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Transforming feminist care ethics: Tracing (un)memorable mother-daughter relations through psychoanalytic inquiry

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Abstract

This thesis draws upon traditional and feminist theories of psychoanalysis, and embarks upon a journey of inquiry initiated by a personal experience of end-of-life care for my mother. Positioned as responsible caregiver, I found myself unable to articulate my experiences as anything other than caregiver-patient who suffered a combination of ‘exhaustion and grief’ leading to hallucination manifesting as hysterical symptom. The constraints on positioning available to me generated the following question as the catalyst for present study. How can mother and daughter relations be spoken within contemporary discourse and how is care positioned in relation to mother-daughter encounter? The inquiry begins with a critical reading of contemporary literature on mothering, care and caring to locate the study within a genealogy of feminist engagement with ethics of care. After situating both feminist care ethics and hysteria within the trajectory of psychoanalytic development, I explore Lacan’s rereading of Freud’s mapping of the unconscious, pre-conscious and conscious as the initial theoretical framework for inquiry, given that this is where hysteria linguistically intertwines with psychoanalysis as a product of caregiving stress. Within the genre of searching, I follow a series of journeys, investigating texts for gaps and pathways enabling a mother-daughter encounter to be remembered and spoken differently. Each journey informs and transforms the problematics of remembering and articulating mother-daughter encounter. Yet they reiterate constrictions at the place where perception meets thought, and each journey is hindered by a metaphorical wall of language. After discussing how the wall locates mother-daughter encounter and care within discourse and shapes reality as a constant series of assimilating, marginalising and discriminating I extend the scope of inquiry
through reading feminist theorists of difference including Irigaray’s concepts of mimesis and fluidity, Ettinger’s matrixial borderspace and Braidotti’s nomadic subject. This allows a rereading of feminist care ethics and possibilities of transformations, where theorising a more inclusive grammatical structure can be thought as enabling possibilities for speaking, writing and remembering women’s encounters with women and a daughter’s encounter with her mother.
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A memorable story

One of the few loving mother-daughter bonds depicted in western mythology is that of Demeter and Persephone. Within available versions of Greek mythology, Demeter is one of the twelve Olympians, a Goddess who has powers over, or inextricably intertwined with, the fertility of the earth. Demeter and her daughter Persephone are inseparable and totally devoted to each other (Guthrie, 1955; Irigaray, 1994). As the result of a deal made by Persephone’s father, Zeus, Persephone is abducted by Hades and taken to the underworld. Demeter, devastated by her daughter’s abduction, roams the earth in search of her daughter (Guthrie, 1955). She renders the earth barren, initiating widespread famine. Finally, Hades agrees to release Persephone, but not before he tricks her into eating a pomegranate seed. By eating the seed, she commits herself to return to the underworld every year for several months, as his bride (Gray, 2007; Kerényi, 1949/1985a). Winter is the direct result of her abduction, the time of the year that Persephone spends with Hades and a time of forced separation from her mother (Irigaray, 1994; Gray, 2007).
Preface: Where is care?

Some years ago, I became a caregiver for my mother, who was terminally ill and had a short time to live. Given that I was the only daughter, I fully understood that this is what daughters do, having witnessed my mother care for both her mother and my father’s mother at the end of their lives. My mother wished to die at home and there was never any question in my mind that it should be any other way: I set out to accommodate her wish. Given that my mother’s health deteriorated rapidly as she came out of remission, virtually overnight I became endowed with ‘what it takes’ to responsibly care for a beloved family member. Some years later, I sat down to write of my experiences. I initially wrote something like, “I was my mother’s caregiver.” There were few words and many tears. I had retained vivid memories of those days along with a strange mix of grief and anger, spoken as grief that she was no longer here, anger that she had left.

When I moved back into the family home and took up my new position, my mother was bedridden; having chosen my old bedroom as the place in the house that she would prefer to die. As she became weaker, she insisted on taking frequent trips to the bathroom. Movement caused her great pain over and above the effects of the drugs, but she was an intensely private person and insistent that she did not want to be a burden. Her insistence to do things on her own meant that I was with her for as many hours as I could stay awake. Indeed when I found the time to sleep, I recall being woken to go and assist my mother who was on the move again. Exhaustion was inevitable as her condition became one of sleeping, waking, asking ‘is that you dear’ until finally she slipped into a morphine induced coma.

The night before she died, a friend arranged for a hospice nurse to come into the house so I could get some rest. That night, while I was sitting with my friend, I
experienced some odd hallucinations. I felt my stature change to that of my mother’s and when I looked at my hands they had changed shape. They were no longer mine. They were hers. I became very frightened and silently asked her to leave. There was no doubt in my mind at the time that she was there and I was addressing her. She left, and I was left with the guilt of sending her away. Guilt seems most fitting since the request for her to leave was driven by fear and not compassion. Early next morning I returned to the house. She was still alive. Not long after I had settled myself in the chair beside her, she opened her eyes, they were clear and alert, as if observing something directly in front of her. She closed them, let out a gentle sigh and she was gone, an exit, I learned later, that was assisted by an increased dose of morphine deemed necessary by the visiting nurse.

This is not a story that I told many people: perhaps to a few of my closest friends not long after these events played out. The general ‘diagnosis’ was hallucinations caused by exhaustion and the stresses of caregiving. So I stored these recollections away until ‘caregiving’ became the focus of my research some years later. Yet there was always a feeling of loss, not just the physical loss of a mother, but something else, an uneasy feeling that I too had lost a part of myself. Something was missing in the telling as our parting, played out within our discursive positions, and within the early beginnings of formulating research topics, I began to wonder where the daughter was during the time that I became my mother’s caregiver. When a daughter and mother’s last days are positioned as caregiver and patient directing the discursive interactions between the two of them, where are the daughter and her mother?

Driven by my experiences, this thesis focuses on the search for a daughter’s lost encounter, and an exercise of hysterical enquiry. While this story begins my
search, and I have now undertaken the inquiry, and written the thesis, I start out with the assumption that I am positioned in discourse as I study and write, as I am when I tell the story of my mother and me. To acknowledge the multiple possibilities of positioning as a daughter, which are elaborated specifically and transformed as the inquiry unfolds, the third person address is used throughout the thesis to draw attention to positioning and multiplicity.

As a case study, the daughter is engaged in caring activities. An over propensity to care according to Breuer, can be considered an hysterical symptom of hysteria (Freud & Breuer, 1893/1974; Verhaeghe, 1999). Moreover, traditional case studies, such as that of Anna O reveal that exhaustion from caregiving is a common trigger for bouts of hysteria that culminate in hallucination (Freud & Breuer, 1893/1974). The hysterical character of this enquiry, given the hallucinatory symptoms invoked through the hysterical pursuit of caregiving, places this study firmly within a framework of psychoanalysis.

Within psychology, psychoanalysis is not necessarily a favoured theoretical framework, yet the influence of psychoanalysis in relation to developmental theory, and mother–child relations, remains significant. According to Tyson, Jones & Elcock (2011), psychoanalysis is sometimes considered psychology, although not often by psychologists, who rarely acknowledge its influence. Psychoanalysis may be regarded as unscientific given that its modes of inquiry are traditionally steeped in the analysis of case studies and mythology. However, as a theory of discourse, psychoanalysis is no longer the study of the individual but theorises how language shapes an individual, how language shapes the reality of the individual, how language marginalises and excludes. Through employing psychoanalysis as a theoretical framework for critical social psychological inquiry, we can consider how
discourse erects boundaries and categorisations, how it intrudes, colonises and specularises (Irigaray, 1985a). Within the context of this thesis, given that I seek to locate a mother-daughter encounter, psychoanalysis is taken up as feminist epistemological pathways to consider the marginalisation, exclusion, intrusion, colonisation and specularisation of women. And as Freud’s work linguistically creates an uneasy gap within the genealogy of psychology, somewhere around the theoretical underpinnings of scientific inquiry and behaviourism, it theoretically offers terrain within which these inquiries can begin.

Putting aside the marginalised position of psychoanalysis and indeed critical social psychology within the discipline, it is crucial, in the context of this project, to acknowledge that Freud’s interest in hysteria plays a foundational role in the birth of psychoanalysis. Hysteria is still present as a series of genealogical connections interwoven within theories of human development, maternal subjectivity, morality, care ethics and educational psychology.

Freud’s interest in hysteria came from his training as a neuro-scientist and was sparked by a notion that the many and varied symptoms of hysteria could not be traced to physical pathology, but were a condition of the psyche with no fixed location within the body. Arguably then, psychoanalysis evolved from fruitless avenues of scientific inquiry delving into the anatomical functions of the brain, into the psychic origins of hysteria. Its ‘cure’ was identified as being possible through abreaction, the talking away of the symptoms as a therapeutic practice, hence the first connection between discourse and the study of the individual who is shaped by discourse within psychoanalysis. The ‘talking cure’ was named by the object of one of the first recorded hysterical case studies, Anna O. Hysterical cure, then, is enabled by clear articulation, a catharsis within available discourse.
Freud (1977) also describes the process that a mother and daughter must go through to ensure normative development of the child, a process that includes rejecting the mother. Kleinian (1932, 1957, 1960) Object Relations Theory, as a further development of Freudian psychoanalytic theory, heavily underpins traditional and contemporary theories of maternal subjectivity, intersubjectivity and trans-subjectivity. As an act of questioning, hysterical enquiry returns the daughter to her theoretical and historical roots to investigate the pathways that have articulated her development, her condition and subsequent theories of mother-daughter bonds. Hence the scope of the daughter’s original inquiry is set through Freudian and Lacanian concepts of the unconscious. In effect, the daughter’s search begins as a search of herself, within a contextualised metaphorical framework, created within available discourse and masculine theories of psychoanalysis.

Psychoanalysis therefore, not only provides the theoretical underpinnings of inquiry, but in terms of this thesis, it sets the boundaries within which the daughter can initially inquire. The limitations of hysterical encounter are set within the borders of Freud’s unconscious as described in letter 52 to Fliess (Freud & Fliess, 1985). Lacan (1997b) rereads Freud’s work as a theory of discourse, each realm that Freud describes becomes an interactive layer of language structure, including a difficult area of transition between unconscious-pre-conscious, that translates through Lacan into a ‘wall of language’. This is the place where pure perception meets with sound and thought to create meaning, the very foundations of how an encounter can begin to be said. What better place for a daughter to initiate her search, than the home from whence her hysterical experience has emerged, to trace her encounter back to a difficult transition and hopefully, through the wall of language. The wall metaphor features prominently throughout this thesis, appearing
within Chapter One in relation to the barriers between intensive and stay at home mothering (Hays, 1996), the private and public, difficulties of transition, transcendence, of traversing borders, boundaries, the margins, and the confines of containers.

A psychoanalytic theory involving discourse reveals a depth of language structure and a vast yet confined area of inquiry to trace what the project will reveal as being a current, fleeting perceptual moment. Hysterical enquiry traverses Freud’s (1985) unconscious layers, metaphor, metonym, synchrony, and diachrony (Lacan, 1997a; 1997b); Lacan’s Symbolic and Imaginary (Lacan, 1997a, 1997b), Levinas’ (1978/1995; 1979; 1998) Same, Other and arguably anachrony, the ‘there is’ (Brody, 1998) and the Real (Lacan, 1997a, 1997b). Gaps are sensed through an uneasiness when investigating signifying chains of knowledge, a feeling that perhaps the daughter has been here before, yet can’t remember. Grammar and syntax create a Symbolic structural conscious connectedness to be negotiated, through which traces, as uneasy moments of (un)memorable encounter can emerge/submerge through gaps of reality created through inquiry. As the daughter senses the gaps, I take the opportunity to search the unconscious pathways they reveal.

Psychoanalytic theories of masquerade provide added texture to the terrain that the daughter searches. Lacan reinterprets traditional mainstream theory as creating an impasse of speaking positions. Riviere’s (1929/2008) original mask provided a sanctuary in an exemplary display of femininity. Lacan’s mask somehow disenfranchises the place of safety as non-existent, highlighting the necessity to distinguish between the speaking positions and their available discourses. For example, within this thesis, I interpret the mainstream position as suggesting there is nothing behind the mask (Tauchert, 2007). The hysteric within a position of enquiry
asks questions of these restrictions. Within the mask, the Real and the ‘there is’ is unavailable, whereas, within the scope of hysterical enquiry mapped out within the bounds of Freud and Lacan’s theories of the unconscious, they are possible spaces to seek, even if they can’t be found. Hence, within the text, there are places where I have written within/beyond. This is to accommodate both speaking positions. Clearly, there are anomalies in relation to speaking positions if we consider the context of the inquiry, the most explicit of these being the mother-daughter encounter when framed as ‘caregiver-patient’.

A clarification of these positions has prompted me to draw on Lacan’s four discourses, the master, the hysteric, the academic and the analyst to help clarify the daughter’s speaking positions as a starting place within the thesis. Again, these create an initial framework to consider the multiple positions that enable alternative pathways within the scope of the inquiry that is Freud’s unconscious structure.

Each of the four positions introduced by Lacan take, as explained in Chapter Two, particular discursive pathways/speaking positions within the work. For example, the daughter labelled as caregiver, speaks from the position of master, as does the daughter who fears and shuns her hallucinatory hysteric symptoms. The daughter, who speaks the discourses of exhaustion uneasily and wishes to find a way to speak her experience, speaks from the position of the hysteric. The daughter who conducts the academic inquiry as a genealogy of care is the academic daughter, speaking in the discourse of the university and the daughter who critically reads the gaps is the analytic daughter. These are the initial positions occupied by the daughters and they can change rapidly. I do not always explicitly label the daughters throughout the work, given that they may change quickly. Distinctions between them can be made by readers, differently.
The other jouissance (Lacan, 1999) is also important to hysterical enquiry as a point of contention between the discourse of the master and the discourse of the hysteric. The hysteric interprets the other jouissance as a possible site for inquiry since it might include mother-daughter memory. The contention is born where the other jouissance may be situated within/or beyond the realms of consciousness, theorised through masculine speaking positions of consciousness. The contention is based on a difference in how each daughter speaks the boundaries of the unconscious or whose unconscious they are speaking. For example, at least one daughter ‘believes’ that the other jouissance may exist as ‘possession’ behind Riviere’s mask, this being a space that falls within the scope of her inquiry.

At the end of Chapter Six, the daughter unexpectedly finds herself in the ontological and metaphorical wilderness, having stepped outside the boundaries within which she is produced, enabling her to extend the scope of inquiry in an effort to articulate, and therefore remember an alternative way of becoming. This is because linguistic, structural and theoretical frameworks within the existing scope of inquiry fail to speak her encounters.

Now that the daughter has pushed the boundaries past the initial scope of inquiry, I introduce the work of Luce Irigaray (1985a), whose critique of both Freud and Lacan’s work extends these boundaries and enables Woman, not as a Lacanian (1999) not whole, but as non-existent commodified object within the realms phallic discourse. Chapters Eight and Nine, continue working with Irigaray’s reading/writing in search of memorable mother-daughter encounter, and care. Chapter Ten, introduces Bracha Ettinger’s (2006a) work, extending the realms of feminine unconsciousness, enabling the daughter to explore further afield than previously possible within an unconscious that is theoretically reputed to be
exclusively feminine. Within the broadening of the scope of hysterical enquiry, the daughter continues to (re)tell her story, reworking shifts that she is beginning to remember.

The hysteric searches for her lost encounter. She sets off on a series of cyclical quests seeking answers to remember the (un)memorable. Her quests are enabled through Butler’s (1987/2004; 2000) critique of Hegel, hence the rhythm of the genre is revealed in Chapter Four, within a discussion between Benjamin (1998, 2007) and Butler (2000) on the theoretical properties of intersubjective thirdness’. Within the searching genre, two self-consciousnesses fight to the death within an inevitable cycle of failure, however, within the bounds of hysterical enquiry, the failure of each cycle does not constitute the failure of the quest. Within the genre of hysterical enquiry, each cycle enables the collection of traces and a shift in (un)consciousness. Each encounter leaves traces because the daughters’ quest is irrevocably altered, whenever the encounter cannot be recalled. Explicitly we seek traces for they alert the analytical daughter to gaps and gaps open up a fresh journey for the daughters to continue her quest. Implicitly, we note the shift. For example, the first quest is initiated by a moment of uneasiness. Throughout her journey, the daughter collects traces, a collection of eloquent silences. As the daughter gets closer to the wall, the voices become louder. As she shifts the boundaries, the voices can be heard as an awakening of trace, enabled by the shifting of the wall. The rhythm of the text is also apparent within a retelling of her story and the retelling and rethinking of other stories within the interludes, this I like to call, given that the genre searches for gaps and paradox, the rhythms of disruption. In Chapter Six we are made conscious of another layer of the daughters’ questing, when we consider the repetitive discourses of mythology and how they recurrently structure
contemporary discourse. There is some merging of the borders here between genre and methodology. The genre of the work enables the appearance of methodological strategies and materials as the work shifts. Therefore, in itself, the genre is part of the methodology of hysterical enquiry.

Hysterical enquiry as a methodology consists of several strategies. Care is pursued and its traces collected and connected within a genealogy of care. I sift through theoretical boundaries that string words together synchronically within a phallic chain of signifiers to find gaps. However, the pathways enabled by unconscious linguistic structure allow the daughter to traverse both consciousness and unconsciousness and consider the possibilities that may lie beyond.

A genealogy of care is assembled, gleaned from our journeys, and put together to help build the texture of the inquiry. For example, the thesis begins with an exploration of commodified care, within an historical and contemporary context. Later, I trace care from Gilligan’s (1977, 1982) work to the present day, and from Klein (1932, 1957, 1964) to Gilligan in relation to maternal subjectivity, intersubjectivity and trans-subjectivity. I also address the commodification of care, its ethical considerations, economic rationalism, and impending techno-ethical problems in relation to a feminist ethics of care. Care is explored as *other jouissance*, hysterical symptom and unconscious leakage from prenatal intra-uterine phantasy, a lost voice and a lost encounter. Care is not entirely chronologically ordered once thought therefore, given that we are made aware of unconscious care within the gaps. Hence the non-linear presentation of care genealogy reads as a disruptive strategy to the chronological order of historical ‘fact’. Connectedness weaves and dances through the realms, threads and texture of the work and although encounters must be
pulled into the Said in available and constricting ways, I have left gaps, disruptions of chronology emphasising what cannot be said.

The daughter searches, journeys, encounters, collects her traces and voices, in a traditionally cyclical fashion accompanying the eloquent silences where care might be, if she could only hear them. As the daughter gets closer to traversing the wall, the voices become louder and increase in number thickening and texturing the inquiry as we traverse the terrain enabled within the scope of inquiry.

As mentioned earlier, the daughter’s story can be thought as a psychoanalytic case study of hysteria. Hysterical enquiry works within the study and its methods unfold as the inquiry proceeds. As I introduce feminist psychoanalytic theory through the work of Irigaray and Ettinger, possibilities of memorable diachronic genealogy are explored. Genealogy is enabled differently.

In Chapter Seven, Irigaray’s (1985a) concept of mimesis is explored and the daughter realises, that a mimetic daughter has been present from the start. She has been observing and describing her own case study, her own journey within the strict confines of Freud’s unconscious. Hence, it becomes apparent that not all the voices within the first part of the thesis are necessarily contained through the four Lacanian daughters. Irigaray’s daughter has always been there, she has been unable to be heard until now.

In Chapter Ten, Ettinger’s (2006a) artwork is surveyed as a layered building of texture, shade and light, from which a uniquely feminine borderspace can emerge. Hence, the reader is invited to reflect upon the thesis as an artwork, where words are perceived as shape, shade and colour to build texture. The texture develops from chapter to chapter as layer after layer is traversed. Again, this strategy messes with the linear and directional properties of conventional academic writing. Hysterical
enquiry not only unearths and follows traces of care, jouissance and (un)memory but uncovers, through a shifting consciousness, another previously unconscious methodological strategy, the possibilities of which can be thought in conjunction with Chapter Eight as a trick of the light.

Within the problematics of the journeys’ confusing directions, with method gradually unfolding as the thesis shifts, I have wondered where the (non)cohesion of the inquiry emerges. (Non)cohesion is aided by a series of interludes throughout the work that appear as disruptions in several forms. Interludes are composed of asides, distractions or quests outside of the general scope or rhythm of the chapter. For example, there are Borromean Knot interludes that entertain the possibilities of the knot and sinthome as areas of inquiry. There are interludes that are an exercise in thinking the current area of search with something mentioned earlier in the thesis, reframing past or future directions. For example, there is a discussion on the similarities between Schreber and Oedipus that exaggerate the searching genre and entertain irony. There are also interludes that are positioned between chapters, pieces written through various voices that relate to what has been and what might become. They sit within chapters, perhaps to fill the gaps and connect the unconnectable. This work has accumulated over four years of daily writing; there are many journeys that have not made their way into the thesis. I sense the gaps that they leave.

The thesis is also punctuated with a series of computer generated drawings that have been produced throughout the course of my work, most of which have appeared on PowerPoint presentations at various conferences and research days. They come from ‘fleeting thoughts while writing’ and they are usually produced for amusement. I hope you enjoy them and consider them as disruptions of thought, also made with a splash of irony, whether conscious or not.
There are the italic disruptions that read as poetic interludes of feminine ecriture, another methodological strategy enabled within the shifting of consciousness. These are written by a collection of enabled voices, into which the telling of various daughters’ stories merge. Certainly, the structure of the thesis becomes more disruptive yet more inclusive as voices are enabled through an expanding, shifting scope of inquiry. Disruption is texturalised by the presence of the chorus, an ancient form of creative theatre of which little is known, except that they articulate themselves within a variety of collective ways.

The inclusion of the chorus as a strategy to enable voices and ‘being’ differently, emphasises the difficulty of writing inclusion within a language that isolates speaking positions, amidst a shifting of consciousness and a plasticity of ontological boundaries. The following is a fictitious example to demonstrate some of the difficulties in writing from several writing positions: ...where I/the daughter(s), or all of us integratedly/separately are/is entertaining the possibilit(y)ies...

As the work shifts, it becomes increasingly difficult to write a feminine conscious ‘being’ within the bounds of existing language structure. I have employed several writing strategies and phrases to help with this. One of these is the use of /. Where I write mother/daughter, I would consider this as an integration of the two. Mother-daughter portrays a mother-daughter bond as articulated within mainstream theoretical linguistic applications of philosophical perceptions of ‘I’. Therefore, if I write something like ‘I/us/integrated interactive yet separate being(s)’, please bear with me. I am trying to convey a consciousness of being that does not exist within phallic discourse and phallic discourse is the only medium I have to write this work. Some of the methodological strategies I have explained, such as mimesis and ‘thesis as artwork’ and ‘feminine ecriture’, emergent methodology, and drawing with a
shakey mouse, are collective strategies I have woken to enact shifts that are not easily written. Likewise, the use of I, the daughter, the daughters, the hysterical, academic, analytic daughter, the mimetic daughter, are reminders that there is a growing collection of voices within the text that are not always easy to specify/contain, especially within a project that consciously endeavours to enact a shift of consciousness within itself.

**A linear view of the chapters presented**

Having introduced the non-linear and cyclical aspects of the work, what follows is an overview or map of the project, to guide you as you journey with us. The first four chapters can be seen to provide the foundations for; the genealogy of care, care ethics, theoretical underpinnings, the contextualising of hysteria and the theories of maternal ‘third’ spaces in which the daughter can initially search for her mother-daughter encounter. Chapter One investigates contemporary care in search of mother-daughter and traces care to contemporary times through historical caring practices, a feminist ethics of care, economic rationalism, political moral practice and the mother’s work-life dilemma. This chapter establishes an hysterical catch cry, where is care? Where is the encounter that precedes the word?

In Chapter Two, the daughter turns to psychoanalysis to seek out care. I explain the realms of Freud’s unconscious structure and unpack the theoretical assumptions that drive this thesis. I clarify my reading of the four initial speaking positions and consider how the daughter’s ‘empty care’ can be rationalised through Lacan’s theory of discourse. The hysterical daughter asks that we investigate Lacan’s claim that ‘woman is not whole’. We listen to the words of the hysteric and collectively prepare to investigate the part of woman that can’t be spoken.
Having listened to the hysterical daughter, in Chapter Three, I introduce Lacan’s (1999) concept of the not whole woman and the other jouissance as possible spaces to look for the daughter’s lost encounter. The chapter also provides a historical overview of hysteria and it’s ‘origins’ to contextualise methodological hysterical enquiry and reveals some interesting connections between hysteria and care. Rivière’s (1929/2008) Womanliness as Masquerade is introduced, generated from an hysterical position as a possible place where care and the other jouissance may be concealed behind the hysterical mask of femininity.

In Chapter Four the daughter searches a gap exposed by Doane and Hodges (1995) in the genealogy of maternal subjectivity. Benjamin’s (1998/2007) ‘third’ is then investigated as a possible site for a memorable encounter. Alerted to another gap, an uneasiness recorded by Baraitser (2009,) the journey moves deep into the confines of Freud’s unconscious structure in search of a mother-child encounter within the theoretical confines of Levinas’ paternal alterity. Chapter Four initially sets the scene for the genre of the work. The daughters’ searching is aided by the introduction of both Butler’s (2000, 1987/2004, 2010) critique of Hegel (1977) and Jessica Benjamin’s (1998, 2007) theorising of intersubjectivity. The limits of transcendence and the dangers of enquiring beyond signification, such as death and madness are explored.

Having witnessed the madness descending around Antigone’s ethics (Lacan, 1997a) between Chapters Four and Five, the daughter embarks on a journey into the madness of President Schreber’s (1903/2000) memoirs in search of a way to speak her hallucinations signified as caregiving exhaustion and therefore hysteria. She reads Schreber’s memoirs as an excruciatingly painful splitting that takes place at the wall of language. In the process, she is left with an uneasy feeling that there is just as
much of interest within the writings of Schreber as for any legitimised theorist of ‘being’ or ‘becoming’. The question emerges, where are our voices?

In Chapter Six the daughter sets out on a quest for voice to articulate her encounter through the gaps created by a reading of Freud’s (1913/1958) *Theme of the Three Caskets*. She somehow finds herself beyond memory through a trace of the forgotten that may well enable her encounter, yet she is at a loss to understand how she may speak of it. So her question becomes, how can we enable our voices? In other words, she has found fractured integrated voices who are now no longer able to speak. She discovers that even silence can be spoken as eloquent and perhaps even heard by those whose boundaries of consciousness have shifted. Chapter Six also adds texture to the cyclical searching genre of the project.

Chapter Seven shifts to a reading of Luce Irigaray’s (1985a) *Speculum*. We extend mainstream theoretical frameworks in an effort to reawaken the silenced voices that perhaps surface occasionally in discourse as an eloquent silence. This chapter provides an overview of Irigaray’s critique of Freud’s essays on woman’s sexuality and discusses some anomalies that arise once we extend the boundaries of our theoretical framework within a series of interludes. The chapter also sees the introduction of another daughter, the mimetic daughter, who, as we explore the enabling properties of mimesis, provides one of the first explicit signs of shifting borders.

In Chapter Eight the daughter accompanies Irigaray on her critique of Plato’s cave. Although, in Chapters Four and Five, the daughter has misgivings around transcendence, the cave offers her a confusion of both direction and light. The daughter explains how transcendence toward the light is not all that it initially seems.
Directional confusion suggests that the shadows may be a more fruitful area of hysterical enquiry; she has been searching in the wrong direction.

Chapter Nine addresses how the walls and borders introduced in Chapters One and Two may offer a pathway that allows the daughter’s encounter with her mother to be spoken if we turn towards them. Yet the borders themselves are interesting specular constructions that reflect, incarcerate, shift, relocate and displace.

In an effort to confront the borderspaces she has turned toward, in Chapter Ten the daughter journeys into Ettinger’s (2006b) matrixial borderspace. The matrix offers a uniquely feminine unconscious space that harbours the other jouissance and compassion. This chapter discusses the difficulties of transforming a matrixial artwork into phallic discourse. I briefly discuss the possibilities of reversing this process, turning phallic discourse into artwork. We discuss the subversive possibilities of fluidity as an alternative life force to the matrix, the light it requires and gaze at the texture of the work we have so far put together.

Chapter Ten revisits contemporary care within a global age that pushes traditional care ethics into uncharted territory. Braidotti (2006) argues that a feminist ethics of care is no longer relevant within a state of advanced capitalism and Tronto (2013) discusses why it is, when framed as a democratic ethics. A close rereading of Tronto’s definition adds textural depth to Irigaray’s fluidity and Braidotti’s feminist uptake of nomadic ethics to open a gateway to transformation, empowerment, subjectivity and a means of remembering.
Readers’ note: Neo liberalism within the context of hysterical enquiry

Throughout this study, I refer to economic theories of liberalism and neoliberalism from time to time. In my understanding, liberalism is underpinned by concepts of individual good and personal responsibility. It stems from ‘Smith’s invisible hand’ ideology, advocating a minimum of government intervention (Becker, 1964). However, Hill (2003) suggests that neo-liberalism requires strong government participation, seemingly led by multi-national companies focused on profit. For Hill, there has been a shift in power from hands off governing of classic liberalism, to global corporations, whom in turn demand strong governance from the western world. This governance requires cuts on spending, often targeting health services to increase profit margins and the opening up of borders to multi-national exploration, such as within the oil industry (Hill, 2003), and the production of bio-fuels. I discuss neo-liberalism within the context of commodified care as a global industry, care as knowledge, the shifting of boundaries and the displacement of people within contemporary society. We can also consider neoliberal global economics in relation to my reference to discourses of public consensus that monitor moral behaviours in the context of health (Chapter Four), the mother’s role in caring for the human capital of the future (Chapter One) and perhaps even the monitoring of hysterical outbursts through a digitally driven practice of witch hunting (Chapter Three). Certainly, neo-liberalism can be thought within a paradigm of governing discourses of human behaviour. Gordon, (1991, p. 43) suggests that neo-liberalism is a mixture of economics and behaviourism.
...whereas *homo economicus* [within eighteenth century liberalism] originally meant that subject the springs of whose activity must remain forever untouchable by government, the American neo-liberal *homo economicus* is *manipulable man*, man who is perpetually responsive to changes in his environment. Economic government here joins hands with behaviourism.
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Chapter One: Searching for mother-daughter care within mainstream care research and ethical practice

I write this chapter as a daughter exploring the relationship I shared with my mother and the positioning of myself through a gendered role of caregiver at the end of her life. From this position, I efficiently struggled as caregiver, acting the part of responsible daughter, while I silently screamed at my impending loss; an indescribable and unspeakable loss. I still ponder as to where mother and daughter were when this tragedy played out within public discourses of home care. How did mother and daughter become positioned in the final scene as caregiver and caree?

In an effort to locate both mother and daughter, I explore discourses of contemporary public-private motherhood and the growing confusion over the meaning of care, along with the growing responsibilities for mothers to care appropriately for their children. Within discourses of nature versus nurture, expert knowledge appears to be winning the battle over a mother’s private capacity to care for her child. The chapter traces how child-care has become positioned as something that mothers need to be taught, including lessons on the physical activities of actually doing it. The contemporary notion of care as meaning an ethical practice to be taught and learned, leads to a discussion of the emergence of a feminist ethics of care around the early 1980s. Through the work of Carol Gilligan (1982), endorsed in the 1990s by Tronto (1993) and Sevenhuijsen (1998), feminist ethics of care is connected through political theories of citizenship and responsibility to its capacity for guiding a global age within an eclectic array of disciplines.
Emerging tensions

Western ideologies of liberalism and Christianity endorse a belief that motherhood skills are not innate, in-born, that they can be learned and should be taught. The correct way to mother can be discovered through scientific research and this knowledge is accredited to the less capable through cultural norms and education (Hays, 1996). Although in contemporary times care teachings may now manifest differently in the form of programmes or courses, the idea that mothers should be instructed how to mother has evolved from early colonial evangelism (Skeggs, 1997). In the late 1800s and early 1900s, for example, women’s homes were established as products of Christian based social work to save poor, fallen, morally bereft and pregnant women, impart mothering skills and to set them on a path of righteousness (Hays, 1996; Tennant, 1992). Chapman (2003, p. 85) airs the views of Frederick Truby King, the founder of the New Zealand Plunket society, on mothers and their need to be instructed in mothering:

His description of women as 'densely ignorant' of the duties of maternity helps explain his simplification of feeding schedules. King wanted a simple regime for baby feeding that could be taught by Plunket nurses and adhered to by nursing mothers.

A legacy of writings by child rearing experts such as Brazelton (1983, 1987) and Dr. Spock (1946) emphasise that mothers must be careful not to psychologically damage the child by impeding normal development through inadvertent acts of bad mothering (Hays, 1996). Good intentions and animal instinct were considered insufficient means to nurture children. Now, in 2014, ‘parenting’ courses are rife, administered to inexperienced, experienced, bad, abused and/or financially struggling mothers by experts represented within contemporary society as resources
of knowledge (Millei & Lee, 2007). Internet sites offer many of these courses. For example, “Love, Laughter, and Limits (2013) “teaches you practical ways to be a warm, positive, and happy parent” and the success of the programme is attributed to it being “based on extensive research.”

Many parenting and caregiving courses advertised on the internet place an emphasis on caring in the private sphere. Some are propped up by government funding and often offered alongside relationship counselling and budget advisory services as interventions for family violence, child neglect and poverty. Since 2004, the New Zealand Government has committed millions of dollars to the contractual delivery of parenting courses alongside policies of child protection, risk assessment and early intervention (Bennett, 2009, 2012).

In the context of global neoliberal economic policy, these courses operate in a contractual basis of decentralisation (Vandenbroeck, 2006), providing superficial answers to the contemporary hardships of western globalisation, such as the widening of the gap between rich and poor (Vandenbroeck, Roose & De Bie, 2011). Recently, the introduction of a Corporate-Government food-in-schools programme has seen much public ideological debate on the abilities and irresponsibility of the poor and the marginalised in providing for their children (Edwards, 2013). Across the Tasman, Australia’s semi-funded Smart Population Foundation Initiative is one of many globally distributed organisations that position children at risk and parents as responsible for gaining sufficient skill for ‘good’ or ‘smart’ parenting. The foundation expounds universal truths about parenting through fundamental rules that apply to all cultures (Millei & Lee, 2007). The mother’s role is seen as pivotal to the normative development of the child and within neo-liberal policies of individual responsibility, everyone has the same opportunities to succeed; the mother is
ultimately responsible for any hardships the child may be perceived as suffering (Vandenbroeck, 2006).

The mother as individual, increasingly shoulders a huge global responsibility. The correct development of the child is considered vital for the future of western civilisation in the guise of potential knowledge, human capital and adequate workforce (Millei & Lee, 2007). This development is deemed dependent on the performance of the mother, and the magnitude or intensity of the mothering asserted. The mother is a good mother, or a bad mother (Johnson & Swanson, 2006; Marshall, Godfrey & Renfrew, 2007).

Within normative development theory, a bad mother can be both smothering and overbearing or cause harmful health problems to her children through neglect: both can impede normative development. A good mother strikes a successful balance between the two outer margins of bad mothering (Soler, 2006). She requires the skills of a tightrope walker, to tiptoe perfectly down the middle of two extremes carefully abiding by what socially constitutes responsible caregiving practices, within conflicting discourses of good mothering. Within western society, what constitutes either a good and a bad mother is becoming more and more difficult to fathom within changing economic ideals. For example, scientific mothering research recognises the nutritional and developmental benefits of breastfeeding for the child (Winikoff & Laukaran, 1989), although breastfeeding in public is not socially encouraged (Mahon-Daley & Andrews, 2002); a difficult dilemma when feeding on demand is the preferred practice over rigid time schedules once advocated by experts such as Dr. Spock (1946). Debates on the correct way to mother, therefore are ongoing. One debate concerns the benefits and risks of parent-infant co-sleeping as a western practice, impacting on a mother’s responsibility to her family and
contemporary society as a whole (Keller & Goldberg, 2004; McKenna, Mosko, Richard, Drummond, Catel & Arpaia, 1994; Millei & Lee, 2007).

Mothers are no longer required to stay at home; indeed, they are encouraged to work, a trend pushed by global politics and economic policy (Dyson, 2004; McInnes, 2006). Contemporary economics has further complicated the boundaries that constitute a good mother. Although Western women’s participation in the workforce is an economic necessity for both domestic and global success (McInnes, 2006), the guilt of immersing the child within a professional day-care or caregiving system remains (Hays, 1996; Kahu & Morgan, 2007).

The discourses of working mothers have adapted to highlight the positive aspects of early separation so that when the mother pursues her own goals, she is available and stimulated to spend quality time with the child. This is more beneficial to her child than the quantity of time that the intensive, unfulfilled mother has available for mothering duties (Barnett, 2005; Bianchi, 2000; Galinsky, 2005; Johnson & Swanson, 2007). For the working mother, day care provides socialisation skills and early learning opportunities. Having the child in day-care also gives the working mother the freedom to develop her self-actualisation (Lupton & Schmied, 2002) and self-realisation (Bailey, 2000) in a space outside of motherhood where she has her own goals and an opportunity to achieve them. Working mothers therefore articulate the integration of motherhood and public life as beneficial to both mother and child.

The discourses of stay at home intensive mothers induce worries about the changing attitudes and contemporary economic pressures to go out to work. Intensive mothers struggle, like the working mother, with shifting motherhood ideologies of what makes a good mother and a bad mother (Hays, 1996). Staying
with her child for at least the first few years of its life is vital for the child’s normal
development. The more time the mother spends with her child, the better the quality
of the care the child receives. The stay at home mother articulates her role as
necessary for the child: it is better for the child to be with the mother than to be
amongst strangers at day-care (Barnett, 2005; Bianchi, 2000; Galinsky, 2005;
Johnson & Swanson, 2007; Kahu & Morgan, 2007). The early mother-child bond
becomes a necessary component of good mothering and healthy child development.
Self-actualisation is constituted as a selfish act of bad mothering and cannot compete
with the pleasures of selfless mothering (Bailey, 2000; Lupton & Schmied, 2002).

Now that the economy requires a dual-earning household, the intensive
mother increasingly feels pressured to join the workforce. To be socially acceptable,
the decision to home-mother requires the economic stability of a partner who earns
enough for all of them (Barnett, 2005). Economically speaking, ‘public concensus’
seemingly offers a rationale that stay at home solo mothers produce babies for
money as a lazy alternative to employment, draining limited economic resources that
could be allocated to those really in need of a ‘hand up’ as opposed to a ‘hand out’
(Key, 2008). On bowing to economic pressure and public consensus to enter the
workforce, the work predominantly available in the public domain for women is
casual, part-time, poorly paid and service related (Connolly & Gregory, 2008; Fine,
2007). Even an adequate or good wage becomes problematic with the limited hours
of work offered within the public domain (Barnett, 2005).

**Encountering resistance**

The journey that contemporary motherhood embarks upon from the private
domain to the public domain is disrupted by a boundary or divide that marks the
threshold between two economic discourses (Hays, 1996). The contemporary good
mother is indeed required to walk a confusing line between the extremes of a neglectful working mother and a smothering intensive mother, finding a perfect work-life balance. Work-life balancing acts embrace part-time, casual and contractual work as flexible working hours created for the good of the mother and the child. Hays (1996) describes the mother’s predicament as follows:

The wall between the public and private spheres, always inadequately maintained, now has many cracks...one would expect this fragile barrier to completely crumble and the ideology of intensive mothering to be crushed under its weight. (p. 153)

Figure 1. Hays’ wall.

The wall, as described by Hays is a dangerous place for the intensive mother, yet the journey across, or indeed, along it, for the working mother must also be precarious, with the prospects of falling into the murky depths of bad motherhood on both sides of the divide. The working mother, in an economic act of good mothering, strains the wall of public-private divide to breaking point and threatens to crush a
long-standing philosophical ideal, the moral good of being a full time mother, once considered the epitome of good mothering. Hays’ wall metaphor highlights a place of conflict, a busy place of confusion where what is constituted as good mothering constantly shifts and slides, creating continuous change between a supposedly natural universal responsibility to the child and what is required to achieve it. Hays’ metaphorical wall represents a site of contestation. It separates the private and public domains like a linguistic tectonic plate and its instability holds unexplained dangers for both intensive and working mothers. These dangers appear to be initiated at the point of or the surrounds of, ethical impasse as maternal care reluctantly goes public.

**Engendering ethical divisions**

The shifting ethical dilemmas of the public and private spatial boundaries are not specifically centred around contemporary questions of mothers’ work-life balance: they are ongoing and were most famously accentuated by Carol Gilligan (1977, 1982) through a critique of Lawrence Kohlberg’s (1981) work on the moral reasoning of children. Inspired by the work of Rawls on liberalism and justice and both Freud and Piaget’s theories on normative development, Kohlberg studied moral reasoning (Okin, 1989). He developed a range of stories, followed by questions, the answers divided into six hierarchical levels of response: the answer to each dilemma decided the participant’s stage of moral reasoning. Initially working with a cohort of 60 boys, Kohlberg concluded that there was a natural progression of reasoning stages, the highest of which was not necessarily attainable for everyone (Porter, 1972). Gilligan (1977, 1982), incensed by what she considered to be Kohlberg’s biased sampling and findings, implemented her own series of studies and critiques that included vignettes developed for Kohlberg’s scale.
Child participants Jake and Amy considered the following fictitious situation. Heinz has a sick wife who is dying from a specific kind of cancer and is in immediate need of medication. A druggist has developed the medicine and is outrageously overcharging for it. Heinz has managed to borrow half of the money, but the druggist will not take this as a payment, even though he would still be making a handsome profit (Kohlberg, 1981; Porter, 1972).

In accordance with Kohlberg’s (1981) questionnaire, Gilligan’s (1982) participants were asked if it would be morally acceptable for Heinz to steal the medicine to save his wife’s life. Jake suggested that it would be morally justifiable. His wife is irreplaceable and the chemist can recoup the money from other customers. Saving the life of his wife in this fashion requires a moral judgement above the law and such a judgement, for Kohlberg scores higher on his stages of moral reasoning. For Amy, the decision is far more complicated. She knows that Heinz’s wife will die without medicine, yet there must be other ways to procure it without stealing. Heinz must try to reason with the chemist and make him see sense before resorting to crime. Besides, what would happen to his wife if Heinz was sent to jail? Who would procure the medicine for the next time she needed it urgently? How would the incarceration of Hans affect his family and friends? Amy’s reluctance to reason above the law would score her lower on Kohlberg’s scale of moral reasoning.

Within a combination of methodological and theoretical uneasiness towards Kohlberg’s original findings, Gilligan (1982) disputed Kohlberg’s (1981, 1982) measurement of moral reasoning as andocentric. In other words, a masculine bias within experimental research methods and western cultural social norms were the reasons for the hierarchical positioning of masculine and feminine responses to
Kohlberg’s questionnaire. Although Gilligan agreed that there were differences in the moral reasoning of boys and girls as demonstrated by their differing answers, she argues that one form of reasoning was in no way superior or inferior to the other. For Gilligan, boy’s reason with a public morality of justice while girl’s reason with a private morality of care.

**Splitting morality: Justice and care**

The different psychoanalytic underpinnings to both Kohlberg and Gilligan’s work were possibly a catalyst to the reinterpretation of Kohlberg’s (1981) research. While Kohlberg relied on the androcentric reasoning of Freud and Piaget’s work (Gilligan, 1977, 1982), Gilligan was influenced by the theorising of Chodorow (1978) who was also uncomfortable with the masculine bias of mainstream psychoanalysis. Mainstream psychoanalysis insists that girls be alienated from their mothers as part of the process of normative development. According to Chodorow (1978, p.167) however:

Girls emerge with a stronger basis for experiencing another’s needs or feelings as one’s own (or of thinking that one is so experiencing another’s needs and feelings). Furthermore, girls do not define themselves in terms of the denial of pre-oedipal relational modes to the same extent as do boys. Therefore, regression to these modes tends not to feel as much a basic threat to their ego. From very early, then, because they are parented by a person of the same gender ... girls come to experience themselves as less differentiated than boys, as more continuous with and related to the external object-world and as differently oriented to their inner object-world as well.

Masculinity, according to Chodorow, develops through maternal separation and femininity through strong and continuous maternal ties. As relationship builders
and kin-keepers, girls are framed as different but equal, the woman centred on the care of others and the man, centred on justice, individualism and perhaps moral education.

Within Gilligan’s (1982) study, Amy’s reasoning around the dilemma of Heinz and his wife shows a response that strives to strengthen community networking and normative hetero-sexual relations through the relational questions that inform her response. Although Kohlberg’s (1981) work suggests that girls followed the same pathway as boys ‘badly’, the influence of Chodorow on Gilligan’s research allowed Gilligan to discover that there are different dialectic ethical pathways open for women and men.

Gilligan’s (1977, 1982) ‘discovery’ of private moral care-centre reasoning has not been without its adversaries. Kohlberg (1982) vigorously disputed the suggestion of androcentrism and two separate, gendered moralities, suggesting any anomalies of gender were due to ‘position’ and economic status. There have also been questions raised by Kerber (1986) over the rigour of Gilligan’s research, suggesting that the differences identified by Gilligan are due to socio-economic factors, such as educational opportunity that are somehow unrelated to gendered moral reasoning. Kerber also suggests Gilligan’s work can be framed as simplistic romanticism, with no real theoretical or historical substance. A criticism by Stack (1986) frames Gilligan’s research as firmly entrenched in middle class white heteronormativity and this is most definitely the case, even though originally driven by the inequities of masculinist research design. Gilligan (1986) herself notes that her critics are quick to point to similar research indicating that there is in fact no difference at all between the reasoning styles of men and women. Yet she suggests that these critiques must also concede there is every indication within society that
there is a difference. Women most definitely adhere and respond to sets of feminine
tasks and responsibilities that convey cultural expectations.

Kerber (1986) also articulates another criticism levelled at Gilligan. Although
Chodorow (1978), who underpins Gilligan’s work, advocates cultural expectations
as the catalyst for the formation of gender identity (in that mothers are culturally
responsible for childcare and girls stay aligned with the mother longer than boys do),
Gilligan has been charged with producing a theory of biological determinism. In
hindsight, this is not surprising: Gilligan is one of the early advocates of equitable
sexual difference, and such theories are continually dogged with charges of
biological determinism whether justified or not (Chanter, 2006). Indeed, Gilligan’s
somewhat ambiguous disclaimer (1982, p. 2) does little to clarify her stance:

No claims are made about the origins of differences described or their
distribution in the wider population, across cultures or through time. Clearly
these differences arise in a social context where factors of social status and
power combine with reproductive biology to shape the experience of males and
females and the relation of the sexes.

Yet despite these criticisms and the ambiguity of her defence, Gilligan’s
work has continued to be acknowledged as a foundational basis from which to
theorise feminist care ethics.

**How to care, ethically**

Nel Nodding (1984) reframes the underpinnings of Gilligan’s care by
situating care as an Aristotelian virtuous practice. Such a practice is possible only in
a good home within the private domain where it is administered by the long-
suffering stay at home mother. Thus, ethical care continues within the framework
criticised by Stack (1986) as a luxury of the white middle classes, endorsing neo-
liberal doctrines of individual responsibility. If you are poor, your child suffers, and it is ultimately your fault (Vandenbroeck, Roose & De Bie, 2011).

Despite these disturbing restrictions of economic class, culture and colour, Aristotelian virtue ethics continues a prominent role within discourses of care ethics and good mothering. McLaren (2001), who suggests that a feminist ethics of care would be better framed as a virtue ethics, is concerned that Gilligan’s (1982) ethics frames care as a uniquely feminine attribute even though women’s responsibility for care is a product of western cultural oppression. It becomes difficult for McLaren to imagine how a difference that is the product of oppression could enhance women. As an alternative, McLaren suggests that the Aristotelian ethical virtues of neatness and sensitivity to shame can be adopted to counteract the oppression of women that forms the basis of feminist care. Virtue ethics equates living a good and beautiful life to a public or social good and it appears that McLaren is tempering the private somewhat sullied caring attributes of women with the justice of man to not only add rigour, but also to escape the ever present criticisms of ‘gendered’ biological determinism. The integration of care with virtue ethics requires a movement of care ethics from the private domain of normative gendered development into the public domain of the social good in an attempt to blur, or in other words, reunite, the boundaries between the two.

Tessman (2001) suggests that living the good life in the Aristotelian sense is oppressive to the poor and the marginalised, framing them as morally damaged yet still individually accountable. Both McLaren (2001) and Nodding’s (1984) melding of care and virtue cripple and enable simultaneously, producing a form of care that tends to its own damage, yet again indicating a somewhat turbulent encounter close to the border of the public and private. As the history of debated feminist care ethics
implies, the main aim appears to be blurring this boundary between the public and private, (re)uniting care with justice however paradoxical and risky it might be. For instance, Kohlberg’s ethical hierarchical stages that frame women and their caring practices as inferior, refuses to acknowledge distinctions of public/private, justice/care yet the turn to Aristotelian virtue ethics in contemporary feminist ethics of care unwittingly advocates just that.

Gilligan (1977, 1982) has accentuated a much discussed and contested difference, centred on the shifting borders of the public and private that form the basis of care ethics. An ethics of care, however, paradoxically strives to eliminate difference by championing the equity of care and justice publically, the difference being a conscious alignment between the two. Yet within cultural and linguistic structures of androcentrism, the (re)amalgamation of the two can only mean that care again becomes subordinate to justice. Chodorow’s and Gilligan’s maternal care gets lost when a feminist ethical care joins the intensive and the working mother and totters precariously on Hays’ metaphoric wall, as it shifts its alignment to public, political and global concerns.

Caring publically

For Tronto (1993), ethical differences are born from the exclusion of women from positions of political power rather than the psychoanalytically underpinned formation of gendered identities. This important shift in the formation of care ethics is emphasised by Fisher and Tronto’s heavily quoted definition of both a feminist ethics of care and its practical applications in feminist care ethics writing:

On the most general level, we suggest that caring be viewed as a species activity that includes everything that we do to maintain our ‘world’ so that we can live as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, ourselves, and our
environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex life sustaining web. (Tronto, 1993, p. 103)

A politicised care, as suggested by Tronto (1993) frames care as a practice where a heightened awareness of another’s needs must also heighten an awareness of justice. Tronto has developed guidelines for ethical practice that comprises of four stages: attentiveness, responsibility, competence and responsiveness. These stages of awareness describe a process of identifying need and an ethical responsibility to act. Sevenhuijsen (1998, p. 137) endorses Tronto’s guidelines for implementing public policy to ensure equitable citizenship:

In order to understand the political dimensions of these values, it should be emphasised that they are not abstract norms that can be invoked when considering a particular situation; rather they should be seen as moral and cognitive attitudes or ‘epistemological’ virtues.

The political referred to by Tronto (1993) and Sevenhuijsen (1998) therefore appears steeped within philosophical ethics of encounter and morality, inclusive of a social ethics of virtue, the sort of virtue that has the potential, through prescriptive moral practice, to create the morally inept and the socially inferior while simultaneously setting up the means for their salvation. To care or not to care, who cares, who doesn’t care, who is in need of care, who fits into theoretical guidelines as deserving: these are philosophical questions of ethical moral practice that are noticeable within varied and various ethical codes that are adhered to by different sectors of health professionals. They are questions generated from a public notion of care, shifting further and further away from the private developmental origins identified by Gilligan (1977, 1982).

The triad in the context of Hollway’s (2006) work, is a contemporary development of Chodorow’s (1978) mother-daughter attachment theory, and sits well within the current trend for parental tuition, dual role caring duties and work-life balance, although it trivialises the emphasis on mother-child relations for stay at home mothers. For example, in a study by Kahu (2006), a participant struggled to name her relationship with her child, until the interviewer suggested that perhaps the word she was searching for was mothering.

Yet Hollway (2006) does make some distinctions between parent-child and mother-child relations from within the paradigm of object-relations theory. For Hollway, the mother-child connection develops the capacity to care and the ability to function normally within the public domain. This connection is also available to a caregiver although it is not as strong given the lack of the pre-birth mother-child connections. Long-suffering motherhood is a contributing factor to developing a caring capacity, achievable also through caring friendships. Although Hollway takes care public and parental within contemporary work-life balance discourse, she is
careful to insist on its feminine origins. Therefore, she fuses care and the embodied feminine with contemporary politics and its confusing ethical dilemmas, leaving us no better off in our pursuit of understanding it. We are still not sure what care is, let alone where it is, even though Tronto (1993) supplies a broad set of guidelines to detect its need and administer it when necessary.

Since care’s entrance into contemporary public discourse, a feminist ethics of care has been discussed as a solution to ethical dilemmas of child-care (Cockburn, 2005) disability (Morris, 2001) business (Borgerson, 2007; Burton & Dunn, 1996; Simola, 2003), nursing (Condon, 1992), economics (Sevenhuijsen, 1998, 2002, 2003; Smith, 2005), geography (Popke, 2006) and globalisation (Held, 1998, 2008; Tronto, 2003, 2006, 2008). This widespread acceptance appears unconditional of theoretical racist, masculinist and classist skeletons in the metaphorical closet and a disturbing conundrum as to what care signifies remains a puzzling mystery.

**Care’s meanings?**

Establishing what constitutes care and how we produce it is a difficult if not impossible task. Gilligan’s (1982) and Hollway’s (2006) care is underpinned by maternal care, yet this care is disengaged when taken up as a political and a public issue. Care also becomes confused with questions of philosophical encounter when discussed within the bounds of virtue ethics, long-suffering motherhood and caregiving.

Within traditional research, taking care of another person manifests as a list of physical activities such as washing, toileting, transporting, shopping, gardening and administrating with no complicating consideration of companionship and psychological support (Gubrium, 1995; James, 1992). This has prompted Gubrium
(1995) to suggest that some understanding of the diversity of care and the multiple discourses that represent it is necessary to ensure its delivery.

Both Forbat (2005) and Stalker (2003) agree that care is a relatively recent word from which many derivatives are developing. These include formal and informal care, carers and carees, service providers and service users as well as ‘inadequate’ care that is representative of ‘abusive’ care. The term ‘care’ first appeared in research in the late 1970s (Bytheway & Johnson, 1998), not long before Gilligan’s (1982) groundbreaking discovery of gendered differences in moral reasoning. ‘Care’ did not appear formally in dictionaries until 1984 (Forbat, 2005) and its appearance and subsequent expansion of meaning coincides with the resurgence of a western global knowledge based economy, the mother’s work-home dilemma and the advent of carers’ associations.

Carers’ associations have developed to support those caring for family at home by providing them with peer groups and government funding (Barnes, 2006). Indeed, the first carers’ association established in Britain in 1981, evolved in conjunction with one of the first working definitions of care. In the context of this definition, carers are described as “Anyone who is leading a restricted life because of the need to look after a person who is mentally or physically handicapped or ill, or impaired by old age” (Stalker, 2003, p. 17), noticeably excluding mothers of dependent children. The description places the carer as ‘burdened’ and according to Stalker there is a vast body of early care research that investigates caring in this light, generated by feminist concern for the burdens and hardship caring imposed on unpaid and unsupported familial caregivers. Therefore, from the early 1980s to the present day, mainstream research has investigated the mysteriously constituted care and the effects, either good or bad that its administration might have on the carer.
This research covers caregiver burden (Essex & Hong, 2005), caregiver strain (Bernard & Guarnaccia, 2003), caregiver stresslessness (Pinquant & Sorenson, 2005), caregiver aggression (Shaffer, Dooley & Williamson, 2007), caregiver distress (Gallagher-Thompson & Coon, 2007), caregiver attachment (Cicerelli, 1995), caregiver’s decision-making (Cicerelli, 2006), caregiver’s personality traits (Hollis-Sawyer, 2003) and caregiving skill (Schumacher, Stewart, Archbold, Dodd & Dibble, 2000). Yet there has been little emphasis on how care affects both the cared for and the relationship between them and the carer (Bowlby, 2011).

Meanwhile, the production of definitions of both care and caregivers continues. A common definition of caring, according to Walker, Pratt and Eddy (1995, p. 402), requires “one or more family members [to] give aid or assistance to other family members beyond that required of normal everyday life.” Yet according to Walker and Pratt (1991), this exposes the difficulty of separating friendship, companionship and acts of aid. A family friend, shopping for a family member, may be doing so out of friendship, not because the friend cannot do his or her own shopping. This conflation of friendship and caring confuses the Schofield et al. (1998, pp. 3-4) definition of caregivers as “people who are under obligation to care because of their close kinship or emotional bond with the care recipient.” Within this description, caregiving requires burden and obligation beyond ordinary acts of friendship.

According to Ross (2005, p. 181), the United Kingdom legally defines the caregiver as “an individual who provides or intends to provide a substantive amount of care on a regular basis for another person.” Care goes beyond obligation and burden by becoming definable through quantity and stability over time. This legal definition also provides another new aspect to care: care by intention. If an
individual signals intent to care, or perhaps even intention to act in a way that has been ambiguously defined as caring, then inadequate care or no care can be ‘supplied’ although the one with intent remains the caregiver. Interesting new forms of potentially substandard care are noted in research by Brechin, Barton and Stein (2003, p. 165) in the form of “difficulties in care relationships”, “care that might give cause for concern” and “suboptimal care.”

To complicate matters even further, contemporary economic practice now also demands that definitions of caregivers are compatible with the needs of measurement and statistical analysis (OECD, 2011). This is because clear definitions are necessary in a global economy that is obsessed with counting and assessing care practiced in the private domain. According to Fine (2007, p. 30) a carer publically defined as such in the private domain is not paid and is not a neighbour, friend or teacher. Carers are not “mothers, fathers, step-parents, foster-parents and custodians of children who are not disabled or suffering a long term health condition...” nor are they “grandparents providing care for grandchildren and people with disabilities caring for their own or other children...”

Attempts to define care in Fine’s (2007) analysis can only end in frustration and dispute. Fine (2007, p. 31) posits care as a “social phenomenon that is constituted and reconstituted by our actions, so that its meaning cannot be held still to study.” Such a definition suggests that we should be cautious of statistical findings generated by official definitions of care through primary indicators. For example, according to Stalker (2003) statistics reveal that there are increasing numbers of male carers: therefore, the gap in numbers between the men and women carers is decreasing. Care is no longer a feminine ethical attribute as once discovered by Gilligan (1982). Yet considering the ambiguous nature of care and the rigid
perspectives of the economic indicators used to measure caring practice, it would be difficult to take Stalker’s revelation seriously without considering what constitutes care within the context of its definition and measurement.

**Incalculable care**

If care measured through statistical analysis, struggles to reflect the multiplicity of definitions that produce measurable indicators, then it becomes even more difficult to locate a care inaccurately reflected or left out of definitions. The care that we have with us today is a subjective matter with no concrete substance that changes, as Fine (2007) suggests, with each situation. This is not altogether surprising when we recall that care is a relatively new phenomenon, slipping almost unnoticed into our vocabulary in the 1970s. Yet in a matter of a few decades, commodified public care sits comfortably in formal language, discourses of social justice, moral development and western legislation as if it were a fixed entity that has always been there. Although Fine (2007) and others hint at the anomalies of care’s meaning and it’s inadequacies as a signifier, it is difficult to lament the loss of adequate signification for that which once was linguistically non-existent and is now present, even though we are unsure of its content as a construct and disagree on its origins.

A problem with care’s linguistic arrival as a new public phenomenon is that it no longer sits compatibly with mainstream theories of development, such as the work of Object Relations Theory followers like Hollway (2006), who link caring practice to human development and mother-child relations. The incompatibility is evident in O’Conner’s (2007) study of the differences in positioning of daughters and caregivers caring for their mothers/patients. She found that when daughters identify themselves as caregivers and their mothers as patients, they are more likely
to make paternalistic decisions, defying their mother’s wishes and opting for what they deem as ‘best for the patient,’ than the daughters who identify themselves as daughters.

Barnes (2006) also acknowledges a subtle shift in signification that she feels is a necessity for caregiver recognition and support within the public community. For Barnes, this shift from mother-daughter to patient-caregiver is a small sacrifice made for eligibility to the public funding and support that will make women’s caring duties more palatable, or in other words, increase recognition of financial inequity and reduce the much researched ‘caregiver burdens’. Once, according to Barnes (2006), familial nursing was a natural private duty for women: a duty not deemed as care, but as ‘just something women did’. In other words, for the acknowledgement, support and funding of caregivers in the public domain, care must be publically recognisable, even if this is detrimental to mother-daughter relations. The care that Barnes (2006) and O’Conner (2007) locate appears as a floating or empty signifier, cut adrift from its silent maternal origins, its meaning entirely dependent on the context of its visibility and usage within the public domain.

**Commodifying care**

A shift into the public domain sees care becoming an increasing force within a western global economy. Relentless pushing to have private care recognised, funded and take its place as an equitable public construct equal to justice, is attributable in some part to the work of campaigners like Barnes (2006), Sevenhuijsen (1998) and Tronto (1993). Yet a bid for an equitable care within the public domain generates a barrage of indicators and complicated statistical gathering by the OECD within the workings of globalised knowledge based economies (KBE). A KBE works towards the production, distribution and the implementation of
knowledge, a progression from the growth of the technological age and the increasing usage of modern technologies. As described by the OECD (1996, p. 9): “Knowledge, as embodied in human beings and in technology, has always been central to economic development. But only over the last few years has its relative importance been recognised, just as that importance is growing.” A KBE monitors the environmental, economic and social factors within an economy that works towards resource sustainability (OECD, 1996, 1999, 2000). Care is just one such resource, reduced to a series of indicators that are continually modified and increased.

Although a KBE is not to be confused with a knowledge economy (KE), again there is some ambiguity in relation to precise definition. A KE represents a methodology that shifts in relation to the project it underpins. In principle, a KE encourages an educated workforce and measures the impact of knowledge within the economy. It is concerned with resources or the location of knowledge within the human workforce (Ministry of Labour, 2009) and identifies knowledge occupations and knowledge workers (Drucker, 1999) of which the health industry has a high proportion. According to Drucker (1999), the crucial question for knowledge workers is “What is the task?” and it is up to the knowledge workers, being experts, to decide the response. An example provided by Drucker (1999) explores how nurses, as knowledge workers, can make better use of their knowledge and provide a quality service for their patients. Two of the tasks identified as reducing the quality of care provided by nurses are ‘responding to patients’ emergency bells’ and ‘taking phone calls from relatives’. Such tasks reduce the knowledge bearer’s time to perform other tasks, especially when less qualified or less knowing staff members who require a lesser wage can complete them.
There are some disturbing similarities between Tronto’s (1993) guidelines for a feminist ethics of care and the requirements of a knowledge worker in the care industry. The health professional remains *attentive* and is required to identify need through the knowledge retained as a professional. They have a *responsibility* to act on this need if it falls in the jurisdiction of the productivity of ‘quality’ care. For a nurse as an applied knowledge worker, a patient who rings a bell is not in the immediate need of the level of expertise that she/he sustains. Nor is the nurse required to relay her knowledgeable opinion to distressed relatives: their distress is not an immediate concern and interferes with the delivery of ‘good’ care. There is no doubt that the knowledge worker must be *competent* enough to perform the identified specific task or to relay her expertise to others. *Responsiveness*, as in a feminist ethics of care, relies solely on the knowledge workers expert identification or the specificity of such a need. Knowledge as an applied resource within both a KE and a feminist ethics of care requires a response to those in need with the best quality of intervention for the patient. Herein lays the problem. Both a feminist ethics of care and care in an economic model appear to have lost sight or are unsure of what care is, unaware of the subtle changes in caring relationships brought about by shifting signification and contemporary focus on expertise. Such shifts not only change relationships but also the identification of who requires care, whatever care may be.

Meanwhile, an OECD driven KBE/KE relentlessly collects statistics that increasingly put pressure on the wall/boundary that separates the public and the private domains. Satellite accounts provide a way to monitor unpaid care within the private domain and turn it into economic worth. In simple terms, a satellite account is a specialised national account that does not affect the Gross National Product. It provides a standalone way to monitor, measure and accrue intangible wealth such as
household chores, private care and caregiving (Landefeld & McCulla, 2000). Dyson’s (2004) *Action Plan for Women* contains strategies to smooth women’s transition from intensive mother to working mother, simultaneously collecting data on the private caring activities of women. To monitor output, private care becomes a set of indicators and variables to measure women’s productivity in the forms of care and caregiving. Within the private domain, women morph mothers, wives and friends into unpaid caregivers, informally caring for spouses, siblings, other family members, friends and neighbours identified as qualifying for care. The OECD (2011, p. 10) explains the distinction between unpaid work (that includes private care) and leisure activities:

> Unpaid work is the production of goods and services by family members that are not sold on the market... The boundary between unpaid work and leisure is determined by the ‘third-person criterion’. If a person could be paid to do the activity, it is considered to be work.

This definition does little to solve the problem of deciding whether taking an elderly relative shopping is familial leisure or work. This clearly depends on whether money could have changed hands in the process.

We might say that this private care gone public is potentially a triumph for women who have campaigned for the blurring of boundaries between the public and private, such as Barnes (2006), Sevenhuijsen (1998) and Tronto (1993), as a means towards equality and recognition for doing what was once invisible. Although economics has not recognised informal care as an unwaged activity in the past, satellite accounts invent a way to insert the worth of private care into a public accounting system to bolster the books.
Yet satellite accounts cannot signify or measure pre-commodified maternal care, if there is indeed such a construct. Arguably, if it cannot be measured, it cannot exist. Nor can creative accounting accurately capture what care is or take into consideration the confusing ethical underpinnings and the political motives for politicising ‘care’, that generate a pool of transferable knowledge administered by expert (usually medical) knowledge workers and indeed, a spiralling business in caring courses administered by experts, even if somewhat suspect and non-directional.

**How to trade ethically**

By dividing ethics and securing masculine and feminine ethics within public and private domains, Gilligan’s (1982) ethics of care has framed these domains as sites of ethical spatial relations, paving the way for research on where care happens and how a particular space affects caring relationships. A feminist ethics of care that takes care from the private domain and integrates it into the public domain turns to a discussion about the shifting or a contestation of boundaries, revealing one of the biggest potential displacements of people ever. Amid the public birth of care, such misplacement initiates the disappearance of mother-daughter relationships from the private domain, sending them into the public domain as androgynous contributors to a knowledge-based community.

It is difficult to imagine that such a mass displacement of people can be considered as providing ethical outcomes, given that ethics is traditionally interpreted as “the philosophical study of morality” (Taylor, 1972b, p. 3). Within the medical/caring professions, this morality strives to work towards the greater good of humanity, providing care for those deemed in need. Yet need goes hand in hand with the new care that, although initially designed by feminist care advocates to give
recognition to women in the public domain, has only added to their invisibility as they risk returning to Kohlberg’s single pathway of hierarchical sameness and becoming embroiled in the complexities of philosophical care ethics.

**Rationalisation**

According to McIlwraith and Madden (2010, pp. 658-659), care “ethics is not simply the study of the ‘right’ conduct.” In other words, care ethics cannot ascribe to a particular set of universal ethical rules of conduct that fit every occasion. Ethics then, “is the study of rational processes for determining the course of action in the face of conflicting choices.” Yet ethics, like care appears to be difficult to define. Kerridge, Lowe and McPhee (2005, pp. 6-7) argue:

...ethics has no substantive form, has no single method, and is not the domain of any one discipline or individual. Rather, ethics is best characterised as a space, a region of turbulence (rather than conflict), where the space is defined by what is at stake – values, relationships, behaviour and human flourishing. This space contains many of the things that people care about, but about which not everyone can agree...this means that ethics must ultimately be about discourse, communication, social relationships and politics.

Kerridge et al. (2005) situate ethics as geographical and spatial. Public ethics are turbulent not conflicting: yet spaces require borders and borders are places of ambiguous confusion and sometimes conflict. According to Gilligan (1982) and confirmed by Hays’ (1996) description of the wall between the public and private, different ethical stances *are* conflicting. This conflict and ‘turbulence’ is also noticeable as mother and daughter relations change when reframed from private familial relationships into public medical discourses; discourses underpinned by a raft of interpretations of both traditional rational theoretical considerations and non-
rational ethical approaches. These considerations are shifting, like ideologies of good mothering, adapting to a technological age that is creating many new ethical dilemmas and economic restraints.

For example, an eclectic array of ‘conflicting’ ways to solve medical dilemmas underpins medical doctors’ practice (Williams, 2009). Although medical doctors were once bound to the Hippocratic Oath, the emphasis has more recently changed to an ethical set of guidelines ascribed to the declaration of the Geneva Convention. There is now a wide range of ethical strategies available to the practicing physician who finds him or herself at the coalface of ethical decision-making. These strategies promote medicine’s core values of respect for human life, dignity and difference along with compassion, competence and autonomy (Williams, 2009). The historically paternalistic physician has evolved into one who is more accountable to patients, colleagues and accountants.

Technology is producing scientific avenues that lead to the prospects for an ethical greater good, promoting and prolonging life. Yet technological advancement brings greater risk and increases the ethical dilemmas involved in responsible decision-making (Williams, 2009). Decisions take family, friends, communities and society into consideration: the greater good of the individual patient no longer solely influences decision-making. Managers and bureaucrats also influence medical decisions, introducing utilitarian risk management and ethical strategies of business. Economic strategies that implement tight budgets surrounding health care spending, introduce another ethical dilemma in the form of resource allocation. Members of the medical profession find that their responsibilities no longer lie within the orbit of individual patient wellbeing, but the greater good of the global community and what is reputed to be a growing international interdependence. According to Williams
(2009, p. 13), “The basis of globalisation is the recognition that individuals and societies are increasingly interdependent.” The medical profession therefore has an ethical responsibility to mete out scarce resources wisely, making judgements as to who deserves the benefits of limited supplies. It is interesting to think of this responsibility within a KE that frames doctors as resources who monitor their own distribution.

The medical profession has a wide range of sanctioned ethical tools at their disposal to make these difficult decisions. Non-rational approaches available to practicing doctors consist of obedience in the form of following institutional rules and governing laws as well as exercising decision-making based on moral judgement or intuition. Systematic repetitive decision-making is also sanctioned along with imitation, or in other words, following or relying on past or present judgements of respected colleagues (Williams, 2009). Interestingly a KE encourages non-rational ethical decision-making by fostering mentoring and volunteerism (Murphy & Enscher, 2006; OECD, 1999) as well as a sharing of knowledge as unequivocal expertise.

The majority of non-rational ethical approaches are strictly prohibited within the nursing profession (Singer, 1979). According to Singer, ethics is not professional etiquette, opinion, gut feeling, intuition or religion. Nor, surprisingly, does it have anything to do with morality, apparently another non-rational strategy. Staunton and Chiarella (2008) see Singer’s interpretation of health care ethics now regaining popularity amongst health care authors. Rational approaches to decision-making employed within the health care sector have traditional philosophical underpinnings. These approaches sit broadly with categories of deontological, consequentialism (utilitarianism, teleological), principilism and once again, virtue ethics.
A deontological approach to care ethics involves decision-making based on universal principles of a greater good. This is a Kantian approach to ethics where universal ethical principles remain unchanged whatever the circumstances (Cornman & Lehrer, 1974; Taylor, 1972a). For example, the ethical nature of the deed does not change according to context. Causing the death of another human in the context of war is as unethical as murder. Such an ethical stance may appear to surface immediately in questions surrounding euthanasia and abortion answered in Moses’ delivery of the tenet; thou shalt not kill, as translated in the King James Version of the Old Testament. Yet while this version explicitly states that killing is universally morally wrong, representing a law with no exceptions, there are differences in translations between versions and religious denominations. *Thou shalt not kill* is also translated as *you shall not murder*, shifting the emphasis from a universal taboo and introducing a different set of utilitarian ‘turbulent’ dilemmas. These manifest within consequential questions as to the context in which killing becomes murder. For instance, when is the ethical right to refuse to kill legitimate outside the paradigm of conscientious objection (Finkelman, 2005)?

Consequentialism therefore, as is deducible by name, bases its ethical decision-making on the consequences of the actions involved. The right action is that which produces the best outcome. This strategy falls within the utilitarian ethics of Bentham and Mills (Taylor, 1972a; Williams, 2009) aspiring to the greatest good with the least consequence. The emphasis in this form of ethics is the outcome and not any individual casualties that may be the product of a bid for greater good. Consequentialism therefore allows for the sacrifice of the individual for the good of the community (Williams, 2009), and by necessity, is an increasingly called upon ethical strategy amidst a contemporary dilemma around the allocation of limited
resources (Staunton & Chiarella, 2008; Williams, 2009). For Kerridge et al. (2005, pp. 13-14):

Consequentialism at least attempts to develop a rational process of moral reasoning that enables the resolution of moral conflict, although in the end it probably does not succeed. Finally, consequentialism attributes moral worth to specific situations or contexts in a manner that has immediate intuitive and clinical appeal, even for those who profess the central importance of rules.

Such a critique demonstrates the necessary inclusion of non-rational ethics that appear to be necessary in order to operate within the bounds of utilitarianism constituted by contemporary care. Contemporary ethics debates struggle with traditional theories of rational thinking and their application in ethical decision-making, yet acknowledge the necessity to persevere with their inclusion.

Similar to the growing number of care and health indicators generated by the OECD (OECD, 2011; Rannan-Eliya & Lorenzoni, 2010), the health professions also rely on an increasing collection of principles to guide ethical decision-making. Autonomy offers the right to self-determination or the paramount right of the individual. This contrasts with the ethical principles beneficence and non-maleficence that come in a utilitarian set of two. The former means to do good and the latter means to do no harm, a utilitarian measurement of the greatest good at the smallest cost (Garrett, Baille & Garrett, 1993). Justice concerns itself with fairness and equal distribution, which again comes under utilitarian pressure within a contemporary restriction of resources. Justice, as a principle, also sits uneasily as a paternalistic guiding hand for care in the context of Gilligan’s (1982) thesis that justice and care are equitable but different. A contemporary difficulty therefore surfaces for principlism in conjunction with Gilligan’s equitable difference. Justice,
as a deontological rule, in that it is available universally for everyone, is disrupted by utilitarianism and principlism. This shaky moral foundation serves as a mentor and guardian of a contemporary care ethics. Staunton and Chiarella (2008) suggests principlism as a preferred ethical framework to promote good nursing practice. Confidentiality, privacy and veracity are important in this model. Although principlism applies set ethical considerations, other theoretical evaluations make for good practice. The autonomy-based model of principlism advocates the best outcome for the patient but also employs a utilitarian assessment of risks, values and the effects on other stakeholders.

Principlism also underpins the American Psychological Association (APA) application of ethics (American Psychological Association, 2010). Unlike other caring professional associations, the APA does not appear to acknowledge the philosophical roots of the principles it advocates as good psychological practice, distancing ethical practices from their sources. There are several main ethical principles that guide the professional psychologist. Again, utilitarian based beneficence and non-maleficence feature prominently. The principals of fidelity and responsibility remind the psychologist of the importance of establishing appropriate and responsible relationships with clients. Integrity appears to consist of the ethical virtue of honesty, steadfastly monitored by deontological rules such as you must not cheat, steal, lie, commit subterfuge or intentionally misinterpret the facts. The psychologist should be aware of and guard against potential biases, incompetence and injustice. Respecting the rights and dignity of others is also an ethical requirement. Again, under the masculine principal of autonomy and justice, refusal or limited access to psychological services is unethical. Yet again, referral policies and cost must jeopardise the application of this principle, considering that the
psychologist does not work in isolation from a utilitarian medical system (American Psychological Association, 2010).

While principlism applies to ethical decision-making about suitable treatment, virtue ethics, according to Williams (2009) applies to the attributes of the carer. Yet virtues ascribed as necessary for a medical professional are honesty, compassion, prudence, dedication; virtues that not only inform but also enhance the practice of good decision-making. This Aristotelian derived ethical practice, as earlier discussed in the context of Gilligan’s (1982) work, exacts ethical excellence from enjoyable activity within a social context. A resurgence of virtue ethics as a guide to good care creates further problems. According to Godlovich (2000), there is disagreement over the requirements and benefits of ethical virtue in the caring professions: is it required to produce good care? Within APA ethical guidelines, virtues emphasised for good practice are integrity, fidelity, responsibility and most importantly, competence (Falender & Schafranske, 2007). Yet Kitchener (2000, pp. 154-155) is doubtful of the benefits of virtue ethics concerning ethical practice, suggesting that:

[it] may be easier to require psychologists to be competent than it is to define what competence means, competence is sometimes easier to identify in its absence than it is to specify what a proficient level of practical or scientific expertises involves.

Thus caring professions and as such, caring as defined within the public domain, follow eclectic, conflicting foundations of philosophical theory blended with the current requirements and economic policies of globalisation. Care ethics serve as a guideline to perform a function that in itself appears to be relatively recently named and ambiguously defined.
Feminist care ethics, like contemporary professional caring ethics also originates from a hybrid of rationalist thinking that inspired Kohlberg’s research on moral reasoning. The ethical ponderings of Ross (1972) advocated for prima facie decision-making stemming from levels of moral maturity or one’s deepest moral conviction. John Rawls aligned this moral maturity with a moral form of justice, combining Kantian universalism with a sliding scale of utilitarian decision-making (Taylor, 1972a) within contexts of economic liberalism (Berkowitz, 2006; Henry, 2001; Litowitz, 2005; Musschenga, 2009; Okin, 1989). Within public ethical care discourse, hierarchical levels of decision-making capabilities continue despite the legacy of Gilligan’s (1977, 1982) egalitarian work and feminist ethics of care. Justice still paternalistically oversees care’s rationalities, principles and distribution, explaining in some part why conflicting ethical stances work so comfortably together. Gilligan’s (1982) thesis of an equitable morality of justice and care, may have uncovered an equitable difference, but that difference continues in the spirit of Kohlberg’s original androcentric findings. Deontological matters of universal greater good are still men’s business and serve as a watchdog to temper the inferior processes of utilitarian/non-rational care.

Gilligan (1977, 1982) however, did temporarily rescue care from the clutches of utilitarianism by reframing it within maternal connections, even if this was short lived. Philosophy has snatched it back through the work of Tronto (1993) and her predecessors in the name of public equality. Despite the tireless work to make care a recognisable, equal and stable entity in the public domain, the underlying masculinist inequities of justice and care have remained intact. Care as an individual good, as community based, as economy, as philosophy, as feminine, remains at loggerheads with maternal care and theories of human development. This impasse heralds a
struggle between equality and equity: equality stands for the right of equal citizenship and public recognition, and equity as a fair right to sexual difference.

**Equality and equity as terms of trade**

There is a great deal of debate surrounding the differences between achieving equality and/or recognising equity in relation to women’s status within western cultural ideology (Stone, 2007; Young, 2003). Women’s equality with men is an apolitical economic aspiration, where women can gain equal status with men by joining the public workforce, doing equal work for equal pay, having equal job and promotional opportunities as well as being free from any gender related discriminations while participating within the public domain (Stone, 2007). Similarly, equality can be discussed within the terms of work-life balance, where men and women may share in public and private work. Equality for women is possible by walking Kohlberg’s moral path for men and righting implicit gender inequalities positioning women as morally inferior. In other words, it is possible to gain equality with men and perhaps reach the aspired to heights of moral depth and ethical justice. Yet Stone (2007) reminds us that there are discrepancies we cannot account for through liberal economic and philosophical ideology: rape, domestic violence and the marketing of women as sex objects.

Equity, therefore, does not equate to equality or sameness: women and men can be equitable without economic and discursive resemblance. For example, equity allows for a journey along Gilligan’s (1982) and Chodorow’s (1978) separate paths of development for girls and boys, with equitably different outcomes (Stone, 2007). Men and women are not necessarily the same so they should not have to aspire to be so to attain equal public status, to work towards public ideals of justice and self-actualisation derived from dubious rational experimental modes of inquiry. Theories
of equitable difference allow us to study the different discursive options that establish women’s social positioning, such as good and bad mothering discourse, work-life balance options and public and private divides.

Theories of equitable difference also highlight that gaining access to the public domain does not necessarily equate to equity: there are other factors creating the subordinate positioning of women in western culture, that lie at the heart of western ideology rather than specifically within economic practices. Theories of equality, according to Chanter (1998) serve to ignore discrepancies in men’s and women’s rights. Chanter joins an ongoing debate around Marxist theories of economic discrimination, such as the gendered division of labour, and psychoanalytic theories of western cultural phallocentrism imposed through the ‘normal’ developmental trajectories of gender.

In the early 1980s, while Gilligan was conducting her research on gendered moral reasoning and care was making its way into formal language, Hartman (1981) initiated a thought provoking discussion that claimed economic inequality and gender discrimination were unrelated problems. Young (1981) was adamant that Hartman was mistaken. For her, the two issues were impossible to separate. Although the debate continues, most feminists would agree that there is oppressive discrimination within the private domain as well as grounds for optimism that a self-determined equality is possible within the public domain. Yet there is a difficulty in articulating both the equality and the equity debate simultaneously: somehow, equality and difference represent two different stances rarely considered as compatible with each other.

For example, for Soler (2006), feminist aspirations of equality and equity belong at opposite poles. Feminism, according to Soler, oscillates between these
poles in a system of equilibrium that is, in contemporary times, erring toward the extreme of equality. Soler (2006, p. 158) observes that: “Although this movement [toward equality] has not yet accomplished its goals completely, its effects are becoming more general, and its triumphs seem irreversible to me.” Indeed Soler appears to be voicing a significant shift in contemporary feminist thought. For her, a shifting workforce and optimism for feminist equality gained by public participation, has led to the demise of the nuclear family. From a traditional psychoanalytic viewpoint, this movement disrupts the production of care and indeed heterosexual models of femininity, that involve women doing particular types of jobs and wearing gender specific clothing.

There is a shifting within women’s writing (Halpern, 2004, 2005; Hollway, 2006) that suggests the gender inequity debate is fast becoming redundant: the contemporary movement of women and care into the public domain confirms this. The birth of public ‘care’ that reconstitutes mothers and daughters as caregivers and parents also suggests that the economics of unpaid work and childcare are no longer solely a woman’s concern they are family or parental issues (Halpern, 2004, 2005). The disappearance of the mother into the ‘parent’ signals economic equality: it is impossible to talk of equity however, when language discards mothers by conflating them with fathers.

This suggests to me that Soler’s (2006) observations have merit; theories of equality and sexual difference are incompatible with each other within public discourse. Gilligan’s (1982) equitable difference disappears under economic weight of justice in the guise of public care, parental equality and sameness. Care, now detached from the maternal, offers an equality that excludes theories of sexual difference, or in other words, the mother as mother. Within discourses of
care/equality, both work-life balance and feminist ethics reveal that not only is the mother disappearing under a mass of commodified care packages and discourses of public self-actualisation, but simultaneously, mother and daughter caring bonds are becoming increasingly difficult to articulate.

Feminist theorists of difference have considered alternative positions from which to address mother-daughter relations. For instance, Irigaray (1985a) and Cixious & Clement (1986), have adopted strategies of mimesis and developed critiques of Freud and Lacan from a place positioned outside of masculine theory. Like Gilligan (1977, 1982), they too have been charged with producing theories of essentialism and biological determination (Schor, 1994; Stone, 2007; Whitford, 1994).

**Where is care?**

So although Gilligan (1982) importantly introduced ‘difference’ into debates of care through the theoretical work of Chodorow (1978), its subsequent transformation into the public domain as grounds for care ethics has seen both care and the equitable difference it highlights commodified, quantified, emptied, diversified and assimilated. This has taken place amidst an expanding knowledge economy and conglomeration of conflicting, philosophically derived moral practices. Within this commodification, the language of a specific feminine care, derived from prolonged attachment of the mother to her child is lost within discourses of work-life, caregiver, patient and parenting skills, taught by experts. This suggests to me that although language increasingly errs towards excluding the mother as a basis for normative development, the mother, strangely absent/present, still shoulders the burden of risk/responsibility for development deemed vital for global economic success.
The disappearance of the mother from contemporary discourses of development and her exclusion from mainstream feminine care ethics prompts me to consider psychoanalytic theory. The daughter’s quest is an hysterical one in the context of its setting. A daughter cares for her mother, develops symptoms of neurosis and psychosis through the stress of her experiences, a classic case study for psychoanalysis and an avenue for hysterical enquiry. The daughter asks; how has the mother become so difficult to articulate within contemporary mainstream care discourse? Hence, her question shifts and her search begins within the boundaries her positioning inscribes. Having exhausted the realms of contemporary care in her search for the mother, the daughter also asks, where can I look for my encounter now that the care I am looking for appears unattainable within contemporary care discourses?

To enable the continuation of the daughter’s search, I now explore the terrain, or the scope of inquiry that she has available to her within the context of her theoretical constraints as caregiving daughter, experiences, her questions and her quest. Returning to psychoanalytic theory is a return to her genealogical connections to the birth of psychoanalysis and a fitting framework from which to initiate an investigation into the absence of her mother as a response to hysterical enquiry.
Chapter Two: Up against the wall of language

[Metaphor is] situated at the precise point at which meaning is produced by non-meaning. (Lacan, 2006a, p. 423)

What I, Lacan, following the traces of Freudian excavation, am telling you is that the subject as such is uncertain because he is divided by the effects of language. Through the effects of speech, the subject always realizes himself more in the Other, but he is already pursuing there more than half of himself. He will simply find his desire even more divided, pulverised, in the circumscribable metonymy of speech. (Lacan, 1981 p. 188)

Here we are then, up against the wall – up against the wall of language. (Lacan, 1953/2006, p. 260)

Now that the movement of care from unarticulated assumption of maternal responsibility in the private sphere to public commodity in a global economic market has been traced in Chapter One, it is clearer that mother-daughter bonds are difficult to locate within contemporary care discourses that treat care as moral and political without connection to motherhood in familial relations. Care then becomes a tricky concept changing with context, all the while challenging feminist ideals of equality and equity. Care somehow equates to burden and ethical and/or moral responsibility, depending on speaking positions, such as whether it is performed by caregiver or daughter (Barnes, 2006; O’Conner, 2007), parent, mother or health professional. It is awash with an eclectic ethical mixture of the contradictions that underpin it.

Driven by the gaps in language discovered as the daughter searches for care in the public domain, this chapter seeks to set up the terrain that the daughter will travel as she continues her search for her lost encounter. Freudian psychoanalysis provides uncanny familiarity for the daughter and explicit pathways to both theories
of maternal subjectivity and ways within which contemporary discourse speaks of mother and daughter. Lacan’s return to Freud transforms this terrain into a search of language structure, enabling pathways that explore how her encounter may be articulated. I set out therefore to describe the scope of the daughter’s inquiry as she continues her journey and the pathways enabled and constricted by Lacanian psychoanalysis.

**Mapping the contours of the scope of inquiry**

The Freudian unconscious is primary. It exists before consciousness and is not an extension of conscious being. In other words, humanity as fleshy, sensual, breathing organisms of pure perception ‘exists’ before conscious awareness. Lacan (1953/2006) notes that Freud’s perception of the unconscious is philosophical in that psychoanalysis asks philosophical questions of becoming in relation to an encounter with a primary Other before consciousness.

Freud’s unconscious constructs itself in stages through a subtle and elaborate sorting of memory, initiated by pure perception or *wahrenehmung*. In letter 52 to Wilhelm Fliess in 1896, Freud names three levels of unconscious/pre-conscious structures, *wahrnehmungszeichen*, *unbewusstein*, and *vorbewusstsein* with a qualifier that these are only the ones he has identified, that he is certain there is more. Freud suggests that the unconscious structure is more complex and has more layers than he has yet discovered (Freud & Fliess, 1985).

Out of the registers that he does identify, *wahrnehmungszeichen*, is the most primary. Freud (Freud & Fliess, 1985) describes this first level as the primary or unconscious registering of perception. I understand this as the place where the very first imprint, mark or recognition of/by neurones takes place, a primary process of the beginnings of a connection to consciousness. These imprints are psychic marks,
traces etched in fleeting moments of encounter. Yet *wahrnehmungszeichen* remains blocked from consciousness. Once perceived, these marks are stored in the next unconscious register *unbewusstein* where again, they are completely inaccessible and (un)memorable (Freud & Fliess, 1985). The psychic and the flesh are inextricably connected at this stage within an embodied set of traces.

*Vorbewusstsein* is a pre-conscious register that initiates the first connections with language. Not all traces make the journey to the pre-conscious and only those that do manifest as unconscious linguistic non-meaning. Perceptions that do not make it to consciousness become detached from their neurones and decompose. The body’s most primary psychic traces therefore remain in the unconscious. If traces do make it to the pre-conscious and eventually emerge within consciousness as speech, they do so within a disconnected context. In other words, they lose their original non-meaning within the context of their embodied origins.

For Freud, a mechanism or metaphoric boundary drawn between the conscious and the unconscious creates difficulties in translating the psychic into language. This difficulty results in the repression of pre-memory or pre-consciousness that in turn manifests as psychic pathology, such as neurosis, paranoia, hysteria and homosexuality. Freudian psychoanalysis premises that if language represses embodied memory, then memory can be accessed through speech. If this is the case, are the disordered ramblings of the pre-conscious linked back to, or reactivated traces of, difficult transitions through the oedipal crisis? Do they speak of lost embodied perceptions of maternal care, relived through traumatic events? (Freud & Fliess, 1985). In other words, are traces of prenatal and/post natal pre-language mother-child encounter implicitly embedded within language
structure? How might commodified, public care discourse inscribe or displace traces of mother-child relations implicitly embedded within language structure?

**Building pathways**

Suggesting that Freud’s philosophical unconscious and pre-conscious structures of ‘becoming subject’ are linguistically based, Lacan (1964/2006, 1997b, 2007) reads Freud’s perceptions of pre-memories’ or difficult psychic transitions from the unconscious to pre-consciousness as a theory of discourse. It is Lacan’s thesis that Freud’s writings are misunderstood (Lacan, 1997b), that although Freud’s own cathexis is noticeable within his work, as are western cultural gender mores, his work is ground-breaking in regard to the role language plays in the developmental psyche and indeed the formation of the western subject. For Lacan, Freud’s famous Oedipus complex does not play out within a predetermined biological developmental schema, as mainstream interpretations of Freud’s work suppose, but as an initiation of the speaking being (Lacan, 1997b). In other words, Freud’s developmental pathway for both boys and girls is pre-empted by discourse, as is the biological determinism born from the misunderstandings of Freud’s work (Lacan, 1988, 2006a). From this perspective, Chodorow (1978) and Gilligan’s (1977, 1982) different but equitable pathways for the moral development of boys and girls, are not biologically, economically or even socially determined, but a product of phallic language, a grammatical phallocentric system of signification into which Freud’s psychic traces merge and are inscribed with meaning. For Lacan, this grammatical system plays out within Symbolic and Imaginary registers, two of three extra layers of pre-conscious and conscious structures, the Symbolic, Imaginary and Real.
Adding texture: Symbolic, Imaginary and Real

Lacan (1999, 2006a, 2007) argues that language is phallocentric, hence the phallus symbolises and generates the master’s discourse. The Symbolic as the register of speaking consists of chains of signifiers, the conveyors of knowledge derived or generated from, the master signifier. Meaning, as suggested by Freud (Freud & Fliess, 1985) in letter 52, awaits utterance through a signifier and is prestructured, strings of grammatically structured metaphor, unrelated words, knotted together into recognisable sequences. In other words, the signifier dictates what is signified. For example, if a child cries, the reality of the Symbolic requires the cry to be meaningful and duly allocates it meaning (Fink, 1995; Lacan, 1960/2006). The cry becomes meaningful in a particular way; the child is hungry, frightened or happy, and the mother may be inscribed as long-suffering, good, bad, or responsible in relation to her response to the cry.

Truth therefore is inscribed somewhere within the child’s body, unlocatable psychic traces, within a disconnected Real or primary unconscious that is unrelated to the reality created by the Symbolic. The Real then, becomes a layer or associate of Freud’s wahrnehmungszeichen, where perceptions and their traces fail to progress past the barrier between the unconscious and the pre-conscious. Transcending through the barrier and into language requires disconnection or splitting by the Symbolic, the splitting of the subject from the Real and from embodied traces; hence the unconscious becomes his primary Other. The Imaginary represents the signified, objects identified within the symbolic structure, metonym, words or diachrony strung together by metaphor and, groups of words ready to be ascribed meaning through grammar and syntax (Lacan, 1997b).
Diachrony and the Imaginary are not constrained by time or the synchronic ordering of events. This makes a conversation about sequence of layers problematic because we must describe this non-relationship within the context of Symbolic historical reasoning. With these constraints ascribed, we can say that the unconscious or Real is primary, but we cannot say that within a process of pre-conscious structuring as guided by Freud’s structural analysis, the Imaginary is primary to the Symbolic or that metonym precedes metaphor. Metaphor consists of metonym, made up of an unconnected group of signifiers of displaced meaning. According to Lacan, metonym is an outlet for the realms of pre-consciousness desire for the mother and therefore a different layer within language structure (Lacan, 1997a, 1997b).

For Lacan (1997a, 1997b), metonymy exists as pockets of disconnected meaning driven by the unconscious or in other words, the more accessible of Freud’s (Freud & Fliess, 1985) neuronal memory traces, strung together in metaphor to make meaning. The structure of language itself and not its content, allows for a chain like reaction of signification that derives from the master signifier. Lacan’s connection of memory and speech is, like Freud’s, a tenuous one. It is the structure of language itself that conveys meaning; meaning that is always destined for misinterpretation (Lacan, 1997a, 1997b).

The Imaginary, underpinned by desire, or the pre-conscious embodied traces of the mother, derives from the splitting of the subject upon entrance into the Symbolic. The speaking being initiates the scopic drive or the gaze, a linguistically driven visual reality that drives a western visual metaphysics (Lacan, 1981) and subsequently, experimental science. Desire as Imaginary is inscribed within metonym (Lacan), much like Freud’s theories of Freudian slips, jokes and dreams; linguistically present yet absent. The Real, remains as the unattainable truth, the
‘impossible’ at the level of pure perception, a form of truth devoid of desire that exists before thought and reason (Lacan, 1981).

"Here we are then, up against the wall"

The subject splits, within the context of Lacan’s return to Freud and the Oedipus complex in an encounter with language. Lacan (1988, 1953/2006) employs a wall metaphor to describe Freud’s pre-conscious barrier. Indeed, the wall metaphor is familiar to us, as Hays (1996) employs it within discourses of work-life balance and public and private splitting as an indication of pockets of linguistic conflict. The ‘wall of language’ that Lacan refers to comes into being within a dawning of thought, where perception and sound meet and language structure takes over the business of interpretation. The wall ‘metaphor’ enables the philosophical musings of becoming subject, of being, through a process of linguistic severing as described through Freud’s letter to Fliess and Lacan’s return to Freud in the context of metaphorical castration or submission to loss. The subject enters into a consciousness that is far removed and cut off from the perceptual realm of the Real.

As Lacan (1981) situates metaphor within the realm of the Symbolic, the wall metaphor of which he speaks becomes part of our constructed reality. According to Lacan, time itself comes to exist through signification; therefore both the Symbolic and its reality-creating metaphor is synchronic, a place that Lacan translates Freudian condensation as condensed metonymic meaning making where the signifier is unable to ‘grasp’ or identify the shifting (un)relatedness of the signified (Lacan, 2006a). For example, Hays’ (1996) wall metaphor makes little sense in the context it is employed if examined more closely. Why would there be a dilapidated wall built through the middle of care discourse, imposing spatial boundaries on men and women and threatening bodily harm through imminent collapse. However, it makes sense if we
think of ‘it’ as spatial linguistic condensation, where a struggle of being takes place, 
within a contestation of western gender issues. Therefore, metaphor as a place of 
metonymic condensation highlights a difficulty in translation where a superimposed 
structure of signifiers stamps its authority on the signified, in a process that interprets 
as meaningful. Even Lacanian theory, that accommodates a wall of language, can 
only be thought within the bounds of pre-structured discourse generated from the 
master signifier.

The signifier and the signified, or $\frac{S}{s}$

The problematic of meaning making is emphasised here, at the wall, where a 
split within discourse takes place. All signifiers are generated from the master 
signifier, a chain of knowledge or signification. The signified must remain 
positioned as subordinate to the signifier and exist within an Imaginary, born from 
the repression of desire (Lacan, 1999). As such, explaining a theory of discourse that 
initiates an embodied split through theoretical contemplation of non-communication 
is nigh on impossible. Lacan (1999, 2007), troubled by the generative problematic 
invoked by speaking or writing, devised symbolic formulae of his theoretical 
musings. Thom (1981) notes that these depictions were heavily influenced by the 
work of Ferdinand de Saussure (1974), a pioneer in the study of the dynamic 
qualities of language that he originally named Semiology (de Saussure, 1974; 
Gasparov 2013).

De Saussure (1974) pioneered ideas of language as metonymic and 
metaphoric, suggesting a loosening or shifting connectedness between the two. He 
also recognised the linearity of the signifying chain as the structural (metaphorical) 
component of language. As Lacan (2006a, p. 415) explains, “...no signification can 
be sustained except by reference to another signification.” In the event of speech
disorders and the breakdown of the linear chain of spoken language, metonym and metaphor appear as two tiers of language. Drawing on the work of de Saussure, Jakobson found that depending on the type of aphasic disorder, the sufferer would speak a language organised around either a metaphoric or a metonymic pole (Sangster, 1982; Thom, 1981).

Yet although de Saussure suggested meanings shift, as in a sliding of the signified under the signifier, he did not envisage reality as subordinate to language. Thom (1981, p. 11) explains that in de Saussure’s original formula, the “acoustic image” or signifier is depicted as subordinate to the “concept” or the signified.

\[
\frac{\text{concept}}{\text{acoustic image}} = \frac{\text{signified}}{\text{signifier}} = \frac{s}{s}
\]

**Figure 2.** The author’s reproduction of de Saussure’s original formula (Thom, 1981, p. 11).

Lacan, through his reinterpretation of Freudian psychoanalysis, de Saussure’s Semiology and Jakobson’s writings, reversed this dominance and represented the signified as a subordinate manifestation of discourse (Lacan, 2006a; Thom, 1981). Metonym, as represented within metaphor, in the context of Freudian theory becomes a place of condensation and pre-conscious desire.
To accentuate his reinterpretation, Lacan (2006a, p. 417) tells the following story. A train pulls into a station: two children, who are brother and sister, occupy a compartment in a carriage and are seated opposite to each other, both with a view of the platform and station buildings. “‘Look’, says the boy, ‘we’re at Ladies’. ‘Imbecile!’ replies the sister, ‘Don’t you see we are at Gentlemen’.” Lacan suggests:

To these children, Gentlemen and Ladies will henceforth be two homelands toward which each will take flight on divergent wings, and regarding which it will be all the more impossible for them to reach an agreement since, being in fact the same homeland, neither can give ground surpassing the one’s unsurpassed excellence without detracting from the other’s glory. (Lacan, 2006a, p. 417)

The signification of the child’s perceptions generates multiple pathways of misunderstanding: not only is their perception of locatedness misguided, but also their perceptions of difference and differentiation, a gendered world where communication is possible.

Within the context of the linguistic dominance of the signifier over the concept and condensation and impotence imposed through repression of desire by a pre-scripted phallic Symbolic, Lacan (1997a, 2007) devised linguistic equations to depict (im)possible speaking positions within the Symbolic realm. To acknowledge
the link between signifiers as generated from the master signifier, Lacan labelled the
S of the signified as S₁ and created S₂ to recognise symbolically, the chain of
signification. One signifier generates another signifier, which in turn signifies yet
another signifier. Language produces knowledge devoid of the concept.

**Four available pathways for speaking**

Through the adaptation of de Saussure and Jacobson’s linguistics (Thom, 1981) Hegelian philosophy of master-slave encounter, Marxist economic theory of
surplus and production and a return to Freud, to name but a few, Lacan developed a
shifting equation of phallic discourse, demonstrating how each speaking position
generates chains of signifiers differently, incompatibly and empty (Lacan, 1999,
2006a, 2007). Four discourses, those of the master, hysteric, university and analyst
are available within the Symbolic and arguably the Imaginary realms, revolving
around fixed positions. Lacan (1999) reminds us that the four discourses that he
distinguishes from discourses of the academy, philosophy, and psychoanalysis are
psychoanalytic discourses. He suggests that movement from one discourse to the
other offers some emergence of the analyst discourse. The fixed positions shown
below in figure 4 are ‘agency’ that subordinates or represses ‘truth’ and the ‘Other’

\[
\begin{array}{c|c}
agency & Other \\
\hline
truth & production \\
\end{array}
\]

*Figure 4.* The four set positions around which Lacan's equations revolve in quarter
turns.

In Seminar XVII, Lacan (2007) suggests alternative terms for the structured
positions that better accommodates the discourse of both the master and the hysteric.
These fixed positions locate speakers and produce discourse differently. For example, the desire attached to each ‘agency’ produces knowledge differently. The daughter, speaking from the position of the master, desires to be desired. When she speaks from the position of the hysteric, she desires desire itself and seeks it in the Other. Within the context of this thesis, the academic daughter desires to know the nature, the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of desire. The daughter analyst listens to know the truth. There is an impossible relation between agency and Other that impacts through the different linguistic realms as shown below in figure 6, the discourse equations represented as impotence and impossibility (Lacan, 1999). These are forever present and change in the context of speaking positions and the generation of signifiers.

The paradox of impotence or impossibility takes place on submission to the name of the father or phallocentric language, the chain of signifiers that initiate from the phallus (Scilicet, 1968/1982). The desire that drives the chain of production is repressed, therefore remains in the Imaginary or in other words, metonymy. The four discourses entangle the subject within a regulated desire for the Other/mother that in turn is the catalyst for production. For Lacan (1999, 2007), the four discourses enact a connection between knowledge and desire. Metonym underscores metaphor suggesting that desire underscores and drives the production of knowledge (Lacan, 1997a, 1997b). The Symbolic production of knowledge is represented within Lacan’s discourse of the master (Lacan, 1999, 2007).

The concept of the master derives from Lacan’s (1988) interpretation of Hegel’s (1977) master-slave dialectic, or in other words, the delusion of mastery.
within the confines of discourse and its functions of desire. The master has no power over the slave within contemporary discourse; nor is he ever satisfied with what he has. He requires the slave’s knowledge to maintain his mastery (Lacan, 1988). Therefore, the slave produces the master’s knowledge, through his subordination. Lacan (1988, p. 72) explains: “The mastery is entirely on the slave’s side, because he elaborates his mastery against the master.” Both the master and the slave want what the other has in what Lacan calls a “reciprocal alienation.”

Think of how little effect the elaborated discourse will have on those who are busy with jazz at the corner café. And how much the masters will be aching to go join them. While conversely the others will consider themselves wretches, nobodies, and will think – how happy the master is in enjoying being the master? – whereas of course he will be completely frustrated. (Lacan, 1988, p. 72)

For Lacan (1988, 2007) the slave is metaphorically S2, or alternatively, the subjugated jouissance/production. This is the slave’s loss, what he has given up to live because the slave has choices: he has a choice of death over slavery: he chooses slavery.

Recognition of failure, for Lacan (1988) is the limit of the Hegelian (1977) phenomenology of spirit. Freud takes us past Hegel, past humanism and immerses us into realities crafted entirely by discourse. The Marxist interpretation of Hegelian theory emphasises the slave’s continuing toil, through his limited choice. However, once we push past the limits of Hegelian theory, choice is no longer an appropriate term. Within French language, the term agent is not necessarily applied to a person who chooses to act, but someone who is caused to act (Lacan, 2007). Inevitable failure and conditional agency reflect an impossible relation between agency and Other/work as shown in figures 5 and 6, there is an impossible relation between the
master represented by $S_1$ and slave/work, represented by $S_2$ within the master’s discourse (Lacan, 1999). The loss/jouissance/production/excess of the slave/Other is repressed, as is the truth of the agent/master. For Lacan, “The subject finds himself, along with all the illusions this comprises, bound to the master signifier, where knowledge brings his insertion into jouissance” (Lacan, 2007, p. 92).

Within the discourse of the master, the split subject represents the incongruence between the primordial pre-language many faceted subject and the social linguistic whole entity. The Other, as Imaginary, is synonymous with the function of speech, yet contrary to language structure. For Lacan, (1953/2006) the Other is separated from the subject “by the wall of language” (p.244). The Other is a voiceless yet implicitly spoken product of perception, assembled/repressed through incompatibility, into the one/other through language, a spoken human development schema as identified within the myth of Oedipus (Lacan, 1988).

![Figure 6. Lacan's four discourses (Lacan, 1999, p. 16).](image)

Within Lacan’s (1999) revolving four discourse equations, the master, as signifier, is represented by the symbol $S_1$. The revolving symbols that make up Lacan’s (1999) four discourse equations are the primary signifier and Symbolic.
generator of knowledge (in the context of ‘reality’), the chain of signifiers that are initiated or produced by the master signifier (S$_2$); the split subject (S); and surplus jouissance (a) or that which is lost or excluded (Lacan, 1999, 2007; Verhaeghe, 1999).

When we relate the discourses to care, each agency or speaking position asks different questions that emerge from chapter one, and because we have recognised this difference, we can suppose that the analyst discourse may have perhaps emerged somehow through the changing of speaking positions of the hysterical daughter, the caregiver and the academic. Therefore, although Chapter One fits together as a linear trajectory of inquiry into the paradoxes and conflicts of care, ethics and equity, through considering the four psychoanalytic discourses, we are now seeing this as an illusion of language structure and Symbolic chronology. For example, questions that ask what and where care is, generate from different speaking positions that are incompatible with each Other. We are able to generate these questions within a literature critique, but making sense of them together generates a knowledge that is a disconnected particular truth within the context of the speaking position. For example, both working and intensive mothers generate discourses of work and life that produce knowledge about the benefits for the child’s welfare and mother-child relations differently and sometimes oppositionally.

In relation to the construction of this work, it has taken considerable time and thought, as it should, to present the contents of the thesis and the questions themselves in a linear fashion, to make sense of the contents and pull through the theoretical threads. Lacanian theory however suggests that we may well have been closer to the truth before attaching signifier to signifier atop a sea of yet to be signified in an obsessive effort to create ‘meaning’. Indeed, we may not have been
pulling through the threads, but generating the connections as we went along. The importance of listening to different voices from different speaking positions separately and studying the gaps within a paradigm of hysterical enquiry therefore becomes recognisable and inevitable. The four discourses produce an interesting alternative for dissecting the production of care and manifestations of (un)care discourse as well as the ensuing strings of knowledge they have provided.

**Speaking care as...**

![Figure 7. Four speaking positions as they rotate to the position of agency.](image)

As shown in figure 7, a stylised version of Lacan’s fixed terms displays four speaking positions of care. The backdrop divides into four sections to emphasise the four fixed positions. The top two quarters are labelled *agency* and *Other*, the bottom two, *truth* and *production*. There is a darker line running horizontally between *agency* and *truth* as well as *Other* and *production* in Lacan’s Symbolisation adapted from de Saussure’s fractional depiction of the shifting nature of discourse. This is
because each pair of terms (left and right), as in de Saussure’s original representation of discourse, depict a relationship in themselves $\frac{S}{\sigma}$, agency (S) prevailing over ‘truth’ (s) and the Other (S) prevailing over production (s).

In front of the backdrop of fixed positions, there are four symbols, $S_1$, $S_2$, $a$ and S, that rotate from a non-existent central pivotal spot or hole, in what Lacan describes as regression and progression from the master discourse (Lacan, 1999, 2007). Each symbol is depicted in the order of the discourse of the master and assigned a daughter/agent to accentuate shifting speaking positions. The symbols rotate in quarter turns only, so that on each turn a different daughter/Other and corresponding symbol sits over the fixed section agency. The positions rotate within the equations shown in Figure 6. Each daughter/body manifests within the context of the position from which they are speaking and these positions can change rapidly.

...the master

For Lacan (2007), the master’s discourse presents the least complicated relationship between the master signifier and the generation of knowledge. Within the context of care, caregivers, doctors, health professionals, those involved in caring, experts, that will be speaking in the discourse of the Master would be amongst the bodies/agents at the time of submission to the discourse, or speech. As depicted in Figure 7, the agent is the caregiving daughter who cares for her mother, within public homeostatic discourses of moral responsibility and medical discourses of expertise and moral behaviours. When $S_1$ shifts to the fixed section labelled agency, the body speaks as caregiver.

So now, caregiver becomes the primary signifier, from which a chain of signifiers as knowledge emerges. As shown in O’Conner’s (2007) work, the caregiver speaks from a position of authority, although this authority is an illusion of
discourse. As contemporary expert, the caregiving daughter, in discourse, shifts the relationship with the mother to a publicly recognised position of agency (S₁) through knowledge production. Barnes (2006) suggests that the production of caregiving knowledge or caregiver-patient rapport provides an avenue for agency, recognition and funding. From the speaking position of master, mother and daughter speaking positions are repressed. The relationship between caregiver and mother becomes disengaged within discourses of agent caregiver, generates client/patient/Other. Mother is generated from a different chain of signification, a different caring chain, albeit a master’s discourse. Interestingly, an increased generation of familial caregiving research on mother-daughter care in the 1980s was heavily underpinned by psychoanalytic discourses of ambivalence, responsibility and conflict in an effort to receive public recognition of strenuous yet unpaid private care. The knowledge generated and signified as ‘caregiving’ agent produces public discourses of care, patient, burden, responsibility, expertise and paternalism.

Both O’Conner (2007) and Barnes (2006) suggest that the ‘caregiving’ daughter distances herself from the mother and is more likely to make decisions that defy her mother’s wishes, within the context of what is medically authorised as best for the patient. Signifiers such as care, care training, patient, funding, mask any Real perception, embodied traces and encounter. In effect, the signifiers themselves become the signified and the truth or what is unable to be signified, is repressed or shifts within the context of de Saussure’s original observations of metonym and metaphor. The discourse of the master highlights the problems associated with speaking relationships as vehicles for public recognition and funding. There are no winners or transformations, just a phallocentric cyclical generation of the same impotent positions, repression and subjugation.
...the university

Tronto (1993), Gilligan (1997, 1982), and other academic contributors are positioned within the label S₂. Within the context of this thesis, the academic daughter occupies this position. The academic, therefore submits within the production of phallic discourse as generating theory as well as accurately portraying the relationship between theory and reality; and providing tight and substantiated critique, argument and fact. Within the discourse of the University, the academic asks her questions “What is care?” and perhaps even, “how might we negotiate care and improve its implementation?” She generates knowledge, signifiers, and definitions and shares her expertise and skills of logical and critical thinking. The lost object a is depicted within the quarter of the Other, reminding us of the impossible conversation between care that is research driven and care that is lost within the generation of empty signification. Positioned as the agent, the academic daughter generates university discourses that cyclically inform and initiate from the discourse of the master. Within this discourse, the split subject is metonymically subordinate S₂, repressed by the production of knowledge. For example, Kohlberg (1981, 1982) generates discourses of justice, morality and ethics: yet these can also be interpreted as discourses of discrimination and essentialism, a production of phallocentrism.

...the analyst

A shadowy figure/agent a, represents the discourse of the analyst in Figure 7. The figure is illustrated as a daughter, however there is no indication so far, that the daughter has a speaking position. The analyst position is occupied by whoever the daughter may be within the discourse of the analyst. As agent, she listens to the other three speaking positions. Yet to remain the daughter and analyst, she does not speak
within the context of analysis. The analyst’s position is therefore a tricky one and an oxymoron within phallic discourse. The analyst agent is not exactly a speaking position unless we think of it as a defiance of the other three speaking positions, or a position that manifests within the quarter turns.

The analyst within the context of the analysand, is required to stop speaking and thinking through dominant pathways, to observe the truth. Within the discourses of care, the analyst-daughter has no voice. Yet through her enforced silence, she is offered a glimpse beyond the phallic discourses of care and beyond desire itself. Within phallic discourse, the analyst sits closest to the truth, an ethical position. The analyst knows that care is lost and irretrievable. The shadowy daughter may well ‘hear’ what the hysteric cannot find, by refusing to participate in the process at all, yet if she thinks or speaks of it, all will be lost, within the shadowy reaches of Freud’s unconscious, at least here, in a thesis written within a University. The discourse of the analyst is Lacan’s (1997a) pathway to an ethics of psychoanalysis, or ethical encounter within psychoanalytic practice.

... the hysteric

In the context of this thesis, as shown in Figure 7, the barred subject represents the hysterical daughter/agent, seeking, or attempting to locate, a lost encounter with her mother. The daughter from this position asks ‘where is care?’, given that the mother-daughter care she seeks does not appear to be present within contemporary care discourse. Her encounter is lost, repressed within the discourse of caregiver. As barred subject, she seeks/senses ‘something’ that is missing, although she is not, at this stage, entirely sure what this is, given that whatever it is, it does not explicitly figure in the chain of generated signifiers. Lacan (1999) suggests therefore, that she seeks desire itself within the master’s words. The hysterical daughter is
underpinned by loss and excess jouissance. She seeks the truth within the words of the master that dominate the flow of university discourse through which she tirelessly sifts.

**Care and the master**

In contemporary times, the discourse of the master as the generator of university discourse increasingly becomes a discourse of capitalism (Lacan, 2007) in light of economic theory that posits knowledge as human capital. Within a global knowledge based economy, where the discourse of the master is increasingly spoken within the university, ‘care’ is aligned with the knowledge generator and bearer. For example, the nurses participating in Drucker’s (1999) research represent the intention to produce good and economically efficient care: research defines what care is. Within the discourse of the master efficient caring is generated as not answering the patient’s bells: the expert nurse is freed from relational care to provide medical care. The position of the (M)other/patient is lost within a miscommunication of knowledge that renders the truth/pre-signified care as the lost object or care as lost. Mastery therefore, is underpinned by the impotence of miscommunication initiated through becoming, as a speaking being (Lacan, 1999).

Within Lacan’s equations, public caring, as the discourse of the master, still wields Rawls (1958/1972) and Kohlberg’s (1981, 1982) morality of justice within a pre-structured language that inscribes reality grammatically, metaphorically. That the majority of nursing staff are women is an inscribed effect of language: within Lacan’s thesis, they enact the designated responsibilities of care, orienting themselves, like the children on the train, journeying to ‘Ladies’ or ‘Gentlemen’.

In the same way, inefficiencies of contemporary care, loss, excess and jouissance are reproduced within chains of empty signifiers cyclically inscribing
linguistic pathways within the discourse of the master. The discourse of the master
speaks a masculine language produced unknowingly so therefore unconsciously by
everyone, regardless of how the speakers themselves are subjugated through the
discursive production of gender by phallic discourse. Lacan’s (1999) discourse of the
hysteric allows the daughter to ask where pre-signified care as truth has disappeared
to, to make way for care that is phallically produced as truth. Inevitably, yet
dishearteningly, for the hysterical daughter, the four discourses, with the exception
of the analyst position do not provide any discursive avenues for the location of her
lost object. The hysterico has the licence to seek and the analyst, to listen. For the
hysteric, the analyst agent’s silence reverberates loss, cast adrift at the wall of
language. The shadowy figure listens for what is yet to be remembered within the
gaps created by discursive change, paving the way for the hysteric’s quest, to
remember an encounter with her mother as something other than caregiver-patient.
Within discourse, care cannot exist before articulation, as it has not yet become, but
it may yet ‘exist’ beyond the Symbolic and Imaginary as primordial pure perception
somewhere in Freud’s reachable pre-conscious or perhaps in even greater abundance
as primary perceptual traces in the darker unfathomable reaches of his unconscious,
or the Real. The hysterical daughter remains hopeful of this because Gilligan (1982)
once briefly glimpsed and attempted to write a pre-signified care as an equitable
feminine difference, before it was subjected to inevitable dialectical disintegration.
Interlude: The Borromean Knot

Playing on the metaphor of the signifying chain, Lacan (1999) introduced the concept of the Borromean Knot to psychoanalysis. The knot consists of a chain of three rings that all interact with each other. Not one of the rings is more prominent than the others in any way (Fink, 1995). If one ring is bent or distorted then it affects the others. Yet if one ring is severed, it frees the other two, demonstrating that not one of these rings is dependent on the other for its form: nor are they all interconnected. There is some sort of paradoxical symbiosis here. We can think of these rings as the symbolic chain that incorporates the three realms: Real, Imaginary and Symbolic (Fink, 1995) and indeed the three realms of Freud’s unconscious structure, wahrnehmungszeichen, unbewusstein, and vorbewusstsein. As such, the knot includes the discourses of the daughter Others and the realms of metaphor and knowledge; metonym, repression, production, jouissance and loss. The chain holds together synchrony, (time, space, history, past, future); diachrony, (repressed linguistic pathways that do not adhere to the orderly Symbolic chain). Even the chaos of the Real’s anachrony is included within the ‘now’ of primordial pure perception, as primary but beyond what we are able to articulate.
There is nothing beyond discourse

Within the depths of Freud’s unconscious, there is a feeling of primary pure perception that cannot be represented synchronically. It is easier then, to think of a baby’s development into ‘being human’ as a place where we might access a glimpse of pre-language (un)consciousness, for lack of better words. For the hysterical daughter, this is the place where a pre-care mother-daughter encounter may be located. Lacan’s return to Freudian developmental theory explains the development of the child from a splintered being of primordial perception to a subject unified by language structure. His theorising of the four discourses reveals speaking positions and the self-perpetuating production of signifiers. His interpretation of Freud’s developmental theory gives us an insight into the splintered world of the child before he/she is unified by language.

Freud’s (1977) development theory has been labelled sexist, ‘costly’ and a product of its time (Westerlund, 1986), therefore Lacan’s turn to Freud as a vehicle
to explain the working of phallocentric discourses makes discrimination, in some part, inevitable. Freud’s unconscious structure asexually processes perception that inscribes through the Oedipus complex as a metaphor for becoming as a speaking being. Once consciousness is attained through speech, there is a different pathway spoken for the development of boys and girls.

Freud (1977) suggests that babies are born bisexual, though not asexual, in that although their path of development is determined through cultural interpretation or signification of biology, sexual difference does not become apparent to the child until it is old enough to recognise the anatomical anomalies between males and females. Therefore, for the child, there are no biologically determined gender traits, these come about when pure perception is tempered with comparison to others. The subsequent affirmation of gender roles follow a ‘normal’ path that results as a later problematic, especially it seems, for women. Gender affirmation is reflected in Lacan’s interpretation of Freudian theory in the observation of phallocentrism as the inevitable catalyst of language production. Accordingly, phallocentrism is not something that requires correction or transformation.

Before the child’s anatomical discovery, he/she progresses through a number of autoerotic stages, initially gaining pleasure from sucking and ingesting. This development progresses to a stage of production, passing faeces, gifting and expelling and then enters a phase where the child gains pleasure from masturbation. Given the child at this stage perceives no difference between boys and girls, this pleasure for the girl is clitoral and not vaginal: the little girl perceives her clitoris as a penis (Freud, 1977).

There comes a stage in development, when both the boy and the girl child become aware of their differences in anatomy; that they are different from each other
as well as the boy being different from the mother and the girl being different from the father. The boy realises that he has a penis but his mother and his sisters do not, and he becomes acutely aware of a possibility that he may lose his also. Within Freudian theory, the child’s super-ego (usually) develops through contact with the mother as primary caregiver. Given that the child has not been aware of the mother’s lack, to this point the child has assumed the mother is complete. When the boy child discovers his mother’s lack, he shifts this alliance to the father, amidst a turbulent relationship that results in metaphorical castration. This confused relationship develops because the boy child becomes his father’s rival for the affections/possession of the mother, something he is now forever banned from enjoying, hence his own loss (Freud, 1977). Freud (1977) names this trauma after a mythical Greek character, Oedipus, brought to life in many tragic plays, the most quoted in psychoanalytic writings being three plays written by Sophocles, early BC, the overarching tragedy of which is echoed in famous plays, such as Shakespeare’s, Hamlet (Lacan, 1977). Oedipus unknowingly murders his father and marries his mother, fulfilling a long standing prophesy that he will do so. It is not the fulfilment of prophesy that culminates in tragedy, it is the discovery after the fact. This for Freud emphasised the cultural abhorrence against an underlying primal desire, an unconscious desire for the mother seemingly initiated by the death of the father.

The girl child must also reject her mother when she discovers both her own and her mother’s lack. She aligns with her father in an effort to regain what she has lost and when she realises that this is impossible, her desire manifests as an unconscious wish to give birth to her father’s baby. Rejected on both counts, the girl returns to her mother who schools her to submit passively to her loss and skills her
on the necessary attributes of adult femininity and normative heterosexuality (Freud, 1977).

Freud (1960) addresses the underlying desire to commit incest for the boy within *Totem and Taboo*, where he recounts a tale of the primordial gorilla father who possesses conjugal rights for all the women in the horde. This means that he has many bachelor sons, rivals for their mother’s affections, who are frightened to challenge the father’s absolute authority. The father is murdered and his sons, instead of fighting for individual absolute authority and the role as primordial father, come to an agreement that they will share the women and take care not to select their own mother as a mate. Their agreement establishes the dead primordial father as the symbolic totem around which western civilisation has evolved, along with a cultural prohibition on mother/son incest. This story emphasises Freud’s (1960) discussion on primitive rituals and societies as a basis for the structure of modern civilisation. In effect, it describes the dawn of civilisation, or an awakening of consciousness and ‘meaningful’ communication. This chain of primordial events carefully evolves to accommodate a taboo desire for the mother as the basis of consciousness, underpinned by the taboo that surfaces so violently in the story of Oedipus and indeed the tale of the primordial gorilla father.

Lacan’s return to Freud emphasises how the importance of the totem, as representing primordial Law, can linguistically translate into the phallus, the father and master signifier that generates available discourses. The phallus initiates the genealogical production of dominant brotherhood (Lacan, 2007) and the linguistic reduction of the way women are spoken (Irigaray, 1985a; Lacan, 1953/2006a, 1999). Once the subject speaks, he is not only synchronically regulated with a pattern of masculine heredity, but his repressed desire for the mother requires that his
behaviour is linguistically and homeostatically regulated through a process of principles and drives adapted from Freud’s original work (Lacan, 1981). The Freudian autoerotic anal drive is displaced within metaphor as synchronic familiarity and comfort in the repetitive manifestation of desire. The scopic drive is the manifestation of desire within discourse. The eye is a mechanism that produces pictures of reality, our reality. The gaze goes beyond this reality in that it textualises and enhances the mechanism of the eye. The scopic drive, or the gaze is especially present within ontological questions of knowing and the necessities for ‘capturing’ or visualising before acknowledgement of existence (Lacan, 1981). Both the pleasure principle and the reality principle regulate the unconscious desire for the mother situated within the realms of Freud’s pre-conscious and Lacanian Imaginary and metonym.

The pleasure principle forges and tempers the Freudian ego through a system of equilibrium between the strict-super-ego and the unbridled primordial pleasures of the id. The id, in conjunction with Freud’s structure of the unconscious, represents the unsignified and therefore Real primordial pleasure/unpleasure, possibly better described, when detached from Christian morality and enlightened reasoning as pure embodied perception/emotion. The pleasure principle is driven by the repression of the desire for the primary lost object that is implied in the taboo on son-mother incest. For Lacan (1981), the pleasure principle sets the boundaries of desire. To go beyond the pleasure principle is to go beyond the speakable properties of extreme pain/pleasure and to exist in a vacuum of true silence that is only attainable through death, which according to Lacan, is the one sure thing that we can look forward to. Lacan’s (1981) Symbolic, as a desire driven realm of consciousness keeps us aware of our mortality and within pre-inscribed available discourses, reminds us that we are
born to die. In other words, we must advance toward death within a synchronicity inscribed through language.

The reality principle is recognisable within the grammatical structure of the Ten Commandments. For Lacan (1981, p. 20), “moral law affirms itself in opposition to pleasure”, or in other words, thou shalt not. The pleasure and the reality principle therefore linguistically and ambiguously ascribe ethics and morality.

Freud’s conscious subject is moderated by the unsanctioned pleasure/unpleasure (unbridled emotion) of the id as represented by the death of the father of the horde and his replacement; the reality principle forms through the strict body of brothers or city fathers, signifiers, that have shaped western civilisation around the denial of desire. Therefore, linguistic homeostasis derives from the primordial watershed/wall brought about by the death of father and his collective replacement that exists simultaneously by virtue of masculine genealogy and inheritance. Freud’s vast theoretical network, stemming from a background in neuroscience, scientific discourse and the production of a linguistic unconscious memory becomes embroiled within becoming, developmental psychology, biological determination, patriarchy, phallocentrism and, according to Lacan (1938/2002), family relations.

**Family complexities: Premature birth**

Lacan’s (1938/2002) early work on family complexes appears to inform later work on the mirror stage (Lacan, 1949/2006) In *Family Complexes: The Formation of the Individual*, he describes the development of individual identity as it takes place within the family/community setting. According to Lacan, there is no resemblance between the family of western culture and the biological (gorilla) family of the animal kingdom. Although our scopic drives may see warm and fuzzy similarities between the two, this is far from the case. The human family system is more
complicated than it appears and plays what Lacan refers to as a primordial role in cultural transmission in the guise of suppressing biological ‘instinct’ that includes an introduction into language.

The family therefore instils behaviours and genealogy (the totem replacement of the primordial father, the phallus) at the levels of the Symbolic and the Imaginary. This process allows for knowledge production as part of a masculine hereditary system that necessitates the existence of the cultural family to facilitate it. Indeed in *Seminar XVII*, Lacan (2007) surmises that within Freud’s tale of the father of the horde, the most significant event was the invention of ‘brotherhood’, the collaboration of the brothers as a collective yet singular identity. As Regnault (1995) explains, the dead father becomes the signifier within a complexity of family. Therefore we can suppose that the inscription of the generation upon generation of sons and brotherhood becomes as Symbolic as the totem itself and as Freud repeatedly emphasised, dependent on the death of the father.

In his earlier work, Lacan (1938/2002) suggests that Freud struggled with the differences between instincts and complexes, due to his scientific background. Yet Lacan (1953/2006) later says that Freud’s theory of the unconscious was primarily language based: the translations of his work inscribe developmental psychology as a matter of biological fact. For Lacan (1938/2002) a complex suggests scientifically represented stages or models to explain mother-child developmental behaviours. This reality, once established, immerses itself further into language through repetition. For Lacan, human reality is far removed from animal instinct. Once having undergone a traumatic birth, a child pieces him/herself together within a primordial ego or imago through mirror imagery of the mother and siblings. On
entrance into language, this imago is cemented within a unified image as ‘I’, a social I, an individual entity, completely separate from the other/Other.

Although there may well be ‘instinct’, there is no way of finding out through a dialectic system that culturally manufactures human development as instinctual, biological and evolutionary fact. Instinct, as unthought (perception) remains in the truth of the Real. This aspect of Lacan’s return to Freud highlights an inevitable confusion within an early developmental theory based on a biological interpretation of Freudian theory. Kohlberg’s research findings are founded on human development and articulated through phallocentric discourse moderated by moral practice. This also gives us some insight into Gilligan’s difficulty with eliminating the biologically determined from her glimpse of difference, however equitable her findings may appear. Within Lacanian theory, equitable difference becomes further buried under discourses of biology, gender roles and a false sense of unity or individuality, all imposed by phallic discourse. This unity is dependent of linguistic concepts of instinct, complexes, normative development, all underpinned by desire for the mother.

For Lacan (1938/2002), the unified image of the social ‘I’ forms on integration into language, in a cruel manoeuvre that simultaneously splits the subject. The subject views him/herself as complete or as ‘one’, constituted by language in the form of the Symbolic that puts a name, a signifier, to the entity that becomes the signified, a genealogically inscribed stamp of brotherhood, another link in the phallic signifying chain. The social I as reality becomes absorbed into grammar and syntax and the desire for the mother that drives the drives.

Lacan (1938/2002) draws on the work of Otto Rank when he suggests that it is the premature helplessness of the child that creates the ‘primordial ego’, the
absorption of mirrored images in place of ‘instincts’ of the fragmented body that represent castration, emasculation, devouring and abjection, to name but a few. According to Lacan, the primordial bond is ‘anachronistic’ (Lacan, 1938/2002) or Real, in that it exists outside of a synchrony aligned with the Symbolic and diachrony aligned with the Imaginary. Therefore, within Lacanian theory, there is a primordial relationship between mother and child postnatally within an embodied encounter with the Real primordial mother. Pure perceptual pre-linguistic encounter/emotion takes place before the chain of phallic signification begins, even if this relationship is prematurely ended within a linguistic extension of the womb that is situated in the real. Within the misguided safety of the whole or unified family unit as a symbolic representation of the mother’s womb, the child gains its perception of primordial self, assembled in fusion with those in the vicinity and/or encounter with the Other.

According to Lacan (1938/2002), weaning the infant from breast milk to substitute foods, drives the most primitive human complex. Although breastfeeding may appear to be instinctual and driven by the biological process of lactation, according to Lacan this is not the case for the human animal. The process is a cultural practice, heavily regulated by scientific knowledge, as demonstrated by the writings of such famous motherhood experts as Spock (1949) and Brazilton (1987) and including contemporary discursive conflicts around breastfeeding documented by Winikoff and Laukaran (1989). Once entered into language as knowledge, these practices pre-empt the disappearance of the primordial mother and must play some part in the formation of the primordial ego instilled by the superego/mother/father within the womb family. The introduction of weaning, according to Lacan (1938/2002, p. 6) creates “a crisis of the psyche” that offers the infant a choice to
refuse or accept. If the child psychologically refuses weaning, a desire to return to its severed mother/self remains. Once accepted, the desire for the mother is repressed. This repressed desire to return to the mother makes way for the collective formation of the unified subject.

**Family reflections: The social ‘I’**

For Lacan (1938/2002, 1949/2006), the mirror stage initiates from a fusional interconnected brotherhood of assimilated familial existence. Continually repeated within language, familial existence becomes the spoken law of the (primordial) father, brotherhood, and its production of phallic signification. Although initially, the mother is the child’s mirror of the self, an intrusion by the father when differentiated from the mother, manifests as rivalry. The father stands in the way of the child and his primary love object, his/her mother.

Siblings, according to Lacan (1938/2002), take part in a fusional negotiation of being, where rivalry becomes a series of postures, gestures and a struggle of differentiation within a process of conformity. Rivalries that manifest in love, hate, desire and jealousy, form the basis of socialisation, accentuated by the difficulties of distinguishing activity or passivity. As an active/passive multiple self, he does not know whether he is the aggressor or the aggr essed within such perceived rivalries (Lacan, 1938/2002; 1949/2006).

It is not until the child begins to speak that the primordial imago, the interconnected child, differentiates him/herself. Hence, the child unifies him/herself linguistically, within a script that produces individual identity through pre-conscious and conscious signification. Wholeness therefore is an illusion of the Symbolic, overlapping the fractured and unstructured primordial ego (Lacan, 1949/2006).
The primordial in respect to the child becomes a social ‘I’, an ‘I’ embroiled within the reality of language as a unified and complete ‘independent’ entity with the knowledge that this reality produces (Lacan, 1949/2006). The tragedy appears to be, that somewhere in the transition to language, an interactive mother and child, as perceived by the child, is divided. Hence, the emergence into language and the suppression of the primordial imago again alerts us to the presence of the wall, a gap between discourses, or a barrier, where traces upon and within traces are lost and a pre-scripted language simultaneously severs and unifies the subject. Lacan describes: “there’s the plane of the mirror, the symmetrical world of the egos and of the homogeneous others. We’ll have to distinguish another level, which we call the wall of language” (Lacan, 1988, p. 244). The Real mother remains on the unconscious side of Lacan’s wall, somewhere before or on the verge Freud’s pre-consciousness and consciousness (Freud & Fliess, 1985). Yet her presence is silently deafening as the catalyst for desire.

The entrance into language here initiates the splitting of the subject: just as Freud’s child rejects the mother and aligns with the father, so too does the Lacanian child (Lacan, 1949/2006, 1988). The entrance into the speaking world requires submission to the Name of the Father and phallic discourse (Lacan, 1953/2006, 1960/2006). The boy child takes his place within a brotherhood founded on the death of the father, a deluded position of mastery within phallocentric reality. He speaks from the position of the master, yet castration is inevitable. The master’s position is impotent, and although he thinks he speaks from a position of authority, his *filia patroni* generates a selection of empty signifiers within a constant flurry of miscommunication (Lacan, 1999, 2007). The girl child is also offered a range of speaking positions, although she has one that is predominantly hers, the discourse of
the hysteric, from which she desires desire itself, as if it were her lost object. For the hysteric, the primordial mother becomes synonymous with das ding or the thing, becoming lost in a void created by the unifying of the subject.

**The thing: Desiring the unattainable mother**

Interpretation of loss gets even more confusing as our metaphor of becoming within Freud’s unconscious structures merges with the womb metaphors of family and the void of the primordial lost mother, to which we desire to return. Linguistically I suspect that the family womb to which Lacan ascribes and the unconscious and discriminatory regulatory structure of Freud’s unconscious are one and the same, as products of linguistically restrictive ways of becoming and being, yet grammatically inscribed as directionally opposite. For example, we are born from non-existence or beyond death itself and return to the womb. The death of the father clears the way for the void as exclusively primordial maternal. The unconscious signifying mechanism linguistically creates consciousness and perpetuates itself as ‘womb’ to enable discourses of desire and return.

Within Lacan’s reinterpretation of Freud, a pending return to the primordial mother drives desire, which determines all lost objects. This mother is das ding, the thing, the absent locus of desire. Das ding therefore drives discursive systems of reality making and is lost in the void that a pre-scripted consciousness has created in the centre of a restrictive linguistic mechanism (Lacan, 1997a). The daughter’s quest for her mother-daughter encounter is driven by a desire for the thing that has fallen through a hole in language that represents the primordial mother herself, into the void, forever to remain lost within the structures of Freud’s unconscious.

When the linguistic encounter between subject and Other splits the subject: a void remains, one that is ineffable. In psychoanalysis, the void is repressed,
manifesting within metonym, an unconscious structure of language. Thus, a void represents a (w)hole, a lack, pieces of fusional subject lost through Symbolically inscribed encounters on the plane of the mirror.

From a miscommunication in language, where according to Lacan (1938/2002), Freudian discursive theory has been misread and mis-translated as a theory of biological determinism, developmental theories of good and bad mothering emerge. Mothers as a complexity of mirror images, homeostatic moral and ethical drives and imago/social I confusions, are articulated within a narcissistic phallic interchange with the Other. Meanwhile, the contemporary dilemma of the working mother and her conflicting discourses of work and family are unknowingly embroiled within a series of confusions that underpin her speaking positions, theories of linguistic phallocentrism mistaken for biological determinism. Such misrecognition is difficult to articulate within available language structures, which is not surprising given that the subject harbours an illusion of both anatomical and psychic wholeness based on miscommunication.

For Lacan (1938/2002, 1949/2006), the split subject, paradoxically unified by his conscious social speaking self becomes represented by the primary signifier, the phallus. The primary signifier predetermines his place as the conscious spoken representation of agency (S₁). Agency represses the unconscious absence/presence of the disjointed emotion and perception, represented by the barred subject, now woven into reality through grammar and syntax. For Lacan, this must mean that communication is doomed to failure. Not only is language a structure of disjointed meaning that constitutes knowledge and reality, but the subject is never actually addressing the same topic as the whole entity he mistakenly thinks he is addressing. Nor is he really addressing another unified whole entity. For example, the caregiving
daughter as a representation of commodity and trade miscommunicates with the
academic daughter, who speaks of care through relevant research. The moment she
speaks, she takes up a particular position that is subject to constant change. The
paradox here is that each daughter is by necessity addressing the self, the particular
self that language sets her up to be. Each time she speaks, the fractured integrated
imagery that she is, becomes solidified into a spectral speaking entity. When we
move away from the discourse of the master to hear from the discourse of the
analyst, we hear that the daughter is not communicating with her mother, but the
patient she now sees in her place. The academic daughter sees her relationships
within theoretical and research critique and articulates the change, yet she is no more
privy to the presence of her mother than is the caregiving daughter.

**Over the wall and into the wilderness?**

Within Lacanian theory, through entrance into language, women become
linguistically inscribed as speaking their own subjugation. They are projected
representations of the phallus, of caring versus justice and private versus public, of
work and life, the inevitability of responsibility, the caring responsibilities of the
master’s discourse, of inscription as deficit and politically inept within the metaphor
of linguistic castration. Indeed, the gap in discourse between these linguistic divides
signals those moments where consciousness eludes us, given there is nothing
memorable within the gap and therefore our recognition of meaning reminds us of
our continuous splitting.

Certainly, what is inscribed as a wilful migration of women across the
wall/gap and into the workforce/public cannot hope to be representing equal
opportunity within Lacanian theory, unless we might consider equality as masculine
projection. Indeed, even within sexual relations, performed beyond the walls that
protect the substitute womb, the family, Lacan suggests that there is no rapport (Lacan, 1999).

Yet separate from man’s anamorphic affair with the unified self, Lacan (1999) suggests that woman is not whole, an interesting thought, given the time he spends theorising the unity of the phallic masculine subject. Somehow, on entrance into language, there is a part of woman that is unable to be tied together within the social I of the speaking being. The pleasure derived from phallic (un)relations is described as the jouissance of the Other. Within the four discourses, jouissance remains coupled with loss and production. Jouissance is produced in excess, repressed, lost, never found, never remembered unless regulated by the pleasure and reality principles. Regulation produces a phallic jouissance, or polymorphous perverse relation with the Other where there is no rapport between the Man and Woman.

However, Lacan (1999) speaks of the other jouissance, a jouissance inter-related with the discourse of the hysteric. If his perception has connections to traces of the primordial mother, the daughter wonders whether there are traces of primordial mother-daughter care that could be said. Psychoanalysis and hysteria tread a pre-scripted path together. It was the hysteric and the strange discursive and embodied manifestations of hysteria, the wandering symptoms of the body, that lured Freud away from neuro-science and into the discursive reaches of the unconscious, pre-conscious and indeed the womb. Hysteria is a pathological derivative of 

*hystera*, a word for womb that has been traced back to Greek antiquity. (King, 1993), and now appropriated as a speaking position. The hysteric not only lays the available pathways for hysterical enquiry but her history and her symptoms are contextually important to the framing of her quest and what she seeks.
Chapter Three: Opening pathways through contextualising hysterical enquiry

[Hysterical symptoms] often, it would seem, grow out of the day-dreams which are so common even in healthy people and to which needlework and similar occupations render women especially prone. (Freud & Breuer, 1893/1974, p. 64)

Why did Freud fall into error at this point, whereas if my analysis of today is to be believed, he only had to chew over what was being hand fed to him...the knowledge he had gathered from all those mouths of gold, Anna, Emma, Dora? (Lacan, 2007, p.99)

This chapter introduces an hysterical enquiry through reading the changing symptoms of hysteria over time, and ponders how hysteria may manifest within contemporary discourses of commodified care. I consider hysterics, witches and women, inquiring into shifting manifestations and the political and religious contexts of previous hysterical case studies and consider what Riviere (1929/2008) may have unconsciously concealed behind her mask.

Lacan’s (1999) four discourses have signified the speaking positions available for the ‘daughter’ in respect to care and inevitably, desire. As suggested in Chapter Two, within the discourse of the master, a woman desires to be desired. She shares the master signifier with/as Him or is generated from it in projection to a passive absent role.

Within the context of hysterical enquiry, the daughter’s boundaries of enquiry and the discursive pathways open for pursuing her answers are limited. The hysterie grammatically offers an active seeking, speaking position for women within phallic discourse. Yet there is an irony here: the hysteric, from a position of agency, actively searches the words of the master for a truth she articulates as ‘yet to find’
and the master articulates as forever lost. Her newly designated speaking position immediately creates a gap, a moment of unease, within a linguistic system where her existence, as a woman, is linked tenuously, to say the least, in the signifying chain of hysteria.

**The other jouissance as lost within the pathways of the scope of inquiry**

Within the context of sexual difference, Freud’s (Freud & Fliess, 1985) unconscious structure seemingly provides an equitable pathway to pre-consciousness in that gender is yet to be discussed. Difference is subsequently assigned through lack. Yet for Lacan (1999), because of the linguistic incongruence between signified and signifier, difference is revealed within the gaps that enable analytic discourse. There is a part of woman that cannot make the journey through the structures and realms of the unconscious into metaphor and even metonym. There is something of woman that cannot be spoken; something missed, in excess of, lost, repressed, displaced or sublimated within Freud’s model of the unconscious/pre-conscious on the entrance into language. Lacan (1999, p. 33) states: “... woman is not whole – there is always something in her that escapes discourse.” There is something of women unspeakably present, signified as the other jouissance.

The meaning of jouissance immediately becomes problematic in translation: according to Grosz (1989), there is no English equivalent to the word. A rough and inevitably unsatisfactory translation equates to unbridled and ecstatic sexual bliss. Yet, given that whatever it is that is missing and belongs to Woman is ineffable within pre-scripted discourse, the signified remains a mystery. Could the other jouissance present a possible avenue to search for a missing encounter, one that appears to have been repressed within language? Does the other jouissance, as a
signifier in a chain of signifiers, metonymically disguise (un)memorable traces of pure embodied perception that eludes, or is excluded from, western language?

The other jouissance should not be confused with the phallic jouissance of the master. Lacan’s (1999) other jouissance is not only exclusively feminine but like the mother, is present and absent. It exists unspoken in (un)memory, inaccessible. Phallic jouissance, on the other hand, manifests through Lacan’s impossible communication between self and other. Phallic jouissance is a product of phallic signification and repressed desire, a self-consuming rapport that is not inclusive of others, or in other words, a shifting and sliding incongruence between the imago and the social I. The narcissistic qualities inscribed in man during his development ensure a fuzzy inclusionary imagery of the other, a remnant of the mirror stage. Phallic jouissance as a product of language falls under the strict regulations of Freudian reality and pleasure principles, and may be translated as the sexual satisfaction gained from man’s misinformed sexual encounters with his projected Other. Therefore, the production of phallic jouissance is the only possibility within the phallic signification of language, the law of the name of the dead father and the (mal)formation of the unified subject.

The other jouissance represents a loss suffered exclusively by women within the initial split or initiation into language. This other jouissance does not exist in language, disappearing along with the pre-oedipal renounced mother as a jouissance that implicitly signifies embodied loss. In a way, it represents truth, in that truth is inscribed in the body. Yet, within Lacanian theory, traces of its existence remain within the Imaginary. Within Lacan’s discourse of the hysteric, the inaccessible becomes both truth and loss, loss because the truth is inaccessible.
Care, hysteria, jouissance and an uneasy feeling...

According to Verhaeghe (1999), the not whole or part existence of woman is inextricably linked to and accentuates the discourse of the hysteric; a discourse that is in some part due to the lack of signifiers for women. For Verhaeghe, the hysteric endures a fractured existence in metonym only, given her repression depicted earlier in Chapter Two, Figure 7, thereby explaining her neurotic spoken presence as symptom or hysteria. The daughter is present within the caring (non)relation and has difficulty consciously articulating a distress or discomfort that may, as Verhaeghe suggests, stem from a linguistic severance from embodied representation that is uniquely feminine. There are implications here in respect to a commodification of care that is producing care devoid of relationships in a context that also produces hysterical discourse.

The discourse of the hysteric in this context highlights a gap, a moment of uneasiness for the daughter, an area of metaphorical condensation, a wall perhaps, a place of conflict. The daughter, as a becoming subject, struggles differently with a phallocentrism that castrates everyone, yet only allows her to speak her loss through prescipted and constricting speaking positions.

Expanding silences

According to Verhaeghe (1999), hysteria discourse becomes a sign of women’s part existence, highlighting a lack of the production of signifiers for woman. For example, as discussed in Chapter One, the production of care within a contemporary society accentuates decreasing avenues for articulation of the relational as maternal/feminine. In the private domain, mothering and fathering gives way to parenting and mothers and daughters become caregivers and patients, assimilated into the business of care provision and the delivery of care packages in
the public and perhaps even the private domain. Care is difficult to define within contemporary society, and this becomes apparent in how it is subsequently administered within a continuum of good to bad. O’Connor’s (2007) research highlights the complications of these shifts in agency by the shift of discourses accessed by the daughter and the caregiver.

For Verhaeghe (1999), women’s articulated precariousness stems from the fact that very few signifiers represent her. He suggests that this decrease in linguistic representation is relatively recent in historical terms: there are becoming fewer and fewer ways of speaking her within scientific and contemporary discourses of commodified care, parenting and work-life balance.

Verhaeghe (1999) suggests that pre-enlightenment hysteria was a signifier generated as an exclusively feminine condition caused by the migration of the uterus, apparently an independent living and possibly thinking entity prone to wandering about her body when deprived/empty. According to Plato:

...the womb is an animal that longs to bring forth children. When it remains barren for too long after puberty, it is distressed and sorely disturbed, and straying about the body and cutting off passages of breath, it impedes respiration and provokes in the sufferer the most acute anguish and all manner of disease besides. (Plato, as cited in Verhaeghe, 1999, p. 17)

Interestingly, in this translation of Plato, although hysteria is uniquely feminine because its signification is generated from the uterus, and not, apparently, the phallus, the uterus is a separate entity and not specifically attached to a woman’s body, representing an interesting obfuscation of reproduction. To digress even further, Lacan’s (1938/2002) womb family comes to mind as the comforter of a
premature humanity calmed through its linguistic displacements of the drives, connected to a whole family rather than a part-woman.

Yet aside from the biological appropriation emphasised above, symptoms of hysteria could once be spoken as exclusively feminine. For Verhaeghe (1999), contemporary hysteria no longer possesses a uniquely feminine signifier since the dawning of the enlightened age that initiated scientific investigations into the origins of hysteria and as such she becomes a metonymic component of the discourse of the master as depicted in Chapter Two (Figures 6 & 7). Perhaps I could qualify Verhaeghe’s (1999) assessment by saying that women lost a signifier through the disembodiment of the hystera/uterus.

**Mapping hysteria**

According to Verhaeghe (1999), seventeenth century researchers suggested that hysteria was a physiological condition, an abnormality of the brain. The symptoms of hysteria became products of biological defect and not reproductive restlessness. This alone suggests the repression of the uniqueness of woman as the catalyst of reproduction and therefore on the face of it, hysteria as no longer explicitly feminine. Relatively, it is not long ago that Kohlberg’s (1981, 1982) scale of moral reasoning generated discussion around boys being morally superior in that they were privy to higher moral reasoning than girls. Such a history indicates a long-standing assessment of inequity within the cognitive functioning of men and women, still being scientifically inscribed as isomorphic with brain functioning (Fine, 2010).

Freud’s neurological mentor, Charcot, searched for physiological signs of hysteria through the practices of autopsy and photography (Didi-Huberman, 2003). Charcot believed that the use of photography allowed the closest observational access to live patients (Didi-Huberman, 2003). Taking pictures appears driven by the
visual necessities of science: interesting that such practices still exist today although they are a lot more technologically advanced. Photography ‘looks’ to be a forerunner to contemporary brain scanning devices that according to the work of Fine (2010) still leave the playing field open for dubious quantitative decisions on how masculine and feminine brains work differently. Unlike Charcot, Freud became convinced that hysteria was not confined to one site of the body, given the diversity of symptoms and their physical locations. Even so, photography as metaphor, dichotomy and complementarity intertwines within Freudian discourses.

A rough but not inadequate analogy to this supposed relation to conscious and unconscious activity might be drawn from the field of ordinary photography. The first stage of the photography is the ‘negative’; every photographic process has to pass through the ‘negative process’, and some of those negatives which have held good in examination are admitted to the ‘positive process’ ending in the picture. (Freud, 1912/2008, p. 13)

Freud also calls on the photographic metaphors to describe gender differences in relation to light and dark (Irigaray, 1985a), suggesting or generating linguistic similarities or interaction between the two processes; consciousness and gender allocation.

Having convinced himself through scientific methods that hysteria was not a product of neurological deficit, Freud explored other ways he may help relieve the symptoms of sufferers. The wandering tendencies of hysterical symptoms prompted Freud to team up with Breuer, who was working with hypnosis as a treatment for hysteria. Although Freud had previously worked with Charcot in the area of hypnosis, this experience was in a neurological context only. Now, Freud suggested that symptoms could be relieved through speaking, just as screaming is a spontaneous reaction to relieve pain (Freud & Breuer, 1893/1974): in other words,
the forming of the symptoms into some form of acoustic image, or drawing through the symptom from metonym to metaphor, as a form of hysterical relief. The talking cure calmed somatic symptoms as they moved about the body as manifestations “grown out of the day-dreams…which needlework and similar occupations render women especially prone.” (Freud & Breuer, 1893/1974, p. 64)

Freud believed that Breuer’s talking cure would work without hypnosis and started talking to his patients, even though Lacan (2007) suggests that Freud never actually listened to them. Werbart (2005) affirms Freud’s intentions to listen were not followed up in practice. This was due to a struggle between the fictions of narrative or “the patient’s private construction of meaning” and strict scientific and academic practice that Werbert (2005, p. 1448) describes as “claims of the professional expert to objectivity and interpretive precedence.”

Freud’s explicit intention to listen however, does suggest that unlike Breuer, he did not believe that the practice of abreaction alone relieved the symptoms of hysteria. Indeed, Laplanche and Pontalis (1986) suggest that mainstream portrayals of psychoanalytic history undertaken in simplistic terms undermine and undervalue Freud’s prolific production of groundbreaking and complex theory developed through the pursuit of hysteria as something other than biological deficit.

Verhaeghe (1999) suggests that Lacan’s attention to Freud’s lack of listening skills was not a slight on Freud’s theoretical prowess. Instead, Freud’s lack was inevitable within the master’s discourse of expertise that paradoxically subjugates the discourse of the analyst. Freud dictated symptoms and causes by calling on his prior scientific knowledge. He was always convinced of hysteria’s sexual origins and his listening skills geared towards his primary theoretical emphasis. An inevitable misinterpretation of hysteria in this case is the catalyst for psychoanalysis. The
Freudian practice of psychoanalysis therefore, although it makes for good reading to call it the product of hysteria, was not exactly born out of hysterical symptoms, more a string of $S_2$ (re)constituting knowledge issued from the symptom in the guise of Freud, the analyst. This happened the minute he stopped listening and opened his mouth to speak.

**The first lady of psychoanalysis**

In Freudian psychoanalytic knowledge, hysteria, the unconscious and psychoanalysis are inseparable: psychoanalysis is a product of Freud’s interest in women’s neurosis and psychosis, his phallocentric views on women’s sexuality and a forerunner to the formation of his theory of the primary unconscious and then the reintroduction of the philosophically derived ego. It is fitting, if not only in a symbolically historical context, that Anna O enters the text here. Anna is important to this discussion as the first hysterical case documented by Freud and Breuer (Verhaeghe, 1999). Anna was Breuer’s patient and a documented case study is available in Freud and Breuer’s (1893/1974) joint publication, *Studies on Hysteria.*

Anna O was a highly intelligent woman born into an orthodox Jewish family, an upbringing that Breuer describes as puritanical. Her intellect was such that Breuer goes to some lengths to convince the reader of Anna’s level headedness and astute reasoning powers. She was well read and had an interest in languages. She was born in 1859, growing up in Germany during a historical watershed of change, creativity and theatre. Yet this was also a time of industrialisation and civil change, the growth of the civil services and the advent of public schooling as a progression from home schooling. As a single woman with home responsibilities, she could look forward to enjoying little of this. Anna O’s illness developed at a time when she would have been expected to marry and her much debated possible recovery would have come
about when she was past the acceptable age of marriage. If she had been well enough to marry, her marriage would most probably have been arranged (Rosenbaum, 1984). Her father fell ill in 1880 and died in 1881. Breuer (Freud & Breuer, 1893/1974) describes Anna as devoted to her father and her illness activated by an exhaustive breakdown caused by the stresses of caregiving.

**Hysterical caring**

Anna escaped her waking life through fantasy and an overly vivid imagination, this symptom signified by Freud (Freud & Breuer, 1893/1974) as a forerunner to hysteria. According to Breuer, she possessed a “slightly exaggerated” kindness and sympathy for others along with an ‘astonishingly’ underdeveloped sexuality. He qualified this observation by stating that Anna had never been in love. Her lack of sex drive, as diagnosed by Breuer, constituted an important psychoanalytic factor pertaining to her illness (Freud & Breuer, 1893/1974).

Anna’s symptoms were severe. She suffered crippling physical anomalies such as paralysis and distorting muscle contractions as well as mood swings and psychosis. According to Breuer’s account, through the process of hypnosis, it was possible to eliminate each symptom in a lengthy process of abreaction, a discursive dispelling of the trauma that had resulted in a particular symptom by the patient. Anna O herself invented the phrase ‘the talking cure’ (Freud & Breuer, 1893/1974).

There are some interesting phenomena involved in Anna’s symptoms that were noted by Breuer. Her major physical afflictions came in the form of paralysis and her psychic symptoms shifted between distinct periods of normality and psychosis. For example, there were two Anna’s at the height of her illness, a good one and a bad one. She suffered psychotic episodes where she was ‘absent’ for periods of time. These periods became gaps in Anna’s consciousness: she was
unable to recall them, or indeed speak them, yet she recognised them as disturbing interruptions. According to Breuer, these interruptions waned through continued sessions of hypnosis and verbalised recollections of past events (Freud & Breuer, 1893/1974).

Her linguistically based symptoms are of the greatest interest in the light of Lacan’s return to Freud. Anna spent a considerable period conversing in other languages, such as English, much to the frustration of those tending her (Freud & Breuer, 1893/1974). This symptom may well suggest that Anna O’s reality of the time was labouring under the restrictive properties of her primary language (German). In other words, she was struggling to articulate her current realities.

**A problem with articulation**

Anna’s most interesting language based symptom, however, manifests in aphasia, the breakdown of linguistic structure itself. Breuer describes her predicament:

> For alongside of the development of the contractures, there appeared a deep-going functional disorganisation of her speech. It first became noticeable that she was at a loss for words, and this difficulty gradually increased. Later she lost her command of grammar and syntax; she no longer conjugated verbs, and eventually used only infinitives, for the most part incorrectly formed from weak past participles; and she omitted both the definite and indefinite article. In the process of time she became almost completely deprived of words. She put them together laboriously out of four or five languages and became almost unintelligible. When she tried to write (until her contractures entirely prevented her doing so) she employed the same jargon. (Freud & Breuer, p. 77, 1893/1974)

At the time, Breuer attributed these behaviours to contrariness. He felt that Anna’s language difficulties were prompted by an obstinate Anna offended at
something said to her (Freud & Breuer, 1893/1974). In light of Lacan’s return to
Freud’s psychoanalysis, de Saussurian semiology and Jakobson’s aphasia research,
Breuer’s explanation seems implausible. Breuer suggested that these linguistic
symptoms manifest concurrently with physical symptoms. As the language structure
disintegrates, so too does reality/consciousness: the pain is an interpretation of
perception and truth inscribed within the body. In the context of Verhaeghe’s (1999)
discussions of the metonymic manifestation of hysteria, Anna’s symptoms suggest a
struggle with metaphor, and grammatical structure revealing the disjointedness of
metonym, and perhaps hysterical repression said to be brought about by the era of
the Enlightenment and the increasing lack of signification for women. An
interconnection between the repression of the primordial mother, embodied traces of
perception and the breakdown of language is possible here. The necessary neurosis
of the hysteric becomes embroiled within a language disintegration that leads or
equates to her symptoms of psychosis.

If Anna’s hysteria connects to the increasingly ineffable in some way then
Verhaeghe’s (1999) thesis of the dwindling signification for woman carries some
weight. Yet can we dare consider that within any sort of linguistic structure, that the
phallus was once not necessarily the primary signifier, that the womb may have
represented a primary Symbolic chain of representation for woman, which is now
absent? What happens to the womb as signified? Perhaps we should be warned by
the appropriation of the womb by the concept of family within Lacan’s (1938/2002)
writings and a Christian reformation that linguistically assigns women back into it as
guardians, housekeepers and caregivers (Boxer & Quataert, 2000), reiterating the
repression of the connections between the mother and her children. Where is the part
of woman, that is repressed, that makes her not whole?
Anna’s psychosis represents a mystery between what we can say as conscious beings within a particular speaking position and what is unable to be articulated and as such remains within the unconscious, repressed, perhaps even fleetingly, from time to time. For Lacan (1999), woman is not whole. Part of her is (un)articulable and inaccessible within the normative structure of language. Part of her is necessarily masculine, in that woman now represents the phallus within an explicit display of projected femininity. The gap identified by Verhaeghe (1999) exposes a repressed uniquely feminine manifestation of hysteria and the ensuing difficulties of articulation, given that there is no possible script for woman as Woman. If the hysteric speaks, language ensures she produces woman as deficit.

As if perceptive to this experience, there was a period of two weeks, in what appears to be total aphasia, where Anna O was unable to speak at all. The speaking of the hysteric plays a vital role in the repression of embodied traces. For example, the hysterical daughter knows there is a part of her that is inaccessible; there is something that she knows she cannot speak of. For the hysteric, the prospect of being talked back to the mainstream reality of the master is an everyday occurrence. (Un)memories hauntingly close to being located and interpreted as symptoms are talked away into oblivion through the discourse of the master.

Interlude: A short story of mother-daughter hallucinations

It is important that we do not gloss over Anna O’s somatic symptoms and de-emphasize their connectedness with aphasia. As
Breuer says, one form of symptom accompanies the other (Freud & Breuer, 1893/1974) and this seems inevitable when there are difficulties, due to language restrictions, articulating particular embodied encounters. In this interlude, the hysterical daughter seeks an encounter with her mother, one she feels she should remember, but can only recall memories of caregiving. Time and again she repeats a series of stories, not necessarily the same rendition, as this is not possible: the story always evolves in the telling, there is always change. In this particular rendition, it is the night before her mother’s death. The daughter experiences hallucinatory hysterical symptoms of mother-daughter. By this, she means that she feels her physical stature change and she is no longer the daughter, she is also the mother. She looks at her hands and they are no longer hers. The daughter is very frightened and confused. There is a difficulty in writing this story. Within the caregiving paradigm, somatic symptoms are brought on by the stresses of the occupation and can only be articulated as neurosis, psychosis, stress and extreme exhaustion, hence a linguistic frustration, an uneasiness that there is a story that cannot be told.

**Writing the mother out of hysteria**

Within the discourses available to Breuer to describe his case study of Anna, her mother barely rates a mention: no bond, no ambivalence or hatred. Anna, Breuer emphasises, is devoted to her father. Within the context of Anna’s story as told by Breuer, Anna takes on the role of caregiver to her sick father. Anna is overly caring
and even through her illness she finds the time and energy to nurse others who are ill. As Breuer describes her, Anna is the caregiving daughter with an overdeveloped propensity to care (Freud & Breuer, 1893/1974).

Breuer (Freud & Breuer, 1893/1974) suggests that the major catalyst for the caregiving daughter’s illness stems from a time she is sitting by her father’s bedside. Her arm, draped over the back of her chair, has gone to sleep through inactivity. Suddenly she hallucinates: there is a snake behind him. The shock, coupled with her physical state of exhaustion, indicates that the contracture of her arm is a direct result of this hallucination.

‘The caregiving daughter’ is a common theme in Freudian case studies as a forerunner to hysteria, often the catalyst to (re)initiate earlier developmental or familial trauma (Freud & Breuer, 1893/1974). The devoted caring for an ailing father while vying for his affections triggering ‘fantasies’ of earlier sexual advances are both common symptoms within Freudian case studies. The hysteric and her symptoms/excess are diagnosed as a developmental disruption in the journey to normativity, explicitly linked to the father. Yet isn’t there a mother somewhere who is silently present?

Anna it seems, is not necessarily her father’s primary carer, but assists her mother in looking after him. Breuer notes that Anna’s mother is out of town when this major trauma occurs and it turns out to be a rare occasion where Anna is attending her father alone so the trauma of the experience is heightened (Freud & Breuer, 1893/1974). However, the father remains the catalyst of Breuer’s narrative account: within Breuer’s telling of the story, the mother’s presence in the caregiving process is recorded by noting her temporary absence.
The other mention of Anna’s mother by Breuer is in relation to a diary she kept the year before (Freud & Breuer, 1893/1974). Through examination of the diary, Breuer is convinced that every night under hypnosis, Anna is recalling each day’s events as they happened exactly twelve months prior (Freud & Breuer, 1893/1974). Anna’s mother alerts us to her presence through her diary, where she silently writes detailed accounts of her daughter’s life, her actions, what she wore on a particular day, subsequently supplying them to Breuer as an aid for Anna’s analysis. The daughter’s devotion to the father is relevant within psychoanalysis as a catalyst for normative development. Caught within the restrictions of psychoanalytic discourse, Breuer tells us nothing of Anna’s relationship with her mother. Indeed, how might an absence from the mother affect Anna when they are both tending an authoritarian husband/father who is slowly and painfully dying? The father becomes the benevolent object of the daughter’s affections, yet there are some ominous omissions from this account of passive and empathetic fatherly love. For example, one of Anna’s symptoms was said to stem from her father’s demand that she fetch him wine, yet nothing further is said of his demands.

The present absence of the mother and the absent presence of the father are not the only omissions in Breuer’s account of Anna O’s illness (Freud & Breuer, 1893/1974). Although Breuer emphatically states that he cured Anna O of her hysteria, this is apparently not the case. Breuer attended Anna O daily, yet this devotion became complicated. Breuer and his wife hurriedly left the country in the wake of what Soler (2006) describes as an ‘unfortunate situation’. Anna informed Breuer that she was pregnant to him, a phantom pregnancy. In a way, this was a fitting conclusion. Hysterical excess manifests as a baby to an authoritative father figure. Yet within the context of Anna’s status as the first recorded hysterical case
study, she finally submits to phallocentrism, and symbolically gives birth to psychoanalysis.

Unfortunately, Anna O was never cured of hysteria, despite Breuer’s claims to the contrary (Soler, 2006). Instead, Anna developed a marked distaste for psychoanalysis and men in general. By utilising her hysterical over-propensity to care, she went on to invent social work under her real name, Bertha Pappenheim (Rosenbaum, 1984; Verhaeghe, 1999).

Bertha worked with impoverished Jewish girls, unmarried mothers and women forced into prostitution to survive, creating homes for them in pre-Hitler Germany. It is probably fortunate that she died before Hitler’s rise to power, spared the agony of knowing the fate of the women’s homes and more importantly, the women who occupied them. Few, if any of these young Jewish women survived the Second World War, being prostituted, raped and murdered by the German army (Rosenbaum, 1984).

Within the caring profession, Bertha was able to redirect her over-emotive hysterical self towards caring for others. Verhaeghe (1999) surmises then, that empathy is also an hysterical symptom as is over-emotion, which suggests in this light that social work is an hysterical fantasy. This in turn, leaves the hysterical daughter again thinking of her own experiences of caring for her mother and pondering the connections between hysteria and public discourses of care. She thinks of the transition between daughter and caregiver, and considers how this plays out within the administering of care. When do these transitions take place? When does the authoritarian carer become the hysterical carer and what happens to mother-daughter encounter as the gap continually expands and constricts? How does this shift to public care repress the daughter and evoke her symptoms, symptoms that
may emerge as care, an empty care that represses an unspeakable care that was perhaps something that women once ‘just did’?

**A quarter turn**

Bertha’s newfound social presence may represent an explicit shift of hysteria from the private to the public domain. She is now driven by an ethical sense of social justice and can implement caring in a moral public domain. Yet does she bring with her a glimpse of what lies beyond the wall? A public display of hysterical excess, of birth, of jouissance, of empathy and a gap perhaps, that would not go unnoticed by the analyst daughter if she were indeed quietly listening from the fringes, or reading and writing them in relation to questions of care and hysteria?

Within the active discourses attributed to the contemporary woman/hysteric, the commodification of care may provide a perfect cover for hysterical daughters to stealthily enter the workforce and infiltrate the caring industry. Indeed, we should be wary: in contemporary times, according to Soler (2006), the growing volume of women entering the workforce makes identifying the hysteric within the public domain extremely difficult.

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**Interlude: The Borromean Knot...again**

In neurosis, in as much as reality is not fully rearticulated symbolically into the external world, it is in a second phase that a partial flight from reality, an inability to confront this secretly preserved part of reality, occurs in the subject. (Lacan, 1997b, p. 45)

In psychosis...reality itself initially contains a hole that the
world of fantasy will subsequently fill. (Lacan, 1997b, p. 45)

For Lacan (2006a), there are distinct differences between speech and writing. Speech is spontaneous and an outlet for abreaction (Lacan, 1997a). Writing offers the opportunities for tightening, for metaphorical adjustments and repressing of the Imaginary (Lacan, 2006a). Lacan’s later work, yet to be officially translated and published in English, suggests that if language forsakes the split-subject and the knot or the chain of linguistic reality is broken, then reality or the subject’s perceived consciousness as a social being becomes tenuous, the chain of signification that holds the subject together as distinct and whole is broken (Harari, 1995). The subject can write his own reality or sinthome, which is another linguistic form of symptom.

This leads Lacan to surmise that it is not necessarily the pre-scripted interconnection of the chains that holds the subject together after all. There is something else entirely, that can only be provided through language in the written form, a madness threaded together with grammatical accuracy, that makes no sense whatsoever to anyone other than the writer, unless interpreted within creative literary art. I wonder then, where such non-sensibility begins and ends. On the linguistic fringes of consciousness perhaps, its sanity/desire preserved by the threads of tragedy and genealogical law. Within the spoken word, the wall that marks the dawning of recognition transcribed into speech is set in discourse as a barrier at the level of pre-consciousness.
The hysterical daughter remains hopeful that writing allows some form of movement of the wall, a consciousness inscribed with grammatical correctness that ascribes an alternative reality. Whatever it is that holds the subject together when the knot is severed appears to be able to shift the boundary that the wall creates after two rings are freed due to the severing of the third. Herndl (1988) puts forward an interesting argument in respect to the cure of Anna O.

It is well documented that Breuer (Freud and Breuer, 1893/1974) did not cure Anna O although after hypnosis and the subsequent retelling of dreams and hallucinations, Anna O became lucid and happy temporarily (Herndl 1988; Hunter, 1983; Rosenbaum, 1984; Soler, 2006), having ‘filled the hole: with the world of [hysterical] fantasy’. Sometime after Breuer’s hastened exit (Soler, 2006), Bertha took to writing and became a published feminist author and translator as well as a recognised champion of women’s rights and public safety (Herndl, 1988; Hunter, 1983). Herndl argues therefore that Anna O did not experience a talking cure, but in fact a writing cure: the talking cure temporarily filled the gap, the writing cure spun a permanent web. In light of Lacan’s sinthome, where the hole opens as psychosis takes hold, the gap becomes thatched with perfectly formed written structural crafting, no matter how psychotic it’s content may seem. A writing cure becomes an alternative existence, not a cure as such, given Lacan’s (1997b) thesis that there is no place for considerations of sanity
(reality) and madness, they both hold equal credence:

Yet the written narrative exposes the ‘something else’ that keeps the subject together, once one of the three rings of the knot have been severed. Perhaps, like Breuer’s talking cure, this offers a lucid outlet as Herndl (1988) suggests, although not a cure as such. The hysteric writes her accounts of alternative realities in the world, allowing Anna O to become the caring public figure she undoubtedly was, cured perhaps within a neurotic adherence to the laws of grammar and syntax, but hysterical nonetheless.

*Figure 9.* The Borromean Knot breaks amidst a flurry of hysterical writing.
**Women, witches, hysterics, mothers, daughters, caregivers...**

Traditional post-Freudians have argued that there is no such thing as hysteria (Chodoff & Lyons, 1958; Mitchell, 2000; Verhaeghe, 1999). This is because the range of symptoms contributed to the condition is wide and vague. Somatic symptoms such as physical contractions, paralysis and seizures, co-exist with phobias, voices, hallucinations and delusion. The sheer diversity of these symptoms has led Verhaeghe (1999) to contemplate both historical and contemporary lack of agreement as to what symptoms or collection of symptoms constitute hysteria, especially since the prevalence of somatic symptoms has abated since Freudian times (Chodoff & Lyons, 1958). Verhaeghe suggests that the diverse range of hysterical symptoms are products of cultural moral judgement, or in other words, linguistic constructs regulated by the reality principle, that objectively (re)constitute and (re)produce hysteria through dominant discourse.

Verhaeghe (1999) points out that past ‘symptoms’ attributed to hysterics, witches and other women are many, varied and strikingly similar. A list of hysterical symptoms supplied by Chodoff and Lyons (1958) are not too far removed from Antoninus of Florence’s list of female vices (Antoninus, 1450, as cited in Verhaeghe, 1999) that served as a guide to the construction of Malleus Maleficarum (Kramer & Sprenger, 1490/1971), also known as the Witches Hammer. Hysterical symptoms include egoism, exhibitionism, and an unbridled display of affects, emotional shallowness, lasciviousness and sexual frigidity. Women’s unique vices and witchery combined equate to ‘greedy animal, beastly abyss, and concupiscence of the flesh, painful duality, passionate passion and fake faithfulness’ (Chodoff & Lyons; Verhaeghe, 1999). It would seem that there is an integrated chain of signification that intertwines women’s moral and social behaviours with their
biology and inherent moral weakness, and these ‘links’ have been historically and violently enforced or generated by fundamentalist Christianity (Boxer & Quataert, 2000; Kramer & Sprenger, 1490/1971).

**Hysterical men or just men behaving badly?**

Juliet Mitchell (2000) suggests that in light of the existence of men hysterics, there is not a great deal of difference between the hysteric, the witch and the bloodthirsty fervour of the Christian inquisitor. For Mitchell, hysteria has been replaced in psychoanalytic theory by symptoms of femininity in the writings of Helene Deutsch and others. In doing so, hysteria, is displaced as an indicator of developmental trauma. The emphasis of post-structuralist theories of sexual difference in tandem with psychoanalysis have represented feminine hysteria as a developmental mother attachment trauma and have ignored the violent outbreaks of hysteria throughout history against women, ethnic minorities religious groups. Indeed, one might contemplate the diagnostic history of hysteria as an hysterical outbreak of scientific endeavour, specifically framed as predominantly directed toward woman and something specifically born from an already scripted feminine weakness emphasised by the predominance of woman witches.

Mitchell (2000) suggests that the historical slaughter of witches was itself a mass act of hysteria and a darker aggressive off-spin emerges from theories of human development. For Mitchell, post Freudian claims that hysteria no longer exists, fail to take account of the migratory nature of the condition. We no longer pathologise hysteria, yet it continues to manifest within contemporary society and surfaces as particularly macabre and sometimes intensely violent behaviours. If witch-hunting, or ‘mass hysteria’ is indeed the hysteria that drives this thesis, then I am disturbed by the idea that the manifestation of the witch and the hysteric is still
possible within available discourse and its prevailing structures. If she still exists within discourse, then so too do her pursuers and persecutors.

Within the consideration of Lacan’s four discourses, the discourses of Christianity are a complex business. There is a gap created in discourse that sends the master into a blind panic, or in other words hysteria, a threat as to what lays beyond discourse, that is cleansed by physical violence against subjugated bodies. What is it about women’s bodies that create the gap between the discourse of the master and the discourse of the hysteric within which the daughter seeks to (re)discover her lost encounter with her mother? If puritanical and fundamentalist behaviour is indeed hysteria, a neurosis born from the difficulties articulating repression from the Symbolic and articulated within the Oedipus complex as metaphoric castration, then there is a difference in how men and women are able to articulate such a loss, men as whole, and women as Symbolically partial. In effect, the hysterical daughter loses the one avenue open for her to pursue if we assimilate hysteria as androgynous. However, by framing witch-hunting as hysterical, Mitchell’s (2000) work makes Lacan’s (1997b) definition of psychosis more accessible. Christian fantasy fills the hole or the gap in reality, and the ‘normative’ subject, in this case, the inquisitor, is effectively the symptom of psychosis.

**Why witches are women**

Boxer and Quataert (2000), describe a persistent religious fervour setting the scene for the European witch-hunts of the 16th and 17th centuries. A quote by King James VI of Scotland and I of England (1597/1982, p. 30) explains why witches were mainly women:

The reason is easie, for as that sexe is frailer than man is, so is it easier to be intrapped in these grosse snares of the Devill, as was over well proved
to be true, by the Serpents deceiving of Eva at the beginning, which makes him homelier with that sexe sensine.

For King James then, the inherent hysterical weaknesses of women make them susceptible to the devil’s advances. This sentiment is also prevalent within *Malleus Maleficarum*:

And indeed, just as through the first defect in their intelligence they are more prone to abjure the faith; so through their second defect of inordinate affections and passions they search for, brood over, and inflict various vengeances, either by witchcraft, or by some other means. Wherefore, it is no wonder that so great a number of witches exist in this sex. (Kramer & Sprenger 1490/1971, p. 45)

The Reverend Montague Summer (1948/1971), who translated Malleus Maleficarum, reports that the book became one of the most famous and respected volumes in history, occupying judges benches and both protestant and catholic pulpits for several centuries. Indeed, Kramer & Sprenger (1490/1971), go to some lengths to substantiate, through biblical texts and literature, the disagreeable and dangerous dispositions of women in general. They suggest to the clergy to be mindful when preaching the evil of all women, now that Eve, in the advent of the New Testament, is not the only example of woman’s behaviour. There is such a thing as a good woman, as portrayed by the Virgin Mary.

In areas that included men in their witch tally, heresy was also an attribute of witchery (Boxer & Quataert, 2000) and the numbers of men caught up in the hunt grew at times when witch-hunting was at its most prevalent (Goodare, 1998). Summers (1948/1971, p. v) suggests that the accusation of “witchcraft was inextricably mixed with politics.” Accusations were strategically made for political and personal gain within the affairs of both the church and the aristocracy.
According to Boxer & Quataert (2000), witch-hunting also became a force in the reformation of women’s behaviour. It was also a selective preoccupation where witches’ symptoms conveniently varied from region to region. In England, witches tended to be old and poor, usually women accused by a relative or acquaintance. The Scottish witch was more often outspoken, married late in life and a peasant of the lowest order (Boxer & Quataert, 2000). Witchcraft in Scotland had a long apprenticeship and required sex with the devil, who would manifest himself into rigid form through the compression of air. Confessions of sex acts with the devil were extracted by torture (Goodare, 1998).

German witches were often widows (Boxer & Quataert, 2000) and in the 1500s, old and poor (Lehmann, 1988). In the British North American colonies, witches tended to be wealthy women about to inherit property or money and thus upsetting the synchrony of phallic genealogical inheritance. In Puritan New England, witches were sinners and many women confessed believing they had indeed succumbed to the whiles of the ‘Devill’ (Boxer & Quataert, 2000).

In light of the convenient shifting of symptoms or generation of signifiers, the overzealous influences of church and state driven by what in modern day standards might be called a psychotic Christian super-ego were underpinned by a more calculating agenda. Witch-hunting became a great opportunity to boost state coffers and eradicate non-productive old women. Interestingly within this process of reform, two acceptable service industry occupations were directed back to the private domain. In areas of protestant domination, witch-hunting went hand in hand with closing of the nunneries, denying opportunities for an independent, sacred status (Bloch, 1978) and a natural haven for the hysterical carer, a place where families
could send their errant daughters or any other female family member who caused hysterical difficulties. The convent was also a handy place to send your daughter for those who could not afford a dowry. Convents provided care to the public domain in the form of child minding, education, food and medical assistance. The rise of Protestantism and its emphasis on marriage as opposed to celibacy closed down opportunities for women to live within the sanctity of piety (Bloch, 1978; Boxer & Quataert, 2000).

Unregulated by the church, care and prostitution became problematic for Catholic and Protestant alike, both denominations aiming to confine care and sex as a woman’s responsibility within marriage (Bloch, 1978; Boxer & Quataert, 2000). Even though Calvinist protestant beliefs decreed that both men and women were equal in principle by the seventeenth century, men who digressed from the sanctity of marriage could be described as sowing their wild oats, while women were publically whipped and banished at the first sign of infidelity (Boxer & Quataert, 2000; Frankel, 1989). In the historical light of witch-hunting, this seems like a merciful escape from a nastier fate.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Christian morality was dispensed by an army of reformist social workers insistent in helping the immoral and the fallen in the name of God amidst a zealous ‘hysterical’ outbreak of care (Belich, 2001; Dalley, 1992; Tennant, 1992; Wanhalla, 2007). In colonial America, in a situation that bears similarities to the torturing of witches, unmarried mothers who refused to reveal the names of their child’s father were administered care by the pious moral middle classes with the rationality that the pain of childbirth might prompt a confession (Boxer & Quataert, 2000). In New Zealand and Ireland, Christian based homes for unmarried mothers inflicted similar care, believing that the pain of
childbirth would administer suitable punishment on the morally inferior and morally
criminal (Tennant, 1992; Titley, 2007).

Between 1983 and 1991, over 100 day care centres in the United States
fielded accusations of Satanist behaviour including cannibalism, orgies, the eating of
faeces and the drinking of urine. There were a variety of convictions and hefty
sentences, such as ‘twelve life sentences’, ‘three life sentences’, ‘life plus 311’ years,
many of which have since been overturned (de Young, 1998).

Day (1987) introduces the Grange Royal Commission inquiry into a spate of
child deaths at the Hospital for Sick Children in the early 1980s as a modern day
witch-hunt. Staff attributed the increase in mortality rates to the phenomenon of
clustering, an unexplained increased rate of a particular medical condition, plus an
increase in ward space, patients and surgery. Police, however, directed an
unrelenting inquiry intent on placing the blame for the deaths on nursing staff. Day
quotes the officer in charge of the inquiry. The officer asked a nurse why she had
administered a particular drug to one of the deceased children prior to the child’s
death, prompting the nurse to request the presence of a lawyer before further
questioning. The police officer’s rationale for the nurse’s guilt and subsequent arrest
goes as follows:

It strengthened my belief that she was the person responsible because I
believed that an innocent person would cry to the heavens and say ‘I didn’t
do it’ or something of that nature. (as cited in Day, 1987, p. 25)

The nurse in this case admits her guilt through silence and rational response.
Obvious signs of hysterical weakness may well have saved this nurse from her witch
trial ordeal. Yet we know that in the past, as told by King James (1597/1982),
hysterical weakness leads women to witchcraft. There may well be links between
contemporary hysterics, witches, women, murderesses and indeed nurses as products of the master’s discourse, just as a coherent definition of hysteria is no closer through the deliberations of the discourse of the University.

Drury (2002) discusses how crowds or majorities enable contemporary witch-hunting, especially within a society that is technologically and media driven. Within this context, although witch-hunting is still prevalent in contemporary times, where the state or the church no longer wields authority over witches, discourses of consensus empower a ground swell of public opinion. Yet discourses of good and evil, of what constitutes a good and a bad woman remain. Modern day targets of witch-hunting, despite the shift from the explicit woman hunting, surface in hospitals and day care centres, predominantly staffed by women. Witch-hunts are initiated by discursive framing of events and circumstances, not by unusual behaviours or symptoms displayed by the workers that might separate femininity from witchery or hysteria.

Although Soler (2006) suggests that Lacan provides clear boundaries to differentiate between discourses of femininity and hysteria, the contemporary hysteric becomes difficult to detect amidst changes surrounding the boundaries between the public and the private. Indeed, Mitchell (2000) also suggests that the contemporary hysteric exists in its traditional migratory form, reinventing its symptoms with the changing times. How can we detect the hysteric who operates, as did Anna O, competently within the public domain, yet officially uncured? Alternatively, how can we detect the hysteric, who masquerades as a product of normative development and performs her God given duties of wife and mother meticulously? How may we flush out the ‘caring’ witch who succumbs to her corporeal traces, her jouissance and the evil it discursively produces? In other words,
how do we detect the hysterical who appears to have become a perfect master of disguise, when there is no known cure, other than repression of her symptoms?

**Masquerading mothers and closing down an avenue for hysterical enquiry**

Joan Riviere initiated the concept of masquerade as a metaphor of women’s sexuality in 1929. According to Heath (1986), Lacan brought Riviere’s masquerade back to life as the projected masculine woman/ideal. Joan Riviere’s (1929/2008) work appears to draw strength from Ernest Jones, Freud and Melanie Klein, all of whom she attended for analysis and subsequently worked with as psychoanalyst and translator (Freud & Jones, 1993; Heath, 1986; Klein & Riviere, 1964). She first met Ernest Jones as a client and when their relationship became untenable and sexual, he referred her to Freud (Freud & Jones, 1993; Heath, 1986). Jones explains his client’s referral to Freud in a letter:

> It is a case of typical hysteria, almost the only symptoms being sexual anaesthesia and unorganised Angst, with a few inhibitions of a general nature.... She has a most colossal narcissism imaginable, to a great extent secondary to the refusal of her father to give her a baby and her subsequent masculine identification with him. (Freud & Jones, 1922/1993, pp. 453-454)

According to Heath (1986), Riviere was an intelligent woman with a forceful character. The trade of women between psychoanalysts and discussion of them in relation to the desires of the analyst were common in the days when Freud and Jones practiced psychoanalysis. Riviere, it seems, was a woman/hysteric who portrayed many of the signs of being one variety of Jones’ homosexual woman. She was
feminine, capable, intellectual and according to Jones, aspired to be a man (Freud & Jones, 1993; Heath, 1986).

In Riviere’s (1929/2008) ‘Womanliness as Masquerade’, she discusses her own case studies as follows:

In university life, in scientific professions and in business, one constantly meets women who seem to fill every criterion of complete feminine development. They are excellent wives and mothers, capable housewives; they maintain social life and assist culture; they have no lack of feminine interests, e.g. in their personal appearance, and when called upon they can still find time to play the part of the disinterested mother-substitutes among a wide circle of relatives and friends. At the same time they fulfil their duties of their profession at least as well as the average man. It is really a puzzle to know how to classify this type psychologically. (Riviere, 1929/2008, p. 25)

According to Riviere (1929/2008), as posited by Freud, all children are bisexual. The phallic woman is merely a slight malfunctioning of the development of feminine sexuality and does not amount to any fundamental tendencies toward the physicality of a full-blown homosexual relationship. She cites the case of an American woman, a successful professional, engaged in “subversive writings.” Riviere marvels at the difficulty of spotting the problem when this woman seems to perform all her duties flawlessly:

...her excellent relation with her husband included a very intimate affectionate attachment between them and full and frequent sexual enjoyment; she prided herself on her proficiency as a housewife. She had followed her profession with marked success all her life. She had a high degree of adaptation to reality, and managed to sustain good and appropriate relations with everyone with whom she came in contact. (Riviere, 1929/2008, p.26)
However, according to Riviere (1929/2008), there remained some anxiety regarding the public performance requirements of her client’s work. Apparently, this stemmed from an unresolved oedipal crisis. Instead of realigning with the mother in true subservient fashion, she had rejected the mother, resulting in conflict between mother and daughter. She had opted for the phallus, stealing said object from her father. Rejecting the mother within Klein’s (1932, 1957, 1960) psychoanalytic theory manifests in sadistic hatred, an over-fixation of the oral stage, where the child wishes to cause grievous bodily harm by biting, severing and devouring. According to Heath (1986), the oral stage is prevalent in the formation of feminine sexuality. A disrupted developmental process may impede the feminine submission (which is predominantly oral and receptive) thereby leaving the door open for a more masculine form of development that underlies an exterior of feminine masquerade.

Through analysis, Riviere (1929/2008) reveals that her client resented assumptions of inequality that manifested in anxieties of inadequate performance. She would seek reassurance from her admiring male colleagues, flirting with them after each performance. So from puzzling over categories, Riviere decides:

[The client] corresponded clearly to one type Ernest Jones has sketched: his first group of homosexual women who, while taking no interest in the other women, wish for ‘recognition’ of their masculinity from men, or in other words, to be men themselves. (Riviere, 1929/ 2008, p.39)

Riviere (1929/2008) explains development of homosexuality or heterosexuality as dependent on degrees of anxiety experienced. According to Riviere, her client equated her colleagues with father figures, both simultaneously seeking assurance from her castrated father while suffering the guilt from the public exhibition of having castrated him and openly flaunting her appropriation of him.
From the title of Riviere’s (1929/2008) paper, one might get the impression that the masquerade is the symptom here. This is not the case: Riviere reveals that the masquerade itself is normative. The manifestation of performance anxiety reveals the homosexual hysteric. The symptom as possession, is located beneath the metaphor of the masquerade or in other words, within the mask. The hysteric reveals her possession of masculinity hidden through impeccable feminine metaphoric form in her anxiety and flirtatious behaviours when public speaking, an unconscious uneasiness that seeps through the gaps. Without such symptoms, the hysteric remains concealed - along with what she has. Riviere’s (1929/2008) masquerade is an important theoretical triumph for the hysterical woman as it provides a safe space that is uniquely hers. As a masculine hysteric, one of Ernest Jones’ (1927) two types of homosexual woman, she has secured the possibilities of a unique feminine space somewhere within the mask that depicts the perfect phallic woman. Yet there are hidden consequences to this work, revealed by Lacan’s interpretation of Rivieres work and Soler’s (2006) critique of Lacan.

Lacan interprets Riviere’s (1929/2008) masquerade and feminine mask as man’s ideal phallic projection, the Symbolic woman. As Mitchell (2000, p. 187) suggests, Riviere’s thesis is ‘turned’ by Lacan from “femininity is masquerade”, to femininity is phallic projection. Through Soler’s (2006) faithful reading of Lacan’s phallocentrism, she summarises Lacan’s interpretation through critique of his work: for her, masquerade is indeed femininity, yet this femininity is manipulative. In other words, women negotiate relationships to gain what they want the most, a phallic jouissance that manifests from the masters discourse, the desire to be desired. Soler’s case study goes as follows. A woman receives an allowance from her husband, yet she habitually overspends. Every budget balancing day, he gets angry, she cries and
they make up. The woman’s behaviours are a masquerade. She has her own finances, which she has concealed from him, knowing that he would feel redundant if he were aware of her competence.

For Soler (2006), women have equity within language in as much as impotence allows: they masquerade as inferior to act out the man’s desires and in doing so they also get what they want. She wears the mask: yet somehow, the mask itself is firmly in control. In effect, Riviere’s masquerade is articulated as manipulation. Riviere’s mask conceals/hides masculinity; Soler’s mask is designed to both conceal and extract it. The hysterics sanctuary, once free from the onslaught of phallocentrism becomes colonised as a place where woman deviously exacts her desires, although she may not consciously do so, a discourse vaguely reminiscent of the ‘hysterical’ master’s ramblings of Kramer and Sprenger’s (1490/1971) *Malleus Maleficarum* and its evil manipulating women. Masquerade is no longer a haven, leaking uneasiness through the gaps in discourse, but a means to procuring phallic jouissance.

Soler’s (2006) critique of Lacan’s reinterpretation of Riviere’s work reveals how the phallic structure of language allows for the articulation of women as constructing their own misfortunes; that women manipulate conflict within familial settings for their own ends, for jouissance and possession and for the sheer fun of negotiation. A discourse of active participation in ones own victimisation is increasingly accessed in contemporary terms in situations of motherhood and/or familial violence, where the mother is held accountable for the father’s violence due to the child’s continued presence in a dangerous predicament. Because of an equitable status of difference made visible through language structure, she is the creator of the situation and she is equally capable of leaving it. In effect, she is
contained within a prison with no visible wall within an enlightened society, increasingly driven by global moral consensus that requires visual reassurance and the comfort of reality-driven generated knowledge.

As caring perpetuates in a global workforce as commodified and sold, the hysteric wonders if Riviere’s mask now extends, inextricably caught in the interface of the public sphere as the face of the caregiving daughter. Does the hysteric’s possession remain concealed within it if she quells her anxieties, or does language continue to evolve in ways that make her difference untenable? As the mask goes about its business exacting pleasure, does the hysteric still conceal her possession, or is there something else she conceals that can only be articulated as either having or not having through the avenues of man’s desire? There is something that she seeks which she is unable to recall.

The hysterical daughter now has memorable historical chronological context and an uneasy feeling that what she seeks was once imaginable although no longer accessible. She must find another pathway within the bounds of her enquiry. The hysteric, who once possessed the secret, masquerades as a normative exemplary mother. I resolve to redirect my inquiry to psychoanalytically underpinned theories of maternal subjectivity, intersubjectivity and trans-subjectivity to consider a ‘third’ space, A third space and the mask become a feature of the terrain that the daughter now searches and the threads and textures of the mask become conscious pathways to open up gaps and acquire traces.
Readers’ note: Chapter Four

I must also emphasise that within the scope inquiry and the genre of enquiry I have drawn some ontological boundaries in terms of the limits of the hysterical daughter’s gaze. In Chapter Four, I suggest that Levinas’ beyond-the-face, interpreted as beyond ontology, is a hysterical position and I have also framed Baraitser’s search for a mother-son encounter as an hysterical journey. These framings are made within the theoretical confines drawn within the functions of the different speaking positions within my reading of the texts. I also acknowledge, from an academic position, the theoretical difficulties within this chapter of framing Levinas’ theory of transcendence within the bounds of Freud’s unconscious structure. Levinas and Lacan never acknowledged each other’s work and Levinas, would not engage with psychoanalysis. Gondek (1998) suggests that this is because there is is an impasse between Judaism and Lacan’s interpretations of God. Certainly, although Levinas denies any religious influences in his work, one would have to agree that God figures strongly within discourses of paternal transcendence and ‘being,’ and transcendence figures prominently within phallic discourse. I read Levinas within the assumptions laid out within Lacanian psychoanalysis and as enabling the daughter to traverse her own tightly mapped scope of inquiry and the ontological restrictions this represents.

Within the context of this work, I initially interpret the term ontology as confined by the boundaries of Freud’s unconscious structure, reinterpreted as a theory of discourse by Lacan and acknowledge that in this context there is nothing beyond it apart from the Real. Within hysterical interpretation, ontology could be
confined as that which lies within the boundaries of Freud’s unconscious structure or within masculine theories of unconscious structures. Similarly, I have made mention of ‘Freud’s unconscious’ and ‘Freud’s unconscious structure’ and Winnicott’s ‘good-enough’ and ‘long-suffering’ mother. The former are metaphors for the scope of the daughter’s inquiry and the latter as metaphors to be interpreted as theoretically possessive within the genre of hysterical searching and not names of personal circumstances or relationships. I also acknowledge the production of good-enough mothering discourses as generated within liberalist discourses of moral practice.
Chapter Four: (Un)memorable encounters

...when deprived of maternal care, the child’s development is almost always retarded-physically, intellectually and socially-and...symptoms of physical and mental illness may appear. (Bowlby, 1952/1995, p. 15)

In light of Riviere’s (1929/2008) revelation that the mask is the product of normative development, impeccable motherhood is ‘outed’ as a masquerade, I have considered this version of the mask as a wall or screen that protects or excludes the other jouissance from the moral projectory of the reality principle, or alternatively a wall created by the disruption of the gaze/scopic drive, one that is inextricably woven within the pathways of the discourse of the hysteric. Within the discourse of the hysteric, the mask itself offers possibilities of a subjective space that can be spoken as mother-daughter, perhaps within the realm of intersubjectivity, where we can consider this space as a third, one that offers a memorable place for encounter and recognition.

In this chapter, I continue a genealogy of care that allows the daughter to follow the pathways of maternal subjectivity, intersubjectivity and trans-subjectivity, tracing Klein (1932, 1957, 1960) and Chodorow’s (1978) underpinning of Gilligan’s (1977, 1982) care through the gaps and traces within the threads of her mask. I locate a gap between Klein and Chodorow through the work of Doane and Hodges (1995) and after discussing the term ‘third’ theorised by Benjamin, the genre of hysterical enquiry is consciously enabled. The daughter accompanies Baraitser on her most adventurous journey yet, deep into Freud’s unconscious structure in an effort to locate maternal alterity. Together, Baraitser’s (2009) mother and the daughter traverse Levinas’ (1978, 1979/1995, 1998) theories of alterity and transcendence, a pathway, initially enabled by Freud, Klein and object relations.
Maternal objects

Klein (1932, 1957, 1960) and Chodorow (1978), as discussed in Chapter One, influenced Gilligan’s (1977, 1982) critique of Kohlberg’s (1981, 1982) work on moral reasoning. Not only have they inspired Gilligan’s feminist ethics of care, their foundational work has also generated ongoing debate and hysterical enquiry around maternal subjectivity, intersubjectivity, trans-subjectivity, maternal encounter and maternal alterity.

Baraitser (2009) questions whether Object Relations Theory and maternal subjectivity is an adequate platform from which to theorise mother and child relationships. This is because Object Relations Theory places an emphasis on the actions of the mother in determining the normal development of the child: object relations has a long history that threads through traditional psychoanalytic theory on mother-child relations (Ainsworth, 1969) and underpins many theories of maternal subjectivity. These works include Winnicott’s (1987) good-enough mothering and Bowlby’s (1952/1995) and Ainsworth’s (Bretherton, 1992) Attachment Theory, as well as Hollway’s (2006) capacity to care, all of which place an emphasis on the mother’s role in the development of the child as opposed to the child’s self-centred world of mother as object. These theories have not developed in isolation. Developmental theory has evolved through influential discursive interaction and critique between key theorists of the times, for example, Freud, Jones and Riviere, Riviere and Klein and indeed, Riviere and Bowlby (Ainsworth, 1969; Bretherton, 1992; Jones, 1927; Riviere, 1929/2008).

Yet according to Doane and Hodges (1995), the mother has not always been considered as the key to normative development. They suggest that the chain of synchronically signified feminine encounter formed by critiques of the work of Klein
(1932, 1960), Chodorow (1978) and Gilligan (1978, 1982), has a missing link. Object Relations Theory has undergone a subtle change in progression from Klein to Chodorow. Although the behaviours of the mother, within Kleinian theory, influence the child in relation to how she touches and responds, the mother’s responses are not emphasised. Klein suggests:

The mother in her good aspects - loving, helping, and feeding the child - is the first good object that the infant makes part of his inner world. His capacity to do so is, I would suggest, up to a point innate. Whether the good object becomes sufficiently part of the self depends to some extent on persecutory anxiety - and accordingly resentment - not being too strong; at the same time a loving attitude on the part of the mother contributes much to the success of this process. (Klein, 1960, p. 6)

The emphasis of Klein’s (1960) object relations focuses on the perceptions of the child although the mother can moderate potential ongoing persecutory anxiety. The child perceives a fractured mother; pieces it is unable to integrate. If the child receives a plentiful supply of sustenance from one breast, it associates that with the good object-mother. Identifying strongly with the good mother enhances the probability of developing a stable personality and friendly, sympathetic relations with others (Klein, 1960). If the other breast is not so forthcoming, the child associates this with the bad object-mother. A pronounced alignment with the bad mother, according to Doane and Hodges (1995), can subsequently result in a guilt-ridden anxiety manifesting from previous unconscious sadistic behaviours and phantasies. These phantasies are orally driven and manifest, for example, as destroying (Klein, 1957) or devouring (Doane & Hodges, 1995) the mother’s body.

The child’s thoughts remain fractured until it is able to integrate the two mothers, forming the basis of a successful ‘splitting’ in relation to the Oedipus
complex. Realisation of integration takes the child from a paranoid-schizoid position of development to a depressive one (Klein, 1960; Klein & Riviere, 1964). These are positions and not stages: according to Segal (1988), the depressive position is not a natural progression from the paranoid-schizoid position. The latter never fully takes over from the former. The depressive position integrates the mother/parent/father without fully displacing the paranoid-schizoid position. For Doane and Hodges (1995), Klein’s Object Relations Theory is not a theory of maternal subjectivity, but of child development that excludes the mother’s subjectivity as primary object and then assimilates her into the silent world of parental responsibility.

The exclusion of the pre-linguistic or primordial mother as suggested by Doane and Hodges (1995) makes sense in the context of what Segal (1988) describes as a progression of Freud’s theories of child development. The portrayal of mother as object in this instance negates cultural discourses of natural motherhood. The mother’s responses are initiated by the child and therefore reveal a gap that can be filled with appropriate ways in which a mother can respond. Pre-scripted mothering assigns meaning to theories of biological determinism and innate mothering skills at the same time that the mother remains an object in the child’s developmental process.

The mother’s presence, in relation to the child, is primordial within the early stages of development. The Kleinian child and its fractured gaze appear isolated within its own perceptions, apart from a primal relation that facilitates as unconscious recognition (Klein, 1960). The child consumes all else in an act of assimilation until it recognises and integrates objects, hunger, thirst and parts of anatomy as an act of recognition of the mother/other (Doane & Hodges, 1995; Klein & Riviere, 1964).

A 'good-enough' mother

For Doane and Hodges (1995), child expert Donald Winnicott (1975) introduces the mother’s subjectivity into Object Relations Theory through the idea of the ‘good-enough mother’. Winnicott adopts Klein’s theory of child development, placing more responsibility for the child’s normative development on the actions of the mother and less on the perceptions of the child. For example, Doane and Hodges (1995) explain that for Winnicott, it was imperative that the mother used the right techniques for putting the child on the breast to help the child successfully negotiate its paranoid-schizoid position. This demonstrates the importance of the mother’s role in presenting the breast in the best possible light to encourage healthy devouring love hate phantasies that prepare the child for successful transition from paranoid-schizoid to depressive or in other words, a successful transition through the oedipal conflict.

Winnicott (1975) suggested that mothers required instruction, given the heavy burden of ensuring normative child development that they carry for society. Moreover, Winnicott’s input into the good mothering debate both initiated and influenced a spate of mothering manuals initiated in the early 1900s (Doane & Hodges, 1995), including the paternalist and scientific views of mothering imparted by the likes of Brazelton (1983, 1987), Spock (1946), and New Zealand’s very own founder of the Plunket Society, Frederick Truby King (Chapman, 2003). As discussed in Chapter One, King held a popular belief of the time that mothers were densely ignorant in maternal practice and in need of expert guidance. Indeed, Spock wrote the introduction to Winnicott’s (1987) Babies and their Mothers, a collection of writings published after his death in 1971, and Brazelton suggests that “Winnicott is a major influence on all of us who have tried to bring emotional and behavioural
issues into paediatrics” (Winnicott, 1987, back cover). Indeed, debates about potentially damaging practices of mothering continue, as are the far-reaching effects of Winnicott’s work.

Bowlby is described by Ainsworth (1969, p. 977) as “a psychoanalyst in the tradition of Object Relations Theory.” Raphael-Leff (2010) cites Bowlby’s (1952/1995) investigation into homeless children to draw attention to the consequences of being subjected to maternal deprivation for the child. Bowlby’s work, part of a World Health Organisation (WHO) initiative that crossed the borders of developmental theory into the political arena, advocates the dangers to the child of maternal deprivation and neglect. One form of neglect noted by Bowlby was that of the full time working mother, although it now appears, in light of contemporary mothering discourse, that home mothering can also be deemed to be developmentally and economically damaging (Bailey, 2000; Barnett, 2005; Bianchi, 2000; Galinsky, 2005; Johnson & Swanson, 2007). Consequences of maternal deprivation on children’s behaviour include dishonesty, delinquency, promiscuity, neurosis and psychosis (Bowlby, 1952/1995).

Wendy Hollway (2006) also reconstitutes intersubjectivity based on Klein (1932, 1957, 1960) and Winnicott (1975, 1987, 1989) as a basis for care theory situated within normal (object-relations) development. The better the mothering, the more propensity to care can be developed by the child. The mother is not only responsible for the normal development of her children, but also their lifelong behaviours. For example, according to Hollway, an unsuccessful transition from Klein’s paranoid-schizoid position can lead to aggressive behaviours towards others, especially the behaviours of men toward women. For women, this maldevelopment
leads to bad mothering and what I interpret as a cyclical chain of genealogical, social and moral ineptitude.

**The mother’s presence as object: Mothering a nation**

Discourses of maternal deprivation are still actively evolving today although not necessarily confined to the private domain. Just as witch-hunting has left the sanctity of the church and become driven by public opinion (Drury, 2002), so too has maternal deprivation left the specialised expertise of politics and psychological discourse to form public consensus in the political and psychological arena. Recently, McNaughton (2011) suggested that the contemporary rallying against child obesity puts mothers in situations that frame them as bad mothers. According to McNaughton, there is public opinion that suggests the over-feeding of children is abusive, prompting talk of law change allowing for prosecution against offending mothers. Similarly, overweight mothers are risking their babies’ well-being. Maher, Fraser and Wright, (2010) cite the WHO as championing the rights of obese children and suggest that although “overweight or obese children are presented as visible signs of overconsumption and excess...it is their mothers’ misdirected appetites and desires that are really the targets” (Maher, Fraser & Wright, 2010, p. 233). Although explicit mother-blame in government policy and developmental theory has waned, discourses of maternal deprivation continue to be globally circulated through public media, still infiltrating confusing work-life balance discourses and the constitution of good and bad mothers.

Lee (2008) suggests that mothering is not only a private responsibility, but now also a matter of ‘public good’. Ethical ‘good’ as a mother’s responsibility has been taken up by the predecessors of past child experts and firmly steered by contemporary findings of medical research inflated by media representation and
popular opinion. Winnicott (1975) was influential as part of the genealogy of object relations, maternal deprivation, and the passive long-suffering mother in light of subsequent theory. His work theorised child object relations in the form of ‘me/not me’ as a child’s gradual child-object separation (Winnicott, 1953) and instigated ongoing debate around the requirements of “good-enough mothering”, a phrase he introduced “to convey an unidealized view of the maternal function” (Winnicott, 1987, p. 90). Now, within theories of normative development, the child emits a barrage of ruthless demands ‘to which the mother must passively respond’ (Hollway, 2006). The mother’s passive and long-suffering response, along with the amount of physical affection the child receives, is crucial to the child’s normal development (Winnicott, 1987).

Doane and Hodges (1995) suggest that all feminist theories of object relations spawned maternal subjectivity are influenced by the theoretical input of Winnicott, including the work of Chodorow in relation to the different developmental paths of boys and girls. Therefore, the perception that there is a genealogy of woman’s theorising of maternal subjectivity, does not put the traditional and indeed masculine heritage into perspective. This genealogy carries traces of moral and ethical tempering that imprints the mother with crippling responsibilities.

Certainly, Chodorow (1978) has put Winnicott’s (1975, 1987, 1989) cultural observations of responsibility to good use, as an argument against evolutionary theories of instinctual good mothering. However, Doane and Hodges (1995) argument carries some weight in consideration of a swing from a sole consideration of the development of the child to the spotlight on the mother’s role with little
consideration of an interaction between the two, changing the emphasis of bad mothering from biological deficit to moral ineptitude.

**The Mother’s absence as subject: Mothering a daughter**

It would be difficult to put the blame solely on Winnicott for this, in light of Lacan’s (1999, 2006a, 2007) consideration of pre-scripted grammatical structure that holds reality-constructing signifying chains together. The absence of the primordial mother, lost within the oedipal transition and from the gaze that scripts her responsibilities, is prevalent within all interpretations of psychoanalytic theory. However, this absence is not singlehandedly initiated by Winnicott. Winnicott explicitly describes the mask that metaphorically assembles the phallic mother, emphasising the absence of the primordial mother, as noted by Doane and Hodges (1995), from Kleinian (1932, 1957, 1960) developmental theory.

For Raphael-Leff (2010), there is a long ‘sequence’ of events that lead towards the mother’s absence. She suggests that the long-suffering passive mother of Object Relations Theory represents de-subjectivity, an absence of the mother, because it removes the mother’s personal experiences. For example, the pathologising of maternal ambivalence creates or at least helps perpetuate a non-existent idealised normal mother, partly supporting Doane and Hodges (1995) suggestion that we, as feminist writers perpetuate our own absence through endorsing the existence of the long-suffering mother. Yet it should be noted that work by women writers to reinstate maternal subjectivity through theories of primordial encounter have made little impression on the mainstream generation of knowledge. These feminist writers include Cixous and Clement (1986), Kristeva (1982), Irigaray (1985a, 1985b, 1993), Rich (1976) and Ussher (2006), to name but a few. Ideologies espoused by Winnicott and the subsequent development of theories
of de-subjectivity where the primordial mother has been replaced or masked as an ‘ideal’ mother, are examples of the theoretical complexities required to navigate the obtuse structures of developmental psychoanalysis that insist on producing and maintaining the long-suffering passive mother.

A maternal space of encounter

Jessica Benjamin (1995, 1998), whose early texts provide an uptake of Object Relations Theory, demonstrates the necessity to engage, with what Lacan would call phallically produced philosophical discourses of encounter, in an effort to consider mother-child inter-relations. Benjamin (1995, 1998) provides a normative version of development that, through an interactive mother-child dyad, goes beyond maternal subjectivity generated from Object-Relations Theory and gives us a ‘third’. The third is a space where intersubjectivity or a unique interaction or recognition between mother and child or subject and Other is possible. Benjamin’s theorising searches for maternal desire within the child’s struggles with love, hate, phantasy and aggression as a pathway to subjectivity. These struggles take place within Kleinian (1932) object relations, Freud’s (1977) Oedipus complex, the mother’s desire for autonomy and according to Benjamin (2004), Winnicott’s (1953) transitional me/not me. Yet although Benjamin’s maternal desire is born from intersubjective interaction, in Lacanian terms, her maternal subject is still formed within the confines of discourse and its foundations lie within the Symbolic mythical consuming mother of object relations that spawns ambiguity and hatred, in combination with the long-suffering mother of Donald Winnicott’s theories.

Passive, long-suffering mothering becomes a moral prerogative to ensure normative development: yet this is not the only requirement. An interesting debate considers the ethical properties of Benjamin’s work which, like Bowlby’s
thesis, introduces an explicit link between political discourses of work-life balance and developmental theory. This takes place amidst a discussion on what constitutes the best subjective interests of both mother and child (Benjamin, 1998; de Marneffe, 2004) in relation to the time that the mother spends with her children. This debate on intersubjectivity and mother-child relations becomes relevant to the metaphoric contests that gather around Hays’ (1996) wall in relation to the dilemma of contemporary mothers who battle with conflicting choices of intensive mothering, work-life balance and contemporary care discourse.

Benjamin’s (1995, 1998) theory of intersubjectivity is not solely driven by Klein’s (1932) and Winnicott’s (1975, 1987, 1989) Object Relations Theory. Evolving economic theory intertwines with the philosophical work of Hegel’s (1977) *Phenomenology of Spirit* and philosophical theories of encounter. Benjamin’s intersubjectivity is achievable through discursive struggles for recognition of mother-child encounter and mutuality between the two (Benjamin, 1998; Driver, 2005). She engages with Hegel’s cyclical master/slave ethical encounters with the Other, to discuss possibilities for contemporary mothers to regulate and initiate normative child development. In doing so, Benjamin creates a space for the mother as autonomous subject, consistent with a world that morally produces motherhood through a conglomeration of politics, economics, philosophy and developmental theory. Benjamin engages with the concept of maternal desire that manifests within Hegel’s constant cycle of tension and recognition of the Other, a reciprocity through a shared psychic space as an intersubjectivity. Within this reality, recognition of the mother’s own desire is crucial for the normal development of the child (Benjamin, 1995; Driver, 2005).
Creating spaces

Although Benjamin advocates a gradual process of individuation, de Marneffe (2004) questions the necessity for such a process to take place at all. de Marneffe (2004) suggests that all women have an unconscious desire to mother. Mothering should be intensive, a full time occupation that sees the mother spending as much time with the child as possible. Contemporary motherhood is now under pressure from a societal change in family values that encourages women to work. Mothering, according to de Marneffe, is suffering from a campaign for equality driven by the feminist movement. She suggests that the movement of women into the public domain has initiated a woman’s desire for individuation and self-actualisation. Self-fulfilment represses the natural desire to mother, a desire that becomes unrecognisable by career-focused women. For de Marneffe (2004), a feminist push for equality is bad for motherhood, although as discussed in Chapter One, critics of neo-liberalism suggest that a feminist push for public equality is not the reason for an influx of women into the work force (Esping-Anderson, 2005). Increasing numbers of women in the workforce are more likely attributed to different economic demand, like rising living costs that require dual household incomes (Halpern, 2004, 2005), declining fertility rates, ultimately lower birth rates, a post-war baby boom, increased longevity and consequently, a higher percentage of retired elderly citizens (Esping-Anderson, 2005; OECD, 2011). Moreover, there is a looming shortage of public care workers, given that the ratio of those that are retired to those that are working is receding (OECD, 2011).

For de Marneffe (2004), a problem with Benjamin’s (1998) work is that it advocates self-actualisation, which for her is a denial of maternal desire. The mother should not only be passive and long-suffering but also be undesiring outside the
aspirations of motherhood. de Marneffe’s mother gains her ultimate satisfaction from being a mother. The closeness of mother and child drives an intensive mothering inspired intersubjectivity. This special unbroken relationship allows for a respectful recognition of the Other.

For Benjamin (1998), as mentioned earlier, mother-child intersubjectivity is accessible in the ‘third’. According to Butler (2000), Benjamin’s third space of psychic relations with the Other is accessible through negation, negation being the survival of destruction, which for Butler signals the influences of Klein in relation to the destructive impulses of the child. Butler notes that Benjamin’s third as a place of recognition is mainly possible without misrecognition, and differs, I suggest, from Lacanian theory where misrecognition is inevitable, thereby indicating an impasse between mainstream object relations and poststructuralist psychoanalysis. The third, for Butler is comparable to transcendence and she suggests that within this paradigm, recognition of the Other is theorised as external or separate to the psychic object, not far removed from Levinas’ concept of alterity discussed later in the chapter.

Allison Stone (2012) discusses Benjamin’s (1995, 1998, 2000, 2007) third space in conjunction with Winnicott’s (1953) ‘potential’ prenatal me/not me, - a space of illusion and phantasy - to allow for a connecting space, an exclusive and linguistic maternal ‘third’ for the development of both the mother and the child’s subjectivity. Stone’s thesis emphasises Benjamin’s (2004, p. 7) stance that although the term ‘third’ “means a variety of things to different thinkers” her third is a creatable intersubjective maternal space and not “a vantage point outside the two.” This particular position, Stone suggests, renders what Kristeva suggests, in the context of the oedipal conflict, is a matricidal separation from a primordial maternal null and void even though Klein considers it a necessary paternal presence for
development. However, according to Butler (2000), Hegel’s (1977) influence in Benjamin’s third space and maternal intersubjectivity creates an impasse, or in other words, a theoretical dilemma.

**An uneasy feeling in translation**

Butler (2000, 2004), who engages extensively with the work of both Hegel and Benjamin, considers that Benjamin’s melding of the works of Hegel (1977) and Klein is an unhappy and incompatible marriage. For Butler (1987/2004), Hegel proposes that recognition of the Other comes about through a battle to the death between two self-consciousness’, each recognising themselves in the Other and thereby existing outside of themselves in the ‘third’. In Benjamin’s Hegelian encounter, when tension strains to breaking point, both the subject and the Other revert back to the dyadic status of mother-child object relations driven by love, phantasy, destruction, and complementarity. Benjamin (2004, p. 9) provides some insight as to her rationale for introducing the work of Hegel when she explains complementarity:

> In the complementary structure, dependency becomes coercive; and indeed, coercive dependence that draws each into the orbit of the other’s escalating reactivity is a salient characteristic of the impasse. Conflict cannot be processed, observed, held, mediated, or played with. Instead it emerges at the procedural level as an unresolved opposition between us...the idea of the paranoid schizoid position – though crucial, do[es] not address this intersubjective dynamic of the two-person relationship and it’s crucial manifestations at the level of procedural interaction.

Butler’s (1987/2004) reading of Hegel (1977) requires that after each battle for recognition, the subject irreversibly changes in that each encounter leaves a trace. Each cycle ends in inevitable failure: each battle that he undertakes as the result of
encounter, takes on different proportions. Therefore, for Butler (2000), Benjamin’s third space becomes possible only through a misinterpretation of Hegel. For Benjamin (2000), the mother cyclically reverts to the same long-suffering passive mother with the child as complementary, through a pattern of recognition, destruction and negation. Access to the third is only possible through surviving destruction. Modification, or in other words, the recognition of the other’s subjectivity happens within a realisation that there are separate perceptions. Yet these separate perceptions are intertwined within the third. For Benjamin (2000), individuation of mother and child becomes a gradual process and a necessary one for normative development. Butler’s (2000) concern with Benjamin’s work is that although the third is a place of modification, a miraculous return from destruction within Benjamin’s cycle between the third and complementarity, should not leave marks or traces on/within mother and child. Each return from destruction sees a return to the status quo. Not only is each encounter (un)memorable, there are no traces etched within other spheres of discourse.

Exploring the gap: A mother’s hysterical journey

The Benjamin/Butler conversation is explored by Baraitser (2009) who argues that Butler’s (2000) critique of Benjamin creates a possibility for shifting from a maternal intersubjectivity laden with Winnicott’s passive mothering, responsibility and economic imperatives to a specifically maternal alterity through shifting Benjamin’s static, normative cycle of development into an irreversible (transformative) encounter. In this way, Baraitser acknowledges the psychic traces repressed within the long-suffering maternal masquerading mother metaphor. She seeks to theorise a truly ethical maternal encounter that takes place before or beyond signification, somewhere within the mask, that leaves some particular form of
inscribed or imprinted (un)memory, embodied or otherwise. To initiate this encounter Baraitser (2009) identifies a gap or a tear in the process of signification within her own experiences of motherhood, creating a moment of recognition that potentially plays out in alterity, free from the constraints of signification.

Baraitser (2009) tells of her newly born son and how she ponders the ‘strangeness’ brought about by naming him. As soon as her son is born, those in attendance demand a name. Baraitser speaks the name at the top of an unwritten list, “Joel”, and her partner nods in agreement. The name does not fit him: it does not ‘stick’. There is a gap between the name spoken and the signified, a place that shows that at this moment, he stands apart from who he actually now is, having been named. For Baraitser, in this moment the child exists apart from language within a different space. The strangeness becomes a signifier for the traces etched through their encounter, and his entrance into language signifies a maternal relationship between the two. Yet what lies within such an encounter before signification and how might the mother access the (un)memorable that has been marked through a feeling of uneasiness and what might have been? The gap of mother-child encounter enables questions within the discourse of the hysteric and initiates, within the scope and context of enquiry, an hysterical journey within the mask’s linguistic structure of metaphor and metonym.

From the position of hysteric seeking the truth within the words of the master, Baraitser (2009) considers the possibilities that this moment may provide a pathway to maternal trans-subjectivity and explores this uncanny uneasiness/strangeness as a possible site of maternal alterity (Baraitser, 2009). The problem that the mother faces is not the gap itself. The gap signifies a trace of irreversible encounter that provides the opportunity for the mother to explore and
journey within the Butler-Hegelian cycle of inevitable failure. By initiating the turn from the discourse of the university to the discourse of the hysteric, she opens up traditional pathways to explore (im)possibilities of maternal encounter within the spheres of unconscious/pre-conscious structure.


Baraitser (2009) combines the insightfulness of Butler (2000, 2004) and the theorising of Levinas (1998) in an effort to locate a maternal alterity and its inevitable ‘traces’ of the (un)memorable, in other words what manifests as ‘strangeness’ within the familial workings of child naming. Levinas provides an extra dimension, a space for the mother outside of phallic mother-son relations in his concept of paternal alterity and here Baraitser sees a possibility of allowing for a memorable encounter that ‘fills in’ a moment of uneasiness. The alterity that Baraitser seeks is external, and as mentioned earlier in the chapter, a similar concept to Benjamin’s maternal space. The hysterical question becomes ‘what is between the mother-son and a memorable encounter’? If it is Lacan’s (1988) wall of language that bars the way, then how might she travel past the wall and into the Symbolic, a stage of the journey vital to the success of the mother’s hysterical quest. Within this journey, memory is to be secured through Levinas’ concepts of alterity and paternal transcendence. This is especially important because we have enabled and will
embark upon a journey of memorable encounter through masculine genealogical patterns of discourse as enabling the memory of maternal encounter.

**A fleeting encounter**

Levinas’ (1998) alterity is a space created by an encounter before signification. This space is separate and unpredictable, created by an initial encounter provoking a spontaneous reaction of wonder, astonishment and responsibility. The Other brings the subject into being in a process that results in the decentring of the subject. For Levinas, alterity is a place of excess, where the Other is unable to be absorbed by the same. It is unpredictably sensual, given that it can be evoked by utterance and/or touch, existent in that it experiences, but not yet an existence as it is yet to be thought and spoken (Baraitser, 2009; Grosz, 1989; Levinas, 1978/1995; Walsh, 2001; Ziarek, 2001).

In Baraitser’s (2009) quest, an encounter between mother and son is sought within the gap between recognition and naming. The gap that Baraitser identifies opens between the subject and subjectivity. The encounter between mother and son offers a moment between subjects that takes place before it can be linguistically ordered. Mother and son meet, in the moment, provoking a spontaneous reaction of wonder, astonishment and responsibility.

For Baraitser (2009), maternal alterity theorised through Levinas, provides a possible explanation for the strangeness experienced by the mother on the signification of her son, given the similarities Butler (2000) suggests are present within Benjamin’s third and Levinas’ alterity: both are external to the subject. Butler has also pointed out another similarity; that recognition within Benjamin’s work, as in Levinas, is not solely based on misperception. When or if encounter reaches memory and language, unlike Lacan’s memories that are allocated signifiers of pre-
scripted meaning, Levinas’ memories open pathways of experiential being or subjectivity. However, Levinas’ alterity is not devoid of traces of past encounter (Baraitser, 2009), as is Benjamin’s (1995, 1998, 2000) Klein-Hegel marriage of self-consciousness, child development and the self-fulfilling mother (Butler, 2000).

According to Brody (1998), within Levinas’ work, there are several relevant concepts used interactively. The Same is used with terms such as subjectivity, existence and the Said. Other is used within the context of subject, existent, face, being and the Saying. For Levinas, the Saying is where initial face-to-face encounter takes place in innocence and wonder. The Saying initiates a sensuous, embodied experience occurring in a fleeting moment of ‘now’ and is a paradoxical place of simultaneous past and present. Experience exists in the now as initial encounter, and in the past once drawn through to the present and inscribed into language and subjectivity. Levinas’ Saying, like Lacan’s Imaginary is infinite, provides no sequence of events, has no boundaries and exists before cognition and memory (Brody, 1998; Walsh, 2001; Ziarek, 2001). The Saying exists on the cusp of the unconscious and the dawning of consciousness, without subjectivity constituted through language. The Saying, like Lacan’s metonym, could be Said to align with the diachronic: therefore, it is not restricted by time, with no beginning and no end. However, the Saying is beyond ontology (Brody, 1998), and Lacan’s diachrony is not beyond ontology (Lacan, 1997b, 2006a).

Levinas’ initial encounter as pure and ethical, once thought, is drawn through to the Said. This process, for Levinas, explains yet another paradox of philosophy: Memories drawn through to the Said immediately become present, finite, and therefore chronologically ordered. The synchronic ordering of history entails a repeated extraction of the past into the present (Walsh, 2001; Ziarek, 2001).
In Levinas’ (1998) alterity, the subject is detached from the subjectivity that ensues through thought and speech. For example, the son has not yet been named and subjectively inscribed and the primordial mother has not yet become the mask, and subjectively endowed with her phallic caring responsibilities of motherhood. A face-to-face encounter becomes a primordial maternal encounter with a yet to be signified son. This encounter is (un)memorable, hence the gap of uneasiness, of ‘traces’ of the Other available within hysterical discourse for the mother to continually pursue.

The Same, for Brody (1998) is ‘convergent’ with Lacan’s Imaginary, reminding us once again that we are unable to compare Levinas’ and Lacan’s linguistic spheres of becoming considering the philosophical differences of phenomenology and Lacanian psychoanalysis. Indeed, Freud suggested, as mentioned in Chapter Two, that the classification of the spheres are incomplete anyway (Freud & Fliess, 1985), perhaps lending interpretation of Levinas’ Same/Other distinctions as classifications of further unconscious realms or alternatively different classifications of the same spaces. In the context of the hysteric’s quest, we will liken the journey of the Saying to the Said as perception/encounter passing through a semi-permeable membrane to avoid the abyss and achieve signification, similar to Lacan’s (1988) wall of language as both a barrier and transition point between the unconscious and the pre-conscious. As with perception before Lacan’s wall, Levinas’ memorable encounter is dependent on negotiating a particularly nasty stretch of nothingness that separates the Same/Said and the Other/Saying called the there is (Assoun, 1998; Brody, 1998).

According to Brody (1998), the Other/Saying, leaves traces in all modes of the Same/Said. The Saying and the Said are not two different alternative modes of
discourse, “the one is undeclinably punctured by the Other” (p. 61). Therefore, a gap, or there is, is created between or within the two. The there is is created by an absolute disjunction between the two linguistic spheres and is described by Levinas as an ‘excluded middle’. In this sense, alterity is enabled through what Brody describes as a semi-permeable membrane that runs between the Saying and the Said that ensures that these two modes are forever inversely separate. Hence, ‘beyond-the-face’ becomes an inward inversion confusing peripheries of exclusion.

In this context, Levinas’ ‘beyond-the-face’ can be interpreted through hysterical discourse as a possible space for what she seeks, Her (un)memorable encounter with Her mother. Levinas’ alterity is infinite, has no spatial borders nor is it ordered. Technically, (un)memorable encounter is neither beyond nor within the Lacanian mask, but theoretically uncontainable and spatially (un)memorable, hinting at the enormous exclusionary powers of the membrane/wall that sifts the threatening darkness to determine the subjects impending subjectivity. Brody (1998, p. 59) suggests “the core of his [Levinas’] concern is exposed in his often desultory and allusive remarks: (un)memorable encounters of unique individuals are ‘bits of dust’ and ‘forgettable moments’.”

From beyond ontology, Levinas’ there is emits a silent rustling, in a form of a living death. It is primordial, elemental, dark, ‘phantasmagoric’, ‘ghastly’ and ‘evil’ (Assoun, 1998; Brody, 1998). The there is is an empty whispering space between terms such as Saying and Said, Same and Other, being and beings, existent and existence, and subject and subjectivity and can be seen as “both a split between and a stitch across from existence to an existent” (Brody, 1998, p. 64). It forms the space between the son and his name and the daughter and caregiver. In other words, it can both enable and deny subjectivity when included as an exclusionary function.
of language structure. The membrane that runs between the Same and the Other and the wall of language that separates the unconscious and the pre-conscious, are like enough for the purposes of hysterical enquiry. In both cases, the barrier prevents the memory of woman’s unique maternal encounter in any other form than the caregiving role.

The hysterical mother’s quest for maternal alterity (Baraitser, 2009) is therefore premised on an experience that identifies a gap, shifting and semi-permeable, enabling and exclusionary, a sense of alterity that sets son and mother apart in an act of (un)memorable recognition. We know this because of the uneasy moments, the strangeness, the traces now ordered into the process of signification: if only she could recall it.

Tracing the traces through the work of Levinas takes us to a place of (un)memorable encounter, a void, a there is. However, following the process of signification through paternal alterity and transcendence is a little more problematic. Levinas and consequent critiques suggest that only selected memories take this path through to the Said. Therefore, history itself is highlighted as problematic and exclusionary, as a chain of selective memories of events, (re)interpreted and linguistically linked together to attach meaning to disordered chaos and splintered being.

Lacan (1999) has suggested that woman is not whole, there is a part of her that cannot be spoken, perhaps assimilated with the thing or das ding. Lacan’s ‘excess’ as an embodied unspeakable sensuality, is neither pleasure and/or pain simply because language cannot accommodate and signify it: there is nothing to hold it to reality, no signification, no law of the father or in other words, no ‘substance’. There is no place within reality for unbridled excessive perceptual pleasure unless
signified as the primordial horrors of the id, lost within the void. Woman’s/object a/excess accumulates at the crossroads of ‘pure perception’, yet is unable to make a memorable transition. It is lost or channelled through the drives as desire and moral regulation within metonym. Levinas’ (1979) excess also accumulates at the crossroads of perception, thought and sound, within, isolated from, beyond or preceding western ontological possibilities of existing, depending on the discourses through which it is articulated.

**Transcending to the Said**

Levinas’ (1979, 1978/1995, 1998) work is invaluable and insightful as a pathway transforming Benjamin’s (1998, 2007) third into a space that leaves the tell-tale traces of unordered encounter/excess. Walsh’s (2001) interpretation of Levinas provides a detailed account of why feminine perception may not make it through the many perceived layers of the mask to Symbolic recognition. In other words, although we now suspect that the uneasiness and strangeness that we experience at times of linguistic incongruence, such as Baraitser’s (2009) mother-son encounter and the daughter’s missing encounter are traces of lost memories, we still cannot draw through the unremembered to the Said. Walsh reveals a gendered exclusionary process that takes place within the layers of unconscious structure, suggesting that there are unique embodied encounters pertaining to the mother that are unable to pass through Lacan’s wall or negotiate transcendence past Levinas forgotten specks of dust and whisperings of the *there is* that have been brought to our attention by Brody (1998). Walsh’s (2001) suggestions of specifically gendered exclusions are at odds with Lacan’s reading of Freud’s description of the processes of his unconscious structure, given that gendered roles are developed through the recognition of lack. Hence, another gap is exposed within the process of hysterical enquiry.
Through making the return journey or transcending from the Saying to the Said, we can trace corporeal perceptions from the alterity that is created as a ‘now’ moment of encounter as they progress through a rigorous selection process where entrance into the Symbolic is either granted or denied according to gender. Lacan’s (1988) wall of language takes on another dimension: it is not only a condensed field of meaning making; it also exercises discriminatory properties of exclusion.

For example, Lacan’s ‘excess’ or other jouissance as an embodied unspeakable sensuality, is metaphorically signified as pleasure, pain, ghastly, horrible, phantasmic within discourse. When spoken they become harnessed to a reality that accommodates an unbridled excessive perceptual pleasure and the primordial horrors of the id, lost within the void, the there is, the hole at the centre of the subject, disconnected from subjectivity. This excess accumulates at the crossroads of ‘pure perception’, unable to make a memorable transition and is lost, within metonym, perpetuated within the drives as desire and within the discourse of the hysteric, as unending, unsuccessful searching. Perhaps there are feminine traces lost completely, such as Benjamin’s third, and/or assimilated within developmental theories. Levinas’ excess in the form of alterity also accumulates at the crossroads of perception, thought and sound, not yet perceived and therefore isolated from western ontological possibilities of existence.

Something forgotten: Sexuality, Eros, and the other jouissance

For Walsh (2001), the embodied exclusion or alienation of woman begins in the Saying. Not all sensibilities are included in initial face-to-face encounter. Sexuality and Eros are considered as beyond-the-face, as excluded, profaned and unreachable, already signified as unethical impurities. The selection process of suitable memories has begun in disentangling sensuality, sexuality and pleasure,
long before Levinas allows for thought and articulation. The embodied exists within the now, yet there are some serious gendered restrictions as to a corporeal transcendence into language.

The selective properties of Levinas’ dawning of consciousness have prompted Irigaray (2004) to question the legitimacy of his alterity as separate freedoms that are prompted through initial recognition of ‘me’ in relation to a responsibility to the Other. She suggests that Levinas’ category of alterity is alienating. Once there, Woman becomes embroiled in a script that assures His ‘whole’ transcendence into language while including only selected parts of Hers, remembering here that Levinas considers language as facilitating a journey from pure perception to the Symbolic.

For Levinas, modesty is necessary to ethical conduct for women. A woman’s naked body and fecundity translates as excess. Nudity initiates a fall into darkness, into the abyss and away from the gaze and indeed the Symbolic (Walsh, 2001). By demanding modesty, Levinas denies the embodied woman, spinning the first threads of the mask and the beginnings of sightedness beyond it, or what Levinas calls beyond-the-face, in a moral and ethical stance that designates women a passive role within heterosexual normativity. Eros and sensuality become “an exorbitant ultramateriality” (Levinas, 1979, p. 256).

... [ultramateriality] designates the exhibitionist nudity of an exorbitant presence coming as though from farther than the frankness of the face, already profaning and wholly profaned, as if it had forced the interdiction of a secret. The essentially hidden throws itself toward the light, without becoming signification. Not nothingness – but what is not yet. (Levinas, 1979, p. 256)
Levinas (1979) is describing a difficulty in transition. The frankness of the face becomes another metaphor, just like the wall, a mask that hides what Levinas colourfully describes as the embodied ‘profanities’ of women. Once these profanities are hidden, Woman transcends towards the light, in this context, a metaphor for phallic ‘paternal’ discourse. Yet the body and its corporeal excess are unable to transcend to signification: they are ‘secret’ from him, a dangerous excess prohibited from signification.

Levinas’ (1979) dawning of consciousness bears similarities to Lacan’s dawning of reality, an inevitability within phallic discourse. There is a belief that truth is attainable through the production of knowledge and one must traverse the unconscious structure to achieve reality, however fictitious. Remaining as ‘what is not yet’, part of the corporeal woman, becomes categorised and labelled as profane. ‘Eros and sexuality’ is silently extended to include maternal embodiedness or Motherness, not to be confused with passive mothering. As such, she remains in Levinas’ Saying, unable to pass from the senses to thought and ultimately into language. For Levinas, if the beloved virgin removes her clothes, she tumbles into the abyss. If she does not remove her clothes, she falls into darkness. It almost seems like the wall is staffed with its customs border control or the phallic consciousness police who must make sure that no illegal uniquely feminine embodied materials pass the inscription point unnoticed as a matter of bio-security.

However, a problem lurks for the ethical man that pales the significance of paradox in historical synchrony. Due to the necessities of the Law of the Name of the Father and procreation, His encounter with the corporeal woman must take place. He risks oblivion as He wrestles with Her/the living, breathing, fleshy organism of pure perception, while plunging headlong into the abyss. An encounter in alterity with
this fleshy (projected) Other becomes necessary within the laws of sanctified religious Union. Ethical Man plunges toward darkness with Her/Himself in the excesses of corporeal ecstasy. This drama takes place on the fringes of consciousness, an ethical dilemma that threatens His ‘being’, a drama, perhaps a tragedy that means Baraitser’s (2009) hysterical mother must rely on a theory of masculine theoretical salvation for a shot at primordial transcendence.

**The father, son and genealogical infinity**

Within Walsh’s (2001) reading of Levinas’ (1998) *Otherwise than being*, sexual difference is highlighted through an alternative pathway for him to transcend. He escapes the fall into (un)memory initiated by partaking in the corporeal sins of the flesh, or carnal relations by transcending into the Symbolic under the metaphor of paternity and its corresponding masculine genealogy. According to Irigaray (1985a), this pathway is not available for Her: Woman has no genealogy, nor is one Symbolically possible under the Law of the Name of the Father, that sees father-son inheritance linked within language as the closest blood connection. Woman’s mother-daughter bloodlines are disconnected and metonymic, hence the difficulty transferring them to the Said. Masculine genealogy, or Lacanian brotherhood enabled by the death of the father, is therefore another paradox of synchrony and the selective process of (un)memory.

As suggested earlier, once Levinas’ Saying transcends to the Said, perception and memory become finite. Symbolic infinity is only possible through the consummation of the Other: the son/self/God/Other becomes an illusionary infinity, perhaps metaphorically related to the Freudian drive toward death. In this process of signification, Levinas also exposes the gap or the abyss that is translated to signify the corporeal, sensual, embodied woman as evil, spawn of the devil, and as discussed
in Chapter Three, witches and hysterics. Therefore, while Woman becomes
diachronically submergent, somehow disengaged from each other as in mother,
daughter, child, flesh, discourse inscribes a double standard. Man transcends as
generative and woman as dangerous, with linguistic extremes to negotiate, such as
virgin and whore (Ussher, 2006). Indeed, Hollway (1984) identifies what she calls,
male sex drive discourses, speaking ‘evolutionary’ drives that dominate heterosexual
discourses and intimate that men have no real control over their sexual urges.

Ethical Man does control his urges and lives life perpetuating the law of the father. Yet he cannot do this alone. To transcend toward God and paternity, Walsh (2001) suggests that, Levinas resurrects part of woman from her abyss in the guise of
the normative, responsible and capable, masquerading psychoanalytic mother. By
thinking eroticism as a legitimate and soul building masculine pathway to paternity,
a means to an end, Levinas paves the way for the subject to transcend to the Said.
Walsh (2001, p. 83) explains: “...paternity, in particular the father-son connection,
signals procreation as the undeniable, social justification of the sexual act as
necessary evil.” Levinas’ subject becomes a reluctant participant in a heterosexual
encounter, an encounter that creates synchronised memories, genealogically and
historically ordered, a triadic paternal God/Father/Son (Walsh, 2001).

**Resurrection**

Woman’s resurrection or transcendence, suggested by Baraitser (2009) as a
possible pathway for maternal alterity, happens in the name of paternity. She
transcends into language in a disembodied maternal sense, devoid of Eros and
sexuality. The maternal is a site of passivity, purity and responsibility and a strange
disembodied receptacle from which to produce/bring forth a son. Transcendence
therefore comes at a cost; her corporeality. Her traces, etched from encounter and
irrevocable difference, are left in the Saying as (un)memorable, as floating bits and whispering voices. As Levinas confirms, one is truly consumed by the Other. Walsh (2001) interprets this as His desire to not only return to the mother but to (re)occupy his mother’s body which is available within the context of family and in extreme cases, refusal to accept the weaning process (Lacan, 1938/2002). Language has already catered for and constantly re-enacts this return.

The mother’s search for maternal alterity through Levinas’ paternity is a momentous quest. The mother, as phallically part woman womb-keeper/kin-keeper, seeks a corporeal connection (perhaps rather than a divine encounter) with her lost self through her son. To confront and traverse the very structure that unifies the mother within her not wholeness may well be as an (un)memorable and futile as any hysterical quest. Yet, as Butler (1987/2004) suggests, there are traces etched from the destruction of each self-conscious, each encounter, each traversing of the wall and they are the product of inevitable failure. These traces, however, are generated through different criteria and different gender roles for negotiating the wall. Sexual difference and exclusion translate into language as gendered difference and perpetuating inequity.

The mother-son encounter enjoys privileges over mother-daughter encounters. The son is an important ingredient of the Symbolic order. An arduous journey certainly, for the mother, plunging headlong into the abyss, saved within the auspices of maternity and the responsibilities inscribed for the mother of the son/Other who is Man’s genealogical passport to reality and infinity. Certainly, Baraitser’s (2009) journey is important and successful, in that she sets out to theorise a space, a fleeting moment before signification when both are free from the confines of phallic discourse. Difficulties occur, however when she transcends through the
wall. For Baraitser, transcendence takes place as the mother of a son, inscribed within language as the ‘good-enough mother’ of Donald Winnicott. For the daughter, she has accompanied the mother to this place before she could indeed be inscribed as such, yet transcendence for her is far more complicated. As she sits by her mother’s side and speaks, she transcends as caregiver and the memory of her encounter in alterity, as does Baraitser’s, becomes a moment of uneasiness that again initiates hysterical enquiry.

**Figure 10.** An exercise in hysterical enquiry.

The mother’s quest is important nonetheless in the context of the hysterical daughter’s journey. The mother searches for an encounter with the Other, beyond the Symbolic, within the structure of Freud’s unconscious. She searches for maternal encounter, her lost object within the bounds of masculine consciousness. Levinas’ ethical being reminds me that she is paradoxically existent yet (un)memorable
beyond-the-face, yet within masculine theories of psychoanalysis, she cannot be
differentiated from any other lost object.

Even though Levinas has demonstrated that traces of woman’s encounters are
inscribed differently to men’s, within Lacanian theory they are not only forgotten,
but also assimilated with other forgotten objects so that the difference or gap
acknowledged within Levinas’ work is closed. Her forgotten memories are now His
lost object, His desire for His mother.

**What of mother-daughter (un)memories**

Irigaray (1985a, 1985b) highlights the difference in signification of
masculine and feminine perceptions. Mother-daughter stories that do not fall within
the discourses of masquerade are rare. For example, Freud’s introduction of
Sophocles’ three Oedipus plays as a template for his Oedipus complex, describe a
son that kills his father and marries his mother. Antigone is primarily described as
Oedipus’ daughter. Jocasta, the mother, becomes a representation of the horrors of
mother-son incest. There is no specific story of a bond between Jocasta and
Antigone. In Christian mythology, there are many loving depictions of Mary and
Jesus, mother-son, yet there are very few explicitly described loving mother-
daughter relationships that fall outside the jurisdiction of mother-daughter
ambivalent, consuming, caregiving, familial phallic connections (Irigaray, 1985a,
1994).

Mother-daughter stories predominantly appear in two main forms, either
fraught with conflict and ambivalence, as in mainstream psychoanalysis and
caregiving literature, or characterised by the absence of the mother from them
altogether (Irigaray, 1985a, 1985b). In Breuer’s (Freud & Breuer, 1893/1974)
account of Anna O’s hysteria, when he informs us that Anna’s mother goes away, we
suddenly realise that she was there unmentioned in the first place, as we do when we consider Klein’s (1932, 1957, 1960) role of mother within Object Relations Theory. The story of Cinderella depicts a complicated step-relationship inclusive of stepsisters. Cinderella’s mother is absent. Her stepmother, whom we will call the phallic mother and her two daughters are nasty and greedy. The mother and daughters mistreat the beautiful and kind stepdaughter, whose only hope of salvation is an escape to love and marriage. Cinderella’s escape from her mother substitute can be considered as a form of sublimation or an outlet for repressed desire, articulated in such forms as religion and courtly love (Lacan, 1997a). Within this theoretical framework, mother-daughter repressed desire is present diachronically as a desire that the hysteric apparently seeks.

Symbolically depicted mother-daughter encounters play out within Freud’s (1977) model of alienation and ambivalence or in other words, a pre-scripted masquerade. Daughters, because of a disconnected pre-scripted interpretation of pure perception, reject their mothers and align with their fathers in an effort to acquire his penis or/and have his baby. Daughters resent their mothers as anatomically incomplete, but also for being rivals for the father’s attentions. When the daughter realigns with the mother, this is in a passive submission to the law of the dead father, now displaced amidst a genealogical network of familial masculinity.

I am now aware of the discriminating components of transcendence and the difficulties of traversing the wall of language as speaking, writing, mother-daughter, these difficulties unfolding through the daughters search. The wall enables and constrains different forms of gendered consciousness, inscribing assimilation/difference. There are different rules at the border of perception and thought that bar the way for embodied perceptions of mother and daughter. The third
contains its own gaps, devoid of traces, peculiarity out of ‘sync’ with the genre of enquiry in that it may facilitate encounter without trace, signifying that there are perhaps encounters that the daughter cannot detect through moments of uneasiness, that there is something that has occurred that she is unable to remember that she has forgotten. There is a moment of uneasiness between chapters in the sense of the (un)memorable as the daughter moves through the gap once again to investigate the possibilities of stepping out of language entirely.
Inter-chapter interlude: A gap filled with the daughter’s journeying thoughts...

...about an ethics of psychoanalysis and whether it may reopen/close the gap to what may uniquely lie within/beyond the mask and beyond signification for woman.

Or

Exerts from a Borromean Knot puzzle book: Ethical ponderings for the reader to put together

Myth and by extension tragedy metaphorically enact the limit of...the psycho-material rupture announcing the subject’s entry into language, an entry associated with a shift from a maternal to a paternal frame of reference. (Walsh, 1999, p. 100)

Creativity, art and theatre represent for Lacan (1997a) a manifestation of man’s desire or das ding. Lacan’s (1997a) reading of Sophocles play Antigone provides an example of an ethics of psychoanalysis.

Theatrical tragedy, according to Lacan (1997a) has a place in catharsis, and/or abreaction. Abreaction can be explained as the therapeutic value of speech itself, highlighted within Anna O’s invention of the talking cure. The talking cure expelled pre-conscious or Imaginary trauma, etched within the hysteric’s body, therapeutically talking away Anna’s somatic symptoms. Abreaction,
combined with catharsis, the telling of traumatic or tragic events, becomes beneficial for the audience within the medium of art and theatre (Lacan, 1997a).

In Lacan’s later work, the properties of writing take on different ‘therapeutic’ proportions in relation to the symptom or sinthome for the writer, a symptom with the properties of substance. Sinthome, or a sort of primary form of symptom, holds the subject together despite the knot or pre-scripted chain of meaning making having been broken. Perhaps we might think of this as a primary ‘substance’ given that Lacan suggests that the subject is the symptom (Fink, 1995). If we consider Walsh’s (1999, p. 100) quote “the psycho-material rupture announcing the subject’s entry into language,” in relation to traversing the wall in which a shift from the maternal to the paternal is enacted through a linguistic splitting of the subject, sinthome takes on mysterious primordial mother properties.

Sinthome creates substance that Harari (1995) interprets as a substitute for the law of the father, in that the law of the father forms the basis of reality. Within a creative medium, substance can be written, preventing the unravelling of the three registers, Symbolic, Imaginary and Real. A sinthome therefore emphasises the tenuous boundaries between what the Symbolic qualifies as fiction and the forming of an agreeable linguistic alliance with sanity and madness. This ‘substitute’ for ‘substance’ or what holds phallic discourse together, is a product of/is writing, the writing of an
alternative reality, however difficult it may be for others to decipher when thought within the restrictions of pre-scripted meanings. As a supplementary hysterical question, what then may direct the writing of Anna O and James Joyce? Is there a primordial substitute ‘substance’ that creates symptom/sinthome that is reality, labouring under the confines of the split paternal subject?

Sophocles, Antigone and a strange alliance between tragedy and beauty

It may well be impossible to separate Sophocles’ reality or indeed the substance of any writer from the body of their work. Yet within theatre, the writer creates a particular unique substance/sinthome or reality that incorporates a mainstream planned sequence of spontaneous speech that evokes a ‘reaction’ from the audience specifically through tragedy. There are multiple webs or connections woven, the writer’s and the audiences’ being the least recognised. The writer’s own reality and the audience’s therapeutic encounter with its own tragedy are not connected. Initially then, a collaboration with the reality of the author and the audience, a compatibility of disconnection, write the circumstances for Antigone’s ethical stance within her familial womb world regulated through the incest taboo and the Law of the Name of the Father.

Antigone and Ismene are daughters and half-sisters of the now dead Oedipus. Oedipus’ wife and mother Jocasta, is also now
deceased. Jocasta, is Ismene and Antigone's mother and grandmother, given that she was also Oedipus' mother. These siblings are the products of mother-son incest. There are also two brothers, Eteocles and Polyneices, who, as a result of Oedipus' tragic death, are to share the throne of Thebes year about. When Eteocles refuses to give up the throne at the end of his term, Polyneices attacks the city and both brothers die in the fighting. Creon becomes the ruler of Thebes and although Eteocles receives a suitable honourable burial as a heroic defender of the city, Polyneices' body lies exposed in the street. This denial of burial is a matter of law: even though Polyneices was fighting for what was technically his, the law states that he is a criminal, having attacked the city. Burial is an unacceptable public event as it considered as an honour.

Antigone wishes to bury her brother: she is distressed that his body lies decomposing in the street. Creon forbids her to bury him and warns that if she defies his order and insists on a burial she will get her wish: he will bury her alive. Ismene refuses to help her with the burial of their brother, distressed by the dangers of such an action to her sister. Yet when she realises that Antigone will go ahead with her burial plans, Ismene finally asks to accompany Antigone on her mission. Antigone scorns her offer and tells her to go back to the safeness of Creon's hospitality. Defying Creon, Antigone buries her brother by covering him with dust where he lies and Creon, not wishing to back down, entombs her alive in a cave.
As Creon’s world/reality begins to unravel on the realisation of the harshness of the punishment, he reverses his decision. He is too late: Antigone has taken her own life, as does Creon’s son, her betrothed, on the discovery of her body.

Hegel suggests that Antigone’s fateful defiant act of burying her brother is based on familial ties, a feminine decision driven by gendered family responsibilities (Lacan, 1997b; Walsh, 1999). Lacan (1997b) disagrees: Antigone explicitly states that she would not have defied the law for a husband or a child, both of whom are replaceable. The brother is not, given that both parents are dead.

Furthermore, Lacan (1997a) suggests that Antigone herself holds the fascination of the audience and not her actions. Antigone is beautiful, headstrong, defiant, scathing, intimidating. Nonetheless, she is a victim of familial tragedy or at least within the script. Her actions evoke the fear and pity necessary for the catharsis that tragedy offers its audience, yet she herself is fearless and as such is the real hero of the play. It is Antigone then, as the central figure of tragedy that enables the outlet of the Imaginary, the desire for the mother, of das ding.

It can be gleaned from the chorus that the ‘child’ Antigone, as she is referred to in the script, is beautiful (Lacan, 1997a). Her beauty is strangely incongruent with her obvious disinterest and distaste for her surroundings and those who occupy it. For Lacan, beauty is the key to the tempering of desire: A beauty that is (un)desiring defies the very mirror that reflects the gaze. That
what is signified as beauty can be free of desire, (un)desiring is unthinkable and shocking.

As suggested by the chorus, Antigone moves beyond the limits of até. In other words, she goes beyond the reality/reaches of the destructive familial force of Oedipus' prophesised and enacted patricide and incest that renders her pitiless and fearless. To be beyond até, the familial chain of tragedy that dogs Oedipus and his family, is to be at the very fringes of the Symbolic or signification. Oedipus' familial tragedy reveals the very structure of language, normative development and drives the desires of the Imaginary. Therefore, by defying Creon; beautiful, scornful, defiant Antigone steps past até and past desire and therefore participates in what appears to the audience as uncaring: She steps out of the plot and out of the chains of signifiers that makes sense of her existence (Lacan, 1997a).

There is no denying that Antigone is located in the Symbolic within a chain of tragedy and misfortune as suggested by Lacan (1997b) and Walsh (1999), yet she also exists elsewhere simultaneously, an alterity created by incongruence with the Symbolic and accentuated by her defiance and her beauty. The fear, the shock, the pity and desire belong solely to the spectators, within a complicated interaction with the players and the chorus. At that moment, she sees beyond the Symbolic and sees her brother for what he really is, unique, and a man that no longer fits his name.
The brother becomes, according to the chorus, her almost lover (Lacan, 1997a). This moment that Antigone now occupies, allows her to see her brother beyond signification, as unique. Her brother, ‘Polyneices’, is irreplaceable, not like a ‘husband’ who is replaceable (Lacan, 1997a). The way to Lacan’s ethics of psychoanalysis is not so much to separate the uniqueness of the ‘individual’ from the moral discourses of the ‘public good’, from the chain of signifiers, to see beyond the gaze and therefore past signification through non-participation, as discussed earlier in relation to the discourse of the analyst. Ceasing to participate becomes profoundly ethical within psychoanalysis.

Antigone’s fate: An hysterical warning

Creon, true to his word, has Antigone buried alive, sealed within a cave. There is much debate as to the harshness of his decision. Regretting his actions, he relents and orders the cave to be re-opened. Antigone has hung herself and her betrothed, Creon’s son, commits suicide. Creon transcends into madness.

Antigone’s fate represents what we might consider as a living death brought about by the denial of até and therefore the denial of desire. She becomes represented as confined, alive, a living death, reminiscent of the forgotten whisperings of the living death of Levinas’ there is. Metaphorically, Antigone’s encounter is shocking, historicised, frozen, yet ultimately forgotten.

It is troubling for the daughter, trying to locate a different
encounter with the mother, devoid of desire, that the outcome of
Antigone’s stance has such dire consequences. Antigone is clear
that the stance she makes for the burial of her brother is not one she
would have made for a husband and a child, or in other words, in
a genealogical chain of the law of the father.

A short and unexpected auditory hallucination from the chorus

How dangerous is the hysterical daughter’s quest to discover her lost
encounter with her mother on the eve of her mother’s death, lost amidst
discourses of responsible caregiving, or should we interpret Antigone’s death
as ‘lost from consciousness’.

Yet the daughter must continue to ask, where is the embodied feminine,
the primordial mother-daughter, jouissance, where is care? She has followed
embodied primordial memories theorised by Freud through the work of
Levinas and travelled to the wall of language (Lacan, 2006, 1988). She has
stood beside the wall, metaphorically observing selective encounters
transferring from the Saying into the Said, progressing through thought, sound
and speech (Lacan, 1988). She watched Her fall naked with Him into the abyss
and we have seen part of her resurrected as the phallic mother through the
Law of the Name of the Father and its inbuilt masculine genealogical
brotherhood. We perceived, though couldn’t remember, the severing of
primordial embodiedness yet we watched its inevitable freefall into the abyss,
the hole in the centre of the Symbolic that contains das ding; the home of
desire. Yet she remains especially aware that when Antigone, in what appears
to be an ethical anti-thesis to hysterical discourse, administered in the tradition
of the talking cure, denies desire as the driver of every locus of meaning/reality, she loses her voice entirely, entombed on the fringes of the Symbolic, contained, marginalised and silenced.

A very short note on the chorus

The chorus is very much involved within Antigone’s story, a collection of voices that are almost always on stage giving commentary during the performing of Greek tragedy. Lacan (1997a, p. 252) suggests that the chorus becomes a commentary or an extension of the audience: it does the emotive work. It is “sufficiently silly” but “not without firmness.” There is not a great deal known about the origins of the chorus and their interaction is a little more complicated than we might imagine. For example, Bacon (1994) suggests that sometimes the chorus refers to itself as ‘I’ and sometimes ‘we’ evoking some movement or leakage within the context of the Lacanian imago and social I and making a scene of miscommunication within a classic phallocentric script all the more complicated. The chorus itself may offer traces of (un)memorable encounter and perhaps allows the hysteric fleeting glimpses of ethical encounter that are more helpful than Antigone’s contribution to a masculine ethics of psychoanalysis in that they may offer the possibility of a different pathway through the wall and past the drifting fragments of forgetfulness that constitutes the there is. Alternatively, the possible primordial whisperings kept at bay by the weavings of sinthome become just barely audible amidst
the questing realities of hysterical enquiry.
Chapter Five: Precarious pathways: Schreber, God and the feminine

I have no doubt whatsoever that my early ideas were not simply ‘delusions’ and ‘hallucinations’ because even now I still receive impressions daily and hourly which make it perfectly clear to me that, in Hamlet’s words, *there is something rotten in the state of Denmark* - that is to say in the relationship between God and mankind. (Schreber, 1903/2000, p. 204/164)

It is of course far from my purpose to wish to convince other people by means of a reasoned argument of the truth of my so-called ‘delusions’ and ‘hallucinations’. I am fully aware that at the present moment this would be possible to only a limited extent. Whether in days to come a transformation of my body altogether beyond the sphere of human experience, will not in itself furnish proof, the future alone can decide. (Schreber, 1903/2000, p.243)

Having traversed the pathways of Freud’s unconscious through the writing of Levinas, transcendence appears a difficult route through which to remember mother-daughter encounter. I therefore investigate possibilities of remembering through another avenue within the scope of inquiry, given the dangers outlined by Lacan, (1997a) between chapters in relation to ethical encounter via stepping out of the script. Both philosophical transcendence and Antigone’s ethics appear constricting as pathways for remembering mother-daughter encounter. Therefore, I turn to consider the daughter’s hallucinatory caregiving exhaustion as an avenue of inquiry.

For Hirsch and Hollender (1969, p. 81) hysterical psychosis is defined as “a state marked by sudden and dramatic onset, temporally related to a profound upsetting event or circumstance. Its clinical manifestations include hallucinations, delusions, depersonalization, and grossly unusual behaviour.” Certainly, such a
definition is reminiscent of Anna O’s hysterical symptoms as recalled by Freud and Breuer (1893/1974). If hallucinations are indeed psychotic symptoms of hysteria; perhaps the daughter can remember through traversing writings, or ‘memories’ induced by psychosis. The daughter asks, how can I remember my mother-daughter encounter? Can I reframe my hallucinatory mother-daughter memories as memorable encounter?

Through the tracing of Freud and Breuer’s (1893/1974) hysterical case studies, psychoanalytic history tells us that the trauma of prolonged caregiving for the terminally ill appears to be enough to initiate episodes of neurosis and psychosis, of delusion and hallucination. Freud and Breuer’s (1893/1974) case studies, present Anna O and other hysterical women with similar caregiving experiences, who have suffered hallucinatory and somatic symptoms. The hysterical caregiver therefore, is a noticeable voice within the discourse of the hysteric as she continues to repeat her story in an effort to remember.

*Within those last few days, I experience some frightening morphological ‘hallucinations’ and ‘delusions’. I experience moments where my hands change shape, I look at them and they are my mother’s hands. My mother’s hands are smaller and uniquely hers, there is a distinct curvature of her third finger. She is five foot, one and a half inches tall. I am four inches taller.*

*The night before she dies, I experience a complete change in stature. I am there/here, not her but part of an integration of sorts. I am not absent and I feel that she is here with me. We exist together yet apart as in an indescribable rush of soothing warmth that in truth frightens the hell out of me, so much so that I tell her that she can go, put an end to her suffering. She does: I no longer feel her presence. She dies early next morning.*
Reflections

In this chapter, I try to make sense of the hysterical daughter’s symptoms in the context of the memoirs of President Schreber (1903/2000) and explore his hallucinations and delusions in an attempt to open a pathway for remembering, to unearth perhaps, the traces still buried within the linguistically entombed embodied primordial maternal Other. For Schreber, his delusional world dissolves into what ‘appears’ to be a primary femininity. In an effort to reframe the daughter’s hallucinations, I explore delusion and hallucination as miscommunication in the sense of the failure to map perception, as in initial encounter, and discourse as in that which has been Said.

Although hysteria appears aligned with both neurotic and psychotic symptoms, neurosis and psychosis have distinct differences. Lacan (1997b) suggests that the value of Schreber’s account of his experiences lies in the very fact that Schreber (1903/2000) writes within such an advanced state of psychosis. His memoirs are in this way unique. Lacan, as did Freud, calls on Schreber’s memoirs to emphasise his own theories around psychosis and neurosis.

Psychosis, according to Lacan’s (1997b) interpretation of Freud, is, in psychoanalytic terms, a falling out of or even resistance to reality, and the concoction of an alternative reality hinging on the sole existence of the subject occupied by multiple Others. I interpret this being applicable to the experiences of Anna O, where Breuer (Freud & Breuer, 1893/1974) reports that her breakdown of grammar and syntax indicates a struggle for subjective unity. In other words, Anna succumbed to the multiplicity of her Imago, or primordial I, and a state of being ineffable within western forms of language.
Neurosis however would appear not so much as falling out of reality, but an effort to fit fully into reality, an incongruence of the Symbolic and the Imaginary/Real (Lacan, 1997b). Within the genre of searching, the caring daughter’s neurotic and psychotic symptoms stem from difficulties of articulation. The psychotic hysteric’s linguistic structure deteriorates to a place where she is excluded from language. This reality deserts her as she struggles to articulate perception: her very being as ‘rational’ is threatened. The neurotic hysteric wishes to find herself within language. She searches for inclusion. Hence, she finds herself in a confusing position: she consciously tries to find her way out of language to a space where she can facilitate her entrance into it. Lacan’s explanation of the terms psychosis and neurosis makes sense in relation to the mother’s quest followed in Chapter Four. The mother seemingly successfully negotiated the wall to a place where maternal alterity was possible through Baraitser’s (2009) work. In light of Lacan’s definition of psychosis, if the mother had linguistically travelled there, instead of theoretically enacting such a trip, then the search for maternal alterity would take a dangerous road indeed. Along that pathway, language structure disintegrates and madness ensues: Antigone’s tragic end is testimony to that. Psychosis then is something else that can be theorised but perhaps not theoretically induced. It initiates or is initiated by a gap, a void, an abyss, a rent or a tear in the very fabric of a reality that holds the subject together. The subject retreats/submerges to an isolated place beyond reality, although still inscribed within the Symbolic as mad.

Neurosis, on the other hand, aligns with the daughter’s attempt to articulate her encounter. Her search is her symptom. As discovered when following the transcendence of Levinas’ (1998) paternity, traversing Lacan’s (1988) wall or transcending the gap of the there is, as introduced by Brody (1998), the mother-
daughter encounter cannot be spoken through theories of maternal transcendence (Walsh, 2001). Neurosis for the hysterical daughter translates, as Lacan (1997b) suggests, as the quest to find a way into discourse from the ineffable and contentiously nonexistent place outside of it. Interestingly for the hysteric, neurosis is the forerunner to psychosis. Neurosis becomes the sense of uneasiness that something is missing, a trace of what has already been; psychosis, the dangers of the search should the daughter insist in pushing further and further into the scope of her inquiry. The hysteric wants to know: she seeks the answers to her questions, explores her silences, her traces and her incompleteness within the realm of the Symbolic and beyond. Through the gaps opened through genealogical inquiry, the daughter searches Schreber’s madness in an effort to recognise her hallucinatory symptoms as a way to articulate her mother-daughter encounter.

**Weaving reality: Schreber’s historic legacy**

Daniel Paul Schreber (1903/2000) describes his madness in *Memoirs of My Nervous Illness*, written throughout his second incarceration and collated in the very early 1900s. Schreber was an influential, well-educated man, twice admitted to mental institutions in the late 1800s. His memoirs expound an absolute belief in science, underpinning his painstakingly logical explanations concerning his experiences. He never faltered in his belief that advanced knowledge would one day corroborate his theories and reveal his sanity.

Schreber’s wide scope of reading displayed diverse interests that included history, philosophy and astronomy, interests that he maintained throughout his two documented bouts of illness. He spoke fluent Greek, as did his voices from time to time and he was astutely interested in politics and public affairs. He also had an academic interest in religion although he was not a religious man (MacAlpine &
Hunter, 1955). Indeed Lacan (1997b) suggests that Schreber’s (1903/2000) writings and the clarity of his logic are on par with many well-known serious philosophical literary works. Freud first encountered these recorded experiences in 1910, publishing a critique in 1911 and Lacan’s (1997b) second seminar, *The Psychosis* also draws heavily from Schreber’s recollections.

The son of an acclaimed doctor and academic, Schreber came from a privileged background. There is little known about his family life and it is surmised that this is because the family remained very quiet after Schreber’s publication (MacAlpine & Hunter, 1955). What we do know is that Schreber’s father was an expert on child rearing and an authoritarian (Dinnage, 2000). According to Dinnage (2000), Schreber’s childhood and the influences of his father reflect within his psychotic experiences. Moritz Schreber expounded extreme views on child rearing. He wrote over thirty books on the subject and invented some frightening contraptions, such as the *Geradehalter*, a device that children were strapped into to teach them to sit up straight. Moritz was also an advocate for cold-water health systems and had various cures for “harmful bodily habits” (Dinnage, 2000, p.xii). He succumbed to severe depression ten years before his death in 1861. Schreber’s older brother by three years committed suicide in 1877 at the age of 38 (Dinnage, 2000; Strachey, 1958).

It is well documented that Schreber suffered two bouts of serious mental illness, the first in 1884 and the second in 1893. According to the editor’s notes introducing the 1955 English translation of Schreber’s memoirs, he is also reported to have re-entered an asylum in 1907 after the death of his mother and his wife’s incapacitating stroke (MacAlpine & Hunter, 1955). His documented illnesses occurred at times of increased professional pressure, his first bout occurring just
before his appointment as a county court judge (Dinnage, 2000; Lacan, 1997b). His symptoms manifested as severe hypochondria (Freud, 1911/1958) resulting in confinement at Leipzig clinic for just under a year (Strachey, 1958). His second illness coincided with an early promotion to presiding judge of the German Appeal Court, from which he received his title of President (MacAlpine & Hunter 1955). That Schreber’s second bout of illness occurred at the time of his appointment suggests that Schreber was unable to cope with added heavy public responsibility acquired at a relatively young age. He returned to Leipzig clinic, again under the care of Professor Flechsig in 1893. This time Flechsig transferred him to the Saxon State Asylum in Dresden and from there, to Lindenhof Private Asylum near Coswig in 1894 (Strachey, 1958). His release in 1902 came about through court order after a two-year court battle he initiated and conducted, to secure his freedom (Strachey, 1958).

After fighting through the court for his own release, Schreber, although discharged, was not cured. He merely proved to the judge that he was an intelligent man capable of living in the community with alternative views of what constituted reality. One year after his release, he published his memoirs, although a chapter concerning his family was removed before publication (Dinnage, 2000; Lacan, 1993).

**Rationalising rationality**

Schreber’s (1903/2000) second bout of illness saw him succumb to, or engage in, multiple dialogues with God, a corporeal presence and ‘relationship’ that materialised through femininity, voluptuousness, sexuality, and divine rays. As a result, with no previous religious conviction, Schreber became a reluctant convert, attracting God’s rays and changing the fundamental order of the world in the
process. In an advanced state of madness, Schreber wrote an account of his bizarre experiences. His ongoing delusional state is the very reason that others believe he provides a valuable description or snapshot of psychopathology, providing rare insight into extreme insanity. Freud (1911/1958) hails Schreber as a triumph or corroboration of his own (Freud’s) extensive theoretical works, remarking on the similarities, or links between his own theorising and Schreber’s recorded experiences.

Strachey (1955) alerts us to the fact that Freud’s (1911/1958) critique was conducted through a reading of the original German text and not the English translation that I have used in my own engagement with Schreber’s memoirs. The English translation, according to Strachey (1958), is prone to the translator’s influential unconscious slips and jokes. Freud’s analysis used here is also a translation from German into English, translated by Strachey (1958). Schreber himself informs his readers of the difficulties he encounters recording his experiences and theoretical explanations because of the inadequacies of language concerning its lack of appropriate words. Therefore, for me as for other readers, both texts necessarily involve varieties of miscommunicating the experiences of President Schreber.

For Dinnage (2000), vital information is missing from Freud’s (1911/1958) critique of Schreber’s memoirs. Freud does not take Schreber’s (1903/2000) past sufferings into account; sufferings at both the hands of his father and while detained in mental institutions. She puts Schreber’s incarceration into context by informing us that Flechsig, his first specialist was, like Freud’s early mentor Charcot, primarily a neuroanatomist, with little interest in psychiatry. She also points out that Freud’s analysis concentrates on father and son and ignores the women in Schreber’s life,
including his wife, mother and adopted daughter, the latter describing him as a kind and gentle man (Dinnage, 2000).

Yet Dinnage (2000) welcomes Freud’s (1911/1958) suggestion that Schreber’s delusions were part of a system designed as a sort of reconstruction of the subject or a self-healing process. Lacan (1997b) however, suggests that the product of Freud’s uptake of Schreber’s writing is a truly remarkable piece of work, the work of a linguist, who after recognising signposts or repetitions within the text goes to some lengths to recompose it into something that makes sense. For Lacan then, Freud’s (1911/1958) interpretation of Schreber’s memoirs demonstrates the Symbolic influences of analytic interpretation. It fails to emphasise the differences between neurosis and psychosis in a way that describes their signification within discourse (Lacan, 1997b). Psychoanalysis is dependent on the limits of the Symbolic for its understanding. As mentioned, Schreber’s self-reported ‘case study’ presented Freud (1911/1958) with rich text upon which to apply his theories. It is not altogether surprising then that Freud’s analysis foregrounds the father/son relations of the oedipal scene, re-enacting the death of the (primordial) father, suppressed homosexuality and the drive to reproduce.

**Passive thoughts and a rush of libido**

Crucial to Freud’s (1911/1958) analytical critique, is a fleeting pre-illness thought that Schreber records in his memoirs. Schreber recalls lying in bed half-asleep and thinking in passing, what a nice experience it would be to be a woman submitting to a man. For Freud this is the indication of suppressed homosexuality. According to Freud (1911/1958, p. 43):

The exciting cause of his illness, then, was an outburst of homosexual libido; the object of this libido was probably from the very first his doctor,
Flechsig; and his struggles against the libidinal impulse produced the conflict, which gave rise to the symptoms.

For Freud (1911/1958), the weakness that led to Schreber’s illness was the absence of his wife, who had been away on holiday not long before the onset of his second psychotic bout. As an aside, I notice here another woman whose presence is documented through her absence. According to Freud (p. 62), Schreber’s libido “bursts its banks at the weakest spot” when his wife is no longer in the vicinity. In Freud’s analysis, Schreber’s wife plays a pivotal part, in absentia holding him together as a normatively functioning pre-delusional heterosexual male. She appears to be producing or maintaining, at this time, his ‘substance’ or ‘reality’, or in other words, the reflection from the plane of the mirror that reflects the whole self-image, perpetuated through the Law of the Name of the Father.

Freud (1911/1958) suggests that Schreber projects his homosexual desires onto his doctor, Flechsig who becomes the target of his love/hate. Flechsig cured Schreber’s first bout of illness, much to the admiration of Schreber’s wife, who always kept a picture of the good doctor handy, as a reflection of admiration for the man who administered her husband’s cure.

For Freud (1911/1958), Schreber immerses himself within an insular system of narcissism and paranoia. Love and hate are indistinguishable. His love of Flechsig translates as his hatred for Flechsig and this in turn becomes decentred: ‘I hate him’ becomes ‘he hates me’. To Schreber, the good doctor Flechsig becomes a ‘soul murderer’ sent by the least amicable of a two tiered God. The apparently singular Flechsig is split into a great many Flechsig children which come in two sizes, little and normal. This prompts Freud to suggest that the multiple miniature Flechsig children and represent Schreber’s unfulfilled desire to be a father. The big Flechsig
are the object of his desire. Within the context of Freud’s endeavour to make sense out of chaos, Lacan (1997b) enquires as to why the little men have to be children; why can they not just be little men.

Within Schreber’s (1903/2000) world, there are also miracle birds, or soul-birds: once human, they have now transcended to a state of feathered bliss. The birds manifest in the shape of different species and change appropriately with the seasons. Schreber interprets these birds as being feminine, leading Freud (1911/1958) to the conclusion that the birds represent little girls. This assumption relies on comparative size, in that although they are normal bird size, they are small in comparison to men.

**Interlude: The severing/feathering of other jouissance**

Schreber’s (1903/2000) miracle birds alert me to yet another gap: as miracles, they have accomplished something special in the form of a blissful transcendence, an ecstatic state of jouissance. In Schreber’s world, the birds are all feminine. Have they successfully transcended the wall of language and within Schreber’s consciousness, become ecstatically blissful? Are they within the realms of the other jouissance? Is this their miraculous characteristic? If they have achieved this as the projected Other of Schreber, then it is truly remarkable. A possible space has been written within a quest beyond the Law of the Name of the Father, one, like Benjamin’s, that does not leave traces in the third. Interpreting Schreber’s miracle birds as situated within a remote reference to Benjamin’s ‘third’ space (1998, 2007): To achieve such
an encounter within a place where jouissance is memorable, she must transcend as feathered, meaning that she has not originated from the primordial womb.

The portrayal of women as birds is not unusual in mythology: the sphinx, for example is often portrayed as half bird. Although in this case the birds are feminine, they are denied any primordial corporeal maternal encounters since they are hatched from an egg. Schreber’s feathered jouissance cannot leave marks or traces of embodied maternal encounter. As we discover later, these birds, employed to sever the body from the soul, tirelessly work toward detaching the embodied mother from language and keeping the projected image of the phallic mother alive. These birds and their bliss are not primordial; they appear to be carriers of an inscribed mess of perception, caught within a fierce contestation of the Oedipus complex. In other words, they seem to represent the entrance into language amidst a conglomeraterion of love and hate, pleasure and pain.

The birds tirelessly work on what appears to be a continuous mission of splitting. God, it would seem consists, not only of double tiers, but also as a collective presence of split souls, soul murderers, little men, miracle birds, tested souls and ‘fleeting improvised men’ (Lacan, 1997b).

As God’s representatives, the birds repeat rote learned meaningless phrases. Their words are poisonous, absorbed into Schreber’s (1903/2000) soul. After successful integration they produce rote learned phrases of friendly damnation. The
birds then, jubilantly integrate back into Schreber’s soul having triumphantly delivered their poison to the body. In what appears to be an oppositional stance to the miracle birds, the soul murderers are representations of a death of consciousness in their very name. Schreber labelled his first doctor, Professor Flechsig, a soul murderer. Indeed, as Dinnage (2000) tells us, Flechsig was a neuroanatomist with a belief that nervous illness had a physical origin. The miracle birds were something different altogether. The birds, with their constant chanting delivery of discourse work tirelessly against the work of the soul murderer Flechsig, whose task it is to destroy Schreber’s soul, for the body to triumph. What occurs here is battle of epic proportions, much like Hegel’s (1977) battle to the death and Levinas’ (1979, 1998) battle against the forces of corporeal evil as destructive to masculine genealogy and procreative infinity. This encounter leaves traces, the traumas of human development.

**For the love of God**

One of the secrets that Schreber (1903/2000) alone holds is God’s ignorance. Schreber’s compelling necessity to complete his voices’ unfinished sentences stems from the fact that God, in his infinite wisdom has little knowledge of human beings. This is because God’s experience with humans is limited to the point of ignorance. Because of God’s difficulties with mankind’s theoretical and scientific endeavours, Schreber must constantly convince God that he (Schreber) is still capable of reason. God is not aware that humans are capable of unproductive moments where thought is non-existent, or in other words, that humanity exists before speech. Within this world, moments devoid of thought or perhaps those of pure perception or ‘recognition before thought’ are impossible or indicate dementia.
If God suspects dementia, he will abandon Schreber and if this happens, given that God, through Levinas’ reasoning has called Schreber into being, Schreber will no longer exist; his tenuous hold on an alternative reality woven around God will be gone. God then, as Other, holds the key to Schreber’s existence, an existence that must resist ‘perception without thought’ as a key to holding on to reality. Yet despite God’s ignorance and unreasonable demands, there is an overwhelming attraction between the two (Schreber, 1903/2000).

Schreber (1903/2000) attracts God’s rays. There is a bond between them that alters the world permanently. As Schreber (1903/2000, p. 204/164) warns, “...there is something rotten in the state of Denmark.” Kantor (1998, p. 495) suggests there are similarities between Moses’ encounter with a burning bush and Schreber’s encounter with God’s rays of light:

[T]he problem of light and revelation is closely connected with that of illusion, or better, to that of how one can tell the difference between illusion and transcendental illusion, between Moses’s “Burning Bush” and Schreber’s “Rays of God”.

For Kantor (1998), Levinas’ theories of transcendence and alterity bear a resemblance to Schreber’s explanations and reality he weaves around his symptoms. Both Levinas’ as Schreber’s realities are dependent on God, light and submission for peace and transcendence. Indeed, as Levinas describes the Other as primary, in that it brings the subject into being within a decentring of I to me (Baraitser, 2009), Kantor suggest that both Schreber and Moses are dependent on God for their existence, subjectivity, and awareness. The realities of Schreber and Levinas therefore appear to rely on a cyclical discourse of transcendence. Schreber suggests that there is no
available discourses to describe his reality, hence he must, if he insists on speaking or writing them, use available language, a structure that inscribes meaning.

![Figure 11. Moses and the burning bush.](image)

Schreber’s (1903/2000) world, therefore, teeters on the cusp of unconsciousness and pre-consciousness, at the wall of language: he is metaphorically up against it. He swings between perception and thought, caught in a world of nonsensical babble attempting to ascribe it with meaning. This continual series of initial encounters or ‘marking’ takes place where Schreber is so close to non-existence that he exists alone (with Others) in alterity, either resisting or falling out of language. In either case, language is struggling to contain Schreber’s embodied traces or perceptions.
Interlude: The Borromean Knot...yet again

So what makes Schreber’s reality psychotic? Lacan (1997b) argues that actually Schreber’s interpretation of the world is actually probably no less valid than more conventional sense making. His psychosis is a product of discursive incongruence; a hole in the subject, filled by an alternative reality. One could say that Schreber’s (1903/2000) memoirs are his synhome, an intricate alternative reality that keeps him together after the knot has been severed, or as Harari (1995) might suggest, his written memoirs are a substitute for the Law of the Name of the Father, the damaged weavings to repair the Borromean Knot that has been broken. I might hasten to add here that within Schreber’s work, the Law of the Name of the Father firmly holds his written work together, as I think, is hinted at by Kantor (1998), when he compares Levinas’ and Schreber’s God(s) and the comparative sanity of their authors.

Submitting to God

The failure to eliminate corporeal traces that disrupt discourse introduces a distinctive battle of duality versus integration into Schreber’s voices. According to Schreber (1903/2000), God is attracted to his ‘soul voluptuousness.’ The more heightened Schreber’s sense or intact/attached/inclusive corporeality and the more feminine the soul, the more attractive he becomes to God. In fact, God is taking on all the appearances of an authoritarian figure, bullying Schreber into submission.
Lacan suggests that he is becoming God’s wife. Schreber’s precarious positioning on the cusp of embodiedness therefore represents a fatal attraction: God’s rays are transforming Schreber into a woman. As time progresses, so, does his (trans)formation of gender. Through a process of hallucination and delusion, language changes both Schreber’s body and soul and this is a process demanded by God/Other. Schreber is witnessing noticeable morphological changes in body shape and stature, interesting when God is attracted to the voluptuousness of his soul and understands little of the workings of the human body.

With Walsh’s (2001) critique of Levinas paternity in mind, Schreber (1903/2000) would be in abysmal freefall at this moment. For Levinas’ transcendence, modesty and passivity is required and transcendence requires paternity (Walsh, 2001). Indeed, Schreber feels that if he submits passively to the change and to God, then things will get better. He observes the changes in his mirrored images, the swelling of breasts that enlarge when God’s rays are strongest, feminine curves of his buttocks and the shrinking of his genitals. The voluptuousness of woman attracts God’s rays of light. It is in Schreber’s best interests to submit to God on God’s terms if he wishes to provide himself with some relief from his tremendous sufferings.

**Marrying God**

As Schreber’s (1903/2000) biology and gender transforms, he is convinced that women have a sensual nerve system or an eroticism that covers their entire body as opposed to men whose sensitivity remains confined to their genitals. When God is close, this ‘soul’ voluptuousness becomes overwhelming. Schreber, having decided that considering the tortures he has endured he deserves some pleasure, makes love with himself. This is not an act of masturbation, of self-gratification. He is both man
and woman simultaneously in a curious fracturing and interaction within the chaos. Schreber’s hallucinations and delusions of morphological change have now immersed themselves within an embodied encounter of subject and Other, where they are both present simultaneously.

Schreber’s Other consists of a multiple babble of voices that emanate a ‘voluptuous’ (Freud 1911/1958; Kantor, 1998) presence, a chaos of undecipherable dialogue that is attributed to God, his Other, his unconscious. When Schreber loses contact with God, when God moves further away or perhaps when Schreber moves closer to the Symbolic, there are times when this incessant babble stops, the two levels of this relationship becomes vitally apparent (Lacan, 1997b). When God’s presence withdraws, Schreber suffers great pain; a rupture, a tearing of the self. In this case, dialogue and Eros seem to be distinct yet connected. Unable to understand such an encounter, Schreber (1903/2000) writes it down in order to initiate meaning. Indeed, his book presents a complicated theoretical and highly entertaining explanation to do with ‘nerves’ that deciphers into a clearly written logical account of extreme madness.

Schreber is not the only one recording the process. Everything that Schreber (1903/2000) thinks is recorded in writing by the ‘souls’, so God will be aware of a slip into dementia and leave him: his voices do not hesitate to let him know when he repeats thoughts. Within Schreber’s world, the souls or ‘substance’ perhaps are synonymous with a diachronic version of unrelated words. Schreber is writing his memoirs, his reality, his rationale, the Other is simultaneously writing his very existence.
**Conversing with God**

Within an advanced state of psychosis, Schreber (1903/2000) experiences voices both within himself and from his immediate surroundings. They are multiple in essence, a collection of perceptions, encounters, souls/God that, earlier in his illness speak in complete sentences and then later resort to broken and incomplete sentences that Schreber is compelled to complete. Schreber’s voices address him with a barrage of nonsensical babble. Yet without the babble or in other words, the times when the voices stop, the silences threaten the reality of Schreber’s world. They signal God’s withdrawal.

The multiple voices of Schreber (1903/2000) are not a ‘symptom’ that is unique to him. Carol North (1988) in her account of her battle with chronic schizophrenia describes her own set of voices and the world that she creates to explain delusions at which she is the centre. Her voices are also nonsensical, repetitive and multiple and like Schreber, she is adamant that there is no language available to describe her experiences accurately. When her voices stop, her silence is deafening. Like Schreber, she writes her experiences down. Yet the most telling difference between these two accounts of madness is that while North wrote her memoirs after a complete recovery, Schreber did not. He never emerged fully from the intricate world he wove even though he remained tenuously attached to ‘reality’. He functioned in the world in the belief that he indeed was the bearer of untranslatable knowledge and one-day science would catch up (Lacan, 1997b; Schreber, 1903/2000).

**An impossible relation**

At the edge of the tear, the gap, Schreber (1903/2000) believes that no one else exists: and at that moment, no one else does. Whether this is a Levinas-like
encounter, where the other calls the subject into being (Levinas, 1998), where the existent is challenged by existence (Levinas, 1995/1978) or a Hegelian encounter, a fight to the death of two self-consciousnesses (Butler, 1987/2004), there is no one else. Schreber’s encounters are (un)memorable, yet their traces remain. Encounters that he can recall are initiated by ‘fleeting improvised men’ or (un)memories that dissolve after they have passed from sight. For example, Schreber was convinced his wife was dead and the wife who visited him was fleeting, improvised, and dissolved after contact.

Schreber’s (1903/2000) memories are struggling at the stage of inscription. We could argue that Schreber’s corporeal torment, the physical torture and hallucinatory morphological transformations, is a reason why Schreber remains trapped somewhere close to Lacan’s (1988) wall of language. After all, he is turning into a woman, and we know that in Levinas’ particular journey, women cannot transcend as embodied beings. Schreber’s transcendence is dependent on a particular relationship with God, one that he has scripted himself yet struggles to write in the master’s discourse. Transcendence depends on passivity, for Schreber as woman, God’s wife, a combination of multiplicity, of traces, of interactive reflections, of men, of women and of God.

**Reflections of a nervous illness**

Schreber’s (1903/2000) memoirs present a man capable of lucidity, rationality and exceptional reasoning. They present a man steeped in the traditions of science, using reason to fathom the instabilities of discourse, a path doomed to failure. Schreber is also a man with a background of subjection to extreme violence in the form of overzealous caring and childrearing techniques; a victim of ‘normative’ scientifically derived, care theory of the day. Physical endurance is not
new to him. It appears logical to me that faced with his linguistic displacements, his symptoms and projections, embodied (un)memory would manifest in extreme representations. Lacan’s (1997b) appeal that Schreber’s memoirs should not be twisted and/or fitted into linguistic structural comfort is reasonable, and I do not imagine for one minute that I can ever gaze into Schreber’s world through his writing. Yet perhaps we can contemplate the way language still structures it, how fractured Others inevitably steer it and perhaps how it serves for Schreber as the foundation on which to argue his sanity.

I think of Schreber’s (1903/2000) memoirs/work as a riddle that we should refrain from solving. He presents a paradoxical nonsensical reality, his sinthome, his substance, a reality that holds his world together given that language has forsaken him to some incongruent extent. Although Schreber’s reality should be left to rationalise itself/himself, Schreber does provide us with a blow-by-blow description of his struggle to survive both a barrage of fractured discourse and an embodied encounter with Other/s. I interpret this as a discursive struggle of consciousness with dualism, a classic battle of soul/substance and flesh/container, of alterity and existence, and yet another journey through ‘Freud’s unconscious structure’.

When Schreber describes soul voluptuousness as embodied man/woman/God encounter: he exists as both man and woman simultaneously, impossibility made possible through madness. I take this (im)possibility that language inscribes as madness or delusion as exposing a space, an alterity, perhaps what Lacan (1988) calls the plane of the mirror: there is nothing behind but darkness, or a third space, where embodied perceptions or encounters with Other take place. Perhaps it offers more than that, a form of embodied traces, manifesting as perceived physical changes.
I worry that language still insists on Schreber ‘submitting’ to please God in an effort to make his life easier to bear, to allow him to transcend into language or for his alternative world to be allowed to cohabit in harmony with ‘reality’. Yet I suspect that the traces or marks left through encounters with his father are foremost in Schreber’s Other, just as a caregiving daughter’s traces of her mother remain to torment the hysteric in the Symbolic, yet are inaccessible within discourse as reality.

This brings me to a place where I consider Schreber’s embodied delusions, his perceived physiological changes and wonder at a rewriting/remembering the daughter’s battle between caregiving family responsibility and hysterical hallucinations and delusions. Schreber opens pathways to a glimpse of a dark, evil, phantasmic place, full of jouissance, whisperings and bits of dust and indeed the possibilities for a rational falling out of language into a world of embodied (un)memory, a rationality that translates into language as psychosis/madness. His experiences of alterity present perhaps, a place where daughter-mother/Other embodied encounter or traces thereof become utterable experiences and not only hallucination or delusion. Hallucination can be rationalised within language structure, as can madness, but ultimately, even Schreber’s account of his experiences, as hinted by Kantor (1998), are written within discourses of transcendence. Certainly, to speak within a rational medium of madness, to try to speak her encounter would ensure that it be said within the current structures of phallic discourse. I detect a moment of uneasiness, a familiarity, and a constricting feeling that the gap is closing rapidly.

*And as I sit here pondering Schreber’s memoirs, I feel a sense of irony that in these undecipherable rantings of a ‘madman’, there’s the rich prospects of rational*
‘hallucination’ and ‘delusion’ that I have so far been unable to locate within reasoned masculine theories of difference.
Inter-chapter interlude: The Sphinx’s story

There are certain similarities within the tragic stories of Oedipus and Schreber. It is no secret that like Schreber, Oedipus also suffered cruelty at the hands of his father. Although Oedipus was not strapped to a Geradehalter; he did have his feet painfully pierced and bound before being abandoned in the wilderness, hence the name Oedipus (Davis, 2010). Both fathers’ cruelties were designed to be preventative. Schreber’s father Moritz’s actions were designed to prevent sloppy posture and perverse bodily practices, while King Laius of Thebes, Oedipus’ father, acted out of self-preservation, or as a preventative measure to ward off his own demise.

Because of a damning prophesy revealed to King Laius that he will be slain by his son, he arranges, on the child’s birth to Jocasta, that the boy will be taken away from the city and abandoned, so that he dies of exposure. Instead, a disobedient servant gives the baby boy to a shepherd: the ruler of a neighbouring kingdom ends up raising the child. He remains alive therefore, nurtured by a family that he thinks of as biological kin. Yet this prophesy follows him. An oracle tells him that he will kill his father and marry his mother. He leaves home to protect his adopted parents whom he understands to be in danger through his presence. On his journey, he has two recorded encounters. The first is with a quarrelsome man whom he kills. Unbeknownst to Oedipus,
this is his father, King Laius. The second encounter is with the Sphinx. The Sphinx is a dreaded winged creature, half beast/bird, and half woman, the complete package being gendered feminine. The Sphinx has been terrorising the kingdom of Thebes through murder, famine and pestilence. Rumour has it that those who have encountered the Sphinx have perished although we should treat such a claim with caution; the Sphinx initiates encounter.

Another similarity in our two stories springs to mind here. The Sphinx is half woman and half beast/bird, depending on the version. Schreber’s feminine creations were feminine birds (miracle or soul birds), cleverly manifesting within the guise of seasonal birds. Schreber reveals he has never met a bird that cannot speak.

The Sphinx does not kill on sight. She asks a question of those who encounter her on their travels to Thebes, but not just any ‘normal’ question, and Oedipus’ encounter is no exception. Like the miracle birds, her words are poisonous. The Sphinx engages Oedipus in the ancient art of riddling. Her question is recorded as being something similar to the following “What has four, then two, then three?” It is my suspicion that this riddle has become more coherent with telling over the centuries in slowly changing to fit with its answer (perhaps similar to Freud’s linguistic sense making). Davis (2010) suggests that the Sphinx asks; “What has four legs in the morning, two at midday and three at night?” He then suggests that for a man with the name Oedipus, or ‘swollen feet’ who must carry himself with an inevitable limp, this could be
purely interpreted as “how are you?” as in a man’s general state in
the world. Actually, Davis’s flippancy is helpful here. Mobility would
appear to be an appropriate theme of torment for Oedipus’ Other to
pursue, just as physical torture and submitting to authority would
be to Schreber.

So the Sphinx does not physically attack Oedipus, but assails
him with words that need deciphering. In a similar vein,
God/Other(s) confront Schreber and constantly bombard him with
‘unfinished’ sentences that required completing. The miracle birds
carry their corpse poison within their rote phrases that Schreber
must finish to convince God that he is capable of thought.

Interlude within an interlude: Some thoughts on riddling

I take time out of the interlude and wonder at the art of
riddling, where an answer is required to make sense out of
nonsense, in both of these stories, for survival. This suggests to
me that riddling is not so much a fanciful art to while away
the time, but an intricate or archaic trick of (un)memory
where perception is required to be reassembled into discourse
and inscribed meaning. For example, riddling is present in the
ancient Estonian tales of Kalevpoeg, in one instance employed
by a wise giant trying to ascertain whether those present have
the rationality of men (Kreutzwald, 1982). More recently, in
Tolkien’s (1937/1966) ‘The Hobbit’, Bilbo is required to
participate in a riddling duel to secure his escape after the
Meanwhile, in Oedipus’s encounter with the Sphinx, the waylaid traveller is required to make meaning to ensure his very existence. The Sphinx as primary Other initiates this encounter and, as Levinas would have it, brings the subject into being. This also makes it more apparent that we have again stumbled to the edge of a gap that indicates a moment of alterity, an initial encounter, a new dawning of consciousness. Oedipus’ battle with the Sphinx is a battle of discourse, a dawning of conscious reality or transcendence into reality, of restricting perception into the confines of language, and a fight to the death.

For Oedipus to survive, ordered chaos, or rationality is required. Instead of just politely saying “fine thanks”, he answers the riddle in such a way that echoes a faultless transcendence into

ring splits from Gollum and aligns with him. In ‘The Lord of the Rings’ (Tolkien, 1954-55/1995), a riddle needs to be solved to acquire the password for entrance into the Mines of Moria, representing the dependence of progress on making sense of nonsense. Certainly, I have a sense that the answering of the riddle presents a difficulty here for Oedipus between life and death and perhaps also for Schreber, where submitting makes life a whole lot more bearable. Hence we might think of the riddle as being at the interface of Lacan’s wall of language, where transcendence toward the light becomes the available pathway once meaning is inscribed.
the Symbolic. He replies something like this “a child crawls on all fours, an adult walks on two legs and then an elderly man walks with a cane.” He has rationally described the lifespan of man’s mobility and development in all his synchronic glory, from a motherless birth to a Freudian march toward death.

Contrary to Davis’ (2010) assumption of ‘rationality’, I suggest that the Sphinx’s rantings are a string of disconnected diachronic garble, a ‘voice’ that Oedipus’s answer serves to silence, and in doing so, he effectively silences himself through castration. Yet although he has cast aside his primordial embodied mother and she/Sphinx/Other disappears from the script in the predictable way of an abysmal death by falling, not all is lost for Oedipus.

Because Oedipus ‘successfully’ answers the question, the Sphinx perishes and along with her, the primordial mother (un)memories. From here, he rejoins the tragedy (ate) and having survived a life threatening encounter with the Other goes on to fulfil the prophesy. Because he has vanquished his Sphinx, and traded off his primordial traces for rationality or reality, he takes the Queen/mother’s hand in marriage and commands the Kingdom of Thebes (given that he has conveniently created a vacancy).
Chapter Six: Murmuring silences

To the Muses

Whether on Ida’s shady brow,
Or in the chamber of the East,
The chambers of the sun, that now
From antient melody have ceas’d;

Whether in Heav’n ye wander fair,
Or the green corners of the earth,
Or the blue regions of the air,
Where melodious winds have birth;

Whether on chrystal rocks ye rove,
Beneath the bosom of the sea
Wand’ring in many a coral grove,
Fair nine, forsaking Poetry!

How have you left the antient love
That bards of old enjoyed in you!
The languid strings do scarcely move!
The sound is forc’d, the notes are few!


Visualise the air in contact with a sheet of water; the surface of the water will be broken up into a series of divisions, waves. The waves resemble the union or coupling of thought with sonic substance. (de Saussure, 1916/2008, p. 17)

After searching the gaps within philosophy, madness and mythology, I now interpret Levinas’ paternal alterity, Schreber’s memoirs, and Oedipus’ encounter with the Sphinx, as transcendence stories. Their telling is confined within language structure and repeated available discourses that require a linguistic traversing of a wall, or abyss toward, God, light and normative development. Selective memory is enabled through journeys of transcendence. Yet, each journey has left traces, shifting her questions, opening gaps enabling yet other pathways. As the daughter searches,
she finds herself in rhythm with journeying and adversity, confrontation and transcendence, a transcendence which will not let her back through the wall of language so she can remember her encounters. Within every search, she finds herself up against an increasingly besieged wall where metaphor converges. She cannot pass the wall without putting a voice to the available linguistic avenues a conscious realisation of the enormity of Lacan’s thesis, that there is nothing outside of language through the avenues she has been searching.

The hysteric is in an impossible position. The pathways made possible to her within discourse offers her an elusive (im)possibility to search beyond them. Even though she searches the words of the master through her hysterical speaking position, the encounter she looks for is ineffable, presenting impossibilities of remembering. To speak of it, she must follow a prescribed format in a voice that does not belong to a daughter encountering her mother. She must speak in a voice that is not her own. Once spoken, the object of her enquiry now becomes silence, in that silence represents what she cannot speak. If the voice she speaks with is not her own, then whose voice is it and where is hers?

In this chapter, the daughter sets out to find her voice by listening to the silences that mask her encounter in an effort to access what the silence represses, her memory, the other jouissance and embodied maternal care. She does this through searching what enables the genre in which she searches, cyclical discourse.

William Blake (1982) poeticises the hysteric’s question in an ode to the Muses alerting the daughter that mythology may yet offer her a pathway to remembering. de Saussure (1916/2008) links sound to the primary elements describes an impact, where elements meet, a place of conflict and turbulence. Perhaps this is the site of the wall, the barrier that isolates Woman’s primordial
memories, her jouissance and her care and perhaps guards the secrets hidden beyond the hysteric’s mask. The daughter pursues silence, through Freud’s (1913/1958) *Theme of the Three Caskets* in which she sees an opportunity to travel back to the time of the Muses and confront the elemental production of sound. If she can trace voice back to its origins, then she may be able to access a time, before its loss, when her encounter can still be spoken. *The Theme of the Three Caskets* offers an analysis of the meaning of silence, within a rhythm of cyclical discourse and traces these origins back to ancient Greek mythology. Freud discusses the connections between dumbness and death and the origins of repetitious discourses of stories of ‘three women’ through mythology and literature.

Through a reading of Freud, I contemplate whether there are archaic cyclical traces of women’s encounters with women, including mother and daughter within western contemporary language structure that are accessible through discourses of transcendence, philosophical theorising of becoming, and archaic stories of three women. If they are present, can we access them? Do these cyclical stories contain traces of voices, voices that are inaudible or alternatively heard? Can we not hear them when they are interpreted as desire for the mother within the discourse of the master? Could the hearing of voices, as an audible hallucination be considered along similar avenues as the daughter’s physical hallucinations as traces of (un)memorable encounter?

**A widening gap between gods and men**

Hallucination, whether it is auditory or visual carries connotations of psychopathology in contemporary times. Yet according to Smith, (2007), hallucinations are not as unusual as we are led to believe nowadays, although they are not something we are able to discuss in public. Smith tells how his father lived
with voices, the shame of which eventually led to nervous breakdown, a reversal of how we might consider that the story should be told. The nervous breakdown should lead to the hearing of voices. Smith’s grandfather had a better relationship with his voices, consulting them in card games, at the racetrack and in multi-choice tests, gaining a self-reported average of 80% in the latter. William Blake also heard voices: hence the lamentation of their growing sparseness. Moses heard voices and in attributing those voices to God, he became a prophet. Joan of Arc heard beautiful voices emanating from God and the saints. The Christian inquisition deemed her voices manifestations of the devil and demanded her death (Smith, 2007).

Smith (2007) also suggests that although Socrates was sentenced to death because his political outspokenness was deemed as leading to the corruption of youth, there is reason to believe that his conviction and execution were directly related to the god or diamonian he consulted. Socrates voices were those of the gods. For Smith (2007), in the time that Socrates lived, the divide or split between God and Man was growing increasingly wider and it was unlawful to introduce a new god without registering this through lawful process. Socrates’ crime was that he failed to follow protocol and kept his god/s to himself. For Smith, conversation between God and man was already being constricted as religion shifted its focus from the integrated body/psyche to the redemption of the soul, as a forerunner to monotheism and Christianity.

The shift in perception God’s relations with man is important, given that Greek mythology underpins psychoanalysis and the splitting of the subject. Psychoanalysis depends upon the story of Oedipus, a prominent cyclical discourse within western language structure as metaphor for subsequent pathways of human development.
The widening of the gap between man and his God(s) is important in that man can no longer communicate with his Other, the void is formed, silence falls through a linguistic problematic of transcending the gap. Hence there are structural formulas, such as those associated with Lacan’s four discourses (Lacan, 1999, 2007), to fill in these voids that we default to when we speak. Through Lacan’s reinterpretation of Freud’s unconscious structure as a theory of discourse, Oedipus’ story, told within contemporary forms of discourse represents a metaphor of exclusion, exclusion of many voices. Hence, silence becomes a scripted pathway of inquiry within mythology. For Kerényi (1914/1985b) mythology is a collection of stories about gods and heroes that battle and travel to the underworld. Mythology cannot be separated from art and music, is dynamic and relates experiences that are lived realities within the societies from which they are born. There are familiar mythological stories that are continually repeated within stories, theatre and creative art. They are often origin myths. Early psychoanalysis writing by Freud, Jung (Segal, 2008), and Rank (1914/1959) examines how the unconscious manifests in language as a world of gods and heroes and takes up cyclical mythology, not as living functions of culture, context and art, but as manifestation of the unconscious, of phantasies, that explain the necessities of ‘splitting’ as normative.

Finding a path through metaphorical congestion

The story of Oedipus is one of many stories that fit a repetitive template. Otto Rank (1914/1959) in The Myth of the Birth of the Hero recounts a series of stories, originating from different countries that begin with prophesies that concern the birth of a child, a son that will eventually harm his father. Even though the fear of death initiates abstinence, the child is still conceived and the father attempts to kill the child by placing it in a basket and setting it afloat on a river. There are usually
multiple variations of the same story, with different endings. The child still manages to survive against the odds and ultimately and inevitably, ends up fulfilling prophesy. Rank names both Oedipus and Moses amongst a mythological list of heroes whose existence follows this pattern that include Paris, Telephus, Perseus and Hercules. Rank (1914/1959, p. 66) suggests that “numerous investigators have emphasised that the understanding of myth formation requires our going back to their ultimate source”, meaning that source to be within the uninhibited imaginations of the child.

Certainly, Rank suggests that these myths represent the desire of the child for the mother amidst a resentment of the father. He also gives thanks to the kindness of Professor Freud for supplying valuable information regarding the similarities of the imaginations of the child and the neurotic. For Rank (1914/1959, p. 68), the detachment of the child from the mother is “one of the most painful achievements of evolution.” Such a process is dependent on the perceptions of the child. It may perceive neglect or rejection as it comes to terms with the relationship of its parents. Rank (p.94) suggests there is an intimate relationship “between the hero myth and the delusional structure of paranoiacs” and that the “the contents of hysterical fantasies, which can often be made conscious through analysis, are identical up to the minutest details with the complaints of the persecuted paranoiacs.”

For the present let us stop at the narrow boundary line where the contents of innocent infantile imaginings, suppressed and unconscious neurotic fantasies, poetical myth structures, and certain forms of mental disease and crime lie close together, although far apart as to their causes and dynamic forces. We resist the temptation to follow one of these divergent paths that lead to altogether different realms, but which are as yet unblazed trails in the wilderness. (Rank, 1914/1959, p. 96)
Certainly the linguistic structures of cyclical mythology, hysteria and journeying are closely associated with Rank’s inquiry and although he may have been able to stop at the border of metaphorical congestion and resist the intrigue of following unblazed trails of hysterical fantasy, the daughter cannot.

Although Segal (2008) suggests that Rank’s (1914/1959) interest in mythical similarities was that they provided fodder for psychoanalytic critique, I suggest that drawing attention to the gap between God and man and cyclical discourse has important implications for psychological research and hysterical enquiry. As the daughter cyclically searches, she may travel the origins of her genre, historically and simultaneously, within the phantasies of the child. I read Freud’s (1913/1958) thoughts on death and silence in The Theme of the Three Caskets as an exercise in both pursuing the historical underpinnings of the genre and as a way of locating gaps within the scope of inquiry for the daughter to traverse where unconscious neurotic fantasies and poetical myth structure meet near the busy line between Imaginary and ‘wilderness’ as a place that the daughter may be able to locate her voice.

A choice of three

Freud (1913/1958) investigates the cyclical repetitions of three women in relation to silence and death and discusses the multiples of three women in mythology, theatre and fairytales. Considering the scripts of two Shakespearian (1970) plays, The Merchant of Venice and King Lear, Freud traces similarities in script to ancient mythology.

In The Merchant of Venice, Portia’s father wants her to choose a husband. Three suitors face a choice of three caskets; one is gold, one silver and the third lead. One of these caskets contains a picture of Portia. The suitor that chooses this casket wins Portia’s hand in marriage. Bassanio, Portia’s suitor of choice, opts for the lead
casket and becomes the victorious suitor (Shakespeare, 1970). Similarly, in *King Lear* (Shakespeare, 1970), the King has three daughters. For Freud (1913/1958), the reason that they are daughters and not prospective brides hinges on the King’s extreme age. The King takes it upon himself to settle inheritance difficulties while he is still alive. He sets about concocting a plan that will enable him to gauge the love that each daughter has for him so he can divide his kingdom proportionally. The daughters must declare to the King just how much they love him. Two of the daughters are very forthcoming and dishonest in their praise. Cordelia, the favourite daughter is not: she speaks honestly and briefly. Outraged, King Lear banishes Cordelia from the Kingdom: Cordelia’s silence or sparse outspokenness becomes her downfall (Shakespeare, 1970). For Freud (1913/1958), she represents the Goddess of Death, a position that corresponds with Portia’s lead casket: Both represent women of few words, qualities of modesty and silence.

**The value of silence**

According to Freud (1913/1958), this plot of three is not original: Shakespeare appropriated *The Merchant of Venice’s*’ story line from *Gesta Romanorum*, where a similar plot is recognisable regarding a girl’s choice of husband, a story line that continues to surface in narrative. Freud (1913/1958) cites the Estonian epic tale of Kalevipoeg as an example of an ancient rendition of Portia’s story since there are three suitors, a sun youth, a moon youth and a son of the North Star to woo one of three sisters, Salme. Salme rejects both the sun and the moon: she accepts the star youth (Kreutzwald, 1982; Freud, 1913/1958). According to Stucken (as cited in Freud 1913/1958; Segal, 2008), Portia’s three suitors are representative of the sun, the moon and the stars. The Prince of Morocco chooses gold; this interpreted as a representation of the sun. The Prince of Arragon opts for silver;
therefore, he is the moon youth. Bassanio, in selecting the lead casket, is representative of the star youth.

Yet Freud (1913/1958) astutely points out to us that there is a certain inversion in the theme of the three caskets. Although in Shakespeare’s (1970) *The Merchant of Venice*, Portia has a choice of three suitors, each suitor has a choice of three women. Portia manifests in triplicate in the form of or potentially within three containers made of gold, silver and lead.

When we interrogate Freud’s reading of the Shakespeare’s script, the women are representative of heavy earthly elements and although they may once have been interpreted as purely elemental, they are now associated with monetary value that fluctuates. They become potential artefacts of cultural exchange and they differ in value and beauty. They are also hollow and if there is anything placed within them, such as the image of the woman, Portia, then it is detached from the outer casing in an explicit display of duality which must surely remind us (in this context) of the gap, a void between the designated value of the outer casing and the image placed within it. The men, in contrast, represent intangibility and immortality in the forms of the sun, the moon, and the stars. The choice of commodity comes down to the outer casing.

For Freud (1913/1958) ‘lead’ women have particular qualities that enhance beauty. They are less flashy; a little more understated and obviously represent some sort of modesty and restraint. In the context of this story, the plot is predestined. Portia’s portrait is already secure in the lead casket, this insisted upon by Portia’s father. Bassanio is required to opt for modesty and not flashiness and he does not disappoint. Bassanio, on choosing the lead casket articulates “Thy paleness moves me more than eloquence” (Shakespeare, 1970, p 198). Freud (1913/1958) suggests
that this means ‘the plainness of the girl’ is far more moving than ‘the loudness of gold and silver’. Hence value is ascertained by understatement and not excess, with noise, loudness being a metaphor for noticibility and plainness for quietness and modesty. Another translation from Elizabethan English/German/English, one that Freud suggests misses the point, is as follows “Thy plainness speaks to me with eloquence” Schlegel (cited in Freud, p. 294). I would interpret this translation within the Freudian confines of lead/plainness/silence, as, ‘your silence speaks eloquently’

Both definitions suggest that eloquence is somehow linked to the subdued outer casing of the casket; the first translation suggests that lead is a superior replacement for loudness; the second suggests that silence can be eloquent.

Interlude: Silence speaks

Eloquent silence features commonly in popular discourse. A quick look at the internet reveals questions such as ‘what is an eloquent silence? Quotes such as Thomas Carlyle’s “Silence is more eloquent than words.” becomes repeated in titles such as “Putin’s silence is more eloquent than McCain’s words” (Pravda TV, 2013) and Verma Report: Govt’s Silence is more Eloquent than Words (Raghaven, 2013). ‘Eloquent Silence is the title of a popular romantic novel by Brown (1982). There is an anonymous quote “silence is the most powerful scream” (Thinkexist.com, nd).

Language speaks audible silences.

Kroetsch (1985) writes The Grammar of Silence: Narrative Pattern in Ethnic Writing, as a comparison between Frederick
Philip Grove’s autobiography and his fiction in the form of the regeneration of cyclical myth. Kroetsch reframes cyclical journeying as enabling. He compares the cyclical generation of journey and failure that enables a voice, a voice that fills the silence between signifiers. In the last two paragraphs of his paper, he reads a shift:

The repetition of the two scenes suggests a ritual unnaming and a renaming into new lives and a new world. And the paradox here is that the new names are exact homonyms for the old ones. The signifier sounds as it always sounded. But the signifier has shifted radically. Now it can be joined again with its signifier; name and object come together, the new life is possible. (Kroetsch, 1985, p. 73-74)

Rapport is proposed at the end of this narrative. In the last line of the text, a paragraph that is single short sentence, a ‘vision’ arises between the two lovers, and this time it is ‘shared by both’. A grammar of the narrative of ethnic experience has begun to assert itself. The silence is finding a way to transform itself into voice. (Kroetsch, 1985, p. 75)

An eloquent silence

The linking of silence and eloquence has a paradoxical place within phallic discourse. For Kroetsch (1985) it can be generated within a genre of cyclical journeying and inevitable failure. There is also something in Schlegel’s interpretation that reminds me of a particular phrase from Bartky’s (1998) work on patriarchal power and the disciplining of women’s bodies. She writes: “... [a]
woman’s body language speaks eloquently, though silently, of her subordination status in a hierarchy of gender” (p. 36). Here, Bartky takes up what appears to be a well-worn metaphor that suggests how an eloquent silence, an (un)silence of bodies, might be disciplined through cultural sanction. The possibilities of silence and eloquence spoken together suggest a possibility that once (in antiquity) discourse accommodated women’s bodies, and hence gives a trace of sense to ‘the silence that speaks’.

It would appear that for Freud, women’s bodies do not initiate silence. In the case of Portia, lead is dumb and it is the dumbness of lead or in other words the silence of lead that sparks Bassanio’s attraction. Yet as we have discussed, Schlegel’s (as cited in Freud, 1913/1958) translation, however (in)accurate, is subtly different. The silence itself resonates in language with an absent/present eloquence, suggesting an implicit presence within the script that is not explicitly attainable, or in other words a shift in meaning, as noted by Kroetsch (1985) that cannot be caught up in the chain of signification. For Freud, the case of Cordelia’s silence in the face of her father’s question represents the Goddess of Death, interpreted as such through his extensive study of the meaning of dreams. As well as this, he gives ample examples of how his interpretation repeats itself in cyclical myth. In one of these examples, Grimm’s fairy tales, a sister unwittingly fulfils a prophesy by killing her brothers and turning them into ravens and must save them by vowing to remain silent: she dies (Grimm, as cited in Freud, 1913/1958).

For Freud (1913/1958), hiding/being hidden, is another symbol of death that manifests in dreams, and this is evident in the story of Cinderella, when she becomes unattainable for the Prince in yet another tale that involves three sisters and a matter of choice. This story is a little different in that cinders (lower case intended), as a
third (step)sister, is originally unsignified in that she is only named after her chore of cleaning out the ashes from the hearth. The mice in the corner of the kitchen live with cinders and she probably converses with them. Unmentioned/unnoticed by Freud, there is a possible connection to cinders and an unmentioned woman in the Kalevipoeg epic poem, one of two sisters of the bride of the star youth.

**Missing voices in cyclical myth**

Within a closer inspection of the Estonian tale that Freud (1913/1958) calls upon to support his argument, silence is not exactly silent: the tale told in Freud’s work is only a small part of a larger extract. There are indeed three sisters and not one woman and there are more than three possible suitors, although there are only two worthy suitors and two worthy daughters.

Within this tale, a woman lives alone. One day, while out walking in the village, she finds a henlet, a black grouse’s egg and a crowlet. She takes the three back to her home for companionship. Within a secret chamber, she charges the henlet with hatching the grouse’s egg and tosses the crowlet to the cat: all survive. The woman becomes their foster mother and said birds grow into young maidens, two of whom have many suitors (Kreutzwald, 1982).

Salme, the henlet, rejects the sun for his harshness on the crops and the moon for keeping unsociable hours and accepts the star youth because of his constant character and kindness to the harvests. The star youth is immortal: therefore, she chooses immortality and a life amongst the stars. The star youth is the third suitor to arrive but although Salme is beautiful, she is not the ‘third’ sister, since the crowlet occupies that position.

For the Grouse, Linda (the second sister), the process begins again. The sun and the moon again arrive on the doorstep: she rejects them. The King of Kungla
arrives and is also rejected. It would seem that this King is mortal and not heroic. Linda rejects him because of his hateful sisters. Linda rejects water because his “waves are wicked in wheeling, tides treacherous in ebbing, springs secret in splitting, rivers wretched in their rolling” (Kreutzwald, 1982, p.17). She rejects the wind: “Winds are savage in their whirling, storms are crazed in their raging, but the air’s too fragile a bridegroom.” It appears that the water in particular and fluidity in general are too treacherous a business for women in ancient Estonia and the air lacks substance or constancy. Linda rejects five suitors before choosing King Kalev, the heroic mortal and son of the immortal ‘Oldman’. She goes on to give birth to heroic sons, as mortal and maternal providing the main genealogical story lines to the tale and reminding me of a genealogical relationship between gods and heroes. Both Linda and Salme reject other suitors in that they have seven in total to choose from (Kreutzwald, 1982). Salme chose the third suitor to arrive, but there were more on the way. If the Estonian storyline regenerates in a cyclical manner, then it has been taken out of context in that it regenerates itself within the context it is spoken and possibly excludes pieces of the tale that are no longer relevant to contemporary narrative. The exclusion creates unease. I understand how Freud frames his confined reading of Salme and her three suitors as repeating the choices among Portia’s three caskets. Yet I worry about the exclusion of Salme’s second stepsister, who has no name, who was brought home and thrown to the cat in a way that resembles the story of Cinderella’s origins. The similarities of stories of the bondsmaid and the servant girl suggest that repetition in discourse is not singular; stories may consist of woven webs of repetition.
Primary echo

The third daughter, the crowlet still lives, like cinders, “in the cat’s corner behind a chest” (Kreutzwald, 1982, p.13), where she was thrown when found. Now a bondsmaid she remains there subjugated, ill-treated and forgotten: there are no choices for her, even though her silence is loud indeed. Like cinders, she has no name except for one that describes her purpose, bondsmaid and is no longer mentioned after her two sisters are wed. She has no suitors: without a fairy godmother and a glass slipper, she is invisible to the King of Kungla. They do not exist in the same reality.

The courting of the sisters is a fractional part the sister’s play in the recorded myth, except for Linda as a key part of Estonian genealogy. A translation of the ‘original’ tale of Kalevipoeg, (Kreutzwald, 1982) bears little resemblance to the writings of Shakespeare and Freud’s interpretations. Within this myth, the closeness of gods and heroes is still apparent. Consciousness remains intertwined with the gods and there is still a genealogical or collective identity with the natural surroundings and the elements. In other words, they are still in conversation: there are still voices. The sisters originate from nature; they are birds that mingle, mate and converse with both gods and heroes. At least one of them gives birth to human sons. The ‘oldman’ heads a descendent genealogical line from a collective consciousness; a different sort of consciousness that now appears suppressed within ‘unconsciousness’. This unconsciousness and consciousness, within the script of Shakespeare, are separated by a widening gap. Yet a fragment of collective consciousness remains embedded within the cyclical myth that portrays women both in multiples of three and the possibilities of alternative speaking positions remain.
Since the crowlet is invisible to the King of Kungla perhaps she may be more compatible with the excesses of the wind and the water. Yet there is something overawing about the remaining elements, quickly dismissed by the visible sisters. These are the very elements within ancient myth (Swerdlow, 1967) and linguistic theory (de Saussure, 1916/2008) that create sound and awaken memory (Kreutzwald, 1982); a collective consciousness marginalised even in the telling of ancient origin myth.

If the crowlet, wind and water are thought together as perception before speech, then they are indeed forgettable, yet why might language now exclude the very elements from a genealogy of becoming that enable its articulation unless it perhaps frames them as articles of trade? The crowlet is not signified beyond her position as one of the three, and her function as waste/food.

She may remain with the elements and produce eloquent sound side by side with gods and heroes. There is no gap, just a harmonious ‘middle’ ground of collective identity not requiring the grammatical forms of individual signification. Yet such a flight of fancy may well read like “innocent infantile imaginings, suppressed and unconscious neurotic fantasies”, born amidst “poetical myth structures” (Rank, 1914/1959, p. 96). As such, I have an uneasy feeling that this is a place where I may have almost remembered a mother-daughter encounter and once glimpsed the missing uniquely feminine excesses of Lacanian theory.

The crowlet is not silent, she manifests within the voices of primordial memory, the voices silenced by philosophy and Christianity, like Bartky’s (1989) embodied eloquent silence. She exists within metaphor of/at the creation of consciousness, Lacan’s wall of language, beyond the constraints of Levinas’ now, and where thought meets sound, de Saussure’s metaphor of air and water, of storms,
waves, tides and tempests. Within contemporary language ‘voice’ is restricted/constricted, choked of meaning, choked dry of flesh...

Then the wind begins to whistle,
the waves start soughing:
may they bring greetings
and herald sweet tidings
of things long forgotten,
memories flown from the mind
which may sparkle at sunset,
twinkle in the chill of twilight,
dance in the dewfall...

An excerpt from *Kalevipoeg: An Ancient Estonian Tale* (Kreutzwald, 1982, p. 6)

**Shifting perceptions**

After reading Kalevipoeg in conjunction with Freud’s interpretation of the theme of the three caskets, another dimension of the mythologies of origin produced within this cyclical form of storytelling appears. Estonian mythology has struggled to survive within a country ravaged by war and Christianity (Neeme, 1985), so that mythologies of various origins intertwine, within historical displacement, religious conversion, annihilation and marginalisation of people. Discourse not only works within a network of repetitions, it colonises origins, art, stories and lived reality, imposing western cultural mores on whatever it retells. Mythology bears the scars of appropriation and colonisation: ancient stories are told within a discourse that has separated man from his gods. Within the first resurfacings or translations of *Kalevipoeg*, there are indications that the crowlet and her stormy companions are
already suffering an ostracising of sorts, separated, unnamed, unloved and
categorised by gender and heterosexual relations.

Within Greek mythology though, the relationship between God and Hero
does not appear to be as stable as an ‘I’ in relation to signification and Lyon’s (1997)
describes these dynamics as both antagonistic and intimate. Antagonism between
God and Hero is common in myth, yet perplexing when it has been found, through
the deciphering of ancient texts, that there are examples of heroes being buried in the
temples of the Gods, apparently at odds with an ancient taboo that forbids mortal
remains. According to Lyons, explanations are many. Two of these suggest
reconciliation through either a promotion of heroes to gods or the demotion of gods
to heroes. One might consider this transcendence across the divide that separates one
from the other. Commenting on the many explanations, Lyons (1997, p. 74)
suggests:

This may be an appealing solution for modern scholars faced with scant
information, but it would be a mistake to project our own frustrations onto the
ancient Greeks, who had access to the syntax, as it were, of their own
polytheism.

An example of a gap between language structure accommodating polytheism
and monotheism surfaces in the story of Iphigeneia, sacrificed by Artemis (a virgin
sacrifice) in order for the fleet to sail to Troy (Lyons, 1997). For Lyons, there are
many versions of this story altering Iphigeneia origins and death. It has been
suggested that Iphigeneia is also a goddess. Iphigeneia was the daughter of
Agamemnon and Clytemnestra. The earliest records refer to her as Iphimede. She is
also described in the Iliad as one of three daughters, Iphianassa, Chrysothemis and
Laodike (later Electra), and in some accounts there are four daughters inclusive of
Iphigeneia and Iphianassa. Another version of the myth/s tells of how Iphigeneia’s sacrifice was a sham, an event that took place with an animal substitute. She becomes Hekate at the will of Artemis. Iphigeneia then was a classic case of sacrificed virgin (or a bride of Hades), yet there are many other renditions of her story within multiple constructions of her name and status (Lyons, 1997).

Iphimede, Iphinassa, Ipheniea and Hekate move, split, and dance in and out of storylines, defying history and synchrony, moving across stories and sometimes in and out of language, of reality, contrary to the way we are lead to understand the synchronic structure of language. She/they move between the impossibilities of Goddess and Heroine. She/they move within but not contained by, a series of identities shifting continually across storylines.

There are explanations for the identity confusion experienced by those interested in ancient Greek Goddesses and heroines. The interpretative problems of archaeology as a process of piecing artefacts/artworks together could well lead to unidentified transformations, lost accounts of stabilising relationships or social bonds that only overlap from the distance between now and then. The multiplicities of Iphigeneia might as simply be explained as discrepancies generated by the continual retelling of stories across the ages. Yet Freud’s interpretations (1913/1958) in *The Theme of the Three Caskets* sustains my doubt about such logical explanations and reveals yet another gap, one that introduces a question of excess beyond the identification of Gods and Goddesses, heroes and heroines.

For Freud (1913/1958), investigation into multiplicity provides a means to pinning down, defining and confining the origins of the multiples of three in mythology and language. As a scientist, he sets about individualising and counting
the Fates and the Graces in an effort to reduce their origins to one, which he does through tracking the similarities between weather, fertility and the art of spinning.

**A woman for each season**

Freud (1913/1958) refocuses his investigation of cyclical depictions of three women in mythology where there are several well-known groups of three sisters such as the Moerae (the Fates), and the Horae (the seasons), the Muses (knowledge) and the Charities (the Graces, fertility). According to Lyons (1997), in Greek myth, women are often grouped together in multiples of three, losing, or perhaps never having specific identities of their own. To support his theory that the third woman, in the guise of Portia, Cordelia, Salme and Cinderella is the Goddess of Death, Freud (1913/1958, p. 296) turns to the Fates. He explains: “But if the ‘third’ of the sisters is the Goddess of Death, the sisters are known to us. They are the Fates, the Moerae, the Parcae or the Norns, the third of whom is called Atropos, the inexorable.”

According to Freud (1913/1958), originally, in ancient Greek mythology, there was only one ‘inevitable’ Fate, called Moera. For Freud, Fate’s triplicate persona formed in line with other groups of three, such as the Graces (or the Horae). Now widely considered the Goddesses of the seasons, the Graces produced moisture from the sky: therefore, they were also responsible for spinning clouds. For Freud, the Fates and the Graces had ‘spinning’ in common, and this commonality led to the consistency in numbers. Because the Graces produced rain, they were vital to the fertility of the earth and therefore closely related to the seasons. There were only three seasons recognised in antiquity, Spring, Summer and Winter and later, on the inclusion of Autumn, there are depictions of four Graces instead of three, adding support to Freud’s interpretation (Freud, 1913/1958).
Presiding over the seasons gradually gave way to being accredited as guardians of time, endorsing a natural progression in human development. The Norns (German mythology) translate into an interesting linguistic lesson in past, present and future tense, what was, what is and what shall be. Hence, for Freud (1913/1958), goddesses of the weather, the Graces, now became the Goddesses of Fate. Within Freud’s thesis, beautiful women become representative of Atropos, the Goddess of Death, such as Portia and Cordelia. For Freud (1913/1958), man appeases his fear of death by transforming it into something beautiful and desirable.

**Interlude: Exit, stage right**

A brief pause here as I ponder the shock of the audience in Sophocles rendition of Antigone’s story, as critiqued by Lacan (1997a), and why her beauty, combined with the disregard for death was such an important feature within the tragic storyline. As the projection of death itself, Antigone disregarded the audience’s fear of death. The Graces and the Fates may well be figments of man’s unconscious in their present form. They are his projections, objects of his desire manifested as a smokescreen to ward off impending death (Freud, 1913/1958).

Sadly, in Freud’s (1913/1958) interpretation, the ‘third’ sister crowlet was never mentioned and is still missing, possibly dead through both silence and hiding, yet still strangely (un)signified. She is an unlikely representative of Atropos: she is not beautiful and desirable. In fact, there is no record of her
desiring either. She is not a Goddess of Death then, nor is there any
hope of impending signification of her multiplicity and vitality. As
Freud has labelled the ‘third’ of the sisters as the Goddess of Death,
perhaps in hysterical terms the ‘third’ forgotten sister becomes the
Goddess of silence.

Ideological shifts and a confusion of numbers

Freud’s perception of ancient Greek women culminating in groups of three
appears influenced by predominant traditions of normative development towards
singular and precise identity through individuation. There are many groups of
women named collectively in ancient Greek myth, such as the Furies, Charities and
the Muses and although some of these have individual names, the names are
sometimes derivatives of each other, signifying a ‘overlap’ in identity boundaries, or
perhaps a bond relying less on the Law of the Name of the Father. These collectives
of women are present in contemporary language in different ways some of them
explicit (Lyons, 1997). For example, probably one of the earlier signs of such
shifting ideologies is highlighted by Goldberg (1966) who suggests that the three
Graces are a forerunner to the three Christian Virtues and as such are depicted in
early Christian art. Freud (1913/1958) has recognised remnants of them in the works
of Shakespeare as cyclical repeats of ancient myth.

Other triplicate groups remain unnamed individually. These reside under a
collective signifier (Lyons (1997). Yet although these groups have names and their
members counted in historical terms, there is some ambiguity in these groupings,
both in numbers and between the members of the groups themselves. Nymphs, for
example, do not exist in groups of three. They exist abundantly in multiplicity,
inextricably linked with water, and depicted on ancient artefacts as interchanging with the Muses (Larson, 2001).

**Interlude: Treading the boards**

Rank (1914/1959) discusses art and music and as a living art form. That is produced culturally, yet the artist’s individuality is present in the way these are performed or transformed. He tells us of art within early forms of civilisation cultural expression of everyday living and how this differs to modern art, where art becomes a place for the artist to retreat away from life itself. He suggests a useful analogy of the artist and the neurotic. The neurotic strives but cannot fulfil. The artist strives beyond and fulfils what the neurotic strives for.

The artist therefore depicts more than the genre of the day by creating individual touches on cultural art form depicting the changing ideologies within the time the work was created. The artists struggle with events, not only within gradual change but also in relation to major change such as historical watersheds, for example, the turn from polytheism to monotheism. Indeed, polytheism is labelled paganism by Rank (1914/1959) that reads as an assimilation of diverse cultural and ideologically lived experiences. Within Western discourses, we speak of God, and/or Christianity as undeniable. The artist fills in the gaps between gods and heroes, Oedipus and the Sphinx. He paints the voids and the
realities with the ‘personality’ of the individual. Rank suggests:

At the highest level of human personality, we have a process that psychoanalysis calls ... “identification.” This identification is the echo of an original identity, not merely of mother and child, but of everything living...

(Rank, p. 195)

Hence, the artist calls on the Muse(s) as a projection of the begetting of life, of self-birth, onto which he projects his/her natural position in the life of the artist. The Muse reflects his creativity, his love of self, his narcissim. Rank (1914/1959) suggests, the artist is driven by himself. She is the projection of the master and although the mother and father may have inspired the son’s creativity, it is the Muse that drives the development of his work. The real Muse, the inspiration for his work, has to endure the ups and downs of the master and may even enjoy the journey as she wears her mask impeccably modestly and silently.

Hence, the neurotic Muse as projected self is reduced to reflection, her voice is reduced to an echo and he traverses the pathways and beyond, that she so diligently searches. The cyclical pathways of phallic discourse through which she treads, echoes with the repetitiveness of her footsteps as she laboriously shifts consciousness through her repeated journeys. His personality, his consciousness suppresses hers; she is a neurotic Muse reflection, yet she unconsciously knows something that he does not, while he tramples all over her dreams, she laboriously treads those repetitive pathways, slowly shifting consciousness and leaving no traces, or
Counting reflections

It appears that once upon a time, there were only three Muses, and not nine as generally thought. Goldberg (1966) relates Pontus de Lytard’s 1552 discussion on the subject. According to Lytard (as cited in Goldberg), three was an almost magical number. In the town of Sicyon, three sculptors were commissioned to erect three statues of three Muses or Graces. The best statue was to stay, but they were all far too good to destroy, hence, three sets of three Muses (or Graces) making nine Muses. The Graces aligned with Muses through their love of music and intellectual pursuits (Goldberg, 1966) and not specifically with the Fates and their spinning prowess as Freud (1913/1958) suggests. It also appears that perhaps the reason why there were three seasons instead of four could have something to do with the magical properties of the number and not a misperception of seasonal change.

Although Freud’s (1913/1958) rationale of the depiction of the Goddess of Death as the third in a set of three may have sounded reasonable and logical through its telling, it now appears difficult to firmly fix these sets of three into the categories that historians and psychoanalysts attempt to put them. For Larson (2001), depictions of multiple sets of three muses would not be extraordinary and therefore should not require an explanation such as the one put forward by Goldberg (1966). Larson suggests also that Nymphs are connected and depicted with many Greek women’s multiplicities. She explains that the Nymphs are the least studied group of ancient Greek women. Yet they are prevalent in ancient Greek culture and appear primordial in origin in that they are the mothers of primordial heroes and they are daughters of
the rivers. They appear in conjunction with Greek creation myth and not descendent from it. Indeed Nymphs assisted in Rhea’s childbirth of Zeus (Larson, 2001).

Nymphs appear inextricably intertwined with nature and provide a genealogical link to the elements, especially water. They are neither mortal nor immortal in that their existence ebbs and flows with nature. If a river or a spring dries up, then the Nymphs are in danger. There is little or no stable basis to the depictions of women within collective sets of three. Nymphs themselves manifest as daughters, mothers, wives, Muses, Charities, Fates, Erinyes (Greek) and Furies (Roman) (Larson, 2001).

According to Varo, an ancient Roman scholar (Varo, as cited in Swerdlow, 1967), Melete, Mneme and Aoide are the three ‘original’ Muses. Melete is born from the movement of water. This Muse acknowledges the fluidity of her birthing origins. Song or voice intertwines with water and the Muse/s. Mneme, means memory: she creates sound from striking the air. The third Muse Aoide represents voice only (Swerdlow, 1967) and incorporates air and water to produce sound. As split women in language, the Muses reflect a primordial template of linguistics and psychoanalytic discourse. Yet what contemporary discourse fails to do is explicitly recognise the embodied primordial relation and this is noticeable within the gaps I read in Freud’s theme of the three caskets.

**Shifting consciousness and enabling pathways**

Freud’s (1913/1958) ponderings of the splitting of women are perceptive to a point. They touch on the instability of the signified, yet they are unable to accommodate the embodied connections of the earth, flesh, fluidity and memory that remain within the text, assimilated with man’s projection of his beautiful Goddess of Death. For him the Fates and the Graces are a natural progression in synchronic
shifting meaning. Yet for me, although meaning is shifting it is doing so simultaneously and collectively in a diachronic genealogy that shifts across language, unable to be captured Symbolically. There is something here about the middle, the gap that accommodates the crowlet, the wind and the water, the collectivity of ancient Greek women depicted in myth, of thought, sound, memory and song/speech that lingers as a trace, a silent eloquence. Symbolically, is the one inscribed as crowlet or bondsmaid, a trace of what was once able to be said, an echo perhaps of past voices, now silenced? Does she emerge from the void, that widening gap between man and God, goddesses and heroines, as a spectre of his Muse?

By retelling mythical stories synchronically, a mismatch becomes obvious between gods/heroes and the intertwining goddesses, heroines, Nymphs and their derivatives/excesses. Are there excesses here that language does not include: the other jouissance, mother-daughter-bonds, collective memories within the script, in diachrony, in his Imaginary? For example, what does the exclusion of the Muses birth origin do to the pure sound that they produce? Is Freud’s thesis of silence as death a problematic of the genealogical projections of begetting, and the fears of mortality portrayed in the repetitive misrepresented tales of ancient mythology?

So now, I return to Socrate’s voices and to a time where gods and men were separated by law and communication between the two without permission was punishable by death. God’s voice represents a time where the soul slowly becomes ‘unchained’ (or perhaps torn hysterically) from the body. At the start of this chapter, William Blake laments the fading of the Muses, the Christian driven move away from aurality towards the cleansing of the soul (Smith, 2007). In other words, the sound of the Muses disappears, restricting the possibilities of creative multiplicities, minimising sensory perception and privileging the soul. As Smith tells us, this is not
just the consequence of Christianity; other religions preceding Christianity paved the way for such silencing. For Smith this amounts to something like the silencing of the soul, an integrated soul, separated only at death. Silencing represents something else: the separation devalues and alters meaning in that it severs ties and memories, memories of my mother, and repeats the disappearance of the links between women and creation, of birth and fertility. The silencing pathologises corporeal (un)memories as neurosis and psychosis.

The familiarity here with the Muses, sound, water, memory that interchange and fade along with the voices in conjunction with the widening of the gap between consciousness and unconsciousness and the Estonian excesses (wind, water, (un)memory) leave me pondering. In the Estonian tale, the presences of the voices are already becoming untenable. Within ancient Greek myth, they resist fading but the gap widens nonetheless...

...and within the gap, contemporary discourses of childcare and development theorise a ‘third’, maternal subjectivity, maternal intersubjectivity and maternal alterity, they write the script to fill/write/paint the gap, the hole in the subject that is das ding. Yet they don’t fill it, they transcend it, its whispering phantasmic (un)memorable contents remain, submerged within developmental discourse, responsible mother discourse, commodified and corporate care, public care, feminine care, carpet care, the third person rule...

Into the wilderness...and out of the scope of inquiry

We know that the voices are still here as traces: well some of them are. There are others that struggle to leave traces, such as Riviere’s (1929/2008) secret somewhere impossibly behind the mask; Gilligan’s (1977, 1982) care; Benjamin’s (1998, 2007) third; yet we cannot talk of them and we can only interpret them in
limited and marginalising ways. We can sense them through uneasiness and we can ponder them in the context of the shifting and changing qualities of mythical Greek women. A discursive morphology of being and becoming is perplexing, yet exciting for the hysterical daughter and her quest, and a key to language structure that enlightens when we consider the difficulties faced in feminist theory in relation to what constitutes essentialism, and what constitutes theories of non-essentialist difference. Linguistic middle ground does not create more diverse relationships; it merely makes existing unconscious relationships articulable and therefore consciously recognised. Language structure creates hallucination; it creates and changes our perceptions of self and surrounding others. It articulates psychoanalytic theory of projected Others, cyclical tragedy and the incompleteness of women.

With this in mind, it is not surprising that there is an on-going debate within linguistic circles concerning the properties of the grammatical structure of ancient Greek. Ancient Greek contains seven forms of tense and three ‘voices’, passive, middle and active. Middle voice no longer exists in contemporary European language. What this means in terms of translation is ambiguous and will always be a matter of speculation. Roland (1994) talks of this voice as a third voice. Barber (1975) explains that within this voice it is possible to talk of the plural self. Middle voice has diachronic properties that exist within the Symbolic (Barber, 1975).

It is my understanding that Derrida’s (1968/2008) concept of difference or “deferment-difference” (Spivak, 1976, p. xxix) is influenced by the disappearance of middle voice from contemporary language structure. For Derrida, the middle voice form of ‘differance’ positions difference closer to its origins. ‘Différance’ then, is what Derrida describes as an epoch, or defining moment. Differences are moments of linguistic conflict. These exist in ‘moment’ such as Levinas’ irreducible alterity;
de Saussure’s air and water meeting; Freud and Lacan’s wall of language that exists between the unconscious and the pre-conscious; Hays’ wall between the public and private; mothers and daughters; and patients and caregivers, and they leave traces that can be captured within a third space, that of ‘différance’. ‘Différance’ and indeed the middle voice that inspired it appear to have centring properties (centred origins) to address linguistic decentring as brought to our attention by Levinas and Lacan.

The thoughts that now surface are in direct regard to the accentuation of multiplicity within accounts of ancient Greek women. Multiplicity exists in conjunction with morphology, the shifting and changing of names and status. Iphigeneia morphs between virgin, heroine, Goddess and Hecate (Lyons, 1997). Kerényi (1949/1985a) suggests that Hecate and Demeter are the same, at particular times. He also suggests that Artemis, Hecate, Persephone and Demeter are interrelated, fudging any clear boundaries between mother and daughter. The Kore of ancient Greek is inscribed as virginal (Kerényi), but the definition of virginal becomes hazy here when inscribed in multiplicity. Middle voice may well confound the dichotomies of phallic language, such as virgin/whore. Larson (2001), who writes about the Nymphs of ancient Greek, explains that they are intertwined and somehow interchangeable with named multiplicities of women, such as the Muses and the Graces.

Middle voice speaks plurality. Its diachrony sits uneasily with contemporary language structures that favour synchronic genealogical passive/active and past, present and future in a way that silences women. Middle voice may have once kept primordial foundational and maternal origins connected. It may have preserved traces in that it speaks them, such as the meanings or experiences of ‘eloquent
silences’. Rethinking middle voice allows for change across language and for interaction. Its loss situates linguistic castration, as in the death of the father and the loss of the mother. Its presence emphasises plurality, shifting the boundaries of what constitutes consciousness and unconsciousness, given that within present language structure consciousness involves an encounter of subject/Other: it is an individual pursuit. Middle voice disintegrates the mask and renders what is theoretically identified in present language structure as unconscious and consciousness ambiguous: there is nothing to hide. In contemporary language, the loss of middle voice is reconstituted or poorly substituted through metaphor. Metaphor contains the traces of embodied eloquence, metonym, fractured and scattered by the loss of voice. Within a phallic language that favours male genealogical synchrony and perpetuates disembodiment, this is detrimental for women, their daughters and their mothers and how we perceive each other, how we care. We have lost our speaking embodied connection.

The daughter is perplexed, treading the pathways within her initial scope of inquiry, she suddenly finds herself in the wilderness, outside of the boundaries of the discourse of the Lacanian’ hysteric and Rank’s neurotic Muse in a most unexpected way. She has not transcended, yet she has found herself amidst the possibilities of speaking mother/daughter, as if somehow she has gone beyond synchronically recorded history, slipping through the gaps and past the wall into the unknown and unspoken easily. She still has no idea how to return, given that what is theoretically linguistically possible will not let her traverse the wall into language, the age old problem of the neurotic. Yet she is conscious, now, that there are other pathways and not entirely sure how she now fits within the designated pathways of the four
speaking positions. And she wonders if her uneasiness may be connected to a gap between an unspeakable middle voice and theories of difference.

In the next chapter, I expand the daughter’s pathways by introducing Irigaray’s *Speculum of the Other Woman*, now the genre of enquiry has shifted the boundaries of the daughter’s consciousness.

The murmurings cease and silence returns for the moment as we search the gap between chapters for mythological mother/daughters.
Inter-chapter interlude: Demeter and Persephone

I return to the story of Persephone and Demeter and now the story reads differently. It no longer represents a lone example of a loving mother-daughter, set out in simplicity before this journey begins, but a story of mother/daughter, one that dances through the very heart of ancient Greek mythology, now misplaced when told within the confines of phallic discourse. Yet I must read with caution here. How can we unravel what might have once been within a language that recycles its ways of telling, that may miss the subtleties of what might be, what may have been or may become, given that ‘now’ is no longer, once thought?

Refocusing attentions on antiquity as a way to unravel the mysteries of mother-daughter connections may not produce any clues to the whereabouts of missing linguistic connections within contemporary modes of speech. Irigaray (1994) suggests that the insistence of accessing past mother-daughter through mythological excavation is a demand to perform an impossible task, and for me it is more like recycling hysterical enquiries than a demand for heroism. For Irigaray, regurgitating myth through phallic discourse destroys its relevance. Language cannot replicate a woman’s genealogy forged by blood, as in mothers giving birth to daughters, not through the linguistic pathways of Law of the Name of the Father.
Recapping on the story to date, Freud's oedipal stages of development require mother-daughter alienation. The mother-daughter connection struggles and falls at the wall of language. This is the genre of hysterical enquiry in the voice of phallic discourse. An insistence that the mother-daughter separation becomes accentuated within a different telling of the story, stories told now, taking their place in language as chronologically ordered, and showing the traces of changing discourses of individuation, monotheism and rejection of the Gods.

The story of Persephone and Demeter is one of the few tales that portray a strong mother-daughter bond. According to Gray (2007), in the earlier Homeric version of the story, Hades abducts Persephone while she is out picking flowers, and rapes her. Suter (2002) describes the abduction as taking place with the knowledge of Persephone’s father, Zeus, who had already offered his daughter to his friend as a bedmate.

Persephone’s mother Demeter, an Olympian Goddess of the earth’s fertility, is so distressed by the loss of her daughter that she forbids the crops to grow. Starving mortals present a problem for the Gods. If the mortals die, then effectively there are no more Gods. The Gods existence relies on the admiration of mortal men. The earth becomes barren. Zeus tries to appease Demeter’s inconsolable loss, first with offers of gifts and then with the return of her daughter. At the time that this story is told, Gods and men are still inextricably related. Demeter agrees to restore the fertility of the earth if her
daughter is returned to her. Zeus sends Hermes as a middle ground of mediation/communication. That a mediator is required suggests an impasse between Zeus and Hades, possibly some form of embarrassment that the agreement between them has caused major disruption. However, we might also consider Williams (1956) suggestion that there are two Zeus’, a light and a dark one. According to Kerényi, Hades is also known as the Zeus of the underworld. He suggests that for the Pythagoreans

Every individual being is accordingly preserved not only in the past of a world temporally conceived (consisting of what has been and is) but in a definite portion of the spatial universe as well. Another such storage place is the House of Hades...” (Kerényi, 1949/1985a, p. 125)

Hermes is described by Marinatos (2003) as someone who crosses borders. Hirsch (1975) suggests that Hermes mediation skills are exercised between Gods and men. Hermes therefore, maintains communications across linguistic barriers, especially in the light of Hirsch’s comment that he translates the infinite into the finite. In other words, Hermes, not only maintains a long lost connection between man and God, but also mediates how perception becomes finitely and synchronically spoken, in this case, a mediation between light and dark or the temporally conceived Hades/Zeus and the finite lived reality of Zeus/Hades. He is called in to negotiate the wall, to mend the rift between man and Gods and mediate an impasse between the underworld and Olympia, perhaps not so much to reunite a mother and daughter than to negotiate
between the manifestations of the simultaneously existing God.

So, Hermes represents eloquence and sets about persuading Hades to release Persephone. He agrees to do so. On release, Hades asks Persephone if she knows of anyone that might take her place and offers her a pomegranate seed, which she takes and eats. Up until this time she has refused food and is unaware that if she consumes food in the underworld, she is unable to leave permanently. She will have to return each year, and Hermes eloquence is reduced to silence (Suter, 2002).

Demeter, overjoyed by the return of her daughter, fulfils her part of the bargain and restores fertility to the earth. However, although Persephone is able to spend two thirds of the year with her mother, she must return to Hades for a third of the year. For this time, little grows: these are the winter months. Suter (2002) confirms Freud’s (1913/1958) claim that there were originally only three seasons.

In a later version of the Demeter/Persephone myth, Persephone seduces Hades and therefore shifts the emphasis of the story away from forced abduction and sexual violence (Irigaray, 1994; Gray, 2007), framing Persephone as an ambivalent daughter who gets what she asks for. Gray suggests that the influence of Freudian theory on mother-daughter relationships sidesteps the monstrosity of such a crime by accentuating the necessity of the mother-daughter split through oedipal developmental structure. Homer’s version, on the other hand, is scathing of the actions of
both Hades and Zeus, who does nothing in his daughter’s defence.
Freud’s focus displaces Demeter’s grief for the abduction, rape and
loss of her daughter, justifying the necessity of such an act for
normative development.

Irigaray (1994) reminds us that the origins of most ancient
Greek myths are unknown. They are not detached from migrations
and historical events, nor can they be interpreted as acultural
belief systems. The two versions above suggest the story changes with
time and colonial encounter. Accessing the past symbolically does
not necessarily give us an opportunity to remember different ways
of being as demonstrated in the following version of Persephone
and Demeter’s story.

Spretnak (1978) relays a version that is designed to be more
in keeping with pre-Hellenic interpretations of Greek mythology. It
is Spretnak’s thesis that the violence portrayed in the story is
uncharacteristic of the period from which the story originates. She
suggests that the violence has been inserted into Homeric version of
the myth. Childbirth was magical; there was no connection made
between sex and fertility. Therefore, Persephone is not abducted by
Hades, but travels to the underworld voluntarily to help the dead
overcome their fear and confusion as they cross the boundaries
between life and death.

Demeter watches over a world where it is always summer.
Concerned by the constant foraging of mortals, she starts the
practice of horticulture, introducing wheat as a basis of a staple
diet of bread. Persephone spends a lot of time stroking the wheat shoots, attracted by their colour. Sometimes mother and daughter would adorn themselves with flowers and dance in the meadows, contented with each other’s company.

Yet Persephone’s contentment is not complete. She is worried about the lost souls she encounters in the forest and Demeter confesses that she is spending too much time on the living given that she needs the dead to push up the young sprouts. Persephone sets off to the underworld and Demeter is grief stricken: nothing can grow. On Persephone’s return, fertility is restored to the earth. Summer is restored.

As a pre-Hellenist version, this story has some problems. The daughter leaves her mother, drawn by a responsibility to care. Hades is non-existent, or outside the boundaries of consciousness, given that he is not necessary to fertility. Therefore sexuality is also written from the story, along with Hades. Hermes has disappeared also, the last link between man and God and indeed mother and daughter.

Each of these stories requires a split and a transcendence of sorts toward the light, each are a product of being told within the structures of phallic discourse. Spretnak’s (1978) version is set in antiquity, yet is most modern version of them all, in that it calls on the daughter’s responsibility to care and her quarter turn from daughter to caregiver.
Chapter Seven: The mysteries of femininity

So it would be a case of you men speaking amongst yourselves about women, who cannot be involved in hearing or producing a discourse that concerns the riddle, the logogriph she represents for you. (Irigaray, 1985a, p. 13)

In Chapter Six, the daughter finds herself out of the realms of her scope of inquiry as she somehow steps through the gaps created by contemporary articulation of art, lived experiences and ancient Greek culture, once spoken in a more complex system of grammar and syntax. In this chapter, I introduce the work of Luce Irigaray to expand the daughter’s terrain in an effort to allow her to consider ways in which she may theorise the space she somehow fleetingly occupied. That the daughter hears resonance within a network of multiple voices, framed as ‘being’ instead of hallucination. Psychosis opens a search for other theorists who may produce gaps for the daughter to pursue.

That her lost encounter may be ‘heard’ suggests that the ‘third’ may only be one available pathway for the daughter to travel in an effort to speak and remember mother-daughter encounter. Theories of the ‘third’ produce spaces to access trace; traces that have enabled the daughters’ journeys. Yet I am cautious of their connectedness to philosophical discourses of transcendence enacted through cyclical and paradoxical paths. In this regard, the metaphor of the three casket(s) reminds me of Portia’s portrait enclosed within its lead casing and the difficulties of creating spaces within the confines of a medium that has been grammatically reduced to accommodate a singular God. Monotheism reduces Otherness to a singular confrontation between man and his reflection, with a frightening void/nothingness in
the middle. Language produces boundaries that enclose or exclude; walls to traverse and transcendence to negotiate.

In an effort to extend the daughter’s inquiry within a theory that will enable the daughter to challenge the wall, I read Irigaray’s (1985a) *Speculum of the Other Woman*. In this text, Irigaray reads Freud’s *On Sexuality: Three Essays and other Works* creating pathways within theories of sexual difference.

**What do women want?**

Irigaray (1985a) suggests that Freud’s views on femininity presents a conundrum, a riddle for mankind that she explains as consisting of tentatively and illogically drawn conclusions of culturally inscribed deficit and lack through anatomical inferiority. In the context of the hysterics quest, as a riddle, femininity theoretically infiltrates questions of contemporary care theory, such as Gilligan’s care ethics and Hollway’s capacity to care. At the heart of the Oedipus myth, femininity remains a mystery as shaped through transition, the splitting created by transcendence into language. Answers remain ineffable, lost in the Real and/or the Said and the *there is*. She remains hidden within the framework of academic inquiry and behind hysterical interpretation of the mask, possibly manifesting as Levinas’ (1978) necessary evil or perhaps even Schreber’s (1903/2000) nightmare of continuous goading babble, emitting (through linguistic licence) from the abyss/there is. Perhaps she stretches across eons and scatters within layers of misinterpreted, re-phrased and re-told ancient Greek mythology. Yet does her presence drive the question ‘what do women want’ when the question remains Symbolically (dis)connected and misdirected at the plane of the mirror? Does the question of female sexuality only derive relevance within the confines of masculine theories of ‘difference’? Irigaray (1985a) suggests the search for an answer to man’s
riddle of femininity has not traditionally included women. How could it, within phallic discourse, when answers are pre-scripted and he directs the questions to himself? Hence, the daughter’s terrain shifts. She no longer searches for a part of herself, but now she searches for all of herself and possible pathways within a uniquely feminine unconscious of Imaginary.

According to Irigaray (1985a), Freud aligns femininity as passive and masculinity as active, a recreation or mimicry of the physiological act of copulation and the active pursuit of sperm in its relentless race toward her passively waiting ovum. In comparing human fertilisation with an act of seduction, Freud connects pursuit with desire, a masculine active desire that brings feminine passivity into being (Irigaray, 1985a). The sexual act as an active pursuit and penetration of the sperm into the ovum becomes an organising structure for Western cultural gender roles, female sexuality and unconsciously, within cyclical available discourses of heterosexuality, an assimilation also of the daughters pursuit of knowledge. It is also therefore, the organising structure of western language, given that language, within Lacanian theory, remains primary in relation to reality and the psychic structure of the subject.

Through science’s gaze there is no mistaking the differences between the sexes, cemented within biological ‘attribute(s)’ with clear-cut boundaries. Sex is so objectively defined by possession and lack that it is surgically policed when anomalies that blur the boundaries between the two are discovered (Coran & Polly, 1999; Preves, 2002). Within a language structure filled with paradox, although such a definition of biological sex is subjectively derived, sexuality, apparently, is not. Heterosexuality continues to be considered the dominant norm although there are differing views as to how the norm is established and maintained. Within theories of
biological determinism, heterosexuality nestles as biologically natural and necessary for procreation and reproduction. Homosexuality is cast as unnatural and deficient and in contemporary times, charitably embraced within discourses of tolerance of those less fortunate or deficit, so long as diversity of sexuality is contained through tolerance and heterosexual normativity (Walters, 2011). Alternatively, as in the early psychoanalytic theory of Freud (1977), Jones (1927) and Klein (1932), heterosexuality presents as ‘developing’ through normative cultural sanctions, rather than appearing naturally. Again, I might add, when it comes to explanations of procreative necessity, the social order holds heterosexuality normative. Nonetheless, developmental pathways create room for leniency for those who go astray since it is not a matter of being biologically inferior.

**A biological inscription of philosophical essence**

In this way, heterosexuality and the gendered roles that it requires as a form of individualist subjectivity, highlights a paradox of Freudian thought. Both become ontologically or philosophically determined as well as biologically explained. Although science allows for the physical alteration of biological sex at birth when a child does not appear to conform to either male or female (Coran & Polly, 1991; Kipnis & Diamond, 1998), the child is altered to conform to biologically engrained language requirement and sexuality becomes a linguistic medium for cultural castration. The girl child becomes a complementary shadowy spectre of masculinity and reminder of his mutilation. This paradox therefore alerts us to a curious reversal of biology and discourse, one that Freud himself alluded to when he suggested that babies’ needs are determined by the way its cries are interpreted (Fink, 1995). I suggest that as I discuss Irigaray’s (1985a) critique of Freud’s (1977) theory on the development of women’s sexuality this paradox is remembered.
Ascribing to a culturally prescribed version of biological discourse, Freud (1977) tells us that both heterosexuality and homosexuality are cultural acquisitions endowed through a process of development. Little boys and girls are bisexual, in that they are, like all humans, sexual beings. They are masculine and their sexuality is active. Passivity comes with the acquisition of femininity, when the girl acknowledges her ‘lack’ and abandons her active pursuit of polymorphous pleasure in a rejection of her mother. A newly forged alignment with the father sees the girl child’s path initiated toward passive submission to ultimately, vaginal penetration. Freud therefore places pre-oedipal bi-sexuality as an objectively framed product of sameness and the active/passive binary that biological difference generates, rather than a physiological idiosyncrasy of childhood.

Freud (1977), according to Irigaray (1985a), warns us that we should be cautious in assuming that active/masculine and passive/feminine is the natural order: animal studies do not support this claim. In higher species, males and females share ‘maternal’ caring tasks. Irigaray suggests that these animals are far more astute in ascertaining the differences between female sexuality and motherhood, a differentiation that humanity struggles to make. Indeed Lacan (1938/2002) also emphasises the inferior or differently dependent attributes of the human ‘child’ on the human maternal mother in relation to the animal kingdom and suggests that Freud again struggles to differentiate between biological or natural instincts and linguistically inscribed complexes.

For Lacan (1938/2002), there is no evidence that animals take on the same nurturing roles as humans. He suggests that the human child is born prematurely and particularly helpless (traumatised), is forcibly weaned (traumatised) and spends its life wishing to return to the sanctity of origin (traumatised). For Lacan (1938/2002),
Freud fails to make the differentiation between his linguistic structure of the unconscious and the biological foundations of instinct. This failure exposes a flaw or impasse between his theory of consciousness and his developmental theory of female sexuality as built in synchrony with the natural attributes of the mother. Here, the linguistic influences of penis envy and passivity in Freudian developmental theory, or in other words, phallic discourse are highlighted. In hindsight, the similarities of biological determinism to available grammar and syntax are striking. As in the Sphinx’s riddle solved by Oedipus, there are three modes of development, past (four legs), present, (two legs) and future (three legs). There are only two positions within encounter; passive and active. This is because consciousness in one case or biological essence in another, are derived through signification that relies on masculine genealogy, in effect, the death drive, and this signification is biologically derived through linking developmental to deficit.

Freud (1977) explains that mother’s are active and draws from what he considers sophisticated animal behaviours to argue that there is no connection between passivity and motherhood given the role is demanding and active. He cites breastfeeding as an example of the active function of mother’s biology. Irigaray (1985a) notes however, that breastfeeding, as an activity, is grammatically framed as passive for the mother and active for the child. The child breastfeeding suggests an immersion in the activity of sucking: the mother is active only in the form of milk production. Breastfeeding therefore becomes a passive function of motherhood removed from the corporeality of femininity, where her body actively produces milk?

For Irigaray (1985a), Freud insists that maternity does not require a position of passivity to the extent that he advises, that reasoning within the bounds of passive
and active is particularly unproductive and should be avoided. Excluding motherhood from theories of child development is somewhat confusing. However, for Freud, passivity is a non-issue and symptoms of ‘it’ can be put down to natural processes of normal development, such as oedipal trauma, that differs from that of boys (Irigaray, 1985a). Subsequent critique and post-Freudian developmental theory, such as the work of Winnicott (1987) unwittingly endorses Irigaray’s (1985a) suggestion that breastfeeding is inscribed within language as a passive pastime performed by the good-enough mother who must be careful to present the breast in a way that minimalizes oedipal trauma. The necessity of the long-suffering mother, passively required to absorb the wrath of the child is prevalent within psychoanalytic theories of maternal subjectivity and inter-subjectivity and are critiqued by feminist writers such as Baraitser (2009), Benjamin (1995, 1998, 2000) and Hollway (2006). In Chapter Four, I introduced Doane and Hodges (1995) thesis that passive mothering was inserted by Winnicot (1953, 1975, 1987, 1989) into Object Relations Theory. However, Woman’s passivity as a product of normative development becomes vitally important within Freud’s (1977) theory of the development of female sexuality, so it might be not quite so straightforward.

**Interlude: Thoughts on passivity, activity, hysteria, Antigone, Schreber and sinthome**

Although Freud suggested that the question of passivity was not worth pursuing in terms of motherhood, it was of great importance within the diagnosis of homosexuality and hysteria as a product of normative development. Certainly, Riviere’s
(1929/2008) case study, diagnosed as one of Jones’ (1927) two types of homosexual woman was feminine and active. Correspondence from Jones to Freud (Freud & Jones, 1993) suggests that Riviere herself was particularly active and hysterical. Activity, as a masculine ‘trait’ is in these cases, inscribed as hysterical and homosexual.

Schreber’s (1903/2000) memoirs on the other hand, demonstrate that masculinity and passivity, as in wondering what it would be like to be a woman submitting to a man, are also a combination for a diagnosis of homosexuality as well as forerunners to psychosis/madness. Masculine passivity presents some interesting deviations from an active desire to race to the ovum. Schreber’s perceived initial lack of desire to return to origin is unthinkable and perhaps entirely ethical within the framework of Lacan’s (1997a) ethics of psychoanalysis as explained through the story of Antigone.

Within the bounds of Lacan’s (1997a) critique, Antigone’s active stance against the injustices of the laws of Thebes sees her step out of language as undesiring, shocking the audience. The cathartic structure of creative art links beauty, desire and active pursuit. Breaking this chain of signifiers invokes fear of death in the audience and creates a gap, an ethical moment. She actively moves toward incarceration, psychosis, and death. Lacan’s (1997a) ethics of psychoanalysis pivots, as he continually emphasises, on sentence structure, not only metonym, metaphor,
synchrony and diachrony, but also the inevitability of past, present future, and the signifying of activity and passivity. However, Antigone’s ethical stance not only pivots on her beauty but also that she is a woman. If she had been a man, she may have been applauded for reasoning within the higher realms of moral justice on Kohlberg’s scale of moral reasoning, if it had indeed been invented or even thought, in antiquity and mythology.

Schreber on the other hand, physically becomes an object of his own desire. He makes love with himself, within his own fight for an existence, within his own torment, his own abyss and his sense making system of signification. He effectively becomes the Other of his own shadow/God within a Levinasian (1978) type alterity where the Other is separate to the self and unable to be absorbed. He is both passive and active and whatever else that he cannot explain. For Schreber, I suggest, that lack of available discourses to explain his disintegrating subjectivity are key. As Irigaray (1985a) suggests, that women are contained, imprisoned and exploited by a mechanism of phallic discourse, is a recipe for madness. The Levinasian style alterity, where Schreber struggles with his multiple Others, has indeed been described as a container or category by Irigaray (2004) and not the infinite beyond ontology he suggests. Therefore we can consider this struggle with God and light as an embedded cyclical script that holds the subject together, firmly chained within his inscribed madness by phallic discourse.

We can think of Harari’s (1995) interpretation of Lacan’s
sinthome as a written alternative to the Law of the Name of the 
Father. Schreber has written his own structural boundaries and 
entombed himself somewhere near the borders of Symbolic madness, 
another container, like Levinas’, confined through discourses of 
God and light. Kantor’s (1998) thesis therefore alerts me to the 
similarities of Levinas’ (1978) and Schreber’s (1903/2000) Gods 
and his question as to whether the former is as mad as the latter. 
Certainly, in earlier interludes, we have considered the daughters 
in relation to the Borromean Knot and sinthome and how we can 
write an alternative substance that holds the subject together once 
the knot is severed. It is fair to say that Lacan’s pathway of/as 
sinthome (Harari, 1995) as a means of writing an alternative 
reality in which women’s consciousness includes primordial 
mother-daughter relation will be considered with some caution as 
a means to remember, and perhaps stands as a warning of the 
difficulties of writing embodied realities as an alternative to active 
and passive.

The development of female sexuality

According to Freud (1977), both girls and boys initially follow parallel 
pathways of development. For Irigaray, (1985a), this means that in her early stages, 
‘aggression’ is not suppressed in the little girl and her primary object of pleasure is 
her clitoris, which is theorised as an inferior version of his penis. Irigaray stresses 
that given the investment in the passive feminine maternal economy, at the stage 
where her activity is not suppressed the little girl is worthless. Yet this worthlessness
reminds us that sexual difference is borne from the assumption of sameness, that the maternal feminine is a product of cultural repression through assimilation that works as an uneven merger, or split. The little girl cannot develop into a woman within the realms of equitable difference in that her femininity is inscribed through deficit: she remains a man within a linguistic structure that produces a biological world of deficit. In Irigaray’s words, “a man minus the possibility of representing oneself as a man = a normal woman” (Irigaray, 1985a, p. 26). She represents castration and lack, portraying mutilated mirror images through which he regenerates himself.

As active and masculine, the little girl is permitted to indulge in clitoral masturbation. For Freud (1977), vaginal masturbation is rare at this stage of development. The change from active clitoral masturbation to passive vaginal sexual pleasure is determined through a parallel but different development to boys. For the boy, the mother is his first and only love object. For the girl however, although the mother is the first love object, this emphasis shifts by necessity during the oedipal phase, to her father. For Freud, the daughter’s desire for the mother is strong and both active and passive and the severance of her bond underpinned by hostility (Freud, 1977). It is through this shift that she will settle on her normal choice of object, herself changing from masculine to feminine and her emphasis to her vagina since Freud thinks of the passage to her ovum as her primary erogenous zone. The boy’s choice of object/mother/woman and erogenous zone/penis remains the same. For Irigaray (1985a), this is hardly a choice: according to Freud, he only has one erogenous zone.

The girl’s pre-oedipal love and desire for her mother, according to Freud (1977) is dismissed as masculine. The boys love for his mother provides the ongoing object of his desire that the newly created feminine woman facilitates as a
stand in for his corporeal mother: a constant reminder of his lack. The Symbolic presents an orderly chaos here, sexuality related to women’s bodies through a tenuous connection: that her body is a parody of his (Irigaray, 1985a).

**The daughter-mother split**

A little girl’s fixation with her mother may last beyond her fourth year and Freud (1977) suggests that this can manifest in a desire to impregnate her mother, given that the girl child is masculine and active at this stage. According to Freud, the desire for the mother actively manifests in play, such as playing with dolls. Sexual activity of the phallic kind in relation to the daughter’s attachment to the mother is somewhat difficult to pinpoint according to Freud and can manifest as the child’s “fear of being killed by the mother” (Freud, 1977, p.385). Therefore, a variant of her pre-oedipal mother fantasies manifests in, or is grammatically signified/situated as, a fear of being murdered or poisoned, or what Freud coins as the appearance of paranoiac tendencies (Irigaray, 1985a).

For Freud (1977), it would seem that even the daughter’s pre-oedipal mother fantasies are steeped in hatred and paranoia. Freud surmises that the birth of a little *boy* from such a fantasised union (mother-daughter) would be the preferable outcome in relation to her possession of the father/phallus.

**Interlude: So what about a daughter born from a mother-daughter union?**

Irigaray (1985a) imagines a *girl* born from a mother-daughter union, female parthenogenesis, and the possibilities of a
transition from two to three retaining or restoring her corporeality. The (im)possibilities of parthenogenesis or virgin birth in relation to women, as an ethical moment, provides an alternative way to consider multiplicity as portrayed in ancient mythology, that of the Muses, the Graces, the Nymphs, the linguistic creations of multiplicity and interactivity. By this I mean becoming, within an alternative form through grammatical change. The birth that Irigaray imagines reduces the gap initiated by entrance into an ordered chaos of selected memory, a chaos generated from the symbolic signifying chain of the phallus. Such a grammatically subversive suggestion evokes a sense of feminine genealogical connections wherein women can be the same/different from, or interchangeable with each other. This is subversive in that it disrupts the hallucinatory connotations of madness given that women can discursively become each other, reframing desire and ethical becoming within an impossible multiplication of women, who may or may not be who they are at any given moment. Woman may well become her daughter and her mother, without being framed within a genealogy of begetting.

Woman as multiple confuses a wholeness inscribed in phallic discourse that facilitates his return to an easily defined individual whole mother. We no longer relate each fractured entity into whole form and count it into existence (Irigaray, 1985a). Multiplicity troubles the symbolic split that separates a mother from her daughter (Irigaray, 1985b) or inscribing their connections with
discourses of ambivalence and perhaps even caregiving. Indeed, female parthenogenesis disrupts the little girl’s complicated Freudian transition necessitated by his fantasy to arrive at normal passive heterosexuality. The Freudian journey requires the rejection and ensuing hatred of the mother, the replacement with the father as the daughter’s love object, and the ingrained hatred of the inadequately endowed mother figure. In an illogical turn around, the girl will realise that her mother has much to offer in the form of instruction in the art of feminine maternity and passivity and realign in an uncomfortable relationship within the fettered bounds of his family structure (Irigaray, 1985a).

**The benevolent father and the malevolent mother**

The daughter’s desire for the father now replaces her disappointed desire for the mother. Irigaray (1985a) suggests that Freud’s case studies show that he encounters many women during the course of his professional practice who confess that their fathers have seduced them. Freud (1977) deduces that these revelations are indeed fantasies. For Freud, the father has rejected his daughter’s desires earlier in the developmental process, forcing realignment with her mother. As an aside, I am dismayed that distressed daughters who trusted Freud enough to reveal the shame of being seduced by their fathers have their stories dismissed by Freud so that they fit into his revised theories of sexual development that silenced the suggestion of sexual abuse by fathers. The revisions came after an outcry from his colleagues and the subsequent belief that he must have been misinformed (Westerlund, 1986).
It would be wrong to blame Freud: a father’s desire for the daughter revises human developmental necessities: theoretical blindness is guided by language structure, as suggested by Lacan’s (1938/2002) reinterpretation of Freudian theory. Remembering the biological/philosophical paradox, within Freudian developmental theory, the father plays a benevolent role in the normative development of the daughter and any abusive behaviour attributed to him are the daughter’s fantasies. The mother is framed as the seducer in Freud’s vocabulary, this initiated by the phallic mother’s maternal role, the touching and caring for the child which arouses the child’s desire for the mother through pleasurable experiences initiated by physical contact.

Irigaray (1985a) suggests that the daughter navigates an extraordinarily difficult path of development that hints at a corporeal attachment of the daughter to the mother, an attachment represented in language as one of ambivalence and indeed hatred. The corporeal bond between mother and daughter is broken by normal development and she now desires the father who, since Freud’s revision of early theory (Westerlund, 1986), is above question in relation to his behaviour regarding his daughter to the point of a disbelief surrounding accusations of inappropriate behaviours.

Within Freudian (1977) theory, the girl cannot desire both the mother and the father; the hatred of one requires the desire of the other. It is the boy only who is driven by the desire for the return to the mother. In Freud’s world, the girl is driven by an envy that produces passivity. She does not possess a penis and therefore desires to be desired, as she still does within Lacanian (1999, 2007) theory and the discourse of the master. Her jealous longings are partially satisfied by attaining what she lacks (Freud, 1977; Irigaray, 1985a).
According to Irigaray (1985a), Freud, towards the end of his life, throws doubt on his previously cut and dried explanations of the development of female sexuality. He admits that the mother-daughter pre-oedipal connection remains longer and is stronger than he first suspected. There are women who never successfully negotiate the detachment from the mother and the replacement of the father as the object of desire. The Oedipus complex, therefore for Freud, hints at becoming the prime stage for the development of neurosis, that perhaps there is some merit in the suggestion that it is the painful discursive detachment and on-going isolation from the mother and not the envious desire for the father that may well form the basis for hysteria (Irigaray, 1985a).

**Masculine genealogy**

Certainly, for Irigaray (1985a), the synchronic male line of inheritance necessitates a cultural dispersion of women and their daughters, once their selected subjectivity is initiated into the symbolic. When the girl submits to her lack and to heterosexuality, there are cultural expectations that she marry and have children. Her father gives her away and she becomes the principle maintainer of her husband’s bloodline. On marriage, she changes her name to that of her husband’s (or perhaps her child’s name to that of her partner). If she chooses to retain her surname, she still carries the signification of her father’s name given that it derives from his bloodline. Certainly, within contemporary defacto relationships and civil unions, masculine genealogy is maintained through the assumption that heterosexual partnerships are the norm. On the other hand, Irigaray (1985a), writing in another time notes that daughters leave their homes and their family name when they marry. Seemingly, there is a diachronic emergence/repression of disconnect feminine genealogy in the
Symbolic, revealed within Irigaray’s critique of Freud’s’ theory of woman’s sexuality.

As we have already discussed, to exist in the synchronic, it is necessary for memory/perception/recognition to be drawn through, or successfully negotiate its way to, an uncertain signification. Freud’s (Freud & Fliess, 1985) unconscious structure has, until now, provided a productive terrain through which to journey in search of the care that precedes contemporary commodification. This has been demonstrated by the writings of Levinas that guided our journey through its realms in Chapter Four, where it provided a feasible pathway for women to transcend within phallic maternal discourse. Yet it simultaneously closes the door to her corporeality and autonomy, a discourse that Irigaray (1985a) explains, initiates women into language as, not only phallic procreative mothers but as an inferior version/extension of man. Women can exist in synchrony as kin keeper, wife and mother: contemporary discourse mimics, inscribes and abhors biological determinism as a sense-making structure. As extensions of him, his selective memory is drawn through to synchrony as procreative extensions of his ancestry in a paradoxical manoeuvre that sees the past existing in the present and indeed the future.

Again, Oedipus’ answer to the Sphinx’s riddle comes to mind as metaphor for human development as it simplistically represents a synchronically ordered advancement of childhood, adulthood and old age, or birth, life and an inevitable march toward death.
In contrast, mother/daughter connections are instantly/continuously disrupted/severed and altered on entrance to the Symbolic and at this point, it could be said that theories of the ‘development’ of woman’s sexuality are somewhat overcomplicated. Born into a phallic economy, the daughter simply learns to speak, and in doing so becomes entangled in an alien world of phallic discourse that reconstitutes her perceptions and her senses (Irigaray, 1985a). For Irigaray, she is his fantasy; he is not hers, as Freud (1977) suggests.

The anxieties that ensue from an incongruence of perceptual recognition and grammatical necessities evoke hysteria and diagnoses of neurosis and psychoses. Her available normative linguistic pathways suppress her equitably ‘different’ consciousness in that it can only manifest within discourses of abnormality. As Irigaray (1985a) suggests: “...woman’s hysteria cannot be interpreted without recourse to a historic process whose re-mark by the libidinal dramatization acted out in the ‘family’ is ever the result of, and agent of, that History” (Irigaray, 1985a, p.
This is a selective history perpetually drawn through to the present and projected into the future.

**Woman as ‘lack’: A phallic economy**

As we know, Freud’s (1977) analysis of the normative path for the development of girls differs from boys in that normal development requires the loss of the primary love object, the mother. Yet the loss of (and disappointment in) the mother has other implications for Freudian theory. Not only does the true extent of the girls and her mother’s lack come to the fore, but this revelation also has a traumatically damaging effect on the way the little girl views all women and the world in general. The girl’s confidence disappears leading to “painful dejection,” and a lessened inclination to masturbate, presumably because of disappointment with the size of her clitoris/penis. She experiences “abrogation of interest in the outside world” demonstrated by minimal input and lack of interest in the social world and a “loss of the capacity to love” highlighted by the rejection of the desire for the mother in an effort to possess the fathers penis, a desire replaced by envy. Her disinterest manifests in an “inhibition of all activity” or in other words, passivity (as a product of a sexual economy); and a general fall in self-esteem given that she has just recognised that she is an inferior copy of Him (Irigaray, 1985a, pp. 66-67).

According to Irigaray (1985a), through the effects of ‘lack’ that drive a cultural patriarchal system of masculine genealogy, a sexual economy structured around the phallus emerges; a castrated Symbolisation of the desire to return to the mother. She starts her life with the (mistaken) impression of equality in this regard. She was active and masculine (equal) until the discovery that her primary source of pleasure, her clitoris, is merely an inferior version of a penis (deficit). Irigaray describes this as the specularisation of women, the mirror image of him that returns
his gaze when he looks at her. Her badly formed body remains a constant reminder of his castration, a castration that manifests for him in his fruitless pursuit to return to his origin, a mistakenly (w)hole entity that forms the basis of his mother. The phallus absorbs this relentless quest in the Symbolic, the phallus structures discourse and the phallus that becomes the impotent catalyst for a sexual economy.

**The impotence of a phallic economy**

For Freud’s Oedipal transition of femininity to take place smoothly, the daughter relents on her mission to possess the father’s penis and shifts to a desire to have the father’s baby. The baby represents the father’s penis and a healthy transition for the daughter to femininity, at this stage, suppresses any explicit desires the daughter might display for her father and satisfies the cultural pressures maintained by the incest taboo. It is here, according to Freud (1977) that the desire for a baby shifts the emphasis of sexuality from pleasure to procreation. The girl’s desire transforms into the desire to have a boy child, developmentally acknowledged by the anal stage where gift/faeces/baby afford expression for admiration. The transformation is still faintly ‘marked’ with the desire to possess a penis/baby and thereby also inscribed with the maternal function of the phallic mother to replace the thwarted pre-oedipal ‘desire’ or bond with the pre-language mother who disappears into the diachronic traces of (un)memory.

There are anomalies brought to light by Irigaray (1985a) regarding the girl’s initiation into the phallic economy described by Freud (1977). The girl has faced her castration trauma at a different time than the boy and the process she undertakes to accept her lack and turn in hatred from her mother is indeterminable. Indeed, such a process may never be entirely completed since it involves she loses something she never had (Irigaray, 1985a). She is made aware of a biological impasse in regards to
her status within phallic economy, even if the ‘metaphorical veil’ of phallic femininity (she is the phallus, in as much as she is what he desires) is designed to hide such a failure from him.

Yet for Irigaray (1985a) even though the girl and the boy develop differently, due to the value of their anatomy in a phallic economy, her ‘difference’ being interpreted as inferior sameness leads to her becoming part of his Oedipus journey. Even though Freud (1977) has described the development of boys and girls as taking different but parallel paths, the difference implicates a value that is barely taken into account. A problematic journey to consciousness requires women to remain as the corresponding negative of positively valued masculinity. So although the development of normative sexuality for her has been ascribed a different journey, as we observed through our travels with Levinas, she must be ready to accompany him through his ‘complex’ on his terms (Irigaray, 1985a). Her presence takes the form of his inverted shadow: this is a linguistic inevitability.

The ‘lack’ the girl experiences on her discovery that her clitoris is a poor imitation of a penis is exacerbated by sharing it with her mother and women in general, and it has the capacity to trigger Freudian melancholia. Irigaray (1985a) distinguishes melancholia from mourning through a reading of Freud’s *Mourning and Melancholia* in conjunction with *Female Sexuality: Three Essays and other Works*. Mourning requires a loss, a death. The little girl’s melancholia initiates from the loss of her mother and her sexuality and therefore equates to a general sadness for an absence of something that she is not aware is missing. Therefore in the case of mourning for a lost loved one, it is likely that you would be aware of the cause of disappearance; with melancholia, there is in this case no known cause, no death, just a slipping from consciousness or in other words, out of the Symbolic. Once the girl’s
connection with her mother and her sexuality slips from consciousness, she is unable to access them or indeed know that they are missing (Irigaray, 1985a).

The girl therefore, according to Irigaray (1985a), does not select melancholia as her passive withdrawal from His world. Selecting a form of defence would require something of her already depleted narcissism that she doesn’t have, given her marked lack of self-esteem and the ensuing drain of her ego that has been severely morally sanctioned by the anti-catharsis of His super-ego. The depletion of said ego makes it impossible for the melancholia syndrome to take hold and it therefore manifests only in various disjointed symptoms. “She functions as a hole” (Irigaray, 1985a, p.71); a restricted inversion of him, afforded signification in metonym, borrowed signifiers, and signification that is allocated in phallic language. Irigaray suggests that with the forced absence of her primary love object, hysteria is her only outlet. Irigaray asks the question, is this psychosis or neurosis? I suspect the difficulty here becomes making the differentiation between biological deficit and philosophical essence (recognition and signification) along with a quest to enter language, or a falling out of language, all of which are separate yet inextricably intertwined: this is no easy task. As Irigaray (1985a, p.71) explains:

She borrows signifiers but cannot make her mark, or re-mark upon them. Which all surely keeps her deficient, empty, lacking, in a way that could be labelled ‘psychotic’: a latent but not actual psychosis, for want of a practical signifying system.

She submits to her fate, amidst the relief of another show of unsound moral fortitude, the first being due to a fit of pique, a petty and shallow reaction to the fact the neither herself or her mother have what it takes to maintain a ‘normal’ relationship, two shadows, without the body or fortitude (or essence) to connect
Freud depicts her guilt as visible within the ‘game’ of sexuality played between the sexes, ignoring the depleted moral fortitude of women, brought about by envy, hatred and separation from the mother, that is necessary for the Oedipus complex to function ‘logically’ and theoretically. Women/mothers are heavily sanctioned, grammatically scripted as carriers of blame: morality and discourse make sure that she is consciously aware and thoroughly grounded in her post-oedipal maternal, kin-keeping, and caring responsibilities. Man/fathers actively complete a connection between justice and morality. Yet their completion is not physical, nor is it linguistic, since they have had to give up their love object: their mother.

The fruit of a phallic economy

Paradoxically, the burden of care for the family and child requires ambivalence between mother and daughter and the specularisation of them both. Two specularised shadows manifest in symbolic form. The commodified phallic mother and daughter are now required by Freud to realign with each other in the best interests of the daughter’s social development, remembering that girl brings with her, a lack of social interest related to her biological deficit. Yet Irigaray (1985a) suggests that she does not align with her own mother, she aligns with his mother, setting up a family complexity that is modelled on his desire for his mother. A family unit, Lacan (1938/2002) informs us, is whole, a safe model of the womb, yet consists of the disassociated, chaotic fragments of distorted self-perception. Within Irigaray’s critique of Freud, this is possible only as far as such fragments are pieces of his distorted perception. Cultural repression of femininity, represented in the disappearance of the mother-daughter connection at an early age requires that they are no longer present (Irigaray, 1985a).
The goods of the phallic economy

Informed by the developmental process of female sexuality in young girls, Freud (1977) applies his findings to mature women. According to Freud, women are narcissistic, and because they do not actively seek out love itself, they desire to be loved. Yet Irigaray (1985a) suggests that the narcissism here is not her own, it is the result of his phallic projection and we must not forget that she has been mutilated, castrated, ridiculed and cast as an inferior copy. For Freud (1977), penis envy and jealousy are responsible for the formation of passivity and femininity, feminine charms, manifesting in an emphasis on personal appearance take the emphasis off anatomical deficit. Irigaray (1985a) suggests that women are required to compete in a phallic economy and must ensure that the ‘goods’ are as presentable as possible. As Irigaray (1985a, p.114) states:

Even if someday she plays to perfection the role of femininity in all its bourgeois perversity, it will in no way fill, this fault, this lack, of a specific specular economy and of a possible representation of her value, for her and by her, which could bring her into the system of exchange as something other than ‘object’.

According to Freud (1977), Woman’s shame is generated for the purpose of concealment, the concealment of (his) physical deformity, yet this shame explicitly reveals her deficit. Irigaray (1985a) reiterates that the pursuit of beauty and a paradoxical physical perfection of a sensual body must always mask or hide her (his) shameful physical lack, even to the extreme of plastic surgery.
Interludes

Essence, essentialism and Irigaray

According to Gray (2007), there are two notable avenues of thought in relation to essentialism. Gray delves into the philosophical underpinnings of ‘essence’. Philosophical musings place essence as a defining ‘thing’ for humanity. She cites Witt (1989, 1995) who suggests that essence is undefinable substance that makes a human a human, or for that matter, a tiger a tiger. In other words, there are essential elements that make beings what they are (Witt, 1989, 1995), though they don't ‘define’ them. Defining is undoubtedly the wrong word in this context because it seems essence is undefinable. The tiger's defining stripes do not represent the essence of the tiger, neither do the leopard's spots, regardless of whether or not they can change. In the context of philosophical essentialism and through what I read to be Witt's reasoning, a leopard could change its spots and it would still be a leopard: we just would not recognise it as such. According to science (Gray, 2007; Witt, 1989, 1995), the superior reasoning properties of the human brain's frontal lobe distinguish man from the animals (including the tiger or the leopard). This is a form of socio-political essentialism of comparison; superior man and inferior animal. Yet doctors informed by scientific medicine may
perform surgery that removes a man's reasoning power and he remains a human being: that is philosophical essentialism. There is something indeterminable and unobservable; an ‘essence’ forged in the very notion of consciousness that is not fundamentally biological or accessible to scientific knowledge and intervention.

According to Gray (2007), this theorising is a philosophy of being, of consciousness and unconsciousness and of individuation and collectiveness. It is not inclusive of socio-political conceptions of essentialism controlled by time, space and matters of discursive boundaries. Science has transformed the notion of essentialism in an effort to detect biological differences and to compare between ethnicities, gender, sexuality, intelligence levels, intellectual disabilities to name but a few. Essentialism of this kind is embedded in the Symbolic; yet so is philosophical essentialism embedded in Western philosophies of consciousness and the existence of the soul. Both forms of essentialism are inextricably and incompatibly entwined within the workings of Freudian philosophy, as is the linguistic (philosophical) determinism brought to light by Freud’s workings of the unconscious as written in a letter to Fliess (Freud & Fliess, 1985) and revisited by Lacan (2006b, 1988).

Lacan’s (1964/2006, 1997b, 2007) suggestions of a philosophical aspect to Freudian theory are justified in a way that highlights Irigaray’s (1985a) concerns of the (non)representation of women in language. Freud, as we remember, left the teachings of
Charcot, in an effort to move away, not altogether successfully, from a quest for the biological of hysteria. He pursued the talking cure, having discovered that physical symptoms moved around the body, the dissipation of one symptom leading to the manifestation of another (Verhaeghe, 1999). Freud refuted claims of socio-political essentialism by claiming that hysteria, a woman’s condition, was not directly due to an essential ‘physical or mental weakness (in comparison), but a psychological trauma brought on by physical deprivation. The difficulties between the two forms of essentialism are exacerbated when Irigaray (1985a,) reminds us that the little girl is born as an inferior little boy. The girl is not aware of this at birth and her super-ego is modelled from the ‘intact’ image she has of her mother. Her ego, according to Lacan (1938/2002), becomes an eclectic jigsaw of those that are close to her as a diverse and difficult to contain ‘whole’ that constantly changes from encounter to encounter, transcending the gaps.

Therefore, from Irigaray’s (1985a) speculation, for both Freud and Lacan, philosophical essentialism must win the day. Although there is a physical difference between men and women the essence is the same, they are all men. Although I could argue socio-political essentialism on a Symbolic plane where women appear to be biologically inferior to men, for Lacan (1949/2006) she represents a mirrored image of him, his inferior projected bits, so now the question becomes one of individuation as a philosophical question of essence and consciousness.
Yet through the writings of Irigaray the question of essence become even more complicated. If the mirror belongs to man only, a mirror that returns, for both Man and Woman, caricatures of both Himself/God, then she does not exist. One thing is clear, a man may reflect an image of a woman (however mutilated), yet she is still a man: that is philosophical essentialism. She has no unique essence, not even care and this is not surprising given the inseparable alliance between philosophy and science, in that yes, there is an undefinable essence in the Symbolic and no, she does not have any of her own, whatever it may be.

According to Whitford (1991), the feminist movement has been at odds with Irigaray’s work, labelled (dubiously) as essentialist. Irigaray’s challenging of mainstream philosophy, however, has been invaluable in exposing the problems of developing particular strategies in the quest for equity and actively pursuing them along set and rigid lines. An exemplary strategy would be our much-discussed feminist ethics of care, defined by Tronto (1993) and now integrated within mainstream care theory. Coming into language, crossing the wall that divides private and public and becoming a commodity firmly grounds the battle for equity over care in the clutches of a phallic Symbolic and activates strategies that depend on a philosophy of essence. The contemporary trajectory of this philosophy ‘naturally’ progresses from questions of ‘being’ to political boundaries imposed around biological essentialism (Whitford, 1991). As we have discussed, this
progression is not as clear-cut as it would seem, and I have already suggested that this is not a progression but an incompatible alliance, a gap only noticeable through heavy use of metaphor when we are up against the wall. A feminist ethics and similar strategies, unable to work in freedom from Freud's symbolically inscribed deficit, are inextricable from the uniquely human and his essence. In light of Harari's (1995) interpretation of Lacan's concept of writing/sinthome, and Schreber's memoirs, we might tentatively call this the Law of the Name of the Father.

Post structuralism theorises essence as a construction of language and Irigaray goes a little further when she suggests that language constructs masculine essence only (Whitford, 1991). According to Whitford, some theorists consider that Irigaray's work accentuates a biological difference that is at present only created by socio-political oppressive boundaries. For me, Irigaray directs women toward their inability to function separately (from him) and collectively (with her) and that a Freudian photographic metaphor as positive and negative are not indications of inequitable difference. This is the portrayal of inequitable sameness. Sameness oppresses us in language. An equitable difference (non)exists outside of culture, philosophy and discourse, perhaps somewhere beyond Riviere's (1929/2008) mask, even though the academic daughter knows that within the masters discourse, as explained by Tauchert, (2007), there is reputedly nothing behind the mask although the hysterical daughter still
Irigaray’s (1985a, 1985b) thesis is that the corporeal feminine woman does not feature in the Symbolic: Woman represents his Imaginary. Whereas she is the mirror image of him, she does not have her own image within language. What she sees is his image of her. Her femininity fades into the shadows of the diachronic, and is fractured and sublimated. Thus, feminine corporeal woman does not appear to equate to his imaginary in this sense for her. The woman that projects from his imaginary is the phallic post-oedipal mother, the good (Adam’s rib/inferior man) woman. The corporeal traces of her in language are not necessarily accessible to Him given that he is, by ontology and Ideology unaware of their existence. What Irigaray appears to be saying therefore is not an Ontological inclusion within existing phallic law as biologically different, but a recognition in language, an existence as feminine as subject, or in other words, the progenitor of her own essence. This would require an encounter that recognises Woman as embodied/corporeal, yet this is not a biological encounter: it is a question of recognition and would be a question of philosophical essence if women actually existed within the bounds of philosophy. Irigaray’s work appears to fall outside the boundaries of both, not essentialist under either banner.

**Mimesis**

Gray (2007) suggests that Irigaray’s strategy of mimesis
brings her writing into a space that allows for her work to be considered as inside ontology, where she accentuates the ironic existence of the Symbolic Woman by knowingly speaking with her as the image beyond the mirror. This strategy gives her a voice by default, a strategy that allows a space to speak from diachrony or perhaps beyond, a suggestive strategy that accentuates her masking by his Symbolic and therefore escapes the confines of ontology and its corresponding philosophy and science. From this position, Irigaray converses with philosophy and the philosophers and parodies masquerade; ironically emphasising that Woman is required to sacrifice herself, sold/spoken as passive goods, to perpetuate this paradoxical tragedy/comedy of the mask. Riviere’s (1929/2008) masquerade yet again takes centre stage as a tragic act of grammatical reversal this time performed from somewhere non-existent.

In Chapter Two I discussed Lacan’s (1999, 2007) four speaking positions that the daughters would, or could, take up within the context of a thesis on care. To date, the speaking positions have changed and intermingled through the work too many times to accurately signpost for the reader. Although these changes were easy to differentiate at the start, these positions are becoming more blurred as we continue. Irigaray’s mimesis has now introduced another speaking position, one that exists outside of masculine theory and separately from the mask in that it can ironically mime the femininity that it produces. Given the confusion of time, in relation to woman’s genealogical connection of events, bloodline and memory, we
cannot remember when the mimetic daughter joined us. Now that we remember her, she feels as if she has been here with us all along, observing and describing, joining in and searching the gaps opened through her own case study. To continue, we will again revisit, within a somewhat repetitive cycle, Soler’s interpretation of Lacan’s masquerade, with a passive melancholy and perhaps this time with just a hint of irony.

Masquerade revisited: Some handy things to know about woman’s lack:

Narcissism

One might also consider the enhancement of beauty a somewhat hysterical exaggeration of the anamorphic/specular veil or mask that is required within the phallic economy. It is what the mask conceals that concerns us here. In light of Freud’s thesis as explained by Irigaray (1985a), it conceals lack. The question is: does Lacan’s masquerade, as explained by Soler’s (2006) disguise, lack, or possession? If it disguises the former, then Lacan’s turn to Freud is complete and the difference between his and Riviere’s masquerade are revealed. Riviere’s (1929/2008) masquerade, like Gilligan’s (1977, 1982) equitable difference, is an island of hope between two Freudian or masculine interpretations of woman. From Soler’s (2006) case study (as introduced in Chapter Three), the woman hides possession, yet this is the possession of wealth and not necessarily representative of the phallic economy. I say this because the woman conceals her wealth consciously in order to extract what she desires, the phallus, or to be desired. The woman in Soler’s case study is narcissistic in that she manipulates to gain what she wants. As such, her financial incompetence enhances her femininity/passivity/beauty, perhaps also as a representation of death/silence. She does not possess the phallus, she lacks it, the
combination of both narcissism and lack emphasising the strong influences of Freud’s original theory in Lacan’s work. In contrast, Riviere’s (1929/2008) original masquerading woman possesses her father’s penis, her performance anxiety initiates from the possibility that her audience of men may find out that she has it. There is a not so subtle difference between the Freudian masquerade and Riviere’s hysterical masquerade, a gap that, as discussed earlier, may hold the key to the whereabouts of care/the other jouissance and the absence of mother-daughter between the many pathways that the threads of the mask provides

**Weaving the threads of Freud’s mask**

For Freud (1977), women lack interest in the social world and have made little contribution, apart from their introduction of weaving and plaiting. This sole contribution is a prime example of woman’s lack of originality in that these activities have been directly plagiarised from nature. Not only that, they are directly related to the matted nature of her pubic hair. Therefore the prevalent activity of weaving and plaiting amongst women folk in general appears to be an en masse attempt by women to cover their inadequate genital areas at a social level. Woman weaves cloth to cover herself in order to give the appearance of (his) wholeness and of course present an acceptable product for sale. Freud’s mask is woven to conceal within frenzy of shame and envy.

**Penis envy as the basis for feminist care ethics**

Freud (1977) interprets a ‘poor sense of justice’ to a predominance of envy. Yet again, there emerges a somewhat confused basis for prevalent developmental research underpinning a feminist ethics of care that is now becoming widely quoted and incorporated in mainstream research as mentioned in Chapter One, such as the work of Borgerson (2007), Cockburn (2005), Condon (1992), Burton & Dunn
(1996), Morris (2001), Popke (2006), Simola (2003) and Smith, (2005). So far within my thesis, I have discussed how women have been posited as reasoning with a morality of care, one that becomes enhanced through or as a symptom of hysteria and men are linked to justice and superior skills of ethical reasoning. Through Irigaray’s writings, I sense that it is not surprising that women reason within care, although not care that could be considered as equitable with justice. Irigaray (1985a) suggests that it is impossible for women to be endowed with a sense of justice given that they are a commodity in a phallic economy. If women’s sense of justice is distorted by penis envy, the care that Gilligan (1977, 1982) frames as different but equal is quickly restored to the commodity it has always been, perceived as equitable in the moment perhaps, and quickly forgotten: it can only represent what she doesn’t have. Care, in this sense, is what justice is not. The contemporary commodification of care becomes a repackaging of lack. Care is an empty product, a hole, a lack of essence, something waiting to be filled, an undefinable thing that is yet another container. If this is care, then what of the ethical terms of trade that guides its moral practice? Care, as an equitable impossible ‘essence of Woman’, becomes a projected object/Other; women on the market. The masquerading woman impeccably continues her caring duties, an empty care, an empty mask, a shiny, passive, beautiful, smooth, lead casket, containing a framed image.

**Masquerade**

Freud’s thesis reminds us of just how contentious Riviere’s masquerade is in the context of mainstream theory. Riviere’s mask, as I read it, unconsciously conceals possession: performance anxiety, when presenting to a male audience, stems from a fear that she will be found out. Within the context of Riviere’s masquerade, plastic surgery, and beauty products supply him with his desire, while
concealing her secret. Her anxiety comes from the fear of being found in possession and not through the shame of lacking what she would like to possess. Riviere’s case study possesses the phallus: she stole it from her father, even though I have an uneasy feeling that, given the confines of discourse she may possess more than or something other than her father’s penis, if only she could remember.

Soler (2006) relates a story about a woman who struggles to keep her finances in order. Her contrived problematic spending behaviours anger her husband who admonishes her (anger) to the point where she breaks down in tears displaying weakness, deficit and passivity. They then make love, satisfying her desire to be desired; he restocks her failing bank account, indicating his masochism. The woman inherits a small amount of money and does not tell her husband for fear that he will feel unwanted. It turns out that she has always been a woman of some means and has kept her wealth to herself to facilitate the masquerade, or perhaps what Freud (1977) has called, the play between the sexes. According to Soler (2006, p. 33) “the woman makes herself into a chameleon and adds a scent of derision.”

**Masquerade, mimesis, sadness, and a touch of irony**

In an effort to explain woman’s passive narcissism in contemporary society, Soler (2006) explains Lacan’s reinterpretation of masquerade in relation to contemporary life. Within contemporary society, there are explicit signs of equality. Women can join the workforce and have children without getting married or living with a partner. The nuclear family system is breaking down and women have far more freedom in the context of what they do and what they wear. Women are promiscuous in that they have multiple sexual partners and they often dress in unisex clothes. So within contemporary times, Soler, in terms of the way she words her critique, frames women as active agents: who (un)knowingly seek their own
gratification and therefore are somehow responsible for the consequences. By consequences I mean the violence against or abuse of women that Soler (2006) suggests manifests from women’s unconscious desires to be desired. These incidences, according to Soler (2006) are unfortunate extremes within a cycle that can go a little too far and angers the man to greater extremes than necessary to exact jouissance. Within psychoanalytic theory, we know that this cannot be the case, Woman cannot consciously exact jouissance within the paradigm of masquerade and trust that this is not Soler’s intention and is, perhaps an unfortunate trick of translation. Language structure inscribes women’s lack and their drive to obtain what they do not have: they cannot be responsible for unconscious linguistic workings and actively contrive to cause derision to exact phallic jouissance.

Masquerading case studies become difficult in the telling, when women can be only active or passive, there is no intermediary positions, just a wall of miscommunication. I suggest that by necessity, we must emphasise by extremes, we cannot speak of the middle ground unless in terms of continuums and these continuums are moderated by morality and ethics or in other words, the super-ego of the brotherhood. Just reading Soler’s (2006) account of women having many sexual partners evokes moral judgements of sluts and whores. There are those who suggest that sexual freedom is not a freedom at all for women, it becomes a contemporary expectation that women will freely indulge in sexual behaviours: it becomes an expected obligation, non-consensual coercion (Gavey, 1992) that still subjects her to discourses that describe her as ‘easy’. As contemporary discourses evolve, conflicting discourses remain, constricting, strangling and inflicting injury and blame.
Masquerade lays the blame with those who have no explanation to give and no voice through which to answer. There are limited voices available to women who seek to articulate their experiences (Nicholson, 2010). For example, Kelly and Radford (1996) talk to the difficulties of women even acknowledging that they have been the victims of violence or harassment when these situations are framed within the discourses that shape Soler’s (2006) interpretation of the Freud/Lacan version of masquerade. ‘Nothing really happened’ becomes the catch cry when women seek to describe injurious behaviours, especially when some of these behaviours initiate within the framework of love, and indeed, Soler’s interpretation of masquerade. Within a loving relationship she remains object, endowed with a projected subjectivity and a script of self destruction inscribed as narcissism, maintained within system of equilibrium and moderation? As Irigaray (1985a, p. 18) states in her critique of Freud: “Woman is nothing but a receptacle that passively receives his product, even if sometimes, by the display of her passively aimed instincts, she has pleaded, facilitated, even demanded that it be placed within her.” Masquerade becomes mimesis in the telling through parody, recognition of passivity, its corresponding phallic productivity and the damage it continues to inflict on women.

The contemporary working woman and/or the contemporary hysterical faces a challenge of being spoken as both active and passive on a daily basis within a continuum of consuming obsession and total disinterest. How does the hysterical woman fare as she hides what she vaguely can’t remember she once had, performing her duties perfectly without showing any tell-tale signs of anxiety, indicating that she might possess what he can never hope to Imagine. We can frame the evolving mask of femininity as an eager participant within a contemporary society that expects her to actively participate in a productive manner and enjoy the sexual freedom in an age
where they can chose many sexual partners. Alternatively, we might think of her as a passive object/commodity in a society that frames her as an active participant whether she wants to be or not, still burdened with the stigmas of promiscuity and mother-blame.

For Irigaray (1985a), woman’s choices are strictly limited within a phallic economy: death of hysteria. What Freud describes as the play between the sexes, duly inscribed into the Lacan’s masquerade and explained by Soler (2006), becomes the slave’s choice, consciousness over death. Yet death can also be interpreted as silence and silence can be metaphorically broken, in parody and mimesis perhaps?

Interlude: The intensive and the working mother revisited

The intensive and the working mother are two extremes that have their origins within Freudian theory. Interestingly both of these, although they are extremes of each other, if framed as the intensive and working mother, each can work within their own continuum of good-enough mothering, as contemporary conflicting discourses imply. They just can’t be that mother simultaneously: such are the paradoxical restrictions of language. The hysterical masquerading woman as the epitome of good mothering takes up the hysterical position and mothers somewhere in-between the two, a good-enough mother in her own right.
Soler (2006) introduces two mothers. Her disinterested mother sits at the extreme of one of two poles. The devouring mother sits on the other extreme, given that there can only be two, within the laws of continuum. I suggest that these two mothers form the basis of the dilemmas of the contemporary mother identified through conflicting mothering discourses (Hays, 1996: Kahu & Morgan, 2007) within a system of equilibrium operating between the two poles.

At first glance, one would expect the intensive mother to represent the devouring mother, and I think this is the case. Yet conflicting discourses make this a difficult stance to take. The intensive mother is possibly falsely represented here. She is not necessarily devouring: she can work along her own continuum of intensive mothering and be a good-enough long-suffering mother within discourses of intensive mothering. She only sways further toward the extreme pole of smothering in light of working mother discourses that suggest that self-actualisation, socialisation and quality time with the child is better in terms of child development. Similarly, the disinterested mother could be framed as the working mother within the context of contemporary discourses of intensive mothering. She sways toward the extreme pole of disinterested mother when put into the context of intensive mothering discourses, such as de Marneffe (2004) advocates when she suggests that self-actualisation for the mother is damaging for the child.

It would be fair to say that the intensive mother would be
more likely to be framed as devouring her child and the working 
mother would be more likely to be framed as neglecting hers. 
Intensive mothering in this case represents the devouring mother 
in that she would be more likely to smother her child and she over 
mothers to the point where she almost consumes her babies. This 
mother wishes to possess her father’s baby as a means to fill her 
lack. The career driven mother desires to possess/steal the phallus as 
compensation for her lack. The perfect (contemporary) mother sits 
somewhere in-between, adhering to contemporary discourses of 
work-life balance that desires or perhaps has both the penis baby 
and the phallus in moderation. This mother now becomes the most 
sought after economic commodity, adding value to both 
production and reproduction and this hysterical position possibly 
harbours the best kept secret in psychoanalytic history. Within 
Irigaray’s (1985a) critique of Freud, however, the perfect mother 
harbours only lack. Although Soler (2006) suggests that it is better 
for the child’s development to have a neglecting disinterested 
mother than a devouring, smothering mother, both poles of 
extreme mothers display (or are presented with available 
discourses that implicitly inscribe) anxieties borne from penis envy. 
It is not particularly comforting to know that woman’s penis envy 
has transferred to theories of phallic discourse as a default of 
masculine theories of difference.

The question of women’s desire posits the maternal 
loss/phallus possession as confused positions, given that to him, she
is the phallus in that she is his anamorphosis. She replaces what he has lost within the distorted range of the scopic drive (Soler, 2006). According to Soler (2006), the mother seeks out what she has lost in another scopic illusion, given that she never actually had it in the first place. The drive to provide what was lost is a process that oscillates between two poles, the overbearing, consuming mother who shows tendencies to devour the child in a way that can be equated to cannibalism/possession through ingestion and the disinterested mother who is driven by desire and self-gratification. The fusional desire to possess to the point of annihilation speaks to the difficulties of distinguishing between self and other, activity and passivity, love and aggression because essentially they are incompatible in that they are linguistically separable as an inscription of perception.

The wall is a mirror. It cannot be crossed or used as a tightrope or a balancing act of any kind, it cannot crumble under weight or crack through neglect as its accompanying metaphors suggest. The wall is a mirror that reflects, it reflects shadows, reversed images. The wall is a barrier where essence inverts back on itself to create his other world, his shadow world...the world where Soler’s (2006) contemporary masquerade takes place. What of the reflections of work-life balance mother as she reflects back off her ‘wall’, never really crossing...no masquerade...no consuming mothers...or neglecting mothers.

Just as care is Othered, so too is passivity, slaves of continuum and equilibrium, separated by a thin line, a hyphen, metaphorically inscribed as a means
of transcendence across the pit that divides Same and Other, Subject/Object; Subject Other.

The shadow woman goes about his business within his shadowy private world, a shadow of justice, a mirror image of justice, of lack, inscribed as care. The mirror is always set between him and his shadow, empty shadowy containers with no real substance and reflected essence. Certainly, she has no Real form, nor can she within the discourse of the master. So where are her shadows, her embodied traces...where is she...and can she ever remember?

Nothing divided by nothing but reflective glass, containers within which his essence, in varying states of deficit, fadedness, goes about his business. Are they boundaries that keep out the babble, reflecting back into grammatical structure? Are they places of recognition, of perception, of alterity of a third, if so, are they, as Irigaray (2004) suggests, more containers? So is there nothing beyond the mask, darkness, nothing beyond the plane of the mirror, perhaps just the voice of mimesis? So where are the lost memories, dust, madness, death or a deafening silence, eloquent or goading? Is there an interactive uncountable memorable multiplicity, the other jouissance, an eloquent silence, mothers and daughters? The hysterical daughter prepares for yet another philosophical venture, seeking shadows, answers within the depths of Plato’s Cave.
Chapter Eight: The myth of the cave

If Plato’s texts can be seen as the origin of western metaphysics, then within those texts, the myth of the cave can be read as a distillation of the metaphysical framework to which they give rise. (Jones, 2011, p.43)

As for those who may have neglected to re-member the source of the only good, they would be left to “the world”, abandoned to the earth, a prey to metamorphosis, destiny of shadows. Buried perhaps in some dark hole where they are attracted and held captive, again by their dreams and fantasies. (Irigaray, 1985a, p. 316)

**Essence**: For Plato, the world of **Forms**, lies invisibly at the heart of that which can be sensed or embodied and such forms lead to transcendence as in the upward movement of the soul from the body.

**The Paradox of Form**: The invisible form becomes a vision of enlightenment.

Within this chapter, I search for shadows and inquire into reflections, essence, origin and maternal care, as a pathway through which the daughter may locate her missing encounter. Irigaray’s (1985a) critique of Plato’s myth of the cave is an engagement with the birth of philosophical thought, simultaneously representing the absence of the mother within western discourse and a dichotomy of essence/biology. I again expand the daughter’s terrain as she searches alternative pathways to remember. The daughter, knows that she is a reflection, an object, and ways of speaking her were once possible, and yet she cannot remember through discourses of light and God. Perhaps there is no other pathway except a constant desire to return to the mother. Irigaray’s reading of Plato opens a possible pathway to her mother as she now, inclusive of an Irigarayian daughter and a growing collection
of voices, journeys back to the womb to search for her/their origin/encounter within
the myth of the cave. How can she access the space transcended by the hyphen, God
and light and return to tell the tale? How can she step through the plane of the
mirror? How can she once again experience a mother-daughter embodied encounter
without fear? Irigaray (1985a, p. 243) reads Plato’s cave as a metaphor for womb:
“[It is a] Ground, dwelling, cave, and even, in a different way, form – all these terms
can be read more or less as equivalents of the hystera.”

**Form by firelight**

Plato frames his myth of the cave within fictitious dialogue, between
Socrates, Plato’s mentor, and Plato’s brother, Glaucon (Irigaray, 1985a; Jones,
2011). According to Jones, the myth of the cave becomes Plato’s teaching tool to
accentuate the painful process of enlightenment and the necessity for the
‘enlightened’ to rule over the less informed. Deep within the cave, there are
prisoners, chained by their neck and thighs, fixed in a position that faces them
toward the rear of the cave. A fire burns behind and above the prisoners, shedding
enough light to initiate shadows. A raised path runs behind and above the prisoners
along which people move, carrying inanimate objects and effigies/statues/artefacts
(Irigaray, 1985a; Jones, 2011).

These shadows, distorted images cast from real objects (prisoners, people and
artefacts), are considered by the prisoners to represent the true state of the world. As
long as the prisoners continue to view the shadows as representing reality, they will
remain in ignorance. For Plato, the shadows cannot represent or provide the pathway
to recognition of unique human essence. Men possess an essence, paradoxically
unavailable to their eye. Once realised, essence or ‘Form’ enables enlightenment, or
in other words enables the enlightened to ‘see the light’ (Jones, 2011; Whitford, 1991).

Within Plato’s myth, one of the prisoners is unshackled: he turns and is dazzled by the unfamiliar light of the fire and although he can now make out the shape of men and objects that have until now been positioned behind him, his familiar shadows are still more familiar and therefore real (Jones, 2011). The prisoner is slowly dragged toward the mouth of the cave and out into the sunlight. This enforced, gradual journey sees the released prisoner broaden his observations as the light increases. He progresses from shadows to reflection in water, to objects and then to the sun itself, a sun that represents an ultimate ethical good (Jones, 2011; Whitford, 1991).

If the prisoner did return to the shadows of the cave, his enlightenment would initially become clouded. Yet he would understand the enclosed and ignorant predicament of the prisoners and have empathy for their plight, even though the prisoners do not recognise it themselves. Having discovered the road toward Forms, he would be less likely to be corrupted and would make a wise mentor and leader (Jones, 2011).

Within this myth, the cave represents the visible world, a world based on perception that does not question the essence or ‘Form’ of objects. Along the pathway out of the cave, essence and/or Ideas separate from objects in an act of dualism that splits perception (the sensible and touchable) from thought. Similar to Levinas’ tour through transcendence as guided by Baraitser (2009), and Walsh’s (2001) through Freud’s unconscious (Freud & Fliess, 1985) discussed in Chapter Four, Plato’s splitting equates to the separation of the invisible, the non-observable and indefinable, the soul of humanity, the uniquely human essence, from the
embodied senses. For Irigaray (1985a), the cave becomes the womb (hystera) of the soul: a journey from the cave, conceived as movement from an embodied darkness of birth, to transcendence and enlightenment that sets up light/essence as an ultimate good, an ultimate form and being, a heavenly God; all devoid of the mother.

The cave, as described by Plato is below the ground and occupied by men. Irigaray (1985a) notes they are ‘men’ of no specific sex. The cave has a long corridor that leads upwards out of the fire light. The description of the cave acts to situate ‘it’/womb in space and time. Enlightenment requires a movement upwards, out of the restrictive boundaries imposed by ignorance. The men have always been confined and restricted, within the bounds of lifespan and knowledge: yet the cave precedes them. Chained facing the back, the wall is in front of them. The back of the cave becomes the front of the cave in a discursive act of disorientation that portrays an unperceived confusion of backwards and forwards and up and down (Irigaray, 1985a). Considering the wall of language in a Lacanian sense, language confuses their orientation and their pathway; if the men do find themselves free to pursue enlightenment, the direction of enlightenment is itself in doubt (Irigaray, 1985a: Jones, 2011).

The unshackled man is at first unable to make out the figures of men and the objects when confronted with the earthly elemental light of the fire. The remaining prisoners remain chained. It is impossible for them to move forward/backward to the origin or towards/away or up/down in relation to the daylight of enlightenment. Their metaphorical chains contain them within what Irigaray (1985a) describes as a wall/curtain, impermeable for bodies. Irigaray explains:

Chains restrain them from turning towards the origin but/and they are prisoners in space time of the pro-ject of its representation. Head and
genitals are kept turned to the front of the representational project and process of the *hystera*. To the *hystera protera* that is apparently resorbed, blended into the movement of hysteron *proteron*. For hysteron, defined as what is behind, is also the last, the hereafter, the ultimate. Proteron, defined as what is in front, is also the earlier, the previous. There is a fault in the *hysterein* which is maintained by the *proterein*, or more exactly here by the... forward, the...opposite, the face, the visage, the physiognomy... maintained by links, by chains that are, as it were, invisible. Thus keeping up the illusion that the origin might become fully visible if only one could turn around (Irigaray, 1985a, p. 245).

Spivak (2010) explains Irigaray’s (1985a) clever use of *hysteron proteron* (putting the latter before the former), an important strategic disruption of discursive order, a chaotic order that binds the formation of western metaphysics to contemporary discourse, for example, the shadow before the solid object that casts it. Such a metaphor not only confuses the direction of the ‘original’ but also turns the shadows cast by the light of the fire into questioning who is casting the shadows, the prisoners or the shadows themselves. Therefore, the prisoner’s ignorance in perceiving the shadows as primary, diagnosed by Plato, is a confusing reflection within the manipulation of an ordered time and space. Irigaray suggests that this confusion relates to a concave mirror, a speculum that perhaps alters the reflection of the objects as portrayed by their shadows. Irigaray puts such a distorted imagery down to the function of the concave mirror, the speculum, used in gynaecological inspecting, invading, pathologising and colonising women’s bodies.

*But this cave is already... a speculum.* An inner space of reflection. Polished and polishing, fake offspring. Opening, enlarging, contriving the scene of representation. All is organised into cavities, spheres, sockets, chambers, enclosures, simply because the speculum is put in the way. (Irigaray, 1985a, p. 255)
If there is a directional problem pertaining to the inside world, then there is a
definite confusion as to what constitutes the outside world, what comes first and last
(inside or outside), whether the origin is to the front or the back. The neck of the
womb and the vaginal opening is perceived as upward, Plato’s advance up/down
such a path potentially becomes a reverse journey along the vaginal tunnel/pathway
back toward the womb rather than out and away from it.

The corporeal shadows reflected onto the back/front of the cave that
represents the prisoner’s world are a confused reflection of the bodily self and
accompanying objects. According to Plato, anyway, they do not represent the true
essence of the world, they reflect a shadowy configuration of corporeal being and
their shape is dependent on the light without an ethical understanding of what it
represents (Irigaray, 1985a). The prisoners are prisoners of the body. This is what the
invisible chains represent. The little wall or curtain that runs behind the prisoners,
that Irigaray (1985a) suggests represents the hymen, must be traversed to travel
towards the light. When the released prisoner turns around, according to Irigaray, he
can only get past the wall if he renounces his corporeal form/body. It is my
understanding of Irigaray’s critique that as soon as the man (of no particular sex)
turns, he can no longer see the shadows. As he turns toward the fire, they are cast
behind him. The quest for enlightenment is a quest of essence, of Forms and this
requires release from corporeality. Hence, the quest for origin becomes directionally
confused with the quest for Form. The journey away/toward the origin sees a march
toward generativity as essence, as man’s work, devoid of the corporeality of the
mother, since once he moves his gaze, the mother represents a solidified cavern in
which he is chained with not even a hint of the corporeal maternal. Conscious
perception and essence relies on memory that is preconceived by language and in
terms of Levinas’ transcendence could be considered as thinking past the constriction of the body, unaware of the confusion of direction.

The world inside the cave is seemingly mirroring/mirrored by the world outside, an inverse, outside world. Within the cave, the fire burns behind and above the cave dwellers. Outside the cave, the sun becomes the fire and the duty of reflection is duly taken over by the moon. The shadows on the wall are replaced by the reflections in the water (Jones, 2011). There is confusion here as to which of these two parallel (reversed/conversed) worlds mimics the other and which of these worlds contains the origin/essence or whether they are both the distorted image of yet another world (Irigaray, 1985a). Yet these two worlds are not as similar as they first appear. One world aspires toward the sun (Whitford, 1991), the father, Immaculate Conception, a soul freed from its corporeal tomb, yet the other contains the ignorant souls trapped in their debilitating bodies.

Figure 13. Plato’s cave.
In the outer world, the sun represents the ultimate good, attained through a series of visual initiations that start with freedom from the body. Whatever the case, the quest for the origin is irreversibly confused with maternal/essence and coincides with the disappearance of the maternal within contemporary western language.

According to Whitford (1991), Irigaray’s (1985a) reading of Plato’s myth accentuates the paradox within the sensible world of the cave, of bodies and the world of forms, of ideas. Although Plato advocates the severing of the body from the soul as a means of enlightenment, this enlightenment is dependent on the body. The physiological function of vision is appropriated by the bodiless. The cave/hystera becomes a bony cavernous eye socket, a speculum that signifies the limits of man’s gaze and once transcendence from the body takes place, vision voids its anatomical function, becoming blind sight. For Irigaray then, Plato’s myth of the cave, replicates an act of procreation with a twist. The outside world (enlightenment) severs Man from Woman and connects Him to himself within reflective imagery (invisible vision). The reflective process ‘disconnects’ in a reflected recognition that is no longer what it ‘appears’ to be.

Within this myth, it appears that there are three ‘spaces’, “the cavern, the world and the Ideas” (Whitford, 1991, p. 109). The third ‘world’ represents a middle space that prevents ‘intercourse’ (Whitford, 1991). Yet there is something reflective about the concept of/or imagining of a third space here, that becomes explicable through a paradox of blind-sight, an Imaginary vision of what never takes place, let alone exists. This Imaginary place produces essence or the primary element of human consciousness.
Conception becomes a blind spot within the confusion of the mirror, buried under a necessity of procreation driven only by masculine genealogical lines and a coupling of the same. Whitford (1991, p. 109) explains:

Of the two elements involved in reproduction, the seed of the father (the idea) and the womb of the mother (the cavern itself), only the paternal element remains in the final scene. Of the primitive scene of giving birth, the paternal idea has incorporated both elements, and engenders, alone, copies, replicas, and shadows without any material aid. In the scene of the Intelligible, the woman’s genealogy has completely disappeared.

It is therefore Irigaray’s (1985a) reading that Plato’s myth creates a primal scene where man not only turns his back and walks away from the mother, but he does so from a womb that is paradoxically motherless. The consequences of the philosophical underpinnings of an essentialism of form are enormous not just philosophically but also socially, given that it signifies a patriarchy that is based on sameness, a phallic language/father/linguistic law that has appropriated modified and (re)sculptured (solidified) motherhood and childbearing. I say solidified at this place because language structure turns recognition into something that necessitates a singular ‘me’ child born of a singular mother that masks multiplicity and the shifting properties of fluidity.

For Irigaray (1985a), by inventing (re-enacting) an invasive replication and contorted configuration of the womb, Plato initiates/facilitates the disappearance of the mother and turns this primal scene into a scene of men, projected into scenes of earth, fire and shadows, sun and reflection, inclusive of replicas of men and objects. Men become transformed/transfixed without corporeal substance, fleeting wisps of justice and genealogy, adjusting an unsubstantiated gaze onto an elemental canvas of light, reflection and the father/God/sun. The cave manufactures statues, artefacts,
objects, yet the Forms apparently require no container and once liberated they exist alone. This is also an illusion.

The forms are contained simultaneously with the objects. Within the cave, the fire replicates/reflects the sun, the elemental mysticism of origin reflected from the visible countenance of the sun. Within Irigaray’s (1985a) interpretation of the myth, the sun replicates itself within the one fire, in what Irigaray describes as an artful turnaround of origin that sees the mother displaced/assimilated by the father. Fire is interpreted by Irigaray (1985a, p. 259) as becoming the sun’s “bastard son.” Within the shadow world, language continues to inscribe its meaning on these simultaneous dichotomous/inverse/same/different worlds.

Transformed into sounds which, once elaborated into language – whether in lexicon or syntax – will immediately be enslaved to the idea of verisimilitude. Thus sound’s only prerogative is to function as a relay station, a detour that is indispensible in guaranteeing the previous existence of the alētheia, which will henceforth take the command of all “beings,” including voices. (Irigaray, 1985a, p. 265)

The transition between the chained prisoners, passing through the duplicating effects of the wall/curtain/border/boundary/hymen/mirror to initiate/reflect a journey that replaces one origin with another, from the sensibilities of the body to a form appropriated through sound and orchestrated through discourse. It requires a forgetting of the almost forgotten, and a (mis)interpretation of the primary marks that precede Plato’s fire, Plato’s womb (in that it is language itself that demands yet denies primacy through its structure dictated by time, space, ‘syntax and lexicon’). These marks (traces) exist beyond the walls of the man-made cave, the boundaries that ensnare the shadow worlds, ghosts that fade into incoherence in conjunction with the movement of, air, of sound, of thought, of essence, alienating the
(unsignifiable) voices and (un)memories that culminate beyond western discourse. As Irigaray suggests, without her shadows, without memories, she “herself is without proper form for otherwise (she) would intrude on (her) own shape” (Irigaray, 1985a, p. 307).

From Irigaray’s (1985a) critique, I understand that the primacy of the mother is untenable; hence an (im)possibility for transcendence. The primacy of the Earth Mother, the Nymphs, the Muses, the Graces, the Fates are lost. Within the borders and the shadows of his colonised and specularised womb, there are (un)memories dormant within/beyond western language. As soon as man turns toward the source of the light, the shadows are lost and his confused upturned specular images come to the fore. Whitford (1991) notes, Plato denies birth and mortality.

As Irigaray (1985a, p. 308) explains “…it is certainly the mirror which, memory(less), forgetful of all traces and imprints, re-presents the image of all set before it” and although it appears to represent the ‘sensible’ as opposed to the invisible intelligible, the images that it represents are the specularised, smooth, disembodied, whole, contained images of man himself.

**A mirror double abyss**

Both the cave womb and the ‘real’ world double and represent twin reflective abysses as man falls from/or towards enlightenment back toward what might have once been his mother, or it is his son he falls toward. The further he plummets/rises, the more confusing and disorienting this fall becomes for him. He descends/ascends to the place where the son/fire throws the light and the shadows reflect the solidified objects, statues, effigies, upon which he gazes with an obsessive fetishism. By turning around toward the father, he turns away from the embodied maternal,
blocking his desire to return to the mother and to what his enlightenment and subsequent language deems as “repulsive naturalness” (Irigaray, 1985a, p. 311).

The turn to the father creates the illusion of Symbolic order and exposes a sanity built on corporeal disengagement: corporeal engagement becomes a dangerous endeavour, a practice of ‘morphological abuse’ (Irigaray, 1985a). To maintain consciousness/illusion, man must continue to pursue a truth that is becoming more and more focused on the one absolute truth, with a vision distorted by mirrors, glass and photographic images, things that manipulate and divert and replicate the sun’s rays (as within Schreber’s (1903/2000) phallic madness) and with them the images that they portray. One might say that such an engagement is becoming even more complicated with increased interconnection through technological advance.

The cyclical hierarchical ascendance toward the father translates as a movement towards sameness, an eclipsing of the other, the appropriation of shadows as fixed opposites of the objective, turned in a different direction and captured as opposite in a “photological economy” (Irigaray, 1985a, pp. 320-321). Such shadows become a necessary component of philosophical metaphysics yet simultaneously threaten its disruption. This is because they hint of something other than western ontology that contains a metaphysics allowing for nothing beyond yet nothing within. There is nothing beyond language: language exists ‘within’ or around and expands through essence beyond the body. The logic of a common reality becomes framed as a product of mass illusion or just another form of madness.

Each one progressively achieves the purity of his being only by coming out of the self, and above all out of “that living tomb which we carry about now that we are imprisoned in the body, like an oyster in his shell. (Irigaray, 1985a, p. 324)
Interlude: A short revision of care so far

The shadows viewed by those who are chained, are the shadows that can no longer be seen when the prisoners turn around to face the light. The shadows are cast behind them; do not exist. In hysterical terms, the shadows fall beyond the mask. When the prisoner turns around to face the light, he is facing the light shining from the face of the mirror, from God/Other. The reflection of the mirror encompasses the contents of the mask and ontology itself.

As a follower of Freudian theory and Rawlian justice, Kohlberg measures the morality of justice through a series of vignettes and finds that men measure higher than women in moral reasoning. Gilligan interprets his findings as women reasoning differently, but equitably. Does she momentarily glimpse the shadows of the reflection from the mirror? This is an hysterical question and its answer has no great bearing on the outcome of this inquiry. It would be fair to say that even if Gilligan did momentarily glimpse the shadows, justice was quickly restored to the masculine position, care becoming its subordinate reflection. Who would think that a quest for care would open up such grand philosophical questions of form, substance, existence, of existent, of subject and subjectivity? There now lays, between the two, Justice/subject and care/Other, the illusion of a gaping chasm, a womb world, carved from stone through specular invasion, where existent and existence chase the tail in a confusion of original directions. Considering the dangers of speaking or writing, the
hysterical daughter stands to the ‘side’ of commodified care, behind the caregiving daughter’s mask. She peers longingly down or up in the hope she may one day remember and ponders how on earth proponents of feminist care ethics could ever contemplate that ethical care was just a matter of reuniting them both or in other words, transcendence, but at what cost!? Yet the chasm into which we fall/rise/ go forward/backward, into which the Sphinx dissolves and reflects back is a distorted mirror, dichotomy, splitting registers, biologically consigning, empty signifiers, distortions, anamorphosis, active and passive.

Each encounter within phallic discourse leaves traces. The hysterical daughter now knows that she is wasting her time searching the reflection of the mirror within a mistaken sense of direction. She must turn away from the mirror and face her shadows. On the border, the hysterical daughter teeters, consumed by the anxieties of what she may possess, if only she could remember. Mothers and daughters become lost in a world of convoluted borders and boundaries, categories, containers, skin bags, unless perhaps, she can figure out a way to write herself and free herself from his distorted gaze. She sighs and dreams of Muses, Fates, Graces and Nymphs and what may lie between passivity and activity if we could just get rid of that pesky hyphen. She listens, “Did I hear voices?”
Figure 14. A typical ending.
Chapter Nine: Shifting shadows and impermeable boundaries

Ability or disability to move divides the world into the globalized and the localized...some inhabit the globe; others are chained to their place. (Bauman, 2000, p. 21)

In this chapter I consider the problems of confusing shadows with reflections and consider the boundaries, the borders and the walls upon which they are cast. Perhaps we should rethink what the shadows repress when framed as dark and awful places, dangerous, the dark side, phantasmic horrors, invoking fear, fear of the unknown or ineffable. The shadows have no form, we see them as reflective of image, as images of ourselves cast by light, mirror images of ourselves both front and back, one light, one dark, one positive, one negative, one good, one bad. The image we see toward the light, contains essence, enlightenment, God, brotherhood, assimilation, not her, not me, not the mother or the daughter, just men of no specific sex that speak their rote phrases of moral good, never hearing our voices, just the voices of righteous selves.  

In the image cast by light, the shadows represent traces of what we are ‘now’, like negatives, perhaps, if negatives are now fleeting moments captured by discourse. Because these negatives do not freeze the images of her, they move continually, fluidly, forming shapes of her fleeting moments of encounter before they are frozen in speech, images cast by texture and light.

We fear them, we are afraid of our traces, of dark, of evil, threatening, our primordial traces that language can no longer trap within walls. Primordial shadows that contain traces of mother-daughter encounter, an embodied care, the other jouissance, mother/daughter/other that were once speakable, perhaps. If reflective light casts assimilated images, then the shadows mark traces of difference, of
equitable sexual difference, of feminine, and of care in the form of the encounter that
the daughter seeks, a daughter caring for her mother, unspoken, an ineffable ethics of
care. Shadows are not just ‘ours’ they are collective traces of maternal connection.
They move, grow and never correspond to how we see ourselves in the mirror: the
less light, the more blurred those fleeting images become. Turn toward the light and
silence her shadows and her caring encounter, sexual difference and equitable
difference are lost. So which is more distorted: our reflections or our shadows? How
can we tell the difference between shadow and reflection as their traces appear on
walls, borders, containers and boundaries?

**Blurred shapes, shifting lines**

Although impermeable, borders are not exactly static, in that they expand and
family structures have linguistic safeguards to ensure they change with the times,
especially in light of their role in the forming of the social I, as discussed in Chapter
Two. Borders are often ‘performed’ or contested at different locations (McDowell &
Wonders, 2009; Wonders, 2006) and the strict rules surrounding entry and non-entry
become a little blurred, which is not surprising within a reflective encounter. For
example, within a paradigm of ‘reality’, airports and external affairs offices represent
a place of entry past a geographically assigned boundary, physically far removed
from such a site and the boundary gives the impression that there is something on the
other side of it. Salter (2010) suggests that in contemporary times permission to
cross these borders is no longer reliant on carrying the right paper work. Once upon a
time, travellers represented friendly visitors. They now become potential enemies
and often the right of entry hinges on a subjective decision made by border
protecting officials. Although we speak and write of clear rules of entry, this does
not appear to be the case. Both Freud (1977; Freud & Fliess, 1985) and Levinas (1998) inscribe a clear linguistic pathway to paternity and maternity that, in the context of critique within this thesis, requires the deletion of primordial senses, particularly those characterised as pre-oedipal and maternal. Borders described within the Symbolic are similarly exclusive, each providing their own set of encounters that either include or exclude: there is no in-between.

Within the Symbolic, borders therefore signify tricky invisible walls that are not located at the site of contestation (recognition). They are complicated constructions (such as Hays’ (1996) wall), like the rules around rite of passage and existence beyond them. For example, some boundaries mark where ‘no man’s land’ starts, such as detention centres for refugees and political detainees (Salter, 2010). Yet these spaces are still confined/defined by rules/boundaries, even if through the lack of them (McDowell & Wonders, 2009; Wonders, 2006).

Within contemporary discourses of border construction, there is increasing discussion on permeability. According to Wonders (2006), although there is a perception that globalisation has opened up the borders for the increased flow/migration of bodies in the form of corporatisation and tourism, this softening in restrictions is selective. Movement between borders has become particularly difficult for not only particular ethnicities, such as those from Middle Eastern countries in the wake of 9/11, but for poor and disenfranchised peoples, such as refugees who remain confined/chained within the borders of their own country (McDowell & Wonders, 2009).

Contemporary linguistic borders are challenged in multiple ways. The line between a fight for equity and terrorism becomes difficult to fathom at times, while contemporary boundaries within boundaries shift within ideologies of individualism,
responsibility and neo-liberalism (Wonders, 2006). For example, people are increasingly held responsible for their own health and the way they are perceived to negotiate this responsibility sets boundaries around health care entitlements (Galvin, 2002; Reiser, 1985).

Displaced borders upon borders stretch out toward the periphery as the void or no man’s lands that exist on the fringes of the Symbolic. Within discourse, geographical borders are filled with the displaced, borders away from borders. Displaced borders that manufacture ‘voids’ filled with displaced people, voids that are neither here nor there, locked within bodies that impede their passing. It appears that global flows of capital are not matched by global flows of bodies. The flow of bodies seems to be enhanced through financial worth. In other words, human capital takes on the same fake fluid consistency of money awarded to electronic global monetary transactions and its unique human essence. As highly skilled packages of human capital, bodies flow more easily through borders (Favell, Feldblum & Smith, 2007).

When portrayed as displaced/unwanted/risks to security, since bodies carry unwanted baggage, their movement becomes stagnated and borders close, unable to be passed. It would appear the borders of the multiple worlds within, around, in place of, or unconnected to the void, are contested features of the multiple womb worlds available to us through different theoretical pathways. These pathways tantalisingly offer access to memories of care, the other jouissance, and mother/daughter, yet, as the daughter has found, especially in the context of her journey toward her origin, they lead her in never ending misdirected circles. They hint at embodied encounter and care, but fade into specular containers, caskets,
where she no longer resides. Bodies cared for within the medical model, the selective bodies of patients, are not mothers.

The worlds, encased walls, dividing/reflecting the public and private appear to present a border drawn around the periphery of masculine consciousness/recognition. Our own borders and periphery are in question here. Yet on closer inspection, it is more likely that such a wall represents individual sites of contestation, of the ontological boundaries that skirt this particular western reality. The contestations that they highlight manifest as such things as work-life balance and a feminist ethics of care, care-justice and passivity and activity, displaced encounters of perceived origin. Boundaries contain particular peoples, yet so do boundaries hold in flesh and separate a reflective passive world from a positive one, depicted as solid as in Hays’ (1996) wall, free standing and self-maintaining. So do they also solidly contain the real, sound-proof walls that silence the voices and the murmurs of corporeal (un)memory banished from his kingdom.

So where is she/us and where can we detect her/our presence? In metonym, yes, within the reflective dichotomies of passivity and deficit, within theories of care as a deficit of justice, within the discourses of the post-oedipal mother, discourses that alert us to her presence through her explicit absence, implicitly trapped and unable to participate. In discourses of the private domain and written between the lines of contractual agreements dictating that women’s labour is worth less than men’s. She is threateningly present within discourses that abhor the permeability of boundaries, such as the water world of the Nymphs disappearing with the silencing of middle voice within individuation and monotheism, flowing rivers that at most now lay waste like the disintegrated ecosystem of a nuclear explosion and at least become the site of poetic lament.
So she manifests within a fleeting glimpse of the mortality of Nymphs and their reliance on the streams and rivers for prolonged existence. Dry up or restrict the flow of the rivers and the articulations that nourish their existence disappear, unable to be reconstituted within his blind spot, yet some may still or have once heard their voices, voices that babble within discourses of madness or hysterical psychosis given that madness is the only possible logical explanation for the loss of Nymphs. Moreover, while we grapple with our shadows, anxieties, our realities and our relationships, discourse continues to dam and poison rivers, creating boundaries for science to invade, inspect, chart and classify.

Bio-medical ethical boundaries

Weiss (1999) situates the scientific body (somatic) imagery as a specular portrayal of ontological boundaries carved up through cultural discourse into not only sex, gender, age ethnicity, disability but into many sub groups of which each particular body in its corporeal completeness can be divided and categorised through the use of endoscopy and internal imaging techniques. Weiss’s list gives an opportunity to discuss the inclusion of gender and with it to return to a discussion on essentialism and the socio-political. Can we frame the silencing of mother-daughter as the consequence of colonisation of the body, of the womb? Is there a silence of marginalisation, of invading borders, of invading and dissecting bodies, of gender and essentialism, empty containers? Should we ignore the similarities between socio-political displacement of people and the displacement of voice, of difference, of sex? The allocation of gender roles is a pressing fundamental question of consciousness and transcendence. Focus becomes a paradox: the clearer the boundaries, the less accessible the Real becomes and that focus, that essence, can only come from disengagement from the body. Each neatly compartmentalised component of Weiss’s
list becomes an issue for western discourse: each has a series of unacceptable corporeal components that mess with his ontological boundaries. Ethnic ontological differences must be dismantled and reconstituted without embodied components; age not only leads to responsibility, but a messy degeneration of the body, it destroys the smooth outer layer; physical disability distorts the body beautiful, an outer casing that encases nothing. As Woman enters into language we see her inscribed as an inferior man into a language of (different) sameness. Her colonisation is written into the language she is required to speak, her dissection into boundaries, her ownership, her relocation, her market value and the stripping and the sale of her assets. Ontological packages of ethnicity, age and disability, or varying amalgams all further compound her lack within western phallic discourse, or vice versa.

The scientific colonisation of the body is still progressing with even more powerful surveying tools made available by technological advances. Colonisation continues and reconstitutes because it is written into western discourse. Simms (2009) alerts us to another seemingly invisible biomedical environmental invasion of women’s bodies (rendered invisible by sameness) that threatens an already traumatised and damaged mother-daughter connection. A conversation with a colleague informs Simms that it is the breastfeeding child who is on top of the food chain and not the well formed physical portrayal of man displayed on glossy posters around her office. Simms (2009) is left wondering where the mother features in this chain: the mother is left out completely. Within a toxic world of residual poisons, placenta and breast milk are delivered, tainted with substances that threaten the physical and mental health of babies. Inside a projected solidified womb/world with impermeable boundaries, appropriated into Form, Man is poisoning his own placental corporeally disconnected lifeline and this is now physically poisoning the
(dis)connection between mothers and babies. According to Simms (2009, p. 265): “The image of the woman and her infant at the top of the food chain puts an intimate and personal question to women: can we still believe in an ethics that stops at the boundaries of our skins.” An ethics of difference for me is no longer separable from an ethics of care. To recognise care, her primary yet unmarketable caring encounter, we must acknowledge difference and not assimilate her uniqueness into his inadequacies and projected distorted images. Meanwhile, a reflective feminist ethics of care, with its liberal underpinnings of justice, strives to sustain a toxic, concrete, specular environment that is starkly unethical for women.

**A feminine corporeal ethics**

A feminine corporeal ethics is becoming much discussed within contemporary feminist writings. As Richardson and Harper (2006) suggest, there is need for ongoing discussion surrounding glaring differences between the disembodied contemporary biomedical ethics and an embodied feminine ethics that cannot equate to the findings of objective scrutiny.

According to Richardson and Harper (2006), corporeal feminism must be concerned with refuting portrayals of the medicalised feminine body and consider such a body as dynamic and integrated. In other words, championing the feminine body within the Symbolic is to critique the phallic maternal disengaged body dissected into anatomical parts, specularised by the scientific world. The latter, within discourses of psychopathy can be considered to fall under the jurisdiction of a contemporary techno-somatic ethics, where detailed inspection of classified body parts can be examined to explain psychosomatic symptoms (Pickersgill, 2009) through such ocular procedures as scanning.
For Cordelia Fine (2010), experimental sciences’ necessity to pinpoint difference in the brain functioning of men and women has led to an ill informed and badly substantiated collection of publications on the subject. In a critique of the available text on the differences in the brain functions of men and women, Fine suggests that in some cases, findings go beyond the capabilities of the technology employed and differences are interpreted beyond what available technology is capable of revealing. In scientific publications, finding no difference is not considered significant within the theory of scientific hypothesis testing, in other words, this is a non-result. For research to count, a difference must be found (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988). This suggests that the speculum still exists/observes through the invasion of women’s bodies in a search for differentiation. Science expressly accentuates differences, yet once these differences are extracted, ironically they are translated into a language of sameness that endorses deficit and lack.

**Colonisation of women’s bodies**

Although technology is obviously advancing in leaps and bounds, things appear not to have changed greatly from the days of Charcot in regards to neuroscience, where the continual snapping of photographic images were thought to provide answers to the wandering somatic symptoms of hysteria (although after Irigaray’s critique of Plato’s ‘hystera’, we are no longer clear whether the womb is wandering or being wandered in). And although the scientific world would deny the inscription of the body through discourse, it would also deny the inscription of the body through corporeal memory, given that both are unable to be observed. In scientific images, the body exists ontologically as a package of tightly contained flesh that is controlled by the centrality of the brain, yet corporeal feminism is able to theoretically expand this scientifically observed centrality to a corporeal re-centring
of abject, non-containable fluidity that harbours unspoken (un)memories of feminine blood relations. Indeed, it would be scientifically absurd to argue logically, as I read Irigaray doing, that the wandering psychosomatic symptoms of the hysterical woman were dynamically ebbing and flowing within a process of osmosis as metaphorically connecting within and around the imprinted memories of their mother, their mother’s mother, spaceless, timeless and non-linear.

Given that the corporeal memories of our mothers may not be always pleasant due to the situation of mothers’ bodies within phallic discourse, corporeal memories of encounter, recognition, sensibilities, touch, may be haunted by continuous splitting, widening gaps, western ideals regarding individualism, denigration, guilt, responsibility, rape, physical and verbal abuse. This is the way of the continuing scars of colonisation (the invasion of the spaces of women’s bodies) and it suggests to me that (un)memories do not remain undamaged, regardless of whether they pass through to perception. Like western ethnic invasion and colonisation, neither does the damage die and decompose with flesh. It becomes imprinted in encounter and touch, (in)visibly and uneasily detected in the widening/constricting gaps and tears in the fabric of the mask. Women are represented by a fluidity (Irigaray, 1985b) that is contained tightly within the confines of her borders. Indeed were it to leak, she may no longer be able to be viewed as a reflection, but appear as a primordial mother, a shadow who casts her own shadows, even if they appear monstrous frightening shadows lurking within the confines and containers of western discourse.

**Solidity, fluidity, and abjection**

Woman never speaks the same way. What she emits is flowing, fluctuating, *Blurring*. And she is not listened to, unless proper meaning
(meaning of the proper) is lost. Whence the resistances to that voice that overflows the “subject.” Which the subject then congeals and freezes, in its categories until it paralyses the voice in its flow. (Irigaray, 1985b, pp.112-113)

The real, I will say, is the mystery of the speaking body, the mystery of the unconscious. (Lacan, 1999, p.131)

There, I am at the border of my condition as a living being. My body extricates itself, as being alive, from that border. (Kristeva, 1982, p. 2)

For Irigaray, solidity (over fluidity) is embedded within Western language and theory (Irigaray, 1985b). Within masculine psychoanalytic theory, solidity/Other is projected through the expulsion of object a in the form of solid faeces by the baby within an anal phase of autoeroticism that produces himself in the form of a gift. According to Irigaray (1985b, p. 113), Freud and Lacan’s object a is not inclusive of such fluidity as “milk, luminous flow, acoustic waves…not to mention gases, inhaled, emitted, variously perfumed, of urine, saliva, blood, even plasma and so on.” Object a is solid through linguistic necessity: solidity is the desired state. When its form is altered, much like the addition of mimesis to masquerade, such a transition becomes disruptive. Irigaray asks how His object a can be defined in relation to fluids, given that the solidity and/or concrete is the desired state of language, thus requiring/desiring the transformation into solids.

For Irigaray (1985c), the quantifiable is enmeshed in western semantics in a way that allows for description of property and quantity, the solid and objective. Difference can only be inscribed as quantitative and not simultaneously autonomous and equitable. This limitation of inscription also eliminates exchange without trade as well as championing solidity over permeability and fluidity. Feminine fluidity is
solidified by its transformation to the ordered chaos of rationality; this includes the transcendence of the phallic mother to a state of objective reality, the phallic maternal disengaged body dissected into anatomical parts. Rationality therefore requires the existence of solid objects. Fluidity becomes a disruptive element within formal language, this disruption being discussed within feminine writings of the abject.

**Abjection**

Theories of the abject consider the fluid emissions from the body. Abjection according to Grosz (1989) refers to the expelling of mucus, tears, urine faeces and the like, or in other words anything distinctly wet and gooey that disrupts the smoothly contained individuality of the subject. Abjection is considered an expulsion of corporeality, seemingly a bi-product of the drives, remembering that in Freudian developmental theory, the anal stage sees the child producing faeces in a pleasurable exercise to please his mother. The smooth, signified outer of the unified body is disrupted by breaks that represent the erogenous zones, which trouble the Symbolic by bringing to consciousness the hidden corporeal. Conscious recognition of the body is troublesome because corporeality is disengaged within an entrance into language. What is left within the Symbolic is man’s engagement with maternal reflective imagery, haunted by a body that threatens non-existence.

Kristeva (1982) suggests that the horrors of abjection to ontology manifest in many ways, one of those being an aversion to dead bodies and the disgust over their degeneration, their decomposing leakiness (Grosz, 1989). Man is confronted with a mortality that is abhorrent in a language that promises infinity and then witnesses the blurring of his ontological boundaries as compartmentalised bodies becoming mingled, eventually returning to the elements that he exploits, is able to exploit,
given his superior ‘special’ status. This special status therefore slips away into an unconscious chaos of multiplicity, from whence his dubious conscious order has been established. It is the product of abjection in the form of the abject that causes such disruption. The abject does indeed become his object a, the focus of unsalvageable loss, lost in a babble of miscommunication, that, like the incest taboo censures his desire to return to a mother that takes up an unattainable position within his imaginary/projection. According to Kristeva (1982), the abject, the permeation that breaks through that smooth outer film that science labels skin represents, in a language that is formed around the comforts of solidity, shows the symbolic order up in all its frailty. Kristeva (1982) sees the danger to the Symbolic as a metaphoric manifestation of monstrous evil.

And let us not forget colonialism’s part in extracting mother figures from conquered cultures and framing them as devouring monster/mothers within the context of Christianity (monotheism), western philosophy and individuation.

**Interlude: Echoes**

So far, I hope I have suggested that unlike the stark individuation of western culture, the ancient depictions of Muses, Fates, Graces, Furies and Nymphs are autonomous yet inseparable: they intermingle. Within contemporary language the loss of this intermingling exists in tandem with loss of voice. When I say loss of voice, I mean that the voices continue but lose their meaning. Rote phrases mimic each other. The ‘voiceless’ continue to be dissected into categories, appropriated, labelled and invaded, invasions
within invasions of bodies. The Western individual ‘one’ takes over to the detriment of women, who exist only within terms of trade, a maternal economy. A casualty here is an ineffable bond between mothers and daughters that is represented in alternative form through the ambivalent maternal and contemporary discourses of care. We’ve talked about the periphery, the borders and the boundaries, that reflect and restrict consciousness through language structure, a medium that makes meaning out of nonsense. When language no longer incorporates the other, then babble ensues, the rote repetitions of psychosis.

To consider the voiceless occupiers of marginalised spaces, Spivak (1993) discusses how Freud ignores the existence of Echo, when he writes of Narcissus and narcissism. She reminds us of Freud’s encounters with borders and boundaries, his critiquing of ‘primitive’ and tribal peoples, how the creating of borders between peoples, the patronising categorising of peoples is discriminating and isolating. Yet as we already know, this is not Freud’s only act of discrimination. For Spivak, excluding the Nymph Echo from his discussion on narcissism is a major and discriminatory ‘oversight’.

Spivak (1993) is referring to the Roman poet, Ovid’s version of the story of Narcissus. For the purpose of this story, Echo, categorised as Nymph, was once known for her linguistic skill and her talkative engagement with others. While Jupiter/Zeus fraternised with other Nymphs, Echo would knowingly hold Zeus’s wife, Juno, in conversation so she would not suspect his unfaithful
behaviours. When Juno discovers this, she punishes Echo, by removing her conversational/communication abilities, or in other words, her free speech. All Echo can now do is repeat the last few words of other peoples sentences.

Narcissus meanwhile has his own tragic set of circumstances. A child of rape, he is the subject of another of Tireus’s prophesies: He is destined to live an untroubled life, totally enamoured by his own reflection. This blissful existence will only last while he is unaware of the truth. Echo falls in love with Narcissus, yet within the bounds of limited conversation and his self-love, Echo is rejected. She is so heartbroken that she wastes away. Her bones turn to stone and all that remains is ‘her’ repetitive echoing voice. Yet Echo does not form a pivotal part in Narcissus’ fate. This is done by another scorned lover and therefore, for Freud, it appears that Echo is an unnecessary part of the tale. He writes her out of the script and in doing so ignores a pathway to the understanding of woman’s silence. In other words, after her mode of communication is restricted (and she is singularly isolated within the script), enamoured, she echoes the words of someone who is only aware of himself. Yet this repetition, through the intricate structure of language as sense making cannot mean the same when the ends of sentences are uttered on their own. The impossibilities of communication here are complete.

For Spivak (1993), Echo offers an endorsement of Irigaray’s concept of mimesis in constituting Woman as a speaking subject.
Echo represents the restricted speaking position(s) of Woman. When there is no recognition, Echo represents Woman as object. When there is recognition and deliberate participation, then she speaks the language of oppression of her own accord, yet in its altered form that is not exactly what it is. She has a voice of sorts though repetition maims her meaning.

So Echo represents the possibilities of Woman as speaking being within the context of castration. The silencing of Echo also represents the silencing of the Nymphs/Muses, not only through her restricted voice, but also through narcissus’ appropriation of water as reflection or in other words the distortion of the gaze, blind sight or masquerade. Here she now appears singular. Echo’s silencing has some frightening connotations for the foundation of the Western speaking being. That the silencing of woman is part of a repetitive discourse brought about by the recognition of the Other. The requiring of constant probing and colonisation marginalises everything that doesn’t fit within a western epistemological framework. Such a framework continually chops, hacks, and severs, castrates and categorises, carving us up into smaller and smaller pieces as western science ‘progresses’. The periphery harbours the unspeakable, rejected through normative narration of distorted reality. The marginalising effects of colonisation cannot be linguistically separated from the objectification of women. And as women, we are inextricably tied into masculine genealogy as a reality, as a form of meaning
making; it is difficult to think past their debilitating effects (Spivak, 1988). Indeed, as I write about borders, I struggle with the boundaries that relate my own family genealogy with the colonisation of India, the very oppression that creates Spivak’s writing.

Echoes and mud puddles

So here I am reading Spivak (1988, 1993), arming myself with impressions of borders...and I have returned to a story of genealogy, my grandmother’s (paternal) story of her father as told to my mother. I am told that my great grandfather Frederick arrived in New Zealand with no stories of his past...with a silence that has reverberated through masculine genealogical blood lines, a severing of genealogy. Recently, while engaging with Spivak’s writings of Echo and the Subaltern, I am drawn to the mysterious family story. It seems that Frederick received letters from India. On searching the internet, I find a brief history of potters, tilers and brick works written in 1906. It goes as follows:

“Mr. Frederick Lampitt, of Messrs. Emeny and Lampitt, was born in London, England, in the year 1849, his father being then in the service of the east India Company. He was educated at the Hackney Grammar School, and at fourteen years of age was apprenticed to the Bombay Shipping Company. For many years he followed a sea-faring life, chiefly in large merchantmen, trading to all parts of the world. In 1875 he left the sea at Wellington, New
Zealand and became...”

I am thinking of the borders that enclose my great grandfather and his father and I’m feeling somewhat sick about their apparent entanglement with the colonisation of India and subsequently Aotearoa, New Zealand. I feel them enclosing and consuming, casting shadows, shadows of gloom and despondency, somehow threatening or encroaching on a web of alternative reality I have been busily writing for the last three years or more. I am feeling disempowered by this connection, yet fascinated, drawn back into His reality, his phallic Symbolic.

I wonder now about London in the mid-1800s, a place of some poverty with a burgeoning population; hunger, filth, stench, despair as part of a lived reality. A time that sent 14 year old boys to sea as merchant seamen. No longer a responsibility? A chance for a better life? I’m wondering also of Frederick’s involvement with the devastation of India and certainly that of his Uncle Charles, who died in the Siege of Delhi. It seems certain that Frederick was employed on the merchant ships of the East India Company and I’m thinking of how boundaries are written and spoken in terms of spatial borders that can be encroached upon, shifted, stormed. A violation of spaces, people, objects and I’m thinking of the interaction of these people/objects, the aggressors and the aggressed. I’m thinking of the children born within these circumstances, their own spaces encroached upon by exploding populations and western civilisation and I am wondering who the
oppressor is here, a fourteen year old boy? I am thinking of the children who were products of colonisation, ‘half castes’ born without spaces, unable to be admitted to either world and the borders, the labels that contain/silence them. The borders that become impermeable through the onslaught of financial gain and a language that orchestrates superiority and inferiority, that decides who can be heard and who cannot, that not only colonises land, beliefs, values and systems, but also encroaches on bodies. I’m thinking about how language must create boundaries first in order to invade them, the boundaries of bodies, women’s bodies that must not leak or show in any way that the skin that holds them together is not water tight. It acts as a veil to disguise corporeality. The boundary as such is not what language talks it to be. Bodies can be invaded; bodies can invade as objects. Bodies can pass through boundaries within specific circumstances. Invasion changes reality by reframing it within a language that cannot describe what is invaded. In this way language excludes: it marginalises. It places people within a periphery, a subaltern silenced marginalised object no longer included in the trajectory of the gaze, only as an object to be categorised, dissected, diagnosed, and described as different to, as singular, dichotomised and catalogued, present yet somehow missing.

So what of a mysterious man who breaks a genealogy through silence; a man who will not speak of his past. What of his silence? Where is it borne from, what does it represent; who does it
represent, why does this matter? How dangerous is it to question those who inhabit the periphery as to why the threat of distorted reality is momentarily broken? I suspect the ‘colonies’ are full of such questions, gaps, jagged boundaries, fractured people, spaces and places.

Stuck, sinking, barely moving through a congealing fluidity slowing down my progress; heavy, thick mud puddles. I put one word in front of the other in an effort to move forward. My words emerge, moving with some great effort, but I am still in the same place, like a recurring dream that I have, swimming in thick, drying mud...getting nowhere never moving, yet working so hard to go forward...trapped in mud. The strategies of hysterical enquiry have caught up with me, entangled me in their echoes. Where is the flow, where are the voices? I am writing to get my voices back...I am caught in the repetitive genealogies of the West, the pushing shoving invading, my voice becomes repetitive, echoes...I must remember mimesis...we have more than one voice, more than one position to write from even if they cannot hear each other.

It hasn’t relented for several days now trapping me, clouding my thoughts. The Nymphs I/we are in danger here of the waters drying up. Remember that our existence is dependent on the rivers, on the flow of water. A stagnant sticky pond is indeed a danger right now. It is time to unblock the dam, clear away the mud and let the water flow again, leave the deafening silences to themselves. They are his silences: that they sit around the edges of
invasion is significant, yes, but I must write past them, I must continue to flow again, yet not in synchrony. Rivers were never meant to be seen as flowing in just one direction.

How dare I bring these recorded memories from the past to the present and entangle them in my thoughts, my writing? How dare they close down the places I have been creating in the text, alternative realities on which to place us, ourselves as subject, not me as object...how dare they invade us...them, my ancestors...not related through blood...through the trading of men, genealogies that read ‘wife’s name unknown’? Whose genealogy is this that runs differently from my own scantily recorded bloodlines? It belongs to men; raping India, trading its treasures around the world, slaughtering its inhabitants, marginalising its people, creating connections, genealogies, children, children who belong nowhere in particular, children shrouded by silence...a deafening silence...arriving on the shores of another vulnerable country, another group of indigenous inhabitants fighting for a reality unspoiled by western thought...yet these people are themselves transformed into synchrony, forever brought from the past to the present...a continuous echoing history of tragedy...a history of silences...if I could only step out of the script, out of ate, like Antigone. I keep writing.

And sure enough, the words begin to flow again, soothing and exhilarating...the voices are returning...no longer an object but a living feeling being...with a corporeality that endangers
Disturbing leakage

The abject represents something monstrous that threatens man’s consciousness, something fluid and this becomes apparent in representations of the leakiness of a woman’s maternal body, the body of the mother, in language. The threat of the monstrous manifests in fears of consumption and annihilation as portrayed by the *vagina dentata* (Ussher 2006), a recollection of mythological dread of the vagina represented by teeth and stories of the devouring of the phallus. Such dread, according to Ussher (2006), manifests from the leaking of menstrual blood. Depictions of the slaying of gaping mouthed dragons, their throats pierced with arrows, by a knight displaying his phallic prowess are suggested by Ussher as being representative of such a dread. Kali, a Hindu goddess, is often depicted with a *vagina dentata* (Ussher, 2006), a nurturing and devouring (intensive, smothering) mother. It appears that within the context of her origins, Kali is much maligned by western interpretations. She is beautiful and terrible and there is no question of her mothering skills within the context of her origin. Curran (2005) suggests that Kali has been appropriated by Christianity and its overpowering monotheism. Kali has been extracted from a different set of articulate realities and portrayed within western cultures as a satanic, devouring, evil, toothed mother.

Meanwhile, oblivious to the representations of smothering devouring evil mother, a daughter grows in her mother’s womb, shares her mother’s blood and is nourished by her mother’s body through the placenta that connects the two of them in a dependent if not invasive relationship if spoken within contemporary language.
structure. Ingestion however, appears within discourse as an invasive opposite to growth, a ‘return to’ or perhaps an ‘away from’ within phallic discourse, a false dichotomy that relates it to annihilation as language suggests. Irigaray (2008) suggests that man has linguistically created another real placenta that he clings to as a substitute for the maternal origins of the Real (that constitutes chaos and confusion in regard to an inaccessible mother, maternal, uterine), thus the constitution of the real mother as the orchestrator of monstrous and destructive ingestion.

Once born, the daughter receives milk, fluids from her mother’s breast (through abjection); they share an (im)possible unspeakable multiplicity. They encounter one another within sensuality, recognition, a perception of shared corporeality that initiates growth and maintains life. One does not consume the other to a point of annihilation as language and philosophy appears to signify, but initiates a consciousness at odds with the Symbolic and it’s aligning synchronic. They ebb and flow within a corporeal fluidity (Irigaray 1985b) that forms the basis of his monsters, his ghosts, unspoken connections between mother and daughter that are broken on utterance, the senseless ranting of his soul, born from an alliance with God, that linguistically formulates a war against the corporeal devil. This is the encounter that (un)signifies an ethics of the feminine. If it is possible to undo ethics from the masculine genealogy that informs ontological philosophical theory and practice, then language breaks a bond.

Historically, theoretically, mother and daughter connections are not able to be spoken as engaged corporeality and our encounters fall within the discursive bounds of abjection; not only because they can be considered both leaky and consumptive, but because of the necessary rejection of corporeal memory by the Symbolic and the disruption of particular erogenous zones associated with heterosexual practices of
sexuality and child rearing. The most compelling emphasis for mother-daughter within the sharing of the abject is that they (un)exist in language in a fluid ebbing and flowing. Therefore, although Ussher’s (2006) work would seem to be more concerned with the abject that blights his visual field as a disruption of the one, such as the visual spillage of blood, spit and mucus, I am more concerned with the unseeable spillage, the unwritten, the unspoken, from which the projection of monsters may very well stem: this framed within the paradoxical projection of primary shadows and (un)remembered (un)memories.

I want to consider the feminine from beyond ontology perhaps but not beyond consciousness. Not from within a socio-political stance for equity but from a place within language that opens and closes, within an ebb and flow of mother/daughter relations as Irigaray (1985b) has suggested that does not work in continuum with his symbolic consciousness (but permeates his ontological boundaries), although it is orchestrated by the trauma his consciousness of individuation creates. It flows within a diachrony, is not fettered in time, space or lineage.

When the gap is widest and the split mother-daughter washes through his consciousness as his projected phallic mother, she solidifies, is unheard, corporeal (un)memories are inaccessible to her, they become Symbolic monsters, his ghosts, the haunting of a corporeal banished from language as a necessity for transcendence, the possibilities of his slip from consciousness. When the gap is closest she remains in a consciousness within his Symbolic, a place that would constitute unconsciousness in language and the ghosts that she manifests lurk within unarticulated (un)memories that struggle to be spoken within the Symbolic as anything other than symptoms of delusion and hysteria.
This is a corporeal feminine that floats timelessly, invisible shadows, merging within an embodied not one, incorporating a silent encounter broken, at times, only by utterance. Western philosophical encounter requires an ethical recognition that sees through his solidified boundaries, boundaries that she is able to permeate in moments of silences, when the gap closes or opens. Experiences of the real take on the projected persona of monsters inexplicable yet solidified within His symbolic. Reflections are cast by solidified statues, artefacts, objects of metaphysics. Symbolically available corporeal ethics are unable to surmount the boundaries imposed by medical science. Science continues to explore the feminine body, observing, mapping and naming, evaluating the object, oblivious of the subject, the corporeal, fleshy, blurry fluidity, seeping with corporeal memory that is unable to be observed. Yet although it may not be able to be seen the question remains, can corporeality, the mother-daughter lost connection, be visually/linguistically represented through a timely return to her shadows? Within Plato’s cave, the shadows line the wall, the borders of the colonised womb, forgotten and unseen. From traversing Irigaray’s work the daughter(s) has/have now turned to face the shadows and considered the properties of borders. In the next Chapter, I extend the boundaries of the daughter’s scope of inquiry yet again with the introduction of Ettinger’s matrixial borderspace as opening pathways through the wall into uniquely feminine spaces where care resides.
Chapter Ten: Borderspace: Texture, light and shadow

Matrixial trans-subjectivity host moments of co-emergence in-differentiation that organize their own time zone - a matrixial bordertime. The metamorphic psychic net is created by, and is further creating – together with, and induced by matrixial affects – relations-without-relating on the borders of presence and absence, among partial-subjects, and between them and their trans-subjective-objects (subjective-objects in the sense of Winnicott) and selfobjects (in the sense of Kohut). Ettinger, 2006a, p. 220)

Through its movement, they draw together. As air is to the echo of a voice, so is the gaze to painting: dynamic medium. (Massumi, 2006, p. 205)

In the last chapter, I considered borders, boundaries, empty categories, containers, and echoes. I discussed how colonisation of bodies assimilates difference and masks care. The daughter knows that she now must traverse the borders to find a space that accommodates sexual difference, a uniquely feminine space where care, the other jouissance and mother/daughter encounter can be found. If she could find a pathway beyond his consciousness, where her lost encounter takes place then she may be able to remember it at last. To accommodate the daughter’s shifting questions, I introduce Ettinger’s matrixial borderspace in an effort to once again, extend the daughter’s scope of inquiry.

Within this chapter, the daughter continues her search for a feminine unconsciousness/consciousness, away from the masculine transcendental light, principally through the gaps created through reading the work of Bracha Ettinger (1997, 2004, 2006a, 2006b) and Luce Irigaray (1985a, 1985b, 1999). Through Ettinger’s work, I explore a matrixial borderspace theorised as a uniquely feminine space/matrix that contains the missing other jouissance, the mother’s phantasy,
prenatal incestuous encounters and traces of the archaic mother/Other. Being drawn
into Ettinger’s work, I am nevertheless troubled by the linguistic restrictions
involved in constructing a womb world and a difficulty to protect the matrix from
phallic discourse once translated from canvas to page. The impossibility to rid
ourselves of castration particularly concerns me as a specular reflection, distorting
the other jouissance and mother-daughter encounter. Ettinger offers a uniquely
feminine space, a safe third where connections between women can be maintained.

**Emerging from the canvas: Shadow and light**

Bracha Ettinger is an international artist, clinical psychologist and
psychoanalyst who presents a convincing argument for the inclusion of a matrixial
borderspace within mainstream psychoanalysis. She calls principally on Lacan’s
later work, Freud, Klein’s Object Relations Theory, Winnicott’s (1953, 1975) pre-
birth minimal recognition and Levinas’ (1978) ethics of encounter. Ettinger’s work
draws on Levinas to provide an ethics through his recognition of woman’s difference
in his theorising of alterity (Ettinger, 2006b; Pollock, 2006) and a responsibility to
the Other as evoking compassion. Levinas’ ethics of compassion incorporates
humanity as a shared responsibility and questions how extreme suffering could
possibly be inflicted in the name of a ‘greater good’ (White, 2012).

An Israeli of German descent, Ettinger makes a rich contribution to a small
body of literature that explores feminine oppression and to a wealth of philosophical
theory battling to help explain the (un)imaginable atrocities humanity is capable of
committing. and the aftermath of traumatic consequences such actions produce.
Massumi (2006, p. 211) explains that “[a]s an Israeli, the communal trauma under
whose shadow Ettinger works is the Holocaust.”
As an artist, Ettinger employs a complicated procedure to suspend time, messing with the linear properties of history. Massumi (2006) describes Ettinger removing partly run photocopied historical, art, pre-Holocaust familial, and unknown images from the photocopying machine, the blurred part-copies no longer representing what/when/who they were nor what they would have been if the copying process had been completed. The images become suspended *somewhere in-between*. The suspended image and its texture are a feature of Ettinger’s work that emerges/fades through a prolonged labour of multiply overlaid oil paint and copy toner that gives it textural depth and a hint of translucency. “What is presented is less the image than the sensation of its remaining in its fading” (Massumi, 2006, p. 202).

Ettinger’s (2006b) work confuses the phallic gaze, allowing for a unique feminine gaze that accesses lost corporeality. The grainy texture reveals a process of metramorphosis.

Through metramorphosis, grains are entwined in severality with no central control. The artwork is created during a process that is passive in part and active in part, so no particular separate grain has control over the gaze, nor suffers its absolute loss either. (Ettinger, 2006b, p. 116)

The gaze transforms within a matrix of metramorphosis and trans-subjectivity. Metramorphosis “knits” the matrix, and it is my understanding that it is theoretically devised from Lacan’s concept of sinthome (an archaic derivative of symptom: Man is the symptom and his phallic reality is the psychosis) introduced in his later seminars. Metramorphosis becomes the feminine embodied ‘substance’ that holds her matrix together, just as the phallus and its chain of signifiers is held together by a castration complex and the reality such a combination weaves. This creates what Ettinger (2006a, 2006b) refers to as a transgressive metramorphosis that
opens up a pathway for trans-subjectivity as a basis for mother-child pre and postnatal relations.

**Filling the void within the texture of the canvas: A gap in the genealogy of care**

Ettinger (2004) suggests that within phallic discourse, there is a distinct void between procreation and care, detached by an unoccupied space. According to Rank (1959), within myth, women’s role is ‘limited’. For Ettinger, these limitations are understated. Birth and its preceding sex act becomes an animalistic encounter with the care required by the mother disconnected from its embodied beginnings (Ettinger, 1994).

According to Ettinger (2004, p. 69), the void is the missing third vacated by what she frames as the archaic m/Other. I read this vacated third as the same kind of space which is appropriated by Rank’s (1959) birth of the hero-genius (Ettinger, 2004; Rank, 1959). I pause here to consider Rank’s suggestion that genius was originally a Roman word linked to reproduction and genealogy, His Hero/genius thesis, enables the rise of the hero/father/son/God and the repression of the womb/birth/mother into absence. I also note the connection of Rank’s Hero/genius thesis with the predominance of bird women in the telling of ancient mythology, such as in the tale of Kalevipoeg (Kreutzwald, 1982), where the heroine and her sisters are hatched from an egg.

Ettinger (2004) stresses Freud’s endorsement of the disappearance of the womb for the normative development within a denial of origin. According to Ettinger (2004), for Freud, the disappearance of the womb is necessary to protect the narcissism and ego development of little boys ensuring women are denied gestation and childbirth as an exclusively feminine experience. One might add here that Freud
did not do a great job of protecting the little boy’s narcissism in light of later interpretation demonstrated in Soler’s (2006) interpretation of Lacan’s masquerade where his masochism facilitates his phallic jouissance.

According to Ettinger (2004, 2006b), Lacan’s earlier work does not engage with Freud’s acknowledgement of the womb, instead emphasising castration and lack, the inevitably unobtainable object of desire designated as object a. As Rank’s (1959) hero-genius is born without the aid of a womb in the maternal sense, Woman as excess or embodied, exists in the void of the Thing (das ding). Ettinger (2004, p. 71) suggests however, that psychoanalysis should consider the m/Other within the field of poetics as a place of encounter between partial subjects, reinstating the womb and with it the archaic m/Other, separated from the thing.

Memory traces circulate in the trans-subjective zone by matrixial affects, frequencies and intensities – which I have named the erotic antennae of the psyche – that disperse different aspects of jouissance and of traumatic events between me and the other who thus becomes ‘my’ intimate anonymous partner and inscribe them along psychic matrixial paths and strings that have been opened by each particular borderlinking between ‘I’ as partial-subject and ‘non I’ as it’s archaic m/Other that, encountered in the Real of the archaic ongoing encounter-event, will become the always-already forgotten yet forever unforgettable and looked-for originary aesthetic environment. (Ettinger, 2006a, p. 220)

Event-encounter then becomes a daughter’s encounter with her primordial mother within an aesthetic poetic feminine space, the traces of which link the daughter and her mother diachronically.
The phallic gaze

Within Lacan’s earlier work generated through his reading of Freud, the feminine is articulated through castration, paternal prohibition or bodily pleasure (Rose, 1982). The phallus is the primary signifier, the first in a chain of signifiers and there is a gap between the signifier and the ‘signified’ within the Symbolic. As Lacan’s (1999) work progresses, he suggests by Seminar XX that phallic discourse ensures there is no sexual rapport between Man and Woman, given her status of object, commodity, phallus, reflection and ultimately, absence. Lacan (1999) introduces the concept of the other jouissance, unobtainable in the Symbolic, although Ettinger (2006b) suggests that the other jouissance still confines Woman to phallic discourse. In other words, the other jouissance is still assimilated and confined to the phallic das ding and Woman is still an object of exchange within phallic discourse and designated as object a through inaccessibility and absence.

Yet for Ettinger, the non-existence of woman and the existence of the other jouissance, gives permission to theorise a possible (sexual) rapport within a different mode of communication that exists before discourse, the oedipal complex and therefore castration. Given that it is Lacan’s thesis that lack of rapport stems from equivalence, or assimilation, then equitable non-equivalence allows for a rapport (Ettinger, 2006b). Within the medium of artwork, non-equivalence allows for or is the effect of another gaze, a matrixial gaze accessed through the artist’s clever use of light.

The artist’s gaze

Ettinger’s (1997) matrix is revealed through a prism, one that refracts light that does not reflect and distort in a specular manner. Therefore, the filtering of light through a prism has different reflective properties than that of the phallic gaze.
Through the artist’s harnessing of light, the borderspace has its own altered/suspended time and space, which is not linear as is the chain of signifiers generated by the phallus. Light and Ettinger’s altered time and space ensure that the matrixial gaze becomes primarily different from the phallic gaze, refuting Freudian (1977) framing of femininity as the Dark Continent. In other words, Ettinger’s prism lights the darkness without denying the shadows. Artwork is dependent on shadow for its depth. Within this altered time and space, the matrix produces knowledge that is (un)thought and (un)remembered within a place weaved through (un)memories that are conducted through an ever changing network of psychic strings, traces revealed through the artists loving work and the matrixial gaze (Ettinger, 2006b).

Although within reality the phallic gaze distorts, it distorts differently as it interacts with art. The artist portrays her unconscious interpretations, not necessarily a reflection of the gaze. Ettinger (2006b) suggests the possibilities of the artist reproducing images from a matrixial gaze, from a different sphere, driven by a different set of phantasies revealed by Freud (1919/1955). For Ettinger, the painter reveals his gaze within a unique sex difference. Art produced by woman can reveal a gaze generated from a matrixial borderspace, a space that harbours traces of the mother’s phantasy, jouissance, as well as prenatal encounters of part objects.

The borderspace and its feminine body primacy are born from sexual difference in that aspects of the subject to be and the mother’s phantasies are linked. The feminine in the matrixial paradigm is not opposed to the femininity in the phallic paradigm, neither is it derived from what language posits as femininity’s superior binary, masculinity. The difference is primordial. The archaic mother is repressed through castration and then assists in driving desire as the lost object. Object a becomes a lack, as in the linguistic value of the phallus. Language therefore
excludes traces of the archaic mother. The archaic mother remains in the Real as her primary location, unable to be signified. Ettinger (2006b) suggests that Lacan’s Real exists within a hole in the Symbolic and within this hole/womb/matrix the archaic mother remains hidden from signification. Object a, as the primordial/archaic mother, is representative of a corporeal psychic trace left from banishing corporeal events through an unachievable link between signifiers and the signified. As in keeping with the later Lacan, object a becomes a primary source of some sort of unthought known. For Ettinger therefore, prenatal communications with the archaic mother is the prime site for ‘examination’ for a uniquely feminine sex difference, a difference beyond the phallus and not opposite or symmetrical to the phallic difference for men. This site exists outside/before a phallic binary/of dichotomy and as this site is imbedded in womb phantasy, it is also the place where feminine desire originates (Ettinger, 2006b).

**Womb phantasy and the mother’s phantasy**

The matrix as a site of phantasy is not based solely on Freud’s acknowledgement through exclusion as suggested in her critique of Rank’s hero/genius (Ettinger, 2004). For Ettinger (2006b), it is also endorsed by Freud’s (1919/1955) thesis that the womb is the origin of uncanny experiences.

There is a joking saying that ‘Love is home-sickness; and whenever a man dreams of a place in the country and says to himself, while he is still dreaming: ‘this place is familiar to me, I’ve been here before’, we may interpret the place as being his mother’s genitals or her body. In this case too, then, the unheimlich is what was once heimlisch, familiar; the prefix ‘un’ [‘un-’] is the token of repression (Freud, 1919/1955, p. 245).
When a place never before visited seems familiar, then this familiarity relates to pre-birth. The familiarity is with the mother and his surroundings within her body that Freud discusses playfully through the words *heimlich* (familiar/ free from fear) and *unheimlich* (unfamiliar/fearful).

Ettinger (2006b) suggests that in this observation, Freud has identified a source of phantasy that may produce another complex that is not castration complex. For Ettinger (1997, 2006a), matrixial phantasy becomes an interwoven matrix of intra-uterine phantasy, mother’s traces of past encounters as well as the phantasies born from minimal transgressive encounters with partial objects that intertwine as the origins of the other jouissance. In a phallic paradigm, both matrixial and phallic phantasies inclusively emerge as anxiety through the repression of castration. Matrixial phantasies, as primarily originating pre-birth from the matrix, only become frightening within the phallic paradigm and their inevitable repression and assimilation.

**Me-not me**

The matrix/womb world is a living organism of primary pre-birth encounter, yet Ettinger (1997) highlights that within classical Freudian interpretations of subjectivity, there is no recognition of pre-birth. Contemporary psychoanalytic theory suggests that the formation of the subject, or the recognition that there is a difference between self and Other occurs in the oral stage of development. There is no acceptance or even acknowledgement of pre-birth differentiation. Indeed, through Object Relations Theory, encounters with the good and bad breast are crucial to developing subjectivity in the oral stage. Pleasure reflects to fusion and displeasure to separation and denigration (Ettinger, 1997).
The possibilities of a pre-birth differentiation, however, have been considered within mainstream theory, where it is distinguished from recognition. Ettinger (1997) questions whether recognition is established only after birth. She draws on Winnicott’s (1975) suggestion that phantasy life begins toward the end of pregnancy within a minimal ‘me’ sensation, implying prenatal recognition between the mother and the child. Winnicott surmises that any hint of ‘me’ must be accompanied by ‘not me’. Ettinger reframes this as ‘I’ and ‘not I’ in a shift from a minimal recognition of differentiated objects to partial subjects. This is an important philosophical shift. In my understanding, ‘me’ does not necessarily require differentiation from the mother within the paradigm of Winnicott’s (1953) work. He suggests, for example, that the first experiences of ‘me’ may include parts of the mother, as in the breast, but there is no recognition of ‘not me’ at this stage. Certainly, within Levinas’ work, that Ettinger draws upon for an ethical responsibility, ‘me’ is produced through recognition of the Other and a decentring of I on entrance into the Said. ‘I’ within Lacanian terms is either a primordial shatteredness of I, an imago that evolves into a social I, a specular image of the self as whole when in effect, the self is a conglomeration of reflected imagery. Ettinger’s shift from me to I possibly circumnavigates an impasse involving Winnicott’s ‘me’, Levinas’ ‘me’ within a metamorphic ‘intra-action’ between partial object-subjects. In effect, the Borderspace is enabled within what I might describe as a mediation, taken up through Ettinger’s (2006a) suggestion of psychic strings running between the ‘pole’s’ of I/not I. This reframing draws on available theory and language structure that paradoxically enables prenatal interaction between mother and child by differentiating between the two.
For Ettinger, (2006b), Winnicott’s (1975) consideration of pre-birth encounter within mainstream psychoanalysis, is not the only hint of pre-birth communication that emerges from Kleinian Object Relations Theory. According to Ettinger (1997), Bion (1962/1988) entertains the concept of inter-uterine communication of emotions. Meltzer and Williams (1988/2008) engage with Bion’s suggestions and considers foetus awareness of exterior others and relations to the placenta as credible. Tustin (1990) expounds the necessity to consider the psychological state of the pre-birth mother to understand early childhood pathology, particularly autism. In consideration of these published works that hint at pre-birth relations, Ettinger (1997) suggests that psychoanalysis, having already explicitly embraced Greek mythology and poetic phantasy, should be receptive to a theory of matrixial pre-birth relations. I wonder, if Ettinger is claiming consent to stretch the connective boundaries of theoretical creativity here or do I detect a hint of irony?

For Ettinger (1997), minimally discerning co-emergence of I and not I initiates in the borderspace, where the archaic phantasy of infants is inseparable from minimal contact with the female body specifically in the Real. The Real, within the paradigm of the borderspace/other jouissance, becomes the primary site for the assembling of joint partial hybrid objects and the affects and information exchanged and transmitted through border links between partial subjects. Thus, a relation becomes possible.

**A womb with a view?**

Although Ettinger’s (1997, 2004, 2006a, 2006b) borderspace exists with, prior to, and separate from the signifying chain of the phallus, the One that shapes reality through language structure, there are questions to consider. How can the borderspace be articulated as a standalone feminine unconscious, untroubled by
phallic discourse when articulated through mainstream theories of psychoanalysis? Can the hysterical daughter find her lost encounter here, can she remember? Is care here? Can the artists gaze be theorised within the medium of mainstream psychoanalysis and phallic discourse? Answering these questions may well require a reshuffle of the function of language structure, a series of transitions that evoke spaces, gaps, voids to be filled with reality. The theorising of a space within a discourse paradoxically isolates and packages at the same time. I am wondering if it is only painting that can ‘articulate’ Ettinger’s borderspace; do theories critiquing and articulating painting, poetics, art lead us back to yet another ‘empty’ specular void requiring transcendence and (un)memory? Certainly, within mainstream Lacanian discourse, alternative reality can be formed through writing, even if one of the metaphorical rings of the knot representing the Real, Imaginary and Symbolic are severed. There is still a human essence that can be written through a careful crafting of phallic discourse to unite unrelated words and alternative realities, within the structural paradigm of phallic discourse. Is this a theoretically safe environment for a matrix that emerges and fades through the shadows on the canvas into a written theory of matrixial metramorphosis?

The matrix is intra-uterine. It represents the Real in that it is embodied, and although it is called the womb, it is not the womb (Ettinger, 2006b), just as the phallus is not a penis. The matrix champions the womb within a diachronic unconscious as a primary signifier within non-linear strings of signifiers, metonymy connected to make meaning through embodied, primary unique femininity. The matrix exists within a paradox of properties previously unable to be theorised/spoken together. Because the matrix is primary, both in the sense of the womb and its creation in art, phallic discourse struggles with its inclusion, possibly because the
womb has already been colonised and art remains better protected from the gaze and restrictive inscription. Is the matrix a shadow, a reflection or a parody within the context of discourse? The matrix is explicitly named as a ‘not womb, a ‘not’ replica. So what is it? If it is what it purports to be, then should it not be ineffable? The matrix contains care and the other jouissance: care is not confined to the same container as his desire for the mother. In Ettinger’s paradigm, the ‘uncanny’ or perhaps the uneasiness of being unable to remember, such as Baraitser's experiences with her son, are traces of embodied (un)memorable encounter that is exclusively hers. Yet, through the restrictions of language structure, they are tucked away in a safe container and appropriation is already complete.

In its embodied primacy, the womb and its traces are Real. As a primary non-linear signifier, the womb initiates a diachronic matrixial unconscious interconnection. The Real permeates the unconscious structure as non-abject. The matrix contains a feminine desire within an all-encompassing context of Freud’s ‘uncanny’ womb phantasy and a prenatal incestual intra-uterine pleasure born from prenatal minimal perception that is a combination of both the mother’s own primordial traces and the child’s phantasies. This desire is differentiated from the masculine object a through Ettinger's (2006b) clever analysis of Freud and Lacan and the help of Winnicott, Bion (1962/1988), Meltzer and Williams (1988/2008) and Tustin’s (1990) recognition of prenatal communication and the child’s vulnerability to the mother’s emotional state. Yet although different from masculine desire, once spoken, assimilation again seems assured. The prism alters time and space, suggesting properties that can distort the real/Symbolic order in that time and space are Symbolically inscribed creations. My interpretation is that the prism disrupts the gaze sufficiently to initiate the change in paradigm or create access to the matrix,
that space between birth and care that according to Ettinger (1994), Symbolically no longer exists.

The prism becomes a metaphor to reconstitute the phallic gaze into another (primarily) morphological trick of light. In light of Irigaray’s critique of Plato’s Cave, there are questions generated as to the origins of the light that morph/refract the feminine gaze to see what is not Real, yet not phallic. Does the light originate from the archaic m/Other as within the womb (principle signifier) that generates the matrix and enables the matrixial gaze (which it can do ‘differently’ for men and women free of the oedipal complex), just as the phallus generates the mirror that distorts and claims the empty phallic womb? We know that although light is a necessity for the gaze, perception often forms through the placement of shadow. Perhaps this is a difference between theory and painting the canvas. The primordial shadow may represent/be present within the latter, free of an ethics concerned with essence, justice and care. Yet the shadows of the written womb still represent a reflected splitting of essence/soul from the body.

**Contextualising the matrix**

It is possible then, that the linguistic replication of what can be portrayed on the canvas may inevitably become another reversed/conversed, inside/outside womb world that phallocentrism produces with monotonous regularity. For example, primordial traces, pre-birth phantasy of the mother and Freud’s uncanny and (un)memorable womb phantasy seem inextricably intertwined (as is the structure of the matrix) within the borderspace. It is difficult here to believe in the primacy of the matrix in written form, when Freud has already speculated on and contributed to its contents as has the long-suffering mother of Donald Winnicott, purported by Doane.
and Hodges (1995) to have inserted herself into a feminist genealogy of maternal subjectivity.

Winnicott and Freud are not the only theoretical inclusions that I find troubling. Lacan’s sinthome has been interpreted by Harari (1995) as a medium for writing the Law of the Name of the Father, within a structural context of diachronic connection. When one of the rings of the knot breaks, the substance, essence of what defines Man, steeped in the structure of phallic discourse remains. Alternative realities can be written and madness can be strung together with perfectly formed sentences, thus holding the psychotic subject together and warding off a breakdown into aphasia and submergence into unconsciousness and the Real. Sinthome as an ideological and Symbolic basis for a matrix, is therefore particularly troubling to me in that Man’s madness, enforced through language within a theory of unique feminine difference, surely intertwines itself into the texture of reality that we might consider in the same light as Schreber’s (1903/2000) memoirs. Woman creates her own distorted reality that is not free from the oppressive madness of the phallus. Moreover, if phallic discourse is the only medium from which to write a theory of feminine difference, then it is foolish to ignore those who have employed some discursive tricks in the past, such as Irigaray (1985a) and Spivak (1993), to upset his gaze. This may well be a difficult assignment, when art and creativity, have been already been appropriated by Lacan (1997a) as an outlet for desire within the categories of catharsis and abreaction.

For Ettinger (2006b), the matrixial borderspace cannot be read as a parody of its phallic counterpart, in that it is a tightly reasoned serious contribution to mainstream theory. She suggests that: “In the phallic framework, hysteria, disguise,
masquerade, and parody or revolt are subjectivizing responses on the part of women to men’s definition of female sexuality” (Ettinger, p. 183).

Yet parody should also be considered as a serious methodological tool to exact a conscious voice free from the limits of the gaze. Hysteria, disguise, masquerade and revolt are unconscious responses that in Lacanian terms, there is nothing beyond. Moreover, Irigaray (1985a) argues that women have no subjectivity of their own; therefore a subjectifying response if it is possible, if women are recognised and their encounters remembered. I suspect that the subjectifying response within parody is to emphasise the impossibilities of a subjectifying response and the inevitability of an objectifying response.

Without parody, there are parallel similarities within the very structure of the matrix to his appropriated womb world that we might have suspected conscious if Ettinger had not already warned that parody was not possible in relation to the matrix. Yet despite her insistence to the contrary, bearing in mind that parody is an unconscious response within the paradigm of Ettinger’s work, the matrix becomes a specular parody of the phallic womb that is a specular parody of the matrix within the context of a subjective response. Irigaray (1985a) has already framed the combination of womb, light and shadow as a misdirection of origin through the properties of discourse within her critique of Plato’s cave. The matrix represents a replica of replication and differently filters the already filtered gaze through another prism, refracting the reflected within yet another altering of perception and direction.

Because replication, parody and mimesis are phallic in their inscription, the matrix dismisses parody in an effort to avoid assimilation. Yet replication in itself is capable of subverting phallic inscription. Mimesis and parody are ably demonstrated by Irigaray (1985a), enacting a voice from beyond masculine consciousness.
Spivak’s (1993) telling of the story of Echo also suggests that replication may include a hidden voice. Repeating the end of someone’s sentences does not regurgitate the same meaning but invokes subtle changes, suggesting that even strict adherence to syntax and grammar can give women a (different) voice of sorts within the context of parody and mimesis. For me, the similarities of the womb worlds are reflective of their theoretical and ideological origins, that language returns the refractive properties of the prism back for reflection.

**Active in part and passive in part**

The writing of the matrix also suffers from the restrictions of active and passive voice. The (not)womb world, so tantalisingly Real on canvas is shut down in text, recognisable in the following quote: “The artwork is created during a process that is passive in part and active in part, since no particular separate grain has control over the gaze” (Ettinger, 2006b, p. 116.). At first reading, the way Ettinger constructs her artwork to subvert the gaze fascinates me. However, on a later reading, it is apparent that there is something missing between the active and the passive not articulated adequately within the words *in part*. There is something in Ettinger’s artwork that we can see, can sense, can touch that language cannot (re)produce. It cannot articulate what actually (un)exists between active and passive and separates the feminine matrix from phallic discourse. What reveals itself subtly and on canvas disappears once said?

**The return of her secret**

Although it struggles to be heard within the text, Ettinger’s (2006b) matrix becomes yet another layer of Freud and Lacan’s unconscious/conscious structure through the telling. It is initiated into the ranks of Freud’s (Freud & Fliess, 1985)
wahrnehmungan, unbewusstein, vorbewusstein, unconscious, consciousness, and Lacan’s (1997a, 1997b) the Imaginary, the Symbolic, metonym, metaphor, diachrony, synchrony and debatably, the Real and anachrony all of which can be observed from outside discourse through mimesis.

The archaic mother occupies her exclusive void that is Man’s Real/real enabled through a prism that messes with boundaries, time, space, depth, shadow, light and texture. The matrix is revealed within a parallel gaze that allows glimpses of feminine corporeality, within combined phantasies of mother-child and Freudian womb phantasy; or was that just another reflection? It weaves its diachronic chaotic (un)ordered way, through the masculine unconscious. There are threads of the mask that are exclusively hers. Once spoken, these vibrant threads contract, solidify as if they had always been structural within Man’s consciousness. However, the pre-oedipal space remains within. The matrix, trapped in rationalisation through the solidifying workings of grammar and syntax, becomes memorable, inscribed synchrony, and although its beginnings “view[ed] the feeling” (Ettinger, 2006b, p. 220) with a different gaze, this gaze is smothered once spoken within the strict limits of phallic discourse. The archaic m/Other is once again inaccessible, (un)memorable, sealed within, an encounter marked by uncanny unease: the matrix as master signifier generates chains of (dis)connected empty signifiers that weave an alternate feminine diachrony.

Meanwhile, I am excited that Ettinger (2006a) has explicitly and cleverly separated the archaic m/Other from das ding, introducing womb phantasy, the mother’s phantasy, ingredients of the other jouissance as now pre-oedipally accessible to theoretical scrutiny. The assimilation of feminine and masculine desire is a problem I have encountered in my own engagement with masculine theories of
difference. Ettinger has also challenged psychoanalysis to consider an unconscious structure that is uniquely feminine and answered the question as to what happens to feminine (un)memory when it is severed by linguistic phallic restriction within the confines of its container. Along with providing an (un)accessible, (un)equivalent, (un)equitable and (un)secure place for daughters and their primordial mothers and associated corporeal traces and (un)memories, she has potentially solved the mystery of where unable to be spoken feminine corporeal (un)memories actually go after being cast into Levinas’ abyss or cut adrift from Freud’s neurones. Yet within a theory of inclusion, Ettinger’s (1997, 2006a) unconscious is nevertheless a masculine one, underpinned by Levinas’ philosophical masculine ethics and written by phallic discourse to maintain its essence. In the context of this thesis, our journey takes us in search of feminine embodied traces, or care, of mother-daughter. Ettinger has located them: we know where they are, can articulate their whereabouts, yet we still cannot access them from their secure container enmeshed within his unconscious, unless we gaze at the canvas/artwork from which they primarily emerged, out through the complexities of light and shadow. Yet our inquiry investigates absence through loss of voice. Our voices are still lost within the hyphen between part-object and part-subject and part-passive and part active.

Ettinger’s (2006b) hope is that the concept of the matrix and its prenatal and postnatal conductivity can deconstruct the “unitary separate phallic subject split by a castration mechanism that rejects its abject and mourns/desires its m/Other” (Ettinger, 2006b, p. 182). Freud’s (Freud & Fliess, 1985) unconscious turns on itself then, an act of self-de(con)struction, an implosion of the foundations of psychoanalysis/discourse through assimilation, that appears to, as we articulate
texture, light and shadow, reinforce the assimilation of women within phallic discourse.

**A poetic pause for refraction**

The matrix on the canvas speaks to me silently of a uniquely feminine trans-connectiveness, the artwork is convincing, yet the writing of it confuses my matrixial gaze. The gaze refracted by/through the canvas/matrix is not his gaze, until it is written in the text. Although Ettinger’s space provides a safe corporeal haven once free of speculation, sadly, this is no longer the case. As the hysterical daughter, Ettinger’s unconscious ‘subject’ is familiar to me, in that sometimes there is a glimpse beyond, that language is quick to smother. Uncanny? Frightening? Or are these just phallic delusions generated from a language where phallic signification, far removed from the signified, writes meaning. I mean, why would a typical feeling of home/sanctity be warm and ‘dry’ if this was a phantasy of a Real womb and not one tidied up of its corporeal and fluid/abject?

**Care’s resonance as a product of hysterical pursuit**

I therefore view the feeling of oceanic emergence in the world (Freud) not as fusion or undifferentiation but as borderlinking-in-differentiation in a compassionate resonance chamber. (Ettinger, 2006a, p. 220)

As the hysterical daughter, I have already described an experience where I have merged in what is now becoming a stirring of embodied memory, one that I may well glimpse within Ettinger’s canvas, yet distorts within the text, corporeal memories metonymically cast adrift. Even through Ettinger’s (2006a, 2006b) work, I am unsure of the authenticities of the Ones she has located. Although Ettinger’s artwork can connect with/creates her matrix, how can we claim back our ‘hallucinatory’ experiences and our voices, our embodied corporeal (un)memory in
language? Such voices are intertwined with the discourse of the hysteric, hysteria, deemed by Freud to be a product of penis envy and phallic castration. Ettinger explains that hysteria is an inevitable product of the phallic economy. Yet within a phallic economy, is there a voice that "a compassionate resonance chamber" that cares/resonates with the voice of the hysteric within phallic discourse? Could such a voice be echoing through her quest to seek the truth, which she finds within the words of the master?

**Care as a product of the matrix**

For Anna O, hysteria was ever present, manifesting in symptoms of neurosis and psychosis, such as embodied trauma (paralysis, pain), hallucination, a breakdown of language structure (Freud & Breuer, 1893/1974) and a complete miscommunication through employing a secondary language to try to create her experiences as meaningful, again, inevitably failing. Despite Breuer’s claim to the contrary, Anna O was never cured (Soler, 2006; Verhaeghe, 1999). There were symptoms pinpointed by Breuer that obviously remained with her throughout the rest of her life, such as an exaggerated kindness and sympathy for others, which I take the liberty to translate as exaggerated compassion and an over propensity to care. Anna’s/Bertha’s compassionate drive underpinned a lifetime devoted to the care of others. She went on to invent social work that according to Verhaeghe (1999), becomes for her, an hysterical fantasy.

For Ettinger (2006b), symptoms of hysteria result from a confrontation with phallocentrism. As an academic daughter, I am interested in the origins of ‘over-caring’ as a subjective response, having long considered the absurdity of hysterical symptoms as being solely initiated by an inability of the daughter to renounce her father or abnormal difficulties in transferring affection from the mother to the father.
Ettinger’s written matrix and her inclusion of intra-uterine and the mother’s phantasy as composing prenatal minimal recognition, incestual encounter, pleasure, trauma and a symphony of emotion and sensation allows me to explore beyond Freudian inspired theory that focuses on an unresolved desire for the father. Although I remain doubtful, whether embodied mother-daughter encounter is possible to speak or write; there is much to be learned about care’s transition to a phallic and saleable commodity.

The production of care as a contemporary commodity

Within the boundaries inscribed by Ettinger’s (1997, 2004, 2006a, 2006b) borderspace, uniquely feminine compassion is enabled by matrixial primordial non-linear strings/traces sparked prenatally within recognition of I and not I as part objects and part subjects as a product of the mother’s phantasy and her other jouissance. If, as Ettinger suggests, the matrixial borderspace is a site for compassion, is this compassion memorable? Given that this compassion within the theoretical properties of the matrix is not articulated within phallic discourse, but thrives within an unthinkable metonymic chain of signification that originates from the matrix, does this compassion implicate care? Care and compassion that is phallically produced initiates from an empty specular ill-lit(ervative) cave of his imagination. At best, Ettinger’s care remains metonymically and diachronically attached within a resonance of psychic strings embedded in another paradigm of being, perhaps unconsciously breaking periodically as a response to phallic discourse. Is this the care that consciously surfaces as Hollway’s (2006) unthought known and integrates into phallic language structure through Object Relations Theory and parental responsibility?
Within this context, care could become a conscious form of subversion if practiced within a paradigm of parody. Certainly Hollway’s care theory does not include the hysterical daughter’s warmth of ‘hallucinatory’ encounter experienced the night before her mother’s death. If the latter could be reframed as care instead of anxiety, stress and madness, how would you consciously signify such a perceptual moment? Has care escaped through a gap, a tear in reality and leaked into the Said as an unconscious response, articulated as frightening, uncanny, phantasmically evil, psychotic, neurotic and particularly (un)memorable? Alternatively, can we imagine that care is still inextricably intertwined and assimilated with ‘the other jouissance’ and all of its embodied traces of maternal encounter, and not jettisoned completely through Levinas’ ethical considerations of modesty earlier in the thesis? This is a possibility that needs to be considered when the matrix is framed within Levinas’ ethics of responsibility and compassion for the other.

From within the mask, the keeper of an unconscious ‘secret’ that can be remotely compared to Benjamin (1998, 2007) and Riviere’s (1929/2008) safe havens for woman’s uniqueness, the hysteretic struggles within a phallic existence. As she hysterically produces outbursts of compassion, so does the phallic economy harvest them for marketing. Certainly, as neo-liberalism must produce poverty, in that it requires a surplus work force, so too must it produce hysteria in order to continue to generate one of the biggest potential areas of profit within a global community, the caring profession. Care/jouissance as embodied traces are perhaps more directly related to Barnes (2006) assertion that care was once just something women did, without a specific term to inscribe it. Care leaks into consciousness, invoking yet another moment of uneasiness that surely it must be called something, whatever it is.
Within Ettinger’s paradigm, the hysteric is unconsciously aware of her lost jouissance but is still unable to access it in language.

The borderspace contains an explosive mixture of traces of the mother’s phantasy and economic potential as well as what must be a philosophically constituted compassion once spoken. This compassion is certainly referred to the Symbolic through Ettinger’s appropriation of Levinas’ ethics of responsibility for the Other, as the phallic mother assumes her responsibilities for which she was permitted to transcend within a mother’s quest for maternal alterity in Chapter Four.

Ettinger’s (2006a, 2006b) written matrix has explicitly provided a missing link in the chain of care signification from birth to hero that is pre-oedipal, prenatal and exists as separate though potentially equitable, with the phallus. With Ettinger’s separation of womb phantasy/the mother’s phantasy from castration complex, we can contemplate transforming hysterical care through matrixial borderspaces remote from desire for the father. The absence/repression of the mother is now another legitimate cause of hysteria within phallic discourse. Ettinger has opened up the space for imagining the lost mother and her accompanying compassion to be heard, allowing us to trace care back to a primordial feminine origin. This jouissance/these pleasures manifest within the hysterics symptoms; embodied trauma, excessive compassion and speechlessness. Another set of questions emerge: are the traces, other jouissance sensed through moments of uneasiness, a Real jouissance, or yet another reflective paradigm underscored by metaphor, reversed and described as feminine interconnected psychic, diachronic strings? Can the threads that follow the natural grain of the fabric be spoken, or consciously traversed? Is there a pathway to voice and unique conscious subjectivities that are hers? Can she only ever expect to perceive care through the artist’s gaze? Can she not speak it with her mother? Will
she ever be able to articulate her encounter in a memorable way, free from discourses of hysteria, neurosis and psychosis? Can she remember the care that she senses within the unique feminine of Ettinger’s borderspace, How can she remember through following pathways that she has already traversed; theories of alterity, transcendence, mythology, ethical becoming and object relations? Are the symptoms of the daughter caring for her mother, or in the case of Anna O, caring for her father, hysterical signs of care, trapped within the threads of the mask, as unable to be spoken as the gap between procreation and motherhood?

Whatever the case, the hysteric highlights a (phallic) lack of (hetero)sexual rapport between the phallus and the womb that manifests in yet another symptom; an astonishingly underdeveloped sexuality (frigidity) which the borderspace is designed to eventually circumnavigate as an avenue for transformation. Until that time, hysteria is endorsed as a bi-product of obvious malfunction within the workings of mainstream psychoanalysis, within which, the site for the mother’ phantasy is a necessity.

**Strings of care that dapple the textural production of light and shadow**

*So the hysterical daughter is now very interested in how engagement with Ettinger’s m/Other care space might reshape my own mother-daughter story and an impasse between hysterical daughter and caregiver that resurfaces throughout the text of experience and exploration. Ettinger’s borderspace potentially transforms the underpinnings of contemporary care and hysterical caring symptoms, providing the terms through which to traverse an impossible clarity surrounding care and its conflicting definitions.*
The metonymic underpinnings of care become more apparent, as do the discourses that produce daughter and caregiver, when I reconsider the differences in positioning between those who identify as caregivers and those who identify as daughters. Both the daughter’s and the caregiver’s positions are invoked by family responsibility and an expectation that care will be produced. Yet, by aligning with caregiver, those responsibilities change as a provider to the patient, widening the gap between care and love for/of the mother. Caregiver enables recognition within the public sphere and corresponding access to funding and resources (Barnes, 2006; O’Conner, 2007). Caregiver shifts the borders of encounter and recognition and as assimilated masculine/feminine subject, allows ease of trade within the phallic economy. Within capitalism’s global expansion more and more activities are recorded as caring in an effort to harness all resources that can be considered through the third party rule, if you can pay someone else to do it, then it is work (OECD, 2005), which potentially places woman’s conjugal duties in an uncannily familiar shadow. The private domain (her domain) is shrinking within a global economy that strengthens capitalism’s hold (Braidotti, 2006). An individualistic capitalist economy, along with the ‘care package’, delivers free of charge Ettinger’s (2006a, p. 116) inaccessible corporeal traces of the archaic mother, phantasy and jouissance. Since one might consider care packages as recordable productivity and an asset to the Gross National Product, I am wondering how long it might take to figure out a way to put a price on unconscious leakage of compassionate (un)memory.

The masquerading daughter/carer, who goes about her business efficiently, reproduces phallic care. The hysterical daughter/carer, is potentially outed by her performance anxiety, manifesting in bouts of phallic over-caring. Yet as both Mitchell (2000) and Soler (2006) have suggested, the contemporary hysteric is
difficult to detect. Anna O’s hysterical immersion into social work by taking symptoms public within a container called caring, perhaps reveals a watershed in relation to the manifestation of hysterical symptomology. There are bound to be hysterics within the public domain, hiding behind/within the mask and concealing an hysterical urge to care through an exemplary display of actually doing so. Somehow, the metonymic attachment of corporeal evil, that we should remember is generated as a bi-product of Levinas’ ethics can be identified by the gaze, suggesting that any hint of this metonymic matrixial uniquely feminine trace that is not a figment of his unconscious, may well be diffused. A history of hysteria, witches and women reminds us of that as ‘part of her’ filters into the watchful gaze of public consensus and global politics the other part continues to non-exist very much in contained isolation, fading and emerging in some very surprising ways.

A daughter’s story revisited through the gaze of the prism?

I hesitate to immerse myself within Ettinger’s written borderspace. Yet I ignore this familiar feeling and remember back once again to an encounter with m/Other on the eve of my mother’s death, when she lies, some kilometres away, unconscious, when we again became partial objects and corporeally inseparable, until my Symbolically inscribed fear of the ‘abnormal’ (initiated by thought) separates us once again. Now I am not entirely sure of the origins of my encounter. Once again, I am feeling confined and restricted within His unconscious, His discourse, His compassion,
choking on a claustrophobic fear of confinement within His language. As the hysterical daughter, I feel as if mother-daughter encounter is indeed being played out within his gaze, a specular world of scrutiny, knowledge appropriation, silence, colonisation, dissection played through a masculine unconscious. Yet here we are, suspended, disconnected in his unconsciousness, in yet another place that is not ours. A care with no compassion; no meaning within the Symbolic, trafficked in care packages, inscribed within ‘ethical’ terms of trade, good-enough care, good care, bad care, substandard care, intensive care, child care, home care, express care, feminine care, feminist care, shoe care, carpet care.

Can trans-subjectivity possibly inscribe other jouissance and mother-daughter within phallic discourse as speakable? What of compassion manifesting as hysteria (amongst other symptoms), an outburst of the mother’s phantasy, other jouissance and incestuous prenatal encounters - x rated care? And I’m wondering why, right now, I am experiencing an uncanny feeling as if I’ve been here before, a familiarity generated by His discourse and its instability. So where are the Real embodied traces, the ones that are uniquely ours, free from His complexes, His womb and His phantasy? Moreover, can the matrix untangle our embodied traces from the marketplace if we leave the womb to Him for the time being and find another metaphor/metonym that is not so accessible/exessable to the specular gaze?
“As air is to echo of a voice, so is the gaze to painting”

Your body is not the same today as yesterday. Your body remembers. There’s no need for you to remember. No need to hold fast to yesterday, to store it up as capital in your head. Your memory? Your body expresses yesterday what it wants today. If you think: yesterday I was, tomorrow I shall be, you are thinking: I have died a little. (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 214)

“Woman does not exist”? In the eyes of discursivity. There remain these/her remains: God and woman, “for example.” Whence that entity that has been struck dumb, but that is eloquent in its silence: the real. (Irigaray, 1985b, p. 111)

So now, with urgency to breathe, through anxiety invoked by previous/present/future encounter, I wish to (re)connect with the eloquent silence that appears within the text, yet is unable to be fathomed by psychoanalysis. Freud (1913/1958) pursued this silence through the works of Shakespeare, ancient Estonian creation myth, fairy tales and Greek mythology as death. Hence, he was caught up in his own death drive. Although Freud pursued the silence, he was unable to push past the fixed entities of the phallic inscription of ancient Greek women and Goddesses. What he did not consider was whether the language used to signify them now, signifies what they were then, now that monothetic colonising western civilization has destroyed their multiple voices and their multiple Gods. On our own excursion into Ancient Greece, we discovered the shifting non-nominal (un)entities of women, in some part solidified in language as the Muses, Fates, Furies, Nymphs, Iphimeide, Ipphinassa, Iphiniea, Hekate/Hecate, Persephone and Demeter and so forth (Larson, 2001). The Nymphs are neglected and this is possibly because their source of life, fluidity, according to Irigaray (1985b), is not favoured within phallic discourse. The Nymphs intertwine with Greek creation myth and as mentioned in Chapter Six,
reputedly assisted Rhea with the birth of Zeus. They are daughters of the rivers and therefore genealogically integrate with the elements. Water, as life force, inscribes a life not confined by chronological age. If the flow of the river wanes, then so does the life force of the Nymphs. The Nymph’s fluid life force represents a timeless ebbing and flowing in rhythm, resonance with the elements before Echo and not a chronological march towards death.

The Muse(s) also connect with the movement of water, which they combine with air to create sound: a sound now an eloquent silence through language restrictions imposed through the One, the unified subject and his individual God. Echo is a remnant of this silence reawakened by Spivak (1993), forgotten/assimilated by Freud in his interest in masculine narcissism. Moreover, if “as air is to echo of a voice, so is the gaze to painting” as Massuma (2006, p. 205) suggests in his critique of Ettinger’s artwork, where compassion and resonance are reduced to echo, then this is a further example of why we should be very wary of a matrix that is transformed into phallic language.

Irigaray (1999) reminds us of the vitality of air and its forgotten status within language. Air as a life-force that facilitates both sound and silence is neglected as such, taken for granted. So vital to life and sound, air could well be the nothing of being within phallic discourse, the indefinable philosophical essence/form/soul that drives Man’s psychosis (Irigaray, 1999). If this is the case then it is not surprising, that in forgetting its elemental properties, air becomes involved in producing repetition. Air as primary produces sound/resonance, its relegation to nothing, produces echo. Like essence and God, air just ‘is’, privileged in that its presence is taken for granted and like the presence of God, becomes solidified within philosophical discourse as something obtainable, objective and beyond question, not
in need of scientific scrutiny. Yet air is not the only element misrepresented within language. Irigaray (1985b) suggests that within a phallic economy, solidity is given priority over fluidity. Fluidity is to be contained, regulated and feared within the context of the abject.

Irigaray (1985b) suggests that regulatory models, like the principle of constancy (pleasure principle); homeostasis (physical self-monitoring and balance); and equilibrium (balance) are favoured over models of fluidity such as osmosis. Osmosis highlights leakage of fluid through semi-permeable membrane such as the abject that strikes horror within the ranks of phallic signifiers, allowing seepage from boundaries only designed to withhold solid objects. Fluidity then, with its feminine links with trans-subjective non-nominal, multiple autonomous subject(s) enables a permeable connectedness through its origins of feminine genealogical creation-birth. Its primary role in birth/sound/Real and its subversive properties within masculine (un)consciousness becomes a valuable metaphor within which to capture a uniquely feminine unconscious and perhaps a consciousness as well. Fluidity becomes a metaphor for metonym (disrupting the regulated gap between signifier and signified), yet through osmosis, it cannot be contained within his unconscious, permeating his boundaries, through his conscious, unconscious, spilling out into the Real, ebbing and flowing, leaving and returning at will, without its presence detected by his border control. It permeates the wall, indiscernibly. Feminine fluidity seeps in and out of his unconscious/conscious structure(s), as seawater permeates a solid piece of driftwood. Reverse osmosis now belongs in our vocabulary: this is a process that is used to separate salt from seawater, to make it drinkable (Rao, 2007). Yet perhaps he is unknowingly aware of the possibilities of feminine consciousness, such a knowledge manifesting in moments of uneasiness perhaps, to consider scientific
interventions and as permeation takes place without him ‘knowing’, reverse osmosis is no deterrent, if he might ever entertain possibilities of filtering blood.

**Fluidity of poetics and/or the poetics of fluidity**

Metonym as fluidity carries the embodied traces of mother-daughter blood relations as a life force that is not restricted to masculine consciousness, nor does it belong in his unconscious. It exists inside/outside of Man’s consciousness and unconsciousness. Meanwhile, his dark dry cavern, warmed by his firelight casts his shadows, the ones that provide him with his uncanny moments. Fluidity carries the blood-red uninterrupted life force of mother and daughter in an (im)possible genealogy not driven by time, space, desire or death, even if marked by genocide and colonisation. The rivers bring life and not an inevitable death that necessitates a drive towards ‘carnal’ (un)relations with the self in the name of God and (re)production. Nor is the recognition of ‘being’ a prerequisite for consciousness, just the sensation of life’s flow and its corporeal trans-connections of autonomous inter-collectiveness of no specific (de)nomination. Fluidity interacts with the primary source of sound, of inter-connectedness.

**I and not I?**

The multiplicity and interchangeability of the Nymphs and the Muses, Fates and Graces connect women in ancient Greek myth as the same and many, reminding us that once it was possible to speak of a consciousness that was not solely derived from ‘I’ and ‘not I’. Such a consciousness is not reliant on Man’s obsession with something called essence/soul/form as that which marks his superiority to all other species. For woman, a position no longer accessible through language ebbs and flows beneath its Symbolic surface in feminine unconscious/consciousness in a
blood red/read/written sea of corporeal (un)memory, a force unable to be contained, Man’s apparition, his worst nightmare. It enables her observations of phallocentrism and its impositions of sameness. As Ettinger’s (2006b) matrix represents a place for painting and gazing, the fluidity that ebbs and flows within but not contained by metaphor provides a place for writing that it is the site of primary sound where air is not forgotten, of a pre-oedipal utterance, as has been attributed to the Muses.

Jouissance ebbs and flows within the inter-collectiveness of women, allowing for possibilities that the multiple mother-daughter, who cannot be reduced to one or any number for that matter may have a presence that can occupy the text. Irigaray (1985b) warns that, within phallic discourse, a moment of utterance initiates a disappearance of the embodied feminine and the dissection of multiplicity into labelled and marketable segments. Irigaray’s not reducible to one within a silence that cannot link it to a binary of the one as negative, ebbs and flows within the limits of speech. The voice(s) of the Muse(s) and the Nymphs before Echo, caution thought and utterance as creating and widening the gap or initiating the split or a wedge, within the middle (or the insertion of the hyphen in place of middle voice) between a feminine embodied consciousness that is mother/daughter.

Irigaray (1985b) entertains removing the ‘you’ from ‘I love’ in that ‘you’ enforces a split; a unified individual wholeness. I read that ‘I love’ becomes a sensual embodied being if the I is collective as is possible in middle voice. ‘I love you’ enforces a split and imposes some sort of responsibility on the other in respect to an individualised reciprocity that is an impossibility once spoken given the non-rapport within phallic discourse. Moreover, should not ‘I (middle) love’ be all that is required within a feminine consciousness that is not driven by desire for the One?
Love, detached from metaphor is released by the restrictions imposed by sentence structure.

**A fluid pause beyond ontology**

Language then, restricts the ‘I’ and inserts the ‘you’ within phallic discourse. Antigone will not renounce her brother-sister bond and denies the word of Creon. ‘I love’ detached from desire for the One denies authority. A living death results within phallic discourse, and although Freud interprets silence as death, it is more likely that death becomes silence, a silence entombed within the solid walls of his container. Discourse individualises the I and inserts the you within the story of Persephone and Demeter to make it a tale of a desperate mother heartbroken over the loss of a daughter, which in itself becomes an unusual story of mother-daughter love. Yet could it also be a story of (un)desire, distorted by the ever restricting structure of language, given that there are linguistic traces of them being both interchangeable, generationally distinctive and one and the same?

**A caregiver’s encounter, shifting again**

As the hysterical daughter, I once again revisit the night before my mother’s death. I sit, having been sent from my mother’s side for some rest. How odd that seems to be to me now, replaced by someone who ‘knows’ to rest from the responsibilities of caring for the hysteric hiding behind the mask as designated carer, from the death of part of me, of my mother/other/Other running through my veins in a ebbing river of blood red embodied (un)memories/traces? Yet my mother physically lies dying in a place where I, within phallic discourse, physically am not: she has lost consciousness, his consciousness, through ever increasing doses of morphine administered by visiting compassionate caregivers (masquerading or
hysterical?) and her breathing comes in rasps, inscribed as a death rattle, a gasp for air, not a resonant ebbing of a life force. As I sit (un)memories return, conscious memories, revealed in what, until now, I can only write as hallucination, yet they become a merging within her (un)conscious silence and my deafening silence until encounter. A silence screaming unbearable pain of a phallic (mother) severance becomes enveloped in a warmth, a flowing of life force, a fluidity, permeation, a mingling of mother and daughter/I (middle voice) who become(s) uncountable/non-nominal. Until I (active-passive assimilation) think. Thoughts propel me back to the Symbolic and fear of the (un)known and the (un)thought.

A conscious memory that struggles in a telling as the hallucinations of the hysterical daughter, yet a conscious memory for me in silence invoked by the ebbing and flowing of life’s blood, that interactive, interchangeable feminine consciousness is dependent on. Such a silence need not be necessary. Nor does this consciousness rely on time, space, ethics, philosophy and the laws of physics, specularisation of women’s bodies, and good-enough mothering.

Those who might consider a feminine consciousness, such as the one I have just (fleetingly) symbolically attempted to inscribed, as utopian, essentialist or nostalgic, given previous (mis)understandings of its theoretical underpinnings; I urge to think again within the paradigm of contemporary discourse. The recognition of such consciousness and where such a concept positions the Symbolic as producing an ever increasing psychosis, to which Man is the symptom, gives us stark warning of the precarious state of the world/global economy enabled through phallic discourse and its championing of individuality through his inscribed insatiable and distorted drive, including insatiable consumption of care. Man’s madness drives a deepening crisis that is becoming more and more apparent through what Braidotti
(2006) calls a state of advanced capitalism. In the final chapter, I revisit the political underpinnings of a feminist ethics of care and track its development within a global economy that faces new challenges born from technological advance. I converse with Tronto (1993, 2013) and consider a feminist ethics of care articulated through the addition of middle voice and revisit Ettinger’s (2006b) borderspace as non-nominal...

...and a daughter finally turns and faces her shadows.

Simultaneously, interactively, and silently, I acknowledge Ettinger’s matrix produced on canvas, as an active and changing artwork, where memory is possible. Within this thesis, we build the layers, chapter by chapter, suspending time and confusing direction, a written artwork, where language structure is not the primary concern. I create texture, adding and weaving the threads to build from the texture of the paper, words as pliable mediums of artistic portrayal, painting upon painting that in turn becomes the mask, light and depth, gathering voices, creating shadows, from which an eloquent silence can emerge. Watercolour words merge and emerge, ebb and flow through the walls of his unconscious structure. This artwork, I might add, is a conscious, subjective, hysterical, academic, analytical, and ironical revolt against phallic discourse.
Chapter Eleven: Rewriting (un)memory

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act toward one another in the spirit of brotherhood. (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 1, as cited in Human Rights Commission, 2008, p. 8)

Once imagine that woman imagines and the object loses its fixed obsessiona{l character. (Irigaray, 1985a, p. 133)

A little girl stands on a beach with her mother and father: they are on holiday. They have stopped to converse with a man standing beside a small boat. Beside the boat there is a fish, a gurnard that has been extracted from a shallow puddle in the bottom of the small vessel and thrown onto the beach. It is still alive. The fish is caked with black iron sand, ground into its scales, gills and eyes through its desperate flapping for life. It is exposed to full sun and the little girl can feel the fish’s skin burning and the weight of waterless gravity crushing the fish as its gills hopelessly work to find its life sustaining force; water.

As far as I (non-nominal), the story teller(s) know(s), there is no specific word/discourse available for this fish’s predicament. It is not drowning as such and not suffocating, it is not air that the fish requires to stem the ebbing, but a total immersion in salt water. The fish/the girl are locked in silence or pain once thought, for which there is also no discourse available to describe being pulled from its/her floating world into the harsh reality of Man’s hooks/language. It/she has no language, no avenue for articulation: it/she is an object…to devour, to trade. The fish has no allies in this moment of rationalisation capable of securing its salvation, nor has she, only silence, a struggle with connectedness to, from the little girl’s
senses, the horror that confronts them both. The girl and the fish’s silent fate, here, now, are intertwined. She too gasps for life, on dry land, surrounded by air, like a fish out of water.

“Nice fish”, says the girl’s father admiringly.

The fish makes a croaking strangling noise, a sort of inverted gasp/croak for air/water. The fisherman laughs.

“It’s barking”, he translates.

There are people gathering, they are chatting, laughing, unconcerned, uncaring, disconnected from the battle for life that plays out at their feet, in their presence; the battle that is consuming the little girl. She starts to cry: her mother quickly tries to comfort her, aware of how the story will unfold: yet the little girl is inconsolable. Her father becomes irritated at his daughter’s out of place emotional outburst. The daughter’s tears turn to hysteria. His irritation turns to anger. She is led away from the gaze of interested spectators.

The father is very angry now, angry at the daughter, angry at the embarrassment, angry at the mother, and perhaps there is something else driving the anger; that a little hysterical girl might trigger the unspoken, the helplessness, unspeakable discomforts, misgivings of others, loss, lack...(un)memories. Is she a little girl, through an unnatural closeness to a smothering mother, who is not yet entirely disconnected/split/severed/castrated and therefore strangely, disconcertingly out of alignment with the realities that language produces?

In the meantime, the father has a deficient daughter to contend with and a wife who has forgotten to pack the little girl’s medication, bottles of pills for just such occasions, to calm the daughter’s trauma, her neurosis and her growing madness, troubling contradictions, schizophrenia, connectedness (disconnectedness
through connectedness), and an hysterical caring at odds with the grammar of reality.

In the last chapter, I extended the boundaries of the daughter’s scope of inquiry to include Ettinger’s matrixial borderspace. Although I was unable to speak and write the daughter’s (un)memorable encounter with her mother, I glimpsed her encounter through Ettinger’s artwork as her prism diffused light differently, allowing both shadows and light to be viewed simultaneously as produced through texture. In a sense, the daughter has found and faced her shadows, she now journeys within them. In this chapter, the daughter traverses with or travels as, nomadic subject as we read Braidotti’s (2006) Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics amidst a crumbling western society suffering from ‘advanced capitalism’. We search for a different ethical framework, within which Tronto’s definition of care ethics may be able to be reread. Nomadic ethics may enable her to shift easily within borders and boundaries and perhaps through the wall of language to Ettinger’s borderspace in a conscious act of subversion.

Braidotti (2006) frames the ‘whole’ western economy as the symptom, a symptom of malevolent decay, a society engaged in a psychotic set of behaviours, guided by bizarre and sometimes grotesque linguistic scripts that silence those that sense or are confronted with something within/beyond/relegated to the unconscious. A western economic and political stance of liberalism and individualism is personified in discourse. It becomes the ideal subject that incorporates all the attributes of a perfect western man, a phallic consciousness, a sinthome, written in the universities and political arenas by those who know: yet how can they know until they speak? Individualism becomes a collective phallic consciousness, a symptom that pieces its reality together in conflicting, bizarre, amusing and grotesque ways; a
chain of empty signifiers attaching meaning to metaphor, the symbolic and grammatical structure.

A fish on a beach, gasping for life: who might care about the tragedies that now unfold for this flapping barking unsuspecting dinner, except for a little girl not protected by the disconnections of a madness called reality? Who else but a little girl not familiar with the sanction of humanity to inflict suffering, appalling treatment onto other species, same species, same/different people, subjects and objects, through a strange belief in a superiority given by God that the environment and the species that inhabit ‘our’ world are provided to feed and sustain Man alone?

The horror confronting the little girl reveals a gap: her reactions to a happy family day at the beach do not appropriately fit the script, disrupting the other players, shocking the audience and emphasising the gap between perception and the scripts available to justify and disconnect from such a blatant disregard, a recognition beyond signification of connectedness and suffering. The consequences for this outburst, the breaking of the rules, the social law, the Law of the Name of the Father, are significant for a little girl hysterically at risk of being buried alive within herself; entombed, isolated, medicated, numbed and confined within a living death.

The little girl’s neurosis and developing psychosis considered/read/written as one kind of madness, an abnormality, deviating from the ideal norm is inscribed through isolation, the absence, the severance. In dialogue with Braidotti’s (2006) vision of global madness, positioning the little girl as object, as doubly deficit and ensuring that the gap between her perception and inscribed reality widens becomes a far more sinister proposition.
A schizophrenic society

Drawing on the work of Deleuze and Guattari (1984), Braidotti (2006) suggests that within a global age, gaps are indeed widening and contradictions are becoming more frequent within available discourses. For example, within the care industry, care can now be articulated as being administered in varying levels of incompetence (Tronto, 2013), creating an even greater gap between conflicting ideas of what we might think care should be and how it has actually become. For Braidotti (2006), the psychotic manifestation of western language structure that constructs our reality is now deepening, a psychosis underpinned by the chronological advance of the universalism of Kant, the justice of Rawls, liberalism, and a contemporary neoliberalism that is structuring moral trajectories within the global age. An embedded individualism in convergence with a technological age produces an advancing schizophrenia.

A global age with a primary focus on economics also steers a global economy and not only looks at producing a mechanical workforce but increasingly drives the push through a technological age towards genetic engineering and reproduction devoid of bodies (Braidotti, 2006). Technology works on ways to replicate reproduction of the human species. Man can reproduce himself without the physical aid of women, although he still produces humanity in His image. The self-generative power of birth is both denied and enhanced by human genetics science in general, confirming the ultimate colonisation of not only the specularisation and appropriation of women’s bodies but the interior, of all living organisms, and the commodification of life itself; air, water, forests, animals and the elements of the planet, the primordial shadows of mother earth.
Framed within metaphors of environmental care and biodiversity, environmental destruction through economic policies of sustainability becomes possible (Welford, 1997). Sustainability is sold as protecting the environment for further technologically produced/enhanced generations to enjoy. However, sustainability policies in practice see the devastation of forests and their inhabitants to manufacture bio fuels as an exercise in sustainable resources; many species are disappearing because of such a practice and human lives are lost through the destabilisation of the land. Indigenous knowledge systems continue to be highly marketable within a global economy that dismantles boundaries within an assimilation generated by contemporary colonisation; a colonisation that continues under the guise of globalisation and progress (Braidotti, 2006; Grierson, 2006).

Paradoxical differences become a saleable and profitable commodity within a global economy, just as the extraction of care as a reflection of justice, or more aptly as a reflection on the androcentrism of justice, has been taken up and marketed accordingly. Although these differences are marketed as equitable, yet again we are faced with a linguistic illusion that is becoming more and more fragmented as Man’s madness advances. For example, contemporary care as women’s business presents a paradox in that it is ‘visually’ marketable services, along with various technologies or scientific advances, yet delivered by low paid labourers, the majority of whom are women precariously employed, however actively we may locate them as pursuing these positions. Although modern politics grandstands individual accountability and equity, in contrast, economic policy still endeavours to produce a pool of cheap labour, especially within a growing care industry.
Care-bots and robo-dogs

Despite low wages for care workers, human-to-human care carries a burgeoning cost within a booming global industry. Because of a series of ethical dilemmas born from an impasse between enhancing quality of life and cost cutting, there is ongoing debate about the manufacture and the ethical implications of caring robots. Sharkey and Sharkey (2012) debate the confusion of ethics in relation to robot caregivers’ trialled in rest homes in Japan and the USA. There is a problem with defining who such technology actually enables. Technology that enables strengthened physical movement may be framed as giving independence to the elderly: on the other hand, it could be framed as streamlining the care industry and cutting costs, reducing the necessity for human-hands-on care. The production of robo dogs and cats is posited as being beneficial to the elderly, for companionship and for anthromorphosis. Kramer, Friedmann and Bernstein (2009) suggest that these are just as beneficial as real animals, if not more so. Sharkey and Sharkey (2012) wonder if this is another potential removal of encounter with living, breathing, flesh and blood and increased loneliness. Elderly patients are lifted by robots in giant teddy bear suits (Coldewey, 2011), the image of which endorses concern that such service could be ‘infantilising’. Of most concern to Sharkey and Sharkey (2012) is the development of caring robots that monitor behaviours. How can you ethically validate a care that crosses the borders of enabling and enhancing into surveillance, restriction and incarceration: a specularised care performed by machines programmed with a limited set of appropriate responses that aim for constriction even if advocating mobility. One of the concerns that Vallor (2011) raises is how these limitations shape the level of care that carebots are able to administer; an interesting possibility when we consider how care vocabulary has
adapted to accommodate many levels of care, from inadequate to adequate. We know that whatever level of technological caring aids produce, it has already been linguistically accommodated. Indeed Sharkey and Sharkey point out a possible violation of a right that no one should be subjected to inhuman acts (Human Rights Commission, 2008). So where do we draw the line between inhuman and unhuman acts of care?

These disturbing ethical questions however, are not too far removed from contemporary caring paradigms, where bodies perform the tasks; disconnected bodies, armies of masquerading women, cyborgs, hysterical carers hiding behind the mask, capable of making ethically required rational and irrational decisions, that apparently unhuman machinery is incapable of doing. Furthermore, if ethical caring-machines are built and programmed with the nonsensical mixture of rational and non-rational codes/principles caregivers and care professionals are required to adhere to, then we can assume that their manufacture would be shifted to the margins, the borders, assembled by minimally paid, displaced, globally colonised workers, in third world countries as Braidotti (2006) suggests. In other words, the industry of carebots would still rely on a pool of underpaid and exploited assembly workers/bodies/women, also dependent on the technological age to precariously survive; labour even cheaper than the minimum wage ascribed in western countries.

According to Braidotti (2006) gender and ethnicity are puzzling paradoxes in a world that aspires towards a prominently visible equity. Equity is one of the claims in a ‘post-feminist’ world where feminism’s redundancy is audibly spoken and racism is considered a series of historical events. For Braidotti, the ‘spectral’ visibility of women in prominent positions, women such as Hillary Clinton, Condoleeza Rice and Helen Clark suggests at a glance that this is the case. Advanced
capitalism certainly highlights famous conservative women, such as those who fit into the individualist ideology of achieving their aspirations, which is now within neoliberal ideology, a possibility for all. Behind these prominent faces however, Braidotti suggests that global capitalism continues to thrive through a racial and patriarchal division of labour that disproportionately locates girls and women, especially those of colour, in low wage assembly and information jobs, servitude and prostitution, and seemingly endorses the trafficking of women and children.

Within a western economy, spectacular equality and its accompanying discourse, props up some surprising ‘schizophrenic’ anomalies (Braidotti, 2006). For example, within the caring industry, robotic medical support systems are masqueraded as cuddly white baby fur seals (Tergesen & Inada, 2010) while somewhere else in the world, the living, breathing version of these cute baby critters are being clubbed to death because of the value of their fur. The covers of these specularised containers are valuable, the visual, the borders, intertwined with discourses of economics, have no connection to their reference containers, an empty signifier with a highly marketable container. Indeed, Paro, the robotic baby seal comes with an antibacterial fur coat as an advantage over the real thing (Restuccia, 2014).

Braidotti (2006) highlights various discursive products of contemporary schizophrenia. She suggests that contemporary discourse produces

...[f]eminism without women, racism without races, natural laws without nature, reproduction without sex, sexuality without genders, multiculturalism without ending racism, economic growth without development, and cashflow without money. Late capitalism also produces fat free ice-creams and alcohol-free beer next to genetically modified health food, companion species alongside computer viruses, new animal
and human immunity breakdowns and deficiencies, and the increased longevity of those who inhabit the advanced world. (Braidotti, pp. 58-59)

Within this list of contemporary contradictions, we can add the production of the new woman’s care devoid of bodies, morphed from its mainstream philosophical and psychoanalytic past that comes in a variety of packages. Within a global economy, a schizophrenic society produces and delivers a care that doesn’t care: whether it is packaged as good or substandard is irrelevant, it gets delivered faultlessly true to label. Care then becomes marketed within the paradigm of classic masquerade in as much as it is performed efficiently and competently, even if the brand administered is dangerous and damaging. Devoid of bodies, care has become part of a technologically produced cyborg mechanism that carries intangible, immeasurable and catastrophic externalities. Contemporary forms of justice, driven by Man’s schizophrenic anamorphosis, drive a world that cannot care unless morally and ethically regulated to do so.

I care

Hence, amidst care’s Man-made madness, a feminist ethics of care becomes increasingly cited as a suitable ethics to guide us through a technological age. However, as Braidotti (2006) astutely notes, an ethics of care perpetuates a liberalist vision of what caring should be, but so far hasn’t managed to explain why people should care or how we might persuade them to do so. What can we do if people are impeccably not caring or caring badly under the structured moral paradigms available linguistically? Braidotti suggests that care (in global form) becomes embedded within a structure of power relations and these power relations are dependent on the formulation of individualism as the essence of being. For Braidotti
subjectivity becomes a fiction born from another paradox of discourse, the split “unity of the grammatical ‘I’."

Braidotti (2006) writes as if feminine theories of difference are critical for disrupting the ‘equitable’ binary between the moral reasoning powers of men (justice) and women (care). Non-binary difference disrupts the delusion that care and justice operate on some sort of continuum, raising a question as to what the hyphen separating the two represents and what it is silencing or excluding. We can also question whether there is a difference between the two phallically produced constructs (justice/care) born from Rawls (1958/1972) Kohlberg (1981, 1982) and Gilligan’s (1977, 1982) interpretation of mainstream philosophy, liberalist theory and psychoanalysis. The silence that language invokes through binary masks a difference out of sameness as a mode of economic production, assimilating Real differences, driven by lack. Lack fuels power, desire and impotence, a confusion now well embedded within grammar and syntax.

Power is inscribed within the mistaken form of the discourse of the master, creating the delusion of mastery and the illusion of equality by silencing the marginalised, the other, through a language that produces a consciousness solely dependent on the unified (split) subject. Man, as symptom, becomes an individual entity that thinks, because he has a unique essence, he is superior and morally and ethically just: that is his lack. His lack is represented within the severed, disconnected discourses of individualism and the advancing schizophrenia of global economics.

Braidotti (2006), reads the schizoid structure of the global economy as visibly displaying and championing equity yet hiding the growing discrepancies between the economic winners and marginalised losers, contradicting the jurisdiction
of mainstream ethics driven by morality and contemporary discourses of equity that champion a fair playing ground for all. Philosophical ethics are reliant on the concept of some unexplainable and elusive essence and being; with a role that perpetuates, mediates and holds constant, Man’s madness, individualism and indeed masculine consciousness, founded on a delusional unified entity, I.

Feminist ethics evolved from a liberalist tradition becomes an outdated moral template for human action; we need to consider an ethics of being, ‘differently’. For Braidotti (2006), nomadic ethics offers the possibilities of defying borders and producing Woman as subject: within a contemporary society we must recognise environmental, social and psyche as trans-connected, not disconnected. Environmental crises, the othering of women, racism, ethnic displacement, embodied displacement and a growing frenzy of consumerism are all intertwined and dependent on the production of the unified rational/castrated subject that produces desire. Different ways of becoming that may enable women and discourses of sexual (multiple) differences are important yet difficult if not impossible to articulate within phallic discourse.

Her uptake of nomadic ethics enables Braidotti (2006) to consider a shifting subjectivity between borders and boundaries, from and to the colonised and specularised. Within an environmental context, deliberate physical and virtual nomadism empowers and disrupts those disenfranchised by the borders that are continually shifting in global economic terms. For example, applied global pressure on western European countries, such as Greece, amidst a global banking crisis to cut social spending in exchange for financial bailouts, sees people displaced and marginalised, the ongoing health effects of which are outlined by Karanikolos et al. (2013) as uniformly damaging. Corporate ‘sustainability’ and changing land usage
for alternative foods and fuels (Borras, & Franco 2012), sees the devastation and displacement of forestry, wildlife and people (Welford, 1997). Cultural assimilation continues in a global fashion, rekindling debates on what can be considered progress and what can be framed as the contemporary repetition of colonisation (Grierson, 2006), or in other words, displacement within one’s own country. Indeed, there is presently debate around westernisation in Malaysia as to whether it brings economic wealth or/and progress or destroys/assimilates existing cultural practices (Abbas, 2012), a conversation that requires a careful consideration of a changing economic world and shifting boundaries (Grierson, 2006).

For Braidotti (2006), those displaced through contemporary colonisation/globalisation, either as refugees, or within the borders of their own countries, are enabled to consciously, physically and subjectively cross borders and boundaries through nomadically belonging. More specifically, nomadism can disrupt linguistically produced embodied boundaries as well as having the potential to disrupt the concept of the unified (split) subject. In other words, it has the potential to blur the boundaries between engrained/inscribed individualism/liberalism and how ‘becoming’ and/or ‘being’ is enacted within philosophical terms of ‘I’. For Braidotti, a nomadic ethics can guide humanity, animals and the environment into an age of mutual respect and redefine objects as subjects.

Braidotti’s (2006) uptake of nomadism as an ethical alternative to theorise Woman as a becoming subject, is (not)situated within/beyond the body that defies displacement and/or colonisation, a displacement that can be thought in relation to public and private spaces, colonisation of body parts, such as the womb, and the hysterical daughter’s hallucinations.
Symbolic boundaries or unconscious drives cannot confine the nomadic subject. Such a subject becomes, inclusive of what Braidotti (2006) calls the virtual feminine, a recollection of what never was but might have been; perhaps (un)memories of a resounding silence. Nomadic ethics becomes an ethics of embodied consciousness. A feminist ethics of care remains a guideline to liberalist moral practice and will remain so as long as we continue to read it as such without challenging its borders. The nomadic subject transforms borders, their meaning and their consequence. If encounter takes place, at the metaphorical wall of language/metaphor that represents all that we cannot remember, under the auspices of the hyphen in inter-nomadic space, how is feminist ethics of care transformed?

**A democratic feminist ethics**

Tronto (2013) suggests that the liberalist democratic doctrine of a feminist care ethics is not rendered ineffective in contemporary western society; it is the turn to neo-liberalism that performs the rendering now. For her, the ‘choices’ that neo-liberalism offers plainly impact to further marginalise the marginalised and therefore care itself: free market choice does not equate to justice. The extreme turn to an individualist doctrine has severed people from people, losing sight of each other’s circumstances however they are reasoned. An extreme individualist doctrine allows for ‘personal’ responsibility, discourses of choice and responsibility within a structure that chokes and constricts discursive pathways. For her then, even though democracy and neo-liberalism fall within liberalism and individualism, they are uncomfortably together, given that democracy promises equality for all and neo-liberalism suggests that it is up to the individual to aspire to achieve equality: the choice is theirs. Indeed, within this paradigm, Tronto has identified yet another
example of Braidotti’s (2006) concerns of a schizophrenic society and the puzzling paradoxes it produces.

Tronto (2013) suggests that there is an ingredient missing in her original definition of a feminist ethics of care, relational care. For Tronto, the something lost is that young children display natural caring tendencies: young children pretend to feed adults and open their own mouths as the food approaches the recipient. From my standpoint, I am not entirely convinced by Tronto’s example of natural caring behaviours of infants. Indeed we might consider this a relational engagement with the self, given the infant is at the beginning of a rocky road of individuation. I wonder at a confusion between the relational and care as voiced within available discourse and language structure.

Indeed, Tronto (2013) realises that relational care is a difficult concept that requires a marked change in thinking about the self in relation to others. However, that care is devoid of any sort of communication between others, rather than Others, comes as no surprise within the context of this thesis, although it would be foolish to place the blame for this solely on economic rationalism, given that it is just the symptom of a bigger linguistic system of marginalisation and exclusion within phallic discourse.

Furthermore, there are some real difficulties involved in inserting relational care within a paradigm of normatively individualistic moral practice. For a start, the mother is still absent from the conversation and it is impossible to add the relational into a language based on miscommunication and impotence: women as object. So what happens if we leave the rereading of Tronto’s (1993) original feminist care ethics definition to the voices themselves within a paradigm of middle voice
engaging a non-nominal I. Perhaps we can draw through/back the lost relational embodied traces and memories cast off through thought and speech: the traces of

*the little girl, The hysterical daughter*

*Anna O, the masquerading woman*

*mothers, daughters*

*Furies, Graces, Muses*

*Cordelia, Portia, Salme, Linda*

*Demeter, Persephone, Nymphs*

*Antigone, Jocasta, Echo, Hekate/Hecate, Artemis*

*Iphigeneia, Iphimede, Iphianassa, Chyrsothemis, Laodike, Electra*

*Melete, Mneme, Aoide*

*Cinderella, Atropos, crowlet,*

*to emerge within the possibilities of reading/writing, to be heard?*

*An impossible engagement with care*

Tronto (2013) advocates for greater responsibilities, to educate people on how they can care in a way that does not marginalise, enacts a true equality and therefore a real democracy. A difficulty here is that there are voices excluded, even from this conversation. Hence, in an (im)possible encounter, I would like to give some of them an opportunity to comment. Within an engagement of what has already been written as metaphorical exclusion, a reading for traces enables a grammatical middle voice, care, and non-nominality, a relational care that is still unattainable within discourses of democracy, yet might be memorable. Within this reading, Fisher and Tronto’s (Tronto, 1993, 2013) well-worn definition engages with an hysterical silence, an eloquent silence within a perception/position of consciousness
awakening, an emerging of a non-nominal I, and an exploration and (re)positioning within the script.

_**On the most general level, we suggest that caring be viewed as a species activity that includes everything that we do to maintain our ‘world’ so that we can live as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, ourselves, and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex life sustaining web (Tronto, 1993, p. 102).**_

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**Figure 15.** Reading care.

So the broad definition of care offered by Fisher and Tronto suits a particular general account of the place and meaning of care in human life. Care needs to be further specified in particular contexts. The Fisher/Tronto definition requires that care not be left on this most general level but that the context of care be explored. (Tronto, 2013, p. 21)

> Yes, thank you for the invitation to speak finally. So let’s explore this definition first, relationally, given that you suggest that the democratic and the relational are important considerations.

> So we suggest? So who are we? A phallic We? Are we women, inclusive of (un)memory, the nothing beyond the text? We as citizens, members of a democratic community, content with our (un)memory? And relationally, are we just a countable
combination of the two, a countable two, a disconnected two? A dyad, suppressed by
the power wielded by neo-liberalism as a spanner in the works of equality...and
what power is this, madness, impotence? We, the splintered remnants of humanity,
the individual unified subject, each piece of us separately claiming individual divine
right, yet each unified within the same God/Other? Do we view care as individuals
within His consciousness, or from a specular vantage point of mimesis? Really? So
how is it that again we are forced to view the world as a detached spectator(s),
specular observers of our own responsibilities? Otherwise, we can only become
upholders of the gaze, assimilated within subject, Man. So are we ethically feminine
and caring, in an elevated position that overlooks humanity and its self-delegated
position of superiority in a division(s) of the self/selves, itself, ourselves,
yourself/selves, us, its ‘we’? We gaze upon our masks, the carer(s), hysterical carers,
kin-keeper(s), impeccable house keepers, mothers, daughters, patients, object(s),
commodity(s), as both the product and the pedlar, as both the pimp and the
prostitute, master and slave, a profit/deficit or double deficit born from difference?
So is we inclusive of a little girl, a woman masquerading, a masquerade, a script, a
tragedy, a disconnection from care, from empathy, unless inscribed as a moral
obligation? A disconnection, care that invokes a little girl’s hysteria, care that sends
her to her isolation? How is it that language inscribes care as commodity, that we
can’t feel it, remember it, that we need to be instructed through a process of moral
reasoning? What to look for and our obligations to perform it where necessary, our
responsibility now everyone’s responsibility within an ethical construct called
relational, another empty container, signifier? We, daughter and mother,
dispossessed of our genealogy, our embodied memory as non-nominal? How can we
have a relational care without recognition of the disappearance of the mother, a relational care without her reinstatement?

And how can we hope to maintain and repair our world when we continue to inscribe it in terms of the sustainability of individualism and commodification? It’s not a matter of reasonable maintenance and economic rationalism; it’s a matter of grammar, of how we speak, how inclusive we are, how we construct, reabsorb as part of ourselves/us/I, yes our world, yes relational as object? Or relational differently, (un)speakably different? Care’s repair requires us as an active relational participant(s) in it(s) living being, to (re)infuse it/us with life, I as inclusive of our world, no longer a commodity but a living part of us/I, a different consciousness. Would Man consume himself/us/we if he could see, as we can from our uniquely feminine specular vantage point that this is what he is in the process of doing, assimilating, colonising, appropriating, modifying, commodifying, degrading, raping, encroaching on his own spaces, probing his own insides and sucking out his/our own life force...killing himself/I/us?

And how can our world in its present state of inscription relationally include our bodies ourselves and our environment? When selected portions of our dissected once non-nominal consciousness(s) are still endowed with essence, that mythical ‘thing’ that gives man licence to continue to tear himself asunder, as a dissectible article of trade, assigning her/we/I - if we dare show ourselves from behind or within the mask, wherever - to a living death by discourse?

Again, the web remains the only way to speak of the relational, web, womb, hysteria, hysteria, matrix, matrixial. How can we weave together what is already disconnected, requires disconnection, ‘to be’? How can we weave His severed, disconnected pieces, categories, specularised empty containers together, when the
relation depends on a diffusion (not reflection, refraction or diffraction) of His boundaries, borders that continue to ensure disconnectedness? So tell me again, how does liberally, equitably re-threading disconnection create a caring world? Our world? Or by insisting on discourses of democracy do we merely prop up an advanced/advancing schizophrenic global society? Are we not still strengthening borders, borders of the body, spatial borders, discursively produced and monitored, encroached upon, through invasion, a colonisation still taking place within a technological age? Could we ‘re-thread’ ‘re-weave’ the disconnection without also affirming the borders to be woven? Caring for whom? For the mother now destined to an unconscious existence? Or in a system of dichotomy that always relegates the Other to a living death, the little girl, whose (un)memory remains encoded as deficit, as lack, whose essence is somehow inferior, psychopathology?

So if “caring thus consists of the sum total of practices by which we take care of ourselves, others and the natural world”, then what countable practices are these, caring practices or moral practices, terms of trade, derived from Rawls’ individualism and the hand of God? And how can we talk of ourselves, others and the natural world within the individualist property of three distinct entities relationally? Ourselves…? Subject? Others, Othered?, the same? Woman? Colonised? Sub-altern? Silenced? Object? And our natural world, after what has been extracted from it, continues to be extracted from it…its memories, its life force, its connections, mother, elements…all divided, counted, priced and sold? It’s not our relational properties you write of here, they’ve long been appropriated and marketed…let’s not allow the specularisation of our impossible genealogy.
Care rarely happens between two people only. And to create opportunities to ‘triangulate’ care also creates opportunities to break up a relentless hierarchy of power. (Tronto, 2013, p. 153)

Yes, we understand this, but it doesn’t work when you read it within the restrictive structures of active and passive voice, where the relentless hierarchy of power is reproduced, so yes but differently, in ways we can’t speak of. There is no power, only impotence, ‘reality’ and silence, yes, triangulation, from a position of relational ‘care’, good care, substandard care. So what does relational care mean anyway, when it is spoken within phallic discourse with the mother silenced? Heterosexual relation? Mother-child relations within a paradigm of normal development? Do these signifiers confine care within a democratic feminist ethics?

…it is clear that violence can and does arise in families…What do these competing accounts of the relationship of care and violence signify? On the one hand, one might denounce violent care and point out that it is harmful for those cared-for. On the other hand, one will hear arguments that in some communities and cultures, violence, especially intimate violence, is simply a part of the way people live, and that we have no capacity to judge their notions of caring, which includes some uses of corporeal punishment. Is there any sort of way through these complications? (Tronto, 2013, p. 78)

Violent care? Here, read what language does; teams violence with care and affords a superior tolerance of linguistic articulations devoid of traces, of colonisation, of trauma, the contents of these packages, long since emptied, assimilated, distorted, discarded? The very language that you speak contradicts democratic care, given a presumption that...

…we are equal as democratic citizens in being care receivers…this quality of being needy is shared equally by all humans…From the standpoint of
democratic life, however, it does make sense to think of an equal capacity to voice needs. (Tronto, 2013, p. 29)

_Ah yes, a voice. So whose equally capable voices are these? His voice?_

Of course, the assumption that all humans are equally receivers of care is not the same thing as saying that all humans have equal, the same, or even necessarily similar needs. But it is to say that meeting needs is a feature of the life of each and every human, and that each of us is thus engaged in caring from the standpoint of the recipient of care. (Tronto, 2013, p. 29)

_Yes, we understand and appreciate the effort to merge the boundaries between the carer and the caregiver, toying with the idea of the hyphen, the wall, though perhaps extending the gaze, not confounding it..._

What we see if we peek over the wall is the possibility of a world in which our capacities to care for ourselves and others will increase only if we have the courage to admit that we need, and will benefit from, recognising the large web of caring relationships within which our lives gain meaning. (Tronto, 2013, p. 182)

_It is as we had feared, peeking over the wall, a specular invasion with the potential to silence even the silence. Our one last bastion of our (non)existence thought as a new frontier of democracy, our traces, jouissance, and even trauma packaged, commodified, sold. And beyond the wall, you glimpse a web, a matrix? A web womb? A mirror image of our world? Yet what if we could traverse this boundary consciously as you are suggesting, reintroduce the relational back into care, and redefine the boundaries between care-recipient and caregiver, this being a place that is possible for negotiation between all of us. Let’s transform a democratic feminist ethics of care for the moment and reframe the relational, the caregiver-care-recipient within Braidotti’s (2006) nomadic ethics and Ettinger’s (2006b)
matrixial borderspace. Let’s also consider different theoretical ways of enabling the matrix that do not rely on light and womb metaphors, such as Irigaray’s (1985a, 1985b) linguistic fluidity.

So what if we read your definition within a ‘relational’ non-nominal I/we, inclusive and interchangeable, multiple and singular, inclusive of the voices of the Muses, of ourselves, others and our natural world? If we (non-nominal) don’t view the world from a detached place but become reabsorbed, not as a species activity, but as inclusive of all in varying interacting (non)nominations. Each and every boundary becomes permeable through inclusivity, an inclusivity we have forgotten how to read within language, another (un)memory.

So then what if, when I say that middle voice has been written out of language, this is not entirely what I mean, such an interpretation labouring under the employ of available discourse. It has been interpreted out of language. It’s been there all along, an (un)memory, we have forgotten how to read it, have been denied it, beyond-the-face, our jouissance, in a long time turn to individualism, rewritings of Demeter’s loss, of Echo’s silence, noted in Socrates day as leading to his demise, warned of by Schreber and inscribed by Kant, Rawls and Smith: Inscribed through the writing of philosophy, I, essence, form, transcendence. Noted by Freud (1917/1955) in a warning of Man’s delusional belief of superiority, the only animal that has a soul, essence and capacity for complex thought: Chosen by God.

The structure itself is still in place and he I and the We within Tronto’s definition still lends itself to reinterpretation as non-nominal, interchangeably, singularly multiple...bring back the voices, reuniting, of the Muses, Fates, Graces, Nymphs, the multiplicities of Demeter and releasing Echo from her
repetition and the only effective avenue she has had for a voice for a long time as an individual/ commodity/object, mimesis.

By (re)reading in/through middle voice, essence and superiority are no longer available, consciousness shifts, silence is reawakened, as are the voices of the mother and the Muses. Care can no longer be enacted as a moral practice as in terms of trade, entity(I/us), shift, ebb and flow, fade, and emerge, from position to position, it can be linguistically possible to be patient and carer simultaneously, mother and daughter inclusively. And if there is such a thing called essence then middle voice infuses it within/between species, elements, Man and Woman, colonisers and the colonised, there is no splitting within this grammatical (im)possibility. And, it can be said with some confidence, Man has always looked after Himself, though now his boundaries are permeable, perhaps he might understand that looking after himself may be interpreted within a whole new context of inclusivity, not assimilation, and recaring our world in the context of non-nominal interchangeability may begin. Within an inclusion of elemental and embodied multiplicity, our ‘interweaving’ can be read as non-nominal and permeable, as a driver of a life force not an unconscious caricature of a colonised womb…a fluid life force of the Nymphs, of blood, of her/our blood, within a genealogy that is exclusively hers, once dared to be imagined by Irigaray. Furthermore, shouldn’t a middle voice transform all feminist theory as inclusive in that we are intertwined/trans-connected, interchangeable, non-nominally with parallel/simultaneous existences, a world, a different form of consciousness invoked? And while I am thinking and writing, I’m encountering, absorbing the threads of another/same world, a web, fading and emerging. I’m wondering now how a rereading of Tronto’s definition of care, a different emerging ‘our’ world may
underpin and enable another impossible encounter, a linguistic possibility for Ettinger’s matrixial borderspace, relational, differently.

Within an act of nomadic activism, I shift the borders and boundaries of the matrixial borderspace back towards its creative origins, away from the colonised space called ‘matrix’ into a fluid becoming within the paradigm of Irigaray’s mother-daughter genealogical blood connections previously linguistically denied. Psychic webs become veins, rivers, intricate patterns of tributaries, accessible through a prism now framed as middle voice. The prism itself is no longer controlled by light and reflection, is no longer a border, a wall, a place of contestation of meaning, not the abject, but a fluid permeability that defies boundaries like air, like water, consciously.

Imagining language that includes middle voice, perhaps womb metaphors do not gate keep and suppress other ways of inscribing a woman’s life, death, and consciousness. Imagining language that allows for a non-nominal I, inclusive and interchangeable, that could exist in multiplicity and aloneness, perhaps simultaneously. Imagine then, an I that connects women, interchangeable non-nominal simultaneously (un)multiply-signified, a strangely signifiable woman that can be articulated and written within the context of mother-daughter-mother as a state of consciousness, a woman not driven by masculine desire, no longer excluded through hyphenation or trapped within/beyond masquerade, the mirror, no longer ruled by the binary of death and life. So too is the hysteric from the hystera. Imagine that we need no longer imagine such possibilities, that they are accessible through a different theorising of language structure and a different reading of that which has already been written.
We could also imagine that a problem for nomadic activism within existing grammatical restrictions is the way women become positioned within discourses of masochistic activism, a paradoxical reversal within the dichotomy of active and passive. Yet nomadic activism allows an ethical shifting between linguistically produced paradigms of consciousness, through a medium of middle voice. As a confounder of boundaries, nomadic ethics informs strategies that comfortably write and read the non-nominal subject, as a permeable thread of an ethics of inclusion that joins and supports forms of consciousness created by permeating boundaries not reliant on metaphors of light. Activism, within the bounds of middle voice no longer becomes grammatically strangled into masochistic activism. Indeed, such a reading and writing initiative becomes an ethical state of being: Braidotti’s (2006) virtual feminine crosses borders into feminine consciousness, yet another conscious act of nomadic activism.

Nomadic ethics becomes inclusive of a non-nominal I, existence, of being, of equity, a way to care, a way to read/write, a uniquely feminine genealogical consciousness(es). A nomadic ethics enables an ethics of feminine consciousness that moves within the permeable abilities of middle voice, transforming boundaries and borders. Within this context, nomadic ethics becomes an admirable inclusion of/with middle voice for a feminist methodology, steeped in writing, reading and being subject(s) that consciously questions and actively challenges linguistic borders. For me, both middle voice and nomadic activism enable each other and in so doing, are the same but different simultaneously, a necessity within a paradigm of unique feminine consciousness. Nomadic activism frees the daughter from her prison; she merges with her shadows, no longer fears them, accepts their enveloping warmth and acknowledges the traces, the (un)memories, and remembers.
Within the context of Irigaray’s mother-daughter genealogy that breathes life and equitable difference into Ettinger’s written matrix, Braidotti’s (2006) nomadic ethics connects the environmental, social and the psyche within an ethical ideology that defies boundaries, includes all species, the environment and defies essence itself. This is an ethics of becoming Woman, of becoming subject differently, inclusive of a borderspace (re)enabled by maternal genealogy, blood connection, seeping into a feminine writing/reading practice, all of which together, can inscribe, read, live, and breath a non-nominal I that allows for shifting feminine consciousness and awakening of traces and (un)memory.

In an effort to ethically and actively make our (un)memory consciously accessible, I reframed Ettinger’s written and spoken matrixial borderspace as being fluidly enabled, by the life force of ancient Greek women and Irigaray’s genealogical blood flow of mother-daughter-mother, enabling a different feminine consciousness, one not colonised by the appropriation of the womb metaphor in phallic discourse and western philosophy. Irigaray suggests that there is a blood connectedness of mother-child that creates a continuous fluid genealogy through the birth of mother-daughter-mother, present within a patriarchal genealogy through procreative links. Inscribing the ‘prism’ that altered time and space within a uniquely feminine event encounter opens a pathway to a metaphor of middle voice. So now that we theorised the possibilities of a conscious mode of becoming, enabled by a more complex grammatical structure, instead of thinking within the bounds of a space of embodied traces and (un)memory, a place of jouissance, no longer ‘Othered’, and the mother’s phantasy, no longer ‘evil’, and a feminine genealogy beyond the market, it appears necessary to again return to the concept of commodified care, wondering about the
possibilities of a flowing life force, flowing back into something that has been forgotten in its primordial context.

I considered this along the pathway of Braidotti’s (2006) thesis of liberalism and advanced schizophrenia. Through Braidotti, I traced care as uncaring and framed within the confines of an ethical practice, an empty ethics now devoid of context. Braidotti’s concern was that a feminist ethics, as has been proposed by Tronto, Held, etc, is not a viable ethical framework through which to advance into a technological age that blurs ethical boundaries and becomes increasing conflictive, or in other words, a world where the gap between signifier and signified grows wider. Braidotti suggested a nomadic ethics that would be suitable to guide a world that increasingly merges the boundaries between humanity and technology, an ethics that operates within the paradigm of conscious activism. Braidotti’s activism is an ethical traversing of borders.

As I/we permeate boundaries and disrupt an individualist doctrine steeped in language we glimpse just how restricting phallic discourse is to our ways of being, of becoming and of consciousness itself and how ethical doctrines of individualism have clouded our gaze and rendered other forms of interpretation unreachable/unreadable, delegated to distant (un)memory. I/we (re)read a feminine ethics transformed from a template for moral practice into an ethics of being and becoming, a contemporary enabling of nomadic activism, writing/reading. Nomadic ethics underpins, supports and strengthens a (re)read of that which has already been written and actively infuses with it, to write/read within a new form of consciousness within which nomadic activism is entirely possible.

Nomadic ethics confounds boundaries and ethically informs strategies that write/read the non-nominal subject, as a permeable thread of an ethics of inclusion
that joins and supports forms of consciousness created by actively challenging boundaries. Reading/writing feminine consciousness and difference is an ethical becoming: Braidotti’s (2006) I/we cross the borders into forever to be unchartered territory, feminine consciousness in a conscious act of nomadic activism.

Nomadic ethics encounters a non-nominal I, consciously inclusive of, existence, of being, of equity, of care, of reading, writing a uniquely feminine genealogical consciousness(s) within activism, and remembers. This is different to active voice, which as we know works in peculiar ways to inscribe women with non-existent agency. A nomadic ethics joins forces/flows with the non-nominal I of middle voice and enables an ethical feminine consciousness that moves within the permeable abilities of that such a voice enacts, through boundaries and borders, an activism that subverts the phallic structures of the passively active. Within this context, nomadic ethics supports a feminine reading/writing practice by actively permeating yet another boundary by taking this practice into a conscious activism, an ethical place of becoming. It makes the reading/writing of text within the paradigm of the non-nominal an ethical practice and a guardian of, feminist care, jouissance, trauma, an ethics of the undiscovered and therefore unable to be colonised. Nomadic ethics connects the environmental, social and the psyche within an ethical ideology that defies boundaries, defies exclusion, includes all species the environment and defies essence itself. It defies exclusion simply because dichotomy is actively confused, categories read within a context of middle voice become infused with each other non-nominally, yet are not assimilated as both passive and active voicing does.

Yet nomadic ethics as a contemporary feminine ethics not only guides a conscious activism, but also within a transformative reading and writing practice that defies specularisation, philosophical forms of phallic being and the framing of
women and actively masochistic. It transforms object to the non-nominal subject, a subject that can read and write themselves within other ways of being in the world. I join fluid life forces within a non-nominal genealogy of becoming, rereading within/between the hyphen beyond His consciousness of which we are free to ebb and flow at will....

...web, matrix, river, fluidity, sound, writing, reading ebbing, flowing...

I take care reread, a care transformed, a feminine consciousness read/write within the borders of Ettinger’s (2006b) matrixial borderspace. Care now becomes an ethical state of being and/or becoming that defies doctrines of individuality, commodification, and paternity. Within a presence of dichotomous giving and receiving, care reinforces the split between mother and daughter required through language structure. (Re)written and (re)read, care allows for a unique feminine consciousness, fading and emerging from/within the page through interpretation of voice(s) merging the borders between giver and receiver. Care enabled through middle voice can be visually detected through Ettinger’s prism, an altered gaze. Light and direction are inextricably entangled with discourses of experimentalism, Christianity, colonisation and indeed liberalism, transformed and disoriented. This is a disorientation that has kept me silent, voiceless when I have spoken from a silent space within and beyond His unconscious. I/we have told my/our stories differently through discourses of heterosexuality, neurosis and psychosis, stories of inevitable splitting, through anamorphosis, I/we, Antigone, Jocasta, Demeter, Persephone, a little girl, a mother, an hysterical daughter, E/echo. Through a rereading of care, her/our memories, our traces are etched through encounter, transformed from her
canvas to the written word and these traces can be read and heard within the writings of patriarchy and separation…

I theoretically and consciously leave the sanctity, the space that Ettinger has created as a safe space in his unconscious to house my/our (un)memory shifting to a place of ethical becoming. I write my unique feminine difference, my unique form of consciousness and read it within an embodied fluid being that emerges and fades, ebbs and flows, in and out of his consciousness as an active ethical act of being subject. I no longer inhabit a parallel unconsciousness, where I can be uniquely different undetectably behind the mask, this is not the only space we, women have available to us. I shift within a genealogical consciousness, a borderspace that I can actively inhabit and leave at will.

...there is a chorus of voices getting louder and louder, almost singing...resonant, sometimes speaking together, sometimes not...becoming disjointed, breaking free of the constraints of phallic language structure...Demeter thinks back to something she once read in a folder labelled Chapter Three. How did Breuer describe ...?

A chorus of voices... “For alongside of the development of the contracture, there appears a deep-going functional disorganisation of speech. It first became noticeable that she was at a loss for words, and this difficulty gradually increased. Later she lost her command of grammar and syntax, she no longer conjugated verbs, and eventually used only infinitives, for the most part incorrectly formed from weak past particles; and she omitted both the definite and indefinite article...”

Laughter...the chorus resumes its babble...

“... I sense, I feel, I live, I love, I laugh, I cry, I care, carer, caregiver, patient, a little girl, a fear of shadows, a different paradigm, lost within the slippage
between the signifier and the signified I am, all, some, none, simultaneously, solitarily, interchangeably, exist, I am subject, I emerge, from the written word...I am heard... I am, fluidity, genealogy, ebbing, flowing. No commodities, plastic surgery to change my face, my body, my sex, you do not own me, you cannot sell me...because you can no longer define me in relation to yourself ...

...Demeter gently closes the folder. The voices continue, though they are silent now. She sighs. The sun emerges, enabled as she adds a subtle splash of sky blue to allow the diffusion of breath, scents of rich soil and sounds of water leaking through the thin dusty, orange curtains...it is warm, relaxing ...there are buds forming on the branches of the tree outside the office window... Persephone will be home soon...she sleeps...

Demeter wakes with a start...
Postscript:

A specular journey through Freud’s (un)conscious and beyond:

Transformations

An hysterical address given by Dr Persephone Smith at the Annual

Winter Conference of the Dark Continent

Underworld (Antiquity)

Mother, daughters, hysterics, women of theory, women of ancient Greece,

while you are all now here in voice and in varying manifestations of yourselves and others, although not necessarily in that order, or any order for that matter, I’ll take the opportunity to share how we come to be here, theoretically, for those of you who can’t remember.

(Laughter)

Thank you for accompanying me through this a journey of hysterical enquiry, prompted by the loss of a mother, my mother, your mother, our mother and still being with me in this latest version of an ending. I admit, when I started out, my mode of inquiry was deeply steeped within the phallic confrontations of philosophical encounter. However as this epic adventure, or series of adventures has continued, I have become aware that these philosophical encounters are necessities of linguistic assimilations and I like to frame these journeys in the context of mimesis, as a bystander or narrator or perhaps an artist, until we figure out a way to write it differently, our own encounters, not His encounter, His journey or quest for His lost mother.
Hence, it has been some years now that I have been searching through discourse for a way to remember a missed encounter, one of mother-daughter, not caregiver, patient. It appears now, that such an encounter(s) took/takes place, (un)memorable encounter(s) which I, with the help of you all, can now ‘envisage’ remembering. As I, the daughter, took my place as designated carer when my mother’s life was ebbing, our life was ebbing and through phallic discursive available structures, designated her to patient by default, a daughter became a voiceless spectator, watching, a bystander, a silent chorus, at her/our mothers ebbing, separated by a wall, a void, unable to comprehend within masculine consciousness what she/we I was/were experiencing.

How, could care as phallic, silence us in such a way, delegate our traces to His diachrony or His unconscious to be assimilated with His desires? Surely care, as has been claimed by us, is a consciousness that is uniquely ours. Care, is a uniquely feminine, a private pursuit, something that women do. So what has care become in that it is uniquely ours yet renders us voiceless? Care disappears with the mother and the framing of sexual difference as biological determinism, aiding assimilation and the signification of lack. So if care on the market, sold within the confines of its ethical terms of trade isn’t really care in that it seems dependent on assimilation, severance and disconnection, on isolation of a mother and her child, then where is it? Where is care? And what is it that in contemporary terms, women are uniquely attached to in the form of some sort of responsibility or moral practice. A contemporary care that is relatively new and difficult to define, stands alone, dampening the silent cries from the shadows, echoes, an empty signifier, severed from meaning, a severed encounter with a lost mother. Surely then, this (un)memory that simultaneously leaves, and marks, creates gaps, walls, voids, a vast empty
cavern in the very middle of my unified objectiveness, my split and mutilated being, must be related to the disappearance of the mother, and somewhat tenuously related to inscribed stages of grief, more something forever ongoing, something unable to be spoken and therefore not reachable, unconscious, never to be remembered.

I began reading the work of both Jacques Lacan and Sigmund Freud, as creators of my prison, my diagnosis, my objectivity and lack. There is an allure here, a charm. Lacan (1999) alludes to a missing jouissance, that woman is not whole, there is a part of Her that can be spoken, the rest of Her shrouded, masked, (somewhere) in (un)memory, unspeakable, of difference, of shadows, where care must be also, perhaps away from the restrictions of phallic discourse of, how He constructs His world, how He constructs us, individualised mirror images, and in doing so isolates us, separates us from each other, the mother from the daughter, packages and sells us. As Irigaray (1985a) suggests, we are women on the market, commodities bought and sold, indeed care on the market. Yet Lacan frames women’s dissection and the inaccessibility of embodied traces and genealogical memory as one of the sad necessities of life, the Oedipus complex as a linguistic scalpel, routinely performing genealogical disconnections of mother-daughter-mother, not so much to exclude, but to mindlessly facilitate phallic discourse, paternity and His transcendence into a subject. So although philosophy, Christianity and language structure insists that ‘I think therefore I am’, or ‘I am that I am’, Lacan suggests “I am not where I am the plaything of my thoughts: I think about what I am where I do not think I am thinking” (Lacan, 2006a, p. 518). Taken by the mysterious arrogance of Lacan and the astuteness of his thesis, I followed his advice and pursued the words of my fellow hysterics, our words, my words that he said were ignored by Freud. Fettered by the initial scope of inquiry, we journeyed through the depths of
the unconscious, through metaphor, metonym, synchrony, diachrony and perhaps even anachrony, each encounter, each trace shifting our consciousness, our being, becoming. In this way, we slowly expanded the scope of our terrain, journeying within specular parody, a metaphoric journey, in sight of his consciousness, scrutinising ourselves, myself as portrayed by Him. Yet always, we came across a wall, a public private divide, between work and life, madness and sanity, science and mythology, Man and God, a divide crucial to the production of phallic care as a dichotomy of justice, a wall impeccably maintained to a point of shabbiness, dangerous, solid and seemingly impenetrable, cavernous, specularised, dissected.

The walls of containers, empty containers, containing empty images... a world of boundaries, of borders, category upon category, bodies, souls, subaltern, sameness, closed and sealed against leakage, waterproofed. Uncrossable for Her, yet breachable through discourses of colonisation and specularisation, never going beyond the finiteness of the boundaries of His gaze, yet the frontiers pushing outward into the unknown, breaking through from compartment into compartment, transcendence upon transcendence, plundering and assimilating, in a never ending cycle of discovery, loss and appropriation. A place indeed that appeared to dictate what was remembered, packaged, labelled and stored in yet another of Freud’s many compartments that make up masculine unconsciousness and consciousness and what was cast into the abyss, into the uncategorised and yet to be colonised and therefore the place in Freud’s unconscious where that which can’t be spoken accumulates and assimilates, the lost object a’s. Still we journeyed, extending our gaze, search after search, as Hegel’s traveller within Freud’s cyclical discourses, initiating alternative pathways and widening the scope of inquiry/enquiry. Each time there are traces: if only She could remember them. So we continued observing, from transcendence to
madness and non-existence, travelling, witnessing, writing, negotiating impossible
counter after encounter, in an effort to remember.

We accompanied a mother and her son to the wall and stood with her on the
hyphen, as she tottered shakily above Freud’s abyss, having woven a tenuous
connection with alterity and Levinas’ paternity. An ultimatum, here, on the verge of
(un)memory only able to transcend if she succumbed to linguistic surgical
intervention and gave up her son in the name of the law of the father. We watched
sadly as she fell into (un)memory, that deep dark hole of assimilated forgetfulness
and simultaneously transcended into discourse as the phallic mother. We visited the
darkness of Schreber in an effort to explain our own hallucinations, our silence, a
constant hissing of voices, amazed by his intricate reality, his battles, painful battles
with existence, fleeting improvised men, body against soul, his sinthome. His
morphological confusions that kept him on the fringes of phallic consciousness and
masculine unconscious, the wall of language that guards the way between madness
and reality, a reality impeccably reasoned, yet another story of God and
transcendence. We listened to his voices, our voices, my voices, still we watched,
albeit unconsciously from a position created by Irigaray, a specular journey of self
discovery... we gazed upon the gaze...

We followed the silence hoping to find a place where it could be heard,
accompanied Freud back to ancient Greece, commodities, caskets, images, death and
silence, back to the Muses, to Iphenae, to Iphenedes, Hekate, to the Graces, the
Furies, the Nymphs, my mother, Demeter, to the origins of our being, of our life
force, of sound itself and then the wall became permeable, the wall between
masculine consciousness and feminine mythology and we were no longer spectators,
no longer a chorus, detached, opinionated, who watched, issuing silent prophetic
warnings. We somehow stepped out of the scope of our inquiry, through the wall, almost undetected, out of the terrain into a wilderness surmised by Rank (1914/1959), and became infused within a time where women could be spoken differently, in multiple forms of being, where multiple voices were not a sign of madness, but discursively possible within a more complex language structure that allowed for the inclusion of woman as subject.

Now knowing that language always leads us toward the light and transcendence, we journeyed towards the origin, deep into the shadows of Plato’s cave/hystera and found that a key to remembering, for us, could be sourced within/past the primordial shadows on the back of the cave and not toward the light. The cave was revealed as a specular monument to the appropriation of women’s bodies.

The fluidity of the origins of language has been argued by Irigaray (1985a), suggesting that there is a masculine rigidity, of the hard sciences, that discourses of fluidity can subvert. We write mother-daughter within fluidity, an ebbing and flowing, dependent on speech. When we speak, the gap widens and we become individual entities without connection, in silence, the gap closes and we become one or more (un)precisely, not one within an autonomous form of being that embraces us. We could speak this place from beyond the wall in a conscious act of mimesis.

Yet Ettinger’s (2006b) matrixial borderspace accessed this place, this fluid difference and rephrased (un)memory as uniquely feminine staking a claim to a newly identified structure or container within Freud’s unconscious. She creates shadows through her prism that add depth and texture, add difference, a place where memories escape His gaze, yet are accessible for us. Our shadows, primordial shadows, safe infinite spaces within the texture of her canvas/mask/matrix. As
artwork, it locates outside of masculine consciousness, perhaps, in a way beyond the wall, within a pre-consciousness, a place of continual spontaneous encounter, ‘now’ moments, until we articulate or think. Yet as I read it through the confines of masculine theories of psychoanalysis and not from a specular mimetic position, my gaze is lost, language colonised, taking over the space within our original scope of inquiry, represented through a theoretical rationality heavily dependent on Lacan, Levinas, Rank, Klein and Winnicott. Once categorised and labelled, language cannot reassimilate (un)memory with His lost objects, only confine it within solid borders and claim it within the very confines warned of by Irigaray, the colonised womb, the matrix, Plato’s cave. The paradigm of mainstream psychoanalysis through which Ettinger’s unique feminine unconscious is written, is dependent on solid impermeable borders and therefore cannot break through the wall of language without following discursive rules that relegate mother-daughter encounter (un)memorable. No matter how we subtly shift meaning and consider it within the context of sinthome, creating an alternative reality, that reality is trapped within phallic discourse.

Not only does Irigaray provide a place for observation outside of His consciousness, she also provides a theoretical framework to permeate the wall, and although within this paradigm, we still can’t speak of it or think of it, we are aware of it within a conscious silence, a default voice if you like, an astute trick with His mirrors, through mimesis. So through Ettinger’s ‘matrix’ we had a borderspace where we/she had managed to locate (un)memory through a skilful negotiation of mainstream psychological theory. So now there was some sort of locatedness and unique sexual difference, there was still a difficulty in retrieval, given that its location lay under siege, deep within the structure of masculine unconsciousness,
still a recipe for the manifestation of neurosis. Our problem lay in the philosophical concept of the unified subject, I, the relationship between self and other, the border, the hyphen, where being is dependent on the nominal and its relationship with the other, to initiate consciousness. In other words, individualism, and in the case of commodification, how to sell those categorised packages, specularised, colonised, plundered and reduced to empty signifiers, including care, through increasing entrenched discourses of liberalism.

Indeed phallic language has only an active and a passive voice, and in this way, individualism and philosophical ways of imagining being and consciousness are extremely limited. Language dichotomises, hence the dependence of self and other. This again, alerts us to the gap, that wall of language, where (un)memories are lost. Yet what if we rethink the problematic of traversing the gap within the context of ancient Greek women and discursive inter-changeability? So to remember that linguists suggest that there was once such a thing as middle voice where encounter could be spoken without the necessity of a separate self, was entirely possible and memorable. Indeed, the daughter can be spoken within an unsevered encounter with her mother and care remains constituted from its origins. She becomes carer, daughter and daughter/mother simultaneously, within an encounter that inclusively enables a non-nominal form of I. Being is reconstituted and consciousness shifts. And it should also be remembered, now we are able, that it should come as no surprise that language is based on solidity and rigidity when we consider that fluidity is documented through mythology as the origin of the life force of not only language and sound but the women of ancient Greece. If only we could write the matrix in a middle voice we once spoke before Hermes was written out of the script.
With being enabled by reading through/within the hyphen, the unspeakable, I re-read care within a paradigm of middle voice, not with the subtleties available within more complex languages, but within the paradigm of the interchangeability of ancient Greek women. For me, such a paradigm breaks down the system of categorisation and borders, skins and caskets, enabling an assimilation that allows for unique differences. No more splitting and a big task, to rewrite an entire language structure, a structure that will surely resist and assimilate... cyclically... Persephone pauses:

It is dark...Demeter sits by her daughter’s bedside, she fades and emerges, the mother, Demeter...the mother... Persephone, her daughter...us...I... she desperately fights sleep...her mother’s presence relaxes her. Yet if she falls asleep, lulled into a false sense of security, her mother will leave her side. If she wakes again soon, which she inevitably will, her mother will be gone.

Persephone wakes with a start: she is alone. It is dark, yet there is enough light to cast shadows, seemingly initiated from the moonlight filtering through the curtains. The shadows move, shift and change, always creeping towards her, never quite reaching her, the fear of what casts them and what they contain taking her to dark and dreadful places. The shadows do not correspond to anything visibly present in the room. Their borders shift: they loom larger and larger, and we might be tempted to interpret this movement as a malevolent primordial dance, if we didn’t now know that there is some confusion here with the direction of light and the consciousness it produces if she dare speak of her fear and confinement.

Persephone lays still, she knows that if she moves, her danger will be heightened; she cannot move out of the darkness that she occupies at this moment and this moment lasts forever, an hour, a night, a winter. She remains frozen:
moving out of the borders of her prison feeds the shadows that she fears, haunting (un)memory. They loom larger and closer. If she cries out, no one can hear her from the reality that she occupies at this moment. An eternity passes, winter, autumn, until sleep once again releases her into a phallic consciousness at dawn when the shadows slowly begin to fade, retreating only until darkness falls once again...

There is another way, but to run through the shadows requires courage over fear that she cannot muster on this long endless winter/night, where somewhere within a distant unconsciousness, her mother, Demeter waits within a desolate despair of loss and disconnection, or does she sleep within a different realm of consciousness, now unaware of her daughter’s pain?

Finally there is a glimmer of light. The shadows recede: summer is approaching. Persephone will sleep soon: when she awakes, her mother will be there, a consciousness within His unconscious, but a reprieve, nonetheless, although an awakening with an effable memory, neurosis, psychosis, deficit, object...

“Is that you dear?” Demeter murmurs.

“Yes, it’s us”, Persephone silently whispers.

Persephone sits by her sleeping mother’s bedside.

It is dark now. The room is filled with soft enveloping shadows and the comforting sound of Demeter breathing...Persephone is seated in the corner of the room. She fights sleep: if she loses this battle with consciousness, she may awake to find her mother gone, a lifeless body, silence, a wakeless sleep. If her mother is gone, then no dawn, no summer...nothing to call her back, no pathway left, to draw her safely through the shadows...
... The sound of Demeter’s breathing stops suddenly: Persephone freezes with fear once more....

“Is that you dear?” Demeter murmurs.

“Yes, I’m here” Persephone replies as her fear subsides.

“Yes, we’re/I am here”, Demeter whispers

Demeter sits at her daughter’s desk, Dr Persephone Smith, is on sabbatical, has gone abroad for the winter and is not expected to return until early spring: old habits die hard. She is surrounded by piles of paper, several stacks of brown manila folders, four empty coffee cups with countless microbes and miscellaneous piles of books, such as a copy of Lacan’s Seminar XX; Irigaray’s Speculum of the Other Woman; How to Assess the Moral Reasoning of Students: A Teacher’s Guide; Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity: Towards a Christian Empire; Women of Ancient Greece; OECD Working Paper 73; President Schreber’s Memoirs; Ettinger’s Matrixial Borderspace; 101 Ways to Cook Zucchinis, some Benjamin, de Marneffe, oh yes, Sharon Hays, Tronto, Gilligan. She selects a manila folder from one of the piles, Persephone’s old thesis chapter drafts...our stories...written each summer differently when Persephone returns...she opens a folder and begins to read aloud:

“Once upon a time there was a borderspace, stored deep within Freud’s unconscious, where women’s memories were safe... inaccessible, but safe, or so we are led to imagine ...yet, it must be remembered that the borderspace is descriptively enabled in part by Object Relations Theory, Klein, Chodorow, Winnicott, good-enough mothering, mainstream psychoanalytic theory...”
Demeter glances toward the window, framed University buildings, topped with thunder clouds. She lifts the dark clouds with hues of light blue and grey.

“...by permeating boundaries and disrupting the individualist doctrine steeped in language we get to glimpse just how restricting phallic discourse is to our ways of being, of becoming and of consciousness itself and how ethical doctrines of individualism have clouded our gaze and rendered other forms of interpretation unreachable/unreadable, delegated to distant (un)memory. (Re)reading/(re)writing a feminine ethics transforms discourses of moral practice into an ethics of being and becoming, a contemporary enabling of nomadic activism, writing, reading, enabling through permeating borders, through situatedness. Nomadic ethics not only underpins, supports and strengthens a (re)read of that which has already been written, but actively infuses with it, to write, within a new form of consciousness within which nomadic activism is entirely possible...”
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