, and its new integration policies, was seen as particularly worthy of study. Among the many groups of people which came into New Zealand were indigenous people, mainly from Australia and North America. At the same time some Maori began to travel abroad and make contact with indigenous people, where they shared experiences and some worked in indigenous communities. It is the contact between Maori and other indigenous people, which is the main focus of this chapter.

Within a specific framework of the two main themes of this thesis, New Zealand’s race relations reputation and the creation and use of space, it is demonstrated how a government controlled ‘visitors’ circuit’ was subverted and Maori gained greater control of the organisation of the visits undertaken by indigenous people. This enabled significant contact to be made between indigenous people and a wide range of social groups across Maoridom. Through an examination of the spaces which contact generated, both at home and abroad, it is argued that despite some weakening of the dominant race relations narrative and the idealised image of the position of Maori in society, New Zealand’s good reputation and the notion of Maori as a privileged and advantaged indigenous people generally remained in place.

At the point of contact between Maori and indigenous people, perception and understandings of race relations which had previously been gained from a distance, or
perhaps even unknown, was replaced with direct observation of the reality of the
group or entity.

The question is, whose reality was it? I suggest that Maori created their own ‘visitors’ circuit’ which also presented a selective and positive image of Maoridom, albeit it was leavened to an extent by contact with Maori and communities at grass-roots level.

This chapter further examines the spaces that were generated through contact, and demonstrates that culture was the overwhelming focus of Maori and indigenous people. The interest was in cultural commonalities and problems associated with retaining their cultural forms. Contact generated a new consciousness and recognition of a shared indigenous identity based on cultural commonalities, experiences and world view, and an understanding of being part of a wider indigenous world. Within the broad context of the thesis, it can be seen as laying the foundations of an intentional indigenous people’s movement which would be manifested in the 1970s by participation in transnational activist networks, and the World Council of Indigenous Peoples.

Activism is commonly understood as direct vigorous action that is taken to promote or direct change. However activism can also be found in dialogue, in the exchange of ideas, and awareness of some injustice. The Women’s Liberation Movement used this consciousness-raising mechanism to effect beginning in the 1960s. This soft form of activism characterised the contact between indigenous peoples in this chapter. It was activism which was found in consciousness-raising, of having grievances and problems recognised, and of becoming aware that change was possible.

This chapter begins with an examination of the visitors’ circuit. Maintaining New Zealand’s good race relations reputation was an imperative for the government and a striking feature of the decade. Most official visitors to New Zealand, and also non-indigenous people studying or observing New Zealand’s race relations model, were escorted by government and Maori Affairs officials and personnel. It is argued that a ‘visitors’ circuit’ had been put in place which functioned as a gate-keeping mechanism, and was designed to present a positive image of the position of Maori and sustain New Zealand’s good race relations narrative. A specific example is presented to demonstrate the lengths which the government was prepared to go to maintain its international reputation, and the use of the visitors’ circuit in this process.
The remainder of the chapter examines how the visitors’ circuit was subverted and Maori and indigenous people came together. For the first time Maori had significant contact with other indigenous peoples, both at home and abroad. Using a series of selected visits I demonstrate how indigenous spaces were created and used and what the principle issues of importance were to indigenous peoples when they came together. The extent to which the dominant race relations narrative was subverted is a central consideration. The suggestion that indigenous visitors were exposed to a Maori arranged visitor’s circuit, and thus gained a mediated view, threads its way through the chapter.

There were a significant number of visitors to New Zealand and points of contact between Maori and indigenous peoples during the decade, mostly of short duration. It has been impossible to include them all, and those which have been selected have been of a longer duration. The visits that are focused upon have been selected to present a diverse range of visits by indigenous people and to give an indication of the commonalities or differences across a range of areas.

**The Visitors’ Circuit: Controlling the Race Relations Narrative**

During the 1960s an array of visitors working in the broad area of Aboriginal affairs were drawn into New Zealand by its reputation for racial equality and harmony, and its integration policies. The Hunn Report had been transmitted abroad and the subsequent implementation of some proposals had drawn interest and favourable comment, particularly from Australia and Canada. During this period the governments of both countries were seeking to attend to the ‘problem’ of their indigenous people, and find ways of integrating them into mainstream economic and social structures. Academics, researchers and aboriginal rights supporters were also looking at ways of raising the status of indigenous peoples and bringing them to a position of equality. Indigenous people came into New Zealand too, and for similar reasons. All perceived that lessons could be taken from New Zealand’s race relations model and its integration policies which placed Maori in an enviable and equitable position in society.

The majority of those coming into New Zealand were non-indigenous people and either representatives of governments or of various organisations which were working to improve the education, health, welfare and overall status of indigenous peoples. They
were officially endorsed and funded by governments, universities and welfare agencies, the United Nations and various international humanitarian organisations such as the Bernard van Leer Foundation (The Hague) and the Ford Foundation (New York).\(^1\)

Their official and representative status required the consent and co-operation of the New Zealand Government which worked to satisfy the aims of the visitors. Most official visitors stayed for a relatively short time ranging from several days to a week or so. Itineraries were arranged and visitors, depending on their status, were accompanied by various levels of officihood. High status visitors were often accompanied by the Secretary of Maori Affairs or personnel from the Department of External Affairs, while others were escorted by field officers from the Department of Maori Affairs.

The arrival of visitors to study race relations had the potential to cause a problem for the government, which guarded New Zealand's international reputation. While it was precisely this reputation which brought many to New Zealand, scrutiny from visitors also raised the possibility that the gap between reputation and reality would become more apparent than was desirable. A visitors’ circuit had been developed over the years which largely eliminated any significant adverse view. It was interesting, varied and scenic, but it was also heavily circumscribed. It was constructed around a series of events, meetings and images that were deliberately chosen to provide the visitor with a positive image of race relations. With some variation to accommodate the special interests of visitors, it followed a basic plan and by the 1960s New Zealand had become renowned for its visitors’ circuit.\(^2\)

The visitors’ circuit almost always included a visit to Rotorua. This had long been New Zealand’s key tourist area and race relations showcase. By the turn of the 1900s the government had gained control of the geothermal area and began to develop Rotorua as a health resort and tourist centre, mainly to promote immigration, tourism and trade.

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\(^2\) Frank Corner, Permanent Representative to the United Nations (New York), reported that the Canadian officials at the United Nations had commented that New Zealand had ‘established a reputation for organising tours for visitors’. See, Correspondence, Frank Corner, Permanent Representative to United Nations (New York) to Department of Maori Affairs, 12 Oct 1964, MA1, Box 31, Record 2/2/1, NA.
Maori were channelled into providing a cultural component: visitors were guided around Whakarewarewa, they observed Maori children diving for coins and women cooking food in the hot pools, and they were entertained by Maori concert parties. Dignitaries were given an additional honour of a traditional Maori welcome and entertainment. The Maori cultural component served several purposes: it allowed tourists and visitors to experience and observe Maori culture, and it served to present an image of racial harmony as Maori and Pakeha were observed mixing and working in close proximity to each other. The positive image was important for governments which were seeking to attract immigrants, tourists and trade.

From the earliest period of the development of Rotorua, Maori leaders clearly understood the value of the cultural component and did not always welcome being made use of in order to serve the agenda of the government. As an example, in 1908 Arawa chiefs were asked to provide a traditional welcome at Rotorua for the forthcoming visit of the American Fleet. They initially refused to extend a Maori welcome or provide cultural displays on the grounds that the Americans had ‘not treated their native races as human beings’. However, there was more to it as Apirana Ngata revealed: Maori were resentful ‘that on every occasion you trot out your Maoris to be exhibited. We want to put a stop to that’.

By the mid-1960s, following the implementation of some of the proposals in the Hunn report, the visitors’ circuit focused on three key areas. Firstly it showed integration in action and a visible demonstration of ‘one people’. Maori and Pakeha were observed working together, taking part in various trade training schemes, attending school together, and living side-by-side in predominantly Pakeha areas into which Maori homes had been ‘pepper-potted’. Secondly, it devoted a considerable portion of the visit to Maori culture. Almost always a visit to the showcase cultural space at Whakarewarewa was included. Visitors watched a concert party in action, visited the arts and crafts centre, toured the scenic wonders of the thermal parks and, depending on their status, they received a traditional Maori welcome. In Wellington, visits to

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4 *Star*, 29 July 1908; *Wanganui Herald*, 7 Aug 1908.
5 *Wanganui Herald*, 7 Aug 1908.
6 The information gained has come from the many itineraries, correspondence related to visits, and reports from Maori Affairs Field Officers in MA, W2459, Box 13, Part 4, NA.
Waiwhetu Marae and performances by the Ngati Poneke Maori club were often on the agenda. Finally, visitors were presented with an image of Maori as successful citizens. There were meetings with Maori doctors, academics and clergy, and successful ‘ordinary’ Maori going about their daily lives, such as ‘Mr Heke the chemist’, and the singer Howard Morrison. There were also invariably visits to Maori farmers on their award-winning model farms at Horohoro, which had been developed and funded through Apirana Ngata’s land development scheme in the 1930s,

Visits arranged to ‘ordinary’ Maori folk added a deeper level of authenticity. As Dean McCannell notes in his study on tourism and his theory of ‘staged authenticity’, tourists perceive ‘back regions’ as places where they will gain a more authentic view of people and their culture. For this reason many tourists often seek to ‘get off the beaten track’ and away from tourist areas. However, MacCannell also suggests that at times the back regions are really front regions that have been deliberately set up for visits from tourists. The visitors’ circuit often included a ‘back space’ component such as visits to Maori farms in the backblocks and Maori homes which had been pepper-potted amongst Pakeha homes in suburban areas. Chats with farmers and home-owners, such as ‘Mrs Tamehana Tamehana and her grandchildren in their new brick veneer home’, or finding ‘time to talk to Mr Heke the chemist’, had the effect of shifting a visit to a level of ordinarness and intimacy, and thus a perception of a greater level of authenticity. In reality these were deliberately staged events, selected and organised in advance, and they were no more ‘back spaces’ than were the staged concert productions and cultural events, or visits to Wanganui Collegiate school and other model institutions.

When meetings with Maori were requested or deemed to be desirable by the government, those selected carried prestige and were highly respected. Various, these included members of parliament, members of the NZMC, clergy, academics and others from a range of respected professions. The visitors’ circuit portrayed an image of Maori in society as representative - typical, ordinary and progressive. While it did show many integration policies which the government had put in place (and therefore also pointed

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8 Ibid, p.597.
9 Correspondence, J.H.W Barber (District Officer, Rotorua) to Department of Maori Affairs, 15 Sept 1967, MA, W2459, Box 13, Part 4, NA.
to Pakeha benevolence), the view of Maori was neither ordinary nor representative. Rather, it was a series of staged 'slices of life' designed to support an image of 'one people'. Therefore, official visitors, who were studying, or who had an interest in race relations and New Zealand's harmonious bi-cultural society, posed little problem for the government: Maori were controlled and contained within a manipulated series of images and experiences.

The desire to preserve New Zealand's reputation was a striking and arguably obsessive feature of the period, and it was jealously guarded, not only by government officials but also by ordinary citizens. When Edward Braithwaite, the renowned author, visited New Zealand to study race relations and give lectures, he was somewhat irked by the incessant claims made of racial harmony:

As soon as I arrived in New Zealand people told me I'd find no racial troubles here. Too much is being said to me about their absence. Now I want to see for myself. If there is really no racial disharmony here, there can be no need to keep telling me about it.10

At times the Government went to extraordinary lengths to maintain New Zealand's reputation. The *Guardian* 'Long Black Cloud' incident was a case in point, but the actions taken following a visit to New Zealand in 1966 by Professor Francois Doumenge (Montpelier University) were more extreme. Doumenge had visited New Zealand several times in an academic capacity, but this time he discovered a side to race relations which he had not previously encountered. On an early morning walk he inadvertently wandered into the 'ghettos' in Parnell (Auckland) where he discovered Maori and Pacific island people living in substandard housing and wretched conditions.11 Additionally, he was given the opportunity by Maori acquaintances to travel north where he spent time in predominantly Maori communities. In these authentic rural back spaces (as opposed to a staged version) he gained an understanding of their contemporary grievances, concerns and position in society. Doumenge presented his observations at a public address in France, which was then printed in a bulletin of the French Geographers Association.12 Amongst these, he was 'pessimistic for the future of race relations', critical of the inaction of government in developing a

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10 *New Zealand Herald*, 23 April 1963; *Canberra Times*, 23 May 1963. Braithwaite was in New Zealand under the auspices of UNESCO. See also *Te Ao Hou*, Sept 1963, pp. 32-33.
11 Correspondence, New Zealand Ambassador (Paris, France) to Secretary of External Affairs, Wellington, 14 March 1967, MA, W2459, Box 13, Part 4, NA.
12 Ibid.
'multi-racial society', and he held that Pakeha were essentially racist. He rejected the government position on integration, and was convinced that 'social integration between Maori and Pakeha was not working'. Doumenge predicted that increasing urbanisation combined with government inaction would lead to race relations becoming a serious issue. 'Partition', he thought, could be an answer to 'the Maori problem'.

The public pronouncements came to the attention of the New Zealand Ambassador to France and the government. Doumenge was an internationally respected academic, likely to comment in the future on race relations, and the imperative of the government was to modify his views. The Ambassador met with Doumenge to discuss the issues raised, apparently to little effect, and then set about putting some written material together 'in the hope of persuading him to look at the situation more closely'. However, stronger intervention was thought necessary. Doumenge was formally invited to New Zealand where he spent ten days as a guest of the government. Officially it was to enable him to discuss with officers in the departments of Maori Affairs and External Affairs, issues related to New Zealand's dual role in the South Pacific 'as a centre for Polynesian immigration as well as a source of technical and capital aid'. The 'unpublicised purpose' was ‘to help him to obtain a balanced view of race relations’.

An itinerary was drawn up and directed towards that purpose:

The efforts of officers associated with the visit were ...directed to persuading Professor Doumenge that, compared with other countries (like Algeria) with racially mixed populations, New Zealand has relatively few problems and that the efforts of Government and a majority of private citizens were working steadily towards their solution.

Doumenge was given VIP treatment in a comprehensive stage-managed visit which was orchestrated collaboratively by the Department of External Affairs and the Department of Maori Affairs. Escorted by leading Maori Affairs personnel, including the Secretary of Maori Affairs (Jock McEwen), Doumenge was exposed to an itinerary designed to

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13 Ibid; Correspondence, Department of External Affairs to Department of Maori Affairs, 13 July 1967, MA, W2459, Box 13, Part 4, NA.
14 Correspondence, New Zealand Ambassador (Paris, France) to Secretary of External Affairs, Wellington, 14 March 1967, MA, W2459, Box 13, Part 4, NA.
15 Ibid.
16 Correspondence, Department of External Affairs to Department of Maori Affairs, 13 July 1967, MA, W2459, Box 13, Part 4, NA.
17 Ibid.
showcase the successes of New Zealand’s integration policies and initiatives which had been implemented for Maori. This followed the usual visitors’ circuit although it was much more extensive with a greater range of examples of integration in action, training programmes and Maori successfully participating in society. It was top-heavy with Maori prestige and status. There was considerable contact with Maori leaders, including meetings with church leaders, Maori MPs, government officials, academics, Maori welfare officers, and visits to marae, urban Maori clubs and MWWL meetings. In the ‘back spaces’ Doumenge met a number of people in their new brick veneer homes, visited farms, visited Howard Morrison, and ‘we found time to talk with Mr Heke the chemist’. As well, there were meetings with Pakeha involved in Maori affairs in a variety of areas.

As Doumenge was always accompanied by those in the upper echelon of the departments of External Affairs and Maori Affairs, it is likely that free and frank discussion with Maori may have been inhibited to some extent. However this is simply conjecture as there is no record of the meetings which took place. What is known, according to the reports, is that Doumenge was always accompanied by an official escort and he never reached unmediated places and communities. It is in these ordinary un-staged places where oppositional images and discourses may be found, and act as a counter to the manipulated ‘authentic’ images and realities which are presented to visitors. The conclusion drawn from Doumenge’s visit is that the itinerary was highly mediated and designed to produce a particular and positive image of race relations.

Following the visit, a report by the Department of External Affairs expressed the hope that Doumenge would have ‘the courage to revise his earlier pessimistic predictions’. Whether he did is not known. What the incident did show were the extraordinary lengths to which the government was prepared to go in order to maintain New Zealand’s reputation for racial equality and harmony.

Apart from transporting visitors around, Maori were generally side-lined or given only token involvement with visitors coming into New Zealand. In 1960 UNESCO hosted a

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18 Information on Doumenge’s visit was taken from, ‘Professor F. Doumenge, Diary of Trip’, July 1967, MA, W2459, Box 13, Part 4, NA, and Report by J.H.W. Barber (Rotorua District Officer, Department of Maori Affairs) 12 July 1967, MA, W2459, Box 13, Part 4, NA.

regional seminar in Wellington as part of their 'East-West Major Project'. The aim of the seminar was to 'contribute to peace' by advancing mutual understandings between peoples of different cultures through the exchange of educational materials’. Over a period of three weeks, 31 delegates from 25 nations studied and discussed the exchange and use of school publications in promoting the understanding and appreciation of disparate cultures, especially those of indigenous peoples. There were many indigenous delegates from South East Asia, and New Zealand included one Maori, Hirini Mead (Headmaster of Waimarama Maori School) in its large delegation of participants and officials. It was marginally better than the delegations from the settler states of Australia, Canada and the United States of America which had no indigenous representation. Instead, non-indigenous delegates spoke for indigenous people and made recommendations on the transmission of their culture and pronouncements on which aspects were important and warranted inclusion. In the case of New Zealand, arguably it was incumbent to include a Maori delegate: questions may have been raised had Maori been totally excluded from an international conference held in New Zealand to discuss the selection and transmission of indigenous culture.

Maori within the Department of Maori Affairs were clearly uneasy with the highly selective view of Maori which official visitors received, and their lack of inclusion, contact or consultation. Field Officers from the Department of Maori Affairs were used to transport visitors around selected locations and arrange meetings, but there was little room for any deviation from outside the heavily mediated visitors’ circuit. Maori who were selected for direct contact with visitors were few, and depending on the interests or status of the visitors were, as identified previously, mostly high status Maori leaders or successful citizens. Brownie Puriri (assistant controller in the Maori Welfare Division of the Department of Maori Affairs) thought something should be done. He argued that as visitors were ‘not always presented with a balanced view of the Maori race’, the Department of Maori Affairs should take steps to address this situation. However Charles Bennett (Assistant-secretary of Maori Affairs) believed it 'unwise' to get

20 Report of Seminar, Wellington (NZ), 1-19 Feb 1960, 'The Use of Publications for Schools in Increasing the Mutual Appreciation of Eastern and Western Cultural Values', http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001262/126280eb.pdf - accessed 1 June 2012. The seminar was part of UNESCO's major project on 'Mutual Appreciation of Eastern and Western Cultural Values' (commonly termed the 'East-West Major Project') which was launched in 1957 for a ten year period.
involved, but if they were approached to assist then they 'should do everything possible to show visitors all sides of Maori life'.

Subverting the 'Visitors’ Circuit': Indigenous and non-indigenous visitors and the expansion of indigenous space

The nature of the visits took several new forms from the mid-1960s as the policy of integration became the central focus of race relations in settler states. Non-indigenous researchers and academics working in the area of indigenous affairs came into New Zealand to conduct in-depth research on New Zealand's race relations model and integration initiatives. Many who were attached to government and non-governmental organisations also came in to scrutinise integration programmes, especially in relation to education. Their aim was to implement similar programmes in order to raise the status of indigenous people to equality with non-indigenous people, and facilitate their integration into mainstream society.

With the focus on in-depth and serious study (many were academics or researchers on United Nations fellowships or other scholarships) the form of their visit took a new route. Generally they came in for a longer period of time and had a well-planned research scheme of the areas they wished to study and more often than not, of the people they wished to interview. If unknown, the Department of Maori Affairs was given advance notice of specific areas of interest in order to arrange meetings with appropriate people. They were not parachute researchers and visitors who dropped in for a short visit, talked to a few government officials, were transported around a visitors’ circuit, and then departed with a glossed and superficial view. While they may have depended on the Department of Maori Affairs to arrange some meetings or facilitate introductions, a large proportion of their visit was on self-directed study. What academic researchers wanted was contact with Maori across the whole spectrum of Maoridom, and most spent significant time in grass-roots Maori communities, which had largely been overlooked in the past.

The new form which the visits took had several significant effects. With the freedom of movement, access was gained to a wide range of Maori opinion, and a more nuanced

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21 Extract from Public Relations Central Committee Meeting, 9 June 1965, MA, W2459, Box 13, Part 4, NA.
view of race relations became available. As an example, Colin Tatz (Director of the Aboriginal Research Centre at Monash University) and his research assistant (Lorna Lippmann) arrived in 1968 and spent six weeks studying 'all aspects of Maori life' and taking 'an intense look at Maori'.

Through the course of his visit it soon became clear that race relations were not as ideal as commonly portrayed and Tatz commented that the 'angrification' of some sectors of Maoridom was noticeable. This is not surprising as in 1968 race relations were undergoing significant upheaval. While this will be detailed in a later chapter, it is enough to note that at the time of Tatz' visit the first Maori activist groups had emerged, and leaders were also publicly and vigorously contesting the Maori Affairs Amendment Act 1967 which they feared would facilitate the alienation of Maori land. Tatz further commented that when in a country for a significant length of time, it is not difficult to gain an understanding of race relations, and thus in 1968 racial disharmony was easily identifiable.

A further outcome was that a self-directed research component enabled researchers to meet with Maori at grass-roots level, and this provided opportunities for the exchange of information about the indigenous peoples in their countries. Researchers and academics such as Tatz, who were deeply involved in indigenous affairs, acted in place of indigenous mobility and facilitated the transnational exchange of information. Tatz explained that throughout the course of his research on indigenous communities in New Zealand (and later North America), he was at the same time 'also telling all these other communities about what is happening to Aborigines in Australia'. Thus there was a cross-exchange of information which raised the consciousness of Maori to the situation of Aborigines.

Significantly, it also confirmed for Maori that they were in a superior position to other indigenous people, and especially Aborigines. That Maori were in a ‘better than’ position in comparison to other indigenous peoples was often iterated by the government and Maori leaders, but few citizens had ever had direct contact with indigenous peoples, or those working with them, to form their own opinion. During Tatz’ visit this was made clear when he visited Maori play centres and related the dire

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22 Interview with Colin Tatz, 26 Nov 2009.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
position of Aborigines to Maori mothers, and explained that he was interested in
importing the Maori play centre model to Aboriginal communities in Victoria. He found
the empathetic reaction astonishing:

What was so remarkable...was that the Maori mums that I met at these play centres
throughout NZ...when I said that I would like to import this idea...without even being
asked, said “we’ll come over and show the Aboriginal women how to do it”.26

A report by a Maori District Welfare Officer gives a deeper understanding of the event.
Not only did Maori show empathy and compassion for the ‘almost hopeless
predicament’ which Aborigines were facing, there was recognition that Maori were in a
far better position than Aborigines:

It came through loud and clear that here was a people who had virtually lost faith in the
administration of their affairs, and what was probably most appalling of all was that
they had almost completely lost pride in themselves as a race and a people. It certainly
was a great thing to me and to everyone to note that here is a whole race of people way
off worse than we are and this had a very humbling experience for all those who met
and spoke to Doctor Tatz.27

Tatz thought that Maori were ‘an outstanding example’ for Aboriginal people to
follow.28 He suggested that their superior position had much to do with the large
numbers of Maori who were employed in the Department of Maori Affairs and who
were ‘serving their people with understanding and sympathy’.29 Nevertheless, while the
position of Maori was much better than that of Australian Aborigines, Tatz came to the
conclusion that Maori also faced structural inequality and issues which were similar to
those faced by Aborigines. In relation to educational under-achievement, for example,
the base causes of Maori and Aboriginal under-achievement were similar and included
low socio-economic status and poverty, cultural differences, language difficulties, and
an awareness that schools were essentially alien European institutions.30

26 Ibid.
27 ‘Report on Visit by Doctor Colin Tatz and Mrs L. Lippmann to Tairawhiti District’, by A Baker, District
Welfare Officer, MA, W2459, Box 14, 2/2/9, NA.
28 Newspaper article, (no name, no date, circa Feb 1968), MA, W2459, Box 14, 2/2/9, NA.
29 Age, 17 Feb 1968.
30 ‘Report by Dr C.A.Tatz and Mrs L.Lippmann to Dr H. Coombs’, 8 April 1968, MA, W2459, Box 14,
2/2/9, NA.
It was not only non-indigenous researchers and academics who bypassed the restrictive visitors’ circuit. Indigenous people from Canada, the United States of America, and Australia came into New Zealand for the first time. Some came in as members of non-indigenous delegations, others worked within their governments. Indigenous sports teams came from Australia, and others came in for a specific purpose - especially in the field of education. Many had the same purpose as non-indigenous academics and researchers, of gaining insights into the position of Maori in society, the policies which had been set in place to facilitate integration, and whether such policies could be adopted or adapted for use in their own countries. For some Australian Aborigines, visits had been arranged to provide inspiration: to show what Maori had achieved and what might be possible in Australia.

The aim of all indigenous peoples coming into New Zealand was to have direct contact with Maori across the spectrum of Maoridom. Mostly, their visits were either co-ordinated or had a heavy input by Maori, and this enabled access into a variety of Maori communities, and events. Nevertheless, in many instances the visitors were treated to a Maori visitors’ circuit which also showed a selective positive image, mainly of Maori success. Arguably, without the restrictive presence of government officials, a more nuanced view of race relations was presented. The main difference between the Maori and government visitors’ circuits was that the meetings with Maori who held prestige and status was balanced by the organisers who sought to expose visitors to a heavy dose of un-staged Maori culture, and some contact with Maori communities. Unlike the performances for visitors and tourists, this was found in the ‘back spaces’ of Maoridom – on marae, in Maori communities, at hui and events. It was in these spaces where indigenous peoples came together and recognised cultural commonalities, shared values and world view, and a common experience of colonisation. These were also spaces where oppositional discourses could be found, although for most of the 1960s this was not a strong feature. Instead, culture took centre stage in the meetings between Maori and other indigenous peoples.
Expanding Indigenous Networks: Canadian Indian and Maori finding Common Ground and Cultural Commonalities

From 1965 indigenous people began entering New Zealand. Thomas Reginald Kelly (Reg), a Canadian Indian (Haida Nation) was the first to arrive. A senior officer in the Department of Indian Affairs (Branch of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration), Kelly had responsibility for the supervision of five reserves with an Indian population of 3500.31 He was well aware of New Zealand's race relations reputation and its new integration policies. He had past associations with the Native Brotherhood of British Colombia (NBBC) and his father (Peter Kelly) had been a key figure in making representations to the Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons during the late 1940s to consider revision of the Indian Act. Peter Kelly, and indeed the NBBC, had drawn heavily on the example of New Zealand and the position of Maori – especially in relation to parliamentary representation – to add weight to their claims for Indian rights. In contemporary terms, Reg Kelly was within a network of leaders, such as Joe Keeper and George Manuel, who had knowledge of the Hunn Report, and in his position in the Department of Indian Affairs it is likely that he had access to information from the Canadian High Commission to New Zealand.32

Kelly was a committed integrationist and worked at promoting integration to non-indigenous Canadians. In 1963, for example, he addressed the United Church Women organisation and claimed that Indians were ‘the unknown Canadians… treated like strangers in their own country’, and who were denied the same privileges and responsibilities as non-indigenous Canadians. He stressed that the ‘illegal barriers’ between non-indigenous and indigenous Canadians must be removed to allow equality of opportunity and integration between the two peoples. The form of integration Kelly envisaged was one which encouraged Indians to retain their languages and beliefs and allowed them to ‘find their own way in society…and work out their destiny’.33

31 'Information Sheet - Thomas Reginald Kelly, U.N. Fellow', (no date, circa Oct 1964), MA1, Box 31, 2/2/1, NA.
32 Reports from the Canadian High Commission to New Zealand are located in, 'New Zealand Native Affairs – Reports', File-2907-40, LAC; 'New Zealand Native Affairs Reports', RG 25, Vol. 16938, File: 45-NZ-13-3, Part 1, LAC.
33 Calgary Herald 16 May 1963.
Kelly came into New Zealand for four months on a United Nations Fellowship. The Canadian Government and Kelly had jointly selected New Zealand for study and the United Nations Secretariat enthusiastically endorsed the choice. The latter viewed it as an excellent opportunity for Canada and New Zealand to establish links, firstly between their departments which administered indigenous affairs, and secondly for Canada to gain information and thus advance government planning for their indigenous people. The purpose of the study for the Canadian Government was multifaceted but central was the issue of human rights. Kelly’s task was to ascertain the rights which Maori had as a minority people, and the measures which the government had taken to ensure that their rights as indigenous people were protected. New Zealand had been chosen for study because the administration of Indian Affairs and Maori Affairs were thought to be similar, and because of its reputation for racial equality. As Kelly explained:

…it is the proud boast of the New Zealand government that they have been one people since 1840...my government felt the Maoris must be far advanced, ahead of the Indian people in Canada. Therefore, in the course of my human rights study here, they… expect me to observe any improvements that the Canadian government could use in their administration of Indian Affairs.

There was, however, much more to the study. As Maori had achieved a higher level of integration than Indian population, his task was look at all aspects of the position of Maori, and the Maori/Pakeha relationship. Some key aims were to discover the legislation and supervision which was in place to promote the rights of Maori in various areas including employment, housing, education and politics, the formal and informal structures in the Maori/Pakeha relationship, organisation, and ‘the extent to which the retention of Maori cultural forms was possible. Further, he sought to discover what social, cultural and administrative organisation was required to provide protection for the rights of indigenous people who had reached the same level of acculturation as had Maori. The intention was that the information gathered would be put to practical use to help plan for the integration of the indigenous peoples of Canada.

In order to plan for the future…it was necessary to anticipate the structures that will be required once the population has moved further towards integration...A study of the way

34 Information sheet from Frank Corner to Department of Maori Affairs, 'United Nations Human Rights Fellowships in New Zealand', 12 Oct 1964, MA1, Box 31, 2/2/1, NA.
35 Reg Kelly interview by Leo Fowler, 'Reg Kelly, Administrator of Indian Affairs', System ID - 410412, Radio New Zealand Sound Archives (RNZSA).
36 'Information Sheet – Thomas Reginald Kelly, U.N. Fellow', MA1, Box 31, 2/2/1, NA.
Maori Affairs are presently structured in NZ to guarantee a maximum freedom of cultural freedoms to the native population will, I hope, help us understand the development which merits our support in Canada.37

The Department of Indian Affairs furnished Kelly with an extensive list of issues to be researched and specific questions to be addressed. These included issues related to the administration of Maori Affairs, education, housing, economic development, social programmes, Maori culture, parliamentary representation and urbanisation.38

Kelly spent four months fulfilling these requests as well as conducting research not specified by the government. As this was an official visit sanctioned by the United Nations and the Canadian Government, the Department of Maori Affairs was fully informed of the nature of the study and had been requested to arrange a programme which would assist Kelly in fulfilling his research agenda.39 Thus the nature of the visit demanded more than the mediated visitors’ circuit. Rather, it was incumbent on the Department of Maori Affairs to facilitate contact for Kelly with a broad a range of people working within the large and general field of Maori affairs.

In large part, Kelly’s itinerary resembled the government visitor’s circuit in that there was a top-heavy focus on meetings with successful Maori who held prestige and status, and who were in positions of influence and authority. An extensive programme was arranged which incorporated a vast array of people and organisations including the MWWL, NZMC, social welfare departments, training colleges, Maori Education Foundation, church leaders, educationalists, academics, and personnel at all levels of the Department of Maori Affairs and its branches around the North Island. These meetings and observations were supplemented with observation of trade training schemes and pre-school centres.40

37 Ibid.
38 'Memorandum', C.I. Fairholm, (Head of Secretariat, Indian Affairs Branch, Department of Citizenship and Immigration) to T.R. Kelly, 4 Feb 1965, MA1, Box 31, 2/2/1, NA.
39 'Letter of transmission' from U.N. Fellowship Committee to the New Zealand Government and a copy of Kelly's application, Oct 1964, MA1, Box 31, 2/2/1, NA; Information sheet from Frank Corner to Department of Maori Affairs, 'United Nations Human Rights Fellowships in New Zealand', 12 Oct 1964, MA1, Box 31, 2/2/1, NA.
40 'U.N. Fellow-Thomas R. Kelly', MA1, Box 31, 2/2/1, NA.
Kelly travelled around New Zealand and used the Department of Maori Affairs as a focal point. His itinerary was seemingly flexible, and often events, meetings and visits to Maori communities were not only the result of planned visits by Maori Affairs, but the result of invitations from contacts made throughout his visit. This fulfilled his aim which was 'to meet as many Maori...of all classes as possible as well as to talk to informed people on the part the Maori plays in ordinary life and whether there was any great degree of discrimination'. Thus his travels took him into the back-blocks and grass-roots Maori rural communities (especially in the North) where he interacted with Maori people within their indigenous space, and gained access to Maori culture on marae and away from tourist displays and concert parties. It was clearly a highlight of his tour and he considered himself 'lucky to be present at the opening of the Ahipara meeting house' as well as having the chance to visit many other meeting houses.

For Kelly, there was a clear identification with Maori, and the most striking aspect of his visit was the recognition of cultural commonalities between the two peoples.

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41 Extract from Whangarei newspaper', (no name, no date), MA1, Box 31, 2/2/1, NA.
42 Ibid.
43 Edmonton Journal, 30 March 1965. In relation to this photo, the Edmonton Journal stated, 'While in New Zealand to study the amity between native Maori and white man, Mr Kelly was welcomed at a ceremony in Hamilton, heart of the Maori country'.
[Both had] a very strong sense of family and tribal identity. They prefer to retain their characteristics and languages as far as they can. They do not like to come to individual decisions that affect everyone ...family relationships are very strong ...and anyone related in any way is immediately acceptable. Like the Maori, the Indian just doesn't know how to say no to relatives. He accepts him any time, all the time. There is no limit to the hospitality. This is the same characteristics for both people...they are the same communal minded people.44

The marae was also familiar. Not only were art forms similar, but the use of social space and the function of the marae was the same as the community hall on Indian reserves.45 Shared too was an intense pride in their culture and Kelly was impressed by the determination of Maori to retain their cultural forms and not have them compromised. As a strong advocate for the integration of Indians into mainstream society but which enabled the retention of their culture and beliefs, the path Maori were taking was to be applauded.

But I am glad to see too that the Maori are unwilling to give up the fact that they are Maori. This is necessary, this is the feeling of pride...Maori people must be commended for the fact that they want to retain their roots, they are proud to retain their identity, they won’t give up the values that they have had...yet they are quite willing to take advantage of the Pakeha knowledge and habits.46

Common to both, however, were problems relating to the retention of culture. Kelly observed that urbanisation had negative effects on the retention of indigenous language in Canada and New Zealand: 'In the cities and municipal areas I have heard a great many Indian grandparents moan loudly that their grandchildren can speak nothing but English' and he had 'heard the same talk in New Zealand'.47

There was no sense of an identification based on the historical experience of colonisation and the negative contemporary effects, and there was no mention of long-held historical grievances. Nor was there any mention of racial inequality or

44 Reg Kelly interview by Leo Fowler, 'Reg Kelly, Administrator of Indian Affairs', System ID - 410412, RNZSA.
45 Correspondence, T.R. Kelly to C.I. Fairholm, Indian Affairs Branch, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, 28 April, 1965, MA1, Box 31, 2/2/1, NA; 'Extract from Whangarei newspaper', (no name, no date), MA1, Box 31, 2/2/1, NA.
46 Reg Kelly interview by Leo Fowler, 'Reg Kelly, Administrator of Indian Affairs', System ID - 410412, RNZSA.
47 Ibid.
discrimination in the interim reports which Kelly sent back to Ottawa. This is perhaps not surprising as his brief was principally to study the measures taken to integrate Maori into society and the concrete protections put in place to maintain basic rights. There is no record from Maori about meetings and discussions with Kelly, how they used the new space which opened up through contact. Kelly commented that he had spent 'considerable time talking to Peter Awatere in Auckland as well as the Maori staff...there was fresh exchange of views', but there was no elaboration of that meeting or what the 'views' were. However bearing in mind the length of time Kelly was in New Zealand, the vast range of Maori he spoke with, and the time spent in Maori communities as well as speaking with Maori staff at all levels in the Department of Maori Affairs, it is probable that there would have been cross-dialogue over a range of historical and contemporary issues in both New Zealand and Canada.

In official reports and public interviews, for the most part Kelly was impressed with the position of Maori in New Zealand and the manner by which they were being integrated into mainstream society. It was 'the finest thing that could happen' and acculturation was being accomplished with the passage of time. Maori were preserving their traditional cultures 'as far as possible' while also taking advantage of Pakeha knowledge and the advances in education and economics which were readily available. However, he did note that there was a problem in relation to the large number of Maori appearing before the courts. This he put this down to the stress and difficulty in adjusting to an urban environment and the 'new cultural standards'. 'Institutional racism' had not yet been articulated, and two years would pass before the concept was introduced by American Black Power activists Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton.

Despite the favourable impression, and that Maori were ‘more advanced’, he stated that 'in many ways, Canada is far ahead of New Zealand in its treatment of its indigenous population'. Unfortunately Kelly did not elaborate and gave no indication on how or

48 Correspondence, T.R. Kelly to Brownie Puriri, (ND, circa April 1965), MA1, Box 31, 2/2/1, NA.
49 Correspondence, T.R. Kelly to C.I. Fairholm, Indian Affairs Branch, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, 'Social Programme Information', 28 April, 1965, MA1, Box 31, 2/2/1, NA; Reg Kelly interview by Leo Fowler, 'Reg Kelly, Administrator of Indian Affairs', System ID - 410412, RNZSA.
50 Correspondence, T.R. Kelly to C.I. Fairholm, 'Social Programme Information', 28 April 1965, MA1, Box 31, 2/2/1, NA.
52 'Extract from Whangarei newspaper', (no name, no date), MA1, Box 31, 2/2/1, NA.
in what area Canada was 'far ahead', but it was most likely to do with parliamentary representation. Kelly was opposed to the separate Maori seats in parliament. This was the very issue that the NBBC and Peter Kelly had campaigned for and had held New Zealand up as a model for emulation. Reg Kelly had also been involved in the campaign, but he now held reservations:

I wondered just whether it is necessary for people as advanced as the Maori to …have their special parliamentary representation. ...[In Canada] there are no special seats...they just vote along with others...I know from our experience that the Indian viewpoint is not lost, in fact it is enhanced. The politicians are very careful to come to the Indian reserves and meetings during elections and between elections, and there is nothing to say the Indian is neglected in any way...His political influence is considerable.53

Kelly's visit was an isolated event and nothing tangible came out of it. Undoubtedly his experience and research would have been spread around Indian networks with which he was involved. What Kelly’s visit did produce was contact and a new awareness of each other, and in small Maori communities especially, it created a series of indigenous spaces where two indigenous peoples, largely unknown to each other, came together at various times. At these meetings similarities and differences were recognised with cultural commonalities binding Maori and Indian into a shared indigeneity.

Towards a Trans-Tasman Indigenous Community: Consciousness-Raising, Developing Indigenous Identity and Solidarity.

By far the most contact and transnational links came out of Australia and were from Aborigines and non-Aboriginal supporters. Contact was rarely initiated by Maori or Aborigines, but came from a number of groups which were working for Aboriginal rights and lobbying state and federal governments, or were working to improve the position of Aborigines and seeking to integrate them into the mainstream population. New Zealand with its reputation for the equitable treatment of its indigenous population and its integration policies was looked to as a model for emulation.

In 1958 the first national political organisation, the Federal Council of Aboriginal Advancement (FCAA), was formed as an umbrella organisation to act as a national

53 Reg Kelly interview by Leo Fowler, 'Reg Kelly, Administrator of Indian Affairs', System ID - 410412, RNZSA.
voice and pressure group for Aboriginal people. Its goal was 'equal citizen's rights' for Aborigines. It sought the repeal of all state and federal government legislation which discriminated against Aborigines, and an amendment to the Commonwealth constitution to enable the Commonwealth government to legislate for Aborigines as it did for other Australian citizens. Its agenda was to forge Aborigines into a political force by generating a sense of community, consciousness-raising at grass-roots level, encouraging participation in their own affairs, and promoting Aboriginal identity.

In 1961 the FCAA decided to internationalise. As the issue of apartheid had entered New Zealand in 1959/60 and opened up the nation to discussion on race relations, it also had an effect in Australia. Specifically, it provided openings for activists to draw attention to racial discrimination being practised against Aborigines. Jennifer Clark sees the move towards internationalisation as originating from the Sharpeville massacre, which resulted in discussions at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers meeting. There, apartheid was pronounced as 'incompatible with Commonwealth beliefs' and racial equality was stressed as the 'basic principle of the British Commonwealth'. Thus for the FCAA a space became available to press Commonwealth prime ministers to pay more than lip service to the ideal of racial equality.

Its first action was to furnish all Commonwealth prime ministers with a report detailing the social, economic and political conditions of Aborigines, along with FCAA resolutions to end 'apartheid' in Australia. Doreen Trainor (Vice-president, Association for the Advancement of Coloured People) wrote to Prime Minister Keith Holyoake 'on behalf of our Aborigines' who have 'no parliamentary representation in his own country', and requested that he put the 'plight of the Aboriginal people' on the table for discussion at the next Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference.

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54 Age, 17 Feb 1958; Gary Foley, 'A Short History of the Australian Indigenous Resistance, 1950-1990', pp.1-29, (p.4), www.kooriweb.org/foley/resources/pdfs/pdf_files.html - accessed 4 March 2012. While the organisation was conceived as a voice for Aboriginal people it was dominated by non-indigenous members. In 1964 the FCAA became FCAATSI in response to a request from Torres Straits Islanders.

55 Jennifer Clark, Aborigines & Activism: Race, Aborigines & the Coming of the Sixties to Australia, Crawley: University of Western Australia Press, 2008, p.81.

56 Clark, Aborigines & Activism, p.85.

57 Correspondence, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation to Prime Minister Menzies, 17 May 1961, A1209, 1961/721, NAA; Sydney Morning Herald, 5 April 1961, p.2; Clark, Aborigines & Activism, p.48, 84-85.

58 Correspondence, Doreen Trainor (Vice-president, Association for the Advancement of Coloured People) to Prime Minister Keith Holyoake, 8 April 1961, A1209, 1961/721, NAA.
declined, invoked the domestic jurisdiction argument and stated that Commonwealth 
governments 'wisely, do not interfere in the internal affairs' of a member country, and he 
had no doubt the matter would be solved by the government and people of Australia.\textsuperscript{59} 
Stan Davey (Secretary of the FCAA) followed up, and asked Holyoake to use his 
influence on federal and state governments 'to apply international standards of justice 
for Aborigines'.\textsuperscript{60} He too was rebuffed by Holyoake on grounds of domestic 
jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{61}

Undeterred, Davey then requested contact between Aborigines and Maori – the first 
time that Aboriginal rights activists had sought to facilitate direct contact between the 
two peoples. Davey explained that there needed to be a 'broadening [of] the perspective 
of the policy-makers in relation to Aborigines' who were ignorant of the actions other 
countries were taking in respect to their indigenous peoples and instead were 'rigidly 
pursuing a policy of assimilation'. He proposed an exchange of Maori officers from the 
Department of Maori Affairs and the Australian Department of Territories and other 
state Aboriginal authorities. Davey noted that they had 'much to learn' and an exchange 
could also be of benefit to Maori Affairs officials.\textsuperscript{62} Ralph Hanan declined the proposal 
as he believed that Maori Affairs officers would not gain any benefit working in an 
Australian department. Aborigines were 'primitive as compared to New Zealand 
Maoris' and the problems in the two countries were dissimilar.\textsuperscript{63} Consideration could 
be given to an Australian officer being attached to Maori Affairs, although that person 
would have to be of 'senior status' in order to be able to comprehend the department's 
work and be able to apply the lessons learned on his return to Australia. There the 
matter rested.\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{59} Correspondence, Prime Minister Keith Holyoake to Doreen Trainor (Vice-president for the 
\textsuperscript{60} Correspondence, Stan Davey (secretary FCAA) to Prime Minister Keith Holyoake, 9 April 1962, 
AAMK 869, W3074, Box 1062e, 36/1/19, Part 1, NA.
\textsuperscript{61} Correspondence, Prime Minister Keith Holyoake to Stan Davey (FCAA), 15 May 1962, AAMK 869, 
W3074, Box 1062e, 36/1/19, Part 1, NA.
\textsuperscript{62} Correspondence, Stan Davey (FCAA) to Prime Minister Keith Holyoake, 4 June 1962, AAMK 869, 
W3074, Box 1062e, 36/1/19, Part 1, NA.
\textsuperscript{63} Correspondence, Ralph Hanan (Minister of Maori Affairs) to Prime Minister Keith Holyoake, 7 Aug 
1962, AAMK 869, W3074, Box 1062e, 36/1/19, Part 1, NA.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.
Australian Study Tour: ‘Australia could learn something from New Zealand’

In 1966 the first substantial contact with Australian Aborigines came when a large group (indigenous and non-indigenous), working 'in the field of Aboriginal Advancement or some other aspect of race relations', came into New Zealand for a 'study tour'. This was a joint initiative between the Department of Adult Education, University of Adelaide and the Department of Adult Education, Victoria University, Wellington. Leading the Australian delegation was James Warburton (Director of Adult Education at the University of Adelaide), and Wiremu Parker, lecturer in Maori Studies in the Department of Adult Education, organised the tour in New Zealand. Of the 30 in the tour group, eight were Aborigines who were involved in activist groups such as the Australian Aborigines' League (AAL) and the Federal Council for the Advancement of Aborigines and Torres Straits Islanders (FCAATSI). The object of the tour was to provide insight into 'Maori life and thought, a background to Maori-Pakeha relations, and knowledge of official policies'. To this end twelve days were spent at Victoria University on lectures, discussions and seminars on a comprehensive range of historical and contemporary topics which were presented by Maori and Pakeha lecturers.

Of the Maori presenting papers, most either worked in the Department of Maori Affairs or lectured at a university. Whether the space was used to present an oppositional narrative of race relations is difficult to assess as records of the lectures are almost entirely absent. However almost certainly historical grievances and some contemporary problems Maori faced, were touched upon. The topics, which included the Treaty of Waitangi, Maori resistance movements, land legislation and problems associated with urbanisation, all invited an oppositional discourse.

Moreover, the Maori lecturers – Charles Bennett, Brownie Puriri, Wiremu Parker, William Herewini, Katerina Mataira, and Koro Dewes – were part of the general shift whereby Maori were becoming more inclined to air grievances and speak out publicly against government policies which affected Maori. Some were emergent activists, such as Koro Dewes who had strenuously opposed the 1960 rugby tour to South Africa. An

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65 Information booklet, 'A Study Tour in New Zealand: The Maori', p.1, University of Adelaide, Department of Adult Education, Joe McGinness Papers, MS 3718, Box 8, Series 16, Item 14, AIASTSIS Archives, Canberra.
66 Ibid.
67 Pakeha lecturers: Mr Ian Wards, Mr J. Sylvester, Dr J.A. Salmond, Mr D.G. Ball, Dr W.R. Burch, Dr Falla, Mr J. Forster, Mr H.G. Miller, Dr J.A. Metge, Mr J.M. McEwen, and Dr W. B. Sutch.
outward sign that he remained politically active came in 1965 when he played a role in ‘O New Zealand’. This was a stage production which acted out historical speeches, letters and exchanges between Maori and government officials when they were sharply divided.\(^6\) By 1968 he was actively involved in the emerging anti-apartheid movement and was publicly presenting an oppositional race relations narrative. On the 8\(^{th}\) February he gave an address at the Founders Theatre in Hamilton in which he bluntly stated that the Treaty of Waitangi ‘is not worth the paper it is written on’ and claimed that a ‘type of imperialism’ had persisted since 1840 to the present day in which anything in Pakeha society, culture or language is superior to Maori’.\(^6\)

At the time of the study tour there was considerable dissatisfaction and criticism across Maoridom, related to Maori land reforms proposed in the Hunn Report and supported in the government-commissioned Prichard-Waetford Report (1965). The report advocated the Europeanisation of Maori land by removing legal distinctions which set the treatment of Maori land apart from that of Europeans. At local, regional and national levels, the report was viewed with suspicion and many feared the loss of Maori land if the proposals were acted upon by government.\(^7\) The study group had a session on the Prichard-Waetford Report and it would be surprising if the dissatisfaction and reservations held by Maori were not expressed.

Moreover, it was a period of noticeable cultural activism as some Maori began speaking out publicly of the need to retain cultural forms and practices, especially te reo, in the face of rapid urbanisation, the assimilative thrust of Government, and disinterest or opposition by the Pakeha population. At the time of the study tour a sharp debate was taking place via the media on the pronunciation of Maori place names by television and radio broadcasters. Some Maori demanded that Maori names be pronounced correctly - a demand which apparently incensed a large proportion of the Pakeha public and which was rejected (initially) by the New Zealand Broadcasting Service on the grounds that 'common usage' should prevail.\(^7\) Patu Hohepa denounced the decision as an insult, and

\(^6\) Nelson Photo News, No.53, 3 April 1965, p.27.
\(^7\) David Williams, Crown Policy…., p.163.
one which reflected 'discreditably on New Zealand's multi-racial prestige in this country and overseas', and he argued it was yet another form of race discrimination.72

At the same time, various Maori leaders and activists were seeking to have te reo taught in primary and secondary schools. With urbanisation and the loss of access to their home marae, as well as Government apathy and disinterest, Maori were fearful that the language would be lost. Katerina Mataira had been particularly active in pressing for te reo to be taught in schools. In 1956, when teaching at Northland College (Kaikohe), she established a Maori language class – the first in a New Zealand state school.73 In all likelihood the retention of language and culture would have been discussed as it was not only an issue of concern across Maoridom, but Aborigines and supporters were also becoming more attuned to cultural loss.

Douglas Ball, who had been a senior inspector of Maori schools, and from 1957 an officer for Maori education in all schools, presented a paper to the Australian group in which he bluntly identified Maori inequality and disadvantage.74 Speaking on the topic of Maori education he pointed out that low educational achievement, as identified in the Hunn Report, was due to the failure of successive education departments to provide Maori with the same equality of opportunity as Pakeha. He spoke of the Maori having been historically 'denied their language and their way of life' and of the Pakeha education system which had failed to include Maori in decisions about the education of their children noting that, although 'many things had been done for Maoris, seldom had they been done with Maoris'. In contemporary terms he slated the education system for taking no cognisance of Maori needs: failing to train specialist teachers to deal with problems unique to Maori, insufficient funding to provide adequate resources, and the refusal of teacher training colleges to teach te reo to trainee teachers. Moreover, no effort had been made to hold discussions with Maori parents and therefore the claim that Maori parents were apathetic (as alleged in the Hunn Report) remained unexamined. On

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73 David Williams, Crown Policy..., p.163. Katarina Mataira, author, artist and academic, helped establish the first Maori language immersion school, Kura Kaupapa Maori, at Hoani Waititi Marae in Auckland in 1986, and was at the forefront of Maori language teaching and revival. She was honoured with the Dame Companion of the New Zealand Order of Merit in the Queen's Birthday Honours List in 2011. See, Katerina Te Heikoko Mataira – Storylines', www.storylines.org.nz/.../Dame+Katerina+Te+Heikoko+Mataira.html - accessed 17 Nov 2014.
74 David Williams, Crown Policy..., pp.147-148.
a personal note, Ball admitted to feeling ashamed that during his tenure as a school inspector he had done little to analyse and rectify issues surrounding Maori education.

However the thrust of the study tour was not so much on contemporary Maori injustices and nowhere in any reports by members of the Australian group was the issue of race discrimination or disharmony mentioned. Rather, the focus, apart from many lectures on the historical struggle of Maori, was how they were overcoming problems with which they faced in an urban environment, and the new educational and integration initiatives which had been implemented by the government.

There was a particularly strong focus on the new educational initiatives, such as the MEF and Maori play centres. Lectures on the MEF were supplemented by visits to Maori play centres which had been set up by Alex (Lex) Grey (pre-school officer with the MEF) and supported strongly by the MWWL. These were intended to address educational deficit and prepare children for entrance to primary school at the same level as that of Pakeha children. The education and training of mothers was as much a feature of play centres as the education of children. Parents were educated in child development, play techniques and qualifications were gained. The centres were an exercise in self-determination (although it was not spoken of in those terms) which is why Maori support was strong: they were run by Maori, decision-making was by Maori, and the wider whanau was involved, which often saw centres morph into family education centres and a greater variety of activities implemented, including cultural components.75 Lex Grey provided support and guidance especially in relation to the educational framework and academic qualifications.

75 The fact that they were Maori play centres without Pakeha involvement contributed to their success. The reasons were more complex than a Maori/Pakeha power imbalance, and were grounded in cultural differences, and low educational and socio-economic status. All led to feelings of inadequacy, embarrassment and whakama by Maori mothers. As an example, in Te Atatu, Auckland, Maori mothers broke away from a bi-cultural play centre and formed their own. The reasons included embarrassment at their lack of education and poor English skills; most were on low-incomes and were ashamed that their clothing (and that of their children) was poor in comparison to that of Pakeha; and many had little to do with Pakeha and felt ill at ease speaking, mixing and joining discussion groups. Thus the more articulate and confident Pakeha mothers took charge of the sessions. Cultural differences were also an issue: Maori liked to do things collectively, some of the children's activities were not seen as culturally appropriate, and Pakeha mothers organised activities which included Maori culture but had little understanding of cultural issues and the offence or embarrassment they caused. See, Auckland Star, (No Date, Circa November 1965), MA1, Box 658, 36/1/21, Part 8, NA.
Both the MEF and the play centre movement were of particular interest to Aboriginal activists and non-Aboriginal educationalists working in the area of Aboriginal advancement, such as Alan Duncan (Department of Adult Education, University of Sydney and education officer for FCAATSI). Aboriginal groups and supporters had called for the formation of an Aboriginal Education Foundation along the same lines as the MEF and the study tour provided an opportunity to gain information on the MEF and observe first-hand the organisation and operation of play centres/family centres.\textsuperscript{76}

Interspersed amongst the formal lectures were a large number of activities and visits organised by Wiremu Parker. In many ways this part of the study tour was similar to the government visitors’ circuit. It was designed to show integration in action, and new integration initiatives. These included visits to Maori hostels, training and educational centres which were intended to show the measures taken by the government to cater for Maori within a new urban environment. Maori culture also formed a significant part of the itinerary. There were visits to marae, hui and cultural performances, and four days were spent travelling around the North island which included visits to the prestigious Turangawaewae marae (the heart of Kingitanga) and Ratana Pa. Two days were spent in Rotorua where along with scenic and cultural activities at Whakarewarewa, they were transported around a visitors’ circuit. The response by Aborigines which spoke glowingly of race relations (and which is detailed later), indicates that the study tour group was presented with a selective series of images outside the lecture theatre which sustained a positive image of race relations and the position of Maori in society. While there is no doubt that problems and injustices were presented, the itinerary suggests that the focus was on presenting a positive and progressive image to study tour delegates.

The tour produced diverse outcomes, not least the appearance of public expressions of discontent from Aborigines. From the beginning it was clear that Aborigines in the group would take the opportunities available to raise awareness in New Zealand and speak out publicly about their plight and the issues under contention at the time. Clive Williams and Rosalind Atkinson were interviewed on NZBC (radio) and spoke of land issues and the lack of land rights, racial prejudice, the current situation of Aborigines, and the loss of Aboriginal culture and language. An Aboriginal perspective was spread

across the air-waves and introduced New Zealanders to race relations in Australia, and some of the current issues which Aborigines were contesting.\textsuperscript{77} It is also clear that there were many opportunities to speak with Maori outside the university environs and at numerous informal social and marae gatherings which, noted James Warburton, enriched the experience.\textsuperscript{78}

For some not immersed in Aboriginal activist networks, the study tour had a politicising effect. Ray Kelly, a Dunghutti Aborigine, had been chosen for the tour and had mixed feelings about taking part as he felt that he would have nothing to offer. As it turned out, it marked a turning point in his life:

\begin{quote}
I was very introverted at that time - I didn't do a great deal of talking and I didn't do a great deal of talking in New Zealand either. For the first four days I said nothing. Other Aboriginal participants had been able to get up and thank the speakers and so forth but when it came to my turn I added nothing. Jim Smith was most constructive in his attempt to show the plight of our people. We were looking at Maoris at least fifty years in advance of us...It gave me a look at what could occur for Aboriginal people.\textsuperscript{79}
\end{quote}

Perhaps most importantly there was a sense of identification between the two peoples. Aborigines spoke of the warmth of the Maori community and its ready acceptance of them, especially noticeable during leisure times, at social functions and welcoming ceremonies.\textsuperscript{80} Others spoke of it in terms of culture: while Aborigines had lost aspects of their culture, and although the symbols of Maori culture were unique to Maori and vastly different to that of Aborigines, there was an identification and pride based on a shared sense of indigeneity. Rosalind Atkinson noted:

\begin{quote}
Our culture is dying out and this is why I am so sorry...when you come over here to New Zealand you just feel so proud you just want to sit down and cry because these people have their own culture.\textsuperscript{81}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{77} 'Te Mana Maori 1967', System ID - 46417, RNZSA.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{80} Comments made by Rosalind Atkinson, Clive Williams and James Warburton, Radio New Zealand interview, 'Te Mana Maori 1967', System ID - 46417, RNZSA.
\textsuperscript{81} Comments by Rosalind Atkinson, Radio New Zealand interview, 'Te Mana Maori 1967', System ID – 46417, RNZSA.
For Clive Williams, identification was based on the shared experience of colonisation. He spoke of the acceptance of Aborigines by the Maori community and the bonds between the two peoples. This he located in historical terms:

It runs even deeper with me as an Aborigine. I feel that after all, here were people, not assimilated, in the same circumstances as we are in - have experienced I think…what we are experiencing now and have experienced this quite some time ago...\textsuperscript{82}

The record about how Maori viewed the relationship and their thoughts about the study tour is absent. However at the most basic level it introduced a wide range of Maori to another indigenous people and a new awareness of their struggles from their perspective. Most New Zealanders had some understanding, even if only superficial, of the historical and contemporary oppression of Aborigines and their mistreatment and marginalisation. More recently, New Zealand newspapers had given coverage to the Freedom Rides of 1965 which placed the spotlight on racial discrimination, segregation and inequality. Following on, there had been a range of articles including the struggle for equal pay and privileges by Aboriginal workers in the Northern Territory, and demands for the rights of Aborigines to take control and make decisions for their own welfare.\textsuperscript{83} However, the interaction with Aborigines through the study tour gave a human face to the issues which were brought alive by the very people who had been affected. Some Aborigines, for example, detailed their personal experience of growing up on the margins of society.\textsuperscript{84} The warmth of the welcome by Maori and their ready acceptance of Aborigines, suggests a degree of identification and empathy.

\textbf{Confirming Maori Privilege, and Stimulating Aboriginal Activism}

The study tour simultaneously confirmed New Zealand's race relations reputation and that Maori were a privileged people, and provided a significant space in Australia for Aboriginal delegates to make comparisons and draw public attention to the neglect, low status and poor treatment of Aborigines. The view that all was well with race relations in New Zealand had weakened slightly insofar as there was recognition that there were 'problems here and mistakes had been made'. These, however, were minor and all 'were

\textsuperscript{82} Comments by Clive Williams, Radio New Zealand interview, 'Te Mana Maori 1967', System ID – 46417, RNZSA.
\textsuperscript{84} See, comments made by Rosalind Atkinson and Clive Williams, Radio New Zealand interview, 'Te Mana Maori 1967', System ID - 46417, RNZSA.
impressed with how New Zealand had handled its race relations'. Moreover, the situation of Maori bore little resemblance to that of Aborigines. In Australia, the 1967 Referendum was six months away and there was intense political activity surrounding this as well as a host of other 'rights' issues including land, education and discrimination. Aborigines used the experiences in New Zealand to add another layer to the wider struggle for Aboriginal rights.

In Australia the study tour attracted media attention, and Aboriginal members of the group used these outlets to inform the public of the great disparity between Maori and Aborigines in terms of status, treatment and opportunities. Rosalind Atkinson was interviewed on a Melbourne television channel and by the print media, and spoke of Maori ‘privilege’ in terms of the good 'attitude' towards Maori and of the advantages they had over Aborigines including government- backed initiatives and support which gave Maori 'better education, housing and land rights', and access to trade training schemes. Aborigines were denied the same educational opportunities and nor did they have an 'Aboriginal voice'. Instead, 'People seem to take the attitude that we are nobodies. The Maoris because of treaties signed many years ago which provided them with land rights...do not have the same problem. But we have no land rights and we are not even included in the Census'. She warned that unless action was taken to rectify injustices, Australia would experience racial strife similar to that which was occurring in America. Drawing on the situation of Maori, she called for the status of Aborigines to be improved by increasing grants for primary and secondary students, the creation of hostels for Aborigines in urban areas and universities, apprentice courses with pay, and measures implemented for Aborigines to retain their culture.

Others spoke similarly. Jim Smith (President of the Armidale Aborigines Association) used the media to criticise the government for the treatment of his people. Maori privilege was evident in that they had 'organisation, money and land rights' and it was astonishing that a small country like New Zealand could put 'such a tremendous amount

85 Comments by James Warburton, Radio New Zealand interview, 'Te Mana Maori 1967', System ID – 46417, RNZSA.
86 The Referendum sought two amendments to the Australian Constitution which gave the Commonwealth government power to legislate for Aboriginal people as a whole, and to have Aborigines count as part of the population of Australia.
87 *Age*, 21 Dec 1966.
88 *Canberra Times*, 16 Jan 1967.
of money into looking after Maoris while Australia was content to give up a measly handout'. 89 Robert Patterson, an Aboriginal from Yarrabah, remarked that as far as the Aborigines in the group were concerned, the progress of Aborigines was 'about a hundred years behind' that of Maori. They were especially impressed by the high education standards of Maori and the way in which they had maintained their cultural traditions and identity while also participating within a modern society. This was, observed Patterson, how it should be in Australia. 90 Aleck Jackomos, a welfare officer, member of the AAL in Victoria and Victorian state secretary for FCAATSI, was impressed by what the New Zealand Government had done for Maori, especially the apprentice training schemes for Maori youth. Australia could 'learn something from New Zealand'. 91

The information and experience gained from the tour of New Zealand was fed into local, regional and national organisations. Rosalind Atkinson announced her intention to organise local meetings for Aborigines in Victoria and 'explain how Maoris had overcome their problems and suggest similar action in Australia'. 92 Alick Jackomos, wrote an official report in which he identified the stark difference in the treatment of Maori and Aborigines, and identified Maori as a privileged people:

The Maori is a national responsibility and New Zealand whose population is smaller than Victoria, spends much more than all Australia states spend on Aborigines'. Maori had all the things that Aborigines were struggling to gain: their culture had survived and formed part of New Zealand's culture, Maori language was taught at the universities, they had land rights via the Treaty of Waitangi, and they had a political voice through the Maori members of parliament. Moreover, there were no discriminatory laws and they had equality with Pakeha New Zealanders, and thus the same rights to 'housing, employment, education and health.... How many years must Aboriginals wait for the same opportunities?' 93

Others in the group worked in diverse areas and used aspects of the superior situation of Maori in New Zealand to substantiate their efforts for the introduction of new schemes to promote Aboriginal advancement or press for Aboriginal rights. Jim Smith for

91 Ibid.
92 Age, 21 Dec 1966.
example, co-authored a pamphlet 'Land Rights for Aborigines' for members concerned about the continuing alienation of reserve land for mining and grazing leases, and who wanted to know more about land rights for Aborigines.\textsuperscript{94} The situation in New Zealand was used to demonstrate Maori land rights and protections via Maori trust boards and to suggest the introduction of a similar scheme for Aboriginal land rights and land development. The pamphlet was sent to federal government authorities along with a request to have all reserve land vested in an Aboriginal lands trust consisting of elected Aboriginal trustees to prevent the alienation of Aboriginal reserves.\textsuperscript{95}

A range of organisations were attempting to implement schemes and offer suggestions on how to raise the educational achievement of Aborigines. Immediately following the Referendum, FCAATSI put forward proposals which included the establishment of a National Education Foundation 'similar to that provided by the New Zealand government for Maoris'.\textsuperscript{96} More significantly, and producing tangible outcomes, were the efforts of educationalists and academics, including Alan Duncan who was actively working alongside Aborigines. The New Zealand play-centre/family-centre model had inspired Duncan who saw it as a means to enable Aborigines to take control of their lives.\textsuperscript{97} In March 1967 Duncan convened a weekend leadership course for Aborigines to discuss their problems, think about solutions and make plans for the future.\textsuperscript{98}

Education elicited much discussion and Lex Grey had been brought to Australia by Duncan to explain the Maori play-centre model to Aborigines. Grey conducted a session on the need for pre-school education for Aboriginal children and the positive effects it could have for the whole family. Out of the conference came a proposal by Aborigines from the three reserves of Box Ridge, Tabulam and Woodenbong to implement centres on these reserves. This they envisaged being for the benefit of both

\textsuperscript{95} For correspondence in relation to this issue see, Armidale Association for Aborigines, 1968-1970, A2354, 1968/11, NAA.
\textsuperscript{96} Age, 29 May 1967.
\textsuperscript{97} See, 'Alan Duncan', http://indigenousrights.net.au/person.asp?ID=1000 - accessed, 22 April 2013. At this time Duncan was Convenor of the FCAATSI Education Committee and staff tutor in the Department of Adult Education at the University of Sydney.
\textsuperscript{98} See, Gwendolyn Watt, 'An Address Given to Aboriginal Conference held at Moree, NSW, on 26th and 27th October, 1968,' Education of Aborigines - general representation, 1968', A2354, 1968/53, Part 4, NAA.
children and adults, and to reflect their vision they chose the name AFEC (Aboriginal Family Educational Centre) for the proposed centres.99

During his visit, Lex Grey showed 'films of Maori singing and dancing' which aroused 'the tremendous interest' of the Aborigines at the various leadership groups at which he spoke.100 At a week’s leadership school at Evans Head 'many of them were projected twenty times, and still the Aborigines kept asking to see them again'. It had already been noted by Duncan and others working in the field that Aborigines were more interested in lectures if they were given by Aborigines rather than non-Aboriginal speakers. As Aborigines were clearly impressed by the films about Maori, and bearing in mind they were not especially receptive to non-Aboriginal speakers or tutors, Duncan made a decision to bring Maori women, who were trained play-centre supervisors, to Australia. The aim was that they would help set up play-centres, motivate Aboriginal women, and train them to become supervisors.

Maori and Aboriginal Women: Generating Indigenous Connections and Consciousness at Home and Abroad

In 1954 at a MWWL Dominion Conference, an Australian observer spoke of the desperate plight of Aborigines. Impressed by Maori as an 'emancipated people', she hoped that 'quite a number' of Maori women from the MWWL would consider going to Australia to 'help the Aborigines with their emancipation'.101 Thirteen years later six Maori women from the MWWL entered Aboriginal reserves in the Northern area of New South Wales and so began a relationship between Maori and Aboriginal women which was to continue into the early 1970s. During this period over 30 Maori women, all play-centre supervisors and MWWL members, made regular trips to Australia to set up pre-school and family education centres and train Aboriginal women as supervisors. They lived and worked in Aboriginal communities, sometimes for lengthy periods, and a number of Aboriginal women travelled to New Zealand for further study and training.

99 Grey moved to Australia later in 1967 and eventually was employed to organise and establish play-centres within the AFEC umbrella which was under the control of Alan Duncan.
100 This paragraph is based on a document, 'Maoris Come To The Aid Of The Aborigines', (Circa 1968), Bernard Van Leer-Foundation Project- New South Wales-Family Education Centres-Grey A., A2354, 1968/159, Part 1, NAA. While there is no author on the document, it was written by Dr D.W. Crowley, Director, Department of Adult Education, University of Sydney.
101 Address by Mrs Bowie, President of the Australian Korean Society (NSW) in 'Report 3rd Annual Conference MWWL, 1954', (p.13), 88-131-19/08, ATL.
Centres were set up in New South Wales, followed by Victoria and Western Australia. By 1970, in New South Wales, there were 11 family centres which had been in operation continuously over 18 months in three clusters. In addition, numerous sub-groups had formed out of these centres. While the work of the Maori women was extensive, the focus here is narrow and on the relationship between Maori and Aborigines, identification and the building of an indigenous community.

First contact with Aborigines came in May 1967, when six Maori women - Betty Brown, Mana Rangi, Hiria Parata, Hine Campbell, Hana Tukukino and Pearl Allen - travelled to Evans Head to take part in a weekend school with Aboriginal leaders from a northern area of New South Wales.

There was instantaneous and mutual acceptance when Aborigine and Maori met. All meetings together had the same spirit as our meetings at home because of the empathy and warmth between us - racial differences did not exist. The first evening… Mana Rangi gave the traditional Maori welcome which was watched with awe and applauded with vigour…we showed pictures of play-centre activities, our New Zealand way of life, and demonstrated some of the arts and crafts practised by our people. The end of the evening came with the Maori action songs to which the Aboriginal people became almost addicted – at every opportunity they asked for a repeat of the performance.

A TV team from the 'Four Corners' documentary series of ABC television filmed the historic meeting between Maori and Aborigines and the events over the weekend. Betty Brown noted that they were enthusiastic but regretted that they could not capture the warmth and harmony between Maori and Aborigine.

Of that first meeting, Desmond Crowley, Director, Department of Adult Education, University of Sydney, took a different perspective:

An underprivileged indigenous race in one country was making an important, possibly an essential contribution, to a scheme intended to promote the development of the

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underprivileged native people of Australia...Though the Maori people, especially in isolated groups, have heartbreaking problems still to overcome in their efforts to attain full equality of opportunity with the Pakehas, their progress over the last forty years has been incomparably better than the “advance” - if that is a suitable term - of the Aborigines. The significant point to note that it has come about largely through the efforts of Maori leaders.... The spark that seems to have been ignited by the Maori visitors may eventually kindle a flame that may never have burned otherwise.  

At the end of the weekend the women travelled in pairs to Aboriginal communities where they were to set up pre-school centres. Pearl Allen and Hine Campbell stayed at Box Ridge, Hana Tukukino and Hiria Parata travelled to Tabulum, and Betty Brown and Mana Rangi travelled to Woodenbong. Betty Brown spoke of deprivation and substandard living conditions under which Aborigines lived on the Woodenbong Reserve. She spoke of a manager responsible for the Aborigines' welfare who made no effort to improve their living conditions, and she noted their stark bleak lives:

...nothing has been done to the houses...wooden, small, unpainted and unlined, with a wood stove and no electricity, no water laid on - one cold tap outside, in some cases no glass in the windows, very little furniture and no home comforts. But this was their land, their dead were buried on the hill and they did not want to leave...The children...showed a considerable amount of aggression and hostility towards each other. Perhaps this was an expression of the barrenness of their lives.

During the week measures were put in place for an AFEC centre and the rudiments of a pre-school group established. With a sense that 'pride of race' was lacking and a dearth of knowledge of cultural traditions and language, grandparents were co-opted into becoming members of the pre-school team to pass on their knowledge to the pre-school children. The friendly and accepting atmosphere continued as many had attended the Evan's Head weekend. The acceptance of Maori, and bonds which had developed was reflected in the farewell given to Maori when they left the North. Aborigines at the

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105 'Maoris Come To The Aid Of The Aborigines', (Circa 1968), Desmond Crowley, Director, Department of Adult Education, University of Sydney, Bernard Van Leer-Foundation Project-New South Wales-Family Education Centres – Grey, A., A 2354, 1968/159, Part 1, NAA.
weekend course had learned 'Now is the Hour' which they sang as the women crossed the tarmac to board the plane.  

The acceptance and warmth of welcome by Aborigines, the bond which developed between the two peoples and the clear identification with each other was replicated almost everywhere throughout the years that Maori women spent in Aboriginal communities. Numerous reports made the same observation, and it was especially remarkable that it occurred even amongst people who had never met Maori before, or possibly even knew of their existence. On the occasion of the first contact between Aborigines and Maori at Ernabella, an official report observed:

For the first time a Maori from New Zealand has visited the Pitjantjatjara people of Ernabella. Although I had expected that they would respond to the warmth of the Maori approach, I was surprised to find how quickly Mrs Mana Rangi was accepted...she made friends with the women very quickly...On the second full day ...the Aboriginal women gave Mana the highest honour any visitor receives. She was invited to a women's corroboree. This was because she had been accepted so well by them that they felt she was one of them.

Hine Potaka explained that the easy acceptance by Aborigines, and the same closeness which both felt for each other was simply that they were coloured people. As most Aborigines in the isolated communities knew little or nothing about Maori, there was no identification based on the experience of colonisation or negative relationships with Europeans. Skin colour, cultural performances and inherent characteristics attributed to indigenous people formed the basis of identification:

We have a closeness with the Aboriginal people in that our skins are the same colour...we have a great love of children, we love our legends and our songs, and this is in fact why I think the Maori women can get close to the Aboriginal mother.

The Annual Review of the Van Leer Project commented similarly:

They are, with their brown skins and values similar to those of Aborigines, accepted readily by Aborigines. This acceptance remains essentially because the Maori people, as one gets to know them, have additionally, an integrity and honesty which are a

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107 Ibid, p.22.
109 ‘Hine Potaka’, 1971, System ID - 40642, RNZSA.
pleasure to experience....They have got closer more quickly than anybody else we know
could to the real thinking of the Aboriginal people. Within a matter of hours they are
sharing confidences with the Aboriginal people.\textsuperscript{110}

That there was identification was seen in the way Aboriginal women regarded Maori as
'sisters'.\textsuperscript{111} More than that, as an Aboriginal Field Officer explained, some regarded
Maori 'as kinsfolk' as Aboriginal mythology regarded Maori as Aborigines who had
moved east.

For Maori, there was an identification based on indigenousness, and direct contact
brought understanding of the position of another indigenous people and empathy about
their situation. Whether Maori recognised that the situation of Aborigines, in terms of
under-privilege, poverty, lack of government support, marginalisation and
discrimination, was similar to that which Maori had suffered in the past and which
many were still subject to some extent, was not mentioned. Nor is there any indication
that the political discourse of colonisation was mentioned as the agent which had
reduced indigenous people to such a condition. What was evoked was empathy and, at
times, anger at the level of deprivation, neglect and marginalisation which Aborigines
suffered. The Maori women understood why there was a sense of hopelessness and
apathy which non-Aboriginal people often spoke of as being a characteristic of
Aborigines. As Hine Potaka explained:

\begin{quote}
You must remember too that in the past they have lived on their reserves on the fringes
of the towns and society. I was sad to see the tribal disintegration. I didn't hear any of
the language being spoken. I didn't see any of the arts or the crafts. It was sad for me to
see their homes built next to dumps, public vehicle dumping grounds. It was sad to see
the roads tar-sealed to within a quarter of a mile of the reserves…What else do you
expect that these people become apathetic, withdrawn, suspicious of the white man, and
this is where I feel that we Maori can go in there and be accepted. In fact the invitation
has come from the Aboriginal people themselves to go there - for the Maori people to
go there and help them.\textsuperscript{112}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{110} 'University of Sydney, Department of Adult Education, Bernard Van Leer Foundation Action-Research
Project, Second Annual Review-1970', Van Leer Foundation Project, New South Wales, A 2354,
1971/168, NAA.

\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Te Ao Hou}, No.63, June 1968, pp.42-44 (p.44).

\textsuperscript{112} 'Hine Potaka', 1971, System ID - 40642, RNZSA.
There was empathy with Aborigines and sadness in terms of cultural loss. In some communities, although not all, there was an almost total absence of any visible signs of traditional culture and this was seen by Maori as directly responsible for a lack of pride in their Aboriginal identity. Maori could identify too with the loss of cultural forms. While they had 'retained the pride of race and identity with...ancestors', they were facing an uncertainty about cultural continuity and the loss of Maori language (te reo) within an urban environment. Maori perceived that Aborigines did not have that same pride of race, as most young Aborigines had no knowledge of their tribal traditions or even a basic smattering of their language. This 'was a tragedy, for they had nothing of their own with which to identify themselves'. Instilling a 'pride of race' and forging a solid relationship with Aborigines were central aims, and Maori instinctively knew that their culture was the key. When entering Aboriginal communities for the first time an evening was spent showing films of Maori cultural performances, and Maori also performed and sang traditional action songs during the evening. As one observer noted, the films and actions songs were received with 'great enthusiasm...the fact that Mrs Rangi had come from a similar and yet different background and culture from their own created a lot of interest amongst the Aboriginal people'.

![Figure 3.2, Honor Goldsmith, Mana Rangi and Hine Potaka at award ceremony for their work with AFEC.](image)

113 This paragraph is based on Betty Brown, 'Aboriginal Family Education Centres Established', Te Ao Hou, No.60, Sept 1967, pp.19-22; 'Hine Potaka', 1971, System ID - 40642, RNZSA.
114 'Visit to Marree by Mrs Mana Rangi, 18-21 May' (Circa 1968), Bernard Van Leer-Foundation Project – New South Wales-Family Education Centres, A 2354, 1968/159, Part 2, NAA.
Maori built on this and often had further evenings where they sang and performed action songs and encouraged Aborigines to join in with their cultural performances. At one level they recognised the power of such performances as the cultural glue which bound indigenous people together, and even though cultural forms may have been vastly different, indigenousness was central. Secondly they hoped that the visible demonstration of their culture 'and the obvious pleasure and pride' would communicate itself to younger Aborigines in particular and inspire 'a pride of race'. It was the development and strengthening of pride of race and identity which was a major focus of the Maori women. There was some success: In an annual review of the project in 1970 it was noted that the Maori women had brought 'a sense of endeavour amongst Aboriginal people and noticeably have awakened...a sense of pride and determination to recapture Aboriginal culture and language'.

There was no reflection or links made by the Maori women that Maori too were in a similar situation in terms of loss of language and some cultural traditions, especially amongst the first generation of young Maori born and brought up in an urban environment. At the time New Zealand was on the cusp of significant social change and race relations upheaval, and by 1970 three radical activist organisations had formed. The inability of many young activists to speak te reo and a lack of knowledge of cultural forms was keenly felt and became a central part of their activist agenda. Moreover, from its inception the MWWL had pressed the government to have te reo taught in schools. In contemporary terms the retention of te reo, in the face of urbanisation and government disinterest in promoting the language, was an enduring concern. However in Australia, there was no reflection by the Maori women of the parallels in relation to cultural loss. Possibly the reason was that in some cases there was an almost total absence of cultural forms, whereas in New Zealand Maori culture remained strong in rural communities. In the cities efforts to enable cultural continuity had been made since the 1950s, and a web of Maori organisations, community centres,

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115 *New Dawn*, Cover, Feb 1972. Honor Goldsmith, Mana Rangi, and Hine Potaka, on the occasion of being presented with letters of acknowledgement by the Chancellor of the University of Sydney. This was in recognition and appreciation of their work in the AFEC movement in bringing pre-school education to Aboriginal communities.

marae and clubs had been created to strengthen Maori identity and re-connect young urbanised youth to their cultural roots.

From 1968 visits were arranged for Aboriginal women to visit New Zealand to further their training. It was not only a means of enabling them to gain higher qualifications, but had been initiated in part to provide encouragement and the impetus to continue, and to observe racial cooperation in action, especially through play-centres that had both Maori and Pakeha.\(^\text{117}\) Resentment and mistrust of non-Aboriginal people was high in the Aboriginal communities, and the aim was to demonstrate that such barriers could be broken down by mutual discussion.

The visits raised a new awareness amongst both Aborigines and New Zealanders which challenged stereotypes in relation to Aborigines and at the same time consolidated New Zealand’s race relations reputation. The first two Aborigines who visited were subject to overwhelming attention from the public, the media and from the local people in the communities in which they stayed.\(^\text{118}\) People everywhere wanted to speak with them and ask questions. This was not surprising, as these were possibly the first Aborigines to enter New Zealand for an extended period of time, live in local communities, and travel extensively throughout New Zealand. The great interest shown was an indication of the stereotypes which New Zealanders held - especially that of Aborigines as primitive, intellectually inferior to whites, and without a 'voice', political or otherwise. Rarely had the Aboriginal voice been broadcast through the New Zealand media. Betty Brown observed that people 'got a shock...they were not prepared for Dorothy and Olga. Preconceived ideas of Aborigines were shaken by the reality of two self-possessed women'. For Aboriginal women, the most astonishing feature of New Zealand was 'the equality of the Maori's place in New Zealand society'. Alice Wood, who spent eight months working in play-centres and living in a predominantly Maori community in the Bay of Plenty, remarked similarly. She had ample time to gain a solid understanding of race relations and was impressed with 'the happy atmosphere between the two races', and the stark difference to that which existed in Australia.

\(^\text{117}\) For reports of the first Aboriginal women to visit New Zealand, see, Betty Brown, 'Two Aboriginal Women Visit Our Play Centres', *Te Ao Hou*, No.63, June 1968, pp.42-44; *Dawn*, June 1968, p.3.

\(^\text{118}\) This paragraph is taken from *Te Ao Hou*, No.63, June 1968, pp.42-44.
You see the Maoris everywhere you go. Whether town or country. It's a very different situation from ours here in Australia. There's still some white prejudice in New Zealand, but it's not nearly as marked as here.

The involvement by Maori in AFEC and the play-centres had all but finished by 1973 as many centres closed down. This was largely due to criticism and agitation by non-Aboriginal academics, educationalists, kindergarten teachers and politicians who regarded the kindergarten model run by formally educated trained teachers and with its highly prescribed curriculum as superior to the play centre model. Such people argued that mothers were incapable of teaching their children and Aboriginal mothers were less so, and they were critical of Maori women who had no university or formal teaching qualifications. Down south in Victoria, Colin Tatz who had set up play centres explained that closure was due to agitation by academics 'who were dyed in the wool kindergarteners and they thought all this was avant-garde, and you have to have teachers registered...and one teacher to twenty-five children...'

The play-centre years and the contact forged with Aborigines, was as Colin Tatz observed, a soft activism and an important step in the development of Aboriginal activism. It was non-political and there is no indication that either were concerned about political issues which were breaking out in Australia at the time. For both, it generated a new consciousness: identification based on indigeneity, and was a step towards the formation of a transnational indigenous community.

**Building Maori/Aboriginal Networks and Raising Political Awareness Abroad**

At the same time as Maori women from the MWWL were working in Aboriginal communities, links between Maori and Aborigines were being forged through other avenues. Whetu Tirikatene and Matiu Rata both spent time supporting the struggle for Aboriginal rights and at the same time they too consolidated New Zealand's reputation for racial equality. Whetu Tirikatene (later, Tirikatene-Sullivan) moved to Australia in

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120 Interview with Colin Tatz, Sydney, 26 Nov 2009.

121 Ibid.
1965 for post-graduate study at the ANU in Canberra. There she quickly became involved with FCAATSI, and joined Aboriginal activists in taking direct action in support of Aboriginal rights and gathering support for the upcoming referendum in 1967. In part, she recalls, this involved 'putting ourselves in the front line to enter locations from which Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders were formerly excluded'.

Through FCAATSI, Whetu made contact with Aboriginal leaders and well-known activists, including Faith Bandler, Kath Walker and Charles Perkins. Bandler and Walker made a considerable impact: 'I was impressed by these women. They expressed the pain of their people and articulated it in remarkably powerful ways...I had admiration [for them] and they gained my full support'. However, Whetu’s involvement in the Aboriginal rights movement was brief. Following the death of her father, Sir Eruera Tirikatene (January 1967), she relinquished her studies and returned to New Zealand where she succeeded him as MP for Southern Maori. Following this, contact appears to have ceased and there is no evidence that she maintained close contact with activists during her role as MP.

More substantial and enduring contact came from Matiu Rata, MP for Northern Maori. An outcome of the 1966 Aboriginal Study Tour was an invitation for Rata to be guest speaker at the FCAATSI Easter Conference in 1967. His address was directed at the upcoming referendum. Rata pointed out that the eyes of the world were on Australia to see if they would acknowledge and support Aboriginal rights and racial equality. While attempts had been made to lift the status of Aborigines, equality would not be gained until there was equality of opportunity, and advancement could only occur when there was 'economic self-sufficiency, a fuller participation in the Australian way of life with equal citizenship, privileges and responsibilities'. Moreover the retention of tribal identity and culture was crucial. It was time that Aborigines took their 'rightful place' in society as Maori had done in New Zealand.

Nevertheless, Rata did not gloss the situation of Maori and stressed that that although the 'rightful place of Maori had been acknowledged’, their situation was far from perfect and significant problems, especially in the areas of housing, education, and living

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122 Email interview with Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan, 21 Aug 2010.
123 Ibid.
124 The content of Rata’s address has been taken from reports in Canberra Times, 25 March 1967; Age, 29 March 1967. It appears to have gone unnoticed in the New Zealand press.
standards, were yet to be addressed. Full equality was not a reality, but there was the opportunity to achieve this and the situation in New Zealand accorded with the ideal of integration. In New Zealand ‘we speak of two races, one nation...You can't wish integration; it can be brought about only by recognising the values of both cultures. And we believe our policy of integration allows both cultures to enrich society’. Rata suggested that it was this form of integration and equality which Aborigines must demand as a right, and which all Australians must support.

Rata’s address signalled a position that some moderate Maori activists would adopt in the future. They acknowledged that Maori were in a much better position than other indigenous people, whilst at the same time pointing out that ‘better than’ was not great and there was still much to be done to address the many injustices and problems which Maori faced.

At the time of Rata’s visit, the Gurindji people were taking political action which was simultaneously a strike and a demand for land rights. The previous year Aboriginal stockmen had walked off Newcastle Waters and then Wave Hill stations in the Northern Territory in response to an arbitration court ruling to postpone the payment of equal wages to Aboriginal pastoral workers for three years. By the end of the year the strike had been transformed into a claim for land rights by the Gurindji people, who moved to Wattie Creek, the spiritual centre of their tribal lands. There they stayed for over seven years and fought for the return of some of their lands which were owned by the British peer, Lord Vesty. The Gurindji struggle to gain title to their lands inspired Aborigines and raised the consciousness of non-Aboriginal Australians through high profile actions and was crucial in the development of the struggle for Aboriginal land rights.125

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125 For an account of the Gurindji struggle, see Bain Attwood, Rights for Aborigines, Melbourne: Allen & Unwin, 2003, Chapter 11.
While in Australia, Rata met with some Gurindji activists to gain an understanding of the issues and to show solidarity. Rata had been a committed trade unionist and official during the 1950s and not averse to taking radical action. During the 1951 waterfront lockout, as a seaman he had been involved in transporting large amounts of cash donated by Australian unions back to New Zealand to distribute to union families. Following his return from Canberra Rata continued to support the Gurindji struggle by supplying CARE with information for their newsletters thereby raising an awareness of the issues involved. By 1969, apart from apartheid which was a central focus, CARE had become more attuned to international issues and began to print information on the position of the indigenous peoples in North America and more often on the struggles of the Australian Aborigines.

During his time in Canberra, Rata came into contact with a great many activists and influential leaders such as John Moriarty and Charles Perkins, with whom he 'made lasting friendships'. At the FCAATSI conference Rata extended an invitation to

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128 For example see, ‘Call for help from across the Tasman’, CARE Newsletter, Nov 1969, pp.8-12 which identifies Rata as providing information.
Aboriginal activists to contact him if they were ever in New Zealand. Some accepted his offer and Rata facilitated contacts for students and academics especially during the course of their study in New Zealand, and he also dispensed advice and information for Aboriginal activists and organisations. However, there was clearly much more to Rata’s involvement with Aborigines than the public record shows: in correspondence between Rata and John Moriarty the latter acknowledged the help and advice that Rata had given to Aborigines over the years.

More substantial was his support for a group of young Aborigines. In 1970 Rata invited a team from the Redfern All Black Football Club (rugby league) to tour New Zealand. Redfern was a suburb in Sydney which young Aborigines, who were new to the city, gravitated towards, and it was also the centre from which Black Power activism emerged. Rata had met Ken Brindle (NSW State Secretary of FCAATSI and secretary of the Redfern All Blacks Club) while in Australia and had learned of the Redfern club and what Brindle was seeking to achieve. The club consisted of young Aborigines who had moved off Aboriginal reserves and into Sydney in search of employment and into Redfern for accommodation. Apart from the sporting aspect, the club provided social activities, encouraged pride in their Aboriginal identity, and provided support systems such as assistance with accommodation, employment and legal advice. Rata invited the team to New Zealand and following discussions with Brindle, he arranged an extensive sporting, social, educational and cultural programme.

Despite the tour being framed as a sports tour, the main purpose was to provide Aborigines with ‘educational and social enrichment and an insight into the Maori way of life compared with that of the Aborigines’. Maori leaders at government, regional and local level were called on to assist and host the team in various activities. An itinerary included civic receptions, balls and other social functions, visits to schools, training and trade centres, and there was a heavy emphasis on Maori culture. According to a report by Ken Brindle:

\[\text{\textsuperscript{129}}\text{Correspondence, John Moriarty to Matiu Rata, 2 Feb 1971, Rata Papers, ABAF, 1/3, NA.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{130}}\text{Ibid.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{132}}\text{Ken Brindle, 'A club to be proud of...', \textit{New Dawn}, June 1970, pp.1-2}\]
Football was of only secondary importance. We have learnt a lot about Maori culture. We have visited many training centres and I am sure many of the boys have been motivated by these. At Rotorua we saw a centre where young Maoris learn carving. Our boys were very impressed by this. It doesn't happen in Australia....The team spoke at various primary and high schools....This helped everyone. We thought Maoris wore grass skirts, they thought all we could do was throw boomerangs....the tour has been a success. We have learnt a lot and the boys will go back much enlightened and motivated by the tours of the various training centres. And we have given school children and school teachers a completely different idea of Aborigines. We got more out of this tour than we ever anticipated.  

What was apparent during the tour was a sense of affinity between the two peoples. As one observer commented, there was a 'natural attachment' between Maori and Aborigines which was most visibly 'displayed each time they departed from marae'. Moreover when a series of unpleasant issues arose which threatened to end the tour abruptly, Maori swung into action and wrapped empathy and support around the young people. Matiu Rata despatched a close friend to accompany and stay with the team, and Kingitanga stepped in and invited the Aborigines to stay at Turangawaewae marae for three days as guests of the Maori Queen. Ken Brindle wrote: 'From the moment the Ngaruawahia Maoris took over... there were always two or three of their committee staying with us, and one even slept with us'. As well as hospitality, friendliness and support from Maori, the presentation of team members to the Maori Queen made the Ngaruawahia visit 'the highlight of the tour and the most enjoyable'. The affinity was demonstrated when a large group of Maori, including a great many from Ngaruawahia, farewelled the Aboriginal tour group at Auckland airport in an emotional farewell.

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134 Newspaper clipping, (No name, no date), Rata Papers, ABAF 2/49, NA.
137 Ken Brindle, 'Report By Mr K. Brindle...'
Recognised by the Aborigines was the importance Maori placed on culture and which in turn highlighted their own cultural loss. Brindle observed that whenever they were welcomed by Maori it was done so in their own language. The expectation was that Aborigines should respond in their own language and 'most of our boys expressed shame that we could not'.\textsuperscript{138} He suggested that biennial exchanges take place because the 'pride of race' and cultural retention was so strong that Aborigines could not help but be inspired and influenced by it. Such exchanges did not eventuate largely due to financial difficulties.\textsuperscript{139} Whether the tour had any impact on the Aboriginal team members is unknown, but at the least it was a consciousness-raising event which pointed to the marked difference between the status of Maori and Aborigines. Some team members became active in the struggle for Aboriginal rights and participated in the activism coming out of Redfern. As will be discussed in the following chapter, within a few years Maori activists began making their way to Australia, and forging links with radical activists in Redfern.

**Using ‘New Nets to Fish up Ideas from International Waters’:**

**Building Indigenous Networks in North America**

At the same time Maori academics began travelling further afield and most went into North America to undertake postgraduate study. Whatarangi Winiata studied at the University of Michigan, Hirini Mead at the University of Southern Illinois, Patu Hohepa at Indiana University, and Kara Puketapu at the University of Chicago. Some remained for a time working in various institutions as lecturers. Patu Hohepa for example, taught at the University of Hawaii, Harvard University and Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Hirini Mead took up positions at the University of British Colombia and McMaster University.

While in America, they had the opportunity to reach into American Indian communities and establish substantial contact with indigenous leaders, individuals and activists. Patu Hohepa recalls that during the course of his academic work (at that time and later) and fieldwork conducted amongst the Hopi, Havasupai and Navaho people, he came into

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{139} Correspondence, Charles Perkins (Project Officer, Office of Aboriginal Affairs) to Mr Huey (Office for Aboriginal Affairs), 27 April 1972, Redfern All Black Junior Rugby League Football Club Records, A 2354, 1970/10, Part 1, NAA.
contact with a wide range of indigenous and non-indigenous people and activists. Interaction brought an understanding of the similarity of the experience of colonisation and its legacy being played out in contemporary society, and similarities in cultural forms, spiritual beliefs and inherent indigenous characteristics. It brought recognition of a shared indigeneity. Of his time amongst the Hopi people, Patu Hohepa recalled:

To find that Maori and Hopi philosophical, cultural and spiritual beliefs were not that wide apart even though the practices and procedures were, and also find that our languages were devastatingly different despite the fact that the contents and things and concerns in our minds from the everyday to the sacred were the same, are findings that go beyond academia into the mix of humanity and shared indigeneity...I stayed and learnt many things.

Understandings were gained of the ways by which each had sought to deal with the colonising legacy, and it was apparent that such information and strategies could be passed on to assist each other. Hirini Mead spent time in the south west of America visiting Pueblo Indian communities and he came to the same conclusion. The Pueblo people had, he noted, been successful in retaining their traditional social and cultural practices, and managed to stem the destructive effects of white society over a greater period of time than had been the case in New Zealand. In this regard they had been much more successful and clearly there were lessons which Maori could learn from the Pueblo people. In fact, each could learn from the other. To this end he suggested cultural exchanges between the Pueblo Indians and Maori: 'The time has come for the Maori to use one of his new nets to fish up ideas from international waters'.

The opportunity came in 1969 when the Ford Foundation in New York sponsored an exchange programme and 'a goodwill tour' between Maori and American Indian leaders. The inspiration for the exchange was Siobahn Oppenheimer, who began working for the Ford Foundation in 1968 as a senior Programme Officer in National Affairs. Included in her portfolio was ‘Hispanic and Native American organisations’ and this reflected a policy shift by the Ford Foundation in 1967 to elevate its support for disadvantaged

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minorities to top priority status. Thus the idea for an exchange coincided with the provision of substantial support for American Indians, and in December 1968 it had announced grants totalling US$654,000 to help American Indians 'enter the mainstream of modern American society'. Oppenheimer worked with Kara Puketapu, an officer on the States Services Commission and a recent holder of a Harkness Fellowship in America, and they devised the itineraries for the tour of their respective countries.

The aim was to give both indigenous peoples the opportunity to study at first-hand, social, welfare and educational programmes. It was also envisaged that the delegates would take their new knowledge and experiences back to their own communities for the benefit of their people. Ten Maori travelled to the United States where they spent 18 days visiting reservations, and ten American Indian leaders spent the same time travelling around New Zealand. Oppenheimer promoted the reciprocal scheme because of her belief that Maori and American Indians shared many similarities and commonalities, but there were also differences. Both could learn from each other.

Maori members of the tour group were selected (by Kara Puketapu) according to their leadership qualities and all carried high prestige and status. Two high school students, Vern Winitana (Hutt Valley High School) and George Asher (St Stephen's School, Pukekohe), were selected for their potential as future Maori leaders. The other members were Robert Mahuta (brother of the Maori Queen Te Atairangikaahu, and lecturer in Anthropology at Auckland University), Turoa Royal (Assistant Officer for Maori Education), Lewis Moeau (Accountant, Department of Maori Affairs), Henry Northcroft (Welfare Executive Officer, Department of Maori Affairs, Rotorua), Timoti Nikora (Accountant, Inland Revenue and Income Tax Department), Rev. Tom Hawea (Presbyterian Maori Mission), Apanui Watene (Welfare Officer, Gear Works, Petone), and Canon Taepa (Maori Pastorate, Wellington).
In America the tour was centred on Indian reservations and the areas of focus were education, welfare, and the retention of culture. A large number of reservations were visited where the delegation met with administrators, directors of schools, and observed 'head start' programmes, gained information on all phases of primary, secondary and university education, and observed education in action on the reservations. They also met with ordinary American Indian people although apparently there were some constraints, not dissimilar to the visitors’ circuit in New Zealand. Henry Northcroft (a welfare officer) noticed that even though he was Maori, as a social worker he met only 'the top brass not the grass-roots, and therefore was denied the opportunity to break through the reserve of the Indian'.

However, the party also saw areas of squalor and misery on reservations and compared it to their own situation:

We did learn of the groanings of the peoples. Their good fortunes and their misfortunes, their frustrations and their injuries...the Maricopa Indians existed in such utter squalor, poverty and hopeless misery...at the Papago reservation ...what a sad sight to see the Indian women and children coming out of the desert scrub shivering with the cold. So we wondered what sustained these people and then we thought again with thankful hearts for the many blessings we, the Maori enjoy.

They also observed situations which made them envious, especially the measures which had been put in place to enable some tribes to retain their culture. On the Navajo reservation they saw schools in which very young children were taught their history and handicrafts by their grandparents and only in their own language until the age of eight when they were slowly introduced to English.

Their native mana and retention of their language...[was] most noticeable...Every reservation we visited had a bold notice warning tourists 'No pencil and paper, no tape recorders no photography in this reservation'...whether it be a Navajo, Hopi, Pueblo or any other reservation, this was the notice that greeted us. Such was their tenacious hold, in spite of their six hundred year's contact with Western civilisation, on their language, their customs, their culture, their peculiar Maoritanga.

\[^{149}\text{CARE Newsletter, 'Report from 12th Annual Conference -FCAATSI', May 1969, Rata Papers, ABAF, 2/8, NA.}\]
\[^{150}\text{Te Ao Hou, No.67, July 1969, pp. 15-16.}\]
\[^{151}\text{Ibid. pp.18-19.}\]
The American Indian party were all leaders involved in welfare work for their people in various indigenous organisations and on reservations. In New Zealand they first spent time in Wellington and then, accompanied by Kara Puketapu, spent 18 days on an extensive tour around the North Island, mainly around the areas of Northland, Rotorua, Taupo, Whanganui, the Ureweras and Waikaremoana. All aspects of Maori life were covered and they were hosted by Maori in their homes and on marae. Included were visits to Ratana Pa, Maori Incorporation blocks, play centres, schools and colleges, trades training schemes, numerous marae, Maori councils, Te Aute College and Turangawaewae marae where they were presented to the Maori Queen, Te Atairangikaahu.152

Education centres were a focus and the group spent much time in Maori pre-school, primary and secondary schools. There they found common experiences and common problems. Joe Sando, having visited schools and other educational establishments, and reading about the problems Maori faced, later wrote:

I read a copy of *Te Ao Hou* which cited Maori education problems...I changed the word Maori to Indian and every word also applied to Indian parents....Like you we also have the problem of our Indian students attending secondary schools and even after 12 years they have not achieved the same level as the Pakeha... Like your schools, our American schools were also meant for the English speaking middle-class Anglo-American. Consequently our Indian people have not achieved as readily as the education standard demanded.153

Figure 3.4  Raymond Kane (Apache) with pupils at Te Reinga School.154

152 *Te Ao Hou*. No.66, March 1969, pp.31-32.
154 Ibid, p.42. Raymond Kane (Apache) with two school children at Te Reinga School near Wairoa.
Sando spoke on a radio broadcast about his work which dove-tailed with the concerns Maori had about the education system in New Zealand and the steps being taken by the MEF to raise educational achievement. He explained that much of his time with students was spent lifting aspirations, encouraging education, and talking about their future, opportunities and vocations of a more intellectual nature 'other than farmer'.

At the same radio interview, Phillip Cook spoke about the lack of interest and effort 'from whites to integrate Indian culture into the American way of life'. He noted the resentment many Indians held towards white people: 'The Indian has a feeling against white people because they tend to look down and this does cause resentment'. When asked about the way in which Maori had been treated in comparison, and whether they were getting a 'fair deal from the Pakeha', he thought that the New Zealand government was more concerned with the individual whereas in America they were more concerned 'with statistics'. Maori had 'advanced much faster than we have...you have gone so much further and so much faster'. Joe Sando pointed out later, that in comparison, Maori enjoyed a great many more advantages.

Out of the exchange came identification and a shared sense of indigenous identity. At one level it was based on common problems. As mentioned, Joe Sando saw it in the similarity of problems related to education. Others saw similarities in the urbanisation of their people which threatened to dilute cultural integrity. Discrimination too was an issue faced by both peoples. However by far the most striking and significant outcome was the identification based on a sense of kinship and cultural similarities. Both Maori and Indians spoke of the 'strange feeling of affinity' with each other during the course of their visit. Joe Sando concluded that American Indians and Maori were all one people. He suggested there were ancient kinship links, 'because of the similarity of your meeting houses, canoes and carvings, it is possible that you migrated from the American north-west to the present Hawaii islands and then to Hawaiian and ...Aotearoa'. Moreover there were similarities in 'facial features' as well as in 'outlook, philosophy and customs'. When meeting with Whanganui Maori he told them that he felt the

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155 ‘Mana Maori Programme’, 5 March 1969, System ID - 46529, RNZSA.
156 Ibid.
157 Te Maori, July/August, 1970, p.29.
158 Te Ao Hou, No.66, March 1969, p. 33.
159 Te Maori, July/August, 1970, p.46.
same 'Great Spirit that you call Io and my people call Yo'. Other Indian and Maori in the exchange visit felt the same shared sense of kinship and cultural similarities. Canon Taepa and Phillip Cook found similarities in ancient waiata which indicated a kinship link. Others remarked on how both peoples had 'songs for every occasion', and had historically had prophets to help their people. One observed that 'many questions sprang to mind as I talked and listened to people. What's different and what's the same about Indians and Maori?'

Immediately following the tour, the two tour groups met at Waiwhetu Marae. There they gathered to discuss what they had observed during their respective visits, problems they had identified, and to put forward ideas and suggestions for solving problems. From the beginning, interaction between the two indigenous peoples was warm, friendly and spontaneous. The openness and spontaneity of the Indian delegation took Hendrik Van Oss (Deputy Chief of Mission at the American Embassy and an observer at the Waiwhetu hui) completely by surprise. Van Oss had previously done an assignment on ‘the place of the American Indian in American Foreign Relations’, and had visited reservations to gather information. The difference between that experience and what he observed at Waiwhetu was an 'eye-opener':

> When I had visited American Indian reservations, the Indians had been fairly straight-laced, self-absorbed, solemn, fairly quiet, not outspoken in any way that I could see. But these 12 Indians from various tribes...there was a Zuni, a Mohawk etc....entered into the spirit of things with great aplomb and enthusiasm. They turned out to be highly sociable, great wits. They danced with the Maori, embraced them, sang with them and seemed to be having a wonderful time.

Van Oss's experiences were multi-layered but two salient issues can be identified. On the one hand his experience and interaction with Indians on reservations reflected the resentment held by many American Indian’s to being studied, evaluated and pronounced on by white American academics, researchers, anthropologists and non-Indian

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161 Ibid.
government officials.\textsuperscript{163} Their strategy was to freeze out researchers and allow only superficial observation. Secondly, what Van Oss was witnessing at Waiwhetu was an indigenous space - where he was merely an onlooker, an outsider with no authority - in which two indigenous peoples were interacting and filling it with all that surrounded and made up their being, as indigenous people. It was a celebration and an acknowledgement of a shared indigeneity.

Discussions were closed to the public except for the final session. In this, the retention of culture, especially within the nexus of government integration policies and the urbanisation of Maori, was the major issue for discussion. This was aimed at the experience of Maori who had not fared as well in this regard. Van Oss remarked:

\begin{quote}
The one thing that struck me was a remark one of the Maori made after a long discussion on culture. He said something to the effect that you Indians have kept your culture in the reservations, whereas our problem is we are so much involved in the schools and life in New Zealand that we don't know when to start injecting Maori culture into our children. That seemed...an important difference between the two groups....American Indians were still immersed in their own culture while the Maori were thoroughly New Zealandized, but trying at the same time to cling to their culture.\textsuperscript{164}
\end{quote}

Joe Sando acknowledged that the Indian people had managed to retain their culture through living apart on reservations. He spoke of the efforts by his people to hold fast to the cultural heritage of their forefathers amidst a period of rapid urbanisation:

\begin{quote}
[Indians were]… forced to the cities for work but want to come home... but they have to stay and their children are growing up not knowing traditional Indian ways…[While] not afraid of losing our culture yet and on the reservations we have everything… many older people, the parents of those who have gone away, are wondering if their children are missing something, because to us land is security. I dare say that we do not have all the mental breakdowns...because of the security we have. We live in the Indian
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{163} Vine Deloria, \textit{Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto}, New York: Macmillan, 1969. Deloria devoted Chapter Four to a critique of anthropologists studying Native American’s, which shook the discipline of cultural anthropology. At the same time there was increasing resentment towards non-Indian people of other disciplines or organisations coming onto reservations to study and observe American Indian people and their culture.

The New Zealand educational system came under severe criticism for its neglect of Maori culture. Lewis Moeau noted that Maori was taught in the universities 'and that's it'. It was taught in the secondary schools 'only if there is demand'. This was in direct contrast to the superior situation on some Indian reservations where he had observed centres devoted to retaining culture and where older people were involved, teaching the young ones in their own language, followed by a gradual introduction of English. Many Maori spoke of being 'hugely impressed' with the education models they saw and the way the language had been preserved. There was a need to 'do this in New Zealand... bring Maori to stand by his Pakeha brothers'. The imperative, stated Canon Taepa, was to 'hold onto culture...we must...we can do this...hold onto our language and culture'.

Discrimination, especially 'employer discrimination', was discussed and was an issue common to both peoples. Most agreed it was not so marked in unskilled jobs, but in skilled jobs and in the professions, as one sought to move up the ladder, employer discrimination was obvious. One Maori speaker noted that 'if you want to advance in your job you need a Pakeha somewhere in your corner'. An Indian speaker made the point that both peoples agreed with the view that 'if you are in competition with an Anglo or a Pakeha, the Indian or the Maori didn't need to be as good as his competitor but a damn deal better in order to get the job'.

Despite the apparent success of the exchange, there were serious reservations from Roland Wright of Wayne State University who was the external evaluator. Wright raised a series of pertinent questions regarding the issue of representation and suggested that the tour around New Zealand had been ‘window dressing’ and deliberately designed to provide a selective positive image of Maori.

Are the Maori more “middle-classized” than American Indians or do they just seem that way? Is the “integration” spoken of so often by Europeans and Maori a kind of window dressing which hides the fundamental relations that exist between “whites” and “Indians”? How representative are the 10 Maori in the leadership programme of Maori

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165 ‘Mana Maori Programme’, Recorded at Waiwhetu Marae, (No Date, Circa March 1969), System ID - 43607, RNZSA.
166 Ibid.
in general? How representative of Maori in general are all the Maori I met? (I met only one working-class Maori that I know of and no poor ones that I know of.)

There is an element of truth to Wright’s claims. The Maori tour group was laden with prestige and success and was not representative of a broad cross-section of society. Moreover, the itinerary in New Zealand for the Indian delegation bore a strong resemblance to the visitors’ circuit and appears to have been laden with success stories, integration in action, and visits to prestigious persons and places. A claim could therefore be made that the intention of Kara Puketapu was to demonstrate the best of Maoridom and the successful integration and participation of Maori in a bicultural society. However it was tempered to some degree, albeit it appears that this may have been to a lesser extent, with a number of ‘back space’ areas - to isolated schools and play centres, hui, homes and marae. The tour group may have visited the prestigious Te Aute College, but they also visited Te Reinga native school in Hawkes Bay.

Despite the tour being top-heavy with positive images of Maoridom, the discussion at Waiwhetu marae left no doubt that race relations were not perfect in New Zealand. There were similar problems related to discrimination in the workplace, education, and Maori faced more difficulties in relation to the retention of culture. Moreover the intensive discussions at Waiwhetu which focused on problems and suggestions for their alleviation, was possibly the first time that Maori had discussed these with an international body so explicitly. The discussions that were recorded appear to have been free and frank and there was no cover-up at the sessions. However what was missing was an overtly oppositional discourse over contentious issues related to historical grievances, racial discrimination, contentious land issues and race relations in general. While some of these issues appeared briefly in the open forum, they were fleeting. However the fact that the other discussions were held behind closed doors indicates that these were not for public consumption and that a freer and frank discussion which may have elaborated on such issues, is more than likely.

What the exchange did was bring two indigenous peoples together who found common problems, had their successes, and shared an indigenous identity of many cultural

commonalities and some differences. They shared a sense of kinship. Friendships were forged. For Joe Sando, such experiences and emotions were overwhelming:

Their attitude and charisma was such that we were touched at the depth of our hearts. It was even painful to leave such a nice friendly people behind physically. However, spiritually we shall be there in your hearts forever as you are in ours.168

Significantly, one of the main messages was that generally, apart from the ‘loss of culture by the younger generation’, Maori were in a much better position in society, and enjoyed many more advantages than indigenous people in America.

**Conclusion: Foundation of an International Indigenous Community and Acknowledging Maori Privilege and Advantage**

Embedded in the construct of New Zealand’s identity is the ‘one people’ ideology. This was the fundamental core of New Zealand’s race relations reputation and which the government strenuously sought to protect and maintain. It was a striking feature of the decade and the government went to great lengths to ensure that its international reputation remained intact. This chapter argued that a visitors’ circuit was in place and was used to present a positive image of race relations and thereby sustain the race relations narrative. Thus the reality of the position of Maori in society was contained within a series of set images which were purported to be representative of Maori experience.

Demonstrated in this chapter was how the visitors’ circuit was subverted and Maori took control of the organisation, planning and form of the visits by indigenous peoples. This put indigenous peoples and Maori, over a range of social groups, into significant direct contact with each other. With contact came an understanding of race relations and the position which Maori held in society. Despite recognition by some that race relations were not perfect and the idealised perception was weakened in that Maori shared some similar problems and had also suffered some injustice, all indigenous peoples took the position that Maori were in a privileged and advantaged position in comparison to them.

168 *Te Maori*, July/August 1970, p.46.
Privilege was recognised in the integration initiatives which the New Zealand government had taken to provide for Maori, especially in the broad area of education. American Indians understood that Maori shared with them some similar problems, especially in the education system in relation to the teaching of Maori language, but they believed that Maori had advanced much quicker and gone much further than they had. In large part this was put down to the government which was more concerned with them as a people rather than seeing them as ‘statistics’. Australian aborigines were in no doubt that Maori enjoyed a great many more advantages and spoke enviously of the equality that Maori enjoyed, the good attitude in New Zealand towards Maori, and the role the government played in the provision of education, housing and extending land rights to Maori.

Contact also reinforced for Maori that they were in a privileged and advantaged position. At a meeting with Colin Tatz, they recognised that a ‘whole race of people’ were ‘way off worse’ than were. The women from the MWWI who worked in Aboriginal communities were shocked at the misery, unacceptable living conditions and neglect, and in America Maori observed poverty and misery on a reservation and were ‘thankful’ for the many advantages which Maori enjoyed.

Meetings between Maori and other indigenous people had a core outcome. While a great many issues were discussed, mainly in contemporary terms, and historical grievances did not feature significantly (or at least not in the written record), culture was one of the key focus areas. Contact brought to Maori and most indigenous people, a new consciousness and recognition of a shared indigenous identity based on cultural commonalities, experiences, world view and innate indigenous characteristics. It brought an understanding that they were part of a wider indigenous community. For Aborigines in isolated communities who had no contact or knowledge of Maori, or indeed of any other indigenous people, identification was reduced in the first instance to skin colour with identification through culture coming later. Meetings between indigenous peoples were spaces where similarities and differences were recognised across a range of issues and experiences, but cultural commonalities in most instances, bound indigenous people together into shared sense of indigeneity.
I suggested that Maori employed their own visitors’ circuit which also served to highlight Maori success and mask the unequal relationship between Maori and Pakeha. There is no doubt that many, if not most, of the contacts which indigenous people had with Maori were top-heavy with Maori prestige and success and a case can be made that visitors received an unrepresentative view of Maoridom, as the external evaluator of the American Indian delegation suggested. In this there was little difference between the Maori and government visitors’ circuits. However Maori success and prestige was tempered to some extent with indigenous visitors being given access to the ‘back spaces’ of Maori life – unmediated spaces of contact with ordinary folk and access to grass-roots Maori communities.

The meetings of indigenous peoples in this chapter can be seen as a soft form of activism which helped lay the foundations for an international indigenous activist community. Consciousness-raising, the transmission of ideas and recognition of what might be possible were crucial for the development of an international indigenous community and subsequent vigorous activism. Through the meetings during the 1960s indigenous people transported their New Zealand experience back to their homelands. The knowledge gained in New Zealand by some Aborigines resulted in politicisation and the impetus to press for indigenous rights in Australia. The knowledge gained by North American indigenous people would have been passed around indigenous networks too. Reg Kelly was part of a network of Indian leaders which included George Manuel, who would make his way to New Zealand six years later. Joe Sando from the Ford Foundation delegation would meet up with Maori from the New Zealand delegation in international indigenous forums years later. For Maori, the gains were simply making contact with other indigenous people, forging networks, and recognising cultural commonalities and problems. Maori were regarded as a privileged and advantaged in comparison to other indigenous people, and one with which they concurred. Thus their route in later years into international activist spaces was to be different and difficult.
Chapter Four:

Radical Activism Across Borders, 1968-1982:
Generating Space, Contesting Maori Privilege

This chapter examines the rise of radical Maori activism and the movement of activists into international spaces. The events arose directly out of those detailed in chapter two which resulted in the rise of political consciousness, growing dissatisfaction and discontent, and the centering of race relations as a point of contention. In the late 1960s radical activism emerged out of a combination of the rise in political consciousness, domestic events, and international currents, events and ideologies which came into New Zealand. From the early 1970s activists turned their sights abroad. It is this international dimension – the effects of international events and ideologies that stimulated Maori activism, and the international connections and spaces used by Maori activists which is the focus of the following chapter.

The creation, expansion and use of space, and New Zealand’s race relations reputation for racial equality which positioned Maori as a privileged or advantaged indigenous people, lie at the heart of the events which took place internationally. The central proposition in this chapter is that the dominant perception of Maori determined the form which much of their activism took. Activists were acutely aware of the oppressive ‘one people’ construct which positioned Maori as a privileged people and they often faced a difficult task of convincing others to the contrary. This saw Maori repeatedly challenge the dominant discourse by replacing it with a grievance-based discourse, generate a new consciousness amongst their audience in which they placed in the same situation as other indigenous people, and in doing so they carved out a space for Maori within an evolving radical indigenous activist network. It was also a feature of Maori activism which took place in forums and organisations and events outside the indigenous activist community.

This chapter demonstrates how activists challenged and successfully subverted the ‘one people’ ideology by ‘telling their story’ which, as Linda Smith notes, ‘remains the
powerful imperative of a powerful form of resistance'. In ‘telling their story’ - an explicitly anti-colonial narrative - they generated a space for a new consciousness and understanding about the negative historical effects of colonisation and its contemporary legacy of institutional racism, political marginalisation, and socio-economic disadvantage. The other significant form which Maori activism took, apart from one occasion, was that activists never deliberately used international spaces as a political resource to participate in the politics of embarrassment and place pressure on the government. This was a strategy which was used particularly by human rights and indigenous rights activists during this period, and Aboriginal activists used it often and to great effect. Again, I suggest that the advantaged position which Maori held and a degree of political power which other indigenous peoples did not possess, lay at the centre of their under-utilisation of international spaces to make political gain.

This chapter begins with a section on domestic activism and a brief discussion on domestic issues and events which led to the development of radical activism. As these have been well documented they have only been lightly mentioned. The focus is on international currents, events and ideologies coming into New Zealand which influenced the development of radical activism and the form which it took. Also examined is the shift which saw Maori identifying with other oppressed people, and the growing recognition and understanding of the activism being undertaken by other indigenous people and the issues which they were contesting. In effect an indigenous community began to take shape via literature and an activist action repertoire which was transmitted across borders. Indigenous activists had yet to meet but consciousness was raised and ‘connections’ were made from a distance.

The second section covers a period 1972-1982 when Maori activists moved into international places. Some participated in church forums, while others took part in single issue meetings and events across the world. However, most contact was made...
with indigenous activists. Demonstrated is the geographic trajectory of Maori activists from initial contact with Australian Aboriginal activists, then into the Pacific Islands and contact with independence activists, and finally into the International Indian Treaty Council in North America. It also demonstrates a progression from single issue and local events (although these were retained), to participation in forums and formal organisations. At the same time, and arising out of contacts and networks which had been formed, an international activist community was developed in New Zealand. By the early 1980s a large activist community had formed across the Pacific which provided support and solidarity for protest actions which were being undertaken; activists gathered together for meetings and raised awareness in the local populations of their grievances and actions; and information was exchanged and transmitted through networks.

The focus throughout this section is on the contacts which were made, the networks which were formed, and how they used the new spaces which became available. Underneath, during most of the 1970s, shimmered New Zealand’s reputation and it was this which directed to a large extent the form which Maori activists took. Maori subverted perceptions of Maori as privileged or advantaged, and by the turn of the decade were an integral part of an international indigenous activist community.

Several events have been given greater attention in order to demonstrate the diverse range of spaces which Maori activists participated in as they spread across the world. In all cases an imperative was to challenge the notion of racial equality and Maori privilege, and generate a new awareness of the reality of race relations in New Zealand. In 1976 they took the issue of Bastion Point to London, and engaged in the politics of embarrassment. Some activists went into international forums, courtesy of an increasing international focus by the United Nations and NGO’s on human rights, indigenous rights and racial discrimination. In 1980 the case was made for Maori at the 'Fourth Russell Tribunal’ in Rotterdam. Others events highlighted include activism within formal church organisations, the organisation of international forums in New Zealand such as a Three Nations Conference, and activism within a cold war context which saw Maori engage with international activists in Cuba.
This chapter should be seen as a foundational period in the development of international indigenous activism and one which expanded geographically and gained strength as the decade progressed. It was a period which established contacts and networks, and laid the foundations for the significant activism which took place during the 1980s.

Section One:

A Space for the Development of Maori Activism:
Domestic and International Connections

‘What goes into the roots, must come out in the branches’

Back in 1944, Major Kahi Harawira stated publicly that young Maori in Auckland were subject to a 'colour bar', especially in relation to employment and accommodation. The ensuing discussion was brief and brought support and denial by Maori leaders and Pakeha alike. In the midst of it, a Maori correspondent wrote in support of Harawira and ended with the warning: 'What goes into the roots, must come out in the branches.'

The inference is obvious and the words were prophetic. A little over twenty-five years later radical activism arrived, fed at the roots in an urban environment with doses of marginalisation, racism, cultural alienation, and an awareness of land, treaty and other historical injustices. Maori, especially younger Maori, publicly contested contemporary and historical injustice and demanded that these be recognised and acted upon. Through radical action they ruptured the discourse which spoke of racial harmony, equality, and the finest race relations in the world. The language was of 'white racism', the 'Pakeha Problem', of 'Uncle Tom’s', and 'cultural genocide'. Black Power ideology, knowledge gained of decolonisation and of independence struggles abroad, and participation in the new liberation movements, especially the anti-Vietnam War and anti-Apartheid movements, fuelled and provided a framework for the young activists.

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3 Auckland Star, 16 Oct 1944; Evening Post, 16 Oct 1944; Auckland Star 17 Oct, 1944.
4 Auckland Star, 18 Oct 1944; Evening Post, 8 Nov 1944.
5 W. A. Pitama, 'Letter to the Editor', Christchurch newspaper, (No name, No date. Letter penned 20 October 1944), MA1, Box 656, Record 36/1/21, Part 1, NA.
with which to make sense of their position and generate identification with marginalised and oppressed people in the world. In short, international and domestic events and issues met and combined to produce a strong radical and politicised activist base.

In Australia and North America a similar phenomenon occurred at much the same time. The radical activism which emerged had its contemporary roots in the migration of indigenous peoples into urban areas which took place in the 1950s and 1960s. They entered urban spaces in search of employment, economic stability, and the social advantages of city life. As in New Zealand, for many there was a gap between expectation and reality. Subject to racial discrimination, socio-economic disadvantage, marginalisation and political powerlessness, they congregated in the poorer suburbs and on the margins of society. There they formed activist groups and organisations and their world view was informed by anti-colonial and Black Power ideologies and involvement in the liberation movements of the time. Radicalised, they took their claims onto the streets and into public places, determined to have their claims acknowledged and acted upon by government.

Thus, collectively, there was an international 'movement' of young radical indigenous activists who were travelling down similar activist lines but had no contact with each other. That would change throughout the 1970s and the second section of this chapter brings them together. This first section examines the development of Maori activism, and their growing awareness of other indigenous peoples to the point of contact.

**The Maori Affairs Amendment Act 1967: Sparking off Maori Activism**

The introduction of the Maori Affairs Amendment Act 1967 (MAAA) is widely seen as the issue which sparked off radical Maori activism. While this is true, Maori activism which emerged in the late 1960s is best seen as the culmination of a number of issues and events from the late 1950s which led to an incremental growth of discontent and a stronger dissenting voice coming out of Maoridom. As has been detailed previously, the 'No Maoris No Tour' protest and issues of racial discrimination, and the Hunn Report were pivotal events in the rise of political consciousness of many Maori. They can clearly be seen as laying the foundations for the emergence of contemporary Maori activism. This was accompanied and fuelled by subsequent events throughout the
decade, marked by increasing dissatisfaction, especially in relation to racial
discrimination, land and treaty issues, and fears of cultural alienation.

Added to this was the accelerating urbanisation of Maori. This was not necessarily a
negative experience as Melissa Williams points out in her recent work on the migration
of Maori from Panguru in the Hokianga to Auckland.6 Williams provides a more
nuanced view which reveals the vibrancy, richness and complexity of the urban
experience as Maori went about creating communities in an alien environment.
Crucially, in relation to the urbanisation of Panguru residents, Williams challenges the
historical record which has tended to essentialise the Maori experience and locate
urbanisation as the driver of cultural dislocation from iwi, hapu and whanau.
Nevertheless, urbanisation did expose racial discrimination, the unequal relationship
between Maori and Pakeha, and the political, economic and social marginalisation of
many Maori. The result was a number of disenfranchised and disaffected youth, many
of whom had become culturally alienated. Significant too was the role of a younger
generation of influential and politicised Maori leaders. Many had been active, and
become politicised, during the 'No Maoris No Tour' protest, and had subsequently taken
leadership roles within the urban environment, especially in trade unions and academic
institutions. People like Patu Hohepa, Ranginui Walker, Koro Dewes, and Tama Poata
played a major role in consciousness-raising and politicising young Maori in particular.
However, the MAAA was significant as it threw the contentious issue of the alienation
of Maori land into a powerful mix of racism, cultural alienation, integration, political
subordination, and simmering discontent. It was the spark which ignited Maoridom and
which also led to the development of a radical form of Maori activism.

In brief, the aim of the MAAA was to Europeanise Maori land by removing legal
distinctions which set the treatment of Maori land apart from that of Europeans. The Act
allowed for the compulsory conversion of Maori land (held by up to four owners) to
European land status, and the power of the Maori Trustee and Department of Maori
Affairs was expanded to compulsorily acquire land deemed 'uneconomic interests'. The
value of uneconomic shares was increased and there was provision made for free-

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holding of reserved Maori lands.\textsuperscript{7} Maori feared that the MAAA would facilitate the alienation of Maori land. To this end they had sought to engage in formulating the MAAA by making recommendations, but they were ignored.

The MAAA was a strand of the wider integration policy coming out of the Hunn Report which aimed at making 'one people'. Maori were to be treated the same as Pakeha and any hint of Maori privilege enshrined in existing legislation was to be discarded. All New Zealanders were to have the same privileges and access to the same institutions and be bound by the same legislation.

Rather than a force for integration and unity, the MAAA was divisive. Dubbed by Maori as 'the last land grab', opposition was across all sectors of Maoridom. Maori organisations at national and regional levels, including the NZMC, MWWL, Maori Trust Boards and District Maori Councils, opposed the legislation. So did urban and rural groups, students, Maori MPs, and individuals. Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan (MP) criticised it as 'nothing more than sugar-coating on an otherwise bitter pill of accelerated alienation of Maori land'.\textsuperscript{8} Similarly, Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board argued that Maori land would pass rapidly to land speculators, and the 'callous disregard' of Maori opinion made it clear that the government regarded the welfare of Maori as subordinate to 'big business', especially in the area of land speculation.\textsuperscript{9} Sir Hepi Te Heuheu (Paramount Chief) led a deputation to government and requested a deferment of the Bill to allow Maori time for consideration. He was unsuccessful. Up North, Walter Kawiti (Ngati Hine) was also angered that Maori had not been given time for discussion. He accused the government of making a mockery of the Treaty of Waitangi, and called on Maori to boycott the 1968 Treaty of Waitangi ceremony.\textsuperscript{10}

Maori students at the University of Auckland, who were becoming politically aware and organised, strongly opposed the legislation. Steven Webster suggests that during the 1960s Maori lecturers at the University's Adult Education Centre were teaching an 'increasing activist form of Maoritanga' and that the centre was a significant base for

\textsuperscript{8} \textit{New Zealand Herald}, 5 Aug 2010.
\textsuperscript{9} \textit{New Zealand Herald}, 8 May 1967.
\textsuperscript{10} 'Treaty of Waitangi', Radio New Zealand Sound Archives, MPT 187.
raising political awareness and discussion about Maori grievances.\footnote{Steven Webster, \textit{Patrons of Maori Culture}, Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 1998, p.159.} By 1967 Patu Hohepa and Ranginui Walker were lecturers at the university where they provided strong support for Maori students, and both played a key role in the politicisation of students and the development of Maori activism. The MAAA was discussed and Hohepa recalled that Maori students were fiercely opposed and 'demanded that the Maori Council and all the supporters do not allow for the amendment of the Maori Affairs Act. Then they wanted it burnt.'\footnote{Patu Hohepa, in 'Nga Tamatoa: The Protest Group Nga Tamatoa Thirty Years On', Conclusion tape, Paul Diamond (producer and interviewer), Radio New Zealand, 2001, RNZA. (Hereafter, this will be known as the 'Diamond Series'). I thank Paul Diamond for making these tapes available for my use.}

In direct response to the MAAA several radical activist groups were formed, the most significant of which was the Maori Organisation On Human Rights (MOOHR).\footnote{The other protest group to emerge was Te Hokioi which had the same ideological base and trade union links as MOOHR. It functioned mainly as a consciousness-raising mechanism about historical and contemporary grievances through its newsletter of the same name. It ran under the motto 'Publish and be damned' and the editor explained that the newspaper was a 'marae for exposing common problems in struggles against incompetence and deceit in high places'. \textit{Te Hokioi}, Aug/Sept, 1969, p.1.} In 1967 several Maori drivers, who had been instructed by their elders to approach the government and 'straighten out' the MAAA issue, approached Tama Poata (secretary of the Wellington Drivers' Union) for advice.\footnote{Tama Te Kapua Poata/ed. Prue Poata, \textit{Seeing beyond the horizon: a memoir}, Wellington: Steele Roberts Publishers, 2012, p.100.} Poata called a meeting of Maori drivers, discussed the issues, and out of this came MOOHR. This was led by Poata who became one of the most influential activists of the following decades.

A Communist Party member for a brief period, Poata became dissatisfied with the contradiction between Party rhetoric and lack of action. Soap-boxing, sloganeering and yelling on the streets, 'Workers of the world unite', were useless actions unless the rhetoric was backed up by action. In his view, Maori were 'the only ones who could unite or knew how to physically do anything positive as a vanguard of the working class'.\footnote{Ibid, p.99.} MOOHR drew its ideological inspiration from the trade union movement. Class was the basic cleavage in society and racism and inequality would be eradicated through an alliance with the working class. Essentially humanitarian in its objectives, and taking as its mandate the Treaty of Waitangi and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, MOOHR sought to defend the human rights of minorities, especially
Maori; oppose all forms of racism and discrimination; educate Maori and 'Pakeha brothers' about Maori rights, and ensure the provisions of the Treaty of Waitangi and Declaration of Human Rights were met.\textsuperscript{16}

MOOHR's opposition to the MAAA was relentless, and they used the media, political channels and public spaces to oppose the legislation. Many letters were written to newspapers and politicians, and in 1967 the Wellington Drivers’ Union agreed to oppose the Act. A group of Maori drivers made submissions on the MAAA to a parliamentary select committee, the first time that a trade union had ever represented Maori issues at a select committee.\textsuperscript{17} On Waitangi Day 1968, MOOHR protested outside parliament and Poata delivered an open letter to Prime Minister Holyoake demanding the withdrawal of the MAAA which served to 'enhance [the] exploitation of this country and its people by overseas capital interests'.\textsuperscript{18} Later that year, on 26 June, thousands of citizens demonstrated outside parliament. The main protest was against an Arbitration Court decision for a nil wage order, but it was a multi-issue protest with many groups advancing their particular cause. This convergence of issues within an overarching protest action was the beginning of a phenomenon which came to define many large protest actions over the following decade. A MOOHR contingent of over 400 Maori from the South Island, Taranaki, Gisborne, East Cape and Hawkes Bay, and supporters from various trade unions, protested the MAAA and presented a petition to Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan. It was the first time that Maori had protested in such large numbers since the 1960 rugby tour protests and as one Maori speaker noted, 'It is wonderful to see at last the Maori people protesting against injustice'.\textsuperscript{19}

\textbf{Nga Tamatoa: Claiming a Space to Force Change}

In 1970 the Maori student body at Auckland University became organised and the group Nga Tamatoa was formed. The immediate catalyst was a Young Maori Leaders Conference, organised by Ranginui Walker. This took the theme of urbanisation due to a range of concerns which clearly needed to be addressed. With this in mind, and to obtain a comprehensive view of the issues, Walker opened up the conference to a wide

\textsuperscript{16}‘Extracts from MOOHR Constitution’, MOOHR Newsletter, Dec 1970, M. Law Collection, Box 29 [Uncatalogued], UWL.
\textsuperscript{17}Tama Te Kapua Poata/ed. Prue Poata, \textit{Seeing beyond the horizon...}, p.100.
\textsuperscript{18}\textit{People's Voice}, 14 Feb 1968.
range of urban Maori. Gang members and students from colleges and tertiary institutions joined with representatives from tribal trust boards, the MWWL, trade unions and churches. Along with perennial Maori concerns about housing, health and education, also discussed were issues of inequality, race discrimination, cultural alienation and the loss of te reo. Some speakers had a powerful effect on young Maori, including John Ohia who was an advocate of Black Power, and who spoke in terms of Maori liberation and Brown Power. Ngoi Pewhairangi (Kotahitanga) urged young Maori to hold onto their language and land - 'not one single acre more' and 'hold fast to our Maori language'.

The conference created unity amongst younger Maori through a shared 'sense of Maori identity, commonality, ethnicity, of feeling dominated and alienated'. It also produced a sense of cohesion in terms of the recommendations which had come out of the conference, especially a strong desire to have Maori language taught within the education system. At the close of the conference Syd Jackson asked what would happen to the ninety recommendations that had been made, and was told that they would be sent to Wellington, put on a shelf, 'and there they will gather dust'. This was the impetus needed. Within months Nga Tamatoa (Young Warriors) had been formed with Taura Eruera as its president. The intention, explained Syd Jackson, was to 'be a young Maori pressure group pressuring for change, and to have those matters in which our people had been fighting for, year after year, finally recognised and acted upon'.

Nga Tamatoa initially drew its membership and support base from the student body and graduates of Auckland University and Auckland Teachers Training College. As it became more established its membership became diverse and across all social groups including school students and the most marginalised and alienated young Maori who belonged to gangs. Further groups of Nga Tamatoa were set up in other centres including Chirstchurch and Wellington. With Nga Tamatoa came a new radical form of activism. This has been well-documented, and it is enough to note that their deployment

20 Walker, Introduction tape, Diamond Series.
21 Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou..., p. 208.
22 Walker, Ohia tape, Diamond Series.
25 Syd Jackson tape, Diamond Series.
26 Ibid.
of radical protest actions and anti-colonial discourse often pushed right through the boundaries of acceptability. 27

There was nothing especially new about Nga Tamatoa in terms of the issues they contested. These were shared by many Maori and had a long historical lineage of contest and dispute. Issues of land alienation, education, the Treaty of Waitangi, the preservation of te reo, were discussed endlessly on marae, at hui, and within formal organisations such as the MWWL, NZMC, and District Councils. Maori leaders negotiated behind closed doors with the government over such concerns. What was new was that Nga Tamatoa took these concerns and grievances from behind closed doors and placed them in front of the public. While most Pakeha disagreed with Nga Tamatoa, and there was considerable animosity towards the group, they were forced to face the grievances which were being presented. Moreover, Nga Tamatoa went further and they backed up rhetoric with action and developed programmes and strategies to bring about change. For example, they protested about the loss of Maori language and then organised a Maori language petition which forced recognition and action by

parliament. Ranginui Walker notes that the lasting effect of the group was that they ‘acted on what was right and correct, and developed programmes to follow through’.29

The manner in which Nga Tamatoa contested and made their claims, the language of protest, and the forms their protests took were also new. The issues, dramatic protest actions, rhetoric and language were abrasive and offensive to Pakeha for they challenged and disrupted national imaginings of racial homogeneity which most New Zealanders held. Tamatoa spoke of the violence of colonisation, the duplicity of Pakeha who had stolen their land and had never honoured the Treaty of Waitangi, and who had ‘thrashed’ the Maori language and culture out of Maori children. They employed the terminology of Black Power - white racism, cultural murder, institutional racism, and they insisted that the 'problem' in New Zealand was a 'Pakeha problem'. Also new was that they asserted their right to speak out publicly, and they were often disrespectful towards their elders and Maori leaders who they, at times, treated with contempt for being ‘Uncle Tom’s and failing to do enough for Maori.30

The value and effectiveness of Nga Tamatoa lay in their radical protest actions. They were the ‘shock troops’ of confrontation which abrasively and publicly advanced issues that moderate activists had long been contesting. Their radical actions pushed through the boundaries of acceptability in their efforts to have grievances acknowledged, and in this they created a space which allowed more moderate Maori to step in and establish reasoned dialogue with the government. As Patu Hohepa noted, if Nga Tamatoa had not been pushing at the limits, the demands of the NZMC, which had become increasingly forceful, would not have been considered by the government or put into legislation.31

Contemporaneous with Nga Tamatoa was the Polynesian Panther Party (PPP) which was formed in Auckland in 1972.32 Although the group is not a focus in this thesis they

29 Ranginui Walker, Conclusion tape, Diamond Series.
30 For example see Evening Post, 7 Feb 1972, This describes Tame Iti’s protest on Waitangi Day when he verbally attacked Bishop Manu Bennett and Rev. Kingi Ihaka and called them traitors, and berated Maori elders for their lack of action. They were also highly critical and disparaging of the MWWL for their passivity and lack of action. They claimed that the MWWL had passed remits ‘year after year since 1952 for the teaching of our language in schools and felt that was enough’. See, Broadsheet, July/August, 1982, p24.
31 Patu Hohepa, Conclusion tape, Diamond Series.
32 The Polynesian Panther Party was originally known as the Polynesian Panther Movement, but changed its name in 1973.
have a part to play. They always had Maori members in their ranks, they often intersected with Maori on domestic issues and protest actions, and they represented Nga Tamatoa as well as the PPP at some international events. The group had its ideological roots within the American Black Panther Party, especially Huey Newton's political policy of black unity. They had formed to meet the social needs of the Pasifika community and their membership came mainly from ex-gang members and school students. As with Nga Tamatoa, they had a focus on community work and set up many initiatives including homework centres, prison visits, food banks and they had a full-time social worker. From 1973 they placed emphasis on political education, consciousness-raising and political activity, joining in anti-apartheid and anti-war protests and mobilisations. The struggle against institutional racism was a focus and they worked for structural change and confronted discrimination in housing, education, the justice system and the police force. A close liaison developed with Nga Tamatoa and they worked together on a range of anti-racism and social work initiatives.33

International Context for the development of Maori Activism

At the same time New Zealand was in the midst of immense social change as liberation ideologies, social movements, events and currents of dissent from abroad came into the country. Perceptions changed, freedom and equality was demanded, traditional authorities were challenged and resisted, and power bases shifted. Many women rejected a life of domesticity and demanded the right to work, contraception and abortion; many young men refused the call to war; and young people rejected conformity and expressed liberation in many ways, from the popular to the political. Nga Tamatoa, expressed their cause as one of liberation by initially calling themselves the Maori Liberation Front.34

Internationally the late 1960s were years of turmoil, protest and dissent, and 1968 was a watershed year with protest and violence erupting across the globe. Protesters in America massed for civil rights and in opposition to the Vietnam War. In France a

34 The name was inspired by international revolutionary actions, and it reflected the broad aims of the group. However, as Syd Jackson observed, it also generated considerable hostility and ‘people were blown away by it, were angered by it, were disgusted by it’. Thus they changed their name to Nga Tamatoa. Comments are on the Syd Jackson tape, Diamond Series.
student protest led by 'Danny the Red' and seven other students escalated into student riots, occupations and culminated in a general strike which paralysed the nation. Protest crossed borders and students followed suit in America, Germany and many other European countries, and closed down universities. In Mexico City student protesters were massacred. Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King Jr were assassinated, the latter sparking days of riots across the major cities in America. At the Chicago Democratic Convention a week of rioting, protest and marches took place, and Yippies from the New Left and anti-Vietnam War protesters clashed with police. Events were televised and sent around the globe giving truth to the chant, 'The Whole World's Watching'. Disillusioned with the Civil Rights Movement, Black Power militants and police engaged in shoot-outs. In an expression of disenchantment and hope, two black athletes stood on the medal podium at the Olympic Games in Mexico City, bowed their heads and raised black-gloved fists as the American anthem was played. Police bludgeoned civil rights protesters in Derry (Northern Ireland) and ushered in 'The Troubles'. Dissent, protest and activism were seemingly everywhere.

Global events, images, reports and the climate of activism reached New Zealand where protest, tame by comparison, was nevertheless significant and international influences were obvious. In June and July 1968 large demonstrations took place in Christchurch and Auckland against the proposed Omega US spy base, an issue which has to be seen in the context of the global New Left student protest, American militarisation and nuclearisation of the Pacific, as well as opposition to the Vietnam War. The Omega issues reinvigorated the anti-nuclear movement in New Zealand, and Owen Wilkes (peace activist) claims that it was the catalyst for the onset of radical and militant student activism against the Vietnam War.35 During the massed demonstration outside parliament on 26 June 1968, student protesters chanted 'Long live Danny the Red' and carried red and black flags, a symbol of the Paris riots.36 More importantly global events provided a model for dissent, and protest increased from that point. Historian Michael King wrote:

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...the potent combination of protest and television coverage ...sparked what conservative commentators ...call a 'contagion of protest’. For the rest of the [1960s] and on into the 1970s there seemed to be a super-abundance of causes that would bring people out onto the streets...\(^{37}\)

The global turmoil and events influenced Maori activists. Syd Jackson recalled: 'For me personally, and... it is probably true of a lot of people who were involved in Tamatoa, we were a product of the 60s and the movements that were taking place at that time'.\(^{38}\) Maori became active in the new social movements, especially the Anti-Vietnam War and Anti-Apartheid movements. In 1965 New Zealand sent combat troops to Vietnam and an Anti-Vietnam War movement was formed. This initially had little support but gained in strength and momentum from the late 1960s as daily reports of massacres, images of death and a small terrified napalmed girl running down the road shocked New Zealanders. Moreover, the student body and youth from the New Left, such as the Progressive Youth Movement, became heavily involved and swelled the ranks of protesters. Between 1967-1971 there were 339 street demonstrations (including large mobilisations) opposing the Vietnam War.\(^{39}\)

In 1966 Maori collectively registered their opposition to the Vietnam War for the first time when Tama Poata led a large contingent of Maori to protest during the 24 hour visit to New Zealand by the United States President, Lyndon Baines Johnson.\(^{40}\) From the early 1970s Maori and Pasifika activists from Nga Tamatoa and the Polynesian Panther Party joined MOOHR in active protest against the Vietnam War. Nga Tamatoa Council voted not to support the anti-war movement on the grounds that it lay outside the immediate aims of the group, but some participated as individuals. Many Maori and Polynesians (including members of the Polynesian Panther Party), were active at the height of the 1970s mobilisations and joined the group, 'Polynesians Against the War'.

A shift was noticeable too in that activists were not only protesting against the war in Vietnam, they had identified with the Vietnamese struggle. In 1968 Tama Poata spoke

\(^{38}\) Syd Jackson tape, Diamond Series.
at the 'Peace, Power & Politics Conference' in Wellington and stated that, 'The struggle of the Vietnam people to obtain self-determination is similar to the Maori struggle in New Zealand. The fundamental difference...is that real bullets are being used in Vietnam'. Speaking to Maori groups in Auckland later in the year he stated that MOOHR 'wanted no part in killing Vietnamese workers and peasants who were fighting for the same rights as the Maori people themselves'.

Figure 4.2  'Polynesians Against the War', 1972.  

At the height of the protests in the early 1970s, influences from abroad are evident on the placards and in anti-war pamphlets of the 'Polynesians Against the War' protesters. As the photo above indicates, Maori and Pasifika activists adopted and adapted anti-Vietnam War influences and discourses coming out of the United States. Poata commented that Muhammad Ali 'was our hero' because he refused to participate in the Vietnam War. Ali resisted the draft on grounds of racial discrimination. He argued that he was discriminated against in America and should not have to fight for a country that treated him as a second-class citizen. Therefore, why should he kill Viet Cong as

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41 People's Voice, 17 April 1968.  
42 People's Voice, 13 Nov 1968.  
44 Tama Te Kapua Poata/ed. Prue Poata, Seeing beyond the horizon..., p.106.
'No Viet Cong ever called me a nigger'.\textsuperscript{45} The sentiments resonated with Pasifika and Maori activists who were subject to racial discrimination and could identify with the racism Muhammad Ali experienced. His message was paraphrased as, 'No Viet Cong ever called me a Coconut', and is clearly identifiable in the photo.

The placards in the above photo, ‘My Enemy is the White Man Not the Viet Cong' and 'White War Brown Lives', had similar overtones and reflected the anti-war/anti-racism discourses coming out of the United States. In America the issue of racism had surfaced due to the disproportionate percentages of who was being sent to war and what roles they were given. The majority drafted were poor, uneducated, unemployed or blue collar workers, and combat troops consisted of a disproportionate number of black Americans who were also sent to more dangerous areas than their white counterparts. Between 1961 and 1966 they accounted for 20 percent of all combat-related deaths in Vietnam even though they constituted less than 10 percent of men at arms and 13 percent of the population.\textsuperscript{46} MOOHR and Polynesians Against the War also believed it was a racist war and Tama Poata noted that 80 percent of Maori were combat troops.

Both organisations believed the Vietnamese and Polynesians were victims of war:

Polynesians are oppressed right here in New Zealand, so why should we be expected to oppress and destroy other people. The government is responsible for sending Polynesians to kill Vietnamese. Since Polynesians aren't given equal educational, housing and job opportunities, it is an easy way out for the government to export young Polynesians to Indochina to do their dirty work for them and import them back in coffins. They deny us the right to determine our own future whilst urging us to deny the Vietnamese people's right to self-determination.\textsuperscript{47}

From the late 1960s the Anti-Apartheid Movement became a focus of MOOHR and the Maori student body who were becoming politically active, especially those at Auckland University. The shift towards an overtly anti-apartheid position was initiated by Maori students. At the national conference of the Federation of Maori Students held during

Easter 1968, the proposed All Black tour to South Africa (1970) was discussed. Whereas past protests and discussion during the 1960s had sought the inclusion of Maori in the All Black team, this time the issue was one of apartheid. Syd Jackson (president) asked, 'How can we, a coloured people, go to a country that practices apartheid?' He put forward a motion that the tour should be opposed regardless of whether Maori were included or not, and it was passed by 45 votes to 26. This came to the attention of Dennis Brutus (President of the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee) who wrote to Jackson congratulating him on his stance.

Later in the year CARE launched its anti-apartheid campaign and put Syd Jackson on the stage as a key speaker. His speech reflected the shift which was taking place: Maori were an oppressed people, and he identified their struggle with that of the black and coloured people of South Africa. In essence it was a speech which opposed apartheid and offered a stinging critique of race relations in New Zealand. Jackson claimed that New Zealand was a racist society with negative attitudes towards Maori and which perpetuated widespread discrimination upon the Maori people. For Jackson, apartheid in South Africa and racism in New Zealand were two sides of the same coin. As black South Africans were discriminated against and oppressed, so too were Maori:

No Maori should go to South Africa, for how can we, when seeking equality, when wanting equality ourselves, go to a country which actively denies another coloured people, solely on the grounds of their colour, the rights we either enjoy, want extended or are striving to achieve for ourselves...We too are a coloured people...we too have a colour problem.

Syd Jackson became the face of the CARE campaign and the events of 1968 brought Maori into the centre of an emergent anti-apartheid movement. Maori students from Auckland University became a leading anti-apartheid force, as did MOOHR, and in 1969 both were central in the formation of the anti-apartheid organization, HART (Halt All Racist Tours), and Tama Poata gave the organisation its name. Both were strongly opposed to the 1970 All Black tour to South Africa and played central roles in a divisive

48 Teheran Journal, 4 May 1968, Gary Clover Papers, Box 2, Item 11, MSS & Archives, A-127, UAL.
49 Correspondence, Dennis Brutus to Syd Jackson, 6 May 1968, Gary Clover papers, Box 2, Item 11, MSS & Archives A-127, UAL. The following years Dennis Brutus was brought to New Zealand by CARE and the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa.
50 'I'm against 1970 tour,' CARE pamphlet, [no date], Box 1, Item 1, Gary Clover papers, MSS & Archives, A-127, UAL.
nationwide protest. No longer was the issue one of the racial composition of the All Black team, and indeed Maori had been granted an 'honorary white' status to enable them to be part of the All Black team. Instead, their opposition was to the apartheid policies of the South African government.

**Cultural Context for Activism: Black Liberation Ideology**

Influencing student activism were new ideologies which came in through black liberation and anti-colonial literature. Peter Rikys recalled, 'We were all brought up on Fanon and Freire and the classical indigenous writers of that era'.

During the early 1970s Resistance Bookshops carried a small selection of anti-colonial literature by Franz Fanon, including *Wretched of the Earth*, and *Black Skins, White Masks*, which dovetailed with the anti-racist shift in the early 1970s towards the psychology of racism and oppression, and of 'decolonising the mind'. Later, Paulo Freire's, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1973) resonated for his analysis and connections made between oppressed and oppressor, subjugation and the processes of dehumanisation by those in power. Influential too, was his theory and method of 'conscientisation' whereby a critical awareness of one's reality is developed through action and reflection (praxis). In particular, Freire's concern was to awaken the consciousness of illiterate and oppressed people and make them aware of the world in which they lived.

Black liberation literature in its various forms of Black Power was arguably the most significant. The Stokely Carmichael version of Black Power came into New Zealand in 1967, with an article in the *New Zealand Listener*, followed by a television programme a week later about the race riots in America in the summer of 1967. Included were portions from interviews with Stokely Carmichael and Rapp Brown, both of whom were founders and leaders of the Black Power Movement. The article cited Carmichael's definition of Black Power as: “Black Power” means putting power in black people’s hands...We propose that our organisations be black-controlled, black-staffed and black-financed...many young negroes, especially the young, consider their struggle as part of

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51 Peter Rikys tape, Diamond Series.
52 Following the publication of *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, Freire visited New Zealand in 1974 and spent several weeks giving presentations and conducting seminars. See, *Salient*, 29 May 1974, pp.4-5. This report states that a weekend seminar in Auckland was attended by about 200 people including educationalists, social workers, pupils, ministers and Maori activists.
the struggle of the dispossessed all over the world....'54 *Black Power*, by Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton came into New Zealand the following year.55 In a review, entitled 'Black Apostles', the *New Zealand Listener* was surprisingly supportive of Black Power ideology and the framework proposed.

...a finely written book that few whites, if any, will enjoy. Those blacks who read it will undoubtedly find it a copious source of the insurgent power they seek. The anxious whites who study the proclamations of *Black Power* would do well to heed the urgent, articulate warnings of its authors.56

In this there was no suggestion that Black Power ideology could provide a model for indigenous peoples in the settler states of Australia, New Zealand and North America. Indeed, media commentators in New Zealand regularly spoke of race relations in America and made no link with the race 'problem' (usually referred to as the 'Maori problem') in New Zealand. Nevertheless while Black Power was 'over there' in America, a fear was beginning to emerge in New Zealand that Black Power signalled grievous change. An editorial by Alexander McLeod in the *New Zealand Listener* bemoaned the death of Martin Luther King Jr and with it his peaceful and non-violent approach, and suggested that a 'cataclysmic' era in race relations may be emerging. Blacks had awakened to their plight, their deprivation, and had become 'susceptible to the arguments of “Black Power”... Martin Luther King's death may well be the end of one era...the era just beginning must be the more cataclysmic for being tainted with the vicious methods King died opposing'.57 Barely recognised was that indigenous activists had also become ‘susceptible’ to Black Power ideology and were reading Black Power literature, and applying the various ideological frames to their situations. By 1970 Red Power had emerged in North America, Black Power in Australia, and Brown Power / Black Power in New Zealand.

Black Power literature was engaged with to a significant degree by Maori and Pasifika activists and groups. Tama Poata commented that Maori, in general, were influenced by Malcolm X, Huey Newton and Martin Luther King Jr, and Cassius Clay (later

54 Ibid.
57 Alexander MacLeod, Editorial, 'Black power, white peril', 1968, p.5.
Muhammed Ali). However it was through two main groups that Black Power literature was distributed and devoured: the student Maori activist body at Auckland University and disenfranchised and disaffected youth. While the latter is the natural constituency of radical literature, the university students had experienced racism and cultural alienation, and moreover had an understanding of the effects of colonisation in terms of a treaty that had never been honoured, political subordination, and the expropriation of Maori land. Syd Jackson, who did comparative studies in race and racism for his MA in Political Science at Auckland University, was inspired by the literature of Black Power leaders Eldridge Cleaver and Stokely Carmichael. This gained him insights into liberation struggles occurring across the globe. In the process he discovered that the 'true' history of Maori had either been 'sanitised or withheld during a Pakeha-oriented schooling'. In studying the history of African independence movements and linking these to the colonisation of New Zealand, it was a short ontological stretch to link the struggles and oppression of Maori with black South Africans, North American Indians, Australian Aborigines, and peoples of the Pacific.

Will Ilolahia, president of the PPP, was also introduced to Black Power literature during his time at Auckland University. He recalled that at the same time, the president of the King Cobra gang 'came out of prison brandishing Bobby Seale's book, *Seize the Time*, and friends and family employed as seamen were returning with literature from the outside world'. Members of the PPP also read the literature and Ilolahia recalled the politicising effect: 'When we read these books deeper we found out the problems they were complaining about were the exact problems we were seeing in New Zealand.'

The Black Power liberation ideology of Stokely Carmichael influenced Nga Tamatoa, and it dovetailed with the central thrust of the group for self-determination. Carmichael defined Black Power as:

...a call for Black People...to unite, to recognise their heritage, to build a sense of community. It is a call for Black People to begin to define their own goals, to lead their

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60 Cited in Robbie Shilliam, *The Polynesian Panthers...* p.5.
61 Ibid.
own organisations and to support those organisations. It is a call to reject the racist institutions and values of this society.62

However, it should be understood that while the focus here is on the influences of Black Power (and other international influences more broadly), Nga Tamatoa was not simply a Black Power group. Equally important, was the long historical lineage of struggle and resistance by Maori against colonisation, and the precedents which Nga Tamatoa had to draw upon. For example, while the central feature underpinning Black Power was self-determination and the demand that blacks control their own destiny, self-determination in various forms had underpinned the historical struggles by Maori.

There was division within the group, but mainly in terms of the means by which liberation was to be effected and the form that it would take. A more radical group, which included Tame Iti and Ted Nia, followed Stokely Carmichael who advocated that liberation was to be achieved by any means necessary, including the use of violence. As one member explained:

We don't mind if we die...If they move the troops in, we might have to fight...When the Pakeha makes a move to prevent us from doing things and they pick up the gun...we'll pick up the gun too.63

The group framed their cause in terms of liberation from Pakeha oppression and sought Maori separatism - a separate Maori government with its own laws based on Maori customs, its own foreign policy and its own education system.64 Further, it was Ted Nia's belief that 'Maori had to gain control of all the economic resources he owned and use them for his own benefit rather than for the benefit of the Pakeha'.65 In short, they wanted two separate nations within New Zealand. In the interim they demanded that, at the least, Maori should have 'Maori Control of Maori Things'.

The other group, led by Syd and Hana Jackson, adopted and adapted Black Power ideology to suit their own purpose. As Greenland suggests, they created a new political consciousness based on Brown Power. In this they reasserted ethnicity which saw the

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63 MOOHR Newsletter, Sept 1971, R.J. Walker Papers, 301.451095, W185, UAL.
64 Ibid.
development of pride in being Maori, a resurrection of Maori identity, and a stress on
separatism. This was often used to contrast the difference in values of Maori and
Pakeha by using a simple good/bad dichotomy, thus giving moral weight to their claims.
The group separated itself from Pakeha influence from an organisational standpoint and
membership was restricted to Maori in order to develop strong group solidarity and a
self-determining organisation. They sought liberation but the key issue was how this
was to be effected – whether to work within the system or stand outside. While there
was no strong philosophical objection to the use of violence, it was recognised that
mounting a revolution was unrealistic and therefore they eventually chose to work
within the system to bring about change. For the group, race not class was the basic
cleavage in society and much of their activism centred on addressing issues of 'white
racism' and institutional racism.

To this end they implemented a number of self-help schemes, similar to those of the
Black Panthers in San Francisco, to provide immediate assistance for Maori, especially
younger Maori, to whom structural inequality or white racism was frequently directed.
Thus they set up a legal aid and court assistance scheme for Maori offenders, arranged
prison visits and supported ex-offenders following their release. An employment bureau
was set up which worked at securing employment opportunities and then directing and
supporting young Maori into taking up such opportunities. There was also considerable
contact with the PPP which, although it had formed to address the needs of Pasifika
people, always had Maori within its organisation. Nga Tamatoa collaborated on a
number of initiatives including the PIG Patrol which monitored a police task force - the
Police Investigations Group - created to clean up the violence on the streets of
Auckland, but which was reputed to target Maori and Pasifika youth. The unfortunate
name was provocatively named the PIG patrol by activists familiar with the PIG patrols
organised by the Black Panthers in San Francisco.

Engaging with International Indigenous Activism from a Distance

There were strong similarities between Nga Tamatoa and indigenous activists in
Australia and North America who had also adopted or adapted Black Power ideology.

66 Hauraki Greenland, 'Ethnicity as Ideology', in P. Spoonley, C. Macpherson, D. Pearson, & C. Sedgewick
(eds), Tauiwi, Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1996, pp.86-102 (pp. 93-96).
67 Syd Jackson tape, Diamond Series.
Contact had not yet been made, although Nga Tamatoa knew of them and the issues they were contesting through newspaper reports and leftist newsletters which, from the late 1960s, increasingly featured articles about the plight of Aborigines and forms of resistance. CARE had formed links with the Aborigines Advancement League (AAL) and often featured material from AAL newsletters. In 1970 CARE published an article asking, 'If you were an Aborigine would you celebrate the bicentenary of Captain Cook?' This was in reference to the protests mounted by Aborigines to the bicentenary which was underpinned by the claim that for Aborigines Captain Cook's arrival in their lands and the legacy in contemporary terms was to be mourned and not celebrated. The article answered the question by detailing land dispossession, contemporary effects on Aborigines, and struggles to have land rights recognised.68

MOOHR also printed a substantial amount of information about Aboriginal activism. Featured heavily were issues of land rights and the repeal of legislation inimical to Aboriginal interests. For example it urged readers to write to the Queensland government and demand the abolition of the Aborigines' and Torres Straits Islanders Affairs Act, 1965.69 MOOHR explained the oppression of Aborigines under this Act to its readers:

...thirty thousand Aborigines and Islanders live under the Aborigines' and Torres Strait Islanders Act ...most of them live on reserves...Govt officials manage and control the lives of these Aborigines...Would you want the Government to have their powers over you to ....transfer you from one part of Queensland to another against your will; refuse to let you travel away from home; refuse to let people living elsewhere, even relations, visit you; control how you spend your money; set wages by Government regulation instead of industrial agreement; put you under house arrest for an unlimited period for....attempting to leave the reserve; failing to obey any instruction from the reserve manager; are idle...careless or negligent at work; in any way offend against discipline or good order of the reserve. This Act oppresses the Aborigines of Queensland. This Act is a denial of Human Rights.70

68 CARE Newsletter, March 1970, Rata Papers, ABAF 2/33, NA.
69 MOOHR Newsletter, (No date, Circa 1971), Rata Papers, Political Papers, 2/33, NA.
70 Ibid.
Much information and material came from Joe McGinness (Secretary of the Aborigines and Torres Straits Advancement League) who often sent information about current issues to MOOHR to publish and raise awareness amongst their supporters.

Literature and articles about the indigenous peoples of North America began to filter into New Zealand from the early 1970s. The situation of American and Canadian Indians was featured occasionally in the newsletters of leftist groups and magazine publications. In 1969, for example, CARE printed information from an 'Indian-Eskimo Association of Canada Report', of the appalling socio-economic position of the indigenous peoples of Canada.\(^71\) In similar vein, *Te Ao Hou* magazine printed an article in 1970 under the title 'Weep for your Brothers, Boy! Weep for your Brothers...' which spoke of neglect, poverty, marginalisation and disinterest.\(^72\) Mainstream and leftists newspapers carried reports of protest actions, especially the infamous events which occurred between the FBI and the American Indian Movement (AIM) at Wounded Knee in 1973. Resistance bookshops too carried material, such as *Touch the Earth: A Self-Portrait of Indian Existence* by T.C. McLuhan, and the American Indian newspaper *Akwesasne Notes* appeared intermittently. In 1973 *Rongo*, collectively produced by Te Huinga Rangatahi (New Zealand Federation of Maori Students), Nga Tamatoa and the Polynesian Panther Party, featured an article on the recent stand taken by AIM at Wounded Knee, and asked its readers to 'read of the American Indian peoples struggle for Survival and Freedom in THEIR Land of America. Their problems and aspirations closely parallel ours.'\(^73\) The article clearly had an impact. The 1974 Spring edition of *Akwesasne Notes* featured two letters from Nga Tamatoa members who identified with the American Indian situation and struggle:

> We are the first really active Maori liberation group working for the native people of this country and we relate strongly to your cause which is the same as ours. The translation of our name 'Nga Tamatoa' is “Sons of the Brave” and we have suffered the same treatment as your people in land and culture. Enclosed is a letter expressing solidarity with the stand at Wounded Knee.\(^74\)

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\(^71\) CARE Newsletter, Sept 1969, Rata Papers, ABAF 2/33, NA.
\(^74\) Correspondence, Michael Walker (Secretary Nga Tamatoa Council), *Akwesasne Notes*, Early Spring 1974, p.74.
The second letter is instructive, not merely for the identification with the indigenous people of North America, but for its reference to the Australian Aborigines, and for the literature which was circulating and influencing young Maori:

I read your publication in a new magazine here... “Rongo”... This magazine is for our Maori (native) people which airs grievances and problems affecting our minority. I have just finished reading “Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee” by Dee Brown. I found it very illuminating but sickening. Sickening in the repetition of broken treaty and massacre. Our country was colonised in similar fashion. Today, the whites say, 'We are all one” only so long as they can call the tune. Last month I met a Cherokee who is working over here – I found him interesting as our struggle is similar... Do your people hear of the struggle of the Australian Aborigine? Just now they seem to be receiving a bit of publicity re the dismissal of a top government official, an Aborigine who called his white minister “a racist”. A book I am reading at the moment is “Wretched of the Earth” by Frantz Fanon.75

Other letters followed, including one from the Maori Culture Club in Paeroa, which noted that 'the problems faced by your native people are almost identical to the problems our Maori people meet in this uptight Western money-grabbing society'.76

Having access to Akwesasne Notes was significant in raising the consciousness of Maori about other indigenous peoples (and vice versa). The newspaper transmitted the aspirations and struggles of indigenous people around the globe, and young activists became aware of a vast indigenous world. It was the foremost native owned newspaper and voice for Native American rights in North America and by the 1970s it had a circulation averaged at 10,000 copies per issue with most subscribers receiving their copies by mail.77 Its geographic reach, in terms of circulation, was vast because of its global approach to indigenous news, and although its focus was on North America, coverage extended to every continent taking in the many indigenous struggles in South America as well as those on the geographic margins, such as the Aborigines in Australia and the Sami in northern Europe. While the articles reflected the issues at the time, it was in the Letters to the Editor columns where snippets of the voices, struggles and lives of ordinary people were brought out and provided the reality and depth of

75 Correspondence, Noel Oriwa Harris, Akwesasne Notes, Early Spring 1974, p.74.
76 Correspondence, Te Reo O Paeroa, Akwesasne Notes, Early Spring 1975, p.45.
indigenous experience. From the letters of Maori activists, readers were made aware that there were indigenous activists in New Zealand who had similar problems and experience of colonisation. In this respect, *Akwesasne Notes* can be seen as an important agent in the development of a global indigenous community through the sharing of lives from a distance.

Activists also came to 'know' other indigenous peoples and become engaged in an indigenous activist community through protest. A 'currency' of indigenous protest developed and bounced across borders as actions were adopted and adapted to suit their own circumstances. Many of the actions took place in spaces of national importance and they were highly visible due to their dramatic actions, symbolism and discourse which raised uncomfortable images in the mainstream population. Thus they were newsworthy and spread across borders into international media.

The earliest expression of a shared currency of protest was the Day of Mourning, which took place on national celebratory occasions. In 1970, FCAATSI held a national Day of Mourning on the day that Australia celebrated Captain Cook's landing. As Australia celebrated, Aboriginal activists and their supporters mourned. Vigils were held, funeral dress was worn, wreaths were thrown into Botany Bay, coffins were carried in procession, and faces were painted white with red foreheads to symbolise the spilt blood of their ancestors. The idea spread to America and a Day of Mourning was held in November 1970 when Native Americans gathered at Plymouth Rock on Thanksgiving Day. It was an event intended to demonstrate that with the theft of their lands, the abrogation of their treaties, the destruction of their traditional way of life, their marginalisation and political powerlessness, American Indians had nothing to celebrate. A few months later, on 6 February 1971, Nga Tamatoa reconfigured Waitangi Day from a celebratory day to mark the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, to a

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78 A protest Day of Mourning first appeared in Australia in 1938 on the occasion of the Sesqui-centenary celebrations. William Cooper (Australian Aborigines' League) and members of the Aborigines Progressive Association organised a Day of Mourning to protest 'the white man's seizure of our country, against the callous treatment of our people by the white man during the past 150 years'. See *Sydney Morning Herald*, 27 Jan 1938. In 1951 Aborigines from Victoria planned to hold a Day of Mourning to 'commemorate the arrival in Victoria of the White Man'. See, *Dubbo Liberal and Macquarie Advocate*, 17 Jan 1951.


Day of Mourning and despair. Nga Tamatoa went to Waitangi to mourn beside the waters for what Maori had lost and a treaty that had not been honoured.

Similarly the idea of a tent embassy gained currency. An Aboriginal Tent Embassy was set up by Aboriginal activists outside parliament in Canberra on 26 January 1972 (Australia Day), and in November 1972 American Indian activists took over the Bureau of Indian Affairs and unfurled a banner outside reading 'Native American Embassy'. Simultaneously a teepee appeared on the front lawn. A few weeks later in New Zealand, Maori activists established a Maori Embassy outside parliament and several more appeared over the following years.

Land marches and caravan ‘marches’ were also a shared form of protest. In 1965 students from the University of Sydney, led by Charles Perkins (Aboriginal student), organised the Freedom Ride - a bus tour of western and coastal towns in New South Wales. The intention was to draw national and international attention to the poor standard of living of Aboriginal people and to the endemic racism to which Aborigines were subject.81 In 1972 members of the American Indian Movement (AIM) organised the Trail of Broken Treaties. This sought to unite Indians from all over America in a protest ‘march’ which began on the West Coast and protesters travelled by cars and buses across America to Washington D.C. where they confronted the government with a list of long-held grievances over treaty rights and claims, and others related to land and socio-economic issues. The purpose was to draw national attention to their grievances, and force the government to recognise and address their claims.82 In New Zealand, in 1975 a Maori Land March began at Te Hapua in the far north and walked down the spine of the North Island to end on the steps of parliament in Wellington.83 The march, which went under the banner ‘Not one more acre’ of Maori land to be alienated to Pakeha, stemmed from concern over the relentless alienation of Maori land and the control of the remaining 1.2 million hectares of Maori land by Pakeha laws. The

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intention was to draw national attention to the issue, and to unify Maori across tribal
boundaries in a common cause.\textsuperscript{84}

Such actions were spectacularly indigenous and laden with symbolism about
dispossession, political powerlessness, broken treaties and European duplicity. Activists
knew little about each other when these protest actions were being enacted, but through
a currency of protest which spoke of indigenous experience, they shared in an
indigenous activist community from a distance.

**Section two**

**Transnational Activism:**

**Making Space across Borders**

In 1972 radical Maori activists first began to travel out of New Zealand and make
contact with other indigenous activists. For the rest of the decade contact increased, the
geographical area increased, and there was a shift from single meetings to the
involvement by Maori in meetings, seminars, and organisations. As well, indigenous
activists began to enter New Zealand from the mid-1970s and by the early 1980s there
was a significant indigenous activist network stretched across the Pacific.

These events, meetings and networking, which will be examined in this chapter section,
should be placed against a backdrop of increasing domestic activism. The 1970s to
early 1980s, a period which Ranginui Walker refers to as 'Years of Anger', was
characterised by growing racial tension and punctuated by high profile events.\textsuperscript{85} Nga Tamatoa and the Polynesian Panthers exposed racial inequality and discrimination, and
the 1975 Maori Land March revealed to Pakeha New Zealand the depth and extent of
Maori discontent over land alienation, a corresponding hardened resolve, and a
reassertion of Maori identity. Racial tensions grew and were fuelled by highly
publicised events such as the police shooting of Daniel Houpapa at Taumarunui, and a
series of land occupations which placed Maori and the state in sharp conflict. Most
notable was the 507-day occupation by Ngati Whatua and supporters at Takaparawhau

(Baston Point) and their forcible eviction by state forces. Further land occupations followed, including Eva Rickard's stand at Whaiangaroa (Raglan).

In 1979 racism was dealt with by He Taua, one of the new radical activist groups which were beginning to populate the political landscape. The group aggressively confronted Pakeha students at Auckland University for their flagrant and continual abuse of Maori culture. This provoked widespread condemnation and discussion on race relations. Towards the end of the decade a new group, Waitangi Action Committee, revitalised the Waitangi Day protests, they re-branded the Treaty of Waitangi as a 'fraud', and they instituted confrontational and newsworthy protests at Waitangi. In 1981 the Springbok rugby tour of New Zealand unleashed the largest and most sustained and divisive protest ever seen in New Zealand and at the same time brought out race tensions. Years of anger and resentment, felt especially by young Maori and Pasifika activists, came to the surface and were directed at police, the state, and often at Pakeha. A report, *Race Against Time*, was issued in 1982 which stressed that New Zealand was operating as a mono-cultural society and that race relations required immediate attention. It was against this backdrop that transnational activism took place.

**Constraints in Accessing International Spaces**

From the beginning, Nga Tamatoa was keen to internationalise. Many members, especially the leadership, were well-informed of international events and of the international focus on human rights and race discrimination which saw a steady increase of international conferences and initiatives during the 1970s. The Nga Tamatoa Council had a portfolio system which allocated key areas of concern to council members and 'International Issues' was one such area. The aim was to follow events involving indigenous peoples, to monitor countries with racially discriminatory policies, and to assess how these might impact on Maori and Polynesian people.

They were especially interested in making direct contact with activist groups and other indigenous peoples. The letters in *Akwesasne Notes* indicates their interest in North American Indians. Similarly, during the early 1970s, anti-racist groups from the United

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States, backed by the World Council of Churches’ (WCC) Programme to Combat Racism (PCR), came into New Zealand to conduct anti-racism workshops. Nga Tamatoa was initially involved but 'disappointed' that American Indians were not included in their team. They ‘looked forward to establishing contact with them’ in the future, and suggested that anti-racist teams be 'diversified' to include Indian representatives. At the same time Syd Jackson expressed interest in taking a group of Maori activists to the United States and the Caribbean, presumably to make contact with Black Power leaders and groups. Australian Black Power activists had made significant contacts with their contemporaries in America and Jackson's interest may have been sparked by Aboriginal Black Power activist, Bobbi Sykes, who had been hosted by Syd and Hana Jackson while in Auckland in 1972. There was interest in travelling to Australia and making contact with Aboriginal activists too, as well as attending seminars and conferences.

In part, this initially came through the efforts of Reverend Don Borrie, secretary of the New Zealand Student Christian Movement (NZSCM), and who was heavily involved in the PCR. Borrie established a close relationship with Maori activists and was a strong supporter of Nga Tamatoa and the PPP. He 'made sure that there was room for them to engage with the NZSCM' and was able to 'open doors for Maori activists to use if they wished. Through his work with the PCR and NZSCM, Borrie had 'doors' into international indigenous networks and conferences, especially in South East Asia and Australia. He passed information to Nga Tamatoa and urged them to engage with activist groups in South East Asia who were 'liberators... working for just and free societies', and with Aboriginal activists. He actively sought to facilitate contact between Nga Tamatoa and Faith Bandler (FCAATSI) with whom he had close links through the PCR and WCC, he passed on information about various land rights

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88 Correspondence, Don Borrie (NZSCM) to Dr Charles Spivey (Programme to Combat Racism, Geneva), 15 Nov 1972, Student Christian Movement Aotearoa (New Zealand): Records (MS-Group-507), 83- 119-4, ATL.
89 Ibid.
90 Interview with Don Borrie, 13 July 2006.
91 Correspondence, Don Borrie to Tamatoa Council, 4 May 1971, Student Christian Movement Aotearoa (New Zealand), Records (MS-Group-0507), MS-Papers-1617-667, ATL. In this Borrie gave contact addresses for two representatives from organisations in the Philippines and Hong Kong, both of whom had expressed interest in making contact with Nga Tamatoa.
conferences with which Bandler was involved, and he worked (apparently without success) to get Nga Tamatoa to Australia for these events.\textsuperscript{92}

The problem for Nga Tamatoa was that despite a will to internationalise, financial constraints curbed participation and for much of the 1970s, only small numbers of activists travelled abroad. As with indigenous people’s organisations across the globe, members generally had a low socio-economic status and consequently their organisations suffered from meagre funds. Within a year of formation the Tamatoa Council urged people to pay their membership fee ($1) as 'Tamatoa Council's financial situation isn't financial any more'.\textsuperscript{93} Much time was spent seeking funds and, as Syd Jackson commented, being in Nga Tamatoa was 'mostly hard work and constantly fund-raising'.\textsuperscript{94} Leftist organisations, especially NZSCM, the New Zealand Race Relations Council and the New Zealand University Students' Association, provided financial assistance on many occasions for travel to national conferences, costs associated with a Maori language campaign and general organisational expenses. However leftist groups also struggled financially and were rarely in a position to fund international travel.

Applications for government funding to attend international conferences was never successful. Arguably there was little enthusiasm about funding outspoken radical Maori activists who would likely broadcast a strong critique of the government and a negative view of race relations. The government could not prevent activists from travelling abroad, but they could refuse funding which was just as effective in closing down international spaces. In this respect little had changed since 1937 when discussions had taken place about the suitability of Guide Rangi and Te Puea Herangi attending an international PPWA conference and funding was denied.

A case in point was in 1972 when Nga Tamatoa was invited to join a delegation of observers to the 'United Nations Conference on the Human Environment' in Stockholm. The conference, which took 'Only One Earth' as its theme, was a landmark event in the development of international environmentalism and some governments included

\textsuperscript{92} For example see, multiple correspondence between Don Borrie and Faith Bandler, 1973 and Don Borrie to T. Eruera, Nga Tamatoa Council, 16 March 1973, Student Christian Movement Aotearoa (New Zealand) Records (MS-Group-0507), MS-Papers-1617-672, ATL.
\textsuperscript{93} Tamatoa Council Newsletter, 1971, Student Christian Movement Aotearoa (New Zealand) Records (MS-Group-0507), MS-Papers-1617-667, ATL.
\textsuperscript{94} Syd Jackson tape, Diamond Series.
indigenous people in their delegations. The Canadian government included George Manuel, President of the National Indian Brotherhood, as an adviser in their delegation. On the advice of Duncan MacIntyre (Minister of Maori Affairs), Nga Tamatoa made an application to the Maori Purposes Board, of which MacIntyre was chairman, for the funding of two delegates. Peter Rikys, who made the case for Nga Tamatoa, argued that Maori needed to be well-informed so they could 'play an effective role in determining national priorities in relation to conservation, an issue which was central to Maori tradition and philosophy'.95 It would have been a valuable conference for the young activists. MacIntyre, who was included in a large government and non-governmental delegation, was surely aware of the new international focus on environmental concerns, sustainable development and the links which were being made with indigenous philosophies. Moreover, provision had been made in Stockholm to accommodate ordinary citizens, with a number of alternative forums organised to run alongside the conference, and which promoted a diverse range of environmental issues. Indigenous peoples were expected to attend and Stewart Brand (a counter-culture guru) sponsored fifteen American Indians to present their philosophy on Mother Earth.96

The request for funding was declined, perhaps not surprising considering current ill-feeling between Nga Tamatoa and MacIntyre. While the relationship had never been overly amiable, it had crashed to an all-time low a few months previously at a meeting on Waitangi marae on the eve of Waitangi Day. With reference to a recently introduced Race Relations Bill, Syd Jackson suggested that the government 'had placed international posturing ahead of the needs and welfare of the Maori people'. Hana Jackson accused MacIntyre of making fools of Maori and added that the lot of Maori was one of discrimination and second-class citizenship. A verbal stoush ensued with Nga Tamatoa, MacIntyre and Maori leaders engaging in an acrimonious exchange.97 The following day Nga Tamatoa disrupted the official Waitangi Day ceremonies with a dramatic funereal protest action, claimed Waitangi as a place of mourning, and

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95 Correspondence, P Rikys (Nga Tamatoa) to Duncan MacIntyre (Maori Purposes Fund), 4 May 1972, MA1, Box 355, 19/1/131, Part 2, NA.
96 For interest see, 'Long Live Life part 2- United Nations Conference on the Human Environment Stockholm, Sweden 1972', http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A6EhvTqUqp4 - accessed 3 May 2014. Stewart Brand's 'The Whole Earth Catalogue' was the 'bible' of the counter-culture and aimed to renew society through self-sustainable living and along environmentally just lines,
97 Auckland Star, 7 Feb 1972; Sunday Herald, 6 Feb 1972; Sir James Henare, Introduction tape, Diamond Series.
contradicted the official 'one people' narrative.\textsuperscript{98} Therefore, Duncan MacIntyre may not have been inclined to support Nga Tamatoa at international forums, especially those dealing with issues where the government record could be challenged.

Apparently Party politics had little to do with the reluctance of the government to support Nga Tamatoa. In 1974 Dr Elizabeth Eggleston (Director, Centre for Research into Aboriginal Affairs) wrote to Prime Minister Norman Kirk requesting financial support for Ted Nia (Nga Tamatoa) and Oliver Sutherland (ACORD) to attend a seminar on 'Aborigines and the Law'.\textsuperscript{99} The two men had been chosen for their experience and work which they were doing with Maori and Pasifika youth in the justice system. Nia was heavily involved in the Nga Tamatoa Maori Legal Service in Wellington, and Sutherland was conducting research on institutional racism within the justice system.\textsuperscript{100} Ivan Apperley (Deputy Secretary of Maori and Island Affairs) advised Matiu Rata (Minister of Maori and Island Affairs) against funding, because he had doubts about the suitability of Nia and Sutherland. If funding was made available, then the government should have some say in the selection of delegates.\textsuperscript{101} Rata recommended that the Prime Minister decline the request for funds.\textsuperscript{102}

\textbf{Contesting the ‘One People’ Narrative: Non-indigenous Places and Making Space ‘to tell our story’}

Nevertheless, activists began to travel abroad from the early 1970s and the first opportunities came through church structures. In 1972 Hana Jackson was invited to participate at a conference in Cyprus on 'Women's Role in Peace Education' organised by agencies of the WCC and the Catholic Church. Early in 1972 a meeting of the executive committee of the WCC was held in Auckland and Jackson met members of the committee including Brigalia Bam who nominated Jackson to be New Zealand's delegate.\textsuperscript{103} On the eve of her departure Jackson signalled that she would use the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{98} \textit{Evening Post}, 7 Feb 1972; \textit{Craccum}, Vol.46, Issue 1, 1972, p.9.
\item \textsuperscript{99} Correspondence, Dr E. M. Egglestone to Prime Minister N. Kirk, 1 April 1974, AAMK 869, W3074, Box 1063a, 36/1/19, Part 2, NA.
\item \textsuperscript{100} ACORD (Auckland Committee on Racism and Discrimination) was an anti-racist organisation founded in 1973 to draw attention to the existence and effects of institutional racism.
\item \textsuperscript{101} Correspondence, I.W. Apperley to Minister of Maori Affairs (Matiu Rata), 21 May 1974, AAMK 869, W3074, Box 1063a, 36/1/19, Part 2, NA.
\item \textsuperscript{102} Correspondence, Matiu Rata to Prime Minister, 22 May 1974, AAMK 869, W3074, Box 1063a, 36/1/19, Part 2, NA.
\item \textsuperscript{103} Brigalia Bam was Executive Programme Secretary for the Women’s Department of the WCC.
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conference 'to speak her mind on ways of combating racism, cultural exploitation, and also the loss of identity which...is at the root of the lack of concern for peace'. At the time, Jackson was fully active in Nga Tamatoa and was the driving force behind a campaign to have Maori language taught in schools. A petition requested that Maori language and aspects of culture be taught in all schools with large Maori rolls, and in all other schools 'as a positive effort to promote... integration'.

Hana Jackson joined women from twenty-three countries for six days in Nicosia. There, 'women came up with few resolutions or policy statements' but focused more on learning about the situation of women in their particular countries and what they were doing to cope with their different situations. This gave Jackson a space to present 'a Maori point of view on New Zealand...They didn't know much about Maoris before. They do now!' She spoke of historical and contemporary grievances, of institutional racism, and of the self-help activities of Nga Tamatoa, including:

...the Maori language seminars run in Auckland by Nga Tamatoa ...to train Maori-speaking teachers to teach Maori in schools; of work in children's courts; visiting prisoners; attitudes to the Treaty of Waitangi; and generally a Maori point of view.

The narrative of Maori disadvantage and discrimination spread to Germany. While in Cyprus, Brigalia Bam suggested that Hana contact the West German branch of the World Day of Prayer, a global grass-roots movement of Christian women who each year held a day of prayer, collected funds and disbursed them to needy groups across the world. Jackson wrote of race relations, and identified the aims of Nga Tamatoa and the self-help programmes they were hoping to implement to deal with race discrimination, especially in relation to Maori youth. In particular, Jackson requested funding for the setting up of a community centre and a training programme for young Maori. Nga Tamatoa's initiatives were considered worthy and they were allocated US $2000 for each project, paid to the NCC to disburse to Nga Tamatoa. Through a series of

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104 Newspaper clipping, 'Her aim is a better deal for Maoris', (No name, no date – circa May 1972), National Council of Churches Records, 87-204-092/10, ATL.
105 Copy of the Maori Language Petition reprinted in The Fly, May 1971, R.J. Walker Papers, 301.451095 W 185, UAL
106 Newspaper clipping, 'A Woman's Place Is..."In Politics", (No name, no date – circa May/July 1972), National Council of Churches Records, 87-204-092/10, ATL.
107 Ibid.
108 Correspondence, Heidi Guttenberg (Organising Secretary, Weltgebetstag Der Fraue, Deutsches Komitee) to The Secretary of the Maori Section, National Council of Churches, New Zealand, 27 October 1972, National Council of Churches Records, 'Maori Section', 87-204-033/3, ATL.
misunderstandings and internal politics in the NCC it appears that Nga Tamatoa never received the funds.\(^{109}\)

On her way home Jackson stopped off in London and was interviewed by the *Observer* which noted that she 'might be described as the Angela Davies of the Antipodes'. Jackson slated New Zealand's race relations paradigm and spoke of white liberals who neither cared nor knew enough about racial discrimination in New Zealand.\(^{110}\) Armed with statistics to prove what she called the 'sham claims' of the New Zealand Government about the integration of Maori and Pakeha, Jackson spoke of discrimination and inequality, and of living in a Pakeha dominated society where 'Everything we are taught about our culture is designed to make us ashamed '. The *Observer* drew particular attention to the loss of Maori language and inequality and noted that Jackson had a point about inequality ‘particularly as the Minister of Maori Affairs is a Scotsman’.

In 1974 Hana Jackson travelled abroad again, this time to the Netherlands at the invitation of the Programme to Combat Racism, a body under the auspices of the WCC.\(^{111}\) During the 1960s the WCC had become increasingly involved with the struggle against apartheid, and in 1968 at its fourth assembly in Uppsala it had adopted the struggle against racism as its focus. The following year the controversial PCR had been launched and in 1974, with its five-year mandate drawing to an end, the PCR organised consultations to assess the efficacy of its programmes, look at new challenges and the renewal of the five-year mandate. Jackson's brief was to speak from a Maori perspective of the work of the PCR, the effectiveness of the programmes, and whether these 'took into account new developments taking place'.\(^{112}\) The PCR had become involved in a range of initiatives in New Zealand including an assessment of the incidence of racism and the viability of holding anti-racism workshops using educators

\(^{109}\) The funds were apparently sent to the NCC to disburse to Nga Tamatoa in 1973. However, by September 1973 Nga Tamatoa had not received any payment from the NCC. The record is patchy and suggestions were made about the possible misappropriation of funds by the NCC, and of decision-making by the NCC as to how the money should be spent, without any consultation with Nga Tamatoa. Whether they eventually received any of the funds is unknown. See, Correspondence, Don Borrie (NZSCM) to Rev. Paul Reeves, 20 Sept 1973, Student Christian Movement Aotearoa (New Zealand): Records (MS-Group-0507), 83-119-4, ATL.

\(^{110}\) *Observer*, 'For Liberals', 18 June 1972.

\(^{111}\) Correspondence, Baldwin Sjollema (Programme to Combat Racism, Geneva) to Hana Jackson, 18 March 1974, National Council of Churches Records, 87-204-069/2, ATL.

\(^{112}\) Ibid.
from the United States, they planned to facilitate a land rights conference between Australian Aborigines and Maori, and they provided support for Tama Poata and Saana Murray who were publishing a book on the struggle for land rights in Te Hapua.

To understand Jackson's address some context is necessary. Jackson was a last minute replacement for Bishop Paul Reeves (Bishop of Waiapu) who was the New Zealand consultant with the PCR but had declined to attend citing ecumenical obligations. At the same time he advised that he wished to relinquish his position with the PCR for similar reasons. Reeves, however, was annoyed with the PCR. For some time there had been lobbying by numerous people (including Reeves and Don Borrie) to have Nga Tamatoa and the Polynesian Panther Party recognised by the PCR as worthy of financial support in their struggle against domestic racism. Both groups sought assistance for their self-help programmes, anti-racism initiatives, and for travel to land-rights conferences in Australia. The PCR finally recognised their value and promised financial assistance, then reneged and instead funded the New Zealand Anti-Apartheid Committee (NZAAC). The decision to pull financial support was, according to Hana Jackson, the reason why Reeves resigned from the PCR.

The wider problem for Nga Tamatoa, and Pakeha supporters, was having white racism recognised as a reality. During the early 1970s, New Zealand's good reputation proved difficult to dismantle and denial of racism was widespread. The term 'racism' offended, 'white racism' even more so, and Sir Guy Powles (Race Relations Conciliator) refused to use such terminology for its politically charged and potentially divisive nature.

I do not believe the New Zealand public is sufficiently understanding as yet to give objective consideration to what is meant or conveyed by the word 'racism'...Most people believe it has implications of malice and ill-will and that to be a racist one must

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113 Correspondence, Paul Reeves (Bishop of Waiapu) to Baldwin Sjollema (Programme to Combat Racism, Geneva), 15 Feb 1974, National Council of Churches Records, 87-204-069/2, ATL.
114 Hana Jackson, 'Paper presented at the World Council of Churches Consultation on “New Challenges to Combat Racism” in the Netherlands, 26 April 1974', CARE Records, NZMS 845 [uncatalogued], ACL. Don Borrie suggested that Rev. Alan Brash, who was working in Geneva as Deputy Secretary of the WCC, played a part in this decision. Borrie noted that Brash, refused to accept that white racism was a feature of race relations and, moreover, having been out of New Zealand for some time 'I would not expect that he even knew about Nga Tamatoa or the Polynesian Panthers, let alone know anything about NZ Institutional Racism'. (Email correspondence with Don Borrie, 20 April 2014).
have evil intent. In my view this is not a correct interpretation of the word and until it can be successfully removed from its emotional overtone, I do not propose to use it.\textsuperscript{115}

Maori leaders were reluctant to speak of racism at all and many distanced themselves from the PCR. Bishop Manu Bennett explained that many Maori held misgivings about the PCR and feared that its initiatives could lead to a 'type of racism which is based on a reactionary hatred of whites'.\textsuperscript{116} In 1972 three clergymen under the auspices of the PCR came to New Zealand to examine the 'racial situation'. On arrival they commented that they did not know why New Zealand was under scrutiny as it 'was supposed to be a model country in terms of race relationships'.\textsuperscript{117} Similarly, Don Borrie recalled that Rev. Alan Brash, a New Zealander and Deputy-Secretary of the WCC in Geneva, declared that there was 'no white racism in New Zealand' and he accused Borrie of 'stirring up trouble'.\textsuperscript{118}

Nga Tamatoa was incensed with the PCR and more so with their decision to support the NZAAC which was essentially a Pakeha organisation and generally worked within the narrow confines of apartheid sport. For some time there had been an uneasy relationship between Nga Tamatoa and the Anti-Apartheid Movement, especially the two major groups, CARE and HART. While Nga Tamatoa strongly opposed apartheid they argued that CARE and HART placed undue emphasis on apartheid sport and side-lined domestic racism. This was an ongoing accusation throughout the 1970s and entwined with a 'Pakeha liberal' discourse which assumed pejorative dimensions - that while liberal Pakeha claimed to support Maori they maintained a coloniser/colonised dichotomy whereby they made and implemented decisions on what they thought best for Maori rather than consulting with them and listening to what they wanted. At a race relations conference in 1971 Syd Jackson berated Pakeha delegates and challenged them to listen to what Maori had to say, rather than telling them what they considered was good for them.\textsuperscript{119} For Nga Tamatoa, the PCR decision was an outrage and confirmed that the organisation, which professed to fight racism, knew little about the people it

\textsuperscript{115} Correspondence, Sir Guy Powles to MOOHR, 3 August 1972, cited in MOOHR Newsletter (August Supplement) 1972, Michael Law Collection, [uncatalogued], Box 29, University of Waikato Library.
\textsuperscript{116} 'Extract from letter from Bishop Manu Bennett', 14 Aug 1972, National Council of Churches Records, 90-387-04/2, ATL.
\textsuperscript{117} \textit{New Zealand Herald}, 5 Dec 1972.
\textsuperscript{118} Email correspondence with Don Borrie, 20 April 2014.
\textsuperscript{119} \textit{Craccum}, 4 March 1971, p.4.
was mandated to assist and held racist and Eurocentric convictions. Hana Jackson had no intention of speaking broadly on the work of the PCR in New Zealand. Rather, she was determined to use the space available to lay bare the reality of race relations.

Her address was both a lambasting of the PCR, and an explanation of conditions in New Zealand and why they should support Nga Tamatoa. Jackson accused the PCR of being 'blatantly racist' in failing to support Maori in their struggle against white racism, and noted that they obviously had only an 'intellectual interest' in racism in New Zealand. This was evidenced by their action which in 'typical white racist fashion' had seen them give support only to a Pakeha organisation. The conclusion to be reached was that the PCR had no understanding of racism in New Zealand and had 'no real desire to understand' or support Maori in their anti-racism efforts. While the Anti-Apartheid Movement was a worthy cause,

…it is predominantly a group of white 'liberals' who do not relate, in any way, to the problems of white racism in New Zealand and who make little, if any, attempt to relate to us, the indigenous people...The PCR had asked a Maori to be its consultant...but when he made certain recommendations...you chose, in your ignorance, to give assistance only to the Pakeha group and not to the groups who are actively working on behalf of their own people to combat racism...all the assistance that has been given...by the PCR has centred on Pakeha. We do not deny that they need working on. However ... it is the Maoris who are living with white racism: it is the Maoris who are best able to help radicalise their people to the Pakeha problem, and it is the Maoris who are in the greatest need of both money and training to maintain their identity as a people.

Jackson addressed any misconceptions that the PCR may have held about the status of Maori. She recognised that Maori were 'better off' in comparison to other indigenous peoples but argued that this did not mean that Maori had not also suffered. She then detailed colonisation in historical terms, especially the ways in which Maori had been stripped of their lands and linked this with their current position in society. Thus she spoke of low socio-economic status and impoverishment, 'cultural genocide' which was exemplified by the loss of te reo, the high rate of imprisonment - 'Maoris are the jail

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120 Hana Jackson, 'Paper presented at the World Council of Churches Consultation on “New Challenges to Combat Racism” in the Netherlands, 26 April 1974', CARE Records, NZMS 845 [uncatalogued], ACL. All information on Jackson’s address is taken from this source.
fodder in our society’ - and a lack of political power in a Pakeha dominated society. All were underpinned by institutional racism:

The battle that Maoris are fighting...is probably the most subtle, the most insidious and the most sophisticated form of racism in the world, and the price that we are expected to pay to live in this Pakeha world is cultural genocide ...we have faced an enormous number of unjust laws in the fields of land and education...as well as in criminal matters, and these laws have all had the effect of bolstering the oppression of us as a people. They are specific manifestations of existing social inequalities which repeatedly reveal the racist core of New Zealand society. Yet at the same time, New Zealand has constructed for itself a comfortable myth of racial equality which most white New Zealanders accept without question... it is white institutionalised racism which allows inequities to be carried out against us.

Nga Tamatoa, explained Jackson, was attempting to remedy the myriad of injustices. First, through political action such as making submissions and deputations to government, active protest and confrontation, they had pressed for the change necessary for a more equitable society. Second, they were involved in welfare work and education in the Maori community and especially within the prisons and courts, to ensure Maori had access to legal representation and 'some kind of a chance in the white man's courts'. The work they did was vital and they 'deeply resented' the decision by the PCR that their work on white racism did not fit with the expectations or criteria of the PCR. At the conclusion of her address, Jackson suggested that the PCR would do well to listen to Maori who were the recipients of institutional racism, and support them rather than ‘passing the buck’ as they had done in the past. Maori were involved in a struggle against racism which, if not attended to, could ‘erupt into violence’.

The PCR did not overturn its decision, and while there was undoubtedly discussion by members of the PCR, the record has not been located. Don Borrie has no recollection of any discussion in New Zealand over the issue. Nga Tamatoa moved on from that disappointment and there is a sense that it was never overly comfortable in formal church structures. Instead, members moved into new locations abroad, mainly radical indigenous activist networks.
In Cyprus, London, Germany and the Netherland, Hana Jackson challenged the ‘one people’ ideology which placed Maori in a position of racial equality and in a privileged position. Her discourse was entirely grievance-based and presented an anti-colonial and anti-Pakeha narrative which would be repeated time and again by activists over the decade. Moderate Maori activists and leaders would often balance an oppositional discourse with some recognition that Maori had managed to achieve gains and had some successes, and they often acknowledged that the position of Maori was indeed ‘better than’ that of other indigenous peoples, and they held many more advantages. However, radical activists gave no ground. Their focus was ‘to tell their story’ which was a narrative of colonisation and its contemporary legacy within which there had been no positive outcomes for Maori. Jackson contested the long-held perception that Maori were in some way ‘privileged’ because they had been treated ‘better than’ other indigenous peoples. Whilst acknowledging they were in a better position - and she was one of the few activists to do so during this period - she added another layer: ‘better than’ was not great. Maori had suffered historically and continued to do so in contemporary terms.

**Trans-Tasman Engagement: Spaces of Radicalism, Support and Solidarity**

In March/April 1972 radical Maori and Aboriginal activists made contact when Roberta (Bobbi) Sykes travelled to New Zealand. Sponsored by the Socialist Action League, Sykes spent nearly three weeks undertaking a national speaking tour on the struggle for Aboriginal rights. Sykes had joined the Black Power Movement in Sydney in the early 1970s and was a central figure in the Aboriginal Embassy protest in Canberra, a member of the Black Caucus (a core group of Aboriginal activists in Redfern, Sydney), and was involved with the Aboriginal Medical Service in Redfern. The latter was one strand of a series of self-help initiatives informed by Black Power ideology, many of which had also been implemented by Nga Tamatoa and the Polynesian Panther Party. Sykes' visit reflected a new aggressive approach by Aboriginal activists (especially the Black Caucus) following the creation of the Aboriginal Embassy in Canberra, to internationalise the struggle for Aboriginal rights and justice.

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121 *Socialist Action*, 17 March 1972. Sykes was not of Aboriginal descent although at the time of her visit to New Zealand she believed that she was. Nevertheless even when her parentage was made known, she continued to identify strongly with the Aboriginal community and work for Aboriginal rights.
The purpose of Sykes' tour was to gain support for Aboriginal rights by raising public awareness of the plight of Aborigines, especially in terms of land rights, social, economic and political marginalisation, neglect and discrimination. At the same time she hoped that the issues revealed and the subsequent publicity would embarrass the Australian government, and pressure it into meeting the demands of activists. \(^{122}\) The deployment of the 'politics of embarrassment' was a major political resource for those who were politically powerless and lacked the resources to challenge the government effectively, or who were faced with an intransigent government. Sykes' tour was extensive and she spoke to large numbers of groups and organisations, especially leftist groups, anti-apartheid organisations, and the student body at tertiary institutions. As well, she was given widespread attention by the mainstream print, radio and television media and had appearances and interviews on the highly rated 'Gallery', 'Checkpoint' and 'On Camera' programmes. \(^{123}\) She was featured in student publications such as \textit{Salient} and \textit{Craccum}, and newsletters \textit{Socialist Action} and \textit{Unity}. The anti-apartheid movement was a target and her aim was to activate local anti-apartheid groups into supporting the initiatives of Aboriginal activists. \(^{124}\) Sykes repeatedly compared the situation of Aborigines with apartheid in South Africa and called for anti-apartheid activists to oppose the 'comparable racial situation in Australia'. \(^{125}\)

Sykes entered New Zealand with an understanding of race relations which had Maori confined within the dominant ‘one people’ paradigm. On arrival she remarked that 'she did not feel there was a discrimination problem against indigenous people in New Zealand as Maoris had been accepted from the beginning'. \(^{126}\) First impressions confirmed her understandings. She observed 'a brown-skinned uniformed man leaving from the cockpit of the plane in which I had arrived. He was the first person of colour I had ever seen working in this capacity and it took my breath away'. \(^{127}\) Moreover she was impressed at the interaction between Maori and Pakeha, the visibility of Maori in everyday life, and of Maori women working in eating establishments, handling and serving food for Pakeha customers. It was something she had never encountered. \(^{128}\)

\(^{122}\) \textit{New Zealand Herald}, 30 March 1972.


\(^{124}\) \textit{Dominion}, 5 April 1972.

\(^{125}\) Ibid; \textit{Dominion} 24 March 1972.

\(^{126}\) \textit{Dominion}, 24 March 1972.


\(^{128}\) Ibid.
Sykes’ perception changed as the tour progressed. From the beginning she had expressed a desire to make contact with Maori and Polynesian organisations and exchange experiences. Throughout the tour she met many Maori and in Auckland she was hosted by Syd and Hana Jackson and made significant contact with activists from Nga Tamatoa and the Polynesian Panther Party (PPP). From them Sykes heard a new version of race relations and began to understand the inequality and structural racism to which they were subject. She learned that 'Maori and South Sea Island people represented more than ninety per cent of prisoners in maximum security prisons, had abysmally low education and employment rates and many lived in extreme poverty'. As well, there was cross-fertilisation of ideas on many issues including land rights, language and treaty issues. By the end of her visit Sykes thought that the problems of Maori, Pasifika and Aborigines were similar in terms of ’discrimination, employment, language and education', and parallels existed in relation to land rights issues.

Out of the visit came the understanding that Maori and Aboriginal activists could assist each other. Sykes took back to Australia information on land rights including the ‘mistakes’ that had been made. She thought this would be useful for the future: when Aborigines were able to set up their own land rights programmes, it was crucial that they were aware of pitfalls and did not make similar mistakes. Maori could take lessons from Aborigines too: 'If they should allow their treaties to continue to be dishonoured, and should become careless and stop agitating in Maori Affairs they might find themselves in the same position we are in.'

Most importantly, significant links were established between Nga Tamatoa, PPP and Sykes, and friendships were formed, especially between Sykes and Syd and Hana Jackson. In particular the relationship between Sykes and Hana Jackson grew strong and developed over the years through regular correspondence and visits to Australia. It was a friendship which lasted a lifetime. While in Auckland Sykes invited Maori activists to visit Australia, spend time at the Aboriginal Tent Embassy and meet other

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130 Sykes, Snake Dancing, p.177.
131 Socialist Action, 14 April 1972, p.2.
132 Ibid.
133 Sykes, Snake Dancing, p.177.
activists.134 The commitment of Will Illolahia impressed her, and on her return to Australia Sykes suggested to the Black Caucus that they should invite him to Australia to make contact with activists and take part in the Black Moratorium demonstrations which were to take place on National Aboriginal Day in July.135

Soon after Sykes' visit, CARE sponsored Kath Walker to New Zealand for a similar consciousness-raising tour.136 Walker addressed students at schools, teacher training colleges and universities, trade unions, Lions Clubs and church groups. As with Sykes, she had a well-organised media campaign which included interviews on radio and with leftist groups, and considerable coverage in newspapers and newsletters of organisations such as CARE, Socialist Action, church publications and university student magazines. She met with Nga Tamatoa and the PPP and the latter was of particular interest. Her son Denis was founder of the newly formed Black Panther Party of Australia and she was keen to 'aid their cause with publicity on her return to Australia'.137 From discussions with members of both groups Walker also gained a new perspective of race relations and the issues faced. When asked if New Zealand provided a good example of race relations she remarked, 'there's a lot to be done here. As far as the indigenous people are concerned, they are better off than others, but if you talk to the Maori you'll find there is a lot that could be done'.138

Walker proposed that indigenous peoples set their sights across borders and adopt a wider approach. She advocated a conference between peoples of the Pacific who 'face common problems and a common enemy and we could produce a very solid charter of rights for the indigenous people of the Pacific'. If church groups were not prepared to fund such a venture she would go to China who would 'certainly' provide financial assistance.139 The Chinese government was encouraging and sponsoring visits by

134 Canberra Times, 31 March 1972.
135 Sykes, Snake Dancing, p.178.
137 New Zealand Methodist, 21 Sept 1972, Clover Papers, A-127, Box 3, Item 16, Special Collections, UAL.
138 New Zealand Herald, 1 Sept 1972.
indigenous and minority peoples at that time, and Aboriginal activists had accepted an invitation to visit at the end of the year. Walker also suggested that white people begin to give serious thought in global terms about indigenous peoples and their subordinate position. The problems Aborigines faced were common to 'all the indigenous peoples of the world...for goodness sake wake up'. Numerically, indigenous peoples were seven times greater than white people and 'when I hit them with that, they do start thinking.140 Sykes' visit created a space for the movement of activists into Australia. Will Ilolahia, representing the PPP and Maori groups, was the first to visit in July 1972. Following this a number of activists, including Syd and Hana Jackson, Dun Mihaka, Patrick Te Hemara and Ted Nia made their way to Australia to meet with Aboriginal activists, especially during the early 1970s. Strong links were made and a web of support and solidarity networks developed. Syd Jackson, for example, developed a close relationship with radical activists in Redfern, Brisbane and Melbourne.141 Gary Foley (Black Caucus) recalled: 'There was a lot of contact between Nga Tamatoa and us, specifically Syd and Ted...those links became incredibly strong. We developed close friendships with Syd and others...a lot of Maori activists passed through here'.142

Most activists had three central aims: to give visible public support for Aboriginal activists and the Aboriginal rights movement; to raise awareness of the issues Maori were contesting and to break down the race relations stereotype; and to forge links with Aboriginal activists and share information, ideas and strategies. Support for Aboriginal activists was facilitated through a range of actions: visiting the Aboriginal Tent Embassy in Canberra, attending Aboriginal conferences, participating in protest actions, and verbalising support for the Aboriginal cause at public meetings. Most visited the Tent Embassy and spent time with activists, thereby layering Maori support onto the Aboriginal cause both in person and in more permanent inscriptions as the photo below indicates. For Dun Mihaka, who visited Australia in 1973, support for Aboriginal rights was a priority and he declared that he wanted to 'share the grievances of Aboriginals'.

140 New Zealand Listener, 21 Sept 1972, p.17.
142 Interview with Gary Foley, November 2009.
To this end he demonstrated solidarity by taking part in an Aboriginal protest on the steps of parliament in Canberra, and spending time at the Tent Embassy.143

On National Aboriginal Day, 14 July 1972, Will Ilolahia took part in the Black Moratorium marches to demonstrate the support of the PPP and Maori activists for Aboriginal rights. Five hundred Aborigines led a 6000 strong march from Redfern to central Sydney under the banner 'Ningla-na – we are hungry for our land'.145 Ilolahia was arrested during the protest, as were many activists, thereby gaining more visibility for the support coming from New Zealand. Following that Ilolahia travelled to the tent embassy in Canberra where he stood in support of Aboriginal activists and was present when the tent embassy was pulled down by the police. He also met up with Denis Walker and Black Panther activists in Queensland, and participated in a 'takeover' of an administration building at the University of Queensland to publicise the moratorium.146

146 ASIO, 'Note for File', 'Buchanan, Cheryl Rose, Vol.1', 12 July 1972, A6119, 3923, NAA.
A central aim of New Zealand activists was to raise awareness of race relations in New Zealand and break down the race relations stereotype, and accompanying perception of Maori as a privileged indigenous people. Gary Foley recalled that they were aware of the stereotype, 'but we weren't fooled by that because we were very conscious of the Australian government's attempts to paint Australians internationally'. Moreover, he noted that from the late 1960s Aboriginal activists had conducted their own analyses of indigenous peoples in the Pacific and 'we felt the Treaty of Waitangi wasn't worth the paper it was written on. This was confirmed to us later in some of the contacts we had with Maori'. What they did understand was that Maori were in a far better position than Aborigines, although that position was not necessarily one of privilege:

Regardless of whether they were older or younger, Maori were coming from a stronger position than we were in. Their language was still alive and we saw them as the mob that had fought the British and had brought them to a standstill and forced the Treaty. We just thought that the Treaty hadn't achieved much...

This may have been a view amongst some activists but it is apparent that it was not one widely shared. Patrick Te Hemara recalled the difficulty he had convincing Aboriginal activists that racial harmony and equality was a myth and that Maori suffered similar problems. On one occasion he spent 'hours of informal chat with an Aboriginal sister to even convince her to the contrary'. Similarly, Will Ilolahia was shocked to learn that many Aborigines believed that there was an absence of racial problems in New Zealand. This pointed to the power and effectiveness of the dominant discourse in shaping perceptions, despite the rise of Maori activism which in itself indicated racial disharmony. As Ilolahia observed, the New Zealand government had been very successful in broadcasting to the world 'the absence of racial problems' and 'white-washing' race relations in New Zealand.

However the attitudes of many Maori who were living in Australia and the difference in the treatment of Maori and Aborigines by white Australia also played a part. Aborigines were aware that Maori living in Australia were accepted without difficulty and not subject to the same discriminatory practices or disrespect as were Aborigines.

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147 Interview with Gary Foley, November 2009.
Moreover, many believed that Maori set themselves apart and tended to look down on Aborigines. This generated ill-feeling and the perception that Maori had been privileged and had no understanding or experience of living under oppressive and racially discriminatory structures. Will Ilolahia explained:

> Our relationship with Black Australians was disunited to the extent that many Black Australians had bad feelings towards the Maori who came to their shores. The Maori-Polynesian is treated like an honorary white, while there are even some who look down on the Aborigine...those who have escaped to Australia – too many of whom are Euro-Polynesians - brown skin Pakeha's.\(^\text{150}\)

It was these perceptions and understandings which many Aborigines held, and a 'white-washed' race relations reputation which Maori activists sought to break down.

Addresses and presentations were given at a number of venues, mostly at universities and trade union centres, and Maori and Pasifika activists used these platforms to speak of race relations. Dun Mihaka spoke at a FCAATSI meeting and at several universities, and placed Maori and Aborigines in the same struggle and experience of colonisation. At a venue in Sydney he pointed out:

> ...for more than 100 years “those white devils” had deprived Aboriginals and Maori of their land and their way of life. 'People think the Maoris live in a happy, harmonious society with the whites of New Zealand...This is the great myth. Maoris and Aboriginals have suffered more than blacks throughout the world, because we have been destroyed in both body and soul'.\(^\text{151}\)

Ilolahia recalled that he was able to clear up some misconceptions. When they asked about Maori land rights, 'They were shocked when I told them a few true facts'.\(^\text{152}\) At an address to the student body at the Australian National University he detailed race discrimination in housing, employment, court sentences (citing 80% of prison inmates were either Maori or Pasifika peoples), education and parliamentary representation.\(^\text{153}\) He spoke of the necessity of the work of the PPP in bringing together disaffected and alienated youth who had gravitated into gangs. Instead of fighting each other, these young people had been convinced to come together and fight the oppressive system

\(^{150}\) Ibid.


\(^{152}\) ‘Letter from Will Ilolahia’, MOOHR Newsletter, October 1972, Franks Papers, 2004-024-3/02, ATL.

\(^{153}\) *Woroni* (Australian National University student newsletter), 12 July 1972.
under which all Maori and Pasifika people lived. To this end they supported programmes designed to alleviate the effects of poverty arising from institutional and overt race discrimination, to build solidarity, and assist with community projects such as the distribution of affordable food, and education initiatives.

Contact between Maori and PPP activists and their Aboriginal counterparts provided the opportunity to exchange ideas, gain an informed understanding of the issues each was contesting, and to discuss strategies, actions and ways to have their claims met.

There was a lot of contact between Nga Tamatoa and us...Nga Tamatoa was partly inspired by what we were doing. There was a lot of cross-fertilisation in terms of the ideology we were developing and in terms of local community control. Nga Tamatoa was influenced in a similar way to us by the programmes the Black Panthers were doing in the West Coast of America...But in those days we were really interested in Redfern and in seeing that there was a similar thing happening with Nga Tamatoa over there.154

The self-help schemes were, as Gary Foley recalled, of interest during the early 1970s as the PPP, Nga Tamatoa and the Redfern Aboriginal activists were implementing schemes to help their people. In New Zealand the PPP and Nga Tamatoa established a wide range of self-help and social work initiatives including homework centres, legal aid schemes, tenants protection and emergency housing initiatives, prison and marae visits, an employment centre, food co-operatives and help for the elderly. The Redfern Aboriginal Legal Service was of interest to Nga Tamatoa which was establishing a legal aid scheme and took ideas from the Redfern scheme back to New Zealand.155

Bearing in mind Nga Tamatoa’s high-profile radical actions and strong public demands over a range of issues in which they persistently called the government (and Pakhe in general) to account, activists made no effort to use the new spaces which had opened up in Australia to make political gain. In this respect the difference between Aboriginal and Maori activists was marked. For example, in New Zealand Bobbi Sykes used the media to full extent as a means of drawing attention to the oppression of Aborigines and embarrassing the government at the same time. This strategy was replicated throughout the 1970s. Maori activists had the opportunity to make similar use of spaces in

154 Interview with Gary Foley, November 2009.
155 Ibid
Australia but never did so. Visits were not publicised in the mainstream media, either at home or abroad, and while activists spoke harshly of race relations and employed a strong grievance-based discourse, this stayed at a local level. The will of the media was there, as is evidenced by a number of articles and items which pointed to a disparity between New Zealand’s reputation and the reality on the ground.^{156} However, using embarrassment as a political resource to shame or pressure the government as a means of effecting change was not a strategy, and ‘telling their story’ to local groups was enough. While the latter is a significant form of resistance, its potential was never exploited and it remained locked into a local space which neither challenged nor pressured the government to acknowledge Maori claims.

Keck and Sikkink, in their study on activism beyond borders, make the point that activists use international spaces for political purposes when the relationship with their government has broken down, when the government refuses to recognise or address their claims, and when there is no recourse left within the domestic sphere to gain satisfaction.^{157} They also note that this was a common strategy of human rights and indigenous rights activists. Using this theory, a case can be made for the power differential between Maori and Aborigines and the ability to have claims or grievances addressed. There was no need for Maori to protest internationally, simply because they possessed a degree of political power and thus were in a better position than Aborigines to have their claims addressed. They had a route into the government via their Maori MPs who worked in the interests of Maori, and who pressed for their grievances and claims to be considered and acted upon. It was not perfect and most gains were hard fought. Nevertheless through the combined efforts of the Maori MPs, Maori leaders and the NZMC they had the capacity to force the government to consider and debate Maori claims. Therefore, Maori did not have to use international spaces in the same way as Aborigines, and they were not so dependent on gaining international support and using

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^{156} See for example, Stewart Harris, ‘Some cracks in NZ’s racial harmony’, 
*Canberra Times*, 9 May 1972. Harris analysed the emergence of radical activism and the rise of Maori and Polynesian gangs in a country noted for racial unity and equality. In this he spoke of ‘glaring socio-economic disparity’, of land alienation, low educational achievement, and of the failure of governments to honour the terms of the Treaty of Waitangi, take cognisance of Maori opinion or recognise the Maori world when formulating policies.

^{157} Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics’, p.93,
isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic446176.files/Week_7/Keck_and_Sikkink_Transnational_Advocacy.pdf
embarrassment as a political weapon to gain recognition. The aggressive internationalisation by Aboriginal activists, and the deployment of the politics of embarrassment, pointed to their lack of political power. They had no Aboriginal representatives in either state or federal governments who were working specifically in their interests, and who could pressure the government and force consideration of their claims.

The other point is that from 1972, when Maori activist began to participate in transnational activism, a Labour government had taken office, and it was proving to be more considerate and sympathetic to Maori claims. It amended the MAAA in 1974, passed the Treaty of Waitangi Act in 1975 which established the Waitangi Tribunal and allowed investigation of government breaches of the treaty after 1975. Significantly it had rejected ‘integration’ as a policy, and it had signalled a shift to ‘biculturalism’. In response to Nga Tamatoa’s Maori language petition, discussions took place with Maori educationalists, the community and government to address the direction of education and the inclusion of Maori language within a bi-lingual framework. By the end of its term in 1975 it had introduced the teaching of te reo into primary and secondary schools, and it had implemented a one year teacher training programme for fluent Maori speakers.

The point is that while many issues needed addressing, and the parliamentary process was imperfect, Maori had access to the government and there were some successes. The door was rarely closed entirely to the point where dialogue was not possible. Thus there was no need to protest internationally.

*Reciprocal support: ‘solidarity with our indigenous brothers’*

Support for Aboriginal rights was taken up in New Zealand following Ilolahia's return home. The PPP, Nga Tamatoa and anti-apartheid groups formed an 'Auckland ad hoc committee' to draw attention to the struggle for Aboriginal rights, and they did so by organising a demonstration at Eden Park in Auckland, at a test match between the Australian Wallabies and the All Blacks. The aim was not to oppose the match but to draw public attention to the oppression, neglect and low socio-economic status of

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159 Walker, *Ka Whawhai Tonu matou...*, p.211.
Aborigines, all of which was underpinned by white racism. Highlighted was the refusal by state and federal governments to grant Aborigines land rights, despite there being a moral right for indigenous people to have control of their lands. The PPP laid out all these issues in a newsletter and invited members to protest in support of Aborigines.160

The committee called for a demonstration at Eden Park to 'make a stand' against white racism in Australia via the rugby team which was part of a white racist society, and the government which continued to oppress the Aboriginal people. A message was sent to the Australian team entitled, 'Freedom for the Aboriginal People'. In this the committee noted that they did not object to their visit and indeed welcomed it. However they expected them to take a message back to Australia about the 'terrible oppression' under which Aborigines lived and to be aware that people across the world recognised the situation and were demanding 'freedom for the Aboriginal people'. Citing Elderidge Cleaver, the message asked the team to consider that while 'you may not think you are to blame, if you are not part of the solution, you are part of the problem.'161

In September/October 1975 Aboriginal activists, came into New Zealand to support the Maori Land March.162 Gary Foley and Gary Williams took part in the march to demonstrate 'solidarity with our indigenous brothers', and to reciprocate the support given by Maori to the Aboriginal cause.163 The Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) which kept a close eye on Aboriginal activists, especially those in the Black Caucus, reported that the intention was to meet with 'radical Maoris to learn disruptive tactics'.164 It was much more than that. Besides demonstrating solidarity, involvement in the Land March provided an opportunity to make new contacts with Maori and Pasifika activists, and to share information and strategies.

161 ‘Freedom for the Aboriginal People’, Wickham Papers, 'Polynesian Panther Party' File, 95-222-1/09, ATL.
162 This event has been well documented in numerous scholarly publications. For example of a more in-depth account see, Aroha Harris, Hikoi..., pp.68-77. For a visual record see, 'Te Matakite O Aotearoa -The Maori Land March', Geoff Steven (Editor, Writer, Director), 1975, http://www.nzonscreen.com/title/te-matakite-o-aotearoa-1975 - accessed 5 May 2013.
163 Interview with Gary Foley, November 2009.
164 ASIO to Headquarters from Sydney, 21 Oct 1975, 'Foley, Gary, Volume 2', A6119, NAA.
Following the march approximately sixty protesters, mainly from Nga Tamatoa, set up a Maori Embassy in the grounds of parliament. Their aim was to raise public awareness over Maori issues including the alienation of Maori land and to remain until the government had given a guarantee that no more Maori land would be taken by government legislation. Foley and Williams, both central figures in Aboriginal Tent Embassy, joined with protesters at the Maori Embassy. This, like the Aboriginal Tent Embassy, it was a consciousness-raising space: activists engaged in discussion with the public about Maori issues and grievances, and events were organised with activities ranging from Maori carving and poetry reading to lectures on international law. For several months the embassy was a visible and constant reminder to New Zealanders of Maori discontent, of land alienation, and that Maori had suffered injustice.

165 PAColl-7327-1-071, Maori Land March, Dominion Post Collection, ATL There is no date given or information except ‘Maori Land March’. The image, however, shows Aboriginal activists, Gary Foley and Gary Williams (front, second and third from left) on the steps of parliament with other protesters following the Land March.

166 Socialist Action, 24 Oct 1975, p.3; Dominion, 14 Oct 1975. They remained on government grounds for several months until their tents were taken down on the orders of the new Prime Minister, Robert Muldoon. They promptly relocated to the grounds of a Maori club opposite parliament and continued raising public awareness to Maori grievances and aspirations.
The Land March was significant for many reasons, not least as it politicised large numbers of Maori, and it raised the consciousness of Pakeha New Zealanders about the grievances held and issues being contested by Maori and the accompanying widespread discontent. Most significantly, it drew Maori together across iwi lines for a common purpose and in doing so created a space in which Maori identity and Mana Motuhake was reasserted. It also marked the beginning of a more determined, forceful and radical activism which developed throughout the latter part of the 1970s and which coalesced around land claims and the Treaty of Waitangi. This, as will be seen later, was mirrored in international forums with activists taking a more assertive and radical approach.

Expanding Indigenous Activism: Creating Space in Asia

Meanwhile Maori activists began moving into other areas and forums. In 1973 the Chinese government, working in conjunction with the Communist Party of New Zealand (CPNZ), sponsored a five person ‘Maori Workers’ Delegation’ on a visit to China. The delegation of Ama Rauhihi (PPP), Tame Iti (Nga Tamatoa), Hone Tuwhare (poet), and trade unionists Timi Te Maipi and Willie Wilson spent several weeks travelling around as guests of the government.¹⁶⁷

Figure 4.5  Maori and Polynesian Panther Party representatives visit to China, September 1973.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁷ Correspondence, Will Ilolahia (Polynesian Panther Party) to Trevor Richards (HART), 30 July 1973, Trevor Richards Papers, 99-278-08/09, ATL.
¹⁶⁸ Trevor Loudon, ‘Who Is Tame Iti?,’ http://www.trevorloudon.com/2007/10/who-is-tame-iti/ - accessed 3 Feb 2014. The information on this site should be treated with caution, not least for the heavy right wing bias and antipathy towards anything on the left of the political spectrum. The site has only been used to gain access to the photograph.
The object of the visit was to observe the situation and treatment of ethnic minorities in China which heavily promoted equality and the idea that the different minorities formed one big homogeneous united family. For Maori and Pasifika activists it provided an opportunity to view how minority people were treated, and to use the information and ideas gained for the advancement of their people. The socialist project was especially important and pertinent to the issues they were contesting in the early 1970s. Both were subject to increasing unemployment and thus were marginalised even further into a low-income bracket. Institutional racism was rife in rental housing and glaringly evident in the justice system which saw a disproportionate and high rate of custodial sentences being handed down to Maori and Pasifika people, especially youth. Out on the streets, 'walking and brown', they attracted police attention and often harassment and arrest. The struggle to maintain cultural integrity and have Maori language available in schools was an ongoing concern. Although the new Labour Government was proving to be more sensitive to Maori needs and had signalled its intention to address land, Treaty of Waitangi and Maori language claims, in 1973 it was just beginning to address such issues. Whether it would meet Maori aspirations remained to be seen. Thus for the delegates who were aware of the reputation of China in relation to the treatment of its minority people, the visit was important for the lessons to be learned and information to be gained. As a Polynesian Panther newsletter reported, it was an honour to be invited to China and it would provide an opportunity 'to meet and see people who have obtained freedom, justice and an end to exploitation and oppression'.

The New Zealand delegation should be seen as part of a wider flow of minority peoples and activists into China in the 1960s and 70s to observe the reputedly superior treatment of ethnic minorities. For W.E.B. Du Bois, who visited China in the late 1950s, China was the 'sleeping giant' that would lead the coloured peoples of the world in the struggle against imperialism and the underdeveloped nations toward socialism. Maharaia Winiata visited in 1959 and was 'deeply impressed by the policy of the Communist Party of China towards the national minorities in that country' and stated that 'the word of God is spoken through the mouth of Mao Tse Tung'. In the early 1970s Black

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169 *Polynesian Panther Newsletter*, July/August 1973, Trevor Richards Papers, 99-278-08/09, ATL.


171 *Peoples Voice*, 13 April 1960; Correspondence, H.E. Gilbert to J. Marshall, 27 April 1960, J Marshall Collection, MS-Papers- 1403:104:3, ATL.
Panther leaders from the United States visited several times and Huey Newton described feeling 'absolutely free for the first time in my life'.\(^\text{(172)}\) The Panthers had been inspired by Mao Zedong's *Little Red Book* and his advice to revolutionaries, and had implemented 'survival' programmes such as Breakfast for Children where food and ideology was apparently freely dispensed. American Indian activists were invited too but it appears the offer was never taken up.\(^\text{(173)}\) With COINTELPRO in full operation against activists from AIM (American Indian Movement), a visit was possibly not thought to be wise.\(^\text{(174)}\) In 1972, and again in 1974, delegations of Aboriginal activists visited China and drew inspiration from the self-supporting communes and the 'barefoot doctors scheme' which was eventually adapted and implemented in some Aboriginal communities.\(^\text{(175)}\) They too were enthusiastic about the equality which minorities enjoyed and the treatment they had received: 'We were treated as human beings for the first time in our lives. At home we are treated like animals or inferior beings'.\(^\text{(176)}\)

The visits by indigenous and minority groups were undoubtedly designed to show that the treatment of ethnic and minority groups under Chairman Mao was far superior than in the capitalist West. Of the forthcoming visit by the New Zealand group, the *Peoples Voice* commented on the contrast between the subjection and exploitation of minorities under the old regime and their current situation under Chairman Mao.

Under the old regime in China, the many minorities fared badly. Han chauvinism was fostered both under the Empire and the Kuomintang as a political weapon to keep the non-Han in subjection and to exploit them... Only with liberation did they come into their own and achieve full freedom and the right to settle their own affairs. All this has

\(^{172}\) Robin D.G. Kelley and Betsy Esch, 'Black Like Mao...', p.7.
\(^{174}\) COINTELPRO, an acronym for the Counter Intelligence Programme, was created in 1954 as a clandestine FBI programme under J.Edgar Hoover. Its aim was to destroy or neutralise organisations and leaders that opposed domestic (and later foreign) policies. The anti-Vietnam War Movement was a target, as were all 'People of Colour' resistance organisations, groups and leaders including the Civil Rights Movement and Martin Luther King, and Black Power organisations. The FBI methods were vicious and illegal and were designed to discredit and demonise groups and leaders as militants; imprison and criminalise members by using manufactured evidence and coerced testimony from 'informants'. It was officially disbanded in 1971 but continued unofficially. AIM came under surveillance and its leaders were harassed. Almost every AIM leader was imprisoned at some point, and after the siege of Wounded Knee numerous charges were laid. See Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall, *Agents of Repression: The FBI's Secret Wars Against the Black Panther Party and the American Indian Movement*, Boston: South End Press, 2001.
\(^{176}\) *Bangkok Post*, 31, Oct 1972; See also *Canberra Times*, 20 Nov 1972; *Sun*, 20 Nov 1972.
happened in recent living memory and the...Maoris should receive a vivid impression of the difference for minority peoples who had once lived under a corrupt class system and now live in one where the socialist system insists on equal rights for all.177

The itinerary was designed for the group to visit a large number of ethnic minorities, mainly in Northern China. There they observed the measures put in place to preserve indigenous peoples’ languages and culture, improve living standards and to devolve a measure of autonomy to indigenous communities who were able to make their own community decisions.178 A report of the tour makes it clear that it was heavily circumscribed and propagandised. In this it was much like the visitors’ circuit which the New Zealand government and Department of Maori Affairs had designed for international visitors and which excluded undesirable realities from the international gaze. Willie Wilson recognised the propagandising element in their itinerary, which used the language and culture of minorities to portray an idealised view of the working class. Parts of their culture were ‘put on the stage as propaganda. For instance we saw a show in Mongolia which praised the peasants and farmers for giving their best horses to the People's Army. It's propaganda, but it’s for the good'.

Wilson came back full of enthusiasm for what he had seen and claimed that minority groups in China were far more fortunate than Maori, enjoyed a better existence and were respected:

> I am convinced this society is totally racist. Maoris have no say in any aspect of the running of this society. Whether you look at the educational, religious, legal, or whatever aspect you like of the system, it’s just there, rubber-stamped, what we Maoris have to fall in line with. It’s a European dominated system. Before I went to China I never had this hard-line attitude. I thought that we had a bit of a say in things. But after being to China and seeing how the minority nationals are treated, how they are permitted to organise and run their own affairs, how special facilities are made available to them, I was convinced...They have the right to learn and speak their own language, and teaching facilities are available...They’re getting a lot of government assistance... Communes are being built for the people ... They’re certainly not exploited as a cheap


178 A report of the visit appeared in *The Paper*, June 1974. This consisted of a series of questions put by Roger Steele to Willie Wilson. Information of the visit is taken from this report except where stated otherwise.
labour force...Maoris and Polynesians are exploited in New Zealand as a cheap, uneducated labour force....actually the minority people are very much respected.179

While the record is sparse on the discussions held with their Chinese hosts, there is no doubt that the delegates had ample opportunity to speak of the position of Maori and their grievances. Chicka Dixon noted that the Aboriginal delegates had 'intimate talks' with various officials and at each new place they visited they were invited to speak.180 As the New Zealand itinerary appears to have been remarkably similar it is likely that the same opportunities were given. Moreover it is clear that significant discussions took place as Willie Wilson explained: 'younger members of the party' spoke of Maori separatism and their belief that the road to the liberation of 'oppressed Maori people should involve Maoris only, excluding sympathetic Pakehas. The Chinese pointed out... that the exploitation of minorities was a class question... and the class structure of society had to be changed before the race question could be sorted out.181

Unlike the Aboriginal activists there was no attempt by members of the New Zealand party to use the visit as a means of making political space to embarrass the New Zealand government. The Aboriginal activists went to China with a primary objective to 'expose the situation in Australia' and they made maximum use of the political space both in China and back home.182 The aim was to shame the federal government and they did this effectively in 1972 by showing a film in Beijing of police brutality when breaking up the Aboriginal Tent Embassy, and at a press conference where Chicka Dixon spoke of discrimination by a 'racist government' and of Australia as 'an apathetic, racist country'.183 The report was transmitted through Asian Press networks and bounced back to Australia where significant press coverage was given. By contrast there were no public statements by the New Zealand party which denigrated the government or drew attention to grievances and injustices. The visit was not highly publicised in the media and reports following the visit were largely confined to university and leftist publications.

180 Ta Kung Pao, 19 November 1972, Department of External Affairs Records, A1838, 3107/38/12/9, NAA.
182 Canberra Times, 9 Dec 1972.
183 Correspondence, New Zealand High Commission (Canberra) to Secretary of Foreign Affairs (New Zealand), 16 Nov 1972, ABHS 950, W4627, Box 3824, 203/6/16, Part 2, NA.
The differences in political power between Aborigines and Maori as mentioned previously, and the access that Maori had into parliament resulted in the form the activism took in China and the different purposes of Maori and Aborigines. The Aboriginal delegation was larger and consisted entirely of Aboriginal rights activists. They went to China with the explicit intention of detailing the oppression of Aborigines in order to embarrass the Australian government, and they hoped to gain support and financial aid from the Chinese government.\textsuperscript{184} The New Zealand delegation was different. There were only two radical activists, and their aim was to observe. There is no doubt that Maori in the group would have made the grievances known, and Tame Iti would probably have been forceful in his denunciation. However, taking these into the public, as the Aborigines has done, was not a strategy and was not necessary.

**Making Space at Pacific Tables: Building Networks of Support and Solidarity, Subverting the Race Relations Paradigm**

From 1973 Maori activists began to make contact with activists from independence movements in the Pacific Islands and a broad indigenous people’s movement arose which had liberation and independence struggles at its core. Initially Maori involvement came through contacts made with Aboriginal activists who had made contact with Pacific independence groups and Black Power activists early in the 1970s. Some had attended Australian universities, become involved in radical activism and had formed links with Aboriginal activists. Maori became involved in events involving Aborigines and Pacific island activist, and networks were formed. Uniting the various groups in the Pacific came in 1975 with the formation of the Nuclear Free Movement. This conference brought a range of people together from all over the Pacific, and not just peace groups and environmentalists, but also independence groups. At the same time various forums were convened in the Pacific including some which were associated with a broad Pacific Women’s Movement. This section traces the movement into the Pacific and through selected examples and demonstrates how Maori activists subverted New Zealand’s ‘best race relations’ narrative, and thus the idea that Maori were a privileged indigenous people.

\textsuperscript{184} *Courier*, 23 March 1972.
Creating networks, raising awareness of Maori realities

Following her visit to New Zealand, Bobbi Sykes travelled to Papua New Guinea.\textsuperscript{185} Her intention, as in New Zealand, was to build international support for Aborigines in their struggle for Aboriginal rights. In Papua New Guinea she made contact with a number of activist groups and individuals including John Kaputin and Oscar Tammur (independence activists and Mataungan Association leaders), and John Kasaipwalova, a Papua New Guinea Black Power leader who had received a university education in Australia and joined radical groups before shifting back to his island home. Sykes spoke to students at the University of Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby Teachers College and the Papua New Guinea Institute of Technology and gained support from an emerging radical student body. All her addresses were highly critical of the Australian government's policies and attitudes towards Aborigines. In Port Moresby Sykes asked the students to 'agitate on behalf of Aborigines' and to support the Black Moratorium on National Aboriginal Day with a protest march. Thus when Will Ilolahia marched at the Black Moratorium demonstrations in Sydney, at the same time in Papua New Guinea indigenous activists were also marching and demonstrating in a ‘disorderly manner and with ‘anti-European overtones’, in solidarity and support for Aboriginal rights. It was one of the earliest events where indigenous peoples across a geographical distance and from several countries had combined in support of another indigenous people.

More significantly it pointed to a development in which indigenous peoples were beginning to recognise the opportunities which lay in collective action. It was not lost on Maori activists. During the early visits to Australia an exchange of ideas and ideologies brought wider international perspectives. They came back to New Zealand advocating that closer links be established with indigenous peoples in the Pacific Islands. Will Ilolahia was convinced that because of the similarities in problems, the struggle in New Zealand would be strengthened if a wider international perspective, and support for other indigenous peoples, was cultivated:

…especially with liberation struggles in Australia, New Guinea, New Hebrides and Tahiti. We are all ruled by racist Government which, in its different forms, exploit and constantly oppress the black and brown people of the Pacific. I have come away from

\textsuperscript{185} Correspondence, D. P. Sheekey (Director of Intelligence) to Regional Director ASIO, Konedobu, 1 Aug 1972, 'Sykes, Roberta Barkley, Vol.2', A6119, 4228, 1972-1973, NAA. All information in the paragraph is from this source.
Australia full of hope that we can stand together and attack on all fronts. I'm not saying that we forget about our own problems and take on other struggles. What I am saying is that now is the time to LINK ARMS with the Aborigines, Niuguineans, the natives of Tahiti and New Hebrides, RECOGNISING EACH OTHER AS FELLOW FIGHTERS FOR THE FREEDOM OF OUR RESPECTIVE PEOPLE – the different communities aiding each other, but not one dominating the other as in the NZ version of “integration”.186

Other activists expressed similar ideas - of building networks of solidarity and support and creating a united indigenous activist Pacific community as a means of increasing political power and having claims addressed. Dun Mihaka, for example, advocated the formation of a movement consisting of 'non-whites' in New Zealand, Australia and the Pacific Islands. Echoing Kath Walker, he stated that although Maori and Aborigines were 'the most oppressed minorities in their countries', if they joined 'the blacks of the world we would become the vast majority'.187

In 1973 Patrick Te Hemara (Nga Tamatoa) travelled to Papua New Guinea where he spent nine days at the University of Papua New Guinea attending the 7th Waigani Seminar. There is no indication of how he came to be at the seminar but he clearly had contact with Aboriginal activists who were present. Prior to the event, and identifying as a 'member of a New Zealand Black Power organisation', Te Hemara organised a public forum on 'White Racism: The New Zealand Experience'.188 There is no record of this address but it was likely to be similar in content to his address at the Waigani Seminar. There, at a session on 'Law and Development in Melanesia', he presented a paper titled 'Combating Oppression in New Zealand'.189 Te Hemara had originally intended to explain and elaborate on the social work schemes with which Nga Tamatoa was involved, especially in the courts and their legal aid scheme to assist Maori youth. Instead, he focused on why it had been necessary to implement such schemes. This gave him wider scope to draw on a range of historical and contemporary injustices, and

189 Patrick Te Hemara, 'Seventh Waigani Seminar, “Combating Oppression in New Zealand”', Connor, John Owen, 85-002-02, ATL.
rewrite the dominant race relations narrative which elided issues of inequality, racism, oppression and cultural subordination. The address was designed to 'destroy the complacency' surrounding race relations in New Zealand which had 'been propagated...as being the best in the world.' A false perception had been accepted that Maori 'have had a far better deal than them' and his task was to correct misconceptions.

Patrick Te Hemara challenged perceptions of Maori as a privileged indigenous people. He spoke at length of the negative impact of colonisation on Maori. Through the 'deviant process of Europeanisation' Maori had paid a heavy price which was manifested by the alienation and 'brutal rape of ancestral lands', the loss of culture, language and identity which were literally 'thrashed' out of Maori' due to education policies. The price paid was the victimisation of Maori which persisted to the present day in terms of cultural genocide: a generation completely deprived of language and culture, suffering white racism and social issues such as the high rate of imprisonment of Maori offenders. It was for these reasons - marginalisation, oppression, and victimisation - that Nga Tamatoa had stepped in and implemented their legal aid and self-help schemes. Apart from raising awareness of the reality of race relations, Te Hemara hoped that his address would enable the people of Papua New Guinea to learn from the experiences of Maori and the 'subtle racism and its consequences' in order to avoid making the same mistakes. Moreover, his address may help 'bridge the gap between Polynesia and Melanesia and all the oppressed peoples of the world who are the victims of institutionalised white racism'. While in Papua New Guinea, Te Hemara made contact with a number of independence movement activists from Papua New Guinea and throughout the Pacific, as well as Australian Aboriginal activists. He flew back to Australia (with a West Samoan activist) and participated in a land rights conference in Darwin along with several other Maori activists.190

In the short space of a little over a year and beginning with the visit of Bobbi Sykes to New Zealand, Maori activists had travelled to Australia and made contact with Aboriginal activists, and then further afield into Papua New Guinea and made contact

with independence activists from several island nations. New Zealand activists had used the new spaces to transmit an indigenous narrative of colonisation and race relations, they challenged the Maori privilege discourse, and they became part of a nascent Pacific indigenous peoples’ activist network. The conception of a pan-Pacific indigenous liberation movement was taking root and was given impetus in 1975 with the inaugural meeting of the Nuclear Free Pacific (NFP) organisation. Through this mainstream protest organisation, indigenous activists connected across the largest ocean in the world, and from the inception of the NFP they sought to make space in the organisation for the struggle for indigenous rights and the eradication of colonisation.

Creating Indigenous Spaces within Mainstream Protest Movements: Maori Involvement in the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific Movement

The Nuclear Free Pacific (later the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific) organisation had its origins in events soon after the end of World War Two. The first was the United Nations Charter, Chapter X1, 73, which recognised that colonised peoples had the right to self-determination. The second was the onset of nuclear testing in the Pacific. Within three months of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Washington signed off on an atomic bomb testing programme on the atolls of Micronesia. Between 1946 and 1958, sixty-six atomic and hydrogen bombs shattered the Bikini and Enewetak atolls, and the islanders of Rongelap and other atolls were irradiated. The destruction wrought was horrendous with some islands rendered uninhabitable and the peoples of many islands have suffered serious health issues ever since. The United Kingdom tested in Australia between 1952 and 1956, and France carried out 193 tests in the Pacific between 1966 and 1996.

In 1975, ATOM (Against Testing on Moruroa), in response to repeated detonations by France, organised the first Nuclear Free Pacific (NFP) conference in Fiji. More than a hundred people, including 93 delegates from 86 organisations, and from 22 Pacific nations and several European countries took part. Pacific Island representatives came from fifteen island nations. Non-indigenous delegates – academics, trade unionists,

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government officials, students, anti-nuclear campaigners, church-based groups – came from Japan, Australia, Canada, United States, New Zealand, England and Sweden.193 While the conference focused on environmental concerns, formulating petitions, letters, and a NFP treaty, by the end of the conference it was obvious that there was a bloc of participants, mainly indigenous people, who had a radicalised political agenda and priorities which lay well outside the simple anti-nuclear/anti-testing stance. For this group, racism, colonialism, and imperialism were central issues which were entwined with nuclear testing, and which needed to be addressed. A preamble to a Peoples' Treaty proposal reflected the ideological split between environmentalists and anti-imperialists/anti-colonialists:

This Conference, noting in particular the racist roots of the world's nuclear powers, calls for an immediate end to the oppression, exploitation and subordination of the indigenous peoples of the Pacific. We, the Pacific People, want to get some things clear. We are sick and tired of being treated like dogs. You came with guns and fancy words and took our land. You were not satisfied with that so you took our language and raped our culture and then tell us we should be grateful. You forced your way of life on us and we want to tell you we do not like your way of life. It stinks. You worship dead things like your concrete jungles and now you bring in your nuclear bomb and you want to “practice” on us.  

Titewhai Harawira, representing Nga Tamatoa, aligned with the anti-colonial/anti-imperial radical group. The conference platform gave Harawira the opportunity to present the case for Maori as subject to colonial oppression and racism and thereby demonstrate the falsity of New Zealand’s good race relations reputation. In the first instance, Harawira launched a stinging attack on the Pakeha New Zealand groups present and accused them of being racist for not inviting Maori to be part of their delegations.195 Nga Tamatoa, noted Harawira, believed it vital that Maori were represented at the conference to ensure that it was not just the voice of Pakeha which was heard in the forum. The failure of Pakeha to include Maori was indicative of the disregard with which Maori were held, and the racism to which they were subject in a Pakeha dominated society:

193 Report, 'First International Conference for a Nuclear Free Pacific and the Peoples' Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty', (ND), Dakuvulu, Joe - Records, 91-081-5, ATL.
194 Ibid.
195 'Paper presented to the Conference for a Nuclear Free Pacific by Mrs Titewhai Harawira on behalf of Nga Tamatoa', CARE Records, NZMS 845 [uncatalogued], ACL.
They have...in typical, arrogant racist Pakeha style not even considered it necessary or important that we, the Maori people, be represented at this Conference. ...Just as the Tahitian people have no part in the decisions about whether there should be nuclear testing in the Pacific so too, we in New Zealand, are excluded from the decision making process in matters affecting us.... The omission in the New Zealand groups to even consider sending a Maori representative here is typical of the treatment we receive all the time from the great white majority. 196

Harawira spoke further of marginalisation and disregard meted out to Maori by Pakeha. This was exemplified by the situation whereby Pakeha delegates had sponsored an indigenous delegate from the New Hebrides but had not thought to sponsor a Maori delegate. This indicated a total lack of consideration and revealed that Maori were regarded as 'non-people in their own country'.

We make these points not just to deservedly embarrass our fellow delegates from New Zealand who are also significantly not only all-white but also almost exclusively male, but to reveal what we consider to be one of the core problems of people in the whole of the Pacific – namely that we do not have the power to determine our own destinies.

The task of the NFP movement, Harawira claimed, was to place nuclear testing within the wider context of the exploitation and domination of indigenous peoples. The route to the de-nuclearisation and demilitarisation of the Pacific was through the elimination of colonialism and imperialism. This was to be effected by indigenous peoples working within their own countries to gain independence and self-determination, yet supported by a collective indigenous community. Thus for Harawira, and other radical indigenous activists, the subjugation of indigenous peoples by white racist power structures was irrevocably entwined with the nuclearisation of the Pacific. Nga Tamatoa's opposition to French nuclear testing was not only because 'it was evil', but because a foreign power was 'arrogantly using illegally held territories to exploit the land, atmosphere and resources of another people'. However the issue was not confined to the French: rather it was the collective of white imperialist groups who had colonised and controlled the indigenous peoples throughout the Pacific who needed to be actively challenged.

196 Ibid. All information in the following paragraphs on Harawira's address is taken from this source.
Harawira drew the colonial paradigm back to the position of Maori in New Zealand and explained that the fundamental issue arising from colonialism had been the expropriation and alienation of their lands. This had led to the situation today where they were the 'most impoverished' group in society and the social fabric and economic base of Maori communities had almost been destroyed. This, they accepted, was common to all Pacific peoples and therefore all, including Maori, should combine to fight and overthrow the oppression to which they were subject. It was a cleverly articulated speech, for Harawira placed race relations in New Zealand at the forefront to demonstrate a wider concern. It was a strong address, anti-white and anti-colonial, and highlighted oppression and subordination. Whether delegates agreed or disagreed, the fact that a Maori had stood before conference and spoken of such issues left no doubt that race relations in New Zealand were at odds with the dominant narrative, not least the component which lauded racial harmony.

At the end of the conference a press statement, 'The Fiji Declaration', made clear the new dual agenda within the Nuclear Free Pacific movement and the demarcation into two streams of thought. One viewed the struggle for a nuclear free Pacific in terms of environmental and anti-military issues, whereas the other viewed militarism as a colonialist and imperialistic tool for the maintaining of their interests, consolidating their power and expanding their influence across the Pacific region. For the latter, the route to a nuclear free Pacific lay in the uniting of indigenous peoples to actively prevent the use of their lands for military activities, and the political independence of territories in the Pacific. Further:

The Conference agreed that racism, colonialism and imperialism lie at the core of the issue of the activities of the nuclear Powers in the Pacific. The Pacific peoples and their environment continue to be exploited because Pacific Islanders are considered insignificant in numbers and inferior as peoples, the delegates stated. ‘For these reasons, nuclear bombs were first used and continue to be tested in our region in blatant disregard of our expressed opposition, rather than in areas with large concentrations of white people...The Conference rejoiced over the victories of the people of Vietnam and Cambodia and expressed its solidarity with them. It further stated that these victories

proved that the struggles of oppressed peoples are stronger than weapons systems of imperialist powers.\(^{198}\)

Further conferences were held in Ponape (1978), Hawaii (1980), and Vanuatu (1983). The two-week conference at Ponape reflected the dual character which the movement had taken. The first week dealt with a nuclear free Pacific and the second week a conference, which took place in closed sessions, dealt with independence movements in Pacific territories. Gary Foley recalls that it was a significant conference for the independence issues which were discussed, and also because there were many leaders of independence movements in the Pacific at the conference and a large number of indigenous people from all over the Pacific. A Maori contingent was there, including 'Ripeka Evans and all those solid Maori women'.\(^{199}\) The 1980 conference, held in Hawaii, was attended by several Maori representatives. The focus of indigenous delegates was the exploitation and oppression of indigenous peoples by colonial powers.\(^{200}\) All spoke of how their lands had been expropriated, their indigenous language, beliefs and culture suppressed, and how they had been ‘downtrodden, soultrodden’ until they had learned to become westernised simply to survive. All were struggling to recover their basic rights, their language and their culture.\(^{201}\)

By 1980 it was clear that indigenous rights and decolonisation had taken centre stage and more attention was needed to define the nature of the organisation and address the ideological shift which had taken place. The conference explicitly addressed the difficulties of synchronising the two issues: the struggle for self-determination and a nuclear free Pacific. Delegates affirmed that the two issues were interrelated and proposed that the title of the organisation be changed to Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific (NFIP) to reflect the ideological shift within the movement. The final resolution of the conference was to make the Pacific ‘nuclear-free and oppression-free’.\(^{202}\)

Representing Maori at the 1980 conference was a younger generation of Maori activists who would carry the movement on throughout the 1980s. They were heavily involved

\(^{198}\) Ibid.
\(^{199}\) Interview with Gary Foley, November 2009.
\(^{200}\) Newsletter, Circa 1980, Author and organisation not identified, 'Pacific People Guinea Pigs for Nuclear Tests', CARE Records, NZMS 845 [Uncatalogued], ACL.
\(^{201}\) Ibid.
\(^{202}\) Ibid.
in a number of new Maori activist groups which had arisen from the late 1970s, such as the Waitangi Action Committee and the Maori Peoples Liberation Movement of Aotearoa. The liberation and decolonising thrust of the NFIP dovetailed with the domestic struggle and provided impetus and inspiration. Hilda Halkyard, one of the Maori representatives, recalled that the conference had such an impact on her developing political ideology that it:

---fuelled me for many years ahead...As a Maori I understood the grieving of indigenous peoples for the theft of land and the subjugation of culture....All the nuclear extractions and testing took place on indigenous lands and the nuclear powers were cold and calculated when they deemed indigenous lands and lives worthless and disposable. For many of the Pacific nations they felt the only way to be safe from the nuclear colonial threat, was to be independent from foreign powers who subjected them to this terror.203

The 1980 conference established a Pacific Concerns Resource Centre (PCRC) in Hawaii and an international steering committee comprising of members from various regions. The function of the PCRC was to communicate and network with groups throughout the Pacific and link Pacific people together. This was effected through the collation and distribution of newsletters, resource material and reports about NFIP issues; information about the struggles and issues which member groups were facing; and details of conferences, events, and protest actions including an 'Action Alert' service for urgent protest/support actions. Its strength lay in uniting Pacific peoples and their struggles on a regular basis, rather than on the infrequent NFIP meetings.

**Contesting Space within Conservative Movements: Maori Activism at the 1975 Pacific Women's Conference**

Alongside the NFP movement through to 1980 were various conferences and smaller meetings in the Pacific which drew indigenous peoples together into a broad indigenous network. Some, but not all, were associated with the NFP and there was cross-over of activists from the NFP movement into other causes. This was apparently so in relation to women's conferences. Maori women were a driving force in domestic activism and were also active internationally. They were mostly young, well-educated, forceful, knowledgeable about all things Maori, and articulate. Inevitably the key issues of

independence, indigenous rights and associated anti-colonial/anti-imperial and even race-based anti-white discourses were taken into such conferences. This led to conflict with conservative older Maori who attended conferences which were never envisaged to be political events.

A case in point was a Pacific Women's Conference which was held in Suva, 27 October to 2 November, 1975. Ninety women from 19 Pacific island countries participated, including eight Maori and Pacific island women from various organisations in New Zealand. The aim of conference was to discuss the situation of women in the Pacific and the issues that were relevant to them as peoples of the Pacific. Despite older and traditional women being hesitant about participating because of 'Women's Lib' which they thought may underpin such a conference, a cross-section of radical, conservative, traditional women, from a wide age range, came together.204

The specific focus of the conference was the 'forces that shape women in society: the family and traditional culture, religion, education, the media and the law and politics'. In the event, the conference expanded far beyond traditional 'women's issues'.205 Radical activists who were involved in the NFP movement and a broad Pacific Women's Movement took the position that traditional women's issues could not be treated separately from the wider issues of independence and a nuclear free Pacific. Thus whenever they attended women's conferences they brought their position to the table: that 'we were against nuclear testing, we were against colonial domination and we were for the struggles if indigenous peoples in White dominated societies, for their language, for their culture, language and land rights to be recognised'.206 In taking these positions they challenged the traditional conception of women's issues. They presented the connection between nuclear testing and colonialism and the exploitation and harm perpetuated on indigenous communities, including the effects on women. However it was the nuclear issue which provided a bridge between radical and conservative delegates, as it was recognised that this threatened the very survival and well-being of indigenous peoples and future populations. As Vanessa Griffin explained, “It has been

205 Ibid.
the one issue that we have always understood, particularly the effects on women personally, in that they bear children. Women, once they hear about nuclear testing, the genetic effects, have always understood.'207

Nevertheless, the position of Maori radical activists was not treated kindly by the conservative New Zealand delegates at the Suva conference. The focus of the activists was on historical and contemporary effects of colonisation, and Titewhai Harawira, in particular, tore down New Zealand’s reputation for racial equality and harmony.

Elizabeth Murchie (MWWL) commented on a strong radical element of 'articulate... highly intelligent' women who focused discussion on imperialism, colonial subjugation and independence for indigenous peoples:

Over the first five days any delegate to Conference seeking a definition of the issues of women in the South Pacific would have suspected that she had landed on the wrong island. The dominant theme was not equality for women, but freedom of indigenous people from colonial subjection. Soon there was an aggressive spirit of anti-imperialism. Speaker after speaker warned that models appropriate to Western cultures were not relevant to a high proportion of Pacific people. This theme was developed to such an extent that many delegates considered that for South Pacific women to emerge the forces of colonial authority must be exorcised; that further Western development was not acceptable...that women must infiltrate the political arena to promote the welfare and the needs of indigenous peoples208

Taking an anti-colonialist/anti-imperialist position, Harawira made a lengthy presentation during the session 'On the law' which had little to do with the law but focused on informing conference of the effects of the colonisation of Maori in historical terms, but more from a contemporary perspective.209

I'm not an expert on law but I am certainly an expert on how my people, the Maori people of Aotearoa, are oppressed by British Colonial Laws...There are things happening in Aotearoa and if people tell you that the race relationship out there is good and everything is fine, I'm here to tell you that that's a load of rubbish.

207 Ibid.
208 Report, 'South Pacific Women's Conference', submitted by Elizabeth Murchie to Dominion President Mira Szaszy (MWWL), (ND), Maori Women's Welfare League Records, 88-131-18/3, ATL.
Harawira covered the colonisation of New Zealand from the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi to the present day. The treaty was 'not worth the paper it is written on...We kept our part of the bargain, but the white man never kept his', and it was a document designed with one aim, to strip Maori of their lands, culture and identity. She spoke of cultural loss, especially te reo which was banned in schools. Land had been lost, which was why Maori had recently participated in a land march – to retain the 'measly two million acres' which remained in Maori hands and 'for our identity'. She identified New Zealand as a racist society, founded on racism and perpetuated by institutional racism which infected all the structures upon which society was based. The education system was designed for Pakeha and totally irrelevant to Maori – there was nothing in the system to which they could identify; racism infected the justice system which saw the prisons full of Maori; and Maori were politically powerless with no voice in the political processes which made decisions about matters which affected Maori. In short, the injustices perpetuated on Maori were why they were standing up and fighting for their rights, and the reason why a group of young Maori were 'sitting on parliament steps. Two hundred of my people are sitting there...because we are fed up'. It was clear, she stated, that the only way Maori and all other indigenous peoples would obtain justice was to stand up, fight and pressure for justice.

Harawira drew in the issue of French nuclear testing in the Pacific and argued that it was part of the oppression and racism under which indigenous peoples lived.

The way the French people are testing in the Pacific- you can't divorce that from women's problems, from the racism, because I believe that if the Pacific was populated by white people, they wouldn't do any testing here....Why can't they test somewhere else? You can't divorce these things – they all interact with one another.  

In conclusion Harawira asked conference 'to support our people who are camped on Parliament grounds by sending a telegram of support, of encouragement, because, to me, this is the best thing that has happened to Maoridom...[and] to Aotearoa'.

The brief synopsis of Harawira's address, which merely identifies key issues, does not do it justice. It was searingly anti-colonial, anti-Pakeha, rich in content from an activist Maori perspective, and the evident passion with which it was delivered, would

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210 Griffen, ‘Women Speak Out!...’ p.75.
undoubtedly have achieved what Harawira intended. That was, to inform the delegates of the injustices which Maori had suffered from the colonisation of their country, and to leave no doubt that reputed good relationships between Maori and Pakeha was 'a load of rubbish'. It apparently upset some of the New Zealand delegates for its political and anti-colonial thrust. Hilda Wilson (MWWL) wrote that 'Because of comments made before and during conference I believe a very bad impression of our situation here in NZ was given'.

Of more concern was Harawira's call for support for Maori protesters camped outside parliament. A resolution was passed that a telegram of support be sent to the government and this caused heated debate. The telegram stated that the women at the conference stood in support and solidarity with those camped outside parliament, and they supported their demands for an assurance from the government that no more Maori land would be taken. It was only such 'continued struggle and unity' that Maori would be able to regain their ‘status, identity and self-determination in their own land, Aotearoa’. The MWWL delegates opposed the resolution, argued that it was outside the competence of the conference and they attempted to have it overturned with the support of delegates from Tonga, Fiji, Niue and American Samoa. Elizabeth Murchie explained that had the telegram been in support of the Land March and people participating, there would not have been any argument. The marchers had 'conducted themselves with dignity' and in a manner which all New Zealanders could admire. However the telegram was in support of a 'dissentient group' which had gone against the wishes of kaumatua and the leader of the Land March (Whina Cooper). In the event the 'forcefulness of some of the militant delegates' ensured that the resolution was passed and a telegram was dispatched.

The MWWL delegates and supporters from Tonga, American Samoa, Niue and Fiji, sent telegrams to Prime Minister Rowling and Matiu Rata (Minister of Maori Affairs) disassociating themselves from the action. The issue caused them acute embarrassment and again reflected the long-held reluctance by moderate Maori, activists or otherwise,

212 Griffen, ‘Women Speak Out!...’, p.139.
213 Report, 'South Pacific Women's Conference', submitted by Elizabeth Murchie to Dominion President Mira Szaszy (MWWL), (ND), Maori Women's Welfare League Records, 88-131-18/3, ATL.
214 Ibid.
not to have their issues or quarrels aired in public, and especially not at an international forum. Hilda Wilson noted that all the delegation felt upset by the 'blow up' at conference and she felt 'very upset that that something that concerned our people should have caused such an uproar. It is unfortunate that the majority decided to take the word of one person about something they knew very little about'.

Through the discourse at conference, support for the young protesters at parliament had shifted into the international indigenous community in the Pacific Islands. In Wellington, at the same time that Harawira was making her plea for support, young Maori were on the steps of parliament, holding aloft banners which read, 'Maori Control of Maori Things', supported by Aboriginal activists from the Aboriginal Tent Embassy. Support and solidarity for Maori had expanded across borders, at the same time drawing an international community inwards both in person and thought, to support Maori who were playing out their grievances and demands on the steps of parliament in Wellington – the seat of Pakeha power and a body responsible in both historical and contemporary terms, for injustices and grievances held.

While transnational Maori radical activism was developing through links with Australian and Pacific Island activists during the latter period of the 1970s, at the same time activists were moving into other international spaces for different purposes. These were single issue events but an important part in the development of radical activism which was increasingly moving into new international spaces. The political landscape in New Zealand during the latter part of the 1970s was a period of deteriorating race relations and of rising Maori activism, punctuated by high profile events as the state and Maori faced off over land rights, and Maori activists took Pakeha New Zealand to task over issues related to domestic racism and the Treaty of Waitangi. It is against this backdrop that Maori moved further afield and into Europe. While the aims were diverse, all were underpinned by the desire to inform an international audience of events in New Zealand and the continued injustices that were being perpetuated.

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Taking Bastion Point to London: The Politics of Embarrassment

Through to the late 1970s few Maori activists had used international forums to deliberately embarrass the government in the eyes of the world and shame it into recognising Maori claims and injustices.216 Those that had travelled abroad to meetings and conferences, or had joined indigenous activists abroad, spoke forcefully of race relations and identified numerous injustices and grievances. However, there was almost no attempt to enlist the media at home to announce their intentions and raise the profile of intended actions, and little attempt to deliberately engage with international media and have their claims publicised abroad. Hana Jackson’s visit to Cyprus in 1972 is an exception although she did not deliberately seek out the media, and her comments were fairly restrained. By the latter part of the 1970s a web of new Maori activist groups and organisations had formed which reflected an increase in the number of issues being contested. Yet despite rising anger and many battles being waged on a number of fronts, few sought to make sustained use of international spaces to deliberately shame the government. Titewhai Harawira's addresses at Pacific forums and her actions in gaining support and sending a telegram to the government came close. However embarrassment is largely dependent on claims and injustices being promoted widely and publicly by the media which creates a space to have such claims held up for public scrutiny and comment. Harawira's actions had limited effect in this respect.

It has been suggested earlier in the chapter that Maori did not use the spaces in Australia to publicise their claims, or embarrass the New Zealand government, as they had the opportunity to use the political process in New Zealand, and thus had more power than Aborigines. The same was arguably similar in other forums and meetings. It therefore follows that engagement in the politics of embarrassment is an indication that the claims they were making were acute, and that they were not making any progress through dialogue with the government. This is a point which Keck and Sikkink make: that activists or claimants only use international spaces when the relationship with the government has broken down and there is no other domestic recourse available. Thus they rely on international allies to ‘amplify their demands and send them back to the

216 There is one exception which will feature in the following chapter and relates to a visit by Patu Hohepa to the United Nation Special Committee on Apartheid.
government. In 1977 activists took this a step further and participated in the politics of embarrassment in London where the Prime Minister was attending CHOGM.

In 1977 the occupation of Bastion Point by Ngati Whatua and supporters, and the wider issue of race relations, was placed under the spotlight in London through a joint protest initiative by HART in London and Maori activists on Bastion Point. David Wickham (International Affairs Officer for HART), who was based in England, organised the protests from the London end. Wickham had played a significant role in the boycott of the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games which resulted in an almost complete boycott by African nations because of New Zealand’s refusal to cut sporting links with South Africa. In 1977 the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) was to be held in London and leaders were intending to pressure Prime Minister Muldoon into an agreement which would ban sporting contact with South Africa. Apart from the moral issue of apartheid, Commonwealth leaders sought to avert a similar boycott of the 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth Games, which was a possibility if New Zealand did not alter its position. Muldoon remained impervious to pressure, either nationally or internationally, and continued to maintain a position of non-interference by the government. On the eve of CHOGM, Muldoon stated that he would 'not compromise the government's standards on the freedom of the individual in order to get a black athlete to Edmonton'.

Muldoon's presence in London provided activists with a perfect opportunity for protest. International opinion was against the New Zealand Government over its stance on apartheid sport, and the eyes of the world were on world leaders and the events surrounding CHOGM. Wickham decided that pressure could be placed on the Prime Minister by publicly exposing his domestic policy and racist attitudes as exemplified

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218 On 5 Jan 1977 Takaparawha (Bastion Point) was occupied by Ngati Whatua following a decision by the Crown to sell the land for up-market housing development. Ngati Whatua claimed the land had been wrongfully taken from them and the iwi and supporters occupied the land for 506 days. On the 25 May 1978, in a massive display of state power consisting of 800 police and armed services personnel, the occupiers were evicted from Bastion Point. 222 people were arrested. Following many years of struggle, during which time a claim was put through the Waitangi Tribunal, the latter supported Ngati Whatua's claim to ownership. On 1 July 1988 the government agreed with the Waitangi Tribunal's recommendation that Bastion Point be returned to Ngati Whatua.
219 The catalyst for the boycott of the Edmonton Olympic Games was that immediately prior to the 1976 Olympic Games, an All Black rugby team toured South Africa.
220 Richards, Dancing On Our Bones…, p.182.
through his actions over Bastion Point. A central aim was to embarrass Muldoon and expose the falsity of the claim that New Zealand was a model country for race relations. As HART explained, 'The official New Zealand line was to crow about our so-called multi-racial paradise. This ploy was used to give New Zealand a respectability it didn't deserve.' A deep antipathy existed between activists and Muldoon who regularly vilified HART, CARE and Maori activists. Nothing induced prime ministerial wrath more than when anti-apartheid activists sent information to foreign governments, international bodies, or issued statements abroad which criticised the New Zealand Government. Such actions were regarded as bordering on treason and Muldoon regularly accused activists of deliberately tarnishing New Zealand's good reputation. Thus, the Wickham strategy was to focus attention on Muldoon's attitude to race at home and in South Africa, dispute the official narrative of race relations in New Zealand by spotlighting Bastion Point, and embarrass Muldoon at the same time. Racism at home and the support of a racist regime in South Africa were 'two sides of the same coin' and one which HART and supporters intended to exploit fully.

The protests in London were also in response to a call by Ngati Whatua in the midst of their occupation at Bastion Point. Ngati Whatua leaders and protesters were keen to have their cause spotlighted, as reports were beginning to appear in the international media but only in a minor way. For Maori activists, the thought of having the injustice of Bastion Point follow Muldoon across borders to London was appealing and a fitting retribution. Taura Eruera (Nga Tamatoa, and a protester at Bastion Point), recalled the satisfaction felt that the 'racism and cynicism' that Muldoon promoted had 'followed him all the way to London'. A group on Bastion Point prepared newsletters, information, flyers and a brochure which explained the issues, and all were sent to Wickham who had them printed and distributed. In London, a 'New Zealanders in London' group was formed with recruits gathered by word of mouth, from New Zealand House and even a Split Enz gig in London. Most were New Zealanders on their OE (overseas experience) who were aware of the events taking place on Bastion Point. The group

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224 Ibid.
planned strategies and protests at venues which would cause Muldoon the most embarrassment, and gain maximum press exposure.

'New Zealanders in London' joined other groups and lobbyists who were using the platform of CHOGM to protest, march, demonstrate and lobby against specific issues, policies and practices of governments. On the eve of CHOGM an Observer article, 'Angry brigades get ready', reported that at least ten groups had formed to protest a range of issues. These included the oppression of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka, land claims and rights of the Inuit, racism against Asian and West Indian residents in England, and grievances against the Malaysian and Singaporean governments which included detention without trial, censorship of the Press and the banning of trade unions. 'New Zealanders in London', noted the Observer, will protest against 'their country's policy of playing rugby with South Africa and of discriminating against Maori natives in New Zealand'.

The first protest took place on the first day of CHOGM (9 June) at New Zealand House and, as the photo indicates, the organisers made the occupation of Bastion Point unmissable. However, also linked, was New Zealand's involvement in apartheid sport

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thereby suggesting an equivalence of issues and racist attitudes, or 'two sides of the same coin'. Banners and placards drew attention to Bastion Point and apartheid sport under the overarching text that the New Zealand government was racist. A delegation met with the New Zealand High Commissioner (Sir Douglas Carter), demanded the return of Bastion Point to Ngati Whatua, and presented a written statement which explained the protest action, and which read in part:

New Zealanders in London wish to dissociate themselves with the policies of the New Zealand Government: (1) In relationship to apartheid, and the continuation of New Zealand sporting contacts with South Africa; (2) In its promotion of racialist policies in New Zealand, as evidenced by police raids on the houses of Polynesian workers; (3) In its continued and provocative denial of the constitutional right of the Ngati Whatua to occupy their historic tribal land at Bastion Point.228

Further protest actions followed on the streets of London with demonstrators following Muldoon around, putting up pickets outside New Zealand House, protesting at venues where he was attending social events, and even organising a 'wake-up' call outside his hotel. These had the effect of informing the public, and every Commonwealth Prime Minister became aware of Bastion Point and gained some understanding of the land issues involved as well as a sense of negative racial currents within New Zealand. Muldoon, noted Wickham, 'was effectively isolated by his attitude to issues of race, both at home and abroad'.229

Figure 4.7 Prime Minister Robert Muldoon arriving at New Zealand House, June 1977.230

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While the English media generally failed to fully comprehend the issues surrounding the occupation of Bastion Point, photos of the London protests and a summary of the issues were published, and Muldoon's past belligerence towards New Zealand activists was re-visited.\textsuperscript{231} Back in New Zealand, while some of the demonstrations were reported, the media played down the demonstrations, including the protesters’ demands and the numbers which took part. At least three of the demonstrations had over 150 participants and another had well over a hundred. What coverage there was, focused on denunciations of HART by government ministers.\textsuperscript{232}

In the midst of the demonstrations and questions surrounding sporting contact with South Africa, Muldoon continued to defend New Zealand's record stating 'without any fear of contradiction', race relations in New Zealand were second-to-none and, 'We are proud of our race relations. Our Maori people are not second-class citizens'.\textsuperscript{233} Events at Bastion Point and the protests in London suggested otherwise. So did Matiu Rata, who a few days previously, had stated that race relations had deteriorated.\textsuperscript{234} The demonstrations were barely picked up in Australia, but Muldoon's comments on race relations in Australia were. Fraser had been outspoken about sporting contact with South Africa and Muldoon, ever sensitive to criticism, informed journalists that Aborigines were 'second class citizens' and 'If we treated Maoris the way Australia treats Aborigines, all the Maoris would have been dead years ago'.\textsuperscript{235}

A more general discussion on race relations in New Zealand opened up as a result. The \textit{Canberra Times} published a lengthy article entitled 'New Zealand: shining example of racial harmony. Or is it?'\textsuperscript{236} The article focused on race relations in general rather than specifically on Bastion Point and noted that 'one of the cosiest of New Zealand conceits is that nowhere in the world do white and coloured people get on better together', and then it proceeded to unpick the myth by detailing disparities and negative statistics in terms of education, health, employment, incarceration in prison, discrimination, the rise in racial tensions, and the formation of activist organisations such as the Polynesian Panthers and Nga Tamatoa. The final salvo was the suggestion that, 'The next time an

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{231} \textit{Amandla}, June/July 1977, p.6.
\item \textsuperscript{232} \textit{Socialist Action}, 24 June 1977, p.1.
\item \textsuperscript{233} \textit{Canberra Times}, 18 June 1977.
\item \textsuperscript{234} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{235} \textit{Canberra Times}, 11 June 1977; \textit{Guardian}, 14 June 1977.
\item \textsuperscript{236} \textit{Canberra Times}, 18 June 1977.
\end{itemize}
earnest white New Zealander boasts of the racial integration in his country, ask him, “When did you last have a Maori home to dinner?”

**The promotion and subversion of the ‘One People’ paradigm**

In London, with the Prime Minister under pressure at CHOGM and from the demonstrations on the streets, a social event at New Zealand House was organised. This was not unusual in that the normal procedure at CHOGM was for delegates to entertain each other at their High Commission, mostly cocktail receptions and formal dinner functions. What was unusual was that New Zealand broke with the usual format and put on a 'Maori Ceremonial Welcome'. The London Maori Club were requested to perform items, and also invited were two hundred members and relatives of the 28th Maori Battalion who were en route to Europe to visit Maori war graves. Selected members of the group were also invited to be part of the formal ceremonies.

The Maori welcome can be seen as a ‘front space’ display and an extension of the visitors’ circuit in New Zealand. Arguably it was a calculated strategy to close down the negative space which had opened up and insert a positive image of race relations, and thus give substance to Muldoon's persistent claims of good race relations. Muldoon was undoubtedly keen to present an image of racial harmony to Commonwealth heads of government and journalists, and take the heat out of the claims that New Zealand was infected with racism, as evidenced by its continuing sporting contact with South Africa and actions at Bastion Point. Journalists were also invited to attend which was another break from tradition, and which lends weight to the suggestion that the event was a propaganda exercise. Journalists understood this to be the case: the *Times* correspondent wrote that the event was an 'advertisement for New Zealand's own race relations'.

It is fair to say that the event was a complete disaster. Journalists took the opportunity to speak with Maori and gained a deeper understanding of race relations, the various issues which Maori were contesting including land grievances, and the situation at Bastion Point. On the latter, Maori made it clear that they were 'far from happy'. As for the Maori welcome, Robert Mahuta, who was the principal Maori speaker during the

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237 *Amandla*, 'Maori Battalion Used', June/July 1977, p.6. The information on the event comes from this source unless otherwise identified.

238 *Times*, 13 June 1977.

formal ceremonial welcome, recognised that Maori were being used to sustain an image of racial harmony. In response he subverted the event and conducted his entire address in te reo Maori, and he suggested that the government had an ulterior motive which was to portray a rosy image of race relations. Journalists had the address translated and the gist of the address was reported in the media:

But not everyone was happy with the motive of the welcome by the New Zealand Government. A guest speaker, Mr Bob Mahuta, a man of considerable mana in the Waikato...made a provocative speech in Maori to the gathering...[he] asked the Battalion to consider whether they were not being used by the Government to promote an image of racial harmony for the benefit of Commonwealth Heads of Government. Ironically Mr Mahuta's speech passed without reaction by those who would have been outraged had they understood one word of Maori. Which in a way is precisely Mr Mahuta's point.

As for treating government leaders and their entourage to a display of Maori/Pakeha harmony, the event fell flat. A *Times* journalist reported:

The London Maori Club put on a colourful and tuneful display, but the evening was a little wearing for non-Maoris, since it included many long and gesticulative speeches in their language. Some senior delegates discovered pressing alternative engagements after staying for quite a short time. David Owens, our Foreign Secretary, lasted about 10 minutes, while Malcolm Fraser of Australia...had a quick drink upstairs and fled without ever taking his ringside seat. Only one head of government lasted the whole thing through until the buffet supper.

Thus, in short, the event failed to shore up New Zealand's image. Journalists gained greater access to Maori opinion on race relations, land issues, and became aware of the disparity between government and Maori narratives. It became obvious to them why such an event had been organised and their understandings of a less unified society were printed in the mainstream media. Maori were clearly unhappy at being used to sustain New Zealand's international reputation, especially in the midst of a bitter struggle to hold onto their lands in the face of increasing government hostility. Robert Mahuta's protest, which ostensibly was intended for Maori to contemplate, reached the mainstream media. That it was translated, probably by someone at the function, suggests that this may have been Mahuta's intention. At the least his agreement to have

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240 Ibid.
his speech made available for translation and publication would have been necessary. Commonwealth leaders clearly had little interest in the event - in part as they were unable to understand the language - and departed early.

At the same time Dave Wickham also spoke out about the Maori welcome and the motives of the government. He suggested that the function was designed to portray New Zealand's 'model attitude towards race when the reality was very different'.242 His comments, which were picked up and quoted in the New Zealand media, caused some outrage. Brian Talboys (Deputy Prime Minister) described Wickham's comments as a 'slur' and a 'gross distortion of the facts'.243 The Minister of Justice (David Thomson) considered extending the Race Relations Act to make the inciting of racial disharmony an offence for people outside New Zealand. This had been suggested to him by the Attorney-General (Peter Wilkinson) who was of the view that any New Zealand citizen who deliberately made distorted statements while abroad knowing that these would incite racial disharmony at home, should be answerable under New Zealand law.244 On his return home, Muldoon denounced CARE and HART and was 'appalled at the volume of material...most of it a pack of lies' that had been spread abroad, and especially the accusations that he and his government were racist.245 Thus, the London protests had been effective and achieved what the activists on Bastion Point and in London had set out to accomplish – to publicise the events at Bastion Point, expose the myth of good race relations and embarrass the Prime Minister internationally. The unanticipated events at New Zealand House were a bonus.

Creating Space within Eastern Bloc Networks: Cuba 1978

In 1978 a delegation of 12 New Zealanders travelled to Cuba to attend the 11th World Festival of Youth and Students.246 The festival was under the auspices of the Soviet organisation World Federation of Democratic Youth which ran conferences every four years. Included in the 12-member New Zealand delegation, consisting of mostly of Socialist Unity Party members, were three Maori activists, Donna Awatere, Josie Keelan

242 Richards, Dancing On Our Bones..., p.183.
243 Ibid.
244 New Zealand Herald, 29 June 1977; Socialist Action, 8 July 1977, p.3.
246 The information for this section on Cuba, unless specifically identified, comes from, 'Rebecca Evans', Broadsheet, October 1982, pp.12-17.
and Ripeka Evans. Under the festival motto, 'For Anti-Imperialist Solidarity, Peace and Friendship', they joined 18,500 delegates from 145 countries, many of whom were from independence movements.\textsuperscript{247}

The New Zealand delegation was housed with the peoples from Asia and the Pacific which put them in immediate contact with independence movements from all over the Pacific, including Vanuatu, New Caledonia, Guam, West Papua, East Timor and Australia. Evans recalled that the New Zealanders joined together with these groups 'and had regular meetings to bring our struggles to the attention of other liberation movements at the festival. We made a big impact on Cuba, even though there were 20,000 people at the festival, because we were three strong Maori women who represented the Maori Nation'. She also recalled a Forum on Racism:

The first seven speakers were white. The Eastern Communist bloc was using the Forum to attack capitalist countries for their racism. As if racism doesn't exist in communist countries. No black buys that crap. As soon as the seventh speaker finished I got ready and jumped onto the stage. I introduced myself in Maori and then told about 2000 delegates what the whites have done and are doing to us still. This had a big impact'.

The festival marked a turning point in changing political ideas, and the inspiration for the Maori Sovereignty philosophy which Donna Awatere would introduce a few years later. This came out of contact and subsequent meetings with members of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). Contact was made with the leadership of the PLO early on at the festival, and at meetings the oppression of both Maori and Palestinians was discussed. Ripeka Evans notes that 'We drew the parallels with ourselves as dispossessed, landless people pushed down in our own country. They really saw the links...and they took us seriously'.

Most significant was the contact with the female members of the PLO. One of the members of the Commando Hijack Unit, Marianne, was inspirational and the three Maori women spent a considerable amount of time with her, 'getting to know about each other’s struggles...Marianne kept saying, You can't go for Bastion Point or other places. You must go for the whole lot'. It was the beginning of a shift for Evans (and indeed all

the Maori delegates) who noted that 'talking with the PLO women moved my political thinking on from where I thought about making piecemeal demands, like Bastion Point, Raglan, the land march and so on, to sewing these together into a coherent political philosophy'. At this point Evans made a decision to 'commit to the nationhood of the Maori people'.

Immediately on their return to New Zealand they organised a Marxist Study Group which, as group member Merata Mita noted, was 'rooted in indigenous identity based on land, language and history, which is innately expressed through whakapapa'. The group (which eventually morphed into a larger Black Unity women's group) met every week and for the first year studied Marx's political economy to understand capitalism, and 'the internal drive it has to colonialism', and they analysed the intersections between class and racism. Current events in New Zealand such as the Maori land rights movement, anti-racist and women's liberation movements, and anti-colonial ideology coming in from independence movements in the Pacific, as well as the works of anti-colonial writers such as Frantz Fanon, influenced their developing Maori nationalist philosophy which rejected Marxist class analyses and placed race as the fundamental cleavage in society. Ideological arguments surrounding class/race debates during the 1981 Springbok Tour and its aftermath saw the group split off from the Left. As Evan Poata-Smith points out, it was widely recognised by Maori activists 'that the working class was no longer capable of bringing about revolutionary change and the trade union was powerless, while the anti-racist movement was obsessed with racist regimes internationally and ignored racism at home'. The Black Unity women, therefore, understood that they stood alone and the way forward was for Maori to direct the liberation struggle, and the process was to be through Maori sovereignty.

This was eventually articulated in its full form by Donna Awatere with the publication of *Maori Sovereignty* in 1984. Searingly anti-colonial and anti-Pakeha, Awatere shook the Pakeha Left as she rejected any alliance with Pakeha activists and denounced

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socialists, the anti-apartheid movement, trade unions, feminists and the broad anti-racist movement in general. She berated all for their lack of support for the struggle by Maori for liberation and argued that Pakeha activists resisted change and perpetuated a system based on structural inequality because they sought to 'maintain their system of privileges'. All Pakeha had benefited through the oppression of Maori, and underpinning the oppression was 'white hatred' and racism. Thus social change and liberation could only come through the re-assertion of Maori sovereignty for 'without sovereignty we are dead as a nation...It is sovereignty or nothing. We have no choice'. 'Maori control of Maori things' had been a demand by activists throughout the 1970s. However for Awatere, 'Maori things' were discarded. Maori sovereignty over Aotearoa was the demand.

The Cuba visit provoked little immediate response at public or governmental level and the activists apparently made no attempt to use the visit for any political purpose. It was more significant in the longer term in linking the Maori activists with the negative connotations of terrorism associated with Cuba. Had the government and citizens been aware of the race relations narrative which the three activists had disseminated in Cuba, the reaction would probably have been fierce. As explained in a previous chapter, Patu Hohepa had been vilified and accused of disloyalty when he spoke at the Special Committee on Apartheid at the United Nations and to newspaper reporters.

However there were some repercussions. The following year, Ben Couch the Minister of Maori Affairs and a staunch supporter of Prime Minister Robert Muldoon, used the Cuba visit in a crude attempt to discredit radical Maori activists by accusing them of deliberately fomenting subversion within the gang community. Couch claimed that gangs were being influenced by a number of 'disruptive' Maori who had gone to Cuba specifically to undertake a 'training programme' in 'subversion'. It was time for them to 'come clean' about their activities. Precipitating the comments by Couch was the increase in highly visible actions by radical Maori activists seen most recently in land occupations and a specific event at Auckland University. Here, direct physical action was taken in May 1979 by He Taua (a Maori group but identified as a 'gang' by the

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253 Ibid, p.27.
255 Ibid, p.32.
mainstream media) against engineering students who were involved in a yearly capping stunt whereby they parodied the haka. Added to this was an increase in gang activity and violent incidents which shook mainstream New Zealand. Most recent was a violent riot involving patched gang members and police in the small Northland town of Moerewa. The number of gangs was on the increase and by 1981 a police estimate put their number (including gang chapters) at over eighty. These included motorcycle gangs, and Maori, Polynesian and Pakeha ethnic gangs.257

For Ben Couch, sustained by information from an officer in the Department of Maori Affairs who had obtained his information 'through the grapevine in Auckland', it was the influence of radical Maori activists who had trained in Cuba as 'subversives' who were responsible for influencing such disruptive and radical behaviour.258 Ranginui Walker immediately took Ben Couch to task noting that he was 'easily seduced by the use of simple reactionary terms and the reds under the bed syndrome'.259 Donna Awatere too hit back and suggested that if Couch wanted to attend to the issue he would do well to send gang members to Cuba to learn the value of working together and that it was 'pointless to fight your brother'. Moreover Couch could play his part by showing Maori gang members that he was 'proud to be a Maori, by feeling it and saying it'. This was a direct swipe at Couch who consistently asserted that he was a New Zealander first and a Maori second.260 In 1981 at the height of the 1981 Springbok Tour of New Zealand, Maori and Cuba re-appeared when Prime Minister Muldoon released a subversives list in an attempt to discredit anti-Springbok Tour protesters.261 Donna Awatere and Ripeka Evans were both on the list. The trip to Cuba was insignificant in that it did not engender immediate animosity or sustained conversation in New Zealand. However it was an event which assumed a public importance far more than was warranted as links were made with a visit to communist Cuba with Maori activism and the assumptions that Maori had been 'turned' and trained to be subversives.

258 Socialist Action, 2 Nov 1979, p.12.
259 Ibid.
260 Ibid.
Accessing an International Forum: A Space at the Fourth Russell Tribunal

During the 1970s the rights of indigenous peoples was a subject of increasing discussion at international conferences and forums. The Fourth Russell Tribunal was a major conference within this framework and had its immediate origins in the 'International NGO Conference on Discrimination against Indigenous Populations in the Americas’ held in Geneva in 1977. This was organised by the Special NGO Committee on Human Rights under the Sub-Committee on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Apartheid and Decolonisation, and participation by indigenous peoples was significant. Out of the conference came the conclusion that the rights of indigenous peoples were being grossly violated by various governments. Indigenous delegates recommended that a tribunal be convened for cases to be presented and witnesses called to inform of the abuses and violations to which they were subject. Subsequently the 'Fourth Russell Tribunal: The Rights of Indians of the Americas' was convened in Rotterdam from 23-30 November 1980 to consider violations and crimes of ethnocide and genocide against Indians in the Americas. The tribunal was organised by the Workgroup Indian Project (Netherlands) in co-operation with the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, Indian organisations, and European and American organisations such as the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) and Survival International.

Local support was strong, especially from church organisations and the public. The Mayor of Rotterdam formally opened the tribunal and observed that this was 'scarcely a pleasure' for it was 'a scandal' that such a tribunal was necessary. A principal function of the tribunal was to serve as a space for indigenous people to give evidence of historical and contemporary injustices, and it adjudicated and challenged the authority of states on the basis of its human rights practices. Through publicity the tribunal aimed to arouse the consciousness and conscience of the world to the plight of indigenous peoples, the actions of governments, and to mobilise public opinion. The tribunal was constituted like a court of law: cases were heard before a panel, witnesses cross-examined, material evidence was scrutinised, and pronouncements were made. It held no authority to enforce findings and relied on its moral influence to raise the

264 Correspondence, New Zealand Ambassador to the Netherlands to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 9 Dec 1980, ABHS 950, W 4627, Box 2663, 108/11/54, Part 1, NA.
conscience of the world and pressure states to rectify injustices. Despite being invited, no government representatives attended as observers or to defend the charges made.  

Out of forty-seven cases submitted, fourteen were considered to be representative of the Indians’ plight, and selected for presentation. Over one hundred representatives and witnesses took part in the sessions including Indian chiefs and leaders, lawyers, priests, anthropologists and other 'experts'. Accompanying the presentations and providing fuller evidence was written documentation on the historical and contemporary situation such as statements, 'official reports, legal documents, photographs, maps, testimonies, articles, and even books, private letters and fingerprints'. Speakers related a catalogue of tragedy and injustice: violations of human rights, land expropriation, treaty violations, the exploitation of indigenous labour, environmental destruction, racism, ethnocide and genocide. They accused governments and international corporations, and they sought support from fellow presenters and humanitarian organisations.  

At the tribunal a place was made for a number of non-Indian minority groups including the Inuit of Greenland, Australian Aborigines, West Papuans, Kurds, the Gypsies of Europe, and Maori. These cases were presented in part or wholly by documentation and some were given a space to make personal presentations at special evening sessions without any formal tribunal adjudication. Colin Clark, who introduced himself as the 'vice-president of a land rights group' based in Auckland and a member of the newly formed Mana Motuhake political party, presented the case for Maori. How Clark came to be at the Russell Tribunal is unclear but he was probably backed by Mana Motuhake and the Orakei Maori Action Committee with whom he was heavily involved and which continued its struggle to have the Ngati Whatua ownership of ancestral lands at Bastion Point acknowledged by government.  

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267 Ibid.  
270 In the late 1970s Matiu Rata became increasingly dissatisfied with the Maori policies of the Labour Party. After losing his position as chairman of the Labour caucus committee on Maori Affairs he resigned and in 1980 formed his own political party, Mana Motuhake (Maori self determination).
Clark came to the tribunal armed with several things: a lengthy and detailed written statement related mainly to the struggle for land rights, a copy of the Treaty of Waitangi, experience borne of many years of activism and involvement in the occupation and ongoing struggle at Bastion Point, and an address which drew sustained applause and a subsequent newspaper report which commented on his moving presentation.

A Maori stood with tears in his eyes, holding a facsimile of a 140 year old Treaty with the British Crown. “We opened the doors to you, but the cupboard is almost bare now. Of the 66 million acres we owned, we are down to two and a half million acres. Japanese companies have leases of our forests. Our artefacts are here in Europe. I feel like screaming my heart out sometimes”.  

Most of all he came with a determination to ‘tell a story’ of marginalisation, dispossession, and injustice. The combination of the prepared statement, Clark’s address and his discussion with other indigenous peoples, re-positioned New Zealand’s international race relations reputation by presenting an oppositional narrative of colonisation and contemporary injustice.

Figure 4.8  Colin Clark, Russell Tribunal, Rotterdam, 1980

The written statement was presented to the tribunal and copies were also available to indigenous delegates.\textsuperscript{273} In this the current situation of Maori was described in terms of: racial discrimination and inequality, political, social and economic subordination, of high unemployment and social problems amongst Maori youth, the alienation of youth from their language and cultural roots, and of a Eurocentric society which 'did not recognise Maori values'. Much of the statement however focussed on the alienation and expropriation of Maori lands and mostly in contemporary terms. The current land protest at Bastion Point was presented as a case study to demonstrate injustice, and the struggle by Ngati Whatua to hold onto their ancestral lands in the face of state power and greed. Referred to, were the brutal actions of government in having Maori protesters forcefully evicted off their land, and the subsequent arrest of over two hundred people. If anyone reading the report held prior notions of New Zealand as a paradise of racial equality and harmony, the document would have disabused them of any such notion.

The statement placed Maori at one with other indigenous peoples. There was no suggestion that Maori had fared 'better than' or had a less harsh experience of colonisation. Rather, they had suffered and resisted, and continued to do so - the same as other indigenous peoples. Adversity, struggle, resistance and indigenous concepts related to land and identity - 'our mother... land and the Maori identity...cannot really be separated' - were commonalities and it was in this collective experience and indigenousness that their strength lay.

Maoris will continue their struggle for the restoration of their ancestral lands, “our mother”. The Maoris feel one with the other autochthonous peoples who are engaged in similar struggles. Mutual solidarity gives hope and strength.

However, it was Clark's speech which reached the largest audience and had impact, as the above newspaper report indicates. Clark filled the space at the tribunal with a strong critique which highlighted in contemporary terms the violence of colonisation, particularly in relation to land, the abrogation of the terms of the Treaty of Waitangi and the position of Maori within a Eurocentric society.\textsuperscript{274} The idea that colonisation had

\textsuperscript{273} ‘The Document of the Maori’ - Fourth Russell Tribunal on the Rights of Indians, Rotterdam, November 1980, MS 1867, Box 5, Item 86, AIATSIS Archives, Canberra.

\textsuperscript{274} Speech by Colin Clark', MS 1867, Box 5, Item 86, AIATSIS Archives, Canberra. A portion of Colin Clark's speech to the Tribunal can be seen in the 'Maori Land Project, Russell Tribunal', Camera,
been benign was dispelled as he spoke of the current situation of Maori mainly through the lens of land and the Treaty of Waitangi, whilst also touching on issues of oppression, discrimination, and the rising activism by Maori to retain land, regain cultural integrity, and claim 'a voice of our own'.

Highlighted, was the expropriation and alienation of land, and the struggle to retain land that remained under Maori control. He explained that the loss of land had been a history of deception and 'greed': Maori rights had been trampled on, and legislation had been designed and implemented with the deliberate intention of divesting Maori of their lands. However, he spoke mainly of the contemporary situation:

Of the 66 million acres that we owned, we are down to two and a half million acres. We are down, through different acts in legislation...and through greed...and through international companies...that own the forestry blocks are the biggest Japanese companies in the world...Our reserves, the land places of our ancestors have been desecrated...No more land must go! We would travel the world. We would let hear our voices...We were happy as we were. We opened the doors to you. With open hearts… and the cupboard is bare now. Just about bare…On Bastion Point...one of the biggest struggles in modern times...the people stood for 16 months to fight for their rights...they [government] tried everything to break us. They just about succeeded.

Finally, Clark ended his address with the Treaty of Waitangi and the failure of successive governments to honour its terms:

The Treaty of Waitangi...150 years suffering of my people. Waitangi. The translation in English is Crying Waters....For 150 years we are still crying. We had only asked that the British government HONOR the rights of our people that we had signed in good faith....During 140 years not one government has offered to compromise with the Maori people on the Treaty of Waitangi. We had sailed the seven seas to England. We had representations of my people many times...All we asked is a little thing....that this treaty be honoured....what we want is our rights as human beings. And our destiny, and our language, and our fishing rights, and our mountains and our rivers ...I'm gonna take this [a copy of the treaty] home. I'll put it on a plane, and I'll probably cry over it... We have

Darcy Lange, 1980, F93597, New Zealand Film Archive. The paragraphs on Clark's speech have been taken from both sources. The written document from the Canberra Archives is incomplete – a malfunction in the public address system during his speech resulted in 4 minutes being lost. The visual from the New Zealand Film Archives contains some material not set down in the written document and probably came from the missing minutes.
the trail of broken treaties. We have the trail of broken hearts. We've had the trail of broken bodies, and we have the treaty of Crying Waters.275

The Russell Tribunal added to a growing global awareness of the grievances, oppression and mistreatment of indigenous people and their subordinate position in society. Their testimonies and accompanying detailed written documentation, as well as the written submissions from those who were not selected to give personal accounts, resulted in a voluminous record of the situation of the Indians of the Americas as well as some non-Indian indigenous peoples. The material was archived at the University of Amsterdam and out of this a complete account of the sessions was published in 1981, a seven-volume 1400 page report which included all cases, some annexes to the cases, testimonies, statements and conclusions. This was used at various United Nations meetings and international conferences.276 The tribunal panel concluded that in most cases there had been serious violations of national and international law, and recommendations were passed onto governments, international bodies (including the United Nations Human Rights Commission) and religious groups working for indigenous and human rights. However while non-Indian indigenous peoples had platform space at the tribunal they were not part of the official proceedings, and their presentations were not formally assessed by a tribunal panel. Therefore there was no contact between the tribunal and governments or recommendations made.

Nor did the international press give any significant space to the non-Indian presentations. Although they had full access to all sessions, their focus was on the Indian presentations and interviewing Indian delegates. Ben Vermeer notes that there were many references and articles on the events in newspapers and other publication all over the world.277 While Indian cases may have been well covered by the press, this was apparently not so for non-Indian presentations. The participation by Maori attracted some interest in European newspapers only. A local Dutch newspaper briefly mentioned Maori as a minority ethnic group 'threatened with extinction', and the

275 ‘Speech by Colin Clark’, MS 1867, Box 5, Item 86, AIATSIS Archives, Canberra.
277 Ibid.
Guardian made more significant reference in several articles.278 Thus it was largely ineffective in generating a space for the new Maori narrative in the media. Although coverage was sparse it was better than in New Zealand where the event was ignored.

Participation in the tribunal put Maori in contact with a vast indigenous community. Away from official sessions, the events at Rotterdam served as a powerful mechanism for Clark to establish contact with other indigenous organisations and individuals. Out of session activities were a celebration of indigenousness as people gathered wearing traditional clothing, performing traditional music and dance, handing out tracts and pamphlets and hoisting banners to inform of current issues that were being contested.279 There was, as a Hopi delegate noted, an indigenous 'atmosphere of sacredness and honor among people with the same problems and the supporters who care and are dedicated to the Almighty, the Great Creator.' 280

The space provided opportunities for interaction between indigenous delegates, for discussion and the exchange of ideas. As Clark noted he formed contacts and friendships with his 'Indian brothers' and 'my home buddies from South America'. While some delegates had previous contact with Maori through the World Council of Indigenous Peoples and were knowledgeable about their situation, many more had little understanding and gained new insights into the struggles and position of Maori. In short it was another avenue whereby Maori were placed within a growing indigenous peoples’ movement which shared a common indigenous world-view, common experience of colonisation and all the devastation that process had wrought. While each had travelled down their own unique historical pathway and there were substantial differences in the manner which colonisation had been effected, the end result had been the same. All had been left with the same legacy of land alienation, broken treaties, cultural loss, institutional racism, social, economic and political marginalisation, and of peoples who featured disproportionately in all negative social indicators.

278 Correspondence, New Zealand Ambassador to the Netherlands to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 9 Dec 1980, ABHS 950, W 4627, Box 2663, 108/11/54, Part 1, NA.
279 Footage of the Fourth Russell Tribunal at the New Zealand Film Archives provides a glimpse into the ways in which the venue became transformed into an indigenous space. The footage shows clearly the 'colour' of the out of session activities, displays and interactions between indigenous delegations, individuals and observers. See, 'Maori Land Project, Russell Tribunal', Camera, Darcy Lange, 1980, F93597, New Zealand Film Archive. Wellington.
More significantly, all had resisted individually since colonisation and were now linking up to form stronger mechanisms to obtain justice. Coming out of the event, and recognised by Clark, was unity in indigenousness and adversity:

The indigenous people are waking up. And we must use that unity...The plight of our people is strong...the people of all nations are suffering...the opportunity is here. The international recognition [of] the plight of indigenous peoples [is here]...I'm saying to my Indian brothers, to my home buddies from South America and to all the people who care and to the little people in Holland: You’re here. If we could help one another we would help one another. Do not sever the communication once it is bound...

The Russell Tribunal gave Clark the opportunity 'to produce the case of my people and... what has been going on for one hundred and forty years' and to generate 'international recognition' of their situation. There was no intention to deliberately shame and embarrass the government. Had this been the intention, the participation of Clark and the organisation he was representing, along with his stated aims of informing an international audience of 'what has been going on' would have been publicised in New Zealand prior to departure in order to capture media attention. Clearly what was important was to gain 'international recognition' in relation to land alienation, the unequal and subordinate position of Maori in a supposedly bi-cultural society, and the contemporary issues (especially land rights claims) which Maori were contesting. To 'tell the story' at an international forum was an act of protest and resistance in itself and it was enough that the case for Maori had been heard and recognised.

**Expanding Activist Space into New Zealand: Three Nations Conference, Bringing Activists into New Zealand**

In November 1980, over three hundred people gathered at Canterbury University to attend a Three Nations Conference on Development and Underdevelopment in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. While most of the delegates were Pakeha academics there was also a large contingent of indigenous delegates – academics, activists, and leaders. Sixteen came in from Australia, including high profile activists Shorty O'Neil, Pat Dodson and Marcia Langton. The large number reflected the aggressive shift by Aboriginal activists into international spaces during the 1970s to

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281 Speech by Colin Clark’, MS 1867, Box 5, Item 86, AIATSIS Archives, Canberra.
raise awareness of their claims and grievances and gain international support and recognition. Moreover there had been significant contact with Maori. Harry Daniels, president of the National Council of Canada was the sole indigenous Canadian delegate and had stopped off at Christchurch while en-route to the Fourth Russell Tribunal where he was to lead a Canadian delegation. Over fifty Maori delegates participated ranging from across the political spectrum including radical activists Donna Awatere, Pauline Kingi and Ripeka Evans; Eva Rickard who headed Te Matakite O Aotearoa, a land rights organisation which formed during the Land March, Patu Hohepa and Ranginui Walker representing the new Mana Motuhake political party, and Georgina Kirby and Mira Szaszy representing the MWWL.

Maori controlled the conference space and their position in it from the beginning. For the first 24 hours of conference, all participants stayed at Rehua Marae and white participants were forbidden from speaking on the marae. Donna Awatere explained that this 'enforced silence [was] necessitated by the fact that we felt that white people have not listened to our point of view, and do not understand “underdevelopment” as it affects Indians, Inuits, Aborigines and Maoris.' With a captive and mute white audience, indigenous delegates gave presentations which described their experiences of colonisation and of living as minority peoples on the margins of a white dominated society. Included were the ways in which their traditional relationship with the land had changed, and their situation in a capitalist economy. The issues presented were easily identifiable and commonalities were evident to all indigenous delegates, especially in relation to the loss of land, low socio-economic position, and racism. Harry Daniels described a history of broken treaties, of 'genocide from disease, spiritual malaise and white settler racism' and structural inequality. He spoke of the historical loss of land through brutal military force and in contemporary terms drew attention to the 'land grab' which the Canadian Government was carrying out at that time. The struggle was to recover their lands: 'We have been alienated from our land. We want some of it back so that we can support our people'. Maori and Aborigines understood exactly what Daniels

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283 Matiu Rata, disillusioned with the Maori policies of the Labour Party resigned in 1979 and in 1980 formed his own political party, Mana Motuhake (Maori self-determination). .
were saying and both were at the time, involved in major land disputes and actions in an effort to regain and retain lands which had been expropriated by governments.

Following the first day, the indigenous delegates made a decision not to participate in the official programme for several days but to hold their own separate indigenous workshop sessions at Rehua Marae.\textsuperscript{286} This gave the opportunity for in-depth discussion on under-development and development and the destruction of their countries. Questions and issues were raised about wealth inequality, power structures, white racism and institutional racism, and broad issues related to the social, political and economic conditions in society. A particular focus was on land and the delegates 'found a common identity in the quest for land titles'. Aboriginal delegates spoke strongly on the economic exploitation of Aboriginal land by multi-national mining companies. Included in conference was a separate workshop on 'Women as Fourth World people' in which women discussed the ways in which racism, sexism and capitalism had impacted on lives.

Strategies and problem-solving for the development of indigenous communities in Australia and New Zealand were on the agenda during the final day of conference. The group formulated plans for establishing communications between Maori and Aborigines, which included the exchange of students and 'experts' in a range of areas. As an example, it was understood that Aborigines had much more autonomy in self-help community development programmes than Maori and the latter could benefit from this expertise. Further, with land issues being of major concern the sharing of information on the avenues pursued and efficacy of legal efforts would be of benefit to both groups. Agreement was reached that Maori and Aboriginal students working in indigenous politics, and who were travelling to each other’s countries, should make contact with indigenous groups and 'avoid academic-type tours of the countries and the people'.\textsuperscript{287}

On another note, Pat Dodson spoke of the 50,000 Maori living in Australia and asked that they stand alongside Aborigines and support them in their struggle for justice.\textsuperscript{288} He explained that Maori were treating Aborigines in a manner similar to the way

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{286} This paragraph is based on a report of the conference in \textit{Identity}, Vol.4, No.2, p 4 and Donna Awatere, \textit{Broadsheet}, Jan/Feb 1981, pp.20-23.
\item\textsuperscript{287} \textit{Identity}, Vol 4, No.2, p.4.
\item\textsuperscript{288} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Pakeha treated Maori in New Zealand. The Maori delegates agreed to take steps to encourage their people in Australia to end the division and to support Aborigines in their activities. What measures came out of this is unknown. However the MWWL had set up a branch in Perth in 1979 and during the early 1980s members were making an effort to reach out to the Aboriginal community. In 1983 the president of the Perth branch, Shalima Hinemoa Fryda, reported that the intention was to try and 'foster closer contact between Maori and Aboriginal groups believing that there are many parallels in their development since colonisation'. The group also made a submission to the West Australian Aboriginal Land Inquiry which investigated the methods and problems of granting land to Aborigines in the state. Fryda explained that they had done so because of the close parallels between Maori and Aboriginal communities and because the experiences Maori had in seeking land rights in the past could be of help to Aborigines in their struggle for land rights.

Out of the conference came a strong feeling of unity, solidarity and empathy between all indigenous delegates. Four of the Aboriginal delegation extended their stay in New Zealand and joined Mana Motuhake at their first Annual Conference in Taupo. There, Mana Motuhake expressed 'warm support for, and solidarity with, Aboriginal efforts for a return of their lands and control of their lives'. Mentioned by the Aborigines was the possibility of a World Council of Indigenous Peoples Conference (WCIP) in Australia in 1981, and although details were vague, these were filled in when NAC representatives visited New Zealand early the following year. Following discussion with Patu Hohepa on Maori treaty and land rights, they suggested that the WCIP Conference, which the NAC was organising, would be an ideal venue and opportunity for a more wide-ranging discussion and exchange of information. Mana Motuhake decided that it would attend the WCIP conference in Australia. This will be discussed in the final chapter, and it is enough to note for the moment that a large Maori contingent attended the conference and took part in an alternative conference held.

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289 *West Australian* 14 June 1983.
alongside the official WCIP and supported a large demonstration for land rights organised by Aboriginal activists.

Support and Solidarity - ‘Our Struggle is Your Struggle’:
Reciprocal Contacts between Maori, Aboriginal and Pasifika Activists

Coming into the 1980s decade the contacts made over the 1970s decade, were clear as indigenous activists came together at certain points to provide support and solidarity and to raise a wider awareness of their struggles and also gain support. A close bond had formed between them and their actions were based on the idea that they had a common struggle, and that their strength lay in collective action.

Trans-Tasman Support and Solidarity
Aboriginal activists, Gary Foley and Shorty O'Neill, came into New Zealand in 1981 to join in the protests against the Springbok Tour of New Zealand. The visit was a reflection and outcome of the strong links, friendships and solidarity that had been created over the past decade through trans-Tasman contact and a growing number of contact points at international conferences and seminars such as the Russell Tribunal, Three Nations Conference, World Council of Indigenous Peoples, and the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific Movement. Participation in the 1981 protests was a continuation of that solidarity. As well, Aboriginal activists sought to raise awareness of the situation of Aborigines and gain support, especially for protests being planned to take place during the 1982 Commonwealth Games in Brisbane. These were aimed at drawing international media attention to the issues which Aborigines were contesting, especially land rights, and embarrassing the federal government and the state government of Queensland under Premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen. Aboriginal activists were aware of the value of having international support as another layer to validate their actions and add to the politics of embarrassment. Foley was interviewed during the anti-tour protests and explained the reasons for coming to New Zealand:

We've come here to express solidarity with our brothers and sisters in South Africa as well as to express solidarity with those Maori groups which are opposed to the tour, and all anti-racist people in New Zealand. The simple fact of the matter is that in Australia

we are not going to achieve land rights, self-determination and all our other aims without international solidarity being expressed with us. And one of the ways in which we can do that is for the black people of Africa and the black people of New Zealand and the Pacific to see that we actually support their cause. We will go anywhere in the Pacific or anywhere in the world to express solidarity with those oppressed people who seek out active support.  

In recognition of the support Aboriginals had given during the 1981 tour, and as part of a wider emerging Pacific peoples’ movement whereby indigenous activists from many countries were beginning to internationalise and provide support for each other, in 1982 the Maori Peoples Liberation Movement of Aotearoa (MPLMA) sponsored Shorty O’Neill on a twelve-day speaking tour of New Zealand. The purpose was twofold: to provide support for Maori and to gain support for Aborigines. In particular the MPLMA sought support from O’Neill for the Waitangi Day protests which were taking place over many days and venues across New Zealand. By now Maori activists had also recognised that protest spaces were strengthened by the visible presence of international activists and Soli Neheu, a Hawaiian activist, was also invited to the Waitangi protests.

O’Neill also sought to raise awareness of the situation of Aborigines and gain support for the forthcoming Commonwealth Games protests. On Waitangi Day (at Waitangi), O’Neill leafleted the crowd and then spoke to a four-hundred-strong gathering about plans for protest action at the Brisbane Games and the similarities in the struggle of Maori and Aborigines for self-determination. His speech was replicated throughout the Waitangi venues he visited. As well, he visited marae, had interviews with print media, spoke on several talk-back shows, gave a presentation at Auckland University, and took part in a march up Queen Street in Auckland. There he condemned racism in New Zealand, and pointed to the parallels between Maori and Aborigines. He met with and gained information about strategies from anti-apartheid leaders and showed films about Aboriginal land rights at many venues. By the end of the tour a large number of

296 Waitangi Action Committee Newsletter, March 1983, National Council of Churches in New Zealand Records, 90-387-07/1, ATL.
297 Maori Peoples Liberation Movement, Newsletter, February -March, 1982, p.5, CARE Records, NZMS 845 [uncatalogued], ACL.
Maori and Pakeha activists had been thoroughly politicised to the struggles of Aborigines, the oppression under which they lived, and the proposed protests at Brisbane. On his return to Australia, he made a place for Maori in *Messagestick*, a North Queensland Newsletter, and spoke of racism, poor socio-economic conditions, and the brutality of the police at Waitangi.

New Zealand is not the place of racial harmony that most Australians hear about. There are over three thousand Maori and South Sea Islanders youth living on the streets of Auckland who are continually harassed by police. Forty-five per cent of the prison population is Maori. Maori are the last to get jobs and the first fired.298

Following O'Neill's visit, Queensland Minister of Welfare Services (Terry White), when visiting New Zealand, 'discovered' that hundreds of Maori militants recruited by Aboriginal activists had undergone 'subversive training' in Cuba and were intending to travel to Australia and wreck the Commonwealth Games.299 A deluge of hysteria came from the media and was fuelled by Prime Minister Muldoon and Ben Couch (Minister of Maori Affairs and Minister of Police).

Bjelke-Petersen and Russ Hinze (Minister of Police) both warned of plots by Maori terrorists.300 Couch spoke of Maori activists who had 'made it quite obvious that they intend to make trouble in Brisbane...We know there is a communist influence here...some radicals have been to Cuba for training.'301 Muldoon denounced Maori activists on Australian television and claimed they were few in number and did not represent Maoridom in any way. It was 'in their character to seek out trouble wherever they can' and activists such as Ripeka Evans and Donna Awatere, were 'psychologically attuned' to violence; 'they won't stop, and they don't much care what the issue is'. He thought they should be denied entry into Australia, but if they were allowed in, a close watch should be kept on them and 'the moment they break the law pick them up and stick them inside'.302

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300 *Age* (Melbourne), 12 April 1982.
301 *Canberra Times*, 20 April 1982.
In April 1982 Hone Harawira, Ripeka Evans (Black Defence Committee), and Hilda Halkyard (WAC) travelled to Australia. The main aims were to share information about the 1981 Springbok Tour protests, raise awareness about the struggles of Maori, and to determine what form of support the Aboriginal organisers wanted from Maori. All three activists had played leading roles in the 1981 Springbok Tour demonstrations and had fronted the Patu Squad (Auckland) which consisted mainly of Maori and Pasifika people. Patu protesters had taken a front-line position and hard-line stance and were often subject to violence from the police, whilst not averse to retaliating in kind. In Australia they provided insights into their experiences, strategies and organisational issues, and spoke to activists about 'the regional organisations, the broad community involvement, the tactics of the State before, during and after the tour, and the present exchange of training between the NZ and Queensland Police.'

During their time in Australia they spoke on television and radio and expressed their support for Aborigines, and they spoke to many groups – mostly in solidarity for Aboriginal rights and current injustices that Maori activists were contesting. Once back home the issue was publicised in newsletters and requests were for support for the struggle for Aboriginal land rights and the protest at the Commonwealth Games. Calls were made for a letter-writing campaign to all New Zealand athletes asking them to boycott the games and show support for Aboriginal land rights; to raise money and send representatives to the games; and for local communities to organise protests in New Zealand to coincide with the games.

In April/May 1982 Bjelke-Petersen visited New Zealand to attend the centenary celebrations of the Lutheran Church in Palmerston North. The Premier was an irresistible target for Palmerston North activists. They had recently been visited by Shorty O’Neill and were well informed of the oppression of Queensland Aborigines, the intransigence of the Premier in relation to Aboriginal land rights, and the draconian legislation which the Queensland government intended to enact to shut down Aboriginal

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303 *Sunday Mail*, 28 April 1982.
304 Ranginui Walker recalled that 'The gangs came out in force too. They were right on the front-line taking on the cops and I think there was a bit of payback on the cops...years of resentment came out'. Interview with Ranginui Walker, 8 September 2006.
305 Maori Peoples’ Liberation Movement of Aotearoa Newsletter, June/July 1982, p.12, National Council of Churches in New Zealand Records, 90-387-07/1, ATL.
protest at the Commonwealth Games. The protesters came from a broad base of Maori and Pakeha and included students from Massey University, anti-racist activists, concerned Christians and a range of Maori organisations including the Waitangi Action Alliance and Nga Uri Pakenga. Joining them was a large contingent from Wellington, and all came under an organisational umbrella the Aboriginal Rights Coalition.  

The coalition took a dual approach of education and direct protest action. This was a hallmark of the Palmerston North Maori activists and had been used to good effect during the 1981 tour. It had involved drawing parallels between the oppression of Maori with black South Africans and raising awareness of domestic racism. Penny Poutu, a key activist during the 1981 tour, explained that when people spoke of apartheid in South Africa, ‘we were mentioning things that were happening in New Zealand. We worked really hard at connecting it with Waitangi issues and the oppression of Maori’. They did the same when Bjelke-Petersen came to town and raised awareness about the situation of Aborigines and at the same time they drew parallels with the situation of Maori:

One way was to produce a leaflet on the state of Aboriginals...We leafleted the town, talking about it …and again talking racism against Aboriginals, racism against Maori, making those kinds of links …in some ways they [the public] found it easier to identify with Bjelke Petersen than it was with racism here, but equally you had a reasonable chunk of people who thought no, we don't want him here...

As well, direct action was taken with more than two hundred demonstrators protesting at the venue where Bjelke-Petersen was attending centennial functions. There, in an angry protest and some violence being exerted by the police, Bjelke Petersen was told that neither he nor his racist policies were welcome in New Zealand. Following the protest the Premier, clearly stung by the protesters, hit back and referred to them as all being 'on the dole'. At the same time he discredited the claims made by Aboriginal activists that Aborigines were oppressed, and he rejected the validity of their claims for land rights. The Aboriginal people 'were satisfied, happy...They're very wealthy people,

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307 Interview with Penny Poutu, 7 August 2006.
308 Ibid.
309 Ibid.
311 Unity, 19 May 1982.
like the sheiks of the Middle East...they get royalties from uranium mining...they don't want anything further. They already own and control vast areas of land...

How many Maori went to Brisbane is unknown but it appears that a significant number took part. Te Matakite O Aotearoa honoured a pledge of support given to Aborigines at a World Council of Indigenous Peoples conference in Canberra (1981), and they also formed a branch in Sydney which guaranteed a Matakite presence. They were joined by members of various groups including MPLMA and WAC. Maori spoke at the demonstrations but it appears they did not take up an offer made by Shorty O'Neill to hitch their cause onto the Aboriginal land rights protests and use the space to focus attention on Maori land grievances. Their aim was to support the Aboriginal struggle and not take the limelight in pushing forward their cause. For Barney Pikari the aim was to show solidarity and support for the Aboriginal people:

We support anyone who's for freedom, justice and equality....I saw this group of Aboriginals protesting for their land rights on TV news one night, being hurled off their land with clubs...I swear they looked just like us. They were dark-skinned, ragged, poor, and angry....Their plea, like ours, is a cry for justice. That's why we're in solidarity with them. That's why our flag will fly beside theirs. That’s why we're going to go to Brisbane.

In New Zealand, for those unable to go to Brisbane, demonstrations were organised throughout the country. The numbers at protest events and the support expressed was a direct result of the efforts of Aboriginal activists on their visits to New Zealand in raising awareness of the situation of Aborigines and especially their claim for land rights. Maori activists too played an important part in disseminating material through newsletters, and by word of mouth. As in Australia, many Pakeha came on board and joined Maori to push the Aboriginal agenda into public places. Solidarity demonstrations to coincide with the Brisbane Games attracted significant support. In Christchurch a demonstration organised jointly by Maori groups and HART, attracted over three hundred people who heard speeches on the oppression of Aborigines. In Wellington protesters carried banners calling for Aboriginal land rights and marched on the Australian High Commission. A deputation was organised, and speeches were given

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312 Canberra Times, 4 May 1982
313 Auckland Star, 10 Feb 1982.
by a number of groups including the local WAC, Te Matakite O Aotearoa and Pakeha anti-racist groups. In Auckland a picket, demonstration and a deputation was organised at the Australian High Commission. Hastings put up a picket, and held a public meeting where Mana Motuhake and Nga Hine Toa spoke of the oppression of Aborigines, the land rights struggle, and the solidarity between Maori and Aborigines because they suffered similar oppression even though the Maori situation was not as desperate. It was one of the few times that such a sentiment had been voiced over the past decade.

The events surrounding the Brisbane games protest was a reflection of the networking and consciousness-raising actions of indigenous activists. Not only did Maori (and other indigenous activists) attend the Brisbane games protests, large protests took place in New Zealand in support. The events that set this in place, and which had taken place over a lengthy period, were the consciousness-raising in New Zealand which had been about both Maori and Aboriginal rights. It was this focus and recognition of a shared struggle which would characterise indigenous activism during the 1980s.

**Expanding Space for Maori: Bringing Pasifika Peoples to New Zealand**

Developing alongside was a Pacific peoples movement. This too was a direct result of contacts formed during the 1970s, mainly through the NFP, and a more aggressive approach by Maori activists to forge solid links and bring Pasifika activists into New Zealand. From 1980, Maori began attending a great number of conferences and events around the Pacific. For example in 1980 several attended the NFP conference in Hawaii, Hone Harawira of the MPLF attended a conference in the Phillipines, Ben Dalton (WAC) attended the independence celebrations in Vanuatu, and two MPLF members attended a NFP conference on Peace and Independence in Australia. Throughout the 1980s contact grew and there was considerable travel abroad by Maori activists, throughout the Pacific region, forging new links of solidarity and support.

On Waitangi Day 1983 the developing networks of support throughout the Pacific region were clear. The WAC received messages of support and solidarity from

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317 Maori Peoples Liberation Movement of Aotearoa, Newsletter, Circa 1980, CARE Records, NZMS 845 [uncatalogued], ACL.
indigenous activists abroad for their protest actions on Waitangi day. For example the Hawaiian group 'Protect Kaho'olawe Ohana' sent a message, 'We support the fight for Maori independence and in solidarity we declare that the Treaty of Waitangi is a fraud'. The Micronesian Solidarity Council and the Organisation for Indigenous Rights (Guam) both expressed support, and in a message the latter exemplified the activist Pacific community which had been created over the latter period of the 1970s:

Those of us in the Northern Pacific are frequently unaware of the struggles of our fellow islanders south of the equator. Intuitively we know that our struggles are the same and that the structures which deny us the right to self-determination are also the same. As the Maori people gather to demonstrate their just cause and the farcical interpretations commonly given to the Treaty of Waitangi, it is fitting that islanders remember …the island people are not alone. Although the oceans separate us with great distance of water, we can also use the ocean to bridge the gap between the islands as our ancestors once did. It is only fitting then that all Pacific Islanders support the Maori struggle, not merely because it is a just struggle. It is all our struggle.  

As well, a group in Hawaii which was currently contesting a land rights issue, arranged a local protest action to coincide with Waitangi Day in a gesture of support – 'Our struggle is your struggle'. Hawaiian activist Ku'meaaloha Gomes came in from Hawaii offering support and solidarity on behalf of her people. Following Waitangi she travelled to various venues, including several secondary schools in Auckland to raise awareness of the issues the indigenous peoples of Hawaii were contesting, and the similarities between the Maori and Hawaiian struggle.

Creating an Indigenous Nuclear Free Network in New Zealand: Te Hui Oranga O Te Moana Nui a Kiwa

At the same time the Pacific People's Anti-Nuclear Action Committee (PPANAC), which was formed in 1980, provided a huge impetus to the development of a Pacific indigenous people’s movement. As with other groups allied to the NFIP movement, it had an individual campaigning agenda and a broad agreement of opposition to nuclear activity and colonialism in the Pacific region. While it was a discreet group, it was part

318 Waitangi Action Committee Newsletter, February 1983, National Council of Churches in New Zealand Records, 90-387-07/1, ATL.
319 Ibid.
320 Ibid.
of a network of Maori organisations such as WAC and Maori Peoples Liberation Front of Aotearoa whose members and supporters flowed in and out of each other’s organisations to support various actions and events. In 1982, PPANAC hosted the first Te Hui Oranga O Te Moana Nui a Kiwa (Te Hui Oranga) which continued throughout the 1980s. This initiative was designed to bring the central issues of the NFIP to grassroots Maoridom. While there had always been representation at NFIP conferences, a lack of financial resources inhibited travel out of New Zealand for all but a few representatives of organisations. Thus the decision was taken to bring the peoples of the Pacific to New Zealand:

One of our hardest problems as Maori people is viewing our own struggle in isolation. We do not have the financial resources to send individuals overseas to look at our problems from afar- so we felt the next best thing was for us to bring Pacific grass-roots activists to us. 321

It was an important first meeting because it brought an international indigenous community to grassroots Maoridom and connected them to indigenous peoples around the Pacific who were undergoing similar struggles. This, as Hone Harawira noted, 'helped Maori to see their own plight as part of a global movement'.322 Indigenous activists came from Tahiti, Philippines, New Caledonia, North America, Hawaii and Australia, and this was a reflection of the contacts and links which had been forged with indigenous peoples over the past decade. A report on the hui noted:

For many of us this was the first time that we ever had contact with our brothers and sisters and so our knowledge grew in many dimensions as we compared our struggles and saw the commonalities. As we shared it was amazing to feel the strength of unity through this contact.323

Te Hui Oranga provided a forum for discussion on the ongoing nuclearisation of the Pacific and its impact on indigenous peoples. The aims of the programme were 'to take part in the national action to have the Treaty of Waitangi honoured; to meet grass-roots Maori people and other activists in tribal and urban regions of Aotearoa; to build and

321 Maori Peoples Liberation Movement of Aotearoa Newsletter, Nov/Dec 82-Jan 83, National Council of Churches in New Zealand Records, 90-387-07/1, ATL.
continue strengthening a network between and with indigenous peoples to reciprocate solidarity in indigenous struggles'.

The hui had organised workshop sessions, audiovisual displays and addresses by guest speakers. Ripeka Evans spoke of ‘Colonialism in the Pacific’; Patu Hohepa spoke on 'Indigenous Movements and Decolonisation in the Pacific'; and Hone Harawira gave an address on 'Maori struggle in the Pacific'.

Participation by indigenous peoples at such hui grew numerically throughout the 1980s and these were arguably the most important venue for the development of indigenous activism and an indigenous community.

**Engaging with North American Activists: Making a Space for Maori within the International Indian Treaty Council**

![Figure 4.9 ‘Maori welcome for First Nations visitor’](image)

Beginning in the early 1980s, American Indian activists made contact with Maori and came into New Zealand for the first time. In April/May 1983 Vernon Bellecourt, a former leader in the American Indian Movement (AIM) and representing the International Indian Treaty Council (IITC), came to New Zealand on a four-week

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325 Maori Peoples Liberation Movement of Aotearoa Newsletter, Nov/Dec 82-Jan 83, Newsletters, ATL.
326 ‘Maori welcome for First Nation visitor’, 1/2-C-22697-F, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington. The Maori woman is not identified, and no date is given. It is possible that it is Eva Rickard, and that it was taken during the early 1980s. However, this is not certain.
national speaking tour. Organised by the Wellington Latin America Solidarity Committee, Bellecourt's purpose was to give his eye-witness accounts of the revolutions in Central America, and especially in Guatemala and Nicaragua. The aim was to gain support for the indigenous peoples who were being massacred in their thousands, particularly in Guatemala.327 Bellecourt made the point:

Ronald Reagan's war against the people of Guatemala is a continuation of the war on indigenous peoples, whether it be in South Africa, whether it be in the United States, whether it be in Central or South America, or whether it be in the Pacific Islands...We know that in this society there are many voices in terms of those who share our views...struggling against oppression.328

A range of Maori organisations including Mana Motuhake, WAC and MPLFA invited Bellecourt to meet with them and participate in discussions and he gained a clear understanding of their situation. When asked by a journalist if there were similarities between the two peoples he replied, 'It's almost exact. It's the same type of denying people's rightful claims to their lands, original rights to fishing and other traditions they have'.329 Following discussions with several Maori organisations, he was appointed to take a joint draft declaration on their behalf to the IITC and from there into the United Nations. The declaration expressed solidarity with Indian nations and a desire to forge contact with them.330

Before he left, Bellecourt extended an invitation for Maori representatives to attend the IITC meeting in June 1983. Hone Harawira was selected and at the conference he laid out the position of Maori and the parallels between the two peoples.331 He spoke of the similarities and differences between the Treaty of Waitangi and the hundreds of Indian treaties; of the steps being taken by Maori for self-determination; and the parallels between the Maori and Indian peoples in terms of world view, lifestyle and problems which both faced. Finally he presented a formal written statement which located Maori and Indian within the same indigenous world, and subject to a similar colonising experience and contemporary reality:

327 Socialist Action, 13 May 1983, p.3.
329 Socialist Action, 13 May 1983, p.3.
331 Maori Peoples Liberation Movement of Aotearoa, 1984, National Council of Churches in New Zealand records, 90-387-07/1, ATL.
….we, the Maori People have been colonised by the same white invaders...our peoples, languages, cultures and spirituality have been subjected to assimilation, degradation and genocide...our treaties have been dishonoured, repudiated, not recognised, and not ratified by the white peoples representatives and governments...our sacred lands have been similarly taken, confiscated, occupied, expropriated, or ravaged by white settlers and their governments.332

The statement affirmed the solidarity of Maori with the Indian nations in the western hemisphere, identified with their 'struggles for life, liberty and sovereignty as ours', and affirmed 'our oneness' by seeking membership in the IITC. If membership was granted they requested that the IITC present to the United Nations their claims to 'redress [for] our lack of sovereignty in our own land, and to redress violations of our human, spiritual, and treaty rights'. Harawira's address and statement received approval from the IITC and the request for membership was accepted. The following year several representatives from the WAC and MPLMA attended the IITC conference in South Dakota and Hinewhare Harawira was elected onto the board and took up the position in 1985 which she retained for many years.

This opened up a vast indigenous activist network in North, Central and South America to Maori activists. It also placed Maori in an organisation which sought to support the struggles of indigenous peoples for self-determination, the recognition of treaties and land claims; to build solidarity between indigenous peoples, and to attend to human rights and environmental issues. Its methods were through advocacy, by providing information and technical assistance, building support networks, facilitating participation of indigenous peoples in appropriate United Nations forums, and working through NGOs and United Nations to have claims and issues recognised.333

In particular, the integration of Maori into the IITC brought close contact and friendships between activists which were expressed through reciprocal exchanges, and activists often came into New Zealand to participate in the Waitangi protests and attend Te Hui O Oranga. A resolution was passed at the IITC in 1984 that the IITC would recognise February 6th, Waitangi Day, as an international day of solidarity.


Conclusion:

Creating Space within an International Indigenous Activist Network

In the early 1970s Maori activist began to internationalise, and within a decade they had carved out a space for Maori within a vast international indigenous activist network. The process began during a period whereby domestic events politicised and then radicalised a new generation of Maori youth. This intersected with a period of immense social change globally which entered New Zealand. Liberation and Black Power ideologies, social movements, trends, events and a 'climate' of protest flooded into New Zealand and influenced and fuelled activists. Maori identified with oppressed people abroad and became aware of indigenous activists. A similar phenomenon took place amongst other indigenous people and in the early 1970s they began to make contact.

This chapter has shown the extent and range of Maori activism which took place across the world. Over the decade Maori activists travelled to Europe, communist bloc countries, the Pacific islands, North America and Australia. The participated in meetings, regional and international forums, and protest actions. Many of these were single issue events. They also made contact with other indigenous activists and this chapter has demonstrated the spread of Maori activism from first contact with Australian Aborigines, then into the Pacific islands where contact was made with liberation movements and subsequent involvement in the NFIP and other Pacific forums, and finally into the IITC in the United States. Contact was reciprocal with activists coming into New Zealand to support protest actions and Maori travelling abroad for similar purposes. By the end of the decade Maori had a place within an indigenous activist network of support and solidarity, where there was both moral and concrete support for each other’s struggles and protest actions, and based on the underlying idea that 'Our struggle is your struggle'.

Maori activists entered international spaces accompanied by a weighty and oppressive ‘one people’ race relations stereotype. This construct created and defined Maori as an indigenous people living in complete equality with Pakeha in a country with a reputation for having the best race relations in the world. It also signified, and was frequently stated, that in comparison to other indigenous people they were privileged or
advantaged, and thus it suggested Pakeha benevolence and that colonisation had been a more benign experience.

A central premise of this chapter is that the ‘one people ideology’ and accompanying stereotype of Maori as advantaged or privileged in relation to other indigenous people, determined the form which their activism took. Their imperative was to address such misconceptions and present an oppositional narrative which laid out the reality of colonisation in historical terms, and its contemporary legacy. I demonstrated how Maori used international indigenous spaces in a variety of ways: to provide support and solidarity for other indigenous people, to forge contacts and networks, and to exchange information and strategies. Overwhelmingly, and in almost all cases examined, indigenous and non-indigenous, Maori used international spaces to ‘tell their story’, and thus challenge and subvert the dominant ‘one people’ ideological construct.

They reclaimed the Maori experience and narrative of colonisation, and they laid out the contemporary realities of the position of Maori in a Pakeha-dominated society. In this they placed themselves at one with other indigenous people and in a space characterised by oppression, socio-economic disadvantage, political subjugation, on-going colonisation, and subject to institutional racism. Activists rejected that they were in any way privileged or advantaged, and while they knew they were in a better position, as Hana Jackson acknowledged, they rarely conceded or articulated the lesser privilege discourse of ‘better than’. The focus was not to defend whether or not they were advantaged or in a better position than others, it was to relate their experience and show that they too had suffered, struggled and resisted the same as had other indigenous people, and in contemporary terms the outcome had been much the same.

Noticeable too was that apart from one occasion, Maori activists never used international spaces to publicly challenge or embarrass the government. This was a common strategy of indigenous activists, and the Australian Aborigines used it often when abroad. It was suggested that this lay in the fact that Maori were in a better position in society and had a degree of political power which other indigenous peoples did not possess. Maori did not participate in the politics of embarrassment simply because there was no need. They had access to the political process and had representatives in parliament backed up Maori leaders pushing for claims to be
addressed. In contrast, Aborigines had no such political power and thus appealing to the international community and shaming their government internationally was the most effective means of having their grievances and claims recognised. The only time that Maori deliberately employed the politics of embarrassment was when the government remained intransigent over the issue of Bastion Point, and it seemed that a satisfactory outcome was unlikely.

International activism during the decade was a foundational period of making contacts, forming networks, becoming engaged in new organisations and participating in isolated events and forums across the world. It was a period which had movement and new spaces at its heart. By the early 1980s the ‘One People’ construct and accompanying stereotype of Maori as privileged and advantaged had been subverted. The ‘better than’ position was not important in activist circles. Recognised was that all indigenous people had their own unique experience of colonisation and the degree to which they had suffered, been oppressed and resisted did not somehow pit one against the other in the oppression stakes. Colonisation had been devastating in innumerable ways and its legacy was reflected in the contemporary situation of all indigenous. Thus, by the early 1980s the discourse was not one of who was more advantaged than the other, but of solidarity and support for all indigenous peoples who were resisting oppressive structures, who were looking to gain redress for past injustices and have treaties recognised, and who were seeking to gain some form of self-determination. It was within this strong indigenous activist space that Maori had made a place for themselves.
Chapter Five:

Intersecting Imperatives


Making Space at Home, Making Space at the United Nations

There are moments in history when people, ideologies, imperatives, and national and international realms intersect, and within that confluence spaces open up for something new to emerge. This chapter is centred on one of those ‘moments’ and examines a small slice of New Zealand’s history during a period in which racial discrimination became one of the key issues of the decade, both nationally and globally. It is through the narrow lens of racial discrimination, and two major themes of the thesis, New Zealand’s reputation, and the creation, use and control of space, that this chapter is framed.

Within the context of racial discrimination, I argue that the disparate imperatives of the United Nations, the New Zealand government and Maori intersected. Within this nexus, and stimulated by domestic conflict between Maori and the state, international influences and events, and a changing political landscape, new spaces opened up for Maori to challenge the government at home and eventually within the United Nations.

A key imperative of the United Nations during the 1960s was to address racial discrimination, and several conventions came into being. The most significant was the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). An expectation of the UN was that member states would ratify the convention. The UN initiative intersected with the government position on racial discrimination which was to deny that New Zealand had a significant problem. Despite repeated calls for racial discrimination to be addressed, the government refused to implement legislation. At the heart of its position lay the imperative which was to maintain New Zealand’s international reputation. This chapter explores the government response to ICERD and demonstrates the importance they placed on New Zealand’s
reputation. It argues that, although unwelcome and undesirable, the ratification of ICERD was unavoidable and the government was forced to commit to the convention.

This decision, followed by a lengthy period of inaction, and finally action with the ratification of ICERD, grafted onto the changing political landscape within Maoridom. Anger was high over the enactment of the Maori Affairs Amendment Act and a more radical form of activism emerged. Coming into New Zealand were issues related to racial discrimination, especially apartheid, and the United Nations focus on human rights which forced discussion about race relations and ICERD. This intersected with a major focus of Maori activists - racial discrimination and ‘white racism’. An examination of this confluence and the tangle of threads which came together during the late 1960s and early 1970s show how Maori created a space to challenge the government and ultimately take their concerns to the United Nations.

The final section focuses on the contact between Maori and the UN. The route for Maori into the UN was facilitated by bodies within the UN which were working to address racial discrimination. The first was the United Nations Special Committee on Apartheid (UNSCA) which sought the eradication of apartheid, and the other was the Economic and Social Council which initiated a study on discriminations against indigenous populations. Two major forms of contact are examined in terms of how Maori used the new spaces which opened up, and shows how Maori subverted the national race relations narrative. An additional focus is on the measures which were taken by the government to exert some control over the narrative and thus maintain New Zealand’s reputation. Both events demonstrate the concerns held by government over the contact between Maori activists and the UN, and their fears that contact would bring subversive activity and damage New Zealand’s international image.

Towards Anti-Discrimination Legislation:

The Panapa Petition and its Aftermath 1960-65

Immediately after the 1960 ‘No Maoris No Tour’ protest came a call for the government to attend to racial discrimination. On 22 September 1960 Sir Eruea Tirikatene presented a petition to the House of Representatives on behalf of Bishop Panapa and
Commonly known as the 'Panapa petition', the impetus for the action came directly from the 'No Maoris No Tour' protest and was underpinned, in part, by a determination to prevent further racial discrimination being applied to Maori on the rugby field. The petition, however, was not so narrowly defined and sought more than a simple request for government intervention in apartheid sport. Instead, it explicitly yoked apartheid sport to domestic discrimination.

It was widely recognised as a 'race relations petition'. This reflected the increased discussion on domestic discrimination and race relations taking place at the time, and also that demands from across the world for racial equality had permeated through to New Zealand by 1960. For some Maori this offered a new space which could be used to gain leverage and support for issues which they were contesting. While the Treaty of Waitangi was undoubtedly the main basis for any claims and provided some leverage, the international focus on race, equality and human rights added another space which Maori could use. They used both with reference to the Panapa petition.

The petition invoked the Treaty of Waitangi and reminded that since the signing of the Treaty, race relations 'had been based on absolute equality of Maori and Pakeha'. While this continued to be the case 'where the government reach extended', such as education, law, politics, social welfare and economics, 'in the sphere of social relationships', racial discrimination was a current reality. The exclusion of Maori from the All Black tour was framed within a wider societal context: racial discrimination was identified as occurring in 'hotels, boarding houses, cinemas and barber shops, and in certain spheres of employment'. The NZRFU was guilty too, for it had committed 'the most flagrant single act of racial discrimination ever to have taken place in New Zealand'. Further, the 'No Maoris No Tour' protest had not only garnered huge support, as evidenced by over 160,000 signatures in support of the petition, it had also 'excited the greatest discussion on race relations ever to be experienced in the Dominion'. Thus the petition called for the government to 'adopt a formal, full and solemn statement' on

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1 'Petition of the Bishop of Aotearoa, W. N. Panapa and others', 22 Sept 1960, MA1, 36/1/21, Part 2, NA
2 For example, the New Zealand Herald, 23 Sept 1960, identified the petition as a 'Petition on Race Relations', and the MWWL produced a copy of the petition for their members entitled 'Petition on Race Relations', Maori Women's Welfare League Records, 88-131-19/8, ATL.
3 'Petition of the Bishop of Aotearoa, W. N. Panapa and others', 22 Sept 1960, MA1, 36/1/21, Part 2, NA.
New Zealand's race relations policy, including its principles, ideals and goals, and to provide a mechanism by which discriminatory behaviour could be judged, monitored and dealt with. A submission accompanying the petition stressed that a declaration by government on race relations was necessary as New Zealand had no written constitution, Bill of Rights or legislation which regulated race relations. Although the Treaty of Waitangi guaranteed racial equality, there was nothing within the articles which had any bearing on social contacts and interactions between Maori and Pakeha.\(^4\)

The MWWL underpinned its submission in terms of the centrality of racial equality and human rights globally, and particularly in relation to the United Nations. To some extent this reflected the involvement of the MWWL in the PPSEAWA which had consultative status at the United Nations, shared its ideological base, and had forged close ties with UNESCO which dispersed literature throughout the PPSEAWA network. Thus, through participation at international conferences and the national organisation, the MMWL had developed a broad understanding of issues related to global inequality, discrimination and human rights. The MWWL submission drew on international currents and noted that as New Zealand subscribed to human rights ideology, the government had a duty to demonstrate its stated commitment to these ideals:

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\text{[There is]} \text{ the growing belief of our generation in the dignity of all men and the consciousness of the means whereby they might best develop unoppressed by fear, poverty, exploitation or inferiority. This belief is not a new one and has been held for many centuries…In our own day, the principles embodied in the United Nations Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights…have given impetus to these beliefs. Insofar as we subscribe to them, and insofar as they are relevant to our own situation, we believe that parliament has a duty to translate them for the guidance of our peoples... It would reflect our seriousness of purpose as a nation, and our awareness of our responsibilities in the great issue of race, both internally and within the community of nations – for it is unquestionably one of the dominant issues of our age.}^{5}\]

Satisfying the requests of the petition was placed on the National Government which came to office in November 1960. Ralph Hanan, Minister of Maori Affairs, consulted the Department of Maori Affairs and accepted the advice of Jack Hunn who opposed

\(^4\) 'Submission in Support of Petition, No.21 (1960), Race Relations', Maori Women's Welfare League Records, 88-131-19/8, ATL.

\(^5\) Ibid.
legislation related to racial discrimination. Hunn claimed that racial discrimination was not a problem, and he drew on a recent survey conducted by various government departments to assess the extent of discrimination. In this, he claimed, 'little evidence [had] come to light, either in the files or from the knowledge of officers', and while a 'few instances' of discrimination had been recorded, these were 'isolated' events, they extended over many years, and they were related mainly to employment and accommodation. Further, Hunn believed that such discrimination was not based on race but on 'social distinctions' and were 'truly minimal and nothing to worry about'. In fact the survey, which was finally presented in May 1961, found significant discrimination across a number of areas. However, Hunn argued that legislation was to be avoided for it would have repercussions domestically in fuelling current unrest, and internationally on New Zealand’s reputation:

Prohibition by law of discrimination against the Maori in such matters as accommodation or employment would leave room both here and overseas for exaggerated impression of the degree to which discrimination operated, would exacerbate existing feelings and would be virtually unenforceable in practice.

This position was maintained by the Department of Maori Affairs and the government throughout much of the 1960s whenever the issue of legislation against racial discrimination was raised.

However, the Panapa petition had not requested legislation but simply sought a declaration from government. The petitioners were adamant that 'legislation would not provide the answer to this problem' and in this they followed the CABTA line taken during the 'No Maoris No Tour' protest which had not sought intervention by legislation. Rather, racial equality was to be gained 'by a spirit of brotherhood and generosity...a

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6 Department of Maori Affairs, 'Race Relations in New Zealand and The Indigenous Populations Convention', May 1961, MA1, Box 654, 36/1/21, NA. The survey was initiated in 1959. Included in this report are comments on the survey by Jack Hunn.
7 J.K. Hunn, Report on the Department of Maori Affairs..., p.78.
8 Department of Maori Affairs, 'Race Relations in New Zealand and The Indigenous Populations Convention', May 1961, MA1, Box 654, 36/1/21, NA.
9 Correspondence, J. Hunn to R. Hanan, 4 September 1961, MA1, 36/1/21, Part 4, NA. See also, David Williams, Crown Policy Affecting Maori Knowledge Systems..., p.99.
priceless treasure. Racial equality commended by the law of the land, and enforced by the police powers of the State, is by comparison, a pitiful thing'.

The Parliamentary Petitions Committee heard oral submissions on the Panapa petition and considered these along with written submissions. Their recommendation to Parliament was that 'it be given most favourable consideration', and this was adopted by the House of Representatives. The MWWL was optimistic and noted that because of the positive response and recommendation by the Petitions Committee, 'It is hoped that Parliament will soon action this decision and that the resulting declaration will have the lasting effect hoped for in the relations between Maori and Pakeha'. By the end of the decade, no statement or declaration had been made by the government.

Throughout the 1960s calls were made for anti-racial discrimination legislation. There had been one earlier precedent in 1955 which arose out of allegations made by a young Maori, Donald Hiki, that he had been denied employment with the Huntly branch of the Bank of New Zealand (BNZ) because he was Maori. The issue gained some attention by the press and much more from the Department of Maori Affairs which initiated an investigation and found substance to Hiki's claim. This included a BNZ practice of not employing Maori who were 'of a dark colour' as 'some of their depositors were a bit fussy'. Eruera Tirikatene (MP Southern Maori) raised the matter with Prime Minister Sydney Holland and asked if he would introduce legislation 'making it an offence to discriminate against worthy citizens of New Zealand on account of race or colour'. Legislation was not forthcoming. The Canterbury Association for Racial Equality also pressed for legislation. One of its stated aims was to 'work for the passing of legislation to make any wilful act of racial discrimination a criminal offence in this country'.

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10 'The submissions of a deputation to Right Hon. W. Nash, Prime Minister, and Hon. J.R. Marshall, Acting Leader of the Opposition, from New Zealand Citizens' All Black Tour Association, and supporting organisations and citizens', 26 Feb 1960, p.3, CABTA Papers, O'Regan Family – Diaries and Papers, 89-097-5, ATL.
12 Ibid.
14 Cited in Rhonda Case, 'The Politics and Law....', p. 94.
15 Newspaper clipping, (No Name, No Date, Circa March 1961), MA1, 36/1/21, Part 2, NA.
its inaugural meeting in March 1961, Norman Gray (Maori) spoke of the need for legislation, in the context of the 1960 rugby tour of South Africa:

This country is always spouting about racial equality, but we saw in 1960 the vilest form of racial discrimination on the sports field. When the doors are opened for us to go onto the battlegrounds they draw no colour distinction. That is the only field where there is no racial discrimination...You may think the 1960 insult is forgotten or that the Maori did not care. When insulted a Maori will go away and say nothing. Many years will pass and many will die, but the Maoris will never forget the insult handed down to them in 1960.16

In 1964 the Canterbury Maori Executive petitioned for legislation but was rebuffed, and two bills prepared by the opposition Labour Party, the Unfair Discrimination Bill 1963 and the 1964 Contracts (Racial Equality) Bill were voted down by the Government.17 The latter was an important bill for it sought to legislate against any contract that included discriminatory provisions. The Department of Maori Affairs opposed the bill and Brian Souter (Deputy Secretary of Maori Affairs) argued that anti-discrimination legislation would send a message abroad that New Zealand had a race relations problem and would 'tarnish' the reputation and 'favourable opinion' which was currently held about New Zealand 'in most countries'.18 Moreover, legislation would not prevent 'infrequent' incidents of racial discrimination from occurring. The government revisited the issue in 1965, following information that an opposition Labour MP was intending to introduce another bill similar to the Contracts (Racial Equality) Bill. Discussion was centred on whether they should take pre-emptive action and introduce a similar but more limited bill for it was becoming clear that racial discrimination was increasingly being brought 'out into the open' and 'could no longer be ignored'.19 Maori Affairs continued to object but others realised that the government could not prevent instances of racial discrimination from being publicised and transmitted abroad. A memorandum for Cabinet members on legislation against racial discrimination noted that the failure to

16 Christchurch Star, 30 March 1961. A newspaper clipping, (No Date, No Name, Circa March 1961) identified the officers and committee of the organisation. Overwhelmingly they appear to have been Pakeha and Norman Gray was the only recognisable Maori in the organisation. However, there could have been other Maori involved who had English names, and it is likely that there were Maori supporters. See MA1, 36/1/21, Part 2, NA.
18 Memorandum, B.E. Souter (Deputy Secretary of Maori Affairs) to Ralph Hanan (Minister of Maori Affairs), 24 Sept 1964, MA1, 36/1/21, Part 9, NA.
act 'could harm our image overseas much more than the passing of legislation would'.\textsuperscript{20} Moreover, as many countries attached 'much greater importance than we do, to legislative declarations of policy', the enactment of legislation before problems of discrimination emerged 'might well enhance rather than damage our relations with other countries'.\textsuperscript{21} Maori Affairs, for its part, argued that legislation would have little effect and could stimulate demands for further anti-discrimination legislation.\textsuperscript{22} However, no specific legislation was passed, although anti-discriminatory provisions were introduced in the Property Law Amendment Act (1965) to prohibit restrictive agreements against individuals or family members based on 'colour, race or ethnic or national origin'.\textsuperscript{23} Clearly it was the preservation of New Zealand’s international image, rather than domestic discrimination, which was the principal concern of the government.

While the government was unwilling to introduce broad anti-discrimination legislation, at the same time measures were being introduced within the United Nations to address inequality and racial discrimination. For the purpose of this thesis, the focus is on two United Nations conventions: the Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, 1957 (No.107), and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). The latter convention was the most significant and is the prime focus. Despite being averse to introducing anti-discrimination legislation, New Zealand was drawn into engagement with the United Nations conventions. Although Maori played almost no part in any of the initial discussions, the following is significant for a glimpse of the strength and centrality of New Zealand’s reputation.

**Engagement with the ILO: Responding to Pressure**

The intersection between domestic race relations and the United Nations (UN) began in the late 1950s with measures taken to formally recognise the rights of indigenous peoples, an issue which had previously been of little concern. The first step began with the International Labour Organisation (ILO), a specialised agency of the UN, which formally codified international standards and placed obligations on states to recognise the rights and welfare of indigenous peoples, and sought to provide protection from

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid, p.103.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
oppression and discrimination. The 'Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, 1957 (No.107)', which was drafted without any input from indigenous people, reflected key concerns following World War Two: it was committed to human rights and racial equality, it had a development thrust which stressed national progress, and it sought the integration of indigenous peoples into the dominant mainstream population.24 The push for integration suggested that indigenous people were backward and had little to offer to the progress of states unless they integrated into mainstream society. It was a broad convention which covered a wide range of issues including education, health, recruitment, training and conditions of employment. Some provision was made for the retention of indigenous customs and institutions, although this was on the proviso that 'these were not incompatible with the national legal system or the objectives of integration programmes' of the state.25 Of significance was an obligation placed on states to preserve indigenous languages, and it advocated for the ownership and use of land and compensation for loss of land. Thus for its time, and despite the assimilatory thrust, the convention was significant. It recognised some indigenous rights and cultural needs, and it placed an obligation on states to deal with social and economic inequality and discrimination, and to develop programmes (in collaboration with indigenous leaders) to provide indigenous people with the same opportunities enjoyed by the dominant population.

Whether or not to become a signatory and then ratify the ILO Convention caused much discussion and some anxiety for successive governments, especially the National Government. It was difficult for New Zealand not to support the ILO convention: it was a ground-breaking initiative in that it was the first international convention related specifically to the rights of indigenous peoples. Moreover, Ernest Beaglehole, one of New Zealand's eminent scholars and a representative on the ILO committee, played an important role in its drafting.26 Much more troublesome, was that New Zealand's good reputation for the treatment of its indigenous people made it difficult to refuse to ratify the convention, but ratification would also open up New Zealand to regular international scrutiny. In communications with UN bodies and at UN forums, New Zealand

25 Ibid, Article 7 (2).
26 Correspondence, Alister McIntosh (Secretary of External Affairs) to government departments, 5 April 1966, MA1, Box 658, 36/1/21, Part 9, NA.
representatives regularly referred to New Zealand's race relations record, claimed it would 'stand scrutiny', and that as it took the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as its standard, all citizens enjoyed full economic, political, social and civil rights.27 Thus the refusal by New Zealand to ratify such a significant convention could raise questions about the veracity of such claims. Placed against a backdrop of high-profile incidents and events beginning in the late 1950s, and increasing public discussion related to domestic discrimination, some of which was reaching international audiences, it was in the interests of the government to become a signatory for it lent support to its race relations claims and signalled that it had nothing to hide. However the price was increased international scrutiny. It was this which bothered the government. Had domestic race relations accorded with New Zealand’s international reputation, then international scrutiny would not have been a cause for concern. The problem was that there was a significant distance between reputation and reality.

Before making a final decision, the government sought to determine the state of race relations and whether any adverse conditions existed which could prove embarrassing if it became a signatory to the convention. It would not ratify unless it could be certain that race relations would stand up to international scrutiny. In 1959 the Department of Maori Affairs was instructed to compile a report on the extent and nature of racial discrimination.28 The report, 'Race Relations in New Zealand and the Indigenous Populations Convention', was finalised in 1961 and was a compilation of information collected through Maori Affairs enquiries and reports from various government departments. It revealed that prejudice existed, including a belief that Maori were inferior, and that discrimination was widespread in housing, accommodation, employment, and to a lesser extent in hotels, shops, picture theatres, clubs and schools.29 Despite this, the report also expressed optimism: it noted that race relations were improving, and there was considerable goodwill towards Maori as evidenced by support from Pakeha during the 'No Maoris No Tour' protests. Moreover, in comparison to other countries, 'New Zealand bears a good name abroad for racial tolerance and

28 Correspondence, Alister McIntosh (Secretary of External Affairs) to Secretary for Maori Affairs, 5 April 1966, MA1, Box 658, 36/1/21, Part 9, NA.
29 Department of Maori Affairs, 'Race Relations in New Zealand and the Indigenous Populations Convention', May 1961, MA1, Box 654, 36/1/21, NA.
harmony. New Zealanders ...accept this modestly as their due, and the Maoris ...do not dispute it'.

The report suggested that several measures be implemented to increase contact and mutual understanding between Maori and Pakeha. This would ensure that any criticism of New Zealand, arising after ratification of the convention, could be answered in the knowledge that race relations were good in comparison to other countries and that measures were in place to improve them.

In February 1963, following inter-departmental discussion, the Department of Labour recommended to their minister that New Zealand ratify the ILO Convention. At this point the issue rested, the main reason being that work had started in the United Nations on a specific convention to eliminate racial discrimination. Many felt that the provisions of the ILO Convention were aimed at assisting indigenous peoples in Latin America whose experience and position in society bore no resemblance to that of Maori, and the new UN convention under consideration was likely to be of more relevance to the New Zealand situation.

Engagement with the United Nations: The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination

The most significant UN anti-racism convention, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), had its origins in an inexplicable epidemic of swastika-painting and other manifestations of anti-Semitism which spread around the globe in the European winter of 1959-1960. The Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and the Commission on Human Rights condemned the incidents as violations of the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and in December 1960 the General Assembly responded with Resolution 1510 (XV) which denounced all racial, religious and national hatred as violations of the United Nations Charter. In 1962 the General

31 Ibid, p.3.
32 Correspondence, Alister McIntosh (Secretary of External Affairs) to Secretary for Maori Affairs, 5 April 1966, MA1, Box 658, 36/1/21, Part 9, NA.
33 Such events even reached New Zealand and swastika's began appearing in cities. For example, in Palmerston North a white swastika and the words 'Heil Hitler' were scrawled on a wall of the Post Office, and in Wellington a fence was painted with a swastika and the words 'Jews Out'. See Canberra Times, 11 Jan 1960.
Assembly adopted a resolution entitled 'Manifestations of Racial Prejudice and National and Religious Intolerance' and requested that governments implement programmes to educate their people in order to eradicate such manifestations; to enact legislation if necessary to prohibit discrimination; and to implement measures to combat prejudice and intolerance. Following this, a draft resolution was put forward by African states which made no mention of religious intolerance or anti-Semitism and requested that a convention be prepared for the elimination of racial discrimination. On 20 November 1963 the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and requested that the Commission on Human Rights give priority to the preparation of the Convention. In December 1965 the General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

**Engagement, Discussion and Ambivalence: Undesirable but Unavoidable**

New Zealand was first drawn into the nascent convention in 1963 with a request from the Secretary-General (U Thant) for information on actions taken by New Zealand to comply with the resolution 'Manifestations of Racial Prejudice and National and Religious Intolerance'. The implications of being involved in the new anti-discrimination thrust of the UN were not lost on the government and viewed with some trepidation. In a memorandum to the Department of Maori Affairs, Foss Shanahan (Secretary of External Affairs) noted that as far as New Zealand was concerned, attention would be concentrated on race relations and New Zealand would be expected to take the lead in actively promoting racial harmony, removing any vestiges of discrimination, and discouraging prejudice and intolerance of any form. Moreover, while the report would be forwarded to the Secretary-General, it was unlikely that the interest of the General Assembly and ECOSOC would be exhausted by one report and the process of seeking information on race relations and the steps taken to address issues would 'probably be a continuing one'.

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35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Memorandum, Foss Shanahan (Secretary of External Affairs) to Secretary of Maori Affairs, 18 Feb 1963, MA1, Box 354, 19/1/131, Part 1, NA.
38 Ibid.
More pertinently, Shanahan observed that while race relations fell within the domestic jurisdiction of member states, if New Zealand was to set an example of international co-operation they could not refuse to transmit information or comply with UN requests. In short, it was a Catch 22 situation. New Zealand's reputation was such that there was an expectation that they take a lead on the elimination of racial discrimination as an example for other nations, but in doing so, domestic race relations would be exposed to international scrutiny. This was similar to concerns held during discussions over the ILO. The government was aware that racial discrimination existed and could become visible through engagement with the UN. Indeed the Department of Maori Affairs asserted that 'no impartial observer could deny that racial discrimination exists in New Zealand'. Yet despite this, the government also needed to engage with the UN to maintain New Zealand's reputation. Thus, while not happy at the prospect of having race relations held up to international scrutiny, the government had little choice but to comply and engage with United Nations requests and directives.

From this point on the government was increasingly forced into a position of supplying reports on race relations and, keen to maintain its international reputation, furnished information which was tailored to sustain New Zealand's good reputation. The information which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supplied to the Secretary-General in 1963 was a case in point. Despite the recent study on discrimination by the Department of Maori Affairs, studies by scholars such as David Ausubel, and increased discussion and evidence of discrimination during and following the 1960 rugby tour, racial discrimination was white-washed out of the UN report. Instead it was reported that 'New Zealand is in a fortunate position of not being troubled to any noticeable extent by manifestation of racial prejudice', and thus it was not necessary to implement the recommendations in the resolution related to manifestations of racial intolerance. As in all other countries, 'social distinctions' did exist but these were 'not related primarily to questions of race'. Racial harmony was evidenced by 'substantial intermarriage'; Maori had full political, social and economic equality and civil rights; and the government was making strong progress towards full integration.

39 Department of Maori Affairs, 'Race Relations in New Zealand and the Indigenous Populations Convention', 1961, p.1, MA1, Box 654, 36/1/21, NA.
40 Report, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Wellington) to Secretary-General United Nations, 30 July 1963, MA1, Box 354, 19/1/131, Part 1, NA.
There was also a lack of enthusiasm about complying with UN requests for reports. In January 1964 the secretary-general asked for a progress report on the action taken by New Zealand in response to the Declaration on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. A year later, New Zealand's permanent representative to the United Nations queried why the request had not been acted on and the Secretary of External Affairs conceded that perhaps it would be prudent to furnish some information as 'no reply at all might attract unwelcome attention'. Therefore comments were sent to the permanent representative to relay to the secretary-general which said little about substantive progress (as few actions had been undertaken), and merely stated that the government opposed racial discrimination and all citizens had equality before the law. The progress initiatives identified were that the government, assisted by the press, had drawn attention to the broader issues of racial discrimination and promoted a 'healthy public conscience'. To this end the declaration had been distributed in all education institutions and government departments.

With the adoption of ICERD by the UN in December 1965, the government set about scrutinising the terms of the convention, in order to make a decision whether or not to become a signatory. Prime Minister Holyoake was certain that there would be an expectation that New Zealand sign and ratify the convention, and the government would be placed under great pressure nationally and internationally to do so. The main objections to ICERD came from the Department of Maori Affairs. Jock McEwen (Secretary of Maori and Island Affairs) 'did not think New Zealand had anything to fear from international scrutiny' for although it was undeniable that racial discrimination did exist, these were isolated incidents and 'of little importance'. He did however have deep reservations about Part 2 (Articles 8-16) of the convention which governed issues of monitoring and reporting, and his objections related mainly to domestic jurisdiction and the potential for interference by other states or individuals. Article 8 established the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination which was comprised of eighteen members elected by state parties. McEwen viewed this with 'considerable
apprehension' and thought it offered 'an admirable opportunity for the extremist members to.... busy themselves with our affairs instead of their own'. In a similar vein, Article 11 posed problems as it enabled any state to approach the committee and bring a complaint against another state if it considered that it was not adhering to the terms of the convention. The committee would then approach the state concerned and insist that it provide explanations and the efforts it had taken to remedy the situation. McEwen found this to be 'objectionable' and 'especially designed to enable international busybodies to interfere in the domestic affairs of other states'.

Article 14 was the most unacceptable, for this provided an opening for individuals or groups, who believed that the state was in violation of the terms of the convention, to approach the committee directly. This was on the proviso that they had exhausted all domestic efforts to resolve the issues. However this provision could only be activated if the state formally recognised and declared the competence of the committee to receive and consider such communications. If it did so, the complaints would be brought to the attention of the state which could then be held to account. For McEwen, this was utterly unacceptable:

Article 14 is a priceless opportunity for the victims of hallucinations to air their views in an outside forum. In this Department, there is a very long history of petitions to Parliament on Maori land claims and other matters which have been inquired into and investigated ad nauseum. I hesitate to think what would be the result of opening up a direct channel to the United Nations. We already have in this country, in addition to the ordinary legal remedies, the system of petitioning parliament and we have an Ombudsman. Surely this should suffice.

Arguably what McEwen found objectionable was that Article 14 would allow Maori access to an international space within which they could present grievances and injustices and in doing so, introduce a new narrative of race relations. It was a space which held a degree of power for people marginalised and discriminated against and who lacked an effective voice or political leverage to have their grievances acknowledged and acted upon. In its working form it was a space in which

46 Correspondence, Jock McEwen (Secretary of Maori Affairs) to Alister McIntosh (Secretary of External Affairs), 13 April 1966, MA1, Box 658, 36/1/21, Part 9, NA.
discriminatory practices and policies, or the inaction of government in dealing with discrimination, could be exposed to an international body, thereby causing embarrassment to a government and resulting in opprobrium from the committee. For the New Zealand Government, which consistently held up New Zealand’s good race relations image to the world, this was troublesome.

In the event, New Zealand signed the convention in October 1966 and then dragged its heels for five years as it considered ratification. One of the main issues was the provision of Article 6 which required states to set up a tribunal or institution to deal with acts of racial discrimination, and to provide all citizens with access and the right to seek redress or satisfaction from the tribunal.47 In discussion, External Affairs noted that the minimum measures which New Zealand could enact, would be a simple procedure whereby complaints of discrimination could be investigated and stopped through the mechanism of a tribunal.48 McEwen was opposed to special legislation being enacted to deal with racial discrimination, and the setting up of a tribunal:

...the more talk there is about racial discrimination and the more special law that is enacted on the subject, the more it is likely to increase than the reverse ...the setting up of special judicial machinery to consider acts of racial discrimination should be avoided at all costs.49

In his view racial discrimination was not a problem as incidents of discrimination were isolated and rare. This, he claimed, was a view shared by officers in the Department of Maori Affairs who were 'better able to give an opinion than most people'.50

**Maori, the Government and ICERD: Opening up a space for Maori**

In 1968 the UN pushed human rights onto the agenda of member states, a move which prompted discussion on a range of human rights issues including inequality and racial discrimination. In New Zealand, and despite its reluctance, the government had no choice but to 'talk about racial discrimination' and place ICERD before the public. In April/May 1968 the First World Conference on Human Rights was held in Tehran and

48 Analysis by the Department of External Affairs on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, (No Date, Circa June/July 1967), MA1, Box 658, 36/1/21, Part 9, NA.
49 Correspondence, Jock McEwen (Secretary for Maori Affairs) to Secretary of External Affairs, 7 Aug 1967, MA1, Box 658, 36/1/21, Part 9, NA.
50 Ibid.
an appeal was made for those states which had not ratified ICERD to do so and to take 'immediate and effective steps' to eliminate racial discrimination. Up to this point, only nineteen states had ratified and eight more were needed to bring the convention into force.\textsuperscript{51} 1968 had also been designated by the UN as International Human Rights Year to celebrate the 20\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This was marked throughout New Zealand by lectures, conferences, seminars, and publicity about the protection of human rights at home and abroad, as part of New Zealand's commitment to the UN to promote human rights during the year.\textsuperscript{52}

New Zealand had always been complacent about its human rights record, simply because it was assumed that there were few human rights problems to be addressed. However, by 1968, however, the major human rights issue in New Zealand, especially for Maori and their Pakeha supporters, was racial discrimination. In international terms, this was reflected by a growing awareness of the system of apartheid in South Africa, and the identification by some Maori activists with the oppression and discrimination suffered by black South Africans. Domestically, the MAAA had angered, politicised, and raised the consciousness of many Maori of their subordinate political status. That the government had failed to include Maori in the decision-making process, or ignored their wishes, signalled discrimination and inequality quite clearly. At the same time, it sent a message that the government had failed to honour its commitments under the Treaty of Waitangi. Thus racial discrimination was highlighted at various events in 1968, and ICERD was also presented at some meetings and addresses. Most likely the government promoted discussion in order to fulfil its obligation as signatory to ICERD which directed states to make citizens aware of its 'purposes and principles'.\textsuperscript{53}

The public meetings and conferences opened up spaces for Maori who had previously been side-lined from discussion on ICERD, and more generally it opened up considerable discussion on racial discrimination. Moreover there had been scant mention in the mainstream media about ICERD and thus New Zealand citizens were generally not well-informed. The public meetings raised awareness and understandings

\textsuperscript{52} Correspondence, Prime Minister Holyoake to Minister of Maori Affairs, 28 April 1967, MA1, Box 658, 36/1/21, Part 9 NA.
of the moves taking place to address racial discrimination internationally. In August Ralph Hanan (Minister of Justice and Attorney-general) gave a lecture entitled ‘Human Rights: The Prospect’ at Victoria University, Wellington. In this Hanan noted that New Zealand had not attached much importance to legislation designed to enforce human rights. Instead, the government preferred to rely on ‘common law’ supported by the good will of citizens. Similarly, legislation which prohibited discrimination was not favoured, although ‘to some extent…we do not have it because we do not think we need it’. However, in relation to ICERD, he indicated that New Zealand may have no choice but to ratify the convention, even though the government considered legislation ‘undesirable’.

If we fail to accept these conventions on the grounds that our legislation does not comply we are open to the accusation – perhaps specious but nonetheless often sincere – that we are really practising discrimination after all, and that our claims to virtue are hypocritical.

Between 18 and 20 October, a 'Conference on Human Rights: For Greater Rights and Freedoms for All' was held at Auckland University. Ranginui Walker was convenor of the sessions on race relations and ICERD was on the agenda. A pamphlet detailing topics for discussion stated that it was 'incomprehensible' that the convention had not been ratified, bearing in mind New Zealand 'proclaims itself as an example to the world in this field'. The aim of the race relations session was to evaluate how much 'reality matches our self-image of racial tolerance, equality and harmony' and to consider ratification of ICERD.

The Department of External Affairs provided a lengthy statement for the conference on the conventions New Zealand had ratified or had yet to ratify, and included in the discussion was ICERD. This was weighted towards why the government should not ratify, rather than the reasons why it should. Highlighted, was the suggestion that international standards could impinge negatively on the system of 'rights' which existed

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54 Ralph Hanan, 'Human Rights; The Prospect', an address delivered at Victoria University, 7 Aug 1968, printed in 'Some Comments on New Zealand Participation in Human Rights Treaties', Department of External Affairs, Circa 1968, p.1, Rita King Papers, MS-Papers-8541-19, ATL.
55 Ibid.
56 Conference Pamphlet. 'A Conference on Human Rights: For Greater Rights and Freedoms For All', p.2, Rita King Papers, MS-Papers-8541-19, ATL.
57 'Some Comments on New Zealand Participation in Human Rights Treaties', Department of External Affairs, Circa 1968, Rita King Papers, MS-Papers-8541-19, ATL.
domestically, and force them to be invalidated. A major 'cause of anxiety' was the issue of 'superintendence' because this 'was no more than a select committee of persons elected by member states, who may be responsive to prevailing political views'. This reflected a mistrust borne out of the decolonisation of Africa and Asia which had seen the number of states from these continents increase and nullify the numerical advantage previously held at the UN by western countries. The power held by the newly decolonised states can be seen in the increased focus on apartheid and punitive measures being placed on South Africa by the UN. New Zealand considered that many of the newly formed states were incapable of making unbiased judgements, and were interested in promoting their own agenda, not least about apartheid and South Africa. The antipathy of the government to the anti-apartheid stance by African and Asian States was reflected in its refusal to attend a Seminar on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination at New Delhi in 1968 'on the grounds that it seemed likely to be extreme in tone' in relation to apartheid.

Although the record of discussion at the Auckland conference is absent a reasonable speculation can be made about whether New Zealand’s 'self-image of racial tolerance, equality and harmony' matched the reality. The speakers and panel included a range of Maori activists, including Doug Sinclair, Matiu Rata, Ranginui Walker and Syd Jackson, all of whom had recently spoken out forcefully about race relations. Doug Sinclair, who later became involved with Nga Tamatoa, gave a presentation on 'The New Zealand Myth of Racial Equality' at the Auckland conference. Two months previously he had presented a paper on race relations at Waikato University and had argued that racial equality was a myth. While race relations appeared harmonious, below the surface 'many Maori were resentful at their exploitation by the Pakeha', and the racial discrimination to which they were subjected. Further, they were angered by the policy of integration which disregarded their aspirations to retain their cultural integrity, and which was the means to extinguish Maori 'as a separate entity.' Similarly, Ranginui Walker had recently addressed the International Friendship League

58 Ibid.
59 Correspondence, George Laking (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) to Prime Minister Holyoake, 27 May 1971, MA1, Box 659, 36/1/21, Part 10, NA.
60 New Zealand Herald, 19 Aug 1968.
on the topic, ‘Race Relations in the New Zealand Situation’. In this he informed the audience that the image of racial equality and harmony, which New Zealand presented to the world, was incorrect. While Pakeha 'fervently' believed this and attributed it to 'something special' in their character, the lack of friction in the past between Maori and Pakeha was due entirely to Maori who had often set aside their wishes and aspirations to accommodate Pakeha. This, Walker stated, had come to an end and Maori were now 'less accommodating, more outspoken when their rights were infringed' and their aspirations ignored.

Syd Jackson attended the Auckland conference as a panellist in a discussion entitled 'Sport and Apartheid'. Jackson had become heavily involved in the emerging anti-apartheid campaign and had recently used the space to focus public attention on domestic racism, and draw parallels between the oppression and discrimination of Maori and black South Africans. This address was a searing critique of race relations and he stated that New Zealanders were not in any position to ‘hold ourselves up as having ideal race relations’, and nor should they allow ‘such a hypocritical image [to] be hoisted overseas. New Zealand's self-image of racial tolerance, equality and harmony was a sham.’ Thus in all probability, similar sentiments were expressed by Walker, Sinclair and Jackson at the Auckland conference, and at other conferences and seminars during 1968.

Also likely, was the view that the government should ratify ICERD. Bearing in mind the centrality of race relations and the increased focus on racial discrimination (and increasingly the harder term, 'racism'), there is no doubt that many did find it 'incomprehensible' that such an important convention had not been ratified. However, despite the government's burst in publicising the issue in 1968, over the following years it continued to stall and displayed little enthusiasm for enacting the legislation necessary for ratification of the convention. In the House, when Prime Minister Holyoake was asked about the government's position on ICERD, he admitted that he had 'not been pushing the departments...because it is an intricate study and departments cannot spend

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61 Ranginui Walker, Address to the International Friendship League, 'Race Relations in the New Zealand Situation', 28 Sept 1968, Rata Papers, ABAF, 2/21, NA.
62 Ibid.
63 'I'm against the tour', CARE pamphlet, [no date], Box 1, Item 1, Gary Clover Papers, MSS & Archives A-127, UAL. In 1968 Syd Jackson was President of the New Zealand Federation of Maori Students.
all their time on it'. It was a particularly weak response and indicated his reluctance to ratify the convention.

**ICERD and a reluctant government: generating a space for Maori activists**

The human rights conferences, seminars and publicity, generated an awareness of ICERD amongst Maori, especially the newly formed activist groups MOOHR, Te Hokioi, and later, Nga Tamatoa. ICERD dovetailed with their focus and activism against racial discrimination nationally and also internationally, especially in relation to apartheid. It was also grafted onto their dissatisfaction with the government which they considered racist in that it failed to consider Maori aspirations, or consult with Maori about new policies which had a direct effect on Maori lives. This had been demonstrated with the passing of the 1967 MAAA against Maori wishes. As an example, MOOHR spoke of 'the disillusionment of so many Maori with the empty parliamentary promises they associate with a “Pakeha veto” or government', and legislation which stripped Maori of their lands. Similarly, Patu Hohepa criticised the government for speaking of racial equality while at the same time it 'ignored the advice of bodies representing minority groups'.

The lack of response from the government about ICERD opened up a new space for Maori activists, in which they sought to shame and embarrass the government. In this they held government actions and inaction up to the public, called government to account and demanded ICERD be ratified. The government was berated for its lack of commitment to the elimination of racial discrimination, and its claims to racial equality and harmony were scoffed and ridiculed.

*Te Hokioi* spoke of widespread inequality and racial discrimination, especially in relation to employment, and insisted that the government 'introduce the legislation making such discrimination a crime'. It was time to halt the fictive race relations discourse and 'tear down the Hanan-Holyoake fig-leaf of racial equality'. MOOHR

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65 Correspondence, Tama Poata (MOOHR) to Matiu Rata (MP Northern Maori), 28 Oct 1970, Rata Papers, ABAF 2/33, NA.
used the press and its newsletters to publicise, raise awareness and urge ratification of
the convention. It placed ICERD within a larger frame of government failure to attend
to Maori aspirations, including recent demands for ratification of the Treaty of Waitangi,
and unwillingness to attend to racial discrimination. It also placed New Zealand within
an international context and found New Zealand to be wanting in comparison to other
countries, and suggested that while the government spoke often of model race relations,
its failure to ratify ICERD did not match this claim.

Some 40 governments of the world's nations have already ratified the UNO
Convention....Will New Zealand's Government attach the same importance to
ratification as most Governments do, or will it avoid ratifying the UNO Convention it
signed in 1966 in the same way as it refuses to ratify the Treaty of Waitangi? ...It is time
for the NZ people to act to oppose racial discrimination which in some places is clearly
more and more raising its ugly head...We think that the NZ Government should ratify
the UNO Convention ...as an earnest... [indication] of its genuine desire to do away with
all remnants of racial discrimination in New Zealand and that the people of New
Zealand should unite in the spirit of Waitangi to demand that the government uphold the
good name of our country and prove that official claims about model race relations can
be achieved in reality.68

Tama Poata corresponded with the New Zealand United Nations Association (UNA)
and suggested that the government be reminded that it had an obligation to adhere to the
fundamental principles of the United Nations. He noted that government
representatives at the UN, and most recently Jack Marshall at the General Assembly,
continued to parrot the line that 'New Zealand yields a place to no-one in practising the
principles on racial equality and opposing apartheid and racial intolerance wherever it
occurs'. However, there was a profound ‘disparity’ between such claims and the fact
that the government refused to ratify ICERD, and had recently abstained from the
General Assembly vote to oppose racism and apartheid in South Africa. Poata suggested
that the UNA had an obligation to use their influence 'to ensure that the official
declarations in favour of racial harmony do not remain mere words'.69

68 MOOHR Newsletter, Dec 1970, pp.4-5, NZSCM Papers, MS-Papers-1617-669, ATL.
69 Correspondence, T. Poata (MOOHR) to D. Bedggood, (President, United Nations Association, NZ), 29
October 1970, Rata Papers, ABAF 2/33, NA.
Similarly, Nga Tamatoa took every opportunity to call the government to account. They pointed out the discrepancy between the constant statements of ideal race relations made by the government at international fora, and its tardiness in formally demonstrating such claims. The group rebuked the government, especially Duncan MacIntyre (Minister of Maori Affairs), and pointed out that five years had passed since the signing of ICERD and yet the government continued to refuse to ratify and adopt measures to eliminate racial discrimination. What, they asked, did the government have to hide? Peter Rikys, recalled that the group had all the information on the issue 'and we beat the Minister over the head with it'. Matiu Rata kept up the pressure at government level and called on Prime Minister Holyoake to explain why his government had not ratified the convention. Holyoake replied that it was being 'considered' and he justified the inaction by noting that New Zealand was not unique in that 71 states had signed ICERD and yet only 35 had ratified to date.

**Window Dressing for a Watching World: The 1971 Race Relations Bill**

On 25 Feb 1971 the Holyoake government, through the Governor-General Sir Arthur Porritt, announced that it would be introducing a Race Relations Bill during the year, in part as recognition of the United Nation's International Year against Racial Discrimination. On 9 July 1971, five years after becoming a signatory to ICERD, Daniel Riddiford (Minister of Justice), introduced the Race Relations Bill (RRB) in Parliament. The object was 'to reaffirm the Government's commitment to racial equality in New Zealand and… to enact the provisions of the United Nations convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination'. The RRB made it unlawful to discriminate 'on the grounds of colour, race, ethnic or national origins' and it appointed a conciliator to investigate and adjudicate complaints of racial discrimination.

In domestic terms, and despite Riddiford’s fine words, the purpose of the RRB was not principally to 'reaffirm the government's commitment to racial equality' and address racial discrimination. Had the government been committed to this issue it would have

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70 Peter Rikys tape, Diamond Series.
71 Correspondence, Matiu Rata to Prime Minister Keith Holyoake, 22 July 1969, Rata Papers, ABAF 2/21, NA.
72 Correspondence, Prime Minister Keith Holyoake to Matiu Rata, 5 Aug 1969, Rata Papers, ABAF 2/21, NA.
74 Ibid, p.1701.
acceded to repeated requests over the previous decade for anti-discrimination legislation, or been willing to make a statement on race relations as the Panapa petition had requested. If domestic race relations had been a serious consideration the government would have involved and consulted with Maori during the drafting of the RRB. Most indicative of the lack of commitment to domestic concerns, was that the bill only included the bare minimum of provisions necessary to satisfy the requirements needed for ratification of the ICERD.75

The fact was that the government considered the legislation to be undesirable, unnecessary, but unavoidable. The principal consideration for the introduction of the legislation was New Zealand’s international reputation. As David Thomson observed, if it had not been for 'considerations affecting our international relations and our international reputation' which made the implementation of the ICERD 'desirable', the government 'would never have considered the legislation'.76 Thus, quite simply, the principal aim of the Race Relations Bill was to provide the minimum statutory and administrative measures necessary to enable New Zealand to ratify the ICERD.

The reasons for the decision to ratify the convention in terms of international considerations were complex. Domestic unrest played a part. The rise of political consciousness, the development of radical Maori activism, and a new political forcefulness expressed by many Maori, had changed the political landscape. Many Maori leaders and activists were pressuring the government to acknowledge and deal with racial discrimination and thus ratify the convention. However, domestic unrest was not reason enough to commit to ICERD, but it was more serious when placed against the impact on New Zealand’s international standing. A central concern was New Zealand's reputation and a world which was watching more closely as Maori activists were beginning to crack open the 'best race relations' façade with talk of a society infested with racial inequality and 'white racism'. At the same time, New Zealand's policy of maintaining sporting contact with South Africa was raising questions abroad and suggesting that the same white racist attitudes which supported apartheid also underpinned the relationship between Maori and Pakeha. In ratifying the

convention, the government could be seen to be sympathetic to Maori demands and also send a strong message internationally that New Zealand was committed to the elimination of racial discrimination. International considerations were paramount: the government needed to be seen to be taking a strong anti-discrimination stance, which would in turn reinforce New Zealand’s good image. Sir Guy Powles (Ombudsman) argued that it was imperative that New Zealand ratified the convention as it was 'essential for our international position that we should be prepared to stand up and be counted'. That it chose to introduce the Race Relations Bill in 1971, the ‘International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Prejudice’, enabled the government to make a highly symbolic statement. Hugh Templeton (MP, Awarua) noted that the RRB may not be strictly necessary as New Zealand had a good record on race relations. Nevertheless, as it was a United Nations designated year to combat racial discrimination, this was one way in which New Zealand could demonstrate its commitment to the United Nations. However, as Ralph Hanan had pointed out a few years earlier, New Zealand had little choice but to ratify ICERD: to state that race relations were good but refuse to ratify the convention could raise questions about the veracity of such a claim.

If the government thought that Maori would wholeheartedly welcome the proposed legislation, they were misguided. Their mistake was to underestimate the depth of discontent and the new political resolve which had permeated through Maoridom following the introduction of the MAAA. For Maori, a major issue of contention was that the government had either not consulted with Maori or had ignored the demands and wishes of Maori leaders. Coming out of the furore was an expectation from Maori leaders that they be included in any discussions on proposed legislation which affected their people. Clearly this message had not been heeded by the government: the RRB was drafted without any consultation or advice from Maori leaders, and they were locked out of the decision-making process.

79 An extract from Hanan's lecture 'Human Rights; The Prospect' delivered at Victoria University, 7 Aug 1968, printed in 'Some Comments on New Zealand Participation in Human Rights Treaties', Department of External Affairs, Circa 1968, p.1, Rita King Papers, MS-Papers-8541-19, ATL.
Thus, another political space opened up for Maori to draw attention to the unequal relationship between Maori and Pakeha. Matiu Rata took the government to task and pointed out that no longer could it continue to enact legislation without consulting with the people directly affected.\textsuperscript{80} Nga Tamatoa asked why the NZMC and other organisations had not been consulted during the drafting of the RRB, and they demanded that it be deferred and a new bill created with Maori participation.\textsuperscript{81} MOOHR questioned the government's commitment to racial equality in the light of its continual marginalisation of Maori from decision-making processes. It noted that had the government been committed to racial equality it would have consulted with Maori when drafting the legislation. Instead it 'repeats the same mistake of 1967 when it passed the Maori Affairs Amendment (Land Grab) Act without consulting Maoris and in the teeth of Maori opposition'.\textsuperscript{82} Even the more moderate NZMC commented:

> For the Maori equality means increased participation in the decision-making processes of the country... Maoris did not have a part in the framing of the Race Relations Bill, nor were they part of any delegation that discussed race relations at international level to ensure the inclusion of the Maori point of view.\textsuperscript{83}

Maori quickly came to the conclusion that the RRB was concerned principally with satisfying United Nations requirements, and domestic race relations were a minor consideration. As one critic stated bluntly, it was nothing more than 'window-dressing for a watching world'.\textsuperscript{84} It was simply 'another piece of Pakeha legislation' designed to fulfil the requirements necessary to ratify the ICERD, and 'to fly the flag to show the United Nations that New Zealand is doing something about race relations'.\textsuperscript{85} Matiu Rata noted that the purpose of the Act was to maintain New Zealand's international reputation, but he doubted whether it would satisfy members of the UN about New Zealand’s sincerity on race relations. He pointed to New Zealand's disgraceful voting record at the UN where it consistently abstained from voting on issues of human rights and racial discrimination, including resolutions related to apartheid. New Zealand's

\textsuperscript{81} NZPD, Vol.377, 23 Nov-17 Dec, 1971, p.5308; Peter Rikys tape, Diamond Series.
\textsuperscript{82} MOOHR Newsletter, October 1971, p.5.
\textsuperscript{83} 'Manifesto of the New Zealand Maori Council on the Race Relations Bill 1971', ND (Circa 1971), prepared by Dr Ranginui Walker, Rata Papers, ABAF, 2/47, NA.
\textsuperscript{84} MOOHR Newsletter, October 1971, p.5.
reputation would be measured on such actions and not by legislation, and the
government 'must realise that the country's reputation abroad cannot and must not be
salvaged on the backs of the minority people of this country'. 86

For Maori, their priority lay not with satisfying a United Nations convention but with
attending to domestic discrimination. Most supported ratification of ICERD, but in
terms of fulfilling Maori expectations the RRB fell short. Many argued that it was
inadequate in that it failed to incorporate a Maori point of view; it lacked depth and
favoured a punitive approach; and it was modelled along the lines of race relations
legislation from England. Therefore it failed to reflect the unique character of New
Zealand society and contained nothing Maori such as the Treaty of Waitangi. Paraone
Reweti (MP, Eastern Maori) argued that if there was to be legislation on race relations,
it deserved to be treated with integrity and the government need look no further than the
Treaty of Waitangi which had been ignored and yet was the 'greatest race relations
agreement in New Zealand'. Legislation 'should embody the spirit and principles of the
treaty which for over a hundred years had been promoted by Maori as the means of
racial harmony'. 87 Pei Te Hurinui Jones (NZMC) reminded the Statutes Revision
Committee that New Zealand's first race relations bill was the Treaty of Waitangi and
Maori were still waiting for legal recognition of that document. 88 Koro Wetere (MP,
Western Maori) went further and argued that if the government wanted to ratify
anything it should be the Treaty of Waitangi. This would demonstrate its commitment to
race relations.

For the last decade there has been a treaty awaiting ratification...and the Government
has done nothing about it...Government members are always talking about cleaning up
our own back yard first...We do not want something to be ratified in another part of the
world, we want something done in this country. 89

Maori opposition to the RRB was widespread and registered in the press, on marae, at
district councils and national organisations, and through submissions to the Statutes
Revision Committee. Syd Jackson challenged Duncan MacIntyre at Waitangi and
accused the government of placing 'international posturing before the needs and welfare

88 Pei Te Hurinui Jones, 'Introduction – Submission of the New Zealand Maori Council on the Race
Relations Bill 1971', Rata Papers, ABAF, 2/47, NA.
of the Maori people' and for producing a 'totally inadequate Bill'.

Nga Tamatoa made a submission to the Statutes Revision Committee which, recalls Peter Rikys, 'was greeted with horror' and the committee 'debated at length whether they would even receive it'. The submission condemned the government for presenting a bill which was 'sheer tokenism' and designed purely for 'international window dressing':

As an exercise in indifference, ignorance, stupidity...the Bill is difficult to surpass...it is a cheap and dirty insult to the United Nations and the Maori people...a pandering to an international reputation in the field of race relations which widely departs from domestic realities...if the Government of New Zealand is so concerned about the questions of racial discrimination and the real welfare of the Maori people...why has it taken 5 years to produce one totally inept Bill? ...Why wasn't the New Zealand Maori Council and other organisations...brought in, in a consulting capacity...Why is the Government so anxious to push through some form of Race Relations Bill? ...To supply international window dressing?  Surely the Government would not be guilty of such hypocrisy.

The crux of the opposition to the RRB lay in the issue of uniformity of equality and thus the subsuming of Maori identity within 'one people'.  No-one disputed that racial discrimination had to be eradicated, although some argued that legislation was not the answer.  What worried many Maori was that in the quest for absolute equality, with the passing of the RRB into legislation, the new RRA could put an end to special Maori rights.  This included rights related to land, the four Maori seats in Parliament, the New Zealand Maori Council, Maori Wardens, Maori Welfare Officers and Maori church schools.  The concern was that all could be regarded as a form of racial discrimination and in contravention of both the RRA and ICERD.  The New Zealand Maori Graduates Association (NZMGA), in their submission to the Statutes Revision Committee, observed that there was a growing body of Pakeha opinion which viewed separate Maori organisations and institutions as racist, and would therefore see these as incompatible with the RRA.  Pressure could be placed on the government to have them removed.  Such views, they noted, took integration to mean that New Zealanders were

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90 Sunday Herald, 6 Feb 1972.
91 Peter Rikys tape, Diamond Series.
93 Auckland District Maori Council Report, ND (Circa 1971), MP-1991/4/12, Folder 9, UAL.
94 'Submission of the New Zealand Maori Graduates Association on the Race Relations Bill', Oct 1971, Rata Papers, ABAF, 2/47, NA
all one people and therefore 'should have one political system, one set of laws, one education system, one race and one culture....The fact that Maoris want to retain and perpetuate their cultural identity is of no significance although...some concession is made for hakas and action songs as part of the tourist industry'. They argued for 'equality in diversity', and called for the maintenance and perpetuation of Maori organisations and institutions, and freedom of cultural expression. The NZMC submission also focussed on the maintenance of Maori institutions and organisations as central for the perpetuation of Maori identity. Maori did not wish to be the same and subsume their identity under the equalising frame of 'one people'. They regarded their identity as 'sacrosanct' and whilst they 'share their country with a majority group they reserve the right to be different.' As a result of the widespread and deep dissatisfaction of the RRB, various organisations called for it to be deferred for one year to enable further discussion. In the absence of a deferment, the Tai Tokerau District Council threatened to refer the RRB to the United Nations.

Creating Space through Dialogue: Taking the Race Relations Act to the UN

A group of Maori activists internationalised their concerns and approached the United Nations. Whether they believed that it had the power to assist them in having their grievances recognised and acted upon is unclear. However, what was well understood was that international forums were useful political resources. For this reason, activists from the new social movements, especially the Anti-Apartheid Movement, internationalised freely. Maori activists were acutely aware of the connection between a 'watching world' and the importance the government attached to upholding New Zealand's international reputation. By taking their grievances into international forums, activists articulated a Maori point of view, and an oppositional narrative which pointed to issues of oppression, inequality and racism, and raised doubts about the veracity of New Zealand's claims to racial harmony and equality. Whether such actions were a deliberate ploy to shame the government internationally and pressure it into acceding to their demands, or whether there was a less radical thrust, these actions caused the government considerable anxiety.

95 Ibid.
96 'Manifesto of the New Zealand Maori Council on the Race Relations Bill 1971', prepared by Dr Ranginui Walker, ND (Circa 1971), Rata Papers, ABAF 2/47, NA.
97 Northern Advocate, 21 Feb 1972.
With a reluctance to air their problems internationally, and a desire to maintain an amicable relationship with the government, many conservative Maori leaders were generally less willing to internationalise and preferred to use the accepted route of negotiation. By contrast, the younger activists from MOOHR and Nga Tamatoa held no such concerns. They took the view that Maori had never achieved enough by working with the government and were highly critical of organisations such as the MWWL and the NZMC, for their 'sweet words and endless deputations to Parliament'.

Nga Tamatoa forwarded copies of its submissions on the RRB, together with explanatory notes, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (U Thant). In this they requested that the New Zealand Government be 'censored in the world forum for abdicating its responsibilities to the people of New Zealand and the Maori people...in the field of race relations'. Taura Eruera informed Prime Minister Holyoake of the action, and why it had been necessary:

By ignoring the requests made by Maori organisations in submissions on the Race Relations Bill 1971 and insisting on placing international prestige before the needs and aspirations of the Maori people, the Government of New Zealand is actively promoting white racist policies, racial bitterness and intolerance, and socio-economic apartheid....these policies cannot be tolerated.

Holyoake penned a five page response which rejected Eruera’s assertions as ‘wholly inaccurate’. In this he dealt at length with the amendments which had been made to the RRB to accommodate requests by Maori, and he rejected the claim that the government had placed international prestige ahead of the needs of Maori. Certainly international considerations had played a significant role:

It would be very odd if New Zealand, which has a race relations record of which it can be proud, were not to be associated with the Convention. Our ratification of the Convention will demonstrate internationally our continuing concern with race relations in New Zealand; it will also...enable New Zealand to take part in an international campaign to eliminate racial discrimination.

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99 Correspondence, Taura Eruera (President, Nga Tamatoa Council) to Prime Minister Holyoake, 20 Dec 1971, MA1, Box 659, 36/1/21, Part 11, NA.
100 Ibid.
101 Correspondence, Prime Minister Keith Holyoake to Taura Eruera (President, Nga Tamatoa Council), 12 Jan 1972, MA1, Box 659, 36/1/21, Part 11, NA.
Further, while international considerations had played an important part in the decision to ratify ICERD, these were ‘never placed ahead of the needs and aspirations of the Maori people’. If ratification had required legislation which was detrimental to the interests of Maori, then legislation would not have been introduced. On the approach by Nga Tamatao to the UN, Holyoake made no comment. Nor was there any comment in an article by the Auckland Star which printed the correspondence.¹⁰²

Nevertheless, alarm was being expressed at government level about the implications of Maori taking their grievances to the United Nations.¹⁰³ Of particular concern were the charges made that Maori had not been consulted during the preparation of the RRB and that their submissions had been ignored. For a country that was reputed to value racial equality, this was a serious indictment of the government. The major anxiety was that the internationalisation of race relations concerns by Maori, the focus on apartheid within the UN, and New Zealand's newly enunciated policy of 'building bridges' with South Africa, would come together.¹⁰⁴ George Laking (Permanent Head, Prime Ministers Department) warned that activists who approached the UN on issues of domestic race relations 'would soon learn the tactical advantage' of drawing attention to the government's attitude towards apartheid 'as an indication of its general attitude towards non-white people'. In short, the attitude to black South Africans and attitude towards Maori would be seen as similar, and there was a real danger of 'slippage in New Zealand's race relations reputation as a successful multi-cultural society'.¹⁰⁵

As a result of its sporting relationship with South Africa, and especially following the 1970 rugby tour of South Africa, New Zealand had become a pressure-point in the struggle against apartheid by an international anti-apartheid movement. Its strategy was 'to focus world opposition to apartheid in sport on New Zealand', and draw attention to

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¹⁰³ Correspondence, George Laking (Permanent Head, Prime Minister's Department) to Prime Minister Jack Marshall, 10 March 1972, ABHS 950, W4627, Box 204/6/8/3, NA; Department of Justice, 'Memorandum on the Race Relations Act, 22 March 1972, MA1, Box 659, 36/1/21, Part 11, NA.
¹⁰⁴ Shortly after Keith Holyoake retired, his successor Jack Marshall announced that the policy of the government towards South Africa would be premised on building bridges and not walls. Therefore, the government would not support HART which sought to sever all sporting contact between New Zealand and South Africa. See, New Zealand Herald, 8 March 1972.
¹⁰⁵ Correspondence, George Laking (Permanent Head, Prime Minister's Department) to Prime Minister Jack Marshall, 10 March 1972, ABHS 950, W4627, Box 204/6/8/3, NA.
the 'attitudes' of New Zealand as condoning apartheid and flying the flag of racialism.\textsuperscript{106}

From the late 1960s anti-apartheid activists, many from South Africa, were sponsored into New Zealand by anti-apartheid and leftist organisations and met with Maori activists from Nga Tamatoa, MOOHR and the ADMC who were also involved in the broad anti-apartheid movement. Some international activists, such as Dennis Brutus, were involved in the United Nations Special Committee on Apartheid (UNSCA) and information was regularly exchanged between international activists, the UNSCA and the New Zealand anti-apartheid movement.

Maori activists approached the UNSCA in relation to the RRB. This was mainly because they had links with the organisation through HART, and also it was the most accessible UN body. Most recently, UNSCA had given HART moral support during the 1970 protests against the All Black tour to South Africa and contact was ongoing as another Springbok tour of New Zealand was scheduled for 1973. MOOHR contacted the UNSCA, expressed its dissatisfaction about the RRB, and made links between government attitudes towards apartheid (via the apartheid sport issue) and attitudes towards Maori. Both, MOOHR claimed, were underpinned by white racism.\textsuperscript{107}

Amongst its complaints, MOOHR was highly critical of the submissions process and spoke of the futility of making submissions to a Pakeha government which consistently ignored their concerns.\textsuperscript{108} Koro Wetere (MP, Western Maori) also approached the UNSCA and met with the chairman during a visit to New York. George Laking (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) noted that while Wetere did not express any criticism over the RRA, he expressed more serious sentiments:

\begin{quote}
He [Wetere] went out of his way to identify himself with the attitudes and principles of the Special Committee - once again, with the implication, for those who wish to draw it, of differences in attitude on a fundamental question between the minority people and a European Government.\textsuperscript{109}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{106} Peter Hain (UK Anti-Apartheid Movement) in 'Statements at UN Special Committee on Apartheid', 23 March 1972, ABHS 950, W 4627, Box 204/6/8/3, NA.

\textsuperscript{107} Correspondence, George Laking (Permanent Head, Prime Minister's Department) to Prime Minister Jack Marshall, 10 March 1972, ABHS 950, W4627, Box 204/6/8/3, NA; MOOHR Newsletter, March 1972, p.2.

\textsuperscript{108} MOOHR Newsletter, March 1972, p.2.

\textsuperscript{109} Correspondence, George Laking (Permanent Head, Prime Minister's Department) to Prime Minister Jack Marshall, 10 March 1972, ABHS 950, W4627, Box 204/6/8/3, NA.
The drawing of equivalence in attitudes of South Africa and New Zealand towards their coloured populations was a strategy employed by the UNSCA and feared by the government. Koro Wetere’s support added more fuel for the UNSCA, which sought to portray New Zealand as a racist country.

**New Zealand Maori Council considers an approach to the UN:**

*Internal tensions, external constraints, and the control of space*

A more serious problem for the government was that the NZMC was considering approaching the United Nations to have the RRA investigated. The NZMC was a statutory body and regarded by government as representative of Maori opinion. It was generally seen as a conservative body, mainly because a long-held view of the NZMC ‘as a creature of government’, and the dominance of National Party supporters in the hierarchy. Nevertheless, as Ranginui Walker points out, while the NZMC was of ‘conservative persuasion’, it was ‘leavened’ by members from other political parties.

By the 1970s, a number of activists, including Patu Hohepa, Titewhai Harawira, and Ranginui Walker, were part of the NZMC. It was an organisation which was not easily given to speaking out in public on contentious issues, but preferred to work with government to have their claims addressed. To speak publicly, as they had done with the MAAA, was an indication of the seriousness with which they regarded an issue, and that dialogue with the government had not yielded a satisfactory resolution. That they were prepared to take their concerns over the RRB to an international body indicated that they had lost faith in the negotiating process. However, such an action would send a strong signal in UN circles that New Zealand had some serious race relations issues. The implication of the NZMC taking such a radical step was not lost on George Laking who noted, it would 'clearly have a most damaging effect' on New Zealand's reputation.

It was not difficult for the government to discredit radical activist groups on the grounds that they were not representative of Maori opinion, but it was impossible to apply this to the NZMC. Of more concern for the government was that Ranginui Walker, who they believed was the 'instigator' of the NZMC action, had intimated on...

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111 Ibid.
112 Correspondence, George Laking to Prime Minister Marshall, 10 March 1972, ABHS 950, W 4627, Box 204/6/8/3, NA.
national radio that they may send a mission to the United Nations.\textsuperscript{113} Sending petitions and correspondence was bad enough, but a delegation was more serious, not least for the international media attention it would attract.

At Waitangi, in February 1972, a resolution was passed that the submissions made by the NZMC on the RRB be sent to the Secretary-General of the UN. This was to show that Maori had played no part in the original draft or final preparation of the RRB, and to relay their concerns over the proposed legislation. The UN would be made aware, that 'in the history of the Maori people there has been a policy of legislation without consultation'.\textsuperscript{114} Patu Hohepa explained, in the media, that the majority of NZMC members were in favour of the resolution, and the action was being taken to demonstrate that the RRB had been passed without the agreement of Maori, and their submissions had been ignored.\textsuperscript{115} In March, and in response to Prime Minister Marshall's 'building bridges' policy, Tom Newnham (CARE), Trevor Richards (HART) and Patu Hohepa were invited to speak at the forthcoming UNSCA meeting in New York. Thus an opportunity was presented to relate the concerns and dissatisfaction of the NZMC directly to the UN Committee, and seek advice from other UN bodies whilst in New York.\textsuperscript{116} The fears expressed by Foreign Affairs, that Maori concerns and apartheid would intersect internationally, were apparently to be realised.

The NZMC met again to discuss Hohepa’s visit, and there was division.\textsuperscript{117} Clearly there had been moves by the government to convince some members of the NZMC that an approach to the United Nations was not in the interests of Maori. Jock McEwen reported prior to the meeting that 'responsible members' of the NZMC were 'making efforts to block this development, and they will probably be successful'.\textsuperscript{118} However, there was also friction in a tangle of side issues, not least the forceful (and sometimes radical) stance taken by the Auckland District Maori Council (ADMC), and personal

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid. In 1972 Ranginui Walker was Secretary of the Auckland District Maori Council and a member of the NZMC.
\textsuperscript{114} Correspondence, Pei Te Hurinui Jones to Prime Minister Jack Marshall, 12 May 1972; MS-Papers-1403-478:6, ATL; NZMC Minutes, (ND, Circa March 1972), MP, 1991/4/12, Folder 8, Item 1, ADMC, UAL.
\textsuperscript{116} The UN Special Committee against Apartheid met annually over three days each year on the anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre (21 March).
\textsuperscript{117} NZMC Minutes (ND, Circa March 1972), MP, 1991/4/12, Folder 8, Item 1, ADMC, UAL.
\textsuperscript{118} Correspondence, George Laking to Prime Minister Marshall, 10 March 1972, ABHS 950, W 4627, Box 204/6/8/3, NA.
issues and animosity between several members. At the meeting, lengthy discussion and debate took place. Those in favour of Hohepa’s visit saw it as an opportunity to generate a space for Maori perspectives to be heard internationally. Bruce Gregory (Tai Tokerau) argued that it would create an 'opportunity for once to a Maori to express views'. Similarly, Norm Perry thought it would be an opportunity to 'say some things ... which the Council has been fighting for since its inception namely the need to retain Maori land, organisations and institutions, and the fact of cultural diversity in this country'.

Opposition to Hohepa’s visit, and indeed any approach to the UN concerning race relations, was led by Jones who, according to the minutes, dominated proceedings. Following a proposal and subsequent discussion initiated by Jones, the Waitangi resolution was rescinded. On Hohepa’s visit and presentation to the UNSCA, Jones stated that there was 'no justification to make comments in relation to the Act' as the UN committee was 'concerned with apartheid and not the Race Relations Act.' Jones clearly wanted Hohepa’s presentation to the UNSCA limited to the issue of apartheid.

Underlying his stance were fears that such an action might be seen as provocative and put in jeopardy the conditions and assurances which he hoped to extract from the government in relation to the RRB. This demonstrates vividly the ongoing problem for Maori in their relationship with the government: the power imbalance meant that Maori had to tread carefully in order to extract concessions or have their claims addressed. In particular, Jones sought an undertaking from the government 'not to promote or introduce legislation affecting the existence of any currently accepted Maori institutions'. This explains the strong oppositional stance he took at the meeting. He successfully prevented the submission by the NZMC on the RRB from being presented to the UN, and he was vehemently opposed to Patu Hohepa bringing the RRB up for

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119 Ranginui Walker recalled that the ADMC was regarded as the radical district council from the early 1970s when he and Patu Hohepa assumed leadership positions. At NZMC meetings they were not always popular as, 'we put the hard issues on the table' and forced discussion. Interview, Ranginui Walker, 8 September 2006.
120 NZMC Minutes (ND, Circa March 1972), MP, 1991/4/12, Folder 8, Item 1, ADMC, UAL.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid.
123 Correspondence, Pei Te Hurinui Jones to Prime Minister Jack Marshall, 12 May 1972; MS-Papers-1403-478:6, ATL; NZMC Minutes (ND, Circa March 1972), MP, 1991/4/12, Folder 8, Item 1, ADMC, UAL.
discussion at the UNSCA. Thus, by extension, he sought to close the space for a Maori perspective on race relations being disseminated internationally. Eventually a proposal was put forward, a vote taken, and the NZMC declined to endorse the Hohepa’s visit to the UN, although they wished him ‘God speed’. The lack of endorsement meant that Hohepa could not claim to represent the NZMC, but neither was he obliged to adhere to any expectations. Thus he was free to speak about whatever he wished. However the apparently bitter exchange between Hohepa and Jones had consequences: while in New York, Hohepa announced that he intended to resign from the NZMC.

Surprisingly, the New Zealand Maori Graduates Association did not support Hohepa’s overseas mission. They had submitted a strong submission on the RRB expressing apprehension over the effects that it could have on the ability of Maori to retain their ‘separate Maori institutions and organisations…and freedom of cultural expression’. The RRB could introduce ‘difficulties which might be to the detriment of the Maori people’. Despite this they considered it was not reason enough to have Patu Hohepa place the issue before the UNSCA. Instead, they would ‘depend on the goodwill of the Government’ to treat Maori justly and ‘act within the spirit’ of the RRB.

Government strategies to control the race relations narrative in New York

Prior to his departure for New York, Patu Hohepa indicated that he would take the opportunity while abroad 'to give a new point of view on race relations'. This expanded the parameters of the visit, and took it from a simple presentation at the UNSCA and out into the public domain. The concerns of government were twofold: that Hohepa would speak negatively of race relations and the RRB during his presentation to the UNSCA, and he would attract the attention of the international media and use the space to speak of race relations. Rather than speaking to a limited audience as initially thought, it was a real possibility that Hohepa’s discourse would reach a wider international audience. With an international focus on apartheid, there was no doubt that the eyes of the world would be on the events in New York, and New

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124 NZMC Minutes (ND, Circa March 1972), MP, 1991/4/12, Folder 8, Item 1, ADMC, UAL.
125 For a report on the exchange at the NZMC meeting, and the reasons for Hohepa’s resignation, see Press, 25 March 1972.
Zealand was likely to be in the spotlight because of its position on apartheid sport and the forthcoming Springbok tour to New Zealand. For the government, this in itself was serious, but to have a Maori representative speaking out negatively about race relations at the UNSCA and out in the public, could only have a damaging effect on New Zealand's race relations image.

The imperative for the government was to find ways to exert some control over Hohepa’s visit and mediate the spaces in New York. In New Zealand, the conservative members of the NZMC, nudged by the government, had done their bit by withdrawing support for Hohepa. Although he would go to New York, he would do so without the backing of the accepted voice of Maori opinion, and without the credibility that was held by the NZMC. In discussion with Jock McEwen, some members of the NZMC advised that Hohepa's impending visit should be ignored. No official statement criticising the visit should be made, as 'critical comment at this stage would be helpful to Hohepa rather than otherwise'.

A great deal of correspondence took place between Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister and New Zealand's Permanent Representative at the United Nations (John Scott) as measures were sought to restrict the impact of Hohepa's visit. One suggestion was that Scott should attend the UNSCA in order to intervene in the discussions if necessary. This was rejected by Scott as 'undesirable' as it was 'unprecedented' for a government not represented on the committee to intervene in discussions. However, as Prime Minister Marshall stated, a government representative would probably be given the right of reply if requested, but he would not be given support or a sympathetic hearing, especially if he was critical of the New Zealand speakers. Therefore, 'in such an atmosphere' it was 'inappropriate' and 'demeaning' to engage in such debate. Thus the UNSCA meeting remained a space free from government influence. As it was not known what the thrust of Hohepa's address would be, or what he might say outside the confines of the UNSCA, a number of scenarios and strategies were proposed and

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129 Correspondence, George Laking (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) to Prime Minister Jack Marshall, 20 March 1972, ABHS 950, W4627, Box 204/6/8/3, NA.

130 Correspondence, George Laking (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) to Prime Minister Jack Marshall, 20 March 1972, ABHS 950, W4627, Box 204/6/8/3, NA; George Laking (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) to John Scott (New Zealand Permanent Representative to the United Nations, New York), (ND Circa March 1972), ABHS 950, W4627, Box 204/6/8/3, NA.

131 Correspondence, Prime Minister Jack Marshall to Mr G. T. Holmes, Canterbury-Westland Division, New Zealand National Party, 7 April 1972, ABHS 950, W4627, Box 204/6/8/3, NA.
discussed. These related to the timing of statements, what these should contain, which media outlets would be helpful, and what level of intervention was necessary.

Complicating the situation was the issue of apartheid sport and the links which could be made between negative statements on race relations by Hohepa and the government's position on apartheid sport. The propagation of the view that 'white racism' infected New Zealand lay at the heart of government concerns.

A consensus was reached 'to play it cool' unless they were compelled to act in which case Foreign Affairs provided John Scott with information and points to focus on for use in official statements.\(^{132}\) If the issue of race relations and apartheid sport intersected, the UNSCA was to be discredited as 'a restricted committee and its membership not representative of all shades of United Nations opinion'. If Hohepa brought up race relations and the RRB in the UNSCA, the point was to be made that this 'approach was misdirected and that the matters discussed do not fall within the mandate of the Special Committee on Apartheid, which was not set up to deal with race relations generally'. A further point to be stressed was that New Zealand, once it had ratified the ICERD, would have the RRB subject to 'scrutiny' by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Finally, it was to be emphasised, that Maori concerns were being dealt with by the government in discussion and collaboration with the NZMC. Drawing an image of a close and collaborative relationship between the government and a body which had been constituted to represent Maoridom was, no doubt, intended to cut away any negative statements by Hohepa and render them hollow.

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**Engaging the United Nations Directly: Patu Hohepa at the UN, 1972**

Patu Hohepa spoke at one session of the UNSCA and claimed the authority to represent the views of 'three national organisations, and three regional organisations....which represent over 80% of the Maori people of New Zealand', as well as the four Maori Members of Parliament.\(^{133}\) In claiming the right to speak for the majority of Maori he

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\(^{132}\) Information for this paragraph is taken from, George Laking (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) to John Scott (New Zealand Permanent Representative to the United Nations, New York), (No Date, Circa March 1972), ABHS 950, W4627, Box 204/6/8/3, NA.

\(^{133}\) Statement given by Patu Hohepa at the opening session of UNSCA, 21 March 1972, ABHS 950, W4627, Box 204/6/8/3, NA. Patu Hohepa obtained the authority to represent a range of organisations including MOOHR, Nga Tamatoa, the four Maori MPs, the Auckland Division of the MWWL and three District Councils including the largest of all District Councils, the Auckland District Maori Council.
largely negated the lack of support from the NZMC. His address focussed almost entirely on the issue of apartheid sport and he roundly condemned the government. He made no reference to the RRB or domestic race relations, but the suggestion that there was a divide between the attitudes of Pakeha and Maori was unmistakable:

...Conscious of the honour, ashamed of the New Zealand Government's policy of building bridges with the 'white' section only of South Africa, I have come here to assure the Committee on Apartheid and the Non-Governmental representatives gathered here of the Maori people's allegiance to the UN Charter and the war against apartheid. Let me assure the African National Congress and the SANROC delegates that we, the Maori minority of New Zealand, are conscious of your suffering, are mindful of your need for international support...We regret, and we abhor, the decision of the New Zealand Prime Minister in endorsing continuing sporting and other contacts with the white racist minority regimes of Pretoria and Salisbury...134

Hohepa concluded by stating that New Zealand's reputation had been tarnished and he called on the member states to inform New Zealand's UN representatives of their dislike of Prime Minister Marshall's decision. Further, he asked the countries in the Commonwealth to inform New Zealand, 'in the clearest possible terms of their displeasure at New Zealand's continuing ties with South Africa'.

Outside the formal sessions of conference were numerous opportunities for informal discussions, and much valuable work and lobbying took place. At a press conference, the New Zealand delegation was given a central place and attracted significant attention. All said that they had been overwhelmed by their reception at the UNSCA and from related groups, and they 'had accomplished even more outside the conference room than inside it'.135 Tom Newnham recalled that although the visit was concerned with the anti-apartheid movement, 'Pat was determined to talk about race relations in New Zealand, which he did very effectively...he was officially representing the views of the ADMC but he conveyed the views of Nga Tamatoa unofficially'.136 This space remained free of direct government interference although diplomats were present and it was clear that they were observing who the New Zealand delegates had contact with. Trevor Richards recalled that the diplomats from the New Zealand Permanent Mission to the United

134 Ibid.
135 Report from Permanent Mission to the United Nations to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 23 March 1972, ABHS 950, W4627, Box 204/6/8/3, NA.
136 Email interview with Tom Newnham, 17 September 2006.
Nations 'seemed to be everywhere I was, listening and writing. I had no doubts but that my every word and action was being reported back to Wellington'.  Richards was correct and correspondence flew back to New Zealand containing information, 'of interest... [although] we cannot be aware of all their activities'.  On Patu Hohepa, there were two items of 'interest'. The first was that he had gathered contacts in order to put 'New Zealand groups in touch with overseas groups, e.g the Polynesian Panthers in touch with the Black Panthers'. Second, at a press conference he had stated that the main reason for his visit to New York was 'to discuss with experts the compatibility of the Race Relations Act with the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination', and to this end he had already had several meetings with members of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.

Hohepa spoke directly through the media about race relations being in turmoil and he suggested that New Zealand was on the verge of 'bitter strife'. He detailed the anger felt by urbanised Maori and Pacific Island youth towards the government, which had marginalised them and their concerns, and failed to take seriously their legitimate grievances. In 'their eyes these grievances were not minor' and deserved attention. Their anger was also directed at conservative Maori leaders who, they believed, were 'out of touch with reality'. While they sought dialogue with the government, they had achieved nothing for Maori and had not addressed historical and contemporary grievances. These included the Treaty of Waitangi, and grievances related to land and urban development, fisheries, and 'greater participation by Maori and Polynesian organisations in the decision-making process'. Hohepa stated that unless these issues were addressed, there would be 'confrontation between Maori and the power structure' and New Zealand could 'spiral into racial conflict'.

Apartheid sport and the forthcoming Springbok tour of New Zealand were drawn on to link racism in New Zealand with South Africa. He pointed out that 'white racism' was a fiercely contested issue on the activists’ agenda and explained that Maori and Pacific Island youth held 'strong feelings on racial issues'. Thus, if the tour went ahead it would

137 Richards, Dancing On Our Bones..., p.80.
138 Correspondence, New Zealand Permanent Mission to the United Nations to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 23 March 1972, ABHS 950, W4627, Box 204/6/8/3, NA.
139 Ibid.
140 See for example, Evening Post, 25 March 1972; Marlborough Express, 27 March 1972.
become 'symbolic ...of the Government's attitude on racial matters'. He warned that the young people had no intention of remaining subjugated and passive and if the Springboks came to New Zealand, physical confrontation was inevitable.

The delegation received widespread coverage in the New Zealand press. Much of it was penned by the New Zealand Press Association correspondent, Bruce Kohn, who reported on all the issues coming out of the UNSCA, and also conducted the interview with Patu Hohepa. The Permanent Mission to the United Nations kept in close contact with Kohn to whom they passed information and statements for his use as a means of damage control. There was, however, no statement made from this source in the Kohn article on Hohepa. The general reaction in New Zealand was one of anger. At the heart lay the issues of reputation and representation. A New Zealand Herald editorial observed:

Rarely do resident New Zealanders go overseas to criticise their country's attitudes and policies before world bodies...people are rightly free to air their views and plead their cases. But it may be wondered how balanced a picture the committee receives of New Zealand attitudes and reasons if it hears no more than the expressions of minority groups.141

'Letters to the Editor' correspondents spoke in a similar manner:

The three New Zealanders...do not represent or speak for the large majority of New Zealanders. I should like to know why the news media gave those people so much publicity. I think they will create a very poor image of NZ unless someone tells the UN they do not speak for the majority of New Zealanders.142

Correspondence was sent to Prime Minister Marshall asking why the government had not sent a minister to the UNSCA to counter the negative statements and to defend New Zealand's policies.143 An editorial in the New Zealand Herald suggested that it would be useful for the government to have had a delegate at the UNSCA to express its position and provide a counter to the views presented by minority groups.144 Out in the

142 New Zealand Herald, 27 March 2972, ('Letters to the Editor' – C.V. West)
143 Correspondence, Prime Minister Marshall to Mr G.T. Holmes, 7 April 1972, ABHS 950, W4627, Box 204/6/8/3, NA. (The correspondence was a response from Marshall and indicated the substance of the original correspondence from Holmes.)
public, Hohepa's discourse on race relations received little sustained specific comment. It was the issue of apartheid sport with which the New Zealand public was most irate and most focused. Undoubtedly this was due to the forthcoming Springbok Tour of New Zealand, and this overshadowed Hohepa’s statements on race relations.

Nevertheless, Hohepa’s public actions were significant. For the first time a Maori representative had spoken of race relations at a United Nations forum and the surrounding environs. He used the space as a political resource to speak of marginalisation, inequality, discrimination, especially among Maori and Pasifika youth, and to present an image of disharmony and impending ‘bitter strife’. He pointed to the unequal relationship between Maori and Pakeha, with little participation by Maori in decision-making processes. Hohepa’s version was entirely at odds with the regularly reported version of race relations in New Zealand which was predicated on racial harmony and equality. The message it sent to the government was that Maori would no longer tolerate being marginalised, and they expected to be part of decision-making processes. If the government continued with the status quo, and if Maori grievances were not addressed, then Maori had spaces abroad that they could use if necessary.

The Race Relations Act (RRA) came into force 1 April 1972 and established the Office of the Race Relations Conciliator with Sir Guy Powles at its head. Duncan MacIntyre held meetings with the NZMC to address concerns and allay fears that the RRA would be inimical to Maori interests.145 Similarly Prime Minister Marshall gave the NZMC an assurance:

The government will not introduce legislation affecting the existence of any currently accepted Maori institution or organisations whether authorised by statute or stemming from tradition without full consultation with the New Zealand Maori Council.146

Pei Te Hurinui Jones found this 'entirely acceptable' and he agreed to a press statement being issued by the government expressing this commitment. He also had the letter by Prime Minister Marshall distributed amongst all Maori committees, district councils,

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145 Correspondence, Prime Minister Marshall to New Zealand Maori Council, 5 May 1972, Marshall, John Ross (Sir), 1912-1988 Political Papers, MS-Papers-1403-478/6, ATL.

146 Ibid.
and printed in the NZMC magazine *Te Maori*. This would, he noted, go some way to negate the 'reckless and misleading statements still being made that race relations are in a bad way'. He further informed Marshall that he was personally satisfied as it was a 'complete vindication of my veto of the Waitangi resolution' and his opposition to the issue being taken to the United Nations.

On 22 November 1972 New Zealand ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. At the same time the *UNESCO Courier* published a photograph and short article under the title, ‘New Zealand Outlaws Racial Discrimination’.

The photograph, selected for the sentiments which UNESCO wished to convey, sustained New Zealand’s international image. In a sense, it can be seen as an aspect of the visitors’ circuit, and not too dissimilar to MacCannell’s notion of ‘staged authenticity’ – the deliberate staging of culture to present an image or give an

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147 Correspondence, Pei Te Hurinui Jones to Prime Minister Marshall, 12 May, 1972, Marshall, John Ross (Sir), 1912-1988 Political Papers, MS-Papers-1403-478/6, ATL.

148 Ibid.

impression of authenticity for a tourist audience.\textsuperscript{150} It was chosen to bring a particular image of race relations in New Zealand to an international audience. Apart from the obvious amity between the two people, the symbolic use of a Maori cultural form signified racial harmony and integration at its finest. The short article completed the view of a country with a good reputation for its treatment of Maori and, in the midst of demographic change, was determined to maintain that happy situation.

Unknown was the back story: of how the government resisted calls for race relations legislation throughout the 1960s; was dragged reluctantly into signing and then ratifying ICERD; and that it did so principally to preserve its international reputation, and not for domestic reasons. Unknown too was the struggle by Maori who fought for their suggestions and concerns to be recognised and included in the RRA, who objected to their marginalisation in the decision-making process, and who took their concerns to the United Nations. The photograph and accompanying article indicates that the purpose of the government in ratifying ICERD was successful.

ICERD was a convention that the government never wanted to be part of and would have been happy if it had never been brought into existence. In a move designed to control the space that ICERD made available for Maori, and indeed any New Zealand citizen, the government refused to make an Article 14 declaration which recognised the competency of the committee to hear complaints from individuals or groups about racial discrimination or human rights abuses. This remains the situation to this day despite repeated requests from the United Nations Human Rights Commission asking New Zealand to reconsider its position.\textsuperscript{151}

**United Nations Engagement with Maori: The Cobo Team Visit New Zealand to Study Racial Discrimination**

Whereas Maori activists had approached the United Nations, either by written appeal or direct engagement, in 1973 the United Nations came to New Zealand. Once again it was New Zealand’s good race relations reputation that brought the visitors to New

\textsuperscript{150} Dean MacCannell, ‘Staged Authenticity…’, pp.595-596.

\textsuperscript{151} The settler states of Canada and the United States of America have also refused to recognise Article 14. Australia took the same position but changed its stance in 1993 and made an Article 14 declaration.
Zealand. The UN team, Augusto Willemse-Diaz and Jose Martinez Cobo, spent time travelling selected areas of New Zealand on an expanded visitors’ circuit. While the government organised the itinerary, the intention of the visit was for the team to meet with as wide a cross-section of Maori opinion as possible. This provided Maori activists with the opportunity to meet with the UN team, and a space to subvert the visitors’ circuit and present an oppositional discourse to the UN team. The subsequent ‘Cobo report’ encapsulated the concerns and experience of Maori during a period of increasing activism and growing dissension. Alongside, this section looks at the ways in which the government sought to mediate the narrative of Maori.

Making Space at the United Nations: an opening for indigenous people

At the same time as ICERD was being formulated and then introduced, efforts were under way to provide a space for indigenous peoples within the UN framework. Prior to the late 1960s the concerns and problems of indigenous peoples had received scant attention in the UN and there was no independent access for indigenous peoples to present their grievances and concerns. ICERD, through the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, did make such a space for individuals or groups but many governments refused to recognise Article 14, and indigenous peoples were denied the opportunity to approach the UN and lodge complaints. Therefore, in international forums, governments held control of the national narrative and the position of indigenous peoples. The lack of power or opportunity to speak and be heard at international forums, and participate in such organisations was an integral part of the silencing process of indigenous peoples across the globe.

Moves to remedy the situation began in the late 1960s and it was through concerns about racial discrimination that a space was created in the United Nations framework for indigenous peoples. In 1969 a 'Study on Racial Discrimination in the Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Spheres' was presented to the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.152 This included a chapter by Augusto Willemse-Diaz on the protection of indigenous peoples in which he described them as 'disadvantaged in relation to the rest of the population; in some countries they are the victims of de facto discrimination and continue to suffer from

prejudice". The report recommended that a new study be conducted solely on indigenous peoples, and should not be restricted to discrimination but should also consider individual and equal rights.

Willemsen-Diaz, a Guatemalan lawyer at the United Nations Secretariat in New York, was anxious to ensure that indigenous peoples gained entry into the United Nations as a separate entity and not under the ‘minorities’ classification which many involved in the sub-commission favoured. Fortunately Willemsen-Diaz had influential support and in 1970 the sub-commission recommended that a study be conducted on discrimination with reference to indigenous populations. The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) agreed with the recommendation in 1971, noting that 'indigenous populations often encounter racial prejudice and discrimination', and they authorised the sub-commission 'to make a complete and comprehensive study of the problem of discrimination against indigenous populations, and to suggest the necessary national and international measures for eliminating such discrimination'. Willemsen-Diaz realised that the channelling of indigenous peoples into the United Nations through the narrow context of racial discrimination was an inadequate explanation for the issues which they faced. However it gave them a small opening into the United Nations, and recognition as distinct peoples rather than being classified as 'minorities'. In 1971 the United Nations authorised a 'Study on the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations' with Jose Martinez Cobo named as Special Rapporteur and given responsibility for the study. Cobo selected Australia, Malaysia and New Zealand as the first countries for scrutiny, and Willemsen-Diaz, who had been given the task of writing the report, accompanied him. Thus, whereas Maori had gone out of New Zealand to approach the United Nations, this time the United Nations was coming to


154 Augusto Willemsen-Diaz, 'How Indigenous Peoples Reached the UN', in Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen (eds.), The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Copenhagen: IWGIA (Publishers), 2009. For an explanation of how indigenous peoples were put on the agenda of the UN with the authorisation of 'The Study on the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations', see pp.19-23.


156 Jose R. Martinez Cobo was a diplomat from Ecuador and a member of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.
New Zealand to engage with Maori. Once again, as had been the pattern since the mid-
1960s, New Zealand’s good reputation was the major reason for the visit.

**Considering the Cobo Visit: Government reluctance**

The Department of Foreign Affairs was reluctant to agree to the visit and the inclusion of Maori in the study.\textsuperscript{157} At issue was Cobo’s definition of indigenous peoples as those ‘who live today in conformity with their particular social, economic and cultural customs and traditions than with the institutions of the country of which they now for part…’\textsuperscript{158} Foreign Affairs argued that Maori fell outside this definition and were not living as they did when New Zealand was first colonised.\textsuperscript{159} More significantly, Foreign Affairs was concerned that the inclusion of New Zealand in the study implied that a racial discrimination ‘problem’ existed – an implication which rankled: the study ‘might fit the Orang Aisli (sic) people of Malaysia and ... the Aboriginal people of Australia but does not apply to Maori here’.\textsuperscript{160}

In fact it was not an assumption that New Zealand had a race relations problem which drew the UN team to New Zealand. Despite the actions of Maori activists which caused varying levels of outrage, and Patu Hohepa had spoken in New York of race relations being on the brink of turmoil, international press coverage was generally sparse and New Zealand retained its good reputation. Moreover, the New Zealand Permanent Representative to the United Nations had access to many people within UN corridors and was adept at deflecting and discrediting negative criticism about New Zealand. On the Cobo study, his understanding was that it was New Zealand's good reputation which had prompted the UN deputation to visit New Zealand. There was 'a genuine and well-intentioned interest within the United Nations Secretariat and perhaps elsewhere in

\textsuperscript{157} On the reservations of Foreign Affairs to the Cobo study and the inclusion of Maori see, Correspondence, John McArthur (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) to John Scott, Permanent Representative, New Zealand Mission to the United Nations (New York), 12 Oct 1972, MA1, Box 660, 36/1/21, Part 12, NA; Correspondence, D. McDowell (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to Secretary for Maori & Island Affairs, 10 Jan 1973, MA1, Box 660, 36/1/21, Part 13, NA.

\textsuperscript{158} Cited in Correspondence, John McArthur (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) to John Scott, Permanent Representative, New Zealand Mission to the United Nations (New York), 12 Oct 1972, MA1, Box 660, 36/1/21, Part 12, NA.

\textsuperscript{159} Correspondence, John McArthur (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) to John Scott, Permanent Representative, New Zealand Mission to the United Nations (New York), 12 Oct 1972, MA1, Box 660, 36/1/21, Part 12, NA; Correspondence, D. McDowell (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to Secretary for Maori & Island Affairs, 10 Jan 1973, MA1, Box 660, 36/1/21, Part 13, NA.

\textsuperscript{160} Correspondence, Secretary of Foreign Affairs to Minister of Foreign Affairs, (ND, circa 1973), MA1, Box 660, 36/1/21, Part 12, NA.
knowing more about our system and why it works'.161 Added to this, the fact that Maori lay somewhat outside the Cobo definition of indigenous people (which assumed a less advanced status), made their inclusion 'useful'.162 Pragmatic reasons also played a part: the easy accessibility of appropriate information was necessary in order to give the study a firm foundation and this would be forthcoming in New Zealand.163

Despite their reluctance and reservations about the Cobo study, as had been the case with the ILO convention and ICERD the government had little choice but to accede to the request. The New Zealand Permanent Representative to the United Nations cautioned about dismissing the visit: New Zealand 'consistently drew attention to its good reputation in race relations' and a failure to submit to international scrutiny may give the impression that 'we have something to hide'.164 Following discussions with Jock McEwen, Foreign Affairs recommended participation in the Cobo study:

> We had reservations about recommending the government concur with the visit...we do not think that it would have been tactically wise to have appeared over-sensitive to the study and possibly critical comment on the situation here. We constantly cite in international forums, the harmonious state of race relations in New Zealand and we claim to have learned lessons about the need to discriminate in favour of a minority. We can hardly refuse to allow an international group to assess the situation and garner what useful material it can about New Zealand experience, particularly when more vulnerable countries like Malaysia and Australia have agreed to the visit.165

A more positive view of the Cobo study replaced reluctance and ambivalence. An understanding was reached that ‘adverse publicity’ could have a negative outcome if New Zealand failed to cooperate with a UN body, especially ‘in an area which New Zealand claimed expertise’.166 Further, as David McDowell (Foreign Affairs) noted, it

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161 Correspondence, John Scott, Permanent Representative, New Zealand Mission to the United Nations, New York, to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 3 Nov 1972, MA1, Box 660, 36/1/21, Part 13, NA.
162 Ibid. The comments were made to John Scott by ‘Mr Brand who is Chief of the Section for Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities’.
164 Correspondence, John Scott, Permanent Representative, New Zealand Mission to the United Nations, New York, to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 3 Nov 1972, MA1, Box 660, 36/1/21, Part 13, NA.
165 Memorandum, Secretary of Foreign Affairs to Minister of Foreign Affairs, (ND, Circa 1973), MA1, Box 660, 36/1/21, Part 12, NA.
166 Memorandum, Secretary of Foreign Affairs to Secretary for Maori and Island Affairs, 5 March 1973, MA1, Box 660, 36/1/21, Part 12, NA.
was clear that neither the sub-commission nor Cobo understood the real situation of Maori, and the visit would provide an opportunity to 'view something of Maori participation in New Zealand national life'. It would also provide a 'salutary lesson' and reveal the inapplicability of the Cobo definition of indigenous peoples to Maori, and show that there was no comparison between Maori and the indigenous peoples of Australia and Malaysia.  

The Cobo team engage with Maori: an expanded ‘visitors’ circuit’

Jock McEwen controlled the visit and organised the itinerary for the six day visit during which he and McDowell accompanied the UN team. Prime Minister Kirk made it clear that the visitors were to have full 'access to anyone it is interested in seeing', but with almost no knowledge of New Zealand the reality was that the decision was left to McEwen to arrange appropriate meetings. He was given assistance from Foreign Affairs, and most likely the four Maori MPs and staff from the Department of Maori Affairs were called on to arrange contacts and events. McEwen provided the UN team with 'a complete range of Maori opinion' and organised a comprehensive itinerary. For the most part this was an expanded version of the ‘visitors’ circuit’ and was top-heavy with prestige and success. Included were meetings with prominent and successful Maori leaders including Maori MPs, officials and representatives from government departments, academics working in universities, local council members, the Maori Queen Dame Te Atairangikahu and her advisers, staff from the office of the Race Relations Conciliator, individual Maori who occupied high standing in professional occupations or community affairs, and representatives from the MWWL and NZMC.

There was also a selection of events and meetings which allowed a wider perspective. The UN team met with 'ordinary' people in order to gain perspectives from outside the confines of government, academia and state structures. They visited Maori within their homes, met with farmers, attended cultural displays and concerts, spoke with students at

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167 Memorandum, Secretary of Foreign Affairs to Minister of Foreign Affairs, (ND, Circa 1973), MA1, Box 660, 36/1/21, Part 12, NA; Memorandum, Secretary of Foreign Affairs to Secretary for Maori and Island Affairs, 5 march 1973, MA1, Box 660, 36/1/21, Part 12, NA.
169 ‘Programme, Race Discrimination Study’, MA1, Box 660, 36/1/21, Part 12, NA.
170 Ibid.
Hillary College in Auckland, and had meetings with iwi and hapu leaders as well as tangata whenua at various marae.\textsuperscript{171}

Included was a visit to Rotorua, the central component of the visitors’ circuit, and they observed integration in action. The UN team met Maori who were involved in the NZMC, community work, local councils, and in professional occupations. They toured the Maori Arts and Crafts Centre, visited farms and homes and spoke with Maori farmers, home-owners and elders, and met with tangata whenua at Wahaio Marae, Whakarewarewa.\textsuperscript{172} David McDowell was especially satisfied with the outcome of this part of the programme, and declared it to be ‘valuable and representative’.\textsuperscript{173} It was hardly representative. It was laden with ‘success’ and prestige, and was a selective and mediated tour with many staged components which were designed to show an authentic vision of integration, racial equality and harmony.

\textit{Activists Making Space in Auckland: Subverting the Visitors’ Circuit}

A visit to Auckland was organised to enable the UN team to meet with representatives from various Auckland groups. This section of the visit caused the government organisers the greatest angst. In 1973 Auckland was a hotbed of Maori and Pasifika activism, and Foreign Affairs had no doubt that the activists would not hold back in detailing their grievances. With this in mind, the meetings were deliberately scheduled to take place during the latter stage of the visit, rather than at the beginning, as the Auckland participants ‘might not give the most balanced first impression’.\textsuperscript{174} While Foreign Affairs and Maori Affairs held reservations about the meeting, in light of the public prominence of the activists it was impossible to deny them the opportunity to meet with a UN team studying racial discrimination - a central issue on the activist agenda. Two meetings were held with many Maori activists and supporters representing various organisations. Included were Syd and Hana Jackson and S. Reedy (Nga Tamatoa), Patu Hohepa and Ranginui Walker (ADMC), Titewhai Harawira (CARE and the MWWL), M.P.K. Sorrenson and seven others (CARE), and Will Illolahia (Polynesian Panther Party). Also present were representatives from the Race Relations

\textsuperscript{171} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{173} Correspondence, David McDowell to J. E. Carter, District Officer for Maori and Island Affairs, Rotorua, 19 June 1973, MA1, Box 660, 36/1/21, Part 12, NA.
\textsuperscript{174} Memorandum, David McDowell (ff. Secretary of Foreign Affairs) to Jock McEwen (Secretary of Maori and Island Affairs), 6 April 1973, MA1, Box 660, 36/1/21, Part 12, NA.
Council, the Department of Maori Affairs, the Auckland City Council (Welfare Services), and the United Nations Association.\textsuperscript{175}

In Auckland the activist contingent subverted the visitors’ circuit. The difference between the meeting with the Auckland activists and those held previously with Maori groups and individuals was marked. As David McDowell noted, Auckland activists made full use of the limited time they had with the UN team and the new political space which had opened up:

On the occasions when we met older Maoris over half the time available was absorbed in ceremonial ...while Nga Tamatoa, the Polynesian Panthers and the various “white liberal” supporters in CARE and the Race Relations Council devoted a minimum to ceremony and a maximum to exposition, not to say dialectic.\textsuperscript{176}

The tenor of the discussions also contrasted sharply: previous meetings had taken place with the 'dignified elders on marae' and other Maori groups and individuals 'who had made it in Pakeha society'. They expressed their views in an 'understated and subtle way' whereas in Auckland 'the decibel level went up' as the 'angry young urbanites...resenting everything Pakeha' informed the UN mission of racial discrimination and the state of race relations in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{177}

The discourse was of cultural genocide, land alienation, Pakeha racism related to housing and employment, the justice system, the education system, parliamentary representation, and marginalisation in political processes at local and national government level.\textsuperscript{178} Much was underpinned by an institutional racism analysis: racial discrimination was not so much overt, although this too existed, but rather it was structural discrimination within the institutions of society. Of the myriad of issues

\textsuperscript{175} See, 'List of Persons Represented at Meeting with the UN Human Rights Organisation Committee at Auckland, 14 June 1973', Memorandum, Secretary of Foreign Affairs to The Permanent Representative, New Zealand Mission to the United Nations, New York, 2 July 1973, MA1, Box 660, 36/1/21, Part 12, NA.
\textsuperscript{176} David McDowell, 'Report of United Nations Team Studying Problems of Racial Discrimination', 19 June 1973, MA1, Box 660, 36/1/21, Part 12, NA.
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid. See also, Correspondence, David McDowell to J. E. Carter (District Officer for Maori and Island Affairs, Rotorua), 19 June 1973, MA1, Box 660, 36/1/21, Part 12, NA.
\textsuperscript{178} Information on the meeting has been gained from the following sources: Report, 'The U.N. Human Rights Commission – the Rights of Ethnic Minorities', CARE Newsletter (ND, Circa June 1973), CARE Papers, 96-004. ATL; David McDowell, 'Report of United Nations Team Studying Problems of Racial Discrimination', 19 June 1973, MA1, Box 660, 36/1/21, Part 12, NA; 'Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations', Chapter XIV (pp. 20, 28), Chapter XV111, (pp.20, 23, 59), Chapter XX (pp.12, 30-31, 57), Chapter XI11 (pp.64, 71, 98-99).
discussed, the justice and education systems, Maori language and culture and land alienation received marked attention.

Racial discrimination was spoken of in terms of the loss of the Maori language and Maoritanga, brought about historically by the policies of assimilation by successive governments and institutions which sought to eradicate te reo from schools, dilute cultural integrity, and bring Maori under the 'one New Zealand' rubric based on European precepts and practices. Official policy had been responsible for a legacy of the loss of te reo over several generations. In contemporary terms, discrimination continued and although some effort was being made by government to preserve the language and assist in its resurgence, this was being done in a half-hearted and inadequate manner. Nga Tamatoa, who bitterly resented the loss of te reo, informed the UN team that this was due 'to the cultural genocide practised by the Pakeha'.

The UN mission heard that while all New Zealand citizens had equality before the law the operation of that law had unequal effects which resulted in disadvantage and discrimination against Maori and Pacific peoples. Institutional racism was a feature of the justice system and related to the high rate of convictions and imprisonment. The system was based exclusively on European precedents and practices and took no cognisance of Maori social practices, cultural difference, feelings of inferiority, ignorance of the system or fear within an alien environment. Maori were therefore disadvantaged and failed to gain equal treatment:

Maori suffer in our legal system because it takes no account of their different social practices; because Maori apprehended before the courts are overcome by whakamaa - become so frightened by the forbidding and foreign atmosphere that they plead guilty “to get it over with”; because they are often not fully aware of their legal rights and fail to obtain legal aid. The end result is a supposedly high rate of crime...
Nga Tamatoa had made the justice system a focus of its work and consistently drew public attention to the over-representation of Maori in the system. They accused the police of misusing their power, and claimed they deliberately targeted and harassed young Maori and arrested them for minor offences or trumped up charges. Once they had been arrested a racist justice system ensured that they became a crime statistic. Nga Tamatoa informed the UN team of their perspective and this was reinforced in Wellington when the UN team met with members of Nga Tamatoa (Wellington branch) who had initiated a legal aid scheme to assist Maori offenders.

Land alienation was another issue which drew a heated response. Bearing in mind the long bitter struggle against land alienation woven into the history of iwi and hapu, this was unsurprising. In contemporary terms, by 1973 anger was high as the 1967 MAAA had been introduced which threatened the alienation of yet more Maori land. However other land-taking legislation, including the Rating Act 1967 and the Town and Country Planning Act, further fuelled resentment which, at the time of the UN visit, was beginning to coalesce into a land rights movement. Both moderate and radical activists were united in opposition to land alienation and the UN visit provided the space for Auckland activists to inform an international body of the relentless alienation of Maori land (historical and contemporary) and the accompanying socio-economic and cultural effects on Maori. The UN team learned that all but 3 million out of 66 million acres were now in Pakeha hands, and yet the government was seeking to bring

183 Maori were over-represented in the arrest and conviction rate and the disparity between Maori and Pakeha was glaring. For example the conviction rate of Maori male offenders under the age of sixteen was 5.1 times greater than that of Pakeha and for females it was 7.4. Nga Tamatoa attributed this to both overt racism and a racist justice system which disadvantaged Maori. Dr Oliver Sutherland suggested that the reason lay in the fact that 86.75% of Pakeha offenders were represented in court by lawyers compared to only 44.5% of Maori. In an attempt to rectify this situation Nga Tamatoa provided practical support which sought to ensure that offenders were made aware of their rights and to arrange legal aid if required. See Ranginui Walker, *Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou*, p.210; *Te Maori*, Vol.6, Issue 3, 1974, pp.28-30; Lin Johnson, 'Nga Tamatoa; Just a “raggle-taggle band” of troublemakers?', Research Exercise BA(Hons), Massey University, 2005.

184 The Town and Country Planning Act restricted land development and often prevented Maori from building on their own land. At the same time it allowed other developments without consultation with Maori owners or without any recognition of historic relationships with the land. The effect of the lack of development meant that significant numbers of Maori were forced to migrate to towns and cities. The 1967 Rating Act gave local authorities the power to confiscate lands for accumulated unpaid rates. This especially affected people who, unable to use their lands or sustain themselves, had migrated into cities for employment.

the rest under Pakeha law. Further, this law failed to take into consideration Maori usages and customs in relation to land, and that sacred sites and burial grounds were often bulldozed over, desecrated and occupied.186

Education was subject to severe criticism and numerous examples were presented of how Maori and other minority groups suffered discrimination within the education system. Whilst acknowledging recent gains in the teaching of Maori language and culture, activists argued that such measures had been inadequate and more attention should be paid to teaching te reo and ‘injecting a greater knowledge of Maoritanga’.187 Further, the marginalisation of Maori language and culture, 'language difficulties and different cultural background and orientation', were the reasons why Maori left school after a few years of secondary education without qualifications.188 Of most significance, the activists explained, were the deeply ingrained racist attitudes of school personnel which affected the educational outcomes and future employment prospects of Maori students. The wishes of Maori students were ignored and they were pushed into courses and studies which teachers and guidance counsellors deemed to be more suited for their background and their ‘future role in society’. This was a result of the preconceived racist ideas about what Maori were deemed to be capable of and ‘what was good for Maoris’ and thus they failed to meet the actual aspirations of many students. Biculturalism 'was the ideal' but would only come to fruition when Pakeha notions of the superiority of their culture, priorities and practices were abandoned. 189

Thus the education system was racist and discriminated against Maori. The Auckland activists, especially Nga Tamatoa and Ranginui Walker had consistently brought to public attention the view that the education system was failing Maori in all areas, including in the curriculum and assessment, and was responsible for the under-

189 ‘Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations’, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.2, 28 June 1983, Chapter X111-Education, pp.71, 98-99. Despite having a significant Pasifika community, as well as Indian and Chinese communities, the talk at this time was of biculturalism not multiculturalism. Although in later years increased immigration generated discussion about multiculturalism, for Maori at least, the biculturalism discourse and principles associated with it remained pre-eminent.
achievement of Maori students. It was culturally biased and failed to recognise cultural
diversity or consider Maori cultural differences, attitudes, experiences, priorities and
aspirations. Nga Tamatoa spoke in terms of 'white racism' and Ranginui Walker
spoke of 'the tyranny of the majority' and a Pakeha middle-class monocultural education
system which was dysfunctional for Maori children. Both meant much the same. For
Walker and Nga Tamatoa the result was the creation of a brown unskilled proletariat.

Complaints were also made about the under-representation of Maori in Parliament. The
four Maori seats, a number unchanged for a century, had been acknowledged by
government as being inadequate for the growing Maori population and discussions were
being conducted in the government caucus on the issue. Nga Tamatoa noted the refusal
of previous governments to countenance an increase, and the tardiness of the present
government in dealing with the issue. In their view, it was a deliberate Pakeha ploy and
delaying tactic by government, presumably to deny Maori a more effective voice.

On racial discrimination in general, the activists claimed that mainstream Pakeha New
Zealand generally rejected the notion that racial discrimination was a problem and the
lack of prosecutions and complaints to the newly installed Race Relations Conciliator
appeared to sustain this view. However the Auckland group made claims to the
contrary. Will Illolahia (Polynesian Panther Party) pointed out that less than 100
complaints had been referred to the office during the first year of operation and only one
was found to be valid. While this suggested that racial discrimination was not an
issue, Illolahia argued that this was an erroneous conclusion: rather it demonstrated that
the legal parameters set in place for dealing with discrimination were 'clearly
inadequate'. Moreover those being discriminated against had no faith in the present
system and failed to lodge complaints. As another activist noted, 'the law speaks a
different language from the Maori in the street.'

190 Ranginui Walker, 'An Address to the Federation of Maori Students', Salient, 24 May 1972, pp.6-7; For
the discourse by Nga Tamatoa and Ranginui Walker on Maori and the education system see, Listener,
191 On the 'tyranny of the majority', see Salient, 24 May 1972, pp.6-7.
19 June 1973, MA1, Box 660, 36/1/21, Part 12, NA.
193 Ibid.
194 Ibid.
After two ‘vigorous sessions’ it was made clear to the UN team that New Zealand was not a paradise of racial harmony and equality as was commonly portrayed. Rather, activists argued that New Zealand was a racist society which discriminated against Maori (and Pasifika people) overtly and in institutional terms and the UN team were made aware that ‘ethnic minorities felt angry and resentful that their legitimate aspirations for cultural identity and self-expression were being denied them by the Pakeha majority’.\(^{195}\)

The concerns and issues which the many non-radical groups and individuals expressed to the UN team are difficult to identify as information and records are almost non-existent. Assumptions can be made with some certainty on the basis of current concerns expressed publicly and issues being contested. For example, it is highly likely that Matiu Rata (MP, Northern Maori) would have raised issues of discrimination in relation to parliamentary representation. Rata had consistently (and recently) pressed for an increase in Maori seats and claimed that there should be at least six. It was ‘hard to convince Maoris that there is true equality in this country’ while Maori were grossly under-represented in Parliament.\(^{196}\) However, the Cobo report indicates that many non-activist Maori raised some similar concerns to those expressed by the activists in Auckland. Both shared the same struggle, contested the same issues, and held similar grievances. The difference was the manner in which the radical activists expressed these issues and the measures they used to have them acknowledged and addressed.

**A Space for Maori in the Cobo Report**

The concerns and information expressed by Maori from across New Zealand, as well as Pakeha supporters, were collated and presented in the ‘Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations’ (Cobo report). Not all the grievances appeared in the report due to the terms of reference, and much was condensed to brief statements. For example racial discrimination in relation to land did not include historical claims and grievances. Rather it was narrowed to a number of categories in contemporary terms, including the rights of ownership and use of land, current protections, and land titles. Nevertheless Maori concerns were represented across most

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\(^{195}\) CARE Newsletter, (ND, Circa June 1973), CARE: Misc Papers, 96-004, ATL. The report on the meeting was written by M.P.K. Sorrenson, a CARE representative at the two meetings. Sorrenson makes clear that many issues discussed were not included in his report.

\(^{196}\) MOOHR Newsletter, Sept 1972.
sections of the report, sometimes only a sentence, others more detailed especially in the areas of language and culture, the justice and legal system and education.

While not proposing a detailed analysis of the Cobo report, there are strong indications in the report that activists and non-activists iterated similar concerns. Some indications come in generic comments. For example, in the section on 'Language' the report noted that 'all indigenous peoples' complained that their language and culture were not properly recognised by the state. They were marginalised and treated cursorily within the education system by non-indigenous teachers who had an inadequate understanding of the language, traditions and culture of indigenous children. Moreover, within action programmes for indigenous peoples, there was a 'lack of interest or deliberate policies of neglect' by the state and other agencies. Specific to New Zealand, the report noted that many informants complained that the policies of successive governments (historically) had been responsible for the loss of the Maori language. In contemporary terms, they argued that the state was not doing enough to preserve the language or assist in its revival, and 'special measures, more and better ones, were needed'.

The report also makes it clear that there was strong criticism from all indigenous peoples about the assimilation policies of successive governments:

Almost without exception, information from non-governmental and indigenous sources has been deeply critical of official policy. The prevailing view is that, even though in theory a Government may advocate cultural pluralism and pledge to respect indigenous cultural values within the process of integration, in practice the indigenous legal, cultural, social and economic conceptions, patterns and institutions have suffered under what has been more akin to a process of assimilation. Such views, which have been expressed most forcefully by the representatives of the indigenous peoples themselves, have frequently been echoed by other non-governmental bodies....

Where it is not specific, it is possible to distinguish through language used whether the comments came from activist or non-activist groups or individuals. For example on a
section on 'Housing' and the “pepper-potting” policy, the first comment most likely came from the latter, and the second from activists:

   Many persons...conveyed to the Special Rapporteur their regret that this policy was preventing the Maori population from keeping their communal ties and from having easy access to the local Maraes. In fact some of these persons believed this policy to be a deliberate “Pakeha” attempt to lessen these ties and provoke the absorption of Maoris into the general European community.200

Similarly on education, most Maori agreed that there was a lack of emphasis on Maori culture in schools, but the activists took a harder line, tone and discourse:

   Many persons mentioned their belief that not enough emphasis was being placed on Maori culture in New Zealand schools, and their desire that true biculturalism would come to be the guiding criterion in official and unofficial education in the country. Some persons felt the policy of “assimilation” formerly espoused by the government was still in operation, although in an admittedly weakened form. According to this last group, notions of the superiority of “Pakeha” culture would have to be abandoned before true biculturalism could have a chance to take over.201

However it should also be stressed that the UN team was under the impression that many older traditional Maori and conservative groups downplayed racial discrimination or were reluctant to speak on the issue. The 'new breed of young urbanised Maori' brought racial discrimination into the open and spoke out forcefully because, as Diaz noted, they were 'no longer subject to the same traditions of courtesy and “personal dignity”'. It was these traditional courtesies and qualities which led to an understatement of issues by conservative Maori and which may have masked the level of discrimination and also 'may have tended to lead ...to underestimation of the degree of Maori resentments. Resistance to discrimination is becoming more widespread if discrimination itself is not'.202

‘It's troublesome to know how to explain it away’: Government intervention

The concern by Foreign Affairs was how Willemsen-Diaz, the author of the forthcoming report, would view discrimination in New Zealand. McDowell worried about representation. He wondered who spoke 'most authentically for the Maori today', and which opinion Willemsen-Diaz would perceive to be the most representative of Maori experience and therefore predominate in the report. Would it be the 'dignified elders...suave civil servants, lawyers' and others 'who have made it in Pakeha society' or would it be the 'angry young urbanites… detribalised and resenting everything Pakeha'?

McDowell feared the latter. Willemsen-Diaz had found 'irrefutable evidence' of racial discrimination and McDowell was sure that this would be found in the areas of employment and accommodation, land issues, the education and justice systems, cultural issues (especially the preservation of te reo), and parliamentary representation.

While there were a blend of Maori statements and understandings put forward, the discourse from activists tended to be more noticeable. CARE also took the opportunity to make written submissions and these featured heavily. Although the activists pointed to racial discrimination being a significant feature across many areas, this was offset by detailed remarks from the government who had been given the opportunity to read the draft report and make comment. Tony Small (Foreign Affairs) was given the task of revising and refuting comments in the draft report and found some issues 'troublesome to know how to explain away'. For example, Small noted that a leaflet on Maori health had been given to the UN without an explanation. There was an ‘unflattering entry on ‘Maori Health and Welfare’ in the New Zealand Encyclopaedia, and ‘it would be awkward to say the least if we gave the Cobo team a different story without being able to back it up’. This infers that the leaflet was not accurate. Moreover, Small wondered if it was wise to include information that national health surveys had to be carried out among the Maori population as this might strike a reader as ‘sinister’.

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203  Ibid.
204  Correspondence, Tony Small (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to Jock McEwen (Secretary for Maori and Island Affairs), 2 October 1973, MA1, Box 660, 36/1/21, Part 12, NA, This correspondence concerns revision of the government submissions by Tony Small, and the changes which he proposed in order to place the government in a positive light and which left no room for awkward questions to be raised. Ibid.
205  Ibid.
The comments put forward were essentially an exercise in damage control and they variously refuted claims, put a spin on various aspects and thereby softened inequality, or painted the government in a favourable light. As an example, the report noted that Nga Tamatoa had set up a Legal Defence Office to provide legal aid for Maori charged with offences. The government stated that it had provided financial assistance and that the Maori Affairs Department provided social workers to assist Maori offenders in the courts. This indicated that the government was supportive of Nga Tamatoa. In fact the Legal Defence Office was almost always desperately short of funds and relied on donations from the Nga Tamatoa Council, fund-raising activities, and a small amount of financial assistance from the WCC Programme to Combat Racism. The government apparently gave little support, either financial or otherwise, and in numerous instances it could be seen as being unreasonable and worse, obstructive. Nga Tamatoa requested that their legal aid workers be given honorary Maori Welfare Officer status which would allow them access to a court list, court information and the names of Maori who were held in custody. This would gain them access to the cells where they could advise Maori in custody of their legal rights before going to court. The request was denied.206

Occasionally the government acknowledged a problem and indicated that measures were being put in place to attend to the issue. This was easy to say and then easy to ignore: there was no follow up by the UN team and neither were governments required to attend to discriminatory practices. For example, the government acknowledged that there was some validity to the criticism made by Maori that they were under-represented in Parliament, and stated that the question of Maori representation was being examined to ensure Maori were represented in parliament in proportion to their population, and ‘The Government intends to amend the law to provide for this’.207 In fact it took a further twenty years for Maori representation to be increased. Despite their extensive ‘corrective’ comments, Foreign Affairs were unhappy with the final report for its adversarial presentation which they feared 'may give the impression of a pervasively deep difference of opinion in New Zealand over the whole treatment of

206 If the government did provide financial support it was either insignificant or the information is well hidden. I have not found any indication of significant support from the government. For information on Nga Tamatoa and the Legal Defence Office, see The Paper, July 1973, Issue 1, pp 11-12; Te Maori, Vol.5, Issue 4, pp 23-24, Aug/Sept 1973. On the information in the Cobo Report, see 'Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations', E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.7, 24 May 1984, Chapter XX – Equality in the administration of justice and legal assistance, pp.31, 57.
Maoris'. This is precisely what the format conveyed: the placing of comments by Maori (and Pakeha supporters) against those of the government demonstrated a gulf in the understandings and experience of racial discrimination. Regardless of who was more believable, at the least it indicated that New Zealand had a race relations problem.

The significance of the UN meeting with Maori and the subsequent report should not be under-estimated. While the report lacked depth in explaining racial discrimination, it identified its existence. Moreover, it provided a space for an oppositional discourse of race relations, especially related to race discrimination, to be articulated, transmitted and broadcast internationally. More importantly it was a transmission based directly on Maori discourse, understandings and lived experience rather than the government or Pakeha authorities defining Maori experience according to their understandings, opinions and suppositions. Had the UN delegates merely spoken to government officials then, as the government comments on the draft report indicate a very different understanding of race relations would have been received and broadcast internationally. This is precisely what had been occurring in UN forums in which the representatives of successive governments had white-washed race relations.

The subsequent Cobo Report iterated the narrative by Maori and also located them within a wider global narrative of indigenous peoples who shared many historical and contemporary experiences, and negative outcomes arising from colonisation. While indigenous peoples’ experiences bore similarities, there were many differences: they flowed down their own lines of resistance and suffering, and were subject to different policies and treatment according to the ideologies and priorities of the colonising power. Nevertheless, in contemporary terms the outcomes of colonisation and the position which indigenous people (particularly within the settler states) occupied in society were remarkably similar.

However the report was also disappointing, mainly for the time it took Willemsen-Diaz to write the document and for the United Nations to order its publication. Reports on the progress of the study were presented to the sub-commission yearly. These received scant attention. Between 20 to 40 minutes were allocated for discussion each year, and

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208 Correspondence, Secretary of Foreign Affairs to The Permanent Representative, New Zealand Mission to the United Nations, New York, 24 Sept 1974, MA1, Box 660, 36/1/21, Part 13, NA.
is a reflection of the lack of interest in indigenous peoples, at least through to the late 1970s. The final Cobo Report was presented to the sub-commission in a series of three documents in 1982, 1983 and 1984. In 1985 ECOSOC called for the publication of the 'Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations' in consolidated form, and requested that it be disseminated widely.\textsuperscript{209} Thus, in the case of New Zealand, by the time the report was published twelve years later the material, while still relevant in some areas, was out of date in others.

Within the New Zealand context, the time lapse meant that the potential and strength it held for raising discussion on racial discrimination was drained. Had it been published within a few years it would quite likely have generated considerable debate and fed into national currents of dissent and activism in which race relations occupied much national discussion. However by 1985 perceptions of race relations had changed dramatically. Maori and the state had confronted each other in many acrimonious actions and events, and the issue of racism had been topical for many years - an outcome of the work of anti-racism campaigners and Maori activists during the 1970s, the 1981 Springbok Rugby Tour protest, and the aftermath which saw the emergence of numerous anti-racism groups and programmes. By then the claim to harmonious race relations had been overturned and there was little talk of New Zealand being a model of racial harmony. At best, it was 'better than', and said defensively rather than with pride.

**Conclusion: Expanding Space by Articulating and Gaining Recognition of Racial Discrimination at the United Nations**

During the 1960s, disparate government and United Nations imperatives on racial discrimination intersected. While the government was averse to dealing with race discrimination, the United Nations was committed to the elimination of racial discrimination and enshrined it in ICERD. Member states were expected to ratify the convention. Despite its reluctance, the government had no option but to commit to ICERD, and in doing so it set in motion a train of events that that would eventually lead into the United Nations. Reluctant to ratify the convention the government stalled,

dragged its heels, and finally in 1972 ratified ICERD and enacted the required legislation.

These measures intersected with Maori imperatives and a new political climate across Maoridom. This was stimulated by the MAAA which had seen Maori opinion ignored and locked Maori out of the decision-making process. They now demanded inclusion in government initiatives and legislation which affected Maori. At the same time radical Maori activism had emerged and the young activists also demanded that their claims and opinion be recognised. A focus was on racial discrimination, in part stimulated by the international focus on racial discrimination, and especially in South Africa. In the nexus of domestic issues, ICERD and the enactment of race relations legislation, Maori activists especially, but also Maori leaders, found numerous new spaces in which to insert their claims, grievances and challenge the government both at home and abroad through communication with UN bodies, and eventually culminated in a visit to the United Nations. The issue of discrimination brought a United Nations team to New Zealand the following year.

Through engagement with the United Nations, Maori activists used the space as a political resource to subvert the national race relations discourse. Patu Hohepa spoke through the media of New Zealand on the brink of racial turmoil, and at the UNSCA meeting he made clear that there was a gulf between the attitudes of Maori and Pakeha towards ‘race’. He hinted at white racism, similar to that embedded in the white population of South Africa, and he made contacts outside the UN where he reportedly iterated the views of Nga Tamatoa. The Cobo visit to New Zealand sought to gain information of discrimination against Maori for a global study on discrimination against indigenous peoples. What Cobo wanted was access to the voice and experience of Maori. For the first time it provided a broad section of Maoridom with the opportunity to articulate their experience of race relations, and especially racial discrimination, before an international body, rather than having the Pakeha voice define that relationship. Activists in Auckland subverted a government controlled visitor circuit, and thus the national narrative of racial equality and harmony. For two days the activists regaled the UN team of widespread racial discrimination in New Zealand. The discourse of Maori was printed in the ‘Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations’, along with reports from Pakeha supporters, and comments
from the government. The latter intervened in the report, and attempted to exert some
control either by rejecting or softening the claims made by Maori.

The attempts by the government to exert control over the race relations narrative and
maintain New Zealand’s reputation, was a feature of the period. The tension between
reputation and reality threads its way through the chapter. In numerous ways the
government sought to whitewash the issue of domestic discrimination, and either limit
or mediate the space available for the voice of Maori to be heard. This included the
protracted discussions over ICERD and then the refusal to make an ICERD Article 14
declaration, mediating in news reports and slanting information in UN reports, ‘talks’
with the NZMC, the expanded prestige-laden visitors’ circuit, and the intervention in the
Cobo report. All indicate how threatened the government felt, and how important it was
to maintain New Zealand’s image. That the RRA only provided the bare minimum of
requirements indicates that it was indeed ‘window dressing for a watching world’.

Acknowledging the reality of racial discrimination, and finding effective ways of
dealing with it, was subordinate to an international reputation.

The experiences and voice of Maori, along with that of Pakeha supporters and
statements from the government, rest in the ‘Study of the Problem of Discrimination
against Indigenous Populations’, along with the voices of indigenous peoples across the
globe. The pages are a testament to the space which was created during the UN visit,
and in a wider sense, to the spaces which were slowly becoming available for
indigenous peoples across the world to have their voices heard. Within the voluminous
report is a slice of New Zealand’s race relations history, and a record of the racial
discrimination to which Maori were subject at a particular time in history.
Chapter Six:

A Place in the Fourth World:
World Council of Indigenous Peoples,
1971-1981

In this chapter, the direction of activism shifts as Maori move beyond participating in transnational indigenous networks and single issue events to participate in the creation and governance of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP). This was the first transnational pan-indigenous organisation with a global perspective. George Manuel, president of the National Indian Brotherhood (NIB), the inspiration and founder of the WCIP, conceived of an international organisation to unify indigenous peoples - the Fourth World - and gain a degree of political power through a collective indigenous voice. A key aim was to gain NGO consultative status within ECOSOC and thus gain authority to advocate for indigenous peoples at United Nations institutions and conferences. In 1977 this was granted and the WCIP was recognised as the official advocate of indigenous peoples.

This chapter is structured around the twin themes of the thesis - the creation, use and control of space, and New Zealand’s good race relations reputation. The latter, in a variety of ways, was a central feature in almost all the events which transpired throughout the period. Within the period 1971-1981, this chapter examines how Maori were drawn into the facilitation and governance of the WCIP, their positions within the organisation, and how they used the new spaces which had opened up. I argue that through to the first conference of the WCIP in 1975, their involvement, the positions which they took, the expectations placed on them, and the roles they played were a direct result of the ‘best race relations’ discourse which positioned Maori as a privileged people in relation to other indigenous peoples. I further argue that Maori generated a space to place the historical experience of colonisation and its contemporary legacy before the conference, and thus they replaced the oppressive discourse of Maori
‘privilege’ with reality, and inflected the softer discourse of ‘better than’ with nuances of Maori agency and resistance.

The route to the WCIP began in 1971 with a visit to New Zealand by a Canadian government delegation, which included George Manuel, to study New Zealand’s integration policies and successful bi-cultural race relations model. The first section of this chapter examines the official visit and demonstrates the ways in which Manuel successfully subverted the visitors’ circuit to make contact with Maori. Within these free spaces came identification of shared historical and contemporary struggle, cultural commonalities, a shared world view and values. For Manuel, the difference between Maori and other indigenous people was that Maori were in a far better position socially, economically and politically than other indigenous peoples. It was from this visit and the meetings with Maori that Manuel began to conceive of an international organisation for indigenous peoples.

The second section traces the movement of Maori into the WCIP and examines their involvement in an elite group of indigenous representatives who attended the preparatory conferences which were convened to bring the WCIP into being. Also examined are the attitudes and reservations held by the NZMC and the government towards the proposed international organisation.

In 1975 a delegation of four Maori, representing the NZMC, travelled to Port Alberni, and took their place at an international indigenous conference to establish the World Council of Indigenous Peoples. This section examines the roles and positions which Maori took, and the perceptions and expectations of others. The perception of Maori as ‘privileged’ determined the form their participation took at the conference. Being ‘privileged’ encompassed a range of meanings spread along a ‘scale of privilege’ which included elite, privileged, successful, westernised and ‘better than’. I demonstrate how Maori navigated their way through these positions at the conference and yet found a way to breach dominant perceptions and present an oppositional race relations narrative whilst also acknowledging their advantaged position.

Finally I examine the participation by Maori in the Third General Assembly of the WCIP in Canberra in 1981. A series of issues and events, including divisions within
Maoridom, affected their ability to use the spaces at conference effectively, and I suggest that this engendered perceptions of Maori as elite and privileged. However, an alternative space, the Aboriginal Forum presented Maori activists with the opportunity to place an oppositional race relations narrative before an international gathering and also show support for Aboriginal activists and their claims for land rights. This went some way to counter any negative image that may have been formed and redeemed the lacklustre efforts of the official delegation.

The focus of this chapter has been limited to describing the historical process of how Maori were drawn into the WCIP, the part they played in the facilitation and governance of the WCIP, and how they used the spaces which became available. The actions and the work of the WCIP during this period have not been covered. Had Maori placed claims before the WCIP for action to be taken, or been heavily involved in the work of the WCIP, this would have formed part of the chapter. However this was not the case.1

The events in this chapter identify another strand of Maori activism and should be positioned alongside the previous two chapters, in which Maori activism developed throughout the 1970s, nationally and internationally. Maori activists were networking with other activists in the Pacific, travelling to Europe and Asia for single issue events, taking part in regional forums such as Nuclear Free Pacific conferences, and participating at international forums which included the Fourth Russell Tribunal and various United Nations conferences and initiatives. Involvement by Maori in the WCIP placed Maori within a global indigenous people’s organisation with a global vision, which aimed to gain indigenous rights for all indigenous peoples collectively.

**Concepts and Context**

*The Fourth World*

The term and concept, the Fourth World, came into use in 1974 with the publication of George Manuel’s autobiographical narrative, *The Fourth World: An Indian reality*, and brought a new perspective to international politics.2 Manuel conceived the Fourth

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World to be ‘the forgotten world of aboriginal peoples locked into independent
sovereign states but without an adequate voice or say in the decisions which affect our
lives’. It was a world comprised of indigenous peoples who were descendants of the
first peoples of the land, they retained a distinctive culture and they had been forcefully
incorporated into states and were now minorities in the land they once occupied.

There were commonalities between all indigenous peoples in that they shared the
violence of colonisation which had seen them partially or entirely stripped of their rights
and political power, cultural forms, lands and resources. While their experiences varied
in terms of severity, and flowed down their own lines of oppression, subjugation,
resistance and accommodation, the contemporary legacy of political, social, cultural and
economic marginalisation and subjection was a contemporary legacy which was
common to all. However, indigenous peoples also possessed cultural commonalities
such as a distinct world view and reverence for land and the natural world. Their
strength lay in unity and cooperation forged by indigeneity and their common
experiences of subjugation and oppression. Manuel believed that the route to changing
attitudes towards indigenous peoples lay in participation in the UN.

**Locating the WCIP within a changing environment.**

The WCIP was the beneficiary of a changing international environment. Indigenous
peoples formed national organisations and activist groups in the 1960s and early 1970s
and then shortly after began to network across borders. All across the Pacific region,
across the America’s and in the arctic and sub-arctic regions, indigenous peoples began
organising politically and then internationalising their cause. As has been demonstrated
in the South Pacific, FCAATSI and black power groups in Australia, Nga Tamatoa in
New Zealand, and independence organisations across the Pacific Islands (such as the
Mataungan Association in Papua New Guinea) all formed at a similar time and then
internationalised a short while later. The formation of regional organisations followed.

Alliances: International NGOs of the United States and Canada in the 1970s’, *Japanese Journal of
American Studies*, No.23, 201, pp.209-230 (218).

4 For an overview on the international development of indigenous peoples organising, see Jochen
In 1973 the first Arctic Peoples’ Conference was held in Copenhagen to address common problems and indigenous rights among Arctic populations. This was followed in 1974 by the formation of the International Indian Treaty Council for tribes and nations across North and South America. In the Pacific, the Nuclear Free Pacific was formed in 1975 which, although not solely for indigenous peoples, incorporated indigenous concerns and rights. The name change to the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific reflected the concerns and agenda of its large indigenous base. Thus the WCIP can be placed within the context of increasing national and transnational activism by indigenous peoples. However the WCIP took activism further and constituted itself as the first transnational pan-indigenous organisation with a global perspective.

From the early 1970s the United Nations, which had largely ignored the rights of indigenous peoples, began to respond to concerns. A turning point came in 1971 when ECOSOC authorised the UN Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to conduct a study on the ‘Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations’, and Jose Martinez Cobo was appointed Special Rapporteur. At the same time there was a growing interest in indigenous peoples by researchers, NGOs and humanitarian organisations including the national church organisations, the WCC, the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, and Oxfam. These were crucial (particularly for their financial backing) in enabling the development of the WCIP and assisting indigenous peoples come together in regional and international forums. The first international conference of NGOs on indigenous issues, the NGO ‘Conference on Discrimination against Indigenous Populations’, was held in Geneva in 1977. This was followed in 1980 with the convening of the Fourth Russell Tribunal in Rotterdam on ‘The Rights of Indians of the Americas’.

**Foundations: George Manuel’s Visit to New Zealand**

In June 1969 Jean Chretien, Minister of Indian Affairs, presented to Parliament a *Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy* which contained proposals to bring about Trudeau's vision of a 'Just Society'. Commonly known as the 'White Paper on Indian Affairs', it was much like the Hunn Report in that it was an integration policy designed to create equality and remove any hint of separate treatment, privileged or

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otherwise. All Canadians were to be treated the same. For the indigenous peoples of Canada, the most offensive and contentious proposals in the White Paper were the repeal the Indian Act, the transfer of responsibility for Indian Affairs to provincial governments, the termination of treaties which various Indian tribes had made with the Crown, and the abolition of their special constitutional status.

The proposals were overwhelmingly rejected by First Nations peoples. As the Maori Affairs Amendment Act had sparked off Maori activism, in Canada the White Paper had a similar effect and ushered in a new era of activism in which Indian nationalism emerged as a political force. The Indian Chiefs of Alberta played a central role in opposing the White Paper and published ‘Citizens Plus’, popularly known as the 'Red Paper'. This was a rejection and critique of the White Paper and a statement of Indian desires, needs and demands, and their proposals for the type of society they wanted. The National Indian Brotherhood (NIB), under the presidency of George Manuel, adopted the Red Paper as its official national position. This called for the recognition of treaty rights, a reaffirmation of the special status of Indians, and demanded a halt to the implementation of any proposals until consultations had been carried out with Indian people and their desires were taken into account.

In June 1970, a delegation of two hundred Indian leaders attended a formal meeting with Prime Minister Trudeau and his cabinet at Parliament Buildings in Ottawa. One chief handed a copy of the Red Paper to Trudeau and another handed back a copy of the White Paper to Chretien who was told, 'We completely reject it because it contains only the proposals of the government itself'. Further, Chretien was informed, 'We have our own set of ideas as to what the Indians should be doing for themselves...We do not need this any longer. Our people do not need the Indian policy paper'. During the meeting Trudeau praised New Zealand’s race relations policies, and informed the delegation that

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Harold Cardinal, President of the Indian Association of Alberta (1968-1977), was the chief architect of the Red Paper.


9 McFarlane, *Brotherhood to Nationhood*, p.117.
the Maori people were doing very well and were doing so without any special legislative protection.\textsuperscript{10} Moreover, he thought that New Zealand could be used as a model for Canada’s developing relationship with its indigenous people.

Trudeau held New Zealand's integration policies in high esteem, and this had been reinforced during his recent visit to New Zealand. He informed Prime Minister Holyoake that ‘recent federal laws on the treatment of the Indian population had been influenced by the multi-racial model of New Zealand social policies’.\textsuperscript{11} During his visit Trudeau had also shown interest in the current policies of the New Zealand Government on 'aid to Polynesian peoples', and information had been gathered.\textsuperscript{12} However, it was a visit to Waiwhetu marae which made a significant impression on Trudeau and confirmed that integration was working in New Zealand. As the \textit{Belville Intelligencier} reported, ‘It may go down as the most moving experience’ of his Pacific tour.\textsuperscript{13}

At Waiwhetu marae Trudeau was given a traditional Maori welcome and Kara Puketapu welcomed him on behalf of local iwi and the other iwi representatives.\textsuperscript{14} The Prime Minister was declared to be ‘kotuki revengatahi (sic) - white heron in single flight’ – and told that he would forever be bound in friendship with Maori. Addressing Trudeau, Puketapu spoke of Maori and likened them to an indigenous tree which had been stripped and withered with the coming of the Pakeha. However, the roots had remained and it was now beginning to grow and ‘bear sweet fruit’. The roots of the tree were ‘the love of Maori for their people and their pride in being Maori’. In response, Trudeau spoke of the Canadian Indians who had also been a ‘stripped tree’. They too had kept their roots ‘and now they are seeking with us - the white man - ways to build together a great society, built on peace, brotherhood and goodwill... We have to live today and preserve our values. I will have learned from you the ways of brotherhood’. He told the gathering that when people in Canada asked about Maori he would say ‘that they are a people who received me as a friend and spoke to me with kindness, brotherhood and

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid, p.118, p.155.  
\textsuperscript{11} Newspaper clipping, (no name, no date – circa May 1970), IA, W 1792, Box 109, 152/2550, Part 2, NA.  
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Belville Intelligencier} (Ontario), 15 May 1970.  
\textsuperscript{14} The following paragraph is an amalgamation of reports from the \textit{Belville Intelligencier} (Ontario), 15 May 1970, and \textit{Te Ao Hou}, No.69, pp.30-31.
wisdom’. Following the speeches, Trudeau mixed with the people, joined a group
performing action songs, and stood among them as they ‘encircled him in friendship’.

The event, and indeed the visit to New Zealand, was significant for it confirmed New
Zealand as a bi-cultural nation, and it portrayed Maori participating in society as equal
citizens and yet maintaining their cultural heritage. It was proof of successful
integration policies and a benevolent government. Also significant was that it played a
large part in a willingness by Trudeau to consider Indian counter-proposals in the Red
Paper. As the New Zealand High Commission to Ottawa reported:

His advisers told us that the favourable impression he had gained from his first-hand
experience of the racial harmony he saw in New Zealand...had already caused him to
rethink his ideas about future federal government action in this field.... Trudeau had
realised that the development in the Indian psyche of a pride of purpose, equivalent to
“Maoritanga”, would be a highly significant step on the way to changing the nature of
the Indian problem. The “Red Paper”...advocates essentially the same thing.16

15 ‘What is Pierre Trudeau Doing?’, Huffington Post, 19 July 2015,
www.huffingtonpost.ca/2015/04/09/stephen-harper-pierre-trudeau-justin-trudeau_n_70345.html
16 Cited in 'The Canadian Indian', prepared by the New Zealand High Commission (Ottawa), 30 Nov
1970. This was attached to correspondence from Hon. Dean Eyre (New Zealand High Commissioner,
Ottawa) to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 2 Dec 1970, ABHS 6950, Box 9, OTT86/5/2, Part 1, NA.
Following the Ottawa meeting with the Indian delegation, Trudeau asked Leonard Marchand MP to lead a delegation on a tour of New Zealand to study the position of Maori in greater depth.\textsuperscript{17} In the event Chretien took over the leadership of the tour (which included Australia, Tahiti and Hawaii), which satisfied Trudeau who was keen for his minister 'to observe at first-hand how Maoris had adjusted themselves to New Zealand society'.\textsuperscript{18} Moreover, it would give Chretien the opportunity to 'discuss with Ministers, officials and others concerned, the relationship between New Zealanders of Maori and European origin and the way in which it has developed'.\textsuperscript{19} Chretien, accepted advice from Marchand, and invited George Manuel to join the delegation.

Manuel hesitated about whether or not to accept the invitation. His main reservation was that he would be 'compelled to spend a lot of time listening to government officials from one country telling government officials from another country about their Native People'.\textsuperscript{20} The NIB Council urged him to accept the invitation and make his own assessment rather than relying on a government appraisal. Manuel joined the delegation which included members of Chretien's senior staff, four members of the Commons Committee on Indian Affairs and Northern Development, and two Indian delegates.\textsuperscript{21}

\begin{center}
\textit{Mediated Spaces: Idealising Integration and Marginalising Maori}
\end{center}

Manuel's principal aim was to meet a range of Maori people but he was concerned that he might only be permitted to meet with those 'who share the same sentiments on integration' as white politicians.\textsuperscript{22} His concern was not unfounded. In keeping with the usual pattern of the visitors' circuit, the itinerary was structured to present an idealised view of race relations. For much of the official tour contact with Maori was limited and they were only visible as concert performers and entertainers, when demonstrating integration schemes, or at official functions where there was no opportunity to discuss political issues. Manuel later remarked that throughout the tour not one Maori

\begin{footnotes}
\item[17] McFarlane, \textit{Brotherhood to Nationhood…}, pp. 155-156. Marchand was the first status Indian MP.
\item[18] Correspondence, New Zealand High Commission (Ottawa) to Department of Foreign Affairs (Wellington), 26 Jan 1971, IA, W1824, Box 1, 152/26/5, Part 1, NA.
\item[19] Correspondence, Department of Foreign Affairs (NZ) to Prime Minister Holyoake, 19 Feb 1971, IA, W1824, Box 1, 152/26/5, Part 1, NA.
\item[21] Sanders, 'The Formation of the World Council…', p.9. The two Indian delegates were Bill Mussell (an Indian special assistant to the Minister and other non-Indians) and Leonard Marchand (MP).
\item[22] McFarlane, \textit{Brotherhood to Nationhood…}, p.156.
\end{footnotes}
accompanied the group, and he suggested that the itinerary had been designed to ensure that the delegation only met Maori who supported their integration policies and shared 'their sentiments'.

A full day was spent in Wellington and was taken up with meeting government officials, ministers and Prime Minister Holyoake. At a meeting with Duncan MacIntyre, Manuel's fears were realised and he was compelled to listen to government officials ‘telling… about their native people’. Moreover, he became acutely aware that the position of Maori had been idealised and the integration policies were, as in Canada, designed to facilitate assimilation:

> During the hour and a half we were with him, Mr MacIntyre described with great enthusiasm his government's policy for the Maori people. We were told...that the Maoris are integrating rapidly; more Maoris are moving into the city than ever. This appeals to the Nationalist Government....It appears from what Mr MacIntyre told us that the Government would like to integrate the Maori completely. Their whole approach seems to be complete assimilation and the dissolution of all special rights and status of the Maori people. In fact, the longer I listened to the learned gentleman, the more I thought I was listening to Mr Chretien describing the Canadian Government's White Paper to a visiting Maori anthropologist.

None of the Maori MPs were invited to the meeting, and nor were they invited to meet with the delegation for discussions during the visit. As the purpose of the visit to New Zealand was to study the position of Maori in society, the expectation was that some form of Maori representation would be included at the meeting with the Minister of Maori Affairs. Manuel found it surprising, but 'symbolic' that constitutionally Maori had special rights of separate parliamentary representation, and yet the present government did not invite them to participate. Moreover, MacIntyre deliberately excluded Maori from the meeting. Not only did he side-line Maori MPs, he ignored a request from Patu Hohepa who, representing the NZMC and ADMC, had asked to be included at the meeting.

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24 Manuel, 'Canadian Indians and Maoris Share....', p.11.
25 Ibid.
Events in New Zealand and a climate of rising political opposition and activism by Maori suggest reasons for the government stance. The four Maori MPs, Matiu Rata, Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan, Paraone Reweti and Koro Wetere, were in the opposition Labour Party and this possibly explains the reluctance of MacIntyre to include them at an official meeting in which he sought to extol the integration policies of the National Party, and race relations in general. Moreover, Matiu Rata and Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan had strongly opposed the 1970 All Black tour to South Africa and had been vocal during the acrimonious protests which had taken place. Following the tour they remained critical of the government for refusing to prohibit sporting contact with South Africa. More recent, the government had announced that it would be introducing a Race Relations Bill later in the year and the Maori MPs opposed the bill in its present form. As outlined previously, swirling around the Maori MPs responses to the bill were discourses of the loss of Maori rights, the Treaty of Waitangi, and of Maori as a subordinate political 'partner'.

Neither was the exclusion of Patu Hohepa surprising. As Ranginui Walker pointed out:

Pat Hohepa, myself and Eddie Mcleod were hitting the headlines, challenging Pakeha power and domination. We were shaking New Zealanders out of their torpor, their intellectual smug torpor about having the finest race relations in the world'.

Hohepa had recently addressed the New Zealand Race Relations Council on the topic 'Waitangi – A Promise or Betrayal' and spoke of the mythical nature of good race relations and the abrogation of the terms of the Treaty of Waitangi. It was a significant speech which shook both sides of the political ideological divide. Hohepa pointed out:

…the practice of many New Zealanders who speak of harmony, of the best race relations in the world, and yet continue to downgrade the language and the culture of the largest minority living here, continue to ignore the advice of bodies representing minority groups, and pass legislation whose effects destroy the confidence and lessen the mana of the minority group…the Treaty of Waitangi is the focus of our discontent...To many Maori individuals, Waitangi Day is a useless ritual for a covenant

27 Interview with Ranginui Walker, 18 June 2009.
already broken. The Maori people mourn for what they have lost, and the Pakeha should celebrate Waitangi as a resounding victory.\(^{28}\)

Understandably MacIntyre would have been loath to include Hohepa in talks with the Canadian delegation: his sentiments were oppositional to the government’s good race relations narrative.

The second day of the tour was spent at Rotorua. There the delegation was transported around the visitors’ circuit which included a tour of the scenic thermal area and a performance by a Maori concert party. Maori housing, land and farm development schemes, and the Maori Arts and Crafts Institute were visited and inspected.\(^{29}\) The integration schemes confirmed for Manuel that New Zealand's policies were assimilative in intent and practice. In particular, the housing programme was the 'most indicative of the government's policies' and were 'really geared to assimilation. The programme provides homes for a limited number of Maoris who are prepared to accept a system that segregates them from the Native community.'\(^{30}\) Later Manuel remarked that although the government held up the situation of Maori as a shining light of successful integration, the New Zealand policy was 'exactly parallel with the White Paper Policy of the Canadian Government'.\(^{31}\)

Auckland was the final phase of the tour. A visit to a Maori trade training course was followed by an official reception at Old Government House. This was a 'Meet the Maori People' event and while the ADMC played a major role in the organisation and Patu Hohepa headed the reception, the Department of Foreign Affairs also had input and its focus was to have the Canadian delegation meet with Maori leaders and representatives of different organisations. Although some politically outspoken members of the ADMC were present, it was seemingly weighted towards the inclusion

\(^{28}\) Patrick Hohepa, 'Race Relations in N.Z.', *New Zealand Public Service Journal*, March 1971, pp.6-7. This was Hohepa's address to the New Zealand Race Relations Conference earlier in the year entitled, 'Waitangi - A Promise or a Betrayal', Rata Papers, ABAF 2/47, NA. Michael Law, student activist and committee member of HART and the Race Relations Council, recalled that Hohepa’s address was hugely significant and had a profound impact on those present. Interview with Michael Law, 5 May 2006.

\(^{29}\) Programme, 'Visit of Hon. Mr Chretien – Maori Occasions', IA, W 1824, Box 1, 152/26/5, Part 1, NA.

\(^{30}\) Manuel, 'Canadian Indians and Maoris Share...', p.12.

of moderate leaders such as Brownie Puriri and Matiu Te Hau.\footnote{Programme, 'Visit of Hon. Mr Chretien – Maori Occasions', IA, W 1824, Box 1, 152/26/5, Part 1, NA; 'Itinerary: Visit Canadian Members of Parliament, 1.4.71', IA, W1824, Box 1, 152/26/5, Part 1, NA.} Activists from Nga Tamatoa do not appear to have been included. There is no indication that the two indigenous peoples used the event for political discussion and in any case, an official reception offered few opportunities for deep discussion on weighty political issues.\footnote{Ranginui Walker recalls being at the function but not having any discussion with Manuel. Interview with Ranginui Walker, 18 June 2009.}

**Subverting the Visitors’ Circuit: Making Indigenous Space and Community**

From the beginning Manuel’s aim was to make contact with Maori. His purpose was to understand their perspectives on race relations, and ‘especially their relations with the government’.\footnote{Manuel, ‘Canadian Indians and Maoris Share…’, p.10.} Although there was limited opportunity during the official programme, spaces opened up for informal meetings and discussion with a range of Maori outside the official tour boundaries. Following the meeting with MacIntyre, Manuel noticed three Maori men standing in the hall. He introduced himself, discovered that they were Maori MPs, and suggested that they get together at his hotel room later in the evening.\footnote{Ibid, p.12.} An evening reception had been organised by the Canadian High Commissioner, and a group of Maori who had met Trudeau at Waiwhetu Marae provided cultural items for entertainment.\footnote{Programme, 'Visit of Hon. Mr Chretien - Maori Occasions', IA, W 1824, Box 1, 152/26/5, Part 1, NA.} Manuel introduced himself and invited them to join with the Maori MPs ‘so that we could talk frankly and honestly’. As it happens, Patu Hohepa and some members of the NZMC also arrived to meet Manuel and they too joined in the discussions. For Manuel, the meeting was a revelation: Maori ‘had much the same convictions and concerns that we have as Indians...they want to retain their rights and they are struggling to do so’.\footnote{Manuel, ‘Canadian Indians and Maoris Share…’, p.12.} The discussion covered a wide range of issues, and in common were concerns related to land rights, indigenous rights and associated issues of education, parliamentary representation and the preservation of indigenous culture.\footnote{McFarlane, *Brotherhood to Nationhood...*, p.158.}

When the official delegation departed for Australia, Manuel decided to remain in Auckland and spend more time with Maori before joining the delegation in the Northern Territory. Patu Hohepa and the Maori MPs facilitated contacts for Manuel with Maori from grass-roots level, academia, and in leadership roles. An affinity was evident and
Manuel recalled, 'I felt so much at home with the Maori people that I kept referring to them as Indian, and they kept referring to me as a Maori from North America'. The days spent in Auckland were a highlight and ‘the most important part’ of Manuel’s trip as he was escorted to meetings and around a number of Maori communities. Much of his time was spent meeting and discussing a range of issues with Maori leaders and academics and a smattering of Pakeha including Dr Robert Chapman (Political Science Department, University of Auckland) from whom he gained information on Maori political life and parliamentary representation. On the final day he attended a Polynesian cultural event which celebrated the cultural diversity and identity of Maori and Pasifika peoples who had settled in Auckland. There he had the opportunity to meet with Maori elders 'and exchange with them some of our traditional views'.

Following his tour, Manuel reported the numerous parallels and commonalities between the indigenous peoples of New Zealand, Australia and North America. All shared a common negative experience and legacy of colonisation and the same historical and contemporary struggle to retain cultural integrity and indigenous identity:

All of us are Dark People in a White-ruled Commonwealth. Wherever a people have had the experience of being colonised by a European nation there have been… common reactions…we three countries, as well as the United States, have the additional burden of a European power succeeded by a local European administration. Our struggle for an identity in which we would find pride as Indian peoples, and the frustration we have known at our own powerlessness have been only the spiritual and cultural agonies accompanying our struggle for simple physical survival as we lost our traditional means of livelihood. We share with Maori and Aborigine... this common struggle.

Shared too were contemporary struggles related to land alienation, land and indigenous rights, and social, economic and educational marginalisation.

Cultural commonalities were, for Manuel, a striking feature. There was 'no difference' between the values of Maori, Polynesian people, Aborigines, or North American Indians, 'particularly their human and spiritual values; their outlook on life; their regard

40 Information of Manuel's travels is taken from, 'Canadian Indians and Maoris Share...', pp. 13, 15-17.
for the natural environment around them'. Thus stretching across borders was a collective indigenous world bound together by the shared experience of colonisation and its destructive legacy, cultural commonalities and a shared world view:

A common set of values, a way of life shared, even from a distance. For instance, if I said to a Maori, “Our culture is every inch of our land”, the meaning would be obvious to him. For his ancestors, as for ours, the relationship with the land, and the water, and the game was always spiritual. He did not believe that man had dominion over nature. He knew that man was a part of that nature.

Within the indigenous world, Manuel placed Maori at the top of an indigenous hierarchy in terms of position and status in society. With the 'possible exception' of the Sami people in Sweden, Maori had achieved a better living standard and had a better relationship with the dominant European population and the government, than any other indigenous people. The superior position was put down to parliamentary representation and their involvement in the political system. This had been responsible for a raft of positive outcomes, not least engaging Maori citizens in the political processes of the nation and creating a sophisticated political awareness. Moreover, Manuel believed it had raised the status of Maori in the eyes of the European population, engendering notions of equality. In all, it had provided Maori with a degree of political leverage and a channel to have their claims and concerns recognised, if not always addressed. It was the single most important thing which set Maori apart from other indigenous peoples and had been crucial in providing Maori with the means to maintain their status and identity. An integral element was the immense pride in being Maori and a determination to hold onto their cultural identity. Maori refused to be assimilated (which he perceived as the government agenda) but were ‘integrating on their own terms’. Pride in their own traditions and culture, combined with the four separate Maori seats in parliament, enabled them to participate in the political processes of New Zealand and at the same time retain their identity. Maori had made that identity part of the political landscape in New Zealand.

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42 Manuel, ‘Canadian Indians and Maoris Share...’, p.13, p.15.
43 Manuel, ‘Canadian Indians and Maoris Share...’, p.15.
45 For Manuel's views on political involvement and parliamentary representation, see Kainai News 31 May 1971; Manuel, ‘ Canadian Indians and Maoris Share...’, pp.16-17; George Manuel and Michael Posluns, *The Fourth World...*, pp.237-239.
46 Manuel, ‘ Canadian Indians and Maoris Share...’, p.16.
Thus Manuel accepted the long-held view of the superior status and position of Maori. The difference in his analysis was the recognition that Maori shared and suffered the same negative effects of colonisation and were fighting similar battles, albeit they were in a much better position to do so. All indigenous peoples had their own unique experience of colonisation, and while the experience for Maori may not have been as brutal as others, the outcomes had been similar. In contemporary terms this meant that Maori, as with other indigenous peoples, featured negatively (and disproportionately) on all socio-economic indicators, and were locked into a struggle over issues related to land and treaty rights, cultural continuity, and self-determination.

Out of Manuel's South Pacific tour, came an idea for an international organisation. While indigenous communities had commonalities, and they were all involved in their own struggles for indigenous rights, they were isolated globally and had only a superficial understanding of each other. Manuel recognised that power lay in global indigenous solidarity. Immediately upon his arrival back in Canada he indicated that he was beginning to think in global terms:

...we have a lot to teach each other. What is important is that what we are doing in Canada is a part of a world-wide movement for cultural autonomy and aboriginal rights of native people. In the past, we saw ourselves carrying on an isolated struggle for our own survival here in Canada so we built provincial and national organizations to represent our needs, and make our word known. In the future we will be able to build better by sharing in the common struggle with our dark brothers across the globe.47

Manuel’s vision – to bring indigenous peoples together at a conference which was hosted, organised and controlled by indigenous peoples – was developed during subsequent travels. These are well documented and will not be revisited.48 It is enough to note that his travels were extensive, and during this time he met with indigenous peoples across the globe to ascertain their views on an international conference and subsequent organisation for indigenous people. Meetings were also arranged with various organisations and NGOs to obtain support and financial backing. In 1972, while in Copenhagen, Manuel announced his intentions for an international indigenous

people’s conference. On his return to Canada he sought a mandate from the NIB to investigate the feasibility of hosting such a conference. This was granted along with his request that the NIB apply for consultative status with ECOSOC. The idea was that with the formation of a World Council of Indigenous Peoples, the NIB membership would transfer to the new organisation. This would create a significant space for indigenous peoples at the United Nations which could be used to place pressure on governments to attend to their claims and grievances. Subsequently a secretariat was formed and early in 1973 it set about making contact with indigenous organisations and individuals around the world. The initial approach was to seek 'moral and financial support' for an indigenous people’s conference, compile a list of prospective delegates, and provide information on the aims of the first conference to be 'planned, conducted and run by aboriginal people for aboriginal people'.

Facilitating the Creation of an International Indigenous Council: An Elite Place for Maori at Guyana and Copenhagen 1974

Approaches were made by the NIB secretariat to individuals and organisations in New Zealand including Ranginui Walker, the NZMC, MWWL, Matiu Rata MP, and Nga Tamatoa, all of whom Manuel had made contact with, or gained knowledge of, during his visit. Nga Tamatoa was particularly eager to participate. At the time, its members were forging links with indigenous activists, mainly in Australia and the Pacific Islands, and using international forums to draw attention to their claims and grievances related to land, treaty, and indigenous rights, and to speak of race relations, especially in terms of cultural loss and institutional racism. Syd Jackson was nominated by Nga Tamatoa for consideration as the New Zealand delegate and 'spokesman for the indigenous Maori Race of Aotearoa'. However the NZMC decided that ‘it should be represented on such an important mission’, and moreover it claimed to have the ‘greatest experience and expertise on the rights of minorities in New Zealand’. The NIB accepted their claim. Ranginui Walker explained that Manuel wanted 'movers and shakers' - people with

49 Correspondence, George Manuel to Dr Ranginui Walker, 12 Jan 1973, MP 1991/4/20, Special Collections, UAL.
50 Correspondence, Marie Marule (Special Assistant to the President, NIB) to Alan Taumata (Secretary, New Zealand Maori Council), 17 Jan 1974, MP 1991/4/20, Special Collections, UAL.
51 Correspondence, Patrick Te Hemara (Chairman Nga Tamatoa Council) to Marie Marule (Special Assistant to the President, NIB), 22 Jan 1974, MP 1991/4/20, Special Collections, UAL.
52 Correspondence, Alan Taumata (Secretary, New Zealand Maori Council) to Marie Marule (Special Assistant to the President, NIB) 16 Jan 1974, MP 1991/4/20, Special Collections, UAL; Correspondence, R.J.Walker to G Manuel, 4 April 1973, MP 1991/4/29, Special Collections, UAL.
political influence. Nga Tamatoa, as an activist group which often pushed through the boundaries of acceptability in order to have claims and grievances recognised, was not well regarded by Pakeha or many Maori, and therefore lacked the status, credibility and political influence of the NZMC.

During April 1974 an elite group of representatives from the four main regions – the South Pacific, North and South America, and Europe - attended a preparatory meeting in Georgetown, Guyana. The meeting was held to discuss the feasibility of an international organisation of indigenous peoples, and the aim of gaining NGO status at the United Nations. George Manuel outlined the struggles of his people, and his vision for an international organisation as the means of gaining a political voice and a route into the UN where they could have their claims and grievances recognised. A collective indigenous voice was the key to political power.

It is the shackles of the past that we are trying to break out of... [In Canada] we struggled, we organised, but we were not politically strong enough to persuade any changes...I went to New Zealand, to Australia, to Sweden, to Africa...The more I travelled...the more I was convinced that we had somehow to work towards... some form of international voice. The international voice is yet to be born. It is going to be up to you and me to discuss and bring this idea...into a reality.

The conference was a non-event in terms of debate about whether an international indigenous organisation was feasible and desirable. A unanimous decision was quickly reached by the delegates: not only was it possible and desirable, it was ‘a necessary and long overdue step in the battle to regain their sovereignty’. Ranginui Walker, who was the New Zealand representative at the meeting, recalled:

We were a hand-picked group of people, a select group...We all came from similar backgrounds...we were all of a common mind, a common stage of cultural loss,

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53 Interview with Ranginui Walker, 18 June 2009.
54 Ranginui Walker, ‘Korero – Meeting of the Fourth World’, New Zealand Listener, 8 June 1974. The representatives were from New Zealand, Canada, Colombia, Australia, Guyana, Greenland, United States of America and Norway (representing the Sami people).
55 Ibid.
57 McFarlane, Brotherhood to Nationhood...., p.195. See also, Sanders, 'The Formation of the World Council....', p.12.
deprivation, and attempts at cultural and language recovery. We were all at the same level...it was easy to come to an agreement...we ought to form a world organisation.\textsuperscript{58}

The remainder of the conference was taken up with attending to organisational issues, details of accreditation of observers, selection of delegates and an invitation by the NIB to host the first conference was accepted. A definition of 'indigenous people' was formulated, with specific criteria to determine who should be invited to the forthcoming conference. While there were difficulties reaching a consensus, a definition proposed by Sam Deloria (USA) was adopted:

The term indigenous people refers to people living in countries which have a population composed of differing ethnic or racial groups who are descendants of the earliest populations living in the area and who do not as a group control the national government of the countries within which they live.\textsuperscript{59}

At the meeting the aims of the organisation were decided:

* To provide exchange of information (organisational, legal, sociological, cultural) and to strengthen the voluntary associations of indigenous people.
* To reduce the possibility of physical and cultural genocide and to combat racism.
* To ensure political, economic and social justice and to establish and strengthen the concept of indigenous and cultural rights.
* To consider the feasibility of a permanent international organisation of indigenous people with the ultimate aim of gaining non-government organisational representation in the United Nations.\textsuperscript{60}

In a brief personal introductory address, Walker spoke of race relations and the position of Maori.\textsuperscript{61} He spoke of being a 'relative newcomer to Maori politics', his role in the contemporary struggle, and 'the goals, aims and aspirations that they had and which needed to be fought for and supported, particularly the maintenance of their culture and identity.' He spoke of his role as a 'mediator between two cultures, as a bi-cultural person relating the minority culture to the majority culture', and of the emergence of 'radical groups who are truly radical'. His address made it clear that Maori, as with

\textsuperscript{58} Interview with Ranginui Walker, 18 June 2009.
\textsuperscript{59} Ranginui Walker, 'Korero- Meeting of the Fourth World', \textit{New Zealand Listener}, 8 June 1974, p.56.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{61} Address by Ranginui Walker, in 'Report of Preparatory Meeting, Guyana', 8-11 April 1974, p,8, Ref: 45-13-3-7, Part 1, LAC.
other indigenous peoples, had significant issues which were being contested and he suggested that race relations were not as ideal as was commonly imagined.

Following Guyana, several reports appeared in the media about the proposed World Council. Since 1973 Walker had published a regular 'Korero' column in the *New Zealand Listener*, the aim being to educate and raise the consciousness of the public about issues concerning Maori. It was not always popular with Pakeha for it exposed myths of nationhood which many found difficult to accept. However, it was an important column as it forced consideration of historical and contemporary events and issues from a Maori perspective. Walker wrote about the meeting in Guyana, the aims of the new organisation, and he introduced George Manuel's concept of the 'Fourth World', popularised in his newly-published book, *The Fourth World: An Indian Reality*. This world consisted of indigenous peoples who had been forcefully incorporated into states, were political minorities in the lands they once occupied, retained a distinct political culture, and who were not recognised as distinctive nations internationally. All indigenous peoples across the globe shared commonalities: communal networks, a shared history of colonisation and subjection, and a common understanding of the universe which was grounded in reverence for the land and natural environment. Later, in an interview on the Maori radio programme, *Te Puna Wai Korero*, Ranginui Walker explained the Fourth World to Maori listeners and introduced them to the idea that they too were part of a global indigenous world. There were common threads running through the lives and experiences of indigenous peoples:

They suffered a common experience of colonial exploitation...had a similar philosophy, culture, attitude in relationship to nature....He [Manuel] felt that these people, because of the similarity and the background, the state of their acculturation, and the position they were in, trying to reinstate their values and their philosophies, that this united them in a common brotherhood around the world... And he likened us to the people of the earth, the culture of the earth and the sky. These are ...mythological themes that tribal people the world over share...these people [are] the Fourth World...

The *New Zealand Herald* also carried an account of the events in Guyana with comments from Walker about the proposed formation of an international indigenous

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63 Ranginui Walker interviewed by Haare Williams, 'World Council...', NZSA.
organisation, the aim of which was to 'combat racism, prevent racial or cultural
genocide and preserve the rights of the people'. There was no comment from the
government which Walker criticised sharply for its apparent disinterest in indigenous
peoples globally, and the involvement by Maori in the nascent indigenous people's
movement. He found it strange that it was only 'a matter of minor interest to the New
Zealand Government that I have attended a meeting to plan a conference to create a
world organisation for such minorities'.

An International Indigenous Space: Anxiety, Concern and Ambivalence

The lack of comment by the government was not indicative of disinterest: out of the
public eye and at government level, concern, dismissiveness and irritation were
variously expressed. Jock McEwen (Secretary of Maori and Island Affairs) was
scathing of Walker: a 'stirrer, with very little following amongst the Maori people, the
product of social science faculties of modern universities, and probably behind some
recent militant action by young Maoris'. He confidently dismissed any further
involvement by Maori in the indigenous organisation as financial constraints would
almost certainly curtail involvement. The NZMC 'could not even find 50,000 cents, and
if they had the money would not spend it in this way'. Nevertheless, the government
also held concerns about the implications of an international indigenous organisation.
Correspondence and reports were exchanged between New Zealand and Canada at
diplomatic and government levels about the proposed organisation, the rise in
indigenous political activity and the Guyana conference. The Secretary of Foreign
Affairs recognised the 'potential for embarrassing the government' and requested that
the Permanent Representative to the United Nations keep him informed of any new
information related to the meeting in Guyana, the proposed conference in Canada, 'and
generally on what this business is about'. For its part, Canada was not overly

64 Cited in correspondence, Secretary of Foreign Affairs (G.J.Ashbridge) to the Permanent Representative
to the United Nations, 4 July 1974, ABHS 950, W 4627, Box 2663, 108/11/54, Part 1, NA.
65 Ranginui Walker, 'Korero- Meeting of the Fourth World', New Zealand Listener, 8 June 1974, p.54.
66 Memorandum, G.J. Ashbridge to Mr Scott and Mr Corner, 4 July 1974, ABHS 950, W 4627, Box 2663,
Record 108/11/54, Part 1, NA. McEwen's comments are cited in this correspondence.
67 Ibid. This comment is in reference to a $50,000 payment that Walker had indicated (at Guyana) could
be forthcoming from the NZMC as part of their monetary commitment to the organisation.
68 Much is contained in the files, ABHS 950, W4627, Box 2663, 108/11/54, Part 1, NA.
69 Memorandum, G.J. Ashbridge to Mr Scott and Mr Corner, 4 July 1974, ABHS 950, W 4627, Box 2663,
Record 108/11/54, Part 1, NA.; Correspondence, Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Permanent
Representative, New Zealand Mission to the United Nations, 4 July 1974, ABHS 950, W4627,
Box 2663, 108/11/54, Part 1, NA.
concerned except that if an indigenous peoples organisation was formed, it would likely press for higher status at ECOSOC than the consultative status which the NIB had been granted.\textsuperscript{70} An upgrading would provide more opportunities to express grievances and gain recognition within ECOSOC.

It was also evident that New Zealand had, for some time, held concerns about Manuel and the growing indigenous movement which was taking root in Canada. Following Manuel's visit to New Zealand, the NIB sought to secure meetings with the High Commission in Ottawa to gain further information on land issues (especially transfer and compensation), parliamentary representation and Maori education programmes.\textsuperscript{71} Eventually they succeeded in gaining a meeting with second-tier officials, which in diplomatic-speak signified a level slightly above that of a snub, and indicated that New Zealand wanted little to do with the Indian organisation. In 1973 the NIB sought a meeting with Prime Minister Kirk while he was in Canada for CHOGM. By this time the NIB had begun to internationalise: it had gained NGO status at the United Nations, and Manuel had announced his intention to create an organisation of indigenous peoples. Following a report by the New Zealand High Commission which had discussed the issue with an official from the Department of Indian Affairs, the meeting was refused.\textsuperscript{72} The general feeling was that it was a political ploy by Manuel to persuade Kirk to place pressure on Trudeau and thus 'boost his own standing in the community...to help him create the impression he was top dog'. Moreover, a fear was that such a meeting would 'give weight to Indian efforts to achieve recognition as a separate nation'. The New Zealand Government had no wish to be seen as supportive of Indian nationalism. With a range of Maori activists and leaders beginning to speak publicly of self-determination and greater control over their affairs, the last thing the government wanted was to be drawn into a position where they could be seen as giving

\textsuperscript{70} Correspondence, Secretary of State for External Affairs to New Zealand Mission, New York, 15 Oct 1974, ABHS 950, W4627, Box 2663, 108/11/54, Part 1, NA. Consultative status was the lowest status amongst NGOs and involvement was restricted: organisations had no right to address meetings, attendance was limited as was the right to submit written material.

\textsuperscript{71} Memorandum, 'Indian Rights', R.A. Farrell (2nd Secretary, New Zealand High Commission, Ottawa), to Department Foreign Affairs, 14 March 1972, ABHS 6950, Box 9, OTT 86/5/2, Part 1, NA.

\textsuperscript{72} Correspondence J.A. Farrell (New Zealand High Commission, Ottawa, to Department of External Affairs, Wellington, 20 July 1973, ABHS 6950, Box 9, OTT 86/5/2, Part 1, NA. This correspondence reports on a discussion between L.J. Watt (New Zealand High Commission (Ottawa) and Mr Murray (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 20 July 1973.
support to the indigenous people of Canada for self-determination, and yet were opposed to the same for Maori.

Despite any misgivings or concerns which western governments may have held, it was difficult to withhold support for an international indigenous organisation, simply because it was not a radical organisation and it was surrounded by respectability. The organisations which supported and worked for the creation of the organisation were reputable. The WCIP took its name from its largest donor, the World Council of Churches, and it was backed by reputable international NGOs and national organisations including the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), International Labour Organisation, United Nations Association of Denmark, Faculty of Humanities at Copenhagen University, Oxfam Canada, and many national church organisations including the Canadian Catholic Association for Development and Peace, and the Anglican Church of Canada.73

More significantly, most of the western delegates represented organisations which were government sanctioned and had high standing. Their organisations received core funding from government, they had a close relationship with their governments, and they were acknowledged as the representative voice of indigenous populations. For example, the NIB received some federal government funding; the Australian Aboriginal delegates represented the National Aboriginal Congress which had been created by the federal government; and the Sami delegates represented the Sami parliament in Finland, which was an advisory board to the Finnish Government. In New Zealand, the Maori delegates represented the NZMC which had been established by legislation and received funding from the government. Thus, for governments to deny support or oppose participation of representatives of organisations which they had created, funded or validated, would be to diminish the autonomy and authority of the indigenous organisations, to represent their people.

Support from governments was seen in a variety of ways including monetary assistance and public endorsements. The preparatory meeting in Guyana was hosted by the

Guyanese government, and the Prime Minister of Denmark welcomed the delegates at the second meeting in Copenhagen. At the first indigenous conference at Port Alberni, the Canadian Secretary of State (Hugh Faulkner) welcomed delegates and the governments of Canada, Guyana, Norway and Denmark all gave financial support for the conference.\(^\text{74}\) New Zealand stood apart and there were no public endorsements or expressions of support, but neither did the government attempt to influence or interfere in the NZMC position. Financial assistance was not given to the NZMC delegates or to the international organisation. That this was a deliberate strategy to curtail involvement is likely, especially in light of Jock McEwen’s comments. The government was aware of the financial status of the NZMC and the difficulty it had in funding international travel, and that the refusal by government to provide financial assistance could lead to non-participation. As will be demonstrated later, this is exactly what occurred.

Following Guyana, there was ambivalence within the NZMC and the issue became one of whether or not to continue its involvement with the international indigenous people’s conference. There was some reluctance by the NZMC to become involved in international organisations and conferences which were slowly increasing in number as indigenous people began to internationalise, and a range of international organisations and NGOs began to respond to indigenous issues at a global level. Many members of the NZMC were conservative and cautious at a time when they were attempting to extract concessions from the government or have their claims met. The fear was that participation in political forums, especially those convened to discuss sensitive issues such as land rights and racism, might harm the good relationship they had with the government and put at risk negotiations. As an example, during the early 1970s the WCC Programme to Combat Racism attempted to organise an international symposium in New Zealand on indigenous land rights and they sought support from the NZMC. Despite initial enthusiasm the NZMC changed its position and declined to support the initiative.\(^\text{75}\) The reason was that they believed they were in a good position to have current land issues addressed to their satisfaction by the government. Duncan MacIntyre had shown ‘genuine sympathy and understanding of land problems …and a willingness to redress wherever possible’. He had also provided unprecedented

\(^{74}\) Ayako Uchida, ‘Searching for Indigenous Alliances…’, pp.219 -220 and note 35.  
\(^{75}\) Correspondence, A. Gnanasunderam (Secretary of the Church and Society Commission of the National Council of Churches) to Mr Baldwin Sjollema (Programme to Combat Racism, WCC, Geneva), 2 June 1971, NZSCM Records, ACC 83-119-Box 4, ATL.
opportunities to the NZMC such as 'direct access to him without even having to go through his departmental officers' and he had invited the NZMC to attend meetings when his office was discussing land questions.\textsuperscript{76} With the possibility of redress for land grievances, and a more inclusive forum for discussion, it was felt that a politically motivated international land seminar may put at risk the good relations with MacIntyre and close down the new spaces which had opened up for Maori.

Following the conference in Guyana, the NZMC discussed whether or not to commit to the indigenous peoples organisation. While there is a suggestion that some members may have been unenthusiastic for political reasons, and others were simply disinterested, a major issue was the inability to provide financial support for the organisation.\textsuperscript{77} The NZMC was starved of funds by the government and had no discretionary income in its meagre budget to contribute $50,000 which Walker had proposed in Guyana.\textsuperscript{78} A decision was made to send Apa Watene to a Policy Board meeting in Copenhagen which was convened to finalise arrangements for the forthcoming conference. Watene was to assess the organisation and provide the NZMC with a 'second opinion', and inform the Policy Board that the NZMC would be unable to provide financial support.\textsuperscript{79}

\textit{Copenhagen 1974: From Ambivalence to Support}

In Copenhagen Watene joined indigenous representatives from the National Congress of American Indians (US), Greenlanders Association (Denmark), Nordic Sami Council (Scandanavia), Mink'a (Bolivia), Unidad Indigena (Colombia) and the National Indian Brotherhood (Canada). Watene, who apparently lacked enthusiasm, simply intended to 'sit and listen and more or less take advantage of the generous offer of the free airline ticket'.\textsuperscript{80} He sat and listened for a day. He heard George Manuel speak of the lack of political space and power: indigenous people constantly explored all avenues and

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{77} 'Report to NZ Maori Council by N. A. Watene', ADMC Records (Special Collections), MP 1991/4/12, Folder 5, Item 1, UAL.
\textsuperscript{78} Sir Graham Latimer, who became President of the NZMC in 1973, recalled: 'From 1962 onward we were not given the funds we needed. We weren't asking for much. Maoridom didn't set up the Council. It was established by an Act of Parliament. We shouldn't have had to ask for anything. What other government body is set up and then expected to pay for itself by running raffles to keep going?' Cited in, Noel Harrison, \textit{Graham Latimer: a biography}, Wellington: Huia Publishers, 2002, pp.83-84.
\textsuperscript{79} 'Report to NZ Maori Council by N. A. Watene', ADMC Records (Special Collections), MP 1991/4/12, Folder 5, Item 1, UAL.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
appealed to their governments but were rarely successful. There had to be a non-government group available ‘to listen to the plight of the people and seek help from the United Nations’. He heard delegates speak of severe oppression, of their lives being in danger through their participation at the conference, and of the problems they faced:

And then I started to imagine the problems confronting the Maori people in New Zealand. Did we have to resort to death to stand up for what we believed? From that point...I participated positively and constructively at the Board Policy meeting. Our people, who are proud of their heritage, must be aware that other people are equally as proud, and that people are looking to New Zealand, especially the Maori people, as an example of...a people who have done, and continue to do well in a bi-cultural society’. 81

Watene took two major points out of the Copenhagen conference. The first was an understanding that the position of Maori in society was much 'better than' that of other indigenous peoples. Therefore Maori had a role to play within the new organisation: they could use their superior position, experiences and successes that they had gained for the benefit of those who were less advantaged, and at the same time provide an example of what might be possible. Watene also became acutely aware of Maori as part of a vast indigenous world linked together by shared tribal, kinship and family ties, cultural values and world view:

The thing that links the aboriginal people of the world, as I believe it, are the family ties, the tribal ties, and the kinship ties, [the] most important links of our people. The second thing that links us together is our devotion to the land, and so I believe that we have certain things in common.82

Watene recommended that the NZMC continue its support for the World Conference of Indigenous Peoples:

Based on my contact with George Manuel, and ...having the opportunity of meeting delegates from other countries, both in laughter, play and at work, recognising the links of tribalism of indigenous people, that of family and extended family and the kinship ties coupled with their love for the land and generally goodwill to all people, I am convinced that the World Conference of Indigenous People must merit our support.83

81 Ibid.
83 'Report to NZ Maori Council by N. A. Watene', ADMC Records (Special Collections), MP 1991/4/12, Folder 5, Item 1, UAL.
The NZMC accepted Watene’s recommendation and selected Graham Latimer (NZMC President), Ranginui Walker (ADMC Chairman, NZMC) and Apa Watene (NZMC Vice-President) as their representatives at a conference in Port Alberni to form a World Council of Indigenous Peoples. The Quaker church in Canada nominated John Rangihau (Senior Welfare Officer for Maori Affairs and Research Officer at Waikato University), and the NZMC granted him observer status within the delegation.\footnote{Correspondence, Neil A Watene to George Manuel (President, NIB), 14 July 1975, ADMC Records, MP 1991/4/20, UAL}

\textbf{Creating a Global Indigenous Space:}

\textbf{Formation of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples,}

\textbf{Port Alberni, 1975}

Delegates and observers gathered on an Indian reserve near Port Alberni, a small industrial town on the west coast of Vancouver Island. It had been a specific goal to hold the conference in an Indian community and on Indian land. The isolated location

\footnote{Ha-Shilth-Sa, 4 Dec 1975.}
was suitable for various Latin American delegates who had expressed fears for their safety and sought protection from the reach of their repressive and hostile governments. To ensure security, Indians armed with Winchesters patrolled and guarded the site twenty-four hours a day. Nineteen countries were represented: Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Finland, Greenland (Denmark), Guatemala, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Sweden, United States of America, and Venezuela. In all, over 260 people participated in the conference, including 52 delegates, 135 observers, 25 members of the press and over 54 staff. Noticeable for their absence were delegates from Brazil and Chile who had been unable to gain permission to travel.

The Tseshaaht Band of Nootka Indians hosted the conference on their reserve at a venue which had originally been a church-run government Indian residential school, but had ceased to operate when the government main-streamed Indian children. Delegates were accommodated in the old school dormitory. The residential school was a space where the past and present flowed into each other. In contemporary terms indigenous peoples from across the globe filled it with historical accounts, hopes and fears for the future, current outrages, indigenous commonalities, and differing ideological imperatives. A range of emotions rang through the venue ranging from laughter, joy and excitement through to hostility and anger, and cultural forms and performances were displayed in clothing, music, stories and dance.

The venue was also redolent with the violence of colonisation. The Nootka people were the first Canadian Pacific coast tribe to be contacted by English explorers, when Captain Cook landed in their territory in 1778. The history of the residential school (which began in the late 1800s), like many across Canada, was one of violence. Down the


87 Sanders, ’The Formation of the World Council…’, pp.13-14; McFarlane, Brotherhood to Nationhood…, p.217. Sanders also notes that indigenous people from Asia and Africa were not invited due to logistical problems, although there had been attempts to contact some groups in the USSR, China, and other parts of Asia.


decades the zeal to Christianise, civilise and assimilate, saw Indian children subject to physical, psychological, and sexual abuse, forced labour, and stripped of their language, traditions and cultural identity. Moreover between 1942 and 1953 the Port Alberni school was one of six residential schools in Canada in which children were used, with federal government approval, for research nutrition experiments. Malnourished children were kept on starvation-level diets and given or denied various vitamins, minerals and selected food groups. More than likely there were local Indians at the conference, either as observers or in a working capacity, who had gone to the school or had ancestors who had attended. It was somehow fitting that the residential school was now the site for a conference to establish a World Council of Indigenous Peoples which included the following aims:

- To reduce the possibility of physical and cultural genocide and to combat racism.
- To ensure political, economic and social justice and to establish and strengthen the concept of indigenous and cultural rights.

The main point of the conference was to bring the WCIP into being and this was scheduled for the fourth day of conference. In the meantime delegates attended workshops on the following:

- Representation at the United Nations
- The WCIP Charter and Solemn Declaration
- Social, Economic and Political Justice
- Retention of Cultural Identity
- Retention of Land and Natural Resources

92 Ranginui Walker, 'Korero - Meeting of the Fourth World', New Zealand Listener, 8 June 1974, p.56.
Navigating a position at Port Alberni

The NZMC delegates entered the conference accepting that in comparison to most other indigenous peoples Maori occupied a much better position. As Apa Watene had recognised in Copenhagen, they faced nothing like the severe oppression, brutality, marginalisation and total lack of political power that those in Latin American countries were facing. This was further reinforced at Port Alberni as they listened to delegates from Latin America relate their experiences and realities. Yet they knew that the reality of race relations in New Zealand was far from ideal, and that Maori also suffered from the same legacy of colonisation as other indigenous peoples. Topical at the time were issues related to institutional racism, socio-economic inequality, political subordination, and the struggle for treaty, land and indigenous rights. For all that, they were in a better position and had made some gains and been able to extract some positive outcomes.94

Different groups held different understandings about the status of Maori such as elite, privileged, successful, westernised and ‘better than’. The Latin American delegates regarded Maori, (and indeed the delegates from western countries) as ‘elite’ (and thus privileged), although that terminology was neither complimentary nor politically neutral. It was a pejorative term which reflected the social and political structures in their countries, largely based on colour and class. The ‘elite’ category (which included the ruling elite) is complex and differed between countries, but in general it was comprised of a non-indigenous landed wealthy white population, and those of mixed European-Amerindian descent who were a westernised majority group in many Spanish speaking areas of Latin America. Further down the scale, but also regarded with connotations of elitism, were indigenous people who had moved up into the middle classes, had become westernised, assimilated and had even denied their indigenous heritage. They were seen by the majority indigenous population to have betrayed their community and heritage and were regarded with contempt.

94 For example, most recently The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, which was steered through parliament by Matiu Rata, gave the Treaty of Waitangi recognition for the first time. The Act set up the Waitangi Tribunal to investigate claims against the Crown from 1975, and to make recommendations. Although it was imperfect, it was a first step, and in 1985 the Act was extended to hear claims from 1840. Similarly, Maori had been able to extract some concessions following a 1972 Maori language petition which called for the teaching of Maori language and culture in schools. The result was that it gave Maori language a presence in New Zealand. A Maori language day came into effect and with the advent of the Labour government, some of the recommendations in the petition were implemented, including a ‘link’ scheme to enable fluent Maori speakers the authority to teach Maori language at primary and secondary schools. See, Ranginui Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou…, p.211.
At the conference, ‘elite’ was conflated with ‘westernised’ in that indigenousness had been diluted or abandoned. For example, Maori had no distinctive identity markers in terms of language, traditional dress or other cultural markers. Instead, they spoke English, wore western clothing and appeared acculturated. Further, the fact that the western delegates were from the ‘capitalist’ west engendered not only feelings of distaste, but perceptions of wealth which was enmeshed in the ‘elite’ construct. For those who had little knowledge of Maori and who were meeting them for the first time, they were 'elite' and indeed, as Walker recalled, 'they told us that we were elite'.

Tied up in the 'elite' construct, was the perception of a close and amicable relationship between the western delegates and their governments. This relationship was viewed with suspicion and aversion by most of the delegates from Latin America. For people who were in conflict with repressive regimes and had revolutionary intentions, such a relationship was incomprehensible. Walker noted that they were at a different level in their development and they failed to understand, that the 'elites' had been through their own periods of repression, dispossession, and armed struggle and had moved ahead. They were now at a stage where dialogue with governments was possible.

As for the western delegates, they saw Maori as an example for other indigenous peoples to follow. This was linked, in part, with Maori parliamentary representation and the status and degree of political power which this institution held. Ranginui Walker recalled:

'They saw Maori as an example to the world. They pointed out that there is no other country in the world where the indigenous population has representation in parliament. This is unique.... So the indigenous peoples in other parts of the world look at this and say 'hold on to it, it is a unique institution, it is worth having'.'

Notwithstanding the perceptions of Latin American delegates (especially from South America), other indigenous people looked to Maori as an example of a people who had retained their cultural forms and thus their identity:

95 Interview with Ranginui Walker, 18 June 2009.
96 Ranginui Walker interviewed by Haare Williams, 'World Council of Indigenous Peoples, Port Alberni', Te Puna Wai Korero, 1975, Media No: 4618-MPT 4587, New Zealand Sound Archives (NZSA).
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
They were impressed with the way in which we have been able to maintain our identity, our culture, our dances, our singing. A lot of them have been acculturated, a lot of their customs have been lost, and they have to try and recover them. We haven't got so much to recover. Much of it is still intact by comparison. This is one of the things that they look to NZ for.99

Based on his observations while in New Zealand, and impressed with their sophisticated political engagement and awareness, Manuel positioned Maori at the top of an indigenous ladder. He was impressed by their sophisticated political engagement and awareness, they had achieved a better living standard, and they had a good relationship with the government and Pakeha population than any other indigenous people with the possible exception of the Sami people.100 As Ranginui Walker recalled, Manuel had expectations and he ‘looked to the Maori people to take the lead’.101

Accompanying the perceptions of Maori was the position which they took. They recognised that they were in a much better position, and had many advantages which others did not possess. Indeed Graham Latimer was explicit and often stated that New Zealand was the ‘greatest country in the world as far as the relationship between immigrant Europeans and natives is concerned’.102 They were also aware that people were looking to them as an example of an indigenous people who were successfully participating in a bicultural society, and they were conscious that they were expected to ‘take the lead’. Thus the space for Maori delegates at the conference was one which incorporated notions of privilege and elitism, of Maori as a successful indigenous people, an example for emulation, and there were shades of expectation by others and themselves. Sitting alongside was an acknowledgement by Maori that they were in a better position than other indigenous peoples, and yet there was also a known reality of the position of Maori in New Zealand which encompassed both oppression and success and shades of these positions in between. It was within this space of perception, expectation and reality which Maori had to navigate.

99 Ibid.
101 Interview with Ranginui Walker, 18 June 2009.
Taking ‘the lead’, being ‘facilitators’ and using their experience and initiative were expectations and a leadership role which the Maori delegates accepted and slotted into easily, especially as far as the business of conference was concerned. This was due to their experience and expertise gained by working within the formal structures of the NZMC and interaction with government departments. They were experienced in 'committee procedure, in framing motions, in following the business, in following an agenda' and therefore at the conference they were 'all the time expediting matters'. Moreover, Ranginui Walker and John Rangihau were called on to act as resource personnel for the round table topic session on the ‘Creation of Incentive and provision of Facilities Prerequisite to Qualifications for Technical and Administrative Employment’, and discussion was based on a paper presented by John Rangihau.

**From Division to Unity: Breaking down Barriers and Stereotypes**

For the first few days the conference lacked harmony and unity. Walker recalls the atmosphere as 'tetchy', in part caused by difficulties in translation which resulted in serious misunderstandings of meanings and intentions. A more fundamental reason was related to the Latin American delegates who had a different ideological agenda, and intended to use the conference for their own purpose. At the meetings in Guyana and Copenhagen, it had been easy to reach agreement as most were like-minded and at a similar level in terms of their relationship with government. At Port Alberni the majority of delegates came from Latin American countries which were governed by repressive regimes, and most were in bitter conflict with their governments. Walker recalls listening to delegates speak of their situation:

...of death squads, people disappearing, being shot if they asked for land rights, imprisoned, beaten up...their wives were raped...hunted like wild animals ... Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua. Bad stuff. Nothing like that in New Zealand. That was behind us in the previous century...

Therefore they were at a different level to the delegates from Europe, North America and the South Pacific. They also had a different agenda and strategy: They came to the

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103 Ranginui Walker interviewed by Haare Williams, 'World Council...', NZSA.
105 Interview with Ranginui Walker, 18 June 2009. This paragraph is based on the information from the interview.
conference 'en-masse, organised, and with one view in mind - to take over the WCIP and use it as a tool to get the oppressor off their backs'.

The conference divided into two groups. On one side were the western delegates from North America, Europe and the South Pacific and on the other were the Latin American delegates who dominated the conference. Many had never been outside their countries or had the opportunity to tell the world what was happening inside their borders. With a new-found ability to speak freely they took every opportunity to do so. They spoke of oppression, genocide, land-grabbing, ethnocide, physical brutality and torture, as well as the ideologies and rhetoric of revolution. There was little interest in the themes and topics of the workshops and time and again they turned the conversation back to their own situation. In part this was to do with their limited experience of the outside world and therefore a global perspective was beyond their frame of reference. As an example, a theme of environmental protection with reference to land was of no importance to a Bolivian delegate, and nuclear testing in the Pacific or the proliferation of nuclear power stations were of no interest. The issues of concern were those related to the repression of their peoples and it was clear that their primary agenda at the WCIP lay in gaining 'moral support, if not direct physical support for the coming revolution in South America'.

Being indigenous and having many commonalities did not bring immediate unity to disparate groups of people. The Sami presented a problem for the Latin American delegates who found it difficult to understand how a white-skinned and fair-haired people could be indigenous. Moreover they did not appear to have a language of their own and they apparently had a relatively good relationship with their government. Walker recalls that it shocked the South Americans to see white people at the conference and it took a long time for them to understand that the Sami were indigenous people who had suffered exploitation and oppression, and that exploitation was based on class and not colour.

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106 The material for this paragraph, unless otherwise stated, comes from, R. J. Walker, 'The First International Conference of Indigenous Peoples', New Zealand Maori Council Records: 98-008-73/11, ATL.

107 Ranginui Walker interviewed by Haare Williams, 'World Council...', NZSA.

108 Ibid.
The United States delegates were a particular target and subject to animosity and suspicion. This was not surprising as the United States government was busily carrying out its imperialistic agenda in 'America's backyard' of South America. Its infiltration and central role in creating and supporting military dictatorships to further their economic and political expansionist ideology was responsible for the political and economic repression, genocide and brutality to which indigenous peoples were subject. Therefore the United States delegation was regarded as a symbol of Yankee imperialism, treated with suspicion and subject to insult and disparagement.

Whenever they opened their mouths it was like a red rag to a bull, it sort of incensed the South American delegations. And so this was part of the problem of this division in the conference, right at the start, the ideological differences and them not being able to comprehend that we too had had our period of exploitation and we had overcome this and were making changes in our countries.\textsuperscript{109}

Such was the ill-feeling that the Maori delegates often had to act as a channel for the United States team. The latter realised that there was only a slim chance of having their proposals or suggestions accepted or even considered with the animosity coming from the Latin American delegates. Therefore, whenever they wanted to push a point or suggestion, they would write it down, pass it onto the Maori delegation, which would then put it forward 'so that it didn't seem as though the idea was coming from the Yankee imperialists'.\textsuperscript{110}

It became the role (self-appointed) of the Maori delegates to ‘take the lead’ and bring cohesion and unity. While the main object of the conference was to unify indigenous peoples and form a World Council of Indigenous Peoples, this was beginning to look unlikely with deep-seated division, and seemingly irreconcilable differences. The problem was exacerbated by the language barrier which made socialising during leisure time and between sessions difficult. Although these spaces were a time for unity, where ideas were exchanged, friendships established, and where the lives of each other were made known, the language barrier made this almost impossible. Yet something had to be done and the New Zealand delegates decided to try and break down the deep divisions and bring about unity. They called a meeting with George Manuel and Sam

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{110} Interview with Ranginui Walker, 18 June 2009.
Deloria to discuss the problem. Walker recalls that Manuel left it entirely up to the Maori delegates to go ahead and do whatever they could to break down the ice between 'them and us'. They decided to arrange cultural performances during the evenings. These would display the cultural universals of indigenous people which needed no language or explanation, and were easily identifiable. The hope was that the statements of indigenous identity would create a collective unity.

And so it began, with Maori giving the opening performance in an atmosphere of excitement and expectation from delegates, observers, the media, staff and the Indian hosts. A journalist for Akwesasne Notes reported: ‘When someone announced the Maoris were going to do their thing, everyone burst into cheering because the irrepressible Maoris were bursting with such contagious warmth and joy and fun’. John Rangihau and Ranginui Walker both gave mihi and translated for each other, and the delegation performed a range of action songs and a haka. The meanings were not lost on the Latin American delegations and word filtered back that a change in understanding had taken place. They were 'amazed' that 'Maori, 'who they identified as white men' had customs which they recognised, and a language and culture of their own. At that point, the ice began to melt and divisions began to break down.

The following evening the Sami gave an electrifying performance. It was a moment in time when they gained unquestioned acceptance into the indigenous world.

Then it was the turn of the Sami people. The performer from the Sami delegation prefaced his item with these words:

For ten thousand years we are thinking we are alone in the world. Now that we have met our brothers we know we are millions. When you return to your countries, listen and you will hear our voice in the wind.

He then proceeded to chant and yodel (joik). The climax arrived when he pitched his voice an octave higher....it was so penetrating it went right through the hearts of everyone present. And Graham Latimer...turned to me and said, 'Look at those South Americans, the tears are rolling down their eyes'.

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111 Ibid.
112 Except where indicated, information on the cultural performances, is taken from three sources, all by Ranginui Walker, and I have blended information from these sources. R.J. Walker, 'The First International Conference of Indigenous Peoples', New Zealand Maori Council Records, 98-008-73/11, ATL; Ranginui Walker interviewed by Haare Williams, 'World Council.....', NZSA.; Interview with Ranginui Walker, 18 June 2009.
113 Akwesasne Notes, Early Winter, 1975, p. 34.
It was a universal call that was understood by everyone in the room. It brought tears to the eyes of the Amerindians as they realised that the Samis... were culturally the same as themselves. Any lingering doubts about the unity and brotherhood of the indigenous people were dispelled at that moment for good.

*Akwesasne Notes* reported that after the Sami had shared their 'songs, crafts, their sense of beauty and wonder and their gentleness', even the South Americans who had excluded them and doubted that they were indigenous people, were hugging and embracing them. Even though there was a total language barrier, and despite 'false notions of colour and race given by the coloniser', the songs and spirits of the Sami and peoples from South America were 'shared as one spirit'.

Many delegations gave performances over the evening sessions. The United States delegates performed a pipe ceremony – a sacred ritual which expresses purity and unity of thought in the presence of ancestors. The ceremony was performed with the leaders of delegations from each country. An American delegate announced that the ritual had fallen into disuse but was now being resurrected as a restatement of Indian culture and identity. Canadian Indians wore their native costumes and Chief George Manuel appeared wearing full regalia. It is not necessary to describe every performance, and enough to note the general reactions and atmosphere that came from the many cultural displays and the unity that followed:

Songs and dances and power and unity and love were shared in the evening gatherings. There were no slogans or rhetoric about brotherhood – instead there were spontaneous embraces. Some wept, overwhelmed by the power of celebration in each other’s songs and beauty, all night, every night. The Greenland Inuit did their dance and all of us sang their hauntingly beautiful songs...When someone asked the lone Hawaiian to “sing a song, a Maori thundered, “He's not alone – we are all Polynesians”... A Quechua taught a Sami to play his flute. Tseshaht and Hesquiat people in their Northwest dance costumes danced with Mayans from Guatemala and Aymaras from Bolivia, and an Aymara joined the singers at the Latoka drum.

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114 Ibid.
116 *Akwesasne Notes*, Early Winter, 1975, p. 34.
The evenings were a space where indigenous identity was reaffirmed, restated and shared and where people drew strength, support and acceptance from each other. When the cultural performances had finished, 'the delegates were completely united as one'.

**A Space for an Oppositional Narrative: ‘Better than’ but not Ideal**

The conference provided space for sharing information, discussion and raising awareness. Notwithstanding the fact that the Latin American delegates commandeered a large portion of time during conference sessions to inform the world of their situation, there were opportunities at round table sessions for other delegates to present information about conditions in their countries. As the records of such discussions have not been located there is no way of knowing what the Maori delegates presented. There were also opportunities during leisure time and the spaces between sessions when information could be shared, strategies planned and issues discussed. While Graham Latimer spoke in glowing terms of having the best race relations in the world, there is no doubt that informal conversations would have seen a more nuanced narrative being presented.

Information travelled back across borders and the plight of indigenous peoples was shared down lines of communication into indigenous networks and at times in mainstream outlets. Ranginui Walker made the observation that prior to the conference he had known very little about the severe repression of indigenous peoples in Latin America.

Throughout the 1970s and 80s he informed of their plight, as well as that of other indigenous peoples, by way of his 'Korero' column. A major communication line was through the WCIP secretariat whose focus was to gather and share written material and information from conferences and various other sources. Delegates were expected to bring material to conference for session topics, and were encouraged to bring additional information about issues within their countries. This was then copied and translated for non-English speakers and dispersed amongst delegates either at conference or at a later date. In this way new information from the perspective and experience of indigenous people, and in opposition to that commonly portrayed by governments, was taken by delegates into networks within their countries.

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117 Ranginui Walker interviewed by Haare Williams, 'World Council.....', NZSA.
118 Interview with Ranginui Walker, 18 June 2009.
At Port Alberni Ranginui Walker presented a paper, 'The Maori People of New Zealand, 150 years of Colonisation', and fifty copies were made and distributed amongst delegates. This gave a potted history of the effects of colonisation, mostly on the expropriation and alienation of Maori lands and the struggle to retain their lands; identity and rights as indigenous peoples; and the betrayal of the Treaty of Waitangi and the subsequent erosion of mana and cultural forms. In contemporary terms he spoke of the position of Maori in a Pakeha-dominated society which locked Maori into a subordinate position as a 'brown proletariat'. The legacy of colonisation was to be seen in a myriad of social, economic, educational and health problems with which Maori had to contend: poor educational achievement, low occupational status, participation in gangs, a high rate of offending against the law, and poor health and life expectancy outcomes. He also addressed the issue of Maori representation in parliament. While many delegates saw this as this as a symbol of Maori success and privilege, Walker stated that the four Maori seats were merely a token gesture and ‘its net effect is to ensure that the Maori remains an outvoted minority subject to the will of the majority’.

In conclusion he observed:

New Zealand is proud of its record of good Maori-Pakeha relations. But as this short survey of 150 years of colonisation indicates, the Pakeha record in New Zealand is not as roseate as he would have the world believe. The Maori has survived in New Zealand as an indigenous people as much by his own resourcefulness and adaptability as by the magnanimity of the coloniser.

The paper was a counter to the perceptions of Maori as 'elite' and 'privileged' and presented a grim reading of the reality of colonisation and its continuing legacy. It also inflected the lesser discourses of ‘better than’ and the ‘best race relations’ with a new reading and sent a message that while Maori might be in a better position, ‘better than’ was still not great. Throughout the conference Maori delegates accepted that they were in a superior position and were successful in comparison to others. The roles of leadership that they took on at Port Alberni reflected this and accorded with their aim to ‘take the lead’, and provide a model of a people who had achieved some success in a bi-cultural society. However while Maori knew that they were in a superior position, this

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did not mitigate their negative historical and contemporary realities. They needed to show these realities. Walker’s paper fulfilled this aim and pointed to the fact that Maori had also suffered, resisted colonial oppression, and despite the advantages they held over other indigenous peoples, the negative effects of colonisation continued to be played out.

Crucially, Walker claimed that any advantages which they enjoyed and the relatively good race relations in New Zealand were entirely due to the efforts and agency of Maori and not from the benevolence of Pakeha. That they had survived, had made some gains, and were now in a better position, was all to do with their efforts, strategies and adaptability. Maori were successful in relation to other indigenous peoples, but it was ‘success’ which was shot through with patches of achievement and satisfaction, but with much more unfinished business, and ongoing struggle. As Walker noted, the truth or reality of race relations in New Zealand was nearer the Shavian saying:

…the real history of mankind is shameful. But there is hope in bits of it.

On the fourth day of the conference, the delegates went into the crucial plenary session to form a World Council of Indigenous Peoples. In the morning the New Zealand delegation moved that the World Council be formed but the opportunity was missed as discussion was side-tracked into the Solemn Declaration and issues were revisited from the round table sessions. The afternoon session was a repeat performance.

And right at the end of the day when we never thought that we would get the organisation formed, the American delegation got up and very politely told them that they were talking nonsense and that all this talk would be to no avail if there was no real intention to form the organisation. And they moved that the motion tabled by New Zealand be put. And with one accord the whole assembly rose to its feet and passed it with acclamation. It was the most moving historic moment - they just clapped and clapped and clapped for minutes on end. And the time that motion was passed?

Right on six o’clock on the fourth day.120

On the final day the plenary was to conclude business. The Charter and Solemn Declaration were adopted and ratified, the latter being a stunning document which expressed what indigenous people stood for. George Manuel and Sam Deloria were

120 Rangimui Walker interviewed by Haare Williams, ‘World Council...’, NZSA.
elected President and Secretary-General respectively with Deloria having additional responsibility of representing the WCIP at the United Nations. A WCIP Executive Committee was elected consisting of five members representing the five regions. Apa Watene was elected as representative for the South Pacific region which put the NZMC via its delegate in a governance role of the WCIP.

**Distancing of the NZMC from the WCIP, 1976-1980**

Following the Port Alberni conference, and in the lead-up to the second WCIP General Assembly conference in Kiruna (Sweden) 1977, contact between the WCIP and the NZMC was sporadic. Some correspondence, including information about the Kiruna conference, was not forwarded to the NZMC, and the blockage of information was further exacerbated when Apa Watene developed health issues. Financial constraints also played a major part in the distancing of the NZMC from the WCIP. In response to a proposal by the WCIP secretariat for a participation programme within the secretariat, Ranginui Walker agreed that the idea had merit but the main problem for the NZMC would be to obtain the necessary funding. He explained that the NZMC had not been able to fund a national secretariat for over a year, and at district council level all work was voluntary with the cost borne by the individual. It was 'so depressing to think about money that I don't, so we fight our battles without it'.

In 1976 Watene wrote to the Department of Foreign Affairs seeking financial support from the Foreign Aid programme to enable NZMC representation at WCIP conferences and meetings over the following three years, including the conference in Kiruna. He urged that financial assistance be given and drew on New Zealand's reputation to support his appeal:

> The Assembly [at Port Alberni] expressed their thanks for Council's attendance and look to New Zealand and the Maori people as an example of how people can live together harmoniously. When you heard of how other indigenous groups fared, and compared the situation in New Zealand…it can be seen that we are on a different level of development than some of the groups at the conference. The New Zealand Government portrays, and rightly so, the harmonious relationships that exist in New Zealand and

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122 Correspondence, Ranginui Walker (ADMC) to R. Contreras (WCIP secretariat), 30 May 1976, ADMC Records, MP 1991/4/29, Special Collections, UAL.
which are held in high esteem internationally...My Council is not in a financial position to be able to play a fuller part in WCIP, yet on the international scene NZMC is asked to participate because of their contribution in showing a better way of life.123

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs turned down the request on the grounds that it did not meet with the objectives of the programme.124 As Ranginui Walker recalled, there was never any financial assistance given by successive governments to enable participation in the WCIP either at the General Assembly or at regional level.125

As a result, there was no representation by Maori at the Second WCIP conference in Kiruna. The NZMC lost its place on the Executive Board and an Australian Aboriginal was elected to the position.126 It was a significant loss for Maori as with it went their voice and influence in the direction-setting and governance of the WCIP. They also lost opportunities to take part in international events and conferences ranging from national indigenous conferences and events to global conferences on human rights and discrimination. For example, in 1978 Sami and Australian Aboriginal members acted as advisers to national delegations at the World Conference on Racism and Racial Discrimination held in Geneva, and other members of the WCIP executive were participants.127 It should also be noted that having one representative for a region was problematic. In an analysis of the WCIP, Massey points out that not all indigenous people were happy being represented by a member of another group and felt that their interests were not being adequately addressed. This was the case in the South Pacific region 'where Maori and the Aborigines resist being represented by one another'.128

With all factors taken into consideration, a lack of interest in the WCIP was apparent. While Ranginui Walker continued to publish articles in his ‘Korero’ column, which indicates that some form of contact continued and enthusiasm had not been lost by all,

123 Correspondence, N.A. Watene (Acting Secretary NZMC) to the Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs, 26 May 1976, ADMC Records, MP 1991/4/20, Special Collections, UAL.
124 Correspondence, Secretary of Foreign Affairs to N.A. Watene, 20 July 1976, ADMC Records, MP 1991/4/20, Special Collections, UAL.
125 Interview with Ranginui Walker, 18 June 2009.
127 'World Council of Indigenous Peoples Four Year Report, 1977-1981', ABHS 950, W 4627, Box 2584, Record 108/11/54, Part 3, NA. Information on activities is spread throughout this lengthy report, but mainly in Sections 4 and 5.
the WCIP appears to have slipped out of the consciousness of most members of the NZMC. However, as Walker noted, this was also a period of intense political upheaval with 'so many battles' being fought on the domestic front, that possibly WCIP matters were deemed low priority.129 With the apparent lack of enthusiasm, it is therefore surprising that a situation developed prior to the 1981 Third General Assembly at Canberra, which saw the NZMC embroiled in a battle to maintain their representative status. Even more surprising, having fought for this right, is how they used the spaces in Canberra.

A Divided Space:

The Third General Assembly, World Council of Indigenous Peoples,
Canberra, 27 April -2 May 1981

A sizeable contingent of Maori delegates, observers, supporters and activists travelled to Canberra in 1981 to attend the Third General Assembly of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples. It was a divisive event, riven with internal dissension and ill-feeling and reflected the development of radical Maori activism which had seen activists command a significant space in the political landscape by the 1980s. Moreover, the events at Canberra were indicative of the development of an international indigenous activist movement which had evolved during the 1970s and in which Maori activists had played a significant role. Activists challenged the right of the NZMC to be the sole representatives for Maori, and they demanded a place in the official delegation. In relation to the NZMC, it also signalled enmity and personal prejudices between conservative members and activists both inside and outside the NZMC.

The events must be seen as a dual event with lines drawn between activists and the NZMC. The focus of this section is on how the Maori contingent made up of official delegates, radical activists, supporters and observers used the political spaces at Canberra both inside and outside the official conference boundaries. Activists found a place to present an oppositional discourse which educated and informed about grievances held. Against this, the involvement of the NZMC delegates was one of apparent disinterest and apathy and a distancing from indigenous peoples inside and

129 Interview with Ranginui Walker, 18 June 2009.
outside conference. Significantly, and a cause of tension, was the fact that Maori were in a better position than other indigenous peoples. As in Port Alberni they navigated position between ‘oppression and success’, and ‘privilege and better than’, albeit with varying degrees of success and enthusiasm.

**Challenging the Right to Represent Maori at the WCIP**

Some context is necessary to understand the events which unfolded in Canberra. In December 1980 Graham Latimer, acting on information that radical Maori activists were intending to seek delegate status at the forthcoming WCIP in Canberra, arranged a meeting with the Australian High Commissioner in Wellington to discuss the issue. Latimer was unsure who would make the decision on the selection of delegates, and was concerned that activists had already put their names forward to the body making that decision, and that selection would be on a 'first come first served' basis. The fact that Latimer was unaware that the NZMC was affiliated to the WCIP, and therefore had sole right to select delegates, is an indication of how far the NZMC had moved away from the WCIP. Latimer informed the High Commissioner that the activists should not be given delegate status as they were not representative of Maori opinion, and he advised that they were planning to support Aboriginal activists in demonstrations calling for a boycott of the 1982 Commonwealth Games in Brisbane. He suggested that the High Commissioner relay the information to the organisers and he indicated that he was keen to be one of the delegates at the conference. Clearly he was hoping that the High Commissioner would use his influence and prevent the accreditation, and thus any official involvement, in the WCIP by activists. The issue was resolved shortly after when the NZMC became aware that they were affiliated to the WCIP and with that had the authority to select delegates.

Who the activists were or how Latimer obtained his information is unknown, but it most likely came out of the Three Nations Conference held in Christchurch a few weeks previously, followed by the first Mana Motuhake Annual Conference at Waitahanui Marae in Taupo. During the Christchurch conference, which was also attended by Matakite O Aotearoa and Mana Motuhake representatives, Patu Hohepa noted that ‘a

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130 Correspondence, D.E.Paulay (United Nations and Commonwealth Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wellington), to Mrs Mullins, 10 Dec 1980, ABHS 950, W4627, Box 2663, 108/11/54, Part 1, NA.

131 Ibid.
strong feeling of unity, empathy and accord' developed between all the indigenous
delegates, and four of the Aboriginal contingent extended their stay in order to attend
the Mana Motuhake conference.132 There, Mana Motuhake expressed 'warm support
for, and solidarity with aboriginal efforts for a return of their lands and control of their
lives'. The conference in Australia was discussed and although details were vague,
these were later filled in when National Aboriginal Council (NAC) representatives
visited New Zealand early the following year. Following discussion with Hohepa on
Maori treaty and land rights, they suggested that the WCIP conference would be an
ideal venue and opportunity for a more wide-ranging discussion and exchange of
information. Mana Motuhake decided that it would attend the WCIP and would seek
delegate status.

Shortly after Latimer's approach to the Australian High Commissioner, the NZMC
Administrative Committee, under the chairmanship of Apa Watene, met in private and
selected Graham Latimer, Tilly Reedy and Apa Watene to represent the NZMC at
Canberra.133 There had been no call for nominations from district councils, nor had
there been wider discussion within the NZMC on the selection of delegates. When the
decision was made known to NZMC members, an acrimonious exchange of
correspondence took place. Ranginui Walker (ADMC) complained to Sir Graham
Latimer (newly knighted) about the lack of consultation and discussion and declared it
to be an example of Latimer's authoritarian rule.134 He wrote to Watene, objecting to
the arbitrary decision, arguing that the process was 'unprincipled and undemocratic', and
reminded Watene of Lord Acton's dictum about power and corruption.135 Watene
justified his decision in terms of financial considerations and time constraints: he argued
that neither the WCIP nor the NZMC were able to fund delegates, the three chosen
could all meet the costs themselves; and a decision had to be made quickly.136 All were
unsatisfactory explanations.

132 Dr Pat Hohepa, 'Report on Third General Assembly, World Council of Indigenous Peoples, Canberra,
April 27-May 2, 1981, to Mana Motuhake Members', (Circa May/June 1981), ABHS 950, W4627,
Box 2584, 108/11/54, Part 3, NA.
133 Correspondence, R. J. Walker (Chairman, ADMC) to A. Watene (Chairman, Administration
Committee, NZMC), 16 March 1981, New Zealand Maori Council Records, 98-008-70/3, ATL.
134 Correspondence, R. J. Walker (Chairman, Auckland District Maori Council) to Sir Graham Latimer,
(President, NZMC), 16 March 1981, New Zealand Maori Council Records, 98-008-70/3, ATL.
135 Correspondence, R. J. Walker (Chairman, ADMC) to A. Watene (Chairman, Administrative
Committee, NZMC), 16 March 1981, New Zealand Maori Council Records, 98-008-70/3, ATL.
136 Correspondence, Apa Watene (NZMC) to Ranginui Walker (ADMC), 6 April 1981, New Zealand
Maori Council Records, 98-008-70/3, ATL.
Rather, it is more likely that the aim was to have a decision made quickly and thus close down any challenge for delegate status from activists outside the NZMC and from the ADMC which included a number of outspoken activists within its ranks. The records of the NZMC make it clear that there was some animosity and personal prejudices between some members of the NZMC and activists within the ADMC. The exclusion of Ranginui Walker, who had been involved in the WCIP since its inception, suggests a degree of personal politics, and possibly his role and position as chairman of the ADMC was significant. The ADMC often stood apart and forced the NZMC to address difficult or unpalatable issues. Moreover, at the time there were strong exchanges between the ADMC and the other district councils over the forthcoming Springbok tour of New Zealand. The ADMC worked tirelessly to gain a majority vote and have the NZMC officially oppose the tour. Walker noted that it was a difficult task: there was a 'big rural rump' in the NZMC 'whose members were all conservative and all liked their rugby'. To oppose the tour was to attack one of the most ‘sacred cows’ and invite a degree of hostility. Whatever the reason for the exclusion of Walker, and indeed consideration of other ADMC members, the issue was divisive.

Outside the NZMC, Te Matakite O Aotearoa spear-headed by Eva Rickard, and Mana Motuhake led by Patu Hohepa (Secretary-General of Mana Motuhake), also sought representation at the WCIP. Te Matakite wanted to use the conference to bring up for discussion the need for an international law to be developed to recognise treaties entered into by indigenous peoples, and place a range of Maori concerns on the table including land laws, multinational incursion into Maori lands, gangs, health and unemployment, and cultural degeneration. Mana Motuhake believed that their constitution, policies and objectives accorded with the goals and purposes of the WCIP. At their Waitangi Annual Policy Hui 28-29 March 1981, Patu Hohepa and Ranginui Walker (Secretariat and Policy Council) were appointed as the official representatives of Mana Motuhake in Canberra. An application for membership of the WCIP was made and letters requesting support for the application were sent to Harry Daniels, President of the Native Council of Canada and Ross Moore (NAC), both of whom were on the WCIP

137 Interview with Ranginui Walker, 8 Sept 2006.
138 Ibid.
140 Dr Pat Hohepa, 'Report on Third General Assembly, World Council of Indigenous Peoples...', ABHS 950, W4627, Box 2584, 108/11/54, Part 3, NA.
executive. When Walker and Hohepa arrived in Canberra, Marie Marule (WCIP secretariat) gave them interim observer status while the issue was investigated. Mana Motuhake also met with the NZMC and made the request for delegate status, and while this was refused, observer status was granted.\textsuperscript{141} Te Mataki sent a delegation to Canberra and made the same request but also gained only observer status. Thus the stage was set for a discordant and tense conference.

\textit{A Space for Maori at the WCIP General Assembly: Side-lined and Ambivalent}

![Figure 7.2 Third General Assembly, World Council of Indigenous Peoples, Canberra, 1981.\textsuperscript{142}](image)

Twenty-one member countries represented by some sixty delegates took part in the Third General Assembly of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples which was hosted by the National Aboriginal Conference (NAC). As well, an estimated four hundred indigenous observers, mainly from Australia, Canada, Scandinavia and New Zealand attended WCIP sessions. Many countries which were not members of the WCIP also sent observers, including Guyana, India, Japan, New Caledonia, Philippines, Tahiti and Thailand. Non-indigenous observers from various institutions and interest groups,

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid; Diplomatic Correspondence/Telegram, 'Indigenous Peoples', Canberra to Wellington, 28 April 1981, ABHS 950, W4627, Box 2663, 108/11/54, Part 2, NA.

academic institutions and government departments also attended. Concerned to retain the WCIP as a predominantly indigenous space and under total indigenous control, limits had been imposed on the number of non-indigenous observers and especially government representatives. Approval was given only on application to the NAC and the WCIP Executive. Non-indigenous observers from New Zealand included representatives from the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Maori Affairs, NZ Planning Council/Police, Maori and South Pacific Arts Council, the Human Rights Commission, as well as a variety of other organisations.

Foreign Affairs in New Zealand was especially eager to get their people and observers from the Department of Maori Affairs into the conference, not least as on the agenda was the drafting of an international convention on the rights of indigenous peoples. The restriction on government observers irked Foreign Affairs as did the 'somewhat curious' distinction between indigenous and non-indigenous observers. However, the WCIP Executive had been concerned from its inception about non-indigenous interference, and especially the possibility that government-inspired direction could compromise indigenous autonomy and the integrity of the WCIP. Moreover, the Port Alberni conference had highlighted the deep suspicions held by some Latin America delegates that western delegates, especially from North America, were working with government intelligence agencies, and the WCIP sought to dispel such perceptions. Despite the limitations imposed by the WCIP, Patu Hohepa noted that the large number of non-indigenous observers 'did not give a semblance of indigenous independence'.

The New Zealand delegation was involved in fractious and unpleasant debate from the beginning of the conference. Honouring a promise they had made to Mana Motuhake, the NAC delegation raised the question of the seating of the New Zealand delegation and the fact that all the delegates came from one organisation. They also raised for

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144 Dr Pat Hohepa, 'Report on Third General Assembly, World Council of Indigenous Peoples...', ABHS 950, W4627, Box 2584, 108/11/54, Part 3, NA.
145 Telex message, Department of Foreign Affairs to unknown recipient, probably the New Zealand High Commission, Canberra, (ND, circa April 1981), ABHS 22128, W 5533, Box 146, CBA 86/5/1, Part 2, NA.
146 Dr Pat Hohepa, 'Report on Third General Assembly, World Council of Indigenous Peoples...', ABHS 950, W4627, Box 2584, 108/11/54, Part 3, NA.
consideration Mana Motuhake's application for representative status.\textsuperscript{147} Sir Graham Latimer rejected the Australian move and tersely stated that they were interfering in the internal affairs of New Zealand.\textsuperscript{148} It was a high-handed response and not in keeping with the unity desired by the WCIP. An Australian motion to seat an alternative delegate lapsed for lack of a seconder, and the WCIP executive ruled that the decision on which organisations of a member country should be seated remained with that country.

Friction continued when the NZMC demanded that the NAC retract a public statement it had made about the NZMC. A few weeks previously, Ross Moore (NAC organiser), frustrated at the lack of response from Maori groups about his requests for numbers attending and the inclusion of a cultural group, had publicly criticised Maori for their apathy. He had hoped for a delegation representing a broad range of Maori opinion, but as the only firm confirmation had been from the NZMC, Moore commented 'it looks like it’s going to be just the old evergreen conservatives'.\textsuperscript{149} Watene demanded an apology and noted that the relationship between Maori and Aborigines had been put 'in jeopardy and did not provide a harmonious beginning for the conference'.\textsuperscript{150} The NZMC succeeded in gaining a retraction - a move which earned them 'rebuke from their fellow delegates', and which cast the NZMC in a poor light.\textsuperscript{151} It was another high-handed action. Amidst domestic and international difficulties and animosity, the NZMC took its place at the WCIP conference. However unlike Port Alberni, the delegation had no status on the WCIP executive, there were no expectations that they take a leadership role, and thus they took their place as simply another indigenous people.

At the conference they gave the appearance of being disinterested and apathetic as evidenced by their lack of substantial involvement in discussions and ill-prepared presentations. To some extent this lay in circumstances outside their control. The information for the conference which included the agenda, topics for round table

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid; J. D. Thwaites (UN Political Section, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra), 'Report, World Council...', ABHS 950, W 4627, Box 2584, 108/11/54, Part 3, NA.
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{149} Newspaper clipping, (no name, no date, Circa April 1981), ABHS 950, W4627, Box 2663, 108/11/54, Part 2, NA
\textsuperscript{150} Cablegram, Apa Watene (NZMC) to Ross Moore (WCIP conference co-ordinator) 23 April 1981, ABHS 950, W4627, Box 2663, 108/11/54, Part 2, NA.
discussion and the issues for which they were required to prepare, was late in arriving and reached the delegates only a short time prior to their departure for Canberra. This meant there was reduced time to prepare statements and organise material for discussion and distribution. It also meant that they had not prepared the crucial position papers for the five major sessions of conference. Thus the Maori delegates were on the back foot from the beginning: it was difficult to participate without having had time to prepare and it explains, in part, their meagre involvement. Nevertheless, the three delegates surely had enough depth of knowledge to apply the situation of Maori to the topics and offer constructive comment. Observers, delegates and spectators knew nothing of such difficulties and conclusions could be made that Maori were uninterested and apathetic.

Joe Thwaites, an observer from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, became acutely aware of the lack of interest and active involvement by Maori, and also delegates from Australia, Scandinavia and the United States. The passivity and unwillingness of the western delegates to intervene effectively, especially in the light of the obvious interest in the conference as evidenced by the large contingent of observers, took Thwaites by surprise. He suggested that this may be a reflection of the extent to which western delegates had assimilated into the dominant culture and this had ‘sapped their sense of identity with indigenous concerns as expressed by Latin Indians’. Moreover, indigenous leaders in these countries tended to be 'pragmatic' and 'establishment-oriented' whereas those from Latin America suffered extreme oppression under repressive regimes and their vociferous and revolutionary forms of oratory and activism had been fostered out of necessity. Delegates too noticed the reluctance to contribute to discussion. Thwaites recalled that the lack of participation ‘was so marked that on more than one occasion Spanish-speaking delegates appealed to “the English-speaking brothers” to participate more actively in the discussions, something which ...they seemed surprisingly unable or unwilling to do’.

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152 Correspondence, Department of Foreign Affairs to NZ High Commission, Canberra, 2 April 1981, NZMC Records, 98-008-69/2, NA.
154 J. D. Thwaites (UN Political Section, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra), 'Report, World Council...'. ABHS 950, W 4627, Box 2584, 108/11/54, Part 3, NA. The material in this paragraph is taken from the Thwaites report.
Adding to the difficulties, midway through the conference Sir Graham Latimer departed back to New Zealand to attend another conference, and Apa Watene was hospitalised in Canberra, which left Tilly Reedy as the sole delegate for two days. The departure of Watene and Latimer resulted in vacant seats at the General Assembly and left Maori without a profile or voice at round-table sessions. The obvious solution to preserve the integrity of the delegation and maintain a voice at all sessions was to co-opt as delegates, Ranginui Walker and Patu Hohepa, who were observing proceedings. No such request was made. Maori therefore became more marginal to proceedings and a valuable opportunity to join in discussions, present the position of Maori, make constructive suggestions based on their experience, and gain perspectives and ideas from other delegates was squandered.

Unlike other delegations, the NZMC did not provide material for distribution amongst delegations, or to accompany presentations at the conference. This was a valuable means of transmitting the indigenous voice and experience across borders. Despite the non-receipt of conference instructions, Apa Watene and Sir Graham Latimer would have been aware of the need to take some material for distribution. Both had attended the Port Alberni conference and knew of the expectations in this regard. Many delegations presented written reports with accompanying evidence as well as material to distribute amongst observers and delegates about their domestic situation. The Aboriginal delegation, for example, had a large number of position papers and information on many issues including health, politics, education and indigenous philosophy and ideology, land rights and Aboriginal legal services. In all, over two hundred and eighty pages of information were distributed amongst delegates and observers. The NZMC had no material for distribution. To avoid total embarrassment and perceptions of apathy, Mana Motuhake deposited a selection of written material and information with the WCIP secretariat. This included a NZMC paper, ‘A discussion paper on future Maori development and legislation’; copies of the Mana Motuhake constitution along with their Education Philosophy position paper, and their Treaty of Waitangi policy and petition; copies of magazines Te Maori and Te Kaea; and pamphlets and newsletters.

155 Notes from a report of conference by Ranginui Walker, included in, Dr Pat Hohepa, 'Report on Third General Assembly, World Council of Indigenous Peoples...’, ABHS 950, W4627, Box 2584, 108/11/54, Part 3, NA. This paragraph is taken from Walkers report.
from the recently formed activists groups Waitangi Action Committee and Maori Peoples' Liberation Movement.

Nevertheless, despite not having position papers and clearly being ill-prepared, the Maori delegates did speak at workshop sessions, albeit briefly. Sir Graham Latimer, as chairman of the delegation, appears to have been the most vocal. At the ‘National Issues' workshop he identified historical injustices which Maori had suffered in relation to the loss of language and culture, and the confiscation of their lands. He spoke of the ongoing struggle for self-determination and the recovery of important ancestral lands, and more recently, mineral rights. He also highlighted socio-economic issues such as high unemployment and an associated problem of a gang culture among Maori youth. In a workshop on 'Indigenous Philosophy', he made the point that the situation of Maori had 'remained unchanged' since the Port Alberni conference.

Yet, at a workshop on 'Political and Economic Imperialism', Latimer spoke of the position of Maori in positive and successful terms. In this Latimer can be seen as negotiating a path between oppression and success: of accepting that Maori were better off than many indigenous peoples and had some successful outcomes, while also speaking of historical and contemporary grievances. While it served to highlight the superior experience and status of Maori in comparison to other indigenous peoples, it also provided an example to others of how Maori were achieving in a bi-cultural society. Thus while Latimer had spoken of negative issues and ongoing struggles, he also spoke of Maori success in various areas.

Latimer outlined land legislation and described how Maori owned four million acres of land and the largest land incorporations in the country, and they had control of their trust boards. New legislation had been introduced favourable to Maori in that it was now difficult for government to obtain Maori land without the consent of the tribe. Thus the

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156 Ibid; Diplomatic Correspondence, 'Indigenous Peoples', Canberra to Wellington, (No date), AAMK 869, W3074, Box 16056, 2/2/21, Part 2, NA.
157 Diplomatic Correspondence, 'Indigenous Peoples', Canberra to Wellington, (No date), AAMK 869, W3074, Box 16056, 2/2/21, Part 2, NA.
rate of sale of Maori land had slowed down considerably.\textsuperscript{158} In terms of political power, Maori had four seats in parliament, three others in general seats and 'so politically we are not badly off' although they would not be 'entirely satisfied' until they had eight Maori parliamentary seats.\textsuperscript{159} He also noted that 'the situation in New Zealand was resolving itself gradually', and over the past four years government had begun to involve Maori more in political processes such as 'enabling their involvement in the drafting of the new Maori Affairs Bill'.\textsuperscript{160}

For indigenous delegates, and especially those from countries in Latin America where repressive regimes were in power, the report of the situation and status of Maori must have been enviable. Indeed a delegate from Costa Rica commented that 'it appeared that the problems of indigenous peoples in New Zealand were resolved.'\textsuperscript{161}

While Latimer was able to speak of the difficulties Maori were facing, and yet acknowledge they were in a better position by speaking of Maori success, Tilly Reedy struggled. She recalled being 'almost apologetic about Maori national issues and our involvement in the economic and political developments, because for many of the countries present the latter would appear to be beyond their reaches while economically many have no say at all'.\textsuperscript{162} Possibly it was this embarrassment which, in part, which constrained her involvement. Certainly it explains the lack of involvement from Sami delegates. Henry Minde notes that they were reluctant to put forward a resolution about

\textsuperscript{158} Notes from a report of conference by Ranginui Walker, included in, Dr Pat Hohepa, 'Report on Third General Assembly, World Council of Indigenous Peoples...'; ABHS 950, W4627, Box 2584, 108/11/54, Part 3, NA; Diplomatic Correspondence, 'Indigenous Peoples', Canberra to Wellington, (No date), AAMK 869, W3074, Box 16056, 2/2/21, Part 2, NA.

\textsuperscript{159} Notes from a report of conference by Ranginui Walker, included in, Dr Pat Hohepa, 'Report on Third General Assembly, World Council of Indigenous Peoples...'; ABHS 950, W4627, Box 2584, 108/11/54, Part 3, NA.

\textsuperscript{160} Diplomatic Correspondence, 'Indigenous Peoples', Canberra to Wellington, (No date), AAMK 869, W3074, Box 16056, 2/2/21, Part 2, NA.

\textsuperscript{161} Notes from a report of conference by Ranginui Walker, included in, Dr Pat Hohepa, 'Report on Third General Assembly, World Council of Indigenous Peoples...'; ABHS 950, W4627, Box 2584, 108/11/54, Part 3, NA.

\textsuperscript{162} Tilly Reedy, 'Report-World Council of Indigenous Peoples...', ABHS 950, W4627, Box 2584, 108/11/54, Part 3, NA.
the Alta affair before the general assembly as, in comparison to the struggles of other peoples and especially those in Latin America, the problems of the Sami were minor. The extent to which the NZMC interacted with other delegates and observers outside the conference venue, and how they used the social spaces which were available is difficult to assess. Reports from Mana Motuhake and Te Matakite which spoke of 'gross negligence', of being 'out of contact and sympathy with the aims of the indigenous peoples conference', and which heavily criticised the Maori delegates for their ineptitude, apathy and a lack of effective participation both inside and outside the conference, may have been overdrawn to serve a particular agenda. Nevertheless, as the Thwaites report indicates, there is no doubt that the performance of the delegates was disappointing in terms of interest and overall lack of involvement. There is no way of knowing about the social interaction which occurred during leisure hours, and the lacklustre efforts during the conference may have been redeemed during such occasions. It was the social spaces which were arguably the most important feature of conference, where there were opportunities for networking, sharing ideas, strategies and information, and strengthening ties between people. A reasonable assumption is that the delegates and observers may have used these spaces in a similar manner.

**The Aboriginal Forum: An Alternative Space for Oppositional Narratives**

Alongside the WCIP conference an alternative conference, the Aboriginal Forum (AF), had been set up to cater for Aboriginal activists. Just as representation had been an issue in New Zealand, so too it was in Australia. Activists were opposed to the NAC having sole representative status and to act as the national voice for Aboriginal opinion. Created and funded by the Federal Government in 1977, the NAC was constituted to provide a national political Aboriginal voice. At the time of the WCIP conference it had lost the confidence of many Aboriginal people and was largely irrelevant to their lives. The fundamental problem, as Attwood and Markus point out, was that it was 'not grounded in Aboriginal culture but had a form imposed on it by whites who continued to believe that they knew what was best for Aborigines'. Thus it lacked any political autonomy or influence, was under-funded and therefore unable to carry out any

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164 Bain Attwood and Andrew Markus, *The Struggle for Aboriginal Rights*, p.278.
effective consultation with communities across the vast continent. Its powers were so circumscribed that it was limited to providing advice to the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs if requested. As this was rarely sought, and the government seldom involved the NAC in Aboriginal issues, it was viewed by many Aborigines as irrelevant and a body created by government merely to enhance its image.

Aboriginal activists took action and mounted a campaign against the NAC as sole representatives of Aborigines at the WCIP. Kevin Gilbert, a well-known Aboriginal activist, was particularly active and issued a series of public statements and lobbied the WCIP secretariat to have the exclusive rights of the NAC to representation removed. He argued that as all three accredited delegates came from an organisation which was government-created and funded, their representation would be more reflective of the government than of the Aboriginal voice.

The NAC is only recognised as representative by the Government, who created it as a puppet body for propaganda purposes to gain national and international credibility on its Aboriginal policy, while actually continuing to deny Aboriginals their rightful status and claims to this land...the NAC is actually an instrument of government with a white lid … deliberately created to defuse the Aboriginal surge for freedom, cultural retention and self-determination.165

With the issue attracting considerable Aboriginal support and threatening to escalate, the NAC moved to defuse the situation by giving activists a voice in the WCIP proceedings. The NAC, in conjunction with the Marring Moroobarng Aboriginal Association in Canberra, arranged an Aboriginal Forum (AF) to run alongside the WCIP conference at the Australian National University. The purpose was to provide a platform and channel for Aboriginal activists to state their concerns and raise issues to initiate discussion. These were then fed through to WCIP conference delegates to raise when appropriate. An Aboriginal Advisory Committee was formed to prepare resolutions for NAC delegates to table during plenary sessions.166

The AF became a popular alternative conference for all. Over five hundred Aborigines from across Australia, including Torres Straits Islanders, participated as did observers

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165 Kevin Gilbert, 'The National Aboriginal Conference (NAC.) is not representative of Aboriginals', (no name or date of publication), ABHS 950, W4627, Box 2663, 108/11/54, Part 2, NA.

166 Canberra Times, 1 April 1981.
and supporters from the many international delegations. Official WCIP observers and delegates also attended at various times. However Patu Hohepa noted that the NZMC delegates took no part in the forum either as observers or participants.\textsuperscript{167} Mana Motuhake and Te Matakite activists made good use of the AF. They both had a large number of supporters and observers and this enabled them to cover both the alternative and official venues. The AF provided a space for meeting new groups of indigenous peoples and sharing experiences, strategies and information. It also provided the opportunity to re-connect with activists met at previous international conferences. An indigenous community was beginning to take shape and grow as the number of international indigenous conferences and forums increased globally. Most recently, Eva Rickard, Ranginui Walker, Patu Hohepa and others along with North American and Australian delegates (including Harry Daniels, Shorty O’Neil and Pat Dodson) had all met at the Three Nations Conference held in New Zealand six months previously and were re-acquainted in Canberra.

More importantly the AF provided a significant platform for Maori. Activists, observers and supporters were given a space to place issues of concern, topics for discussion and grievances they were contesting before an international gathering. The organisers facilitated this by setting aside an afternoon session specifically for Maori. Patu Hohepa recalled the session:

Doctor Doug Sinclair spoke on medical, land and educational issues; Betty Williams went into details of multinationals and their exploratory and mining ventures which affect Maori land; Eva Rickard...received a standing ovation when introduced to the assembly of some 600 people. She spoke on Bastion Point, Raglan and Awhitu, and the continuing struggle of the people. I spoke on the Treaty (or nonTreaty) of Waitangi, language and cultural loss, the Minister of Maori Affairs’ lack of sympathy to economic independence, and Maori aspirations. Shorty O’Neill and Pat Dodson spoke of their being looked after in New Zealand ….\textsuperscript{168}

The space was one of indigenous solidarity and support and this was demonstrated in visible and concrete form when the AF organised a land rights demonstration and march from the city to Parliament House. Aboriginal activists knew they had the support of

\textsuperscript{167} Dr Pat Hohepa, 'Report on Third General Assembly, World Council of Indigenous Peoples...', ABHS 950, W4627, Box 2584, 108/11/54, Part 3, NA.
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid.
international and national participants at the AF, and were hopeful of gaining the support of WCIP delegates. On April 30th the AF sent a request to the WCIP Assembly calling for support at a demonstration in front of parliament to demand Aboriginal land rights. The Assembly resolved unanimously to show support for the protest and stand alongside their Aboriginal brothers and sisters outside parliament. Joe Thwaites noted that there was a reluctance by the Maori and Sami delegates to support the motion until it became obvious which way the vote was going. The conference was suspended and delegates and observers were transported to Parliament House.

![Aboriginal Land Rights Protest, Canberra, 1981](image)

The demonstration was a statement of Aboriginal political power supported by the powerful presence of an international community of indigenous peoples. There 'they raised some rousing indigenous rallying cries in Spanish, Sami and Indian languages and milled around for half an hour'. Spokesmen from all the official delegations made speeches in support of the Aboriginal protest except for the New Zealand delegate

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169 J. D. Thwaites (UN Political Section, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra), 'Report, World Council...', ABHS 950, W 4627, Box 2584, 108/11/54, Part 3, NA.


171 J. D. Thwaites (UN Political Section, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra), 'Report, World Council...', ABHS 950, W 4627, Box 2584, 108/11/54, Part 3, NA.
who felt unable to take part. At this point Patu Hohepa stepped up and spoke on behalf of Mana Motuhake and the Maori people of New Zealand and offered support to the Aboriginal people in their struggle for self-determination. A haka by the Maori contingent completed the gesture.

Why the NZMC delegate felt unable to take part is unknown but possibly related to conservatism, a lack of international experience, and a consciousness of being the sole voice for the NZMC and the mantle of responsibility that lay on her shoulders. However the relationship between the NZMC delegates and the activist groups was not easy either. In a later report Reedy referred to the 'insidious behaviour of the other two Maori groups....I was naïve to imagine it would be a bed of roses, forgetting, but not for long, the sharp thorns'. Undoubtedly true, but the failure to visibly support the demonstration was not helpful to the overall perception of the NZMC delegation. When combined with passive, sketchy, ill-prepared participation at the conference and the subsequent absence of two thirds of the delegation, there was little to indicate that the NZMC were committed to an international indigenous community. Their apparent lack of interest and involvement was noted at the conference, and arguably conclusions could be drawn that this was a reflection of the superior status of Maori, and that they had nothing to gain from participation in the WCIP.

Aftermath

The events in 1981 marked a turning point in the involvement of Maori in the WCIP. Whether from lack of interest, funding or commitment to issues in New Zealand, by 1984 it seems that with the exception of Ranginui Walker, enthusiasm had waned. With the Fourth General Assembly of Indigenous Peoples to be held in Panama in 1984, Walker initiated a discussion on the issue of representation. Out of this came the recommendation that accreditation to the WCIP be shared amongst three groups, the

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173 Ibid.
NZMC, MWWL and 'one other' to be named. This was agreed and arrangements were made with the WCIP secretariat to have delegate status shared. Delegates chosen for the conference in Panama were Ranginui Walker, Georgina Kirby and Eva Rickard representing the NZMC, MWWL and Mana Moutuhake respectively.

Additionally, in 1984 the NAC, who were WCIP regional organisers in the Pacific, invited Walker to attend a conference in Canberra with the object of forming a WCIP Pacific Regional Council. Out of this first meeting came a council of delegates from New Zealand, East Timor, New Caledonia, Tahiti, West Papua, Australia, Hawaii and Micronesia. Walker reflects that the Pacific Council was never very successful from his point of view as the NZMC had no money to fund travel to meetings and therefore much of the communication was by written correspondence. At the end of the 1980s he retired and new representatives came onto the scene for a brief period until the WCIP ceased in 1996 due to internal conflict.

Ironically, as the NZMC were curtailing their involvement in the WCIP the government was becoming interested. In 1984 Walker chaired a WCIP Commission of Enquiry on Guatemala and sent the report to David Lange, the newly installed Prime Minister. Lange and his government were more receptive to the involvement of Maori in the WCIP than their predecessors, although not receptive enough to provide funding. Indeed, Walker was the sole New Zealand delegate at the WCIP conference in Panama as the Mana Motuhake and MWWL delegates were unable to raise the necessary funds. Lange passed the report on Guatemala and another on the proceedings of the WCIP General Assembly to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Lange also asked Walker to furnish him with any extra information and texts related to specific resolutions that had been passed by the General Assembly. These related to opposition to French nuclear testing in the Pacific, the dumping of nuclear waste by Japan and the United States, and

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176 Correspondence, Marie Smallface Marule (Chief Administrator, WCIP) to Patu Hohepa, 27 June 1983, World Council of Indigenous Peoples Records, R9349, Box 16, Folder 24, LAC.
177 Ibid.
178 Interview with Ranginui Walker, 18 June 2009.
179 Correspondence, Prime Minister David Lange to R. J. Walker, 6 Dec 1984, AAMK 869, W3074, Box 1605A, 2/2/21, Part 1, NA.
another which called for ‘the French to consult only with the Maori people of French Polynesia about continued French nuclear testing’.180

CONCLUSION

The visit by George Manuel to New Zealand set in train a series of events which culminated in the formation of the World Council of Indigenous peoples. This chapter explains the way in which Manuel subverted the official visitors’ circuit and created a space to meet with Maori. During these meetings he recognised that Maori and Indian shared many cultural commonalities, a similar world view and values, and a shared history of colonisation and its negative contemporary legacy. He also recognised that Maori occupied a unique place as an indigenous people who had been able carve out a place in New Zealand within which they had preserved their cultural identity, had gained a measure of status and respect, and who enjoyed a good living standard. The key to the degree of success they enjoyed was parliamentary representation. Thus, while not ideal, the position of Maori was better than that of other indigenous peoples and he placed them at the top of an indigenous hierarchy in terms of status and position in society.

The second section of this chapter traced the shift of Maori into a small elite group of indigenous peoples which was convened to organise the inaugural World Council of Indigenous peoples. Examined were the ambivalences of some Maori to involvement in the WCIP and the lack of support from government which suggested opposition to the WCIP. The issue that saw them commit to the WCIP was the recognition that Maori were in a much better position than other indigenous peoples and could therefore use their experiences and provide an example for those struggling under oppressive regimes.

The examination of the events at the inaugural conference of the WCIP at Port Alberni supported the premise that the involvement of Maori, the positions which they took, the expectations placed on them, and the roles they played were a direct result of the ‘best race relations’ discourse which positioned Maori as a privileged people in relation to other indigenous peoples. At the same time they generated a space to place the reality of

180 Ibid.
Maori experience before the conference, and thus replaced perception with reality. I demonstrated how Maori navigated a position within a nexus of perception and expectation. Perceptions of the status of Maori included elite, privileged, successful, westernised and ‘better than’. Expectations from Western delegate were that Maori could be an example to follow. Maori also had expectations. They acknowledged that the position of Maori in society was much better than that of other indigenous peoples. Therefore they could use their experience for the benefit of those who were less advantaged, and at the same time provide an example of what might be possible.

Thus Maori took on central leadership roles and positions throughout the conference and this reflected their expertise in dealing with committees and formal meetings. They also ‘took the lead’ and brought unity amongst conference delegates through cultural performances. At the same time, through the presentation of a paper on colonisation and the contemporary effects, they found a space to counter the oppressive ‘elite’ and ‘privileged’ perceptions and the softer ‘better than’ discourse was imbued with nuances of Maori agency and struggle. Maori did not dispute that they were in a better position but this was entirely due to their own efforts.

The participation by Maori in Third General Assembly at Canberra was in stark contrast to Port Alberni. They had lost their status on the Executive Council and were no longer part of an elite group. A variety of issues including divisions within Maoridom, a reduced delegation numerically, and being underprepared for the conference, affected the ability of the Maori delegates to use the spaces at conference effectively. A reluctance to speak and participate in discussions was noted as were perceptions of apathy and disinterest, and there is a suggestion that the lack of involvement may have been constrained by embarrassment borne of the recognition that the problems of Maori were insignificant to those of other indigenous peoples. The NZMC were unable or unwilling to make a strong case for Maori and this gave the impression of apathy and a lack of interest.

However, Maori found an effective voice and space was at the alternative venue of the Aboriginal Forum. There Maori activists presented an oppositional narrative to the ‘best race relations’ discourse and detailed injustices, the issues which they were contesting, and they took part in an Aboriginal land rights protest to provide support and
solidarity for Aboriginal activists. In many ways the activists redeemed the lacklustre efforts of the NZMC delegation.
Conclusion

This thesis has demonstrated how Maori activists progressively created space for themselves in a wide range of international venues to have their grievances and claims acknowledged and accepted. To do this they had to challenge and overturn the oppressive ‘one people’ discourse which confined them as a privileged indigenous people who occupied a position of equality in New Zealand. This thesis has focused on the period between 1950 and 1982 and how Maori generated space for themselves within New Zealand and overseas. Initially, this took the form of soft activism with the Maori Women’s Welfare League and their involvement in the Pan Pacific Women’s Association. The 1960s saw four seminal events which resulted in Maori becoming more politicised: the 'Bennett incident' which drew attention to domestic racism; the visit of David Ausubel and the publicity his work generated, particularly his book *The Fern and the Tiki*; the protests over the exclusion of Maori from the 1960 All Blacks tour of South Africa; and the Hunn Report which advocated for the integration of Maori into European society. These issues generated two strands of Maori activism. The first was a form of soft activism. The policy of integration resulted in a number of visits to New Zealand which included indigenous peoples and it would be through these visits that Maori became aware of other indigenous peoples and subverted the ‘visitors circuit’ that had previously restricted visitors exposure to Maori. These visits did not immediately result in the formation of indigenous networks. However, they were important in that they raised awareness of indigeneity and the political struggles of other indigenous peoples. The second strand was the genesis of a more radical form of protest after the exclusion of Maori from the 1960 All Blacks Tour to South Africa, and further stimulated by the Hunn Report and particularly the MAAA which threatened the alienation of Maori land. By the 1970s this more assertive attitude had become much more prominent, a new generation of Maori leaders (many of whom had become politicised during the 1960s) created spaces for Maori both within New Zealand and overseas. In this new phase of activism Maori visited places such as the United States, the United Nations, Australia, China as well as engaging in activism within New Zealand. In the process of these exchanges Maori played an important role in the formation of Indigenous networks, particularly the World Council of Indigenous
Peoples. It was through these contacts that Maori managed to successfully contest the belief among many indigenous peoples that they were privileged and that colonisation had been a benign process. The following paragraphs elaborate on this broad picture and highlight the key findings of each chapter.

Chapter One examined the participation by the MWWL in the PPWA, and especially in international conferences. It was argued that they were able to use this as a space to subvert the ‘one people’ and ‘best race relations’ narrative and claim the right for Maori to have a voice in their own right in international forums. In the process of attending these conferences they used space in the margins to centre indigenous people and engender a new consciousness between delegates. Although the MWWL has often been characterised as a moderate organisation, it is argued here that their actions in demanding a bicultural New Zealand delegation which included both Maori and Pakeha representatives was, for its time, radical coming as it did in the early 1950s when oppositional voices to the ‘one people’ narrative were seldom expressed in New Zealand and overseas. An example of this was their opposition to the 1956 South African tour to New Zealand, one of the very few groups to do so.

In Chapter Two I examined three key events involving racial discrimination which cumulatively levered open New Zealand’s race relations reputation and generated a space for widespread domestic discussion and international scrutiny. The Bennett incident provoked a short but significant national reaction as Pakeha were confronted with the reality that racial discrimination existed. Internationally New Zealand's race relations reputation was subject to some criticism. The publications by David Ausubel, especially *The Fern and the Tiki*, exposed social, economic and political inequality and a host of discriminatory practices to which Maori were subject. Internationally there was some criticism which suggested that New Zealand’s good race relations reputation may have been questioned but the protests against the 1960 tour of South Africa, in which many Pakeha were involved, somewhat paradoxically served to restore this reputation internationally. At the same time the government published the Hunn Report which was a blueprint for an integration policy, and which aimed to finalise the colonial project of making ‘one people’ and integrating Maori into mainstream New Zealand. This was a pivotal period in which, cumulatively, the events especially the ‘No Maoris No Tour’ protest and the Hunn Report, generated a great national discussion on race
discrimination and the position of Maori, and race relations was shifted into the centre of society where it remained. The events were situated as part of a global ‘wind of change’ when liberation had become a central ideology and people demanded freedom from oppression, civil rights and equality. Such ideologies and events changed perspectives across the globe, and there is no doubt they had an effect in making a space for the development of a new consciousness in New Zealand. The ‘No Maoris No Tour’ protest for equality on the rugby field was seen by some Maori as New Zealand’s ‘wind of change’, and Jack Hunn located it in his integration proposals. Collectively they opened the door for the entry into New Zealand of academics and researchers and indigenous people, all of whom came to study New Zealand’s race relations model and the integration policies which came out of the Hunn Report. During the 1960s indigenous peoples from Australia, Canada and the United States of America entered New Zealand and saw the beginning of an indigenous people’s community.

Significantly the period politicised and raised a new political consciousness among many Maori. There were no immediate protest actions, but there was a discernible shift as Maori became more forceful and inclined to speak out publicly on contentious issues. Some joined CARE, others were in demand as speakers on race relations, anti-racism workshops began to appear, and others supported the anti-apartheid movement which began in 1968. These few years and the events discussed laid down the bedrock for the development of radical Maori activism which emerged a few years later. Out of the confluence of events came a generation of Maori who, during the following decade, would take leadership roles in New Zealand, and some would support and become involved with the new generation of young activists from Nga Tamatoa.

Chapter Three focused more closely on visits to New Zealand from overseas, particularly the way in which they ultimately subverted the ‘Visitors' Circuit’. It will be recalled that this circuit, which was initially designed by the Department of Maori Affairs and a variety of government agencies, comprised visits to prestigious Maori and places such as Whakarewarewa which show-cased Maori achievement and the position of equality which they were said to enjoy and which the government was keen to portray. Despite the controlled nature of the circuit, however, Maori subverted the visitors’ circuit by taking advantage of opportunities to meet visitors and convey a different narrative to that intended by the government. In the process, space was created
for indigenous peoples and Maori to engage with each other for the first time. Thus Maori regained control of the race relations narrative. Stories were told and exchanged, similar historical and contemporary experiences were recognised, and commonalities were found in terms of culture and world-view. During the period an opportunity was generated for women from the Maori Women's Welfare League to travel to Australia and work in Aboriginal communities. As well Maori began travelling out of New Zealand to continue academic studies and contacts were made with indigenous peoples. It was a period where indigenous peoples came together in a variety of ways engendering a new consciousness and understanding of each other and a recognition of their place in an indigenous world. It was a 'soft' form of activism and the first steps towards an indigenous peoples’ movement which would be initiated in the following decade.

Chapter Four examined the movement of radical and moderate activists into international places and venues and sought to shed light on how they used the new spaces which opened up, and the networks that they formed. The extent and range of radical Maori activism was impressive. Over a decade they travelled to Australia, Europe North America, Communist bloc countries, and across the Pacific islands. They took part in meetings regional and international forums, provided support and solidarity for other indigenous peoples and they participated in protest actions. Many were single issue events. Mainly they made contact with other indigenous activists. In this respect there was a movement from first contact with Australian Aborigines, then into the Pacific islands where they became involved in the NFIP and other Pacific forums which formed as off-shoots from the NFIP, and finally they moved into the IITC. Networks were formed and contact was reciprocal with indigenous activists coming into New Zealand to provide support for Waitangi Day protests and conferences. This included the Te Hui Oranga O Te Moana Nui a Kiwa conferences which had been initiated by Maori activists to enable the wider Maori population to be informed of issues of contention and political actions being taken by other Pasifika peoples.

Maori entered many international spaces with an oppressive race relations stereotype attached. This defined Maori as a privileged or advantaged indigenous people living in complete equality with Pakeha in a country with the best race relations in the world. From the earliest days when they met with other indigenous peoples, especially in
Australia, Maori were made aware that they were regarded as a privileged indigenous people, they lived alongside Pakeha in a position of equality, and that race relations were ‘not a problem’ in New Zealand. I suggested that the form which Maori activism took was related to the perceptions of Maori as privileged. Thus the imperative was to address such misconceptions and present an oppositional narrative which laid out the reality of colonisation in historical terms, and its contemporary legacy. I demonstrated how Maori used international indigenous spaces in a variety of ways: to provide support and solidarity for other indigenous people, to forge contacts and networks, and to exchange information and strategies. Overwhelmingly, and in almost all cases examined, indigenous and non-indigenous, Maori used international spaces to ‘tell their story’, and thus challenge and subvert the dominant ‘one people’ ideological construct. The narrative was often strongly anti-Pakeha and anti-colonial, and there was rarely any concession that Maori had been treated better than other indigenous peoples. In fact, it was often stated that Maori had suffered more because of the insidious racist ‘one people’ ideology which had been transmitted and entrenched throughout the world and thus closed the space for Maori grievances to be taken seriously. In relentlessly presenting a grievance-based discourse Maori not only subverted the perceptions of Maori privilege and notion that there was racial equality and harmony in New Zealand, at the same time they gained acceptance for their claims and created a space for themselves in an evolving indigenous network.

International spaces offered a significant political resource and the opportunity for activists to have their grievances and claims spread across the media and thereby embarrass the government. Maori activists, however, rarely used the media to publicise their visits, state their claims and only once did they participate in the politics of embarrassment to shame the government. The politics of embarrassment was a common strategy employed by many indigenous activists and yet Maori never sought to use the new spaces which had opened up and make political gain. I suggested that this was related to the fact that Maori were more advantaged than other indigenous people in that they possessed a measure of political power that other indigenous peoples did not. Activists had four Maori MPs who they could call on to present their claims in government. Moreover the claims of Maori activists were not too dissimilar to those coming from Maori leaders and members of Maori organisations. Thus Maori did not
need to use international spaces to embarrass the government as they had other avenues through which to press their claims.

Chapter Five focused on how Maori utilised growing international concern over race relations, particularly from the United Nations, to advance their causes. This began with the Panapa petition in 1960 which called for the government to make a statement against race relations in New Zealand. It would be the debates over the International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, however, that would cause the government considerable difficulty. By the late 1960s a range of Maori individuals and organisations, among whom MOOHR and then Nga Tamatoa were particularly prominent, were calling on the government to ratify the convention, something which the government was most reluctant to do, despite its protestations that New Zealand’s race relations were exemplary. Reluctantly, and without consulting Maori, the government introduced a Race Relations Bill which many Maori regarded as ‘window dressing’ for the sake of New Zealand’s international reputation. Consequently, Maori took their concerns to the United Nations. Patu Hohepa’s visit to the United Nations in 1972, where he spoke on apartheid, generated publicity for Maori grievances overseas and he utilised other meetings to cast doubt on New Zealand’s good race relations narrative. The chapter also demonstrated that Maori relationships with the United Nations were a two-way affair. The visit of UN Special Rapporteur Jose Martinez Cobo to New Zealand in 1973 gave Maori direct access to a visiting UN official. Radical activists, particularly Nga Tamatoa, met over two days with Cobo and took the opportunity to highlight to him the impact of institutional discrimination against Maori. Within not much more than one decade, Maori had utilised international pressures for nations to formally legislate against racial discrimination to gain recognition for their grievances within the United Nations, in the process challenging the notion they were a privileged people.

Whereas Chapter Five discussed the actions of more radical Maori in accessing international forums, Chapter Six focused on more moderate activism, in particular the involvement of Maori in the WCIP, a movement in which they were influential in originating. At the inaugural conference of the WCIP in 1975, Maori delegates took a leading role which was an outcome of George Manuel's visit to New Zealand and his perception that Maori were at the top of an indigenous hierarchy. This was largely due
to Maori parliamentary representation and the greater opportunities available to Maori which other indigenous people were struggling to attain. Unlike radical activists, Maori delegates accepted they were in a better position than many other indigenous peoples. Nevertheless, they took the opportunity to make other indigenous peoples aware that despite their relatively good position, they had also suffered extensively from colonisation in the past and that the legacy was a continuing one. Moreover, they argued that while they had made some gains, these were due to Maori agency rather than the benevolence of the government. They took a position whereby they fulfilled the expectations that their ‘better than’ position demanded, especially that they take on a leadership role and provide an example for others. However, they also created space for an oppositional narrative to be heard. Ranginui Walker presented a paper on colonisation and its contemporary legacy which was marked by a myriad of negative social and economic indicators, and political subordination. He noted that while NZ was proud of its race relations record, and some gains had been made, this had been due to Maori resourcefulness rather than Pakeha benevolence. Ultimately Walker's message was that ‘better than’ was still not great. Maori involvement in the leadership of the WCIP was not long lasting. When a Maori delegation visited Canberra for the Third WCIP in 1981, Maori had lost their place on the WCIP Executive and internal divisions within the New Zealand Maori Council limited the opportunities to create space. Nevertheless, some Maori activists who travelled to Canberra did take the opportunity to participate in the alternative Aboriginal Forum thereby creating spaces for Maori concerns to be voiced overseas. Although Maori involvement in the WCIP in the period under review was confined largely to 1975 participation in the forum was useful as a network where Maori both made new contacts and renewed existing relationships with indigenous communities.

Reflections

It has become apparent during this thesis that there are many untold stories about the engagement of Maori with indigenous peoples abroad. Almost all the events discussed from Chapter Three onwards have never been examined. Some of the events which I have chosen to focus on deserve a thesis in their own right. The work of the Maori Women's Welfare League in Aboriginal communities in Australia is one and the involvement of Maori activists in the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific Movement is another. The involvement of Maori women (activists or otherwise), within a broad
indigenous Pacific women's movement is another which needs attention. Finally, an area which was neglected but which needs to be explored is the role of Maori who were living in Australia and who supported the struggle for Aboriginal rights. Some even set up a Mana Motuhake branch in the early 1980s, although it seems this was short-lived. Despite an intention to draw this into the thesis, the lack of archival information, media reports and the difficulty in obtaining interviews forced me to reluctantly abandon the idea.

It is hoped that this thesis has shown the benefits of looking at New Zealand’s history from a global perspective. Although some of the New Zealand material is well-known, I have nevertheless offered a new and broader perspective by bringing in an international dimension. While many incidents discussed in this thesis occurred separately, there is also an interconnectedness between many of them. To give just one example from 1975, over a period of a few months, Maori radical activists created a Maori Embassy at Parliament following the Maori Land March (an idea which was itself inspired by the Aboriginal Tent Embassy in 1972 and which Maori had visited). They were in turn joined by Aboriginal activists Gary Foley and Gary Williams who had been key players in the formation of the Aboriginal Embassy. At the instigation of Titewhai Harawira, the Maori Tent Embassy also received a message of support from a Pacific Women’s Conference which was taking place at Suva. At the same time, Maori delegates at Port Alberni (Canada) were involved in constituting the World Council of Indigenous Peoples where they discussed a variety of issues including the retention of cultural identity and the retention of land. Much of the thesis has also focused on the power of people and the organisations to which they belonged to create their own indigenous international networks.

In a sense Maori activists rode the waves of the global upheaval of the 1960s. They routinely relocated Maori history within a global context and through references to the struggle by black Americans, the Vietnam War, the blacks in apartheid South Africa, Maori indicated their identification with other oppressed peoples. They grafted their cause onto the new social movements, especially the anti-apartheid and anti-Vietnam war movements, and found a space to have their grievances heard. Ideologies came flooding into New Zealand with black liberation and anti-colonial ideologies resonating with the newly emerging activist organisations.
A similar phenomenon was occurring with indigenous peoples in the other British settler states. In the early 1970s Maori and other indigenous peoples made contact and so began a relationship which continues to this day in various forms. The 1970s was a foundational period of coming together, forging networks of support and solidarity, of planning strategies, and at times of providing physical support for protest actions. Stories were told to sustain, educate, and resist the construct which had been imposed on them by the colonisers of their country. As well, Maori activists moved into other areas: to the Russell Tribunal in Rotterdam, to the streets of London during CHOGM, to the Programme to Combat Racism, to China and Cuba, to international conferences of the Pan-Pacific Women's Association, and into the WCIP. Always, however, the imperative was to transmit their narrative of the historical and contemporary effects of colonisation, to reclaim and transmit their history and their right to tell their story. In doing so they created political space for Maori and corrected the dominant narrative which had for so long confined them within a 'best race relations' and Maori as 'privileged' paradigm.
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