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IN PURSUIT OF THE SUBJECT OF HAPPINESS:

A GENEALOGY

A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Masters

in

Psychology

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New Zealand.

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Abstract

This study is a Foucauldian genealogy of the truth and knowledge produced by the Science of Happiness, which is part of the Positive Psychology movement; this is a an historical analytic of the scientific truths and knowledges of the present. Psychological well-being, or happiness, has become a legitimate, and burgeoning, object of scientific inquiry since the formation of the Positive Psychology movement in 2000. The first section reviews the literature for findings from the new Science of Psychology and also reviews the literature on the use of the methodology of genealogy as a research practice. The second section contains the genealogy which, following Foucault's advice, starts with Descartes and the ruptures of the Enlightenment, following the transition of happiness from a matter of luck or chance or the gift of the gods, to a matter that man has control over and the Science of Psychology has an interest in. This section takes fragments of text from Descartes, Spinoza, Bacon, Locke, Blackstone, Jefferson, Bentham, Mill, Carlyle, Dickens, and Skinner to build the genealogy and to show the contingencies of the past that brought us to the scientific 'truths' of the present. The final section briefly reviews the genealogy and explores the trajectories for future work on the subjectivity produced by the scientific subject of happiness.

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INTRODUCTION

In the last 30 or so years the discipline of psychology has become interested in happiness. Correlations documented include: People who live in wealthier countries are happier (Hagerty & Veenhoven, 2003). People with achievable goals are happier (Diener, Suh, Lucas & Smith, 1999). People who are extraverted are happier (Fleeson, Malano, & Achille, 2002; DeNeve, 1999). People who believe they control their own lives and like that idea are happier (DeNeve & Cooper, 1998). People with high self esteem are happier, (DeNeve & Cooper, 1998, Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger & Vohs, 2003).

Psychology has also found that people who are happier are less susceptible to disease (Myers & Diener, 1996) and go to the doctor for medication less (Scshwenzfeier, Rigdon, Hill, Anderson & Seelert, 2002). Diener (2000) summarised the studies of happiness by saying happy people participate more in the community, are liked more, live longer, perform better at work and earn more.

On this basis psychology suggests it is good to be happy. As empirical research continues to build upon current knowledge, psychology thinks it can make more of the people happier, more of the time. Two of the most active researchers in the field Martin Seligman and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi promote a new form of psychology, positive psychology, a psychology that focuses on preventing pathology by offering tools to improve emotional and mental well being. They say that in the past psychology has had an exclusive focus on pathology and that pathology arises where there is a lack of well being (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000).

A science of positive subjective experience, positive individual traits, and positive institutions promises to improve quality of life and prevent the pathologies that arise when life is barren and meaningless. (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, p5)

Psychology has found that people seem to have a genetic set point for happiness so that lottery wins and paraplegic bodies are unnoticed (or at least adjusted to) over an individual lifetime (Brickman, Coates & Janoff-Bulman, 1978; Silver, 1982, cited in Diener, 2000; Wolsic & Fujita, 1995; Lykken & Tellegen, 1996) but while 50% of the variation in current happiness is heritable, like cholesterol, happiness is genetically influenced but not fixed (Lykken & Tellegen, 1996). Psychologists can help influence "normal" people toward happiness.

If psychologists wish to improve the human condition, it is not enough to help those who suffer. The majority of "normal" people also need examples and advice to reach a richer and more fulfilling existence. (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, p10)

Psychologists believe they have come a long way with the empirical psychometric measurement of happiness but Ed Diener suggests that the United States should have an National Index of Happiness because 'societies need to afford the same importance to subjective well-being (happiness) as they do now to economics: tracking the phenomenon, supporting research to understand it, and educating people about it' (Diener, 2000, p41). Diener thinks psychology needs to do more measuring, more surveillance of "normal" individuals.

So psychology has empirically based knowledge that certain personal characteristics influence happiness, they suggest these can be taught, and happiness influences health and productivity.

These are knowledges generated in academia but they're also truths that move out into popular culture partially through the discourse of practicing psychologists and partially through less formal, less legitimately knowable texts; it's hard for the media to resist a good sound byte when the study is on that elusive reified state called happy.

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Get Smart

Friday April 12, 2002 > News > News Story

Professor tracks happiness levels

Christina Wall
The Daily Illini

Sophomore in LAS Mike Cozzi thought he was very happy. But after taking a short survey developed by psychology professor Ed Diener, he found out he was about average on the happiness scale.

"I would have said I was above average," Cozzi said. "But it's normal for a person to want to change things in their life. There is always room for improvement."

Diener has been conducting these types of studies on adults of all ages. Diener is one of the few professors in the United States researching happiness as part of the positive psychological movement that has



Liz Smith The Daily Illini

When Mike Cozzi asked himself, 'Am I happy?' Mike Cozzi answered, 'Yes. You are very happy.' But Ed Diener could assure him, via a valid, reliable psychometric instrument with the scientific truth that he wasn't very happy at all. So now when Mike Cozzi asks himself, 'Am I

happy?' Ed Diener has provided him with the room to doubt his own answer and the opportunity to improve in that room.

Do not ask to whom the truth is told it is told to thee...

For Foucault the production of scientific truths about all facets of 'life' and life processes is no longer an abstract or formal problem: it directly concerns the way we live and the ways in which we understand or experience those processes. It is not enough to hope that a 'better' truth is on its way. But neither can we abandon belief in these truths, for they concern our very material existence: our experience of pleasure, illness pain, suffering, joy and so on. (McHoul & Grace, 1993, p83)

In this thesis I am not looking for new truths about happiness nor trying to falsify old truths.

Each time I have attempted to do theoretical work it has been on the basis of elements from my experience – always in relation to processes that I saw taking place around me. It is in fact because I thought I recognised something cracked, dully jarring or disfunctioning in things I saw in the institutions in which I dealt in my relations with others, that I undertook a particular piece of work. (Foucault, 1985, cited in Tamboukou, 2003)

Like Foucault, I take up this work because I think I recognise something dully jarring in the way the 'Science of Happiness' is producing scientific knowledge and forming scientific truths about happiness. Like the truth told to Mike Cozzi that he is only average, truths can produce new spaces and shapes for the bodies of its subject, the objects of its study, to bend into. The Science of Happiness seeks to shape me happy because it thinks I should be.

This work I take up is a genealogical work.

Foucault's genealogical method reflects on the past to see more clearly what we are in the present and how what we are seeks to constrain what we may become in the future...It is a process of becoming otherwise than we are through the agonistic use of reason. (Ashenden & Owen, 1999, p16)

In this work I am trying to see the present, the truths I am told, through the lens of the otherwise. I am trying to ask what effect these told truths about happiness have on the ever-tropic process of becoming of the modern subject.

This thesis will consider first the location from which it is written, the current state of the science of happiness, and the Foucauldian genealogical methodology. It will then document a genealogical investigation of the present science of happiness and consider the spaces opened up for becoming otherwise.

PRELUDE TO A GENEALOGY OF HAPPINESS

Reflection On The Research Practice

The Practice of Reflection

In the introduction I began the process of reflection that will be a theme through this writing. I use the word reflection carefully to distinguish the practice I intend from reflexivity.

Qualitative research in psychology, and other social science disciplines, has taken up the practice of reflexivity as a way of acknowledging that the 'researcher's background and position will affect what they choose to investigate, the angle of investigation, the methods...the finds, the framing and communication of conclusions' (Malterd, 2001, p483-484). Reflexivity is intended to bring attention to the researchers part in the context of knowledge production (Finlay, 2002; Malterd, 2001).

According to Finlay (2002) reflexivity is a tool that allows the researcher to engage in an explicit, self-aware meta-analysis of the research process. The researcher watches the researcher do research, and reports back. This can be compared to another option; the researcher does not watch the researcher, thinks he is invisible, and finds it necessary to write in the third person. Webb (1992) says this is a practice which psychology, in an attempt to establish respect and credibility, imitated from the physical sciences. In these sciences the observer thought he had no impact on the observed real world; that was the received truth when psychology took the practice of writing in the third person. But physical science has since observed that 'there can be no ultimate division between the observing instrument and the observed object' (Bohm, 1995, p134) in what is now commonly known as the observer effect.

Finlay (2002) offers reflection as an option often confused with reflexivity; for her this is at one end of a continuum of awareness with reflexivity at the other; it is "thinking about" an object, a distanced process, while 'reflexivity taps into a more immediate, continuing, dynamic and subjective self-awareness' (p533).

In keeping with Foucauldian research ideals, which I will explain my understanding of below, while I practice genealogy as Foucauldian research method in this project I will hold reflexivity as reminiscent of the "hermeneutics of suspicion" and phenomenology that Foucault eschewed, so I will be grimly clinging to the reflection pole, although I cannot guarantee not to indulge in some 'subjective self-awareness' from time to time.

The role of Foucault's conceptual apparatus is both to show how we come to experience a form (or aspect of a form) of subjectivity as necessary by tracing its historical emergence and development and, in so doing, to show the respects in which it is 'singular, contingent and the product of arbitrary constraints'. However to ground this practice of historical reflection as a practice of critical reflection, genealogy needs not only to show how we can reflect on – and thus open a space for transgressing – our historically constituted limits but also to show we have reasons for engaging in this activity. (Ashenden & Owen, 1999, p34)

I claim the right to reflection, historical reflection, critical reflection, by nature of the genealogical research practice but as Ashenden & Owen (1999) point out I need to have a reason to engage in this practice. It is simply this: no other practice is yet available to me to answer the research question I will outline below that is as exciting to use. This practice allows me, forces me, to transgress. The English word transgress means to go beyond the bounds or limits prescribed by law or command; to break, violate, infringe, contravene, or trespass. It is from the Latin *transgressus* which means to pass over, step over, or cross. It is exciting to see the view that emerges as I step over into the space that Ashenden & Owen promise me. The English word *excite* means to stir to activity, to arouse emotion. It is from the Latin *excitare* which means to set in motion, to wake, to rouse. I choose this practice for the thrill. The English word *thrill* means to experience an intense sensation of pleasure, delight or sometimes fear. It comes from the Old English *thyrlian* which means to pierce, to make a hole, and which in turn comes from the Indo-European root *ter* which means to cross over, pass through.¹ I choose this practice to be stirred into crossing over into the space the practice creates.

The Practice of Thesis Writing For Academic Gain Within The University

The reflective practice (as opposed to, or at least at the other end of the continuum from, the reflexive practice) seems to me to have the added advantage of not only reflecting on research choices, methods, and communication of conclusions but on the context in which I find myself producing this research work and reproducing this research practice.

I am writing a thesis in the hope that I will be awarded a masters degree at Massey University. I am writing a thesis for academic gain.

¹ Unless specified otherwise definitions of English words, and their etymology, in this work are from the Oxford (1976); definitions of Latin and Greek words are from Perseus (2005); Indo-European roots are from American Heritage (2000)

A thesis is situated within the University as an examination practice. It is, 'defined as a piece of original research which reveals whether the student has attained technical mastery of the field of specialisation, is capable of doing independent scholarly work, and is able to formulate conclusions' (Masters Theses, p25). The University industry has a clear picture of what a thesis should look like. 'It is expected to be presented in APA format. It should be about 100 pages long and not longer than 150 pages' (Masters Theses, p26).

A thesis is situated within the University as an historical practice. Walter Ong (1981) traces the history of the thesis-driven essay as the basis of Western male-centred educational institutions since the classical Greek academy. He describes the University as a male puberty ritual for the upper classes and places it in the same context as the ritual contests exhibited in the practice of jurisprudence, sport, and commerce. He describes teaching as orally based and agonistic, based in the dialectical procedures of the Socratic dialogues as reconstructed by Plato, who said writing reduced truth to lifelessness. He says the ideal product of the classical education is a rhetorician and orator, that Medieval and Renaissance universities used texts for learning but continued the oral and deeply agonistic intellectual style. According to Ong, it was as late as the mid-eighteenth century, and in some places much later, when writing was made and more a part of a student's work, but was still written to be read aloud. His thesis is that agonism still lives on in academia and in all of life.

A thesis is situated within the University as an economic practice. The modern university is at least partly, if not entirely, a commercial entity. The ideological shift in New Zealand to university education as consumer product, commercialisation, competitive practice means I, as object of the educative practice, have shifted position, from student to client. But this shift occurs in a university that sells predominantly a style of psychology it terms 'scientific', a style of psychology with its goal as understanding, describing, controlling and predicting behaviour.

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Psychology covers a very broad range of topics, but at its simplest level it is the scientific study of the way people act and interact. Psychology helps people make sense of the human impact on the world in which they live. The goal of psychology is to understand, describe, control and predict behaviour.

Te Kōwhiri
ki Pūrehuroa

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This style is also the style of the 'science of happiness' which dully jars me and which is the object of this analytic research.

Foucault is interested only in what we will call serious speech acts: what experts say when they are talking as experts. And he furthermore restricts his analyses to

the serious speech acts in those 'dubious' disciplines we call the human sciences.
(Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, pxx)

Boland (1995) says 'because higher education is quintessentially a modern institution, attacks on modernism are attacks on the higher education system as it is now constituted' (p521). If not an attack this thesis is agonistic.

The word thesis comes from the Greek *tithenai*, to put or set down, including the application of a name to an object, so as I set down in acceptable academic writing style the question I have asked and name the partial, historically bound, complex objects created by the thetic practice I will attempt to stay in the purview of the academic thesis. If I transgress it will not be so far as to eliminate my thesis from consideration, but transgress I already have as I attempt to identify the discursive formation within which thesis writing is a practice and within which I generate a serious speech act in a dubious discipline.

It would be easier for all of us, me and you (the examiner), if I would pretend this is a work of pure scholarship outside of time, history, and the actions of power but I do not pretend, and thereby I transgress. The thesis is historically an agonistic, rhetoric ritual (Ong, 1981). I do not seek to find this otherwise.

Review of the Literature On Happiness

In a review of research on subjective well-being over the thirty years from 1967 to 1997 Diener, Suh, Lucas & Smith (1999) concluded by saying they hoped after the next thirty years 'nobody can possibly claim we know nothing more than the ancient Greeks about subjective well-being' (p295). The literature on happiness does go back to the ancient Greeks but I will limit this brief review to the findings of the current 'science of happiness' in what Ryan & Deci (2001) call the hedonic tradition.

The happy person is blessed with a positive temperament, tends to look on the bright side of things, and does not ruminate excessively about bad events, is living in an economically developed society, has social confidants, and possesses adequate resources for making progress toward valued goals. (Diener et al, 1999, p295)

Interest and research in this 'science of positive subjective experience' (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, p5) has occurred as psychology's focus shifted from psychopathology and the disease model of human functioning to the building of positive qualities and the promotion of well-being (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, Ryan & Deci, 2001). Ryan and Deci's (2001) review of well-being research sees the burgeoning interest as the result of a culture of surplus in the 1990's equivalent to the 1960's. This was the period when the work of Maslow, Rogers and other humanist psychologists interested in human growth and potential did not take hold in mainstream psychology to build an empirical base (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). Ryan & Deci suggest these are times when the economically advantaged find material security and luxury do not secure happiness.

At March 2005, Veenhoven's (1999) World Database of Happiness lists 8257 correlational findings from 787 studies in 140 nations. These seek correlations between subjective well-being and other constructs as diverse as nation, creativity, occupation, being a victim of a crime, and winning a lottery.

The following sections define the construct of happiness, look at correlative findings, the measurement and consequence of happiness, and the desire of researchers, both psychological and economic, to measure happiness more deeply and more often. Finally it looks at the findings on whether it is possible to teach people to be happy.

I present the findings of the research without comment in this review section and then reflect on what have found in the following section.

The Construct: Subjective Well-Being or Happiness

The literature reviewed uses the words subjective well-being and happiness interchangeably.

Diener (1999) defines subjective well-being as a general area of scientific interest rather than a single specific construct. He says it includes people's emotional responses, domain satisfactions, and global judgments of life satisfaction each of which needs to be understood in their own right but which often correlate substantially suggesting a higher order factor.

Hills & Argyle (2001) say that psychological well-being or happiness is a multidimensional construct comprising emotional and cognitive elements. Positive and negative affect and cognitive-evaluative elements, which include self-esteem, personal control, optimism, and goal fulfilment, are elements comprising overall happiness.

Ryan & Deci (2001) summarise the view of well-being by psychologists as subjective happiness which includes judgments about the good/bad elements of life.

Genetics, Looks, Personality and Happiness

A proportion of the variation in subjective well-being can be explained by genetic factors. Researchers looking for evidence of a set point of happiness, genetically determined, found that happiness was moderately stable over time with only small changes following major life events, both positive and negative; genetics may be connected to biological variables that are known to affect mood (Diener et al, 1999). Lykken & Tellegen (1996) found 80% heritability for happiness levels, and from their research concluded that happiness is a stochastic (chance) phenomenon 'determined by the great genetic lottery' (p189).

Physical attractiveness is a heritable characteristic and Diener, Wolsic & Fijita (1995) found it was slightly correlated with happiness generally but more correlated if physical attractiveness was a resource which was important to life goals.

Personality can be viewed as individual differences in the nervous system caused by genetic factors (Diener et al, 1999); some research has attempted to correlate personality traits with subjective well-being. Extraversion-neuroticism has received the most empirical research attention. The correlation found between extraversion and subjective well-being is so strong and consistent that Watson & Clarke suggest that neuroticism be relabelled negative affect (Watson & Clarke, 1997, cited in Diener et al, 1999). DeNeve's (1999) meta-study found neuroticism was one of the strongest negative correlates of subjective well-being. Fleeson, Malanos & Achille (2002) found that participants in the study they conducted were happier when

they acted more extraverted whether they were extraverted or not. The negative role of neuroticism is disputed by DeNeve & Cooper (1998) who found in a meta-study that neuroticism was actually a better predictor of life satisfaction, happiness and, paradoxically, negative affect as well. Hills & Argyle (2000) suggest that neuroticism might be relabelled emotional stability and although they agree happiness is associated with extraversion they say it is not an essential correlate of happiness.

Self-esteem and optimism have also been studied and in Western samples subjective well-being has been consistently found to be correlated with measures of both (Diener et al, 1999). Baumeister et al (2003) go further to say that high self-esteem leads to greater happiness.

A meta-analysis by DeNeve & Cooper (1998) found the traits most closely associated with subjective well-being were repressive-defensiveness, trust, emotional stability, locus of control-chance, desire for control, hardiness, positive affectivity, private collective self-esteem, and tension.

Life, Lifestyle, The Comparison Effect and Happiness

Self reported health, relative income, religious certainty, happy marriage, and education level all correlate with happiness (Diener et al, 1999). The qualities of interpersonal relationships have been found to be vital to well-being (Deci & Ryan, 1991; Baumeister & Leary, 1995, cited in Ryan & Deci, 2001) with DeNeve (1999) showing that affiliation and relationship-enhancing traits are among the most strongly related with subjective well-being. Ryff and Singer (2000) go so far as to consider positive relationships an essential element of well-being as opposed to a correlate.

Being able to compare oneself favourably to others correlates with increase in subjective well-being (Clark & Oswald, 2002).

National income predicts greater national happiness (Hagerty & Veenehoven, 2003) but the relation of wealth to well-being is at best a low positive one (Ryan & Deci, 2001).

Life Events, Coping, Goals and Happiness

People adapt or habituate to events (good or bad) and return to a set point of happiness over time; the time is related to the type of event. People have active coping strategies which are consistently found to be related to subjective well-being; these include spiritual beliefs, rational

action, problem-focused coping (Folkman, 1991, 1997 cited in Diener et al, 1999) and responding to life-events in a fully functioning manner (King & Pennebaker, 1998 cited in Ryan & Deci, 2001). Repressive tendencies lower subjective well-being (DeNeve & Cooper, 1998).

Lucas, Clark, Georgellis & Diener (2004) suggest that some life events affect set point profoundly and may possibly alter them. In a 15 year longitudinal study they found the people who become unemployed did not completely return to their former levels of satisfaction even after becoming reemployed but those who adapted quickly were more likely to return to close to their original set point.

Inappropriately high or low levels of aspiration can be detrimental to subjective well-being (Eamons, 1992 cited in Diener et al, 1999). Goals that are realistically set and are congruent with one's personal resources predict subjective well-being (Diener & Fujita, 1995 cited in Diener et al, 1999). Progress toward goals that are subjectively rated as important predict enhanced well-being (Brunstein, 1993 cited in Ryan & Deci, 2001).

Utility, Consequences of Happiness

The literature is considerably more limited when it comes to predicting the outcomes of subjective well-being and often appears to endorse the utilitarian view that happiness for the good of its own end is sufficient reason to study happiness (Ryan & Deci, 2001). Lyubomirsky (2001) says 'the dawn of the new millennium finds increasing research evidence supporting Aristotle's two millennia-old argument that happiness is the whole aim and end of human existence' but goes on to say, 'happiness appears to have a number of positive by-products which may benefit not only individuals, but families, communities and societies' (p239).

Veenhoven (1999) says while there are strong indications that a positive appreciation of life facilitates social functioning, studies are scarce as yet. He also says that while not everybody accepts the utilitarian axiom that happiness is ultimately the only value, most people agree that it is better to enjoy life than to suffer. Supporting this idea in a survey of college students over 41 countries Diener, Sapyta & Suh (1998) found the average rating for the importance of happiness was 6.39 on a 7 point scale.

Psychologists have attempted to link other behavioural outcomes to happiness: Myers & Diener (1996) say self reported happiness predicts other indicators of well-being, happy people have high self-esteem, feel personal control, are optimistic, extraverted and the close personal relationships of happy people are correlated with health. Diener et al (1999) suggest that the characteristics of extraverts might actually be an outcome of higher levels of positive affect. Diener & Seligman (2002) found very happy people were highly social, had stronger

relationships, were more extraverted, agreeable, less neurotic, and scored lower on psychopathology scales. Lucas, Georgellis, Clark & Diener (2003) found that happy people were more likely to get married and stay married.

There is also work being done on the psychophysiological effects and health outcomes of happiness: Schwenzfeier, Rigdon, Hill, Anderson & Seelert (2002) found well-being correlated negatively with the requirements for prescription of medication. Carol Ryff's interest is in how well-being influences unfolding trajectories of morbidity and mortality measured by allostatic load. She sees a worthy goal of the new millennium being to study the positive health implications of interpersonal flourishing or well-being. In her study with Singer (2000) they found higher well-being lowered allostatic load and produced better autoimmune functioning. They say understanding positive health requires mapping how positive psychological experience affects, first, neural circuitry, and second, endocrinological and immunological systems producing vitality and longevity. Ryan & Deci's (2001) review found that social support (which for Ryff is a defining element of well-being) influences mortality via changes in the cardiovascular, endocrine, and autoimmune systems.

In an economics journal publication Clark & Oswald (2002) listed the measures predictive by subjective well-being as being length of life, coronary heart disease, absenteeism, counter and non-productive work.

The Tools and Units of Happiness Measurement

There are a number of psychometric instruments designed to measure happiness. Diener (2000) says that early measures were one question for each of the constructs that made up overall subjective well-being. Pavot & Diener (1993) offered a Satisfaction With Life Scale which was a 5 item measure using a seven-point Likert scale. This was extended to a 15 item measure to allow for past, present and future expectations to be measured in the Temporal Satisfaction With Life Scale (Pavot, Diener & Suh, 1998). Hills & Argyle (2002) offer the Oxford Happiness Questionnaire which is a 29 item measure using a six-point Likert scale.

Diener et al (1999) say the field of subjective well-being has deep roots in survey research with the most common assessment being the single occasion self-report but that subjective well-being research is limited by the almost exclusive use of cross-sectional correlational designs with inadequate tests of causal hypothesis. To address this he suggests the increased use of the naturalistic experience sampling method where researchers assess respondents' subjective well-being at random moments over a period of one to four weeks.

Schimmack & Diener (2003) strongly recommend increased use of the empirical approach of experience sampling method also known as ecological momentary assessment and comment these methods can now combine subject self reports with physiological measures like cortisol levels. They say this type of measure overcomes the limitations of survey data and experimental research; surveys cannot provide causal data and often ask questions about past happiness and may be subject to memory bias while laboratory results are often not extrapolated to the 'real world' (p1).

Clark & Oswald (2002) use regression analysis to analyse the relative coefficients of income and life events on happiness to produce a shadow price or monetary value for life events such as unemployment, widowhood, and loss of good health. This compares the life event with the amount of money it would take to compensate for the loss of subjective well-being produced by the event.

Veenhoven (2002) suggests while it might be useful to express changes in happiness caused by life events in money equivalents, it would be better to express this change in 'happiness adjusted life-years' with social policy expressing their utility this way in order to demonstrate they produce the 'greatest happiness of the greatest number'.

The Periodicity of Happiness Measurement

Oswald (1997) said that while governments have a range of economic indicators they do not try to measure happiness from year to year and they should. He suggests that governments act on the unspoken assumption that improving economic conditions improves a society's authentic well-being and this is the motivation for improved economic conditions. He contended that happiness should be measured and included in reported statistics.

Diener (2000) agrees and suggest the United States should have a National Index of Happiness and says societies need to afford the same importance to subjective well-being as they do now to economics, especially now more is known about how conditions in a society can influence it. He suggests the index be built from nationally representative samples of respondents using experience sampling methods.

Schimmack & Diener (2003) note that experience sampling will be made easier as technology develops and cite the example of a pager like device that can record and transmit data about physiological parameters such as heart rate, blood pressure and body temperature. They see this as tool for the random monitoring of self-reports with physiological data.

The Teachability of Happiness

While set point research has led some researchers to say happiness is stochastic it has led others to say that the set point is actually a range and psychologists can help normal people achieve the high point of their genetic range thereby lifting the mean level of happiness for a population (Lyubomirsky, 2001).

Research has found self-esteem is important as a predictor of happiness (Diener et al, 1999; Baumeister et al, 2003) and also found that a new hair do improves self-esteem (McFarquhar & Lowis, 2000) thereby increasing happiness. While physical attractiveness is heritable is it also enhanceable through cosmetics and modifiable through plastic surgery. There is evidence to show that cosmetic surgery has a lasting effect on well-being (Frederick & Lowenstein, 1999 cited in Easterlin, 2003).

Fleeson et al (2002) found that when participants in the study they conducted were taught to act extraverted they were happier and Seligman (1991, cited in Lyubomirsky, 2001) found optimism can be taught. Both extraversion and optimism are predictors of happiness.

Cognitive psychology could be deployed to teach people about goal congruence and coping strategies both of which enhance happiness (Sheldon, Kasser, Smith & Share, in-press cited in Lyubomirsky, 2001).

Self-reflection is contra-indicative to happiness and Lyubomirsky (2001) suggests that avoiding self-reflection is teachable.

Easterlin is an economist who questions the conclusions that psychology has drawn around set points. He points to research on individual difference in returning to baseline levels of happiness and cites Lucas et al (2003) as an example; this research showed while the average baseline is restored individuals vary considerably. Easterlin says 'if set point theory is correct, not only is public policy likely to be ineffective, but there is little an individual can do to improve his or her well-being, except, perhaps, consult a psychologist' (p11176).

Looking to an alternative in *Explaining Happiness* (2003) he suggests a new theory of happiness that says adaptation (return to baseline or set point) does not occur in non-pecuniary domains, like health and relationships, the same way as it does as pecuniary domains. He believes that economic policies that 'yield better-informed individual preferences...increase individual and societal well-being' (p11176) would get people to focus on non-pecuniary ends such as family life and health and would increase overall happiness. He says traditional or mainstream economics operates on the assumption that each individual is assumed to make rational choices in his or her own best interest but 'once it is recognised that individuals are

unaware of some of the forces shaping their choices, it can no longer be argued that they will successfully maximise their well-being' (p11182). Economic policy should include teaching individuals to make informed choices.

Bottom Lining the Empirical Work on Happiness

The Science of Happiness has as its goal to understand, describe, control and predict happiness. Reflecting on the literature review above I can see that psychologists have defined what they mean when they talk about the construct of happiness. They know being happier makes people healthier and more productive. They have found ways to measure it, and they want to measure more of it more often so they can increase it. They have found while it is at least partially genetically bound, they can increase it through teaching what they've found out about it.

As a side effect of studying positive human traits, science will learn how to buffer against and better prevent mental, as well as some physical, illnesses. As a main effect, psychologists will learn how to build the qualities that help individuals and communities, not just to endure and survive, but also to flourish. (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, p13)

Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) think we would know more about happiness now if we had listened to Maslow and Rogers and the other humanist ancestors of positive psychology but, 'these ancestors somehow failed to attract a cumulative, empirical bode of research to ground their ideas' (p13). They say psychology became obsessed with pathogenesis and healing disease at the expense of salutogenesis and the building of factors that allow people to flourish. Michel Foucault noticed this some time before Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi:

The gravitation pull which the greatest platitudes seem to exert on the majority of psychologists has led them for several years to the study of "frustrations"; the involuntary fasting of rats serves as their infinitely fertile epistemological model. (Foucault, 1977c, p80)

Psychology is now remedying this unfortunate turn although all the rats are not yet set free, or even fully fed. As I reflect on rats I wonder if their involuntary fasting might serve positive psychology as well as it did the study of frustrations, which means they may never be set free?

As I reflect on the subjects who are asked, 'Are you happy? Are you happy now? Are you still happy?' as their physiological measures are beamed to positive psychology's headquarters, I wonder what truths will be produced and how these truths will form the subjects they are told to. I wonder in the self-reflective space produced by the very question, 'Am I happy?' what turns the subject makes to perform their investigations and what is produced?

Toward Genealogy as the Methodology

The Academic Practice of Genealogy

I seek credibility here in this section. I have chosen Foucault's genealogical analytics as my rhetorical tool of choice in this agonistic thetic contest, but it is hardly a common choice. So, I need to create credibility by convincing you it does meet the rigorous requirements of methodology allowed as a serious speech act in psychology.

My search for credibility takes the form of a search of published work; to be published in a journal or book that is listed in a database made accessible by a university library requires qualification by academic credential, commitment to the form required by the discipline of publishing, peer review, and most of all serious intent. It is here I have been trained to search for my predecessors' work in my graduate studies so far.

This search for credibility proves to be difficult because when I searched the Psycinfo database for *foucaul** and *genealog** for the five years from November 1999 I had only 15 results. A search over the same five years for *ethnomethodolog** produced 59 results, *hermeneutic and phenomenolog** produced 175, *empiric* and phenomenolog** 237 results, *grounded theor** 1110, and *discourse analys** 1252 out of total number of searchable articles of 359,806. If qualitative methodology is on the margins of mainstream psychology then Foucauldian genealogy is on the fringe of the margin, hence the need to establish credibility.

A search in Web of Science, which includes other social science publications, produced 44 results for the same five years for *foucaul** and *genealog**. So first, what do other 'credible' users of the genealogical method say about genealogy? I consider these examples credible because of publication in book or journal form and referenced by Psychlit or the Web of Science or referenced by articles published there. I will not judge whether these studies named as genealogical actually seem to be practices like Foucault's own practice of genealogy. I will say among the studies below there are a wide range of interpretations of what genealogy produces as a practice, and how it is performed, but all make relevant points or explications of the methodology of genealogy

In *On The Morals of Genealogy*, Jacqueline Stevens (2003) suggests the practice of genealogy has become a fashionable form of counter-narrative, certainly among cultural studies students amongst whom, 'no serious student would do a "history of x" and not its genealogy for her dissertation' (p559). In Steven's opinion this is one more disciplining convention within the academy. That may be so in cultural studies but not in psychology, at least not yet.

Feminist studies have consistently made use of Foucault's ideas. 'The theoretical programmes suggested by Foucault and Deleuze respectively are, in contemporary philosophy, the least harmful to women' (Rosi Braidotti, 1991, cited in Tamboukou, 2002, p5) and 'Foucault's project of genealogy... (is used by feminists) ...to explore the complex and multifarious ways that the female subject has been historically and culturally constructed' (Tamboukou, 2002, p5). In *Disciplining Foucault: Feminism, Power and the Body*, Jana Sawicki says genealogy disrupts taken-for-granted knowledge and points to the contingent power relations which create spaces for particular assertions to operate as absolute truths. It serves as a conduit for submerged voices previously marginalised by power-knowledge arrangements (Sawicki, 1991, cited in Pavlich, 1995). It shows the contingent nature of the truths of things like gender and sexuality; a very useful tool for feminism.

Policy studies too seem to accept Foucauldian genealogy as a building block at least. Pillow (2002) says feminist genealogy used in policy studies can be utilised to focus attention upon the 'discursively structured, raced, gendered and sexed body' (p146).

Psychology is using genealogy too. Brown & Lunt (2002) wrote *A genealogy of the social identity tradition: Deleuze and Guattari and social psychology*. Unlike me they did not attempt to offer a good excuse for using a methodology that is not widely used, or possibly even widely accepted, within psychology. In the only reference to the methodology they employ they merely say they are following Foucault's genealogical method, they mention the term genealogy comes from Nietzsche, and say genealogy is the historical analysis of the way knowledge emerges within networks of power relationships.

I should amend that and say the discipline of psychology that Steven Brown works within, at Loughborough University, is using genealogy too. The psychology I was taught through my undergraduate years at Massey University certainly does not. But Steven Brown also said it is commonplace to hear claims that psychological categories, such as mind, cognition, attribution, or remembering, are constructed or negotiated primarily through discourse and biological referents such as development, gender, and sexuality, emotion, are also socially constructed; claims of this kind do not create 'widespread consternation within the discipline' (p171). These ideas do seem to cause consternation among my fellow psychology post graduate students, particularly those bent toward clinical and organisational options, but I shall continue this thesis as though Steven Brown were right, and the discipline of psychology is accepting of what Vivien Burr calls the family of social constructionism (Burr, 1995).

Nancy Knoohuizen's PhD dissertation, *Recovering the social narrative: A genealogy of the tradition of conformity and obedience* (2002) is another example of the use of genealogy in psychology. She justifies the use of Foucauldian genealogy by saying that it works toward the goals outlined by Gergen (1996, cited in Knoohuizen, 2002) for post empiricist history,

contributes to the knowledge of a methodology for problematising the historical evolution of the knowledge tradition, and helps to remove conceptual barriers and restore to view areas of knowledge that have been marginalised and excluded. Like me she wants to see through the lens of the otherwise. Like a good genealogist (which I will begin to define below) she 'hopes to envision a space in which the social and individual narratives within the knowledge tradition might join to create a stronger dialogue of new possibilities' (Knoohuizen, 2002, p4)

Sociology has been using Foucauldian genealogy for a comparatively long time. In 1990 David Armstrong recommended it in, *Use of the genealogical method in the exploration of chronic illness: A research note*. In 2000 Elianne Riska used the method in, *The rise and fall of Type A man*, to trace the social construction of Type A man in the scientific medical literature. Pavlich (1995) offers it as an important approach for a post-modern sociology, one that fully appreciates the loss of credibility of grand-narratives and the contingency of all knowledge production. Steven Russell uses a 'necessarily cursory' interpretive analytic (Russel, 2001, p122) in a genealogical study on the dynamics of witchcraft trials. Gavin Kendall & Gary Wickham are both sociologists and co-wrote *Using Foucault's Methods* (part of a Sage publications series *Introducing Qualitative Methods*); this offers as close as I found to a 'how to do' Foucauldian genealogy.

Incredibly enough accountants are using it too. Kearins & Hooper (2002) wrote *Methodological Issues: Genealogical method and analysis* for *Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal*. They describe genealogy and explicate its use in a study while arguing that it is beneficial for accountants to understand power relations implicit in the human (all-too-human I would say) science of accounting. They list nine previous accounting studies using Foucauldian genealogy.

Educationalists would seem to be more likely users of it than accountants; they are, after all, interested in the disciplining of bodies. Meadmore, Hatcher & McWilliam (2000) describe their paper, *Getting tense about genealogy*, as a response to the growing interest in the genealogical method. They describe the project of genealogy and its use in three separate studies completed previously by the authors. Like me they are concerned about credibility for the methodology: 'While working without a blueprint, scholars who adopt genealogical methodology must nevertheless conform to certain demands' (Meadmore, Hatcher & McWilliam, 2000, p465).

And of course philosophers love it, especially philosophers of science, I have not included philosophical studies using genealogies but I have sourced the theoretical underpinning of the Foucauldian methodology primarily from this discipline. An entry in a dictionary of philosophers written by Maurice Florence is attributed to Foucault himself (Gutting, 1994); in this entry Foucault is described as perfectly at home in the philosophical tradition, particularly the critical tradition of Kant. 'His undertaking could be called *A Critical History of Thought*...if by thought is

meant the act that posits a subject and an object in their various possible relations' (Florence, 1994, p314). There is a large body of work within philosophy on the theory and practice of Foucault's methods. I have used Bouchard (1977), Dreyfus & Rabinow (1982), McHoul & Grace (1993), Gutting (1994), Prado (1995), and Ashenden & Owen (1999) in developing a theoretical understanding of genealogy.

I will end with Foucault himself. If all other appeals for credibility fail I can at least make recourse to the source. He is the 'initiator of this discursive practice'; to him is ascribed the 'author-function' (Foucault, 1977d, p132). His major genealogical works are *Discipline & Punish* and *The History of Sexuality, Part 1* (Prado, 1995).

Stevens (2003) says Foucault and the academy developed a symbiotic relation and that his work has now been mainstreamed within academia. I hope to some extent this is so and I hope that I have sufficiently demonstrated its acceptable use within a wide range of social science disciplines including psychology.

As I reflect on Foucault's methods of genealogy it seems strange that I wish to perform critical analytics on a branch of psychology called The Science of Happiness from within the very discipline of psychology. It will be allowed by the discipline of psychology if the tropic nature of becoming, acting on the subject of psychology, is acceptable within the subject of psychology. Butler (1997) follows Foucault in understanding the subject as being formed by power and suggests the form that power takes to produce the subject is marked by a figure of turning, 'a turning back on oneself or a turning on oneself...the turn appears to function as a tropological inauguration of the subject' (p3). The subject that is me and the subject that is psychology are both involved in this tropological becoming.

Am I happy, are you happy, with *The Science of Happiness*? It will only be if genealogy is an acceptable methodology that I can turn the question over, or perhaps have that question turn me over, in the space that genealogy creates.

On The Genealogy of the Practice

Genealogy did not start with Foucault but there is now a type of genealogy that is Foucault's. I have lots of textual evidence of its existence but finding out what that is, and how to pick it up to inspect the present with, is not an easy matter.

According to Prado (1995) Foucault had an Heideggerian ambition to think the unthought and a Nietzschean interest in the daimonic. His deep commitment to the study of subjectivity began with the Nietzschean question, 'How did I become what I am, and why do I suffer for being what I am?' A question I might easily pose about genealogy itself.

Nietzsche's Genealogy and Foucault's Faithful or Unfaithful Appropriation

To start with Nietzsche's genealogy, for me, is to ask what Nietzsche was doing in his work *On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic*. But this work exists alongside all the other works that Foucault references in his exegetical article *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History* written in 1971 (Foucault, 1977e). In this article Foucault acknowledges his debt to Nietzsche and references *The Gay Science*, *Human - All Too Human*, *The Dawn*, *The Wanderer and His Shadow*, *Twilight of the Idols*, *Beyond Good and Evil* as well as *On the Genealogy of Morals*.

Foucault is accused of misunderstanding or misappropriating Nietzsche. Gilles Deleuze, whose *Nietzsche and Philosophy* published in 1962 predates Foucault's own use of Nietzschean terminology, is accused of the same fault as well (Donaldson, 2000; Stevens, 2003). In his work Deleuze said that Nietzsche created the new concept of genealogy (Deleuze, 1962, cited in Stevens, 2003). Stevens (2003) takes issue with this saying Nietzsche was actually parodying the genealogical work of Ree. Regardless of what Nietzsche was doing we now have a legacy of genealogy bequeathed from Deleuze and Foucault.

Foucault said:

Nowadays I prefer to remain silent about Nietzsche...If I wanted to be pretentious I would use 'the genealogy of morals' as the general title of what I'm doing. It was Nietzsche who specified the power relation as the general focus, shall we say of philosophical discourse...Nietzsche is the philosopher of power, a philosopher who managed to think of power without having to confine himself within a political theory in order to do so...The only valid tribute to thought such as Nietzsche's is precisely to use it, to deform it, to make it groan and protest. And if commentators then say I am being faithful or unfaithful to Nietzsche, that is of absolutely no interest. (Foucault, 1972, p53-54)

Faithful or not, to better grasp power and genealogy in Foucault, reading Nietzsche's *Genealogy* and asking what he was doing seemed important.

Nietzsche said:

...we need a critique of moral values, the value of these values is for the first time to be called into question - and for this purpose a knowledge is necessary of the conditions and circumstances out of which these values grew, and under which they experienced their evolution and their distortion...(Nietzsche, 1962, Pviii)

In *On the Genealogy of Morals* Nietzsche searches for the way in which moral concepts have arrived at the present (his present, our past) in their current shape. He looks at the history of moral concepts, and the etymology of the words that describe the concept, and finds there is no transcendental right and wrong handed down from a divine source. He finds instead, to paraphrase Foucault (1977e), that words do not keep their meaning, desires do not point in a single direction, ideas do not retain their logic, and the world of speech has known invasions, plundering, disguises, ploys. Importantly for the genealogy that Foucault appropriated he also used a unique approach to power of a non-political type not previously described; he found power relations which were explained in terms of competing moral psychologies. (Donaldson, 2000). This is non-judicial, non-political, non-sovereign power. Also important for Foucault he also found the potential for the self-creating subject outside of the constraints of slave morality.

Nietzsche finds the history of morals not in the blue vacuum of heaven:

In the grey...authentic facts capable of definite proof and having actually existed, or, to put it shortly, the whole of that long hieroglyphic script (which is so hard to decipher) about the past history of human morals. (Nietzsche, 1962, px)

Foucault agrees genealogy is:

grey, meticulous, and patiently documentary. It operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times. (Foucault, 1977e, p139)

Genealogy, as I perform it here in this thesis, is the patient deciphering of texts left by the (mainly) men who have participated in the power relations in which moral psychologies compete; selecting a point at which to start, resisting the urge to keep going back to some finite source, accepting the same things are written and stored as words over and over again. These men say the same things different ways and then a different contradictory thing, yet they are truth tellers and partially quoted by their disciples. But the quoting is never quite the same, never quite in the same context, for quite the same reason. The same words are re-written and entangled with others. Texts become fathers to other texts, but never in their entirety; the textual seed is merged with others to form the child. I can prove what was written, when it was written, to whom it was written but I cannot not fully understand why the textual child emerged as it did. A history of the present is a work of fiction, a literary work created by imagination; it relies on a path, selected intuitively, through a library containing indexed and un-indexed works. It is grey because it is a no-colour between black and white with no positive hue (definition of grey from Oxford, 1976). To what Nietzsche and Foucault said I add that genealogy disrupts, corrupts and interrupts; genealogy rips and destroys and does not build.

Genealogy versus History

History relies on textual evidence too but genealogy, as practiced by Foucault, is not history as it is more usually practiced. Somewhere inside my head there is an eye gazing at humanity climbing, according to divine schedule, up a Jacobian ladder to The Future high in the blue vacuum of heaven. Prado (1995) says that's an Augustinian view of history as a 'divinely scripted cosmic drama...a linear conception of a consolidated, teleological sequence of events set in motion and supervised by God, with a beginning (the Creation), a middle (the Incarnation) and an end (the Last Judgment)' (p33).

I've done away with the catholic god of my childhood but most of us think we're going somewhere (the future) from somewhere (the past) which means we're somewhere between those two places right now (the present), and if it's not a beginning (creation) and an end (last judgment) because god bailed out shortly after takeoff, at least it's a journey with the potential for a shift from cattle class to business and possibly an upgrade to first. We're getting smarter, knowing more, living better; we know how to be happy.

The historian's job is to support that view with a good story. The word history comes from the Greek *historia*, which is learning or knowledge acquired by inquiry or a written account of that inquiry (Perseus, 2003). The good historian, using good historical practice, gives a good account of how we got from there to here and makes it sound as though being here (the present) was determined by, and is necessarily better than, being there (the past). It's all under control. The flight plan was filed, the auto-pilot turned on, and the control tower is still in contact. It is this teleological view that genealogy opposes.

We want historians to confirm our belief that the present rests upon profound intentions and immutable necessities. But the true historical sense confirms our existence among countless lost events, without a landmark or a point of reference. (Foucault, 1977e, p155)

Genealogy looks for (and finds) 'happy and unhappy accident and coincidences united by interpretations' (Prado, 1995, p34). It is the task of the genealogist to 'counter the view that the emergent was inevitable by recording its lowly beginnings...(and showing that) morals, ideals, and metaphysical concepts are ...not preordained developments but rather the products of conglomerations of blind forces' (Prado, 1995, p38).

...only the historical contents allow us to rediscover the ruptural effects of conflict and struggle that the order imposed by functionalist or systematising thought is designed to mask. (Foucault, 1980a, p82)

Where history depicts the continuity of times and the inevitable progress of the will to truth, where it finds a constant support in metaphysical illusion, genealogy points to the inequality of forces as the source of values or the work of resentment (resentment, hostility toward the superior) in the production of the objective world. (Bouchard, 1977, p22)

Genealogy looks to the historical archive for the creation of words, knowledges, truths and asks what this means to the present, while history asks the truth how it got here and believes its account. Foucault's genealogical practice is a strategic act of resistance in search of tools to destabilise truth and disrupt power relations.

Let us give the term genealogy to the union of erudite knowledge and local memories which allows us to establish an historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically today. (Foucault, 1980a, p83)

Historical practice, of the type that is a search for the source, an explanation of the inevitable unfolding of knowledge, a quest for truth, is a symptom.

One must go beyond the search for an ultimate source of morality by considering the quest itself as a symptom, as a problem, and as discourse that (mis)shapes us. (Stevens, 2003, p570)

But genealogy is a symptom too: the genealogist is uneasy and the genealogical process of reading widely and disparately, following intuition down dark and sometimes blind alleys, is a quest or at least a very long question? The discourse of the inevitability of the human discovery of truth, human improvement, and human superiority to other life on our planet, this discourse that shapes or mis-shapes us, irritates and excites the genealogist.

Foucault's Genealogy

Genealogy is Foucault's suggestion for doing research. It is both a mode of reflection on the nature and development of modern power and a theoretical tool for doing research. A key insight in genealogy is that truth cannot be separated from the procedures of its production. Consequently genealogy is concerned with the

processes, procedures and apparatuses, whereby truth and knowledge are produced, in what Foucault calls the discursive regime of the modern era...Foucault's genealogies pose the question of which kinds of practices, link to which kind of external conditions determine the different knowledges in which we ourselves figure. (Tamboukou, 2003, p6)

The apprentice genealogist looks for links; in what context was the text produced? What else was produced at the same time?

Genealogy conceives human reality as an effect of the interweaving of certain historical and cultural practices, which it sets out to trace and explore. The subject in the genealogical analysis, is socially constructed in discursive practices, but at the same time, able to reflect upon these very discursive relations that constitute it, capable of resistance and able to choose from the options produced out of the clash between contradictory subject positions and practices. What is significant in the genealogical strategy is exactly this conceptualisation of human reality as practices or technologies, which are to be analysed and deconstructed from within. (Tamboukou, 2003, p6)

When I heard the question, 'Are you happy?' before I started this genealogy, I had a space in which to answer the question. Now when I hear the question, 'Are you happy?' I have a different space from which to answer that allows me not to answer at all as I listen to the clash of texts. Genealogy has offered me a different set of responses and is performed publicly, (c.f. *Discipline and Punish, The History of Sexuality Part 1*) in order to offer that possibility to its audience.

As Foucault sees it, genealogy involves searching meticulously in the most unpromising places, reading and rereading dusty documents, paying attention to unimportant details, trying to discern unheard voices. (Tamboukou, 2003, p8)

The meticulous search can never be a complete search; therefore it is finite and performed intuitively, irrationally. I will look to three domains to try to better understand Foucault's irrational genealogy; his description of genealogy in *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History*, the way he practices it in his first genealogical work, and what he and others say about that work subsequent to publication.

Nietzsche, Genealogy, History

The 1971 essay is, according to Gutting (1990), Foucault's explication of Nietzsche's view of genealogy with no comments on the validity of the view. It helps as a starting point for my purposes, particularly since Dreyfus & Rabinow (1982) say, 'It would be hard to overestimate the importance of the essay for understanding the progression of the work which followed; all of the seeds of Foucault's work of the 1970's can be found in this discussion' (p106).

I have made my own peace with this piece – eventually. Genealogy is an historical practice that seeks the **events** of history, written in documents, where the engagement of different views occur; it does not seek the origin of the view that won the engagement and became the truth as we know it. It does not look for origins, essences, ideals; it does look for chance, details, accidents that accompany beginnings; it does look for passionate, competitive scholars with a devotion to truth, and the unending discussion between them which produce truth. There is no positive knowledge; to believe in positive knowledge makes possible a field of **knowledge** whose function is to discover origins, essences, ideals. The analysis of **descent** is of the numberless beginnings (just as I have numberless ancestors 2X2X2X2X2...) of a figure, a soul, a self, which believes in its own coherence; of the myriad events that combined, against probability, to form that apparent unity. Truth does not lie at the root to be found, it is not the result of pure devotion to objectivity but is the product of accidents and the outcome of struggles won, not lost. The **body** is the product of descent, the inscribed surface of the winners of events, and the arena for the agonistic struggle of **forces** in new events; it is moulded by regimes, formed by the habits of life imposed on it, nourished or poisoned by food and values; it changes with each victory announced in the arena. The analysis of **emergence** is of the struggle these forces wage against each other and sometimes against themselves, within themselves, as they splinter in their abundance or become weak. This struggle, the endlessly repeated play of domination, occurs in the space that divides forces, the void, an abysmal place, between them, which is where they confront each other; emergence occurs in this interstice. If interpretation is not the slow exposure of hidden meaning but rather the appropriation of rules in order to bend them in a new direction, then the development of humanity is a series of interpretations and genealogy records its history; the history not of continuous development or of reassuring stability, but of forces that operate not by destiny or regulation but by response to conflict; haphazard, chaotic, chance conflict; the human **will to power** attempts to master chance and only succeeds in giving rise to more chance. Historians are grounded in a particular time and place and the genealogical historian knows the genealogy produced is a projection of that position: the genealogy is slanted, it does not submit itself to history, it does not seek laws. History can be practiced parodically by offering multiple possible views; it can be practiced dissociatively by dislodging identity, it can be practiced sacrificially, violently, by interrogating scientific knowledge and finding that all knowledge rests upon injustice, that the **will to knowledge** calls for experimentation upon ourselves, and has become a passion which knows no bounds (Foucault, 1977e).

To approach Foucault's genealogy then, means to find a way to approach events, knowledge, descent, the body's part in all of this, emergence, will to power and will to knowledge.

Discipline and Punish

Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* was his first major genealogical work (Prado, 1995); I will consider his use of the methodology in this work as I try to elaborate on the approach I am struggling to find a way into.

This book is intended as a correlative history of the modern soul and of a new power to judge; a genealogy of the present scientifico-legal complex from which the power to punish derives its bases, justifications and rules, from which it extends its effects and by which it masks its exorbitant singularity.

(Foucault, 1977a, p23)

My second reason for wanting to study the prison was the idea of reactivating the project of a 'genealogy of morals', one which worked by tracing the lines of transformation of what one might call 'moral technologies'. In order to get a better understanding of what is punished and why, I wanted to ask the question: how does one punish?...a method which seems to me to yield, I wouldn't say the maximum of possible illumination, but at least a fairly fruitful kind of intelligibility.

(Foucault, 1991, p74)

The question for the apprentice genealogist is how Foucault's genealogical methodology was applied to the historical archive in order to analyse the way in which the subject was produced through the technologies of power. How do I do what Dreyfus & Rabinow (1982) call interpretive analytics? How do I plot the transformations in moral technologies?

Foucault set himself four methodological rules in *Discipline and Punish*: regard punishment as a complex social function by looking for the productive effects not just the repressive effects, regard punishment as a political tactic and analyse it as a technique of power, regard the technology of power as the common matrix from which penal law and human science arise, regard the body as the focus of a technology of power, and the site where the object of knowledge, man, is produced through a specific mode of subjection.

Essential to applying these methodological rules I must:

...admit that power produces knowledge (and not by simply encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative

constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations. These 'power-knowledge relations' are to be analysed, therefore not on the basis of a subject of knowledge who is or is not free in relation to the power system, but on the contrary, the subject who knows, the objects to be known and the modalities of knowledge must be regarded as effects of these fundamental implications of power-knowledge and their historical transformations. In short, it is not the activity of the subject of knowledge that produces a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but power-knowledge, the processes and struggles that transverse it and of which it is made up, that determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge.

(Foucault, 1977a, p28)

For me this means I cannot understand knowledge apart from the structures that form and enforce it and the relations that promote it. For instance the knowledge of the Science of Happiness is formed within the structure of the university in the discipline of psychology. It is formed using tools accepted by the empirically based science of psychology. It is formed on the foundation of the publications of the permitted predecessors. It is formed within and bound by the architecture of the university and the structure of academic hierarchy. This only allows a limited outcome.

In *Discipline and Punish* Foucault analyses discipline and punishment (in orphanages, schools, hospitals, factories, military establishments and prisons) from the beginning of the 17th century. The date is not arbitrarily chosen. It is the 'modern soul' that is Foucault's interest but to look at Modernity he retreats to the distance of the Classical age which 'set itself the project of constructing a universal method of analysis which would yield perfect certainty by perfectly ordering representations and signs to mirror the ordering of the world...with Descartes as the emblematic figure who sought certitude through the search for a method that would guarantee it' (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p19). The Classical Age (or the Age of Reason or Enlightenment) is usually seen as the 18th century, but stemming from the scientific and intellectual developments of the 17th century, which fostered a belief in empirically discoverable universal natural law and a supreme faith in rationality.

We must try to proceed with the analysis of ourselves as beings who are historically determined, to a certain extent, by the Enlightenment. Such analysis implies a series of historical inquiries that are as precise as possible; and these inquiries will not be oriented retrospectively toward the 'essential kernel of rationality' that can be found in the Enlightenment and that would have to be preserved in any event; they will be oriented toward the 'contemporary limits of the necessary,' that is toward what is not or is no longer indispensable for the constitution of ourselves as

autonomous subjects. (Foucault, 1984, p43)

The way Foucault proceeded was to start *Discipline and Punish* by comparing a public execution of a regicide in 1757 to the timetable that organised a Paris prison 80 years later in 1837, using this as an example of a radical shift in penal style from punishment of the body to punishment of the soul; a shift from the spectacle of the punishment of one body to the surveillance of all bodies as part of discipline. But, he says, the soul is a new invention:

...it has a reality, it is produced permanently, around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished – and in a more general way. On those one supervises, trains, corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonised, those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives. This is the historical reality of the soul, which unlike the soul represented by Christian theology, is not born in sin and subject to punishment, but is born rather out of methods of punishment, supervision and constraint. (Foucault, 1977a, p29).

He says the soul is the element where the effects of disciplinary power are expressed. The soul is both reality-reference for knowledge about itself and the machinery that power-relations use to construct that knowledge. The soul is a turbine for power as it creates soul truths that bind the soul.

...it is the element where various concepts have been constructed and domains of analysis carved out: psyche, subjectivity, personality, consciousness, etc; on it have been built scientific techniques and discourses, and the moral claims of humanism...(but) the man we are invited to free is already in himself, the effect of subjection much more profound than himself. The soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body...What is at issue...is this whole technology of power over the body that the technology of the 'soul' – that of the educationalist, psychologists and psychiatrists – fails either to conceal or to compensate, for the simple reason it is one of their tools. I would like to write a history of this prison...(Foucault, 1977a, p29-30)

So as genealogist Foucault states clearly the method of his practice and its focus: 'a correlative history of the modern soul and of a new power to judge' (p23). He continues *Discipline and Punish* as he started, with example after example of practices of discipline and punishment. He traces the development of techniques as diverse as architecture designed to observe people, to daily spelling and arithmetic tests and shows them all born from power and becoming rituals of power that continually reinforce power.

The target of analysis...(is)...practices – with the aim of grasping the conditions which make these acceptable at a given moment...it is a question of analysing a 'regime of practices'...as places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and reasons given, the planned and the taken for granted meet and interconnect....It's a matter of shaking this self-evidence, of demonstrating its precariousness, of making visible not its arbitrariness but its complex interconnection with a multiplicity of historical practices, many of them of recent date. (Foucault, 1991, p75).

McHoul & Grace (1993) call this technique 'a kind of lamination: building up citation upon citation, juxtaposing official and marginal discourses, quoting at length, rarely making heavily marked interpretive comments, allowing bits of cited text to carry the work, arranging and collecting historical fragments so that the order and arrangement of them, the technique of their montage perhaps, speak for them' (McHoul & Grace, 1993, p21)

According to Dreyfus & Rabinow (1982) Foucault succeeds in *Discipline and Punish* in presenting 'the genealogy of the modern individual as a docile and mute body by showing the interplay of a disciplinary technology and a normative social science'(p143)

Todd May (1997) summarises the work by saying it documents the change from destroying the body through torture to manipulating it to the last detail to ensure it is maximally conforming and productive; reform replaced elimination. 'Practices of normalisation came to replace practices of torture; observation and manipulation replaced random spectacle and execution; psychological intervention replaced regal authority' (p74).

May (1997) also says:

...the nature of the mind as a discrete substance belonging to an individual whose nature it is the project of psychology to discover is inseparable from an intersecting set of politically charged [practices within which it emerges. To the first of the two questions raised earlier regarding the political and social factors that determine the emergence of linguistic structures Foucault offers the structure of an answer with his genealogical method. To the second question, why we understand the mind as a purely internal affair, Foucault responds with a specific genealogy that isolates the practices and motivations that are intertwined in the emergence of psychology as a therapeutic discipline. (May, 1997, p74)

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The genealogy I am about to embark on lies solidly within the realms of the discipline of psychology so Foucault's genealogy offers me a starting point both methodologically and theoretically.

Two Lectures and Questions of Method

Aside from observing how Foucault does genealogy he has also written about the methodology. In *Two Lectures* Foucault says:

...the genealogical project...entertains the claims to knowledge of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory which would filter, hierarchies and order them in the name of some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its objects....genealogies are anti-sciences...opposed primarily not to the contents, methods or concepts of a science, but to the effects of the centralising powers which are linked to the institution and functioning of an organised scientific discourse within a society such as ours. (Foucault, 1980a, p83)

Perhaps like the Science of Happiness?

He also offers five methodological precautions for the analysis of power: don't look for power in regulation and law but look for it as it is expressed in local practices; don't ask who has power and what is his strategy but ask how power constitutes subjects through organisms, forces, energies, desires, thoughts etc and see embodiment as the material instance of power; don't take power as a domination of one group over another but analyse it as something that circulates, functioning in the form of a chain or network where individuals are always undergoing and exercising power as the vehicles of power not just the receptacles of domination, in fact where individuals are the effect of power which produces body, gesture, discourse, desire; do not look for power at the centre to find its path through the network to the periphery but rather conduct an ascending analysis starting from the minute at the edge and analysing power

functions there; do not look for power as a product of ideology but rather look at the formation of instruments for the formation and accumulation of knowledge – power is exercised and evolves through these subtle mechanisms (Foucault, 1980a)

In *Questions of Method* Foucault (1991) recommends 'eventalisation' as a method of analysis. He says eventalisation is, 'making visible a *singularity* at places where there is a temptation to invoke a historical constant...an obviousness that imposes itself uniformly on all...a breach of self-evidence, of those self-evidences on which our knowledges, acquiescence and practices rest' (p76). For example it was not self-evident that the only thing to be done with a criminal was to lock him up. Eventalisation is also the rediscovery of 'connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays or forces, strategies and so on which at given moment establish what subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal and necessary' (p76).

Other Contributions to Approaching Foucault's Genealogy

As I move from considering how to approach genealogical methodology to performing it I reflect on some textual fragments from the archive.

Genealogy offers, first and foremost, an analysis of the singularity of events (an event in the Foucauldian sense requires a breach of self-evidence demonstrating there is no ideal continuity or natural process). This process challenges taken-for-granted knowledge and recognises the multiplicity of causes and conditions that constitute an event. It also takes account of the increasing interconnections of the conditions of possibility that have allowed an event to occur when and how it did. (Meadmore et al, 2000, p465)

What is important is that a line of descent should be drawn to the emergences, the discontinuities, and the events closest to the "problem of the present" under investigation. This should guide the inquiry rather than the arbitrary demands of historical time frames or historical dates...refusal of the notion of progress becomes a defining feature of this approach. (Meadmore et al, 2000, p465)

Descent recognizes that unity derives from a dispersion of singular events. Rather than accounting for a discourse, a practice, or even an event in terms of the origin which is its source, descent looks at separate events in unrelated domains to see how these have come together to form the object of genealogy's investigation. ... If there is a unity to be found in descent, it is only that of the body, which is the surface upon which the dispersion of events is inscribed in order to form the unities that present themselves to appearance. (May, 1993, p74-75)

Emergence is complementary to descent. It recognizes that the movement of history is not a progress or a development but a play of forces each struggling for dominance, forces which change with the history that is their product. Emergence traces the "hazardous play of dominations" of the forces of history, a play that has no goal or progress. The illusion of progress is only an interpretation grafted onto history by the force that is dominant (or by the structure of forces, both dominant and dominated) at the moment the interpretation is offered. Far from being the realization of a meaning or the intention of a force transcendent to it, history is the anonymous play of forces that, in their dispersion, are under no one's control and have no common end in view. (May, 1993, p74)

It is only if we grasp these techniques of power and demonstrate the economic advantages or political utility that derives from them in a given context for specific reasons, that we can understand how these mechanisms come to be effectively incorporated into the social whole. (Foucault 1980a, p101)

This new mechanism of power is more dependent upon bodies and what they do rather than upon the Earth and its products. It is a mechanism of power which permits time and labour, rather than wealth and commodities, to be extracted from bodies. It is a type of power which is constantly exercised by surveillance rather than in a discontinuous manner by means of system of levies or obligations distributed over time. (Foucault 1980a, p104)

Let us ask ...how things work at the level of on-going subjugation, at the level of those continuous and uninterrupted processes which subject our bodies, govern our gestures, dictate our behaviours...(Foucault 1980a, p97)

To approach Foucault's genealogy then, means to approach events, knowledge, descent, the body's part in all of this, emergence, will to power and will to knowledge. Through his work and others I have approached these concepts and hope to use them in the following genealogy.

A GENEALOGY OF HAPPINESS

Words Shift And So Too Does Desire

Genealogy is gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary. It operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times. It is wrong to describe the history of morality in terms of a linear development (as Paul Ree did to whom Nietzsche was replying in *The genealogy of Morals*) – in reducing its entire history and genesis to an exclusive concern for utility. He assumed that words had kept their meaning, that desires still pointed in a single direction, and that ideas retained their logic; and he ignored the fact that the world of speech and desires has known invasions, struggles, plundering, disguises, ploys. (Foucault, 1977e, p139)

Words do not keep their meaning; because of this etymology is an acceptable part of the genealogical practice. The English word happy was once thought of more in terms of good fortune than good feelings. It derives from the Old English word *hap* which meant fortune, chance, a happening or occurrence. In turn *hap* came from the Old Norse *happ*. It is the same hap as in haphazard, hapless and happenstance. The first usage of the word happiness was in 1530 to indicate prosperity. By the time Shakespeare wrote *Two Gentlemen of Verona* around 1591 it had come to mean the state of mind that occurred when good fortune happened: 'Wish me partaker in thy happiness when thou dost meet good hap.' By 1611 in *Cymbeline* it was a state of mind that could be soured: 'To sour your happiness, I must report the queen is dead.' For the next one hundred years the two meanings co-existed but by the early 1700's the word happiness had shifted from meaning 'good fortune, luck, success, prosperity' to 'the state of pleasurable content of mind which results from success or the attainment of what is considered good' (Oxford, 1976).

So happiness was originally conceived as being a state of good fortune bestowed by whatever gods or goddesses of chance rule the lives of mortals; a state that brought a happy state of life. It has shifted from that. What it has shifted to is part of the inquiry of this thesis project, but, for example, Hills & Argyle (2001) define happiness as positive affect and cognitive-evaluative elements which include self-esteem, personal control, optimism, and goal fulfilment. Lemonick (2005) quotes Professor Davidson of the University of Wisconsin as saying the word happiness 'is a kind of placeholder for a constellation of positive emotional states'.

I reflect on the constellation of negative emotional states, disorders, and ill-being, carefully delineated in the DSM-IV and look ahead to the inevitable adoption of multi-axial classifications of well-being that The Science of Happiness will provide. This is already underway with Peterson & Seligman's *Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook and Classification* (2004).

'We follow the example of the DSM and ICD and their collateral creations by proposing a classification scheme and by devising assessment strategies for each of its entries...our goal is "a manual of the sanities" ' (Peterson & Seligman, 2004, p4).

Why inevitable? Why a manual of the sanities? Because in the chapter on the DSM I studied in *Abnormal Psychology III* it said the DSM was developed because, 'it is essential that professionals be able to communicate accurately with one another about the types of cases they are treating or studying' (Davison & Neale, 1996, p59) and, 'It appears to be in the nature of humankind to categorise whenever we perceive and think about anything. Those who argue against classification per se therefore overlook the inevitability of classification and categorisation in human thought' (Davison & Neale, 1996, p67). Inevitability in human thought? Then I reflect that this is the science from which the science of happiness sprang. I was uneasy about the categorisations of pathology in the DSM but even uneasier about a classification of non-pathology.

Desires shift too and the matrix from which words, meanings, and desires emerge does not stay still. Happiness has shifted from a matter between the gods and man, to a legitimate object of scientific inquiry. Physical Science has shifted from desiring knowledge of the acts of leeches, to the acts of apples, to the acts of ever-smaller particles. Psychological Science has moved from studying the acts of mad humans to the acts of happy ones and the left prefrontal lobe activity of meditative monks (Lemonick, 2005).

This genealogy holds up fragments of text that document these shifts against a background filling up with Foucauldian terms. I seek to see the (epistemic) shift in those terms and see if they make sense to me in those terms.


I see this genealogy as aligned with Foucault's project in *'The History of Sexuality'* where he asked 'how did we directly constitute our identity through ethical techniques of the self which developed through antiquity down to now' (Foucault, 1988, p146). He said he was not simply concerned with the acts of sex that were permitted or forbidden but with the drives to seek within the individual soul thoughts and desires, anything hidden, any movements of the soul. Theoretical (western) philosophy from Descartes to Husserl is pre-occupied with knowledge of the self as the first step to all knowledge; this shifts the Socratic invocation to take care of yourself to watch yourself in order to know yourself (Foucault, 1988). While this is not the start of the pre-occupation it is the beginning of the era when all men are considered rational and able to do this work upon themselves; implicit in this work is that we are not yet perfect, in fact we are all deeply flawed, but we must work to become perfect.

Foucault outlines the movement from care of the soul, or the self, in pre-Christian (Greco-Roman) times to watchfulness, and the activity of conscience, in early Christian times; this

develops from a practice of reminding oneself what the right rules of action are and preparing oneself by meditation for what life was to send including misfortune or death, into Christian confession where even the intention to do bad is a sin to be confessed, to be submitted to punishment and even innocent thoughts must be examined for evil origins (Foucault, 1988).

Where the Greeks had daimons whose actions in the lives of humans was unpredictable the Christians had the Devil; not at all unpredictable but very slippery and often invisible. The catholic confession of my childhood was a sort of insurance policy; confess everything just in case. *Mea culpa, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa*. Always be sorry for my actions. We were once perfect in Eden but we sinned, at least Eve did, and then we were no longer perfect. The language was abytropic (the prefix *aby* means to expiate one's sins, Oxford, 1976) and the turns of language were around expiation.

Against this background I undertake this genealogy.



Starting With Descartes

Descartes' Dutch Republic

Foucault saw the Enlightenment as a place to start the genealogical analytics of the 'modern soul' This was the period which, 'set itself the project of constructing a universal method of analysis which would yield perfect certainty by perfectly ordering representations and signs to mirror the ordering of the world...with Descartes as the emblematic figure who sought certitude through the search for a method that would guarantee it' (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p19).

This genealogy starts with Descartes. The shift to the present concept of happiness at the core of the Science of Happiness, and its becoming a valid object of scientific inquiry, may or may not have started with Descartes but was certainly catapulted through the Enlightenment to Modernity with Cartesian power. The shift was not a linear journey – an express train from Descartes to Diener. It wasn't even a slow meandering train – from Descartes to Diener via Hobbes, Locke, Bentham, Jefferson, Mill, Dickens, James and Disney. I reflect more on a pinball machine, with happiness as the elusive, shiny object that bounces randomly off each of those points, sometimes hovering uncertainly before it does so, and sometimes more than once.

So although I start with Descartes, behind him are the propulsive, repulsive, compulsive forces of the past, some known, some not. Certainly Descartes was not the first philosopher to contemplate the condition of happiness and how to achieve it; the list before him is very long and includes Homer, Herodotus, Plato, Socrates, Aristotle, the Stoics, the Epicureans, Augustine and Aquinas (Dictionary of Ideas, 1973). And although I start with Descartes I start with him only after having started with Foucault. I read Descartes and what Descartes read through a lens which Foucault ground. I see the truths told by Descartes about happiness against a new set of power relations emerging in his time; a set I will describe in some detail because where we were is so different from where we are.

Hugh Trevor-Roper (1967) says the period 1500 to 1800 began with the Catholic phenomenon of the Renaissance (1500 - 1620) and ended with the Protestant phenomenon of the Enlightenment (1660 - 1800) with the years 1620 to 1660 marking an interregnum in an otherwise orderly advance from one to the other. Descartes was a French Catholic, born in 1596, educated by Jesuits, who lived in the Protestant United Netherlands (the first Dutch Republic) from 1628 to 1649. Vermij (2002) says that hardly any country was less representative of the European state system of the time than the Dutch Republic – the Seven United Provinces of the Netherlands.

Christendom was fragmenting into multiple religions and sects within religions. By 1620 Lutheranism, The Church of England, Calvinism, Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Baptists

and Episcopalians had all emerged from the shattered unity of the Roman Catholic Church. Empires were fighting and fragmenting in the Thirty years War of 1618 – 1648. The years 1600 to 1650 were the most intense years of a 250-year history of witch burning (except for the Netherlands where from 1600 the death penalty for witchcraft was no longer permitted). Heretics were hunted too; Giordano Bruno was burnt at the stake in Rome in 1600, Lucilio Vanini, a libertine philosopher who suggested man was descended from apes, had his tongue cut out and was burnt at the stake in Toulouse in 1619, and Galileo's recantation, after an interview with the Inquisition in 1633, was the reason Descartes amended *La Monde* before publication. Against a background of war and religious and other forms of persecution the European countries also suffered a great economic depression starting around 1620. Once again, other than the Netherlands – this was the time the Dutch call The Golden Age (Trevor-Roper, 1967).

No witch burning, no heretic hunting, no recession, and independent from Spain (although still fighting). Little wonder that Jonathan Israel (2001) says it was the Netherlands that made the Enlightenment possible, not France or England.

One of the accidents that created the conditions for the first Dutch Republic was the murder in 1584 of William the Silent, Prince of Orange. In 1572 the Seven United Provinces of the Lowlands had declared independence from Spain. William was appointed Stadholder by the provinces; each Province had an appointed Stadholder – these were not inheritable positions. Although offered it by the provinces he steadfastly refused sovereignty over the Netherlands during the long war with Spain that followed. The Netherlands had no monarchical court system as a result and their first 'elected' leader was called Stadholder which means Governor. The Republic's birth is considered the Union of Utrecht in 1579; the 26 articles of union reflected William the Silent and Johan Van Oldenbarneveldt's desire for toleration in matters of faith. Oldenbarneveldt was a lawyer turned politician (Pensionary of Amsterdam), a liberal, who believed toleration should extend so far as it was consistent with the national safety, that the supremacy of the civil power over Church and State must be preserved and this should include the resolution of ecclesiastical disputes by the civil authority. The 'Libertine' Calvinists (including the Socinians and the Arminians) were in ascendancy; the Libertines were inflexibly opposed to the claims of the ultra-Calvinists that the Church should have authority over the State (Trevor-Roper, 1967).

After William's death there was a new and unusual emergence. The United Provinces elected Oldenbarneveldt as Permanent Advocate, in control of civil affairs, while William's son, Maurice of Nassau, became Stadholder of Delft and Captain-General of the Army. Trevor-Roper (1967) says part of the reason for the crisis elsewhere in Europe was serious structural weaknesses in the European monarchies at the beginning of the 17th century. In the new Republic there was now no monarch at all, putting the first Dutch Republic in its unique position. It did have its own

crises; Maurice, backed by the Orthodox Calvinists, asserted his rights as Stadholder in 1617 and executed Oldenbarneveltdt. Motley (1880) says the Stadholder was backed by the Orthodox Church, but the Church in turn was backed by the humbler classes (it was the burghers who became Libertines).

Trevor-Roper (1967) describes the ensuing situation in the Netherlands as the orthodox Calvinist clergy never having complete power. The lay power, however precariously perched, was always supreme.

... the tyranny of the orthodox was not permanent; when the political crisis was over, the Arminians recovered their freedom and the Socinians—those “most chymical and rational” of sectaries, as an Englishman called them—throve under their protection. The universal oracle of orthodox Calvinism, Gisbert Voëtius, might denounce liberal ideas and new ideas of all kinds, and especially the ideas of Descartes, but the new philosophy was preserved and continued by Arminian patronage. (Trevor-Roper, 1967, p191)

Vermij (2002) says this was a tactical rather than a theological stance, though cloaked in Arminian theology; the oligarchs of the Dutch province were not planning on losing control. As Nietzsche said in *The Will To Power*, ‘One seeks a picture of the world in that philosophy in which we feel freest, i.e., in which our most powerful drive feels free to function. This will also be the case with me!’ (Nietzsche, 1968, p 224).

A Side Track to Matters of Faith, Discipline, and Salvation

It is perhaps necessary to explicate the matters of faith (or opinion) and the paths to salvation behind the Socinian and Arminian sects of Calvinism that found themselves here in this place at this time in opposition to orthodox Calvinism.

Foucault said of the Reformation:

...all those movements which took place in the fifteenth and sixteenth century and which had the Reformation as their main expression and result should be analysed as a great crisis of the Western experience of subjectivity and a revolt against the kind of religious and moral power which gave form, during the Middle Ages, to this subjectivity. The need to take a direct part in spiritual life, in the work of salvation, in the truth which lies in the Book – all that was a struggle for a new subjectivity. (Foucault, 1982, p213).

I'm not sure this is true of orthodox Calvinism. Michael Servetus (a humanist, anti-trinitarian who preached using reason to interpret the scriptures) was condemned to death by the Catholic Church but burned at the stake by Calvin in his theocracy of Geneva in 1553 (Trevor-Roper, 1967). Toleration for new subjectivities, other than the new form Calvin created, do not appear to have been on the Calvinist agenda. Calvin said his work was based on that of St. Augustine. 'Augustine is so completely of our persuasion, that if I should have to make written profession, it would be quite enough to present a composition made up entirely of excerpts from his writing' (Calvin, cited by Olsen, 2000, p31). Not surprisingly then the orthodox-Calvinist/Arminian debate reflected that of a much earlier time, Augustinian/Pelagian.

Augustine (354 to 430 BCE) taught that the source of evil is the misuse of human free will saying that the only evil thing is evil will. He taught that the human priest is Christ's extended hand over a congregation where some will be saved and some not and where it is predestined who will be saved. He taught that since the fall of Adam humankind suffers from original sin (the concept of original sin originates with Augustine), and is incapable of doing good without the supernatural help of God imparted by Baptism – grace cannot be received by an act of human will it must be given as a gift from God (Olsen, 2000).

The Pelagians disagreed with Augustine's ideas on original sin, grace, free will and predestination. They denied the idea of inherent depravity and believed that humans were capable of living sinless lives simply by exercising the will to good – an ability given to man by God (Olsen, 2000).

Calvin took the Augustinian position on how man relates to God 1100 years later, so his part of the Reformation may be about a struggle for a new form of subjectivity as Foucault suggests (Foucault, 1982), but it was one in which there was less room to move; in Calvinism there was more restriction and more discipline with the 'elect' choosing a new form of self-discipline from clothing to reading practices in order to achieve salvation. Gorsky (1993) describes Calvin's doctrine of Justification as an ethic of self-discipline which entailed living in perfect obedience to God's law; to achieve this obedience the Calvinist engaged in what had been long standing monastic practices such as frequent prayer and moral logbooks. Lay elders of the church could choose to 'interview' members before communion and could issue punishments which might include social sanctions, all the church members were encouraged to 'remonstrate' with others who they perceived as errant and to report sins to the church elders. The emphasis was on visible outward conduct so a sin such as drunkenness was considered bad but bankruptcy even worse, being seen as an extreme punishment for lack of grace.

MacCullough (1989) says that the arguments among Christians on the question of salvation have been between those who seek to stress God's mercy, humanity's dignity and free will to

choose their destiny, and those who prefer to see God's majesty, his planning of human destiny (predestination) and humanity's hopeless fall into sin unless they are one of the 'elect' predestined for salvation. I wonder how Calvin, backing Augustinian depravity, not Pelagian delight, would score on Diener's The Satisfaction With Life Scale?

Jacob Arminius was educated in orthodox Calvinism, was a Calvinist minister and theology teacher at the University of Leyden in the Netherlands. He questioned the Augustinian pessimism at the heart of Calvinism. In another country at another time he may not have survived those doubts, but the Reformed Church of the Netherlands was only 40 years old and he was in a country proud of the intellectual tradition of Erasmus; the Reformation sprang from criticism of the Roman Catholic Church and the humanist Erasmus was a bitingly sarcastic critic of its faults. The Arminian doctrine was of free will, and tolerance of other faiths, that the inclinations to evil inherited from Adam are not themselves blameworthy, and only consent to them involves real guilt. Those interested in a less divisive faith to unite the seven provinces adopted these doctrines rapidly (and conveniently). It is estimated that a minority of the people in the provinces were convinced adherents of the Reformed Church (30% according to Grosky, 1993) and tolerance of other faiths was a way to minimise the power of the Reformed Church within the United Provinces.

The burghers of the Dutch Republic, whether orthodox or libertine, supported the disciplinary activities of Calvinism. Visitors from other parts of Europe noted that crime was low and arrests for minor crime were high. The liaison of the Calvinist church with the monarchical/military in the form of the Prince of Orange had resulted in a self-disciplining society with economic benefits that the rest of Europe was not enjoying. Gorsky (1993) describes what occurred in the Netherlands as a disciplinary revolution, which led to rapid and fundamental social transformation via cultural and structural disciplinisation.

The church and the city councils combined to provide social welfare to all, except 'able bodied' men who were deemed fit for work and built the first reformatories in Europe; the Tuchtuisen (house of discipline) imposed a daily regimen of hard labour with moral education to 'reform' petty criminals, vagrants and sometimes the wayward sons of wealthy families who were 'committed'.

So although Oldenbarneveldt was a libertine he was also an active supporter of the disciplinary techniques of Calvinism. Whether Maurice of Nassau took up the opposing position because he believed in orthodox Calvinism, or because it was the opposing position and the Reformed Church would be an ally in the military coup of 1618, is debateable. The coup occurred, Oldenbarneveldt was executed, and the Reformed Church published the five points of Calvinism:

1. The unconditional decree by God of election
 2. The limiting of Christ's atoning death for humanity to those elect to salvation
 3. The total corruption of humankind
 4. The irresistibility of God's grace
 5. The unchallengeable perseverance in saving grace of God's elect
- (MacCullough, 1989)

Maurice can't have been too convinced because after an initial burst of persecution, because as Trevor-Roper (1967) says, when the political crisis was over, the Arminians recovered their freedom and the Socinians thrived under their protection.

Which gets us to the Socinians; they originated with Faustus Socinus, He and his followers held that that the church and state should be held separate and:

1. All religious authority depends on applying reason to Scripture
 2. The doctrine of the Trinity is false because there is no Scriptural evidence for it
 3. The ethical teachings of Jesus, particularly the Sermon on the Mount, are the main guide, not the words of Paul
 4. Jesus was human, though an exceptional human; though not God, he was endowed with divine attributes of wisdom and virtue.
 5. The resurrection was significant because it demonstrated the possibility of immortality
 6. Jesus' death was not an atonement for our sins nor did God demand that someone suffer for our sins.
 7. The following doctrines are false: original sin, predestination of the elect, the inherent depravity of human beings, and eternal damnation
 8. We can have faith in the good and loving nature of God
 9. Though well aware of how sinful human beings can be and often are, we can have faith in the human capacity for reason and goodness.
 10. Religious thought should be free, and all creeds should be tolerated
- (Hillar, 2005)

This clash of moral psychologies was embedded in the peculiar set of power relations in the Netherlands; Calvin's irresistible God of corrupt humanity who had sent Christ to save the elect versus the Arminian or Socinian good God who sent Jesus to teach some rules. Both were embedded in the Calvinist techniques of self-discipline and abytropic discourse.

As to Descartes' faith, he remained a Catholic throughout his life, attended Mass, and corresponded with the Jesuits in France making valiant attempts to reconcile his new science with the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation. This was to no avail ultimately and the Catholic Church banned his books in 1663, after he had died. The God of Descartes was not just the

creator of the material universe; he was also the father of all truth in the intellectual world. Descartes said the metaphysical truths were established by God and therefore were knowable by man with God's help. He separated soul and body with soul as boundless and immortal, and body as material and mortal. In 1641 he published *'Meditations on First Philosophy, in Which Is Proved the Existence of God and the Immortality of the Soul'*. Regardless of this, based on an interpretation of what Descartes had written there, Gilbertus Voetius charged him with atheism in 1643 and Descartes had to seek the protection of the Prince of Orange to escape persecution (Trevor-Roper, 1967).

Foucault's Pastoral Power and Care of the Soul

This digression to matters spiritual has a reason, aside from describing theological struggles and the differences arising from the contingencies of history. Foucault talked of the pastoral power of the Christian church and its transition to a new form of pastoral power held by the 'modern state'. He says that the pastoral power of Christianity was a form of power whose aim is salvation of the individual in the next world, prepared to sacrifice itself for this salvation of the flock (down to lowliest lamb), individualising and requiring individual confession (so that the individual may know the truth of themselves). He says it has shifted to a new form of power whose aim is salvation in this world - salvation being health, well-being, security. This new form of power has more functionaries across a state apparatus and requires more knowledge of man both at a macro and micro level (Foucault, 1982).

I would add that not only is individual confession about knowing where the black marks on my soul are, finding them and verbally describing them, but also about sorrow and expiation for actions and thoughts, past, present and future. I don't confess what is good only what is bad. When the truth is found it must be atoned for.

So the new science of happiness might be a technique of pastoral power, and replaces the guaranteed salvation of the elect (Calvin) or the salvation of all who live by the teachings of Jesus (Socinus)? The word salvation comes from the Latin 'salvatio' - deliverance, salvation, which in turn comes from the Latin 'salvus' - in good health, well, sound, safe, unharmed, uninjured. The Latin salvus is from the Indo-European root 'sol' - whole. The same root made it to Greek as 'holos' - whole, entire, complete in all its parts, safe, sound. Other English words from the same root via Latin or Greek are salve, salutogenic, health, hale, whole. The Hebrew word 'kol' means whole and is from the Semitic root 'kl' - to complete. Salvation is to be whole, not corrupt. Corrupt is from the Latin 'corruptus' - to be destroyed, literally 'cor'- with, 'ruptus'- breakage. Ruptus (from rumpere - to be broken) is from the Indo-European root 'reup' - to snatch or rip away. Other English words from the same root are bereave, rob, rupture, bankrupt, irrupt.

The spiritual choice in the Netherlands at that time appears to have been: accept the truth told that corruption was part of your predestined human nature and hope like hell you were one of the elect to live in paradise, in your risen body, with God for eternity or using your recently liberated rationality look for another true option. The Arminians and Socinians did that and went for a humanist truth, a tolerance born from the new truth they made from their new hermeneutic of the New Testament, yet holding to the truth that there is a God and there was a Jesus Christ and there was the possibility of a risen body; their humanist truth rippled through Hobbes and Locke and Jefferson and ended up an inalienable right. Descartes looked for new truths too and produced a new set of truths not based on the Bible at all. If I can think then I am, bodies and souls are different, and of course some very useful mathematics. All offered no alternative to the truth that the soul must be watched and constantly corrected. These are the truths that seem to ripple through the new Science of Happiness, the science that dully jars me.

They all offer a way to wholeness. If you want wholeness join me – you are predestined to. No join me – I offer you life, liberty and pursuit of wholeness. No join me – I offer you reason and will to wholeness.

It seems odd that since Christian times no-one seems to have been able to say – I don't know. Wish I did know, but I don't. I simply don't know. I won't sign up for anything just yet and here's my philosophy on how to live with uncertainty, and powerlessness in the face of an unknown and chaotic universe and most importantly no pursuit of wholeness, with the upside being no confession and expiation.

Hacking (1986) describes Foucault's work as shifting from a preoccupation with what we say and do to other people, reflected in his archaeology and genealogy, to what we say and do to ourselves, reflected in the work he called ethics. For Foucault ethics is about customs and practices through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents. Foucault (1982a) lists four major aspects to the relationship to oneself: Which is the aspect or part of my behaviour which is concerned with moral behaviour? Or what is the *ethical substance* which will be worked over by ethics? For Foucault this has shifted from desire for Christians prior to the Enlightenment, to intentions in Kant and to feelings in modernity. What is the invitation or *incitement* for people to recognise their moral obligations. He gives as examples divine law, cosmological order, rational rule. What are the *means/technology* by which we can change ourselves in order to become ethical subjects? Or how do we work on the ethical substance? Foucault seems to say this depends on what the ethical substance is. If it is desire we can work to eradicate it or channel it in acceptable ways. Finally what is the kind of being to which we aspire when we behave in a moral way? What is the end result? Will we become pure or immortal or free or will we have self-mastery? This is what Foucault calls the *telos* of morals.

Foucault says that the main themes of morality did not change from the Greeks to the Christians; for instance prescriptions about the body, sexuality in particular, and prescriptions about fidelity within marriage. What did change, he says, is the relationship to one-self. For the Greeks the ethical substance was aphrodisia (acts linked to pleasure and desire), the incitement to recognise moral obligations was through a politico-aesthetic choice, the technology was asceticism and the telos was self-mastery. For the Christians, the telos became purity and immortality (of the risen body), the incitement was divine law, the technology was a new form of asceticism (self-deciphering) and the ethical substance was flesh, particularly the desire of the flesh.

Foucault concluded that in Greek ethics people were concerned with their moral conduct, and their relations to themselves and others, more than religious problems, like what happens after death; he thinks these are unimportant problems to them. Foucault elaborates on the technologies of the self employed by the Greeks in the service of ethics by explaining the Greek term 'epimelesthai sautou' which he translates 'care of the self'. This involved for the Greeks (and Romans) their quite conscious effort, a powerful work, to fashion the self according to ideals of wisdom, virtue, beauty and health, to create the self as a work of art and implied attention, knowledge and technique; it required choice or discrimination amongst knowledge of only those knowledges relative to the person.

Foucault does not elaborate on this shift but it might be understandable within the framework of the doctrine of ascension, the General Resurrection. The big point of difference for Christianity as a product was the Resurrection. Jesus Christ died but then his body rose again; this was a promise made to all Christians that they too would rise on the last day. The early Christian saint, Paul, preached of the resurrection of the dead to the Greeks at Athens and according to Acts (17:32) some philosophers of the Epicureans and Stoics listened to what he had to say and at the end some mocked, and others said, 'We will hear thee again of this matter'.

So with the Christian theology ethics becomes tied to the immortal body; what happens after death irretrievably tied to ethics. Good guys go to heaven, bad guys go to hell but, whichever direction, in your body forever.

In 1215 the Twelfth Ecumenical Council published the Canons of the Fourth Lateran Council; toward the end of Canon 1 is written, 'He will come at the end of the world to judge the living and the dead and will render to the reprobate and to the elect according to their works. Who all shall rise with their own bodies which they now have that they may receive according to their merits, whether good or bad, the latter eternal punishment with the devil, the former eternal glory with Christ' (Fourth Lateran Council, 1215).

The Catholic Encyclopedia (2005) says:

The general resurrection can hardly be proved from reason, though we may show its congruity.

- As the soul has a natural propensity to the body, its perpetual separation from the body would seem unnatural.
- As the body is the partner of the soul's crimes, and the companion of her virtues, the justice of God seems to demand that the body be the sharer in the soul's punishment and reward.
- As the soul separated from the body is naturally imperfect, the consummation of its happiness, replete with every good, seems to demand the resurrection of the body.

I imagine that the new doctrine of a risen body would effect a change on the telos (to purity and immortality) and the ethical substance (flesh). Foucault has said that with Christianity came a different technology of the self, the new form of asceticism was self-deciphering, care of the self became a hermeneutics of the soul, confessional and repentant.

Pastoral power, or the aspect of it that promises wholeness and the technology of the self of self-examination, confession and repentance of old bad ways are all there in the Science of Happiness. The new Science of Happiness promises that care of the self, done in the prescribed way, will lead to happiness, which leads to health and wealth. As we have seen the word health shares the same Indo-European root as salvation, 'sol'. The word wealth is from an old English word, 'wela', which in turn is from the Indo-European root, 'wel'. This means to wish or to will; other English words from the root are will, well, volition. Ironical really since Descartes proposed using the will to achieve happiness and consequently health, a circular proposition it seems.

Back to Descartes and the Genealogy of Happiness

When genealogy looks to beginnings, it looks for accidents, chance, passion, petty malice, surprises, feverish agitation, unsteady victories, and power. (Davidson, 1986, p224).

Foucault's genealogy involves searching meticulously in the most unpromising places, reading and rereading dusty documents, paying attention to unimportant details, trying to discern unheard voices. (Tamboukou, 2003, p8)

This genealogy does not attempt to look to the beginnings of the subject of happiness but it does have to start somewhere so, back to Descartes and Happiness. By the time Descartes came to live in the republic in 1629, the orthodox Calvinists had been reigned in and the

intellectual climate was liberal; the tactical stance taken by the Stadholder and other rulers within the oligarchy, had prevented the worst of the excesses of demon hunting from emerging in the Dutch Republic. Trevor-Roper says of the witch-burning and heretic hunting in the rest of Europe, 'the frontal opposition of Catholics and Protestants, representing two forms of society incompatible with each other, sent men back to the old dualism of God and the Devil and the hideous reservoir of hatred, which seemed to be drying up, was suddenly refilled (Trevor-Roper, 1967, p130). The Dutch Republic had emerged from Gorsky's (1993) disciplinary revolution and the new institutions of reformatory, workhouse, and university were well established.

Although Voetius, professor and rector of the University of Utrecht and ultra orthodox Calvinist denounced the theories of Galileo and Descartes and produced a series of arguments to show witches do exist and should not be suffered to live, the secular Dutch state refused to participate in the same way the Catholic and Protestant rulers of France, Germany and England did as the Reformation and Counter-Reformation swept back and forth across Europe.

Foucault says the human subject is placed in relations of power that are very complex and that we need to know the historical relationships of our present circumstances (Foucault, 1982). Here in Descartes' Netherlands all of the great institutions of the western democracies were present and struggling with each other, possibly for the first time; the monarchy and the military (both embodied for now in the Prince), the church and the university (Voetius embodied both of these), and the state structure with control of economic resources, devoted primarily to economic growth (Oldenbarneveldt). In the first round the state won by default, almost by accident, because the Monarch in the form of Philip of Spain was rejected, the Prince was dead and all the other available Sovereigns were busy. In the second round the monarch/military won, not at all by accident (although oddly the conflict centred on the predestination/free will debate within theology) and the Statesman died.

Maurice died shortly after this and was succeeded by his brother Frederick. During his time as Stadholder 1625 – 1647 the position was made hereditary and the United Provinces, already wealthy (not in depression as the rest of Europe was) as a result of the long period of rule by the Statesman Oldenbarneveldt, entered the Golden Age of expansion. Frederick kept busy militarily (continuing the war against Spain) and the United Provinces kept him under control with budget restrictions.

Against this backdrop Descartes decided if he thought he was. He also thought if he put his mind to it he could be healthy and live a very long life. Shapin (2000) cites Des Maizeux as reporting that Descartes said he could not promise to render a man immortal but he was quite sure it was possible to lengthen his life span to equal that of the Patriarchs, to a thousand years or so (his contemporaries were shocked when he died at 54). His work on physiology, dissection and vivisection, led him to perceive the body as machine-like system (Cook, 2002);

this being the case the machine could be governed to operate perfectly. No need to rely on the risen body. Part of his therapeutic approach was to tell people who consulted him to cheer up. He said he took this advice himself to great effect.

From [my mother] I inherited a dry cough and a pale colour which stayed with me until I was more than twenty, so that all the doctors who saw me up to that time gave it as their verdict that I would die young. But I have always had an inclination to look at things from the most favourable angle and to make my principal happiness depend upon myself alone, and I believe that this inclination caused the indisposition, which was almost part of my nature, gradually to disappear completely. (Descartes, 1983, p221).

Much of Descartes early thoughts on the separation of body and soul, and the link between reason and happiness, are discussed in the correspondence with Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia in the year 1644 to 1646. She questioned and challenged some of his ideas and he wrote *Passions of the Soul* at her request (Shapiro, 1999). Almost as an aside they also discussed her health and he offered her advice on ongoing health problems. In 1644 he exhibited his 'will to health' philosophy when he told her:

I know no thought more proper for preserving health than a strong conviction and firm belief that the architecture of our bodies is so thoroughly sound that when we are well we cannot easily fall ill...(Descartes, 1644, cited in Shapin, 2000, p146).

In another letter cited by Shapiro (1999) he maintains that thinking happy thoughts is alone is:

capable of restating someone to health, even if his spleen and lungs were already in poor condition because of the bad condition of the blood caused by sadness. (Descartes, 1645, cited in Shapiro, 2000, p514).

Elizabeth responded later the same year:

...still do not know how to rid myself of doubt that we can arrive at the happiness of which you speak, without the assistance of that that does not depend on the will, because there are some diseases which...render the most moderate person subject to letting themselves be carried away by her passions, and less capable of untangling herself from the accidents of fortune...(cited in Shapiro, 2000, p514).

Descartes is saying, 'Will it and it will be.' Elizabeth is saying, 'What about accident, fortune, chaos?' Shapiro (1999) says that Elizabeth holds an alternative position to Descartes. He says

the mind affects the body. She says the mind depends upon the good health of the body and health can be a result of fortune, good or bad.

Descartes returns with:

You observe very truly that there are diseases which take away the power of reasoning...what I said in general about every person should be taken to apply to those who have free use of their reason and in addition know the way that must be followed to reach happiness. (Descartes, 1645, cited in Shapiro, 2000, p515).

This seems to me to be truly dualistic in thinking – no reason or free use of reason – no shades of grey. At this stage Descartes was clear that there were two types of people: great and base. He outlined his position in another letter to Elizabeth in 1645:

...the difference between the greatest souls and those that are base and common consists principally in the fact that common souls abandon themselves to their passions and are happy or unhappy only according as the things that happen to them are agreeable or unpleasant; the greatest souls, on the other hand, reason in a way that is so strong and cogent that, although they also have passions, and indeed passions which are often more violent than those of ordinary people, their reason nevertheless always remains mistress, and even makes their afflictions serve them and contribute to the perfect happiness they enjoy in this life. (Descartes, 1645 cited in Rutherford, 2003)

Descartes was also concerned about the 'how to' of happiness, whether happiness could be taught or willed into being, whether man could control the passion of his soul. He had certainly read Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics during his Jesuit education and Aristotle grappled with that too.

For this reason also the question is asked, whether happiness is to be acquired by learning or by habituation or some other sort of training, or comes in virtue of some divine providence or again by chance...happiness seems, however, even if it is not god-sent but comes as a result of virtue and some process of learning or training, to be among the most godlike things; for that which is the prize and end of virtue seems to be the best thing in the world, and something godlike and blessed. It will also on this view be very generally shared; for all who are not maimed as regards their potentiality for virtue may win it by a certain kind of study and care. (Aristotle, 2000, p8-9)

Descartes read Aquinas too; he brought Aquinas' *Summa Theologica* with him to the Netherlands when he moved there (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1911). He disagreed with Aquinas who thought, agreeing with Augustine, that perfect happiness was not to be found in life; human nature was perfectible for Descartes. The title he first proposed for his *Discours de la méthode* (1637) was *le projet d'une science uni-verselle qui puisse élever notre nature à son plus haut degré de perfection* - "the plan of a universal science which can raise our nature to its highest degree of perfection" (Dictionary of the History of Ideas, Vol 3, p471). To be perfectible must mean we are imperfect to start with, but that was/is an unspoken assumption at the core of abytropic discourse.

On the question of whether happiness was achievable by will he agreed with Aquinas' answer to Question 4, First Part of the Second Part of the *Summa Theologica*, Whether happiness once had can be lost?

If, however, the virtue remain unimpaired, outward changes can indeed disturb such like happiness, in so far as they hinder many acts of virtue; but they cannot take it away altogether because there still remains an act of virtue, whereby man bears these trials in a praiseworthy manner. (Aquinas, 2005)

In the *Passions of the Soul*, published in 1649, Descartes moves to a position influenced by his correspondence with Elizabeth (Shapiro, 1999).

The Passions contains 212 Articles explaining what passions are, listing the six primitive passions (wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness), describing the physiology of how they arise in the body (and protect the body), and affect the soul. Descartes finished the *Passions of the Soul* by stating very clearly that the passions are good. All the excerpts below are from Descartes', *Passions of the Soul*, 1649.

The 212th Article

That from them alone all the good and evil of this life depends.

Now the soul may have her delights distinctly by herself, but for those which are common to her with the body, they absolutely depend on the passions, so that those men whom they move most may be apt to taste most sweetness in this life. It is true, they may also find the most bitterness, when they do not understand how to employ them well, and fortune is adverse to them. But wisdom is herein especially requisite, that it teach us so to make ourselves masters of them, and manage them with so much dexterity, that the evils they cause may be easily endured, and we may even extract joy from them all.

Rutherford (2003) summarises Descartes' position; his view seems to be that the passions (particularly those of love and joy) form a valuable part of a normal human life, that the enjoyment of them is consistent with the happiness that is the natural product of virtuous action, but that happiness arising as a product of virtue can be had even in presence of harmful passions such as sadness or grief.

The position he took in the letter to Elizabeth regarding the great and the base is echoed here in the Passions. Article 48 is a tribute to will and its ability to make firm judgments about good and evil, and a warning to those who do not exercise it.

The 48th Article

Wherein the strength or weakness of souls is known, and what is the misery of the weakest.

Now it is by the successes of these contestations that every one may understand the strength or weakness of his soul. For those in whom the will can most easily conquer the passions, and stop the motions of the body that come along with them, have without doubt the strongest souls. But there are some who can never try their own strength, because they never let the will fight with her own weapons...firm and determinate judgments concerning the knowledge of good and evil according to which she has resolved to steer the actions of her life....

Article 50 is a declaration that there is no soul so weak that the right method of training cannot make her become a master of the passions.

The 50th Article

That there is no soul so weak, but well managed, may acquire an absolute mastery over her passions.

...For since with a little art the motions of the brain in beasts who are void of reason may be altered, it is evident they may more easily in men and that even those who have the weakest souls, may acquire a most absolute empire over all their passions, if art and industry be used to manage and govern them.

He continues to separate quite distinctly the 'interior emotions' of the soul from the 'passions' of the body that affect the soul. Article 147 describes these interior emotions using a very interesting example:

The 147th Article

Of the interior emotions of the soul.

I will only add here one consideration which me thinks is very useful to hinder us from receiving any discommodity by our passions. It is, that our good and will depends chiefly of interior emotions, excited in the soul only by the soul herself, wherein they differ from these passions, whichever depend of some motion of the spirits. And although these emotions of the soul be often joined to the passions resembling them, they may also be often found among other passions, and even spring from those that are contrary to them. For example, when a husband weeps for his deceased wife, whom (as oft it falls out) it would vex him to see restored to life again, it may be his heart is straightened by sadness, which the solemnity of the funeral and the absence of a person whose conversation he was used to, excite in him. And, it may be some remnants of love or pity, which present themselves to his imagination, draw true tears from his eyes. Notwithstanding that in the meantime he feels a secret joy in the most interior part of his soul, where emotion is so strong that the sadness, and tears accompanying it, cannot diminish any of its force. And when we read strange adventures in a book, or see them personated on a stage, it sometimes excites sadness in us, sometimes joy, or love, or hatred, and generally all the passions, according to the diversity of objects that offer themselves to our imagination. But withal we take a delight to feel them excited in us and this delight is an intellectual joy, which may as well spring from sadness, as all the rest of the passions.

For Descartes these interior emotions of the soul have more power than the passions of the body and a man whose interior is content, through following the path of virtue, can be assured that exterior troubles (from abroad or from his passions) will not disturb the tranquillity of his female soul.

Reading this Article and Article 148 (below) Rutherford (2003) says Descartes is committed to the view that the pursuit of virtue is sufficient for happiness while rejecting the idea that virtue has only an instrumental value as a means to happiness. This is because virtue is grounded in the one aspect of human nature that is of unconditional value: freedom of the will.

The 148 Article

That the exercise of virtue is a sovereign remedy against the passions.

Now, forasmuch as these interior emotions do touch us nearest to the quick, and consequently have more power over us than the passions they differ from, which are met withal in them, it is certain that provided our soul have wherewithal to content her interior part, all the troubles that come from abroad, are not able to hurt her, but rather serve to augment her joy in that, seeing she cannot be injured by them, it lets her understand her own perfection. And that our soul may be thus contented, she need do nothing but exactly follow the track of virtue. For whosoever has lived so that his conscience cannot hit him in the teeth for failing to do all things which he judged to be best (which is the thing I mean here by following the track of virtue) he from thence receives a satisfaction so effectual to make him happy that the most violent assaults of the passions, shall never be strong enough to trouble the tranquillity [of] his soul.

Article 152 again talks of will and mans free disposition to use it.

The 152nd Article

For what cause a man may esteem himself.

And because one of the chief parts of wisdom is to know in what manner & for what cause everyone ought to esteem or condemn himself, I will here endeavour to give my opinion thereof. I observe but one thing in us which may give us just cause to esteem ourselves, to wit, the use of our free disposition and our empire over our wills. For only the actions depending on this free disposition are those for which we may justly be praised or blamed. And it makes us in some manner like unto God, by making us masters of ourselves, provided we do not lose the privileges it gives us

by our unworthiness

Article 153 outlines his idea that that generosity comes from man knowing he can call nothing his own but his free disposition of will and making the resolution to use it to the best.

The 153rd Article

Wherein generosity consists.

So, I believe true generosity, which causes a man to set himself at the highest rate he justly may, consists only partly in knowing there is nothing which truly he can call his own, unless this free disposition of his wills, nor wherefore he ought to be praised or blamed, unless for using that well or ill; and partly in feeling a constant, and firm resolution in himself to use it well, that is, his will shall never be wanting to undertake and execute such things as he shall judge to be best, which is to follow virtue absolutely.

Article 156 tell us how the generous man can be master of his passions.

The 156th Article

What the properties of generosity are and how it serves for a remedy against all unruliness of the passions.

They who thus are generous are naturally addicted to do great things, and yet to undertake nothing they are not capable of. And because they esteem nothing greater than to do good to other men, and to condemn their own interest on such an occasion, they are exquisitely courteous, affable, and officious to everyone. Withal, they are absolutely masters of their passions, especially of their desires, jealousy and envy, because there is nothing, the acquisition whereof depends not on them, whose worth they suppose can countervail a hearty desire of them, and of hatred against men, because they esteem them all; and of fear, because the confidence of their own virtue secures them; and lastly of wrath, because little valuing all things without themselves they never give their enemies so much advantage as to acknowledge that they are angry with them.

And Article 211 provides a 'general remedy' against the 'good' passions. When a man perceives his blood is stirred, he ought to be wary...he must abstain from judgment...and divert himself with other thoughts.

The 211th Article

A general remedy against the passions.

And now we know them all, we have less reason to fear them than we had before. For we see that naturally they are all good, and that we ought to avoid only the ill use of them, or their excesses, for which the remedies I have laid down may suffice, if every man were careful enough to practise them. But because I have put premeditation and industry among these remedies, whereby the defects of nature may be corrected by using to separate the motions of the blood & spirits in oneself from the thoughts wherewith they [are] use[d] to be[ing] joined. I confess, few men are thus prepared against all encounters... But what may be done on such an occasion, and what I think to lay down here as the most general remedy, and the easiest to be practised, against all exorbitances of the passions, is that when a man perceives his blood thus moved, he ought to be wary.. he must abstain from giving his judgment thereon immediately, and divert himself from it to other thoughts, until time, and rest, have wholly allayed the emotion in the blood. And lastly, when it incites to actions, concerning which resolutions are instantly to be taken, the will must peculiarly dedicate itself to consider and follow the reasons repugnant to those which the passion represents, although they appear less weighty...

So Descartes is saying that that in the agonistic struggle Reason Versus Passion, reason can win. Using the principle of generosity even the weak can achieve dominion over the passions, provided enough skill is used in training the weak. All passions are good and useful to preserve the body, but can be used badly or in excess, so the blood must watched for its stirrings. Reason will pursue virtue and this alone is sufficient for the happiness that can withstand the vicissitudes of fortune.

All this as binary oppositions, good and evil, strong and weak, mastery and want of mastery.

Or as Aristotle said, 'Now the following opinions are held: (a) that Self-restraint and Endurance are good and praiseworthy dispositions, Unrestraint and Softness bad and blameworthy' (Nicomachean Ethics, 2000, p69) Aristotle goes on apparently in defence of unrestraint (akrasia) 'If Self-restraint makes a man steadfast in all his opinions, it may be bad, namely, if it makes him persist even in a false opinion. And if Unrestraint makes him liable to abandon any opinion, in some cases Unrestraint will be good. '

The word Aristotle uses for self-restraint is 'enkrateia' and the word for unrestraint is 'akrasia'. The word 'akrateia' exists and is translated as want of self control, incontinence, want of power, debility, and Aristotle does use the word akrateia in other works. Perseus (2005) lists only Xenophon (in *Memorabilia*) and Aristotle (in the *Eudemian Ethics* and *Nichomachean Ethics*) as using the two words (enkrateia and akrasia) as a pair. They are translated as self-control and lack of control in the *Eudemian Ethics*; this is a work preceding the more commonly known *Nichomachean Ethics*. The word enkrateia is translated as self-mastery but the word akrasia is a little more confusing (as it should be). The Greek word is the prefix 'a' (without) and the word 'krasia'. This word in Greek (akrasia) is translated alternatively as bad mixture (not mixed properly) or ill temperature (the word 'krasia' is from 'krasis', which is translated as a mixing, a blending, a union, or the temperature of the air) or as impotent, lack of self control.

Akrasia arrived in Latin as 'acrasia' which is translated as irregularity, intemperance, or unmixed. It arrived in English as acrasia and in 1596 in Spencer's *Faerie Queen* the personification of intemperance, incontinence was the enchantress, Acrasy. By 1634 it had been apheresed and had come to mean mentally affected, insane, possibly because it was conflated with the Norse word krasa, to crackle or crack; akrasia became crazy. (Oxford, 1979)

All of this (The Passions) without reference to God in a God-crazy world; a tribute to human free will and reason, training and the pursuit of virtue; a rejection of the Aquinian/Augustinian idea that only through God could happiness be found. Echoing Aristotle, Descartes seems to have untangled the pursuit of virtue from the tangled skein of the God of his day, and then shown how happiness arises from that pursuit. Unlike Aristotle, Descartes eliminated akrasia as having any benefits at all. Descartes was not a man in two minds, not even a man to hold two opinions, jostling for space in one mind. Akrasia is lack of union, the bumping together of things not yet transformed into a happy blend and it brings an uncomfortable temperature. Akrasia makes you crazy, cracked and cranky.

Descartes' aim was to develop certainty, to find truth where God had left it to be found by human free will and reason, and to eliminate doubt. *The Discourse* (1637), Part 4 includes his famous first principle of the philosophy that he sought;

But immediately upon this I observed that, whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought, should be somewhat; and as I observed that this truth, *I think, hence I am*, was so certain and of such evidence, that no ground of doubt, however extravagant, could be alleged by the Sceptics capable of shaking it, I concluded that I might, without scruple, accept it as the first principle of the Philosophy of which I was in search. (Descartes, 1637)

In Part 3 he says:

My *second* maxim was to be as firm and resolute in my actions as I was able, and not to adhere less steadfastly to the most doubtful opinions, when once adopted, than if they had been highly certain... it is very certain that, when it is not in our power to determine what is true, we ought to act according to what is most probable; and even although we should not remark a greater probability in one opinion than in another, we ought notwithstanding to choose one or the other, and afterwards consider it, in so far as it relates to practice, as no longer dubious, but manifestly true and certain, since the reason by which our choice has been determined is itself possessed of these qualities. This principle was sufficient thenceforward to rid me of all those repentings and pangs of remorse that usually disturb the consciences of such feeble and uncertain minds as, destitute of any clear and determinate principle of choice, allow themselves one day to adopt a course of action as the best, which they abandon the next, as the opposite. (Descartes, 1637)

Akrasia begone! This is the scientific method that still applied in the science of psychology I was taught, where the goal of psychology is to understand, describe, control and predict and where I act as though a hypothesis is true until it is probably not true.

Certainty is from the Latin 'certus' which translates as determined, fixed, resolved, in turn from 'cernere' which translates as to sift, to determine, to separate, to make out, to perceive, that which has been determined. This is from the Indo-European root 'krei' to sieve, separate, distinguish. This root sends out the words certain, discriminate, garble and riddle to English. It also sent out the comparative and the superlative certainer and certainest. These were used commonly until the middle of the 18th century when their use died out (Oxford, 1979). Things must have got a lot more certain then; they must have been at their certainest. They still are in the Science of Happiness.

The Unheard Voice of Spinoza

Baruch Spinoza was born in Amsterdam in 1632. His Portuguese/Jewish parents moved there because of the more tolerant climate. He was educated at a Jewish school so was exposed to the thought of Jewish medieval philosophers who aimed at combining the traditional theology with ideas from Aristotle and his Neoplatonic commentators. Spinoza was an independent thinker from a young age; eventually his views, especially of a pantheistic deity, were seen as threatening by the Jewish community in Amsterdam and he was excommunicated in 1656. This, along with the decline in the family's business fortunes brought about by the Anglo/Dutch

war, freed him to leave Amsterdam and concentrate on philosophy while working as a lens grinder.

He read Descartes' works and published an exposition of Descartes' geometry in 1663. He found three unsatisfactory aspects to Descartes' metaphysics: the transcendence of God, the extreme dualism of mind and body, and the ascription of free will both to God and to human beings. He read Francis Bacon's work and found fault with his empiricism too, most particularly his non-mathematical approach, but also his belief that understanding receives an infusion from the will, which Spinoza did not believe was free or causal (Israel, 2002).

In his lifetime, and after, he was denounced as an atheist; the God invoked in his *Ethica* is a more personal, immediate, naturalistic God than the absent God of Descartes' *Passion of the Souls*.

Spinoza wrote his *Ethica* toward the end of his life and it was published after his death in 1677. For him the motive of philosophy was the classic motive of opening to man the way of the good, the blessed life, *vita beata*, the happy life (Israel, 2002).

His work is less scrutable than Descartes so I have connected with it through Israel's (2002) interpretation first. Israel's summary of Spinoza's *Ethics* (Israel, 2002, p230-241) could be further summarised to:

- There is only one substance and therefore only one set of rules governing the whole of reality which surrounds us and of which we are part – this means body and soul are not separate but different aspects of the same substance.
- In nature there is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way - hence the chain of necessity is infinite and infinitely complex, and only partially knowable through human science, not because elements of the chain are conceptually beyond the reach of human reason but because science cannot empirically take account of the whole of such a sequence.
- Will and intellect are related to God's nature as motion and rest and therefore freedom of the will is not necessary for God to produce an effect – all things have been predetermined by God not through the freedom of his will but from his absolute nature – the mind as sensibility of the body is part of that nature and thus determined through necessity.
- Men suppose themselves to be free because they are conscious of their desires and actions but are ignorant of the causes by which they are determined to desire and act as they do - men always act toward an end they perceive to benefit them.

- Having realised that nature provides for them they are psychologically disposed to assume these things were created by some agency for their use and this explains why man has developed so many accounts of the gods and their desires. It also explains why men ascribe natural phenomena such as earthquakes to the gods.
- The human mind is awareness of the impact of other human bodies and external realities via sensation, emotion and impressions. It cannot know itself except by how it is affected – this explains why most men's minds are muddled and why mankind only slowly gropes toward reason and philosophy.
- Only mathematically verifiable measurements and calculation can differentiate what is true from what is false.
- When we understand we act from the necessity of our nature (which is God) and stop expecting to be rewarded or punished for our good or bad deeds we can then act from love and morality and this is where our greatest happiness or blessedness lies.
- Mans irrationality, inadequacy, and absurdity are within nature not a defect of nature.
- Good and evil are relative; the terms signify nothing of an intrinsic or absolute character but are just modes of thinking about things that bring joy or pain.
- Virtue is human power itself where power is the striving (conatus) by which man seeks to preserve his being.
- This striving is appetite or when accompanied by consciousness, desire. Man can be an adequate or inadequate cause of his desires; where he is inadequate desire can be caused by external things and thus can lead to either happiness (the emotion caused by lucky external events) or sadness (the emotion caused by unlucky external events) – these are passive transitions.
- A central task of the Ethics is to specify the way in which we can become more active, that is, become the adequate cause of desires whose fulfilment necessarily promotes the preservation of our existence, and produce changes which we experience as pleasure of the highest sort – tranquility.
- The human mind has the ability to grasp eternally true ideas – by dwelling on eternal things man shares in eternity and this brings about the highest form of human happiness.
- Knowledge of the first kind is based on representation to us through our senses in a way that is confused for our intellect; knowledge of the second kind is correct inferences or logical deductions in terms of geometrically related propositions; knowledge of the third kind is an intuitive knowledge of the formal essence of things. This knowledge of the third kind brings the philosophers salvation.

I then connected with Spinoza's ideas about happiness and salvation through Rutherford's (1999) article on Spinoza's *Acquiescentia*. Rutherford says that Spinoza's writings are preoccupied with advancing a formula for the highest human happiness (*felicitas*) or

blessedness (*beatiudo*). Spinoza uses the term *acquiescentia* for the highest happiness and Rutherford translates this as tranquillity or contentment of mind but the Latin *acquiesco* is defined as, a) to come to a state of repose in relation to one's wishes, desires, to repose in, to find rest, pleasure, to rejoice in or b) to be satisfied with, to acquiesce in or give assent to. The English word from this Latin one is *acquiesce* which means to consent or comply passively or without protest. The Indo-European root is 'kwei' to rest, to be quiet and the Latin *tranquillus* (which Spinoza did not use) is from the same root. This is translated as quiet, calm, still, tranquil usually of the weather or the sea. For me *acquiescentia* has a sense of rest after activity where tranquillity is undisturbed serenity.

So far it sounded to me as though Spinoza was saying that I live in a unified field ruled by non-linear dynamics which may be partially understood through complexity theory. Empiricism tells me more about the observer than the observed and makes me become causally crazy. I am socially constructed; everything is relative. I strive to preserve myself through desire, and desire primarily comes from outside me, unless I work very hard to have it come from inside me in alignment with my knowledge of nature. My irrationalities, inadequacies, absurdities are not pathological. I can aspire to *acquiescentia in se ipso* (translated as self-esteem or the joy in perfection already possessed) which is the kind of joy I experience as I move away from external causes of my desires and experience myself as an author of my own increase in perfection through improvements in my own power of thinking or acting. This will lead inevitably to the knowledge that I do not have absolute power to adapt things to my own use. I can aspire to *acquiescentia animi* too; this is man's highest happiness or blessedness or his salvation and is the joy arising from knowledge of the third kind, the intellectual knowledge of the intuitive knowledge of God, the timeless joy of the idea as an eternal essence. Chaos theory meets Buddhism?

The Churches all agreed on the risen body and Descartes was saying at least the soul is eternal, but Spinoza was only offering a kind of mystical un-individual union with eternal essence. Descartes said the pursuit of virtue (the virtues tabulated by him) brings happiness; Spinoza said the virtuous life is the one devoted to the pursuit of one's own advantage and the only real advantage is an increase in understanding. This will lead to justice, honesty, honourable actions and ultimately to *acquiescentia in se ipso* (Rutherford, 1999). Descartes was willing to tell the weak how to be happy on their way to perfection and Spinoza said weakness is part of nature; we are not imperfect we are human. Descartes said God had designed and built, but then left the building so we could discover its truths, and Spinoza said Nature is God and it is chaotic. Descartes said we have free will and Spinoza said we have no idea what forms us and free will is an illusion.

Having made a preliminary circumnavigation of Spinoza's ethics I finally went to the text itself and brought back some fragments. *The Ethics* has five parts:

- PART 1 CONCERNING GOD
- PART II ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND
- PART III ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS
- PART IV OF HUMAN BONDAGE, OR THE STRENGTH OF THE EMOTIONS
- PART V OF THE POWER OF THE UNDERSTANDING, OR OF HUMAN FREEDOM

PART II ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND

1. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the decree of God, and to be partakers in the Divine nature, and so much the more, as we perform more perfect actions and more and more understand God. Such a doctrine not only completely tranquilizes our spirit, but also shows us where our highest happiness or blessedness is, namely, solely in the knowledge of God, whereby we are led to act only as love and piety shall bid us. We may thus clearly understand, how far astray from a true estimate of virtue are those who expect to be decorated by God with high rewards for their virtue, and their best actions, as for having endured the direst slavery; as if virtue and the service of God were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom.
2. Inasmuch as it teaches us, how we ought to conduct ourselves with respect to the gifts of fortune, or matters which are not in our power, and do not follow from our nature. For it shows us, that we should await and endure fortune's smiles or frowns with an equal mind, seeing that all things follow from the eternal decree of God by the same necessity, as it follows from the essence of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two right angles.
3. This doctrine raises social life, inasmuch as it teaches us to hate no man, neither to despise, to deride, to envy, or to be angry with any. Further, as it tells us that each should be content with his own, and helpful to his neighbour, not from any womanish pity, favour, or superstition, but solely by the guidance of reason, according as the time and occasion demand, as I will show in Part III.

Lastly, this doctrine confers no small advantage on the commonwealth; for it teaches how citizens should be governed and led, not so as to become slaves, but so that they may freely do whatsoever things are best. I have thus fulfilled the promise made at the beginning of this note, and I thus bring the second part of my treatise to a close. I think I have therein explained the nature and properties of the human mind at sufficient length, and, considering the difficulty of the subject, with sufficient clearness. I have laid a foundation, whereon may be raised many excellent conclusions of the highest utility and most necessary to be known, as will, in what follows, be partly made plain.

Like Descartes, Spinoza thought that happiness lay in the management of the passions and that the passions came from without and affected the power of reason, but unlike Descartes he did not think reason could always end up the winner in the struggle between mind and emotion.

PART 3. ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS

Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be treating rather of matters outside nature than of natural phenomena following nature's general laws. They appear to conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom : for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows nature's order, that he has absolute control over his actions, and that he is determined solely by himself. They attribute human infirmities and fickleness, not to the power of nature in general, but to some mysterious flaw in the nature of man, which accordingly they bemoan, deride, despise, or, as usually happens, abuse : he, who succeeds in hitting off the weakness of the human mind more eloquently or more acutely than his fellows, is looked upon as a seer. Still there has been no lack of very excellent men (to whose toil and industry I confess myself much indebted), who have written many noteworthy things concerning the right way of life, and have given much sage advice to mankind. But no one, so far as I know, has defined the nature and strength of the emotions, and the power of the mind against them for their restraint.

I do not forget, that the illustrious Descartes, though he believed, that the mind has absolute power over its actions, strove to explain human emotions by their primary causes, and, at the same time, to point out a way, by which the mind might attain to absolute dominion over them. However, in my opinion, he accomplishes nothing beyond a display of the acuteness of his own great intellect, as I will show in the proper place. For the present I wish to revert to those, who would rather abuse or deride human emotions than understand them. Such persons will, doubtless think it strange that I should attempt to treat of human vice and folly geometrically, and should wish to set forth with rigid reasoning those matters which they cry out against as repugnant to reason, frivolous, absurd, and dreadful. However, such is my plan. Nothing comes to pass in nature, which can be set down to a flaw therein; for nature is always the same, and everywhere one and the same in her efficacy and power of action; that is, nature's laws and ordinances, whereby all things come to pass and change from one form to another, are everywhere and always the same; so that there should be one and the same method of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever, namely, through nature's universal laws and rules.

Thus the passions of hatred, anger, envy, and so on, considered in themselves, follow from this same necessity and efficacy of nature; they answer to certain definite causes, through which they are understood, and possess certain properties as worthy of being known as the properties of anything else, whereof the contemplation in itself affords us delight. I shall, therefore, treat of the nature and strength of the emotions according to the same method, as I employed heretofore in my investigations concerning God and the mind. I shall consider human actions and desires in exactly the same manner, as though I were concerned with lines, planes, and solids.

(Spinoza, 1876)

On the subject of akrasia (which he calls bondage) he said we need to know the power and the infirmity of our nature before we can say what reason can do. But he also said perfection is merely a way of thinking; it is socially constructed. Descartes' perfectible human is only perfect from a point of view of what perfect is constructed as. Man names a quality perfect and forgets that nature is formed from necessity; nature (including man) in all its apparent imperfection is always perfect.

PART IV: Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions

PREFACE

Human infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions I name bondage: for, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is not his own master, but lies at the mercy of fortune: so much so, that he is often compelled, while seeing that which is better for him, to follow that which is worse. ...Perfection and imperfection, then, are in reality merely modes of thinking, or notions which we form from a comparison among one another of individuals of the same species; hence I said above (II. Def. vi.), that by reality and perfection I mean the same thing. For we are wont to refer all the individual things in nature to one genus, which is called the highest genus, namely, to the category of Being, whereto absolutely all individuals in nature belong. Thus, in so far as we refer the individuals in nature to this category, and comparing them one with another, find that some possess more of being or reality than others, we, to this extent, say that some are more perfect than others. Again, in so far as we attribute to them anything implying negation-as term, end, infirmity, etc., we, to this extent, call them imperfect, because they do not affect our mind so much as the things which we call perfect, not because they have any intrinsic deficiency, or because Nature has blundered. For nothing lies within the scope of a thing's nature, save that which follows from the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause, and whatsoever follows from the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause

necessarily comes to pass.

PROP. XVII. Desire arising from the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as such knowledge is concerned with what is contingent, can be controlled far more easily still, than desire for things that are present.

Proof.-This Prop. is proved in the same way as the last Prop. from IV. xii. Coroll.

Note.-I think I have now shown the reason, why men are moved by opinion more readily than by true reason, why it is that the true knowledge of good and evil stirs up conflicts in the soul, and often yields to every kind of passion. This state of things gave rise to the exclamation of the poet: "The better path I gaze at and approve, The worse-I follow." Ecclesiastes seems to have had the same thought in his mind, when he says, "He who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow." I have not written the above with the object of drawing the conclusion, that ignorance is more excellent than knowledge, or that a wise man is on a par with a fool in controlling his emotions, but because it is necessary to know the power and the infirmity of our nature, before we can determine what reason can do in restraining the emotions, and what is beyond her power. I have said, that in the present part I shall merely treat of human infirmity. The power of reason over the emotions I have settled to treat separately.

(Spinoza, 1876)

Unlike Descartes he re-thought the nature of good and evil as well and relegated sin to a non-divine matter.

PROP. XXXVII. NOTE II

...We may readily understand that there is in the state of nature nothing, which by universal consent is pronounced good or bad; for in the state of nature everyone thinks solely of his own advantage, and according to his disposition, with reference only to his individual advantage, decides what is good or bad, being bound by no law to anyone besides himself. In the state of nature, therefore, sin is inconceivable; it can only exist in a state, where good and evil are pronounced on by common consent, and where everyone is bound to obey the State authority. Sin, then, is nothing else but disobedience, which is therefore punished by the right of the State only. Obedience, on the other hand, is set down as merit, inasmuch as a man is thought worthy of merit, if he takes delight in the advantages which a State provides. Again, in the state of nature, no one is by common consent master of anything, nor is there anything in nature, which can be said to belong to one man

rather than another: all things are common to all. Hence, in the state of nature, we can conceive no wish to render to every man his own, or to deprive a man of that which belongs to him; in other words, there is nothing in the state of nature answering to justice and injustice. Such ideas are only possible in a social state, when it is decreed by common consent what belongs to one man and what to another. From all these considerations it is evident, that justice and injustice, sin and merit, are extrinsic ideas, and not attributes which display the nature of the mind. But I have said enough.

(Spinoza, 1876)

Toward the end of the Ethics he discusses Descartes' idea there is no soul so weak they cannot acquire power over their passions and takes issue with Descartes' separation of soul and body.

PART V:

Of the Power of the Understanding, or of Human Freedom

PREFACE

(Descartes) thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak, that it cannot, under proper direction, acquire absolute power over its passions. For passions as defined by him are "perceptions, or feelings, or disturbances of the soul, which are referred to the soul as species, and which (mark the expression) are produced, preserved, and strengthened through some movement of the spirits." (*Passions de l'âme*, I.27). But, seeing that we can join any motion of the gland, or consequently of the spirits, to any volition, the determination of the will depends entirely on our own powers; if, therefore, we determine our will with sure and firm decisions in the direction to which we wish our actions to tend, and associate the motions of the passions which we wish to acquire with the said decisions, we shall acquire an absolute dominion over our passions. Such is the doctrine of this illustrious philosopher (in so far as I gather it from his own words); it is one which, had it been less ingenious, I could hardly believe to have proceeded from so great a man. Indeed, I am lost in wonder, that a philosopher, who had stoutly asserted, that he would draw no conclusions which do not follow from self-evident premises, and would affirm nothing which he did not clearly and distinctly perceive, and who had so often taken to task the scholastics for wishing to explain obscurities through occult qualities, could maintain a hypothesis, beside which occult qualities are commonplace. What does he understand, I ask, by the union of the mind and the body? What clear and distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union with a certain particle of extended matter? Truly I should like him to explain this union through its proximate

cause. But he had so distinct a conception of mind being distinct from body, that he could not assign any particular cause of the union between the two, or of the mind itself, but was obliged to have recourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is to God. Further, I should much like to know, what degree of motion the mind can impart to this pineal gland, and with what force can it hold it suspended? For I am in ignorance, whether this gland can be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which we have closely united with firm decisions, cannot be again disjoined therefrom by physical causes; in which case it would follow that, although the mind firmly intended to face a given danger, and had united to this decision the motions of boldness, yet at the sight of the danger the gland might become suspended in a way, which would preclude the mind thinking of anything except running away. In truth, as there is no common standard of volition and motion, so is there no comparison possible between the powers of the mind and the power or strength of the body; consequently the strength of one cannot in any wise be determined by the strength of the other. We may also add, that there is no gland discoverable in the midst of the brain, so placed that it can thus easily be set in motion in so many ways, and also that all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the brain. Lastly, I omit all the assertions which he makes concerning the will and its freedom, inasmuch as I have abundantly proved that his premises are false. Therefore, since the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by the understanding only, we shall determine solely by the knowledge of the mind the remedies against the emotions, which I believe all have had experience of, but do not accurately observe or distinctly see, and from the same basis we shall deduce all those conclusions, which have regard to the mind's blessedness.

(Spinoza, 1876)

If Spinoza's truth had won in the encounter with Descartes' truth the Enlightenment would have been a different one. But both these thinkers were writing against the background of the Dutch Republic and the Calvinist disciplinary revolution could never accept Spinoza's truth. If the contingencies of history had rejected Descartes and accepted Spinoza science as I know it could not have existed. But the rise of Cartesian science and the rise of capitalism, the birth of the industrial revolution and the benefits of bending and disciplining bodies to their requirements neatly coincided.

The Cartesians, The Church, The University, The Truth

According to Israel (2002), before 1650 science and philosophy did not concern rulers and ruling elites, they saw them as peripheral to the business of government, because they were under the control of the churches and practiced in institutions under ecclesiastical supervision. While some universities (such as Leiden) were set up by monarchical decree many (like Utrecht) grew from being seminaries to being universities. Either way, because of the strict control exerted by theological imperatives, The Church and The University were effectively one institution.

In the Dutch Republic from about 1635 onwards there grew a rift between scholastic Aristotelian philosophy and the new Cartesian philosophy. In 1634 Gilbertus Voetius became Professor of Theology at the new university at Utrecht. He introduced Aristotelian philosophy and scholastic method as solid underpinning of theological learning to protect the purity of the Reformed dogma, but always stated the Bible was the touchstone for all learning. For him theology was the primary form of learning and philosophy was secondary. Students learnt the definition of the world, its causes, including its final cause, its form and its attributes in a didactic way from approved sources. Attacking the philosophical presuppositions of the system was, to Voetius, the same as attacking the faith; Cartesianism proclaimed its method without reference to theological truth, it claimed the absolute truth of Copernicanism, which was considered to be contrary to the Bible, and it made Reason all-powerful and therefore theology powerless (Israel, 2002)

At around the same time Descartes became friends with Henricus Renerius who was made professor at Utrecht in 1634; he was certainly sympathetic to Descartes' philosophy and taught aspects of it himself, but more importantly was instrumental in the appointment of Henricus Regius, his successor in the post. Regius taught the new Cartesian theories including the circulation of the blood and the motion of the earth. In a tract that discussed the union of mind and body he crossed the boundary to theological heterodoxy; Voetius complained, the quarrel between the two men went on for 10 years, and in 1645 the authorities ordered Regius to stick to medicine and not mention Descartes again.

Vermij (2002) says that many of the friends that Descartes cultivated were university professors and he presented Cartesianism as not just a set of philosophical ideas but as a new program of learning; knowledge should come from the study of nature not the study of ancient texts. At the core of the new program was Descartes' new physics based on the study of the mechanistic universe.

The Voetius vs Regius dispute was only one example of the same dispute happening at Leiden (the oldest Dutch university). Vermij (2002) says that the dispute at Leiden had Heereboord, Professor of Logic, taking the Cartesian position but from his own writings it is not clear that he even fully understood or agreed with Descartes and he was not a Copernican; his Cartesian position may have had more to do with his dislike of Aristotelian scholastic philosophy and the Leiden theologians who taught it. In 1647 the curators of the university at Leiden took the same positions as the curators at Utrecht and forbade mention of Descartes or Cartesianism.

While Utrecht remained under Voetius' guidance Cartesianism was not taught but Regius continued to publish outside the university expounding Cartesian philosophy. At Leiden the ban was less strict. Cocceius was professor of theology at Leiden from 1650. Quite apart from a dispute over his support of the teaching of the Cartesian method, he and Voetius had a long and bitter dispute over covenant theology with Cocceius spearheading the Arminian position and Voetius the orthodox Calvinist position.

Outside the University religious dissenters often adopted Cartesianism, probably not because they fully understood, but because it was the counter position of the Reformed Church. The rift in the Universities paralleled the rift between the reformed church and the liberal sects of Calvinism (the Socinians and the Arminians).

Over the next 50 years, at both universities, a mixture of Aristotelian and Cartesianism was taught. Vermij (2002) says that students were often put in the position of being taught both systems as true and having to choose for themselves which they would take as truth to their lives outside the university as lawyers, physicians, ministers or civil servants. It was common, at Leiden particularly, for fistfights and more, to break out amongst students and lecturers who had taken opposing positions.

Descartes left the Dutch Republic in 1649 and died the following year but the dispute did not die with him. It moved to another level in 1656 when the States General, wishing to mediate a form of peace issued an 'Order against the mixture of Theology with Philosophy'. This ordered that the freedom to philosophise in the Republic should not be misused to the disadvantage of Scripture, that philosophers should not taunt theologians and they in return should not discuss questions that can be solved by the use of 'Natural Reason'. It confirmed the resolution of the curators at both universities that Cartesian philosophy should not be dealt with in lessons, either to agree with it or to disagree with it. This may have seemed like a win to Voetius but it was in fact one of the first steps toward the separation of Church and University and the freedom to philosophise was now a State decree and Natural Reason was the real winner (Vermij, 2002).

Israel (2002) says from the 1680's through to 1720 Cartesianism was in general ascendancy in all the Dutch universities and high schools and the Netherlands became the chief source of

powerful intellectual current, basically a modified academic Cartesianism, which spread rapidly across Germany and the rest of Northern Europe (other than France, Descartes' native land, where both the Church and the University remained under Church rule).

In the battle Reason Versus Faith, just as in the battle Reason Versus Passion, Descartes' Reason had won, at The University at least. Spinoza says nature is not contingent but Foucault says look for contingencies. The Cartesian program became intertwined with the inter-theological disputes in the Dutch Republic. Wrapped up in Copernicanism, geometry, physiology the new truth struggled with the old.

Foucault's position is, unequivocally, that 'truth is not external to power' (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p204) but the job is not to free truth from power it is to make the account of truth function differently within the field of power. If I am to undertake this job in my present, I need this genealogy to give me the perspective to see how truth within a field of power functioned to produce the history of my present.

The basis of Aristotelianism was a separation between the qualitative mathematical sciences and the quantitative natural sciences. The basis of Cartesianism was the mathematisation of nature. These fundamental differences created tensions because they grew out of competing rights to produce knowledge. The truths of Aristotelianism and Cartesianism were struggling within power relations, a struggle for the right to define truth and speak it by The Church and The University where The University eventually becomes The Cartesian University. The only thing the two camps agreed about was that Spinoza was dangerous.

Foucault's later unpublished lectures dealt with the concept of parrhesia – truth-telling. In the conclusion of his six lecture series at Berkeley (Foucault, 1983) he says, 'My intention was not to deal with the problem of truth, but with the problem of truth-teller or truth-telling as an activity' He goes on to say considering truth-telling as an activity raises questions like: 'Who is able to tell the truth? What are the moral, the ethical, and the spiritual conditions which entitle someone to present himself as, and to be considered as, a truth-teller? About what topics is it important to tell the truth? (About the world? About nature? About the city? About behaviour? About man?) What are the consequences of telling the truth? What are its anticipated positive effects for the city, for the city's rulers, for the individual, etc.? And finally: what is the relation between the activity of truth-telling and the exercise of power, or should these activities be completely independent and kept separate?' I am not going to attempt to answer these questions in any depth but I am interested in how Cartesian truth became possible.

As I read Foucault's questions I reflect on the feeling in myself of a yearning for truth. The word truth is from the Old English 'treuth' meaning loyalty. It is in turn from the Indo European root 'deru' meaning to be firm, solid or steadfast; tree, endure, and druid all come from the same

root. While I acknowledge that desire for solid, truthful ground, I will only consider, here, the nature of Descartes as truth-teller, how he met all the requirements for parrhesiastes.

Of all the fragments of Descartes I have assembled in this work his dream of his philosophy in 1619 is one fragment that might best explain his status as parrhesiastes. He was 23 years of age and was attending the coronation of Ferdinand II of Austria in Frankfurt. He spent the winter staying in the house of a middle class family; he had almost complete leisure to attend to his philosophy and it was there he made his original mathematical discovery (this would later become his analytical geometry) and formulated the methods outlined in his *Discourse on the Method*. Following his mathematical discoveries he had a series of three dreams in one night. His first biographer Adrien Baillet describes the dreams and says Descartes believed it was the 'spirit of truth that wished, through the dream, to reveal to him the treasures of all the science'. Part of the dream included Descartes having a discussion with an unknown man who said a poem beginning 'Est et non' or 'Yes and No' was the most beautiful. Descartes answered that the one starting 'Quod vitae sectibus iter' was more beautiful; this means 'What sort of life one should choose.' Descartes interpreted this to mean the sound advice of a wise person or a moral theology (Von Franz, 1985, p121).

Descartes took into his work nearly all the elements that Foucault identifies with the 'truth-teller' and was ultimately anointed as truth-teller via the agonistic process of establishing and testing of authority that sets aside the search for certain truths. Foucault says parrhesia is an ancient ethical practice (again, ethics is about customs and practices through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents) of 'fearless speech', usually in the context of a combative exchange between speaker and audience (Luxon, 2004). Or, of saying everything the parrhesiastes has in mind. not hiding anything but opening his heart and mind completely to other people through his discourse; the parrhesiastes acts on other people's minds by showing them directly what he believes. 'Since Descartes the coincidence between belief and truth is obtained in a certain (mental) evidential experience' (Foucault, 1983, p3).

Luxon (1983) says the parrhesiastes must have adequate resources to guide individuals in an ethical work on the self (modern experts find these resources in profession) and cites Foucault as saying, 'Parrhesia is not a profession, it is something more difficult to pin down; it's an attitude, a manner of being that develops out of virtue' (Luxon, 1983, p468). The parrhesiastes is not linked to a particular institution and lacks recourse to an authority of a particular office, is less powerful than those to whom he speaks and it is partly this aspect that has generated the belief that truth and power are separate. He speaks only in his own name, takes personal responsibility for his words, and his words reflect his personal virtues and character. He speaks from a sense of duty, framed as an obligation to himself to bear the burden of speaking truthfully to improve or help other people, and therefore parrhesia can occur in a monarchy, dictatorship or democracy. It is risky truth involving personal danger (Socrates was a parrhesiastes) and

this risk helps to establish both credibility and ethical development; if it is dangerous to say it must be true and you must be courageous to say it. The parrhesiastes must be willing to use freedom to speak truth, speaking truth does not lead to freedom as a result; it stems from the rational use of freedom to speak frankly (this is not rhetorical speech designed to persuade). Those who question the parrhesiastes, his interlocutors, participate in the process of struggle to attain truth using curiosity and combat and finally by observing that the parrhesiastes does not speak from self-interest or to flatter they learn to trust him, to allow his words to influence and ultimately transform them.

Foucault's work on parrhesia is tracing the history in the Greek democracy and Luxon (2004) says the model of truth-telling allows us to distinguish analytically those relations that produce individuals (to fit a specific mould) from those that educate individuals for autonomy (such that they are the result of their own design). Foucault displays parrhesia as a process of subject-formation that is governed by relations of trust that allows the 'education' rather than the production of individuals.

I am not yet sure that the effects of the difference between education and production are yet discernible to me. I can only hope that the subject formed by education might have more room to move in that tropological process.

Descartes' dream where the spirit of truth gave him the treasures of science set a parrhesiastical process in motion. He spoke from 'outside', his dream permeated him with sense of truth and duty and he spoke at risk to himself. He used freedom to speak. As parrhesiastes he started a process that ultimately split truth-telling down the middle. The Church was left with irrational spiritual truth-telling and The Cartesian University with rational scientific truth-telling.

The Cartesians, The Republic, The People, The Scientific Consumer

As the struggle between Aristotelianism and Cartesianism dragged on through the late seventeenth century the Dutch Republic entered a new phase. Throughout most of Descartes' life in the Netherlands the Prince of Orange had been Frederick Henry (brother of Maurice). He died in 1647 and his 21-year-old son William II became Prince. While his father had governed in conjunction with the State-General assembly he attempted to abolish this; he sieged Amsterdam and imprisoned members of the assembly. When he died of small pox in 1650 (later the same year as Descartes) his own son was an infant and the States-General took complete control. For the following 22 years the Dutch Republic was ruled by an oligarchy selected from the seven provinces of the Netherlands.

As Grand Pensionary (head and finance minister) of the republic was Johan de Witt who was educated at Leiden University while Descartes was still living in the Netherlands. He was talented at mathematics and wrote a textbook on analytical geometry to extend and make more available Descartes' abstruse work. Cook (2002) says de Witt saw himself as a skeptical realist who had no faith in humanity to save itself; he was a Calvinist of a neo-Stoic kind. His solution to the inherent corruption of humanity was the sharing of power to prevent abuse, Cook (2002, p10) cites de Witt's words as 'the welfare of the inhabitants of the country must be the supreme law', but he did not go so far as to agree with Spinoza's ideas on a true democracy. He agreed with Descartes that the passions of man were good but did not agree that all men could learn to master their passions with reason. He was a pragmatic man who Cook (2002) cites as saying 'nothing so much inspires men to love and affection as the feeling in the purse.' It was de Witt who carefully crafted the 'Order against the mixture of Theology with Philosophy' in 1656 that walked a tightrope between placating the orthodox Calvinists and allowing Cartesian-Coccean philosophy to continue to be published. Descartes' works were not banned in the Netherlands during this period (and neither were Spinoza's) although pressure was constantly applied by the Reformed Church (Israel, 2002).

De Witt's priorities during his leadership of the Dutch Republic were to restore the country's financial position and to extend its commercial interests in the East Indies, all the while trying to ensure that the house of Orange would not be restored. He firmly believed that monarchy (in state or church) was detrimental to 'all the liberal Arts and Sciences, all Virtue, and the Liberties and Properties of Men' (Cook, 2002, p45). Ultimately he lost the battle; the French invaded the Netherlands in 1672, the Reformed Church moved to restore the Prince of Orange and a crowd ripped de Witt and his brother to pieces in a street in The Hague. The tide had turned and the Dutch Republic was no more. But Cartesianism remained in multiple forms and places and Spinoza's banned works were circulated illegally.

There was also a change for the people during the years of de Witt's Dutch Republic. Book shops were allowed to sell books banned in other parts of Europe, literary journals began and so did literary and philosophical societies. Tea and coffee shops started to open in Holland and became a social space for the intellectuals of all classes.

The Dutch East India Company imported tea for the first time in 1610 and by 1650 it was a popular, if upper class, drink. The Dutch gave Tea its name and were the first to add milk to it. At the same time as the Cartesian/Aristotelian debate raged so did a scholarly debate about whether tea was good or bad for people. By 1650 the Dutch were actively involved in trade throughout the Western world. Peter Stuyvesant, Director General of the Dutch possessions in North America, brought the first tea to America to the colonists in the Dutch settlement of New Amsterdam (later re-named New York by the English when the Dutch surrendered it); a municipal government modeled on the Dutch cities ran the settlement. On acquiring the colony,

the English found that the small settlement consumed more tea at that time than all of England. Coffee made its debut around the same time; around 1616 the Dutch acquired coffee plants and by 1650 had a strong trade in coffee.

Israel (2002) says there arose a new class of man (and to much lesser extent women), who frequented the tea and coffee shops, urbane, well read, and intellectual. This new space became a leveling force across classes. Joeckell (2003) calls this new form of public discourse and intellectual interchange a universal stage occupied by one large homogenous group. This leveling worked to universalize and homogenize experience toward a uniform ideal.

While Spinoza's atheism was too radical for most, Cartesian philosophy, opposed by the strict orthodox Calvinists, was discussed and adopted by the inquiring minds, with a shot of caffeine making them work a bit faster than usual. Happiness and its pursuit became one of the subjects of discussion and a mythical ideal began to form. Descartes says that Passion is good, that Reason can Control Passion, that the pursuit of virtue leads to happiness.

How strong is my reason? Am I happy? For the first time the subject of popular science was formed, the consumer of scientifically produced knowledge, the same consumer of the commodified products of the colonised Dutch possessions.

Backtrack to Bacon

I have started this genealogy with Descartes and the strange confluence of conditions that occurred in the Dutch Republic, which led to the Cartesian University, the Republic, and the individual who is both consumer and subject of scientific discourse. One of the influences on Descartes (and as it turns out many of the people who appear later in this story) was Francis Bacon (1561- 1626). Smith (1952) says that Descartes, very unlike Bacon, was an intuitive who saw conclusions before he had the steps to establish the conclusion. However, Descartes wrote 'many eulogistic references to Francis Bacon' (Smith, 1952, p6) but seems to have interpreted his empiricism in a unique and possibly ill-informed way. Descartes was critical of those who professed to follow Bacon using only observation and experiment in purely inductive way. He believed the experience of the senses is what we understand least, only the deductive method can interpret the appearance of the reality as it presents to the senses.

Haldane (1905) cites Baillet (Descartes' original biographer) as saying Descartes was affected by the news of Bacon's death. Even though he thought empiricism was nothing to him if he did not know the meaning of experience, he believed Bacon had established an invaluable method in science that would strike a deathblow at Aristotelianism.

According to Church (1884), Bacon was born English and was a brilliant but sickly child like Descartes. He attended Trinity College, Cambridge, read law, became a barrister and later a member of the House of Commons. His fortunes rose with James 1's ascension to the throne in 1603. In the eighteen years following he rose to become Baron of Verulam and then Viscount of St. Albans. In 1621 he was impeached for corruption and retired from office. He died in 1626 after devoting his last five years to his philosophical works. Foucault's definition of parrhesiastes would not see Bacon as truth-teller but subsequent generations have made him one anyway. A quick search on the internet told me he was Roger Bacon, Shakespeare, Queen Elizabeth 1's illegitimate son, he edited the King James translation of the Bible, and he was a Rosicrucian. I'm not sure how he fitted his day job in, but the myths of Bacon's life ripple widely through the virtual world of our lives.

The England in which Bacon lived most of his life was the golden age of Elizabeth I. Raleigh and Drake explored and fought the Spanish on the high seas and the Armada met its end in 1588. Plague came and went, politics was a life and death affair and Shakespeare was writing.

Bacon started writing pamphlets of a political nature for public circulation in 1585. But in 1603 he wrote about his destiny, a vision of being a benefactor to the human race, *the conqueror and subduer of necessities*.

Believing that I was born for the service of mankind, and regarding the care of the Commonwealth as a kind of common property which, like the air and water, belongs to everybody, I set myself to consider in what way mankind might be best served, and what service I was myself best fitted by nature to perform.

Now among all the benefits that could be conferred upon mankind, I found none so great as the discovery of new arts, endowments, and commodities for the bettering of man's life.... But if a man could succeed, not in striking out some particular invention, however useful, but in kindling a light in nature—a light that should in its very rising touch and illuminate all the border regions that confine upon the circle of our present knowledge; and so spreading further and further should presently disclose and bring into sight all that is most hidden and secret in the world—that man (I thought) would be the benefactor indeed of the human race—the propagator of man's empire over the universe, the champion of liberty, the conqueror and subduer of necessities.

For myself, I found that I was fitted for nothing so well as for the study of Truth; as having a mind nimble and versatile enough to catch the resemblances of things (which is the chief point), and at the same time steady enough to fix and distinguish their subtler differences; as being gifted by nature with desire to seek, patience to

doubt, fondness to meditate, slowness to assert, readiness to reconsider, carefulness to dispose and set in order; and as being a man that neither affects what is new nor admires what is old, and that hates every kind of imposture. So I thought my nature had a kind of familiarity and relationship with Truth.

(Bacon cited in Church, 1884, Chapter 1)

In 1603 he wrote *Valerius Terminus – Of The Interpretation of Nature* in which he began to outline some of the ideas he would expound in more detail in his later works. While Bacon expounded an empirical method he did not (like Locke later on) think the mind was a *tabula rasa*. He thought our senses did not receive objective images of a true picture but saw the world through an enchanted glass (a distorted mirror); the enchantment (or distortion) was caused by four idols; the word idol is from the Greek *eidolus* which means phantom or mirage. For Bacon man's perceptions were skewed because man mingles his own nature with what he observes. The four major sources of distortion are human nature (the tribe), man's own peculiar individual nature (the cave), society where man intersects with man using language to communicate (the marketplace) and the received dogmas of philosophy and religion (the theatre). The Idols to Bacon seem to be, as the Passions to Descartes, objects from outside which prevent rationality; the Idols cause *akrasia*. Bacon thinks that the distortion caused by the Idols can be eliminated using his method.

The reflexion also from glasses so usually resembled to the imagery of the mind, every man knoweth to receive error and variety both in colour, magnitude, and shape, according to the quality of the glass. But yet no use hath been made of these and many the like observations, to move men to search out and upon search to give true cautions of the native and inherent errors in the mind of man which have coloured and corrupted all his notions and impressions.

I do find therefore in this enchanted glass four Idols or false appearances of several and distinct sorts, every sort comprehending many subdivisions: the first sort, I call idols of the NATION or TRIBE; the second, idols of the PALACE; the third, idols of the CAVE; and the fourth, idols of the THEATRE

(Bacon, 1603, p14)

The Advancement of Learning Was Published in 1605 but *Novum Organon* (The New Tool) published in 1620 is a complete summary of Bacon's method: The *New Organon* was to replace Aristotle's *Organon* which had dominated academic learning. From around 1606 Bacon discovered the pre-Socratic Greek philosophers, especially the atomists, of whom Democritus was the first, with Epicurus a successor. In England as in the Dutch Republic, the battle for the right to generate knowledge in "truth games" (Foucault, 1988, p18) was Aristotelianism versus the rest.

From *Novum Organum (The New Tool)*:

...power and knowledge directly imply
one another...

Foucault, 1977, p27

Aphorisms III

Knowledge and human power are synonymous, since the ignorance of the cause frustrates the effect. For nature is only subdued by submission, and that which in contemplative philosophy corresponds with the cause, in practical science becomes the rule. (Bacon, 1620)

Novum Organon Or True Directions Concerning The Interpretation Of Nature, was Bacon's full description of a new scientific method. A way of penetrating into the inner chambers of nature (whether she wanted them penetrated or not).

...if there be any man who, not content to rest in and use the knowledge which has already been discovered, aspires to penetrate further; to overcome, not an adversary in argument, but nature in action; to seek, not pretty and probable conjectures, but certain and demonstrable knowledge — I invite all such to join themselves, as true sons of knowledge, with me, that passing by the outer courts of nature, which numbers have trodden, we may find a way at length into her inner chambers. And to make my meaning clearer and to familiarize the thing by giving it a name, I have chosen to call one of these methods or ways Anticipation of the Mind, the other Interpretation of Nature.
(Bacon, 1620)

The process corrects the old method, which was the induction of general proposition from sense-data. These propositions stood until refuted by more evidence. Bacon's new method was to start with sense-data, using induction to create an axiom, and then to create tests to try to negate axioms. As each axiom was proved, to build a table that referenced the axiom, this becoming a step up a ladder to a higher truth each time the process occurred.

Bacon used his method originally to apply to discovering the meta-laws behind the rulings of common-law. Law was not tabulated during his lifetime so his interest was in discovering and documenting, creating certainty of outcome in law proceedings and making law more available. Wheeler (1999) says that law proceedings were conducted in law-Latin the terms of which had their own meanings. Jurists lived in a world of artificial law-made reason that was essentially an adaptation of Aristotelian rhetoric. Bacon's desire was to create a new 'archival information-processing technology' (Wheeler, 1999, p11). For Bacon the unwritten common law was a phenomenological 'form', a deep-structure, which existed independently of the imperfect and transitory expression of it in common-law rulings; this legal substance could be uncovered using

the logic of dialectical inquiry but not the (Aristotelian) logic of rhetoric. Starting with law Bacon began the tradition of scientific naturalist, the search for not yet known laws by meticulous empirical observation (Wheeler, 1999).

Wheeler (1999) says the modern mind wants to jump from Aristotle to Descartes and Newton: Descartes creating the separation of mind and body and a mechanical view of nature, and Newton creating linear relationships in a closed causal system. But he says we must allow that Bacon's empiricism came in between, with Newton himself crediting Bacon for his method.

Bacon's method was to eliminate the problems he saw with the use of demotic language to describe nature; he saw this as the reason the ancients (the Greeks and Romans) had not invented science, as it was unfolding in his time with optics, printing and other inventions. He wanted nature to be studied, and to testify in her own language in an Inventory (a place where inventions were made and tested). He said human thought was the slave of language and only by eliminating language and allowing nature to demonstrate her meaning would her laws be uncovered, her inner chambers penetrated, while not being misled by her (Wheeler, 1999).

LXVIII

So much concerning the several classes of Idols and their equipage; all of which must be renounced and put away with a fixed and solemn determination, and the understanding thoroughly freed and cleansed; the entrance into the kingdom of man, founded on the sciences, being not much other than the entrance into the kingdom of heaven, whereinto none may enter except as a little child.

LXIX

But vicious demonstrations are as the strongholds and defenses of idols; and those we have in logic do little else than make the world the bondslave of human thought, and human thought the bondslave of words. Demonstrations truly are in effect the philosophies themselves and the sciences. For such as *they* are, well or ill established, such are the systems of philosophy and the contemplations which follow. Now in the whole of the process which leads from the sense and objects to axioms and conclusions, the demonstrations which we use are deceptive and incompetent. This process consists of four parts, and has as many faults. In the first place, the impressions of the sense itself are faulty; for the sense both fails us and deceives us. But its shortcomings are to be supplied, and its deceptions to be corrected. Secondly, notions are ill-drawn from the impressions of the senses, and are indefinite and confused, whereas they should be definite and distinctly bounded. Thirdly, the induction is amiss which infers the principles of sciences by simple

enumeration, and does not, as it ought, employ exclusions and solutions (or separations) of nature. Lastly, that method of discovery and proof according to which the most general principles are first established, and then intermediate axioms are tried and proved by them, is the parent of error and the curse of all science. Of these things, however, which now I do but touch upon, I will speak more largely when, having performed these expiations and purgings of the mind, I come to set forth the true way for the interpretation of nature.

(Bacon, 1620)

Bacon saw this new method as universal; the science of anger, fear or shame all as equally legitimate as a science of heat, light or vegetation. It is interesting to note he envisioned tables of negative affects such as anger, fear and shame (now all neatly tabulated in the DSM IV) but does not mention happiness (or felicity as he would have called it).

CXXVII

It may also be asked (in the way of doubt rather than objection) whether I speak of natural philosophy only, or whether I mean that the other sciences, logic, ethics, and politics, should be carried on by this method. Now I certainly mean what I have said to be understood of them all; and as the common logic, which governs by the syllogism, extends not only to natural but to all sciences, so does mine also, which proceeds by induction, embrace everything. For I form a history and table of discovery for anger, fear, shame, and the like; for matters political; and again for the mental operations of memory, composition and division, judgment, and the rest; not less than for heat and cold, or light, or vegetation, or the like. But, nevertheless, since my method of interpretation, after the history has been prepared and duly arranged, regards not the working and discourse of the mind only (as the common logic does) but the nature of things also, I supply the mind such rules and guidance that it may in every case apply itself aptly to the nature of things. And therefore I deliver many and diverse precepts in the doctrine of interpretation, which in some measure modify the method of invention according to the quality and condition of the subject of the inquiry.

(Bacon, 1620)

Bacon saw himself as a sort of secular saviour; man had endured the Fall from innocence and dominion over nature, but religion could restore innocence and art and science could restore dominion over nature.

But now I must proceed to the supports and rectifications of induction, and then to concretes, and Latent Processes, and Latent Configurations, and the rest, as set forth in order in the twenty-first Aphorism; that at length (like an honest and faithful guardian) I may hand over to men their fortunes, now their understanding is emancipated and come as it were of age; whence there cannot but follow an improvement in man's estate and an enlargement of his power over nature. For man by the fall fell at the same time from his state of innocency and from his dominion over creation. Both of these losses however can even in this life be in some part repaired; the former by religion and faith, the latter by arts and sciences. For creation was not by the curse made altogether and forever a rebel, but in virtue of that charter "In the sweat of thy face shall thou eat bread," it is now by various labors (not certainly by disputations or idle magical ceremonies, but by various labors) at length and in some measure subdued to the supplying of man with bread, that is, to the uses of human life.

(Bacon, 1620)

In *The Great Instauration* published in the same year as *Novum Organon* Bacon begins with:

Francis Of Verulam

Reasoned Thus With Himself

And Judged It To Be For The Interest Of The Present And Future Generations That
They Should Be Made Acquainted With His Thoughts.

He makes reference to the Fall again by saying that the serpent tempted Eve with the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, not the knowledge of nature which God, like a playful daddy, had hidden for the sons of knowledge to find.

Wherefore, seeing that these things do not depend upon myself, at the outset of the work I most humbly and fervently pray to God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost, that remembering the sorrows of mankind and the pilgrimage of this our life wherein we wear out days few and evil, they will vouchsafe through my hands to endow the human family with new mercies. This likewise I humbly pray, that things human may not interfere with things divine, and that from the opening of the ways of sense and the increase of natural light there may arise in our minds no incredulity or darkness with regard to the divine mysteries, but rather that the understanding being thereby purified and purged of fancies and vanity, and yet not the less subject and entirely submissive to the divine oracles, may give to faith that which is faith's. Lastly, that knowledge being now discharged of that venom which the serpent infused into it, and which makes the mind of man to swell, we may not be wise

above measure and sobriety, but cultivate truth in charity.

And now, having said my prayers, I turn to men, to whom I have certain salutary admonitions to offer and certain fair requests to make. My first admonition (which was also my prayer) is that men confine the sense within the limits of duty in respect of things divine: for the sense is like the sun, which reveals the face of earth, but seals and shuts up the face of heaven. My next, that in flying from this evil they fall not into the opposite error, which they will surely do if they think that the inquisition of nature is in any part interdicted or forbidden. For it was not that pure and uncorrupted natural knowledge whereby Adam gave names to the creatures according to their propriety, which, gave occasion to the fall. It was the ambitious and proud desire of moral knowledge to judge of good and evil, to the end that man may revolt from God and give laws to himself, which was the form and manner of the temptation. Whereas of the sciences which regard nature, the divine philosopher declares that "it is the glory of God to conceal a thing, but it is the glory of the King to find a thing out." Even as though the divine nature took pleasure in the innocent and kindly sport of children playing at hide-and-seek, and vouchsafed of his kindness and goodness to admit the human spirit for his playfellow at that game. Lastly, I would address one general admonition to all — that they consider what are the true ends of knowledge, and that they seek it not either for pleasure of the mind, or for contention, or for superiority to others, or for profit, or fame, or power, or any of these inferior things, but for the benefit and use of life, and that they perfect and govern it in charity. For it was from lust of power that the angels fell, from lust of knowledge that man fell; but of charity there can be no excess, neither did angel or man ever come in danger by it.

(Bacon, 1620a)

Give to faith that which is faiths but leave nature to me and my new method.

In the Netherlands Descartes had set in motion the Cartesian tide which swept, sometimes violently, through the universities. Mind and body were now separated. By the early 1700's Cartesianism had been largely abandoned in favour of Bacon's method and the separation of God from Science was well underway (Israel, 2002)

But Bacon's Science was born in the ruins of the Fall where suffer the 'sorrows of mankind and the pilgrimage of this our life wherein we wear out days few and evil' and knowledge is not to be sought 'for pleasure of the mind, or for contention, or for superiority to others, or for profit, or fame, or power.' Perhaps that's why it took 350 years to begin the taxonomies of happiness.

Hill (1997) says that Bacon's aspiration was that his method would liberate mankind from the consequences of the Fall, to restore the mind to its original perfection. On human happiness and well-being, Bacon said conquering nature by understanding causes would guarantee that; following his method would guarantee that.

The destiny of the human race will supply the issue (of my work), and that issue will perhaps be such as men in the present state of understandings cannot easily grasp or measure. For what is at stake is not merely a contemplative happiness but the very reality of man's well being and all man's powers of action. Man is the helper and interpreter of Nature He can only act and understand in so far as by working upon her or observing her he has come to perceive her order... Nature cannot be conquered but by obeying her. Accordingly these twin goods, human knowledge and human power, come in the end to one. To be ignorant of causes is to be frustrated in action. (Bacon cited in Hill, 1997, p79)

Bacon, following in the footsteps of Plato (*The Republic*) and More (*Utopia*) wrote a utopian novel called *New Atlantis*. It was unfinished when Bacon died but describes the discovery of an island where the goal of the common good is sought through research in a vast academy of science, called Solomon's House. Progress is made through the painstaking observation of nature and the accumulation, by inductive reasoning, of a body of knowledge that benefits mankind. Bacon did not discuss social and governmental systems; that may have been his plan in the completed work, but he does give some clues to societal values; marriage is sacred and the Atlantans value the material aspects of wealth like fine clothes and jewellery.

The preface to the 1627 edition says:

THIS Fable my Lord devised, to the end that he might exhibit therein, a model or description of a College, instituted for the interpreting of Nature, and the producing of great and marvellous works for the benefit of men; under the name of Salomon's House, or the College of the Six Days' Works. And even so far his Lordship hath proceeded, as to finish that part. Certainly, the model is more vast, and high, than can possibly be imitated in all things; Notwithstanding most things therein are within men's power to effect. His Lordship thought also in this present fable, to have composed a frame of laws, or of the best state or mould of a Common-wealth; but foreseeing it would be a long work, his desire of collecting the Natural History diverted him, which he preferred many degrees before it. (Bacon, 1951, p256)

The vast model of science leading society that Bacon dreamt came true. Science supplanted God and man's quest to become happy gods commenced.

Toward The Declaration Of Independence

Locke: Property, Happiness and Liberty

Locke (1632 – 1704) became the father of liberal philosophy with his ideas becoming one of the keystones of the American and French Revolutions (Zuckert, 2002). He grew up in England, studied Medicine at Oxford and philosophy in France, and read Descartes, Bacon, Hobbes and Spinoza amongst others. He lived through the Cromwellian revolution, the civil war, the restoration; his outspoken views on religious toleration saw him have to seek exile in the Netherlands in the years 1683 to 1689. He returned to England only after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which ousted King James II and put William of Orange (grandson of Charles I) and his wife Anne (James daughter) on the throne but now a throne subject to Parliament under the terms of the Declaration (or Bill) of Rights, 1689. Locke, like Descartes, lived in interesting times. *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (primarily written the Netherlands) was published in 1690. This became a key philosophical text and influenced thinkers of the next hundred years (Zuckert, 2002).

Locke was influenced by what he read but produced some new ideas of his own which he outlined in *The Essay*; included in this were the foundations of empiricism. His philosophy was that there was a material world but that impression of it only come to human understanding via Sensation and is understood through Reflection. This is empirical method, rather than the Cartesian deduction as method. Where Descartes saw innate ideas discovered through meditation, Locke saw the mind as a blank piece of paper (*tabula rasa*) with all ideas being learned through Sensation and Reflection. One thing he did believe was innate is the universal desire for happiness and an aversion to misery:

From *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Book 1 Neither Principles nor Ideas Are Innate, Chapter II No Innate Practical Principles)

3. *Objection:* ...Nature, I confess, has put into man a desire of happiness and an aversion to misery: these indeed are innate practical principles which (as practical principles ought) do continue constantly to operate and influence all our actions without ceasing: these may be observed in all persons and all ages, steady and universal

Locke was concerned with many of the same issues as Descartes and Spinoza – reason, mind, passions, liberty, virtue, necessity, good and evil. Like Spinoza he thought good and evil were not intrinsic but were only those things that bring pleasure or pain

1. *Pleasure and pain, simple ideas.* Amongst the simple ideas which we receive both from sensation and reflection, pain and pleasure are two very considerable ones. For as in the body there is sensation barely in itself, or accompanied with pain or pleasure, so the thought or perception of the mind is simply so, or else accompanied also with pleasure or pain, delight or trouble, call it how you please. These, like other simple ideas, cannot be described, nor their names defined; the way of knowing them is, as of the simple ideas of the senses, only by experience. For, to define them by the presence of good or evil, is no otherwise to make them known to us than by making us reflect on what we feel in ourselves, upon the several and various operations of good and evil upon our minds, as they are differently applied to or considered by us.

2. *Good and evil, what.* Things then are good or evil, only in reference to pleasure or pain. That we call good, which is apt to cause or increase pleasure, or diminish pain in us; or else to procure or preserve us the possession of any other good or absence of any evil. And, on the contrary, we name that evil which is apt to produce or increase any pain, or diminish any pleasure in us: or else to procure us any evil, or deprive us of any good. By pleasure and pain, I must be understood to mean of body or mind, as they are commonly distinguished; though in truth they be only different constitutions of the mind, sometimes occasioned by disorder in the body, sometimes by thoughts of the mind.

From *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Part II, Chapter XXI, Of Power. Can the power of the mind control the action of the body? Yes of course.

7. *Whence the ideas of liberty and necessity.* Every one, I think, finds in himself a power to begin or forbear, continue or put an end to several actions in himself. From the consideration of the extent of this power of the mind over the actions of the man, which everyone finds in himself, arise the ideas of liberty and necessity.

Passions arise external to our mind and take it over so it does not have power to act.

12. *Liberty, what.* As it is in the motions of the body, so it is in the thoughts of our minds... sometimes a boisterous passion hurries our thoughts, as a hurricane does our bodies, without leaving us the liberty of thinking on other things, which we would rather choose. But as soon as the mind regains the power to stop or continue, begin

or forbear, any of these motions of the body without, or thoughts within, according as it thinks fit to prefer either to the other, we then consider the man as a free agent again.

There is always a cause. The will always moves the mind to act when it is uneasy.

29. *What determines the will.*

...What moves the mind, in every particular instance, to determine its general power of directing, to this or that particular motion or rest? ...the motive to change is always some uneasiness: nothing setting us upon the change of state, or upon any new action, but some uneasiness.

If I were an empiricist I would feel a state of mind that was uneasy and if I reflected on this I would know that uneasiness causes movement.

32. *Desire is uneasiness.* That desire is a state of uneasiness, every one who reflects on himself will quickly find. Who is there that has not felt in desire what the wise man says of hope, (which is not much different from it), that it being "deferred makes the heart sick"; and that still proportionable to the greatness of the desire, which sometimes raises the uneasiness to that pitch, that it makes people cry out, "Give me children." give me the thing desired, "or I die." Life itself, and all its enjoyments, is a burden cannot be borne under the lasting and unremoved pressure of such an uneasiness.

Locke also considered akrasia, and did not agree with the general consensus that the greater good determines the will, that man will do what is best for him in the long run. The otherwise inexplicable way men act is explained only by the desire to remove present uneasiness. Men do act akratically.

35. *The greatest positive good determines not the will, but present uneasiness alone...* I am forced to conclude that good, the greater good, though apprehended and acknowledged to be so, does not determine the will, until our desire, raised proportionably to it, makes us uneasy in the want of it... let a drunkard see that his health decays, his estate wastes; discredit and diseases...but when the uneasiness to miss his accustomed delight returns, the great acknowledged good loses its hold, and the present uneasiness determines the will to the accustomed action; which thereby gets stronger footing to prevail against the next occasion, though he at the same time makes secret promises to himself that he will do so no more; this is the

last time he will act against the attainment of those greater goods...

Uneasiness prevents happiness and therefore when it determines us to act we move toward happiness.

36. *Because the removal of uneasiness is the first step to happiness...* whilst we are under any uneasiness, we cannot apprehend ourselves happy, or in the way to it; pain and uneasiness being, by every one, concluded and felt to be inconsistent with happiness, spoiling the relish even of those good things which we have: a little pain serving to mar all the pleasure we rejoiced in. And, therefore, that which of course determines the choice of our will to the next action will always be- the removing of pain, as long as we have any left, as the first and necessary step towards happiness.

Everyone wants to be happy.

42. *All desire happiness.* If it be further asked,- What it is moves desire? I answer,- happiness, and that alone

People are very short sighted and easily pleased.

45. *Why the greatest good is not always desired.* This, I think, any one may observe in himself and others,- That the greater visible good does not always raise men's desires in proportion to the greatness it appears, and is acknowledged, to have: though every little trouble moves us, and sets us on work to get rid of it. The reason whereof is evident from the nature of our happiness and misery itself. All present pain, whatever it be, makes a part of our present misery. but all absent good does not at any time make a necessary part of our present happiness, nor the absence of it make a part of our misery. If it did, we should be constantly and infinitely miserable; there being infinite degrees of happiness which are not in our possession. All uneasiness therefore being removed, a moderate portion of good serves at present to content men; and a few degrees of pleasure, in a succession of ordinary enjoyments, make up a happiness wherein they can be satisfied. ..whilst they bound their happiness within some little enjoyment or aim of this life, and exclude the joys of heaven from making any necessary part of it,- their desires are not moved by this greater apparent good, nor their wills determined to any action, or endeavour for its attainment.

There is a governor in our mind who can get us to wait before we act while we examine what is around us.

48. *The power to suspend the prosecution of any desire makes way for consideration...* the mind having in most cases, as is evident in experience, a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires; and so all, one after another; is at liberty to consider the objects of them, examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others. In this lies the liberty man has...we have a power to suspend the prosecution of this or that desire; as every one daily may experiment in himself. This seems to me the source of all liberty; in this seems to consist that which is (as I think improperly) called free-will. For, during this suspension of any desire, before the will be determined to action, and the action (which follows that determination) done, we have opportunity to examine, view, and judge of the good or evil of what we are going to do; and when, upon due examination, we have judged, we have done our duty, all that we can, or ought to do, in pursuit of our happiness; and it is not a fault, but a perfection of our nature, to desire, will, and act according to the last result of a fair examination.

Happiness is good, necessary and God like.

51. *A constant determination to a pursuit of happiness no abridgment of liberty...* The constant desire of happiness, and the constraint it puts upon us to act for it, nobody, I think, accounts an abridgment of liberty, or at least an abridgment of liberty to be complained of. God Almighty himself is under the necessity of being happy; and the more any intelligent being is so, the nearer is its approach to infinite perfection and happiness...

The careful and constant pursuit of happiness is our greatest good; it is an expression of a perfect intellect.

52. *The necessity of pursuing true happiness the foundation of liberty.* As therefore the highest perfection of intellectual nature lies in a careful and constant pursuit of true and solid happiness; so the care of ourselves, that we mistake not imaginary for real happiness, is the necessary foundation of our liberty. The stronger ties we have to an unalterable pursuit of happiness in general, which is our greatest good, and which, as such, our desires always follow, the more are we free from any necessary determination of our will to any particular action, and from a necessary compliance with our desire, set upon any particular, and then appearing preferable good, till we have duly examined whether it has a tendency to, or be inconsistent

with, our real happiness: and therefore, till we are as much informed upon this inquiry as the weight of the matter, and the nature of the case demands, we are, by the necessity of preferring and pursuing true happiness as our greatest good, obliged to suspend the satisfaction of our desires in particular cases.

Descartes is right about man's ability to control his passions

54. *Government of our passions the right improvement of liberty.* ...Nor let any one say, he cannot govern his passions, nor hinder them from breaking out, and carrying him into action; for what he can do before a prince or a great man, he can do alone, or in the presence of God, if he will.

We are all individuals with different tastes in food and happiness.

55. *How men come to pursue different, and often evil, courses.* From what has been said, it is easy to give an account how it comes to pass, that, though all men desire happiness, yet their wills carry them so contrarily; and consequently some of them to what is evil... every one does not place his happiness in the same thing, or choose the same way to it.

56. *All men seek happiness, but not of the same sort.* The mind has a different relish, as well as the palate...I think, that the philosophers of old did in vain inquire, whether summum bonum consisted in riches, or bodily delights, or virtue, or contemplation... For, as pleasant tastes depend not on the things themselves, but on their agreeableness to this or that particular palate, wherein there is great variety; so the greatest happiness consists in the having those things which produce the greatest pleasure, and in the absence of those which cause any disturbance, any pain. Now these, to different men, are very different things....though all men's desires tend to happiness, yet they are not moved by the same object. Men may choose different things, and yet all choose right

Back to akrasia.

58. *Why men choose what makes them miserable.* What has been said may also discover to us the reason why men in this world prefer different things, and pursue happiness by contrary courses. But yet, since men are always constant and in earnest in matters of happiness and misery, the question still remains, How men come often to prefer the worse to the better; and to choose that, which, by their own

confession, has made them miserable?

59. *The causes of this.* To account for the various and contrary ways men take, though all aim at being happy, we must consider whence the various uneasinesses that determine the will, in the preference of each voluntary action, have their rise:

(1) From bodily pain. Some of them come from causes not in our power; such as are often the pains of the body from want, disease, or outward injuries, as the rack, &c.; which, when present and violent, operate for the most part forcibly on the will, and turn the courses of men's lives from virtue, piety, and religion, and what before they judged to lead to happiness; every one not endeavouring, or, through disuse, not being able, by the contemplation of remote and future good, to raise in himself desires of them strong enough to counterbalance the uneasiness he feels in those bodily torments, and to keep his will steady in the choice of those actions which lead to future happiness.

(2) From wrong desires arising from wrong judgments. Other uneasinesses arise from our desires of absent good; which desires always bear proportion to, and depend on, the judgment we make, and the relish we have of any absent good; in both which we are apt to be variously misled, and that by our own fault.

Locke says we all want happiness all of the time; that's innate. He says we have the power of the mind (will) to control the actions of the body but passion, which arises from without like a tempest, can interfere with this power. We don't always act toward the greater good because we are more interested in alleviating present pain than in achieving absent good. The pursuit of happiness is consistent with liberty. We must take 'care of ourselves' so we do not mistake imaginary for real happiness. This 'care of ourselves' is the necessary foundation of our liberty.

In other writings Locke makes it clear that he thinks some of us have more hope of using our reason, caring for ourselves, and achieving happiness than others. West (2002) cites Locke from *The Reasonableness of Christianity*: Some of us must be told what to do because we cannot discover truth through reason.

...you may as soon hope to have all the day-labourers and tradesmen, the spinsters and dairymaids, perfect mathematicians, as to have them perfect in ethics (by discovering moral truth through their own reasoning). Hearing plain commands is the sure and only course to bring them to obedience and practice. The greatest part cannot know and therefore they must believe. (Locke cited in West, 2002, p240)

Descartes thought the pursuit of virtue would ensure happiness (while inoculating us against misery) and we must watch the stirrings of our blood. Locke thought the pursuit of happiness (and avoidance of misery) was innate but we should take care we are pursuing real not imaginary happiness. They both agree we should use our reason to watch ourselves and some of us have to be educated or told what to do.

Locke's ideas on civil government are outlined in his *Second Treatise on Government* (1689). This outlines his political theory: humans were once in a state of nature, pre-society, and there they enjoyed natural rights. Property could be freely exchanged, sold or accumulated and no one in that state would consent to have life or liberty taken away. Government requires the consent of the people and the role of the state should be limited to protecting life, liberty and property. Accordingly the power of the state should also be limited so this excluded absolute Monarchy as a method of government.

Second Treatise on Government, Book 2, Chapter 2 Of the State of Nature

6. ...The state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions; for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker; all the servants of one sovereign Master, sent into the world by His order and about His business; they are His property, whose workmanship they are made to last during His, not one another's pleasure. And, being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of Nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us that may authorise us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another's uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for ours. Every one as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he as much as he can to preserve the rest of mankind, and not unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.

In Chapter 5, Of Property Locke outlines why property is essential to liberty.

Sec. 27. Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are property his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that

is his own, and thereby makes it his property.

Sec. 44. From all which it is evident, that though the things of nature are given in common, yet man, by being master of himself, and proprietor of his own person, and the actions or labour of it, had still in himself the great foundation of property; and that, which made up the great part of what he applied to the support or comfort of his being, when invention and arts had improved the conveniencies of life, was perfectly his own, and did not belong in common to others.

In Chapter 6 Of Paternal Power he qualifies equality but gives to all men sovereign rights over themselves.

Sec. 54. Though I have said above, Chap. II. That all men by nature are equal, I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of equality: age or virtue may give men a just precedency: excellency of parts and merit may place others above the common level: birth may subject some, and alliance or benefits others, to pay an observance to those to whom nature, gratitude, or other respects, may have made it due: and yet all this consists with the equality, which all men are in, in respect of jurisdiction or dominion one over another; which was the equality I there spoke of, as proper to the business in hand, being that equal right, that every man hath, to his natural freedom, without being subjected to the will or authority of any other man.

In Chapter 9 Of the Ends of Political Society and Government he outlines the uncertain nature of natural rights and explains that government (men uniting into commonwealths) has as its chief end to protect property. Property for Locke is the product of life and liberty.

Sec. 123. IF man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no body, why will he part with his freedom? Why will he give up this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others: for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very insecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates,

which I call by the general name, property.

Sec. 124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property.

So for Locke the individual or self, has natural rights to life, liberty and property but also an inbuilt desire for happiness, that happiness being something unique to each unique individual. If we are to deserve liberty, autonomy, does that mean we *must* pursue happiness?

Blackstone, Commentaries, Happiness

Sir William Blackstone (1723 – 1780) was an English law professor who wrote *Commentaries on The Laws of England*, the first attempt at codification of England's common laws; in this book he outlined the history of the law, the rules and principles and compared these with what he called the Laws of Nature. He profoundly influenced the American founders and his book became a chief source of knowledge of English law in the new Republic. Blackstone was the second most cited secular author (after Montesquieu) during the founding era of the American Republic, 1760 to 1805 (Zuckert, 2002).

The following fragments from *The Commentaries* explain his views on happiness, reason and the creator:

From the Introduction, Section 2: Of the Nature of Laws in General

Nothing is a matter of chance. Everything follows unerring rules.

Thus when the supreme being formed the universe, and created matter out of nothing, he impressed certain principles upon that matter, from which it can never depart, and without which it would cease to be... The whole progress of plants, from the seed to the root, and from thence to the seed again - the method of animal nutrition, digestion, secretion, and all other branches of vital economy - are not left to chance, or the will of the creature itself, but are performed in a wondrous involuntary manner, and guided by unerring rules laid down by the great creator

Noble man must (by divine command) use his reason and freewill to regulate his behaviour.

... But laws, in their more confined sense, and in which it is our present business to consider them, denote the rules, not of action in general, but of human action or

conduct: that is, the precepts by which man, the noblest of all sublunary beings, a creature endowed with both reason and freewill, is commanded to make use of those faculties in the general regulation of his behavior.

Man is subject to the immutable laws of nature, created by God. Man was given reason to discover the purpose of those laws.

Man, considered as a creature, must necessarily be subject to the laws of his creator, for he is entirely a dependent being. A being, independent of any other, has no rule to pursue, but such as he prescribes to himself; but a state of dependence will inevitably oblige the inferior to take the will of him, on whom he depends, as the rule of his conduct: not indeed in every particular, but in all those points wherein his dependence consists. This principle therefore has more or less extent and effect, in proportion as the superiority of the one and the dependence of the other is greater or less, absolute or limited. And consequently, as man depends absolutely upon his maker for every thing, it is necessary that he should in all points conform to his maker's will.

This will of his maker is called the law of nature. For as God, when he created matter, and endued it with a principle of mobility, established certain rules for the perpetual direction of that motion; so, when he created man, and endued him with freewill to conduct himself in all parts of life, he laid down certain immutable laws of human nature, whereby that freewill is in some degree regulated and restrained, and gave him also the faculty of reason to discover the purport of those laws.

The creator also created immutable laws of good and evil, which he himself (the creator) obeys and which human reason can discover.

Considering the creator only as a being of infinite power, he was able unquestionably to have prescribed whatever laws he pleased to his creature, man, however unjust or severe. But as he is also a being of infinite wisdom, he has laid down only such laws as were founded in those relations of justice, that existed in the nature of things antecedent to any positive precept. These are the eternal, immutable laws of good and evil, to which the creator himself in all his dispensations conforms; and which he has enabled human reason to discover, so far as they are necessary for the conduct of human actions. Such among others are these principles: that we should live honestly, should hurt nobody, and should render to every one his due; to which three general precepts Justinian has reduced the whole doctrine of law.

Self-love is the universal principle of action and happiness is so intertwined with the laws of eternal justice it is impossible to be happy unless you are obeying those laws. There is only one rule to obey and that is that man should pursue true and substantial happiness, with true and substantial happiness being in harmony with eternal justice.

... As therefore the creator is a being, not only of infinite *power*, and *wisdom*, but also of infinite *goodness*, he has been pleased so to contrive the constitution and frame of humanity, that we should want no other prompter to inquire after and pursue the rule of right, but only our own self-love, that universal principle of action. For he has so intimately connected, so inseparably interwoven the laws of eternal justice with the happiness of each individual, that the latter cannot be attained but by observing the former; and, if the former be punctually obeyed, it cannot but induce the latter. In consequence of which mutual connection of justice and human felicity, he has not perplexed the law of nature with a multitude of abstracted rules and precepts, referring merely to the fitness or unfitness of things, as some have vainly surmised; but has graciously reduced the rule of obedience to this one paternal precept, "that man should pursue his own true and substantial happiness." This is the foundation of what we call ethics, or natural law. For the several articles into which it is branched in our systems, amount to no more than demonstrating, that this or that action tends to man's real happiness, and therefore very justly concluding that the performance of it is a part of the law of nature; or, on the other hand, that this or that action is destructive of man's real happiness, and therefore that the law of nature forbids it.

The pursuit of happiness is actually using reason to determine what the law of nature (the creator's law) wants us to do in any circumstance. Sadly, since the Fall, reason is not to be trusted so we have to turn to revealed laws which reside in the scriptures.

...But in order to apply this to the particular exigencies of each individual, it is still necessary to have recourse to reason; whose office it is to discover, as was before observed, what the law of nature directs in every circumstance of life: by considering, what method will tend the most effectually to our own substantial happiness. And if our reason were always, as in our first ancestor before his transgression, clear and perfect, unruffled by passions, unclouded by prejudice, unimpaired by disease or intemperance, the task would be pleasant and easy; we should need no other guide but this. But every man now finds the contrary in his own experience; that his reason is corrupt, and his understanding full of ignorance and error.

This has given manifold occasion for the benign interposition of divine providence; which, in compassion to the frailty, the imperfection, and the blindness of human reason, has been pleased, at sundry times and in diverse manners, to discover and enforce its laws by an immediate and direct revelation. The doctrines thus delivered we call the revealed or divine law, and they are to be found only in the holy scriptures

Civil society requires a sovereign.

For when civil society is once formed, government at the same time results of course, as necessary to preserve and to keep that society in order. Unless some superior be constituted, whose commands and decisions all the members are bound to obey, they would still remain as in a state of nature, without any judge upon earth to define their several rights, and redress their several wrongs. But, as all the members which compose this society were naturally equal, it may be asked, in whose hands are the reins of government to be entrusted? To this the general answer is easy; but the application of it to particular cases has occasioned one half of those mischiefs, which are apt to proceed from misguided political zeal. In general, all mankind will agree that government should be reposed in such persons, in whom those qualities are most likely to be found, the perfection of which is among the attributes of him who is emphatically styled the supreme being; the three grand requisites, I mean, of wisdom, of goodness, and of power: wisdom, to discern the real interest of the community: goodness, to endeavor always to pursue that real interest; and strength, or power, to carry this knowledge and intention into action. These are the natural foundations of sovereignty, and these are the requisites that ought to be found in every well-constituted frame of government

So Blackstone, full of creator ordained confidence, says we are divinely ordained to pursue happiness but agrees with Locke that most of us aren't capable of that without direction from a source outside ourselves.

Zuckert (2002) says that while Blackstone's Tory politics were not popular in America his amalgam of natural rights with legal/constitutional rights gave the American founders a ground on which to stand to make their Declarations.

The new American democratic republic was to be the place in which the body of the liberated could exercise its right to life, liberty, property and the pursuit of happiness.

Declarations of Rights and Independence

Exactly who influenced the American founders, particularly Thomas Jefferson author of the Declaration of Independence, continues to be debated. Zuckert (2002) includes Hutcheson, Kames, Burlamqui, Montesquieu, Hobbes, Locke, and Blackstone as sources. What is important for this genealogy is that the American Declaration of Independence listed 'natural rights' and number three on the list was the pursuit of happiness.

That Locke had a profound influence is undebated; the Declaration of Independence is modeled on the English Declaration of Rights presented by Parliament to the new monarchs in 1689. Locke's work was pivotal to this; his Treatise on Government was foundational to the Declaration, which like the Declaration of Independence makes a claim to universal rights and liberties and then provides a list of wrong doing to support the change the document outlines (Zuckert, 2002).

Before there was the Declaration of Independence there were other Declarations. Zuckert (2002) says Jefferson always said his Declaration was not in the least unique in its appeal to natural rights. But it was unique in the listing of these rights as life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. In 1772 Samuel Adams wrote The Rights of the Colonists. Using the Lockean formula of appealing to 'natural rights' Adams also used the Lockean list of 'life, liberty and property'.

I The Natural Rights of the Colonists as Men

Among the natural rights of the Colonists are these: First, a right to life; Secondly, to liberty; Thirdly, to property; together with the right to support and defend them in the best manner they can. These are evident branches of, rather than deductions from, the duty of self-preservation, commonly called the first law of nature.

...The natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but only to have the law of nature for his rule.

III The Rights of the Colonists as Subjects

A commonwealth or state is a body politic, or civil society of men, united together to promote their mutual safety and prosperity by means of their union.

...The absolute rights of Englishmen and all freemen, in or out of civil society, are principally personal security, personal liberty, and private property.

(Essential Documents in American History, 2005)

Also preceding the Declaration of Independence was the Virginia Declaration of Rights. Written by George Mason, earlier in 1776, but with help from Thomas Jefferson. Clause one says:

That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety. (Essential Documents in American History, 2005)

This lists the rights as life, liberty, property, happiness, and safety. Abshire (1997) says the Virginia Declaration Of Rights in June of 1776 was the first declaration of its kind, the opening of the Declaration of Independence was modeled on it, and its purpose was to ensure that the power of sovereignty resides in the individual, the free colonist who determined the course of government through his franchise.

Thomas Jefferson drafted the US Declaration of Independence. Property and safety have gone from the list of natural rights. However, following its adoption by Congress on July 4th 1776, it is a natural right to pursue happiness. Whatever the pursuit of virtue, alignment with natural law, or simply happiness was before it is now a self-evident truth that it is a right to pursue it. People (presumably day-labourers, tradesmen, spinsters and dairymaids at least) are usually more likely to suffer than to abolish a form of Government they are used to. Just Government, that secures the rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, comes from the consent of the governed and will organise its powers to effect their safety and happiness. It will not apparently organise its powers to effect their ownership of property, any or equal amounts of it; that is left to the market to decide.

When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the Powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new

Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security. Such has been the patient sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world. (Essential Documents in American History, 2005)

Zuckert (2002) suggests that Jefferson and the drafting committee for the Declaration were well aware it was to be read aloud and that euphony played a part in the truncation to 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness'. He says Jefferson clearly states his position on property as a natural right elsewhere so removing property from the classical life, liberty and property triune and replacing it with pursuit of happiness was not because he disagreed with Locke.

Of the object of the Declaration Jefferson wrote *To Henry Lee Monticello, May 8, 1825*

When forced, therefore, to resort to arms for redress, an appeal to the tribunal of the world was deemed proper for our justification. This was the object of the Declaration of Independence. Not to find out new principles, or new arguments, never before thought of, not merely to say things which had never been said before; but to place before mankind the common sense of the subject, in terms so plain and firm as to command their assent, and to justify ourselves in the independent stand we are compelled to take. Neither aiming at originality of principle or sentiment, nor yet copied from any particular and previous writing, it was intended to be an expression of the American mind, and to give to that expression the proper tone and spirit called for by the occasion. All its authority rests then on the harmonizing sentiments of the day, whether expressed in conversation, in letters, printed essays, or in the elementary books of public right, as Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney, &c.

Zuckert (2002) suggests as a first alternative to aesthetics of sound that the Declaration was a justification (after the event) of the split from England and a call to war. They were quite aware

while equal property rights would be held by all there would not be equal distribution of property. Zuckert does not talk about the removal of safety but if he's right about preparing for war that might explain that as well. Rousing potential troops with life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness works a lot better than life, liberty, unequal distribution of wealth, pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety whilst holding a gun. Zuckert also says that the 'pursuit of happiness' is comprehensive and summative and contains within it the rights to property.

Zuckert's second alternative is that Jefferson is following Blackstone in a mutual connection of justice and happiness with natural law boiling down to one precept, that man should pursue his own happiness. But this happiness would be defined as following the rules of God with each individual achieving that which they are impelled (by God) to do. The desire for happiness is innate but knowledge of how to achieve it is not. Man is akratic and his reason is not to be trusted. For Blackstone this problem is solved by recourse to Scripture and the Law.

Following Zuckert I will not pursue what Jefferson 'really' thought when he wrote the words. The Declaration was agreed by a committee and whether it was euphony or ideology that produced 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness' the words echo 230 years later.

Having written them Jefferson did later explicate in various ways what the meaning was. In a letter in 1819 he wrote about happiness in purely Epicurean terms.

As you say of yourself, I too am an Epicurian. consider the genuine (not the imputed) doctrines of Epicurus as containing everything rational in moral philosophy which Greece and Rome have left us.

... I will place under this a syllabus of the doctrines of Epicurus,

Moral. -- Happiness the aim of life.

Virtue the foundation of happiness.

Utility the test of virtue.

Pleasure active and In-do-lent.

In-do-lence is the absence of pain, the true felicity.

Active, consists in agreeable motion; it is not happiness, but the means to produce it.

Thus the absence of hunger is an article of felicity; eating the means to obtain it.

The *summum bonum* is to be not pained in body, nor troubled in mind.

i. e. Indolence of body, tranquillity of mind.

To procure tranquillity of mind we must avoid desire and fear, the two principal diseases of the mind.

Man is a free agent.

Virtue consists in 1. Prudence. 2. Temperance. 3. Fortitude. 4. Justice.

To which are opposed, 1. Folly. 2. Desire. 3. Fear. 4. Deceit.

(Jefferson, 1819)

If Jefferson truly was Epicurean then Barnouw's (1983) theory that the pursuit of happiness in Jefferson is really a Baconian happiness of pursuit may not fit. To explain the move from property to pursuit of happiness, Barnouw points out that Jefferson said the three greatest men the world has ever produced were Bacon, Newton and Locke. Barnouw says Jefferson thought the stability and continuity of the republic depended on each individual being self-centred in and through the pursuit of happiness; this fits with Blackstone's self-love as a universal principle of action that impels man to pursue true and substantial happiness.

Is it pursuit of virtue that brings happiness (Descartes)? Is the desire for happiness innate with uneasiness impelling us to pursue it (Locke)? Is pursuit of 'true' happiness, inextricably intertwined in justice, God's plan for us? (Blackstone)?

Barnouw suggests that it is pursuit not pursuit of happiness that is important to Jefferson, following Bacon's philosophy. Bacon says pursuit, fuelled by desire, brings advancement and felicity.

The former question being debated between Socrates and a sophist, Socrates placing felicity in an equal and constant peace of mind, and the sophist in much desiring and much enjoying, they fell from argument to ill words: the sophist saying that Socrates' felicity was the felicity of a block or stone; and Socrates saying that the sophist's felicity was the felicity of one that had the itch, who did nothing but itch and scratch. And both these opinions do not want their supports. For the opinion of Socrates is much upheld by the general consent even of the epicures themselves, that virtue beareth a great part in felicity; and if so, certain it is, that virtue hath more use in clearing perturbations than in compassing desires. The sophist's opinion is much favoured by the assertion we last spake of, that good of advancement is greater than good of simple preservation; because every obtaining a desire hath a show of advancement, as motion though in a circle hath a show of progression.

(Bacon, 1605, Book I, XXI, 2)

Bacon also says man has an instinct of advancement 'formal and essential'. It is this instinct that leads us to the perfection of our form.

So in man,

"Igneus est ollis vigor, et cælestis origo."

His approach or assumption to divine or angelical nature is the perfection of his form; the error or false imitation of which good is that which is the tempest of human life; while man, upon the instinct of an advancement, formal and essential, is carried to seek an advancement local. For as those which are sick, and find no remedy, do tumble up and down and change place, as if by a remove local they could obtain a remove internal, so is it with men in ambition, when failing of the mean to exalt their nature, they are in a perpetual estuation to exalt their place. So then passive good is, as was said, either conservative or perfective.

(Bacon, 1605, Book I, XXI, 2)

Whether Jefferson is in two minds, or one mind shifting from Epicurean virtue and absence of desire to the desire of desire for advancement I can't tell, but now man has a natural right to pursue happiness and with rights come duties.

Man's happiness has also shifted from a matter for the Church to govern to a matter for Man to govern via democratic process.

The Utility of Happiness

Bentham, Pleasure, Pain

Up to this point happiness has been written of by men who do not deny the existence of God; Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Blackstone, and Jefferson all had varying degrees of belief in an active, intervening deity but they did not publicly state any atheistic ideas. Jeremy Bentham did and helped move happiness to a secular matter which should be governed.

Bentham (1748 – 1832), like Descartes, lived in interesting times and had a big dream about his own destiny. Mack's (1963) biography says he was child prodigy and his father was obsessed by his genius and high prospects. He was sickly, not allowed to play with children of his own class in case they lowered his standards, and read constantly from the time he was four. When he was 11 years old he read a book that, Mack says, profoundly moved him. The three volume memoirs of a prostitute, *An Apology for the Conduct of Mrs T. C. Phillips*, was the story of woman fighting for her legal rights – and not winning. Mack (1963, p40) cites Bentham as writing of the revelation the book was to him, "Tossed from pillar to post was the fair penitent – from Courts Temporal to Courts Spiritual, by Blackstone called Courts Christian...while reading and musing, the Daemon of Chicane appeared to me in all his hideousness. What followed? I abjured his empire. I vowed war against him."

Bentham's father's plan for him was that he go to Westminster, Oxford, read law and become Chancellor. His father, an attorney, saw the law as the perfection of justice and wisdom. Bentham did go to Westminster; Mack says he saw public school brutality there, floggings and beatings, but did not experience much himself although he left with a chronic terror of physical pain. He went to Oxford when he was 13, only allowed entrance after compulsorily signing the 39 articles of Anglican faith. He objected strongly, saying they were irrational and against scripture, but signed reluctantly saying the Established Church had made a perjurer of him by this requirement. Locke's ideas on toleration had not made much impact on Oxford where faiths other than Anglican could not attend. Bentham later wrote that the Church was bound to the University as well as the Law Court – all interrelated parts of a whole and all requiring reform.

He passed his degree and went to read law at Lincoln's Inn in 1763. Mack says the London of the time was a terrifying place. Mobs formed and rioted, open sewers ensured epidemics were so common that it was said there were no third generation Londoners, there was cock fighting, bear baiting and public hanging as spectacle. Mack says Bentham saw chaos and desired order.

As he worked at his study of the law he began to become disillusioned with what he saw and later described his feelings:

Destined by education to...the study of the English law...I entered upon the task. I had been taught to believe both in print and in conversation that it is in [its]...several parts as beneficial to the people as the whole together is profitable to those who study it as a profession: that it is as near to perfection as any thing can be that is human; that if it has any imperfections, they are like spots in the sun, absorbed in the splendour of superior beauties. As I advanced every page I read seemed to furnish an exception to those general rules; till at last I began to be almost at a loss to conjecture upon what particular observations could have given occasion to these magnificent positions. ...I saw crimes of the most pernicious nature pass unheeded by the law: acts of no importance put in point of punishment upon a level with the most baneful crimes: punishments inflicted without measure and without choice: satisfaction denied for the most crying injuries: the doors of justice barred against a great majority of the people by the weight of wanton and unnecessary expense: false conclusions ensured in most questions of fact by hasty and inconsistent rules of evidence: light shut out from every question of fact by fantastic and ill consider'd rules of evidence: the business of hours spun out into years: impunity extended to acknowledged guilt and compensation snatched out of the hands of injured innocence by...impertinent & inscrutable exemption: the measure of decision in many cases unformed: in others locked up and made the object of a monopoly: the various rights and duties of the various classes of mankind jumbled together into one immense and unsorted heap: men ruined for not knowing what they are neither enabled nor permitted even to learn: and the whole fabric of jurisprudence a labyrinth without a clew. These were some of the abominations which presented themselves to my view.... From the view...I confess resulted a passionate desire of seeing them done away. It soon appeared that to cleanse the Augean stable to any purpose there was no other way than to pour in a body of severe and steady criticism and to spread it over the whole extent of the subject in one comprehensive unbroken tide. This I determined to attempt...and whatever might be the success, it seemed that the labour of a life, as of a thousand more if I had them would not be ill bestow'd in the endeavour.

(Bentham cited in Mack, 1963, p67-68)

In 1776 Bentham wrote *A Fragment on Government* and published it anonymously; this was a critique of Blackstone's work, particularly his lack of desire for reform; this was the first flow of the unbroken tide of criticism.

The first paragraph echoes Descartes and speaks of the assumption of perfectibility and certainty. It was in Bentham's lifetime that the comparative, certainer and the superlative, certainest of the word certain ceased to be used.

THE age we live in is a busy age; in which knowledge is rapidly advancing towards perfection. In the natural world, in particular, every thing teems with discovery and with improvement. The most distant and recondite regions of the earth traversed and explored--the all-vivifying and subtle element of the air so recently analyzed and made known to us,--are striking evidences, were all others wanting, of this pleasing truth.

Correspondent to discovery and improvement in the natural world, is reformation in the moral; if that which seems a common notion be, indeed, a true one, that in the moral world there no longer remains any matter for discovery. (Bentham, 1891, p93)

But if Bentham echoes Descartes it was Francis Bacon who inspired him most. Crimmins (1990) says Bacon was the original inspiration behind Bentham's efforts through observation to discover first principles and to classify the divisions of knowledge. Bacon's inductive science had no place for knowledge that had as its purpose mere contemplation; its aim is the production of works for the promotion of human happiness. Bentham cleansed Bacon's philosophy of its theological centrality (deic cleansing?) and utilised its emphasis on the adaption of discoveries in natural philosophy (mathematics and physics) to the improvement of social condition.

Human knowledge and human power meet in one; for where the cause is not known the effect cannot be produced. Nature to be commanded must be obeyed; and that which in contemplation is as the cause is in operation as the rule.
(Bacon, 1620)

It is in *A Fragment*, published in the same year as the American Declaration of Independence, that Bentham first outlined his rejection of the theory of natural rights and his theory of utility.

Thus continued I unsatisfying, and unsatisfied, till I learnt to see that *utility* was the test and measure of all virtue; of loyalty as much as any; and that the obligation to minister to general happiness, was an obligation paramount to and inclusive of every other. (Bentham, 1891, p155)

By 1780 he had completed, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, his major work on Utilitarianism. This was finally published after much refinement in 1789. In 1780 Bentham had a dream in which first an angel flies in the window holding a book which he

passes to Bentham. He does not know the angel's name but knows he is an implacable enemy of the Daemon of Chicane. He is musing over the book when a great man arrives and asks him 'What shall I do to be saved?...to save the nation?' In the dream Bentham replied to the great man, take up my book and follow me. Bentham said the book was *The Principles of Morals and Legislation* and in the dream he was the founder of a sect called the Utilitarians, a person of great sanctity and importance. The dream continued and Bentham cured a man called George and a woman called Britannia (Crimmins, 1990).

Crimmins (1990) cites Bentham comparing Utilitarianism to a religion, or alternative to religion:

The principle of utility fell exactly into its place as the keystone which held together the detached and fragmentary component parts of my knowledge and beliefs. It gave unity to my conceptions of things. I now had opinions; a creed, a doctrine, a philosophy; in one among the best senses of the word, a religion; the inculcation and diffusion of which could be made the principal outward purpose of a life. (Crimmins, 1990, p288)

Around about this time Bentham was befriended by Lord Shelburne, a statesman, who read his work and introduced it to other influential reformers. By now Bentham was no longer practicing law; first the annuity and then the inheritance from his father enabled him to place himself outside practice and work on theory and critique from outside the profession.

Initially Bentham, as parrhesiastes, thought he would only have to tell the new truth and that enlightened statesmen would institute reform to promote happiness. As time moved on he saw this was not going to happen and he began to back the call for democracy, thinking that a gradual improvement in the level of education in society would ensure all people would be more likely to decide and vote on the basis of rational calculation of what would be for their own long-term benefit. Individual rational decision-making would increasingly tend to promote the greater general happiness.

Like Descartes and Locke he thought education would ensure people acted according to reason. People can fully understand cause and effect, but can act from consciousness, unconsciousness, or false consciousness. Bentham does not address akrasia, that peculiar circumstance Locke says is caused by the need to relieve uneasiness, where the perceptive faculty is conscious and yet the action is contrary to reason.

IV...The connexion there is between the intention and certain consequences is, as we shall see hereafter, a means of producing other consequences. In this lies the difference between rational agency and irrational

V. Now the intention, with regard to the consequences of an act, will depend upon two things: 1. The state of the will or intention, with respect to the act itself. And, 2. The state of the understanding, or perceptive faculties, with regard to the circumstances which it is, or may appear to be, accompanied with. Now with respect to these circumstances, the perceptive faculty is susceptible of three states: consciousness, unconsciousness, and false consciousness. Consciousness, when the party believes precisely those circumstances, and no others, to subsist, which really do subsist: unconsciousness, when he fails of perceiving certain circumstances to subsist, which, however, do subsist: false consciousness, when he believes or imagines certain circumstances to subsist, which in truth do not subsist.

(Bentham, 1879, p71)

While Jeremy Bentham was not the first to coin the phrase 'greatest happiness of the greatest number' his restriction of the meaning of happiness to the pleasure pole of the pain-pleasure duality placed happiness in the body and its pursuit in the state governed to ensure it.

I Mankind Governed By Pain and Pleasure

Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. In the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think; every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire: but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while

(Bentham, 1789,p1)

Every action, either private or public, should act to increase happiness.

II. Principle of Utility, what

The principle of utility is the foundation of the present work: it will be proper therefore at the outset to give an explicit and determinate account of what is meant by it. By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of the every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question; or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of every action whatsoever; and therefore not only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government. (Bentham, 1789, p2)

Government must promote happiness through punishment of actions that work against it and reward of actions that work toward it.

Chapter V11 Of Human Actions in General

I. The demand for punishment depends in part upon the tendency of the act.

The business of government is to promote the happiness of society, by punishing and rewarding. That's part of its business which consists in punishing, is more particularly the subject of penal law. In proportion as an act tends to disturb that happiness, in proportion as the tendency of it is pernicious, will be the demand it creates for punishment. What happiness consists of we have already seen: enjoyment of pleasures, security from pains. (Bentham, 1789, p70)

Ethics is the art of self-government where private actions are directed toward happiness.

Ethics at large may be defined, the art of directing men's actions to the production of the greatest possible quantity of happiness, on the part of those whose interest is in view. What then are the actions which it can be in man's power to direct? They must be his own actions, or those of other agents. Ethics, in as far as it is the art of directing a man's own actions, may be styled the *art of self-government* or *private ethics*. (Bentham, 1789, p310)

A man has a duty to promote his own happiness.

Now human creatures, considered with respect to the maturity of their faculties, are either in an *adult*, or in a *non-adult* state. The art of government, in as far as it concerns the direction of the actions of persons in a non-adult state, may be termed the art of *education*.

As to ethics in general, a man's happiness will depend, in the first place, upon such parts of his behaviour as none but himself are interested in; in the next place, upon such parts of it as may affect the happiness of those about him. In as far as his happiness depends upon the first-mentioned part of his behaviour, it is said to depend upon his *duty to himself*. Ethics then, in as far as it is the art of directing a man's actions in this respect, may be termed the art of discharging one's duty to one's self: and the quality which a man manifests by the discharge of this branch of duty (if duty it is to be called) is that of *prudence*. In as far as his happiness, and that of any other person or persons whose interests are considered, depends upon such parts of his behaviour as may affect the interests of those about him, it may be said to depend upon his *duty to others*; or, to use a phrase now somewhat

antiquated, his *duty to his neighbour*. Ethics then, in as far as it is the art of directing a man's actions in this respect, may be termed the art of discharging one's duty to one's neighbour. Now the happiness of one's neighbour may be consulted in two ways: 1. In a negative way, by forbearing to diminish it. 2. In a positive way, by studying to increase it. A man's duty to his neighbour is accordingly partly negative and partly positive: to discharge the negative branch of it, is *probity*: to discharge the positive branch, *beneficence*. (Bentham, 1789, p312)

For the following thirty years Bentham was active, writing books, letters and articles. His work was translated into French by his friend Dumont and circulated widely in France; Bentham was made a citizen of France in 1792. By the 1820's he was widely respected and had corresponded with a large number of influential people in Russia, France, England, America and South America; his correspondents included Peel, Wilberforce, Boswell, Talleyrand, Adams Smith, Quincy Adams, Madison (the future President Madison). He founded a journal 'The Westminster Review' in 1824 and a political party, Philosophical Radicals. The journal was popular and JS Mill (2005) in his autobiography said it had an extraordinary large sale for a first number; it excited much attention because the tide had already turned toward reform and liberalism.

Bentham was a flow in the tide of reform, although the Cambridge History (2005) says it is not possible to assign to the philosophical radicals their exact share in bringing about the changes which gradually ensued because many other influences were working in the same direction.

Mill, Carlyle, Dickens, Depression

J. S. Mill (1806 – 1873), Thomas Carlyle (1795 – 1881) and Charles Dickens (1812 – 1870) shared lifetimes. Mill's articles in the Westminster Review were political and were part of an increased circulation of magazines to an increasingly literate and politically aware society. Carlyle's articles and books were historical and philosophical. Dickens works were popular fiction, novels which attacked social conditions. All three were famous in their lifetimes.

Dickens was one of the many other influences working in the same direction as Bentham though he didn't agree with Bentham about finding mathematical equations that weigh happiness, and he was worried that the rigid Utilitarian formulae were becoming predominant in the liberal project. His novels *Bleak House* and *Hard Times* were examples of satire aimed at Benthamism. But he did agree about the importance of human happiness.

Federico (2003) says that *David Copperfield*, Dickens's 1850 novel (his favorite of all he wrote), is an intimate study of the paradoxes of one of the most enduring legacies of liberalism: the

conscious desire for happiness in one's life and the right to pursue it. She says it is an engagement with what the pursuit of happiness means, morally and ideologically, and what happiness means to individuals in line with liberal goals of self-determination, equality and fair opportunity; the right to pursue one's own happiness became naturalised as a dominant ethic and Victorian writers were pre-occupied with the ethical implications of the pursuit for happiness and the nature of happiness.

Thomas Carlyle, had no love for liberal ideology or utilitarianism, but he wrote a Chapter named Happy in his book *Past and Present*. Here he laments the new modern obsession with Happiness. Perhaps his clear contempt for the new fashion of happiness came from his own well known grumpiness or perhaps he saw the threat to the fundamentals of the Christian religion he had strong faith in?

...Does not the whole wretchedness, the whole Atheism as I call it, of man's ways, in these generations, shadow itself for us in that unspeakable Life-philosophy of his: The pretension to be what he calls 'happy?' Every pitifulest whipster that walks within a skin has his head filled with the notion that he is, shall be, or by all human and divine laws ought to be, 'happy.' His wishes, the pitifulest whipster's, are to be fulfilled for him; his days, the pitifulest whipster's, are to flow on in ever-gentle current of enjoyment, impossible even for the gods. The prophets preach to us, Thou shall be happy; thou shall love pleasant things, and find them. The people clamour, Why have we not found pleasant things?

We construct our theory of Human Duties, not on any Greatest-Nobleness Principle, never so mistaken; no, but on a Greatest-Happiness Principle...Your Greatest-Happiness Principle seems to me fast becoming a rather unhappy one. - What if we should cease babbling about 'happiness,' and leave it resting on its own basis, as it used to do!

...'Happy,' my brother? First of all, what difference is it whether thou art happy or not! Today becomes Yesterday so fast, all Tomorrows become Yesterdays; and then there is no question whatever of the 'happiness,' but quite another question...

...Observe, too, that this is all a modern affair; belongs not to the old heroic times, but to these dastard new times. 'Happiness our being's end and aim' is at bottom, if we will count well, not yet two centuries old in the world.

(Carlyle, 1843, Book 3, Chapter 4)

As to akrasia, intemperance or just stupidity Carlyle says it's the job of the wise to prevent the stupid from walking off cliffs.

Liberty? The true liberty of a man, you would say, consisted in his finding out, or being forced to find out the right path, and to walk therein. To learn or to be taught what work he actually was able for, and then by permission, persuasion and even compulsion, to set about doing of the same! That is his true blessedness, honour, liberty and maximum of well-being: if liberty be not that, I, for one, have small care about liberty. You do not allow a palpable madman to leap over precipices; you violate his liberty, you that are wise; and keep him, were it in strait-waistcoats, away from the precipices! Every stupid, every cowardly and foolish man is but a less palpable madman: his true liberty were that a wiser man, that any and every wiser man, could by brass collars, or in whatever milder or sharper way, lay hold of him when he was going wrong, and order and compel him to go a little righter. O if thou really art my Senior, Seigneur, my Elder, Presbyter or Priest - if thou art in very deed my Wiser, may a beneficent instinct lead and impel thee to 'conquer' me, to command me! If thou do know better than I what is good and right, I conjure thee in the name of God, force me to do it; were it by never such brass collars, whips and hand-cuffs, leave me not to walk over precipices! That I have been called by all the Newspapers a 'free man' will avail me little, if my pilgrimage have ended in death and wreck. O that the Newspapers had called me slave, coward, fool, or what it pleased their sweet voices to name me, and I had attained not death but life! Liberty requires new definitions.

(Carlyle, 1843, 3-13)

And, most of all, Carlyle points to the new pursuit of happiness residing in the body, in the full stomach, not in the soul as blessedness.

I asked myself: What is this that, ever since earliest years, thou hast been fretting and fuming, and lamenting and self-tormenting, on account of? Say it in a word: is it not because thou art not HAPPY? Because the THOU (sweet gentleman) is not sufficiently honored, nourished, soft-bedded, and lovingly cared for? Foolish soul! What Act of Legislature was there that _thou_ shouldst be Happy? A little while ago thou hadst no right to _be_ at all. What if thou wert born and predestined not to be Happy, but to be Unhappy! Art thou nothing other than a Vulture, then, that fliest through the Universe seeking after somewhat to _eat_; and shrieking dolefully because carrion enough is not given thee? Close thy _Byron_; open thy _Goethe_."

"_Es leuchtet mir ein_, I see a glimpse of it!" cries he elsewhere: "there is in man a

HIGHER than Love of Happiness: he can do without Happiness, and instead thereof find Blessedness!

(Carlyle, 1834)

In fact Bentham's Utilitarian theory was that the individual should (rationally) subordinate their own individual happiness to ensure the greater happiness. Mill published *Utilitarianism* in 1863 and starting by acknowledging the length of time that the discussion about happiness had gone on.

THERE are few circumstances among those which make up the present condition of human knowledge, more unlike what might have been expected, or more significant of the backward state in which speculation on the most important subjects still lingers, than the little progress which has been made in the decision of the controversy respecting the criterion of right and wrong. From the dawn of philosophy, the question concerning the summum bonum, or, what is the same thing, concerning the foundation of morality, has been accounted the main problem in speculative thought, has occupied the most gifted intellects, and divided them into sects and schools, carrying on a vigorous warfare against one another. And after more than two thousand years the same discussions continue, philosophers are still ranged under the same contending banners, and neither thinkers nor mankind at large seem nearer to being unanimous on the subject, than when the youth Socrates listened to the old Protagoras, and asserted (if Plato's dialogue be grounded on a real conversation) the theory of utilitarianism against the popular morality of the so-called sophist.

(Mill, 1901, pp1-2)

Mill gives Bentham credit for forming the moral doctrines of the day even among those who reject Utilitarianism. The answer to 'Do you agree that people should be happy?' is a bit like the answer to 'Do you still beat your wife?' Utilitarian objectors (like Carlyle and Dickens) still found themselves talking about happiness whether they thought they should be or not.

Although the non-existence of an acknowledged first principle has made ethics not so much a guide as a consecration of men's actual sentiments, still, as men's sentiments, both of favour and of aversion, are greatly influenced by what they suppose to be the effect of things upon their happiness, the principle of utility, or as Bentham latterly called it, the greatest happiness principle, has had a large share in forming the moral doctrines even of those who most scornfully reject its authority. Nor is there any school of thought which refuses to admit that the influence of actions on happiness. (Mill, 1901, p5)

Mill does deal with akrasia, unlike Bentham. He resorts to the Lockean explanation; uneasiness leads men to settle for the nearer good, but adds that this makes them incapable of achieving the higher good.

It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides.

It may be objected, that many who are capable of the higher pleasures, occasionally, under the influence of temptation, postpone them to the lower. But this is quite compatible with a full appreciation of the intrinsic superiority of the higher. Men often, from infirmity of character, make their election for the nearer good, though they know it to be the less valuable ; and this no less when the choice is between two bodily pleasures, than when it is between bodily and mental. They pursue sensual indulgences to the injury of health, though perfectly aware that health is the greater good. It may be further objected, that many who begin with youthful enthusiasm for everything noble, as they advance in years sink into indolence and selfishness. But I do not believe that those who undergo this very common change, voluntarily choose the lower description of pleasures in preference to the higher. I believe that before they devote themselves exclusively to the one, they have already become incapable of the other. Capacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant, easily killed, not only by hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance; and in the majority of young persons it speedily dies away if the occupations to which their position in life has devoted them, and the society into which it has thrown them, are not favourable to keeping that higher capacity in exercise. Men lose their high aspirations as they lose their intellectual tastes, because they have not time or opportunity for indulging them; and they addict themselves to inferior pleasures, not because they deliberately prefer them, but because they are either the only ones to which they have access, or the only ones which they are any longer capable of enjoying. It may be questioned whether any one who has remained equally susceptible to both classes of pleasures, ever knowingly and calmly preferred the lower; though many, in all ages, have broken down in an ineffectual attempt to combine both.

(Mill, 1901, pp14 –15)

He also mounts an attempt to put morality and virtue back into Utilitarianism; a Utilitarian is Jesus of Nazareth like – impartial, disinterested and benevolent. The Utilitarian has conquered his Passions? Is in the world but not of it?

It is noble to be capable of resigning entirely one's own portion of happiness or chances of it: but, after all, this self-sacrifice must be for some end; it is not its own end; and if we are told that its end is not happiness, but virtue, which is better than happiness, I ask, would the sacrifice be made if the hero or martyr did not believe that it would earn for others immunity from similar sacrifices? Would it be made, if he thought that his renunciation of happiness for himself would produce no fruit for any of his fellow creatures, but to make their lot like his, and place them also in the condition of persons who have renounced happiness? All honour to those who can abnegate for themselves the personal enjoyment of life, when by such renunciation they contribute worthily to increase the amount of happiness in the world; but he who does it, or professes to do it, for any other purpose, is no more deserving of admiration than the ascetic mounted on his pillar. He may be an inspiring proof of what men can do, but assuredly not an example of what they should.

Meanwhile, let utilitarians never cease to claim the morality of self-devotion as a possession which belongs by as good a right to them, as either to the Stoic or to the Transcendentalist. The utilitarian morality does recognise in human beings the power of sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others. It only refuses to admit that the sacrifice is itself a good. A sacrifice which does not increase, or tend to increase, the sum total of happiness, it considers as wasted. The only self-renunciation which it applauds, is devotion to the happiness, or to some of the means of happiness, of others; either of mankind collectively, or of individuals within the limits imposed by the collective interests of mankind.

I must again repeat, what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbour as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality.

(Mill, 1901, pp21-23)

Laws and education should be used to 'establish in the mind' the connection between individual happiness and the happiness of the whole.

As the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal, utility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness, or (as speaking

practically it may be called) the interest, of every individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole; and secondly, that education and opinion, which have so vast a power over human character, should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the whole; especially between his own happiness and the practice of such modes of conduct, negative and positive, as regard for the universal happiness prescribes : so that not only he may be unable to conceive the possibility of happiness to himself, consistently with conduct opposed to the general good, but also that a direct impulse to promote the general good may be in every individual one of the habitual motives of action, and the sentiments connected therewith may fill a large and prominent place in every human being's sentient existence. If the impugners of the utilitarian morality represented it to their own minds in this its true character, I know not what recommendation possessed by any other morality they could possibly affirm to be wanting to it: what more beautiful or more exalted developments of human nature any other ethical system can be supposed to foster, or what springs of action, not accessible to the utilitarian, such systems rely on for giving effect to their mandates.

(Mill, 1901, pp23-25)

So Mill's Utilitarian would obtain the Jesus factor with education. This does not seem to be the same happiness that Carlyle was opposing; either way, neither of these discourses altered the tide of liberalism and reform and, right alongside that, the normalising of individual happiness or at least its pursuit as a natural right.

Federico (2003) cites Sidgwick (the English philosopher) as saying that his observation was that most men feel more keenly pleasures and pains arising from sources other than their conscience. These sources might be from the senses (physical) or from the possession of power, fame or knowledge (mental). In his opinion not even early training would give the conscience predominance and ensure decisions were made for duty. Like Carlyle he linked the new pursuit of personal happiness to the increasingly materialistic society (the pleasures of the body and the body's appetites and desires).

Federico (2003) said as this became normalised it was the job of Dickens and other storytellers to dissect the psychological and emotional consequences of pursuing happiness. She says to answer the question, 'Am I happy?' affirmatively became one the clearest imperatives of the Victorian age and that it was the question that Dickens constantly asked himself and had his hero David Copperfield ask himself. Federico says Dickens provided a touchstone for self-observation.

Chapter 43

Still I don't believe it. We have a delightful evening, and are supremely happy; but I don't believe it yet. I can't collect myself. I can't check off my happiness as it takes place. I feel in a misty and unsettled kind of state; as if I had got up very early in the morning a week or two ago, and had never been to bed since.

(Dickens, 1850, <http://www.bartleby.com/308/43.html>)

It seems a shame the physiology of happiness was 150 years in the future, or equipped with sensors and transmitters to happiness headquarters David could have checked off his happiness as it took place.

Federico cites Dickens from his personal diary in 1855 when she says he had become obsessed with the idea of finding happiness, which in spite of his success seemed to elude him.

The man who is incapable of his own happiness. One who is always in pursuit of happiness. Result. Where is happiness to be found then. Surely not everywhere? Can that be so, after all? Is this my experience?

(Dickens cited in Federico, 2003, p69)

Mill in his Autobiography, published posthumously in 1873, tells of his struggle with the concept of personal happiness. After he first read Bentham he had an enterprise in which his personal happiness was bound.

From the winter of 1821, when I first read Bentham, and especially from the commencement of the Westminster Review, I had what might truly be called an object in life; to be a reformer of the world. My conception of my own happiness was entirely identified with this object. The personal sympathies I wished for were those of fellow labourers in this enterprise. I endeavoured to pick up as many flowers as I could by the way; but as a serious and permanent personal satisfaction to rest upon, my whole reliance was placed on this; and I was accustomed to felicitate myself on the certainty of a happy life which I enjoyed, through placing my happiness in something durable and distant, in which some progress might be always making, while it could never be exhausted by complete attainment. This did very well for several years...

(Mill, 1960, p93)

But in 1826 Mill asked himself a question and what followed was the dry, heavy dejection of the melancholy winter of 1826-7. Let me imagine all I work for has come to pass. Am I happy?

Suppose that all your objects in life were realized; that all the changes in institutions and opinions which you are looking forward to, could be completely effected at this very instant: would this be a great joy and happiness to you?" And an irrepressible self-consciousness distinctly answered, "No!" At this my heart sank within me: the whole foundation on which my life was constructed fell down. All my happiness was to have been found in the continual pursuit of this end. The end had ceased to charm, and how could there ever again be any interest in the means? I seemed to have nothing left to live for.

(Mill, 1960, p94)

He entered a period of doubt and darkness. He wondered how Utilitarianism could possibly be a true doctrine if what was pleasurable to him had become not pleasurable at all. As he passed through his depression he realised he must not ask the question, 'Am I happy?'

The experiences of this period had two very marked effects on my opinions and character...I never, indeed, wavered in the conviction that happiness is the test of all rules of conduct, and the end of life. But I now thought that this end was only to be attained by not making it the direct end. Those only are happy (I thought) who have their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness; on the happiness of others, on the improvement of mankind, even on some art or pursuit, followed not as a means, but as itself an ideal end. Aiming thus at something else, they find happiness by the way. The enjoyments of life (such was now my theory) are sufficient to make it a pleasant thing, when they are taken *_en passant_*, without being made a principal object. Once make them so, and they are immediately felt to be insufficient. They will not bear a scrutinizing examination. Ask yourself whether you are happy, and you cease to be so. The only chance is to treat, not happiness, but some end external to it, as the purpose of life. Let your self-consciousness, your scrutiny, your self-interrogation, exhaust themselves on that; and if otherwise fortunately circumstanced you will inhale happiness with the air you breathe, without dwelling on it or thinking about it, without either forestalling it in imagination, or putting it to flight by fatal questioning. This theory now became the basis of my philosophy of life. And I still hold to it as the best theory for all those who have but a moderate degree of sensibility and of capacity for enjoyment; that is, for the great majority of mankind. (Mill, 1960, p99-100)

But that is the question that the Science of Happiness wants me to ask myself, offers me validated scales on the internet so I can, and the only question I have to ask is why it took them so long to ask me?

The Science of Happiness

The History of Psychology in 100 Words or More

While literature and philosophy continued to ask questions about happiness, for most of the twentieth century mainstream psychology did not. If psychologists enjoyed pastoral power they concentrated on flocks of sick sheep; counting them, listing the ways in which they were sick, and attempting to make them not as sick as they started out. At a conference in 2000, Martin Seligman suggested this might be because of money.

His words at the conference were reported in a summary on the conference website (my italics and underline).

With the creation of the Veterans Administration in 1946, practicing psychologists discovered that they could get reimbursed by the federal government for the treatment of mental disorder. A year later, with the birth of the National Institute of Mental Health, psychologists realized that grant money was readily available for research on mental illness. The juxtaposition of these factors created a system of economic incentives that has lead the profession to orient itself primarily towards the study and treatment of psychological dysfunction. This intense focus on the aberrant side of the human psyche yielded its victories: by Dr. Seligman's estimate, at least 14 previously untreatable mental illnesses became tractable either through pharmacological or psychotherapeutic interventions. Moreover, in the course of its coordinated and vigorous attack on mental disorder, the psychological profession came to develop sophisticated and precise research methodologies and effective diagnostic procedures.


(Seligman, 2000, Opening Address to The Power of Positive Psychology Conference, <http://www.psych.upenn.edu/seligman/viasum.htm>, March 2005)

By 2002, at the Positive Psychology Summit, Martin Seligman, the father of positive psychology (www.reflectivehappiness.com) was a bit more negative and told his positive audience that clinical psychology had some dirty little secrets, some problems, and was facing a dead end.

<http://reflectivehappiness.com/>

Meet Dr. Seligman

Martin E.P. Seligman, PhD is the father of positive psychology. He was recently featured in Time Magazine for his forty years of work on the science of optimism, learned helplessness, and depression. He is currently Fox Leadership Professor of Psychology in the Department of Psychology at the University of Pennsylvania, and the Director of the Positive Psychology Center. [More...](#)



As you know, a lot of my work has been in clinical psychology, and I've come to have more and more serious reservations about what goes on in clinical psychology, and to contrast the future of positive psychology to the history of clinical psychology. And so I want to do a little bit of that today. And I want to talk about the problems of clinical psychology, and why I believe it's reaching a dead end.

And the first is within the United States, at least, due to the exigencies of financing and insurance, clinical psychology here and elsewhere in North America confronts restricted budgets. Managed care is one version of that, and that has very interesting intellectual consequences. And that is clinical psychology and psychiatry have come to be professions which are about firefighting rather than fire prevention. That is, the dirty little secret of biological psychiatry and much of clinical psychology today is that it's given up the notion of cure. It's about crisis intervention and cosmetics.

...There are no curative drugs, and psychiatry has given up on the notion of cure...Another way of saying this is that it turns out, and I've spent a good part of my life measuring the effects of psychotherapy and drugs that the effects are small. That is, when you take something that works like that I've worked in for many years, like cognitive therapy of depression, basically, if you do it well, you get a 65% relief rate, and you've got a 45 to 55% placebo rate. So the effective of cognitive therapy and the effect of every drug and every form of psychotherapy I know with one or two small exceptions is a small to moderate effect.

(Seligman, M. (2002) Opening address to the Positive Psychology Summit, http://www.gallup.hu/pps/seligman_long.htm, March 2005)

The word clinical comes from the Latin 'clinice', the science of clinical medicine or practice at the sickbed; the Latin 'clinicus' is the physician who attends patient sick o\in bed. The Greek 'klinikos' is of or for a bed or the physician who attends patients in their sick beds. Both are from the Indo-European root 'klei; to lean; the physician leans over the bed. Other English words from the same root are recline, incline, and decline.

The person to coin the new phrase 'clinical psychology' was Lightner Witmer who opened the first psychology clinic in 1896.

During the last ten years the laboratory of psychology at the University of Pennsylvania has conducted, under my direction, what I have called "a psychological clinic". Children from the public schools of Philadelphia and adjacent cities have been brought to the laboratory by parents or teachers; these children had made themselves conspicuous because of an inability to progress in schoolwork as rapidly as other children, or because of moral defects which rendered them difficult to manage under ordinary discipline. (Witmer, 1907, p1)

He explains the phrase of clinical psychology and moves the meaning of clinical to method (scientific) not location (beside the bed) but does not alter the object of the work. The gaze of the clinical psychologist is fixed on the body of its dysfunctional object, the patient. He mentions Boerhaave (1668 – 1738) as the founder of clinical medicine. The Cartesian University of Leiden, was influenced by empiricism by the time Boerhaave taught there during the early eighteenth century; Boerhaave was influenced in his scientific method by Sydenham, a close friend of Locke, and combined the mechanistic view of nature (the body of man and animal is a machine governed by necessity, everything is knowable and reducible to mathematics) of Cartesianism with the empirical taxonomic approach of Lockean thought (Israel, 2002). Cook (2000) says Boerhaave's medical teachings explicitly avoided any reference to immaterial powers, whether they be faculties of the mind or of the soul, in favor of that which could be known through the senses; the body of the patient experienced through the body of the physician.

The phraseology of "clinical psychology" and "psychological clinic" will doubtless strike many as an odd juxtaposition of terms relating to quite disparate subjects. While the term "clinical" has been borrowed from medicine, clinical psychology is not a medical psychology. I have borrowed the word "clinical" from medicine, because it is the best term I can find to indicate the character of the method which I deem necessary for this work. Words seldom retain their original significance, and clinical medicine, is not what the word implies, the work of a practicing physician at the bedside of a patient. The term "clinical" implies a method, and not a locality. When the clinical method in medicine was established on a scientific basis, mainly through the efforts of Boerhaave at the University of Leiden, its development came in response to a revolt against the philosophical and didactic methods that more or less dominated medicine up to that time. Clinical psychology likewise is a protestant against a psychology that derives psychological and pedagogical principles from philosophical speculations and against a psychology that applies the results of laboratory experimentation directly to children in the school room. (Witmer, 1907, p1)

While words do seldom retain their original significance, clinical psychology was born at the bedside gazing at the body of the infirm. Martin Seligman was president of the Society of Clinical Psychologists (Section 12 of the APA) in 1994. By 1946, when Seligman said it responded to the reinforcer of economic incentives to focus on psychological dysfunction, it had been pretty much doing only that since 1917 when it was formed as the American Association of Clinical Psychology taking the name Witmer offered in 1907. Witmer's clinical psychology was a Lockean empirical protest against Cartesian introspection. Let the building of taxonomies using the mechanistic view of the necessary behaviour of rats and pigeons commence.

Straight to Skinner

Burrhus Frederick Skinner (1904 –1990) was a Professor of Psychology at Indiana University in 1946 and would be Professor at Harvard by 1948. I go straight to Skinner because his influence over the next generation of psychologists is legendary; Altus & Morris (2004) say in his 40 year career he was arguably the most eminent psychologist of the century; he was certainly one of the first to cross the divide between academia and popular culture and Rozycki (1995) says he was the P.T. Barnum of academic psychology. While Seligman's clinical psychology was being reimbursed by the federal government for treating mental disorder, Skinner was inventing the Air Crib, to store babies in, and his experimental psychology was training pigeons to guide missiles (Rozycki, 1995). Not without funding of course; Rozycki says 'scientific rat runners of that period enjoyed all sorts of scientific federal support disallowed to their less scientific Cognitivist brethren' (Rozycki, 1995, p20).

Skinner's Brief Autobiography outlines his early and coincidental exposure to Francis Bacon's work. He was around 14 and his father had mentioned at home that Shakespeare's works were actually written by Bacon. When his class studied *As You Like It* he told the class that Bacon was the true author; his teacher told him he was wrong. To prove to her he was not wrong he read Edwin Durning-Lawrence's *Bacon is Shakespeare*, biographies of Bacon, summaries of his philosophical position, and a good deal of *The Advancement of Learning* and *Novum Organon*.

In his Brief Autobiography Skinner talks about his Baconian view of life.

Much of this attitude is Baconian. Whether my early and quite accidental contact with Bacon is responsible or not, I have followed his principles closely. I reject verbal authority. I have "studied nature not books," asking questions of the organism rather than of those who have studied the organism. I think it can be said, as it was said of Bacon, that I get my books out of life, not out of other books. I have

followed Bacon in organizing my data...I classify, not for the sake of classification but to reveal properties.

I also follow Bacon in distinguishing between observation and experimentation. Bacon no doubt underestimated the importance of extending the range of human sense organs with instruments, but he did so in emphasizing that knowledge is more than sensory contact. I would put it this way: Observation overemphasizes stimuli; experimentation includes the rest of the contingencies which generate effective repertoires. I have also satisfied myself that Bacon's four Idols can be translated into an acceptable behavioral analysis of faulty thinking.

...My position as a behaviorist came from other sources. Perhaps, like Jeremy Bentham and his theory of fictions, I have tried to resolve my early fear of theological ghosts. Perhaps I have answered my mother's question, "What will people think?" by proving that they do not think at all (but the question might as well have been "What will people say?"). I used to toy with the notion that a behavioristic epistemology was a form of intellectual suicide, but there is no suicide because there is no corpse. What perishes is the homunculus -- the spontaneous, creative inner man to whom, ironically, we once attributed the very scientific activities which led to his demise.

(Skinner, 1967, <http://ww2.lafayette.edu/~allanr/scientst.html>)

In the autobiography he also talked about a revelation he had as a teenage about balance. In life happiness must equal unhappiness and God had nothing to do with it.

Shortly after I reached puberty, I had a mystical experience. I lost a watch, which I had just been given by my family, and I was afraid to go home ("You would lose your head if it were not screwed on"). I took my bicycle and rode up along the river and followed the creek up to our shack. I was miserably unhappy. Suddenly, it occurred to me that happiness and unhappiness must cancel out and that if I were unhappy now I would necessarily be happy later. I was tremendously relieved. The principle came with the force of a revelation. In a mood of intense exaltation I started down along the creek. Halfway to the road, in a nest of dried grass beside the path, lay my watch. I have no explanation; I had certainly "lost" it in town. I took this as a Sign. I hurried home and wrote an account in biblical language and purple ink. (The ink I had made by dissolving the lead from an indelible pencil, and it had an appropriate golden sheen.) No other signs followed, however, and my new testament remained only one chapter in length. Within a year I had gone to Miss Graves to tell her that I no longer believed in God. "I know," she said, "I have been through that myself." But her strategy misfired: I never went *through* it.

(Skinner, 1967, <http://ww2.lafayette.edu/~allanr/early.html>)

Skinner emulated Bacon another way. He wrote a utopian novel called *Walden Two* (*Walden* was Thoreau's utopian novel)

But that coin has another face: once obeyed, nature can be commanded. The point of Solomon's House in the New Atlantis, as of The Royal Society founded on Bacon's model, was that knowledge should be useful. A hundred years later -- in an epoch in which I feel especially at home -- Diderot developed the theme in his *Encyclopedie*. A hundred years after that, the notion of progress took on new significance in the theory of evolution. *Walden Two* is my *New Atlantis*; I suppose it could also be said that in applying an experimental analysis to education I returned to a motto which Bacon as a child saw in his father's house: *Moniti Meliora* (instruction brings progress). I believe in progress, and I have always been alert to practical significances in my research.

(Skinner, 1967, <http://ww2.lafayette.edu/~allanr/scientst.html>)

Walden Two is explained by Frazier, the fictional founder, in a dialogue with visitors. A managing elite rules a luxurious community and education 'takes the shackles off the souls of even the women' (Skinner, 1948, p137). Government and economics are reduced to behavioural psychology; original sin, selfishness, is 'shaped' out of the members of *Walden Two*. Physical health is ensured through hygienic disciplines, exercise and nutrition. Skinner does not have Frazier tell us that people need to cheer up for good health; mental health is achieved through meaningful work.

Each of us has interests which conflict with the interests of everybody else. That's our original sin, and it can't be helped. Now, 'everybody else' we call 'society.' It's a powerful opponent, and it always wins. Oh, here and there an individual prevails for a while and gets what he wants. Sometimes he storms the culture of a society and changes it slightly to his own advantage. But society wins in the long run, for it has the advantage of numbers and of age. Many prevail against one, and men against a baby. Society attacks early, when the individual is helpless. It enslaves him almost before he has tasted freedom. The 'ologies' will tell you how it's done. Theology calls it building a conscience or developing a spirit of selflessness. Psychology calls it the growth of the super-ego.

"Considering how long society has been at it, you'd expect a better job.

(Skinner, 1948, p104)

The result of the application of scientific method, knowing causes, is happiness and equanimity.

"My dear fellow," said Frazier, "of course they're not. It's not the separation that counts, but whether the relation between cause and effect is obvious. The happiness and equanimity of our people are obviously related to the self-control they have acquired."

(Skinner, 1948, p177)

Skinner's celebrity increased through the Air Crib invention and the book *Walden Two*; behavioural science was a technique that fitted with American Cold War ideology and popular science became popular (*Time* magazine had a science section from its first publication in 1923, *New Scientist* magazine was first published in 1956). The scientific consumer had moved from the Dutch coffee shop to the dentist's office and now had an up to date knowledge about what the great men of science were doing to improve lives. Medicine, physics, cosmology, psychology all laid bare for inspection. Rose (1999), *Governing The Soul*, traces the path by which the 'psy' endeavours have made it possible, through producing knowledge and making truth claims, to govern subjects who are apparently free and autonomous. The scientific popular media has played a large part in providing us with language and convincing us we should participate in this governing of our selves.

In 1971 in an interview in *Time* magazine Skinner outlined his philosophy regarding individualism, and gave a plug for *Walden Two*, which was now heading toward its millionth copy sold. Like Bacon, Skinner believed in Idols, people exerting freedom are akratic and should be stopped.



Skinner acknowledges that the concept of freedom played a vital role in man's successful efforts to overthrow the tyrants who oppressed him, bolstering his courage and spurring him to nearly superhuman effort. But the same ideal, Skinner maintains, now threatens 20th century man's continued existence.

"My book," says Skinner, "is an effort to demonstrate how things go bad when you make a fetish out of individual freedom and dignity. If you insist that individual rights are the summum bonum, then the whole structure of society falls down." In fact, Skinner believes that Western culture may die and be replaced, perhaps, with the

more disciplined culture of the Soviet Union or of China. If that happens. Western man will have lost the only form of immortality he can hope for—the survival of his way of life.

Skinner's reasoning is that freedom and free will are no more than illusions; like it or not, man is already controlled by external influences. Some are haphazard; some are arranged by careless or evil men whose goals are selfish instead of humanitarian. The problem, then, is to design a culture that can, theoretically, survive; to decide how men must behave to ensure its survival in reality; and to plan environmental influences that will guarantee the desired behavior. Thus, in the Skinnerian world, man will refrain from polluting, from overpopulating, from rioting, and from making war, not because he knows that the results will be disastrous, but because he has been conditioned to want what serves group interests.

Skinner rises at 5 a.m., writes for three hours, then walks to his Harvard office, sometimes memorizing poetry (Shakespeare or Baudelaire) on the way. There he charts the sales of *Walden Two* on a graph over his desk; the total should reach the million mark sometime in 1972.

(Time, 1971, <http://time-proxy.yaga.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,909994,00.html>)

But paradoxically while freedom for the masses (Descartes' weak souls?) should not be an option Skinner leaves himself room to have the freedom to help mankind and to ask himself the question that Mill says he should not, 'Am I happy?'

Skinner nonetheless allows himself some relaxation. He drinks vodka and tonic in the late afternoon, sees an occasional movie, reads Georges Simenon detective novels once in a while, and enjoys the company of friends, his two children and his grandchildren. It sounds fulfilling, but a poignant passage from a personal journal several years ago suggests an underlying sadness: "Sun streams into our living room. My hi-fi is midway through the first act of *Tristan and Isolde*. A very pleasant environment. A man would be a fool not to enjoy himself in it. In a moment I will work on a manuscript which may help mankind. So my life is not only pleasant, it is earned or deserved. Yet, yet, I am unhappy."

That sort of unhappiness wells from deep personal sources. Yet it is also related to his more universal concerns. Skinner worries about the fact that, as *Walden Two's* Frazier put it, "our civilization is running away like a frightened horse. As she runs, her speed and her panic increase together. As for your politicians, your professors,

your writers—let them wave their arms and shout as wildly as they will."

(Time, 1971,

<http://time-proxy.yaga.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,909994,00.html>)

Because after all, above all, entrenched deeply, happiness is our first goal.

What we are trying to achieve through our cultural experiments in Walden Two is a way of life which will be satisfying without propaganda and for which, therefore, we won't have to pay the price of personal stultification. Happiness is our first goal, but an alert and active drive toward the future is our second. We'll settle for the degree of happiness which has been achieved in other communities or cultures, but we'll be satisfied with nothing short of the most alert and active group-intelligence yet to appear on the face of the earth.

(Skinner, 1948, P209)

Unhappy punters are aroused punters who might just question government.

In Walden Two no one worries about the government except the few to whom that worry has been assigned. To suggest that everyone should take an interest would seem as fantastic as to suggest that everyone should become familiar with our Diesel engines. Even the constitutional rights of the members are seldom thought about, I'm sure. The only thing that matters is one's day-to-day happiness and a secure future. Any infringement there would undoubtedly 'arouse the electorate.

(Skinner, 1948, p270)

It appears that even when the spontaneous, creative inner man disappears he leaves his Cartesian, Spinozan, Baconian, Lockean, Blackstonian, Jeffersonian, Benthamite, Millsian, Carlylian, Dickensian, Skinnerian etc etc etc desire for happiness behind him.

Perhaps I have answered my mother's question, "What will people think?" by proving that they do not think at all (but the question might as well have been "What will people say?"). I used to toy with the notion that a behavioristic epistemology was a form of intellectual suicide, but there is no suicide because there is no corpse. What perishes is the homunculus – the spontaneous, creative inner man to whom, ironically, we once attributed the very scientific activities which led to his demise.

(Skinner, 1967, <http://ww2.lafayette.edu/~allanr/scientst.html>)

What Skinner and his colleagues bequeathed to the modern psychologists was Cartesian rats

and pigeons, Baconian method, and an uninterrupted view of the landscape of the desire for happiness.

Psychology After Skinner

As Trippet (1979) commented in a Time magazine article *The Scientific Pursuit of Happiness*, what we were waiting for was the Newton or the Galileo of happiness, or the $e=mc^2$ of happiness, and science was planning on working on it in the usual detached and taxonomical way.

Lately, however, science has begun to nose around in that shifty terrain (of happiness) it so long neglected. Tenuous scientific probes of the happiness phenomenon, as an aspect of mental health, were organized as long ago as the 1960s. Perhaps because happiness itself was all but out of style in the days of Viet Nam, urban riots and the burgeoning dope culture, the trend never took off. Only now is it becoming clear that our gladness is likely to be subjected to the same methodical research and analysis that has been lavished for generations on our madness. The signs that happyology is aborning as a discipline have come in sequences of earnest surveys, widespread drizzles of articles and now a spate of hardback tomes.

...The one thing common to most of the research is the conspicuous wariness of the investigators. The utterly elusive ingredients of the mood they are examining force them to turn away from the phenomenon itself. They prefer to tabulate its incidence and parameters. So, even though they maintain their scientific detachment and method in analyzing data, to collect it they have had no convenient choice but to adopt the time-tested techniques of public opinion polling. Subjects are asked merely to declare their degree of happiness, not define it.

(Trippet, 1979)

Trippet was quite right, the Science of Happiness was aborning amidst a deeply embedded assumption that we all experience some degree of it and we should all want more. The central dogma of Utilitarian religion: the greatest happiness for the greatest number.

21st Century Popular Science of Happiness

This genealogy concludes with fragments generated from the academic science of happiness from the 21st century, not from the scientific literature which has been summarised at the beginning of this thesis, but from popular literature. Science for the scientific consumer or the searcher for happiness on the world wide web.

Futurist, July-August 2002

World Trends & Forecasts

Society

Science Pursues Happiness

Happiness pays off, studies show

P sychologists seeking the real secrets of happiness report that very happy people tend to be more extroverted and agreeable than less happy people.

"Our findings suggest that very happy people have rich and satisfying social relationships and spend little time alone relative to average people," write psychologists Ed Diener and Martin E.P. Seligman in their latest *Psychological Science*.

jective well-being – in other words, the person evaluates his or her own quality of life. The question to ask is, "Is my life going well, according to the standards I choose to use?" If the answer is "yes," then that person is judged to be happy.

Because people evaluate their lives based on happiness, subjective well-being is very important. Though necessary, it is not sufficient for having a good life. Subjective well-being

The Salt Lake Tribune

www.sltrib.com

WEDNESDAY
March 26, 2003

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What Makes a Child Become a Happy Adult?

By Brooke Adams
The Salt Lake Tribune

As it turns out, you can help your child put on a happy face for life -- something that may be needed now more than ever.

Some people are born with naturally easy-going, happy temperaments, but there are things parents can do to guide children in developing a contented outlook on life, said Ed Diener, a psychology professor at the University of Illinois.

"Very happy people all have one thing in common -- good social relationships," said Diener, who is known as "Dr. Happiness." "And most very happy people have meaningful, internal goals they enjoy pursuing."

For more than 20 years, Diener has studied what makes people happy. He will visit Utah this week to give two lectures on the subject.

Tonight at 7 p.m. Diener will present "The Pursuit of Happiness: Is There Anything Parents Can Do to Raise Satisfied, Happy Children?" at Rowland Hall-St.

WHAT MAKES TIME FLOW

SCIENCE OF HAPPINESS

PART ONE 10 KEYS TO A CONTENTED LIFE

HAPPY Does more of it make you happier?

RELATIONSHIPS The unlikely power of marriage

HOMELIFE What's so special about Denmark?


FEELGOOD FACTOR | PART ONE

The pursuit of happiness

It is the subject of countless treatises and self-help books. In the US, the quest for it is an inalienable right enshrined in the Declaration of Independence. Now investigating it has become an academic discipline. Michael Bond looks at the new science of how to be happy

WHY It is a new science, but it is not new. The quest for happiness has been a part of human life since the dawn of time. It is the subject of countless treatises and self-help books. In the US, the quest for it is an inalienable right enshrined in the Declaration of Independence. Now investigating it has become an academic discipline. Michael Bond looks at the new science of how to be happy

These are the days of the 'feelgood factor'. It is the subject of countless treatises and self-help books. In the US, the quest for it is an inalienable right enshrined in the Declaration of Independence. Now investigating it has become an academic discipline. Michael Bond looks at the new science of how to be happy



The pages that follow, TIME's third annual Mind & Body special issue on health, explore how work, marriage, religion, money, health and even laughter itself lead to (and flow from) a state of happiness. We may not always be able to find it, but we know when we have arrived. And sometimes a road map can help.

TIME (2005)



Want to get Americans to agree on something?

Ask us if we're happy. In an era in which we can't reach consensus on the dangers of the deficit, the wisdom of the war or even the color of the map, a clear majority stake a claim on happiness. In a TIME poll, 78% of those surveyed said they feel that way most or all of the time. But beneath the national contentment there's evidence of a creeping dissatisfaction too. Why else are so many of us flocking to therapists, consulting divorce lawyers, scarfing Prozac? Why do so many reach midlife with a surprising sense of emptiness? Why does the self-help book remain such a reliable cash machine? In a society as wealthy and privileged as the U.S.'s, what, after all, does it take to find real satisfaction in life?

Time, 2005

prefrontal cortex that is predisposed to happiness and one that isn't? It almost certainly has in part

HEALING

Can Sunny Thoughts Halt Cancer?

It's almost an article of faith: your best ally in the fight against cancer is a doggedly optimistic outlook. And it would seem that mounting evidence of the links between emotional and physical well-being would bolster that view. The only problem, says Dr. Jimmie Holland, a psychiatrist at Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in New York City, is that there is no good evidence to support that belief when it comes to cancer. Moreover, the "tyranny of positive thinking," as she calls it, often becomes just one more burden for the afflicted. Cancer patients shouldn't feel obliged to smile through their suffering. More critically, she says, "they shouldn't have to feel guilty if their treatment fails."



KEEP SMILING? It can become yet another burden for the ailing, says Holland, right, with patient Yvette Muyette

It was research in the 1970s and '80s that first popularized the idea that attitude might affect cancer outcomes. Such research led doctors to encourage patients to think happy thoughts and visualize their immune system blasting away tumor cells. But most of those studies have been dismissed as either flawed or inconclusive. A review of 37 studies that was published in the *British Medical Journal* in 2002 found that although a positive outlook does correlate with the perception of less pain by patients—a real benefit—there is "little consistent evidence that coping styles play an important part in survival from or recurrence of cancer."

Still, the optimism theory remains seductive. One reason is that Westerners live in a culture that covets control. We want to believe that we can beat cancer by imposing our will on the disease. A better reason is that mental states like depression and chronic anxiety have been shown to have physical consequences that affect the progression of such illnesses as heart disease and diabetes. While a similar connection is biologically plausible for cancer, it is far from proven. Even researchers who believe that studies will ultimately establish links

between stress and the progression of cancer, like Stanford's Dr. David Spiegel, know the picture is complex. "It isn't a matter of 'Fix it in your mind, and you fix it in your body,'" he says, "but it would be strange if what goes on in our minds didn't affect how our bodies deal with illness."

So where does that leave cancer patients? Doctors know that individuals will always bring their own disposition—sunny, sour or sarcastic—to bear on their illness and treatment. Pressuring them to be paragons of positive thinking is futile. Worse, it could cause them to hide their fears and shun support. But clinicians must remain alert for signs of depression, which can affect the outcome of any disease if it interferes with treatment. And many patients will also need—and welcome—help to improve poor coping skills. Spiegel says, "Having worked with people with life-threatening illnesses for 30 years, it's clear that there are better and worse ways to deal with these things." False optimism isn't helpful, but neither is despair. —By David Bjorklie

monitor the brains of test subjects. The mental mode he studies is anticipation. "When people

SHAWN THOMPSON—AP/WIDEWORLD FOR TIME

Are you a happy subject of the new science of happiness? Or are you uneasy? Measure yourself and find out with validity and reliability in Time, 2005

Measure Your Happiness

How happy are you? Sure, you may think you know, but this little test will help you keep score. The Satisfaction with Life Scale was devised in 1980 by University of Illinois psychologist Edward Diener, a founding father of happiness research. Since then the scale has been used by researchers around the world.

Read the following five statements. Then use a 1-to-7 scale to rate your level of agreement.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at all true			Moderately true		Absolutely true	

- 1 In most ways my life is close to my ideal.
- 2 The conditions of my life are excellent.
- 3 I am satisfied with my life.
- 4 So far I have gotten the important things I want in life.
- 5 If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing.

Total score _____

Scoring: ● 31 to 35: you are extremely satisfied with your life ● 26 to 30: very satisfied ● 21 to 25: slightly satisfied ● 20 is the neutral point ● 15 to 19: slightly dissatisfied ● 10 to 14: dissatisfied ● 5 to 9: extremely dissatisfied

And a recent example from xtra.co.nz. Learn To Be Happy
Happy makes you healthy. Are you happy?

Mental Health

Health Update

Sun 17 April 2005



Learn To Be Happy

PHOTOGRAPH BY [illegible]

By Katherine [illegible]
circumstances

If you thought that a lot of money or a successful marriage brought happiness, think again. Research has shown that neither of these truly makes people happy. In fact, all the evidence points towards it having very little to do with other people or

Down Under. A recent study done by Queensland University researchers in Brisbane, found that divorced, widowed and never-married women over 60 were happier than their married counterparts. Their findings fly in the face of consistent studies over the years that show married women as being happier than unmarried women. But the crux of the matter seems to be that the older single women had active lives and were anchored in the community, rather than the fact that they were without partners.

Good for your health. Medical research shows that being happy is good for your health. It is good for your heart, builds a strong immune system and provides people with a positive outlook in life, making them better equipped to deal with life's numerous disappointments and surprises.

Buy one, get one free. There are numerous products for sale that claim to elevate the mood and improve one's levels of happiness. From raising serotonin levels through exercise or eating chocolates, to herbal remedies like St John's Wort or even taking Vitamin B complex tablets. While all of these no doubt contribute to a general level of well-being, long-lasting happiness does not lie in a single solution.

Ask the pros. Professors of Psychology David Myers and Edward Diener found that though people think more money will make them happy, it actually does not. Americans' personal income had more than doubled between 1960 and 1990, though the percentage of people describing themselves as happy, had actually declined.

It's the non-material things that make people happy," according to Dr Vijai P. Sharma. The irony was that people spend all their time trying to make money, leaving little time to pursue those things which actually makes them happy.

Grocery list for happiness

- Meaningful relationships
- A satisfying job
- Good health
- Positive family life
- Feeling appreciated/loved
- Enjoyment of music/sports/hobbies

Are you happy? It would then appear as if the good doctors are challenging us to look at the above list and rate ourselves accordingly. Very few of us can say we have great relationships, a wonderful job and fantastic relations with our family - all at the same time. The trick is to start off small and see what can be changed. Perhaps all it takes is to make a phone call, send out a CV or take better care of yourself. Apologise to someone, take a friend to lunch, buy a child an ice cream. Give a little. It sounds a little too easy, doesn't it? But perhaps, it is worth a try.

Andrea Botha
Health24
March 05

In the scientist practitioner model of psychology I was taught, the one steeped in Baconian method, it wasn't a good thing to draw causal connections. Unless you were certainest it was only a good thing to talk about correlations; the search for confounding factors, connections that cause both effects went on. While the psychologists in the article below are careful to say there are plausible biological pathways linking happiness with health the article says, 'Happiness is good for the heart.' Which gets us neatly back to Descartes who thought exactly the same thing.

The NZ Herald 20th April, 2005

http://www.nzherald.co.nz/index.cfm?c_id=28&ObjectID=10121376

Wednesday April 20, 2005

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Smiley, happy people have healthy hearts

20.04.05

By JEREMY LAURANCE

Happiness is good for the heart, thinning the blood, reducing its stickiness, and cutting the level of the stress hormone cortisol, according to psychologists from University College London.

The more happiness people experience the better their health is likely to be, they say.

While the adverse physical effects of depression and anxiety are well known, the biological impact of a good mood has not been demonstrated before, they claim.

The finding, published online in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, comes as separate research shows that the risk of heart disease as an adult is increased by childhood infections such as colds and flu.

Researchers found the flexibility of the arteries in 600 children was reduced during an infection and in some cases did not recover after the infection was over.

Artery flexibility is a key risk factor for heart disease and the researchers suggest in the journal Circulation that there could be a link between this and infections suffered in childhood.

In the study examining the impact of happiness on health, 116 middle-aged men and 100 women from London were monitored at work and leisure and tested in a laboratory.

They gave blood and saliva samples and rated their happiness at different times. Some of the participants never felt happy while others felt happy all the time. Most were happiest during their leisure hours.

The happier people had lower levels of fibrinogen, a clotting factor in the blood which increases the risk of heart attack.

They also had lower levels of cortisol, the stress hormone, even when subjected to stressful tests, indicating that they coped better with adverse events.

The results showed for the first time that there are "plausible biological pathways" linking happiness with health, the authors said.


Andrew Steptoe, professor of psychology, who led the study, said: "What we find particularly interesting is that the associations between happiness and biological responses were independent of psychological distress.

"We already know that depression and anxiety are related to increased physical health risk. This study raises the intriguing possibility that the effect of happiness may be somewhat separate."

Jane Wardle, professor of psychology and an author of the study, said: "If you think of psychological well-being on a scale from happy at the top through neutral to depressed at the bottom, most research has looked at the bottom part of this distribution.

"What we have found, by looking at the top part, is that there could be a whole other side involving happiness which affects biological factors."

- INDEPENDENT



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a message from
Dr. Seligman

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Meet Dr. Seligman

Martin E.P. Seligman, PhD is the father of positive psychology. He was recently featured in Time Magazine for his forty years of work on the science of optimism, learned helplessness, and depression. He is currently Fox Leadership Professor of Psychology in the Department of Psychology at the University of Pennsylvania, and the Director of the Positive Psychology Center. [More](#)

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Dr. Seligman & Reflective Happiness website featured in TIME Magazine cover story

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Like Descartes, Dr Seligman does not think this applies to 'every person' but to 'most'; that would exclude the 'base' person.

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Reflective Happiness

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Welcome to ReflectiveHappiness.com

I've created this website because there is now a powerful enough science of Positive Psychology to help most people lead happier lives than they lead now.


Over the last 40 years I have dedicated my life to the investigation of ways to improve the emotional well being of adults and children. In founding Positive Psychology my vision has always been to create the tools to help people build more pleasure, more engagement and more meaning into their lives.

There is now compelling evidence, both from the clinic and from the laboratory, that many of the positive interventions that we have created will lastingly increase happiness and decrease depression. My research team at the Positive Psychology Center at the University of Pennsylvania continues to create these interventions and to document their effectiveness. To keep you abreast of these new findings, **ReflectiveHappiness.com** will provide you with one new positive intervention during the first week of every month. Our interventions include things like Three Blessings™, the Gratitude Visit, Savor a Beautiful Day, Signature Strengths, Active & Constructive Friendship & Love, and Meaning & Positive Service.

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In addition to a monthly intervention, each month subscribers will also get:

- A Question & Answer internet exchange in which I will answer questions from subscribers the second week of every month
- A newsletter from me about the latest developments in Positive Psychology and how they apply to



STREAMING 0:00:02 / 1:5

If Elizabeth was still critiquing she might have said to Dr Seligman, as she did to Descartes, what about embodiment? What about the conditions of my life? What about the accidents of fortune that bring me to this place at this time? What about contingency? What about DNA? Dr Seligman would answer unless you're mad or base I can make you happier if you follow my instructions. And if you're mad Dr Seligman would say, echoing Freud¹, that at least clinical psychology can make you less unhappy.

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Meet Dr. Martin Seligman

Martin E.P. Seligman is the father of positive psychology. He has for forty years worked on the science of optimism, learned helplessness, and depression. He is currently Fox Leadership Professor of Psychology in the Department of Psychology at the University of Pennsylvania, and Director of the Positive Psychology Center. He was formerly President of the Division of Clinical Psychology of the American Psychological Association, and in 1997 was elected President of the American Psychological Association by the largest vote in modern history.


Dr. Seligman has received many awards including the Laurel Award of the American Association for Applied Psychology and Prevention, the Lifetime Achievement Award of the Society for Research in Psychopathology, and two Lifetime Achievement Awards, one for basic science, and the other for the application of science from the American Psychological Society.

He received his A.B. from Princeton University, Summa Cum Laude in 1964 and his Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania in 1967. He holds three honorary doctoral degrees.

Since 2000 his main mission has been the promotion of the field of Positive Psychology. This discipline includes the study of positive emotion, positive character traits, and positive institutions. As the science behind these becomes more firmly grounded, Dr. Seligman is now turning his attention to training Positive Psychologists, individuals whose practice will make the world a happier place, in a way that parallels clinical psychologists having made the world a less unhappy place.



Dr. Martin E. P. Seligman



Click on book to see Dr. Seligman's other works

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¹ Freud actually said, 'much will be gained if we succeed in transforming your hysterical misery into common unhappiness. Thus with a mental life that has been restored to health you will be better armed against that unhappiness. (Freud cited in Thompson, 2004).

Are you happy? Are you still happy? What about now?

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A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE GENEALOGY AND ITS TRAJECTORIES

Fragments From The Archive

I have come from the historical archive with some fragments. In the genealogical method I have tried to pick up and use, I have found it is what I select from the archive that is an act of interpretation. The archive is practically infinite and each fragment is embedded in an infinite sea of events that surround it. The past is not tidy and not linear. The fragments I have selected have offered me opportunities to return to the present with knowledge that disrupts 'the tyranny of globalising discourses' (Foucault, 1980, p83). It has certainly disrupted me.

Foucault has traced the emergence of new forms of power, results of the 'confluence of Christian techniques of self-decipherment and Enlightenment technologies for the rational policing of populations' (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p253). Foucault's bio-power can be understood as normalising, forming and constraining. The form it takes on Dr Seligman's web site is of self measurement, self evaluation, self monitoring, changing the thoughts of the self in order to improve the health of the self. The founding father tells his children how to be happy and advises them to watch themselves – constantly.

So how did we arrive here? What turns were made to arrive here and now?

To live in the times of Descartes, Spinoza and Bacon, where I started this work of fiction was to live within power structures that appear to be obvious from this historical distance via the lens I have available to see. Europe was at war, Sovereignty was challenged, and the Church was splintered.

That Man had Fallen, that evil was present and invisible, that the body would rise to immortal happiness or to eternal damnation were all truths, and all ripple through the disciplinary techniques that have emerged and merged to form my self.

Descartes, parrhesiastes, longed for certainty, and perfection and by this perfection thought he could achieve immortality, or at least a life of 1000 years. The female soul could be mastered by the male reason; the passions which arise in the body to torment the mind could be monitored and managed by the mind. Man has a free will; akrasia begone.

If doubt is the opposite of certainty, and doubt had comparative and superlatives, as certain used to, then Spinoza was the doubtfullest about Descartes' certainty. He saw infinite chains of necessity, the comprehension of which is outside human capacity, man constrained in webs he could not ever fully see, he saw man caught in man made abytropic discourses of evil and

repentance. I bring Spinoza's doubt back with me, along with unease that even he thought man was caught in a pursuit of happiness that he preferred to name tranquility.

And Bacon, self-professed parrhesiastes and saviour, he too longing for certainty and perfection. Certain that the Idols could be vanquished; akrasia overcome by method.

All three writing, and therefore desiring, to change humanity. To somehow make things clearer for us that cannot see so well.

And the Church and the University gradually separated, like Rangi and Papa, by Descartes and Bacon. And knowledge of science, the academy, the university all committed to Promethean acts of increasing perfection. The Science Man will become God. The body will be immortal and perfect.

And Locke defining natural rights, that we are all unique, but not unique in that born in all men is the desire for happiness, that happiness is opposite to misery, that constant watchfulness of my self is required.

And Blackstone agreeing with natural rights and merging them with legal rights.

And Jefferson reading Bacon and Locke and Blackstone and, with an ear to the euphonics of a call to war, making the pursuit of happiness not just an American right but mine as well. And rights of course always lead to duties.

And Bentham, yet another dreaming parrhesiastes, reading Descartes, Bacon and Locke and corresponding with American founding fathers, linking happiness forever with utility, the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers, it is my duty to seek my own happiness.

And Skinner, reading Bacon and Bentham, writing his vision for a world where happiness was the first goal, and training pigeons to guide missiles, and wondering why he was unhappy.

And Seligman and Diener, sons of Skinner, twin founding fathers of the Science of Happiness, prescribing right thinking, right virtues and predicting good health, citing themselves and each other, issuing 7 point Likert scale questions about happiness to readers of Time

And me, no delusions of grandeur that I'm yet aware of, reading Foucault, writing for academic gain, rejecting utterly the Science of Happiness and wondering whether Spinozists are really tranquil.

To live in my times, where I finish this work, is to live within power relations that are less visible to me. The world moves from war to war, the Monarchy survives but Sovereignty does not. Democracy makes it appear as though government changes every 3 or 4 years. The Church and The University are riven. I have passed through multiple institutions that specialise in disciplining my body and my mind. I have inspected the waste pipes of my psyche on many occasion, looked for piles in the rear end of my mind, confessed to hating my father. I was born a catholic and I understand abtropy and confession but not happiness. The Science of Happiness does not wish me health and happiness but only happiness because that leads to everything else.

Have we followed the linear path to perfection that Descartes and Bacon envisaged, akrasia gone, Idols vanquished, man supremely perfect?

To approach Foucault's genealogy means to approach events, knowledge, descent, the body's part in all of this, emergence, will to power and will to knowledge. I can see events swirling around the men in this fiction. Adopting Descartes was rejection of a Church that wanted control of a State, pursuit of happiness sounds so much better than plain old property. Knowledge and power, as Bacon says, are twins born joined at the head, and they are born, not waiting fully formed to be discovered or picked up and held. And the body's part in all of this. The sickly bodies of Descartes and Bacon and Bentham. The embalmed body of Bentham. Emergence of the practice of clinical psychology and the Science of Happiness. And will, or desire, or as Bacon would have it the pursuit which makes me happy.

The Shifting Meanings of the Word – A Discursive View

On the return from the past, or the turn around the past viewed via the genealogical history, what is important is a disrupted view of the present. A view that makes a new analytic of the ontology of the present and its possibility of truth claims available. A view that displays the present that forms me and gives me new possibilities to be re-formed. A view that might display power relations which produce and repress, and provide a space in which I might practice the 'art of not being governed' which is how Foucault defines freedom (Foucault cited in Ophir, 2001, p410). I reflect on Bacon's Idols and akratically hold the desire to escape the Spinozan inescapable in the same space as the desire to artfully slide out from under some of the normalising governance I see at work.

Ophir (2001) says that Foucault is Nietzschean, for him the present has multiple pasts and also there is no *one* present either. How we are constituted depends on what we are trying to become, which in turn constitutes what we have become. I perform the analytics of the present here on behalf of those who desire to become happy, those engaged in the pursuit of happiness, and who propose to use the route offered by the New Science of Happiness.

Analysis is the resolution of something complex into simpler elements and is from the Greek word 'analysis'; this means to loosen or release or dissolve and in the Logics of Aristotle is the reduction of the imperfect figures into the perfect one.

At the heart of the desire for happiness is man's desire not to rely on god, or chance, to be gifted good fortune and a perfect risen body. The Science of Happiness is a new flourish of the Science of Medicine that Ivan Illich says has launched into a Godlike battle to eradicate death, pain and sickness and in doing so has turned people into consumers destroying their capacity for health (Boyars, 2002). The shifts that have produced the Science of Happiness may be the same shifts that have created what Illich (1995) calls the amortal society where the ordinary person suffers from the inability to suffer and to die. I'd have to add that psychology before it became 'positive' was an unhappy world according to the founding fathers of the Science of Happiness.

To live in a Cartesian world is to be certain that thinking is being, to live in a Baconian world is to be certain that causes can be found and finding the cause will enable perfect prediction and control. To live in a Spinozan world is to be at the mercy of events that I cannot predict or control; a world in which I can be lucky and tranquil but not practice positive psychology.

The English word happiness is from the Old Norse word 'happ', which means luck or good fortune, 'ohapp' means misfortune. When it moved into English it became the word 'happy',

which meant lucky and replaced the Old English words 'gesaelig', which went on to become silly, but meant blessed, and 'eadi, which meant wealthy, precious or blessed. Related words were 'hap' which meant chance or fortune, good or bad, 'happen' which meant to occur by hap, and 'happiliche' which meant perchance.. In 1500 to be happy was to be lucky, to be blessed, to be wealthy. It was a physical state of good fortune and it had nothing to do the fuzzy emotional warmth of goal achievement and good social relationships.

When the meaning of the word shifted so did the meanings around the word. The dictionary definitions reflect the unlucky history of the word; it has been trawled and made to groan. Dictionaries started to appear in the mid 1500's but Thomas Blount's 1656 Glossiography is considered the first full dictionary. He defined 'auspicious' as happy, bringing good luck, 'beatitude' as blessedness, happiness, prosperity and faustity as good luck, happiness; (Early Modern English Dictionaries, 1999). Faust is a now disused English word meaning good luck from the Latin 'faustus', to favour. The contingencies of language mean we have a Science of Happiness when we could have had a Science of Faustiness. What an infernal shame!

Samuel Johnson's dictionary published in 1755 is considered to be the first full lexicon of the English language. He defined 'happiness' as prosperity, blissfulness, blessedness; a state in which the desires are satisfied (Joeckel, 2003). This definition of happiness marks a shift of meaning to where happiness is not just blind luck or divine favour but the satisfaction of a desire achieved. Joeckel (2003) says that it was around this period that the universalising, homogenising forces of the Enlightenment shifted the common conception of happiness from good luck to a psychological state of well being that came from the achievement of desire. This desire however would ideally be rational desire; this is Lockean happiness, good, necessary and God like. It is happiness arising from taking care that we desire the right things. It is the happiness of moral rectitude, of ethical success.

Webster's American Dictionary of the English Language published in 1828 defined 'happiness' as: (from happy) 1. The agreeable sensations which spring from the enjoyment of good; that state of a being in which his desires are gratified, by the enjoyment of pleasure without pain; felicity; but happiness usually expresses less than felicity, and felicity less than bliss. Happiness is comparative. To a person distressed with pain, relief from that pain affords happiness; in other cases we give the name happiness to positive pleasure or an excitement of agreeable sensations. Happiness therefore admits of indefinite degrees of increase in enjoyment, or gratification of desires. Perfect happiness, or pleasure unalloyed with pain, is not attainable in this life. 2. Good luck, good fortune. 3. Fortuitous elegance, unstudied grace (Webster, 1828). This definition is Bentham's happiness, many things to many people, the sum of pleasures. It is also measurable, scalable, happiness can be small or large but not perfect; this definition makes it possible to invent a Likert scale for happiness. It is now possible to pursue it and measure it.

The Oxford English Dictionary published in 1928 defined 'happiness' as: The quality or condition of being happy. 1. Good fortune or luck in life or in a particular affair; success, prosperity. 2. The state of pleasurable content of mind, which results from success or the attainment of what is considered good. 3. Successful or felicitous aptitude, fitness, suitability, or appropriateness; felicity.

Intimations of mortality and lives hereafter ruled by divine will are gone. The way is open for the Science of Happiness to understand, describe, control and predict it.

The Unexplored Trajectories For The Pursuit of The Subject of Happiness

This genealogy has left me with questions, with directions for future research. A genealogy is exciting, thrilling and propulsive. As it insists on transgression it opens up spaces and propels the genealogist onward. While this thesis has been concerned with the genealogy of the subject of happiness it opens a space in which the subjectivity produced by the discourses of happiness, and in particular the science of happiness, might be explored. Some of these spaces are briefly explored below.

Abytropic Discourse and Power

The 1928 Oxford definition completes the movement of meaning to the attainment of human desire in life, whatever that might be. Before this Augustine and Aquinas still had the last word on happiness. Perfect happiness is not attained in this life, but in the next eternal life. Do the work, expiate your sins and you get to participate in the contemplation of God and the supreme delight of the will; Webster 1828 agreed with that. This is still the position of the Catholic Church who say there is a hell and all those who die in personal mortal sin as enemies of God, and unworthy of eternal life, will be severely punished by God after death (New Advent, 2005). The pastoral power and confessional power of the church was to act as intermediary between Fallen, sinful man and God, to be a conduit for salvational power. The Reformation and the plethora of faiths that exploded out of that did not change this fundamental position. If pastoral power is the power to guide the flock and confessional power the power to hear and judge, salvational power is the power to make whole. For all these forms of power to act they must act through a network of abytropic discourse. I was whole, I Fell, I will be whole again if I follow the shepherd, confess and expiate my sins.

If the touchstone of the Enlightenment was the perfectibility of man, the key assumption was that man was not, is not, perfect but can be made so. Springing as this did from the abytropes of Christianity the forms of power remained; pastoral, confessional, and salvational but within new structures. Meanings shift and so too do desires but I do not see these forms of power shift, only their expression. To make these forms available we need abytropic discourse. But what form does ethical power take to allow the production and reproduction of the discourses of lack of perfection, guidance, penitence, movement to wholeness and the disciplines that support, or perhaps insist upon, movement to wholeness?

Foucault (1978) says that western man has become a confessing animal and that confession is for the purpose of producing truth. While confession and penance had been part of the life of the Christian church at least since around 200 AD, the Lateran Council of 1215 codified the

Sacrament of Penance and by 1517 there was a practice of selling Indulgences (get out of purgatory free cards) the proceeds from which was going to the building of St Peter's in Rome. It was this practice that caused Luther to nail his 95 theses to the church door at Wittenberg and kick start the Reformation. Martin (2004) says that Luther was actually a very sensitive man who became an Augustinian monk; he had made a vow to do so to St Anne after getting caught in a storm. He had a high level of guilt, fear, and intensity and performed six hour confessions, which his confessor found very tedious. The first of his 95 theses was

1. When our Lord and Master, Jesus Christ, said "Repent", He called for the entire life of believers to be one of penitence.
(Luther, 1961 p490)

The Protestant or Reformed church ceased using the Sacrament of Penance, where the penitent must perform the three acts of penitence, confession and reparation so the confessor, housed in the confessional, can grant absolution. To absolve is to give remission of sin or to acquit of sin. Absolution is from the Latin 'absolvo'. This literally means to loosen, to free or to complete. The Indo European roots are 'sol', whole and 'leu' to loosen so absolution makes us whole again by dissolving sins in much the same way that Baptism does. By 1524 the voluntary private confession was still available in the Reformed church but rarely taken advantage of. Instead there was a general confession of sin prior to the celebration of the Eucharist and the pastor pronounced a general absolution. Calvin did not allow private confession but strongly believed in the efficacy of pastoral absolution in the weekly general confession; it was here that Calvin said man found a renewal of the baptismal covenant (Rittgers, 2004).

So although Foucault has said the Reformation was about finding new forms of subjectivity (Foucault, 1982) it was subjectivity formed within pastoral, confessional, salvational power relations across a network of abytropic discourse. Foucault also says that the 'truthful confession was inscribed at the heart of the procedures of individualisation by power' (Foucault 1978, p59). While truth is at the heart the confession always requires acknowledgment of sin, of being born in sin and, only ever, absolution from sin and salvation through the mediation of the pastor with God. *Mea culpa, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa*.

Ethics for Foucault is about the customs and practices through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents (Foucault, 1982). Ethical power then must be the power relations within which we are constrained to produce ourselves as moral agents in a certain, particular way. Ethics can be defined as the science of morals, or as moral principles, or the rules of conduct, by which a person's life is conducted. The word comes from the Greek 'ethikos' meaning morals or showing moral character which in turn comes from 'ethos' meaning nature or character, but also accustomed places or custom. It comes from the Indo-European root 'swe', which is the

pronoun of the third person and reflexive (referring back to the subject of the sentence); we or ourselves. Ethikos comes from the suffixed form 'swedhno'; the Latin 'suesco' which means to be accustomed, habituated or trained comes from the same root, although Latin imported 'ethica' meaning a moral philosophy direct from the Greek as well (Oxford, 1976) This root is also a parent to self, suicide, and secret. So ethical power is the power that allows us, and sometimes forces us, to do the customary things we do, where the customary things are deemed by us to be good, to be morally correct. The ethical power of Christianity lies behind pastoral, confessional, and salvational power. Abytropic discourse is part of the network along which these powers function to produce the disciplines that form me out of us. How does that work? How does that form my self?

Let us ask ...how things work at the level of on-going subjugation, at the level of those continuous and uninterrupted processes which subject our bodies, govern our gestures, dictate our behaviours...(Foucault 1980a, p97)

A Shifting Framework for Formation of the Ethical Subject

Foucault has proposed a framework to the way that customs and practices constitute us as moral agents; this is via ethical substance that is incited by means to an ethical end. He says for early Christians the ethical substance was flesh, the incitement was divine law, the means (or the technology) was a new form of self-deciphering asceticism, and the end or telos was purity and immortality (Foucault, 1982a).

Ethical Substance	Desire of the flesh. Concupiscence.
Incitement	Divine law
Technology	Constant watchfulness of the thoughts. Confession and punishment of evil.
Telos	Purity. Immortality of the perfect risen body. Release from desire.

Carrete (1999) says that Foucault's later work engages with the historical and political formations of Western culture of which the Christian religion is a formative stratum. As I retrieved the fragments from the archive, the ones that seemed to me to be the genealogical relics worth carrying home to the present, I formed the view that this is a useful way to think about the germinations that resulted in the flowering of the Science of Happiness.

Foucault says:

...it (the soul) has a reality, it is produced permanently, around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished – and in a more general way. On those one supervises, trains, corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonised, those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives. This is the historical reality of the soul, which unlike the soul represented by Christian theology, is not born in sin and subject to punishment, but is born rather out of methods of punishment, supervision and constraint. (Foucault, 1977a, p29).

But this new 'modern soul' is not separate from the old' Christian soul'; it is produced on top of it. The discourses produced by power and by which power is reproduced, the discourses that produce the 'old' soul remain. The ethical powers of Christianity work through the obligation to accept truth and dogma, to accept certain books as having divine origin, to accept that only certain people (pastors) can interpret these books correctly. Confessional power works to serve this ethical power via constant acknowledgment of being lesser than, of being wounded and requiring healing. The ethical powers that act in the Western culture act upon a Christian self and a Christian self requires the ever ongoing activity of expiation in order to progress to perfection.

But, as Foucault (1988) said, the sorrowful Christian self is also a self-examining, self-deciphering self, a self that sacrifices itself to a master. Foucault uses the example of a monk in early monastic tradition to explain the technology of the self that emerged. He must have permission of his director to do anything, even die; if he does anything without permission he is stealing, he must live obediently. In conjunction with obedience was contemplation, a form of self-examination which Foucault says was imported from the Syrian and Egyptian monastic traditions. This was a permanent watchfulness over the thoughts to ensure that only those thoughts that were turned toward God were allowed to exist. But to make matters more difficult there were thoughts that could masquerade as good when they were in fact evil. To decipher the thoughts of the self, a watchful hermeneutics was required. If evil actions or evil thoughts happened they must be verbalized in confession in order to be forgiven. The work upon the ethical substance of flesh via self-deciphering asceticism, the work that is incited by divine law toward the end of purity and subsequent immortality requires ongoing supervision and forgiveness.

In parallel with the previous framework another emerged to work side by side with it.

Ethical Substance	Soul
Incitement	Imperfection.
Technology	Confession and repentance
Telos	Salvation. Wholeness

The shift that seems to have started with Descartes must have occurred within a framework acceptable enough to the current Christian ethical power that, although it was resisted, it was not rejected entirely (like Spinoza). How was it possible for Descartes to take the position he did in relation to the duality of body and mind, the passions of the body, happiness and health? What was the framework that allowed him to work on himself as an ethical subject in an acceptable way? Descartes said the mind and the body were different and that corporeal life was perfectible and the business of man whereas spiritual life as the business of God. He neatly separated the work of science from the work of theology and yet stayed within an ethical framework consistent with Christian virtue. The ethical framework of early Christianity supports the work of the mind to control the flesh and the quest for purity of thought. Descartes, Bacon, Locke and even Blackstone all worked upon themselves as ethical subjects, and, through acceptance of their work as universal truths, upon others in a framework that might be expressed as follows.

Ethical Substance	Reasoning mind that can govern the emotions of the soul and the passions of the body.
Incitement	Rational rule. The free exercise of will.
Technology	Control of the interior emotions and the passions of the body through constant watchfulness of the stirrings of the blood. Education of the base souls who cannot exert this control naturally.
Telos	Perfection of mental substance. Certainty of cause. Release from corporeal necessity and akrasia and consequent to this release, happiness.

By the time Bentham came to consider happiness it was now undisputed that the goal of humanity, in life, was happiness and it was the duty of government to effect happiness in the population. Bentham added that it was the duty of the newly free individual to pursue happiness and the path to happiness was irrelevant. Ethical power shifts direction so that the individual is now ethical if he is happy, from ethical if he is perfect. The subjects of ethical power are now constrained to produce themselves in a way that is, at first, complementary to the way Christian ethical power constrains them.

Ethics at large may be defined, the art of directing men's actions to the production of the greatest possible quantity of happiness, on the part of those whose interest is in view. What then are the actions which it can be in man's power to direct? They must be his own actions, or those of other agents. Ethics, in as far as it is the art of directing a man's own actions, may be styled the *art of self-government or private ethics*. (Bentham, 1989, p310)

McMahon (2004) describes this as a shift from the happiness of virtue to the virtue of happiness where pursuing virtue to achieve happiness (Aristotle, Descartes, Locke) moves to pursuing happiness which is seen as a sign of virtue. McMahon also says the truth appeared self-evident in the 18th century that to be useful (utilitarian) government and all institutions (including the religious ones) should promote happiness in life as a possibility that did not conflict with achieving happiness through salvation after life. Following Locke and Blackstone it became common to believe that God wanted his creatures to be happy because he was a good God. He wanted to give humanity a foretaste of the pleasures that awaited them in heaven. If you were happy in life God must be pleased with you.

The ethical framework after Bentham might be expressed as:

Ethical Substance	Man's actions.
Incitement	The utility of the greatest happiness for the greatest number
Technology	Education. Punishment and reward. Government.
Telos	Bulk happiness.

It is easy to see how the Behaviorism of Skinner was partially rooted in Bentham.

What is interesting is that there now appeared a vacuum – neither the state nor science took up the proffered governing of happiness. The state and science divided up the government of life, liberty, property and safety but no-one actively and directly governed happiness. The techniques of government, policing, medicine worked to reduce unhappiness not to increase happiness, so pursuing and obtaining happiness became the domain of literature not government.

Ethical Substance	Emotions
Incitement	Universalising discourse
Technology	Romantic love
Telos	Happy ever after.

And finally the Science of Happiness filled the vacuum and began the process of governing happiness.

Ethical Substance	Reason
Incitement	Scientific law. Happiness produces health
Technology	Surveillance. Education
Telos	The happy body, healthy and inoculated against disaster.

But whatever form ethical power has taken, through whatever framework, since the early Christian power, which Foucault defined, its functionaries have remained the same. Pastoral, confessional and salvational powers accompany all these forms. A guide is required, full disclosure and penitence for the imperfect past, and a desire for wholeness. What forms do these take now? How do they serve the power relations of the present?

The Happy Consuming Subject, Bio-Power

For an awfully long time, no one has seriously questioned the embedded assumption that our purpose here, embodied in life, is to be happy or at least to pursue happiness. This seems suspicious to me. What is even more suspicious is the word has shifted meaning. Aristotle's eudaimonia, Bacon's felicity, Locke's happiness do not have the same meaning as happiness when I say it today. Yet this shifting thing called happiness is what we're all supposed to desire and pursue here in our bodies on earth?

In *Discipline and Punish* Foucault discusses the imposition of relations of docility-utility on the body through emerging disciplines of the 17th and 18th centuries. 'The art of the human body was born' (Foucault, 1977, p137). The body becomes obedient and useful in a new form of power relations. Disciplinary power turned its desire to control the space the body occupies to the building of penitentiaries, asylums, schools and barracks, its desire to control the acts of the body to gestures, apparel, exercises and timetables, its desire to control the outcomes of its acts upon the body, to know cause and predict outcome, to experimentation, observation, surveillance, tabulation, teleology. Control is not always to limit but often to extend, and power is not always repressive but often productive. Foucault contends, 'the growth of the disciplinary technologies underlay the growth, spread and triumph of capitalism as an economic venture. Without the insertion of disciplined orderly individuals into the machinery of production, the new demands of capitalism would have been stymied' (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p135). 'The techniques that made the cumulative multiplicity of men useful accelerated the accumulation of capital' (Foucault, 1977, p221).

The genealogical history shows that in the late 1700's the natural rights of Locke shifted from life, liberty and property to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness and at around the same time Bentham linked happiness and capital in the Utilitarian doctrine; the theory of absolute utility says that additional income allows each person to achieve additional desires thus increasing the average long-term happiness of the population (Hagerty & Veenhoven 2003). Also around the same period McMahon says the happiness of virtue shifted to the virtue of happiness. Happiness moved from a function of virtuous action to a function of feeling (McMahon, 2004), or as Carlyle put it from a blessedness of the soul to a satiation of the body; prosperity is considered a sign of blessedness.

McMahon (2004) says it has long been a truism of modern historiography that the shift from the happiness of heaven to the happiness of earth was a product of the Enlightenment, the consequence of its assault on revealed religion and a validation of secular pleasure, but goes on to contend that this was not simply a movement from one thing to another it was a movement that forked outwards and became parallel. It became ethical to seek both the perfect happiness of heaven and the risen body, and the pleasures of the earth within the temporal body. Federico (2003) says one of the most enduring legacies of liberalism was the conscious desire for happiness in one's life and the right to pursue it. Bentham made that right a duty and, although he was an atheist, this duty was compatible with the duties of Christianity. McMahon cites Tocqueville as a saying in the early 19th century that after listening to American preachers it was difficult to be sure 'whether the main object of religion is to procure eternal felicity in the next world or prosperity in this' (Tocqueville, cited in McMahon, 2004, p15).

Foucault contends that in the 17th century bio-power emerged as a coherent political technology; it was power directed toward the fostering of life and care of populations. It was power unmoored from older ethical modes of thinking. It was a new political rationality that worked in conjunction with the nascent empirical human sciences (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982).

Marshall (1995) defines bio-power as a form of power which carries a specially anatomical/biological aspect, exercised on the body of the individuals of a population so that their sexuality and individuality are constituted and adjusted in certain ways to fit with issues of national policy, including the machinery of production. There are two poles to bio-power; one is disciplinary power and the other expresses itself in the technologies of the self which includes confessional power. He says compliance with the rationality of the state is obtained not by a totalising, oppressive form of power, but by bio-power directed in a totalizing manner at individuals so that they are both individualized and normalized within the population. The human sciences and their "truths" play a crucially important role in this exercise of bio-power.

'The basic goal of disciplinary power is to produce a human being which could be treated as a "docile body" (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, p134). But disciplinary power alone does not

necessarily produce a consuming body, a subject produced to consume, willing to continue the existing economic processes. The technologies of the self act with disciplinary power to produce the docile body in a certain, specific way.

Being inquisitive about power and its functionaries is to look for the footprints power makes as it acts and to wonder what kinds of creature made those prints. Power is enabling but deceitful. 'Power is tolerable only on condition it mask a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms...power imposes secrecy on those who it dominates...would they accept it if they did not see it as a mere limit placed on their desire, leaving a measure of freedom – however slight – intact?' (Foucault, 1978, p86).

This being the case, has bio-power extended to operate through the pursuit of happiness where happiness has shifted from being inscribed on the soul as virtue, to being inscribed on the body as wealth and health? Asking any 'self' how happy it wants to be, and then asking if it is that happy, will create a space in which that 'self' can turn and look at itself. This space is where the Science of Happiness lies in wait offering surveillance, confession and salvation.

But how does the knowledge of the self produced by surveillance, confession and the offer of salvation work to support the power relations that operate with the structures of capitalism? How does the possibility of the happy consuming subject produce the obedient, docile, useful body required? How does the Science of Happiness perform its normalising work to generate the subjectivity required?

CONCLUSION

It is traditional (recommended) that a thesis have a conclusion (Fenton, 2002). Foucault's conclusion to his first genealogical work, *Discipline and Punish* went:

At this point I end a book that must serve as a historical background to various studies of the power of normalization and the formation of knowledge in modern society. (Foucault, 1977, p308)

Fenton (2002) recommends that conclusions be drawn about each research question or hypothesis. The meaning of the word conclude can be, to arrive by reasoning at a judgment or opinion. I suspect this is the Cartesian kind of conclusion that Fenton has in mind. A conclusion is usually a step in the advancement of knowledge toward certainty that Descartes and Bacon would have applauded. But conclusion can also mean simply to close or finish, as Foucault did at the end of *Discipline and Punish*. The conclusion of a genealogy cannot be of the Cartesian variety so must simply be an ending.

The thesis is historically an agonistic, rhetoric ritual (Ong, 1981). Agonia requires struggle and struggle implies an adversary. Mine has been the dubious, 'science of happiness' which dully jars me and which was the object of this analytic research.

A genealogist does not seek new truths but does, sometimes inadvertently, create new spaces in which to reflect on old truths and unheard voices. Before I end I reflect on some of the fragments I have selected from the archive, and carefully placed into the genealogical fiction. Mill's advice is do not ask 'Am I happy?'

The enjoyments of life (such was now my theory) are sufficient to make it a pleasant thing, when they are taken _en passant_, without being made a principal object. Once make them so, and they are immediately felt to be insufficient. They will not bear a scrutinizing examination. Ask yourself whether you are happy, and you cease to be so. (Mill, 1960, p99-100)

That might mean that when the dubious science of happiness asks, 'Are you happy?' How happy are you?' I can refuse to answer.

I can refuse the assumption that I should be happy, that if I am not I should be on a quest for it, if I am I should be on a quest for more of it. I can refuse the truth produced by Descartes and reproduced in the 21st century Science of Happiness by Seligman that more happiness leads to

more health (and wealth and wholeness and salvation) and that for \$9.95 per month Seligman, father of positive psychology, can get me more of all of that.

I can read Spinoza not Seligman. I can refuse the abytropic assumptions that I am flawed but perfectible and refuse the 'fathers' who offer me the path to absolute dominion; that path and the bodies that walk along it are inscribed with the signs of confession, repentance and the offer of salvation.

Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be treating rather of matters outside nature than of natural phenomena following nature's general laws. They appear to conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom: for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows nature's order, that he has absolute control over his actions, and that he is determined solely by himself. They attribute human infirmities and fickleness, not to the power of nature in general, but to some mysterious flaw in the nature of man...

I do not forget, that the illustrious Descartes, though he believed, that the mind has absolute power over its actions, strove to explain human emotions by their primary causes, and, at the same time, to point out a way, by which the mind might attain to absolute dominion over them.

Spinoza (1876)

At this point I end a thesis (written for academic gain within the confines of time, history and the actions of power) that might serve as a historical background to various studies of the formation of the subject of happiness.

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