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Emotional Labour and Occupational Identity:
Passionate Rationality in the New Zealand
Parliamentary Workplace

A thesis presented in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of

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Abstract

This thesis explores parliamentarians’ emotional labour in their workplace, and argues the enactment of passionate rationality is crucial to how parliamentarians accomplish vocational authenticity. The New Zealand parliamentary workplace is characterised by an elaborate set of feeling rules and a complex emotional culture. On entry to parliament, parliamentarians go through a period of identity transformation akin to a moral career. Parliamentarians must manage emotion to achieve their occupational identities according to local feeling rules.

Based on analysis of in-depth group and individual interviews with parliamentarians, and focusing on the passage of the Civil Union Bill as an exemplar of parliamentarians’ emotion work, three interpretative repertoires were identified in their accounts of emotion in the workplace. These repertoires, The Game, The Performance and The Crusade are workplace-specific meaning-making resources whose flexible deployment enabled parliamentarians to assert claims of occupational identity and vocational authenticity.

These repertoires show the emotional labour involved in parliamentarians’ negotiation of shared meanings around ‘entering’ the occupational role and asserting the authenticity of their new identities. In particular, The Crusade repertoire makes available the subject position of the Knight, the subject position important for accomplishment of being a passionately rational worker.

In this thesis, I introduce two new concepts for emotional labour in complex workplaces where that labour has both exchange and use value; emotional convocation and personified emotion. Together these concepts allow for a more thorough theorisation of emotion work than do existing concepts of emotional labour.

Although developed in relation to the work of parliamentarians, personified emotion and emotional convocation have utility for understanding other contemporary experiences of work where emotion management within a complex emotional culture is
fundamental to both occupational identity and the accomplishment of vocational authenticity.
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Chapter One

Exploring the Emotional Labour of Parliamentarians

New Zealand’s parliament is a workplace with a complex emotional culture characterised by an elaborate set of feeling rules (Hochschild, 1979). This culture and these rules require parliamentarians as workers to manage emotion as they negotiate the complicated issues, relationships and expectations that are a part of their workplace milieu. In this thesis, I explore the emotional labour (Hochschild, 1983) of New Zealand parliamentarians. In particular, I explore how parliamentarians experience and make sense of their emotional labour and how this sense-making shapes their occupational identities. In this chapter, I contextualise my research into parliamentarians’ emotional labour before outlining the structure of the thesis.

Situating parliamentarians as emotional labourers

Analysing the importance of the organisation and experience of work has been an important focus for sociological investigation since the earliest days of the discipline (Durkheim, 1933; Marx, 1970; Weber, 1991), although interest in the relationship between emotion and work is much more recent (Bolton, 2005; Fineman, 2000; Fineman, 2008; Hochschild, 1983; Hochschild, 2003). To explore the emotional labour of parliamentarians, I undertook one small group interview and eight one-to-one interviews with New Zealand Members of Parliament. My research was directed by the following questions:

1) How do New Zealand parliamentarians account for emotional labour within the parliamentary workplace?

2) Does ‘emotional labour’ adequately explain these accounts?

In the past decade, New Zealand parliamentarians\(^1\) have been under increasing pressure to perform emotional labour in order to demonstrate their suitability to the current work

\(^1\) In this thesis, Member of Parliament, MP and parliamentarian are used interchangeably.
environment and to accomplish authentic\textsuperscript{2} occupational identities in conditions where their identity claims are often challenged. Changes in the system of electoral representation (Palmer & Palmer, 2004; Shaw, 1999), as well as concerns with the practice of democracy and a general scepticism around the integrity of parliamentarians as a category of worker (Hawke, 1993; Knauf, 2005; Palmer & Palmer, 1992; Palmer & Palmer, 1997), have made the performance of emotional labour increasingly important and complex for New Zealand parliamentarians. In addition, the research for this thesis took place during a period characterised by several contentious pieces of legislation that were accompanied by public debate and protest. One of these bills, the Civil Union Bill (now the Civil Union Act [2004]), is used in this thesis as a case study to better understand the emotional labour of New Zealand parliamentarians.

Research has demonstrated that what Hochschild (1983) termed emotional labour is common to a variety of workers including Disneyland employees (Van Maanen & Kunda, 1989) and nail technicians (Kang, 2003), to police detectives (Stenross & Kleinman, 1989) and nurses (Smith, 1992), to barristers (Harris, 2002) and magistrates (Anleu & Mack, 2005). In spite of these workers’ disparate occupations, the concept of emotional labour has continued to be employed by researchers, in some cases to the detriment of conceptual clarity (Bolton, 2005, p. 9).

In this thesis I argue that the conditions of parliamentarians’ work are different to the conditions in which emotional labour was originally employed to conceptualise the “management of feeling to create a publicly observable facial and bodily display … sold for a wage” (Hochschild, 1983, p. 7). Parliamentarians do emotional labour, however, they have more autonomy than many others who do this type of work, such as nail technicians (Kang, 2003) and fast-food employees (Leidner, 1993). Emotion, self, identity and occupational authenticity are all important dimensions of the emotional labours of parliamentarians.

There are particularities to do with the symbolic nature of parliamentarians’ work, the expectations that surround the performance of this type of work, and the importance of an ‘authentic self’ in such circumstances, that mean the emotional labour of parliamentarians is likely to be different to that of both service workers and

\textsuperscript{2} My use of the terms authentic and authenticity within the thesis is elaborated in Chapter Three on page 59.
professionals. Parliamentarians apply their emotional labour to the production of occupational identities, and understanding the connection between institutional expectations and identity production requires further research (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002). Although this thesis investigated New Zealand parliamentarians, the study has utility for understanding the emotional labour of other workers where an authentic occupational identity is required.

Parliament as a workplace

New Zealand’s parliament is currently located within a historic epoch in which the integrity of democratic processes is being questioned by writers commenting on national and international circumstances (Moore, 2006; Stoker, 2006; Trotter, 2006; Wolfe, 2006). The practices of democratic government in countries including Australia, the USA and New Zealand have been subject to critique (Palmer, 1987; Theophonus, 1980; Wolfe, 2006). Some commentators have argued that there is currently a broad crisis of confidence in democracy (Stoker, 2006).

Those who work in the democratic systems as representatives have been similarly critiqued and at times positioned as people who are held in contempt (Stoker, 2006) or are deserving of public disregard and cynicism (Moore, 2006). There is in New Zealand a general scepticism and disdain for those who labour as democratic representatives, including those who carry out this work at the national level (Knauf, 2005, p. 27). Opinion polls (Perry & Webster, 1999), media commentators (Trotter, 2006; Moore, 2006), and academics (Vowles, Aimer, Banducci, Karp, & Miller, 2002) each suggest a concern with the integrity of democratic representatives in New Zealand. One consequence is that parliamentarians are required to perform emotional labour to position themselves as ‘genuine’ and therefore as vocationally authentic.

The lines of accountability for the parliamentarian as a worker are not straightforward. Workers in other large organisations know they need to be able to meet the demands of their workplace superiors and to work alongside their co-workers, but for parliamentarians the reigns of power that direct their work and future opportunities are shared by disparate groups. The media, the electorate, party members, party colleagues, especially those in their party’s upper ranks, all hold influence over the parliamentarian’s ongoing access to the occupational place they aspire to.
Accountability is further complicated by the symbolic nature of the workplace. It is not only the electorate and their party that a parliamentarian serves but in a more abstract sense they are also accountable to the values of the democratic system more generally.

The public nature of the parliamentarian’s work, the multi-directional lines of accountability and reliance on the support of the parliamentarian’s party and the voting public for the continuation of their employment ‘contract’ create some unique work conditions. Yet, in other ways the issues of the parliamentary workplace are similar to those faced by other workers. Gaining co-workers’ cooperation, facing competition within the workplace, dealing with social alliances and divisions as well as notions about the way things are done in ‘the workplace’ (Martin, 2002, p. 1) are matters which do not only affect parliamentarians. The negotiation of organisational and emotional culture and occupational identity are part and parcel of the experiences of a myriad of workers, and in addition to occupational identity, are central to the concerns of this thesis.

**Emotional labour and occupational identity**

In this thesis I argue that emotional labour and occupational identity are closely tied, especially in complex workplaces. Establishing an authentic occupational identity is crucial to parliamentarians’ workplace performances. Through an analysis of the interview transcripts I will argue that parliamentarians deploy three interpretative repertoires for understanding their workplace experiences; The Game, The Performance and The Crusade. These repertoires not only capture meanings around ‘parliamentary work’ and the ‘parliamentary workplace’ but also how one should be a parliamentarian and the place of emotion in being that kind of worker. Thus, the repertoires are important cultural resources used by parliamentarians to make claims to occupational identities that in some instances draw together rationality and emotionality to position ‘ideal’ parliamentarians as ‘passionately rational’ workers.

Although all of the repertoires were important, being an ‘ideal’ worker required parliamentarians made claims that positioned themselves as ‘passionately rational.’ This positioning was achieved only through The Crusade repertoire. Through this repertoire, the vocationally authentic parliamentarian was a worker who employed both their ‘heart’ and ‘mind’ in the pursuit of a ‘just’ outcome in their workplace activities.
Thus, I argue in this thesis that the enactment of passionate rationality is crucial to how parliamentarians accomplish vocational authenticity.

So far in this chapter, I have introduced the thesis and my interest in the emotional labour of parliamentarians. I have showed how the current conditions of the New Zealand parliamentary workplace make the exploration of parliamentarians’ emotional labour sociologically relevant. I have also foreshadowed some aspects of my research findings which will be further developed throughout this thesis. The next part of this chapter outlines the structure of the thesis.

**Structure of the thesis**

This thesis is situated within the sociological study of workplaces and emotional labour. In particular, the works of Hochschild (1983) and Bolton (2005) provide a foundation for studying emotion in the parliamentarian’s work. Hochschild’s work has spawned an abundance of studies on emotional labour but only a small number of studies address emotional labour in ‘high status’ occupations. Bolton’s work provides an analysis of workplace emotion that enables greater distinction between different types of emotion at work and therefore suggests a more flexible view of the various emotional experiences that are a part of workplace accounts. This thesis lends support to the argument that there are important differences between emotion management carried out by different ‘kinds’ of workers. These differences are addressed through two new concepts, emotional convocation and personified emotion, both of which are discussed in the final chapter of the thesis.

Chapter Three outlines the theoretical perspective that informs this thesis. Here, I situate myself as a social constructionist and argue for an understanding of emotion as something that necessitates an interpretative analytical process. I argue that social construction diverts unnecessary sociological argumentation regarding the ‘nature’ of emotion by establishing the focus of research on understanding the constitution of meaning within the situated interpretive process of language. Goffman’s dramaturgical theorising on the self informs my theoretical perspective to the performative aspects of language and emotion.
Taking emotion to be the experience of “involvement” (Barbalet, 2001, p.1) of a “sentient” self (Hochschild, 2003, p. 77), and taking parliamentarians’ talk to be accounts of their experience (Orbuch, 1997) and the object of my focus, I adopt an interpretative theoretical perspective that has consequences for my methodological decision making. In Chapter Four, I discuss the related implications of epistemology and ontology in light of my theoretical perspective by referring to Crotty’s schemata for understanding the foundations of social research (Crotty, 1998). In this chapter, I describe the design of the research and the management of the data. I also evaluate the analytical tool of interpretative repertoires (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) and what it offers to the study of parliamentarians’ accounts.

Chapter Five is the first of three data chapters and it is here that I introduce parliament as an institution with totalising tendencies, involving parliamentarians in a process of self-transformation that can be understood as a moral career (Goffman, 1961). Through the process of admission, mortification, adaptation and release (Lee & Newby, 1983, pp. 334-336), elected representatives to parliament come to understand themselves as ‘parliamentarians’ through their new occupational identities. They learn to understand social interaction within the parliamentary workplace through three interpretative repertoires: The Game, The Performance and The Crusade. In this chapter, I outline the repertoires within parliamentarians’ accounts and identify their ‘typical’ characteristics. Familiarity with the interpretative repertoires over time leads parliamentarians to mastery of the repertoires and the consequences they carry for meaning-making at work. Here I argue that parliamentarians’ mastery of The Crusade repertoire is particularly important for incorporating a sense of vocational authenticity within performances of occupational identity. Indeed, this is because parliamentarians come to understand their workplace performances as an indication of ‘whom’ and ‘what’ they are.

As parliamentarians become accomplished actors within the organisational culture of the institution, they learn what it takes to ‘be’ the ‘ideal’ parliamentarian. In Chapter Six, I extend my analysis of parliamentarians’ accounts, looking at how the organisational culture of parliament shapes their understanding and management of emotion at work that are informed by notions of the ‘ideal’ or ‘right kind’ of worker. The repertoires establish institutional knowledge and practice in ways that have consequences for workers’ understanding of the place of emotion in the workplace and thus for the ‘feeling rules’ that apply in the parliamentary workplace.
The passage of the Civil Union Bill is the focus of Chapter Seven. The bill’s debate offered parliamentarians an opportunity to establish vocational authenticity in a socio-historic milieu where the parliamentarian as worker is often positioned as one who is manipulative and self-interested (Knauf, 2005, p. 21). The status of the bill as a conscience vote made especially salient the worker’s vocational authenticity because, under the conditions of a free vote, the parliamentarian’s position was understood as an ‘individual’ decision. The study of this bill afforded an opportunity to demonstrate support for my argument that the three interpretative repertoires contributed to the understanding of parliamentarians’ accounts of the negotiation of emotional labour.

In Chapter Eight, I combine a discussion of the research results with some concluding remarks. Parliamentarians’ accounts of identity transformation and their production of meaning through the three interpretative repertoires indicate that the emotional labour they take part in is bound up with the achievement of occupational identity and vocational authenticity. Emotional labour, and its focus on the management of emotion in exchange for a wage through surface and deep acting, is therefore of limited conceptual utility for theorising the contemporary experiences of vocational workers. In Chapter Eight, I argue the emotional labour required to ‘be’ a parliamentarian is best conceptualised as ‘emotional convocation’. Emotional convocation explains the management of emotion to produce a feeling state in oneself or another that contributes to confidence in an abstract ideal or system, rather than for the financial benefit of a third party. Emotional convocation is a form of emotion management that has both use and exchange value. My analysis of parliamentarians’ accounts contends that emotional convocation can be understood by adding another dimension to Bolton’s (2005) typology of workplace emotion. That dimension is personified emotion. Personified emotion follows vocational feeling rules that call for a passionately rational workplace performance.

Conclusion

This chapter has contextualised the thesis interest in emotional labour, identified my research questions, and outlined the thesis structure. The emotional labour of parliamentarians as workers has been situated within a complex organisational and emotional culture. In the next chapter, I extend my discussion by introducing three
themes and the literature that is relevant to parliamentarians’ emotional labour. These three themes from the literature contributed to the development of my research question.
Chapter Two  

Contextualising Parliamentarians’ Emotional Labour

Introduction

Parliament is a workplace that has its own organisational history and an ongoing organisational and emotional culture. New Zealand parliaments (and parliamentarians) are situated within a historically specific milieu that includes a growth in the service-orientation of contemporary work and changes in the organisation of parliamentary representation (Hawke, 1993; Hochschild, 1983). Both the growth in the service orientation of contemporary work and changes to parliamentary representation have consequences for understanding workplace culture, emotion work, occupational identities, and intra and cross party relationships.

In this chapter, I review the relevant literature around three key themes. These themes are the sociological study of workplace emotion, organisational cultures and identities, and the New Zealand parliamentary workplace. I then highlight the relevance of these themes for contextualising this study of the emotional labour of New Zealand parliamentarians.

The sociological study of workplace emotion

Sociology has demonstrated that investigating the organisation of work is not only a way of learning about the workplace itself but is a way of learning more generally about the changes taking place in the social organisation of people’s lives (Hughes, 1971b). Historic changes to how work is organised have been myriad and the changes have often commanded the interests of sociologists (Amin, 1994; Beynon, 1984; Bikson, 1996; Durkheim, 1933; Easton, 2007; Heiskanen, 2004; Marx, 1970). Those interests have revolved around issues including capitalism and the appropriation of surplus value (Marx, 1970), Fordism (Beynon, 1984), and the alienation of workers in contemporary labour processes (Braverman, 1974). As well, studies of the stratification of work and the organisation of occupations (Hughes, 1971a), the contested nature of ‘definitions’ of
professionalism (Freidson, 1973) and the declining repute of professionals in contemporary, capitalist societies (Haug, 1973), have demonstrated that the meanings of work and the culture of workplaces are socio-historically specific in capitalist societies.

In contemporary capitalist societies some work is accorded greater status and higher wages than other work. In this thesis, the understanding of work is that it

has an end beyond itself, being designed to produce or achieve something; it involves a degree of obligation or necessity, being a task that others set us or that we set ourselves; and it is arduous, involving effort and persistence (Thomas, 1999, xiv).

The organisation of work reflects other social divisions and inequities and its study is something that benefits from critical sociological analysis (Fineman, 2008, p. 2-3).

In a consumer-oriented society, a person’s social status has been associated with their participation in the paid workforce, and the position of their occupation in the hierarchy of paid work (MacDonald, 1995). Occupational status reflects social inequalities and divisions, such as class, ethnicity and gender patterns, for example, that suggest factors other than higher education and long training periods influence who has access to highly paid or high-status work (Grint, 1998).

Interest in the study of emotion at work followed a history of sociological theorising of other forms of division and inequity in work. What qualifies as work is contingent, rendering some work activities invisible. The historically traditional association between men, ‘public’ workplaces and ‘reason’ versus women, ‘private’ lives, and ‘emotion’ has been cited as a contributing factor to disregard of the importance of emotion in the workplace organisation (Fineman, 2000, p. 10). Sociological critique has contributed to greater recognition of the productivity of women’s activities and of the various inequities in what counts as work, in access to that work, and variability in the status and reward accorded different types of work (McLennan, Ryan, & Spoonley, 2000; Oakley, 1976; Waring, 1988). Recognition of the relevance of inequities in definitions of work and in which ‘workplaces’ attracted social research in contemporary, capitalist societies has developed during the same historic period as interest in the productive and social value of emotion in the workplace was growing (Oakley, 1976; Waring, 1988).
Performing emotional labour

In the early 1980s, Hochschild extended sociological critique of the workplace to theorise that changing economic structure and conditions were producing a new form of worker alienation through what she termed emotional labour (Hochschild, 1983). Hochschild described emotional labour as work with three key characteristics. It involved face-to-face or voice-to-voice contact with members of the public, required workers maintain a particular emotional display in order to produce an emotional state in another person, and had a degree of employer control of employees’ emotional activities through training and supervision (Hochschild, 1983, pp. 7-8).

Hochschild’s (1983) work grew out of her previous observation that rather than being “unbidden and uncontrollable”, emotion was subject to social rules or what she called feeling rules (Hochschild, 1979, p. 551). Hochschild’s early research on the manageability of emotion noted that through the socialisation process actors learned to feel in ways that were understood as the contextually ‘appropriate’ ways to feel for a given situation. From these observations, Hochschild developed an “emotion-management perspective as a lens through which to inspect the self, interaction, and structure” (Hochschild, 1979, p. 551). By working on their understanding of meaning, actors were able to do ‘emotion work’, to negotiate socially inscribed meanings for emotion rather than simply being driven by a biological ‘emotion’ response (Hochschild, 1979, p. 561).

Recognising that actors were able to ‘act’ upon emotion, Hochschild identified emotional labour as an invisible yet growing aspect of work in societies where primary industry and manufacturing jobs were on the decline and service-oriented jobs on the rise (Hochschild, 1983). In similar ways, workers were socialised and ‘taught’ the new rules for the production of emotional labour through training manuals, practical training courses and supervision (Hochschild, 1983, pp. 13-14).

Hochschild’s workplace study built on Marx’s insight that the exchange of a worker’s physical labour for a wage involved the appropriation of the surplus value of that labour for the benefit of the employer (Marx, 1970). Hochschild argued that when workers were asked to produce, display and engender particular feelings at work they were having the surplus value of their ordinarily personal ‘emotion work’ appropriated by
their employer. In so doing, they harnessed their own emotional skills and ‘gifts’ to the needs of a company; an act that was not something expected of, for instance, the factory worker producing a roll of wallpaper (Hochschild, 1983, p. 5).

Hochschild’s study of airline flight attendants found they had two ways of dealing with proscribed feelings at work. One was to alter their outward countenance to produce a particular appearance, something Hochschild called surface acting. Surface acting was what flight attendants did when they painted on their hostess smile (Hochschild, 1989, p. 105). But what their trainers and supervisors preferred them to do was to practice deep acting (Hochschild, 1983, p. 33). This involved the attendant drawing upon a memory of an experience in which they had ‘naturally’ felt the desired emotion, and then imagining themselves in that same situation again. This performance called for an actor not to “try to seem happy or sad but rather express spontaneously … a real feeling that has been self-induced” (italics in original) (Hochschild, 1983, p. 35). The airline companies wanted passengers to feel safe, comfortable and cared for, and they expected flight attendants to gear their workplace performance towards this end (Hochschild, 1983, p. 4).

The emotional labourer was thus taught to over ride personal feelings as a company representative (Hochschild, 1989, pp. 24-25). They may be bored, tired or agitated but to allow those feelings to show in their interaction with clients was proscribed (Van Maanen & Kunda, 1989, p. 58). Not only must they hide those feelings but they must hide them in a way that belies the production of a performance. Hochschild argued that under intensified work conditions, being required to act on such a personal thing as feelings had negative consequences for workers.

Hochschild asserted the introduction of emotion into the labour exchange was important on two grounds. Firstly, the ‘invisibility’ of this aspect of service provision, and the over-representation of women within the occupations where emotional labour was necessary, meant that once again the productive activities undertaken by some members of the community were neglected (Hochschild, 1983, p. 21). The neglect to specifically acknowledge and financially recompense this labour echoed the struggle for social recognition of other productive activities largely undertaken by women. Secondly, Hochschild argued there are ‘hidden’ costs to emotional labour that accompany its ‘invisibility’ as a form of labour.
Hochschild argued that flight attendants’ efforts to change their feeling state and to care for passengers, even difficult and rude ones, comes under particular stress when economic conditions puts added strain on the time available to carry out this work. The result, she argued, is the development of an ‘instrumental stance’ toward feelings with the result that, even in their ‘private’ lives, feeling began to lose its ‘signal function’ (Hochschild, 1983, p. 17 - 20). It was this loss that led to emotive dissonance and a sense of inauthenticity.

Maintaining a difference between feeling and feigning over the long run leads to strain. We try to reduce this strain by pulling the two closer together either by changing what we feel or changing what we feign (Hochschild, 1993, p. 90).

The only option for a flight attendant who wanted to ensure their ongoing participation in work for the company was to change the way they felt and, in so doing, risk becoming “estranged from face and feeling” (Hochschild, 1983, p. 89).

Extending emotional labour

Hochschild’s conceptualisation has been used to study the emotional labour of other types of workers and workplaces. Hochschild identified six groups from U.S. census occupational categories that carried out emotional labour, among them professionals and managers (Hochschild, 1983, p. 244-252). Emotional labour has been extended to the study of a variety of workers including fast-food operators (Leidner, 1993), beauty therapists (Sharma & Black, 2001), supermarket clerks (Tolich, 1993), Disneyland employees (Van Maanen & Kunda, 1989), nurses (Smith, 1992), police detectives (Stenross & Kleinman, 1989), and paralegals (Lively, 2000; Pierce, 1999).

Emotional labour is a part of many different kinds of contemporary work but Hochschild’s assumption that the introduction of emotion into the labour exchange necessarily involved alienation and costs to the worker such as ‘burn-out’ was premature. Emotional labour research has found that the negative effects of emotional labour are not as straightforward as Hochschild initially posited.

Research has suggested that workers doing emotional labour have more agency than Hochschild initially argued. For example, in jobs where workers were supervised to provide a particular style of emotional service, the workers still found ways to make that service ‘their own’, demonstrating that organisational control and worker autonomy are
not straightforward (Tolich, 1993). Some fast-food workers even found the dictates of company scripts a relief when it came to handling difficult customers (Leidner, 1993). Jobs with emotional labour in some cases offer workers a higher level of satisfaction than other types of work (Wharton, 1999). Although Hochschild posited that emotional labour led to burnout and alienation, these other studies have suggested that the consequences of doing emotional labour are complex. A quantitative study of bank and hospital workers, for instance, found that factors including autonomy and the number of hours worked were better predictors of burnout than a sole focus on emotional labour (Wharton, 1999).

The lack of agency in the workplace actor of Hochschild’s original theory bears an association to the workers more often chosen as the topic of extensions to her research: lower status workers with less control over their work conditions than other types of workers. These include employees in fast-food, supermarket, amusement park and cosmetics sales workplaces (Abiala, 1999; Leidner, 1993; Tolich, 1993; Van Maanen & Kunda, 1989). It is only recently that the research of workers from the ostensibly more ‘powerful’ work category of ‘professionals’ has begun to consolidate (Anleu & Mack, 2005; Harris, 2002; Pierce, 1999). Although research into the emotional labour of professional work is limited, what research has been done suggests that it is not only service workers who produce emotional displays and states in themselves and others. In addition, workers in the professions also experience emotional labour as taxing work that can lead to ‘burn-out’, although not inevitably.

Emotional labour in professional work

One of the few studies on the emotional labour of professionals focused on barristers and asserted the need to study the emotional labour of these professional workers on five grounds (Harris, 2002). First of all, Harris cited the already mentioned proclivity for emotional labour research to focus on front-line service and care workers to the neglect of emotional labour in professional work. In addition, he argued that professional work has characteristics which are different in important ways from service work. The social understanding of professional codes of practice meant barristers’ delivery of emotional services was expected to adhere to the social expectations that accompany their occupational categorisation. The other three reasons Harris cited for considering barristers’ work are that they are largely ‘self-regulating’ of their workplace performances, they belong to a group of professional workers who are expected to
“serve a greater good”, and their work requires a greater “reliance on ingenuity, reflexivity and innovativeness” (Harris, 2002, pp. 554-555).

In spite of their professional status, Harris found that like other workers, barristers felt pressure from clients to provide a certain style of emotional service and their ‘training’ did include being taught how to ‘feel’ in ways appropriate to their profession, (Harris, 2002, p. 569). In a marked departure from the circumstances of other emotional labourers, however, barristers accounted for their ongoing access to income as self-employed professionals as something that called for emotional labour with work colleagues. In order to have work referred to them, barristers ‘touted’ influential solicitors and barrister clerks, both of whom could have an influence on whether work was referred to a particular barrister (Harris, 2002, pp. 567-568). Under these circumstances, barristers’ provision of emotional labour extended into their lives outside of work, and to their intimate partners’ lives, as prominent work colleagues were hosted in barristers’ homes in order to ensure ongoing access to contracts (Harris, 2002, p.568).

The emotional labour of professionals differs from the emotional labour of front-line service workers in that it does not involve direct supervision and this point has been used to highlight the limitations of emotional labour for conceptualising professional work (Bolton, 2005, p. 52). The work of Anleu and Mack (2005) has suggested that the emotional labour of professional magistrates is monitored, albeit in quite a different way than front-line service work. Although in the course of their everyday work magistrates do not have their emotional labour overseen by an attending supervisor, their work is monitored nevertheless. Their performance of emotional labour is monitored, not by a supervisor on hand, but by a more amorphous audience including themselves taking account of judicial ethics, appeal court judges, journalists, and court users. (Anleu & Mack, 2005, p. 614).

It is not only the production of ‘feeling’ that is a taxing workplace activity, but containing emotion at work is also a demanding task and this ‘containment’ is similarly watched over by the professional worker themselves as well as others who assess and comment on their workplace performances (Anleu & Mack, 2005, p. 599). Anleu and Mack are supported by other researchers who argue that the professions are traditionally constituted as work best undertaken by ‘suppressing’ emotion (MacDonald, 1995).
Significant in the research on emotional labour and professional work are four findings. First is that even when workers enjoy greater autonomy at work than front-line service staff, the need to demonstrate that they “serve a greater good” (Harris, 2002, p. 554) calls for attention to the style of service provided by the worker. Secondly, in situations with greater autonomy, workers still needed to provide emotional services and, indeed, rather than being ‘easier’ their emotional labour had to be carried out in ways that called for greater flexibility of performance (Harris, 2002, p. 555). Thirdly, the emotional labour of professional workers involved the suppression of emotion and this is accounted for as work that also required management. Finally, even when emotional labourers are not directly supervised by workplace superiors, a high public profile meant that professional workers were aware of the necessity to perform, even though to a more amorphous audience than other emotional labourers.

In this chapter, I have argued that Hochschild’s conceptualisation of emotion as a socially negotiated phenomenon that could be harnessed to an employer’s pursuit of a commercial profit drew attention to the role of emotional labour in contemporary capitalist societies that provided services rather than tangible ‘products’. I have shown how research has extended Hochschild’s theorising to other workplaces, establishing the centrality of emotional labour for a variety of different types of workers. Extensions to Hochschild’s original conceptualisation have shown that the costs and consequences of emotional labour are dependent on factors other than simply the provision of such labour (Wharton, 1999). Currently, however, research on emotional labour has only rarely been applied to work where there is greater worker autonomy or where the worker belongs to a professional organisation (Anleu & Mack, 2005; Harris, 2002; Pierce, 1999). When such research has been undertaken, it has suggested that valuable as the concept of emotional labour is, it does not explain some of the important differences in the emotional labour of workers in the professions vis-à-vis other emotional labourers.

The key differences in the emotional labour of professional workers include expectations created by the understanding of their work as serving a ‘greater good’, the need for greater flexibility and innovativeness in the way this labour is delivered, and

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3 Situating New Zealand parliamentarians as a particular ‘type’ of worker is left to the third and final section of this chapter.
the importance of emotional labour to the precarious nature of ongoing access to income for self-employed professionals. In the final section of this chapter, I will explain the ways parliamentarians’ emotional labour is similar to professionals’ labour. First, however, Hochschild’s emotion management perspective has recently been joined by another framework for understanding emotion at work that requires addressing. Bolton has acknowledged the valuable contribution Hochschild has made in understanding that people work on their emotional states and that capitalist systems support an appropriation of that skill, but she has argued for a more nuanced understanding of social actors through her introduction of a four-pronged typology of workplace emotion (Bolton, 2005).

Critiquing extensions to the emotional labour concept

Bolton has critiqued research extending Hochschild’s original work on emotional labour on the grounds that the concept has been applied too broadly, and ultimately inappropriately, moving it away from Hochschild’s original definition (Bolton, 2005, p. 53). This criticism has centred primarily on researchers who have applied the concept to the professions. Bolton has found fault with this approach for three reasons. First of all, conceptualising professionals such as nurses, doctors and social workers as emotional labourers is at odds with Hochschild’s definition because the emotional services offered by professionals are not supervised but dictated to less directly, through “professional norms and client expectations” (Bolton, 2005, p. 52). Secondly, there is no third party appropriation of the surplus value of the emotional labours of professionals for commercial profit and thirdly, it has not traditionally been a part of the work of professionals to produce a “profitable product such as ‘customer contentment’” (Bolton, 2005, p. 52).

Hochschild’s model of the social actor allows little opportunity for understanding issues such as worker’s resistance to management demands or the negotiation of meaning that takes place within workplaces (Bolton, 2005, p. 101). The result is something of a one-dimensional portrayal of organisational life … with frustrated managers, emotionally exhausted workers and dis-satisfied customers becoming the central focus of analysis (Bolton, 2005, p. 101).

Bolton’s position here is supported by other researchers who have likewise found the concept of emotional labour falls short in explaining autonomy and resistance in workers’ accounts (Tolich, 1993; Wharton, 1999). Bolton’s conceptual framework
makes an important contribution to these issues because of its ability to better accommodate the variable motivations and ways that workers have for performing the management of emotion in the workplace, and for its conceptualisation of workers as “multi-skilled emotion managers” (Bolton, 2005, p.11). By acknowledging the various motivations and consequences of worker’s management of emotion, Bolton also avoids Hochschild’s assumption that doing emotional labour necessarily equates to exploitation and alienation.

Bolton has developed a typology based on identification of four dimensions of emotion at work. Her model posits these dimensions as pecuniary, prescriptive, presentational and philanthropic emotion (Bolton, 2005, p. 91). Pecuniary emotion can be understood as similar to Hochschild’s emotional labour where the actor provides their emotional labours for financial reasons according to commercial feeling rules. Their performance may result in a cynical or a compliant performance and there is the potential for alienation from the benefits of this work (Bolton, 2005, pp. 91-93). Bolton’s prescriptive emotion takes account of emotional labour in situations where an organisation’s expectations for this work are not necessarily related to a profit motive. Bolton cited public service sector organisations as an example of workplaces where “emotion management may be closely prescribed but not necessarily for commercial gain” (Bolton, 2005, p. 92). These first two categories may be thought of as roughly approximating Hochschild’s emotional labour concept (Bolton, 2005, pp. 91-92), although with refinement that has important repercussions for how the social actor is understood.

The other two categories of Bolton’s typology are presentational and philanthropic emotion. Her orientation to the social actor owes a great deal to Goffman’s work, but it is in the description of presentational emotion management that the debt is most apparent. This type of emotion management operates according to social feeling rules motivated by the actor’s need for ontological security or a sense of ‘self’ (Bolton, 2005, p. 97). Whether the actor views their performance as sincere or cynical, the consequence was a stable sense of self, one that was capable of presenting or indeed shielding information on self during social interaction. The link between presentational and philanthropic emotion is that both are guided by social feeling rules and are without a profit motive. They are therefore akin to Hochschild’s emotion work category (Bolton, 2005, p. 92). In the case of philanthropic emotion, the motivation is to make a
gift of emotion which requires a sincere performance. The result is again a stable sense of self but with the added benefit that the actor can reinforce their sense of being unselfish through the lack of an external demand for the performance or gift. Comparing the different dimensions of workplace experience that are augmented by Bolton’s theory is illustrated in Table 2.1 by reproducing Bolton’s typology of workplace emotion (Bolton, 2005, p. 93).

Table 2.1 Bolton’s typology of workplace emotion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feeling Rules</th>
<th>Pecuniary</th>
<th>Prescriptive</th>
<th>Presentational</th>
<th>Philanthropic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental</td>
<td>Altruism</td>
<td>Ontological</td>
<td>Gift</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental</td>
<td>Instrumental</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cynical</td>
<td>Cynical/sincere</td>
<td>Sincere/cynical</td>
<td>Sincere</td>
<td>Commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance</td>
<td>Consent</td>
<td>Consent</td>
<td></td>
<td>Commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional/ self</td>
<td>Self</td>
<td>Self</td>
<td></td>
<td>Self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alienation</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Satisfaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contradiction</td>
<td>Identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Contradiction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Bolton’s argument galvanised around concerns to portray the organisational actor as a ‘skilled emotions manager’ guided by sets of feeling rules, but showed that there is more than one potentially relevant set of feeling rules within a situated interaction. Her typology allows for a balance between the ‘enabling’ and ‘constraining’ characteristics of social structure.

By illustrating the social actor’s ability to draw upon different sets of feeling rules according to judgements about the context of interaction, Bolton’s typology accounts
for variations in how emotion is practiced in the workplace and variations in the consequences of that practice. She has suggested that each of her four ‘ideal types’ may be seen in different combinations in any one workplace. Each involves a different set of feeling rules, motivations, performances, identity claims and consequences (Bolton, 2005, p. 93). Bolton’s typology thus captures the importance of the organisational actor’s interpretive efforts and their ability to alter their social performance accordingly.

The typology rectifies a gap within emotional labour as a concept by allowing for a consideration of emotion management activities regardless of whether the goal is commercial profit or not, making the model applicable to public service organisations (Bolton, 2005, p. 126). Bolton thus solves the problem she saw with emotional labour’s lack of utility for understanding the variety of motivations and consequences of emotion in the workplace by developing a framework for understanding the different feeling rules workers were able to draw upon. By positing different sets of feeling rules, Bolton’s framework explains how workers can claim some autonomy for themselves even within managerial prescriptions for emotion (Tolich, 1993), and how it is that emotional labour can be a pleasurable aspect of work even though it might also lead to ‘burn-out’ (Wharton, 1999).

Organisational cultures and identities

In this and the following section of the chapter I assess literature that addresses two different areas of interest for this thesis: the importance of organisational cultures to the constitution of workplace identities; and the composition and history of the New Zealand parliamentary workplace. Firstly, I draw together work that helps to establish what I mean in using the term organisational culture in relation to the parliamentary workplace and to discuss the significance of emotion to organisational culture and identities. Research on organisational culture has established that the management of workplace culture necessarily involves the management of feeling (Van Maanen & Kunda, 1989). Central to the frameworks of both Hochschild (1983) and Bolton (2005), presented in the previous section of this chapter, is the notion that feeling rules are established through interaction with others in the workplace. It has been argued that induction into an organisational culture involves taking up new occupational identities and that organisational dictates produce expectations around appropriate workplace identity (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002; Becker, Geer, Hughes & Strauss, 1992 [1961];
Cahill, 1989; Kleinman, 1984). I will demonstrate that although this literature has not previously been utilised to illuminate the understanding of parliamentary organisations, it does offer fruitful ways for thinking about the work that parliamentarians do.

In the following section of this chapter, I draw upon literature from the political science field to briefly sketch out aspects of parliament’s composition and history that are necessary to provide contextual background to its study as a workplace for parliamentarians. Although democratic governance in general (Rhodes & Weller, 2005; Stoker, 2006; West, 2004), and New Zealand’s parliamentary democracy in particular (McLeay, 1995; Wanna, 2005), are topics of much exposition, the central debates of that literature are only of tenuous interest here. Within the context of this thesis, what is important about parliament is that it constitutes an everyday workplace for parliamentarians and that it is within this organisational environment that parliamentarians as workers forge their occupational identities. It is an understanding of the meaning-making of parliamentarians as workers that is the central focus for this thesis and in this regard much of the political science literature is of limited utility. Indeed, Rhodes has identified a general lacuna when it comes to research that focuses on the perspectives of those who work in government (Rhodes, 2005). He rightly suggests that the methodological preferences that are dominant in the study of politics and politicians produce limitations for what can be learned from that work and he cites the need for research that takes an interpretative approach to understandings of political work life (Rhodes, 2005, p. 3-4).

Until recently, work organisations were understood as ‘rational enterprises’ and hence devoid of emotion (Becker, et al., 1992 [1961]; Fineman, 2000, p. 10). The gendered division of labour, which saw women typically responsible for the care of family and home and men the ‘breadwinner’ of the family, has been identified as a factor which influenced social attitudes to emotion, associating emotion with women and private life and rationality with men and the public workplace (Fineman, 2000, p. 10; Jaggar, 1989, p. 145). This belief has been thoroughly and convincingly challenged in the literature (Bolton, 2005; Fineman, 2000, 2008; Hochschild, 1983; Lively, 2006; Sandelands & Boudens, 2000; Waldron, 2000).

The study of organisations from a cultural viewpoint has brought to light aspects of the workplace that have been understudied but that contribute to the understanding of work
as a place where stories and jokes are told and where newcomers are initiated to meaning around how things ought to be done here (Martin, 2002, p. 3). Martin (2002) used culture as a metaphor for the organisation rather than as a variable and in this thesis I use the term in the same metaphoric sense rather than to suggest the existence of a stable entity called culture. In conceptualising parliament as a workplace culture, I draw attention to the way that meaning is negotiated within a contextual web of understanding that is particular to the ‘stories’ or accounts of experience in the parliamentary workplace.

Sociological investigation of the everyday organisational culture of parliamentarians is scant, so little is known about issues such as how these workers are introduced to workplace culture (Rhodes, 2005). When research attention has been focused on parliamentarians, it has more often been in relation to “particular circumstances … [such as] the behaviour of politicians engaged in election campaigns [rather than] … their activity once in office” (Levine & Roberts, 2004, p. 40). Although there is a long tradition of studying other workers and workplaces, there is little research on parliament as a worksite (Rhodes, 2005). The present study is one contribution to research addressing the lacuna.

Emotional culture is best understood alongside the broader concept of organisational culture. The term organisational culture refers to

> a basic pattern of assumptions invented, discovered or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration — that has worked well enough to be considered valuable and therefore to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems (Schein, 1985, p. 36).

As an aspect of organisational culture, emotional culture refers to the

> dominant values, beliefs, assumptions and norms of the organization or a given subunit regarding affective issues, together with the symbolic vehicles for conveying these attributes (Gordon, 1989, p. 322).

The emotional culture of the workplace is therefore constituted through the accounts, the vocabularies and the metaphors used in social interaction and institutionalised through the talk and practices of workers.
Emotion is important to culture, making it impossible to ‘manage’ culture without also ‘managing’ emotion, hence organisational culture necessarily includes rules on how to express emotion in a workplace (VanMaanen & Kunda, 1989). People do not only learn to negotiate their thoughts and actions alone through cultural understanding but they learn how and what they ought to ‘feel’ in various situations (Van Mannen & Kunda, 1989, p. 46).

Emotion management is common in organisations that involve face-to-face contact with others, where workplace superiors set an expectation for the restriction of feelings, and wherever service work is a part of workplace performance (Van Maanen & Kunda, 1989, pp. 54-55). The more management required by a given position, the more feeling rules there are to learn and people who have been in the organisation for longer and know the rules ‘best’ are the most likely ones to have an investment in maintaining the rules of the job (Van Maanen & Kunda, 1989, pp. 54-55). Organisations concerned to develop company culture do so because workers’ adherence to the culture is considered important for company success so ‘culture’ becomes a discrete means of managing workers.

Socialisation to professional and occupational identities has suggested that “taking on any new ideology involves learning how to feel differently about things” (Stenross & Kleinman, 1989, p. 1020). Research into the ways that learning to do particular jobs involved learning to understand feeling and identity through new social meanings has included inquiry into transformation processes in the understanding of new identities for medical students (Stenross & Kleinman, 1989; Becker et al., 1992), mortuary science students (Cahill, 1989) and high steel ironworkers (Haas, 1977). This work has all suggested that something more than task-based learning is required in learning how to do new jobs. For example, mortuary science students who were not able to take up the new ways of understanding their feelings around dead bodies and various unpleasant tasks required of funeral directors understood this inability as a demonstration of their unsuitability to the work and left the field (Cahill, 1989). Thus, organisational cultures and the feeling rules that are a part of them are significant in workers ongoing participation in particular workplaces.
Parliamentary workplaces

Rhodes (2005) research is one of a small number of notable exceptions to the general lack of empirical attention paid to the cultural milieu of parliamentary workplaces (see also Levine & Roberts, 2004). Rhodes sought to replace what he calls the ‘modernist empiricism’ common in political studies through the use of ethnographic method. Taking a qualitative approach to the study of life in a ministry of the British government, Rhodes shadowed ministers and permanent secretaries, analysed their diaries, and conducted non-participant observation as well as interviews, to “… draw a portrait; that is, an account of what the world looks like through their eyes” (Rhodes, 2005, p. 6). Rhodes presented his findings, which came out of his contact with three different but similar departments, as “a composite portrait” to provide anonymity to his participants (Rhodes, 2005, p. 21).

Although Rhodes’ research participants included more public servants than ministers, he did interview both groups of workers. His account of ‘everyday life in a ministry’ suggested a number of things about the British ministerial workplace. Firstly, Rhodes found the pace of work in the ministry punishing compared to work in organisations such as universities or local government, two other organisational settings he was already familiar with. He found both the workload and a need for caution in sharing confidences were prominent features, making the parliamentary workplace a sometimes isolating one (Rhodes, 2005, p. 18). In a work setting that seemed to frequently involve workers coping with crises, Rhodes’ observation was that workers produced an understanding of the difficult aspects of their work situations as ‘unique’, one-off events rather than as everyday occurrences. Within what he described as an “intense” work environment, Rhodes claimed that the expression of emotion was discouraged (Rhodes, 2005, p. 19). In spite of the crises that occurred, while Rhodes was observing workers “did not run, they did not shout, and they did not show emotion” (Rhodes, 2005, p. 19). Although Rhodes did not employ the concept of emotional labour, what he describes is the containment or management of certain emotions and the desirability of other emotional states, such as rationality.4

My primary critique of Rhodes’ work is that even though he eschews the ‘modernist empiricism’ of other, primarily political studies, research, his use of ethnographic

4 In Chapter Three I argue that rationality is an emotional state.
method pays insufficient critical attention to the negotiated nature of language and meaning. He cites the weakness of ethnography as the tendency to present a report that does not acknowledge the way the teller mediates the story. Making his own position clear, he writes:

I accept that the department’s story is my construction of how my interviewees see their world and that it is crucial to locate people’s beliefs and practices against a background of traditions (Rhodes, 2005, p. 20).

What he does not make clear is that equally participants’ understandings are ‘constructions’, an interpreted version of events rather than a transparently meaningful representation of what ‘happened’. While welcome for its focus on parliament as an everyday workplace, for public servants but also for parliamentarians, Rhodes’ research does not provide as analytical an approach as it promised. The result is that Rhodes’ research offers description rather than critical analysis. Rhodes’ work highlights the epistemological difficulties inherent in any research that lays claim to ‘giving voice’ to participants’ ‘perspectives’, even when qualified as the author’s interpretation.

**Occupational identities**

Shaffir and Kleinknecht conducted qualitative research into what happened when parliamentarians and other politicians lost office (2005). Their analysis of 45 informal interviews with defeated federal and provincial Canadian politicians found politicians had a variety of strategies they employed to adjust to the forced necessity of ‘un-becoming’ when voted out of office. Canadian politicians described the involuntary occupational identity loss and exit from the workplace as “devastating” and a type of “death”, highlighting how occupational identity is connected to a sense of self.

Working conditions for politicians contributed to a strong connection to occupational identities as the long hours required, and the limited opportunity to pursue other activities, resulted in “‘politician’ quickly [becoming] a master status” (Shaffir & Kleinknecht, 2005, p. 708). The work conditions of parliamentary work included the exhilaration of the environment, the need to sacrifice other relationships, and the length of time spent preparing for a political career (Shaffir & Kleinknecht, 2005, p. 731). Consequently, when that status was lost, parliamentarians experienced the loss as “death” (Shaffir & Kleinknecht, 2005, p. 708). Workers posited a number of explanations for their losses that situated the control and responsibility for defeat beyond themselves (Shaffir & Kleinknecht, 2005, p. 720).
Shaffir and Kleinknecht’s study of politicians’ accounts of involuntary job loss showed the interconnection between occupational identities and ‘self’ identity. Their research demonstrated that for politicians their workplace identity was a primary means to understanding ‘self’ such that loss of that identity felt like a ‘death’. This work contributes to an understanding of federal and provincial politicians’ occupational identities as integral to experiences of self. While Shaffir and Kleinknecht explored identity loss, the process of parliamentarians’ identity acquisition has not been studied from within a sociological perspective.

Parliamentary work in New Zealand

As noted earlier this chapter, the New Zealand parliamentary workplace that is the location for this research is situated within an international context as one of a number of Westminster-based parliamentary democracies (Patapan & Wanna, 2005; Rhodes & Weller, 2005; Stern, 2005; Wanna, 2005), but also within a national context as a political organisation that is the product of European colonisation (Martin, 2004). It is the national context that is the focus of this section of the chapter. The history of the modern nation of New Zealand predates European settlement by some hundreds of years (King, 1983) and Maori as tangata whenua (indigenous people) had a cultural and political world that preceded the arrival of European whalers and merchants. It is the signing of The Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 that marks the beginning of the modern nation over which contemporary parliaments govern, although it was some 14 years between the signing of the Treaty and the first meeting of parliament (Martin, 2004, p. 3).

Early attempts at self-governance by European settlers saw the eventual importation of the British Westminster system and

… a centralised form of legislature based on a small number of cohesive political parties (usually two) competing for power. A simple majority in the debating chamber determined who held power. New Zealand followed this model, with factional politics dominating in the nineteenth century and organised political parties developing from the 1890s (Martin, 2004, p. 10).

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5 The Treaty has a long, complex, and fraught history (Orange, 1987).
Unlike larger countries such as Canada or the United States, New Zealand has no provincial or state government. This ‘unitary’ style of government allows for the delegation of certain responsibilities to local body or regional governments, but parliament has complete jurisdiction in deciding what those responsibilities will be (Mulgan, 1997 [1994], p. 191). New Zealand’s democratic parliament is neither a nebulous nor ‘natural’ organisation but one imbued with cultural assumptions which come from its historic connections to particular institutions and which have had a range of effects for tangata whenua (Orange, 1987, pp. 1-5).

New Zealand is currently divided into geographic electorates from which the Members of Parliament are chosen. Over the years, the number of seats and the boundary lines of electorates have been subject to change but the system of representation remained effectively unchanged until recently. Once every three years, electorate members vote for a local representative from the list of political parties who put forward a candidate for that particular seat in parliament. Until electoral reform, the Governor-General, on behalf of the sovereign, asked the political party winning the majority of these electorate seats to form a government. This style of electoral system has been commonly referred to as ‘first-past-the-post’ (FPP).6

The composition of parliament

At the time this research was done, there were 120 Members of Parliament in the 47th New Zealand Parliament. Those members represented seven different political parties. The government was a formal minority coalition made up of the Labour and the Progressive parties, led by Labour’s the Right Honourable Helen Clark and the Progressive party’s the Honourable Jim Anderton. The coalition government was supported on matters of confidence and supply by United Future party and a cooperation agreement with The Green Party of Aotearoa/New Zealand. This set of arrangements ensured the stability of the minority coalition government.

The largest opposition party was the National party with Dr Don Brash as leader. The other opposition party was ACT New Zealand. In addition, there was one independent Member of Parliament.

6 There is some concern with the communicative accuracy of this term. In addressing its shortcomings, Easton describes this “method of election as ‘front runner’ or FR” (Easton, 1999, p. 27) given that the winner of this style of election is the party that captures the largest number of electorate seats rather than being the party that is “first” in any other terms, such as in winning over 50% of votes cast.
Table 1.1 The composition of the 47th New Zealand parliament in 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Electorate Seats</th>
<th>List Seats</th>
<th>Total Seats</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Green</td>
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<td>Labour</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>National</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZ First</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Future</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Progressives</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
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Parliament’s legislative process

In New Zealand, legislation is produced through the introduction of a bill to the House of Representatives. There are four kinds of bills: government bills, members’ bills drawn by ballot, local bills on behalf of local body authorities and private bills which are introduced by a sitting member on behalf of a person or group. A government bill may be a whipped bill or a conscience vote. A whipped bill requires members to vote in accordance with the party position while a conscience vote allows members a free vote. Conscience votes tend to be taken on matters considered of moral or social importance (Lindsey, 2006, p. 186).

A bill’s introduction to the House precedes parliamentary debate and a vote to ascertain whether there is sufficient support for the bill to get past its first reading (New Zealand Parliament, 2008a). If successful, it is usually referred to select committees for consideration. The committee generally opens the process up to submissions from the electorate. Both written and oral submissions are made and a number of public hearings held. Once the committee has considered the bill, they make recommendations for amendments and the bill returns to the House for a vote on whether it should pass its second reading. The last stage of a successful bill’s journey includes the vote at the end of the committee stage that approves the bill for its third and final reading. After the third reading, the bill receives the Royal Ascent and, upon its signature by the Governor-General, becomes law.
Select committees

It is in the select committee meeting that the details of legislation are scrutinised. In New Zealand, there are 18 permanent committees, including 13 subject area committees and there may be a number of ad hoc special interest committees operating at any one time. The committees comprise eight members and party representation mirrors representation in the House. The committee chair is a parliamentarian without ministerial duties and may be a member of a party that is not in government (New Zealand Parliament, 2008b; Pears, 1996, p. 52).

The select committee is an important part of New Zealand’s democratic process, offering the public an opportunity to comment on proposed legislation (Shaw & Eichbaum, 2005, p. 52). Which committees a parliamentarian sits on or chairs is taken as an indication of future potential (Levine & Roberts, 2004, p. 40). Some but not all of the select committee meetings are open to the public. The committee is where the bulk of the policy work is done and a means of allowing for accountability of parliamentary representatives and administrators.

The select committees are the workhorses of New Zealand’s parliamentary system. They are also its best kept secret. While the political action which takes place in the chamber can affect parties’ morale and the prospects of individual Ministers and MPs, it is often highly choreographed and has relatively little bearing on the content of policy … [The committees, on the other hand] make a substantial difference to policy … with the active assistance of a wide range of people from beyond the parliamentary complex … (Shaw & Eichbaum, 2005, p. 52).

Select committee public meetings are easily accessed and though they are seldom in the public eye in the way that the proceedings of the House are, these committees are a particularly important aspect of New Zealand’s democratic system and a means for parliamentarians to prove they have a contribution to make to the running of the House.

The job of the parliamentarian

There is no job description for New Zealand’s parliamentarians and a change to Standing Orders in 2003 means that members are not even legally required to turn up to work (Gillon & Miller, 2006, p. 174). Former Speaker of the House Jonathon Hunt has defined parliamentary business as
… the undertaking of any task or function that a member could reasonably be expected to carry out in his or her capacity as a Member of Parliament and that complements the business of the House of Representatives (Gillon & Miller, 2006, p. 174).

Their loosely defined job description allows parliamentarians to take part in a wide range of different activities in the course of their work. These include constituency work, party work and legislative work but the aspect of their work that is the focus of this thesis is the work that takes place during debate within the House of Representatives and the scrutinising of legislation that takes place during select committee meetings.

Introducing Mixed Member Proportional Representation

Over the years, details such as the number of seats and the boundary lines of electorates were subject to change but the system of electoral representation remained effectively the same (Martin, 2004). The result was that minor parties held little influence in the House and the government’s highest ranking ministers comprised its Cabinet and enjoyed a high degree of ‘political clout’ (Shaw & Eichbaum, 2005, p. 43). These arrangements gave a small group of representatives a disproportionate amount of power (Palmer, 1992; Shaw & Eichbaum, 2005, p. 43).

New Zealand’s adoption in 1996 of a system of Mixed Member Proportional Representation has been attributed to changes in New Zealand’s relationship with its colonial past and to the actions of government in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Boston, Levine, McLeay, & Roberts, 1996; Mulgan, 1993). Some New Zealanders favoured a change in the system of electoral representation as a means of marking the nation’s growing independence from Britain (Boston, et al., 1996, p. 2). Another motivation for electoral reform was the actions of successive Labour and National governments in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In both cases, the adoption of neo-liberalising agendas that were not well signalled in the pre-election period resulted in falling public confidence in the communication process of the democratic system (Mulgan, 1993, p. 49). A New Zealand electorate that been moving away from its British colonial roots had also become increasingly critical of the integrity of its representatives and support for a referendum consolidated (Boston, et al., 1996, p. 2).

With the electorate showing a preference for a more consultative model for its political leadership, the referendum was passed with 53.9% in favour of a change to MMP as
opposed to 46.1% in favour of the status quo of FPP (Pears, 1996, p. 48). For the first time in 1996, New Zealand voters had two votes: one for their preferred electorate representative and the other for their preferred party. The redrawn electorate boundaries created 62 general electorate seats, seven Maori electorate seats and 51 or 52 seats from the party lists for a total 120 seats (Pears, 1996, pp. 21-22).  

Disquiet in relation to the distribution of power was wide under FPP. Along with concern at the amount of power held by a small group of elected individuals, there was a concomitant concern with the way that the structure and style of parliamentary democracy in New Zealand made easier the participation of some sectors of the population while making participation less easy or appealing for other sectors (Waring, 1994). Under FPP, there were concerns about the lack of representation of minority groups and the limitations on the ability of back-bench parliamentarians to influence the course of political events. These features contributed to the adversarial and competitive way that parliamentary interaction was conducted (Grey, 2000; Knauf, 2005; Levine & Roberts, 2004). There were hopes that electoral reform would result in a more inclusive parliament and a less hostile form of cross-party interaction (Knauf, 2005, p. 28), but thus far those hopes have not been realised (Grey, 2000, p. 1; Knauf, 2005, p. 28, 33).

The change to MMP has brought change to governmental and parliamentary practice (Levine & Roberts, 2004; Palmer & Palmer, 1997). Since the introduction of MMP no single party has had a sufficiently large majority to rule alone. That has lent the smaller parties a greater degree of power as the larger parties have had to negotiate agreements that ensure their support in order to govern. In parliament, the change to MMP has similarly brought greater value to parliamentarians outside of the executive. As mentioned earlier, the select committees are not chaired by ministers. Under FPP, when there was an inbuilt majority on select committees, the management skills of committee chairs were not as significant as they are now (Levine & Roberts, 2004). The result is that select committee work has taken on extra importance in relation to parliamentarians’ future aspirations (Levine & Roberts, 2004, p. 40).

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7 Parliament normally has 120 seats except when a party wins “more electorate seats than the total number of seats it is entitled to based on its share of the effective party votes” (Pears, 1996, p. 21). In that case, the party keeps those electorate seats it has won but does not receive any list seats and parliament will have 121 representatives.
Levine and Roberts (2004) have argued that one of the strengths of the MMP system is the greater influence accorded back-bench parliamentarians. Instead of being reduced to mere ‘lobby fodder’ to be mustered up in support of voting in the House, New Zealand parliamentarians are provided with an opportunity to demonstrate their leadership through select committee participation and by taking the chair (Levine & Roberts, 2004, p. 39). One aspect of the skills practiced by an effective select committee chair is the management of emotion.

The introduction of the Civil Union Bill

The Civil Union Bill exemplifies the complexities of the legislative process that parliamentarians take part in. Introduced to the House of Representatives as a government bill, it was sponsored by the Honourable David Benson-Pope in June, 2004, assigned to the Justice and Electoral Select Committee for scrutiny and taken as a conscience vote. The bill attempted to recognise the issue of state recognition of same-sex relationships, making it possible for people in these relationships to go through a public and state-sanctioned ceremony in acknowledgment of their commitment to one another. The bill sought to establish a new form of state-sanctioned and legally recognised relationship status, civil unions.

The bill was significant in a number of ways. First, although the government acknowledged the bill would be of most use to people in same-sex relationships, couples comprised of a male and female partner could also apply for a Civil Union license. Parliamentarian supporters of the bill suggested during select committee hearings that couples averse to the religious or patriarchal associations of traditional marriage, including marriage conducted in a civil ceremony, might prefer to register for a Civil Union. Secondly, while some opponents dubbed it the ‘gay marriage’ bill, it was not officially a revision of The Marriage Act (1955). The bill did employ much of the same language found in that act. Thirdly, a Relationships (Statutory References) Bill (SRB) was supposed to accompany the Civil Union Bill, but the SRB was delayed when it required further work before it met with parliamentary approval. The SRB sought to clarify the statutory rights of de-facto couples. The Select Committee heard that same-sex couples were discriminated against at times of the ill health or death of their partners but also that they sometimes benefited financially by being allowed to claim state support in situations that would have seen them denied support were they a
couple comprised of a male and female. The SRB addressed the rights and responsibilities in such situations.

Opposition to the Civil Union Bill came primarily from two groups. The larger of these two groups voiced the opinion that the bill in effect was about ‘gay marriage’. These particular opponents, claiming the religious grounds of their argument, held that the bill was in contradiction with biblical teachings and that as an ostensibly Christian nation the bill therefore ought not to be supported. The other group to oppose the bill were those who instead supported recognition of gay marriage and said they would have preferred an amendment to The Marriage Act (1955).

Locating the parliamentarian as a ‘type’ of worker

The activities of parliamentarians fit easily into Thomas’s (1999) definition of work, but just where their work falls in the social hierarchy of professions and occupations is not as immediately clear. The New Zealand census brings a wide range of occupations into the category of professional based on the requirements of lengthy education or job training. Parliamentarians come under the category of manager and, as legislators, are clustered in a sub-category alongside chief executives, general managers and other legislators (Statistics, 2007).

In spite of their census categorisation as managers, parliamentarians’ work shares some of the characteristics of professional work. They participate in work that is high status, well paid and involves the provision of specialised skills (Giddens, 1989, pp. 286-287). They are accorded a level of autonomy in their work that grants them more control over their provision of labour than is the case with lower status occupations. They exercise collective control over the promotion or relegation of their own party colleagues and there is a spirit of collegial responsibility. Like the original ‘status professions’ (Harris, 2002, p. 558), there is a notion that parliamentarians serve a greater social or common good. Their public performances influence the regard in which people hold the larger bodies of their party, the parliamentarian population and the democratic system parliamentarians represent, in a similar way that the performance of magistrates is taken as representative of the justice system (Anleu & Mack, 2005).

In other important ways parliamentarians are unlike professionals. Their access to work involves a complex and staged process in which they must seek the approval of both
party members and the electorate. They gain access to their job via a democratic course of election requiring first nomination, then selection as a candidate, and thirdly, selection as a representative of an electorate or a sufficiently high ranking in their party list to gain them entry to parliament. In order to progress up the ranks once they are in parliament, they must convince their peers that they are worthy of promotion. Their ability to stay in the job depends not on maintaining requirements of registration but rather in maintaining their suitability to the position in the eyes of their party, parliamentary peers and the voting public. Managing these processes may well require certain skills, but there are no specific training or accreditation prerequisites.

Parliamentarians are not, strictly speaking, professional workers, although some do come into their parliamentary work from a professional background. They also ought not to be considered the same as the emotional labourers who work in the front-line service work. In this thesis I use the term contemporary vocational work to refer to parliamentary work as vocational in character. Although parliamentary work does not require a professional qualification, it is a ‘status’ occupation of sorts. The term vocation is used variably in the literature, sometimes referring to work which requires applied training rather than an academic education (Oldfield, 2007) and other times being used to refer to work that has an altruistic element to it, such as in the case of teaching or theology (Engelhard Jr., 2005; Higgins, 2005). I use the term vocational in relation to the parliamentarian’s work in a manner that bears relationship to Weber’s use of the word (Weber, 1991).

The political leader must inspire those they lead by being

… recognised as the innerly ‘called’ leader … [People] do not obey [their leaders] by virtue of tradition or statute, but because they believe in [them] (Weber, 1991, p. 79).

Weber defines three ideal types on which a leader’s legitimacy may rest, but says that it is legitimisation by charisma that is most relevant for politicians because charisma is a demonstration of ‘calling’. Rather than focusing on ‘calling’ for the recognition of vocational work, in this thesis I argue that contemporary vocational workers need to demonstrate the authenticity of their occupational identities in order to be understood as the ‘right’ kinds of person to lead.
Weber’s description of the political leader as someone who is able to convince people to ‘believe’ in them highlights an important difference between the parliamentarian and industry leaders or professionals. Other leaders might be considered to legitimately claim their worthiness to the job through their skill base, but the parliamentarian ideally needs also to be recognised as worthy in a moral sense. Some professionals might also claim the vocational character of their work and certainly the original status professions included a notion of servitude to either a deity or an ideal (such as judges who are sworn to uphold justice or the doctor who swears a Hippocratic Oath) (Fincham & Rhodes, 1999, p. 467).

Emotion, organisational cultures and studying parliamentarians

The concept of emotional labour has not previously been applied to parliamentarians’ work. There are four key insights in this review of the relevant literature that are pertinent for such a study. First of all, research has demonstrated that by highlighting a ‘hidden’ aspect of work, Hochschild’s (1983) study does have utility for understanding the management of emotion in contemporary, capitalist societies in workplaces other than the airline industry (Anleu & Mack, 2005; Harris, 2002). The second insight is that the original concept of emotional labour has limitations for explaining work where there are substantially different conditions that surround the work that is done. The emotional labour of front-line service workers and members of professional groups have similarities but also important differences that mean the causes and consequences of professional work suggest new frameworks for theorising are needed (Harris, 2002). The new development of a typology of emotion at work (Bolton, 2005) offered one way of addressing this lack. Bolton’s (2005) framework offers a means that better accounts for agency and the variable sets of feeling rules that workers as ‘skilled emotion managers’ flexibly drew upon.

The third key insight, from the study of organisational cultures and identities, is that understanding organisations as cultures involved exploring ‘webs’ of meaning-making, including meanings around identity and feeling. Two studies related to parliamentarians and their work showed that organisational culture influenced parliamentary workers’ management of emotion and that parliamentarians accounted for their occupational identities as central to how they understood ‘themselves’ (Rhodes, 2005; Shaffir & Kleinknecht, 2005). In particular, Shaffir and Kleinknecht have
highlighted the centrality of occupational identity for parliamentarians and other political representatives.

The last section of this chapter discussed contemporary parliamentary work in New Zealand, situating that work in its historic, national and global context. The central insight from this section was that New Zealand parliamentarians currently work in an environment where the credibility of democracy has been questioned with consequences for their social status, and especially for their vocational authenticity. In arguing for an understanding of parliamentarians as contemporary vocational workers, I drew upon the literature to show the similarities with and differences between parliamentarians and other ‘types’ of workers. Being situated in a workplace that has had its integrity critiqued and where the electorate response to that situation had been to vote for a new form of electoral representation has put parliamentarians under increasing pressure to perform emotional labour in particular ways, and especially to demonstrate their vocational authenticity.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have situated the thesis interests in the emotional labour of parliamentarians within the workplace around three themes: the sociological study of workplace emotion; organisational cultures and identities; and contemporary parliamentary work in New Zealand. Through this literature, I have argued the growth of the service-related sector and the competitive nature of contemporary, capitalist societies has made emotional labour an important concept for understanding the workplace, but the concept has limitations. Central amongst these is the need to accommodate the different conditions under which contemporary vocational work is carried out. Within such work, occupational identity is closely tied to notions of ‘self’. Although research has shown that involuntary identity loss is problematic for some parliamentarians, research showing how occupational identity becomes such a ‘master status’ (Shaffir & Kleinknecht, 2005) has not yet been undertaken.

In the following chapter, the related issues of ontological, epistemological and theoretical perspective are the focus. In that chapter, I outline the perspective I take in this thesis in regard to these issues. I argue that social constructionism enables a more critical exploration of the relationship between emotional labour and occupation and
self identity. Indeed, I will demonstrate that it is through social constructionism that the particular constitution of emotion and reason in the parliamentary workplace can be understood as consequential for parliamentarians as workers.
Chapter Three

Theorising Emotion and the ‘Self’

Introduction

In the last chapter, I contextualised the study of parliamentarians’ emotional labour within sociological interests in the study of work and workplace emotion, showing that currently there are questions around the viability of emotional labour for conceptualising workers’ experiences in work situations that are different from Hochschild’s (1983) original study. In addition, I established a need to explore the part emotional labour plays in workplace identity transformations for contemporary vocational workers. In this chapter, I clarify the use of terms in this thesis including emotion, identity, and self, and outline other key sociological concepts drawn upon in the substantive chapters that follow. I explain the ontological, epistemological, and theoretical underpinnings to the social constructionist approach that I take in this thesis and evaluate their contribution to understanding parliamentarians’ emotional labour.

Although identities and the self may appear as preoccupations characteristic of mobile, contemporary societies, contemplations on the self have long motivated human and academic inquiry (Jenkins, 2004, p. 13). In recent decades, a sociological concern in how ‘self’ is understood and the social processes involved in acquiring ‘identities’ (Goffman, 1961; Jenkins, 2004) have been accompanied by a burgeoning interest in the companionate field of emotion. This thesis bridges the fields of self, identities and emotion. In this thesis, I argue that exploring how parliamentarians account for emotional labour benefits from a social constructionist approach because it is an approach that draws attention to the mediated nature of experience and to the complexities involved in researching ‘experience’.

A social constructionist approach to the study of self, identities and emotion necessarily raises philosophical questions about the nature of the social world.

Ontology [as] the study of being … is concerned with ‘what is’, with the nature of existence … it … sits alongside epistemology informing the theoretical
perspective for each theoretical perspective embodies a certain way of understanding what is … as well as a certain way of understanding what it means to know [hence] … ontological issues and epistemological issues tend to emerge together (Crotty, 1998, p. 10).

In this thesis, I argue for an understanding of the social world as a place where we understand ourselves, other social actors, and events in the world, in ways that reflect the time and place in which we are located (Giddens, 1991; Jenkins, 2004). The way we know about the world, including the world of material things, is through language (Burr, 2003, p. 7). This understanding of social life contributes to a conceptualisation of language as constitutive in achieving meaning, including the meaning of reality and experience.

In this chapter, first I establish the approach of the thesis by considering ontology, epistemology, and theoretical perspectives. Secondly, I discuss sociological perspectives on emotion and position the interests of this thesis amongst critical and social constructionist understandings of emotion. I respond to critique of social constructionism. In the third part of this chapter, I explore relevant theoretical literature on the socially negotiated nature of self, evaluating some of the difficulties with the concept of role. The third part of the chapter incorporates theorising on socialisation to occupational identities. Throughout this chapter, I argue that the benefit of a social constructionist perspective of parliamentarians’ accounts of emotional labour is the ability to produce an understanding of the self, identity and emotion as situated.

Social constructionism as epistemology

Social constructionism has been an important avenue for critiquing some of the problematic epistemological and ontological assumptions common in earlier days of social science research (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Jaggar, 1989). Social constructionism offers a way of understanding the world that is different from modernist, positivist approaches to the study of social life; approaches which led to a belief that ‘truth’ was ‘discoverable’ through objective, scientific interrogation (Crotty, 1998, p. 18-19). The critical attitude of early social constructionism presaged many of the concerns of postmodernism, but leads to different positions in regard to the self and the empirical world (Hewitt, 2003, pp. 25-28). A critical approach, whether practiced from a constructionist or a realist position, enables recognition of how certain ways of seeing the world can reflect the ‘vested interests’ of powerful social groups.
One of the assumptions social constructionism has contested is notions of the self as arising from internal attitudes, beliefs, and personality characteristics (Burr, 2003, pp. 131-135), emphasising instead the importance of language in the constitution of the self. Social constructionism not only helps to explain the way that apparently ‘real’ phenomena such as reason, emotion and self are socially constituted, rather than ‘things’ that are part of an external world, but it also helps to make sense of the different ways social researchers have of thinking about the related issues of ontology and epistemology (Crotty, 1998; Lincoln & Guba, 2000). These two terms are explained and used variously in the literature because they are also socially constituted ‘categories’. Although some writers understand epistemology and ontology by separating them out (Lincoln & Guba, 2000), others understand ontology as something which flows out of epistemological and theoretical perspectives (Crotty, 1998).

In this chapter, I identify the epistemological and theoretical perspective taken in this thesis, preferring to discuss ontology as an issue which arises out of their consideration (Crotty, 1998). Although there are incompatibilities between certain epistemologies, theoretical perspectives, methodologies and methods, the choice, for instance, of a given methodology does not automatically mean a direct correspondence to a particular epistemology (Crotty, 1998, pp. 8-9). The explanation I give in this and the following chapter is how I understand the research process generally and, in Chapter Four on researching emotion at work, my own research process specifically. The discussion that follows here will demonstrate my position as epistemologically a social constructionist, and will show that the research work for this thesis has been informed by the theoretical perspectives of symbolic interaction and critical inquiry (Crotty, 1998, p. 5).

Social construction does not have a singular meaning but rather it is an umbrella term that can be used to refer to a variety of different theoretical and methodological approaches including phenomenology, discourse theory, ethnmethodology, ethnography, critical theory, and symbolic interaction (Burr, 2003; Crotty, 1998). As such, social constructionism informs social research across disciplinary divides.

Although there are different strands to social constructionism, the strands are best understood as sharing a ‘family resemblance’ to one another rather than being identical.
Burr has identified four tenets central to social constructionism. These are:

- A critical stance toward taken for granted knowledge
- An understanding of social life as specific to its historical and cultural location
- That knowledge is sustained by social processes
- That knowledge and social action go together (Burr, 2003, p. 3-5).

These four tenets contribute to perspectives that: take an ‘anti-essentialist’ view of the social world and people, meaning there is no ‘discoverable’ essence; that question the ability to ‘know’ reality; that what is known is historically and culturally specific; and that understands language as something that ‘creates’ knowledge and ‘is’ action (Burr, 2003, pp. 5-8). A social constructionist approach involves acting cautiously around assumptions based on how things appear. It involves understanding language not as a means of ‘representing’ the world but of ‘creating’ it (Burr, 2003, p. 56). There is a willingness to imagine what other meanings could possibly have prevailed. Together, social actors construct their understanding of the world around them by negotiating through language. Consequently, constructionism is particularly interested in what people have to say (Burr, 2003, p. 62). Words are not inconsequential but invite different kinds of social action and hence can be thought of as active themselves, making possible different responses to people and events (Burr, 2003, p. 59).

Epistemology refers to how we understand and explain “how we know what we know” (Crotty, 1998, p. 3) while “ontology is the study of being” (Crotty, 1998, p. 10). There are a number of possible epistemological positions ranging from the objectivist stance, ordinarily associated with positivism and post-positivism, the subjectivist stance, associated with structuralism, post-structuralism and postmodernism and constructionism, associated with meaning creation that is socio-historic and culturally located (Crotty, 1998, p. 9). These stances involve different assumptions about how it is possible to know anything. Rather than searching for ‘facts’ to be ascertained through the systematic study of emotion or emotional labour, I am interested in identifying the meanings around emotion and emotional labour in a contemporary workplace and those meanings are inevitably contextual, and historically changeable. The social constructionist position has enabled me to approach the social investigation
of emotion in the workplace in spite of unresolved definitional issues around what emotion ‘is’ (Thoits, 1989) because from this position it is the historically and culturally located meaning-making of workers in the workplace that is important. The understanding of emotion in the workplace is located and negotiated. It is not possible to ‘identify’ emotion or emotional labour in the workplace except through the meaning-making activities of situated actors.

Social constructionism involves a commitment to research that does not hold either to the notion that objective knowledge is attainable or to the notion that meaning is achieved through entirely subjective means (Crotty, 1998, p. 5). It is on the relativist end of an epistemological spectrum, but can take a variety of qualitatively different positions on the ontological spectrum. Constructionism from a relativist epistemological stance therefore informs a number of different theoretical perspectives, including symbolic interactionism, feminism, postmodernism and critical inquiry, even though these perspectives can involve quite contrary approaches to ontology.

From a constructionist position that is at the extreme end of the relativist spectrum, it might be argued that everything in the world is a social construction. However, the position I take in this thesis is that “… the manner of existence of a thing is dependent, in some substantial part, upon the social world [but that] some things are not socially constructed [and] those things which are socially constructed may equally well depend upon other, non-social aspects of the world for their existence” (Crossley, 1998, p. 299). The benefit of social constructionism for this thesis is that it allows for a consideration of emotion as an aspect of the social world that is “activity or context dependent” (Crossley, 1998, p. 298).

The importance of language

For social life to occur there must be communication between social actors. Communication relies upon symbols through which shared meaning is negotiated and for many social constructionists the primary focus of interest is therefore language. Understandings of emotion are dependent on located linguistic activity and context and therefore profit from constructionist accounts.

A constructionist approach to language is a productive instrument in the search for understanding of the nature of reality (Berman, 1989). The ‘linguistic turn’ in the social
sciences alerts us to our inability to directly represent phenomena through language, including ‘experience’ and emotion. Seeing language as something which achieves things involves a turn away from a representational theory of language, and refraining from the suggestion that social attitudes, beliefs or emotions can be conveyed through language (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). This does not mean a denial that these things exist but the importance of the question is sidelined in preference for a focus on language, words and symbols as performative (Potter, 1996). To say that language is performative is not, however, to suggest conscious intention. For instance, “when people use [language] they are not necessarily acting in a Machiavellian fashion, but just simply doing what seems appropriate or what comes naturally in that situation” (Burr, 1995, p. 61).

In this first section of the chapter, I have elaborated the epistemological and ontological underpinnings of this thesis and explained that the social constructionist perspective is useful for the study of parliamentarians’ emotional labour because it produces an emphasis on ‘experience’ and language as socially located and mediated. It emphasises language as a social action. In the next section, I discuss sociological perspectives on emotion and clarify my use of the term. I also respond to critics of the social constructionist approach to the study of emotion.

Understanding emotion as a social construct

The systematic study of emotion as an explicit topic within sociology has recently been invigorated and is continuing to gain strength as an avenue for theoretical and empirical work (Hochschild, 1998; Stets & Turner, 2006). Collective titles such as ‘the sociology of emotions’ (Stets & Turner, 2006) can, however inadvertently, gloss over the significant differences in perspective that sociologists bring to the study of emotion. The various perspectives involve different assumptions about the world and how it might be known, as well as diverse directions for research. In considering the different ways that sociologists have addressed the study of emotion, I argue that the understanding of emotions as ‘socially constructed’ offers an understanding of both reason and emotion as emotional ‘states’ and therefore is the most constructive avenue from which to investigate how parliamentarians account for ‘emotion’ at work.
Some sociologists at the forefront of the resurgence in interest in the sociological study of emotion have been interested in such issues as charting the number of social emotions, in a way that resembles some psychologists’ attempts to identify the number of ‘core’ or ‘universal’ emotions (Kemper, 1987). Establishing a definition that differentiates emotion from feelings, sentiments, and moods (Thoits, 1989) and identifying and classifying the ‘range’ of emotions (Thamm, 1992), have driven other sociological research projects. More recently, Franks has been working to develop an understanding of the implications of neuroscience for the interactionist study of emotion (Franks, 2006). Researchers sympathetic to notions of the unconscious meantime look to the contribution a psychoanalytic sociology might make (Clarke, 2006). Those studies which from an early point were interested in understanding the cultural and located rules that guide social actors in the identification of and reflection on their ‘internal emotional states’ (Hochschild, 1979; Hochschild, 1983) share the theoretical approach taken here. In this thesis, I take a social constructionist approach to my research project because it is the most productive in making sense of parliamentarians’ accounts of workplace experience. This perspective allows for the exploration of meaning that lends sense to ‘experience’ (including emotionality) without positing an ‘unconscious’ or creating a structurally deterministic model of the self.

The consolidation of research that is identified as ‘the sociology of emotions’ began in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Turner & Stets, 2005, p. 1). Much of this work was characterised by a split between those who held to a constructionist perspective and those who did not. Although Smith-Lovin (2005) has argued that this particular controversy has lost its fire, some sociologists continue to question the contribution that the constructionist perspective can make to the study of emotion, at the same time as maintaining other kinds of critical approaches to what constitutes reason and emotion, (Barbalet, 2002, p. 23; Williams, 2001, p. 13). In spite of Smith-Lovin’s contention that constructionism is no longer an issue, ongoing attention to questions influenced by positivism, such as ‘how many emotions there are’ (Turner & Stets, 2005, p. 10), mask the assumptions inherent in the question, as well as diverting attention away from the power of critical approaches to emotion for understanding the social world.
Clarifying emotion

Although distinctions between terms such as feelings, moods, affects, sentiments, and emotions, or ‘knowing’ the difference between an emotion and its display, are matters that have influenced some sociological definitions of emotion (Harre, 1988, p. 4; Hochschild, 1983; Kemper, 1978; Shields, 2002; Thoits, 1989), my interest in the contextual significance of emotion makes the detailed differentiation of emotion into sub categories unnecessary. Rather than concerning myself with what emotion ‘really is’, or whether I am referring to a sentiment, an affect or an emotion, I use the term emotion to refer broadly to an experience of involvement. A person may be negatively or positively involved … profoundly involved or only slightly involved, but however or to what degree they are involved with an event, condition or person it necessarily matters to them, proportionately. That it matters, that a person cares about something, registers in their physical and dispositional being. It is this experience that is emotion, not the subject’s thoughts about their experience or the language of self-explanation arising from the experience, but that immediate contact with the world the self has through involvement (Barbalet, 2002, p. 1).8

This particular clarification of the use of the word emotion is important as it allows us to understand emotion as both cause and effect of social interaction (Barbalet, 2002). It may be that a person’s experience of emotion inclines them to a particular action or it may also be the case that a social interaction leads to the experience of involvement. It is important to conceptualise emotional experience as both cause and effect because social actors are neither solely ‘driven’ in some internal way by emotion nor entirely ‘pushed’ from without by the actions and emotional expression of other actors. The experience of involvement is both structured through and interpreted within a set of social relationships and that interpretation requires an active social agent (Bolton, 2005).

Emotion may involve bodily sensation, but there is a wealth of research attesting to the malleability of emotion and its located variability (Becker et al., 1992 [1961]; Cahill, 1989; Haas, 1977; Hochschild, 1983; Lutz & White, 1986; Van Maanen & Kunda, 1989; Wikan, 1990). Anthropological research has demonstrated the importance of cultural context to the naming and understanding of emotion. Wikan (1990) found that

8 Barbalet’s assertion that emotion is not the ‘thoughts’ or ‘language’ of a social actor’s ‘experience’ foreshadows the attention to epistemological issues addressed in the next chapter.
the Balinese culture was unable to conceptualise the Western reason-emotion dichotomy because in their language

feeling (perasaan) [and] thought (pikiran) … [were] both … aspects of one integral process – keneh – which is best translated as feeling-thought (Wikan, 1990, p. 35).

The Balinese find Western-influenced ways of understanding emotion as something separate from thought or reason difficult to understand. Lutz and White (1986) too, have demonstrated the significance of culture and language to understanding of emotion. This variability cannot possibly be explained through recourse to biology. What is required is a sociological explanation.

Avoiding the reason-emotion dichotomy

One challenge in developing explanations of emotional experience is to avoid creating a dichotomous relationship between reason and emotion that is common in Western culture generally (Williams, 2001, p. 2). This dichotomisation has followed a line linking masculinity with instrumentality, the mind, and rationality, and the public worlds such as business and politics, as opposed to a line linking femininity with emotionality, the body, and the private world of families and relationships (Hepworth, 1998; Jaggar, 1989; Shields, 2002). However, reason and emotion are not different ‘things’; rather, their division is socially constructed.

According to Barbalet’s (2001) conceptual scheme, even research that takes a feminist stance in reclaiming the importance of emotion in the production of knowledge can fall short of the mark in terms of challenging the dichotomisation of reason and emotion. Barbalet has offered a schema for thinking about the reason-emotion dichotomisation by identifying three different theoretical approaches to the study of emotion (Barbalet, 2001, p. 29-61). He categorised social research according to the emotional ‘paradigm’ or model of emotion that informs different theoretical approaches (Barbalet, 2001, pp. 29-54). The three are the conventional, critical and radical approaches.

The conventional paradigm comprised a style of thought based in Cartesian dualism. Emotion is connected to the body, nature and irrational action. In opposition, reason is connected to the mind, culture and rational action. The mutinous effect of emotion on rational action is cause for distrust of emotion and social actors are described as being at the mercy of their feelings and emotions. “This is because these [feelings or emotions]
are not things that persons do, but what their bodies do to them”, (Barbalet, 2001, p. 34). The conventional approach is reflected in a number of everyday utterances about emotion; for instance, the admonition to avoid ‘losing it’ or to ‘keep a cool head’ in an argument, implying the need to control subversive ‘hot’ emotions. The conventional paradigm portrays emotion as akin to ‘instinct’ and relegates emotion to a residual, under developed category of social action (Barbalet, 2001, p. 15-16).

The second paradigm in Barbalet’s schema was the critical approach. Proponents of this approach argue in support of emotion’s significance and against its detrimental effect on reason. Feminist critique that recognises the positive contribution of emotion to rationality falls within Barbalet’s critical approach category (Jaggar, 1989, p. 146). Even though such a position challenged objective reality and scientific discourse, it insufficiently re-conceptualised the relationship between emotion and reason. The radical paradigm took the concern with the social construction of emotion further than the critical paradigm.

Drawing on James (1956) to explain the radical paradigm, Barbalet’s third category paid close attention to the way that reason, or ‘intellect’, was also socially constructed. Through this paradigm, rationality was only ever understood through “the absence of any feeling of irrationality” (James, 1956 [1897], pp. 63-64). The feeling of irrationality occurred when an actor was unable to act on their ‘feeling’ state; hence, justifying the concern with the historic association between the powerful in society and rationality (Jaggar, 1989). A person with the power to take action, including the action to define what is and what is not reasonable, or having the ability to define meaning, would therefore have no reason to contemplate whether their actions incorporated emotional disposition or particular values. On the other hand, someone who resisted a prevailing situation or definition, yet did not have the immediate power to change things, would be likely to experience emotion and to be seen as, and to have their argument understood as, emotional. Thus, Barbalet claimed

it is an enduring feature of political life that those who exercise power experience their enthusiasm as reasonable, but the enthusiasm of those who challenge them as unreasonable and emotional (Barbalet, 2001, p. 15).

In this thesis, I draw upon the radical paradigm to posit the notion of ‘passionate rationality’. Passionate rationality is how actors understand the emotional state James describes as one in which there is an “absence of a feeling of irrationality” (James,
Rather than being understood as an ‘unemotional’, passionate rationality brings together a sense of being both ‘emotional’ and the sense of being ‘rational’.

Although Uffenheimer-Lippens (2003) has employed the term passionate rationality in an article on Aquinas’ theorising of the relationship between reason and the passions, my use of the term is quite different. Uffenheimer-Lippens used passionate rationality in the title of her article without an explicit discussion of what she meant by the term. In light of this omission, Uffenheimer-Lippens use of the terms passion and rationality constitutes them as ‘different’. Indeed, in order to posit a relationship ‘between’ reason and emotion, it would be necessary, in terms of Barbalet’s schema, to take a critical approach (Barbalet, 2001). However, my use of the term develops from a ‘radical’ approach.

The research for this thesis has inquired into accounts of workplace emotion and the emotional labour they require within a setting that has arguably been more often posited as one in which rationality ‘rules’ over emotionality. Although the sociological study of emotion and politics has developed in a way that is peripheral to the interests of this thesis, there is one point about that literature that is worth mentioning here because of the concern I have with who is portrayed as emotional and who is not. In the sociological study of emotion and politics there has been a tendency to focus on the ‘passions’ that drive the more marginal social movements at the neglect of the emotional aspect of conventional political participation or, indeed, the parliamentarians who work within the democratic system. Recent writing still leaves unaddressed political issues to do with the historic tendency in Western culture to ascribe emotion to those in less powerful social positions (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2001). The problematic this creates is that the study of emotion in relation to those involved in more powerful or traditional pursuits of politics is neglected. Taking a radical (Barbalet, 2001) social constructionist approach to the study of emotion, and emotional labour, in parliamentarians’ workplace experiences is therefore one way of bringing some balance to understandings of the emotion in and of politics.

Critique of social constructionist approaches to emotion

There has been vocal sociological resistance to the view that emotion is a social construct. Both Craib (1997) and Barbalet (2001) have critiqued the constructionist
position on emotion. Other authors have contended that social constructionism neglects to theorise the corporeal aspects of emotion experience (Williams, 2001). Constructionist accounts of emotion have been censured for portraying emotion as only an affect or expression of cultural norms. Barbalet contends that within a constructionist account “… emotion remains a consequence of other forces and its capacity for influencing social processes is neglected if not implicitly denied” (Barbalet, 2001, p. 23). Barbalet’s criticism is true of some social constructionist accounts of emotion more than others and the critique is a rather broad stroke. For instance, Bolton’s (2005) framework posits emotion as a motivation for action at the same time as it is also influenced by constructionism through the use of Goffman’s socially negotiated self.

The critiques of Barbalet (2001), Williams (2001), and Craib (1997) centre on some common criticisms of social constructionism that can be cleared by attending to the differentiations between the ontological and theoretical perspectives amongst those who can be understood as belonging to the social constructionist ‘camp’. These criticisms are an example of the implication that is sometimes made wherein all constructionist are thought to be ‘hard’ constructionists, at the extreme subjectivist end of an epistemological spectrum (Crotty, 1998, p.5). The critique that social constructionism cannot account for emotion as a motivating force for social action is not true of all constructionist positions. This thesis will show that a social constructionist perspective can indeed produce an understanding of emotion as a ‘motivator’ of social action.

Craib’s critique was addressed to definitions of social constructionism that appropriated all of sociology to the constructionist paradigm and which he asserted were redefining psychology as sociology (Craib, 1997). Specifically it was Burr’s (1995) work he was responding to. He was in agreement with her description of constructionism as anti-essentialist and anti-realist which is why he suggests it is unhelpful to the study of emotion. He questioned “… why, if the person is indefinable and undiscoverable, we need bother with psychology or social psychology or even sociology; and one might ask how we know we construct our own versions of reality if we do not have any direct sense of what that reality might be” (Craib, 1997, p. 5). My contention is that Craib’s criticism of work “that fail[s] to account for the ‘raw material’ out of which the ‘finished product’ of self construction is made” (Craib, 1997, p. 5) is more aptly applied
to the more extreme forms of relativist constructionism found particularly in postmodernist approaches.

There is in Craib’s (1997) critique some of the slippage between ontological and epistemological uses of the term constructionism that Crossley (2005) has written about. Craib defended the psychoanalytic approach to understanding of emotion as the preferable option against what he called sociology’s ‘colonisation of emotion’, suggesting that sociological approaches to emotion fail “to recognise the limitations of [the] discipline” (Craib, 1997, p.1). To suggest that the understanding of emotion is socially mediated is not, however, to negate the bodily experience of emotion or even the intra-psychic experience of emotion or self-hood, in the same way that taking a social constructionist approach does not automatically imply that everything in the world is a social construction. Some constructionists do take the line that the very existence of a variety of objects belonging to the natural world [is] somehow dependent upon our labelling of them, such that we might be tempted to believe that our world would not be blighted by a variety of illnesses [or emotional experiences] and natural disasters if we had not given life to these phenomena by naming them (Crossley, 2005, p. 299).

This is not the constructionist position I take. People would no doubt continue to have experiences which fit current understanding of emotion regardless of whether such experiences were named such or not – in the same way that mountains, rivers and trees would continue to exist regardless of whether human social life continued (Crossley, 2005, pp. 297-298). How human beings act in relation to mountains, rivers and trees will, however, differ according to the socio-cultural meanings such objects have for them – just as how they interpret and act upon emotion changes according to the meaning social actions and experiences have for them. It is the negotiation of meaning in relation to emotion in the workplace, and sensitivity to differences in the persuasive power of particular understandings that accompany that negotiation, that interests me in this thesis.

Understanding the self as a social construct

So far in this chapter I have positioned myself as epistemologically a social constructionist interested in the consequences of the negotiation of meaning around emotion in the workplace for parliamentarians as workers. What is important from a sociological position is the meaning that language and social interaction brings to that
world (Crossley, 1998), and how the meanings given to the world are negotiated through language as a cultural resource of understandings. Epistemological, ontological and theoretical perspectives all influence research decisions, making each a necessary consideration for the sociologist (Crotty, 1998, p. 3). My theoretical perspective is informed by symbolic interactionism. The epistemological perspective I take in this thesis is in keeping with the central tenets of social constructionism as outlined by Burr (2003). Ontologically, I acknowledge the ‘lived’ experience of emotion (Bendelow & Williams, 1998), at the same time as I employ a constructionist perspective to understanding how it is that parliamentarians as social actors negotiate the meaning of emotion in their workplace. As such, the emphasis in this thesis falls upon the social construction of meaning. This is an interest shared by those who research emotion from a critical realist perspective.

Symbolic interactionism’s position on the self was informed by and developed through the work of Mead (1934), Cooley (1964), and Goffman (1959) all of whom conceptualised the self as inherently a social ‘phenomenon’. In this part of the chapter, I outline key characteristics of symbolic interactionism and its perspective on how the self is understood. I then introduce the concepts of identity and role that have been of interest to symbolic interactionism before concluding this section with a discussion of work on socialisation to occupational identities that has significance for this thesis.

Symbolic interaction

In common with other social constructionist perspectives, symbolic interaction takes a contingent perspective on language, culture and the self. Symbolic interactionism understands meaning as negotiated through social interaction, a process known as ‘the definition of the situation’ (Blumer, 1986, p. 2). The definition of a situation, or the labelling of an action as deviant, is negotiable and contestable rather than related to inherent nature. One of the concepts that developed from the notion that the definition of the situation was a social production was labelling theory. Labelling theory holds that deviance was not within the nature of the act nor even in the transgression of societal norms; rather, deviance was whatever could be so defined and defended (Becker, 1963). Social acceptance of a particular definition of a situation imbued the definition with its power. The significance of labelling theory is that if we apply it to emotion the suggestion is that no emotion, in and of itself, is necessarily good or bad, healthy or unhealthy, unless its definition is culturally and linguistically negotiated to
give it that meaning. The extension of labelling theory’s proposition could be used to explain differences between cultures in the ascription of meaning to what are ostensibly similar ‘emotions’ (Lutz, 1982; Lutz & Abu-Lughod, 1990).

The interactionist interest in the social processes through which meaning is negotiated has lead to an understanding of the observation of human interaction as an important aspect of sociological research. Instead of using quantitative methods to analyse something called ‘attitudes’ or ‘beliefs’, symbolic interactionism was interested in qualitative methods for exploring participants’ meaning-making in everyday social life. A key proponent of the approach asserted that

the term ‘symbolic interaction refers … to the peculiar and distinctive character of interaction as it takes place between human beings. The peculiarity consists in the fact that human beings interpret or ‘define’ each other’s actions instead of merely reacting to each other’s actions. Their ‘response’ is not made directly to the actions of one another but instead is based on the meaning which they attach to such actions. Thus human interaction is mediated by the use of symbols, by interpretation, or by ascertaining the meaning of another’s actions (Blumer, 1986, p. 79).

Blumer thus highlighted the importance of the social negotiation to definitions and interpretations of social actions.

The symbolic interactionist perspective not only shares the central tenets of social constructionism but also some of the tenets of postmodernism. It shares with the postmodernist perspective the position that knowledge is relative, language is situated and that language shapes rather than reflects (Hewitt, 2003, p. 26-27). However, an important difference between the symbolic interactionist and postmodern theoretical perspectives is the vision of the subject or self. Postmodernism constitutes the self as a product of discourse. In contrast to postmodernist perspectives, symbolic interactionism

argues that the self is an acting subject …[as well as] an active and creative constructor of discourse (italics in original) (Hewitt, 2003, p. 27).

This understanding of an active agent that is not only produced through discourse but is also an active agent in the generation of discourse establishes symbolic interactionism as a theoretical perspective that takes the self to be something constituted through social interaction as well as being a self that has agency.
The socially negotiated self

The symbolic interactionist perspective rests on a model of the social actor informed by the work of Mead (1934), Cooley (1964) and Goffman (1959). Each of these theorists contributes to the theoretical approach I take to understanding the social interactions of parliamentarian workers. However, it is Goffman’s notion that a central aspect of all social interaction is the presentation of self that most significantly informs my analysis of parliamentarians’ workplace activities (Goffman, 1959). While Cooley highlights the importance of the self as a product of ‘imaginative thought’ (Cooley, 1964) and Mead establishes the importance of reflexivity to the self, it is Goffman’s work on understanding self as a social performance that provides the over-arching conceptual framework through which parliamentarians’ actions are analysed.

Taking first the work of Cooley, the symbolic interactionist perspective contributes to an understanding of emotion and the self because of the significant connection he was able to draw between the two (Cooley, 1964). Cooley’s concept of the self rejects modernist or objectivist approaches to research on the self.

I do not see how any one can hold that we know persons directly except as imaginative ideas in the mind … I conclude, therefore, that the imaginations which people have of one another are the solid facts of society and that to observe and interpret these must be a chief aim of sociology (Cooley, 1964, p. 119).

Cooley’s conceptualisation of the ‘looking glass self’, or what he calls the ‘self-idea’ involves

the imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of his judgement of that appearance, and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification (Cooley, 1964, p. 184).

The second element of this self-idea is crucial to Cooley’s theory. It is the self’s imagination of its appearance in the mind of the other that evokes self-feeling.

The thing that moves us to pride or shame is not the mere mechanical reflection of ourselves, but an imputed sentiment, the imagined effect of this reflection upon another’s mind (Cooley, 1964, p. 184).

Thus, Cooley drew attention to the need to study self (and through their interconnection, also the feelings of self) through the understandings that were a part of people’s ‘imaginations’ and thoughts.
Like Cooley, Mead’s concept of the self involved conceptualising the self as something that was understood through language and meaning. Where Cooley focused on the way that feeling lent a person a sense of self, Mead developed understanding of the way the self was a social product, created through interactions with others beginning in childhood socialisation (Mead, 1934). Mead argued for an understanding of the self based on his observation that an infant did not appear to be born with a sense of ‘self’ but to learn in time that it was not coterminous with its caregivers. Initially, the infant was only an ‘I’. When a child was able to recognise itself as an object, the child developed a ‘Me’. Put another way, the ‘I’ is an acting person; the ‘Me’ is a reflection of the self from the perspective of another.

Mead emphasised the importance of children’s socialisation experiences at play (Mead, 1934). By learning to be ‘mother’ and ‘father’ or ‘doctor’ and ‘patient’, a child learns about the adoption of roles⁹ (Cooley, 1964; Mead, 1934). Through games, children extend their understanding of taking a role to understanding the indeterminacy of role. That is, they may be one thing one moment but they must be able to imagine who they are from another’s point of view as well as be prepared to take up being another thing in another moment (Mead, 1934, p. 159). Mead used the child playing a game of ball as an example. The child without the ball must first recognise herself as the ‘catcher’ and the other as the ‘thrower’. Once she holds the ball, the roles reverse. Mead used the notions of role play and game play to explain the process through which children learn to be a self that will later be able to reflect back on itself by internalising the view of themselves from the role of the ‘generalised other’, or society. In order for social interaction to be enacted in a coordinated way, each person is required to have the capability of seeing themselves from the position of another and to imagine how that other could potentially interpret a given action and how the other self might then be expected to respond to that action (Mead, 1934).

Both Mead and Cooley had a conception of the self as something that required a reflective process, but Cooley paid explicit attention to the role of feeling in perceptions of the self (Cooley, 1964, pp. 170-176). Cooley argued that feeling was not inherently more important than other aspects of self but that feeling was what actors understood as a ‘decisive sign’ or ‘proof’ of their own existence (Cooley, 1964, p. 170).

⁹ The term role was employed by Cooley (1964) and Mead (1934), but I do not use the term in relation to my own research. The reason for this will be made explicit later in this chapter.
‘I’ does not only refer “to the body of the person speaking. It refers chiefly [though not solely] to opinions, purposes, desires, claims, and the like” (Cooley, 1964, p. 176).

Cooley’s notion of the self therefore takes more explicit notice of the part feeling plays in understandings of the self, while Mead’s notion of the generalised other explains the need for an internalised notion of the other that can only be acquired through socialisation. Both theorists’ works are therefore important to the thesis argument that parliamentarians acquire a sense of self through learning to ‘feel’ the way a parliamentarian ‘ought’ to feel, but that this learning process necessarily involves their interpretation of the generalised other, or ‘society’s’, expectations.

Goffman’s theorising on the self

Goffman’s concept of the dramaturgical self relied on the stage as a metaphor for life where selves as actors engaged in the “enactment of rights and duties attached to … status” (Goffman, 1959, p. 16). An actor’s performance involved the presentation of a particular self that was dependent on the context and relationships that the actor at any one time might find themselves acting within. In analysing parliamentarians’ emotional labour at work, I focus in the data chapters on the means available to the parliamentarian to present a particular self, one that is dependent on the immediate context, through the management of emotion. Goffman described social presentations where a person was conscious of the performative quality of their behaviour as ‘front stage’ behaviour as opposed to the preparations for the performance that occurred in a ‘back stage’ region. Back stage was a place where the performance was assembled “where the suppressed facts [kept discrete from the front stage region] make an appearance” (Goffman, 1959, p. 114). The important point here is that all presentations of self are dependent on the context in which they are made and involve both front and back stage regions.

The performance given in face to face interaction is not only for the benefit of the audience but also for the benefit of the self (Goffman, 1959, p. 17). During social interaction, Goffman argued that actors seek out information on selves in order to know how to define the situations they find themselves in, as well as to understand the other selves who are party to the situation. Definitions of situations are not automatic and need to be achieved through social interaction. Definitions require knowing what roles are being played and by whom. Without a shared definition of the situation, social
interaction is too complex and confusing and would require much in the way of negotiation.

Given the vastness of the potential social exchange in the world, actors tend to respond to one another on the basis of information gleaned in the social interaction about another’s status and their identity memberships (Goffman, 1959). Goffman argued that this tendency to respond to people based on their identification as a particular ‘type’ of person (e.g., gender, age, ethnicity, status, etc.) involved some assumptions.

… Any projected definition of the situation also has a distinctive moral character … Society is organised on the principles that an individual who possesses certain social characteristics has a moral right to expect that others will value and treat him in an appropriate way … [and] an individual who implicitly or explicitly signifies that he has certain social characteristics ought in fact to be what he claims he is (Goffman, 1959, p. 24).

Goffman argued that it was through this sense of entitlement to a particular performance that identity develops a ‘moral’ aspect to its performance.

Using the psychiatric hospital as an exemplar, Goffman’s original study of the total institution focused on institutional culture and its consequences for a person’s experience of the self (Goffman, 1961, p. 11). Goffman argued that a total institution is one where the culture of the place demands a transformation of self from those who enter as ‘inmates’. On entry to the institution, the old self is necessarily displaced as the entrant takes up the practices, beliefs and understandings common to the new social group they find themselves in. This environment restricts the person’s access to situations where prior identities were practiced and the institutional identity comes to define the self in a singular and encompassing manner (Goffman, 1961).

Through the process of admission to the institution, and the mortification, or loss, of the old self, the institutional ‘inmate’ comes to understand themselves and their relations with others in markedly different ways (Lee & Newby, 1983, pp. 334-336). Adaptation to the new expectations for a self, now defined through membership in the institution, precedes possible release from the presentation demands, although for the groups Goffman focused on, release was not to be assumed. The important point in relation to
the present discussion is that Goffman argued group membership has an effect on the ‘type’ of self that is negotiated. Group membership is understood to indicate some shared characteristics amongst group members and leads to social expectations for group members to act similarly in certain respects.

In each case, Mead (1934), Cooley (1964) and Goffman (1959) conceptualise the self as something other than the result of particular, innate personality characteristics. In each case, the self is constituted through social interaction. In Cooley’s case that interaction takes place through the imagination of self and other’s opinions of that self, while in Mead’s case the self is acquired through a socialisation process that teaches people they are an ‘individual’ and that like other ‘individuals’ they are required to carry out a variety of different roles in order to facilitate social interaction. Where Goffman differs from symbolic interactionism’s embrace of the self of Mead and Cooley is in his greater emphasis on the immediate encounter as the key to understanding the self (Allan, 2006, p. 75). For Mead and Cooley, the reflexive process that the interaction initiates in the individual is the important aspect of self constitution whereas Goffman is interested in the conditions of the encounter and the possibility that these conditions create for understandings of self (Allan, 2006, p.75).

The concepts of identity, self and role are related but different ways of talking about social actors. Hewitt has argued that an interactionist approach to role emphasises the negotiable nature of role, and that role can only be understood by attending to its social location (Hewitt, 2003, p. 65). Rather than being a “fixed list of duties”, Hewitt has argued that a symbolic interactionist approach to role allows for an understanding of role as

…a set of more general ideas about how [actors] are related to one another in various situations in which they interact … role can be thought of as a resource” (italics in original) (Hewitt, 2003, p. 65).

Although Hewitt has argued that the concept of role is not inherently deterministic, he has conceded that it has been associated with some functionalist and deterministic approaches to understandings of the self (Hewitt, 2003, p. 64-68). I do not employ the term role to talk about parliamentarians in this thesis because of the objectivist connotations that have at times been associated with the concept. I find the concepts of workplace, albeit with some differences to do with the institutional particularities of parliament as a workplace.
identity and self to be sufficient for understanding parliamentarians’ workplace experiences and occupational identities.

Concerns over the use of the concepts of identity, self and role were at the centre of symbolic interactionism before they became topics of interest for postmodern theorists (Hewitt, 2003, p. 25-28). In this thesis, I use the term self to refer to the understanding an actor has of themselves that is negotiated through social interaction (Goffman, 1959). I use the term identity to refer to the various and different situated aspects that may comprise a person’s sense of self (Hewitt, 2003, p. 98-105). Thus I understand the self as constituted through these various identities which are made relevant by the situation.

Subsequent to Goffman’s theorisation of the dramaturgical self, he continued to argue for the plurality of identity (Goffman, 1961). Rather than having ‘an’ identity, the self is comprised of various identities which are of three different types: social identities; personal identities; and ego identities (Goffman, 1961). Social identity is given to a person by virtue of their group associations, such as ethnicity, gender, and occupation (Allan, 2006, p. 78). Personal identity is what is shared between people in close, long term relationships, where presentations of self have taken place in a variety of different contexts over time. The repetition of similar performances over time and context lead to a social understanding of a person’s observed actions as ‘characteristics’ central to whom a person ‘is’ (Allan, 2006, p. 79). Ego identity “is first of all a subjective, reflexive matter that necessarily must be felt by the individual whose identity is at issue” (Goffman, 1961, p. 106). Allan argued that Goffman’s recognition of the ego identity lent his theory a ‘core’ self (Allan, 2006, p. 78), but at the same time Goffman managed to maintain a non-essentialist notion of the self.

Implications of a socially negotiated self

Goffman’s concept of the dramaturgical self provides an appropriate conceptual framework for this inquiry into parliamentarians’ accounts of emotional experience because his notion of the variability involved in presentations of self draws attention to the performative activity involved in the production of parliamentarians’ occupational identities and to the importance of context to those performances. The parliamentarian is both ‘someone’ before entering parliament and is required to incorporate other aspects of ‘being’ within the workplace. Yet, ‘self’ in contemporary Western societies
also requires a sense of stability, or what Giddens (1991) has termed ontological security.

To be ontologically secure is to possess, on the level of the unconscious and practical consciousness, ‘answers’ to fundamental existential questions which all human life in some way addresses (Giddens, 1991, p. 47).

The sense of stability that is offered through ontological security lends actors a sense of themselves as ‘genuine’ in spite of the variability of their situated performances of different identities. It allows for understanding of “what one is doing and why one is doing it” (Giddens, 1991, p. 35). Hence, in this thesis authenticity is understood as a product of an actor’s understanding of the self that serves the need for ontological security.

Goffman’s work is also illuminating given his attention to the unstated rules and guidelines that govern social interaction (Goffman, 1959; 1961). Goffman noticed social patterns in the small, everyday practices of social life in a similar way that Hochschild later noticed the subtle social pattern of emotional exchange in people’s social lives. Hochschild’s (1983) extension of Goffman’s interest took interactionist theorising into the emotional arena of the workplace and provided the starting point for the present inquiry.

In attending to the unspoken rules that are an implicit part of everyday life, Goffman elaborated the various ways these rules and notions of the self and others directed human interaction. His analysis of the processes through which self is accomplished, including the transformation of self initiated within the ‘moral career’, serve as the basis for understanding parliamentarians’ initiation to the workplace in Chapter Five. His multi-faceted model of self identities prompts the notion in this thesis that for the parliamentarian their occupational identity takes on a ‘master-class’ status over their other ‘identities’. The parliamentarian may therefore maintain a sense of ‘personal’ identity that is understood as something overlapping with, but not identical to, occupational identity.

Goffman understood the self as a social process enacted through contact with social others. In other words, the self is not a creation of an individual but is created in the to and fro communication between social actors. The individual presents a version of the self particular to the context of the situation and social others reply in ways that either
confirm the self presented or calls for further alteration or effort to convince, taking into account the picture of the self that has been returned or reflected back. The rules that exist around the social encounter thus both constrain and enable the presentation of the self. People engage in an interpretive process which means these rules and their results are not necessarily straightforward.

Socialisation to occupational identities

Amongst the sociological interest in occupations and workplaces is a group of work that takes an interest in the socialisation of occupational and professional identities (Becker et al., 1992 [1961]; Hughes, 1971a). One focus in that literature is an understanding of how actors new to their professions were socialised to the expectations that accompanied their new-found, or developing, professional status (Becker et al., 1992 [1961]; Cahill, 1989; Kleinman, 1984). Cahill (1989) has argued that taking up professional positions involves more than the uptake of formal qualifications. Learning to feel differently at work is also connected to the successful achievement of occupational identities (Cahill, 1989). On the other hand, failure to ‘feel’ in accordance with professional, occupational expectations can result in an understanding of the self as not sufficiently well-suited to occupational identity requirements. For instance, Cahill’s mortuary students who were unable to change the way they felt around dead bodies were also unable to understand themselves as having the potential to ‘become’ professional members of the mortuary business, and consequently left the industry (Cahill, 1989).

Cahill found a link between a person’s biographical background and their success or failure in adapting to the new meanings given to items such as dead bodies and stainless steel gurneys. In preparation for the mortuary science student’s entry to workplace culture, it was common practice for lecturers to use cadavers and gurneys as lecterns in order to ‘normalise’ them (Cahill, 1989, p. 105-106). Lecturers attempted to teach students new ways of ‘feeling’ around these features of the funeral business as ‘normal’ ‘everyday’ items in ways that were contrary to the cultural meanings students had previously been socialised to.

Cahill argued for the concept of ‘emotional capital’, based on Bourdieu’s (1993) notion of cultural capital, to make sense of why some workers adjusted to the new professional norms of the funeral business while others could not and left the field. Cahill found that
becoming a funeral director involved attaching new meanings to experiences with dead bodies and their accompanying sights and smells that allowed continuing students to get on with the job (Cahill, 1989, p. 108). He argued that the successful mortuary student’s ability to ‘feel’ differently about these things was attributable to differences in their biographies. Those students who adapted best had prior life experience with death through family and friends who owned or worked in funeral homes. Their prior socialisation experiences thus inclined them to accept their training experiences as ‘normal’. Those students without this emotional capital tended to understand themselves as ill-suited to the professional culture and did not complete their training (Cahill, 1989, p. 108).

Not all work involves prior training and professional or occupational socialisation, but Alvesson and Willmott (2002) argue that expectations around who a worker ‘should be’ can be taught through workplace socialisation and that the result is appropriation of identity to ‘organisational demands’. Alvesson and Willmott argued that “self-images and work orientations that are deemed congruent with managerially defined objectives [mean that] organisational control [calls for the production of] the appropriate individual” (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002, p. 619). Although Alvesson and Willmott’s analysis depends on a postmodern theoretical orientation, their core assumptions regarding the performative aspects of identity work and the necessity of its ongoing production are sufficiently in keeping with the constructionist analysis employed in this thesis to make their results relevant.

Focusing on the “discursive and reflexive processes of identity constitution and regulation within work organisations” (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002, p. 621), they noted that the process of worker induction into the organisation has consequences for the way that identity is shaped. While Alvesson and Wilmott suggest that identity regulation is a means of “organisational control [for the production of] the appropriate individual” (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002, p. 619), in the case of parliamentarians, their production of identity is controlled more obtusely than might be the case for other workers. Also, although Alvesson and Wilmott attempt to move away from an overly deterministic model of structure and agency, the worker is still portrayed as only capable of, at best, a ‘micro-emancipation’ (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002, p. 638). In this thesis, an interactionist model of the social agent has allowed for an emphasis on both the enabling and constraining effects of organisational influence on identity performance
and therefore of the mutual benefits that occupational identities bring for the worker and the institution they belong to.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that the exploration of parliamentarians’ emotional labour benefits from a social constructionist epistemological approach and a theoretical perspective informed by symbolic interactionism because together they establish the importance of social negotiation to understandings of the self and emotion. I have clarified my use of terms and responded to the critique of social constructionist approaches to emotion by making clear the critical approach I take here. I have placed my analytic interests in actor’s understandings of the social world.

This thesis focuses on parliamentarians as workers who are located in a complex workplace where managing contentious issues, complicated relationships and situations are an everyday part of work. Within that workplace, self, identities, rationality ‘and’ emotionality are constituted in particular ways. In this thesis, I conceptualise parliamentarians as social actors involved in the performative and interactive task of creating a sense of self and of their understanding of emotion as one of the means through which an understanding of self is achieved. Self and emotion are both socially constituted and negotiated (Goffman, 1959; Hochschild, 1979). What is sought in this research is a situated explanation of parliamentarians’ accounts of their experiences of emotional labour and occupational identities that acknowledges the social production of meaning within those accounts. The ontological, epistemological and theoretical perspectives elucidated in this chapter support the goals of the research. The process of ‘doing’ the research for this thesis is the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter Four

Researching Emotion at Work

Believing [that people are] suspended in webs of significance [they themselves have] spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretative one in search of meaning (Geertz, 1993 [1973], p. 5).

Introduction

Thus far in this thesis I have situated the research interest in parliamentarians’ experiences of emotional labour within the sociology of work, particularly in the study of workplace emotion. I have contextualised the parliamentary workplace in two ways: as one that is socio-historically located within what some commentators have termed a ‘crisis’ in democracy; and as one that has been through changes to electoral representation that included changes to the emotional dimensions of parliamentarians’ work. In the last chapter, I argued that the research for this thesis has benefitted from a social constructionist approach because this perspective on self, identity, and emotion attends to how social meaning (and social action) are negotiated (and enacted) through the use of language. Social constructionism draws analytical attention to meaning-making, while symbolic interactionism emphasises meaning-making is a socially situated activity.

In this chapter, I discuss both methodology and methods, taking methodology to be a ‘strategy’ for research and methods to be the ‘techniques or procedures’ we use in instrumentally reaching those goals (Crotty, 1998, p. 6-7). I provide a temporal account of the research process, incorporating my discussion of methods and methodologies at the relevant moments in the discussion. I introduce the analytical tool of interpretative repertoires and argue for its utility in a social constructionist ‘search for meaning’. Participants’ ‘webs of significance’ motivate my research interests, but, as Geertz (1993) acknowledges in the quotation above, my analysis also involves its own negotiation and interpretation of meaning.
This exploration of parliamentarians’ workplace experiences and their emotional labour at work involved a qualitative approach to the generation of data. The research process has been a recursive one, with each stage of the research requiring a return to questions I thought already answered, and each iteration bringing a growing understanding of the complexity of the social world and processes involved in doing research. In this chapter, I outline the qualitative methods I employed to generate data, the ethical considerations I gave to the research, the management tools that allowed me to begin analysis, and the conceptual tools that I used for analysis. I explain how a qualitative approach enabled me to reconsider the status of that data after the interviews had been completed.

Research design

My early research inquiries combined an interest in the sociological study of emotion and emotional labour with a curiosity about how New Zealand parliamentarians managed to do emotional labour within the socio-historic context of their work. The broad nature of these interests meant further decision-making was required in order to create a manageable project. An interest in people’s lived experiences, and correspondingly in research that focused on contextualised understanding, initially drew me to incorporate the ethnographic practices of non-participant observation and the creation of field notes. I was inspired by research accounts that employed ethnographic methods (Ellis, 1999; Fine, 2001; Wikan, 1990), at the same time as I was aware that there would be limitations on the level of involvement and length of time I could spend ‘in the field’ that I wanted to research.

Even when time and level of involvement are limited, ethnography can be useful for developing theoretical understanding informed by the everyday understandings and practices of social actors, comprising what has been called “microethnography” (Shanks, 2002, p. 59). This was the style of research I planned to emulate. My observations were intended to contextualise my understanding of parliamentary work and the workplace, primarily as a precursor to in-depth, one-to-one interviews that I intended to record. The research design was emergent to allow for flexibility given the high level of uncertainty that was characteristic of the project in its initial stages.
From the time I decided I was interested in parliamentarians’ workplace experiences, I began to watch Question Time\(^{11}\) on television. I observed politicians speaking at public meetings as they passed through my electorate, as they presented to first year students in a Massey University sociology course in Palmerston North, and later as they took part in televised election debates. I read the newspapers, listened to radio interviews, watched television news and documentaries and read biographies, autobiographies and even novels about politicians (Lee, 1987; Wall, 2003). I went on tours of parliament, sat in the gallery during Question Time and legislative debate, and attended public select committee hearings. My intention throughout this work was to immerse myself as much as possible in the work world of New Zealand parliamentarians. I kept a reflective diary of these non-participant observations throughout.

The impending first reading of the Civil Union Bill came to my attention during one of my observational visits to parliament. It seemed a good bill to follow for three reasons. Firstly, since it had not yet been introduced, I would be able to watch it progress through its legislative journey from start to finish. Secondly, it was to be a conscience vote and conscience votes generally produce intense debate. Finally, being a bill about intimate personal relationships, it had its own allusions to emotion. I used the bill as a selection and focusing device, centring my observations on its three readings in the House and all of the public select committee hearings held in Wellington.\(^{12}\)

I chose an ethnographic approach in the early stages of data collection because although I was interested in what participants would have to say about the emotional dimensions of their work, I also wanted to find out how people ‘acted’ in this work place, not ‘just’ how they ‘said’ they would act. I was interested in more than what people had to ‘say’ about emotion work, I wanted to also be able to watch them as they ‘did’ emotion work in this particular workplace. At this early stage, I neither questioned the latent realist assumptions of emotion, self and experience that were incorporated into these intentions, nor what epistemological challenges might be involved in researching with participants. I thought that by observing the ‘subjects’ of my research as they deliberated a bill it would be possible to ‘see’ ways in which they were emotional but

\(^{11}\) Question Time is an occasion in Westminster-style parliaments such as New Zealand’s that offers an opportunity for governments to be held accountable through the presentation of questions from other Members of Parliament. Ministers are expected to either attend or have someone else attend on their behalf.

\(^{12}\) Public submissions were also heard in Christchurch and Auckland.
‘covered’ over their emotions with language that was constructed to emphasise the ‘rational’ nature of their arguments.

By designing the research as an ethnographically-based interview project, incorporating interviews around a particular bill, I wanted to communicate to participants that my interest in emotion was indeed ‘work-focused’ rather than ‘personal-life’ focused. By focusing on a particular bill I thought it would be easier to engage participants in discussion, rather than asking ‘abstract’ questions about emotion and emotional labour in the workplace.

Ethical considerations

Publically elected representatives such as parliamentarians tend to be accustomed to requests for interviews and to having their statements recorded. Indeed, some participants seemed bemused by the attention I paid to ethical requirements within the context of the interviews. Research participants were accorded the same conditions of confidentiality and anonymity as any human participant to Massey University research. In consultation with the supervision team, this research project was reviewed, judged to be low risk and approved by the team, followed by filing of a low risk notification with Massey University Human Ethics Committee.

In spite of parliamentarians’ familiarity and comfort with the interview setting, careful attention to ethical requirements was maintained. I incorporated a paragraph into the information letter and consent forms expressly asking participants to consider carefully confidentiality and anonymity issues. Even if I used pseudonyms and removed distinguishing details, I was concerned that there might remain a faint possibility that others could identify them through some disclosure, or turn of phrase, that I did not recognise as identifiable, but which their colleagues might. I provided all interviewees with a complete transcript of the interviews they were involved in and offered them the opportunity to delete, change or clarify anything that was said. Only one participant took up the offer, adding to areas of the transcript where audibility had been an issue, but not asking for any deletions.

Research participants’ public profiles, and the importance of their reputations to ongoing work relationships and opportunities, also required thinking carefully about how to report the research findings. I have used random letters as a form of pseudonym
to identify different participants and the letter I for interviewer to identify myself. Because my work with the data did not involve gender analysis, I have deleted all gender-identifying information and used the pronouns ‘they’ and ‘their’ to refer to participants and their responses. I took this action to further protect the identification of Members of Parliament. I do not identify their party affiliation, although whether they are in a government or opposition party may sometimes be made apparent by their comments. I am interested in the parliamentarian as a worker in a particular workplace rather than as representatives of their party. The small size of New Zealand’s parliament and the public nature of their careers mean that identification may still be tentatively postulated in some cases by involved parties. I have, however, done everything I can to protect against this.

Approaching participants and doing the interviews

On deciding to use the Civil Union Bill as a case study, the first step I took was to send a letter to the chair of the Justice and Electoral Select Committee charged with hearing submissions to the bill. I asked whether I could be assured entry to the gallery for the three readings of the bill. The gallery is open to the public when parliament is sitting, but there is often a large attendance when a high profile bill is introduced and getting in can be extremely difficult. Members of Parliament do have a small number of allocated seats in the gallery that they are permitted to extend to particular interested parties. With the support of the chair’s administrative personnel, I was able to attend all of the three readings.

Being public meetings that only occasionally attract large audiences, the select committee hearings were easily accessed. I attended all of the hearings held in Wellington. Few people other than public servants, submitters and occasionally members of the media, attended the meetings. Once submissions have been heard, committees debate the bill in private. Using a section of Standing Orders that allows for outside-party attendance at these meetings in some circumstances, I asked if I could also be present during the committee’s private discussions of the bill. I wanted to study how research subjects debated the issue when the press and public were not privy to proceedings. The committee declined my request. As an alternative, administrative staff from the chair’s office assisted by organising a small group interview at the chair’s suggestion.
The first stage in approaching potential individuals for participation in interviews involved getting a list of committee members. I sent out an information sheet (Appendix A) on the project with a covering letter (Appendix B) requesting members’ participation in the small group interview and advising them of the time and date of that meeting. The letter explained that the interview would be recorded, subject to the ethical guidelines outlined by Massey University. Four of the 10 members of the committee attended the meeting, held while the House was sitting under urgency for the bill’s debate. I went into the meeting with a broad set of questions (Appendix E) and potential prompts. At the start of that meeting, I obtained consent by explaining that I took their attendance at the meeting as evidence of their willingness to take part in the research and did not require them to sign a permission form. I reminded them of the ethical guidelines, emphasising that the interview was to be audio-taped but that they retained the right to request the tape be turned off at any point. Participation in the group interview did not imply their willingness to be a part of the second stage of the interview process.

The small group (or what participants called a focus group) interview offered me a chance to listen to participants talk with one another on an issue where there was some diversity of opinion, but in a way that was different than if I had been able to attend the private deliberations. The interview gave me ideas about the questions that might be worthwhile asking in the one-to-one interviews. I told the group I was open to their suggestions in shaping the direction of the meeting as long as it maintained a focus on their workplace experience and included the Civil Union Bill. At times, the discussion wandered well away from my interests and participants were difficult to bring back on track. They sometimes fell to lengthy historical discussions and disagreement on minor details of these past events in a way that was not always helpful.

The small group interview was followed up a few weeks later with an information sheet that invited participation in a one-to-one interview to be under one hour’s duration (Appendix C). The letter went to the 41 parliamentarians listed as having sat in on the submission hearings at some point. Many of those members sat in on proceedings only briefly, sometimes as a replacement for another party colleague who had a time conflict. Again, I detailed the conditions the interviews would be subject to, including that the interviews would be recorded and highlighting the ethical guidelines that allow for
withdrawal from the interview or cessation of taping. Written consent for these interviews was obtained at the time of each interview (Appendix D).

Participants were invited to reply by returning the self-addressed and stamped envelopes or by contacting me by phone or email. I offered to conduct the interviews in a location that suited participants. Once a participant agreed to be interviewed, I contacted their office secretary to negotiate a time in their diary. All but one of the interviews was conducted in their parliamentary offices with one being conducted in an electorate office. The Justice and Electoral Select Committee comprised 10 full time members of which I was able to interview six.

Scheduling interviews with participants was sometimes difficult and there were cancellations when urgent matters arose. I found participants highly approachable and amenable to my research needs. However, by the time I had followed the ethical guidelines, the ethical review of the project and sent out requests for personal interviews, an election had been called. This complicated matters further, as members suddenly needed to spend more time in their electorates. Some were too busy to see me prior to the election, and others of those who said they would be available afterwards did not make re-election. Their re-location outside of Wellington made travel too costly for me to be able to take up their offers. I had to turn down at least three offers to be interviewed due to the travel costs that would have been incurred.

Interview details

In addition to making observations and taking field notes, I interviewed eight parliamentarians in one-to-one, in-depth interviews as well as conducting one small group interview with four parliamentarians. In each case, I took notes following the interviews. The interviews took place between November 2004 and February 2006. Some of the small group participants were also those I interviewed in a one-to-one situation. In the end I interviewed a total of nine different parliamentarians from three different parties.

The interviews were semi-structured with about a dozen prepared questions (Appendix E), although not all questions were asked at every interview. After reminding participants of their ethical rights, ensuring they were willing for the interview to be recorded, and having them sign a consent form, I would begin the tape recorder. My
overriding concern was to stay with the interests of participants, so I gave them a large degree of latitude in setting the direction of the interview. I thought of myself as a ‘naïve’ observer. Rather than moving onto subsequent questions too early, I attempted to follow a line of inquiry that looked for the accumulation of meaning in regard to their comments.

At this stage, I unwittingly was holding an objectivist notion of ‘meaning’ in the research encounter, but a constructionist understanding of what emotion ‘was’. I thought that my careful questioning and willingness to follow participant’s leads would help me ‘find’ the meaning they intended. I realised I was involved in researching that involved my interpretative efforts but what I had not thought through was that the research participant’s own understanding was similarly interpretative, and a work in progress, rather than a stable story. I had not yet acknowledged the mediated nature of understanding and was holding to a representative position on language. Although I understood participants as socio-historically and culturally located, I did not understand that this location was accomplished rather than ‘given’.

All of the transcripts from these interviews were professionally transcribed by a company referred to me through Massey University’s sociology department office. The transcriber signed a confidentiality agreement. Any disadvantage in having someone else transcribe the material was quickly overcome through my data management method. That method, the focus of the next section of the chapter, required extended interaction with the transcripts.

Managing the data

My primary data consisted of 118 pages of transcribed interview material produced as a result of the small group and one-to-one interviews. I had also taken field notes every time I was on site at parliament, reviewed Hansard transcripts, video taped televised sessions of Question Time and collected newspaper articles of general interest as well as articles specifically on the Civil Union Bill. I chose in the end to focus my analysis on the interview transcripts rather than these other potential data sources. My initial desire to collect material from a variety of different sources was premised on the belief that there was a ‘real’ parliamentary work world that my research needed to map and I thought that by accessing as many sources as possible I would be more able to find the ‘real’ story.
The interview data covered a broad range of topics. My flexibility to participants’ initiation of direction during the interview encounter meant that frequently topics were broached by one participant but not by another. This made initial consideration of the transcripts and the search for themes complex. After sitting with the material for some time, and still feeling uncertain how to proceed with analysis, I was introduced to a data management process called framework, “a matrix based method for ordering and synthesising data” (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p. 219). I followed the authors’ instructions and felt the first glimmer of hope that there might be a way of making sense of the vastly different sorts of things participants had spoken about in the interviews.

There were essentially three steps in the data management process. The first step was to begin to get familiar with the data set. This was achieved by repeated readings of the interview transcripts, a single reading of diary and field notes, the creation of a three page list of topics and phrases that I identified in the interview material. This list was tied closely to the original language of participants, employing as little ‘abstraction’ as possible (Ritchie & Lewis 2003). The second step was the creation of a thematic index that began to establish points of connection in the discussions and topics. This step required abstracting from the material with a continued focus on the content of the transcripts rather than employing theoretical categories from literature. The third step involved applying this thematic index to the transcript material, a process called indexing but which resembles what others call coding (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p. 204).

During the exercise of indexing, my criteria for classifying certain comments as one thing or another required frequent scrutiny, further definition, and increasing clarification in order to bring consistency to the process. This was an extremely iterative process in which my growing familiarity with and understanding of the data resulted in approximately five versions of the thematic index before I settled with one which seemed to cover most of the material in the transcripts. This process stayed close to the data material in order to keep the analytic process ‘grounded’ in the data (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p. 222). Once the final thematic index had been established, the transcripts were re-indexed accordingly and the matrix framework was entered into Word document tables.
Incorporated into my early attempts at analysis was a tension in how to understand emotion in the research setting in a way that focused on participant’s own perspectives while I questioned the cultural assumptions surrounding emotion. In particular, I understood the division between reason and emotion as semantically constructed, but continued to think there was something behind the ‘illusion’ and that emotion would be identifiable through observation and language. In the early stages of the project, I considered rationality a social construct used to negotiate a socially powerful position for an actor, but I had not yet realised that the ‘emotion’ I searched for was equally socially constructed.13

While analysis of a sort had begun to take place during the above mentioned process, it was only when I began to write up the data, incorporating my field notes as introductions to the chapters, that I came face to face with the gap left by an insufficiently nuanced understanding of the relationships between epistemology, ontology, theoretical perspective, methodologies and methods (Crotty, 1998). There was confusion in my understanding of the status of both language and emotion. The early methodological formulation of my study was informed by ethnography but this was also characterised by a belief in the sanctity of actor's experiences and a belief that they were able to represent this experience in language through an interview.

I had taken an inductive, qualitative approach to this research rather than a deductive or a quantitative approach because I understood emotion to be deeply entwined with meaning-making. However, I had problematically adopted an understanding of participants’ emotional worlds as something 'in them' – for me, something that was 'out there', to be discovered through my careful questioning and attentive listening. I visualised my participants’ meanings as gem stones that I could bring to light with the ‘pick axe’ of my questions. I had a ‘faith’ that not only did meaning ‘exist’ but that it was ‘knowable’.

13 Sociological discussions of emotion emphasising the need to consider the physiological, or corporeal, aspects of emotion and its experience (Turner & Stets, 2005, p. 4; Williams, 2001) led to a personal misunderstanding around the socially negotiated nature of emotional experience.
Analysis

The methodological decisions a researcher makes influence the methods they are likely to use as well as how they view the analytic process. Some methods are amenable to a variety of different methodologies and analytic processes. For instance, ethnography as a methodology may employ the methods of participant observation, non-participant observation, or in-depth interviewing. Likewise, phenomenological research, action research or a methodology of discourse analysis may all employ the interview method but with different research goals for the data (Crotty, 1998, p. 12). In beginning my research using ethnographic methodology, which I understood as a methodology that prioritised the participant’s perspective, I had assumed I was taking a constructionist position; however, I had retained some positivist assumptions about the ‘knowability’ of emotion made possible through their accounts.

Realism in ontology and constructionism in epistemology turn out to be quite compatible … It would seem [therefore] preferable to retain the usage of ‘theoretical perspective’ and reserve the term ‘ontology’ for those occasions when we do need to talk about ‘being’ (Crotty, 1998, p. 11).

My confusion was based in taking realism, positivism and objectivism to be necessarily coexistent. I considered my approach to be constructionist because I did not support objectivism in the study of social life, and I was employing a methodology informed by ethnography and its interest in the perspectives of research participants. Guba and Lincoln argue that if

a ‘real’ reality is assumed, the posture of the knower must be one of objective attachment … in order to discover ‘how things really are’ and ‘how things really work’ (Lincoln & Guba, 2000, p. 108).

Crotty argues that by linking realism and objectivism in this way, Lincoln and Guba imply one is concomitant with the other (Crotty, 1998, p. 10). This was certainly a misapprehension that I held and that manifested in difficulties when I faced the need to begin analysing the data. In the final part to this chapter, I account for my research experience and the effect of my changing understandings during the process of doing this research. For now, I introduce Table 4.1 to summarise the shift that occurred during the analytic stage of the research process. The key change was a methodological one from ethnography to discourse analysis. As the table shows, that change meant some of my ‘data’ was not used for analysis and other data took on greater significance
during analysis. The most important consequence was the change in the research outcome I was interested in developing.

Table 4.1 Charting the consequences of change in methodological orientation

| Methodology       | Aims                                                                 | Methods                                           | Research outcomes                                    |
|-------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|                                                  |                                                      |
| Ethnography       | To discover parliamentarians emotional experiences and observe their ‘real’ experiences of emotion at work | Field notes Interviews Collecting written media commentaries Taping media interviews with parliamentarians | Themes An understanding of ‘real’ emotional experience A description of the emotional ‘culture’ of parliament |
| Discourse analysis| To explore how parliamentarians ‘accomplish’ emotion in their accounts and the consequences this has for understandings of self within those accounts | Interviews Data management using a matrix-based method Close reading of transcripts | Interpretative repertoires |

The reorientation to the status of my data described in Table 4.1 (above) first involved understanding the interview transcripts as participants’ ‘accounts’ of emotional experience and the topic of analysis, rather than taking emotion or emotional ‘experience’ to be the analytic focus. Considering the transcripts as accounts led to the adoption of discourse analysis as a methodology for understanding those accounts.

Accounts

Stories, discourse, talk, text, and narrative are all terms that may be used to refer to the product of an interview interaction. In this thesis, I use the term accounts (Harvey, Orbuch, & Weber, 1990; Orbuch, 1997) to refer to what was produced by transcription of my audio taped interviews with participants. I refrain from using the term discourse with reference to my own empirical data, although in this chapter I use the term
discourse to talk about other language-based research when that is the term writers themselves have used.

The term account has been used to refer specifically to attempts at apologies or explanations when events have not gone according to plan (Benoit, 1995; Scott & Lyman, 1968) but I do not use this term in this same way. Instead, I employ the term after Harvey, Orbuch and Weber (1990), to refer to language-based data that requires an interpretative search for the meaning and importance of life and events. Accounts are "meanings organised into a story… Accounts do not merely explain events, they also rationalise [and] justify …" (Harvey et al., 1990, vii). The literature on accounts led to an exploration of other work that took an approach to the transcripts from interviews as more than ‘content-based’. In the section that follows I explain how understanding language as active led to the use of discourse analysis as a methodology to inform my analysis of participants’ accounts.

Discourse analysis

The terms discourse and discourse analysis are used in different ways in the literature, sometimes referring to specific methods and in other cases referring more broadly to a methodological orientation (Phillips & Hardy, 2002). In this thesis, discourse analysis replaced ethnography as a methodology informing the strategies employed to understand the data. “Discourse analysis is best understood as a field of research rather than a single practice …” (Taylor, 2001, p. 5), hence not all discourse analysts employ the same methods in their work.

As a field of research, discourse analysis has no disciplinary boundaries and there are different purposes that analysis can be put to. The field of discourse involves an interest in ‘talk and text’ (Phillips & Hardy, 2002), but as has already been pointed out, an interest in talk and text does not mean that all who use discourse analysis hold to the same ontological commitments regarding what it is that their data ‘represents’. As Crotty (1998) has pointed out, epistemological constructionism is not incompatible with a realist ontological position; indeed, contemporary developments have demonstrated the ability to incorporate a critical epistemological perspective while also holding an ontologically realist position in regard to emotion through critical realism (Williams, 1999).
As the “close study of language in use” (Taylor, 2001, p. 5), discourse is not a reflection or a map but an “artefact of communal exchange” (Gergen, 1989, p. 266). Discourse is a compelling concept for understanding social life because it helps to explain the importance of language in relationship to social action. As an example, Potter and Wetherell argue for the consequential aspect of discourse in their investigation of the way that the category of ‘community’ is established through the use of a small number of terms and metaphors which result in different evaluations of conflict between Bristol youths and police (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 133). Without exception, where the term ‘community’ was used with a strongly evaluative force it was positive: ‘community’ was seen as a good thing … not [a] reasonable target for police attack” (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 134-136). The findings of the study showed the invocation of the social category of community to refer to youths involved in conflict with police led to the judgement that police action was inappropriate or unfair. If the youths had been referred to as, for instance, a gang, the implications for what would be appropriate future action could have been different.

Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) use of discourse analysis has demonstrated the power that deploying a word, in this case, ‘community’, can have for subsequent judgements of people’s actions. They show how powerful a discursive analysis can be and demonstrates the active aspect of language by showing that what might otherwise be thought of as ‘mere words’ have significant consequences for people’s actions in the social world. Advice on how to go about conducting such analysis, however, is often vague.

Using the framework method as a guide to managing my data, I became extremely familiar with the content of the transcripts and began to see that language was being used in the active manner that Potter and Wetherell have postulated. Participants’ accounts conveyed, for instance, moral messages about the actions of themselves and other social actors in the workplace. The accounts did coalesce around particular themes but those themes were not ‘topic’ related, but rather the themes were to do with similarities in the ways participants employed language within their accounts and the consequences of their language for ways of understanding work, workers and the workplace. Through the process of analysis, I came to conceptualise these themes as interpretative repertoires (Edley, 2001; Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Potter & Wetherell, 1987).
Interpretative repertoires

Potter and Wetherell describe discourse as “forms of spoken interaction” (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 7), but interpretative repertoires are understood in this thesis as a specific type of discourse. The identification of interpretative repertoires is the endpoint of discourse analysis and a repertoire is a named discourse (Talja, 1999, p. 461). Interpretative repertoires are discursive resources that “instantiate cultural modes of representation” (Wetherell, et al., 2001, p. 23). Interpretative repertoires are the building blocks speakers use for constructing versions of actions, cognitive processes and other phenomena. Any particular repertoire is constituted out of a restricted range of terms used in a specific stylistic and grammatical fashion. Commonly these terms are derived from one or more key metaphors and the presence of a repertoire will often be signalled by certain tropes or figures of speech (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 172).

Like the term discourse, interpretative repertoires involve the conceptualisation of language as performative. Meaning may be conveyed through the referential element of words but also through contextual cues and associations. Interpretative repertoires are linguistic resources which people use in their communication with one another. They might be thought of as particular stories that people use to talk about things that achieve things, including meaning. Gilbert and Mulkay’s research around scientists’ discourse (1984) demonstrated the importance of interpretative repertoires for how the world is understood.

Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) have argued that the scientists they interviewed employed two interpretative repertoires in accounting for the work they do. The repertories were the contingent repertoire and the empiricist repertoire (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984). In employing the empiricist repertoire, scientists produced an understanding of research practice as something objective, quantifiable and carried out according to a particular (‘scientific’) set of procedures. In employing the contingent repertoire, scientists produced an account of research practice as something far more intuitive, less certain or regimented and more creative. Scientists were more likely to employ the contingent narrative in personal encounters such as in talking amongst their colleagues or even in one-to-one interviews with interested parties such as themselves. The empiricist repertoire, however, was deployed in official journals and other publications with the
consequence that the empiricist repertoire was the repertoire more commonly and publicly understood. Gilbert and Mulkay argued that the empiricist repertoire obfuscated the contingent aspects of science practice and added to its understanding as ‘objective’ activity. Their argument was that this selective use of one repertoire over another within the public domain contributed to the predominance of an understanding of science that was partial. Gilbert and Mulkay’s research has demonstrated the analytical power of interpretative repertoires.

My identification of the interpretative repertoires in participants’ accounts was achieved using a method called Framework (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). The repertoires were not developed from the theoretical literature but instead reflect my interpretation of participants’ accounts. The repertoires were developed through the repetitious task of producing a number of thematic indices until identifying characteristics between the otherwise idiosyncratic transcripts were found. The inductive line I followed during the interviews made this part of analysis more difficult than it would have been, perhaps, with a regulated question schedule. Framework kept the repertoires well ‘grounded’ in the data, but I also acknowledge that the repertoires are a sense-making means that I have instilled upon the transcript material. Ultimately, interpretative repertoires were well suited to the analytical tasks of this research because they represent a form of analysis that does not rely on ready-made categories but looks to the productive qualities of people’s accounts.

Positioning

Self, identities, emotions, rationality and meaning of all sorts are negotiated in the social exchange of an interview.

Positioning, defined as the dynamic construction of personal identities relative to those of others, is an essential feature of social interaction (Parrott, 2003, p. 29).

Positioning is therefore one of the ‘activities’ that actors take part in through the production of their accounts. Positioning theory accounts for the way in which emotion and identity claims are negotiated in social encounters, including workplace encounters. The negotiation of position is not ‘conscious’ nor is it a straightforward process. (Parrott, 2003). Rather, positioning is one of the consequences of the production of discourse.
In this thesis, positioning offers a way of understanding the consequences of the interpretative repertoires that participants deploy within their accounts. They do not set out to ‘claim’ a position, but their deployment of the three different repertoires will be shown to have different consequences for the positioning of their occupational identities and the vocational authenticity of their identities.

“One striking feature of this positioning is the central role that is being played by emotions” (Parrott, 2003). ‘Emotionality’ thus becomes a means of negotiating positions within accounts. In making claims about emotionality, participants constitute meaning around their identities. To be angry at the injustice of legislation introduced by another party achieves a number of things and one of these might include a position as a self who is compassionate and the subsequent positioning of one’s enemies as unsympathetic. Positioning is about strategic attempts to achieve particular identities and is a concept particularly appropriate for “considering the manoeuvring of rivals or adversaries” (Parrott, 2003, p. 30). The cultural propensity for emotion to be considered as something over which a person does not have control is what lends it its moral salience in social encounters.

Reflections on the research experience

Until this point in the chapter I have focused on the design of the research, the methods used in doing the research and the methodologies that have informed my analysis. In this last section of the chapter I reflect on choices made during the process of doing the research and the consequences of those choices, as well as considering the liminality of the research experience and the ‘holistically’ productive lesson that accompanied the analytical crisis I encountered.

Observations on the research decisions

Locating my study of emotion in the workplace in parliament was a decision made with the expectation that this was a workplace in which the theme of rationality would hold sway. The parliamentary workplace is in this sense like so many other workplaces traditionally conceptualised as arenas of rationality rather than emotionality (Fineman, 2000). It is not their status as a parliamentarian that makes this study important but it is their location in a workplace culture understood to be hostile to emotion as a basis of social action (Grey, 2000; Waring, 1985; Waring 1994).
There were advantages and disadvantages to having parliamentarians as the subject of my workplace study. The salience of identity in politics is especially high. In presenting papers at conferences on the thesis as it developed, I found people sometimes more interested in discovering who the participants were than in what had transpired within the interview or its analysis. The mention of ‘parliamentarians’ evoked a strong reaction in some people, who were often eager to tell me what they ‘knew’ about parliamentarians. Some, particularly those who had personal experience working with and reporting on them, presented their opinions to me in a forceful manner, seemingly concerned that I know the ‘real’ truth about parliamentarians and emotions.

Two other important choices made for the research include the decision to stay with the analysis of text from a small number of research participants and the decision not to undertake a gendered analysis of the data. I decided that gender would not be a means of analysing the data for two reasons. First of all, I believed that the gendered nature of politics (Childs, 2004; Childs & Krook, 2006; MacKay, 2004), including the New Zealand parliamentary workplace (Waring, 1988; 1994), had already been established. Secondly, I was concerned that asking questions in relation to gender and emotion in the workplace would be likely to produce responses that would merely draw upon the kind of gendered stereotyping that I remain critical of. Although I did not frame any of my interview questions by reference to gender, I did maintain vigilance around listening for explanations that referred to gender. This happened two or three times in the interviews; far too seldom and in too brief a manner to be able to draw any useful conclusions from.

As explained earlier in this chapter, the small number of research participants was in part due to events outside my control\(^{14}\) but was a limitation that was considered manageable given the value of detailed analysis of small data sets when working with qualitative data (Yin, 2003). Indeed, Yin has argued persuasively that there is much to be learned even from the qualitative analysis of even a single case study. Concerns regarding the ability to generalise from qualitative work generally and case studies specifically are misplaced and often misrepresent the way that scientific generalisation is achieved (Yin, 2003, p. 10). The results of qualitative social research need not to be

\(^{14}\) The event referred to was the calling of an election which saw some willing participants ousted from office. Interviewing these people would have incurred air travel costs that I did not have funding for.
generalisable to a population to be of value, but rather it is the theoretical propositions the research is able to generate that have broader utility. In conducting research that relies on small data sets, the “goal will be to expand and generalise theories (analytic generalisation) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalisation)” (Yin, 2003. p.10).

The epistemological and ontological position a researcher takes influences the kinds of claims for the data that are considered appropriate (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p. 21; Wetherell, Taylor, & Yates, 2001a, pp. 12-13). The constructionist position I take in this thesis, as outlined in Chapter Three, involves understanding the purpose of this research to be an investigation of meaning rather than to generate predictions and statistical generalisations. The focus of analysis is not the individuals themselves but the narrative resources at their disposal. Therefore, although a larger group of participants and more ‘talk’ could conceivably have added to the richness of the data, I remain convinced that the analysis of the resources employed by these participants is sound and that the repertoires would most likely be replicated in the accounts of other parliamentarians. This is because the repertoires are examples of the ‘instantiation’ of shared cultural meaning rather than features unique to particular individuals (Wetherell et al., 2001a, p.23).

Liminality

When I was challenged through supervision to account for the status of my data and when that account itself was challenged, I experienced a crisis. I wondered what could be claimed for my data if what participants had told me was not ‘about’ the culture of the workplace, if I was not going to be able to reconstruct their emotional experiences through the telling of my research story. The analytic crisis generated by this experience has proven to be one of the most personally illuminating aspects of the work. In inquiring into participants’ experiences of their work world, of emotions and of themselves, I have had to discover the assumptions I was making about my own experience, emotion and sense of self. None of these things appear to me now as they did at the start.

This aspect of the research experience caught me by surprise. I had thought myself well-versed in the intractability of researcher as person and research topic and even
better versed in emotional experience. My choice to research in an area with which I had little personal familiarity obscured, at least for a time, the involvement of my personal values and beliefs. A re-consideration of the symbolic interactionist literature (Goffman, 1959; Goffman, 1961) and Burr’s (2003) explanation of constructionism brought to my awareness the influence psychotherapeutic notions of the self had made on my assumptions. Deepening my understanding of the implications of a critical understanding of the world, selves and emotions through the adoption of a social constructionist epistemological position (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) had an impact on both my intellectual and personal development.

The words of Ricoeur (cited by Gergen & Gergen, 1997, p. 177) encapsulate my understanding of the lesson I learned about the ‘nature’ of experience.

My experience cannot directly become your experience … Yet, nevertheless, something passes from me to you … this something is not the experience as experienced, but its meaning.

Conclusion

This chapter has accounted for the instrumental process of doing research as well as the transformative process I experienced in doing that research, and the consequences of the decision-making undertaken as part of the research project. I have moved from certainty that I could ‘identify’ emotion through observation and attention to language, to the crisis created when doubting the ontological integrity of my data, to finally understanding research, data, and the social world as socially constituted and meaning as linguistically mediated. The qualitative and emergent nature of the research design proved well-suited to researching a topic and setting that required room for growing understanding and the negotiation of meaning.

The first four chapters of the thesis have established the socio-historic, theoretical and methodological foundation for the study of parliamentarians’ accounts of emotional labour. The next four chapters present the results and a discussion of the research project. Analysis of the data begins in the next chapter by considering parliamentarians’ accounts of their entry to the parliamentary workplace and their adaptation and subsequent release from demands that include institutional expectations and moral obligation for particular ‘kinds’ of occupational performances. In Chapter Five the three interpretative repertoires of The Game, The Performance and The
Crusade are introduced before the extension of their analysis in Chapters Six and Seven. The three data chapters build on my argument that parliamentarians are required to do emotional labour in the workplace and that they perform that labour using passionate rationality in order to be positioned as the ‘right’ kind of worker for the parliamentary workplace. Chapter Eight will argue for the utility of two new concepts, emotional convocation and personified emotion, for theorising parliamentarians’ emotional labour.
Chapter Five

Becoming a Parliamentarian: Identity Transformation and Vocational Authenticity

Introduction

For the first-time parliamentarian, entry to the workplace involves initiation to a new occupational identity as a particular worker within a specific organisational culture. The tasks for the novice parliamentarian include learning how meaning is negotiated within this particular workplace culture and how to fulfil the expectations that accompany their new-found occupational identity within that culture. These necessary changes call for the parliamentarian’s accommodation of their new circumstances. Successful transformation, therefore, requires an understanding of the changed self as ‘genuine’, and an understanding of themselves as a vocationally authentic parliamentarian.

First in this chapter, the focus is on workplace entry and the transformation required in fulfilling the expectations of occupational identity. I analyse parliamentarians’ accounts of entry to the workplace and of the process involved in first ‘becoming’ a Member of Parliament. I draw on Goffman’s (1961) work in understanding the situated experience of ‘self’ to argue that parliamentarians’ accounts produce an understanding of the workplace as an institution with totalising tendencies, involving them in a process of identity transformation that can be understood through the concept of the moral career. Through the process of adaptation, parliamentarians, like members of other institutions, learn what it takes to meet the institutional requirements for their identities. One means of meeting the demands of transformation is to work towards being the ‘perfect inmate’ (Lee & Newby, 1983, p. 335) or the ‘ideal’ member of one’s identity category. However, what is required to be the ‘ideal’ worker is situated and varies according to the specific workplace contexts within which the parliamentarian finds themselves.
Secondly in the chapter, I describe the three interpretative repertoires through which the parliamentary workplace is understood and the circumstances that make necessary the deployment of the different repertoires. I highlight the typical characteristics of each repertoire before arguing that these repertoires are meaning-making resources that lend coherence to parliamentarians’ accounts of themselves as workers within the particularities of their work and workplace. Indeed, the accomplishment of occupational identity involves familiarity with these repertoires such that they become a part of the ‘commonsense’ framework parliamentarians draw upon for understanding themselves, their work, and, importantly, parliament as ‘their’ workplace. One outcome of the deployment of these repertoires is that emotion comes to be understood in ways that necessitate the parliamentarian take part in emotional labour so as to position themselves as someone who meets occupational identity expectations.

Finally in this chapter, I consider the relationship between the repertoires and emotional culture. Parliamentarians do not only learn how to carry out the instrumental tasks that accompany their new identities but they also learn, through the repertoires, how to ‘feel’ in ways that are in keeping with and organisational culture that calls for the performance of emotion that depends on the particular location and circumstances of interaction. Identity transformation according to organisational expectations requires careful management as Western culture generally continues to be influenced by notions of a ‘self’ as an ‘internal’ phenomenon that has stability across encounters (Burr, 2003, p. 194). This notion, combined with a general mistrust of parliamentarians as a category of persons (Knauf, 2005; Perry & Webster, 1999), draws attention and adds importance to the parliamentarian’s ability to be positioned as vocationally authentic. Workplace experiences of emotion, and the association of emotion with an inner ‘self’, work together to affirm the ‘genuine’ nature of the parliamentarian’s occupational identity, and hence to position them as the vocationally authentic worker.

From ‘me’ to MP: the moral career

Even veterans of parliament speak of initial entry to the parliamentary workplace as a key moment in their career biographies. Previous identities are left behind, altered considerably or made relevant in new ways, when one ‘becomes’ a parliamentarian and enters into the organisational culture. As workers, parliamentarians learn to perform their identities according to organisational conventions. One of these conventions is to
be authentic in the performance of occupational identity. Parliamentarians account for the transformative experience of becoming the parliamentarian as one in which their work identity comes to take priority over other aspects of the ‘self’.

Parliamentarians come to the workplace from a variety of situations and previous experiences, yet all account for the start of their parliamentary careers as a significant moment, and one in which there is a sense of entering the unknown. The uncertain nature of the election process, the anticipation that accompanies first time election to parliament, and the inability to adequately prepare oneself for all of the changes that take place, contribute to the dramatic quality of parliamentarians’ accounts of their entry to parliament. This ‘life changing’ event necessitates thinking of themselves in new and different ways.

Well, I wasn’t expecting to win was I? And I wasn’t high enough on the list to have been an automatic ride into parliament at all. But I won the seat. Well, hell, the world changed that night for me. My life was suddenly thrown into absolute chaos. By Monday we were at parliament. [I had] a sharp realisation that there was no way I could [continue with my other commitments] and be in parliament (Parliamentarian B).

For me, mine was quite an achievement – it was just a runaway win for me. It was pretty euphoric … all quite exciting and new… (Parliamentarian F).

Participants’ accounts of becoming a parliamentarian can be understood through Goffman’s conceptualisation of the changes to self that take place within the context of institutions (Goffman, 1961). As described in Chapter Three, Goffman’s study of the total institution focused on institutional culture and the consequences of location for the sense of self (Goffman, 1961, p. 11). In his exemplar of the psychiatric hospital, the person who enters the institution is compelled to become one of many others ‘like’ themselves (Goffman, 1961, p. 6). They become understood, first by others and then by themselves, through their membership to this particular category of persons. Likewise, parliament places institutional demands on those who enter to ‘be’ a particular ‘kind’ of person. Parliamentarians are thereafter compelled to understand themselves through their membership of a category known to those both in and outside the institution as ‘the parliamentarian’. There are general characteristics that those within the parliamentarian category are expected to possess and, like the inmate to the psychiatric hospital, those characteristics are expected to be found in all members of this category.
The parliamentary institution has similarities with the ‘total institution’ identified by Goffman as one “established the better to pursue some work-like task and justifying themselves on these instrumental grounds” (Goffman, 1961, p. 15). Like other large-scale institutions, parliament has a sizeable and varied population and parliamentarians are but one of a number of groups found in this setting. Parliament also has a hierarchical organisation, although in this case, parliamentarians as a group have higher status than do the members of other groups that are a part of the workplace. In addition, there is a hierarchy within the parliamentarian population. As an institution, the purpose of parliament sets it apart from other large-scale organisations.

Although parliament is not a total institution, it is a workplace that has commonalities with such institutions. For those who find themselves working there as parliamentarians, parliament is a workplace that captures their ‘time and interests’ to a degree that is described as ‘encompassing’. Goffman argues that

> every institution captures something of the time and interests of its members and provides something of a world for them ... every institution has encompassing tendencies ... Their encompassing or total character is symbolized by the barrier to social intercourse with the outside and to departure (Goffman, 1961, p. 15).

Total institutions such as prisons, the army or boarding schools place physical restrictions on the movement of institutional ‘inmates’ (Goffman, 1961, p. 5). Parliament, on the other hand, neither physically nor definitively controls all of the parliamentarians’ activities. Nevertheless, the time demands that such participation entails, do place less complete constraints upon parliamentarians’ movements and participation in outside activities.

Parliament is understood best as an institution with totalising tendencies. In the total institution, the activities of eating, working, sleeping, leisure pastimes and other daily performances all occur within the institution and in the company of a stable group of similar others (Goffman, 1961, p. 6). The actor is denied access to other potential identities through physical containment. In the total institution, staff controls daily activities. Thus, parliament is different from total institutions.

Parliamentarians are not expected to spend their sleeping hours at work and there is no physical barrier to departure. The totalising tendencies of parliament result from the level of commitment to the job that is expected and the way the parliamentarian’s
occupational identity remains relevant in different places and situations. Whereas the member of a total institution finds identity restricted by an inability to physically depart the scene, the parliamentarian finds their public profile means identity is restricted because they cannot avoid being understood through their occupational identity even outside of the work setting. The expectation of the parliamentarian’s attendance at a variety of events outside normal working hours, the provision of leisure resources within the institution, such as the parliamentary swimming pool and gymnasium, and the on-site restaurant, all contribute to the totalising tendencies of the institution. Within the institution with totalising tendencies, therefore, the demands and expectations that accompany the work act as a constraining force.

The newcomer to an institution holds a prior notion of whom and what they ‘are’ developed in the ongoing social relationships they have previously been a part of (Goffman, 1997, p. 55). The changes created through an actor’s location in the new institution bring change to the social relationships that lend them a sense of self. Given the importance of context, institutional membership calls for the development of new understandings of self in ways that incorporate the actor’s change in social categorisation and status. Once a change in identity occurs, aspects of the prior self become understood retrospectively through their relationship to the actor’s current status. There is a temporal change whereby institutional membership creates the means for a recasting of the past in relation to the present. One parliamentarian, reflecting on their past, noted:

I’ve always been very interested in politics, from the time I was a very small child. I had had a keen interest, not just in history but in politics as well … I’ve always had a very keen interest in politics. I can’t exactly say why but from the time I could read I was reading the international pages in the paper and the political pages. I’ve always been fascinated by politics (Parliamentarian G).

Like those inmates whose past becomes understood through their status as a member of the psychiatric institution the parliamentarian’s past does not carry any certainty of future consequence, but comes to be understood in this way retrospectively. Indeed, it is only once entry to the institution has taken place that such an understanding can be constructed (Goffman, 1997, p. 128).

Goffman (1961) argues that the transformation of identity that occurs within institutions can be understood as a ‘moral career’. Moral in this sense refers to the ways in which a new ‘self’ is produced within the particularities of the institutional context. The
production of this self is not random but is constrained by the expectations that accompany the actor’s institutional membership categorisation. Goffman argues that social actors are understood to carry a moral obligation to live up to their categorisations (Goffman, 1997, p. 21). Goffman’s use of the term career alerts us to the ways in which the transition of self occurs over time, with each stage contributing to the consolidating of the transformed self. The moral career involves the four transformative stages of admission, mortification, adaptation and release (Lee & Newby, 1983, pp. 334-336).

**Admission and mortification**

During the admission phase, an institutional member goes through an identity transformation that involves ‘disidentification’ with their past lives and relationships (Lee & Newby, 1983, p. 334). Admission to the institution first involves a physical removal from the social networks in which notions of self were produced, followed by procedures that signify and ritualise the change in identity (Goffman, 1961, p. 35). Goffman argues that upon entry to the institution, the entrant “begins to learn about the limited extent to which a conception of oneself can be sustained when the usual setting of supports for it are suddenly removed” (Goffman, 1961, p. 148).

For the parliamentarian, the first stage of formal admission to parliament is departure from their homes and communities. On their arrival at parliament, they participate in historic rituals, including a swearing-in ceremony and a maiden speech. Media attention accompanies these events, heralding the person’s change in status. Parliamentarians’ accounts of entering the workplace recognise these moments as ones that signify something ‘new’ and a ‘world’ change. The experience of being successful in an election and the sense of moving ‘into’ the parliamentary world are part of the process of admission to the institution. One parliamentarian commented on successful first-time election as a time when

… everything is on a sort of a buzz and everything’s sort of swinging along …
… You’ve got no idea what you are walking into … (Parliamentarian F).

Entry to parliament is voluntary, yet undertaken without having a full understanding of what entry to the institution entails. Participants suggest the effect of physical distance
from personal relationships is hard to understand prior to taking up office. Sometimes veteran parliamentarians pass on advice to newcomers about this aspect of the work:

When I was first elected – [an outgoing electorate parliamentarian] said to me you have the right to use the telephone with national toll calls – use it, use it every day, ring your partner every day. Don’t ever let a day go by where you don’t talk to your partner on the phone because you will find that the distance is magnified if you don’t talk. It was the best advice that I received … that’s something that nobody is ever quite prepared for is the distance from family (Parliamentarian A).

As a tempering tactic, the advice of the outgoing parliamentarian offers a means of moderating the effect of the loss of connection to personal support networks, and the conceptions of self they allowed for.

During the admission stage, there are also changes in the availability of personal information about the institutional entrant. Their “past history” (Lee & Newby, 1983, p. 334) becomes of public interest and aspects of this past take on new relevance in light of their current status. In the psychiatric institution, the entrant finds staff suddenly has access to information that was previously ‘private’, and that as an institutional entrant they have no control over this access. As the implications of their new institutional identity sink in, parliamentarians too become aware that they have little control over what personal information enters into the public arena.

I think it’s the sense that you have no private life, that any aspect of your private life can be used as a weapon against you. … So opinions are formed about individual politicians regardless of their political persuasion through media impressions and issues … There is initially an intense sense of frustration about that and the unfairness of it (Parliamentarian H).

In the parliamentarian’s case, it is not only staff who may gain access to their personal information, but media interest means there is a wider audience for information on parliamentarians. It is in this sense then that there is a “violation of [the parliamentarian’s] personal space” (Lee & Newby, 1983, p. 334).

Through admission to parliament, the parliamentarian recognises themselves as belonging to a particular category of worker. They become an insider to the parliamentary institution as they learn to identify themselves in ways that are in keeping with understandings of what ‘kind’ of person they should be. Admission requires parliamentarians to begin managing their performances of self accordingly, including demonstrating their understanding of how the parliamentarian should ‘feel’ in particular
situations. The subsequent stages of the moral career, mortification, adaptation and release, are dependent first on the parliamentarian going through this admission process. Admission marks a change in category from the ‘pre-parliamentarian’ self to a new self. This shift is consolidated through the next stage of the moral career, mortification.

Where the admission stage involves entry to the institution and a series of actions marking the beginning of ‘disidentification’, the mortification stage involves an intensification of the removal of the vestiges of ‘the old self’. During this stage, the implications of institutional membership on the experience of self become manifest. As prior notions of self are stripped away, the losses that accompany the new institutional identity are ‘felt’. The self becomes “systematically, if often unintentionally, mortified” (Goffman, 1997, p. 55) with the loss of relationships. There is a “… radical shift in [the] moral career, a career composed of the progressive changes that occur in the beliefs that [the person] has concerning [themselves] and significant others” (Goffman, 1997, p. 55).

Membership to parliament brings extensive demands for the parliamentarian’s physical presence at events. In addition to changes in their physical availability for other personal or social events, their new-found status also affects the meaning-making that takes place during interaction with others. One parliamentarian was told by an outgoing colleague to take a good look at the friends they had prior to entry to parliament because they were the relationships that could be assumed to be ‘genuine’. At the end of their tenure, these relationships would be the only ones left and those established during their parliamentary career would not survive their exit from parliament. Another parliamentarian said that even those prior relationships can come under threat.

We were told when we came in that most relationships that we come in with are gone by the time we leave again (Parliamentarian H).

For parliamentarians, the mortification of the self occurs through the loss of old relationships and the need to approach present and future relationships in a new and different way.

The experience of mortification of self presents a challenge to the new parliamentarian. Parliamentarian F earlier described admission to parliament as a ‘buzz’; however the ‘euphoria’ does not last long. The excitement of victory and the status that victory
accords, is soon replaced by a need for the parliamentarian to learn to manage the ‘feelings’ that accompany the work.

… When you come into parliament everybody goes through the same generalised process and that’s one, the honeymoon period and two, you end up going into a trough … The trough is when, things are tough and I would say that they’re emotionally tough too, but you, and I’m pretty sure that everybody goes through it, and you have just got to handle it. … You’ve got no idea of what you are walking into and then as you start to get thrown into it, because you’ve got to sink or swim, someone throws you into the water and you sink or swim, it’s literally like someone throwing you into the water (Parliamentarian F).

The requirements for change are met through the loss, mortification, or the ‘sinking’ of self. The work places expectations on the parliamentarian that cannot be met through old understandings and practices of self. Different skills and new understandings are required.

Although the totalising tendencies of the institution do not restrict parliamentarians in the same way that total institutions restrict inmates, barriers are created which limit the parliamentarian’s access to opportunities for the enactment of other ‘selves’. In particular, the plethora of requests for the parliamentarian’s presence at events, and the demand for polished performances in both public and workplace activities, involve vast amounts of time spent doing work-related tasks, leaving little time for other activities.

The demand is huge on one’s time. For a single person, like me, all-consuming. Yeah, all-consuming because people would begrudge me a moment that I might need to have for myself (Parliamentarian B).

…It’s restricted me as a person because the job is so all-consuming that the things that I like doing … all of those things are – seem – engaging with friends – are much restricted because I just don’t have time. I doubt if I would work less than a hundred hours a week. And it’s a seven days a week job. And I think that while it’s a very stimulating job, it’s probably also having a negative effect on my personal life and my relationships with people (Parliamentarian G).

The relationships and settings that give the parliamentarian a sense of ‘self’ not defined by occupational identity are affected by their membership in the institution and the expectations that accompany those who work as parliamentarians. Another parliamentarian noted the effect of becoming a parliamentarian on personal relationships.

[Friendships are] destroyed, destroyed. Ripped apart, stressed and distant. Friends I had prior to politics, yeah we had things in common, now we almost –
[have] zero, because I can’t unload on them stuff I know about, I don’t mean unload, but I mean discuss things because they aren’t in that sphere. I shouldn’t expect them to be. I have found I have got out of touch with what they might be interested in because of my all-consuming political life (Parliamentarian B).

Immersion in the work of parliament becomes a barrier to social interaction with past friends or people outside of the workplace, but not only because of the demand on time. The ‘stuff’ of the job is not shared with old friends because ‘they aren’t in that sphere’. This parliamentarian undergoes a change in their “beliefs [concerning] themselves … and significant others” (Goffman, 1997 p. 55) which involves an understanding that there has been a decrease in the ‘things [they have] in common’ with friends from the past.

The loss of the pre-parliamentary self is accounted for as one of the costs that come with being a parliamentarian.

What cost to your personal life are you prepared to pay for a life in politics? … I find the cost quite high … it explodes into this incredibly demanding life. … I have had difficult times … so totally consumed and focussed on that, that I had lost recognition of what I was giving up, which was a piece of me all the time (Parliamentarian B).

The entrant to the institution has a number of avenues available to them through which a transformation of self may be enacted, but the transformation most likely to bring the parliamentarian success in their workplace is the “conversion of the self … to the role of [the] ‘perfect’ [parliamentarian]” (Lee & Newby, 1983, p. 335).

Adaptation and release

By marking out the beginning of a transformation, and by stripping them of an old self, the admission and mortification processes prepare the social actor to adapt to new aspects of identity that fulfil the expectations of the institution. During adaptation, the changes feel forced, but as new ways of acting are learned, they come to seem like ‘second nature’ and there is a sense of release from the efforts of performance. Release for Goffman’s institutional inmates involved the physical release from the confines of the institution (Goffman, 1961, p. 70). For the parliamentarian, release is achieved when the actor understands ‘self’ in a way that is in keeping with institutional identity requirements. The parliamentarian comes to understand their performance in the institutional context as a part of who they now ‘are’.
During the adaptive stage, ‘the old self’ is required to ‘become’ different. The skills required in being different need to be learned.

[For someone who] had come from a completely different kind of perspective and experience of life, [I] was suddenly thrust into this incredibly proper, and I somehow managed to use all of my upbringing, if you like, to help me make what I call the cross-over … I mean to ask questions in the House, to give a speech in the House, is hugely nerve-racking. I hated having to talk on bills and stuff I knew nothing about. How the hell was I going to do that? That kind of adjustment, and losing the fear factor, or the real apprehension factor, took me a while to overcome that. … While I sort of think I have been consistently sinking I suppose … I haven’t sunk as quickly as people might have thought I would. Including myself (Parliamentarian B).

In spite of the difficulty adapting in the early stages of this parliamentarian’s career, the account suggests that in time the identity requirements of being a parliamentarian are more easily met. Parliamentarians account for the transitional moment in their moral careers as an experience that feels overwhelming. Yet, as they ‘become’ different, as their actions support an understanding of self as someone who ‘belongs’ in the parliamentary institution, they accomplish the transition.

Parliamentarians account for the new expectations of themselves as workers as demanding, even when anticipating the challenge and even when achieving adaptation.

I mean we were thrown into that job … and, I loved it, I just thrived on it, but I think it would be better to kind of have a sort of a lead in training session from probably most helpful would be [people] who had been there done that (Parliamentarian A).

Another parliamentarian accounts for change in themselves:

Because of my line of work I’m probably having to ‘cut to the chase’ a bit quicker and become probably a bit more abrupt … you are driven to it in some ways. You have to – I don’t take as much time as what I used to, to listen to people (Parliamentarian F).

This change takes place in order to meet workplace demands for a high volume workload and is understood as a necessary step in adaption to workplace expectation.

Adapting to the encompassing nature of parliamentary work was described by most parliamentarians as a challenging task. They suggested that there was little or no time for leisure activities or social relationships other than occasionally with immediate family. One parliamentarian described adaptation to their new work circumstances as
something that required the containment of work demands by including social events within their work diary.

I do [take time for outside interests]. I schedule it in. But it is all about scheduling. If you don’t schedule it in, it won’t happen. Something else – you’ll be asked to another meeting. Your life is just totally scheduled (Parliamentarian D).

Although this strategy does result in the parliamentarian’s maintenance of social relationships, the achievement occurs by treating leisure and social engagements akin to work by appointing them a slot in the work diary.

Within the parliamentary institution, the ‘ideal’ parliamentarian is one capable of fulfilling extensive work obligations. One participant noted how their ability to adapt to the physical work load came as a surprise, and this ability furthered their confidence that they did indeed have the personal ‘characteristics’ necessary.

[Working in this job has taught me] that I have a very high physical stamina. That I can cope with stress much better than I thought I could. It’s given me more confidence about my ability to do something. I think that we are all products of our genetics and our life experiences and I come from a … background where a sense of self-esteem was always an issue, so without getting into too deep a personal profile, I think this job has shown me that I could do some amazing things that I didn’t think when I was younger I ever could do (Parliamentarian G).

This participant understands their ability to meet institutional requirements as ‘evidence’ of their suitability to the job and accounts for this as an experience that builds their ‘confidence’. Parliamentarian F suggests below that difficulties meeting the expectations of the job because of personal life events hampers the parliamentarian’s understanding as one who is able to ‘be’ a parliamentarian. A lack of confidence in the parliamentarian’s ability to cope with the emotional challenges posed to their personal life can be understood as a threat to transformation. In reply to a question seeking clarification of what could lead to ‘sinking’ or failure to meet the heavy workload, one parliamentarian said:

Oh, if you can’t cope emotionally. If you are too emotionally tied up with family, or if you have got too much in the way of demands on you in other areas. You have to have the freedom to do what you have got to do down here and you have got to have the fortitude to be your own person. If you can’t be your own person, stand on your own two feet, you are not going to go anywhere. If you need to have the support of others to any great degree, you’re in trouble (Parliamentarian F).
Here the ‘perfect’ parliamentarian worker is described as one who is without emotional ‘ties’, and who does not need ‘support’.

Parliamentarians’ accounts involve a constitution of the parliamentarian as someone who does not take part in the uncontrolled expression of emotion and is able to ‘stand on their own two feet’. Adaptation does not only require meeting the physical expectations of maintaining a high work load, but also means the parliamentarian must learn to manage the expression of feeling in ways that are in keeping with the expectations for parliamentarian workers.

When I first arrived here, I wasn’t prepared for the environment because it really did feel like a pressure cooker, that whole debating chamber thing, us and them … and they introduced laws that changed everything I believed in … I cried when [that act] passed. I couldn’t bring myself to break down in the House because I didn’t want them to see me crying and so I rushed to the lift and … burst into tears … [Someone in the lift] said ‘are you all right?’ and I said, ‘of course I’m all right’ and then … went back to my office and closed the door and cried for an hour (Parliamentarian A).

Initially, the process of transformation requires effort on behalf of the parliamentarian as they work to understand what qualities of selfhood are called for in this setting and then as they work to experience themselves as one who possesses those qualities. The ability to bring off an accomplished performance as one who is in possession of the qualities of the ideal parliamentarian develops into a sense of self as one who simply ‘is’ that ‘type’ of person. This understanding is followed by a sense of release from the efforts required to become the transformed self. Adaptation to the institutional expectations and moral obligations of the parliamentarian category is achieved by undertaking the identity work necessary to be this worker. The transition need not be ‘complete’ nor does the parliamentarian need to understand themselves as one who meets all of the ideal characteristics. The important point is that these characteristics or qualities are understood by the actor as expressions of their ‘natural’, ‘immutable’, ‘inner’ self. It is this experience that leads the parliamentarian to the stage of release.

Parliamentarians find release from the effort required to ‘perform’ their transformed parliamentary identity through the incorporation of occupational identity with new understandings of a self. The identity of ‘parliamentarian’ becomes something that does not require effort. The conditions of the workplace require parliamentarians to ‘adjust’
in order to operate in the political environment, and what begins as an ‘adaptation’ to the institutional requirements becomes a ‘part of your persona’. One participant noted:

Most politicians get very – one of the reasons they talk in sound bites is to avoid the possibility of part of it being taken and not the rest so they learn to use sentences that are very hard to break. That’s just in terms of getting to the media. I think it becomes part of your persona that you tend to talk, not necessarily in clichés where you bring almost everything you do, you reduce to elements that you try and make indivisible. So that you can’t then be misconstrued. Either that or you make it so complex and fuzzy that no-one knows what you mean anyway (Parliamentarian C).

Attendance at private functions is understood as a time when the demands of the parliamentarian’s workplace are less immediate. On being asked when it is possible to leave the identity of parliamentarian aside, one participant replied:

Obviously when you are with family and friends but most family environments always turn to a political discussion. I mean, you can’t help that. (Parliamentarian A).

Here, the notion is that parliamentarians are their most ‘genuine’ or ‘authentic’ selves in the company of those with whom they have long standing, personal relationships. Yet, even in ‘intimate’ or ‘personal’ situations, the occupational identity is dominant. At the same time as participants claim such occasions are an opportunity to suspend the performance of their occupational identity, they also describe this as more of an ideal goal than as something that is readily ‘achievable’. Following a recent policy announcement, Parliamentarian A’s attendance at a family celebration, where a number of guests voiced their opposition to the implications of the policy, they said they worked to clarify the intentions of the policy, but even still:

… I had a lot of explaining to do that weekend.

I: Does that get tiring at all?

No, because I love it. And I love the opportunity to, because, the one thing that’s amazing about this country, well, one of the many things that’s amazing about this country, is that ordinary people can meet politicians in ordinary situations and talk politics with them (Parliamentarian A).

This participant makes sense of the expectations of their workplace as ones that require an inordinate amount of time spent effectively working. The transformation of self that has been occurring means that these expectations no longer come as a shock. As the identity work undertaken has allowed the parliamentarian to understand themselves as
someone who possesses the ‘internal’ qualities necessary to being the parliamentarian, less effort is required to meet the expectations. Rather than talking about their work as involving a personal ‘cost’, as one participant did earlier, the parliamentarian above accounts for the demand for occupational identity performance outside the work context as a privilege. This understanding of the dominance of workplace identity acts to position this parliamentarian as the ideal worker of the institution.

Thus far in this chapter I have made sense of the transformation of identity that parliamentarians undergo through their participation in the workplace by understanding that process using Goffman’s concept of the moral career (Goffman, 1961). Included in this process is the parliamentarian’s initiation to local understandings of the ideal parliamentarian worker. The entrant to an institution cannot achieve adaptation without an understanding of the type of self they are required to become. They learn what is required of that self through three interpretative repertoires that are the focus of the next section of this chapter. I introduce the repertoires I have identified within parliamentarians’ accounts of institutional culture and the importance of the repertoires to better understanding the occupational identity requirements of parliamentarians. Finally in this chapter, I will show how accommodating the culture of the parliamentary workplace involves more than learning to do things a certain way but also involves learning to ‘feel’ differently and that it is through access to the repertoires that parliamentarians are able to achieve this ‘change’ in feeling.

Interpretative repertoires as guides to the workplace

I have identified three interpretative repertoires in parliamentarians’ talk about work and the workplace. As explained in Chapter Four, an interpretative repertoire is a linguistic resource that can be thought of as a “named discourse” (Talja, 1999, p. 461) and may revolve around the use of one or a number of tropes and metaphors (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 149). The repertoires “instantiate cultural modes of representation” (Wetherell, 2001a, p. 24), therefore, by studying the repertoires it is possible to add to our understanding of the cultural production of meaning within the parliamentary workplace. In this section, I introduce the three repertoires through which parliamentarians produce meaning in relation to the actions of themselves and others within the context of their particular workplace, parliament. The three repertoires employed in participants’ accounts are The Game, The Performance and The Crusade.
Although each repertoire has distinguishing characteristics, the repertoires occasionally employ terms and tropes that are similar. The importance of the repertoires is that they act as meaning-making devices within parliamentarians’ accounts and produce different consequences for how emotion is understood.

Table 5.1 presents a list of the terms and tropes that characterise the repertoires. A more detailed description and discussion of each of the repertoires follows.

Table 5.1 Repertoires of parliamentary work and their associated terms and tropes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interpretative Repertoire</th>
<th>Associated terms and tropes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Game</td>
<td>The/that game, teams, team mates, team player(s), the other side, on top, fair game, rules, play, playing or playing the game, watching, winning, out of bounds, pressure, duty, row internally not externally, attacking, victory, determined to win, lose, adversarial, the pecking order, a pack, ritual fighting, defending, overshooting the mark, disciplined environment, fairness, being tested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Performance</td>
<td>Drama, audience, conventions, TV cameras, anecdotes, rituals, sermons, entertainment, rhetoric, selling, messages, transparency, performance, skewed views, surreal atmosphere, acting, watching, not always open, risk revealing, heart is on my sleeve, losing it in front of the nation, performing, sustaining performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Crusade</td>
<td>End goals, beliefs, integrity, moral, judgement, sides, attacks, vicious, victory, power, advisors, thrones, courtiers, king/queen, monarch, laws, values, danger, shots, the blow torch, survivors, traps, fighting the other side, taking the hits, shots fired, enormous pressure, moral dilemmas, brutalising experiences, won’t resile from, going for the jugular, loyalties, on bended knee, being overcome</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The competitive imagery of The Game repertoire

The interpretative repertoire of The Game draws on imagery of the competitive interaction of a game or a contest in which either individuals or teams vie for the prize at hand. The Game repertoire involves the direct use of the term ‘game’ to refer to social exchange in the parliamentary workplace. This repertoire results in understandings of social interaction in terms of teams and competition, although the composition of teams can shift. Because the rules that govern social interaction change depending on which game governs a particular situation, parliamentarians must become experts in the interpretation of situated meaning. Indeed, one of the critical lessons the new entrant to the parliamentary institution must learn is how to identify the different repertoires, their relevant rules, and to recognise the situational cues which indicate which repertoire appropriately defines a given situation.

The terms and tropes that are characteristic of this repertoire are associated with games and teams and revolve around notions of winning and losing. Within this repertoire there are rules to be adhered to, although they may be stretched, and the use of legitimate tactics to secure a win is approved of as part of the game. Players may be exposed to the ‘rough handling’ or play of other players but such interaction can result in sanctions of both formal and informal sorts. In the interpretative repertoire of The Game, meaning coalesces around notions of fair or unsporting play. Colleagues become either ‘team mates’ or members of the ‘other team’. The division between one’s team and the other team is not always made simplistically along party lines. Sometimes the party itself is divided into teams while at other times, such as during the select committee process, the team may be comprised of cross-party alliances. The competition may also pit individual parliamentarians against one another.

Through this repertoire, the Speaker of the House is understood as the referee and is the one who determines whether a parliamentarian’s actions are permissible. Occasionally other parliamentarians aid the Speaker in this task, although they can only do so successfully as long-time members or those with a particular affinity for Standing Orders and cross-party respect for that knowledge. This position operates akin to a touch judge in rugby, pointing out a breach of boundary that the Speaker may not have discerned. Just as in other games, repeated or seemingly intentional infractions by players can result in expulsion from the ‘playing field’ or House.
The Game provides a context for understanding relationships in the parliamentary workplace. The following excerpt from the small group interview is a typical example of The Game repertoire.

... But we’ve organised our caucus … to be – we thrashed our arguments in caucus. They are pretty well structured arguments there and we come in here pretty much as a team. We don’t argue among ourselves much around the table here … I mean, ’cos we come from teams, you come from [your party] … [there are] splits in some caucuses … so you come from certain teams in the caucus (Parliamentarian C).

Here, ‘the team’ shapes how the party is understood, yet there is also an understanding that within parties there will be factions or internal ‘teams’. Arguments between team members are permissible, but the understanding is that these disagreements ought not to detract from the united front presented when in the company of other parties or teams. By drawing upon this repertoire, parliamentarians are able to make sense of their need, at certain times, to cooperate with people they may not otherwise agree with or care for. By interpreting such personal action as a necessity of team membership, and therefore a requirement of the job, they avoid an understanding of the self as ‘disingenuous’ and therefore an understanding of themselves as an ‘inauthentic’ parliamentarian.

The Game repertoire explains why some personal attacks in parliament are inconsequential. One parliamentarian commented:

... A lot is also to do with whether it is public or private because quite a lot of the activity is ritual fighting if the media’s around (Parliamentarian C).

The repertoire of The Game operates here to make light of the fighting or personal attack that goes on between parliamentarians by suggesting that it is ‘ritual’ rather than meaningful action. In this case, the word ritual suggests the verbal fighting parliamentarians take part in is a form of stereotypical activity undertaken in light of parliamentarians’ notions of what the media expect from them.

Parliamentarian C described their early experience of social interaction between parliamentarians during Question Time, and in the House of Representatives generally, as an experience that left them with the impression that parliamentarians’ interaction in the House was of a childish nature and of little consequence to the ‘real’ business of
parliament. Ongoing participation in the House, however, led to a change in their understanding of House interchange.

I spent the first six months in Parliament, not going [to Question Time]. I hated it. I thought it was puerile. I thought it was trivial, stupid stuff. But I’ve got a theory that, to me, accounts for it or justifies it now … One of the things that I often get asked about when people come and watch parliament is the chamber, which is the tournament. And then you say, but that is there, that is a tournament, and I now justify that as a necessary tournament (Parliamentarian C).

The Game repertoire achieves two things here. First of all, it accounts for the interchange within the chamber as exchange that rightly involves conflict and aggression; saying ‘that is there’. It is not all of parliamentary work but it is appropriate in this particular workplace situation. After suggesting they initially thought House conduct ‘puerile’, the participant demonstrates adoption of localised definitions of meaning by saying that they ‘now justify’ that conduct as ‘necessary’. In so doing, they demonstrate their familiarity with The Game repertoire through which this behaviour is defined as ‘ordinary’, and by mentioning the change as something that has occurred over time, they allude to the transformation in understanding required.

The staged imagery of The Performance repertoire

The interpretative repertoire of The Performance draws on imagery of the staged performance to account for parliamentarian’s work as activity that requires a meditated and public action. The Performance repertoire employs terms and tropes related to the stage, to entertainment and to illusion. Like The Game repertoire, The Performance repertoire involves the direct use of the term ‘performance’ to refer to social exchange within the parliamentary workplace. This repertoire results in an understanding of politics as a world of drama in which sustaining a performance or an act is essential in order to communicate successfully, particularly, although not exclusively, with the public and the media. One of the tasks of new entrants is to become comfortable playing the part of an actor, spokesperson, and sometimes star of the show, and to identify the situations in which this repertoire appropriately defines social interaction.

The terms and tropes that are characteristic of The Performance repertoire are also associated with putting on acts and include references to parliamentarians’ presentations of self as ‘masks’. The repertoire’s deployment typically calls upon parliamentarians as workers to take part in a constant performance-oriented enterprise in which all actions
are scrutinised for their authenticity. Within The Performance repertoire, meaning coalesces around notions of parliament as a work place in which judgements of genuine or disingenuous display are an integral feature in social interaction and the boundaries between ‘the performed’ and the ‘authentic’ self are under scrutiny.

Deployment of this repertoire resonates with Goffman’s dramaturgical metaphor and the model of ‘front’ and ‘back’ regions (Goffman, 1971 pp. 22, 112). The private offices of parliamentarians are back regions where performance still takes place, but is more difficult to maintain. Participants said that those who would make the ‘best’ informants for a researcher wanting to better understand the emotional aspects of parliamentary work would be administrative staff and parliamentary clerks of the House; in other words, those who are privy to back regions.

The following excerpts show how this repertoire typically shapes understanding of social action in the parliamentary workplace.

I would talk to the secretaries because they see them. They are still performing, even in front of their secretaries, but it is quite hard to sustain a performance over a long run that isn’t going to be seen through. I’d talk to their colleagues and ask them in circumstances probably where it is no longer material, like possibly when they lose office, and talk to them about how they thought their colleagues really behaved then in circumstances where it wouldn’t be trivial to them … They would be able to tell you much more than politicians would ever risk revealing while there is still prospect of office (Parliamentarian C).

Sometimes I think that, you know, the senior private secretaries and executive assistants, they might hold some of the clues so I would probably go and – I mean, but you would have to do it with permission but it would be quite interesting to ask them what they thought (Parliamentarian A).

The Performance repertoire characteristically maintains a difference between the ‘public’ self and the ‘private’ or ‘real’ self. The first excerpt above (spoken by Parliamentarian C) creates an understanding of parliamentarians as actors involved in performances in order to attain or maintain office. Both of those above understand parliamentarians as workers who perform differently in public as opposed to more private or intimate settings. The Performance repertoire makes possible the understanding of social actors in this place as performers who deliver the lines of their script. The content of this script may be understood as talk that ‘genuinely’ reflects their opinion or it may be understood as a carefully crafted attempt to avoid making
apparent their individual position or thoughts on a matter. The repertoire does not ensure the authenticity, or the ‘inauthenticity’, of the actor’s words, but casts attention on the performative quality required by the work.

The battle imagery of The Crusade repertoire

Drawing on the imagery of war and battle, the interpretative repertoire of The Crusade involves the use of terms and tropes that allude to competitive interchange between parliamentarians and different sides, but the division is not merely between different teams that desire the same thing – victory. Rather, the division is between light and dark, or good and evil. This repertoire takes its name from the inclusion of tropes within parliamentarians’ accounts that relate to royal leaders, moral battles, sacrifice and war. Those who fight alongside the parliamentarian are not mere Team Mates but fellow warriors, there through mutual commitment to defend a moral cause.15

[When] … we suddenly see our value system … [threatened] … suddenly all these petty things … Forget it. We’ve got to get through this … and we are suddenly like that again. And so your values do hold you together – they are the fundamental strings that hold you together. At the moment they are getting pulled really tightly and that’s good because you reaffirm … what makes you tick’ and so we are … diverse … and we have … tensions but still the fundamental platform of values is what holds us together (Parliamentarian D).

The terms and tropes characteristic of The Crusade repertoire are associated with the struggle for power, often on behalf of the powerless, and with value-driven battles over ‘right’ and ‘wrong’.

[The other political party] didn’t know what they were going to do to the people who had the least protection … it’s wrong (Parliamentarian A).

Within The Crusade repertoire, meaning coalesces around issues of morality and its defence. What transpires in the parliamentary workplace is of more than instrumental importance. It is work with symbolic meaning.

I felt it was just so wrong for others to impose their values system on people … I just found it so ugly, the things that came out … So I got more driven than I ever imagined … I found it brought up the ugliest side of humanity (Parliamentarian D).

_________________________________________

15 I considered calling this repertoire The Battle, but was more inclined to The Crusade because of the latter term’s ability to incorporate the moralist tone in the accounts.
Within The Crusade repertoire, parliamentarians cannot be certain of a colleagues’ support simply because they are on the same side.

… you get levels of advice on all sorts of levels [but] you never get it from your colleagues in here … because they are all desperately seeking too. They’ve come in to make a difference (Parliamentarian D).

The symbolic and moral characteristics of The Crusade repertoire shape the understanding of self-interested actions of actors in this place as actions that are the result of persons who are in the workplace ‘to make a difference’; in effect, persons who are on a crusade. The pursuit of personally-meaningful causes contributes to the solitary nature of the work experience. The above participant understands the most difficult aspect of working in the parliamentary workplace as:

… loneliness. It would be loneliness. Very long hours, very hard work. … we’re all so busy now. Loneliness is a real feature of this place … You find you have to know the people you can trust (Parliamentarian D).

The issues of loyalty and trust are also central features in deployment of The Crusade repertoire.

If one of your own colleagues joins in attacking you or feeds the enemy or tells stories that damage you. And I know this from talking to others, this is not, we have been a pretty harmonious and cohesive caucus, but it’s the thing that really gets politicians upset. When they feel betrayed or – and they will decide to get vengeance and that can be just so corrosive (Parliamentarian C).

The Crusade repertoire and its imagery of moral battles and vengeful colleagues make possible an understanding of some actors as disloyal or ‘traitors’ to their given side.

The Crusade repertoire involves the use of language with powerful metaphoric elements, particularly in relation to morality. While the other two repertoires sometimes involved the direct use of the words ‘game’ and ‘performance’, parliamentarians did not use the term ‘crusade’ in their accounts. As was made apparent in Table 5.1, there are similarities between this repertoire and The Game repertoire because the language employed during encounters in sport has much in common with the language of war. The repertoires both suggest conflict between people, and others are seen as either “for you or against you”, to quote a participant. I
differentiate between The Game and Crusade repertoires because their deployment shapes meaning in different ways and their use results in disparate consequences.

A key difference between these two repertoires is that The Game repertoire shapes an understanding of competition that is sometimes mere artifice, expressed in a participant’s comment earlier that sometimes the verbal exchange between parliamentarians was just ‘ritual fighting’. The Game suggests that social interaction need not be particularly serious and competition can be of a playful or light-hearted quality. The Crusade repertoire involves competition and conflict of far greater consequence than is the case with The Game repertoire. With The Game, it is possible to lose but that loss can be a minor event. Within The Crusade, much more than a single game victory is at stake and participation is not voluntary. Parliamentary work is driven by a ‘compulsion’ that is not possible to resist.

For right or for wrong I felt compelled through some kind, form, of deep connection … which isn’t apparent on the face of things with … me, but suddenly something strikes you as being very, very important, beyond anything … that I would go blindly with (Parliamentarian B).

Like the previous two repertoires introduced in this section, The Crusade repertoire informs parliamentarians’ interpretative practices in the workplace in particular ways. All of the repertoires are important resources that the parliamentarian must learn to negotiate in order to become a cultural ‘insider’ and to establish themselves as someone who understands the expectations the repertoires bring for the ‘ideal’ parliamentarian worker. This includes learning to ‘feel’ and to manage feeling in the ways that the organisational culture calls for.

The different repertoires are made necessary because the parliamentarian is required to manage emotion in highly diverse ways within the work environment. Unlike some other workers who manage emotion (flight attendants or fast food operators, for instance), the emotion rules for the parliamentarian are changeable. No one set of rules pertains in all circumstances. It is the ability of the repertoires to frame emotion in different ways that makes them useful for parliamentarians’ management of emotion according to what is called for within a particular context. For instance, at times when it is desirable to be positioned as an aggressive competitor (such as within the debating chamber), The Game is more likely to be deployed. When a high profile public issue is
being addressed, The Performance repertoire frames expectations for the type of presentation a parliamentarian ought to make and the way they are expected to position themselves. Yet in other situations it will be desirable to position one’s self and one’s emotions as ‘authentic’ and in such situations The Crusade repertoire will be the most suitable repertoire to draw upon. Next in this chapter, I examine the importance of emotion in the institution’s culture.

Emotion as part of an organisation’s culture

The term organisational culture encompasses a wide range of workplace features (Martin, 2002). A workplace such as parliament has an organisational culture with an abundance of material artefacts and cultural practices that symbolically reproduce the institutional significance of the place. All artefacts act as symbols to convey meaning in a place, but for this thesis it is the cultural practices that are of primary interest. The interpretative repertoires are “symbolic metaphors” (Gordon, 1989, p. 323) through which cultural meaning is conveyed. As “vehicles” (Ashforth & Saks, 2002, p. 353) of meaning, the repertoires make sense of parliamentary culture by offering a “toolbox of solutions” (Macionis & Plummer, 2005, p. 106). Parliamentarians draw on interpretative repertoires in order to make sense of their experiences, but the ‘deployment’ of different tools or repertoires varies depending on the specific workplace context and their use consequently brings about different results.¹⁶

The interpretative repertoires help the parliamentarian to understand what kind of place parliament is, and how, as workers, one ought to feel within it. The repertoires carry implications for the ‘status’ of emotion and it is through the repertoires that parliamentarians learn the feeling rules of their occupational identities. The long-standing convention that workers and workplaces could bracket out ‘private’ emotionality while taking part in the ‘public’, ‘rationally’ driven pursuit of an income or profits has been thoroughly challenged in the academic literature (Macionis & Plummer, 2005; Williams, 1998) and has been dealt with critically by feminist writers confronting the value-imbued, culturally-specific, nature of knowledge (Jaggar & Bordo, 1989). Indeed, parliamentarians’ accounts repeatedly acknowledge the importance of both emotion and rationality to their work.

¹⁶ The conditions which call for the deployment of a particular repertoire are further elucidated in the following chapter when the repertoire’s ability to position the worker in certain ways is discussed.
Given that emotion and rationality are so often understood in Western culture as antithetical (Hochschild, 1979), one of the key challenges in establishing occupational identity and becoming the vocationally authentic parliamentarian is to present a self that is both emotional ‘and’ rational. Accounts demonstrate the centrality and connectedness of reason and emotion but they also demonstrate a tension that results from the commonsense understanding of emotion and reason as different ‘things’. One parliamentarian asserted the importance of emotion to their work.

If you can’t [empathise] then, personally, I don’t think that you can quite get enough energy to see an issue through … once you get that sort of feeling that it is not fair then you all become committed to finding a solution (Parliamentarian A).

Yet at other times the importance of emotion to their work may be marginalised. This marginalisation can be created by the same parliamentarian within the same account. The parliamentarian who made the comment above also replied to a later question in the following way:

I: What part does emotion play in decision making … here?

I would have to say not that much (Parliamentarian A).

At the same time as emotion is understood as central to the parliamentarian’s motivation for action, the comments recounted here constitute emotion as a feature of work with a limited role.

So I think emotion is understandable but the real leaders of the party probably use logic more than emotion (Parliamentarian C).

… There is no room for emotions like that … I work in the world of politics and that is a … hard edged and direct, and the reality … [is there’s] no room for, it seems to me, anything ethereal (Parliamentarian B).

The dichotomisation of reason and emotion within the organisational culture of parliament creates a particularly complex environment for the parliamentarian’s accomplishment of occupational identity and vocational authenticity. In order to ‘be’ the ‘ideal’ parliamentarian, one is expected to experience emotion and to make a public display of that experience but to also be understood as one who is able to ‘manage’ the emotions of one’s self and of others. One way that a parliamentarian demonstrates their ability to manage emotion is by claiming a temporal shift in how they ‘feel’ about
workplace events. Either one ‘toughens up’ or one learns to see the value in the seemingly ‘child-like’ fighting that takes place in the House, but regardless of the particularities of the situation, new understanding leads also to new ways of feeling.

Learning to ‘feel’ differently

Employing the notion of culture to refer to the parliamentary workplace draws attention to the community of meaning that parliamentarians belong to and conduct their daily work affairs within. People “interpret emotional experience within socially constructed frameworks of meaning” (Gordon, 1989, p.115). These frameworks weave into parliamentarians’ individual experiences through meaning-making practices and come to seem like commonsense.

As Van Maanen and Kunda have argued, “[Organisational] culture influences not only what people think, say and do but also what they feel” (1989, p. 46). Indeed, becoming an ‘insider’ – an accomplished, situated actor – within the parliamentary work institution requires the parliamentarian learn to ‘feel’ in accordance with the organisational beliefs and practices that surround emotion in the parliamentary workplace. Through the repertoires described in this chapter, parliamentarians make sense of emotional labour as a normative workplace expectation. Indeed, it is through these repertoires that parliamentarians come to understand the feeling rules that make certain emotional states desirable in relation to occupational identity claims and others undesirable.17

The three interpretative repertoires The Game, The Performance and The Crusade are the means through which parliamentarians come to understand meaning within the workplace, including the meaning of emotions. The Game makes light of competition. The Performance casts the maintenance of regions and their different performance requirements as ‘normal’. The Crusade alludes to the combative and moralistic side of parliamentary interaction. In informing the ‘feeling rules’ (Hochschild, 1983) of parliamentary culture, the repertoires make desirable competitive thirst, the performance of different emotional states and the expression of righteous umbrage. Parliamentarians position themselves as the ‘ideal’ worker by demonstrating that their understandings,

17 I further elaborate the feeling rules that the repertoires create in Chapter Six.
including their understanding of emotion, are in accord with dominant meanings constituted through the repertoires.

Employing the repertoires to understand interaction in the parliamentary workplace changes how actions are understood and subsequently can change how the parliamentarian ‘feels’ about a particular situation. The extract below demonstrates how The Game repertoire enables Parliamentarian B to act in a way that suspends the relevance of their previous, amicable relationship with an opponent. They are able to understand their own ‘cruel’ actions towards the other parliamentarian as something that is simply “what all the colleagues do”. The understanding created is that such behaviour is appropriate in the context, rather than a characteristic of a ‘flawed self’. Understood this way, Parliamentarian B’s actions do not initiate an understanding which requires them to feel disingenuous or shameful.

… My more immediate prior experience with [an opposition party member] … was quite a different relationship … was far more friendly and congenial. Suddenly now [in the House] there is this adversarial situation … I would go into this tantrum about them and talk about them badly, not to them personally, but their career and their meanness when they were a Minister … and attack them. Afterwards I would walk out of the Chamber thinking ‘God, I hated saying that!’ I don’t have that degree of disrespect for them … I might jibe them but I wouldn’t want to be as cruel as I was because that’s what all the colleagues do and that’s what you do in there because they would do the same to us and do. So toughen up! Face up to it (Parliamentarian B).

This parliamentarian’s initial reaction to their actions in the House suggests a dilemma in understanding those actions given their lack of any ‘feeling’ of animosity towards the other parliamentarian. They make sense of the tension created by the dilemma by understanding their actions as a part of the game of being in parliament and as appropriate to the normative expectations for the behaviour of opposing team mates. This interpretative shift enables an understanding that makes unnecessary the undesirable experiences of inauthenticity or shame.

Changes that result from the parliamentarian’s adaptation to cultural meaning-making allow for other emotional experiences to also be understood differently within the context of parliamentary work. By invoking a contextual understanding for the actions of others, in the excerpt below Parliamentarian G’s actions are understood as ones that do not have the same relevance as they might in another situation. Although their initial
reaction is to feel frustrated, understanding the experience in context allows them to change that feeling to ‘acceptance’.

So opinions are formed about individual politicians regardless of their political persuasion through media impressions and issues … There is initially an intense sense of frustration about that and the unfairness of it. ‘Why do you hate me, you don’t even know me’, but you quickly come to realise that you just have to deal with that, you just have to accept that kind of reality of the situation (Parliamentarian G).

The accounts above both show a change from an initial understanding of a particular action to a new understanding. In both cases, the new meaning offered allows the MP to understand and therefore to ‘manage’ their emotional response to a work situation in a way that is in keeping with local understandings of actors as members of different teams. The change in feeling is made possible through the repertoires, and altering their emotional response is achieved as a result of the meaning that adheres within The Game repertoire. The parliamentarian is thus able to maintain a desirable identity consistent with the emotional rules of parliament.

In both of the examples, parliamentarians acknowledge the potential for other meaning-making and consequently other ways of feeling. Nevertheless, ultimately they demonstrate their present ability to frame these actions in new ways. The ‘new’ feeling state allows the first participant to avoid the potential shame of their actions. Shame is not an appropriate feeling state for the ‘ideal’ parliamentarian worker. Nor is vulnerability, which the second participant avoids by changing a state of frustration to one where they ‘accept’ other people’s dislike for them.

The three interpretative repertoires have consequences for how the characteristics of organisational culture are understood and which characteristics are understood as ‘natural’ qualities of the place. The Game repertoire typically informs understandings of parliamentary work as game-like, requiring parliamentarians to learn rules and to recognise their Team Mates. The Performance repertoire informs understandings of parliamentary work as activity requiring attention to presentation, requiring parliamentarians take part in a public production. Finally, in The Crusade repertoire,

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18 These accounts both employ The Game repertoire but in this instance it is not the particular repertoire that I want to highlight but rather the process of change.
the parliamentarian’s work takes on an overarching moral purpose requiring an ability to understand workplace interaction through a framework of right and wrong.

Mastery of the repertoires signifies a ‘release’ in the process of identity transformation that comprises the parliamentarian’s moral career. Release means the parliamentarian has available the meaning-making resources to accomplish the identity of parliamentarian. An example of this was found in Parliamentarian G’s account of a temporal change in their understanding of parliamentarians’ social exchange within the House. At first their understanding of things such as name-calling and sarcasm lead to the judgement of parliamentarians’ behaviour as ‘puerile’. Yet later, once they had access to The Game repertoire, they are able to make sense of this same behaviour instead as a ‘necessary’ part of the game-like exchange that takes place in the parliamentary workplace.

The following is an example of a parliamentarian’s incorporation of The Crusade repertoire as a meaning-making resource. In this case, the participant demonstrates the accomplishment of occupational identity through their ability to ‘feel’ in a different way than they would earlier have thought possible.

I think it would have been hard when I came in here to have said that I had a strong dislike verging on hate, for the [other major party]. It would have been hard to say at the beginning … and I think probably over time … I think I’ve found it easier to do that, without hating individuals … I often quite like some of the individuals, but not the ideology or the institutions … That’s one thing that I’ve learned I guess over time, which is something that I didn’t think I’d be able to get my head around (Parliamentarian H).

The repertoires, therefore, are important to the parliamentarian’s process of ‘becoming’ the person required in this institutional workplace. Experiencing ‘feeling’ in keeping with the moral obligations of their occupational identity allows the parliamentarian to understand themselves as ‘that’ worker. The connection between the repertoires and the management of emotion is discussed further in the next chapter.

The ‘ideal’ worker and vocational authenticity

The accounts presented in the first part of this chapter demonstrate institutional expectations of the ideal parliamentarian as someone adaptable in new situations. The ideal parliamentarian is one who is capable of adapting to new ways of meaning-making and who understands the need to compete, even with friends and colleagues. They have
few relational or emotional ties, and a high ‘physical stamina’ to meet a demanding work schedule. In addition, the ideal parliamentarian is expected to experience an emotional commitment to the job and to demonstrate that the qualities expected to be found in the ideal parliamentarian are aspects of their own ‘authentic’ and ‘personal’ self.

Understanding the characteristics of the ideal parliamentarian as manifestations of the parliamentarian’s ‘inner’ self allows social actors to claim vocational authenticity. Vocational authenticity means that the socially-defined qualities and characteristics of the vocational worker are the same qualities and characteristics that belong to the ‘personal’ self of the worker. Therefore, the public performance of the vocational identity is understood as something that is an extension of ‘who and what’ the worker ‘is’. The parliamentarian’s identity incorporates an expectation that their public performances ought to be more than a performance of occupational identity; it ought to be a demonstration of both the ‘private’ and ‘public’ self, of both occupational and personal identity. Indeed, as pointed out in Chapter Two, Weber suggests a convincing demonstration of vocation requires that one be “recognised as the innerly ‘called’ leader of men (sic)” (Weber, 1991, p. 79). It is through the congruence of personal and occupational ‘characteristics’ that authenticity is claimed. Vocational authenticity is the successful outcome of emotional labouring that acts to position the worker as ‘genuine’.

In order to bring meaning to complex and changing situations in their social worlds, social actors seek out information about the “facts of the situation” (Goffman, 1997, p. 21). Since the information available is often partial, this process of ‘fact-finding’ proceeds from assumptions that are based on judgements about appearances. Actors … tend to treat … others … on the basis of the impression they give now about the past and the future. It is here that communicative acts are translated into moral ones. The impressions that the others give tend to be treated as claims and promises they have implicitly made, and claims and promises tend to have a moral character. In his (sic) mind the individual says: “I am using these impressions of you as a way of checking up on you and your activity, and you ought not to lead me astray” (Goffman, 1997, p. 21).

The expectation of not ‘leading people astray’ is understood as a particular tension in the parliamentarian’s public performances. In one sense, they are held to the same social expectations as others. Yet in another sense, public understanding of parliamentarians takes the opposite approach to Goffman’s suggestion here. Indeed
there is some expectation that the parliamentarian is likely to give a cynical performance (Clifton, 2005; Knauf, 2005; Perry & Webster, 1999). Within such a context, the parliamentarian’s ability to show that their public performances are an extension of their ‘genuine’, ‘personal’ self shores up support for their claims to being suited to their work and indeed, to being vocationally authentic.

Within the audience to the parliamentarian’s public presentations, there will be social actors of various political commitments. There will be those in the audience who bring into the social interaction a notion of the parliamentarian as one who is not vocationally authentic. Often attempts will be made to position a particular parliamentarian as someone who lacks vocational authenticity by showing inconsistencies between their words and their actions. Some new parliamentarians counter the challenge by demonstrating that they are not only a ‘parliamentarian’ but that they are also a ‘person’ who experiences ‘feeling’ in the context of their work.

One of the things as a new MP that I have really noticed is the change in the way people perceive you. I mean all of a sudden they jump on the fact you are a Member of Parliament not on anything else that you have done. And it’s quite hard. You know, you walk into a room and automatically people have this preconception of you … and you can, sometimes, the change that you see when you give a speech or something you try, you give personal anecdotes about yourself and people get to know you a little bit – the change is just phenomenal. One thing that a lot of people talk about around here is how hard they find that. How hard they find going to events cold. Because of the way people feel about the job and because of the general disdain in which we are held which – until they get to know you, know you on a personal level, people judge you. The same way they judge everyone else but, like that’s probably, I can’t remember who it was … they said that’s what they find exhausting. That’s the most exhausting thing is the stress of, how am I going to be perceived? (Parliamentarian E).

This account is illustrative in a number of ways. First of all, the participant accounts for the dominance of occupational identity. Expectations that surround the parliamentarian’s occupational identity incline people to make particular judgements initially. Their response to this is to share ‘personal’ information with people, to show that even within their work they remain a ‘person’ like those in the audience. This information challenges negative notions of the cynical or instrumental parliamentarian and is one way that the parliamentarian establishes a claim to vocational authenticity. The participant above continued on to say that their motivation for sharing personal anecdotes is:
to just be accepted … trying to break down that difference between the personality … so that you can … engage with people because while they just hate you because you are in [a particular political party] and they don’t like [that party] you are never going to have any actual dialogue with people and you’d like to be able to. I think everyone is genuinely, even when that somebody really disagrees with them would like to be able to talk to people about that. At least have that respect that you come from different places but often you are trying to achieve the same ends … A lot of people, that weighs on their, they stress out about it (Parliamentarian E).

In the account above, Parliamentarian E constitutes themselves and other parliamentarians as ‘people’ who worry about the preconceptions others have of the ‘kind’ of person who belongs to the category of parliamentarian.

So far in this chapter, I have analysed parliamentarians’ accounts to illustrate the process of transformation in understandings of the self that results from their entry to the organisational culture of the institutional workplace. I have found that as workers, new entrants must ‘become’ a parliamentarian in order to negotiate workplace expectations. To do this they require new ways of making sense of themselves as workers within the parliamentary institution. Their understanding of the ideal parliamentarian includes one who can trace their interest in parliamentary work to a time prior to their workplace entry, someone who can tolerate the incessant demands work makes on their time, and who can accommodate the emotionally demanding aspects of the work. Positioning self as one who meets these requirements with relative ease, because of the possession of ‘inner’ ‘characteristics’ that make being the ‘ideal’ parliamentarian achievable, is key to being understood as vocationally authentic, making emotional labour a central aspect of the parliamentarian’s work. However, expectations for parliamentarians’ performances of emotion are not stable or unitary but rather they differ according to the various workplace contexts in which the parliamentarian is situated. It is the ability of the repertoires to position understandings of emotion and the self in distinct ways that makes them useful.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have analysed parliamentarians’ accounts of entry to the workplace, finding a means of understanding the accounts through Goffman’s work on the influence of institutional membership on ‘selves’. Parliamentarians enter the institution of parliament with a sense of self made possible via their participation in a number of different settings and identity categories. On being admitted to the institution, they
experience a transformation of identity. Their participation in this process can be made sense of through the concept of the moral career (Goffman, 1961). In order for members of any institution to move through the moral career, they must understand the located ways of establishing meaning and they require a notion of the ‘perfect inmate’ (Lee & Newby, 1983, p. 335) or in the parliamentarian’s case, a notion of the ‘ideal’ parliamentarian. For the parliamentarian, key to being the ideal parliamentarian is vocational authenticity. Vocational authenticity is claimed when the emotions evoked within the context of work are also positioned as aspects of the ‘inner’ or ‘genuine’ self.

Within parliamentarians’ accounts there are three interpretative repertoires that establish the means through which they learn to negotiate meaning in the parliamentary workplace. The Game repertoire draws on the competitive imagery of game-playing to shape meaning in the parliamentary workplace. The Performance repertoire involves the performative imagery of the stage to make sense of the parliamentarian’s workplace and The Crusade draws upon battle imagery to inform the meaning of parliamentary interaction. The new entrant becomes a parliamentarian by learning to negotiate the meaning of their actions, as well as the actions of others, through the three repertoires.

Becoming a cultural ‘insider’ to parliament requires the parliamentarian learn to ‘feel’ differently; to feel in ways that are in keeping with notions of the ‘ideal’ parliamentarian. All three of the interpretative repertoires involve emotional labour as the parliamentarian fulfils their occupational identity expectations. The repertoires enable parliamentarians to variously manage the emotions experienced in the workplace by negotiating meaning and thus making emotional responses either a by-product of the game, a performative resource or as evidence of their ‘personal’ commitment to the work. Although all three repertoires are necessary for the performance of occupational identity, it is The Crusade’s meaning-making that is crucial to establishing the vocational authenticity of an actor’s positioning as the ‘ideal’ parliamentarian. In the following chapter, I build upon the identification of the repertoires to further elucidate the insights to the workplace culture they produce. I analyse the ways the repertoires inform institutional knowledge and practice, how the repertoires themselves are emotion management tools, and how they create a need for the parliamentarian to practice passionate rationality in their work.
Chapter Six

Being Vocationally ‘Authentic’: Passionate Rationality at Work

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I conceptualised parliament as an institution with totalising tendencies, compelling parliamentarians to negotiate new occupational identities through a temporal and institutionally specific process that can be understood as a moral career. The process involves parliamentarians learning to understand the workplace and workers through the meaning-making made possible by three interpretative repertoires. The repertoires are shared cultural resources that inform meaning in different ways. Their deployment carries consequences for how emotion is understood and for the ‘characteristics’ that are associated with the ‘ideal’ parliamentarian.

Through becoming accustomed to the meaning-making typical of the repertoires, and the expectations their meaning-making creates in the workplace, parliamentarians learn to ‘feel’ differently in light of their occupational identity and the culture they are now a part of. The interpretative repertoires described in the previous chapter inform the institutional knowledge and practices of parliament’s organisational and emotional culture. Through the repertoires, parliamentarians make sense of emotional labour as a normative workplace expectation. It is through these repertoires that parliamentarians come to understand certain emotional states as desirable and others as undesirable.

In this chapter, I extend my analysis of the different opportunities the repertoires offer for the understanding of emotion in the parliamentary workplace and for the implications the repertoires carry for the constitution of the ideal parliamentarian worker in ‘emotional’ terms. I am interested here in the way that the repertoires create particular opportunities for institutional knowledge and practice within workplace culture and for the consequences this has for how emotion is understood.
The ideal parliamentarian needs to provide a performance that varies between workplace locations as well as within the shifting negotiation of meaning that takes place within settings. All three repertoires are necessary for the parliamentarian to position themselves in a way that they understand as both emotional ‘and’ rational and it is by flexibly deploying the repertoires that parliamentarian become positioned as the ‘ideal’ worker. Although the parliamentarian needs to be able to recognise all of the repertoires, and negotiate workplace meaning through them to establish occupational identity, tensions around their presentations of self make The Crusade repertoire critical for positioning as the vocationally authentic parliamentarian.

The repertoires and their consequences for meaning

Each of the three interpretative repertoires is effectively a different ‘strand’ of the ‘web’ of meaning (Geertz, 1993 [1973]) within which parliamentarians make sense of the emotional labouring aspects of their work. Each repertoire constitutes a different way of understanding and has implications for how emotion therefore ‘ought’ to be managed according to the situated feeling rules. Table 6.1 (below) summarises the way each repertoire creates institutional knowledge and practice, and the different outcomes for meaning-making the repertoires entail.
Table 6.1. Shaping the understanding of emotion through the interpretative repertoires

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interpretative repertoire</th>
<th>Institutional knowledge and practice</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Game</td>
<td>This is a workplace that requires competition as well as cooperation. Competition needs to be handled carefully to avoid feelings of disloyalty.</td>
<td>Creates as commonsense the notion that the ‘right’ kind of worker competes with everyone, including friends. Makes emotion peripheral.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Performance</td>
<td>What occurs in the workplace is highly scrutinised. Performances are scripted.</td>
<td>Creates the expectation that in order to be the ‘right’ kind of worker, a parliamentarian must be prepared to perform. Makes emotion a resource.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Crusade</td>
<td>Workplace interaction involves staging life and death battles. Workers battle in earnest.</td>
<td>Creates an understanding of the ‘right’ kind of worker as one who takes risks in defence of a moral position. Makes emotion ‘authentic’.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the following discussion, I elaborate each repertoire in relation to institutional knowledge and practice and the different consequences each repertoire carries for how emotion at work is understood. It is important to note that the interpretative repertoires are not ‘fixed’ or stable entities but rather are cultural resources that may be called upon for the negotiation of meaning.
Understanding emotion through The Game repertoire

The interpretative repertoire of The Game was introduced in Chapter Five as a repertoire that accounts for the workplace as one in which games are played and where notions of teams, team mates and opponents are relevant. The tropes employed revolve around notions of winning, losing, and fair play. The Game repertoire informs meaning-making in ways that enable and constrain parliamentarians in their negotiation of the feelings generated through the complex social interchange of parliament. This repertoire constitutes the parliamentary workplace as one where diverse emotion management skills are required in order to keep up to the changes as the game is played. It also allows for emotion to be understood as something that the parliamentarian can distance themselves from, as a feature of ‘the game’ rather than as something connected to a ‘self’.

Institutional knowledge and practice

In shaping institutional knowledge and practice, The Game repertoire allows parliament to be understood as at once a competitive workplace and a workplace comprised of teams. This understanding creates the knowledge that both competition and cooperation will be a part of social practice. As explained in Chapter Five, the competitive games played here involve teams of shifting composition and may also be played by individuals, contributing to the changing nature of relationships in the parliamentary workplace. One parliamentarian noted:

You have to be self-promoting. You are not going to get anywhere if you are not because there is so much competition. If you just sit back – you’d have to be pretty special to be someone who could just sit back and be promoted without saying that you wanted it – if you don’t have that thirst for it. It’s a hard job … You have to have a real thirst to want to do it and if you can’t find the energy to even put your hand up and say I want to do it then I think that’s a pretty good indication that you are probably not the right kind of person (Parliamentarian E).

The deployment of The Game repertoire reinforces as commonsense the notion that parliament is a competitive place and that the ‘right’ kind of worker must employ the institutional practice of competing, even if they have a personal relationship with a competitor.

So, I mean, I have some really good friends in here but there is also that awareness that you are in competition with people within your own party as well (Parliamentarian E).
This account draws upon The Game repertoire in making sense of the competitive nature of relationships as an inherent characteristic of workplace activities rather than an individual flaw of social actors.

The teams created by the parliamentary process involve complexities that the parliamentarian must negotiate. The second important outcome of The Game repertoire is its ability to explain divergence within teams at the same time as maintaining the teams’ importance.

You don’t choose your team mates. [The] party chooses those or the voters choose them (Parliamentarian C).

Understanding parliamentary colleagues as Team Mates chosen by someone else helps to explain how individual differences and animosities become unimportant when faced with the need for a combined effort aimed at the achievement of team or group goals. Through The Game repertoire, difference amongst party members is contained in a way that the parliamentarian understands as appropriate rather than as an indication that their actions are insincere or inauthentic. The Game repertoire’s team metaphor also shapes the following account.

I’m hugely proud of [our party] and the leadership, I would have to say. I just think it’s uncompromising about what we are as a group, [what we are] working for … Why did I choose this party? … I get that affirmed daily – I get my daily fix on it and so that’s an interesting side of it too. When you are up against it suddenly we are a pack and we hang together (Parliamentarian D).

Equally as important as being a competitive individual is the need to be committed to the team’s overall best interests, in spite of relational complexities.

… Sometimes you look at a colleague and you think ‘where are you coming from? You don’t fit’, but they are entitled not to fit because of the diversity of views within our own … system … (Parliamentarian D).

Accounts of experience in the workplace that draw on the imagery of a team that is working towards a shared goal allow the parliamentarian to downplay the negative aspects of competition and to understand their commitment to a team that may include members with whom they have significant differences.

The complexity of the dual understanding to be both competitor and Team Mate calls for careful negotiation. Participants suggest that people ‘are okay with’ the competition
but that when the competitive thirst is not handled well, damage is done. There are ways of conducting competitive practice that allow for behaviour to be understood as acceptable team behaviour. There are other ways of conducting that competitive practice which are understood as unacceptable.

… Sometimes you see strains in relationships between people depending on how much they put work above the friendship and that happens in every caucus, I think it all depends on how you handle it. Some people handle it very well because they are just very open about it, then, those, someone might feel put out by it. As long as you are open about it and there’s no going behind someone’s back with it so they don’t feel they have been sideswiped. … generally, I think, people are okay with it. There’s a general understanding this is politics at the end of the day … and there’s a lot of competition – so many people have been working really hard to get here. You’d much rather be in a position of having so many people who want to do it that you get those tensions around who it is going to be than be in the position of really having not the talent to do it. It’s all politics …

I: What do you mean when you say ‘it’s all politics’?

Well, it just kind of comes with the territory really. It’s the way the place works and it’s a competitive environment (Parliamentarian E).

Another nuance of relationships within the parliamentary workplace is that members of different parties can sometimes be understood as members of the same team. For instance, the members of select committees work conjointly to produce legislation. Even those members who oppose the legislation being put forward may work on the details of a bill and contribute to its improvement.\(^{19}\) In such instances, it is the goal of democratic practice that draws parliamentarians of different political persuasion together. The rules around such inter-party interaction are not only unwritten, “they are not even spoken” (Parliamentarian C), and therefore can only be learned through experience. Using the select committee debate on a particular bill as an example, one parliamentarian said it was:

probably an instance of the rough edges being scraped off one MP in particular to the point where they have become quite constructive … when [the MP] first came, we detested them. Everyone detested them. They’re not quite as hostile … now. But [there was] a lot of learning to do about the unwritten rules, the laws that operate within a group which basically – reciprocity, and you can break rules but if you do it all the time, sooner or later people close ranks against you and that’s across the table (Parliamentarian C).

\(^{19}\) A number of participants accounted for select committees as the property of democratic process rather than the property of government
The tacit agreement of fellow committee members regarding matters of conduct is achieved collectively through the treatment of an insubordinate team member. The errant group member learns the ‘rules’ of the game through the actions, and reactions, of others.

The Game repertoire constitutes as institutional knowledge the understanding that competition is a positive phenomenon; it is just “the way the place works” (Parliamentarian E). This understanding creates an expectation that workers, indeed, ought to compete with one another. Competition between teammates is understood to hone ‘talent’ to the benefit of the democratic system or ‘team’ as a whole. If competition results in negative experiences for some workers, that is the necessary cost of having an excess of ‘talent’ from which to choose. Within the culture of parliament, The Game repertoire produces as natural the expectation that those on the ‘bench’ will want to challenge for positions in the ‘starting line-up’, regardless of whether they have a personal relationship with the person whose position they would like to fill.

Buffering emotional experience

The Game repertoire is a meaning-making tool that offers the parliamentarian a way of understanding emotion in a way that is different from the way the same sorts of emotions might otherwise be understood in everyday interaction. By understanding competition as an inherent characteristic of the workplace, emotions such as the desire for success and promotion or the defensiveness of those workers in possession of power become ‘natural’. The parliamentarian is thus able to manage the feelings that result from the need to compete with ‘friends’ and fellow team mates by understanding them as necessary aspects of their occupational identity.

Understanding parliamentary work as a game acts as an emotional buffer in situations which are less frequent in usual social interaction but a common part of everyday life in the parliamentary workplace. The parliamentarian deploying this repertoire to understand the things that happen in their line of work is able to avoid taking personally actions that could be taken as a reflection of the ill will of colleagues or as insults or devaluations of the self.

…if you don’t adapt to that, and some people never do really. They have a deep sense of hurt …. I think that, for … those successful in this process, you quickly realise you just have to switch off from that … They don’t understand, this is just the process … for example, going into a public place in a campaign and you
are walking around shaking everyone’s hand and you will sometimes come to someone who refuses to shake your hand, where there is this intense personal dislike but you have never seen this person before. Now, not many individuals … have to deal with that. Normally you would sit down and say ‘what’s the problem here? Why do you hate me?’ But you’ve got a roomful of people to deal with you just have to switch off from that and not dwell on it and go to the next person. That’s a skill … (Parliamentarian G).

The Game repertoire provides a means for understanding the emotional dimensions of workplace experience as something that is without deep or consequential meaning for self. By becoming familiar with this repertoire, the parliamentarian is able to ‘adapt’, to learn the ‘skills’ required for continued participation in the work. The Game repertoire provides the parliamentarian with the tools to minimise unwanted emotional responses. The parliamentarian gains access to a ‘feeling’ of personal ease in regard to personal slights.

The following account employs The Game repertoire in a way that buffers response to another challenging workplace encounter.

… A lot is also to do with whether it is public or private because quite a lot of the activity is ritual fighting if it’s the media around, whereas privately you have quite a good relationship and as long as everyone understands the rules, that’s not emotionally very stressful. But if people don’t see that distinction, don’t see it as a game, you can … (Parliamentarian C).

This participant makes light of the fighting that is a part of the parliamentary environment through talk of ‘ritual’ fighting. ‘The rules’ are constituted here as an important aspect of the interpretation of action and if actors fail to ‘understand’ the rules, people will experience stress. The ‘rule’ is an interpretation rule. ‘Fighting should be understood as something people do to win ‘the game’ being played, rather than being understood as individuals attacking the identity, integrity or self of another person and therefore should evoke a feeling of equanimity.

The Game repertoire suggests that emotion is not particularly important to what happens in parliament or what is said about a person within the political arena generally. Situations or events which in everyday life could be expected to cause a person emotional concern are understood through The Game repertoire as simply someone else’s attempt at point-scoring and best brushed off. In commenting on the derogatory comments that can appear on blog sites, a participant said:

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I never find that very upsetting. My partner does … [they] follow the blogs and … used to ring me and say ‘they are getting stuck into you on … something like that but … it doesn’t hurt. You know that’s part of the game. Sometimes you feel offended by it if, what I see as … inconsistency … But mostly you – it’s much less hurtful than people would assume. Cartoons and things like that, you know, that’s what happens (Parliamentarian C).

Through the repertoire of The Game, this parliamentarian understands criticism as a part of the game and positions their emotional reaction as equanimous – ‘it doesn’t hurt’. Understanding derogatory comments about a parliamentarian as within the rules of the game allows the parliamentarian to make sense of such comments as unimportant.

The team metaphor of this repertoire allows workers to make sense of collaboration with colleagues who at other times they may oppose, without understanding themselves as insincere. The repertoire acts as a buffer in understanding interaction in complex workplace relationships that might otherwise be understood as disingenuous. Understanding relationships through the team metaphor resolves the incongruity that could be created by the parliamentarian’s meaning-making around such action and their own sense of authenticity. Building on their earlier comment about colleagues being allowed to lack compatibility with others in the party, Parliamentarian D went on to say:

… It is true to say, and I never realised it - that the mantra of the party is bigger than any one individual – an affirming thing. Here we are facing an election … And suddenly all these petty things … forget it – we’ve got to get through this election and we are suddenly like that again. … the … strings that hold you together, at the moment they are getting pulled really tightly and that’s good because you reaffirm … So it’s a funny, tenuous link (Parliamentarian D).

This ‘tenuous’ link to colleagues that they understand as not ‘fitting’ is achieved by understanding their colleagues as team members. The metaphor of the team acts as a joining force that allows small or ‘petty’ differences between members to be overlooked without generating feelings of insincerity.

Parliamentarians’ accounts suggest the parliamentary system creates teams of people who may have little in common with one another or even major points of difference. The Game repertoire creates tension in parliamentarians’ understandings of themselves as both friend and competitor to some in their party but also offers a means of negotiating that tension by constituting their actions as necessary because of the ‘natural’, incontrovertible aspects of the workplace environment. The flexibility of The Game repertoire and its team metaphor allows for shifting notions of team composition,
something that is especially necessary in an MMP environment where coalition requirements force larger and minor parties to interact.

An important outcome of each of the repertoires is their ability to constitute particular feeling rules for the parliamentary workplace. Through The Game repertoire, the ideal parliamentarian is understood as one who does not take umbrage at competitive collegial or interparty parliamentary exchange. They ought not to feel disingenuous as the result of presenting a united front for a team whose membership includes competing factions. The feeling rule this creates is that parliamentarians ‘ought’ to be able to distance themselves from the emotional turmoil created within the competitive parliamentary workplace. The rule is, therefore, that they ought to be capable of ‘not feeling’ certain emotions including personal doubt or disingenuousness that are constituted as undesirable for winning the games played in parliament.

Understanding emotion through The Performance repertoire

The Performance repertoire is one that accounts for the parliamentary workplace as a stage on which workers enact performances, the success of which is under scrutiny of an audience. For parliamentarians, much of their work takes place in areas that have low public visibility. Public judgement of job performance is made based on their ‘on-stage’ work. The tropes employed in this repertoire revolve around the ‘reality’ of situations compared to ‘appearances’, to ‘genuine’ as opposed to ‘performed’ feelings and suggestions of different regions of performance. The Performance repertoire enables and constrains parliamentarians as they understand performance as necessary, though sometimes opaque. The introduction of MMP means parliamentarians cannot be certain electorate support for their party will equate to electorate support for themselves as a representative, increasing the importance of the parliamentarian’s visibility in the electorate.

You must show that you are a hard worker because ultimately you are in the hands of others judging you for what you deliver. Particularly now under the process we have of MMP where people can vote for you as an individual and for different party if they want to (Parliamentarian G).

Institutional knowledge and practice

This repertoire constitutes as institutional knowledge the understanding that parliament is a stage where performance takes place and where assumptions about those performances should be held tentatively. One outcome of the repertoire is that it makes
it acceptable, even necessary, for parliamentarians to put on an act and to expect that others will be doing the same. Performance as institutional practice becomes something required for ‘being’ the parliamentarian.

We are all performers and we have to be, that’s our job assessment, and we don’t get back here unless we have been reported (Parliamentarian C).

Parliamentarians need to maintain a public image as someone who is doing their job. The Performance repertoire is a means for parliamentarians to understand the performances that they and other parliamentarians engage in as part of their work rather than as something that is insincere or specious, although they may be either of these things. The ability to stage a performance imbues the parliamentarian with power.

Now I exploded in this emotional outburst and the House fell silent. Drama. The room, the empowerment. The Chamber was packed, absolutely packed. You can imagine the gallery was full and I just exploded in this three and a half minutes all up, I think, I spoke and got my point across, and still managed without breaking down into tears, which I often get to the verge of. And remained staunch to [the message and spoke from a] place of power (Parliamentarian B).

In addition to creating an understanding of the parliamentary workplace as a stage where performances take place, this repertoire establishes front and back regions to performance. The performance itself must be adapted to the ‘region’ in which it takes place. Every participant drew upon The Performance repertoire. It informs the accounts in which they said that if I ‘really’ wanted to know about the emotional dimensions of their work I would be best to talk to senior private secretaries, administration and clerical staff or people who have since left the halls of parliament.

I would talk to the secretaries because they see them. They are still performing, even in front of their secretaries, but it is quite hard to sustain a performance over a long run that isn’t going to be seen through. I’d talk to their colleagues and ask them in circumstances probably where it is no longer material, like possibly when they lose office and talk to them about how they thought their colleagues really behaved then in circumstances where it wouldn’t be [risky] to them… They would be able to tell you much more than politicians would ever risk revealing while there is still prospect of office. It’s the risk, it’s partly the risk of being unmasked. There is an unsavoury side that people manage to suppress. But it is also the risk that every politician is very aware of more than any other profession I think (Parliamentarian C).
Concerning secretaries, one parliamentarian suggests they are most transparent in their working relationships with these people.

My senior private secretary …… she knows exactly how I’m feeling about things. She’s like a second mother really (Parliamentarian A).

Another parliamentarian suggests asking general staff members about parliamentarians would be the best way to find out about what it was like working in this place.

I tell you the best person to ask about that would be the staff in this building. They would be the best ones to ask because the staff [is] here. Day in, day out, year in, year out, they see people, parliamentarians come and go. They see governments change. They are constant and I’ve spoken to one or two and they, in their opinion it is always [another party] that trawl, that do the dirty (Parliamentarian F).

In creating different regions, The Performance repertoire allows for an understanding of some performances as those conducted by ‘performing’ and ‘illusory’ selves as opposed to other performances as those conducted by ‘natural’ or ‘authentic’ selves. There is a suggestion that the effort required to produce a performance, to present an ‘illusory’ or ‘masked’ self makes the performance difficult to sustain in relationships that take place over a lengthy period, and where there is a higher level of contact.

Central to parliamentarian identities is the need to garner attention, not only of the media and the public, but also of colleagues. The business of the House can be tedious and one aspect of occupational performance that may be put to a member’s advantage is the ability to entertain.

Not everyone who comes in here is good at that kind of screaming and yelling, making witty jokes about people, the kind of politics, that’s so popular. So, if it’s a general debate, someone will stand up to make a serious speech on something that’s really important but because it’s not a smart-arse speech, which is what people expect in a general debate, they’ll have people yelling out that it is boring, or this is a terrible speech and, in fact, it has a lot more substance than anything else that’s been said in the general debate. So, I think for a lot of MPs who aren’t really comfortable with that style of politics it can be quite hard. It’s not nice to have someone tell you that you are boring … (Parliamentarian E).

The deployment of The Performance repertoire here suggests that in some circumstances the presentational or performative quality of a parliamentarian’s work is more important than the substance of the message, implying there can be a superficial quality to parliamentary debate.
Certain types of performance are attached to particular areas of the workplace and not others.

The big thing that I think … is for people not to make the mistake of mixing up the public performance parts of the role with the private analytical parts and there’s always the demand for openness, there’s always a demand for transparency, there’s always a demand for more disclosure, you know …. In the end, the rational will always have to retreat to where it can be done without damage. The emotional is our public theatre role … (Parliamentarian C).

Shaped by The Performance repertoire, this parliamentarian’s understanding is that emotion is a necessary stage prop for the production of public identities. As a stage prop, emotion becomes ‘unnecessary’ when the location shifts to the back regions, which include the select committee table where Parliamentarian C comments the ‘rational’ work is done.

The Performance repertoire, and its invocation of front and back regions and the stage, provides the means for judgements about the situated appropriateness of behaviour. Within the House, where different teams and competition are most salient, The Performance repertoire enables parliamentarians to dismiss personal or party political attacks as simply a part of a performance; a performance that takes place front stage. However, parliamentarians frequently find themselves in other, more social, situations in which a competitive performance is not appropriate. When asked how they would handle finding themselves in close social proximity to someone they had recently berated in parliament, an MP said:

It depends on the degree of harm. I’ll give you an example. I also come down on Monday and I was, so occasionally I would go upstairs to Bellamy’s for tea and I happened to bang into [a member from another party] and so two or three Mondays in a row we had tea. And then I went to a [social] function downstairs, [the same MP] was there … [was] the host. So we had quite a gathering, you know, all different parties, representatives from each political party went, and I went along and a few others went along. [The host MP] got up there and, I’ve never heard it before, hadn’t heard it before and I haven’t heard it since, but just slated [my party] like you wouldn’t believe. I just stood there absolutely staggered that we had had this sort of relationship. There were only a few of us there. It was all unnecessary and, it just seemed, it was just bizarre. They didn’t just do it the once they kept repeating it within the same few sentences. It was like they were driven by something. I thought, ‘f…. you’. So, I never went near them again … [It was] totally unwarranted, totally unnecessary [It was unfair], was just bizarre. It was out of context and I just couldn’t understand what the hell was going on … You want to act like that, fine, do it, on your own time. I don’t want to know about it (Parliamentarian F).
The changing circumstances of interpersonal, interparty relationships inform the meaning attached to personal or political attacks. Different meanings result in different understandings of the ‘degree of harm’ that has been done. Meaning also depends on the region in which the interaction takes place. Had this situation occurred in the House, the parliamentarian’s ‘slating’ of another party would not have been understood as a breach of institutional practice because of the ‘region’ where the slating took place. However, in this case the slating is considered offensive. Even though the social occasion could involve performance of a certain type without raising offence, this performance in a place considered more of a back region than a front region creates the conditions for an angry response. Added to the breaching of region boundaries is the violation of personal relationship boundaries, especially given that the participant and host had previously enjoyed a personable relationship in another back region, the on-site parliamentary restaurant.

Unlike other performances, what is said in the House is uttered in a public domain and is recorded. Through The Performance repertoire what is said becomes understood as a script. Words that are spoken take on a more permanent existence than would ordinarily be the case in a verbal exchange. This knowledge influences the public presentation of an occupational ‘self’. In addition to taking care in their public performances, parliamentarians are aware of the need to convince their colleagues, including opposing party members, of the sincerity of their performance.

It will certainly be used against them if it’s thought to be … if it’s thought to be fake. [One member of another party] who is generally fairly liked and fairly respected, is prone to winding themselves up to a frenzied rant and people will always follow that up by talking about their brain-popping act. It might be sincere, they might be, but they may even feel they are sincere but basically there is a view that they wind themselves up and so they are fair game … They may even be performing to themselves. But … Generally, if it looks like a very sincere emotional effect people just let it go, even if they are secretly amused by it (Parliamentarian C).

Here performance is not only activity undertaken to convince other actors of one’s emotions but that the performance may even be produced for the person themselves.\footnote{This comment is redolent of the ‘me’ aspect of Mead’s self (1934, p. 172).}

Justifying emotional performances

The Performance repertoire informs institutional knowledge in a way that creates an organisational expectation for parliamentarians to be capable of communicating
effectively and that includes communicating through the performance of emotion. This may mean ‘masking’ fear, ‘showing’ sincerity or simply ‘connecting’ with other people. Through this repertoire, emotion in the workplace becomes a communicative tool in an interpretative medium.

I think politics are intensely emotional because it’s about persuading people to a particular point of view or a particular philosophy or programme and to be a successful communicator, successful salesperson, you have to be able to engage at a human level with the public. Somebody who is isn’t emotional, who wasn’t able to trigger that sense of somehow connecting, wouldn’t be successful so, to be a successful politician you have to be able to trigger an emotional reaction in people, a positive emotional reaction (Parliamentarian G).

The communicative performance therefore involves managing the script and one’s own performance in such a way that elicits particular emotions in the audience. In addition, The Performance repertoire makes necessary the parliamentarian’s ability to manage their own emotions in relation to the performances of others.

You learn to … handle quite a lot of emotions generated which just can too easily become too upsetting or too challenging (Parliamentarian H).

Both of the parliamentarians above touch on the complexity of managing emotional performance in the parliamentary workplace. The performance of emotion is central to the job as well something that holds a challenge for the maintenance of occupational identity.21

This repertoire therefore justifies the management of emotion as a necessary means of meeting the expectation of performance that accompanies the parliamentarian’s occupational identity. In order to perform, the parliamentarian must first be capable of drawing attention to themselves and that is often achieved through performances that are ‘emotionally engaging’ in an environment with many tedious and repetitious tasks. The parliamentarian must be at ease being the centre of attention, be able to monitor their own performance for its communicative potential and to understand the different requirements for performances in the various regions of the workplace. As one participant noted, “It's how you use emotion if you are going to use it at all.” (Parliamentarian B).

21 I elucidate this point further in the final section of this chapter.
Participants use the words ‘celebrity’ and ‘artful’ politician to talk about workers who are particularly good at this aspect of the job. Celebrity or artful parliamentarians are those workers who receive attention for their ability to entertain, to gain attention and to stage a smooth performance. They are also those parliamentarians who manage to make a given expression appear as if it is a natural ‘given off’ one. The suggestion is that these parliamentarians are more about appearance than substance.

Watch [a particular MP]. They turn up to Select Committee, they might only stay one hour whereas we are the honest toilers that stay for three and have read all the papers. They will walk into a Select Committee, with the television crews behind them, so they have already set up that they’re going to put something on the table and they want to be filmed. And then they go. And we are left with the residue. It … [shows] … the grandstanding … those dramatic bits … (Parliamentarian D).

The Performance repertoire makes ‘natural’ parliamentarians’ harnessing of emotion to their performance in order to garner attention. The repertoire creates a need for the parliamentarian to be capable of staging a performance that generates and holds an audience’s attention. The audience may be parliamentary colleagues, the electorate or the media, but the ability of a parliamentarian to command and hold the attention of others is crucial to ongoing participation in the workplace.

The notion of emotion performance is not only relevant to parliamentarians’ interactions with the media or the public but also to House interaction between and within parties. The way performance is conducted in the House allows parliamentarians the opportunity to look for both intended and unintended messages. As explained in Chapter Three, Goffman theorises this feature of social interaction as ‘expressions given’ and ‘expressions given off’ (Goffman, 1959, p. 4).22 The following comments are made in reference to Question Time performances.

If it’s a Minister who is in good standing, on top of their job, then their colleagues will be willing them to succeed, to show that they can squash the other side and you can see that. They are looking at them as they speak. The problem is often looking round watching to see the triumph, watch the performance, and – [someone] will leap in happily to support or endorse or back

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22 ‘Expressions given’ is a term Goffman used to account for various ways a person works to present the self, to create “impressions” (1959, p. 4). One way of creating an impression is through “sign vehicles” (Goffman, 1959, p. 24). These are instruments for giving an appearance as a certain ‘type’ of person and may include items such as cars and clothing. ‘Expressions given off’ (Goffman, 1959, p. 4) is a term used to refer to appearances that are achieved through “non verbal, presumably unintentional” (Goffman, 1959, p. 4) communication.
up so that they are saying ‘I’m pinning my prestige to this person’ (Parliamentarian C).

In this account, emotion performances in the chamber are taken as more than ‘expressions given’, or having an intended message. They are carefully observed for ‘expressions given off’, taken as indicative of what is going on in parties ‘behind the scenes’. The emotional dimensions of performance in the House are made sense of as aspects which reflect some ‘inner reality’ or what is ‘really’ going on behind the scenes of the performance.

Within parties, notion of a scripted performance also informs parliamentarians’ understanding of interaction with colleagues.

It often means using language quite carefully – sort of saying ‘I hear what you are saying’. At the moment we are being lobbied about supporting this person and that person for cabinet, so a big skill is finding careful ways of saying ‘I’ve heard what you are saying’ what you are saying is I’ve registered you as being interested for … without actually saying ‘yes, I’ll vote for you’ (Parliamentarian H).

This parliamentarian’s interaction is understood as a crafted performance in which language is used ‘quite carefully’. The artful use of words is made sense of as a means of conveying a particular message which offers neither outright support nor outright opposition to the proposal. Within this performance, the parliamentarian positions themselves in a way that allows them to avoid understanding themselves as someone who is not authentic in their interactions with colleagues. A lack of authenticity is something that MPs accounted for as the cause of strong ill feeling amongst workers and as behaviour that is destructive of relationships and careers.

Through The Performance repertoire emotions generated by the conditions of the workplace create particular challenges to the ability to stage a performance as the ideal parliamentarian

[There is] a lot of fear. I mean, that’s fear of colleagues, fear of making mistakes, fear of being sidelined and some fear of, particularly by Ministers, some fear of opposition spokespeople. If you want to see fear around here you go round the Minister’s offices at lunchtime before the, when the questions are being put in for answer at Question Time. There are great emotions at play there because Ministers know they can end their career if they say the wrong thing. It’s very high – that’s when the stress really is on (Parliamentarian H).
The emphasis here is on the performance of parliamentarians, particularly the ministers. The fear is of ‘making a mistake’ in the performance and of the potential to be relegated to a supporting role rather than a starring role as a result of a poor performance. The Game repertoire can also be said to involve pressure for a skilled performance, but this parliamentarian refers to the importance of not saying ‘the wrong thing’. Once again it is the delivery of a script, or the lines, which is of prime concern. The script is the parliamentarian’s means of communicating their message to the electorate, the media and their parliamentary colleagues. It is the means through which they make their meaning-making apparent and in which they bring the work they do behind the ‘scenes’ to the attention of others.

Like The Game repertoire, The Performance repertoire constitutes feeling rules in the parliamentary workplace. It suggests first of all that judgement of the appropriateness of a given emotional performance must be gauged on the front stage or back stage location in which it is given. The Performance repertoire calls for the parliamentarian to take part in the production of emotion that communicates a position rather than an ‘internal state’. Ultimately, the feeling rule of The Performance repertoire is that the parliamentarian ought not to feel shame in giving a performance but rather ought to take pride in their ability to produce an attention-getting presentation.

Understanding emotion through The Crusade repertoire

The Crusade repertoire draws on imagery of the parliamentary workplace as a battleground where representatives wage royal battles and demise is a constant possibility. The repertoire constitutes the events that transpire in the parliamentary workplace as moral matters, of symbolic importance and related to ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘life’ and ‘death’. Although there are ‘sides’, just as in The Game repertoire where there are ‘teams’, within The Crusade repertoire the sides also invoke notions of traitors, and the battles take place in an environment of subterfuge where rules are few. The battles waged on this field are part of a long-term campaign and seldom are they waged singularly. When a campaigner does initiate a cause with little collegial support, it is on behalf of some other group.

Participants in this research project did not directly use the word ‘crusade’ in reference to their work as they did with The ‘Game’ and ‘Performance’ repertoires. What participants did refer to were the ‘values’ that were a part of their work, their
responsibility as ‘representative’ of other people and causes, and of emotions that drove their action in ways not immediately self-serving.

Institutional knowledge and practice

When parliamentarians deploy The Crusade repertoire, there is no talk of enjoying the interchange as though it were a form of entertainment, as there often is when The Game repertoire is deployed, although other parliamentarians are occasionally cast as the sort of people who enjoy ‘seeing blood’. The Crusade repertoire constitutes as institutional knowledge the understanding that interaction between parliamentarians is battle, with the possibility that workers will be wounded, often, but not inevitably, with fatal consequences for their parliamentary career. They make sense of their emotional response to events in the workplace as phenomena that come from the ‘inner essence’ of their ‘being’, and of a ‘compulsion’ to act, regardless of concern for their own survival.

Within this repertoire, institutional practice involves attacks that can be ‘brutalising’. Whether or not the wounded survive a defeat depends on their ability to recover, sometimes quickly and at other times over a longer period. In the case of one MP who was rumoured to have had some sort of moment of ‘weakness’, a participant commented:

Now, in their case, it would be a convention against mentioning those sort of things nearly all the time but … because they so obviously recovered, when I say recovered I don’t even know what it was, but they have been so competent and so tough that it’s almost okay again [to attack them in the House] (Parliamentarian C).

The outcome of the deployment of this repertoire is that attacks are not of minor or superficial importance, as they are in The Game. Rather than accounting for the institutional practice of fighting as ‘not emotionally stressful’, as in The Game repertoire, The Crusade’s fighting or persecution of fellow parliamentarians results instead in a loss of confidence and standing by the person who has been the subject of attack. One participant recounted an experience in which a fellow party member was interrogated in the House over a situation where their honesty was called to question.

Now, I don’t think that anyone ever found [out anything] but it certainly looked a bit dodgy. [They were] plainly ashamed of [themselves], internally. I don’t know whether [they were] ashamed because, I don’t think there was anything dishonest, but they just thought that they had been such a mug … But even
though the rules say that’s it, you are not allowed to mention it again, just about every second or third time they would get up to speak or say anything [opponents would allude to the incident and]… it would just whack them because it was something they didn’t feel good about … and so that they would be trying to ignore it, trying to speak, but you could tell, we could tell sitting beside them … [they] lost half their gas. That was, again, nothing effective about their attacks it was simply because they didn’t feel good about themselves and therefore couldn’t overcome it (Parliamentarian C).

The attacks launched here are not of the same nature as the attacks launched in a game. It is parliamentarians’ sense of ‘self’ that suffers. This has implications for the experience of emotion understood through The Crusade repertoire. Inability to fend off an attack in The Game does not result in shame but may result in embarrassment at a person’s lack of ability or weakness. One MP, deploying The Game repertoire, comments on their verbal exchange with another MP:

… I do kind of slap myself a little bit sometimes for my behaviour because I did enjoy it I’m afraid and the thing was with it was that it was a game (Parliamentarian A).

Shame and embarrassment are two distinct emotions (Parrott, 2003, p. 34). Expressing embarrassment suggests a flaw in presentation, a momentary lapse. What is at least alluded to through The Game repertoire in the above extract is embarrassment. Shame, on the other hand, is linked more closely with ‘who’ a person is in moral terms (Parrott, 2003, p. 34). The expression of shame, therefore, is closely linked with notions of the self and of the morality of one’s actions and hence is significant in identification of The Crusade repertoire in the previous extract.

The Game and The Crusade repertoires share some terms and tropes given that the language employed during encounters in sport often have aspects in common with the language of war. Both repertoires suggest a level of conflict between people wanting to be victorious in their goals. Only The Crusade repertoire employs terms to do with mortality.

I suspect that humans have evolved institutions that try and test people – I mean one day they might have life and death responsibility and if they quiver in the headlights you don’t want them (Parliamentarian C).
Another central difference between the two repertoires is The Crusades’ invocation of moral purpose. In talking about another party’s repeal of a particular act, a parliamentarian commented:

… They were punching their fists in the air and it was like a real victory … even though we had no hope of defending against it because we were such a small opposition. I knew that none of them knew what was going to happen to the people that I went to Parliament to represent and that’s what upset me. It wasn’t so much that they had won and we had lost it was just that sense of helplessness knowing that they didn’t know what they were going to do to people … I don’t actually believe that they were even thinking about that as politicians because that bill was written for them by [a lobby group]. There is no way that their officials wrote that bill (Parliamentarian A).

To suggest that a party has allowed an interest group to write their policy is to call into question the morality of the party and its actions. On the other hand, the MP claims the personal experience of being ‘upset’, positioning themselves as caring in relation to the instrumentality of the other party.

The moral nature of parliamentary work is not only to do with honesty but is also to do with loyalty and the causes that the parliamentarian takes up. The Crusade repertoire produces institutional understanding of decisions as matters that are about loyalty and hence as particularly precarious ones. The following participant comments on how they make decisions about what to support and what not to support.

Someone who’s picked you up when you are feeling bruised, who has come in here and said ‘you look terrible. Let’s go and have a cup of tea’, and when the time comes … something you don’t have a strong view about but they do, your personal view would be the opposite to the way they want you to go, what do you do?

I: Have you been in that situation?
Oh, I think every politician does it frequently, whether you know it.

I: How do you usually decide?

There isn’t a rule. I think some politicians make a rule. I think some of them just say ‘lord who will trump all’ and simplifies the whole issue for them. Some will say ‘what’s in my best interests’? Some will say ‘what does purity require of me’. Purity of intellectual assessment. I don’t know. I know the way that I would normally resolve it would be, there’s some bottom line things that I won’t vote for, stuff that I think is bad but where I… often you are making a decision on very limited information and very fast … I think in most walks of life there are circumstances like this but politics is a very – it’s much more lonely than usual. Most social structures have hierarchy that resolve a lot of that, ‘it’s not
my decision’. But in parties, things are always – because the nominal hierarchy has no power other than constant persuasion (Parliamentarian C).

The parliamentarian takes part in a complex weighing up of potential decisions and their moral consequences. Loyalty is not a simple matter. There are a number of ways that different decisions could be subsequently understood as expressions of loyalty. The question is more about whom and what the parliamentarian is loyal to; ‘purity of intellectual assessment’ or ‘my best interests’. Decisions involving morality are ‘lonely’ ones.

Authenticating emotional experience

In spite of the similarities between The Game and The Crusade repertoires, it is important to differentiate between the two because they carry significantly different implications for the understanding of events, emotions and identity. Deployment of The Crusade repertoire allows for, even calls for and glorifies, the expression of emotion in the parliamentary workplace. Understood through this repertoire, emotion is ‘authentic’. The deployment of The Crusade repertoire requires parliamentarians to understand the things they do at work quite differently than The Game and The Performance. They understand their actions as ones that are motivated by a ‘genuine’ self and that it is the emotions of self that direct their decision-making.

[My membership in the party is based on] a basic political philosophy, which you do feel emotional attachment to. The reason that I’m in [this] party is not because academically I think it’s the best thing but emotionally I feel that the things that we do are helping the people that we represent (Parliamentarian E).

Understood through The Crusade repertoire, parliamentarians consider their own emotions in relation to workplace experiences as proof to themselves and to others that they are not involved in a game or a performance but in the serious moral business of a virtuous campaign. This repertoire produces an understanding of emotion as phenomena that are ‘pure’ and ‘authentic’.

The conflict that I personally had was something between something deeply … human to me, a part of who and what I am, as compared to a cold, hard piece of law that we were making decisions upon that affected the [community] … For right or for wrong I felt compelled through some kind, form, of deep connection … but suddenly something strikes you as being very, very important, beyond anything I should feel about it, and that I would go blindly with (Parliamentarian B).
Terms and tropes to do with an incontrovertible need to act a certain way are indicative of The Crusade repertoire. This MP constitutes the moral crusade as an issue connected to something ‘deep’, a part of ‘who and what’ they are. The conflict or tension here is not between themselves and a parliamentarian foe but within themselves.

The Crusade repertoire allows parliamentarians to claim victory on behalf of those people less powerful than themselves. It also allows for feelings of pride, self-importance, even righteousness.

I mean, I have just had a victory so I am feeling very pleased with myself. A woman … came to see me about it – [an inequitable consequence of the benefit payment structure]. She came to see me last year – we’ve now got her [situation sorted] But we’ve also got the government to announce a change in policy and this will apply to everyone from 1 July next year. So we have had a major victory. But if I hadn’t done what I did it wouldn’t have happened. If she hadn’t brought it up in the first place and stuck to her guns it wouldn’t have happened. If we hadn’t had a government that was prepared to make some changes it wouldn’t have happened. So it requires a combination of the three.

I: Did it require some emotion about the situation as well?

Absolutely, because you had to actually convince officials … and he agreed with me that it wasn’t fair and I think that once you get that sort of feeling that it is not fair then you all become committed to finding a solution. To actually feel that something is not fair you have to have some emotion, right? (Parliamentarian A).

This parliamentarian’s ability to claim a ‘victory’ illustrates how The Crusade repertoire can be deployed to understand action. The fight is a moral battle for justice in this situation, justice for the woman involved and for other people like her who may be, in their understanding, similarly disadvantaged.

Neither of the other repertoires involves the invocation of ‘genuine’, ‘deep’, feelings in the way that The Crusade repertoire does. The emotional dimensions of workplace experience are understood as something sourced from ‘the very essence’ of an ‘inner being’. Through The Crusade repertoire, parliamentarians can posit their commitment to this ‘authentic’ emotion as responsible for their action (a vote in favour of the bill) knowing that how they are subsequently ‘seen’ by others may be at odds with how they see themselves.

I: Have you ever felt one way but found it necessary to act another?
No, not really. One. I will tell you this one because I think it’s a very good example … At the very essence of my inner being is an abhorrence of [the subject of this bill] … There was a side of me that found it despicable … I mean I felt repulsed … I hated that bill. … I still felt sick voting for it, I really did. Nothing is going to change that. … so [some people] interpret my voting for that bill … [as] support [for it] … which I find deeply offensive. But that’s because they haven’t bothered asking (Parliamentarian A).

In this account, the battle is between how an affirmative vote in the House may be understood by others ‘as promotion and support’ when the parliamentarian’s understanding of self as a moral person means they find such a suggestion ‘deeply offensive’. Yet they are willing to run the risk of misrepresentation through a ‘deeper’ commitment to a ‘greater good’. Thus, the account establishes emotions as compelling and as authentic guides to action.

Like the other repertoires already considered, The Crusade repertoire constitutes the feeling rules of the parliamentary workplace in particular ways. It creates a feeling rule that suggests the parliamentarian’s anger, compassion and confidence in the propriety of their actions are all emotions that ‘ought’ to find expression in the workplace. The association between emotion and self creates the conditions whereby workplace emotional experiences are taken to support claims to the vocational authenticity of occupational identity. That authenticity is demonstrated by positioning through The Crusade repertoire. It is through The Crusade repertoire that the parliamentarian is able to meet the feeling rule to ‘be’ both passionate ‘and’ rational.

The ‘ideal’ worker constituted through the repertoires

So far in this chapter, I have explored how the interpretative repertoires have consequences for the production of institutional knowledge and practice. These consequences include informing which emotions are desirable and which are undesirable, as well as shaping notions of how the parliamentarian ‘ought’ to go about their work. In this last part of the chapter, I consider what ‘kind’ of worker the repertoires constitute as the ‘ideal’ or ‘right’ kind of worker. I elaborate the concept of passionate rationality and how it is that passionate rationality is important for the parliamentarian.

The three interpretative repertoires constitute the ‘ideal’ worker as someone who is able to control emotion in situations where its expression would not be prudent, yet is also
able to represent or ‘personify’ certain emotions on behalf of other people or causes and thus to ‘feel’ emotionally engaged with their job, the democratic system and the electorate.

You can say things out of turn and this in fact, you create a major sort of sin so you are quite heavily managed, particularly when you are here. I mean personal integrity and self control are probably the biggies for doing a job well … It’s quite a bit of a balance so you learn to kind of keep inside your shell because that’s your protection but at the same time you have to be able to go out and do stuff … (Parliamentarian H).

It is through their ability to deploy all of the repertoires that the ‘ideal’ parliamentarian claims occupational identity but it is only through The Crusade repertoire that vocational authenticity is asserted. Central to vocational authenticity is an understanding of the interconnectedness of occupational identity and self and of ‘genuine’ emotion as that which arises from a self.

… If you want to make a point … speak it from the heart … I never write a speech, never write a speech. It’s written for me by Hansard as I say it … The most important speeches I have ever made – they have come from the heart, they have come from experience (Parliamentarian B).

For the parliamentarian worker, occupational identity overlaps with the sense of self. There is an expectation that the ‘ideal’ worker ought not to have aspects of self identity that conflict with occupational identity. Vocational authenticity is the means through which congruence between the self and occupational identity is asserted. It is through claims to vocational authenticity that parliamentarians understand themselves and are understood by others as “the innerly called leader” (Weber, 1991, p. 79).

When it comes to the performance of vocational authenticity, a performance considered an ‘act’ is a failed performance. An ‘act’ should not be necessary for the worker in possession of vocational authenticity. Instead, their performance of occupational identity ought to be congruent with their own ‘personal’ qualities and therefore they should appear as though they are ‘being themselves’ as opposed to putting on a performance. Parliamentarians meet the need to ‘be’ the ‘ideal’ parliamentarian, and one who possesses vocational authenticity, by presenting their emotions at work as a central aspect of the self.
Practicing passionate rationality

Parliamentarians’ accounts of emotion and rationality can best be understood through the concept of ‘passionate rationality’. I propose this concept informed by James’ (1956) essay on ‘The sentiment of rationality’. I hold that ‘reason’ and ‘emotion’ are, as James argues in regard to ‘intellect’, phenomena that require an understanding that takes account of their mutual constitution through language. James argues that rationality is itself a feeling, identified as a state in which there is a lack of a sense of irrationality (James, 1956, p. 64).

I use the concept of passionate rationality to enjoin both intellect and emotion by understanding rationality as just one of a number of available emotional states. Indeed, the artificial presupposition that a ‘rational’ versus ‘emotional’ argument or a ‘rational’ versus ‘emotional’ actor can be ‘identified’ or understood in any way without at the same time considering the way this understanding takes place through the linguistic resources available leads to difficulties. Such an approach overlooks the methodological dilemmas in researching ‘emotion’. This is not to say that I disregard the physiological aspects of emotional experience. As I explained in Chapter Three, a constructionist perspective does not deny the physical existence of ‘things’ but casts our research interests towards the ways in which the meaning of phenomena is socially located, and constituted in and through social negotiation. In the same way, my analysis here does not deny that social actors understand their emotional experiences as experiences that hold inherent meaning. However, I am interested in how that meaning around emotion is produced.

In parliamentarians’ accounts, informed by a cultural dichotomisation of the terms reason and emotion, parliamentarians emphasise the dual importance of both emotion and rationality for the performance of occupational identity. Lacking the linguistic resources to talk about rationality and emotion together in anything but the falsely dichotomous manner provided by Western culture produces a tension. If to be understood as rational is to be understood as not emotional, or indeed, if to be understood as emotional is to be understood as not rational, then the parliamentarian faces a dilemma. In order to ‘be’ the ‘ideal’ worker in the parliamentary workplace, parliamentarians need to be understood as both rational and emotional, not just at different times but at the same time. Indeed, in a context where there is scepticism
surrounding the parliamentary occupation, passionate rationality is an important means for parliamentarians to counter scepticism and to assert claims to authenticity.

Passionate rationality is a quality of practice belonging to the model of the ideal parliamentarian worker. As workers, they need to perform through the repertoires and the subject positions they make available. Parliamentarians may successfully accomplish some aspects of identity without passionate rationality, but they can never ‘be’ the ‘ideal’ worker without it. Passionate rationality is practiced through The Crusade repertoire and its authentication of emotional experience. It involves the parliamentarian successfully negotiating an understanding of their arguments and actions as ones that are initiated by both ‘heart’ and ‘mind’. Passionate rationality is action that enjoins emotion and reason to achieve an outcome understood as morally ‘just’ as well as instrumentally achievable.

Understanding oneself as the ‘right’ kind of person is necessary for success in the workplace of parliament. Proving one’s sincerity is an impossible task, but the parliamentarian who ‘experiences’ their workplace emotions as a ‘genuine’ display of personal, internal, ‘authentic’ feeling moves toward an understanding of occupational identity as an authentic aspect of self. Understanding their experience of emotion as ‘genuine’ allows them to ‘experience’ their workplace performances as authentic ones and that understanding in turn produces a confident performance. Emotion’s association with the self enables passionate rationality to be recognised as a reflection of vocational authenticity and conversely the parliamentarian who positions themselves through The Crusade repertoire is also understood as the vocationally authentic worker.

Conclusion

Parliamentarians’ flexible deployment of the three interpretative repertoires of The Game, The Performance and The Crusade allows them to make sense of their workplace as one that calls for different ways of understanding and managing emotion at work. Through their use of The Game repertoire, they understand personal attack as simply a part of the game and of little or no personal consequence. The Performance repertoire allows for an understanding of emotion as a necessary communicative aspect of their work. On the other hand, deployment of The Crusade allows the parliamentarian to understand their workplace emotions as extensions of an authentic, inner self and
therefore through this repertoire they can claim emotional commitment to the job and the vocational authenticity of their occupational identity.

The repertoires’ ability to influence institutional knowledge and practice is significant because of the way they constitute knowledge as ‘commonsense’ and organisational practices as the ‘right’ way for things to be done. They produce an understanding of knowledge and practice as incontrovertible forces rather than as shared cultural meanings open to negotiation and change. Likewise, the repertoires constitute the parliamentarian’s ‘ideal’ occupational identity as the means through which workplace success is achieved.

The constitution of the ‘ideal’ parliamentarian calls for the ability to deploy the repertoires in a way that positions the worker as passionately rational. The ideal parliamentarian understands and presents their arguments, and indeed themselves, as emotional ‘and’ rational.

In the following chapter, I examine the importance of the interpretative repertoires in relation to parliamentarians’ accounts of one particular piece of legislation. Using the Civil Union Bill as a case study, I argue that the bill is one opportunity for parliamentarians’ demonstration of passionate rationality and hence as an important bill for positioning as the vocationally ‘authentic’ parliamentarian.
Chapter Seven

Debating the Civil Union Bill:

Asserting Authenticity through Passionate Rationality

Introduction

The interpretative repertoires of The Game, The Performance and The Crusade lend coherence to parliamentarians’ accounts of their experiences by providing a means of understanding the ‘type’ of workplace parliament is and for making sense of their experiences within parliament’s institutional culture. Through these repertoires, ‘real’ or ‘genuine’ emotion, that is emotion understood as a feeling that is an unbidden, internal response in a person, is expressed only through The Crusade repertoire. The Game repertoire allows parliamentarians to manage their emotional experiences at work by understanding emotion as simply a tactical part of a game. The repertoire buffers the effect of personal attacks, rendering them unimportant by-products of competition. The Performance repertoire constitutes emotion as part of a communicative act rather than as something related to authenticity. This repertoire enables the parliamentarian to produce communicative and performative interaction without connecting their performance to a self, thus justifying the instrumental use of emotion. In contrast, The Crusade repertoire produces an understanding of emotion as ‘authentic’ experience. Through this repertoire, emotion results from a confluence of occupational identity with an ‘inner and genuine’ self, creating the possibility for vocational authenticity.

In order to ‘be’ the ideal parliamentarian during a conscience vote, something more than the emotional labour of The Game or Performance repertoires is required from parliamentarians. The Crusade repertoire is a valuable means for parliamentarians to account for the ‘genuine’ nature of their work in an environment where authenticity is under continual scrutiny. In this chapter, I illustrate the contribution the interpretative repertoires make to understanding parliamentarians’ meaning-making by using them to analyse accounts of one particular piece of legislation, the Civil Union Bill. This
analysis shows how parliamentarians used the Civil Union Bill, and its status as a conscience vote, as an opportunity to demonstrate vocational authenticity through The Crusade repertoire and to position themselves as the passionately rational worker. In these accounts, even though the other repertoires are useful for talking about their work, it is The Crusade repertoire and its association with the passionately rational worker that is most powerful for positioning as the ‘authentic’ and ‘ideal’ worker of the parliamentary workplace. Understanding themselves as vocationally authentic supports the production of a ‘self-confident’ performance, something participants have accounted for as an essential part of being an effective parliamentarian.

I begin this chapter by establishing the significance of the Civil Union Bill to the theoretical interests of the thesis. That discussion is followed by an analysis of parliamentarians’ deployment of each of the three repertoires, looking at the consequences of that deployment for understandings of the bill, emotion and the subject positions created by the repertoires’ use. I argue that flexible deployment of the three repertoires is necessary for the parliamentarian’s performance of occupational identity. However, it is the passionate rationality of The Crusade repertoire that is critical for vocational authenticity.

The significance of the Civil Union Bill

In Chapter One, I noted the Civil Union Bill acts as a form of case study for the theoretical interests of the thesis: occupational identity and emotional labour in complex workplaces. This government bill aimed to provide state recognition for same-sex relationships without amending The Marriage Act (1955). As a bill involving issues of discrimination, ‘morality’, categories of personhood, and the right to legal recognition of personal relationships, it is a bill that generated a high level of public interest and controversy. Although the bill was a ‘free’ or conscience vote, there were discernable party leanings with the majority of Labour MPs voting in favour of the bill and the majority of National MPs voting against the bill. In the end, the bill became the Civil Union Act on December 9, 2004. Of the 120 members in the House, there were 65 votes in favour with 55 in opposition.

The Civil Union Bill is one of a number of contentious bills that has been introduced into the House following the introduction of MMP, although only some of those have
been taken as conscience votes. Participants highlighted conscience votes as situations in which the parliamentarian is accountable in a way that is not the same as other bills. As one parliamentarian noted, a parliamentarian might be excused from responsibility as a team member bound by protocol to cooperate with a party position on a whipped bill, but in the case of a conscience vote they are seen as individually responsible for their vote.

... A conscience vote ... that’s an individual decision as opposed to a group decision ... in my view, and a group decision takes on a whole lot of variables and everybody comes to a majority consensus. But with conscience decisions it’s a straight for or against for the individual (Parliamentarian F).

Conscience votes involve a more complex and reflective process than whipped votes. In these situations, workers have to ‘really think about what they are saying’.

... Some of the best debates that have ever happened in my experience in parliament have occurred during a conscience vote – debates on, particularly Prostitution Reform Bill,23 Civil Union Bill, that kind of thing, where people have actually had to really think about what they are saying because it is then they are not doing it under the party line (Parliamentarian B).

Understanding conscience votes as ‘individual’ decisions makes such bills particularly important opportunities for parliamentarians’ vocational authenticity within their performance of occupational identity. The connection between ‘who’ a parliamentarian is and their actions at work is at other times more obtuse as occupational identity (as part of a team or as a part of a group performance) might excuse acting against ‘personal feelings’. A conscience vote, however, is understood as one that demands authenticity and sidelines other relational obligations. Passionate rationality on a conscience bill becomes understood as ‘proof’ of vocational authenticity.

The Civil Union Bill involved parliamentarians in a complex provision of emotional labour for two other reasons. First of all, there was the call from senior parliamentarians to ensure Civil Union Bill deliberations were carried out in ways that separated ‘emotion’ from ‘reason’. Following its introduction and passage through its first reading, Prime Minister Helen Clarke commented in a radio interview that as the bill moved to the select committee stage, it was time to move away from the ‘rhetoric’

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23 The Prostitution Reform Act passed its third reading June 25, 2003. The Private Member’s Bill was a conscience vote that decriminalised prostitution for persons over the age of 18 and further “introduce[d] provisions to protect the health and safety of sex workers and their clients”.
and get down to the ‘evidence’. At the bill’s second reading, the chair of the Justice and Electoral Committee chair made a similar comment. “The role of the committee is to separate emotion from fact” (Hansard, 2004). These two high ranking parliamentarians called for Members of Parliament to practice emotional labour in the manner shaped by institutional emotional culture.

Secondly, the MMP environment in which the Civil Union was debated places additional need for the careful management of emotion in the parliamentarian’s workplace. Since the introduction of MMP, no New Zealand political party has won a sufficient share of the vote to rule alone. The result is that negotiating majority support in the House for bills requires the management of cross-party relationships that prior to MMP was seldom necessary. This means that MMP parliaments are characterised by the need for cross-party coalition agreements, producing the conditions for an increase in the importance of emotion management.

(Under FPP) … committees all had an inbuilt majority just about … where the governing party’s [victory was assured] – now they don’t [have an inbuilt majority]. If this committee needs [minority party] support … it [requires] constantly looking for commonalities [of] interests and I think, generally … we have [to have] some broad agreement [for] parties to join forces in order to govern (Parliamentarian H).

Winning the support of another party requires a degree of inter-party relationship not historically a part of New Zealand’s parliamentary interchange. Through the management of emotion, parliamentarians are able to focus on commonalities with colleagues who at other times are their opponents. Being able to establish one’s vocational authenticity in an environment where negotiation and concessions are necessary is made even more important. Being understood as ‘passionately rational’ contributes to a parliamentarian’s recognition as one who answers a ‘calling’.

Both conscience votes and the MMP environment then, place extra importance on the parliamentarian’s practice of passionate rationality. As argued in Chapter Six, vocational authenticity and ‘passionate rationality’ are important means of establishing a position as the “innerly called leader” (Weber, 1991, p. 79). The passionately rational parliamentarian is required to deploy the interpretative repertoires variably during the

Civil Union Bill’s deliberations by being both emotional ‘and’ rational. The bill offered parliamentarians an opportunity to establish their ‘inner calling’ by demonstrating the authenticity of their emotion in relation to the bill. In the discussion to follow, I demonstrate that it is through The Crusade repertoire and its attendant subject position of the Knight that parliamentarians establish vocational authenticity.

Making sense of the bill through the repertoires

Some bills generate more public interest than others and conscience votes invariably attract a high level of interest from the public as well as special interest lobby groups. By virtue of the public and media interest such bills receive, there is an attendant increase in the complexity of parliamentarians’ emotion management as they act to position themselves, and their opponents, in particular ways. I have explained the Civil Union Bill as one such bill, requiring the parliamentarian to work to contain and express the emotions they think best suited to supporting their identity claims.

The acceptability of emotion in the parliamentary workplace is shaped by cultural understandings of emotion and reason as dichotomous, and of a tendency to accord greater power to those who act to position themselves as rational rather than emotional subjects. Yet, in order to claim vocational authenticity, parliamentarians must be able to position themselves as both rational ‘and’ emotional actors. Deployment of the interpretative repertoires contributes to as well as helps to resolve this tension. Within The Game the expression of emotion is largely discouraged, while within The Performance emotion is needed in order to bring off a convincing act, even though the audience and the actors may understand emotion as part of an act. Within The Crusade repertoire, however, ‘genuine’ emotional commitment to the work is essential. Deploying The Crusade repertoire involves demonstrating the authenticity of that emotion as part of the claim to vocational authenticity.

The ability to align one’s emotional state in relation to the appropriate feeling rules supports parliamentarians’ understandings of themselves as the ‘right’ kind of worker. The way the Civil Union Bill is made sense of within parliamentarians’ accounts will next be explained by attending to the three interpretative repertoires and their consequences for how the bill, emotion and the parliamentarian’s work are understood. Table 7.1 below summarises the discussion to follow.
Table 7.1 Understanding outcomes of the interpretative repertoires for the Civil Union Bill.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interpretative repertoires</th>
<th>Constitutes the bill as:</th>
<th>Constitutes emotion as:</th>
<th>Creates the subject positions of:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Game</td>
<td>A competitive game of tactics</td>
<td>Tactical response or out-of-bounds</td>
<td>Tacticians, Team Mates and Game Players</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Performance</td>
<td>A personally scripted performance</td>
<td>A performance technique</td>
<td>Star Performers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Crusade</td>
<td>A crucial moral battle</td>
<td>The motivation for taking action</td>
<td>Knights and Enemies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Civil Union Bill understood through The Game repertoire

The Game repertoire acts as an emotional buffer by providing parliamentarians with a means for understanding *ad hominem* debate as simply the way the game of politics is played. In regard to the Civil Union Bill, it continued to serve as a means for containing emotion. The Game repertoire had three outcomes within parliamentarians’ accounts of the Civil Union Bill. It provided the conditions for the bill to be understood as a tactical exercise. The repertoire also asserted an understanding of emotion as a largely irrelevant by-product of the game. Emotion becomes something best managed in a way that does not distract the member in their game-playing capacity when in public settings and as outside the boundaries of the less public select committee. Finally, by invoking an understanding of workers through game metaphors, the repertoire enabled parliamentarians to position actors in three different ways: as Team Mates, as Game Players and lastly as what I call, in keeping with game tropes, the Tactician.
The bill as a competitive game of tactics

The Game repertoire allows parliamentarians to make sense of the Civil Union Bill as a competitive match but the teams to which parliamentarians belong are not identifiable expressly by party affiliation. Indeed, the teams made salient by the bill are those comprising individual parliamentarians either for or against the bill. The Game repertoire involves understanding emotion as a by-product of little importance, except when it is used as a baiting tactic to get a response from opposing team members that puts them ‘off their game’. In reply to a question about how one parliamentarian found the experience of facing detractors of the bill, they said:

I didn’t want to resile from [the face to face interaction]. I relished it! I welcomed the opportunity. … No I’m not going to lose [it in public] … Some people … wanted me to sort of get angry … – but, no, no, no. Integrity had to be maintained (Parliamentarian B).

By understanding the emotional aspects of workplace experience via The Game repertoire, parliamentarians understand emotional reaction as undesirable and challenges as opportunities to be welcomed. In keeping with the feeling rules of The Game, ‘personal’ feelings in support for the bill are inconsequential and the focus is instead on ‘winning’ the encounter. Being able to contain emotion by understanding the encounter as a tactical game enables the worker to avoid unwanted emotional expression and understand themselves as the victor in the exchange.

Understanding legislative work as rational has high currency in the political environment (Hoggett, 2001). The need to separate ‘emotion’ from the ‘facts’ in the select committee process positions reason as the appropriate emotional state from which parliamentarians should present argument in the select committee while allowing emotion to be employed tactically within the House.25

I … use that element … in the House, delivering a speech, if you want to make a point … (Parliamentarian B).

In contrast to the House, the select committee context involves understanding the Civil Union Bill as a game of tactical argumentation. This paves the way for emotion, as it is constructed through commonsense meaning, to be understood as superfluous to the task of decision-making.

25 The understanding of this need to separate ‘emotion’ from ‘fact’ also establishes the House as a different place where socially negotiated rules for that location allow the overt display of a variety of emotions.
And, I felt … someone needs to be looking at [the Civil Union Bill] as a technical piece of law. How do these provisions hang together? Will it be enforceable? Does it do what they claim it does? Does it do things that no-one’s looking at? To me, that’s the … legislators’ rational evaluation … (Parliamentarian C).

Through this interpretative repertoire then, the work that takes part in select committee is subject to rules that are different to those that apply in the House. In the select committee, negotiation takes place through ‘technical’ arguments aligned with the ‘rational’.

Overall, the deliberation of the Civil Union Bill, with emotional performance reserved for the House and rational performances predominating in select committee, was accounted for in the following way by a participant.

It was still about rallying your arguments. It was about finding the flash points, it was about politically knowing the timing of when to speak, when is it valuable? Is it … [time] to roll you sleeves up and join in or do you leave it to those that it’s their personal – so it was only about timing, the right arguments, knowing the trends of how the country’s sensitivity is going towards it and then saying ‘well, I’m not here to stuff around. … So, no, it was no different … (Parliamentarian D).

Here, the Civil Union Bill is a bill like any other that requires employing the ‘right’ arguments to convince others of the verisimilitude of a person’s opinions. The need to read the ‘sensitivity’ of the electorate is understood as a tactical task in assessing the advisability of a given action.

Emotion as either tactical response or ‘out of bounds’

The Game repertoire constitutes emotions as phenomena related to internal or private characteristics that have the potential to make a person ‘vulnerable’. Deployment of the repertoire also involves understanding emotion as something that ought not to overtly or ‘erroneously’ influence the deliberation of public policy. Emotion is therefore either managed as a tactical response to the rules of the public side of the game or ruled out of bounds in the legislative game. In either case, the repertoire establishes an occupational expectation for the parliamentarian’s maintenance of a feeling state of rationality.

Here, the feeling rules suggested by The Game repertoire are first of all that ‘personal’ emotions have the capacity to weaken a parliamentarian’s argument and judgement and that a better way to achieve one’s goals in this place is to appear tactical. Through this
repertoire, emotion has the potential to distort tactical decision making, thus the ‘ideal’ parliamentarian should distance themselves from emotion and frame their ‘feelings’ as rational when operating in their legislative capacities. One supporter of the bill said:

I tried my best to make sure that the legislation went through … but [some committee members] were hoping to catch [supporters of the bill] out in terms of being overtly supportive or hostile to some submitters. That’s all about the self control thing I guess … you want the people who are the most hostile to the bill to feel as though they have been respected and honoured and listened to (Parliamentarian H).

In terms of The Game repertoire, to have been ‘caught out’ allowing emotion to influence ruling decisions, would have raised questions for the parliamentarian’s integrity and their ability to ‘play’ according to the rules. In order to play the game, the worker is required to control their own feelings in regards both to submitters who hold to the same stance on the bill and to those who are hostile to their stance. This involves containing emotions such as like and dislike and displaying others such as concern for submitters’ democratic right to be heard regardless of their position.

**Team Mate, Game Players and Tacticians**

Through The Game repertoire parliamentarians are understood as Team Mates, Game Players and Tacticians. Some participants talked about the difficulty they saw in the bill’s debate for parliamentarians who were open about being homosexual. They expressed concern for team mates’ welfare when faced with the judgements implied in bill opponents’ comments.

I actually offered to [do that work] for them so that they didn’t have to go through that but they were willing to see it through. My respect for them is enormous … They did really well (Parliamentarian A).

I really felt for them. I died every day for them because I just felt that people were so disrespectful. I was just so proud of them. I admired them so much and respected them (Parliamentarian D).

Understood through The Game repertoire, the Team Mate position creates little resistance. However, when the notion of the parliamentarian as a Game Player is used to position other MPs in the workplace, there is an implication of someone who practices their work in an insincere way, in a way that challenges a worker’s vocational authenticity. One participant commented that the way the Civil Union Bill supporters negotiated their case said to them that the bill itself was not the only issue.
I thought that [their actions], to me, said their agenda really is smacking around the other side (Parliamentarian C).

The interpretative repertoire works here to position supporters of the Civil Union Bill as Game Players by suggesting first of all that they have an ‘agenda’ and secondly that their agenda is an insincere one; not so much to do with social justice, which is the claim they make, but instead to ‘smack’ their parties’ opponents. The smack is achieved by positioning those who oppose the bill as people who are withholding the accordance of human rights to a minority group based on their own moral position around rights for gay and lesbian people.

Understanding of the Civil Union Bill as a tactical game and of rationality as the preferable emotional state for the parliamentarian worker makes available various subject positions that have consequences for occupational identity. Being positioned as the Tactician of the game, the occupational identity asserted is a worker suited to the task at hand. Claiming this identity simultaneously positions one’s opponents, whether other parliamentarians or members of the public, as ‘not’ able to demonstrate the preferred emotional state and as less well suited to the task at hand. Both proponents and opponents of the Civil Union Bill deployed this repertoire. For example, one parliamentarian, a bill opponent, noted:

[This bill] had a very strong emotional content and it was saying ‘I’m human, I’m not scary, I’m law abiding, my community, my family – perhaps some have repudiated me, [but] I want this law because I want to be more respected, I want more dignity’. Now, I don’t see those as fact arguments … This is a particular view of what you use law for and I don’t think it’s the right use of law but that’s a question of ideology and … philosophy so I don’t regard them as illegitimate in drawing those things together it’s just at the wrong end of where I want to see the law being used. To me it attracts everyone else into using the law for the same purposes and ultimately it’s not stable … (Parliamentarian C).

The Game repertoire here constitutes the work of the select committee as a technical exercise in the production of law where the consequences of the bill need to be logically laid out and assessed. The repertoire establishes an understanding of the participant as a team tactician concerned with the overarching implications of the bill and its relationship to law. In opposing the bill, they are positioned as logical and the bill’s supporters as emotional. Law is constituted through a common Western discourse as something that is about ‘fact’, standing antithetically to emotion.
On the other hand, the deployment of The Game repertoire by supporters of the bill also positioned the bill’s opponents as emotional and illogical. Following the comment that bill opponents were people who practiced ‘emotional overspin’ and based their arguments on ‘faith’ rather than ‘research’, a bill supporter commented:

I believe there’s no rational argument against the bill … [People who are against it] should say, ‘I’m homophobic, I can’t overcome this, and therefore I can’t approve … or I have a deep religious belief and that’s my starting point’ … (Parliamentarian H).

Another parliamentarian, commenting on their response to the bill’s success, noted:

Well, what was all the fuss about? Really, what is all the fuss about? [Is it logical?] Yes. You know, what really is the problem? … It’s a basic human right (Parliamentarian B).

The need to separate emotion from fact in the legislative process was suggested by a number of parliamentarians. One participant, acknowledging the difficulty of this task, commented on the negotiable nature of ascertaining ‘fact’.

[The suggestion that the select committee] separates emotion from fact [is] certainly only half true in the sense that we did manage to find some facts but, having said that, often the facts were the ones that the majority judged to be factual [rather than something that could be achieved through] factual analysis (Parliamentarian H).

This account constitutes facts as things that are understood to be ‘fact’ through a process of social negotiation. Thus, understanding the Civil Union Bill through the Game repertoire situates the Tactician and their instrumental approach as a particularly valuable part of a team. Understanding the bill through The Performance repertoire carries different possibilities for understanding than does The Game repertoire.

The Civil Union Bill understood through The Performance repertoire

The Performance repertoire has previously been described as enabling an understanding of parliamentary work as a communicative performance. In relation to the Civil Union Bill debate, The Performance repertoire established the notion that the bill’s debate has both front and back regions, each with different rules for emotional performance. The need to convey one’s own or the party’s message through performance involves understanding the choice of emotive words or stories as necessary ‘stage props’ for front region performances, without necessarily equating the use of such resources as
duplicitous action. The Performance repertoire justified the implementation of emotional performances as a necessary aspect of doing the job of parliamentarian.

It’s about how you’re going to use emotion, if you’re going to use it at all (Parliamentarian B).

It’s about salesmanship (sic) (Parliamentarian G).

This repertoire is employed to make sense of the public or front stage element of the parliamentarian’s work and makes sense of emotion as necessary to that aspect of the job, though not necessarily as an aspect connected to the personal ‘self’. Emotion is used as the means for conveying a message.

The bill as a scripted performance

The Civil Union Bill required parliamentarians to consider the feeling rules that apply to the setting and to script their performances accordingly. Interaction in front stage regions such as the House, when understood through The Performance repertoire, follows feeling rules that allow for the use of emotional arguments or what participants call ‘rhetoric’. Although some select committee meetings are conducted in public, these meetings have far less visibility, making them a qualified back region and not the appropriate place for emotional performances.

Drawing on The Performance repertoire, a participant understood the wording of the Civil Union Bill itself as a form of scripted performance designed to portray the legislation in a particular way. Through this repertoire, supporters of the bill are constituted as giving an insincere performance.

I thought it was quite a neat device to avoid directly trashing the feelings of those who felt that marriage was their sacrament. But when they were divided (the Civil Union Bill from the Statutory Relationships Bill) and we dealt with one months before the other, it just offended me … (Parliamentarian C).

Using The Performance repertoire, the Civil Union Bill’s separation from the Relationships (Statutory References) Bill, 26 and the passage of the one without the

26 Amongst the issues the Civil Union Bill and the Relationships (Statutory References) Bill addressed were both the advantages and disadvantages accorded to people in same-sex relationships. Disadvantages included not only the inability to enter into a state-sanctioned relationship but also difficulty claiming things such as next of kin status when partners were admitted to hospital, bereavement leave and other associated citizenship rights. The advantages included the eligibility of people in same-sex relationships for state support such as unemployment benefits even though they were in committed relationships. The Civil Union Bill addressed the disadvantages and the Relationships (Statutory References) Bill addressed the advantages. However, the latter required more work than could be achieved in the time left prior to
other, becomes understood as an indication of an ‘artificial’ performance. The repertoire allows for the interpretation of the bills’ supporters as actors involved in a performance that is simply a ‘device’ designed to avoid directly offending those who opposed the bill on the grounds that it was ‘gay marriage’. Thus, the choice of wording for the bill is understood as an attempt at the management of the oppositions’ emotions, albeit unsuccessful in the opinion of this participant.

The front stage performance required of parliamentarians is generally scripted through caucus agreement or instructions from seniors in the party hierarchy. Once a caucus decision has been made on the party’s position, parliamentarians are expected to conduct their front stage performances according to the script, except in the case of conscience votes. Although the production of the party ‘line’ as a performance may be superficial, in comparison, a conscience vote requires parliamentarians to ‘really think’ about their performance and that performance is understood as ‘personally’ scripted rather than scripted by others.

In the previous chapter, The Performance repertoire was deployed to account for the different regions of the parliamentarian’s workplace, with different attendant expectations for emotional performance. In the following extract, a parliamentarian speaking in the small group interview deployed The Performance repertoire by emphasising the performative aspect of the bill’s House debate as something different from the ‘content’ of the debate.

The content of what we are hearing is not [being debated] … it is arguing cut-outs, it’s arguing … we are down to delicate name calling … saying we’re liberals, we’re not homophobes, and … the other side saying we’re traditionalists and we don’t like being told that our traditional institutions are going to be co-opted (Parliamentarian C).

Instead of being about the details of the bill, House debate becomes about appearances or ‘cut-outs’, and the performative characteristic of debate leads to interaction centred not on the particularities of the bill but on ‘name-calling’. Another parliamentarian followed up these comments of the debate that followed the second reading of the bill by noting:

the 2004 election. The two bills were separated and the Civil Union Act passed in December 2004 with the Relationships (Statutory References) Act following in 2005.
This part of the debate is actually … not … about the technicalities of the bill …
If the Select Committee has done its job right then the technical detail thing is a relatively minor part of the debate anyway (Parliamentarian A).

Through The Performance repertoire the performative aspect of the House is understood as appropriate while the select committee is understood as the fitting place for ‘technical’ details to be sorted.

In the following example, the performative aspect of the bill’s debate is highlighted through The Performance repertoire.

It’s very hard because so much is like a sermon. It’s given [like] the rhetoric given in a sermon, and I think we get caught up in some rhetoric too … Actually there’s a perception that, you know, what you are saying isn’t actually the fact. We are constantly scurrying off to the Research Unit, to the Library … or checking it back in your own electorate just to see what’s happening. No, so what becomes the message is very hard [to change] once the perception becomes reality it’s very hard to get enough fact that tips it back beyond that perception to reality … it’s … about … galvanising your facts (Parliamentarian D).

Through this repertoire, a tension is created between ‘reality’ and ‘perception’. First, acknowledging that rhetoric is not only employed by other parties but also by their own party members, the parliamentarian alludes to the performative aspect of the job through the metaphor of a sermon. At the same time, The Performance repertoire constitutes parliamentary work as work that is best performed through the intellectualisation of authenticity. The importance of getting the script right is related to the power of ‘perception’ once a performance has been made. The power comes from the ability of a persuasive performance to lead to a particular public understanding that is difficult to change once it has been taken up through popular use and repetition.

Emotion as a performance technique

The Performance repertoire offers parliamentarians two opportunities in regard to the Civil Union Bill debate. It is an opportunity for a front stage performance designed to achieve the actors’ desired outcome. It is also an opportunity to demonstrate their knowledge about the boundaries between the different regions or between ‘public’ emotion and ‘private’ reason. Demonstrating their understanding of this boundary supports the parliamentarian’s claim to occupational identity.
Through The Performance repertoire, the Civil Union Bill is understood as a situation within which the use of emotion for the performance of the parliamentarian’s work is to be expected.

It’s not hard in … matters [such as the Civil Union Bill] to use this kind of emotion sometimes (Parliamentarian B).

One consequence is that emotion becomes associated with the public aspects of the bill’s debate within the House and in front of the media, but ‘emotional’ performances during the select committee process are not called for. Instead, emotional displays at select committee are more likely to be interpreted by other parliamentarians as ‘playing politics’ inappropriately. The emotion least likely to be considered inappropriate in the select committee environment is the emotional state of rationality.

[Arguments against a bill in select committee] are not going to be won on the emotional level because you are actually fighting the other side. What I actually admire about [a parliamentarian] … – they do intellectualise the issues and will debate them to get the best possible result, … to improve the bill, so they don’t take politics on select committee … you feel like they have done the right thing … made that contribution (Parliamentarian A).

As well as identifying the different rules for the games played in front stage arenas like the House and back stage arenas such as the select committee, the deployment of The Performance repertoire allows for another important suggestion. An ‘intellectual’ performance is associated with rationality and therefore becomes a means of asserting occupational identity. Through the repertoire, the House is identified as a work environment distinct from the select committee, where the only concessions that can be won are those that appeal to the ‘intellect’ of other committee members. At the same time, in the above extract The Performance repertoire results in positioning a parliamentarian from an opposing party as the ‘right’ kind of worker by virtue of their recognition that the select committee is not the place for certain kinds of performance. Indeed, understood through The Performance repertoire, the parliamentarian’s recognition of this difference positions them as one who understands in which situation ‘authentic’ practice is the only acceptable performance.

The Star Performer

Parliamentarians account for the use of emotion in front stage discussions of the Civil Union Bill as a necessary performance technique for getting across their message.
People can see in my eyes, in my expression, when I talk and when I flare and the way I sit and conduct myself … and I’ll talk in an understated way and I might raise the voice a little bit. But I will control it because it’s [public] and it’s a different way of communicating with people and getting a point across. … [With the Civil Union Bill] I didn’t flicker for a moment in that (Parliamentarian B).

In this account, The Performance repertoire is deployed through references to matters of appearance and communication. The repertoire constitutes emotion as something that can be controlled in order to bring off a communicative performance. An outcome of this repertoire is that it offers an opportunity to position parliamentarians as the Star Performer through both their appropriate expression and containment of emotion.

Through The Performance repertoire parliamentarians are able to understand themselves as appropriately emotional performers when they are in the public eye. The ability to conduct a persuasive performance is a central aspect of the job. A persuasive performance is held as one that has the ability to ‘sell’ the message of the script, regardless of whether it is a script produced by other party members or the parliamentarian themselves. As one parliamentarian commented:

I constantly worry about how I come across to the public] because I’m a salesman. I have to sell [our party’s] programme so I’m constantly worried that I’m not doing it as successfully as I could [be]. I have to be re-elected every three years in my constituency. I have to sell myself there so I constantly am on alert to ‘Can I do this better? Can I do it in a different way’? Constantly, I have to hope that I have persuaded them that the programme we are offering … is one that people will support … I have to sell what I want to do … you must show that you are a hard worker because ultimately you are in the hands of others judging you for what you deliver – particularly now under the process we have of MMP where people can vote for you as an individual and for a different party if they want to … It’s a profession, an occupation if you like, that is very dependent on public opinion and so you have to be very responsive … (Parliamentarian G).

Not all parliamentarians are adept at the production of performance and even those who are may, at some point, put in a poor performance. The prospect of a failed performance is a constant companion.

The Performance repertoire constitutes the bill as a performance opportunity in the House and justifies the deployment of emotion in support of an actor’s on-stage performance but also requires in the back stage select committee the presentation of ‘rational’ argumentation. Which emotions are employed in the performance:
depends on which way you want to manipulate the speech and if you want to be kind and generous and sound most sincere and pious … as opposed to … [angry] (Parliamentarian B).

‘Kindness’, ‘generosity’ and ‘sincerity’ are usefully deployed in the parliamentarians account above of a House performance, whereas at other times it is ‘rationality’ that informs as is deployed through performance.

[We’ve] actually had to justify whatever position you took to people within your own party who’ve got very strong feelings (Parliamentarian C).

[Convincing submitters] took quite a lot of on-going conversations with quite a number of submitters (Parliamentarian E).

By understanding the bill through The Performance repertoire, Parliamentarian C positions themselves as a performer learning the lines necessary to convince others of the veracity of their position, first of all in relation to their own colleagues. Parliamentarian E’s self-positioning through the repertoire leads to an account of the need for ‘on-going’ performances aimed to persuade opponents to their position on the bill.

When it came to speaking to other parliamentarians outside of the House in an effort to convince them to support the bill, a parliamentarian said that it was not their job this time because:

There were other people doing that (Parliamentarian E).

Though this participant did not identify themselves as the one doing the performing, they did position other of their colleagues as occupiers of that position.

Understanding parliamentary work through The Performance repertoire constitutes the Civil Union Bill as a scripted performance where different emotions are enacted in order to bring off a convincing presentation of occupational identity. That identity calls for the practice of particular emotional displays when in front stage regions compared to back stage regions including the select committee meeting. Front stage, both ‘anger’ and ‘piousness’ may be employed as a communicative technique but in the back stage of the select committee it is the emotional state of ‘rationality’ that supports occupational identity claims.
The Civil Union Bill understood through The Crusade repertoire

The last repertoire to be considered for its influence on the Civil Union Bill debate is The Crusade. The deployment of The Game and The Performance repertoires are important means of understanding the Civil Union Bill debate and parliamentarians’ accomplishment of occupational identity through passionate rationality requires an ability to deploy all three of the repertoires. It is, however, within The Crusade repertoire that emotion is understood as the motivation for social action. It is the understanding of emotion as something associated with an ‘inner’ and ‘genuine’ self within this repertoire that allows the parliamentarian to be positioned as vocationally authentic. The Crusade repertoire and its ability to shape the understanding of a parliamentarian’s emotions as ‘belonging’ to the self and as the motivators for social action make vocational authenticity possible.

The Crusade repertoire constitutes work within parliament generally as a battle for power and supremacy and invokes metaphors of war, mortality and morality. In relation to the Civil Union Bill, parliamentarians talk about not wanting to ‘resile’ from the battle of controversy, of ‘dying every day’ for a fellow campaigner facing attack, and of parliamentarians on the other side of the debate as people of dubious moral standard. It is within this repertoire that the occupational identity of the parliamentarian is cast most explicitly in moral terms. The Crusade repertoire constitutes the Civil Union Bill debate as a battle between two sides, with both sides understanding the battle as a moral crusade for what is ‘right’. Three outcomes of The Crusade repertoire for understanding this particular bill are that parliamentary work becomes a symbolic battle, emotion becomes understood as the motivation for social action (regardless of the potential cost to the individual worker), and the ‘ideal’ parliamentarian subject can be understood through notions of the Knight in contrast with an imperfect and immoral Enemy.

Through The Crusade repertoire, parliamentarians are no longer positioned as ‘logical’ Tacticians, or as communicators producing a performance. Parliamentarians become passionate defenders of justice against Enemies on the other side. Strong or passionate emotion is hence central to The Crusade repertoire and to the authenticity of parliamentarians as ‘good’ workers. Conscience votes are especially important means
of ‘checking out’ authenticity because of the expectations around ‘individual’ decision-making, and the emotion they make so apparent. One parliamentarian commented that:

A conscience vote means you are touched … That’s a fascinating process (Parliamentarian H).

The bill as a moral battle

In The Game repertoire, the interpretation of the rules of the game is important, but in The Crusade repertoire, the interpretation of principles is primary. The Crusade repertoire involves a focus on the morality of actions, on the ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ of events and incidents. The deployment of this repertoire in parliamentarians’ accounts is carried out through the use of language with strong moral overtones. Parliamentarians are no longer simply people doing a job but, as will be shown in a moment, as righteous Knights rising to the defence of the helpless and good. Opponents to one’s position are positioned as people of lesser moral standing than oneself. Through The Crusade repertoire an understanding is supported that positions the provider of the account as the one on an appropriately ‘high’ moral ground in contrast to those with whom they disagree.

… I got more driven than I ever imagined [during the Civil Union Bill debate] and I found it brought up the ugliest side of humanity. There were times after that debate when I came back [into my office] and I wanted to go and have a shower. I couldn’t believe that we had such an ugly underbelly of society in this country (ParliamentarianD).

Parliamentarians opposing the bill are positioned through The Crusade repertoire here as the ‘ugly underbelly’ of society, positioning the participant as clean or ‘pure’. Through the metaphor of the ‘shower’ the distaste of the opposition is understood and their position as one that is ‘dirty’ is asserted.

Through the Crusade repertoire, the Civil Union Bill is understood as a matter of ‘fundamental principle’. Deployment of The Crusade repertoire in the following account positions the participant’s opposition to the bill as the appropriate moral stance to take because conscience votes ‘ought’ to be decided based on the moral principle of governance for the greater good versus governance for the minority.

Essentially, it comes down to me making a decision in the national good – for the greater good … because that’s what I understand governance to be. It’s for the good of the nation as a whole. Whereas the Civil Union Bill was a bill that was centred around a small group of people. People being gay is not an issue for me. … [but] I want to, if I can in any way, promote … the common concept of
family, which is mum, dad and the kids … because I think that’s fundamental to our civilisation – just to the whole of humanity … so I just came back to that fundamental principle of making decisions which are governing in the best interest of the nation as a whole and not in the best interest of a minority group. … I wanted to support [gay] people … but … I had to make a call on that one … (Parliamentarian E).

In addition to constituting an understanding of the bill through The Crusade repertoire as a matter of the ‘greater good’, this participant positions themselves on a moral high ground by constituting the bill as one that is about ‘family’ as opposed to about ‘people being gay’.

Although it is through The Crusade repertoire that parliamentarians are able to defend what is ‘right’ against the ‘ugly side of humanity’, the repertoire also constitutes the choices they have to make as complex, of crucial moral importance, making deciding what is ‘right’ a fraught affair. In employing this repertoire, the difficult decisions that are a part of everyday parliamentary work life are understood as sensitive moral ones because they are not about deciding what is obviously right and wrong but instead are about deciding what is ‘bad or worse’.

There’s constant moral dilemmas. Do I fight on the principle today with the risk that I might not live to fight again another day? I’m often choosing between two – there’s very rarely a choice between good and bad. There’s often a choice between bad and worse. Which is worse? How much of my own personal self interest is it legitimate to inject into that. When I am deciding [how] … to vote … I know that there is very active monitoring group out there, Christians, who will decide that I am bad [if I] vote one way. On the other hand there are a whole lot of liberals whose views are important as well to me who would not understand any vote other than the vote the other way. The actual vote is on a bill that none of them have ever read. There are complexities in it that they don’t even know … (Parliamentarian C).

Following on from someone else’s talk about conscience votes during the small group interview, a parliamentarian noted:

There’s more room for disappointment though. I’ve never seen anything like this [the Civil Union Bill]. I mean I heard about it in the past on conscience votes but not people playing politics with their own conscience was just beyond the … (Parliamentarian A).

I think you made, but again you went, you essentially, it was in the genre ‘look at me. I’m not an ogre. I want to be treated in a way that shows the community doesn’t regard me as despicable… How can you bear to repress me?’ Well, it was well made but that was a theme that then got repeated lots of times … That
speech just went on and on and on. And on the other side was ‘I believe in the future, that kids come first, that families have to be strengthened’. I mean, it was just sick (Parliamentarian C).

Through The Crusade repertoire, an understanding of both opponents and proponents of the bill as taking the wrong ‘moral’ approach to the bill is possible. Another participant similarly criticises both sides in the House, and even their own speech, understanding the level of debate as ‘pathetic’ and unworthy of this symbolic setting where “[wrestling] with the arguments” ought to be the purpose of debate.

Well, I’m angry. I haven’t been in the House. I thought I would have been in the House all the time and I’ve … made one pathetic speech and left. I just simply get quite angry. I just think the level of debate is bad, and I think it is a totally stupid debate and I don’t think it does any of us proud to be honest. … I think each of us were sitting down feeling demeaned by the experience because we’ve actually wrestled with some of these arguments … because it hasn’t been party aligned. You’ve actually had to justify whatever position you took to people within your own party who’ve got very strong feelings. So, you might have practised most of the arguments and then expected this debate to be the occasion when you’d crystallise it. It’s pathetic (Parliamentarian C).

The deployment of The Crusade repertoire in this instance does not only involve positing other parties and their policies in terms of the morality of their actions, but also holds parliamentary interaction up to the scrutiny of democratic principles.

Emotion as motivation for action

The Crusade repertoire accounts for emotion as a ‘genuine’ experience that arises from within a person, compelling them to act in a way that is in keeping with the moral stance of their ‘feeling’ self. Within this repertoire, emotion becomes an inherently moral phenomenon. The repertoire frames work decisions and issues as matters of symbolic significance and interchange with the other side as skirmishes that ought not to distract them from the overall goals of the campaign.

For me it was passionate, very emotional … I saw it very much as a civil rights issue, not just for the gay and lesbian communities, but for all New Zealanders, because it was about the recognition [of difference], that diversity and individual rights are very important … It was a greater philosophical question … so I found it very difficult to sit in the Chamber and listen to nonsense that I had [so often fought] against … I found that quite hard to manage in the chamber and sometimes … I just got so angry. I kept telling myself … don’t lose sight of the goals you want to achieve’ (Parliamentarian G).
Neglecting to rise to the challenge of defending the moral position of a parliamentarian’s emotions is to fail, to ignore the call to arms and to therefore detract from the campaign.

If I had the opportunity [to speak out in support of the bill] and I didn’t use it ... Who would I fail? …You say enough is enough please. And that’s what others and that really gets to me. I suppose that’s the passion – the one sort of thing that drives a person to say. Look it would be so easy to just sort of walk away and then something comes along and you think no, no, I can’t. I’m here now. What if I didn’t and, you know. And the cost of that is personal (Parliamentarian B).

Parliamentarians account for the conviction of their emotions around what is ‘right’ as something that insists on particular action if they are to maintain an understanding of themselves as one who possesses vocational authenticity. As a participant noted in an earlier chapter, the parliamentarian who doubts their own sincerity in relation to the work that they do can suffer a blow that makes it difficult for them to take part in the on-going performance of occupational identity. It is important for the parliamentarian to maintain a sense of vocational authenticity and of being morally ‘right’.

You are weighing a whole range of pressures – the pressure from competing constituencies … the pressure of time, the pressure of your colleagues … the pressure from your own desire for intellectual integrity (Parliamentarian C).

The following account includes the deployment of The Game and The Crusade repertoires. The participant is both the Tactician and the Knight. ‘Emotion’ initiates their stance on the bill, positioning them as the Knight, but the Tactician evaluates whether it is ‘a good idea’.

With something like the Civil Union Bill there was an awful lot of emotion but … if I had started to look at the research and had seen that it was actually going to make things worse I wouldn’t have supported it. Even though my initial reaction to it was ‘this is a good idea’. Well, if I looked at the research and it [hadn’t said] that yes, children can grow up in same sex families actually then I would have had a struggle between the emotional things that … said, yes, and the facts, which would have said ‘no, this isn’t a good idea’. Which is what you always have. I mean, everyone has that. People who say that they only, there’s no room for emotion, you are constantly weighing up what you are feeling and what the evidence shows. In a lot of areas the evidence can be conflicting and this is one area I felt the evidence wasn’t at all conflicting. The evidence that the research in this area was quite clear, and a lot of the emotion that was coming out wasn’t based on any fact. A lot of it was based on people’s faith but that’s fine (Parliamentarian E).
This participant’s stance on the bill is a passionately rational one. They constitute their position on the bill as an ‘emotional’ one but also one backed by ‘unconflicting evidence’. That ‘evidence’ contained in the research was ‘clear’ compared to the arguments of opposition to the bill that was not ‘based on any fact’. This parliamentarian employs a presentation of meaning that holds ‘science’ and ‘research’ as the ‘sensible’ basis on which to make a decision on the Civil Union Bill. They draw upon The Game repertoire in acting to position the bill as a game of logic in which the affirmative side has won the argument and they draw The Crusade repertoire by suggesting emotion as an initial motivator of action. Most importantly, by drawing on an understanding of this bill through both The Game repertoire and The Crusade repertoire, the participant demonstrates their ability to practice passionate rationality, where ‘feeling’ and ‘thought’ work together to produce a decision that not only seems logical but that is also devoid of any feeling of irrationality (James, 1956).

Knights and Enemies

In constituting the Civil Union Bill as a moral battle, The Crusade repertoire establishes the conditions for understanding workers as necessarily moral or immoral and produces the possibility of Knight and Enemy subject positions.

Credibility had to be maintained but my seething anger, my underlying outrage at … intentions to dismantle human rights … No way am I going to sit back quietly and let that occur without … being able to challenge it (Parliamentarian B).

The Crusade repertoire makes possible this parliamentarian’s understanding of themselves as the Knight and those who oppose the bill as the Enemy to be faced. The subject position of the Knight is constituted as one who is passionate, ready to rise to defence but also wise in battle, knowing the most effective time to take action. On the other hand, this participant’s extract acts to position the Enemy whose ‘intentions’ [are] to ‘dismantle’ something as basic as human rights, as immoral.

Another participant’s account made coherent through The Crusade repertoire positions them as a worker that does not take an ‘academic’ or tactical approach, but takes an approach informed by compassion for electorate members. The Crusade repertoire invokes emotion as a central motivator for action. These next comments were made following on from an account of the emotional aspects of the Civil Union Bill.
I mean you have to consider the effect that you are having on people when you pass legislation. Some people think you should come out with a more academic point of view but, personally, I never tend to think in the theoretical, I always think ‘how’s this actually going to affect people who I know who are concerned about this, not happy with it?’ When you are on a select committee, as well, you can’t help but see the effect that you have on people when they come along to make personal submissions. Some of whom are more emotive than others, obviously, but at the end of the day I think it is all about, none us would be here if it wasn’t for the emotion that we have. The only thing that really keeps you going in a job like this is how angry the other side make you and how good you feel when you do something – when your party does something that you really believe in – and that’s all of us. If we didn’t have that you just wouldn’t be here – you’d burn up (Parliamentarian E).

Through The Crusade repertoire, this participant positions themselves as the Knight who is someone that feels and ‘believes’ in the cause. They account for the consideration process as one that includes ‘thinking’ as well as feeling through consideration of how legislation will ‘affect’ the people who are concerned. The parliamentarian worker who positions the self as the Knight and who understands their work through The Crusade repertoire maintains a sense of ownership of their emotional state and that state is understood as being related to a bigger issue, cause or ‘philosophical issue’ such as party affiliation.

Participants on occasion positioned their select committee colleagues as the Knight. This occurred more frequently with colleagues on the same side of the debate but was not the only time colleagues were so positioned.

I really felt for [a gay colleague]. I died every day for them because I just felt that people were so disrespectful by even, oh I don’t know, by even expressing that view. I don’t judge other people, you know … I actually offered to [sit in for them but they declined]. My respect for them is enormous … I don’t think that I could have taken that degree of intolerance and bigotry, yeah, I don’t think I could have taken that. They did really well (Parliamentarian A).

I just thought ‘you wonderful person’. You’ve taken hatred, you’ve taken filthy remarks but you’ve just gone on quite smoothly because the issue was bigger than any one individual. And it was the right thing to do. I admired them so much and respected them (Parliamentarian D).

Through The Crusade repertoire, these participants both position themselves as supportive members of a side as well as positioning their colleague as a Knight who

27 It is interesting to note that while some emotional labourers appear to experience ‘burn-out’ as a result, this participant suggests that without the experience of feeling “good” as well as “angry”, parliamentarian workers would “burn up”. Notably, this comment is not made in regard to the management of emotion at work but rather in regard to an emotional dimension of workplace experience that finds freedom of expression in the workplace.
does the ‘right’ thing even if it has the potential to incur a personal cost. Colleagues on the other side could be also positioned as defenders of democratic principle, even while maintaining an oppositional stance.

[A select committee member and opponent to the bill] … we had a private discussion, they were actually agreeing on approaches to some issues which separated me from my own colleagues a bit just in terms of consistency of delivery … For example, a lot of the committee were totally relaxed about some interchangeability in the use of language, which [could have] created all sorts of future problems. …It had to all be absolutely separated and [the opposition member was] with me on that, so my colleagues had to be challenged. They were being a little lazy probably, … partly because they were … concerned about the jobs the staff would have to do in redrafting things but … if that wasn’t done it would just be used as a criticism to beat us with afterwards (Parliamentarian G)

But you feel [that by debating details of the bill in select committee] … he has done the right thing, he has made that contribution (Parliamentarian A).

In both these instances, select committee members position positively people with whom they were diametrically opposed, yet these opponents are accorded respect because of their ability to contribute to the select committee process as a property of democratic parliament. Their actions lend them a moral position as a defender of democratic principle and hence they too are positioned as the Knight through The Crusade repertoire.

Positioning members of the other side as the Enemy was found in the general accounts of parliamentary work as well as in specific discussion of the Civil Union Bill. Parliamentarians acted to position the other side as both the Enemy and as immoral in the sense that what they stood for was ‘wrong’.

… but I felt it was just so wrong for other to impose their value system on people who really want to affirm their relationship and I just found it so ugly. [It was] as if they mocked [homosexuals and their loved ones] (Parliamentarian D).

A willingness to decline to rise to one’s own defence was also capable of positioning as the Knight. This is made possible through the suggestion that fearlessness to act, even at the risk of being misunderstood, contributes to establishing the authenticity of the parliamentarian. It is through an account of such a situation in relation to the Civil Union Bill that Parliamentarian C positions themselves as someone for whom principles are more important than ‘public’ image.
[You have to] put aside the fact that at the end of it you will make a decision which is going to be characterised as aligning you one way or the other, even if you had, [if] you weren’t paying any attention to that … I’ve tried to do that, I’ve tried to do that in most of [conscience votes] and I end up usually [looking] more conservative … It probably is slightly tribal – I often find the smugness of the proponents of these things sort of irritates me so I find I set out to puncture their claims (Parliamentarian C).

As well as a willingness to be misunderstood as ‘conservative’, this MP suggests that it was both the feeling state of their opponents and their own emotional response that contributes to their position on the bill.

There is a tension created by the common tendency to view parliamentarians’ performances through The Game and Performance repertoires. Countering that positioning can be disadvantageous. In the extract below, the participant shows how not being drawn into their own defence lends them a sense of ‘morality’ and allows them to be positioned as the passionate Knight.

When people assume that I’m constructing an argument to suit my prejudices or preconceptions I don’t actually try and argue any longer because there is a bit of a disadvantage of being too earnest around here. In fact, because you are assumed to be a bit cynical or politically calculating or expedient. There is no point in saying you are not so, it might sound odd, but I don’t. I probably use some rhetorical tricks sometimes … [but] none of the arguments I have been putting forward aren’t coming from the heart so when you say it’s rational I don’t think it’s rational at all. … If the overt objects of this bill were to remove disability, to give people more diversity, more diverse relationships, lifestyle choices, I wouldn’t have started where [this bill] started at all. I think the real objective is this to use the law … as an educational club, to force people to accept something they don’t want (Parliamentarian C).

By attempting to be seen as not ‘too’ earnest, this worker acts to position themselves in a way that appeases their own sense of being genuine.

In the preceding parts of this chapter, I have established that as a conscience vote the Civil Union Bill held particular relevance for parliamentarians’ claims to vocational authenticity. I have argued that each of the repertoires makes possible different subject positions within the bill’s debate but that it is The Crusade repertoire that is crucial in establishing vocational authenticity within the workplace of parliament. Next I look at how The Crusade repertoire and the subject position of the Knight are used to secure claims to such authenticity.
Authenticity and passionate rationality

In Chapter Five, I argued that through accounts that were temporally ordered, parliamentarians’ transformation of self can be understood as a moral career in which they come to experience their ‘parliamentary selves’ as persons who meet the expectations of the workplace. In Chapter Six, I argued that within the emotional culture of parliament the ‘ideal’ parliamentarian is a worker who can manage workplace requirements for emotional labour through the use of three repertoires. Not all workers are required to establish vocational authenticity in order to establish their occupational identities. For some, simply having the physical or management skills to do the work is sufficient. Although occupational identity may be asserted through more superficial means and surface acting may meet the demands, compared to other workers, the authenticity of parliamentarians’ emotions in the workplace are of central importance and surface acting is insufficient. Even deep acting is not enough. What is required is for the parliamentarian to experience their emotion as a ‘genuine’ aspect of their parliamentary self. Through this experience, understanding themselves as ‘authentic’ and as an ‘ideal’ parliamentarian is made possible.

The parliamentarian may assert occupational identity through the same means as other workers. By doing the tasks associated within their work, and through surface acting, they may produce the demeanour expected. However, the deployment of The Crusade repertoire and positioning oneself as the Knight is required to display passionate rationality, establish vocational authenticity and to be recognised as the ‘right’ kind of worker for parliament. The Knight as an aspect of occupational identity sits in tension against the cynical and self-interested subject positions offered through The Game and The Performance repertoires.

Vocational authenticity requires parliamentarians present themselves as workers who answer a calling in the practice of their work. The ‘personal’ experience of ‘genuine’ emotion affirms to the parliamentarian their own vocational authenticity and they draw upon this emotion in order to demonstrate that authenticity to themselves as well as others. A participant supports an understanding of themselves as vocationally authentic through the following account:
I think that often the unexpected, I’m quite a controlled person because I have rationalised things personally first, but then every now and then something just triggers you – to me that’s the emotional response so it’s not the head response. It’s that uncontrollable spark that makes us better for having it and it doesn’t hurt to spill it out either (Parliamentarian D).

In this extract, the self is accounted for in two important and connected ways; as a ‘controlled’ person, allowing them to be understood as ‘rational’, but also as someone who has an internally ‘triggered’ emotional response to moral issues such as the Civil Union Bill. Emotion as an ‘uncontrollable’ aspect of the self makes possible vocational authenticity.

Conclusion

The passage of the Civil Union Bill offered parliamentarians an important opportunity to act in ways that positioned them as the ‘ideal’ parliamentarian worker. Although flexible deployment of the three repertoires contributed to parliamentarian’s claims of occupational identity, to be recognised as ‘ideal’ workers in parliament required positioning through The Crusade repertoire. Though The Performance is a repertoire through which a range of emotionalities can be displayed, emotion understood through this repertoire is of insufficient ‘depth’ and ‘authenticity’ to allow vocational authenticity to be defended. Similarly, The Game repertoire is one through which parliamentarians can contain their emotions as resources in order to achieve their end goals. But in order to demonstrate that they are both emotional ‘and’ rational, and therefore the ‘ideal’ parliamentarian, it is The Crusade repertoire’s deployment that is essential.

As a conscience vote, the Civil Union Bill offered parliamentarians the chance to understand their ‘unbidden’ emotions at work as ‘evidence’ of vocational authenticity. Without the dictates of a party caucus to constrain decision-making, the parliamentarian’s performance of emotional labour became a demonstration that ‘who’ and ‘what’ they are as a worker is congruent with ‘who and what’ the self is. These expectations cannot be met through surface acting nor even can they be fully met through deep acting. They are met through the practice of passionate rationality and its ability to enjoin ‘reason’ with ‘emotion’. Through the subject position of the Knight, the parliamentarian understands themselves as the ideal parliamentarian by co-opting
their rational ‘and’ emotional aspects of ‘being’ to the production of a morally just world.

In the following chapter I address the need for new ways of conceptualising the parliamentarian’s production of parliamentary selves and emotional labour. The parliamentarian’s production of emotional labour involves the appropriation of their labours for the benefit of the institution they belong to. The parliamentarian’s need for passionate rationality in order to be understood as the ‘ideal’ worker requires they take part in something more than emotional labour as it is currently understood. What is required of them is something more than the management of feeling, however. What is required is an understanding of the vocational authenticity of their occupational identity. Such understanding is achieved by experiencing emotions in the workplace as ‘authentic’ experiences. This understanding lends parliamentarians an ontological security in their occupational identity.
Chapter Eight

Rethinking Emotional Labour

The parliamentarians’ management of workplace emotion takes place within a complex organisational climate and a socio-historic milieu in which there has been a bourgeoning emphasis on emotion, self and identity and the related issue of authenticity, at the same time as there has been a crisis of confidence in democratic systems and their representatives (Giddens, 1991; Mansfield, 2000; Stoker, 2006; Wolfe, 2006). It is within such a climate that parliamentarians negotiate their occupational identities. The necessity to manage emotion may previously have been an aspect of parliamentary work; however, in a contemporary socio-historic milieu where emotion and authenticity are central, the parliamentarian’s management of emotion is particularly important.

At the beginning of this thesis, I identified two questions that have driven the present research:

1) How do New Zealand parliamentarians account for emotional labour within the parliamentary workplace?

2) Does ‘emotional labour’ adequately explain these accounts?

In this chapter, I draw together my analysis from the three data chapters to argue New Zealand parliamentarians account for emotion within the workplace through three interpretative repertoires that carry consequences for how emotional labour is understood and enacted. Indeed, parliamentarians use all three repertoires to accomplish occupational identity but it is only through The Crusade repertoire that they are able to assert vocational authenticity and be positioned as the ‘ideal’ parliamentarian.

Unique to The Crusade repertoire is an understanding of workplace experience as something that involves both the ‘heart’ and the ‘mind’ of the parliamentarian. As I have argued in this thesis, it is through The Crusade repertoire that both a ‘genuine’ self and an ‘occupational’ self can be enacted through claims to passionate rationality.
Passionate rationality addresses contemporary concerns with emotion, self, identity and authenticity, as well as concerns for the disregard in which democracy and its representatives have recently been held. Parliamentarians may fulfil some of their occupational expectations and obligations through other forms of emotion management, but they cannot build confidence in themselves as an ‘ideal’ worker, nor in the institution of parliamentary democracy, without practicing passionate rationality. Passionate rationality authenticates emotion through its constitution as a dimension of workplace emotion that enjoins emotion and reason in the achievement of authentic occupational and self identities.

In this final chapter, I summarise the thesis argument and highlight key points in response to my second research question regarding the adequacy of ‘emotional labour’ as a concept for understanding parliamentarians’ work. It is my contention that emotional labour does not sufficiently explain parliamentarians’ accounts of workplace experience. Emotional labour is limited because it neglects the importance of identity to workplace emotion management. It remains a useful concept for explaining the workplace experiences of less autonomous workers where the emotional labour exchange is less complex. Rather than discarding Hochschild’s notions of emotion work, emotion management and emotional labour (Hochschild, 1983), in this chapter I rework her framework by adding what I have conceptualised as emotional convocation to better understand the similarities and the differences between these different productive activities.

The finding that parliamentarians are indeed able to negotiate the different interpretative repertoires within their workplace supports Bolton’s notion of workers as ‘skilled emotion managers’ (Bolton, 2005). By adding to Bolton’s workplace emotion typology the emotional dimension I have conceptualised as personified emotion, it is possible to theorise parliamentarians’ accounts of the performance of passionate rationality as central to their accomplishment of vocational authenticity.

In what follows in this chapter, I summarise the thesis argument first by establishing the key points from each of the preceding chapters before explicating emotional convocation and personified emotion, showing their relationship to existing theorising and demonstrating the contribution they make to understanding the emotional labour of
contemporary vocational workers. The chapter ends with a consideration of the possibilities for future research and some concluding remarks.

**Emotion management and parliamentary work**

The complexities of the parliamentary workplace have resulted in an increasing necessity for New Zealand parliamentarians to manage emotion in the achievement of their work. This first key point is made in the first and second chapters where I contextualised my research interest in parliamentarians’ emotional labour within sociology’s long-standing interest in the changing organisation of workplaces. I explained that the management of emotion has possibly been a part of parliamentary work previously. However, historically-specific concerns about democracy (for example, that parliamentarians are increasingly self-interested) and the changes those concerns have wrought in the parliamentary workplace (for example, the introduction of MMP in New Zealand) throws the spotlight onto the importance of such work now. Indeed, MMP has increased the importance of cross-party interaction. Managing cooperative relations with other parties requires more from parliamentarians than was previously the case. A discussion of the other current features of relevance for understanding parliamentarians’ work makes up the balance of Chapter Two. These include self, emotion, identity, authenticity, and the relevance of their interrelationship.

In Chapters Three and Four my second key point involved an argument in support of an understanding of self, identity, and emotion as socially negotiated. In the third chapter I elaborated my theoretical perspective, informed by symbolic interactionism, and to a lesser extent critical inquiry, to show how such a perspective can add to the situated understanding of emotion in the parliamentarian’s workplace. Methodology is the focus of Chapter Four. In that chapter, I took the basic premise of my theoretical perspective from Chapter Three, that the meaning of ‘things’ is situated and negotiated between socially located actors, and outlined the methodological approach to the research process and data used that was in keeping with that basic premise. Chapter Four included an explanation of how a social constructionist epistemological stance shaped my search for the meaning of ‘experience’ and how that stance has been supported by an interpretivist methodology using interviews and the analytic tool of interpretative repertoires to explore meaning-making.
The third key point of my argument is that the contemporary vocational work that parliamentarians take up occurs within an organisation that has totalising tendencies. This requires of the parliamentarian an identity transformation early in their parliamentary career that can be understood as a moral career. In Chapter Five, I demonstrated that within parliament’s workplace culture, ‘becoming’ a parliamentarian included learning to ‘feel’ in ways that are situated by localised understandings of ‘emotion’ and its relationship to ‘reason’. My analysis of parliamentarians’ accounts demonstrated the deployment of three interpretative repertoires to make sense of their ‘experiences’ of the work and the workplace. The Game, The Performance and The Crusade interpretative repertoires were identified as shared cultural resources through which meaning is negotiated.

In Chapter Six I argued that the three repertoires carry implications for institutional knowledge and practice and subsequently for how emotion is understood in relation to work and the workplace. This chapter demonstrated the fourth key point of the argument: that although parliamentarians negotiate workplace meaning through all three of the interpretative repertoires to accomplish occupational identities, vocational authenticity can only be achieved through The Crusade repertoire. This is because it is only through The Crusade repertoire, and the subject position of the Knight, that ‘heart’ and ‘mind’ come together and allow the parliamentarian and their actions to be understood as passionately rational. Passionate rationality is the means of establishing vocational authenticity and hence it also secures an understanding of the parliamentarian’s occupational identity as part of a ‘genuine’ self that finds expression through workplace emotion.

In order to demonstrate the utility of the repertoires for analysis, in Chapter Seven I introduced a discussion of the passage of the Civil Union Bill. Using the bill’s debate to demonstrate how parliamentarians’ accounts can be understood through the repertoires, I made the fifth key point of my argument. I illustrated how the deployment of the different repertoires had consequences for how the bill was understood, for how emotion was understood in relation to work on the bill, and for the subject positions made available to social actors. The status of the bill as a conscience vote made it of particular importance to claims of occupational identity and vocational authenticity because conscience votes are seen by parliamentarians as situations where there is an expectation of transparency between ‘who’ they are and how they vote. There is no
room to hide behind justifications such as being bound by party loyalty. Consequently, this bill was an important opportunity for the enactment of vocational authenticity through a passionately rational performance as the organisationally-desirable ‘subject’ of the Knight.

Finally, this research leads me to the conclusion that there is a need for new concepts in understanding emotional labour as it applies to contemporary vocational workers and their management of emotion to accomplish occupational identities. Understanding parliamentarians’ emotional labour as the “management of feeling to create a publicly observable facial and bodily display … sold for wage” (Hochschild, 1983, p. 7), and achieved through surface or deep acting, fails to adequately theorise the type of work that parliamentarians do: work requiring vocational authenticity.

The sixth point of my argument is that emotional convocation and personified emotion can meet this need for theorisation. The next task of this chapter is to introduce emotional convocation and personified emotion. By making clear the differences between the emotion management required by contemporary vocational workers and the current ways we have of understanding the labour involved in emotion management, I argue that emotional convocation and personified emotion contribute to theorising this work by attending to the interconnections of emotion, self, occupational identity and vocational authenticity. Although I have conceptualised emotional convocation and personified emotion in relation to the work of parliamentarians, these concepts could also be useful for understanding other contemporary workplace experiences where emotion management is fundamental to occupational identity and involves the appropriation of intangible benefits by a third entity or party.

The place for emotional labour

Emotional labour is a perspicacious concept whose introduction acknowledged a ‘hidden’ aspect of service-oriented work in contemporary, capitalist economies. However, as I explained in Chapter Two, over reliance on emotional labour to theorise the myriad situations where emotion management is necessary, but under different conditions such as high worker status or where there is greater worker autonomy, does not contribute to conceptual clarity (Bolton, 2005, p.49). The concept of emotional convocation addresses this problem in relation to contemporary vocational work. In Chapter Two, I showed how Bolton’s typology of emotion in the workplace highlights
the variable ways in which workers act as “multi-skilled emotion managers” (Bolton, 2005, p. 11) as they act in ways they judge to be socially appropriate according to different types of contextually relevant feeling rules. In this chapter, I will show how emotional convocation and personified emotion add to the understanding of the multiple ways workplace emotion is important.

Emotional labour, as represented in Table 8.1, follows Hochschild’s understanding of the concept. As mentioned above, emotional labour is useful in understanding certain situations where emotion is managed at work. It is helpful for theorising in situations where front line service workers are trained by the company and its representatives in the type of emotional service required and where adherence to training is externally monitored. Emotional labour theorises situations where a financial profit motive means work is performed according to commercial and organisational norms, lending the work an exchange value rather than a use value. The lines of accountability and the expectations in the relationships between employers, workers and clients or customers are more straight-forward than is the case in the occupational setting of parliament. Thus, emotional labour is best suited to explaining work that involves direct lines of accountability and where the appropriation of emotional labour brings monetary benefits to the employer.

The conditions for the parliamentarian’s provision of emotion management, what I have until now referred also to as their emotional labour, differ from these circumstances in important ways that are highlighted by Table 8.1. The feeling rules parliamentarians labour under are not social, nor are they straightforwardly commercial and organisational. They are best described as vocational and institutional. Rather than learning these rules or norms through explicit training programmes, parliamentarians learn the rules during a process of self transformation that takes place on entry to the workplace, and through the identity acquisition that takes place through their ‘moral careers’.

Emotional labour as a concept is unable to account for the process of parliamentarians’ transformation of identity, nor does it explain the need to be understood as a worker who ‘fits’ the system. It is not only ‘feeling’ that is managed according to institutional parliamentary practice but also parliamentarians’ vocational identities. Alvesson & Willmott argue for recognition of organisational expectations that include the
production of the ‘appropriate’ worker identity (Alvesson & Wilmott, 2002, p. 638). The concept of emotional convocation meets this call by recognising that one aspect of the value of emotional convocation is the contribution it makes to the accomplishment of vocational identity. Emotional labour also does not account for the non-monetary value that parliamentarians’ production of emotional labour brings through building the credibility of parliament as an institution.

Extending theorising through emotional convocation

Emotional convocation is the management of feeling in order to produce a feeling state in oneself or another that involves intangible benefits for a system or abstract ideal. Emotional convocation helps to explain parliamentarians’ accounts of the emotional dimensions of their workplace experience in a way that neither emotion work nor emotional labour are able to. Emotional convocation is the management of emotion in accordance with vocational rules and is work that has both use and exchange value for the worker as well as their workplace organisation.

The contribution emotional convocation makes can be better understood by re-examining emotion work and emotional labour and their definitional differences with emotional convocation. Table 8.1 (below) illustrates the similarities and differences between the concepts. In the table, I use the terms emotion work and emotion management differently from Hochschild’s early work (1983). I reserve the term emotion management as a general category to refer to the various different ways that people have of acting upon emotion in both private and public settings. In Hochschild’s own work, the terms emotion work, emotion management and deep acting are used synonymously (Hochschild, 1983, p. 7). Rather, I identify emotion work as one type of emotion management that is a taxing and productive activity carried out disproportionately, but not only, by women in their homes and communities. Reserving the term emotion management as a generic category is important as it acknowledges the similarities between the various kinds of efforts undertaken.
Table 8.1 Types of emotion management and their characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feeling rules</th>
<th>Work</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Convocation</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>Institutional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Organisational</td>
<td>Vocational</td>
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<tr>
<th>Identity acquisition</th>
<th>Through private socialisation process</th>
<th>Through job specific training</th>
<th>Through the process of a moral career within an institution</th>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Conditions of delivery</th>
<th>Face to face</th>
<th>Face to face</th>
<th>Face to face</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voice to voice</td>
<td>Voice to voice</td>
<td>Voice to voice</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Institution to public</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provided to</th>
<th>Self</th>
<th>Client/customer</th>
<th>Self</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social others</td>
<td></td>
<td>Institution</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Co-workers</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
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<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Use</th>
<th>Exchange</th>
<th>Use and exchange</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vocational identity</td>
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<td>Intangible</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>institutional benefits</td>
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<tr>
<th>Monitored by</th>
<th>Self</th>
<th>Workplace superiors</th>
<th>Self</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social others</td>
<td>Customers/clients</td>
<td>Workplace superiors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Co-workers</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Public</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Media</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Consequences of failure</th>
<th>Emotional discomfort: own and others</th>
<th>Reprimand</th>
<th>Loss of position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social censure</td>
<td>Loss of job</td>
<td>Loss of future opportunities</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Loss of authenticity</td>
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Table 8.1 highlights the divergent audiences for whom the parliamentarian performs emotional convocation, with the media an important addition. These same groups monitor the parliamentarian’s performance. Differences between the groups’ interests make the parliamentarian’s provision of emotional convocation complex and require familiarity with an elaborate web of expectations and rules. These differences call for the parliamentarian’s ability to flexibly deploy meaning-making through the cultural resources of the interpretative repertoires.

Emotional convocation involves a more complex process, as vocational workers may provide their emotion management for the benefit of people and groups, in support of abstract values or to contribute to the social standing of the institution they belong to. The result is that their activities have both use and exchange value. Use value lies in the benefits that accrue to the individual, just as is the case with emotion work. Parliamentarians carry out this work in order to earn a wage and to continue to have access to the occupational identity that enables them to earn financial recompense. In addition, however, the benefit of their emotional convocation accrues to the institution, yet does not have a commercial ‘value’. Rather, these performances have a bearing on matters of institutional credibility and legitimacy. In the parliamentarian’s case, the institution can be conceptualised in a variety of ways; it might be the broader institution of democracy as a particular value system, or the specific institution of the parliament to which they belong or even to their party as an historic and ongoing institution.

The worker that performs emotional convocation understands their workplace experiences through two sets of feeling rules. These two sets of norms are the rules of the organisational or institutional culture and the rules for work that is vocational in character. Through the process of a moral career that follows their entry to the workplace institution of parliament, parliamentarians ‘become’ a different self that ‘feels’ differently. This process of transformation of self includes acquiring an understanding of the part they are expected to perform and of the ‘ideal’ worker for the parliamentary workplace. In contrast to the management of emotion of front-line service staff, emotional convocation calls for the communication of emotion through public performances. In the parliamentarian’s case, these performances are often represented widely through the media. This feature of their work emphasises the importance of managing their public performances of emotional convocation and of attending to the scripts from which these performances are produced.
When the question of who monitors the provision of emotional convocation is raised, once again the answer is a more divergent group than is the case for emotion workers and labourers. In addition to the self and co-workers, the media and the public attend to parliamentarians’ emotional convocation performance efforts and make decisions about their worth. This leads to a complex set of potential consequences, particularly when one’s efforts are assessed as a failure. An individual labourer may personally reprimand themselves and endeavour to do a ‘better’ job in the future or they may be reprimanded by workplace seniors or co-workers. In the latter case, there is the potential for loss of future opportunity, which includes the loss of the opportunity for promotion as well as the loss of ongoing access to the job. In addition, the vocational character of the work and the use value of their efforts mean that failure produces a loss of a sense of ‘authentic’ identity, signalling the symbolic value of vocational identity. Other research has shown that workers involved in parliamentary work account for the experience of losing their job and their occupational identity as a devastating one that can affect their ability to successfully move on into other satisfying work (Shaffir & Kleinknecht, 2005).

Emotional convocation explains the type of emotion management employed through the interpretative repertoires of The Game and The Performance and The Crusade. Emotional convocation calls for parliamentarians to both contain and display emotion, according to the situation. Emotional convocation allows parliamentarians to understand the game-playing and performative aspects of their vocational identities as necessary for the maintenance of confidence in themselves as well as the system they work within.

The competitive nature of the workplace understood through The Game repertoire constitutes competition in a positive light. It is the means through which actors are vetted and the ‘best’ ones for the job are found. The repertoire provides a means for parliamentarians to understand competition with friends and colleagues in their party as an acceptable activity. The understanding it creates is that competition amongst parliamentarians is in the best interests of the nation and democracy. Through this repertoire, individual experiences of emotion are best avoided, or at least contained, thus creating a boundary that separates emotion from productive workplace activity.
In drawing on the imagery of a staged performance and the parliamentarian as a Star Performer, The Performance repertoire similarly allows workers to understand the ‘genuine’ nature of workplace performances of emotion as a sideline issue. This repertoire enables parliamentarians to produce their emotional displays through emotional convocation without experiencing themselves as disingenuous. It is the performative aspect of emotion that is understood as important through this repertoire. Emotion is a communication resource that is put to use in a way that conveys the ‘right’ message. Through The Performance repertoire, the parliamentary workplace is divided into ‘front’ and ‘back’ regions and so emotional convocation allows workers to produce a performance that suits the region.

Through emotional convocation, the parliamentarian understands workplace experience as something that involves the ‘feelings’ of a vocationally authentic self. The Crusade repertoire employs tropes and terms of war and battle and introduces a moral aspect to the performance of parliamentary work. In the case of emotional convocation, the benefit of vocational authenticity accrues not only to the self nor to a commercial enterprise, but to a non-commercial, value-based system or institution. The flexible deployment of the repertoires calls for the ability to deploy The Crusade repertoire in order to meet the needs of the institution and system. By demonstrating that the institution is occupied by workers who are ‘genuine’ in their work, parliamentarians produce a benefit that accrues to the system. Parliamentarians’ production of emotional convocation therefore has value for themselves as vocational workers by generating confidence in the authenticity of their occupational and vocational identities, and the experiences of feeling they involve. This allows parliamentarians to ‘feel’ and ‘act’ self-confidently. A self-confident performance meets the occupational expectations of their parliamentary work identity. The parliamentarian’s production of emotional convocation has another intangible benefit. It shores support for and confidence in the abstract ideals of the institution.

By comparing the parliamentarian’s workplace activities with the activities of those already conceptualised as emotional labourers, it is apparent that the parliamentarian’s work is carried out in different conditions than other emotional labourers. Parliamentarians take part in workplace activity that, instead of following commercial feeling rules, employs vocational and institutional feeling rules. The excess value that is produced does not have use or commercial exchange value alone but has both a
monetary and non-monetary exchange value, with corresponding tangible and intangible benefits. The monetary exchange results from the parliamentarian’s receipt of a salary for the work that they do. The non-monetary aspect of emotional convocation’s exchange value is its ability to shore confidence in an abstract value or system.

Personified emotion

My analysis of the three interpretative repertoires in parliamentarians’ accounts suggest that parliamentarians are indeed “multi-skilled emotion managers” (Bolton, 2005, p. 11), capable of flexibly negotiating meaning-making around emotion, rather than pawns of social forces or the institution. Bolton’s emotion typology makes it possible to understand parliamentarians’ practices of emotion management at work as an activity that is prone to a variety of contextually relevant feeling rules. For instance, the way parliamentarians understood the Civil Union Bill because of its status as a conscience vote meant that it was not only organisational feeling rules that were relevant. As a conscience vote, the bill prioritised vocational feeling rules. It was not enough for parliamentarians to use party loyalty to justify their position on the bill. What was required was personified emotion.

While emotional convocation is the management of feeling that provides intangible benefits for a system or abstract ideal, the notion of personified emotion explains how it is that emotional convocation is achieved. Personified emotion is feeling governed by vocational rules and is associated with a motivation for vocational authenticity. It is performed through passionate rationality. The benefits of personified emotion accrue to the individual worker as well as the institution. During the Civil Union Bill debate, what was needed was a demonstration of personified emotion through the practice of passionate rationality. Neither positioning as an ‘emotional’ nor a ‘rational’ worker was enough. As parliamentarians perform passionate rationality in the workplace, they understand their performances as ones in which ‘heart’ and ‘mind’ are enjoined to causes that are not directly ‘self-motivated’.

Personified emotion is a type of workplace emotion motivated by a need for ontological security of vocational identity. Those identity claims cannot be supported through ‘proof’ of one’s inclusion in a professional community, nor is it something that is slowly acquired through training that includes lessons in the feeling norms for the professional group. Nor is personified emotion an emotion that can be performed using
surface or deep acting. It requires an understanding of emotion as an encompassing experience that is ‘felt’ by a ‘genuine’ self. Parliamentarians account for personified emotion as emotion that comes from ‘deep inside’ them, as a force that cannot be resisted even though they may realise that acting on the emotion could result in negative consequences for them within the workplace. The identity maintained incorporates both a sense of an ‘authentic’ self and a vocational self that meets a set of external identity expectations. This identity is secured through passionate rationality.

Passionate rationality involves the parliamentarian accounting for their experience of emotion at work as one that is an ‘all-consuming’ experience. The emotion is not understood as a performance or as a resource in a game. It is understood as a part of ‘who’ and ‘what’ they are that finds expression in the workplace. Passionate rationality meets the need for vocational workers to fulfil the instrumental requirements of their work as well as the abstract ideals that accompany vocational work.

I identify examples of personified emotion in parliamentarians’ accounts through The Crusade repertoire. Within The Game and The Performance repertoires, emotion is performed in ways which allow for the emotion to be seen as a resource or a stage prop which facilitates the playing of the game or the production of a performance. This type of performance can be understood as pecuniary or prescriptive emotion through Bolton’s typology. However, within The Crusade repertoire, the parliamentarian speaks of emotion as something that is the very ‘essence of being’. Emotion is ‘deep’, ‘genuine’, and ‘felt’ on behalf of others and compels the parliamentarian to take action regardless of the potential of sustaining personal injury or loss. The experience secures their understanding of themselves as vocationally authentic. Their surety of their own authenticity in turn supports a self-confident performance.

Drawing on Bolton’s typology, (see Table 8.2 below) it could be said that at times parliamentarians practice the management of emotion for pecuniary reasons, because they want to continue to collect their parliamentary salary, or for prescriptive reasons according to the organisational feeling rules. Parliamentarians’ management of identity could be understood as motivated by ontological security needs, yet the ontological security they seek is inextricably connected to the need for vocational authenticity of their occupational identities. The work that parliamentarians do is not strictly philanthropic for it is not a gift to another social actor but to the self as well as the
institution, and personified emotion is not subject to social feeling rules but vocational ones. Personified emotion therefore adds to Bolton’s typology by including explication of the workplace experience of emotion that is particular to contemporary vocational work for which vocational authenticity is fundamental to occupational identity.

In Table 8.2, showing the relationship of personified emotion to Bolton’s typology of workplace emotion, the first five columns are a reproduction of Bolton’s table (Bolton, 2005, p. 93). The shaded sixth column adds personified emotion to Bolton’s other dimensions of emotion in the workplace. In the sixth column, the relationship between personified emotion and the other emotion dimensions of the typology are illustrated. Bolton states that Hochschild’s emotional labour and emotion management concepts relate in a general sense to her categories of pecuniary and prescriptive emotion and that Hochschild’s use of the term emotion work relates similarly to Bolton’s presentational and philanthropic categories. Emotional convocation can be seen as related to personified emotion in the same way.
Table 8.2  The relationship of personified emotion to Bolton’s typology of workplace emotion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feeling Rules</th>
<th>Pecuniary</th>
<th>Prescriptive</th>
<th>Presentational</th>
<th>Philanthropic</th>
<th>Personified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>Professional Organisational</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Vocational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated motivations</td>
<td>Instrumental</td>
<td>Altruism Status Instrumental</td>
<td>Ontological security</td>
<td>Gift</td>
<td>Ontological security of occupational identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance</td>
<td>Cynical Compliance</td>
<td>Cynical/ sincere Consent Commitment</td>
<td>Sincere/cynical Commitment</td>
<td>Sincere Commitment</td>
<td>Passionate rationality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>Imposed/ self</td>
<td>Professional/ self</td>
<td>Self</td>
<td>Self</td>
<td>Vocational/ self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences</td>
<td>Alienation Contradiction Conflict Resistance</td>
<td>Professional identity Contradiction</td>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Stability Satisfaction</td>
<td>Vocational authenticity Credibility of the institution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Bolton, 2003, p. 93).

Future directions for the research

There are a number of ways these research findings on the management of emotion in the parliamentary workplace might be extended through future research. For instance, a larger study might be able to incorporate a gendered or ethnicity-based analysis, or the deliberation of more than one bill could be studied. If future work was timed appropriately, it may be possible to conduct a longitudinal study in which new entrants to parliament were periodically interviewed in order to explore the temporal changes in their meaning-making as they adapted to their occupational identity expectations.
The theoretical productivity of emotional convocation and personified emotion could be further assessed through the study of another workplace in which other workers undertake contemporary vocational work. Such an extension might possibly include the study of regional government workplaces, the elected representatives of local bodies or District Health Boards, or even academic staff in a university setting. The application of the concept of emotional labour to the work of professionals has found that although emotional labour explains some aspects of this work, there are some important differences it cannot account for. The exploration of similarities between parliamentarians’ work, as an example of contemporary vocational work, and professional workers could assess whether or not emotional convocation and personified emotion hold any utility for understanding the management of emotion in professional occupations.

Given that research suggests rising numbers of women in New Zealand’s parliament have not significantly altered the adversarial character of interaction in the House of Representatives, the thesis argument could be further assessed by explaining what it is about New Zealand’s parliament that makes it difficult to significantly change its adversarial character. A gendered analysis of the repertoires as cultural resources shaping the ‘ideal’ kind of worker and the intractability of the meanings made through these repertories might prove a productive investigation.

The inability within the research design of this thesis to address the complicating factor of media representation of parliamentarians means that future research could look to include a study of representations of parliamentarians in the media in relation to the interpretative repertoires and the subject positions they make available. Public perceptions of parliamentarians are well researched using such methods as surveys and focus groups, but parliamentarians’ accounts of their interactions with the public could also be of interest here. Indeed, such research could contribute to better understanding of parliamentary occupational identity and the ways in which the parliamentary institution is both an enabling and a constraining force in parliamentarians’ production of occupational identity and vocational authenticity. There is also a need for more research into the ways that parliamentarians’ ‘identity regulation’ benefits the institution of parliament and the effect this work has on the person who works to produce the ‘appropriate’ institutional worker.
Finally, as the skilled emotion managers that they are, future research could explore the ways that parliamentarian workers negotiate to resist the call to ‘become’ a certain ‘kind’ of worker and with what consequences. Parliamentarians are not ‘pawns’ to a system yet they do negotiate meaning within a workplace context that is not entirely of their own making, nor even entirely of the making of current workplace colleagues. Extending this research by historically exploring the changes in the emotional dimensions of parliamentarians work could prove profitable.

Concluding remarks

Parliamentarians’ accounts of workplace experience draw upon three interpretative repertoires, The Game, The Performance and The Crusade. All three require parliamentarians to manage emotion. The Crusade repertoire, however, is fundamental for the accomplishment of vocational authenticity within occupational identities. The Crusade illustrates the need to conceptualise parliamentarians’ ‘emotional labour’ instead as emotional convocation.

As examples of contemporary vocational workers, parliamentarians’ accounts have demonstrated the centrality of occupational identity and vocational authenticity to emotional convocation. Emotional convocation calls for the parliamentarian to manage emotion at work in order to produce a feeling state in themselves and others in a way that brings intangible benefits to the democratic system and its ideals. Although traditionally vocational work has been understood through reference to a ‘calling’, contemporary vocational work is rather work that ‘calls’ for authenticity and requires a demonstration that the worker’s ‘personal’ characteristics are conducive with vocational expectations.

The expectations that accompany the parliamentarians’ occupation include that they ‘ought’ to undertake their work not only for its status and financial reward but also for the symbolic nature of the work. They are able to demonstrate the ‘genuine’ nature of this ‘motivation’ through positioning as one who experiences personified emotion. The vocational character of their work, combined with the encompassing aspects of occupational identity, make personified emotion necessary for being understood as the ‘ideal’ parliamentarian.
This thesis contributes to other work that seeks an understanding of workplace experience, in this case with particular attention to contemporary vocational work. The thesis contributes to an understanding of workers as social actors located within the ‘webs of meaning’ of their organisational cultures. Understanding the parliamentarian as a skilled negotiator of meaning within the workplace brings attention to the place of personified emotion within the production of emotional convocation. Emotional convocation requires the management of emotion to produce a feeling state in oneself or another to the benefit of an abstract ideal or system. Within contemporary workplaces, emotion that is subject to vocational feeling rules that include a need for the ontological security of vocational identity is theorised as personified emotion. Personified emotion is performed through passionate rationality. In the process of being passionately rational, the convergence of vocational and ‘self’ identity is asserted. The consequence is that the vocational workers’ actions produce institutional credibility through the vocational authenticity of its workers.


Shanks, G. (2002). Qualitative research: A personal skills approach. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey; Columbus, Ohio: Merrill/Prentice Hall.


Appendices

Appendix A

Information Sheet for Focus Group Meeting

My name is Kathy Stuart and I am a PhD student in the Department of Sociology, Social Work and Social Policy at Massey University, Palmerston North. I am currently working on a research project with the provisional title *Blood, Sweat and Tears: Members of Parliament work with feeling*. This work is funded by a Vice-Chancellor’s Doctoral Research Scholarship from the University. The supervisors for the project are Dr. Mary Murray (Sociology) and Dr. Richard Shaw (Social Policy).

**What is the study about?**

This study has two principal aims. The first is to develop some general understanding of what the lived experience of an MP is like within their parliamentary workplace. While I realise emotion may also be considered an important part of constituency work, and that the public nature of this type of job has an affect on things like personal and family relationships, these areas are not the focus of the current project.

The second principal aim is to find out how MPs understand the role of emotion in their work. Are there some situations in which emotional expression is more acceptable than in others? Do MPs have particular strategies to control for the influence of emotion in their parliamentary decision-making?

The study involves observations of debate in the House, attendance at select committee meetings, a study of written records in Hansards, and one focus group meeting to be followed up with personal interviews with a small number of MPs. I have chosen to focus on the debate with regard to the Civil Union Bill in order to take discussions from a general to a more specific level. You are being asked to take part in this research as a result of your membership on the Justice and Electoral Select Committee.
There are two ways in which I am attempting to access MPs’ experiences of emotion in the workplace. The first is through the focus group meeting scheduled for next Wednesday the 8th of December from 3.30 to 4.30 pm. The second is through individual interviews yet to be arranged. Taking part in one way does NOT bring with it the expectation that you are committing yourself to taking part in the other. This letter is being written in order to invite your participation in the focus group meeting. Later I will approach MPs individually to invite participation in a personal interview.

**What are the parameters for the focus group participation?**

Your participation in the focus group interview will be subject to the usual Massey University ethical requirements as listed below. The focus group interview will be audio-taped. The tape will be transcribed either by me or a transcriber who will also be bound by a confidentiality agreement. All due care will be taken to ensure tapes are kept in a secure place until the research is completed. At that time they will be destroyed.

The interview will be subject to the following ethical guidelines as established by the University’s Human Ethics Committee:

- You have the right to refuse to answer any questions, to withdraw from the study and to withdraw any information supplied at any time.
- You have the right at any time to ask further questions about the study.
- **You have the right to ask for the audiotape to be turned off at any time during the interview.**
- You have the right to have access to your transcript and to be able to make comments on it or make changes to it.
- You will be given access to a summary of the findings of the study when it is concluded.
- The information you provide is completely confidential to the researcher. All records will be identifiable only by code number and will be seen only by the researcher and her supervisors. Though excerpts from the focus group interview may be included in the thesis and related publications of the research a pseudonym will be used.

Lastly, within the context of this interview, your party affiliation will not be identified or significant, although whether you are part of the government of the day or in opposition may be revealed in the comments you make.

**Special confidentiality and anonymity issues**
The public nature of your job and the relatively small parliamentary population of which you are a part require special attention to confidentiality and anonymity issues. While any excerpts or discussions which arise from the interview will be kept anonymous through the use of a pseudonym and every effort will be made to remove distinguishing details of other Members of Parliament whom you may refer to during that interview, research participants must remain aware of the fact that others who have been a party to events commented upon may, by virtue of what is said, be able to identify the speaker. I will take every precaution I can to avoid this situation, but I would also alert interviewees to the need to review the interview transcripts (which I will provide) and to request removal of any information with which they are concerned.

What next?

I look forward to meeting you at the meeting on Wednesday the 8th of December and welcome your contribution to the discussion. I am hopeful that the present study will open up new avenues for exploration of the world of politics and look forward to any assistance you are able to give me in ensuring this is the case.

Sincerely,
Appendix B

Cover Letter

June 7, 2005

Dear

My name is Kathy Stuart and I am undertaking doctoral research in the School of Sociology, Social Work and Social Policy at Massey University, Palmerston North.

I am researching the work of MPs. My project – which has the provisional title Blood, Sweat and Tears: Members of Parliament work with feeling – has two aims. The first is to develop a general understanding of the emotions MPs experience as they develop and debate legislation. The second is to find out how MPs understand the role of emotion in their work. I am particularly interested in finding out if there are some situations in which the expression of emotions is felt to be more acceptable than others, and whether or not MPs have particular strategies for controlling the influence of emotion in their decision-making.

I would like to request an interview with you to discuss these sorts of issues. Please find attached an Information Sheet which explains the project in greater detail, and sets out what would be required of you should you agree to my request.

I would be very grateful if you could contact me with your response, either by emailing me at k.stuart@wise.net.nz, or by phoning me on 06-377-1817.

Thank you for considering my request.

Yours sincerely,

Kathy Stuart
Appendix C

Information Sheet for one-to-one interviews

My name is Kathy Stuart and I am a PhD student in the School of Sociology, Social Work and Social Policy at Massey University, Palmerston North. I am currently working on a research project with the provisional title Blood, Sweat and Tears: Members of Parliament work with feeling. This work is funded by a Vice-Chancellor’s Doctoral Research Scholarship from the University. The supervisors for the project are Dr. Mary Murray (Sociology) and Dr. Richard Shaw (Social Policy).

What is the study about?

This study has two principal aims. The first is to develop some general understanding of what emotions MPs experience as they develop and debate legislation in the parliamentary workplace. While I realise emotion may also be considered an important part of constituency work, and that the public nature of this type of job has an affect on things like personal and family relationships, these areas are not the focus of the current project.

The second principal aim is to find out how MPs understand the role of emotion in their work. Are there some situations in which emotional expression is more acceptable than others? Are there some emotions which are safer to express than others? Do MPs have particular strategies to control for the influence of emotion in their parliamentary decision-making?

The study so far has involved observations of debate in the House, attendance at Justice and Electoral select committee public meetings, a study of the written parliamentary record, and one focus group meeting. The research is now entering its next phase and I am seeking individual interviews with MPs who sat on the Justice and Electoral select committee in either a part time or full time capacity during discussions on the Civil Union Bill. You are being invited to take part in this research as a result of your attendance at the select committee stage of this piece of legislation.
What would I have to do?

If you agree to take part, I would like to meet with you at a time and place convenient for you for an interview which will take approximately one hour. I would prefer to meet with you on your own and in a place which will give us a relatively quiet and uninterrupted space. During the interview, I will pose some general questions but you will also be invited to talk about your experiences in the House in ways which you feel are important.

Your participation in the interview will be subject to Massey University’s ethical requirements as listed below. With your permission, the interview will be audio taped. The tape will be transcribed either by me or a transcriber who will also be bound by a confidentiality agreement. The transcription will be forwarded to you for verification. Tapes and transcripts will be kept in a secure place until the research is completed. At that time they will be destroyed.

The interview will be subject to the following ethical guidelines as established by the University’s Human Ethics Committee:

You have the right to refuse to answer any questions, to withdraw from the study and to withdraw any information supplied at any time.
You have the right at any time to ask further questions about the study.
You have the right to ask for the audiotape to be turned off at any time during the interview.
You have the right to have access to your transcript and to be able to make comments on it or make changes to it.
You will be given access to a summary of the findings of the study when it is concluded.
The information you provide is completely confidential to the researcher. All records will be identifiable only by code number and will be seen only by the researcher and her supervisors. Though excerpts from the interview may be included in the thesis and related publications of the research, a pseudonym will be used.

Lastly, within the context of this interview, your party affiliation will not be identified or significant, although it may be suggested by the comments you make.
Special anonymity issues

The public nature of your job and the relatively small parliamentary population of which you are a part require special attention to anonymity issues. While any excerpts or discussions which arise from the interview will be kept anonymous, research participants must remain aware of the fact that others who have been a party to events commented upon may be able to identify the speaker. I will take every precaution to avoid this situation, but I would also alert interviewees of the need to review their interview transcripts accordingly and make any necessary amendments.

What next?

I look forward to meeting with you and welcome your contribution to my inquiries. I am hopeful that the present study will open up new avenues for exploration of the world of politics and look forward to any assistance you are able to give me in ensuring this is the case.

If you have questions about this research please do not hesitate to contact me or one of my supervisors.

NB: This project has been reviewed, judged to be low risk, and approved by the researcher and her supervisors under delegated authority from the Massey University Human Ethics Committee. The researchers named above are responsible for the ethical conduct of this research.

If you have any concerns about the conduct of this research that you wish to raise with someone other than the researcher(s), please contact Professor Sylvia Rumball, Assistant to the Vice-Chancellor (Ethics & Equity), telephone 06 350 5249, email humanethicspn@massey.ac.nz.
Appendix D

Consent Form

Blood, sweat and tears:
Members of Parliament work with feeling

I have read the information sheet for this study and have had the details explained to me. My questions about the research have been answered to my satisfaction, and I understand that I may ask further questions at any time.

I also understand that I am free to refuse to answer any particular questions, withdraw from the study and to withdraw any information supplied at any time.

I agree to provide information to the researcher on the understanding that it is completely confidential and will not be used for any purpose other than this research.

I agree to the researcher audiotaping the interview and know that I have the right to ask for the tape recorder to be turned off at any time during the interview.

I agree to the researcher using the transcript from this interview for the purposes of this research.

I understand that she may use brief direct quotations from the interview in her reports of the study provided these do not identify me in any way.

I wish to participate in this study under the conditions set out on the information sheet.
Signed:
Name (please print):
Date:
Appendix E

Question Schedule

Questions for the small group interview:

1) If you were given the job of investigating the role or influence of emotion in politics, how would you go about it? Who would you talk to? What would you ask?
2) What does a person need to learn in order to work as an MP?
3) If you were to mentor someone else, what would you tell them?
4) What has it been like considering the Civil Union Bill?
5) Is it the same as any other bill or is it different?
6) Have you ever seen someone’s expression of emotion used against them in parliament?
7) Does the public vote based on emotion?
8) What does it mean to you to take a rational approach to your job? To the Civil Union Bill?
9) Is it possible in your job to separate out what you think about an issue from what you feel about it?
10) A parliamentarian has said to me that there is no room for emotion in their work. Can you comment on that?

Questions for one-to-one interviews:

1) How would you describe the work environment here?
2) Is it what you expected when you entered parliament?
3) What role does emotion play in politics?
4) How would you respond to the statement “There is no room for emotion in politics”?
5) Are there some contexts in which it is more acceptable to express emotions than in others? What are they? What makes things different?
6) Are there any rules around working here?
7) Tell me what its been like considering the Civil Union Bill. Has it been different than other bills? In what ways?
8) After the first reading of the bill, Helen Clark said on radio that it was time to get away from the ‘rhetoric’ and get down to ‘evidence’. What do you think she meant? How do you do that? What is the difference between rhetoric and evidence?

Prompts:
1) Can you tell me more about that?
2) I’m not sure I understand what you mean.
3) Can you think of an example of that?
4) Has that ever happened to you?