THE PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF HISTORY: A DISCOURSE ON HERITAGE AND NOSTALGIA IN THE 1990s

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ABSTRACT

The dialectic of history as an ideology and history as a commodity can underpin a discourse on the production and consumption of history as heritage and nostalgia in the 1990s. History as an ideology is erased from the dominant space of representation, by history as a commodity; therefore, history as an ideology needs to be discussed separately from history as a commodity even though they are not independent categories; this is because they are mutually constitutive of each other. The processes and structures that underwrite this dialectic, Capitalism and Modernity, produce different outcomes in different places and at different times; outcomes such as the cabinets of curiosity during early modernity, modernist and postmodernist museums, heritage sites such as country houses, a shopping mall and a disneyfied theme park arranged around a historic locale and the gentrification of some parts of the inner City of London. These objects of history are produced, reproduced and consumed by social actors in different places and at different times. The production and consumption of history as an object does not explain why these particular outcomes exist in the places and the times that they do. These outcomes need to be explained, and can be explained, by using a dialectical methodology. Such an explanation would look at the underlying processes and structures of Capitalism and modernity.
A few years ago, my husband purchased some antique golf clubs. The purchase intrigued me: not only because of the items he had bought but also because his purchase highlighted the proliferation of antique shops that had appeared in the greater Manawatu area. Antique shops were found along State Highway One at Sanson and Bulls, in former milk treatment stations and once derelict buildings. The 'past' appeared to have been re-invented at three levels. First, collectable items such as old wooden furniture (complete with borer holes), ordinary rather than elitist china, period costumes, knick-knacks such as brand tins of tobacco as well as old machinery (whether in working order or not) such as Singer sewing machines had become fashionable. Second, particular buildings were refurbished to house these saleable collectables: this added a sense of authenticity to the items that were for sale. Third, many of these items for sale were not destined to be used once sold but were bought for display purposes.

What struck me as particularly interesting was that new items in period style were offered for sale alongside second-hand or antique items. Further, some items were physically altered to fit a particular purpose. For example, an oak dining table is easier to come by than a table with six matching chairs; as a result when a table is purchased by a proprietor without the chairs, a set can be made to match often using another piece of furniture the same age, such as a wardrobe. Thus the age of the wood would ensure a degree of authenticity to the entire set. Further, as a set, the entire suite would command a greater price than the sum of the chairs or the table individually.

During the search for antique golf clubs, it became apparent that prices varied by location: in the larger cities of Wellington or Auckland, a single club could be up to fifty percent more expensive than in the provincial areas while in an out of the way location, a single club could be up to fifty percent cheaper. Price played an important economic and social role in the acquisition of a club: if a bargain could be had, it was all the more enjoyable an experience.

The reasons for my husband collecting antique golf clubs were varied: not only were they a commercial investment but it was also a father and son activity, and related to an enjoyment of playing the game of golf as a leisure activity in the present.
My husband's collection of antique golf clubs is stored in a cupboard at my in-laws (where I hope they will stay). With each new purchase, however, the entire collection is brought out, dusted off, and the new acquisition(s) are examined as an integral part of the whole collection: where they will fit with respect to brand, age, and state of repair. One day, I am told, my husband will have enough clubs to make up a single set by brand, or a set of similar types of clubs of different brands. The clubs will then be ready to be displayed in a purpose made cabinet or mounted on the wall.

There is a caveat to this thesis: writing as a Pakeha in New Zealand in the 1990s, it is impossible to ignore the contested histories of marginalised groups such as Maori. It is also impossible to ignore any controversy surrounding the opening of The Museum of New Zealand, Te Papa Tongarewa in February 1998. As a result, this thesis deliberately sets aside these contested histories, not only because of the controversial nature of these histories but as a Pakeha researching Maori issues the very research itself would be contested by those better qualified to undertake Maori research, or research on behalf of Maori.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvey's 'The Limits to Capital'</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Limitations to 'The Limits to Capital'</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of the Chapters</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER TWO: THE PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF VALUE, IDENTITY AND THE CONSUMPTION OF HISTORY: A DIALECTICAL DISCOURSE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction: A Dialectical Method</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History Defined!!!</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Use of Language in the (Post)modern Epoch</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Consumption of History in the (Post)modern Epoch</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Production of Value, Identity and the Consumption of History: A Dialectical Discourse

Conclusion

CHAPTER THREE: THE PRODUCTION OF VALUE AND IDENTITY IN THE (POST)MODERN EPOCH

Introduction

The Construction of Identity and Value in the Renaissance and the Early Modern Period

The Enlightenment Project (18-20th Century)

Modernity and Hegemony

The Production of Value and Identity in (Post)modernity

Conclusion

CHAPTER FOUR: THE CONSUMPTION OF VALUE, IDENTITY AND HISTORY: A DIALECTIC FOR (POST)MODERN TIMES

Introduction

PART A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The Emergence of a 'Middle Class' in Western Europe in the Early Modern Period

Collectors, Collecting and Cabinets of Curiosity in the Early Modern Period
Consumption Practices of the Middle Classes in England During the Early Modern Period 62

Consumption Practices and Identity Formation During the European Enlightenment 63

Alternative Consumption Practices in the Twentieth Century 65

The Emergence of the New Middle Class in Britain in the Late Twentieth Century 66

PART B THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Heritage Landscapes in the Late Twentieth Century 72

History and Heritage in 'the City' 84

The Production and Consumption of an Historical Geography: The Example of the City of London 87

Conclusion 94

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 97

REFERENCES 110
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1  The Paths of Capital Flow 6

Figure 2  Historic and Contemporary Alamo Grounds in Relation to Present Streets 78

Figure 3  Location and Layout of Haw Par Villa 81

Plate 1  The Wagener Museum Brochure 76
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The research in this thesis will focus on collectors and the collecting of antiques and collectable items. Why people collect is something that is part of everyday life: it has a history and a geography. People collect different objects in different places, at different times and for different reasons. The objects people collect will change over time; not only do fashions change but as time passes more historical items are available for commodification by 'the market'.

Commodification of objects of the past occurs when these objects are alienated and hence can be exchanged for a price. The exchange value of an object of the past (commodity) erases from view the use value of the commodity. Commodities, however can also become fetishised (Harvey; 1982 drawing on the work of Marx). Commodities, according to Harvey (1982) are produced by individuals who possess labour power. These individual producers, relate to each other through the commodities they produce so that

the relations connecting the labour of one individual with that of the rest appear, not as direct social relations between individuals at work, but as what they really are, material relations between persons and social relations between things (Marx quoted in Harvey; 1982:17).

As Harvey (1982) goes on to argue, this fetishism of commodities, which is an outcome of the exchange process, 'conceals our social relationships with others behind a mere thing - the money form itself' (1982:17).

Value, according to Harvey (1982) embodies socially necessary labour time or the average time taken to produce a socially necessary commodity under average conditions that prevail at the time. All commodities embody socially necessary labour time and it is this labour
component that allows their value to be assessed in relation to other commodities for sale. Prices on the other hand are the material manifestation of values in money form and allow individual producers to find an equilibrium point between supply and demand of commodities for sale in different places and at different times.

Under the capitalist mode of production, value is achieved through the transformation of money into commodities that produce more commodities for sale and hence money: value is the active factor in the transformation process but assumes different forms in different places and at different times. The total amount of capital, however, is not equal to the total wealth in society: 'there is ... a great deal that goes on in society that is not directly related to the circulation of capital' (Harvey; 1982:20).

People also collect experiences: this is important with respect to the tourism industry. Much tourism is based on an experience of an object as well as the company and the setting of the experience. These are factors the producers of the experience site cannot control, but it does indicate that people and place are important factors in the way tourists negotiate any tourist-motivated experience.

Collecting by institutions such as museums and corporate firms is intimately tied up with capitalism; but the creation of collections cannot be reduced to capitalism. The factors that have allowed museums and corporate collections to evolve over time still carry within them these factors even though they may not be obvious. Further, it was never intended to focus the research on corporate collecting; as a result, only museums are discussed in this thesis.

Because people approach objects and experiences in multiple ways it is extremely difficult to put forward a single model of consumer behaviour. As Prentice has suggested of heritage, it is part of a

'shopping list' of things to do, which is ordered by priorities, determined in part by past activities and experiences at a destination area, and which is liable to amendment ... if other opportunities are found, of which fine weather may be one, or brought forward if other opportunities are lost (1993:226).

The traditional economic ideals of what, how and for whom goods and services are produced does not say anything about why people consume the goods they do and in the
manner they do. Orthodox economic theories reduce the value of objects to their price or marginal utility in terms of price; however not everything can be reduced to its price. As Richins notes:

Scholars since the time of Aristotle have recognized that market value does not necessarily represent total value by making a distinction between value in use and value in exchange. Although economists generally consider an object's utilitarian purposes when describing value in use, the distinction between value in use and value in exchange can also be applied to a tattered teddy bear or some chipped china plates, which are items that may have low exchange value but high (non-utilitarian) value in use to their possessors (Richins; 1994a:505).

Exchange value is only one aspect of the value of commodities: the everyday experiences of people matter (Richins; 1994:504). Often, objects that evoke memories and experiences of the past have no economic value (price) but these objects are also often not for exchange. As Belk suggests 'we are very unlikely to swap pets [or] wedding rings ... even when the alternative offered is demonstrably superior to our own' (quoted in Richins; 1994a:505).

du Gay has argued that consumers 'translate commodified objects from an 'alienable' to an 'inalienable' condition; that is from being an apparent symbol of estrangement and price value to being an artefact with particular inseparable connotations' (1996:86). In this respect Belk suggests that collectors transcend the commodity market:

by remaining constant to a collecting theme rather than following each new consumer novelty that comes onto the market, the collector pursues a corrective to the alienation of the general market, even while participating actively in a sector of the market (1995:151).

In a study on the difference between the public and private meanings embedded in possessions Richins suggests:

the public meanings of an object result from socialization and participation in shared activities; private meanings consist of these public meanings shaped by the private knowledge and experiences of the possessor with respect to the particular object he or she owns ... Despite their importance, we have little knowledge of how [public] meanings develop. It is likely that they are influenced by a variety of factors, which include advertising, portrayals of consumer goods in media such as movies and television shows, and the association of specific goods with highly visible and distinct social subgroups (1994a:517).
Value is not limited to the ownership of objects but also to the ownership of the experiences of an object such as a tourist attraction or a heritage site. As Richins suggests:

because private meanings emerge from one's personal experiences with a possession, it is possible, for instance, that goods providing the most chances for unique or personally tailored experiences with the possession will have the greatest capacity to develop private meanings (1994a:517).

It is also important to not reduce the consumption process to forms of uniqueness because there is a social consensus forged around how goods and services will be consumed. In this thesis, the notion of a social consensus is discussed as a class relationship; however, it is realised that other social groups (such as ethnic, gender, religious, racial) do matter.

Even though a person's identity is in some circumstances individual, it is also formed within collective settings such as class, ethnicity, gender and race. Identity will be discussed as a relational concept; therefore, the aim of this thesis is to understand how the concepts of value and identity are arrived at in the present and how these concepts can be related to the current interest in particular historical narratives in the 1990s.

There are many ideas in this thesis which re-occur, it may appear to the reader that the same ground has been covered more than once. It needs to be pointed out, however, that the re-occurrence of ideas is intentional; to borrow an idea from Ollman, relational concepts can be viewed

as a separate 'window' from which we can look in upon the inner structure of capitalism. The view from any one window is flat and lacks perspective. When we move to another window we can see things that were formerly hidden from view. Armed with that knowledge, we can reinterpret and reconstitute our understanding of what we saw through the first window, giving it greater depth and perspective (quoted in Harvey;1982:2).

A windows approach is useful because different, but connected processes can be shown to operate simultaneously. The two processes that I will focus on in this thesis is history as an ideology and history as a commodity. In chapter two and chapter three, history as an ideology will be discussed especially through the modernity/postmodernity nexus and the production/consumption nexus. Chapter four will focus on history as a commodity where examples of collections, museums and heritage sites from the Renaissance to the present day
will be discussed. The dialectic of history as an ideology/history as a commodity is extremely important because it can underpin the economic/cultural nexus in Western Capitalist countries in the 1990s.

*Harvey's 'The Limits to Capital'*

Of particular interest to this theme is Harvey's (1982) 'Limits to Capital' discourse. The following is a brief summary of some of the key points from Harvey's *The Limits to Capital* (1982) with reference to *The Geopolitics of Capitalism* (1985) in which Harvey summarises many of the key points made in *The Limits to Capital*. According to Harvey (1982) the accumulation cycle has five phases: stagnation, recovery, expansion, speculation, and the crash. These phases resolve the inner contradictions of over-production and under-consumption of commodities due to the immobility of various forms of capital and labour.

Wealth generated through the Capitalist Mode of Production needs to continually circulate so that individual capitalists can make a profit (Harvey; 1982, 1985). But capital is also constrained to circulate within specific capital circuits: production of commodities, the built environment, the consumption fund, financial services and the government sector. Capitalists, given adequate credit at their disposal will switch their capital between circuits to stave off crisis (a short-term solution to long-run capital crises).

According to Harvey (1985) capitalism needs to expand through the exploitation of labour power to create absolute surplus value, while at the same time capitalists replace labour power with technology to gain greater profits through relative surplus value. The use of technology, however implies that investments become fixed for a period of time; therefore capital is locked into fixed infrastructures and is not free to switch into the circulation of productive activity. Further, capitalists who are constrained to produce particular commodities are often unable to switch their capital into producing alternative commodities even if demand for the original commodities no longer exists. The credit system does alleviate this problem in the short-term by allowing fixed capital to be released from immobile infrastructures and to be re-invested in other areas such as the built environment and the consumption fund. For example, conspicuous consumption by many individuals of 'new money' during the Renaissance took a parallel course to debt creation, the innovation in
Figure 1: The Paths of Capital Flow

(Harvey, 1982)
banking techniques and financial instruments of this period: a situation that has continued into the present day.

Long-run capital crises are inevitable, according to Harvey (1982) and arise out of the contradictory nature of individual capitalists who pursue absolute and relative surplus value that ultimately cannot be absorbed through re-investment in current production or through final consumption. These long-run crises are characterised by the increasing amount of capital generated through surplus value that cannot be absorbed and the growing number of unemployed (made redundant through the application of innovation and technology in the production process) that also cannot be utilised. When 'surplus capital and surplus labour power exist side by side with apparently no way to bring the two together to accomplish socially necessary tasks' (Harvey; 1985:132) then a crisis will manifest itself in a number of ways.

Both capital and labour can be devalued, individually or collectively. Harvey argues that 'devaluation is the non-production of values and the production of non-values' (1982:194): the production of non-values is wasted labour. This can be achieved through idle productive capacity or through not producing socially necessary wants and needs that are required by labour power to reproduce itself: for example conspicuous consumption of luxury items by the bourgeoisie could be considered socially unnecessary (sic) commodities. The production of non-value could also be related to the production of new items in period style (authentic fakes) that are sold alongside genuine antique or second hand items.

Fictitious capital is often destroyed during crises: that is 'bonds, mortgages, stocks and shares [and] government debt' (Harvey; 1985:137). Fictitious capital depends on the ability of future labour to generate value in the production process. This is because fictitious capital is lent ahead of time and must be realised at a later date. If the production process is devalued or idle, then surplus value cannot be realised; hence fictitious capital is destroyed. This is done through the devaluation of prices of stocks and shares trading on 'the market' and in the default on mortgages and other types of debt (Harvey; 1982).

Labour is also devalued: the reduction in real incomes through retrenchment or a reduction in working conditions and the wage rate affects the standards of living and life changes of wage labourers and their families. Even physical and social infrastructures such as health and education may be affected as capital invested in government programmes is devalued or lost. Crises tend to halt continued investment in long term government programmes.
Harvey (1982) suggests that if current production is given over to paying off old debts created through long term investments in such areas as hospitals and schools and the training of teachers and nurses, and these loans cannot be repaid from surplus value generated in the productive sphere within the necessary turnover time of capital then these investments are necessarily devalued. Some government debt is in effect in perpetuity; it is simply rolled over and never repaid.

If some government debt is never repaid then how do individual investors regain their initial investment in the short-term. It is at this point that fictitious capital becomes divorced from its commodity base money and circulates as investment opportunities for money capitalists in a finance capital 'market'. The problem with this situation, according to Harvey (1982) is that the price of fictitious capital on the 'finance market' bears no relation to the production of socially necessary goods and services. As Harvey argues:

\[ \text{debt claims ... circulate as a form of money capital. The quantity of fictitious capital moves steadily ahead of the actual accumulation, and the gap between the monetary basis as a real measure of values and the various forms of paper moneys in circulation begins to widen (1982:303).} \]

In this way, fictitious capital can provide money capitalists with an annualised rate of return on their investment. Fictitious capital is instrumental in creating disequilibrium between department one and department two in a capitalist economy: that is between the need to produce those commodities in such quantities that they exactly match the amount required to reproduce both capital and labour in their normal state (Harvey, 1982).

While many groups of people, capitalists and wage labourers, face the negative effects of crises and devaluation, there are those who also benefit. Those who hold debt benefit from inflationary pressure at the expense of those who hold state-backed paper money or investments that yield an annualised rate of return. Where physical infrastructure is devalued, capitalists who survive the crisis with liquid capital (such as money) stand to gain by buying fixed capital at discounted prices. For example, derelict buildings or those no longer used for their original purpose can be bought at a discounted price and refurbished to house historical objects for sale. The accumulation cycle can start again with little recourse to the credit system in the medium term as individual capitalists are able to extend credit to each other. If labour power has been devalued, new institutional arrangements can be made with workers over employment conditions and the wage rate.
Collecting objects and experiences of history do not fit easily into Harvey's 'Limits to Capital' discourse. At first glance, collecting objects of history would appear to be capital circulating in the consumption fund. As Harvey notes:

competition for relative surplus value ... is tied to changing whims, fashions and the desire to exhibit signs of status ... built-in physical obsolescence is therefore just as important to sustaining markets as economic obsolescence (1982:231).

Harvey does not discuss antiques and collectables per se but he does discuss second hand items:

the exchange value of second hand items within the consumption fund is broadly dictated by the value of new equivalent items. The marketability of such items depends upon their alienability and their capacity (at whatever stage of their physical lifetime) to yield a flow of future revenues in return for their use. The price of the asset is then fixed by the revenue it can generate capitalized at the going rate of interest (1982:231).

Not all second hand items in use can be said to be alienated; it will be argued in this thesis that consumers translate objects from an alienable to an inalienable condition where their value in exchange is not determined by the going rate of interest. Not all items will produce a flow of revenues over time - the private consumption of antiques and collectables housed in a 'cabinet of curiosity' afford their owner an identity value as much as provide the owner with an investment value; again price is determined much more subjectively than the going rate of interest. Further, people not only purchase an object of history but they also purchase the experience of purchasing an object of history.

Objects of history that are housed in public collections such as museums and heritage sites are alienable in the sense of the entrance fee paid to view the exhibits in the collection; so while the individual items remained in an inalienable condition, the collection as a whole is alienated as a commodity ripe for exploitation by 'the market'.
The problem with using economic concepts in the 1990s in New Zealand is that the cultural turn in geography has ideologically swept aside economic determinism, Marxism and multiple variants of the two. Even though traditional economic geography may be an old-fashioned form of analysis, suggestions by Thrift and Olds (1996) are worth noting. Thrift and Olds (1996) argue economic geography is opening up new spaces of analysis in three ways: the use of multiple narratives that are relational rather than oppositional; a critical awareness of outside influences and alternative strategies; and the use of a new set of words or vocabulary that stretches the definition of economic geography in ways that would have been unacceptable to the academy twenty years ago.

McDowell suggests 'cultural geographers increasingly are turning to questions about the city and cultural life in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, to questions about identity, meaning and imagination (1994:152)'. Further, McDowell identifies three French cultural theorists, Lefebvre, Debord and de Certeau as important:

[their] work ... distinguishes between a scientific, rational view of space ... urban planning and conventional geographical analysis, and an idea of space as something that is experienced or imagined ... that is not possible to represent either in scientific discourse or in a set of social statistics (1995:153)

In a similar vein, Cosgrove has suggested 'that the advance in cultural geography ... signals a broader shift within the discipline' away from economics as an explanation of how society operates 'towards the recovery of an idea of human geography which is historical and contextual in explanation, localized in its objects of study and catholic in its embrace of the diverse motivations of human agency' (1989:566-7 original emphasis).

Drawing on the work of Daniels, Mitchell (1995) claims that the category culture has dissolved the categories of classical Marxism. New cultural geographers, according to Mitchell (1995), use the category culture to provide an explanation of social behaviour and resistance in the late twentieth century: this is because the categories of economics and politics could not wholly explain the ethos of modern life. Jackson, however, argues 'against 'culturist' explanations' ... [:] 'culture' cannot explain; it is a thing to be explained' (1995:572).

McDowell (1994) identifies two dominant types of 'new' cultural geographies: cultural materialism and the landscape school. Each will be summarised in turn. Cultural materialism critiqued the rise of mass consumption as an homogenising influence on social
life, a yearning for lost authenticity and the specificity of local places which led on to an analysis 'of the ways in which material artefacts are appropriated and their meanings transformed through oppositional social practices' (McDowell; 1994:158).

The landscape school 'recognised that material landscapes are not neutral but reflect power relations and dominant 'ways of seeing' the world' (McDowell; 1994:161). Lefebvre's and de Certeau's work, according to McDowell (1994) fits neatly into the landscape school paradigm.

According to Cosgrove the new cultural geography is historical in its subject matter; however, the very subject matter itself is 'now part of the postmodern world's celebration of historical pastiche' (1989:570). This dialectic is important: the production of historical cultural geographers who are studying the past created in the present is in turn increasingly reproducing historical cultural geographers who demand historical cultural analysis. Thus the academic division of labour is predicated not so much on throwing out economic analysis (or the diminishing number of economic geographers relative to cultural geographers) but by bringing an awareness to economic geography that economy and culture are mutually constitutive of the other.

Jackson has argued 'for a materialist approach to culture' (1996:572) and Duncan and Duncan argue that 'to turn away from economistic explanations is certainly not to reject economic or political analysis as invalid' (1996:576). Barnes suggests that economic geographical writings on post-fordism, labour markets and money have shown a marked 'interest in its cultural form, both internally as a production system and externally as one of the ingredients of a postmodern culture that shapes identity, consumption and the organization of space' (1995:427). Barnes goes on to argue that the framework of political economy is 'its ability to adapt, and to accommodate and to respond to criticism' (1995:428). It is a combination of the two perspectives outlined above that this thesis follows, drawing primarily on Marxian political economy laid down in David Harvey's *The Limits to Capital* and Lefebvre's *The Production of Space*.

Lefebvre's (1991) discourse on *The Production of Space* will be used to show how the everyday lives of people (local cultures) are erased from the dominant space of representation leaving only an objective historical geography of the present to view.
Lefebvre argues the political right have reduced the concept of production to a crude and brutal economism whose aim is to annex it for its own purposes. On the other hand, it must be said, in response to the left-wing or 'leftist' notion that words, dreams, texts and concepts labour and produce on their own account, that this leaves us with a curious image of labour without labourers, products without a production process or production without products, and works without creators (no 'subject' - and no 'object' either) (1991:72).

According to Lefebvre (1991) Marxist production attempted to transcend the classical opposition between subject and object. As Eagleton suggests:

Marxism could never see any real contradiction between the subject as autonomous and the subject as decentred; in fact each dimension could be grasped in terms of the other ... A self-determining human subject is ... someone who has been able to negotiate his or her freedom within those determinations set upon it both by nature, and by the right to self-determination of others. It is for this reason that all the ponderous chicken-and-egg arguments between 'humanists' and '(post)structuralists' about whether the subject or the structure came first, whether we fashion ourselves or have the job done for us ... are finally beside the point. For the autonomy of the human subject simply means that it is determined in such a style as to be able to react back upon those determinations and make something new and unpredictable out of its encounter with them. (1997:268-69).

Drawing on the work of Marx, Harvey (1996) argues that everything exists in the moment of production; not distribution, exchange or consumption. Production is not seen here as a homogeneous category because distribution, exchange and consumption are mutually constitutive processes that interact within the moment of production to create particular outcomes: that is, the maximum transformation that can be made of the social relations of the unity of production, distribution, exchange and consumption lies in the domain of production. It is important to realise that production per se does not cause change in the other entities of distribution, exchange and consumption: production is not an independent variable with all others as dependent variables.

According to Lefebvre (1991) Marx narrowed the concept of production to look at products only. In so doing, Lefebvre suggests 'works' are erased from the concept of production (1991:68). Works do not transcend the products that created them; however, the dialectical
movement of products and works produce social space in particular places and at particular times.

The existence of space cannot be separated from the social relations of its production - it is 'a product to be used ... it is also a means of production; networks of exchange and flows of raw materials and energy fashion space and are determined by it ... The forces of production ... (nature, technology, knowledge); structures (property relations); superstructures (institutions and the state itself)' (Lefebvre; 1991:85) all form single moments within the unity of production rather than acting as discrete entities that operate autonomously.

Producers of space, according to Kirsch (1995, drawing on the work of Lefebvre) can never fully control the multiple interpretations of space by other social actors. Social space is the product of negotiation and contest: that is it may be produced (conceived) within the dominant mode of representation but its actual use will be adapted or transformed by the meanings (perception) people put on those spaces and how those meanings are lived out by social actors (Kirsch; 1995). In this way, Lefebvre (1991) argues space is constituted through the triad of the conceived, perceived and lived experiences of society. It is through 'the body that space is perceived, lived - and produced' (Lefebvre; 1991:162). This space of the body cannot be defined in any sense by reducing it to objects but it does allow society to understand 'the transition from representational spaces to representations of space' (Lefebvre; 1991:163). Spaces, however, are never static and eternal; they may outlive their original purpose and hence be available for re-appropriation (Lefebvre; 1991).

Lefebvre (1991) has suggested that social space conceals its contents through a specific dialectic: the absence of meaning or the overload of meaning. It is impossible, Lefebvre (1991) argues to recover an exact representation of space that accurately reflects the lived experiences of everyday life. This space becomes an illusion that is beyond the gaze. When space is brought within the gaze it becomes fetishised along with everything that exists in that space into objects for consumption. The problem Lefebvre suggests is that fetishised space now contains 'users' who cannot recognize themselves within it, and a thought which cannot conceive of adopting a critical stance towards it' (1991:93).

The production of an historical space in the 1990s is produced from earlier social spaces but cannot be reduced to these earlier forms. The reason for this is that a new social space is created in the 1990s through the dialectical movement of products and works. Works are 'irreplaceable and unique' whereas products are 'reproduced exactly' through repetition.
This new historical space is created in the present for consumption in the present: at this level, social actors who both produce and are themselves produced through the production of an historical space in the 1990s are part of an authentic social experience. This idea is quite complex and will be developed in later chapters; however, Lefebvre's (1991) main argument is to show how the everyday lived experiences of people are erased from the dominant space of representation and is replaced by hegemonic representations of history.

Although this thesis borrows a great many ideas from Lefebvre's (1991) discourse on *The Production of Space*, it will be argued here that the historical space created in the 1990s is infused with critical historical narratives that both support and undermine hegemonic representations of history. It is the dialectical nature of the production and consumption of history that continually support and undermine each other that allows any historical narrative to be 'authentic'.

Merrifield has suggested that the publication of the English translation of *The Production of Space* has sparked a thorough reevaluation of social and spatial theory, to the degree that the great French maverick Marxist is now much in vogue within critical geographical circles (1995:294). In particular, Merrifield suggests that Lefebvre's use of language, especially the metaphor/metonymy dialectic 'has much in common with post-structuralism' ensuring that Lefebvre's discourse 'is perhaps the most cogent treatise to date of an anti-essentialist Marxism' (Merrifield;1995:299-300 original emphasis). This is interesting because Marxism has often been critiqued for essentialist overtones '[that make] the economy the essence of social life' (Graham;1990:54). Graham goes on to argue that both essentialist and non-essentialist language co-exists in Marxism and that these contradictions permeate both 'the work of Marx and ... the contributions of all later Marxists' (1990:54).

Harvey has argued that 'those who have the power to command and produce space possess a vital instrumentality for the reproduction and enhancement of their own power' (1987:265). Harvey uses Lefebvre's ideas to suggest that 'the spaces of representation ... have the potential not only to affect representation of space but also to act as a material productive force with respect to spatial practices' (1987:267). Harvey (1987) goes on to argue that the temporary resolution of this dialectic (space of representation/representation of space) can be situated in the material world within Bourdieu's concept of habitus where 'thoughts, perceptions, expressions, actions - whose limits are set by the historically and socially situated conditions of its production' (Bourdieu quoted in Harvey;1987:268).
Bourdieu's ideas will be taken up in chapter four where they will be used to show how the new middle class is constituted and how the new middle class is appropriating representational spaces of history to the exclusion of the working classes and ethnic minorities.

Sayer (1985) argues for an analysis of space using a realist methodological approach. In his argument Sayer (1985) suggests that space includes both necessary and contingent relations: necessary relations are where one object cannot exist independent of another object, whereas contingent relations are where objects can exist independent of the other. Further, space contains objects that 'possess casual powers and liabilities to do or suffer certain things by virtue of their structure and composition' (Sayer; 1985:50). These casual powers can be activated depending on the contingent nature of the objects and how they are arranged spatially (Sayer; 1985). Spatial outcomes are the concrete form of social relations that are manifest for the world to see: space does not exist independently of the objects that constitute it (Sayer; 1985); therefore, whenever a relationship between two objects is created, a class relationship is also created. Class relationships, therefore, are a constitutive element of the production of social space.

Lefebvre (1991) has argued that capitalism is unable to produce anything other than a capitalist space. Harvey's (1982) ideas in the Limits to Capital, however are based on the notion that the capitalist mode of production is dominant even when other modes of production co-exist with capitalism.

Residual elements of past modes, the seeds of future modes and imported elements from some contemporaneously existing mode may all be found within a particular social formation (Harvey; 1982:26).

These elements exist despite the efforts of capitalists to subvert all other modes of production to the capitalist mode of production. With regard to the consumption of history in western capitalist countries in the 1990s, this presupposes that many historical objects that have been appropriated for capitalists to sell may have been produced under different conditions of production and exchange. Drawing on the work of Emmanuel, Naidu (1991) argued this process produced conditions of unequal exchange between two producers operating in different regions. The idea of unequal exchange can be used with respect to history produced in under-developed countries. The history (transformed into heritage) of under-developed countries is 'exported' to developed countries for sale via tourism. Because
under-developed countries are generally areas of low wage labour (as these areas become incorporated into the capitalist world system) the price of the products of heritage produced for sale is reflected in the different cost of labour power in the abstract; hence, 'the products of the high-wage country are dearer and the products of the low-wage country cheaper than they would have been if wages were the same in the two countries' (Brewer quoted in Naidu (1991:9). This idea of unequal exchange has been criticized for its failure to differentiate production relations from exchange relations' (Naidu;1991:10). Overall, however, Short argues that there is a 'transfer of wealth' (1982:18) from under-developed regions to developed regions of the global economy.

For the purposes of this thesis, I wish to follow the line of reasoning that all modes of production embody some form of labour power in western capitalist countries and that capital uses existing forms of production to extract surplus value at the expense of one class over that of another; therefore, the production of history (as heritage) produced under different modes of production still represent the extraction of surplus value and the exploitation of labour power by capital, while at the same time giving rise to the opportunity for capital to circulate and expand.

Summary of the Chapters

Chapter two explores the idea of relational categories by promoting a dialectical method of analysis with respect to the production of value and the consumption of history. But as language is 'fundamentally problematic' in the postmodern epoch then it is quickly realised there can never be a singular universal one to one relationship between the signifier and the signified. Barnes and Curry argue that the move to postmodernism would appear to signal a change from an economic geography that is purely economic and behavioural in focus to one that includes an interest in culture and place; from a methodology that is authoritative and universalistic to one that is contextualist; and from a view in which language and meaning are unproblematic to one in which they are fundamentally problematic (1992:57).

Further, people live out their lives as narratives where they actively participate in their life story and so negotiate their experiences in a critical way. The everyday lives of people are
erased from dominant space through the use of the metaphor/metonymy dialectic. This dialectic is important with respect to how historical objects are juxtaposed in space in such a way that they can become meaningless bric-a-brac if coherent representations of history disappear. The fact that coherent representations of history do change over time is reflected in the changing status of museums and heritage sites and in the price of collectables and antiques.

It will be argued in chapter two that the consumption of history cannot be understood without reference to the production of identity in the postmodern epoch: identity is not just related to the economic sphere of work but also to the cultural sphere and to consumption practices. This is important because people both produce and consume their identity through work and leisure.

In this thesis it will be argued that the notion that capitalist countries have moved into a new epoch beyond the modern period is a contentious issue that has yet to be resolved. The categorisation is important, however, because it highlights nodal points of transformative activity: the outcome of a build-up of social, economic and political activity that may have been simmering for several decades. Value and identity are temporally and spatially specific: chapter three looks at how identity has adapted to particular circumstances throughout both the modern and the postmodern period.

Chapter four uses empirical examples to illustrate how value, identity and history are consumed. Consumption patterns cannot be understood without reference to the material world because it will be argued that identity and history and the values identity and history produce are transitory, hybrid and mobile. Further, objects and experiences of history will be consumed in ways that the producers of these objects and experiences do not expect.

The examples used will look at collecting during the Renaissance as a precursor to the cabinets of curiosity that appeared in the early modern period. It will be suggested that collecting during the Renaissance was as much part of capital formation as it was of identity formation. This then leads on to an analysis of the consumption patterns of the middle classes in England: the middle classes are both the precursor to and an outcome of the production of a capitalist modernist space.

In the 1990s the middle classes have brought about a new construction of nature and of culture. But it will be argued that the interaction of the middle classes with these new
constructions is not straightforward. Further, the history the middle classes consume is transformed into heritage and nostalgia. This is because history is created in the present as a dynamic living process whereas heritage is a way of halting the infinite regress of history; in the process producing a commodity that is available for exploitation by 'the market'.

Not all histories however, are available for exploitation by 'the market'; as a result, heritage sites will always occupy contested terrain. The examples used have been chosen to illustrate specific points: the Wagener Museum (New Zealand), the Museum of Science and Technology at Manchester (UK), Wigan Pier (UK), the Alamo (USA), Haw Par Villa and Tiger Balm Gardens (Singapore) and Strokestown Park (Ireland).

The Wagener museum at Houhora Heads in Northland New Zealand shows how a contemporary cabinet of curiosity can displace a localised history with a history of consumer sovereignty. It further shows how the metaphor/metonymy dialectic ensures ideological concepts are deployed. The Wagener Museum, as a postmodern museum, may act as a critical approach to history but the representations in the museum occupy more hegemonic space than the producers of the museum may wish to promote.

Bagnall's (1996) discussion of the Museum of Science and Technology (Manchester) and Wigan Pier (both in the UK) reveal a class bias in the type of visitor each site attracts. Further, it will be argued that education plays a mediating role in how each site is negotiated.

The discussion by De Oliver (1996) on the Alamo site in Texas USA shows that the Alamo site has been preserved as an inauthentic representation that has been physically altered and manipulated to represent Mexican American cultural and economic capital. The site is negotiated by both Latin American and Anglo Americans but in the discussion the Latin Americans are erased from social space by their absence from the discussion.

Local people are an important part of any sanitised version of history; often they will also accept a manufactured history. This idea is discussed using an example from Singapore (the disneyfication of Haw Par Villa). Further, tourists and non-tourists operate in a dialectical manner to produce successful tourist sites. A site must first be popular with local people before it begins to attract tourists. This is because tourists are more often than not looking for an authentic tourist experience; the only way a tourist experience can be perceived as authentic is for the tourist to get 'backstage' and become part of the everyday lives of people.
Further, heritage sites that use high tech entertainment concepts to sell or brand their heritage sites run the risk of becoming old-fashioned very quickly. High tech sites are less likely to attract local people to the site more than once; whereas heritage sites that are grounded in the lived experiences of the past are more likely to attract local people to continually want to return to the heritage site. It will be argued that a degree of authenticity and educational value is important to legitimate the heritage site for both the tourist and the non-tourist.

Johnson's (1996) discussion on Strokestown Park in Ireland is used to suggest that historical geographies can be consumed in a critical way because consumers use complex and multiple narratives to understand a heritage site. In contrast to the Alamo site, Strokestown Park has been designed by the owners as an overtly contested history. But no heritage site, contested or hegemonic, can ever completely recover the complexity of any history under examination. This is because any omission in the historical narrative will lead onto further omissions; as a result, the everyday lives of people in the past can never be completely recovered in the present.

The move to re-invent the city as a sanitised version of the past has been prevalent in industrialised countries in the 1990s: it is both a way to gain inward investment and 'as a device for engineering social consensus' (Philo & Kearns; 1993:4). The City of London (the square mile that encloses the present day financial district) is the final example of a heritage site in chapter four. The City of London has evolved out of the production of multiple social spaces over time. In this respect 'the city' is a work not a product; although, 'the city' does not transcend the products that helped to create it. As a work, 'the city' is a unique place created through social, political, economic and cultural institutions: these institutions have evolved over time since the Renaissance. In the 1990s, coalitions of social actors are using the rhetoric produced by and through these institutions as a means to preserve the built environment of 'the city'. Social actors treat 'the city's' institutions as eternal (for example the Bank of England and the Stock Exchange); whereas these institutions have adapted to changing economic and political circumstances over the centuries and in some instances have not remained physically in the same place (for example, the Bank of England was rehoused in Threadneedle Street in 1734).

As the old spatial matrix of the City of London was under attack in the 1980s (due to new technology and outdated social practices), coalitions of social actors sought to preserve 'the
city': the conservationists, the shopkeepers and the local government. It will be argued that even though the outcomes were the same, the reasons behind each of these groups was quite different.

The preservation of 'the city of the past' was centred on heritage: an homogeneous version of history. In point of fact, heritage sites selectively appropriate the past in the present; thus ideologically erasing those parts of the past as well as those parts of the present that do not fit the heritage image. Ideologically, the city as a heritage site, has been represented by the white middle class gaze and tends to overlook embedded consumption patterns of the working classes and other marginalised groups: for example, ethnic, gender and race.

In the chapters that follow, the collecting of objects and experiences of history will be shown as a form of social power and social comment. By taking a *longue durée* approach in this thesis, it will be argued that the contemporary interest in historical narratives is not a new phenomenon, nor is it a particularly different phenomenon. The production of historical objects and experiences is embedded within the production of an historical space in the 1990s; it is more than just a commodified object to sustain the capitalist accumulation cycle.
CHAPTER TWO

THE PRODUCTION OF VALUE, IDENTITY AND THE CONSUMPTION OF HISTORY: A DIALECTICAL DISCOURSE

Introduction: A Dialectical Method

The use of dialectical reasoning as a method of academic inquiry has a long history; however, this thesis turns to more recent uses of dialectical reasoning inspired in the first instance by David Harvey's appropriation of Marxian dialectics that Castree suggests is a predominantly 'systematic/epistemological' dialectical method that serves 'both as an explanatory-diagnostic tool and as a propaedeutic to further study' (1996:343). The use of an historical materialist inquiry will provide an explanation of social processes that act as a vehicle for transformative activity while at the same time 'be aware of the partiality and limitations of [the] theoretical arguments' (Castree;1996:346). Further, Harvey suggests the partiality of the researcher ensures that a dialectical inquiry will produce its own particular knowledge and that this knowledge will 'be supported or undermined by continuing processes of inquiry' (1996:55).

Dialectics however, 'is both non-linear and synchronic' (Castree;1996:347). Through a dialectical inquiry of theory and praxis specific moments within history can be articulated. This is not to imply that specific dialectics have been resolved for all time, only that they have been 'temporarily alienated' (Harvey;1996:56). As Harvey argues:

formal dialectical logic cannot, therefore, be presupposed as an ontological quality of nature: to do so would be to superimpose a particular mental logic on the world as an act of mind over matter. The dialectical unity of mental and material activities ... can never be broken, only attenuated or temporarily alienated (1996:56).

The problem arises however, that in order to understand the whole, it is necessary to start with a few simple categories and consider them individually; however, it is the interconnectedness of each category that makes up the whole. As a result, each category cannot
be explained totally until the whole is explained and vice versa. As Castree puts it, dialectics is

a logical development of a system of categories, from the most simple and indeterminate, to the most rich and concrete, by virtue of the contradictory imperatives of each successive form. The results are thus not contained in the premises because later categories are necessarily richer in content (or what Marx called 'determinations') than those which precede them (1996:351).

Moreover, if all fixed categories are contradictory (that is, have 'two or more internally related processes that are simultaneously supporting and undermining one another' (Ollman quoted in Harvey; 1996:52)) then it is necessary for the researcher to understand the contradictory processes and relationships that constitute the things under examination. Harvey (1996) does qualify this idea by suggesting that objects and things only internalise what is necessary for them to survive. There are no fixed boundaries to what can be internalised; it therefore becomes necessary to '[set] boundaries with respect to space, time, scale, and environment [which] then becomes a major strategic consideration in the development of concepts, abstractions and theories'(Harvey; 1996:53).

Following the dialectical method outlined above, the aim of this chapter is to show how value is produced under the capitalist mode of production and link this to the current interest in the consumption of history in the late twentieth century using the following categories: the use of language and the production of value in the postmodern epoch.

First, the use of language will be explored as the method upon which value is imposed on society. It will be argued that value is a slippery concept that cannot be examined outside of the dialectical process of metaphor and metonymy. Value under the capitalist mode of production will be shown as a bounded and constrained entity; however, value is often given volition as an ontological category in its own right by powerful groups within society. The concept value is often deployed as a hegemonic representation; however, value is also contested by the lived everyday experiences of people. Hegemonic representations of value can never stand for all time: value is geographically and historically mobile and in the late twentieth century takes on specific forms. Two of these forms is history represented as heritage and the past represented as nostalgia: categories that are made to appear as eternal truths but which are in fact negotiated in multiple and hybrid ways by different groups in society.
Second, the consumption of history has been argued as a postmodern phenomenon where the culture industry has commodified history in order to make a profit. It will be argued here that the consumption of history cannot be reduced to the economic workings of capital in the cultural realm (or the post modern epoch) as heritage and nostalgia, but like value is negotiated by consumers in ways that the producers of heritage and nostalgia do not necessarily intend. Whereas hegemonic representations of history may be reified or undermined by different groups in society, alternative histories will also suffer the same fate. What both types of 'history' (hegemonic/alternative) have in common is that they are partial, mediated and contested. It will be shown in this chapter, that history is not an eternal truth that stands for all time but a selective and partial representation of the past that is politically motivated by particular groups within society.

*History Defined!!!*

According to Merriman 'history is a dynamic process involving conflict and change' (1991:13): it is not a static view of the past. Using the work of Shanks and Tilley, Merriman suggests, museum displays act as 'props in an experience which is bought in the present' (1991:12). The category 'history' is produced in the present as an unproblematic entity but as Harvey argues 'The 'things' and systems which many researchers treat as irreducible and therefore unproblematic are seen in dialectical thought as internally contradictory by virtue of the multiple processes that constitute them' (1996:51). This is because, Harvey goes on to argue, that 'Elements or 'things' ... are constituted out of flows, processes and relations operating within bounded fields which constitute structured systems or wholes' (1996:50).

Harvey also argues that 'Dialectics forces us always to ask the question of every 'thing' or 'event' that we encounter: by what process was it constituted and how is it sustained?' (1996:50). Using Harvey's idea that every event is a process then history can be viewed as a process. It can be suggested that a history of the past is really a history of the present remembering the past (albeit selectively). This remembrance of the past will always be filtered and partial by those groups within society that have a vested interest in particular histories being articulated. Museums for example, homogenise history by removing artefacts from their historical context:

> objects, once with distinctive meanings in particular social systems ... thus
become static and removed from history ... A consequence of this static portrayal of the past ... is that the present, and the capitalist mode of thought, are made to appear inevitable, thus maintaining the social status quo (Merriman; 1991: 12-13).

Sherman & Rogoff (quoted in Johnson; 1996: 552) on the other hand argue that museums use 'contingent and variable' strategies to promote their particular histories. Not only do museums classify objects but they use these objects as some form of narrative of nation, local culture or class relationships. In so doing, a formal representation of history is articulated, drawing out an audience response which 'in turn [becomes] an integral part of the museums discourse' (Johnson drawing on Sherman & Rogoff; 1996: 558). In particular, Johnson (drawing on the work of Brett) suggests 'if readers are sufficiently clear on the premise underlying the ordering of a display or a narrative sequence, they will be able to arrive at their own critical conclusions' (1996: 552).

The consumers ability to negotiate 'history' critically while at the same time accepting hegemonic versions of history is a very important dialectic: one that will permeate this thesis. If history is fluid and changing then it is constantly being produced, reproduced and contested by social actors in capitalist countries. This raises the following question. How is history articulated in late twentieth century capitalism? In order to understand this process, the use of language in the postmodern epoch will be explored to explain how the production of value and the consumption of history are dialectically related.

The Use of Language in the (Post)Modern Epoch

Social discourse in the late twentieth century is '[increasingly concerned] with language and how it is used to produce meaning ... the production of social meanings is ... a necessary condition for the functioning of all social practices' (du Gay; 1996: 40). McDowell (1994: 163) puts this idea succinctly: 'all statements operate within a particular discourse, which defines or limits how we think about things'. Meaning and the use of language are mutually constitutive terms which are at all times contingent and historical (du Gay; 1996). Language is important to our understanding of the world and how we in turn are understood by others. As Rose suggests:

human beings do not just use language to recount their life to one another, they actually live out their lives as 'narratives'. We use the stories of the self that our culture makes available to us, with their scenarios of emotions, their repertoires
of motives, their cast-list of characters, to plan out our lives, to account for events and give them significance, to accord ourselves an identity as hero or victim, survivor or casualty within the plot of our own life, to shape our own conduct and understand that of others (1997:237).

As western capitalist countries approach the fin de siècle new and not so new questions emerge about social space and the social actors that inhabit social space (McDowell, 1994). One of the most important questions being promoted is the social construction of knowledge and the positionality of the researcher (McDowell, 1994). Moreover, there is a heightened awareness that culture plays a more important role than previously thought. Indeed, all categories are now seen a problematic in that they are constrained by the place and time in which they circulate.

The categorisation debate has also questioned our language and sign system. It has been argued the one to one relationship between the signifier and the signified has broken down (Jameson, 1984; Harvey, 1989; Lefebvre, 1991). The problem with this notion is that it leaves us with the idea that signs no longer exist, or if they do still exist then they are not grounded in the material world.

Language is fundamental to peoples ability to categorise and to classify. The scientific method of classification evolved from enlightenment reason in the eighteenth century where facts were divorced from values; however, language brings facts into being rather than the other way around (du Gay, 1996:40). The Cartesian way of thinking not only affected the classification of objects, but it also affected the classification of human subjects: the classification of a thinking human mind was a distinct and separate entity from the body or the senses (Wilson, 1993).

According to du Gay (1996) every person in society is embedded in some form of social practice; therefore, people will unconsciously pass value judgements on both objects and subjects alike. If people are constantly involved in creating value from facts then authority is not given from above - it is constituted through power relationships that attempt to make facts true or false (du Gay, 1996).

A further difficulty arises in the categorisation debate between the modernist and the postmodernist use of language. Although postmodernists have argued that language and signs are 'fundamentally problematic', they often employ modernist standards to critique the
modernist use of language (Barnes and Curry; 1992:58). The use of language is applied as a standard in the academic division of labour as a way of distinguishing modernists from postmodernists; however, to create two distinct polarised camps merely reinforces the academic division of labour rather than bringing about an enrichment of ideas that could be discussed on fertile middle ground.

According to Curry (1991:216-7), postmodernists employ authority figures such as Nietzsche and Wittgenstein to critique the modernist use of language. Wittgenstein, according to Curry (1991:217) critiqued the ontology 'in which language somehow 'hangs above' the world and when successful, mirrors it'. Under Wittgenstein's model, language exists at the level of everyday life where

the complex intersections of ways of speaking and acting create a groundwork against which one cannot simply change one's mind about this or that without compromising a range of other habits and customs (Curry; 1991:217).

One particular idea that has surfaced in the categorisation debate over language and meaning is the use of metaphor. While metaphors are a useful aid to explanation (Kirsch; 1995) they eventually fall apart because they cannot wholly constitute that which they are not, and in so doing tend to obscure that which they do not wish to illuminate.

The modernist view of metaphor is suggested by Barnes and Curry (1992:60) as being derived from Aristotle. This idea has been proposed in two ways: first, 'elements of one realm are being compared with elements from another' and second, metaphor is 'merely the substitution of one term for another' (Barnes & Curry; 1992:60). This second idea however, is a metonym rather than a metaphor.

Lefebvre (1991) argues that metaphors and metonyms are dialectically related. By following Nietzsche's interpretation of metaphor and metonymy, Lefebvre argues:

Words themselves go beyond ... the chaos of sense impressions and stimuli. When this chaos is replaced by an image, by an audible representation, by a word and then by a concept, it undergoes a metamorphosis. The words of spoken language are simply metaphors for things. The concept arise from an identification of things which are not identical - ie from metonymy (1991:138-39).
Further, Lefebvre suggests 'metaphorization and metonymization are defining characteristics of signs' (1991:140). Lefebvre (1991) also argues that signs ultimately destroy the signifying process through becoming embedded in objects; thus the subjective nature of signs or the signifying process is erased from view.

The sign has the power of destruction because it has the power of abstraction - and thus also the power to construct a new world different from nature's initial one (Lefebvre; 1991:135).

Conversely, Jameson (1984:71-2) has argued that in postmodern capitalism there has been a 'breakdown in the signifying chain'. Rather than seeing a break in the signifying chain, Lefebvre (1991:160) suggests spaces can become so overloaded with 'signs of well-being, happiness, style, art, riches, power, prosperity and so on - that not only is their primary meaning (that of profitability) effaced but that meaning disappears altogether'.

Whether there has been a break in the signifying chain or an overload of meaning in social space, that does not mean that spaces cease to signify anything at all: signification also operates at the level of everyday experiences of people. It is worth quoting Lefebvre at length here:

Architects ... link signs together, articulating them and conferring meaning upon them (arches, vaults, pillars and columns) ... spaces which first and foremost escape mortality: enduring, radiant, yet also inhabited by a specific local temporality. Architecture produces living bodies, each with its own distinctive traits. The animating principle of such a body, its presence, is neither visible nor legible as such, nor is it the object of any discourse, for it reproduces itself within those who use the space in question, within their lived experience. Of that experience the tourist, the passive spectator, can grasp but a pale shadow (1991:137).

According to McDowell social space is much more global in character where 'ethnicity, religion and life-chances, are linked through circuits of capital and global communications' (1994:165). As a consequence, social actors no longer identify exclusively with local places. Thrift suggests this process is 'contributing to class dealignment' where 'the service class tend to be particularly active in shaping the places in which they live in their image' (1987:231-32).
Social actors create signs in the very act of using social space. Signs are read in conjunction with a person's life narrative; hence the same space will mean different things to different people. Signs are codes, ways of doing things that are taken for granted. Signs are thus grounded in the material world of the object while the signifying process or the subjective nature of signs escapes from view.

The subjective nature of signs is a very slippery concept that cannot be articulated with any degree of certainty. As Eagleton has suggested, the subject,

cannot be represented within the system it grounds and so it slips through the net of language leaving the merest spectral trace of itself behind. A foundation cannot itself be found, without risk of infinite regress (1997:266).

The idea of infinite regress is important to the way in which social actors narrate history in the present. Chalmers explains that the concept of the

infinite regress of reasons ... dates back at least as far as Plato. If some statement is to be justified, then this will be done by appeal to other statements which constitute the evidence for it. But this gives rise to the problem of how the statements constituting the evidence are themselves to be justified. If we justify them by further appeal to more evidential statements then the problem repeats itself and will continue to repeat itself unless a way can be found to halt the infinite regress that threatens (1982:114).

According to Lefebvre 'every social space has a history' (1991:110) grounded in the material world of objects. Yet Lefebvre (1991) suggests this historical space plays havoc with traditional historiography: if social space is the outcome of past actions that have different time sequences then the linearity of history is necessarily suspect. As Lefebvre points out,

the space engendered by time is always actual and synchronic, and it always presents itself as of a piece; its component parts are bound together by internal links and connections themselves produced by time (1991:110).

The subjective nature of history 'cannot confer value upon itself (to borrow a phrase from Eagleton;1997:266) without recourse to the temporal realm as well as to those objects located in social space in particular places and at particular times. This is because,

at the very moment of its exuberant omnipotence, this strenuously mastering subject finds itself with its feet planted on nothing more solid than itself, and thus
endures diminishment of knowing that there is absolutely nothing outside itself to validate its existence... The subject, like the autonomous work of art, must now confer value upon itself, but it cannot therefore know whether this value is valuable, since it can have no criteria beyond itself by which to assess it (Eagleton; 1997:266).

Thus a subject needs an object to define itself and give it value; however, the subject cannot be reduced to its object without losing the freedom to be unrepresentable, fluid and changing. The metaphor/metonymy dialectic is important here. Things (objects) are substituted for relationships (subjects) and by using metaphors to describe particular objects rather than the relationships that constituted them these processes can be described in such a way that they become discrete, bounded and constrained entities that represent a coherent whole. All the while, the relationship itself disappears while the objects remain. Donato (quoted in Belk; 1995:39) for example suggests that museum displays are fictional history as a result of the metaphor/metonymy dialectic. This is because objects are so classified that they are spatially juxtaposed as fragments that represent a coherent knowledge of history: if this fiction disappears then all that remains is meaningless and valueless bric-a-brac that is 'fragments of objects which are incapable of substituting themselves metonymically for the original object or metaphorically for their representations' (Donato quoted in Belk; 1995:39).

This idea is somewhat problematic. The metaphor/metonymy dialectic ensures that history is displaced by heritage in for example modern and postmodern museums. These sites produce an object that represents history; a history that for the most part is inauthentic. On the other hand, the heritage site halts the infinite regress of history to produce an authentic but partial representation of history in the present (a topic that will be taken up in chapter four). These heritage sites are not internally homogeneous but have, to re-quote Ollman (in Harvey; 1996:52), 'two or more internally related processes that are simultaneously supporting and undermining one another'. If heritage sites produce an inauthentic yet coherent representation of history in the late twentieth century then how is this process enacted?

Heritage sites produce a coherent representation of history as much for economic as for cultural reasons. This dialectic is extremely important. Individual capitalists as well as multi-national corporations will seek profit as their primary goal. To do this capitalists may undermine labour power with technological innovation through the production of high tech entertainment centres. At the same time capitalists will attempt to make a profit out of an homogenised version of culture. Teo and Yeoh (1997) have suggested that many multi-
national corporations have attempted to interpret culture for social actors in capitalist
countries: especially tourists. But the dialectical movement of economy and culture ensures
that no cultural representation is ever completely represented as an homogeneous event ripe
for exploitation by multi-national capital.

Wernick argues conflicts 'are provoked all along the seam of economy and culture where the
market's lust for expansion rubs up against pre-existing forms of normativity and moral
value' (Wernick; 1984:22). This dialectic is played out in two ways: First, commodity
exchange can only happen when people are prepared to set 'the terms of trade [and] that
there be a social consensus over what is for trade and over the conditions under which (if at
all) that trade is allowed to take place' (Wernick; 1984:22-23 original emphasis). Second, all
groups within society have 'symbolic lines beyond which (temporarily at least) neither the
market nor its enemies are allowed to encroach' (Wernick; 1984:23). Moreover, 'From the
very beginnings of capitalist development the sphere of consumption ... has been especially
subject to the eruption of such conflicts' (Wernick; 1984:23). As Eagleton comments:

In the classical phase of capitalism, there was a space - call it culture,
consciousness, religion, the family, the aesthetic - where we were still just about
free, even if encircled on all sides by powers which laid siege to our liberty.
What has happened in consumerist, so-called postmodern capitalism is that these
... enclaves have themselves been steadily integrated into general commodity
production as art, culture, sexuality and (in the US at least) religion become
themselves forces in material production. Freedom must accordingly be
redefined as a sort of ceaseless mobility whose only enemy is that of limit; and
the buzz-word for this in our own day has been desire (1997:268).

This desire, according to Eagleton is that same subjectivity 'which resists all objectification
... a subjectivity without a subject' (1997:268). Desire is then invested in particular objects
at particular places in different times: as Ettema (quoted in Belk; 1995:137) suggests
museums 'reinforce the idea that goods are inherently beneficial because objects contain
desirable qualities'.
The Consumption of History in the (Post)Modern Epoch

Harvey has argued that a dialectical inquiry is a process that is constituted by opposites which 'in turn become particular nodal points for further patterns of transformative activity' (1996:54). Can the intersection of economy and culture be seen as a nodal point for the transformation of history into heritage and the past into nostalgia?

Merriman (1991) argues that when people lose faith in the future they tend towards re-reading the past as a way of understanding how they arrived at the present. As Jameson (1984) has suggested, social subjects in the postmodern epoch cannot represent their own current social experience in an active and coordinated way: it is therefore increasingly necessary for contemporary society to recreate the past in the present. Jameson argues this is because of a lack of some 'collective project' (1984:65) of modernism that allows a particular style to anchor social convictions and motives.

Because of this lack of style, the producers of culture use the past to imitate and ground the present. Jameson calls this the 'culture of the simulacrum' which is derived from Plato's conception of the 'simulacrum - the identical copy for which no original has ever existed' (1984:66). The past then becomes a commodity that has an exchange value while the memory of use value (especially of a more distant past) disappears leaving only a textual past as a reference point. The past can never be truly represented through the 'stylistic connotation ... of the image' (Jameson; 1984:67) because the representation of the past through intertextuality (the combining of several texts or several readings of the same text) allows 'the history of aesthetic styles [to displace] 'real' history' (Jameson; 1984:67).

On the other hand, Belk (1995) suggests history has been consumed in different ways since pre-modern times. In many respects the consumption of history is a chaotic category: it has to be broken down into specific histories and cannot be considered as a homogeneous whole. This underpins some important considerations - how, what, why, who and for whom are particular histories articulated and who/what is included or excluded.

Johnson (1996) argues that postmodernism is inadequate to explain the proliferation of heritage sites, especially when these sites are highly contested. Further, Prentice has suggested that the heritage industry produces a variety of products for consumption based 'not so much by our increased scientific knowledge but through an increased awareness of
change, a desire for conservation and a nostalgia for the past ... heritage has become a commercial 'product' to be marketed to customers seeking leisure and tourism experiences' (1993:49).

Bagnall (1996) argues that authenticity is important to legitimate the visit to a heritage site. Education provided by the site is also suggested by Bagnall (1996) as validating the history offered by a site. People however, desire information to be based on facts. This I would suggest is highly problematic because facts and values are dialectically related and it is only if there is a social consensus over the value of the history being articulated that allows the 'facts' to be legitimated. As Teo and Yeoh (1997) argue the (re)presentation of original artefacts that are grounded in material history (lived experiences of the past) is more likely to be used and accepted by the people who live in the local area.

Following McCrone et al. Bagnall (1996) suggests two ways of understanding heritage. First, through the physical appropriation of objects that possess certain values in the present. Second, these objects actively aid in the construction and maintenance of identities for the possessors of these objects: they also act as a vehicle for bringing the past into the present. For example, Belk (1995) has argued that collecting can be linked to wellbeing - the act of acquisition is a pleasant memory in itself over and above the association that the object has with our own more distant past.

The Production of Value, Identity and the Consumption of History: a Dialectical Discourse

New forms of everyday life are one of 'three main processes connected with consumption' in the postmodern epoch (Glennie and Thrift; 1992:423). Grosberg suggests 'everyday life is the province of the better off ... [it] is also routinized and in important senses mundane ... To offer the simplest example, there is real security and pleasure in knowing when and where and exactly for what (including brands) one will go shopping next' (quoted in Longhurst and Savage; 1996:292).

According to Longhurst and Savage (1996) everyday life has established, repetitive patterns that people recognise. This recognition of texts allows consumers to give repetitive patterns meaning (Longhurst & Savage; 1996:293). People will still engage in consumption patterns
which are consistent with their own life narrative even when these patterns may look inconsistent to outside observers (Longhurst & Savage; 1996). As Richins argues:

the development of an objects private meaning involves active processes in which meaning is 'cultivated' over time through repeated often purposeful interactions with the object ... the meanings of consumers' important possessions will embody or characterize their personal values and other aspects of self (Richins; 1994b:523).

Glennie and Thrift (1992) suggest emulation processes by the working classes of middle class consumption patterns fail to allow the working classes to formulate knowledge and desire for goods through their class context: that is the working classes would selectively appropriate consumption patterns from the middle classes and disregard others. Even so, as incomes rose for the working classes they would aspire to consume those goods that they desired first and foremost from their low-income context (Glennie & Thrift; 1992). du Gay (1996:89) has argued that although consumers are caught within the grid of production, they are not reduced to it. People will appropriate and reappropriate goods 'by establishing it as ones own' (du Gay; 1996:89). People will not necessarily assimilate symbols given from above uncontested.

Richins (1994) notes that people with high material aspirations are more likely to give value and identity in terms of monetary value or assets accumulated; people with low material aspirations are more likely to invest value in non-intrinsic items that are relationship based. Can this idea be linked to Longhurst and Savage's (1996:294) suggestion that there are two types of consumption patterns. First, there are those patterns directed towards impressing others and second, there are those patterns directed towards reassuring oneself.

In postmodern society there appears to be a 'blurring between the spheres of 'production' and 'consumption' ' (du Gay; 1996:76). According to du Gay (1996:79) work in contemporary society is now defined not as a constraint on freedom but the realm in which people represent, construct and confirm their identity as consumers. In this way, consumers seek 'to 'add value' to themselves' through both work and leisure (du Gay; 1996:79).

du Gay (1996:88) suggests that 'the relationship between production and consumption is one of dislocation' - that is it is constitutive and relational. Drawing on the work of de Certeau, du Gay (1996:89) argues that consumption is the other of production.
The subject of consumption does not manifest itself through its own 'autonomous' representations but in relation to ways of using representations and products 'from above'... Procedures of consumption do not simply map onto the spaces delineated by systems of production; rather, they trace 'indeterminate' trajectories that appear meaningless "since they do not cohere with the constructed, written and prefabricated space through which they move" (de Certeau quoted in du Gay; 1996:89).

Consumption, however, is not meaningless: it is fragmented, what is 'left over' and beyond the gaze of society (du Gay; 1990:90): the everyday life of consumers. What society sees is what is left - the object of the gaze while the subject of the gaze disappears (du Gay; 1996:90).

It is through this process that history and the past are transformed into heritage and nostalgia: that is 'the past is transformed from being the intrinsic local roots of a place to a palatable slice of nostalgia which fuels a robust 'heritage' and 'culture' industry in capitalist economies' (Teo & Yeoh; 1997:194). Heritage is produced by society to create specific identities. As Lowenthal argued, 'heritage distils the past into icons of identity' (quoted in Johnson; 1996:552) creating a bond with our earlier selves. Identity is always under construction so that it 'always moves into the future through a symbolic detour through the past' (Hall quoted in Bagnall; 1996:242).

Thus, identity is not a static entity. Identity is always a contested and contingent reality that is embedded in the situation at hand - it is not a separate capacity that people carry with them from one social situation to the next (du Gay; 1996). People's identity is also constrained within the space that it circulates (ie class relationships). This dialectic is very important because the recent upsurge in the twentieth century consumption of history can also be linked to the change in class structure. As Prentice argues 'membership of heritage and history organisations is strongly biased to non-manual households and within them to professional and managerial households' (1993:169).

This professional and managerial class, often referred to as the new middle class, is very heterogeneous in its make-up (production) and in its consumption patterns. Drawing on Glennie and Thrift (1992) discourse, consumption patterns will be formulated within class structures; hence new ways of consuming history by the new middle class will be found. If the new middle class is made up of both upwardly mobile and downwardly mobile groups
(see chapter four) then the consumption patterns of the new middle class will incorporate aspects of the old middle class culture as well as working class culture.

**Conclusion**

This chapter sets the scene for a dialectical discussion of the consumption of history as heritage sites. But history is also about the everyday lives of people that Lefebvre (1991) argues is erased by the dominant space of representation (the capitalist mode of production) and articulated by the dominant groups in society. One of these dominant groups is the new middle class who articulate a class based version of history based on their life narrative. Other histories still exist but they are ideologically erased from the space of representation. Further, alternative histories are articulated in subversive ways so that the dominant groups within society are constantly mediating a form of social consensus over what parts of history will be articulated and what will be left out.

It has been argued that history is created in the present through the use of language and meaning. Language is important because through its use language brings facts into being and gives them value through the use of other concepts such as scarcity, novelty, vanity, snobbery or exchange. Language does not hang above the world as a reflection of reality but is an active ingredient in the constitution of a value laden subjectivity; this is then transferred to objects that people collect, either publicly or privately. People not only collect objects that they can privately own such as antiques and memorabilia, but they also collect the experiences of public objects such as visiting museums and heritage sites.

The use of language allows people to construct for themselves an identity that is hybrid, multiple and transitory. Identities have been argued as being not fixed but is constantly adapting to the situation at hand. The recent upsurge in the consumption of new historical narratives reflects people's changing identities and a changing social consensus over what is an acceptable historical narrative. The capitalist mode of production has grafted itself onto these changing historical narratives: in some instances capitalists have pushed for a new version of history, in other instances capitalists have exercised some control over pre-existing historical narratives.
People will only accept certain types of history transformed into heritage and it is the dialectical interplay of the producers and the consumers of history that will ultimately decide whether it will be economically, politically and socially acceptable or not. To suggest that the new historical narratives that are emerging in the 1990's are operating outside the economic sphere is as reductionist as suggesting that heritage sites are created solely for profit by multi-national corporations, government agencies and private investors.

As western capitalist countries approach the fin de siecle, it could be suggested that there is a certain amount of nostalgia for the century in which modernity reached its peak. The move into the new millennium could signal the need for social actors to sum up the last one hundred years as if the year 2000 represents a radical rupture in the mode of representation. Indeed, Ley has argued that the last fin de siecle was a time of transition to a new age where social actors 'sought to redefine culture ... [where] there was still room for history and regional tradition, for spiritual and emotional expression ... [and] for decoration to take on authentic form' (1989:46). Drawing on the work of Giddens Taylor (1996:212) argues that during modernity 'tradition was confronted and often undermined but only for new traditions to be invented in new rounds of 'culture wars'.

Yet radical ruptures in the mode of representation do not necessarily imply a shift to a new epoch. As the year 2000 clicks over on our clocks and western capitalist countries leave the century of high modernity behind, then by default, the twenty-first century is implicated as the century of postmodernity. But just what is it that postmodernists are attempting to do? Dollimore makes one suggestion:

postmodernism ... competes to occupy the forward edge of our own contemporary moment, clamouring to announce a profound new insight into the recent moment, convinced that today all is radically changed, that something is radically new, while knowing that tomorrow it will all change again and anxious to be in on the diagnosis when it does. If I have a subtext, its simply that much postmodern theory desperately needs intellectual history (1997:252).

There is a sense in which postmodernists are treating the modern age in much the same way as the modernists treated traditional society: out with the old ideas; in with the new ideas. Is it that in postmodern capitalism, social actors are asking many of the same questions that have already been asked and thought to be resolved. Ultimately, there is nothing that can be resolved for all time; the contexts may change but the questions may remain the same.
As western capitalist countries leave the century of high modernity behind, it is easier to reflect on events that are foremost in people's collective memory. But events that culminated in the twentieth century often have their origins in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Many of the questions that were asked during early modernity are being re-articulated in the late twentieth century. These questions are of subtle importance in understanding why the representation of history and the past as heritage and nostalgia took the form that it did, both historically and geographically.

The producers of historical representations often draw on the persuasive power of collective memory and advertising to sell a unique event. First, we as individuals can lay claim to having been present at historical events that are already past like the first and second world wars. Second, we as individuals can be physically present at historical events that are still to come such as being physically present on the first land-mass in the world to see the dawn of the new millennium. Not only is space important but so too, is time.

The producers of history are not only selling an historical past but they are also selling an historical future. Social actors are buying their own future, not by getting rid of the past but by re-inventing the past in the present. To revisit Hall's (in Bagnall; 1996) idea, the creation of a person's identity in the future is always constructed symbolically from past events.

There is something particularly powerful about the idea of the year 2000; although once the physical presence of the day is gone it will most likely be 'business as usual'. It is important, therefore to not make too much of the idea of the fin de siecle as a radical rupture in the mode of representation that will signal the start of a new era. At the same time, however, the fin de siecle is worth noting as a time for western capitalist countries to take stock of where they have been and where they are going. At the risk of sounding trite, perhaps the time is right for western capitalist countries to clean up the 'junk' and to raise the 'garage sale' sign for the first Saturday in January 2000. The metaphor is as illuminating as it is contradictory.
CHAPTER THREE

THE PRODUCTION OF VALUE AND IDENTITY IN THE (POST)MODERN EPOCH

Introduction

This chapter looks at how value and identity are constituted in the (post)modern period and will relate this to the desire to consume history in some way. The prefix post is encased here in parentheses to alert the reader to the fact that it is not abundantly clear whether the modern period has finished; the result will be that postmodernity is articulated as a contentious issue that cannot be resolved within the scope of this thesis.

Following Harvey (1989) it will be argued that it was in reaction to the corporate/capitalist version of the enlightenment project that the countermovements of modernism can be found; however, it will be suggested here that postmodernism looks very much like modernism before it was suppressed by American hegemony. The countermovements of the 1960's are suggested as having sowed the seeds of (post)modernity that according to Harvey included:

- individualised self-realisation through a distinctive 'new left' politics,
- through the embrace of anti-authoritarian gestures, iconoclastic habits (in music, dress, language and lifestyle)

As western capitalist countries approach the fin de siècle and leave behind the century in which modernity had its peak, the questions that are being asked have some resonance with questions that were being posited during early modernity. Questions of identity and value in the postmodern epoch are being articulated within vernacular styles. It is ironic then, that within western capitalist countries many of the vernacular styles of the Renaissance and early modernity that had become fixed in physical space would be used to articulate a coherent representation of modern life: a coherence that was epitomised in the enlightenment project of the eighteenth century. Although the enlightenment project always operated within contested terrain, for many people their everyday lives enabled them to live in a world in which they implicitly understood who they were both in relation to others and in relation to themselves. The enlightenment project of the eighteenth century reached its peak in early
part of the twentieth century, only to symbolically end in the early 1970s (Harvey:1989); yet to articulate such a grand sweep of history in a few short phrases implies a coherence to modernity that was always contested. This chapter selectively discusses some of the questions that were posited during the early modern era as a prelude to similar questions being asked in the postmodern era.

*The Construction of Identity and Value in the Renaissance and the Early Modern Period*

Burke argues that identity during the Renaissance was more concerned with the 'collective or institutional rather than individual' (1997:26) self. This is not to say that there was not a heightened awareness of the self, only that identity was constrained by the space in which that identity circulated. As a result, Burke also suggests that portraits for example were painted where the 'sitters were surrounded' by icons of social status such as 'robes, crowns, swords, columns [and] curtains' and that these paintings were often 'hung in groups [according to] a particular family or holders of particular social offices (Bishops, Doges and so on)' (1997:26).

Burke suggests that during the Renaissance 'the presentation of self' (1997:19) to others became extremely important. In particular, 'material culture was, and is an important vehicle for expressing views of the self' (Burke;1997:24). This resulted in an increase in biographies, memoirs, plays, novels and portraits being produced that reproduced particular identities to the world (Burke;1997). From the sixteenth century onwards in Europe, urbanisation, travel and print were dominant features of the modern age (Burke;1997): it was also the age of the mirror.

The technology of the mirror, perfected and marketed in Venice in the early sixteenth century first enabled people to reflect on a whole picture of themselves. By contrast, before the sixteenth century, blown glass mirrors magnified what was near their surface and this made it difficult for people to see their whole appearance. In all of this, there was an enrichment of the sense of self (Smith;1997:53).

By the seventeenth century, however 'Rene Descartes ... [had] established mechanist ways of thought about nature, the explanation of nature by matter and motion and then began to apply such thought to what we hold human' (Smith;1997:49). According to Levins and Lewontin 'Cartesian thought [is] an 'alienated' form of reasoning because it depicts a world
in which "parts become separated from wholes and reified as things in themselves, causes separated from effects, subjects separated from objects" (quoted in Harvey;1996:61).

Wilson elaborates this point:

Descartes claims that simple ideas fall into three general classes: simple ideas of the body (extension, figure and motion), simple ideas of spirit (thinking, doubt, volition), and ideas which apply to both body and spirit, such as existence, unity and duration ... The classification ... already implicitly assume the fundamental ontological distinction ... between the physical or material world ('body') on the one hand and the thinking human mind on the other hand ... Animals and even the human body are only machines ... but human beings, unlike animals, have minds as well as bodies ... As the seat of reason, consciousness, and purpose, the mind can be guided and trained by the rules of Cartesian method to uncover the mechanical laws that govern the physical world, including its own body ... reason can and should function independently of the senses' (1993:x-xi).

According to Taylor 'Descartes is particularly important ... because his new philosophy showed how the materialism of making money could be made compatible with Christianity ...[this] allowed Europe to keep its God while it unmade and remade its material world at will' (1996:110).

Smith also suggests a similar view: 'Descartes himself remained sincerely committed to the existence of the soul, a rational and immortal principle' (1997:49). This idea of the soul was not inconsistent in the seventeenth century: the philosophers of the day (Descartes included) understood their work, and were in turn understood by others, in theological terms.

Identity, or the sense of self, that became prevalent in the seventeenth century was according to Smith not fixed, but had evolved out of a long term historical process; however, it was in the seventeenth century, that 'modern people [became] preoccupied by personal feelings, personal wealth, personal fulfilment, personal health, personal privacy and much else 'personal' besides' (1997:49).

Sawday (1997) also argues that the seventeenth century witnessed a new vision of the body. On the one hand, science was used to describe the outward appearance of the body, while on the other hand, religion was used to explain the inward appearance of the body. Artists of the seventeenth century explored both the aesthetic and the scientific study of corporeality, especially in Italy, Holland and England: they collected the dissected limbs of
human bodies for observation and use in the same way the artists of previous generations had done so in secret (Sawday; 1997).

Sawday (1997) goes on to suggest the goal of the seventeenth century modern artist was to master the process by which embodiment would be rendered in their painting. Embodiment and selfhood operate as relational categories in the seventeenth century and the tension between these categories brought about the emergence of the science of autopsia 'seeing for oneself' and the modern idea of corporeality (Sawday; 1997:36).

Increasingly, as the seventeenth century drew to a close, a singular truth was sought through science and mathematics rather than through religion (Harvey; 1989); although, Shaw argues that in the seventeenth century 'there was no particular antagonism ... between religion and science' (1997:64). In particular, philosophers and theologians developed scientific knowledge in Protestant countries: for example, it was the clerics who developed the 'scientific revolution' in England (Shaw; 1997:64). Taylor suggests that 'by the end of the 17th century ... science was released from religious restrictions to become the great manipulator of the natural world in the search for new commodities' (1996:110).

The Enlightenment Project (18-20th Century)

According to Taylor (1996:128) the idea of progress first makes its appearance during the enlightenment of the eighteenth century but 'appears implicitly throughout much of the intellectual ferment of ideas that marked the 17th century'. This is because a break with the past needs a 'period of time [for] ... intellectuals to come to terms with the new phenomenon of incessant social change that challenged the concepts they inherited from the classical world and Christianity' (Taylor; 1996:128). To this end the Royal Society was founded in 1662 as a means for gentlemen scholars to meet and discuss philosophical issues of the day and have them published 'in the Philosophical Transactions which were first issued in 1665' (Shaw; 1997:67 original emphasis).

With so many events being debated in public by people from all walks of life, the Royal Society set about ensuring guide-lines for claims to be established as knowledge.

Prominent among these technologies were the performance of experiments in a
public space (the scientists lab rather than the alchemists closet), the testimony of witnesses present at those public events and the means of ensuring that these witnesses were reliable (that is, were of the right educational and social rank, and the right gender), and the development of clear scientific prose for describing those events for people not present (virtual witnessing) (Shaw, 1997:69).

Harvey argues 'the project of modernity came into focus in the eighteenth century' (1989:12 original emphasis). As Taylor suggests:

the enlightenment was a European-wide intellectual movement of the 18th century centred in France. The goal ... to construct an 'age of reason' to challenge the absurdities and irrationality of the ancien regime (1996:131).

According to Tomaselli (1997) enlightened individuals lived in an age of luxury, consumption and commerce. Excess in all things was derided while simple elegance prevailed as the ethos of the age. Eighteenth century critics however, realised that modernity was its own antithesis:

thus it was regarded as an age marked by ever greater material inequality, moral and sexual depravity, and the shameless pursuit of the lowest forms of gratification. It was the triumph of the appetites over reason, licentiousness over liberty, of earthliness over spirituality. Never had man [sic] been so alienated from his true self and destiny, from other men and indeed from nature ... Never had either sexes been so taken in by the realm of shadows and appearances, including the greatest delusion of all, namely that theirs was a uniquely civilised age (Tomaselli, 1997:87).

The result of this alienation of people both from their selves and others has lead Tomaselli to argue that peoples 'highest ambition was to acquire and display' (1997:87). Hundert suggests that people 'behaved according to ... conventions of propriety, not because of their moral content but in the expectation that such behaviour would win the approbation of others' (1997:74). During the eighteenth century West European society increasingly became secularised (especially in the Protestant commercial centres of Europe) where 'publicly proclaimed standards of propriety paid mere lip service to ... Christian or antique ideals' (Hundert, 1997:75). Further, a persons identity was built on their outward display of wealth. As a result 'in commercial society, where social standing and public identity so intensely depended upon the opinion of others, one's moral autonomy threatened always to be compromised' (Hundert, 1997:81).
Artists and philosophers represented an avant-garde political group in Western Europe in the eighteenth century that contested the Capitalist Mode of Production through art and literature (Harvey; 1989). According to Belk,

the avant-garde, born of the French Revolution and steeped in romantic revolutionary political fervour, is dedicated to upsetting the status quo, bringing down the elite, and challenging traditional symbols of power ... For this first generation of avant-garde visual artists it was the everyday and the simple that most challenged the canons of the academy and the elite ... avant-gardism was also opposed to capitalism and embraced, at least ostensibly, the model of the artist starving in the garret (1995:111).

Even so, the cultural avant-garde were still constrained by the Capitalist Mode of Production and in many instances co-opted into, politicised by, taken over and trapped within the dominant order. As Harvey suggests:

aesthetic judgement ... could just as easily lead to the right as to the left of the political spectrum ... the individual artist could contest [political processes], embrace them, try to dominate them, or simply swim with them, but the artist could never ignore them. The effect of any one of these positionings was, of course, to alter the way cultural producers thought about the flux and change as well as the political terms in which they represented the eternal and the immutable (1989:20).

One of the reasons modernist art and literature is implicated in the Capitalist Mode of Production is because artists themselves have to make a living: art became a commodity like everything else in the cultural system that can be bought and sold (Harvey; 1989).

Smith (1997) also suggests philosophers such as Montaigne and Descartes relied on either private wealth or patronage to continue their work. This is because the use of capital from the seventeenth century onwards generated enough wealth to be used to support art, scholarship and moral philosophy. As a result, individuals (mainly the elite) used their economic power to display themselves to the world, through the purchase of art and the patronage of artists, in both intellectual learning as well as dress and material trappings (Smith; 1997).

A tension existed in the eighteenth century between extreme confidence in the enlightenment project and extreme despondency together with nostalgia for antiquity both in moral outlook
and in identification of ancient figures (Tomaselli; 1997). Tomaselli, drawing on the work of Locke, argues the identity of a person or self requires consciousness where 'memory and the appropriation of past actions remembered provided the link with the past' (1997:90). The Classics were still studied in schools and by privately educated children, and were to be found in architecture and paintings and most other aesthetic representations: 'the ancients were read, studied and imitated in art, while political theorists were for the most part agreed that the small ancient republic animated by the spirit of civic virtue and liberty ... was unrealisable in the modern world' (Tomaselli; 1997:92).

Taylor (1996:128) suggests pre-modern 'societies were unhistorical in the sense that they had no conception of a social continuity linking past with the present in order to contemplate the future ... Time was seen as a natural cycle, and hope in the future consisted of a return to 'the golden age'. Conversely, modernist philosophy according to Harvey belonged to the present:

modernity can have no respect even for its own past, let alone that of any premodern social order. The transitoriness of things makes it difficult to preserve any sense of historical continuity. If there is any meaning to history, then that meaning has to be discovered and defined from within the maelstrom of change (1989:11).

Yet the horrors of the industrial age led the cultural producers of modernity to seek refuge in a 'pastoral golden age ... for traditional and deep seated communities' the family, craft production 'and for the sense of the unique' (Merriman; 1991:11).

By the eighteenth century, however, West European society was becoming more secularised with 'empiricism as the predominant epistemological theory' of the day Tomaselli; 1997:89). As Harvey suggests:

the enlightenment project [of the eighteenth century] ... took it as axiomatic that there was only one possible answer to any question. From this it followed that the world could be controlled and rationally ordered if we could only picture and represent it rightly. But this presumed that there existed a single correct mode of representation which, if we could uncover it (and this was what scientific and mathematic endeavours were all about) would provide the means to Enlightenment ends (1989:27).
Following Lefebvre it will be argued that there is a 'dual aspect [to the modern world] - capitalism [and] modernity (1991:123)'. This dual aspect creates particular socio-economic outcomes that Lefebvre argues were epitomised in the project of the Bauhaus.

Gailson argues that the Bauhaus project was 'to use scientific principles to combine primitive color relations and basic geometrical forms to eliminate the decorative and create a new antiaesthetic aesthetic that would prize functionality' (quoted in Gregory;1994:394). The Bauhaus were despised by 'the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich' to such an extent that the third Reich 'in fact closed their school in 1933' (Gregory;1994:395).

The irony of the Bauhaus project was that Hitler's Germany used 'modernist techniques and put them to nationalist ends' (Harvey;1989:33): the Bauhaus architectural designs of buildings as machines for living in were reproduced 'in their construction of the death camps' (Harvey;1989:33). As Harvey argues:

> it proved possible to combine up-to-date scientific engineering practices, as incorporated in the most extreme forms of technical bureaucratic and machine rationality with a myth of Aryan superiority and the blood and soil of the fatherland. It was exactly in this way that a virulent form of 'reactionary modernism' came to have the purchase it did in Nazi Germany, suggesting that this whole episode while modernist in certain senses, owed more to the weakness of Enlightenment thought than it did to any dialectical reversal or progression to a 'natural' conclusion (1989:33).

The Bauhaus project was a vehicle for the Capitalist Mode of Production to erase from dominant space any subjectivity, retaining only the object of the gaze to view. The object of the gaze was the machine: the metaphor of a machine age was used in such a way that people became identified (and valued) as machine-like. People's lives were reduced to a representation of the industrial assembly production line: life for West European people under this model was understood as ordered, controlled and efficient.

But metaphors of the machine (like all metaphors discussed in the previous chapter) break down because social subjects ultimately cannot be ordered and controlled. People negotiate social situations in multiple and hybrid ways; as a result, the metaphor of the machine was under attack by West European society even as it was perpetrated as the myth of modernity. As Harvey suggests:

> there were strong objections even within modernism ... to the idea that the
machine, the factory, and the rationalised city provide a sufficiently rich conception to define the eternal qualities of modern life (1989:32).

Modernity and Hegemony

According to Taylor (1996:4) 'the word 'modern' was coined in the 17th century to describe the new Europe and came to be applied to other regions as they were transformed through incorporation into Europe's spheres of activity'. Furthermore, Taylor (1996:41) following Berman argues that there are 'three main phases of modernity ... in the 17th century a Cartesian world was devised with 'man' at the centre, the 19th century was the high mark of change interpreted as human progress and in our century the idea of change has been globalised and repackaged as 'development' in modernisation theory' (Taylor; 1996:41). Taylor (1996) goes on to suggest these three phases coincide with the three hegemons of modernity: the Dutch in the seventeenth century, the British in the nineteenth century and the Americans in the twentieth century. Within each hegemonic phase the hegemons produced a particularly localised modernity that was to be emulated by the rest of the world (Taylor; 1996).

Taylor (1996:133) argues that 'it was the British that gave the idea of progress its decisive subject, the new industrial world: ... 'the logic of industrialism' became generally viewed as the means to raise societies to "a higher plane" ' (Kumar quoted in Taylor; 1996:133). In particular, history was encapsulated within the metaphor of progress as the 'British Whig School of History ...[to create] a universal history' (Taylor; 1996:135-136). In this way, the 'historical imagination consisted of "the march of history as an unending progress towards liberty" with Britain at the end of the march' (Carr quoted in Taylor; 1996:136).

du Gay (1996:75) argues that during the industrial age, people made sense of their daily lives by determining their identity through work (the alienated worker) who contrasted their public lives (work) with that of their private lives (the domestic, consumption and leisure). For example, Harvey argues:

the value of labour power ... is set ... by the value of commodities necessary to maintain and reproduce labouring individuals in their 'normal state' ... As holders of money, labourers are free to buy as they please, and they have to be treated as consumers with autonomous tastes and preferences ... [however] the illusion of
free choice in the market plays an important ideological role. It provides fertile soil for theories of consumer sovereignty as well as for that particular interpretation of poverty that puts the blame fairly and squarely upon the victim for failure to budget for survival properly (1982:46-47).

Harvey suggests 1848 was a strategic date when a general 'loss of faith in the ineluctability of progress and ... the growing unease with the categorical fixity of Enlightenment thought' (1989:28-29) brought about a change in West European people's attitudes and in aesthetic production in particular; however, it was to take another seventy years until the outbreak of World War One for a major crisis in representation to manifest itself. Between 1848 and 1914 'modernism, in short, took on multiple perspectivism and relativism as its epistemology for revealing what it still took to be the true nature of a unified, though complex, underlying reality' (Harvey; 1989:30); however, in 1914 'modernist subjectivity ... was simply unable to cope with the crisis into which Europe in 1914 was plunged' (Taylor quoted in Harvey; 1989:30). This suggests the 'subject' was in crisis; however, as Dollimore points out the individual subject has always been in crisis:

what we might now call the neurosis, anxiety and alienation associated with the subject in crisis are not so much a consequence of its recent breakdown as the very stuff of its creation, and of the culture - West European culture - which it sustains (1997:254).

United States hegemony came of age after World War Two and ensured a different regulatory order under the United Nations and the Bretton Woods Agreement: it also incorporated anything from the modern period that had been rejected by Fascism and Nazism (Harvey;1989). In particular, the USA tried to de-politicise modernity. According to Taylor 'modernity was redefined ... as the good life attainable by everybody in ... 'affluent society' this term was soon superseded by the phrase 'consumer society' (1996:126). Further, Taylor goes on to argue that Americanisation 'has been a bottom up process of modernisation both in class terms and generationally ... That is the message of Coca-cola, Macdonald's and Levis the world over' (1996:127). As Harvey suggests 'what was distinctly American had to be celebrated as the essence of Western culture' (1989:37).

According to Harvey 'the modernism that resulted [after 1945] was ... 'positivistic, technocratic and rationalistic' at the same time as it was imposed as the work of an elite avant-garde of planners, artists, architects, critics and other guardians of high taste' (1989:25). The USA as hegemon turned international modernism to their advantage, not
because of its socialist overtones, but because it had been rejected by the fascists in the 1930s. The US congress used this ideology in the 1950s as a way to counter communism (Harvey; 1989). According to Taylor this 'anti-ideology position' (1995:115) enshrined freedom and liberty where communism was coded as unfree. As Taylor argues, hegemons [develop] politics which define themselves in opposition to 'unfree others'. It is this hegemonic self-identity as free societies that is projected onto the rest of the world as an image of multiple free societies to generate liberal ideologies (1996:105).

The USA as hegemon hoped to neutralise the cultural producers of modernity by having them express the liberal ideology of the USA. Harvey argues this was a form of 'cultural imperialism' (1989:37). Liberalism in post World War Two USA, according to Taylor (1996) was a very pragmatic affair. The US domestic 'new deal' programme instituted in 1933 to help in the recovery of the US economy from the effects of the worldwide depression was internationalised after 1945 as a new deal for the world based on American corporatism and anti-communist ideology that was to become enshrined in cold war politics. This 'narrow form of universal ideology' (Taylor; 1996:114) was exported to Western Europe and parts of Asia via the Marshall Plan, thus ensuring American corporations benefited from the reconstruction of Europe and Asia (Taylor; 1996).

*The Production of Value and Identity in (Post)Modernity*

Featherstone suggests many of the art features of modernism have been 'appropriated into various definitions of postmodernity' (1988:202). Further, Featherstone suggests:

The basic features of modernism can be summarised as an aesthetic self-consciousness and reflexiveness, a rejection of narrative structure in favour of simultaneity and montage; an exploration of the paradoxical, ambiguous and uncertain open-ended nature of reality; and a rejection of the notion of an integrated personality in favour of an emphasis upon the destructured, dehumanized subject (1988:202).

The search for authenticity and 'the real' as opposed to the reproduced is as much a modern condition as it is a (post)modern one. The problem arises then, as to how does one define (post)modernity. According to Featherstone,
the prefix 'post' signifies that which comes after, a break or rupture with the modern which is defined in counterdistinction to it. Yet the term 'postmodernism' is more strongly based on a negation of the modern (1988:197).

Drawing on the Rose's discussion on architecture, it is too easy, Featherstone suggests to 'import' into philosophy and social theory ... an over-simple periodization of twentieth century as modernist and post-sixties as postmodernist' (1988:211). Moreover,

those who welcome postmodernism as a mode of critical analysis ... are essentially flawed efforts to totalise and systemize ... they are authoritarian grand narratives which are ripe for playful deconstruction (Featherstone; 1988:204-5).

Harvey argues that postmodernity did 'not [occur] in a social, economic or political vacuum ... Its rootedness in daily life is one of its most patently transparent features' (1989:63). This idea of daily life is important with respect to how history is consumed in the 1990s. As Ley argues 'postmodern space aims to be historically specific, rooted in cultural, often vernacular, style conventions, and often unpredictable in the relation of parts to the whole' (1989:53).

History is not impartial: it is impossible to access all the historical material that is available as well as that which has not yet come to light. Any detail that is left out of a complete history would lead onto further omissions: history then becomes an incoherent category (Belk; 1995). If postmodern space aims to be historically specific than postmodernism, like history per se becomes an incoherent category.

Taylor suggests postmodernism 'is merely a 'phase' in the development of high culture in the modern world-system ... 'post-traditional' is a preferable descriptor of this situation ...[where] traditions have been profoundly altered by the contemporary context in which they are forced to operate' (1996:211). Taylor goes on to suggest that it is ordinary, modern people 'who are defining new social limits' and not the 'experts' who derive their knowledge and authority from professionalisation and educational qualifications (1996:212).

In the modern epoch culture was always theorised as being outside of the economic workings of capitalism, not a constitutive element of it (Jameson; 1984). Jameson (1984) argues that post-modernity is the cultural logic of late capitalism - that culture is dominant in
capitalist society: Multi-National Corporations have commodified culture to such an extent that the semi-autonomy of culture has been destroyed by late capitalism. Teo and Yeoh (1997) suggest that Multi-National Corporations attempt to interpret heritage for the consumers as an accurate representation of the past. In point of fact, 'relics and events of the past [are] selectively ... used [within] contemporary activities' (Ashworth & Tunbridge quoted in Teo & Yeoh;1997:194).

Thrift (1994b:222) suggests Jameson's view ignores consumers being able to use commodities in ways that producers did not dictate, by actively negotiating meanings for objects and services. Harvey (1989) on the other hand also suggests that post-modernity is a vehicle for the Capitalist Mode of Production to re-invent itself. There are, he suggests, two avenues to look at this. First, that in the 1960's the post-modernist movement set out to satisfy repressed desires in the commodity form; and secondly, that in order to sustain capitalist markets, the culture industry has '[produced] desire and so titillate individual sensibilities' (Harvey;1989:63). In this way, a new aesthetic is created, over and above traditional forms of high culture.

Social subjects both produce and consume their own identity in such a way that allows that same identity to be reproduced in the contemporary moment. As a result, people consume history as part of their identity construction; not because they are passive receptors of hegemonic representations of the past but because they actively negotiate images of the past in their everyday lives. The past exists within the present moment for people as a living memory and these living memories are then reproduced by people through such activities as visiting museums and heritage sites or collecting antiques and memorabilia.

History is given value by consumers through the consumption process and cannot be reduced to orthodox economic theories and right wing market politics. This is not to imply that historical objects do not have a price, but that price is arrived at in a much more subjective way than orthodox economic theory would suggest. People consume objects of history according to their life narrative: as Burke suggests of the sixteenth century there was not an inexplicable change in 'spirit' but a chain reaction, in which certain texts awoke or restructured perceptions of the self, while these perceptions in turn created a demand for texts of this kind (1997:27).
Perhaps a similar chain reaction is taking place toward the close of the twentieth century where people consume history and the past as part of a chain reaction associated with, but not reduced to, the production of heritage and nostalgia.

Conclusion

Identity construction and the values (aesthetic/intrinsic) embodied in material goods is an ongoing process as part of the ethos of modern life. Further, this process affects the way people give value to objects and subjects alike in their daily lives: hence a person's sense of history is affected by the identity/value dialectic. This is a process that started in the Renaissance but did not manifest itself until the seventeenth century. By the eighteenth century, however, identity and value were becoming constrained by the prevailing scientific programmes of the day. The outcome of these constraints were crises in the mode of representation and production that were manifested throughout European modernist history: people contested both the mode of representation and production by transforming material objects from an alienable to and inalienable condition; thus restoring the subject and object as relational categories.

Even though antiques, memorabilia, heritage sites and museums all aid in the construction of a subjective self, this subjective self and the historical object that embodies the subject are mutually constitutive of each other. In order to understand the subjective nature of historical objects, the researcher needs to separate the object from its subject. This sounds very much like reductionism but as Lefebvre (1991) argues all scientific theories start out being reductionist. Harvey has argued that 'Cartesian thinking has a hard time coping with change and process except in terms of comparative statics, cause and effect feedback loops, or the linearities built into examination of experimentally determined and mechanically specified rates of change (as represented in differential calculus)' (1996:62). As a result, this thesis reduces history and the past to heritage and nostalgia in the full knowledge that this is only a partial representation of the world. This topic will be taken up more fully in the next chapter.

Once the objects of history are under examination it will then be necessary to bring back the subjective self in the form of the lived everyday lives of people. In this thesis this will be done through the example of the City of London as a heritage site; how the site embodies
both the past and the present on a collision course with the future. The historical geography of the City of London as a heritage site is about the present; it is actively negotiated by social subjects who live and work in the local environment. How the City of London is negotiated by people will depend on class contexts and the coalitions between different classes as how to best utilise the built environment of the City in the present.

When the world appears to be moving forward in what appears to be a coherent project, it has been suggested that people tend to disregard the past as only having meaning through influencing the future. But for those people within society who cannot negotiate the 'maelstrom of change' to borrow a phrase from Harvey (1989), every age produces a yearning for some sort of golden age: classical Greece, Rome, the Renaissance, the Victorian and Edwardian age. These 'golden ages' become spatially juxtaposed in the present and are recombined in an intertextual simulacrum. This combination of golden ages becomes divorced from real history because the social and political relationships that existed in these previous epochs is forgotten while the objects of these epochs (monuments, buildings and memorabilia) are exposed to twentieth century consumption.

The next chapter attempts to show that this quest for golden ages still exists in capitalist societies. But as the examples in the next chapter will highlight, the historical dialogue presented in each country is place specific; hence, while there are some common themes that link the commodification of history as heritage as a homogeneous global event ripe for exploitation by multinational corporations, the interaction of multinational capital with the everyday lives of consumers will ensure that even representations of history will be more heterogeneous than the producers of history expect.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE CONSUMPTION OF VALUE, IDENTITY AND HISTORY: A DIALECTIC FOR (POST)MODERN TIMES

Introduction

This chapter selectively looks at consumption patterns in Europe based on Glennie and Thrift's (1992) argument that there were changes in consumption patterns in Britain at the beginning of the eighteenth century. These consumption patterns emerged through a long term historical process extending back to the beginning of the Renaissance. It will be further argued that people's identity in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was based on what they consumed as much as on what they produced. These identities were then reproduced for wider society.

Part of the consumption process includes the consumption of history; a process that has been going on since the Renaissance that Taylor suggests 'represented the discovery of the classical Mediterranean civilisation as a golden age of learning' (1996:5); although as Cosgrove points out 'many of the classical texts which were so revered by the self-styled revivers of antiquity were well known and widely read during the Middle Ages' (1989:191).

Glennie and Thrift (1992) suggest consumption patterns that dominated from the seventeenth century onwards were based on novelty and the experience of consuming novelty goods. It will be argued here that novelty and authenticity operate dialectically to produce value and identity in the history that is represented in the 1990s.

It will also be suggested in this chapter that identity is linked to issues of authenticity and education: ideals that existed in both the modern and postmodern epoch. In some respects the preservation of heritage sites acts as a hold on the infinite regress of history and allows people to articulate critical moments in the historical narrative that, while they contain degrees of inauthenticity, are in themselves primarily authentic representations.
Drawing on the work of Lowenthal, Merriman (1991) suggests the traditional pattern of everyday life allowed the past in pre-industrial society to be reproduced in the present: it was not a separate realm from the present. Change happened very slowly in pre-industrial society; however, the pace of change accelerated during the Renaissance, especially with the development of science and rationality. Prior to the Renaissance, desire for collecting items of antiquity was the province of the Catholic church in Europe: 'the medieval justification of collections [was] testimony to the glory of God' (Belk; 1995:29). People in Medieval times however, also 'sought out novelty both for its own sake and for immediate practical purposes. It is to [them] we owe such useful inventions as eyeglasses and mechanical clocks' (Cameron; 1989:71).

According to Merriman (1991) the pace of change has created a desire for the past (exemplified in the museum) which can never be satisfied in the present. This is because history is no longer constituted in the present: it is 'completed and becomes a matter for curiosity or nostalgia' (Merriman; 1991:11). Ettema suggests 'history comes to be the story of material progress ... museums still promote the interests of the business and manufacturing classes because they celebrate the ownerships of objects' (quoted in Belk; 1995:137). It will be argued in this chapter that museums can still offer critical histories to the public in the 1990s: museums as heritage sites also halt the infinite regress of history.

Following Jardine (1996) it will be argued that the search for objects of the past during the Renaissance was intimately tied up with material life and the circulation of capital. Not only did objects of antiquity have an exchange value but they also afforded their owner with an identity value. This dialectic is historically and geographically mobile: different objects had different values in different times. Objects could be up-graded or down-graded as society chooses; even forgeries could become accepted as authentically inauthentic.

Objects of history constitute signs of status and identity that according to Urry 'function metonymically' (1990:129) so that the metaphor/metonymy dialectic discussed in chapter two plays itself out over time. The consumption of different histories in the 1990s has been linked to the emergence of the new middle class; however, it will be argued here that the concept of a new middle class is a contentious issue that I do not intend to resolve in this thesis. Not withstanding this, a class based analysis does yield some valuable insights into how history in contemporary society is negotiated.
Any discussion of the historical geography of the middle classes has to be place specific; as a result, the middle classes in England during the modern period will be discussed because this leads onto a discussion of the new middle class thought to be prevalent in Britain in the 1990's.

It will be argued here that each class appropriates history in a way that is class-connected and in so doing reproduces for wider society a particular version of the historical narrative. This historical narrative will then be 'frozen in time' to borrow an idea from Harvey (1989:21) as heritage in order to make a profit. But profit is not the only motive for preserving heritage: social and environmental politics also play a role in heritage preservation.

This chapter has been split into two sections: part A will take an historical overview of class structure and material life during the European Renaissance and early modern period; part B will discuss empirical evidence of heritage preservation in the 1990s in capitalist countries. Although the ethos of material life is not identical in the 1990s, there are some connections to be made between the more distant past and the present. The revival of material life during the Renaissance is intimately tied up with the rise to dominance of capitalism, urbanisation and new forms of class structure in Western Europe. Notwithstanding this, the discussion that follows is very place specific; although some common threads may be prevalent in other societies, both at the same time and in different times, any discussion of other societies is outside the scope of this thesis.

PART A - HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

_The Emergence of a 'Middle Class' in Western Europe in the Early Modern Period_

The idea of an emerging middle class contemporaneous to the emergence of capitalism and urbanisation would appear, superficially at least, to be unproblematic; however, if asked to quantify who or what fits into the category 'the middle class' the idea becomes, at best difficult, at worst chaotic. One way of dealing with class structure has been suggested by
Reddy (following E P Thompson):

that class be seen, not as a group of individuals but as a relationship ... that classes do not exist by themselves, but come into existence only when human beings enter into vital relationships with each other to produce and distribute resources and to control the application of coercion (1992:16).

The concept of class is also place specific; hence there will be different groups of people who will align themselves to the middle classes in different places. Seed argues that in England the term 'middle class' only appears in the eighteenth century 'as an interposition between the rich and poor, between persons of rank and the common people' (1992:115). Seed goes on to suggest that 'the middle class did not 'rise' out of the level plains of the traditional social order ...[but] involved a radical reordering of social relations within the eighteenth century 'middling sort' ' (1992:124). In particular, there was both upward and downward mobility: those with small amounts of capital and producing for the commercial market either prospered or 'were bankrupted ... by the vicious fluctuations of an unstable economy or by cut-throat competition' (Seed;1992:125). For example, the price inflation of the sixteenth century resulted in a redistribution of wealth and income amongst social groups. As Cameron puts it:

those whose incomes were price elastic - merchants, manufacturers, landowners who farmed their own land, peasants with secure tenures and producing for the market - benefited at the expense of wage earners and those whose income was either fixed or changed only slowly - pensioners, many rent receivers and rackrented peasants (1989:105).

In many respects, being middle class is a matter of attitude both towards others and towards oneself. 'The boundaries of middle-class identity' (Seed;1992:129) are extremely fluid but as Seed (1992) goes on to argue certain protocols emerged in the eighteenth century centred on the family, marriage partners and religion. By the nineteenth century 'the gradual emergence of a secular public sphere' (for example The Literary and Philosophical Society) 'were important in providing spaces for social association outside the narrow circles of immediate business associates, co-religionists and family' (Seed;1992:132).

Glennie & Thrift (1992) argue that people have become socially fragmented both economically and non-economically as new sources of wealth opened up opportunities for social mobility, religious diversification and new forms of work. Identities that had become homogenised by static notions of community under the old feudal order were now dislocated
into particular social positions. Consumption patterns by particular groups ensured a certain status and this status creation could be manipulated by both cultural producers and consumers (Glennie & Thrift 1992). Collecting items of cultural or natural history in cabinets of curiosity during the early modern period and the European Enlightenment provide one such example.

Collectors, Collecting and Cabinets of Curiosity in the Early Modern Period.

In Europe, it was not until the fourteenth century that private collections became prominent: even then it was only by a handful of people (Belk; 1995). In particular, the Medici family of Florence was conspicuous in their collecting habits, leading the way in amassing large amounts of silver, gold, medals, ceramics, musical instruments, leather goods, tapestries and historical paintings (Belk; 1995).

Around 1456 ... Piero [de Medici] housed his library in a purpose built studio/a in the Medici Palace in Florence, designed as a 'cabinet of curiosities' to which important guests might be brought to admire his manuscripts alongside his collections of gems and other precious objects ... [they were] a sign of conspicuous consumption, and a source of visual and aesthetic delight (Jardine; 1996: 183)

Jardine (1996:186) goes on to suggest that people of dubious lineage or social status could buy themselves respectability through 'surrounding [themselves] with priceless artistic treasures, discerningly selected [where people] could establish [themselves] as truly noble and not simply 'new money' ' (Jardine; 1996:186).

Art as a commodity according to Belk (1995:28) emerged during the Renaissance. In addition to producing one-off paintings, artists such as Albert Durer found they could make more money producing for the mass-market:

single-sheet wood cuts, sold cheaply and widely distributed, represented a better investment of the artists time and talent than one off paintings for patrons who watched suspiciously for over-charging and were reluctant to pay until the work precisely matched their specifications (Jardine;1996:228).
In the fifteenth century a person needed credit to be able to purchase all the wondrous goods that exploded onto the European market (Jardine; 1996). To do this, prominent merchants like the Medici family lent to other merchants and leading individuals such as 'Popes, Cardinals and Heads of State - the incentive to lend to them was likely to be some lucrative franchise or trade concession offered in lieu of interest on the loan' (Jardine; 1996: 93).

Arrighi suggests collecting was also good business policy for powerful families and merchants: to re-invest all their capital into expanding their 'financial, commercial and industrial operations would have been bad business policy, the seemingly 'unproductive' expenditure of a large proportion of these profits in pomp and display was in fact good business policy' (1994: 105). Such an expansion would have increased the amount of capital in circulation to such an extent that the only investment opportunities would have been risky or 'dubious business ventures' (Arrighi; 1994: 105). This policy was one way of staving off the crises in capital circulation in the short-run (Arrighi; 1995).

Moreover, many leading individuals died leaving their estates debt-ridden and impoverished (Jardine; 1996). Often the luxurious goods collected over a lifetime were used to settle an estates debts upon a person's death. The lavish goods that had surrounded many individuals during their lifetime had more often than not been used as security for loans to buy other goods or to finance government debt. For example:

For the weddings of two of her children in 1495 Queen Isabella of Castile had to retrieve her crown of gold and diamonds from Valencia where it had been held since 1489 as a pledge against a loan of 35,000 florins, one of three sums advanced as part of a total loan of 60,000 florins raised to support the war against Granada (Jardine; 1996: 95).

Collecting rare books during the Renaissance is another example where commercial investment was prized as much as the scholastic value of retrieving lost texts from antiquity (Jardine; 1996).

[Entrepreneurs] had a vested interest in encouraging the general view that value (commercial cost) of an art object denoted the worth (aesthetic taste and moral esteem) of its purchaser ... ostentatious expenditure on fine books guaranteed that the purchaser would be established for posterity as a person of virtue, honour and nobility, regardless of his social origins or the source of his wealth (Jardine; 1996: 192-93).
Collectors rarely read the books they collected, leaving that to the academics who flocked to use their libraries. Collectors coveted the books for the identity value it afforded them (Jardine; 1996). The advent of the printing press changed the way in which the dissemination of information by scholars occurred and how that knowledge was reproduced for wider society.

By the 1520s, the partnership between book production and scholarship had become a merger, and in the process both had become less exclusive. The brilliant scholar now devoted his energies to collating variant manuscripts for a publisher rather than for a private patron (Jardine; 1996:227).

In the sixteenth century, German financial capital underwrote learning and education through book production, especially once the printing press became a viable alternative to hand produced manuscripts. The increase in knowledge that occurred in Europe during this time was to start with, the by-product of a good commercial investment on the part of the German merchant bankers (Jardine; 1996:223).

Belk also suggests the 'unearthing of ancient Rome between 1450 and 1550AD' provided another impetus for collecting and a new type of collector 'consisting of professionals including doctors, lawyers and scholars' (1995:29). The busts and coins of ancient Rome, Burke (1997:24) argues, 'encourages the growth of interest in physical appearance as an expression of the inner self' (Burke; 1997:24).

From the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries people were interested in fame and famous people: for example 'in the sixteenth century Paolo Giovio ... collected four hundred-odd historical portraits of 'famous men' (including at least seventeen women) for the museum in his villa near Como' (Burke; 1977:25). By the seventeenth century however, Taylor suggests:

there was only one Protestant country in Europe where art fully survived the crisis of the Reformation - that was the Netherlands. Instead of waiting for commissions, artists in the United Provinces painted to sell, thus creating the first art market (1996:195).

During the seventeenth century, the collecting theme reached new heights; in particular, the European 'discoveries of foreign lands, European population growth following the Plague, new inventions such as the clock and the printing press and the rise of capitalism'
Belk (1995:29-30) meant that Europeans wanted to amass 'the world in a cabinet of curiosity' (Belk;1995:29).

Cabinets of curiosity, however, were not universal or homogeneous - the Protestant reform led the way in looking at the natural world, while the Catholic population continued to collect religious curios, art, paintings, antiques and medals. Objects of nature were excluded from more than ninety percent of Roman Catholic collections (Belk;1995).

Collecting in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries existed in a liminal space between the dissolution of the old feudal order and the rise of capitalism: between the decline of religion and the rise of science. Cabinets of curiosity or wonder cabinets as they became known, 'declined with rise of Cartesian science and the divorce of science from art' (Belk;1995:34).

Further, Belk (1995:32) suggests these cabinets were the early precursor to classification and specialisation of objects as a means of 'controlling the chaos that novelty [threatened] to create'. Even the earliest cabinets contained order and classification: for example,

naturalia, such as minerals, stuffed animals, plants, ethnographic artifacts, and fossils and artificalia, ... paintings, weapons, scientific instruments and mechanical marvels such as clocks and automata. Religious objects and relics were often a third type of marvellous object included in these cabinets (Belk;1995:32)

Burke suggests that following a model derived from antiquity (when writing biographies in the seventeenth century)

had the advantage of imposing order on apparent chaos, turning random events into a story with a plot, with a beginning, middle and end. All the same, something which we would regard as valuable ... must have been sacrificed in the process of fitting new lives into old categories (1977:23).

The same can be said of the wonder cabinets. To treat everything as novel threatened to undermine the authentic representations of these objects: by trying to classify objects using a foreign system of classification Europeans may have trivialised something important about an object while attaching importance to something that is trivial. This can be related to Belk's (1995) suggestion that novelty was the primary motive for collecting.
By the early eighteenth century people no longer saw the world as an integrated whole but as classified and ordered. Following Foucault, Belk (1995) suggests that the classical episteme (description of things in the world) gives history a new meaning and that the first form of history is a history of nature. The space of this history has changed: it is now possible to order and describe nature. Curiosity about nature (plants, animals and people) was not a new phenomenon, but by the time of the Cartesian revolution, Belk, drawing on Foucault (1995:33) argues a new way of making history had been found.

Collecting can be seen as a form of social power and social comment (Belk, 1995). The changing fashions of what to collect was temporally and spatially specific. Collecting themes in different countries depended on the economic circumstances of people within specific countries. Further, by the eighteenth century 'a growing proportion of collectors [were] middle-class' (Belk, 1995:37). Cabinets of curiosity were known in Vienna in the sixteenth century; however they became prominent in the Netherlands in the seventeenth century (Belk, 1995). By the eighteenth century however, the centre of the fine-art world had shifted from Amsterdam to Paris (taking up temporary residence in London during the French Revolution) (Belk, 1995).

In England, collecting during the eighteenth and nineteenth century reflects the emerging economic and political dominance of England. Belk (1995:43) also suggests 'the ideal of the English gentleman's country house ... [and] being able to claim an established lineage ... was replaced ... by a wholly new system of status in which novelty and fashion supplanted this conservative principle'.

This seems too linear a move from one category to another: people could rise from commoner to noble status and quite frequently did; while on the other hand the reverse was also true (Bush; 1992). It was the emergence of a substantial and wealthy middle class in Britain that backed the novelty principle rather than the nobility (Glennie & Thrift; 1992). This is important because class distinctions are much more fluid than Belk (1995) suggests. As Dahrendorf (quoted in Thompson; 1983:116) argues: 'an individual becomes a member of a class by playing a social role'. Further, consumption patterns are an integral part of a person's social role. The next section will look at consumption patterns of the middle classes in England.
Glennie & Thrift (1992) suggest that from the middle decades of the seventeenth century there were major changes in consumption patterns in Britain based on novelty and the experience of consuming novelty goods. Fifty percent of the British population in 1700 occupied the middle classes (commercial farmers and wealthier trades and artisans) and were considered more prosperous than their European counterparts (Glennie & Thrift, 1992). The English middle classes were more interested in good quality but inexpensive goods that were amenable to mass production rather than luxury items like gold, silver, jewellery and paintings (Glennie & Thrift, 1992). This is in direct contrast to their European counterparts who were more interested in conspicuous consumption of low-volume-high-value luxury crafts (Glennie & Thrift, 1992).

The problem with a fixed category such as luxury goods is that as Braudel argues, luxury goods cannot be defined as an unending category because these definitions change over time - 'sugar was a luxury before the sixteenth century; pepper was still a luxury in the closing years of the seventeenth' (1973:121). Plates, forks, glass windows, chairs, handkerchiefs and oranges were also considered luxuries in the sixteenth century:

> luxury does not only represent rarity and vanity, but also social success, fascination, the dream that one day becomes reality for the poor, and in so doing immediately loses its old glamour (Braudel, 1973:122)

Braudel goes on to suggest that 'every luxury dates and goes out of fashion' (1973:123). By the eighteenth century middle class homes in England had been extensively remodelled, together with 'notions of hygiene and personal habits' (Williams, 1987:168). Stone suggests the use of 'forks ... separate plates and utensils for each course ... night clothes ... washbasins ... [and] soap' (quoted in Williams, 1987:168) were all signs of quality, status and class. Although it would take more than one hundred years for these goods to become commonplace in Britain, luxuries would be re-coded not just in terms of expense but also in terms of acceptable social behaviour.

Luxury and non-luxury goods operate in a dialectical manner. Further, if luxury goods are glamorous and rare they could also be novel. Drawing on the work of Mukerji, Glennie & Thrift suggest,
novelty could reside not just in a material object itself, but also in the techniques, or the motifs and concepts of design involved in its making ... Novelty [was prized] as part of the experience of consumption, and as a source of pleasurable experience in itself (1992:429).

Warde (1990) argues the quality of the experience of consumption is the most important factor in the consumption process; however, experience must first be produced. The social environment in which goods and services are received, especially the ambience and the company that is present, all make up the consumption experience. Depending on whether the experience is enjoyable or not will depend entirely on whether the good or service will be coded as acceptable or not acceptable (Warde;1990:4). According to Glennie and Thrift novelty was and still remains the prime motivation for presenting new fashion goods and services (including non-luxury goods) to consumers: 'novelty entered into how consumer goods were 'read', both by purchasers and consumers, and by observers' (1992:429).

Further, the pace of urbanisation was important for people to understand consumption practices. This is because people observed others in such places as 'fairs, markets, inns, shops, [and] in the streets' (Glennie & Thrift;1992:430). In this respect, the United Provinces and England were the most urbanised economies in Western Europe outside of the Italian city states (Glennie & Thrift;1992:Felloni;1977:Van Houtte & Van Buyten;1977)

Consumption Practices and Identity Formation During the European Enlightenment

The acquisition of goods is part of everyday life: 'the ascription of meanings to goods and identities to people, went on before, during, and after acts of purchase' (Glennie & Thrift;1996:36); however, from the eighteenth century until the mid twentieth century consumption was considered an intellectual activity as part of the Enlightenment project. It is worth quoting Glennie & Thrift at length on this issue:

We find it difficult to believe that 18th century consumers had a complete intellectual framework through which they articulated their motives and which they deployed when encountering commodities, other consumers, and consumption sites. We find it equally difficult to believe that such an intellectualised understanding is held by late-20th century consumers, especially given the intervening two centuries worth of laying down of practices of how
and what to consume ... consumption practices "are basically repetitive, intuitive and inventive" which are often "meaningless" but not unintelligible because they are a part of everyday societies in which talk is deployed in a pragmatic way to explain and justify the moment to hand (Hermes quoted in Glennie & Thrift, 1996:39-40).

Drawing on the work of Veblen, du Gay (1996) argues that as early as 1899 the consumption of goods acted as an index of social status and that no class foregoes conspicuous consumption unless dire economic necessity prevails. Working class households for example would keep up appearances despite economic hardship as early as the eighteenth century (Glennie & Thrift, 1992). All classes engage in the construction of identity value of some kind. For example, Glennie & Thrift suggest the middle classes in the nineteenth century were more interested in the quality of the product/experience whereas the working classes made 'quantitative judgements about [peoples] ability to consume' (Johnson quoted in Glennie & Thrift, 1992:433).

In the closing decades of the nineteenth century, Jenik and Toulmin suggest Viennese bourgeois 'good taste' took everything to the extreme where the European middle class
craze [was] for totally meaningless articles of decoration ... a craze for stain-like surfaces; for silk, satin and shining leather; for gilt frames ... tortoise shell, ivory and mother of pearl ... multi-coloured Venetian glass ... a skin rug on the floor complete with terrifying jaws, and in the hall a life-sized wooden Negro (quoted in Ley, 1989:45).

It is difficult to equate 'bourgeois good taste' with the entirety of the middle classes in Europe. There are many sub-groups within the middle classes that exist in particular places and at particular times. As Pred (1996) argues, knowledge about what to consume cannot be divorced from the social relations that define who or who may not do what, when, and where.

People will also contest hegemonic representations of spaces and commodities by producing new uses and interpretations for the goods and services they consume (du Gay, 1996: Pred, 1996). du Gay (1996) argues that subordinate groups translate commodified objects from an alienable to an inalienable condition. These objects are then constructed as signs. In so doing, people (re)create new identities and challenge the ideology of hegemonic discourses. The example of the car boot fair in Britain will be used to illustrate this point.
Gregson & Crewe (1994) suggest the car boot fair in Britain is negotiated in multiple ways by different classes of people: for example, the working classes may use car boot fairs to buy household goods cheaply but the middle classes also use these sites to buy household goods and collectables (retro-chic). The car boot fair allows people to challenge class identity through dressing down, or through the act of strolling or browsing.

The second-hand market is dominated by cash transactions that by-pass international circuits of capital; where the products sold are given meaning after the initial act of purchase and before the goods are discarded as useless (Gregson & Crewe; 1994). Braudel (1973:372) argues money and credit are luxuries that only a few people share: for life to continue for the majority other forms of exchange continue to be used even in the present day: 'barter, self-sufficiency, statutory labour [and] slavery'. Leyshon & Thrift (1996:1150) suggest that the process of re-regulation of the international financial system favours affluent minority groups while the poor and the disadvantaged are denied access to credit and finance. In particular 'banks ...[tend] to lend only to 'low-risk' borrowers which, in the eyes of the financial services industry tend to be those that are "suburban, white [and] middle-class"' (MacDonald quoted in Leyshon & Thrift; 1996:1151).

Alternative consumption sites are very important places for those people who do not fit the white, suburban and middle class mould. Gregson & Crewe (1994) suggest that people participate in alternative consumption sites in three ways: as buyer, small time entrepreneur and as voyeur: these are places to promenade, and to be seen. According to Glennie and Thrift (1992:36) shopping is an embodied rather than an intellectual practice for consumers - goods can have 'a range of possible meanings for the same person, in part depending on the contexts in which goods were used over time, and by whom' (Glennie & Thrift; 1996:36).

The construction of identity through consumption is geographically and historically mobile. du Gay (1996:87) argues that social subjects actively produce hybrid identities which cut across pre-given social divisions. Similarly, Pred argues consumption and identity are 'complex mutual entanglements of economy, culture and politics' (1996:21). Thrift has suggested that 'consumption issues have become more important in the class constitution of places' (1987:212 original emphasis). According to Pred (1996) the role of consumption in
identity formation does not explain the complexity of any change in identity formation especially the spectacular emergence of 'the new middle class' in the late twentieth century.

The Emergence of the New Middle Class in Britain in the Late Twentieth Century

Longhurst and Savage (1996) argue that the new middle class do not fit into 'established and traditional class divisions, because they are transient, occupying 'liminal' class positions' (Longhurst & Savage; 1996:281). Further 'these 'new intellectuals' ... are fascinated by identity, presentation, appearance and lifestyle' (Featherstone quoted in Longhurst & Savage; 1996:280). The new middle class is pretentious, 'constantly defining their superior status not with education but with conspicuous consumption of the most vulgar kind' (Enfield; 1998). In the 1990s the old middle class would suggest they are ordinary people who engage in an ordinary everyday life. But as previously discussed, an everyday life requires a degree of affluence and the old middle class have been affluent a lot longer than the new middle class.

The old middle class have established repetitive patterns which are recognised as 'old middle class'; the new middle class, to put it quite simply, have a different code. Bearing in mind that vulgarity and taste are dialectically related, then the debate over who has more or less taste, and whether identity is purchased by 'new money' is as much a modern as it is a post modern dilemma. One group of the middle classes will suggest that a particular attitude, object or action is vulgar; another group will suggest that it is not. This is not a subject that is easily resolvable, nor will it be resolved in this thesis.

According to Lees (1994:145) 'the new middle class have an ambiguous role as both exploiter and exploited'. Longhurst and Savage (1996) discuss the possibility that what appears to be happening is a maturation of the established classes and not a new occupational group per se. Drawing on the work of Gershuny, Longhurst and Savage suggest for example, that

[the] British male work histories are becoming increasingly divided between professional workers ... and manual workers ... [where] the majority of professional workers spend their entire careers in professional jobs whilst manual workers find it ever more difficult to move away from such forms of employment (1996:282).
The problem with using occupation as a yardstick of class differentiation is that it ignores changes in the types of occupations that have occurred especially since the inception of information technology and advanced telecommunications on a global scale and the fluidity in which different groups of people both from the old middle class and the working class move into these new positions. As Thrift and Williams (1987:7) argue, class alignment is an 'historically contingent process'. Further, electronic media has had an important impact on the way in which class position is constituted. As Thrift and Williams (drawing on Meyrowitz) comment:

by bringing many different types of people to the same 'place', electronic media have fostered a blurring of many distinct social roles. Electronic media affect us, then, not primarily through their content, but by changing the 'situational geography' of social life (1987:18).

The emergence of the service class that services capital cannot be reduced to the new middle class any more than the new middle class can be reduced to the service class; however, the alignment is a useful one because each category is mutually constitutive of the other and hence does have an impact on class relationships at a contingent level. The new middle class, is a useful term for the benefit of this discussion even though the term is a contested one and will be used generically to mean both the new middle class and the service class.

The following discussion briefly describes some of the characteristics attributed to those people who occupy the new middle class. According to Longhurst and Savage (drawing on the work of Bourdieu), people in the new middle class are:

the bearers of a distinct new form of consumer culture. These new groups, located in new sorts of service jobs, are held to be distinctive in rejecting established forms of high cultural practice and subjecting new forms of consumer practice to forms of cultural distinction. Rather than cultural distinction being based around the classic terrain of high culture (notably through the appreciation of classical music, 'great art' etc), it might be based around the right sort of holiday destination, new vegetarian cuisine or hiking gear. New forms of consumerism were thereby related to strategies of upwardly mobile occupational groups (1996:279).

Similarly, Urry argues:

that in western societies there is both a major service class and, more generally, a
substantial white collar or middle class ... [who] 1) do not own capital or land to any substantial degree; 2) are located within a set of interlocking social institutions which collectively 'service' capital; 3) enjoy superior work and market situations generally resulting from the existence of well defined careers, either within or between organisations and 4) have their entry regulated by the differential possession of educational credentials [and are predominantly in the] 25-35 year old age group (1990:88-89).

According to Thrift, 'the service class has been formed by at least four main processes' (1987:216). First, they do not produce socially necessary goods but service capital and the state apparatus. Second, they have 'a degree of autonomy and discretion in the way its members operate at work'. Third, they generally command high salaries, enjoy 'a degree of job security, geographical mobility and opportunities for promotion'. Fourth, they are 'predicated on the growth in importance of educational credentials which both make its labour more attractive, and to a degree, allow it to close off access to its work and market situations through the use of professions, examinations and other social mechanisms'.

The service class does not, as a general rule, align itself to any particular political party or political philosophy: this has resulted in particular places (that have been appropriated by the service class) showing a marked change in political allegiances and voting behaviour (Thrift; 1987:227).

The lack of cohesiveness of the service class in the political arena has contributed to what Thrift has called political 'class dealignment': a process that is changing the shape of British class structure rather than doing away with class structure; a process that is replacing class allegiances with 'other sectoral cleavages based upon production ... and consumption'; and a process that is changing 'local political cultures' (Thrift; 1987:228-31).

Consumption cleavages are an important part of the process of class dealignment. The service class usually have access to capital, are considered a lower risk than the working classes by the international financial community when trying to obtain credit, and are individually motivated but conservative in their outlook on life in general.

Many factors according to Thrift affect the way particular classes will consume goods especially positional goods such as owner-occupier housing; however, conservation and heritage are also 'service class political activities' where there is a 'need to defend the positional goods' of old masonry and countryside against newcomers' (1987:230). Further,
service class interests can often go against the wishes of the majority especially when 'service-class members with the same knowledge and background as their counterparts in local and national government are more easily able to gain trust and co-operation than other class members' (Thrift;1987:231).

According to De verson and Lindsay these people '[work] hard, [strive] to achieve a comfortable lifestyle, [encourage] their children to be successful, and [fill] in their time with profitable activity ... they are wealthy enough to achieve a comfortable status in life, but not rich enough to be considered immoral' (quoted in Thrift;1987:226). Further, the new middle class, according to Urry

employ relatively high levels of cultural capital to proclaim the tastelessness of much of both bourgeois and working class culture. The former is criticised for 'elitism' (that is, not sufficiently de-differentiated); the latter for coarseness or lack of subtlety (that is too close to nature) (1990:88).

These people refrain from doing anything that, to them, represents bourgeois culture - especially anything that is expensive or luxurious. For example, Urry argues they would engage in 'the culturally most legitimate and economically cheapest activities ... museum going ... mountain climbing or walking are likely to occur particularly frequently among the fractions (relatively) poorest in economic capital' (Bourdieu quoted in Urry;1990:89). These people prefer 'ostentatious poverty' ...[tend] to dress casually even when at work, to favour bare wooden interiors, and activities like mountaineering, hiking and walking, which represent the intellectual's taste for 'natural, wild nature' (Urry;1990:89).

The new middle class stands in relation to the old middle class: the new middle class must define itself by what it is not. As a result, the new middle class is not an homogeneous whole but contains elements of the old middle class while at the same time they also operate outside the boundaries of the old middle class. This is because the new middle class contains groups of people that are both upwardly and downwardly mobile.

According to Urry (1990) this new class has brought forward an alternative construction of nature. They are not interested in anything luxurious or aesthetic unless it is functional and utilitarian and reflects the real rather than the reproduced. For example, the new middle class enjoy 'health foods ...traditional, non-western science and medicine ... wool, lace and cotton rather than man-made fibres, antiques rather than 'man-made' reproductions [and]
restored houses/warehouses' (Urry;1990:95). Indeed, Harvey (1989) has suggested the house as a machine for living in has been transformed into an antique for living in.

Further, Urry suggests that people have become disillusioned with the modern lifestyle especially the affect of 'wholesale reconstruction of town and cities in the post-war period' (1990:97). On the other hand Merriman suggests that 'when given the choice [most people] would prefer to live in the present than in any other period in the past' (1991:34). The new middle class (who predominantly represent the baby-boomers of the post-war period) are interested in a countryside that never existed in reality. People want to live in 'the village in their mind' (Pahl quoted in Urry;1990:97).

To do this, it is necessary to de-populate and de-mechanise the countryside: 'to erase from it farm machinery, labourers, tractors, telegraph wires, concrete farm buildings, motorways, derelict land, polluted water and more recently nuclear power stations' (Urry;1990:98).

According to Thrift (1987:210) 'many 'rural' areas, as a result of middle class urbanisation of the countryside, have become middle class suburbs with more or less trees and fields forming the Laura Ashley backdrop'.

Lees suggests 'gentrification ... [is] a response to nihilism ... an attempt to create a reality of one's own, stolen from past realities, past cultures in what becomes a recategorisation of place' (1994:147). In a similar vein Harvey has argued that mass production denied many groups of people the opportunity 'to capture symbolic capital' (1987:274) and hence to differentiate themselves from others through 'the collection of luxury goods attesting to the taste and distinction of the owner' (Bourdieu quoted in Harvey;1987:274). Harvey goes on to argue that symbolic capital can be transformed into money capital and hence becomes part of the capitalist accumulation cycle that is 'open to devaluation or enhancement through changes in taste' (1987:275).

May suggests that gentrifiers in an inner London neighbourhood (Stoke Newington) are attracted to the area because of

its ability to conjure up images of ... [an] England lost; a quieter more stable England of parish churches and village greens, reaching back to the area's founding moment as the 'village in the woode' (1996:202).
May (1996) goes on to suggest that different class factions who live in the area both contest each others vision of the past and simultaneously join together in coalitions to preserve what each group considers the unique identity of the area. This is despite each class faction attempting to preserve local areas for quite different reasons.

For the new middle class residents who have recently moved into Stoke Newington 'the area represents history and 'the power to buy into history and the past ...[an] image [that] is centred ... [on] the Georgian and Victorian splendour of Church Street' (May;1996:202-3). Conversely, the working class either accepts a partial representation of the English village icon in the full knowledge that it is manufactured for the new middle class gaze. In some instances they will contest the manufactured icons in a subversive way: for example, people may revert to the use of older names that represent 'a more recent living past' (May;1996:203).

The politics of place played out in this neighbourhood undermines the diversity that the area is supposed to celebrate (May;1996). Further, the new middle class has been argued by May as

\[
\text{form[ing] part of a new flaneurial class ... [that project] ... an 'exotic gaze'... that allows the area's new cultural class residents to construct a sense of place that looks both inwards - to an image of a forgotten village England - and outwards, but in ways that are far from progressive. Such images work to exclude both the area's ethnic minority and white working class residents (1996:208-210).}
\]

The idea of the countryside put forward by the new middle class is highly problematic. People may want the ordinary countryside but the new middle class appropriation of the countryside is as much produced as the previous modernist version. This is not a return to nature but a return to an idealised form of nature or the natural that is produced for consumption by this class of people. In particular, new middle class attitudes towards heritage landscapes in Britain are 'based upon the 'rural' historical imagery revealed in country kitchens and Laura Ashley fabrics' (Thrift;1987:226). Urry (1990) goes on to suggest heritage landscapes in the 1990s are subject to the gaze of the postmodern (new middle class) tourist in their search for the real, the mundane, and the ordinary. For example, 'the proportion of the service class visiting museum and heritage centres [in Britain] in any one year is about three times that of manual workers' (Urry;1990:106)
PART B

This section of the chapter will look at the empirical evidence of heritage landscapes in the 1990s; landscapes that are predominantly appropriated by the new middle class. A number of disparate examples have been used to highlight a specific idea; that history as a commodity is available for exploitation by 'the market'. It will be argued, however, that objects and experiences of history will be consumed in ways that the producers of these objects and experiences do not expect.

_Heritage landscapes in the late twentieth century._

The production of the new middle class and the consumption of history operate in a dialectical manner. Are the new middle class responsible for the proliferation of postmodern museums and heritage sites in the late twentieth century? Or are museums and heritage sites in part responsible for the emergence of the new middle class? Urry suggests that 'museums have become more accessible, especially to the service and middle classes [as it] enables the acquisition of a certain cultural capital, an acquisition made possible by the increased degree to which people are now able to 'read' museums' (1990:132). This dialectic is extremely important as Belk suggests, there is a 'hierarch[y] of museums ... the higher social classes and robber barons were most prominent in fine-art museums while the museums established from world's fairs were more likely to be museums of decorative arts, ethnography, industry, and science' (1995:109).

Further, Urry suggests that place is important to the museum and heritage site 'because [of] some connections between the past and the present are usually provided by place' (1990:134). For example, 'in the tales [Robin Hood] ... belonged to real places. Nottingham and Sherwood Forest are the settings for his many feuds' (Souvenir Guide, Tales of Robin Hood, Nottingham).

Urry goes on to suggest that 'the seventeenth century disease of nostalgia seems to have become an epidemic' (1990:105). But just what is nostalgia? According to Urry nostalgia is a social construction often generated during 'a time of discontent, anxiety or disappointment
[with] much contemporary nostalgia ... for the industrial past' (1990:109). Lefebvre (1991) suggests nostalgia is the transfer of anthropological ideas, derived from the study of village life, onto the modern world. In this way, Lefebvre (1991) goes onto suggest that social space is consumed both economically and literally; people flee the modern world of cities and industrialisation for a supposedly more simplistic version of the world. Tourism exemplifies this process as do those people who 'seek refuge in the country, in folk traditions [and] arts and crafts' (Lefebvre;1991:122). Lefebvre (1991) suggests that such migrations destroy the space of migration for the local people that inhabit that space. But if nostalgia is constructed then it is largely inauthentic: an authentic history is 'continuing and therefore dangerous [whereas] heritage [is] past, dead and safe' (Urry;1990:110).

Cohen (1988) argues that authenticity is also constructed by society. 'Under modern conditions the place of the individual in society is preserved, in part, by newly institutionalized concerns for the authenticity of his [sic] social experiences' (MacCannell;1973:590). Authenticity (or the authentic value of an object) is also geographically and historically mobile (Cohen;1988:375). For example, Museum curators and art historians changed the terms by which primitive art was genuine or fake; that is 'should not be manufactured "specifically for the market"' (Cornet quoted in Cohen;1988:375) even though traditional methods and materials were used. Further, objects which had originally been deemed inauthentic can over time, gain respectability as authentically inauthentic (Cohen;1988). For example, an 'original' Goldie forgery by the New Zealand painter also called C F Goldie. MacCannell explores the relationship between front and back regions:

[back regions] are seen as the core of social solidarity, and they are also thought by some to be morally superior to rationality and distance in social relationships and more 'real'. Being 'one of them' or at one with 'them' means in part, being permitted to share back regions with 'them' (1973:592).

It is impossible however, to completely enter into another social situation and claim it to be totally authentic. The only authentic thing about the present moment is the present moment. History or heritage may not be totally authentic but it is not totally inauthentic either. The heritage experience is authentic in so much as the person who is experiencing the consumption of heritage at that particular moment is producing an authentic experience. As the souvenir guide The Tales of Robin Hood says 'Welcome to your own adventure'. Once that experience is past and a person starts to relive that experience then inauthenticity sets in
because omissions in the historical narrative will start to occur; hence the infinite regress of history is stopped through the production/consumption nexus of the heritage site.

Similarly, Urry (1990) suggests that heritage sites can generate different meanings to different people and as such cannot be considered an homogeneous representation of history. For history to be a coherent representation over time it is necessary to 'freez[e] time' (Harvey; 1989:21) in space. Different groups preserve different sites for different reasons and do not always necessarily represent a bogus (produced) history for economic gain for multi-national capital.

Urry suggests that oral histories are important to preserve memories (even if they are selective ones) and also 'fail to link the pressure for conservation with the much broader development of environmental politics in the 1980s' (1990:111). McCormick suggests that in the USA and Britain 'members of ... environmental groups are generally more affluent and better educated than the average' (1989:132). Further, 'the rural ethic holds a place in the British psyche that is equivalent to the position of forests in West Germany or wilderness in the United States ... [however] very little, if any, true wilderness remains' (McCormick; 1989:130).

Nostalgia is articulated by different groups of visitors in a variety of ways that are much more complex and ambiguous than the producers of heritage sites would like. The understanding of history, like consumption per se, is not an intellectual practice but is much more embodied and pragmatic. In particular, Urry suggests that 'for many people ... [history] will be acquired at best through reading biographies and historical novels. It is not obvious that the heritage industry's account is any more misleading' 1990:112).

Urry suggests the emergence of the 'postmodern museum' has been premised on the increasing number of objects that are being preserved as well as 'alternative or vernacular histories has developed - social, economic, populist, feminist, ethnic, industrial, and so on' (1990:130). Further, people want the 'ordinary' and the 'mundane' to be represented rather than art that was represented during modernity; thus reflecting 'the anti-elitism of postmodernism' (Urry; 1990:130). Belk argues museum formation is also more likely when a nation has nationalistic tendencies and imperialistic ambitions it wishes to assert' (1995:104).
An interesting contemporary example of the cabinets of curiosity can be found in the Wagener Museum at Houhora Heads in Northland, New Zealand (plate 1). What struck me when I visited this museum was the seemingly disorganised collection of everyday artefacts from Victoriana, both valuable and non-valuable, 460 chamberpots, artefacts from 'pioneer' New Zealand, Maori artefacts, an extensive range of old fashioned mechanical equipment such as telephones, washing machines and office equipment as well as everyday knick-knack’s, British royal memorabilia, musical instruments, a natural history with large collections of rocks, shells, insects, butterflies, birds and small mammals and so on. The brochure suggests 'The museum really is unique - an amazing collection of collections'.

These static displays had the effect of dislocating time and space. It was not until the 'live demonstration [of] Symphonium, music boxes and Gramophones' (Wagener Museum brochure) that the displays came alive and the sounds of the fair ground of the past one hundred years immediately came to my mind. This cabinet of curiosity emphasises a history of consumer sovereignty by displacing the everyday experiences of people. It erases the subject of New Zealand history from view while only the objects of history remain. Further, the displays celebrate novelty over authenticity: the individual items would be vulgar if they were not encased in some way.

The museum also acts as a metonym for a bygone era through the displacement of New Zealand history: metaphorically it represents a rather orthodox history of New Zealand: Maori settlement, followed by pioneer New Zealand as part of the British Empire. This is not suggested overtly in the displays: they have to be 'read' as part of one's life narrative. As Urry argues some 'signs ... function metonymically ... the substitution of some feature or effect or cause of the phenomenon for the phenomenon itself' (1990:129).

Urry (1990) argues history will be 'read' by consumers in accordance with their own life's narrative rather than the way the producers of culture expect. If this postmodern museum is 'read' by the new middle class then it will celebrate the consumption culture and the quest for novelty over authenticity. History however, is a continuous process that is alive in the present moment. Further, sites are created from multiple processes by a different number of groups; thus heritage sites and history more generally is negotiated in multiple and complex ways by both consumers and producers. The following examples will be used to illustrate this point.
Welcome to this special Northland spot only 33km from Awana north of Kaitaia on the Main North Road.

The short access road is tarmacked to the Museum, cafeteria, golf course, historic home, boat ramp, picnic area and camping ground.

Enjoy the moderate sub-tropical climate in an unspoiled recreational haven.

The Museum really is unique — an amazing collection of collections providing a 7 day all-weather attraction for everyone.

Open 9.30 - 4.30, with extended hours in summer. The historical homestead on the property is a real pioneer home in original condition and is open 2 hours daily or by arrangement.

Also provided:
- Demonstration of various working exhibits.
- Cafeteria and souvenir shop for refreshments, basic camp supplies and gifts.
- High-pressure boat wash.
- Hire dinglys.
- Yoked bullocks a few hours daily.

The Golf Course is open to the general public every day, with hire equipment available.

This northern-most international standard 18 hole course on Easy undulating country is an interesting, challenging and professionally maintained course.

It is also home to the Wagener Park Golf Club.

The camping ground has a good range of sites for economical camping. Bookings can be made through the Museum office or (09) 409-8864.

Access the northern end of the long sweeping ocean beach of Rangauna Bay. Enjoy fishing, swimming, etc., in the protected harbour and stream waters. With a boat there is easy access to ocean fishing and coastal bays.

Within 5km are motels, a petrol station, general store, restaurant/takeaways, a wharf for "launch diesel and charter fishing, and all-weather access to the middle of the 30 Mile Beach at Hukeruru.

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Phone (09) 409-8850, 409-8860
R.D.4, Kaitaia, N.Z.

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Plate 1
The Wagener Museum Brochure
The heritage sites at Wigan Pier and The Museum of Science and Technology in Manchester Bagnall (1996) argues, are gender and occupation biased in the type of visitor they each attract. The Manchester site appealed more to men, especially fathers visiting with their children, while this was less the case at Wigan Pier. The Manchester site was visited predominantly by people with higher education: at least one person per group had a degree of some sort while only sixty percent of the people who visited Wigan pier had higher education. The Manchester site is suggested by Bagnall as connecting people to their particular industry: people required some sort of cultural capital to consume the site. In this respect, the Manchester site could be seen as suitable to middle class professionals while Wigan Pier presented a much more working class approach to heritage consumption. Ironically, both these sites appealed mainly to white Europeans and those in work: the unemployed and ethnic minorities were absent from both sites.

The commodification of history as heritage often conceals an homogeneous construction of history for mass consumption. Even though heritage may not be bogus history as Johnson (1996) suggests it is often a managed (produced) show-case for twentieth century consumption. The Alamo (Texas, USA) is one such construction.

De Oliver (1996) suggests the Alamo site in Texas represents a contested history between the Anglo American and Latin American histories of the site. In particular, the Alamo that has been preserved is very much an inauthentic representation because it has been physically altered and manipulated to represent Mexican American cultural and economic capital. The following discussion is based on De Oliver's (1996) article.

The original site has mostly been demolished and the mission chapel that once was part of the original mission grounds (backstage) has been brought front-stage as the focal point of the site and the entrance way. The chapel entrance was also given a new facade of German design. Originally preserved as a symbol of Texas nationalism by the Anglo Daughters of the Republic of Texas, the Alamo site was to have no commercial activity within the original grounds (De Oliver;1996).

To be a successful tourist venture, however, the Alamo required an economic extension that was commercially viable. This was done through the development of the River-walk/River-centre with a pedestrian corridor linking the two (De Oliver;1996). Urry argues that modern shoppers use 'the mall' as a place 'to stroll, to gaze and to be gazed upon' (1990:149).
Figure 2: Historic and Contemporary Alamo Grounds in Relation to Present Streets
(De Oliver, 1996)
Urry also suggests 'Shopping is ... only part of the appeal of the mall, which is as much concerned with leisure and with tourism' (1990:149). The original Alamo grounds have been incorporated into a shopping plaza while the restorers of the tourist site have bought land adjacent to the original site: they could then culturally code this landscape anyway they wished. In particular, a concentric radial design from eighteenth century Europe was used to represent a symbol of power because 'the classical structure in the heart of the European garden represented the central axis of a sacred space' (De Oliver;1996:7).

The park on the new development is a very modernist design representing morality and order. De Oliver (1996:8) suggests the use of the park ideologically upholds white Anglo-American moral order in an alien landscape: not only has the original site been altered but the naming of the streets reflects the Anglo-American people present at the Alamo and not the Latin-Americans (De Oliver;1996).

The Alamo is currently the leading tourist attraction in Texas with the economic extension (River-walk) as the second most popular tourist attraction in Texas (De Oliver;1996). But if the Alamo as an economic success has displaced real history then it is still considered a contested history.

Tourists go to the Alamo site to mostly shop in an Anglo-American environment spending only a small amount of their time at the physical Alamo site. But the site itself is important because visitors require a degree of something authentic to provide the impetus to visit the site: the site still needs to be 'culturally recognizable to provide orientation and promote security' (De Oliver;1996:14). I suggest this means that not everything can be commodified by consumer culture - there must be a degree of authenticity even in an inauthentic representation to make the site attractive to visitors.

The Alamo site, has been de-constructed by De Oliver as a hegemonic representation by showing how the Latin-Americans, and their historical geographies, have been ideologically erased from this space. But the Latin Americans still exist in the physical space of the economic landscape. There is very little mentioned by De Oliver of how this contested landscape continues to be part of the negotiation and conflict that exists within the dialectic of space of representation/representational spaces. The approach here has been to reify the homogenising effect of the commodification of the cultural site 'The Alamo', over the lived history of the present occupants of the site as well as any visitors to the site. How for example, do people, both Anglo and non-Anglo Americans react to the site? Do they accept
the history represented here or do they re-interpret it to their own needs, wants and desires.

Chang (1997:56) argues 'history and collective memory are sanitised to attract visitors and boost the tourism economy' but that local people must endorse the project to legitimate the site. The postmodern tourist likes to get backstage so that a place must be first popular with the local community before it begins attracting the tourists ... cultures and traditions are not static, and that locals can indeed be persuaded to accept state-induced and tourism-related modifications up to a point (Chang; 1997:60).

An example from Singapore will help illustrate this point. In Singapore, the exotic and the colonial past has been commodified at Haw Par Villa for tourist consumption. Although history is used as a primary motivater for tourism, this production intersects with different players at both the local and global levels. In the Singapore example local people, the private sector owners of the site and the state joined together to create the tourist attraction at Haw Par Villa. At this point cultural exchange value is transformed into economic exchange value: that is the market value for heritage ensures that what is preserved in the heritage landscape can be commodified and hence make a profit.

During the 1980s the Ministry of Trade and Industry in Singapore became concerned that 'the country's loss of "Oriental mystique and charm ... best symbolised in old buildings, traditional activities and bustling roadside activities" was an impetus for the down-turn' (Ministry of Trade & Industry quoted in Chang; 1997:51) in the number of tourists arriving in the country. One proposal was to disneyfy Chinese culture to create a spectacular consumption site together with a high tech entertainment centre at Haw Par Villa (Teo & Yeoh; 1997). This disneyfication of history has a long pedigree. For example, the Western Museum (1820-1867) was a 'vulgarised ... freak and horror show...the first Disneyland of the west' (Tucker quoted in Belk; 1995:105).

An offshoot of Disney productions won the contract to re-develop Haw Par Villa and Tiger Balm gardens (using public funds)(Teo & Yeoh; 1997). The gardens were expected to be profitable: in the process many original artefacts were discarded while others were re-vamped based on what was perceived as appealing to tourists. For example, the lady white snake acquired a husband and a maid where she had not had one before. The icon of the
Figure 3: Location and Layout of Haw Par Villa
(To & Yeoh, 1997)
Dragon replaced the original icon of the Tiger as the central focus of the gardens (Teo & Yeoh; 1997).

The disneyfication of Tiger Balm gardens and Haw Par Villa ensured the site became an Americanised theme park: it also failed to become a profitable tourist attraction (Teo & Yeoh; 1997). The park is now considered old fashioned by tourists and locals alike (Teo & Yeoh; 1997). Tourists felt the entrance fees were too high, with attractions not always open or rotated often enough to ensure people continually returned to the gardens. Inadequate signs, maintenance, service and shelter also detracted from the site. Chinese legends, Teo & Yeoh (1997) argue, appeal to the tourist gaze but it was felt by tourists that the site adulterated the tourist gaze because the disneyfied image has not compensated for the loss of the old image of Tiger Balm Gardens and Haw Par Villa.

Multi-national capital may package heritage landscapes for tourist consumption, but at the same time tourists, both local and non-local, regard authenticity and educational value as more important than a disneyfied version of culture if they are to return to the site (Teo & Yeoh; 1997). In particular, non-local tourists looked for an authentic Chinese theme that they could believe was authentic while the local tourists looked for the authentic in the lived experiences of the past; the site also had to provide some sort of educational value for local people to want to return to the site (Teo & Yeoh; 1997).

According to Belk 'A Disneyfied museum ... sacrifices education and enlightenment to superficial entertainment based on illusions ... the presentation is sterilized and romanticized in order to make more it visually appealing ... historic locales have been sanitized, glorified, and made into consumption-oriented entertainments rather than something more authentic and substantive' (1995: 123).

Local people in Singapore have contested the disneyfied image of Tiger Balm Gardens: in the process they have negotiated for a new image (Teo & Yeoh; 1997). Many of the original artefacts that had been discarded have been re-introduced; especially the animal statutes. The name has been changed back to Tiger Balm gardens and the history of the Aw family (the original owners of the gardens) has been introduced. In this way, it is hoped to highlight the authentic parts of the gardens rather than a disneyfied version of Chinese culture (Teo & Yeoh; 1997).
By way of contrast, the history presented at Strokestown Park in Ireland is suggested by Johnson as 'a radical critique of the nineteenth-century estate system' (1996:558). This is because the heritage site has developed independently of national policies on tourism and multi-national capital. According to Johnson (1996) this has allowed the private owners to construct a more challenging site; although it will be interesting to discover whether or not this makes the site more or less authentic.

Urry suggests the tourist gaze finds classical buildings and in particular the classical country house 'popular objects of the tourist gaze' (1990:124). Further, 'out are the endless, old fashioned glass cases you poured over in hushed silence. In are professionally designed displays, working models to play with, complete period room settings to browse through and sound effects to complete the picture' (White quoted in Urry; 1990:130). Strokestown Park still offers only a partial history of the house and the local area as tourists must take a tour in order to access the house. As a result, both the Anglo and the Irish histories are still produced for the tourist gaze. The following discussion is based on Johnson's (1996) article.

The owners of the park have used a variety of means to ensure as much authenticity as possible; however, Johnson (1996) does suggest that Strokestown Park is not a window enabling people to look in on the past: it is rather a contingent representation of the past. People still live in the house resulting in the past and present colliding with each other to create a valuable historical landscape.

Visitors to Strokestown Park enter through the front door (a rare occurrence in heritage sites) and are introduced to the house via a guided tour. Both visual and verbal narratives are used. The tour is designed to explain the social history of both the British, as well as the Irish people of the area. Visitors have easy access to objects within the house: there is a distinct lack of barriers around displays within the rooms of the house. The owners make no secret of the underground passage-ways that exist in the house thus ensuring that the invisibility of the servant class of the nineteenth century is exposed to twentieth century consumption (Johnson; 1996).

According to Johnson (1996) Strokestown Park house offers a critique of the geographical and social separation of different classes in nineteenth century Ireland, offering a narrative of both the included and excluded people of Irish history of this particular period. The problem, however, is that it is still a selective history, even though it does contest hegemonic interpretations of history. Johnson (1996) suggests that the history offered at Strokestown
Park is not a bogus symbolic history because the people that took the tour interpreted the site differently: some liked the history portrayed, while others did not (Johnson, 1996:564).

Some important connections seem to emerge from the preceding discussion and examples. Both novelty and authenticity are important to the consumer. One without the other cannot exist. The more novelty value something has, however, the less authentic it becomes. Novelty, however, cannot be judged as authentic/inauthentic because it remains outside the realm of the consumers ability to decide if it is authentic and therefore has value: for example, the Wagener Museum at Houhora Heads has novelty value. As mentioned earlier, the displays would also be vulgar if they were not encased in some way.

In order for people to be educated, an object also needs to be authentic. The less authentic an object, the less educational value is to be gained. According to Urry (1990) education is now part of the tourist experience where people either learn new skills or find out about the past in some way. For example, people are educated through visiting museums that bring to life the past in some way. This can be achieved with the use of working models of real machinery from the industrial past. A site can be 'authenticated' through the degree of education it can offer. Education and identity is also important especially for the new middle class who often possess a great deal of educational capital but little economic capital; therefore, identity is forged through educational status rather than economic status.

All the above categories are social constructions of the concept value and are produced by society; however, they are not necessarily consumed in the way the producers of these categories intend. The next section traces the production and consumption of heritage in the built environment. As many cities in Europe are (re)writing their histories as sanitised versions of the past to attract inward investment into their area, local people still have to negotiate the city as part of their everyday lives.

*History and Heritage in 'the City'*

This example looks at the historic built environment in the City of London through the lens of everyday life: that is social life is understood through routine and ordered activities in the 1990s. What is missing from the analysis of the previous section is a focus on how people embodied within, and reproduced as part of the historic landscape, negotiate that landscape
and reproduce it for consumption as heritage.

According to Philo and Kearns (1993:4) the city as cultural capital has two dimensions: 'a resource for economic gain (through attracting inward investment) but also as a device for engineering social consensus (although, ... the emotive quality of culture can often shatter consensus politics)' (Philo & Kearns, 1993:4). White suggests history 'is a living experience at the local level' (quoted in Philo & Kearns, 1993:4): the past means different things to different people so that any 'manipulation of history' (Philo & Kearns, 1993:5) in order to promote a city will always involve highly contested terrain.

As Urry (1990) comments, not all historical landscapes can be appropriated for the tourist gaze. In particular, 'three conditions are necessary ... [in] constructing ... a heritage city. First, there would have to be a number of attractive and reasonably well-preserved buildings from a range of historical periods ... second, such buildings would have to be used for activities in some ways consistent with the tourist gaze ... [and] third ... that the buildings should in some sense have been significant historically, that they stand for or signify important historical events, people or processes' (Urry, 1990:118).

Lefebvre suggests that social space often signifies:

something other than what they appear or seek to signify: specifically, the inability of Capitalism to produce a space other than a capitalist space and its efforts to conceal that production as such, to erase any sign of the maximization of profit (1991:160).

Further, Lefebvre argues that the social space of the city is first experienced through the body:

[sense] of smell and taste ... legs and feet. His [sic] hearing picks up the noises and the quality of the voices; his eyes are assailed by new impressions. For it is by means of the body that space is perceived, lived - and produced (1991:162).

But power is also present within social space through the use of 'strategies': 'their complexity is in proportion to powers resources' (Lefebvre, 1991:162).

The promotion of cities in the late twentieth century for economic and social gain is, according to Philo and Kearns (1993:20) 'not so much that they be genuinely different from
one another but that they harness their surface differences in order to make themselves in a very real sense nothing but 'the same' ... the same pleasant ensemble of motifs (cultural, historical, environmental, aesthetic) drained of anything controversial'.

The surface appearance of the City of London (the square mile that encompasses the present day financial district) seems to be non-controversial: it is for this reason that 'the city' is an excellent example for the final section of this chapter. Indeed, it could be suggested that the City of London manufactures codes of practice for the financial community. The City of London therefore is a living city that produces and reproduces itself continually as a world financial centre. It is also, in many respects, a dying city for much of its creation is past (Lefebvre; 1991). The City of London is a work (that is, it is not repeatable) but it is also made up of products that allowed it to be created such as buildings, roads and sewers. Hence, the City of London as a work does not transcend the products that initially created it (Lefebvre; 1991).

Seen in this way, the City of London can be transformed into an object for the tourist gaze and as such becomes a working museum, an architectural antique and a collectable item. People collect the City of London at a number of levels. People collect tourist sites both through visiting the site and taking photos to enable the experience to be relived once the tourist returns home (Urry; 1990). But the site is also collected by the people who work there.

The City of London as a museum space erases the social relations of its production and the social activities that are contained within the buildings in the present day. As Philo and Kearns note 'the architecture of public buildings was intended to impress with its magnificence, and to make the political order seem immortal through its classical references' (1993: 13).

The dialectic of the City of London as a producer of an object finance, and also as a museum space (both which act as metonyms for value) is worked out in a variety of ways in late twentieth century capitalism. Just how the City of London came to take the shape it did is part of a long drawn out historical process of capitalism, urbanisation and class structure.

Political institutions that become embodied in the built environment appear 'eternal and immutable' to borrow a phrase from Harvey (1989). But these institutions were created for quite pragmatic reasons that are then re-imagined in later epochs to represent a coherent and
stable history of politics and social life over time. These institutions however, are not necessarily stable over time but have been adapted to the changing circumstances of the political economy of European capitalism. The City of London as a world financial centre cannot be understood without recourse to the political institutions that preceded it; this is because these former political institutions are also embodied within the city institutions in the present day. As Lefebvre argues 'no space ever vanishes utterly, leaving no trace' (1991:164).

The Production and Consumption of an Historical Geography: The example of the City of London.

The City of London dates back approximately two thousand years (Barker & Jackson; 1974:9) but it is 'the city' during European capitalism that is of interest to this discussion. Well sited geographically at a natural bridging place on the river Thames, London was part of the complex European trading system and European division of labour in the thirteenth century (Williams; 1963). 'The city' was occupied by numerous foreigners conducting their trade, while on the other hand the English concentrated on wool and cloth exports and the wine, 'spices and mercury [industries] of the Mediterranean'; however, it was only in the fourteenth century that the London merchant class 'were moving into finance' (Williams; 1963:14).

According to Braudel:

[Elizabethan] London was the concentrated area of houses, streets and squares along the [left bank of the] river - all turning their backs on the town; but above all it was the city (160 hectares) as marked out by the old city walls. They stood on the site of the ancient Roman wall, but they had disappeared around the twelfth century on the river front ...[but] they survived in a broken line, very roughly forming an arc of a circle from Blackfriars Steps or Birdwell Dock up to the Tower of London (1973:432).

By the middle of the fifteenth century the major Italian banking families (eg the Medici) had branch offices in London (Cameron; 1989: Kindleberger; 1996: Jardine; 1996); however, it was decisions made by Elizabeth I and her adviser, Thomas Gresham that are predominantly reflected in the present built environment of the financial district of the City of London. For example:
As long as Antwerp functioned effectively as a truly 'international' market place in which the English 'nation' was in control of a special bourse for trade in commodities, Gresham continued to operate out of Antwerp ... But as soon as the relationships between 'nations' in Antwerp became intensely competitive following the crash of 1557-62, Gresham began building a bourse in London in imitation of Antwerp's commodity and stock exchanges with the declared intent of making England independent of foreign 'nations' both in trade and in credit (Arrighi; 1994: 190).

Foreign merchants were driven out of the City of London: for example the Hanseatic League who had 'won rights of extraterritoriality and self-government [in London by] 1281' (Cameron; 1989: 63) 'were stripped of their privileges in 1556 and deprived of the stahlof [the steelyard district] in 1595' (Braudel quoted in Arrighi; 1994: 192).

It is against this backdrop of political consolidation that the Royal Exchange 'had been founded by Thomas Gresham in 1566' (Braudel; 1973: 433). Originally called the Bourse, the name 'Royal Exchange' was granted by Elizabeth I in 1570 (Braudel; 1973: 433; Arrighi; 1994: 190). Allen and Pryke (1994: 460) similarly argue that 'since its inception, from the late 17th century through to the present day, the City of London has shaped and been shaped by the world's financial system'. But the City of London has also been shaped by the world's political and social system.

Pryke (1991: 198) argues the City of London takes a particular spatial form that immunised it against change up until 1984 and even after the 'Big Bang' of 1986 ensured that 'each new 'layer' did not and in fact could not locate elsewhere' (Pryke; 1991: 198). As Pryke (1991: 199) suggests, tradition was an important factor in the design of the old spatial matrix of the financial district especially as 'many of today's financial markets in the City had their origin in the Royal Exchange ... towards the latter part of the eighteenth century, alternative meets continued in the new coffee houses ... [which were] places to gather and discuss business' (Pryke; 1991: 199).

According to Barker and Jackson 'the first coffee house was opened in St Michael's Alley, Cornhill in 1652' (1973: 173): it was in the coffee houses that people not only gleaned local gossip but they also could read news sheets published with all manner of business information. Different coffee houses attracted different types of people; hence if you wished to meet financiers you went 'to Jonathan's in Exchange Alley' (Barker & Jackson; 1973: 173).
The Royal Exchange in the seventeenth century was more than just a finance house; it also originally housed 135 shops around its courtyard (Glennie & Thrift, 1996) and according to Braudel 'attracted a rich clientele' (1973:433). Retail shops in seventeenth century London specialised in 'new commodities, tobacco, tea, sugar, soap, starch, and new fabrics ... long-standing staple goods ... and exotics such as currants, raisins and pepper' (Glennie & Thrift, 1996:31). Destroyed in the Great fire of 1666, the Royal exchange was rebuilt on the same site by Edward Jerman when it too 'was destroyed by fire in 1838' (Mitchell & Leys, 1958:89). The third building to occupy the site still remains to the present day (Barker & Jackson, 1973).

In the sixteenth century (during Elizabeth I reign) 'the heart of the town [of London] beat inside the walls' (Braudel, 1973:433). The authorities tried to limit the growth of London (to stop the poor from emigrating into the city): new buildings within the city were prohibited between 1580 and 1625. To get around these laws, shanties and hovels sprung up on land of dubious ownership while many other houses were split into smaller residences; this ensured the population could continue to emigrate to the city (Braudel, 1973).

Parts of London had been built in brick during the Elizabethan period but the majority was still wooden when the Great Fire broke out in 1666 (Braudel, 1973). As Marmot and Worthington note the 'upper levels cantilevered and almost touched from opposite sides of the streets below - a layout ideally suited for conflagration' (1986:216). Further, 'a strong east wind' and the close proximity of 'warehouses stacked with tallow, oil and spirits' ensured the fire spread very quickly (Barker & Jackson, 1973:143). 'The Great Fire of 1666 destroyed 373 acres of property within the walls of the City of London leaving only 75 acres undamaged' (Marmot & Worthington, 1986:216).

But the greatest innovation of the English was the inauguration of the Bank of England in 1694: 'private creditors were put in control of the management of the public debt' (Arrighi, 1994:206). There was nothing new about this move as it was similar to the Casa di San Giorgio in Genoa; however According to Braudel:

The innovation of the Bank of England was that it added to the functions of deposit and clearing banks those of a deliberately organised issuing bank, capable of offering ample credit in notes (whose total amount in fact far exceeded actual deposits) ... [which] increased the quantity of money (1973:360).
The Bank of England put into circulation notes of between twenty and one thousand pounds sterling. Its activities according to Braudel consisted of ‘discounting Bills of Exchange, ... [giving] massive loans to the state and to the South Sea and East Indies companies, [collecting] taxes in the form of bills of exchange ... and [constantly] exceeding its reserve’ (1973:366). Braudel (1973:366) further suggests the private banks in London and Scotland took advantage of the circulation of the notes of the Bank of England; they also issued notes (because the public were used to using notes) as well as discounting bills of exchange. This effectively ‘formed a pyramid of credit with the Bank of England, a construction at once solid and fragile, at the top’ (Braudel; 1973:366). During the early part of the eighteenth century the Bank of England was given ‘a renewed charter from 1708 and housed in Threadneedle street from 1734’ (Hallsworth; 1992:59).

According to Pryke (1991:200): for three hundred years ‘the Bank of England [has acted] as a spatial guardian of the city’. The Bank of England regulated who may or may not set up a financial business in ‘the city’: this changed only with the Banking Act of 1979. The Bank of England also supervised each individual business ‘personally’ through the discount office where ‘banks used to call upon the principal of the Discount office and present their annual reports ... perhaps twenty-four hours before ... [they] were published’ (Pryke; 1991:207).

According to Thrift ‘the Bank of England insisted that all foreign banks offices were in close proximity to it’ (1994:343) and that all transactions between foreign banks had to pass through a British intermediary: a situation that lasted until 1980 (Pryke; 1991). To be included in the daily rounds of the clearing system meant that ‘institutions had to be within half a mile radius of the Clearing house’ (Thrift; 1994:343). The stock Exchange also regulated its own space ensuring for example that its members located within 700 yards of the Stock Exchange premises (Thrift; 1994).

In the 1990s Electronic flows have replaced many of the tedious activities associated with banking but the boundaries of the old spatial matrix remain intact. Even with the opportunity to relocate to other places nearby like the London Docklands, many firms maintain a presence in the old city even if their back office functions have moved away. Thrift (1994) offers three reasons for the retention of the old spatial matrix. First there is still a need for face to face contact. Second, electronic space has been added onto face to face contact rather than replacing it so that proximity is still important. Third, an identifiable global space for circulating stories, doing deals and forging new relationships is important.
Thrift also suggests 'the city' has a 'strong' social structure based upon highly visible class, gender and ethnic divisions' (1994:338). There were (up until the 1960's), according to Thrift (1994) three distinct classes in the city. First, directors and partners (often being drawn into the landed gentry in the nineteenth century rather than being from the aristocracy per se). Second, a professional and managerial middle class became increasingly necessary as firms increased in size in the nineteenth century. Third, the 'clerical labour force' (Thrift;1994:340) was made up of both middle class and working class people.

'Insiders' in the city observed the correct dress code, were usually men (although women from good family backgrounds could become clerks), were essentially English (or English connected such as Anglo-Jews); otherwise people in 'the City' who were not English were foreigners who were despised 'for starting work early and finishing work late' (Thrift;1994:342). Drawing on the work of Williams, Pryke suggests one of 'the most powerful groups in the [nineteenth century] English bourgeoisie were the City's merchant banking families' (1991:201).

The city guardians sponsored a cosy 'clubiness' that Thrift suggests manifested itself in the 'narrative of the gentleman' (1994:342). Close proximity within the spatial matrix ensured that everybody knew somebody and that the 'gentleman' espoused 'values of honour, integrity, courtesy ... [which were] manifested in ideas of how to act, ways of talk, suitable clothing and so on' (Thrift;1994:342). The idea of the 'gentleman' was an invented tradition, a combination of 'the dominance of City banking by a small group of merchant banks ... [and] the revival and selective reconstitution of the idea of the gentleman ... The product was a financial aristocracy' (Pryke;1991:201-2).

Beyond the social and spatial practices that emanated from the City of London over the last 150 years, there have been quite pragmatic reasons for the spatial matrix of the old city to remain intact. The effectiveness of the London financial system is based on the need for personal contact and daily knowledge of what is going on. The need for informal conversation and talk is extremely important. According to Thrift 'the City's role [is] as a centre of knowledge, expertise and contacts, of narrativity' (1994:349). Further, Thrift goes on to argue that the city as an information centre has four aspects:

The city is a nexus of face to face communication ... is a centre for electronic information gathering and transmission ... is a centre of textual interpretation ... [and] the city is increasingly home to many different global 'epistemic
communities', occupational communities with their own specialized vocabularies, rhetoric's, knowledges, practices and texts' (1994:349-50 original emphasis).

Over the last thirty years there have been challenges to the old spatial matrix and the cosy clubiness policed by the Bank of England and the Stock Exchange. Foreign banks increasingly challenged the authority of the Bank of England with many major foreign banks relocating outside the old spatial matrix, especially in the Aldwych and The Strand: as well may banks challenged the rules of membership within the banking fraternity (Pryke; 1991). By 1983, the Stock Exchange was defending its rules and practices (Thomas; 1989). But other fundamental changes were also occurring at the same time: 'a screen based trading system replaced the central floor; the long-standing distinction between broker and jobber disappeared; ... a new species of market participant was introduced to the market; and the membership rules were speedily relaxed to allow financial interests, both domestic and foreign, to acquire member firms' (Thomas; 1989:19-20).

In the 1990s the City of London, is marketed as a 'centre of cultural authority' (Thrift; 1994:350). Reflexivity and the building of trustworthy working relationships have replaced the gentleman's code of the nineteenth century. The more heterogeneous the participants in the banking fraternity have become the less workable the gentleman's code has become also. What is interesting is that the city has rediscovered its heritage: icons of the past are 'used to 'brand' the City, to boost its image of solidarity and trustworthiness' (Thrift; 1994:350).

The City of London is a major tourist attraction in Britain with three million tourists visiting the city of London each year (Jacobs; 1994). The need to alter the old spatial matrix to fall in line with the needs of new electronic trading (especially large floor areas) came into conflict with the aims of the Corporation of London's local plan to treat much of the area of 'the city' as a conservation area (Pryke; 1991: Marmot & Worthington; 1986). McCormick suggests 'the British environmental movement' which includes the national trust for acquiring and maintaining historic buildings and scenic landscape 'had some 3 million members, or 5.3 percent of the total population [in 1983]. This made it the largest mass movement in British history' (1989:131-2).

The draft local plan's 'aim was to preserve the integrated nature of the City's physical fabric and the historic social relations of the old spatial matrix and the wider City ... 70% of the city core was to be designated as a conservation area' (Pryke; 1991:215-6). Marmot and
Worthington (1989) note that two reactions to the plan occurred. First, new developments at Canary Wharf were mooted for financial institutions. Second, a revised plan was released in 1986 which increased the 'possibilities for large scale private developments ... of at least an additional 20 percent of floor area of the City' (Marmot & Worthington;1989:220-21).

According to Jacobs (1994:360) the 'redevelopment [of Bank Junction] controversy centred on 'heritage: artefactual ... practical ... and ideological'. Further, 'the Corporations defence of a townscape relationship in which the Bank of England (along with Mansion House and Royal Exchange) remains visually dominant is a symbolic reiteration' (Jacobs;1994:367) of the cosy clubiness of upper class values expressed through the narrative of the gentleman. In this way, the Corporation of London hoped to re-invent the 'City of Empire' through conserving the built environment (Jacobs;1994). Yet the 'City of Empire' had yet to be established when many of these institutions were first built.

A coalition of independent retailers and conservationists who objected to the redevelopment 're-imagined' the City of London as a 'city village' where 'independent retailers, the street life of a shopping precinct, [and] the parish' (Jacobs;1994:376) are all considered important aspects of the social and cultural life of any village. Bank Junction was presented 'as a traditional retail centre in the City' (Jacobs;1994:375). Most villages incorporate a church spire and the 'conservationists [advocated] the protection of the view of St Paul's dome and its visual relationship with the more local spire of St Mary-le-Bow' (Jacobs;1994:375). It could also be suggested here that links were also made to the church as the moral guardian of capital. The dome of St Pauls can be seen from Bank Junction. The symbolism of God keeping the bankers in order could be used to imply that not only was the city moral but that any removal of the old city would also remove the morality of finance capital. This is somewhat ironic given that the church has always forbidden usury (Jardine;1996).

Allen and Pryke suggest that 'much of the City's new built form' (1994:463) represents a singular image to the world - high technology trading. Allen and Pryke also argue high technology trading erases from dominant space the 'traditional culture of finance ... [where] conversational dealers, those involved in investment banking and corporate finance ... occupy the most powerful spaces within finance houses' often at the top of buildings where 'oak panelled executive dining rooms [are found] ... purposefully replicating the old City and its class traditions' (1994:463-5).
The abstract space of finance according to Allen and Pryke (1994) masks alternative representations of the same space: cleaning, catering and security. In contrast to the finance staff, cleaners, caterers and security guards re-code space to suit the narrative of their employment: for example, surfaces to be cleaned, spaces to prepare food or rooms to be watched via a television monitor. Often, dominated workers are not visible and often 'only becomes apparent through their non-work' (Allen & Pryke;1994:468). These workers can also code spaces of resistance to dominant space through the appropriation of space on the periphery of formal space: 'a place to put up posters, read newspapers, listen to the radio and the like' (Allen & Pryke;1994:471).

The formal representation of space never completely erases the everyday lived experiences of the different groups that use formal space. Within the city of London, alternative representations of the space of an international financial centre abound, not only within the finance houses but in the retail sector, the conservation movement and the local government. What cannot be denied is that the City of London's built environment is the product of a long drawn out historical process of the political, social and economic fortunes of the British economy. The City's traditions that were originally created for quite pragmatic reasons have been transformed in the 1990's into an object for sale: heritage. But this heritage is sold at two levels: first, to the tourist the City of London represents a working museum of finance while to the financial community this heritage landscape represents trust and dependability. Both strategies, it is hoped, will generate investment in the city.

Conclusion

Consumption discourses have until recently been unreflexive about the role of the consumer and how consumption practices and values are transmitted between individuals (Jackson & Thrift;1995:218). This chapter has attempted to trace consumption patterns since the inception of capitalism as the dominant mode of production in western Europe. Capitalist behaviour did not erase from dominant space earlier forms of production or consumption: these earlier forms still existed; although often modified by technological innovation and the use of wage labour.

Consumption of objects of history, whether of antiquity or the more recent past is intimately tied up with the circulation of capital since the beginning of capitalism. But consumption is also about identity formation; hence, the values invested in material objects and the consumption experience is related to one's identity. But as the feudal system dissolved, so
too did any static notions of community, allowing people to reconstruct their identity into new class relationships. Identity formation under capitalism is class-specific; although people can qualitatively move between classes especially during times of flux, consumption patterns will generally be forged within class contexts.

The middle classes that had emerged in Europe by the seventeenth century represented a powerful majority that could influence political situations. The problem with the fixity of the 'middle class' category is that it is temporally and spatially specific; although there are some connections between the middle classes in for example England, Holland and the USA, their rise to preeminence as well as the role they played in the social life in these particular places is different in each country.

But the middle classes (or a particular sub-group) are tampering with the rigidity of enlightenment categories. A social consensus has been formed by the middle classes about history. To revisit Burke's idea: perhaps a 'chain reaction' is taking place where historical narratives have helped to restructure the identities of those people in the new middle class in such a way that this in turn created a demand for historical texts of this kind. In other words, the new middle classes were looking for something to brand themselves with that was distinctive and different from the old middle classes while at the same time remaining middle class. The heterogeneity of the middle classes allows the different factions to operate internally in a dialectical manner to produce different historical narratives in the 1990s.

Notwithstanding this, the version of nature that the new middle classes have brought forward has had a profound affect on the geography of historical narratives. This version of nature is socially constructed and constrained by the space in which these ideas circulate: it is no more or less authentic than previous versions of nature epitomised in the cabinets of curiosity in the seventeenth century. The middle classes sought to control novelty in the seventeenth century through classification and segmentation; heritage landscapes in the 1990s are no different. They are one way to halt the infinite regress of history and historical narratives and hence the chaos that infinite regress threatens.

The articulation of some historical narratives in the 1990s are also constrained within the circulation of capital and as such must make a profit. Heritage landscapes conceal their production from the tourist gaze in such a way that they appear as coherent, real and authentic versions of history: it also conceals the fact that surplus value is concealed in the
fetishism of commodities by masking the 'expropriation of value by one class at the expense of another' (Lee quoted in Jackson & Thrift, 1995: 220).

But a social consensus is necessary, indeed vital, if these historical narratives are to be successful tourist ventures. If tourists require an authentic real experience then the tourist must become part of the production of social space; otherwise they are merely spectators to an historical geography of the present in which they play no part. For tourists, the fascination of the City of London is the ability to get 'backstage' and be a part of an authentic social experience of the past that is being reproduced in the present.

Ultimately, tourist sites cannot recover the everyday lives of people because no historical narrative can ever be completely recovered and reproduced for the tourist gaze: initial omissions in any historical reproduction will lead onto further omissions. But people, both tourists and non-tourists, negotiate these sites in multiple and complex ways that makes the phenomenon difficult to theorise except through an historical materialist inquiry.

The dialectic of class and history ensures that historical reproductions are not consumed in ways that the producers of the tourist sites expect. As Jackson and Thrift argue '[discussions using] metaphors of visibility, reflection and the gaze have ... tended to overlook the practices and values of consumers' (1996: 218) as active and embodied social actors. Further, consumption discourses tend to 'glorify the market' (1996: 220) in such a way that production is downgraded. But production and consumption operate dialectically to produce historical outcomes that are transformed into heritage: it is this dialectic, through forging an alliance with the new middle class that legitimates the heritage site as authentic in the 1990s.

In the same way collectables are valued for their non-intrinsic properties (Belk, 1994) so too Teo & Yeoh (drawing on MacCannell) suggests 'tourists can deliberately select qualities which they deem of value' ((1997: 193 original emphasis). Through this process, tourists expectations shape the concept 'value' in the tourist landscape and act as a mediating force between the consumption of history as nostalgia and the commodification of history as heritage.
CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

The concept of value, identity and history have been discussed in this thesis as temporally and spatially specific. By using a windows approach to the discussion, it has been possible to show how different processes are connected and can operate in social space contemporaneously; however, because time and space did not allow for an extended discussion of other places and societies the examples used in this thesis have been drawn from 'the West'.

One of the aims of this thesis has been to trace the development of a capitalist/modernist space since the Renaissance: a space that is produced and consumed through the dialectical movement of the mode of production and the mode of representation. Within this capitalist/modernist space several other dialectics are evident: the transformation of nature through economic imperatives which are then mediated by the cultural dimension. The dialectical movement of economy and culture produces a time lag. The production of a capitalist space does not imply that all other modes of production are erased from social space, but they can be erased from dominant space. As a result of this time lag many crises in the mode of production and representation occurred in the material world as social actors sought to define the ethos of modern life.

The ideals of West Europeans constantly switched between secular and Christian, classical and modern, vanity and piety, progress and tradition, facts and values and most importantly between science and philosophy. That these categories are mutually constitutive rather than reduced to their opposites has never been more obvious than in the search by West Europeans for a singular truth and a way to represent that singular truth. The fact that multiple truths and perspective’s were always explored in the aesthetic realm seems to have been overlaid by a 'brutal economism' (Lefebvre;1991) that has attempted to reduce the concept of production to objects and things (products) that are ripe for exploitation by "the market".
Material life however, produced its own antithesis: that is the individual subject became alienated from other subjects and increasingly, as wage labour became more common, alienated from their own selves. Cartesian philosophy is partly to blame for this separation; although Descartes should not be held responsible for all the re-workings of Cartesian philosophy that have taken place since the seventeenth century. But Cartesian philosophy did have a profound affect on European thinking and the way the world outside Europe was categorised. This can clearly be seen in the example of the cabinets of curiosity that emerged during the Renaissance in Italy and then spread throughout Europe as the twin processes of capitalism and material life expanded to incorporate the Netherlands, Germany, France and England.

There are three ways in which this capitalist/modernist space is implicated in the construction of historical narratives in the 1990s: the production of class relationships, the production of a new way of making history following the Cartesian revolution and the production of capital within specific capital circuits. Each of these points will be summarised in turn.

First, this capitalist/modernist space has produced class relationships: the upper, middle and lower classes are themselves related to each other as well as to the different factions within each class. The heterogeneity of class relationships ensures that products and works are not produced and consumed in a linear fashion. The development of the middle classes in Western Europe is very much a consequence of capitalism and modernity; however, in order for the middle classes to emerge in particular places and at particular times, political and cultural processes had to interact within the capitalist mode of production to produce the middle classes. This could only happen, however, if a particular merchant/commercial class were sufficiently encapsulated within a proto-capitalist framework.

Class factions however, are not independent autarchic enclaves; they form coalitions with other class factions for similar but independent ends. While the means used by the coalitions may create the same outcomes, the purpose behind the coalitions may not be the same. Further, the production of social narratives does not involve a singular voice: multiple voices are not just class based but they represent other sectors of society such as gender, ethnic, religious and political groups, who will also join in coalitions to pursue a social consensus over political issues; in the 1990s many of these coalitions have been involved in preserving nature, wildlife and historical artefacts.
The middle classes (of which the new middle class is a constitutive element) have restructured the historical narratives that are available in the 1990s and have harnessed them not only for profit, but as an important ideological weapon. This vanguard action by the middle classes has been mobilised through forming coalitions with the patrons of alternative histories of both nature and of culture. These alternative histories are then remodelled so that they are acceptable to the majority of the factions within the coalition, while ideologically erasing from hegemonic space those parts of the alternative histories that do not fit, or are unacceptable to the majority. In other words, social actors arrive at a consensus over the history being presented. It is worth re-quoting Eagleton here: people 'negotiate [their] freedom with those determinations set upon it both by nature, and by the right to self-determination of others' (1997:269). In other words, not all histories are for sale.

Once these restructured histories have been accepted by the majority of people perhaps it can be claimed that a chain reaction is taking place where alternative historical narratives have helped to restructure the identities of those people in the new middle class in such a way that this in turn created a demand for historical texts of this kind.

There is however, no single answer to the question of how history will be consumed in capitalist countries in the 1990s: what may become a profitable heritage site in one geographical location may be a failure in another. In this respect, du Gay's (1996) argument that people translate commodified objects from an alienable to an inalienable condition is particularly relevant. Promoters of objects or experiences of history will do well to remember that a singular model of consumer behaviour cannot predict the successful outcome of any heritage site. But even more important is to remember that people both fashion a space and are fashioned by that space: the everyday lives of people matter.

Second, this capitalist modernist space has produced a new way of making history; a history that separates subjects from objects and facts from values. The subjective nature of history is embodied within objects of history; however, this subjectivity is erased from the dominant space of representation such as heritage sites, museums and private collections of antiques and memorabilia.

When history is objectified it becomes fixed, bounded, individualised and alienated. Further, social actors use language to describe these objects as if the social relations of production did not exist. Objects then become a metonym for value and as such are deemed to be
authentic. As a result of the dialectical movement of authenticity and falsity, anything objectified is authentic, while anything subjective is false.

Authenticity takes on another role in capitalist/modernist space: it is related to novelty. This dialectic has played an important ideological role in Western Europe from the Renaissance onwards as a way of categorising the world outside Europe and indeed outside of a person's realm of reality. Novelty also exists when it is objectified in some way: thus we see order placed on novelty through the cabinets of curiosity and in museums that dealt with exotic animals and human freaks. By turning subjects into objects, social actors also turn chaos into order.

Over time, cabinets of curiosity and the museums of fine art became polarised at opposite ends of the nature/culture dialectic: cabinets of curiosity equated with popular culture (closer to nature) while museums equated with high culture (elitism). Yet the museums and the cabinets of curiosity were also one way of halting the infinite regress of history: like the camera, they produce a snapshot view of history that is often enframed on all sides by alternative representations of history.

Novelty has a price; that which people are prepared to pay for themselves to be classified as authentic, real and ordinary. As a result, people will most often define their identity in the negative: what they are not. This is particularly true of the middle classes: the new middle class is no exception. If luxury is related to novelty then something that is luxurious may not necessarily be authentic: it may also be quite tasteless. This process occurs in the gentrification of older areas where houses and streets are re-invented as sanitised versions of the past: Stoke Newington discussed in chapter four is one such example. The problem with this dialectic is that it makes a mockery of hegemonic representation and how these representations are consumed: for example, the new middle class is defining itself as ordinary and mundane by using inauthentic and often tasteless versions of the past.

Third, during the Renaissance, people could purchase for themselves social status and prestige as a way of making 'new money' acceptable. This process occurred throughout the modern period and indeed still occurs in the present day; the new middle class is still using 'new wealth to buy themselves social status and prestige through the need to acquire and display objects or experiences of the past.
Conspicuous consumption of objects of history is also considered a commercial investment: since the Renaissance and right up to the present day exchange value and identity value have operated dialectically to produce price at any given time for an object. The subjective value of the object to the purchaser is always embodied within the object and reflected in the price of the object. This also applies to objects that are not for sale. Prices can vary but values do not according to Harvey (1982); however, this appears to be a minor contradiction. Value is a slippery concept that can be viewed dialectically: the original value embodied within the object (socially necessary labour time) is still the same irrespective of the price paid by the purchaser; however, the subjective value of the object to the purchaser is different from the value created in the production process.

In the 1990s, it has been suggested that people in capitalist countries desire historical narratives that are rooted in vernacular styles, whether novel or authentic. The collecting of memorabilia as opposed to antiques is operating within the novelty/authenticity dialectic. Objects and experiences can also be authentically inauthentic. This gives "the market" a great deal of scope to pursue multiple narratives with an almost limitless combination of texts and styles: the endless historical simulacrum.

The consumption of history, however, does not fit easily into Harvey's discourse on the circuits of capital. In point of fact, it could be suggested that the production of historical objects, whether for private purchase or as heritage sites, whether, new (fake) or old (authentic) is 'new production' that embodies living labour. At this level, the production of history is operating within the classical boundaries of capitalism and is a way for individual capitalists to sustain their respective markets. When over-production occurs in commodity production, capital can switch into investment in re-inventing the built environment as a sanitised version of the past.

Individual capitalists (often with government incentives or by purchasing property at discount prices) can re-develop derelict areas; thus new consumption areas are established for particular classes of people, especially the new middle class. Stoke Newington is a particularly good example of a gentrified area that manufactures a particular historical image to the new middle class. But the potential for that image had to already exist. The same is true of the City of London. The image of 'the city' as a villagescape is a manufactured one; but one that also had the potential to exist. This dialectic is important when it is promoted by those classes who hold the balance of political power.
Capital that switches into the consumption fund can often produce 'non-values' (Harvey, 1982: 194) in the form of luxury items for the bourgeoisie. Examples of this type of conspicuous consumption by the middle classes has been around since the inception of capitalism; it has been a way of staving off long run capital crises. Art for example, can be a commercial investment that can be traded on the art market in much the same way as shares are traded on the share market.

In many respects, the production and consumption of history exist simultaneously in all of Harvey's (1982) capital circuits. The devaluation of capital in fixed infrastructure allows capitalists to benefit at the expense of other capitalists, but such devaluation does allow capital to circulate (albeit discounted) as productive capacity once more.

Long run capital crises are inevitable, however, and arise out of the contradictory nature of individual capitalists who pursue absolute and relative surplus value that ultimately cannot be absorbed through re-investment in current production or through final consumption. The consumption of historical objects and experiences may represent a commercial investment for individual capitalists but it also represents more than the ability of the capitalist mode of production to sustain capital markets in the late twentieth century: it represents the dialectical movement of economy and culture.

As Western capitalist countries approach the fin de siècle, individual capitalists are making a profit out of the century in which modernity reached its peak. Indeed, global media such as television, radio, video and telecommunications technology such as the internet have attempted to reduce social space to the simulacrum of the middle class living room. Yet the producers of the millennium celebrations advocate specific local places to the beginning of the twenty-first century: the first place in the world to see the new day. The implication of time in the production of specific and localised millennium celebrations confirms Lefebvre's suggestion that social space is produced by time which is in turn reproduced through time.

The economic producers of the history of the past and the history of the future are still constrained by past political institutions. The meridian at Greenwich, which is a product of nineteenth century British hegemony, dictates which place in the world will see the new day first. Move the meridian and we move the place to see the first dawn of the first day of the twenty-first century. History could be re-written at the stroke of a pen!! The same is true of the institutions in the City of London: the Bank of England, the Stock Exchange and many other institutions are brought together under the icon of the 'city of empire'.
Traditions are invented, but not arbitrarily. At first glance, it would appear that there should be no limit to the amount of historical narratives (past or futuristic) a person may consume; however, there is a limit in what type of historical narratives can be produced for consumption. For it is at the point of production that, as Harvey (1996) noted, the maximum transformation of the dialectic of production distribution, exchange and consumption can take place.

For people to consume objects and experiences of history, these objects and experiences must first be produced both physically and ideologically as heritage and nostalgia. The producers of heritage and nostalgia in the 1990s draw on authenticity and education as legitimating consumers identity when they purchase objects and experiences of the past. If people believe the 'facts' being (re)presented are reasonably accurate then local people are also more likely to accept the site by continually using the site in their everyday lives. As the example of Tiger Balm gardens and Haw Par Villa showed, both tourists and non-tourists in the 1990s desire to be educated by the history they consume as well as having a site that has some relationship to the lived experiences of the past. Local people play an important part in the legitimation process of a heritage site: this is because tourists wish to get backstage to capture an authentic social experience.

The producers of heritage and nostalgia may also use the opposite of authenticity and education (novelty and entertainment) by defining the object or experience in the negative. No matter how the producers of heritage and nostalgia formulate their production of objects and experiences of history, consumers will always negotiate such objects and experiences in multiple and hybrid ways.

The category 'history' operates dialectically between the fixity of heritage sites and the liminality of an historical geography of the present. This dialectic has always existed in capitalist/modernist space in order to produce social outcomes that appeared as a coherent representation of modern life. Heritage sites, museums, antiques and memorabilia can never be used in such a way that they fully recover the past in the present moment, but selective parts of an historical narrative can be used in the present as an integral part of the production of a new social space: it is at this level that the tourist and the collector can gain an authentic real experience. For example no heritage site can enable a person to relive some-one else's experience (even though this is what many of these sites offer) but the sites do enable the
consumer the opportunity to create a new narrative in the present based on a manufactured historical experience.

The outcome of these historical experiences are related to the company a person is with, together with the general atmosphere and ambience of the social situation. At this level heritage sites are also authentic: to re-quote The Tales of Robin Hood 'welcome to your own adventure'.

Historical narratives do not have to be exactly correct in (re)presenting history as heritage: they can be manufactured for the tourist gaze so long as local people accept the manufactured narrative. Thus the producers of heritage sites will do well to remember that local people are an important factor in legitimating a site.

People acquire historical information at a variety of levels; not only through academic discourse but as Urry (1990) pointed out biographies and historical novels also provide people with historical 'facts'. To re-quote Urry 'it is not obvious that the heritage industry's account is any more misleading' (1990:112). The values placed on historical narratives are not fixed for all time but they are embedded in the situation at hand. The acquisition of antiques and collectables is also an act of the present. The objects collected not only provide the collector with a pleasant memory of the acquisition experience but it can also give the collectors a sense of connectedness to a more distant past.

If history is related to identity and identity is continually adapting to new situations then so too are the values imbued in objects of history and coherent representations of history. The consumption of history as heritage is both contingent and historical. As the examples of the gentrification of Stoke Newington and the redevelopment of Bank Junction have shown representations of history can change depending on which particular class is articulating the history: even a hegemonic representation of history can change as coalitions between class factions seek to preserve histories for different reasons.

Even though hegemonic representations of history may appear to win the day, these representations are neither permanent nor eternal: they are constantly under construction and re-construction. Hegemonic representations cannot exist without a hegemonic mode of production (such as capitalism) that will always seek to undermine alternative economic and social strategies; although like the car boot fair in Britain these alternative strategies are never completely erased from dominant space but are often articulated in subversive ways.
Hegemonic and critical histories operate dialectically in the 1990s; a hegemonic representation will contain constitutive elements of alternative histories and vice versa. It is worth borrowing an idea from de Certeau (in du Gay; 1996) here: critical histories do not manifest themselves through their own autonomous representations but in relation to ways of using representations from above. The example from Strokestown Park in Ireland was used to show that people negotiated an historical narrative independent of, but also infused with hegemonic representations. Further, the history presented at Strokestown Park will be partial because, even though areas within the house were not roped off, they were already encased as a display for tourist consumption.

Lefebvre (1991) has argued that capitalism is unable to produce anything other than a capitalist space. It follows then that modernism is similarly unable to produce anything other than a modernist space. But as Lefebvre (1991) also suggested the dual aspect of a capitalist/modernist space produced particular socio-economic outcomes in particular places and at particular times. If the production and consumption of history as heritage and nostalgia is contingent and historical then by taking a longue durée approach to the production of a capitalist/modernist space it becomes obvious that the production of a postmodern space is nothing new. The tensions embodied within capitalist modernist space have existed since the Renaissance. Further, the history that is being produced in the 1990s is a history of a capitalist/modernist space. This idea can be understood dialectically: the production of a capitalist modernist space produces its own particular history; a history which in turn reproduces a capitalist modernist space. The capitalist space that embodies an historical imagination is necessarily richer in content than its constituent parts.

The dialectic of economy and culture and modernity and postmodernity all provoke conflicts along their respective boundaries. The temporal realm allows social actors to change the way that history is both understood and articulated. The production of an historical space in the 1990s as heritage and nostalgia is about the production of social power. The history of capitalist/modernist space is being re-written in the 1990s through the use of alternative histories by powerful groups in society. This does not mean that capitalist/modernist space is at an end: far from it. Social actors may be producing new historical commodities for 'the market' but at the same time these commodities are still constrained to circulate within a predominantly capitalist/modernist space.
It has already been stressed that the debate over whether western capitalist countries have moved into the postmodern epoch cannot be resolved within the scope of this thesis or at this time. It can be pointed out, however, that the dispute over modernism and economy versus postmodernism and culture is nothing new. As Wernick (1984) suggested, conflicts over the boundaries have existed since the inception of capitalism. It is important to realise then, that even though western capitalist countries may be heading towards a postmodern future, this future is produced within capitalist/modernist space. Capitalist/modernist space will, of necessity, be embedded within a postmodern space and at the beginning of our postmodern future, it will constitute a good proportion of postmodernity. A postmodern future will contain many postmodernities as conflicts are provoked along the seams of capitalist/modernist space. Eventually, when enough postmodernities have altered capitalist modernist space to such an extent, then social actors may wish to give contemporary social space another label. At the risk of being trite, a simple (but problematic) analogy may sum this idea up: (post)feudalism was transformed into the Renaissance.

The dispute over the boundaries of economy/modernity and culture/postmodernity have not done away with capitalist modernist space but instead have introduced a new set of social and economic constraints. Alternative consumption sites such as the car boot fair in Britain is indicative of the extent in which many groups of people access goods and services (including credit and finance) that would not be possible in the formal sector.

In this (post)modern future, many people are still excluded from formal representations of space; these groups of people are different from the excluded groups of people from previous epochs. The coalitions that are formed over the history that is being (re)presented is about social power and social comment. In the 1990s, the 'constraints of the market' ideology masks a consensus politics over who is or who is not included in an everyday life. An everyday life requires a degree of affluence and the new middle class is accessing an everyday life to the exclusion of ethnic minorities and the working classes.

There is nothing new in these ideas except that they are grounded in the 1990s; hence, the outcomes may be different while the structures remain the same. On average, the business cycle produces a relatively stable phase of capitalist development followed by structural crises when the conditions for capitalist development are blocked. These 'regimes of accumulation' (Tickell & Peck, 1992:193) or 'Kondratiev waves' (Dicken, 1992) or the 'accumulation cycle' (Harvey, 1982) have been shown, empirically at least, to have occurred throughout capitalist/modernist history.
But the structures that underwrite capitalism are still there. Crises are still manifest in the over-production and under-consumption of commodities, capital is still locked into fixed infrastructures awaiting release and the circulation of finance capital ultimately cannot create absolute surplus value in the economy. When the conditions are ripe, when both capital and labour are devalued, when crises are manifest in the capitalist economy both temporally and spatially, then the engine of capitalism is able to start again.

But individual capitalists do not act alone. They form coalitions with other capitalists over who is or who is not included in an everyday capitalist/modernist life. And as for history: history as ideology is a very powerful idea and is used by powerful groups in society such as the new middle class. What this means in the 1990s is that every person in western capitalist countries can purchase a history so long as they can afford to pay for it. The metaphor/metonymy dialectic is instructive here: capitalist/modernist space erases history as ideology and leaves history as a commodity to view. This process parallels progress as ideology in the nineteenth century and consumerism as ideology in the twentieth century.

This rather circular argument brings the discussion back to the original question posed at the beginning of this thesis: how is value and identity produced in late twentieth century capitalism and can this be related to the current consumption of history? As Harvey (1982) argued, when wage labour becomes general, production and consumption are separated by relations of exchange. The relationships of exchange between producers and consumers erases from view the use values of commodities. Further, prices and values are not necessarily equal.

As noted in chapter one, value is a social relation: in its simplest form it is the relationship between two independent individuals who wish to exchange the products of their labour for other commodities. But this relationship is obscured by the commodities themselves. Producers relate to each other through the commodities they produce so that social relationships are fetishised into material relationships that are exchanged for a price.

Identity is also a social relationship that is fetishised into class relationships. The reduction of class relationships to a two class model under a Marxian analysis obscures the fluidity of class relationships as well as the multiple and hybrid ways in which people located within specific class positions operate. Harvey's (1982) point that the relationship between capital and labour was never a pre-given universal category (but arises out of a specific historical
process that allows social actors to call society a capitalist society) is particularly relevant to this argument. For if the boundaries of capitalism are still intact (even if embattled on all sides), then to revisit Lee's idea, surplus value is concealed in the fetishism of commodities by masking the 'expropriation of value by one class at the expense of another' (Lee quoted in Jackson & Thrift; 1995:220).

A conclusion is impossible, yet a conclusion can be drawn from the analysis contained in this thesis. The contradictory nature of the previous statement can occur under a dialectical methodology because all resolutions are temporary and contingent. What can be concluded, therefore, is that the value produced in the production process is not the same as the value produced in the consumption process but they are dialectically related. The production process transforms an inalienable object (which embodies labour power) into an alienable object through the exchange process into a commodity for sale and consumption. During the consumption process, this object is transformed into an inalienable object that has a value that cannot be reduced to the labour power embodied in the object during the production process. The object does not assume the same inalienable condition as it did before it was offered for exchange: at the very least, the object assumes a different use value.

It follows then that history is produced and consumed in the same way. Historical objects in their inalienable condition, even if produced under different modes of production, can become alienated through the exchange process by being transformed into heritage. This alienated history known as heritage, is transformed once again through the consumption process into an inalienable condition. This 'new' history does not assume the inalienable condition of the old history because it has been transformed through the production/consumption nexus of exchange. How value is measured in the transformed history that has been both produced and consumed is the subject of an historical materialist inquiry into the value of historical objects in particular places and at particular times.

It is the contingent nature of the relationship between the production and consumption of history that has allowed the disparate collection of examples to co-exist in this thesis. The production and consumption of history in different places and at different times is not the same yet the relationships that these objects embody can be discussed in an abstract way to show that similar processes and structures are operating in particular places at particular times; processes that can produce such different outcomes as my husband's golf club collection, the cabinets of curiosity, Haw Par Villa and Tiger Balm gardens, Strokestown
Park, the Wagener Museum, the Tales of Robin Hood, the Alamo, Wigan Pier and the Museum of Science and Technology at Manchester, and the City of London.

These underlying processes and structures cannot be understood from a purely economistic perspective any more than they can be understood from a purely cultural perspective. It is the dialectic of history as ideology and history as a commodity that underpins the preceding discussion and connects the seemingly unconnected examples used in this thesis. Objects of history, like 'the economy' and the 'culture' do not explain why particular outcomes exist in the places and the times that they do. These outcomes are something that need to be explained; an explanation that can be provided by a dialectical understanding of the underlying processes and structures of Capitalism and (post)modernity.
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