“You Bring It, We’ll Bring It Out”
Becoming a Soldier in the New Zealand Army

A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Social Anthropology at Massey University Manawatū, New Zealand.

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Abstract

The transition from civilian to soldier is a process of identity acquisition. Based on participant-observation, this thesis follows a cohort of new soldiers through the first year and a half of their careers in the New Zealand Army, from their first day of Basic Training to their first overseas deployment. Both the Army as an institution and its individual soldiers are explicitly self-reflexive, and I use not only academic theory but also soldiers’ own theories of identity and identity acquisition to make sense of the experience of becoming a soldier. I show that although recruits undergo change in becoming soldiers, they simultaneously retain pre-service identities. Using Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice, I argue that civilians join the Army because of a shared “primary habitus”, a pre-existing identification with action, productivity and continual self-improvement through facing challenges that forms recruits’ earliest embodied understandings of themselves. The relationship between this “practical” habitus and the new soldier habitus to be acquired is key to understanding the civilian-soldier transition. While civilians draw on and thus fulfil the primary practical habitus in becoming soldiers during initial training periods, once socialised they find the Army much less challenging, and therefore may find that their need to be involved in meaningful action is not met. Although the practical habitus is behind and can make sense of the cohort’s actions, it is a mode of identity that has not often been recognised as such by academics, due to the fact that they do not share it. However, I show that it is more important in generating soldiers’ practice than the modes of identity that are usually employed to understand them: gender, sexuality, ethnicity and nationality. Therefore, I argue that anthropologists should not limit analysis to traditional axes of identity.
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For the boys
This thesis is longer than is standard for a Massey University PhD thesis, for the following reasons. During Nina’s fieldwork she was offered the opportunity to deploy to the Solomon Islands on a RAMSI mission, and thus was able to follow some of her participants from their first day in the army through to their first deployment. Taking up this unique opportunity meant that fieldwork was longer than usual, which resulted in an extra ethnographic chapter and an extra contextual chapter.

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Chapter One

Introduction

“We’re going to change so much,” a recruit declared in the first week of Basic Training. In doing so, he summed up both why he and his fellow recruits had joined the Army, and why they were so excited about it. It wasn’t just what they were going to change into—soldiers—that was motivating them, but also change for its own sake: “Have I changed yet?” Recruits asked me this question often. They asked anybody that they thought might know the answer.

In order to change enough to pass Basic Training, the most important thing the recruits had to learn was to “display the qualities of a soldier.” This was made clear to us in a lecture by the recruits’ Officer Commanding (OC). We were told that everyone had come from completely different cultures and backgrounds, and had arrived with traits that were acceptable to their whānau¹ and mates. Each recruit was like a piece of paper, with these traits written on them in pencil. Some of these pencilled in traits were acceptable in a soldier, but some were not: “we will get the eraser out and rub them out and write the Army values in there in indelible ink.” It was these soldier qualities “against which your performances will be assessed”. Continual failure to display the qualities of a soldier was the primary reason that any one of the New Zealand Army’s newest members would be removed from Basic Training. Throughout the course, in meetings like this, the recruits would nervously ask the OC what would happen if they failed their physical assessments (Required Fitness Levels (RFL), Battle Efficiency Tests (BET)). The OC would always respond by trying to draw their attention back to soldier qualities instead: “No one has ever failed [Basic Training] because of an RFL or a BET.” “Qualities”, in this lecture, were defined as “character traits and attributes which give you a certain persona or ability and make you the person you are.” That is, it was “the person you are” that the Army would be assessing. The recruits should be focusing not just on how many push ups they could do or how much

¹ “Extended family” (Moorfield, 2011, p.257).
weight they could carry, but on their identity. The soldier qualities that the recruits needed to display were derived from a range of official Army documents, and included the Army’s four official values of “3C”: Courage, Commitment, Comradeship, and Integrity.

However, when the OC turned away from official lesson plan to explain the acquisition of soldier identity in his own words, he too was irrepressibly drawn to activities that are done, rather than things that may be “displayed”. Nouns like “qualities”, “traits” and “attributes” disappeared, and he spoke about identity change in terms of actions instead:

I guarantee that by the time you get home for the mid-course break, you won’t be able to sleep past 0600. By the time your parents get up you’ll be up, have vacuumed the lounge, gone for a run, cooked your breakfast and done the dishes.

Despite the official focus on “values”, what changes specifically in the transition from civilian to soldier is the ways in which you act. Your identity is how many push ups you can make yourself do. And it isn’t just the way that you act in the Army itself that is under scrutiny, but, as seen in the example above about what would happen when you got back home, the ways in which you act everywhere. Soldiers’ definition of soldiering is, however, even more simple than this. At the heart of it, it is not the ways in which you act, but the fact that you act at all, that makes you a soldier. Soldiers, the OC told us, are the guys at car crashes who don’t just watch, but jump in and help. If you turn up at the pub, and some guy is beating on his wife, it’s the soldiers who step in rather than stand by. Six months later, a soldier telling me and one of his mates how he had changed from the beginning of Basic Training chose this example: when the Corporals used to call for volunteers, he would look down, trying to make himself invisible, hoping not to be noticed. Now when they called for volunteers, “I just volunteer”.

Another informant asked me if “how long it takes to be able to switch on” was in my study, “because that is what a soldier is”: someone who can switch on instantly. If you are switched on you are fully functional and operating at 100%, alert, aware of everything around you and poised to respond; this enables you to snap into action as soon as anything happens (someone starts beating his missus in the pub; your Corporal asks for volunteers; you are suddenly and unexpectedly deployed; you run into enemy contact). You need to be able to switch on at a moment’s notice, no matter what you were doing when the call came
or how relaxed you were in your “switched off” state. If a soldier is someone who will always act, to be a soldier you need to always be ready to act.

This is an anthropological thesis that follows members of a cohort of new riflemen through the first year and a half of their careers in the New Zealand Army. It begins with their first day of Basic Training and ends when they walk through the airport arrival gates at the end of their first deployment. On the ethnographic level, this thesis is about how this group of civilians became soldiers. Therefore on the theoretical level it is about identity and the processes of identity acquisition. The New Zealand Army is an all-volunteer force, meaning that everyone was there by choice, and the cohort that I followed were Regular Force (RF), that is, full-time soldiers. “Riflemen” is the name given to members of the infantry: the combat soldiers on the frontlines of war, or those that provide security in peacekeeping operations. Riflemen progress through several different Army units in the first stages of their careers. Mirroring this progression, I spent four to five months embedded with each of four different units in four different geographical locations over the course of two years. I did not follow any one soldier or small group of soldiers through each of these four stages, but rather the cohort of new riflemen in general, with some familiar and some new representatives of this cohort in each new platoon. Embedded first with a platoon of soldiers of all occupational specialties at Basic Training, I then followed the riflemen to their specialised “Combat Corps” Training Course. Once training was completed, I spent time with some of the new soldiers in an infantry battalion based in camp in New Zealand, and finally accompanied a platoon on their deployment as part of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands.

The key to understanding the civilian-soldier transition, I found, was the relationship between two identities: the new soldier identity to be taken on, as well as a pre-existing identity that the recruits already had upon their arrival at Basic Training. As in the paragraph with which I began this introduction, the fact that the recruits were focused on changing their identity for change’s sake was just as important as the fact that they had chosen “soldier” to change into specifically, and this desire was a central aspect of the identity with which they had arrived. The two identities on which I will therefore focus - soldierhood, and what I will call, following Pierre Bourdieu, the “practical habitus”- are not modes of identity often discussed by anthropologists. Once I had completed my fieldwork, and attempted to
write my literature review, I found that the ethnographic question of how it was that my informants had become soldiers could not be answered by drawing on the axes of identity we most often use in anthropology. When anthropologists examine identity, they traditionally employ a limited range of types: gender, sexuality, ethnicity, nationality, class and religion. When academics discuss soldierhood, therefore, they most commonly focus on gender and subsume soldierhood under masculinity. None of these modes of identity, however, resonated with how my informants thought of themselves, or therefore seemed useful for understanding their identity projects. In terms of the first identity that I focus on, soldierhood, I argue that it is not in fact reducible to masculinity. And I had trouble finding the identity that recruits had arrived with amongst the traditional axes at all. While my informants differed from one another along the axes of gender, ethnicity and class, they were more similar to one another than not. Further to this, I myself was similar to many of them along some of these axes, and yet was more different to them than not. There was something fundamental about my informants’ identity that these traditional modes of analysis were missing: regardless of ethnicity, gender or class, the recruits primarily identified themselves through their relationship to action and productive activity. They were people who did things. This relationship was so important to their self-perception as to not only itself be a mode of identity, but to be their central mode of identity.

Thus to answer the ethnographic question of how my informants became soldiers, I have had to go beyond the usual axes of identity at the theoretical level. I couldn’t name this mode of identity after the way insiders speak of it, because they don’t speak of it; it is so obvious to them that it goes unnoticed. I finally found a name for the mode of identity that seemed missing through the work of Pierre Bourdieu, working backwards from his discussion of another group: academics themselves. In the simplest possible terms, it’s about being a doer, rather than a thinker (as a member of the Army tasked to review my thesis succinctly put it, cutting through my much more opaque theoretical language). Bourdieu’s (1990b; 2000) work suggests that a primary identification with action is not amongst those axes that academics commonly discuss because they don’t notice it. This is because academics don’t identify in this way themselves; they primarily think the world rather than act in it, and presume everyone is like them. Bourdieu argues that scholars are distanced from practice and practicality and fail to see that others may be immersed in
practice and practicality. From this point of view, identity is not in fact about being, or about “the person that you are.” Rather, it is about doing, and soldiers conceptualise identity through a verb: becoming. It is not what you think or believe that is important when you are a soldier, but what you do, and critically, not only what you do because of what you feel, but what you do despite this. It is choosing whether or not (often not) to act on your own emotions and opinions. Not acting on these is an act in and of itself, in that it takes will. To academics, a change in practice may not seem as fundamental an identity change as one in the beliefs or feelings that caused the practice in the first place, but that is only because academics privilege thought over action.

Although this is quite an unconventional ethnography in that soldiers are an unusual subject for anthropology (see Chapter Three) it is, in another way, a very traditional ethnography in that its main aim is to understand becoming a soldier from the informants’ own point of view. This doesn’t just mean understanding the informants’ civilian-soldier transition from their point of view, but also looking at what this reveals about their own theories of identity and identity acquisition. It was not only myself who was interested primarily in identity and identity acquisition during my fieldwork, but also the trainee soldiers themselves and the Army as an institution, although my informants’ theories were of course much more practical and less abstract than mine. My primary goal is to take the ways in which soldiers understand identity seriously. Briefly, as above, soldiers conceptualise identity through becoming, and therefore see identity and identity acquisition as one and the same. Identity should not be something that is stable, but rather in process. This process should be demanding, but always in a way that is productive and that lets them build on their past selves, rather than replace them. It is on this basis- soldiers’ own understandings of identity and identity acquisition- that I will critique previous academic understandings of soldier identity and the process of acquiring it.

It is therefore the relationship between soldierhood and the pre-existing primary identification with action that forms the core of this thesis. This relationship is helpfully summed up by a New Zealand Army recruiting slogan: “You bring it, we’ll bring it out”. That is, the recruits bring the pre-existing “practical” identity that will allow them to become soldiers with them when they join the Army, and the Army provides them with conditions that allow them to perform and embody it more fully than elsewhere. My argument is that
although change is effected in recruits—just like they wanted—it is achieved by drawing on this pre-existing identity, which is not replaced but melded with the soldier identity. The practical identity lay beneath and could make sense of my informants’ differing reactions to the four different Army units I saw them pass through over two years, even after they had fully internalised the soldier identity and this too began to generate their responses. The pre-existing practical identity could in fact still trump the soldier identity if it came to it, as will be seen in the later stages of this thesis. This is because the thesis doesn’t cover only the time period in which soldier identity was acquired, or end when the civilians have become soldiers. The last two stages of my research examine how the soldiers’ new identity worked out in the environments for which it was designed: the infantry battalion as a workplace, in both its camp and deployed roles. My informants entered the New Zealand Army at the tail end of a decade of high-tempo operations. The Army was involved in three long-standing deployments: a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Bamyan, Afghanistan; stability and security missions in Timor-Leste; and the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands. Thus the new soldiers could have expected, on joining the Army, to soon be engaged in soldiering overseas, and that expectation was reinforced by staff who trained them in the early stages of their careers. In fact, however, all three of these operations ended within the first two years of their careers, before many could be deployed. This led to disillusionment. My informants were attracted to the Army by change and action, but some found that soldiering was more often about being ready to act than actually acting. Because of this, although this thesis was designed to focus on the first stages of the soldiers’ careers, in several cases it ended up encompassing the final stages of their careers as well, as a number quit the Army before the end of my fieldwork period.

Given that it is where I finally located a set of ideas that helped me make sense of my informants’ self-perception, I use Bourdieu’s (1977; 1990a) theory of practice as the framework for my examination of the civilian-soldier transition. This theory offers much more than just the concept of practical identity, and I use four of Bourdieu’s concepts to structure my arguments, beginning with his concept of habitus. The word “identity”, which I have been using up until this point, refers very generally and broadly to a concept that may be understood differently by different groups. Habitus is the more specific conceptualisation of identity that I have chosen to make sense of soldiers’ experiences. Through emphasising
inclinations and habitual tendencies (*dispositions*), habitus draws attention to the embodied and behavioural, rather than cognitive, aspects of identity. That is, it explains identity largely through practice. When I discuss my own arguments about soldier identity and its acquisition, therefore, I use “habitus”. I refer to the identity my informants are to acquire as the “soldier habitus” and their pre-existing identification with action as the “practical habitus”. However, when I discuss another party’s understandings, such as the Army’s own perspective or previous scholarship on soldierhood, I continue to use the word “identity” in order to avoid implying that these groups conceptualise identity in the same way that I do.

Secondly, Bourdieu distinguishes between habitus acquired at different stages of life, and explicitly discusses the relationships between them. He argues that our earliest identity—the *primary habitus*—is the most durable and continues to generate practice throughout our lives, enabling me to highlight the role of pre-existing civilian identity in shaping recruits’ responses to the process of becoming soldiers. Thus the relationship between the two habitus is at its base a relationship between a primary and a *secondary* habitus. The third of Bourdieu’s ideas that I draw on is his project of questioning whether pairs that scholars generally take to be *binaries* are as mutually exclusive as might be presumed. Currently in academic literature and wider public discourse, soldiers tend to be conceptualised as either too similar to one another or too diverse. In the first of these misconceptions, it is thought that civilians lose all pre-existing individual identity through conforming to uniform soldierhood, while in the second, the privileging of traditional axes of identity like ethnicity and gender is more likely to draw attention to the differences in their pre-existing identities than to the commonalities. Practice theory, however, can deal with identities that are at one and the same time collective and individual, through reconceptualising such presumed binaries as acting instead in *dialectical relationships*. I have said that my informants were more similar than not, and, as will be seen, the international literature shows that a shared soldier habitus may even cross nations and cultures. And yet what is of interest is how each soldier makes this shared identity his or her own individual identity.

This leads to the fourth set of Bourdieusian ideas that I will use, concepts that can help me understand not only the soldier habitus and its acquisition, but also how others in the past have understood these and why. As above, Bourdieu’s concept of the *scholastic disposition* explains how academics misunderstand informants by writing as if they are thinkers, rather
than doers. His further concepts of practical mastery and symbolic mastery outline how doers and thinkers respectively learn and perceive cultural content— as inherent in practice, for doers, as explicit, formalised, and reified, for thinkers. I will use this set of ideas to contrast how academics, soldiers, and Army hierarchy conceptualise identity and identity acquisition. This is important not only for understanding how academics have previously understood soldier identity and why I break from this, but also because Army hierarchy sometimes also make use of symbolic rather than practical mastery. This means that soldiers in the course of their jobs may have to embody as part of their habitus notions about identity that differ from their own.

**How to Read this Thesis**

Readers of this thesis may be looking for quite different things from it. I know of at least two distinct audiences: my informants/soldiers, and academics. Because militaries are largely inaccessible to civilians, this thesis dwells on things necessary for civilian readers’ understanding that will seem blindingly obvious to soldiers (examples: you didn’t join the Army just to prove your manhood, and you didn’t turn into a robot when you got there). The thesis is therefore divided into two parts to enable anyone who doesn’t require background, or who has no interest in anthropological theory (who might already be getting bored), to easily skip straight to the narrative of the first year and a half of the cohort’s careers. This begins in Part Two, which answers the ethnographic question of how my informants became soldiers, while Part One provides the accoutrements necessary to answer this question academically: theoretical framework, literature reviews, methodology and ethical considerations. Part One, to be honest, is paradoxically a too academic way of saying that scholars discuss identity too academically. For informants who might therefore want to skip straight to Part Two, there are two sections of Part One you might have some interest in: if you want to know what the Army said about how they intended to train you before Basic began, this is in Chapter Five, and if you want to make sure that I admitted that I am a person who never does anything, this is in Chapters Two and Three. For those in it for the long haul, however, the less facile summary of the content of Part One is that it explores the ways in which soldier identity and its acquisition is conceptualised by various parties— by
academics in the literature, by the Army itself, and by myself. It makes the case for why I take the approach to understanding the civilian-soldier transition that I do.

In more detail, both parts have four content chapters (while Part Two also has a fifth chapter in the Conclusion). Because of the unprecedented opportunity to accompany an overseas deployment, which was an additional but natural extension of the original fieldwork period (see Chapter Three), this thesis is longer than a standard PhD. Part Two is arranged chronologically, with a chapter for each of the first four stages of the cohort’s careers: Basic Training, Corps Training, Battalion, and Deployment. These will show the process of becoming a soldier as structured by the relationship between the two core identities of this thesis, with the primary practical habitus drawn on to facilitate the embodiment of the secondary soldier habitus, and the two eventually working together to generate the soldiers’ practice. These ethnographic chapters are structured by three interrelated aspects of the civilian-soldier transition: the content of the soldier habitus (what my informants had to become), how they were to become this, i.e., the process, and of course the relationship between this new habitus, the process of embodying it, and the primary practical habitus (and other pre-existing habitus, particularly ethnicity and nationality).

Before this, Part One introduces the two core habitus and their relationship on the theoretical level. Chapter Two outlines why I consider these two habitus to be the most important, while Chapters Four and Five explain why I do not use the axes of identity that are usually drawn on to make sense of soldierhood. The two core habitus of the thesis are explored in every chapter, and three of the four chapters also discuss them in relation to one or more of the more traditional modes of identity: class (Chapter Two), gender/sexuality (Chapter Four), and ethnicity/nationality (Chapter Five). Chapter Two introduces the primary practical habitus and the secondary soldier habitus, their relationship, and the theoretical framework that informs them. I will argue that scholars are often prevented from fully understanding the practical habitus by the biases that arise from their own dispositions, and may, for example, subsume it under more traditional axes like “class”. Chapter Three outlines the methodology and ethical considerations of this research project, both of which were impacted by the difference between my scholastic disposition and the practical habitus of my informants. Chapter Four, the literature review, discusses
the axes of identity that academics have traditionally used to understand the civilian-soldier transformation. The two most prominent discourses are, firstly, the idea that soldierhood is really just a form of masculinity and that it can therefore be understood through understanding gender, and, secondly, that soldierhood is in fact a loss or lack of individual identity. Chapter Four presents my argument for why soldierhood should be seen not only as an identity at all but also a distinct one that is irreducible to masculinity, and this chapter therefore is the justification for soldierhood itself being one of the two core modes of identity on which I focus. Chapter Five outlines how the New Zealand Army as an institution understands soldier identity and its acquisition, introducing the Army’s formal training programmes as well as a common discourse in which the New Zealand soldier identity is linked to New Zealand national and ethnic identities. While gender will not appear as either a framework for analysis or an insider perspective after Chapter Four, the concepts of ethnicity and nationality as discussed in Chapter Five do continue forward into Part Two. The Army’s perception of identity is closer to soldiers’ own than academic conceptualisations, and further, soldiers are required to engage with the Army’s perceptions in both formal and informal manifestations. However, the ethnography in Part Two will show that not even ethnicity and nationality are as important in generating soldiers’ practice as the practical habitus. In not relying on the typical axes of identity, I focus in on soldiers’ own understanding of identity and identity acquisition, as centred on practice and change.
Part One
Chapter Two

Theorising Identity: Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice

This chapter introduces the two identities whose relationship forms the core of this thesis, along with the theoretical framework that justifies this focus. These two identities, which will hereafter be referred to as the primary practical habitus and the secondary soldier habitus, will be introduced in both theoretical and ethnographic terms, so that it may be seen how the theory I have chosen helps me make sense of the ethnographic questions raised by my fieldwork. I use Bourdieu’s theory of practice to argue that in order to understand any identity acquisition that occurs after early childhood, we need to not only take the influence of the pre-existing identity into account, but treat it as a key factor. On the ethnographic level, the two habitus themselves are introduced: what form do the primary and secondary habitus actually take in this case? Each of these identities has a different role in my analysis of identity acquisition. As the identity to be acquired, it is through the secondary soldier habitus that this process is highlighted, and the “readiness” that structures this habitus is introduced in this chapter. Because the recruits already had the practical habitus when I met them, however, I do not have data on how exactly they came to have it. Therefore this identity is examined only in its role as a pre-existing habitus, that came into play as the recruits became soldiers. The practical habitus in this chapter is introduced in the same way that I myself first noticed it: in the differences between my informants and myself as an anthropologist in the field.

What I mean by the “practical” habitus, and why practice theory is so appropriate for discussing it, is that the recruits/soldiers that I followed identify themselves primarily through “practice”- both in always needing to be acting, and in being “practical” in their outlook. Bourdieu works well because, despite soldiers’ self-perception as people who act, there is a commonplace assumption equating soldiers with automata, in which they are seen as merely “manifestation[s] of training and […] orders” (Bowler, 2003, chapter I p.7). The aim of practice theory, as Ortner (2006) writes, is to “[restore] the actor to the social process without losing sight of the larger structures that constrain (but also enable) social
action” (p.3). What better theory, then, to illuminate how soldiers can remain active agents whilst adhering to the constraints of strict Army discipline? Although academia has now largely rejected structural determinism, it has yet to fully disappear from the literature on soldierhood.

Bourdieu is then further helpful as his concept of the scholastic disposition can illuminate why scholars have analysed soldiers in the ways that they have, and why this can be misleading. Again this disposition is introduced in this chapter ethnographically as I became aware of it, through the differences between myself and my informants in the field. Knowledge of this disposition will be particularly important in the literature review of Chapter Four. That chapter shows how the scholastic disposition leads academics to understand soldiers in the way that they do, while this chapter covers the necessary precursor to this, examining how the scholastic disposition leads academics to view people who identify themselves primarily through practice more generally. The primary practical habitus, when discussed in academic literature, is conflated with other modes of identity such as class. This unfortunately distorts the practical habitus, in that “class” focuses on the socio-economic status that results from particular forms of work, rather than the work itself.

Before getting into the specifics of the pre-existing habitus that my informants brought with them to the Army, however, this chapter will begin with an overview of how the interaction between soldierhood and pre-existing civilian identities has previously been understood.

The Role of Pre-existing Identity in the Civilian-Soldier Transition

My decision to privilege pre-existing identities in the discussion of the process of becoming a soldier is quite unusual, in that it conflicts with commonplace discourses on this identity change that can be found in both academic works and wider society. The usual notion is that, over the course of initial military training, recruits lose the civilian identities with which they had arrived, and have new, uniform and interchangeable identities imposed upon them. Speaking of militaries in the United States, Burke (2004a), for example, writes, “In boot camp, the civilian life is regarded as a fallen world from which military discipline and training promise redemption” (p.26):
Basic training aims to transform individuals into standard, “government-issue” soldiers by erasing civilian identities that have been formed over many years. During basic training, recruits are prohibited contact with the civilian world, the anchor to their former selves. No previous accomplishments matter. Intelligence, charm, and humor count for little (Burke, 2004b, p.6).

Further,

Recruits undergo a process of “deindividuation,” the suspension of the self and the uncritical investment in a group identity. With that group identity comes a sense of anonymity, a loss of self and of the inhibitions that allow a person to perform acts that a self-conscious individual ordinarily would not. By erasing self-awareness, military training dissolves the inclination toward self-regulation and crystallizes the willingness to be regulated by others (Burke, 2004a p.46).

Likewise, Harrison (2003) writes that:

Recruits exchange their old identities for the military uniform, haircut, and daily routines. They are humiliated, derogated, and emptied of the achievements of their previous lives by being told repeatedly that nothing they did prior to coming to boot camp was important. The vacuum created in recruits’ self-esteem by this harassment is then filled with the new ‘combat-ready’ identity that the military wishes to provide (p.74).

Writing about the British Army in World War I, Duffett (2012) states “institutional feeding facilitated the erasure of self, an unhelpful attribute in the military world” (p.251). Hockey (1986), a sociologist and former soldier, conducted fieldwork with the same Army decades later in the 1980s, and wrote that the job of training staff was to “[strip] new recruits of their previous identity through such means as dressing them in uniform” (p.23). In this way, a recruit was “dispossessed of his civilian role” (Hockey, 1986, p.23).

Similarly, Mannitz (2011) writes of the German Army: “In the military, individuality and self-determination are replaced by discipline to ensure coercive functioning. Soldiers need to be transformed from autonomous persons into useful “means” that serve the purpose of the institution, at least to some extent” (p.682). Gill (2009) examines the United States Army and writes that Initial Entry Training “systematically breaks down recruits and rebuilds them into soldiers”, which involves “an overcoding of martial norms on top of civilian ones in
order to displace them” (p.144). “The military, in order to guarantee the efficacy of training, has constructed the civilian as the antithesis of everything that makes for a successful and valued soldier” (Gill, 2009, p.144). In this way, academic discourse assumes that military recruits lose their various pre-existing civilian identities and/or individual self in becoming soldiers, and that the new soldier identity is therefore completely uninfluenced by these previous civilian identities. Further, it is assumed that this is because the retention of such pre-existing identities would hinder the internalisation of soldierhood.

By contrast, I will argue that, far from stripping their new recruits of their civilian identities, the New Zealand Army actually makes use of pre-existing identities in building good soldiers. This is clearly seen in a new recruiting slogan which was released mid-way through my fieldwork: “You bring it, we’ll bring it out”. While the Army does see some of the civilian traits with which recruits arrive to be inconsistent with soldierhood and therefore in need of removal, it also conceptualises other pre-existing traits as assets or capabilities. When soldiers arrive with such traits, the Army not only doesn’t remove them, it brings them to the fore.

The pre-existing identities that the New Zealand Army primarily and explicitly value are the ethnicities of their soldiers. In this case the retention, rather than stripping, of previous identity may be seen as particular to the New Zealand Army and the wider New Zealand context. Holmes-Eber’s (2014) ethnography of the United States Marine Corps’ attempts to improve their capabilities in cross-cultural interaction begins with an outline of the basic traits of the Marines who must enact this new policy. She writes “at least in theory, once one becomes a Marine one’s individual previous identity-one’s ethnicity, race, gender, religion- no longer matters” (Holmes-Eber, 2014, p.35). This is based on what her informants told her, one Lieutenant Colonel, for example, stating, “There are no demographic features to the Marines. We’re all green” (Holmes-Eber, 2014, p.35) and a Colonel, “we may come from the cross section of society but we refuse to reflect it” (Holmes-Eber, 2014, p.47). Holmes-Eber (2014, pp.32-34) argues that this focus on interchangeability came about because of the requirement that every Marine be a rifleman first, regardless of actual occupational specialty or any other difference, so that they are capable of responding if engaged by the enemy. Whilst the Marines and other military forces have spent the last decade working on improving interactions with local communities in their deployment areas
(“human terrain”), the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) believes that its servicemen are already skilled in this area. This is thought to be due to the multi-cultural nature of the NZDF. Thus although the New Zealand Army shares with the Marines the requirement that every member is a soldier first, unlike the Marines, it proudly emphasises the demographic diversity of its soldiers.

However, the loss of civilian identity in soldiers may also have been overstated for soldiers of all nationalities. As Simons (1997), who conducted fieldwork with United States Special Forces, writes, “contrary to civilian-held stereotypes, soldiers do have personalities” (p.101). Recently, a few academics have begun questioning the assumption that soldiers are always dispossessed of their pre-service identity. Again this questioning most often occurs in relation to ethnicity. Krebs (2004) compared empirical studies from various militaries and reviews of such studies, and concluded that “the military’s power as a socializing agency [...] is, at best, mixed” (p.88). His aim was to evaluate the belief held by several nations that military service for ethnic minorities would help build “cohesive national communities out of their countries’ multinational jumbles” (Krebs, 2004, p.85). Part of the idea behind this notion was that service would “socialize soldiers to national norms”, indicating a belief that “military service leads individuals to reconsider their identity” (Krebs, 2004, p.87). Krebs’ (2004) survey found, however, that many soldiers’ political viewpoints and values, and hence identities (Americans in World War II, West Point Cadets, Arabs in the Israeli Defence Force, and soldiers in the West and East German Armies) were not fundamentally altered by service (pp.97-99). Krebs quotes one of the reviews he draws on:

Contrary to the anxieties of those who believe that [soldiers] will become automatons, and contrary to the suppositions of enthusiasts who imagine military service will effect a virtuous remolding of character, most veterans of military service emerge with pre-existing values and beliefs largely intact (Lovell and Stiehm as cited in Krebs, 2004, p.98).

Kachtan (2012) shows that ethnic identities (and the class identities to which they are tied) are not only reproduced but in fact intensified within the Israeli Defence Force, despite its state-directed role as a melting pot that should consolidate “all citizens into a single nation with shared national values” (p.153). This is partially due to deliberate “attempts on the part of individuals to preserve the habitus they bring with them”, often enacted through everyday factors like music choice (Kachtan, 2012, p.164; for further examples, see Enloe,
During my fieldwork, I found not only that my informants retained their civilian identities, and that understanding these was therefore crucial to understanding their engagement with military training, but also that the identity that was most important to understand was not in fact ethnicity.

**The Pre-existing Practical Identity**

Given the popular stereotype of the loss of civilian identity, as well as discussions with Army staff before my fieldwork on the need to re-socialise recruits from diverse backgrounds, I was surprised to find, on arrival at Basic Training, that the recruits—though they differed in terms of ethnicity, class and gender—were all already much more similar to one another than I had anticipated. I first noticed this in relation to myself; everybody seemed to share certain perspectives and values except for me. Above all, the recruits all shared a fundamental need to always be “doing something,” and particular definitions of not only what types of activities were worthwhile doing, but also which activities actually counted as “doing something” at all. These particular understandings were crucial to becoming a soldier, and were not taught because there was an assumption that they were already present (I didn’t witness the recruiting process, but they may have been selected for, either consciously or unconsciously). Looking back, the males I found most “familiar” and easiest to interact with at Basic Training— the ones who had identities closer to mine— were also the ones who didn’t make it through the course. (It was a bit different with females, despite the same difference, presumably because we nevertheless also shared gender socialisation).

I initially intended to as much as possible train with the recruits and make the identity transition with them, although I never truly believed I could physically handle Basic Training. Despite six months of personal training, I indeed could not handle even a fortnight of it. In week two, I partially paralysed my left shoulder. My arm suddenly stopped working halfway through a Physical Training session—there was no pain, I just literally couldn’t lift it anymore—and didn’t start working again for several months. I had damaged the suprascapula nerve, which supplies nerves to the muscles that allow lifting and rotation. I had some use of my forearm, but could not move my arm anywhere beyond a few centimetres from my body. This meant that I was incapable of doing push ups, carrying packs, and using weapons— the
fundamentals of soldiering, as one of the recruits noted. If I had been a real recruit, I would have been sent home immediately.

The OC (Officer Commanding) of Recruit Company, however, allowed me to stay on, doing what I could and observing what I couldn’t. Thus I would, for example, stand back and watch lessons that I could no longer participate in, such as lessons on weapons, which I couldn’t hold up for long, and which require the use of two arms, when, for example, you hold a rifle in one arm while cocking it with the other. This, after I had introduced myself as intending to participate in everything, did not go down well amongst some recruits, and was exacerbated by them having to pick up some of my slack (see the next chapter for the ethical and methodological implications of this). Further, what I was still doing, research, was not conceptualised as work by the recruits and thus I could be seen to be doing no work at all.

Recruit Hall, for example, caught my eye across the hall in our separate bedrooms while I was writing fieldnotes one night and said loudly to his section mates of me, “shouldn’t you be writing a book about how you stand around and do nothing all day?” From my perspective, I had been working- the recruits had been doing weapon drills, and I had been writing for hours on how the lessons were taught, how the recruits responded, and their interactions during them. Obviously I did not think what I was doing was anywhere near as challenging as what the recruits were doing, but I did conceptualise it as doing something, and as working. The recruits did not. Another time, when I was helping turf, that is, removing and laying aside the grass and top layer of soil from a patch of ground in order to dig a shellscape (a type of defensive position) which then could be covered up again as if it hadn’t been disturbed, Hall said, “no offence, but that’s the most work I’ve ever seen you do.” Once when I was one-handedly lashing wire to help construct a fence around a Forward Operating Base, a Corporal came past and said, “bloody hell Harding, you’ll have an allergic reaction” i.e., to work. “What do you do, nothing?” a soldier who was in the Basic Training Platoon I was embedded with asked me, when I was also embedded in his next, specialised infantry training Platoon. “She does nothing all day- sits on her bum” he explained to a new Platoon mate. There also seemed to be some belief that I was either faking the injury to get out of work or that the injury was psychosomatic (honestly I thought this one was a possibility myself, but the Doctor said that it couldn’t be because my subconscious didn’t understand which nerve controlled what well enough to keep the injury so consistent).
But the biggest problem wasn’t that I was injured and couldn’t do some things, but rather that I wasn’t appropriately upset about this. I was relieved the research could continue, albeit compromised because there would be no real acceptance from the group. I had more time for writing notes, which is what I was invested in. Recruits however expected someone who had lost the opportunity to do Basic Training to be devastated. They themselves tend to try and push through injuries, and, if possible, to hide them. I thought that a decision not to attempt to fire a semi-automatic rifle with one arm was just common sense, but I found that what soldiers really value are people who just get in there and do it, no matter what. Before the fact, I had nervously tried to warn Basic Training staff that I would be physically incompetent, but they wouldn’t listen to such nonsense. In the Army you do not say you can’t do things. You just go and do them. If you can’t do it, then learn. Some of my participants couldn’t conceptualise any point in my being present and not participating in everything, an NCO asking me in great confusion, “Why are you here, Harding? Just for the study, yeah?” They likewise couldn’t conceive of a PhD as something anyone would desire. Private Mitchell, for example, struggled to understand why I would pay (food and accommodation) to hang around with the Army: “But what’s in it for you, Harding, there must be something in it for you?”

I soon realised that this view of what does and does not count as work was also what lay behind a general anti-officer attitude. Officers- particularly specialists in roles such as psychologist, who are recruited for their degrees and don’t have to go through as rigorous training as everyone else- regularly brought deserved disdain upon themselves by condescendingly talking down to recruits. However, the basic underlying conflict between soldier and officer is pointed to by a common saying that one of the NCOs used on us often in the early days. We were still learning the basics and getting ranks mixed up, and thus it was fairly common for a recruit to mistakenly call an NCO “Sir”, which is a title that is applied only to officers, and to which NCOs take offence. “Don’t call me Sir,” Corporal would say, “I work for my living.” Like me, officers are not conceptualised as doing real work, because officers are in charge of various forms of paperwork: writing orders, processing charges, and so forth.
I argue therefore that ethnicity is not the only pre-existing identity that helps the New Zealand Army make good soldiers. The perspectives which I first noticed in relation to myself were in fact the perspectives through which the recruits evaluated everything in their lives, and which formed the basis of their identities. They are what Bourdieu would term their primary habitus (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990, p.42). This identity is not discussed explicitly like ethnicity is because it is so basic to their conceptualisation of the world as to be doxic (taken for granted). It focuses on doing and acting, on physicality and physical work. It is more specific than this, however, as it also centres on practicality. It emphasises useful or productive labour. Part of what should be produced through such work is the recruits themselves, as they seek out challenge and change. In most cases, for something to be productive, it also had to be new, because repetitive training in skills they already knew how to perform was not seen as constructive. This identity is what led my research participants to join the Army. And although once there they did undergo transformation, as they desired, their underlying identification with action and practicality was not only not altered, but was in fact reproduced. Although these are traits that are required in combat, they are traits that do not necessarily suit soldiers to a peacetime Army. Hence as well as being the reason why my participants joined the Army, they are also the reason why some then quit only a few years afterwards. We cannot therefore easily dismiss soldiers’ pre-Army identities. However, the stereotype of the un-individualised soldier must have become widespread for a reason, and so in examining how soldiers are not, in fact, uniform automata, it also becomes clear how and why it is that they often make themselves publically appear to be. This in fact is not a loss of individual identity, but part of a “switched-on” soldier identity which is collective and yet which each recruit internalises individually. In the following section I will introduce the theoretical framework that helped me make sense of this seeming paradox.

**Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice**

This section will introduce Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice, and the key concepts from this theory that I will use to examine the civilian-soldier transition. I begin by discussing Bourdieu’s general project of questioning binary thought patterns. Binaries (such as structure and agency, and collectivity and individuality) that are often thought to be
mutually exclusive are re-conceptualised in ways that illuminate interaction and mutual constitution instead. This is important as I will argue in Chapter Four that the academic literature often erroneously conceptualises soldiers as being constructed through such binaries. I will then outline the concepts of *habitus* (the concept I will use to examine soldier identity) and *field* (which draws attention to Army structures and how they are implicated in the embodiment of this identity). Finally, the concepts of *primary habitus* and *disjuncture* will be discussed in order to make sense of the role of pre-existing identity in the acquisition of new identities like soldierhood. I briefly touch on the concepts of *practical mastery* and *symbolic mastery* to help explain habitus, but will examine them in more depth in the next section.

**Dialectical Relationships**

Bourdieu developed his theory of practice in order to overcome the deficiencies in the theories of objectivism (structure) and subjectivism (agency), and most importantly, the way in which the two were conceived as binary opposites. He disagreed with the way in which objectivism suggested that practice was merely a mechanical acting out of structures or following of rules. He also disagreed with the suggestion of subjectivism that every action was deliberately thought out and aimed towards an explicit end goal (Bourdieu, 1977, p.73)\(^2\). More generally, he argued against all sorts of such “oppositions that artificially divide social science” (1990a, p.25), believing that “one of the major tasks of genuine epistemology [...] is to confront the problems raised by the existence of these dualisms” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 179). He argued that in fact “social science need not choose between these poles, for the stuff of social reality [...] lies in relations” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p.15, emphasis added). His work therefore consists of showing how pairs such as structure and agency, so often conceptualised as mutually exclusive, in fact act in dialectical relationships.

In the case of soldiers, it is the deficiencies in objectivism that seem most obviously relevant: soldiers are rarely accused of being free, unconstrained agents, but are instead seen to be mere robots unthinkingly acting out strict hierarchical Army discipline. Thus Bourdieu’s (1998) theory of practice “refus[es] to reduce agents, which it considers to be

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\(^2\) As the next seventeen or so pages feature frequent references only to the work of Bourdieu, I have not included his name in every in-text reference, unless the work in question has multiple authors.
eminently active and acting (without necessarily doing so as subjects), to simple epiphenomena of structure” (p.viii) and “[escapes] [...] the objectivism of action understood as a mechanical reaction “without an agent”” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p.121).

I am not arguing that soldiers do not embody Army regulation and discipline, but rather that this doesn’t automatically make them un-individualised automata. During recruit training, the following things were made very clear: that Army values and regulations (structures) would be internalised in recruits, that recruits would begin acting in accordance with these structures, that this would result in a transformation of recruits’ identity, and that all of this would place recruits in unequal power relationships. Not only did the recruits not recoil at this, they were eager. They actively and in full knowledge do their best to internalise Army values. If that sounds strange, it is because subordination and free will is just another one of those binaries that academics often conceptualise as mutually exclusive, and which Bourdieu’s work encourages us to re-conceive in a different type of relationship: “Resistance can be alienating and submission can be liberating” (Bourdieu cited in Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 24). In the next section I will introduce the specific concepts that can be used to avoid such binaries.

**Habitus and Field**

I will use two of Bourdieu’s three key concepts, primarily *habitus*, but also *field*, as the former cannot be understood without the latter. I do not use *capital*, as it has less explanatory potential in this context, and because I don’t want to over-theorise, given the habitus of my participants. Habitus is “a mediating concept” (2007, p.104) that “aims to transcend” pairs that are usually assumed to be binaries, such as “determinism and freedom, conditioning and creativity, consciousness and the unconscious, or the individual and society” (1990a, p.55). Together, field and habitus explain “the internalization of externality” (1990a, p.155) where the externality (structure) that is internalised is the field, and the internalisation and the identity that this results in is the habitus. Habitus is thus “the em-bodiment of the immanent regularities and tendencies of the world” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p.138) and “roots the most fundamental structures of the group in the primary experiences of the body” (1990a, p.71) (which again is seen in a dialectical rather than binary relationship with the mind).
Habitus are “systems of durable, transposable dispositions” (1977, p.72). Dispositions generate our “thoughts, perceptions, expressions and actions” (1990a, p.55) and “[orient] practices in a way that is at once unconscious and systematic” (1990a, p.10). The word disposition was chosen as:

> It expresses, first, the result of an organizing action, with a meaning very close to that of words such as “structure”; it can also denote a manner of being, a habitual state (especially of the body), and, in particular, a predisposition, tendency, propensity or inclination” (Bourdieu cited in Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990, pp.67-68, footnote 1).

That is, a person’s habitus predisposes (rather than determines) them to think and act in certain ways. Dispositions are both mental- “schemes of perception and thought” and physical- “in the form of bodily postures and stances” (1977, p.15). They determine “reasonable” and “unreasonable” conduct (1977, p.77) and “tacitly [lie] down the dividing line between the thinkable and the unthinkable” (1977, p.21). They are “classificatory schemes [...] different tastes [and] make distinctions between what is good and what is bad, between what is right and what is wrong” (1998, p.8). They are “procedures to follow, paths to take” (1990a, p.53), producing “a durable way of standing, speaking, walking, and thereby of feeling and thinking” (1990a, p.70). A habitus is durable and transposable as it “[induces] an identity of reaction in a diversity of situations, impressing the same posture on the body in different contexts” (1990a, p.89). That is, a person will react to all of the situations they encounter in terms of the same underlying dispositions. Although dispositions don’t fully determine action, they remain, as Hage (2013) writes, “active variable[s]” (p.84), because a disposition has “a specific type of causal power even when it does not cause a body to do what it is predisposed to do” (Hage, 2013, p.84). The example that Hage gives is that going against one’s disposition takes effort and energy; another example would be the frustration that may arise when someone is prevented from following their disposition. It is helpful to be clear on the exact relationship between habitus and disposition. As a system of dispositions, the habitus is not the sum of the dispositions themselves as such but rather the “shared structure” of these dispositions (Hage, 2013, p.85). That is, all of the dispositions have the same underlying nature, and it is this underlying nature that is the habitus.
A person’s habitus is “objectively adjusted to the particular conditions in which it is constituted” (1977, p.95). That is, as long as a person remains in the same social milieu in which they were socialised, and which they therefore internalised, their expectations of the world will match the world around them: “When habitus encounters a social world of which it is the product, it is like a “fish in water”: it does not feel the weight of the water, and it takes the world about itself for granted” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p.128).

When Bourdieu talks about the internalisation of externality he is talking about the internalisation of the social: “to speak of habitus is to assert that the individual, and even the personal, the subjective, is social, collective” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p.126). This is because people who have occupied similar social positions and have had similar experiences tend to think and act in similar ways, as they have internalised the same social structures: “the homogeneity of the mode of production of habitus (that is, the material conditions of existence and pedagogic action) produces a homogenization of dispositions and interests” (1990a, p.192). (This is what has led many social scientists over the decades to conceptualise individuals as acting out structures.) Hence, “field” is defined through social relationships: “a field may be defined as a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 97). Because such positions in any given field may be quite different from one another, each individual’s perception of the field depends “on the point of view they take on the field as a view taken from a point in the field” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p.101).

Each field therefore produces people who “possess the necessary properties to be effective, to produce effects, in this field” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p.107). Processes like Army training can be thought of as “the long dialectical process [...] through which the various fields provide themselves with agents equipped with the habitus needed to make them work” (1990a, p. 67). Through the habitus not only are individuals produced, but the whole field is reproduced as individuals “by their well-ordered choices aligned with the objective order [...] tend to reproduce this order” (1998, p.26). This is “the principle of the continuity and regularity which objectivism discerns in the world” (1977, p.82). Importantly, “what is necessary to reproduce the structure is still a historical action, accomplished by true agents” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p.140). The next section will briefly describe the habitus the Army tries to instil in its soldiers.
The Soldier Habitus

To talk about a soldier habitus is to talk about the embodiment of Army structures—both formal regulations and informal regularities— in each individual soldier. The Army explicitly tells recruits that they are to internalise Army values and to self-lead according to them in all areas of their life— that is, that they will internalise what will become durable and transposable dispositions. Given that the Armed Forces have document after document of formal regulations (Defence Force Orders, Standard Operating Procedures) for soldiers to follow, the idea that people can be regulated without following explicit rules may not seem relevant to soldiers. However, these formal regulations were not in fact as important to becoming a soldier as a set of more informal, less explicit dispositions were. This thesis is largely about these informal dispositions, as it is primarily these that recruits engaged with. They can be seen to be far from codified in the fact that I have had to name some of them myself in order to be able to discuss them, and this is why, through trying to keep them as close as possible to the ways in which they were actually expressed, they will sound faintly ridiculous. In many cases I refer to these dispositions using sayings or slogans that are used during training, but in a few cases dispositions were almost never spoken of explicitly, and I have named them after the very few times that this occurred.

The shared structure that underlies these various dispositions, and that therefore constitutes the soldier habitus, is readiness: the ability to embody the “switched on” state, continually aware of everything around you and poised to react. All of the dispositions I write about share this general structure in some way, and will be discussed in depth in Chapter Six. The sayings “if it looks flash it is flash”, “gears before beers” and “squared away” indicate the readiness of one’s physical body and equipment, and therefore of oneself. “Get over it” and “don’t flap” indicate the mental dispositions of controlling oneself and concentrating on the situation at hand rather than being distracted or panicky respectively; “attention to detail” is the way in which you become attuned to everything around you; and “sense of urgency” enables you to react both quickly and effectively.

We can see how “a durable way of standing” leads to durable ways “of feeling and thinking” (Bourdieu, 1990a, p.70) through the drill position of standing “at attention”. This attentive and alert stance is echoed in the nonetheless more informal movements of the body at other times, as recruits are in various ways taught to never slouch or slump. You will be
punished, for example, for leaning on the wall: “that wall’s been standing for twenty years, it doesn’t need your help.” Beds are only to be used for sleeping at night and you cannot even sit on them during the day. Only certain ways of sitting on open ground are acceptable. No lounging is allowed, and the only thing you can lean upon is one another’s (upright) backs. Thus your body is always ready to react, and so is your mind; the lack of physical relaxation has prevented mental relaxation. This begins to be the way that you hold yourself everywhere. The first time I ventured out of the military bubble during Basic was to attend a medical appointment, and I suddenly noticed that I was sitting ramrod straight in a waiting area, unconsciously ensuring that no part of my upper body was touching a chair that was designed to be comfortable. The intensive process of internalising the Army field could lead to feeling out of place in the civilian field when suddenly thrust back into it. When let out of Basic for a day trip to Taupo, we acted in line with Army dispositions, approaching leisure tasks with a sense of urgency. Used to efficiency and to doubling (running) everywhere, the slow pace of people on the sidewalks and the leisurely manner of the cashiers serving us was physically jarring; it felt like moving through molasses.

The embodiment of these dispositions of readiness leads soldiers to appear as a certain type of person in public. In order to be able to deal with anything, they have learnt to suppress their emotions and side-line their opinions (“get over it”) in certain situations. When soldiers are “switched on” they appear reserved. A better word than reserved, however, is composed. Battles require composure. An even better word is self-composed, because each soldier has individually worked to achieve this state. Other soldiers read this as professional competence, but civilians find it hard to read, which is what leads to the stereotype above of de-individualisation and the loss of pre-service identity. Soldiers have not in fact lost individual feelings. It is just that they are not, currently, acting on them. They have learnt to contain them by expressing them only to one another and only at appropriate times. When they are on the job, when they are out in public as soldiers, they retain silent, watchful self-composure in order to maintain readiness. Further, because they have had to work at it, soldiers see this uniform self-possession as individual identity. The contrast between how soldiers and civilians interpret the “switched-on” soldier habitus is explored more in the literature review in Chapter Four, but in terms of my ethnographic data does not really come up until the last chapter of this thesis. This is because, for the first three stages of my
fieldwork, I mostly saw the informants in segregation from the rest of the world, within the groups in which soldiers could switch off and opinion and emotion were expressed. It wasn’t until the fourth stage, the deployment, that I really observed what being switched on looked like in public. It is the internalisation of this “switched-on” habitus that is the subject of this thesis. However, I have argued that the practical habitus that my informants had already acquired through internalising the regularities of their pre-service life was just as important to this process as the habitus to be internalised itself. Therefore, the following section explores the role of a pre-existing habitus in the embodiment of new dispositions.

Primary Habitus and Disjuncture
As discussed in the Introduction, everybody involved in recruit training in the New Zealand Army was very explicit about the process of identity acquisition, particularly in constant discussions about “change”. Bourdieu’s theory of practice, however, has been critiqued as not being able to account for “knowing subjects” (Ortner, 2006, p.111). Ortner (2006), for example, discusses Bourdieu’s “insistence on the inaccessibility to actors of the underlying logic of their practices” (p.111). Bourdieu does indeed argue that the habitus may be inaccessible to the conscious mind, but, in fact, he presents this as a kind of ideal type rather than always being the case. There are two related reasons for the idea that individuals to Bourdieu are not “knowing subjects”. The first is that a key part of Bourdieu’s argument is that, through habitus, the arbitrariness of the group’s social structure is obscured and thus naturalised. Habitus is “embodied history, internalized as a second nature and so forgotten as history” (1990a, p.56). He calls this “misrecognition”, i.e. “misrecognition of the objective truth of that culture as a cultural arbitrary” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990, p.31).

The second aspect to Bourdieu’s unknowing subjects is his argument that the practices produced by habitus do not have to go through the level of conscious thought. As they are embodied, people react as if by instinct. This is what Bourdieu calls practical mastery, as opposed to symbolic mastery, which is “the making explicit and the formalizing of the principles at work in a practice” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990, p.46). “Practical mastery” is how Bourdieu refutes the other side of the false binary, subjectivism or agency. That is, he argues that not every action is consciously considered beforehand or can be seen as a well thought out strategy aimed towards a known end goal. Habitus is “a logic that is performed
directly in bodily gymnastics, without passing through explicit apprehension” (1990a, p.89). This also means that systems of dispositions may have some “‘fuzziness,’” that is, “irregularities and even incoherences” (1990a, p.86) “resulting from the fact that they have as their principle not a set of conscious, constant rules,” but rather “practical schemes” (1990a, p.12). Habitus “follows a practical logic, that is, a logic that is intelligible, coherent, but only up to a certain point (beyond which it would no longer be “practical”)” (1990b, p.384).

How then, can we use habitus to make sense of what goes on in Basic Training, in which all participants are knowing subjects, thinking about and verbalising their attempts to internalise a particular identity? In fact, a habitus in terms of practical mastery, something that does not pass through conscious thought, is what the Army is aiming for, but has not yet achieved in its recruits. The below quote from Bourdieu, for example, neatly sums up how the Army wants soldiers to be able to act on the battlefield, so that they are not paralysed by emotions like fear:

> This practical sense, which does not burden itself with [...] with calculations or deductions, which are in any case excluded by the urgency of action ‘which brooks no delay’, is what makes it possible to appreciate the meaning of the situation instantly, at a glance, in the heat of the action, and to produce at once the opportune response. Only this kind of acquired mastery, functioning with the automatic reliability of an instinct, can make it possible to respond instantaneously to all the uncertain and ambiguous situations of practice (1990a, pp.103-104).

Bourdieu (1977) writes that “it is, of course, never ruled out that the responses of the habitus may be accompanied by a strategic calculation tending to carry on quasi-consciously the operation the habitus carries on in a quite a different way” (p.76): “the pre-adjustment of the habitus to the objective conditions is a ‘particular case of the possible’” (1990a, p.62). This ideal type has a further name, doxa, which occurs “in the extreme cases, that is to say, when there is a quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective order and the subjective principles of organization” (1977, p.164), that is, between the field and the habitus. Bourdieu (1977) uses the word doxa, “to distinguish it from an orthodox or heterodox belief implying awareness and recognition of the possibility of different or antagonistic beliefs” (p. 64). The Army can never achieve a state of doxa in soldiers because
it is a second socialisation explicitly recognised as transformative. This means that soldiers are always aware there are other possible ways of life. Militaries are therefore aiming instead for orthodoxy, doxa’s “necessarily imperfect substitute” (1977, p.169) which, unlike doxa, involves choice, “made possible by the existence of competing possibilities” (1977, p.169), such as being a civilian.

There are several situations that could have led to a person finding themselves in a field that does not “match” their habitus- that is, in a social space that does not make sense to them and in which they do not know how to act, which will make them recognise it as arbitrary, rather than natural, and subsequently draw their attention to their own behaviour. To understand this we must understand that although people may continue to acquire dispositions throughout their lives, Bourdieu (1977) argues that the first dispositions one acquires are the most durable and remain primary:

> Practical estimates give disproportionate weight to early experiences: the structures characteristic of a determinate type of conditions of existence [...] produce the structures of the habitus which become in turn the basis of perception and appreciation of all subsequent experience (p.78).

This is because “the earliest phase of upbringing” is “carried out [...] without any antecedent” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990, p.42) (no other possibilities are known). Bourdieu calls this the “primary habitus, characteristic of a group or class, which is the basis for the subsequent formation of any other habitus” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990, p.42). “Thus, for example, the habitus acquired in the family underlies the structuring of the school experiences [...], and the habitus transformed by schooling, itself diversified, in turn underlies the structuring of all subsequent experiences, and so on” (1977, p.87).

The primary habitus tends to “protect itself from crises and critical challenges” through “the systematic ‘choices’ it makes among the places, events and people that might be frequented” only going into fields “to which it is as pre-adapted as possible, that is, a relatively constant universe of situations tending to reinforce its dispositions” (1990a, pp.60-61). Further, “habitus contributes to constituting the field as a meaningful world, a world endowed with sense and value, in which it is worth investing one’s energy” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p.127). Bourdieu often compares the field to a game and states that
“players agree, by the mere fact of playing [...] that the game is worth playing” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p.98). If an individual’s habitus inclined them to see a particular field as not making sense, it would not be seen as a worthwhile endeavour in which to invest their energy.

This can make sense of why my participants joined the Army in the first place: because it seemed to offer experiences and a lifestyle that matched that which their primary habitus predisposed them to see as worthwhile and desirable. This primary habitus is the identification with productive action outlined above, hence why my informants see this identification as natural, and have trouble understanding decisions, like mine, that contravene it. In many cases this primary habitus seems to have made the recruits not view school (the second major site of habitus acquisition after family) as worthwhile, and afterwards join the Army as it was by contrast seen to involve meaningful activity (Private Mayhew, for example, joined the Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment “because I like being outside, I hate being inside”).

Bourdieu (1990a) calls finding yourself in a field other than the one in which you acquired your habitus “disjuncture”: “the environment they actually encounter is too different from the one to which they are objectively adjusted” (p.62). “Disjuncture” may arise, for example, when the society in which one was socialised undergoes change: “agents whose mental structures have been molded by [...] prior structures become obsolete and act inopportunely [...] and at cross purposes”. For example, “those older people of whom we may justly say that they are ‘out of sync’” or “peasants endowed with a precapitalist habitus [who are] suddenly uprooted and forcibly thrown into a capitalist cosmos” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p.130). In the case of the Army there is a disjuncture between the recruits’ habitus and the field of the Army because, although they are predisposed to both want to and be capable of internalising its structures, they have not yet done so. This means they are very aware of how they don’t fit. The recruits’ disjuncture makes it possible and necessary for everybody to recognise the cultural arbitrary.

Bourdieu argues that:

The specific degree of productivity of any [Pedagogic Work, i.e. education/socialisation] other than primary [socialisation] [...] is a function of the distance between the habitus it
tends to inculcate (i.e. the cultural arbitrary it imposes) and the habitus inculcated by the previous phases of [socialisation] and ultimately by primary [socialisation] (i.e. the initial cultural arbitrary)” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990, p.43).

That is, the success of any secondary socialisation depends on how closely the dispositions being inculcated match the dispositions already present. These predispositions will affect whether the training is seen to make sense and be worthwhile, and whether the student has the abilities necessary to complete it (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990, p.45).

Learning, and therefore socialisation, can occur in two ways. The first type, implicit, is associated with practical mastery, with “the unconscious inculcation of principles which manifest themselves only in their practical state” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990, p.47) and which therefore are “transmitted in practice” (1977, p.87). The second, associated with symbolic mastery, is explicit: “the inculcation, methodically organized as such, of articulated and even formalized principles” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990, p.47). Something similar to both of these types of learning occur in the Army, with most skills being learnt first in a classroom, but then, more importantly, by getting “hands on”. The learning style favoured by soldiers is transmission through practice rather than through codification. Formal lessons were just evils to be gotten though before everyone could be given the equipment to have a tutū (fiddle) with it. This is also why I have had to name some of the more general dispositions soldiers internalise myself: implicitly transmitted as practical mastery, I have had to translate them to explicit concepts to write this thesis. Between implicit and explicit learning, “every society provides for structural exercises tending to transmit this or that form of practical mastery”, examples being “riddles and ritual contests” (1977, p.88). Structural exercises are common in the Army, both directed by staff and initiated by new soldiers themselves. These exercises help trainees to internalise transposable dispositions, but the practices that make up the exercises themselves are not always intended to be transposable. Many structural exercises in the Army, for example, involve challenging one another to help each other learn how to deal with hardship. This however occurs only in certain places and times, as its ultimate purpose is to prepare one another for the hardships of deployment and battle, fields in which challenging one another is replaced by supporting one another.
Speaking of implicit socialisation in militaries and other such institutions specifically, Bourdieu (1977) says:

> if all societies, and significantly, all the “totalitarian institutions”, in Goffman’s phrase, that seek to produce a new man through a process of “deculturation” and “reculturation” set such store in the seemingly most insignificant details of dress, bearing, physical and verbal manners, the reason is that, treating the body as a memory, they entrust to it in abbreviated and practical, i.e. mnemonic, form the fundamental principles of the arbitrary content of the culture. The principles em-bodied in this way are placed beyond the grasp of consciousness (p.94).

Again using military training as an example (which he himself went through, and in which he felt disjuncture due to his academic socialisation (2007, pp.38-39 & 95)), Bourdieu writes:

> the essential characteristics of secondary [socialisation/education] seeking to bring about a radical conversion [...] may be deduced from the fact that such operations are required to organize the social conditions of their performance with a view to killing off the ‘old man’ and engendering the new habitus [...] Consider, for example, the tendency to [...] the flaunting of the arbitrariness of the inculcation as arbitrariness for its own sake, and more generally the imposition of rules for rules’ sake, [...] e.g. [...] military drill, etc. In this respect, ‘total’ institutions (barracks, convents, prisons, asylums, boarding schools) unambiguously demonstrate the deculturating and reculturating techniques required by [socialisation] seeking to produce a habitus as similar as possible to that produced in the earliest phase of life, while having to reckon with a pre-existing habitus. At the other extreme, the traditional institutions for young ladies of good family represent the paradigmatic form of all institutions which, thanks to the mechanics of selection and self-selection, address themselves exclusively to agents endowed with a habitus as little different as possible from the one to be produced, and can therefore content themselves with ostentatiously organizing all the appearances of really effective training (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990 p.44).

Given the argument above regarding the over-emphasis on Army training’s transformative capacity, I disagree with this argument. I argue that in fact Army training may have more in common with “finishing school” type education than civilians usually suppose, particularly in all-volunteer forces like the New Zealand Army. While Bourdieu’s comments may resonate in the case of draftees like himself, the trainees in this case are self-selected, and already have a habitus suited to the training, which was why they self-selected in the first place.
Further, the “arbitrary” requirements of Basic Training are now presented to recruits as being far from arbitrary. This is done by being up front and explicitly telling recruits that the purpose of seemingly insignificant pedantic details is to make certain reactions automatic. The fact that these dispositions are to be “placed beyond the grasp of consciousness” (1977, p.94) is at first brought to recruits’ conscious attention.

Throughout all the time that I followed them, I found that for something to be worthwhile to my participants, it had to be physical, it had to be practical, and it had to be productive. This is their primary habitus through which all other socialisation is perceived and judged. Thus when I argue against the discourse of military training as profoundly transformative, I am by no means arguing my participants went through no personal change. Rather, they went through these changes because their primary habitus predisposed them to want to, meaning that this primary habitus was fulfilled rather than replaced by secondary socialisation. Thus, the first half of Part Two of this thesis, which deals with the two initial training periods my research participants went through, in which they were in state of disjuncture, is an opportunity to examine in depth how acquiring a habitus can actually work, as this is discussed constantly. Success would be being able to stop having to think so hard (and eventually, at all) about what you are doing. And indeed, in the second half of Part Two, which covers what happened when my participants entered the Army proper, discussion of Army dispositions will decrease markedly, as they will have become second nature. However, the concept of disjuncture between field and habitus will still be important. Talk will turn instead to the lack of inculcation. Because the soldiers’ primary habitus focuses on action and challenge, the state of becoming matches their expectations of worth. Already being a “fish in water” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p.128), however, does not. Though their primary habitus focused on change it was also remarkably durable: the one thing that stayed the same for my participants was that they should always be changing. Thus while the Army does produce individuals who have internalised its structures, this, unusually, does not mean that the field of the Army itself is likewise reproduced at the same time. The Army currently has a retention problem, but this is not because their efforts to impart the soldier habitus are failing. It is because the Army has to produce in soldiers a habitus that is suited not to the field they will most likely find themselves in (a peacetime Army focused on repetitive training) but rather to the field they
must be prepared for (war). Neither my participants’ pre-existing primary practical habitus nor their new soldier dispositions matched the peacetime Army, causing disjuncture and the perception of the Army as not making sense. This was especially the case given that, due to recent history, my informants had not expected to find themselves in an Army with very few active deployments. These expectations will be discussed in more depth in the ethnographic chapters, but for now the next section will discuss the primary habitus that generated soldiers’ excitement about deployment in more depth.

**The Practical Habitus (from the Scholastic Point of View)**

This chapter has already introduced the practical habitus ethnographically, as I first encountered it in the field, and will now discuss it theoretically, in that Bourdieu’s work can help me make sense not only of primary habitus in general but also of this particular primary habitus. As stated in Chapter One, it was in Bourdieu’s theory that I first found a way of talking about the mode of identity that my informants had “brought” to the Army and which the Army would “bring out”. Bourdieu discusses this habitus as a contrast to academics’ own dispositions, in order to explain why academics sometimes misunderstand their informants. Therefore, this section will also introduce the scholastic disposition. While it will primarily be introduced as a contrast to highlight the practical habitus of my participants, this disposition will also be further relevant to this thesis in several ways. Much of the interaction between myself and my participants, and the course my research therefore took, is due to the fact that I have this disposition. The scholastic disposition can further be useful in understanding the ways in which academia and militaries have engaged with and represented one another more generally. Finally, to enable discussion of how pertinent groups (soldiers, the Army as an institution) themselves conceptualise identity and its acquisition, I expand on two concepts I have introduced already, practical and symbolic mastery.

Bourdieu wrote that “every proposition set forth by the [science of society] can and ought to apply to the sociologist himself” (Bourdieu as cited in Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p.202). Accordingly, he argued that academics embody a specific type of “scholastic” disposition. Bourdieu developed his practice of theory in the first place because he felt that previous theories fell short in understanding practice, and the reason for this was a
tendency of scholars to project their own relationship to the world onto their subjects. That is, scholars have assumed that everybody has their own basic predispositions, “picturing all social agents in the image of the scientist” (1990b, p.384). This is problematic because scholars’ dispositions come from internalising the social condition of the academic, which is very particular. Bourdieu states that the distinction between scholars and other groups is more fundamental than those axes of difference that anthropologists normally stress (ethnicity, religion, gender), calling it “the most essential bias” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 69):

Knowledge does not only depend, as an elementary relativism suggests, on the particular viewpoint that a ‘situated and dated’ observer takes up vis-à-vis the object. A much more fundamental alteration [...] is performed by the sheer fact of taking up a ‘viewpoint’ on it and so constituting it as an object (of observation and analysis) (1990a, p.27).

With regards to the world, “to study it, to describe it, to talk about it, we must retire from it more or less completely” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 69). Thus scholars are “condemned to see all practice as a spectacle” (1977, p.1), which involves conceptualising it “as a set of significations to be interpreted rather than as concrete problems to be solved practically” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p.36). If we think of practice “as something to be deciphered” (1990a, p.37), “the social world appears as a representation” (1990a, p.96). Contrasting this “detached, distant disposition” (2000, p.17) is the “practical relation to the world” (1990a, p.52):

the pre-occupied, active presence in the world through which the world imposes its presence, with its urgencies, its things to be done and said, which directly govern words and deeds without ever unfolding as a spectacle (1990a, p.52).

Following Plato- and resonating with my participants not viewing anything I did as work - Bourdieu (2000) states that academic activity is to “play seriously” (p.4) and calls it a state of “inactivity”, although “unlikely to be perceived as such by minds shaped by the academic institution” (1990a, p.31). It is a “gratuitous game,” “a mental experience that is an end in and of itself” (1990b, p.381). The scholastic point of view is “made possible by the situation of skholè, of leisure” (1990b, p.381) with skholè defined “as distance from necessity and urgency” (1990b, p.388). Not only are scholars predisposed to want to, they have “the
ability to raise speculative problems for the sole pleasure of resolving them and not because they are posed, often quite urgently, by the necessities of life” (1990b, p.381). That is, this disposition is dependent on economic privilege and hence may be seen as class-based (1990a, p.140). Therefore, Bourdieu (1990a) speaks of the contrasting practical point of view as “the dispositions of agents who cannot afford the luxury of logical speculation, mystical effusions, or metaphysical anxiety” (p.115).

I would emphasise, however, that conceptualising the scholastic disposition as a “luxury” is a view from within the scholastic disposition itself. My participants would not see logical speculation as something of value or something that they would ever want to do, given its useless and unproductive nature. While many of them liked the idea that this thesis would exist, this was because there would be a record of them having completed challenges and changed (fulfilling their own practical habitus). They couldn’t imagine ever wanting to do it themselves: “I couldn’t do your job, I’d do one sentence and then give up.” (I want to emphasise, however, that I am not saying that all of my participants hated school, or reading- some had degrees, many read for fun- but that they all shared a desire for productiveness and action.) I, meanwhile, began to internalise the scholastic disposition early on in life, as my mother tried to teach me to read before I could talk (labelling all the household objects with their names, which were therefore already representations by the time I began to know them as practical objects).

While Bourdieu primarily uses the phrase “the scholastic point of view”, and this is the title of the article (1990b) that outlines the concept, he also refers to this point of view as a “disposition” throughout the article. That is, he saw it as one disposition, rather than a habitus, a more fundamental structure that underlies multiple dispositions. The scholastic disposition is a secondary socialisation, the internalisation of the social conditions of adulthood rather than early childhood (though Bourdieu (1990b) suggests that it is a “prolongation of an originary bourgeois experience” (p.381) of distance from necessity), and it not fully transposable as everyone needs to confront the necessities of life occasionally: “the practical mode of knowledge [...] is also [the scholar’s] own in the most ordinary acts and experiences [...] of ordinary existence” (2000, p. 51). However, I call the practical point
of view of my informants a habitus, as it is so fundamental to them as to be the overall system that orients numerous dispositions.

The scholastic disposition is an example of “misrecognition” - that is, academics misrecognise their “cultural arbitrary” as “objective truth” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990, p.31). This misrecognition leads to “scholastic ethnocentrism” (2000, p.51) in academic analyses. “It is rare for this difference in viewpoints,” Bourdieu writes, “to be really taken into account” (2000, p.54). That is, academics assume their informants relate to the world in the same detached way as themselves rather than in the practical way they actually do. This can take the form of an assumption that the intellect is “superior” (2000, p.23) to the body and that subsequently intellectual work automatically has more value than manual work. This will become clear below, where I discuss some examples of scholastic ethnocentrism.

Bourdieu’s proposal to counter this scholastic ethnocentrism is of course the same counter we use with all types of ethnocentrism, reflexivity. Bourdieu notes that this is “the only means, and itself scholastic, of fighting against scholastic inclinations” (2000, p.52). This means that our only defence against the scholastic disposition comes from within the scholastic disposition, and we are “condemned to [...] subject scholastic reason to a critique that is inevitably scholastic in its conditions of possibility and its forms of expression” (2000, p.93). This is what I meant when I wrote in the introduction that this thesis is a too academic way of arguing that we discuss identity too academically. This is not to say that people with the practical habitus aren’t self-reflective – recruits certainly are- but they question themselves for different reasons using different measures.

Scholastic ethnocentrism is not just the overvaluing of intellectual work, however. Merely through trying to discuss some phenomenon, academics distort them. This can be explained by going back to the concepts of practical and symbolic mastery. Turning practice into spectacle is achieved through symbolic mastery, which, as a reminder, is “the making explicit and the formalizing of the principles at work in a practice” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990, p.46). Symbolic mastery is differentiated from practical mastery, in which actors react to situations as if by instinct, without having to explicitly think about what they are doing. Converting practical to symbolic mastery is therefore bringing such actions to “conscious
awareness” (1990a, p.102) and enabling them to be expressed verbally (1977, p.88). The deficiency Bourdieu (1977) saw in academic discussions of practice was that by translating action into discourse in order to be able to discuss it, scholars subjected it to a fundamental transformation:

Simply by bringing to the level of discourse- as one must, if one wants to study it scientifically- a practice which owes a number of its properties to the fact that it falls short of discourse […] one subjects it to nothing less than a change in ontological status (p.120).

Academics then “place the models that the scientist must construct to account for practices into the consciousness of agents” and “operate as if the constructions that the scientist must produce to understand practices” (such as “culture”, or kinship systems) “were the main determinants, the actual cause of practices” (1990b, p.384). Examples of such constructions are the traditional axes of identity discussed in the introduction. Scholars use the concept of “masculinity”, for example, to explain a set of practices and traits associated with soldierhood, and then operate as if the desire to perform masculinity was the cause both of these practices and of becoming a soldier in the first place (see Chapter Four). But the symbolic mastery of a practice cannot fully depict it. To explain and/or teach activities like tennis and dancing, for example, you have to “artificially isolat[e] elementary units of behaviour” (1990a, p.102) and speak of “discrete positions, steps or moves”, that cannot really capture the whole as enacted together (1990a, pp.102-3).

So far it may seem as though I am setting up another binary of the type that I used Bourdieu to warn against earlier in this chapter, with the practical habitus, along with practical mastery and implicit learning, on one side, and the scholastic disposition, symbolic mastery, and explicit leaning on the other. It is true that symbolic mastery and explicit learning themselves are practices that some people value and others don’t, as the earlier discussion of soldiers’ preferred learning styles illustrated. Speaking of primary and secondary education, Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) argue that children from different classes are unequally predisposed or “prepared for symbolic mastery” (p. 43) due to it being privileged or otherwise in their primary socialisation. Again I would add that viewing this as a deprivation rather than a preference comes from within the scholastic disposition. However, these seeming opposites too can be seen to relate dialectically. All peoples, although they
may use each type of mastery to a greater or lesser degree and prefer one to the other, need to use both at various points in their lives. Even scholars have to be practical sometimes. And while Bourdieu most often uses the concept of symbolic mastery in the above manner, to discuss what scholars must do to analyse practice, he also notes that non-scholars sometimes need to use it as well. It may especially be required to accomplish socialisation: “the pedagogic work of inculcation […] is one of the major occasions for formulating and converting practical schemes into explicit norms” (1990a, pp.102-103).

Further, in regards to the scholastic disposition and practical habitus themselves, it is likely that scholars and soldiers are each on an extreme end of a continuum. The officers that make up the military hierarchy, for example, are both more practical than academics and more scholastic than soldiers. Officers presumably identify strongly with practice and being useful. However, they also step further back from “the pre-occupied, active presence in the world through which the world imposes its […] urgencies” (1990a, p.52) than soldiers do, if only to prepare for the urgencies of ten years hence. In doing so they have produced or commissioned a number of official programmes to guide soldier socialisation, converting implicit soldier practices into codified norms. The Army has very different reasons for this use of symbolic mastery than scholars do- not to play seriously, but for practical and productive ends. Whatever ends it is used for, however, the conversion from practical to symbolic mastery still involves the same fundamental transformation discussed above.

Thus my reason for introducing these concepts is not only to examine how scholars have represented soldiers in the literature review of Chapter Four, but also to examine the Army’s own use of symbolic mastery in Chapter Five. Given recruits and soldiers’ practical habitus, the presence of such symbolic mastery in the Army field could sometimes contribute to the feeling of disjuncture. Before I discuss soldierhood specifically, however, this chapter will now examine how what I am calling the “practical habitus” appears in academic literature more generally. It will show the potential dangers in scholastic ethnocentrism, through examples of how academics’ unconscious assumption that intellectual work is superior to physical can lead them to miss the importance of productive activity for informants. In these examples, the practical habitus is therefore not conceptualised as a distinct identity as I have conceptualised it, but rather has been
subsumed by other axes of identity: class, and then in an act of double veiling in New Zealand, which likes to think of itself as having no class system, race/ethnicity.

**The Practical Habitus in Social Science Literature: Class**

Discussion of the practical habitus in the anthropological/sociological literature can be found through the lens of class in Marxist analyses (for an example of it conceptualised through the lens of gender instead, see Chapter Four). By contrast, I want to focus more on the content of this habitus- the defining of self through productive activity- rather than class in the sense of socio-economic status. Ortner (2006) notes that class is not often discussed in America (see below on a similar situation in New Zealand) but that it can be found “hid[ing]” (p.72) in discussions of other axes of identity, such as gender and ethnicity. She writes:

> The phrase “working class” is rarely used and indeed, usually rejected by people we might think of “objectively” as members of the working class. The chemical workers in Elizabeth, New Jersey, so brilliantly studied by David Halle (1984), for example, think and speak of themselves as “working men” but reject the phrase “working class” (Ortner, 2006, p.70).

Halle’s (1984) participants’ category of the “working man” is centred on the idea “that blue-collar work takes a distinctive form and is productive in a way that the work of other classes is not” (p.205). “Those who are not working men” such as businessmen, “are not really productive, do not really work,” and “just sit on their butts all day” (Halle, 1984, p.205). Halle interprets this as class consciousness, but also shows that these men make no critique of capitalism (1984, p.219). That is, it seems to be the fact of working and their relationship to work, rather than their class status, through which these men identify themselves. Bourdieu (1998) argues that classes don’t exist unless actively brought into being through political mobilisation, but that this is not the same thing as “denying the existence of differences and of principles of differentiation” (p.12). The fact that they make distinctions based on people’s relationship to work is more important to understanding my participants than their objective class position (no socio-economic data on the cohort is available, but it seemed that most backgrounds were represented).
The best example of a work in which we can see the practical habitus being subsumed under “class” is Paul Willis’ (1977) classic Marxist ethnography *Learning to Labour: How Working Class Kids get Working Class Jobs*. This can be seen to be written from the scholastic point of view, with white collar work uncritically assumed to be superior, and the value placed on physical work by Willis’ informants dismissed as ideology. *Learning to Labour* is based on interviews and participant-observation in the early 1970s in England. Willis followed a group of working class “lads” through their last years of high school and the first stages of their working lives (largely on shop floors). The ethnography is an analysis of how the lads “freely” (Willis, 1977, p.120) enter a lifelong state of socio-economic oppression and exploitation at the bottom of the class system by rejecting high school and the qualifications available there on the basis of working class masculine values (i.e. dispositions). Willis’ ethnography paved the way for both the sociologies of education and gender (Arnot, 2003, pp. 97 & 103), and was innovative in presenting high school drop outs as active agents employing choice rather than just failures or victims (Aronowitz, 2004, p.ix). It is thus a good example of how individual actors are the force behind the reproduction of social structures, even when said structures disadvantage them. However, I wish to show that Willis’ argument can be seen as an example of scholastic ethnocentrism, and therefore the type of analysis that I want to avoid.

The lads Willis (1977) followed didn’t value educational qualifications because “they feel that they can always demonstrate any necessary ability ‘on the job’” and that “what really matters is [...] ‘pulling your finger out’ when necessary” (p.94). They only found theory useful “insofar as it really does help to do things, to accomplish practical tasks” (Willis, 1977, p.56). Their perception of fellow schoolmates who were attentive in class was that “it seems that they are always listening, never doing” (Willis, 1977, p.14).

Willis (1977), on the other hand, makes his view of manual work clear early on, writing that the lads held the above point of view, “despite the inferior rewards for, undesirable social definition, and increasing intrinsic meaningless, of manual work: in a word its location at the bottom of a class society” (p.1, emphasis added). He then uses the fact that industry jobs

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3 As these quotes suggest, Willis uses gender as well as class in his analysis. However, class is the key concept through which he frames his work, with masculine working class values seen as a subset of class values. Chapter Four, the Literature Review, discusses the subsuming of the practical habitus under gender in detail.
were at that time becoming de-skilled and standardised to again conclude that “most work in industry is basically meaningless” (Willis, 1977, p.127). He extends this view to the lads, arguing that they feel alienated from their labour: “labour power is a kind of barrier to, not an inner connection with, the demands of the world. Satisfaction is not expected in work. The exercise of those parts of the self which might be appropriate to intrinsic satisfaction in work is denied” (Willis, 1977, p.102). Willis cannot conceive of anyone choosing manual work for the work itself, and therefore looks elsewhere for their motivation. Intellectual work is said to be resisted not because the lads really do have a negative perception of it as “pen-pushing” but because this is a way in which they can resist authority. Labour is valued not because it is by contrast “graft” (Willis, 1977, p.103) and “really ’doing things’” (Willis, 1977, p.96) but because it signals the adult world (Willis, 1977, p.103) and because it “comes to stand for and express, most importantly, a kind of masculinity”: “Despite its intrinsic meaningless, manual labour [....] comes to mean for ‘the lads’ [....] an assertion of their freedom and a specific kind of power in the world” (Willis, 1977, p.104). Willis (1977) thus sees his participants’ choices regarding work as merely symbolic of other issues: “Labouring-itself meaningless-must therefore reflect aspects of the culture around it if it is to be valorised” (pp.103-104). (In the literature review we will see a similar trend of anti-war scholars unable to conceptualise soldiering as something desirable, and thus likewise looking in other places- again masculinity- for the “real” attraction).

The evidence Willis (1977) gives for this argument is that it didn’t seem to matter much to the lads which job they got: “’the lads’ are not choosing careers or particular jobs, they are committing themselves to a future of generalised labour” (pp.99-100). Further, they put a lot of emphasis on the money and on a work environment where they can have “laffs” (Willis, 1977, p.100). Willis (1977) states that “the commonality and meaningless of labour” can be seen in the fact that in wage labour “it does not matter what product is made since it is money which is really being made” (p.133). He does not consider that it is just being productive in and of itself that may be what is important. And yet Willis (1977) argues of those students that conform to high school’s expectations- that is, those who share the same definition of valuable work as he does:

The conformists [...] are much more likely to believe in the possibility of satisfaction in work [...] and to see their own values and achievements expressed through the intrinsic properties
of work activity [...] Labouring for them expresses its own properties, not other indirect cultural values (p.104, emphasis added).

In 1997, Beverly Skeggs published a similar ethnography, this time focused on working class women, but asking a similar question: “why do women, who are clearly not just passive victims of some ideological conspiracy, consent to a system of class and gender oppression which appears to offer few rewards and little benefit?” (p.22). Her research participants are students of college caring courses, where they “learn” and gain qualifications for the domestic tasks that are already part of their lives. These women “[stress] the practical side of their courses over the uselessness of academic qualifications” (Skeggs, 1997, p.59) and “continually stress how practical and sensible they are” (Skeggs, 1997, p.60). The major difference between Willis and Skeggs, however, is that she acknowledges that self-fulfilment may be found in practical labour: “The individual is not to be emancipated from work, perceived as merely a task or a means to an end, but to be fulfilled in work, now constructed as an activity through which we produce, discover and experience ourselves” (Rose as cited in Skeggs, 1997, p.62).

Skeggs therefore points out that if your self is your work, then when your work is judged, so is your self. According to the discourses of the caring courses attended by her informants, women cannot merely do caring work. Caring for someone is conflated with caring about that person, so to be able to perform such labour women have to actually be a caring person (Skeggs, 1997, p.68). This means that it is not merely their job performance that is under constant scrutiny, but their subjectivities. What is being assessed is their feeling(s): “they are stripped down to their most intimate levels and measured, monitored and classified on the basis of ‘natural’ dispositions” (Skeggs, 1997, p.69). Although Willis and Skeggs have opposite views on the relationship of practical labour and the self, they use these to make the same overall argument about the reproduction of the class system:

In trying to escape the negative classifications of dialogic others [ie. by inverting the “usual” hierarchy and constructing practical labour as superior to academic work] the women invest in caring and put themselves under greater scrutiny [...] they are consigned to forever proving themselves through the reiteration of reproductive caring performances (Skeggs, 1997, p.72).
As seen in the introduction, my participants too are very explicitly judged on their selves and can fail Basic Training for not having “soldier qualities”. However, they do not see such constant judgment as constraining. Rather, in line with their primary habitus, they welcome opportunities to prove themselves.

**The Practical Habitus in New Zealand Literature: “Race” and ethnicity**

New Zealanders tend to refuse to acknowledge that our society is structured along class lines, but discussions of class may in fact be disguised within discussions of “ethnicity” (itself a polite term for conceptions closer to “race”) (Rata, 2000; Webster, 1998). Thus in New Zealand it is the academic work on the differing social construction of ethnic bodies in which we can find discussion of the practical habitus. The bodies of Pākehā, the majority settler descendant group, are constructed in different ways to the bodies of indigenous Māori⁴ and immigrant Pasifika⁵ peoples. The key academic in this field is Brendan Hokowhitu, who has extensively explored (2003; 2004; 2008) how the common national conception of “Maori and Pacific peoples as ‘practical’ and ‘physical’ will ultimately limit their potential” (Hokowhitu, 2008, p.81). In discourse surrounding national sports teams, Māori and Pacific Islanders are seen as “naturally” physically talented but are “not afforded the same work ethic and conscious morality” (Hokowhitu, 2008, p.85) as Pākehā athletes. While Pākehā athletes are praised for their discipline and hard work, Māori and Pasifika athletes are seen to “just turn up” and be able to get the job done due to innate talent (Hokowhitu, 2008, p.85). This has also led to the funnelling of Māori and Pasifika high school students into Physical Education courses and Sports Academies rather than more academic courses. Hokowhitu (2008) shows how, both historically and today, the conception of purely physical dispositions has acted as an excuse “to provide substandard education” (p.87), led to “confinement to manual and blue collar labour” (p.84), and is ultimately a form of control and suppression (Hokowhitu, 2004, p.192).

Hokowhitu (2003) notes that during his childhood in a small rural town, “it was necessary for both Maori and Pakeha men to be physical”, not as a “leisure pursuit, hobby, or sport” but as “a way of life”, whereas academic achievement was “usually derided” (p.180). But,

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⁴ The use of the macrons in Te Reo Māori is now standard in New Zealand, but this was not the case for sources published in earlier years or internationally. I use macrons myself but have not corrected the many cited sources that do not.

⁵ A New Zealand specific term meaning New Zealanders who are migrants from the Pacific region or descendants of such migrants.
especially with rise of the “new age man”, he eventually learnt that “Pakeha men in general enjoy a fluidity of masculine culture that the Maori male, as yet, does not” (Hokowhitu, 2003, p.181), because Maori masculinity is seen to be “deeply entrenched in biological determinism” (Hokowhitu, 2003, p.188). Five years later he perhaps saw some improvement, as he writes in an article published in 2008 that such conceptions of masculinity may be more problematic for Pacific Islanders, given the “increasing Māori middle-class and the self-determined movement of Māori away from physical constructions” (Hokowhitu, 2008, p.83). Maybe it is our refusal to discuss class that has led practical dispositions to be even more problematically aligned with “race,” and in line with that social construct, to be attached to biology and genetics.

Hokowhitu himself does not privilege one form of masculinity over any others, but other scholars following him in this field of inquiry have displayed an anti-physical bias. Fitzpatrick (2013) for example, recognises the damage that may be caused through devaluing the physical, but doesn’t quite avoid making the same mistake herself. Following Hokowhitu, she argues that the conception of Māori and Pasifika students as innately physical is problematic, noting that Māori and Pasifika success is seen as “genetically determined and not, therefore, a result of their own hard work, practice or dedication” (Fitzpatrick, 2013, p.140). Such success is hence devalued. Fitzpatrick (2013) argues however, that at the same time, PE in high schools provides “an engaging space of achievement and access to formal school qualifications” (p.137). Thus such students “accede to the view that they are ‘non-academic’, a process of negative internalization” (Fitzpatrick, 2013, p.143). The article begins with a transcript of an interview in which Fitzpatrick asks Samoan and Cook Islander high schoolers why they chose PE as their main subject. They answer, “‘Cause we like being physical”. Fitzpatrick’s response to this is, “So what do you get out of it, apart from having that physical outlet, what do you get out of it, what’s good about it?” (Fitzpatrick, 2013, p.135, emphasis added). One of the boys responds that he can apply what he learns in PE to his extracurricular sports, and Fitzpatrick responds, again, “So what else, why take PE over, say like, science?” (Fitzpatrick, 2013, p.136, emphasis added). That is, like Willis, Fitzpatrick can’t accept the physical as a reason in and of itself- there must be something else. The boys tell her “‘Cause we don’t like sitting around” and then, more to Fitzpatrick’s liking, add that unlike science, they understand PE and find it easy (Fitzpatrick, 2013, p.136). Noting that the
Physical Education course actually contains science (biomechanics, physiology and so on—which I would be willing to guess her informants find to be worthwhile because they can see its productive applications) Fitzpatrick (2013) concludes that “this statement suggests that PE is perhaps more than just running around and being physical” (p.136), with “just running around” sounding especially dismissive.

There are then in fact two problems identifiable in the discussion of the practical habitus. The first is that there may be limited access to the intellectual sphere for some groups because they are primarily conceptualised as physical. But another is that scholars sometimes speak as if it is common sense that this intellectual sphere is automatically superior to the physical. Fitzpatrick (2013) argues for the revaluing of the subject of PE but she does it by emphasising that it actually does involve science, rather than arguing for the value of the physical itself: “there is clearly still much for teachers and students to do if they are to promote their subject as more than merely physical. Such a repositioning of PE might allow the achievements of black and brown youth in this subject to be recognised as more than just physical” (p.150, emphasis added). My point is that in regards to those people who do identify their selves through manual and productive work- who have internalised this habitus at some early stage rather than having been born with it- we should be taking more care to take what they say to us about this work seriously.

Hokowhitu (2004) further notes that conceptualising Māori and their practices (Kapa Haka, Poi, etc) as merely physical is in fact “a fragment[ing] of the Maori world” (p.207) from a Pākehā point of view. By contrast, “the holistic nature of Maori epistemologies (i.e. the non-compartmentalisation of the spiritual, mental, emotional, and physical realms) determines cultural forms where the balance between these realms is constantly sought” (Hokowhitu, 2008, p.89). It must be re-emphasised that when I speak of the practical as opposed to scholastic dispositions I am not primarily contrasting physical with mental but rather the manual/practical with the specifically academic in terms of seeking understanding merely for understanding’s sake. Though the physical and mental may have be conceived as binary opposites this pair also act in a dialectical relationship. The physical is often also mental- in a

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6 Performing Arts; “to dance” (haka) (Moorfield, 2011, p.21) in “rank[s], row[s]” (kapa) (Moorfield, 2011, p.58).
7 “A light ball in a string of varying length which is swung or twirled rhythmically to swung accompaniment” (Moorfield, 2011, p.151).
way that is not academic because it is still productive— as can be seen in the uniting of
physical and mental dispositions in the concept of habitus. An example of the type of
analysis that can therefore be done using Bourdieu, in terms of rejecting the physical-
mental binary, and therefore resisting scholastic ethnocentrism, and also in terms of paying
attention to the role of pre-existing habitus in the acquisition of a new one, is Wacquant’s
(2004) study of boxing and what he calls the “pugilistic habitus” (p.16).

The Practical Habitus in a Bourdieusian Analysis
Wacquant (2004) uses the concept of habitus to show how boxing is simultaneously physical
and mental. He conducted participant-observation in a boxing gym in an African-American
“ghetto” in Chicago, where his participants often compared their training and the discipline
it took to joining the military (Wacquant, 2004, p.56). Boxing “turns the individual into his
own arena of challenge and invites him to discover himself, better yet to produce himself”
(Wacquant, 2004, p.15). Wacquant (2004) states that the pugilistic habitus is:

> a set of corporeal mechanisms and mental schemata so intimately imbricated that they
erase the distinction between the physical and the spiritual, between what pertains to
athletic abilities and what belongs to moral capacities and will. The boxer is a live gearing of
the body and minds that erases the boundary between reason and passion (p.17).

In the ring “the body of the fighter computes and judges for him, instantaneously, without
the mediation- and the costly delay that it would cause- of abstract thinking , prior
representation, and strategic calculation” (Wacquant, 2004, p.97).

Wacquant’s case study is also similar to military training in that it is another situation which
is primarily conceptualised as a major transformation from one’s previous life and identity
but which nevertheless depends on the habitus internalised during that previous life. The
boxing gym “defines itself in opposition to ‘the street’” and its “proclaimed goal is to
provide a structured setting capable of lifting young people living in the ghetto out of urban
exclusion and its gloomy cortege of crime, gangs, drugs and poverty” (Wacquant, 2004, p.
30). Yet it is street culture that has “predispose[d] the youths of Woodlawn to conceive of
boxing as a meaningful activity that offers them a stage on which to enact the core values of
its masculine ethos”. Boxing draws on the street’s “masculine culture of toughness,
individual honor, and bodily performance”. Although this transformative training makes use
of these pre-existing primary dispositions, it “harnesses street qualities to the pursuit of
different, more astringently structured and distant goals” (Wacquant, 2004, p.55). That is,
although the boxers’ predispositions towards performance and endurance are drawn on,
they are directed towards different ends, perceived to result in a different, better future.
Other parts of street culture, such as bragging, disrespect to women, cursing and smoking –
which may be generated from the same predispositions as the valued traits- are banned
from the gym (Wacquant, 2004, p.55). This results in personal transformation, but it was the
dispositions that were already held that were used to accomplish this change.

In this case the required predispositions were quite particular, meaning this avenue of
escape was not open to everyone. The members of the gym tended to be those young men
of the working class who “are struggling at the threshold of stable socioeconomic
integration” (Wacquant, 2004, p.43, emphasis in original), rather than the most
disadvantaged, who were excluded because:

They lack the habits and inclinations demanded of pugilistic practice: to become a boxer
requires a regularity of life, a sense of discipline, a physical and mental asceticism that
cannot take root in social and economic conditions marked by chronic instability and
temporal disorganization (Wacquant, 2004, p.44).

Like soldiers, those who joined the gym had self-selected (Wacquant, 2004, p.43) and had
already shown some of the necessary predisposition by doing so. Wacquant’s analysis of
boxing and its interaction with the primary practical habitus is the same basic process that
occurs in the Army. Young people with particular predispositions are recruited, and then
those predispositions, directed towards new objectives in a new context, and drawn on
more consistently, are used to enact personal change: “You bring it, we’ll bring it out”.

Conclusion

This chapter introduced the way in which I will examine identity acquisition, which is
through a focus on the relationship between pre-existing and new identities. It also
provided the theoretical justification and framework for this method, Bourdieu’s theory of
practice. Bourdieu’s concept of the primary habitus argues that dispositions that we have
embodied from early childhood generate our thoughts and actions, and therefore form “the basis of perception and appreciation of all subsequent experience” (1977, p.78), including further socialisation. I have therefore structured this thesis around the primary practical habitus and its relationship with the soldier habitus because it is this habitus that structured my informants’ experience of becoming soldiers. The dispositions that caused the cohort to deem only some activities as productive and therefore of value are what generated their differing responses to the four stages of their careers that I cover. Therefore, contrary to common discourse, in this case pre-existing civilian dispositions cannot be conceptualised as being overwritten by military training. Recruits’ civilian identities are not lost, but initially fulfilled in military training, which further means that recruits realise their individual identity projects by submitting to hierarchy and uniformity. The fulfilment of desires generated by the pre-existing habitus was a large part of my informants’ investment in being a soldier, and the lack of such fulfilment could reduce this investment. Part Two of this thesis, the ethnographic chapters, will show that the four career stages covered differed from one another in terms of the level of productive and challenging activity that they offered. This chapter has therefore also introduced concepts that allow me to examine how the same underlying habitus can generate different responses to different contexts (fields): the practical habitus caused participants to see some of these fields (primarily the first two) as making sense and being worth investing in (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p.127), but their experience of others (primarily the last two) was characterised by disjuncture. The potential for such disjuncture can already be seen in this chapter’s introduction to the two habitus themselves, with the general structure of the dispositions that make up the primary habitus being productive action, but the general structure of the soldier habitus simply being readiness for action.

This chapter also introduced one other identity, the dispositions of academics themselves. This scholastic disposition is based on not only detaching oneself from practice, but also detaching action itself from practice in order to be able to examine it (converting practical mastery to symbolic mastery). While the relationship between the practical habitus and the soldier habitus is the basis for the ethnographic chapters of Part Two, the basis of much of Part One is the contrast between the practical habitus and this scholastic disposition. More specifically, Part One is based on the question of what happens when symbolic mastery is
used to talk about or to those with the practical habitus, who are not disposed to value it.

Two of the next three chapters have detailed discussions of two of those “constructions that
the scientist must produce to understand practices” (1990b, p.384). These are the axes of
identity that are most often used to try and understand soldierhood: gender, in the case of
the academic literature (Chapter Four), and ethnicity in relationship with nationality, in the
case the New Zealand Army itself (Chapter Five). These chapters will show why I myself am
not using any of these identity axes as a framework. In the first case, I argue that gender is
misleading, whereas in the second it is not that ethnicity is misleading as such, but rather
that it doesn’t fully capture what is going on. It is my informants’ embodiment of the
practical habitus, I argue –their collective identity, rather than their differences in terms of
gender and ethnicity- that best helps us understand how they became soldiers. This is not to
say that “practical habitus” is not itself a construction formed through symbolic mastery in
the same way that gender and ethnicity are. But Bourdieu’s concepts at least try to
acknowledge this fact within themselves - as Bourdieu warns, we can never fully escape the
scholastic disposition in trying to do social science, but we can be reflexive about it. In the
next chapter, therefore, I cover the methodology and ethical considerations of this research
project, both of which were significantly influenced by the fact that I was acting in line with
the scholastic disposition whilst my research participants’ actions were generated by the
practical habitus.
Chapter Three

Researching the Practical Habitus with a Scholastic Disposition: Methodology and Ethical Considerations

This chapter outlines the methodology of my research, which was anthropological participant observation, as well as its ethical considerations. It is, therefore, the most straightforward and least theoretical chapter in Part One of this thesis. This means that it is not as closely structured by the relationship between the primary practical habitus and secondary soldier habitus as many of the other chapters are. However, these habitus are still relevant to this chapter, in that they are central to understanding how my research progressed. Because their primary habitus is what my informants use to evaluate all experience, it also generated their reactions to my research. This practical habitus disposed them to view the research project in two distinct ways. Firstly, some were glad that there would be a record of their identity transformation (“have I changed yet?”). Secondly however, I myself was seen as somebody who never did anything. Because my actions were generated by the scholastic disposition, while the informants’ were generated by the practical habitus, we sometimes appeared very strange to one another.

Soldierhood as a set of predispositions also has a potential effect on research undertaken in the military sphere, in that once the soldier habitus is embodied, emotions and opinions are carefully controlled. An indication of just how inaccessible soldiers’ thoughts are, even to their superiors within the organisation, is that after my fieldwork I was invited to a New Zealand Defence Force workshop because I have a “very unique perspective of NZDF culture”. This very unique perspective was the actually not at all unique collective point of view of the Army’s privates. Perhaps what was most important to my ability to gather data was that I met many of my informants before they internalised this habitus, and was around a lot in those more private spheres in which opinion is expressed.

I owe this aspect of my methodology to the New Zealand Army itself. The Army designed my research project for me, and they did a much better job of it than I would have done. With
the backing of an Army Officer seconded to Massey University’s Centre of Defence and Security Studies, I had approached the Army and asked if I could accompany a deployment to Afghanistan. Unsurprisingly, they said no. However, the Chief of Army approved the idea of a research project in general, and a group of officers convened to think of a project that would be useful to the organisation suggested that I study soldier socialisation instead. They pointed out that I had asked to look at the “end of the pipeline” (deployment) which I would be unable to fully understand because I would have no knowledge of what had come before, and therefore no understanding of why deployed soldiers acted in the ways that they did. The officers therefore came up with a research plan that began at the start of the “pipeline” and traced the development of soldier training and values through multiple stages. The multiple stages were the central motivating factor of this plan. While staff in charge of each individual stage knows what is going on in their unit, and research had been done on some of the specific stages, what was missing was a picture of the whole process and how one stage interacted with the next. For example, a 2008 Army Cultural Review (Horn, Pepper, Ballantyne, Willan & Bond, 2008) noted that Basic Training instructors were concerned that what they viewed as a “PC” environment “was not preparing soldiers for the reality of the way units functioned in the rest of the Army (the theme being that the culture in many units is much harsher)” (p.59). However, the parameters of this study didn’t allow for checking in on these soldiers further into their careers to ascertain whether this was in fact the case. To understand both the course of my research and the course of the informants’ careers, it is first necessary to briefly outline the structure and organisation of Army training and of the Army itself. The information on Army structure comes from lessons that I sat in on and was tested on whilst embedded with a Corps Training platoon.

New Zealand Army Organisation and Structure

The New Zealand Army is part of the wider New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), along with the Royal New Zealand Air Force and the Royal New Zealand Navy. It has “around 4500” fulltime soldiers, as well as reservists (“Welcome to the New Zealand Army”, 2016). Soldiers first enter the Army as “recruits,” as they have not yet achieved a rank. Soldiers are recruited to the Army to fulfil particular jobs or roles, and hence everybody has joined

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8 Politically Correct.
specifically as, for example, a rifleman, or a medic, or an engineer, and so on. This is referred to as your “trade” or “corps”. However all soldiers (as opposed to officers, see below) begin their careers by attending an All Arms Recruit Course (AARC) held in Waiouru. This is because everybody in the Army, whether they are a chef or a mechanic, is first and foremost a soldier. Everyone must be able to respond effectively if engaged by the enemy, even if they hold a logistics position that is unlikely to place them anywhere near the frontlines. Therefore, the AARC teaches core soldier competencies (the basics that will be built on later for recruits who become riflemen) and there are no trade elements. The AARC is referred to colloquially as Basic Training.

After Basic Training, soldiers split off into their trades. Most undergo further specialised training called Corps Training, where they learn the specific skills required for their particular role. Riflemen go to Combat Corps Training along with crewmen (or “tankies” - those soldiers who crew the Army’s Light Armoured Vehicles (LAVs)). They are now referred to as “Corps Trainees”. Combat Corps Training takes place in Burnham and is run by 2/1 Battalion, Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment. Riflemen and crewmen train together for the first half of the course, and separate when it is time for the crewmen to learn their way around the LAVs. The role of the infantry (as trainees are to recite on command) is “to seek out and close with the enemy, to kill or capture him, to seize and hold ground, to repel attack, by day and night, regardless of season, weather or terrain”. In order to fulfil this role, each rifleman, according to the Aide Memoir everyone was issued, had to become “proficient at: handling all Platoon weapons; fieldcraft; basic navigation; marksmanship; tracking; first aid; and the operation and maintenance of section specialist equipment”. Riflemen must also keep their weapon, ammo, equipment and clothing in clean and working order and remain “physically fit and healthy”. Once the riflemen “march out” of Corps Training (graduate) they join the Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment (RNZIR). They are now referred to by their rank of Private. Privates are colloquially called baggies, but riflemen most often refer to themselves collectively as “the boys”. This therefore is the term I use.

The privates are posted to one of RNZIR’s two Regular Force Battalions, either 2/1 Battalion in Burnham or 1 Battalion in Linton. 1st Battalion is colloquially referred to as “one R” (1R), while 2/1st Battalion is colloquially referred to as either “second first” (2/1st) or “two one” (2/1). 2/1 is a light infantry battalion, while at the time of my fieldwork 1R was
“mechanised” or “mounted” infantry (that is, equipped with Light Armoured Vehicles for combat and transport).

Armies have two separate rank structures and therefore two separate training programmes, the enlisted soldiers as discussed above, and Commissioned Officers. Commissioned Officers command soldiers. Because of this, the two form separate groups that eat, sleep and socialise separately. In the New Zealand Army civilians who are to become officers enter the Army as “Officer Cadets”, and when they have finished their initial training march out as Second Lieutenants. Second Lieutenants act as Platoon Commanders, a platoon being the basic unit of Army organisation. The unit organisation outlined from this point on is the organisation of infantry units, as three out of four of the units I was embedded with were infantry, whilst the fourth, at Basic Training, was based on the infantry model.

A platoon has a ratio of one officer to thirty to forty soldiers. The majority of those soldiers are privates. The privates are divided into three sections (1 Section, 2 Section, 3 Section) made up of around ten soldiers each. Each private in a section can act as a rifleman, but there are also specialised roles including scouts, a sig (who carries the radio) and gunners. Each section is headed by two Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs). NCOs are soldiers who have been promoted past private and given further training in order to act in leadership positions. Each section is led by a Section Commander (Seco), who deals with tactics and orders, and a Second in Command (2IC), who deals with supply. The Seco and 2IC are Junior Non-Commissioned Officers (JNCOs), Lance-Corporals and Corporals. Each platoon also has a Platoon Sergeant (a Senior Non-Commissioned Officer), who (like the 2IC) deals with supply as well as welfare. The Platoon Commander and Sergeant make up Platoon headquarters, along with the platoon sig, a private who is assigned to headquarters rather than to a section. On deployments or field exes a medic and driver may also be assigned to platoon headquarters. The platoons at Basic Training are largely based on this structure, except that there are no NCOs acting as section 2ICs (recruits step into this position) and there is an extra JNCO in headquarters, a Regimental Corporal, to help deal with Platoon-wide organisation.

The next level up from the Platoon is the Company. A Company is made up of three to four platoons. A light infantry company has a ratio of 5 officers to 119 soldiers/NCOs, while
mechanised infantry companies have a ratio of 6 officers to 137 soldiers (more soldiers as there are LAV crews as well as riflemen). Companies are led by an Officer Commanding (OC) who holds the rank of Major. Three to four rifle companies, along with some support companies, make up a Battalion. Battalions are led by a Commanding Officer (CO), a Lieutenant-Colonel. The Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment has two Regular Force Battalions (that is, made up of fulltime career soldiers), 2/1 and 1R, as well as three Territorial Force Battalions (made up of part time reservist soldiers). As we were told at Corps Training, a Battalion is “a mythical beast based on a bunch of rifle companies and some hangers on.” These “hangers on” include a Health Services Support Platoon (i.e. medics), a Service Support Company (i.e. logistics), and a Combat Support Company. Combat Support Companies are made up of platoons with specialised tasks- Reconnaissance, Signals (communications), Direct Fire Support Weapons (who provide direct fire support to the battalion in the form of machine guns and automatic grenade launchers) and Anti-Armour (whose role is to prevent the intrusion of enemy armour into the Battalion’s field of operations). Soldiers tend to be posted to this company from the rifle companies after a few years’ experience and further training. My informants were beginning to be posted to Fire Support and Recon as I was finishing this thesis.

Methodology

As riflemen therefore progress through three different units in the first year of their careers, my original research plan included three stages. As a precursor and introduction to the first stage, the All Arms Recruit Course, I attended a three week induction course held for the NCOs who would run this course and who were new to this role. I was then embedded with a platoon during the Basic Training itself, to act as much like one of the recruits as possible. After Basic Training I followed the riflemen down to Burnham for their Combat Corps Training, and shadowed another platoon there (staying with the riflemen when the crewmen split off). The third stage involved following the integration of the now fully trained riflemen into the RNZIR Battalions. I spent a few days with a 2/1st Platoon on a field exercise shortly after Corps Training and, a couple of months after that, another four months with a Platoon in 1R at Linton. After these three original stages of fieldwork were completed, I and my Army-Massey sponsor again asked if I could accompany a deployment
to Afghanistan, given that I now had an understanding of the start of the pipeline. The Army this time showed some willingness to let me go for a week, but given the anthropological preference for long-term fieldwork, they also offered to embed me with a platoon for the whole of a four month deployment to the Solomon Islands instead. This Platoon was in fact broadly the same one as the 2/1st Platoon I had spent a few days with on field ex, and included many more of the cohort that I had followed than made it to Afghanistan, and so the Solomon Islands deployment became the fourth and final stage of this research project.

As soldiers progress through the three initial stages of their Army careers, they are posted to new platoons with some, but not all of their previous platoon-mates, based on the new unit’s own organisation. Therefore, at each progressive research stage I was placed with a different platoon with some familiar but some new faces. Many soldiers were involved with this research in that I was embedded in only one of their platoons. Quite a number however were members of two of the researched platoons, and one soldier was in three. This means that there were over a hundred research participants, counting NCOs as well as privates. I originally intended to use interviews as well as participant-observation, but because during Basic and Corps Training recruits are kept busy from dawn until at least 10.30pm seven days a week, this was not a practical or an ethical time to do so. By the time this work tempo eased off, I had been based with some of the soldiers for closing on a year already and they couldn’t really be bothered being interviewed: “you know what I’m going to say anyway,” one said. Further, individuals who have internalised “switched-on” soldier dispositions, as covered briefly last chapter, and as will become much clearer in the ethnographic chapters, tend to be non-forthcoming, and thus not particularly open interview subjects. Therefore it now seemed not only unethical to interview soldiers who couldn’t be bothered with this academic task, but also fairly pointless. This thesis, however, still very much features the words of the participants: the unprompted, informal conversations they had in the course of daily life. I almost never asked questions. Rather, this thesis centres on hundreds of discussions we had at lessons, on the range, in the field, at dinner, in barracks, and in numerous instances of “hurry up and wait.” Not uncommonly participants would come up to me with a request to record something in particular: “Can you write down that...”; “Write that shit down girl!”; “Put that in your report”; “Write this in your book...” A couple of people even seemed to be consciously collecting stories to tell me, and would have a list of
incidents to report if they saw me again after a few days or even months. Once a Corps Trainee came up to me and said, “Harding, I’ve got something you can write in your thing.” When questioned by his mate as to whether I should really write down that particular thing, (he believed it was controversial), the original trainee responded, “What do you think she’s for?”

Although I came across Defence Force members of many different ranks and specialities in the course of my research, this thesis is specifically based on the point of view of the riflemen that made up the cohort I followed, to give a detailed picture of their particular experience of the Army. When I discuss groups other than the cohort or the particular Platoon with whom I was based- other platoons, other companies, the hierarchy, soldiers of other Armies, local Solomon Islanders- I am presenting those groups solely from the point of view of my cohort and/or Platoon. This discussion is not meant to reflect an accurate picture of what was really going on within those other groups, but rather reflects how my participants saw them, which was largely based on how they saw themselves in comparison. Many officers and senior NCOs were extremely helpful and attentive to me, organising my movements, facilitating access to research opportunities, and checking on my welfare, and in some cases I have reciprocated by writing about them only in a negative light, in that the privates had a negative view of them. I wish then to both thank and apologise to these people. One of my Platoon Sergeants once asked if I wrote bad things about people, “like do you write down if something is useless?” When I replied that I wrote down if the boys thought something was useless, he said “fair enough.” I got caught up in the riflemen’s point of view myself, and in the second year of research was told by some Territorial soldiers that I was "defensive and biased" when it came to the cohort I followed. I have periodically given updates to NZDF headquarters in Wellington, and despite years hanging around the Army, have become largely incapable of taking part in informal conversations with officers, because the types of information you need to converse with officers are so completely divergent to the topics of conversation favoured by soldiers.

**Ethical Considerations**

Participant-observation conducted with militaries has leaned heavily on the “participant” role. Due to how difficult it is for academics to access militaries, most ethnographers have
been service members or ex-service members themselves (See, for example, Ben-Ari, 1998; Hawkins, 2005; Hockey, 1986; Jaffe, 1984; 1995; Jokitalo, 2013; Kirke, 2009), academics that are employed by militaries in their own universities or institutes (see, for example, Cervinkova, 2009; Haddad, 2010; Holmes-Eber, 2014; Langer & Pietsch, 2013; Tomforde, 2009; 2010) or even Army spouses (Simons, 1997). Some academics have managed to do participant-observation at the end stages that I too initially tried for, that is, peacekeeping deployments or pre-deployment training (See, for example, Carreiras & Alexandre, 2013; Belcher & Martin, 2013; Ghosh, 1994; Persson, 2011; Rubinstein, 1998). I however am a civilian who had no military contacts before the fact. I do not work for the NZDF and was self-funded (paying the Army for my accommodation and food). Because over the course of a year and a half with the Army, it couldn’t be guaranteed that I wouldn’t come across classified information, it was necessary for the Army to review this thesis before it was publicly disseminated (through submission, publication, or conference presentation). It was checked for any information that might affect national security under Section 6 of New Zealand’s Official Information Act. The result of this was that the thesis was cleared with no changes or omissions requested: “full public disclosure with no caveats”. I also obtained the lowest level national security clearance to be able to complete the deployment phase of this research.

Military anthropology is an example of what Laura Nader termed “studying up,” which is the study of powerful institutions. It is sometimes suggested that those studying the powerful shouldn’t necessarily follow standard anthropological ethical codes, which were developed with less powerful subjects in mind. I strongly disagree with this suggestion, and outline why below. I then discuss my subsequent efforts to ensure that my research adhered to the Association of Social Anthropologists of Aotearoa/New Zealand’s (1992) Principles of Professional Responsibility and Ethical Conduct.

Nader first advocated the method of “studying up” in 1969, noting that “anthropologists value studying what they like and liking what they study and, in general, we like the underdog” (Nader, 1969, p.303). She asked, however, what would happen if “anthropologists were to study the colonizers rather than the colonised, the culture of power rather than the culture of the powerless, the culture of affluence rather than the culture of poverty” (Nader, 1969, p.289). She argued that this would not be merely
academic: “the quality of life and our lives themselves may depend upon the extent to which civilians understand those who shape attitudes and actually control institutional structures” (Nader, 1969, p.284). Since then, even though anthropology at home has become more popular, studying up is still uncommon. Robbins (2013) argues that anthropology dealt with the questions raised about its traditional “primitive” subject during the crisis of representation by replacing it with “the suffering subject”: “the subject living in pain, in poverty, or under conditions of violence or oppression” (p.448). Thus even at home anthropologists tend to study the marginalised and poor, changing the location and degree of exoticness of their fieldwork, but retaining the traditional way in which anthropologists and informants are positioned in relation to each other (Gusterson, 1997, p. 114; Priyadharshini, 2003; Womack, 1995, p.48). “Anthropologists,” wrote Nader (1969), “might indeed ask themselves whether the entirety of fieldwork does not depend upon a certain power relationship in favour of the anthropologist” (p.289). Studying the powerless and oppressed has often led to the anthropologist occupying the more powerful position in the research relationship. Studying up, however, requires anthropologists to put themselves in a subordinate position in relation to research participants.

Nader (1969) suggested that there is an “implicit double standard” (p.304) in that there is one ethical standard for studying down, and one for studying up. A researcher of law and science, she herself felt that personal indignation should be a motivating factor in studying power players (Nader, 1969, pp.285-286). Edwards (2007), who conducts participant-observation amongst Japanese corporations, writes that “at times” anthropology “can serve as a challenge to those power holders” (p.564) and that there are “cases where writing against- rather than for- those studied may be the right thing to do” (p. 577). These comments indicate that such anthropologists do not always see their “paramount responsibility” as being to their research participants, as New Zealand’s national version of anthropological ethical codes puts it. This code states that in any conflict of interest, one’s research participants “must come first” (Association of Social Anthropologists of Aotearoa/New Zealand, 1992, principle 1). Nader and Edwards’ comments above, however, instead suggest privileging what the anthropologist deems to be the greater good over research participants. This may fit with the general anthropological ethos of siding with the downtrodden, but it certainly doesn’t fit the ethical codes, which require that the welfare,
dignity, and interests of participants remain unharmed as a result of research, and that “fair return should be given them for their help and services” (Association of Social Anthropologists of Aotearoa/New Zealand, 1992, principle 1 & 1.a).

Nader (1969) wrote that:

we should not necessarily apply the same ethics developed for studying the private, and even ethics developed for studying in foreign cultures (where we are guests), to the study of institutions, organisations, and bureaucracies that have a broad public impact. In reinventing anthropology, any discussion of ethics should consider the public-private dimensions as well as the home-abroad component (pp.304-305).

In other words, Nader seems to be saying, if your powerful participants can directly affect your own life, and not just those of your other research participants in the way that a chief in a remote village that you will eventually leave does, then maybe we can act differently.

Womack (1995), who studies newspaper journalism, even argues that we may be able to abandon cultural relativism as a “value orientation” (p.50). Womack argues that cultural relativism was used in the first place to try and counteract the power imbalance between anthropologists and their subjects in colonial days, to counter the idea that other societies would and should “evolve” along the lines of Western values (Womack, 1995, p.54). She further suggests that if this specific power imbalance is not present then maybe cultural relativism doesn’t have to be either: “when the people can throw anthropologists out or have them arrested, does cultural relativism continue to be relevant?” (Womack, 1995, p.50)

I do not agree that we can or should rethink cultural relativism or basic anthropological ethics when studying up. When you are on the ground in a powerful institution, it becomes clear that if you comment on the actions of that institution, what you are really doing is revealing the actions of individuals, who might then suffer consequences within the institution. The Army is made up of groups of people positioned differently within hierarchical structures. While I was indeed subordinate to some in my fieldwork, the cohort of recruits I primarily followed were just as powerless, or in some ways more powerless, than I was. We cannot forget also that the same people are positioned differently relative to various others in different fields, and treating the powerful as only powerful is missing the
whole story. Soldiers exercise power in the sense that they may carry rifles in foreign
countries and sometimes, are even allowed to use them (the cohort I followed never were,
however). But they are also heavily associated with submission and obedience. Therefore I
have followed the Association of Social Anthropologists of Aotearoa/New Zealand’s (1992)
ethical code with no alteration as far as possible. However, the fact that I did put myself in a
subordinate position in my field site in relation to NCOs and officers sometimes interfered
with my attempts to do so. This will be discussed in detail in the section on Basic Training
below.

Because the order originated from far above them, no soldier could do much about the fact
that I was embedded in their platoon. However, individual consent from every
recruit/private was required in the form of a signed consent form. Each time I was
embedded with a new platoon the consent process was gone through again with those new
to my study. In three of the stages- Basic, Battalion, and Deployment- I also got formal
signed consent forms from the higher ranks in the platoon and wider company, that is,
NCOs and officers (see below for the situation in Corps Training). Anybody who chose not to
sign the form- of which there were a few- has not been included in this study. This means
that while the general outline of what their platoon went through can be found here, I have
used no information, quotes, or examples from them personally. At the Basic Training and
Battalion stages I gave a public speech on my research to the whole group. At Basic this was
to the whole Company, and I later went around the soldiers in my particular Platoon with
consent forms. At Battalion the soldiers signed the forms in the meeting at which I spoke,
and then I followed up with anyone who may have been away that day. At Corps Training
and on deployment I more informally caught up with the soldiers hanging around barracks (I
missed some people on deployment, and hence have not used information from these
people). As is standard, I had information sheets to go with the consent forms, but it soon
became clear that most people had no interest in reading a whole page on ethics, so I began
just explaining these verbally. I made it clear that anyone who signed could later choose to
pull out of the study, and re-emphasised this at later stages with some people, if they joked
about pulling out (to screw me over!), or seemed unhappy with my presence. For example, I
asked Hall, the recruit who in the previous chapter consistently commented on my lack of
work, if he wanted out, and he just responded, “Didn’t I sign a piece of paper?” (By the end
of Basic we settled on being amicable nemeses who could cheerfully discuss our enmity with each other). A few people did change their minds and drop out, and I deleted all information I had collected from them. Because after I was injured I took advantage of the times in which the informants were active and I was not to take notes, I was quite often visibly writing, about which people tended to comment. This meant participants were generally well aware that what they were doing might be included in the study and perhaps therefore knew to censor themselves if they so wished. I also made it clear that anyone could tell me not to use particular pieces of information, which some people occasionally did.

Given the hierarchical nature of the Army, it was important to emphasise that nothing that a participant told me, or that I heard or saw them do, would be repeated up or down the chain, either to their superiors or to those under their command. In the ethical application for this project one of the things that I noted I would watch out for was whether the recruits’ subordinate position in a hierarchical organisation might lead them to believe that they had to give consent. I think that having to listen to the whole spiel again at each new stage (because of new participants) worked to counter this for original participants who were now comfortable in the Army. The fact that some soldiers at most stages, including Basic, did choose to not sign or to pull out indicates that it was indeed seen as an individual choice.

After Basic Training, at each new research stage there were always soldiers around that had participated before who would explain me to newcomers. When I went around with consent sheets at Corps Training, for example, Wheeler joked to his new section mates, “it’s gay though, ‘cause she won’t let you choose cool names”, i.e., pseudonyms. I did decide not to use the pseudonyms the boys requested, solely because they only ever requested Spartacus, Bravo Two Zero, or Stud. Instead I have generally tried to choose pseudonyms that match each soldier’s ethnicity, so that the cultural identities that the New Zealand Army deems so important are clear in the events recounted. This means that I have given those participants that identified as Māori clearly Māori surnames, although a proportion of them actually had more “Western” names, and Pākehā soldiers stereotypically Pākehā names. This strategy is only ethical in regards to those ethnicities that make up the majority of the Army however, that is, Māori, Pākehā, and some Pacific Islanders. In the case of ethnic groups from which there were only a handful of soldiers (Asian, European, South
African, and some Pacific Islander ethnicities), I have not matched surnames, given that this would destroy anonymity. Smaller unit groupings—sections, platoons, and companies—have also been re-named. The designations of units tasked with training, as well as battalions and regiments, however, are unchanged, due to their large size and the impossibility of disguising them (there is only one infantry regiment and two regular infantry battalions in the New Zealand Army).

During the course of the research I also briefly encountered a number of people—for example, specialists who taught the cohort one lesson in their subject area—that I didn’t get formal consent from. However, I was very conspicuous (ridiculously so) over the course of my research (my uniform differed from everyone else’s for this purpose, and I marched separately/behind the main body of platoons once I was injured) and everywhere I went I could hear people talking about me (“she’s here doing a study…”). Many people asked me what I was doing, and when I explained, responded with their opinions on training. Because in these cases it was clear they were purposefully telling me these things because of my research, I have taken this as consent for that piece of information.

**Methodology and Ethical Considerations by Research Stage**

Because I moved around four different Army units, anthropological methodology and ethics worked out differently in each particular context. I will therefore now address each stage individually, as well as the interaction between each (mirroring the structure of this thesis as a whole).

**Basic Training:**

**Judson VC Platoon, RF Company, The Army Depot**

My original plan for this research was to train with the cohort of new soldiers that I was following, and as much as possible make the identity transition myself, only to immediately thwart myself by injuring my shoulder. In discussing his participant observation with boxers, Wacquant (2004) states “boxing “makes sense” as soon as one takes pains to get close enough to grasp it *with one’s body*” (p.7). Unlike Wacquant, I never grasped soldiering bodily, especially important to note given that soldiers privilege practical mastery. “How can you understand us if you don’t have cuts on your hands from the guns?” asked one of the
recruits. (When first learning C9 Machine gun drills the speed and force required often causes hand injuries, which are seen as marks of pride.) This thesis therefore does not have as much emphasis on the physical aspects of soldiering as the participants would place on them. Rather, it focuses on the cultural content of the soldier habitus and the social process of embodying it, as this is what I am capable and qualified to provide illumination on.

Not all was lost with my injury however. I did not go through the process of embodying job skills as subconscious muscle memory through repetitive drills. However, as a transposable and durable habitus, the soldier identity is seen to include not only job skills but also much more general dispositions. The Army explicitly tells recruits that they are to “self-lead” in line with soldier “values” not only whilst at work but everywhere: at home, and out in the civilian world. Because such values are to be enacted in all areas of a soldier’s life they are also taught through all areas of a recruit’s life. They are learnt not only in the field but also in the barracks and the mess. They are internalised through learning how to dress and present yourself, your kit, and your living spaces, and how to appropriately interact with each other and with your superiors. The idea is that through the routines with which you accomplish basic daily tasks you learn skills that become embodied as dispositions which can then be applied at war.

Therefore while I did not learn battle skills, I did still participate in barracks routine, and to a lesser extent did participate in the process of internalising general dispositions. “Well, if nothing else,” a Corporal once said to me, “you can iron a mean uniform.” During Basic Training I was with the recruits most of the waking day. I slept in the Officers’ Mess rather than the Platoon’s barracks, for ethical and other reasons (I could stay up past the recruits’ lights out to catch up on notes), but came over to join them around 0555 every morning, in time to form up for breakfast at 0610. I would then stay with the Platoon until lights out (officially 1045 but sometimes earlier or later). I was referred to by my last name, and was issued all kit and wore a uniform (although it was a different cut and camouflage to the ones the recruits wore, so people could tell me apart). I had to follow all orders, move within barracks and other spaces as the recruits did, and, in front of recruits, interact with the NCOs and Platoon Commander in the same way that they did (using rank, coming to attention). The reason there are no photographs in this PhD is that my Basic Platoon wasn’t
allowed cameras, and by the time I got to a stage that I could have carried one, nothing
seemed novel enough for me to think to photograph it. I attended all lessons, participating
in the classroom and taking written tests, and observing the practical ones. Initially I took
part in drill and marched with the Platoon, but after my injury was placed on LDs, which
stands for Light Duties. Recruits are put on Light Duties by doctors and given forms which
list which activities they can and cannot do. Being on LDs is a short term measure, as
recruits either recover or are sent home. However, it became how my limited ability to
participate became conceptualised in native terms. In other words, I was “on LDs” for the
entirety of Basic (regaining movement in my shoulder near the end of the course as
randomly as it had ceased). LDs march in a separate group from the platoon as a whole.
Those with leg injuries have to go slower and start earlier, but every injured recruit still has
to march in step within the smaller LDs group. I could only swing one arm, which looks as
ridiculous as it sounds and would have made the whole Platoon look stupid. LDs also don’t
take part in PT (Physical Training) with their platoon, instead following exercise routines in
the gym that take their injury into account. I was therefore unable to observe PT (but did
learn a lot about how recruits felt about being on LDs).

The barracks blocks at Basic consists of four large 10-12 man bedrooms, a staff office, a small
bedroom for whichever staff member is on duty, and a corridor. The existence of a corridor
seems obvious and not worth mentioning, but in fact corridors in the Army are much more
than mere passageways. Whenever the Platoon was to be briefed or punished, a staff
member would yell “Corridor!” and the recruits ran to line the corridor walls at attention.
Many significant events happen in the corridor. It is a sort of official space that you don’t
stay in without permission; if you are using it in its normal sense of a route from one place
to another, you must double (run) (and thus get out of it as soon as possible). This means
that when we were in barracks but not in corridor, either doing a set task or Personal
Administration (PA- completing necessary tasks like ironing, cleaning or studying) we had to
be in a bedroom. This presented me difficulties later on, but at Basic I had a “bed space” in
the female bedroom. In general, bedrooms are assigned by section, so there was one male
bedroom per section, along with one bedroom for the females of all sections (the females
therefore had two distinct support groups, their section and the girls, which they could
move between if one was wearing on them, an advantage males didn’t have). While I didn’t
use the bed in my bed space, I had my uniform, iron and so on in the wardrobe (Basic Training involves changing your clothing multiple times a day, and this also meant I could take part in change parades). Thus during uniform and barrack inspections I was inspected like everyone else (never having to use and hence remake the bed made this much easier) and shared responsibility for fatigues within the female bedroom and wider barracks. If sections are doing a task together they do it in the (male) section room, so I also spent time in the bedroom of the section with which I was embedded (although they banned me once, because I refused to pass on a piece of NCO gossip).

Basic Training was the stage at which the subordinate position I had willingly taken on sometimes meant that I had trouble sticking to my interpretation of anthropological ethical codes in the ways that I wished to. My lack of ability to influence any of the events around me was good in that it let me experience the world from a lowly ranked soldier’s point of view. It was also bad in that it I couldn’t always control or minimise the effects my presence had on those around me. Around the same time that I was injured, so were about seven other people in the Platoon. This was an unusually large number and, seemingly deciding that most of us were malingering, the Platoon staff started trying to shame the recruits into getting better. This occurred at the same time that that the Platoon was learning to march with FSMO (Full Service Marching Order- webbing and the large packs that contain all of the supplies you need to survive several weeks in the bush). The recruits were therefore carrying their packs with them everywhere they went, although they weren’t actually needed. The standing order was that if you had been declared unfit to carry your pack by the doctors, as I had been, someone else had to carry it for you. Injured people in other platoons just carried smaller day bags. In our Platoon however, for every person on LDs a fit recruit had to carry two packs, one on their back and one on their front. Therefore, rather than not disadvantaging my participants through my research, I was actually creating extra work for whichever of them had to carry my pack each day. Every time we formed up to go somewhere, I would stand unencumbered on the side of the parade ground with the other LDs, looking at the weighed down Platoon and crawling with guilt. Further, on my duty recruit days, I had to ask others to do the heavy lifting tasks that most duty recruits would do themselves, and one of the girls very generously lifted my pack on top of my wardrobe for me every day. The various small ways in which I could help out recruits- doing the girls’
laundry in the Officers’ Mess after their lights out, buying the boys cigarettes at the store
they weren’t allowed to go to, and helping fill in dreaded paperwork—hardly made up for
this. Several times I tried asking the Platoon Commander if my pack could just be left
behind. But Sir wasn’t going to make me an exception to the rule. I then tried strategically
scheduling my Doctor’s appointment at the same time the Platoon would leave the barracks
for the day, so that I could just join them later with a day bag, but in my absence and of
their own initiative, the conscientious recruits took my pack with them anyway.

On an overnight task in preparation for the upcoming first-ever field exercise, I resorted to
paying a member of my section to carry my pack. He was happy with the money but I saw
him struggle, and on our return I informed Sir of what I had figured out weeks ago, that I
could not go on the field ex. He responded by arranging alternative arrangements: I was
detached from the Platoon during field exes and placed in field headquarters instead. HQ
tends to stay in one place for much longer than the Platoons, and because of equipment,
when they do move they don’t tend to do it by foot. Thus I would encounter the recruits on
their day tasks, and could stay with them if they were on a Forward Operating Base, but
wasn’t with them during times I would be a burden. After this the staff accepted me telling
them that I couldn’t attend certain activities in which it seemed like I would cause extra
work. A few times at Corps Training, however, I did get caught out with people having to
carry my pack because, with no idea what was happening next, I didn’t know enough in time
to stop it. The NCOs there were unconcerned as they deemed carrying double packs good
training. This did result in me getting to spend a few days on field ex with the boys during
easier, non-tactical phases.

Participating even in these limited ways did in fact result in me internalising some new
dispositions. I am jumping ahead here to discuss this because I believe that Basic was the
best opportunity I had to do so and the place where it most likely occurred. The set of
informal slogans introduced in the previous chapter, which express the principles by which
soldiers should self-lead, still pop into my head on a regular basis and I do still act in line
with them when they do. I swear a lot and have anxiety over leaving living spaces messy. I
never physically pulled off moving and holding myself as a soldier should, however. A recruit
once told me with much disgust that I should run properly, not prance, and seeing my
confusion, another recruit helpfully explained that I ran like a pixie, as if I was floating across
the floor. (Looking back through my notes, I realised an NCO had actually tried to warn me about this before Basic began, telling me I couldn’t “skip like a schoolgirl in the Army”.) Interestingly, at least one other military anthropologist, Frühstück (2007), who participated in Basic Training for a week in the Japanese Army, seems to have acted in line with the same dispositions as myself when in this unfamiliar field. She “turned like a dancer instead of like a soldier in a formation of soldiers” (p.31), and we both reacted to making a mistake by smiling self-deprecatingly at our Corporals, for which we were both immediately reprimanded. I did, however, pick up enough to be less trouble than some other civilians were. During a field ex I attended with 1 RNZIR, civilians were embedded to act as reporters. I was highly flattered when the Platoon Commander stated that he was scared our embedded photographer was going to die, and told his gunner to sort the photographer’s sleeping space, because no one felt the need to sort out my sleeping space. NCOs at Corps Training would sometimes use my rudimentary skills as a shaming device: “even Harding has her bed space laid out, call yourself a soldier?”

Some aspects of the soldier habitus are of course contradictory to the anthropological disposition, and not only in terms of practical versus academic work. As will be seen, one of the key dispositions that soldiers must act in line with is to “get over it,” which involves not dwelling on how you are treated or your own failures, and not publically airing your true feelings about the Army, your superiors, and so forth. This thesis contravenes this disposition. Publically talking about how I never did any real work is dwelling on this criticism, rather than fixing it, getting over it and moving on. However, this discussion is necessary for fulfilling anthropological requirements of reflexivity and ethical transparency. More importantly, I will be writing about my participants’ true opinions of the Army, which they themselves would not and do not report to their superiors, even when directly asked. Because of their soldier habitus, they cannot say some things, even if they would wish them to be known. But I can.

**Corps Training:**

**3 Platoon, Depot Company, 2/1st Battalion, Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment**

As with Basic Training, there were some methodological issues to work through at Corps Training, but they were of a different sort. The cohort was now familiar with both my
research and my lack of practical ability, and it was another aspect of my identity, my
gender, that caused some administrative-type obstacles. At Corps Training, no one was
really expecting me to do much— the boys because they knew me, the NCOs, I think, because
the idea of me participating seemed strange and perhaps offensive. Even before the injury, I
had never envisaged myself being able to do anything near to keeping up at Corps Training. I
was less embedded, more “shadowing,” as an officer put it. Again I was almost always
present, but the NCOs would tell me to “relax in back”.

Most of the Corps Trainees that had not been in the same Basic Platoon as me had
nevertheless seen me around Waiouru and heard about the project through either my brief
or the rumour mill, and had therefore known in advance that I would be at Corps Training.
Near the end of Basic someone I didn’t know had gestured to me in the mess line and said
of Corps Training “I hope she’s going to make it PC.” “You’re going to write a whole chapter
about me,” someone announced to me by way of introducing himself. One NCO asked the
Corps Training Platoon with which I was embedded, “who understands what Harding is
doing here?” and when the majority of the trainees put their hands up, he got Williams to
come out the front and explain it to him. “She’s here like Jane Goodall, but for people,”
explained Williams, “to observe our personal transformations.” (“You get to see us turn
from people into soldiers,” Phelan said to me once, and later when someone new to the
study asked me what type of thing I wrote down, Wheeler chimed in to ask “Nina, have you
written down how awesome I’ve become?”) Williams later explained to someone that I
“don’t do stuff,” but was here to observe, and that when he thought of me he pictured a
crow with my face perched above the boys with a notebook under one wing. Once during a
visit to Williams’ hootchie in the bush, the conversation turned to masturbation. Someone
looked at me and stopped talking, and Williams said, “No, you can’t stop talking in front of
her; she won’t get the real picture. It would be like the monkeys suddenly acting civilised
when Jane Goodall came.”

However, the turn-around from Basic to Corps Training was only three days, which meant
that this stage of the research didn’t have the careful pre-planning the other stages did. The
Corps Training NCOs had very little warning before my appearance. By now, I was quite
institutionalised. For example, when I was told to give an impromptu speech answering the
question, “what is the most shocking thing you have seen in the Army?” I flapped and
mangled the task because I could not think of one strange thing in the entire Army experience. Afterwards Mitchell tried to prompt me, asking “bed rolls? The timings?” and all I could think was, no, those all make sense (for the reasons given to me by the Army, as in the chapter on Basic Training). Later, closely reading my notes for the first time after my fieldwork had ended, I was shocked to find that I had indeed been shocked in the early days of Basic. But I retained the belief that I was never shocked for probably two years, even answering this same question at an official brief to hierarchy in Trenthem by saying “I always get asked that, but there is nothing shocking about the Army!” This internalisation of Army viewpoints, at Corps Training, resulted in me automatically conceptualising the NCOs there as Corporals and myself as a lower being, rather than them as primarily informants and me as the anthropologist. I should have arranged a brief for them and instead I meekly didn’t interact with them unless they approached me. Hence for this one group I did not get formal individual consent. However, I identified those amongst this group that seemed uncomfortable with the idea of being researched, double checked with them, and have left them out. The Corps Training NCOs had a habit of asking me to leave if they didn’t want me around for particular events (“you can go outside”), and in the Corps Training chapter I have further tried to make no particular NCO stand out as an individual. Thus they might appear as a bit of a faceless, nameless mass.

Overall it was NCOs that took the brunt of my presence in terms of having to deal with me. The OC at Basic said that I “kind of disappeared into the group”, the OC of the Company with which I was embedded in 1st Battalion mentioned that he sometimes saw me, but mostly forgot about me, and the Senior National Officer in the Solomon Islands said, “you don’t even know Nina’s here, in a good way, she does research in a way lets [hierarchy] get on with their jobs.” For the poor NCOs though, I never disappeared. The ones on Corps Training in particular appeared to be terrified that I was about to up and die of hypothermia on their watch. As at Basic, at Corps Training I was embedded with one particular section. At first the Platoon Commander indicated that I would at some stage be switched to the other sections. The Section Commander seemed to want others to have to have a turn at being responsible for me (“we’re getting rid of you today!” he said cheerfully after a few days embedded with them on field ex). Therefore he and I separately asked the Platoon Commander when this would occur, but Sir apparently decided he was happier leaving me
with the one section for the duration. This turned out to be good for research, if not for the Seco.

Not participating in anything physical, I now also had difficulties participating in the barracks routines that had been so good for research at Basic. This was due to my gender, although related to practical issues rather than sexism. There were no female Corps Trainees in the course that I shadowed, an unlucky coincidence given that this was not the case in both the courses directly previous and directly following (I later shared a barracks with most of these females at 1R). Although this meant, for example, sharing ablutions with the boys, such things weren't particularly bothersome, and I did sometimes use my gender to my advantage, i.e. to justify my place as one of the people allowed to go to the store: “Do you want to buy me tampons?” What was challenging, however, was that with no female trainees, there was no female bedroom that I could hang out in. Further, there was no “section” room in which all the section completed tasks together, because the trainees were in four man rooms now and thus a section was divided over three rooms. Thus, research in barracks, given that if you were in barracks you were in the bedrooms, became much more problematic. I was given for my use a small office with a wardrobe. However, this office was cut off from the main corridor by a heavy smokescreen door, through which I often could not hear corridor being called. The NCOs didn’t care if I came to corridor or not, and they also didn’t tend to inspect my room, understandably, because it would only make extra unnecessary work for them. Thus I spent quite a bit of time in my room alone, especially during inspections, and often didn’t have a clue what was going on, in terms of what would be happening next or when it would happen. However, this was quite characteristic of the Army condition: no one knows what is going on, as several staff pointed out. The trainees don’t know because their NCOs haven’t told them, the NCOs haven’t told the trainees because no one has told the NCOs, and so it goes up the chain.

However early on in Corps Training, the trainees went to West Melton Rifle Range for weapons training, and the whole Platoon was divided into two large rooms for the two week stay (I had one to myself, or sometimes shared with some Air Force females). It is much easier to hang around in such a big communal space than in a more private bedroom that belongs to a smaller number of people. After our return from West Melton I felt more comfortable and thought some of the boys from the section seemed alright with me visiting
their room. Because this was so much better than sitting alone all day, and I was getting good data, I of course almost immediately overdid it and outstayed my welcome. When the boys began making comments like “I thought we’d get away from girls”, I thus tried to draw back, staying in my room again or alternating between two of the section rooms.

At Corps Training, training is seen as a group effort and everyone works on each other’s flaws and tests one another’s coping skills through various forms of harassment. Everybody “takes shit” for something, and therefore so did I. My major flaw, it turns out, is that I always look like I’m in a bad mood (sometimes I was in fact in a bad mood when I was told this, but at other times it bemused me): “what do you want this time Grinch?” Because of my strange position, however, I had trouble discerning whether any criticism I took was fundamentally the same thing that was happening to everyone else, and I just needed to get over it and smile more, or whether it was in fact an anthropological ethical issue and I should never impose myself on certain people by sitting next to them at the dinner table ever again.

Once Penn joked that I should get some of the boys to write about me back and put it in my study, and when I said that if they wanted to write something I’d take it (they didn’t, sadly) Wheeler joked, “That slut, she was always putting out,” but immediately felt bad: “you know I just do that because we’re close, I mean we’ve been [in the same Platoon from the start].” Despite getting sick of me at times, many of the boys, especially in my section, were also extremely helpful and considerate, offering to carry my things, spending time coaching me on skills, and giving me unprompted updates on upcoming timings I had missed.

And then there were problems with having key informants when you are the only female in an all-male environment. Nobody was going to interpret such a relationship as an anthropologist-key informant one, but rather jump straight to a sexual assumption. For example, there were rumours I had regularly performed oral sex on trainees who had been key informants at Basic. Or, for example:

   NCO: Would you ever go out with an Army guy there, Harding?

   Harding: Dunno, they know how to clean at least.

   NCO: In with a chance there, Townsend.
This made such trainees uncomfortable, and thus retaining key informants was unlikely.

In a field in which I wasn’t competent in many valued skills, I tried to provide fair return where I could, although this never came close to balancing the scales of what people did for me. I helped with paperwork, and was a source of “female” knowledge: “Harding, do you think I should pop this [blister]?” I instructed various trainees on how to clear the lint collector in the clothes dryer and how to thread a needle, and sewed a few buttons on myself. I helped the boys do things like construct camouflage for their helmets and rearrange their webbing straps. I tried to get them smokes from HQ soldiers during field exes, but HQ caught on: “No! You don’t smoke! It’s for one of them!” Because I wasn’t inspected, my room was a good place for the Section to hide contraband.

As Corps Training drew to a close, I attempted to take all of the ethical challenges I had encountered thus far into consideration when planning the third stage of research. I did not follow the boys straight into Battalion, which allowed time for careful preparation. Further, the Battalion context - the presence of females, the fact that the Platoon with which I was embedded was mounted and thus often travelled by LAV rather than foot, and a much less intense work tempo - opened up research opportunities.

**Battalion:**

**1 Platoon, Oscar Company, 1st Battalion, Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment**

Originally, the plan for the Battalion stage of my research was to first spend time with 2/1 (as 2/1 runs Corps Training and I was already in Burnham), and then move on to 1R. However, this had not been organised in advance, and by the time Corps Training finished, it seemed more ethical to take a break rather than to embed again immediately. After eight months, the boys were sick of me, and I was sick of them: “You must really hate us,” a Corporal said to me laughing. Soon after Corps Training I spent a few days with the boys that had been posted to 2/1 on the field exercise Southern Reaper. At this time most of them had been temporarily placed in one platoon with many of the same NCOs that had been at Corps Training. When I arrived at the Platoon’s loc (location), one of the Corporals
announced, “You’re the bane of my existence, Harding.” After these few days in the field I therefore decided to make no further enquiries about shadowing 2/1st.

As planned however, I went to shadow 1R at Linton a few months later. There was time for careful preplanning in which I talked to hierarchy about what had and had not worked in the past. For example, I told them that it was better for me to not be attached to a particular section, and from then on just drifted between sections based on which NCOs were willing to have me that day. I gave separate briefs to three different rank levels—Battalion and Company hierarchy, NCOs and Platoon Commanders, and the privates. As the participants were now full soldiers rather than trainees, and I was not, I did not wear uniform. People who met me for the first time from this stage onwards referred to me as “Nina,” rather than “Harding” (though those from earlier stages tended to continue using Harding).

The space of a few months seemed to have been helpful: one night in the Linton mess, I ran into Moataane and O’Brien, who had seemed to avoid me by the end of Corps Training. They surprised me by wanting to talk to me. They asked how come I had been placed with a Company other than theirs (they said that most of the boys were in theirs) and seemed to have re-engaged with the idea of being in the study. Moataane said one of his new platoon mates had asked “‘who’s that girl?’ I was like, that’s Harding. Nina Harding. She’s our anthropologist.” This was therefore the right decision practically and ethically. It does mean that I never saw the immediate transition from Corps Training to Battalion, however.

Further, 1R and 2/1 are seen to be very different Battalions, with 1R perceived to be regimental and by the book, and 2/1st more laidback. A few people expressed interest in whether this difference is as significant as it is made out to be, but because I never observed 2/1 in their camp role, I am unable to comment on this.

Unless there was a field ex or night task, Battalion is, unlike the training courses, more like an eight-five job. No longer were the living space and the workspace one and the same, and not everyone lived in barracks, with some soldiers living off base in Palmerston North. At Battalion I stayed in the same barracks as participants for the first time, this now being ethically possible due to everyone having individual rooms. I had originally been placed in the Officers’ Mess again, but the OC and Company Sergeant Major (CSM) switched me to the barracks in which the females of Oscar Company (very small numbers of grunts and
tankies, and attached loggies) lived. The Barracks Master was very concerned for me - I
shouldn’t have to deal with the loud music and the timings for handing in linen- and assured
me that it was okay if I wanted to come back for a room in the Officers’ Mess after all. I
therefore saw the male participants during the work day, but also had access to wider Army
life. In barracks I largely hung out with the one female member of the Platoon with which I
was embedded. I followed her lead for how much interaction there was with the rest of the
Platoon outside of work hours. For example, we didn’t eat in the mess with the boys much,
as the 1R females didn’t really eat at the mess. She, and her opinions, are included in the
Battalion chapter, but for reasons of anonymity I have not identified her as female. Also at
Battalion, I was able to stay with the Platoon for the whole of a field ex for the first time
(although with Platoon HQ rather than a section), as they were travelling by LAV.

At 1R I was approached many times about a particular concern of Linton soldiers. Linton
Military Camp is just outside Palmerston North, the city in which my University, Massey, is
based. There is an unshakeable urban myth at Linton that, every year, incoming Massey first
year females are gathered together sometime during orientation and given a brief in which
they are warned not to go anywhere near the Linton soldiers. I tried to assure everyone that
this was completely false but largely failed. Therefore, in an attempt to provide fair return
in a form that the boys would most appreciate (“Ow, Harding, do you have any sexy friends
around here?”), for the last six semesters, I have been encouraging the anthropology
undergraduate classes that I speak to about fieldwork to go and talk to the Army boys in
town. I have no idea whether this has had any effect.

**Deployment:**

*Combined Task Force, Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (Platoon
deployed from 2/1st Battalion, Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment)*

Although I did not therefore catch up with the research participants who had been posted
to 2/1st Battalion for more than a few days in the third stage of the research, it fortuitously
turned out that the Platoon I was given permission to accompany on deployment was from
this Battalion and made up of many of these participants. This stage of my research involved
attending a two week pre-deployment training course at Burnham, and then living with the
Platoon on the RAMSI base in Honiara. As an extra stage added at the end of my research,
deployment was not covered by the consent I had originally gained from the boys.
Therefore, as well as gaining consent from those new to the study, I also asked original participants to sign a new form covering this extra stage. Because we went through their rights again, this was a good reminder that they could withdraw their earlier participation (although none did and everyone in this position re-signed).

Because this was an operational environment, there were more restrictions on my activity. I signed a contract that covered things such as not wearing any uniform to ensure that I could not be mistaken for a Defence Force member, and not handling any weapon. For reasons of safety, liability, and my lack of competence, I could not go on any overnight trip off the Base. (One of my roommates told me that the fact I therefore missed field exercises was good because it provided a break from being researched.) Again I stayed with female members of the contingent, in a two-man room this time. My room was in the same barracks as the Platoon’s NCOs, which was opposite the boys’ barracks. Although there were communal living spaces, the majority of people preferred to spend most of their time in their bedrooms, for the air-conditioning, and because the best way to not get tasked is to be invisible. My two consecutive female roommates were not part of the Platoon but worked in other roles, so were not really part of the study, but I did gain consent from them so that I could include a few useful pieces of information they gave me on how the Platoon was perceived. As with Battalion, I largely saw the boys at the mess and on official work tasks. Various Section Commanders would also offer to take me on their section’s recreational trips off base.

In the Solomon Islands, no RAMSI member could leave the base alone, and so admin staff would have me come along with them so they could do their chores in town. This is a good example of the role I took across my time with the Army as a whole: as a kind of spare that could be utilised. Because it didn’t really matter if I passed the tests that everyone else had to complete, Corporals in training stages often had me play the patient that soldiers practiced first aid on, or the hostage that needed saving. At Basic I spent a lot of time picketing weapons (watching over weapons that were not currently in use but which could not be left alone). I was the person who wasn’t doing anything and therefore could be given your camera to film you doing anything you found particular noteworthy (assaulting, gas mask drills, firing the larger weapons). “Are you doing the haka, Harding?” asked Phelan on
our arrival in the Solomons, disappointed, “But you’re supposed to be the one with the camera!”

Conclusion

The primary practical habitus and secondary soldier habitus, along with the scholastic disposition through which people like me usually understand soldierhood, help make sense not only of the process of becoming a soldier, but also of the course of my research. As someone with a scholastic disposition who privileged scribbling in her notebook over getting in there and doing everything on offer (that is, who privileged converting practical to symbolic mastery rather than obtaining that practical mastery for herself) I was a confusing figure to those with the practical habitus. The above quote, however, in which Phelan had an expectation of what I would be doing in a given scenario, suggests that by the end of my fieldwork my informants had come to their own understanding of my role. Overall, although I was always different, I was around so much that I also became a familiar presence. Further, I could in a small way be connected to practical identity projects in that there was a level of engagement in their personal transformation being recognised and recorded for posterity. Because of these two things, enough of the soldiers (although not all) were willing to talk to me to allow me to see behind the professional, switched-on face that soldiers present to the world. This was especially the case with those participants who I met in the early stages, before they had embodied this disposition, and with whom I was with while they were doing so. Their actions were not generated by “getting over it” when I got to know them, and they were used to my presence in the groups in which they did express themselves.

In the next chapter, which is the literature review, I will argue that the switched-on soldier habitus has led scholars to misinterpret soldiers, reading this as a de-individualising uniformity rather than professional readiness. This is especially the case with those who haven’t had much interaction with actual soldiers, and who therefore have a problematic tendency to evaluate soldiers through scholastic dispositions rather than fully examining the soldiers’ own habitus. By contrast, my disjuncture in the field I was so fortunate to access was so marked that the arbitrariness of the scholastic disposition was very quickly made apparent to me. Partially taking on and having some of my own thoughts generated by soldier dispositions, even to the limited extent this happened, was also helpful. The
platoons in which I was embedded, because the soldiers within them worked and lived so closely together, started to react as one to events around them. For example, in Basic, we would all be standing at attention lining the corridor walls, only able to sense rather than really see one another because we were focusing straight ahead, and a staff member would say something that enraged you, or made you despondent, and you knew that everybody else felt that exact same thing at that exact same second. Everybody’s face was blank and nobody twitched, and individually you might not have gotten on well with some of the other Platoon members, but it felt like whatever it was that the Platoon was thinking was passing down the lines between you. The officers who designed this research project were right: I needed to be there from the beginning. Although I was progressively further separated from the cohort as my research progressed, my understanding of what had gone before, particularly of the bases on which platoons were likely to evaluate events, meant that I was much better prepared to see beyond my own scholastic disposition than I otherwise would have been.
Chapter Four

The Soldier Habitus: Literature Review

I had originally thought that this literature review would focus on one of this thesis’ two core identities, the soldier habitus, and outline what academics have previously argued about soldier identity and the way in which it is acquired. And the first section of this chapter will indeed cover how those academics who have been embedded with militaries have presented this identity, and show that these ethnographies suggest that it has a common structure across nations. However, large parts of this chapter turned out to be a diversion from soldier identity. For a long time, parts of the literature confused me, because they didn’t seem to resonate with what I knew of my informants. Although some works seemed to be about soldier identity, I eventually realised that they really weren’t. In feminist scholarship particularly, soldierhood is not the focus in and of itself, but rather is used to illuminate what academics see as more fundamental modes of identity. There is a common presumption that soldiering is not in fact the main attraction for soldiers, but rather a means to the ends of masculinity and heterosexuality. Soldiers, however, think the opposite: the soldier habitus is their primary motivation, and gender and sexual identities are either incidental to this, or may be used as tools in creating it. Then there is another set of works, which I have already introduced in Chapter Two, in which soldierhood is not seen as an identity but rather as a loss or lack of identity. Although much of this chapter therefore covers literature that is not in fact focused on soldierhood, it ultimately does illuminate the soldier habitus through showing why this literature is misleading. It is not that these discourses have not already been challenged in the military literature; they have been repeatedly, and many of these challenges will be drawn on in this chapter. The discourses are, however, remarkably resilient despite this. I will argue that soldierhood is an identity rather than a lack of one, and that it is a distinct one that is irreducible to masculinity and heterosexuality. The embodiment of this soldier habitus can help each soldier fulfil their own individual identity projects, even though it may be seen to be uniform not only within
their own military institutions but also cross-culturally. This chapter therefore adds to my argument that the best way to understand the civilian-soldier transition is through the relationship between the primary practical and secondary soldier habitus.

To understand the two types of analysis I have identified above, soldierhood as masculinity and soldierhood as lack of identity, I will focus on the binary thought patterns that structure these analyses. Here I am drawing on Bourdieu’s (1990a) argument that such binaries “artificially divide social science” (p.25) and that “one of the major tasks of genuine epistemology […] is to confront the problems raised by [their] existence” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 179). In some cases, I will follow Bourdieu’s recommendation in looking at how supposed mutually exclusive binaries might more productively be seen to be acting in different, more dialectical relationships instead. This is the case for the discourse in which soldierhood is seen as a loss of identity. Up until now I have stated that this is because soldiers appear uniform and un-expressive in public, and civilians don’t have the inside knowledge that would allow them to interpret this in the way that soldiers do. Here I will examine this in more depth by showing that the visible dispositions of soldierhood—uniformity and submission—are each thought to be one half of a binary that suggests that their embodiment precludes individual identity. Thus uniformity is seen to be mutually exclusive with individuality, and submission to be mutually exclusive with will (in the sense of exercising one’s will through choosing one’s own actions). Soldiers are seen to have lost individual identity and self-actualisation in conforming to uniform standards, and will and agency in their submission to Army regulations and superiors. Will/submission and individuality/uniformity are almost always discussed in tandem, because in individual-centred Western societies uniformity is generally not conceptualised as something that would ever be chosen, but rather is seen to be the outcome of determining structures. I will show, however, that in fact soldiers enact will through submission and achieve their own identity projects through conformity.

The other major binaries I address are masculinity/femininity and masculinity/homosexuality. These of course align with will/submission in the set of binaries that underpin Western thought (that is, masculinity is matched with will and femininity with submission). Soldiers are seen to have foregone their individuality and free will in their
quest for the hegemonic masculinity provided by soldierhood. Those scholars focused on masculinity and heterosexuality argue that soldiers construct these identities through the rejection of anything feminine or gay. In this case, it is not possible to entirely dismiss binary relationships, because soldiers themselves may use them. As above, soldiers aren’t particularly focused on these identities at all, but they do playfully make use of the masculine/feminine and masculine/homosexual binaries in internalising the soldier habitus that they are focused on. That is, they enact their soldier habitus through confidently showing no concern for their masculine image whatsoever, cheerfully stepping over the boundaries of these binaries to show that they are unafraid. Here binaries are not just divisive but also productive. While the relationship between will and submission is important to understanding how my participants became soldiers, however, I argue that the ubiquitous focus on masculinity can actually mislead us about the soldier habitus, and therefore do not myself use masculinity as an explanatory framework.

It is not masculinity, but the skills and competence required to do the job, that soldiers themselves are focused on. “Competence” comes up again and again in this chapter, in the words of many different soldiers, interviewed by many different researchers using a range of explanatory frameworks. In order to maintain the readiness of the soldier habitus, soldiers must be proficient. The focus on competence can further be linked to the practical habitus, as taking on new skills fulfils the desire for action, change and self-development. Thus while Chapter Two demonstrated that the practical habitus has often been subsumed by “class” in social science literature, this chapter will show that it may also be subsumed by “gender”. Although my informants do use binaries, the practical habitus may generate quite different ones than the scholastic disposition. Hence it is not masculinity/femininity that soldiers primarily think through, but rather active/passive, real work/not work, useful/pointless. Looking at the soldier habitus and its acquisition through these binaries, rather than through those of academics, gets us closer to soldiers’ own point of view. These binaries can be seen throughout the chapter, but are most clear in the final section, in which I discuss the relationship between the soldier habitus and the peacekeeper or counterinsurgent habitus. Some scholars have assumed that these too contradict one another, but most militaries don’t agree.
The Uniformity of Soldier Dispositions as seen in Military Ethnographies

This first part of my literature review focuses on a relatively small number of works. Analyses that focus on the soldier habitus itself tend to be written by those comparatively rare and lucky academics who, like me, were able to spend long fieldwork periods embedded with soldiers. Because of difficulties of access, a significant proportion of military ethnographies were written by ex- or current servicemen (for example, Ben-Ari, 1998; Hawkins, 2005; Hockey, 1986; Kirke, 2009). Likely because such authors are predisposed to favour the practical over purely academic exercises, their work tends to privilege ethnography over theory, and to use theory that is experience-near, aimed primarily at making sense of the field site, rather than using the field site to address wider issues. Military studies in general, write Castro and Carreiras (2013, p.2), are dominated by positivism. Kirke (2009), for example, explains social structure by likening it to a map, and notes that in developing a model he chose language “as close to natural English as possible, to avoid […] torturous non-intuitive phrases” (p.21). Hawkins (2005), a reserve Lieutenant Colonel who conducted fieldwork with the American Army in Germany in the 1980s, finds the practice of constantly mooting and rejecting theories “a humanistic exercise in cultural narcissism” (p.289), and writes:

I am not worried in the slightest by the postmodernists’ denial of the “Real World” or their having given up on the distinction between fact and fiction. Warfare would restore their belief in such distinctions and realities, as would an examination of their behaviour were one of their representatives to try and walk across a busy freeway (Hawkins, 2005, p.293).

Rather than choosing one theoretical framework to structure his work, he focuses on identifying and solving “real world” problems, and relegates some brief theoretical discussions to their own chapter at the end of the ethnography.

The larger body of literature on the soldier experience, which can be found in the disciplines of anthropology, sociology, international relations and geography, is based on shorter-term ethnography, interviews, surveys and document analysis. This is partially due to the lack of access but in some cases is also due to the anti-war, anti-military sentiment of many scholars. Speaking of the American military literature, but resonating with that written in the English language more generally, Holmes-Eber (2014) writes that “anthropologists have
tended to avoid research on the military directly, focusing most of their research *around and about* the military” (p.16). This has resulted in a “strangely distant and almost disembodied set of writings around (but not touching) the military” (Holmes-Eber, 2014, p.17). (As Holmes-Eber (2014, p.17) also notes, more participant-observation has been conducted in nations like Brazil (Castro, 2013) and Germany (Langer & Pietsch, 2013), but not many of these findings are available in English.) These distant and disembodied writings include works which study soldiers “from the outside- using military publications, doctrine, correspondence, and advertisements as the source of their ethnographic data” rather “than actually interviewing or observing” (Holmes-Eber, 2014, p.17). I would add movies and media coverage of military scandals to her list. Basham (2013), a feminist scholar, finds claims that experience is necessary for understanding military issues depoliticising (p.9):

> the claim that war and life in the armed forces can only really be fully understood via direct experience is one I have frequently encountered [...] This idea, of course, marginalises a multitude of experiences, not least those of the bombed, invaded, and occupied (Basham, 2013, p.8).

While this is a good point for war, it is not particularly valid for “life in the armed forces”, particularly as it has been shown (Hockey (1986) as discussed below, for example) that everyday life in the Armed Forces is quite different to the official representations drawn on above. Further, the use of methods that don’t involve spending time in actual military institutions means that academics don’t have the experience of finding themselves in a field which does not match their habitus, which could draw their attention to the arbitrariness of their own scholastic disposition. It is therefore these works that privilege other modes of identity over the soldier habitus, and which understand this habitus through binaries that are generated by the scholastic disposition rather than the practical habitus. First, however, I will discuss those military ethnographies that are based on long term participant observation by anthropologists and sociologists, and which focus on soldierhood in and of itself, in order to show that these ethnographies reveal that the soldier habitus has a similar structure across American, British, Israeli and Japanese Armies, from the 1980s to today. When I read the ethnographies after my fieldwork, these dispositions were very familiar, as I had seen them all in New Zealand soldiers. If I had to guess at the reasons behind these
similarities they would probably be, firstly, that people with similar primary habitus self-select for first world volunteer armies (or self-select for the combat units that tend to be the focus of research in the case of Israel’s compulsory military service (Rosenhek, Maman and Ben-Ari, 2003, pp.475-477)), and secondly, they are then are placed in and embody similar external structures and regularities due to a common requirement for readiness. Due to many militaries sharing a common basis in the “historical model of the Prussian Corps”, a “common (worldwide) military culture” can be identified (Elron, Shamir and Ben-Ari, 1999, p.84). This commonality is then perpetuated by inter-military exchanges and exercises held to foster interoperability (Elron, Shamir and Ben-Ari, 1999).

The practical habitus, for example, can be seen in Frühstück’s (2007) ethnography of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (“He hated being inside all day” (p.59)), Simons’ (1997) ethnography of American Special Forces (“among the handful of background commonalities SF soldiers seem to share is boredom in high school” (p.102)) and Holme-Eber’s (2014) ethnography of Marines (“it’s a do, not think, culture” (p.38)). Thornborrow and Brown (2008) on British paratroopers, Hawkins (2005) on American soldiers in the 1980s, and Ben-Ari (1998) on Israeli soldiers all emphasise a desire for self-development through being challenged. Ben-Ari (1998) calls this “playing with risk” (p.107) and Hawkins (2005) writes that “adversity was simply absorbed, metabolized, disregarded” (p.68). My research participants would welcome the situation of elite British paratroopers as described by Thornborrow and Brown (2008): “The extent of a being a paratrooper is never ending. You feel that you are a paratrooper at one level, but you go up the ladder, an endless ladder [...] you don’t feel like you are the finished article” (p.13). They write “success is not merely uncertain but (for most) perpetually deferred; yet this is acceptable because the process of becoming is itself valued” (Thornborrow and Brown, 2008, p.21). Frühstück (2007) writes that Japanese “Self-Defence Force members volunteer for international missions because they long for an authentic experience of their own. [This] is evident in the relative unimportance they attach to the purpose of the mission” (p.72).

It has been demonstrated that soldiers in Britain (Hockey 1986; Killworth cited in Kirke, 2009, p.33) and America make clear demarcations between what does and does not count as real work. Hawkins (2005), for example, argues that American soldiers deployed to
Germany in the 1980s felt alienated because much of what they spent long hours doing was not “worthwhile work” or “real work” (p.27): “soldiers felt that their military activities should be clearly linked to maintaining their unit’s mission readiness and that military activities that did not contribute to training and readiness wasted a soldier’s time” (Hawkins, 2005, pp.69-70). Hockey (1986) explains how what did and did not count as work changed as British soldiers in the late 1970s progressed through their careers. He could equally have been discussing Kiwi soldiers:

During the Basic Training stage, activities which recruits perceive to be central to their new found infantryman’s role [...] are new and challenging. There is a degree of glamour and excitement in these activities [...] the novelty of such activities together with the desire to graduate from the Depot motivates recruits to display much enthusiasm and energy when completing them (p.83).

Once they reach the Army proper and the novelty has worn off, however, “these chores are perceived by privates as ‘ballaches’” (Hockey, 1986, p.84).

Soldier dispositions are embodied not just from formal structures and regulations but also from informal regularities used to get around these official “ballaches”, as can further be seen in Hockey (1986) (and also in Simons (1997)). Hockey (1986) found that British soldiers displayed “a craftmanlike pride [...] a concern to carry out efficiently all the core activities which they perceive to be central to their military role, in their terms ‘real soldiering’” (p.142). They also, however, engage in deviant practices in order to make their lives more comfortable in the face of constraints, referred to as “looking after number one” (Hockey, 1986, pp. 144 & 168). This is just as much a part of their soldier habitus as their military proficiency. If a soldier had an opportunity to get out of a task that wasn’t “real soldiering” without incurring extra work for his peers, it was expected he would take it. Not doing so was interpreted by other privates as a lack of experience (Hockey, 1986, pp.143-144). These more informal aspects of the soldier habitus never threatened proficiency- soldiers would complain about being NFI (Not Fucking Interested) whilst simultaneously taking extraordinary care to do their jobs well (Hockey, 1986, p.145) - and in fact these dispositions could be useful on operations:
Skiving, scrounging and the use of shortcuts are all ploys which demand the employment of initiative, guile, quick thinking, subterfuge, and the like- the very qualities which the organisation officially tries to foster in privates, particularly since modern war has become characterised by a high degree of fluidity (Hockey, 1986, p.147).

As indicated in the previous two chapters, the soldier dispositions I will analyse are largely expressed only through informal sayings, and Holmes-Eber (2014) shows a similar process of such phrases reflecting fundamental underlying values in the Marines: “In daily speech, Marines would frequently spout out a saying meant to remind their colleagues of a particular lesson or value that needed reinforcing.” These “sayings [...] communicate concepts or feelings that are unacceptable to discuss in public but completely understood among the speakers” (p.5). Some of the sayings I heard in the New Zealand Army appear in ethnographies from other Western Armies, for example “playing the game” and “mandatory fun” amongst contemporary American soldiers (MacLeish, 2013, pp.44 & 136), and “being squared away” and “having one’s shit together” amongst American soldiers in the 1980s (Hawkins, 2005, p.23).

We can also see in the ethnographies that the processes by which these dispositions are taken on are similar. Ben-Ari (1998, p.52) shows that in Israel a good soldier can be identified through his gear, which I will also argue for New Zealand soldiers. Simons (1997) writes that in the American Special Forces “everyone winds up being kidded for something” (p.98). This is a form of perpetual testing, the idea behind it being, “you’re [Special Forces], right? So you can handle this, right?” (Simons, 1997, p.99). She notes that this teasing will not take the form of racial comments unless the soldier in question is also incompetent, because if you are a good soldier that is how you are primarily identified: “prove to us you are a good soldier and we won’t care about anything else” (Simons, 1997, pp.98-99).

The internalisation of these dispositions results in the switched-on, self-effacing demeanour discussed in Chapter Two: “because emotions may impede the performance of military tasks they must be overcome, channelled, and above all controlled” (Ben-Ari, 1998, p.44). MacLeish (2013) writes that American soldiers uniformly have “a neutral flatness of expression” (p.40) and Frühstück (2007) of a Japanese soldier, “in professional mode she seemed both invisible and ready to take on anyone and anything” (p.30). Hockey (1986) demonstrates how soldiers enact this disposition not just with civilians but also with their
superiors: “You might as well try to open them up with a chisel. They’re like Fort Knox, you can get nothing out of them” (p.81).

Therefore, my data will not show anything new or ground-breaking about the content of soldier dispositions. However, this uniformity itself, and what it means in regards to individual soldiers’ subjectivities, is of interest in itself. The blank, professional image that soldiers present to the world is most likely what feeds the myth of soldiers as uniform automatons, which never quite goes away, despite not making much sense if you think about it for very long, or if you have ever met an actual soldier. Civilians find soldierhood hard to understand, because of the binaries through which we think- if someone is obedient and conformist they must not have agency. In particular, academics with the scholastic disposition are focused on making a unique contribution to their field (hence realising that all of the soldier dispositions that I had identified had already been written about was a stressful experience).

Military sociology, however, which has a longer history than military anthropology, has long recognised that soldiers are motivated by individual interest. Moreover, its focus is quite close to soldiers’ own focus on competence/skill. Following Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960), from the 1970s Military Sociology was dominated by the theme of professionalism (Segal, 2007, p.50) (although often the focus was officers, rather than enlisted soldiers). In 1977 Moskos argued that the American military was undergoing transition. Traditionally an institution, soldiering was becoming an occupation. Joining an institution is seen as a calling, involving “self-sacrifice” for a “presumed higher good” (Moskos, 1977, p.42). An institution is paternalistic and takes care of its own, and compensation may be in the form of social and cultural rather than economic capital. An occupation, however, follows the logic of the marketplace with “monetary rewards for equivalent competencies” (Moskos, 1977, p.43): military service is no longer a sacrifice but motivated by self-interest. In 1997 Battistelli added to Moskos’ model a third possible motivation for service, which he characterised as “postmodern.” Under postmodernity soldiers are still motivated by self-interest but “in the expressive (rather than instrumental) sense” (Battistelli, 1997, p.469). It is not purely economic, but rather focused on “my search for my own identity”: “participation, aesthetic pleasures, and self-fulfilment” (Battistelli, 1997, p.469). Moskos (1997, p.44) himself and others since (Levy, 2007 p.188) have argued that in practice elements of both the institution
and occupation would be present simultaneously. My participants had all of the motivations that Battistelli (1997) lists under both occupation (earning money, “learn[ing] things that could be useful to one’s [...] return to civilian life”) and postmodernity (“to satisfy a desire for adventure” “to have a meaningful personal adventure” (p.471)). They also in some senses expect the Army to act as a paternal institution that takes care of its own.

However, Woodward and Jenkings (2011) write that although this body of literature focuses on soldiers’ motivations, it is in fact not concerned with the soldiers themselves and doesn’t illuminate their experiences or their subjectivities. Rather, the focus is the military organisation, with soldier identities primarily seen as “variables likely to shape the effectiveness of a conscript army” (Woodward and Jenkings, 2011, p.254). By contrast, a large body of contemporary academic work, from anthropology, sociology, geography and international relations, does focus on identity. However, it does not focus on the soldier habitus itself. Rather, it is focused on the recent opening up of militaries to various minorities (females, gay men and lesbians) and the gendered contexts that they encounter. This body of work is a response to militaries’ historical justification of their exclusion of minorities, which takes the form of the claim that group cohesion is essential to win battles, and that diversity could threaten this cohesion (see, as an example, Dandeker and Mason, 2001, p. 229; and for discussions of this trend, Kier, 1998; Segal, 2007, p.57). These groups are the “underdogs” of the military, and hence the type of subject that anthropologists tend to be attracted to. This means, however, that the real focus of this work is specifically the gendered and sexual aspects of soldiers’ identity, rather than the soldier identity that all soldiers share. Because my own focus is the soldier habitus, I will discuss the parts of this literature that focus on how the whole group engages with gender and homosexuality, rather than on female or gay soldiers as distinct subsets. It should be noted that, as this chapter is based on international literature, nothing here relates specifically to the actions of the New Zealand Defence Force⁹.

⁹ The NZDF emphasises that diversity brings added value, recently conducted a review into the treatment of women within the organisation (Ministry of Defence, 2014), and won the 2013 Equal Employment Opportunities Trust Diversity in the Workplace awards for its group OverWatch, which promotes the wellbeing of GLBTI service members (“Defence Force takes top prize in workplace diversity awards,” 2013).
Masculinity/Femininity and Masculinity/Homosexuality: The problematic concept of “militarised masculinities”

Soldiers are most often analysed through the framework of “military masculinities” or “militarised masculinities”, a concept especially employed by feminist scholars. Military service has of course been heavily associated with manhood and is often seen as a masculine rite of passage. The military is, as Carreiras (2010) puts it, a “gender-granting” (p.473) institution for men. However, using gender as a frame for the analysis of my data would be both distracting and misleading. Those who use the concept of military masculinities are more concerned with the masculinity half of the phrase than the military half (“militarised” is the adjective giving further information to “masculinity”). Working with British soldiers, for example, Basham (2013) “explored the significance of gender, race, and sexual orientation to their self-identities and relationships, to military culture and civil-military relations, and to war and preparations for it” (p.9). Belkin (2012) defines military masculinity as “a set of beliefs, practices and attributes that can enable individuals- men and women- to claim authority on the basis of affirmative relationships with the military” (p.3). His focus, that is, is on what military involvement can do for other aspects of such individuals’ lives.

From their own liberal viewpoints, many scholars seem unable to recognise that from other perspectives, war is attractive, that, as van Crevel (2008) writes, “war, and combat in particular, is one of the most exciting, most stimulating activities that we humans can engage in, capable of putting all others in the shade” (p.411). War provides “intense feelings, both emotional and physical,” writes Sasson-Levy (2007, p.310), “that derive from extraordinary experiences that are perceived as inaccessible in everyday life”. Feminist scholar Basham (2013) apparently couldn’t even see soldiers as people until she actually met one. She had “reservations about whether I should be conducting fieldwork with soldiers at all” (p.2), as engaging with the military might legitimise it or make it more effective (Basham, 2013, p.3) and writes of her first meeting with a soldier:

Within the confines of my university office, it was easier to characterise soldiers in narrow terms; to consider them as wholly violent, easily indoctrinated to unwittingly follow orders, misogynistic, vehemently homophobic, racist, and so on. But encountering soldiers in the
flesh complicates and sometimes contradicts these claims [...] It was not until Kev spoke, until he welcomed me, that I was able to reflect on the likelihood that his life was characterised not only by soldiering and war but by things that mine is too; things such as family and friends, failures and successes, births and bereavements, mortgages and bank accounts, and so on. It was in the act of Kev introducing himself to me that I began to see beyond his uniform, to see him and his fellow soldiers as “people” (Basham, 2013, p.4).

Such viewpoints make it hard for scholars to understand why young people join the Army. Not able to see any attraction in the military itself, scholars look for the pull in other places, and largely situate it in the desire to claim masculinity. “Part of the process of transforming young men into warriors involves the lure of masculinity itself,” Whitworth (2004, p.159) writes, and, “indeed some observers have even suggested that the military’s first job is to teach manhood and only secondarily to teach soldiering” (Whitworth, 2004, p.160). The question of how young people- who have in fact followed their own predispositions in joining the army- are “lured” into it is usually the only military “issue” that anthropologists in general will engage with, in my experience (although more usually they will not engage at all).

None of the soldiers I knew, however, spoke about becoming a man. The focus of everyone was to become a **soldier**. Although masculinity was produced, it was a by-product or side effect of everyone’s actual motivation. Further, what one became was not necessarily always as important as the process of becoming itself. I was surprised, in my time with the infantry, to hear riflemen listening and singing along to music that I had assumed to be un-grunt-like and “girly”: High School Musical, Taylor Swift, love ballads in various genres. I had a conversation about this with Privates Hunter and Williams while we were hurry-up-and-waiting one day. Hunter had stated that girls were complicated, and it was easy to be a man. I said that nobody questions the masculinity of guys in the Army, but others, like geeky guys who weren’t good at sport, might sometimes have trouble claiming masculinity. Both boys disagreed: “there are those in the Army! Even in the infantry,” and cited some of their fellow trainees (who didn’t struggle with physical activity, but rather had what might be classified as “geeky” hobbies). Much later I had a conversation in the Solomon Islands about the same topic- my surprise at the “unmanly” music - with one of the boys that had been
cited in this conversation. Gibson asked Harvey what clique he had been in at school. He himself had always been in the computer room. Harvey responded that he had been a nerd early on in High School. I said that I had been surprised that there were so many nerds in the Army (repeating Harvey’s terminology) to which he said, “there’s intelligent people here too!” I clarified I didn’t mean intelligence but rather geekiness i.e. “listening to Taylor Swift”. They both immediately declared there was nothing wrong with listening to Taylor Swift, and Gibson said, “The job covers it.” After someone’s arrival interrupted the discussion he even came back to this point with me: “but yeah, no, the job covers it.” When I asked: “no one can question your masculinity,” he confirmed that this was what he meant. (Harvey added, however, “I’m a professional cleaner. The amount of manly things we do is actually minimal.”) These make up two of the only three conversations about masculinity I ever witnessed in the Army, and in both cases the topic was largely initiated by myself (the third conversation is discussed in Chapter Seven, Corps Training). Likewise, once when I bought a Cosmopolitan for a mog ride it was quickly grabbed off me and passed around. The boys claimed it was because Cosmopolitan teaches “you the mean skills, and you become a pimp,” but they were reading the more romantic articles as well as the sex ones. By becoming a soldier you gain unquestionable masculine status. While masculinity is generally seen by anthropologists to be an identity requiring perpetual demonstration through performance, soldierhood is so symbolic of masculinity that soldiers feel they have proven their manhood once and for all just by being one. You are a soldier: you can read and sing along to anything you want. But this was never the primary aim. This too may be common to first world soldiers, as gender doesn’t appear as an important analytic tool in any of the ethnographies based on long term participant observation discussed above.

The fact that recruits were taking on the soldier habitus rather than masculinity meant that throughout my fieldwork females took on the same dispositions as males and thus always reacted to events in the same way that the males did. They did sometimes have to apply these same dispositions to different sorts of incidents; the boys never had to “get over” (i.e. not dwell on or take to heart) their Platoon mates telling them that their patterned tights were hooker-wear, or being punished with their sections for messy bedrolls when in fact the NCOs had only inspected the boys, having completely forgotten to even step foot in the female bedroom, as once happened at Basic. In that case I was the only one who even
reacted negatively. While I was ranting, the other females were quietly getting on with their punishment, as all soldiers should, whether it was unfair or not. None of the women I met would appreciate me presenting them as a “female soldier” rather than as a “soldier”, and hence I am not going to do so. (Feminist scholars would argue that this is because we too have become invested in and want the power of militarised masculinity for ourselves (see for example, Belkin, 2012, p.3; MacLeish, 2013, p.19)).

In some work on militarised masculinity, academics read masculinity into conversations in which soldiers haven’t mentioned it themselves. MacLeish (2013) writes that soldiering relies on “connotatively manly practices, traits, and disciplines” (p.18, emphasis added), which captures the idea that although discussions of soldiering almost inevitably bring masculinity to mind for many, it was not necessarily intended by the speaker. Basham (2013), for example, writes “for Craig, the opportunity to display and test his body attracted him to the Royal Marines” (p.61). She refers to this as Craig’s “desire to prove his masculinity in basic training.” The parts of her interview with Craig she quotes, however, don’t mention masculinity. He says rather that he had seen a recruiting ad that featured a trainee being sick, “So I thought to myself, I’ll do that […] You’ll feel that sick, [you’ll be] on the floor because the trainings too hard. And I thought it can’t be that hard” (Basham, 2013, p.61). Titunik (2008) writes that scholars tend to search for gendered explanations for soldiers’ actions whilst overlooking “that there may have been a military rationale” (p.154).

When soldiers are not explicitly asked about “externally or predetermined analytic categories” like gender, “they do not emerge as substantial topics or elements in the self-presentation of a military identity” (Woodward and Jenkings, 2011, p.253). This is what experienced military researchers Woodward and Jenkings (2011) found when they, for the first time, interviewed British service people without bringing up gender. Without a prompt, their interviewees did not discuss masculinity, rather conceptualising “their military identities in ways that emphasized the performative components of military activity”, especially professional skill and competence. Thus Woodward and Jenkings (2011, p.253) state that previous research “may have skewed the prevalence” of concepts like gender in understandings of soldier identity. King (2006) argues that although masculine bonding rituals are “more fascinating that tactical drills” they are not as important as military sociology would lead one to believe: “it is important to recognize that only those who have
already proven themselves capable of contributing to the collective military goals of the group will be allowed access to more genuinely personal and intimate interactions” (p.510). In other words, competency is the most important factor in the soldier habitus.

I am not saying that I never heard phrases like “grow some balls,” in the Army. However, such comments came from individuals, rather than being part of the group of informal sayings (like “get over it”) that everyone used and that structure the soldier habitus. In order to demonstrate the skewed focus of some scholars on gender, Tortorello (2010) cites an example from anthropologist Catherine Lutz. An informant of Lutz’s characterised peacekeeping as “babysitting”, and from this comment she constructs a gendered analysis, as “a babysitter is female” (cited in Tortorello, 2010, p.107). Tortorello (2010), on the other hand, argues that the soldier was “using gendered discourses” to express his preference for action over passivity (that is, his primary practical habitus): “Though the larger meaning—soldiers are active—may be expressed through the citation of a stereotypic masculinist discourse, this alone does not mean we are permitted to ignore or denigrate the larger meaning” (p.107).

However, the literature on military masculinities still needs to be examined in a bit more depth. This is because conceptualising soldier dispositions primarily through masculinity has led to assumptions about what the soldier habitus does and doesn’t include that are incorrect. As Belkin (2012) writes, “it is not an overstatement to posit that almost every study of military masculinity suggests that attaining masculine status requires a rejection of the unmasculine, and that the masculine ideal consists of that which is not-queer, not-emotional, not-soft” (p.26). Scholars have written that military masculinity is constructed through the “suppression” (Eicha, 2012, p.112), “exclusion” (Allsep, 2013, p. 381), “banishment” (Osborne, 2010, p.120), “cancellation” (Höpfli, 2003, p.13), “den[ial]” and “obliterat[ion]” (Whitworth, 2004, p.161) of the feminine and homosexual. These are seen to be “antithetical” (Allsep, 2013, p.386) to the soldier habitus and to act as its “Other” (Baaz and Stern, 2011, p.568). In particular, the control and suppression of emotion that allows the switched-on state is seen to be a performance of masculinity through the suppression of the feminine (see for example, Sasson-Levy, 2007, p.302; Whitworth, 2004, p. 160), and it is argued that “any sign of weakness, vulnerability, or even sensitivity can be interpreted in the military as a sign of homosexuality” (Sasson-Levy, 2007, p.302). It is not that the scholars...
themselves necessarily believe in a masculine/feminine binary, but that they assume that
the military does, and that it structures its practices around this.

The best example of this is Julia Welland’s (2013) “Militarised Violences, Basic Training, and
the Myths of Asexuality and Discipline”. Welland (2013) argues that war crimes “may be
explained as an ‘excess’ or ‘spilling over’ of militarised masculinity” (p.882) and that it is
through futile attempts to expel femininity and homosexuality “that we can begin to make
sense of militarised violences” (p.894). She writes that “binary pairings such as
masculine/feminine; violent/passive; strong/weak; heterosexual/homosexual, provide the
prism through which militarised masculinity is constructed, with the identity aligning itself
with the former terms” (Welland, 2013, p.885). Her focus is on Basic Training in the British
Army. She argues that although Basic Training involves paying constant attention to
cleanliness and one’s appearance, “the myth of discipline ensures a border is marked
between the potentially feminising performances of domesticity [...] and the masculine
soldiering performances of instilling self-restraint and control” (Welland, 2013, p.897). This
works, she argues, because expelling messiness and disorder is conceptualised as expelling
“implicitly feminised traits” (Welland, 2013, p.898). She then notes that it is “impossible to
maintain” this “pathological cleanliness” in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the expectations of
Basic are “rendered ridiculous”. The messiness of deployed soldiers “disrupt[s] notions of a
controlled and disciplined soldier, undoing understandings of a militarised masculine
identity” (Welland, 2013, p.898). She does not seem to recognise that, practically, such
environments are the reason for socialising dispositions focused on cleanliness and order.
Such routines may not be able to keep a soldier spotless in the desert. However, soldiers
who unthinkingly enact hygiene and tidiness every day are much less likely to become ill and
much more likely to be able to locate their kit in the midst of chaos.

Welland (2013) further argues that training and bonding at Basic are achieved through the
“expulsion of, and disconnection from, homosexuality” and that this is “a violence” as it
“denies a recruit so many possibilities of becoming” (p.891). She sees male bonding as
having to be actively separated from sexuality and refers to this as the “myth of asexuality”
(Welland, 2013, pp.890-892). As an example of this disconnection, she cites the fact that
soldiers don’t see group nudity (i.e. in showering, getting changed) as sexual.
Homosexuality, however, is not fully banished and persists as a “ghost.” There is “an
unbroken continuum between the ‘harmless’ homosocial behaviour of basic training and [...] ‘excessive’ and highly (homo)sexualised abuses” (Welland, 2013, p.894) on deployment.

In fact, some anthropologists have shown that soldiers don’t tend to compare themselves with women or gay men but rather with other (assumed heterosexual) males (Frühstück, 2007, p.53; Sasson-Levy, 2007, p.306). Hale’s (2012) “The Role of Practice in the Development of Military Masculinities” uses the framing device of military masculinity, but in the cited interviews with British soldiers, it is “civilians” with whom soldiers constantly compare themselves. In Brazil too, “to join the Armed Forces, means, above all, not to be a civilian” (Castro, 2013, p.9). While it seems that recruits in some militaries are derogatively labelled as feminine or queer (Basham, 2013, p.100; Belkin, 2012, p.29; Gutmann and Lutz, 2010, pp.51-53; Zeeland, 1996, p.26), in the New Zealand Army, the insult of choice is “ballbags”, an undeniably masculine term. According to Ben-Ari (1998, p.55) recruits aren’t disparagingly implied to be feminine in Israel either.

The image of a hyper-masculine military that “foster[s] an aversion to female qualities,” is “overly simplistic and fundamentally flawed” (Titunik, 2008, p.139). Titunik (2008) calls this stereotype “The Myth of the Macho Military”. Her argument is that “in fact, the requirements of combat effectiveness have led military organizations to limit the aggressive qualities associated with hyper-masculinity” (Titunik, 2008, p.139) and that the qualities that are valued are those “associate[d] with femininity: teamwork, submission, obedience, and self-sacrifice” (Titunik, 2008, p.147). It is “steady professionalism, rather than “erratic manliness,” that is militarily effective” (Titunik, 2008, p.151). Control in following Rules of Engagement, for example, is an important part of training.

In fact the erroneous connection of hyper-masculine traits to a particular job is typical not only of soldierhood, but also of most jobs that are characterised by risk: firefighters, police, miners, ironworkers (Desmond, 2007, p.7). This is demonstrated by Desmond (2007), a wildland firefighter who conducted participant observation amongst his colleagues. He states that social scientists have long “believed that men take dangerous risks in order to acquire masculine recognition” and that “following this logic, most researchers investigating arenas of professional risk taking have suggested that the hallmarks of a good firefighter, police officer, or soldier are hypermasculine traits such as courage, aggressiveness, and
toughness” (Desmond, 2007, p.7). The firefighters he observed however “prize[d] competence and control above all other attributes and (contrary to most accounts) view masculine aggression and courage as negative qualities”: “Far from understanding risk as [...] a route to acquiring masculine character, firefighters view risk as something that can be tamed [...] and death as completely avoidable through competence” (Desmond 2007, p.8). Desmond’s analysis is quite similar to mine in that he uses Bourdieu to examine how a primary habitus is drawn on to embody a secondary career habitus- something I discovered when I read him for the first time after I had written most of this thesis- and the similarity is not only in our case studies but also in the traditional literature surrounding them. Desmond (2007) shows that the assumption that firefighters take risks in order to gain the reward of masculinity is an example of scholastic ethnocentrism: sociologists see risk as a cost-benefit calculation (p.11) whereas in fact the decisions made whilst fighting fires “are made at the bodily level” and “exist in cognitive form only fleetingly, if at all” (p.10). The way in which Desmond (2007) characterises his informants’ primary habitus is through an identification with rural life: “the distinction between “outdoor” and “indoor” people, between “the country” and “the city” functions as their primary symbolic binary” (p.29). He states that this is their “fundamental principle of division,” as Claude Levi-Strauss would call it, since, more than any other antipodal cultural pairing (e.g., man/woman, white/black, rich/poor), it reinforces a foundational boundary separating known from unknown, familiar from foreign, and pure from polluted” (Desmond, 2007,p.29, emphasis added).

Although he therefore argues that the country habitus is more fundamental than masculinity, he continues to attach masculinity to his analysis, often referring to his informants’ primary habitus as “country masculinity” or “country-masculine dispositions” (Desmond, 2007, p.13). That is, his way of countering the misleading framework of masculinity is to try and show that masculinity isn’t universally defined by reckless bravado, and to in his case redefine it as characterised by competence, along with other traits. I argue, however, that the concept of masculinity is so well-established that the only way to avoid its connotations is to not use it, and that acting/competence is so fundamental to some people’s subjectivity as to be seen as its own habitus, rather than just a defining feature of their gender.
Not only are soldiers not necessarily focused on traits associated with hyper-masculinity, they actually value traits that scholars argue they banish for being too “feminine”. The persistent emphasis on bonding amongst soldiers in particular undermines the idea that they are trained to be fully emotionless. The idea that primary group cohesion is the best way to inspire soldiers to fight effectively has had the status of dogma since World War II (Smith, 2008, pp.280-281; Winslow, 1998, p.350), and has been romanticised through the image of the “Band of Brothers” (although both the idea that bonds between soldiers are as strong as the romantic notion suggests (Daddis, 2010) and the idea that this is effective militarily (Winslow, 1998) have been challenged). Whitworth (2004) actually writes that “caring, emotive human beings who feel a connection with other human beings are not, it seems, what most militaries are looking for” (p.172) less than twenty pages after previously writing that “perhaps most important to the new soldiers’ sense of self is the intense bonding among soldiers” (p.158). Persson (2011), who watched Swedish soldiers caring for one another after being pepper sprayed as part of Pre-deployment training, saw this care as disruptive of “the everyday ways of being military men” (p.133) rather than a durable disposition in which looking out for one another is highly valued. Persson (2011) argues that in caring for one another, “laboriously crafted masculinities crumble” (p.133), and thus require “repair work”. She acknowledges camaraderie but argues that this can only take place within “a setting that remains undoubtedly heteronormative” (Persson, 2011, p.146).

Persson (2011) notes that this discomfort could have however been triggered by factors other than the existence of the emotion, such as its being discussed publically and out of context, rather than just acted on when needed.

In fact, “the endorsement of a strong bond between men in combat units permits some expressions and actions that might otherwise be avoided in all-male groups”, such as “kissing, hugging, nudity, and verbal expressions of love” (Kaplan and Ben-Ari, 2000, pp.402-403). Many accounts suggest that, far from avoiding anything that could be construed as “gay”, straight male soldiers not uncommonly engage in practices like cross-dressing (Serlin, 2003), simulating (homo)sexual acts (the most well-known examples being Naval Crossing the Equator rituals (see, for example, Hersh, 2002) and leaked Canadian Airborne Regiment
hazing videos (see, for example, Whitworth, 2004, pp.93-95)) and pretending to be lovers. This last is the form of such practices that New Zealand riflemen enact, and has also been noted amongst Israeli (Weinstein cited in Kaplan and Ben-Ari, 2000, p.412) and Swedish soldiers (Persson, 2011, p.145). I will show in Chapters Seven and Eight that Kiwi riflemen test one another’s ability to confidently deal with anything- a necessary soldier disposition- by “acting gay” towards one another, and in doing so also act out “feminine” emotions like love, care and mutual support. Thus, far from becoming men by banishing homosexuality, they become soldiers (and hence men as a by-product) by playacting it.

Feminist scholars who have recognised such practices, however, argue that it only further reinforces binaries. Basham (2013), for example, sees “Naked Bar” as a “boundary making” (p.108) activity. If a British soldier shouts this phrase in the bar, the last man out of his clothes must buy everyone a drink. (Scholars never seem to believe soldiers when they tell them that communal nudity doesn’t have to equal eroticism). Basham (2013) believes this “necessitates the exclusion” (p.108) of gay men as she “strongly suspect[s]” (p.109) (but has no evidence) that the presence of a gay man would render the practice no longer innocent. This “allows men who self-identify as heterosexual to engage in homoerotic rituals […] without undermining their manhood and without the fear of being labelled as “gay”” (Basham, 2013, p.90). By contrast, I argue that in the case of New Zealand soldiers, there would be no point to such practices without the fear created by the possibility that they aren’t innocent. Because soldiers engage in these practices to test and improve one another’s ability to confidentially handle anything without worrying about how they will be perceived, the possibility of there being fear to handle is essential to the exercise. Thus although the soldiers are making use of a binary- the expectation that to claim one identity they should fear another- they are using it in a productive manner. By conspicuously flouting the boundaries of the gender binary, they produce and demonstrate a different type of identity, that of soldierhood.

Although such gay playacting can be read as homophobia, especially because of the fear of being seen as gay, this concept on its own cannot fully make sense of why soldiers engage in it. Here I am following Hage (2000) and extending his arguments about racism to homophobia. Hage (2000) argues that academics (who, I would add, are following the scholastic disposition) misread racism as primarily “a mental phenomenon” (p.28) and
divorce it from practical functions, not realising that “popular racist categorisations are not out to explain ‘others’ for the sake of explaining them” (p.31). Rather, “knowledge for most people who produce it has a practical purpose. It helps people do things” (Hage, 2000, p.30). Thus only labelling soldiers’ playacting as “homophobic” doesn’t provide an understanding of how it is employed in the acquisition of particular soldier dispositions. Appropriation as a more specific concept is helpful here. Appropriation is the use of the culture or practices of a marginalised group by a more powerful group, and this “to some degree” can be a “mark of respect and admiration” (Bell, 2014, p.86) for that marginalised group, in that it is quite a different thing from banishing the practices of the group or refusing ever to engage with them. However, appropriation remains problematic because such uses are “divorced from any support for, or wider understanding of, the wider political issues” facing the marginalised group (Bell, 2014, p.86). Rather, the culture of the minority group is used to benefit the majority group. Thus while simply labelling soldiers’ playacting as homophobic would not illuminate its practical uses, “appropriation” as a concept highlights those uses while also not suggesting that the engagement with homosexuality means that homophobia has itself been banished.

Even academics who break from the common notion that homosexuality is banished from military settings may fall into the trap of scholastic binaries. Belkin (2012), in his analysis of the American military from 1898 to 2001, argues that soldiers are in fact expected to simultaneously disavow but also embody femininity and queerness. However, he uses his re-conceptualisation of the masculinity/femininity binary to reinforce another binary through which soldiers are commonly understood, that of will/submission. Belkin (2012) writes that the goal of training is to turn recruits into “a tool, a blind instrument to enforce another’s aims and purposes” (p.41). He sees soldiering and agency as incompatible: “Bob’s compliance with military norms and imperatives reflected Bob’s lack of agency” (Belkin, 2012, p.39) (albeit briefly mentioning the dangers of assuming such a lack of agency (Belkin, 2012, p.42)). Belkin (2012) argues that soldiers are expected to simultaneously occupy both halves of pairs that the Army frames as irreconcilable binaries (“masculine/feminine, strong/weak, dominant/subordinate, victor/victim, civilized/barbaric, clean/dirty, straight/queer, legible/illegible, stoic/emotional” (p.4)). This is “how the military establishes social control over the troops” (Belkin, 2012, p.25). Belkin argues this works through both
fear and confusion. Soldiers “must fear that their embrace of the unmasculine could emerge in plain view if their conformity were to diminish” (Belkin, 2012, p.24). Further, the double expectation “is so confusing and dense that discipline has been nearly impossible to resist” (Belkin, 2012, p.36):

Unable to embody subject positions which are coded as oppositional yet indistinguishable, and unable to ascertain the difference between what they are supposed to idealize and that which they must disavow, they have found that surrender to authority is the most viable option. A penchant for obedience and conformity has emerged from the double confusion (Belkin, 2012, p.34).

Belkin (2012) sees this as “erasures of self” (p.39). The military has “fragmented service members’ identities” by “[intensifying] their desire to become masculine while making it impossible to live up to that standard” (Belkin, 2012, p.40). He writes that this is a similar process to the psychological condition of identity diffusion, which is “marked by uncertainty about one’s personality, preferences, ideology, goals and even gender. Individuals characterized by identity diffusion do not know who they are” and are “more likely to conform to group norms than individuals with more consolidated egos” (Belkin, 2012, p.39). One of Belkin’s two main case studies is male on male rape victims, a crime he argues is not uncommon in the military. This helps explains his focus on a lack of agency. While this is an important issue to investigate, however, I do not know that we can use rape victimhood as a model for soldierhood in general. I will argue that, just as soldiers are seen to gain hegemonic masculinity through soldier dispositions that include the feminine and queer, they can demonstrate their own will through submission. Further, the type of uniformity employed in the New Zealand Army is one that not only allows but relies upon the development of the individual self. These supposed binaries are the subject of the next section.

**Will/Submission and Individuality/Conformity: Enacting will through submission and conformity**

Will/submission and individuality/conformity are two of the key binaries that the concept of habitus was designed to overcome. Scholars seem to find it especially difficult to do so in the case of soldiers, however, as is seen in the myth of servicemen as automatia in which
“the soldier and his actions are regarded as merely a manifestation of training and an extension of the orders that he is given and not an “agent” in his own right” (Bowler, 2003, chapter I p.7). Basham (2013) writes that in the West we assume that “individuals can only be free if they are not subjected to the rules of others” (p.6). Her point is that in fact only white males can achieve such freedom, but this may also help explain why she couldn’t see soldiers as people until she met one, and hence more widely the strange persistence of the soldier-automaton myth. Although it is not always expressed in such strong terms, the idea that soldiers lack agency persists in the idea that soldiers must have been “lure[d]” (Sasson-Levy, 2007, p.298; Whitworth, 2004, p.159) into service rather than chosen it. Bowler (2003) suggests this may also be related to the doing/thinking divide in Western thought: “the Taylorist paradigm stresses that the “doer” has little or no agency, other than implementing the orders of the “thinker”” (chapter IV, p.12). This section will discuss those academics who have begun arguing that, in the military, “submission can be liberating” (Bourdieu cited in Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 24) as well as self-actualising.

Many academics seem to write from a perspective in which it is assumed that it is agency, control over one’s actions, and individuality that form the primary habitus of citizens of Western nations. But it seems that for soldiers (and others) the practical disposition is more fundamental. It is not that these dispositions necessarily conflict, but that if they do, the latter takes precedence over the former. It is not when they are given orders or expected to conform that makes the Army stop seeming like “a world endowed with sense and value” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p.127) to soldiers, but rather when they are not given anything to do, or are given only busy work that has no practical effect. Running around submitting to demands is still doing something, and at the beginning of Army careers is also more specifically becoming, in the sense of working on your individual self.

There is one example in the literature of a work that argues that soldierhood is structured by binaries like will/submission, but that does so from the perspective of the practical habitus. This is one of those ethnographies written by a (reserve) military officer, Hawkins’ (2005) exploration of American soldiers in Germany in the 1980s. Hawkins argues that “aspects of ordinary American life and aspects of Army life are substantially in opposition” (p.229), including the right to make choices versus subordination, individualism and diversity versus group orientation and uniformity, and restriction versus freedom. American
culture is thought to be natural, whereas Army culture is seen as “subordinate, contingent” (Hawkins, 2005, p.230). However, American soldiers will accept Army culture as long as it is oriented towards real, useful work. No complaint was made if “the deviating premises and practices were applied strictly within the Army’s military activities” (Hawkins, 2005, p.251). If, however, soldiers are made to perform tasks that go “beyond the boundaries necessary for readiness and warfare” (Hawkins, 2005, p.250), then conformity, uniformity and compliance start to chaff. Hawkins approaches this issue as a problem that can be solved and provides recommendations on how to lessen the encroachment of the Army on soldiers’ American values. MacLeish (2013), however, a scholar who cites Hawkins but who does not share his practical habitus, argues that Hawkins is wrong to see “the competition between Army and family” as “incidental” rather than “fundamental” (p.148). Hawkins, he writes, “like many others, regards the Army purely in terms of function” (MacLeish, 2013, p.149). Following Goffman (and much like Belkin), MacLeish (2013) instead argues that the Army is a total institution in which values clashes are used as a “sustained tension” (p.148) in order to manage men. As Castro (2013, p. 15, footnote 4) points out, however, conceptualising militaries as total institutions in this way doesn’t make much sense. Rather than trying to maintain clashes between binary home and military values, militaries explicitly seek to instil their own values as transposable habitus that will then also be enacted in the home.

The key point from Hawkins is that, as with masculinity, the issue of complete control over one’s actions is not as fundamental to soldiers as scholars assume. However, it is also not necessary to continue to think of the issue in binary terms as he does. Viewed through the practical habitus and the desire to become, individual will and obedience, and self-actualisation and uniformity, are not mutually exclusive. In “Meaning and Military Power: Moving on from Foucault,” Smith (2008) disputes Foucault’s picture of a “clockwork” soldier, a notion that suggests that “the less the distracting subjectivity, the stronger the soldier” (p.276). He points out that the ritual and ceremony that surround militaries “are without any obvious benefit for a robot” (Smith, 2008, p.284) and that the most prestigious medals are “awarded for innovation” (Smith, 2008, p.279). Rather, he characterises being a soldier as “moderate levels of compliance in the face of obstinate emotion and personality” (Smith, 2008, p.281). Soldiers become not “automata,” but “stoics” (Smith, 2008, p.286).
Again this suggests that it is the ability to suppress or hide emotion that contributes to soldiers appearing uniform and compliant. “It would not be accurate to say that the Army forbids all emotional expression,” Sasson-Levy (2007) writes; rather, the Army “dictates which emotions are allowed, when, where, and for what audience” (p.308). Smith (2008) discusses Special Forces soldiers who “might actively seek to become devoid of feeling,” and “the extraordinary efforts” that they “take to convert themselves into automata”: “This is not a tale of automatism imposed from above on the hapless mass of recruits. Rather it is of an active and reflexive effort that empowers the self-disciplining and self-selecting individual” (p.282). The ability to suppress emotions, “ironically enough allows the emotional satisfactions of elite status” (Smith, 2008, p.283). Likewise, Samimian-Darash (2012) writes “I suggest moving beyond the distinction between conscious and automatic actions. The soldier’s behaviour is not solely a result of getting an outside punishment or rewards, but also a result of his gaining internal control during that process” (p.59).

Sasson-Levy (2007) develops these points in depth in an article based on interviews with Israeli combat soldiers. She argues that, although it seems paradoxical, soldiers actually experience “external control” (Sasson-Levy, 2007, p.307) and “their growing obedience to military discipline,” as “increasing physical and emotional self-control, which create[s] a strong sense of agency and empowerment” (Sasson-Levy, 2007, p.315). “Giving up autonomy is not a passive project,” rather, “the soldier needs to mobilize all his willpower [...] Obedience is associated here with strenuous effort, hard physical work, and a strong will” (Sasson-Levy, 2007, p.309). Attaining such self-control and becoming a soldier enables these individuals to also experience thrill (“the outward expression of wild, unrestrained feelings, stemming from life-endangering events, adventurous activities”) (Sasson-Levy, 2007, p.298). However, Sasson-Levy interprets this as false consciousness, a scholastic ethnocentrism that I would like to avoid. She asks “how democratic societies [...] succeed in persuading men that they want to enlist in the army”, “how states convince young men to go to war” (Sasson-Levy, 2007, p.297, emphasis added) and “how specific constructions of militarized bodies lure men into fighting” (Sasson-Levy, 2007, p.298, emphasis added). She writes that “the authoritarian principles and practices of the military” (Sasson-Levy, 2007, p.315) as well as its “coercive” (Sasson-Levy, 2007, p.299) and “repressive nature” (Sasson-
Levy, 2007, p.316) are “thus disguised as belonging to, and even as promoting, an individualistic discourse” (Sasson-Levy, 2007, p.315, emphasis added).

Those military ethnographies that are based on long term participant-observation share the viewpoint that submission requires willpower. Ben-Ari (1998) argues that it is because “emotions are not thought to be completely under one’s control” (p.43) that harnessing them is linked to willpower. They are “thought to cause various involuntary visceral responses such as turning pale, flushing, trembling, shedding tears, or sweating” (Ben-Ari, 1998, p.44). Thus “the problem becomes one of agency: Who will be master? Situation or person?” Again it is competency that is the focus: “soldiers who cannot control themselves [...] are considered to be inept or nonprofessional” (Ben-Ari, 1998, p.82). Taking control of one’s life through submission is linked to the practical habitus in Frühstück’s (2007) ethnography of Japanese soldiers. These soldiers differentiate themselves from the “unadventurous”, “inconsequential” and “predictable” (p.60) lives of white collared salarymen (Japan’s particular form of hegemonic masculinity) (Frühstück, 2007, pp.53-57):

Whereas the outside observer imagines military service as the loss of freedom and a life of obedience and subordination, young, often socio-economically underprivileged recruits see it as the opposite: liberation from societal expectations and boredom [...] and, above all, from the anonymity of the masses. In spirit, at least, joining the Self-Defence Forces also means liberation from a sense of alienation in the present-day world, in which nothing significant ever seems to happen (Frühstück, 2007, p.59).

It is the same with the supposed uniformity/individuality binary:

For civilians, donning a military uniform may connote giving up one’s right to act as an individual and thus be equated with giving up one’s identity. By contrast, from the perspective of [...] young service members, military uniforms allow them to become individuals. The uniform can say things they do not have to say themselves (Frühstück, 2007, p.59).

The reason that conformity in the military can be self-actualising is that in the end it is proficiency that soldiers are conforming to. Professional competence is the uniform standard. Thus Hawkins (2005) writes:
If mutual substitutability is essential, the logical spin-off is “Don’t be different.” At first blush, it would appear that “Don’t be different” is contradictory to the idea that some are going to be judged as more competent than the others. But in fact, the expectation of excellence in personnel was a variant of “zero defects”. In Germany, those who approximated the standard of “zero defects” by maintaining the appearance of errorless total dedication to mission were substantially alike. Those who did not were different and defective (p.191).

Likewise MacLeish (2013) writes that if a soldier is injured, they suddenly become an individual: “It is all about you and it ought not to be” (p.115). The inability to do the job is the difference that matters. “Prove yourself [Special Forces]” Simons (1997, p.100) writes, “and everyone will disregard whatever else he thought you were”.

Submitting to orders and conforming, and controlling one’s own feelings to do so, takes hard work, both physical and mental. Hence submission cannot be seen merely as a lack of will. It also can’t be seen as a loss of identity. Such hard work is a fulfilment of the type of activity desired by those with the primary practical habitus, and results in personal development. In the military, uniformity is competence, and competence feeds into individuals’ own identity projects.

**Warrior/Peacekeeper and Warrior/Counterinsurgent**

In the final section of this chapter, I will briefly discuss academic work around irregular warfare and military operations other than war (MOOTW), including counterinsurgency and peacekeeping. With the increase in United Nations peacekeeping missions in the 1990s, the adaptation of soldiers to peacekeeping was “the single-most surveyed issue among American military personnel in the 1990s” (Segal, 2001, p.612). Academics tended to predict that soldiers would dislike peacekeeping (Miller, 1997, p.415), focusing on “the potential incompatibility between the roles of warrior and peacekeeper” (Segal, 2001, p.612). However, most often the military’s own perspective is that these roles are not in fact incompatible. As early as 1960 Janowitz “anticipated that professional soldiers would resist identifying themselves with policelike duties” and as early as 1976 officers countered this assumption, peacekeepers in Cyprus telling Moskos that “military professionalism teaches more than how to kill people, and that soldier training was also useful in the tasks of peacekeeping” (Miller, 1997, p.419). Moskos (1976) found his informants very capable at
adaptation (pp.93-95) and concluded that scholars should try to understand military professionalism better, “rather than giving weight to preconceptions of an inflexible “military mind””. The idea that peacekeeping contradicted the military habitus was “a gross misunderstanding” and “simply erroneous” (Moskos, 1976, p.137).

Scholars continued to argue the point right through into the next century, however, particularly those working within the framework of masculinity. “Peacekeeping missions are perceived by peacekeepers as feminine and therefore as a challenge to their combat and masculine identity” wrote Sion (2008, p.562). Some have suggested that a warrior/peacekeeper binary leads to transgressions on deployment, Franke (2003) for example arguing that “the disconnect between aggressive warrior identity and the mission objectives of a peace operation,” could be seen in “misconduct, including illegal detentions and excessive use of force” (p.32). Likewise, Whitworth (2004) argues that not being able to enact “appropriately masculine soldierly behaviour” on peacekeeping missions causes “a crisis of masculinity” (p.16), and concludes that this “crisis has resulted in displays of hypermasculinity and violence” (Whitworth, 2004, p.16).

This perceived contradiction between warrior and peacekeeper is not necessarily felt by soldiers themselves, or, if it is, may actually be based on a different binary thought pattern. While academics see peacekeeping as “a different set of skills than combat training” (Sion, 2006, p.469), several militaries see themselves as inculcating transposable habitus that can be applied in the fields of peacekeeping, counterinsurgency and combat. The military concept of “three block warfare” further illustrates the military belief that soldiers rather than police must conduct peacekeeping in case of sudden escalation. Three block warfare expresses the complexity of contemporary conflicts through the image of three adjoining city blocks variously requiring differing levels of intervention: peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and combat. Thus soldiers must be proficient in all of these tasks. Holmes-Eber (2014, p.77) found that Marines reconcile the roles of warrior and culturally aware counterinsurgent through perceiving themselves as modern-day versions of chivalrous knights. Frühstück (2007, p.33) writes that in Japan, Basic Training includes spiritual training and training in public service, and that soldiers are encouraged to develop love for the people. Dutch peacekeepers told Sion (2006) that “combat training can also be useful to peacekeeping. Cohesion, mutual trust, and command are ancillary skills or even byproducts
of combat training” (pp.463-464). New Zealand servicemen have always been seen to be
good soldiers because of an ability to create rapport with local communities. In New Zealand
this is strengthened by the number 8 wire, jack of all trades mentality: soldiers should be
capable of doing anything, they just need to get in there and figure it out. Winslow (2007)
discusses similar “muddy boots can do it all” and “can-do” (p.71) attitudes amongst the U.S.
Army.

A second body of academic work on these less traditional military activities emerged in the
late 2000s, this time based upon the framework of military masculinities. These works (see,
for example, Carreiras, 2010; Christie 2012; Duncanson, 2009; Mäki-Rahkola and Myrttinen,
2013; Manjikian, 2013; Streicher 2012; Welland 2014; for specifically New Zealand
examples, Bevan and MacKenzie, 2012; Stevens, 2013) argue that new forms of military
masculinity are emerging in response to the new activities. Christie (2012), for example,
writes that these new forms of masculinity “value characteristics that are quite different
from the typical forms of behaviour valued within the combat arms” (p.61). Such
characteristics include “feminine” traits like the ability to relate to and provide support to
others. The idea that such traits are completely new, however, rests on the problematic
gender binary assumptions made about soldiers as discussed above.

Soldiers in fact perceive some peacekeeping or counterinsurgency operations through
binaries that can cause them to devalue these activities. However, these binaries are not
simply peacekeeper/warrior or counterinsurgent/warrior, but rather are those that arise
from the practical habitus: the difference between acting and being passive, and between
being useful and not achieving anything. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps
Counterinsurgency Field Manual (2007) states that “sometimes doing nothing is the best
reaction”:

Often insurgents carry out a terrorist act or guerrilla raid with the primary purpose of
enticing counterinsurgents to overreact, or at least to react in a way that insurgents can
exploit- for example, opening fire on a crowd or executing a clearing operation that creates
more enemies than it takes off the streets (p.49).

Not acting does not sit well with soldiers. American soldiers peacekeeping in the Sinai
“thought they should be in Lebanon, “where the action is”” (Segal, 2001, p.619). They felt
“that six months of sitting in the desert was a waste of their talents”; “our hands are tied” (Miller, 1997, p.420). During her research in Macedonia, Miller (1997) “found combat soldiers traveling around the countryside, trying to discover a mission for themselves” (p.429). UN policy was that peacekeepers would retreat if the Serbs advanced, but the soldiers were unable to believe that they would be ordered to retreat rather than stay and fight in such an event (Miller, 1997, p.430). Haaland (2010) found a “genuine sense of wanting to be put to good use” (p.548) amongst Norwegian soldiers across various deployments. American soldiers in Somalia had thought they were deploying to save a starving population and when they found they weren’t allowed to distribute aid, morale dropped (Miller and Moskos, 1995, pp.620-622). That is, to avoid disjuncture between their habitus and field, soldiers don’t necessarily need to be doing something martial - they just need to be doing something useful.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown why it is that I do not use either of the two most resilient analyses of soldier identity- the loss of individual identity, or militarised masculinities- in my examination of how civilians become soldiers. As Bourdieu argued, we should try to see beyond the binaries that structure academic thought. Pairs that look like binaries through the scholastic disposition may in fact be acting in reciprocal relationships in the case of those with the practical habitus (will/submission) or may still be employed as binaries, but for productive, not merely divisive ends (masculinity/homosexuality). Further, academics without the practical habitus may overlook the binaries that are central to this habitus (active/passive, useful/useless). Repeatedly in this chapter, informants quoted in works framed by gender could instead be seen to be focused on challenge (Basham, 2013, p.61), the desire to be active (Lutz cited cited in Tortorello, 2010, p.107) or skill (Woodward and Jenkings 2011). These preoccupations may be seen to be generated by the practical habitus, rather than requiring the concept of masculinity to be understood, and this would further enable us to acknowledge that such desires may be fundamental to females also. I further demonstrated that soldiers themselves define soldierhood as the embodiment of skilled competence. Gaining these skills is a process of working on oneself and becoming, and hence is a fulfilment of the pre-existing practical habitus rather than a loss of it. It is
because soldiers themselves focus on the practical and soldier habitus, therefore, that I use these two habitus to understand the experience of my informants, rather than any of the modes of identity presented in this chapter. The control of emotion is not seen as banishment of anything that could be deemed “feminine” or “individual”, but rather has the specific aim of producing soldiers who are ready to deal with anything. It is through their competence, or lack thereof, that a soldier is identified by their peers, and throughout my fieldwork I saw soldiers of both genders (and all ethnicities) become highly respected through displaying proficiency. While gender and sexual identities are obviously present in soldier training, they are not the point of it, but rather are used to test the coping skills that enable performance.

While in this chapter I considered the gendered and sexual identities that academics see as fundamental to soldierhood, in the next chapter I will consider the modes of identity that the New Zealand Army itself sees as fundamental, ethnicity and nationality. Thus rather than the international soldier habitus, the next chapter focuses more specifically on the habitus of New Zealand soldiers. The New Zealand Army’s official view is that “diversity brings added value”, and the key distinction it claims for its soldiers- the ability to build rapport with the populations of deployment zones- rests on their multicultural identities. Thus the New Zealand Army, like academics, converts the practical mastery of soldier dispositions into explicit codifications, but in the Army’s case, this is to help instil these dispositions in new recruits. This, however, originates at the top of the hierarchy, and it will therefore be important to remember the tendency discussed in this chapter towards a divide between official military representations and directives and the informal everyday lived experience of soldiers.
Chapter Five

The New Zealand Soldier Habitus: The Reflexive Use of Identities as Capabilities

This thesis aims not only to explore identity acquisition through the lens of anthropological theory, but also to understand how those involved in socialisation themselves conceptualise it. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the New Zealand Army’s own view of how it turns civilians into soldiers, including the dispositions it desires its soldiers to embody, and how it aims to achieve this. Switching the focus from how academics have understood soldier identity to the perception of the Army itself necessitates a change of topic, a centring of different modes of identity. This chapter brings the focus back to the two habitus whose relationship is the core of this thesis: soldierhood itself, and the primary practical habitus. Unlike academics, the Army is of course focused on soldierhood over any other mode of identity, as their primary concern is to train competent soldiers. While scholars automatically equate soldierhood with masculinity, the Army does not think of soldierhood in gendered terms. However, two other modes of identity, nationality and ethnicity, are seen to make New Zealanders good soldiers. Although I outlined the reasons to believe there may be a shared pan-national soldier habitus in the last chapter, the New Zealand Army distinguishes its soldiers from those of other nations on the basis of these national/ethnic dispositions (because the New Zealand national habitus is based on biculturalism and multiculturalism, ethnicity and nationality are closely linked in New Zealand discourse).

What is covered here are the formal socialisation programmes, created or commissioned by hierarchy, with which recruits are required to engage. This then is necessary background to understand what happened as my participants moved through the initial training stages of their Army careers. While what is presented in this chapter is much closer to how my participants themselves conceptualise soldiering than the discourses in the previous chapter, it is still not an exact match. As well as outlining the formal socialisation
programmes, I will show how these programmes may be interpreted slightly differently to how they were intended in the informal everyday sphere, by both training staff and new soldiers. This is again largely due to the practical habitus and its mismatch with symbolic mastery. The codification and standardisation of soldier dispositions that is required in order to create formal training programmes gets a bit too close to the discourse of identity as being, rather than doing, for recruits and trainers. Although linking soldierhood to nationality and ethnicity is closer to soldiers’ own point of view than linking it to gender is, by the end of the ethnographic chapters it will become clear that even these modes of identity are not as important in generating soldiers’ actions as is the primary practical habitus. Like academics, the Army doesn’t explicitly discuss the practical habitus. But this is not because this habitus is foreign and therefore unrecognised, as with academics; rather, it is because people who have embodied the habitus take it for granted and don’t need to think about it consciously.

There are three major ways in which the New Zealand Army explicitly conceptualises the identity of its soldiers and of itself as an institution. First, all recruits are required to internalise an official set of Army “values” known by the acronym “3CI.” Secondly, the New Zealand Army, like all New Zealand state institutions, is officially bicultural, and has Māori tribal status as Ngāti Tūmatauenga, Tribe of the God of War. All recruits therefore become members of Ngāti Tūmatauenga. Thirdly, New Zealand soldiers have always been seen to be “good at” building rapport with local populations on overseas deployments, a capability that is usually referred to as “winning hearts and minds,” but which I will call the “rapport-building disposition”.

Together, these three sets of dispositions produce a New Zealand soldier habitus that is both shared and yet diverse. In fact, some dispositions are seen to be shared by diverse groups because of their diversity. 3CI is a shared habitus that everyone is expected to embody. The Army also stresses, however, that “diversity brings you added value”, as an equity officer once told us. Biculturalism draws attention to not only the two major ethnic groups in the New Zealand Army, Māori and Pākehā, but also to the many other ethnicities represented, especially Pasifika ones. But this diversity is in fact seen to lead back into another shared habitus, the rapport-building disposition. In Bourdieu’s language, the fields in which New Zealand soldiers are socialised (the Army, and the wider nation that it serves)
are diverse, and soldiers therefore internalise and come to embody dispositions that are open-minded and respectful of difference, generating laidback and curious inclinations. There are two differing discourses that attempt to account for the rapport-building disposition in New Zealand, and one of them is largely the same as this Bourdieusian analysis: New Zealand soldiers learn cultural sensitivity through constant exposure to difference. In the second discourse however, the rapport-building disposition is naturalised, and said to be an innate characteristic of New Zealanders. The latter discourse means that the rapport-building disposition can be seen as a pre-existing disposition that recruits already have on arrival at Basic Training, while the former creates the view that it is picked up by multi-ethnic recruits at Basic Training as a by-product of going through the more official training programmes together. Thus, unlike almost everything else (the Army teaches recruits how to load washing machines, drink at social occasions, and communicate with their partners) interaction with local populations is not seen to be completely reliant on explicit training.

The importance of ethnicity and the rapport-building disposition to the New Zealand Army shows that the internal military understanding of becoming a soldier differs significantly from the stereotype of the loss of civilian identity. Rather, pre-existing civilian identities of New Zealand soldiers are fundamental to the soldier identity. The embodiment of 3CI is seen as an identity change, just not a complete replacement. Although the Army doesn’t discuss the too-obvious pre-existing practical habitus in the way that it explicitly discusses pre-existing ethnic habitus, this habitus is still central to this chapter, in that it is key to understanding people’s reaction to the formal training programmes. To employ two of Bourdieu’s concepts that will be particularly important in this chapter, the primary practical habitus has remained on the level of practical mastery, whereas ethnicity along with the secondary soldier habitus have been brought to the level of symbolic mastery. Through various official discussions of soldier identity, practice that was once performed and taught to the next generation without passing through conscious thought has been formalised and codified to facilitate socialisation. This is what is behind the difference between the Army’s official version of soldier identity and the soldiers’ own: soldiers would prefer their identity projects to stay in the realm of practical mastery. This chapter will first show how the Army’s codification of identity is part of a wider trend in which organisations explicitly make
use of this concept in order to enhance performance. It will then cover the three ways in which the New Zealand Army conceptualises the identity of its soldiers.

**Symbolic Mastery: Identity as a workplace asset**

Sourcing information on how the New Zealand Defence Force conceptualises identity and identity acquisition is not difficult, as it is an institution that privileges self-awareness and reflexivity. This includes regular questioning of all of its own beliefs about itself. Evidence of this can be seen in the fact that this thesis exists at all. At one point, the Vice Chief of Defence Force told me to “not pull any punches- I hope it will be as explosive as *Myth and Reality*” (McLeod, 1986), a book that challenged a then widespread national belief in the superiority of New Zealand soldiers compared to those of other nations. Another example of this reflexivity is a NZDF “People Capability Summit” I attended during the course of my PhD, which was run by Winsborough, a business psychology firm. Told that today there was no rank and no repercussions, the participants, high-ranking officers and some representational NCOs, were asked to question their organisation’s “sacred cows” (those things that are seen to be immune from question). This lead to the questioning of such military fundamentals as rank and hierarchy, the importance of physicality, wearing uniform, recruit courses, and having rules as opposed to guidance. Having completed my fieldwork by this point, I found myself one of the most conservative people in the room, shocked and arguing that the exact positioning of the rank slide in relation to the crease in your shirt (used as an example of a pedantic “who cares” issue) does so matter (see Chapter Six, Basic Training).

The above may seem surprising in view of a common conceptualisation of militaries as conservative, but it is in fact unsurprising in the context of a wider trend in which identity has become increasingly important to corporations and other organisations. Since the 1980s, “the ‘self’ and subjectivity have become central motifs in the lexicon of management” (Costea, Crump and Amiridis, 2008, p.663), with employees’ “soft characteristics (e.g. attitudes, character traits, predispositions, emotions)” seen as “key to organizational success” (Mutsaers, 2014, p.72). The element of this trend that is most relevant to the Army is the use of “corporate cultures”, deliberately designed sets of values and perspectives. “A “strong” corporate culture” (Gordon, 1995, p.7) is seen to be
associated with excellence and “changing a corporate culture” has become a similar type of process to “hiring a new CEO” (Batteau, 2013, p.57). Corporate cultures are an attempt to specifically tailor working environments (fields) and therefore also worker identities (habitus) in order to enhance performance (Costea, Crump, & Amiridis, 2008, p.667), with employees “enjoined to incorporate […] new managerial discourses into narratives of self-identity” (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002, p.622).

Along with the internalisation of shared values comes the idea of diversity as an asset (Gordon 1995, p.9), or, in more military terms, a capability. The concept of diversity “demands (nicely) that employees give the corporation their entire person and potential […] If you thought you had to leave your cultural identity at home, now you’re expected to contribute it generously to the corporate mission” (Gordon, 1995, p.18). New Zealand Members of Parliament, as studied by Gershon (2008), for example, view ethnicity, and especially Māoriness, as a “useful skill set that can assist people in their market relations” (p.424). Although this may sound mercenary to academics who don’t privilege practicality, viewing one’s ethnicity as useful economically or politically is not at all incompatible with viewing it as a fundamental and deeply treasured aspect of one’s identity. As Sahlins (1999) argues, just because a group’s culture can be instrumental, it doesn’t mean that this culture is reducible to its economic uses.

The New Zealand Army uses both the strategy of requiring its members to embody official values as part of their identity, and the strategy of employing diversity as an asset. The three major ways in which the Army conceptualises the identity of its soldiers (3CI, Ngati Tūmatauenga, and the rapport-building disposition) are all examples of one or both of these strategies. The influence on and use of the self by organisations is in some contexts and academic analyses seen to be an intrusive system of control and objectification (Mutsaers, 2014, p.72, see also Alvesson and Willmott, 2002). However, as argued in the previous chapter, soldiers may turn being controlled to their own ends, enrolling it in their own identity projects, whether this control is in a traditional military form, a new corporate form, or a mixture of both.

The employment of a shared corporate identity and of diversity as an asset are also both examples of Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic mastery, “the making explicit and the
formalizing of the principles at work in a practice” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990, p.46). As outlined in Chapter Two, Bourdieu (1977) argued that the conversion from practical to symbolic mastery was a fundamental “change in ontological status” (p.120), and that the danger lay in assuming that the “constructions [...] produce[d] to understand practice” actually existed in “the consciousness” of the “agents” who carried out that practice (1990b, p.384). It is thus important to examine what effects this transformation and the use of the explicit norms it produces has in the real world. I will therefore discuss the effect that the Army’s conversion of subconscious dispositions imparted through implicit learning to norms transmitted explicitly has had on its processes of socialisation. 3CI, for example, is a formalisation of “principles at work in a practice” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990, p.46) designed to make transmission of these principles to new members easier, whilst less officially and for the same reason the rapport-building disposition is a practice previously subconscious that is increasingly being discussed explicitly.

In the Army, symbolic masteries operate alongside practical mastery. For example, 3CI as a set of values operates on the level of symbolic mastery, but exists alongside an unspoken set of dispositions that are transmitted implicitly at the level of practical mastery. This chapter outlines the explicit symbolic values, while Part Two, the ethnographic chapters, cover the implicit dispositions. It will become clear that the content of the two doesn’t really differ, but that the differing approach to inculcation is important. Soldiers prefer not only the latter learning style but also the theory of identity that goes along with it. This leads to one of the real world effects of symbolic mastery discussed in this chapter, which is that soldiers may not be particularly receptive to it given that it doesn’t match their primary habitus or their subsequent preferred way of identifying themselves through action. The other effect discussed is due specifically to the existence of both types of learning/mastery simultaneously, which, despite an overall match in content, sometimes led to unexpected contradictions.

3CI: Inculcating shared soldier dispositions

I have previously stated that the Army requires soldiers to internalise Army values and to self-lead according to them in all areas of their life. Here I will outline what the Army means by self-leadership, and what these values actually are. The term “values” is the Army’s own.
I myself use “dispositions” in preference to “values” in my discussion of the acquisition of soldier identity, as “dispositions”, a more action-oriented concept, seems to be a better match with soldiers’ own understanding of identity. Further, the way in which Army documents present the values makes it clear they are to be embodied as durable and transposable dispositions. The following discussion is based on several official Army documents as well as on a three week training course I attended at the Army Depot (TAD), the unit in Waiouru that handles Basic Training. This course was for the staff members new to TAD who would be running the Basic that I followed, and took place before Basic begun. Both of these sources are instances of conversion to symbolic mastery, in which soldier identity is discussed explicitly in order to facilitate its socialisation.

The way in which the Army perceives the civilian-soldier transition is expressed in a “cultural review” (Horn et.al, 2008) that the Army conducted of the Army Depot in 2008. The review states that recruits “bring varied values, skills and experiences with them. Many of those values and behaviours are not consistent with those of the Army and will require modification in order to result in a successful soldier” (Horn et. al., 2008, p.17). This means that “when recruits enter TAD there is a period of time where the culture of the individual does not match the culture of TAD and if basic training is successful each recruit’s values will gradually align with those of the Army” (Horn et. al., p.18). The aim is for:

The ethos and values of the NZ Army [to] become an integral part of a soldier’s own value system and sense of who they are. Thus they act in accordance with these even when under significant duress or in an environment inconsistent with them (Horn et. al., 2008, p.29).

The soldier habitus to be internalised is based on a model called the Army Leadership Framework (ALF). This was created by psychologists, and outlines what is to be learned and executed at every stage (i.e. rank) of an Army career. Each new stage builds on the last. The first stage is “self-leadership”, which all soldiers and officers must master. The ALF then moves on to “Lead Teams”, in which, for example, Section Commanders/Corporals lead sections, which is followed by “lead leaders”, in which Platoon Commanders and Sergeants lead the Section Commanders, all the up through to “Lead Army”, in which the Chief of Army and Sergeant Major of the Army head up everyone. According to the ALF, the transition into the Army can be described as the acquisition of skills of self-leadership.
Leadership Framework Task SL 1.11 (i.e. the very first task) is “Model NZ Army Ethos and Values” (Leadership Framework: Coaching Guide, 2009, p.2). The ethos is “to serve New Zealand honourably and loyally” and the values are “3CI” - there are three “C” values, Courage, Commitment, and Comradeship, and one “I” value, Integrity. In practice, self-leadership and 3CI are inseparable, as 3CI provides the values with which a soldier should self-lead. The values are explained in depth in a booklet that everyone was issued on arrival at Basic Training, The Way of the New Zealand Warrior (2010). Courage is not only being able to charge a battlefield, but also moral: “the strength of character to do what you know is right in spite of pressure to do something wrong” (p.14). Commitment “involves putting the needs of the team or organisation before your own personal needs. It includes dedication to the completion of a task in spite of discomfort or difficulties” (The Way of the New Zealand Warrior, 2010, p.18). Comradeship is teamwork and traditional New Zealand mateship. Having integrity means “to take responsibility for [your] own actions and accept the consequences of those actions”, to be reliable, to “follow what [you] truly believe to be right,” and to have “sound moral principles” (The Way of the New Zealand Warrior, 2010, p.25). New soldiers are expected to take on these values and use them when making decisions not only at work but everywhere and at all times: “The NZ Army Ethos and Values must now serve as your guides when considering what is appropriate in any situation - whether you are in uniform or not” (Leadership Framework: Do More/Do Less Matrix, 2009, p.2). They should be “the basis for your decision-making in the absence of external direction or guidance” (Leadership Framework: Learning Outcomes, 2009, p.20). That is, they are to serve as durable, transposable dispositions.

The Army Leadership Framework uses a set of standard elements to break down each rank/stage into what lessons should be learnt. One of these is “self-development”, and “reflection” is a sub topic under “on-the-job learning”. Overall the ALF indicates that Army training should involve regular self-reflection, on your progress in practical skills, but also on matters of identity. Recruits should “reflect on your own experiences and behaviour in light of the Army Ethos and Values”, and staff should debrief recruits “after any opportunity to

The ALF was instituted shortly before the cohort I followed joined the Army, and so was in its early days. In particular, self-leadership was to be embedded early and often throughout Basic Training, rather than just being covered over a few days near the end of the course, as had been done the previous year. 3CI however predated self-leadership. The Cultural Review (Horn et. al, 2008, p.17) notes that the instructors that run Basic Training tend to arrive with values that differ from those of TAD. This is due to their differing parent units (NCOs from all trades are posted to TAD), but also to the fact that “the TAD culture had significantly changed since they went through recruit training” (Horn et. al, 2008, p.18). Thus TAD must “assist them in aligning to the current culture” (Horn et. al, 2008, p.19), especially as recruits are “likely to be particularly vulnerable to the way behaviour is modelled by instructors” (Horn et. al, 2008, p.29). This was a major aim of the staff induction training that I attended. This course, as is all Army training, was based on the principles of adult learning, and was heavily influenced by psychological tools such as positive visualisation.

The ideas about identity acquisition presented at this TAD induction had a different emphasis than the official documents above (or than how an academic would be likely to interpret these documents). This more informal discussion suggested that soldiers do not have to fully embrace and believe in the values mentally, but rather have to act in line with them. This idea probably underlies at least some of the documents. The ALF, for example, discusses “‘living’ the Army ethos and values” and “model[ling] the NZ Army Ethos and Values” (Leadership Framework: Learning Outcomes, 2009, p.4, emphasis added) and includes a “do more/do less matrix” (2009), while The Way of the New Zealand Warrior (2010) states that the values “are only useful if the behaviours which make up the values are acted on by all members of the Army on a day to day basis” (p.32) and concludes with a
table of specific examples of such behaviours broken down by value (pp.38-39). However, the reification required to produce such codifying documents may have overwhelmed this. Whether or not it would be easy for each recruit to fit into the Army, the NCOs were told, would depend on their background. If a recruit could find an affinity with 3CI they would do well, whereas those who couldn’t would be the problematic recruits. The staff were told that 3CI “doesn’t mean you need to agree, but you have to live within them” (emphasis added). If you got a “bad apple”, the solution was to try to help them find “a commonality between the two value sets” (i.e. their primary habitus and the Army habitus). That is, one’s existing values do not need to be completely modified as the Cultural Review might suggest. Army values would come to act as a moral compass for some recruits, but not for others. Regardless, everyone needed to live by 3CI. This may at first seem like a shallower type of identity change, but this is not in fact the case given that soldiers emphasise, value, and judge others on their actions, rather than thought.

This focus on “living by” the values is why I use Bourdieu’s term “dispositions,” with its focus on actions towards which people are predisposed, rather than the Army’s chosen term “values”, which is a noun, implying that values are “possessed”. 3CI is not a completely new corporate culture designed from scratch. Rather, 3CI has been codified from underlying pre-existing dispositions of the Army- practical mastery converted to symbolic mastery. These practical dispositions still exist alongside 3CI in their original form -the informal, action-oriented slogans and sayings (i.e. “get over it”) introduced in Chapter Two. The following chapters will show that new soldiers engage more readily and often with the dispositions than the values. The content of these dispositions in fact largely matches the content of 3CI. Hence it is solely the type of mastery that is the deciding factor in which recruits prefer. Bourdieu argued that practical mastery is characterised by “partial contradictions and the fuzziness that pervade the whole system and account for its flexibility, its openness, in short everything that makes it “practical”, and thus geared to respond at the least cost […] to the emergencies of ordinary existence” (Bourdieu, 1990, p.384). What happens when the messy dispositions by which people live are codified is that this incoherence comes to light. In the case of 3CI, this is dealt with by acknowledging in training that sometimes the four values contradict one another. Direction is then given on how to deal with this. For example,
integrity takes precedence over comradeship: you should have the courage to let your mates know if they are out of line.

Part of the reason that the practical dispositions are still prominent is that they are highly valued and reproduced by those NCOs discussed in the Cultural Review, who became soldiers before the advent of 3CI/self-leadership. While 3CI largely aligns with the practical dispositions, some other elements of new recruit training procedures don’t co-exist with the dispositions so neatly. Here I will outline the primary example of such an element so that in the next chapter I can examine how this uneasy co-existence worked out in practice. Basic Training is deliberately designed to be an open environment in which recruits are kept well informed and are enabled to report any issues. The genesis of this can be seen in the Cultural Review:

One issue raised by instructors about working with recruits is the need to explain “why” things are done the way they are. This was reported as something specific to the current generation of recruits. If instructors can provide the “why” to recruits, it is likely to increase their motivation and commitment (Horn et. al., 2008, p.42).

Indeed during Basic Training staff were very open with recruits and we always knew the “why”. Almost everything I heard at the TAD induction, for example, I later heard repeated to the recruits. The Cultural Review was also concerned that inappropriate behaviour or harassment was not often reported (Horn et. al, 2008, pp.44-48) and stated that it was important to “consider how to reduce some of the barriers to reporting” (these including fear of being seen as a nark or weak, fear of being singled out, and so on) (Horn et. al, 2008, p.44). At NCO induction it was reiterated that Generation Z “liked to have their say,” as they had been encouraged to do so during their years of schooling. This was the reason why TAD used “facilitation”: asking questions like “who knows what this is? Can you explain it to everyone else? What would you do?” Later I would hear similar comments made about soldiers: “you tell them to do something, they say “why, Corp?””. Again this was attributed to generation. As will be seen, however, by deciding to indulge this belief at Basic Training, the Army actually taught recruits that knowing the why and being able to express their opinion was something they could expect and at the least reproduced this disposition themselves. This, however, sometimes conflicted with learning to control one’s emotions. This is not the only disposition that I saw being socialised in the Army itself but later heard
attributed to generation; another example being the disconnect between soldiers and senior leadership. My informants were therefore perceived to be similar to one another in that they arrived with what were interpreted as shared generational predispositions, and were then all expected to embody the same secondary dispositions. The following section will elaborate on the ways in which they were seen to be diverse, and on how, like their similarity, this could be enrolled to enhance their performance and that of the Army as a whole.

Ngāti Tūmatauenga: Bi (and Multi) culturalism

The Army sees itself as modifying recruits’ identity, but also makes use of pre-existing identities in the form of diverse ethnicities. The New Zealand Army is officially bicultural, as are all New Zealand state institutions. In practice, it is also multicultural. The literature about ethnicity in military organisations that I have discussed so far focused on a desire to override such diversity: the attempted use of military training for the purpose of assimilation, and the argument that soldiers need to be homogeneous to be cohesive and hence effective. However, the literature is also beginning to show that the NZDF is not alone in seeing ethnically diverse soldiers as an asset. This is sometimes because soldiers may be used as interpreters and cultural brokers in regions from which they originate, as with Middle Eastern soldiers in the German Armed Forces (Menke, Langer & Tomforde, 2011, p.33). In other cases, particular groups are seen to be useful in any context because of transposable ethnic dispositions. For example, in Israel there is an Orientalist belief that Bedouin are good trackers because they are “closer to the land” (Lomsky-Feder & Ben-Ari, 1999, p. 173). Further, New Zealand is not the only nation to believe that experiencing diversity leads soldiers of all ethnicities to embody operationally useful dispositions. German Armed Forces social scientists (Menke et al., 2011, p.34) suggest that native-born German soldiers become more culturally sensitive by serving with comrades of different religions and ethnicities. Likewise, it is argued that in the Armed Forces of multicultural Canada, “military members who work in an atmosphere free of dissension and harassment, one that promotes a strong sense of equal opportunity, are apt to be more productive and team-oriented” (Winslow, 1999, p.34). This section begins with a brief history of official New Zealand biculturalism, as this forms the wider field in which the Army must operate, and
from which it shapes its identity and therefore that of its soldiers. I then look specifically at how the Army enacts biculturalism, and at the major ethnic identities that are seen to be so valuable by the NZDF.

Biculturalism in New Zealand is conceptualised as a “partnership” (Sissons, 1993, p.100), based on the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi, between indigenous Māori and British settlers (whose descendants are now referred to by the Māori term “Pākehā”). In the 2013 census, 74% of New Zealanders identified as some form of European10, 15% as Māori, 12% as Asian, and 7% with at least one Pacific identity (Statistics New Zealand, 2015), with the five largest ethnic groups being New Zealand European (i.e. Pākehā), Māori, Chinese, Samoan, and Indian (Statistics New Zealand, 2013). According to New Zealand Army statistics, of 140 recruits in the Basic Training I followed, 63.6% were New Zealand European, 22.1% Māori, 4.3% Other European, 2.8% Pacific Islander, and 1.4% Asian. This indicates that the Army is less white, and has a higher proportion of Māori, than society as a whole. I was surprised at the low percentage of Pacific Islander recruits when I saw these statistics, and believe that in the specifically infantry groups I moved into after Basic this percentage was higher.

Biculturalism was adopted as New Zealand policy in the 1980s, as part of a wider international movement towards multiculturalism and the privileging of ethnicity over other axes of identity. “Culturalism,” the “view that the most fundamental characteristic of a person is their culture” (Barber, 2008, p.154, footnote 3) began in Western countries to replace “more traditional concepts such as social class, as a means of explaining beliefs and actions” (Openshaw, 2010, p.6). That is, it was now assumed that individuals’ primary habitus is based on their culture/ethnic background, and accordingly, governments in many places began using “multicultural policies” to manage diverse populations (Moore, 2011, p.34). This wider focus on ethnicity as the fundamental aspect of people’s identity in the public sphere, rather than the similar focus on gender amongst scholars of the military, is influential in official Army thinking.

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10 The majority of these being New Zealand European, i.e. the descendants of European settlers. Statistics New Zealand doesn’t use the term Pākehā in the census because when bracketing it with “New Zealand European” was trialled in 1996, there was “significant adverse reaction from some respondents” (Statistics New Zealand, 2009, p.14). Use of the term Pākehā indicates a political perspective “sympathetic to Maori calls for justice” (Spoonley, 1991, p.159) and opposition to the term amongst some New Zealand Europeans is correlated with opposition to bicultural politics (Spoonley, 1991, p.161).
New Zealand’s specific version of such cultural identity movements was a continuation of the Māori Renaissance, and increasing calls for “redress for colonial injustice and for political and economic self-determination” (Bell, 2014, p.148). Such calls had begun in the late 1960s, and in those early days had class as well as ethnic dimensions (Hill, 2010, pp.297-303), with Māori and Pasifika peoples jointly protesting their socioeconomic marginalisation (Hill, 2010, p.296). Pasifika protestors were recent migrants, drawn to New Zealand by the demand for labour (Fleras & Spoonley, 1999, p.194; Hill, 2010, pp.294-296). The Treaty of Waitangi had not been treated as having legal status by the state for about a century by this time, and was also not always mobilised as a tool by Māori protestors, who “contemptuously dismissed” it as “a fraud and symbol of the perfidy of the Pakeha” (Attwood, 2013, p.52). In the 1970s alliances between various ethnic groups endorsed multiculturalism, which began gaining political traction. However, this led to Māori rights under the Treaty being further “downplayed within Crown policy” (Hill, 2010, p.301), and Māori increasingly expressed the view that, because it positioned them as just one of many minorities, multiculturalism enabled the government to avoid acknowledging Māori status as Tangata Whenua (people of the land) and to likewise avoid addressing the history of colonial injustice (Hill, 2010, p.301; Bozić-Vrbancić, 2003, p.310). In the 1980s, therefore, the Treaty of Waitangi was, as Henare (2004) puts it, “rehabilitated as the ‘founding document’” (p.56) of a bicultural New Zealand state.

The manifestation of this biculturalism that is most relevant in the case of the New Zealand Army is the “official recognition of Maori language, culture, and modes of social organisation, and their incorporation into government protocols, discourses, administration and policy considerations” (Barber, 2008, p.141). This began with the election of the Labour Government of 1984 (Sissons, 1993, p.100) and involved making state institutions more culturally sensitive (Fleras & Spoonley, 1999, p.239) and “more responsive to Māori needs” (O’Reilly & Wood, 1991, p.330), in their roles as both service providers and places of employment. Concretely, this meant that government departments, beginning with the Department of Social Welfare (Smits, 2014, p.47) were given Māori names and began using Māori language and protocol for official and ceremonial occasions, which also now often
took place on marae\textsuperscript{11} (Fleras & Spoonley, 1999, p.237; Sissons, 1993, p.107). Such departments also employed Māori in advisory or liaison roles, and some institutions began establishing their own marae (Sissons, 1993, pp.109-110).

It should be noted that this form of biculturalism has been seen by some Māori as “merely window-dressing” (Smits, 2014, p.48) and “tokenist distractions” (Smits, 2014, p.45), rather than real structural change (Fleras & Spoonley, 1999, p.237): “Maori cultural identity is asserted in the context of western political and bureaucratic institutions, rather than as a basis for self-determination through independent political structures” (Smits, 2014, p.48). Māori are still socio-economically marginalised (Bell, 2008, p.851) and Webster (1998) shows that this marginalisation actually worsened during the Renaissance (pp.12-13 & 25). Within academia, criticism of biculturalism tends to come from political economy perspectives (Barber, 2008, p.148). McCormack (2011), for example, argues that cultural traditions as a right become detached “from the resources necessary to realize such rights” (p.294). That is, the focus on ethnicity has left behind issues of class.

Although biculturalism won out over multiculturalism in New Zealand, biculturalism is in fact seen to encompass more than the two ethnic groups of Māori and Pākehā. According to Bozić-Vrbancić (2003), “official government policy defines biculturalism as a celebration of cultural diversity, a celebration that includes not just “Two” (that are celebrating and that are being celebrated), but “Many”: “We are One nation, two peoples and many cultures” (p.295). This can best be seen in Te Papa Tongarewa, the Museum of New Zealand. The “two peoples” presented in exhibits are Tangata Whenua, that is, Māori, and Tangata Tiriti, “those who belong to the land by right of the Treaty” (Bozić-Vrbancić, 2003, p.297), Pākehā and all the rest of the “many cultures” (Bozić-Vrbancić, 2003, p.299). That is, one half of New Zealand’s bicultural composition is also multicultural. Simon-Kumar (2014) notes that “the main population groups in New Zealand include Pakeha /Western European New Zealander, Māori/indigenous peoples, Pacific Island communities, and what are considered ‘other’ ethnic groups” (p.137). Further, “The Office of Ethnic Affairs […] defines an ethnic person as anyone who is not Anglo-Celtic, Māori or a Pacific Islander” (Simon-Kumar, 2014, p.137). The fact that Māori, Pacific Islander and Pākehā groups are not conceptualised as

\textsuperscript{11}“Traditional social and ritual centres,” (Sissons, 1993, p.102); “ceremonial spaces with a meeting-house” (Sissons, 1995, p.66).
“other” or “ethnic” indicates that they are all seen as the “norm” in New Zealand. Pasifika peoples are thus seen to be definitive of the nation along with the other two groups, although they are a smaller presence demographically than Asians. This matches the nation’s self-identification with the Pacific region (a realignment from the British Commonwealth that was somewhat forced upon New Zealand by Britain’s own realignment with Europe (Attwood, 2013, p.50; Fleras & Spoonley, 1999, p.150)).

The New Zealand Army states that it is jointly composed of “Tikanga\(^{12}\) Maori on the one hand and British and European custom on the other” (NZPA, 2009). During a one night marae visit on Basic, we were told that the Army could be conceptualised in the shape of a “Y”, with the two strands of Māori and Pākehā tradition feeding into one: “You’ve had the British tradition for the past 14 weeks, and now is the Māori part”. Māori soldiers are prominent in New Zealand Army history, particularly the 28\(^{th}\) (Māori) Battalion (see Soutar, 2008), New Zealand’s most decorated Battalion in World War Two. Māori leaders organised Māori units at the outbreak of both World Wars, despite government reluctance to involve them (Belich, 2001, p.211), in an attempt to win respect and “prove that Maori had earned the right to equal citizenship status” (King, 2003, p.332). During World War Two Māori had such a consistently high level of volunteers that conscription never needed to be applied to them (Belich, 2001, p.475). The 28\(^{th}\) gained the respect of the rest of the New Zealand Forces, their allies, and their enemies (King, 2003, p.400) and “became something very close to the elite unit of the Second New Zealand Division” (Belich, 2001, p.476). The iwi that made the biggest contributions to both World Wars were those, like Ngāti Porou, that had previously fought with the British in the New Zealand Wars (Belich, 2001, pp.212 & 476; King, 2003, p.332), and I was told anecdotally that Ngāti Porou still accounts for large numbers in recruitment.

The Way of the New Zealand Warrior (2010), issued to each recruit, introduces the Army’s dual martial composition. This booklet contrasts “British style versus Māori style” as seen in the New Zealand Wars: “the Māori were formidable opponents with a great ability to adapt tactically and create innovations on the battlefield to win the immediate fight,” whereas the disciplined British “were not initially as tacitly innovative, but nonetheless had a stronger

\(^{12}\) “Correct procedure, custom” (Moorfield, 2011, p.208).
sense of the overall strategic goals” (p.9). The booklet concludes: “The modern New Zealand solider is a mixture of cultures and backgrounds. The two great warrior cultures of the Māori and the British dominate the mix and have created a truly unique soldier.” New Zealand soldiers have “refined” the “rigidly disciplined approach” of the British “into something new” whilst also maintaining “aspects of the aggressive and adaptable” Māori warrior (The Way of the New Zealand Warrior, 2010, p.9).

The New Zealand Army doesn’t just have a Māori name, like other government branches, but is, in fact, a tribe: Ngāti Tūmatauenga, Tribe of the God of War. According to Army News, “Ngati (tribal) status” was “conferred to the New Zealand Army by Maori at Easter 1994” (the identity of those who did the actual conferring is not specified), and “Ngati Tumatauenga was officially recognized as a tribal entity within New Zealand at the opening of the New Zealand Army National Marae in October 1995” (“New Chapter as National Army Marae Renews Life Force,” 2009, p.9). The National Army Marae, Rongomararoa O Nga E Wha, is in Waiouru. All important ceremonies take place here, and it is:

“... the place where the individual officer or soldier of New Zealand, irrelevant of race, creed, gender or religion can justifiably stand and state that they are members of ” NGATI TUMATAUENGA “... An unprecedented fusion of the Maori and European Warrior Cultures towards something ancient and timeless” (Williams, 2014, p.8).

Thus one of the very first things to happen at Basic Training is that recruits are welcomed onto the Marae.

Again from Army News:

Traditionally Maori name a whare13 after an ancestor and thereafter all the stories within that whare tie back to that ancestor. Soldiers of the New Zealand Army do not trace their lineage to one ancestor, therefore, the name “Te Whare Te Taua o Tumatauenga” (The House of War pertaining to the God of War Tumatauenga) was found to be more appropriate to encapsulate the diversity and full representation of the New Zealand Army (‘New Chapter as National Army Marae Renews Life Force,’ 2009, p.9).

13 “House” (Moorfield, 2011, p.258), in this context referring to the Marae’s meetinghouse.
The Army also has a Māori cultural advisor, and in 1999 altered its badge to replace two crossed swords with a sword crossed with a taiaha14 (Bruce, 2012). It regularly holds training in taiaha and in karanga15, “enabling the mana16 of Ngati Tumatauenga to be maintained during ceremonial and cultural situations” (Williams, 2013, p.30). All Army units also have their own haka17. As haka are used as symbols of New Zealand on the international stage, and are particularly important on deployment, in practice acting as a member of Ngāti Tūmatauenga most often involves the performance of various haka.

Every now and then I heard some criticism of the official and formalised aspects of Ngāti Tūmatauenga. Recruit Raukawa, for example, told me, “The Māori it’s so cabbage here! ‘Cause I come from a place where it’s really rich. I was telling my dad, we went to the Marae and they spoke English!” However, as with 3CI, recruits more often encounter informal, every day aspects of Māori culture than formalised ones. In the Army the term “black” is used to collectively refer to soldiers of both Māori and Pacific Islander descent. It is used by both themselves (“I was the only black guy in the room”; “there are enough black arses for you to learn the haka off”) and by Pākehā and other ethnicities (“those black guys are out having a feed with the corporals”). Sections that are largely composed of Māori and Pasifika soldiers are said to be “black”: “I was happy to see my section was black.” In some ways it was Māori and Pacific Islander culture and dispositions that were most valued in the corridors. “Black” music dominated when music was allowed, and Pākehā who hadn’t already had exposure to it in their hometowns or high schools had to pick up black slang. “Don’t make a big deal,” a Corp Trainee said quietly, “but I don’t actually know what ‘skux’ means.”18. A white soldier in one black section was asked, “how come your cap is flat? You’re turning black with your section,” and some (Māori and Pākehā) NCOs had a discussion about another such soldier: “He’s turning into a black cunt19, eh?”; “He’s got that Tongan haircut …” It is this experience of encountering and embracing ethnic diversity that

14 “A long weapon of hard wood with one end carved” (Moorfield, 2011, p.184).
15 “A ceremonial call of welcome to visitors onto a marae, or equivalent venue” (Moorfield, 2011, p.61).
16 “Prestige”, “influence, status” (Moorfield, 2011, p.94).
17 “Vigorous dances with actions and rhythmically shouted words” (Moorfield, 2011, p.21).
18 Someone who is well presented with stylish clothing and hair and who thus will be attractive to girls, often used when the boys had obviously made an effort in their appearance.
19 Although “cunt” almost always has negative connotations amongst civilians, in the Army it is largely a neutral term, basically meaning person. It is the adjectives placed alongside “cunt” that determine the tone with which it is used. Sometimes it is placed with negative terms (such as “jackcunt”, see next chapter), but if you were to praise someone, you would most likely call him a “good cunt,” or GC for short.
is often cited as the genesis of the rapport-building disposition, the subject of the following section.

The Rapport-Building Disposition: The shared internalisation of diversity

That New Zealand soldiers are good at building rapport with anybody from anywhere has been a national tenet of faith for many decades, and has therefore only just begun to be scrutinised. The reason for this scrutiny is the increasing focus on counterinsurgency (COIN) in Western militaries since 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (Jones and Smith, 2010, p.84). Before then, in the United States Military at least, counterinsurgency had been “treated [...] disdainfully as a secondary activity” (Jones and Smith, 2010, p.81).

Counterinsurgency involves focusing not only on insurgents themselves, but also on the local civilian populations in conflict zones, in order to gain their support and likewise deny it to insurgents (Sewall, 2007, pp.xxiv-xxv). The civilian population is seen as “the deciding factor in the struggle” (Sewall, 2007, p.xxv) and moves are made to position oneself as the side with which the population prefer to engage. Part of this effort involves paying attention to the population’s culture, with Field Manual No 3-24 (FM 3-24), the first manual focused on counterinsurgency published by the American Army in more than 20 years (2007, p.xlv), stating that “cultural knowledge is essential to waging a successful counterinsurgency. American ideas of what is “normal” or ‘rational” are not universal” (2007, p.27). This cultural turn has been seen as a “revolution” (Jones and Smith, 2010, p.81) in the United States, but is not as “paradigm shattering” (Sewell cited in Mirzoeff, 2009, p.1738) for New Zealand, given the historical belief in the rapport-building disposition. It has, however, meant that this taken for granted national discourse has been explicitly discussed, examined, and questioned in a way it hadn’t been before. A conversion from practical to symbolic mastery is underway. At the beginning of my research, I was one of those who found the idea that New Zealand soldiers were “naturally” good at local interactions to be problematic, but, as with everything, have realised that this was because I was viewing it through a scholastic rather than practical habitus. So while this section will cover recent critiques of this national discourse of rapport building, it will also look at the effects of applying such codified critiques to a field made up of practical people.

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20 Hence the unethical use of social scientists in Human Terrain Systems in the United States from 2007-2014; the NZDF, however, has never had such a programme.
It is first necessary to explain why I am referring to this as the “rapport-building disposition,” rather than using the traditional terminology, which is “winning the hearts and minds” of the local population, or just “hearts and minds”. This term came from Britain, and was coined in the Malayan Emergency in the late 1950s, General Templar stating that “the answer lies not in pouring more soldiers into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the Malayan people” (Miller, 2012, np). Although I used it during my fieldwork and in early reports, I have decided that the term “hearts and minds” is best avoided. As an officer pointed out to me, we tend to use it indiscriminately without ever clarifying what we mean by it. It is both too vague and too historically loaded (Heuser (2007) calls it “classic purple language” (p.168) and Miller (2012) “a political marketing slogan inflated by the press” (np)). More recently academics have called the ability to engage with diverse peoples “cross-cultural competence” (Hajjar, 2010; Langer & Pietsch, 2013) or “intercultural competence” (Tomforde, 2010, p. 527). However, I also find these misleading in New Zealand’s case: although this ability is seen to be relevant to the wider military cultural turn, and is now sometimes spoken of in terms of “culture” by officers, it has not always been and still today is not always conceptualised through this framework. Terms like cross-cultural competence draw attention above all to identifying and addressing people primarily in terms of their specific culture, whereas in New Zealand discussion surrounding this disposition appears to focus on getting along with people regardless of who they are, rather than on specifically addressing their cultural particularity.

In our own part of the world, the ability to get on with locals is sometimes referred to as the “Pacific Advantage” (Reitzig, 2010). For example, when New Zealand brokered peace talks in Bougainville, one resident stated that, because of the Māori, New Zealanders understood “our Melanesian ways”. New Zealand-led discussions fared better than Australian ones because they began with a pōwhiri21, and those involved felt that the practice of hongi22 broke the ice between the warring parties (Reitzig, 2010). Māori ceremonial protocol is of use not only in the Pacific, however. What the haka in particular enables, and what Australia, for example, does not have, is the ability to respond in kind to any “cultural” performance. Army News, for example, reports that during an exercise in Malaysia, New

21 “Welcome ceremony” (Moorfield, 2011, p.156).
22 “To press noses in greeting” (Moorfield, 2011, p.36).
Zealand riflemen responded to local cultural performances with a haka and a taiaha demonstration: “the Malaysians were most impressed” (Seymour, 2014, p.11; see also Kelly, 2014, p.3).

Diversity is not just seen to enable specific practices, however, but to have created a disposition in which New Zealanders are able to get along with anyone from anywhere. A series of quotes on deployments or overseas exercises from Army News can illustrate this rapport-building disposition. Speaking of operations in Timor-Leste, a Major said:

We have a good mix of culture - Western, Maori, Polynesian and Asian. We don’t judge, and are just happy to meet people and see what’s going on, experience the culture, and share a bit of our own - people respond to that (Taylor-Doig, 2012, p.9).

Likewise about Bougainville:

This mission demonstrated some of New Zealand’s unique national characteristics in the way we operate. We are a multicultural society that not only respects the diversity of our own society and national make up, but also those of other nations [...] As a Defence Force we provide a combination of leadership, niche capabilities, and multicultural awareness that provides our people with a greater understanding, appreciation and sensitivity to the history, culture, values, experiences and lifestyles of the different countries we work in (Dransfield, 2014, p.8).

Of Afghanistan:

Key leaders in Bamyan speak very highly of the Kiwis and the strong relationship they have developed, says the Bamyan Governor Dr Habiba Sarabi. She says she has always admired the behaviour of Kiwis. “They respect the culture of Bamyan, they respect the people, especially the elders and the people in the villages. We have a friendship and brotherhood with them” [...] LTCOL Sholto Stephens, commanding Officer of CRIB 21, says the Defence Force’s people skills are its strength. “One of our advantages here has been the rapport we’ve built up in the last decade. We have a very good rapport with local leaders” [...] “Kiwis have the right people skills. We might not have the numbers but our people are our biggest capability - our respect for other cultures, and interaction with them,” adds Staff Sergeant Rogers (“Bamyan: Mission Accomplished”, 2013, p.8).
As members of the NZDF we pride ourselves on our ability to get on with most people. As Kiwis, this trait is innate and has helped us [...] to go about our business in far flung places and combat zones [...] These young men and women from New Zealand were doing exactly what our forebears did – they got on with the people they were working alongside. This is why New Zealanders are liked the world over – creating enduring relationships with people from different cultures (Kelly, 2014, p.3).

As indicated in these passages, this is not always seen to have been socialised in the Army itself, but rather is often thought to be a pre-existing disposition of New Zealanders. The Penguin History of New Zealand, for example, states:

Most New Zealanders, whatever their cultural backgrounds, are good-hearted, practical, commonsensical and tolerant. These qualities are part of the national cultural capital that has in the past saved the country from the worst excesses of chauvinism and racism seen in other parts of the world (King, 2003, p.518).

In my fieldwork, I also encountered a more specific idea that it is not just the national habitus, but particular ethnic dispositions (i.e. Māori and Pacific Islander ones) that lead to this empathetic ability. Bowler (2003), a British anthropologist who was embedded with a New Zealand peacekeeping contingent in Timor-Leste, reports that an NCO told him “those Maori boys are good at just sitting down and chewing the fat” (chapter III, p.20). Here particular ethnic dispositions are seen to not just enable you to get on with people from a similar culture to your own, but with anyone. Hokowhitu (2003, p.187; 2004, p.212; 2008, pp.89-90) warns about where discourses such as “Māori are naturally good at war” can lead if accepted too uncritically. He argues that the conception of Māori men as naturally physical, as discussed in Chapter Two, can also lead to narratives of them as naturally aggressive and savage. Although this should be borne in mind, I do not think that this is what is currently going on in the Army. Māori are seen to be good soldiers not merely for physical reasons, but also because of other dispositions, such as “chewing the fat” above. Although Way of the New Zealand Warrior’s (2010) assertion that Maori warriors were good on the battlefield whereas the British Army was better at long term strategy is reminiscent
of the discourse in sports in which “Pākehā train and work hard while Māori show up and do well on the day”, this on the spot ability is characterised as mental rather than physical: the “ability to adapt tactically and create innovations” (p.9).

However, when interviewing Māori ex-NZDF personnel who worked in Private Security Companies, Bargh (2015) found that some of her interviewees “did not find their Māori identity particularly relevant while working” (p.125). They focused on professional competence rather than other modes of identity. One, for example, said “in this industry, race/nationality didn’t really matter, skills mattered more” (p.59): “being Māori was irrelevant. What was important was how professional you were. It didn’t matter what race you were. If you were professional at doing your job over there you generally earned respect from the other guys” (p.58).

The belief that recruits arrive at Basic Training with a pre-existing rapport-building disposition is not the only theory about the origins of this disposition. A second discourse focuses on processes that occur within the NZDF itself: because the Army itself is multicultural, New Zealand soldiers pick up interaction skills in the course of their training and careers. In May 2010 an Army blog posited that the New Zealand Army’s easy rapport with locals “is because we already have an understanding of other cultures. Non-Māori have the Ngāti Tūmatauenga concept introduced to them and Māori have been indoctrinated into a military environment which stems from British imperial background.” The logical outcome of both these notions however is similar. If rapport-building is a pre-existing disposition, training in this area is not necessary. With the second theory meanwhile it is not that nothing needs to be done, but that something is already being done- that as a by-product of other features of the training process, New Zealand soldiers internalise the rapport-building disposition.

Recently, however, this disposition has more explicitly become a focus of both New Zealand military and academic attention (see, for example, Stevens, 2013; Weiss, 2012). Rapport-

23 I myself am Pākehā, and was born and raised in Christchurch, a city with a fairly “white” population demographically, which is anecdotally deemed to be fairly racist. Therefore I was one of those who had aspects of Māori culture introduced to them in the Army.
building is no longer necessarily seen as something that doesn’t need to be addressed. An internal Army report on “developing cross-cultural relationships through military anthropology” (Terrill 2014), for example, states that the Commander Joint Forces New Zealand (i.e. the commander of deployed personnel) “has recognised the need to grow the cultural capability of the NZDF” (p.15). Terrill (2014) writes that “the general perception, within the NZDF, that personnel possess intrinsic cultural empathy is dangerously shortsighted” (p.14):

It appears there is a school of thought within the NZDF that its personnel can establish cross-cultural relations in an informal, somewhat ad hoc manner, by virtue of their intrinsic psycho-social dispositions [...] To simplify cultural empathy and confuse it with the generalised expression of ‘friendliness’ overlooks the underlying tenets of inter-cultural awareness; for some, it may even suggest a degree of cultural ethnocentrism (Terrill, 2014, p.12).

Terrill cites examples of soldiers who felt their cultural awareness was lacking and requested further training (Lauren cited in Terrill, 2014 p.10) as well as some “erroneous cultural assumptions” made in Afghanistan (Parkinson cited in Terrill, 2014, p.10). Emphasising reflexivity, Terrill (2014) writes that to develop good intercultural relationships, soldiers must understand “the influence of their own [...] culturally determined frames of reference” (p.27) and acknowledge “that deployed NZDF personnel live alongside and operate within foreign cultures with western eyes; western biases and with the values and principles of a bicultural yet ostensibly western mindset” (p.14).

I originally was one of the people questioning this “innate” rapport-building disposition. In the conformation report I completed six months into this PhD, before I began fieldwork or knew anything very much about the Army, I wrote, following a discussion of rapport-building in the Pacific:

Cultural and regional proximity, however, does not explain why Kiwis can relate well to locals in Bamiyan, Afghanistan. This discourse of cultural prowess, unexamined as it is, at times comes perilously close to an assumption that those who (unlike unmarked Westerners) have culture can, through the virtue of this “possession”, understand other
peoples who also have culture—despite the fact that the cultures in question may be completely different.

Here I was coming from the scholastic disposition and as such was focused on cultural content. I didn’t see how a Pacific culture could relate to a different Middle Eastern culture. I was thinking on the level of symbolic rather than practical mastery: even though I put it in quotation marks and apparently thought the conceptualisation was coming from someone other than myself, I was discussing culture in a codified, reified sense as a possession, rather than as practices that are enacted. The lack of attention to cultural content was confusing me, whereas the reason for this was of course that soldiers were practically focused on the process of interaction instead. I was thinking that you act differently in response to different cultural values, whereas the Army discourse suggests you act the same wherever you are: open, friendly, engaged. The focus is not on difference. Although situations may of course differ, all soldiers are expected to adapt and “just get in there and do it” anyhow. My point is not that those questioning the rapport-building disposition don’t have good points, but that it is important to also look at what this conversion to symbolic mastery has done—what effect it has had.

Many of those who have begun explicitly discussing the rapport-building disposition don’t question that it actually exists, but rather feel that it “needs to be better understood” (Terrill, 2014, p.9) and that the NZDF should be more proactive about maintaining it. The idea is that there is an “initial cultural foundation” (Terrill, 2014, p.13), but this needs to be built on to “ensure these standards are passed forward to future generations” (Terrill, 2014, p.11). Because the rapport-building disposition is thought to be related to the Army’s own diversity, this includes maintaining, or increasing, said diversity. At the People Capability Summit, Professor Paul Spoonley gave a presentation stating that the fastest growing ethnic groups in New Zealand were Asian, and for the rest of the day conversations centred on the “problem” of how to attract more Asian recruits. The NZDF seems to be trying to build cultural skills up from its pre-existing diverse base, running an advertisement in *Army News* that introduces “a survey to determine the potential language and cultural skill set that exists within the Defence Force. The results will help us to know where our current strengths lie, and where we need to further develop our skills” (Bateman, 2013, p.23). Thus
skills seen to be innate are here being codified, collected together for analysis. Some, however, are against such codification. A Sar Major told me that he didn’t believe rapport-building should be put in regulations, turned into another chore: “That’s ridiculous, they’re people, go and mingle, show them respect.”

The codification of rapport building, as either a set of standard procedures or an innate trait, is, I suggest, too divorced from practice and work for soldiers. Webster (1998) shows that over-valuing cultural artefacts and practices, and thereby placing them on a pedestal above everyday concerns, obscures the fact that it was everyday work that produced them. His primary example is a marae (Webster, 1998, pp.190-216), conceptualised as detached artwork rather than as a place of work that took skilled labour to produce, but this same idea works with something much different, an identity. By continually valorising an “innate” and “natural” predisposition towards creating rapport with locals, we get a bit too close to obscuring the everyday labour that goes into local interactions. You have to work at it, an NCO told me, and it takes ages. At one point in my fieldwork the questions around the rapport-building disposition were raised with the soldiers themselves (covered in Chapter Nine, Deployment). It was presented to them as something they should already be (a New Zealand identity), rather than as something they could do, or a new disposition they could internalise, a conceptualisation they rejected. Soldiers do not want to already be, but to work and become. The soldiers also saw prowess at interacting with locals as something that was situated, “principles which manifest themselves only in their practical state” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990, p.47), not an ongoing character trait that could be divorced from context.

Bowler (2003), the anthropologist who was embedded with New Zealand peacekeepers in Timor-Leste, once asked an NZDF corporal what made a good soldier and the response was “getting on with the job and not bleating about what you need to do the job!” (Chapter III, p.12). During Bowler’s fieldwork, the “UN had developed a system of statistics that counted the number of, what can best be termed “good will acts” that various military contingents had conducted within a given period of time.” However, “The New Zealanders’ figure were not good, and they were placed low on the league table” (Bowler, 2003, Chapter IV, p.19). A Warrant Officer told Bowler that counting goodwill acts:
Was a dangerous way to think of the job. He raised the point that New Zealanders were not guilty of a shortfall of “goodwill acts,” but of not maintaining records of these acts. He felt that this statistical or systematic approach to rapport might actually get in the way of establishing a relationship. His example was- When some soldier gives a local kid a lolly, I’d like to think he did it because he wanted to give the kid a lolly, not because he was trying to fill a quota (Bowler, 2003, Chapter IV, p.19).

Through discussion, the rapport-building disposition had been taken too far out of practical mastery into symbolic codification to suit soldiers’ primary habitus.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have explored the New Zealand Army’s own theories of soldier identity and its acquisition. The Army is a self-reflexive organisation that pays close attention to the identity of its soldiers, and understands identity very practically as a useful capability that helps it perform its role as an institution. Their reflexivity is therefore directed at both tailoring the habitus of its soldiers (which may involve some identity change) and at mobilising aspects of their pre-existing dispositions. In a field of international politics in which ethnicity is seen to be the fundamental aspect of people’s identity, the Army sees the diversity of its soldiers as creating a productive national rapport-building disposition.

Of anthropology’s traditional axes of identity, ethnicity and nationality are the ones that come closest to making sense of my informants’ experience in the Army. On their own, however, they cannot give the full picture. Even to understand soldiers’ responses to the Army’s official vision of soldier identity (in terms of both ethnicity/rapport-building and 3CI) the practical habitus needed to be invoked. Although the Army therefore emphasises ethnicity and nationality in their discussions of identity while I emphasise the practical habitus, we don’t really have too different a view of soldierhood: it is just that the Army hasn’t made the practical habitus explicit. Military staff wouldn’t make a point of arguing that the practical habitus is more important in generating soldiers’ actions than ethnicity, because these actions feel natural and obvious to them. The Army has codified 3CI and rapport-building, however, and while this matches the Army’s practicality in that its purpose is to facilitate training, it does not always match the practicality of its soldiers.
As seen in the Army Leadership Framework, the Army extends its privileging of reflexivity to the requirement that recruits too be self-reflexive. This, in a broad sense, makes the field of the Army a good match with recruits’ primary practical habitus, given that this habitus predisposes them to such reflection, in terms of always challenging, testing and measuring themselves. In terms of the details however, soldiers are predisposed to measure self-improvement in terms of their actions, their ability to complete new tasks, and very concrete factors such as changes in their physical body, whereas the symbolic mastery undertaken by the Army casts identity in terms of internal “values” instead. It will be seen in the following chapters, therefore, that while soldiers eagerly embraced 3CI because it was seen as achieving something (their transformation into soldiers) they responded more eagerly still, and more durably, to more informal, active expressions of these values. In terms of local interaction, soldiers resisted symbolic mastery by continuing to see creating rapport as an activity rather than an innate cultural trait when superiors presented it to them in that way. The codification of practices is not a good match with recruits’ primary habitus, and as such is not perceived as making sense; only one of several factors that sometimes led my informants to feel disjuncture in the Army field. However, this occurs later on in their careers, and the next chapter, Basic Training, shows how this habitus may be fulfilled by the process of becoming a soldier.

This chapter wraps up Part One of this thesis, which has examined the differing modes of identity with which various parties have made sense of soldierhood. While I found gender to be unhelpful, the role of ethnicity and nationality is important to understand— but not as important as soldiers’ identification with practice. It is productive action and work, and readiness and competence, that come up again and again if we pay attention to what soldiers themselves are saying. Part Two will present the civilian-soldier transition ethnographically, as it occurred from the point of view of my informants, and the above is why I use the relationship between the primary practical and secondary soldier habitus to make sense of this experience.
Part Two
Introduction to Part Two

The following four ethnographic chapters tell the story of one cohort’s experience of becoming soldiers, more specifically riflemen, in the New Zealand Army. Each chapter focuses on one stage of this process: Basic Training, Corps Training, Battalion, and Deployment. This story begins with passionate recruits who can’t believe their luck in having been accepted for Basic Training. In a sharp turn around, it then ends with bored, disappointed soldiers, critical of the Army. I make sense of this through a focus on the relationship between two identities: the soldier habitus that is embodied over the time period covered, and the primary practical habitus that the recruits already had on arrival at Basic Training.

For those who have skipped Part One, the word “habitus” roughly translates to “identity”, and is designed to define someone’s identity through the ways in which they act, rather than through what they think or believe. A “habitus” is made up of “dispositions”, which are our habitual tendencies and behavioural patterns, the ways in which we are predisposed to subconsciously act and react.

The practical habitus is the specific identity of people who conceptualise themselves as “doers” rather than “thinkers”, who value physical, productive activity and challenge. What recruits with this habitus were looking for in joining the Army was worthwhile things to do, and in particular, challenging activities that would push them beyond their previous capabilities. The most attractive activity that the Army provided for them was the initial opportunity to transform themselves into soldiers. Thus the first two career stages covered, Basic and Corps Training, were valued by new soldiers. Of these two, Corps Training was the most highly valued, as it was the most demanding, both physically and in terms of having to internalise new dispositions. However, the more successfully soldiers were socialised, and the more capable they became at acting appropriately within the Army, the less there was to learn or be challenged by. Thus life in the Battalions once initial training was complete-
and even on the particular deployment that some of the cohort found themselves on—was viewed as less worthwhile.

In terms of the theory introduced in Part One, for those who didn’t skip it and are interested, the cohort found themselves in varying degrees of disjuncture in all four of the fields through which they moved: “the environment they actually encounter[ed was …] different from the one to which they are objectively adjusted” (Bourdieu, 1990a, p.62). Sometimes they valued being in a state of disjuncture and sometimes they didn’t. This was dependant on which set of dispositions it was that was not adjusted to the field. Disjuncture was a problem only if it was the underlying primary practical habitus itself that did not match, as in the fields of Battalion and Deployment. If other, ancillary, dispositions were in disjuncture and therefore in need of aligning to a new field, as in at Basic and Corps Training, disjuncture was welcomed, because it provided an opportunity for the transformation desired by the practical habitus. In the former two fields, however, having taken on the soldier habitus, there were no more ancillary dispositions for the soldiers to modify, and the primary practical habitus itself being in disjuncture led them to not always see the Army as field that made sense.

These chapters also, however, highlight the soldiers’ own theory of identity and identity acquisition. Because their identity is that they are people who are always working on their capabilities and selves, for them identity is identity acquisition. The ethnography will show that soldiers believe that acquiring identity should be a demanding process, achieved in hardship. That is, it occurs primarily through action, not through abstract contemplation. However, not everything that was demanding was accepted as part of the process of identity acquisition. There is an old adage that military training involves breaking down civilians and rebuilding them into soldiers. The trainees in this study, however, were specifically looking to be built up, and reacted negatively to being “broken down”- that is, to anything that they saw as demeaning.

All four of the following chapters are structured around three aspects of the civilian-soldier transition that must be examined in order to understand it. The first two of these, content and process, relate to the first of this thesis’ core identities, the soldier habitus. “Content” refers to what the recruits became: what were the soldier dispositions that were to be
embodied and acted upon? “Process” refers to how these dispositions were embodied. Because the goal is for soldier traits to become transposable predispositions, they were taught everywhere and in all contexts. They were taught in the barracks and mess through the basic routines of everyday life, and in lecture rooms and ranges and field exercises along with practical skills. This process of becoming was just as important to the trainees- if not more important- than the content. So far, in Part One, I have covered experience-distant concepts, and in order to discuss the process of becoming a soldier ethnographically, I will here introduce two further, experience-near, concepts. These are intersubjectivity and interobjectivity. Intersubjectivity draws attention to how the subjectivities of individuals are mutually constitutive. People internalise their habitus in and through their relationships with others. Related to this is the concept of interobjectivity, which likewise draws attention to how people and objects are mutually constitutive. I deal largely with one side of this relationship: how people construct their identities not just through their relationships with other humans but also through their relationships with various objects. These concepts work alongside those of Bourdieu: recruits internalised the Army field in relation to one another and to the objects around them. For example, each individual had to present themselves and their kit in a manner that was identical to everyone else. Given that relationships are key to soldier socialisation, it is important to note that riflemen view their relationships (with one another, with the Army as an organisation, and with local populations on deployment) in the same way that they view everything else: through a practical lens.

The third aspect that needs to be taken into account to understand the civilian-soldier transition is how soldier dispositions and the process of internalising them interacted with the pre-existing habitus with which the recruits arrived. This refers to both the core relationship of this thesis, the primary practical habitus and the secondary soldier habitus, but also to the various pre-existing ethnic dispositions that the Army itself is focused on. These three aspects- content, process, and the relationship between the soldier habitus and pre-existing habitus- are of course only distinguished from one another in order to allow clarity of argument. In practice, they are inseparable. For example, the dispositions to be embodied are themselves processes, which then enable the embodiment of further soldier dispositions.
Part One introduced several ways in which soldierhood has been characterised that I countered in terms of theory and academic literature. On the ethnographic level, different aspects of my research participants’ experience of soldierhood speak to each of these discourses, meaning that specific chapters in Part Two relate particularly closely to specific chapters from Part One. Thus in Chapter Two I argued against the discourse in which it is thought that the soldier identity replaces pre-existing civilian identities, and Chapter Eight (Battalion) in particular shows soldiers still acting on their primary habitus. Closely related to this, Chapter Four argues against the “automata” discourse of soldierhood as a loss of individual identity, and Chapter Seven (Corps Training) in particular demonstrates how uniformity can be enrolled in individual identity projects. In Chapter Five I introduced the debate over whether soldier dispositions differed from peacekeeping dispositions, and whether that means soldiers devalue peacekeeping, and obviously the chapter on Deployment (Nine) can most directly speak to this (they may indeed differ, but this is actually a reason to value peacekeeping).

Likewise, I argued throughout Part One that the practical habitus underpins soldiers’ identities and can therefore more effectively make sense of their experiences than the modes of identity that are more usually drawn on in anthropology. In Chapter Five I presented the viewpoint that New Zealand soldiers’ actions on deployment are caused by ethnic and national dispositions, and Chapter Nine shows that these actions are generated more by the practical habitus and the soldier habitus itself. In Chapter Four I refuted the argument that soldiers’ primary motivation is the performance of masculinity, and the argument that this performance is achieved through the “banishment” of anything “feminine” or “gay”. The practice of “playing gay chicken”, which was consistent throughout much of the soldiers’ careers and which therefore runs through Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine, is a more nuanced engagement with identity and gender. The presentation of soldiers’ own theories on the soldier habitus and its acquisition, together with the illustration that the practical habitus is behind more of their reactions than the traditional modes of gender and ethnicity, build to my overall argument that soldierhood is a distinct identity that can be and is drawn on in individual identity projects. It is this soldier habitus, and its relationship with the practical habitus, that best helps illuminate the transition from civilian to soldier (and back again) from the soldiers’ own point of view.
Chapter Six

Basic Training

All Arms Recruit Course

The Army Depot

Waiouru Military Camp

The first three minutes of Basic Training went exactly as everyone expected. As soon as the bus carrying the recruits from the lower North Island pulled onto the Army Depot (TAD)’s parade ground in Waiouru Military Camp, there were NCOs up on the bus steps yelling that we had three minutes to be off the bus, standing behind that white line with all our gear. Recruits threw luggage and ironing boards off the bus in a frenzy of desperate teamwork. From behind the white line, we were sorted into platoons. I was called by the Sergeant of Judson VC Platoon. And after that, things got kind of weird: there wasn’t any more yelling.

We were taken immediately to TAD’s lecture room/bar complex to undergo drug testing. Females were tested first, lined up together in front of a table of medics with our little cups of urine. After the two females from the lower North Island who had been assigned to Judson and I were declared drug-free, we were told to go through to the smoko area outside and wait. The three of us stood very properly and quietly by the wall in our good clothes. Judson’s Regimental Corporal came out to tell us that we were allowed to sit down. As the boys started passing their drug tests and filing into the smoko area he popped out several more times to tell the silent, formal recruits with increasing bemusement, “You can talk! You can smoke!”

Next we were marched down to the Supply Depot to be sized for clothing, learning to march on the go. The Platoon Sergeant and other staff were very supportive and encouraging. “We’ll get there!” they said repeatedly of our drill. “It’s only the first day, that’s actually pretty good, guys.” By dinner time we had been joined by the recruits from the upper North and South Islands, and the NCOs looked over at us from their own table in the mess to say,
“You can socialise! You can talk, if it gets too loud, we’ll tell you.” Over the next two days, we continued to learn drill. Recruits in the position of marker, who lead the Platoon and from whom everyone else in the formation takes position, were sometimes sent to the back for putting the Platoon out, but Sergeant told everyone, “Don’t take it hard if you are sent back, it just means you aren’t made to be a marker. The marker is normally the tallest guy anyway.” Later he double checked with one of the girls: “You didn’t mind that I sent you to the rear, did you?” He wasn’t exactly the type of terrifying Drill Sergeant you see screaming in everyone’s face in the movies. Likewise, the first time we were inspected on fatigues and found wanting, we were told that we would make mistakes at first, but not to take correction personally. Most reprimands, in fact, were followed by the words, “don’t take it personally.”

The recruits soon came up with a theory for this bizarre behaviour. We had arrived in Waiouru on a Monday, but Attestation, in which the recruits formally pledge themselves to the New Zealand Defence Force, was not until Wednesday night. On Wednesday morning rumours spread that the Army was just going easy on everyone for the first three days so that no one would quit before attesting. It became common wisdom that as soon as everyone attested, the Platoon staff would come down hard and hammer us. Some recruits tried to safeguard their belongings, anticipating an attack on them. The bus rides to and from the Army Museum next to Base, where attestation was held, were largely quiet bar hushed speculation about how it was on tonight. We got off the bus, marched back to barracks, and were told to dress down. Everyone raced through it, bordering on hysterical panic: “Get it done!” “It’s all on now!” “I just want to know what it’s going to be!” We were called to corridor and everyone giggled nervously and stumbled over their words as we numbered off, because here it came, whatever the Army had planned. In fact, we spent the evening performing skits, as if, perhaps, we were at school camp.

The All Arms Recruit Course, colloquially called Basic Training (pronounced bass-ick, not base-ick), is the first stage of training for all soldiers, regardless of occupational specialty. This chapter focuses on one Platoon’s experience of becoming soldiers through Basic Training. One company at a time goes through the AARC, so there were three other Platoons with them. Here I refer to the Platoon in which I was embedded as Judson VC Platoon, and to the Platoon with whom we shared a barracks block as Hardham VC Platoon.
Recruit platoons are named after New Zealand Victoria Cross recipients, and I have renamed them after VC recipients whose names TAD has not been currently using for this purpose. The infantry recruits in Judson who I ended up following through later stages of their careers include Recruits Ellis, Hunter, Mitchell, Moataane, Wereta and Wheeler. However, because TAD makes no distinction between recruits based on their corps, this chapter focuses on the whole Platoon and what they went through together, rather than the riflemen specifically. The conversations of individual recruits of all trades are used as examples of what the whole Platoon was thinking or debating. I do however make note when the riflemen as a group seem to have had divergent views from the rest of Judson. Further, because I wrote this chapter after the whole fieldwork process, during which I was exposed to a lot of infantry socialisation, it may perhaps present Basic from the point of view of riflemen dispositions.

The reason that Judson was so convinced that everything was going to kick into a higher gear on the night of attestation was that they wanted it to. This was the kind of thing that they had joined the Army for: to face challenge and be transformed through it. The primary practical habitus generated the expectation and desire for adversity, and confusion when confronted with seemingly pleasant staff. I chart not only the recruits’ progress through the programmes by which they embodied the soldier habitus, but also their evaluation of these programmes. This evaluation reveals their own theory of identity acquisition as a process that should be demanding and achieved through action and hardship. The fact that they did not see all hardship as productive, however, and reacted negatively to anything that they felt diminished their selves, can also be seen in their evaluation of Basic Training.

There were contradictions in Basic Training, both in terms of what the soldier dispositions to be embodied were, and in terms of the processes that were to be used to do so. The recruits were presented with several ways of acting which in certain situations became impossible to perform simultaneously. There was also confusion over the way in which the individual related to the group, which is significant because it is through this relationship that soldier dispositions are embodied. These contradictions were the result of two factors. The first was that some individual staff members in Judson promoted ideas that differed from the soldier dispositions that were to be internalised. The second factor was the newer aspects of Basic Training outlined in Chapter Five, self-leadership and the requirement to
allow recruits to have their say, which the one of TAD staff members referred to collectively and cheerfully as “tree-hugging bullshit”. Some of these contradicted older Army dispositions that staff were instinctively transmitting, and this seemed to be unrecognised. This was exacerbated when the new training procedures just happened to reinforce those staff ideas that also diverged from the dispositions. I didn’t realise that this was what was going on until much later, when some of these dispositions were presented much more consistently at Corps Training, and as such became clear to me for the first time. Before this they were muddled, and this confusion led Judson VC Platoon into a downward spiral that resulted in them being viewed by TAD as an unusually and eventually legendarily problematic Platoon that was not adequately learning or performing. This was due both to the fact that a fundamental soldier disposition (“get over it”) was being undermined, and a lack of clarity over whose fault poor performance was and who therefore needed to act to fix it.

The fact that the process of identity acquisition went so badly in Judson and extra measures were taken to course correct was disheartening for recruits. However, it does mean that more explicit attention than usual was drawn to what should have been happening. (This was a coincidence; I do not mean it as support for the rumour that I planted a recruit in the Platoon with instructions to be incompetent in order to make my thesis more interesting!)

In the first half of this chapter I discuss the dispositions that recruits needed to acquire in order to internalise the soldier habitus, how these were presented and taught, and how the recruits engaged with them initially. This largely covers the first half of the AARC. The second half of the chapter is focused on Judson’s downward spiral, and therefore covers the second half of Basic more chronologically.

Pre-existing Dispositions and Process: Why the recruits joined the Army

The recruits were very much on the same page as the Army in Basic Training in that the Army was very explicit about the course being primarily a personal transformation, whilst the recruits were very explicit about desiring this transformation. The reasons recruits gave for joining the Army when the topic came up focused on their selves and a desire for development, as can be seen in the focus on “change” that I highlighted in the Introduction. During organisational admin for the midcourse break, Ward said that he didn’t want to go
home halfway through Basic, as his parents’ reaction would be merely, “yeah, you’ve changed a bit.” He wanted to be fully transformed before he saw the people at home again. The recruits continually asked whether they had changed yet. I once saw 2 Section gathered around their Section Commander enthusiastically asking who had changed the most, for example. One of the recruits was away for two weeks on sick leave, and upon her return, Raukawa eagerly asked her for the outside opinion: “So, have we changed?”

The recruits mostly just talked about “change” in general, without giving much specific detail as to what sort of change they actually meant. If asked directly by an NCO why they had joined the Army they would cite things like wanting to learn discipline or gain confidence. This focus on general change shows that it wasn’t just the content of soldierhood- being a soldier- that was desired, but the process of becoming itself. In fact many recruits went into the Army only planning to be there for a few years. They wanted to achieve the significant transformation of military training, but not necessarily be a soldier long term. After a few years of service they expected to be set up in terms of finances and qualifications- and desirable workplace dispositions- which some were already planning to use to establish themselves in more permanent careers outside of the Army. Quite a few intended to join the police; it is widely believed that it is easier to get accepted if you are ex-Army. Hughes’s career aim, he was telling his section, was to be a firefighter, “I live for it.” He thought he would do three years in the Army, and by then he would have the necessary vehicle qualifications. Longmire responded, “Yeah, lots of people use the Army like that.” Grey chimed in: “They shouldn’t teach me to use computers, because that’s what I want it for, IT.” Wilson planned to stay in the army a few years, save hard, then buy some land and spend the rest of his life farming. “Fuck,” he said suddenly a while later, “I hope I can buy a farm.” That the motivation wasn’t just the experience of soldierhood itself was further indicated by ongoing confusion throughout my research coming from almost every soldier I encountered as to how I could possibly want to hang around the Army without being paid.

Others were however invested in the role of soldier for its own sake, in Judson, for example, Wheeler, Wereta, and Ellis, all of whom were riflemen. Wheeler once stated that he wanted to make Sar Major, and someone responded that that was a lot of training. “Yeah, that’s 15 to 20 years, that’s my life,” said Wheeler. This did not describe all riflemen, however. I later met some who were also only planning to stay in the Army for a few years, like Gibson, who
once announced to his NCO, “oh, to be honest, Corporal, my long-term plan is to leave the Army, it’s my financial starter.”

In the first week of Basic, which was taken up with lectures, the recruits were disappointed not only in the above lack of shouting, but also in the lack of physical activity. Lectures are in fact referred to throughout the whole Army as “death by PowerPoint”. The recruits so hated them that they were looking forward to running their first Required Fitness Level (RFL) assessment, despite this being a stressful milestone: “I can’t wait, I just want to be doing something.” Despite Judson being widely regarded by staff as well as recruits as the strictest Platoon in the Company, the recruits often spoke of how they felt certain staff members were too easy on them. “Our Sergeant and Corporal are way more lax than the other ones,” a recruit decided in the first week. This wasn’t a good thing: “Sergeant seems too soft”; “Sarge is a bit too relaxed.” So far, Basic Training wasn’t turning out to be challenging in the ways in which recruits had expected and hoped. The Platoon Commander was stricter and often in the first month would have us holding up an iron chair or prone bridge position for punishment. About Sir, recruits said “Sir is awesome,” “Sir’s cool, eh, he’s like the 3 Fs, firm, fair but friendly.”

**Soldier Dispositions and Process: Explicit values transmitted at the level of symbolic mastery**

The skits that we performed on the night of Attestation in lieu of being thrashed\(^\text{24}\) were on the Army’s 4 official values, 3CI: Courage, Comradeship, Commitment and Integrity. The Platoon had assumed that TAD’s priority on their formally signing their life away would be to test them, whereas TAD’s actual priority was to make sure the recruits understood the values that would shape the people they needed to become. In fact everybody was actually focused on the same thing: becoming. The staff was just focused on what the recruits should become, while the recruits were focused on how: they wanted to get to it, to be changed through hardship.

Before we performed the skits, we sat down in groups to discuss the concept of values. These were defined as beliefs that society has an emotional investment in, and that act as

\(^{24}\) In the Army, being punished is referred to as being “thrashed” or “beasted”.

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your moral compass. The section given integrity acted out a scene at a night club in which everybody was offered drugs, but only one recruit accepted: “These recruits acted with integrity and are about to reap the rewards. This recruit didn’t act with integrity and is about to get in the shit,” proclaimed the narrator as a random drug test played out the next day. For comradeship, the females re-enacted some of the events in which we had been in trouble over the last few days and showed us supporting each other through them (“don’t take it personally,” I act-consoled Cook, having heard this numerous times already but not yet really understanding what it meant). The courage section acted out Willie Apiata’s VC heroics, with a lot of carnage. Here Sir stood up to remind us that there were two types of courage, physical but also moral courage, standing up for what you believe in.

The next day the whole company went through soldier values and qualities again with the OC, who also outlined the stages of Basic that the recruits would go through. These matched the identity changes that were expected to occur, and were expressed by changes in the punishment structure: what would happen to you if you did something wrong. The stages of punishment recruits would go through as they progressed through the course were based on increasing expectations that you could meet requirements by yourself. Thus achieving self-leadership (also referred to as self-discipline) as guided by 3CI is for recruits aligned with how you were punished, as well as with the level of supervision that you were under. For the first month there was to be a period of amnesty from the Armed Forces Discipline Act as the recruits did not yet understand the requirements. During this period there was group, or collective punishment. At this stage each platoon had one of their staff members with them at all times- the duty NCO stayed overnight in the barracks and continued directing our movements after the rest of the staff had gone home. After the amnesty ended, recruits became subject to military law and individual punishment started, in which recruits were individually given CT (corrective training) for a first strike, were charged for their individual misdemeanours on the second strike, and went to a summary trial on the third strike. A while after individual punishment came privileges that demonstrated that the recruits could lead themselves. Supervision decreased to one NCO per barracks block (containing 2 platoons) at night. Further, platoons would organise and march themselves to their timings

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25 In 2007, then-Corporal Willie Apiata received a Victoria Cross for New Zealand for actions in Afghanistan. Under fire, he carried a gravely wounded comrade across seventy metres of open ground to safety.
(every activity is strictly timed and soldiers must be “five minutes before place of parade”,
that is, in place five minutes early every time). These were signs that recruits had been
deemed capable of self-discipline and were the concrete things that told them how they
were going and whether they had changed.

**Soldier Dispositions and Process: Implicit dispositions transmitted at the level of practical mastery**

Eager to change, the recruits threw themselves into the first stage of training, learning the
basics. In the first week of Basic Training, for example, the Platoon was standing on the edge
of the parade ground, taking a break from drill practice. We were waiting for an officer or
an NCO. No one in particular, the recruits just wanted any old officer to walk past us so we
could practice reacting properly. If an NCO comes by, one recruit has to yell “NCO!” so that
everyone knows to stand fast (come to attention); if an officer comes by, someone has to
yell “stand fast!” Everyone was enthusiastically outlining how to read rank slides for
everyone else while we waited, as the rank slide would have to be read correctly so that the
right command was called. Finally a Second Lieutenant (one diamond on the rank slide)
came along, and the Platoon performed well (“Stand fast!”). The Second Lieutenant walked
past grinning- obviously very amused- and thanked the Platoon. But then the Platoon was
thrown for a loop by the approach of a Padre. Padres do not fit into the rank slide structure
that everyone had been quizzing each other on- instead of varying numbers of diamonds
like other officers, or varying numbers of chevrons like NCOs, their rank slide features a
cross. As he got closer and closer the whole Platoon peered desperately at his rank slide,
trying to figure out what was going on. “Trying to figure out the rank slide?” he asked us
kindly, so we stood fast, and the Padre and braver members of the Platoon had a discussion
about who he was, and now the recruits knew what to do if they saw a cross. But then
something horrible happened. An NCO approached. But we were already talking to an
officer! Now what did we do?! If we yelled “NCO!” and stood fast, we would be interrupting
a conversation with an officer. But what would happen if we didn’t acknowledge the NCO?
The tension and confusion must have been coming off the Platoon in waves, because Padre
decided to spare our poor selves and interrupt his own conversation to leave us to it.
“NCO!” someone yelled, and the Platoon snapped to attention. “Relax,” said the NCO.
Although at first recruits were nervous of yelling “NCO,” within a few weeks they would compete to yell it in a loud and exaggerated manner as soon as any NCO was in the vicinity. Recruits, when first exposed to an Army requirement, and having gotten over any initial fear of performing it, will often turn it into a type of amusement or game. Part of the attraction is displaying that you are capable of performing the action. When a staff member calls out an instruction, for example, everyone who hears the instruction must yell it back, so that the whole Platoon hears it, i.e. “Corridor!” or a recruit’s name if they are needed at the office. Within a few weeks the Platoon would repeat the instruction as loudly as possible, well past the point when, for example, the recruit had heard their name called, and even if the recruit was standing right there and had heard the staff member themselves. Once NCOs noticed these trends the recruits were told to desist: “stop being knobs.” This playing around with new actions appears to be a first stage of conscious testing before the skill becomes a subconscious disposition, and died off in Judson after the first month or two. By the last month of Basic, when the Platoon was approached by a staff member, only one person would yell “NCO” in a measured tone.

Given all this, one would expect recruits to take on 3CI eagerly. They do very quickly learn the values as concepts and come to see 3CI as a fail proof answer when they are questioned on anything related to Army culture: “I just answer 3CI to everything.” This is not necessarily however the same thing as internalising 3CI and using it to direct one’s actions. After the initial formal lessons mentions of 3CI become scarce in my fieldnotes. Integrity did show up every now and then, when something had been done by unknown culprits. Staff would emphasise that one should show integrity by owning up to, for example, using the weekly optional church visit as an opportunity to go to the dairy\textsuperscript{26}. Recruits made use of the concept of integrity themselves, if they felt NCOs or officers hadn’t shown it. But although they used the language of 3CI with and in relation to staff, they did not tend to use it amongst themselves or in reference to each other. This does not mean that they hadn’t taken on Army dispositions, however.

Rather, 3CI were the “death by PowerPoint” version of Army dispositions. Daily life revolved much more around learning and implementing a group of informal, un-codified sayings,

\textsuperscript{26} Shop.
including to “switch on”, “get over it,” to not be “jack”, to do things with a “sense of urgency” and an “attention to detail”, to have everything “squared away”, by dealing with your “gears before beers”, not to “flap”, and that “if it looks flash, it is flash”. Following all of these directives allowed a soldier to be ready for any eventuality. Again, these do not sound as polished as 3CI because they were never treated in the same way as the values—never conceptualised as such or explicitly discussed together as a set. “Values” would be the wrong word for them. Unlike 3CI they are not nouns. They tend instead to be verbs, that is, literally doing words, or instructions on how to do things. They make up dispositions to be acted in line with, rather than values to believe in. They were partially imparted implicitly, in that recruits heard them from NCOs in the barracks or outdoors during practical lessons, rather than when they were obviously following formal lesson plans in stuffy lecture rooms. The NCOs would use this language without explanation, just expecting everyone to catch on, and indeed were very quickly imitated.

One such disposition is to not be jack. “Jack” is basically an expression of what is meant by the 3CI value of comradeship. Jack is selfishness. If you pile up your plate at the mess while there is a line of people behind you that might miss out, you are jack. If before a barracks inspection you spend all your time focusing on your own bedspace and don’t vacuum the bedroom or clean the bathroom you are going jack. This is an interesting word choice because Jack has largely been used in the English language to refer to the everyman (i.e. “jack of all trades” “Jack in the box,” “all work and no play makes Jack a dull boy” (Liberman, 2005, pp. 109-111)). Thus the use of this word in particular implies that everybody is jack—that this is a normal inclination that must be overcome. Going jack on your mates is the number one cardinal sin in the Army, rivalled only by being incompetent (being a “sack”). Jack is often paired with “cunt” for further emphasis, i.e. “he’s a jackcunt.”

Our earliest experiences with the concept of jack were in reference to food. The NCOs just started using the word, telling us when we were doing it, and let us catch on to its meaning. On one night we were the second out of four platoons into the mess and piled our plates with dessert. Our Sergeant and Regi Corporal were present, and our Regi Corporal just said, “Judson, once you’re finished, go outside.” Thus we waited outside, formed up in the cold whilst the two NCOs finished their dinners. Hughes, who could see inside the mess from his vantage point, gave us updates (“He’s getting dessert,”) while Moataane angrily yelled at
everyone to shut up. When he finally appeared, Sergeant reminded us of how we had been bitching for days about other platoons being jack in the mess (we hadn’t been using the term, but expressing the same thing in civilian language), and “now all eyes are on us and we are the jack Platoon.” The Regi Corporal came out and announced he had planned to tear us a new one but Sergeant had ruined it for him. It was clear that not being jack was something they really cared about and personally believed in. Recruits were using “jack” without thinking about it, as if they had been doing so all their lives, within the first few weeks of Basic. It did not go through the conscious playful testing phase. Further, they used it not only in reference to other people’s actions but as a way to evaluate their own and make decisions: “I’m not doing that, that would be jack,” “I’m sorry that I’ve been jack lately”.

What was confusing the Platoon at the beginning of this chapter- the encouragement in place of expected yelling- was in fact another one of these key dispositions, “get over it”. This is the New Zealand Army’s particular form of the disposition in which soldiers control their emotions and only express them in certain situations. The “it” that must be gotten over is, eventually, everything and anything. However, recruits learnt this disposition in a series of stages, with “it” being a series of specific things emphasised at different times. In this first stage they had to get over being reprimanded by staff. The OC told the Company: “Yeah, in field training they might use bad language to move you along. That is not directed at you individually, we have to get you from here to there. We can’t stop in the middle of a battle to give you a pat on the back.” Likewise the recruits were told that if you were manhandled on the range it was just to stop you because you were about to do something dangerous: “so don’t get upset if the rifle is grabbed off you.” At the end of a fault-finding debrief for an urban patrol, 3 Section’s Section Commander said: “Don’t take these as bad things, it is good that these points come out now rather than later.” Sir chimed in: “take it on the nose.”

By continually saying “don’t take it personally,” staff were trying to teach the recruits to not get caught up in negative emotions when they were reprimanded- embarrassment, upset, resentfulness, or denial that you were wrong and needed to adjust. Such emotions, at this stage of their Army career, prevented them from taking criticism on board and improving. In
later stages of their career, it could prevent them from getting on with the job. The staff were not comforting recruits by implying that making mistakes was okay, as it at first seemed. Rather, they were saying that although a recruit may have done something very wrong and was never to do it again, the recruit was not to let himself feel bad about it, because that is distracting and would interfere with whatever he was supposed to be doing right now. You need to be able to take constructive criticism, act on it immediately, and focus on the task at hand rather than wallowing. Thus the lesson as it first appeared is both a soldier disposition itself and the process by which soldier dispositions are taken on, as “get over it” is a key method to enable you to learn everything else a soldier needs. Eventually, the disposition of getting over it would come to orient riflemen’s actions towards any sort of thing that could be said or done to them, by any person.

**Process and Soldier Dispositions: Interobjectivity**

As previously mentioned, barracks routine is seen to build up the skills needed for performing as a soldier in the field. Judson was told constantly that everything in the Army came back to operations: “you have to realise that all that stuff we do back in the barracks is applied out there too and does translate to the field”. The way that this works is that what are to become transposable dispositions are first introduced in their application to small, seemingly unimportant everyday things - clothes, your things, your living spaces. These dispositions are then applied during practical lessons, with your military gear, and then in field exercises, the closest you get to operations on Basic.

The soldier is made through interobjectivity; which is expressed in the Army with the saying “If it looks flash, it is flash.” This is basically about maintenance: taking care of yourself and your kit. Soldiers are judged on whether they and their equipment are looking tidy, well-ordered and well-taken care of. You can be charged for not looking after yourself, which could lead to you being unable to do your job: for getting sunburnt, for getting a tattoo that led to infection. Rifles won’t fire if they are dirty; it’s harder to find something essential in a hurry if your pack is a mess. Everything should be “squared away”, that is, in its proper place, with everything present, and ready to be grabbed and used if you were suddenly called out. If a soldier looks good his equipment and self is well maintained and ready to be utilised in battle with no malfunctions, and so he is a good soldier: if it looks flash, it is flash.
This is in 3CI terms commitment and integrity- the official poster for integrity shows a soldier in the field on a snowy day; undeterred by the weather he is shaving in the mirror of his Light Armoured Vehicle.

Once you have used soldier dispositions to “square away” your clothes and your kit and your living spaces, these things become visible proof that you have taken on these dispositions and are acting in line with them. The Army works on the shell to work on the inner. If you have developed the skills to present yourself and your surroundings well and maintain these at all times under any circumstances, you have also developed soldier dispositions: attention to detail (you can spot and eradicate the tiniest piece of fluff on your uniform, and can apply this disposition to finding traces of enemy movement on patrol); sense of urgency (all such tasks can be completed very rapidly with no loss of attention to detail); gears before beers (always cleaning and repairing your kit on return from any exercise before relaxing); being able to switch on (no matter how relaxed or un-alert you were prior) and remain switched on (aware of everything around you, poised to react) and being able to not flap (which is to become flustered and metaphorically flap one’s arms around unhelpfully rather than acting in a controlled and therefore productive manner).

Judson was often told, “you’re at Basic, to learn the basics,” and when the Army say the basics, they really mean the basics. The first few weeks consisted of learning how to dress ourselves and get ourselves places on time. It sounds easy on paper, but getting 35 people out onto a parade ground dressed immaculately and uniformly ready for an inspection is a quite a task. Properly dressed encompasses: ironed with no creases; no fluff or stray threads; all buttons done up; the toggle of your jay-hat done up to your chin; collars lying flat; rank slide clean; shirt buttons, belt buckle and fly all neatly lined up; carrying a notebook and pen (in exactly the same pocket as everyone else); trousers bloused; no bootlaces or socks showing; boots polished (no scuffs, no mud, no grass); males shaven and females with their hair in a bun with no “wispsys”. Looking back, I now understand why a TAD Corporal at induction at the very beginning of my fieldwork asking me to borrow a pen told me that he wasn’t a good soldier because he didn’t have one. By day four Judson had started policing itself: “Are everyone’s laces tucked in?” someone would call, and half the Platoon would lean down to check. Armed with lighters for the threads we inspected each other before leaving the bedrooms and fixed the collars of the recruits in front of us in
formation. Just before we were due to be formed up on the parade ground recruits would run through the barracks yelling “Notebook! Pens! Hats!” and so we would all make it to the parade ground with our notebooks and our pens and our hats, and get pulled up that time for fluff.

There are different “dress orders” for different tasks. “Field”, for the outdoors, is sleeves down, whereas “dress threes,” for more formal or indoor tasks, is rolled up sleeves, achieved not simply by rolling the sleeves up but by a process that involves rolling up and ironing layer by layer, with precise measurements done by folding into triangles in the manner of wrapping a present. We got changed frequently, usually at least three times a day but not uncommonly five or six: field for outside lessons, then into dress threes for dinner, into and out of PT gear, dressing down in barracks. Everyone had to be completely uniform. Soldiers are issued brown t-shirts that act as PT shirts but also can be worn underneath your DPM shirt (Disruptive Print Material) on cold days. Either the whole Platoon wore them, or no one did. Not only did a decision on this have to be made in the morning, but everybody had to be told what it was (because the girls slept in a separate room from the rest of their sections, the duty recruits often forgot to tell them). Then someone would change their mind a few minutes before form up and the whole Platoon had to be informed and get redressed. The same principle of uniformity applied to our wet weathers- goretex trousers and jacket, so the decision was not just yes or no, but both? Just jacket? Sometimes, in the early days, the 35 of us would stand out on a field in a lesson break bickering endlessly about whether or not we should wear a jacket. If a recruit wasn’t uniform, if, for example, you had forgotten your headdress, a staff member would ask, “Why are you so different?” This was not only literal, in that there was something about you that didn’t match the others. It also meant, why are you so different that you have failed at being uniform, when everyone else had achieved it?

Although this all sounds insanely pedantic, and was as I have said aimed at teaching general dispositions, it was also very practical: the uniform standard is actually competence. For a while, Sir’s favourite inspection point was whether everybody’s pockets were fully buttoned up. I always assumed he had just randomly chosen this as something to pick on, right up until the night when I lost my army issue notebook, half full of anthropological fieldnotes, on some hill in the training area because my pocket wasn’t properly buttoned. Although I
was horrified it wasn’t because I had lost the notes forever, but rather because when some NCO said, “notebook, prove!” I would have nothing to produce. Uniformity is practical: everything is arranged uniformly so that anyone can quickly find anything they need in someone else’s gear, for example, a casualty’s own first aid supplies (you might need yours later).

After your clothes there was your gear. Every bag clip on both day bags and packs had to be done up and all extra material on pack straps was to be rolled and taped up so they weren’t dangling down “looking like a sack of poos.” All packs or day bags during lessons were left in three straight ranks, all facing the same way, with your webbing (a piece of equipment formed of pouches worn on the body to provide easy, fast access to ammo and other commonly used items) arranged around them in the exact same position. Following every field ex there was an intense period of PXA, Post-Exercise Administration, in which every pack, hootchie (tent), tent pole, peg, mess tin, magazine, entrenching tool, pruning saw and hexie cooker (small metal cooking apparatus used with flammable hexamine blocks) had to be intensely scrubbed and rid of any rust. Most importantly, we spent hours ridding rifles and machine guns of even the smallest speck of carbon, using pocket knives, one by ones (little scraps of white cloth measuring one centimetre by one centimetre), baby wipes and what the Army terms “rags, old”. During weapons inspections, if they were in a good mood, the NCOs might use the carbon they somehow reached in impossible to reach crevices to draw a moustache on your face. Or else they would charge you.

Small, seemingly boring everyday tasks like cleaning are given great significance in the same way that the small items on your person are. This is because failure both incurred punishment and was explicitly conflated with failure to display soldier dispositions. Fatigues and barracks inspections were constant and involved “standing to beds” - standing at ease at the foot of your bed with your wardrobe open ready for perusal with the rest of the barracks spotless. Everything was uniform: everyone’s wardrobe had to organised in exactly the same way with everything in exactly the same place. All irons had to be facing the same way, all shirt buttons facing towards the inside of the room. Recruits folded their sheets and blankets into a complicated and intricate bundle called “bedrolls” each morning, which were placed at the head of the bed. Corporal Taumata told us the barracks needed to be immaculate, and had me define immaculate: “No flaw whatsoever, Corporal.” He
periodically had recruits repeat this for him. Failing an inspection could lead to your tallboy being tipped over, your mattress flipped: a “hurricane”. There was to be no drop of water whatsoever left in bathroom sinks or showers, and no leaves bigger than a fifty cent piece in the garden (attention to detail). “Oh no, it’s an apocalypse,” groaned Ellis when we stepped outside the morning after a strong wind. During one corridor, Corporal Maitland told us, “Dust is your enemy. Not the Viet Cong. Your enemy is dust. Isn’t that right, Hoeata?”

“Yes, dust is the enemy, Corporal!” Hoeata screamed. Wereta would storm down the corridor with the Neopol, Army issue crème cleaner, yelling “I am Neopol! Commander of dust!” while Corporal laughed hysterically in his office. Soon after we had been to pick up our body armour and helmets, 2 Section decided to put on their Kevlar during fatigues “to get used to it”. On noticing this Corporal Maitland declared that if 2 Section was wearing their armour, everyone had to. Kirby ran down the corridor excitedly passing this news on to the rest of the Platoon: “We’re going into battle! We have to vanquish the enemy!”

Though it was sometimes clear that we were having barracks inspections because the duty NCO didn’t have anything else for us to do, staff always made sure to tell us the reason behind any obscure requirement or punishment and how it would help make you a good soldier: what we were learning, why we were being punished, how the punishment related to what we did wrong and how it helped us correct that. Having to make bedrolls every morning was to get you used to timings: “I know some of you are thinking of sleeping in sleeping bags but cheating is only cheating yourself, if you get to your units and you can’t get places on time.” When Corporal Maitland kept interrupting the short period of time we had to complete fatigues to have us stand at attention achieving nothing in the corridor, and Corporal Taumata spent an evening making the Platoon literally go to bed and get up and go through morning routine over and over again, they made sure to tell us it was because we were learning a sense of urgency.

**Process and Pre-existing Dispositions: Learning soldier skills and playacting**

And then there were the very many practical skills that soldiers need to learn: to operate a number of weapons systems as well as communications equipment, to navigate, to organise food and shelter in the field (fieldcraft), to patrol, to communicate accurately and/or silently
with the Section/Platoon, to spot hidden enemy, to keep yourself from being likewise detected, who goes where and does what during an attack, first aid, and so on. Because of the primary practical habitus, which NCOs shared with recruits, lessons on the theory of such practical skills, or information that went along with them, such as keeping communications secure, were treated as nuisances to get out of the way so that the Platoon could get to where understanding would really be built: actually doing it hands on. “This does not test for understanding,” an NCO said of an academic test:

Let’s face it. None of us will understand it. We have to do it […] something might be in the test, you’ll go, “Huh? What the fuck does that mean? Fuck, I’ll fail.” You will. I’ll laugh…like I said, you’ll understand it when we get hands on.

The staff just tried to get everyone through indoor lessons (frequent, several times an hour breaks outside, standing up and sitting back down to wake everyone up) and tests (“put a star next to this to remind yourself this might be a very good question for a test,” “question one, C that you get the answer right…”). Out in the field the good teachers demonstrated the meaning of the endless phrases and acronyms. For example, to translate the fourth marksmanship principle, which we all knew by rote- “The shot is released and followed through with minimum disturbance to the firer’s position or the weapons alignment”- Corporal Taumata adopted the kneeling unsupported firing position and mimed firing a rifle and rocking back from the recoil, demonstrating how he ended up in a different position with his rifle pointed in another direction.

During weapons lessons there were punishments, and we were made to run to a shed and back again, or to “play tag with the trees”. During the collective punishment stage the whole Platoon might have to run if anybody: carried their rifle one handed, had their finger on the trigger, dropped ammo, left their rifle behind, walked in front of a line of weapons, talked too loudly, called a rifle a “gun”, or called 1 Section “Section 1” (“it sounds gay”). You also had to double (run) if you wanted to go to the toilet. Hence lessons familiarised you with running in boots, webbing, and with rifles. Again everything was done for a reason and that reason was made clear: Corporal Taumata once made everyone run to a shed and back and as soon as the Platoon returned had them go into the kneeling unsupported firing position.
“Why is this so hard?” he asked. “Breathing Corporal!”: breathing heavily makes it hard to keep your position and rifle steady, thus changing your point of aim between shots.

For things that weren’t practical skills with drills that could be repeated- nutrition, military law, conflict resolution, 3CI as above and so on- there were skits. For a long time the sheer number of skits we performed at Basic confused me. “It’s like drama school,” said Wereta. Now I understand that this was the only way more abstract concepts could be turned into action for people that only learned this way: by acting out a value like integrity, it became a thing you did.

Because of course the things that soldiers are required to do- take part in battle, shoot the enemy, render first aid for combat trauma - are not things that can be practiced hands on until they actually occur (which may be never). The only option for training is playacting. Basically, those training act as if they are at war, whilst various other members of the Army (our staff, staff from other units, those on Light Duties due to injuries) act as the enemy or as civilian inhabitants of conflict zones. This is referred to as “playing enemy party”. Field exercises involved both acting as if the enemy was out there- maintaining secure positions, doing sentry, radioing in incidents- as well as sometimes stepping out of the scenario for lessons and assessments. A range of activities that were all aspects of one overarching scenario required recruits to simultaneously implement all of the practical skills and soldier dispositions that they had learnt. The New Zealand Army trains against fictitious enemies that have been drawn up in detail. At Basic this took the form of a nation state. First, there was a night stalk in which the recruits had to attempt to get close enough to spy on and gain intelligence from a meeting of enemy leaders (the staff). During this night stalk I accompanied Corporal Maitland, who like other staff had dressed up in a foreign uniform, and who told me: “This is what the Army is all about, you dress up and walk around with weapons. It’s like being a big kid.” By the time of the first field exercise, Kaimanawa Retreat (KR), this other nation state had invaded New Zealand but had been stalled south of Waiouru. The Recruit Company was deployed to the forest to conduct close country patrols to prevent harassment and to conduct training for a likely assault. The exercise ended with an early morning forced withdrawal due to a contact (complete with simulated mortars) with an unmanageably large number of enemy. In this way, the first field ex in terms of the scenario ended in defeat. The second field ex, Exercise Final Challenge (which was called
“Final Chance” before the advent of the “tree-hugging bullshit”), had more urban warfare elements, with the Company operating out of a Forward Operating Base and an attack on the Urban Training Area which took out all key enemy leaders. Thus by the end of Basic the Company had triumphed over their opponent.

Playacting works when real emotions are involved, so that in some sense the scenarios feel real. Recruits thus get practice dealing with their emotions, and learn not to flap. At this stage the recruits were very engaged in the scenarios. For the night stalk, Corporal Taumata, who would be patrolling the training area trying to catch the recruits, talked up the pit-bull he would bring with him loudly and at length, causing many frenzied discussions on how to confuse a dog’s sense of smell. Two recruits managed to sneak onto the roof of the building where the meeting was held, and almost had a heart attack when one of them dropped a pen. For one first aid stand a car wreck was towed out and placed halfway across a road with its nose in a ditch. I lay on the bonnet as if I had been thrown out of the windscreen and was instructed to act unconscious, Young was the driver and was given a syringe full of fake blood to imitate arterial spurts, and Cook had her leg trapped in the car and screamed her head off the entire time: “Help, I’m trapped! Harding, are you alright? Young, you dick! Why did you do that!” As one of the sections went through I heard Raukawa whisper, “this is scary,” and have a very worried discussion with Douglas in which they agonised over whether they should move me: “I don’t know what to do here.” A few groups did move me off the bonnet to which Corporal Taumata screamed, “You’ve paralysed Harding!” Once I died: “Now you five and one more are carrying her casket in the funeral and her Mum’s screaming her tits off!” Later on at Corps Training in a similar scenario I was told by a NCO that I had to scream more and be better at it, because it had to be scary; in other words, I wasn’t a good enough actor for this training. On Final Challenge, 3 Section was chosen to clear a building (with blank rounds) where NCOs were acting as enemy party holding a hostage. “That was awesome, I got my first notional kill!” enthused Alexander afterwards.

Meehan was asked if he had fired any shots and replied “I believe so,” but couldn’t really remember, a psychological quirk as if he had been in a real firefight. Practically, Alexander told him to check his gas plug then, and looking at it and deciding it was too clean, concluded, “Nah, you haven’t fired shit.” Meehan was unconvinced. When I came to the
portaloos a bit later he and some of his mates were standing around them staring at the stars: “I can’t believe we were just firing off rounds, now, oh, look at the stars!”

Soldier Dispositions: Having your say

As outlined in the previous chapter, staff at Basic Training were to ensure that recruits knew why they were doing what they were doing, were given a chance to have their say, and felt able to report any inappropriate behaviour. In practice this meant that staff regularly sat the Platoon down and asked them to express their opinions on how Basic was going. This included talking over not only their own progress (“name something that is going well and something that we could do better”) but also the training itself, and the staff. In one corridor, for example, a staff member was asking leading questions about if lessons were good enough, and assured us he would speak to the Section Commanders about what they could do to improve them. In the third week when Sergeant asked how the training was going the boys at the top end of the corridor complained about how quickly the mess ran out of food at dinner, and how there wasn’t enough food in the cut lunches. Those of us down the other end of the corridor (although in agreement) were worried and muttering “don’t moan!” but Sergeant told us that everyone was mad at the mess. He said that every night the staff came around and asked how the food was and we just answered “mean, Sarge!” Thus when we had been curtailing complaints, he was encouraging us not to. He told us we were armed with much more information than he had been as a recruit, and because of this, “it’s a better Army now. Except for the mess.” The very next day a second TAD dining room opened, and we were provided with extra-large plates: “Sergeant gets shit done overnight!”

Every recruit was issued with a diary, to be handed in each week. Each page featured a space for an entry, goals to be set for the next week, and a space for staff members to leave comments and sign the page. Judson was told “use your diaries. Don’t be afraid to write it down if you’re embarrassed to say it. We can’t help you if we don’t know what’s broken.” Recruits used these strategically to inform staff of their opinions. For example, many wrote that they were disappointed that the March Out ceremony had been altered so that not everyone would be marching out in the Army’s ceremonial uniform. One week I wrote that
that the staff never remembered to tell the injured recruits (separated from the Platoon formation) where to march to and Sir wrote “Roger that” in the comments.

Further up the chain, we would every now and then be summoned to an OC or CO hour, a chance to ask questions of these officers. Recruits took advantage of this, complaining about the mess, new boots being slow to arrive, the top shot of the course being determined after the recruits had only been shooting for two weeks, and so on. During the OC hour which marked the end of the amnesty on the Armed Forces Discipline Act, when the OC was outlining the procedure in which a first strike would mean Corrective Training and a second a charge, Tawhara spoke up to say that his Section Commander had said that his section wouldn’t be having CT but instead would be going straight to charges. This was met with much disapproval from the rest of Judson but he defended himself: “I wanted to know if it was right. I don’t want to be charged for dirty boots.” The OC said no, that would not be happening, going on to explain that 44 of the NCOs at TAD were new “and don’t know how we roll.” He assured us he would sit down with them and make them all aware of the procedures so that everything was fair and above board. He told us that the year before an NCO had been charged for embarrassing a female recruit by giving her an unattainable number of push ups at the mess in front of her entire company. There had recently been an incident in which a recruit from another Platoon had been discharged for making threatening comments, followed by the Company being lectured by the enraged OC for the bullying that had led this young man with no home to return to and no other prospects to these actions. The OC now asked if anyone thought the recruit’s dismissal was harsh. Cook in fact did feel empowered enough to say that she felt it was harsh, but that nothing harsh enough had occurred to his Platoon for the bullying. The Platoon in question defended themselves against this charge, (even though the OC’s feelings on the matter were clear), claiming that it was the discharged recruit that was the instigator and bully. The OC then took us through his thought process, sharing with us that they had thought about keeping him, but that they had to be careful, and at end of the day the Army was not social welfare. In these ways, recruits were constantly not only given the opportunity to, but encouraged to express their feelings about training. This included the airing of dissatisfaction, and the idea that they had the right to explanations. As will be seen, this had unforeseen consequences in that it interfered with the ability to internalise the “get over it” disposition.
Becoming a soldier is very much intersubjective in that being a soldier is largely conceptualised as being a team (i.e. section and platoon) member. Soldiers help one another internalise collective dispositions, and this mutual aid is itself one of these dispositions. The key aim of Basic Training is to develop each individual as a good team member (because, based on organisational psychology, four months is not seen to be long enough to develop an effective team itself). Teamwork in the Army is of a particular and unusual type. It was much later that I realised exactly what type of teamwork this wasn’t: the “you’re only as fast as your slowest member,” model. Some Australian territorial soldiers said this to me once when I was being the proverbial slowest member, having vomited during a climate familiarisation walk in the Solomon Islands. Although they were being lovely and taking care of me, all I could think after having observed sixteen months of Regular Force training was that they were doing teamwork wrong. A team shouldn’t be only as good as their weakest member because there shouldn’t be a weak member. No one should have to be pulled by the team because everyone should be able to pull their own weight. It is not about what your team can do for you, but what you do for the team. Thus, each soldier must focus on developing their individual capabilities (which is of course what the recruits wanted). Contemporary romantic civilian notions of teamwork tend to see it as sacrificing individual desires for the group, but it is actually impossible to enact such a view of teamwork at Basic Training.

The key to Army teamwork is that all members are self-disciplined and self-lead. Drill is a good example. The stated purpose of drill is simultaneously to develop self-discipline and to “provide the basis of teamwork”, because these are one and the same. Very often during drill practice recruits would be instructed to “work on your individual drill!” Drill is a team activity in that everyone has to be in step and in time. It is also an individual activity in that no one else can help you. You have to be in step but you have to get yourself in step by matching yourself to those around you and following drill calls. Tellingly, if one person makes a mistake the whole platoon is drastically affected. One person out of step puts everyone behind them out of step: “you’re going jack on the person behind you!” Someone goon marching (swinging the arms in the same direction, rather than the opposite direction,
as the feet are stepping- i.e. often me in the first few weeks) is very obvious and makes the whole platoon look bad. Indeed in the end of course drill competition, some Platoons lost due to just one person. In the moment, there is nothing anyone else can do about that one person. You can’t verbally or physically draw their attention to their fault without also being conspicuous and therefore equally in the wrong. Likewise recruits are constantly told to “work together” when the activity they are conducting, although it is the same thing at the same time as everybody else, is quite individual, such as holding yourself in the prone bridge position or doing push ups. No one can help you do these things: what “work as a team” means is do it yourself for the sake of the team. Don’t fall down, don’t fail, because individual failure will incur more reps for everyone.

Obviously being a soldier does involve conducting many collective activities, such as group fire manoeuvres in which large groups advance and fire on the enemy whilst avoiding friendly fire. This requires a lot of communication and is advanced to through several stages beginning with the basic building block of advancing and firing in pairs. But the building block before even pairs is the self- your partner has to know that you will listen to information he is giving you, and that you will adequately pass information to him. He has to know that if he can’t help you in the moment, you can handle yourself and do your job without giving up. This means that the recruits could simultaneously be putting the team first whilst being able to work on their individual identities, as they desired.

In fact anyone not capable of pulling their weight quickly fell out of the team. This can be seen in the experience of recruits who are put on Limited Duties (LDs) due to injury or illness. LDs were immediately physically separated from the Platoon in that they marched, not in the formation, but in a smaller LDs group. Those with leg injuries had to go at a slower pace while those who can’t swing arms would ruin the Platoon’s uniformity. Much shaming was applied to LDs to encourage them to either push through and get better or stop malingering. We were commonly referred to as “lame and lazies,” (in fact we called ourselves that). Having to do things like go to specialist appointments meant you had different immediate concerns than the group, who were all always focused on the same thing. It took you out of, for example, the desperate group scramble to be on the parade ground in two minutes in Dress 3s, and nobody had any time to pay attention to your differing affairs. You had failed to maintain yourself as uniform: why are you so different?
Thus LDs recruits would often try to retain group membership by including themselves, carrying things when they weren’t supposed to according to their medical chits, trying to join in punishments or assist those being punished when medically they couldn’t be punished. The NCOs were always very quick to shut down any such attempt.

There were some indications at Basic that the way in which the individual was improved as a team member was through competition with the rest of the team. A constant aspect of lessons was competitions and games such as relays in which recruits had to switch out disassembling and assembling weapons. This was quickly imitated by recruits who would set up races in their breaks, timing themselves to see who could replace a magazine or strip and assemble a weapon the fastest. This idea however only came into full force at Corps Training. Indeed, 2 Section, with quite a few riflemen, and with riflemen as their most forceful personalities, often complained about a lack of competitive spirit in Judson, particularly Moataane: “I wish the other sections would be competitive though, ‘cause that would push us.”

The Army’s view of teamwork can also be seen through the punishment structure. The way in which collective punishment is designed to work is that when a Platoon is being punished for an individual’s mistake, it is not that everybody is being punished to shame the individual that deserved it, but that everybody deserves it: they didn’t ensure the mistake didn’t happen. This suggests a version of teamwork in which if anyone fails it is everyone’s fault and thus everyone has failed. This was not always clear at Basic because there were other, contradictory discourses that were sometimes emphasised more. This is however the undisputed conceptualisation of teamwork amongst the infantry and for this reason was most obvious at Corps Training. Looking back, however, I can now identify it at Basic and see that the staff members who most consistently made this point to us were the NCOs who had at some point in their careers been riflemen. One such Corporal noted that a particular recruit’s bedroll was a “shitfight,” “but it’s not his fault, because his mates aren’t helping him.” Likewise, for the first month of Basic the focus of much of the female room’s attention was Recruit Gill’s thwarted attempts to quit the Army- the staff wouldn’t let her. She was often upset and in need of comforting which the rest of us felt was dragging morale down. One afternoon one of the infantry NCOs told us that if we were giving 100% to help Gill, as we had claimed to him, then she should be performing exceptionally. But if she was failing,
we had failed. At this stage we did not accept this; after Corporal left the room the girls
dismissively expressed their displeasure by angrily stomping on the floor and miming shooting
themselves in the head.

The requirement to get everybody up to speed leads to the second application of the “get
over it” disposition. If incompetence has to be dealt with by the Platoon, then you need to
be able to take constructive criticism not only from staff but from your peers also. Recruits
often identified faults and reprimanded one another: “Get off the parade ground!” “Take
your finger off the trigger! You never have it there unless you intend to fire.” “Gears before
beers. You’re letting the team down. We have a timing.” They quickly adopted the language
of NCOs and used it on one another to do so: “get it together ballbags, sort your lives out!”
However, early on, to some of our civilian minds, it seemed that the people who were doing
the correcting were self-righteous teachers’ pets. Here for example is what I wrote on an
occasion in which one of the recruits corrected me and I had not yet learnt to respond
properly:

I was fixing my hair outside, Cook: there’s a bathroom in there, me: meh, Cook: just
remember you need a headdress on at all times, like blah blah blah it is funny that Cook acts
like such a model recruit in this respect always telling people what to do when we all just
had to go for a run to the bridge and back because she was laughing as usual.

Instead of writing this rant, I should have accepted the criticism and gotten over it:
recognised that I shouldn’t be outside with a bare head, put my headdress on, gone inside
to fix my hair in the bathroom, and told Cook to be quiet the next time I heard her laughing
too loudly. Likewise, Peterson responded to several people yelling “your rifle!” when he
stepped further than arms-length away from it by grumping: “remember the conversation
we had the other day about being polite? It changes the whole conversation.” During one of
the occasions on which Sir asked the Platoon for points on how we could improve someone
mentioned recruits telling others what to do and how they could at least do it more
courteously. Sir did not see this as a valid complaint: “just take it in the spirit in which it is
meant.” Eventually I found myself losing the view that those doing the correcting were
doing it to be bossy. One morning Corporal Maitland came into the female room to check up
on Gill, who had been vomiting all night. When he left, Cook told Gill that she needed to
remember to address NCOs by rank. In the back of my mind I was still aware of what my
usual reaction would have been- that telling someone so ill to remember to follow finicky rules was petty- but in all honesty I was mostly feeling shocked that Gill had addressed Corporal without using his rank. Most people did listen to one another. Once when I was duty recruit a group of boys was standing around talking and I mentioned that I was supposed to be making sure they weren’t fucking around: “so if Corporal comes, just look productive.” To my surprise- I had just meant to make it look like they were gainfully employed if he suddenly appeared- they all actually left to do something. Internalising the get over it disposition through learning to take direction from each other is therefore a good example of the way in which the soldier habitus is embodied intersubjectively.

Process: Contradictions in the desired intersubjective relationship between the group and the individual

There was no contradiction in the idea that everyone had the right to and in fact should correct their fellow recruits. The confusion came in whose fault it was if a recruit was reprimanded by the Platoon but refused to listen or correct this fault. The infantry view is that it is still the group’s fault- it didn’t matter what you had already tried, if someone was still incompetent it was still your fault; you hadn’t done enough, obviously. Some however felt that the Platoon wasn’t at fault- we were trying to help, they just weren’t listening. This feeling was backed up by an inspirational speech that one of the staff members made during a punishment one day, which the recruits regularly referred back to thereafter. This speech didn’t seem to be in line with the implicit Army dispositions that many other staff were working towards. It had been a bad night: the female room was hurricaned (pulled apart as if a hurricane had hit it) because Gill and I had left it insecure (i.e. unlocked); we had to do a “Gas! Gas! Gas!” drill, that involved suiting up in our wet weathers as a protective measure, because the duty staff member got sick of people farting in corridor (I died apparently, due to a combination of my weight and the drawstring of my hood not being drawn tightly enough); we had only ten minutes to eat and get rid of all traces of our dinners, during which Sergeant came past and benevolently informed us, “if you’re eating that fast you need plenty of fluids, team!”; and then the duty staff started giving us two minutes per item for every piece of kit in the bedrooms to be up to a uniform standard. Every time something wasn’t uniform we had to go right back to the start of the list. The staff member told Judson that they weren’t seeing the improvement they needed, and that we were the worst
Platoon in the Company. At the time we assumed he was just saying this to make everyone prove him wrong, and everyone decided to do so despite “seeing through” this technique, but in hindsight, I think he meant it. What he said next was defining for Judson for the entirety of Basic:

When I graduated, I looked to my left, and I looked to my right, and I didn’t think the people standing there deserved to be there. Nothing cheapens a graduation like people not deserving it. My obligation to you is not to let that happen.

This view implied that your personal achievement would be cheapened if someone incompetent was standing next to you. This is quite different to the idea that if someone incompetent was standing next to you, you had failed that person. It introduced another option other than continuing to try and bring them up to par: that they should be backsquaddled (not graduated with their original Platoon, but given another chance by being placed in a new platoon on the next Basic). Despite the fact that the Platoon admired the infantry staff, and tended towards dislike of this particular staff member, it was this more individualistic view, less of a change from civilian predispositions, which they tended to adopt. “You know how [staff member] said you don’t want people on March Out that don’t deserve it?” asked a member of 2 Section, “Hendrick is one of those people.” Raukawa intended to go and talk to staff about another recruit, because they were “one of those people I don’t want to be next to on March Out.” “I don’t want him to march out with me,” became a not uncommon thing to say when evaluating each other (note the use of “me” and “I” rather than, say, “I don’t want him to march out with us/the Platoon”). It particularly came up in the last weeks of Basic: “there are about six people here who shouldn’t be.” One recruit said, “There’s only so much teamwork you can do. Then the individual has to not be a cunt.”

Although this seemed to be coming from an individual staff member, it was unwittingly reinforced by the switch from collective to individual punishment; that is, by the new policy of self-discipline. Individual punishments- being put on CT (Corrective Training)-suggested that only the individual was at fault for a transgression. Whereas previously if there had been failures the whole Platoon might spend a night doing change parades, now only the individuals on CT did change parades while everyone else was in their rooms doing PA
(Personal Administration) in relative peace. Again Infantry NCOs gave this a more collective slant by telling sections with members on CT that they should be helping their mates by doing some of their PA for them when they were too busy. Some NCOs from Platoons other than Judson in fact apparently disliked what recent changes suggested about the team relationship, and thus stubbornly persisted with collective punishment after the official switch. For example, one of the NCOs from Hardham Platoon, who was sometimes in charge of us due to supervision dropping to one NCO per barrack block, told us: “I could charge you, but like I say, charges are for pussies. I believe in group punishment.”

Thus there were two dispositions available to be taken up that shaped your actions towards struggling recruits but also your relationship to the group more generally. Young was one recruit who took the more individual one, saying once during a lesson break that he didn’t want to suffer because of the actions of certain “fucktards” in the Platoon. He felt that some people would be fucktards even putting in 100% and should be cut. He had talked to Sir and Sergeant about this (again demonstrating the freedom the recruits felt to express their complaints to staff) and “they said that I had to bring them up [to standard]!” Other recruits agreed with the more group oriented staff, chiming in, “yeah, teamwork.” Young replied, “But people don’t listen.” Thus recruits like Young felt they had tried to help their section mates, had been rebuffed, and therefore gave up, drawing on a validated viewpoint that such individuals should be removed.

**Process and Soldier Dispositions: The worst platoon**

Thus far I have outlined the dispositions that recruits were supposed to take on and how this should occur. However, this was not a smooth process in Judson VC Platoon, which was, according to one of the staff in TAD headquarters, the worst platoon they had ever seen. More than a year later, Wereta and I were discussing Basic on deployment in the Solomon Islands when one of the NCOs in the contingent, who had been posted to TAD after our departure, suddenly exclaimed; “were you that Platoon?! You’re legendary!” The rest of this chapter discusses the problems Judson had in taking up soldier dispositions, and how this was partially due to some of them directly contradicting one another. Although Bourdieu argues that habitus tend to be fuzzy and partially contradictory, in this case there were too many situations in which either of two dispositions, but not both, could be acted upon. The
recruits were sometimes reprimanded for making the wrong choice, although both dispositions had been encouraged by staff. Thus unlike the fuzziness that allows for flexibility, “in short everything that makes [the system] “practical”, and thus geared to respond at the least cost [...] to the emergencies of ordinary existence” (Bourdieu, 1990, p.384), these contradictions hindered the recruits’ ability to act appropriately in the field of TAD.

Judson was always seen as the strictest platoon in the Company. Sharing a barracks block with Hardham Platoon, we constantly compared ourselves with them: they had had time with their cell phones, we hadn’t; we were punished more often. It is important to note - especially given that at times Hardham recruits expressed concern that I was unfairly writing negative things about their Platoon- that the Hardham I write about here is not an accurate reflection of what was actually going on in that Platoon, which we couldn’t really know. Rather it is a reflection of the Hardham that we constructed in our shared imagination in order to cast Judson as an underdog. The recruits, keen to be challenged as they were, quickly put a positive spin on being in the strictest Platoon: it would make Judson better soldiers, and that was the staff’s aim. “That’s why we’re going to be the best platoon,” said Raukawa, “That Hardham Platoon-Easy Platoon!” A Hardham recruit actually told us she was jealous because they hadn’t been punished yet: “nothing has happened to us.” This perception never completely went away, but as Judson began being told more and more often that they weren’t progressing, there was also resentment. Largely the problem as perceived by staff seemed to be a failure to internalise “the basics” and hence soldier dispositions, such as not always switching on or acting with a sense of urgency.

Because TAD was so very open about the entire process of training, when things began to go wrong, and staff felt this was partially their fault, Sergeant told us this. Sergeant asked Judson why they thought they weren’t performing and the recruits replied that although they were continually told that standards weren’t being met, they never had a clear idea what those standards actually were. Sergeant told us that most of the Platoon staff were new and had not acted consistently, but were taking it on the nose that it was down to them, and henceforth standards would be clear. Sergeant was modelling on behalf of the whole staff the get over it disposition; calmly taking criticism and acting on it. At the same time however, he was reinforcing the idea that the Platoon could and should complain
about staff. As will be seen shortly, this interfered with the recruits taking on the get over it disposition themselves.

Shortly thereafter the whole Platoon was put on CT because none of the section guns, which are the responsibility of the whole section, not just the gunner who carries them, had been cleaned adequately, despite the standards for this now being clear. Here the staff were making a punishment designed to be individual into a collective one. Given the above discussion, some recruits suspected this was a pre-planned aspect of training and that the guns were just an excuse. CT involved various beatings such as change parades, but also meant losing the privileges of uniform and being back in the beige overalls recruits wear in the first weeks of Basic, effective because this is the loss of key items that interobjectively make you a soldier. One of the Corporals also set up a “band” that he deployed whenever somebody should get over something. At the command “band,” the three shortest recruits had to run over to him and the offender, and at the command “band play” they would sing “Cry me a River.” Once the CT period had ended, Sir sat Judson down for a meeting. Here he directly asked several times if there were any staff issues and reinforced the use of the diaries: “be honest if you’re hating a staff member’s method.” Everyone then had to come up with one way in which the Platoon could improve. He himself set two goals: everyone was to pass the RFL at a G1 pass (the upper level of pass- i.e. you did not have to do this well to officially pass, but Sir wanted everyone to aim higher) and that there were to be no UDs (Unauthorised Discharges- weapons being fired, usually on accident, when firing was not authorised) on the upcoming Exercise Kaimanawa Retreat (KR), Judson’s first field exercise. Later Sir was to say that he thought this had cursed the Platoon.

The defining event of Basic Training for Judson VC platoon occurred midway through this first field exercise. It was always thereafter referred to only as “that night on KR”—no further explanation was ever needed. Because I was based with Company Headquarters for the exercise I did not witness this event, but picked up the basic outline from fragmentary conversations the next morning and a skit re-enactment (about which more later). One of the key aims of the first field ex was to learn to live and operate in a field environment in which enemy was a threat, and to do this, “to harbour.” A harbour is a secure resting place for a patrol when it stops for any extended period, primarily for the night. Security in the form of sentries and early warning devices is set up and bedspaces established. One
afternoon, Sir and Sergeant discovered that the previous night, someone had “shit in the harbour”, between 2 hootchies. Obviously field exercises involve toileting in the outdoors, but this does not mean anywhere in the outdoors. In fact there were portaloos available, (apparently a DOC requirement due to constant polluting of the land used for NZDF exercises). To shit inside the harbour is the equivalent of taking a shit in your lounge at home.

The staff told the Platoon that the culprit, who became known as “the Phantom Shitter”, had one chance to show integrity and come forward. No one did. This lead to, that night, a beasting that gained mythical status. From the stories the Platoon told afterwards, that night on KR consisted of hard physical exercise and constant repetition of field routines like “standing to”. Although this was the type of thing recruits had seemed to desire earlier in Basic, that night on KR completely annihilated Judson’s morale for weeks to come and a lot of resentment was built up around it. The reason that KR was so different from other beatings in this respect was, I think, that it had a much different tone. Recruits recalled leopard crawling through the harbour, and being told, “Hopefully one of you will crawl through it.” The rest position during the physical exertion was a squat, during which staff lectured about how someone had been in this position last night, and equated the Platoon with dogs: “We all had to bark. And they barked at us.” During most punishments recruits were told how what was happening would help them to become a soldier. The punishments were directly tied to the personal advancement in which recruits were invested. Here by contrast the recruits seem to have felt that they were being demeaned. Later on, I asked Corps Trainees if the beatings they were now experiencing were worse than KR. Hunter (who had proven himself capable of enduring extreme physical duress) told me that they weren’t degrading like that night on KR was: “we became less than human. We became dogs.” At one point one recruit was so undone that he tried, but failed, to falsely confess to being the Phantom Shitter.

By the time I re-joined the Platoon the next morning for their first helicopter familiarisation ride, they were crushed. The night before had been termed “Evolution One,” and they were terrified of apparently upcoming “Evolution Two,” wholeheartedly believing in the plausibility of every threat that had been tossed around: they would be harbouring every night for the rest of Basic, would be on ratpacks for the rest of Basic, that the entire Platoon
would be backsquadded. Tawhara said that had it gone on for ten more minutes he would have quit the Army, Hughes, likewise, said he was “about ready to say ‘see you, guys’”. 2 Section decided as a group that if that night got too much, they were going to quit as one, and believed that by telling the Platoon this at lunch they could get the Phantom Shitter to confess: who wanted ten people’s careers on their head? 2 Section, however, had overestimated the importance of their careers to the Phantom Shitter, although they and several others pleaded with him/her, emphasising that their futures were on the line. Several recruits stated that nobody cared about finding out who the Phantom Shitter was, as long as they confessed to staff, and Owen assured them that confessing now would mean forgiveness. Shortly after this discussion however, several others, especially riflemen Wereta and Ellis, expressed shock at hearing people saying they wanted to quit: “This is me. This is what I want to do.”

Nobody confessed, and KR went downhill from there. In total over KR Judson had eight Unauthorised Discharges. This is a staggering number: an NCO told me that in the entire AARC that went through two Basics before Judson there had been only two UDs in the entire course, amongst four platoons over two field exes and other armed activities. As the Section Commander of the Section that had been responsible for four of the UDs said: “four UDs. If it had been live rounds, that is four different people you could have killed.” There were also other weapons charges (rusty rifle, loss of A class stores) and when we arrived back at barracks after the ex (some of the boys singing “Highway to Hell” on the ride home) laundry workers found rounds in one of the section’s dirty linen. And still no one had confessed.

Again the Platoon expected a thrashing and again instead found themselves in a more “tree-hugging” situation- a meeting with a member of Company hierarchy. “This Platoon,” the staff member said, “is not performing. Why is it that the Company’s performance is up here”- indicating with one hand- “while Judson’s performance is down here?” indicating a much lower level. To the sea of stunned faces: “or did you not know that?”
“We didn’t know that,” someone finally said. If the recruits didn’t perform, the staff member said, they wouldn’t be graduating. At this point, Fenton noted that morale was low and gave, as a reason, an incident that had occurred shortly before KR. Judson had achieved the first of the goals Sir had set for them: everyone that ran the second RFL got a G1 pass, and was extremely happy and proud. A few hours afterwards in corridor, however, an enraged staff member assured the Platoon that he had taken note of those who had shown unrealistic improvement. An NCO from another Platoon had informed this staff member that he had overheard members of Judson discussing a strategy in which they had supposedly given less than a hundred percent on the first RFL so that their second RFL time would look more impressive. The Platoon, who had not in fact cheated in this way, was very upset by the way in which this accusation belittled their achievement. It is not surprising that Recruit Fenton made the choice to bring this event up in the meeting with Company hierarchy, given that the recruits had been continually encouraged to discuss their feelings about training and to bring up what they saw to be staff issues.

However, as the response to this made clear, by adhering to this aspect of what he had been taught, Fenton, and Judson as a whole, were at the same time not acting in line with another key disposition:

Here’s a secret. You’ll be treated like crap. You need to get over it. On my Basic we had irons placed on our hands and we got over it- we had to because we wanted to be here. You’re going to be called everything under the sun. I think a lot of people in this room have this hurdle, they can’t get over it. You need to have a thick skin [...] Big, bad Army, what are you going to do, throw your toys out of the cot? Get over it. There is no room for feelings in the Army, Christ.

*There is no room for feelings in the Army* is of course the crucial point of “get over it.” It is not necessarily that you don’t have them. It is that you *act* as if you do not. Just as with the lesson about your mate’s failure being your failure however, this was not always clear to us. This was because we were also, in numerous meetings and corridors, being asked to not only have feelings and opinions but to share them, which necessitates actively remembering events and thinking them over, rather than quickly taking on board the lesson intended and

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27 The recruits were addressing the staff member by rank at the end of each sentence, but I have omitted the rank for anonymity.
then moving on. It had been at least implied that if we thought a problem was someone else’s fault, we were empowered to air this, rather than just letting it go. This particular contradiction then was due to new procedures interacting badly with underlying Army dispositions.

In fact throughout the meeting with the member of Company hierarchy both messages were present. Judson was asked about relationships within sections and when someone responded, “I think we have personality clashes” the staff member reiterated “get the hell over it.” Lewis said that he thought everyone mocked each other a bit too much (which now seems like something that would have elicited another get over it) but this time the response emphasised expressing your feelings: “It’s not a bitch session if you sit down with Sergeant. He wants to hear your genuine concerns.”

The meeting also touched on some other confusions when we were asked, “I go on about teamwork but who is it down to?”

“Yourself.”

Yourself. I go on about teamwork but it just takes one person to take a whole section down. You’re not going to make it in the Army if you can’t make it in your section of eight to ten. If you want to graduate you need to get over yourselves. That’s the problem. Get over yourself.

When Tawhara opined that there was too much immaturity and people constantly fucked up, the staff member asked “are they helped? Do you tell them to shut the fuck up?” We did, confirmed Tawhara, and Young added, “They don’t listen, they take it as a personal attack.” Thus many of the Platoon were still adopting the individual discourse in which if someone didn’t accept your help, it was their own fault (for not getting over it).

The Phantom Shitter did apparently confess that night; the staff member came back to tell us “we have what we need.” This was such a relief that one of the boys buried his face in his hands and cried. I never found out for sure who the Phantom Shitter was; Judson kept their promise that as long as there was a confession, no one would go publically digging for the truth. Judson VC was however by now well and truly the “starring” Platoon. To be “starring” is to be discussed constantly amongst the wider unit, and if you are discussed
constantly it is because you have failed in a spectacular enough way to be discussed. Everybody had taken to calling Judson “Pringles Platoon”, a reference to the UDs, as in “once they pop, they can’t stop.”

The next thing to happen, however, was the pre-planned switch between one phase of Basic and the next, that is, the loosening of supervision and the further emphasising of individual punishment in the expectation that recruits could now self-discipline. This happened on schedule to the Company as a whole just before mid-course leave, seemingly without taking into account where each individual platoon was actually at. Thus Judson was graduated to a new stage literally days after being told that they had not yet proved themselves capable of the previous stage. This was yet another mixed message, as some recruits interpreted certain elements of the switch to be a “good sign” in relation to their progress. The night before mid-course leave, the staff member on duty reiterated “there’s nothing worse than marching out with someone who didn’t do the job.”

On return from midcourse break, Judson turned to interpreting their recent experiences in the same eager way that they had valued hardship at the beginning of Basic: they would become better soldiers because of it. Judson cast themselves, basically, as the underdog. We could see ourselves as the underdog because of the fact that Judson had stricter staff than the rest of the Company and thus, we thought, a much harder time of training. At this time the Platoon gained three new recruits, backsquadded from the Basic before us due either to injury or lack of soldier qualities, who confirmed that their previous platoons had been less strict. Telling the story of his backsquadding, Recruit Alexander noted: “I said, please don’t send me to Judson, I heard they get thrashed a lot.” We also continued to compare ourselves to Hardham VC and the other two platoons, especially now we shared duty NCOs with Hardham, feeling that inspections by Judson NCOs were harder than those by others, that other platoons prioritised getting to the mess on time whilst we just fit that in around training, and that Judson did extra training, i.e. carrying full packs around as conditioning the week before the BET (Battle Efficiency Test) whilst the other platoons just continued to carry day bags. Whilst some of this had basis in truth, Judson was also constructing a view of the other platoons that was much more about how it wanted to see itself than about what was actually going on in those platoons. Once we witnessed a Hardham NCO walk past a group of his recruits, and all of them scream “NCO!” much like
Judson used to at the beginning of Basic. Hughes, Whareaitu and Raukawa had a conversation about how we would have got in trouble for that: “It’s not professional. We’ll be more professional when we get to our units.” In these ways of course, rather than getting over the fact that their staff were stricter, Judson was dwelling on it.

The underdog story was even more concretely fixed on the Top Platoon Award to be handed out at the March Out parade. The recruits assumed that this decision was made numerically, i.e. that whichever platoon had accumulated the most top placings in various assessments would be named Top Platoon, and that this meant Judson was in the running. Judson had topped the RFL and also came first in reactive/instinctive shooting. The last few weeks of Basic involved countless speculation: “We missed the AWQ [Annual Weapons Qualification] but if we take Ex Warrior [the section Skill at Arms competition] or the Drill comp…”

One weekend night on which there was nothing on the training programme for us to do, the duty NCOs decided to bring all of the platoons in the Company together and have each of the 12 sections present a skit on some part of their training thus far. It was a Hardham duty NCO night and we spent the late afternoon coming up with our skits. After dinner, the Hardham NCO, Corporal Leggatt, sent us to do fatigues. Coming through our barracks shortly thereafter, Corporal found people in their rooms rather than out doing fatigues, and believed them to be going jack. Our punishment was to do Hardham’s share of the fatigues in the common areas that we shared for a week. At this stage most of Judson felt that all Corporal Leggatt had seen was people putting their smocks away after dinner before beginning fatigues. Indeed, this had all the elements of something that we might feel put upon about— we had to do Hardham’s fatigues, it was Hardham’s own Corporal that had made this decision, and we didn’t think we were in the wrong. 2 Section decided to talk to our staff about it. At this point, however, we had to go and perform skits.

Most sections chose to re-enact one of their greatest hits, generally either drunken escapades after a function or some memorable beasting. One section from a platoon other than Judson or Hardham had written a song mocking everybody, including themselves, set to “Summer Nights” from Grease: “Judson Platoon are trigger happy/That’s why they have eight UDs”. The skit from a Hardham section revolved entirely around this joke, and basically had the section marching around UDing every two seconds. At this stage two of
Judson’s sections had yet to have their turns and were inspired by the opportunity to communicate with the rest of the Company. They had some things they wanted everyone to know. 2 Section decided to be direct and re-enacted that night on KR. Although they played some parts for laughs (particularly a bawling fake confession), for the most part this skit was greeted with silence. “Yours was too realistic, bro!” Owen said to Tawhara at the break. “I just kept remembering, it wasn’t funny.” Hall said, “Now they know how we have it.” The Platoon was getting fired up. 1 Section gathered to discuss quickly changing their skit, specifically to a re-enactment of a series of events in which they believed Judson had been treated harshly, with 2 Section sitting behind them chiming in with ideas: “Do the RFL we did really well in, when [they] said we cheated!” 1 Section took this advice: “We all passed, like [our staff] wanted,” intoned the narrator. “Ok team, you all passed, like we wanted,” said the recruit acting as the staff member in question. “You must have cheated!” They then moved onto a pack march that their section had completed near the end of KR:

You must pass all the platoons. What are you doing drinking, Ellis? Did you think that your body needed water? You thought wrong! Stay hydrated. Oh, we’re finished. Did I say stop? Ok we’ve passed all the other platoons. I’m disappointed.

“This is just nightmares over again,” Owen commented. The section began to move onto yet another incident when Corporal Leggatt cut them off: “Okay, that’s enough of that.”

“We had ten more coming!” yelled Tawhara from the audience. Judson considered the night a triumph. They discussed at length both their own response to the skits (it was too depressing to be funny, everyone slumped in their seats) and the response from the rest of the Company: “The Hardham girls kept asking, did you actually do that?!”

Raukawa: I saw Corporal Leggatt go [mimes wide eyed shock] when they called us dogs.

Hiroti: Hard, eh. Now they fucking know.

Raukawa: About time.

And a few days later:

Recruit: it was funny all ours were about how [we get treated] like shit.

Longmire: Now the other platoons know.
Raukawa: And the Corporals too. It’s funny how everyone took the piss out of us, and then when we took the piss out of ourselves, they were just like, Oh. That’s what it’s really like.

Corporal Leggatt ended the skit night by reinforcing the expectation that recruits get over it: “If you’ve had fun made of you or whatever, don’t have a cry or anything. If you’ve had feelings about it come and see me after. I’ll send you to the Padre, he might give you a tissue.” Judson Platoon had, in their cathartic release, shown that there were a number of things that they had not let go.

However despite this, or perhaps because they finally felt they had achieved some recognition of their grievances, the Platoon almost immediately followed this up with a thorough display of getting over it, the first time we had really done so. On arriving back to barracks from the skits, I heard through the rumour mill that 2 Section had indeed gone to talk to our Sergeant about the fatigues. We next heard that a Platoon meeting had been called for 2035, and I assumed that 2 Section had called it. In fact, it was Owen and 3 Section, and it was not at all what I was expecting. “I’m guilty of this too,” Owen began, and then told the Platoon that generally only a few people went down to do fatigues, with many staying in their rooms, thus acknowledging the validity of the reprimand that we had been given. Moataane chimed to say, “Yeah, take it on the chin.” Hunter uncharacteristically spoke up to say that we needed to stop whingeing, no matter how unfair we thought it all was, and just do the fatigues. Meehan took the opportunity to say that he’d heard a lot of talk that there was only two weeks of hard work left (in two weeks, Exercise Final Challenge and Exercise Warrior would be finished, leaving only the drill competition, March Out rehearsal, and admin) but that we can’t think of it like that, “We have to think it’s four weeks of hard work and then we can pat ourselves on the back. Otherwise we’ll switch off, and we’ll get raped, again. We always do. Four weeks and then we can have a break.”

“Except infantry,” Wereta interjected, and the riflemen laughed (we had just found out that Corps Training started three and a half days after Basic ended). Wereta also felt people should think of the remaining four weeks as a challenge rather than as hard: “KR wasn’t going to be hard, but we made it hard, with what we did.” Young said, “Less talking, more working.” So not only did the Platoon call a tree-hugging type meeting to tell each other to get over themselves, they did it with a sense of urgency and cut it short to get back to
fatigues. Sometime during this, both Corporal Leggatt and our own Sergeant walked past and looked bemused, but left us to whatever it was we were up to. My fieldnotes that night indicate the process of accepting the need to let things go:

I found myself thinking that now we’ve gotten over the unfair punishment thing all we need to do is get over the hard done by strict thing. Which indicates I’ve started thinking we should get over this, rather than have a right to feel hard done by.

I sound faintly surprised that my thoughts have actually come to this. Two years later writing this, after having spent a year with the infantry, I am instead surprised that I ever thought we had the right to complain about being hard done by because of the actions of superiors. There is a fairly common saying in the Army, used when soldiers have done something wrong because they were ordered to, in which the person that gave the order will say to the soldiers: “My mistake. Your fault.”

Although this was a huge breakthrough, it was not followed by Judson always acting in line with soldier dispositions. Rather, I would say that by the end of Basic Judson as a whole was capable of switching on and acting with a sense of urgency and did so very well at times (once for example giving ourselves only six minutes for the whole Platoon to eat lunch at the mess to rectify being behind on a timing due to no fault of our own). However, Judson did not always choose to switch on; that is, we weren’t consistently applying the dispositions everywhere, every time. Within this of course individual recruits were more consistent than others. There continued to be issues such as forgetting to fetch people from the bathroom for corridor and dirty boots on the parade ground. “I almost feel like you guys are being insubordinate because I have to keep telling you the basics,” one staff member said in exasperation. After one such incident in which Sir had told the Platoon they had switched off, Owen commented, “It’s not because we had switched off, it’s because we were brain-dead from marching all day.” Instead of agreeing, Hughes responded: “No, we had switched off and couldn’t find our way back to the light switch.” Owen accepted the correction: “The bulb is blown, and we can’t find the cupboard with the new bulbs.”

However, a few weeks from the end of Basic, the mixed messages were complicated even further, again in a move that affected the whole Company and which was not completely related to actual performance. The recruits were deprived of their self-leadership
privileges, the things that were markers of their having successfully achieved soldierhood. Platoons were placed back on the same level of supervision we had had at the beginning of Basic, one duty NCO per platoon until March Out, and could no longer march themselves places. This was largely because the NCOs had been taking liberties with their decreased workload. Several had not turned up to supervise the platoons during the weekend between Final Challenge and Exercise Warrior. Judson’s for example had not, as promised, turned up to help the recruits prepare their dress uniforms for March Out (a much anticipated event, again due to the importance of uniform in the interobjective construction of soldiers). In the absence of supervision, recruits from various platoons had been caught by the Camp’s Orderly Sergeants in various infractions: “the rooms were shit, there were dudes running around in bike pants, half a Platoon had decided to go to the weights room, and there were girls half-dressed with the doors open.” The OC was very open that this was partially a punishment for his staff: “you guys failed and they failed.” The hammer wouldn’t come down on us, “because it wasn’t really your fault.” A few days later an NCO was punishing Judson with the prone bridge, and got down with them:

You’re probably wondering why we’re back to collective punishment. I’m a big believer in teamwork. We celebrate victory as a team and suffer defeat as a team. I do punishments because if you screw up, it’s my fault because I let you down.

**Soldier Dispositions: Ngāti Tūmatauenga and building rapport**

Through these periods of low morale the Platoon would always pull themselves up and re-engage with training with determination. Some of the training that was enjoyed the most was that related to being a member of Ngāti Tūmatauenga, particularly haka and waiata\(^ {28} \) training for the March Out Parade, and an overnight stay at the Army Marae, referred to as Exercise Tūmatauenga. The recruits had been welcomed onto the Marae on the second day of Basic, and Corporal Taumata began the first haka training session by saying that learning that haka was as much a part of the curriculum as the RFL, and asking two Māori recruits what tribe they were from. After they answered, he told the Company that any one of them now had an answer to that question. He then asked a blond, blue-eyed recruit what his tribe was. The recruit stumbled in pronouncing Ngāti Tūmatauenga, and Corporal spoke about

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\(^ {28} \)“To sing”, “song” (Moorfield, 2011, p.235).
the importance of pronunciation, comically mispronouncing some common Anglo-Saxon first names to make his point. Likewise, in the lead-up to the Basic day trip he made sure to correct many people’s anglicised pronunciations of the destination, Taupō: now you’re in Ngāti Tūmatauenga, you have to pronounce Taupō correctly. Most stayed back during the lesson break to keep practicing the haka, and a recruit from a minority ethnic group who was especially into it responded to praise for a passionate performance with, “Yeah, I’m more Māori than you Māori fellas!”

“What iwi are you?” challenged Hughes.

“Ngāti Tūmatauenga,” he responded blithely, and with correct pronunciation.

When Judson and Hardham sat down in the wharenui29 on Ex Tūmatauenga, they were asked, “Who doesn’t have a marae?” A good number of Pākehā recruits fell for this, putting their hands up as other recruits yelled, “You’re sitting on it!” at them. We were divided into work parties, to work on the hāngī30, to set up mattresses, to set the dining room, and to cook the extra components of dinner, fried bread and boil up. While Judson had remembered to pick up our cut lunches for the day, Hardham had forgotten, and made a batch of fried bread instead, the (white) Hardham females yelling, “It’s for Hardham only!” when they served it, greatly disturbing some Māori recruits. I was also told by one recruit that they and other Māori members of their section were sick of how the section was “so white” in the way they dealt with food. When recruits were allowed to go to the Waiouru supermarket or café for food, it was organised by section, so that often only a few section members would go for everyone. The Pākehā recruits in this section would then carefully divvy everything up down to the exact number of biscuits each individual was entitled to. At home, Raukawa said, they were used to sharing and treating guests like royalty. Raukawa and Whareaitu would consistently add generous amounts of their money to the section fund whilst others were freeloaders: “But you’re in the Army now, you need to be professional.” At the Marae, the NCOs’ families came and had dinner with us, and we were indeed instructed to treat them like royalty. The females went for food first, a practice which is transposed to all meals in the Army at which there are guests present, whether

29 “Meeting house”, “main building of a marae” (Moorfield, 2011, p.259).
30 “Earth oven to cook food with steam and heat from heated stones” (Moorfield, 2011, p.24).
they are held on a marae or not. Most female soldiers are awkward and hesitant about this, and most male soldiers respond by yelling at them to hurry up because they’re hungry.

We were supposed to learn mihimihi (during which recruits would have been able to introduce themselves as belonging to Ngāti Tūmatauenga for the first time), but ran out of time. Instead everyone introduced themselves in English. We were instructed to end with a song but almost everyone refused (which very strangely we were let away with) except for one recruit who sang an advertising jingle and another who sang Amazing Grace in his own language because “I’m sick of all the songs in Māori and not knowing what they mean so I’m going to sing in [my language]”. After this we (shockingly) had free time, and some of us sat around while Raukawa and the recruit who had sung Amazing Grace told us traditional myths from their iwi and culture, respectively.

On Basic we also had one lecture on “interpreting the customs and norms of a culture,” “fitting into unfamiliar cultures,” “building relationships and trust” and “winning the hearts and minds of local people”. My notes indicate that my impression at the time was that it wasn’t too different to an anth 101 course in that it focused on getting across the idea that differing cultural backgrounds affect how situations may be perceived. Examples were given to demonstrate the possibility of misinterpreting something as basic as what emotions were being expressed facially. The examples themselves however would be a bit too codified and pattern-based for most contemporary anthropologists (there was said to be (only) seven universally recognised human emotions, and seven important continuums along which cultures differed, i.e. individualism vs collectivism, implicit vs explicit communication). These were, however, obviously practical attempts to quickly teach recruits to recognise diversity, and it was emphasised that soldiers should be willing to adapt and get involved in the local culture.

Conclusion

If this was a movie, Judson VC would have won Top Platoon. But this was not a fictional story about an underdog, no matter how well we had told it to ourselves, and Hardham VC Platoon won not only Top Platoon, but also Top Recruit, Exercise Warrior, and the drill

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competition. Top Platoon was not, as we had thought, based on numbers. As the Company’s 21C told me when I went to check with him that my non-participations weren’t being converted to zeroes and counted towards Judson’s scores, it was judged more subjectively, based on “a feeling.” The morning that Judson Platoon marched out of Basic Training- minus twelve original members who had not made it- the Platoon Commander gave a speech:

115 days ago you formed up on that white line […] You have been equipped with basic skills and the mindset and the values you need to live by. That’s up to you. You have been given as much guidance and direction as you are probably going to get. It’s up to you now. Once you get to your unit, if you want to do no PT or go on LDs and be a sack of shit you can probably get away with it, believe it or not. Do the right thing and keep it up.

Lest anyone is tempted to read this chapter as showing that the problems in Judson VC Platoon were caused by newer, more “tree-hugging” methods disrupting the older, stricter Army standbys, it should be noted that Judson always seemed to be stricter than Hardham, and the results would tend to show that it was Hardham that were doing things right. Although we cannot on this data therefore assign preference to any of the competing dispositions in their ability to produce good soldiers, we can see that the fact that there were competing dispositions was disruptive to the internalisation process. In some cases by enacting one disposition you were necessarily failing at another.

The reason for this is that some, but crucially not all, of the implicit processes involved in Basic Training had been converted to symbolic mastery. The idea that Generation Z liked to have their say, originally a perception of the NCOs who worked at TAD at the time of the 2008 Cultural Review, was made explicit when they were interviewed by the review’s authors and subsequently formalised in that document. It was then acted upon in All Arms Recruit Courses. When it was acted upon, however, it clashed with the underlying “get over it” disposition, which remained in the realm of practical mastery in that it was being passed on to recruits without fully reaching the level of conscious thought or discourse. Although it is a vital disposition in the soldier habitus, enabling soldiers’ readiness to deal effectively with anything, the words “get over it,” appear in only one place in two years’ worth of my fieldnotes. The only time I ever heard them uttered by a soldier was in that one discussion Judson had with Company hierarchy after Exercise KR. That is, in order to be able to write about this disposition, I have named it after the one time in which it was discussed explicitly
and at length, a discussion that ordinarily would not have occurred and only did occur because of what TAD saw as unusually severe difficulties in embodying the soldier habitus. The other times I heard the disposition (obliquely) referred to also tended to occur when someone was inching too close towards acting against it (see Chapter Nine, Deployment). Presumably then, “get over it” had never been codified to the extent that the need for Generation Z to have their say was- likely it was so obvious and fundamental that no one ever thought to discuss it. This means that the two dispositions were probably never placed side by side in any formal body of knowledge, and therefore could not be examined simultaneously, allowing the potential for contradiction to go unnoticed. I didn’t consciously notice it myself until more than a year later, when I started collating and coding my fieldnotes.

The resultant poor performance of Judson was devastating to the recruits, and the reasons for this lie in the relationship between the primary practical and secondary soldier habitus. What was presented to Judson Platoon as a failure to take on soldier dispositions signalled a failure in their deepest embodied motivations: the desire to change and prove themselves. The practical habitus initially led recruits to be disappointed in the process of embodying the soldier habitus, as the beginning of Basic Training wasn’t as challenging as expected. This same primary habitus seemingly paradoxically also led them to be resentful of the difficulty they encountered that night on KR. This was because, although that night on KR was challenging and physical, it wasn’t productive, in that the recruits didn’t feel it directly related to internalising soldier dispositions. In the face of failure however, the recruits consistently drew on the practical habitus: apart from that night on KR, they repeatedly reframed their difficulties as just another challenge, sometimes even reinterpreting straightforward statements that they weren’t up to par as deliberate untruths designed to inspire them. Reframing these difficulties as challenges turned them into something productive, as recruits always took the view that the greater the challenge, the more effective the personal transformation that would result. In this way the recruits always managed to pull themselves out of the mire of low morale, enabling them to refocus with renewed energy on internalising the soldier habitus. The new soldier disposition of “get over it”, just beginning to shape their practice, also contributed to this ability, with the two habitus beginning to meld in both generating the same actions. Despite the
disappointments and difficulties Judson faced, by the end of Basic Training the recruits had to varying degrees internalised soldier dispositions.

Infantry recruits like Wereta, Wheeler and Ellis were due at Burnham Military Camp just three and a half days after March Out for Combat Corps Training, a course which turned out to be more fulfilling than Basic, and which did not require the embodiment of conflicting dispositions. There was not as much new “tree-hugging bullshit” at Corps Training, where even 3CI was almost completely ignored. It was made clear early and often that your mate’s failure was always your failure, and individual punishment disappeared. Likewise, the public expression of feelings and opinions was not encouraged. Thus the Corps Trainees did not get a say, and had to let go of some of the individual-centred viewpoints they had been able to retain at Basic, putting even more of their pre-existing dispositions in disjuncture. Yet they much preferred Corps Training to Basic. Having to change these dispositions was much more challenging than having them catered to, and was therefore more in line with the deeper primary practical habitus. Having now completed Basic Training, the Corps Trainees were acting in line with soldier dispositions. Despite this, however, their period of becoming was not over. They were soldiers, but had yet to become riflemen.
Chapter Seven

Corps Training

Combat Corps Training

Depot Company, 2/1 Battalion, Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment

Burnham Military Camp

The Role of the RNZIR:
To seek out and close with the enemy
To kill or capture him
To seize and hold ground
To repel attack, by day or night
Regardless of season, weather or terrain

The Motto of the RNZIR:
Onward

During Corps Training, Private Arnold announced to his roommate Kereama and I: “just because someone is a sack, doesn’t mean he’s a bad soldier.” Kereama and I were shocked: being a sack was by definition being a bad soldier, and we told Arnold so. But Arnold said no, being a sack was being ineffectual at “things that don’t matter, like ironing and tucking in.” Indeed, visible uniform or equipment deficiencies were the most common way to get yourself called a sack, a word which conveys disorder and hence incompetence. Kereama and I couldn’t believe that Arnold thought ironing and tucking in didn’t matter. It’s attention to detail, we told him. It gives you the ability to complete tasks quickly. In other words, when Arnold challenged the connection that had been made at Basic Training
between small everyday tasks and the ability to perform soldierhood, myself and Kereama leapt to its defence, instantly spouting the party line. Most trainees had arrived at Corps Training with soldier dispositions in place. Not only was Kereama demonstrating a unthinking knowledge of soldier dispositions, when another trainee showed that he had not likewise internalised them, Kereama immediately acted to try and get him up to standard.

The Combat Corps Training Course that I observed was made up of the riflemen and crewmen from two All Arms Recruit Courses, the one that I had followed and one that had marched out a month earlier. The Corps Trainees make up Depot Company, nominally part of 2/1st Battalion, Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment, although it was made clear that the trainees hadn’t earned Battalion membership yet. The trainees were divided into three platoons, two infantry platoons and one platoon that contained the crewmen as well as some riflemen for whom there wasn’t room in the infantry platoons. Depot Company is housed in Quinn’s Post, a three story barracks, with one platoon on each floor. There was only one Orderly NCO (ONCO) in the barracks per night, and when he wanted to give an order, he would call the whole Company to the corridor of the particular Platoon he belonged to. I was embedded with 3 Platoon, the infantry platoon that contained most of the riflemen from the Basic that I had followed, including, from Judson Platoon, Wheeler, Moataane, Mitchell and Hunter, as well as ex-Hardham recruits like Kereama. Others from Judson, such as Wereta and Ellis, were in different platoons. Within 3 Platoon I was placed with 2 Section. All platoons and sections discussed in this chapter are referred to by different numerical designations than they had in reality. Soldiers, and particularly riflemen, refer to themselves collectively as “the boys”, for example, “I went to town with the boys”. The trainees began using this phrase during Corps Training, and therefore from now on I refer to them using their own chosen terminology.

In the previous chapter on Basic Training, the process of internalising the soldier habitus became clear when it went awry, causing more explicit discussion of the process than is usual. At Corps Training, by contrast, most trainees had successfully embodied the soldier habitus. While in Judson there were contradictory messages about how a soldier should act, Corps Training was coherent and consistent throughout. In this stage of my research therefore, the process of embodying the soldier habitus is most clearly seen in the few
individuals who were still struggling with it, and the way in which the more adept trainees reacted to them.

Corps Training built on and extended soldier dispositions introduced at Basic, as well as introducing some new but complementary emphases, particularly an emphasis on confidence. In terms of process, at Corps Training the internalisation of the soldier habitus by each individual was very much seen to be a team effort and was achieved intersubjectively through the relationships between the trainees. During Corps Training the boys achieved individual identity projects through conforming to uniformity, playacted gay relationships with one another in order to reinforce soldier dispositions, and demonstrated will through submission to orders.

Corps Training was fulfilling because it was more challenging than Basic. It’s not that Basic didn’t provide challenge, but that because the practical habitus is durable, it isn’t satisfied by completing one challenge. Rather, people with this habitus continue seeking even greater challenges. Of the four fields in which the boys were located over the first year and a half of their careers, Corps Training was the field to which their practical habitus was most closely matched, in that it was at Corps Training that the process of embodying the soldier habitus was most demanding. However, several elements of the boys’ later disjuncture first appeared at Corps Training, and begin to show how life in the Army for those who have already embodied the soldier habitus may be less fulfilling. Although intersubjective relationships were emphasised even more than at Basic, the way in which recruits had become soldiers interobjectively began to break down a bit. That is, some trainees became less willing to buy into the connection between small everyday tasks and soldiering, and therefore no longer accepted every activity as a valid instance of “doing something”, or of doing something productive. The boys continued to evaluate their training based on their theory of identity acquisition, which should be demanding but not demeaning. Learning to master a multitude of new requirements for everyday living is challenging; performing them once they are already mastered is not. Trainees began to feel that at times they were “being fucked around,” – that is, that their time and energy was being wasted on the unproductive. In response to this the boys were taught another set of unofficial Army dispositions to internalise, this time summed up in the sayings “playing the game” and “the crime is getting caught.”
I will first outline the riflemen dispositions that the Corps Trainees needed to internalise, and the intersubjective process that Corps Training staff insisted that they use to do so. Section will then be used as a specific case study of how this intersubjective identity acquisition worked out in practice. I will then discuss the other important mode of pre-existing identity that the trainees had brought with them to the Army: their ethnic identities and how staff explicitly presented these as tools that could be used in various aspects of soldiering.

**Riflemen Dispositions and Process: How the infantry distinguish themselves from the rest of the Army**

On the first day of Corps Training, the CO of 2/1\textsuperscript{st} Battalion told the trainees that during this course “you will grow into your skin as a soldier,” a metaphor that suggests that they had already embodied the soldier habitus but here would become comfortable and confident in this identity. In a morning of introduction speeches from the hierarchy, key soldier dispositions were emphasised, particularly being able to cope with anything (by getting over it, not focusing on how you felt but rather getting on with the job) and teamwork (which will help you to cope with anything). The CO, for example, said:

> You need teamwork. If someone is having trouble help them out- we’re more interested in seeing the Section ready to go as a team than half and half […] It will be tough. Keep going. You will be better for it. You’ve got some hard work ahead of you but what one man- or woman- can do another can do. It’s not insurmountable.

These familiar dispositions however were now more specifically aimed at one objective. Over and over again that day the boys were told that soldiers marching out of Corps Training had to be capable of going straight onto a Pre-Deployment Training (i.e. the period of specialised training a unit goes through right before they are deployed overseas) and that this had happened to trainees in the past. At the end of the course, you were deemed deployable, and thus “from now on, everything we do will be operationally focused.” The boys needed to start “thinking that way” the OC of Depot Company said, “Because in six months you could be deployed.” Likewise the CO stated that there was plenty of work for them and they would probably be looking at a deployment soon.
What’s more, the soldier’s job as that of killing became explicit. The Regimental Sergeant Major of 2/1st said:

Our job is about killing people. Our job is about doing it effectively. If you don’t want to do that, leave. It will get cold. It will get wet. You lip will hit the ground. Suck it up. Pick it up. Get on with it. When it gets hard we want people who sit there and say “I’ve done worse,” and get on with it. When there’s no light at the end of the tunnel look around, you mate is next to you. Use each other to get through. Have fun. Use self-discipline.

(He also said, “Be careful of girls, they like to take soldiers and turn them into farmers.”)

Likewise, 3 Platoon’s Platoon Commander said:

You’re not an individual; you’re working as a team, so if you do something wrong, you are letting your section down. If you do something wrong, pick yourself up. [...] Our job is what? What are we here for?

Killing, Sir.

Good, killing the enemy. [If you] don’t kill him, he’ll kill you. Or your mates.

Only one of the speakers gave a different view of what might happen after Corps Training, the RSM stating that everything they trained in here they would do again when they reached their units, over and over,

Down to level four which means instinct [...] That is what you sign up for, men [...] Don’t think of this as a course I have to get to the end of. It’s just training- exactly the same as you’ll be doing when you get out to the units.

Amidst the much more exciting visions of the future being painted by other staff members, however, this advice went largely unheeded.

Corps Training was what the recruits, disappointed by the early lack of yelling, had wanted Basic to be. It turned out that the Corporals on Basic had never really screamed at us at all. Rather they had lectured us in loud voices, which I hadn’t realised until I arrived in Burnham and heard real screaming. Activities that were punishments on Basic were done routinely by Depot Company as a matter of course: 30 push ups before every meal, doubling most places they went. There were push up and pull up breaks in lessons. On day three Wheeler announced that just today he had done ten times as many push ups as any Basic day, and he
wasn’t exaggerating. Corps Training was very physically challenging. Sometimes the trainees hated it. And also they sometimes loved it. In fact, they loved it because they hated it.

“Man, Basic was lame, eh?” Moataane declared, “Compared to this.” Wheeler responded, “Basic was shit! All that really easy stuff that we found so hard.” When we discovered a note on the corridor’s whiteboard instructing all trainees who did not yet have a passport to add their names to a list, one boy marvelled, “Even the admin here is more exciting.” I noticed over the course of my research that while many soldiers like to reminisce about Basic, riflemen rarely do. They talk about Corps Training instead; it is a much more significant event. Private Phelan checked several times, both during Corps Training and in the Solomon Islands, that I was going to cover Basic and Corps Training in separate chapters, because he only wanted to read about Corps Training: “not stupid Basic”.

On the first day of Corps Training, the Platoon Commander had announced, “Remember, you’re infantry. That makes you better than 99.99% of the rest of society.” By that night Mitchell and Wheeler were already scoffing about how easy the medics (including people who less than a week ago had been their section members) had it: no reveille, 4.30pm knock-offs, every weekend off: “bullshit.” Moataane and I ran into one such medic, Meehan, on the day of the first Corps Training RFL (Required Fitness Level assessment). Meehan was in civvies and on the regular side of the mess, while Moataane and I were in the segregated Corps Training section in uniform. “What are you doing?” said Moataane. “I don’t know. PT I think,” said Meehan. “RFL?” asked Moataane. “Nah,” said Meehan. This was greeted with complete silence by Moataane. The NCOs very directly and purposefully instilled in the boys an exclusive group identity in which the infantry was distinguished as superior to the rest of the Army. Interactions such as Moataane and Meehan’s had been observed, as at the end of the first week Depot Company was called into the corridor and told, “no more talking to your pogue friends in the mess, you know who you are. No talking to your other military mates on leave tomorrow, no old TF (Territorial Force) or cadet friends.” Pogue, which is such an old military term that we no longer know its origins, refers to soldiers who aren’t in the combat trades. It is a dismissive and derogatory term. Soon afterwards a loggie from Kereama’s Basic platoon who had just arrived in camp approached Kereama in the mess with his hand out, and Kereama had to say, “Oh, we’re not allowed to talk to you.”
Process: Learning soldier skills and playacting

Corps Training was built around five key events, the first being the misleadingly named Range Week, which was two weeks at the West Melton Rifle Range in which trainees had to pass their Battle Efficiency Test (BET) as well as learn and be evaluated on nine separate weapon systems (Rifle (5.56mm Steyr), Machine Guns (5.56mm Light Support Weapon C9; 7.62mm General Purpose Machine Gun L7A1), Pistol (9mm Sig Sauer P226), Shotgun (Benelli M3), Grenade launcher (40mm M203 PI), Rocket Launcher (66mm M72 A6), Anti-tank gun (84mm Carl Gustaf M3), Anti-personnel mine (M18A1 Claymore CDF)). Then there were two field exes, open country in Waiouru (usually this takes place in Tekapo, but that year it was slotted into Exercise Takrouna, an Officer Cadet School exercise in which Cadets are tested on leadership and therefore need platoons to command) and close country on the West Coast in Exercise Tropic Warrior. Fourth was the urban phase, in which the trainees spent several weeks at Burnham’s UTF (Urban Training Facility), which was made up of a complex of furnished shipping containers. Last was Skill at Arms. Before West Melton, trainees re-did lessons on first aid, navigation and communications, and in between the other periods they did Post Exercise Administration, Physical Training, and Battle Prep.

The lessons themselves were remarkably continuous with those from Basic, with the same format and content to reinforce skills. But the Battle Handling Exercises (BHEs- tests of the skills learnt in lessons through enacting scenarios) were much preferred. All BHEs were based around combat scenarios. Unlike at Basic, where we treated victims of civilian car accidents or training accidents, we now playacted ambushed vehicle patrols in Afghanistan. You didn’t just practice sending though a supply request at a desk, the section had to jog to a secure location first, in a defensive diamond, with three jerry cans of water. Trainees also had to expand their knowledge of how to conduct war, not as straightforward as it might seem. As Kereama said of trying to explain what he did to his civvie friends: “they probably just think you pick up a weapon and run.” Rather, one must think about (in the simplest possible terms) who within the section goes where in particular scenarios, who covers what, who points their weapon which way, how to move forward, and how to communicate all of these things to each other. It became clear in the corrections given in such repetitive exercises that these things are not instinctive and need to be learnt.
Trainees remained engaged in playacted battle scenarios. For Takrouna, some trainees were given Tess sets, which consist of attachments to one’s rifle and uniform that basically work like laser tag and indicate who has been hit. “If you get hit it beeps,” the trainees were instructed. “It only stops beeping if you lie down. If you’re dead, you’re dead. Don’t try to be a Churchill or a Rommel and inspire your friends, it’s just confusing. Enjoy the rest.” Similarly, during the urban phase, paintball equipment was used. If you were hit in any limb, you were to grab it and start screaming, and Sergeant would come and assess your paint mark and tell you what type of injury you had: “If afterwards I see a paint mark on you and you’re not over with the wounded you’ll be doing 1000 push ups until you are wounded.” The boys were very keen on this: “People pay to do this! And we get paid to do it!” (“We get paid to run around a flagpole, too,” noted Kereama.) Afterwards the trainees were scolded for being too slow to get into buildings because they were “scared of a little bit of paint.” Usually, however, blank rounds were used and Corporals informed you if you had died (if, say, you stood in front of a window without clearing it first). There was contestation amongst trainees over who had died: “Ow, you’re dead, Murphy!” “Youse two are dead!” In fact when they used the paintballs the Platoon Commander emphasised the need to switch on, because silent paintballs don’t get the adrenalin going like using blanks (which sound similar to real rounds) does.

Riflemen Dispositions: Continuing dispositions, new dispositions

Corps Training continued the emphasis on transmitting dispositions implicitly on the level of practical mastery, and had much less focus on 3CI than Basic. Once, a 3 Platoon staff member walked in on me joking that what another staff member was about to do “wouldn’t show integrity,” and said “Don’t tell me you’ve been brainwashed into that 3CI stuff! We don’t really believe in that. As long as you can shoot straighter than the enemy.” Corps Training built on almost all of the dispositions introduced at Basic, the one exception being the propensity towards expressing discontentment to hierarchy. Some new dispositions were taught, which complemented those that had already been internalised, and which may have been around at Basic but were more explicit here. One was to be competitive, discussed in the next section. The other was to do everything with confidence, which was a primary focus of most staff. The OC said, “By the end of this course I want all of you to be
confident. Take the red diamond and say yes, I am a crewman/ripleman and I can do my job. Put me in with a section, I can learn the last little bits and be deployed.” (Riflemen are distinguished by a red diamond on the upper left sleeve of their SDs (Service Dress, i.e. ceremonial uniform), presented at March Out.) Confidence of course applies to job skills: “You’re not homos\(^{32}\) and you’re not 12 years old. I don’t want to see any of this [imitates a feeble gesture to ineffectively tell a detainee to back up]. You tell them what’s going to happen and then do it”. As with every disposition, however, confidence is also taught in small everyday ways. When someone mumbled an answer to a question on the marksmanship principles, Sir asked “how are you going to kill someone if you can’t talk like a man?” When answering questions you should “have confidence. Don’t guess, either know or don’t know, back yourself.” During Range Week Wheeler was bombing up (loading his magazine with ammo) and one of the NCOs said to him, “you’re making that look hard-what’s your name?”

“Umm, Wheeler, Corporal,” he answered, and the NCO responded, “Have some confidence, do you need to think about your name?” (“We can practice your confidence, Wheeler,” the boys would say to him later. “I’ll ask you your name.”) An NCO once “found” rounds in someone’s webbing during a range clearance, then declared, “Nah, I had that in my hand, I was trying to make you flap. But you should be so confident in your own personal checks you can say, ‘No, Corp, you did not find that on me.’”

The RNZIR’s motto, “Onward”, may also be seen as a disposition, which is closely connected to getting over it. At first I read “onward” as conjuring up romantic images of noble troops charging purposefully forward into battle, but came to realise that it actually means that it might be cold, and wet, and you are starving, and in pain, but you just keep putting one foot in front of the other and pushing on. This, and the superiority of riflemen, was expressed in a poem on the corridor walls:

No amount of airpower ever wins war, it can only help.

The artillery, tanks, and supply columns are only supporting troops.

\(^{32}\) As outlined in Chapter Four, although homophobic comments weren’t systematic, they were made every now and then.
In the end, one man, grimy, unshaven, tired, bleary eyed and ‘scared as hell’ will hoist himself up, grab his rifle and plug forward.

He is, the infantryman.

**Process and Riflemen Dispositions: Internalising dispositions intersubjectively**

The model of teamwork emphasised at Corps Training was still the one that incorporated individuality in that everybody had to concentrate and work on their own self in order not to let the team down. However, if somebody was letting the team down, addressing the issue was everybody’s responsibility. Corps trainees disciplined each other. At Basic, the recruits had had to learn to get over themselves and graciously accept and act on correction from their mates. At Corps Training the focus was on the other side of the coin: you had to learn to be the one doing the correcting. Everyone was to have the confidence to tell their mates when they weren’t performing. During a uniform inspection, the boys were told:

Check your buddies before a parade …He’s your mate; tell him if his shirt is a shower of shit. You’re all going to be leaders, one day you’re going to have to tell your mate beside you to sharpen up, even if he is your mate. If you do it on Corps Training, it’ll be easier.

In another pre-PT inspection the NCOs checked whether everyone’s water bottles were full and threw the half-empty ones around the corridor. Those who had failed had one minute to fill their bottles while everyone else was in the press up position, an NCO screaming: “Don’t just sit around doing nothing if you know your mate’s water bottles are empty!” This bemused me at the time, but yes, you are required to know such details about your section members, or to know, basically, whether they are squared away. In an early barracks inspection rubbish was found in the ablution block that 1 Section was responsible for, so 1 Section had to call out press up directions (“Lower! Hold! Raise!”) for the rest of the Platoon: “Did anyone check their ablutions for them? We watch each other’s backs in this trade.” In this way, in all such cases, it was not the people that had erred that were the primary focus of punishment: it was everyone else, those who had let it happen. If someone skipped breakfast the first question was always “Who was in his room? Why didn’t you get him up?” At Basic, recruits like Young gave up on section members who would not listen to correction, but this was not an option at Corps Training, which had a “whatever it takes”
mentality. Getting mates up to standard was to be done, it was implied, and a few times said directly, by any means necessary. And this was comradeship. If you did not get your mate in line (harshly, if it came to it) then you were going jack on him. If someone else was jack, you were jack, because you had let him be jack.

For example, one Sunday afternoon local leave had been cancelled despite there being no tasks for the boys to complete, so everyone spent the day bored, annoyed, and drifting around aimlessly. Most went to watch the rugby at Burnham’s sports bar, but Gibson stayed in barracks and drank half a bottle of contraband whiskey. He then, visibly drunk, went to the mess for dinner, splattering fish around as he served himself and having trouble feeding himself. “Who knew and let him go to the mess?” the trainees asked one another, echoing staff. The smokers who gathered around the barrack doors after dinner discussed whether they should “thrash the cunt, barracks justice.”

“I better go get that cunt some water,” someone sighed resignedly. Gibson’s section members, particularly Williams, took good care of him, and kept him and the rest of the Company safe from the thrashing that would come down if the NCOs noticed his condition, but did so very angrily, sprinting back and forth with vomit buckets whilst harshly ordering him around: “Go to the bathroom and stay there! Oy, Gibson, get up, do it now.”

“Fuck he’s a faggot,” Williams and Phelan agreed, and physically dragged him to the bathroom. Most of the boys were back at the bar by now watching league, and periodically checked up, texting: “How’s fuckwit doing?” They never did smash Gibson however. Instead they performed barracks justice Gen Z style: they drew “I love cock” all over his face and set him up a profile on a gay dating website.

Taking on soldier dispositions intersubjectively didn’t just apply to those trainees who were struggling, however. It was believed that by competing against one another, the boys pushed one another and hence everyone improved. Competition, of the sort which 2 Section in Judson Platoon had always mourned the lack of, was here encouraged. In his opening address, the RSM urged the trainees to take on a competitive disposition: “play a sport. It’s all about being competitive, learning to win and lose. It’s our job to win.” The Platoon Sergeant asked, “Competition’s good, who’s competitive? Friendly competition, but push each other.” Likewise after the first fitness assessment the Orderly NCO asked for the
highest number of push ups achieved, which was 64, and then said, “Everyone should be
trying to beat that guy, 65.” Especially during Range Week, the trainees continued their
practice of racing each other through weapons drills during their spare time. “Fuck I hate
races,” said Henare on one such occasion.

“No, that’s how you get good under pressure,” another trainee corrected him. “Everything’s
a competition with you,” I once said to Murphy, who answered, “competition. It makes you
better.” Thus even competition was about teamwork and helping each other improve as
individuals and team members. In this section, I will use two of the things that were most
important to the boys during Corps Training (food and thrashings) and one thing that they
did habitually (playing “gay chicken”) to illustrate the intersubjective ways in which riflemen
dispositions were internalised by each soldier, thus achieving individual identity projects not
in spite of, but through a normative focus on collectivity.

**Food**
The basic expression of being a good team player is the concept of jack, but amongst the
infantry this concept was more complicated than it might at first appear. Infantry teamwork
did not have the character of romantic self-sacrifice for one’s mates that war movies might
lead you to assume (and that, from my observations, some non-infantry soldiers seemed to
expect of riflemen). This can be seen in the example of food. The first complication of the
concept “jack” comes in the term “jackrats”. Jackrats (a combination of the words jack and
rations) are food brought along by soldiers on field exercises that isn’t Army issue, i.e.
chocolate, salami, tinned corned beef. Having “jack” in the name suggests that such food is
individual and selfish. However, bringing jackrats is just what you do; if you don’t have any,
it’s your own stupid fault. Although the hierarchy tried to ban jackrats during Corps Training,
the Section Commanders encouraged the boys to bring them as part of their training on
how to prepare for field exercises.

Food is a good site for looking at the relationships between Corps Trainees because it was
just so significant. It is hard to explain the extreme importance jackrats take on in a field
environment where otherwise all you are eating is ration packs or meals from hotboxes
(large containers filled with hot food driven out to your location) for weeks on end. The
opportunity to access different food, of your own choosing, is absolutely make or break for
morale. One naafi run (trip to somewhere food can be bought) can fix everything; one promised naafi run taken away is devastating. When we went to West Melton for Range Week, everyone stocked up. One of the Corporals had told us that you can take cheeseburgers to the field, because McDonalds is full of preservatives, so Murphy bought 20 along in his pack. They became an important trade good. Once he held a lolly scramble with half a cheeseburger, by now at least a week old, and people leapt over piles of weapons to reach it. Nearing the end of Range “Week” jackrats were running low. Murphy was getting desperate, and had focused this desperation on obtaining a can of V. Penn still had a few left and Murphy offered, “I’ll give you five cash, right now.” Penn wanted 20, and Murphy paid it with little haggling. He then went off:

I feel ripped off. I earn like $2.40 an hour so this V is ten hours of my work. Ten hours of being thrashed, and wanting to cry it hurt so much. And I’ll just piss it out. [Pause] This V tastes like angel tears... it was worth the thrashing.

During the first field ex, Private Somerville was brought to headquarters to see the medic, as he had smacked face first into his gun whilst displaying commendable aggression during an assault and bitten through his lip. He was still around HQ at dinner time, where there was a startling excess of barbeque rations and cake provided for staff. Somerville, however, refused to have any, because he didn’t want to be jack on his mates. He was adamant about this, despite having food offered to him repeatedly by the medic, the driver, myself, and Sar Major. Sar Major was so surprised and impressed that he told me about it later: “what a good guy.” This was fairly early on in Corps Training and I think reflects the way some people expected infantry teamwork to operate: you always sacrifice for your mates, whether this sacrifice brings them a concrete benefit or not. In this case it didn’t: by not eating Somerville did not increase his section’s food supply. I saw another example of this type of thinking during Basic, when a recruit on LDs, standing on the side of the parade ground watching drill practice, insisted on unnecessarily standing in the rain. If the rest of the Platoon was going to get wet, so was she.

It turned out however that this was not how infantry teamwork functioned (note that Sar Major was surprised by Somerville’s unusual behaviour). This can be seen most clearly in a later example from the Solomon Islands, when I saw another soldier, a medic, make this
same assumption about how riflemen would relate to each other. We had gone out to the
rifle range, which was not on the RAMSI base, for overnight jungle training and were on rat
packs. However the Sar Major and Platoon Sergeant had to drive back to base to switch out
some incorrect ammo, and the medic and I rode along. We got to base at 11.20am, so
Sergeant, Sar Major and I ate at the mess, and Sergeant made a wrap to bring back for the
Platoon Commander: “keep him happy.” Although most of the boys were patrolling in the
jungle, the Platoon Sig, who is based with the Platoon Commander rather than a section,
was with him on the range. The medic had been waiting in the vehicle, having declined to go
to the mess. When I told her that I had asked if a sandwich could be brought back for the sig
too, she responded that she bet he wouldn’t eat it if I brought it to him anyway. It became
clear that she had chosen not to go to the mess because the boys couldn’t. By this time I
had spent months around riflemen, and I was shocked by this assertion. I said of course he
would eat it, but she disagreed and suggested an experiment to see who was right. When
we got back to the range, the sig was up in his tower manning the radio, and two of the
sections had come back from patrolling. Sergeant gave the sig his sandwich, and he not only
had no compunctions about eating it, he did so right there in the tower, highly visible and in
front of all of his mates. They didn’t blink an eye (and Somerville was one of them). Wereta
asked us if we had eaten in the mess and when he learned that the medic hadn’t
immediately harshly declared, “that’s stupid” and belaboured the point, and I also was a bit
too publically glad that I had been right, until she obviously felt everyone was harping on
and told us to shut it. So I am sorry to be making a point of this again, but it does illustrate
an important fact about the nature of infantry teamwork.

Grunts will always take food if they can get it. They won’t worry about mates who didn’t
have the same opportunity because their mates would think anyone who turned it down
was stupid. The medic, like Somerville, had assumed that riflemen comradeship involved
making noble sacrifices for the purpose of solidarity; that if someone else was suffering, you
would suffer too, whether you needed to or not. When I mentioned this experiment later to
one of the territorial (i.e. part-time) soldiers in the Platoon, he said: “I wouldn’t have
[eaten], either!” Riflemen are much more practical than this. To them this just increases the
number of people suffering, which doesn’t help the team overall. In a war you would want
as many people as possible well-fed and thus able to fight effectively. Obviously if you can
acquire some jackrats for your mates as well you do. But if you can't, again a focus on your individual desires is not conceptualised as selfish, but rather as a way to improve the team.

**Gay Chicken**

As stated, the way in which good soldiers were conceptualised as being made was through everyone challenging one another to become better. This did not apply just to weapon drills but also to internalising riflemen dispositions. One form that such competition took was a common practice of gay playacting. By this I mean that soldiers play a game sometimes called “gay chicken” in which the object is to be able to act as if you are gay without flapping that people might be judging you. I found, over the course of my fieldwork, that riflemen consistently use homosexual metaphors. However, the tone and content of this playacting changed at different stages of their careers. In Corps Training, it was about overt competition between the trainees. It was a learning process and test of whether they could act in line with the dispositions of confidence and getting over it: not reacting to anything that is said about you personally, no matter what it is. At Basic, Judson primarily learnt such lessons in relation to the training process itself. Gay chicken was a playful, everyday test of the same dispositions, not primarily related to work and initiated by the boys themselves. All soldiers are tried through some sort of harassment and are expected to be able to take it. Such harassment is sometimes individualised, but gay chicken was a more general version. It is, in Bourdieu’s language, a structural exercise. It is an implicit form of transmitting practical mastery, in that the purpose behind it was never stated, and it was rarely discussed rather than merely enacted: as with get over it, I only ever heard the words “gay chicken” uttered once (“You don’t want to play gay chicken with Gilchrist. He will take one up the arse”).

The trainees who initiated gay playacting tended to place themselves in a dominant role within a metaphorical homosexual relationship: “I’m going to put it in your arse whether you like it or not.” Hearing that O’Brien looked sick, Okeroa responded, “He needs some hot meat. He needs an injection of my vitamins.” Another such conversation went:

Townsend: Show us your dick then, Williams.

Williams: I’ll do more than show you. I’ll put it inside you. In your arse.

Penn: Get inside here and see how real men fuck.
Williams and Penn’s reactions are an example of the way that you should react to such comments. You don’t get defensive, or angry. You play along, and if possible, turn the advantage to yourself.

This gay playacting takes place in an environment in which everyone knew details of each other’s (presumed heterosexual) sex lives. The way in which everyone greeted each other on return from leave was “did you get laid?” In Platoon wide corridor discussions, everybody seemed willing to identify whether they had or had not scored without much shame. “Get any cock?” an NCO asked me. “You know why I ask you that, right?”

Harding: No, Corporal.

Corporal: Because I ask all of them if they got any pussy.

Harding: Oh, that’s fair, Corporal.

Corporal: So I’m not singling you out.

He then yelled “Who got pussy?” down the corridor, and hands went up. That is, as far as I know, none of the boys were actually gay and most openly discussed their heterosexual experiences. One’s actual sexuality wasn’t really relevant to gay chicken, except in that the suggestion of homosexuality had to be seen as something that could possibly cause a defensive freak out, for the game to work. It’s not that everyone had these conversations necessarily, but that if someone directed such a comment at you, you needed to be able to play along without taking it as a threat to your identity. Most soldiers are extremely good at gay chicken. Hardly anyone ever backed off or failed to play along. I only ever witnessed two or three people who could not do it. If someone reacted correctly, everyone moved on and this type of talk was a sporadic event. However, since such treatment is seen to weed out the weak, it will not stop if you cannot prove that you can deal with it in the appropriate manner. Such was the case with roommates Kereama and Arnold. Most of 2 Section were sitting around together one night, and everyone was singing Shania Twain’s From this Moment On, except Arnold, who just said: “oh, God.” Far from taking offence at the suggestion that his taste in music was off, Kereama cheerfully responded: “You know this song, Arnold. The one we sang together.”
“Did you take turns with the lines as you’re pushing?” asked Penn, and Wheeler asked Kereama, “Which one are you?” Kereama kept playing along by noting that “it changes”. Arnold, on the other hand, did not react in the right way, saying: “Fuck, you guys aren’t from [his hometown], eh. [Hometown] men would never talk like that. Because we’re too manly.” The discussion turned back to music, Arnold telling the others what “real men” listen to. This is the one of the only three conversations about masculinity that I heard during my fieldwork, and as such was the wrong thing for Arnold to bring up. Merely by explicitly asserting that his music choices were masculine- by falling back on masculinity for credibility- Arnold was failing to display the rifleman disposition of confidence. He was the only one who framed the discussion in this way: Kereama just responded by saying that Arnold should listen to Jason Derulo and Bruno Mars, without defending his masculinity (rifleman displaying confidence shouldn’t feel the need to defend themselves) or bringing masculinity into it at all.

No one was forced into playing gay chicken as often as Arnold, because he didn’t react correctly. It got so that Kereama would say “Do you know what I heard, Arnold? Heard you’re a bit of a queer cunt,” literally about every five minutes. Arnold would show embarrassment, get defensive, and sometimes try to argue. Once at dinner when Arnold left the table to get some fruit, Kereama said to Murphy, “watch this, Arnold will say I’ve already said this 20 times.” When Arnold returned Kereama said simply, “you like cock, eh?” As predicted, Arnold sighed, and said, “I swear he’s said that like 20 times today.” As Murphy suppressed his laughter Kereama continued: “Why did you get a banana? You must have had enough bananas today. And not in your packed lunch.”

“He’ll pack your lunch,” chimed in Murphy.

“He’ll pack fudge,” said Kereama.

This spread around the Platoon until everyone was saying “I heard you were a bit of a gay cunt, Arnold”. Trainees who showed confidence by easily casting themselves in a gay role, on the other hand, only had to take part every now and then.

**Trashings**

In the first few days of Corps Training a trainee encountering me in the corridor said, “Man, you’ll get a good story out of this. Tell the right one.” I am certain that the “right” story
according to the trainees would be the one that emphasises how many times they got thrashed. Trainees would continually say to me, “did you write down that we got thrashed?” “Did you write down that we got smashed for two hours, Harding?” “Are you going to write about our thrashings? What are you going to say?” “I got smashed, Harding. Write it down.”

I was almost never asked if I had recorded anything else. Thrashings were what the boys saw as worth preserving and having people know about. For trainees, punishments were Corps Training, and were what they wanted to represent their time there. We went to Waiouru for Takrouna a week early, and there was a comparatively large amount of free time. “This is weak!” declared Tipene as he was playing pool in TAD’s bar one night. “I’d rather be getting smashed. That’s Corp Training. That’s what makes you a soldier.” An NCO who had just thrashed 3 Platoon once said to me, “You’ll ace your studies now. Now you’ve seen everything.” A year later, in the Solomon Islands, Wereta asked me if I had written down that his Platoon had been thrashed. When I said that I was always asked about that, and never anything else, Wereta said, “‘Cause everything else is boring.” One of the Section Commanders added, “At the time you’re like, “this sucks,” but afterwards you’re like [mimes delighted hysterical laughter].” The boys were invested in and liked thrashings- in retrospect- because they were challenging: “they’re good. Don’t get me wrong, I hate them at the time.” Corps Training thrashings were physically demanding and primarily featured stress positions and endurance alternated with cardio. “It’s good though,” said Tipene, “I’ll smash the RFL run. Even though I’m feeling shit today.” Kereama said of one thrashing “last night was the worst, eh?” and noted he had been sweating more than at PT. Indeed, some trainees who had no problem passing BETs and RFLs struggled during punishments.

As in Basic, the way that individuals were expected to relate to the group could be seen through the type of punishments given. Corps Training did not have the same focus on self-discipline as Basic, and individual punishment largely disappeared. Group punishments were the norm for the duration. Because the switch to individual punishment was a sign of progress at Basic, it was possible for this to be interpreted as a step backwards, but most trainees didn’t take it this way. The idea that everyone deserved punishment for having allowed any infraction to occur was unchallenged.

A frequent punishment was what is called ladder or snake push ups. Everyone in a section or platoon gets in the push up position with their feet on the shoulders of the trainee behind
them. The feet of the guy in front of them rest on their shoulders in turn, so that the entire group is connected in a chain, and must do push ups together. One person struggling to hold their weight destabilises the entire chain. Here then was a true group activity, rather than an individual one cast as a group one: “This will be so much easier if you work together! It’s about teamwork!” Ladder push ups are extremely physically challenging, only achieved with much screaming, panting, and groaning that made it clear how much pain the boys were in. The way that everyone reacted to the people who collapsed is illustrative: the group punishment was still designed for the individual to work on themselves. While sometimes the boys were encouraging and supportive of those who were struggling, much more often they became infuriated at each other: “Hurry up boys, stop being weak!” “Fucking harden up!” “Get up, cunt!”

“Get up!”

“I’m fucking trying!”

“Well, fucking try harder!”

One morning on the range 2 Section was ordered into the push up position while Henare “sorted his shit out” - his blousing was messed up, so his socks could be seen, and they were odd. Arnold struggled in the push up position, knees wobbling, collapsing and heaving himself back up. The boys were furious, screaming at him to sort it out, Penn yelling that he was going to punch Arnold in the face, and eventually even Henare, having bloused himself properly and joined the rest, told Arnold to hurry up (and was promptly told to shut it by the NCOs). Half an hour later, the section discussed “how little that cunt did” within Arnold’s earshot. “It was really hard on me,” Arnold tried to explain.

“Oh, it wasn’t hard on all of us?” they replied. “Do you like hearing us suffer?”

“I would have if I could have,” protested Arnold.

“Oh, could have. Just do it!”

The NCOs never said a word about the boys’ treatment of each other, never told them to be more supportive or less angry, as, looking back, I subconsciously expected: this was perfectly acceptable, even desirable practice. You didn’t deserve to be treated nicely for
failure. This can be seen in that it was not a stage to be moved beyond, that is, it wasn’t that they would learn to work as a team without the screaming. During the dinner parade of the last night of Corps Training, some trainees had dirty boots. The boys were quite proficient physically at the ladder push ups that were their punishment by now, but acted towards each other exactly the same as always: “Motherfuckers!” “Get up!”

Although they would correct their mates, the boys wouldn’t extend this to approval for undeserved punishments. Once in barracks a red-headed trainee was made to stand out in the car park at attention for a long period, his sole crime, as far as I know, being born with red hair. Another red-headed trainee was ordered to stand on Quinn’s Post’s balcony and pour a bucket of water on his head. The other boys, after yelling at the trainee with the bucket to make sure the water was lukewarm, went around pulling the curtains over all windows that overlooked the trainee, denying the NCOs their spectacle. The red-haired trainee himself just stood there calmly and took it, of course. Being punished “just because” over some aspect of your identity that you couldn’t help was simply another test of getting over it. Likewise, one Orderly NCO punished the Cantabrian trainees because the Crusaders had beaten his own rugby team (“that’s for being the top of the table”) and another ONCO gave one trainee fifty push ups for giving him a cold (“raise your hand if you have a cold too. It’s this cunt’s fault”).

Punishments that were physically challenging and which had some direct and understandable catalyst were positively valued and not resented. On a pack march to condition the body for the upcoming BET, each section had one Mag 58 (machine gun), which weighs 10.9 kilograms. The NCOs yelled that these should be rotated so that the heavy load was shared around and no one person had to carry one for the whole march, but no one from 1 Section would take the one Gibson was carrying. The Corporals were incensed, and had the boys leopard crawling and doing closed circle ladder push ups while they stood over them screaming in apoplectic rage:

“We have no jackcunts in this Corps. If your mate’s been shot are you going to take his weapon? Jack fucks.”

“If your mate’s hurting you help him out. If he’s hungry, you help him out.”

“It’s good for us, though,” said Kereama, rehashing the event the next morning.
However, as with that night on KR, if the punishments did not seem productive, if they stopped being a challenge that could produce personal and team growth, and instead seemed like a demeaning waste of time, the thinking changed. Cleaning weapons one night at the range, the boys were spaced out in the open courtyard so that they couldn’t talk. The Orderly NCO was unhappy because the weapons hadn’t been clean by the time dinner arrived, and told me that because the boys had messed him around, he would mess them around. At 2130 we were allowed dinner, but had to wait until everyone’s plate was full. Then, on the order consume, we were to consume our dinners, every last bit on the plate, and then sit at the position of attention. “Is anyone having trouble, needs a hand?” called Tahuparae (I did have to pass some of mine off to one of the boys). “At least the thrashing last night was getting things done,” said Mitchell. Later the boys had two minutes to be standing to beds in their underwear: “on the command mount you will put your foot in your sleeping bag. Mount! Sleep!” When I re-joined them in the breakfast line the next morning they were muttering “It’s like being prisoners”. At breakfast, mess tins piled with double their height in powdered scrambled eggs were passed along the rows of trainees and had to be gone in two minutes. Suddenly you were jack for not taking seconds. The talk for the next few days was that even the other Corporals (source of all opinions that must be correct in the world) had felt that this NCO had gone too far. This pedantic and debasing control over the basic tasks of eating and sleeping was an example of what is termed “being fucked around.” This is a term used in reference to anything deemed unproductive. You may be being fucked around if you are kept doing repetitive unnecessary tasks, or if you are kept at work or denied leave when there are no tasks that need doing.

In response to being fucked around, you learn “to play the game”. This is basically to just do as you are told. The hierarchy might be being ridiculous and everyone knows it, but you just play along, not buying into it, but not making this obvious. No longer would the Corps Trainees tell any member of staff past the rank of Corporal or in some cases Sergeant what they really thought about their tasks or their training programme. Unlike Basic, where recruits were encouraged to express their opinions, before the first OC hour at Corps Training the Company was told by NCOs not to ask stupid questions that could be sorted out by lower ranking staff, and were specifically told not to moan about food. Some possible appropriate questions were suggested and other things the trainees might want to ask
vetted. By contrast, the OC said on his arrival, “You don’t have to worry about any retribution from this, even if it’s the dumbest question going, we’ll answer it as best we can, and if there’s a problem we’ll fix it.” But if a soldier is faced with the OC telling him one thing and his Corporals telling him another, he will go with the Corporals. The boys continued to extensively evaluate- and complain about- their training and development amongst each other, as will become clear. The point of “getting over it” is not that soldiers don’t have opinions about what they are asked to do, but that these are closely contained within the small group: they don’t go further than the soldiers and are not acted upon. To anyone else, soldiers’ feelings and opinions are invisible and inaccessible. Most importantly, negative feelings will not stop them from completing a task and completing it well.

After a barracks inspection, an NCO told us “the inspection was pretty good, I endeavoured to fail everyone. It’s going to get worse. You’re going to get fucked up and fucked around, just eat it.” Another NCO, speaking of an upcoming punishment, announced, “Like I told you, take the thrusting. I’m on extras [a form of punishment in Battalion], I’m orderly for the piss up because I didn’t work on Saturday. You take the thrusting and enjoy it.” Thrashings were in fact often conceptualised by NCOs as “playing” in an ironic way, with two common beatings being entitled “Playing corridor sports,” (sessions of ladder push ups interspersed with jumping up and down the corridor with your hands clutching your ankles) and “playing ‘it pays not to be a Corps Trainee’” (being given physical tasks by Corporals for no particular reason other than that you were a Corps Trainee so they could).

One night the whole Company had a “lesson in uniformity,” a change parade in which the boys could come up with their own dress but had to be completely uniform. They weren’t allowed to choose dress 3s, field, PT or SDs- i.e. all the uniforms that everyone was already expert at wearing uniformly. Thus the boys chose simple combinations such as thermals and jandals, jerseys and bike shorts, and quickly caught on that they needed to be organised and communicate exactly how everything was to be worn: “buttons done up!” they would yell down the corridor, and the next round “buttons undone!” because it had become clear that some people had lost their buttons. When they went with thermal top and green army issue towels they yelled, “Tucks at the back!” down the corridor, and “Thermal over the towel! Over.” I could hear the boys singing as they got changed. Afterwards, the NCO said of the fact that he had had to punish the boys, “I just wanted to get you pissed off, I didn’t want to
do anything physical tonight.” However, the boys chose not to get pissed off. Instead they took the punishment as a challenge in communication, teamwork, attention to detail and sense of urgency. Uniformity takes effort. The boys could make themselves uniform - could act uniformly - because they were, individually, good soldiers who by doing so were further developing their aptitude in soldier skills. Their uniformity is really their competency. It is not the result of a lack of individual identity, but rather of individual discipline and will.

On another night, Sergeant informed 3 Platoon while we were formed up for dinner that he was sick of them and therefore everyone was to have their beds set up outside on the grassy area in front of the barracks with all kit laid out on top in inspection order by 1800. Further, there was a Company SDs inspection at 1830 in 2 Platoon’s corridor. 3 Platoon rushed through dinner and began dragging their mattresses and kit down the stairs and out of the barracks. Quinn’s Post is right next to Burnham Camp’s Mess, so the Platoon was effectively the pre-dinner entertainment for most of camp. With about three minutes to go, the ONCO came out from his own dinner and asked, “Where’s your bed bases?” Not wanting to know, we ignored this, until Sergeant likewise appeared and asked where the bed bases were. There were now two minutes for 30 people to get up the stairs, grab their bed bases (these particular ones were box-like, with slats, and drawers in the side), carry them out of their rooms, navigate the corridor and the stairs, get them outside, and lift the perfectly made up mattresses and perfectly laid-out kit up onto them. In this melee, a number of bed slats were broken, and some ends knocked off the bases, to which Sergeant just yelled, “Any damage to beds, you pay!”

In fact, everyone managed to stand to their immaculate outdoor bedscape by 1805. As we waited for Sergeant, somebody mused, “Who’s keen for a haka?” and started making challenging movements. This idea was eagerly discussed, but when Sergeant appeared with copies of the forms to report the broken beds, the boys did not enact this plan. This is in some measure resistance to being fucked around: the trainees would discuss amongst themselves how ridiculous it all was and how they could theoretically respond, but ultimately prove themselves to be good soldiers by not responding beyond effectively carrying out the orders they had been given.
By now everyone was hyped up. The boys had maybe 15 minutes to get their beds back up to their rooms and then get in their SDs for the Company inspection. In a chaotic but productive frenzy everyone charged upstairs with the beds whooping and yelling and blocking each other off but then quickly and efficiently angling beds around one another and the narrow corners. Okeroa charged down 2 Platoon’s corridor with his mattress above his head, using it as a clear path to his room on the opposite end of the barracks, scattering 2 Platoon trainees as he went. Then the order suddenly came to have the kit that had been hastily pulled off the mattresses, and was still outside, laid out nicely. This was done, with everyone standing behind their kit ready for inspection, by 1823. When Sergeant leaned over the Quinn’s Post balcony and yelled for the boys to get up into the corridor, the Platoon charged the barracks door screaming battle cries. The Corps Trainees knew how to get over it. Instead of directly resisting being fucked around, the boys were over-complying, attacking simple tasks with excess enthusiasm. Even the ridiculousness of hierarchy can be met as a challenge: it doesn’t matter what you ask soldiers to submit to, they can and will do it. The most well-known expression of this type of reaction is probably the American military saying “embrace the suck.” The Kiwi version is to ask fellow soldiers in the middle of thrashings or freezing field environments, “living the dream?”

Upstairs, the Company inspection turned into a change parade. One round was PT kit with bedrolls. Trainees were ordered to throw each other’s deficient bedrolls off the third floor balcony to the ground below. Through the window I could hear Wereta laughing hysterically and cheering as he retrieved his. Wheeler sadly noted that his had been thrown in a puddle (this is worse than it sounds, because Quinn’s Post periodically had a problem with leaking sewage). Kereama however noted that the trainee with his bedroll had taken the risk of surreptitiously throwing it through the ablutions door instead: “good cunt!” Afterwards, Sergeant asked: “who had fun tonight? You must have had fun, you were making enough noise.” However, “who’s sick of it?” Everyone’s hands went up.

At Corps Training, therefore, the boys found a pre-existing Army expression for the type of unproductiveness they hated in “being fucked around”, and were introduced to a standard way of dealing with this, “playing the game”, which itself could be internalised as a disposition. Thus the soldier habitus includes dispositions that provide paths for dealing with things that those with the practical habitus are predisposed to be frustrated by. The boys
themselves further drew from the practical habitus to deal with these same frustrations by over-complying: once again casting an annoyance as just another challenge that could be turned to the productive ends of personal transformation. Both playing the game and over-compliance are reinforcements of getting over it, now directed not just at being able to learn through criticism, but also at being able to competently carry out orders despite your opinion of them (by not acting on this opinion). In the next section I enlarge on what some of those opinions actually were by discussing a shift from Basic to Corps Training in the process of internalising dispositions interobjectively.

**Process and Riflemen Dispositions: Internalising dispositions through interobjectivity?**

At Basic, almost everything had been successfully linked to learning soldier dispositions and therefore the recruits had accepted any task as being worthwhile, no matter how mundane. This carried over into the beginning of Corps Training, but began to break down by the end. The first few weeks of Corps Training, for example, focused on the effort to lay out absolutely everything in the barracks uniformly, another of those activities in which enacting uniformity was an act of individual and group will and development. The trainees themselves were responsible for deciding how everything was to be placed in their wardrobes and drawers and making everyone conform. So there was much consternation over, for example, which hat was placed on top of which. The boys ran up and down the stairs checking what the other platoons had done: “are your SD belts over your Corps belts?” The order of placement in the toiletry drawer was exactly detailed: razor head pointed toward the far end of the drawer, the head of your toothbrush pointed to the far right. For some reason, the other platoons hadn’t given deodorant a place in this drawer, which meant it couldn’t be in your room during inspections and had to be hidden in your bag in the luggage room.

However, as the notion of being “fucked around” indicates, trainees did not remain willing to conceptualise every task as productive and therefore as worthwhile. As part of one of those thrashings designed to frustrate rather than physically exhaust, the riflemen had to write an essay on why they joined the infantry. Wheeler wrote that he “wanted to become a warrior through conducting change parades.” One day the fucking around was particularly
bad. The trainees were preparing for a pre-field ex OC kit inspection, and were having numerous lesser test inspections beforehand. However, the real packing for the exercise would actually be done after the inspection was over. At Basic, recruits had only been allowed to learn the basics, the official way of doing things. Corps Training was when the boys finally got to learn infantryman lore, the tricks of the trade. This involved no longer having to complete tasks the DS (Drill Standard) way, and the secos spent much of Corps Training teaching the boys how things would actually be done in Battalion. This included being able to supplement Army issue kit with civilian purchases: warm gear (puffer jackets, underarmour, non-issue gloves and sleeping bags), dry bags, thermos flasks, sporks instead of KFS (Knife Fork Spoon), frying pans and gas cookers instead of cups canteen and hexy cookers, headlamps, metal rather than plastic hootchie pegs. It also involved being allowed to break down your rat packs- that is, reorganise your rations to take up less space, be easier to find in the dark, and take out the things you never ate. You could now modify your kit to make life easier (double hootchie strings knotted every few centimetres to form a chain of loops, so no knots ever had to be tied when putting your hootchie up; the thermal mat cut down and placed at the back of your pack instead of the top; cutting a slit between the hootchie pouch of your pack and the main body to make an extra pocket). We learnt to take the clasps off our smockliners (polar fleece jackets worn as an inner layer under your smock), and put them on our bootlaces in lieu of tying and untying them (freeing up considerable amounts of time in both standing to and change parades) and to attach bungee cord in an inverted V to the back of your pack so your hootchie could slide underneath and rest at your hips. These were markers of riflemen’s expertise in fieldcraft above and beyond basic soldier knowledge, and thus interobjectively constructed the trainees as grunts: later on soldiers of other Corps remarked that they could identify me as having been embedded with grunts from my kit. However, Depot Company’s officers still wanted things done the Drill Standard way during Corps Training. Thus the trainees were packing just for the inspection and would later re-pack for the actual ex. Because of the strict standards, especially the requirement that everything be named, the NCOs further decided that to be safe, the boys better name all expendables too- every last lip balm, bottle of foot powder, cam paint compact, and box of hexy (hexamine fuel tablets used for cooking).
During all of this Williams was rifling through his luggage in the baggage room, which was right next to my room, and as he did so he told me about a book he was reading on the first 50 years of the SAS. The SAS, he told me, had realised that fucking people around was not “making” good soldiers, and so they had stopped. Being fucked around, Williams said, “turns good people into bad people.” He had worked his arse off at Basic, always the first to complete a task, always the first to arrive at fatigues. But he would still get thrashed because a few people didn’t do likewise, and the standards were unknowable and ever changing. “So what’s the point?” he asked. He still worked hard, he said (he did) but “Fuck yeah, I take my time now. I take what I can get.” He told me that “since you’re going to change the Army” I had to tell them to get rid of the fucking around. The boys had done way more cleaning than shooting: “Like I can pick up every little piece of dust but there’s not much you can call soldiering going on.” I, as always, said that the Army’s response to that would be that the boys were learning attention to detail and thus the ability to spot small things out of place on patrol. Williams told me that despite being able to see every tiny piece of dust, he was never any good at field tasks that tested the ability to detect small signs of the enemy in the bush. Thus Williams, although a top performer, disputed the claim that dispositions learnt in the barracks translated to field skills. The rest of the boys had noticed the change in Williams, agreeing that he used to be “so serious” but “now he’s a real joker,” “He’s always playing around.”

On another day I was sitting in a mog with Williams’ section as they waited for their turn to run through an assault, when Williams asked seriously, “why aren’t we having fun?”

Gibson: You get home and you tell people what you’re doing and they’re like, “you guys must be having so much fun!” and it’s like, no...

Hunter: You get home and you’re trying to explain how gay it was but it sounds awesome and you can’t explain how it was gay.

Williams: No, when I describe it I make it sound awesome but actually when we’re doing it, fuuccck this. It’s because of how they treat us. They could ruin anything. They could ruin PlayStation and sex. No, seriously, they could ruin sex. Stoppage! Red river, what do you do? Take the dirt road, Corporal! You’ve only got five minutes until her dad comes home... Get back, you’ve left underwear here, condom there. Those are A class stores!
However, I spent a few days with the new 2/1st soldiers, including Williams, about a month after the end of Corps Training on Ex Southern Reaper, and found that he had gone back to acting as he had at Basic. As the acting 2IC of his section, he was struggling to get others to listen to him on points he was passing on from NCOs: not eating or shaving by their bedspaces, giving him the count of how much ammo they still possessed in magazine lots rather than individual rounds. In response to someone noting that something was up with Williams, Wereta said: “What do you mean what’s wrong with Williams? He’s gone back to ballbag Williams. Basic Williams.” The day before, coming in from an assault in which he had to crawl through five kilometres of gorse, Williams had said, “Today was hard, but the good kind of hard. The kind of hard I joined the Army for.” When he was no longer being fucked around, Williams had switched on again.

The idea that absolutely everything was a display of soldierhood, from clean barracks to carrying a pen, was losing its hold over the boys. This was partially because, as described above, they now had kit that was much more directly related to being a specialised grunt and to battle skills. It was much easier to implement “if it looks flash it is flash” at Corps Training because trainees were finally issued “real” soldier kit. Most important was the jay-hats, the headdress worn with field dress. Recruits wear jay-hats with comically large brims and their names written on white masking tape stuck to the front. At Corps Training we were issued real, short-brimmed jay-hats. Much anticipation and excitement surrounded this event. There was a very particular way to wear the new jay-hats, copied from the NCOs, which was to pull the brim down low on your forehead so that the hat stood up high at the back of your head. Trainees being punished had to go back to wearing the large brimmed hats. Likewise, at Basic our smock hoods were worn rolled up to form a neat collar with zips done right up to the top. The first time we wore smocks on Corps Training, Phelan scolded me: “Harding, represent.” Trainees could now wear their smocks with the hoods unrolled, the zip not fully done up, and the sides folded down to form the collar instead. “It’s Battalion,” the boys explained to each other, as they went around unrolling each other’s hoods. Thus riflemen were still constructed interobjectively- they had just become selective about the objects. Riflemen were specialised experts and no longer needed to eagerly seize upon any object of even tangential military relevance to construct themselves as soldiers.
Too much focus on mundane objects or tasks was now unproductive- they had learnt lessons such as attention to detail already- and was being “fucked around”.

Now not fully engaged in everything they were asked to do, the most obvious way trainees engaged in resistance was through acquiring contraband. Contraband primarily included junk food and was easy to hide, because of the practice in which items that could not be out during inspections were put in your luggage in the baggage room. Every barracks inspection there was a constant stream of traffic to and from the baggage room: putting things away, getting them out again after the inspection. Therefore being in there didn’t arouse suspicion. 2 Section also made use of my room, which had an empty filing cabinet, and which never got inspected. Many people also had cell phones with them for most of Corps Training, despite them being banned and stored in the office, through various methods such as having an official phone and a secret phone and not handing their SIM card back in with their official phone when they were collected. Some of the boys who had managed to hold onto their car keys would sneak off base after lights out and go to McDonalds or the supermarket at Hornby to stock up on jackrats, or, as Corps Training wore on, increasingly confident, to the movies and eventually even clubbing.

“When I’m an NCO,” said Phelan, “I’m going to find so many phones, because I know where to look.”

“You’d think they would know where to look,” I mused. Phelan explained that they did, of course: “They just don’t care. But if they see one, they have to do something about it.” In other words, the NCOs had no desire to seek out the contraband. But if they happened to see it accidentally, they were obliged to deal with it. The NCOs knew the boys, one declaring that the reason he was making the Company clean weapons outside instead of in their bedrooms was “Because they’re like fucking outside dogs, they’re not allowed inside. If an outside dog goes inside it switches off. And starts eating shoes.” Further, it was clear that this sort of thing was accepted because the NCOs did it. Several times in the urban training phase when we were patrolling around base sections “patrolled” to the dairy or the fish and chip shop behind base. The NCOs had begun telling the trainees to just look busy if there was nothing for them to actually do, a practice that would continue in Battalion: “What are we doing?” “Looking busy.” Everyone learned that if you were about to be late for parade,
and thus make everyone suffer, then you just didn’t go out at all. This was in fact the internalising of another informal disposition. This attitude of getting away with what you could is summed up in the saying “the crime is getting caught”. That is, the only thing that would be conceptualised as wrong about acting in this way would be if you hadn’t done it well enough to escape notice. It applied to periods in which there was nothing but busy work going on, and didn’t prevent soldiers from switching on or doing their jobs (and thus is another way in which soldiers’ own motivations were only acted on in private).

**Intersubjective Process and Riflemen Dispositions: 2 Section as a case study**

In this section I will examine the above processes of embodying riflemen dispositions intersubjectively through the specific example of the relationships within 2 Section, with whom I was embedded for the duration of Corps Training. This is an example of the change and becoming that the boys had desired, and demonstrates one way in which the requirement that everybody discipline each other worked out in practice. I will focus on Privates Henare and Townsend and their relationship with their section, particularly their relationship with each other. Henare was one of the trainees who were struggling and whom other trainees needed to bring up to standard, whereas Townsend was doing well. Bringing Henare up to speed was part of Townsend’s own process of embodying soldier dispositions. Townsend and Henare had been in the same section at Basic, and now shared a four man room with Wheeler and Penn.

Unlike Arnold, Henare never disputed Army logic about, for example, why everything should be squared away, but was just simply not good at executing it. He was often behind others in picking up skills and completing tasks, and found it hard to achieve the meticulous presentation of kit required. Townsend was the one who most consistently attempted to bring Henare up to standard. The rest of the section tried also, but not as diligently, and sometimes found the task more amusing than serious. Townsend expressed his view on teamwork in a conversation shortly following a barracks inspection in which the OC had found dirt on Penn’s shoes. The boys were speculating on their inevitable thrashing and Arnold was questioning why they were still on collective, rather than individual, punishment. “Because,” said Townsend, “we’re a *team*. That’s the best part, the teamwork.”
“What?” responded Arnold, “The best part is firing the weapons.”

“I mean [the best part] of the ethos, values, that crap,” said Townsend impatiently. A short while later, Townsend asked me what I was writing about him, so I read out the above exchange. “That’s true, though,” he told me. “Your mates are what get you through in the field. I learnt that on Basic.” Later that afternoon, the NCOs came around to check that everyone’s kit was properly named. The boys had been told to lay out their FSMO (Full Service Marching Order i.e. pack and webbing), but Penn, watching through the doorway as a room across the hall was inspected, had informed everyone that they were also checking the DPMs in your wardrobe. Each discovery of an unnamed item earned one “activity” for the whole Platoon, and Henare’s DPM shirt was deemed to be inadequately named (it was named on the tag, but not in the pocket as well, and tags can just be cut off by the supposedly numerous thieves in the Army). As soon as the NCO left the room, Townsend said, “It’s just the little things like this, Henare. How can we trust you if you can’t even name your stuff?” (Note here Townsend’s extension of small barracks tasks to more general dispositions).

“We were this close to a perfect room,” said Penn.

“What would have happened if the OC had asked you to pull that out?” demanded Townsend. From somewhere down the corridor we heard an NCO yell out the new activity tally of six. “Fuck, it’s not difficult to name your shit!” Townsend yelled. To Townsend, the way that he was talking, although it might seem harsh to civilians, in no way contradicted what he had said earlier about valuing teamwork. To Townsend this was teamwork; this was how the Army had taught him to do teamwork.

2 Section genuinely tried to help Henare at times. During Range Week Wheeler and Penn attempted to teach him not to flap when he got to the firing mound and the NCOs started screaming, by standing over him while he did drills and doing an exaggerated imitation:

“Get this fucking gun apart!”

“Fuck, I’d get some speed together if I were you! You’ll get shot in the head!”

“What the fuck goes next, cunt? No this, you dipshit! Put it in! Fuck man!

“You have exactly one minute! Go! Otherwise that will be another 40!”
“You’re on a fucking time schedule, mate. You still have to do a functions test, cunt!? It’s still fucking cocked! Oh, you fucked it, cunt!”

Henare was laughing hysterically during this: “You guys are crack up, man.” A bit later, I noticed that Henare so accepted the correction of his mates that he was actually doing the 40 push ups that they had given him.

Back from a field ex, Penn surveyed Henare’s kit spread over the room and noted, “He better clean up his stuff or Townsend will have a fit.” Sure enough, arriving back from the laundry, Townsend reprimanded Henare. “It’s like having a mother around,” Penn noted out of Townsend’s earshot. Townsend must have been thinking along the same lines: “I feel like his father!” It was not that Townsend didn’t make mistakes himself- he had a bit of a propensity to lose A class stores (military equipment that for reasons of expense but especially security must be accounted for at all times), for example. However he (along with others in the section like Kereama) was increasingly getting praised for his performance.

“I’ve become way more confident,” Townsend told Penn and I one day, noting that he used to try and look down and not catch NCOs’ eyes when they asked for volunteers, but now he just volunteered. He said that his Basic Corporal had been worried he wouldn’t pass before the first field exercise but he had improved since then. In particular Townsend was commended for his performance on a pack march on the West Coast, on which he had been charging ahead carrying two full jerry cans. He had a significant gash on the back of his neck from carrying a stretcher against it. One of his NCOs had given him a nickname indicating endurance and going hard, which Townsend heard of for the first time when Penn mentioned it. “Oh,” said Penn, “I thought you already knew that. I didn’t need to add to your self-confidence.” This was because, raised as Kiwis, Penn’s and my immediate response to this conversation was to cut down the tall poppy. Townsend said he didn’t mean to talk himself up, “I hate people that do that. It must be all the confidence I’ve had lately.” Later in the corridor, Townsend indicated that he needed a ride to the airport for mid-course leave and someone answered, “No, you’re all good, Townsend, just grab a couple of jerry cans and walk there.”

“You have made a name for yourself then,” I said, and Townsend said that it was the name he’d been “working” to make for himself: “Man, if I had worked as hard my whole life as I
am now, I would actually have gotten somewhere, like actually been a good [sports] player.”

Veering confusedly between being genuinely impressed and the inescapable expectation for humility, Penn and I started mocking again, but Townsend stood up for himself: “to be honest I was never confident, it’s only since I joined the Army [...] I’m not up myself; I’m just confident in my abilities.”

“You’re up yourself,” said Penn.

For Townsend, getting Henare in line was part of this performance as a good soldier. In this same discussion Townsend said that he cared about whether Henare made it through Corps Training or not, “he’s a numpty and I don’t like him, but he’s grown on me.” By seemingly being awful to one another the boys felt they were helping one another. You have to learn to deal with awful. War is awful. However, the way this system is supposed to work is that due to his mates’ correction, the reprimanded trainee should get better, and when he has proved his competence, the shit that he takes will stop. But, although he tried, Henare didn’t get better. In the case of sections like 2 Section that were required to get people who weren’t competent up to speed, it could become hard to draw a line between the desirable behaviour of not being jack by correcting your mates and very undesirable behaviour. In several lectures, the Army had taught us to distinguish bullying or workplace discrimination from correction that could be harsh but was necessary in order to get people moving in urgent situations (i.e. battle, live firing). A key distinguishing characteristic of bullying was repetition. Back when recruits at Basic attempted to correct each other but were unsuccessful, recruits like Young quickly gave up, stating that they had tried. This had not been presented as an option at Corps Training, however. Because Townsend wouldn’t give up on Henare, and the rest of the boys continued to be disadvantaged by him (as he incurred group punishments) and therefore also joined in often, this treatment of Henare never stopped and was repetitive. Such continual chastisement could look and feel like bullying, especially to Henare and others like him (such as Arnold in his never-ending game of gay chicken).

From the outside too it could feel like bullying; despite understanding what the boys were trying to do and why, I myself often had that emotional reaction. At the armoury one morning Henare was wearing his wide brimmed jay-hat because he had lost his short
brimmed one, and someone informed him that he had left it in the sickroom. “Do you even
look for the stuff that you lose?” asked Townsend immediately. A number of people from 3
Section came to Henare’s defence. “I’m trying to help him,” responded Townsend. Someone
put in that that wasn’t helping. Later on, Arnold noted that the situation was getting like
childhood bullying. Kereama replied, “He deserves it though. He does so much dumb stuff.”

“I’m sick of this section,” said Penn, “getting thrashed for them.” No one is willing to make
the sacrifice of being thrashed because of their mates. Rather, their mates shouldn’t have
gotten them thrashed.

One member of 2 Section, Reihana, did in the early days step in on Henare’s behalf. When
the boys were thrashed on an overnight Navigation ex, having to dash-down-crawl
repeatedly through the snow for losing a compass, which straight afterwards Henare found
in his trouser pocket, and Wheeler angrily yelled, “Tell [Corporal] where you found it,” at
him, Reihana put in, “hey, no, it’s okay.” The first night of the first field exercise, the Seco
was getting increasingly incensed that Henare didn’t have his hootchie up yet, and Reihana
went and quietly told him, “He’s missing one of the poles, Corporal.” Thus Henare further
got in trouble because “you tell someone if you don’t have something!” and for how his not
doing so indicated a lack of confidence: “you couldn’t even tell me yourself, have to get
Reihana to.” Reihana made Henare a pole from a tree branch and the boys discussed what
Henare needed to work on: “he needs to have more confidence, when he talks to Corporal
he always looks down,” said Penn, and earlier he had had the right answer to a question but
changed it when the NCO asked him if he was sure (something the Corporals asked a lot
when given a right answer, to test the trainee’s confidence). The next day, sitting around
waiting to be dropped off into the bush, Wheeler said something cutting of Henare, and 3
Section commented on it. “[Wheeler]’s always like that,” Reihana said, sitting with 3
Section. Moataane, who used to be in the same Judson section as Wheeler, pointedly gave
Henare more chocolate than he gave Wheeler.

However, Henare’s lack of improvement seemed to wear away his defenders. Shortly before
the ex, 2 Section managed to convince Henare that he had to act as 2IC for Takrouna. Within
a few hours, the whole Platoon was in on it and subtly asking, “2IC, eh, Henare? You’ll have
to step up.” Henare walked around saying “shit!” and, inspired, “I’m going to have to step
up”. This time no one defended Henare. Even Reihana had a smile watching him. In an attempt to get the others to help, Townsend was telling the section that only he and a few others ever did fatigues (which was true), and Henare said magnanimously, from his “position” as 2IC, “you can take a break, Townsend.”

Again, not only was this type of thing what the trainees had implicitly and explicitly been told to do, but the fact that it was condoned was obvious by the fact that NCOs sometimes joined in. One, for example, attached a teddy bear from the Urban Training Facility (which was set up with bits and pieces reminiscent of real households for authenticity) to Henare’s webbing and made him walk back to barracks through camp with it (although fortunately the NCOs didn’t march with the boys that day, driving instead, so I carried it most of the way, throwing it back to Henare when the NCOs periodically stopped their car to check on the Company).

Real help and support did not stop either; the boys encouraged Henare when he was continually made to recite the eight steps of a navigation resection (he actually knew how to do one, it was reciting the steps word for word from the lesson plan rather than paraphrasing that was the problem). “You’ve got it Henare,” they would call, and then murmur “he’s got it!” to each other. In fact, Henare turned out to be, according to staff, excellent as the link man during live fire assaults (responsible for communication within the section). There was only one live Carl Gustaf round for the whole Platoon for the whole of Corps Training, and I overheard the staff seriously consider giving this biggest of rewards to Henare because of this performance: “It would be good for him to be rewarded for once.” (However, a trainee who had been awarded one of two M72 rounds managed to hit the target with it, and thus was given the 84mm also.)

By the end of Corps Training, everyone was getting restless (the Company had been doing nothing for days on end) and the boys started getting in fake (ish) fights. During a struggle between Wheeler and Henare to destroy each other’s pristine inspection standard bedspaces, Townsend called, “punch him!” When Henare fake punched Wheeler’s jaw, Townsend cheered, “Really punch him!”

“I don’t want to punch him,” said Henare, “I don’t want to get charged.” Townsend was genuinely shocked by this statement and what it indicated about what Henare thought
about his relationship with the section: “We wouldn’t *nark* on you. He’s not going to nark on you. He’ll just take the punch and then beat the shit out of you.” It became a “thing” to try and get Henare to throw a punch. “If Henare cracked you in the face, would you crack him back?” Townsend asked the room another day.

“Yeah,” said Penn, “I’d be proud of him, but I’d punch him back.” Townsend then instructed Henare that people were going to mess with him his whole life if he didn’t stand up for himself. This of course was more torment; but they also sincerely wanted Henare to learn confidence. In response to someone noting that Henare had in fact changed a lot from Basic, Penn said, “but everyone’s changed a bit. It’s impossible to go through a course like this and not change.” By now some of boys would tell Henare off while laughing hysterically. They liked that he would react: “You can’t control me, cunts!” he would yell.

Despite this atmosphere, unlike many, Townsend never switched off (although he laughed that he would be the guy that lost his red diamond at March Out). Along with Wheeler, he was never one of the ones who went out at night: “Too much risk. Too close. For what? Nothing.” Townsend was frustrated by those in his section that did switch off, not, for example, promptly putting their kit away after an inspection. He asked someone “when do you reckon you’ll have your first scrap [in Battalion]? I’ll probably have mine before I even get there, I’m sick of some of the cunts around here.” Packing up in the last week, Townsend announced, “Wheeler, I can’t handle our relationship anymore, I’m moving.”

“Fuck you cunt,” said Wheeler, “I’m taking the house.”

“Fine,” said Townsend, “I’m taking the kids.” At this point it occurred to them both who the kids in this scenario were, so Townsend backtracked fast: “No, you take the kids.”

Wheeler: No, you take the kids!
Townsend: No, you.
Wheeler: You.
Townsend: *You* take Henare.
Wheeler: No, you take Henare and Penn. They’re not house trained like at all.
Townsend: That was what it was like in this room, eh? We were like the parents.
Wheeler: Hard. “Pick it up.” “Clean it up.”
“Yeah, you have to write that,” said Townsend to me, “Always looking out for the boys, even though they stabbed me in the back. Never helped with fatigues…” (The Army’s particular version of teamwork enables Townsend to mention this, rather than suffer in silence).

Wheeler mused on his own development, and perhaps on why he hadn’t spoken up as often as Townsend: “You know I chose to be a different guy in this Corps Training. Not the loud mouth, the middleman.” (A middleman is solidly dependable but doesn’t try to stand out.) Penn meanwhile was placed in the kid category largely because while he did well in the field, he acted more in line with “the crime is getting caught” disposition, for example figuring out a way to remain in bed past 6am each morning. While Townsend had privileged and internalised more official switched-on soldier dispositions, Penn had privileged more informal grunt dispositions in which the importance of fatigues was fading. Most soldiers, of course, enact a mixture of these dispositions, dependant on the situation.

A few days later Wheeler paused in teasing Henare about porn preferences to get nostalgic: “I’m going to straight up miss you, Henare, I don’t even know why. I kinda hate you, and I wanna stab you, but God, you make me laugh. It’s at your own personal expense.” This is an example of a particular type of Army relationship, in which you can simultaneously care for and hate the same person. This is another binary that may be overcome: maybe you dislike someone, but due to taking on hardship together and being unable to escape one another 24/7, at the time you still feel more closely connected to them than you might ever be to civilian friends. As for what Henare thought of the way 2 Section interacted with him, a few months later I found myself embedded in his 1R platoon and we discussed his former roommates. Penn and Wheeler, he told me, were cunts, and he wanted to punch them both in the face. Henare seemed to recognise and acknowledge Townsend’s intentions, however, saying that Townsend was “alright,” however, “now [in Battalion] he hangs with the white guys.”

The morning after March Out and the function afterwards, Penn skipped the breakfast parade and got away with it as usual. Wheeler was vomiting and had also stayed in bed, resisting Townsend’s attempts to get him up, but had committed the crime of getting caught. As his roommates, the responsibility was placed at the feet of Henare and Townsend (who had also vomited and who had then gotten up early to clean the ablutions). The staff continued to try and reinforce infantry dispositions up until the last minute, and
made it clear that the collective focus that had characterised their Corps Training was to be a transposable disposition: “If you’re going to drink on a Wednesday night in Battalion, and know your mate has, you wake him up in the morning!”

**Pre-existing Dispositions: Ethnicity and its translation to the rapport-building disposition**

It was at Corps Training, focused as this course was on producing deployable riflemen, that I most directly heard the link made between particular ethnic dispositions and the rapport-building disposition outlined in Chapter Five. Corps Training is also one of those periods in which it is argued that trainees are introduced to one another’s cultures, thus leading to cultural sensitivity. It just so happened, however (it was decided alphabetically), that the sections in 3 Platoon were fairly segregated. Trainees commented that 3 Section was largely “black” (Māori and Pacific Islanders), 1 Section was largely “white” (Pākehā), and 2 Section was mixed. The 3 Section Commander laughed, “black arses, white guys, half-castes!” He was also “black”, and further said, “I was happy to see my section was black. Then I was like, fuck, more work. No ears, sticky fingers…”

Every now and then, ethnic differences caused confusion. One day, for example, Townsend and I were sitting in Kereama and Arnold’s room with them and Kereama was telling us a story- or attempting to. Townsend, Arnold and I are all very Pākehā. We quickly got into a muddle when Kereama used the word “sieg” (a greeting used by supporters of the Mongrel Mob, not that I knew that then) and Townsend assumed that he was talking about an Army “sig.” Kereama tried in vain to explain to us what “sieg” was as we all sat in a very confused row, Townsend asking, “so sieg is a dog?” Kereama gave up in disgust: “youse are so white.”

There was also one argument amongst 2 Section during Corps Training on the topic of race relations. Cleaning weapons in the barracks at West Melton, Wheeler had said, “you guys are dumb, you sold a whole country for some blankets,” and Reihana, normally quiet, said, “Don’t call my people dumb, that’s one thing I don’t stand for.” Wheeler was ashamed of himself, and apologised, but Gibson woke up at that point to state another common Pākehā racism, that being that Māori can’t complain because there are affirmative action programmes: “they get scholarships.” At that point I couldn’t help myself and started
arguing too. Reihana said give us the government then, and Gibson responded that Māori “can get seats.” Gibson then bitched that he couldn’t get back to sleep, and I said, “So you’re angry because you had to wake up to defend your racism?” and he said, “You must have things that just make you angry,” and I said, “like racism?” Although he was silent during this exchange, Henare brought it up to me months later in Battalion: “Man he was a racist, Gibson. He really got Reihana going... You remember that, eh?”

However, Māori and Pacific Islander dispositions were for the most part highly valued in the infantry. On one of the last nights of Range Week, the Company was kept up all night cleaning weapons in preparation for an upcoming inspection (and being thrashed for falling asleep), but were told to act as if they had slept, as the shotgun qualification was that day. In the breakfast line the boys were so spacey that when a plane passed overhead everyone lazily craned their necks to look and all up and down the line people told their mates about how after Corps Training they were going to fly somewhere, look down on the next Corps Trainees and laugh. After fatigues, we had to do a shuffle to LMFAO’s Party Rock Anthem in formation and afterwards the (black) Corporal had the boys close in for a talk. “Well done on the weapons,” he said, “but if you thought that was hard, you still have two exes to go. What’s the unofficial motto of the infantry?”

“That’s another one. It’s “Grunt life.” If your mate drops his lip just turn to him and say “grunt life.” Even if he’s white, he’s a fucking nigger in the infantry. He’s a black cunt.” This was a very high honour. “If you didn’t like it,” the Corporal went on, “say I don’t like it, I’d rather sit in a warm cab all day and deliver food or whatever and watch the grunts suffer.” Many riflemen have “Grunt Life” tattoos, and it is a common slogan for t-shirts. It seems to go along with, and be the informal expression of, the official motto Onward. Then it was off to the range for the shotgun qualifications: “Hey Harding, here’s something you can write: I fell asleep three times when we were marching.” The staff running the qualification complained, “Try and stay awake. It’s not hard to stay awake.”

“We’ve had our eight hours of sleep, several nights ago,” the boys laughed. Being a soldier-that which is highly valued- is here equated with “black cunt” and “nigger” status, and is said to provide that status. This is placed in the same sentence as “Grunt Life”, suggesting that it
is black dispositions that give you the endurance and fortitude to handle the infantry lifestyle.

During Corps Training we attended a lesson on Key Leadership Engagements (KLEs- i.e. meetings with the leaders of local communities. The boys’ role in a KLE would be to provide security and gather intelligence for their own leaders, who would be in the meeting). It was here that it was suggested that black dispositions were what made Kiwi soldiers good at patrolling amongst and meeting with locals- not just in the Pacific, because of cultural similarity, but anywhere, as these traits were good for patrolling in general. The boys were told that patrolling is just “being nosy. You black guys, eh, it’s looking can I steal that? Can I use that? We’re riflemen, don’t mean much to society, let’s face it, have to take what we can get.” Here, it is dispositions soldiers are already seen to be acting on (nosiness, looking to get what you can) that are said to make them good at patrolling. What’s more, the progression of this sentence shows that such dispositions are thought first, to be Māori/Pacific Islander dispositions, and then by extension infantry ones. Though this is on the face of it an insult- they’re thieves- it is connected to value through the infantry’s “the crime is getting caught” disposition. During a multi-national exercise that took place in Germany, the staff member taking the lesson said, Kiwi soldiers were finding IEDs in a mock village that other nationalities couldn’t detect, even some from a previous ex thought lost, because the Kiwis were always craning their heads around to have a look, “what’s over there?” This was reiterated when we were outside watching a vehicle search: “Like I said before, it’s just being a typical Kiwi, a nosy motherfucker.” In explaining how to conduct searches, the trainees were told “have a think about if you’ve been searched before, yeah, you Māori guys.” The trainees were also advised to win over the children: “cause the kids yap. “Kiwi gave me this, good Kiwi.” Parents start thinking oh, these Kiwis might be alright.”

Conclusion

By the end of Corps Training, the boys had passed two training courses, considered themselves changed as people, and were ready to take their place in the Army proper by marching into their battalions. The tankies and I watched from inside a barracks block as those new riflemen who had been posted to 2/1st Battalion did just that, performing their haka to their new battalion on the 2/1 parade ground. When their new battalion mates
responded with the 2/1\textsuperscript{st} haka, they got so far up in the ex-trainees’ faces that, watching from inside, Owen noted of Wereta: “he’s shitting himself.”

The process of embodying riflemen dispositions at Corps Training had largely matched the boys’ pre-existing practical habitus, and at this moment it seemed like Battalion too could provide challenge. Corps Training largely operated through implicit learning, rather than through codifications like 3CI. It was also physically challenging, and learning to not act on your own feelings, to submit to orders no matter what they were, and to show confidence no matter what was implied about you, took work and willpower. Through becoming soldiers who could switch on and do the job enthusiastically no matter the circumstances, the desire for personal growth was fulfilled.

The practical habitus, however, is never completely fulfilled in that, like any habitus, it is durable: it continues to generate the desire for change. Having internalised the Army field, the boys were no longer in a state of disjuncture, but rather were beginning to be able to take the world around them for granted. They did not feel that now they had met the challenge of becoming riflemen, they could stop becoming. This could be seen in that, in the last week of Corps Training, one of the things that most excited the boys about their imminent release was that, after eight months of being under the Army’s control 24/7, they would finally have the freedom to go to the gym, where they could work on their strength and physical bodies. This was why, although Corps Training was largely valued, it had also begun to wear on the boys on occasion. The more competent they became, and the more their actions were guided by soldier dispositions, the less productive training and especially tasks in barracks were seen to be, because these things were no longer teaching them anything new. The new dispositions of “playing the game” and “the crime is getting caught” are strategies for dealing with this disjuncture of the practical habitus, suggesting a new dimension to the core relationship of this thesis in that the practical habitus is not only drawn on to internalise the soldier one, but has also had a role in shaping it. This further shows that the soldier habitus is made up not just of dispositions that have official origins in hierarchy, but also of dispositions that arise from the rank and file. Despite their differing origins, however, both of these types of disposition have the same result: they predispose soldiers to complete any job well no matter their own feelings about it. Hence readiness as the underlying, unifying structure of the soldier habitus is maintained.
The occasional feeling of “being fucked around” at Corps Training was just the beginning of a dynamic that became more pronounced in later stages of some of the boys’ careers. There was a gap of a few months between Corps Training and the fieldwork I conducted at Battalion, and while the previous two chapters featured energetic, enthusiastic and engaged recruits and trainees, when I arrived at Oscar Company, 1st Battalion RNZIR, I found bored, apathetic and resentful soldiers. The relationship between the practical habitus and the soldier habitus as it is being internalised is not the same relationship as that between the practical habitus and the soldier habitus already embodied. Battalion for Oscar Company did not in fact turn out to be challenging in what were perceived to be the right ways, and the feeling of being fucked around increased. At Corps Training, being fucked around could still sometimes be linked to “becoming”. Reacting to being fucked around with over-compliance for the first time was still a part of internalising the soldier dispositions that allow you to do the job anyway and do it well. Further, Corps Training had a clear goal, graduation, before which you had not yet fully achieved soldierhood. Oscar Company, however, had nothing concrete and specific beyond general readiness to work towards, and there were no completely new skills or dispositions to be taken on. This meant that there was no “becoming” to link anything to, and therefore nothing that was going on appeared to be productive. In the next chapter, I explore whether or not the boys reacted to this situation in line with the soldier dispositions they had internalised over the course of Basic and Corps Training.
Chapter Eight

Battalion

“1R”

1 Battalion, Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment

Linton Military Camp

On the first field exercise that I attended with Oscar Company, I found myself as usual in Company headquarters with a few NCOs. Having explained my presence and research to one of them, he asked me, “Are you sure you’re writing about how the Army turns civilians into soldiers, and not how it makes soldiers want to be civilians?” Indeed, I had arrived at Oscar, about four and a half months after the end of Corps Training, just in time to witness Ellis, one of my original Basic Training informants, quit the Army. To quit is referred to colloquially as “to 717” (pronounced seven-one-seven), after the numerical designation of the resignation forms. Ellis, who had reacted to people’s threats to quit after that night on KR with incredulity (“This is me, this is what I want to do,”) asked his Section Commander for his papers just a year and two weeks after he attested. He didn’t 717 because he didn’t want to be a soldier anymore; but rather because he felt this desire was not being fulfilled in the New Zealand Army. He planned to join the Army of another nation instead. He was also very much not alone in considering putting in his papers. The NCO at field HQ was right: when I eventually looked back over my fieldnotes from my time with Oscar Company, which was supposed to be the section of my research that finally examined the boys as full soldiers, they were about almost nothing except soldiers thinking about making the transition back to civilian.

This chapter focuses on 1 Platoon, Oscar Company, 1 RNZIR. 1 Platoon is not representative of the infantry battalions as a whole, but is just one example of how the soldier habitus embodied in Basic and Corps Training worked out once the boys reached the Army proper.
Oscar Company was one of three rifle companies in 1st Battalion. This is, however, a pseudonym, as are all other company names in this chapter. Companies are named using the phonetic alphabet, and here I have renamed them using sections of that alphabet not currently in use in the RNZIR. As in the last chapter, the numerical designations of all platoons and sections have also been changed. Those soldiers that I had followed from Basic and Corps Training that had been posted to 1R were dispersed throughout the whole Battalion. There were around five boys from Corps Training in 1 Platoon, including Ellis, Henare and Pokaia (from Corps Training’s 3 Platoon) and Malone.

At the time of my fieldwork, Oscar Company was mounted, or mechanised infantry; that is, equipped with Light Armoured Vehicles for both transport and combat. Light Armoured Vehicles are colloquially referred to as “LAVs” or “wagons”. This means that the Platoon with which I was embedded was made up of both LAV crews (tankies) and grunts. The workplace was the hangar in which the LAVs were housed. There was a LAV per section as well as the boss’ LAV, in which Platoon HQ rode. In this context the grunts were referred to as “dismounts” (unlike the crews, they left the LAVs during battle).

Now that the boys were posted to the battalions, the issues that the Army at large was facing began to really affect them for the first time. Whilst the boys had been in Basic and Corps Training, the Army had begun a drive to save $350-400 million by the end of the 2014-2015 financial year, as outlined in the 2010 Defence White Paper (Kirk, 2012). This, I heard at a brief during TAD’s NCO induction at the beginning of my fieldwork, was based on a report by a civilian contractor which argued that the best value for money for the organisation would be to focus on that for which the NZDF is internationally distinguished, overseas operations, and thus create a third manoeuvre unit (1st and 2/1st Battalions being the existing two). To pay for this, money would be saved from other areas. Most dramatically this led to the civilianisation of hundreds of roles. That is, jobs that were performed by soldiers became jobs performed by civilians (saving an estimated $20,000 each on expenditure like military hardship pay, uniforms, and accommodation benefits). This was unpopular from the beginning and some tried to fight the civilianisation of certain roles. But the plan went ahead, eventually proving to be so damaging that it had to be halted and in some cases reversed. Statistics released to the public showed worryingly low levels of morale, and related to this, high rates of attrition. For example, in 2012 the NZDF
reported attrition rates of 19% and the loss of a thousand personnel over the past 2 years (Levy 2012c). A survey in 2012 showed that 40% intended to leave the Defence Force (Levy 2012a). In conversations that I have had with the Army leadership in Wellington, some have indicated that they have come to believe that they may need to accept such high turn around as “the new normal.”

However none of this had ever really come up at Basic or Corps Training. The NCOs at Basic had been told to be professional: the new recruits didn’t need to hear a word of this. And they didn’t. And, of course, rifleman is the last job that could be civilianised, and the addition of a third manoeuvre unit was one of the major aims of the restructuring. However, the general atmosphere of low morale that the statistics above indicate caught up to the boys fast once they entered the Army proper. This chapter portrays what all of those numbers looked like on the ground, in one platoon.

The field of Battalion is not organised around becoming a soldier, as the training courses had been, but rather around maintaining the readiness of the soldier habitus. Therefore, the relationship between the practical and soldier habitus had now changed. It was no longer a relationship between an already held habitus and a habitus in the process of being embodied, but rather a relationship between two already embodied habitus. The processes of becoming that were so valued were largely over. There were no new dispositions to acquire at Oscar Company. There was not very much else deemed productive to do, either. Low morale in 1 Platoon, that is, was due to the boys’ need to always be acting very rarely being met, resulting in a state of disjuncture. Now that the practical and soldier habitus were both embodied, one would expect the boys’ actions to be generated by both. What I explore, therefore, is whether they worked together to generate the same responses, and, if not, what happened in the event of a possible clash. In fact, those dispositions of the soldier habitus that might be expected to be used to deal with low morale, that had been internalised partially as strategies for such situations- such as “getting over” feelings like disappointment, or disciplining one another for failure to focus on the job- were not employed in this direction. The boys felt that their not being given something worthwhile to do was not something that they should just have to accept, demonstrating that it was the practical habitus that was still primary.
This chapter then is largely focused on complaints. A lot of these complaints - especially boredom - are hardly new or surprising aspects of peacetime military life. However, to four month old soldiers, just off the intensity of Corps Training, they may indeed have felt new and different. Moreover, such complaints are not always associated with such low levels of morale and retention. The voices in this chapter tend to belong to the most disaffected soldiers in the Platoon, as they were the most vocal and loudest about their opinions, and therefore may give a distorted view of how many people were actually unhappy enough to leave the Army. The retention numbers for the All Arms Recruit Course that I followed show that, in the fourth year after Basic Training, 67% were still serving in the Army (although just over 10% of those who were no longer serving exited in the same year that Basic took place, indicating that this proportion of the numbers may be due to not passing, rather than quitting). 5.7% of the cohort 717ed along with Ellis in their second year in the Army, and the year after that had the largest loss of 8.6%. Although in much of this chapter I am therefore discussing a route that many soldiers choose not to take, it nonetheless demonstrates what it was that everyone was listening to, day in and day out, and thus the general atmosphere in which everyone worked.

**Pre-existing Dispositions: The practical habitus, doing nothing and being fucked around**

The very dispositions that induce people to become riflemen- they enjoy and seek out even life and death challenges- are the exact same dispositions that make them unsuited to a peacetime Army. The boys valued “doing something” above all else, but during my time at Battalion, we routinely sat around doing nothing. This was quite far from the “what is our job?” “To kill, Sir,” construction from Corps Training, and the repeated assurances of imminent deployment made there. Ellis told me on my arrival to Oscar that if he could be recruited by another Army he would 717, as “I’m getting nothing out of sitting around here.” Likewise on heading to the brew area one day he announced: “I’m going to get some cold milo, so I can get something out of this job.” The boys had joined the Army for their individual development, but Ellis did not feel that he was getting to act as a real soldier, saying of a Battle Handling Exercise (BHE) one day: “I went in there, saw a notional enemy, notionally killed him, he notionally died in the notional red zone...I don’t know how to operate with real ammo, I’m only a notional killer.” He didn’t even seem to feel he was
being provided with a job, once telling me that he was concerned about what my report might make the public think about soldiers. He was worried that an account of his day to day activities would make them look like “glorified dole bludgers.”

Oscar Company had particularly low morale and doesn’t seem to reflect the RNZIR more generally. One battalion at a time are tasked with deployments and at the time it was 2/1’s rather than 1R’s rotation. Some Oscar grunts were reserves for Timor-Leste, but none were called up. Further, one of the other Companies in 1R, Quebec, was not mounted like Oscar but instead was what is called an “Enhanced Infantry” Company (also a result of the 2010 White Paper) which meant they were engaged in more advanced urban, amphibious and airmobile training. To maintain these skills Quebec was reported to have had regular access to boats and helicopters, and weekly live firing. Soldiers in Oscar had no access to boats and helicopters and during my stay only fired during field exercises. During Exercise Alam Halfa Oscar watched or supported Quebec as they went about much more engaging tasks; securing an airfield so that Quebec could land on it, watching them rappel from helicopters, providing back up for Quebec’s assault. That is, it is not that being a soldier in Battalion inevitably meant there were no more dispositions to acquire- soldiers in Quebec Company were learning new skills; soldiers in 2/1 were really acting out soldierhood on deployment rather than just playacting it- but that there was no identity acquisition occurring in Oscar specifically. In the mess one day we ate with a member of Quebec, who asked, “Do you hate Quebec over in Oscar?” The boys said no: “we hate Oscar, we hate our own Company, that’s how bad it is.” Had Ellis ended up in Quebec, he might not have 717ed; morale seemingly was much better there. However, discussion of this sort was actually rare. Acting on the getting over it disposition, the boys only occasionally compared themselves to Quebec, even amongst themselves. Working at Oscar was also uncertain because of the upcoming creation of the third manoeuvre unit. This was to be formed out of Queen Alexandra’s Mounted Rifles (QAMR), Royal New Zealand Armoured Corps- i.e. the primary LAV unit. As part of the restructure 1R was to be dismounted (that is, lose the LAVs), but 1 Platoon’s grunts, with their dismount experience, were slotted to be transferred with the tankies to QAMR.

While 2/1 was preparing for trips (the informal term for deployment) and Quebec learning to rappel from helicopters, Oscar Company did not much of anything. This was typical Army
hurry up and wait, except that there was usually nothing for which the grunts were waiting.
The working day began at 0800 with PT every day but Wednesday, which had scheduled
sports instead. Otherwise any activities were generally fairly short training sessions or brief
admin tasks. During a normal day, Platoon HQ would be working in their office area upstairs,
the tankies would be working on their LAVs, and the grunts would be sitting waiting in a
space in the middle of the hangar, between LAVs and lockers, in which there was a semi-
circle of chairs arranged around a white board. As an example, one day after PT there was a
half hour lesson in civvie GPS systems. The grunts were sent off for lunch at 11.30 to be back
at 12.55, when they were sent for a brew for ten minutes. There were a few more lessons
and a short testing exercise on the GPS. After this there was a quiz, a common time waster,
which took us to 1530. Then we waited because the boss (Platoon Commander) was in O
group (was getting orders): “I would knock you off but important things might be coming
out of that.” Because the tankies wouldn’t be available for orders until 1630, at 1600 the
grunts were sent off for their own time for 25 minutes.

Another morning when the dismounts were sitting around doing nothing after having
completed inventories on the section stores, the NCOs laughed and said “have a ten minute
break from our intensive quiz.” They explained to the boys that they would cut them away
(send them home for the day), but then HQ would come down to give them notes from
orders: “you guys have it lucky, we’re always getting hassled for cutting you away, letting
you do nothing.” Then in fact we did do a quiz. The grunts had lunch from 1145 to 1255,
then re-confirmed their next of kin details, then went to Company Headquarters to pick up
expendable stores. “So what are we doing today in this well organised Company?” Ellis
asked, as everyone was sitting around clutching bags of sunscreen and glowsticks.

“Are you going to put this in your report?” asked Ratahi. “That the infantry do fuck all?” The
grunts then cleaned the area around HQ, were told to be at a fitting for a new type of PT
shoe in 30 minutes, which was cancelled, and finally ended up in barracks with 40 minutes
to come up with a presentation on any subject, the Corporals having quickly devised this as
an activity to work on the boys’ confidence.

On a third day there was a timing for a Kit check at 0915, but when the boys arrived at work
the timing had been moved until 1045. This was more than two hours away but the
dismounts weren’t to go anywhere- or to get snapped by one of the Sergeants (mounted rifle platoons have two - one tankie and one grunt) doing nothing (despite their having been given nothing to do). At 1045 the NCOs did a surface kit check and sent the grunts away at 1120: “Next timing 1300, if Sergeant asks, after the kit check we quizzed you all up.”

The above reflects most, but not all, days in 1 Platoon, Oscar Company. There were some days with Battle Handling Exercises, or other challenging and engaging tasks. One day PT involved the boys pulling the 19.05 tonne LAVs down the road. There were some lessons on Close Quarter Combat and pepper spray familiarisation taken by American Marines. During my four months with Oscar, there were two field exercises: a Company live firing exercise, Exercise Okinawa\(^\text{33}\), and a much bigger Brigade/whole Defence Force exercise, Alam Halfa. Further, Battalion is a bit of a revolving door as people go on and off different courses, in which they are trained in, for example, different weapons systems, driving military vehicles, advanced signals and first aid, and so forth. I never saw a course, but think that some at least were conceptualised as challenging and worthwhile. However, this type of thing did not happen often enough to override the days of doing nothing.

Thus a lot of time was spent sitting around in the circle of chairs in front of the whiteboard, doing nothing, and “talking shit”. In theory, I should have been able to handle this better than the boys, not sharing with them the equation of physical exertion with doing something, and having my fieldnotes to write. Yet even I was completely, utterly, bored out of my mind and felt like I was going insane. Although by now never complaining in front of hierarchy was thoroughly internalised, this never stops soldiers from bitching amongst themselves, so not only was everyone bored, but we were constantly talking about how we were bored, which was pretty boring. In this the Junior NCOs were as one with the boys, displaying the same opinions and behaviour patterns, as will become clear.

The boys once wrote up on the whiteboard a model daily programme, which sums up how they felt an average day in their life proceeded:

- 0800: Sit around
- 0815: Roll call
- 0825: Smoko

\(^{33}\) Companies tend to name their exercises- and LAVs- with martial words that begin with the same letter as their alphabetical designation, hence this exercise too is re-named.
The general idea of this programme is that the day is largely comprised of waiting around to start work. When work does finally start- at 1100 and 1500- it is quite late, when everything could have been achieved earlier had it started earlier. The non-waiting periods are taken up with classic time fillers NCOs employ when they don’t know what to do with their soldiers: quizzes and kit inspections. Despite this, orders will be late and knock off will be later than it could have been. Next to this daily programme, someone scrawled, “Train as we fight!” However, Ellis pointed out this phrase was not in fact ironic: “We do train as we fight though, ‘cause we don’t fight and we don’t train.”

Someone had propped a range target up against the whiteboard, and because this particular target was in the form of the top half of a man, someone had drawn him a speech bubble, with the words, “knock off until the war begins.” Underneath this someone else had added, “Never, you don’t go anywhere.” To this Malone added, “Ever,” and a fourth soldier “PERIOD!” I once watched Ellis and Malone attempt to fill the whole whiteboard with ellipses, as follows:

Wait..............................................................................................................................................................................

Wait out..........................................................................................................................................................................  
................................................................................................................................................................................................

Stand by........................................................................................................................................................................

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Noting that I was copying this down in my notebook, Malone, who insisted my research be turned into a movie because he couldn’t be bothered reading a hundred thousand words, said: “make sure this is a key scene in the movie.” Pleased with their result, they noted: “I should take a photo of that: ‘you bring it, we’ll bring it out’,“ and added this recruiting slogan to their masterpiece.

Ellis told me, “you’re going to have to be really creative to write a book out of this, eh,” and, “your book’s going to be so interesting, eh. Chapter One: Stand by...Chapter Two: ...to stand by. Chapter Three: Wait out.” We were having this conversation whilst waiting to get orders, and several people had fallen asleep in their chairs. Another day Ellis reiterated: “do you regret choosing this [topic]? I would. I do.” Likewise a tankie told me, as we were sitting waiting for a lecture to begin at 1645, “You could write this report up in three words: Fuck. This. Shit.” Another day, based on the activities thus far, I said to Nepia, “You didn’t need to come in until 1300.”

“I hope you’ve written down how ridiculous the Army is,” he replied.

This was only one of two times in my fieldwork that I was repeatedly asked about whether I was writing about one specific issue, the other being thrashings at Corps Training. Thrashings at Corps Training and doing nothing at Battalion were opposite sides of the same coin: the boys found it noteworthy both when their desire to be challenged as generated by the practical habitus was being fulfilled and when it was not. In fact, there were no big rewarding group thrashings at Battalion. If you fucked up, you were either charged, or if the offence wasn’t that bad, individually given “extras”. Someone on extras could be given extra, undesirable tasks at any point until their allocated punishment had run out. While I was with 1 Platoon this basically meant that there was a short list of people on the HQ whiteboard, who were sometimes told to stay behind at knock off to clean the office area.

As one of the HQ staff noted to me, the grunts never saw the prep and admin that was occurring whilst they were waiting, and that had to be completed before they did anything, but rather “think they are getting the muck around.” It did feel at the time like being fucked around. One day for example the dismounts were ordered to fill out the wrong L&D forms (Lost and Destroyed- the paperwork to get kit replaced). Everyone knew that the paperwork was just going to have to be re-done on the right forms. “It’s this I can’t stand, eh,” said Ellis.
“Sitting around doing nothing,” someone agreed.

“I’m a professional procrastinator,” said Malone. “It’s my job title now.”

Another day marked the third day after the live firing ex in which we cleaned the already clean co-axials (machine guns that are mounted on the LAVs). When a Sergeant in charge of organising Battalion rugby teams came into the hangar, a Corporal announced, “We have no time for your chit chat! We have to clean these guns for the twenty benty billionth time!” Malone almost nodded off over his part, and by 1432, no one was pretending to clean anymore. Corporal announced a smoko, and to be back at 1500: “to carry on doing nothing.”

“Are you writing about how we’re cleaning the co-axes for the fourth time for no reason?” Chambers asked me.

One afternoon the grunts were preparing for a night task. “Are we using NVGs?” asked Ratahi. “But it’s a full moon tonight.”

“I think the whole point is the NVG training,” I said, and Malone said, “I thought the point was to fuck us around.” Next the soldiers refilled out forms with their basic information: licences they held, courses they needed to complete, dependants. “Do they think our regi number [regimental number, i.e. ID number] changes every two weeks?” complained Ellis. “My date of birth hasn’t changed for 18 years.”

Sometimes I could see the boys’ excess energy channelled anywhere it could go. One afternoon we were doing admin tasks upstairs in the office and the boys were intent on completing them perfectly. Sergeant watched two of them avidly laminate documents: “oh, this is intense, boys”.

“Oh, we’ve got spare time,” Ellis noted, “Shall we trim them up real mean?”

“Dig it in, Ellis, dig it in,” Sergeant responded. “The amount of effort you’re putting in, you’re making me think I should inspect them.”

“Do you need anything else laminated, Sergeant?” Ellis asked hopefully.

“No, not at the moment. Good job Ellis, good job.”
One PT session, a pack march, had to be redone partially because some of the boys had gone too fast. They had been told not to run, because on operation one’s pack would be too heavy for running, and marching is a different skill that takes different muscle groups that also need to be developed. The boys didn’t respond well to being told to limit themselves. On learning that the next day’s PT session was a long distance run, they commented: “Don’t go too fast. We’ll have to do it again.”

**Riflemen Dispositions and Interobjective Process: The crime is being caught**

All of this inactivity led to an apathetic atmosphere in which even if the dismounts were given a task, they were not relieved, but rather sometimes complained and didn’t necessarily give the task 100%. This seems paradoxical at first, but can be understood by remembering that only certain activities are seen to count as doing something, or as real work. The key factor is of course whether they can be seen as new and productive or not. For example, after Ex Okinawa, the LAVs had been stripped and everyone was supposed to be grabbing parts to clean. Nobody much was, however, with more soldiers than necessary instead just wiping down the already clean brew area. However, as soon as the LAV’s much more exciting cannon became available to clean, Ellis and Pokaia jumped in eagerly. Had the boys been looking for absolutely anything to do, there was always the option of offering to help the crewmen with their maintenance tasks. One tankie told me that when he had been in 1R’s other mounted Company, some of the grunts had always came over to help, but that he never had such offers at Oscar. When a tyre was replaced on one of the LAVs, however, the sheer size of it and the subsequent novelty and difficulty of the task had all of the grunts gathering around wanting a turn. By this time the link between simple, everyday tasks (like cleaning) and soldier dispositions was well and truly broken. By Battalion the boys had been cleaning for more than a year, but the soldiering that this was supposed to help them prepare for had not materialised. It was the same story with the more boring objects that had nevertheless been important in interobjectively constructing a squared soldier at Basic. There we had had to carry a pen and notebook at all times and prove that we had them at random. We had been thrashed for various people’s failure to do so, and recruits had regularly policed each other on the issue. During my time in Battalion, however, I always carried at least three pens, because that was the minimum number of soldiers that would
ask me if they could borrow one every single time a quiz was announced. The boys’ more military kit— the objects that best constructed them as good riflemen, like their packs— were still kept meticulous, and the boys still reacted with disgust and impatience to Henare’s seeming inability to do so. One’s pack, obviously, is connected to the right type of doing something.

During my time with 1R, we expended quite a bit of energy on trying to avoid work. Once the dismounts had finished the day’s training by 1530 and a Seco told the boys to get into cleaning the weapons. Instead everyone just sat down. Coming past again, the Seco said, “seriously, get into weapons, don’t just sit here doing nothing. If you get caught, you and I get charged.” So we cleaned weapons, but only after an argument about who had to walk to the end of the hangar to fetch rags. Ellis mused:

That I could get charged for doing nothing is beyond me, eh. Isn’t that 90% of my job? If someone came along and saw me doing nothing, he’d be like, “wow, you’re good at your job!” And I’d be like, “I know, right?!”

Another day, after having being given and completed admin tasks upstairs, the boys were told to find a better hiding place (so that they couldn’t be tasked with anything else). We had been heading towards the chairs, but seeing a staff member that would likely task us we all diverted, trying to make it look like we had an actual purpose (jiggling a locker lock, picking up a random form from a table) and left again to hole up in a smaller lesson room. On seeing this an NCO noted, “Yeah, just hide there until I come get you.”

“You get to the point where you’ve daydreamed too much that day,” noted one of the boys, waiting. “Nah, can’t daydream anymore.” Eventually we were told to move outside to the hangar steps and stay away from the chairs, as a staff member was on the warpath down there. After a couple of minutes outside however this staff member came out, so “right boys, let’s get back to our [non-existent] task,” announced a Corporal. Back in the hangar, we pretended to clean for a while, but eventually, too apathetic to even hide, some of the newer soldiers just sat down again, to immediately be told: “Fucking go sit down outside like I told you, cunts!”

To count as productive, and therefore as doing something, an activity generally had to be not only physical, but also challenging, to enable the boys to work on themselves. This
meant that repetition of tasks that had already been done didn’t count, hence even
playacting assaults wasn’t always now classified as doing something. The boys once
discussed how Oscar’s 2 Platoon had recently been given a range of night tasks: “Don’t tell
them we’re bored- that’s what 2 Platoon did.” This state of mind is referred to in the Army
as being “unavailable”. If you are unavailable today, you are disengaged and uninterested in
anything around you. You just can’t be bothered. It was hard to be motivated in the sluggish
environment of the hangar. This happened to me: despite having the most time by far to
take notes, my fieldnotes from Battalion are much more slapdash than the ones I stayed up
past midnight to scrawl in the intense training environments.

All of this may seem to contradict something that I argued in the previous chapter, which
was that soldiers use the get over it disposition to consistently perform their jobs well,
despite resentments. Perhaps the most significant sign of how low morale in 1 Platoon had
fallen was that the feeling of apathy did sometimes affect performance in platoon training
(although not in wider venues like field exes). For example, at a debrief after an assault in
one Battle Handling Exercise, the dismounts were told that four months out of Corps
Training they shouldn’t be having this talk, but: “I was disgusted at that attack.”

“It might be a bitter pill to swallow,” said an NCO, but they seemed to be lacking basic
infantry skills. Section Commanders had bigger things to worry about than how riflemen
were moving, or having to tell them where to place themselves on the ground. During this
attack I had been with the enemy party, some of whom were asleep when the Platoon
rolled up in the LAVs, forcing staff to yell “wake up!” Another NCO stated, “I don’t want to
hear, ‘there’s a fence in front of me, Corporal.’ I don’t give a fuck, just go over the fence, you
know how.” The NCOs acknowledged that “we’re probably all losing soldier skills stuck in
camp,” and asked for points from the floor. One soldier said, “I think it’s more lack of
motivation than necessarily lack of skills.” The NCOs agreed. This indicates that although the
get over it disposition was embodied and almost always acted upon (no complaints were
aired to hierarchy, for example) if it ever came too directly into conflict with the practical
habitus, it was the practical habitus that took precedence. This is because the practical
habitus was the boys’ primary habitus, and as such not only “the basis of perception and
appreciation of all subsequent experience” (Bourdieu, 1977, p.78) but also the basis on
which their new soldier habitus had been built. The one thing the boys could not fully get over was inactivity.

When I explicitly asked soldiers about how they didn’t like doing nothing but didn’t seem to like it when they did something either, Mayhew told me that is was because when they were training, it was training that they had already done. Ratahi, acknowledging the seeming paradox, very carefully told me: “I hate the procrastination that this organisation leads on a day to day basis. However, rest is important, but not at the levels I have been experiencing.” (Then: “That’s pretty- you wouldn’t think I’d written that, eh? If Sergeant...you’d think a white person had written it.”) He also told me:

Don’t get me wrong, I’ve had fun in the Army, but when the fun outweighs the bullshit that’s what you remember. But when the bullshit replaces the fun and there’s more bullshit, that’s what you remember. I’m not a psychologist, but I’m pretty sure that’s what happens.

The staff of course knew that to keep the boys engaged, they had to have them doing things. The Platoon Commander once explained to me that the reason the Platoon was going to Ashhurst the next day to practice river dismounts and fording was that they were going “stir crazy” staying in Camp. (This, however, apparently fell through). Once, one of the NCOs sent the boys away so that he could tell the Secos that, although he acknowledged he was the worst at the buddy-buddy stuff, the grunts shouldn’t have been just sitting around. “Any training is better than no training at all,” he said, and “all training starts with us. If they’re not engaging, they’re thinking about the next whorehouse”.

I had a discussion with one of the Sergeants one day, in which he said “these dudes have got it pretty sweet I reckon...it’s pretty cruisy. The only thing they could complain about is doing nothing.” That was, of course, what they complained about. Sergeant went on, “that’s how you can tell somebody’s ready to go to the next level, they get sick of sitting around doing nothing. But these guys never do. Never do anything about it.” Knowing that they were sick of it, I asked what could they do?

“They could be a pest. They could ask if they could be doing this. Or they could do it quietly, pick up a pamphlet to read. DFOs, SOPs.” The Defence Force Orders and Standard Operating Procedures are dry manuals full of regulations and processes and, given the type of people they are, reading them would not relieve a grunt’s boredom (I tried a few times, and it
Sergeant felt there was a lack of professionalism, of wanting to be good at the job: “there isn’t a culture of that here, of looking for personal development.” It was not of course that the boys didn’t value personal development; but rather that they only wanted to be personally developed in certain ways. They did not desire to become someone who knew all the SOPs. They also never badgered HQ about more active tasks; this of course was partially because, acting in line with the getting over it disposition, they would not complain to hierarchy. One day in which the boys knew they would be working late because there was a lecture scheduled for 1645, we were sitting around after lunch doing nothing. The boys commented that the replacement equipment from the lost and damaged forms had arrived. They could see it from where we sat: “They could be giving them out right now.”

“Can you ask them?” I asked.

“No, because they’d make up some excuse. Like, this is not the right time and place. Start counting the scuffs on the hangar floor.”

Intersubjective Process

Although a large part of the problem in Battalion was the lack of opportunities to become (better soldiers with new skills, soldiers that had actually been on deployment as opposed to just playacting it), the intersubjective processes through which the soldier habitus had been acquired in Corps Training were carried over to Battalion. The boys continued to test and maintain one another’s soldier dispositions through gay chicken, and to much less playfully discipline anyone who still struggled with these dispositions more generally. These intersubjective processes show how the boys’ actions were generated by the soldier habitus, but also highlight a few cases in which soldier dispositions could have been drawn on, but were not.

Gay Chicken

The much less intense atmosphere of Battalion as compared to Corps Training was reflected in a change in the manner in which gay chicken was played. By still playing it, the boys were still testing one another’s confidence. However, the content of the playacting expressed competition less overtly and focused on more explicitly supportive bonds. That is, the boys
no longer playacted domineering relationships centred on sex but rather loving, caring relationships. “They really love the man love, eh,” a female soldier said to me. This was not particular to Oscar, but rather was a long-running practice that new Battalion members presumably picked up from older ones. I had, for example, seen this type of loving gay chicken played amongst 2/1\textsuperscript{st} soldiers posted to field HQs during Corps Training, whilst the Corps Trainees I was following were still enacting the more domineering version. Although the boys in Oscar Company were currently unavailable, the fact that they still tested one another in soldier dispositions in the same way that the boys in all companies did shows that they were still invested in these dispositions.

On a lazy day on a field ex, Malone (from the Corps Training I followed) turned to Nepia (one of the older soldiers), stroked his bare arm where his shirt sleeve had pulled up, and said “we’re going to spoon, aren’t we, Nepia?” Half asleep, Nepia just happily responded, “Mmmm.” On another day, Malone sang “I will always love you,” to Nepia, who responded by putting his hand on Malone’s thigh.

“They keep putting their hands on each other’s legs today,” my fieldnotes say at one point. Malone and Nepia once had the following exchange:

Malone: Nepia?

Nepia: Mmm?

Malone: I love you.

Nepia: Love you too, bey\textsuperscript{34}.

Likewise, Malone once moved away from me and hence closer to Ellis due to his smoking, and when I said not to worry about it he responded “no, it’s alright, I’ll go and sit next to my baby, eh baby?” He joked that his tattoo said “I want Ellis’s dick in my mouth.” Malone also playacted a sensitive lover concerned with his partner’s pleasure. Performing a CQB drill, he suggestively asked the soldier he was practicing on: “Is that right, do you like that?”

Again, such playacting occurred simultaneously with storytelling about heterosexual escapades, some of which used of military metaphors to conceptualise sex. For example, on

\textsuperscript{34} Māori/Kiwi slang for man, mate, etc.
how to handle threesomes: “You just have to switch between, eh, alternate your arcs”; on whether or not prostitutes stop the second your time is up: “oh, not if you’re in the middle of a mean as spurt, like three to five round burst she’ll go a minute or two over, but if it’s just like one or three rounds, ‘safety on, weapon away’”.

Playacting love and support towards another man, for straight men, is perhaps a bigger challenge and hence displays more confidence than expressing sexual dominance over him does. As with the sexually aggressive metaphors, you needed to be able to play along. Soldiers who did not respond correctly the first time could be harassed just as effectively with gay compliments as they could with gay insults. Ratahi, for example, once started stroking another soldier’s hair. The soldier backed off: “it’s not funny, it’s just gay.” This just encouraged Ratahi to keep going: “Look at those beautiful blue eyes, and those curves, so slim...hey. Do you give a good blowjob? Look at those beautiful ears I can hold onto when you’re sucking my cock.” Thus this second stage of gay playacting, in which you challenge your mate with your love for him, neatly encapsulates the infantry conceptualisation of teamwork in which you test the people with whom you are closest because of this closeness.

**Disciplining one another**
The boys were not only still playfully testing one another’s soldier dispositions, but would also still discipline one another if they felt it was required. Sadly, in the absence of group thrashings, this could most clearly be seen in the continuing treatment of Henare. It was not just the boys with whom Henare had gone through Corps Training who continued to discipline him in the same way as they had done there, but all of the other boys as well, showing that this too is a common practice internalised across many Corps Trainings.

Henare had clearly internalised some soldier dispositions, particularly getting over it, as he had taken on the criticisms he received without resentment. When I expressed sadness that he was thinking about 717ing after everything he had gone through, he told me, “yeah, I got a lot of bro passes, though.” (Bro pas: someone passes you through an assessment, despite your lack of competence, to help you out). He could tell stories about his various mishaps and laugh as hysterically about them as his audience did. However, Henare still had not fully achieved competence at various practical tasks. For example, myself and Morgan, who was
more experienced than Henare’s cohort, once helped Henare move barrack rooms. Seeing the disorganisation of Henare’s kit, Morgan genuinely gave him tips about how he should store and look after it, but did so in a harsh, impatient tone.

As well as attempting to improve skills such as these, the boys were still working on Henare’s more general dispositions, particularly the lack of confidence. Specifically they disliked a habit Henare now had of looking at the ground, head bowed or leaning against his rifle, and as much as possible ignoring the harsh questions and criticisms they threw at him: “He’s talking to you, answer him”; “Answer people when they talk to you”; “look at people when they’re talking to you.” The other newer soldiers told me, when he wasn’t around, that Henare could speak confidently about any aspect of rugby or sport. Thus it seems they were trying to enable him to act like this in other areas of his life. They noted, with admiration, that “he keeps trying,” saying that if it had been them, they would have quit. As at Corps Training the boys were a mixture of helpful and relentless to Henare, supportively helping him to fill in a 717 form whilst lecturing him for folding it (you mustn’t fold Army admin forms), admonishing him to “speak up” and “tell somebody if you lose something” (in this case his locker key) whilst simultaneously breaking into his locker for him.

The NCOs did react to some of this behaviour. In particular, one gave the boys who had come through Corps Training with Henare (Pokaia, Ellis, and Malone) a speech in which he told them that if “that cunt” (a particular soldier Henare was having trouble with) was bothering Henare, to tell him to fuck off and if he doesn’t... “Can I [mimes punching] Corporal?” asked Pokaia.

“Tell him to fuck off and if he doesn’t, yeah. Back up Henare.” The boys seemed very impressed with this and immediately went into a huddle to plot. They sometimes teased Henare for their amusement, but at least once decided they’d gone too far. When spray painting goggles black to use as detainee blindfolds, the boys somehow convinced Henare to put on a wet pair and get paint all over his face. Then, however, they realised that they had upset him. “That was kind of sad, what we did to Henare,” Mayhew said to me, walking past the chairs. Then, walking past again: “Henare’s upset.” When I asked where he was: “don’t go yet, Pokaia’s talking to him.” Mayhew also informed Ratahi that Henare was upset. Ratahi at least interrupted this as a correction because he responded defensively: “I
didn’t do anything! Don’t blame me!” Thus, there was a line: the boys did get to a point where they felt they had overdone it, and Pokaia tried to correct this. This didn’t stop them, a few days later, quizzing Henare about his section’s movements during a task, and again harshly instructing him to look at people when they were talking to you, because such corrections are still acceptable ways of disciplining one another.

During Exercise Alam Halfa, Henare was punched by another member of his section (not from his Corps Training) during an altercation that I did not witness. Platoon HQ was not unhappy to be rid of this particular problematic soldier, and they rallied around Henare. When Henare asked what was going to happen to him, his Seco said “you’re not in trouble. You didn’t join the Army to get hit by your own people.” The next morning Sir asked Henare’s Seco if he had managed to get Henare to reconsider his 717 papers. He had: “the atmosphere is getting better for him here, and you don’t want to go out like that.”

The reason that I recount these further torments is that they show that the boys were still policing each other if they felt anyone was failing to act in line with soldier dispositions. The reason this is important is in a contrast: they never, ever disciplined one another for switching off or being unavailable in Oscar Company. This includes, as seen above, not only the Privates but the Corporals. This suggests that the boys did not feel that they were in any way performing soldier dispositions deficiently, but rather that they weren’t being given the opportunity to do soldierhood.

Over the course of their training, the boys had been taught several models for practice that the Army would hope they would use if they found themselves in such circumstances of inactivity and low morale. As well as the disciplining of one another, there was also self-discipline. In fact, we had been warned about situations like this during Basic Training. The Judson recruits- that is, Ellis- had been told: “It’s up to you now […] Do the right thing and keep it up.” This indicated that in the units you wouldn’t be forced to be switched on and giving a hundred percent at all times, and would have to use self-discipline to maintain these dispositions. However, Corps Training hadn’t privileged self-discipline, and the discipline of one’s peers had become more important. In becoming riflemen, the boys were taught that rather than just motivating yourself, it is the relationship with the group that motivates you. Corps Training was preferred to Basic, which is interesting, in that it seems
“self-discipline” as a more individualistic guiding principle may have been partially aimed at those generations that the TAD Cultural Review saw as wanting to know the reason for everything and to have their say, whereas in fact it was actually the Corps Training model that forced compliance and uniformity in which the boys most felt that they could express their preferred identity. The thing that soldiers had remarked on the most in terms of challenges, that is punishments, were not something they had chosen for themselves but were forced. This is not to suggest that the boys were unable to challenge themselves. Rather, relinquishing control was one of the biggest challenges of all and hence one of the more rewarding.

In Oscar Company, there were two responses to the fact that there was nothing for the Platoon to do, expressed in the following exchange. Ellis said, “If they haven’t got anything for us to do, they should knock us off.” Another soldier answered, “No, the thing is, they should have something for us to do.” When I first arrived Ellis had hoped I could tell him about 2/1, “because it’s shit here.” He got that they might not have anything for them to do, “but they could acknowledge it and knock us off instead of sitting around in this sauna.” (To civilians, the expectation that if there is not much to do at work one day you should be allowed to just go home perhaps sounds entitled, but it makes more sense in a context in which at other times, i.e. field exercises, you are required to be at work 24/7). Despite the fact that Oscar were constantly exposed to sister 1R Company Quebec and their much more exciting Enhanced Infantry role, the boys always much more explicitly compared themselves with 2/1st. And this wasn’t usually about 2/1 having the trips, but rather a simpler everyday factor: they believed that if there was nothing to do in 2/1st, the boys were just knocked off. Once down in Burnham the Oscar grunts had seen some 2/1 guys in civvies at 0830: “We were like, ‘eh?’” The 2/1st guys explained that the Battalion had nothing for them to do, “so they said ‘see you later’. We’re going to the gym.” The difference the boys saw was opportunity: unlike them 2/1st weren’t stuck in a hangar all day. Not only were the Oscar riflemen not provided with anything worthwhile to do, they were to some extent prevented from providing it for themselves: they couldn’t, for example, go and work out at the gym. Feeling they were being fucked around, most fell into “the crime is getting caught” mentality. As they tend to do, the Platoon largely shared one opinion. Thus rather than motivating one another, they were feeding on one another’s low morale.
This further meant that 717ing could be contagious. Once a Corporal came back from PT joking that he was going to 717, and so someone handed him the forms (in other words, someone actually had the papers physically on hand on any old random day). When another NCO saw the first holding these papers he got excited: “joining the crew!” Oscar Company seemed to be full of people who had already put in their papers and were waiting for their time in the Army to be up, and people who were considering 717ing. And they all talked about it incessantly. Such discussion was inescapable. Even if you didn’t want to quit, the idea, the possibility, was always there, always being brought to your attention, available for consideration, summoned by daily frustrations. One Monday, it was Morgan’s last day in the NZDF. The day passed entirely unmarked. In its commonality, it was an unremarkable event: “We used to farewell them all, eh. Now there’s just so many of them.”

During Ex Okinawa, sitting around a lake not doing much, Siloata told me that “all the boys” were getting out because “the Army’s changed.” When I asked how the Army had changed, he said, “Leadership and disorganisation. This isn’t organised, and it used to be more interesting, like we’d go and train. It was mean, not like this, I don’t even know what this is, sitting around and doing nothing.” He also indicated that he had done the same training over and over, and never got a trip. In fact Siloata did not 717 by the time I left Oscar, but this shows how the idea is in the minds of even those soldiers remaining. When I left Siloata and wandered over to another group, they too were discussing 717ing.

Siloata also said however: “The one thing that holds me back is the mates.” One morning, on hearing the rap that Siloata supposedly used on all the girls (“What’s up my cuz/I hope you’re feeling my buzz/everywhere I go I’m always covered in sluts“) a Corporal announced: “you guys are crazy, you cunts are the only ones keeping me in this job. Cause I always come to work and hear something random.” However, because of the high volume of 717s in the Army overall, it also began working the other way around: because those who were left behind were losing their mates, there was less reason to stay. Over in 2/1st, Bishop told me that because everyone from “the friend group” was planning to leave next year, he too was contemplating something new. Likewise one of his Platoon’s corporals noted one day that his last best mate in the Army had just put his papers in. “If they came back, I’d stay in the
Army for life. But... gutted.” I later heard that the Corporal had gotten out and gone “to Australia to live with all his boys.”

For those who did want to leave, comradeship was a resource. Siloata and Henare were discussing 717 strategy (not quitting until you had a job lined up) and Siloata said: “Don’t worry, I’ll look after you bro, that’s what bros are for.” When Ellis was about to go into the meeting to ask for his papers he was given advice on how to approach it from Morgan, who had already had his own such meeting (“What, so I shouldn’t just say I’m leaving because this place sucks my cock?”). In turn, Ellis, now experienced, could assure Henare, who had heard from another soldier that the forms couldn’t be hand-written: “no, that’s just his Platoon Commander being a cunt to him, mine was written and Sir said it was all good.” Soldier dispositions could also be used in organising one’s departure and future career: “I want to be squared away before I put [my papers] in [...] No point in throwing away a perfectly shitty job to be unemployed.”

This was the environment in which those who did want to remain in the Army had to work every day. Malone’s response to his mate Ellis’s 717 was, for example, “Man, every cunt’s leaving.” Ellis would suggest Malone should do the same:

Malone: I’m so bored.

Harding: And it’s only nine o’clock.

Malone: It’s a sign.

Ellis: You should 717 with me, it’s a sign.

Another time someone announced: “Bored out of your skin, bro? Welcome to everyone else’s world.”

“Everyone else should have the balls to join me,” responded Ellis.

Malone had no intention of leaving; he wanted to see what QAMR would be like, and to go for selection (for the SAS). “My boys, my boys,” he bemoaned, and then “I’ll be Chief of the Army soon,” – that is, because there would be no one else left. “I’ll be CSM (Company Sergeant Major) by the end of the week. The only cunt left. I’ll be doing Battalion assaults. By myself. All these cunts leaving.”
Malone did share Ellis’ complaints. The 717 form includes a checklist of possible motives driving the decision to quit for data collection purposes, and looking through it, the three of us laughed at tempo of work too high. “Nobody in history has ever said that,” said Malone. He himself identified at least half of the list as something he was experiencing and eventually said to Ellis: “just put all of the above, this is ridiculous.” When I asked Malone whether Ellis’s constant 717 talk was bringing down his morale he said no: “It doesn’t need Ellis, it’s already there.” Likewise Nepia said, “I’m not going anywhere soon. I’m just sick of this shit. I might have a different idea once my debt’s gone, though.”

**Process: Field exes and playacting**

During my time with Oscar Company, it wasn’t just everyday tasks like cleaning that had lost their value. Even field exercises, usually conceptualised as doing something, could be conceptualised as being fucked around. The emotional investment that worked to make playacted battle scenarios seem “real” was gone. Again partially this was due to the frustration of repetition. Dissatisfaction was also, however, due to the perception that this repetition indicated a lack of respect from their superiors.

Exercise Okinawa was a Company exercise focused on live field firing. Ellis had told me he was keen for field, because it would be better than doing nothing. However, there was a certain amount of doing nothing on Okinawa also, including a few mornings spent sitting around a lake. A Corporal noted that this ex had “been really good training for the tankies, eh? The dismounts not so much.” One grunt outlined plans to get everyone sent home: “Malone, you go because of your shits, Mayhew your shoulder, Ellis, your wisdom tooth, Nepia can make something up…” One soldier told me that he had heard “so many people” saying they wanted to go home, and that it didn’t used to be like that. Rather, everyone would be “high tempo: ‘yeah, we’re going field, yeah, we get to fire.’” When I asked why he thought this was the soldier cited money. A decrease in ammo meant less firing.

After a night-time platoon live fire, Mayhew and I ran into two guys from 2 Platoon outside the portaloos, who said that their assault had been shit due to their “crap commanders”, and they had been smashed because of it. Mayhew said that 1 Platoon’s assault had been shit also: “everyone wants to 717 eh, everyone’s like I’m going to 717 when we get back.”
Again, everyone didn’t 717 when they got back. But when they were disgruntled, 717ing was what soldiers’ minds jumped to first.

Soon after Exercise Okinawa was Exercise Alam Halfa, involving one and a half thousand NZDF personnel from all three branches. Alam Halfa was based on a scenario in which peace was to be restored to a troubled fictional nation and then control of that nation handed back to its own government and police. During preparations, Mayhew announced to me, “And you can write this in your little book, they’re fucking us around with this ex and it’s not even towards anything. Like, we’ve got nothing to look forward to so it makes everyone not want to be here.”

“You guys are looking at exercises the wrong way,” a staff member tried to tell the Platoon. “It’s never a fuck around at your level. There’s always something new or different to pick up.”

“Southern Reaper was,” someone answered.

“Well, that’s because of you. If you go in negative, it’s going to be negative. If you go in positive, enhance what you know, or get something from other people.”

Alam Halfa was preceded by briefs on counterinsurgency, talking to locals, and detaining prisoners. For example, there was a brief on “the chat”: “you may be required to spin a yarn with someone.” This emphasised asking open-ended rather than leading questions, and being aware of body language: you should make sure there are no physical boundaries, such as desks or fences, separating you from people you are conversing with, and remember that while you are used to weapons, civilians aren’t, and thus try not to hold them or yourself in a manner than might be intimidating. (That is, some embodied soldier dispositions might need some adjustments for peacekeeping, indicating there was still some identity acquisition to be had out of being a soldier if you could get deployed). At the end of the brief, we practiced “the chat” by asking questions about our neighbour’s weekend. American Marines were present for these briefs and the exercise, and after a NZDF staff member had demonstrated how to lean a prisoner against a wall- facing the wall with the palms of his hands up against it- he asked them for pointers, given that some of them had been in Iraq and Afghanistan and done this for real. Saying, “if it was me,” one Marine
rearranged the prisoner, taking his hands off the wall, putting them on his head, and leaning his forehead against the wall instead. This is obviously a more uncomfortable stress position. The Kiwi soldier in front of me muttered, “This is why everybody hates America. This is why nobody likes your country.”

During Alam Halfa the crew of the wagon I rode in sometimes had trouble distinguishing between enemy party playing locals and real New Zealand locals (which mirrors the difficulty distinguishing combatants from the rest of the population in many conflict zones):

“We just passed someone on a quad with a handheld.”

“That was just a farmer, eh? That wasn’t enemy party.”

“But he had a radio.”

“He was a farmer. I’ve seen a lot of farmers. I know farmers.”

One of 1 Platoon’s sections apprehended a civilian- that is, an actual civilian. It was just some guy parked up in his car smoking a joint. When the boys made the guy get out of the vehicle, the Seco saw the joint and knew immediately he wasn’t “one of ours”. The DS (Directing Staff- staff who direct the scenario by informing you of notional events) backed away stuttering, while the civilian exclaimed: “I’m tripping man! I’m tripping out!... Are those real guns?!”

During an early morning clearance of an airfield, which I experienced through listening to the comms in the back of the LAV, it was clear that some of the soldiers involved were emotionally engaged, frantically yelling down their radios rather than just going through the motions. There was a tense conversation in which engineers felt they could not safely deal with an IED on the runway due to lack of light and informed the Commanders that they were going to hold until daylight. They were informed the task was priority and they could use white light. “We’ll take that risk,” came stiffly back. The engineers then tried to get one of 1 Platoon’s LAVs to clear the runway. The vehicle commander, who had already checked that there would be a countdown to the explosion, snapped: “[Engineers’ call sign], silence. There will be a countdown and this call sign will provide security to the last minute.”

Although more senior soldiers with engaging roles in this task were therefore emotionally invested in it, 1 Platoon’s grunts were not. They had been acting as security and support
whilst 2 Platoon conducted the actual clearance, and when I later caught up with them in front of the portaloos, I witnessed the following conversation:

“Hate this.”

“I want to stab whoever planned this.”

“It’s pointless, we’re not doing anything.”

On another day, 1 Platoon was sent to set up a radio relay point in a nearby town. According to Sir: “They didn’t have anything for us to do, so they’ve just made this up.” On the way back one of the DS stepped out onto the road and announced that 3 Section’s LAV had hit an IED. As in all such situations, the “wounded” were given a photo of their injury with their symptoms listed on the back. At this point the Platoon had no embedded medic. Although acting as if everyone is in a combat zone, the Army also has to follow legal safety requirements, which means that drivers can only drive so many hours per day, and must observe mandatory rest periods. The medics wouldn’t come to the scene- or meet the Platoon halfway- because they had already used up their daily legal driving hours. 1 Platoon’s drivers were in the same situation. The evac helicopters apparently couldn’t land. Three quarters of the section notionally died. Because this was a Brigade exercise involving all Corps, the whole chain was being tested, and so the “corpses” were transported back to a morgue on the Forward Operating Base where the loggies practiced bagging and tagging them. The LAV also had to be cleared and taken for “repairs”. The notionally dead boys’ kit was not taken with them; and there were no spare sleeping bags or so on for them on the FOB, thus they were expected to spend the night with just the uniforms on their backs. They responded by raiding some loggies’ stores, acquiring some jackrats and stuffing bivvie bags with hessian sacks to sleep in. This is an example of how the “crime is getting caught” disposition, informal and resistant to Army hierarchy though it is, can become effective in operations. Had this been a real scenario, the boys would have improved their ability to perform their job the next day by bettering their physical condition. Once the casualties had finally been evacuated, and I met up with the grunts in the night loc, Mayhew announced shortly to me: “putting in my papers when we get back.”

After this, the OC of Oscar Company left the field and Oscar came under the command of the Enhanced Infantry Company, Quebec. Quebec was tasked with the capture of two
insurgent leaders who had escaped the airfield clearance and were now hidden in an urban area. They walked into this enclave under cover of darkness, driven to their departure point in 1 Platoon’s LAVs, whilst 1 Platoon rode in open-sided mogs as security, then waited four hours at the drop off point to follow. 1 Platoon had one building to clear, but by the time the task was over and we were eating breakfast at 1000, the grunts were muttering darkly about fuck-arounds. Then word came through that the task was being conducted again, straight away. This was a rehearsal: the Minister of Defence was coming to watch the task in the next day or two. The Platoon Commander, obviously agreeing that this was a fuck around, instead managed to get the Platoon tasked with FOB security, which meant one section manning the gates, and the other two guarding a fence. This meant that many could dry their kit in the sun and crash out- except the NCOs, who were tasked to watch the rehearsals and figure out the best vantage point for the Minister. Sir arranged “a patrol to Helwan camp to check that the hot water’s on” (Translation: we got showers). Saved from a fuck around, but back to doing nothing.

At the end of Alam Halfa, the whole Company, from the OC down to the Privates, was called into the Waiouru conference room for an exercise evaluation in which a highly ranked NCO asked for observations. The OC had the most to say; the baggies, of course, didn’t say a word, despite being encouraged: “Come on, does anyone have any points, baggies? It’s like voting, if you don’t do it, don’t criticise the government.” (However he also cut off or dismissed some of the points that people did raise: “that’s not my problem”; “we’re just looking for observations, not trying to figure out where the problem is”). A Section Commander noted that we had been led to believe (partially from the briefs discussed above) that a large part of the ex would take place in urban areas, “seeing the public, having a yarn, doing urban patrols” which would have been “good training for the new guys coming through.” Instead, within two days the Company was in Waiouru yet again, “running around forest blocks. We could have done that at home.” (Indeed, this Corporal spent much of his ex shaking his fist at the sky whilst shouting “fuck you Waiouru!” and sarcastically singing *Glad you Came.*

All of the ranks above Private, from the Secos to the OC, brought up the IED casevac, noting that the medics wouldn’t meet them halfway (“I lost three quarters of my guys because they didn’t get to them fast enough”) and that given the restriction on driving hours, the IED
should have been timed more carefully (“hit us at a time when we can deal with it”). They also reported the non-provision of kit to the notionally dead. This had been compounded when the “respawned” casualties were unexpectedly brought back out to the Company HQ. Because the Company hadn’t been warned, there were no arrangements in place to transport the boys back to their dispersed platoons, meaning they had been left in yet another place without their kit. In this evaluation of Alam Halfa we can see the common complaints of this chapter so far—training wasn’t productive or therefore worthwhile—but also another feeling that was quite prevalent in my time at Battalion: that soldiers weren’t being looked after well enough.

**Process: The failure to intersubjectively or interobjectively construct a wider Army community**

So far we have seen that Oscar Company riflemen had a hostile relationship with their leaders in that they felt they were not being provided with worthwhile tasks. But this was not the only area in which the boys felt the Army was failing them. When I arrived at 1R, the Battalion hierarchy told me that they were worried that the Army community was eroding, specifically mentioning community in the residential areas. They wanted to know if soldiers saw the Army as their life, or just as their “nine to five”. I had learned at TAD induction that official Army statistics show that feelings of “military belonging” drop off after the initial training periods. Throughout my time with them, most of both the Battalion and Company hierarchy were strangely focused on whether or not I went to town (i.e. clubbing) with the soldiers. I couldn’t figure out why they seemed to think there was such good research to be found in the bars. On those occasions when I did go to the baggies’ bar or clubs in Palmerston North with the soldiers (following the participants, I went with girls from my barracks when they chose to do so, which was probably not as often as the hierarchy would have liked) it was pretty much just like going to town with any group of people of their age. It was only after the fact that I realised that this interest was most likely due to the same concern about Army community. The hierarchy wanted me to see the soldiers after five because they wanted to know if they formed a true community.

If there is community erosion, it is not at all about a lack of bonds amongst the soldiers, who did act as a tight community after five. Soldiers are strongly attached to their mates. Once in
the Linton bar I ran into Gibson, from Corps Training, who was 2/1st, and there by himself because he was up from Burnham on a course. He told me how weird it was to be “without my boys”: “I don’t have my boys with me, it sucks!” What the boys never disliked about the Army was the mates, and, as before, their presence or lack thereof could affect individual soldiers’ decision to stay or go. Rather, if there is a breakdown in Army community, the problem is that although the community was felt horizontally amongst privates and corporals, it was not also felt vertically. What the soldiers saw as breaking down- and they did conceptualise this as a change, and as a recent development- was their collective relationship with “the Army”. “Tell the Army to stop treating its soldiers like shit,” a soldier once said to me. Although the boys feel kinship for one another in their sections, platoons and companies, this is not extended to “the Army” as a broader construct.

The lack of worthwhile activity was not only boring and frustrating; it also said something to soldiers about their relationship with the Army, particularly about how they were valued by the organisation. One morning the grunts were ordered to refill out NTI forms for weapons and other A class stores that they had very recently NTIed. For the life of me I can’t remember what this acronym stands for, if I ever knew, but to NTI equipment is to go through all of its parts, check that they are in working order, and fill in forms either verifying that they are up to standard or noting any damage. The Secos were incensed that they had to get the boys to redo checks that had just been done, and had the following rapid-fire exchange:

“What a good idea! Let’s NTI stuff we’ve just NTIed!”

“That will raise soldier morale!”

“We’ve finally figured out what’s been missing.”

“More NTIs!”

“Now people will stop 717ing.”

“They’ll pull their papers.”

“Listen up guys, there’s no trips or deployments, but there’s Waiouru and NTIs.”

One of the Secos then turned to the baggies and greeted them, “Hi, little buddies!”
“Hi, big buddy,” Nepia responded for the group.

“Ready for another fun filled day?” the Seco asked. And, to me, “Write that down, Nina.”

“What?” I responded stupidly.

“They don’t trust us, they don’t trust their leaders. Why do they promote us if they don’t trust us?”

This order read to the NCOs as if “they” did not trust them to have done the NTIs properly in the first place. What other reason was there to have the paperwork redone?

Notice that in this speech the Seco uses a general plural pronoun i.e. “they”, rather than referring to whom specifically the order to re-do the NTIs came from: “They don’t trust us, they don’t trust their leaders. Why do they promote us if they don’t trust us?” I don’t know if the Secos knew who it was that made this decision, but from the way it was presented to the baggies and myself, we certainly didn’t: “they” did it. This is a common speech pattern in the Army: when soldiers feel they are being fucked around, “they” did it. “They” refers to the equally as unspecific “the Army.” In reality, “they” must mean some individual decision maker, or a number of individuals whose decisions culminated in an overall effect, but this was not often visible to soldiers. “They” indicates a lack of information about (or interest in) the details of what went on in the ranks above corporal.

The following are two more examples of the use of “they”. During a refurb of an area (i.e. restoring it to its previous condition) that the Platoon had assaulted through the night before on Ex Okinawa, a “Warning: unexploded mine” sign was found. “Oh, good one,” was Mayhew’s response, “This is what they made us assault through.” Sitting around in the LAV one day, the crew discussed their LAV Weapons Effects Simulator (LWES- an acronym buried in an acronym) - basically a noisemaker. With sound effects that simulated firing, the LWES addressed an ongoing problem: during training for which blank ammunition for the LAV’s weapons systems was unavailable, the dismounts couldn’t tell if the LAVs were currently notionally firing or not (“LAV Weapons Effects Simulator (LWES)”, 2012, p.8). The crew was shocked that developing this system had cost twenty thousand dollars:

“For four speakers, an amp, a battery, and a few switches.”
“I could have made this.”

“They didn’t even try to make them look professional. They just put it in an ammo box. Have some class.”

“That’s asking a bit much.”

“These speakers are worth more than I own.”

“Are these waterproof? Would they spend that much on speakers that weren’t waterproof?”

“Yes, they always do dumb stuff.”

Thus although teamwork is fostered in the Army, these bonds don’t seem to have taken root much past the level of the face to face team you interact with regularly (this is the small group cohesion that early military sociology was so concerned with). This group usually consisted of the privates, their secos and their 2ICs, i.e. the junior NCOs. (What group senior NCOs such as Sergeants fall into, us or them, depends on the individual Sergeant- I saw it go both ways). Bonds do not extend to the Army as an organisation. Rather the Army is a faceless institution against which you and your mates may stand in opposition: “I’m sure this organisation is run by monkeys and HQ is actually at Auckland Zoo.”

Another fact that implied that “they” didn’t trust their soldiers was that the Linton Military Camp MPs (Military Police) had recently begun wearing body armour whilst on duty on base, including in the mess and when they came through the baggies’ bar near closing each night. This absolutely disgusted privates: “Why are you wearing body armour?” they would ask the MPs. “Is someone going to shoot you?” Once at dinner someone told us that that morning at breakfast he had seen the Orderly Sergeant force an MP to leave the mess to take his armour off: “Does it say on there [on the list of attire that is and is not permissible posted just outside the doors] that you can wear your vest in my mess?!” This story was greeted with much delight.

Looking back, sometimes what happened in barracks after the pub was in fact quite informative, in that it also sometimes led to the expression of how soldiers viewed their relationship with the Army. Just as the OC and CSM had hoped, the girls in my barracks invited me to Linton’s baggie bar the Friday after I moved in. When the bar closed, and the
MPs came through in their body armour to make sure everyone was leaving without a fuss, us females went with some male loggies back to their barracks. This is against regulations after 2200, as is consuming alcohol in the barracks after 2200, and everyone ignored the girl warning us that the MPs were coming, so fairly shortly we were having our names and numbers taken down and being sent back to our own barracks. “Why do you wear…” a loggie tried to respond, before his mate shushed him.

Once we were back in our own barracks the MPs came through and found some open bottles, which the girls argued just happened to be still open from 2159. They noted that the MPs had gotten worse lately (“Maybe it’s you,” they speculated to me). The next morning the MPs stopped me as I was walking to the gates to say that they knew I was new and didn’t know the rules (actually I was perfectly aware of the rules) but that I had to follow said rules whilst on base, and very nicely outlined them for me. They were still wearing their body armour.

What we were in trouble for- being near males and their beds and alcohol after 10pm- are very particular Army regulations and constitute what most other people the soldiers’ age were probably doing that night. But this wasn’t what was bothering the soldiers in my barracks. Instead, they started talking about how “the Army is not as considerate as they think they are.”

“There’s no compassion,” one said.

“Do you know what,” one of them said to me, and everyone else joined in to back her up, “if your friend dies, you have to get a letter from their parents saying you were close friends so you can get off for their funeral.” I heard this same type of story- the Army putting up roadblocks to your attending friends’ and family members’ funerals- many times at 1R. For example, an NCO had found out during a field ex that his grandfather had died, and wanted to go to his mother, who was all alone: “they made big trouble about it, like I think its best you stay another day, your men need you, it’ll be good training.” A grunt told me to write down that if your fiancée was sick, as in, in the hospital getting tests done sick, the hierarchy will say to you: “do you have to go see her? Is there someone else who can do it?” I did hear some talk to the effect that some soldiers, when they have cell phones on field ex, get family members to call with fake emergencies that require the soldier to come home. That
may have been what some commanders were thinking when they didn’t automatically grant leave. But the recurrent funeral story was just one aspect of a wider idea running, not just through the hangars but the wider barracks and bars, that the Army had stopped caring about and for their soldiers.

Evidence of this was also found in budgetary cutbacks and the reorganisation of pay and entitlements. At this time rumours were circulating about an upcoming restructure of soldier pay packages. When this eventually materialised after I had left Linton, it involved a pay rise, the first in four years, paid for out of money saved under the Defence White Paper plan. There was also an increase in the “Military Factor” allowance, in recognition of the hardships of the military lifestyle, i.e. the 24/7 nature of the job and the separation from family it entails. This however was accompanied with a loss of leave and allowance entitlements, which was dealt with by one-off buy-outs or buy-backs of currently held entitlements. There was also the removal of a rent subsidy for those living in residential areas and barracks, reportedly both to align rents with market rates and to remove the advantage held by those who lived on base over those who lived off base. Some soldiers calculated that despite the pay rise, they would now be worse off monthly (Levy 2012b; 2012d).

Running into a soldier I had known at Basic, she told me to write that “they’re taking away everything that made you want to join- free food, living allowances.” They had filmed the new recruiting ad that day, she told me: “out there on the field, and pretended it was Samoa. Write the Army is not like they say on TV!”

“Can’t they even spend money to keep guys in?” someone mused one day.

“They can’t even spend money to get new guys.”

“Haven’t you heard the new slogan? ‘You bring it, we’ll bring it out.’ That means you pay a twenty thousand dollar bond when you join the Army and you don’t get it back when you leave.”

Aside from just financial concern, the junior soldiers seemed to feel these cuts as the erosion of the particular type of Army-soldier relationship in which the Army, in Moskos’ (1977) sense, is an institution that takes care of its own. Housing and food, are, after all, key
symbols of family and of being cared for. These are soldiers who just a year earlier had been stunned and ecstatic that the Army served them bacon and eggs for breakfast, subsidised, every single morning. I once accompanied a medic on her nightly rounds on Ex Okinawa, and a soldier asked her for some Panadol. She responded that medics don’t carry Panadol anymore, because they can’t carry enough for everyone, and to get some from the med kit in the LAV. The soldier felt unable to do this, as he had been told that grunts weren’t allowed to use the kit that belonged to the LAV. This frustrated the medic, who noted that that was what the kits were there for, and that such kits often came back to them unused and expired. After we left the soldier, who still didn’t have Panadol, I expressed surprise that someone would come to the field without carrying their own painkillers. The medic responded: “You’re a civilian. You’re used to providing yourself with this stuff, but Army guys are used to Army provides.” If the Army is seen to stop providing food and accommodation and Panadol, and to be just giving you a pay check instead, it is like them declaring they will no longer look after you like family. Some of the interobjectivity that helps construct the Army community has shifted. Last chapter I demonstrated through the discussion of food that riflemen are very practical in their relationships with one another and don’t use gestures that aren’t of any tangible use to construct these relationships. Rather, relationships are constructed through that which is productive and useful (such as helping one another to internalise soldier dispositions). As a transposable disposition, this applies to their relationship with the Army as well, meaning that the loss of the material signs of community is a fundamental blow to the sense of community itself. A tankie told me that with all of the benefits they had been losing, specifically citing the accommodation allowance, “It feels like the Army isn’t for its soldiers anymore, it’s for its officers.” He said he could earn this much at Pak’nSave, so it wasn’t worth it anymore, “it’s just like a civilian job now.” Another day he came and told me that one of the biggest problems “we have now is there used to be a culture in the Army of they looked after the guys really well, but now it’s really quick to be hung out to dry, and if they’re done with you, they’re done.” He said it had gone from being like a big family to a workplace. When I asked for examples of what had changed, he said he didn’t know, as he hadn’t been around long enough to see the change, rather he sensed this from the older guys. Quite often when people said that the Army now cared less about their soldiers, what they said was quite vague, and I would ask
for specifics. I got few, but it doesn’t matter if the feeling can be backed up if it is there and affecting soldiers’ morale and decision-making.

At one point the boys in 1 Platoon seemed actually surprised to learn that the Army was concerned about the fact that privates were unhappy in their employment and thus 717ing. Mayhew had said to me, “you’re going to have a really depressing view of the Army,” and when I said that was okay because “the Army” wanted to know why everyone was leaving, the grunts reacted with shock:

“Eh, the Army wants to know that?!”

“How do you know?!”

When I answered “because they told me,” Siloata asked, in a rare show of interest in who the “they” actually was, “what, like the corporals told you?” This is an indication of how this soldier at least viewed the Army- the higher workings are largely invisible and beyond his experience. No, I said, the Deputy Chief of Army told me.

“They’re letting you tell them why people are leaving?” said Ellis. “Tell them it’s because it’s bullshit.” Letting you tell them is an important construction here. It suggests that myself and the soldiers might want the Army to know privates’ concerns, but that the Army is merely allowing this- that it isn’t something they themselves are invested in, but they would listen as a favour. In fact “they” are concerned with the view of their soldiers, but it seems that their soldiers don’t know this.

**Conclusion**

By the time I left 1R, nothing had changed. The boys were still bored, frustrated, and contemplating 717ing. Soon after, they were transferred to QAMR, and I heard through the grapevine of the next platoon with which I was embedded that they felt they were still being fucked around there. Whereas even I got to go straight on from this to accompany a deployment, soldiers like Ellis and Malone didn’t get a trip. The deployments to Afghanistan, Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands were tasked to 2/1st up until the NZDF pulled out of all three of these nations not much longer thereafter.
The field of Battalion, unlike Basic and Corps Training, was not one to which the boys’ habitus was adjusted. This was true of both habitus that were generating the boys’ actions, the new soldier habitus and the underlying primary practical habitus. In the first case, this was because the soldier habitus was not specifically designed for this field, but rather, by necessity, for war and deployment, very different fields to that of a company training in camp, where constant vigilance had nothing much at which to be directed. In the second case, however, the boys were simultaneously too well adjusted to the field to fulfil the practical habitus. Because they were acting in line with soldier dispositions, they could react as if by instinct to all eventualities in camp and on field ex. Battalion therefore was not challenging in the ways that they conceptualised challenge. Not much of the training occurring at Battalion was seen to be novel or unfamiliar enough to make it seem worthwhile or productive.

In theory it seems that dispositions like getting over it and self-discipline could be applied not only to the exigencies of war and peacekeeping, but to any situation in which your emotions might interfere with what you are asked to do, and thus also to a build-up of disappointment, boredom and resentment over a lack of soldiering opportunities. However, these dispositions had always been inculcated and embodied in situations of high intensity. Thrashings or inspections in the training periods may have been designed solely to frustrate, or been unproductive busy work, but they tended to involve frenzied activity nonetheless. In the boys’ experience, therefore, it was activity that triggered these dispositions. In the lack of activity, it didn’t feel to the boys as though what they were experiencing was actually soldiering, and they didn’t know what to do with themselves. Unlike at Basic or Corps Training, they could not reframe their troubles as just another challenge. The fact that soldier dispositions like “get over it” could not reconcile the boys to inactivity shows that, although the relationship between the practical and soldier habitus had changed once both were embodied, the key underlying basis of this relationship was not altered: the practical habitus remained primary and the soldier habitus secondary. The pre-existing practical habitus was still the basis on which the boys judged their experience of the Army, and the reason that some of them chose to walk away from the military life for which they had worked so hard.
Because acting and being challenged is so fundamental to the boys’ primary habitus and hence selves, not being provided with anything to do may also be interpreted as a lack of respect and concern for them as people. This provides more insight into the boys’ theory of identity acquisition as a process that should be demanding but not demeaning. It is not just that identity acquisition should be demanding and not demeaning as two separate variables, but that these are more closely related in that sometimes work is demeaning because it’s not demanding.

The next chapter focuses on a deployment, an opportunity to finally do what the boys had trained for, and, therefore, a field that would presumably match the practical and soldier habitus more closely than that of Oscar Company. But the 2/1st Platoon that deployed to the Solomon Islands had more in common with 1 Platoon than might be expected. The concerns of the boys whilst there were very familiar: there’s nothing to do; this training isn’t worthwhile; we could have done this at home.
Chapter Nine

Deployment

Operation Rata II

Combined Task Force

Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands

Guadalcanal Beach Resort, Honiara, Solomon Islands

Driving beyond the gates of RAMSI’s base in Honiara for the first time since his Platoon’s arrival in the Solomon Islands, Mitchell felt naked: “this is the only time we’ve ever been on patrol without weapons, and it’s on deployment. Can anyone explain that to me?”

“No,” one of his mates responded, “I can’t do that, eh.” Mitchell’s section was on an AO fam (Area of Operations familiarisation - a trip to acquaint the Platoon with key spots in Honiara at which potential disturbances could occur). The reason the boys weren’t armed was that there had been no major outbreak of violence in the Solomon Islands since 2006. A show of arms by RAMSI soldiers was at this stage counter to the aims of the mission, which, nearing the end of military involvement, were to boost the population’s confidence in their own state by demonstrating that the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF) could and was handling any disturbance. The visibility of the military troops based in Honiara was kept very low lest the sight of uniformed soldiers constantly out and about implied that this was necessary to continuing peace. However, after a year and four months of carrying Steyrs during training, the lack of the rifle during a real deployment was making the boys feel wrong. Driving through the busy centre of Honiara and looking out at locals going about their day, one of the boys said, “I feel vulnerable without a weapon, eh?” and a bit later, “they’re looking at us like meat, eh? Like steak.” Never having routinely carried a weapon myself, and therefore not feeling its absence, and not having embodied the ever vigilant soldier habitus, I was a bit surprised to hear the bustling city conceptualised as threatening
(being surrounded by soldiers encourages one’s sense of safety, of course). But Army training by necessity is geared at the worst possible scenario and the boys had always been interobjectively constructed as soldiers with their Steyrs. This embodied military habitus was still not quite matching the field of even a deployment. The boys quickly adapted to this new context, and got over any feelings of vulnerability. However, the fact that military visibility was to be avoided shaped the whole deployment.

The Platoon that I accompanied to the Solomon Islands was from 2/1st Battalion. It contained the majority of the boys that had been posted to 2/1st from the Corps Training Course that I had followed, including Wereta and Mitchell from Judson at Basic, and Gibson, Phelan, and Tahuparae from 3 Platoon at Corps Training. They were originally placed together as an interim measure for Exercise Southern Reaper, as it wasn’t an ideal time for existing platoons to integrate new soldiers. The original plan was to spread them out amongst the other platoons after the exercise, but at some point it must have been decided that this was unnecessary. One of the secos told me that this unusual formation made quite a difference. Usually, as at Oscar Company, small numbers of fired up new guys came into existing platoons with low levels of morale and soon became unavailable themselves in response. In this case however, the core of the Platoon was the eager newbies, and smaller numbers of more experienced soldiers had to adjust to them. Extra personnel were further attached to the Platoon just for the deployment, including three Territorial Force (i.e part-time) soldiers, and support elements such as a medic and drivers.

At the time, the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was made up of three bodies; the civilian Office of the Special Co-ordinator, responsible for overall direction and coordination, the Participating Police Force (PPF), made up of police officers from contributing countries who worked with the RSIPF, and the Combined Task Force (CTF), the military branch that provided backup in case events went beyond the ability of the police to handle. The CTF was one Company made up of three platoons from three different nations. There was an Australian Territorial Forces platoon, the New Zealand platoon, and, at the time of the boys’ deployment, a Tongan platoon (Tonga rotated with Papua New Guinea). The CO of the CTF was from the Australian Defence Force, and the Deputy CO from the New Zealand Defence Force. RAMSI personnel are housed on the Guadalcanal Beach Resort (GBR), which was in fact a tourist resort before it was leased to
RAMSI and converted into a base. Everyone is accommodated in ITSAs (Individual Tropical Shelter Accommodation), raised barracks consisting of two corridors of two-man rooms separated by “breezeways”, large common areas open on each end to allow air to circulate.

RAMSI is a police-led mission, and the New Zealand Senior National Officer (SNO) explained to me that the police wanted the military “at the back”, out of sight, out of mind. Just prior to and during the deployment Honiara hosted several international events which were in a manner used as tests, with the RSIPF pushed to the front, to see if they could maintain law and order. They could. “It’s our time to go,” said the SNO, “past it, actually.” This meant that the activities of soldiers outside of the base were very limited. In earlier stages of RAMSI, the CTF had conducted patrols, meeting with local communities and gathering intelligence. But the point of this type of patrol is visibility, and thus in their entire four month deployment the boys never went on patrol beyond one three day choreographed familiarisation exercise. In terms of the operation, the deployment consisted solely of QRF. QRF stands for Quick Reaction Force, and refers to the fact that there is always a group on standby ready to respond within an hour to any disturbance. The Kiwi Platoon shared this responsibility with the two other platoons, meaning they spent about a third of the deployment on QRF. They were never called up, and it was clear from early on that this was going to be the case: “the chances that you will be called up to perform what you have been trained to do are very slim.” On more usual deployments, sections might rotate between patrol, sentry on the base, and QRF, with QRF being seen as the rest period. Here, QRF was the only on period. The rest of the time, the Platoon was on “tasking and training,” the key focus of which was a jungle training package. The Platoon was told that although the CTF currently had permission to train in the down periods, “if we step a foot out of line, we will be stuck on base, because the police don’t care about any of that other stuff. They just care about the QRF.”

A deployment is where soldier dispositions should finally be able to be performed in the real world. On deployment you can actually do the things that you have only been able to playact in training. There was never going to be a contact, but it could be expected that there would at least be interaction with real locals in need, and hence the doing of something actually useful. This would allow the boys to work on themselves in that peacekeeping would provide new dispositions to acquire. By stating this, I am taking the
view that the boys did not already have a “natural” rapport-building disposition that would provide instinctive paths to follow in all local interactions. The fact that peacekeeper dispositions could differ from soldier dispositions has been pointed to in a few suggestions, as in Mitchell’s discomfort above and in training for Alam Halfa in the previous chapter, that peacekeeping requires a different way of holding oneself and one’s weapon than the boys’ current instinctive bodily stances. Hence deployment had the potential to revert the relationship between the practical and soldier habitus back to the more valued form this relationship took at the beginning of their careers, in which new dispositions, required to maintain the readiness of soldierhood, need to be internalised, in turn fulfilling the practical habitus. Soldierhood could turn into becoming again. This deployment however was unusual in not providing an opportunity to internalise such new dispositions.

Therefore, it is the dispositions that they had already embodied that are key to making sense of the boys’ experience of their trip. It was in fact not until the Solomon Islands that the effects of these dispositions became clear to me, as this was the first time that I really witnessed the way in which the switched-on soldier habitus, and in particular the predisposition to get over it, caused soldiers to act in public. The boys could also now intersubjectively reinforce these dispositions through contrasting their own practice with that of the other soldiers who they were serving alongside, particularly the Australian Territorial platoon.

Because the belief in the ability of multicultural New Zealand soldiers to build rapport is so strong and ubiquitous, and is currently the subject of much interest, I tried to focus on local interactions in the Solomon Islands. This, however, did not turn out to be a focus of the actual trip. As always, the mode of identity that kept coming into focus instead was the practical habitus: the boys’ quest to challenge and improve themselves, the Army’s perceived failure to provide them with a job that would allow them to do so. In the absence of the opportunity to acquire a rapport-building disposition through interactions with locals, the boys designed their own identity acquisition projects, focused specifically on changing their physical bodies. The hierarchy were fully aware of the potential for boredom and frustration inherent in this deployment, hence the attempt to engage the boys in training. These training programmes, however, were often perceived in the same way Oscar
Company saw its field exercises: useless repeats of things they had done many times before. They were also disruptive to the boys’ own projects.

There was some interaction with local Solomon Islanders, however, and the ways in which the boys acted during these encounters was generated more by their shared soldier and practical habitus than by their ethnic diversity. These local interactions just happened to occur when the boys were engaged in either training or leisure activities, because without patrols or a QRF call out, they never interacted with locals on the job. The Platoon encountered locals at malls, beaches and in Chinatown on their days off. Solomon Islanders would gather to watch them when they were training on the range, in the jungle, or even on the base itself, as local men and children would congregate on the other side of the fence. By some definitions none of these encounters would actually count as “hearts and minds”, but the fact that the definition of this is disputed is of interest in itself.

The Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands

The Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands is a peacekeeping mission that, unusually, is not under the auspices of the United Nations but rather the Pacific Island Forum. It is “a partnership between the people and Government of Solomon Islands and fifteen countries of the Pacific” (“What is RAMSI?” 2014). It was formed at the request of the Solomon Islands government in 2003 after several appeals to Australia and New Zealand for aid and

Is helping the Solomon Islands to lay the foundations for long-term stability, security and prosperity – through support for improved law, justice and security; for more effective, accountable and democratic government; for stronger, broad-based economic growth; and for enhanced service delivery (“What is RAMSI?”, 2014).

The Solomon Islands’ problems, as Dinnen (2009) writes, arose not so much from state failure as from a state “never having been properly built” (p. 74) in the first place. The Solomon Islands was one of those Pacific nations which inherited from its former British colonisers a Westminster style parliament and other “institutions of the modern state” which “had shallow foundations in indigenous societies.” The many diverse ethnic groups on hundreds of islands did not conceptualise themselves as one political community (Dinnen,
Further, social institutions like Wantok\textsuperscript{35} did not interact well with Western institutions, with electoral support “mobilised through kinship and other personalised networks.” Those who took office were then obliged to prioritise the desires of the groups that got them into power, meaning “those who supported rival candidates are often ignored, leaving large numbers of voters effectively disenfranchised” (Dinnen, 2009, p.74).

The government’s inadequacies became apparent when conflict arose in the late nineties. From 1998 to 2003 “rival militias from [...] two neighbouring islands were in a low-level civil war” (Moore, 2008, p.387). In 1998 militia groups from Guadalcanal, the largest island where capital Honiara is based, “took up arms” against other ethnic groups that had settled in Guadalcanal, especially from neighbouring island Malaita (Anderson, 2008, p.63). This was largely about disputes over land and “scarce and poorly managed resources” (Ponzio, 2005, p.175): “Malaitans were viewed as having prospered at the expense of local people” (Dinnen, 2009, p.74). By 2001 over 35,000 settlers had been driven from their homes (Ponzio, 2005, p.174). Malaitans were forming their own militia groups for protection by late 1999 and in 2000 the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) along with Malaitans in the RSIPF executed a coup in which the Prime Minister was kidnapped and forced to resign, leaving Malaitan militants in control of Honiara (Anderson, 2008, p.64-65; Moore, 2008, p.387). This conflict led to disruption in the police force, the economy, and the delivery of basic services such as health and education (Dinnen 2009, p.70; Moore, 2008, p.387; Ponzio, 2005, p.174), demonstrating “the profound weakness of the Solomon Islands government” (Dinnen 2009, p.70). Ironically, because the government had never been able to provide basic services to all of its citizens, many of those on islands other than Guadalcanal and Malaita were not reliant on the state for daily necessities and therefore didn’t feel the effects of the crisis (Dinnen, 2009, p.75). Thus unusually, writes Ponzio (2005), the primary reason for international intervention was not a “large humanitarian crisis” but rather “insidious levels of crime, corruption and poor governance” (pp.177-178).

In its early days, RAMSI was a success, collecting and removing from circulation many weapons, arresting militants, and purging the RSIPF of corrupt members (Ponzio, 2005,

\textsuperscript{35} From the pijin term “one talk,” i.e. those who share a language, a system of very strong social obligation to assist members of one’s own group materially and otherwise, which begins to look like patronage from the point of view of Western institutions.
pp.175 & 178). In 2004 therefore the focus shifted to the use of civilian advisors in addressing “longer-term state-building issues” (Ponzio, 2005, p.178). Despite this early success, in April 2006 the election as Prime Minister of Snyder Rini, who was associated with previous corrupt regimes involving logging and Asian business interests, exacerbated by the use of teargas by RAMSI police against discontented crowds outside of parliament, led to two days of rioting and looting in which large parts of Honiara’s Chinatown were burnt to the ground (Anderson, 2008, p.70; Moore, 2008, p.388) (the Chinese being another resented immigrant group in Guadalcanal). Rini resigned, and affairs seemed to stabilise in the years between 2006 and the arrival of the Platoon which this chapter follows. However, some Platoon staff warned that it had seemed that way in the lead-up to the 2006 elections also.

**Pre-existing Dispositions and Process: Playacting (being bored at) RAMSI on PDT**

Pre-deployment training (PDT) was held over two weeks in Burnham Military Camp. It consisted of a week of lessons followed by an exercise based on the Solomon Islands scenario. One of the Sar Majors that ran PDT told me that Op Rata was one of the worst missions from a command perspective. The relaxed, low-key environment could induce soldiers to switch off and thus hinder their ability to respond immediately if something did suddenly happen. Trying to counter this by over-emphasising the likelihood of something happening, on the other hand, would lead to frustration if it never came to pass, and hence to the type of situation that Oscar Company found themselves in.

Therefore, unlike at Corps Training, expectations were handled very carefully. It was made very clear at PDT that there would not be much action in the Solomon Islands: “at the moment, thankfully, your purpose is to maintain, not create peace, to provide potential support, not support.” The lecturer on RAMSI Rules of Engagement said “I don’t want you to go away thinking you’re going to be shooting your weapon”, and “it’s hard to distinguish who the bad people are- or whether there even are bad people- mingled with the civilian population”. The exercise had to provide training for the worst case scenarios, and given the history of the 2006 Chinatown riots, Public Order Management training (POM training, i.e. riot training) was a key focus. The Platoon was told, however, to be aware of the worst case but not to expect it, and that they were rehearsing the most dangerous tasks rather than
the most likely tasks: “If we did it for most likely, it’d be a lot of PT.” In fact, a Sar Major told me, those coordinating the exercise were purposefully not giving the secos many tasks during the day, and watching to see if the boys were kept busy despite this. One night orders included:

We’re doing well at gathering information, but little things are starting to make us look like cunts and amateurs and its boredom that’s doing it [...] things like if you go on a night patrol, take a torch [...] Have your packs tidy. Clean up the brew room.

Thus hurrying up and waiting was purposefully built into the ex as representative of the deployment, and a lot of time was spent sitting around watching movies: “Just be aware guys, this is what it’s going to be like a lot over there.”

PDT also included culture and language training, consisting of an afternoon of lessons with a New Zealand citizen originally from the Solomon Islands. This took two parts, an introduction to the culture, and an introduction to basic phrases of Solomon Islands pijn. The lecture on culture lasted about an hour and in this short time the speaker tried to emphasise how very diverse the peoples of the Solomon Islands are, but nonetheless introduce some commonalities in order to give useful advice about how to behave in order to avoid offence. These commonalities included social institutions like Wantok, and practices such as church attendance, use of betel nut, respecting elders, loving television and the internet, and “island time” (“Will they be mad if we’re late, though?” “Depends who you keep waiting”). There was also tourist type information on, for example, the best places to buy souvenirs. One slide noted that “just for [RAMSI] being there, makes people feel safe” and “people seem to have a very good [rapport] with the NZ police/forces than their Aust. Counterpart. They see NZers to have an understanding of pacific ways, culturally sensitive...NZ being a bilingual and multi-cultural society.”

During the exercise, Ex Quick Response, the Platoon interacted with enemy party acting as Solomon Islanders, referred to as “players”. Ex Quick Response was designed to simulate a week of linked events under an overarching scenario. Thus intelligence collected on patrols in the early parts of the week would be helpful as events escalated. Honiara was mapped onto Burnham and its surrounds: the Urban Training Facility was Chinatown, the Quarry was Honiara’s football stadium, and Port Levy was the Guadalcanal coast. “Play it real,” the
Platoon was told, “stay within the ex construct.” At the beginning of the week the sections rotated around several tasks: QRF, a short patrol to Chinatown, and a long range patrol to support the police in delivering a warrant. At the end of the week tensions escalated, nationals were evacuated and the Platoon was called out to riots in Chinatown.

Interacting with foreign peoples is hard to replicate in training however; interacting with soldiers acting as locals cannot really mirror such an encounter. During Basic and Corps Training and my time with 1R, being enemy party generally involved acting as a generic sort of enemy, which in informal settings soldiers tended to play as vaguely Middle Eastern (due to the major deployment being Afghanistan). In more formal cases such as field exes, Army planners had developed fictional nations, ethnic groups and terrorist cells with clear motivations, aims, and organisation, but not much cultural detail (or, at least, we never heard it at the baggie level). At PDT, however, the scenarios, and the people with whom the Platoon would be interacting, were based on a real life situation and specific ethnic groups.

From an Army perspective, I had a tendency to overthink scenarios, and during a “Chinatown riot”, I asked who it was exactly that was rioting. The Guale? The Chinese? Everyone? A Sar Major answered, “It doesn’t matter, a riot’s a riot.” Interaction with another cultural group was never the primary motive of the training activities the boys engaged in. Rather, they were practicing gathering intelligence and the focus was on issues of military interest such as locations and times, or POM drills were being tested, and those don’t change no matter who is rioting. But in light of New Zealand’s obsession with the rapport-building disposition, and the fact that this was one of the only ways in which any practice could be provided before such interaction actually occurred, perhaps the side effects of what these events could suggest to the soldiers are worth a look.

I went with 1 Section on a night-time patrol of “Chinatown” during a party the “locals” had told them about earlier that day. One of the Territorial soldiers, Chen, who happened to be Chinese, was attached to 1 Section for the deployment. Some of the enemy party, acting as native Solomon Islanders, and following the exercise brief in regards to the Chinatown scenario, had told him how they hated “the Chinese”. Chen said he had answered, “They seem like nice people to me.” Meanwhile Wereta said some acquaintances in the enemy party came up and starting talking to them: “this is gay.” Wereta responded by asking if he could have some intelligence.
It was a pretty good party. The locals/players had taped zylumes (glowsticks, which soldiers are issued and keep in their webbing for indiscernible illumination on night tasks) along the fronts of the shipping container buildings of the main street, and broken open more to throw the contents over the walls so that everything glowed. The players were standing around “drinking”, and one asked the boys, who carried their steyrs, “Why are you guys so kitted up?”

“Oh, no reason really,” the soldier answered.

“Don’t trust us?” asked the local.

“Don’t trust the Chinese, they’re bad,” another local chimed in, and the Solomon Islander players began bickering with a player enacting a Chinese shopkeeper:

“You know I don’t sell fried rice in my store!”

“Go home! Why you come to the Solomon Islands? You no have a Chinatown in China?”

“Ohoo. He attacked Ping’s house. You see, he broke Ping’s window!”

“Hey! You put rubbish in my house! I live in there, and sell in there. I do sell fried rice, but not to you!”

“Why?”

“Because you a arsehole!”

As can be seen from the grammar in this exchange (“you a arsehole!”), the soldier playing Ping was using the fake accent and broken English that Westerners put on when they are imitating Chinese, often exaggerated for comic effect. The players were also making use of common stereotypes to portray Chinese-ness in the discussion of fried rice, although Ping was simultaneously calling the “Solomon Islander” out on this use of stereotype in implying that he was assuming Ping’s store sold fried rice just because Ping was Chinese. The Platoon was not interacting with a different ethnic group here, but rather with how their own culture stereotypically views the Chinese for their own amusement. In New Zealand there is much less familiarity with Solomon Islanders, however, and no well-known stereotypes about them. Therefore, presumably a bit lost as to how they should portray this ethnicity,
some of the “Solomon Islanders” were also using the mock Chinese accent: “You no have a Chinatown in China?”

Although the Army does the best they can (the better funded American Army has set up full villages, with actors and piped in smells (Belcher, 2014; Gill, 2009)) such playacting exercises cannot actually provide an encounter with foreign peoples. Enemy parties don’t provide the experience of interacting with people of divergent habitus because enemy parties quite quickly fall back on the soldier dispositions that they share with those on PDT. For example, after the patrol, a member of the Intelligence Corps collected the information the boys had gathered. Firth stated that a local had “said something about a “gun” and one of them automatically corrected him to “rifle”, indicating they have knowledge of weapons.” What had happened here is that it is practically impossible for anyone who has gone through Basic to hear the word “gun” used to refer to a rifle and not correct the offender- even I can’t help myself correcting this whenever I hear it, despite plenty of evidence that this is not something to which civilians react well. Thus presumably one of the players used the word “gun,” one of his mates automatically corrected, “rifle”, and Firth, “playing it real”, treated it as he would have had an actual local said it, reporting it along with the rest of the section’s intelligence. Likewise, when near the end of the exercise Chinatown erupted in riots, the rioters used military commands (i.e. “open order”) to organise the riot.

Unlike Oscar Company, the 2/1st boys were still emotionally engaged in field exercises. This one was, of course, actually “towards something”, and any training involving riots is always highly valued in any case: “riot training always gets ruthless”. A small room had been put aside in which either players or soldiers could be put to calm down if they “lost it”. Because the Platoon would only be called out to a riot if it proved too much for the police to handle, there were a group of cops training with the boys and they went out to the riot first. The players had built a barricade out of the household paraphernalia in the UTF to which they had added spray painted signs: “Go home Kiwi,” “die, Kiwi,” “Kiwi Hore.” The rioters were engaged in screaming at the police, again employing a mixture of stereotypes, about both the cops and the Chinese (some of them?) were portraying: “You’re going to be bacon!” “I’m going to eat your cats and dogs!” They were being directed by DS staff, who were telling them to back up behind the barricade, to not tire their arms out before the Army arrived, to stockpile and not use all their ammo (rocks and bricks) before the Army arrived.
A few fires had been lit and one guy was dragging a flaming tyre around behind him. “Don’t throw the fire!” the DS were yelling. When the Platoon arrived and advanced, the rocks and bricks the rioters were throwing cracked two riot shields completely in half. “Act like it was really gas!” yelled a DS, reacting to what he thought the Platoon had just notionally done, so some of the players started coughing, but “No, it’s pellets not gas!” yelled another DS, “Pellets!” When the boys did throw notional gas, and most of the rioters obediently dispersed, one, based on the direction of the wind, yelled “No, [don’t run away], the gas is blowing the other way!”

At another callout due to the re-escalation of the riot, Phelan got hit in the throat with a brick that had sailed just above his armour, someone else had a tooth chipped, and Tahuparae was hit in the shoulder. “No more trip for you, Tahuparae,” Wereta teased, and Tahuparae answered, “fuck, I had a few tears though, ‘cause I thought it was broken. That’s my trip.” Gibson, stuck in the vehicle as the section driver, sadly told me: “Write down that we were sniping from the vehicles.”

**Pre-existing Dispositions and (Lack of) Process: Not becoming a soldier in the Solomon Islands**

With the lack of patrols and call-outs, Op Rata was not generally conceptualised by the boys as a performance of their job or as an opportunity to enact soldier dispositions. Much of the deployment was spent in your two man air-conditioned bedroom watching TV on your laptop. Kiriona, from the Corps Training I followed, once used the phrase “this deployment” in a conversation, to which Russell, one of the more experienced soldiers, responded, “You think this is a deployment? That’s so cute!” Likewise, when one morning at breakfast someone begun to say “this deployment,” Harvey cut in, “this isn’t a- it’s an embarrassment.” Russell too declared “it’s an embarrassment being here, actually. I only did it for the medals.” He later added, “I’m not even going to admit having been here. ‘Have you just got back from the Solomons?’ ‘No. I’ve just been on a really long hunting trip’.” A common practice amongst deployed Western soldiers is to produce YouTube videos featuring photographs and film of their patrols and contacts set to rock music. Phelan spent a lot of time planning his own hypothetical ironic slideshow, which would feature the boys
picking up brass, relaxing at the pool, playing basketball, and going to the gym. “Doing fatigues,” I suggested. “Don’t be stupid,” said Phelan, “I don’t do fatigues!”

Soon after arrival in the Solomon Islands the boys had their only patrol-like experience, a three day acclimatisation trip to Savo Island, in which they walked around the island, viewed its volcano, and were welcomed into local villages. This was, however, in the words of some of the people that planned it, “choreographed,” “very template,” “pretty contrived,” and “like that Rotorua Māori village,” (i.e. a cultural experience put on for tourists). The boys had been welcomed with dances, performed the 2/1st haka, and given the kids all of their zylumes. The supp tech wasn’t happy: “So what are you going to do if I haven’t got any more to give you? Kiwi boys and the locals, nice one.” On their return, I asked the boys generally about the trip and not specifically about interaction with locals in order not to be too leading. They tended not to bring that topic up, instead focusing on the walk. When asked by his roommate what they did, Corporal James replied, “Walked around an Island, the whole way, 37K.”

“Is that all?”

“Came back to where we started.”

My roommate asked Wereta if he had had fun, to which Wereta responded, “No, it was gay.”

Roommate: Aw you had to walk around-

Wereta: Pretty much, yeah.

Roommate: Doing your job.

Wereta: That wasn’t my job.

When I asked, he elaborated that it was just fucking stupid in that they had carried packs around for three days for no reason, and now everyone had blisters with a field ex starting in three days. That is, to Wereta, the exercise was not only unproductive but counter-productive. Someone else told me Savo was “chillax” but “not needed.” A TF soldier who had been on an earlier RAMSI rotation told me that while it was good to get off base, “before, the patrols, they were actually to do something, to look for criminals or criminal
activity. This by comparison was a meet and greet. Show off our fancy uniforms.” As ever, doing something only includes doing certain (useful and practical) things.

Being on QRF meanwhile entailed one section of the Platoon being on 30 minutes’ notice to move, the soldiers of this section taking turns manning the call out desk day and night, waiting for the phone to ring. The other two sections were at 120 minutes’ notice to move. The first few days of QRF there were some practice call outs, and in the early weeks there were also Area of Operation familiarisations in which the sections went out to familiarise themselves with key locations. There was also sometimes airport security if military aircraft were at Honiara International Airport.

Every weekday morning that the Platoon was on QRF, the Kiwi HQ opted to hold POM training. Sergeant told me that if the Platoon was ever called out they would be slick, and that you have to live in hope. POM training involved being kitted up with uniform, Kevlar vests, helmets, shields, batons and periodically gas masks in the oppressive mid-morning heat, continuously doing riot drills. On completion of POM training, the boys’ t-shirts were always soaked through with sweat: “See that Nina? That’s hard work and dedication.” If the Platoon did not perform well they were sometimes beasted, having to run around the base and complete squats, lunges and so on in varying degrees of gear: “Did you write down that we got thrashed?”

In the absence of operational tasks, the boys felt the primary focus of the whole deployment was the jungle training programme. This was a 5 “block” programme that progressed from watching Platoon, to a one night stay in the jungle, to two much longer field exercises. Common practice is to have deployment t-shirts made up, which soldiers then wear around barracks and at the gym once home. In this case such a t-shirt would say “Op Rata,” “Op” standing for Operation. The boys joked about getting “Ex Rata” t-shirts instead, “Ex” standing for Exercise. In fact, no t-shirts were made up; the boys apparently not wanting to advertise this trip around Burnham. There was in fact more training going on during Op Rata than there ever had been during my time with Oscar Company.

There was a Company Skill at Arms, a Kiwi range week, a trackers’ course, which only section scouts got to attend, and an Australian Junior NCO course which a few Kiwis attended. The jungle training was given the most emphasis however. In this, the hierarchy were taking advantage of the Solomon Islands’ geography. New Zealand gained a reputation for jungle fighting during the Malayan Emergency in the 1950s (the same place, in fact, that it first gained its
reputation for hearts and minds), but this type of warfare became uncommon after Vietnam, leading to worry that this skill will be lost. The training staff told me that with the NZDF about to leave Afghanistan, the focus would turn again to the Pacific region, and the boys would be well placed if they had jungle experience. Operating in the jungle involves increased difficulties in terms of lack of visibility, inhibited mobility, and humidity. The training staff therefore saw jungle training as new skills that were worthwhile learning. The boys had a different view. Although some adjustment to the terrain was required, there was nothing new enough about jungle training to make it seem worthwhile. It was basically the same drills—recces, observation posts, ambushes—in a different setting. Harvey once asked whether I had been at a recent CO hour where the CO had said that the training was “pretty challenging”: “all the Kiwis cringed.”

“I’m just sick of the fucking Army, I hate field exes,” laughed one soldier during a discussion with his mates about moving to Australia, “Playing toy soldiers…”

“Like when am I ever gonna have a chance to shoot a cunt?”

“I bet that’s what those guys in Afghan said,” broke in someone, but “I have more chance of shooting a guy in my hood,” said another.

During Block One, planned to be a one night stay in the jungle that surrounds the range, the boys learnt they would be doing live pairs fire manoeuvres, which they had been doing since Basic, and which would have to culminate on the range itself rather than in the jungle: “I came out here to do jungle training, not pairs fire”; “We should be doing something actually useful.”

One of the boys asked his Seco, “cause you guys know how to do snares and stuff, eh? That’s what I wanted to do, something actually useful.”

However, when the Platoon Commander found out about the live firing, he too didn’t see any value in it and felt like he would just be fucking the boys around. He cancelled the task to avoid having “a sleepover for no reason.” The boys did not witness their HQ standing up for them on this one, however.
When I asked Harvey at dinner if he was looking forward to the first field ex, he said “hell no, no one is, not even the available guys”. He said that the only new thing they had learnt so far was when his Seco had taught them to connect five trip flares into a daisy chain so that they all went off at once. “Is there no way the NCOs can rally together and convince the boss to convince [the hierarchy]?” Harvey asked his Seco. His Seco responded that they had already written a note to the CO, so they couldn’t go any further up the food chain: “But at the end of the day we’ll bitch and keep it to ourselves. Not cry like girls.” Harvey was one of the more vocal in the Platoon about his displeasure, and this was an indirect- and yet surprisingly explicit- reminder to get over it and not air his complaints publically.

Later, Harvey sat down next to me at dinner and exclaimed, “Fuck, you must be bored,” (given that I wasn’t allowed to do the only two things going on: POM and jungle training). “Here’s something you should write down in your piece. The New Zealand Army has fucking retarded leaders that—” at this point Harvey’s mate Bishop started gesturing frantically at the Platoon HQ eating dinner at a table behind us, so we left the conversation until we got back to the ITSA, where Harvey told me:

We’re in the Solomon Islands but we’re doing like a month of jungle training and that’s all stuff we could have done on the West Coast at home. We all know the drills. We’re not doing anything specific to the Solomon Islands like going out and meeting and greeting the locals [...] But try and tell that as a baggie to the hierarchy, there’s no consideration for anyone but the hierarchy. No intelligence.

He also suggested Rules of Engagement training as something that would be specific to the Solomons. Reading over my shoulder, he got me to add “things that are actually relevant to the [deployment]” and then gave me a look when I also wrote down that he was insistent on this point. Bishop noted, “It would be cool if we could do survival training, you can’t do that on the West Coast.”

“Yeah,” agreed Harvey, “if it was anything new like a tracking course, sweet as.”

After the second ex, one of the boys unprompted told me that it had been dumb: “It would be alright if we were doing anything different.” However, my roommate at the time, who was support personnel, spent this exercise with Company HQ and reported back to me that the hierarchy had been impressed with the Kiwis, as “they had come out really motivated
for the ex.” This of course was the exact opposite of their true feelings, but as always the hierarchy had no access to these. Despite their disdain, the boys had gotten over it, and performed professionally and well.

The perception of not being given worthwhile tasks was exacerbated in the Solomon Islands by the fact that the Company was Australian led. The Australian leadership and Platoon were seen as different to the Kiwis- not because of the much hyped Kiwi-Aussie divide, but in military terms. The Australians were Territorial rather than Regular Forces like the Kiwis, and further, the Australian Army is seen by New Zealand to be more restrictive in terms of both safety and legal regulations. Again what I say about the Australians is solely a reflection of the boys’ perspective of this group in relation to their perspective of themselves, rather than an accurate portrayal of it. The caution inherent in following safety regulations contravened the boys’ view of what a soldier should be. For example, in case they needed to be medically evacuated, Australian soldiers couldn’t go any further than an hour’s helicopter ride away from the GBR. It was rumoured that they couldn’t sleep on hammocks in the jungle (the preferred sensible method to avoid insects) in case they fell off and broke their backs, and that during Australian riot training, the “rioters” could only throw tennis balls in place of rocks. They did battle PT in running shoes, because they were only allowed to run a certain distance in their boots. During Company-run tasks, such regulations affected the Kiwis. A discussion amongst some of the boys, about how they weren’t allowed to crawl on the grass with bare arms during PT sessions in case of worms, once sent them into a parody of the safety regulations:

Phelan: Oh, it’s 28 degrees, there’s been a bit of wind so there’s some gravel on the path, so the run’s cancelled. Get out there and there’s one small stone, eh. Oh, but we’re not moving it, because it has sharp edges.

[You can move the stone, but you must wear gloves.]

Tahuparae: And the gloves have to be sharp proof and water proof.

Phelan: But first fill one of your canteens half full and tip it over the rock so it’s not too hot. But be careful when you’re filling your canteen, don’t turn the tap up too much, cause there might be some splash back.
At a live assault during Skill at Arms the boys were monitored by Australian safety staff and found that they interrupted them too much, telling them basic safety drills that they should and did already know. Gilchrist reported one such interaction:

“Do you have your safety on?”

“What?”

“Do you have your safety on?”

“Yes, cunt, I’m moving.”

Two injured Kiwis left behind while the Platoon was on field ex went to the range to help the Australians but couldn’t both be on the same sentry point because the weapons held there were Australian Army Steyrs, on which they were not technically qualified. (Although New Zealand also uses a Steyr variant, there are slight differences, in, for example, the sights and where the safety is located). This disgusted the boys:

“Umm, we use Steyrs in the New Zealand Army too.”

“I’d say to him, what’s this on my right shoulder? Oh, it’s a red diamond. Do you know what that means? No, you don’t, because you don’t have one.”

The red diamond is a patch awarded on completion of Infantry Corps Training. Again here the boys’ reaction was due to a perceived implication that they couldn’t be trusted to perform the basic skills of their job that they had mastered long ago (to safely handle weapons). Furthermore, this was coming from Territorials whom the boys considered to be less qualified than themselves.

As part of POM training, the New Zealand Platoon tried to organise a session with Molotov Cocktails. Australian command had decided this couldn’t be done on base, and I was sitting with the staff in our breezeway as they waited to hear if it could be done off-site. The boys were hanging out in their rooms in the ITSA opposite and at about 1000 Bishop was carried out of the corridor with his hands cuffed behind his back and his feet tied. His mates put him down in the middle of the breezeway and wandered off. Corporal Pihama eventually noted: “Jack, eh, secos just watch and don’t do anything.” Right then the CO arrived, and stopped
to talk to Bishop. When he reached the staff, the Platoon Commander said to the CO: “that’s what happens when we can’t do Molotov training.”

“Yes,” agreed the CO, “I’ve just heard that’s what happens to COs who don’t let you do Molotov Cocktails.” The decision was that the training could occur off base, but the nominated area was grassed, so the bottles might not break when thrown. A staff member called to a just-freed Bishop to:

Get two other guys, Māori would be best, and go around and look for stuff we can nick to break the bottles against- grating like on those steps. You don’t need to pinch it now; we’re not doing it ‘til Thursday. Oh, pinch it now if you can.

Before Thursday came, however, the training was called off.

Despite all of this, the boys had not reached as serious a state of disjuncture as Oscar Company had, and there was much less talk about 717ing. As inferior as it may be, they were still on a trip, and physically challenging tasks of the type that the boys valued were still fairly common, as in POM training (and the thrashings that accompanied it). Further, in the absence of the Army providing them with any new skills to acquire, the boys had set themselves a challenge, and their Platoon HQ were supportive of this.

**Pre-existing Dispositions: Making gains**

RAMSI wasn’t giving the boys much of a chance to build on their soldier dispositions in terms of going on patrols or dealing with incidents, but they were still going to follow the practical habitus in working on their selves. Deployments- months filled with boring down time, without your normal life to distract you, and in which you can carefully control your eating at the mess- are seen to be particularly good opportunities to focus on “making gains” at the gym. The term “making gains” refers to physically putting on muscle- getting bigger, getting into shape- but it also more widely refers to the lifestyle it takes to achieve this. As with “if it looks flash it is flash,” the physical appearance of the boys also displayed their internalised dispositions. Making gains takes hard work, discipline and will power, and this was what soldiers read in the changes they saw in each other. This was, therefore, a particularly good example of the demanding identity acquisition that they desired. Wereta once explained the attraction of the gym to Chen, who mystified the boys by saying he
found it boring: “It’s because you haven’t been doing enough to make gains. When you see your body has changed, it’s like fuck, this is awesome.”

Prioritising making gains during deployments is such an institution that it was addressed at PDT. Medical briefs included tips on training programmes and warnings about which supplements (used to variously gain weight, build muscle, and boost testosterone) were and were not approved (“supplements are icing on the cake,” added the Platoon Commander, “80% of you need to make the cake first”). The day we arrived in Honiara, as soon as the welcome ceremony and room assignments were over, everyone immediately raced off to investigate the gym. The boys displayed unwavering dedication to this self-improvement project. Support staff predicted that no one would do their daily gym session following one particularly gruelling POM training thrashing, but there were at least four riflemen down there within the hour. Corporal Pihama felt his section had done poorly during this thrashing, indicating that they should be running rather than always working out, and so banned them from the gym for two days. He gave up on this after a day, because “some of them are looking like their lives are over.” Sections would have literally just arrived back from field exes, not having yet had the chance to shower, and would already have somehow discovered what had happened in the gym in their absence. The boys educated themselves in physiology and sports science online and debated the best programmes, supplements and eating plans. As usual they also evaluated each other, talking about who was neglecting cardio, who was focusing on their arms and forgetting about their legs, and so on. There was some concern about acquiring protein powder, as we were told that each person was only allowed one kilogram of mail per week. This wasn’t really enforced, but we didn’t figure that out until after Bishop’s mum divided his supply up into one kilogram lots and sent him an unmarked bag of white powder, much to everyone’s delight. Watching all of this, Sergeant announced he was going to get himself a shaker (used to mix supplements) so that he could walk around shaking up cordial inside looking cool like all the boys. “Nah,” said Corporal Pihama, “then they’ll be whispering, ‘Sarge’s been on supps for three months and he hasn’t made gains!’”

Like thrashings at Corps Training, making gains was considered representative of the deployment, the point of it. Harvey said that they shouldn’t really get the two medals they
would be receiving for RAMSI, as they hadn’t done anything operational: “My first medal should be for gym effort, the second for being away for my missus for so long.”

“We should make our own contingent haka, eh,” said Gilchrist, miming the actions he would include: “shake the shaker, bench press.” Sergeant recounted plans being made for the parade which would mark the Platoon’s departure, noting that someone had suggested that the boys throw smoke grenades for a dramatic entrance, with each section emerging through the smoke to represent a different stage of the deployment. The first section would depict the Platoon’s arrival, the second would be dressed in POM gear: “he wasn’t sure what the third should be though, so I suggested gym gear and snorkels and flippers, cause that’s what [the deployment] is now.”

The snorkels and flippers were a reference to one of the other main ways in which the boys used the deployment to improve themselves. Many went on diving courses to gain their diving qualifications, out of which at least one rifleman planned to make a career. Finau even stated that he had quit smoking and now wanted to quit drinking, “That’s why I came to the Sollies, to sort my life out, it’s like rehab.” The Platoon staff was always supportive of these projects. For example, one tasking for the last month of deployment was to pull apart and clean your webbing. This task had been designed so that when the boss asked what the boys were doing, he could be told that they were cleaning webbing in their rooms, whilst in fact they could be down at the gym. The Platoon Commander in fact asked the training staff to reschedule the first block of jungle training because it coincided with the first available dive course. They were happy to, because they wanted to do the dive course themselves.

Part of the problem with jungle training was that it endangered these identity projects. Not only were the boys going on repetitive field exes in which they didn’t gain any new skills, but these threatened their physical gains. A field ex was a week away from the gym, on rations whose nutritional value you could not control, sweating in the heat with limited water supply, very possibly losing the weight that you had gained. Coming off the tracker’s course ex, the boys teased Gilchrist for losing weight. “Yeah, a KG!” he agreed. “That’s [just] water,” assured Harvey, but, “it still makes me sad!” bemoaned Gilchrist. When in orders the programme for the last nine weeks of the deployment was announced, the first thing
the boys did was calculate how many straight weeks in the gym that gave them before they once again, as at the end of Basic, went home to display their new and improved selves.

**Cultural Interactions within and outside the GBR, as Informed by both Soldier Dispositions and Pre-existing Dispositions**

Despite the lack of patrols, a multinational peacekeeping mission is always a site of multiple multi-ethnic interactions. All of these may be used to help intersubjectively construct the individual soldier, either through contrasting one’s own dispositions to those of other soldiers, or through being able to perform soldier dispositions through interaction. This section will therefore discuss the boys’ interactions with various groups that they encountered, primarily the Australian Platoon and the local Solomon Islanders. However, because it is thought that New Zealand soldiers internalise a culturally sensitive rapport-building disposition due to their own internal diversity, I will first discuss relationships within the Platoon, both in terms of soldiers’ engagement with each other’s cultural rituals, and in terms of relationships between ethnically diverse Kiwi soldiers. This will show that there is not a straightforward link between internal diversity and the ability to interact with external groups.

**Pākehā Soldiers’ Struggle with the Ngāti Tūmatauenga Disposition**

The key practice of New Zealand’s rapport-building disposition is the haka. Performed everywhere the Army deploys, it is a physical expression of the Army’s official biculturalism in that it is a Māori war dance, and of its actual multiculturalism in that locals watching see it performed together by soldiers of many ethnicities. It is also another of those teamwork activities, like drill, in which each soldier must individually perform well or else risk making the whole group look bad (although not in this case for reasons of uniformity, as haka is rather about the expression of inner spirit). The haka then is the site in which Pākehā (and Asian, South African, and so on) soldiers must most consistently show cultural competency. They were, however, struggling to do so.

Although they had been in the Battalion for nine months, most of the Pākehā soldiers didn’t know the 2/1st haka. Gilchrist told me that they had never really been taught it. Presumably influenced by the valued method of learning by doing, on days when it had to be performed, there would be one practice and then everyone would just go and do it. During the
deployment, however, there were regular haka practices, as Platoon HQ had heard from the previous rotation that the Kiwis were often called upon to perform the haka by Australian command. This is referred to as rent-a-haka; likewise the Tongans were constantly tasked to cook pigs, referred to as rent-an-umu. The Australian state and Defence Force do not have a tradition of mobilising Aboriginal content for the national project, and it seemed to us that if a cultural experience was required, they looked to the other two platoons to provide it. Shortly after arrival, the Kiwi Platoon attended the Australian handover ceremony as they too rotated in a fresh platoon. “This is going to be even more boring than usual,” said Wereta, because unlike New Zealand and Pacific Island nation handovers, there wouldn’t be any haka- they’d both “just stand there”.

“Don’t they have Abo dances?” asked someone. In fact, the Australian platoons instead did a ceremonial handing over of the duty cell phone. Once at orders the Platoon Commander asked his staff, “Can anyone do a hāngī? Cause it looks like we’re doing one on Tuesday.” In other words Australian and/or Kiwi Officers had decided that the Kiwi Platoon was doing a hāngī without thinking to check whether anyone actually knew how. A Kiwi Tongan soldier who knew how to do an umu and a Māori soldier who thought he could figure it out were told that they’d have to work it out between them.

The Pākehā boys’ struggle with the haka surprised me, as it was the first and only thing I ever saw to physically faze soldiers. Riflemen are very comfortable in their bodies, even when confronted with new physical activities. When performing a new weapon drill or type of Close Quarter Battle they draw on their knowledge and muscle memory of similar activities and throw themselves into it with confidence. For example, I had to play netball in the GBR tournament, because there weren’t enough Kiwi females for anyone to opt out. I had no idea how, and I was terrible at it. I still have a scar on my knee from that time I tripped over when I wasn’t even anywhere near the ball. Phelan didn’t know how to play netball either. But he just jumped in enthusiastically, got called up by the referee a few times for violations, and was competent by the end of the first quarter. Although he didn’t know this particular sport, he had a general, and transposable, sport disposition and “instinctively” understood where to put himself and how to move.
As soon as the white boys got to haka practice, however, they became awkward, hesitant and self-conscious. They didn’t know what to do with their limbs and faltered half way through movements. Rather than wide and strong, their movements were small and limp. They suddenly, uncharacteristically, looked uncertain and self-aware. These soldiers were competent in at least two haka - the one used at Basic, and the contingent haka performed on arrival in the Solomon Islands. But unlike with sport, knowledge of the general act hadn’t resulted in the embodiment of a transposable disposition that could be applied to all variants. They couldn’t just jump into any haka, but rather were stymied by new words and actions. Obviously not caused by any anxiety about physical capability, this also wasn’t due to a lack of motivation or interest. The Pākehā boys talked about being keen to go hard, and the outgoing haka is seen as “the best part of the deployment.”

The use of indigenous rituals like haka in national projects is often deemed to be cultural appropriation. Although such appropriation is “a mark of respect and admiration for indigenous cultures” to “some degree” (Bell, 2014, p.86), it also tends to be “divorced from any support for, or wider understanding of, the wider political issues of indigenous struggles for survival or recovery, or the rights of indigenous sovereignty” (Bell, 2014, p.86). The Pākehā members of this deployment, however, seemed unable to divorce the haka from awareness of political issues, as manifested in their reaction to the haka as a taboo space in which they were hesitant to act, unsure whether they belonged there or would cause offence. Murray (2000) reports that Pākehā men who used to unhesitatingly perform haka at school during the 1950s have, since the advent of biculturalism, “become critical of their own ignorance of the Maori meanings of their performances at that time.” They “could no longer stand up and perform the All Blacks ‘Ka Mate Haka’ without wondering if they were doing it correctly or if it might be offensive to Maori people” (Murray, 2000, p.354). The boys by contrast grew up in the era of biculturalism, and embodying Pākehā dispositions from a field of constant public discussion of race relations seems to only have strengthened such unease. This unease, however, only led them to be more disrespectful by performing so badly.

During one particular haka practice, held in the boy’s breezeway, the boss (who was of Māori heritage) got fed up and called each section up to do the haka in front of everyone. 3 Section, largely Māori and Pacific Islander, were quite good, and 2 Section were competent
bar two Pākehā members. But 1 Section, largely white, looked unsure and fumbled. Tahuparae, who had been leading each section from the back, came through to stand in front of them, looking distressed and wary. We could all feel Sir’s fury building.

Once they were done, Sir announced to the Platoon Sig (that is, the only baggie who was a member of the Platoon HQ rather than a section) “come on, let’s go.” Everybody laughed. The sig, one of the smallest, blondest, whitest guys, made as if to take off his shirt. Everybody laughed harder. The boss directed his haka right at the Platoon, going hard, eyes bulging, challenging them. The sig- despite looking utterly terrified- also went hard, fumbling a few times but pulling himself back in. As soon as they finished, Sir barked into the silence, “Every time you do a haka, you do it properly. Cunts.” Immediately, Kiriona responded, “that’s us. Come on, that’s us,” waving everyone forward. This time as the Platoon did the haka the breezeway floor shuddered beneath them. Perhaps the white boys still didn’t know all of the words and motions, but they threw themselves into it. Sir watched calmly. When the Platoon finished, he announced: “That’s haka practice boys. Good work,” and left.

Over the next few practices, the Pākehā boys continued to build up their confidence, losing some of the awkwardness. Though Sir dismissed them suddenly each time, some began drifting back out to the breezeway shortly thereafter, excited and hyped up. “That’s mean,” said Gibson, “like you feel really embarrassed when it’s done but as soon as it’s underway...” The Pākehā boys, then, did get to learn one new skill fundamental to New Zealand soldierhood during the deployment, and learn it in the valued manner of being challenged by staff. However, in this case, internal diversity and cultural sensitivity had not straightforwardly led to competence. Quite the opposite: sensitivity had in fact led to incompetence. In the following section I discuss another case that problematises the link between internal diversity and the ability to relate to other cultures, this time in relation to a different ethnicity, and specifically in relation to dispositions acquired in the Army.

The Getting over it Disposition and its Possible Implications on a Rapport-Building Disposition

While the pre-existing practical habitus and subsequent need to always be acting is key for understanding the deployment, a disposition that is equally important is one of those that the boys had acquired from the Army: that of getting over it. Throughout this thesis and
particularly in Chapter Two, I have briefly discussed how the embodied soldier habitus, enacted in the public sphere, results in a composed and self-possessed demeanour. This is in large part a result of “getting over it”, as soldiers put their feelings and opinions to the side in order to switch on and be ready to react if required. I have, however, not gone into this switched-on habitus much in regards to the ethnographic data up until this point. This is because, before the deployment stage of my research, most of what I saw did not take place in public, but rather in military camps or out in the bush. This means that I largely saw the inner workings of platoons, where true feelings and opinions are expressed, rather than those platoons interacting with other groups, where feelings would be kept silent. The exception of course was the boys’ relationship with hierarchy. Now that there were multiple other groups around, it became clear that the way in which the boys acted around their own hierarchy- composed and silent- was a transposable disposition applied to most other groups. Further, the presence of the Australian reserve soldiers caused the boys to (only sometimes, and only within the Platoon) discuss their contrasting behaviour, as these Australians tended instead to be enthusiastic, exuberant and publically opinionated.

Thus, the argument that what goes on within the soldier group (internal diversity) positively affects what goes on outside it (wider sensitivity to others that can be applied on deployment), does not take into account the fundamental fact that soldiers keep what goes on within their group very carefully contained to that group. A lot of what happens within the group- challenging harassment, gay chicken - are not themselves transposable dispositions to be enacted in all spheres, but rather are structural exercises that help each individual embody the actual transposable dispositions. It is getting over it and confidence that are transposable, not the practices with which they are internalised.

The testing of one another still continued and could especially be seen in the same type of loving gay chicken that was played at 1R. One night, for example, it thundered, so Phelan put his hand just above his mate’s knee, mimicking fear. The guy looked at it, looked at Phelan, and said, “Higher.” Someone had written “Hey, Finau, did you know my dick belongs in your mouth?” in big letters on the side of the fridge in the boys’ breezeway. During a round of complaining about why weapons had to be cleaned outside in the heat rather than in the air conditioned bedrooms, someone reasoned, “its male bonding out here.”
“We could bond better in our rooms,” said Phelan. Phelan’s roommate, Collings, turned to the guy on his other side, put his hand on his shoulder, and asked, “Did you know the Spartans had sex for morale?” To one of the TF soldiers embedded with the Platoon, who looked shocked, Phelan explained, “We only do gay stuff sometimes. Whoever gets cold enough.” Phelan and Gibson moved on to talking about one of the boys in Battalion back home, and Gibson suddenly said, “does Collings know about him?”

“I didn’t hear any of that if you want to come clean, Phelan,” said Collings.

“No,” said Phelan, simultaneously giving Gibson “subtle” shut up! looks, “you’re my only one.”

However, here I will primarily discuss testing through harassment of a different kind, related this time to ethnicity. The fact that getting over it meant you had to be able to not be offended by absolutely anything became most clear to me in the Solomon Islands, because here it became particularly evident that this included racism. I will use 1 Section as an example of how race was conceptualised and discussed (although this doesn’t necessarily reflect how all of the boys thought). I say race rather than ethnicity because this is the term that the boys used. Within 1 Section there was a TF soldier seen to be struggling with the job, and this set off a process similar to what had occurred with Henare at Corps Training. This soldier, Chen, was Chinese, and the second half of this section will therefore discuss the way in which racial jokes were used as another method by which the boys attempted to bring fellow soldiers up to standard. In looking at what the boys were trying to do with such jokes, I am again following Hage (2000) in avoiding the scholastic ethnocentrism of assuming that racial categorisations are mental constructs aimed primarily at explanation for explanation’s sake, rather than more practical phenomena that are used by people to help them “do things” (Hage, 2000, p.30). This discussion will therefore further show that it can in fact be a good thing that what goes on within the group, in relation to internal diversity, is not also applied outside of the group. Although soldiers learn to interact with members of other ethnic groups, this is not the same thing as developing the idea that others’ “culture” should be valued merely because it is their culture.

For some reason, whenever I accompanied 1 Section on a trip off base, they would always have a long, intense conversation about “race”. Worried that after claiming I could provide
insight into local interactions I had found myself on a deployment without any, I was grasping at anything even the least bit related to cultural interaction and so quite liked this tendency of 1 Section’s. Once, when their Seco asked me if I wanted to go off base with them, I answered “Yes please, your section’s always good research, you always start talking about ethnicity for some reason.”

“That’s because we’re racist,” the Seco said cheerfully. Malloy said of his section, “two things about 1 Section, it’s extremely racist and extremely negative.” Likewise Harvey once responded to the comment “that’s the 1 Section way,” with “Racism, and hatred. Racism, degradation, and exclusion.” Despite this self-definition, the way the boys conceptualised the difference between groups was not that far away from that of anthropologists and was closer to what we mean by ethnicity than race. It focused on practice and, crucially, saw such practice as neither natural nor inevitable.

Once I went out with 1 Section when they were constructing snares and traps in the jungle. Wereta was saying that stereotypes are not the same as racism, because stereotypes are based on some sort of truth: “Like [another soldier in the platoon] is the exact stereotype of a Māori. He’s a dumb, Hori cunt. And then he complains that people are racist to him. No! You have to fight the stereotype!” This was greeted with some quiet laughter and Harvey exclaiming, “Jesus!”

“Do you fight your Hori Māori stereotype?” someone asked Wereta, who responded seriously, “I try to.” Wereta then explained a study he read in which it was argued that the word “nigger” itself was not inherently racist, but that the presence or absence of racism was dependent on the way it was used. Harvey responded, “You wouldn’t want a skinhead saying it in any situation.”

“But that’s about what he stands for, not the word,” Wereta argued.

Everyone demonstrated their traps to the section, Firth noting that the trees here weren’t very springy, but that if they were, the branch that he had bent over would have bounced back further when triggered and therefore hold what his trap had caught out of reach of

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36 Derogatory term used in relation to Māori people, has connotations of poverty and lack of class.
predators. When someone questioned if there were any predators here, someone else joked “Solomon Islanders.”

“Niggers will steal your food!” said Wereta cheerfully.

“Was that racism or stereotype?” Harvey challenged him.

Pleased, Wereta answered, “The way I said it was racist.” Harvey noted, “Wereta’s a skinhead born in a black body, eh?”

Another day on the way to a café, Wereta suddenly yelled, “there’s an albino!”

“I can finally say I’ve seen a black albino,” said Malloy happily. When others tried to argue that there was no such thing and it was just a white guy, Malloy cut them off: “He’s black on the inside.”

It was not just his own Section but the whole Platoon who habitually made comments about Chen’s ethnicity. The fact that there were Territorial Force soldiers on the deployment was a sore spot, given there had been Regular Force reserves at Pre-Deployment Training. Gilchrist called this “stealing guys’ trips,” emphasising all of the boys “coming to work every day and not getting trips” (Wheeler and Penn, for example, were some of the above reserves). This was exacerbated when it became clear that some Territorial soldiers couldn’t do the job as well as the Regular Force boys at home. It was possible for Territorial soldiers to gain respect in the same way that anybody could—through competence—and one did just that. Chen, however, was seen to be lacking some soldier skills and dispositions. The example most often cited was that, during PDT, Chen, who had never used Night Vision Goggles (NVG) before, had asked how to attach the mount to his helmet on the way to a riot. What really disturbed the boys about this was not that he hadn’t known how to attach the mount, but that he hadn’t admitted this and asked for help in the previous week. The public expression that this view took tended to be jokes and puns centred on Chen’s Chinese ethnicity, for example, a series of nicknames in which his name was inserted into stereotypical Chinese commodities like “sweet and sour” or “chicken chow mein”. This was at least sometimes experienced as racism by Chen.
Most often in public Chen seemed very good at getting over this teasing and playing along (whether this came from Territorial training, or perhaps just from being Chinese in New Zealand). During a lesson on plucking chickens, the instructor noted that you could just pluck it down to the first knuckle: “I don’t know if anyone will eat the feet.” Several people called out to Chen, who responded, “I probably would, actually.” He later specified, “If it’s cooked properly” when it was offered to him.

“Same with cats and dogs, eh Chen,” said someone.

“Nah, cats are different bro,” Chen said. “You cook them longer.”

In fact, it seemed to me at first that the Asian jokes were largely initiated by Chen himself. He told me, however, that he did it to pre-empt everyone else: if he did it, they didn’t have to. We decided that Chen wouldn’t bring up his ethnicity for a whole day, and he assured me that if he didn’t, the others would. Indeed there were three comments within a few hours. Playing along and getting over it, however, didn’t halt the consistent nature of the tormenting, as it does if, for example, you react well and play along when someone implies that you are gay. Unsurprisingly the repetition began to wear on Chen. Whilst during PDT if I asked him if he was offended by a comment he would say no, it was great, he always made fun of himself, a way into the deployment he would say things like “guys in my section still don’t accept me” instead.

Once after Pihama unveiled his latest nickname for Chen to the guys he was playing poker with, he looked over at me reading on the couch and said, “that’s harassment, isn’t it?” We had had a lecture reinforcing the harassment policy that had been introduced at Basic from an equity officer during PDT. The officer began by re-stating the Army’s overall view on diversity and its usefulness: “Diversity brings you added value.” She then led the Platoon in an exercise to identify Kiwi dispositions that both helped and hindered in the workplace: “our characteristics can get in the way of doing our job as well as help us.” She particularly focused on the tendency of Kiwis to use insults and banter as a way of both expressing affection and breaking the ice in new social situations. This was said to be useful in the short term, but often carried on too long; it became negative once people had gotten to know one another.
What happened to Chen however was not conceptualised by riflemen as banter that had originally had some usefulness but no longer did. The boys did perceive a specific purpose to what they were doing, and they all knew this purpose, although they almost never stated it out loud. Perhaps noting my focus and worried I wasn’t properly understanding, Gilchrist said to me at dinner one night, “but you know it’s not racism, eh, you would have seen it on Basic.” Someone else chimed in, “it’s weeding out the weak.” It was of course the same lesson that everyone is subjected to: get over it, become the person that can take everything and keep moving. Everyone takes shit about something. For one person it may be some past stupid mistake, another their red hair, me that I read instead of doing real work, and for some people it is their ethnicity. This is not seen as racism by Gilchrist because this is just the particular form your harassment takes. From an outside perspective it is not even so much that it isn’t racism, as that so what if it is? You have to be able to take anything, and learn not to have a weak spot.

The question of why the race talk didn’t stop is important, especially considering that Chen almost always took it well and therefore had shown he could get over it. It was because the real issue, as always, was competence: although he could show he wasn’t weak in being able to laugh off racism, he hadn’t to the boys’ satisfaction shown that he wasn’t weak at the job. I have seen soldier of all ethnicities (and genders) gain respect if they are competent. There had been other Asian soldiers in other stages of my research who were good at their jobs and towards whom such comments were never directed. I could be expected to understand what was going on when given an unusually explicit reminder (“you would have seen it at Basic”), although I did need this jolt to get over my original knee-jerk anthropologist-socialised view that comments centred on ethnicity, because they were just so “wrong”, were somehow different to everything that I had ever seen Henare be subjected to. However, not having been to an RF basic or an Infantry Corps Training, it is entirely possible that Chen did not know that this is what was happening.

The comparison with Henare is also illuminating. Although similar processes were applied to both Henare and Chen because of perceived incompetence, the harsh words that Henare took were focused directly on pointing out his specific mistakes and giving him practical information so that he could correct them. Chen’s treatment, although about his mistakes, didn’t contain such information and was covered over in talk about his ethnicity, which he
couldn’t change. There are two reasons for this difference. One is that, unlike with Henare, although the boys were weeding out the weak with Chen, they weren’t really trying to get him up to speed job-wise. Because he was TF, he wasn’t one of them in the same way Henare was. He was only with the Platoon for this one trip, and the staff weren’t holding the others responsible for him. Further, although the boys at Corps Training said very many things to Henare to test and improve him, they were almost never about his ethnicity. A Māori soldier’s easy target for harassment would never be his ethnicity, and neither would a Pacific Islander’s. These ethnicities are both too normal, and too valued, for this treatment, and, as seen with Reihana at Corps Training, soldiers didn’t feel they had to just take derogatory comments about Māori.

What the example of Chen shows however is that although in the infantry you may learn to interact with people from other cultures, you also learn that if you denigrate your mate’s culture he should be able to take it with good humour. This is good for getting people to learn to focus on the job rather than personal emotions, but would not serve as a good model for interactions with locals. This shows both that the actions of soldiers towards each other in regards to their internal diversity does not necessarily directly lead to a transposable disposition that is used on deployment, and that this is in fact positive rather than negative. The boys wouldn’t say anything like any of the above racial comments to a Solomon Islander because this type of discourse doesn’t go past the group. Firth and Russell, both new to my study on this trip, made sure that I understood this when we were picking up brass on the range one day. Here they were talking generally about the type of conversation that occurs in the infantry. This then applies to the racism, the gay playacting, and to testing one another through all manner of off colour comments. “You should write in your study,” said Firth, “that we only talk like this in the Army around other grunts, we don’t amongst civvies.”

“Some people don’t understand the humour,” Russell said, “it’s just you’re trying to one-up each other.” Firth added, “It’s like when you’re at parties at college, you didn’t act the same way as at your mother’s.” Russell reflected however that he had once accidentally crossed the boundaries: “I’ve done it in front of civvies once, I was really drunk. Looked up and everyone was like [mimes jaw dropped to chest] can’t remember what I was talking about, oh, it might have been raping dogs.” Within the group what the boys are doing has a
purpose. Nothing is off limits as everything must be handled. If new people like Chen come into the group this model of interaction is applied to them because they need to be able to operate within the Platoon. But it would have no purpose in interactions with people outside of the infantry sphere, and as has been repeatedly seen, the boys don’t do anything that is pointless.

The public demeanour of the boys, their composed and switched-on habitus, was highlighted by the contrast between their actions and those of the Australian soldiers, especially in CO hours, and could also be seen in their own reaction to this contrast. One day in orders, Corporal Pihama instructed his section: “There’s a CO hour tomorrow. It’s to have a whinge; you just keep quiet and if asked, say, ‘Chur, brother.’” All three platoons attended, and the Kiwis went in and automatically sat along the back wall. We were instructed to fill the room up from the front, to which the Kiwis paid precisely no attention, rather quietly staying put. The Australian TF Platoon asked the CO many questions, focused on two issues. The first was a feud they were having with their hierarchy over dress regulations. The soldiers felt the officers were being too pedantic. If this happened to Kiwis, they would bitch to one another, but then do what they were told. For example, early on the Kiwi Platoon had been reprimanded for walking between the ITSAs and ablution blocks shirtless, because of the women present, which disgusted them. Their response was to (sometimes) just quietly do it anyway if they could get away with it or to (mostly) just wear their shirts. The TF soldiers were not guided by the tenet of “get over it” however. Rather than shutting up about the pedantic enforcement of dress codes, they instead read the regulations very carefully and strategically planned outfits that were blatantly rebellious but that followed the exact letter of the law. When this feud eventually resulted in charges, the Australians put up “Happy Charge Day” decorations in their ITSA. The Australians, in other words, purposefully made a display of their contempt. New Zealand soldiers would never make such a fuss: if they didn’t agree with something, they just quietly didn’t do it where possible.

The second issue the Australians brought up at this particular CO hour was one that the Kiwis actually privately agreed with: that the trip was being treated like a training exercise rather than a deployment, and that this training was not relevant to the operation. While the Australians made multiple complaints, the Kiwis and Tongans were completely silent.
When an Australian noted that he wouldn’t be able to go on a patrol that was in the tentative planning stage because he was on a training course at the same time, Malloy couldn’t take it anymore and muttered “harden up,” under his breath, causing much laughter and the CO to cheerfully repeat to the soldier in question, who had missed it, “he said ‘Harden up’!”. The CO instructed “Kiwis! Think of a question!” Despite not being given a real job or anything challenging to do, however, nobody was going to say this, because this would mean not having the discipline to publically get over it – a soldier disposition they could enact. However, one of the secos asked if they could do survival training instead of a jungle exercise. The boys had not had survival training before and it would involve learning what were conceptualised as new, actually useful skills (living off the land, and so on). Collings noted to me afterwards that this was the only useful question of the day. He was currently on the Australian NCO course and so I said “they obviously haven’t socialised you as an Aussie yet then,” to which he said, “No, well, did you hear me bitching in there? I was only bitching about the Aussies’ bitching.”

I got the idea that to the Kiwis, the rowdy Australian Platoon came across as lacking in dignity and hence professionalism. They disliked what they saw as self-congratulation or excitement over what they felt should make up a soldier’s basic skill set. Driving out of base one day, our mog passed an Australian section that had just completed a stretcher run for the Skill at Arms competition. The Aussies were enthusiastically high fiving: “What the fuck?! They just did a little stretcher carry and they’re high fiving! Like they won World War II! Jesus Christ!” At one point a Company Sports tournament was held. New Zealand won the overall day with Tonga coming in second. Most importantly to the Australians, it seemed, the Kiwis had won the tug of war that had ended the day. A few weeks later another tournament was announced. “Argh, another sports day? Why?”

“Because they want to win.”

“We should have just let them win the first one.”

The Australians were especially passionate about winning the tug of war. Both the Australian and the Tongan tug of war teams trained. The Kiwis were not about to practice a tug of war and believed that they couldn’t win against a practiced Tongan team, who had a clear body weight advantage. The Kiwis had won the first time around by being strategic and
coordinating the team’s movements with a caller. The Tongans had learned from this and now had the strategy and the body mass. The Kiwis found the open and earnest expression of the desire to be number one - the public expression of emotion - distasteful on the Aussies’ part. Their reaction was to attempt to undermine the seriousness with which the Australians were taking everything by turning the whole thing into a pisstake. Even if the Australians won, they would lose, because they cared too much. The key part of the (carefully constructed) plan was to wait until the Aussies were going hard, and then on a previously agreed upon order simultaneously drop the rope so that the Aussies would all lose balance and topple over on their arses. If possible, they would immediately re-capture the rope and pull while the Aussies were on the ground. So focused were the Aussies that they were completely oblivious, celebrating their first heavyweight class victory sincerely without realising that the Kiwis had made this celebration look foolish in that they had in fact only fielded the Kiwi lightweights. During one round the Kiwis did succeed in dropping the rope and tumbling the Aussies over, and almost- but not quite- managed to pull out a win in the confusion. It was the Tongans, however, who won both the tug of war and the overall day.

Once I saw all of my notes together, I realised there was a pattern of the boys not engaging with others, and this was at least partially based on their trained dispositions of public restraint. During the trip, the Secretary of Defence made a day visit to Honiara, and the hierarchy organised for him to have lunch with one of the sections. The Platoon HQ had been instructed to send “pers who will engage with the [Secretary]”. Hence 3 Section, full of loud and gregarious and charming soldiers, was chosen, and upon sitting down with the Secretary for lunch, promptly turned silent and reserved. Likewise, a World War II anniversary came around during the deployment, and about a dozen Kiwi soldiers chose to attend a service to mark it at Honiara’s American War Memorial. Afterwards, everyone was invited to chat and get photos with the high-ranking American officials and local war veterans present, but most of the Kiwis stayed with their group, sitting down. The SNO told them not to be shy, and indeed, some of the boys were clearly keen but wouldn’t go alone, having to talk each other into going together. An American woman came past with a baby on one arm and a toddler in the other, saying to the Kiwi soldiers, “These two are New Zealanders, their father’s a New Zealander, this one was born in Auckland and this one in Christchurch, so it nice to see you here.” No one said a word. Eventually, a 2IC, because of
his rank forced to be the one to do something, silently waved at the baby. Another day the whole Platoon was out in the breezeway waiting for a timing, and an Aussie sergeant walked past and asked, “Busy, guys?” No one answered. The Padre once came out on a task and mentioned to the boys that it was Guy Fawkes Night. There was awkward silence until someone quietly muttered “fireworks” to fill it. There were several Company events, or joint New Zealand police and Army events, designed to encourage mingling, but not much mingling was done at them (although this did increase by the end of the deployment). The boys discussed how the only Kiwis really talking to the other platoons were the TF guys, and agreed that it was because they shared the TF culture, and didn’t fit into the Kiwi platoon as well. People tended to leave as soon as possible, partially because such events were seen as “compulsory fun” and basically came under the category of the Army fucking you around with not particularly useful tasks. They generally interrupted what people really wanted to be doing, like going to the gym, and eating at the (amazing) mess rather than attending an alcohol-free barbeque (food is primary, as always). The boys, therefore, tended to maintain a reserved demeanour rather than engaging. This was seen by at least one staff member as indicating that they were not embodying the rapport-building disposition, and this is what I will discuss in the next section.

Interaction with other Cultures is a Process of Becoming, not a Pre-existing Disposition

A few months into the deployment, there was CO-type hour with a senior NZDF officer. Shortly before this, it had briefly seemed as if the platoons were actually going to go on patrol. Tasks were being organised in which the boys would meet with locals who hadn’t seen RAMSI (i.e. uniformed soldiers) for years, and gather updated intelligence on islands’ infrastructure. Hierarchy had been emphasising the importance of these patrols (“this is real shit”). They were then abruptly cancelled. There was a Company meeting to “dispel the rumours,” in which it was stated that the patrols had been called off because a) the role of RAMSI was to help the RSIPF achieve self-determination; b) patrols were counter to that, and c) public perception was being closely managed, and RAMSI couldn’t be seen to be doing the RSIPF’s job. The patrols were replaced by a week of “non-military training”: mountain bike riding, a barbeque on the beach, and the sports tournament. When I asked Harvey if he was disappointed, he answered “yes and no. No because we can keep our
gains, yes because we still haven’t done anything even useful, like we were going to take photos and talk to people who haven’t seen RAMSI in- and that keeps up rapport.”

The officer began the hour by asking for the boys to discuss what they liked about the deployment (not food!), what they didn’t like, and what they would like to do. The boys did not of course jump in to say, we hate the jungle training and we hate the lack of operational relevance. In the absence of much response, the officer moved on, and explained in more detail why the patrols had been cancelled (there was some concern that interacting with soldiers was encouraging some RSIPF units to behave more like a military than a police force). Finally, Milne, who was a Territorial soldier, and thus hadn’t had as long and sustained a period to be socialised as the Regular Force Infantry, did what no one else would and stated aloud that the training programme was focused on skills that could be practiced at home, rather than on things that would take advantage of the new terrain, such as tracker or survival courses, “that we’d actually get something out of.” Malloy then asked a practical question, whether they could use police urban training facilities, and the answer was that they couldn’t. The military was doing nothing but “treading water”, the officer explained. He was surprised they were even allowed to do jungle training.

This officer had a history of encouraging the boys to get to know their neighbours on base. “Do say hello to your neighbours,” he said on the Platoon’s arrival, “because if you can’t say hello here what makes you think I can trust you engaging with the locals out there? Common courtesies, team.” During a barbeque with the New Zealand Police, he specifically told the group that the reason behind this mixed event was that if we can’t get on with each other, then we can’t get on with the people “out there”. He made a direct link between the way soldiers behaved towards other groups on base and the way they behaved with locals. At the end of the hour, therefore, the officer stated that he wanted to bring something up for the boys to ponder. They didn’t have to answer, but should think about it. And this was that he was starting to think that he had pissed some people off, because of the amount of times he had walked past Kiwi soldiers as everyone was walking to and from the mess for breakfast, and they had not said good morning to him. This wasn’t him having an issue with not respecting rank, but rather that “if we can’t even say good morning to each other,” he was wondering what was happening off-base. There had lately been Australian VIPs in Honiara, and the boys hadn’t engaged with them: “And that makes people wonder. It makes
them wonder if you are interacting in the wider community.” The officer said he had “a feeling in his water” that New Zealand’s reputation for relating to locals was “old stuff”.

This officer thus conceptualised the rapport-building disposition as an expansion of everyday manners and therefore something that occurred in any interaction with another group. That is, he saw it as a transposable disposition enacted in the same way in all fields. From this point of view it would be something that was practiced every time a soldier stepped outside the fence. The boys did not share this definition. This became clear when the boys met the suggestion that they might be failing at local interactions by stating that they had had no opportunity to do any. The officer’s comments were so frustrating that two people were actually compelled to speak up and defend themselves. One said, for example, that in the past Op Rata centred on patrols whereas now it felt like their focus was the field ex. Even in East Timor, which was also low tempo, it had still felt like the focus was operational. Another stated that pretty much the only interaction they had been given the chance to perform was “driving around and waving.” When I recounted the meeting to an NCO later on, his response was immediate: “What?! They haven’t been anywhere to do hearts and minds.” When the Platoon was outside the fence they were doing one of two things: military training, or leisure activities. Despite having encountered locals whilst at the range or shopping, the boys seemingly considered themselves as never having been in a situation in which they would enact the rapport-building disposition. Corporal Pihama once told me that “this is the worst place you could have come for what you need to see.” He said that in Timor they would patrol around the neighbourhoods where the trouble makers were and play pool with inhabitants. When something did happen they would go and talk to these acquaintances, who would “be like, it was my little cousin, or, nah, it was another gang did it.” And in Afghanistan, he said, the locals hate you, but you see guys starting to make friends with them. It takes ages, and you have to work at it, but “it’s like wow, Kiwis are good.” However, “It’s more lazy here. Job wise. You do more fitness.” That is, with no criminal activity, no patrols, no information to collect, the rapport-building disposition wasn’t drawn on, as there was no practical soldiering purpose for it; nothing specific towards which it was directed.

The officer responded to the boys’ arguments that they hadn’t had any interactions of the kind in which the rapport-building disposition would be enacted by re-emphasising common
courtesies, saying that if you were a guest, “you would naturally, naturally you would...” He was conceptualising Kiwi soldiers as being people who are naturally polite and friendly on all occasions. The repetition of the word “natural” further implicitly cast the boys’ reserved behaviour as unnatural. However, as always the boys viewed the world from the perspective of doing. The boys were conceptualising the rapport-building disposition not as an enduring character trait but as a situational task that you do, a job skill that occurs during certain events such as patrols, for which they are specifically given the mission of building relationships. That is, they did not see rapport-building as a transposable disposition that was enacted in all fields. Rather, their transposable habitus was the soldier habitus of readiness, embodied as quiet composure in public. Rapport-building was one of the things they were ready to do, but would be triggered by specific contexts rather than “instinctively” acted on everywhere.

The officer restated his concerns to me individually later, saying he felt that, in comparison to the Kiwis, the Tongans were really good outside the fence and (when I asked) that yes, they always said good morning to him, and you could tell that it was genuine. He added that he felt that the decline in rapport-building ability was a generational thing, and that you could see it in the camps in New Zealand: the guys are really insular and just go home after work. This mirrors the concern of the 1R hierarchy at Linton. Within such discourses, negative change is attributed to wider social forces, and there is no recognition that the boys’ reserved disposition may actually have been learnt within the Army itself.

I had unconsciously gone in with this same assumption, that the rapport-building disposition is being nice to everyone, everywhere, all the time. This is not actually a very military perspective. At a preliminary presentation of my findings to Army hierarchy, an officer told me that he felt that our impression of the definition of “hearts and minds” is misled by Army News: “here's another photo of soldiers giving kids lollies”. Rather he saw it as gaining “the good narrative” so that you will be the group that the people want to deal with, and ensuring your interactions have no negative effect on your mission. I sat in on a lecture on civil-military liaisons with the Platoon HQ at PDT, at which the question of when you would or would not agree to support an NGO’s request for aid was covered. The deciding factor is that the mission is primary at all times. “Mission fade,” that is, drifting away from your task, and falling into the “feel good trap”, are to be avoided. NGOS are only to be supported in
humanitarian efforts when that effort would directly support and contribute to the achievement of the specific mission: “We don’t do things because we are good guys [...] Bar the Padre, we’re not here to bring joy to the world.”

Based on this, and the fact that the current specific aim of this mission was to build public confidence in the RSIPF, the Kiwis in fact should not have been interacting very much at all with Solomon Islanders. This clash of definitions however shows that the discourse that New Zealanders are naturally good at rapport building can be problematic. The Platoon was given minimal training on such interaction, and both from their own perspective and that of the Army above were not given the opportunity to try it, and yet they could be reprimanded for not being automatically competent at it. Ending on this note, the Platoon was dismissed from the CO hour, and Kiriona responded for the group, “Kia ora, Sir” (which is the formal version of “chur, brother”). Thus while mildly defending themselves, the Platoon quickly went back to getting over it in public. Afterwards I ate lunch with some of 3 Section (the boys deemed talkative enough to meet the Secretary of Defence), who did in fact say hello to everyone they passed on the paths. Gilchrist walked past the table, and so they said hello to him and laughed when he didn’t answer.

The rest of this section will discuss the boys’ actual interactions with Solomon Islanders, focusing on how these were a learning process, rather than intuitive and easy. The boys had to become comfortable in cultural interaction. Given that the boys did not see rapport-building as a transposable disposition, this section will further focus on how these interactions were mediated by their actual transposable dispositions: the primary practical habitus. As one of the boys had argued that the only thing that they ever got to do that approached “hearts and minds” was “driving around and waving,” this is what I will discuss first. In the Solomon Islands each section had a NZDF pinzgauer (pinny), which are military all-terrain vehicles with open back and sides, which meant that although eight to ten people would be lined up in the back of them, everyone can see out and be seen. Many Solomon Islanders waved friendlily whenever they saw a RAMSI military vehicle. The frequency of waving worked in concentric circles: the people who lived and worked near the GBR always waved as we drove out or back in, but less people tended to wave in the bustling crowds in the middle of Honiara. Once you started getting into the more suburban areas or to the villages just outside Honiara however, waving became common again.
As we drove the short distance from the airport to the GBR on arrival in the country, the locals walking down the street or sitting at market stalls all waved, and so the boys started waving back: “I’m going to have a sore hand by the end of this trip,” declared Mitchell. “Be a really good waver,” someone chimed in. In the first week I went with HQ on AO fams and Sergeant had this same type of reaction: “I’m going to have to switch waving hands soon, the left one’s getting a work out”; “I’m going to need a week on base to recover my waving arm after this”; “he put a lot of effort in, he did, he got a full hand wave.” Although RAMSI had been in the Solomon Islands for about ten years by this point, on both sides individuals new to the experience still had to learn how to relate to each other even in this simple mode of greeting. I once saw a little boy try out a more complicated gesture on one of the soldiers- likely copying the many soldiers he had seen that didn’t just wave but did something akin to throwing up gang signs- and get extremely excited when the boys responded in kind. Another time we passed a village in which three small children were standing at the edge of their yard staring at us. A woman sitting on her porch yelled “Army! Army! Army!”- not at us, but at the children, clearly teaching them what they should do when they saw a pinny.

There were a few guys in each section who, despite the general tendency to either fall asleep or zone out with your iPod whenever you were in a vehicle, consistently engaged with waving at the locals. Kiriona got a reputation for being really cut if the locals he waved at didn’t wave back. I once rode with 2 Section to a task and, because I didn’t usually accompany 2 Section, noticed that it was Milne in this section who most consistently waved. Completely unprompted (but perhaps he had noticed me noticing) he said to me “one thing I will say, the TF are more relaxed when it comes to waving.” So I said that there tends to be a few people per section that wave the most, for example in 2 section it was Kiriona and Mitchell, to which Milne responded, “yeah but when Kiriona does it he’s taking the piss. I hate that. ‘Chur brother!’ [Imitates throwing a sign].” I don’t necessarily agree that this was what Kiriona was doing- this was his cultural way of acknowledging people, and kids seemed to love it. Milne however said more generally, “I think part of it is some people think they have to look tough, they can’t look friendly by waving.” He said all of this in front of the rest of the section, none of whom had any visible reaction. Because I largely spent time with 3 and 1 Sections rather than 2, I don’t know who he was referring to. However, most likely
they would have been embodying the switched-on, ready-to-go habitus, rather than “toughness”- the exact same dispositions that caused them to pay no attention to Milne’s open criticism about it.

Interactions more involved than waving occurred whilst the boys were off-base for either training or leisure activities. The range used by the CTF was on locally owned land, and off to its side, right opposite the firing mounds, there was a local business operation- a large raised hut at which coconut was processed to make oil. Often locals would sit in this hut and watch whilst the boys were firing. The children would imitate the boys, echoing their body language by, for example, lining up to listen in when the boys lined up for safety briefs, and repeating drill calls. The range is obviously dangerous and locals couldn’t be on it when it was in use or until it was cleared. Thus three sets of sentries were sent out to intercept locals who wished to pass through and coordinate their movements with range control.

Locals would also sometimes pause in their daily activities if they spotted the boys training on base, watching from the other side of the chain-link fence that surrounded the GBR. There were often children on the beach watching riot training, for example. Young boys would trail the advancing Platoon, sometimes echoing the rhythm to which the boys thumped their batons against their shields, and sit down cross-legged to watch intently if the Platoon stopped. There was a beach reclamation project going on, and workers would also stop and watch man down drills or parade rehearsals.

The boys sometimes found it hard to understand the locals’ actions, particularly if they countered the practical habitus, which, as their primary habitus, was hardest not to be ethnocentric about. The above tendency to watch them train, for example, confused the boys, given that watching others act is the opposite of doing something. Here of course their views were based only on those locals that were visible to them. Soon after we reached a clearing for survival training one morning, some locals appeared. “Locals, eh,” said Tahuparae, “What do they do all day?” His Seco answered, “Stare at white people, apparently”.

“They were watching us cut down a tree,” said Tahuparae, “when it went they were like, ‘ooo’”. Driving back from the range on another occasion the boys held the following
conversation, prompted by the locals sitting in stalls along the side of the road, a common
sight.

Russell: I don’t know how they can just sit around all day.

Sit around, get some food, that’s it.

Do you think they plan out their day?

I think they just wing it.

Firth: That’s all they have to do here, eh, have sex.

Phelan: And sit around.

Firth: Waiting for sex.

Phelan: Like we do at home! Except we have PlayStations if we get bored.

Interacting with locals involves ways of acting that the boys might not have previously had
exposure to, and can feel awkward at first. For example in a café car park a father asked
Mitchell to pose for a photo holding his little girl, and they got into some confusion because
no one was quite sure who was taking how many photos, and the father seemed to be
wondering why his daughter hadn’t been handed back. After some reflection Mitchell said,
“I think I was holding her wrong.” These soldiers felt awkward (rather than natural) during
this encounter because they were unpractised in both holding young children and reading
the cues of their parents as to when they should hand them back.

The boys were also interacting with people that had different conversational patterns than
they were used to. When they would talk to Kiwis, the Solomon Islanders had a tendency to
launch straight into an explanation of who they were, what they were doing that day, and
their general life story. The boys found this abrupt personal information from a stranger
odd. It seemed to Kiwis- and especially to soldiers who didn’t express their thoughts
publically- to come out of nowhere with no logical lead in. In trying to make sense of this
style of conversation the only comparison from their own experience that the boys came up
with was the computer games centred on heroic quests that they had played. In these
games, onscreen characters will give the player detailed but seemingly random pieces of
information that together help him to complete the quest. On the range one day, Harvey
repeated what a local had said to him whilst he was on sentry, “My name is Francis, and I am going to cook fish.”

“Is that what he said?” asked Wereta.

“Yep.”

“It’s like computer game talk, eh?”

The next day Wereta re-initiated this conversation: “they’re like the people on a PlayStation, eh? They tell you their name and what they’re doing. ‘My name is, and I am going home.’ What was that one yesterday?”

“My name is Francis, and I am going to cook some fish,” supplied Harvey.

The way that the boys built relationships, by contrast, was not by sharing their stories, but by sharing things that they deemed to be useful. In the previous two chapters I have shown that the boys tended to be unrelentingly practical in regards to their relationships, both with each other, and with the Army as an institution, and this was true of their relationships with Solomon Islanders also. Just as the boys did not value purely symbolic gestures of sacrifice that did not tangibly help anyone in regards to their relationships with one another, they conceptualised their relationships with locals as something that should be materially helpful. If they couldn’t do anything concrete, they weren’t inclined to make friendly gestures. Most interactions thus focused on a material transaction. The boys equated engaging well with the locals with giving them something, that is, literally providing them with some sort of material goods. What they would give was what they already had on them, expendables that the Army had issued them for their own use, that is, zylumes, the bottled water that we carried boxes of everywhere, and lunch rations. For lunches, we were given a box of sandwiches, a box of cake wedges, and a box of fruit, so there was always spare food to give away. It quickly became common practice to pick up cut lunches every time we left the base in the morning, even if the boys knew they would be back in time to eat lunch at the mess, solely so they could distribute the food to children.

On one occasion, 1 Section went east and another section west to practice establishing comms between the two groups, setting up signalling equipment with wires thrown over
tree branches. We were parked on an open plot of land just past a medical clinic for about two and a half hours, across the road from some houses. As the boys were setting up, some local men sat down on a concrete block across the road to watch. Mostly no one paid attention to this except for Russell, who (not necessarily reflective of everyone’s opinions), said “oh, why don’t you come and watch us standing around and doing nothing because we’re white?” Three kids appeared and sat on another concrete block to watch quietly, eventually creeping closer. When the other section sent word that they were set up, and there was a sudden bustle of activity trying to raise comms, all of the locals came closer. The number of kids increased and several began engaging in loud, high-spirited activities that seemed designed to gain attention: pushing each other and giggling, diving off logs into a ditch, whacking each other with branches. One boy crept so close that he had to move out of the way when Harvey backed up with a wire. The boys never spoke to the kids or overtly paid attention to them, however. Talking to the kids was a possibility, given that most of the boys spent the time sitting around on the grass waiting. Once it became clear the comms weren’t working and it was the other end with the problem, everyone retreated back into the pinny to wait, and seeing the soldiers seemingly about to leave, the kids left too. The longer we sat there however, the more kids drifted back, until there was a row of them watching silently. A lifetime of exposure to Army News soldiers-giving-kids-lollies type peacekeeping photos had led me to expect that soldiers would engage with children in endearing ways whenever they encountered them, and so in situations like this I was always civilian-surprised at how little interaction there was between the two groups. The boys, however, were focused on the task at hand, which was not a meet and greet, but the comms, and keeping classified and expensive equipment secure.

Eventually a local man approached the pinny to introduce himself and tell the Seco, “it’s nice to see you here, you are welcome.” One of the children came over to tell some of the boys his name, while the rest of the children laughed at him. “Do we have spare lunch?” asked Wereta.

Russell: Yeah, why, do you want a sandwich?

Wereta: No. We should give it to the kids when we leave.

Malloy: You can give them my sandwich, I’m not going to eat it.
Chen: Me too.

Russell: If we gave them that box it would burst, eh. There’d be nothing left.

Wereta disagreed: “Actually they’re really calm when you give them food, they distribute it evenly.”

“They didn’t on that island,” said Russell, referring to Savo, and Wereta responded, “that was because of everything else going on,” and explained for me that the locals had been doing a welcome dance but that one of the soldiers had been standing right in the middle of everything giving out lollies “like a dumb cunt.” In other words, Wereta was arguing that these were just typical over stimulated children. This shows also, as throughout this section, that the boys had differing levels of interest in and respect for the local Solomon Islanders. Wereta followed up his defence of the children by loudly imitating the singing that presumably went along with the dance. Russell meanwhile had spent the conversation clearing all of the rubbish out of the box of lunch so it could be given to the kids. The boys discussed amongst themselves how they would give the box to one of the older guys so that he would distribute it fairly, and the Seco told them to just do it right before we left so that they weren’t swarmed with kids while still trying to pack away the radios.

Just before we departed, Malloy went over to give one of the men the box of sandwiches, the kids lined up in an orderly fashion, and we left, the boys all waving out of the pinny to the children we had just spent two and a half hours not really acknowledging. Simultaneously, the boys had a conversation about how the Aussies were hated in the Solomon Islands (some guy in Chinatown told one of the boys so). Malloy said it was because the Aussies drove down the roads too fast, which was dangerous (Malloy was consistently passionate about this issue and also called Kiwi drivers out on it if he felt the need). The boys also laughed over how some Australian musicians who had performed for the GBR recently had been told that Australians were loved here: “how funny was that?” It was quite clear that this conversation had been prompted by the boys seeing themselves as just having engaged well with the locals. To them, giving the locals something concrete was how this was done. Because they were out on a comms training task, not out to see locals, they perhaps were thinking that they had in fact gone out of their way to do so untasked
(and in fact, by CTF standing orders, informal distribution of military rations was technically prohibited).

On another day the boys were training on a field just inside the GBR fence. A group of children sat down on the other side to watch. The boys were practicing teaching basic weapons drills and the kids were riveted, one yelling “stoppage!” in imitation of the boys. An Australian jogged past on the running track and said to the soldiers, “you’ve got an audience! Watching! Little pikinini [Solomon Islands pijin for children],” to which the boys didn’t verbally respond. Later another Australian drove by and, seeing the kids, stopped and got out of his vehicle to have a chat with them: “Are you watching the training? Bang Bang?” Near the end of the lesson, Harvey started searching through his webbing. He discovered however that his issued zylume had already been accidentally snapped and therefore was useless. There were some cans of lemonade around, but they were too big to fit through the chain-link fence. Thus Harvey could find nothing to give the kids: “I feel bad.” With nothing material to give them, however, he didn’t approach them at all. The Australian approached the children without a gift, just to speak with them, but Harvey must not have seen this as an option. This was not the only time I saw soldiers search for something to give the kids, fail to find anything, and therefore decide on no interaction at all.

Often the material transaction went one way only- the soldiers gave children food and water- but sometimes in return the soldier gained a photo of himself with that child, of the type commonly seen of New Zealand peacekeepers in the media. Again I had naively assumed that these pictures indicated some sort of ongoing relationship with the child’s community. However, in the case of this deployment, the pictures were actually the result of five minute encounters with children that the soldiers never saw again. These photos were desired largely for the boys’ Facebook pages. By posting this type of easily recognisable image, the boys were publically claiming the identity of deployed soldier, even though they never really got to enact this through doing the type of work with local communities that they would see as worthwhile. For example, on the beach once Mitchell and Phelan talked to two small boys who were sitting quietly and shyly near the pinnies, exchanging names, asking them questions, and then having me take a photo. “Come here for a photo!” Mitchell asked one of the children, who was stealthily drifting out of the back of the frame. Mitchell then gave the boys a bottle of water. As well as photos featuring
themselves, the boys were interested in photos that solely featured exotic looking children, to be used as profile pictures to represent themselves. Corporal Pihama took a photo of a kid with yellow dreads, as he himself had had dreads as a child (until his grandma cut them off behind his father’s back). Likewise, after an acclimatisation walk we were waiting for a bus to pick us up and a bunch of kids were sitting in a group across the road. Pihama realised there was the same number of kids as there were members in his section: “nine! Gibson, do you have your camera? Someone take a photo of those kids and we can put it on Facebook and tag the section in. As long as I’m that cool kid in the back right,” (who also had dreadlocks).

Perhaps partially because they saw their relationship as revolving around material goods, some of the boys tended to assume that the locals were largely economically motivated in their interactions with the Army. The locals did often ask for smokes or bottles of water or money for betel nut. There was an assumption however that locals were trying to rip Westerners off and a vigilant stance towards being scammed. For example, local landowners charged beach goers per vehicle (although only 100 Solomon Island dollars, which was around 20 New Zealand dollars, for a pinny, i.e. roughly ten people). “What a Jew thing to do, charge to go to a beach,” said Harvey. There was then a discussion amongst the Pākehā about how this was just like the Māori at home (i.e. referring to political debate over the ownership of the seabed and foreshore). After snorkelling however Russell decided the beach was mean: “they could charge more.” The boys also didn’t like being charged to see the relics from the Second World War that villagers had collected. Another time we went to collect firewood, and the Seco in charge said that if anyone tried to wave us down for stealing wood, to just wave. In fact no one that saw us looked the least concerned, but Harvey declared: “It’s fucking wood! ‘It’s their wood.’ I hate that mentality, eh?”

“Māori mentality,” another Pākehā added. In this case finding a connection between Kiwi “biculturalism” and other cultures was negative. Again, however, this type of discussion was kept within the group. The ways in which the boys interacted with Solomon Islanders were based more on their shared habitus than on their ethnic diversity and internal inter-cultural relationships. It was their focus on practicality that generated their responses to locals. Meanwhile, the “get over it” disposition that they had internalised to become soldiers meant that there was not going to be a link between internal relationships and external
ones (beyond the fact that they were both viewed practically) as everything internal was contained to the group.

**Riflemen Dispositions: Are soldier dispositions peacekeeper dispositions?**

One question raised in the military literature seemed also to be on the minds of at least the NCOs on this deployment, that of the fit or lack thereof between soldier dispositions and the ways in which peacekeepers are required to act. The lack of opportunity to do anything on deployment led these NCOs to discuss the disconnect between training and what actually happened on trips. One imitated a hypothetical soldier 717ing: “I’m leaving because we do all this training and then when we go overseas we just hand out blankets and shake hands and wear baseball caps.” Corporal Pihama chimed in:

> There’s no point training a grunt to do ambush, practice all day and not allowed to do ambush overseas. There’s a real world and a fake world and the real world is blankets and handshakes and baseball caps, but they ignore that in the fake world where they’re still doing ambuses- that was Vietnam-and are all, “blouse your trousers! One meat choice!”

The repeated reference to baseball caps is due to the fact that soldiers are issued special headdress for deployments. As previously discussed, headdress is very important for interobjectively constructing the soldier. The headdress worn in training are jay hats, which are made of camouflage material, whereas the baseball caps issued for deployment are the exact opposite of camouflage in that they are specifically meant to identify you as a New Zealand soldier- they are black, with a white kiwi.

The last and longest field ex took place in uninhabited areas of jungle. However, the Platoon had to drive through villages to get there, and during one road clearance task that took them through a village, the Platoon was ordered to dismount and patrol. Because they were on an ex, the boys were armed as they dismounted in the village. Chen told me that villagers stared at them, stunned, “like, what’s going on?” He said he was trying to do “the friendly thing”, waving and smiling, but “it wasn’t working.” A man came over, extremely angry, to ask why they were carrying weapons, so the soldiers mounted back up and drove away, only having walked about ten metres. Chen told me that the unanimous response of the Platoon was: that was stupid. Although this was a one-off event, its implications are
important to explore. Later, Chen mentioned to Milne that he had been telling me about the patrol and Milne immediately said, “Oh that was just fucking dumb [...] that was not the right thing to do. And it didn’t help that some people, and I won’t name names, jumped straight out of the vehicles with their tough guy stances on.” This was the second time Milne had suggested that a “tough guy stance” was interfering with the friendlier, peacekeeping role that was more appropriate to this deployment. We can probably assume that in this case it was not so much that the boys Milne is referring to thought they were too tough to smile in general, but that they were, as on all field exes, playacting the combat soldier. A traditional exercise was here being enacted in an actual peacekeeping environment, a zone that, as the response of the locals made clear, required presentation of a different sort of military disposition. That is, the boys were made to train for what Pihama termed the “fake world” in the actual real world of handshakes and baseball caps. And this training compromised them in that real world. The boys of course had not wanted to do this training, but rather something more relevant to the Solomons. They would have preferred to learn to adapt to the specific operational context and take on peacekeeping dispositions, but were ordered to embody the attentive readiness of an armed patrol and so complied. It is not, as many academics have argued, that soldiers don’t want to be involved in peacekeeping because peacekeeping dispositions differ from soldier dispositions. Rather, the boys did want to be involved in peacekeeping because the dispositions differ. This difference provides an opportunity for further identity acquisition, as desired by the practical habitus.

I asked Milne about the scenario of the field exercise, and he answered that that was what was so dumb, the scenario was “never clear to us.” They were told that the ROEs were the same as in the Solomon Islands under RAMSI, but then they were doing jungle training, sneaking around and killing people. So they were never sure, if they came upon the enemy party, if they should respond as if to an enemy, or approach it like a peacekeeper would. “It’s ridiculous,” he said, to have an exercise in an operation with different ROEs than the operation itself: “I mean I know this isn’t really an operation anymore, but if something really happened...” A few days later the Padre told me that he was going out with Company hierarchy to apologise for this show of arms. He said later that the village had taken the apology well.
Process and Riflemen dispositions: Gaining new skills

As mentioned above, the hierarchy were aware of the potential for frustration on this deployment, and in the first week held a meeting to strategise on how to limit this. The SNO asked the Platoon HQ to organise a “grab bag” of possible activities for if and when there was nothing for the boys to do, and stated the intention to be proactive about courting Australian approval for such training. Between the NCOs’ suggestions and the hierarchy’s approval, training that the boys did see as valuable was eventually arranged. This was survival training, in which the boys learnt to survive in the jungle without the full packs and webbing that soldiers usually carry everywhere. Learning to feed themselves without rations, construct shelter without their hootiches, and navigate without their compasses and maps were all seen as new and useful skills which took advantage of the Solomon Islands as a location. The boys had always been interested in such skills, often discussing Bear Gryll’s *Man vs Wild* on field exes throughout their training.

However, the survival training didn’t replace the jungle training, as the Platoon had hoped: “The thing with the survival ex was we wanted to do it instead of the field ex. Now we have to do the field ex and the survival ex.” Survival training was scheduled after jungle training, and after the Platoon’s last QRF rotation. For four months the boys had been working on their gains, and now just weeks before they were due to go home, they would be doing a four day ex with minimal to no rations, including water. Given their operational tasks were now completed, and “since they’ve been good,” Sergeant had been planning to ask the Platoon Commander if the boys could just hit the gym for the last month. The only thing that the boys felt they had really achieved on deployment was their gains, which were now in jeopardy. When asked if he was looking forward to the survival ex one of boys said, “Yes and no, yes because it’s something new, no because no food for three days is gay.” Hopefully, Sergeant noted, since it was just for four days, and each section was being provided with a pig on day three, “they’ll hardly lose any gains.”

During a day trip preceding the ex, in which the boys learnt to kill, prepare, and cook fish, chickens and pigs, Sergeant said, “Nina, this is the most interested you’ve seen them all tour, eh?” It was. I could tell the boys were pleased by their near-constant wrestling. Thus,
by the end of the deployment, although the boys hadn’t become soldiers with real-life experience at patrolling, they had made improvements through learning some new skills.

**Riflemen Dispositions: What had the boys become by the end of the deployment?**

At the end of the deployment, the CO asked the soldiers to reflect on how the Solomon Islands had made them a better soldier, person, and family member. He and various politicians fairly unconvincingly tried to present the boys as having performed a key peacekeeping role. The Australian High Commissioner told the Company that “because of what you have done, children have got education, women have gotten to go to the market, and businesses have felt secure enough to invest.” The New Zealand High Commissioner said that it could be hard to come at the end of a successful mission, but that their contribution was as valuable as anyone else’s. In later years they would bring their family here for a holiday, or would hear something positive about the Solomons in the news, and would know that they had helped to make that possible.

Despite the fact that boys hadn’t had the opportunity to perform peacekeeping dispositions, they were used as representatives of them when in the last few days of the deployment reporters and photographers from various New Zealand media outlets came to the Solomon Islands at the NZDF’s invitation. According to the SNO, they wanted to “take the guys to the market, watch them interact with the locals,” and also film them playing soccer with local children. The SNO wanted to (and apparently did) talk them out of the soccer with children segment, because it wasn’t representative of “what we’ve been doing.” Filming the boys in Honiara’s central market on the other hand was seen as representative because this was now vibrant and safe partially due to New Zealand’s years of contribution to RAMSI. Four members of the contingent were very carefully chosen to be the media team, given that in just four people, Regular and Territorial Force, male and female, grunt and support staff, Pākehā and Pacific Islander, young and older soldiers were all represented. “So if you’re in it you get to play soccer with the kids?” one of them asked. On their arrival at the market to film the segment, the media team were told to “just do what you normally do.” This was, however, the very first time either of the two grunts on the team had ever been to the market. When I had mentioned it early in the deployment to the secos I was told, “No, that’s crowded. Someone got murdered there a while ago.” In fact the media soon dispersed to
interview locals or do some shopping rather than follow the boys, who told me they had tried to lose the reporters as soon as they saw them take out a notebook. Once they had shaken their reporters, the boys happily shopped for food.

The presence of the media did however result in the filming of two end of deployment events in which the boys were heavily invested, in large part because they were opportunities to display their newly improved dispositions. These were the haka which is performed at the handover parade, and the reunion with families on arrival at Christchurch Airport. Both were key moments in the overall deployment journey that results in one becoming a soldier of Ngāi Tūmatauenga with overseas experience. Further, they both allowed the boys to show off the improvements to self that they did feel they had made, their gains, in that the haka was performed shirtless, whilst many of the boys’ appearance had changed significantly since their families had last seen them four months ago. “All the boys will want to show off their gym bodies,” Corporal Pihama noted. The primary activity of many in the last few weeks was not only to continue going to the gym, but also additional appearance projects designed to display and supplement gains. Spending the last month tanning was a strategy that had been planned early on, and there was also some talk of waxing. While for almost the entire deployment I had had the pool to myself whenever I went, it was suddenly packed with boys working on their tan. Sitting out in the sun during a survival training lesson, many of the boys likewise pushed their t-shirt sleeves up. Chen followed suit, to which Gilchrist responded, “Fuck, Chen, you ruined it,” pushing his own sleeves back down. Chen hadn’t done the work on his body to merit this behaviour, because this was not, of course, just about displaying muscles, but also about displaying the discipline behind them.

The haka was treated with much anticipation, Firth noting that the previous rotation “had blood blisters on their arms from hitting them so hard.” The Māori boys acting as the warriors painted their chests with cam paint. Finau cut the boys’ hair, giving everyone his own preferred high and tight style, meaning that they looked even more uniform than usual. Everyone even ironed their uniforms for perhaps the first time on deployment, because one person did: “As soon as one person irons they ruin it for everyone.” For many of the Pākehā, this was the first opportunity to enact their improved (but not yet fully there) confidence. Phelan, for example, wanted to go hard but noted it was awkward and that the others
laughed at you (the Platoon, did, in fact, spend the night before our departure passing around the recording one of the cameramen had taken of their haka and laughing at Phelan’s facial expressions/ attempts at pūkana: “I did it and now everyone’s laughing at me!”).

At duty free in Christchurch Airport, some of the boys bought aftershave to further enhance the first impression they would make during reunions with girlfriends. The media filmed as they walked out of the gate to embrace their missuses, once again changed, this time not because they had taken on dispositions and challenges that the Army had provided them with, but because in the absence of any more such challenges, they had made improvements under their own direction, in spite of Army obstruction.

**Conclusion**

The general structure of the soldier habitus is the ability to embody the alert, poised, switched-on state; the readiness to react at any time. In that it is therefore directed towards action, it seems to fulfil the primary practical habitus. However, problems arise if soldiering involves always being ready to act but never in fact actually acting. Although the deployment itself didn’t provide much worthwhile activity, it did give the boys the opportunity to provide it for themselves, in the way that the boys in Oscar Company had wished they could, if only they would be knocked off when there was nothing to do. In fact, about two years after the deployment, based back in camp, Wereta told me, “I miss that place, especially the gym. It’s so hard to get into a gym routine here with the damn field time.” Although morale was therefore much better than at Oscar, this is not necessarily the same thing as the Army itself being seen as capable of providing challenge. After their post-deployment leave, the Platoon was scheduled to begin the Enhanced Infantry Company training that, at 1R, had sustained Quebec Company’s morale as Oscar’s had been flagging. Despite this, a year and a half after the trip, I ran into Corporal Pihama in the mall, and the first thing he told me was that many of the boys had 717ed.

Academics have argued that soldiers devalue peacekeeping because peacekeeper characteristics clash with the soldier habitus. In this case, however, the deployment was devalued because the boys wanted to do peacekeeping- expressing the desire to patrol or
even just to train in skills more relevant to this activity— but weren’t given the opportunity to do so. That is, the boys weren’t able to become peacekeepers through embodying any peacekeeping dispositions. The argument that soldiers reject peacekeeping because it clashes with the soldier habitus gives too much motivating power to the wrong habitus. Rather, taking on peacekeeper dispositions would be desirable because they differ from the soldier habitus, thereby providing a new challenge that would fulfil the practical habitus. Learning to be a peacekeeper by doing would involve many of the characteristics that draw the boys to a task and which, for them, epitomised identity acquisition. It would have been something new, in that the opportunity to build rapport with foreign peoples is largely impossible to replicate in training, and in that this is not necessarily a focus of training in any case due to ideas about the “natural” rapport-building disposition. It would be useful and productive, and hence seen as actually “doing something.” And it would have been especially challenging, in that, as Pihama told me, “It takes ages, and you have to work at it.” Thus the idea that the soldier habitus as the primary motivator of practice causes problems in peacekeeping rests on the myth that civilians lose their pre-service identity when they become soldiers. It could well be that New Zealand national dispositions, various ethnic dispositions, and New Zealand soldier dispositions set Kiwi soldiers up particularly well for the work of peacekeeping and rapport-building. Our national military history would suggest this. But as rapport-building is seen as situational rather than transposable, and the boys never found themselves in the proper context for it, I was never able to observe this process.

Without the chance to embody peacekeeping dispositions through doing, the boys’ actions continued to be generated primarily by both the practical and soldier habitus. It was the switched-on, silent soldier habitus that was transposable, not the friendly, engaged rapport-building disposition. It is helpful to remember here that a habitus is the underlying principle that structures multiple dispositions. It is readiness and the ability to switch on that structure the soldier habitus, whereas rapport-building is one of many things that a soldier is ready to switch on and do. A soldier would enact rapport-building only in specific contexts, those in which building rapport would be practical in that it could achieve tangible aims. In most other situations, the switched-on habitus is embodied to maintain readiness. Unlike some Australians and some more senior New Zealanders that I saw, the boys did not
seem to see value in cultivating a general view of New Zealanders as friendly by being consistently sociable and forthcoming. They did, however, seem to be working to construct a general picture of New Zealanders as providers and thus materially helpful. This is because their actions are also generated by the practical habitus. Thus while in the presence of local children their soldier habitus won’t let them be distracted from their current task and overall readiness, once that task is completed their practical habitus generates the desire to provide the children with something concrete. The two habitus are working together to generate a particular response to this event. The way that Kiwi soldiers build relationships with people of different ethnicities overseas is not based on how they react to internal diversity within their own group, but rather on the two habitus that they all share despite this diversity. It is their similarity, not their difference, which they apply beyond the group. Just as they build relationships with each other based on their shared value of helping one another, they build relationships with Solomon Islanders through trying to provide them with practical aid. This is partly why I believe that using concepts like cultural awareness in regards to the rapport-building disposition is misleading. These concepts suggest appreciation of different values and perspectives, whereas soldiers are very much acting from their own deepest points of view. Bourdieu suggests that the scholastic disposition is “the most essential bias” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 69) held by academics. It seems that the same is true of the practical habitus: “the pre-occupied, active presence in the world” (Bourdieu, 1990a, p.52) that soldiers embody is more important to their selves and the way they act in the world than even their varying ethnicities.
Chapter Ten

Conclusion

The ethnographic basis of this thesis was an exploration of the transition from civilian to soldier amongst one group of new recruits (and, unanticipated when the research began, in some cases the transition back again). This identity acquisition was structured by the relationship between two identities: the soldier identity to be acquired, and the pre-existing civilian identity that generated the recruits’ responses to becoming a soldier. This thesis too, therefore, was structured by this relationship. I looked at identity and identity acquisition not only through the lens of academic theory, but also from the perspective of informants’ own theories. The understandings of the boys, however, operate largely on the level of practical mastery. Identity acquisition is not discussed amongst soldiers in the abstract, “as something to be deciphered” (Bourdieu, 1990a, p.37) for the pleasure of deciphering it, but rather comes up when questions “are posed, often quite urgently, by the necessities of life” (Bourdieu, 1990b, p.381). That is, questions of identity acquisition arose in relation to specific events occurring that day, which directly impacted either the boys’ attempts to internalise soldier dispositions, or their quest to always be acting in order to avoid disjuncture in their deepest embodied sense of themselves. It is not possible to transport such understandings into a doctoral thesis without converting them to symbolic mastery, however. Just by writing them down I have inevitably had to express them in a way that the boys would not.

It was in the attempt to find concepts to express these understandings in a manner as close as possible to their practical manifestations that my ethnography revealed some gaps in how anthropologists discuss identity at the theoretical level. I needed to find a way of characterising both of the identities on which I was focused, the soldier identity and the civilian identity. This necessitated a refocusing on soldierhood itself as well as the development of the concept of the practical habitus. The axes of identity that anthropology traditionally draws on could not make sense of the boys’ experience. Being limited to these
traditional axes and the analyses of soldierhood they have resulted in would mean that in
the place of soldier identity I would have put “masculinity” or “lack of individual identity,”
or, the most nuanced option available, “a lack of individual identity accepted in order to
experience the rewards of hegemonic masculinity”. In the place of civilian identity, I would
have had to put “no longer exists”, or focus on ethnic and gender identities that would have
emphasised the differences between the recruits rather than their shared experience of
identity acquisition. None of these options were capable of fully capturing the identity
projects of the boys, and at worst some of them can be seriously misleading about the
soldier experience. The solution I have chosen, Bourdieu’s theory of practice, is not only
inevitably a conversion to symbolic mastery, but is also a famously writerly example that I
have no doubt many with the practical habitus would characterise as “torturous non-
intuitive phrases” (Kirke, 2009, p.21). However, the advantage of Bourdieu’s concepts is that
they acknowledge that a fundamental transformation in the knowledge that is being
reported has taken place, and won’t let you forget it.

Ethnography

The Boys
Identity, to a soldier, is not what you think, or what you feel. Your identity is what you do.
You are not the fact that you were cold and miserable, and your feet hurt, or the fact that
you were disillusioned and frustrated. You are the fact that you pushed on anyway. The
boys shared a primary habitus, “the basis of perception and appreciation of all subsequent
experience” (Bourdieu, 1977, p.78), which is structured by action and productivity. Because
this habitus generates the boys’ perception of all things, it generates their perception of
identity itself, and is therefore the reason that they define their selves through their
relationships to work, productive activity, and becoming. The boys’ own theory of identity is
that it is a process. It is not a stable set of characteristics or even a stable set of
predispositions; rather, it is a continual effort to acquire new and improved dispositions.
Identity, that is, is identity acquisition. Identity should be acquired through hardship, but
this hardship should not involve demeaning previous selves or having to reject them in the
manner of the old adage about breaking civilians down in order to rebuild them. Given that
identity acquisition is so central to soldiers’ self-identification, the absence of the
opportunity to acquire new dispositions may itself be taken as demeaning.
Hence the first stage of the relationship between the practical habitus and the soldier habitus as it played out through the first year and a half of the soldiers’ careers was that the practical habitus motivated the decision to join the Army and acquire the soldier habitus. As the primary habitus is “the basis for the subsequent formation of any other habitus” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990, p.42), the practical habitus was both the foundation on which the soldier habitus was built, and was used to construct it. Echoing the recruiting slogan “you bring it, we’ll bring it out,” recruits bring the practical habitus to Basic Training, and the Army brings it out- that is, forces recruits to draw on it in order to achieve what is required of them.

The Army could “bring out” the practical habitus more effectively than the boys could on their own, because it provided them with a kind of challenge that they couldn’t provide for themselves. There were several instances throughout the ethnography in which the boys preferred to be challenged by external forces rather than do it themselves. “They never want to do anything,” a group of NCOs in the Solomon Islands mused one day, but, despite that, if you took them through a really hard PT session they would always say “I’m really glad I did that,” after the fact. This was sometimes used as a judgement against them, as in Battalion when it was suggested that the boys not finding themselves something to do instead of sitting around indicated a lack of desire for personal development. Those boys of course wanted to be knocked off so they could challenge themselves in the gym in the same way the 2/1 boys did, but they cannot in fact challenge themselves to the same extent that others can. It is more challenging to have to adjust to external requirements, because these may be generated by a habitus that differs from your own, and are therefore capable of putting you in a valued state of disjuncture. The way in which you can place yourself in disjuncture is to put yourself under the power of others, as with joining the Army in the first place. This is how submission can be self-actualising. When the New Zealand Army later changed its recruiting slogan, this time to “Purpose Built (for you)”, presumably in recognition of the individual motivations of many of their recruits, they may have misjudged exactly what kind of “meaningful personal adventure” (Battistelli, 1997, p.471) these recruits are after.

Thus through the work ethic and willingness to turn hardship into challenge that is generated by their primary practical habitus, recruits internalised the readiness that
structures their secondary soldier habitus. Far from being replaced by the soldier habitus, the practical habitus is actually reproduced, because the external challenge of military training required it to be acted on constantly. The primary habitus has led the boys to enter a field “to which it is as pre-adapted as possible”, thereby “reinforc[ing] its dispositions” (1990a, pp.60-61).

With the soldier habitus embodied, but not having replaced the practical habitus, the two began generating practice together. This melding of the two habitus can especially be seen in an update one of the boys gave me about two years after my fieldwork ended. In response to my asking him in an email conversation “sounds like you’re getting to do some good stuff and not getting too fucked around then?” Wereta wrote:

Yes and no. This year has been outrageously busy [...] Longest ive spent in barracks continuously [for the last 7 months] was 3 weeks. Ex after ex after doing a 5 week tracking course. Got to go to Singapore too, which was good experience but wouldnt put my hand up for it again. This ‘EIC’ [Enhanced Infantry Company] title they gave us messed with a lot, just trying to polish a turd, it was nothing special but theyve tried to make it something. All in all if we had of got called out, we would have been worser off due to people getting broken from workload, kit breaking or just not having stuff squared due to the field time.

Here we have the by now familiar appraisal of only certain kinds of activity being worthwhile, or real work: “it was nothing special but they’ve tried to make it something”. This opinion is no longer generated solely by the practical habitus, however. This is partially what is occurring: we can again see the belief generated by this habitus that only new challenges are productive and hence worthwhile in that Singapore was a good experience the first time but not worth repeating. The conceptualisation of some activities as counterproductive is now also generated by the soldier habitus, however. Not only was EIC training not challenging, it threatens readiness. It left bodies and kit broken and in disarray, possibly impeding the ability to react in the event of a real incident. Thus the practical and soldier habitus have aligned in determining what type of activity is real work, is productive, is worthwhile.

This leads us to the key shift in the relationship between the practical and soldier habitus, which occurred midway through my fieldwork: when the soldier habitus melded with the
practical habitus, it no longer provided a challenge for the practical habitus. Embodied soldierhood is not, however, inevitably devoid of productive challenges. It is possible for the soldier habitus to be enhanced through the taking on of new dispositions, as with peacekeeping ones- this just didn’t happen for the particular boys that I followed through the last two stages of my fieldwork. That there was always going to be some periods of frustration caused by inactivity in the Army was indicated by the fact that, across generations, soldiers have informally built “procedures to follow, paths to take” (1990a, p.53) in such unproductive situations into the soldier habitus itself in the form of dispositions like “playing the game”, over-complying, and “the crime is getting caught”. The practical habitus is not just drawn on in embodying the soldier habitus, but has, in this way, partially shaped it. However, neither these dispositions nor others like “getting over it” could counteract a state of disjuncture that went on too long.

The slogan “you bring it, we’ll bring it out” seemingly promised that the Army would challenge you. Hence it isn’t surprising that the disaffected soldiers of Oscar Company brought it up several times when they felt the Army was failing them, for example joking: “‘you bring it, we’ll bring it out.’ That means you pay a twenty thousand dollar bond when you join the Army and you don’t get it back when you leave.” Through a financial metaphor, this soldier suggests that he had fulfilled his half of the bargain by bringing it, but the Army wasn’t giving anything in return. If the Army stops bringing out the primary habitus that the soldiers have brought, and the soldiers have to turn to bringing it out themselves, it may appear to them that they can better do this elsewhere. And, as has been seen, several boys did take this option.

However, this was not the case for the whole cohort. The Army offers at least one other extreme challenge in going for selection, that is, undergoing the physically and mentally gruelling days-long testing process to be accepted for training in the New Zealand Army’s elite units, the SAS (Special Air Service) or counter-terrorist Commandoes. In fact, whenever someone gives me an update on the boys, they tell me about two distinct groups: those who got out, and those who passed selection. The majority of the cohort, however, is probably the group in between: those who haven’t gone for or passed selection, but have hung in there and not 717ed. Army statistics quoted at the NCO induction course I attended before Basic quite accurately predicted the overall trajectory of the cohort’s first years in
the Army: morale and feelings of military belonging, the research shows, are highest during
the initial training periods, but drop off once soldiers get to their units. I have shown in
detail why this is. This same model suggests that those who chose to stay in the Army for
another few years may be approaching another big drop in morale, but that then, finally,
they will reach a stage which provides productive challenge. Soldiers, it is believed, struggle
with their first promotion to Lance Corporal, attributed to their being promoted over,
having to lead, and thus being separated from, their mates. But once they make it to
Corporal, and have eight soldiers in need of their guidance under their command, things
start to improve. This, tellingly, is attributed to a feeling that in this new set of
circumstances they can actually “make a difference”: “they feel they can make a change”.

The Army
To the New Zealand Army, identity is something that can be employed to help fulfil its role
as a national organisation. Through tailoring new dispositions and making use of pre-existing
ones, it works to socialise soldiers who will act in the ways that are most effective in the
varying fields in which they need to perform. While 3CI and ethnicity/nationality are made
use of explicitly, the practical habitus is made use of implicitly, and is even more effective
than the former. This instrumental use does not indicate that these identities are
inauthentic, as they are still deeply cherished; in fact they are cherished even more so
because they are useful and productive, given that the Army is made up of practical people.

The practical habitus that is so useful to the Army is, however, also one of its biggest
potential obstacles in peacetime; the type of people that are drawn to the Army are
probably the hardest to retain. This is a situation largely out of the Army’s own control, in
that the soldier habitus they instil in servicemen does not override the primary habitus that
generates the desire for new challenges once soldierhood is acheived, and in that the Army
also of course does not itself determine whether there are currently any deployments that
might motivate soldiers to stay around. The model of what an Army is and what its soldiers
are motivated by developed by Moskos (1977) and expanded on by Battistelli (1997) can
illuminate the difficult spot in which the Army finds itself. In this model military life has
progressed from institution to occupation to somewhere to fulfil “postmodern motivations”
(Battistelli, 1997, p.471). These categories were of course created through a conversion to
symbolic mastery and therefore care must be taken not to see them in binary terms. In fact,
in the case of the boys, elements of all three exist simultaneously. Soldiers’ motivations are now occupational (earning money, acquiring skills useful to post-military life) and postmodern (working on identity projects through adventure) rather than institutional (a self-sacrificial calling to dedicate oneself to a higher purpose) (Battistelli, 1997, p.471). However, soldiers still expect the Army to act as an institution in terms of taking care of its own through providing, not only materially, but providing the opportunity to fulfil occupational and postmodern desires. Thus the Army has to continue acting as an institution, but without the soldiers with a lifetime calling that would help sustain such an organisation. The things it needs to provide soldiers in order to maintain good relationships with them are often geared towards eventually leaving the Army: new skills that will allow them to set up elsewhere, challenges that are only valued the first time and are not worth repeating. The restless and unquenchable practical habitus, placed in a field of comparative inactivity in the peacetime Army, is what lies beneath current retention problems.

**Literature**

In this thesis I contribute an analysis of soldierhood that, unlike much of the current literature, is not structured by scholastic binaries that are foreign to soldiers. The civilian-soldier transition is an intersubjective process in which the boys could simultaneously be putting the team first whilst working on their own identity projects. You have to (and therefore can) work on your individual identity in order to be capable of conforming; you have to (and therefore can) enact will to submit, especially if you don’t deem the things to which you are submitting to be worthwhile. In another example of a presumed binary reconceptualised as a dialectical relationship, the practice of gay chicken is much more nuanced than the construction of masculinity through the banishment of femininity and homosexuality. In a roundabout way, and mediated by another, more highly valued, habitus, the boys partially became men through pretending to be gay, in that they performed soldier dispositions through such playacting, and soldierhood confers hegemonic masculinity. Not conceptualising femininity as mutually exclusive with soldierhood also enables a view of soldierhood that can encompass females’ desire to become soldiers without reducing it to a desire for a gender with which they don’t identify. There are differences between being a soldier and a peacekeeper, but these aren’t irreconcilable;
rather, they led the soldiers to value peacekeeper dispositions as something they could acquire. At the root of all of these binaries reconceptualised as dialectical relationships is the recognition that soldierhood and pre-existing civilian identities like femininity, will and individuality are not in fact mutually exclusive. Soldierhood is not antithetical to identities embodied in pre-service life. In particular, the practical habitus has a more complicated relationship with the soldier habitus than a binary one. Primarily what I do in this thesis is provide a view of the acquisition of the soldier identity as shaped by a pre-existing civilian identity; of recruits’ pre-existing habitus built up by this process rather than broken down by it; of soldierhood as a melding with civilian dispositions, not a replacement of them. The reason that the practical habitus is often merely implicit in the military literature in the words of soldiers rather than explicit as the author’s theoretical framework- and the reason therefore, that the discourse of the loss of civilian identity has persisted so long- is that it is not one of the limited range of modes of identity on which social science generally draws.

**Theory**
The analysis of the civilian-soldier transition that I have made is not one which could have been reached through social science’s traditional axes of identity, gender, sexuality, class, nationality and ethnicity. The way in which one relates to the world- maintaining a “pre-occupied, active presence” (Bourdieu, 1990a, p.52) versus retiring from it in order to treat it as an object of observation- is more essential (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 69) to the identities of some groups than ethnic or gendered dispositions. Given the belief in New Zealand’s rapport-building disposition, I had assumed before my fieldwork that my thesis would prominently feature ethnic identity and inter-ethnic interaction, but instead saw “diverse” soldiers interacting with locals in the same practical ways and being similarly confused by their perceived non-action. In the New Zealand Army, this practical habitus was shared by many individuals of differing ethnicities and genders and united these diverse groups. This shared practical habitus, structured as it is by work and productivity, meant that the measure by which everybody was evaluated was competence. Platoons didn’t interact with anyone primarily on the basis of their ethnicity unless that person had first failed to show that they were competent, and even then the repeated references to ethnicity were not really about that mode of identity, but rather about trying to amend the lack of competence. Competence, not masculinity or heterosexuality, was the identity that
everyone was trying to embody, and although they walked a harder road, females could become very highly respected through proficiency.

Soldierhood, meanwhile, is often subsumed by gender. The disposition of “getting over it”, central to the soldier habitus, demonstrates what the axes of identity normally drawn on in anthropology might miss. “Getting over it” is the control over emotion and opinion that allows these to be side-lined and not acted upon. It is most often interpreted as a sign that individual identity has been sacrificed in the quest for hegemonic masculinity through the banishment or anything feminine or homosexual, modes of identity equated with emotion. But an analysis of soldiers as not-individual, not-female or not-gay does not lead to an understanding of the readiness of the soldier habitus. It doesn’t illuminate the many practical functions of “getting over it”: being able to take on constructive criticism and learn from it; being able to keep yourself from distraction and maintain awareness of everything around you in a switched-on state; being able to complete a task not only well but enthusiastically even if you think it’s pointless; being able to only ever act in the way you believe to be most helpful for a group of people even if their actions confuse you. If traditional axes of identity can miss this much about soldierhood, what might we have missed about other groups of people?

The irony is that what academics may read as a lack of individual identity in soldiers is in fact the embodiment of their most valued and hardest fought for identities. The composed, switched-on soldier habitus that is so hard for civilians to interpret is a uniform identity, but in that this uniform professional competence was individually achieved through hard work, it is also an individual identity. Because the soldier habitus was worked on tirelessly, and because it is the self that would be most productive in a crisis, it is not only the soldier habitus itself that is expressed in its public embodiment, but also the soldiers’ deepest and earliest self, their primary practical habitus. Soldiers handing children food rather than playing with them may seem like an impersonal form of engagement, but given that being useful is at the core of soldiers’ habitus, their selves are in fact deeply implicated. The mistake that is made in the inability to see identity in soldierhood is thinking that those thoughts and feelings that aren’t expressed are the soldiers’ selves. The scholastic disposition is based on thinking as one’s primary method of relating to the world. As this is a deeply embodied disposition that has become like second nature, academics unconsciously
presume that informants are like them in this respect. Therefore, because soldiers don’t express their thoughts in public, academics can’t see their identity.

Despite my being quite contrary in this thesis in choosing one of the most controversial subjects available and arguing against almost every academic discourse I came across, this is really a very traditional ethnography. I used one of the most basic tools of anthropology, reflexivity, to identify what it was about my own dispositions that could block understanding, and then quietened these enough to fulfil anthropology’s traditional aim: understanding, in my case, the soldier identity and its acquisition from the soldiers’ own point of view. I then used this point of view to critique and expand anthropology’s overall body of knowledge. It’s just that the disposition that was most likely to interfere with this project was not a cultural or gendered one, but rather the very fact that I am an academic, who privileges thought over action. Understanding soldiers requires acknowledging that, instead, other groups identify themselves primarily through practice. My argument really is this: to keep using these basics of anthropology- which seem to work!- we might just need to expand the range of identities upon which we rely.
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Glossary

1R 1st Battalion, Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment. Based at Linton Military Camp.

2/1 or 2/1st 2/1st (pronounced “second first”) Battalion, Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment. Based at Burnham Military Camp.

2IC Second in Charge- of a section. Deals with issues of supply, admin, etc.

3CI Courage, Commitment, Comradeship, Integrity- the Army’s official values.

717 pronounced seven-one-seven, the numerical designation of NZDF resignation forms. To quit is therefore colloquially referred to as “to 717”.

A Class Stores Equipment that must be treated with the highest level of security due to its dangerous nature, secrecy, or cost, i.e. weapons, radios, Kevlar.

AARC All Arms Recruit Course, i.e. Basic Training.

AO Area of Operations.

AWQ Annual Weapons Qualification. A test of marksmanship skills.

BET Battle Efficiency Test. Assessment that involves pack marching, rope climbing, fireman’s carries and climbing over walls.

BHE Battle Handling Exercise. Tests of the skills learnt in lessons enacted through scenarios. Usually a few-hour activity on base, then back to barracks.

CO Commanding Officer. In charge of units larger than and encompassing several Companies (i.e. Battalions, TAD).

CT Corrective Training. A form of punishment individuals are placed on, i.e. you may be given 5 days CT.

CTF Combined Task Force- the military branch of RAMSI.

DFOs Defence Force Orders.

DPMs Disruptive Print Material, i.e. the fabric uniforms are made out of. This is extended to refer to your uniform itself, i.e. when you refer to your DPMs you are referring to your uniform shirts and trousers.

DS This appears to have 2 meanings, either:

–Directing Staff- during an exercise, staff who direct the exercise scenario by informing you of notional events and giving instructions to the enemy party.
- Drill Standard. By the book.

**Fam** Familiarisation- task in which soldiers are introduced to something (location, tool, technology) with which they need to be familiar.

**FOB** Forward Operating Base.

**FSMO** A dress instruction- field dress with pack and webbing. Extended to refer to the pack and webbing themselves.

**GBR** Guadalcanal Beach Resort. RAMSI’s base in Honiara.

**ITSA** Individual Tropical Shelter Accommodation. Barracks on the GBR in Honiara.

**KLE** Key Leadership Engagement. Meeting between leaders of a community and leaders of the peacekeeping force.

**KR** Exercise Kaimanawa Retreat. Held in the Kaimanawa Forest, the first field ex recruits go on during Basic Training.

**LAV** Light Armoured Vehicle.

**L and Ds** Lost and Destroyed. Forms used to request replacement kit. L & Ds as an acronym is extended so that it may refer also to the replacement items themselves or be used as a verb i.e. “to L & D” something.

**LDs** Light Duties. Recruits who are injured or sick are put on LDs by Doctors and given chits which exempt them from certain types of tasks dependant on their individual injury.

**Loggies** Soldiers in logistics roles- supply technicians, drivers, etc.

**MP** Military Police.

**NAAFI** non-rationed food and the purchasing of it. A Naafi run is going to a store, a naafi on base is a small collection of pre-purchased food that soldiers can access and pay for in cash or through a tick system.

**NCO** Non-Commissioned Officer, i.e. the collective term for Lance-Corporals, Corporals, Sergeants.

**NVG** Night Vision Goggles

**OC** Officer Commanding. In charge of a Company.

**OCS** Officer Cadet School. The officer equivalent of TAD.

**ONCO** Orderly NCO, i.e. the NCO on duty.
PA Personal Administration. Time in which your actions weren’t specifically directed but in which you had to take care of everything that needed to be done- squaring away equipment, ironing, studying, etc.

PT Physical Training.

PDT Pre-Deployment Training i.e. the period of specialised training a unit goes through right before they are deployed overseas.

POM Training Public Order Management Training, i.e. riot training.

PXA Post Exercise Administration. Cleaning and repairing everything that was used on a field ex in order to get it back into immaculate working condition.

QRF Quick Reaction Force- the unit on standby to respond immediately to incidents on deployment.

RAMSI Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands.

RFL Required Fitness Level. Physical assessment that must be passed periodically by all soldiers, based on the ability to do certain amounts of curl ups and push ups, and run 2.4 K in certain time periods, dependant on gender and age.

RNZIR Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment.

RSM Regimental Sergeant Major. The Senior Warrant Officer (Non-Commissioned) in a Battalion.

RSIPF Royal Solomon Islands Police Force.

SAS Special Air Service i.e. the New Zealand Army’s elite unit.

SDs Service Dress. Dress uniform worn at formal parades, i.e. March Out, Anzac Day.

Seco Section Commander. NCO in charge of a section of usually 10-12 (including his 2IC, also an NCO, and Privates). Deals with battle commands while his 2IC deals with supply.

SNO Senior National Officer- i.e. the NZDF officer with the highest rank on deployment.

SOPs Standard Operating Procedures.

TAD The Army Depot- Unit in charge of Recruit Training, based in Waiouru.

TF Territorial Force, i.e. part-time soldiers.

UD Unauthorised Discharge. The firing of a weapon at an inappropriate time and place when no clearance or permission has been given. Usually accidental. A very serious offence that results in a charge.
UTF Urban Training Facility. Areas set up as urban streets/building complexes for use in urban warfare training. Sometimes made up of shipping containers, sometimes old houses from the residential areas.