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**'TOUR OF THE DECADE'?  
NEW ZEALAND-SOUTH AFRICAN RUGBY  
RELATIONS 1985 - 1986**

**A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts in History at Massey University**

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## INTRODUCTION

Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, there existed worldwide pressure upon the South African Government to abolish its controversial policy of apartheid. Sporting boycotts, which excluded South African teams from the Olympic Games and other sporting events were imposed on the Republic so long as they pursued the practice of racial segregation between whites and non-whites. Such boycotts were seen as an effective way of forcing the leaders of South Africa's Afrikaner National Party to repeal its harsh apartheid laws. New Zealand's close sporting relations with South Africa throughout the apartheid period, with rugby union in particular, made the issue of sporting sanctions a sensitive subject for many New Zealanders. Many believed the result of sporting boycotts towards South Africa was the denial of an inherent right to play and watch one of the toughest sporting contests in the world - a rugby test between the New Zealand All Blacks and the South African Springboks.

For decades New Zealanders and white South Africans have shared an obsession with the game of rugby union unmatched anywhere else in the world, perhaps with the exception of the fanatical Welsh rugby supporter. However, what is without doubt is the enmity between the two countries when their respective national teams meet on the rugby field. Since the first South African tour of New Zealand in 1921, test series between the All Blacks and Springboks have been tense, tightly fought contests. Until 1997, the home team had never been beaten in a series. It is for this reason that New Zealanders looked upon test matches against the Springboks as the ultimate challenge. Unfortunately, as will be discussed latter in this thesis, the visit by the 1981 Springboks to New Zealand caused severe social disruption and disaffection as the issue of race relations surpassed matters on the rugby field.

Despite the controversial Springbok tour of New Zealand in 1981, the New Zealand Rugby Football Union (NZRFU) accepted an invitation from the South African Rugby Board (SARB) to tour the Republic in 1985. After a case brought by Auckland lawyers claiming to be 'true' rugby people, the High Court of New Zealand, upheld an application for an interim injunction which stopped the tour on the eve of the players departure. Subsequently, the tour was abandoned by the NZRFU. However, a loophole in the ruling enabled the players as 'individuals' to undertake a private tour under the guise of the Cavaliers in 1986. The tour polarised the country. They were supported by some for standing up for their rights as 'individuals'. Others condemned them for playing without the sanction of the NZRFU. Some people saw them as rugby mercenaries motivated by the rumoured monetary rewards of touring South Africa.

The abandoned 1985 All Black tour to South Africa and the subsequent tour by the Cavaliers had enormous ramifications for the game of rugby football in New Zealand. On the field, it provided the catalyst for the All Blacks success in the inaugural Rugby World Cup in 1987. This was achieved through the NZRFU's decision to suspend the Cavaliers for two international matches before becoming eligible for selection for the All Blacks again. The search for suitable replacements for the two-test series against the Australians, which followed the Rugby Union's decision, resulted in the advancement of back-up players into first choice players. This undoubtedly sharpened performances when the Cavaliers returned from their suspension and ensured fierce competition for spots in New Zealand's World Cup squad. For a number of the players, the two-test stand-down saw a premature end to their All Black careers.

Off the field, it shook the establishment and administration of the game to the core. It also further isolated the SARB from the international rugby community. Politically, the Cavaliers tour demonstrated the ongoing gulf between New

Zealand's two dominant political parties. David Lange's Labour Government was fervently opposed to rugby contact with South Africa, while the National Party Opposition held the view that while it regretted the players decision to tour, it respected the right of individual New Zealanders to travel and play sport without intimidation. Without doubt, the cancellation of the 1985 tour and the rebel tour of 1986 represented one of the most significant moments in the history of rugby football.

This thesis will address an aspect of New Zealand's history that has until now been neglected. While others have touched on the subject of the cancelled All Black tour of 1985 and the Cavaliers tour that followed, no individual has brought it all together and made it the focal point of an historical enquiry. Secondly, it will make a contribution to the historical understanding of the tumultuous relationship between New Zealand and South African rugby in the mid-1980s.

This thesis will endeavour to answer a number of questions. Firstly, why did the NZRFU abandon the 1985 All Black tour to South Africa? How important were factors such as Parliament's opposition to the tour, international condemnation from international sporting bodies, opposition from anti-tour groups within New Zealand, the legal challenge or maybe the potential backlash against rugby, in prompting the NZRFU's decision to call off the tour. Was it was the refusal of the Auckland and North Harbour Rugby Unions to support the tour that forced the NZRFU to overturn its decision? This thesis will argue that it was not one, but all these factors which caused the cancellation of the tour.

Secondly, this thesis will examine why there was an unsanctioned tour of South Africa in 1986. What motivated the players to risk a lifetime ban from the game or from All Black selection for the sake of an unofficial series against the

Springboks? Was it a desire to right the perceived injustices committed in 1985 when the All Blacks tour was stopped? For some of the players, a tour of South Africa was seen as the pinnacle of achievement for any All Black. In the absence of a world cup, such a tour decided who were the true world champions of rugby football. Others would have seen a tour of South Africa as an ideal way of ending their All Black careers. Perhaps some players saw such a tour as an opportunity to thumb their noses at the politicians and lawyers who tried to obstruct their individual freedoms and democratic rights. Over the years speculation has been rife that it was money which lured New Zealand's rugby heroes to tour South Africa. This thesis will attempt to answer whether large cash payments were indeed offered to players to ignore the wishes of the NZRFU and tour the Republic as rugby rebels.

This thesis has drawn on a number of sources, both primary and secondary. My main documentary source has been the records of anti-tour organisation HART (Halt All Racist Tours) Aotearoa, located in the Alexander Turnbull Library. The contents of the HART collection include papers relating to campaigns, tours, and conferences. It also includes organisational material including correspondence with government, rugby players and sponsors, minutes, financial reports, publications, media releases and newspaper clippings.

The New Zealand Rugby Museum in Palmerston North, was another substantial source of information. The museum's extensive collection of weekly rugby publication *Rugby News*, gave me an insight into the New Zealand rugby fraternity's attitude toward sporting contacts with South Africa. A video archive, also located in the rugby museum, featuring television news bulletins for the period 1985 to 1986, and transcripts of interviews with several key figures in the events described, including Ces Blazey and David Lange, provided important information.

The Rugby Union was contacted with a view to gaining access to their files, however this proved to be unsuccessful.

Newspapers were useful in providing a day-to-day account of the events. The *Dominion*, *Evening Post*, *New Zealand Herald*, and the now defunct, *Auckland Star*, were those most widely consulted.

Interviews were, I hoped, going to be a valuable source of information. Unfortunately this was not to be. Most of those approached failed to respond to my enquires or proved to busy to assist, so only one interview was conducted. Patrick Finnigan's openness and frankness provided a valuable insight into why he set about challenging the proposed All Black tour to South Africa in 1985.

In a country as rugby-mad as ours, there has, of course, been a number of autobiographies and biographies written by and about ex-All Blacks. These have proven to be extremely illuminating. Most useful was former All Black great, Andy Haden's book, *Lock, Stock'n Barrel*.

The *New Zealand Parliamentary Debates* were helpful in giving me a sense of the various political arguments for-and-against-sporting contacts with South Africa. The *New Zealand Law Reports* enabled me to achieve a clear understanding of the legal action brought against the NZRFU by Auckland lawyers, Patrick Finnigan and Phillip.

In addition to the primary sources I have mentioned, several books written by academics and journalists have provided excellent secondary material. In particular, *Human Rights and Sporting Contacts - New Zealand Attitudes to Race Relations in South Africa 1921-1994*, written by Malcolm Templeton, enhanced my understanding of the complex tensions between the NZRFU and

its supporters, the politicians, the anti-apartheid movement and finally, general public.

This thesis has been divided into six chapters. Chapter one will provide an account of the controversies that dogged New Zealand's rugby relationship with South Africa rugby between 1900 and 1984. This will achieve two things. Firstly, provide a background to what is arguably New Zealand's longest and most bitter sporting controversy - the issue of sporting contacts with South Africa. Secondly, it will provide a context with which the events of 1985-1986 occurred.


'The tour that almost was,' the proposed All Black tour to South Africa in 1985 is the focus of chapter two.<sup>1</sup> Like chapter one, it will provide a chronological account of the events surrounding the SARB's invitation to the NZRFU to send a team to South Africa. It will identify the arguments for-and-against touring the Republic and analyse the reaction to the NZRFU's decision to accept the SARB's decision.

Chapter three will discuss the legal battles that led to the cancellation of the 1985 All Black tour to South Africa. It will also examine the reaction to the cancellation from the players, protestors, politicians and media.

The fourth chapter will provide a history of the Cavaliers, a team that included twenty-eight of the All Blacks who had been scheduled to tour South Africa the previous year. It will discuss will the players motives in touring. Why did they ignore the wishes of the Rugby Union, Parliament, and approximately half the New Zealand population?

The fifth chapter will examine the immediate consequences of the Cavaliers tour on the players involved. A final chapter will discuss the impact of the

cancelled 1985 tour on rugby more generally. It will discuss rugby's relationship with the Government following the Cavaliers tour that followed and identify the beneficial and detrimental effects the tour had on New Zealand and international rugby.



**Fig 1: The Cavaliers.** Doug Laing, *Cavaliers in South Africa 1986*, Auckland: South Seas Visuals, 1986, p. 6.

## CHAPTER ONE

### CENTURY OF CONTROVERSY 1921 - 1984

New Zealand and South Africa have enjoyed a fierce rugby rivalry that can be traced back to the Boer War of 1899-1902. When war broke out between Great Britain and the Boer descendants of Dutch settlers in Southern Africa, Prime Minister Richard Seddon, eagerly committed New Zealand troops to the cause in an effort to demonstrate the nation's loyalty to the 'mother country.' By the time the war ended in 1902, some 6,500 New Zealanders had served in South Africa. It was this war which first brought New Zealand and South African rugby players together. Many New Zealanders, during a break in hostilities, would indulge in their favourite past time and turn out for local South African club sides.<sup>1</sup>

It was not until 1919 that teams from New Zealand and South Africa met on the rugby field. After the Armistice troops from the British Empire were awaiting transport to their respective homelands, to relieve their boredom an inter-services rugby tournament was organised. Called the King's Cup, entrants included troops from the Royal Air Force, the British Isles, the Australian Imperial Forces, the Canadian Expeditionary Force, the South African Forces and finally, the New Zealand Army. New Zealand won the tournament, beating the British Isles 9 - 3 in a final played in front of King George V at Twickenham. The rugby relationship between New Zealand and South Africa was resumed during the earlier stages of the tournament when the New Zealanders ran out handsome winners to the score of 14 - 5.<sup>2</sup>

Following the King's Cup, the victorious New Zealanders were invited to play in South Africa on their way home. On the field the tour proved an enormous success, with the team winning all but three of their games. The results reflected the strength of the Army team which contained fifteen players who had either been capped for New Zealand or were latter to be capped.

Unfortunately, events off the field overshadowed those on it. For the first time in what would become a long and controversial history, a player would be omitted from a New Zealand side due to South Africa's reluctance to host what it classified as 'coloured' players. Vice-captain of the New Zealand Service team, Nathaniel 'Ranji' Wilson, was not chosen for the South African tour because of his English/West Indian parentage. The incident was recounted by two members of the touring team to rugby historian, the late R H Chester. According to the two men, 'South African officers who were in England at the time and South Africans who had played in the King's Cup, suggested it would be "unwise" - that was the word they used - to take him to South Africa. So they decided to go with out him.'<sup>3</sup> Wilson's exclusion from the tour was the beginning of an unfortunate chapter in the history of rugby football.

## RUGBY AND POLITICS

By the early 1920s the tension between rugby and politics had been established; so too the beginning of the notion of South Africa as the 'old foe' in New Zealand rugby culture. The racial issue flared again when the Springboks made their first visit to New Zealand in 1921. The itinerary included a match against the New Zealand Maori at McLean Park, Napier. The Springboks won by 9 points to 8. By all accounts, the match was an ill-tempered affair. All Black legend, George Nepia, described the game in his autobiography, *I, George Nepia*, as 'more than rugby, it was a racial conflict.'<sup>4</sup> After the match a South African journalist wrote in a cable to his paper,

It was bad enough having to play a team designated New Zealand natives, but the spectacle of thousands of Europeans frantically cheering on a band of coloured men to defeat members of their own race was too much for the Springboks, who were frankly disgusted.<sup>5</sup>

The journalist also suggested that the Maori team had played in a way designed to deliberately injure their opposition. A concerned postal worker leaked the

contents of the cable to the *Daily Telegraph*. The reaction to the cable was mixed. The source of the leak was subject to an official enquiry and as a result the postal worker responsible lost his job. According to Nepia, it provoked 'a reaction and bitterness which within the heart of the Maori race have neither been forgotten or forgiven'.<sup>6</sup> The South African tourists attempted to dissociate themselves from their fellow-countryman's remarks. However, the Springbok team manager, Harold Bennett, would later suggest that future South African sides would not play Maori, and that no Maori would be welcome in his country.

In 1921, the NZRFU accepted a dictate from the South African Rugby Board (SARB) that it not select players of Maori descent for future tours of South Africa. The NZRFU's reluctance to stand up to the SARB's unmistakably racist policy saw Nepia and another Maori player, Jimmy Mills, excluded from the All Black team which toured South Africa in 1928. Later, the Rugby Union decided not to field a Maori XV against the Springboks on their 1937 tour of New Zealand. The Second World War (1939 - 45) kept further clashes between the All Blacks and Springboks on hold until 1949.<sup>7</sup>

By this time the context within South Africa had changed. In 1948 the Afrikaner-dominated National Party under Dr Daniel Malan won South Africa's general election, this led to the adoption of a policy of apartheid, the state-sanctioned system of racism where the non-white majority was institutionally oppressed by the white minority. Apartheid effectively made compulsory and intensified the racial discrimination already widespread in South Africa, guaranteeing white superiority in that country. The policies of the National Party ensured that the SARB would not reverse their dictate regarding the exclusion of 'coloured' players from touring teams. When the All Blacks made their second tour to South Africa in 1949, midfield back J.B. Smith was left behind due to his Maori background. The failure of the NZRFU to condemn the SARB's overtly racist dictate prompted the strong opposition from the president of the Returned Services Association (RSA), Major-General Sir

Howard Kippenberger. On being told that a tour excluding Maori would take place, Kippenberger voiced his frustration, 'I had Maoris under my command for two years (during WW II), and in that time they had 1,500 casualties, and I'm not going to acquiesce to any damned Afrikaaner's saying they cannot go. To hell with them'.<sup>8</sup> The South African newspaper, *Die Burger* took exception to Kippenberger's comments, arguing that the exclusion of Maori was for their own good, 'we cannot imagine that they would find the tour of the Union enjoyable'.<sup>9</sup> Inexplicably, Kippenberger apologised and withdrew his comments.<sup>10</sup>

The third Springbok tour to New Zealand in 1956 passed without incident. On the field, the tour proved to be the most dramatic in the history of New Zealand-South African rugby relations, rapidly becoming part of rugby folklore. A match against New Zealand Maori was included in the South Africans itinerary. Fears that such a game would evoke similar ill feelings to those experienced in 1921 were misplaced. The game turned out to be one of the cleanest and good-natured of the tour.<sup>11</sup>

The political dimensions of the New Zealand - South African rugby relationship soon raised their head again. In 1958 the NZRFU determined that the All Black side scheduled to tour South Africa in 1960 would exclude Maori participation. The Union justified its decision as driven by the desire to save Maori players from any hurt or embarrassment. They considered that more harm than good would be caused by including Maori and provoking confrontation with their hosts. Seeking to establish whether its decision was a correct one, the NZRFU asked the SARB a series of questions. Seemingly trivial queries such as 'how would Maori be treated in hotels, on trains and on buses?' were combined with more sinister questions like, 'would their presence in the side lead to political demonstrations or violence?' The response received convinced the NZRFU that its decision was the right one.<sup>12</sup>

The Rugby Union announced its decision to the New Zealand public in June 1959. It was greeted with unprecedented public protest. Organisations such as the Citizen's All Black Tour Committee (CABTA) were formed to oppose the policy. CABTA opposed racially selected All Black teams and used various means to express its views including distributing pamphlets, public comments and petitioning politicians. The anti-tour movement was a diverse collection of church leaders, trade unionists, teachers and university students. Campaigning with the slogan 'No Maoris, No Tour,' CABTA demanded the tour be cancelled and gathered the signatures of 153,000 people on a petition presented to Parliament.<sup>13</sup> The Walter Nash led Labour Government refused to intervene on behalf of the protestors arguing that the NZRFU was an autonomous body with which governments should not and could not interfere. Of the Cabinet, only the Minister of Maori Affairs, Sir Eruera Tirikatene, called for the tour to be abandoned. He did so outside Parliament, speaking as a Maori leader and not as a member of the Government. The reluctance of politicians from either side of the House to condemn the tour for fear of the political consequences reflected New Zealanders ardent devotion to rugby football during the era.<sup>14</sup> It also reflected the relative lack of international condemnation for the apartheid system. Both the domestic and international context would change in subsequent decades.

### **DIRECT PROTEST ACTION**

The furore over the All Black tour to South Africa during 1960 was significant in that it was the first time protestors had employed direct action to halt sporting contacts with South Africa. There were demonstrations in the streets and at Athletic Park in Wellington, where the All Black trials were played. When the All Black touring team left Whenuapai airport for South Africa, the players luggage had to be searched due to a bomb threat, while several protestors hurled themselves at the departing aircraft in a vain attempt to prevent its take-off.<sup>15</sup>

Events in South Africa proved a greater threat to the tour than domestic protest. On 21 March 1960, the eve of the All Blacks departure, South African police opened fire on a peaceful demonstration against pass laws in the black township of Sharpeville, near Johannesburg. Sixty-seven Africans were killed and 200 wounded. Following the shooting, a state of emergency was proclaimed in South Africa.<sup>16</sup> The incident in Sharpeville sent alarm bells ringing back in New Zealand and around the world. The NZRFU were forced to consider whether it was advisable to send an All Black team into such a hostile environment. In an attempt to grasp a clearer picture the Union made arrangements for its chairman, Cuthbert Hogg, to visit the South Africa and determine whether the All Blacks would be placed in unnecessary danger should they go ahead with the tour. A cable was also sent to South Africa's rugby authorities seeking assurances of safety for the team. On the evening prior to Hogg's departure, the NZRFU met to discuss the tour and reversed its decision to send Hogg on the grounds that it would be to insult the SARB, who had earlier guaranteed the All Blacks safety while on tour. Despite the civil unrest, the tour went ahead without a hitch.<sup>17</sup> International pressure on South Africa increased after the Sharpeville incident.

In 1965 the Springboks made their fourth tour to New Zealand, surprisingly, it attracted little public protest reflecting that the issue of the treatment of Maori was more central to the debate at this point than contact with apartheid. However, as the tour drew to a close, further All Black tours to South Africa were cast in doubt. Addressing a National Party youth congress in Gauteng, Prime Minister Dr Hendrik Verwoed, made it clear that Maori players would not be welcome in any All Black team in South Africa. 'In accordance with our basic principles and attitude', stated Verwoed, 'we say that when we are the guest of another country we have to behave according to their traditions. We will play there in the exact way it has been arranged by New Zealand. The fact that we have accepted the invitation means that we will adapt ourselves to their customs'. He continued,

This is in accordance with our basic principle that we do not interfere in the affairs of other countries. Like we subject ourselves to their customs, we expect that when other countries visit us they will respect ours and they will adapt themselves to ours.<sup>18</sup>

Verwoed's speech caused the touring Springboks considerable embarrassment. The South African management, and Dr Danie Craven, the president of the SARB, distanced themselves from their Prime Minister's comments. Craven made it clear that the SARB's views on Maori players touring South Africa were diametrically different to those of Verwoed and the South African government, however the damage had been done.<sup>19</sup>

The NZRFU declined an invitation from the SARB to tour South Africa in 1967 following the indication that Prime Minister Keith Holyoake would oppose the projected tour on the basis that South Africa would not accept an All Black team chosen solely on merit.<sup>20</sup> Internal pressure from South Africans, denied a test series against their favourite rugby rivals, prompted Dr John Vorster, who had succeeded Dr Verwoed as Prime Minister following his assassination, to soften the Government's policy on interracial sport. Vorster's reluctant gesture to accept Maori players as 'honorary whites' in future All Black touring teams prompted the resumption of rugby tours between New Zealand and South Africa.<sup>21</sup>

In 1970, for the first time in New Zealand rugby history, an invitation from the SARB for the All Blacks to tour the Republic was extended to Maori players. As a consequence, Sid Going, Buff Miller, Blair Furlong, and Bryan Williams toured South Africa as 'honorary whites'. The participation of Maori players on the 1970 tour failed to take the heat out of the protest movement at home. The exclusion of Maoris from All Black tours to South Africa was no longer the issue. Reflecting the growing international anti-apartheid movement, opponents of the tour wanted no contact with South Africa at all, at least while sport in the country was still racially segregated. An umbrella organisation to

unite all the forces opposed to sporting contacts with South Africa had been formed a year in July 1969. Called HART (Halt All Racist Tours), its membership included Citizens Association for Racial Equality, the Student Christian Movement, the New Zealand Federation of Maori Students, the New Zealand University Students Association, the socialist forum and the Maori Organisation of Human Rights.<sup>22</sup> The polarising nature of rugby football in New Zealand society began to reveal itself around the time of the 1970 tour. Deep divisions began to emerge within New Zealand's major religious denominations. The Catholic hierarchy supported the tour, while the Catholic press strongly opposed it. The Anglican Church was similarly split between anti-tour clergy and pro-tour lay representatives at their General Synod.<sup>23</sup> While trade unionists, students and the general public were also divided over the issue.

#### **A SPRINGBOK TOUR IS CANCELLED**

The Springboks were due to make their fifth tour of New Zealand in the winter of 1973, however the proceeding year had seen the landslide victory of Norman Kirk's Labour Party. During the election campaign, Kirk made assurances that his party would keep politics out of sport and allow the tour to go ahead as scheduled. Five months into his term in office, Kirk reversed his election promise arguing that to allow such a tour to proceed would lead to large scale public demonstrations. Police estimates of the considerable cost of widespread protest put the Government in an invidious position. On one hand it could honour its election pledge and allow the tour to go ahead as planned. Or it could reverse it and apply pressure on the NZRFU to withdraw its invitation to the SARB to send a Springbok team to New Zealand and therefore suffer the inevitable voter backlash at the next election.

In the end, the potential damage of civil unrest on New Zealand's international reputation, particularly the consequences for the 1974 Commonwealth Games to be held in Christchurch, forced Kirk to act. When the NZRFU refused to

heed the Government's request to revoke its invitation, Kirk threatened them with cancellation. Backed into a corner, the Rugby Union had no choice but to comply with the Government's wishes. Kirk died in office soon after but was succeeded by Bill Rowling, who endorsed his predecessor's policy.<sup>24</sup>

The tour issue emerged as one of the main points of difference between the two leading parties during the 1975 election campaign. Labour remained committed to its opposition towards rugby contact with South Africa, while the National Party under the leadership of Robert Muldoon, campaigned under the banner 'We will play sport with all the world'.<sup>25</sup> The National Party's guarantee that future tours would not be stopped was received well by heartland New Zealand where rugby remained an integral part of everyday life. The South African issue contributed to the election result where Labour lost a number of provincial seats, including New Plymouth, Oamaru, Hamilton West and Otago Central. The National Party, on the other hand, increased its total share of the vote by six per cent and its number of seats in Parliament by twenty-one.<sup>26</sup> The final outcome of the general election was a landslide victory for the National Party and vindication for those who advocated sporting contacts with South Africa.

After the National Party's election victory, the NZRFU moved quickly to organise an All Black team to tour South Africa in 1976. Once again opposition to such a tour emerged. Prior to the All Blacks departure, Abraham Ordia, the Nigerian president of the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa (SCSA), visited New Zealand. His attitude was threatening. 'If New Zealand persists in its support for racist South Africa', wrote Ordia to *New Zealand Herald* sports writer T.P. McLean, 'We will not take part in any competitions including the Olympics and the Commonwealth Games if New Zealand is also taking part in the same competitions'.<sup>27</sup> His statements antagonised many people. Muldoon dismissed Ordia's abrasive comments. When asked to comment on the boycott threat, the Prime Minister confined himself to saying, 'Time will tell'. Judging the mood of the New Zealand public, Muldoon refused Robert Ordia an audience. 'He is not a diplomat or a member of a government', Muldoon

argued, 'He is some kind of sports administrator'.<sup>28</sup> Ordia left New Zealand an angry man. Two months later, he repeated his earlier warning at the SCSA's executive committee meeting in Kenya. 'If the Rugby Union sends a team to South Africa in June, then it will be the last straw', Ordia announced. 'In that case we have unanimously decided to call on all African countries to boycott sports events in which New Zealanders take part in the Olympic Games'.<sup>29</sup> Despite the threat, the NZRFU did send a team to South Africa in 1976. As a result, 27 nations boycotted the twenty-first Olympic Games in Montreal because of New Zealand participation.<sup>30</sup>

Prospects for future sporting contact with South Africa appeared gloomy when, in June 1977, the heads of government within the British Commonwealth attended the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Great Britain. Growing international concern regarding the situation in South Africa saw the issue of sporting contacts with the Republic raised during the weekend retreat for the Heads of Government (HOG) at Gleneagles Hotel in Scotland. It was here that the Commonwealth governments, including New Zealand, issued a joint declaration that became known as the 'Gleneagles Agreement'. In summary, the Agreement labelled apartheid an abomination; supported sporting boycotts of South Africa; obliged each government to 'discourage' contacts between its country and South Africa; and finally, called for HOGs to support the international campaign against apartheid.<sup>31</sup> The Gleneagles Agreement had enormous implications for Muldoon's National Government and New Zealand rugby. Firstly, because the Government had signed the Gleneagles Agreement it was effectively reversing its election promise that reciprocal rugby tours between New Zealand and South Africa would be free of government interference. Secondly, if New Zealand honoured the terms of the Agreement there would be no further clashes between the All Blacks and Springboks until apartheid was dismantled.

## THE 1981 TOUR

Despite increasing opposition towards rugby contact with South Africa and the Government's obligation to comply with the provisions of the Gleneagles Agreement, the NZRFU invited the Springboks to tour New Zealand in 1981. Mindful that it had to placate both the New Zealand public and international opinion, the Government made repeated calls through the Minister of Foreign Affairs Brian Talboys, for the Rugby Union to withdraw its invitation to the South Africans. However, in the interests of winning the general election in 1981, Robert Muldoon steadfastly refused to intervene and cancel the tour. On 6 July 1981 Muldoon declared that, 'The Government will not order the Rugby Union to abandon the tour'.<sup>32</sup>

In defiance of the Government's requests, the NZRFU exercised its right to invite whom they liked into its home. Throughout the Springboks eight-week tour, New Zealanders were deeply and equally divided on the issue. In May 1981, according to a *New Zealand Herald* poll, 43 per cent of the population opposed the tour, with 41 per cent for it. As the tour began its opponents had increased to 49 per cent.<sup>33</sup> The tour provoked unprecedented scenes. Rugby Historian, Keith Quinn, suggests 'relatively peaceful New Zealand knew the nearest thing to a civil war since the land wars of the 1860s'.<sup>34</sup>

During the eight weeks of the tour nearly 2000 New Zealanders were arrested in various anti-tour incidents. To cope with protest on a scale not seen since the Vietnam War demonstrations during the late 1960s, specially-trained and clad riot police armed with the American-designed Monadnock PR-24 long baton, were deployed to protect the touring Springboks and maintain law and order. A common feature on New Zealand television sets were images of confrontation between police and demonstrators attempting to disrupt the tour.

The second game of the tour, in Hamilton, where the Springboks were scheduled to play Waikato, provided the most dramatic moment of the entire

tour. Approximately 4,000 protestors arrived at Rugby Park in a bid to stop the game. With the police unable to control numbers of that kind, about 300 protestors invaded the pitch prior to kick-off. What transpired was a significant victory for the anti-tour movement. With the protestors defying both the police and an incensed crowd of 28,000 spectators, the Commissioner of Police, Bob Walton, called the game off. Walton's decision met with contrasting emotions. Protestors were jubilant, while the spectators who had gone to park to watch a game of rugby were angry and bitter. Tony Reid, a participant in the pitch invasion latter recalled the tension of the moment.

When the protestors broke onto the middle of the field you had a kind of obscene geometry. You had forces lined up, you had the crowd around chanting "kill, kill, kill". You had the riot police for the first time seen in New Zealand and their visors and long truncheons and so on all around the field.<sup>35</sup>

For security reasons, the match against South Canterbury was also cancelled. On the eve of the third and final test in Auckland between 10,000 and 12,000 people marched down Auckland's Queen St in protest against apartheid. It would be a precursor to the extraordinary events of the test match at Eden Park. As demonstrations by 10,000 or so protestors took place outside the ground, a light aircraft piloted by Marx Jones, repeatedly buzzed Eden Park, throwing flour bombs on the field in an effort to interrupt the match. One 'bomb' managed to score a direct hit on All Black prop and future Cavalier, Gary Knight. Despite the unusual interruptions, the All Blacks went on to win the match and the series by a margin of two games to one.<sup>36</sup>

The breakdown in law and order associated with the 1981 tour effectively placed future Springbok tours to New Zealand on the backburner. However, the Rugby Union still entertained the thought of sending an All Black team there. As will be revealed in the following chapters, New Zealand rugby would experience some tough times ahead.

## CHAPTER TWO

### THE DECISION TO TOUR

The thorny issue of sporting contacts with South Africa reappeared in mid-1983 when it became public knowledge that seven All Blacks had been invited to South Africa as members of an World Invitation XV to play in three matches to celebrate the centenary of the Western Province Rugby Football Union. The New Zealanders invited were Gary Knight, Stu Wilson, Bernie Fraser, Steven Pokere, Gary Whetton, Mark Shaw and John Ashworth.<sup>1</sup> Prime Minister, Robert Muldoon, wrote to the NZRFU urging it to give 'careful consideration to the wider effects that a rugby tour would have on New Zealand's international sporting activities in a range of other codes'.<sup>2</sup> HART in a press release expressed its concern that New Zealand rugby players could be 'exhibiting their talents' in the Republic. They claimed the public was looking for a clear statement from the Rugby Union that it would not contemplate any further tours to, or from, South Africa while apartheid continued. 'Instead', it argued, 'the Rugby Union is still flirting with apartheid. The only reason we can see for this tour is to ensure further rugby tours with South Africa ... it is an ominous sign'.<sup>3</sup>

The Rugby Union rejected the Government's concerns on two counts. Firstly, the union had already announced that if invitations were received from other overseas rugby unions, it was duty-bound to pass on the invitations to the players concerned in accordance with its 'normal practice'. The alternative to passing on the invitations, the Rugby Union argued, would be to deny the players the fundamental right to decide for themselves whether to accept. Secondly, they argued that the tour did not just involve New Zealand players. There were also fourteen players from Wales, Ireland, Scotland and England as part of the invitation team.<sup>4</sup>

Ray Dutton, Chairman of the New Zealand Olympic and Commonwealth Games Association (NZOCGA), also wrote to the NZRFU, as it was obliged to do under the Commonwealth Games Federation's (CGF) Code of Conduct.<sup>5</sup> He reminded the union of his organisation's opposition towards sporting contacts with South Africa. The Rugby Union ignored the NZOCGA's views. NZRFU chairman Ces Blazey stated, 'The Rugby Union in the past has not been in the habit of accepting direction from bodies not affiliated to it or with no direction from bodies not affiliated to it or with no jurisdiction over it'. In Blazey's view it was 'sheer arrogance' for a resolution (the Code) to try and direct governments or to impose penalties for the actions of sports organisations outside the orbit of the Commonwealth Games. 'That might be acceptable in an authoritarian society', he said, 'but it should not be accepted in New Zealand'.<sup>6</sup> The invitations were received and accepted by the seven All Blacks concerned. A number of rugby administrators were also invited, including the President of the NZRFU, Noel Stanley, and Ivan Vodanovich, a former All Black who agreed to coach the team.<sup>7</sup>

The decision of the players to accept invitations to play in South Africa saw them receive a number of threats from people opposed to sporting contacts with the Republic. In the case of All Black prop, John Ashworth, threats were made against his property and the welfare of his wife. 'As a result', claimed Ashworth, 'clubs in the North Canterbury sub-union took turns guarding his farm'.<sup>8</sup>

The New Zealand media largely ignored the tour. However, the Rugby Union's stance was criticised by the *Evening Post*, which said that it should not be the fear of pain of other nations responses which should determine New Zealand's attitude: 'It is the moral question of a committed multicultural nation playing with a state which has institutionalised and legalised racism'.<sup>9</sup> The NZRFU's

position also found them offside with the Government. Minister of Justice, Jim Mclay, described its attitude as 'naïve and dangerously self-indulgent'.<sup>10</sup>

The general election of 1984 forced the three main political parties to announce their policy towards sporting contacts with South Africa. As it turned out, there was no difference between the written policies of the National Party, the Labour Party and Social Credit. The National Party, as well as Labour and Social Credit, expressed their opposition to sporting contacts with South Africa. While opposing apartheid, all three parties pledged not to cancel an All Black tour of South Africa in 1985. In their view, the decision of whether to send a team to South Africa was one for the NZRFU to determine. The New Zealand Party, so crucial to the outcome of the 1984 general election, pledged to 'uphold individual freedom and self-determination, free from government interference and without impediment from those with differing views. It also promised to safeguard, among other things, the freedom to engage in leisure activities'.<sup>11</sup>

## **A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT**

On July 14 1984 David Lange's Labour Party won the general election. The election of the Labour Party and of Lange as Prime Minister marked a hardening attitude towards South Africa. Almost immediately, it had made steps to close the South African Consulate in Wellington. Anticipating such a move, the South Africans vacated in advance of any formal request. The Government had demonstrated to the New Zealand public in a crystal clear way that it would adopt a hard line towards South Africa until such time that it dismantled apartheid. In addition, Lange announced that his Government would not allow South African sports teams to compete in New Zealand. On the issue of New Zealanders competing in South Africa, Lange made it clear that his Government would not deny citizens their fundamental right to travel to South

Africa as individuals. Unlike Muldoon, Lange was prepared to enter into correspondence with anti-apartheid groups such as HART and CARE, to receive occasional delegations, and to be more active in persuading sporting organisations within New Zealand to co-operate in ending sporting contacts with South Africa.<sup>12</sup>

Pressure on the NZRFU to refuse the SARB's invitation to tour South Africa increased following the Commonwealth Games Federation's decision on July 26 1984 to allocate the 1990 Games to Auckland. Joseph Garba, Chairman of the Special Committee Against Apartheid argued that a decision to send a team to South Africa would 'cause concern' for the organisers of the Auckland Games. In others words, if the proposed All Black tour of South Africa went ahead the following year, there was a real threat the 1990 Games could be boycotted by African nations within the Commonwealth.<sup>13</sup>

In September 1984, Lange wrote to Ces Blazey, the chairman of the NZRFU. Blazey was a long-serving rugby administrator who had taken over the position of chairman in 1977 and held it through the stormy years between 1981 and 1985. In his letter, Lange expressed his growing concern regarding the proposed All Black tour of South Africa in 1985. He spelt out the Government's position on the tour, which was that it was 'implacably' opposed to it. The result was an agreement between Lange and Blazey to discuss the question of the 1985 tour at a latter date.<sup>14</sup>

In preparation for this meeting, Lange asked the Commissioner of Police, Kenneth Thompson, for an estimate of the cost of maintaining law and order in New Zealand should the Rugby Union accept an invitation to send a team to South Africa. Thompson's response was staggering. In his opinion, a major police operation would be required. He envisaged police costs, excluding

salaries, could be \$3 million, with support from the Ministry of Defence at a further \$1 million, excluding salaries.<sup>15</sup>

On November 8 1984, a private meeting between Lange and Blazey took place. Blazey made it clear to the Prime Minister that while the NZRFU had not received an invitation from the SARB, he expected one would be on its way and that 'if I was forced to make a guess I think the answer would be to go'.<sup>16</sup> Lange replied that while it opposed any such tour, the Government would not place any obstacles in the way of the NZRFU.<sup>17</sup>

The NZRFU Council met on February 8 1985 to consider the SARB's invitation to tour, which had been on the International Rugby Board's (IRB) schedule of tours since 1970. The Council agreed that a final decision on whether to send a team to South Africa should be delayed until the Prime Minister, on his request, had been given an opportunity to address the Council.<sup>18</sup>

On March 18, Blazey addressed the media and outlined the Council's position on sending a team to South Africa. He made three main points. Firstly, that the Council rejected any suggestion that by sending a team to South Africa it was demonstrating its support for the apartheid system. 'We are proud of our record over a long period ... People of any race, colour, religion or political views can be and are involved in rugby'. Secondly, he strongly resisted the intrusion of politics into sport but accepted that it had occurred. He also voiced the Council's opposition to sporting boycotts. According to Blazey, the only people harmed by such boycotts were the sportsmen who had trained over a long period of time in their chosen sport or event and then denied the opportunity to compete. Thirdly he claimed, New Zealand, and rugby, were the victim of unfair discrimination. After all, there were a number of other countries whose sportsmen continued to compete in South Africa or against South

Africans in many sports. In rugby alone, he pointed out, there had been tours to South Africa in recent years by the British Lions, England and the South American Jaguars.<sup>19</sup>

Blazey also argued that an All Black tour to South Africa in 1985 would not jeopardise the international future of other New Zealand sports teams. He pointed out statements by senior officials that there would be no boycott of the Edinburgh Commonwealth Games and that the 1990 Games would not be removed from Auckland should the team tour the Republic. Blazey rejected any suggestion that the Union was 'ignoring' the views of the Government. He reminded the media that it had given very careful consideration to the views of the Government and that, 'to have a contrary view or to come to a different conclusion is very different from ignoring another view'. Blazey argued that opposition to the tour by many people was, 'based primarily on the fear that there will be a recurrence of violence by protest groups'. He claimed, 'We do not think the majority of New Zealanders would consider that a decision should be made on the basis of intimidation, threats or blackmail'.<sup>20</sup>

Finally, Blazey disputed comments from the anti-tour movement that changes in the sporting situation in South Africa were 'cosmetic'. He referred to the Springboks where black and coloured players could and were selected to represent their country. 'Without question', he argued, 'they have earned their places on merit'.<sup>21</sup> It was obvious, even to the casual observer, that the Council members had made their decision. The tour was on.

A complication for the New Zealand Union emerged when the provincial unions of Auckland and North Harbour voted against the tour going ahead. Auckland's anti-tour stand brought a backlash when at the NZRFU's annual meeting; the union found its nominees for the vice-presidency, national council and Maori member rejected. The most significant rejection was of Auckland's

chairman Malcolm Dick, who as an All Black had himself toured South Africa in 1970. Until the tour of South Africa became an issue, Dick had been expected to fill a vacancy on the NZRFU council created by the retirement of an incumbent councillor. One Aucklander Ron Don, an advocate of the tour, maintained his place as a North Island council member, despite not being nominated by his own union.<sup>22</sup> The Nelson Bays Rugby Union on the other hand came out in support of the proposed tour. At its annual meeting, a motion asking the NZRFU to decline South Africa's invitation to tour was defeated by thirty-six votes for the tour to go ahead and ten against.<sup>23</sup>

The proposed All Black tour to South Africa was the focus of Parliament's attention on March 28 when the Prime Minister proposed a motion to the House that it 'strongly' urge the Rugby Union to reject the SARB's invitation to tour South Africa in 1985. In moving the motion, Lange asked the House to note that such a tour would 'seriously harm New Zealand interests at home and abroad'. He suggested that it would hurt rugby, and urged the House to reaffirm New Zealand's commitment to 'the principles of the Commonwealth statement on Apartheid - the Gleneagles Agreement'.<sup>24</sup> The National Opposition, under the leadership of Jim McLay, proposed an amendment to Lange's original motion. It called for the House to recognise the decision to tour as one for the Rugby Union alone and accept that the Government 'must always preserve the right of all New Zealanders to act without intimidation, provided their actions are within the law'.<sup>25</sup> Lange agreed with National's amendment and declared it to be the Government's position also. After vigorous debate, the House passed the amended motion. This motion was significant for it forced the two major parties to declare their attitudes towards the controversial issue. What came out of this debate was that both Labour and National were united in their opposition to the tour but were in agreement that it was the place of the Rugby Union to ultimately decide whether or not to send a team to South Africa. Where they parted company was in relation to allowing

visits to New Zealand by sports teams from South Africa. While the Government retained the right to refuse visas to South African sports teams, the National Party in the words of Muldoon, would 'retain in our policy the ultimate freedom of our people to play sport with whomsoever they choose'.<sup>26</sup>

On the morning of March 30, the eighteen-strong NZRFU Council went to the Beehive in Wellington to hear the Prime Minister convey his concerns regarding the tour. In a letter addressed to the councillors, Lange emphasised the Government's strong opposition to sporting contacts with South Africa and the potential harm the tour would have on New Zealand's interests at home and abroad. In short, he urged the Rugby Union not to proceed with the tour. After spending about twenty minutes with the Prime Minister, the Council adjourned to Rugby Union's offices in Wellington to consider the South African invitation and Lange's letter.<sup>27</sup> Lange on the other hand, embarked on a visit to five East African countries with the realisation that the future of the 1990 Auckland Commonwealth Games hung on the decision of the Rugby Union. In Lange's opinion, New Zealand was not going to have a successful games if the South African tour took place. He recalls the trip as a case of having to fence, duck, weave and bob the issue, pointing out to his hosts that the New Zealand government was 'thoroughly against the tour'.<sup>28</sup>

### **THE DECISION IS MADE**

Interest in the NZRFU's final decision was huge. The long awaited press conference took place on the afternoon of April 18. The media, in particular, gave the Rugby Union's decision extensive (respected rugby writer, Bob Howitt, suggested hysterical) coverage. The *Evening Post* billboards proclaimed, 'Today's the Day'! The committee room where the union announced its decision was absolutely packed with more than 45 journalists, not to mention a number of cameramen and newspaper photographers.<sup>29</sup>

At 4.29pm, Ces Blazey began reading the official Council news release that ran into more than four typewritten pages. The second to last paragraph contained the pertinent statement, the Council had accepted SARB's invitation to send a team to South Africa. Before confronting a barrage of questions from the journalists present, Blazey pointed out that the decision had been passed 'by a substantial majority'.<sup>30</sup> When asked whether there was one primary factor which influenced the councillors decision, Blazey replied, 'I believe the councillors had to be satisfied that what they were doing was right'.<sup>31</sup>

### THE RESPONSE

Reaction to the decision was mixed. Lange was predictably enraged when he learnt of the decision, remarking, 'I made a mistake. I treated them as honourable men ... I know a Rugby Union that has brought shame on this country'.<sup>32</sup> Following the decision, Lange latter recalled feeling that he had a war on his hands in terms of the country being divided following the decision. The division, he thought, was between urban and rural New Zealand and those people who believed, or did not believe the Prime Minister should have the power to prohibit people going overseas.<sup>33</sup> In contrast, a number of National MPs could not contain their delight that the tour would go ahead. Although he had voted to urge the NZRFU to call off the tour, Derek Angus, MP for Wallace, told the *Evening Standard*, 'Bah! What unanimous resolution of Parliament'.<sup>34</sup> Lange latter accused the National Party of encouraging the Rugby Union to accept the invitation to tour believing the union had every right to do what it wanted to do.<sup>35</sup>

A number of organisations denounced the tour. One of these was the Post Primary Teachers Association. Its opposition to the tour was expressed in two remits passed at its national conference. The first called for the condemnation


of the All Black tour of South Africa, while the second called for rugby to be replaced in New Zealand secondary schools by other sports.<sup>36</sup> A new organisation called Women Against Rugby was established in April 1985. Its objectives included winning the vote for South Africa's black population. They considered the prevention of the All Black tour was the best means of achieving this goal. Its convenors, Dinah Priestly and Alison Webber stated, 'Sport is one of the few chinks in South Africa's impregnable armour through which the regime can be touched and through which change to the country will come'.<sup>37</sup> In a symbolic gesture at the organisation's inaugural meeting, Federation of Labour vice – President Sonya Davies cut a rugby jersey down the middle.<sup>38</sup>

Anti-tour group, Boycott, also launched in April 1985, reacted to the decision by attempting to isolate the NZRFU from its financial base. It called on consumers to exercise their right to withdraw their custom from any company which provided advertising or sponsorship assistance to the Rugby Union, such as clothing manufacturer, Lane Walker Rudkin. Boycott spokesperson, John Murray said, 'The campaign will be legal and peaceful. It should attract thousands of New Zealanders to show their disapproval of the decision'.<sup>39</sup> HART had employed such tactics in previous anti-tour campaigns and responded in a similar fashion by encouraging people to close their accounts with the Auckland Savings Bank (ASB) due to the bank's sponsorship of Auckland schoolboy rugby and the Auckland and North Harbour Rugby Unions. Only a handful of accounts were closed, according to ASB assistant general manager Ross Cambie, he stressed that the response was 'nothing of significance'.<sup>40</sup> The ASB hit back at HART with a full-page advertisement in the *Auckland Star*, which argued as follows,

The ASB, with its proud record of 118 years of service to Auckland, was asked, under duress, to reverse a legitimate business decision to financially support schoolboy rugby. The ASB supports and will continue to sponsor sports activities at school, as an integral part in the development of

citizenship. Despite the fact that both the Auckland and North Harbour Rugby Unions spoke out against the projected tour of South Africa, the protest movement demands that schoolboys be penalised by the withdrawal of the ASB's financial support of this activity. This Bank does not accept this demand.<sup>41</sup>

**MAKE EVERY ALL BLACK  
A NAKED ALL BLACK**



When an All Black runs on to the field  
EVERYTHING HE IS WEARING  
(except for his mouthguard)  
HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE RUGBY UNION  
BY LANE WALKER RUDKIN LTD.

ADIDAS boots, shorts, and jersey;  
An ADIDAS ball under his arm;  
Socks from LANE WALKER RUDKIN; and  
Probably even JOCKEY underpants.  
And his off-the-field gear.  
And LANE WALKER RUDKIN top this off  
with \$10,000 for rugby coaching.

**OPPOSE THE TOUR**

BOYCOTT  adidas

BOYCOTT  JOCKEY

BOYCOTT hip hi and less

BOYCOTT CANTERBURY 

BOYCOTT pickaberry

BOYCOTT Formfit 

Fig 2: Boycott Poster. HART Aotearoa Papers, MS-Papers-93-042-03, Alexander Turnbull Library.

Ray Dutton reacted by warning that the 1990 Auckland Commonwealth Games could be taken away from New Zealand if the tour proceeded as planned. 'I believe it is a distinct possibility', Dutton remarked, 'that the games could be taken from Auckland because there is sufficient time for another country to offer to host the games'.<sup>42</sup>

Johnson Mhlabo, foreign affairs secretary for the Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania, on a HART-sponsored visit to New Zealand warned the tour meant danger for the All Blacks and blacks living in South Africa. The South African government had outlawed Mhlabo's organisation, whose aim was to overthrow apartheid. He predicted 'massacres of black people during tour demonstrations' and that 'players should be warned that they would be fair game for violence during their tour'.<sup>43</sup>

Not everyone was opposed to the tour. Albert Ferrasse, President of the French Rugby Federation (and latter Chairman of the International Rugby Board), a stern advocate for allowing South Africa to maintain its place in world rugby, declared his support for his New Zealand counterparts decision. 'We must continue to do everything in our power', argued Ferrasse, 'to destroy apartheid and in my opinion multi-racial encounters during rugby tours do much more than boycotts to advance this cause'.<sup>44</sup>

A group of Wellingtonians demonstrated their support for the Rugby Union's decision by establishing an All Black fund for those selected to tour the Republic. Among the fund's trustees were former All Blacks, Andy Leslie, Jack Griffith and John Tanner. The aim of the fund was to support any All Blacks financially disadvantaged through touring South Africa. Some players, especially those employed government departments could either lose their jobs, or be forced to take leave without pay for the duration of the tour. The fund proved an enormous success and demonstrated the level of public support for

the tour. Set an initial target of \$20,000, the fund raised \$10,000 within the first three days.<sup>45</sup>

While the union had made its mind to go ahead with the tour, a number of players were less certain. Three Canterbury All Blacks, Warwick Taylor, Jock Hobbs and Wayne Smith were reported to be on the verge of making themselves unavailable for the tour following a meeting with members of the Christchurch-based Coalition against the Tour (CAT). The players pointed out that a number of factors had to be considered before deciding whether or not to go on the tour. For Taylor, an important factor was the risk of losing his teaching job at a local high school. Hobbs was not only concerned about the amount of time off work as a lawyer, but also about the amount of time away from home.<sup>46</sup> In the end, all three elected to go to South Africa. The players echoed Ferrasse in seeing benefits from the tour. 'I have thought a lot about the tour', claimed Smith, 'and I have come down to the issue that maintaining sporting contacts with South Africa will do more good than isolating them'. Hobbs agreed, 'I feel the tour will be of more good than isolating it'.<sup>47</sup>

Before the proposed tour of South Africa, the All Blacks undertook a domestic programme of two tests against England and a one-off test against Bledisloe Cup rivals, Australia. As expected, a backdrop of demonstrations reminiscent of those four years earlier greeted all three matches. 'It was extremely trying and difficult, and in some cases upsetting', according to former All Black coach, Brian Lochore, for players to try and concentrate on the matches against England and Australia against an unending barrage of abuse from people protesting against the tour.<sup>48</sup> Lochore recalls one particular moment of hostility that occurred outside Rugby Park in Hamilton.

After training there were no buses and we had to get taxis back to the hotel. While we waited for the taxis, we just had to stand there in the face of unrelenting abuse. The language was appalling, especially from the women.

We couldn't do anything, say anything, just stand there and let it wash over us.<sup>49</sup>

All Black captain, Andy Dalton, conceded the demonstrators actions did have the potential to be upsetting, especially as players were harangued on a personal basis.<sup>50</sup>

Following their success against both England and Australia, the All Blacks were ready and raring to go to South Africa. With the Government admitting it did not have the power to prevent the tour from going ahead and the Rugby Union unlikely to reverse its decision, the rugby public, with a great deal of anticipation, looked forward to another tense, tightly-fought test series with the Springboks. However, a surprising development was just over the horizon.

## CHAPTER THREE

### TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS

Once the NZRFU Council had made its decision to send an All Black team to South Africa it seemed there was little to stop it from proceeding. This was despite the best efforts of the Prime Minister to 'persuade' the Rugby Union to decline the SARB's invitation. However, as the date for the team's departure drew closer, a new challenge to the tour emerged. On May 1 1985, thirty-five concerned lawyers gathered in the Auckland District Law Society offices to set up a steering committee under the chairmanship of a Queen's Counsel, Ted Thomas. Their purpose was to outline a range of moves it felt could halt the All Black tour in its tracks. Options considered included laws to punish the union financially and preventing it from receiving money from South Africa, boycotts of sponsors and travel agencies and a review of how lawyers could advise people charged after protests. The option finally agreed upon was to examine possible legal avenues to see if grounds existed for court challenges to stop the tour.<sup>1</sup>

There was a precedent for an attempt being made to use the law to stop a tour of South Africa. In 1970, Wellington bookseller, Roy Parsons, made an application to invoke an ancient writ, *ne exeat regno* – 'lest he leave the realm', to prevent the departure of the All Black team to South Africa. Such writs, according to historian, Malcolm Templeton, had been used in the past as a state writ, to prevent acts prejudicial to the realm, or as a private writ, to prevent an absconding debtor from going abroad. On this occasion, the application was given short shrift by the judiciary on the grounds that the issue of a writ for the safety and benefit of the realm would require the intervention of the Queen's ministers on her behalf, and as they had shown no inclination to apply to be heard, the application was declined.<sup>2</sup>

In outlining the decision to pursue a legal challenge, Thomas cited three reasons why the group was opposed to the tour. Firstly, they were united in their intense dislike of apartheid and its moral and social implications. 'An All Black tour', Thomas claimed, 'unquestionably gives comfort to the white minority in South Africa and definitely assists to prop up the system'. Secondly, they were concerned about the safety of South Africa's black population if the tour went ahead. 'I believe South Africa is in a state of turmoil and the police there are undoubtedly killing and injuring many black people in their efforts to maintain law and order'. An All Black presence in South Africa, he argued, 'would be a focal point for demonstrations that would inevitably lead to people being killed and injured'. Thirdly, they believed a rugby tour of South Africa would not be good for the game.<sup>3</sup>

After a session of brainstorming, Rod Hansen, a senior Auckland solicitor, suggested looking at the Rugby Union's constitution as a means of halting the tour. Upon receiving a copy of the union's rules, Hansen's idea seemed possible. In the lawyers opinion, the Rugby Union's decision to tour would harm rugby in New Zealand. The union was therefore acting outside its rules, which required it to 'promote, foster and develop amateur rugby union football throughout New Zealand'.<sup>4</sup> As a subsidiary argument, the group argued that the Rugby Union council's decision to tour was outside its normal powers and that such a decision could only be made - as the union's constitution required - by the NZRFU at its annual general meeting.<sup>5</sup>

The next step was to find suitable plaintiffs to front the case. They had to be rugby people, willing to stand against the tour. Hansen approached two Auckland lawyers, Patrick Finnigan and Phillip Recordon who were known to be rugby club members opposed the tour. The group was concerned that in order to challenge the constitution of the NZRFU, it had to be by a member or someone within the NZRFU complex. Finnigan latter explained,

Otherwise, there could have been procedural challenges to a challenge being brought by say Jack Smith who was but a citizen of New Zealand. To that extent I was a member of the University RFC in Auckland and as such was in the matrix or the complex of the NZRFU and therefore they approached me for that reason. It so happened that I paid my sub on the Saturday night before I was approached on the Monday – fortuitously.<sup>6</sup>

Finnigan had been a lawyer since 1971 and a rugby player since 1951. While his playing and coaching involvement in the game had ended, he had remained a non-playing club member and had provided the University club a \$500 loan debenture in 1984.<sup>7</sup> Recordon was a member of the Teachers RFC and was, at the time, an active player in Auckland's president's grade competition. Recordon believed the tour was wrong and that after the 1981 tour it should have been 'obvious to every rugby councillor that there could be no good for rugby from the tour proceeding'.<sup>8</sup>

On May 20, the lawyers were ready to move and the case was filed in the Wellington High Court. But before the case could be brought to court, there was a motion from the Rugby Union to have the action struck out. It succeeded. Despite both plaintiffs being card-carrying members of rugby clubs, Chief Justice, Sir Ronald Davidson ruled against the challenge to the tour on the grounds that neither plaintiff was a member of the Rugby Union, and therefore had no 'standing' to claim the NZRFU had acted contrary to its rules and constitution in accepting the invitation from the SARB. In addition, he held that the NZRFU Council, 'exercising its powers of management, was the right body to decide on the South African invitation'.<sup>9</sup>

The lawyer's next move was to rush a hurried appeal to the Court of Appeal. On June 11 part of the case was reinstated, enough to make the union defend its decision to send an All Black team to South Africa in court. Appeal Court

President, Sir Robin Cooke rejected the 'wrong body' ground for the appeal, but ruled that 'Although not having contracts directly with the parent union the plaintiffs as local club members are linked to it by a chain of contracts'. The issue of whether the NZRFU had acted against its objects of 'promoting, fostering and developing the game', could not, in Cooke's opinion, 'be dismissed as a matter of internal management'. He continued.

The decision (to tour South Africa) affects the New Zealand community as a whole. And judicial notice must be taken of the obvious fact that in the view of a significant number of people, but no doubt contrary to the view of another significant number, the decision affects the international relations or standing of New Zealand ... While technically a private and voluntary association, the Rugby Union is in relation to this decision in a position of major national importance.<sup>10</sup>

It was for this reason, that Cooke was reluctant to apply to the question of standing the narrowest criteria that might be drawn from private law fields. He went on. 'The Court was not seeking to determine whether the decision was the exercise of a statutory power, but did consider that it fell into a special area where, in the New Zealand context, a sharp boundary could not be drawn between public and private law'. In his concluding comments, Cooke, made the observation that 'Whatever may be the majority opinion of those associated with the sport, there is no reason to suppose the views of the plaintiffs are held by only a tiny or negligible minority. The plaintiffs cannot be dismissed as mere busy bodies, cranks or mischief makers'.<sup>11</sup>

Amidst the growing legal problems, the All Black selection panel of Brian Lochore, Colin Meads and Tiny Hill, set about the task of picking a team to tour South Africa. After much deliberation, the team was selected and subsequently announced on July 3 following the All Blacks 10-9 victory over Australia at Eden Park.<sup>12</sup> Five days later the case was back in the High Court.

This time, it was heard before Justice Casey. The impending departure of the All Black team to South Africa on July 17 saw the lawyers play their trump card. On June 30, Thomas moved for an order restraining the Rugby Union, including their servants and agents, from proceeding with the proposed tour until such time as a final ruling could be determined. After much deliberation, Justice Casey delivered his ruling on July 13. It was not good news for the Rugby Union.

### **CASEY'S RULING**

In a 40-minute-long oral judgement, Justice Casey argued that it had been long recognised that the court has jurisdiction to make orders preserving the status quo until the dispute between the two parties had been disposed of by further hearings. 'In such an application', he said, 'the court was concerned with, first, the maintenance of the position that would allow justice to be done when its final order was made'. Casey emphasised that the granting of an interim injunction 'was not the final ruling in the claim, nor any indication of how the court would decide it'. Instead, he said, 'it was a matter for his discretion. I am engaged essentially in balancing the rights the plaintiffs seek to protect against the defendants right to make the decision and carry on their activities which are not yet shown to be unlawful and may turn out to be entirely proper'. The purpose of an injunction, Casey said, was to prevent what was described as deplorable damage to the plaintiffs. He explained,

That term means in this context an injury for which money would not be an adequate compensation. Here the plaintiffs face an initial problem in identifying just what injury they would suffer if the tour proceeds before the case can be decided. Certainly, neither can point to definite or other tangible loss. Nor could they indicate any prejudice to their rights or expectations as rugby club members.<sup>13</sup>

While he had acknowledged that the Court of Appeal had rejected any contractual relationship between the plaintiffs and the union whereby the plaintiffs' standing could arise, Casey held that in special circumstances, 'the sufficiency of their interests had to be judged in relation to the special matter of their application'. He said the plaintiffs' main argument in support of the injunction was that the decision did not comply with the Rugby Union's objects of promoting, fostering, and developing rugby in New Zealand. The union was obliged, he argued, as an incorporated society, to act in accordance with its constitution.<sup>14</sup>

Justice Casey reminded the court that the 1981 Springbok tour of New Zealand 'was a disaster both for rugby football and the community, which was widely, and sometimes violently split', over the question of sporting contacts with South Africa. Casey recalled instances where the courts encountered cases where usually law abiding citizens found themselves at odds with the law for the very first time, while those responsible for its enforcement came under enormous strain. As such, Casey argued the plaintiffs had established a strong prima facie case that the present tour could not benefit rugby in New Zealand. The correspondence and other evidence had demonstrated much the same concept in the community over the issue.<sup>15</sup>

Those opposed to the tour, according to Casey, 'could not be brushed aside as irresponsible troublemakers or stirrers, as some of the evidence and opinion from the union suggested. It was impossible', he said, 'to regard the leaders of nearly all our churches or a unanimous House of Representatives, or the Auckland and North Harbour rugby unions, in that light'. Rather it appeared to be 'an unarguable fact that a substantial number, perhaps even approaching half, of all New Zealanders were opposed or upset about the tour on grounds that seemed to include the good of rugby, New Zealand's international standing, trade, the cancellation of other sports likely to be affected, or moral

reasons connected with hatred of apartheid'.<sup>16</sup> He admitted 'Most of these reasons may have no direct connection with benefiting local rugby. But, taken together, they must result in a groundswell of public opinion exasperated or angry with the union's stance'.<sup>17</sup> Casey suggested that the plaintiffs were on strong ground in his opinion when they said such an attitude spread so widely among all sections of the community must inevitably damage the image of the game and lead to a drop in support and interest and retention of players at the school boy level. 'Similar comments', he continued, 'could be made about the increasingly important financial and moral sponsorship' He argued that the case was not answered by the proposition of counsel for the defendants, Douglas White, that international tours by themselves were in the best interests of rugby.<sup>18</sup>

Casey admitted that Thomas had taken him through a detailed study of the NZRFU council's minutes and records and volume of primary exhibits, which he believed demonstrated an arguable case that when they were read as a whole a pattern emerged of a majority on the council 'deliberately shutting their eyes to the reality of the widespread public concern over the tour'. In doing so, he claimed, 'they had closed their minds to any genuine consideration of its effect on the welfare of rugby'. He continued, 'They became side tracked in the defence of the right to choose those whom the union would play, instead of capitulating to threats or intimidation'.<sup>19</sup>

Casey mentioned 'one or two significant remarks indicative of the attitude he had just described'. He cited the March 30 meeting between the Prime Minister and the council as an example of the union's determination not to play into Lange's hands, rather than evincing a desire to listen to what he had to say. On Blazey's intimation that if the Prime Minister used the words 'require' and 'direct the tour not take place' he would accept a decision, a letter was written by the council on that point and also asking Lange to state how New Zealand

would be affected by the tour. He noted that the Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer replied on April 4 in a letter Casey could only describe as a 'clear, comprehensive and forceful presentation of New Zealand's position. And it contained' he said,

an equally clear formulation of the Prime Minister's statement that the tour must not proceed as amounting to the directive, instruction or command which the Rugby Union has said in the past it would respect. Annexed was a copy of the unanimous resolution of the House of Representatives of March 30, urging rejection while nonetheless acknowledging the union's right to decide.<sup>20</sup>

Casey noted that in a memorandum to the council on April dealing with Palmer's letter, Blazey had drawn attention to the fact that the direction or command had no legal backing.<sup>21</sup>

Having found an arguable case in respect of the decision, based on the normal test of good faith applicable to voluntary incorporated societies, Casey turned to the alternative advanced by the plaintiffs which would place a higher obligation on council members. Any decision, he suggested, must have regard to the unique importance of the decision in the public domain and the effect it could have on New Zealand's relationship with the outside world and on its own community. In his opinion, such a decision required

that body, or any other in a similar position to exercise more than just good faith. It must also exercise that degree of care which if had been found proper to impose on statutory bodies in the exercise of their powers affecting legal rights or legitimate expectations.<sup>22</sup>

Broadly speaking, Casey believed the council had a duty to act reasonably as well as honestly, paying regard to relevant considerations over the playing of

New Zealand rugby and must not be influenced by irrelevant matters in reaching its decision.<sup>23</sup>

Casey indicated that the circumstances pointed to the union's keeping its options open. He also thought that there was force in Thomas' criticism of White's suggestion that the tour would be cancelled in the event of the interim injunction being granted, 'and asking me on the one hand to so find while on the other his client declines to make that statement positively'. Casey stated that he believed there was room for some elasticity in fixtures. He based this on the fact that if the tour was delayed 'the keen enthusiasm of the SARB to get the All Blacks would go along way to ensuring it took place if humanly possible'. However, he said, 'I accept that there is a real possibility that it might not take place and a very strong one that, if it does, it will be different from the present one'.<sup>24</sup>

In his summing up, Casey said the interest of the public and the nation in not having the tour go ahead was a most potent factor. The tour, he said, 'was contrary to a clear direction from the Government because of the harm it could do to New Zealand's national interest'. He said the unanimous resolution of Parliament indicated the serious harm it would do New Zealand's interests at home and abroad and the spirit of the Gleneagles Agreement. There was also a risk of violence and bloodshed, even death, to Africans. Casey argued,

All these matters emphasised the vital importance of ensuring that the decision which might cause such consequences be one that was lawfully arrived at. They were of such seriousness that, in the responsible exercise of his discretion, he considered the only order he could make was one that would preserve the position existing at the date of that discussion.<sup>25</sup>

Therefore, he announced that the injunction had been granted as moved until further order of the court.<sup>26</sup>

## REACTION TO THE DECISION

Reaction to the news within New Zealand rugby was one of great disappointment. Rugby Union councillor Ritchie Guy described the High Court decision as ‘A black day in the history of sport. We’re in a position now where anyone belonging to any organisation at all can contest the decision of the parent body and what body can operate under that type of constraint’?<sup>27</sup> Outspoken rugby councillor Ron Don was upset at the ruling. ‘For the sake of the thirty All Blacks chosen I’m absolutely appalled’, he said. ‘This is a sad day for them, a sad day for rugby and more importantly a sad day for sport and for the whole of New Zealand’.<sup>28</sup>

All Black coach Brian Lochore recalled being disappointed for the players.

I was at home when I heard the news on the radio. I was numb. When you work for something and its taken away from you, you're left numb. It's as if part of you has been taken away from you. The guys were shattered their rugby life in tatters. They'd been thinking of little else for years. Every time you went for a run, you'd run a wee bit harder and a wee bit longer because you'd think of South Africa. It was devastating for them. What do you say to guys like G. Knight and J. Ashworth? There's no challenges left for them. They knew that. The ends of their careers had been taken away from them.<sup>29</sup>

Fellow All Black selector Bryce Rope, shared Lochore’s view. ‘I know the hours of training and the pressures the All Blacks have been under and to me its very sad for them’.<sup>30</sup>

For All Black captain Andy Dalton, the decision was a bitter blow. ‘I find it frustrating that on the eve of assembly we still don't know what on earth is

going on. I find it unbelievable that it should be left to this late stage'.<sup>31</sup> Andy Haden recalled,

Personally I was angry. To tour South Africa was certainly top of the list of ambitions I had in life, but the loss of the opportunity to make a twelfth All Black tour was not in itself a devastation. Perhaps I was disappointed for those who had not experienced the thrill of wearing the All Black jersey even though they had been selected to tour. You are not an all Black until you take the field.<sup>32</sup>

Veteran All Black, John Ashworth recalled feeling like he'd suffered a serious personal injury and was out of the tour. 'I kept thinking over and over again that the greatest ambition in my life, to wear the All Black jersey in South Africa, had been unfairly ripped away from me. I thought, you bastards, you've done it this time and I'll never forget that hurt'.<sup>33</sup>

For the newly selected All Blacks chosen to tour South Africa, the High Court injunction created enormous uncertainty. Wayne Shelford, Steve McDowell, Vic Simpson and Taranaki winger, Bryce Robins were left wondering whether they would ever get the opportunity to wear the prized black jersey. McDowell recalled in the *Rugby News* how he went home on the Saturday feeling 'absolutely stunned. I just sat in a daze, not knowing what to think'.<sup>34</sup> For McDowell, it was a case of history repeating itself. In 1980 he'd been chosen to represent New Zealand in Judo at the Moscow Olympics. New Zealand's boycott of the Games in response to the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan prevented the fulfilment of his Olympic dream. Shelford's disappointment was obvious. 'Being one who hasn't experienced the thrill of taking the field as an All Black', he said, 'you can say I'm thoroughly brassed off'.<sup>35</sup>

The plaintiffs displayed enormous restraint in spite of the dramatic ruling 'This is not a matter for elation', Finnigan insisted. Bearing in mind that the original

case against the tour was still to be heard, it was in his words, 'still early days ... It may eventuate', he said, 'that our case ultimately will fail, but at least we will have had the case heard'.<sup>36</sup> Recordon described the week as 'the most emotionally draining and physically tiring' he had experienced, 'but it was also the most rewarding'. After the decision he said, 'I am relieved, exhausted, very pleased but still apprehensive'.<sup>37</sup> Counsel for the plaintiffs, Ted Thomas was also wary of shouting from the rooftops too soon. 'I'm very, very grateful for this decision and I hope it will stick against any Appeal Court application to overturn it. I'm really so pleased', he said, '... but I don't want to count my chickens before they're hatched. There's so much that can still go wrong'.<sup>38</sup>

Reaction amongst politicians was predictable. The Prime Minister proclaimed to be 'probably the proudest I have ever been to be a lawyer ... In a curious way it is a real triumph for rugby people, because two rugby supporters have put their support in the wider context of New Zealand's wider responsibility'. Lange said he was not surprised at the decision, 'I was always certain the tour was not in the interests of rugby'.<sup>39</sup>

Opposition and National Party leader, Jim McLay, said he was astonished at the High Court ruling. 'I have no wish to criticise the Honourable Mr Justice Casey. However the decision clearly has very serious implications that go far beyond rugby or sport. It amounts to judicial interference with the freedom of New Zealanders to leave the country'.<sup>40</sup> Former Prime Minister, Robert Muldoon, by then a backbencher, described the ruling as a 'milestone in legal history and an appalling decision', which had effectively killed the right of New Zealand sportsmen, who had committed no offence, to leave their own country.<sup>41</sup> The National Party's spokesman on sport, John Banks shared his colleagues concerns. 'I am deeply disappointed with the decision, New Zealanders look to the courts to protect our rights and our freedoms. This

decision seriously infringes the freedom of sportsmen to make their own decisions. This is a tragic day for New Zealand and a sad day for sport'.<sup>42</sup>

Anti-tour campaigners were understandably jubilant but realistic. HART leader John Minto, said the court injunction was a holding action. He expressed doubts whether the injunction would prevent the All Blacks travelling to South Africa unless the court finally decided against the tour. Notwithstanding, he described Casey's ruling as a 'courageous decision and it's the right decision', he said. 'It clearly points to who has been offside in this whole campaign'.<sup>43</sup> Former HART leader, Trevor Richards, said he had been optimistic on the outcome of the move to stop the All Blacks leaving before the original trial could be finalised. 'I'm absolutely delighted', he said. 'It's the best thing I've heard in years. The judge was stronger than I expected. I hope every rugby union councillor will commit this decision to memory'.<sup>44</sup>

Pro-tour activists were appalled by the tour-stalling injunction. Pat Hunt, spokesman for the Society for the Promotion of the Rights of the Individual (SPRI) and a former National Party MP, said 'I'm amazed the Judiciary should restrict the rights and freedoms of law-abiding sportsmen to travel overseas'. The ruling, which Hunt described as 'unprecedented in a Western democracy', would make people lose faith in the Judiciary. He urged the players to travel to South Africa as individuals.<sup>45</sup> SPRI member Elizabeth Sutherland was defiant in defeat. 'We might have lost this battle but the war is still very much alive', she said. 'I am totally shattered by the court move and lost any faith I have ever had in the New Zealand justice system. The law is an ass'.<sup>46</sup>

Reaction to the news in South Africa was one of uncertainty and jubilation depending where one stood on the tour issue. Springbok Coach, Cecil Moss, reflected soberly on the consequences of the decision. 'I am worried - if they do not come, who will take their place'.<sup>47</sup> Springbok first-five eight Naas Botha,

who only a week earlier had played in trials to selected a national side to play the All Blacks, shared similar feelings. 'It will be a bitter let down if the tour is cancelled. If they don't come, who will?'<sup>48</sup>

In contrast, the *Sowetan Sunday Mirror*, South Africa's leading black newspaper applauded the High Court ruling. 'The All Blacks and others in New Zealand must know that South Africa is going through a terrible time of violence', the editorial said. It prophesied the All Blacks would probably receive a 'torrid send off' from New Zealand if the tour went ahead, while opposition to the tour in South Africa would be likely to lead to 'scenes of unprecedented violence'.<sup>49</sup> Frank Van der Horst, the president of the South African Council of Sport (SACS), which affiliated all black and coloured sports organisations in South Africa, described the injunction as 'great news'. He regarded the decision as a tremendous victory for the fight against racism in sport. 'We salute the people of New Zealand for helping us regain our humanity'. Van der Horst warned that he now expected the SARB to try and arrange a rebel All Black tour, 'It follows the racist thinking of the board and the white-dominated sport administrators that they would spend millions they have obtained from money achieved by paying the black labour force starvation wages'.<sup>50</sup> How right he would prove to be.

### **THE TOUR IS CANCELLED**

On July 15, two days after Casey had issued the injunction, Ces Blazey announced that the arrangements for the All Blacks to assemble in order to leave New Zealand on July 17 had been cancelled. The tour was off. The Rugby Union gave four reasons for its decision. Firstly, practical considerations led to the decision to cancel the tour and also not to appeal against the interlocutory injunction. Secondly, after Casey's granting of an interim injunction in which he indicated his preliminary views against the defendants

(the NZRFU), a long trial was inevitable and would be substantially longer than the two weeks originally estimated. Thirdly, there was no certainty when judgement on the trial was to be given and consequently, no alternative departure date could be arranged. Without a specific date, the required travel and security arrangements required for the All Blacks to travel to South Africa couldn't be made. Finally, the uncertainty created by these practical considerations would also affect the players and their families.<sup>51</sup>

HART's John Minto could hardly disguise his elation over the Rugby Union's cancellation of the tour. 'This is sixteen years of campaigning ... and it looks like this is not a minor win. This could be the final nail in the coffin of rugby contacts with South Africa', he predicted. 'It will be the breaking of the back of international sporting contacts with South Africa. It's a significant decision ... because it is a move that's finally come from within rugby'.<sup>52</sup>

The Prime Minister was relieved upon hearing the union's decision. 'Today's ruling is in the best interests of New Zealand, its people, and the game of rugby', he said. 'I am pleased that the Rugby Union has taken the appropriate and responsible attitude not to go to South Africa'. He understood the decision would disappoint some people but was glad the players might have an opportunity of representing New Zealand elsewhere. 'Overall', Lange said, 'I am relieved that the tour will not proceed'.<sup>53</sup>

Jim McLay expressed regret at the union's decision whilst acknowledging it had no alternative. The interim injunction, he said, had so interfered with the union's plans and those of the police and other agencies 'that it was effectively the court decision that cancelled the tour. My regret is that the Rugby Union was forced to make this decision not by its own choice'.<sup>54</sup> Opposition deputy leader Jim Bolger described the cancellation as a 'sad day for New Zealand when our premier sporting team is denied the right to travel as a team to play

sport. All New Zealander's will question whether their rights will be threatened or curtailed'.<sup>55</sup>

Not all within New Zealand rugby circles were disappointed with the cancellation of the tour. Three of New Zealand's more prominent rugby coaches welcomed the decision. Auckland's John Hart stated, 'I just have a sense of relief that we can get on with carrying out the goods things in the game'. Ian Upston, Wellington's coach also suggested that the tour would not have been a good idea for the game. Canterbury coach Alex Wylie agreed with Upston's comments. 'I don't think it would have done a lot for the game of rugby, especially in New Zealand'.<sup>56</sup>

Reaction to the cancellation of the tour from within South Africa was mixed. The United Democratic Front (UDF), a multi-racial coalition of radical anti-apartheid groups, which had planned to organise demonstrations against the tour claimed the 'oppressed people' of South Africa had 'applauded' the cancellation of the tour. In a statement issued by its publicity secretary Murphy Munroe, the UDF said that the All Blacks would have demonstrated 'gross insensitivity' if they had proceeded with the tour, 'at a time when the South African army and police are massacring our people'.<sup>57</sup> Dr Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert, leader of the anti-apartheid opposition in the white-only House of Assembly disagreed with the UDF. Van Zyl Slabbert declared the cancellation 'riddled with hypocrisy', claiming it would 'limit South Africa's exposure to desegregated sport'.<sup>58</sup>

### **THE END OF THE ROAD?**

Following Justice Casey's ruling, the Rugby Union instructed its solicitors to continue its defence of the action in the High Court, and to have its decision to send a team to South Africa confirmed as being in the best interest of rugby.

The plaintiffs, satisfied the tour had been halted, elected not to continue with their court action. The union, after thorough consideration, agreed. Therefore, agreement was reached between the two parties that the application for an injunction against the Rugby Union was to be adjourned *sine die*. This ensured that the court would not have to hear the case. The further expenditure of the NZRFU's resources, which in the opinion of the council 'would be better directed elsewhere in the interests of promoting, fostering and developing amateur rugby in New Zealand', was cited as the principal reason for the Rugby Union's decision.<sup>59</sup> Both parties agreed to bear their own court costs. Casey congratulated them 'on the wisdom demonstrated by this conclusion to what might have been an expensive and drawn out action that would have done little to heal divisions in our community over the issue'<sup>60</sup>.

'I'm pleased all round, for rugby and for ourselves', Finnigan said after the announcement that agreement had been reached. He went so far as to suggest the Rugby Union was privately pleased about the outcome of the case. 'I believe in its heart of hearts, the Rugby Union was very pleased to obtain this decision, and this agreement'.<sup>61</sup> Finnigan maybe correct in his assumption. As the case progressed, the thought of capitulating to the anti-tour movement became more and more unthinkable to the union. In fact, the presence of HART and others gave the Rugby Union more incentive to push the tour through. The decision of the plaintiffs to keep their distance from groups such as HART, which included the refusal of any offers of money to defray expenses, made it more palatable for the union to accept an All Black tour to South Africa in 1985 was no longer practical.<sup>62</sup>

Despite accepting the discontinuance of action in the High Court, the NZRFU remained committed to proving that it had the right to tour when and where it wanted. To this end, the Rugby Union sought an order from the High Court upholding its right to appeal to the Privy Council against the Court of Appeal

decision that the plaintiffs did have the standing to bring their action. In a statement to the media, the Rugby Union council argued 'that the best interests of New Zealand amateur rugby would have been best served by giving our team the opportunity to play against one of the best teams in the world'. The Council statement went on to explain the reason behind its decision to reserve the right to appeal to the Privy Council. 'The councillors who had the responsibility of deciding on the tour issue', argued Blazey, 'reached their conclusions honestly, believing that they were doing so in the best interests of rugby. It is a matter of great concern to them that their honest views, which were democratically elected to express, could have been challenged in the courts with the disastrous consequences which have followed'.<sup>63</sup> In addition, the Council rejected allegations made by plaintiffs that the Springbok tour of 1981 had been a disaster for rugby. If the High Court action had continued, claimed the Rugby Union, it would have called evidence to establish that firstly, attendances at provincial and international rugby matches had improved. Secondly, that sponsorship in the game had increased. Thirdly, there had been a substantial improvement in the union's financial position. Fourthly, the number of schoolboy teams had increased, while there had been no overall decline in the numbers of club teams, and finally, the quality of New Zealand rugby had continued to improve at all levels.<sup>64</sup>

Despite the Rugby Union's case, the High Court denied the union's request on the grounds that the action in question had been effectively terminated by agreement between the plaintiffs and union. Therefore the issue on which the Rugby Union wished to appeal was no longer alive.<sup>65</sup>

The *Rugby News* estimated the Rugby Union spent approximately \$159,000 on legal fees in defending its right to send a team to South Africa.<sup>66</sup> This begs the question, how was the plaintiffs court action financed? According to Finnigan,

Lawyers would take the case and work for us and therefore to that extent it was a voluntary action. The only financial ramification for this was during the course of the hearing when the decision was taken to seek an interim injunction because time was running out. Phillip Recordon and I had to give an undertaking to the court to pay damages if damages ought to have been paid and so that could have involved a substantial payment or risk of payment if we had failed. It did cost us money, but they were essentially expenditure of disbursements such as travel, toll calls, filing fees and subsidiary expenses but a reasonable amount. Whilst Phillip, I and the lawyers involved funded these sorts of things donations were received from people in New Zealand which I on sent to the group which had kicked this off and they sent me back a cheque for what I had spent.<sup>67</sup>

## **AN ALTERNATIVE TOUR**

Now that an All Black tour to South Africa was dead and buried, the Rugby Union called the players selected for the original tour to Wellington on July 16 to discuss an alternative tour. After a tense six-hour meeting chaired by Andy Dalton, the players came to a unanimous agreement that they should ask the Rugby Union to send them to Argentina, at that time an emerging rugby force. The proviso to the union was that the team had to go to South America immediately. 'The players were psychologically and mentally prepared to tour there and then and delays could only mean a loss of that edge and playing form', explained Dalton. The players suffered another setback. The following day, the Rugby Union regrettably informed the players that Argentina was unable to host a tour at such short notice.<sup>68</sup>

The beginnings of the Cavaliers concept emerged in the wake of the cancellation of the South African tour and the postponement of a tour to Argentina. On July 15, at a press conference, a journalist asked the Prime Minister whether it would be legal for individual All Blacks to travel to South Africa, form themselves into a team and play the Springboks.<sup>69</sup> He made it clear

that while the Government did not condone such a course of action, there was nothing in the injunction issued by the High Court that prevented individuals from travelling abroad.<sup>70</sup> He would later deny that his comments could have encouraged a rebel tour to South Africa. 'I offered them no encouragement', he said, 'I offered them discouragement. I also told them the state of the law'.<sup>71</sup> In hindsight, his comments were misguided. For there is no doubt that he unwittingly planted the notion of such a plan in the minds of many of the All Blacks.

On July 18, Radio New Zealand news reported that a number of players were off on a 'rebel' tour of South Africa that night. Despite denials to the contrary, such a tour was indeed about to go ahead. The only aspect of the report that was incorrect was the date of departure. Instead, the twenty-seven strong squad (Jock Hobbs and Robbie Deans did not take part) were due to fly out of Auckland on July 21, however that weekend, civil unrest in South Africa saw the tour plans postponed.<sup>72</sup> Phone calls from South Africa the following evening, insisting the situation in the Republic was not as dangerous as first thought; saw the tour back on.

At this stage, a couple of the younger players, John Kirwan and Grant Fox, pulled out from the touring party.<sup>73</sup> 'I would not go', suggested Fox,

because I did not want my career to end up on Loftus Versfeld. I was angry as most All Blacks about the abandonment of the official tour and the means taken to squash it but I was not ready to gamble my rugby playing future by taking part in an unsanctioned tour.<sup>74</sup>

North Harbour player, Frano Botica, replaced Fox. Kirwan held similar concerns.<sup>75</sup> Despite their decision not to go, neither player endured peer pressure or recriminations from those who were taking part in the tour. 'I'd

isolated myself but the others were good about it', claimed Kirwan, 'they just said, If that's your decision, fair enough'.<sup>76</sup>

The principal organisers of the tour were South African Barbarians Chairman, Chick Henderson and Auckland businessman and former Auckland Rugby Union committee member, Winston McDonald. The arrangements for the tour were simple. Before departure, the players would resign from their clubs removing them from NZRFU jurisdiction. Once the players arrived in South Africa, they were to reform as a Barbarians team and pick up the itinerary originally arranged for the All Blacks.<sup>77</sup>

Within a few hours of intended departure on a Continental Airlines flight that would have taken them through Los Angeles to New York and then down to Johannesburg, seventeen of the touring party gathered at the home of former All Black doctor 'Doc' Cunningham in Milford, Auckland. The Canterbury players were still on their way to Auckland. Just as the tickets were to be issued, Andy Dalton arrived with bad news. He had in his possession a copy of a telex Ted Thomas had sent the previous day to the Rugby Union saying he had been alerted to the fact, by 'A person in a position to know', that 'all but one of the selected All Blacks were to travel to South Africa'.<sup>78</sup> The gist of the telex was that Brian Lochore, as coach of the All Blacks, Dalton, as a member of the players liaison committee, and Andy Haden, who had recently been appointed as the Rugby Union's marketing consultant, would, as 'servants or agents of the union' be in contempt of court should they participate in the tour.

Some of the players considered Thomas's threat a bluff and were prepared to tour South Africa regardless. However, there were a sufficient number of the players assembled who treated the contempt of court threats seriously enough to abort the tour. Without Lochore, Dalton or Haden available, the tour became a pointless exercise. 'There didn't seem to be any point to it anymore',

All Black halfback, Dave Loveridge recalled. 'I didn't want to go there in such circumstances - and we thought there might be increased reaction in New Zealand against us - and go there and not have a show of achieving what we wanted, to beat South Africa'.<sup>79</sup> Murray Mexted summed up the whole saga for a large number of the players when he said, 'I've had a bloody gutsful.'<sup>80</sup> Dalton concedes in his book that it was a traumatic time for him. 'It was one of the worst times of my life and the hardest thing was the pressure on the family', he said. Dalton's mind was racked with inner turmoil. By going were the best interests of rugby being served and was there a danger of a further split in the unity of New Zealand rugby, he asked himself? 'It was extremely difficult', he claimed, 'trying to please everyone'.<sup>81</sup>

Through the efforts of Blazey and the NZRFU secretary, Barry Usmar, the players suffering was somewhat alleviated when they persuaded the Argentinean union to change its mind and accommodate an All Black tour scheduled for October. The results on the field were mixed. The second test saw the great Argentinean flyhalf, Hugo Porta, single-handedly secure his side a 21-21 draw. However, the Argentine tour was more significant for its role as the catalyst for a rebel tour the following year. After questioning the players originally selected to tour South Africa, Andy Haden was convinced there was unanimous support within the team for another attempt at an unsanctioned tour of the Republic the following season.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE CAVALIERS

The prospect of a New Zealand rugby team touring South Africa in 1986 received a major shot in the arm during the tour of Argentina. Senior player, Murray Mexted, canvassed the players originally selected to tour South Africa and discovered that they were united in their support for another attempt at a rebel tour. Haden recalls the moment when he realised another unsanctioned tour was feasible. 'Mexted came to me and said "We don't know whether to tell you this now or later but everyone here in Argentina, who was selected to go to South Africa originally, is still keen to go"'. Haden's reply was positive. 'If that's the case', he said, 'count me in too, and I'm quite happy to pass that information on to South Africa'. The realisation of every All Black's dreams, a tour to South Africa was about to come true.<sup>1</sup>

#### MOTIVATION

Interest by the players in an unauthorised tour of South Africa in 1986 was overwhelming. There were two primary reasons why the players were motivated to go on such a tour. Firstly, it was an opportunity to right what the players saw as the injustices committed against them in 1985. In other words, it would be the perfect way to thumb their collective noses at the Lange government, the anti-tour movement and the lawyers who had attempted to curb their individual freedoms. Secondly, a tour of South Africa represented the ultimate test for any rugby player. If the players couldn't tour as the All Blacks, the next best thing was to take part in an unofficial tour of South Africa. Jock Hobbs recalls the tour being about 'a group of players who had been prevented from going to South Africa as the All Blacks, as representatives of the NZRFU wanting to go and play in South Africa against South Africans'.<sup>2</sup> For Murray Mexted, the tour was an opportunity to answer his desire to play the

Springboks in South Africa and beat them. According to Mexted, 'Most of the players felt strongly that by some quirk of the law something which was rightfully theirs to choose was snatched from them on July 13, 1985'.<sup>3</sup> The term 'strongly' was perhaps an understatement in the case of Wayne Shelford. After being refused special leave without pay to go on the rebel tour, Shelford resigned from the Navy, his employer for the past eleven years. Public Relations director for the Navy at the time, Commander Gerry Power, defended the Navy's decision on the ground it was following State Services guidelines which stated that leave without pay could not be granted to sportsmen seeking sporting contacts with South Africa.<sup>4</sup>

With the exception of John Kirwan, every player who had been selected to tour South Africa in 1985 indicated they were prepared to go. Kirwan declined to go to South Africa for two reasons. Firstly, he was still concerned that a tour to South Africa that was unsanctioned by the NZRFU could jeopardise his All Black career. Secondly, his father's ill-health saw him desire to get back to New Zealand as soon as his rugby-playing stint in Italy was over.<sup>5</sup>

## **LOGISTICS**

Within a fortnight of the All Blacks return from Argentina, the wheels were set in motion. In late December, a tour planning meeting took place in Hong Kong, chosen because of its convenient access from New Zealand and South Africa. The purpose of the meeting was to formulate the shape and details of an unofficial All Black tour to South Africa during 1986. The New Zealanders in attendance were; Andy Haden, All Black captains Andy Dalton and Ian Kirkpatrick, and Winston McDonald, the chief instigator of the first attempt at an unofficial tour a few months earlier. McDonald was committed to resurrecting rugby contact between New Zealand and South Africa and had developed very strong links with many influential South Africa rugby people

including Transvaal Rugby Football Union (TRFU) chairman, Louis Lyut. The South African delegation in Hong Kong consisted of TRFU officials including; Lyut, Ellis Park general manager Robert Denton, Lyut's personal solicitor Mervyn Key and Johaan Classen, general manager of Volkskas Industrial Bank, the tour financiers.<sup>6</sup>

Inside forty-eight hours, including the flights to and from Hong Kong, agreement was reached between the TRFU and the New Zealanders. The ground rules for the tour were established at the meeting. Among the points agreed was that the tour include all those chosen for the 1985 tour; that it be organised along similar lines to an All Black tour; that a tours agreement of the International Rugby Board (IRB) type be drawn up by Transvaal and submitted to all the players; and that every effort be made to distance the touring team from any association with the name 'All Blacks'.<sup>7</sup>

Following the Hong Kong meeting, McDonald and Key travelled throughout New Zealand offering not a contract but 'a carefully worded letter of intent' asking players if they would be available if invited to tour.<sup>8</sup> At this stage, the finer details of the tour, such as the date of departure, match venues, number of games, were kept from the players. This was a deliberate move on behalf of the organisers. Keeping the tour 'under wraps' was crucial to the success of the tour on two counts. Firstly, it meant every player could honestly answer the media that 'No, they hadn't received invitations and no, they didn't know when the tour was going to take place, if indeed there was to be a tour'.<sup>9</sup> Secondly, it was important that as few people as possible knew what was going on, especially those within the NZRFU. Had the Rugby Union been brought into the loop, the rebels would have been open to a similar legal challenge to that of 1985. Alternatively, had the New Zealand union told the players they couldn't tour, then the tour would have been called off. According to Dalton, informing the Union would have been 'a no-win situation'.<sup>10</sup>

The next piece of the jigsaw was the appointment of a coach and manager. In February 1986, All Black legends, Colin Meads (a current All Black selector) and Ian Kirkpatrick, were confirmed as coach and manager respectively. This was after All Black coach Brian Lochore and former All Black coach Fred Allen had turned down the job. Lochore was ambivalent to his invitation. He maintained he had a loyalty to his players but also to the NZRFU.

I could not wear two hats in my position. As much as I sympathised with what the players wanted to do, I had been appointed chairman of the New Zealand selectors and coach of the All Blacks and my responsibilities lay in New Zealand.<sup>11</sup>

For Allen, the decision was a lot simpler. 'Under the circumstances', said Allen; 'I had no option but to turn it down. It was not good for the sport'.<sup>12</sup> Mead's had a different view to Allen on contact with South Africa. His motivation for going was 'to open door that should never had been shut'.<sup>13</sup> For Kirkpatrick there were additional benefits, it was an opportunity to jump the queue. 'If I had gone through official channels to get the management of this type of team', he said, 'it would have taken me twenty years'.<sup>14</sup>

## THE RUMOURS BEGIN

The inevitable had to happen. Rumours of an impending rebel tour surfaced throughout the month of March. When asked of his involvement in the tour by the *Sunday News's* Richard Becht, McDonald's response was a guarded 'No comment'. He stated, 'I've been to South Africa with other teams before and that's why people seem to come to me ... I've heard all the rumours - and I know a bit about what's going on - but I'm just not prepared to comment on it'.<sup>15</sup> The first significant 'breaking' of the tour's reality occurred over the Easter weekend of March 29-30. Respected rugby journalists, Keith Quinn, on

Television New Zealand and Alex Vesey, in *the New Zealand Times*, stated that sources outside rugby and from South Africa had revealed that a team of past and present All Blacks were to fly out to South Africa within a fortnight and play a 'test' series against the Springboks.<sup>16</sup> Fortunately for the players, neither the public, nor more importantly, the Rugby Union, treated the rumours with more than a passing interest. Ces Blazey recalled, 'There had been rumours flying around, of course and I wouldn't be stupid as to suggest that I hadn't heard rumours; but I'd been used to rumours and I had worked on the basis always that when it became a fact, then I was really interested'.<sup>17</sup> A reactive, rather than pro-active stance, would later return to haunt Blazey.

The final hurdle for the organisers was how to get the bulk of the players to South Africa. Since the tour did not have the blessing of the NZRFU, travel arrangements were unorthodox. Some players were off to IRB centennial matches in Britain and could easily travel on from there. Others had been invited to play for a World XV against Transvaal in South Africa. Together, these two groups comprised almost half the team named for the abandoned South Africa tour ten months earlier. Most players remaining in New Zealand flew out on the evening of April 13 from the international airports of Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch on Qantas flights to Sydney. They then travelled on to Hong Kong and then to Taiwan to connect with a South African Airways flight through Mauritius to Johannesburg. To ensure the players escaped the attention of anti-apartheid protestors as they departed New Zealand, tickets were booked with false names. Of course, the player's names matched those on their passports. Because the tickets were allocated to fictitious passengers this ensured the seats became available on a 'first in, first serve' basis. When asked by the media whether his airline would have carried the players if he knew of their destination, New Zealand manager for Qantas, Des Church, replied 'Unsure'.<sup>18</sup> As an extra precaution, Police were notified of the players impending departure to ensure their protection and security. The Police

response was to make arrangements to make sure the players could move quickly through to the departure areas.<sup>19</sup>

The decision on whether to go on the rebel tour was a difficult one. For some, it was much harder. A last-minute hiccup for the team was the withdrawal of David Kirk from the touring party. In March, when players were first asked to commit themselves to the rebel tour, only Kirk and Kirwan said they wouldn't go. Kirk's decision was based on a number of factors. Firstly, it wasn't an All Black tour, as he explains, 'there wasn't the pull ... we weren't going as the New Zealand All Blacks to beat the Springboks'.<sup>20</sup> Secondly, there was talk of money. According to Kirk, 'It (money) sticks like tar. You could proclaim you were in South Africa to play rugby - but if you'd taken the money no-one would believe you'. Thirdly, it was a moral decision. Kirk was sympathetic to the argument that sporting boycotts hurt the South African Government and that by going it would give comfort to the apartheid system.<sup>21</sup> Despite his misgivings, Kirk had a change of heart and told the team he wanted to go following Auckland's match against the New Zealand Barbarians on March 13. According to Kirk, the rebels believed if they were to go to South Africa, then they should all go. 'I decided to go along with the team decision'. He stated, 'I put the commitment to the team before my decision to follow my instincts'. In his autobiography he recounts the hostile environment at his place of work - the Carrington Psychiatric Hospital - following his decision to take part on the tour. 'The support staff would ignore me or make hostile remarks about rugby, rugby players, rugby politics. People I actually loathed were treating me with real bigotry', he recalled, 'and my colleagues and friends with whom I had a deep bond were depending on me'. For Kirk, it was a real dilemma.

If I did what I thought was right I would be doing what people for whom I felt deep distaste wanted me to do. At the same time I would be selling out people I felt something akin to love for.<sup>22</sup>

After consulting family members Kirk made a last minute decision to pull out of the rebel tour. He recalls rushing home from work and ringing the travel agent to inform him of his decision.<sup>23</sup> He mentioned a possible replacement - Wanganui and 1984 All Black halfback - Andrew Donald. Fortunately for the rebels, Donald readily agreed to the tour and when told of the urgency, he replied, 'I'll jump on my bike and pedal there if I have to'.<sup>24</sup>

On the 14th of April the players arrived at Jan Smuts airport, Johannesburg and were immediately engulfed by the South African media. Six days later, the team held a press conference at the Johannesburg home of Louis Lyut. In a press release delivered by Meads, Kirkpatrick and Dalton, the tour captain, the team was given a name - the Cavaliers. This was to ensure the media did not refer to the team as either the 'rebels' or the 'All Blacks'. According to Haden, the name Cavaliers simply popped into his head and he decided he liked the sound of it.<sup>25</sup> The rest of the press release read as follows:

Our team members have been invited by the Transvaal Rugby Union to play in South Africa as a collection of individual players. We are not the All Blacks. That is the official team of the NZRFU. We will be known as the Cavaliers. We are aware South Africa has political problems but as sportsmen we emphasise that it would be improper for us to comment on them. We are here to play sport and will not at any stage debate politics or answer any political-slanted questions. We will be playing twelve games, four of which will be against a South African team. These will not be official tests as we do not represent an official rugby union or the NZRFU ... at no stage of the tour will team members talk to the media...<sup>26</sup>

## **REACTION**

The rebel tour overshadowed the IRB's centenary congress in the English town of Oxfordshire. Blazey expressed disappointment at the player's actions upon hearing of their arrival in South Africa. He stated, 'It is quite frankly

unacceptable for any New Zealand rugby player to play in South Africa without the sanction of the union.<sup>27</sup> He latter recalled,

I was disappointed that the players had decided to go without letting me know because I was on pretty good terms with the senior players. But they would not have been in that situation had it not been for the action of the SARB ... who went outside the normal convention.<sup>28</sup>

The Rugby Union's first course of action was to send a telex to the SARB reminding them that they had permission to have only seven All Blacks in South Africa. A second message was addressed to Meads telling him more or less the same thing. While the SARB received their message, the telex sent to Meads allegedly failed to reach its intended recipient. Meads denied ever receiving the telex that latter led to Blazey speculating that 'culprits' within South African rugby withheld the telex from Meads.<sup>29</sup> Meads latter doubted whether the telex would have made much difference to the tour going ahead. 'Had I received the original telex', he said, 'I would have put it to the players and let them make the decision. Thinking back, I do not think the telex would have made much difference to their decision to carry on with the tour, although that's only my opinion'.<sup>30</sup>

Within New Zealand rugby circles, opinion was divided. The Auckland Rugby Union responded by holding an emergency meeting of its management committee. As a result of that meeting, a telegram was sent to Blazey in London urging immediate action be taken against the players. Ten of the eleven unions whose players were in South Africa endorsed Auckland's telegram. Counties were the only omission.<sup>31</sup> However, its silence did not indicate support for the tour. Chairman of the Counties union, Don Shuker explained, 'I did not hear of the Auckland request until late on Tuesday night when there was no time to call a special meeting of my management committee'.<sup>32</sup> Auckland's executive director Lew Pryme called for disciplinary action against Meads and

Haden for their parts in organising the rebel tour. As 'servants' of the NZRFU, Pryme believed the union was obligated to take 'urgent' action against them.

Colin Meads is a New Zealand selector and should be here viewing New Zealand players over the next six weeks, with a test coming up against France ... and Haden is the New Zealand union's marketing man. He was involved with the New Zealand Breweries sponsorship negotiations at a time when he knew he was going to South Africa.<sup>33</sup>


Canterbury and future All Black coach, Alex Wylie was more understanding of the players action.

I wouldn't blame them for wanting to go to South Africa. They play the game to try and get as much enjoyment as possible. I believe the last tour was stopped by foul means and to have it taken away the way it was was not sporting for the players concerned. Its an amateur game and as such the players have the right to please themselves.<sup>34</sup>

Andy Leslie, captain of the last All Black team to tour South Africa held grave concerns for the future of rugby as a result of the rebel tour. 'A hell of a lot of money must be involved', he speculated. 'I am concerned about the reaction of sponsors. It may be that some of the older players saw this as their last chance. One might be able to sympathise with their point of view, but frankly, this tour is the last thing New Zealand rugby needs'.<sup>35</sup>

Again the response from New Zealand's political leaders was predictable. The Prime Minister called for the immediate cancellation of the tour, arguing that it was not in the best interests of New Zealand. Lange also appealed for 'New Zealanders, whatever their view on rugby, not to lend their support to this selfish act'.<sup>36</sup> Mike Moore, the Minister of Recreation and Sport, warned Parliament that the tour had 'the potential to do severe damage to New Zealand's participation in the Commonwealth Games and other international

sporting events'. Moore argued that the degree of damage was likely to be affected by factors such as the steps the Rugby Union took to discipline the players and the extent to which the media featured the tour.<sup>37</sup> Moore also announced government moves to support the Rugby Union to censure players taking part on the tour. He assured the public that as long as the tour was seen as a rebel tour, then the Auckland Games would not be threatened.<sup>38</sup> Opposition leader, Jim Bolger, while disappointed with the player's decision, was less forthright in his regret. 'I regret the players have ignored the wishes of Parliament. But Parliament and certainly I myself accept that individual New Zealanders have the right to travel and play sport without intimidation'.<sup>39</sup> Four National MPs, Derek Augus, Rex Austin, Norman Jones and Rob Talbot, went so far as to send telegrams to the rebel players extending their best wishes for success on the tour.<sup>40</sup>



**Fig 3: Prime Minister David Lange appealed to 'New Zealanders, whatever their view on rugby, not to led their support' to the tour.**  
*Rugby News*, 13 April 1986.

At local government level there were concerns that Auckland could lose the 1990 Commonwealth Games because of repercussions from the rebel tour. Auckland's Mayor, Catherine Tizard claimed the tour 'opened up imponderables'. She warned, 'If there were a move and there was enough votes to say Perth should have the games instead of Auckland, then I imagine it could happen'.<sup>41</sup> Ray Dutton, NZOCGA chairman, echoed Tizard's concern that the 1990 Games could be taken away from Auckland as a result of the Cavaliers tour.<sup>42</sup> He hinted that New Zealand athletes could be the focus of anti-apartheid demonstrations or worse still, excluded from competing at the Edinburgh Commonwealth Games. But the Chairman of the Edinburgh Games, Ken Borthwick, rejected this by saying he did not see the tour as a serious threat to the 1986 Games.

Race Relations Conciliator, Walter Hirsh regretted the tour was going ahead and felt it would have a negative effect. 'It is certain the tour will reflect badly on New Zealand in the eyes of the world and that New Zealand as a whole will suffer ... we will find the whole exercise is totally inappropriate, extremely badly timed and divisive in the community. To foist issues on the community when they are based on issues of race is not a growing experience'. Hirsch predicted the tour would add further provocation to the racial tension and conflict in South Africa and therefore urged the Rugby Union to consider the matter seriously and react accordingly.<sup>43</sup> A former race relations conciliator Hiwi Tauroa, who had close connections within the National Party and in 1979 sought to coach the All Blacks, considered turning away from the game. 'I think the tour is a childish, petulant and stupid response by people who should know better'.<sup>44</sup>

The Cavaliers tour brought a negative response from a number of secondary school teachers. Under the headline 'Schools say image will suffer', the *New Zealand Herald* reported schoolboy rugby coaches were reviewing their future

involvement in rugby as a consequence of the rebel tour. Their primary concern was the long-term damage the tour would have on rugby. The strongest reaction was at Auckland Boys Grammar, a school with a proud rugby tradition. Twenty-seven rugby coaches at the school demonstrated their opposition to the tour by sending a telegram to the NZRFU demanding all of the players involved in the tour be disqualified from the game for life. For Headmaster John Graham, an ex-All Black captain, the tour represented the worst thing to happen to rugby in his time. 'The selfishness and thoughtlessness of the players did nothing for rugby and for social peace'. According to Graham,

They have owed their sporting and social distinctions in rugby not a little to their schools, their clubs, their provinces, and their country. It would not have been placing a heavy burden to ask that, in return, they be steadfast in their loyalties to the game.<sup>45</sup>

Graham's comments represented a shift in opinion within rugby circles to sporting contacts with South Africa. There were genuine fears for the future of the game. The Principal of Hato Petera College, Toby Curtis, suggested the tour would heighten interest in the rival code, rugby league.<sup>46</sup>

Reaction among the opponents of the 1985 tour was more predictable. Patrick Finnigan believed the players made a massive misjudgement. 'They put their own interest in front of the country and when you think about it they had by then the best part of nine months (following the cancellation of the 1985 tour) to think it through'. Finnigan suggested the players failed to accurately read the feelings of the people of New Zealand.<sup>47</sup>


As expected, HART was strongly opposed to the players actions. It called for the Rugby Union to take a number of steps to prevent another rebel tour including, imposing life bans on the players, expelling the SARB from the IRB,

and finally, embracing professionalism to remove the incentive for rugby players to go on such tours to the Republic.<sup>48</sup> A couple of weeks later, HART sent an 'international backgrounder' to governmental and non-governmental bodies overseas seeking support to halt further tours to South Africa. It blamed both the Rugby Union and the Government for the tour going ahead. The NZRFU, HART argued, was guilty for four reasons. Firstly, the union had 'facilitated the planning of the Cavaliers tour by approving seven of the All Blacks to play in South Africa'. Secondly, the coach, Colin Meads, was a current NZRFU selector. Thirdly, the NZRFU had failed to call an emergency meeting of its council to attempt to stop the tour when requested to do so by ten of its constituent unions. Fourthly, HART claimed there had been no indication that any Rugby Union official in Britain attending the IRB centenary had attempted to discourage any of the nine All Blacks who subsequently joined the rebel tour from touring South Africa. Finally, no official of the union had attempted to convey to the players any indication of the likely penalties if they continued to tour.<sup>49</sup>

In the eyes of HART, the Government was equally to blame, despite publicly condemning the tour. The Government, in the opinion of HART, had made no effort to stop the tour after the tour became public knowledge on March 30 and its commencement on April 28. The Government's condemnation counted for nothing, claimed HART, for there was no evidence that it had acted to stop the tour, or pressured the Rugby Union into either forcing the tours abandonment or penalising the players involved.<sup>50</sup>

Arguably, the most scathing criticism of the players came from the president of the South African Council on Sport, Frank van der Horst. On April 14 1986, the *New Zealand Herald* quoted van der Horst as saying the players involved in the tour were 'sporting prostitutes'. He continued, 'We condemn them, we tell them, "Do not come to South Africa, go home, do not take the money that

bleeds blacks and puts them in poverty". They are not here to enhance sport, they are here to debase humanity'.<sup>51</sup>



**Fig 4: The SARB and the Cavaliers ignored their critics.**  
Minhinnick, 1986, in Malcolm Templeton, *Human Rights and Sporting Contacts – New Zealand Attitudes to Race Relations in South Africa 1921-94*, p. 271.

Yet those disappointed by the players as arrival in South Africa, were matched by many who were in favour of the tour going ahead. The South African media in particular were delighted with the tour. According to state-run Radio South Africa, the rebel tour demonstrated the long-term futility of sports boycotts. 'As with the oil and arms boycotts, claimed the station, South Africa has now again risen above heavy odds and emerged from it with a welcome boost to morale'.<sup>52</sup> South Africa's white newspapers were ecstatic. *The Johannesburg Citizen's* headline read, 'All Black's Are On Their Way', while the *Afrikaans Beeld* described the impending tour as 'The Tour of the Decade'. SARB President, Dr Danie Craven, while denying any involvement with the tour

arrangements, expressed delight at the news. Asked for his reaction, Craven said, 'I hope it is true, but it seems to good to be true.'<sup>53</sup>

At home, the readers of New Zealand's weekly rugby publication, the *Rugby News*, overwhelmingly supported the rebels. Of the 1932 people who responded to a readers poll, a massive 86.5 per cent supported the players decision to tour, while 83 per cent were opposed to any ban being imposed when the players returned. An even greater number, 89.8 per cent said they would listen or watch if live radio or television commentaries were provided.<sup>54</sup> For Pat Hunt, the Cavaliers were showing that sportsmen could exercise their individual freedoms and democratic rights, in the face of legal manoeuvring and a hostile Government. For this reason, claimed Hunt, the tour represented a 'victory for democracy'. His only regret was that the tour could not be official.<sup>55</sup>

#### **CRAVEN COMES CLEAN**

Initially Danie Craven and the SARB disassociated itself from any involvement with the tour. The Transvaal Rugby Union, which issued the invitations, told the media that its intention to promote a full-scale rugby tour had been conveyed to the SARB in 1985 and that the union had given Transvaal its full support. However, Transvaal did concede that while it did inform SARB that it intended to invite thirty players (to which the SARB gave its blessing), it had not told the board that the invitees would be the All Blacks.<sup>56</sup> According to Haden, the SARB knew more than they were publicly admitting. After all, the Cavaliers had been promised by Transvaal officials that a number of their matches would be played on South Africa's major grounds, against teams wearing Springbok colours and chosen by SARB selectors after official trial matches. The bottom line for the Cavaliers was that if they couldn't play in South Africa with the blessing of the SARB, they wouldn't play at all.<sup>57</sup>

Meanwhile, Blazey had sent a telegram to the SARB expressing amazement that many New Zealand players, in addition to the seven who had been given the authority by the NZRFU to play in South Africa, had been invited to the republic without the knowledge or approval of the union. Blazey was absolutely convinced that the SARB was involved with the tour.

It was a well-established convention at the time ... that if New Zealand for example wants to invite a team of any kind to another, they must do so through the national governing body of that particular country. South Africa was very well aware of that and he (Craven) couldn't possibly not have known because there was an itinerary. After all, you don't go over to another country without there being an itinerary.<sup>58</sup>

As a consequence, Blazey told Craven that the situation was 'unacceptable'.<sup>59</sup> The tour threatened South Africa's future as a member of the IRB.

The SARB stood accused of violating IRB regulations by inviting the Cavaliers without going through the formal channels. Blazey and Craven meet on the eve of the annual IRB meeting to discuss South Africa's future membership of the board. On the 23rd of April, the IRB demanded the immediate cancellation of the tour. In a press statement, the Board announced, 'The SARB has acknowledged responsibility for the present unofficial tour of South Africa by overseas players and accepts that the normal procedures for inviting players were not followed'. The statement continued. 'The international board disapproves of this unofficial tour and has required the SARB to make the necessary arrangements to bring the tour to an end'.<sup>60</sup>

Craven's response was to declare his intention to resign if the Transvaal Rugby Union did not call off the tour. A week later, however, the SARB issued a statement declaring, on the basis of legal opinion, that the tour did not

contravene the IRB's rules or the SARB constitution. As a result, the SARB officially sanctioned the tour and awarded full test caps for the Springboks involved in the series. Blazey was indignant. 'You are entitled to assume that I am far from happy with the board's response', he said.<sup>61</sup> Speaking at the official welcome for the Cavaliers, Craven defended his board's decision. 'In a period of reform', argued Craven, 'South Africa would benefit.' Craven saw the tour as a stabilising factor. He told guests, 'Never before has South Africa needed a tour of this nature so much'.<sup>62</sup>

### **MEDIA WARS**

Controversy followed the Cavaliers from start to finish. On April 28, Television New Zealand (TVNZ) director-general, Julian Mounter announced there would be no run-of-play coverage of the tour. This followed an earlier statement from Bruce Crossan, head of news, sports and current affairs for TVNZ on April 22 that to comply with the wishes of Parliament, there would be no coverage of the tour, although Jonathon Hunt, Minister of Broadcasting, latter denied any discussions with Crossan or anyone else at TVNZ about the tour.<sup>63</sup> Mounter justified his decision with the following argument:

TVNZ, does not have the resources or the desire to give extended coverage to an event of this nature. News coverage is more appropriate, because the tour may well have considerable repercussions for New Zealand sport, but the games themselves, being unofficial, is of no real relevance.<sup>64</sup>

Radio New Zealand (RNZ) followed Mounter's lead and announced it also would not broadcast the Cavaliers games. The Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand (BCNZ) supported Mounter's actions. BCNZ chairman, Hugh Rennie argued that 'The presence in South Africa this year of some New Zealand rugby players is not only unofficial, but contrary to the express wishes

of all the relevant rugby authorities. On normal considerations, regardless of the country involved, it would not warrant television or radio coverage'.<sup>65</sup>

Mounter's decision did not go down well with a number of New Zealand households. Despite surveys showing that a majority of New Zealanders opposed the tour, an opinion poll commissioned by the *Listener* also showed that sixty-eight per cent of the population still wanted the matches broadcast on radio and television. Even those opposed to the tour voted forty-six per cent to forty-four per cent for radio and television coverage of the games.<sup>66</sup> Opposition spokesman of Broadcasting, John Banks, argued the decision of TVNZ and RNZ not to broadcast the games reinforced the case for the introduction of a private television network in New Zealand.<sup>67</sup> SPRI accused the BCNZ of biased judgement and censorship.<sup>68</sup>

The lack of television coverage prompted SPRI to lodge an appeal with the Broadcasting Tribunal on May 8. Unfortunately for SPRI, the Tribunal ruled that the limited coverage - restricted to news and current affairs - met the requirements of the Broadcasting Act. It rejected claims of political or personal bias behind TVNZ decision not to televise the tour. The Tribunal determined that the unofficial status of the players, statements by New Zealand sporting bodies, the claims of other sports and the potential impact of coverage on amateur rugby were the factors that influenced TVNZ's tour blackout.<sup>69</sup> The Tribunal's findings outraged John Banks. 'The corporation's decision was a crude form of sponsorship', Banks argued, 'Its (the Tribunal) nothing more than a kangaroo court'.<sup>70</sup> In Parliament, Banks asked Jonathon Hunt to direct the BCNZ to reverse its decision not to provide either live or delayed coverage of the tour. The Minister said that under the provisions of the Broadcasting Act 1979 that he could not interfere in programming matters.<sup>71</sup> Public correspondence with TVNZ reflected the same support indicated by the *Listener* survey. During the month of May, TVNZ received 124 letters of

complaint against the decision not to give programme coverage of the tour, and 103 letters in favour. Of the phone calls to TVNZ, 253 had been against the decision and 140 in support of it.<sup>72</sup>

Despite the failure of TVNZ and RNZ to broadcast what the public wanted to see and hear, coverage of the Cavaliers tour was eventually secured. Independent Radio Sports relayed live broadcasts of the 'tests' between the Cavaliers and Springboks. Auckland entrepreneur, Russell Clark profited from the tour by marketing video cassettes of the tour via his company Videocorp International, after he won exclusive broadcasting rights to the series following negotiations with the South African Broadcasting Corporation. The cassettes, of which there were six, were produced from master tapes that were sent to New Zealand immediately after each game and then sold at video stores at a cost of \$49.95 each.<sup>73</sup> The videos provided thousands of New Zealanders the viewing opportunities TVNZ failed to deliver.

The Cavaliers themselves found it difficult to accept that TVNZ had decreed that the public should not watch the tour because it was unofficial, and therefore, 'irrelevant'. 'Surely most New Zealanders wanted to see the tests on television', argued Dalton.

We heard from people back home a big audience would have seen the game had they been shown live. In a democratic society I would have thought people could have the option of watching the games or not. They wouldn't need to turn their sets on if they did not want to watch. It's a quite severe penalty under the circumstances.<sup>74</sup>

Dalton's comments reflected a conflict that existed within the minds of the players. Despite denials to the contrary, the players did seem to see themselves

as All Blacks engaged in test rugby and therefore worthy of television and radio coverage back home.

The Cavaliers relationship with the New Zealand media was a constant source of controversy. The general feeling among the players was that the vast majority of the media were vehemently opposed to the tour. 'We detected in the tone of the writing, and from their demeanour', according to Haden, 'a tremendous feeling of opposition from the press corps to our tour'. As a result, Haden claims, the team decided to stop trying to promote or justify their decision to tour South Africa. 'We had expressed our viewpoint in press statements and yet were still misunderstood and derided', Haden explains. 'Editors and other experts 10,000 miles away were intent on linking South Africa's political situation with our tour and journalists accompanying us were only too keen to further promote the chosen philosophy of the media in general'.<sup>75</sup>

A consequence of the Cavaliers dissatisfaction with the media was the decision of the team to close ranks and distance itself from the media. This included stopping all newspaper columns being written by players and the termination of radio reports back to New Zealand. A source of enormous frustration for the players was the fact that most of the media missed the point they wished to convey. 'We weren't in South Africa on a holiday or for financial or political gain', argues Haden, 'we were there to play rugby and to win'.<sup>76</sup>

An aspect of the media that rankled with some of the Cavaliers was its preoccupation with off-field incidents. Rather than providing match reports for the people back home, the media were more intent on providing footage of rioting in Soweto. Perhaps one of the stronger examples of the media's antagonism towards the Cavaliers was an editorial that featured in the *Sunday Star* prior to the players' departure. The editor wrote as follows:

Cheap cowards! That's the rugby players planning to sneak off to play their precious game in South Africa. With their pockets full of South African rand, many Kiwi stars are prepared to once again drag their nation's name in the mud. For the sake of money - although they'll say its for the game - they're off to socialise with the leading henchmen of a blood-splattered regime. They must be a proud bunch these All Blacks -they resort to lies and subterfuge to avoid facing the elementary justice of Kiwi public opinion. One hopes they can live with the shame, because there are millions of innocent black South African's who aren't allowed to live in dignity, with justice or free from fear. Indeed, many of the people our proud rugby players will meet will have recently taken part in the state-organised killing of blacks - and will do so again after the game. Shame!<sup>77</sup>

This editorial reflected the general attitude of the media towards the Cavaliers.

## **MONEY**

Speculation that players were circumventing rugby's amateur regulations was hotly denied by all those involved in the tour. Allegations included each player receiving \$100,000 - banked in overseas accounts, interest-free loans of \$150,000, and a 'team fund' which had amassed a million dollars.<sup>78</sup> The constant burden of such rumours prompted Meads to address the question of whether he, Kirkpatrick and the players were being paid huge sums of money for embarking on the tour.

It has come to the point where we are now being condemned because we have accepted the equivalent of IRB touring allowances while not being an official team of a board country. If that is the case being brought against us then we're guilty. But I see it as a ridiculous criterion, and one which has been turned into desperation. The players are sick of the guesswork, which has been the basis of labelling them professional. They're sick of the stories about laundering huge sums of money.<sup>79</sup>

The Cavaliers players and management had steadfastly refused to confirm or deny payments until 1999. With rugby union turning professional in 1995, the players have, to some extent, come clean on player payments. Allegations in the *Sunday Star-Times*, that players each received \$50,000 for touring South Africa were supported by some Cavaliers but denied by others, including Haden. Yet even he conceded that the Cavaliers had a team fund 'which was larger than normal'. Financially, he claims, 'it was well worth the players going on the trip'.<sup>80</sup>

A whole raft of revenue-winning activities existed in South Africa according to Haden. Appearances at shopping centres, after-match functions in private boxes, speaking at functions, writing, appearances on television and fashion parades, and selling tickets ensured the players were well rewarded for making the trip. In addition, the team received the most lucrative rugby sponsorship in the history of the game. The deal with South Africa's Yellow Pages, arranged by Transvaal's Robert Denton, amounted to \$2.2 million.<sup>81</sup> In exchange, the Cavaliers wore the sponsor's logo on their tour kit.

Like many of the Cavaliers, Louis Lyut refuses to acknowledge player payments. 'There were no payment from us', he insists, 'We invited auditors to come in and investigate and they couldn't find anything. We didn't pay them. That's my word of honour'.<sup>82</sup> Lyut's comments should be taken with a grain of salt. He is correct when he claims the SARB did not pay them. However, it did provide the Cavaliers with far more match tickets than usual to on-sell for the team fund. Winger Bernie Fraser recalled reserves and team management having to sit on the grass along the touch lines at matches because all the tickets had been sold for the team fund.<sup>83</sup> Because money was not exchanged between the Cavaliers and the SARB, the auditors could not find any incriminating evidence. Whether the Cavaliers were paid to play is a matter of

interpretation. Players did not receive financial or material rewards for taking the field on a match-to-match basis. Instead, the players and management each received a cut of the team fund at the end of the tour, a practice common among most international touring teams, including the All Blacks. The principal difference being the size of the team fund, which Haden has described as 'larger than normal'.<sup>84</sup>

### **CAVALIERS OR ALL BLACKS?**

Before and during the tour, the Cavaliers were extremely keen and distancing themselves from the All Blacks. Even though there was nothing stopping the players wearing the All Black uniform, the Cavaliers, out of respect for the NZRFU, chose not to. Instead, the jersey was black, with gold stripes and collar and a specially designed monogram shaped like Ellis Park with a springbok atop a silver fern. However, this did not stop their South African hosts continually refer to them as the 'All Blacks' and the international matches as being genuine tests. The South African's went as far as referring to the Cavaliers as the 'All Blacks' in the 'test' programmes and on match tickets. The programme for the fourth 'test' carried an historical summary of tests between New Zealand and South Africa and included the three previous matches against the Cavaliers on the list.<sup>85</sup> The South Africans constant references to the Cavaliers as the 'All Blacks' prompted Dalton to lash out at SARB officials after their match against Western Province.

I have said this before and I hope I don't have to say this again. We are not the All Blacks. I don't care what the SARB feels, they cannot make us the All Blacks. We are individuals on tour and the SARB stance just makes it harder for us back home.<sup>86</sup>

Latter Dalton pointed out that as the Cavaliers were not an official New Zealand representative team, they were keen to make it clear that they were not

the All Blacks.<sup>87</sup> This reflects a desire among the players to avoid tarnishing the All Black image from any negativity which could, and would arise from the rebel tour.

<p>SUID-AFRIKA          vs          ALL BLACKS          SOUTH AFRICA          vs          ALL BLACKS          geelbladsye          "Stryd van die Reuse"</p>		<p>24 MEI/MAY</p>
<p>DAD.          Loftus Versveld          3RD TEST</p>	 <p>yellow pages          "Battle of the Giants"</p>	<p>Ingang          Entrance Lynnwoodweg/Road          Hek/Gate 6</p>
	<p>NTRU</p>	<p>Prys/Price R12,00</p>
		<p>STAAL SUID-PAWILJOEN          STEEL SOUTH STAND</p>
		<p>BLOK/BLOCK E</p>
		<p>RY/ROW AA</p>
		<p>SITPLEK No 145 SEAT</p>

Fig 5: Cavaliers or All Blacks? Ticket for the Third 'test'.  
 HART Aotearoa Papers, MS-Papers-93-042-03, Alexander Turnbull Library.

So what happened on the rugby field? On the 21st of April the Cavaliers set themselves a goal never achieved by any All Black team - a series win in South Africa. It wasn't going to be easy. The itinerary was daunting. The first five games before the first 'test' were against the Junior Springboks and the powerhouse provinces of South African rugby - Northern Transvaal, Orange Free State, Transvaal and Western Province. The Cavaliers knew they would be up against the toughest opposition they had ever faced, but the reality of the magnitude of their task hit when they took the field for their first match. Their first opposition was against the Junior Springboks but the team was nearer to a South African second XV side for it included players of any age who had not played for the Springboks proper. With time up on the clock, and the Junior Boks leading 21-19, it looked like the Cavaliers were going to start their tour

with a defeat. But four minutes into injury time, first-five Grant Fox dropped a goal. The Cavaliers got home by one point and a score line of 22-21. 'No game is easy in South Africa', was Kirkpatrick's reaction to the game.<sup>88</sup>

The second match at Pretoria was against the Northern Transvaal 'Blue Bulls', South Africa's premier provincial side in recent times. In front of 36,000 spectators, the Cavaliers scrapped home by a single point 10-9. It was a narrow escape for the New Zealanders after Springbok first-five Naas Botha hit the upright with a penalty close to fulltime. Unfortunately the most notable feature of the match was a shameful one. Late in the first half, Springbok flanker Burger Geldenhuys punched Dalton from behind and broke his jaw, ending Dalton's tour. Reaction in South Africa was nothing short of astonishing. Instead of universal embarrassment and apology, there was a great deal of resentment at the action of Craven when he used his power of veto to ensure that Geldenhuys was not selected for the Springbok 'test' side to play the Cavaliers. In New Zealand, opponents of the tour saw the whole action as poetic justice. 'You take out a hooker each day', the Prime Minister joked, 'its worse than Kings Cross'.<sup>89</sup>

With Dalton out of the tour, Andy Haden assumed the captaincy. Replacing Dalton in the squad was Canterbury hooker John Mills, who resigned from his position as an economics teacher at Christ's College after being denied leave without pay.<sup>90</sup> Mills selection came after Manawatu's Bruce Hemara turned down an offer to join the tour when informed he would lose his job as a meat inspector at the Longburn freezing works should he go.<sup>91</sup> Mills was latter rehired by Christ's College, prompting a small group of Anglicans, including several clergymen to picket outside the school. Headmaster, Dr Max Rossiter defended his reappointment claiming Mills as the 'best applicant for the job'.<sup>92</sup>

A win over Orange Free State was followed by a 19-24 loss to Transvaal, in which Wynand Mans did not help the Cavaliers through a very parochial display of refereeing.<sup>93</sup> The Cavaliers bounced back to beat Currie Cup holders Western Province 26-12 in at Cape Town. The game was marred by more unsavoury incidents which led to the Cavaliers replacement captain, Haden threatening to call his team from the Newlands field. The object of his criticism was the touch judge, who happened to be Wynand Mans, the villain of the peace three days earlier. This occasion, Mans twice called the referee's attention to acts of foul play committed by the Cavaliers. Haden was incensed that Mans could not see his way to similar action against the Western Province players. The match only continued after a midfield discussion between the referee, Haden and Western Province vice-captain Schalk Burger who asked Haden to stay on 'for the good of the tour'.<sup>94</sup>

Just four days latter, the Cavaliers ran out on to the same field for the first 'test' against the Springboks. History was against the Cavaliers. Neither New Zealand nor South Africa had ever won the first test of a series in the other team's country. Unfortunately for the Cavaliers, the kicking talents of Naas Botha would confirm that extraordinary statistic to the history books. With four minutes to go and up 15-12, the Cavaliers looked as if they were headed for a win, until Welsh referee Ken Rowlands awarded the Springboks a penalty that Botha kicked between the posts. The match seemed certain to end in a draw, but with three minutes to go, South African winger Carel du Plessis scored in the corner to snatch a victory for the Springboks. To rub salt in the Cavaliers wounds, Botha converted the try from the touchline to stretch the winning score to 21-15. After the match Botha offered some advice on how the rest of the series would go. 'People are feeling sorry for the New Zealanders because we beat them. I am not', he said. 'I wanted to win today and then take the series'.<sup>95</sup>

The Cavaliers next game was against Natal at King's Park, Durban. The match is remembered for being the most ill tempered of the tour. The heated nature of the game began before either team had even ran on to the field. Allegedly, as the teams prepared to run on to King's Park, the Cavaliers Maori players in the tunnel were subjected to some unpleasant racial abuse. Constant ugly brawling which started at the very first scrum ruined the match itself. After the referee had tried three times to get the scrum packed down straight, Natal lock Allan Heuer punched Cavaliers prop Scott Crichton. What followed was a massive brawl involving all sixteen forwards. Things had barely settled down when a Natal player shoved lock Gary Whetton out of the next lineout. Perhaps the most enduring image of the match was when incensed Cavaliers midfielder Bill Osborne chased Natal's Graham Hefer around the field after Hefer had struck Osborne's team mate, Wayne Shelford across the back of the neck. Despite such distractions the Cavaliers won the game 37-24.<sup>96</sup>

The second 'test' followed four days latter on the same field. The heartache of the previous 'test' was not repeated with the tourists running out winners 19-18. Three days latter, the team was back in action again - at Ellis Park in Johannesburg against the South African Barbarians. The Cavaliers were impressive in notching an excellent 42-13 win against strong opposition.<sup>97</sup> A week after the second 'test' came the third, at Loftus Versfeld in Pretoria. Again, the match promised to be a close affair. With nine minutes remaining the scores were level 18-all. However, what followed was a total disaster as the Springboks rattled on fifteen points which left the Cavaliers stunned at the final score line of 33-18.<sup>98</sup> The game involved one unsavoury incident when Springbok hooker Uli Schmidt late tackled halfback Dave Loveridge. The tackle knocked Loveridge out cold and ruled him out of the rest of the tour. Three days latter, the Cavaliers battled through their disappointment to record a 26-18 win over Western Transvaal at Potchefstroom.<sup>99</sup>

The fourth 'test' at Ellis Park was a do-or-die effort for the Cavaliers. It was their last shot at squaring the series and regaining some prestige. Two of the Cavaliers best players in the first three 'tests', first five Grant Fox and fullback Kieran Crowley were dropped for Wayne Smith and Robbie Deans in an attempt to ignite the Cavaliers back line into action. For the final 'test', the team, led by hooker Hika Reid, performed a haka. Dalton regretted that at his request, the team had not performed the war dance before any of its matches. It had been a conscious decision on Dalton's behalf not to perform the Maori challenge which he believed could have led to unwelcome accusations the Cavaliers were masquerading as the All Blacks. Dalton remembers the moment when the Cavaliers performed the haka. 'The crowd knew what was coming because as the Cavaliers got ready they started to roar. The cheering continued and the noise was incredible. I don't think anyone could have heard the haka. They ended it with a leap in the air and simultaneously 70,000 people rose from their seats in a very moving standing, ovation'.<sup>100</sup>

The match itself was a bitter experience for the Cavaliers. Despite outplaying the Springboks in most facets of the game, the Cavaliers found themselves on the wrong side of a 24-10 score line. Unfortunately the goal kicking was woeful, and the back play only adequate. The Cavaliers believed that Welsh referee Ken Rowlands had robbed them of the chance of drawing the series. Time and again, the Cavaliers would get into attacking positions only to be penalised for what seemed to them dubious reasons. On a number of occasions, the Cavaliers were thrown back almost the length of the field, and lost scoring positions, as a result of decisions against them. On one occasion, the referee's decision making bordered on the inexplicable.<sup>101</sup>

The Cavaliers let their feelings get the better of them both during and after the game. As Rowlands left the field, Reid shoulder charged the referee, while Wayne Smith and Murray Mexted joined in shouting abuse at the Welshman.

Distasteful post match displays saw unrestrained criticism coming from the Cavaliers camp. Match captain Jock Hobbs accused Rowlands of penalising his players out of the game. 'We were penalised when we charged, when we attacked and when we drove for the line. Everything we tried we seemed to be knocked back'. Kirkpatrick described some of Rowlands rulings as 'incredible'. 'I don't know about earlier in the series but after the game I would say he was definitely whistling it pro-South Africa in this game'.<sup>102</sup> But it was tour captain Andy Dalton who really let his feelings be known at the after-match function. 'The panel we were given (for the series) was Ken Rowlands, Ken Rowlands, Ken Rowlands, Wales. We had the choice of three and we had to pick one'. Dalton continued. 'I have always demanded honesty from a referee but when I think what our guys went through to get there I think sadly we got less than that in the last game'.<sup>103</sup> Rowlands listened to the criticisms unperturbed. 'If I had the match over again I would referee it again just as I did today', he claimed. He dismissed Dalton's criticisms as 'just the disappointment coming through'.<sup>104</sup> Just as he had for most of the series, it was Naas Botha who had the last word. He thanked Rowlands for 'doing a great job. If I had a final thought on the matter', he said, 'it is that cowboys don't cry'.<sup>105</sup>

In many respects, the feelings of the Cavaliers that they had got less than an honest deal from Rowlands cannot be dismissed as merely a case of 'sour grapes'. The nature of Rowlands appointment casts a heavy shadow on proceedings. Because the 'test' series was unsanctioned by the IRB, the world's top referees were not prepared to take on games for fear of recriminations. Rowlands had retired from international referee duties and therefore was unconcerned with any retributive measures taken against him by rugby's ruling body in response to his involvement. By accepting an invitation to referee the series, Rowlands and his wife received an all expenses-paid trip to South Africa on behalf of the SARB. To suggest that Rowlands might have shown even the slightest bit of favouritism toward his hosts cannot be considered unreasonable.

Dalton recalls going up to Rowlands after the fourth 'test' and asking him if he would be able to look in the mirror the next morning. Rowlands reply left Dalton flabbergasted. 'Come on, Andy', he replied, 'I was more middle of the road in this test than I had been in the other three'.<sup>106</sup> Rowlands unguarded comment seems a little unusual for someone who was apparently a 'neutral' referee. However, maybe this is being too hard on Rowlands. Accusations of favouritism cannot be levelled at Rowlands following his display in the first 'test' at Newlands. In this match, Rowlands awarded a penalty try to the Cavaliers when the Springboks collapsed a five-metre scrum near their line nine minutes from fulltime. Rowlands refereeing in the third 'test' did not prevent the Cavaliers winning that match. The fall out from the Rowlands controversy was the creation of bad blood between the teams and the absence of the Springboks from an end-of-tour social function at the residence of Louis Lyut.<sup>107</sup>

Perhaps the criticisms of the refereeing stemmed from the Cavaliers desperation to square the series with the Springboks. If the Cavaliers had drawn or even won the series they would have been vindicated for going to South Africa and perhaps returned home as heroes. A lost series would mean they would continue to be condemned. In Grant Fox's words, 'Success meant triumph. Failure meant retribution'.<sup>108</sup> Dr Craven was well aware of this. Speaking at the Cavaliers official welcome, Craven argued that should the Cavaliers win the 'test' series, the results would be recorded in the NZRFU record books as a win to the All Blacks.<sup>109</sup>

So if it wasn't the referee which cost the Cavaliers the series, what was it? Undoubtedly, the absence of Kirwan and Kirk hurt the Cavaliers badly. A fast, running halfback like Kirk would have thrived on South Africa's notoriously hard grounds, while his speed and acceleration would have found the Springboks huge back row wanting on most occasions. The earlier decision

only to invite those who were originally selected to tour South Africa in 1985 or failing them players who had already been chosen as All Blacks, came back to haunt the Cavaliers. It meant the team was not as strong as it could have been. While the forwards were rich in experience and probably the best available, some were clearly past their use by date. The average age of the Cavaliers front row, for example, was thirty-six years old. The same applied to backs, where Wellington winger Bernie Fraser was brought out of retirement due to Kirwan's unavailability. Had the team been selected on 1986 form, other backs may have made it, including Auckland centre Joe Stanley. A player such as Stanley could have added the much needed pace and strength that was missing from the Cavaliers back line. Coach Meads conceded in *The Geriatrics* that had an All Black team been chosen in 1986 for an official tour, instead of the Cavaliers, there would have been five or six changes.<sup>110</sup>

The insanity of the itinerary counted against the Cavaliers. Playing four tests on consecutive weekends, as well as playing world-class provincial sides mid-week made it tough on the tourists. Haden latter described Ranfurly Shield rugby as 'gentle' compared to the opposition the Cavaliers faced in South Africa.<sup>111</sup> The compressed nature of the itinerary prevented Meads from experimenting with players in different positions. It also limited player's recovery rates following injury, which subsequently hindered Mead's when it came to selecting sides.

So why did the Cavaliers management agree to such a tough itinerary? It was a combination of four factors. Firstly, the strong desire of those wanting to tour South Africa meant the tour organisers did not have enough time to negotiate the itinerary. Hard bargaining on behalf of the TRU was another factor. Originally there were to be only three 'tests'. A fourth enabled the TRU to play another match at Ellis Park and therefore alleviate to some extent Transvaal's financial difficulties. The new stadium at Ellis Park built in 1982 had ran the TRU into enormous money problems amounting to debts of around twenty

million rand.<sup>112</sup> The third factor was the difficulty of fitting the tour into the existing South African domestic season. The final factor was the naivety on the part of the Cavaliers negotiators on the realities of touring the republic. Certainly, had Murray Mexted been part of the negotiating team, the itinerary would not have been agreed to. Mexted had played a couple of seasons for Natal, and was well aware of the overall strength of South African rugby, and of the individual provincial sides. In Mexted's opinion, the itinerary organised by the South African's was a deliberate attempt to set-up the Cavaliers for a 'thorough pasting in the tests'.<sup>113</sup>

The tour was over and it was now time to go home and face the music. The players were uncertain about their futures in the game they loved. What was more certain was that they had fulfilled one of their life-long ambitions - touring South Africa. The next month would prove just as tough for the players, as those experienced on the rugby fields of South Africa. What would the ultimate cost of touring prove to be?

## CHAPTER FIVE

### CAVALIER CONSEQUENCE

The tour was over and it was now time for the 'rebels' to face the music. Arriving home, a number of the players were greeted by groups of anti-tour demonstrators. Dalton recalled arriving at Auckland International Airport on June 8 and being mobbed and jeered by an angry gathering of HART activists.<sup>1</sup> The *Dominion* described HART protestors as 'encircling Dalton, pushing and shouldering him and shouting "racist" and "scum"'. Despite a police presence they 'continued to shove and shoulder Dalton through the car park to a waiting car'.<sup>2</sup> For Dalton, it was a threatening and intimidating experience. 'I had met people in the United Kingdom and South Africa who felt we shouldn't have gone', Dalton said, 'but I had to come back to my own country to be jostled and spat upon'.<sup>3</sup>

Now that the players had arrived home, the question on the minds of many New Zealanders was what was to become of the Cavaliers? The NZRFU Council believed disciplinary measures were necessary. However, the Council was uncertain on how to deal with the players. A major concern for the Rugby Union was the possibility that any punishment considered to heavy by the players could be contested in the courts. 'I am in no doubt that the players have had very sound legal advice', suggested councillor Tom Johnson. 'I imagine they have gone through our constitution and rules and found which, in their eyes, says that penalties can be imposed on them so long as they were exercising their democratic rights. Let's face it, the Prime Minister did say they could go as individuals. I would be very surprised if there is anything in this'.<sup>4</sup>

The Rugby Union's first course of action was to place the Cavaliers under suspension pending an investigation into playing in South Africa without approval, and also into allegations that the players had been paid while on tour.

In the absence of concrete evidence regarding player payments that transgressed the IRB's amateur regulations, the Cavaliers faced two charges. Firstly, that they had failed to seek the customary NZRFU clearance before travelling overseas; and secondly, they had failed to return forms sent to the players in South Africa by the Rugby Union and were therefore guilty of misconduct.<sup>5</sup> The Council was split on how best to deal with the first charge levelled at the players. 'I would say about 100 to 200 players have left the country without New Zealand Rugby Union permission every year since I was born', claimed one councillor. 'No penalties were imposed on them so how can we apply them to these players? I think they are probably in the clear'.<sup>6</sup> Another member of the Council had a different opinion on the matter. 'I think we are going to have to take some action otherwise everyone will think they can flout the Rugby Union's laws. But I do think we have to be as lenient as we can. There is a lot of support for these blokes'.<sup>7</sup> A further complication was the announcement by a number of Australia's leading players that they would declare themselves unavailable for the Wallabies tour of New Zealand, scheduled to kick off in July, if the Cavaliers were suspended by the Rugby Union. The threats from the Wallaby camp were based on a perception among the players that they would be placed in a no-win situation if the tour went ahead. If they were to defeat the third best All Black team they would be bagged, and were they to lose, they would be bagged unmercifully!<sup>8</sup>

On June 9, the Rugby Union declared all the Cavaliers ineligible for the upcoming test against France for failing to attend the All Black trials which were held whilst the players were in South Africa. It then found the players guilty of misconduct (for playing in South Africa without Rugby Union approval) and suspended them for one international, the first against Australia, therefore effectively imposing a two-test suspension on the rebels. The Rugby Union 'resolved to severely reprimand' Colin Meads, the Cavaliers coach. In reaching its decision, the NZRFU took into account his valuable contribution to

New Zealand rugby over a long period. 'Nevertheless', argued the union, 'as a member of the New Zealand selection panel he should have sought permission to go overseas'.<sup>9</sup>

Many people criticised the penalties imposed on Meads and the players as nothing more than a slap on the wrist. After all, Meads retained his position as a New Zealand selector. The Government, much of the media, HART, and also the Canterbury and North Harbour Rugby Union's condemned the Rugby Union's timidity. The Prime Minister remarked 'if you are determined to make international fools of yourselves you have to perform the piece de resistance - you have to tell Meads you are going to smack his hand'.<sup>10</sup> Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer accused the Rugby Union of letting New Zealand down again 'with lenient disciplinary actions'.<sup>11</sup> The *Dominion* asked the Rugby Union how 'could it expect to retain a sense of authority when similar transgressions overseas had received suspensions of three years to life? Its weak approach would be read as unspoken support for the tour'.<sup>12</sup> HART described the Meads decision as 'a disgrace'.<sup>13</sup> The Canterbury union asked its parent body to reconsider its decision to allow Meads to continue as an All Black selector.<sup>14</sup> While North Harbour's chairman, Chris Kenning, described the penalties as 'not much of a punishment'.<sup>15</sup> Meads was dumped as an All Black selector the following year, perhaps belatedly demonstrating the ongoing depth of feeling against the Cavaliers tour.

For some of the players, the two-test suspension meant the end of their All Black careers. 'Some All Blacks', argued Dalton, 'will never regain their test places. There's no doubt in my mind a few test careers have been ended following the union's move to penalise the guys who went to South Africa'.<sup>16</sup> Dalton's words would prove prophetic. Robbie Deans, Mike Clamp, Bryce Robins, Bill Osborne, Steven Pokere, Victor Simpson, Bernie Fraser, Wayne Smith, Frank Shelford, Andy Donald, Dave Loveridge, Murray Mexted, John

Ashworth, John Mills, Scott Crichton and Andy Haden, never again took the field in an All Black jersey after the Cavaliers tour.

The players considered the possibility of challenging the Rugby Union's penalties through the courts, but ultimately, the consensus among the players was that they accept their punishment rather than take proceedings further. 'We were advised we could win a court appeal against the sentence', claimed Fox. 'We declined, not because we believed we had escaped lightly but because it would have been further trauma for the game'.<sup>17</sup> According to Haden, there was a feeling among the players that, 'There had already been too many trials and too many lawyers involved; we all just wanted to get on with our lives and settle back into domestic rugby'.<sup>18</sup>

HART on the other hand, refused to let the matter rest. For the second test against Australia at Carisbrook, ten Cavaliers returned to the All Black fold after New Zealand's one-point loss in the first test in Wellington. This was reduced to nine when Wayne Shelford broke a bone in a hand during a club match. Prior to the third test, HART released an open letter to the media addressed to the Meads and the nine Cavaliers due to take the field for the All Blacks. HART's Auckland spokesman, Shane Phillips wrote:

We are appalled that following the Cavaliers rugby tour to South Africa you have the cheek to make yourself available to represent your country.

You all know full well that black South Africans have repeatedly appealed to this country to cut its rugby links with South Africa. You know also that the tour would give great comfort to the white population of South Africa who holds the black majority in enslavement.

You chose instead to put your personal pleasures and financial self interest above everything just as do all despicable mercenaries.

We demand that you withdraw from the All Black team.<sup>19</sup>

The refusal of the nine Cavaliers to comply with Phillips' demand, prompted HART protestors to gather outside the Poenamo Motor Lodge, where the players were staying, and at Eden Park, the scene of the third test, to demonstrate their displeasure.<sup>20</sup>

### **GUILTY OR NOT GUILTY?**

On the issue of player payments, the Rugby Union remained unconvinced that the Cavaliers did not benefit financially or materially from their tour to South Africa and therefore announced further investigations into the matter. 'It was their duty', claimed the union, 'as a member of the IRB to investigate possible breaches of the regulations relating to amateurism'.<sup>21</sup> As a consequence, the council directed newly appointed NZRFU chairman Russell Thomas to draft an affidavit for the players to sign swearing they had not been paid on the tour.

Suspicion that the players had received large sums of money for playing in South Africa was heightened when the players and officials declined to sign the affidavit. Reluctance on behalf of the players to sign the document was interpreted by some as proof that money was involved. However, the players stated they simply wanted more time to seek legal advice to have greater clarification. According to Knight, 'To sign statutory declarations would have been an unnecessary risk when it realised that under a strict interpretation of amateurism the players were not entitled to a daily allowance, to operate a team fund or even to free meals'.<sup>22</sup> Dalton claimed with a touch of bitterness,

One of the risks of signing those forms was it may have given that Auckland bunch of lawyers the chance to drag us through the courts again. I had a ring in the last week of the tour and was told on good authority that

a group lawyers was ready to pounce in any way possible to discredit the players.<sup>23</sup>

The NZRFU responded by amending the affidavit so players had only to acknowledge they hadn't received anything beyond the IRB's daily allowance and a share of the team fund. The amended document received a one hundred per cent response from the Cavaliers and predictably they all denied receiving directly or indirectly any monetary consideration, benefit or material reward, for touring South Africa. In May 1987, Thomas announced that due to insufficient evidence, all charges concerning the Cavaliers payments were dropped.<sup>24</sup>

## CHAPTER SIX

### ONGOING CONSEQUENCES

#### THE COST OF THE CANCELLED 1985 TOUR

The cancellation of the 1985 All Black tour hit South African rugby hard. The SARB had spent nearly R225,000 on the abandoned tour causing a loss for the Rugby Board of R145,000 for the 1985 season. At the Board's annual meeting in 1986, Finance Committee chairman Jan Pickard disclosed the SARB had spent nearly R41,000 on travel costs, including cancellation fees, for the tour. A further R39,000 went into producing a brochure, R49,955 on Springbok trials, another R49,000 on bringing out guests to South Africa and some R30,000 on tour related expenses.<sup>1</sup> The cancellation of the tour saw a number of South Africa's leading players, frustrated at the lack of international play, switch to British rugby league. This included Springbok winger Ray Mordt, who moved to Wigan R.L.<sup>2</sup> At the Board's meeting, Dr Craven claimed, 'our rugby has been dealt a crippling blow, and the damage will not be easy to repair', following the All Blacks no-show in South Africa.<sup>3</sup> The Cavaliers tour the following year no doubt replenished the SARB's coffers. Despite the unofficial nature of the tour, the Cavaliers attracted approximately 415,532 rugby fans through the turnstiles and generating millions of rand in gate takings for the SARB<sup>4</sup>

For New Zealand rugby fans, the cancellation of the 1985 tour was a huge disappointment. Approximately, three thousand All Black supporters had paid deposits to tour South Africa with the team. The extent of the disappointment in rural New Zealand was demonstrated when a thousand people took part in a Wairarapa Bush Rugby Union-organised march down the main street of Masterton protesting at the cancellation of the tour.<sup>5</sup> Arguably, the Cavaliers tour alleviated some of their frustration.

## RUGBY'S RELATIONS WITH GOVERNMENT

Rugby's relationship with the Government remained strained following the Cavaliers tour. The All Black team that toured France in 1986 contained ten players who had represented the Cavaliers in South Africa. In Paris, Prime Minister Jacques Chirac entertained the team in his capacity as Mayor of Paris. The purpose of the function was to help heal the damage caused by the Rainbow Warrior affair, which Chirac declared should never have happened. The New Zealand Embassy announced that honour had been satisfied. The Prime Minister strongly disagreed with the Embassy's assessment of the situation. 'It certainly wasn't', he said, 'Most of those bastards were in South Africa this year and I don't regard them as deserving the designation "national team", notwithstanding my aversion to the word "national"'.<sup>6</sup> In March 1987, Lange knocked back a request from the rugby World Cup organising committee that Prince Edward or Princess Anne be invited to attend the inaugural event. He could not think of anything more ridiculous than a royal presence. 'It would be wrong', argued Lange, to have royal patronage at what he viewed, 'a potentially divisive event'.<sup>7</sup> He told the *New Zealand Herald* that 'One would have to be out of their tree ... to think it was not potentially divisive to have the All Blacks led by Andy Dalton, a recent returnee from a mercenary trip to South Africa as a Cavalier'.<sup>8</sup>

John Banks attacked the Prime Minister's actions saying Lange's 'hatred towards the international rugby fraternity was lamentable. Boycotting the World Cup because there might be a tour to South Africa sometime in the future', he argued, 'was ludicrous'. 'New Zealanders', he continued, 'would be disgusted that Mr Lange had recently hosted the leader of the African National Congress, Mr Oliver Tambo, but was refusing to invite members of the royal family here for a historic occasion'.<sup>9</sup>

In May, Lange declared that he would not attend matches or functions at the World Cup at which any officials or players associated with the Cavaliers were present on the grounds that the Rugby Union had gone against the Government regarding sporting contacts with South Africa. Lange went further and imposed restrictions on ministerial attendance at the Cup matches permitting his ministers to only attend matches between teams 'which were not connected with South Africa'.<sup>10</sup> However, this left only three matches, none involving any of the eight seeded teams for the tournament. Mike Moore attended the match between Argentina and Italy, despite the Argentinean team containing a number of players who had toured South Africa under the guise of the South American Jaguars in 1984. Moore defended his decision to attend the match by pointing out the Argentinean Government had informed the United Nations that it had introduced legislation forbidding sporting contacts with South Africa.<sup>11</sup> Banks described Moore's action as 'An act of crude, selective morality. It has nothing to do with Gleneagles. It has got a lot to do with the Prime Minister's committed bigotry and hatred of rugby'.<sup>12</sup>

One of Lange's cabinet ministers, Peter Tapsell broke ranks with the Prime Minister and called for the Cavaliers to no longer be treated as public enemies. 'This Cavaliers issue', he argued, 'should be forgotten. We can't fight vindictive battles against these people for the rest of their lives'.<sup>13</sup> Jim Bolger was able, as Leader of the Opposition, to step into the vacuum Lange had left. In fact, it was the Rugby Union who had the last laugh. At the final of the World Cup between New Zealand and France, Mike Moore, as the Government's representative, was snubbed in favour of Bolger. As Moore came up the stairs with the French Minister to the official's box; he found his seat taken by Bolger. Representatives of the Rugby Union had only a moment to decide which politician to back. They chose the Leader of the Opposition who'd stood by the Rugby Union throughout the tournament, rather than the

representative of the government that had steadfastly ignored them until it looked like they would win the competition.<sup>14</sup>

The rift between the NZRFU and the Government was healed when the Rugby Union gave Lange an assurance that it would take firm disciplinary action against anyone who participated in an unauthorised tour of South Africa, and that it had no intention of authorising a tour following the World Cup.<sup>15</sup> This was in response to an announcement from the Prime Minister that he was almost certain another rebel tour of South Africa would be made following the World Cup and that he would not believe any disclaimer to the contrary from the Rugby Union.

#### **A DIFFERENT TYPE OF TOUR**

In some respects, the Cavaliers tour broke new ground for New Zealand rugby. The Cavaliers wives and girlfriends and even the children of some of the players, were invited and had a special tour of their own, the first time a touring team had made such an arrangement. Like the Cavaliers, the players' partners traveled to South Africa in a clandestine manner under the guise of an Angora goat study group! Before the days of such legislation as the Privacy Act, the *Sunday Star's* Alan McDonald and Lindsay Knight gained access to the boarding list of the flight taking the women's to South Africa and discovered to their surprise, the women's surnames mirrored those of a number of New Zealand's more prominent rugby players.<sup>16</sup>

Strict rules, set by the players, were adhered to throughout the tour. The players' partners stayed in different hotels and travelled in a different group. Contact with the players was restricted to the daytime and the night of each match.<sup>17</sup> There were three reasons why the players were allowed to take their wives and girlfriends on tour. Firstly, the bad press created concern for the

safety of the players loved ones. Allowing partners to tour helped to ease fears over their welfare should they have remained home. The experiences of Ashworth and Dalton following earlier trips to South Africa ensured neither would leave their families at home again. Secondly, according to Ashworth, 'the reward of a tour was something wives and girlfriends deserved for the sacrifices they made in meeting the demands of someone else's international rugby career'.<sup>18</sup> Thirdly, Haden claimed, having their partners around allowed the players to cope with the pressure they were under by sharing their thoughts with someone else.<sup>19</sup> The tour's critics used the presence of the players' partners as evidence of professionalism. While one journalist inaccurately described them as 'groupies'.<sup>20</sup> The practice of allowing wives and girlfriends to tour has since been embraced by a number of national teams, not least the All Blacks, as evidenced by the 1999 rugby World Cup.

### **THE IMPACT ON NEW ZEALAND RUGBY**

The tumultuous events of 1985 and 1986 had an enormous impact on New Zealand rugby. Financially, the NZRFU suffered as a consequence of the South Africa problem. It cost the Rugby Union \$159,000 in legal fees defending its right, in court, to send a team to the Republic. Perhaps more importantly, the NZRFU and provincial rugby unions - the grass roots of New Zealand rugby - lost considerable revenue following the loss of significant rugby sponsorship. So much so, the Rugby Union had to spend \$152,000 subsidising the national provincial championship after the Apple and Pear Marketing Board, McDonalds Family Restaurants, and Cable-Price Toyota, withdrew their names from rugby sponsorship following the controversy surrounding the court case.<sup>21</sup> Ironically, it was rumoured that the Springboks who played the Cavaliers the following year were paid R5,000 each by Toyota and were known as the Toyaboks.<sup>22</sup> The Rugby Union incurred a further loss of \$27,285 on France's two-match tour of New Zealand in 1986 after only 24,000 patrons passed

through the Lancaster Park turnstiles.<sup>23</sup> The loss, according to NZRFU chairman Russell Thomas was 'attributable to the unavailability for selection of All Black players', who had been suspended for two international matches for taking part in the Cavaliers tour.<sup>24</sup>

The Cavaliers tour also demonstrated to the NZRFU that it could no longer maintain discipline among its leading players. By touring South Africa, the players had effectively thumbed their noses at the Rugby Union and its constitution, which required players intending to go overseas to notify the union, and await clearance. The tour also demonstrated that players were now prepared to sacrifice their All Black status for other incentives, for example, an all expenses paid trip to South Africa. Because a rebel tour like that carried out by the Cavaliers, had never been contemplated by the Rugby Union, penalties for such infringements had never been spelt out. Being a body elected to control amateur sportsmen, the union did not have penalties itemised for specific 'crimes'.

A notable consequence of the Cavaliers tour was the level of hostility within the All Black camp following the tour. A number of the players vented their anger and frustration at David Kirk, who had been appointed captain in the absence of more senior players due to the suspension. According to Kirk, a sense of failure aroused such unpleasant emotions, the failure to win in South Africa, the failure to find widespread support for the tour and the failure of the tour to be televised.<sup>25</sup> He recalled when things came to a head at a team drinking session during the All Blacks tour of France in 1986. 'There wasn't a good feeling in the room and when alcohol had loosened people's tongues some of them found it easier to be direct with me about my part in the (Cavaliers) fiasco'. Reduced to tears after an unrelenting torrent of abuse from his team mates, Kirk was left with an overwhelming sense of guilt that he had betrayed not only those present, but the 'whole All Black ethos'.<sup>26</sup> This sad chapter in All Black history

was in stark contrast to the perception in the eyes of New Zealanders that their team was, in historian Jock Phillips' words, 'community of mates'.<sup>27</sup>

The Cavaliers tour threatened to disrupt future rugby tournaments. On March 12, 1987, the Malaysian Rugby Football Union announced its intention to boycott the annual Hong Kong Sevens because the New Zealand side was led by Cavalier Wayne Shelford.<sup>28</sup> On the eve of the rugby World Cup, speculation was rife that Zimbabwe would withdraw from the tournament after senior Zimbabwean politicians had questioned the African nation's participation due to the presence of Cavaliers players in the All Black squad to contest the competition. However, Zimbabwe did eventually take its place in the competition when, according to one Zimbabwean source, 'it was realised withdrawal would be a futile gesture'.<sup>29</sup>

Another consequence of the Cavaliers tour was the further isolation of South African rugby. Upon his arrival in South Africa, Colin Meads claimed to 'have opened doors which should never have been closed,' he had, in fact, not only shut the door, but locked it as well.<sup>30</sup> The NZRFU was incensed by the underhand way the tour had been organised and especially by the duplicitous role Dr Craven and the SARB - a union New Zealand had in years past bent over backwards to help, often to its cost - had played. Within a short time, the Rugby Union had found itself on the same side as the anti-apartheid forces. In March 1988, the IRB agreed that 'World XVs' might be invited to South Africa to celebrate the centenaries of the Northern Transvaal Rugby Union in 1988 and of the SARB in 1989. Rumours were rife that the first of these World XVs might include five All Blacks. The Rugby Union, still licking its wounds after the Cavaliers tour, was against any resumption of contacts with South Africa and in May 1987 the NZRFU decided that no New Zealand player would be permitted to join the 1988 World XV in South Africa. This decision was in line with the attitudes of most other IRB members, with the exception of

the Australian Rugby Union. The union's judgement marked a change in the attitude of past NZRFU administrations to the rights of individual players to make their own decisions by refusing to accept South African invitations. In August, the Northern Transvaal union announced the cancellation of the World XV tour, despite the willingness of six Wallabies to take part. In 1989, no New Zealanders received invitations from the SARB to participate in the union's centenary celebrations.<sup>31</sup>

The Cavaliers tour was a catalyst for All Black success in the 1987 rugby World Cup. The tour itself, according to Haden, made players become 'stronger emotionally and mentally because the attitudes learnt and disappointments overcome were great character-building lessons'. The players, he claims, 'learned more about pressure and how to handle it. Their determination to succeed and the standards they set themselves made them superb players, the driving force behind the All Blacks'.<sup>32</sup> Of the outstanding 1987 All Black side that won the World Cup, five of the eight forwards were Cavaliers including three of the tight five, plus a further three in the backs. In addition, the unavailability, through suspension, of the thirty-one players who toured South Africa for the test against France and for the first against Australia, meant there was never a better chance to earn a spot in the All Black side. The result was the uncovering of a group of new young players, such as centre Joe Stanley, who previously thought they had little chance of representing their country, suddenly realised they, were in the running for test selection. Players who would play with distinction at the World Cup, such as Terry Wright, Michael Jones, John Drake, John Gallagher, and future New Zealand captain, Sean Fitzpatrick, emerged quickly to fill the vacancies available in the All Black team. Competition for spots within the All Blacks line up was fierce when the Cavaliers returned from suspension. This had the effect of sharpening performances on both the training fields and when it came to game time.<sup>33</sup>

Duncan Johnstone of the *Sunday Star-Times* has suggested the Cavaliers were the catalyst for big money sums coming into the New Zealand game.<sup>34</sup> I disagree with Johnstone's assertion. Haden suggests that had the Cavaliers' tour been considered by the players to be the beginning of pro rugby the composition of the team would have been vastly different. It was, he maintains, 'never a consideration that the tour would be the catalyst for pro rugby'.<sup>35</sup> For the players, the tour represented an opportunity to do what they had set their minds on from the time they were originally selected for the planned official tour in 1985. At best the tour may have unwittingly accelerated the process to professionalism. Given that the players received substantial cash payments for touring South Africa, it would seem logical for the players to consider their future worth to the game. There was speculation after the tour that it would be but one of series of rebel tours to be undertaken, had this been the case professional rugby would have arrived a lot sooner than 1995. To determine whether 'big money sums' came into New Zealand rugby as a consequence of the Cavaliers tour, one only needs to ask themselves, why did All Blacks continue to switch to rugby league in ever increasing numbers if such money was there to keep them in rugby union?

The closing of the door on the Cavaliers chapter can be traced back to two moments in time. The first was Andy Dalton's selection as captain of the All Black team to contest the 1987 World Cup. This reflected a symbolic forgiveness by the Rugby Union towards the players. The second was stand in captain David Kirk taking the Webb Ellis trophy, holding it aloft, then motioning to sidelined captain Andy Dalton, who had been injured earlier in the tournament, to come up and share the moment. This poignant gesture symbolised the healing of old wounds within the team and the beginnings of a golden period in New Zealand rugby.

## ENDNOTES

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### CHAPTER ONE

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- <sup>8</sup> Keith 293.
- <sup>9</sup> Macdonald, p. 85.
- <sup>10</sup> Keith, p. 293.
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- <sup>12</sup> Graeme Barrow, *All Blacks Versus Springboks - A Century of Rugby Rivalry*, Auckland: Reed Books, 1992, p. 164.
- <sup>13</sup> "No Maoris, No Tour" - *New Zealand Protests 1959-1960*, Wellington: New Zealand Citizens All Black Tour Association, 1960, p. 12.
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- <sup>15</sup> Keith, p. 293.
- <sup>16</sup> Alan Palmer, *Dictionary of Twentieth Century History 1900-1991*, Auckland: Penguin Books, 1992, p. 362.
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- <sup>18</sup> Barrow, p. 164.
- <sup>19</sup> Barrow, p. 166.
- <sup>20</sup> Quinn, p. 232.
- <sup>21</sup> Barrow, p. 166.
- <sup>22</sup> Geoff Chapple, *1981: The Tour*, Wellington: Reed, 1984, p. 11.
- <sup>23</sup> Macdonald, p. 93.
- <sup>24</sup> Macdonald, p. 93.
- <sup>25</sup> Macdonald, p. 96.
- <sup>26</sup> *New Zealand Official Yearbook 1976*, Wellington: Department of Statistics, 1976, p. 930.
- <sup>27</sup> Trevor Richards, *Dancing On Our Bones: New Zealand, South Africa, Rugby and Racism*, Wellington: Bridgett Williams Books, 1999, p. 141.
- <sup>28</sup> Macdonald, p. 96.
- <sup>29</sup> Richards, p. 142.
- <sup>30</sup> Quinn, p. 233.
- <sup>31</sup> Templeton, p. 149.
- <sup>32</sup> Macdonald, p. 102.
- <sup>33</sup> Keith, p. 293.
- <sup>34</sup> Quinn, p. 233.
- <sup>35</sup> Macdonald, p. 103.

<sup>36</sup> Chapple, pp. 264-313.

## CHAPTER TWO THE DECISION

<sup>1</sup> Lindsay Knight, *Gary Knight, Andy Dalton, John Ashworth: The Geriatrics*, Auckland: Moa, 1986, p. 224.

<sup>2</sup> *Evening Post*, 18 July 1983.

<sup>3</sup> HART Aotearoa, Media release, 4 February 1983, HART Aotearoa Papers, MS- Papers-93-042-03, Alexander Turnbull Library.

<sup>4</sup> *Evening Post*, 18 June 1983.

<sup>5</sup> Templeton, p. 212. The Code of Conduct, drawn up by the in 1983 prohibited sporting contact between individuals or sporting organisations that continued to participate in sporting competition with South Africa. If an individual or sporting organisations such as the Rugby Union violated the Code, the CGF could suspend or reprimand the Association of the sports body or individual involved.

<sup>6</sup> *Auckland Star*, 7 October 1983.

<sup>7</sup> Templeton, p. 217.

<sup>8</sup> Knight, p.224.

<sup>9</sup> *Evening Post*, 16 June 1983.

<sup>10</sup> *Evening Post*, 22 September 1983

<sup>11</sup> *New Zealand Party Manifesto*, Wellington: New Zealand Party, 1984, p. 2.

<sup>12</sup> Templeton, p. 217.

<sup>13</sup> *Timaru Herald*, 13 February 1985.

<sup>14</sup> Templeton, p. 222.

<sup>15</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 1 April 1985.

<sup>16</sup> Blazey quoted in Templeton, p. 223.

<sup>17</sup> Templeton, p. 223.

<sup>18</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 9 February 1985.

<sup>19</sup> *Rugby News*, 21 March 1985.

<sup>20</sup> *Rugby News*, 21 March 1985.

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<sup>27</sup> *Rugby News*, 3 April 1985.

<sup>28</sup> Transcript of interview with David Lange [no date], Alan Erson, Tape 67, 98/146/2, p. 1, New Zealand Rugby Museum.

<sup>29</sup> *Rugby News*, 24 April 1985.

<sup>30</sup> *Rugby News*, 24 April 1985.

<sup>31</sup> *Rugby News*, 24 April 1985.

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<sup>33</sup> Interview Transcript with David Lange, p. 2.

<sup>34</sup> *Evening Post*, 20 April 1985.

<sup>35</sup> Interview Transcript with David Lange, p. 1.

<sup>36</sup> *Rugby News*, 13 March 1985.

<sup>37</sup> Women Against Rugby, 22 April 1985, HART Aotearoa Papers, MS-Papers-93-042-03, Alexander Turnbull Library.

<sup>38</sup> *Dominion*, 3 April 1985.

- <sup>39</sup> Boycott Media Release, 19 April 1985, HART Aotearoa Papers, MS-Papers-93-042-03, Alexander Turnbull Library.
- <sup>40</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 7 May 1985.
- <sup>41</sup> *Auckland Star*, 29 April 1985.
- <sup>42</sup> *Auckland Star*, 18 July 1985.
- <sup>43</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 24 June, 1985.
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- <sup>46</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 24 June 1985.
- <sup>47</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 1 July 1985.
- <sup>48</sup> G. Caffell, R. Palenski, A. Vesey, *Lochore: An Authorised Biography*, Auckland: Hodder Moa Beckett, 1996. p. 179.
- <sup>49</sup> Caffell, p. 180.
- <sup>50</sup> Knight, p. 231.

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- <sup>4</sup> *New Zealand Law Reports (NZLR)* (1985) vol 2, *Finnigan v NZRFU Inc*, High Court, 6-10 June 1985, p. 159.
- <sup>5</sup> Interview with Patrick Finnigan, 3 September 1999.
- <sup>6</sup> Finnigan interview.
- <sup>7</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 19 July 1985.
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- <sup>10</sup> *NZLR* (1985) vol 2, *Finnigan v NZRFU Inc*, Court of Appeal, 18-21 June 1985, p. 179.
- <sup>11</sup> *NZLR*, (1985) vol 2, *Finnigan v NZRFU Inc*, Court of Appeal 18-21 June 1985, p. 180.
- <sup>12</sup> Caffell, Palenski, Vesey, p. 152
- <sup>13</sup> *NZLR*, (1985) Vol 2, *Finnigan v NZRFU Inc*, High Court, 11-13 July 1985, p. 184.
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- <sup>15</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, July 15 1985.
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- <sup>20</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, July 15 1985.
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- <sup>24</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, July 15 1985.
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## CHAPTER FOUR THE CAVALIERS

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- <sup>2</sup> Jock Hobbs interviewed by Keith Quinn in *Legends of the All Blacks*, TVNZ, August 23 1999.
- <sup>3</sup> Murray Mexted, *Mexted: Pieces of Eight*, Auckland: Rugby Press, 1986, p. 217.
- <sup>4</sup> *Sunday Star*, 13 April 1986.
- <sup>5</sup> Thomas, p. 48.
- <sup>6</sup> Haden, p. 72.
- <sup>7</sup> Knight, p. 242.
- <sup>8</sup> Tim Bickerstaff, *Heroes and Villains*, Auckland: Hilton Valentine, 1998, p. 92.
- <sup>9</sup> Haden, p. 73.
- <sup>10</sup> Knight, p. 244.
- <sup>11</sup> Lochore cited in Caffell, p. 193.
- <sup>12</sup> Bickerstaff, p. 93.
- <sup>13</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 18 April 1985.
- <sup>14</sup> Kirkpatrick cited in Haden, p. 106.
- <sup>15</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 6 April 1985.
- <sup>16</sup> Knight, p. 243.
- <sup>17</sup> Transcript of interview with Ces Blazey, Rugby Transcripts 2, Tape 52, 98/146/2, New Zealand Rugby Museum, p. 2
- <sup>18</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 17 April 1986.
- <sup>19</sup> *NZPD*, vol 17 April 1986, pp. 1065-1066 (Russell Marshall).
- <sup>20</sup> Keith Quinn, *Legends of the All Blacks*, Auckland: Hodder Moa Beckett, 1999, p. 56.
- <sup>21</sup> David Kirk, *Black and Blue*, Auckland: Hodder Moa Beckett, 1997, p. 87.
- <sup>22</sup> Kirk, p. 90.
- <sup>23</sup> Kirk, p. 90.
- <sup>24</sup> Knight, p. 246.
- <sup>25</sup> Quinn, p. 56.
- <sup>26</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 22 April 1986.
- <sup>27</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 15 April 1986.
- <sup>28</sup> Transcript of Ces Blazey interview, Tape nine, Part one, Folder 1/8/99, p. 37, New Zealand Rugby Museum.
- <sup>29</sup> Blazey interview, p. 35.
- <sup>30</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 7 May 1986.
- <sup>31</sup> *Auckland Star*, 16 April 1986.
- <sup>32</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 17 April 1986.
- <sup>33</sup> *Rugby News*, 22 April 1986.
- <sup>34</sup> *Auckland Star*, 10 June 1986.
- <sup>35</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 15 April 1986.
- <sup>36</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 13 April 1986.
- <sup>37</sup> *NZPD*, vol 470, 15 April 1986, pp. 989-990.
- <sup>38</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 15 April 1986.
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- <sup>42</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 15 April 1986.
- <sup>43</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 15 April 1986.
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- <sup>46</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 14 April 1986.

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- <sup>48</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 18 April 1986.
- <sup>49</sup> International Backgrounder, 1 May 1986, Hart Aotearoa Papers, MS-Papers-93-042-03, Alexander Turnbull Library.
- <sup>50</sup> International Backgrounder, 1 May 1986, Hart Aotearoa Papers, MS-Papers-93-042-03, Alexander Turnbull Library.
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- <sup>52</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 16 April 1986.
- <sup>53</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 14 April 1986.
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- <sup>55</sup> *Eyewitness News*, 14 April 1986.
- <sup>56</sup> Templeton, p. 271.
- <sup>57</sup> *Auckland Star*, 8 May 1986.
- <sup>58</sup> Transcript of interview with Ces Blazey, Rugby Transcripts 2, Tape 52, 98/146/2, New Zealand Rugby Museum, p. 2
- <sup>59</sup> Blazey interview, p. 2
- <sup>60</sup> *Auckland Star*, 1 May 1986.
- <sup>61</sup> *Auckland Star*, 1 May 1986.
- <sup>62</sup> *Auckland Star*, 8 May 1986.
- <sup>63</sup> NZPD, vol 471, 29 May 1986, pp 1785-1786 (Jim Gerard).
- <sup>64</sup> *Listener*, 3 May 1986.
- <sup>65</sup> *Auckland Star*, 30 April 1986.
- <sup>66</sup> *Listener*, 3 May 1986.
- <sup>67</sup> *Auckland Star*, 1 May 1986.
- <sup>68</sup> *Auckland Star*, 8 May 1986 and *New Zealand Herald*, 9 May 1986.
- <sup>69</sup> *Auckland Star*, 30 April 1986.
- <sup>70</sup> *Auckland Star*, 9 May 1986.
- <sup>71</sup> NZPD, vol 471, 29 March 1986, p. 1818.
- <sup>72</sup> NZPD, vol 471, 5 June 1986, p. 2052 (Jonathon Hunt).
- <sup>73</sup> *Rugby News*, 22 April 1986.
- <sup>74</sup> Doug Laing, *Cavaliers in South Africa 1986*, Auckland: 1986, p. 70.
- <sup>75</sup> Haden, p. 76.
- <sup>76</sup> Haden, p. 79.
- <sup>77</sup> *Sunday Star*, 3 April 1986.
- <sup>78</sup> Bickerstaff, p. 95.
- <sup>79</sup> Meads cited in Laing, p. 66.
- <sup>80</sup> *Sunday-Star Times*, 15 August 1999.
- <sup>81</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 21 April 1999.
- <sup>82</sup> *Sunday Star-Times*, 15 August 1999.
- <sup>83</sup> *Evening Post and The Press*, 16 August 1999.
- <sup>84</sup> *The Press*, August 17 1999.
- <sup>85</sup> Knight, p. 253.
- <sup>86</sup> *Auckland Star*, 7 May 1986.
- <sup>87</sup> Quinn, p. 56.
- <sup>88</sup> Laing p. 14.
- <sup>89</sup> *Evening Post*, 6 May 1986.
- <sup>90</sup> *Eyewitness News*, April 30 1986.
- <sup>91</sup> *Eyewitness News*, April 28 1986.
- <sup>92</sup> *Eyewitness News*, Date Unknown.
- <sup>93</sup> *Evening Post*, 1 May 1986.
- <sup>94</sup> Laing, p. 26.
- <sup>95</sup> *Evening Post*, May 12 1986.

- <sup>96</sup> *Dominion*, May 14 1986.  
<sup>97</sup> *Dominion*, May 21 1986.  
<sup>98</sup> *Dominion*, 25 May 1986.  
<sup>99</sup> Barrow, p. 131.  
<sup>100</sup> Knight, p. 266.  
<sup>101</sup> Barrow, p. 133.  
<sup>102</sup> Laing, p. 63.  
<sup>103</sup> Laing, p. 69.  
<sup>104</sup> Bickerstaff, p. 102.  
<sup>105</sup> Bickerstaff, p. 102.  
<sup>106</sup> Knight, p. 260.  
<sup>107</sup> Laing, p. 64.  
<sup>108</sup> Vesey, p. 62.  
<sup>109</sup> *Auckland Star*, 8 May 1986.  
<sup>110</sup> Knight, p. 262.  
<sup>111</sup> Haden, p. 111.  
<sup>112</sup> Quinn, p. 282.  
<sup>113</sup> Mexted, p. 228.

## CHAPTER FIVE CAVALIER CONSEQUENCE

- <sup>1</sup> Knight, p. 249.  
<sup>2</sup> *Dominion*, 9 June 1986.  
<sup>3</sup> Knight, p. 249.  
<sup>4</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 7 May 1986.  
<sup>5</sup> *Rugby News*, 1 July 1986.  
<sup>6</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 7 May 1986.  
<sup>7</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 7 May 1986.  
<sup>8</sup> *Rugby News*, 13 May 1986.  
<sup>9</sup> *Rugby News*, 10 June 1986.  
<sup>10</sup> *Evening Post*, 10 June 1986.  
<sup>11</sup> *Christchurch Press*, 10 June 1986.  
<sup>12</sup> *Dominion*, 11 June 1986.  
<sup>13</sup> *Christchurch Press*, 11 June 1986.  
<sup>14</sup> *Christchurch Press*, 11 June 1986.  
<sup>15</sup> *Eyewitness News*, 11 June 1986.  
<sup>16</sup> Laing, p. 69.  
<sup>17</sup> Vesey, p. 62.  
<sup>18</sup> Haden, p. 74.  
<sup>19</sup> HART Media Release, 4 September 1986, HART Aotearoa Papers, MS-Papers-93-042-03, Alexander Turnbull Library.  
<sup>20</sup> *Dominion*, 6 August 1986.  
<sup>21</sup> *Rugby News*, 6 June 1986.  
<sup>22</sup> Knight, p. 251.  
<sup>23</sup> Knight, p. 252.  
<sup>24</sup> Quinn, p. 57.

## CHAPTER SIX ONGOING CONSEQUENCES

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- <sup>2</sup> *Rugby News*, 3 April 1986.
- <sup>3</sup> *Rugby News*, 15 April 1986.
- <sup>4</sup> Figures calculated from those provided in Laing, pp. 14-64.
- <sup>5</sup> *Auckland Star*, 25 July 1985.
- <sup>6</sup> Templeton, p. 272.
- <sup>7</sup> Templeton, p. 272.
- <sup>8</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 12 May 1987
- <sup>9</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 12 May 1987.
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- <sup>11</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 11 October 1984.
- <sup>12</sup> *New Zealand Herald*, 12 May 1987.
- <sup>13</sup> *Dominion*, 13 May 1987.
- <sup>14</sup> Kirk, p. 93.
- <sup>15</sup> Templeton, p. 272.
- <sup>16</sup> *Sunday Star*, 13 April 1986.
- <sup>17</sup> Haden, p. 76.
- <sup>18</sup> Knight, p. 249.
- <sup>19</sup> Haden, p. 76.
- <sup>20</sup> Knight, p. 246.
- <sup>21</sup> *Rugby News*, 3 April 1986 and *New Zealand Herald*, 18 July 1985.
- <sup>22</sup> Templeton, p. 270.
- <sup>23</sup> R.H. Chester, N.A.C. McMillan, *History of New Zealand Rugby Football Volume 4 1980 – 87*, Auckland: Moa Publications, 1987, p. 239.
- <sup>24</sup> Haden, p. 74.
- <sup>25</sup> Kirk, p. 90.
- <sup>26</sup> Kirk, p. 103.
- <sup>27</sup> Jock Phillips, *A Man's Country? The Image of the Pakeha Male – A History*, Auckland: Penguin Books, 1987, p. 115
- <sup>28</sup> *Christchurch Press*, 13 March 1987.
- <sup>29</sup> *Dominion*, 12 May 1987.
- <sup>30</sup> Laing, p. 65.
- <sup>31</sup> Templeton, p. 272.
- <sup>32</sup> Haden, p. 111.
- <sup>33</sup> Haden, p. 113.
- <sup>34</sup> *Sunday Star-Times*, 15 August 1999.
- <sup>35</sup> Haden, p. 109.

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