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Re-Thinking Development in Conflict

Lessons and Impressions from the African Great Lakes

A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

Based on a review of contemporary development literature and substantial experience in relief work in the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa, this thesis asserts the need to ‘re-think’ development and relief work in conflict situations.

Recent ‘development’ has been a process of prescriptive global modernisation based on models created following World War II when periods of conflict and resolution were well-defined. Western ideas became institutionalised into the form that many international development agencies remain in today. Much development in practice is not only inappropriate, but also increases the vulnerability of poor communities and adds to the likelihood of conflict.

Colonial powers imposed western systems upon traditional orders, distorting and exploiting issues of kinship and ethnicity for short-term economic gain. With a focus on the South Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), and recent events in the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa, links between power, poverty and conflict are discussed and social and economic consequences examined.

Contemporary humanitarian emergencies are complex, caused by and resulting in a multitude of social, political and economic issues. Conflict permeates society, exacts a high toll on civilian population and further impoverishes vulnerable communities. Such emergencies require comprehensive solutions. Poverty and conflict, and accordingly relief and development work, are inextricably linked.

Localised long-term ‘vulnerabilities’, rather than short-term ‘emergency needs’, should be the focus of relief assistance. Peace is essential for true sustainable development, but the international community does not act as a cohesive whole for the elimination of global conflict and poverty. Some political leaders also promote conflict to their own ends. Therefore, continued conflict is a likelihood and appropriate interim interventions to safeguard community welfare must be continued.

NGOs and individuals have a crucial role and must remain committed and open-minded in order to promote truly beneficial development in a local context. Individual recognition of the historical, social and cultural dimensions of contemporary crises and understanding of the root causes of conflict are crucial for the effectiveness of international relief and development work towards long-term peace and local prosperity.
“American, French, I don’t care. When you start bombing the brown races of the world, you’re an Englishman. You had King Leopold of Belgium and now you have fucking Harry Truman of the USA. You all learned it from the English.”

Voice of Kirpal Singh

Michael Ondaatje
The English Patient
1993:286
I have written this thesis as both a personal learning exercise and to highlight ‘lessons and impressions’ gained from experience in international relief work in a conflict situation. Thus, I hope to make a small contribution towards refining global development practice and trust that the expression of such views may aid others in similar employ. I would have liked to have better understood the issues discussed within this thesis before commencing work in Africa myself.

The thesis is specifically written from the perspective of an expatriate, transient in a complex environment of profound culture and conflict. It is a philosophical discourse following a period of further research and reflection as opposed to the many technical reports that I have produced over this period in the field. With the benefit of hindsight, the actions suggested within this thesis may be somewhat contradictory to the purely ‘technical’ recommendations that I have previously proposed.

Having experienced a certain evolution of consciousness during the process of compiling this thesis, I understand that the international community does not, as a whole, act in favour of eliminating global conflict and poverty. Rather, it is the good will, knowledge and respect of individuals within their associated agencies that can effectively act to influence good change and combat poverty under a shadow of prevalent and recurrent conflict.

I have been a part of the conflict described on the following pages and I have felt the loss of colleagues and personal friends. As the final words of this thesis are typed, combat continues in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

Jonathan Andrews
Grafton, Auckland
25 November, 1998
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many people from both the local and expatriate communities in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo assisted with information for this thesis. They are too numerous to name here and an attempt to list key contributors is included within references following the main thesis text.

Much information is drawn from Oxfam publications. The work of Chris Roche from Oxfam’s Programme Development Team must be acknowledged and his model of ‘The Changing Emphasis of Support’ from his article on ‘Operationality in Turbulence’ has been used as a basis for Figure VII in Chapter 9 (Roche, 1994:18). The comprehensive review of ‘development’ by Gustavo Esteva (1992) is much referred to as a basis for Chapter 2.

Many sources of information were found to have a political bias, such as several quotes referred to by Dr. Theogene Rudasingwa, the current Ambassador of Rwanda to the United States. The author has attempted to exercise discretion in their selection and only uses quotes from the least emotive abstracts that he feels reflect the reality of the situation. Information is also drawn from American-run business data systems, and it is recognised that these sources are also not entirely objective nor complete.
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Figure 1. Map 1. The Democratic Republic of Congo
This thesis is about re-thinking approaches to development work in an environment of protracted conflict and poverty. Poverty and conflict are two inextricably related issues, connected as both cause and effect of each other. Development is often regarded simply as the process of escaping poverty. Thus, there is an obvious implication that correct development will also remove some of the causes of conflict. However, conflict is also treated as a short-term inevitability and this thesis explores ways of supporting essential development projects whilst war continues.

AIM

This thesis aims to further the philosophy of appropriate, sustainable development in conditions of prevalent and recurrent conflict. It is the intent of the author to demonstrate, by synthesising a review of historical ‘development’ with personal experience from the African Great Lakes region, that once accepted models of development are not appropriate and new methods of analysis and practice are required.

There are fundamental relationships between conflict, development and community welfare that all international relief agency staff should be aware of when working in such an environment. Thus, a further aim of this thesis is to illustrate recent ‘development in conflict in practice’ in South Kivu to influence the approach of individuals in order that their actions may be refined to achieve more appropriate, community centred interventions in the future.
"Probably no region on the African continent brings to the forefront the
difficult and quite often controversial themes of humanitarianism, human
rights, democratisation, economic reform, conflict resolution and
management, African renaissance., new African leaders, ... than the Great
Lakes region of east and central Africa" (Rudasingwa, 1998: 1).

Western influence over the world’s lesser-developed countries has historically been a
process of prescriptive global modernisation and indoctrination into western culture in
the name of ‘development’. Development, as conceived by the west, was perceived as
ultimately good, requiring cultural change and economic progress to bring all societies
into modern modes of production and consumerism.

Such development in practice has had dramatic effects. Colonial powers imposed
western economic systems and political administrative structures on traditional orders,
distorting and exploiting issues of kinship and ethnicity and promoting the power and
control of certain groups over others. These divisive policies were implemented in the
quest of short-term economic gain for the West without consideration of the social and
economic consequences for local populations.

These influences have given rise to regions of immense poverty and political instability
leading to long-term and ill-defined conflict. This conflict permeates society, exacts a
high toll on civilian population and further impoverishes vulnerable communities.
Contemporary humanitarian emergencies are complex, both caused by, and resulting in,
a multitude of social, political and economic issues. Resolution strategies are neither
obvious nor simple to implement.

During the mid-twentieth century, western conceptualisation of poverty and conflict
were institutionalised into numerous ‘humanitarian’ relief and development agencies.
However, since this period, two main issues have become evident. Firstly, the complex
nature of contemporary crises cannot be adequately addressed by such organisations in
their present form prescribing inappropriate, outdated and ineffective policies.
Secondly, many actions of these agencies have in reality further exacerbated poverty and conflict rather than serving to promote peace and prosperity.

Approaches of the international community must be adapted, and in some cases radically changed, to address the root issues of poverty and conflict in order that relief and development are achieved in a sustainable manner that truly relieves suffering and betters the lives of poor people.

Furthermore, the international community does not act as a cohesive whole for the elimination of global conflict and poverty. Rather, it is the combined good will, knowledge and open-minded and respectful attitudes of individuals that can effectively act to promote good change under the shadow of prevalent and recurrent conflict.

**STRUCTURE**

This thesis is divided into four sections. The first section, ‘Context’, includes an introduction of main themes and gives an overview of the study area in Chapter 1. Attempts to define the key issues of development and conflict with a historical review of development theory and global practice follow in Chapter 2, focussing on changing views of links between poverty and conflict. The second chapter also discusses how the standard accepted philosophies in the middle of the twentieth century became institutionalised into the form that most development agencies remain in today.

Section II – ‘Poverty and Conflict’ – is centred on the study area of South Kivu in detail. Within this section the third chapter examines the social, political and military evolution of the region under changing power structures from pre-colonial times to independence. Chapter 4 follows with a focus on regional events from 1993 to 1998, aiming to demonstrate the complexity of contemporary conflict. Chapter 5 summarises this section and, reading somewhat like an engineer’s report detailing sector pitfalls, is designed to illustrate the socio-economic conditions and community needs stemming from the superimposition of conflict upon an environment already suffering from long-term impoverishment.
The third section – ‘Development Actors’ - maintains a focus on the study area and gives a broad overview of institutions and development mechanisms in place in chapter six. The seventh chapter examines in depth some examples of these agencies in specific case studies, detailing their background philosophies and strengths and weaknesses.

Synthesis is attempted in Section IV by way of relating some of the author’s experience from relief and development work in areas of conflict. The penultimate chapter presents personal reflections and examples of issues and constraints on relief and development operations in such a context. The final chapter returns to the main issues discussed in the thesis, summarising key concepts and concluding with ‘lessons and impressions’ gained from the field and recommendations for individuals and the international community as a whole.

**METHODOLOGY**

This thesis draws upon a broad range of development literature but is heavily influenced by personal experience gained from exposure to poverty and conflict over a four year period in the African Great Lakes.

The idea of examining development practice in an ‘inter-conflict’ environment was conceived during relief and rehabilitation work in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) and a study outline was drafted in late 1996. During 1997, the structure of the thesis proposal was refined and much fieldwork adapted in order to gather information that would benefit ongoing implementation of projects and later be used as a basis of this thesis.

Notes from structured interviews and a formal ‘participatory rural appraisal’ (PRA) type exercise form the core of the sixth chapter, ‘Case Studies’, and contribute significantly to other sections of the thesis. As noted in the ‘Acknowledgements’, many people assisted with information and all material has been synthesised and included as objectively as possible.
Figure II. Map 2. The Study Area: South Kivu
THE STUDY AREA

Geography

The setting for this study can be geographically defined as the province of South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of Congo - formerly Zaire (see Fig. 2, Map 2). It is a region of physical diversity, ranging from the lush forests and high altitude plateaux of the Mitumba mountains to the low plains of the Ruzizi River and Lake Tanganyika. South Kivu, refers to the specific administrative area with the same official name.

Often, for the sake of brevity and fluidity, the Democratic Republic of Congo is referred to as 'the Congo' rather than constantly repeating the full name or, as also common, using the initials 'DRC'. The Democratic Republic of Congo refers to the territory that was under Belgian rule and should not be confused with the smaller neighbouring state of the Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), which was a French territory.

Chapters pertaining to most of the dictatorial rule of President Mobutu Sese Seko retain usage of the name 'Zaire' in lieu of 'the Congo'. The word was Mobutu's creation and came to signify many of the characteristics of his rule. Thus, 'the Congo' and 'Zaire' should be regarded as interchangeable throughout the text with the latter referring to a period from the early 1970s up to May 1997.

South Kivu forms part of the greater 'Kivu' area; the name given to an older administrative area of the Congo now comprising the three provinces of South and North Kivu and Maniema. 'Kivu' is sometimes used to denote this total area as much historic data refers to the three provinces combined. The Kivus also form part of the area referred to by the international news media and aid agencies as 'the Great Lakes' region of central Africa.

Other territories in the Great Lakes, notably Rwanda, are discussed in relevance to direct repercussions in the South Kivu area. For many, the African Great Lakes region has come to signify the large area overwhelmed by humanitarian crises in Burundi in
1993 and moreover, Rwanda in 1994. This is nominally the area that experienced significant population movements during this period and still accommodates hundreds of thousands of refugees today.

Geographically, the Great Lakes region includes the area bounded by Lake Victoria in the east and the great sweeping arc of the rift valley lakes from Albert (Sese Seko) in the north-east, south to Edward (Idi Amin, Virunga), Kivu and Tanganyika in the south west: an enormous territory encompassing Rwanda, Burundi and significant portions of Uganda, Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

**Populations**

South Kivu is currently home to approximately three million inhabitants of diverse cultural backgrounds. For the purposes of this thesis, the tribal make-up of South Kivu is treated as being comprised of the Banyamulenge Tutsi and the Bantu tribes of Bashi, Barega, Babembe, Banindu and Bafulero. However, it must be recognised that this classification is vastly over-simplified as the rich Kivu area has attracted migration from many groups over the centuries and many of the 200 tribes of the Congo are present.

Specific mention must be made of the Twa - a group of pygmy forest dwellers who are, due to their inherent pacific nature, often overlooked when issues of conflict are discussed. However, the Twa account for up to one percent of the population of Rwanda and Burundi and are numerous in the forest areas of South Kivu around the Mitumba chain of mountains and Kahuzi-Biega National Park.

**Socio-Economic Setting**

The vast majority of the people of South Kivu live in small, dispersed rural villages. Most Bantu people, including many of the families in the City of Bukavu and Uvira town, are engaged in subsistence agricultural activities - as opposed to the Tutsi who are a population made up principally of cattle herders. The Tutsi perhaps numbered 100,000 before the 1996 war in the high plateaux area of South Kivu (UNHCR,
1998:8), representing only three percent of the provincial population. However, they were responsible for much of the meat and dairy production - important sources of protein in the area. As Tutsi control much of the cattle in the region and are relatively inexperienced in agricultural practices, Tutsi and Bantu tribes appear to exist in a relationship of economic inter-dependence when times of relative peace permit.
CHAPTER 2
DEVELOPMENT AND CONFLICT

DEFINITIONS

Interpretations of the meaning of ‘development’ are many and varied. They range from the impressive, intellectual dissertations of professional development theoreticians to the curt ‘good change’ as defined by Robert Chambers in his book, *Whose Reality Counts?* (Chambers, 1997). Many contemporary texts on development admit that the concept defies definition and that the question ‘What is development?’ is rarely even coherently answered (Cowen and Shenton, 1995:27).

Development must be viewed as both means and goal, describing both the process and intent of action. The process of development, in terms of what it aims to achieve, can perhaps best be conceptualised as progress from a state of poverty towards circumstances of improved health, security and welfare. Movement or change, however, must not be over-emphasised as this assumes a pre-condition of impoverishment and, in reality, a certain resistance to change is sometimes the best approach to securing welfare.

‘Poverty’ in itself is an important concept with both objective and subjective dimensions. A family’s need for food, clothing, shelter and other basics may objectively determine a minimum standard of welfare to remain above a level of absolute poverty. “Absolute poverty,” wrote Robert McNamara, President of the World Bank, in 1978, is “a condition of life so limited by malnutrition, illiteracy, disease, squalid surroundings, high infant mortality, and low life expectancy as to be beneath any reasonable definition of human decency” (Oxfam, 1995:13). Yet, as a subjective concept, poverty is also discerned in relative terms, with the perception changing over time with no apparent relationship to genuine needs.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) refers to a ‘Human Development Index’ (HDI) as an indicator of the degree of national poverty. The HDI is composed of measures of life expectancy at birth, rates of literacy and school enrolment and real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita as indicators of living standards (UNDP, 1998). It is very important to recognise the enormous limitations of these measures as they fail to account for inequalities within the nation, the hidden worth and cost of informal activities and impact in the cultural context.

In this thesis the term ‘development’ is treated as meaning progressive ability to choose between options that influence human health, security and general well being. A developed society would therefore maintain this ability to make decisions regarding its own condition and a developing community would be progressing in its capacity to control relevant decisions and actions.

Implicit in this concept is the issue of “empowerment”- the need for knowledge in order that a group may be aware of options and consequently capable of making correctly informed decisions. Some argue that this implies that a developing community must be sufficiently developed in the first instance to be in the position to choose. This argument in itself indicates a need for external forces in initiating the empowerment process and is related to the rationale of some international development agencies, namely Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).

It should also be noted that otherwise ‘developing’ communities sometimes regress in their positions of control of health and welfare through external forces – often the very forces intended to develop them. A ubiquitous example of this is the World Bank’s ‘structural adjustment’ policies. Reforms frequently bring about cuts in expenditure on health and education and diminish government food subsidies (Hancock, 1991:56). Such ‘development’ designed for the greater good of the nation further impoverishes much of the population. Thus, development must be seen as having both positive and negative connotations.
A positive view of the possibilities of development should be maintained. Correctly supported, development should be a process of progressive community empowerment in the form of knowledge and ability to control factors influencing their lives with the aim of maintaining control over the basic human rights of subsistence and security.

The Changing Face of Conflict

"In the sense of dispute, conflict is universal in the politics of family, community and nation... [thus] any dynamic human system is by nature a conflictive one, encompassing the play of opposing interests" (Agerbak, 1991:27). Conflict may be construed as an outcome of competition - a natural and often beneficial occurrence. However, pertaining to this thesis, conflict is defined as the largely negative phenomenon of 'warfare' in the broader social context of violent confrontation between socio-political groups (Rønnefeldt, 1998:23).

"In 1911 the Encyclopaedia Britannica offered its readers a definition of ‘civilised’ warfare. Such activity, it suggested, was ‘confined, as far as possible, to disablement of the armed forces of the enemy; otherwise war would continue until one of the parties was exterminated’" (Oxfam, 1995:43). Commencing only three years later, and true to accepted perceptions of conflict at the time, World War I claimed only five percent of its casualties from the civilian population. However, in comparison, contemporary conflicts appear to be distinctly 'uncivilised' – or rather overly civilian oriented in that a vastly higher proportion of the resulting dead and maimed is from the civilian population.

Today's wars pervade communities. Combat is not confined to defined battlefields, nor are casualties largely restricted to military personnel. Rather, conflicts permeate society at all levels – homes, work places, fields and schools. More than 1.5 million children are thought to have died as the direct result of conflict between 1982 and 1992 - and a further 4.5 million left maimed and injured (UNICEF, 1993).
According to the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, the world experienced 52 major conflicts (in 42 countries) from 1993-1994, and another 37 countries experienced internal political violence. In this period ethno-political wars were responsible for 4 million deaths, most of whom were civilians (UNDP, 1994).

Many relief agencies refer to contemporary conflicts in the form of ‘Complex Humanitarian Emergencies’ (CHEs) or ‘Complex Political Emergencies’ (CPEs). Such emergencies are characterised by combinations of multiple causes such as resource scarcity, land rights, civil and ethnic violence, famine, disputed rule, displacement, non-respect of perceived rights or a breakdown of sovereignty. “CPEs are not temporary crises after which society returns to normal; they have long term structural characteristics and result from the failures of development” (Chamberlain, 1996:39).

Conflict, as with development, has a ‘poverty’ dimension as both possible cause and effect. Poverty, as a condition, is often a basis for conflict as communities compete for scarce resources such as water and productive agricultural land. Similarly, poverty is often exacerbated by conflict. Furthermore, as with poverty, the concept of deprivation is often subjective and fear of loss may also be cause for conflict.

Resource scarcity conflicts are often thought to be “initiated by rational state-actors calculating their interest in a zero-sum [win-lose] or negative-sum [lose-lose] situation” (Percival, 1998:5). Hostility may also be the outcome of ‘group identity conflicts’ triggered by large-scale movements of populations brought about by environmental change. “When different ethnic and cultural groups are propelled together under conditions of deprivation and stress, inter-group hostility may be mobilised as these groups come into competition” (Rønnfeldt, 1998:24).

THE HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT

Writing at the end of the 1820s, the Saint-Simonians were said to be the original positivists. “Their ideas were nurtured during the rise of industrial capitalism and, like Adam Smith, they posed the problem of creating order in a society undergoing radical
transformation... [They] argued that humanity was a collective entity that had grown from generation to generation according to its own law of 'progressive development'... a progressive amelioration of the moral, physical and intellectual condition of the human race” (Cowen and Shenton, 1995:32).

This thesis is concerned with more recent formalisation of development theory and, moreover, the subsequent practice of the past five decades of the 'development industry'.

**The Birth of Underdevelopment**

“We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. The old imperialism – exploitation for foreign profit – has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a program of democratic fair dealing” (Esteva, 1992:6).

These were words of Harry S. Truman in his inauguration speech as President of the United States on January 20, 1949. Through massive application of technology and industrial might the United States had, in its own eyes, won the Second World War. It was Truman’s impression that the same approach would now aptly serve to conquer global poverty.

It was the first time ‘underdevelopment’ had been used in such a politically auspicious context. Immediately the word became universally accepted, penetrating global intellectual and popular consciousness. “On that day two billion people became underdeveloped. In a real sense, from that time on, they ceased being what they were, in all their diversity, and were transmogrified into an inverted mirror of others’ reality: a mirror that defines their identity, which is really that of a heterogeneous and diverse majority, simply in the terms of a homogenising and narrow minority” (Esteva, 1992:7).
President Truman was reflecting the sentiments of the major paradigm of development philosophy at the time - 'modernisation theory'. Popular western thinking conceptualised an increasingly urbanised and literate society participating in a wider economic system, becoming more modernised and developed as a result.

Development, thus proceeded in an economic sense as the process of transition from one type of economic system to another - the most obvious example being the move from traditional village-based communities to a modern, urbanised, industrial society. A corresponding cultural change closely linked to certain ideologies of international relations was also implicit in this philosophy.

Development, in relationship to conflict, was viewed as a largely separate entity in the sequence of events (see Figure III). Following the resolution of conflict in war-ravaged Europe, relief and reconstruction to a state of sufficient modernity were seen as necessary pre-conditions for the development process to take off. It was also recognised that development and the eventual consequent reduction of poverty would help prevent further conflict.

![The 1949 View - Conflict to Development Sequence](image)

Figure III. The 1949 (post-war) view of Conflict and Development

It was not until the 1950s and 1960s that 'underdevelopment' or 'dependency theory' emerged as an alternative major paradigm of development philosophy. Contrary to
modernisation theory, ‘underdevelopment’ was not seen as a primeval condition but rather a function of a nation's exploitation by the more developed world. Nevertheless, Truman did make reference to an issue that could have been interpreted as recognition of some of the basic principals of dependency theory when he stated that, “The old imperialism – exploitation for foreign profit – has no place in our plans” (Esteva, 1992:6). Many would say, however, that Truman had a ‘new imperialism’ in mind.

Development Institutionalised

Following the Second World War, the United States led the western world in an effort to combat world poverty. Some refer to “the great achievements of humanitarian law of this century - most of them gained in the period 1945-51 by men and women driven by the visceral shock of Auschwitz and Dresden” (de Waal and Omaar, 1997:1). However, it was not only post-war euphoria and purely altruistic concerns over the wellbeing of the less fortunate driving the United States, but rather the perception that poverty posed a threat to world peace and to the overall interest of the US and allied nations.

The United Nations (UN) officially came into existence on 24 October 1945 with a charter ratified by China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom the United States and a majority of member states. Even as early as 1946 the UN Temporary Social Commission on Social Affairs was stating, “At least half the peoples of the world are living, by no fault of their own, under such poor and inadequate conditions that they cannot, out of their own scanty resources, achieve decent standards of living. The deep gulf existing between the standards of living of different nations and peoples are, in the opinion of the Commission, a main source of international discontent, unrest, crisis and, in the last resort, are causes of wars untimely endangering and devastating countries of high as well as low standards of living...” (de Senarclens, 1998:191).

In order to implement Truman’s ‘bold new program’ of industrial progress for ‘underdeveloped areas’, the late 1940s and 1950s saw the birth of an enormous range of western development plans and agencies. The Marshall Plan had been launched in
1947 by the United States to provide relief and reconstruction assistance to a war-ravaged Europe thus limiting the establishment of communist influence. The plan provided large-scale international economic aid as an open manifestation of US political strategy.

In 1949, Truman continued with the anti-communism strategy for the rest of the world with the launch of his famous ‘Point IV Programme’. Point IV heralded the birth of large-scale technical-assistance projects for the entire underdeveloped world. Shortly afterwards the theme was universally adopted and the Technical Assistance Programme (TAP) officiated throughout the United Nations system.

**Figure IV. The Institutionalisation of Development Philosophy**

“Point IV aspired to the dissemination of the American model by showing the way to a future of ‘abundance and liberty’. It proposed sharing ‘knowledge and capacities’, sending advisers or missions of experts to governments and business; participating in the financing and administering of public services; creating research centres and laboratories, as well as pilot projects, training researchers and university graduates; promoting the
exchange of students; distributing publications and films – in short, propagating the American social and cultural system thought the dissemination of the knowledge and techniques that allowed it to function” (de Senarclens, 1998:191).

Selling the concept of liberty and consumerism to the underdeveloped world was not difficult. The practice of technical assistance was also an efficient way of raising the global profile of American ideals and could be easily controlled by the US as it was mainly driven by western countries. Investment was minimal compared to potential returns. Experts, focussing on the introduction of modern technology, lay the foundations for sales of goods and machinery manufactured in western markets.

Technical assistance in this form demanded profound social, institutional and cultural change and had major political implications. However, at the time there appeared to be a universal denial that technology and political order could possibly be related. Even today, technical assistance is often presented, and seemingly accepted, without recognition of potential social or political concomitants.

The United States was institutional in the creation of modernistic development practice and, with a high global military and economic profile maintained through the advancement of technology, continued to control the shape of international development practice into the 1960s. Gross National Product (GNP) dominated the 1950s and 1960s as the universal indicator of ‘development’. W. Arthur Lewis, a prominent American economist, wrote in 1955 that, “First it should be noted that our subject matter is growth, not distribution”, [reflecting] the mainstream emphasis on economic growth that permeated the whole field of development thinking” (Esteva, 1992:12). Development had become even more destitute than it was directly following Truman’s speech, reduced now, by its foremost advocates, to mere ‘economic growth’.

In the late 1940s, Latin American representatives of the UN contested the US designed structures of development by international trade and started to demand another form of economic aid. This culminated in a submission to the UN Administration for Economic
Development and an official request to the UN Assembly by the Chilean Representative in 1952 for an alternative Development Fund (de Senarclens, 1998:196).

Much preferring the mechanisms of the World Bank as it was largely under their control, the US opposed all proposals for alternatives and consistently asserted the need for adherence to the plan of creating offshore environments favourable for investment. The US maintained considerable global influence throughout this period with military budgets escalating due to the East-West confrontation, decolonisation conflicts and the Korean War. However, they did finally concede to the creation of an ‘expanded technical assistance programme’ (ETAP) in 1958 under the direction of the former Administrator of the Marshall Plan. In 1965 this programme was merged with the UN Technical Assistance Programme to become the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (de Senarclens, 1998:196).

The social consequences of economic development were largely downplayed during the 1950s. Reports tended to focus on the successful rapid growth of GNP and insinuated that social conditions were also improving with development. However, social service specialists became increasingly outspoken against purely economic growth with the controversy finally inspiring action on the political agenda in 1963. The UN then created the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD). The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), in a resolution of 1966, also recognised the need to harmonise social planning with economic development (Esteva, 1992:13).

Though now officially part of the terminology, ‘social development’ enjoyed only a secondary role and was seen as a minor constituent of the development process that continued to be dominated by a fixation for economic growth. Social issues were often seen as obstacles to the overall development process and the need for social development was only accepted if it would bring about favourable pre-conditions for economic growth (de Senarclens, 1998:200).

The first UN Development Decade (1960-1970) was conceived and proceeded very much along a trajectory defined almost entirely by economic growth. Modern
technology was imposed on highly inequitable systems. The ‘green revolution’
promoted improved seeds and technology but only large farmers were able to take
advantage of the new techniques and often consolidated their holdings. Consequently
small producers were displaced and, with the overall decline in the demand for labour,
the poor became more marginalised (Oxfam, 1995:19).

By 1970, the fact that development was leaving behind a trail of social inequity, poverty
and, in some cases, economic regression, became too obvious to ignore. The World
Bank itself seemed to support the growing theoretical revolt against the use of purely
economic criteria and admitted that more measures than GNP were necessary (Esteva,
1992:13). However, as no consensus on an alternative measure could be reached, GNP
remained as the universal indicator of development.

The Second Decade of Development then started with economic and social aspects
theoretically merged into a ‘unified approach’ recognising such key issues as
environment, population and women. The concepts of ‘integrated’ and ‘participative’
development were introduced and many catchwords coined that still prevail in
contemporary development talk. The Second Decade gave rise to many new
professional development specialist posts, yet was not overly successful for the
proposed beneficiaries in the developing world. “The key candidates for unification
were constantly in dispute, arising from the old controversy over priorities and the day­
to-day disputes among bureaucratic bodies for survival and allocation of resources”
(Esteve, 1992:14). Harmonious development action on the economic and social front
never actually occurred.

The ‘Basic Needs Approach’ was introduced in 1976 by the UN International Labor
Organisation (ILO). Documents supporting the approach were explicit in their
recognition that development was producing many negative effects and would not, in
itself, eliminate world poverty. The approach called for directly dealing with each of
the basic needs of society rather than expecting needs to be satisfied by the trickling
down of benefits from development. Many experts, governments and agencies,
including the World Bank, supported the approach and it maintained popularity for
several years (Esteva, 1992:15).

Acknowledgement of the characteristics of individual societies was attempted during the 1970s with the concept of ‘endogenous development’ put forward by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). However, with the principal theory and practice of the development industry fuelled on the ideal of creating a global economy and culture, UNESCO’s notion was eventually recognised as a contradiction of terms by its original instigators and quietly withdrawn (Esteva, 1992:15).

An atmosphere of pessimism prevailed throughout the 1980s despite Asia demonstrating what many refer to as ‘textbook development’ through rampant economic growth and social change. Many other countries abandoned previous efforts and even actively dismantled projects. This period is sometimes labelled the ‘lost decade for development’ but heralded the start of post-development, or at least ‘post-structural’, thinking (Esteva, 1992:13).

At the end of the 1980s, as the ‘Cold War Era’ faded, so did the drive for ‘development’ to influence governments and secure territory in the name of capitalism or communism. The post-World War II bipolar environment became one of an undefined form of multipolarity, or as some argue, in a condition of unipolarity dominated by an unchallenged, victorious United States.

Yet today development continues. Hundreds of thousands of people are employed and many billions of dollars are spent each year in its pursuit. “It would be difficult to find a single nation state in the North which does not have its departments or ministries of local, regional and international development. Nor can any Third World nation expect to be taken seriously without the development label prominently displayed on some part of its governmental anatomy” (Cowen and Shenton, 1998:27).
New Thinking and the NGO Movement

Around the time of the formation of the UN and the Second World War, a movement of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) also emerged, registering as charities, raising money and implementing assistance for the world’s displaced and poor. NGOs, as non-political entities, found themselves in the position of being able to campaign against government and UN decisions in the interest of relieving suffering arising in any part of the world as a result of wars or other causes.

When the Allies imposed a naval blockade on Nazi occupied Greece in 1942 and no food or medical supplies could get through, even to civilians, 2,000 people were dying of starvation every day. The Oxford Committee for Famine Relief was one of a number of groups set up around the UK aiming to highlight the problems created by the blockade, and requesting that relief be sent to those in most urgent need. Following the war, Oxfam continued assistance for war refugees and displaced people (Oxfam, 1998:2). Many other NGOs, such as CARE (USA) also originated during this period.

NGOs presented to the general public a different picture of poor people to that depicted by the UN and governmental system. Whereas in the UN Assembly and ECOSOC “there was frequent criticism of the internal structures of the underdeveloped countries, stressing the consequences of certain cultural traditions and the social disparities that they encouraged” (de Senarclens, 1998:193), NGOs looked to local people and systems, not as the problem, but as part of the solution. NGOs started to explore the root causes of poverty and suffering and the role of the West in creating and potentially solving, poverty in the ‘Third World’.

In the 1960s, increasing affluence of the West and growing realisation and concern for the world’s poor among the general public, led to an extraordinary growth of NGOs. Throughout the 1970s, further new ideas and theories were put forward about development and poverty. NGOs led the movement to respect and realise the capacity of local people and refugees themselves, employing them in-situ rather than international expatriate staff. Principles of community involvement and control were
emphasised and support of traditional ‘coping mechanisms’ began to be included into assistance projects rather than imposing modern western ideas (Oxfam, 1998:2).

In the 1970s it became clear to the NGO world that many of the problems associated with poverty required changes in government and international policy. NGOs began to campaign on behalf of people in developing countries. Campaigns included issues such as food aid, child labour, gender equity, land reform, essential drugs and pesticides. The structural causes of poverty in developing countries, such as crippling debt burdens, unfair terms of trade and inappropriate agriculture practices and policies were openly challenged. Often campaigns argued against current practices of UN member state governments and renowned institutions such as the World Bank.

By the 1980s, as many of the failures of the past three decades of development became evident, an increasing allocation of relief funds became available and many development budgets reduced. NGOs were active as proponents of change and also in working where the UN could not. “During the Cold War, when the UN was constrained by considerations of national sovereignty, NGOs attempted to supply humanitarian aid in contested areas. NGOs were implementing and rushing in “where soldiers and bureaucrats feared to tread” in areas where multilateral and bilateral agencies were unable or unwilling to get involved, such as controversial cross border operations (Chamberlain and Goodhand, 1996:40).

The annual turnover of many larger NGOs was running as high as $US 100 million during the 1980s and 1990s. Global media widely portrayed gruesome images of the suffering and dying in Ethiopia, Sudan, the Horn of Africa and Rwanda. The public gave generously in unprecedented amounts and initiatives such as Bob Geldof’s Band Aid and Comic Relief further helped bring global issues into public consciousness and raise significant revenues for NGOs.
Failed Development

"Could it be that the relative failure of aid, or at least our disappointment with the effectiveness of aid, has something to do with our materialist philosophy which makes us liable to overlook the most important preconditions of success, which are generally invisible?" (Schumacher, 1973:136).

Perhaps the preconditions Schumacher referred to were nothing at all to do with western perceptions of economic growth. Certainly the model hasn't worked. Severe poverty and conflicts and more prevalent after four decades of 'development' than prospects for support to long term growth. More than half of the UN budget today is directed towards emergency relief - up from one quarter in 1989 (Duffield, 1994:5). Again, as cause and symptom, the ability for development agencies to pro-actively engage in 'preventative' development work to strengthen local peace keeping and reconciliation efforts has been eroded as funds are diverted from traditional development budgets towards emergency work.

The Relief-Development Dichotomy

The classical view of emergency relief and longer-term development as two discrete modes of operation applicable in two distinctly different environments has become institutionalised. There are many factors blocking the evolution of programmes as most agencies are set up as either relief or development entities - not both or transitional. A classic example exists within the United Nations with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) responsible for development, and the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) embracing a mandate of emergency life supporting assistance and protection of refugees.

Many NGOs also view themselves specifically as 'emergency relief organisations', such as Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) which specialise in short term 'first phase' inputs and follow a policy of rapid withdrawal once conditions stabilise.
As an improvement, Oxfam recognise its capacity in both relief and development but tend to divide responsibility as separate functions into departments that often appear to compete. “Reviewing the experience of development agencies suggests that it is three or more years before any conflict-related programme progresses beyond crisis into an effort to address development in conflict” (Agerbak, 1996:27).

**Summary**

The international development industry is still heavily influenced by the political policy of the United States through its global military and economic dominance. The World Bank, in its own words ‘traditionally’ has an American as its Chairman (World Bank, 1998:3). Similarly, other western governments are still blatant proponents of global structuralism. Many specify employment of their own nationals and technology as criteria for their contributions to world equality.

The US and allies fought the Second World War with an enormous mechanised, technical army and finally forced ‘resolution’ with application of the ultimate technology of the age – the atomic bomb. The US applied massive technical assistance to relief and the reconstruction of Europe with the Marshall Plan and carried on to crusade for further development with technical assistance programmes – convincing the entire western world to follow the model.

The perception of emergency relief and development work as separate entities continues to characterise most approaches to development in practice and the west still appears to be obsessed by ‘modernisation’. It seems surprising that after 50 years, in which this approach has demonstrated so many obvious failings, that it is still nearly universally accepted.

However, it is refreshing to see an alternative force emerging in the shape of international and local NGOs. These agencies, less concerned with the vagaries of international and domestic politics when human lives and livelihoods are at stake, command respect in public opinion and with most governments. They demonstrate a
more realistic appreciation of the real needs of the world's poor and help to implement governmental strategies if viewed as beneficial to positive development. Moreover, they also maintain the capacity to campaign against the UN and powerful governments when their policies are spurious and perhaps even inducing the need for subsequent emergency relief.
A BRIEF HISTORY

This chapter discusses the people and history of the South Kivu area as pertinent to the regional conflict under discussion, including Rwanda, Burundi and the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

History of movements of people in this area of Central Africa refer to two distinct population groups; the Bantu peoples who are believed to have originated in north-west Africa, and the Nilotic peoples of north-east Africa from the Ethiopia, Horn of Africa area (Davidson, 1978:276). This thesis maintains these classifications for consistency with associated texts and, as discussed in Chapter 1, the tribal make-up of South Kivu is treated is a simplified manner as being comprised of Banyamulenge Tutsi of Nilotic origin and various Bantu groups.

Pre-Colonial Times

The original human inhabitants of the South Kivu area are believed to have been Twa Pygmies who were marginalised and forced into forest areas when Bantu tribes migrated from the north-west of Africa in search of agricultural land between 500 BC and 1000 AD (Congonline, 1998). Bantu is a broad classification for many central, western and eastern African peoples including the South Kivu tribes of Bashi, Barega, Bafulero, Banindu and Babembe and the Hutu of Rwanda and Burundi (UNHCR, 1998:8).
The arrival of Nilotic peoples, migrating from the northeast of the continent, can be traced to between 1400 and 1700 AD. As opposed to the Bantu, the newer immigrants were tall, nomadic, cattle herding pastoralists, and came to North and South Kivu in search of cattle grazing lands. Finding the higher regions in the area and much of Burundi and Rwanda suitable, they settled. Originally classified as two groups, Hima and Tutsi, descendants were all later labelled as ‘Tutsi’, perhaps simply for convenience by the colonial powers (Davidson, 1978:276). This thesis also refers to the term ‘Tutsi’ in order to maintain consistency but there appears to be a recent resurrection of the term ‘Hima-Tutsi’ in topical debate in a context of possible attempts to recreate an African empire (Rudasingwa, 1998).

The Nilotic and Bantu peoples came to live together in the Great Lakes and, with their modes of production as agriculture or livestock raising well defined, appear to have cohabited peacefully in a relationship of mutual respect and economic inter-dependence. Before colonial rule in Rwanda, ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ were not ethnic groups as they exist today. However, due in part to their monopoly on cattle, Tutsi generally inhabited higher lands near natural pastures and, managing to organise society to their benefit, became rulers through economic dominance over their Bantu neighbours. Thus by the end of the seventeenth century, much of present day Rwanda was a network of virtual kingdoms with Tutsi in command (Kearne, 1998:3).

But the relationship between different peoples was complex and always liable to change. At the hub of the Rwandan State was a powerful court, based on Nyiginya (Tutsi) lineage. In the countryside, Tutsi were cattle owners and representatives of the court whilst Hutu were farmers. “Hutu could, and did, become Tutsi as chiefs were incorporated into the ruling elite, or farmers became wealthy and acquired cattle. Rwanda was certainly an unequal society, but the ethnic boundary was permeable, and Nyiginya Tutsi dominance was mitigated by social institutions that gave much authority to certain Hutu chiefs, and imposed certain obligations on Tutsi administrators” (de Waal and Omaar, 1997:2).
Although little violence is believed to have occurred during this period, the concept of 'Tutsi aristocracy' and perhaps the first inklings of 'Hutu resentment and inferiority', were well established before the area was colonised by Europe. All Tutsi came to be considered to be more powerful though greatly inferior in number. Yet not every Tutsi was rich and powerful because of owning cattle, as there were many poor Tutsi with a similar socio-economic status as many Bantu (Prunier, 1995).

EXTERNAL INFLUENCE

The Congo Colonised

As early as the 1480s, Portugal established diplomatic relations with the Kongo Kingdom in the western Congo basin. Representatives of the kingdom visited the Vatican soon after and the kingdom adopted Roman Catholicism. Between 1500 and 1800, Arab, Portuguese and other European traders visited the region in search of slaves, which they often purchased from regional leaders (Shillington, 1989:311). Between 1875 and 1879 the ex-American British explorer Henry Morton Stanley performed reconnaissance missions and eventually established much of the Congo as an outpost for King Leopold II of Belgium.

"As ruler of Belgium from 1869 until his death in 1909, Leopold II was said to be an ambitious and energetic leader of his small nation. This ambition led him to seek an empire in Africa, where he secured an area sixty times the size of Belgium. Unlike other colonial efforts, the Congo Free State was not actually annexed by the state itself, but was, in fact, Leopold's personal fiefdom to do with as he pleased" (Shillington, 1989:313).

At the time, the local system of African kingdoms was losing control and it was not difficult for Leopold’s new political system to be imposed, but his coercion tactics were often brutal. Stanley, by then renamed by the Congolese as ‘Boula Matari’ (Breaker of Rock), concluded treaties with 450 local chiefs. King Leopold was personally financing Stanley’s expeditions and was keen to pursue exploitation of the vast economic
resources. He began to sign deals with large private companies, who, upon payment of sizeable advances, received vast concessions for palm oil and rubber plantations and copper exploration areas. In 1885, at the Berlin conference, where European colonial powers sought to divide up Africa amongst themselves, Leopold managed to convince the conference that the Congo was his private property.

In order to recoup investment in Leopold’s Congo, companies required an enormous workforce and exploitation of the local population commenced in earnest. Many were forced to work on plantations and deliver certain goods in the way of taxes (Davidson, 1978:120). Abuses of the local Africans were multitudinous. There are many reports of inhuman acts, such as severing the hands of workers who failed to meet the rigid ivory and rubber production quotas imposed by Leopold’s agents (Kakutani, 1998:1).

At the start of the 20th century mistreatment multiplied to the point that, between 1885 and 1908, it is believed that up to 8 million Africans perished in the Belgian Congo (Kakutani, 1998:1). The Congo proved to be valuable to some, but it was at a horrendous expense to the Congolese people.

As Leopold’s excesses became exposed and international criticism of the harsh treatment of the indigenous people under his rule became common knowledge, Belgium was forced by Great Britain and the United States to assume control of the Congo Free State. The colony was then renamed the Belgian Congo. At the time the burden of the Congo had grown to gigantic proportions on Leopold and he did not hesitate to merge his interests with the Belgian State (Shillington, 1989:315).

Even under the new regime the Congo was submitted to a period of merciless economic exploitation. Practically all education and medical assistance was left to the missionaries. There was no question of preparing the country for independence. The linguistic conflict that already divided Belgium was also reflected in the composition of the Congolese administration. Most senior staff were Francophone; Flemish speakers occupied lesser posts. Even if a Congolese advanced well in education, it was
practically impossible for him (and never her) to receive anything but a very junior post in the colonial administration (Davidson, 1978:273).

The new authorities constructed railways and roads and stimulated the agrarian and mining sectors. Inspired by the indirect rule of the English, the Belgians in the Congo charged local chiefs with the responsibility of road maintenance – for which chiefs were paid a levy directly from the Government of Belgium. The Belgian Colonial Army created a special cadre, the Force Publique, designed from the onset to suppress uprisings caused by maintaining a system of forced labour and the introduction of a new fiscal system that made monetary taxes compulsory for all (Congonline, 1998).

The Colonial Empire of the Belgian Congo continued following the second world war and the industrial push, initially justified by the ‘war effort’, continued. Although the severity of rule over Africans was somewhat more relaxed than in the late 1800s, and some facilities, such as missionary hospitals, had been constructed to benefit African workers, they still toiled virtually under conditions of forced labour. “A highly centralised administration accustomed to regard Africans as ‘adult children’, marched firmly with a narrowly monopolistic system of economic extraction: by the middle 1950s, 3.17 percent of employers had 51.15 percent of the wage-earning labour force” (Davidson, 1978:273).

Industrialisation and plantations demanded much labour and the eastern Congo saw significant population movements in this period as workers moved from villages towards mining, commercial, industrial and plantation areas. Although some efforts were made by the authorities to control this, slums and shantytowns grew rapidly in and around busy centres. Menfolk left rural villages for extended periods and traditional communities were undermined. Rural populations were further impoverished through losing necessary labour. More often than not, wages won were spent in town areas before they could reach their families. Modern industrialisation and commercial export-oriented agriculture consequently impoverished much of the country.
For the Congolese African community, travel was banned and most schools followed an extremely paternalistic Catholic missionary style. The *Force Publique* continued to control internal security and, even in 1960s, contained no African members. City areas, such as the Central Quarter of Ibanda in Bukavu, were zoned as exclusively for whites and African workers required pass cards. Altogether, an enforced deprivation of experience with internal and external issues greatly hindered African development of modern political strategies.

**Ruanda-Urundi**

At the Berlin Conference in 1885, European powers allocated Ruanda-Urundi to Germany. Germany at the time occupied Tanganyika (later to become Tanzania) to the east, however scarcely any Europeans had been to Ruanda-Urundi at the time. In 1896 Germany set up its first Ruanda-Urundi outpost with less than 100 colonial personnel as military-administrators. The White Fathers Order of the Roman Catholic Church also arrived in Ruanda-Urundi at this time to stake their religious claim in the area and, as colonial administration was meagre, quickly managed to obtain extraordinary influence.

Although Tutsi and Bantu were cohesive through the common culture of language, religion and music, and the system had evolved to an apparent state of consistency and acceptability by all, the colonial rule transformed this pattern and promoted the Tutsi as privileged intermediaries in their rule. “No mere cynical ‘divide and rule’ strategy, this intervention reflected the racist thinking that was axiomatic of European imperialism. Since the European conquerors held that no civilisation could have existed in black Africa, the centralised state of Rwanda was an anomaly that challenged a premise of colonial legitimacy” (de Waal and Omaar, 1998:2).

Anthropology books written about European groups in the 19th century contained many theories about racial origins. “With this ‘bogus science on Africa’ popular European consciousness considered all Negroid peoples to be inferior, but with some more inferior than others” (Kearne, 1998:3). The fantastical theory of the so-called ‘Hamitic hypothesis’ existed in Europe at the time and purported that “all ‘civilised’
institutions in central Africa were the result of an invasion by ‘Hamites’ - variously identified as ‘black Caucasians’ and ‘African Aryans’” (de Waal and Omaar, 1998:2). Tutsi were thus considered by colonial soldier-administrators and bishops to be Hamitic and therefore approaching civility.

“In the period from 1910 to 1940, the White Fathers, led by Bishop Leon Classe, further developed this Hamitic ideology. Classe and his acolytes then rewrote Rwandese history to conform to it, designating the Tutsi as Hamites, inventing a Christian origin for them, and arguing that they were ‘lapsed’ Ethiopians destined for a privileged place in Christian evangelism. The theory coincided neatly with colonial anthropologists’ quest for racial topologies (sic). Tutsi were on the whole taller, thinner, and more ‘European’-looking than Hutu. [Thus,] Hamitic ideology legitimised a rigid pseudo-racial hierarchy which had profound and long-reaching political consequences. The elevation of the Tutsi meant the relegation of the Hutu to the status of Bantu serfs, and of the Twa to the lowest position of aboriginal ‘pygmoids’- supposedly remnants of an earlier stage of human evolution” (de Waal and Omaar, 1998:3).

In 1916, during World War I, Belgium’s colonial army from the Congo to the west took Ruanda-Urundi from Germany’s meagre forces and proceeded to administered the region under a League of Nations mandate in much the same way that a colony was run. Following World War II, Belgium oversaw the region as a United Nations trusteeship, with full recognition of international pressures and obligatory legal procedures in preparation for independence (Vassal-Adams, 1994:8).

Under Belgian rule, Tutsi privileges increased and their dominance was extended. The Belgians further required that the entire population of Ruanda-Urundi be registered as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa and created a system of compulsory identity cards. However, as racial classification had never previously been well defined, the authorities eventually chose cattle ownership as their gauge. People with 10 or more cows were designated as Tutsi, in perpetuity, and those with fewer than 10 became Hutu.
Hence the politics of aesthetics played a large part in the nature of colonial administration in Ruanda-Urundi. The Germans furthered and legitimised domination of the Tutsi minority who represented only 15 percent of the population. This policy of indirect rule appeared, however, to work better in Rwanda with its more defined and effective royalty. In Burundi, the colonial administration never really managed to gain full control of all the small competing chiefdoms.

**THE COMING OF INDEPENDENCE**

**Independent Congo**

Due to heavy repression very few Congolese appreciated the concept of nationalism. Rather, the theme of numerous public protests in the 1950s was based upon defence of interests within ancestral charters - traditional systems of belief and loyalty. Towards the end of the 1950s a blend of nationalism and traditionalism evolved and was preached by the few educated and experienced Africans such as small traders, clerks and schoolteachers. However, within the terrain of the Congo, many conflicting traditional parties vied for some form of power and the notion of a single Congolese "nation" was not the underlying tenet (Davidson, 1978:274).

In 1959, a serious clash in the colonial capital, Léopoldville (Kinshasa), left 49 dead after police and the *Force Publique* opened fire on angry protesters. This was, for the oppressed and peace-enforced Congo, a significant security incident. Immediately thereafter Belgium changed tact with its political stance and appeared to support a rapid hand-over to political independence. However, it is probable that Brussels may have been calculating that an abrupt hand-over to many diverse, inexperienced, conflicting parties may have been the best way of prolonging colonial rule.

In any case Belgium supported moving political control to Africans and when a few of the local parties actually coordinated to express their wish for national independence by January 1961, Brussels did not resist but actually advanced the date to June 1960.
"Independence came, and, as tension after tension erupted through the frailties of a regime without unity or roots, chaos came with it. Only one political movement now showed itself as possessing the vocation and the actual or potential support, rising above the rival leaderships of regions or nationalities, that could be capable of welding a Congolese national framework" (Davidson, 1978:275). This was the Mouvement National led by Prime Minister Partrice Lumumba.

However, Lumumba could not control the situation and civil conflict escalated. The newly independent nation rapidly fractioned with Katanga, a mineral rich province to the southeast, seceding under Moise Tshombe and the South Kasai, under Albert Kalondji. Lumumba and his president, Kasavubu, called for UN military and international aid. Some contingents arrives from Ghana, Nigeria and Ethiopia and international interest grew in the mineral-rich southern areas. Lumumba unsatisfied with the UN, asked the USSR for assistance. He was immediately labelled as a ‘communist’ and a young pro-American military commander named Joseph Desiré Mobutu seized control of the central government. Mobutu’s forces captured Lumumba in 1961 and handed him over to the Katangese where he was promptly killed.

Rwanda and Burundi

Toward the end of the colonial era, the Church and the colonial authorities reversed their preferences and inverted the hierarchy in favour of Hutu, appearing to readily identify with them as an oppressed majority. Thus, as independence approached in the late 1950s, the racial classification remained, but it was the Hutu who were now gaining control.

In 1959, Belgian paratroopers presided over a bloody uprising in Rwanda which left 10,000 Tutsi killed and more than 100,000 driven abroad. In these few years leading up to independence, namely from 1959 to 1961, Tutsi fled pre-independent Rwanda and their diminishing stronghold to Tanzania, southern Uganda and the Masisi region of North Kivu in the Congo (Vassal-Adams, 1994:9).
Uprising of the Hutu majority continued and, in 1961, supported by the new opinion of the out-going authorities in the build-up to independence, a coup put a Hutu political party in power. Thus Rwandan Hutu managed to end their domination by Tutsi with relatively low levels of ethnic violence (de Waal and Omaar, 1998:3). In 1962, Gregoire Kayibanda, secretary to the Archbishop and founder of the ‘Party of the Movement for Hutu Emancipation (PARMEHUTU)’, duly became the first president of independent Rwanda (Vassal-Adams, 1994:9).

However, at the same time in neighbouring Burundi, the Tutsi king’s eldest son was assassinated after his political party won a clear victory triggering an eruption of violence between Tutsi and Hutu. In an appalling contrast to the relatively smooth transition in Rwanda, the Hutu were unable after independence to gain headway against Tutsi rule, and worsened their position by ill-judged attempts at doing so (Davidson, 1978:276).

In 1962, the United Nations recognised the independence of Ruanda-Urundi and Rwanda and Burundi became two autonomous nations. However, the Belgians left their trusteeship territory with an enormous amount of in-built tension – tension that was later to rise and set the scene for many years of increased regional violence and brutality.

POST INDEPENDENCE

Zaïre and the Reign of Mobutu Sese Seko

Following independence from colonial powers in the Congo, five years of intense civil conflict and instability followed. UN forces were present for much of the time in an effort to reduce the violence. Joseph Mobutu officially assumed rule in 1965 but never fully gained control of the provinces of Katanga and Kasai. However, Mobutu settled in for 32 years of sustained dictatorial rule that would prove disastrous for the potentially rich nation of the Congo. He supported himself and his clan at the expense of many millions of Congolese people.
Realising that his rise to power had no popular legitimacy and was consequently insecure, Mobutu knew that he would be unable to keep the vast Congo nation together through democratic means. Therefore, his regime resorted to utilising the coercive machinery of the state to intimidate and eliminate opponents. At the same time, Mobutu exploited and encouraged Congolese ethnic and tribal hostility to further legitimise his own rule. Mobutu also relied on much foreign military intervention to maintain his power, - mainly from the United States, Belgium and France, for which Mobutu repaid the west by acting as destabilising agent in Africa against Congo's neighbours and the struggle for independence in Southern Africa (Hancock, 1991:178).

“He was one of the last of the “Big Men” installed by imperialism to safeguard its interests after the end of direct colonial rule at the beginning of the 1960s. Mobutu was a former police informer and sergeant in the Belgian colonial militia, the Force Publique, who following ‘independence’ was named head of the army of the Congo-Kinshasa. As Washington’s man, he played a key role in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, the radical nationalist leader who gave the chills to the Western capitals. With the aid of the CIA, Mobutu took over in a coup d'état in 1965. His authoritarian regime stayed in power through a combination of ferocious repression against any leftist opposition, and systematic corruption of a docile elite, the Zairean kleptocracy” (Internationalist, 1998:2).

Foreign interests relentlessly exploited the Congo’s natural resources with the assistance of Mobutu. Consequently, the Congolese people were forced to endure sustained and ruinous social and economic degradation while their national wealth was siphoned off by a minority of foreign and national actors.

Zaïre received abundant foreign development aid during Mobutu’s rule. However, there was little evident benefit of these funds ever reaching the Congolese people. Much of this was due to Mobutu’s outright thieving. “Important sources of funds for the President [were] business contracts, foreign aid grants and long-term loans for
wasteful and exotic schemes such as the Inga-Shaba Power Project: he has reportedly helped himself to approximately 20 cents off the top of every dollar of foreign assistance that has come Zaire's way since 1965...” (Hancock, 1991:179).

Whilst propped up by the West Mobutu also displayed an eccentric disrespect for western culture. In the 1970s, he forsook his Christian name of Joseph for Sese Seko and renamed the nation, the Congo River and the new currency, 'Zaire'. Claiming that the nation had to achieve a new identity, he thus decreed all citizens under his rule to be 'Zaïrois'. At the same time he expressed contempt for the international financial organisations to the extent that he regarded paying foreign debt “as a joke” (Hancock, 1991:179).

Western donors appeared to be aware of Mobutu’s actions but did little to pressure him into being more honest. “As early as 1982, the boards of the IMF and World Bank were told by Erwin Blumenthal, a senior German banker, that President Mobutu was siphoning off assistance into special accounts outside Zaïre” (Oxfam, 1997:6). Despite such information confirming that Mobutu was blatantly abusing his nation’s finance and resources, he continued to receive aid.

The Congo had enormous potential in its natural resources. Immense timber areas, estimated at 74 per cent of territory in 1997, remained largely untapped (Oxfam, 1997:6). Soils were suitable for many crops and the nation was rich in minerals. “However, past dreams of turning Zaïre into a major industrial power... turned into a nightmare of 'white elephant projects' and huge debts, due to mismanagement and corruption. Zaïre remained an exporter of raw materials and importer of machinery and equipment. By 1990, Zaïrian manufacturing contributed only 11 per cent of GDP” (Oxfam, 1997:6).

Mobutu’s last years brought complete economic disaster to his nation. The remaining state-owned enterprises, such as Gecamines mining company with 36,000 workers, and ONATRA rail and harbour company, were barely functioning. Copper production plummeted from 506,000 tons in 1988 to 38,000 tons in 1996. Cobalt production fell
from 10,000 tons in 1988 to 4,000 tons in the same period. Total exports fell from $US 1.3 billion in 1990 to $US 176 million in 1994 (Internationalist, 1998:2). In 1997, the former Zaire's total external debt was estimated at $US 13.9 billion (Oxfam, 1997:12).

Whilst Mobutu's Government administration initially appeared strong in a national context, the circle of control gradually diminished leaving an administrative vacuum in outlying areas. This was especially true in the in the east of the country where distances from the capital, poor communications and non-existent transport links to the capital left Mobutu's massive administration weak to the point of ineffectiveness. Congo's instability was fuelled by the resulting localised power struggles. Meanwhile, a powerful political class of 'Mobutists' emerged.

A survival instinct kept many supposedly state institutions alive in remoter areas, with their heads using the institutions as sources of personal revenue. After all, salaries were often not paid and their example of national leadership did anything but inspire honesty and fair play. Thus, a paradoxical socio-political structure remained. Mobutu maintained his massive administration and a high level of corruption prevailed, but at the same time the outlying areas fell from his direct influence into a form of laissez-faire policies (Dodd, 1988:94). Whatever the case, directly repressed and exploited by the Mobutists, or abandoned to the whims of other emerging localised power elites, the poor people of the Congo had little chance to influence their own development.

**Post Colonial Rwanda and Burundi**

Immediately following independence in Rwanda, a military president represented the major ethnic group and appeared committed to social and economic improvement for the entire country. He enjoyed majority support and won a fair legal election in 1981. In Burundi an almost identical structure remained, except Tutsi had retained control through post independence turmoil and continued their domination through military force and repression of the majority.
Tutsi held all key military and civilian posts. The Hutu, having failed to gain control over the Tutsi, were wary of being seen as activists in every sense including socio-economic development. The ruling Tutsi demonstrated no real interest in national socio-economic development with a focus on rural population as their rule relied on keeping the majority Hutu powerless (Dodd, 1988:90).

Although the history in the region was by no means peaceful, the local conflicts and conquests over the past centuries became insignificant compared to violence since independence. In 1972 a brutal Hutu insurrection in Burundi was followed by a Tutsi war of Hutu extermination. More than 80,000 Hutu were killed within a few weeks (Davidson, 1978:276). Further massacres continued thereafter. In 1987-1988 an additional 20,000 Hutu were reportedly killed and a further 100,000 are believed to have perished 1993. In Burundi from 1995-1997 up to 150,000 people died due to ethnic violence and currently an estimated 100 people are killed daily (Rudasingwa, 1998).

Internal violence combined with declining national economies during the 1980s to exacerbate widespread poverty and caused further misery in Rwanda and Burundi. Due to agricultural policies introduced by the West, Rwanda and Burundi relied largely on the production of coffee for foreign earnings. Between 1980 and 1989 terms of trade for under-developed commodity-producing countries fell by 16 percent compared with an overall increase of 12 percent enjoyed by industrial countries (Coote, 1992:8).

Tumbling international commodity market prices for coffee, upon which Rwanda relied for 73 percent of its export earnings, meant that Rwandan terms of trade regressed an enormous 47 percent during this period (Coote, 1992:8). At the end of 1995, Rwanda's total debt stock was $US 1 billion, equalling 89 percent of GNP. Similar economic decline set the scene in Burundi with a massive 110 percent of GNP or debt totaling $US 1.2 billion recorded (Oxfam, 1997:12).
Summary

Ever since the end of the 19th Century the Congo has undergone oppressive rule characterised by “the annihilation of all that is human for the goal of economic development” (Kadima-Nzuji, 1998:1). One must pity the average Rwandan, Burundian and Congolese citizens as they have had little chance of bettering their lot in the midst of massive violence and economic repression.

The region is united by its common history of brutality. Foreign commercial interests exploited all three nations with little regard for human rights. Leopold’s enforced regime in the Congo was the most barbaric of any foreign endeavour in the history of Africa. Later, official colonial rule further exploited the innocent local population and, although less violent in physical terms, the authorities made no serious attempt to address the issue of poverty.

At the end of the 1980s, more than a century after the three nations were carved out of the African interior, a complex and volatile socio-political arena remained. Traditional systems of rule had been contorted, and ethnicity, which had once added to the diverse culture and resources of the region, had been cultivated into a destructive force - unscrupulously aggravated for the sake of personal gain by a few members of the elite.
CHAPTER 4

SOUTH KIVU IN THE 1990s

ONE DECADE.
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF CATASTROPHE COMPOUNDED

INTRODUCTION

"Sectarian politics, mainly based on kinship, ethnicity and region have been a very distinguishing characteristic particularly in the last 100 years. While pre-colonial Rwanda was not a democracy, the political and socio-economic entities presided over by Tutsi kings had checks and balances that ensured at least minimum cohesion to keep society secure and intact as a nation. Many would say this was an unstable equilibrium, based on inequality. Yet, the instability generated first by colonialism, and subsequently by post independence regimes... was without historic precedent in the entire history of Rwanda" (Rudasingwa, 1998:2).

The history of Rwanda is very much the history of the Great Lakes. Central to this chapter is the rise of regional 'ethnic' violence graphically demonstrated to the world by the 'crime of the decade' - the Rwandan Genocide of 1994. This chapter also discusses the recent regional affairs influencing South Kivu including events leading to massive population movements from Burundi into the Ruzizi Plain in 1993 and the conquest of Mobutu's Zaïre in 1996 and 1997. Some thoughts on the renewed and ongoing conflict of 1998 are also documented.

DECADE OF DESPAIR

From early in the 1990s violence intensified in the Great Lakes region. Just as most internal events through the 1970s and 1980s had been largely ignored by the
international media, the region was further abandoned. The bi-polar power play of the Cold War era was over and central Africa was no longer important on the international political agenda. The new decade dawned with wholesale violence as an integral part of local life.

In 1993 events began to be noticed by the humanitarian world as hundreds of thousands of Hutu fled Burundi after 100,000 died at the hands of the Tutsi authorities. Seeking refuge in Tanzania, southern Rwanda and South Kivu in eastern Zaire, the international community responded by setting up serviced refugee camps.

At the time there were also indications of similar violence about to erupt in Rwanda and Mobutu actively promoted disorder in Zaire as he was being pressured into allowing the creation of opposition political parties. However, for the international aid and development industry it was very much business as usual. The distribution of development grants and loans continued to the three regimes even though it was obvious that not one took human rights issues seriously.

This was particularly the case in Rwanda prior to the genocide of 1994, but the international community applied little concerted pressure to President Habyarimana's regime despite visibly intensifying repression. “During the 1990s, when human rights violations were increasing, civil war raged and genocide was being planned, international aid to the Rwandan regime was higher than ever before. Donors who reduced their aid over this period did so with reference to budgetary concerns rather than human rights” (Adelman, 1996:31-32).

**THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE**

In April 1994, hard-line Hutu extremists used the military, political and administrative structures of Rwanda to carry out a genocide of the minority Tutsi and to kill moderate Hutu who were viewed as Tutsi collaborators. Soldiers of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and members of a local militia group, known as the Interahamwe, took the lead in slaughtering more than half a million people. The same identification cards
introduced by the Belgian authorities were still in use and clearly marked if a citizen was Hutu or Tutsi – “telling the modern-day killers whom to kill and whom to spare” (de Waal and Omaar, 1998:3). Some estimate that up to one million were slain.

Ever since October 1990, Rwanda’s Hutu Government had been at war with Tutsi guerrilla fighters based in southern Uganda – the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) (Vassal-Adams, 1994:21). Many of the RPF were direct descendants of Rwandan Tutsi exiled three decades earlier. By use of military means to pressurise the Government to consent to their demands for power-sharing, several RPF incursions had made it well into the country. On one occasion the French sent troops to assist Habyarimana’s forces to repel them from near the capital, Kigali. International pressure increased on Habyarimana to recognise the Tutsi’s legitimate claim in Rwanda’s military and civil administration by relaxing his hard-line single party rule.

It was also in this period that the local militia group, the Interahamwe, amassed large popular support as ‘defenders of their nation against the Tutsi enemy’. Interahamwe translated to ‘those who act together’ and militia training was accompanied with hard-line anti-Tutsi propaganda. “If the colonial regime founded the fascist ideology through the introduction of systematic and institutionalised divisions among the Rwandese people on the basis of ethnicity, [Hutu extremist elements in] Habyarimana’s regime perfected the ideology into a very effective tool of planning, organising and execution of genocide from 1959 up to now” (Rudasingwa, 1998:3).

In August 1993, the Habyarimana Government finally signed a comprehensive agreement with the RPF and Rwandan opposition parties in Arusha, Tanzania. “The agreement ensured a multi-party system with the main opposition groups, an independent judiciary with respect for human rights, integration of the RPF into the national army, and an abolition of the extremist paramilitary forces. This step toward peace and democracy was successfully negotiated with the apparent support of African and Western governments, and guaranteed by the troops of the UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR)” (de Waal and Omaar, 1997:2).
At the time Habyarimana was under serious pressure from extremists in his party who opposed power-sharing with the Tutsi. Some Hutu believed power-sharing would bring an end to the their "unfettered power and privilege" (de Waal and Omaar, 1997:2). Others genuinely feared that the Tutsi, once re-established with a position of partial power, would proceed to take over the country and rule as they were in Burundi. Habyarimana repeatedly stalled in implementing the measures provided for in the Arusha accords in a play-off between international pressure and his extremist colleagues.

On the night of 6 April 1994, the plane carrying President Habyarimana and President Ntayiyamira of Burundi was shot down on the fringes of Kigali upon return from another round of talks in Arusha. Everyone on board was killed. Immediately the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) erected roadblocks throughout the city of Kigali and a carefully planned extermination of Tutsi commenced. Acting with the FAR was the well-prepared Interahamwe. They had been specially trained by extremist elements in the government and given a list of targets compiled in advance. The killing quickly spread to other areas of Rwanda (Vassal-Adams, 1994:32).

Theodore Sindikukwabo, an extreme proponent of supremacist ‘Hutu-Power’, assumed the role of interim President and dismissed all staff he considered to be moderates. Many of them were soon added to the target list. The state-sponsored radio broadcast incitements to mass murder. Sindikukwabo himself made incendiary speeches on radio and in person around the country congratulating the killers on a job well done and telling those in places such as Butare, where the killing had not yet started, that they should ‘set to work’ (de Waal and Omaar, 1997:6). Much of the civilian Hutu population was induced to participate in the killing of Tutsi. Some, convinced that Tutsi really would destroy them if left unchecked, participated willingly. Others were intimidated and threatened with death themselves if they did not kill.

French and Belgium troops evacuated foreign nationals from Kigali within 48 hours of the killings commencing. Ten Belgian soldiers were then killed protecting the Hutu, moderate Prime Minister. Belgium as a result ordered all its soldiers home without first...
informing the UN. On 20 April 1997, the UN Security Council voted to reduce the UNAMIR force from 4,500 to 270 men and to further restrict its activities even as the slaughter escalated (Vassal-Adams, 1994:35). Literally minutes after the UN troops abandoned their base, which had become refuge for several thousand Rwandese Tutsi and opposition Hutu, the Interahamwe and FAZ stormed the compound and began to massacre all who had taken shelter there (Omaar and de Waal, 1997:6).

In July 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invading for one final time from southern Uganda overthrew the genocidal regime and captured Kigali. By this time the Hutu extremists leaders were on the run, much of their killing completed. More than half a million Tutsi and moderate Hutu had been slaughtered in one hundred days. The killing was efficient and low tech, relying on the Rwandan peasants and their agricultural tools to slay their neighbours. As the RPF advanced, some two million Hutu fled Rwanda in fear of retributions or simply obeying orders to follow their government leaders into exile.

The International Response

There has been much controversial debate over the actions of the west during the three months in which so many lost their lives in Rwanda. 'Scuttle diplomacy' on the part of the UN became an international scandal as some staff pleaded for action and others prevaricated, demanded more time and information or just blocked intervention outright.

One of the contributing factors leading to the failure of the international community to mobilise and halt the genocide in Rwanda was the recent military debacle of the US-UN mission in Somalia. In this bungled operation in October 1993, barely six months earlier, the lives of numerous US Marines were lost. The US had consequently developed a new 'extra-cautious' approach to international military peacekeeping. "Only on June 8 did the Security Council give the final authorisation to a deployment that had been accorded the 'utmost urgency' on April 29. In the intervening five
weeks, at least 100,000 died; probably well over 200,000. Each day's delay in April and May meant at least 10,000 more people dead” (de Waal and Omaar, 1997:7).

In theory, the UN could have stopped the killing with less than a thousand international soldiers and a few armoured cars to break up the roadblocks. There are many reports of the mere presence of a few UN troops or other foreigners averting killing at the time. However, there were only 450 UN soldiers in Rwanda remaining for much of the genocide and they had no mandate to use force. Even under the “energetic and courageous leadership” of the Canadian General Romeo Dallaire they were grossly handicapped by the lack of fuel and spare parts and reduced to improvising to keep vehicles running (Kearne, 1998:4).

Stopping the genocide would have required giving a broader mandate to the UN forces including the ability to fire upon Hutu extremists. It is estimated that between 20 and 200 UN soldiers could have died in battle. (Kearne, 1998:4) However, the chance for this hypothesis to be tested never came, as by the time the UN had the go-ahead to deploy more troops, the RPF had secured Rwanda and hounded the extremists into exile. The RPF itself halted the killings, but was too late. Genocide had been committed and by no means had a sustainable solution been reached.

A New Phase of Conflict in the Making

The US Government’s ‘over-cautiousness’ then rapidly became an attitude of indignation. The international community at large rushed to the aid of the two million Hutu refugees in neighbouring countries. Hundreds of international NGOs and affiliated agencies, under the general coordination of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), responded to the massive population movement by providing life saving services in refugee camps with deliveries of essential supplies of clean water, food, medicine and shelter. However, despite the massive international response, the flood of humanity overwhelmed agencies who were not prepared for such a mass displacement of people. In Goma alone, between 20 July and September 1994, 46,000 refugees died from cholera and associated diseases (Vassal-Adams, 1994:52).
Camp populations were mixed. Civilian refugees were amongst regrouping military units retraining and planning to take Rwanda back from the RPF. All were nourished at the expense of the international community. "Human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH), humanitarian agencies including UNHCR and the Rwandan Government, repeatedly demanded international intervention to separate the refugees, many of them women and children, from the armed elements, former soldiers (ex-FAR) and militia members. Although the UN prepared plans for such action, the Security Council rejected them as too expensive and perhaps unworkable" (HRW, 1995:4).

The enormous border-area camps in Zaire and Tanzania were controlled by the administrative officials, military and political leaders of the former Rwandan regime, many of who were directly responsible for the genocide. In these camps the ex-FAR and militia consolidated and reorganised. They trained new recruits, bought arms from abroad and intimidated civilian refugees into remaining as their 'human shield' instead of returning home. Back in Rwanda, soldiers of the new Tutsi regime killed suspected genocide participants and carried out massive arrests without regard to due process. This further fuelled the hard-line stance of Hutu extremists in exile and facilitated their continued influence over civilian refugees.

The new regime in Rwanda viewed the large refugee camps near its borders as an enormous threat to national security. Already murders of 'genocide survivors' by remaining Hutu extremists in Rwanda were being carried out. In 1995 incursions into Rwanda by exiled Hutu extremists increased in number and impact. "In the face of stepped-up infiltration in 1996, a rash of killings of civilians in border areas, and apparently aware of preparations for an invasion, Rwandan [military] leader General Paul Kagame again alerted leaders of the US and perhaps other countries that Rwanda would act if conditions did not change" (HRW, 1996:9).

The camps in the Kivu area, where an estimated 1.1 million refugees including much of the former Habyarimana Government were concentrated, were the most threatening to
Rwanda. Reports of the ex-FAR military training were common, and in Goma itself there was one camp area that the international community was excluded from. In this Hutu military training camp, men walking around in battle fatigues brandished new weapons and sent their women to collect food from the UN serviced camps.

Another cause for Rwandan concern was Mobutu’s attitude toward Hutu extremists on his territory. Mobutu certainly paid lip service to the international call for repatriation, but also used the presence of refugees to his benefit as an excuse to postpone scheduled elections. As part of his campaign to promote division amongst ethnic groups in areas remote from Kinshasa, and hence further legitimise his rule, he encouraged the exiled Hutu to incite local hatred against the Tutsi in eastern Zaire. Rwandan Tutsi thus saw Mobutu himself as a tremendous threat to their security.

TUTSI, BANYARWANDA AND BANYAMULENGE

Before the massive influx of Rwandans in mid 1994, about one quarter of the 6 million people in North and South Kivu were Kinyarwanda speakers. Many had settled in the region before the delineation of colonial boundaries and more had migrated from Rwanda for economic reasons or as political refugees during the twentieth century, “many with official encouragement from the Belgian authorities in the 1930s” (HRW, 1996:11).

As speakers of Kinyarwanda, these people became known as ‘Banyarwanda’, and in some areas such as Masisi in North Kivu, they constituted a majority of the population. As in Rwanda, the Banyarwanda in eastern Congo as a whole were mainly Hutu and only about 20 percent were Tutsi. However, in South Kivu, the Banyarwanda were mainly a small group of Tutsi pastoralists in the High Plateaux. Their numbers were augmented by other Tutsi fleeing political repression in Rwanda this century, with significant numbers arriving in 1959.

These Tutsi became known as the Banyamulenge (the people of Mulenge) during anti-Mobutu rebellions in 1964. Many Banyamulenge came under threat from the rebel
forces led by Laurent Kabila in 1964 and took refuge in Kinshasa whilst others sided with the rebellion. The term Banyamulenge became widely used referring to ethnic Tutsi Congolese in general from mid 1996.

**Alienation of Tutsi: Conflict Cause and Effect**

The right to Zairian citizenship, recognised by earlier laws and constitutions for Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda, was revoked by Mobutu in 1981 and limited to those that could prove ancestry in the country before 1885. However this law was not actively enforced and identity cards were not revoked. In the early 1990s, Congolese politicians who feared the number of votes represented by Kinyarwanda-speakers in proposed elections, stirred up sentiments against the Tutsi among people of all neighbouring ethnic groups. At the time of the National Conference in 1991, a South-Kivu Bembe, Celestin Anzuluni, led a move to exclude the Banyamulenge, claiming that they were not Zairian but recent Rwandan immigrants. Banyarwanda of North Kivu were similarly excluded. After this, leaders of other ethnic groups increasingly challenged the rights of Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda to citizenship.

“...In 1993, a Hunde, Nande and Nyanga civilian militia known as Mai-Mai and Bangalima, encouraged by Government officials and sometimes supported by the [Zairian] military, attacked Hutu and Tutsi communities in North-Kivu, killing thousands and displacing some 300,000” (USCR, 1993:11). The arrival of enormous numbers of Rwandan refugees in eastern Zaire in 1994 enormously exacerbated tensions between existing Tutsi and other ethnic groups in the region.

Arriving with genuine refugees, the Interahamwe and ex-FAR encouraged hatred of Tutsi amongst adjacent populations. Whereas Hutu and Tutsi were once viewed as a common enemy, local populations sided increasingly with Hutu and all Tutsi were branded as being loyal to the new Government in Rwanda. In South Kivu, Babembe and Barega began forming a militia modelled on the Hutu Interahamwe and attacks on Tutsi increased. In 1996, Interahamwe, Mai-Mai and Bangalima killed hundreds of
Tutsi in Masisi and drove more than 18,000 into exile in Rwanda and Uganda (HRW, 1996:7).

**The Banyamulenge Revolt**

During 1995, with the genocide barely one year old, Tutsi in Zaire had reason to feel endangered. Most of those responsible for the Rwandan genocide were still alive, close at hand, and proceeding to consolidate their influence with the nourishment of the international community. Banyamulenge in South Kivu, therefore, began to organise themselves into a consolidated movement for 'liberation', bought new arms and began military training. At the same time a delegation of Banyamulenge men went to Rwanda and were trained and supplied with weapons by the RPA.

In August 1996, Mobutu officially outlawed Groupe Milima, a Banyamulenge development NGO based in Uvira, and arrested several prominent Banyamulenge. In early September it was decreed that all Banyamulenge who inhabited the 'High Plateaux' in the Mitumba Mountains west of Uvira must leave the country. Babembe Militia, supported by FAZ soldiers at the time, commenced attacks on Banyamulenge in and around Uvira. Mobutu's eviction order was formalised on 7 October by the deputy Governor of South Kivu and an ultimatum of one week given for all Banyamulenge to depart with threats of aerial bombing if they disobeyed. Mobutu suggested that all Banyamulenge return to Rwanda which presented an additional dilemma as many families had two centuries of history in Zaire and no connection to Rwanda.

Mobutu sent more troops to continue assaults on Tutsi villages in the High Plateaux. However, as there were no roads, troops were obliged to advance on foot from the low ground of Uvira. The troops had substantial weaponry and often conscripted civilians to carry ammunition and supplies into the mountains. In Uvira, daily life and business was disrupted as young men, fearing involuntary recruitment off the streets, stayed in their homes and otherwise concealed themselves.
The Banyamulunge maintained the high ground and in most cases succeeded to repel the advances of attacking troops, often inflicting high casualties upon them. Mobutu’s soldiers were failing in their assault on the High Plateaux and returned to Uvira wounded and demoralised. From mid-September 1996, the atmosphere in South Kivu was extremely tense for the entire population including refugees, the local Hutu and Tutsi and the international aid community. Attacks on Tutsi or suspected sympathisers continued with much killing and raping. Survivors were forced to flee.

In early October, a group of Tutsi soldiers crossing from Burundi towards the Mulenge mountains and suspected of carrying arms for the Banyamulenge, killed four refugees as they passed near Runingo refugee camp en route. The following day all 18,000 refugees fled the camp in what was, in fact, the first camp break-up exercise implemented by the Tutsi forces. Although possibly unintentional at the time, it did demonstrate the volatility of the situation for the humanitarian community, and the potential efficiency of such tactics for the Tutsi military.

Mobutu’s forces continued to harass Tutsi communities during October, by which time the Banyamulenge were fully prepared for retaliatory action. A coalition had been formed with Tutsi fighters from Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda and named the ‘Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire’ (AFDL). Angolan troops are also thought to have assisted. Laurent Desiré Kabila, an ethnic Katangese from southeast Zaïre, had been chosen as a figurehead during 1995 to diminish the predominant Tutsi image of the movement. As Mobutu’s forces and aligned militias stepped up their attacks on ethnic Tutsi, the AFDL attacked.

On 22 October 1996, from several fronts including the High Plateaux and Rwanda, AFDL forces invaded eastern Zaïre engaging in combat with the FAZ and systematically attacking Hutu refugee camps in the Ruzizi Plain. Occasionally brief resistance was mounted but most FAZ retreated quickly. The AFDL advanced rapidly against Mobutu’s demoralised and poorly disciplined army.
The AFDL moved north from Uvira to Bukavu and on to Goma by mid-November 1996, breaking up refugee camps progressively en route. There are reports of the AFDL surrounding camps and opening fire on refugees. Other reports suggest that the AFDL used more gentle tactics to encourage refugees to return to Rwanda.

It is believed that the majority of the 1.1 million refugees in Kivu returned during this period including an estimated 500,000 from Mugunga and Lac Vert camps in Goma on 15 and 16 November 1996. However, many refugees were intimidated to flee westward with ex-FAR, Interahamwe and former Rwandan Hutu government extremists.

A further consequence of the AFDL advance was the exodus of Zairian civilians who were fleeing fighting. More than 100,000 crossed into the neighbouring countries of Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, boosting the region’s refugee population to even higher levels. In the mean time, former Kivu refugee Hutu extremists, leading their civilian shield in organised caravans or small groups, progressed into the jungle heading west away from Tutsi forces. These refugees were often attacked again, this time by extremist Tutsi military elements, and many lost their lives in mass killings. For a long period “... humanitarian organisations remained unable to shed light on exactly where most of the 1.1 million refugees [were]” (CNN, 1996).

In early November 1996, the UN identified the need for a multinational force (MNF) to secure ‘humanitarian corridors’ in order to access refugees cut off by fighting and provide them a safe passage for repatriation. Many European states pushed for the urgent deployment of such a force including the outspoken European Commissioner on Humanitarian Affairs, Emma Bonino. The US initially agreed to participate in the MNF in a ‘limited fashion’ and US Defence Secretary, William Perry, announced that the US anticipated sending 1,000 troops to the Goma area, and up to a total of 4,000 more to neighbouring countries in support roles (CNN, 1996).

US spotter planes flew over eastern Zaire to identify refugee groups. Nevertheless, the US did not come forward with information to confirm the existence of refugees in the
interior despite calculations by numerous humanitarian agencies and first hand reports from local people. Humanitarian officials on the ground, desperate to know what the US planes had seen, were told that cloud cover had prevented good aerial imaging.

Further prevarication on the part of the US led the Canadians to eventually offer their assistance as coordinators of the MNF and a team of Canadian military advisers was dispatched to the Great Lakes. However, the massive return of refugees to Rwanda in mid-November had reduced international pressure to provide the MNF. The Canadians finally followed the US sentiment in early December and, upon estimating that remaining refugees numbers were small and the MNF would be expensive and likely to cost the lives of their soldiers, the planned operation was abandoned.

By this stage the new authorities in the Congo maintained that if refugees were still in hiding they must be fearful of retribution and therefore guilty of genocide. This tenet led many of the new authorities to the conclusion that since international law did not grant refugee status to perpetrators of crimes against humanity, then there were in fact “no more refugees” on Zairian territory. However, UNHCR managed to find and repatriate an additional 234,000 Rwandans between December 1996 and June 1997 by which time they had also located an additional 52,600 – half in the Congo, with others dispersed in Central African Republic (CAR), Congo Brazzaville, and Angola.

The AFDL were perhaps only trying to secure a swathe of Zaïre in the Kivu area as a buffer zone adjacent to Rwanda in which they could control security. However, finding Mobutu’s troops demoralised to the stage of giving up their arms, the momentum continued and the AFDL propelled themselves towards Kinshasa. “At the same time, Laurent Kabila, an entity that had been in the wilderness for most of his adult life, found himself catapulted to the position of President of the Democratic Republic of Congo in a historic twist of events that were a product of internal and external factors.” (Rudasingwa, 1998:4) Kabila renamed Zaïre the Democratic Republic of Congo on 18 May 1997 and declared himself President. He publicly thanked Rwanda for help during the “war of liberation” on an official visit to Kigali on 29 August 1997 (Washington Post, 1997).
Conflict Continues

Following his 'propulsion' to the leadership of the Congo, President Kabila proceeded to systematically undermine Tutsi authority in his administration. Early in 1998 he dismissed several prominent Tutsi military and civilian figures and replaced them with Bantu. Much of this was done to play to lingering popular sentiment and distrust of Tutsi. Many reasoned that the Tutsi should have no influence in the Congo’s capital, Kinshasa, 2000 kilometres from Rwanda and the Kivus.

However, Tutsi were instrumental in installing Kabila and were counting on him to recognise their long-term claims to citizenship in the east. As a function of their role in the toppling of Mobutu, Tutsi military officers also understood all the strengths and weaknesses of the Congolese forces. However Kabila eventually chose to follow Mobutu’s line and again, during early 1998, refused to recognise the Banyamulenge Tutsi of the Congo as fully fledged Congolese citizens.

Such was his tact, that on 27 July 1998, Kabila had one of his military officers announce on national television a presidential decree that all Rwandan soldiers remaining in the Congo must return to Rwanda within 48 hours. Tutsi, Rwandans and Congolese Banyamulenge alike, saw this as the ultimate double-cross claiming they had signed an agreement with Kabila in 1996 which guaranteed them rights in the Congo in exchange for assisting him in battle. Tutsi forces went through the motions of following Kabila’s orders and reconsolidated in the east. On 6 August 1998, a new Tutsi alliance of Congolese Banyamulenge, Rwandan and Ugandan Tutsi troops invaded the Congo in a bid to topple President Kabila.

Instrumental in the new rebellion was James Kabare, Kabila’s recently fired Tutsi commander of the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC). The banished Tutsi soldiers knew the intricacies of the FAC inside out as many had helped train Kabila’s army. Kabare himself reportedly sat in the cockpit and held the gun as his forces hijacked a commercial airliner from Goma and flew Tutsi troops to the west of the Congo to open a new front against Kinshasa (IRIN, 1998).
In August 1998 battles raged in the west, the east, and in Kinshasa itself as a small pocket of Tutsi remained dug-in. Kabila set up the cry of searching out ‘the Tutsi infiltrators’ and issued 5,000 automatic weapons to anyone in Kinshasa who wanted one (IRIN, 1998). Militias of young men and boys flourished, and in a tragic replay of some of the actions witnessed by Rwanda in 1994, any person unfortunate enough to resemble a Tutsi in Kinshasa was summarily shot or burnt in the street.

The Tutsi forces were well organised and had judged that they could topple the FAC. However, Kabila managed to enlist the support of national army forces from Zimbabwe and Angola and finally beat back the Tutsi from Kinshasa. Fighting continues today in the east of the Congo.
INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the socio-economic affects of 'poverty' and 'conflict', and with a focus on South Kivu, demonstrates the catastrophic consequences of a combination of these two conditions.

Figure V. The Affects of Poverty and Conflict Superimposed.
The eastern Congo was dramatically impoverished through the actions of colonial powers and associated commercial enterprises. Congolese of the east further suffered under ethnic division provoked by their president, Mobutu Sese Seko.

With dire social and economic depravity as base conditions, masses of refugees then spilled over from Rwanda and Burundi bringing further violence and disorder. This 'superimposition of burden' has led many of the Congolese of South Kivu to a state of deplorable distress and destitution.

The Berlin Conference of 1885 signalled the beginning of 'impoverishment' for many an African. Arguably, pre-colonial Rwanda was not 'democratic', but the colonial rulers of central Africa sought to shatter beneficial societal cohesion by favouring some and consequently impoverishing those they deemed inferior.

Some argued that it was merely a rationalisation of being miserly: that the Germans and the Belgians preferred the Tutsi only because the colonial administrators thought they could perform the job of an expatriate for less money. The individual colonialists were perhaps innocent, believing that they would be staying in Africa for hundreds of years. Many dangerous and ultimately counter-productive policies - not fully understood at the time - were simply seen as normal interim measures allowing the local economy to be developed quickly and efficiently. In terms of Rwanda: "Yes the effect was disastrous but we didn't realise it. It was not intended to be disastrous" (Kearne, 1997:4).

When coffee and quinquina buyers in South Kivu encouraged peasant farmers to stop growing a broad range of subsistence crops and concentrate on a single export crop, they may have genuinely believed they were helping the local population. However, this policy led to disaster as many commodity prices later plummeted leaving the peasant farmer with no earnings and no crops to eat.

Nevertheless, if there were some innocent injustices of the colonial period, there were certainly also some deliberately sinister schemes launched in the name of empire.
building. Colonial methods of inducing production in mines and plantations through forced labour and threats of violence kept people away from their lands and deprived them of their means of existence. Deliberate maiming of workers jeopardised the ability of many of them to resume a productive life later.

One of the most harmful, ultimately impoverishing actions that the colonial powers introduced was the imposition of monetary tax. Whereas many communities had previously been self-sufficient in a subsistence agricultural and bartering culture, the new policies forced people to seek monetary gain. This drove people away from rural areas to towns where slums rapidly grew. Health and security conditions in the slums were deplorable. Absence of the same menfolk in the country also undermined their village communities, burdening others with their traditional tasks. In terms of development, the ability for many to control factors influencing their lives and to maintain control over the basic human rights of subsistence and security, were undermined by these colonialist policies and practices. Thus, in many ways, colonialism impoverished Africa.

The independence of Rwanda, Burundi and the Congo was presumably Africa’s answer to end ‘poverty by colonialist repression’ and restart national development under African authority. However, as discussed in this thesis, African leadership has also failed on many fronts to deliver the services needed to lift their nations and people from their yoke of poverty.

**SOUTH KIVU IN 1990. INITIAL CONDITIONS**

**Agriculture and the Rural Life**

In 1990, 85% of the population of South Kivu was directly associated with subsistence farming. The climate and soils were good but erosion and soil impoverishment through over-planting, disease, lack of appropriate seeds and generally poor agricultural practice, reduced potential yields and created irreparable damage to lands. Overall, 52 percent of land was used for mixed cropping and the rest for monoculture. (BEST,
In the self-subsistence economy, farmers concentrated on the production of manioc (cassava) which was the staple food and consumed in great quantity throughout the year. However manioc was not at all nutritious and only just over half of the calories were absorbed. Beans were an important source of protein, but seasonal. Produce of animal husbandry was rarely consumed but often sold, exchanged or used for dowry. Only families without sufficient production bought staple goods in the market. Meat in small quantities was traded, as were small volumes of fish. In general, the volume of basic goods traded in village markets was minimal compared to total consumption (González, 1989:32).

In 1988, nearly 130,000 cows existed in South Kivu with 75,000 sheep, 200,000 goats and 60,000 pigs. Cattle herding around Bukavu was a ‘cultural activity’ and rarely commercial. This was distinct to the patterns of the Banyamulenge who undertook cattle raising as a significant economic activity, but were severely limited due to lack of pasture (Zaire, 1992:42).

Income for farmers in Kivu was typically half of the national average, and one quarter of the urban average. From 1970 to 1989, South Kivu agricultural production improved 1.8 percent whereas the average national sector improvement was 3.1 percent. According to FAO and WHO, only 55 percent of protein needs were covered in the period from 1986 to 1989. Most farmers faced the problems of lack of seeds, incorrect techniques, and poor transport of goods to market. In 1960, national agricultural produce represented 41 percent of exports but this fell to only 12 percent in 1985 (González, 1989:23).

**Nutrition**

General malnutrition was noted as a key problem undermining development and exacerbating poverty in South Kivu. Protein consumption related directly to family
income level with only the most prosperous of families being in the position to adequately supplement their intake during non-harvest periods with market merchandise. "There [was] a demonstrated profound affect on the state of health directly related to nutritional levels" (González, 1989:24).

On land use relating to nutritional intake, levels of malnutrition were severe in much of the more densely populated rural areas of South Kivu especially the Kabare-Walungu zone where population density even in 1990 exceeded 163 inhabitants per square kilometre. (Zaire, 1992:12) An estimated 85 percent of parcels were located more than an hour’s walk from dwellings. Average plot sizes were 0.35 hectares with 6.9 people per plot giving 0.05 hectares of cultivated land per person. This was grossly below the general estimation of 0.4 hectares per person deemed necessary in these conditions to assure subsistence (MAARDC, 1991:48). The difference between the above stated theoretical position and the reality of families enjoying better health was possibly made up from small animal husbandry activities and the profusion of fruits in the area including banana, papaya and mango. However, chronic malnutrition did exist in much of South Kivu and continues today.

Health

The importance of community health cannot be overemphasised in the ‘fight against’ poverty. However, in South Kivu less than a third of the population was serviced by the formal health network and in 1985 only one doctor was available for 45,000 potential patients. Nevertheless, this was better than in North Kivu and Maniema provinces where one doctor was present for 58,000 or 89,000 inhabitants respectively. World Health Organisation (WHO) recommendations were for one doctor and 14 nurses per 10,000 people (Zaïre, 1992:17). The better ratio in South Kivu was perhaps due to the climate and scenery making it a more pleasant location for missionaries.

During 1990 South Kivu had only 49 doctors in post and required a further 181 and only 1,533 nurses were employed against a total of 8,600 required. There was also a pronounced concentration of medical services in urban centres. Many rural health
centres were abandoned, or if functioning, buildings and facilities were dilapidated and supplies and equipment missing. A lack of salaries meant nurses and doctors had to extract payment from clients and seek additional employment. As the state did not supply drugs and equipment, some health institutions were forced to buy at expensive prices from the private market with funds from patients. The population was also noted to exhibit an excessive confidence in western medication and tended to over-consume imported drugs (Zaire, 1992:19).

Government policy under Mobutu was to progressively diminish support to the national health service. In 1980, 2.5 percent of the national budget was reserved for health but in 1988 this was less than 0.7 percent. In 1985 the budget for the ministry of health was at 50 cents US per person per year and this dropped to 30 cents in 1990 (Zaire, 1992:22). The lack of Government support in the health service was both cause and symptom of western interest. International religious organisations or UNICEF constructed most health centres in South Kivu.

**Education**

In 1980, 18.9 percent of the national budget was reserved for education. However by 1996 this had been reduced to 1.5 percent and to less than 0.7 percent by 1989 against the African average of 13 percent (Zaire, 1992:54). The Government nationalised schools in 1974 and had since progressively relinquished management responsibility. From 1985 to 1986, 760,852 children attended primary school in Kivu, but secondary schools only enrolled 129,323 students in the same period – reflecting in many ways the colonial policy of providing education only to a certain level. Less than a third of children at primary age never attended school and only 38 percent of students reached the sixth year (Zaire, 1992:61).

All three tertiary education institutions in South Kivu were in the provincial capital, Bukavu. They consisted of one teacher training college; l’Institut Supérieur Pédagogique (ISP), the medical school; l’Institut Supérieur des Techniques Médicales, (ISTM) and l’Institut Supérieur de Développement Rural (ISDR) – for promotion of
economic development and social and human affairs for rural communities. There was a distinct male bias at all levels of education due to the cultural norms of keeping females in the village environment for tasks such as wood and water collection, house and agricultural work and childcare. Males left the rural areas to study, often staying with relatives or friends in town.

Education was not free. Costs for books and associated school supplies had to be covered and, with the withdrawal of state support, also teacher’s salaries. Finding competent teachers and enough money to keep them in place was difficult. Consequently many unqualified, inexperienced people attempted to teach. Many schools were in a state of advanced disrepair as money for their upkeep was minimal.

The result was a progressively less educated population and an older student profile as many returned to school after time-out to earn money. Many parents could simply not afford the cost of education and rural schools frequently did not function. Most textbooks, if any were used, were the discarded remnants of western systems and did little to reflect the reality of Africa. Even with the existence of the ISDR, there was little appropriate agricultural and pastoral training whereas it was the predominant vocation in the region (Zaïre, 1992:59).

As if access to schools in the rural areas wasn’t difficult enough, the inhabitants of South Kivu lived in an economic environment which provided few formal work opportunities. Education, therefore, did little to improve their chance of employment and there existed a perceived contradiction between an obligation to pay for education where finally the educated perform the same tasks as the non-educated. Furthermore, most rural inhabitants were attached to traditional group values and education tended to exclude them from this.

**Water and Sanitation**

The general figure for adequate potable water coverage in the Congo was 39 percent in 1992, and believed by local national rural water authorities to be only about 30 percent
in South Kivu. At this time WHO considered 77 percent of the national population to be without acceptable sanitation (WHO, 1992:34). Very poor support to related state sectors in recent years meant that many rural water supplies had fallen into disrepair without means of maintenance. The local water department lacked trained staff, transport and materials and could not possibly service the province. Sector professionals indicated that a lack of inter-ministerial coordination in the public health related sectors was a major constraint to development in the Congo (WHO, 1992:42).

The Division of the Environment, which was responsible for solid waste management in urban areas, was in a similar position and completely unable to perform its tasks. Consequently people discharged their solid wastes on the streets and footpaths and into open storm-water drainage systems. This further compromised town sanitation and increased health risks. Bukavu, with a population of 300,000, had no water borne sewage system and relied on pit latrines and septic tanks, many of which would over flow regularly for lack of maintenance. In a region where cholera was endemic, public health facilities were potentially catastrophic.

**Infrastructure**

South Kivu was remote and lacked both internal roads and good external transport routes. By 1998, many national roads under the authority of Office des Routes (ODR), had not been maintained for 25 years. Access to external markets had to pass by boat and rail through Tanzania or by difficult roads through Rwanda and Uganda. Even internal trade in the region was extremely hampered by the lack of roads – which were completely impassable in all seasons. Nevertheless, South Kivu was advantaged by the existence of two hydro-electric stations which could theoretically generate power for much of eastern Congo (Zaire, 1992).

Typical rural dwellings consisted of mud walled huts, built in a rectangular form, with grass roofs and a few with tin roof-sheets. Urban dwellings were generally, but by no means always, more substantial and constructed in mud and fired clay brick. Lack of
land in urban areas prompted many to build on dangerous slopes. Landslides and building collapses were common, sometimes killing their occupants.

**Social Factors**

The village system, as the base of social fabric in South Kivu traditional society, was ruled by a Chief at the summit of the hierarchy who distributed land. At the bottom of the social scale were peasants who had to pay the chief, possibly in cows or goats, relative to the land they wanted. Thus many peasant farmers did not own their land and worked the property of others with some arrangement of providing a share of produce for rent. Certainly most did not have access to sufficient land to produce adequate food for their families and dependants. If owned, land passed from male to male in tribal lineage.

Women in society had an especially marginalised role and no rights to land. They were particularly insecure with respect to usufructual rights especially relating to marriage difficulties. Widows and divorced wives were obliged to appeal to males of their original families to gain access to land. Women were also traditionally denied access to credit.

**SOUTHERN KIVU HOSPITALITY**

With a fairly bleak traditional socio-economic base, and poverty subsequently consolidated by the actions of international and local leaders, refugee presence in South Kivu from 1993 to 1996 further compounded problems for the average citizen.

The Uvira area hosted 110,000 refugees from Burundi from 1993, which increased to 220,000 by 1996 with the addition of 70,000 Rwandans in 1994 and 1995, and a further 40,000 Burundians who arrived in mid-1996. More northerly areas of South Kivu were swamped with an influx of 330,000 Rwandan refugees in mid-1994 following the Rwandan genocide. In localised areas surrounding the camps, refugees accounted for more than a third of the total population.
More than 30 refugee camp sites were created, nearly all on good agricultural land. Not only did the presence of refugees immediately put stress on local food stocks, but they also damaged or stole many crops. Furthermore, their occupation of agricultural land reduced the communities’ ability to grow sufficient crops for themselves. The refugees also stole much livestock from areas en route and surrounding camp sites. However, they did not dare approach the High Plateaux area, home to tens of thousands of cattle and the Banyamulenge.

Humanitarian aid agencies arrived and provided much necessary food, mainly maize grain, beans, oil, sugar and salt. More food on the market meant fluctuations in price that benefited some but disadvantaged many peasants trying to sell their crops. Market patterns dramatically altered as excess refugee food was traded for local produce and village markets began to trade a higher proportion of basic goods in relation to total consumption.

The already meagre health services of South Kivu were suddenly hit with thousands of refugees demanding treatment. Due to the good will of health staff and the insistence of refugees, many of them wounded in flight, the few remaining stocks of medication were soon consumed.

With their open areas and shelter, many South Kivu schools served refugees as spontaneous camping areas. In the first few days of occupation desperate refugees caused incredible damage by destroying most desks and chairs for fuel-wood. Doors and windows, including frames, were also torn out to add to the fires. If schools had latrines, the refugees filled and ruined them, and then further defecated everywhere inside and outside buildings.

Any wood was fair game for refugees. Tens of thousands of trees were cut in the first few weeks for cooking fires and shelter construction. The refugees tore down every wooden telephone pole along 35 kilometres of the Bukavu to Kavumu road, permanently cutting communication between the airport and town. Additional
environmental damage occurred as refugees grouped into spontaneous sites around the villages, further destroying crops and vegetation and fouling water sources. Much theft occurred, often out of desperation for food and clothing. Many refugees were armed and tension between local residents and refugees mounted leading to numerous violent confrontations.

However, the international community acted rapidly in South Kivu. Camp sites were negotiated with landowners, who were paid, and the construction of fully serviced sites commenced. Much road access was improved, water and sanitation systems constructed, fuel and construction wood contracts with regional suppliers arranged and plastic sheeting and water containers flown in. Numerous humanitarian agencies set up within the first few weeks and, as the government insisted upon hiring nationals outside camp areas, the local job market exploded.

Hotels, restaurants and the local house rental business boomed as expatriate agency staff moved in. Anyone fortunate enough to have a vehicle that moved could hire it out for hundreds of dollars per day. Business in hardware, trading and food dramatically increased and the refugees provided a cheap source of labour, and some otherwise lacking construction skills, for the local population. Many local citizens, especially those at the higher end of the socio-economic scale, did well out of the refugee crisis.

KIVU AT WAR

If there were any benefits gained by hosting refugees from 1993 to 1996, they were more than lost during the year of conflict that followed. In October 1996, when South Kivu fell to the invading AFDL forces, the humanitarian community was forced to evacuate and leave the refugees and local population to fend for themselves. The conflict and chaos that resulted from the AFDL invasion was horrendous. Three destructive waves crashed through the countryside, killing civilians and destroying infrastructure and rural assets in their path. As roads were few, and much of South Kivu’s population lived along these access routes, all of South Kivu was affected. The
local community of South Kivu once again extended its hospitality, though this time much more reluctantly, to people at war.

The first wave of destruction was instigated by enormous groups of retreating refugees including armed extremist Hutu elements, Interahamwe and ex-FAR accompanied by their shield of women and children. They participated in widespread, indiscriminate theft to sustain themselves. Schools, health centres and many village buildings were looted and damaged in their path and crops stolen or ruined by trampling. The Chief Medical Doctor at Walungu Hospital reported that, for an entire week, the main road outside the hospital was teeming with a massive caravan of refugees moving west. Occasionally a small group would swing through the hospital and steal mattresses, food or drugs. The doctor was unable to argue against armed desperate people en mass.

A second phase of devastation soon followed. With insufficient logistical support from Kinshasa for their campaign against the AFDL, the FAZ resorted to widespread theft and appropriation. Seeking any possible means of escape, they assaulted people and stole money and vehicles. Many humanitarian agency vehicles were requisitioned even before expatriate staff were evacuated. The FAZ developed a pattern of looting just prior to their departure. Some civilians were killed if they withheld food. As an example typifying their action, before fleeing the city of Kindu in February 1997, the FAZ looted the Kindu General Hospital, depriving patients of medical care and stealing basic medical supplies and equipment including medicine and mattresses still in use by patients.

Soldiers of the Alliance forces quickly advanced in a third destructive wave and often caught up with retreating refugees and FAZ. Open warfare resulted, though often one sided. Searching out their FAZ and refugee opponents, large numbers of people were killed, including civilians suspected of withholding information. Soldiers would often turn a village into their outpost, displacing residents from their dwellings and making excessive demands on their resources in the name of 'liberation'.

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Figure VI (Map 3). Refugee Camps and Population Movements, 1997
A fourth disruptive wave must also be considered as local citizens themselves, compelled by rumours of imminent AFDL atrocities, abandoned their villages and fled with the refugees and FAZ. Although not destructive in intent, the desperation of the situation led many to steal. Many homes were left abandoned which encouraged looting from passing opportunists. Many local citizens, fleeing areas south of Uvira, hired or stole boats to cross Lake Tanganyika and seek refuge in Tanzania. Others, moving internally in the Congo abandoned their homes to hide in forest areas and distant villages.

As the AFDL forces secured swathes of the eastern Congo, the Mobutu regime in Kinshasa ordered aerial bombing attacks on Bukavu, Shabunda and other towns. These attacks were largely inaccurate and no military targets were hit. One bomb in February 1997 landed in a crowded market place in Bukavu, killing and injuring many civilians.

Even after the 'liberation' of Congo in May 1997, regional violence continued on a regular basis. Groups of Interahamwe, hiding in forest areas west of Bukavu, consolidated with remaining FAZ and local militia elements and often emerged to ambush AFDL patrols. Sometimes these resurgent groups formed convoys and battled their way back to Rwanda in order to assist disruptive guerrilla forces there. Tutsi troops would also cross regularly from Rwanda bringing arms and support to their AFDL allies who were fighting remaining Hutu elements in the Congo.

The recent advance of Banyamulenge and Tutsi forces from Uganda and Rwanda (August and September 1998) in their bid to topple President Kabila, is a continuation of the complex conflict that has afflicted the communities of South Kivu for many years.

POVERTY AND CONFLICT: SOUTH KIVU TODAY

Overall, the socio-economic setting in the Great Lakes today presents a bleak picture. In 1998 the life expectancy in the Congo was 45.2 years for males, and 49 for women. A staggering low life expectancy of 38 years for males was recorded in Rwanda (CIA,
Congolese women expect to have 6.64 live births, but nearly 13 in 100 children die as infants and more than a fifth do not make it to the age of five (UNICEF, 1998).

Nevertheless, impoverishment by contemporary development 'experts' has continued in recent years. Under structural adjustment policies of the World Bank, export-led agricultural growth, accelerated commercialisation of farming, and stringent controls over government spending were still recently promoted (Oxfam, 1996:55). IMF austerity programmes led to the dismissal of 7,000 teachers from the Congo's primary education system in 1990 for 'budgetary reasons' (Hancock, 1991:179).

"The 1997 Human Development Report [ranked] Burundi and Rwanda among the seven countries in the world with the lowest human development. The Congo (despite its vast economic potential) was estimated in 1995 to be the fourth poorest country in the world, with GDP per capita at US$125. In the Congo, proliferating local taxes have imposed an increasing burden on people for little return in the way of basic service-provision" (Oxfam, 1997:6).

For South Kivu, conditions of poverty that were already firmly established by past policies have been overlain by a heavy cloud of seemingly perpetual conflict. This conflict continues to shatter the structure of communities and the livelihoods of people dependant on the land.

Of the 130,000 cows in South Kivu in 1988 (Zaire, 1992:42) less than one quarter are believed to have remained in 1998: the rest having been slaughtered for food or in spite, or stolen and herded back to ranches in Rwanda. As with most rural assets, South Kivu's once vigorous dairy industry has been decimated.

Further implications of conflict on economic life were profound. Fear kept many farmers in their homes, afraid to venture into fields. An overall decline in planting, production and food consumption resulted and nutritional status and health deteriorated accordingly. In urban areas the interruption of electrical supply led to cuts in pumped
water and further increased the prevalence of disease. Corpses of those killed in battle lay about uncollected adding a further serious health risk.

The displaced eventually returned to find their homes destroyed and uninhabitable. Roof-sheets, doors and windows were commonly looted by opportunistic neighbours. Fields were either overgrown or appropriated by others. Agricultural cycles had been missed, and with seed stocks consumed in desperation and tools stolen, there was often no capacity to restart production. Many turned back to the forests where at least some coping mechanisms had been established over the past months. Others chose to cultivate deserted refugee camps sites and risk being killed or maimed by abandoned mines and grenades.

Men were away from their homes, fighting, lost to battle or in hiding. In their absence women assumed much additional burden and remained susceptible to acts of aggression and rape. Thousands of refugee and local children became separated from their parents during mass population movements or were orphaned as a result of the conflict. These children were found later in South Kivu homes, perhaps well integrated in family life, but frequently exploited for their labour in fields. Other children had been adopted by militias and national armies and ended up toting guns often taller than themselves.

An atmosphere of intense unease pervaded society. People were nervous and quick to lose tempers. Paranoia ruled. Government and rebel spies were everywhere. Citizens were detained without trial and tortured for what they knew about the enemy. Many were executed or simply disappeared. Conflict permeated the homes of the wealthy and the poor and arrested the human development of society in South Kivu.
This chapter gives an overview of the types of development institutions that were active in South Kivu during recent humanitarian emergencies, namely in the period from 1993 to 1998. Their histories, mandates and objectives are briefly discussed along with modes of operation. Strengths and weaknesses of each development actor are also noted in relation to performance in acting to positively 'develop' local populations and promote the equitable sharing of power and control.

TRADITIONAL DEVELOPMENT MECHANISMS

Kinship, ethnicity and geography have been dominant factors in the local politics of the Great Lakes region for hundreds of years. In pre-colonial Rwanda and Burundi, Tutsi kings presided over society in a manner that was effective and promoted relatively stability. Bwami, as traditional kings, operated in much the same manner in the Congo and ethnic issues between differing Bantu tribes, though perhaps not as evident as in Rwanda, were considerable nonetheless.

As noted in Chapter 5, the village system was the basis of social fabric and the bwami controlled land and much of the distribution of wealth. Bwami could, and frequently did, demand labour from peasants under their rule. This ‘tribute labour’ appeared to be accepted in the community and was a mechanism of potential village progress and development.
Strengths of such traditional mechanisms were derived from their cohesion-inducing role in the village structure. A mwami, as head of the community, had reciprocal obligations to peasants and the community at large to ensure security and social and economic stability. Furthermore, bwami seldom unilaterally made significant decisions but discussed issues, such as labour and community taxes, with a well-defined hierarchy of lesser chiefs and headmen. Another principal advantage of ‘local systems’ was that control over resources rested at community level.

However, control within the community itself was based on roles defined by class, ethnicity, family ties and gender. The positions of chiefs and headmen were always represented by men except in exceptional ‘interim’ cases. Only very much inferior roles in the control of community development were assigned to women.

In many ways the colonial powers reinforced traditional structures and the position of their elites as an economical form of territorial administration. This was especially the case in more remote areas where the bwami’s capacity to mobilise their populations as a workforce was exploited to serve colonial interests.

One example of this, related to the author by a Belgian miner in Kinshasa, was the road maintenance contracts that the colonial administration had with local bwami. The administration required roads to be maintained to a certain standard to provide good access to plantations and mines and to ensure the transportation of produce for export. Bwami were given the responsibility of maintaining sections of road through their territories and were paid a fixed rate per kilometre for road maintained to the specified standard.

Contracts were exclusively with the bwami and no direct negotiations with the workforce were entered into. Payment was based upon a full amount for a completely up-to-standard road, which was judged by driving a vehicle along the road at forty miles per hour with a beaker of water strapped to the bonnet. A full beaker at the end of the ‘test’ represented one hundred percent payment, which was reduced
proportionally for the amount of water spilt. Roads were said to be kept in 'perfect' condition at this time.

Weaknesses of these traditional systems stem from this absolute control by a local male elite over women and land-less peasants who were relegated to positions of dependence with very little influence over community matters and consequent poor control over their own welfare.

CHURCHES

Churches were the first foreign development agency to arrive in South Kivu en force and their presence in the larger Great Lakes region dates back to the initial journeys of the missionary Dr. David Livingstone to Lake Tanganyika around 1866. During colonisation in the region churches established themselves in parallel with the colonial administration and became a powerful development force.

Although often seen as having an 'alternative agenda', churches have contributed significantly to the positive development of Kivu in many ways. The Catholic Church was particularly strong and, during the reign of Mobutu, was often an outspoken critic of the Government's non-respect of human rights despite Mobutu's many warnings against 'confusing religion and politics'. As the local government and military often exploited the poor to make up for the difference between low salaries and the real cost of living, churches maintained an important role as "the sole protector of human liberties" (Dodd, 1988:94).

An intrinsic weakness of churches as development mechanisms was their sometimes-strict adherence to 'western' theological doctrines that were not always appropriate in the traditional African setting. The Catholic Church's outspoken stance against contraception promoted births in areas where population stress was a principal underlying cause of poverty and conflict. 'Competition' between differing churches was also not always positive and often the 'developmental services' provided were limited to congregations belonging to the church. In Bukavu in 1994, the Catholic
church supplied food to a camp of military from Rwanda in direct contradiction to UNHCR’s attempted policy of non-support to identified war criminals.

A major strength of some international churches is that their expatriate staff, or missionaries, were often extremely dedicated and served long assignments, endeavouring to learn local languages and to really understand their communities. During times of conflict, missionaries often remained in place to support their populations and to even to argue for respect of human rights with invading forces. Some missionaries have saved countless lives. Many have also been killed.

Some international churches also have substantial financial backing and can promote important development projects. Many of the education and medical services in South Kivu have been provided by churches and are often still managed under their supervision.

STATE INSTITUTIONS

State institutions were based on the colonial Belgian model of town and regional administrations reporting to centralised authority in the capital through respective line ministries. The theoretical strengths of such institutions were that they provided consistency in national planning and coordination of services and acted as an official channel for the application of national budgets and also as a revenue collecting mechanism for the central Government.

State institutions are theoretically important instruments for beneficial national development. However, Government policy in the Congo has been to progressively reduce support to state services, such as health and education, over the past 20 years. Regional government offices have consequently become dilapidated and staff remained unpaid for months as budgets were cut. As a result, state institutions in the Congo have become havens for corrupt officials who often prove to be more of a hindrance than a help to progressive development.
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS

International NGOs

International NGOs have had a relatively short history in the Great Lakes region compared to the developmental wings of international church organisations. Some NGOs were initially church-inspired relief agencies moving more recently to a secular mandate.

Over the past 20 years or so international NGOs have been a major proponent of human rights and community development in South Kivu. In this time they have risen to a position of influence in the international humanitarian aid and development industry, commanding sizeable budgets and accomplishing substantial programmes in areas of poverty and conflict.

A main strength of international NGOs was the very ‘non-governmental’ philosophy which absolved them of political allegiances and (theoretically) allowed a purely ‘humanitarian’ approach to their work. International NGOs in the Great Lakes implemented many of the refugee relief programmes for the UN and donor governments and worked to support local state institutions when their policy proved beneficial to community welfare. Many of the same NGOs have also actively campaigned against international government policy and influenced changes in strategy.

With recent world events calling for more emergency intervention, many international NGOs are fractionating into specialised functions according to pre-emergency, emergency, and post emergency stages. There are few NGOs that perform well in both the emergency and longer-term ‘development’ environment and this was especially noticeable in eastern Congo in 1997 as refugee care operations became ‘rehabilitation programmes’. A major issue was the difficulty that agencies had in moving from a relief phase to development. Some agencies had to entirely close projects and open new ones in the same area.
Nevertheless, the actions of International NGOs such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF, Doctors Without Borders), Oxfam and CARE, to name a few, have saved countless lives in the Great Lakes Region over the past few years. With expertise in emergency medicine, water and sanitation, shelter and camp management, these agencies mobilised quickly with experienced staff and ‘kit-set’ emergency supplies and delivered essential ‘life-saving’ services almost overnight.

Local NGOs

Local Non Governmental Organisations have risen to prominence in many developing countries over the past few years. In South Kivu there appeared to be two distinct types of local NGO. Firstly there were the organisations grown from roots in traditional village development associations, seeking representation for groups, such as widows, that were otherwise sidelined in traditional male dominated village administration. These ‘Local Development Initiatives’ (ILDs) seemed to provide fair representation of their members as beneficiaries – but did not reach out to others in need in the community beyond their fellowship.

In South Kivu there were also many ‘local agencies’ based on the models of international (western) NGOs. They consisted of a board of directors, secretaries, treasurers and other staff and, unlike ILDs, had mandates to extend benefits to communities rather than just individual members. Normally they concentrated their expertise in a limited range of fields such as ‘rural development’ including the protection of springs, construction of small gravity water systems, and projects to support community tree nurseries and agriculture.

Some of the more established local NGOs maintained strong links with churches and derived considerable project funds with their international links. Others formed partnerships with international NGOs in the region, combining local knowledge and international resources to achieve some very effective development projects. Yet in the context of high impact emergency relief, local NGOs were very much sidelined to make way for experienced and well-resourced international relief agencies.
Recently in South Kivu, there has been a phenomenal rise in the number of local agencies based on international models. Many were created purely as business ventures in response to the availability of international funds for humanitarian relief. This was understandable as employment and business opportunities were otherwise extremely limited. Another apparent large disadvantage of local NGOs was their susceptibility to local political pressures and allegiances based on the classical traditional values of kinship, ethnicity and geography.

THE UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES

In response to enormous humanitarian needs, numerous UN agencies became operational in the South Kivu area over the past decade. The most significant of these since 1993 was the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) which is documented in ‘Case Studies’ in the following chapter. A brief overview of other UN agencies follows.

The UN claims to have devoted “more attention and resources to the promotion of the development of human skills and potentials than any other external assistance effort” (UN, 1998: 1). Currently more than US 10 billion are disbursed annually in the form of loans and grants by the UN system. But it must be highlighted that the UN is neither a provider of funds, nor regularly operational. It mainly coordinates the funds of international donor governments and organises implementation agreements with local and international NGOs, state agencies and private contractors.

The UN Development Programme (UNDP) is concerned with projects for agriculture, industry, education, and the environment aiming to work in close cooperation with over 170 Member States and other UN agencies. With an annual budget of US 1.3 billion, the UNDP supports more than 5,000 projects and is the largest multilateral coordinator of grant development assistance world-wide (UN, 1998). However, in South Kivu in 1997, UNDP had a minimal presence with an office staffed by one expatriate and a few local staff. A modest budget was forthcoming in 1998 but work actually undertaken appeared to be minimal. Much of this was perhaps a function of the classical western
view that the region was still in a state of conflict, therefore little ‘development’ could be realistically committed to.

The World Bank, or the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), has coordinated the loan of over $US 333 billion to developing countries for development projects since 1946 (World Bank, 1998). Input of the Bank in the South Kivu area has been limited during recent times of conflict. In early 1998, President Kabila discouraged the World Bank from lending a relatively small sum of money to the Congo.

The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) spends $US 800 million a year on immunisation, health care, nutrition and basic education in 138 countries. (UN, 1998:2) UNICEF has had a very significant presence in the South Kivu region since 1974 and with the rise in instability in the area in 1994 its capacity has been increased. In South Kivu, UNICEF specialised in the management of ‘cold chain’ vaccination programmes, mother and childcare, school projects, social projects such as the disarmament and reintegration of child soldiers, and community sanitation and water improvements.

The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) had some programmes in South Kivu from 1988 to 1990 specialising in rural animation and development, however, they were limited to a virtually non-operational capacity as widespread conflict came to dominate the scene.

For delivery of food to refugee camps, the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) became a huge agency in the Great Lakes region over recent years with many staff, trucks, cranes, barges and warehouses. They transported, stored and delivered to UNHCR (who organised final distribution to refugees), up to 1000 tonnes of food per day in the entire region. Nearly 300 tonnes of food was required on a daily basis for the refugees in the South Kivu area alone.
INTERNATIONAL DONORS

Finance for relief and development operations in South Kivu came from a variety of sources including the European Union, bilateral government funds, private donors, international agencies with fund-raising capacity and churches.

The United Nations agencies had very little of their own funds and relied on voluntary contributions for large donors such as the European Union with major contributions from their ‘European Community Humanitarian Office’ (ECHO), ‘Project for Support to Transitional Health’ (PATS) and the ‘Project for Support to Rehabilitation’ (PAR).

International donors were the backbone of all humanitarian assistance in the Great Lakes region and were immensely strong and influential in that they coordinated funds from their respective governments or member states. However, by the same token, such donors were susceptible to international political pressure and often a ‘political mandate’ would override evident humanitarian needs.

An example of this was highlighted to the author at a meeting with the European Union where fear of a ‘political trap’ was mentioned as a reason for not freeing up money for humanitarian assistance in the eastern Congo. At the time, not all European member states considered rule in the east to be legitimate and it was feared that aid might assist those who could later become involved in the military domination of the region. Subsequently many of these predictions came true.

SUMMARY

Institutions and varying types of organisations have distinct perspectives and aims. Consequently their policies and modes of operation are often divergent. Two agencies often find themselves pulling in different directions, even when both are presumably guided by humanitarian principles. The following chapter examines the positions and activities of some ‘development actors’ and communities in South Kivu.
CHAPTER 7
CASE STUDIES

OXFAM

This study is based on the author’s experience of Oxfam as an implementing partner for UNHCR from 1996 to 1998 and a structured interview with their South Kivu Coordinator during this period.

Oxfam, an international secular non-governmental agency with a demonstrated commitment to local partnership for sustainable development, opened its first office in the Great Lakes region in 1978 with a regional representative based in Kigali, Rwanda. The office covered Rwanda, Burundi and the Kivu regions of the Congo. South Kivu was much more accessed by crossing the international border from Rwanda at Bukavu than from Kinshasa.

At the time, the situation in the three states was very different and consequent approaches to intervention had to be varied. Popular rule in Rwanda and the relative openness of the Government allowed UN and NGO agencies to work satisfactorily within official agreements. The socio-political set-up of Rwanda was based on ‘communes’ run by the local Bourgemestres, who were rather junior in overall national administration but enjoyed the freedom to implement their own development projects. The Bourgemestres tapped into local and even foreign development aid directly and could activate umuganda, the national community labour system. Good sealed roads connected all communes in Rwanda and the overall impression was that ‘development worked’ (Dodd, 1988:90).
However, in Burundi the socio-political situation was very different. The Government had no real interest in rural development and actively repressed the mainly Hutu rural peasantry in order to keep them powerless. Government policy allowed few official agreements for development agencies and foreigners were often regarded suspiciously.

Oxfam had no Government agreement to operate in Burundi and maintained a very low profile. The local administrators were generally members of the ruling Tutsi elite and acted as barriers between NGOs and the population. The Government of Burundi was trying to implement a programme of villagisation, amassing dispersed rural populations into central village areas where they could be more easily controlled. Although the Government sought to limit the powers of the Church, some still maintained low profile social and economic development projects which Oxfam supported.

In the eastern Congo, Oxfam commenced operations via local church networks and moved expatriate management from Kigali to Bukavu in 1983. Although Oxfam had an agreement with the Government in Kinshasa, initial contact with the local authorities in Kivu was minimal. "It was clear that partnership with the authorities would be almost impossible and that the Church, as the protector of liberties, was the most appropriate body with which to work" (Dodd, 1988:89).

Thus, Church-associated projects were the original focus of Oxfam’s activities in Kivu and included treatment and social rehabilitation for the disabled and hospital work with outreach and medical supplies. Community projects were progressively expanded over the years since 1983 to include village water supply and agricultural programmes. Consequently Oxfam were well established and instrumental in the international response to the needs of refugees in Kivu in 1994 by quickly installing water supplies in refugee sites. Expatriate emergency engineers, support staff and equipment was flown in for this, but locally trained staff also played a significant role.

With their original presence in the region based on community development, Oxfam continued with this principal and maintained a programme of support to community public health through water and sanitation projects. However, the invasion of AFDL
forces and evacuation of expatriate staff in October 1996 called a halt to these ‘refugee affected area’ projects. In December 1996, Oxfam returned to South Kivu and re-commenced community projects for public health and food security.

**Seeds and Tools Distribution**

As much of the population of South Kivu had become displaced during the 1996 war, agricultural cycles were disrupted and assistance with food was identified as an elementary need in late 1996. Oxfam, with funds coordinated by UNHCR, hurriedly commenced purchase of agricultural tools and seeds and organised distribution in early 1997 to various community groups.

There were numerous shortcomings in Oxfam’s approach and their field representatives in Bukavu admitted later to the author that this project was not well implemented. Incorrect seeds had been purchased in haste, the distribution to certain groups had not been equitable, tools were not always correct for the desired task and, in general, the project was not tied to the beneficiary communities.

Nevertheless, ‘food security’ remained a major issue and Oxfam reviewed its approach for later in 1997. A network of five local partners with expertise in community agriculture was coordinated and much of the decision-making delegated to them and the communities that they represented. Oxfam set the general terms of the programme but left all finer details to the partner organisations.

What resulted was what Oxfam’s Bukavu coordinator deemed to be “a very positive experience”. The local partners were extremely thorough with both their extension work and motivation of local communities and themselves identified that seeds and tools would be of little use without measures to control erosion and protect soil fertility. The partners then enforced a process of distributing seeds and tools only to families which had created compost pits and had started using them.
The result was a highly aware local agricultural community with appropriate seeds, tools and new techniques and a consequent good harvest. Local experts and the community designed, planned, implemented the project and were therefore responsible for its success. Consequently both the community and local support organisations became 'empowered' and gains were made towards sustainable development.

Oxfam saw enormous need and scope for development in the agricultural sector in South Kivu and identified this as a priority need. All acknowledged the huge potential of the region and noted the need for massive re-education in soil conservation and agricultural techniques. Expertise needed to be injected right from the ministerial level in order to 're-develop' Government policy on agricultural practices. However, as part of the programme, Oxfam also discovered and sourced much of the necessary expertise in other African countries and the Shaba Province of the Congo. Contacts were initiated for their Kivu partner organisations and the start of what all hoped to be a fruitful networking relationship began.

**Water supply projects in refugee affected areas**

Another major facet of Oxfam's work in South Kivu in 1997 was the re-use of water equipment from refugee camps for the creation of community water supply schemes in 'refugee affected' areas. The Bukavu area was backed by a long chain of mountains and numerous opportunities for spring protection and gravity water supply schemes existed.

UNHCR coordinated funding of the necessary additional materials and associated costs for the projects and tied Oxfam to a timetable for completion. However, at the time many of the areas where Oxfam worked were still insecure and liable to incursions from various armed elements.

Oxfam chose to plan for a long period of community motivation for many projects at once. Often, after numerous community sessions, when excavation for pipes was about to commence, a small battle in the area would render the villages out of bounds for a
few weeks. By the time Oxfam returned, community motivation had to start all over again.

Although Oxfam was trying to be ‘developmental’ in its approach, no capacity for completing works in their absence remained with the community. Furthermore, only one local engineer and one community worker were assigned to cover several village sites, which was an impossible task. But Oxfam insisted on paying high rates for its local staff, almost twice the rates that comparable agencies were paying, so additional staff could not be justified.

UNHCR identified numerous faults in the way Oxfam was working and was not at all pleased that after six months of field work not a single pipe had been laid, when it had initially been agreed between parties that all projects should have been completed during this time. UNHCR would have preferred to see completion of the projects on a one by one basis rather that trying to do all at once, and even with some paid labour to bring water to the needy people in areas prone to conflict. In short, the windows of opportunity presented to Oxfam and UNHCR were not well exploited in this case.

THE MWAMI OF KISEKA

Mwami Bwami na Luindi Mubeza III and his wife Yvette were colleagues and good friends of the author. The following notes are based upon a long working relationship with “Mwami”, discussions held during the course of supporting community development work in his territory and a formalised interview on the structure of systems of tradition rule.

The general history of the traditional village collectivité system and development mechanisms including “tribute labour”, where bwami and chiefs demanded labour from their population, have been introduced in previous chapters. In much of South Kivu an additional form of income for the village was also generated from a ‘banana tax’ - a tax
imposed upon banana *shamba* holders and used within the local community for development projects.

One of the main problems that the Mwami mentioned was the movement of young people away from rural areas. Local communities suffered as their ability to work the land was compromised and the authority of the local systems was lessening. However, in towns, young people were not doing well and often led a harder life than in the country.

**Road Development Projects in Kiseka**

The Mwami was very perceptive of changes in power roles in the area and recognised international intervention as a temporary phenomenon. On several occasions he expressed concern to the author of how the false economy created by the international community often undermined traditional “sustainable” systems.

The territory of the Mwami contained an important road to the southwest of Bukavu that was in need of repair to allow the passage of trucks to assist refugees. An international agency, implementing road repair projects on behalf of UNHCR at the time, had commenced negotiations with local groups in the Mwami’s area for labour to repair the road. Incentives proposed included WFP “food for work” for labourers plus some monetary payment for supervisors.

When the Mwami realised what was going on he appealed to UNHCR to change the approach to the project stating that it would heavily compromise the efforts he had undertaken for development in the area. The Mwami asserted that his people drew a significant benefit from the road and had always in the past, when coordinated by village elders, repaired roads with free community labour. Hence, following the programme as proposed by the agency, the local population would then become reliant on external incentives and would no longer feel responsible for its own infrastructure. In the Mwami’s terms, this project would do irreparable damage to what he saw as the only feasible sustainable development of the region – traditional “tribute” labour.
UNHCR realised that the Mwami had a point and, although his traditional rule was perhaps not completely democratic, equitable nor gender sensitive in western terms, the system as proposed by him was the ‘least contradictory’ to sustainable development efforts. He was right in his perception of the international community, at least in the form of UNHCR, as temporary. If there were developmental gains to be made in the gradual equitable empowerment of his community, it could happen later. Disrupting his system by handing out incentives then would not have help.

Eventually a deal was agreed upon where UNHCR would provide tools, that the community could later keep, and some spare parts and diesel for a tractor and trailer that the Mwami would borrow off a local mining company. In this way the Mwami would facilitate his community to repair the road and open it up to truck traffic and his traditional system in tact to repeat the process for many years to come.

**Emergency Assistance to High Plateaux Displacees**

During fighting in the High Plateaux area of South Kivu in October and November 1996, an estimated 2000 people arrived in the territory of Mwami and proceeded to camp around existing village areas. The local population supported the displaced with as much food and shelter as it could. Only by April 1998 was there some indication that these displaced people might be able to return to their home villages. There was talk of local moves for reconciliation and some Banyamulenge and Babembe communities had met to discuss the issue and had even openly apologised for killing each other months before.

The Mwami held a position of profound importance. He realised that the visitors were compromising the welfare of his people who were already vulnerable as they inhabited an area between the High Plateaux and the low agricultural lands. Their vulnerability was further exacerbated by the presence of the displaced but he could not insist upon them returning if this would only lead to further conflict. However, once the warring parties outwardly both expressed their desire to re-enter an economic relationship and re-establish their stake in regional peace, the Mwami saw a small initiative on his part as
necessary to consolidate local sentiments into palpable action. Both the physical climate (with the planting season coming) and the political climate were favourable. The Mwami approached UNHCR for support in the form of some seeds, agricultural tools and basic shelter like plastic sheeting for each of the 400 families which were to return to their destroyed villages.

UNHCR unfortunately could not, because of its mandate, interfere in an area which was formally the responsibility of the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), as this was an internal ‘displacee’ issue and not one of international refugees. The ICRC commenced some assistance activities in the area shortly afterward but was limited by poor road access. Many of the supplies ordered for the operation had not yet arrived when war broke out in the area in early August 1998.

GIHAMBA COMMUNITY

The quarter of Gihamba, on the rural fringe of the City of Bukavu, was an area of squatter settlement on steep, marginally inhabitable land. As typical with the urban poor, many in the community lacked legal rights to the land they occupied and had to make do with entirely inadequate services. There was only one water tap for 15,000 people so many were forced to use local springs known to be contaminated at times with cholera.

As a growing phenomenon in South Kivu, more and more people moved away from rural villages to towns and came to live in ecologically fragile areas exposed to the risk of flooding, erosion and landslides. Gihamba was also near the Rwandan border and received military patrols and often experienced cross border incursions and battles.

Community Appraisal

Over the past decade, ‘Participatory Rural Appraisal’ (PRA) has developed into an important and widely used tool, allowing a deeper level of understanding of people's
needs and encouraging greater local involvement in the management of development projects. Application of PRA techniques essentially involves a set of exercises that enable local people and decision-makers to identify, share and build upon their knowledge of their livelihoods and environments. Although the set of approaches and methods applied are normally associated with the rural context, the author considered that certain elements of the approach could be applicable in any environment where decision makers needed to find out more about a community, and people needed to find out more about themselves.

The author networked with local and international development workers in the area, reviewed possible exercises, and decided jointly upon a trial session with a local community association in Gihamba. For the exercises almost 100 members of the community spent a day in the community school area, grouped in five categories as children, youths, men, women and old people.

The first exercise was in ‘community mapping’ where the graphical representation capacity and perception of the physical layout of their neighbourhood was drawn by each group on large sheets of paper. This was followed by an exercise where ‘community assets and liabilities’ were listed, which simply allowed each group to document what they viewed as negative and positive about their community. On the maps ‘good and bad’ features were highlighted. The main road, which traversed the neighbourhood, was very dangerous for children and marked by the men with a big red skull and cross-bones. The river at the foot of the hill was also an international border. The women viewed this as both a good resource but also an area of danger due to the presence of military.

Groups then identified ‘perceived problems and priorities’ of each other group. For example, the women’s group wrote up what they envisaged as the priority needs of their children, youths, men folk and elders. Groups then presented their opinion to the room. As a follow up, proposed solutions to the noted problems were listed with resources required. As a final exercise, each group identified who they thought should
be responsible for providing solutions to their problems. A representation of the table resulting from the last exercise is depicted in Table I.

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<th>Responsible Group</th>
<th>Children</th>
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<th>Women</th>
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<th>Elders</th>
<th>Town Authorities</th>
<th>Provincial Authorities</th>
<th>Central State Authorities</th>
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Table I. Summary Table. Gihamba Community Perceived Needs and Responsibilities

A key observation from the final exercise was that the community held very high expectations of international NGOs and UN agencies. Some responsibility was perceived to rest in local town authorities, however the community had all but given up on the idea of assistance from the central Government. However, it also has to be recognised that the community was probably using the exercise to appeal to the author as part of the international community.

In rural areas the most crucial asset was arable productive land. With land and available labour, a means of production could usually be sustained. However, in urban areas the most critical asset was seen as opportunity for waged employment. All residents in Gihamba identified lack of employment as a serious constraint on their development. People had moved to the city in order to gain employment and many, finding themselves away from the productive land of their home villages, were also out of a means of subsistence. Some had arrangements with nearby landowners to cultivate land and pay with a portion of their crop but it appeared doubtful that adequate food could be produced for the community in this manner.
Also identified as a high priority was the children of the community and their need for education. A school association had been set up and the head teacher sometimes received modest contributions from parents. The school structure had been built many years ago with community participation and was now in a state of disrepair.

**Summary**

The above noted exercise was an experimental venture instigated by the author. It was not particularly well organised but did provide an interesting forum for information sharing and confirmed that 'PRA' type exercises were equally applicable in the urban context and could be used to strengthen the design and implementation of projects. Perhaps the term "Rapid Urban Appraisal" (RUA) would be appropriate for the approach taken.

The exercise demonstrated to the author, as a decision-maker, the community’s will to be involved in planning and its capacity to express its needs and propose solutions. It became evident that the most likely projects to succeed were those where the community perceived its responsibility to be the greatest, as in the provision of schools.

At the end of the day it became obvious to the author, more than ever before, that the people of Gihamba were ultimately exposed and insecure. They had moved from the country to the urban area in order to improve their livelihoods but had in reality increased little but their vulnerability.

**UNHCR**

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was first created by the UN General Assembly in 1951 and charged with the resettlement of 1.2 million refugees left homeless in Europe in the wake of World War II. Initially envisaged as a
temporary office with a life span of three years, UNHCR is today one of the world’s most important humanitarian agencies. With headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, and offices in 122 countries, more than 5,500 international staff are employed – of whom 80 percent work in the field. Today, 22.7 million people in over 140 countries are under UNHCR’s care (UNHCR, 1996).

Funding for UNHCR is almost entirely made up of voluntary contributions from NGOs, individuals and governments. Fifteen major donor countries account for about 95 percent of total budget. With the number of complex emergencies involving mass population movement increasing dramatically in recent years, UNHCR’s annual budget has risen accordingly, from $US 544 million in 1990, to more than $US 1 billion annually since 1992 (UNHCR, 1996). Numerous in-kind contributions have also been received ranging from planes for airlifts, water tankers and drivers, drilling rigs, to food, cooking oil and clothing.

In South Kivu, as with most other operations, UNHCR relied on partnerships with other UN agencies such as WFP, UNICEF and UNDP and hundreds of specialists international and local NGOs for relief and legal assistance programmes. Also relating to the increasing complexity of emergencies in recent years, UNHCR has become associated with institutions that it has traditionally had little to do with. These new liaisons include UN peacekeepers and paid local military such as those employed to maintain security in refugee camps in the Congo.

The ‘Great Lakes’ has been a major programme for UNHCR since the early 1990s with significant operations since 1993 in southern Uganda and for Burundian refugees in Rwanda, Tanzania and the Congo. In the aftermath of the attempted genocide in Rwanda in 1994, UNHCR’s programme in the Great Lakes grew enormously to provide relief to an additional 2 million Rwandan refugees.

However, UNHCR was only one component of the overall UN system and focused on safeguarding the immediate welfare of refugees over and above regional problems that the UN should have addressed as a whole. “Beginning in 1994, the international
humanitarian community helped create and perpetuate problems in eastern Congo by dealing only with humanitarian needs and neglecting the more complex political and military issues concerning the refugee camps” (HRW, 1996:3).

UNHCR endeavoured to distinguish between war criminals and innocent Rwandan refugees in camps in eastern Congo but never succeeded to separate these elements. Such an exercise would have taken a significant international military force and plans on just how it should have been undertaken were never clear. Consequently, in the name of ‘humanitarianism’, UNHCR continued relief services to innocents and criminals alike for two years until the Rwandan backed Tutsi AFDL forces broke up the camps and UNHCR and all other agencies were forced to evacuate.

Relationship with Local Authorities

Official aid to developing countries is normally facilitated by bilateral or multi-lateral agreements between governments. UNHCR thus endeavours to work in parallel with sovereign state authorities wherever possible. However, when UNHCR re-entered South Kivu in late November 1996, it negotiated with the leaders of the so-called ‘rebels’ movement and commenced work in a zone controlled by forces opposed to the ‘legitimate’ Mobutu Government. At the time UNHCR also ran an office in Kinshasa, the state capital, which was still under ‘official’ governmental control.

The new civilian authorities in South Kivu in late 1996 were aligned with Rwanda and the conquering Tutsi rebel movement. UNHCR continued to negotiate for access to rural areas but local authorities were reluctant, suspicious of UNHCR’s intent. As a consequence of the UN’s failure to prevent massacres of Tutsi in Rwanda but then to provide services to known Hutu extremist elements in refugee camps, the UN, and UNHCR in particular, were perceived by many as an agency aligned with Hutu. Therefore, the new authorities viewed UNHCR’s proposed programme of assistance and repatriation of Hutu refugees with little interest and often as a direct threat to their security.
The original mandate of UNHCR was to provide ‘protection’ to refugees, in the form of legal representation and physical services, and to seek durable solutions such as repatriation, relocation or settlement. This mandate has subsequently become somewhat stretched in recent years as the complexity of crises has increased and the agency endeavours to maintain infrastructure in enormous refugee camps and assist local host populations.

UNHCR’s presence in South Kivu necessitated yet another stretching of mandate because, in order to convince local authorities that UNHCR was worth having around, some palpable community rehabilitation had to be quickly undertaken. Largely due to the work of UNHCR staff on the ground and their strong convincing arguments to Head Quarters, $20 million was raised for the ‘community rehabilitation’ component of what came to be known as the ‘Expanded Humanitarian Programme’ (EHP). In line with UNHCR’s primary mandate, the programme also included large refugee repatriation operations with vehicles, aircraft and essential services such as water and medicine.

Hence, in response to a complex environment, UNHCR attempted to provide a comprehensive solution of necessary life saving services to refugees and projects for local communities. The rehabilitation component was designed to compensate local communities for hosting refugees, but also to serve some of their direct needs as war had recently compounded local poverty. The ‘rebel’ authorities probably only agreed to UNHCR’s presence because the plan also proposed to assist local populations. Although they often harshly criticised UNHCR, the new authorities themselves evidently benefited as they demonstrated an ability to manage ‘international agencies’. This helped legitimise their presence to an otherwise uneasy population.

**The Expanded Humanitarian Programme**

UNHCR’s EHP in eastern Congo in 1997 was a major undertaking. More than 350 projects were completed in North and South Kivu in the sectors of water, sanitation, infrastructure including drainage, road and bridge repairs, agriculture, the environment,
school rehabilitation, and health and social work. Approximately 50 local and international NGOs entered into partnership with UNHCR over this period in order to implement projects. UNHCR also designed and administered some construction contracts directly with local private contractors and state institutions.

At the start of 1997 as funds became available, there was very little capacity in the region for either designing or implementing rehabilitation works. Many people were still displaced and in hiding and it was difficult to find competent technicians in town. Much equipment from contractors had been stolen and spare parts pilfered. There were few vehicles available, stores had not all reopened and state services did not function. In short, there was an enormous amount to do, significant budgets to spend, but few resources available to adequately implement projects.

At the same time UNHCR staff in charge of managing rehabilitation projects were under intense pressure from both local authorities and headquarters in Geneva. Consequently projects started prematurely and mistakes were made. UNHCR technical staff struggled to keep up with all activities in the field. They also battled against their own administration in order to have sufficient staff and resources to adequately design and administer projects and monitor budgets.

Much good work was achieved with the EHP but many of the agencies employed to implement projects on behalf of UNHCR had little experience and were not fully competent to undertake the assigned tasks. Management of finances was often poor. Some agencies were inefficient at producing results compared to amounts of money spent; others did reasonable work but could not track their expenditures, and some just blatantly sidetracked funds.

One of the main problems was that UNHCR could not commit to a long-term programme. In a replay of the history of the agency itself, the EHP was originally envisaged for only three months, which was subsequently prolonged to six, then twelve months, and then to eighteen. This initial 'non-commitment' was probably responsible for shortsighted actions on the part of local UNHCR staff and local partners who were
susceptible to enormous pressures from peers and family.

The message passed to many was that ‘short-term gains’ had to be made. Staff of local NGOs were also often under tremendous pressure from various local authorities because having a contract with UNHCR implied that they had money. Due to the non-existence of local capital, all projects with local partners had to be undertaken with a significant portion of the project cost advanced. This put UNHCR in a compromised position from the day agreements were signed.

The selection of projects was always a point of contention and it would have been preferable to involve local authorities more in the process. However, as noted, many local authorities were simply not around in the early stages of programme work. Furthermore, in the absence of local authorities, UNHCR reluctantly became the focal point for international agencies arriving in the region seeking to undertake projects. In a later discussion with a senior ministerial official, UNHCR was severely criticised for imposing projects upon communities because local authorities were not in the position to say no: “You offered us water in a dirty glass. We were thirsty - so we drank” (Kamanzi, 1998).

By October 1997, public servants hadn’t been paid for six months. The Division of the Environment, responsible for solid waste management in Bukavu, was without resources and completely unable to perform its assigned tasks so refuse continued to build up in the streets. Few government staff remained in their offices as they needed to seek other gainful employment. They normally maintained their official positions but ran shops or other businesses in order to live.

A shortage of staff to manage the implementation of technical projects was a persistence problem throughout the EHP. The UN system in general seemed to have little appreciation of the need for skilled staff to assist in participatory planning and to monitor the implementation of projects. This was perhaps a function of UN experience with prescriptive modernisation techniques and programmes where time-consuming community based design was not viewed as a priority. Because community
participation takes time and energy, many expatriate workers still prefer prescriptive techniques as they are quicker to implement and less expensive in the short term.

In June 1997, following the recent legitimisation of the Democratic Republic of Congo as a state, the author proposed to create a project of ‘needs assessment and institutional support’ for local state sector specialists in order that proper planning information could be compiled for future projects. As proposed, the exercise would also have had a significant component of capacity building for local institutions that had by this stage regained some semblance of order. However, the UNHCR office head turned down the project because he still viewed it as being ‘overly political’.

Although UNHCR managed to secure a significant budget for rehabilitation, in reality works performed were a mere drop in the ocean compared to the enormous needs left behind by three decades of corrupt state management and conflict. Often projects for the most vulnerable could not be implemented as these zones were ‘off limits’ due to security constraints. Consequently the programme took on an urban bias as Bukavu town was often the only area accessible.

As EHP rehabilitation projects became established and visible, UNHCR also began to receive harsh criticism from other UN agencies – specifically those were mandated to undertake rehabilitation works but were unable to do so for lack of staff and budgets. UNHCR was viewed as having overstepped its limit, in many ways only because UNHCR staff in the field had put a good argument to their headquarters and had been supported. At least some donors still had faith in UNHCR, though confidence in the UN overall appeared to be declining. And in the eastern Congo, someone had to do something.
SUMMARY

This chapter has demonstrated some differing points of view of local and international development institutions and resident communities.

An evolution of awareness was demonstrated by Oxfam as an international NGO, and although errors were made, lessons were noted and approaches refined accordingly. However, UNHCR, as a very much larger and more politicised organisation, exhibited more resistance to taking on community based projects. Within all organisations was an ‘administration’ that field workers battled with. UNHCR struggled against the UN system as a whole to have refugee criminal and civilian elements separated – which they never successfully achieved.

Different institutions demonstrate distinct perspectives and priorities. Their capacities are also vastly different. Communication between local communities and development initiatives, and international agencies with the UN, needs to be promoted. All ‘development actors’ should combine their skills and energies to identify the most effective ways of ‘pulling in the same direction’ to promote peace and fight poverty.
INTRODUCTION

I have written this chapter from a very personal point of view endeavouring to highlight my own experience from involvement in relief and development work in the Great Lakes region over the past four years. I maintain that the effectiveness of any organisation in this context depends on the sum energies of individuals. For this reason a section in the final chapter also concludes with personal advice – perhaps not prescriptive recommendations – but rather what I would like to term ‘lessons and impressions’ hoping that these will be helpful to others who may find themselves in a ‘comparably complex’ environment one day.

As a regularly trained civil engineer, I find it interesting now that I should be writing a thesis that in many ways condemns the technology that I have been conditioned to prescribe. During the course of my formal education I received little preparation for the social and political implications of my work, which were to become evident to me in the Great Lakes.

I have personally witnessed much of the poverty and suffering of people involved in this crisis, the sum of which I still find too enormous to contemplate. I myself have lost colleagues and good personal friends to the violence – a violence that I feel I will never fully comprehend and sometimes can only reconcile as pure madness. I have come to appreciate the complexity of the situation and know that there are no quick and simple solutions, even if all world powers were to unite for the greater good of humankind. However, international agencies are a reality and much good work can be done to
support people to cope with poverty and conflict in the medium term as longer-term prospects hopefully improve.

PERSPECTIVE

My first impressions of the Great Lakes region were gathered from a brief period in Rwanda shortly after the genocide in 1994. Oxfam (UK&I) employed me as a sanitation engineer for the large and growing camps of internally displaced in the south. It soon became evident that the people in the camps were now living in a largely altered environment and much of my time needed to be dedicated to raising community hygiene awareness, rather than purely the technical supply of latrines and washing facilities.

Augmenting my inherited ‘extension workers’ with drama groups, we created a programme of community ‘Hygiene Action Theatre’ (HAT) and acted out positive and negative scenarios of hygiene with travelling camp productions. The camps were situated in steep hills and many sites served as natural amphitheatres. Camp populations were hungry for entertainment and appeared to appreciate their role in taking charge of their own sanitation when the messages were dramatically portrayed. Plays were followed by discussion sessions that further confirmed the population’s interest in securing its own welfare.

Following Rwanda, I continued with Oxfam to Tanzania in early 1995 in order to take charge of public health facilities in camps for Rwandan refugees in Karagwe District. At the time refugee numbers in many localities far exceeded local populations and in the entire district refugees accounted for more than a third of the total population. Stress on community resources was consequently enormous.

However, the abundant good will and hospitality of the receiving populations impressed me. This was once high-lighted at a meeting of communities near the Kyabalisa camps with the Regional Commissioner at the end of 1995, following more than one year of intense refugee occupation. The Commissioner was insisting that all refugees had to leave Tanzanian territory when one of the elders in the community spoke up with words
to the effect of “well... they’re not really that bad.” Others in the meeting echoed this sentiment and, supporting the initial speaker, proceeded to forward the case for not evicting the refugees in the near future.

This moment highlighted several aspects of the situation for me. First and foremost, there was such a thing as African solidarity. Although there had been numerous instances of tension between refugees and local host communities, there was a general sympathy for the refugees and locals were fully aware of security conditions in Rwanda and the situation that refugees would be in if forced to return prematurely. Many local Tanzanians had daily contact with refugees and understood the situation in a regional context - much more than representatives of their Government appeared to. Regional officials saw an immediate solution in forced repatriation, but communities living in the border areas realised that this would cause more problems in neighbouring Rwanda. Subsequent violence and abuse of human rights would then lead to renewed movements of people back into Tanzania.

Another factor was the benefit that host communities derived from refugees. Refugees, in abundance and otherwise underemployed - thus a cheap source of labour - commonly worked on local shambas gaining payment in bananas or vegetable crops. As all refugees freely received their necessary life supporting services such as food and water in the camps, ‘exploitation of refugee labour’ did not appear to be an issue.

The refugees, less directly, also greatly influenced the economic environment for local villages. Many more products were on the market ranging from plastic sheeting to jerry-cans and surplus grain foods. Arguably, this brought mixed benefits and had both negative and positive affects on local markets as, although the market was much larger, many new goods were imported. However, in general, local communities seemed to participate in refugee markets and vice versa and the impression was of general positive development. In the urban context, as two main commercial centres serviced the hinterland occupied by the refugees, business and job opportunities were also greatly improved.
Services provided for refugees had positive and negative affects on local populations. Roads were improved to allow food convoys to reach the camps and this positively assisted local farmers in accessing markets. Water services were enhanced and, although total quantities delivered were limited, access for local communities as well as refugees improved.

Realising the need to address broader issues, Oxfam created the ‘Karagwe Community Assistance Project’ (KCAP) to improve public health and education services in rural areas adjacent to the refugee camps. Project objectives were multiple. Increased standards of services would both deliver real positive developmental benefits to the area and compensate host populations for sharing resources with refugees, which would in turn alleviate stress on resources and consequent tension.

I further promoted the concept of ‘over-resourcing’ border regions as possible refugee accommodation areas. I argued that these areas would be likely to receive refugees in the future and more services would give local communities an enhanced capacity to cope themselves and provide initial assistance to refugees. I reasoned that if, say, an allowance for a few thousand additional people entered the design calculations, then obligations on the international community to act immediately in the very first phase of a future refugee influx would be reduced and intervention could proceed in a more orderly manner. I realise now that at that point I had already accepted that the crisis in the region was a long-term phenomenon.

ZAÏRE

Following a year in Tanzania promoting refugee public health, completing the 1995 community assistance project and designing and securing funding for the 1996 KCAP phase, my focus moved across Rwanda to Goma, North Kivu, Zaïre. There had been 120,000 refugees in Karagwe – and I had perceived them as mostly good-hearted rural folk who had fled Rwanda from the north during the first phases of the RPA invasion. But in Goma I was faced with 700,000 refugees in five gigantic camps and the ambience was very different. The size of the camps was intimidating, as were many of
the individual refugees. Goma was the haven of the former Hutu extremist regime of Rwanda and many of the instigators and performers of the genocide.

My first day in Goma was marred by a rocket attack on a civilian mini bus heading north from town. 17 people were killed and, two days later when the road again opened to the public, the bus was lying there still smoking. This was May 1996 and cross border incursions to and from Rwanda were common. The ill disciplined Zairois troops patrolling Goma were a very different breed from the few Tanzanian soldiers I had met in Karagwe. There was shooting nearly every night in town and considerable numbers of civilians were robbed, abused and killed. The atmosphere was ultimately heavy and depressing and I came to further appreciate the size and complexity of the regional crisis.

The population of the immediate Goma area increased three fold with the coming of the refugees and most of the trees that had once lined Goma’s stately avenues and covered the volcanic dome of Mount Goma were gone. In the camps, not far from the edge of Goma town, children, women and men, refugee innocents and mass killers alike, were being nurtured and protected by the good will of the ‘international community’ and the funds of the international tax payer.

A bizarre mix of opulence and oppression was evident in Goma. President Mobutu maintained a lakeside palace that we often drove past on our way to drinks at a luxury hotel. There were an astounding number of expatriates who rented most of the decent houses for extortionate prices. White aid vehicles - Landcruisers, food trucks and water tankers - appeared to account for more than half of the town traffic. Restaurants and hotels were doing a fine trade. However, at the same time Government troops had begun to rout Tutsi from the hills of the Masisi area immediately to the west and local churches and school yards began to fill up with people; hounded, hungry and dispossessed. This was the start of Mobutu’s 1996 anti-Tutsi campaign and the people I saw arrived from the hills with nothing and were far more vulnerable than the refugees now safely accommodated in their well serviced camps.
The expelled people I met were mixed in appearance and I myself could not distinguish them as Rwandan or Tutsi. Perhaps, even if they were related by some distant decent, they had long since become Zaïrois. However, Mobutu was commanding them to return to Rwanda – a country that they had no rights in and would have to enter as international refugees. I saw the crisis enlarging. There were already more than a million Rwandan and Burundian refugees in Zaire. Now another group was becoming entangled in the crisis and innocent Zaïrois were being driving to become refugees in Rwanda.

Following Goma I moved south in Zaire to Uvira on Lake Tanganyika to assume the role of Water and Sanitation Coordinator for UNHCR. More than 220,000 refugees of Burundian and Rwandan origin were maintained in camps in the Ruzizi Plain north of Uvira. For these camps I coordinated four emergency relief NGOs in the provision of public health services.

Meanwhile on-going violence in Burundi continued to drive refugees to Zaire and much work had to be done to keep up with water and associated services. People were incredibly desperate and sensitive to the point of paranoia. Discussions with refugees led me to believe that it was usually rumours and fear of violence that drove people to seek refuge across borders rather than the experience of violence itself. In one instance a movement of 3,000 people was generated following the deaths of less than 30. This further highlighted for me the complexity and volatility of the situation.

During my second month, in September 1996, there was a significant build-up of Zaïrois Army Forces (FAZ) in Uvira to pursue the anti-Tutsi campaign as outlined in Chapter 4 and previously witnessed by myself in Goma. The atmosphere in town became very tense. Drunken soldiers occupied most bars and roamed the streets. Military checkpoints increased, as did related security incidents including the harassment of humanitarian staff. My water tanker driver was stopped and robbed of his money and radio and another driver dragged from his car and beaten by soldiers.
FAZ troops were trying to expel all Tutsi from Uvira and surrounding areas and to rout the Banyamulenge from the high plateaux in the hills west of Uvira. Throughout the month of September, civilian Tutsi were rounded up and told to leave for Rwanda. Many Tutsi men were separated from their families and imprisoned in Uvira. Their homes were looted. It appears that local civilians participated in the looting and expulsion of Tutsi - but this was the theme generally supported by the local authorities and amongst all the fear-mongering and propaganda I found it hard to lay blame on any individual. I found myself personally experiencing the process that evoked the mass participation in genocide in Rwanda barely two years earlier.

It was during this period that I experienced the most unsettling feelings in my career. Mobs of young men roamed the streets at night deliberately creating horrendous noise. All night long, for several nights, they banged iron pipes on gates and chanted in order to keep the community awake and ready to combat ‘the Tutsi enemy’ who were rumoured to be planning a siege of Uvira by night.

At one stage about 100 Tutsi Uvira civilians were sheltered in our compound. This gave local citizens the impression that we were aligned with the Tutsi rebel movement rather than performing a purely humanitarian response. Public and military pressure soon forced us to move them to the care of the CZSC (Contingent Zaïrois pour la Securité de Camps - the UNHCR supported Zaïrois military forces) at their camp in Sange. Finally Mobutu’s military pressured the UN paid CZSC military and expelled the sheltering Tutsi to Rwanda in a truck requisitioned from an International NGO. I accidentally witnessed the loading of the truck but was unable to influence the fate of these people. However, talking to some of them weeks later, I gained the impression that most had lived.

Working for UNHCR, I was criticised by both sides - initially for assisting Hutu refugees and then for protecting Tutsi. There were many rumours circulating that UNHCR was supporting the Tutsi rebels by smuggling arms in our trucks and aircraft, and was not evenly vaguely concerned for the safety of local ‘Bantu’ citizens. The
entire population seemed very open to rumours and easily led to accept what I found to be far-fetched, almost impossible stories.

In early October security in Uvira worsened. The FAZ troops were failing in their attacks on Tutsi villages in the high plateaux. Troop numbers increased and young civilian men from town were ‘conscripted’ to carry arms and supplies into the hills. Troops made little progress and returned to Uvira very demoralised with wounded and dead. One night our expatriate CZSC military liaison officer was abducted by the FAZ and taken to the hospital to see their dead Captain. He was roughly treated and robbed but returned later in the evening - shaken but unharmed. Each night there was shooting, beatings and the looting continued.

THE AFDL ATTACK

Because of growing danger, UNHCR had by early October reduced international staff from 18 to five. The Security Officer was acting as the Head of Sub-Office. NGOs had similarly dramatically reduced. Morning and evening radio checks and announcements tracked staff and advised on possible movements. On many days people were advised to stay in their homes. Movement to camps was only allowed in convoys with armed CZSC escorts.

On the night of Saturday 12 October 1996, one small part of Runingo Camp, about 35 kilometres north of Uvira, was attacked. Automatic weapons and rockets were reportedly used and four refugees killed. By Sunday, almost the entire 18,000 population of Runingo was on the road, heading for Sange or Luberizi camp in the north. This meant I had to be nearly constantly present in the field increasing water systems and sanitation in receiving camps. I also tried to convince refugees to stay in Runingo where health, water and food services could be provided. They appeared to be very scared and insisted on ‘security first’ and adamantly refused to stay in the camp.

By Thursday October 17, more rumours and small incidents in the Ruzizi Plain had other refugees on the move. This was my last day in the field before being confined to
town due to the increasing likelihood of warfare. As Uvira was rapidly filling with refugees, we worked to install water bladders at a few public sites. On Saturday October 19, all expatriates of UNHCR and agencies gathered in the UNHCR compound to be protected by the CZSC as Rebel-FAZ clashes moved closer to town. Weapons fire continued in the surroundings, day and night, as did numerous chanting protests against UNHCR presence by civilians. The atmosphere was extremely tense and the decision to evacuate all expatriate staff was taken.

However, by this stage escape options were minimal. The road east to Bujumbura was reported to be mined and the soldiers there were said to be very hostile. Fighting and advancing rebels cut the road north from Kamanyola to Bukavu. The road south, towards Baraka, was known to be full of Babembe militia (a type of Mai-Mai) and clashes with FAZ were also reported. No access to the west, towards the high plateaux, was possible.

The only realistic chance seemed to be evacuation by air from Kiliba airstrip - about 30 kilometres north of Uvira. We requested an aircraft for Sunday but for reasons unknown to me this was not possible. On Monday, the World Food Programme (WFP) Buffalo was arranged and scheduled to land at Kiliba at 1500 hours. Coordination between the Bukavu office and our group continued via satphone. At 1400 hours on this day, 10 NGO vehicles, intermixed with vehicles carrying armed CZSC, formed a long convoy and proceeded to the airstrip without incident. However, there was a clearly hostile atmosphere against expatriate presence in town. The road north was also lined with masses of refugees moving south toward Uvira.

Some local people had attempted to make barriers of rocks across the road to prevent our departure and we sent out a forward party of CZSC to clear these. At the airstrip the CZSC were well installed in advance with mounted machine guns in almost dug-in positions. The evacuating team felt relatively comfortable and settled in to wait for the plane. However, by 1700 hours it became clear that the plan had gone wrong. Some telephone calls to Bukavu confirmed that the plane was blocked there and wasn’t allowed to leave that day. I’m unsure of all reasons but believe that the FAZ military
were trying to send arms on the plane to support forces in Uvira and this complicated the story to the extent that the Governor became overly involved and finally just completely blocked the plane.

The choice then had to be made to stay the night at Kiliba airstrip or to return to the UNHCR compound in Uvira and try again the following day. Armed CZSC forces more or less assured our security but the morale of the team hit a low point at this stage. The town was hostile and would not welcome us back. Reluctantly the convoy reformed and proceeded to return to Uvira.

At the Kiliba junction a large rock roadblock hurriedly constructed by the local militia obstructed our convoy. CZSC military in the first vehicle tried to negotiate passage. Unfortunately, the next two cars contained a group of twelve Ethiopian truck drivers who were part of the GTZ / Ethiopian Government food delivery package. The locals immediately identified the Ethiopians as ‘Tutsi’ and became very aggressive, throwing more rocks under the wheels, banging at the windows and threatening to stab tyres with their spears. Still the military at the front of the convoy insisted on talking and all the while the crowd gathered around increasing in number and attitude.

I was about halfway back in the convoy, right behind a pickup with a heavy mounted machine gun. The young CZSC soldiers there were arguing that waiting and trying to negotiate was not the right tactic. They were all very nervous. Safety catches were off and grenades were out and being fingered. Right next to us stood a group of Mai-Mai warriors - near naked men dressed in animal skins and red headbands, with spears and knives and crazed rolling eyes. They were covered with dust and mud and appeared heavily drugged.

The light faded and still the CZSC leaders tried to talk our way through the barrier. Then, near nightfall, someone from the crowd wandered out with a rifle and fired a shot. In response the CZSC began shooting in the air. The crowd began to disperse, but surprisingly slowly. After initially hitting the floor I looked up to see some people still standing around as the guns were lowered and shots aimed at the crowd. I saw
some people fall and a grenade explode on the road surface. The darkening sky was full of sparks and tracer bullets. The noise was incredible.

Finally the rocks were rolled away and the convoy hurried off in the darkness towards Uvira. On the road a shot from the crowd was aimed at our car but the bullet passed under the vehicle. We arrived in Uvira well after dark and settled into the UNHCR compound for a very uncomfortable, nervous night. Shooting continued outside.

The night passed without incident. A MSF nurse patched up wounded CZSC soldiers in our compound. In the morning word came that a Tutsi had been killed and his head was being paraded on a stick through the market. Stories like this did not help our morale. Negotiations for the plane continued by satphone and it was confirmed for 1500 hours the same day - Tuesday 22 October 1996.

Due to heavy local hostility, it was decided to load nearly all evacuees into the back of a large truck covered with a canvass to disguise them as cargo. Sticks were propped up to give the canvass an anti-grenade slope. I assisted in loading people up at 1300 hours then proceeded to the airstrip in a Landcruiser behind the truck - with the windows well taped. The CZSC had again cleared the road and miraculously not one militia group attempted to hinder our progress.

Still, many refugees lined the road and driving at high speed the journey was rather dangerous and we had several near misses. We expected an ambush at every corner but arrived at the airstrip safely to find the WFP Buffalo waiting for us. The pilots were nervous and in a hurry for us to load and take-off. A plane for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was also there. Their team had finally decided to evacuate as well after local hostilities became intolerable.

The Buffalo was airborne at 1500 hours. We flew over all the camps which were deserted and devoid of plastic sheeting. Many fires were burning. Even canvas warehouses, distribution centres and hospitals - large structures that could easily be identified from the air - were already destroyed.
We touched down briefly in Bukavu for formalities as it was still under Government control. We then headed to Entebbe (Kampala), base for the WFP Buffalo, and on to Nairobi where we awaited colleagues from other offices to be evacuated as Zaire fell.

WORKING WITH THE REBELS

In Nairobi I followed events in Zaire by radio reports and countless agency meetings. I was asked to act as a focal point for NGOs, endeavouring to track refugee movements and coordinate a response back into Zaire once the east opened to humanitarian agencies (see fig. VII, Map 4, Appendix B).

One month after leaving Zaire the rebels agreed to let a limited number of us re-establish UNHCR in Bukavu. We returned to our looted offices in old cars borrowed from a UN operation in Mozambique as all others had been stolen. Bukavu was full of Tutsi soldiers and appeared to be void of most of the population. Not a single civilian car moved save for a few under the command of the military.

The new civilian authorities then emerged, aligned very much with Rwanda and the conquering Tutsi military. We proceeded to negotiate for access into rural areas to search for refugees. This was very difficult but progressively we managed to visit some of the old refugee camps, finding them all completely destroyed. Field trips, once authorised, had to be undertaken with 'facilitators' - a euphemism for agents that obviously gave their superiors a detailed report of our activities at the end of each day.

After one month we were permitted to visit Uvira. By this stage all but very few of the Uvira refugees had either returned to Burundi or Rwanda, joined the Bukavu refugees to the west, crossed the lake to Tanzania or died. Some may have been in hiding near Uvira and in the Ruzizi Plain but the new military were rather thorough at searching them out. Eventually from the west and north of Bukavu, small groups of refugees began to emerge from forest areas. They had been moving west but due to rebel military on the road and extreme conditions in the jungle had then decided to return to
Rwanda. UNHCR launched a repatriation exercise and over the following three months assisted and transported 70,000 refugees to Rwanda. During January 1997, up to 3,000 refugees would appear from the bush on a daily basis.

I was asked to act as UNHCR Repatriation Coordinator to ensure that way-stations were set up with water, food and emergency health services and that sufficient trucks were provided to collect refugees (see fig. IX, Map 5, Appendix C). This position involved many negotiations with the rebels, who later became the ‘legitimate’ army, and their pseudo-military ‘facilitators’.

These ‘facilitators’ became ‘complicators’ and went out of their way at times to make our operation as difficult as possible. UNHCR’s mandate was to save the lives of these refugees, who in their terms were largely genocidal extremists and their enemies. Hence they saw our presence as compromising their mission and the security of Rwanda. On several occasions we were cut off from reaching refugees just as reports of their presence were received – only to later gain access and find them all mysteriously disappeared.

In February 1997, I led a mission with 10 UN and NGO vehicles and 30 local and expatriate specialist staff into the Kingulube area, 170 kilometres by road west of Bukavu. We had received reports from local people and the church there that numerous refugees were present and needed assistance. Following many tedious negotiations and several false starts, the authorities approved of the mission and we were assigned four facilitators. After two long, hard days of driving we arrived at Kingulube to find the remains of an enormous refugee camp – and an AFDL military outpost.

During much of the journey out we had been travelling in the same direction as a long line of foot soldiers carrying arms and ammunition. For two days we would pass them when road conditions were reasonable, only to have them later overtake us when we were winching through mud or repairing one of the many log bridges en route. Eventually we arrived at the same location – ‘the front’. Each day I negotiated with the
AFDL group commander for access. We were forbidden from proceeding west as it was declared to be an ‘operational area’. Access was finally granted to go to Nzovu, on the border with Kahuzi-Biega National Park, 20 kilometres northeast of Kingulube. That night in a team meeting we decided to split the mission into two. One group would go to Nzovu and the other would remain in Kingulube to assist the clinic and set up a serviced way-station.

Very early the following morning the military dispatched 30 soldiers to Nzovu in front of us to hunt out refugees. It took us until the evening to reach the town, as we had to repair many bridges – the complete reconstruction of one taking five hours. When we eventually arrived in Nzovu the military were already walking back and we met a hundred or so Hutu refugees sitting along the road. They were all old men, children and a large group of women, many of whom were openly weeping.

We stayed the following day at Nzovu and set to work at the hospital to provide some basic care with food, water, medicine and oral re-hydration salts. Whilst the team was working I tried to meet with local people and village representatives. However, I felt that the presence of our facilitators not only made honest conversation difficult, but also jeopardised the safety of local people. The facilitators were always lurking behind trees and around corners trying to catch a word in what was a tragic, but sometimes hilarious, parody of a poorly acted spy movie.

At one stage a local man led the ICRC representative and myself off to see his palm plantation, claiming that it had become a spontaneous refugee site and was damaged. On the way there he confessed that he was actually also intending to show us an open grave containing Hutu refugee men killed the previous morning by the patrol dispatched from Kingulube. By this stage the facilitators realised they had lost sight of us and were frantically trying to track me down on the radio. We decided that it would be best to forgo the ‘damage assessment’ and promptly returned to the village. I had already seen quite a few dead people in abandoned villages and camps en route – however only one was freshly killed: a male refugee that villagers said had been walking along with his wife and child then ‘taken aside’ when they unluckily stumbled into a group of soldiers.
Back at our camp at the abandoned Kingulube School, we regrouped with the other half of the mission, who by this time had been joined by 400 refugees. News arrived during dinner that night that both Bukavu and Nzovu had been bombed during the day – with helicopter gun ships raking much of Nzovu shortly after we had departed.

I reconsolidated the team early the following morning and headed back towards Bukavu with the convoy now spread out over several kilometres, seat belts off and doors unlocked. All were briefed to leave the cars and run into the forest if we came under attack from the air.

We returned from this initial mission with thirty refugees in our vehicles and hundreds of others walking, assisted with our food and water, back to a point near Bukavu where trucks could reach them. Our convoy stopped sometimes to bury refugee children that passed away whilst returning in the vehicles with us.

Well before we reached Bukavu, a local engineer warned me that he had overheard the facilitators talking about me amongst themselves and that they were going to give a very negative report to their command upon their return. On our last evening in the country I stopped the convoy in Walungu, only 45 kilometres from Bukavu, in order to hospitalise some refugees and have a final meeting with the facilitators.

I invited them to the local bar where we hired a private room and had a long discussion about ‘national security’. In what was very much an ‘I know that you know that I know...’ conversation I admitted that things had been seen on the trip that obviously weren’t meant to be. I asserted my understanding of their view that Hutu refugee elements were possibly a serious danger to the Tutsi and that they felt the best way to minimise this threat was to kill off every Hutu male of fighting age. I then explained the point of view of donors, the international humanitarian community and western perceptions of human rights issues. With this I focused on ‘the need to (together) convince the world that we were playing this out fairly’, in order that full international support could be gained and the consequent development funding and national progress
forthcoming. We left the bar— not as good friends—but at least understanding each other a lot better.

I repeated a similar series of meetings with higher authorities back in Bukavu with the assistance of some African UN colleagues. We affirmed our desire, not to write a series of damming reports on the recent actions of the ‘new authorities’, but rather to have access and be able to send in positive reports that confirmed cooperation was taking place. I believe some localised short-term gains were achieved by this tactic and the repatriation plan put in place following the Kingulube mission assisted several thousand refugees to repatriate.

However, humanitarian operations were always difficult due to very poor access and the actions of the military. On many occasions refugees told me that the local population had freely given them food and shelter. Most local authorities, chiefs and headmen, were humanitarian minded and tried to help save refugee lives. However, they were often intimidated by the military into doing otherwise.

Much of 1997 progressed with what I saw as a tragic ‘cat and mouse’ relationship between the military authorities and us, ‘the humanitarian community’. Making a request to visit an area alerted the authorities to the presence of refugees so they sent out soldiers before us. Once started, our operations encouraged refugees from cover but we often couldn’t remain in place to assist them. The bridges and roads we repaired for repatriation vehicles were then used by the military. Sometimes they even stole our vehicles and arrived on the scene: deadly impostors for the refugees that often searched out the blue and white of UN vehicles as their sole chance of survival.

Thus in many ways our actions were detrimental to the lives of refugees. The High Commissioner for Refugees herself later asked us to cease all ‘active search and rescue activities’ and remain only as a passive receptor in a few locations.

Even as Kabila captured Kinshasa in May 1997 and renamed Zaïre the Democratic Republic of Congo, human rights abuses continued. My assistant shrugged and said, “I
was born Congolese, then I became Zaïrois, now they tell me I am a Congolese again." He did not look jubilantly liberated.

Personally, I never came to terms with how the UN could be pushed around so much by local ‘rebel’ authorities. Much of this, I assume, was due to the loss of respect over recent years from failures in Rwanda and the refugee camps. The refusal of our leaders to dispatch the MNF further compromised our level of esteem. In effect, aid agencies in the field had been abandoned by the international community at large and left to their own interpretation of what to do in the name of ‘humanitarianism’. By the same token, in many ways, expatriate workers were left to their own means of survival.

THE HIGH PLATEAUX MISSION

In early 1998, I handed over responsibility for the Bukavu operation and took up a regional position in the UNHCR office in Kinshasa. There I assumed more duties for other countries in the region but remained substantially involved with the eastern Congo and South Kivu in particular.

By this time UNHCR realised that steps to encourage peace and reconciliation between Tutsi and Bantu parties needed to be pro-actively pursued and UNHCR saw itself in a position to initiate some positive actions. Numerous requests had been received from Banyamulenge to visit the High Plateaux area of South Kivu and to commence development projects as they had missed out on much of the EHP in 1997. The Government supported the idea in principle but was reluctant to officially authorise entry into the area.

In early July 1998, after many meetings and letters to the Government, the Minister of the Interior finally approved a mission into the High Plateaux area. The stated aim of the mission was to ‘demystify’ the area and to attract interest from international agencies, specifically identifying actions that would contribute positively to the reintegration of viable communities and reconciliation. In order to do this the area had to be visited with representatives from as many agencies as possible to gain a general
appreciation of the needs of resident populations. I came to lead another ten-vehicle convoy with thirty participants from UN agencies and local and international NGOs into the high plateaux. At the final coordination meeting in Uvira an escort of eight soldiers was imposed upon us and photography was expressly forbidden.

The high plateaux was found to be an area of physical diversity with numerous small villages inhabited by several tribal groups - notably Babembe, Bafulero and Banindu agriculturists and Banyamulenge pastoralists. Some villages were predominantly mono-ethnic whilst others were mixed. According to local parish priests in the region, pre-war population estimates for the plateau of Minewbwe and Tulambo were 180,000. The area had many resources but was classically under-developed and presented many needs for which the solution appeared to be long-term community based projects.

Furthermore, during war in 1996 and 1997, entire village populations had fled. From lower areas towards Fizi many escaped to Tanzania to become ‘international refugees’ but most from the higher plateau area fled into forests to the west. Many of these ‘internally displaced’ were now returning after many months in the forests to a situation which was, within their limited means, completely beyond recovery. They found their villages and fields destroyed, livestock killed or stolen. For them, missing two full agricultural cycles had compounded an already fragile existence. I visited many of these families living in and around their ruined houses. Life for them was extremely difficult.

These displacees had not benefited from assistance such as that being provided to international refugees. A poignant example was related to me by a man near Fizi who fled into the forest west of his home when conflict erupted. A neighbour of his fled east and eventually ended up in Tanzania. Now both had returned. The neighbour managed to work whilst in Tanzania and came back with a bicycle amongst other things. He was given a returnee package: plastic sheeting, kitchen set and food compliments of UNHCR. He now also had a goat, was progressing economically and had a positive outlook. The man that chose to remain in his own country had nothing.
Their conclusion: if given the choice, come another conflict, it was much better to become an ‘international refugee’ than an ‘internal displacee’. It must be taken into account that insecurity and the consequent lack of access to these internally displaced has severely limited the international community’s ability to assist them. However, the tale above represented the sentiment of much of the local population in the High Plateaux area.

Many people encountered on the mission talked positively of progressive peace and tribal reconciliation in the area. They had initiated much dialogue themselves and all recognised the urgency to regain a relationship of economic partnership. Communities identified the need for improved conditions in the plateau in order to minimise migration and support reconciliation. Food security related projects, notably agriculture and livestock, were viewed by all as a priority.

The mission identified that returning communities were in need of urgent assistance with general food distribution, therapeutic feeding of the malnourished, basic medicines, household utensils and blankets and shelter materials. Repair of the Fizi to Minembwe and Tulambo road was also prioritised to secure access for humanitarian assistance. This ‘emergency’ work would also have contributed significantly to economic development and subsequent reconciliation.

Furthermore, many explained how villages and fields were destroyed and why entire villages fled into the forests to escape fighting. The history and cause of the war was understood by most, but when questioned on just who had gained, the unanimous reply was “no one”.

The Banyamulenge Tutsi were a very hospitable, noble group of people. They welcomed us and at no stage of the mission did the team feel threatened. There was a clear need to start projects in the area immediately, yet no agencies had any money or resources to contribute.
Two weeks after this mission the Banyamulenge Tutsi invaded the Congo with assistance from Uganda and Rwanda in a bid to oust President Kabila. The UN ordered my evacuation and I have not yet had the chance to return.

END NOTE

Throughout four years in the Great Lakes I had contact with many Hutu refugees but did not perceived a notion of guilt concerning their actions in the Rwandan genocide of 1994. I sometimes openly discussed their flight from Rwanda with them and would have thought that someone would have suggested that the genocide was not an entirely wholesome idea. Sadly this was not the case. I do not know if it was stubborn self-righteousness on their part, the result of thorough brain-washing or just plain ignorance. Later the realisation that some Tutsi also relentlessly and mercilessly hunted out and killed Hutu did little to help my understanding. I wondered then and I still do, how without pity or remorse there can ever be true reconciliation.
CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION

MAIN ISSUES

This thesis has examined the historical inter-relationships between poverty and conflict, development and relief. For many in the west, conflict is understood as a limited interval of violent death and destruction followed by a brief period of relief and reconstruction and a return to normality. However, as demonstrated by the example of South Kivu, conflict must be often viewed as a ‘recurrent’, if not ‘permanent’, phenomenon.

Focussing on the South Kivu example, the complex nature of contemporary conflict has been demonstrated. This chapter recaps the major points discussed, adds some commentary to relate examples back to the broader context, and details specific suggestions for the international community, development agencies and - as the thesis is written from a personal point of view - for individuals working in the field.

The West is inextricably entangled in the history of conflict in the Great Lakes. This ‘international influence’ has been a conglomeration of the wills of individuals, some powerful and others not. Their input has ranged from genuine good-heartedness, bringing about moderate local success, to ignorance, selfishness and evil, inflicting failures and outright disasters upon the region. The historical role and continued action of international forces is as complex as the very nature of the emergencies they cause or seek to correct.

Contemporary Emergencies are Complex

As discussed in the broader global context, and highlighted by the example of the continuing crisis in South Kivu, contemporary emergencies can be extremely complex.
There may be multiple causes with roots in issues ranging from simple resource scarcity, ethnic identity and the breakdown of local or regional political leadership to actual or perceived poverty. The resulting conflict is usually protracted and widespread, pervading all levels of society and claiming a heavy toll of civilian casualties.

It is important to understand how humanitarian relief and development fit into the larger socio-political context and it is not enough to respond to a conflict with a classical relief programme without examining deeper causes of the problem.

**Relief and Development are Interrelated**

Just as conflict often has a root in poverty, the level of emergency relief required relates to levels of development, or perhaps more correctly, vulnerabilities of populations brought about by the failure of development. As humanitarian inputs, relief and development must be not viewed as two separate entities but rather as interrelated (and overlapping) phases in the overall socio-political and socio-economic environment.

![Diagram: Changing Focus of Humanitarian Support](image_url)

Figure VII. The Changing Focus of Humanitarian Support. After: Roche, 1996:18
Emergency relief can be viewed as an input based operation whereas developmental activities strive to promote community self-sufficiency with a focus on local skills and resources. Figure VII above depicts levels of humanitarian support required in a changing socio-political environment. Time is represented on the horizontal axis, but in the context of South Kivu there is currently no uniform progress in one direction as the climate swings from a situation requiring emergency relief, to a pseudo-recovery period and back again on a regular basis.

It is important to recognise that even during a period of a 'classical' humanitarian emergency - as represented by the left of the diagram - that there is still an element of 'developmental' type institutional capacity building and local support required. Certainly at critical moments, such as the initial stage of a mass population displacement, the focus is on supply of emergency 'life-saving' services. However, as resources become available the support of local management, institutional capacity and political stability must be pursued in a continual, progressive manner.

The move from the far left of the diagram to the right should not take place in a jump. Rather, through the changing focus of the application of resources a smooth transition from relief to development should be pursued.

**Sustainable Development needs Peace**

Although there are obvious connections, or should be, between relief and development work, it must be fully appreciated that relief in itself cannot bring about sufficient development to eliminate poverty. "Given the inter-related causes and consequences of complex emergencies, humanitarian action cannot be fully effective unless it is related to a comprehensive strategy for peace and security, human rights and social and economic development" (UNDHA, 1995:3).

Relief can certainly reduce human suffering and promote an increased level of welfare in the short term. However, classical relief programmes are, by their very nature, often
counter-developmental with long term negative implications of increased community
dependence and consequent heightened vulnerability.

Emergency relief is an important component of humanitarian assistance. It is this
component that the western world often perceives as a moral obligation to provide to
the developing world. Relief efforts must continue and aim to provide basic life-
supporting assistance to affected populations even more efficiently in the immediate
future. Furthermore, as discussed on the previous page, relief inputs must recognise
long-term developmental needs and aim to support local coping mechanisms and
management strategies. This may best be conceived as choosing a path ‘least
contradictory’ to local systems.

Humanitarian action cannot effectively consist of purely a relief component which
ignores underlying causes of the emergency. Relief is designed as a short-term,
punctual input that must be related to a comprehensive plan for addressing the causes of
conflict and regaining peace and security. Without this, all is compromised and the
probability of renewed conflict remains intact.

**Focus on Vulnerability**

Vulnerabilities, as the long-term factors that precede a conflict, contribute to the
severity of the crisis, and continue thereafter affecting the ability of a community to
respond to events and rendering it forever susceptible. Vulnerability, as with poverty,
operates at many levels and leads to a downward spiral as events that suddenly make
people poorer also reduce their assets. ‘Needs’, however, are short-term requirements
for survival or recovery from the crisis (Roche, 1996:19).

International relief efforts typically tend to focus on immediate needs whereas
addressing vulnerabilities is important if sustainable solutions are sought. Hygiene
awareness raising, literacy training and advocacy of women’s rights are all examples of
possible actions that may reduce the long-term vulnerability of communities.
Women, classically vulnerable in the context of development, become much more so during times of conflict. They frequently suffer disproportionately. Absence of male kinfolk increases both women's responsibility to perform other demanding functions and tasks and renders them more exposed to physical violence. Military forces often employ rape as a deliberate weapon of war. Gender issues, focusing on changing the established roles of male and female in society, often need addressing in order to increase female control and their consequent ability to resist the affects of conflict.

In recognition of the long-term and complex nature of contemporary humanitarian crises, much work with refugee populations must be conceptualised, not as specifically relief or development, but as a form of 'survival training' for the vulnerable elements of society. By the same token, conflicts can lead to opportunities and are known to have improved gender and power relationships. A good example of this was the rise of influence of female freedom fighters in the liberation war between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Developmental actions in Eritrea now need to focus on sustaining the empowered status of women in society.

In refugee camps, concentrations of under-employed people hungry for entertainment and knowledge often provide excellent opportunities for development-related actions. Positive gains on the issues of gender, power and vulnerability are possible, and in many ways more easily implemented in the pseudo-urban environment of modern refugee settlements than by accessing scattered rural populations. Assuming that refugees will thereafter return or resettle into a more sustainable community structure, development agencies should use times of crisis to efficiently 'empower' groups.

**Individual Agencies have a Crucial Role**

As discussed and highlighted by the example of Rwanda, the Western, or 'First' world, has had significant influence on the socio-political and socio-economic environments in many lesser-developed countries. Colonial policy has often directly been responsible for conflict. The Germans and Belgians were guilty of the ethnicisation of the relationship between Tutsi and Hutu in Rwanda. Similarly, condoned and encouraged
by colonial powers, the economic exploitation of resources and populations by foreign enterprises has perpetrated poverty as a means to their own economic ends.

Solutions to contemporary complex humanitarian emergencies are theoretically possible if correctly supported by the powers of the developed world. However, many would require significant peacekeeping action and possible military intervention to be upheld by relief and rehabilitation and continued high level diplomacy. In many cases, the developed world chooses not to attempt resolution of conflicts claiming that the cost of the solution will be excessive. Realisation of the difficulties of implementing a peacekeeping strategy in eastern Zaïre led to the abandonment of a 'near confirmed' international military intervention by the West in late 1996 when they estimated that their own troops would be at serious risk.

US foreign policy is often blamed for the woes of many an African nation. On selective intervention, a newspaper comment in 1996 concluded: "If the US considers a foreign policy action to be critical to its interest, it acts unilaterally and tells the rest to follow if they wish. If the US considers a foreign policy action to be important to its interest, it activates NATO. If it is simply an interesting action, it tells the UN to take care of it. If it is totally bored with the foreign policy action, it tells the locals to take care of it. So we already know where Zaïre sits on the official American foreign policy agenda: interesting at best and rapidly moving to boring" (Zaïre Watch, 1996).

Most American citizens would not dispute this and many are in fact proud that their nation "at least has a foreign policy". And policy is necessary. One reality of the contemporary world is that resources are limited. Whereas the livelihood of the international community has no real connection with this region of Central Africa, the UN is at the same time under-resourced and donors are reluctant to promote any intervention that may follow the example of their debacle in Somalia in 1993.

If the US has to choose between interventions where there would be a return on investment and those that have only potentially negative outcomes, such as the loss of American citizens, they will choose not to intervene in the latter. America is by no
means the only western power that operates in such a manner. Perhaps the reason the US receives such a high, sometimes disproportionate, amount of criticism is that it is more open about its foreign policy than many other western governments.

It must also be recognised that resolution of crises is not necessarily perceived as beneficial by all. Many western based arms manufactures rely on conflict for business. Similarly, at a local level, many prosper as a result of refugee occupation, the presence of the humanitarian community and the associated business generated. Tutsi rebels refused to attend peace talks in August 1998, as they perceived that they had nothing to gain by an immediate cessation in fighting. The international humanitarian aid industry itself stimulates manufacturing in the western world and employs an enormous amount of professional western and local people. Thus, not all players, local or international, have a stake in peace.

One must therefore conclude that conflict and insecurity will continue in many parts of the world for the foreseeable future. World powers are neither capable nor willing to bring about quick solutions to every conflict. Economic, political and cultural issues are mixed with the concept of humanitarianism on the agenda of international foreign policy. The purely ‘humanitarian’ world of relief and development must accept this as a reality and plan for positive action within the parameters set.

Individual agencies, such as UN agencies, NGOs and Church groups, therefore have an important role to play in reducing human suffering and combating poverty in the long term. It is important for agencies and their individual staff to understand how humanitarian relief and development fit into the overall socio-political environment of conflict, power and poverty.

Agencies, as part of the international community, are just players in the system and are often misused by the power holders in the west and in the developing world. Leaders will often abuse their power to consolidate their own interests. Mobutu did it blatantly and many others enjoy what they perceive as ‘traditional leadership rights’. The same applies at every level of society right down to control within the village and inside
family groups in relationship to gender. Humanitarian agency staff must understand the power function that their agency or project may support and aim to contribute to the building of peace and security, rather than add to the causes of conflict and vulnerability.

NGOs, church agencies and charities have the distinct advantage of being able to maintain some degree of effectiveness where multi-lateral and governmental agencies, including the UN, sometimes cannot. Such agencies have an important role as campaigners for change of government policies - a function that the UN cannot always perform due to political sensitivities.

Competitiveness and the phenomena of 'shelf life' in the media industry today means that major issues often fall from world coverage as soon as they are a few days old. Protracted conflicts, although of huge local and regional significance, often lose their capacity to provide the more graphic images and 'sensational' coverage required by the international media. And when the media fall silent wars are 'forgotten' by the world. NGOs have a vital role to play in raising the international profile of many contemporary emergencies and campaigning for international public awareness.

LESSONS AND IMPRESSIONS

Measures to relieve poverty and resolve conflict can only be effective in the long-term if combined with measures to address the root causes of conflict and increase prospects for peace. The physical and moral presence of the international community is crucial for support of long-term measures of sustainable peace and development.

Action to provide emergency relief must be accompanied with conflict resolution, peace-building and local capacity building measures. All actors in the international community should be committed to an integrated effort to enable governments and communities to reduce poverty. Carefully targeted and comprehensive international aid
to the Great Lakes region must be pursued. “However, if poorly targeted, international aid can exacerbate inequalities between men and women, across generations, between families and clans, or between people of different ethnic groups or geographical regions. Interventions need to be carefully designed with a concern for equity, targeting the vulnerable, and aiming to build bridges across communities” (Oxfam, 1998:5).

Implicit in the concept of ‘careful design’ is the need to understand the power relationships in the region including the position and stakes of beneficiaries, the government, possible rebel elements, and the plethora of development actors. Conflicts, and associated causes and consequences must be appreciated in local terms. All members of the international community must be alert to, and accountable for, their impact on fragile socio-political environments and vulnerable communities.

**Types of Projects to Support**

True to the tradition of modernisation, many facets of technology are applicable to sustainable peace-building and poverty reduction. However, as mentioned, it is only the combination of the technical elements of these projects with social issues that will maximise benefits to communities and strengthen, rather than undermine, community coping mechanisms. The appropriateness of introduced technology must be considered in terms of both its capacity to remain functional and who in the community it will empower or render more vulnerable.

Therefore, all technical sector projects must carry a high component of community participation from project identification to planning, implementation, evaluation and continued operations and maintenance. Projects need to make maximum practical use of local materials and skills – again building on local resources, not undermining their value. All should have a substantial ‘empowering’ element in the ‘local’ context.

Projects that improve living conditions in place, support natural community structures and alleviate the need for migration are often of immense importance to the promotion of reconciliation and further conflict prevention. However, such projects need to be
sensitively implemented on a model of multi-community management and control where all ethnic, gender and class groups are openly involved in project ‘ownership’.

Support to projects that will be sustainable in times of future conflict is also important. Examples from the public health sector include those employing simple technologies, such as the construction of pit latrines rather than water flush systems where water supply is likely to be cut or poorly maintained. Locally sustainable projects, peripheral to urban areas, such as hand-dug wells and spring protection works around towns, may be important even if a functional pumped and treated urban water supply scheme operates in times of normalcy. Both urban and rural populations need raised awareness of health and hygiene over and above that required in regions and periods of stability.

**A Rural Focus**

Typically, aid and development projects tend to have an urban bias. This is often due to the nature of the technology being introduced and the ease of access to populations. In times of conflict the urban focus often intensifies as rural access becomes limited. However, support of the rural economy is crucial for ensuring regional food security and to enable rural peasants, as potential exporters, to benefit from trade possibilities.

A serious effort to develop rural infrastructure must be pursued. Services in villages and possible employment opportunities will encourage active people to remain to their satisfaction in rural areas. Technology that supports local rural capacities must be encouraged.

**Improved Agriculture**

Food security issues underlie many conflicts. The provision of food assistance in the short-term is important and people further need access to land and agricultural inputs. In the eastern Congo, prolonged conflict and displacement has severely disrupted normal agricultural cycles. Seed stocks have been almost all consumed in desperation.
and urgent assistance is required in the provision of sufficient and appropriate seeds and tools.

Technical advances are also needed in order to maximise food production at the same time as minimising environmental degradation and the loss of valuable soils. Peasant farmers need access to credit and training in order to acquire technical inputs and apply them correctly.

**Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Awareness**

Both as a critical life saving intervention in the context of emergency assistance and as a longer term developmental goal, safe water and sanitation are a priority. Supply of potable water, and correct sanitation and hygiene, are extremely important for the reduction of mortality and morbidity and the realisation of human potential. Clean water is an important factor influencing the vulnerability of populations and has special significance for women, the traditional water carriers and users in developing societies.

**Education**

Education for literacy and appropriate technical and artistic skills must be pursued. The emphasis must be on local and rural, rather than foreign and urban. Appropriate text and curricula must support this as must the skills and experience of educational staff.

Maintenance and reconstruction of educational facilities is important in times of conflict and recovery. Community participation of parent communities, for assistance in school construction and the supply of materials, must be actively pursued. Parents often need to be motivated to send children to school and orphans should be registered and supported. Host parents must be educated to allow foster children to attend schools. The re-integration of young military is often necessary as an education related project. Furthermore, communities and the education system in general should become more receptive to the idea of educating females.
The school system also provides an important forum for helping people understand the links between their poverty and conflict and all opportunities should be taken to introduce such issues. "Disputes may be inevitable, but violence is not. To prevent continued cycles of conflict, education must seek to promote peace and tolerance, not fuel hatred and suspicion" (UNICEF, 1996).

**Health**

Just as sustainable development emphasises addressing root causes rather than serving relief needs, emphasis on health services should focus on 'preventative' rather than 'curative' actions. The capacity of hospitals and health centres to provide services with the short-term supply of medicines and equipment and correctly trained staff must be supported by a multi-sector approach to overall public health with associated water, sanitation, food security, shelter and education projects.

Maternity and affiliated 'mother and child care' health services are critical in a developing environment to support community perception of family and social security.

**Credit and Business Development**

Sufficient credit and business skills, to support local commercial enterprises, are often lacking in circumstances of conflict and poverty. Small and medium ventures need assistance through the provision of credit and training to develop marketing channels for products. Such assistance must be made available to women.

"[The] lack of access to credit on favourable terms is a major obstacle to industrial recovery, as it prevents essential rehabilitation and repairs, the purchase of inputs, and training of staff to replace those who have been killed or have fled... In a context of competition for land, delay in developing non-agricultural income opportunities, like wage labour or petty commerce, can prove catastrophic" (Oxfam, 1997:8).
Environmental Projects

Although often regarded as a secondary need in times of crisis, environmental projects are important. Fuel-wood and construction timbers are in enormous demand during mass population displacements. Women are often charged with the collection of wood and their vulnerability is increased as local supplies dwindle and they venture further and further afield. Projects that initially supply wood for fuel and shelter are essential to reduce vulnerability and promote welfare. These ‘emergency’ measures should promptly be supported by moves toward sustainability with the initiation of tree planting, environmental educational and associated technical projects such as the introduction of improved stoves. Timber supply is also crucial as a construction material in post-conflict situations.

Associated environmental projects, including soil conservation by planting, drainage, erosion protection and soil-enhancement by composting, are important to ensure local fields yield maximum nutrition for local populations and refugees alike. Consideration must also be given to protection of local natural resources such as national parks and wildlife reserves.

In general, and related to the sector of agriculture and livestock, complete environmental audits and natural resource management plans should be supported for all complex emergency situations. The environment as a whole, and its capacity for agriculture, animal and wood production, is the basis of life in many areas and must be protected and managed for sustainability. Complex social issues are interwoven into the environmental sector.

Socialising Projects

Psycho-Social Projects

Psycho-social projects, drawing on western trauma models, have gained popularity in international emergency situations over the past decade. However, the ‘psycho-’ prefix
is somewhat misleading and should be dropped (see social projects below). Social sector experts appear to place much emphasis on the 'traumatisation' of populations in times of intense conflict. Certainly trauma was an issue in Rwanda during the massacres of 1994, but in such a society it appears almost peripheral to the overall issues of peace and sustained development.

The distress and suffering resulting from war, which is a man-made rather than natural crisis, must not be treated as a psychological condition requiring professional treatment in its own right. Emphasis should be placed on social development with human rights and justice as central concepts.

"For the vast majority, 'traumatisation' is a pseudo-condition. This rather narrow approach risks creating inappropriate sick roles and sidelines a proper incorporation of people's own choices, traditions and skills into strategies for their creative survival. It also aggrandises the role of western experts and their mental health technology, which is assumed to be universally applicable" (Summerfield, 1997:3).

**Social Support to all Projects**

Specialist staff in the social sector must work in an integrated manner with other sector specialists and endeavour to understand what local society perceives to be their main social issues: their strengths and their barriers to sustained natural development. The international community should encourage the growth of localised organisations of civil society - especially those involved in the protection and promotion of human rights.

Programmes supporting basic principles of humanitarian law for members of the police, army and judiciary are important as is raising the communities' overall knowledge of international human rights issues. War affected populations need to know how to manage suffering and adapt to a form of recovery that minimise perceived needs for retribution in a collective, rather than individual, manner.
Focus on Women

Women have historically made significant contributions to both peaceful development and war. They play a key role in maintaining family order and normalcy in times of conflict and, as mentioned previously, assume additional burdens when men engage in war and leave or are killed. However, women also often contribute to the outbreak of violence and hostilities — "in many cases, they are instrumental in inciting men to defend group interests, honour, and collective livelihoods" (Sørensen, 1998:1).

Realising the potential of women is of crucial importance to humanitarian work in all environments. They are at once both vulnerable and potentially powerful in society. Women must be empowered to cope with change and adversity in a rational manner that supports their families and the community overall.

PROPOSALS FOR ACTION

For Governments and Donors

Donor Governments and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) need to adopt a consolidated, integrated approach in the provision of aid and support rehabilitation of social and physical infrastructure in the Great Lakes. A renewed coordinated commitment to regional cooperation must be established. All relevant institutions must establish goals to address the underlying causes of conflict and promote the unification of working within all coordinating (UN type) and implementing (NGO type) agencies, grass-roots organisations and national actors.

"In the future, financial institutions such as the World Bank seem likely to increase their role as the social and economic conditions underlying many refugee movements are addressed" (UN, 1998). Donors must back up aid with capacity building measures for government institutions and tie financial assistance to issues of human rights.
Measures for the demobilisation of soldiers and the decommissioning of weapons must be provided and regional governments encouraged to build national, professional, accountable armies.

For UN Agencies

*International Nations United in Presence*

Sustained presence of the international community in the zone of conflict is important for both the ability to witness events and to maintain consistency of approach in the implementation of assistance programmes. An operational framework must be established in South Kivu to achieve this. The framework calls for an agency as focal point - and it is not important exactly who this agency is, but they must be recognised by all and respected in both local and international terms. For this reason it is suggested that an existing UN agency, such as UNDP or OCHA assume this role, or possibly UNHCR if mandate changes allow.

*Senior UN Staff at Conflict Decision Centres*

In order to be effective the head of UN in the field needs to be a senior staff member. This would have the two-fold benefit of allowing important decisions to be made in the field and increase the respectability of the agency with local authorities. This is especially relevant where local authorities are at the decision centre of the conflict.

Senior staff are in better positions to network with high level authorities and promote agency profile. They are also better placed, as a function of their respectability, to denounce and actively express dissatisfaction at human rights abuses and disrespect of humanitarian aid workers. This was a particularly sensitive issue in South Kivu during 1997 as the UN agencies, seeking to protect and promote human rights, were dealing with authorities who deliberately acted precisely on the contrary.
Undertake Publicity Programmes

The UN should actively market its goodwill in South Kivu, both to the people of the Congo and internationally. At the local level, populations and local authorities need to be informed of the modes of operation, mandate and objectives of the UN and affiliated agencies. This may help promote respect of human rights.

There are many possible media from local newspapers, radio and television channels, to formal speeches, presentations at schools and public centres, public openings of projects and billboards. Funding realities and constraints need to be further explained to authorities to help reduce unrealistic expectations. Ignoring local curiosity and not providing information is dangerous as it leaves space for rumours and negative propaganda.

Undertake community information sharing

Increasing prospects for peace by addressing root causes of conflict implies that the underlying causes of the conflict must be understood. It is important to support local initiatives and dialogue so that at least the conflict, with all causes and effects, is appreciated by international actors in local terms.

Little was known about host communities when UNHCR's EHP commenced in South Kivu and the typical model of refugee assistance was applied. Later in the intervention period, community sessions of PRA type techniques were found to yield valuable insights into peoples' capacities, perceptions and priorities. Such information was crucial for the sensitive design and implementation of projects.

Similarly, community sessions can help promote a realistic profile of the UN in communities and allow practitioners to explain the UN system, with all relevant functions and constraints, to all concerned. Expectations of the community should therefore be more realistic.
**Implement Palpable Projects**

Rehabilitation of infrastructure and support for the restoration of livelihoods is critical in the medium term so that people perceive that their opportunities are expanding and their stake in peace is being increased. Agency respectability, and consequent ability to have influence in a community on issues such as human rights, are functions of capacity to perform and deliver benefits.

Communities must feel that they have a stake in peace and will derive some benefits from the process. As alluded to above, expectations on the international community are often extremely high, especially in a country such as the Congo where past leaders and governments have only impoverished communities. Failure to deliver, once expectations are raised, may seriously jeopardise agency and international credibility. Presence must therefore be backed up with action in the form of modest palpable projects with tangible community benefit.

**Work Through Local Authorities**

On of the main criticisms of UNHCR’s work in 1997 was that they tended to sideline local authorities. As noted in previous chapters, there were reasons for this, but with the benefit of hindsight, UNHCR missed an ideal opportunity to build upon the capacity of local authorities and impart some real developmental skills.

Local authorities, such as the town roads and drainage authorities, must be involved in project selection, planning, implementation and evaluation of all relevant projects.

**Employing Maximum of Community Participation**

As mentioned above, the process of PRA type information sharing exercises will assist in the identification of projects that are community priorities and projects that the community can most become involved in through participation. The feeling of ‘ownership’ is important as a means to promote community esteem and a feeling of a
stake in community welfare. Such participation also ensures understanding and consequent sustainability of projects. Projects should also be limited to a modest size to reflect community need and ability, and the capacity of the overseeing agency to fund and monitor.

**Ensure Adequate Agency Staffing Levels**

Some of the failings of UNHCR's EHP in 1997 can be attributed to a lack of professional staff compared to levels of funding and project opportunities. In order to promote community based planning and implementation of projects, time needs to be taken and consequent demands on staff are significant. Monitoring of projects to ensure resources and 'empowerment' issues are channelled in the desired directions is also demanding.

Knowledge gathering, community participation and PRA type exercises require that staff resources are available to promote and perform such techniques. Staff may be either directly employed through the UN system or by way of NGO partnership arrangements. Incentives must be sufficient to retain suitably qualified and experienced staff.

**Ensure Decision Focus at Local Level**

Conflicts can descend overnight - and often do. Expatriate development staff must think ahead and from time to time, even in situations of relative calm, ask themselves what will happen to the project if they cannot return to the site thereafter. Are local staff trained, resourced and capable to carry on? Are local populations in charge and do they know how to complete and maintain or at least protect their project?

**For International Relief Workers**

War and civil conflict are now undermining the livelihoods of unprecedented numbers of people. Up to 90 percent of modern-day casualties of such conflicts are civilian and
the terrorisation of whole populations is often resorted to as a means of social control (Summerfield, 1997:85). Victims are forced to endure the deliberate demolition of their economic, social and cultural worlds. Consequences are influenced by social, cultural and political factors in a complex, dynamic inter-relationship. The correct interpretation of how such events affect populations is crucial for developing sound approaches to assistance.

In addition to comprehensive and accurate knowledge of characteristics of modern conflict and complex humanitarian emergencies, international relief workers need to be aware of particular historical, social and cultural dimensions of the impact of a crisis in the local context. A solid relationship with those to be assisted adds a significant quality and effectiveness component to intervention. Sound knowledge of beneficiaries and their perceptions and priorities is crucial.

Concentrate on community strengths and vulnerabilities and endeavour to understand what they mean for the local people. Some local consequences, such as the amount of physical damage, may be apparent. However, conflict also causes less evident outcomes such as states of feeling and consciousness - which to the people concerned are often as much of an issue as damage to homes and family losses.

Development workers must be aware of these issues and remain alert to the ways they may be manifested. There are rare cases of the international community recognising the need for this such as in a seminar organised by the US Embassy in Rwanda in December 1994. This was in response to the realisation that many international workers had become insensitive to major underlying issues relating to the genocide and were causing unnecessary disruptions to society with some of their work.

**FUTURE PROSPECTS**

There would be little point in discussing the issues presented in this thesis without an appreciation of prospects for success. In this case, success would be defined by the
achievement of sustained regional peace and the commencement of a period of true sustainable development in the Great Lakes.

**Conflict and Population Dilemmas**

Conflict is an intrinsic part of human history. It serves the double function of accessing new territories for growing populations and also of numerical societal control in itself with checks on population growth – often through the elimination of large sections of society.

However, as there are some natural spontaneous conflicts, it must be noted that the organised violence of the Great Lakes was by no means natural anarchy. It did not arise spontaneously as a manifestation by some local people against others. It was politically organised violence. “Between 1959 and 1963, the [level of] violence rose... as did the degree of political organisation. It was not anarchy at all” (Kearne, 1998).

“Two hundred years ago, Thomas Malthus predicted mass catastrophe as a result of overpopulation. So far, events have not turned out quite as he supposed they would, yet the brutal probabilities he described continue to darken some views of the future. Today 98 percent of population growth is in the developing world” (Zwingle, 1998:36).

Population explosion and stress on resources is the underlying issue in many conflicts today. The finite element in the equation is environmental resources. The population of Rwanda doubled between independence and 1994 (Davidson, 1978; CIA, 1998). Improved technology can only go so far in maximising the supportive capacity of the environment for ever-increasing populations. Thus, without measures for limiting population growth, there will always be cause for poverty and subsequent conflict.

Western theories of development have assumed that achievement of a global consumer culture and improved welfare will provide sufficient social security to inspire family size limits of one or two children. In much of the developing world, the point where most
families have attained such a theoretical sufficient standard of living will not be achieved in the foreseeable future.

Parents must feel sufficiently secure that all children are likely to survive to maturity and be able to care and provide for their parents. They must have access to family planning education and products. Complex traditional values are interwoven into the population issue including varying perceptions of worth between male and female children. Introduced religious values further complicate the issue. Women in the Congo and Rwanda are currently expected to produce six or seven children in their lifetime (CIA, 1996).

Leadership and Ethnicity

Many perceive the prevalent and recurrent insecurity in the Great Lakes as an ‘ethnic’ issue. However, as demonstrated in this thesis, the ‘ethnicisation’ of processes in the region is largely a western-induced phenomenon. To label problems as ‘ethnic’ is not only an easy excuse to abandon responsibility, but is also in many ways completely fraudulent as it insinuates that issues stem from a purely local level.

At the root of conflict in the Great Lakes region are the unresolved issues of population growth and stress on resources. Much of the prevalent regional poverty has been exacerbated due to outside influence if not directly brought about by it. As early as 1500 AD, Arab, Portuguese and other European traders visited the region in search of slaves, which they convinced regional leaders to part with (Congonline, 1996). Thus, for centuries, Congolese people have also been oppressed and exploited by their own leaders.

With the supervision of the UN, Belgium grafted a Western political structure onto the region’s traditional system. Successive systems of rule have been based on this western model and at no stage been cause for optimism for the largely rural majority. Ever since, national elites have demonstrated lack of both the will and the capacity to improve living conditions for their populations. They have almost unfailingly looked to
the political and administrative system as a means of acquiring personal wealth, power and privilege at the expense of their own people.

"The real problem in the Great Lakes region and, indeed in most African countries, has been lack of good leadership. Today's conflicts and tragedies are primarily products of yesterday's divisive politics, all-round marginalisation of large sections of the populations, and blatant abuses of human rights. The ordinary African people, including the Hutu and Tutsi, have never been an obstacle to Africa's development. On the contrary, failure at the top to provide good leadership has made ordinary people victims in the many conflicts that have been characteristic of Africa" (Rudasingwa, 1998:6).

The United States of America, in a press statement on 21 October 1998, stated that it was "gravely concerned about reports that insurgent groups motivated by ethnic hatred such as the Interahamwe militia and the ex-Rwandan armed forces [were] actively involved in the recent conflict... and condemned] the Congolese Government's efforts to recruit and train these groups and [viewed with] alarm the fact that this conflict is strengthening the hand of the perpetrators of the 1994 Rwanda genocide" (USA, 1998:2) However, the US and other western governments flagrantly supported these same elements for two years in the refugee camps of Zaire and have made no real attempts to address what they claim to be gravely concerned over.

With respect to interest in promoting fair and legitimate leadership, this thesis has discussed and concluded that international political powers are unlikely to attempt to influence the control of power in favour of poor communities. One can only deduce, that in regions perceived by the West as being of little political or economic significance, the individual aid worker should not rely on consolidated global support for humanitarian action and sustainable development.

Currently the Congo suffers from the same lack of unified national identity that prevailed before independence and during the reign of Mobutu. In many ways Mobutu
perpetrated this national weakness – which initially protected him, but eventually led to his downfall. The recent rebellion from eastern Congo relies on Kabila’s inability to promote a national identity that could mobilise all citizens in a unified effort for change. Kabila, in the steps of Mobutu, is continuing to promote the alienation of Congolese Tutsi and is precluding chances for peaceful transition towards democracy.

“Humanitarian response, while imperative, is not the solution. Increased diplomatic initiative, from the UN and western governments as well as the current regional efforts, must end the violence, deal with impunity, address the citizenship concerns of the Congolese Tutsi population and find a way to achieve accountable governance and development progress for Congolese children and their families” (Verhey, 1998:2).

The Importance of Individuals and NGOs

NGOs and individuals have a crucial role to play in working for, and campaigning on behalf of, poor communities. Whilst donor governments cannot be relied upon to instigate change, they are nevertheless an important source of finance and can often be convinced to finance truly beneficial actions.

NGOs, as small-scale actors, cannot be expected to provide services in the long term. However, in the context of intermediate relief and development, NGOs and individuals can serve important functions until local government structures are capable of absorbing aid and efficiently implementing development projects. The concept of a new type of leadership emerging in the future is also not baseless. Stemming from notions of local identity, priorities and resources, individual aid workers can promote national capacity and local solutions to local problems.

“Do not slavishly follow any foreign system, or any hypothetical social or economic model. Be selective and adapt to local realities [and] do not allow too much power to reside in a few hands for absolute power really
does corrupt absolutely. Always ensure there are checks on power. At the same time, work to strengthen all ideologies which give people a common sense of purpose, and lift them above purely materialistic considerations” (Walsh, 1993:3).

There has been a “tendency in the past to think of development, not in terms of evolution, but in terms of creation” (Schumacher, 1973:136). What is required now in the Great Lakes is a complete re-think of the notion of development. Development must be pursued in an appropriate form – not to serve the ends of foreign governments and businesses – but as a process evolved from the people of Africa towards peace and their own prosperity.
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Author’s Note. Some web references in the main body of text do not contain exact page references as page numbering depends on style of printing of document or manner of embedding into a text document.
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The people of Gihamba
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GLOSSARY

As many of the terms used in this document are of French (Fr.), Kiswahili (Sw.) or traditional language origin (Td.) this glossary provides nearest. Traditional languages of Kinyarwanda, Shi, Kirega and other origins are all denoted (Td.) for simplicity. Terms italicised in the main text are referenced in this glossary. Other terms and abbreviations are included for reference.

Ba-
(Td.) Refers to people of a tribe e.g. Ba-rega. The cultural suffix ‘-rega’ often also relates to the language spoken by the tribe e.g. Ki-rega. Capitilsation varies; Ba-rega, or baRega are also found in text. May also be used to delineate the population of a country: e.g. Barundi as people of Burundi or Banyarwanda as Rwandans or more loosely people that speak Kinyarwanda - including High Plateaux Tutsi of the Congo. The singular form of ba- is ‘m-‘; therefore one Barundi is referred to as a ‘Mrundi’.

Bantu
Refers to a broad range of tribes predominant in Sub-Saharan Africa. Originally from Ba + mtu (or mtu in Kiswahili) meaning simply person or ‘the people’. Bantu is a broad classification for many central, western and eastern African peoples who include the ancestors of the South Kivu tribes of Bashi, Barega, Bafulero and Babembe and the Hutu of Rwanda and Burundi.

Banyamulenge
(Td.) Name derived from ‘the people of Mulenge’ during anti-Mobutu rebellions in 1964 to denote Tutsi, Kinyarwanda-speakers of the High Plateaux area of South Kivu. The term came to be used widely in Congo referring to ethnic Tutsi Congolese in general from mid-1996.

Barundi
Plural form of Mrundi. People from Burundi. Also known as Burundese, Burundian or Burundaise. Normally speakers of Kirundi, a language not unlike Kinyarwanda.

bourgemestre
Rwandan administrative head of commune – but rather junior in hierarchy of overall national administration. Of German origin; - similarities with bourge (town) and mestre (master).

bwami
Plural of mwami - traditional tribal royal leader or ‘king.’
**collectivité** (Fr.) An entire community group - overseen by a mwami. A ‘collection’ of groupements.

**Congo (the)** An abbreviation of the full name of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The Democratic Republic of Congo was under Belgian rule as opposed to the smaller neighbouring state of the ‘Republic of Congo’ commonly distinguished as ‘Congo-Brazzaville’ after the name of the current capital and the original explorer that claimed the territory for France.

**ECHO** European Community Humanitarian Office.

**ECOSOC** The United Nations (UN) ‘Economic and Social Council’.

**Force Publique** (Fr.) Public Force. The colonial civil security forces maintained by the Government of Belgium in the Congo until independence.

**GDP** Gross domestic product.

**GNP** Gross national product.

**groupement** (Fr.) A grouping of localités.

**Hutu** Predominant grouping of Bantu peoples representing 85% of the population of Rwanda and Burundi (see Bantu). ‘Hutu’ is used as both a singular and plural form in this thesis (sometimes also referred to as Hutus, baHutu or Bahutu).

**IBRD** The, UN affiliated, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development – otherwise known as the ‘World Bank’.

**IFI** International Financial Institution.

**ILD** (Fr.) *Initiative Locale du Développement*. Literally a ‘Local Development Initiative’. A community group formed to develop a certain sector in their village. Almost synonymous with local NGOs - but the latter tend to be based on a more western model.

**ILO** The (UN) International Labour Office.

**localité** (Fr.) Expression sometimes applied to a small town. In the Congo refers to a traditional administration term for a number of villages.
Participatory Rural Appraisal: Assessment technique involving a set of exercises that enable decision-makers and local people to identify issues relating to their livelihoods and environments and build upon knowledge. Emphasis on sharing of information. Techniques involve graphical exercises such as mapping and making charts. The author considers that certain elements of the approach can be used in an urban context as 'Rapid Urban Appraisal' (RUA).

Alt. Mayi Mayi. Swahili origin from maji maji - meaning 'water water'. Term loosely applied in eastern Congo to any traditional warrior force. Origin of term dates back to the 1905-1907 uprising of the population against the Germans in Tanganyika. Mai Mai are prevalent as members of the Babembe tribe in South Kivu with strength increasing with increasing Hutu refugee numbers and arms in late 1996. Warriors believe that washing their bodies from certain water sources before battle makes them invincible to bullets. They have demonstrated an unusually strong affinity with water and anything associated and have been seen in force, adorned with assorted looted bathroom fixtures.

A traditional 'king'. Leader of a collectivité of groupements of localités.

See 'the West'.

A cultivated field area. In South Kivu commonly used to grow bananas, cassava or mixed crops.

See 'the West'.

Nilotic peoples thought to have migrated to central Africa from the north-east of the continent between 1400 and 1700 AD. Originally classified as two groups of nomadic, pastoralists, Hima and Tutsi, descendants were all later labelled as Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi (see Banyamulenge). 'Tutsi' is used as both a singular and plural form in this thesis.

(Td., Kinyarwanda) Rwandan term for compulsory 'tribute' labour.

The United Nations Development Programme.

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation.

The United Nations Children's Fund.
UNHCR (Office of ) the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

UNRISD The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

village Area defined as set of dwellings and surrounding shambas or cultivated fields.

West (the) The terms 'West' or 'western society, western world and western powers' are used throughout this thesis to loosely denote the socio-political realm of economically strong capitalistic 'developed' nations including the United States of America and western Europe. The West is sometimes referred to in other texts as the rich 'North' or 'First World' as opposed to the poor 'Third World' or 'Southern' nations which are 'underdeveloped' or 'developing' countries.

WFP The (UN) World Food Programme.

Zaïre Name of the current nation of the Democratic Republic of Congo as created by President Mobutu Sese Seko in the early 1970s. Also used at the time for the monetary unit (Zaïre then Nouvelle Zaïre) and the 'River Zaïre'. Zaïre reverted to its previous name of the Democratic Republic of Congo under the new leadership of President Kabila in May 1997.
Assumed locations and movements of refugees and displaced persons in Great Lakes Region to best current knowledge
25 November 1996

Key
- Areas of assumed refugee population
- Areas of possible displaced persons
- Population movement

This map has been prepared for the sole purpose of aiding planning for potential humanitarian assistance - specifically the allocation of resources to possible technical response. All figures are assumed and approximated.

Distributors accept no responsibility for the accuracy of population figures and locations indicated.
Note: Many activities ongoing as of August 97