THE ART OF ~~WAR~~ LISTENING:

An Examination of the New Zealand Defence Force's Civil-Military Coordination in Pacific Disaster Relief Responses

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Abstract

As natural disasters have increased in frequency and intensity in the Pacific, so too has the New Zealand Defence Force's (NZDF's) involvement in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR). This has made effective civil-military coordination crucial, particularly due to the severity and scale of resulting humanitarian needs. Yet despite the Government of New Zealand Government's (GoNZ's) publicised intentions to improve the military's interoperability and HADR capabilities, this study presents the first independent examination of the NZDF's civil-military coordination in the context of Pacific HADR.

Findings were drawn from a comparative analysis of the NZDF's involvement in the 2015 Tropical Cyclone (TC) Pam response in Vanuatu and the 2016 TC Winston response in Fiji. These report how stakeholders perceived the NZDF's civil-military coordination efforts, identify the major obstacles to coordination and discuss how these impacted the HADR provided. Data were triangulated from literature and sixty-eight interviews with participants from; the NZDF, GoNZ, international and local humanitarian agencies, affected governments and community representatives. Notably, this is the first time feedback on the NZDF has been collated from Pacific Island governments, humanitarians and populations.

Substantial similarities emerged when stakeholders' views of the NZDF's coordination were compared. Although the majority of interviewees perceived the NZF's overall civil-military coordination efforts in a positive light, several previously unreported tensions were identified. Obstacles to coordination also had serious negative impacts on HADR, which indicate that stakeholders did not meet the priority needs of affected populations, in either HADR response.

A new model was also developed to summarise thesis findings. This explains how variables, such as stakeholder perspectives, obstacles and mechanisms, interact to produce positive or negative outcomes. The diagram can also be used to evaluate past civil-military coordination efforts and anticipate future challenges. This is a significant benefit to stakeholders, as it provides a simple but practical way to analyse and enhance civil-military coordination efforts.

Prologue

I sat cross-legged on the grass, opposite a community representative. We were talking about our experiences of natural disasters and discussing the differences between my childhood in the Cook Islands and the interviewee's own in these isolated Pacific islands.

A long silence followed, and I wondered if they were deciding to trust me. It was time to explain why I was visiting an island still bearing the scars of a Category 5 cyclone. I described the purpose of my research project and how I previously worked for both the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) and humanitarian agencies. I also spoke of my involvement in disaster relief responses, and how I had seen these affect people. Handing over my research information sheet, I finished with the truth,

> *"I'm here because I want to know how you feel things went after the cyclone.*
> *If you're willing to share, I would like to hear how you and this village felt…*
> *about the New Zealand military's coordination and assistance."[1]*

The interviewee received this statement with an encouraging smile. They talked for over an hour about the NZDF, how personnel had interacted with villagers, and the assistance they received. The interview began with a description of how friendly and hard-working NZDF personnel were. Laughter punctuated stories of soldiers playing rugby with the local children and learning how to shuck coconuts. Suppressing a chuckle, they recounted,

> *"[NZDF personnel] were using… the toilets in the school building. Then they*
> *FILLED up the septic tanks aye?* [Laughter] *Next thing, we heard they… didn't*
> *only fix it… they EMPTY all the septic tanks! They were really flexible. It's the*
> *first time that the whole island have seen [the septic tank] emptied.* [Louder*
> *laughter]… The [affected] government… didn't have that equipment… That*
> *was really nice. We owe a lot to [NZDF personnel] for what they've done."*

We set out to walk through the grounds of a small school.

> *"[The NZDF] come and build those three houses* [pointing]. *They just came*
> *and did the ruling… then they start building... If they had asked us where to*
> *put the house, we could have shown them… You might need to put it back*
> *there* [pointing further away]*… we know this place... it would have been*
> *better* [voice trails off]. *The house WAS good, but … the [chief] was never*
> *here when the New Zealand Army was… the [local officials] were doing their*

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[1] All prologue quotes are taken from interview 67. Where necessary, some identifying details have been altered or removed, to preserve the participant's anonymity. Ethical considerations are detailed in the thesis Introduction below.

> *own stuff... [The NZDF] had their own commander there who's making the call… We didn't know who to talk to."*

The community representative pointed to a large hole nearby. It was an open pit, which the NZDF made to discard rubbish and unused building materials. In an embarrassed tone, they explained that this pit had accidentally been dug in the middle of the community vegetable garden.[2] Post-disaster, this had been feeding two villages and was one of the only remaining cassava sources on the island.[3] Continuing apologetically, they stated,

> *"The people thought… maybe [the discarded materials] should have been… given to the people. To take the timber and use it for their houses?... It was okay… because [the NZDF] wanted to do the job FAST. But they could have just asked… Rather than go and put it in the pit."*

Some villagers lost everything in the disaster. I learned that most of them could not afford to buy or transport necessary building supplies to rebuild. After restating how grateful the village was for the NZDF's help, the community representative reflected,

> *"But to come and fix the staff quarters?… They are PAID workers... they can fend for themselves… but the villagers can't. It's just where [the NZDF] put the priority on WHO to help… To me, it was a bit unfair… I don't know how the [affected] Government and New Zealand Government did it… maybe they communicated that they needed to do this?… But it would have been better if they [helped] everyone."*

We then walked to where NZDF vehicles had made large ruts that blocked a creek by the garden. The representative recounted how the pit quickly filled with water in the rainy season. This pool became a breeding ground for mosquitoes. As a parent, the interviewee worried about mosquitoes biting their children. Dengue fever and the Zika virus are health concerns and the mainland's healthcare system was far from the island.[4]

It was sunset and getting late. So I asked my final questions. Was there anything else the interviewee wanted to comment on, and had they been hesitant answering anything?

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[2] NZDF personnel later reported the position of these buildings and pit had been pre-approved by the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) and local officials. This miscommunication is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five.

[3] Cassava is a root vegetable, also known as manioc. It is a staple food in many Pacific islands and was one of the only crops which can survive Category 5 cyclones. After the NZDF left, the community replanted a new vegetable garden.

[4] Dengue fever and Zika virus are spread via day-biting mosquitos. There are no preventive vaccines or antiviral treatment. Dengue fever causes a feverish illness, headache, and severe muscle pains, which require medical care. Danger signs include prolonged vomiting, blood in the vomit, and a blotchy rash. Zika Virus symptoms include mild fever, headache, muscle and joint pain, nausea, vomiting, and general malaise. The virus can also be transmitted from a pregnant woman to her foetus.

The community representative avoided my eyes and stared at the ocean. I guessed this meant there was something else but I was only there to record what stakeholders were willing to share. They then told me many things I did not expect to hear. These disclosures seemed to occur at the end of most interviews. The representative stated quietly,

> *"The things that [the NZDF] brought… they left it there for [local officials] to finish the rebuilding… [Locals] were supposed to use it for the school* [long pause]*… It would have been better for [the NZDF] to give it to the locals or… the school principal, who would have been in the right position to distribute it. They gave it to the wrong person.* [Expression implies a misuse of aid]*."*

Although I always tried to be impartial, this was hard to hear. I found the following comments even more challenging,

> *"It is the New Zealand people's money that should have been used for these people who were affected… Then these guys came and took it back to the mainland?* [Frustration expressed in voice] *It was not used in the RIGHT way. That's taxpayer's money. The New Zealand people's money."*

Despite all this community had experienced, the representative was angry because they felt an injustice had been done to New Zealanders and the NZDF personnel who provided them assistance.

The representative thanked me and asked that I relay the village's sincere gratitude to the New Zealand Government and Defence Force for their assistance. To my embarrassment, this occurred after most interviews. Affected communities often reflected that I was the first to return and ask them how they *really* felt about coordination and this assistance.

In the course of my field research, I heard many similar stories. Two years—and two cyclone seasons—following these disasters, some families were still living in tents or under tarpaulins. Many of them lived in the most impoverished or severely affected areas. When they spoke of their experience of the disaster, it was often with fear and concern for their future. These conversations almost always finished on a positive note and with a smile. The military came once, they noted,

> *"We hope the Army will help again… the next time a cyclone comes."*

Acknowledgements

Thank you for these verses in particular, may they speak for themselves:

"Is not this the kind of fasting I have chosen: to loose the chains of injustice and untie the cords of the yoke, to set the oppressed free and break every yoke?

Is it not to share your food with the hungry and to provide the poor wanderer with shelter - when you see the naked, to clothe them, and not to turn away from your own flesh and blood?

Then your light will break forth like the dawn, and your healing will quickly appear; then your righteousness will go before you, and the glory of the Lord will be your rear guard. Then you will call, and the Lord will answer; you will cry for help, and he will say: Here am I.

If you do away with the yoke of oppression, with the pointing finger and malicious talk, and if you spend yourselves in behalf of the hungry and satisfy the needs of the oppressed, then your light will rise in the darkness, and your night will become like the noonday.

The Lord will guide you always; he will satisfy your needs in a sun-scorched land and will strengthen your frame. You will be like a well-watered garden, like a spring whose waters never fail.

Your people will rebuild the ancient ruins and will raise up the age-old foundations; you will be called Repairer of Broken Walls, Restorer of Streets with Dwellings."[5]

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[5] Isaiah 58:6-12, Holy Bible: The New International Version.

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List of Tables and Illustrations

Glossary and List of Acronyms

ABCA	American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies (Coalition Operations)
ACFID	Australian Council for International Development
ACMC	Australian Civil-Military Centre
ADDP	Australian Defence Doctrine Publication
ADF	Australian Defence Force
ADRA	The Adventist Development and Relief Agency
APC-MADRO	Asia-Pacific series of Conferences on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations
CDCCCs	Community Disaster and Climate Change Committees (Vanuatu)
CDF	Chief of the Defence Force
CID	(New Zealand) Council for International Development
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
CMCoord	(United Nations) Civil-Military Coordination
COMJFNZ	Commander Joint Forces New Zealand
CONPLAN	Contingency Plan (Defence Force Documentation)
DFAT	(Australian) Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DJIATF	Deployable Joint Interagency Task Force
ECC	Emergency Coordination Centre
ETF	Emergency Task Force (New Zealand)
FRANZ	France, Australia and New Zealand agreement for the South Pacific region
FSAC	Food Security and Agriculture Cluster
FWCC	Fiji Women's Crisis Centre
GHD	Good Humanitarian Donorship (initiative)
GoA	Government of Australia
GoF	Government of Fiji
GoNZ	Government of New Zealand
GoT	Government of Tonga
GoV	Government of Vanuatu
HADR	Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
HMNZS	Her Majesty's New Zealand Ship
HQ JFNZ	Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand
IAT	Initial Assessment Team
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
JCART	Joint Command and Reconnaissance Team
JCART	Joint Inter-Agency Reconnaissance Team
JTF	Joint Task Force
LO	Liaison Officer
MoD	Ministry of Defence (New Zealand)

NDMO	National Disaster Management Organization
NDRF	(New Zealand) Non-Government Disaster Relief Forum
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NZDD	New Zealand Defence Doctrine
NZDF	New Zealand Defence Force
NZMAT	New Zealand Medical Assistance Team
OCHA ROAP	(United Nations) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific
OPV	Offshore Patrol Vessel
Oslo Guidelines	Colloquial term for the: Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief
PDNA	Post Disaster Needs Assessment
PHT	Pacific Humanitarian Team
RCRC	Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
RFA	Request For Assistance/form
RFMF	Republic of Fiji Military Forces
RNZAF	Royal New Zealand Air Force
RNZN	Royal New Zealand Navy
SK	Southern Katipo (NZDF military exercise)
SPC	The Secretariat of the Pacific Community
UN	United Nations
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UN-CMCoord Officer	United Nations Civil-Military Coordination Officer
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
US	United States of America
USAR	Urban Search And Rescue
VHT	Vanuatu Humanitarian Team
VMF	Vanuatu Mobile Force
WFP	World Food Programme
WoG	Whole of Government

Introduction: Big Waves in the Pacific

The New 'Normal'

On 12 March 2015, Tropical Cyclone (TC) Pam struck the Republic of Vanuatu. The Category 5 storm left a trail of destruction across the archipelago, impacting over 70% of the country's population (GoV, 2015a).[6] TC Winston struck the Republic of Fiji less than one year later. Similar levels of destruction were encountered by over 60% of Fiji's population (GoF, 2016). Both cyclones were among the strongest storms ever recorded in the South Pacific.

Major humanitarian needs emerged in the aftermath of these disasters. Shelter, food security and water shortages were immediate priorities. In some areas over 80% of crops and housing were also destroyed, leaving many communities with little to survive (GoV, 2015a, GoV, 2015c). This placed a heavy burden on affected Governments, which had limited resources and logistical capability to reach isolated islands.[7] In response, both Governments quickly appealed for international assistance. A large number of actors responded, resulting in the biggest examples of civil-military coordination ever seen in the context of Pacific humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR).

Of the foreign militaries deployed in both disasters, the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) made one of the most significant contributions. Over 300 NZDF personnel provided assistance and repaired infrastructure in Vanuatu, while nearly 500 were involved in Fiji (NZDF, 2016g). Aircraft and naval vessels also supported these international responses, which were led by the Government of Vanuatu (GoV) and the Government of Fiji (GoF). These NZDF assets enabled civilian actors to complete needs assessments and transport vital aid to communities. At the time, the size of these responses also made them the largest the NZDF had undertaken in the Pacific (NZMAT, 2016).

For a number of reasons, civilian and NZDF personnel worked in closer proximity than ever before in these responses. This was partly due to the military deploying within a civilian-led Whole of Government (WoG) approach, which was led by New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT).[8] Other Government Agencies (OGAs) were, for example, embedded in NZDF teams for the first time in Fiji and close interaction was encouraged between the

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[6] Category 5 on the Saffir-Simpson scale describes a cyclone with winds of over 252 kilometres an hour. This suggests catastrophic damage will occur, including a high percentage of framed homes being destroyed and power outages which may last for weeks to months. Most affected areas would be expected to be uninhabitable for weeks or months after the disaster.

[7] Cyclone damage had, for example, reduced Vanuatu's logistical capacity to one patrol boat, one private helicopter and commercial vessels, with twenty two islands needing assistance. Although the Government of Fiji had a greater number of air and maritime vessels available, these were unable to rapidly reach the one hundred and sixty seven affected islands.

[8] The acronym 'WoG' is used throughout this thesis, while the term 'All-of-Government '(AoG) is interchangeable the former has been used due to key stakeholders using this most frequently.

military and affected Governments (NZMAT, 2016).[9] A new military model called the Deployable Joint Interagency Task Force (DJIATF) was also applied for the first time in the TC Pam and Winston responses. This model had been intentionally adopted to mitigate previous civil-military coordination issues and enhance the NZDF's inter-agency cooperation.

Discrepancies among stakeholder perspectives

Post-disaster literature which was published by the Government of New Zealand (GoNZ), NZDF and United Nations (UN) consistently praised NZDF civil-military coordination efforts. For example, UN stakeholders suggested foreign militaries set a "*new global standard in military support to humanitarian operations*" during the TC Pam disaster response (UNDAC, 2015a, p.5). NZDF sources also reported that the Force's civil-military coordination had improved in the TC Winston response. NZDF personnel in one article reflected,

> "*Coordination across the different New Zealand agencies… has been effective and can be the model for future missions… We did this in Vanuatu and we developed this further in Fiji*" (Baguioro, 2016, p.9).

In contrast, non-governmental stakeholders identified obstacles to civil-military coordination in both responses. These included communication issues, militaries not adhering to local systems and a lack of understanding about the roles and responsibilities of military and civilian actors (GoV and SPC, 2015, GoF and SPC, 2017). This was described by one humanitarian representative, who gave their impressions of the NZDF as follows:

> "*Australia and New Zealand had no idea how [coordination] works at the local level. At the [GoF's] lessons learnt workshop – it became clear that the Australia and New Zealand military hadn't been briefed but no one realised. They flew in and operated within their own terms of reference. No one thought to ask. You need to find out what are the local systems before you go*" (Winterford and Gero, 2018, p.15).

A previous study completed by the researcher also suggested that stakeholder perspectives within literature were more favourable than those actually held by humanitarian and community stakeholders (Roddis, 2016).[10] For example, interviewees reported that obstacles to coordination appeared to impede the NZDF's ability to meet humanitarian needs. This was

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[9] These agencies included the New Zealand Medical Assistance Team (NZMAT) and Urban Search and Rescue (USAR).

[10] As part of the researchers' unpublished Honours dissertation, interviews were completed with TC Winston stakeholders. While this study focused on the application of the DJIATF model, it also collated perceptions of the NZDF's TC Winston response from desk based literature and twelve semi-structured interviews with stakeholders who were involved in the response. These included representative from the NZDF, GoNZ, GoF, humanitarian agencies and community representatives.

described by a community representative who interacted with the NZDF during the TC Winston response, they reflected,

> *"If there was more interaction between us, [the NZDF] would have known what needs we had and maybe they would have helped in that way?"*
> (Roddis, 2016, p.26)

Yet despite these contrasting stakeholder perspectives, few studies have examined the NZDF's civil-military coordination in the Pacific HADR context. Most existing reports are also published by the NZDF or GoNZ, and have not included the perspectives of key civilian actors, such as affected individuals. These factors raise concerns around publication bias and pre-conceptions.

Considering the major role the NZDF plays in Pacific HADR responses, independent research must be undertaken to verify whether or not civil-military coordination issues have occurred and if so, how these may have impacted the assistance provided. Answering these questions is crucial for the development of future government and humanitarian policy, as well as to ensure actors are best able to meet the needs of affected populations in Pacific HADR responses.

i. Research Aim and Questions

This thesis, therefore, presents the first independent analysis of the NZDF's civil-military coordination in a Pacific HADR context. Within this study, the term 'civil-military coordination' is defined as any interaction taking place between civilian and military actors, which aims to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.[11]

The study seeks to answer the following research questions:

1. How did stakeholders perceive the NZDF's civil-military coordination efforts in past Pacific HADR responses?
2. What, if any, were the obstacles to the NZDF's civil-military coordination in past Pacific HADR responses?
3. How do stakeholders believe obstacles to civil-military coordination impacted the HADR provided?

Answers to these questions are urgently needed for several reasons. One of these is that Pacific island countries are among the most vulnerable States in the world to natural hazards (United Nations, 2014). Coordination during initial responses is frequently impeded by the geographical, logistical and infrastructure challenges in the region. Climate change is also contributing to the increased frequency and scale of these disasters in the Pacific (Knutson *et al.*, 2015).

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[11] This definition is intentionally broad, as UN OCHA and military definitions of the term detail the aims of civil-military coordination, which would limit the study's scope. These contrasting definitions of the term are examined in Chapter One.

The GoNZ has also acknowledged the need for the NZDF to adapt to changes in climate, as well as human and environmental security in the Pacific region. These factors were discussed in the 'Climate Crisis: Defence readiness and responsibilities report' (2018) produced by the GoNZ. This stated that the NZDF needed to enhance its HADR capabilities and make changes to the way the force operated to: "*further increase the credibility of Defence within New Zealand, with South Pacific partners, and at a global level*" (GoNZ, 2018, p.3).

While some stakeholders feel these factors justify the use of the NZDF and foreign militaries as a 'first line' of response, others suggest this is contrary to international civil-military guidelines and the principles behind HADR. Consequently, stakeholders have increasing called for actors to "*address the civil and military relationship in the Pacific*" (PHT, 2014, p.28, UN OCHA, 2014). These challenges and divergent perspectives suggest past Pacific HADR responses and civil-military coordination must be examined, to address these concerns.

Research findings are further valuable to Pacific stakeholders, as the NZDF's role in HADR is only likely to increase. GoNZ intentions to enhance the military's interoperability were publicised in the 2010 and 2016 Defence White Papers, as well as the Future 35 Strategy (NZDF, 2011).[12] The need for the NZDF to operate and undertake HADR operations in New Zealand and the Pacific was also listed as one of the GoNZ's highest priorities in the 2018 Strategic Defence Policy Statement (MoD, 2018, sect 172). This stated that interoperability was "*critical*" to the conduct of these operations and maintaining New Zealand's "*strong international reputation as a valued and credible defence partner and ally*" (MoD, 2018, sect 16).

The GoNZ's 'Pacific Reset' WoG strategy and recent budget announcements also reveal increased defence expenditure, as well as funding in the South Pacific (Sachdeva, 2018).[13] This means the New Zealand public and Government have a vested interest in ensuring Pacific HADR and the NZDF's civil-military coordination efforts are as effective as possible in the future.

Finally, stakeholders need to be reassured that the assistance being provided in Pacific HADR is meeting the needs of affected populations. The GoNZ, NZDF and relief agencies have all publicised their adherence to the international legal and humanitarian obligations in HADR contexts (MFAT, 2012b, GoNZ, 2015, HQ JFNZ, 2019a).[14] An examination into civil-military

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[12] The Future 35 Strategy describes the NZDF's capability outlook to 2035.

[13] The announcement stated that NZD$714 million would go toward an increase in Official Development Assistance (ODA). Currently 59% of the country's ODA is spent in the Pacific. This includes expenditure under the New Zealand Aid Programme and some humanitarian activities undertaken by the Ministry of Defence.

[14] These include the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Principles, the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) 2005-2015 and others which New Zealand is a signatory to. This means humanitarian assistance under the New Zealand Aid Programme will be based on the humanitarian principles of: humanity (to save lives and alleviate suffering with priority given to the most vulnerable), impartiality (which is based on need and without discrimination), neutrality (meaning actors do not favour any side in an armed or other dispute), and independence (actors must be autonomous from political, economic, military or other objectives).

coordination efforts and actors' assistance is, therefore, crucial, as the scale and severity of humanitarian needs are intensifying in the region. This is even more vital in the initial phase of disaster responses when assistance can be a matter of life or death for those in need.

ii.   Research Design and Methodology

As few researchers have examined civil-military coordination in the context of Pacific HADR or focused on the NZDF's coordination, an exploratory study was selected for this thesis. A qualitative methodology was also used, with an emergent, inductively grounded approach to gathering data.[15] A key advantage of this approach is that conclusions are derived from data which is systematically gathered and analysed during the research (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). This helps mitigate any researcher's preconceptions or biases.

The approach used also contains elements of phenomenological or ethnographic studies, which examine the perceptions, perspectives, understandings, and feelings of individuals. This design is recommended for research exploring different cultures, understudied phenomena or complex social phenomena (Miles and Huberman, 1994). It also enables participant perspectives, coordination, obstacles and outcomes to be investigated in a great deal of depth (Davidson and Tolich, 1999). These factors have led many authors to conclude that qualitative, inductive approaches are the most appropriate way to examine civil-military interaction, as the field is considered "*too complex to be approached with explicit conceptual frames or standard instruments*" (Rietjens, 2014, p.129).

Case studies and their selection

Two case studies were selected for comparative analysis in this thesis. This methodology enabled the NZDF's civil-military coordination, possible obstacles and their impact to be examined in real-life contexts, through interviews, observations and document analysis (Tellis, 1997, Yin, 2014). Comparative analysis also meant findings could be compared between HADR responses and stakeholder groups. This strengthened the depth of analysis and internal validity, which is vital if findings are to inform actors' future Pacific HADR responses.

The case studies selected were the 2015 TC Pam disaster response in Vanuatu, and the 2016 TC Winston response in Fiji. These were identified via a 'most similar systems' design. This aimed to reduce the number of research variables, by comparing disaster responses which were as

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[15] In this approach, a theoretical concept materialises slowly during research. Important questions can also become clear gradually, while instruments are derived from the context and actors' views. The term 'grounded theory' was developed by Corbin and Strauss, this is applied in inductive research. It uses a bottom-up approach, which derives conclusions from data which was systematically gathered and analysed throughout the research.

similar as possible (Anckar, 2008). Some justifying factors included physical and cultural similarities. For example, Vanuatu and Fiji are both archipelagoes, which experienced Category 5 cyclones. They also have a number of cultural similarities, due to having both Melanesian and colonial influences (Burley, 2013).[16]

A similar range of stakeholders also responded to the TC Pam and Winston disasters. NZDF responses to these events were also undertaken within a civilian-led WoG approach, which applied the new DJIATF model. This meant the same or comparable humanitarian and civilian actors interacted with the NZDF in both responses.

There were also many in-country similarities, concerning civil-military coordination. For example, New Zealand High Commissions existed in both country capitals (MFAT, 2019). MFAT, therefore, had pre-established relationships with affected Governments and a local base, where civil-military coordination hubs were established. Both disasters also happened to occur in the lead up to domestic elections in both Vanuatu and Fiji (Radio New Zealand, 2015, ABC News, 2016, Round, 2016b). Literature suggests this context heightened political tensions in these disaster responses, which may have impacted coordination, obstacles and the assistance provided (Radio New Zealand, 2015, Round, 2016b).[17]

While the similarities described above strengthen internal validity, they can also present challenges when findings are generalised. Conclusions may therefore be less applicable if applied in dissimilar contexts, such as in Micronesian cultures, or in different natural disasters, such as earthquakes.

As no two disaster responses are the same, a number of differences also existed between case studies, which created variables. For example, while New Zealand-Vanuatu relations were relatively warm before the NZDF's HADR response, historic diplomatic tensions existed between the GoNZ and GoF. These related to GoNZ sanctions and severed relations between the NZDF and Republic of Fiji Military Force (RFMF), following the 2006 Fijian coup (Prujean, 2011, Collins and Fraenkel, 2012).[18] While these variables likely impacted civil-military coordination, relationships and the level of trust between actors, they could only be mitigated by applying controls in the research design. These are described below.

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[16] While there are cultural divisions within both Vanuatu and Fiji, Vanuatu's affected population was largely Melanesian. Fiji is the furthest east of the 'Melanesian' countries, affected communities were therefore both Melanesian and Polynesian, with some Indo-Fijians. Both countries also have British colonial histories, prior to independence.

[17] These issues are discussed in greater detail in Chapter two and Four.

[18] Bilateral relations soured between the GoF, GoNZ and Government of Australia (GoA) after Commodore Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama overthrew Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase's government in December 2006. The GoNZ condemned the coup, reduced foreign aid to the country and placed sanctions on Fiji. NZDF engagement with Fiji and the Republic of Fiji Military Force (RFMF) was also severed. The GoNZ's measures were accompanied by the request that Bainimarama (who took the role of Prime Minister following the coup) allow a return to democracy. Diplomatic tensions only began easing after Bainimarama was elected in 2014, following a reportedly diplomatic election. NZDF-RFMF interaction was also re-established after this date.

iii. Data Collection

To produce robust research findings, multiple data collection methods and sources of evidence were used. Data were therefore collected through semi-structured interviews, the researcher's journal, observations, documents and archival records.

Desk-based literature review

Data collection began with a desk-based literature review. Documents included published stakeholder reports, press releases, news media and interviews. Post-disaster lessons learned reports were also used. Some of these collated the perspectives of a range of stakeholders, in workshops held in Vanuatu and Fiji (GoF and SPC, 2017, GoV and SPC, 2015).[19] Internal NZDF and Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand (HQ JFNZ) lessons learned reports and after-action reviews were also obtained via an Official Information Act (OIA) request.[20]

This literature served two purposes. It was first used to present an overview of each disaster and the NZDF's HADR response. These data were also triangulated and collated, to report findings to the posed research questions (Yin, 2014).[21] A broad range of military and civilian sources was intentionally used. This aimed to balance any tendencies toward publication bias, which may have existed in reports published by New Zealand, Pacific and international stakeholders.

Semi-structured interviews

Sixty-eight semi-structured interviews were completed with disaster relief stakeholders from five key sectors. These were: i) the GoNZ and NZDF, ii) New Zealand civilian stakeholders, iii) international and local humanitarian actors, iv) affected governments, and v) affected populations (see Table 1). The use of in-depth interviews is considered an appropriate data collection method, particularly to better understand participant perceptions (Soeters *et al.*, 2014). The method also means findings emerge organically from the views of those who have experienced the phenomenon studied, which further mitigates researcher pre-conceptions or bias.

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[19] Both the TC Pam and Winston lessons learned workshop reports collated the perspectives of a broad range of stakeholders. These included locally-based representatives such as those from affected Governments, Ministries, National Disaster Management Offices, and local humanitarian organisations. Representatives from UN and humanitarian agencies, INGOs, foreign States, civilian agencies and academic institutions were also involved in workshops.
[20] Internal NZDF reports were obtained via OIA. They included the HQ JFNZ J8 (Continuous Improvement) Branch TG 651.3 – OP Pacific Relief Tropical Cyclone Lessons Collection Synopsis, Lessons Learned OP Pacific Relief (Tropical Cyclone Winston), CIMIC Post Activity Report: Op Pacific Relief – TC Winston 2016 (FIJI), and a DJIATF Post Activity Report: Op Pacific Relief – 01-16.
[21] Stakeholder perceptions, obstacles to the NZDF's civil-military coordination, and the impact these may have had on the assistance provided are therefore reported, as they were portrayed in the literature.

In each case study, seven participants were sought to represent each sector. This number was achieved in all but one sector, as only five GoF interviews were able to be analysed.[22] Participants were selected via theoretical sampling and snowball referral (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, Davidson and Tolich, 1999).[23] Interviewees were selected for their relative expertise, experience and close contact with the NZDF, with different ages, gender and rank sought in each sector.[24] Authors consider this diversity and the triangulation of a large number of participants a strength, as this strengthens the validity of findings and enables the views of a collection of communities to be canvassed (Davidson and Tolich, 1999).

Sector	Examples of organisations and positions
i. GoNZ and NZDF	MFAT, New Zealand High Commissions, NZDF deployed forces, DJIATF staff and Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) teams.
ii. New Zealand civilian stakeholders	New Zealand humanitarian agencies, civilian companies, OGA representatives such as from the New Zealand Medical Assistance Team (NZMAT) and Urban Search and Rescue (USAR).
iii. International and local humanitarian actors	(INGOs, NGOs, UN Agencies, local humanitarian and volunteer organisations.
iv. Affected governments	Ministry, Divisional and Provincial officials, public servants, National Disaster Management Office (NDMO) staff and Liaison Officers (LOs).
v. Affected populations	Chiefs, village headmen, male and female community representatives.

Table 4. The five interview sectors and examples of interviewee roles.[25]

Where practicable, interviews were completed face-to-face, in New Zealand, Vanuatu and Fiji.[26] This enabled body language and facial expressions to be observed, which provided greater insight into stakeholder perspectives. Field research was also crucial in the outer islands of Vanuatu and Fiji, to collate the perspectives of community representatives. This was because NZDF assistance was provided in isolated and often impoverished areas, which lacked reliable communication and transportation.

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[22] This reduced the original seventy intended interviews to sixty eight. This occurred as one GoF official was unable to conduct a planned interview in Fiji. The other participant could not be contacted to confirm whether or not their interview transcript was accurate and could be used in this study.

[23] Snowball referral means that participants themselves also recommended other suitable candidates. This is considered appropriate when investigating sensitive topics in small communities, where trust is important. This was the case in the NZDF, affected nations, as well as in the Pacific and New Zealand disaster relief sectors.

[24] While female perspectives were sought in this research only nine interviewees in each case study were female. This may reflect the higher ratios of males represented within the NZDF, Pacific governments and some disaster relief positions. It may however also mean that findings do not fully encapsulate female perspectives within each sector.

[25] In order to preserve confidentiality of participants a generic list of organisations and positions is provided here.

[26] Interviews took place within New Zealand, (April 2017 - February 2018), Fiji (14 -27 August 2017) and Vanuatu (27 August – 08 September 2017). Where interviews were not possible in person they were conducted via Skype and telephone.

An interview guide was also used (see Appendix 1). This directed conversation around ten topics, using open-ended questions. This method provided flexibility as it meant the researcher could gain new insight and investigate topics as research progressed (Tolich and Davidson, 1998). All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed. Transcriptions were then returned for verification in all but a few cases, where participants were either inaccessible or asked not to have these returned.

Coding and analysis

Literature and interview findings were triangulated and analysed independently. The separation between these data collection methods meant literature findings could be compared with those which emerged from actual stakeholder interviews. This design aimed to identify where there were discrepancies among data or perspectives diverged. It was hoped this might explain why literature and actual stakeholder perspectives appeared to vary.

Due to some considerable gaps in the literature, stakeholder perspectives, obstacles to the NZDF's civil-military coordination and their impact were reported in a semi-chronological sequence, according to how these HADR responses unfolded. This provides a more logical examination of the NZDF's civil-military coordination.

In contrast, thematic coding was undertaken on interview data, to identify stakeholder perspectives, obstacles to civil-military coordination and their impact (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). This was undertaken until the point of saturation, when no new codes, patterns or themes emerged (Urquhart, 2013, Soeters *et al.*, 2014). Obstacles were then ranked according to the total number of interviews in which they were mentioned.[27]

To enhance internal validity, participants were also sent a copy of preliminary research findings. This aimed to ensure that interviewee perspectives were accurately portrayed and, if desired, these stakeholders could provide further comments for analysis.

Methodological advantages and limitations

The author was considered an 'insider-researcher' in most interviews (Unluer, 2012). This was because the researcher has been involved in national and international HADR responses.[28] She

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[27] These findings are presented in tables within Chapter Two and Four, according to the total percentage of case study participants who identified or provided examples of these obstacles in their interview.

[28] HADR responses included the 2010 earthquake in Haiti and New Zealand Rena oil spill disaster, when serving in the NZDF. She also resides in Christchurch, New Zealand, which experienced a large earthquake in 2011.

also grew up on a small island in the Pacific, had previously served in the NZDF and with INGOs and NGOs in the humanitarian sector.[29]

The advantages to being an insider-researcher are well documented and include: 1) having a greater understanding of the culture being studied; 2) not altering the flow of social interaction unnaturally; and 3) having an established intimacy which promotes the telling and the judging of truth (Bonner and Tolhurst, 2002). Insider researchers also know the politics of institutions, such as the formal hierarchy and how things 'really work,' which enables them to approach others receptively (Unluer, 2012). They also often have a great deal of knowledge, which would otherwise take an outsider a long time to acquire (Smyth and Holian, 2008). Collectively, these factors aided in the interview and data collection process, as well as in analysis.

This role duality, however, can have disadvantages. These include participants making assumptions about the researcher's knowledge, "*closeness to the situation hindering the researcher from seeing all dimensions of the bigger picture*" and susceptibility to making assumptions, without seeking clarification (Unluer, 2012, p.6). A preventative approach was used to mitigate these, which applied a robust methodology, triangulated data and used feedback from external sources. This involved the researchers' supervisor providing feedback on findings and analysis.[30] Preliminary research findings were also discussed with different stakeholders from these key sectors, before publication.[31]

A further limitation of this study relates to its qualitative methodology (Soeters *et al.*, 2014). Findings are specific to the NZDF and Pacific HADR context, meaning they may not be transferrable to other foreign militaries or regions. Interview data also only reflect the perspectives of the sixty-eight selected participants.[32] While generalisability is not the objective of qualitative research, other State and defence actors may consider research findings helpful to inform their own Pacific HADR responses. Stakeholder perspectives and feedback may also be useful for civilian actors who want to enhance their civil-military coordination efforts.

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[29] The researcher grew up in the Cook Islands. She also served as a Navigation and Warfare officer in the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN). She then left the NZDF to serve in the humanitarian field, supporting development projects in the United Kingdom, Europe and Asia Pacific.

[30] Dr Anna Powles' is a Senior Lecturer at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University. Her expertise includes: Pacific islands regional security and politics, women and peace studies, and New Zealand defence and foreign policy.

[31] Stakeholders at this briefing included representatives from: the NZDF, MFAT, INGOs and academic institutions.

[32] While selecting a broad range of stakeholders aims to mitigate this, participant views are unlikely to encapsulate the entirety of stakeholder perspectives. Participants may also be subject to bias or false recollections, which could impact findings. Wherever possible the researcher used post-disaster literature to eliminate any suspected inaccuracies, particularly as some participants found it difficult to differentiate between NZDF and other foreign military troops and assets for HADR.

iv. Ethical Considerations

Ethical considerations are especially important in contexts which involve both military personnel and vulnerable populations, such as in HADR responses (Soeters *et al.*, 2014). Author motivations must also be evaluated, as "*prior commitment to either making the military more effective or critiquing its actions may actually blind researchers to important questions: both political and analytical*" (Ben-Ari, 2014, p.33). The researcher was therefore conscious of 'doing no harm' throughout data collection while remaining as impartial as possible.

Before commencing interviews, low-risk human ethics approval was obtained from Massey University's Human Ethics Committee.[33] Ethical processes were adhered to, which ensured that participation was voluntary, interviewees were treated respectfully, and that information and data were securely stored. Participants were also given research information sheets (see Appendix 2) and signed consent forms (Appendix 3) before being interviewed. All of these documents and interview questions were translated into the native languages of Bislama and Fijian, to ensure participants gave their informed consent and understood all interview questions.[34]

Authors note the importance of ensuring the confidentiality of participants and their institutions when investigating sensitive research topics (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, Soeters *et al.*, 2014). Interviewees are therefore identified by number and sector within chapters. Where necessary and with participant approval, some quotes and details have been altered to ensure anonymity.[35]

Approval to conduct interviews was also obtained from institutions and state entities, which agreed to respect participant confidentiality. Permission was therefore granted by the NZDF, GoNZ, GoV and GoF before conducting interviews.[36] These entities expressed their support for this study and the desire to receive open and honest feedback on their involvement in these HADR responses.

Although being an insider-researcher presents valuable data, it can also pose dilemmas in the final write up stage (Unluer, 2012). While determined not to play down certain aspects findings, the researcher has taken into account the sensitivity around some findings. Some information has therefore been omitted and will be used in policy briefs for specific stakeholders, post publication.

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[33] This was obtained on 03 April 2017 for the duration of research. The ethics notification number was: 4000017266.
[34] In Fiji the most common dialect among indigenous Fijians is Bauan, while it is commonly termed 'Fijian.' In Vanuatu and Fiji most participants chose to conduct interviews in English, as they had learned this in school. While translators were available, any unfamiliar terms or misunderstandings were clarified during interviews, or when transcriptions were returned.
[35] Locations, names and other identifying details have been removed so that participants or intuitions cannot be identified.
[36] Research permits were obtained and observed when conducting field research in Vanuatu and Fiji.

v. Thesis Outline

This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter One provides a review of relevant literature and studies concerned with civil-military coordination. This also describes the key coordination mechanisms and models adopted in the Pacific and by the New Zealand Government and Defence Force.

Chapters Two and Three focus on the 2015 TC Pam case study. In Chapter Two the context of the disaster and NZDF response are described. Literature findings are also reported, as they relate to the three research questions. Chapter Three then reports how interviewed stakeholders perceived the civil-military coordination, obstacles and their impact. Chapters Four and Five mirror this same structure, instead focusing on the 2016 TC Winston case study.

A comparative analysis of both case studies is then presented in Chapter Six. This discusses the implications of the findings and their contribution to previous literature. A new model is also proposed, which aims to help stakeholders better understand the complexities of the NZDF's civil-military coordination. Following this, Chapter Seven concludes with a summary of the thesis and a brief look towards the future of civil-military coordination in Pacific HADR.

Chapter One: The Shaky Foundations of Civil-Military Coordination

This chapter presents an overview of the literature relevant to this thesis. Previous research and theories are reviewed in four parts. These provide an understanding of the contribution this study makes in the academic field. Civil-military and Pacific HADR mechanisms are also described, to help readers understand the context and findings of the following chapters.

Part One explains the theoretical background behind this research. In this section, civil-military relations theories are examined, along with the authors' critiques. Part Two then explores the international literature focused on civil-military coordination. Gaps and weaknesses in research are examined, along with the most commonly discussed obstacles to civil-military coordination.

Narrowing the field, Part Three investigates civil-military coordination in the context of Pacific HADR. Recent literature focused on the region is examined, along with the mechanisms which aim to enhance coordination. Part Four then explores the documents which detail the NZDF's civil-military coordination in Pacific HADR. The newly established GoNZ and NZDF coordination models and mechanisms are also examined, at the close of the chapter.

Part One: Civil-Military Relations Theories

i. Theoretical foundations and civilian control

Although coordination in modern HADR contexts has become increasingly complex, civil-military relations theories serve as the foundation of this research. Historically, most authors in this field aim to address what is termed the "*civil-military problematique*" (Feaver, 1996, p.149). This dilemma raises the question of how States can best maintain a military that is both effective and subordinate to civilian rule.

Most critiques of these traditional theories suggest they were "*narrowly conceived*" or "*too bound by the culture and national politics*" of their predominantly American authors (Bland, 1999, p.8).[37] Yet despite these weaknesses, many theories remain relevant in the modern context of civil-military coordination (Huntington, 1957, Janowitz, 1960). This is because Western militaries, such as the NZDF, often deploy under civilian control in Pacific HADR responses. This leadership must also be balanced with the need for military effectiveness, as well as achieving State objectives and meeting humanitarian needs.

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[37] These criticisms relate to traditional civil-military relations theories narrowly focusing on national security aims. They also often conduct ethnocentric analyses on the United States (US) military, within the political context of the Cold War.

Two streams of thought

In response to the 'problematique,' two opposing theories emerged to explain how civil-military relations should best be structured. The first theory was proposed by Huntington, in *The Soldier and the State* (1957). The author argued that a clear divide or separation should be maintained between the military and policymakers, to maximise military professionalism and effectiveness. In contrast, Janowitz endorsed an integrated approach in *The Professional Soldier* (1960). This theory suggests that military personnel should develop political understanding and sensitivity, to establish civilian control through "*self-imposed professional standards and meaningful integration with civilian values*" (Janowitz, 1960, p.420).

The debate over separation or integration

These opposing theories raise crucial questions of relevance to this study. One concerns whether the 'separation' or 'integration' of civilian and military actors is more appropriate in Pacific HADR and likely to ensure civilian control. These subjects continue to be debated by academics and humanitarians (Schenkenberg van Mierop, 2016, Gordon and Donini, 2016, Harris, 2016a). This suggests the debate over how civil-military relations should best be structured, remains unresolved.

Another question surrounds how civil-military arrangements may have impacted actors' relationships, coordination and ability to meet HADR needs. Considering that the GoNZ and NZDF have adopted increasingly integrated approaches in Pacific HADR responses, findings in this thesis present a valuable opportunity to build on existing civil-military relations literature.

ii. Contemporary civil-military relations

Several contemporary civil-military relations theories were also developed after the Cold War. These aimed to address weaknesses and gaps in Huntington and Janowitz's work and, in doing so, introduced a range of new considerations in the field. Many of these factors remain relevant in the modern context of civil-military coordination and should be accounted for in the analysis.

The impact of national principles and norms

Bland (1999), for example, proposed a 'unified theory,' which aims to explain civil-military relations across times of peace, crisis and war, as well as in different countries. The theory suggests that civilian control and relations are impacted by nationally evolving principles, norms and decision-making procedures. The dangers of generalisation were also discussed by Bland, who argued that the differences between countries and actors had a significant impact on civil-military relations.

The impacts of civilian society and culture

Schiff's (1995) 'concordance theory' also evidenced how human, cultural and historical dimensions significantly impacted relations in different States. She also argued that previous conclusions, which proposed that military and political institutions should remain separated, might be inappropriate for other nations. This was because these findings were primarily drawn from the historical and cultural experiences of the United States (US). In contrast, Schiff suggested that "*cooperative relationships*" should be encouraged between military and civilian actors, which did not necessarily require separation (1995, p.7). Her work also introduced important factors, such as the influences of civilian society, on civil-military coordination.

Policy, the environment and culture

Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein (1996) also explored how national security policy is shaped by the global or domestic environment, as well as culture and identity. This work led other authors to call for further research into modern, integrated civil-military operations and actors' policies. Mychajlyszyn (2007), for example, suggests this is critical because civil-military relations are likely to be impacted by the culture, and norms in these new contexts. This suggests that changes in the Pacific HADR context, such as the increasing levels of civil-military integration, should be accounted for in stakeholder and national security policies.

The works above highlight the suitability of the research design and the valuable contribution this thesis could make to academia. These relate to the narrow focus of this study on specific actors, such as the NZDF and key HADR stakeholders, in the relatively unstudied field of Pacific HADR. Schiff and Bland's work also reinforce the value of collating data from a broad range of civilian perspectives, to ensure that valid conclusions are drawn.

iii. The changing nature and roles of defence forces

Since the 1990's militaries have come under increasing domestic and international pressure to adapt and evolve their capabilities. Authors suggest factors such as globalisation, human rights and norms have expanded military roles, to include non-combat capabilities, such as HADR (Dandeker and Gow, 1999, Kümmel, 2002, 2004).

As the interoperability between civilian and military actors has increased, so has research into how this is impacting military structures and culture. Moskos, Williams, Segal and other authors have, in particular, made significant contributions in the field of military sociology. These authors were among the first to propose the theoretical concept of a 'postmodern military.' They argue that military culture has changed, as forces have become more voluntary, and multipurpose, with *"greater permeability with civilian society"* (Moskos *et al.*, 2000, p.1). This is

supported by case studies, which suggest increased involvement in international operations has democratised, liberalised, and civilianised some armed forces.

The multidimensional impacts of civil-military integration

Some authors argue that postmodern factors, such as increased integration and civilianisation, have had positive impacts on civil-military coordination. Egnell's (2006) comparative case study, for example, concluded that the British military's 'Janowitzean' (or integrated) approach enhanced coordination in their 2003 Iraq deployment. In comparison, the US military's 'Huntingtonian' (or separated) approach, was less effective. More recent research by Hajjar (2014) argues that postmodern factors[38] have contributed to an emerging 'peacekeeper-diplomat' cultural orientation in the US military. This has reportedly resulted in the military working more effectively with civilian society, the national government, other agencies and NGOs.

In contrast, some authors argue that integration impedes civil-military relations and coordination. For example, Dandeker's work suggests the blurring of political and military spheres has resulted in "*more frequent opportunities for political-military conflict*" (2001, p.42). Sotomayor's (2010) research also concluded that increased interaction in peace operations had magnified, rather than reduced, civil-military differences in South America.

Other authors, such as Malešič (2015), highlight the dynamic outcomes of closer civil-military interaction in HADR. The author's research concludes that integration can foster both cooperation and the "*mutual transfer of values,*" or "*competition, conflict and a clash of organisational cultures*" (2015, p.981). These seemingly contradictory conclusions suggest further research is needed to determine how integration may be impacting civil-military relations, such as the NZDF.

iv. Cultural and structural change in the NZDF

To enhance the NZDF's effectiveness and interoperability, the force has undergone major structural changes over the last two decades. These have included a defence-wide restructure and civilianisation process, which were initiated by the GoNZ in 2010.[39] After these measures were introduced, reports concluded that they had negatively impacts, such as reducing defence expenditure, morale and the retention of personnel (Office of the Auditor-General, 2013).

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[38] Hajjar argues that military culture has been modified by postmodern factors such as the global growth of ambiguity, the movement towards greater multiculturalism, the impact of the information age, the growth of military civilians, increasing questioning of authority and ideas, and the emergence of a multi-mission military.
[39] This civilianisation process converted 1400 military positions into civilian roles.

Yet despite these significant changes, minimal research has examined how increased civil-military integration has impacted the NZDF's culture or coordination. Considering that Hajjar's research implies that postmodern factors, like civilianisation, enhance coordination, this thesis provides a valuable opportunity to explore how these may have impacted the NZDF.

Stakeholder perceptions of the NZDF's culture and interoperability

Within the literature, only a small number of academic studies have investigated how stakeholders perceive the NZDF's culture and interoperability. Most of these are also focused on peacekeeping deployments, rather than HADR contexts.

Morris (2017), for example, examined perceptions about the NZDF by interviewing NZDF personnel who had been deployed to Afghanistan. These personnel described the NZDF as having a distinct 'ANZAC' or 'professional' identity when operating with other actors. This was demonstrated by doing things in a "*Kiwi way*" or with a *"can-do attitude"* (Morris, 2017, p.89). NZDF personnel also felt the force was perceived as friendly, approachable, flexible and respectful. These traits were linked to the culture, small size and budget of the NZDF. While personnel reported that these factors had enhanced interaction with the local population, Morris concluded that these self-perceptions did not "*automatically make [NZDF personnel] good at development work*" (Morris, 2017, p.91).

Greener (2017) completed a similar study, which explored how external stakeholders perceived NZDF personnel, during overseas deployments. Data were drawn from interviews with representatives of International Stabilisation Forces, the UN, Multinational Forces and Observers.[40] Four positive themes emerged to describe the NZDF. These included professionalism,[41] personal qualities,[42] cultural appreciation[43] and attitudes.[44] Greener concluded that these stakeholder perceptions were closely aligned with how NZDF personnel viewed themselves.

'Areas for further development' were, however, also identified from Greener's data. These included a clear differential between NZDF senior officers and more inexperienced soldiers. Several interviewees reported difficulties either working or communicating with soldiers or young personnel. This led to recommendations that the NZDF deploy personnel conversant with the local language in the area of operations. 'Kiwi humour' was, at times, also misunderstood and personnel behaviour was considered disrespectful or inappropriate.

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[40] These interviews took place in the Sinai, Timor-Leste, Israel and Tiberius.
[41] This perception was perceived to enable NZDF personnel to 'get things done' and add value to operations.
[42] NZDF personnel were viewed as honest, with integrity and openness, and acting with respect and humility.
[43] The influence of Maori and New Zealand culture was perceived to have increased the NZDF's flexibility. It also reportedly enhanced individuals' cross-cultural appreciation and competence.
[44] These attitudes included informality, an easy-going nature and a relationship-building emphasis.

Overall, these previous examinations of NZDF culture and interoperability imply that despite the NZDF generally being perceived as positive, there still appear to be communication, cultural challenges and misunderstandings impeding coordination.

Gaps and limitations in NZDF-focused research

Despite the recent publication of these studies, an examination of their methodologies reveals some limitations. Morris's (2017) study, for example, collated data from only ten NZDF participants. It also focused on NZDF development efforts in Afghanistan and a complex environment, rather than in the Pacific or HADR. In contrast, many of the participants in Greener's (2017) research were foreign military personnel, rather than civilians, and only one of the thirty was female. Greener was also employed by the NZDF during his research, which he acknowledged could create a "*context within which certain views might be more or less likely to be expressed*" (Greener, 2017, p.99).

These concerns highlight several research weaknesses, which the methodology used in this thesis aims to address. These surround the need to interview a large number of civilian representatives, from different sectors and of both sexes, to better understand stakeholder perspectives. The fact that the author was considered an 'insider researcher' and ensured participant confidentiality, also aims to mitigate any interviewee hesitancy about openly expressing their views.

Part Two: Civil-Military Coordination and its Main Obstacles

i.   International literature and gaps in the research

In contrast to civil-military relations theories, which largely focus on national-level interaction between military and civilian actors, the field of civil-military coordination encompasses a broad range of stakeholders and operating environments. An examination of the literature, however, reveals a number of weaknesses and gaps in existing research. These are examined below.

A focus on conflict and complex environments

A major gap in the literature concerns the lack of research in the context of natural disasters. This is because the majority of studies have investigated coordination in peacekeeping or politically complex environments, rather than in HADR. For example, authors have examined civil-military coordination in Somalia (Beauregard, 1998, Scheltinga *et al.*, 2005), Bosnia (Scheltinga *et al.*, 2005) Kosovo (Mockaitis, 2004) and Afghanistan (Rietjens *et al.*, 2009). In general, these works suggest that civil-military coordination efforts are often improvisational,

pragmatic and 'ad hoc,'[45] in international responses (Rietjens, 2006, Metcalfe *et al.*, 2012, Soeters *et al.*, 2014).

The conclusions drawn in these studies have, however, been critiqued by some authors (Rubinstein *et al.*, 2008, Ferris, 2012, Rubinstein, 2014). These suggest that research is often narrowly focused on the US or British military, and their interaction with UN agencies or Western NGOs. This has led authors, such as Slim (1996), to caution against generalisation, as there are often significant divergences between different militaries and actors.

Other authors question the relevance of these findings for the HADR context. Ferris (2016a), for example, argues that civil-military coordination after natural disasters is less contentious than in a conflict scenario. She suggests this is because there are fewer political tensions. While this is a contested assertion, the critiques above reinforce the need to examine civil-military coordination in the Pacific HADR context.

Research weaknesses and publication bias

Although most case studies which examine civil-military coordination collect data from interviews, many of these display methodological weaknesses. Pramanik's (2015) research, for example, examined the civil-military coordination efforts of the Swedish military. Data was, however, collated from only twelve interviews, with Swedish Government or military officials. Three participants were also military trainees, with limited experience. Other studies include larger interview samples, but limit civilian participation to either Government or specific humanitarian actors (Minear *et al.*, 2000).[46] These weaknesses call into question the validity of previous studies, particularly surrounding their portrayal of stakeholder views.

Most stakeholder perceptions about civil-military coordination are also drawn from grey literature, rather than academic or peer-reviewed sources. This raises questions about publication bias, as documents are often produced by political actors, militaries or humanitarian agencies, which have a vested interest in findings (Pramanik, 2015).

The general lack of empirical research

In general, there is a lack of robust, academic research in this field. Egnell argues that most works are based on "*weak historical, empirical and theoretical foundations*" (2013, p.238). He suspects this is due to authors undertaking research with the 'assumption' that integration and

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[45] The definition of 'ad hoc' according to the Merriam-Webster dictionary is: "*for the particular end or case at hand without consideration of wider application.*" Ad hoc used as an adjective can be 1) concerned with a particular end or purpose, 2) formed or used for specific or immediate problems or needs, or 3) meaning improvised or fashioned from whatever is immediately available.

[46] One example of robust research was completed by Minear and colleagues. These conducted over 200 interviews to produce findings for their study into civil-military coordination within the Kosovo crisis.

civil-military coordination are positive or will enhance effectiveness. Researcher bias also remains a major concern in qualitative research, as analysts often fail to apply measures to protect against self-delusion or drawing invalid conclusions (Soeters et al., 2014).

Pramanik's (2015) systematic literature review substantiates the lack of empirical research. This concluded that only 15% of all civil-military literature was published in scientific peer-reviewed journals. Obstacles to civil-military coordination were also only identified in 16% of the academic research surveyed.[47] This scarcity of empirical research is concerning, as obstacles to coordination must first be identified before stakeholders can consider how these might be mitigated. Common obstacles to coordination are now examined in the section below.

ii. The tension and challenges of civil-military coordination

Contrasting principles and pursuits

The different values and principles of military and civilian actors are, perhaps, the most discussed obstacles to civil-military coordination. These often relate to the concern that militaries are pursuing political or military interests, rather than aiming to meet humanitarian needs in deployments (Metcalfe *et al.*, 2012, De Siervo, 2012). Authors suggest this tension is further compounded by the politicisation and militarisation of HADR (Pelling and Dill, 2010, Pulu, 2014, Martinez, 2016).

Politics and State sovereignty

Stakeholders' interests and political motives can also negatively impact coordination. Katoch (2006), argues that developing or small nations are, in particular, suspicious of foreign assistance, as this can be interpreted as an affront to State sovereignty. He suggests this can lead governments to "*zealously guard their ability to act autonomously,*" which undermines coordination (Katoch, 2006, p.156). Case studies by Barber (2009) and Seekins (2009) demonstrate that affected Governments have refused HADR assistance from military and humanitarian actors in the past.[48] They also suggested that this had serious negative implications for the affected population.

Within the emerging field of 'disaster politics,' authors have identified several factors of relevance to civil-military coordination and Pacific HADR.[49] Pelling and Dill (2010), highlight that national political systems *"do not operate in isolation from international pressures,"* which can

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[47] A similar ratio emerged when the literature was reviewed for this thesis, in 2018.
[48] These case studies focused on the TC Nargis response, in Burma. The US military and some humanitarian actors were refused entry into the country, despite these actors transporting tonnes of aid for the affected population.
[49] Research in the field of 'disaster politics' often explores the impact politics and interests have in disasters.

complicate relationships and coordination efforts (Pelling and Dill, 2010, p.25). Corruption can also impede coordination between foreign actors and affected governments. For example, Pelling (1998) concluded that local political elites in Guyana presented themselves as local voices to capture external funds.

While no research has explored how these factors may be impacting civil-military coordination in Pacific HADR, authors suggest they must be taken into account when analysing data (Pelling and Dill, 2010).

The humanitarian imperative and principles

The tension between politics and both the 'humanitarian imperative' and 'humanitarian principles' is another reason why military-humanitarian coordination, remains particularly contentious (ICRC, 1994, Sect 1).[50] The latter principles include humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence (ICRC, 1994).[51] These require stakeholders to implement HADR independent of any political, military, commercial or other objectives.

Historically, many authors have raised questions about whether militaries, which are ultimately trained to kill, are appropriate HADR actors (De Coning, 2005, Gordon and Donini, 2016, Schenkenberg van Mierop, 2016). Some also argue the pursuit of political objectives is "*fundamentally incompatible*" with the principles most humanitarian agencies and responses are founded on (Weir, 2006, p.26).

The dilemma faced by militaries deployed for HADR

These obligations reportedly pose a dilemma for militaries. This is because, on one hand, they are extensions of the State and, therefore, are controlled by Governments and driven by political interests. On the other hand, most militaries are obligated to adhere to the principles within HADR guidelines, as well as UN General Assembly Resolutions 46/182 (1991) and 58/114 (2003).[52] This tension has led to considerable debate over whether, or not, militaries can actually adhere to the humanitarian principles in HADR (Rieffer-Flanagan, 2009, Gordon and Donini, 2016, Schenkenberg van Mierop, 2016).

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[50] The 'humanitarian imperative' is often cited by humanitarian agencies and is considered an obligation in HADR. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) states that: "*The right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental humanitarian principle which should be enjoyed by all citizens of all countries. As members of the international community, we recognise our obligation to provide humanitarian assistance wherever it is needed…The prime motivation of our response to disaster is to alleviate human suffering amongst those least able to withstand the stress caused by disaster.*"

[51] The humanitarian principles require actors to implement HADR independent from any political, military, commercial or other objectives. They are defined by the ICRC as follows. "*Humanity: To save and protect life and dignity and prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it is found. Impartiality: Help is based solely on need. Assistance provided will not discriminate on the basis of gender, race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, political affiliation, sexual orientation or social status. Neutrality: Assistance must be provided without taking sides in controversy that is of a political, military, religious or ideological nature. Independence: humanitarian aid activities will be implemented separate from political, military, commercial or other objectives.*"

[52] These UN resolutions obligate member States, including those in the Pacific, to adhere to these principles in HADR responses.

Humanitarian agencies also reportedly fear their 'neutrality' or 'independence' will be undermined if they coordinate with militaries (Byman *et al.*, 2000, Abiew, 2003, 2012). These factors are perceived as crucial for humanitarians, which feel they are needed to gain affected government approval to carry out HADR (1999, Metcalfe *et al.*, 2012, Harris, 2016b). In particular, these concerns have led humanitarian stakeholders to be either hesitant or refuse to interact with military personnel during deployments.

Diversity in stakeholders' perspectives

Despite most academic literature concluding that military-humanitarian coordination is contentious, some research contradicts these findings. For example, some studies evidence extreme diversity among the perspectives of humanitarian actors, particularly over adherence to the humanitarian principles and views on civil-military coordination (ACMC, 2012, Ruffa and Vennesson, 2014, Harris, 2016b).

Madiwale and Virk's (2012) examination of the 2010 Pakistan floods also concluded that national humanitarian agencies and local actors were less concerned with their neutrality and more likely to coordinate with militaries, than INGOs and the UN. These findings raise questions about how humanitarians view the NZDF and whether, or not, they are willing to coordinate in Pacific HADR.

iii. Common barriers and obstacles to civil-military coordination

Cultural and organisational differences

Across the literature, the organisational differences between military and civilian actors are also discussed as obstacles to coordination. Within this broad category, a range of key differences are discussed in studies. Abiew (2003) and Franke (2006), for example, focus on differences in '*organisational structure*.' They stress how the centralised and hierarchical structure of military forces contrasts with the horizontal and consensus-based decision-making procedures of civilian and humanitarian organisations. Differences in '*organisational approaches'* are also discussed by Gourlay (2000). His work suggests that militaries often focused on short-term, decisive action, in contrast to the long-term developmental concerns of civilian organisations.

Despite many studies identifying organisational differences as an obstacle, some authors question the validity and generalisability of these findings. Rubinstein (2014), for example, argues that actor perspectives are often influenced by stereotypes or preconceived ideas, which can skew findings. Slim (1996) and Rubinstein (2014) also stress that most case studies have focused on the interaction between humanitarian actors and the US military.

Consequently, they question the relevance of these conclusions for other military and civilian actors.

A lack of understanding between actors

Another well-documented challenge concerns the lack of understanding between military and civilian actors. Byman's (2000) research describes examples of these, which often surround misunderstandings about institutions, operational procedures and capabilities. These include humanitarian representatives making unrealistic demands of the military, while military personnel overestimate the capabilities and resources available to humanitarians. These misunderstandings then foster frustration and confusion, which impede coordination.

Research also suggests that, in general, military personnel lack HADR knowledge and experience (Metcalfe *et al.*, 2012). An extra layer of misunderstanding can also be fostered between the political officials controlling WoG responses and the military personnel they are directing (Miller and Barbera, 2014). This can impede decision-making and the determination of military tasking, as well as coordination with civilian or humanitarian actors (Ray, 2012).

The impact on the assistance provided

This obstacle can also lead militaries to deliver inappropriate HADR or not meet humanitarian needs. Authors often criticise militaries for providing goods and services *"without considering the impact on local merchants and workforces"* (Miller and Barbera, 2014, p.145).[53] Some link this lack of understanding to the fact that military training and tasks are usually combat-focused, rather than taking into account development or humanitarian factors (Heaslip *et al.*, 2016, Dandeker and Gow, 1999, Gibb, 2015, Miller and Barbera, 2014).

Some authors also suggest that the military's lack of understanding is institutional (Byman *et al.*, 2000). This is, reportedly, due to knowledge being retained by certain personnel or civil affairs officials, but not shared throughout the ranks. Byman also argues this is a consequence of the 'sporadic' and 'uneven' attempts of Western militaries to engage with the relief community. These assertions highlight factors to consider in this study, particularly surrounding how pre-deployment interaction may have impacted the NZDF's coordination.

Cultural misunderstandings

A small number of studies have also evidenced cultural misunderstandings between militaries and affected populations. One of these was completed by Rubinstein and colleagues (2008) and drew data from local interviewees. These reported that US military personnel lacked an

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[53] A poignant example of this was when military engineers built roads in Somalia, while hundreds of local men remained unemployed.

understanding of local culture and were unaware when their actions were considered disrespectful by local actors.

While some studies into the NZDF's culture suggest the military is more culturally aware than other militaries, others stress the likelihood of cultural misunderstandings (Morris, 2017, Greener, 2017). Lanier's (2000) work, for example, highlights that misunderstandings often lead to frustration and confusion, when opposing cultural features clash. In particular, her work describes the significant differences between cold-climate cultures, such as New Zealand, and hot-climate cultures, including most Pacific islands.[54]

While not discussed in Lanier's research, some of these opposing factors, including 'task orientated vs. relationship-focused cultures' and 'concepts of time and planning,' may be compounded by the characteristics of military culture. These factors highlight the need to interview Pacific-based stakeholders, to determine whether or not cultural misunderstandings may be impeding the NZDF's civil-military coordination.

Information sharing and poor communication

Communication is also a common obstacle to coordination, within which sub-themes emerge. These include the incompatibility of actors' systems (Arancibia, 2016), poor information sharing (Rietjens *et al.*, 2009) and the actual language and terminology used by actors (Pramanik, 2015). In addition, the military's classification of materials and security restrictions have reportedly hindered information-sharing (Mockaitis, 2004, Rietjens *et al.*, 2009).

Communication challenges also surround stakeholders' willingness to openly discuss issues about coordination and assistance. This issue is well documented in the book '*Time to Listen: Hearing People on the Receiving End of International Aid,*' which produced findings from over 6,000 interviews, across different contexts and continents (Anderson et al., 2012). These authors concluded that people's experiences with international aid were remarkably consistent, with several key messages emerging from this research. One key finding was that participants often began interviews by citing positive experiences and expressing their appreciation for assistance. This was, however, consistently followed by a deeper analysis of how this aid had not worked and they believed it could be improved.

Generally, aid recipients were also disappointed by the assistance provided. They often called for 'smarter' aid, perceiving that 'too much' assistance was given 'too fast,' which was viewed as a waste of money and resources. The authors suggested these outcomes were the result of both unrealistic community expectations and the "*processes and systems of the international*

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[54] These differences include 'relationship vs. task orientated cultures', 'direct vs. indirect communication,' 'individualism vs. group identify' and 'different concepts of time and planning.'

aid system [undermining] its intended effectiveness" (Anderson et al., 2012, p.2). This led to the conclusion that, globally, aid providers need to listen and engage more with recipients.

In particular, these observations reinforce the need to interview affected populations in the Pacific, to better understand how they view the NZDF's coordination efforts and actors' assistance. They also highlight the need for trust between the researchers and interviewees, so that critical, not just positive feedback is included in analyses.

Part Three: Pacific HADR and the involvement of foreign militaries

i. Gaps and weaknesses in Pacific-based research

Surprisingly, despite the increasing role of foreign militaries in the Pacific HADR, few studies have examined the mechanisms introduced to enhance civil-military coordination. For example, only one peer-reviewed journal article has investigated military involvement in South Pacific HADR (Reaves *et al.*, 2014). This focused on the US military and identified several weaknesses in the engagement model applied by the force. Most of these were aligned with the obstacles to coordination, described above.[55] The article further concluded that poor communication and coordination between the military and local actors, in particular, had negative impacts on the assistance provided.

As with international literature, the majority of stakeholder perspectives and conclusions are drawn from grey literature. This material is, therefore, subject to the same concerns which relate to publication bias and the validity of findings.

Most studies focus on the Australian Defence Force's coordination

Within civil-military coordination literature, most reports focus on Australian Defence Force (ADF) coordination efforts, rather than the NZDF. Lipner and Henley's (2010) study, for example, explored how NGOs perceived Australia's coordination in HADR (Lipner and Henley, 2010). This illustrated poor communication between the ADF and NGOs, and that coordination often relied on personal relationships. Humanitarian stakeholders also felt these obstacles reduced the effectiveness of Australia's WoG response, describing this as a "*missed opportunity*" to create a more cohesive civil-military response (Lipner and Henley, 2010, p.19).

More recent analyses have also been published by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Government of Australia, 2017) and the Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC)

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[55] Examples included supplies and manpower often not being consistent with country needs, military leaders and planners often lacking HADR experience, and assistance providing short-term solutions for long-term problems.

(2018). Although all conclude that the ADF's civil-military coordination efforts were successful, barriers to coordination are also identified (ACMC, 2018).[56] These reports highlight the need for further research, to determine whether, or not, the same issues are impacting the NZDF's coordination.

Methodological weaknesses

An examination of these reports, however, exposes some conflicts of interest. This is because almost all of the reports above were either State-funded or undertaken by Government and military personnel (Government of Australia, 2017, GoA, 2017, ADF, 2016). Even Lipner and Henley's (2010) report was undertaken by the Australian Council for International Development (ACFID)[57] and ACMC,[58] which are, on inspection, institutions funded by the GoA.

In addition, most lessons learned workshops undertaken after Pacific HADR responses are sponsored or co-hosted by the GoA, UN or Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC). This could hinder open discussion, as many of the INGOs and stakeholders in attendance receive substantial funding from these donors, during HADR or WoG responses. As discussed in Anderson's (2012) work, these considerations may reduce stakeholders' willingness to critique State or military efforts.

Local stakeholder and affected population perspectives are also often not included in studies, despite their importance. In contrast, most State-funded reports often draw findings from interviews with Government, military personnel and INGOs (Government of Australia, 2017, ADF, 2016, HQ JFNZ, 2016). This gap in research is concerning as it means vital feedback from key HADR stakeholders is not being included in reports.

ii.   Critiques of coordination in Pacific HADR

Within grey literature, stakeholders in the Pacific have raised general concerns about how foreign actors plan and provide assistance in HADR. Organisations such as the Fiji Women's Crisis Centre (FWCC) and Pacific Women's Network Against Violence Against Women have, for example, reported that local leaders frequently accept foreign aid without question, due to a shortage of resources (FWCC, 2018, Radio New Zealand, 2018). In some cases, this aid

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[56] The ACMC report identified a lack of understanding about military asset capabilities, a lack of standardised language and communication issues and challenges surrounding decision making and the appropriateness of the asset to the environment.
[57] ACFID is an independent national association of Australian non-government organisations (NGOs) working in the field of international aid and development. ACFID currently has over 70 members.
[58] The ACMC is an Australian Government initiative to improve Australia's effectiveness in civil-military collaboration for conflict and disaster management overseas. Originally named the Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence, it was officially opened by the Australian Prime Minister, in 2008. It is staffed by officials of relevant GoA departments and agencies and is administered through the Vice Chief of Defence Force Group. Portfolio responsibility resides with the Minister for Defence.

reportedly does "*more harm than good,*" as it fails to meet community needs or result in positive development progress (FWCC, 2018).

Donors and INGOs have also been accused of competing and coordinating poorly in Pacific HADR responses. These issues are linked to foreign actors failing to communicate with local agencies, affected communities and women (FWCC, 2018, Radio New Zealand, 2018).

Collectively, these issues have led to calls for improved coordination between local and foreign agencies, as well as between the military and civilian actors (WHS Regional Consultation for the Pacific, 2015, FWCC, 2018, Dateline Pacific, 2016b).

Severe humanitarian and gender-based needs

Stakeholders also suggest that poor coordination in HADR has meant issues, such as violence against women, gender inequality and human rights, are not being appropriately addressed (Dateline Pacific, 2016b, FWCC, 2018). Sagar's (2015) work discusses how these issues are compounded by disasters, in a region with already unacceptably high levels of poverty and gender-based violence.[59] These factors also mean that vulnerable sectors of the population are often disproportionately affected in the aftermath of disasters.

Allegations are also made about donors and foreign actors not adhering to their international obligations. Several reports, for example, indicate that the requirements of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on 'Women Peace and Security' (2000) are not being met by assisting actors (CARE International, 2017, Oxfam, 2018, FWCC, 2018). This resolution requires all UN member States and supporting actors to engage women in relief and recovery processes, provide assistance which is informed by a gender analysis and address the unique needs of females in HADR. Yet despite the most actors, including the GoNZ ratifying UNSCR 1325, women continue to be excluded from the development planning and, at times, distribution of certain donors (CARE International, 2017, Oxfam, 2018).

The recent application of UNSCR 1325 in military models

Although no research has examined the NZDF's application of UNSCR 1325, one publication implies that the ADF used a 'Women Peace and Security' approach in the TC Winston response (HQ JOC, 2016, p.1).[60] ADF literature stated that this was the first time the military had applied a gender-inclusive approach.

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[59] National surveys in Fiji highlighted that 72% of ever-partnered women have experienced physical, sexual or emotional violence from a partner in their lifetime. Other Pacific islands have similarly high statistics. These levels of sexual and gender-based violence generally increase post-disaster, until societal structures and law and order are restored.

[60] The letter was published online and was a reply to a GoA official's request for information on the ADF's approach to UNSCR 1325, Women Peace and Security in the TC Winston response. The GoA also asked the ADF for suggestions as to how the

The model reportedly enhanced civil-military coordination between the ADF, civilian agencies and women (HQ JOC, 2016).[61] Officials stated that the relationships established by the Gender Advisors resulted in:

> "improved civil-military cooperation, coordination and understanding. In particular, [NGOs] have been willing to share their Gender Analysis with [ADF] Gender Advisors to plan future crisis response" (HQ JOC, 2016, p.4).

While these outcomes were positive, some factors suggest the model remains in its infancy. For example, two of the three Gender Advisors deployed were not appointed until approximately day nine of the response (HQ JOC, 2016).[62] This late appointment may suggest that the approach was improvised as the response developed.

The recent introduction of UNSCR 1325 into military models does, however, highlight another valuable contribution this research can make to scholarship. This relates to how the NZDF has coordinated with female stakeholders, in Pacific HADR responses.

iii. Civil-military coordination mechanisms in the Pacific

Over the last two decades, many mechanisms have been adopted to regulate and improve civil-military coordination in Pacific HADR. Yet surprisingly, minimal research has focused on how these mechanisms impact coordination and actors' assistance. Where available, analyses of these models are discussed below, alongside brief descriptions of how they function.

UN guidelines for the use of military assets

Without a doubt, the 'Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief' are the most discussed mechanism in scholarship (UN OCHA, 2007). These were created by the UN in 1994 and are commonly known as the 'Oslo guidelines' (UN OCHA, 2007,

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Australian Defence Sub-Committee of the Joint Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade could assist with WoG synchronisation of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief planning, exercises and operations in the future.

[61] The ADF Gender Advisors attended 'Protection and Gender Based Violence' cluster meetings on a weekly basis, engaged with local women's networks and coordinated International Women's Day activities with the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) gender and humanitarian advisors.

[62] These two were female logisticians by trade; the other was the Joint Task Force (JTF) legal officer who advised senior ADF staff. The document did not state how these Gender Advisors were selected or trained.

p.4).[63] Although these guidelines are voluntary and non-binding, all UN Member States have agreed to adhere to them (MFAT, 2012b).[64]

Despite this State endorsement, debate continues to surround key principles in the Oslo Guidelines. These include the principle of "*last resort,*" which states that military assets should only be requested and deployed when no comparable civilian alternative exists and these are necessary to meet a critical humanitarian need (UN OCHA, 2007, para 5). Other contested principles include one which states that militaries should, to the extent possible, not provide 'direct assistance' to the affected population.[65] These and other rules ultimately aim to ensure separation is maintained between militaries and civilian actors.

The applicability of the Oslo guidelines in the Pacific

While the UN, most humanitarian agencies and States reportedly support the use of these guidelines, other stakeholders question their applicability in the Pacific (Salmon *et al.*, 2011, UN OCHA, 2015b, Schenkenberg van Mierop, 2016, Gordon and Donini, 2016). Pacific-based reports suggest international processes may not be an appropriate 'fit' for the region (Barber, 2015, Australian Red Cross, 2017). Foreign militaries are also observed to be the first assets deployed in the Asia-Pacific, which suggest is because they are viewed as a valuable or necessary contribution to HADR (Powles, 2016, Ear *et al.*, 2017). These views raise questions about how stakeholders in the Pacific perceive the Oslo Guidelines and military involvement in HADR.

The Asia-Pacific regional guidelines

Following these observations, the 'Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response Operations' (APC-MADRO Guidelines) were created (UN OCHA, 2014). These were adopted in 2014 and, conspicuously, do not discuss the principle of 'last resort' in the text.

While no independent literature has examined the effectiveness of the Oslo or APC-MADRO Guidelines in the Pacific, Bollettino (2016) investigated their use in the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan response.[66] His study concluded that less than half of the humanitarians interviewed were

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[63] These Guidelines aim to establish the "*basic framework for formalising and improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the use of foreign military assets in international disaster relief operations.*"

[64] This means the majority of States in the Pacific, including New Zealand, have policies which require national and military actors to adhere to the Oslo Guidelines in HADR responses.

[65]'Direct Assistance' is the face-to-face distribution of goods and services. 'Indirect Assistance' is at least one step removed from the population and involves such activities as transporting relief goods or relief personnel. 'Infrastructure Support,' in comparison, involves providing general services, such as road repair, airspace management and power generation that facilitate relief, but are not necessarily visible to or solely for the benefit of the affected population.

[66] Bollentino's study only investigated the application of the Oslo Guidelines in this response in the Philippines. The APC-MADRO Guides were created the year following, so could not be examined. While the UN itself has produced literature on the

"*familiar*" with the Oslo guidelines and only 12% used these to guide civil-military interaction (Bollettino, 2016, p.8). Findings in this thesis are, therefore, valuable as they may clarify how the Oslo and APC-MADR guidelines have impacted coordination in past Pacific HADR responses.

UN Civil-Military Coordination mechanisms

Several UN civil-military coordination mechanisms are also discussed in this thesis. These were established by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (OCHA ROAP), which maintain their application.[67] All are deployed at the request of affected governments and are, therefore, voluntary.

Keynote mechanisms include the Pacific Humanitarian Team (PHT)[68] and UN Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) officers (Reario, 2015, OCHA ROP, 2016).[69] Humanitarian coordination is also often organised within a regional 'Cluster Approach,' which is based on the UN Cluster System model.[70] Together, these structures pool PHT and humanitarian partner resources into thematic 'clusters.' These then work with the UN CMCoord officer who facilitates communication and, at times, the interaction between military LOs and humanitarian agencies.

Divergent stakeholder perspectives on UN mechanisms

While most UN-initiated studies and officials report that these mechanisms enhance coordination efforts, some stakeholder perspectives challenge these views. For example, UN post-disaster reports suggest these mechanisms have provided "*indispensable liaison support*" in Pacific HADR (UNDAC, 2015a, Lacey-Hall, 2015, p.1). In contrast, an independent evaluation of OCHA's role in civil-military coordination concluded that stakeholder opinions were "*mixed*" concerning the suitability of OCHA to carry out CMCoord (Universalia Management Group, 2012, p.52).[71] Wolf (2017) also reports that some humanitarians consider the UN's CMCoord

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application and effectiveness of these Guidelines in the Pacific, this is not considered independent research, as UN agencies and employees have vested interest in the outcomes of findings.

[67] OCHA has administered the Regional Office for the Pacific (OCHA ROAP) since 1999, which is based in Fiji and exists to support 14 Pacific nations. These UN agencies work with Governments, National Disaster management Offices (NDMOs) and humanitarian actors, to support HADR efforts and emergency coordination in the Pacific region.

[68] The Pacific Humanitarian Team (PHT) was established in 2008. It is a network of humanitarian partners which can support government-led responses, when requested. PHT members include the UN agencies, NGOs, the IFRC and other humanitarian agencies with the capacity to respond to disasters in accordance with the PHT Code of Conduct.

[69] These facilitate communication and, at times, interaction between humanitarian and military actors. These efforts are mostly limited to humanitarian or civilian Requests For Assistance (RFAs) and logistical support. The RFA system and forms aim to streamline humanitarian requests for the use of foreign military assets.

[70] The Cluster Approach was an outcome of the UN's humanitarian reform in 2005. This sought to strengthen the capacity of the humanitarian response system. Generally, the approach is a mechanism employed by the UN and broader aid community to address identified gaps in response and enhance the quality of humanitarian action. The basic idea of the approach is to organise humanitarian actors into sectors or 'clusters,' each focused on a separate humanitarian need. Each cluster is led by a designated lead agency which has responsibility for the coordination of that cluster, as well as to act as 'provider of last resort.'

[71] This study examined HADR case studies which were all outside of the Pacific region.

role in HADR as "*intrusive and unnecessary,*" while national governments can feel this is a challenge to State sovereignty.

These concerns have been acknowledged in recent conferences. One UN official, for example, stressed the need to 'rethink' how current models are applied, as behaviour could inadvertently suggest actors were trying to "*replace, rather than augment*" national HADR responses (Lacey-Hall, 2015, p.3). This critique was similarly reflected in Barber's (2015) analysis of the TC Pam response, which implied there was a 'default assumption' that international mechanisms would be used by the GoV.[72]

The contrasting views above suggest that an in-depth investigation into stakeholder perspectives would be valuable, to better understand how these view UN CMCoord structures.

The FRANZ Agreement

The 'France, Australia and New Zealand Agreement for the South Pacific Region' (FRANZ Agreement) is also a longstanding framework in the Pacific, which has been used since its establishment in 1992. This enables military assets from FRANZ partners to provide HADR to twelve Pacific island countries (MFAT, 2014).[73] This coordination is undertaken by the respective FRANZ Foreign Affairs departments of these militaries.

As with UN mechanisms, stakeholder perspectives vary surrounding the application of the FRANZ Agreement. Government press releases and articles often report how the agreement fostered civil-military coordination. They also reiterate that FRANZ States and militaries are committed to respecting the "*sovereignty and leading role*" of affected countries in HADR, as well as the principles within the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative (MFAT, 2014, p.1).

In contrast, Vachette's (2013) work discusses the relative power differences between FRANZ partners and small Pacific island countries. She also reports that Pacific-based stakeholders are often suspicious of these ex-colonial nations, and being subjugated in HADR contexts. This disparity between FRANZ and stakeholder perspectives raises questions relevant to this thesis. In particular, these surround how affected Governments may view the assistance of FRANZ militaries, including the NZDF.

National coordination structures

According to international law, the affected State should maintain primary responsibility for the *"initiation, organisation, coordination, and implementation of humanitarian assistance within*

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[72] As this report is discussed in the case study it is only briefly mentioned in the literature review.
[73] These Pacific nations are: the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.

its territory" (UN General Assembly, 1991, Annex 1.4). This responsibility can, however, also have negative impacts on civil-military coordination. Authors suggest this is because infrastructure and national structures are often weakened by natural disasters, which can reduce the State's capacity to coordinate (Ferris, 2012).

In general, national coordination structures in the Pacific are strained in the aftermath of disasters. For example, National Disaster Management Offices (NDMOs) frequently experience leadership, communication and coordination challenges due to a lack of capacity (Connors and Ayobi, 2016).[74] Pacific island nations also often lack legislation and policies, to regulate civil-military coordination (Soldateschi, 2011, GoV and SPC, 2015, IFRC, 2016, GoF and SPC, 2017).

The aforementioned factors can create a dilemma for stakeholders, which are legally obligated to respect State authority over HADR responses but also meet humanitarian needs. Reports suggest this has led some actors to act independently, which is interpreted as disrespectful or an affront to Sovereignty by local officials and organisations (GoV and SPC, 2015, Barber, 2015). This has led many local actors to call for greater 'localisation' in Pacific HADR responses (WHS, 2015, Australian Red Cross, 2017).[75]

Considering the growing calls for localisation and the relative power difference between foreign militaries and affected nations, this thesis provides a valuable opportunity to explore how the NZDF was perceived by locally-based stakeholders, in previous HADR responses.

Part Four: New Zealand's approach to Pacific HADR

i.   GoNZ and NZDF Guidance material

WoG leadership and 'command and control' arrangements

Since the 1990s, New Zealand has become increasingly involved in Pacific HADR. Military and civilian agencies have also been progressively integrated, to the point that HADR responses are now undertaken via a Whole of Government (WoG)[76] approach (MFAT, 2019). These changes reflect global trends, regarding the militarisation of HADR and the integration of civil-military relief efforts (ACMC, 2012, Hartwell, 2016, Harris, 2016a).

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[74] Although there has been significant foreign investment in National Disaster Management Offices (NDMO's) and structures across the Pacific, reports continue to call for efforts to strengthen local capacity. Most funding has been provided by the UN, European Union, the GoA and GoNZ (within Official Development Assistance or Aid budgets).

[75] Localisation is defined as: a process of recognising, respecting and strengthening the independence of leadership and decision making by national actors in humanitarian action, in order to better address the needs of affected populations.

[76] While some documents also refer to this approach as an All of Government (AOG) response, the term WoG is used throughout this thesis as most GoNZ reports use this term.

WoG 'command and control' arrangements are detailed in both GoNZ and NZDF documents.[77] These clarify that MFAT will act as the lead agency in all GoNZ HADR responses in the South Pacific (MFAT, 2012b). This means that while the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) retains full command of all military personnel, WoG responses are ultimately civilian-led (HQ JFNZ, 2019a).[78] Documents also state that civil-military coordination is facilitated within coordination hubs. These are established by MFAT in the Emergency Coordination Centre in Wellington, and in New Zealand High Commissions in affected countries (HQ JFNZ, 2019a).[79]

These policies mean NZDF personnel and assets are always deployed in a supporting role, alongside civilian members of the Emergency Task Force (ETF) (MFAT, 2012a, p.6).[80] This ensures the GoNZ and MFAT maintain control over deployed military elements.

The aim and purpose of WoG and NZDF responses

Both GoNZ and NZDF policies clarify that WoG responses aim to meet humanitarian needs. For example, MFAT's 'Policy and Strategies for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Risk Reduction' states the WoG approach aims to achieve an "*effective needs-based response to, and recovery from, emergencies*" (MFAT, 2012b, p.3, 5). Actors in a WoG response will, therefore, adhere to the following requirements:

1. Respect national government authority.
2. Respond to requests for humanitarian assistance based on assessed needs, availability of resources, security of access to affected populations and the ability to determine New Zealand's effectiveness and impact.
3. Focus on vulnerable people (MFAT, 2012b).

The NZDF's 'Contingency Plan Number 102: Pacific' (CONPLAN 102) further clarifies that military HADR deployments aim to:

> "*provide appropriate military support to minimise loss of life or injury, support the welfare of the affected county's population and liaise with the*

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[77] The term 'command and control' is a term used by the military, which is also interchangeable with the term 'C2.' It means a process that commanders or command organisations use to plan, direct, coordinate and control their own and friendly forces and assets to ensure mission accomplishment.

[78] Commander Joint Forces New Zealand (COMJFNZ) has Operational Command of all the Initial Assessment Team (IAT), Joint Command and Reconnaissance Team (JCART) and Force Elements assigned as part of a Joint Task Group (JTG).

[79] Disaster relief efforts are coordinated from the Emergency Coordination Centre, which is based in MFAT headquarters in Wellington. WoG coordination centres are also often established in the New Zealand High Commissions in affected Pacific island nations. New Zealand has consular services in the following Pacific island nations: Cook Islands, Fiji, Hawaii, Kiribati, Nauru, New Caledonia, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Communications between the NZDF and NGOs that may be operating in the affected country are also arranged through MFAT officials in country.

[80] ETF agencies include the New Zealand Ministry of Health, Fire and Emergency New Zealand (FENZ), Police, Red Cross, INGO and NGOs, as well as actors from FRANZ partner countries. NGOs are represented by the Council of International Development.

affected country to ensure unity of effort, coordination response and civil-military cooperation" (HQ JFNZ, 2019a, p.8).

NZDF support will then be withdrawn when the military's "*HADR effect"* has been delivered and met the "*GoNZ intent*" (HQ JFNZ, 2019a, p.8)*.* [81] This aim, however, implies that NZDF HADR remains focused on State and military objectives, rather than humanitarian needs. This subtlety in the text appears to reinforce the concerns of some authors, which are discussed in the section relating to 'the tensions and challenges of civil-military coordination' (Metcalfe *et al.*, 2012, De Siervo, 2012, Powles, 2016). [82]

ii. GoNZ and NZDF international and humanitarian obligations

According to GoNZ policy, all WoG HADR responses must be undertaken in accordance with the international legal obligations and agreements the country is a signatory to (MFAT, 2012a, MFAT, 2019). These obligations are laid out in human rights conventions, UNSCRs, the Oslo and APC-MADRO Guidelines and the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) principles (MFAT, 2012a, p.4, GHD Initiative, 2013, GHD Initiative, 2016). [83] Collectively, they require WoG actors, including the NZDF, to provide HADR by following the 'humanitarian principles' (MFAT, 2012b).

GoNZ and NZDF application of HADR principles

While no studies have examined how WoG actors or the NZDF adhere to the above obligations in HADR, recent measures have aimed to increase actors' accountability. New Zealand's 'National Action Plan' for UNSCR 1325, for example, describes GoNZ and NZDF plans to implement this resolution (GoNZ, 2015). CONPLAN 102 also states that the NZDF will:

> *"ensure all relevant aspects relating to [Women, Peace and Security] are considered during planning and implemented during any HADR activity"* (HQ JFNZ, 2019a, p.12).

Several allusions to UNSCRs and the civil-military guidelines also suggest that the NZDF is bolstering its efforts to adhere to international obligations. Aspects of the Oslo and APC-MADRO Guidelines are, for example, referred to in policy. CONPLAN 102 states that NZDF

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[81] The CONPLAN states that NZDF HADR effect is "*transitioned to appropriate agencies*" prior to return to New Zealand.

[82] This tension surrounds the idea that military involvement in HADR may be more motivated by State interests, rather than the humanitarian principles.

[83] Other international codes and guidelines include: International Disaster Response Law Guidelines; Principles of Conduct for the International Red Cross Movement and NGOs in Disaster Response Programmes; Principles agreed under the Busan Aid Effectiveness Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation; The Sphere Project Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response; and Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies.

assets should only be employed as a "*last resort*" and "*on the basis that suitable and sufficient civilian capability is not available, in the time required to meet critical humanitarian needs*" (HQ JFNZ, 2019a, p.4).

The NZDF's 'Forward Leaning Approach' to HADR deployments is also described. This involves the military providing "*proactive support*" to MFAT as disasters are forecast and offering the "*immediate deployment*" of some units (HQ JFNZ, 2019a, p.3).[84] A footnote clarifies, however, that this aim "*does not imply that NZDF is the lead agency or first responder to an emergency or disaster*" (HQ JFNZ, 2019a, p.3). While somewhat paradoxical, this suggests the NZDF is trying to balance the Oslo guidelines with a rapid military response.

iii. NZDF models and mechanisms

Minimal guidance material on how HADR models function

In line with GoNZ intentions to enhance NZDF HADR and interagency capabilities, new civil-military coordination models have been introduced over the last two decades. Minimal literature, however, describes these models or how they will achieve interoperability.

New Zealand Defence Doctrine (NZDD), for example, describes the requirement for "*a large degree of civil-military interaction*" in HADR and comprehensive approaches. It, however, contains little detail about how this will be achieved (NZDF, 2017b, sect 3.50).[85] CONPLAN 102 also describes how Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) teams and the DJIATF are deployed, but does not clarify how they function in HADR contexts.

A report published by the Non-Government Disaster Relief Forum (NDRF) (NDRF, 2016a) also critiqued the 2016 Defence White Paper. The analysis highlighted that the White Paper had failed to detail how the military intended to integrate with the robust humanitarian system in the South Pacific, despite this being a major defence priority (NDRF, 2016a, GoNZ, 2016, Sect 5:47).[86] In its conclusion, the report recommended the NZDF work more closely with OGAs and NGOs, to better clarify actors' roles and develop civil-military coordination guidance material.

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[84] This deployment is, however, limited by the need to give military personnel and assets notice for departure, which can be between twelve or twenty-four hours, depending on the unit or asset.

[85] The document defines a comprehensive approach as: "*an approach that responds effectively to complex crises by orchestrating, coordinating, and deconflicting the activities of the military, other government departments, and, where possible, international organisations and non-governmental organisations.*"

[86] While the White Paper recommended the NZDF enhance interoperability by developing: "*complementary capabilities, as appropriate, ensuring mutual familiarity (developed through personnel exchanges and exercising), and the compatibility of communications and command and control systems.*"

Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) models

Due to this lack of clarity, the 'Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Domestic and Offshore Aide Memoire' (HQ JFNZ, 2019b) is likely the best public resource describing the NZDF's HADR operations. It contains operational-level guidance and describes key lessons learned from previous responses (HQ JFNZ, 2019b, p.19-25).[87] The document was, however, published in 2019, meaning only the 2012 version existed at the time of the TC Pam and Winston responses (HQ JFNZ, 2012). In comparison, this focused on HADR in a New Zealand context, rather than in the Pacific.

NZDF literature also contains little information on how Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) models are applied by the force. For example, the 2012 Aide Memoir describes the need to establish models such as a CIMIC Centre and CIMIC teams in HADR but does not describe how these function (HQ JFNZ, 2012, sect 1.19.4).[88] CONPLAN 102 acknowledges that "*CIMIC- HADR activities inherently involve significant CIMIC planning and tasks*" and that responses will usually involve a CIMIC cell, but provides no further unclassified details (HQ JFNZ, 2019a, p.12).[89] The term CIMIC is also, rather conspicuously, missing from the new 2019 HADR Aide Memoir.

This lack of clarity around CIMIC models is also reported in international case studies, which suggest that CIMIC models are often not well understood or are applied in an ad hoc manner by militaries (Haugevik and de Carvalho, 2007, Soeters *et al.*, 2014, Smith, 2015).

Coalition and ADF guidance material

The lack of defence doctrine on these concepts means most NZDF descriptions of CIMIC elements are drawn from the coalition or ADF doctrine (ABCA, 2008, ADF, 2009).[90] Within this, the role of CIMIC operational support teams is described as the provision of "*expertise, CIMIC liaison and staff assistance in planning, coordinating and/or executing CIMIC activities in support of a [Joint Task Force]*" (ADF, 2009, Sect 4.13). CIMIC disaster assessment teams are also, reportedly, likely to coordinate with civilian representatives from the Lead Agency, Host Nation, INGOs and NGOs, during disaster responses (ADF, 2009, Sect 4.13-17).

The fact that these ADF and coalition documents are not specific to the NZDF or Pacific region raises questions about the applicability of these documents and models for the NZDF. The lack

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[87] These include the 2011 Christchurch earthquake, 2015 TC Pam, 2016 TC Winston, and 2017 Kaikoura earthquake.
[88] The document states that the CIMIC Centre should contain representatives of the Lead Agency (MFAT or Affected Government), LOs and staff from; Life Line utilities (e.g. ports, airports, electricity, hospitals, gas, fire services), local government, military, OGAs and NGOs.
[89] These may have been explained in an annex, the researcher was, however, not able to view these due to their classification.
[90] This fact was confirmed in personal correspondence with NZDF representatives. Key guidance material includes the 'American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand (ABCA) Armies Coalition Operations Handbook' and the 'Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 3.11 Civil-Military Cooperation.'

of clarity around how the NZDF uses CIMIC teams is also particularly concerning, as CIMIC teams were deployed by the NZDF during both the TC Pam and Winston response. This highlights a further contribution this research makes to literature, through exploring the NZDF's use of CIMIC in past responses.

The new DJIATF model

The DJIATF model is, however, described in slightly more detail in NZDF literature. This model was adopted in 2014, to address previous concerns around ad hoc 'command and control' arrangements and interoperability (NZDF, 2014). It is described as a scalable, operational-level command and control capability, which is deployed in joint inter-agency or multinational operations, such as Pacific HADR (NZDF, 2014).

DJIATF staff support WoG efforts by providing MFAT with military options and planning capabilities. These elements can consist of an Initial Assessment Team (IAT)[91] and a Joint Command and Reconnaissance Team (JCART)[92] (HQ JFNZ, 2019b). The unit can also seconder staff from other NZDF units for HADR responses, to act as LOs to provide service-specific expertise.[93] Overall, these measures aim to strengthen working relationships, information-sharing and cooperation with national actors and OGAs.

Application of the DJIATF model in HADR

As with the application of other civil-military coordination mechanisms, stakeholder perspectives on the DJIATF vary significantly. NZDF media and reports, for example, suggest the introduction of model enhanced civil-military coordination efforts during the Southern Katipo civil-military exercise,[94] as well as in Vanuatu and Fiji (Gall, 2015, HQ JFNZ, 2019b).

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[91] The IAT is a small team comprising of four personnel that deploys at the invitation of the lead agency. It is commanded by a Major, with the remainder of the team comprising a Logistics, Intelligence and an Environmental/ Health specialist. The IAT is responsible for providing advice on what military effects can be achieved, coupled with military planning to the New Zealand lead agency (often the New Zealand High Commission) but is on hand to respond to Requests for Information, which assists with informing planning at the joint operational level.

[92] HQ DJIATF has the capacity to form one JCART, which is intended to deploy on command after an event. This is a tool to develop situational awareness through the conduct of reconnaissance and liaison in theatre. The JCART role is to provide expert advice on contingency planning and operational issues, including force composition, logistics, command and control, and communications. Up to twelve NZDF personnel will form the nucleus of the Light HQ, should it subsequently deploy.

[93] For example, a representative from the Royal New Zealand Air Force, Navy and New Zealand Army can act as separate Liaison Officers to provide expertise on asset capabilities.

[94] Exercise Southern Katipo (SK) is the NZDF's major military exercise. It is held every two years in various areas of New Zealand. The exercise aims to test and evaluate the NZDF's ability to plan and conduct joint operations involving naval, land and air assets. It offers the NZDF an opportunity to work with its international defence partners, particularly those in the Pacific region. The joint exercise involves naval, land and air assets and often includes personnel from other countries, such as Australia, Canada, Fiji, France, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, the United Kingdom and the United States.

In contrast, a previous examination conducted by the researcher in 2016 suggests the DJIATF encountered obstacles to coordination, during the TC Winston response (Roddis).[95] Findings collated the perspectives of twelve stakeholders from the NZDF, GoNZ, GoF, humanitarian agencies and community representatives. These suggested that while the DJIATF model was mitigating some obstacles to civil-military coordination, the unit's effectiveness was still constrained by other barriers, such as disaster politics and actors' interests.[96] This discrepancy between the literature and stakeholder perspectives reinforces the need for further research, to explore why these appear to be inconsistent.

Historical reports of 'ad hoc' civil-military coordination

While few studies have examined the NZDF's coordination efforts in the Pacific, previous academic studies have raised concerns about the military's models and policies. Jacobs-Garrod (2010), for example, investigated the NZDF's coordination with NGOs in Bosnia, East Timor and Afghanistan in her PhD thesis. Her research revealed that NZDF and NGO personnel lacked an understanding of the NZDF's CIMIC doctrine and protocol. This contributed to 'ad hoc' coordination in all three case studies. Poor NZDF-NGO coordination also reportedly reduced the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance, as well as the NZDF's ability to carry out its mission. This led Jacobs-Garrod to recommend that the NZDF develop a Civil-Military Affairs doctrine and create a specialist unit or personnel to undertake CIMIC tasks.

Coordination issues have also been identified in the context of natural disasters. Jones's (2011) analysis of the 2010 Christchurch Earthquake, for example, described communication, 'command and control' and coordination issues between the NZDF, GoNZ agencies, NGOs and local actors. Mosley's (2012) research into the 2009 Samoan Tsunami response discussed weaknesses in the NZDF's operational planning and logistical support (Royal New Zealand Navy) vessels. Fogarty (2014) also linked civil-military coordination issues to a lack of realistic training and simulation exercises for NZDF personnel. This included exercises failing to incorporate HADR scenarios or include key disaster responders, such as humanitarian actors and MFAT.

These works suggest NZDF operations have been impeded by common obstacles to civil-military coordination in the past. Analysis of more recent Pacific HADR responses is, therefore, needed to determine whether or not these obstacles are continuing to impede coordination.

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[95] The researchers' unpublished Honours dissertation, focused on the application of the DJIATF model in the TC Winston response. This collated perceptions of the NZDF's TC Winston response from desk based literature and twelve semi-structured interviews with stakeholders who were involved in the response.
[96] Other obstacles included: the size of unit and permanent staff, information management and a lack of training for LOs.

Chapter One summary

In the chapter above, key sections of the civil-military coordination literature were examined. Theoretical concepts were discussed in Part One, which discussed the increasing complexity of civil-military relations and the ongoing debate over integration and separation. In Part Two weaknesses and gaps in existing literature became evident. Concerns particularly surrounded the scarcity of empirical research in HADR contexts and identifying obstacles to civil-military coordination.

Similar research gaps were identified in Part Three, which examined civil-military coordination in the Pacific HADR context. This section revealed that despite having numerous coordination mechanisms in the Pacific, few studies have investigated their effectiveness or how stakeholders perceive them. Part Four then reviewed New Zealand's WoG HADR approach and civil-military coordination models. This found a lack of clarity within GoNZ and NZDF policies, particularly around how models function in the Pacific. Throughout all four parts, discrepancies were identified between the literature, academic research and stakeholder perspectives.

Collectively, these sections reinforce the need for this study and to find answers to the proposed research questions. A comparative analysis of the NZDF's civil-military coordination in past Pacific HADR responses is, therefore, crucial. This is needed to better understand stakeholder perceptions, identify any obstacles to civil-military coordination and how these may be impacting actors' assistance. These findings are examined in the following chapters, beginning with the 2015 TC Pam case study.

Chapter Two: A Tidal Wave of Foreign Assistance

The chapter below presents findings from literature which depicted civil-military coordination in the TC Pam disaster response. The scope of the case study includes all coordination taking place in New Zealand and Vanuatu, between 07 March and 22 April 2015.[97]

The chapter is presented in two parts. Part One provides the reader with the context needed to understand the NZDF's civil-military coordination response. Part Two then reports how stakeholder perspectives of the NZDF's civil-military coordination were portrayed in the literature. This includes reports of obstacles to coordination and their impact on HADR.

Part One: Overview of the TC Pam disaster and response

The sections below describe key elements of the TC Pam disaster and civil-military coordination. They provide an overview of the disaster scale and humanitarian needs, the overall HADR response and a description of the civil-military coordination mechanisms. This provides the context needed to understand the NZDF's civil-military coordination efforts, which are examined in Part Two.

i. Disaster scale and humanitarian needs

Between 12 and 14 March 2015 TC Pam passed through all five of Vanuatu's provinces.[98] Twenty-two islands were impacted and experienced hurricane-force winds of up to 320 kilometres an hour (ABC News, 2015b). Catastrophic damage and severe humanitarian needs remained in affected areas. These included Epi Island and the Shepherds Island group, where the NZDF assistance was later provided (see the centre of Figure 1).

At the time, the Category 5 storm was the most powerful cyclone ever recorded in the South Pacific.[99] These factors made the disaster response extremely challenging, by global standards. This was reflected on by the director of Save the Children Vanuatu, who stated,

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[97] These dates include coordination which occurred the week before the cyclone event and all interaction which took place up until HMNZS Canterbury departed from Vanuatu on 22 April 2015.

[98] The Category 5 cyclone travelled in a southerly direction, severely affecting all areas shaded orange in the diagram. Vanuatu's five Provinces are depicted in Figure 1. Impacted islands were: Torres and Banks (Torba Province), Pentecost, Ambae and Maewo (Penama Province), Malekula, Ambrym and Paama (Malampa Province), Efate, Epi Island and the Shepherds island group (Shefa Province), and Tanna, Aniwa, Futuna, Erromango and Aneityum (Tafea Province).

[99] Category 5 on the Saffir-Simpson scale describes a cyclone with winds of over 252 kilometres an hour. This scale suggests catastrophic damage will occur, including a high percentage of framed homes destroyed and power outages which may last for weeks to months. Most affected areas would be expected to be uninhabitable for weeks or months after the disaster.

"I was present for the Haiyan response and I would 100 per cent tell you that this is a much more difficult logistical problem." (New Zealand Herald, 2015a)[100]

Figure 1: Path of TC Pam. Source: (GoV, 2015a, p.3)

Although communities in Vanuatu frequently encounter natural disasters, TC Pam was beyond the scale of anything previously experienced (United Nations, 2014).[101] Approximately 188,000 individuals were affected − approximately 74% of the population (GoV, 2015a, p.1).

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[100] The Typhoon Haiyan response occurred in the Philippines and was considered a challenging HADR response globally.
[101] As the world's most vulnerable nation to natural disasters, Vanuatu experienced many natural disasters prior to TC Pam. These included an earthquake in 2002, two volcanic eruptions in 2005 and 2009, and TC Ivy in 2004.

Widespread power outages and severed communication lines also isolated many villages in the initial response (BBC News, 2015, UN OCHA, 2015c, p.7).[102]

As a result, significant humanitarian needs were reported. In some areas, over 90% of residential housing was destroyed (GoV, 2015a, p.4, UNDAC, 2015b).[103] High proportions of health facilities and schools were also damaged, creating major disruptions to medical and education services (GoV, 2015a, p.4).[104]

Crop damage also meant food sources were depleted within weeks, in severely affected areas (UN OCHA, 2015a).[105] These shortages affected up to 80% of the population, who relied on agriculture for their livelihood, food and nutrition security (GoV, 2015c, p.2-4). The Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) indicated the most vulnerable sectors of the population, such as youth, women and those with disabilities, were the most severely impacted (GoV, 2015c, xiv).

In total, the damages and losses caused by the cyclone were estimated at 48.6 billion Vatu - 64% of Vanuatu's GDP (GoV, 2015c, ix, IDA, 2015, p.3).[106] Even following a successful Flash Appeal by the UN, international donations were not enough to adequately address all the aforementioned needs (UN CERF, 2015).[107] One GoV official highlighted the challenging situation this put the government in, stating:

> *"This is the time of most need, and we're going to need a lot of assistance, so*
> *we're pretty much counting on our development partners to come forward*
> *now with financial assistance and other assistance because we can't get*
> *through this on our own."* (ABC News, 2015a)

The financial, logistical and communication challenges described above contributed to foreign militaries such as the NZDF playing a significant role in the TC Pam response. Effective civil-

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[102] Only one operational cellular tower remained in Port Vila following TC Pam, restricting the mainland's communication with outer islands. Widespread power failures also isolated some affected communities into mid-April.

[103] The Humanitarian Action Plan reported up to 90% of houses were damaged on the islands of Tongoa, Emae and Erromango. Other sources reported that 90,000 individuals needed housing repairs.

[104] Up to 70% of health facilities and over 50% of primary and secondary schools sustained damage or were destroyed.

[105] UN OCHA estimated that food sources in Tafea and Shefa Province would only last until 25 March, less than two weeks following the cyclone.

[106] These damages and losses equate to NZ $633 million. The UN considers Vanuatu one of the world's least developed countries. It has a GDP of US $828 million with about two-thirds of the population make a living from agriculture.

[107] Figures suggest that of the US $37.7 million required to meet needs, only US $26.8 million was received. An overview of reported funding is included in Annex Four. This highlights two key issues, first, that the GoV faced a significant financial shortfall, meaning some needs would likely not be met. Second, much of the assistance came in the form of donated supplies or was channelled through UN agencies, the IFRC and INGOs. The latter highlights that although much-needed support was provided to the GoV, control over this assistance still largely lay with States, international or humanitarian agencies.

military coordination was therefore vital, as actors needed to work together to ensure the affected population's needs were met and that the most vulnerable received assistance.

ii. Overview of the national and international response

The initial response

At the onset of the disaster, the GoV was clear that national actors would take control of the HADR response and its coordination. National disaster management structures were stood up, although their capacity was limited by the cyclone's direct impact on the capital, Port Vila (Vanuatu NDMO, 2015a, p.8).[108] This factor and the growing awareness of humanitarian needs led the GoV to accept offers of international and military assistance quickly.

A large influx of stakeholders soon arrived in the country. In total, twenty foreign governments,[109] seven foreign militaries,[110] over one hundred INGOs, NGOs and independent agencies contributed to the response (UNDAC, 2015a, p.6). At the time, this made the TC Pam response the most substantial case of civil-military coordination in Pacific HADR.

The NZDF and other foreign military assets were among the first to arrive in the country on 15 March. This preceded the international appeal for assistance, which was televised by Vanuatu's President the following day (GoV and SPC, 2015, p.13). The emotional nature of this appeal and the fact that it was broadcast from the UN World Conference on Disaster Risk and Reduction raised significant media interest in the response (The Guardian, 2015). This heightened media awareness contributed to the uncontrolled influx of actors and donated goods arriving in Vanuatu, as well as the coordination challenges this number of stakeholders created.

Response priorities and data collection

The GoV announced multiple priorities in the HADR response. These were initially the provision of life-saving aid such as "*water, sanitation, food, health, shelter and key non-food items*" (RedR Australia, 2015, GoV, 2015a). The prioritisation of restoring health and education services then

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[108] The Category 5 cyclone passed fifty kilometres from Port Vila. As a result, although National Clusters met as early as 09 March and the National Disaster Management Office (NDMO) and National Emergency Operation Centre (NEOC) were activated on the 11th, many individuals within the disaster management structure were personally impacted and offered five days leave to recover. These coordination mechanisms are discussed below.

[109] The majority of Governments provided financial support, although some of this would go directly to the GoV most would be used to provide relief items or would be channelled through UN agencies, the IFRC and INGOs. Donor Governments included: Andorra, Australia, Canada, China, Denmark, Estonia, France, French Polynesia, Germany, Republic of Korea, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Caledonia, India, Japan, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

[110] Australia, France and New Zealand, provided military support under the FRANZ agreement, with other military assets being provided by Fiji, Solomon Islands, Tonga and the United Kingdom. These actors assisted the GoV with its disaster response, with the support of the Vanuatu Mobile Force and Police Patrol Boat.

followed (Radio New Zealand, 2015).[111] Notably, damage and needs assessments were mandatory before HADR was to be delivered (SBS, 2015). GoV officials stated that this aimed to ensure "*transparency, accountability and a fair distribution of relief supplies*" (Cooke, 2015).

Response priorities were, however, impeded by logistical, resource and communication challenges. For example, although officials reported that aid had reached all of the nation's islands by the end of March, multiple sources refuted this claim (UN News Centre, 2015, Hawkins, 2015b, UNDAC, 2015a, p.11).[112] The PDNA was also not completed until 18 April, over a month after the cyclone (GoV, 2015c, p.6).[113] These factors presented challenges for supporting actors, as they relied on GoV sources to determine priorities and focus their assistance where it was most needed.

Collectively, these factors led agencies and donors to call for greater visibility in future responses, to ensure their aid was being distributed according to humanitarian needs

Foreign military support

Partly due to these challenges, FRANZ and other foreign militaries played a crucial role in the response. These supported the GoV by providing logistical support, assisting with assessments, clearing debris and repairing infrastructure (French Embassy, 2015). Within the response, FRANZ militaries provided HADR in separate geographical locations, which were a top GoV priority (Cowlishaw and Downes, 2015, GoV, 2015b).[114] The fact that these militaries were operating in areas which had the most severe humanitarian needs made civil-military coordination even more vital.

Obstacles to coordination and the distribution of HADR

Within the literature, some stakeholders reported issues about women and minorities not being included in the decision-making processes of the GoV or foreign stakeholders (2015b).[115] An INGO report, for example, revealed that while CDCCC members encouraged women to

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[111] The GoV aimed to get schools open as early as possible so the population could return to normalcy. It instructed all schools to reopen by 30 March, although many struggled due to damages and the fact they were being used as evacuation centres.
[112] The GoV and UN reported on 27 March that aid had reached all twenty-two storm-affected islands in the country. This was contradicted by other sources, including a Radio New Zealand reporter based on Erromango Island. Local stakeholders reported that villages were yet to receive assistance on the 27th and only had enough food to last a few more days. Other reports claimed that some communities did not receive assistance for six weeks.
[113] The PDNA produced a detailed analysis of damages, losses, humanitarian needs and laid out a recovery strategy for the country. Although the GoV began initial damage assessments on 14 March, the report acknowledged that data collection challenges and a lack of logistical support had impeded efforts.
[114] The French frigate Vendémiaire was to first to arrive on the 19th, focusing on Tanna, while the patrol boat La Glorieuse focused on the Tafea Province. The Australian logistics support ship HMAS Tobruk arrived on 24 March and also focused on Tanna. The NZDF's multi-role vessel HMNZS Canterbury then arrived on 25 March and provided support in the Shefa Province, particularly Epi Island and the Shepherds group. These areas were designated priority level one by the GoV (see Figure 1).
[115] Transparency International Vanuatu, for example, viewed the inclusion of vulnerable population groups as vital for ensuring that humanitarian needs were met.

participate and raise post-disaster concerns, women in some communities felt excluded (CARE International, 2017). The report noted:

> *"Women were not confident in speaking up in [some] community meetings, and some reported in the women's focus group that they were not able to participate in community decision-making and had to follow the chief's instructions"* (CARE International, 2017, p.38).

These perspectives raise questions about the inclusivity of women in the decision-making process and civil-military coordination efforts of the NZDF. [116]

Other concerns related to the influences of politics, corruption and interests on coordination and HADR. Transparency International Vanuatu and the Vanuatu Daily Post, for example, alleged that foreign relief supplies and funds were being used for personal gain by officials (2015a, 2015b, 2016, Roberts, 2018).[117] These related to local authorities or committees:

> *"[diverting] aid from those who most need it towards their families, friends, ethnic or regional group, or those able to pay"* (Transparency International Vanuatu, 2015b).

Further validating these concerns was the conviction of fourteen GoV Ministers in October 2015, on bribery and corruption charges (ABC News, 2016).

New Zealand media also reported that a GoV official attempted to hijack a truckload of relief to give to their supporters during the response, but was intercepted by military personnel (Radio New Zealand, 2015). As a result, local stakeholders cautioned foreign donors to ensure they were communicating and coordinating with trusted locals (Transparency International Vanuatu, 2015a, 2015b, 2016, Roberts, 2018, ABC News, 2015b).

Despite foreign militaries or donors not being explicitly named in these sources, they raise questions about whether, and to what extent, these factors may have impacted the NZDF and other stakeholders.[118] While some of these factors are discussed below, greater analysis is provided in Chapters Three and Six.

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[116] As with the other gaps identified in TC Pam literature, interviewees will provide further clarification of this in Chapter Three.
[117] Articles alleged that NDMO staff, government and provincial officials stole, sold or unfairly distributed aid items. One member of the public alleged that a senior provincial government official for selling, for personal profit, TC Pam relief supplies. They claimed that "*bags of rice, canned foods, building materials, water bottles, bales of sugar and many more supplies were not being distributed, as intended, to the people of his island, but that all the supplies were stored safely in a storage room belonging to the government official who used the supplies as 'gifts' to his immediate families and friends.*"
[118] While the report did not clarify which foreign military was involved, the incident reportedly occurred on Tanna Island and involved a Black Hawk helicopter. These details suggest the ADF was likely the military involved, as ADF assistance was based on this island and the military deployed these helicopters.

Stakeholder perspectives on civil-military coordination

Within the literature, tensions and coordination issues were reported between the GoV and foreign actors, despite officials expressing gratitude for the external support.[119] Numerous locally-based stakeholders claimed the influx of international assistance was detrimental to coordination and the delivery of HADR (Cowlishaw and Downes, 2015, Hawkins, 2015a, Barber, 2015). In contrast, international media and stakeholders critiqued the national response, reporting delays in distribution and that humanitarian needs were not being met (Cooke, 2015, Hawkins, 2015b).[120]

These factors contributed to some international actors and humanitarians reportedly working on their own, rather than in cooperation with the GoV (Cowlishaw and Downes, 2015). One report summed up stakeholder perspectives of response coordination as follows:

> *"While the [TC Pam] international response was at the time considered to be highly effective and achieved much, it has subsequently been criticised for being foreign-driven, undermining government systems, and lacking accountability"* (Government of Australia, 2017, p.28).

These negative perceptions of stakeholders later had significant implications for Pacific HADR. They led Pacific-based stakeholders, in particular, to call for greater localisation and national control in future responses (WHS Regional Consultation for the Pacific, 2015, p.10-12, Loy, 2017).[121] The response also impacted civil-military coordination, with humanitarian stakeholders recommending greater "*adherence to existing international guidelines on civil-military [] coordination,*" and "*regular joint exercises,*" to achieve appropriate and principled military support in Pacific HADR (WHS Regional Consultation for the Pacific, 2015, p.10-12).

Within the TC Pam lessons learned workshop report, only a small number of civil-military coordination issues were identified with minimal accompanying analysis (GoV and SPC, 2015).[122] In contrast, a UN end-of-mission report concluded the HADR response set a new "*global standard*" for civil-military coordination (UNDAC, 2015a, p.16).[123] The report further recommended that a more detailed analysis of these coordination efforts be undertaken, to ensure this capacity could be *"maintained in the Pacific region"* (UNDAC, 2015a, p.16).

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[119] These tensions will be discussed in greater detail in Part Two, as they related to the NZDF's coordination.
[120] An examination of the financial support raised for the TC Pam response also reveals that even with international support, total funds were insufficient to repair all damages and meet humanitarian needs. This resource shortage meant decisions had to made by the GoV and donors in the response, concerning the prioritisation of needs.
[121] Rooted in the belief that locals know best what their communities need, "*localisation*" aims to empower local actors to lead responses to crises on their turf. These actors include indigenous peoples, community organisations, local NGOs, municipal authorities or national governments.
[122] The TC Pam lessons learned workshop report collated the perspectives of a broad range of stakeholders. The report reflected on foreign militaries as a collective. This limitation meant the NZDF was not explicitly named anywhere in the report.
[123] These civil-military coordination challenges will be discussed below in Part Two, as they relate to the NZDF.

These reports highlight how positively civil-military coordination efforts were portrayed in the literature. Stakeholder requests for further analysis also highlight the suitability of using the TC Pam response as a case study to examine the NZDF's coordination.

iii. Civil-military coordination mechanisms

The following sections describe the major civil-military coordination mechanisms the NZDF engaged with in the TC Pam response. This provides the reader with the context needed to understand Part Two findings.

National coordination structures

In the initial response, Vanuatu's Ministry of Foreign Affairs took charge of receiving offers of foreign military assistance and determining which were accepted. This arrangement meant the Ministry played a "*key role as a linking agency*," by facilitating discussions between FRANZ partners and foreign affairs officials (GoV and SPC, 2015, p.26).

Interaction between foreign military and civilian representatives also took place in the National Disaster Management Office (NDMO) and National Emergency Operation Centre (NEOC) in Port Vila. These mechanisms were co-located and became a focal point for civil-military coordination in the response (GoV, 2010, Section 3.4, GoV, 2013b, p.33).[124] This structure aimed to bring all GoV agencies, Ministries and humanitarian organisations together, to address humanitarian needs through the National Cluster System.[125]

These national coordination mechanisms were linked to provincial and community structures, which some foreign military representatives engaged in the field (GoV, 2013a, p.7-8). Community Disaster and Climate Change Committees (CDCCCs) were established at the village level, in some areas of Vanuatu (Vanuatu NDMO, 2017, p.17).[126] These aimed to ensure fair aid distribution and that the needs of women, youth, the disabled and the disadvantaged were

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[124] Within the structure, NDMO representatives took responsibility for coordinating the overall disaster response, while the NEOC acted as an information hub which was manned at all hours. The NDMO and NEOC were co-located in the *Ministry of Climate Change, Adaptation, Meteorology and Geo-Hazards, Energy Environment and National Disaster Management*. Both operated under the NDMO Director, who also acts as National Disaster Coordinator. See Annex Four for a more detailed description of this structure.

[125] The National Cluster System was adopted by the GoV in 2011 and is an adaption of the United Nations cluster system. It consists of six clusters which are led by government ministries and co-chaired by Vanuatu Humanitarian Team (VHT) members.

[126] CDCCCs consist of elected community representatives and facilitate coordination at the village level. Members identify safe houses, train families on how to prepare for disasters and evacuations, and aim to ensure the elderly, disabled and vulnerable community members are also treated fairly. Although CDCCCs were being established with the support of INGOs and the Vanuatu Humanitarian Team (VHT), many villages across Vanuatu still did not have these established by 2017.

met. Most interaction between militaries and the affected population was, however, facilitated by local Liaison Officers (LOs) or chiefs.[127]

New civil-military coordination mechanisms were developed

Despite Vanuatu's disaster management systems being well-established, the GoV did not have a clear policy on how stakeholders would engage with military actors in HADR responses (Soldateschi, 2011, p.13, Gero *et al.*, 2013, p.96-97).[128] Changes to national coordination structures such as the NEOC and National Cluster System were also made during the response (GoV, 2013a, Barber, 2015, p.6, 15).[129] These factors contributed to two civil-military coordination mechanisms being adopted as the response progressed.

One of these mechanisms was an informal structure adopted by the GoV. The structure placed the NDMO Director-General in charge of authorising military tasks, which were appealed for and approved in writing (Vanuatu NDMO, 2015b). Requests for military assistance were then given to military LOs, who attended meetings in the NEOC. Tasks were then undertaken if the FRANZ Foreign Affairs approval was gained. This decision-making structure ensured both the GoV and foreign States maintained civilian control over military operations.

The UN also introduced a civil-military coordination mechanism. This consisted of an UN-CMCoord Officer who facilitated communication between military LOs and the civilian stakeholders operating within the National Cluster System (Lacey-Hall, 2015). The UN-CMCoord officer also introduced Request for Assistance (RFA) forms, which aimed to streamline humanitarian requests for the use of foreign military assets (Reario, 2015, p.10). These were given to the NDMO Director-General, who applied the approval procedure described above.

Part One findings

The sections above provided an overview of the TC Pam disaster and civil-military coordination efforts. A range of key factors were identified, which likely impacted the NZDF's response. These include the large scale of humanitarian needs, an existing lack of logistical capacity to reach affected islands and an overall funding shortfall. The large influx of foreign stakeholders is

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[127] Secretary Generals, Provincial governments and Area Councils disseminated information and direction through Provincial Disaster Committees and Community Disaster and Climate Change Committees (CDCCCs).

[128] Although Vanuatu's disaster management framework had been adequate for small and medium scale disasters, prior responses revealed that legislation needed to be updated. For example, Soldateschi conducted an independent assessment of Vanuatu's Disaster framework in 2010 following both an earthquake and tsunami. This study recommended that legislation be updated and amended to clarify existing roles and better facilitate foreign disaster response, noting that draft legislation existed and was awaiting approval.

[129] The GoV accepted offers of support from UN OCHA and the Pacific Humanitarian Team (PHT). This surge support increased the number of individuals operating in the NEOC and NDMO. Some stakeholders considered this a result of the GoV accepting surge capacity for the NEOC from international agencies. The impact this had on coordination is described below in Part Two.

also likely to have impacted coordination efforts, particularly considering the impact this had on national structures.

Having gained an understanding of the HADR context and these factors, Part Two now focuses specifically on the NZDF response. Considering the above factors above and the fact that the response was considered to have set a new 'global standard' in civil-military coordination, the TC Pam response is an ideal case study to examine the NZDF coordination efforts

Part Two: the New Zealand Defence Force Response to TC Pam

The three sections below examine how literature portrayed the NZDF's civil-military coordination at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.[130] Obstacles to coordination are examined, along with how sources reported these impacted HADR. While most stakeholders did not clarify how obstacles to coordination impacted the NZDF's coordination or actors' assistance, some of these factors are discussed in the sections below. This is due to their relevance to interview findings and the comparative analysis in Chapter Six.

Stakeholder perspectives were predominantly drawn from NZDF and GoNZ sources, which amounted to over 80% of the utilised literature.[131] The other crucial document used was the TC Pam lessons learned workshop report (2015). This collated the perspectives of stakeholders from the GoV, UN, INGOs, NGOs, foreign States, civilian agencies and academic institutions.[132]

These proportions mean most stakeholder perspectives, including some civilian views, were drawn from NZDF or GoNZ sources. This raises concerns about publication bias and whether, or not, these reports accurately reflect the perspectives of civilian stakeholders.

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[130] The strategic level is a military term which refers to decisions made at the highest level of leadership, usually at the national or headquarters level. The operational level refers to coordination at the general planning level. The tactical level refers to coordination within the field. In this case, it refers to the interaction between the NZDF and civilian actors on the ground in New Zealand, Vanuatu and on outer islands. This engagement is at the level of the soldier, airman or sailor.

[131] As discussed in the introduction, only one internal NZDF report reflected on coordination issues which occurred in the TC Pam response. This *document is titled the 'TG 651.3 OP PACIFIC RELIEF Tropical Cyclone Lessons Learned Synopsis*,' which identified issues which had occurred within both the TC Pam and Winston responses. The majority of other published material consisted of media and press releases produced by the NZDF and GoNZ.

[132] The TC Pam lessons learned workshop report collated the perspectives of a broad range of stakeholders. The report reflected on foreign militaries as a collective. This limitation meant the NZDF was not explicitly named anywhere in the report.

i. Coordination at the strategic level

Pre-disaster coordination among New Zealand stakeholders

The GoNZ began preparations for a WoG disaster response one week before TC Pam struck. In accordance with deployment guidelines, MFAT took charge as the lead agency and established two coordination hubs. These were located in the Emergency Coordination Centre in Wellington and the New Zealand High Commission in Port Vila (MFAT, 2012b, p.5).[133]

These structures ensured the GoNZ maintained civilian control over the WoG and NZDF response. They also enabled communication and information-sharing efforts to begin, between military and civilian strategic level leadership, in New Zealand and Vanuatu (HQ JFNZ).[134] This paved the way for a rapid WoG response, as WoG stakeholders were able to begin coordinating the civil-military response before personnel departed.

Coordination among FRANZ partners

The FRANZ agreement also facilitated the NZDF's rapid deployment into Vanuatu. This enabled representatives from the Australian, New Zealand and French High Commissions to be briefed by NDMO staff in Vanuatu (Vanuatu NDMO, 2015a). This in-country meeting was praised by State stakeholders, as it enabled FRANZ partners to begin coordinating which military assets would be deployed if the cyclone made landfall (French Embassy, 2015, UNDAC, 2015a, p.6).[135]

The TC Pam lessons learned report also reflected on the benefits of the pre-disaster interaction. It reported that having New Zealand High Commission officials already based in Vanuatu meant there were "*existing strong relationships*" between countries, which helped facilitate civil-military coordination (GoV and SPC, 2015, p.26). These officials also reportedly helped "*resolve issues, logistical needs and provide coordination solutions*" between militaries and GoV (GoV and SPC, 2015, p.35). While these issues were not detailed, the report concluded that this strategic-level coordination meant GoV requests were completed rapidly in the response.

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[133] Within the New Zealand hub, the Emergency Task Force (ETF) was stood up and held daily meetings within the initial response. MFAT chairs the ETF; other members include the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, New Zealand Police, Ministry of Health, the New Zealand Fire Service, NGO partners (represented by the Council for International Development), the New Zealand Red Cross, FRANZ partners and the NZDF.

[134] Throughout the response, NZDF personnel were based in and attended meetings in these centres. This arrangement enabled civil-military coordination to take place at the strategic level between the GoNZ, HQ JFNZ Zealand and other New Zealand civilian representatives from MFAT, OGAs and humanitarian organisations. The operational forces of the three services are directed from HQ JFNZ, opposite Trentham Military Camp in Upper Hutt. From here, military leadership exercises command over NZDF elements. This command includes control of all overseas operational deployments. Among NZDF representatives who attended these meetings were HQJFNZ and DJIATF personnel.

[135] The first FRANZ meeting took place on 11 March. Partners met again with the GoV on 15 March, when offers of assistance were accepted. All countries deployed air assets in the initial response.

The NZDF's rapid response and arrival was portrayed positively

Pre-disaster coordination meant the GoNZ's offers of financial, humanitarian and military support were quickly accepted by the GoV (McCully, 2015c, McCully, 2015b).[136] This meant NZDF air assets began arriving in Vanuatu on 15 March. This was less than twenty-four hours following the cyclone and before the international appeal for assistance.

All GoNZ and NZDF press releases described the military's rapid response in a positive light (McCully, 2015c, Chapman, 2015).[137] MFAT officials, in particular, emphasised how the NZDF's speed and coordination efforts benefitted the GoV and GoNZ (McCully, 2015c). For example, a Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) P-3K2 Orion completed a reconnaissance of affected islands and shared this information with the GoV and civilian stakeholders (McCully, 2015c). This civil-military coordination was viewed as critical, as it informed the GoV's damage assessments and enabled priorities to be established in the initial response (Chapman, 2015).

Hercules aircraft enabled WoG stakeholders to arrive rapidly

C-130 Hercules aircraft also commended frequent flights into Vanuatu immediately after the airport opened on 15 March (Embassy of France, 2015).[138] New Zealand media and officials highlighted how this speed and the NZDFs logistical support had benefitted stakeholders (McCully, 2015a, New Zealand Herald, 2015a).[139] This related to the transportation of WoG personnel and large quantities of aid into Vanuatu, from New Zealand humanitarian organisations, such as the Red Cross (New Zealand Herald, 2015a).[140]

Media also emphasised how these coordination efforts benefitted humanitarian agencies and the affected population. This was because humanitarian agencies were able to arrive in Vanuatu, while the airport remained closed to civilian aircraft (New Zealand Herald, 2015a). It also enabled these agencies to get urgent relief supplies to outer islands (McCully, 2015a).

No NZDF reports, however, reflected on NZDF-humanitarian coordination. This reveals a crucial gap in the literature, considering the perceived benefits civilian stakeholders described above.

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[136] These offers of assistance were facilitated via bilateral discussions and the FRANZ agreement. On 15 March, an initial one million NZD contribution was announced by the GoNZ, for Vanuatu, Fiji, Tuvalu and Solomon Islands. This amount increased to a total of 3.5 million NZD for Vanuatu, over the complete response. Funding included costs for relief supplies, technical assistance and medical personnel. A further 26 million NZD was also given to help the tourism sector recover.

[137] The principle of '*last resort*' states that military assets should only be requested and deployed when no comparable civilian alternative exists, and these are necessary to meet a critical humanitarian need.

[138] Five military aircraft arrived on 15 March, immediately after the Bauerfield Airport was opened. These were: one C-130 and two C-17s from the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), one CASA plane from New Caledonia's armed forces (FANC), and the NZDF's RNZAF C-130 Hercules.

[139] Eight tonnes of relief was transported on these flights. Aircraft which followed contained similar quantities, which was distributed under the guidance of the Vanuatu NDMO. These aircraft also evacuated New Zealand citizens, transported relief supplies and personnel into the country.

[140] Red Cross personnel and relief supplies were transported on some of the first Hercules flights which landed on 16 March 2015. Other NGO's from the National Disaster Relief Forum (NDRF) were also offered the use of the NZDF's logistical support.

Civil-military coordination challenges described by other sources

While no stakeholders specifically reflected on the fact that these arrangements and the NZDF's rapid response could be interpreted as undermining the principle of '*last resort'* in the UN Oslo guidelines, some sources alluded to related issues. For example, two reports identified general civil-military coordination issues which were linked to the rapid influx of actors.[141]

One of these was a Government evaluation of Australia's response to TC Pam. This stated that the rapid influx of relief supplies "*overwhelmed the capacity of local facilities and humanitarian agencies to manage them*" (Government of Australia, 2017, p.37). The Australian Defence Force's (ADF's) prioritisation of speed was also believed to have contributed to these challenges. This led to the conclusion that Australian and international assistance could have "*slowed down to better align with national systems and better address needs*" (Government of Australia, 2017, p.2).

Similar coordination issues were identified in the TC Pam lessons learned report. This admitted "*initial challenges*" had impeded collaboration between the GoV, donors, regional and international actors (GoV and SPC, 2015, p.26).[142] GoV stakeholders also reported a lack of understanding about the protocols for the use of military assets and stated these should have been communicated "*from the outset*" (GoV and SPC, 2015, p.27). Although further details were not given, the need for military actors to "*follow and conform to the host country's diplomatic channels*" was identified as an area for improvement (GoV and SPC, 2015, p.27).

Collectively, these reports raise questions about the NZDF response. These surround whether or not the NZDF's rapid arrival and prioritisation of speed may have had similar impacts on coordination, as were observed with the ADF.[143] This gap in the literature further justifies the need for stakeholder interviews, to better understand how these factors may have impacted the NZDF's civil-military coordination and the HADR provided.

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[141] Although not directly stated, these documents raise the question of whether these issues also impacted the NZDF and if so, how they may have affected the assistance provided.

[142] These issues concerned a lack of communication, lack of understanding, particularly around how militaries were controlled.

[143] These factors and stakeholders perspectives will be discussed in Chapter Three.

ii. Coordination at the operational level

The first application of the DJIATF model

On arrival in Vanuatu, personnel from the DJIATF, MFAT and OGAs were embedded in the New Zealand High Commission (McCully, 2015a, New Zealand Herald, 2015a).[144] This was the first time the DJIATF model had been used in a Pacific HADR context and entailed DJIATF leadership and LOs providing MFAT, OGAs and GoV officials with military expertise and operational planning support throughout the response (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.5).[145] This arrangement demanded high levels of civil-military integration between WoG stakeholders, most of whom had never worked together previously.

Within the literature, all published sources portrayed the DJIATF's coordination with civilian stakeholders as positive. NZDF representatives further stated that the unit's coordination efforts enhanced the overall NZDF and WoG response (NZDF, 2015a, McLoughlin, 2015). An example of this related to DJIATF personnel forming a Joint Command and Reconnaissance Team (JCART), with MFAT and GoV representatives. Together, these individuals undertook aerial reconnaissance of affected islands where the NZDF later assisted.[146] This helped WoG stakeholders determine the materials and assets to be loaded on HMNZS Canterbury before departure (Chapman, 2015). It also meant operational-level officials were able to begin identifying priorities and planning assistance before the Joint Task Force (JTF) arrived (NZDF, 2015a, McLoughlin, 2015, p.8).[147]

Published NZDF sources reported the DJIATF's coordination was good

As detailed in Part One, DJIATF LOs were invited to attend daily meetings in the NEOC (GoV and SPC, 2015, p.9).[148] All published sources reported that the coordination efforts of these NZDF personnel were good, with the GoV, humanitarian agencies and other civilian stakeholders in the NEOC. For example, it was stated that foreign governments "*worked collaboratively with the NDMO*" (GoV and SPC, 2015, p.26).

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[144] A small number of DJIATF and WoG staff arrived on the first Hercules flights into the country on 15 March. Other supporting personnel arrived in the following days.

[145] Military LO's from the Air Force, Army and Navy were seconded into the DJIATF from the NZDF. These personnel were therefore, not full-time members of the DJIATF but provided service-specific expertise to support the WoG response. This arrangement is termed a 'shadow posting' in the NZDF.

[146] This team assessed damage and gathered information about the Shepherds island group and Epi Island on approximately 18 March. These islands are 100 kilometres north of Port Vila in the Shefa Province. They are discussed in detail in Part Two.

[147] NZDF press releases stated that: "*having combined reconnaissance teams… sets up access for [the NZDF], allowing us to prioritise work and decide what to put where and when.*"

[148] This arrangement resulted in close coordination with GoV Ministry officials and the NDMO Director-General, who identified and approved tasks for the NZDF to undertake.

In contrast, the internal HQ JFNZ lessons learned synopsis contained slightly more analysis around obstacles to coordination. For example, it reported that MFAT officials lacked an understanding of the DJIATF model and how it was applied (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.14).[149] NZDF LOs were also observed to need more knowledge of their "*respective asset capabilities*" for HADR (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.15).[150] These more critical views indicate the DJIATF did encounter challenges in the model's first application, although these were not reported publicly.

The eighteen-page HQ JFNZ synopsis, however, only mentioned the DJIATF once. It also did not provide clarification on how obstacles impacted civil-military coordination or the HADR provided. This is surprising, considering the significant role the DJIATF played in the response and the fact this was the first time the model was tested in the Pacific. A more in-depth understanding of how stakeholders viewed the DJIATF would, therefore, be valuable and is presented in Chapter Three.

UN stakeholder views were positive

Throughout the response, DJIATF LOs met regularly with the UN-CMCoord officer, UN agencies and other humanitarian partners, which UN officials concluded was a "*great success*" and a "*best practice*" (Reario, 2015, p.10, Lacey-Hall, 2015, p.1). Most perspectives related to the outcomes of coordination or the practical benefits of NZDF support. For example, UN stakeholders emphasised that RFAs were often completed by militaries in less than twenty-four hours. This reportedly demonstrated the "*effective and efficient*" use of foreign military assets and how essential these supported HADR in the TC Pam response (Reario, 2015, p.10).

These stakeholders, however, predominantly referred to foreign militaries as a collective and provided little reasoning for why they felt coordination was positive, beyond the practical tasks achieved.[151]

Domestic factors and national coordination mechanisms were linked to challenges

While stakeholders did not always reflect on how obstacles to coordination impacted civil-military interaction or the NZDF specifically, some of these factors are needed for the case

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[149] MFAT Heads of Mission also reportedly did not understand the differences between the light and heavy JCART options and what these entailed. This misunderstanding resulted in only a small number of DJIATF personnel deploying in the initial response. The report suggested that increased interaction between the NZDF and MFAT might improve understanding of actors' strengths, challenges, systems and acronyms.

[150] NZDF Air LOs and Maritime LOs were specifically mentioned. Maritime LO, in particular, were reported to need an understanding of amphibious operations, as well as the capabilities of Canterbury and the Offshore Patrol Vessels.

[151] UN stakeholders, in particular, reflected on how joint civil-military efforts and planning enabled actors to complete the second phase of needs assessments in a shorter space of time. Examples of this coordination are discussed below, in the section which relates to the NZDF's tactical-level coordination with humanitarian actors

study analysis. For example, many sources reported that domestic factors and coordination mechanisms had impeded the overall coordination efforts.

Some issues were linked to legislation, which did not clarify how the GoV would facilitate civil-military coordination (GoV and SPC, 2015, p.9, 27, 36, GoV, 2013a, p.15).[152] Guidance documents were also produced across fifteen years and many were due to be updated.[153] These factors contributed to confusion over stakeholders' roles, responsibilities, and how military assistance would be facilitated (GoV and SPC, 2015, p. 22-23, 26-27). Sources did not, however, indicate how this may have impacted the NZDF's civil-military coordination.

Stakeholders also identified issues related to national mechanisms. GoV buildings, national coordination structures and many public servants were directly impacted by the cyclone (UN OCHA, 2015c, p.7).[154] This negatively impacted the capacity of the NEOC and NDMO, particularly in the initial response (GoV and SPC, 2015, p.23).[155] Challenges were also reported about the National Cluster System (2015b, p.2, 2015a, p.3). These factors meant "*existing structures were not in place when international assistance was needed*" (GoV and SPC, 2015, p.29).

Collectively, these obstacles and GoV procedures meant humanitarians reportedly struggled to utilise military assets. For example, the decision-making process for the approval of military tasks was also described as "*problematic*," by UN stakeholders, who believed this contributed to "*delays in accomplishing urgent tasks requested by the clusters*" (Reario, 2015, p.10).[156] Stakeholders did not, however, comment on how these factors may have impacted the NZDF's coordination or the HADR provided by actors.

International and humanitarian coordination mechanisms were linked to challenges

Coordination issues were also linked to the influx of international stakeholders and humanitarian mechanisms. Locally-based stakeholders, for instance, reported that

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[152] Vanuatu's legislation stated that logistical support from FRANZ partners could be utilised at the GoV's formal request. No clarification was, however, provided on how foreign militaries would interact with the NEOC, national or international actors. Stakeholders, therefore, did not know whether Vanuatu's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the NDMO or international mechanisms would facilitate coordination.
[153] Key legislation included the *National Disaster Act* (2000), *National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction and Disaster Management* (2007), *National Disaster Plan Review* (2010) and the *Cyclone Support Plan* (2013). Discrepancies between documents meant only the '*National Cyclone Support Plan*' accurately described the structures in place prior to TC Pam.
[154] TC Pam passed only 50 kilometres from the country's capital Port Vila, damaging the building which housed both the NEOC and NDMO. Public servants were reportedly given five days leave to repair their houses and help family members.
[155] These challenges were noted in the TC Pam lessons learned report, which stated that the NDMO was "*understaffed and under-resourced*," while the NEOC lacked the information management and coordination capacity to fulfil the multiple roles it was given. Documentation stated that the NDMO was to be run by eight full-time staff. Three volunteers and two VHT staff members could also be seconded if needed.
[156] These challenges were linked to both the NDMO Director-General having to provide written approval of requests, along with Foreign Affairs approval from FRANZ partners. Assets were also reportedly frequently tasked for passenger transportation, assessment and census activities, while military assets were also reportedly unavailable for humanitarian tasking after 06 April.

"*complications increased exponentially*" after international surge capacity was accepted in the NEOC (Barber, 2015, p.15).[157] National and international pre-cyclone staff were reportedly 'pushed aside' by incoming actors, who failed to show respect to figures of authority (Barber, 2015, p.13, 19, Loy, 2017). One locally-based humanitarian emphasised why this was particularly harmful in the Pacific. They stated,

> "*In Vanuatu as throughout Asia Pacific… government authorities expect to be respected. The importance of ensuring that no one 'loses face' is ingrained in the national psyche… is referred to locally as the 'bigman syndrome' – the expectation by men in senior positions that they will be accorded a degree of deference*" (Barber, 2015, p.19).

This led to tension between local and foreign representatives, with GoV officials stating the constant stream of donations and stakeholders into Port Vila impeded their ability to efficiently coordinate and deliver HADR (Cowlishaw and Downes, 2015).

Changes were also made to humanitarian coordination mechanisms (see Figure 6). [158] This confused stakeholders, as the roles and responsibilities of national and international stakeholders were "*not understood outside a small number of individuals*" (Barber, 2015, p.16). National and international coordination structures also "*appeared… to be significantly overlapping*," according to local actors (Barber, 2015, p.16).

Although UN, ADF, Australian Government and some humanitarian stakeholders reported the UN-CMCoord officer played a vital coordination role in Vanuatu, they also noted the coordinator arrived "*several days after the cyclone hit*" (ACMC, 2018, p.4).[159] This delay meant there was little civil-military coordination in the first forty-eight to seventy-two hours when civil-military coordination was of vital importance.

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[157] Vanuatu-based humanitarian agencies felt meetings took longer than they should have, due to the sheer number of actors. Incoming actors were reported to have had a "*very limited understanding of national processes and requirements.*" Many agencies were also reported to have not coordinated their activities with the GoV or through the national clusters

[158] For example, an extra Cluster was added to the National Cluster System, along with seven working groups. Members of the PHT and UN Agencies also took a leading role in clusters, as opposed to Vanuatu Humanitarian Team (VHT) members.

[159] These stakeholders also reported that the UN CMCoord officer had the right personality, skill set, training and experience to be an invaluable conduit between civil and military responders.

Figure 2: TC Pam humanitarian coordination structure. Source: (GoV, 2015a, p.5)

Literature lacked analysis about coordination and obstacles at the operational level

The literature sources described above often lacked an in-depth analysis of civil-military coordination, in general, and the NZDF's efforts specifically. Some sources, however, alluded to these obstacles having negative impacts on civil-military coordination. The lessons learned report, for example, highlighted the need for the NDMO to be recognised as the "*central linking agency*" between military and humanitarian teams (GoV and SPC, 2015, p.27). This was identified as an area for improvement(GoV and SPC, 2015, p.27)(GoV and SPC, 2015, p.27)(GoV and SPC, 2015, p.27)(GoV and SPC, 2015, p.27), to strengthen the "*coordination, location and prioritisation of military assets*" in future responses (GoV and SPC, 2015, p.27).

While not openly stated, these statements imply some of the aforementioned obstacles were likely impeding the use of foreign military assets. Further information is, however, needed to better understand both how these obstacles may have impacted the NZDF and the views of these stakeholders.

The HQ JFNZ synopsis also contained no specific analysis of the NZDF's coordination with the GoV or national structures. It did, however, draw collective lessons about host nations from the TC Pam and Winston responses. Personnel noted a perceived lack of a higher-level national plan the NZDF could work to (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12). It was also reported that host nation

officials "*may not operate in the same way*" or may have different priorities to the GoNZ (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12). This led to warnings that NZDF personnel needed to be prepared for host nation officials to take "*ownership over offers of aid*" (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12).

While no further clarification or examples were given, these observations raise questions about how differences in organisational culture and 'command and control' issues may have impacted NZDF-GoV coordination.[160]

iii. Coordination at the tactical level[161]

The Joint Task Force response

The Joint Task Force (JTF) response to TC Pam was made up of several NZDF elements, which operated simultaneously and coordinated with a range of civilian actors. The central aspect of the response was, perhaps, the multi-role vessel -HMNZS Canterbury, which served as a civil-military coordination platform during the twenty-nine days NZDF elements were deployed.[162]

Throughout the response, the ship served as a mobile base from which NZDF, WoG and other civilian stakeholders were accommodated and deployed. These included LOs from MFAT and the GoV, who helped identify tasks the military would undertake. Representatives from New Zealand OGAs, including USAR and NZ MAT teams, were also embarked for two weeks (New Zealand Herald, 2015b, NZMAT, 2015).[163] This was the first time most of these civilian representatives had worked with the NZDF. It also culminated in closer civil-military integration than had occurred in any previous WoG HADR deployment.

Three four-person NZDF CIMIC teams were also deployed with the Canterbury and played a crucial civil-military role in the response (NZDF, 2015b). These operated ashore and moved ahead of the JTF to help identify priorities and tasks for the NZDF. This meant personnel gathered information about population needs by "*engaging with local leaders and*

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[160] These factors would be raised by interviewed stakeholders and will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three.
[161] The tactical level refers to coordination which takes place in the field. In this case, it refers to the interaction between the NZDF and civilian actors on the ground in New Zealand, Vanuatu and on outer islands. For example, between civilian actors and NZDF officers, soldiers, airmen or sailors.
[162] The Canterbury arrived in Port Vila on 25 March and departed from the country on 22 April. The vessel transported a significant amount of aid into the country as well as equipment and assets. These included two Landing Craft Medium (LCM), Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBS) and vehicles such as the Unimog and Pinzgauer.
[163] Although transported by the NZDF, these civilian teams operated independently from the military and focused on separate tasks. The New Zealand Fire Service deployed a USAR squad of 14 personnel to support the WoG response. The Ministry of Health also sent an NZMAT team made up of 11 doctors and nurses. Both OGA teams operated alongside NZDF personnel between 25 March to 07 April. The USAR team conducted building repairs, operated equipment to provide communities with drinkable water and provided logistical support for the NZMAT team. This team was made up of doctors, nurses, which provided communities with medical clinics and check-ups.

personalities, maintaining relationships and providing a single consistent point of contact for the duration of the deployment" (NZDF, 2015b). This led to interaction between NZDF CIMIC personnel and chiefs, provincial officials, CDCCCs and humanitarian agencies operating in the NZDF's vicinity.[164]

The final major element of the NZDF's civil-military engagement involved the use of air assets (Chapman, 2015). [165] These aircraft supported needs assessments by conducting air reconnaissance and transporting GoV and humanitarian representatives to complete these. They also conducted casualty evacuation and transported aid, civilian and military personnel into Vanuatu, as well as among isolated islands during the response.[166]

The NZDF's area of operations

Throughout the response, NZDF and WoG efforts were focused on Epi Island and the Shepherds islands group, in the Shefa Province (see Figure 3).[167] These were considered a high priority by the GoV due to their critical humanitarian needs islands and relative isolation, being 100 kilometres north of Port Vila (see Figure 4, NZDF, 2015c).[168]

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[164] CDCCCs are discussed in Part One; this term stands for Community Disaster and Climate Change Committees.

[165] These included a King Air B200, Seasprite helicopters, a P-3K2 Orion and C-130 Hercules. Defence Minister Gerry Brownlee critiqued the decision not to deploy any the NZDFs eight new NH90 helicopters to Vanuatu. This was reportedly due to difficulties surrounding the transport of the NH90's and the aircraft not yet being cleared to operate from the CANTERBURY. Helicopter operations were therefore conducted with only one Seasprite, which limited the NZDF's ability to transport civilian actors, supplies and access outer islands.

[166] For example, a Hercules aircraft was offered as transportation for individuals from Fiji to Vanuatu. This coordination enabled a contingent of the Republic of Fiji Military Force (RFMF) engineers, health professionals, and supplies from Fiji to support the response. These were transported from Suva to Vanuatu on 24 March.

[167] Some NZDF personnel, including NZ Army engineers, supported Vanuatu Mobile Force (VMF) efforts, on the mainland Efate and in Port Vila. This military-paramilitary coordination was, however, not the focus of the JTF response.

[168] The isolation of these islands also made it difficult for civilian actors to access them, due to national logistical capacity being limited to only a small number of vessels. Cyclone damage had reduced the country's logistic capacity to one functional police patrol boat, one private helicopter, the Rainbow warrior vessel and commercial vessels.

Figure 3: Map of Epi Island and the Shepherds Island group. Source: (FSAC, 2015)

The priority humanitarian needs of these islands were described in assessments produced over a week before the NZDF arrived (Humanity Road, 2015, Humans of Vanuatu, 2015).[169] These clarified that the smallest islands were the most severely affected, with widespread food and water shortages and the destruction of up to 100% of dwellings in some villages (UNDAC, 2015b).[170] These factors made coordination between the NZDF and civilian actors even more vital, to ensure population needs were met.

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[169] As early as 15 March, humanitarian sources began reporting water and food shortages within communities. These concerns included reports that villages within the Shepherd Islands were drinking saltwater. This claim was however contested on social media, with some questioning whether Ni-Vanuatu were instead digging into the beaches to access fresh water springs.

[170] An UNDAC rapid needs assessment of some of the Shepherds islands was conducted on 20 March. It revealed that up to 100% of dwellings were destroyed on some islands. For example; all 37 houses on Mataso had been damaged, all 83 on Tongariki and 27 of 31 on Buninga, with significant water and food shortages anticipated on each of these islands.

NZDF assistance and tasks

NZDF and WoG assistance was provided in two phases. Phase one focused on the larger islands of Epi and Tongoa, while phase two concentrated on smaller islands such as Mataso, Tongariki and Buninga (NZDF, 2015c).[171] While the literature contained no analysis of these phases, their sequence meant the bulk of NZDF and WoG assistance was initially focused on islands which had more extensive population bases, but less severe humanitarian needs.[172] This raises questions about whether HADR was provided according to the greatest humanitarian needs.

NZDF tasks on these islands predominantly focused on restoring public infrastructure. These included clearing debris and roads, restoring water storage and repairing schools, medical facilities and aid posts (NZDF, 2015c).[173] Although the NZDF transported some water, food and non-food items to these islands, most aid was disembarked in Port Vila, for distribution by local stakeholders (McLoughlin, 2015, p.5).[174] This arrangement meant GoV elected LOs facilitated communication between the NZDF, local officials and village chiefs, who helped identify needs and tasks for the NZDF.

Perceptions of the NZDF's civil-military coordination at the tactical level

Due to the number of civilian actors who engaged with the JTF, the perspectives of stakeholders are grouped by sector below. This provides a greater depth of analysis, as it highlights how literature portrayed the perspectives of; 1) New Zealand civilian actors, 2) international and local humanitarian stakeholders, 3) the GoF and 4) the affected population.

Coordination with New Zealand civilian actors

Published literature reported that coordination was good

Overall, all published sources portrayed the NZDF's coordination with New Zealand civilian stakeholders as positive. The media reported that WoG efforts were "*really well coordinated*" (McLoughlin, 2015, p.8). An NZDF representative described coordination as follows:

> "*Everyone here has the same sense of purpose and vision, and we are all determined to provide maximum effect to improve the situation of the people on these islands as soon as possible. We are all focused on the same thing so that makes it really easy to work together*" (McLoughlin, 2015, p.8).

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[171] Phase one was undertaken between 27 March and 12 April, phase two between 13 and 19 April 2015.

[172] The order and priorities of the NZDF's assistance will be reflected on by interviewed stakeholders in the following chapter.

[173] Over the four weeks the NZDF completed repairs to twelve schools and eight medical clinics, installed sixteen water tanks, reinstated existing community water supplies and transported tonnes of aid. Desalination plants were also used to provide communities with water. A more detailed report of these tasks is provided in Annex Five.

[174] On arrival in Port Vila Canterbury offloaded 150 tonnes of food and other supplies under GoV direction. The NDMO, local officials and some designated humanitarian actors were then put in charge of aid distribution on the outer islands.

These perspectives led NZDF and GoNZ sources to suggest the NZDF's civil-military coordination efforts had enhanced the HADR response (McLoughlin, 2015, p.8).

There was a general lack of civilian perspectives

The majority of perspectives were, however, drawn from NZDF or GoNZ sources. For example, civil-military interaction was only briefly described in one NZ MAT newsletter. This reflected that it was the first time OGAs had worked alongside the NZDF in the Pacific, which "*gave an opportunity for all three organisations to get to know how each better*" (NZMAT, 2015). This scarcity of New Zealand civilian perspectives evidences the need for interviews, to better understand how these stakeholders perceived coordination at the tactical level.

The HQ JFNZ synopsis contained greater information but lacked in-depth analysis

In contrast, the internal HQ JFNZ lessons learned synopsis contained slightly more detail but lacked in-depth analysis of coordination efforts and impacts. For example, NZDF stakeholders commented that MFAT LOs were easy to work with and proved "*very beneficial*" on the Canterbury (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.8). It also reported that *"once deployed, 'on the ground' relationships with the OGAs were good"* (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.9). The report also concluded that the overall efforts of the HADR Task Group in TC Pam were a success "*in terms of the effects delivered and the high level of civil-military and inter-service cooperation*" (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.4).

Examination of the synopsis, however, reveals that few statements included explanations of why stakeholders held these views, other than positive outcomes. The report also contained no analysis on how NZDF-New Zealand humanitarian coordination was perceived.

Some coordination challenges were identified or alluded to

The internal report also identified some obstacles to NZDF-New Zealand civilian coordination. The concerned tight timeframes and procedures,[175] the rotation of MFAT LOs on Canterbury,[176] a civilian lack of understanding about the NZDF,[177] differences in priorities,[178] as well as

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[175] NZDF personnel noted that Canterbury's short timeframe for departure had placed strain on NZDF-MFAT coordination. This put pressure on NZDF personnel, meant MFAT-sponsored stores were transported at the last minute and there was little time to determine the suitability of embarked equipment. The vessel departed within forty-eight hours of New Zealand Foreign Affairs Minister Murray McCully announcing that the Canterbury would deploy. This statement was made on 19 March.
[176] MFAT LOs were also rotated on the Canterbury, with minimal handover. This reportedly impacted coordination, due to military staff needing to spend time updating new team members, each time MFAT LOs were replaced.
[177] These included a lack of understanding about NZDF assets and operations and the different operating styles and priorities of stakeholders.
[178] NZDF personnel perceived that OGA priorities were prioritised ahead of the NZDF's. An example of this disparity concerned OGA personnel and equipment being sent ashore first and given seats on reconnaissance flights, ahead of NZDF teams.

communication and information sharing issues (NZDF, 2015a, HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.8).[179] Notably, none of these issues were discussed in published literature.

In some sections, the synopsis alluded to these obstacles having negative impacts on HADR. The NZDF and OGAs, for instance, conducted separate internal assessments of HADR. This meant some villages were assessed "*numerous times*" which was inefficient (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.9). Late notice requests by civilians also negatively impacted the work and rest ratios of NZDF personnel.[180] While no analysis surrounded how these obstacles may have impacted the affected population, several recommendations were made to improve civil-military coordination in future Pacific HADR responses (HQ JFNZ, 2016).[181]

Coordination with international and local humanitarian actors

Few humanitarian perspectives reflected on interaction in the field

Less than five descriptions of coordination between the NZDF and humanitarian actors were found in literature, which addressed interaction at the tactical level. Of these, all were the views of either UN stakeholders or representatives of one INGO.[182] All sources, however, depicted NZDF-humanitarian coordination in a positive light and did not report any barriers to coordination.

UN and INGO perspectives were positive

Of the UN sources, most focused on the benefits or outcomes of NZDF support, rather than the quality of coordination. For example, stakeholders focused on how the NZDF's coordination with UN, humanitarian and GoV representatives enabled these actors to rapidly complete the second phase of needs assessments (Lacey-Hall, 2015, UNDAC, 2015a, p.6).[183] This reportedly saved civilians weeks of work and provided a better understanding of residual humanitarian

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[179] Communication issues occurred on the Canterbury as the ship lacked a common information-sharing system. NZDF security restrictions also meant OGA's could not view or share data on the ship's system, this meant OGAs had "*no visibility*" of stored data.

[180] This lack of understanding about the NZDF was reported to have resulted in the NZDF needing to provide OGA's resources and transport unexpectedly. It was also connected to OGA's not attending daily meetings held by the NZDF, which resulted in late notice requests for assistance, which impacted work and rest ratios for NZDF personnel.

[181] Key recommendations included the need for regular interaction and joint briefings between the NZDF and New Zealand civilian actors, to increase mutual understanding for future HADR responses. Other key recommendations included: 1) the development of Standard Operating Procedures for coordination and assessments, 2) the need to clarify the command and control structure between OGAs and the NZDF, and 3) the need to develop an Unclassified system so civilian actors could share information and access email accounts on the Canterbury.

[182] The only non-UN perspectives were from representatives of the INGO Save the Children.

[183] Assets from all military forces were used to insert eleven teams into the Provinces of Shefa and Tafea to undertake the second round of needs assessments in early April 2015. The NZDF contributed a Sea Sprite Helicopter and B200 King Air aircraft. The ADF contributed HMAS Tobruk and fixed and rotary winged assets (Australian S70 Blackhawk helicopters, the RAAF B350 King Air aircraft and an Australian C130 aircraft). The Solomon Islands and Tonga both contributed their own Pacific Class Patrol Boats to the operation. France also contributed a Puma Helicopter. Assessments were completed in five days.

needs and gaps in assistance (Reario, 2015, p.10). UNDAC representatives further concluded this example of military planning and support set a "*new global standard*" for civil-military coordination in humanitarian operations (UNDAC, 2015a, p.16).

CIMIC teams enhanced coordination efforts

INGO representatives, in contrast, highlighted the benefits of CIMIC teams, which facilitated coordination between NZDF personnel and humanitarian agencies in the outer islands. The director of Save the Children Vanuatu, for instance, reflected on how NZDF and humanitarian capabilities could be complementary. He stated,

> *"[The NZDF have] got significant assets that we don't have in terms of their*
> *helicopters, their barges, their boat, their desalination capacity to provide*
> *fresh water. I was talking to them yesterday, I will continue to talk to them so*
> *that we can coordinate and use the best of our skills together"* (Gil, 2015).

Locally-based humanitarians and community representatives also reflected on how NZDF-humanitarian assistance efforts helped the affected population, as combined efforts led to schools on Epi Island opening early (Gil, 2015).[184]

While the HQ JFNZ synopsis did not mention the efforts of CIMIC teams or NZDF-humanitarian coordination, the media suggested these efforts enhanced the JTF response. This was because humanitarians provided the military with local knowledge, which helped with NZDF task planning (NZDF, 2015b). This conspicuous lack of analysis is concerning, considering the key role CIMIC teams played in the field and the significant humanitarian needs in the NZDF's vicinity.[185]

<div align="center">Coordination with the Government of Vanuatu</div>

Coordination was perceived positively by State stakeholders

In line with an emerging trend, all published sources described coordination between the NZDF, GoV, NDMO and local officials as positive at the tactical level. These perspectives are largely related to the practical benefits of the NZDF's maritime and air support, which reportedly enhanced the GoV HADR response (Cullwick, 2016, Brownlee, 2015, UNDAC, 2015a).[186] This

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[184] This outcome was linked to NZDF personnel conducting repairs, while the INGO distributed learning materials. A community representative also reflected on this, stating, "*If it wasn't for the help of organisations such as Save the Children and the New Zealand Army, I don't know how long it would have been before we had the materials and money to rebuild the school. We are immensely grateful for their help.*"

[185] The fact that analysis of CIMIC team coordination was conspicuously missing in the HQ JFNZ synopsis is concerning and may reflect a lack of understanding in the NZDF about how these teams are applied. This lack of understanding about CIMIC will be reflected upon by interviewees in the following chapter and discussed in greater detail in the discussion within Chapter Six.

[186] This support reportedly enhanced the GoV response by enabling it to transport aid, personnel and complete assessments earlier than would have otherwise been possible.

included NZDF logistical support enabling the GoV and local stakeholders to begin distributing critical food and non-food items to communities (McCully, 2015a).[187]

GoNZ and NZDF sources also reported the military's coordination efforts were well-received by the GoV and had benefitted both nations. Politicians and Ministers, for example, reported that coordination efforts strengthened bilateral relations (McCully, 2015b, Brownlee, 2015). NZDF personnel also noted that local LOs gave the (Chapman, 2015, HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12)(Chapman, 2015, HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12)(Chapman, 2015, HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12)(Chapman, 2015, HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12)NZDF information and connections, which helped the military determine its tasks and priorities (Chapman, 2015, HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12).

Internal reports disclosed some coordination issues with host nation officials

Although no obstacles to NZDF-GoV coordination were publicised, the HQ JFNZ synopsis alluded to issues which may have impeded coordination.[188] Most notably was the concern that there:

> *"may be a tendency for local officials to channel support to their own areas of interest first, with a perceived lack of a higher level national plan that the NZDF could work to"* (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12).

Further clarification or examples were not given. This gap in the report raises questions about how domestic factors may have impacted trust, relationships and coordination between the NZDF and GoV.[189]

Coordination with the affected population

All published literature expressed the affected population's gratitude

Of all the sources reporting the affected population's views of the NZDF, over 90% were produced by the GoNZ or NZDF. While this meant actual community perspectives were limited, all articles suggested there were good relations between individuals. In general, these views focused on the outcomes of the NZDF's HADR or the gratitude of communities (McLoughlin, 2015, p.7, NZ Army, 2015, p.8).

Local media also reported that the NZDF received "*overwhelming praises and words of appreciation*" from communities on Mataso and Epi Island, for the HADR provided (Cullwick,

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[187] An RNZAF Hercules aircraft was also the first to land on Tanna Island after the cyclone, which enabled the GoV to conduct initial damage assessments and begin relief distribution. This flight arrived on 19 March and transported Vanuatu's Prime Minister Joe Natuman, the New Zealand Head of Mission, NZDF personnel, a Red Cross team and seven tonnes of relief supplies. Natuman's home island is Tanna. He served as Prime Minister from May 2014 to June 2015.

[188] As previously stated, this section of the HQ JFNZ report drew collective lessons learned from both the TC Pam and Winston responses. While not always directly stated, obstacles to coordination with Host Nations are, therefore, inferred as relating to both the GoV and GoF.

[189] Some of these factors will be discussed in greater detail by interviewed stakeholders in the following chapter.

2015).[190] While no articles reported obstacles to NZDF-community coordination, the overall lack of perspectives from the affected population emphasises the value of stakeholder interviews, particularly to determine how communities viewed the NZDF's coordination.

Coordination was reportedly improved by GoF LOs and previous HADR experience

This gap in literature meant the HQ JFNZ synopsis contained the most in-depth analysis of the NZDF-affected population coordination.[191] This emphasised the benefits of using chiefs and local guides to facilitate communication between the military and outer island communities. Personnel reported this broke down language and social barriers and made it easier to extract information about villages (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12). This was because chiefs were perceived to be "*more aware of what needed to be done within their own community,*" which helped the NZDF determine its tasks and priorities (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12).

Internal reports identified some coordination challenges

In contrast to published literature, some obstacles to coordination were alluded to in the HQ JFNZ synopsis. This noted that interaction with islanders varied, due to the different priorities and operating styles these individuals had to New Zealand actors. These differences led to the observation that:

> "*Patience is required when dealing with the local population to determine priorities when providing HADR support*" (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12).

Information from locals was also reportedly "*not forthcoming*" at times, until locals understood the NZDF was there to help (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12). No further analysis accompanied these statements, around how these obstacles may have impacted coordination or the HADR provided. These observations do, however, raise questions about why Ni-Vanuatu appeared non-communicative and had different priorities from the military.[192]

Some coordination issues were alluded to by communities and stakeholders

While obstacles were not openly discussed by communities or linked to the NZDF, some articles alluded to relevant issues. Several agencies and members of the population reported the vulnerable and severely impacted were not receiving adequate assistance (Transparency International Vanuatu, 2016). Among these individuals were several community leaders from

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[190] In one article, a school principal also stated that without the NZDF's support classes would not have resumed on March 30 and enabled students to keep on track with their studies.

[191] As previously stated, the report, however, draws collective lessons about the Host Nation from the TC Pam and Winston responses. Observations, therefore, relate to interaction with the affected population across both responses.

[192] Community representatives and other stakeholders will comment on these factors in greater detail in the interview findings within Chapter Three.

Shefa Province, where the NZDF later provided assistance (Transparency International Vanuatu, 2015a, Hawkins, 2015b).[193] They stated,

> "our communities are short on water, most of our islands and communities
> lack the necessary sufficient facilities that can support families after a natural
> disaster, it is now more than a week, and we have yet to receive any form of
> relief assistance while other areas have already received assistance"
> (Transparency International Vanuatu, 2015a, Hawkins, 2015b).

These reports suggest humanitarian needs were not being met and that HADR may have been unfairly distributed. While these statements were made before the NZDF commenced its tasks on Epi Island, they highlight the context the NZDF was deploying into. Further information is, however, needed to determine whether, or not, this impacted the NZDF.

Part Two findings

The sections above examined the NZDF's civil-military coordination efforts at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Within the literature, these efforts were generally portrayed in a positive light, with coordination often described as 'good' or 'beneficial.' Most sources reflected on the practical benefits of NZDF support, particularly for civilian actors and the population.

While the number of these reports is substantial, their content and sources reveal some limitations. For example, minimal analysis or evidence surrounded why stakeholders held these views. The majority of stakeholder perspectives, including those of civilians, were also drawn from NZDF or GoNZ material.[194] Published literature also contained a minimal analysis of obstacles to the NZDF's civil-military coordination or how these impacted HADR.[195] The HQ JFNZ synopsis also contained few examples of how obstacles impacted coordination or HADR.

On the surface, these findings may reinforce stakeholder perceptions that the NZDF's coordination was positive and well-received. The fact that the internal HQ JFNZ lessons learned synopsis, however, identified several obstacles to coordination which were not publicised,

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[193] The first report by Transparency International Vanuatu was published on 28 March, one day after the Canterbury began providing assistance on Epi Island. It stated that community leaders were concerned about the fair distribution of relief supplies. This report was published after the GoV announced that aid had reached all of the nation's islands. Sources did not, however, specify where this unfair distribution occurred. Shefa representatives also made these comments before the NZDF arrived.

[194] In several NZDF articles, members of the affected population, GoV and MFAT officials were quoted, or their perspectives about the NZDF response referenced. The perspectives of OGAs, non-UN humanitarian actors and members of the affected population were also infrequent or absent.

[195] For example, the TC Pam lessons learned report only briefly discussed civil-military coordination issues and referred to foreign militaries collectively. Civil-military coordination issues were discussed on five of the fifty-seven pages in the report. Discussion occurred in four sections. These were: cross-cutting issues, logistics, regional coordination (donors) and regional coordination (mechanisms).

questions how accurately the literature portrayed obstacles and stakeholder perspectives.[196] This indicates there is a discrepancy between published and unpublished stakeholder perspectives within the literature.

Chapter Two summary

The chapter above explored how TC Pam literature described both the overall HADR response and the NZDF's civil-military coordination efforts. While, in general, stakeholder perspectives portrayed the NZDF's coordination efforts favourably, some inconsistencies were evident, when published and unpublished views were compared.

Substantial gaps were also identified in the literature, which amplify the concerns raised in Chapter One. In particular, these include a lack of clarity around how civilian stakeholders view the NZDF's civil-military coordination and how obstacles may be impacting actors' assistance. These shortcomings justify the need to interview a broad range of stakeholders, both to better understand actors' perspectives and ensure a balanced analysis of the NZDF's civil-military coordination is presented. These interview findings are presented in the following chapter.

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[196] These included a lack of understanding, communication challenges and concerns relating to politics and interests.

Chapter Three: Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen

In Chapter Two TC Pam literature described the NZDF's civil-military coordination efforts as 'positive' and 'beneficial.' The present chapter builds on these findings by examining how the thirty-five interviewed stakeholders perceived these same efforts.[197] This provides more in-depth data, which aims to address the identified gaps in the literature.

Findings are presented in three parts, with each focused on a separate research question.[198] Part One examines how interviewees perceived the NZDF's civil-military coordination in the TC Pam response. Part Two discusses the four key obstacles to coordination, as discussed by participants. Part Three then explores the impact these obstacles were reported to have on the HADR provided by stakeholders.

Part One: TC Pam stakeholder perceptions

Interviewee perspectives are examined in the four sections below. These report how participants described the NZDF's coordination with; i) New Zealand civilian actors, ii) international and local humanitarian actors, iii) the GoV, and iv) the affected population.

In each section, the general impressions of interviewees are summarised, along with their reasoning for holding these views. Both positive and negative stakeholder perceptions are reported, while a more detailed examination of obstacles and their impacts is reserved and reported in Parts Two and Three respectively. At times, perspectives varied significantly between participants. These contrasts are highlighted where possible, along with participants' justification for their views. [199]

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[197] All interviews were completed in New Zealand and Vanuatu between June and September 2017.

[198] The three research questions are: 1) how did stakeholders perceive the NZDF's civil-military coordination in past Pacific disaster relief responses? 2) What, if any, were the obstacles to the NZDF's civil-military coordination in past responses? 3) How might identified obstacles have impacted the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief provided by actors?

[199] Interviewees did not always detail why they held certain perspectives, but these are reported, where possible.

i. Coordination with New Zealand civilian actors

Civil-military coordination enhanced the WoG response

In general, interviewees viewed the NZDF's coordination with MFAT, USAR, NZ MAT and New Zealand humanitarian agencies as positive in the TC Pam response. Most New Zealand participants described the practical benefits of coordination, such as the NZDF's logistical support and how this reduced overall costs for civilian actors.[200]

As a result, many felt civil-military coordination had enhanced the overall WoG response and the ability of individual civilian actors to meet the affected population's needs.[201] This was because it enabled civilian actors to provide assistance more rapidly, efficiently and in larger quantities than would have been possible using commercial assets.[202]

Pre-disaster interaction enhanced coordination at the strategic level

Several factors were believed to be behind positive coordination efforts. Particularly at the strategic level, pre-disaster interaction between the NZDF and stakeholders such as MFAT and the Ministry of Health (MoH) was described as *"key to the success of the [WoG] mission."*[203] This was because individuals had a greater understanding of each other's roles and organisations before deployment.[204]

The new DJIATF model and its leadership improved coordination

The application of the DJIATF model and particularly embedding NZDF personnel in the High Commission were also perceived as *"crucial"* in the initial response.[205] This was because this close interaction improved communication, planning and understanding between NZDF and civilian representatives in Port Vila.[206]

Four interviewees credited the success of the model to DJIATF's leaders, who were described as particularly skilled, professional and competent in their roles.[207] This enabled them to act as a

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200 Interview: 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21.
201 Interview: 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21.
202 An example of this included NGO use of the C130 aircraft, which enabled some humanitarian agencies and supplies to arrive several days earlier than would have been possible on commercial flights.
203 Interview: 17. Stakeholders provided the examples of positive pre-disaster interaction. These included joint-planning at the strategic level, Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) and MFAT representatives taking part in the 2013 Southern Katipo Exercise.
204 Interview: 17, 18, 19, 20.
205 Interview: 15.
206 Interview: 1, 3, 4, 5, 15.
207 Interview: 1, 4, 5, 15.

bridge between civilian and military spheres, as they *"could work with diplomats, civilian medics and all three of the services of the Defence Force."*[208]

The unique characteristics of the NZDF

Interviewees also reported that the NZDF displayed characteristics which made coordination easier with civilians. These characteristics included flexibility, a 'give-it-a-go' attitude and friendliness.[209] Participants also felt the NZDF's smaller size and command chain meant personnel were less hindered by hierarchy and bureaucracy.[210] One New Zealand humanitarian participant observed,

> *"[NZDF] tasking was much more civilianised and that does make life a lot easier… I think there is a flexibility, a 'can do' approach that is much more inherent within the New Zealand Defence Force than, as I say, the Australian."*[211]

Four interviewees felt these characteristics set the NZDF ahead of other foreign militaries, in terms of its civil-military coordination with national actors.[212]

Command and control issues

Despite these positive perceptions, 'command and control' issues were also observed and reportedly impeded civil-military coordination.[213] While some interviewees felt MFAT's civilian control over the NZDF had, at times, enhanced coordination, it also resulted in tensions between these stakeholders.[214] Some participants described instances where NZDF personnel were believed to have deliberately disregarded civilian leadership or acted without MFAT authorisation. This frustrated MFAT officials and on at least one occasion reduced the effectiveness of the assistance provided.[215]

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[208] Interview: 15. The names of the LTCOL and COL were removed from this quote to preserve their confidentiality.
[209] Interview: 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 23. Many commented that NZDF personnel displayed positive and friendly attitudes which some associated with the New Zealand culture.
[210] Interview: 16, 17, 19, 20. This was contradicted by other stakeholders who felt organisational issues and the military hierarchy had impeded coordination. This is discussed in Part Two under the section on *organisational culture*.
[211] Interview: 20.
[212] Interview: 1, 4, 20, 23. The ADF was mentioned by name a number of times, some participants made more general comments about the NZDF appearing to be among the better of the assisting militaries.
[213] Interview: 1, 4, 5, 16, 20. The term 'command and control' is used in the military and is interchangeable with the term 'C2.' It means a process that commanders or command organisations use to plan, direct, coordinate and control their own and friendly forces and assets to ensure mission accomplishment.
[214] In contrast, five interviewees believed civilian oversight had positive impacts on civil-military coordination and the assistance provided (Interview: 1, 4, 16, 20, 33). Some discussed examples where MFAT officials had tried to align NZDF priorities with humanitarian needs or had fostered closer NZDF-NZ civilian coordination. NZDF interviewees also acknowledged that MFAT oversight had at times served as a *"brake"* on the NZDF's response and that this prevented the JTF from *"doing things that may have helped in the short term but hindered in the long term"* (Interview: 7).
[215] Interview: 1. For example the NZDF Public Relations team was described as *"uncommunicative"* and acted without MFAT approval on a number of occasions, as if it *"had its own mandate."* On one occasion it delayed the Canterbury's departure from

Ad hoc coordination and a lack of interaction

Stakeholders also reported that NZDF-New Zealand civilian coordination was often 'ad hoc' or improvised.[216] One OGA representative acknowledged that both the NZDF and civilian stakeholders were "*winging it,*" when working together. They reflected,

> "*As it progressed it was very much neither [the NZDF nor OGA's] really knew what the others did and weren't really sure how it really fitted into this [Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief] picture… there was a degree of initially arm's length.*"[217]

Some interviewees believed this was due to most NZDF and new Zealand civilian personnel having little or no experience working together, before TC Pam.[218] Others felt this was the result of shortcomings in the methods used to improve civil-military coordination.[219] Exercises, tabletop discussions and lessons learned mechanisms were, for example, perceived as not always relevant for the Pacific HADR context and at times did not involve key actors.[220] This frustrated stakeholders, particularly as 90% of all NZDF and New Zealand civilian actors felt more training and interaction would improve future civil-military coordination efforts.

ii.   Coordination with international and local humanitarian actors

Minimal or ad hoc coordination was reported

In general, participants reported there was either minimal or ad hoc coordination between NZDF and humanitarian representatives in the TC Pam response. [221] As evidence of this, two locally-based humanitarians reported their organisations were operating in the same area as the NZDF, yet only discovered this in hindsight, when representatives came across military personnel.[222] One of these commented,

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Port Vila to embark a TV crew. This delayed the transportation of relief supplies for affected communities and angered MFAT officials who had not given their approval.

[216] Interview: 5, 7, 15, 16, 18. Ad hoc coordination was particularly observed in the field and on the Canterbury.

[217] Interview: 16.

[218] Interview: 1, 5, 7, 16, 17, 20.

[219] Interview: 15, 16, 20.

[220] Although four stakeholders felt Southern Katipo and table top exercises had improved understanding between the NZDF and civilian actors', some critiqued the level of interaction or practical benefits of these civil-military engagements. For example, civilian stakeholders reported that there had been minimal interaction within the NZDF-run Southern Katipo exercise, despite the NZDF inviting civilian staff to participate. Others felt the exercise was not realistic in terms of actual HADR scenarios or had not attempted to further understanding of civil-military coordination.

[221] Interview: 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 19, 21, 23, 24.

[222] Interview: 9, 10.

> *"For [NGO's]… We don't have any information at all … that we can have a relationship or work closely with this [New Zealand] army."*[223]

Despite the general lack of direct NZDF-humanitarian contact, participants which did witness examples of coordination perceived these as positive.[224] Humanitarian reasoning related to the benefits of NZDF logistical support, which reduced transportation costs, and enabled agencies to access isolated communities and deliver assistance more rapidly.[225] NZDF interviewees also described coordination in the field as "*complimentary,*" as personnel benefitted from the local knowledge and connections NGOs offered.[226]

Stakeholders reported that different reasons were behind the lack of interaction

Interviewees provided three main explanations for the lack of NZDF-humanitarian coordination. Two NZDF interviewees and one GoV official believed this was the result of humanitarians being reluctant to work with the NZDF.[227] One NZDF representative stated,

> *"I have heard on the grapevine… that the [NZDF] combined headquarters at Port Vila struggled a little bit with [humanitarian] agencies that don't really want to be seen to be aligning with military organisations."*[228]

These reports were, however, contradicted by all humanitarian interviewees. These expressed the desire to coordinate more closely with the NZDF, utilise assets and meet humanitarian needs.[229]

Only one humanitarian stakeholder confirmed their organisation had reduced direct contact with the NZDF to adhere to the humanitarian principles.[230] They emphasised, however, that this did not mean their organisation did not want to coordinate but chose to use humanitarian coordination mechanisms to facilitate interaction.

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[223] Interview: 9.
[224] Interview: 5, 6, 10, 14. The interaction described by stakeholders included attending cluster meetings, utilising NZDF transportation and ad hoc coordination in the field.
[225] Interview: 8, 9, 10, 11.
[226] Interview: 6. In one example NZDF support had enabled INGOs such as Save the Children to more rapidly conduct assessments and distribute relief to communities. In turn, NGO staff connected the NZDF with local Community Disaster Committees (CDCs), while providing local knowledge and expertise.
[227] Interview: 5, 7, 23.
[228] Interview: 7.
[229] Interview: 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14. All international and local humanitarian interviewees believed their desire to coordinate with the NZDF was appropriate in the TC Pam context. Eighty six percent of these justified this on the basis that Vanuatu or their agencies lacked the logistical and financial resources to access communities in need.
[230] Interview: 8.

Domestic factors were believed to impede coordination

Challenges concerning national capacity, coordination structures and oversight were also reportedly behind the NZDF-humanitarian separation.[231] These views were expressed by 80% of humanitarian interviewees, who believed physical communication issues and poor facilitation by the GoV impeded their ability to coordinate with the NZDF.[232] Some felt the GoV intentionally isolated humanitarian actors in the response, due to poor relations between these stakeholders.[233] This included one participant who reported that some agencies were "*not given permission*" to operate in certain outer islands.[234]

Challenges with the humanitarian coordination structure

Interviewees also reported the humanitarian coordination structure and actions of INGO and UN agencies contributed to the lack of interaction.[235] These issues related to UN mechanisms, stakeholder interests and a lack of integration between local and international structures.[236]

Many local interviewees stated UN agencies and INGOs had taken too much control over the NEOC.[237] One local humanitarian described how this led some local agencies to boycott the system, which reduced their ability to coordinate with the NZDF. They recounted,

> *"[Foreigners] came and sat and overtook, overtook OUR NDMO… there was not a black face in the room… There were [expatriates] colour-coded and running around… there was not any uniformed person in terms of any of the military people that I usually see… I just got the shock of my life and so I walked away."[238]*

This meant that while larger INGOs and international agencies were able to coordinate with the NZDF through the NEOC, smaller agencies and local actors felt they were 'left out.'

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[231] Interview: 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16. The term foreign stakeholders include interviewees who were not Vanuatu-based, such as INGO representatives or actors from New Zealand, Australia or other Pacific islands. Reasons largely related to national systems not functioning or being too slow to ensure humanitarian needs were being adequately met.

[232] Interview: 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14. Many believed either the GoV had not communicated how humanitarians could utilise NZDF assets.

[233] Interview: 1, 3, 4, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16. Some stakeholders felt this separation between actors was a reflection of the GoV's lack of trust for humanitarians. This was connected to historical tensions and the GoV's frustration about local systems being disregarded and the NEOC being overwhelmed by international actors.

[234] Interview: 1.

[235] Interview: 9, 11, 13, 14, 22, 23, 25, 28.

[236] Many participants believed humanitarian agencies were seeking publicity and donor support in the TC Pam response. Some felt this and the cost of travel to Epi Island (where the NZDF was operating) led agencies to provide assistance on the mainland Efate and Tanna Island, as they were more likely to gain visibility there.

[237] Interview: 9, 11, 13, 14, 22, 23, 25, 28.

[238] Interview: 11.

As a result, some stakeholders believed current humanitarian and UN coordination mechanisms were unsuitable for Pacific HADR responses.[239] This included two humanitarian representatives with extensive HADR experience and two GoV officials. One of these GoV participants further reflected they would be "*very hesitant for the UN to take that senior lead [on civil-military coordination]*" following the TC Pam response.[240]

iii. Coordination with the Government of Vanuatu

The NZDF was viewed positively compared to other militaries

Although, in general, interviewees felt GoV-NZDF coordination was positive, perspectives varied significantly among GoV participants. For example, while the majority of NZDF and GoNZ interviewees believed coordination was 'good,' just over half of the GoV participants expressed this view.[241]

Interviewees provided three main reasons for their views. First, NZDF and GoNZ participants believed the NZDF adopted a flexible and "*collaborative approach*" with the GoV.[242] This reportedly enhanced coordination as it demonstrated respect for national leadership and fostered better relationships. One GoNZ official reflected,

> "*New Zealand [Defence Force] efforts were appreciated by the [GoV] and there were a couple of special mentions about how easy we were to work with.*"[243]

Second, both GoV and New Zealand stakeholders felt the use of DJIATF and local LOs enhanced civil-military coordination efforts.[244] These benefits were particularly observed in the NEOC and on the Canterbury, where close interaction reportedly increased levels of understanding, communication and coordination.[245]

Third, while not all GoV participants agreed, some interviewees believed the NZDF's unique characteristics, culture and ethnic makeup meant the GoV found it easier to coordinate with the NZDF.[246] Participants also reported the influence of New Zealand culture made the NZDF

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239 Interview: 11, 14, 22, 23.
240 Interview: 23.
241 Interview: 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 24, 26, 27, 28.
242 Interview: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
243 Interview: 3.
244 Interview: 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 17, 22, 24, 28.
245 Interview: 1, 3, 4, 5, 22, 24.
246 Interview: 3, 4, 5, 15, 23, 25, 26, 27. Examples related to the NZDF deploying personnel who previously served in Vanuatu or were Ni-Vanuatu, this meant they spoke Bislama, which enhanced communication. Some stakeholders suggested the presence of Maori and Pacific Islanders in the NZDF meant the military had a greater understanding of the local culture and therefore

friendlier and easier to work with.[247] Due to a combination of these factors, some GoV officials reported it was easier to coordinate with the NZDF, in comparison to other foreign militaries such as the ADF.[248]

Initial tension and issues over control were reported

Despite these positive views, 70% of GoV interviewees identified 'areas for improvement' and three officials reported significant coordination issues with the NZDF.[249] These related to the NZDF's prioritisation of speed, organisational culture and the military's tendency to take control. These factors led some GoV officials to report that it was "*difficult to work with the military.*"[250]

In contrast to most interviewees who felt the NZDF's rapid arrival was positive, some GoV participants believed this negatively impacted coordination. One GoV official reported that NZDF personnel were viewed as *"trying to bulldoze everything"* in the initial response.[251] This frustrated officials and almost resulted in the first NZDF Hercules aircraft being denied approval to land in Vanuatu when a public servant did not receive the requested information.[252]

Other GoV interviewees believed the rapid influx of militaries and a lack of communication meant assets were not always suitable for the disaster context or used effectively.[253] One of these reflected,

> *"Your need to help is not what's important here and you need to listen to people like me or the Prime Minister's Office or NDMO… having all the military assets there for the first ten days or fourteen days, and them all to leave when really the hard work is just about to get started, is a bit tough."*[254]

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ability to coordinate. Examples related to the NZDF deploying personnel who previously served in Vanuatu or were Ni-Vanuatu, this meant they spoke Bislama, which enhanced communication. Participants commented that deploying a NZDF LTCOL who had previously served as head of the Engineers deployment in Vanuatu improved civil-military coordination. The LTCOL understood Bislama and had many local connections which assisted the NZDF with its TC Pam response. Another example raised was a RNZN sailor who was Ni-Vanuatu and deployed on the Canterbury. The representative spoke Bislama and was able to advise NZDF personnel on Vanuatu's culture and language.

[247] Interview: 23, 24, 25, 26.
[248] Interview: 23, 24.
[249] Interview: 22, 23, 24.
[250] Interview: 22.
[251] Interview: 22, 24, 25.
[252] The public servant interpreted this as the NZDF prioritising the speed of the New Zealand response over GoV desires. The GoV official reported, "*[The public servant] requested specific information. He said 'I need to know who and what type of personnel are you bringing into the country,' and [the NZDF] did not provide us, so he decided not to allow the plane to land.*"
[253] Interview: 22, 24. Some stakeholders felt the NZDF deployed assets and vehicles which were not always suitable for the Vanuatu context. Examples included a lack of helicopters with air lift capability, aircraft which could land on small outer islands, trucks that were suited to smaller island roads and vessels which could navigate the coral reefs and transport aid rapidly.
[254] Interview: 25.

These views led GoV participants to recommend the NZDF or GoNZ ask affected governments what support is needed before deployment.[255] They also reflected on whether staggering the arrival of assets or using these for longer periods, might be more beneficial for the affected population in the long term.[256]

Frustration and coordination issues were also reported over the control of NZDF assets. GoV officials felt NZDF personnel had, at times, undermined national leadership, which was considered disrespectful.[257] One GoV official recalled,

> *"When [NZDF personnel] walked [into the NDMO] they said 'we feel that it's proper for us to assist Shefa province, we're able to operate within that facility'… But normally it's the [Vanuatu] Government that should decide where [military assets] go."[258]*

These views were, however, challenged by NZDF and GoNZ participants, post-interview.[259]

iv. Coordination with the affected population

Perceptions tied to positive outcomes for the affected population

In general, participants' reported that relations and coordination between the NZDF and the affected population were positive. Many interviewees believed this was a natural reaction to the desperate situation communities were in, before the NZDFs arrival.[260] Some felt this meant the communities would have been grateful for any assistance provided.[261] One GoV official reflected on this as follows,

> *"The [Ni-Vanuatu] people are lovely people. They are not going to stand in the way of the [NZDF's] assistance… And they don't much care whether it's the Vanuatu Government, the New Zealand Government… They just want to*

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[255] Interview: 22, 25.

[256] This would however go against the UN Oslo guidelines and other humanitarian principles which recommend that militaries are only used as a last resort and for a short time period.

[257] Interview: 22, 25.

[258] Interview: 22. In contrast to this perspective GoNZ interviewees reported that the GoV had chosen New Zealand's area of operations.

[259] On seeing the final findings draft GoNZ representatives, in particular, reported NZDF and GoNZ officials had asked the GoV where they felt was most suitable.

[260] Interview: 1, 4, 10, 11, 23, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34. Many stakeholders reflected on the isolation and extensive needs within Epi Island and the Shepherds island group, which meant communities had received little help or communication prior to the NZDF's arrival. One GoV official acknowledged that it took six weeks to get food and shelter to some villages because of logistical and financial challenges (Interview: 23).

[261] Interview: 2, 12, 13, 20, 23, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34.

> *be assisted, to be cared for and have people know that…they've got serious issues."*[262]

All community representatives expressed this extreme gratitude and described the NZDF's assistance in a favourable light.[263] Some also stated that the NZDF's presence uplifted community spirits after the disaster.[264]

Contrasting views of the level of coordination and communication

Participant perspectives varied considerably regarding the level of communication between the NZDF and communities. Most NZDF, GoNZ and GoV interviewees, for example, believed local LOs and chiefs had helped facilitate communication.[265]

In contrast, ten participants, including 70% of community representatives reported there had been minimal interaction or communication between the NZDF and the population.[266] This outcome was linked to the NZDF communicating with only a small number of predominantly male leaders.[267] One community representative reflected,

> *"If [NZDF personnel] spend just one minute talking with somebody to make assessments, they can get [information] that… is not serious or is not too important... They are talking with some important people in the village, but… You cannot just talk to ONE person."*[268]

This meant information was not always shared with communities and only certain needs were reported to the NZDF.

Contrasting views of cultural understanding

Perspectives also varied concerning the impact culture had on coordination. For example, several interviewees believed the NZDF's "*friendly*" culture and the deployment of personnel with Maori or Pacific Island heritage made it easier for the affected population to coordinate

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[262] Interview: 23.
[263] Interview: 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34. Over 80% specifically requested that their thanks be passed on to the NZDF and GoNZ, for the assistance provided to affected communities. Many stated personnel arrived just in time, worked hard and repaired vital community infrastructure faster than other actors would have been able to.
[264] Interview: 34. The community representative stated: "*even only their presence… Because the cyclone has done damages physically and emotionally… seeing a military friend like the New Zealand military, on our island… Sort of uplifts our spirits again. Seeing… we are been cared for by other people.*"
[265] Interview: 1, 3, 4, 6, 10, 26, 28, 30, 32. This was believed to have mitigated language and culture barriers between military personnel and communities.
[266] Interview: 2, 5, 8, 20, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34.
[267] Interview: 8, 28, 29, 33, 34, 35.
[268] Interview: 29.

with personnel.[269] This contrasted with the perspectives of some locally-based interviewees. One highlighted that NZDF personnel were mainly Polynesian and that there were "*huge differences between Polynesian… and Melanesian cultures.*"[270] This meant cultural understanding and better coordination were not guaranteed for the NZDF.

Community representatives also reported examples where they felt cultural barriers impeded coordination with the NZDF.[271] Some reported Ni-Vanuatu were "*afraid*" to approach military personnel or felt they would be judged or considered lazy if they communicated their needs.[272] Some participants linked these concerns to Vanuatu's colonial past and development history.[273] Others reported communities were worried that questioning or disagreeing with the NZDF might lead to support being withdrawn.[274]

Communities desired greater levels of interaction and accountability

As a result of the lack of interaction and communication, four community representatives believed the NZDF had not understood or addressed the priority needs of communities.[275] One of these commented,

> "*It'd be more social [for NZDF personnel] to try and talk to locals… the people would really want to socialise more with them and ask them 'what are they doing?' And maybe if [the community] need some assistance, [the NZDF] can help them locally?*"[276]

This led all of these interviewees to recommend greater coordination between the NZDF and the affected population in the future.[277]

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[269] Interview: 3, 4, 5, 15, 23, 25, 26, 27, 29. An example of this was given by a New Zealand civilian stakeholder. They described how a NZDF officer gave Ni-Vanuatu a '*koha,*' in response to the local hospitality shown to the NZDF. The interviewee reflected that this was, "*hugely well received [by the local population] as a respectful gesture*" (Interview: 15). Koha is an old established Maori custom in New Zealand, similar traditions are held by Pacific cultures. It is a gift, either physical or in time and energy, which is about acknowledging people and showing respect.

[270] Interview: 25.

[271] Interview: 2, 26, 33, 34.

[272] Interview: 33.

[273] Interview: 11, 12, 13, 23, 24, 26, 33, 34. A number of participants suggested Vanuatu's colonial history impacted how white foreigners were perceived and treated by Ni-Vanuatu. One community representative described this as follows: "*It is more cultural. When [Ni-Vanuatu] see a white person they say 'Aah, he or she's coming to do something [important] so I might as well stay away from him or her.*'

[274] Interview: 24, 26, 33, 34.

[275] Interview: 29, 30, 33, 34.

[276] Interview: 34.

[277] A high proportion of community representatives also reported that unequal distribution had occurred either in the vicinity of the NZDF or with supplies that had been transported by the military. Although all community representatives believed NZDF personnel were unaware of this, many stakeholders recommended that the NZDF introduce mechanisms to ensure accountability and equal distribution in future HADR responses. These recommendations included: holding public meetings to identify priority needs, collaborating with CDC's or trusted locals, having male and female NZDF LOs that communities could speak with, and having NZDF personnel observe or conduct aid distribution themselves.

Part One findings

The sections above examined the perceptions of TC Pam stakeholders and presented key findings. One of these is that most interviewees viewed the NZDF's civil-military coordination efforts as good and beneficial. Some even considered the NZDF ahead of other militaries, in terms of coordination with the GoV and other civilian stakeholders.[278] Participants provided reasoning for these positive views. These included factors like the NZDF's characteristics and culture, previous interaction between actors and coordination mechanisms, such as the DJIATF.

In contrast to these positive perceptions, minimal or ad hoc coordination was also reported between the NZDF and sectors.[279] Some GoV representatives also felt there had been significant tensions and challenges when coordinating with the NZDF.

In general, these stakeholder perspectives portrayed a more critical view of the NZDF's civil-military coordination, than was expressed in the literature. Over 90% of all participants did, however, highlight a strong desire to coordinate more closely with the NZDF and enhance civil-military coordination efforts in future HADR responses.

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[278] Interview: 1, 4, 20, 23, 24.
[279] These sectors included New Zealand civilian actors, humanitarian agencies and the affected population.

Part Two: Obstacles to Coordination

This section reports the four key obstacles to the NZDF's civil-military coordination, as collated from interview data. An overview of these obstacles is presented in Table 2.[280]

Key obstacle	%	Sub-themes and coordination issues
i. Domestic factors	83%	− Measures taken to protect sovereignty and ensure national oversight impeded civil-military coordination. − The strain on national capacity (human, logistical and financial) impeded national coordination mechanisms. − Politics and personal interests impeded relationships, trust and civil-military coordination.
ii. Poor communication	66%	− Physical communication issues. − The use of terminology by military and civilian actors. − Communication and data band issues on HMNZS Canterbury. − Poor communication with the population, advanced by language, cultural barriers and limited engagement with local leadership. − Poor communication with humanitarian agencies.
iii. Lack of understanding	66%	Regarding: − The capabilities and roles of the NZDF − Ni-Vanuatu culture and context, other actors' capabilities and roles, HADR operations and the humanitarian principles (exhibited by NZDF personnel). − How the NZDF and civilian actors could communicate and coordinate. − How CIMIC teams and the DJIATF model integrated in HADR.
iv. Organisational culture	54%	− Clashes in priorities, culture and organisational structure (between NZDF and civilian actors). − High staff rotation (MFAT within country and NZDF/DJIATF staff within postings).

Table 5: Obstacles to the NZDF's Civil-Military Coordination in the TC Pam response

Due to the complexity of these obstacles and the number of sub-themes, a more thorough analysis of these is included in Appendix Four. This presents participant views and examples of the obstacles and sub-themes described in the table above.

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[280] The column on the far left details the thematic obstacle to coordination. The second column reports the percentage of interviewees who identified or provided examples of challenges associated with this obstacle. The third column describes sub-themes and barriers to coordination, which were identified by multiple interviewees. Some participants did not use specific terms to describe obstacles. Examples of coordination issues were therefore coded by the researcher, depending on their subject matter and theme.

Part Two findings

When collated, interviewee data revealed four thematic obstacles to the NZDF's civil-military coordination. In order of significance, these were: domestic factors, poor communication, lack of understanding, and organisational culture.

An examination of the statistics behind these findings is also revealing. First, each obstacle was described by at least half of all participants, including at least one representative from each of the four civilian sectors.[281] Three or more obstacles were also identified by 43% of all participants, including all of the NZDF and three GoNZ interviewees.[282] These high proportions and the consistency of reports across sectors strengthen the validity of findings.

Although some of these obstacles were discussed in the literature, interviewees identified many additional sub-themes, some of which were believed to have significantly civil-military coordination.[283] These obstacles were also frequently described as interconnected or dynamic. This meant some obstacles appeared to overlap and interact with one another.[284]

Many participants also emphasised that their willingness to discuss these obstacles with the researcher was motivated by a desire to improve civil-military coordination efforts in future responses. This acknowledgement, in addition to many interviewees reporting issues which were not discussed in the literature, draws attention to a discrepancy between published stakeholder views, and those reported by interviewees.

Part Three: How the Obstacles to Coordination Impacted HADR

Within interviews, participants identified four main impacts which resulted from the obstacles identified above. These are detailed below and include: i) HADR was delayed or not delivered, ii) assistance not always being suitable for the affected population or context, iii) population needs not always being met in accordance with humanitarian principles.

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[281] Between 83% and 54% of stakeholders identified these, with the most significant obstacle being discussed within twenty-nine of the thirty-five interviews.

[282] Interview: 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7.

[283] Domestic factors were, for example, the most frequently discussed obstacles to coordination, despite little mention or in-depth analyses of these in the broader literature or NZDF reports.

[284] For example some participants felt the NZDF's lack of understanding about the Ni-Vanuatu culture and language led to communication issues in the field. The reverse was noted by community representatives, which felt that poor communication between the NZDF and the population led to a lack of understanding about their needs. This highlights both the complexity of civil-military coordination and how a number of obstacles can contribute to challenges.

i. HADR was delayed or not delivered

Twenty-seven interviewees discussed examples where the assistance of the NZDF or other civilian stakeholders was delayed or not delivered because of the identified obstacles to civil-military coordination.[285] Some of these related to the NZDF and other actors duplicating assessments, which were completed before aid delivery or the commencement of tasks.[286] Other examples related to NZDF procedures around the use of aircraft and vessels.[287]

A frequently raised example was the lengthy reconnaissance which needed to be conducted by the NZDF, prior to the delivery of personnel or assistance in the outer islands. One GoV official described this as a "*REALLY BIG challenge*" as at times reconnaissance took a whole day to complete, while many populations remained isolated and were yet to receive food, water or medical assistance.[288]

A lack of communication between the NZDF public relations team and MFAT, in particular, had negative impacts on HADR. For example, one GoNZ interviewee reflected on how the public relations team's actions delayed the Canterbury's departure from Port Vila, to embark a television crew. The interviewee reflected on how this went against procedures, commenting,

> *"All communications from countries are meant to go through the High Commissioner... it was raised with [the NZDF] a couple of times and the guys on the ground were quite supportive, but the actual [NZDF Public Relations] team itself felt that it had its own mandate."[289]*

This delayed the NZDF's transportation of relief supplies for affected communities and angered MFAT officials, who had not given their approval.

The GoV, OGAs and humanitarian participants also reported not being able to utilise NZDF assets or support effectively, which impeded their ability to provide and deliver assistance.[290] One GoV official, for instance, reported that it was three days before the GoV could utilise NZDF assets in the initial response, due to "*the language barrier, the way they operate, the protocol*."[291] At times, similar factors meant humanitarians struggled to meet the NZDF's

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[285] Interview: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 33, 34.
[286] Stakeholders connected this to a lack of communication, organisational culture issues and domestic factors. This was because politics and interests were believed to have led to a lack of trust.
[287] Stakeholders connected this to organisational culture issues and a lack of understanding. This was because local actors and fishermen knew the coral reefs and could have helped guide these vessels.
[288] Interview: 28.
[289] Interview: 1.
[290] Interview: 2, 3, 4, 8, 9,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20, 22 , 25, 29, 30, 33. This was connected to a lack of communication, organisational culture issues and domestic factors. The latter related to sovereignty concerns, politics and interests, which led to tensions when the GoV, NZDF and MFAT all tried to maintain control over assets.
[291] Interview: 22.

planning requirements. This meant aid and personnel were "*missed*" and could not be delivered to affected populations as rapidly.[292]

ii. Assistance was not always suitable for the affected population or context

Sixteen interviewees provided examples where obstacles resulted in assistance being either unsuitable for the disaster context or affected population.[293] Some participants reported the NZDF's assets and supplies were not always suitable for the outer island context.[294] This was reportedly due to a lack of understanding about the area of operations, as well as a lack of communication between the NZDF, GoV and local stakeholders before deployment.

Participants also connected this outcome to the NZDF's prioritisation of speed and protocol.[295] One NZDF interviewee believed the drive to depart rapidly meant the Canterbury was "*loaded at about a 60% solution,*" whereas an additional forty-eight hours would have provided a better outcome for the population.[296]

In other cases, NZDF reportedly delivered Non-Food Items, equipment and aid to communities, but did not communicate how these were to be used or maintained.[297] Some participants also reported the NZDF's decision-making processes and HADR did not account for gender or women's needs.[298] These outcomes were connected to the NZDF predominantly communicating with male leadership and the military's lack of awareness, cooperation and utilisation of trustworthy mechanisms, such as Community Disaster Committees.[299]

Some negative impacts will likely have negative long-term impacts on communities

Finally, some of the tasks undertaken by the NZDF were perceived to have had negative long-term repercussions for the affected population. A GoV representative, for instance, recounted

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[292] Interview: 14. This was connected to a lack of understanding about NZDF assets and procedures.

[293] Interview: 2, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 22, 25, 28, 29, 31, 33, 35.

[294] Interview: 22, 25, 28, 29, 31, 33, 35. Stakeholders observed that as opposed to large quantities of corrugated iron, outer-island communities needed tarpaulins to weatherproof their thatched housing, as well as a greater number of water tanks and repairs to water sources. Others noted the NZDF lacked air lift capability, aircraft which could land on outer islands, smaller vehicles to drive on small island roads and vessels which could navigate reefs and transport aid to smaller, isolated islands.

[295] Interview: 2, 5, 22, 25, 28, 29, 31, 33, 35.

[296] Interview: 5. In this example HQ JFNZ placed restrictions on the DJIATF, which limited the Joint Reconnaissance Teams' ability to gather information prior to the Canterbury's departure.

[297] Interview: 8, 9. Due to the isolation of some communities, instructions were often needed so that individuals could use western aid effectively. In one example it was explained that even operating a water tap would need to be explained in some communities, along with how to maintain these systems.

[298] Interview: 5, 8, 9, 29, 33.

[299] Interview: 2, 8, 11, 17, 22, 25, 28. One humanitarian believed the NZDF were either not aware of or did not use Community Disaster Committees. They stated, "*I have seen a village that forces went to and drive directly to community and distributing relief without coordination with [the Community Disaster Committee].*" Interview: 8.

how NZDF personnel were tasked to clear fallen trees and chop wood at the Prime Minister's Office. They reflected,

> *"Apparently* [sarcasm implied] *there wasn't anything else for [the NZDF] to do… This [local] person said to me… 'We should be paying a Ni-Vanuatu person to do that, so that they've got some money to take home and buy food for their family or put a new roof on their house.'"[300]*

This suggests some of the NZDF's tasks may have been more appropriate for local stakeholders or individuals to undertake, for long term development benefits. These examples highlight some areas for improvement, particularly surrounding how the NZDF's tasks are identified and making sure these account for the HADR context and long-term development impacts on the population.

iii. Population needs were not met in accordance with the humanitarian principles

Nine interviewees believed the four key obstacles and a lack of civil-military coordination contributed to some population needs not being met.[301] Participants felt this was a result of a lack of communication and coordination between the NZDF, GoV and humanitarian actors. This meant the NZDF predominantly focused on infrastructure repairs, while communities had higher priority humanitarian needs that were not being met by other actors. Four community representatives confirmed this occurred, reporting that food, water, medical supplies and shelter were actually their urgent needs.[302]

Interviewees also felt a lack of communication between the NZDF and the affected population contributed to this outcome. Community representatives and other interviewees believed the NZDF was either unaware of community needs or had not asked what these were.[303] One humanitarian interviewee reflected on how this impacted the population, they commented,

> *"When [our organisation] did research post Cyclone Pam [community members] said, '[the military] didn't ask me about what I need. They were basically giving me these relief items, but I don't need them'… These [affected] people are hungry and living without water and maybe some of the*

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[300] Interview: 25.
[301] Interview: 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 29, 30, 33, 34.
[302] Interview: 29, 30, 33, 34. One community representative ranked their needs in order of priority while the NZDF was operating in their area. These were: "*Food supplies, water accessories… storage tanks with lids and pipes to connect us to our water sources… planting materials, medical supplies, building material supplies, fencing materials, garden tools and hand building and fencing tools, stationary supplies for school children.*" The NZDF was however tasked by the GoV and MFAT to focus on infrastructure repairs, debris clearance and repairing water supplies.
[303] Interview: 8, 29, 30, 33, 34.

*children are having health problems… while waiting upon the response from
the [Vanuatu] Government."*[304]

The fact that the NZDF may not have focused on the priority needs was discussed and defended
by one GoV official. They reflected,

> *"In a different role [the NZDF] could have done some other things good or
> better. But that WASN'T their role. You can't fault them for their role. They
> were given a role to play and they played that role very well."*[305]

The GoV participant acknowledged that it took six weeks for some stakeholders to get food and
shelter to some communities on Epi Island and the Shepherds island group, due to logistical and
financial issues.[306] This, however, meant that while the NZDF was not tasked to meet these
needs, there were higher priority humanitarian needs in their vicinity.

Assistance was not always focused in areas of need

Eight participants also reported the NZDF had not always focused its assistance in areas of
greatest need.[307] Many believed the NZDF began assisting in areas of Epi Island which were
easier to access and less severely damaged than the smaller, more isolated Shepherds islands
nearby. These smaller islands reportedly had greater humanitarian needs and yet were not
assisted by the NZDF until near the end of the deployment.[308] One NZDF interviewee reported
that the military was aware of this in hindsight, along with the fact that local actors had already
completed and returned needs assessments of these islands, before the NZDF's arrival.[309]

Some participants were aware stakeholders were trying to manipulate the NZDF's HADR

Fifteen participants raised concerns that this or other examples of NZDF assistance were the
result of local actors manipulating the NZDF's assistance for their own interests.[310] This
included one GoV official, who stated,

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[304] Interview: 8. Organisation name removed to preserve confidentiality.
[305] Interview: 23.
[306] Interview: 23.
[307] Interview: 2, 6, 8, 11, 29, 30, 31, 33, 35.
[308] Interview: 2, 6, 8, 11, 29, 30, 33. Representatives felt the NZDF had only focused on the West Vermali area of Epi Island
which was easy-to-access. This meant more isolated communities and some of those in greater need did not receive any or the
same level of assistance.
[309] Interview: 6. The interviewee stated: *"[Epi Island] did sustain some damage but relative to Tongoa [Island] it was in much
better state, which [NZDF personnel] only discovered two, three days later through another reconnaissance… the local
[Community Disaster Committee representative] on Tongoa, he was adamant that his report had gone back and the NDMO…
had already received his report prior to [NZDF personnel] arriving."*
[310] Interview: 2, 5, 6, 9, 14, 16, 18, 21, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35.

"In Vanuatu we have a lot of political parties and during distribution times it's easy for people in politics to influence, to step in and you know try to make a name for themselves using the aid that's coming from New Zealand."[311]

Interviewees also felt the lack of coordination between the NZDF and local actors who distributed aid meant that unfair distribution occurred in some communities.[312] Among these were six community representatives, some of who believed this aid was transported by the NZDF. Participants also reported it was the most vulnerable members of the community that often missed out on this assistance, such as widows, single mothers, orphans and those with disabilities.[313]

While most NZDF and GoNZ participants reported politics had not impacted the NZDF's response or stated they were unaware if it had, two acknowledged they were aware of these factors and attempts to manipulate HADR.[314] One GoNZ interviewee stated,

"The [local] representative on board [Canterbury] they were… 'influencing' where all the relief was going. Most of it would be going to the particular island where they are from. That is just from a PERSONAL perspective."[315]

This reveals a major challenge for NZDF personnel overseas, particularly when under the direction of governments and operating with limited information on the needs in outer islands.

Part Three findings

In the sections above, interviewees reported several impacts they felt obstacles to civil-military coordination had on HADR. Three of the major impacts entailed assistance being delayed, not delivered or being unsuitable for the affected population or context. Serious concerns were also raised by participants about the priority needs of communities not being met, as well as unfair distribution occurring and impacting vulnerable sectors of the population. Although not always directly attributed to the NZDF, these outcomes were believed to be the result of either a lack of civil-military coordination or communication between the NZDF and key sectors.

Analysis of these reports also reveals that, in many cases, interviewees believed that multiple obstacles contributed to the negative impacts on HADR. This illustrates the complexity of civil-military coordination and draws further attention to the interconnected and dynamic nature of the identified obstacles to coordination.

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[311] Interview: 28.
[312] Interview: 2, 14, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35.
[313] Interview: 8, 9, 29, 30, 32, 33.
[314] Interview: 2, 5. One of these was a NZDF representative, the other was from the GoNZ.
[315] Interview: 2.

Finally, many interviewees expressed hesitancy about critiquing the NZDF or GoV response. This particularly concerned how the obstacles to coordination were impacting the assistance. While most displayed hesitancy through body language or chose not to provide examples, some openly discussed their concerns in interviews.[316] These views raise concerns about how valid data and feedback can be obtained following HADR responses, particularly if stakeholders are afraid of receiving negative repercussions for their honesty.

Chapter Three summary

In the chapter above, TC Pam interviewee findings were examined. These detailed how the thirty-five interviewed stakeholders perceived the NZDF's civil-military coordination efforts, obstacles to coordination and the impacts these had on HADR.

Findings confirm that most participants viewed the NZDF's civil-military coordination efforts as positive and beneficial for actors. Interviewee data, however, provided a greater depth of analysis on the reasons why different sectors and stakeholders held these perspectives. These included the NZDF's characteristics and culture, previous interaction and coordination mechanisms, such as the DJIATF.

Other aspects of these findings reveal a discrepancy between the perspectives reported in the literature and those of interviewed stakeholders from the same sectors. For example, four thematic obstacles to coordination were identified by participants, along with numerous sub-themes, which were not discussed in the literature. Some of these also reportedly had serious negative impacts on the NZDF's civil-military coordination and actors' HADR.[317] The most concerning of these reports suggests the priority needs of communities were not always met, unfair distribution occurred and vulnerable sectors of the population were the most impacted.

The fact that the literature did not discuss some of these obstacles to coordination and their impacts on HADR, in particular, raises some concerns. These surround the fact that the NZDF and GoNZ may not have been aware of stakeholder views, all barriers to coordination and the impacts these may have had on HADR.

TC Pam interview findings, therefore, reinforce the need for a robust analysis of civil-military coordination in Pacific HADR. Their contentious nature also justifies the need to examine more than one case study, to verify and compare data. This is undertaken in the following chapter, which examines the literature concerning the NZDF's 2016 response to TC Winston, in Fiji.

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[316] These largely surrounded concerns that the GoNZ, GoV or NZDF might withdraw support either during the TC pam response or in the future, if stakeholders provided negative feedback.
[317] These impacts included assistance being delayed, not delivered or being unsuitable for the affected population or context.

Chapter Four: Many Hands Make Light Work

Having now examined the TC Pam case study, this chapter will focus on the TC Winston response and findings which were drawn from the literature. The scope of the case study includes all coordination which took place in New Zealand and Fiji, between 13 February and 17 April 2016.[318] The chapter is structured identically to chapter two. Part One describes the context of the NZDF's response. Part Two explores stakeholder perspectives on the NZDF's civil-military coordination, including obstacles to coordination and their impact on HADR.

Part One: Overview of the TC Winston disaster and response

The sections below describe key elements of the TC Winston disaster and civil-military coordination. They provide an overview of the disaster scale and humanitarian needs, the overall HADR response, and the civil-military coordination mechanisms applied. This provides the context needed to understand the NZDF's civil-military coordination efforts, which are explored in Part Two.

i. Disaster scale and humanitarian needs

Between the 20th and 21st of February 2016, TC Winston passed through all four of Fiji's Divisions.[319] Hurricane-force winds of up to 306 kilometres an hour were recorded. This meant the country had endured the most powerful Category 5 cyclones ever recorded in the southern hemisphere (GoF, 2016).[320]

The disaster left a trail of destruction across 167 of the archipelago's islands (GoF, 2016). The main island of Viti Levu and the Lau Island Group were both severely affected, where NZDF later assisted (see Figure 4). One NZDF representative gave their first impressions of the affected islands as follows:

> *"I saw the raw effects of what Winston had done; no leaves left on trees, and [the villages] just stood there naked. An island that was now brown and had lost all of its green, no roofs on houses and the church had taken some damage too. The wharf was destroyed… A quiet, still island; soon be flooded by NZDF, USAR and Fijian Army Personnel"* (Navy Today, 2016).

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[318] These dates include coordination which occurred in the week prior to the cyclone event and all interaction which took place until HMNZS Canterbury departed from Fiji on 17 April 2016.

[319] The cyclone travelled west, severely affecting all areas shaded red in Figure X. Fiji's Divisions are depicted in Figure X, they are the Eastern, Northern, Central and Western Divisions.

[320] Category 5 on the Saffir-Simpson scale describes a cyclone with winds of over 252 kilometres an hour. This is the highest category and suggests catastrophic damage will occur.

Figure 4: Path of TC Winston and severely affected areas. Source (OCHA, 2015).

The resulting destruction was greater than anything seen in previous natural disasters.[321] Approximately 540,400 individuals were impacted, this being 60% of the population (GoF, 2016). Communication was severed to most affected islands and power cuts were experienced in 80% of Fiji (GoF, 2016). The restoration of these services took up to four months in some areas, which isolated many communities in the initial response (Radio New Zealand, 2016g).

Major humanitarian needs were created. Residential housing was severely impacted, displacing nearly half of Fiji's population (NZDF, 2016b, Baker-Wilson, 2016).[322] Schools and hospitals also suffered extensive damage, which halted medical and education services in some areas (GoF,

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[321] Fiji experienced numerous natural disasters in the decade prior. Several floods occurred between 2009 and 2012, along with TC Thomas in 2010 and Evan in 2012. TC Zena also followed only two months after Winston.
[322] Single districts estimated they had 5000 to 6000 people in their evacuation centres. One chief reported that 500 villagers were sheltering in the six houses which remained after TC Winston.

2016, Round, 2017).[323] The PDNA indicated the individuals who were worst affected by TC Winston were already those in the most impoverished sector of society (GoF, 2016).[324]

In some locations, total crop losses were reported. These were further exacerbated by El Nino-related water shortages and TC Zena, which struck two months after Winston (UN OCHA, 2016i, Round, 2016a). This led up to 70% of farmers to abandon their crops, which jeopardised the livelihoods of over half of Fiji's population (Round, 2016c, Radio New Zealand, 2016f, UN OCHA, 2016f).[325]

In total, damages and losses were estimated at FJ$1.99 billion - approximately 22% of Fiji's GDP (GoF, 2016, World Bank, 2018).[326] These figures meant that despite the Island nation having one of the strongest economies in the Pacific, external support was required to address the aforementioned needs. While the UN's Flash Appeal later made the TC Winston response the best-funded emergency of 2016, figures suggest less than half of the required funds were donated (UN OCHA, 2016i).[327] These factors, and the fact that foreign military assets were offered at no cost to stakeholders, likely contributed to the NZDF and other foreign militaries playing a major role in the response.

This repeated cycle of destruction and recovery highlights not only the challenges faced by Fiji but the many other Pacific Island countries enduring increasingly intense and frequent natural disasters. This trend reinforces the importance of this study and research into civil-military coordination, to ensure Pacific HADR stakeholders are working together well and adequately addressing the needs of affected communities.

ii. Overview of the national and international response

The initial response

In contrast to the TC Pam response, the Fijian capital Suva was relatively undamaged. This meant a rapid national response was able to be initiated by the GoF, which placed the Fijian NDMO in charge of response coordination. A State of Natural Disaster was announced for all

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[323] The GoV reported that 55% of schools and 88 medical facilities were either damaged or destroyed in the cyclone.
[324] Data from 2013 and 2014 reported that 35% of Fijians lived below the basic needs poverty line. Hardest hit were the Northern and Eastern Divisions which had the highest poverty rates, at 48% and 40% respectively.
[325] By June 2016 the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation reported major shortages of fruit, vegetables and fish. Articles also reported that children were being hospitalised for malnutrition around this time.
[326] Fiji's GDP was calculated from World Bank data, which reported Fiji's GDP as US$4.39 billion in 2015. TC Winston damages and losses equated to NZD $1.39 billion.
[327] The Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster only received 39% of the funding required. Combined with TC Zena setbacks, this left an on-going need for seeds and seedlings. The Shelter Cluster also received only 21% of the requested funding, which meant thousands of families would lack shelter and not have the means to "Build Back Safer."

Divisions, on 20 February and would later be extended until 19 April (Bainimarama, 2016, Radio New Zealand, 2016c).[328] This enabled the GoF to request emergency support from Fijian Ministries, police, RFMF and foreign militaries, to be used at officials' discretion.

The Fijian Prime Minister Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama then appealed for international assistance the following day (UN OCHA, 2016c). This call was responded to by twenty-nine foreign governments,[329] seven foreign militaries[330] and many humanitarian stakeholders (UN OCHA, 2016f).[331]

Response priorities and data collection

The GoF announced multiple priorities in the response and undertook these in two phases. Phase one focused on the provision of basic needs such as food, water, shelter and accessibility (Fiji Village, 2016). Phase two focused on the restoration of essential services, such as electricity, water, ports, health and educational services (Fiji Village, 2016).

The Republic of Fiji Military Force (RFMF) played a major role in spearheading these priorities. RFMF personnel were put in charge of evacuating affected communities, coordinating logistics and distributing food and non-food items (Bainimarama, 2016, UN OCHA, 2016d).[332] This level of military involvement is considered unusual in Pacific HADR, as few Island States have national militaries, particularly the size of the RFMF (Rotan Charter, 2012).[333]

Similarly to the TC pam response, logistical, resource and communication challenges, however, impeded overall HADR efforts. For example, while some officials stated that all communities had received emergency assistance by early March, other stakeholder reports challenged these reports (NEOC, 2016, Fiji News, 2016).[334] Some of these suggested that HADR was delayed and

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[328] Although legislation limited this State to 30 days, a second 30-day period was announced on 21 March. This extension only applied to red zone areas, including the northern Lau Group, where the NZDF was based until departure on 17 April.

[329] Donor Governments included: Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, European Union, France, French Polynesia, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kiribati, Lithuania, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Sweden, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea, Tonga, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Vanuatu.

[330] FRANZ partners included the ADF, NZDF and Armed Forces of New Caledonia (FANC) and Armed Forces of French Polynesia (FAPF). India, Indonesia and Tonga also made significant military contributions. The Tongan Government deployed two Navy vessels which assisted in Vanuabalvu and the Lau Island group, alongside the NZDF.

[331] Humanitarian actors began to be accepted by the GoF on 22 February. The support of UN OCHA and the Pacific Humanitarian Team (PHT) was among the first accepted. Local organisations such as the Fiji Red Cross Society also played significant roles in the response. This included at least forty five agencies which attended meetings organised by the Fiji Council of Social Service and the Pacific Islands Association of NGOs (PIANGO).

[332] Damage assessments and ration distribution were initiated by the military immediately after the cyclone.

[333] The RFMF is large in relation to Fiji's population as it has more than 3,500 active soldiers and 6,000 reservists. Five Fijian maritime assets were also allocated areas within which they provided assistacne. These included the MV Sigavou (Northern Division), MV Vunlagi (Western Division) and MV Cagivou (Eastern Division).

[334] Officials reported that more than 370,000 individuals had received the first round emergency food distributions by the end of March. This was 90% of the GoF's targeted population.

not getting through to the most vulnerable (Baker-Wilson, 2016, Radio New Zealand, 2016l, Baleilevuka and Dipitika, 2016).[335]

Delays created by TC Zena also meant the PDNA was released sixty-five days after TC Winston (UN OCHA, 2016g, p.1, GoF, 2016, p.23). This meant stakeholders had to rely on locally-based sources and data to determine their priorities and meet humanitarian needs. Collectively, these factors led agencies and donors to call for greater visibility in future responses, to ensure their aid was being distributed according to humanitarian needs (UN OCHA, 2016f, p.3, NEOC, 2016, p.3, Fiji News, 2016).

Foreign military support

Despite previous diplomatic tensions between Fiji, Australia and New Zealand, the assistance of the NZDF and other FRANZ partners was quickly accepted by the GoF (UN OCHA, 2016c, McDermott, 2016).[336] These militaries were deployed for up to eight weeks and assisted in the GoF's highest priority areas (see Figure 5), in terms of cyclone damage and humanitarian needs (ADF, 2016, UN OCHA, 2016b). This scale of foreign military support exceeded that deployed for any previous Pacific HADR response.

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[335] As early as six days after the cyclone, humanitarian and community representatives reported that aid was not getting through to the most vulnerable. Reports also noted that isolated communities were often the last to receive aid, as the 10% of the population which hadn't been reached by stakeholders were located in hard-to-access areas.

[336] These tensions were briefly detailed in the introduction and will be discussed in greater detail within Part Two. They related to the Fijian coup and the reactions of the GoNZ and GoA to this.

Figure 5: TC Winston GoF priority areas. Source: (FAO, 2016).[337]

Foreign militaries were deployed alongside RFMF contingents, within separate geographical boundaries. Their major tasks included logistical support, clearing debris and restoring critical infrastructure (ADF, 2016, NZDF, 2016g). Considering the NZDF was deployed for longer than any other foreign military and was allocated the GoF's number one priority area, the force's civil-military coordination would be vital for ensuring population needs were met.

Some concerning obstacles to coordination and the distribution of HADR

Within the literature, some stakeholders raised concerns about corruption and the misuse of aid. Some articles alleged RFMF personnel consumed or sold aid that was intended for cyclone victims (Radio New Zealand, 2016b, Rowan Gard and Veitayaki, 2017, p.161). Members of Fiji's Opposition party also accused GoF officials of *favouritism, nepotism* and devoting most of their energy to "*looking good on the international stage and ignoring the plight of the ordinary people at home*" (Radio New Zealand, 2016b, Radio New Zealand, 2016k).[338]

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[337] Figure 5 details the twelve priority zones in the response, these were designated by the GoF and are listed in order of priority. The Lau Island Group is centre right in the diagram and was where the NZDF and JTF was predominantly based throughout the TC Winston response. The ADF focused its support in the islands of Koro and Taveuni, in the Lomaviti group (GoF priority two in Figure 5). The HMAS Canberra and the majority of the Australian JTF were deployed to Fiji on 26 February and returned 01 April. NZDF and French military Forces alternatively focused on the Lau Island Group (GoF priority one). The NZDF and the majority of its JTF deployed from 28 February and departed on 17 April. French Forces departed 24 February; it is unclear how long French Forces stated for but at least until 15 March.

[338] Fiji's Opposition party called for greater accountability and transparency, particularly surrounding GoF control over foreign assistance. Opposition leaders stated the public was entitled to know the extent of damage caused by Cyclone Winston, while donor nations should be told about government's plans for managing the crisis and the large flow of aid within the country.

Community representatives also alleged that some offers of military support were conditional and motivated by political interests (Radio New Zealand, 2016j).[339] The cyclone also struck in the lead-up to Fiji's 2018 elections, which heightened domestic tensions (Cook Island News, 2016, Radio New Zealand, 2017, Tahana, 2016). Diplomatic tensions were also reported between Fiji, New Zealand and Australia, although Prime Minister Bainimarama commented that New Zealand media was *"exaggerating the tension between the two countries"* (Radio New Zealand, 2016d, Round, 2016d).

Concerns were also raised about the accuracy of information published during and after the HADR response. Stakeholders noted the "*absence of critical baseline data"* and *"reliable assessment results highlighting areas of need"* (UN OCHA, 2016i, p.2). This was acknowledged in the PDNA, which confirmed there were no records of aid supplies, once they reached the divisions (GoF, 2016, p.114).[340] Some linked this lack of information-sharing to Fiji's Media Industry Decree, suggesting that published articles did not always reflect what was occurring on the ground (Round, 2016b, Amnesty International, 2017).[341] The leader of the Fijian Opposition Party supported these concerns, stating that "self-censorship" was widespread in Fiji and among the media (Round, 2016b).

Some of the allegations above were validated by the Fijian office of the Auditor-General, which confirmed that disciplinary action was taken against GoF officials in 2017 (Vuibau, 2017). These measures related to the unauthorised diversion of rations, delays in aid delivery or rations being unaccounted for. No sources, however, reflected on how the aforementioned factors may have impacted civil-military coordination, or the NZDF's response specifically.

Stakeholder perspectives on civil-military coordination

Within the literature, many stakeholders reflected on the differences between the TC Pam and Winston responses. In general, stakeholders reported that the overall response coordination was "*much smoother*" in Fiji and "*a completely different kettle of fish*" from the response a year

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[339] Comments referred to the Government of Indonesia's offer of military support. This was connected to political interests in West Papua. Local stakeholders clarified they did not believe the GoNZ and GoA had set pre-conditions for HADR, despite these Governments being seen as opponents of Fiji's Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama.

[340] This meant actors and the GoF could not evidence where their aid was delivered or that it had reached targeted communities. This presents a significant issue as it cannot be evidenced that aid and rations were distributed according to need, and therefore according to the humanitarian principles.

[341] The Media Industry Decree was introduced in June 2010. This enables the Fiji Media Industry Development Authority to enforce and investigate possible violations by local media outlets. The Fiji Times editor and publisher were reported to be facing sedition charges post-disaster. GoF officials accused the Fiji Times of being a "*mischief maker*" surrounding post-cyclone sugar industry issues. Articles also alleged that individuals were being intimidated or threatened for speaking out against the GoF.

earlier (Narayan, 2016). This was linked to the NGO community learning lessons from Vanuatu and fewer humanitarian actors arriving in the country.[342]

Stakeholders also believed the HADR response was more controlled due to the GoF's approach, which they described as "*centralist*" and largely implemented by the RFMF (Narayan, 2016, Loy, 2017). Locally-based actors, including one representative from the Fijian Red Cross, perceived this as a protectionist measure to ensure the GoF and national stakeholders maintained control. They stated,

> "*The international response a year earlier in neighbouring Vanuatu… had been completely overpowering. International aid agencies, donors, and the United Nations swept in, bringing their own systems and ways of doing things… When Cyclone Winston struck, Fiji's government was determined not to let the same thing happen*" (Loy, 2017).

The TC Winston lessons learned report also concluded that civil-military coordination efforts had been very good (GoF and SPC, 2017).[343] This concluded that military resources achieved a rapid scaling-up of HADR operations, which was "*far in advance of what would have been possible with civilian capabilities alone*" (GoF and SPC, 2017, p.40). Only a small number of civil-military coordination issues were discussed in this report, which included some common obstacles to coordination (GoF and SPC, 2017).[344]

State and UN stakeholders also reported that civil-military coordination efforts were successful, beneficial and "*a real team effort*" (McDermott, 2016). A World Bank report even linked the quick deployment of assets and relief to the RFMF's role in the response, which contributed to "*strong civil-military coordination*" between the GoF and foreign militaries (Mansur *et al.*, 2017, p.5).

In contrast, some locally-based humanitarian stakeholders reported that foreign militaries lacked an understanding of national structures and had "*worked separately to local systems*"

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[342] The same influx of actors did not occur as in Vanuatu. This was due to GoF restrictions, which placed the NDMO in charge of all foreign assistance and accepted humanitarian agencies on a case-by-case basis. Fiji's central location in the Pacific also meant many INGOs already had staff or national branches located on Fiji's mainland, which reduced the number of incoming agencies. This led humanitarians to reflect that the TC Winston response was "*a completely different kettle of fish"* to the TC Pam response NARAYAN, R. 2016. UNICEF says Winston response benefits from Pam lesson, 20 April. Loop Vanuatu. Available: http://www.loopvanuatu.com/content/unicef-says-winston-response-benefits-pam-lesson.

[343] TC Winston lessons learned workshops were attended by over 500 participants from the GoF, local and international NGOs, affected communities, the private sector, humanitarian partners, sub-national government and civil society groups. The report summarises discussions and recommendations collated from these workshops. Although the workshop was hosted by the GoF, it was funded by the EU's ACP-EU Building Safety and Resilience in the Pacific project, the Pacific Community and UN OCHA.
[344] These are discussed in greater detail in Part Two. Obstacles included poor communication, information management issues and a lack of understanding about the roles and responsibilities of military and civilian actors.

(Winterford and Gero, 2018, p.15). These seemingly disparate views indicate a more detailed examination of civil-military coordination is needed, which is undertaken in Part Two.

The TC Winston response led to calls for more regional civil-military coordination

Following the disaster, interest was generated to develop a regional framework to enhance civil-military coordination. Stakeholders recommended this involve more civil-military training and HADR exercises in the Pacific (GoF and SPC, 2017, p.41).

Two different models for the use of militaries in future HADR responses were also proposed. The first entailed militaries assuming a central coordination role, while the other involved militaries providing support only when called upon by stakeholders (GoF and SPC, 2017, p.41).[345] Advantages to both approaches were noted, as these "*[capitalised] on the military's unique capabilities… and [ensured] civilian leadership in areas where they have comparative strengths*" (GoF and SPC, 2017, p.41).

Regional momentum was further evidenced during a civil-military workshop hosted by Fiji in 2018 (Kumar, 2018).[346] State representatives discussed the possibility of creating a civil-military taskforce in the Pacific, with the Fijian Minister for National Disaster Management concluding:

> "*this is what we want in the region - for countries to have a civil and military taskforce that is able to prepare for and respond to the disaster events both domestically and abroad… it is essential that we utilise the skills and experience to design a framework for a regional response and recovery mechanism*" (Kumar, 2018).

These perspectives evidence a growing desire to improve future civil-military coordination in the Pacific. This further reinforces the importance of this study, to help identify previous obstacles to civil-military coordination and the HADR provided by stakeholders.

iii. Civil-military coordination mechanisms

The following sections describe the major civil-military coordination mechanisms used by the NZDF in the TC Winston response. This provides the reader with the context needed to understand Part Two findings.

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[345] The report would however state that in either scenario there was a need to: strengthen communication, information management structures, and train military personnel in humanitarian assistance and protection principles to inform their work.
[346] The workshop was co-hosted by the GoF and GoA, it was attended by stakeholders from Fiji, Australia, New Zealand, France, the US, European Union, and UN. It was a three day Pacific civil-military disaster response coordination workshop to strengthen national and regional coordination in disaster preparedness, response and recovery.

National coordination structures

Fiji's national disaster management structures were similar to those used in Vanuatu. Offers of military support were initially discussed between Foreign Affairs officials, within the FRANZ arrangement. This ensured Governments maintained control over their military assets, while the GoF accepted the assistance it required.

The Fijian NDMO and NEOC were both co-located in Suva and became focal points for civil-military coordination (GoF, 2016).[347] Coordination between the GoF, Fijian Ministries and humanitarian agencies was undertaken within a National Cluster System.[348] The level of GoF and RFMF involvement in the NDMO, NEOC and Clyster System was, however, unusual (Winterford and Gero, 2018, p.15).[349] GoF Ministers and RFMF personnel were seconded to the NEOC and coordinated closely with foreign military LOs (Government of Fiji, 2013, Section 7.11). Most of these officials were either serving or ex-RFMF personnel, including Prime Minister Bainimarama, who served as Commander of the RFMF until 2014 (GoF, 2014b, Fraenkel *et al.*, 2009).[350]

These national-level structures were also linked to coordination mechanisms at the divisional, provincial and district levels, which some militaries engaged with in the field.[351] Most interaction between foreign militaries and the affected population was, however, facilitated by RFMF personnel or GoV elected LOs (Quilliam, 2016). At the village level, these communicated with District Officers, Roko Tui, village headmen or Turaga Ni Koro.[352]

New civil-military coordination mechanisms were developed

Although Fiji's disaster management structure was extensive, the legislation did not clarify the role of militaries or how civil-military coordination would be facilitated in HADR (Gero *et al.*,

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[347] The NDMO took responsibility for coordinating the overall disaster effort, while the NEOC controlled information management. Legislation states that the Fijian NDMO is manned by twelve permanent staff. The NDMO and NEOC operate under the authority of the Director NDMO, who also acted as National Disaster Coordinator.

[348] The National Cluster System was first applied in the 2012 TC Evan response and is an adaption of the UN humanitarian cluster system. Within the structure the NDMO takes charge of inter-cluster coordination, while GoF Ministries lead eight individual clusters.

[349] NEOC Standard Operating Procedures state that a RFMF Military LO was to be based in the NEOC to liaise with the RFMF for military tasking and resources. During the response, Fiji's Prime Minister was briefed by foreign militaries, humanitarian actors and donor Governments and helped determine the tasks militaries undertook in the response.

[350] The impact RFMF involvement and the militarisation of the NEOC may have had on the NZDF's civil-military coordination will be discussed further in Part Two and in Chapter Five. Prime Minister Bainimarama was Commander of the RFMF for the last fifteen of his thirty nine years in the RFMF.

[351] Divisional Commissioners assumed responsibility for the coordination of emergency operations in each of the four divisions. Disaster Management Committees (DISMAC) were also established at the Divisional, Provincial and District levels. District Officers were then responsible for distributing relief supplies and aid after the disaster.

[352] Roko Tui is the title for the executive head of any one of Fiji's Provincial Councils. The position of village headman is locally termed as Turaga Ni Koro, which is determined through the ancestral line.

2013, GoF, 2014a, White, 2015).[353] Changes to the NEOC and National Cluster system were also made as the response progressed and new civil-military coordination mechanisms developed (GoF and SPC, 2017).[354]

The main mechanism was the 'Future Operations' cell, which coordinated the deployment and use of foreign military assets (GoF and SPC, 2017).[355] This cell was established in the NEOC, was led by the Minister for National Disaster Management and was restricted to military personnel (Cava, 2014). Foreign military LOs were embedded in this cell and received written requests for assistance from civilian stakeholders. These were undertaken if approved by the Minister for National Disaster Management and respective Foreign Affairs officials. This ensured the GoF and foreign States maintained civilian control over the deployed militaries.

The other civil-military coordination mechanism consisted of two UN-CMCoord officers who were based in the NDMO (UN OCHA, 2016f).[356] These officers facilitated communication between humanitarian agencies, the National Logistics Cluster, RFMF and foreign militaries. These also introduced an RFA system, which aimed to help civilian stakeholders utilise military assets.[357] These requests were reportedly sent to the Future Operations cell, after which the aforementioned decision-making process was followed.

Part One findings

The sections above provided an overview of the TC Winston disaster and civil-military coordination efforts. Several unique factors were identified, which likely impacted the NZDF's response. These include the significant involvement of the RFMF and foreign militaries in the response and the GoF's centralised approach. These factors also contributed to the relative militarisation of the NEOC and changes to the national structure, such as the creation of a new civil-military coordination mechanism, which was led by a Fijian Minister and RFMF staff.

Having gained an understanding of the HADR context and these factors, Part Two now focuses specifically on the NZDF response. Considering the factors above and that this was the NZDF's largest disaster relief deployment in the Pacific at the time (NZMAT, 2016), the TC Winston response is an ideal case study to examine the force's civil-military coordination.[358]

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[353] Pervious disaster reports revealed a lack of clarity over the roles and responsibilities of national and international actors. The GoF acknowledged these and in 2006 attempts were made to update legislation. Progress had, however, stalled due to a lack of human and financial resources. Legislation was therefore due for review in 2015, the year TC Winston struck.

[354] These are described in more detail in Part Two, with respect to the NZDF's operational-level coordination.

[355] The other military cells were 'current operations' cell and 'planning, strategy and international coordination.'

[356] The UN-CMCoord officers arrived on 26 and 28 February, approximately one week into the initial response. They facilitated briefings and information sharing sessions between foreign militaries, the RFMF, GoF, NDMO and humanitarian actors.

[357] UN and GoF sources contradicted each other surrounding whether or not this system was actually utilised by the GoF.

[358] The NZDF deployed approximately 530 personnel to Fiji. These included 150 combat engineers, a 55-member detachment from the RNZAF's 3 Squadron, as well as tradesmen, medical personnel, environmental health and logistics specialists.

Part Two: the New Zealand Defence Force Response to TC Winston

The three sections below examine how literature portrayed the NZDF's civil-military coordination at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.[359] Obstacles to coordination are examined, along with how sources reported these impacted HADR. While most stakeholders did not clarify how obstacles to coordination impacted the NZDF's coordination or actors' assistance, some of these factors are discussed. This is due to their relevance to interview findings and the comparative analysis to follow.

Within this case study, a greater number of reports were produced by civilian actors. The scope of this literature also included a broader range of stakeholder perspectives on the NZDF's response. Internal after-action reviews were, for example, produced by the NDRF (2016b)[360] and a draft document by FENZ (2016).[361] The TC Winston lessons learned workshop report also summarised the views of over five hundred stakeholders, from the GoF, INGOs, NGOs, private sector, civil society groups and the affected population (GoF and SPC, 2017).

Yet despite this increased diversity, over 70% of the literature reflecting on the NZDF's civil-military coordination was produced by the NZDF or GoNZ.[362] As with Chapter Two findings, this means many stakeholder perspectives, even that of civilians, were drawn from NZDF or GoNZ sources. These proportions raise concerns about publication bias and whether, or not, these reports accurately reflect the actual perspectives of civilian stakeholders.

i. Coordination at the strategic level

Pre-disaster coordination among New Zealand stakeholders

In the week leading up to TC Winston, the GoNZ initiated preparations for a WoG response. In accordance with deployment guidelines, MFAT took charge as the lead agency and established two coordination centres. These were located in the Emergency Coordination Centre in Wellington and the New Zealand High Commission in Suva, which became civil-military coordination hubs.

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[359] The strategic level refers to decisions made by high-level of leadership, at the national or headquarters level. The operational level refers to coordination at the general planning level. The tactical level refers to coordination which takes place in the field.

[360] The NDRF report collated the perspectives of twelve New Zealand humanitarian stakeholders.

[361] The draft version of the 'Cyclone Winston USAR Deployment and NCC activation review' was obtained via OIA. Officials clarified that it contained some inaccuracies, which have not been resolved within FENZ. For this reason it has not been shared with the NZDF and other agencies. The report incorporated feedback from MFAT, NZDF, USAR, FENZ personnel.

[362] Internal NZDF reports were obtained via OIA. They include the HQ JFNZ J8 (Continuous Improvement) Branch TG 651.3 – OP Pacific Relief Tropical Cyclone Lessons Collection Synopsis, Lessons Learned OP Pacific Relief (Tropical Cyclone Winston), CIMIC Post Activity Report: Op Pacific Relief – TC Winston 2016 (FIJI), and a DJIATF Post Activity Report: Op Pacific Relief – 01-16.

These measures initiated strategic-level coordination between the NZDF and New Zealand civilian representatives from MFAT, OGAs, humanitarian agencies and other partner agencies.[363] Within after-action reviews, these arrangements were praised. For example, NDRF stakeholders described MFAT as an "*efficient conduit for relaying information between [the] NDRF and NZDF*" (NDRF, 2016b, p.7).

Notably, some of these civilian and NZDF representatives were involved in or had deployed together for the TC Pam response. This reportedly benefitted the WoG response as NZDF and civilian representatives had pre-established relationships and a greater understanding of each other's roles and capabilities (NZDF, 2016h).

Coordination among FRANZ partners

Pre-disaster coordination was also initiated under the FRANZ Arrangement, by foreign affairs officials.[364] These discussed which FRANZ military assets were available for deployment and offered these to the GoF. Reports indicate the GoF, however, delayed accepting these offers to establish a better understanding of cyclone damage (UN OCHA, 2016c, p.1). This meant the GoNZ's offer of a P-3K2 Orion Aircraft to conduct aerial surveillance and assess initial damages was accepted, while ADF assets were kept on standby.[365]

While the GoF's approach to foreign military assistance appears to be more aligned with the Oslo and APC-MADRO guidelines, some sources implied these offers and their acceptance were more motivated by State interests than humanitarian needs. Humanitarian, academic and local sources, for instance, alluded to competition and power struggles between States and donors (FWCC, 2018, Loy, 2017). Others linked the large scale and length of ADF and NZDF deployments to Government interests (Powles, 2016, Loy, 2017, Powles and Sousa-Santos, 2016). This was because it was in the interests of the GoNZ and GoA to strengthen diplomatic ties with Fiji, after the 2014 elections.[366]

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[363] Within the New Zealand coordination hub the Emergency Task Force (ETF) was stood up and held daily meetings within the initial response. The ETF is chaired by MFAT; other members include the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, New Zealand Police, Ministry of Health, the New Zealand Fire Service, NGO partners (represented by the Council for International Development), the New Zealand Red Cross, FRANZ partners and the NZDF. OGAs included the New Zealand Medical Assistance Team (NZMAT), which consisted of individuals from the Ministry of Health, Urban Search and Rescue (USAR), which consisted of representatives from the Fire and Emergency New Zealand and the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI).

[364] The GoF briefed diplomatic partners on 21 February, as the cyclone subsided.

[365] This aircraft was deployed the same day, GoNZ officials offered the asset to the GoF.

[366] These statements concern the diplomatic tensions described in the introduction. These relate to the GoNZ and GoA introducing sanctions and severing relations between their militaries and the RFMF after Commodore Bainimarama overthrew Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase's government in December 2006. Diplomatic tensions only began easing after Bainimarama was elected in a democratic election in 2014. The HADR response was a way the GoNZ could improve diplomatic relations with Fiji which had applied a "look north" policy, which increasingly relied on financial and military support from China and Russia.

The NZDF's rapid response and arrival were portrayed positively

Despite the historical tensions between the GoF and GoNZ, offers of financial and military support from New Zealand began to be accepted within twenty-four hours (MOG, 2014).[367] Pre-disaster planning then led to a rapid response from the NZDF, which was praised by GoF, GoNZ and NZDF stakeholders (NZDF, 2016f, Baguioro, 2016, Moir, 2016, MFAT, 2016).

Most sources emphasised the practical benefits of this coordination for the GoF. NZDF and Fijian media, for example, reported these efforts strengthened bilateral relationships (Baguioro, 2016, p.9, Fiji Sun, 2016b). Positive outcomes were also described by RFMF officials, one stated,

> *"Without the [NZDF] Orion, [the RFMF] would have to physically visit the likely affected areas to assess the damage. That is how we did it in the past and that took days to carry out in a scattered archipelago"* (NZDF, 2016a, p.15).

Sources also emphasised various benefits which resulted from the NZDF sharing its aerial photography of affected areas. NDRF stakeholders, for example, noted the NZDF's coordination with the environmental engineering consultant 'Tonkin + Taylor' resulted in rapid disaster mapping. This enhanced the planning ability of the GoF, NZDF, MFAT and some humanitarian actors (NDRF, 2016b, Tonkin + Taylor, 2018).[368] New Zealand's Minister of Defence also described these efforts as "*a first for any Pacific island nation struck by a natural disaster*" (Tonkin + Taylor, 2018). NZDF sources also indicated these efforts enabled the GoF to immediately secure international aid (Baguioro, 2016, p.9).

Hercules aircraft enabled WoG stakeholders to arrive rapidly

The rapid response of the NZDF's C-130 Hercules aircraft and the transportation of WoG personnel into Fiji were also described favourably by media and NDRF members (NZ Red Cross, 2016, NDRF, 2016b, p.7).[369] For example, a New Zealand Red Cross representative stated that this coordination enabled their organisation to send the largest ever deployment of relief supplies to Fiji. This was believed to have *"[made] a real difference for the people who need it*

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[367] NZD$50,000 in initial assistance and NZD$170,000 in pre-positioned relief supplies were announced on 21 February. As the WoG response proceeded the GoNZ gave further assistance, final reports suggest NZ $15 million was spent by the GoNZ on the TC Winston response. Although Defence expenditure was not published, this was likely included in this MFAT estimate.
[368] Disaster relief organisations such as UNOCHA, UNICEF, Red Cross, Oxfam and Save the Children, as well as NGOs and Government agencies, were provided with Tonkin + Taylor's online "click and see" rapid disaster mapping portal. NZDF, ADF and World Bank aerial reconnaissance images, as well as on-ground images were used to help facilitate rapid, efficient relief efforts.
[369] The first flight contained 12 tonnes of relief supplies. Many Hercules trips followed, transporting over120 tonnes of aid into Fiji. Personnel from the WoG response were also transported, while citizens were returned to New Zealand.

most," which highlighted the importance of maintaining *"close partnerships across the Pacific"* (NZ Red Cross, 2016). [370]

No NZDF reports, however, reflected on NZDF-humanitarian coordination. This reveals a crucial gap in the literature, considering the perceived benefits civilian stakeholders described above.

Civil-military coordination challenges described by other sources

In contrast to the previous case study, stakeholders' internal reports did allude to obstacles to coordination at the strategic level. These included "*confusion around leadership*" arrangements in the WoG response and the planning of OGA and DJIATF deployments (FENZ, 2016, p.15, 18, HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.14).[371] USAR representatives were also reportedly frustrated as they felt pressured to "*sell their capabilities to MFAT and NZDF*" (FENZ, 2016, p.21). These reports raise questions, particularly around how these factors may have impacted the NZDF's civil-military coordination and assistance.[372]

ii. Coordination at the operational level

The second application of the DJIATF model

DJIATF personnel were embedded in the New Zealand High Commissions in Suva and undertook similar operational level tasks to those described in Vanuatu.[373] Overall, a larger number of DJIATF, MFAT and OGA representatives were, however, deployed in the TC Winston response. Some of these personnel had also deployed together in Vanuatu. This reportedly benefitted these stakeholders, as individuals had a greater understanding of each other's roles and capabilities (NZDF, 2016g, Radio New Zealand, 2016a).

Most sources describing the DJIATF's efforts were positive and reported the model helped improve upon the civil-military coordination seen in Vanuatu (NZDF, 2016h, p.10).[374] For example, one DJIATF representative who was deployed in both disasters concluded,

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[370] This coordination enabled the New Zealand Red Cross to transport personnel and large quantities of aid to Fiji between 23 and 27 February. Supplies totalled thirty three tonnes and included items such as: shelter tool kits, blankets, water containers, mosquito nets and tarpaulins. These were transported on four separate flights.

[371] The deployment of NZMAT and NZ USAR at the same time created some confusion with cross communication about deployment status. There were reportedly no USAR policies and procedures surrounding small deployments for the Pacific. Confusion around OGA deployment also reportedly impacted on the continuity of the mission, relationships built with MFAT, and resulted in confusion around leadership.

[372] While not openly stated, this suggests there may have been competition around the deployment of USAR and NZDF teams.This will be discussed in greater detail by interviewed stakeholders in Chapter Five.

[373] On arrival in Suva DJIATF leadership and LOs formed a JCART and began supporting WoG response.

[374] NZDF personnel felt the increased size of the DJIATF deployment had enhanced the NZDF's situational awareness, planning and decision-making.

"Coordination across the different New Zealand agencies… has been effective and can be the model for future missions… There is unity of purpose and we are all working together to achieve a common goal. We did this in Vanuatu and we developed this further in Fiji" (Baguioro, 2016, p.9).

NZDF sources also reported the DJIATF's coordination efforts had enhanced WoG and military HADR (NZDF, 2016h, p.1). An example of this related to the JCART's contribution in a Joint Inter-Agency Team, which conducted reconnaissance of Vanuabalavu Island and the Lau Group.[375] This helped stakeholders prepare for the arrival of the JTF and WoG response and assisted with task planning and prioritisation.

Published GoF and NZDF perspectives reported the DJIATF's efforts were good

As described in Part One, DJIATF personnel and LOs were embedded in the NEOC and Future Operations cell soon after their arrival. All published GoF, GoNZ and NZDF reports described the NZDF's coordination efforts were excellent and well-received by stakeholders in the NEOC (Finau *et al.*, 2018, p.132).[376] While the HQ JFNZ synopsis did not specifically discuss coordination in the NEOC, it also concluded that NZDF-GoF coordination was, in general, to a high level (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.4).

Despite coordination between NZDF personnel and GoF, RFMF, humanitarian and NDMO staff being reportedly positive in the response, few sources described why stakeholders felt this way (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.15).[377] This is surprising, considering the major involvement of the RFMF in the NEOC. Media also indicated that the Fijian Minister for National Disaster Management (who led the Future Operations cell) had previously served alongside NZDF personnel in New Zealand, while in the RFMF (Cava, 2014).[378] These factors highlight a gap in the literature, particularly concerning how the militarisation of the NEOC and pre-existing ties with GoF or RFMF personnel may have impacted the NZDF's coordination.

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[375] This inter-agency team consisted of DJIATF, MFAT, OGAs and NDMO representatives. It conducted reconnaissance on the island of Vanuabalavu in the Lau Group between 27 February and 02 March. This was to prepare for the arrival of HMNZS WELLINGON and Canterbury.

[376] Interviewed stakeholders reflected on how these factors impacted civil-military coordination. This is described within Chapter Five, in the sections relating to the NZDF's coordination with the GoF.

[377] DJIATF and NZDF LOs attended daily NDMO and regular meetings with GoF Ministers and Prime Minister Bainimarama. They were subject matter experts from each service (Army, Air Force and Navy), provided service-specific expertise and were seconded into the DJIATF from other positions. No information was published on the structure of the Future Operations and Planning cell within the NDMO, information was therefore drawn from interview data (Interview 36, 39, 41, 59 & 60).

[378] The Minister spent two of his twenty years in the RFMF with the NZDF. These were served as an Officer Instructor at the Office Cadet School in Waiouru and at the New Zealand Joint Command and Staff College in Wellington.

UN and INGO stakeholder views were generally positive

With respect to humanitarian perspectives of the NZDF and civil-military coordination, in general, views varied considerably. Most UN and INGO officials, for example, portrayed these coordination efforts in a positive light and focused on the logistical and financial benefits of using NZDF assets (UN OCHA, 2016j, p.14, GoF and SPC, 2017, p.43, Logistics Cluster, 2016a).

These stakeholders also reported that UN-CMCoord officers helped "*build relationships*" between humanitarians and foreign militaries, which were founded on *"mutual respect and trust of each other's roles and responsibilities"* (UN OCHA, 2018, p.119). This reportedly led to "*strong civil-military coordination*" in the NEOC between UN OCHA, UNDAC, humanitarian actors and foreign militaries (UN OCHA, 2018, p.119, Mansur *et al.*, 2017, p.5).

Other humanitarian agencies and locally-based stakeholders expressed more critical views

Locally-based humanitarians, however, discussed obstacles to civil-military coordination, including a lack of understanding and poor communication (Winterford and Gero, 2018, p.15, NDRF, 2016b). In one academic report, an anonymous humanitarian stated,

> *"Australia and New Zealand had no idea how [coordination] works at the local level. At the government's Lessons Learnt Workshop – it became clear that the Australia and New Zealand military hadn't been briefed but no one realised. They flew in and operated within their own terms of reference. No one thought to ask..."* (Winterford and Gero, 2018, p.15).

The NDRF review supported these views, as representatives "*consistently noted the absence of NZDF from in-country coordination fora, notably the UN Cluster system*" (NDRF, 2016b, p.9).

Domestic factors and national coordination mechanisms were linked to challenges

Some of these outcomes and the separation between military and humanitarian stakeholders were linked to either domestic factors or coordination mechanisms within the literature. For example, some stakeholders noted that Fiji's legislation did not clarify how civil-military coordination was to be facilitated or the role militaries played in disaster relief (GoF and SPC, 2017, p.40).[379] Guidance documents were also produced over a span of twenty years, which meant they did not accurately describe existing coordination structures (GoF, 1995, GoF, 1997,

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[379] Section 4.2 of the *Disaster Management Plan* stated that "*all international assistance*" would be coordinated by the National Disaster Controller and requested by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This contrasted with page nine of the *Cyclone Support Plan,* which stated that the National Disaster Management Council would liaise directly with Aid agencies and donors to determine the type and quantity of assistance required. Neither clarified the role of foreign militaries in disasters.

GoF, 1998).[380]This created some confusion about how stakeholders could coordinate with militaries.

Stakeholders also identified issues which related to national mechanisms, such as the National Cluster arrangement,[381] NEOC and NDMO[382] (Logistics Cluster, 2016a, p.1, Winterford and Gero, 2018). These related to decision-making processes, data collection and information-sharing issues, which were also acknowledged in the TC Winston lessons learned report (GoF and SPC, 2017, p.29). These resulted in logistical bottlenecks, reduced stakeholder control over their HADR and, at times, delayed aid distribution (UN OCHA, 2016e, p.3, Lam *et al.*, 2016, p.18, GoF and SPC, 2017, p.29).[383] This included figures which suggest less than 60% of humanitarian requests for military assistance were being completed (2016b, p.2).[384]

International and humanitarian coordination mechanisms were linked to challenges

In contrast, other sources linked coordination issues to international or humanitarian mechanisms. For example, humanitarian leadership over national clusters changed during the response (see Figure 6).[385] OCHA's RFA process was also reportedly accepted by the GoF but not used by national actors (Canyon, 2017, p.47). One author reported this was because the GoF considered it unacceptable to have their decisions vetted by an UN-CMCoord officer. They noted that while this "*could have been viewed as a sign of defiance against OCHA*," it implied the GoF was confident in its management of the response (Canyon, 2017, p.47).

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[380] Key disaster management legislation included the National Disaster Management Plan (1995), the Natural Disaster Management Act (1998), and a 'Cyclone support Plan' (1997). The GoF was in the process of reviewing its HADR legislation.

[381] Some stakeholders described national logistics cluster arrangements as "*inadequate,*" particularly to coordinate an effective Government and multi-agency emergency response.

[382] Arrangements within the NEOC were at times described as a "*challenge*" and a "*barrier to timely response.*" This was because the dissemination of assessment reports and decisions depended on the availability of the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Rural and Maritime Development and National Disaster Management, to endorse documents before they could be shared. Humanitarian representatives also noted that despite their pre-disaster relationship-building attempts, different GoF officials were put in charge of NDMO and response coordination.

[383] Some noted this reduced donor and humanitarian control over aid and distribution, as the GoF implemented over half of all post-disaster relief projects. The Flash Appeal final summary report emphasised that although 85% of funding was received by UN agencies, the majority of projects were implemented by local actors. In fact 58% would be implemented by the GoF and 8% by national NGO's, with only 14% by INGO's and 20% by UN agencies.

[384]The logistics cluster report published on 14 March stated that only 47 of the 80 humanitarian requests were completed.

[385] In contrast to documentation, which stated that National Clusters were to be co-led by locally-based humanitarian actors or UN OCHA (on request), most clusters ended up being led by UN agencies or INGOs. Two working groups were also added to the structure, one of which was a civil-military coordination group.

Figure 6: TC Winston coordination structure. Source: (UN OCHA, 2016a).[386]

Stakeholders also recommended increased collaboration between humanitarian, national and military actors to "*enhance coordination in future emergencies*" (UN OCHA, 2016i, p.2).[387] The need for "*further training of military personnel in humanitarian assistance and protection principles*" was also raised in two key lessons learned reports (Winterford and Gero, 2018, GoF and SPC, 2017, p.41). It was believed these changes would allow humanitarian partners to ensure responses are *"better aligned with local needs"* (UN OCHA, 2016i, p.2).

While not openly stated, the perspectives above suggest obstacles such as a lack of understanding and military-humanitarian interaction were negatively impacting coordination and assistance in the response. Further research is, however, needed to better understand both these humanitarian views and how these obstacles may have impacted the NZDF.

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[386] Official approval was given by UN OCHA to use this image.
[387] The summary was prepared by UN OCHA ROP on behalf of Fiji country clusters and the Pacific Humanitarian Team. National actors referred to were: the NDMO, various line ministries, divisional, provincial and district authorities.

The literature lacked an analysis of coordination and obstacles at the operational level

The literature sources described above often lacked an in-depth analysis of civil-military coordination, in general, and the NZDF's efforts specifically. The TC Winston lessons learned report, for example, contained less than two pages of discussion focused on civil-military coordination and discussed militaries as a collective, rather than the NZDF explicitly (GoF and SPC, 2017, p.41).[388]

Few published sources also discussed obstacles to the NZDF's coordination at the operational level. Some issues to the DJIATF's coordination were, however, alluded to in internal NZDF reports. Most of those identified in the HQ JFNZ report were identical to the obstacles reported in the TC Pam response (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.14-15).[389] This included that host nation officials had "*different priorities*" and operational styles to New Zealand actors and a perceived lack of a higher-level national plan the NZDF could work to (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12). These factors led to the suggestion that NZDF personnel needed to be prepared for State actors to "*attempt to take ownership*" of offers of aid (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12).[390]

New issues were, however, identified in the DJIATF's internal review, which provided greater clarity on these. Some challenges were linked to the staggered deployment of DJIATF staff, which meant personnel were initially unable to establish a functional headquarters to provide HQ JFNZ and civilian actors with timely information (NZDF, 2016h, p.2).[391] Other issues included barriers to communication, command and control, and organisational culture (REF DJIATF report). [392]

The fact that the HQ JFNZ synopsis reported similar obstacles to coordination in both case studies, but did not include those identified by the DJIATF raises some questions. These concern why obstacles persisted, despite mutual understanding and the DJIATF's civil-military coordination reportedly improving efforts. They also indicate that published literature did not report all the barriers raised by stakeholders.

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[388] Only two of the one-hundred-and-twenty page TC Winston lessons learned report focused on civil-military coordination. It did, however, recommend Fijian documents be updated to clearly define the role of militaries.

[389] These concerned a civilian lack of understanding about the DJIATF and the need for LOs to have an increased understanding of asset capabilities. For example, MFAT staff and Heads of Mission reportedly did not understand the differences between light and heavy JCART options and what these entailed. Following TC Winston, HQ JFNZ proposed the early deployment and pre-positioning of JCART elements prior to a major cyclone affecting a Pacific island country. MFAT agreed for to up to four JCART personnel to be deployed.

[390] Lessons concerning host nations were drawn from both the TC Pam and Winston NZDF responses. It is therefore assumed that these issues applied within both case studies, despite Governments not being specifically named.

[391] JCART personnel were deployed into Fiji across several days. These NZDF personnel were transported by military and civilian aircraft under MFAT and HQ JFNZ direction. The issue of staggered deployment has been reported to MFAT, which has since decided to deploy the DJIATF into High Commissions prior to disasters, if the safety of personnel can be guaranteed.

[392] The lack of an UNCLASSIFIED deployable IT network was identified as a constraint to effective inter-agency planning. Local air assets were also not approved for use as they did not meet Defence Force Orders 36. This a Seasprite helicopter had to be on standby at all times for casualty evacuations, which reduced air support for the affected population.

i. Coordination at the tactical level[393]

The Joint Task Force response

The JTF response to TC Winston was more extensive and complex at the tactical level when compared to the Vanuatu response. One difference in the Fiji response was the deployment of NZDF Army engineers before RNZN vessels arrived. This meant the NZDF provided support on the mainland Viti Levu from 24 February onward and the force interacted with civilian stakeholders in two key locations (NZDF, 2017a).[394]

Two RNZN vessels also deployed for Fiji, in a staggered response. This arrangement meant the Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) HMNZS Wellington arrived first, later followed by the Canterbury and the larger JTF (Fiji Sun, 2018).[395] NZDF and GoNZ sources reported this approach enhanced NZDF and WoG efforts, as the OPV helped identify anchorages for the Canterbury in the outer islands. This enabled WoG actors to begin planning their tasks earlier and proceed ashore immediately after the Canterbury's arrival (Jane's International Defence Review, 2016, p.8).

As occurred in TC Pam, these RNZN vessels were used as civil-military coordination platforms. MFAT, GoF, RFMF and local representatives were embarked in Suva and accommodated on board (Quilliam, 2016, p.5, Fiji Sun, 2016a).[396] These State officials facilitated communication with the local population and helped identify tasks for the NZDF to undertake.

OGA representatives from USAR and NZMAT were also embarked on vessels for up to three weeks (NZMAT, 2016, FENZ, 2016).[397] Notably, USAR representatives were deployed on the Canterbury from New Zealand and worked with Army engineers ashore in integrated teams (Hudson, 2016).[398] This was the first time most of these personnel had worked together in a Pacific HADR context and integrated civil-military teams.

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[393] The tactical level refers to coordination taking place in the field, at the level of the soldier, airman or sailor. It refers to the interaction between the NZDF and civilian actors on the ground in New Zealand, Vanuatu and on outer islands.

[394] The team consisted of thirty-seven Army engineers. Viti Levu is the largest Fijian island. It contains the capital, Suva and 70% of the population - approximately 606,000 citizens, according to 2014 GoF estimates.

[395] Wellington arrived first in Suva on 28 February, Canterbury followed on 01 March 2016. Both vessels disembarked their aid under the direction of the NDMO, which as put in charge of distribution.

[396] Fijian officials included representatives from Provincial Councils, the NDMO, approximately twenty-six RFMF personnel and twenty staff from the Ministry of Education.

[397] Overall, six NZMAT teams and three NZ USAR team rotations were sent to assist in Fiji. NZMAT teams included an Initial Assessment Team, four medical teams and an operational-level leadership team. One of these medical teams was based on the HMNZS Canterbury and provided mobile medical clinics on the islands of Avea, Vanuabalavu & Cikobia-i-lau.

[398] Originally only nine USAR personnel were going to be deployed. Four flew to Fiji, while the remaining personnel were transported on the Canterbury with the bulk of the USAR cache.

Another major difference in case studies relates to the fact that only five NZDF CIMIC personnel were deployed in the 2016 response (NZDF, 2015b).[399] This team disembarked in Suva with "*no orders or tasking,*" which resulted in the team supporting reconstruction efforts and completing a Measures of Effectiveness study for the NZDF (NZDF, 2017c, p.5). While this meant CIMIC personnel did not facilitate civil-military coordination in outer islands, the team did interact with RFMF, GoF, local leaders and some members of the affected population on the mainland.

The final element of the NZDF's tactical level coordination involved the use of air assets.[400] Aircraft conducted reconnaissance, supported needs assessments, evacuated casualties and transported aid, GoF, civilian and military personnel throughout Fiji (NZDF, 2016a). In contrast to the TC Pam response, many aircraft, including the new NH90 helicopters, were based on the mainland (INSERT JANES).[401] This arrangement enabled the NZDF to transport Suva-based officials, as well as support GoF aid distribution to more isolated areas.[402]

The NZDF's area of operations

Due to the division of NZDF efforts, the military's coordination and HADR were focused on the mainland of Viti Levu and the Lau Islands Group (NZDF, 2016g).[403] Vanuabalavu Island served as a base for the Canterbury and JTF operations during the response. This was because the island was the largest in the Lau Group and was the location of a GoF station where RFMF troops were deployed (see Figure 7).[404]

The Lau Island Group was identified as the GoF's highest response priority (FAO, 2016). This related to the high levels of destruction and severe humanitarian needs identified, which were prioritised as food, water and shelter (Radio New Zealand, 2016h, Perrottet, 2016, GoF, 2016). Evidencing these needs, an RFMF commander stated that over eight hundred more tents were needed after national stores were delivered. He further reflected that affected islanders might be living in these "*from six months to two years*" due to the lack of building materials on the islands, which were 290 kilometres from the mainland (Perrottet, 2016). These reports were undertaken before the NZDF arrived to provide HADR.

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[399] This contrasts with the three four-person CIMIC teams deployed in Vanuatu. Only one individual in this team had completed CIMIC training before deployment, as other qualified personnel were overseas. This staff limitation was recognised as a capability gap in the post-activity report.

[400] Aircraft included a King Air B200, two Seasprite and NH90 helicopters, a Boeing 757, P-3K2 Orion and C-130 Hercules aircraft.

[401] The NH90's were reportedly based on the mainland as they had not yet completed trials to land on the Canterbury at sea. This was planned for late 2016 and meant the helicopters were not able to refuel on the Canterbury, while it was based in the Lau Group. This limited the NZDF's air HADR capability in the outer islands.

[402] NH90s transported relief supplies, medical staff and VIPs from the GoF and RFMF.

[403] The Lau Island Group is located in the Eastern Division. It consists of 60 islands, 30 of which are inhabited. These cover 487 square kilometres, with only two small airstrips. Vanuabalavu is the home island of the former Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase, who continues to hold a leadership position in the Lau Group. Qarase was ousted by current Prime Minister Bainimarama in the 2006 military coup. The implications of these domestic factors are discussed by interviewees, in Chapter Five.

[404] Figure 7 identifies a 'Government Station' in Lomaloma village. This was where the NZDF based its land forces.

Figure 7: Map of Vanuabalavu, detailing NZMAT assistance. Source: (NZMAT, 2016).

NZDF assistance and tasks

Assistance was provided concurrently by NZDF elements during the response.[405] NZDF tasks predominantly focused on public infrastructure. This meant personnel cleared debris and roads, restored water storage and repaired schools, medical facilities and public buildings (Baguioro, 2016, p.9, NZDF, 2016a).[406] The sequence of the NZDF's tasks again meant the force's HADR was first provided on the mainland and on bigger islands, with larger populations (see Figure 8).

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[405] The Wellington carried 60 tonnes of relief aid and 71 NZDF personnel into Fiji. It arrived in Vanuabalavu on 29 February and departed Fiji on 16 March. The Canterbury transported 300 NZDF personnel and 106 tonnes of aid, arriving in Vanuabalavu on 04 March. Both vessels provided assistance to different islands, including Yasawa, Yacata, Vanuabalavu and others.
[406] Over eight weeks the NZDF transported over 570 tonnes of aid into Fiji and completed a dozens of repairs to schools, medical centres and community buildings. Numerous generators and water tanks were also installed for communities. A more detailed overview of the NZDF's HADR is provided in Annex 7.

This meant smaller islands and more isolated villages received assistance later in the response.[407]

Figure 8: NZDF aid delivery as of 10 March. Source: (UN OCHA, 2016h).

While the NZDF did transport water, food and Non-Food Items to affected areas, most aid was disembarked in Suva or distributed under the direction of RFMF or GoF officials. These officials also facilitated communication between the NZDF, village headmen and Turaga Ni Koro, who helped identify tasks (Quilliam, 2016, p.5).[408]

The NZDF deployment was also extended at short notice following bilateral discussions. This meant the Canterbury and larger JTF remained in the Lau Group until 17 April.[409] This extension

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[407] Articles suggest over 80% of houses had been destroyed in some villages across the Lau Group. Some stated that only eight of the sixty houses in one village had not been destroyed. While some figures in the PDNA contradict local and media reports. It stated that the island group had a population of 11,455. It estimated 328 of the 5,897 houses in the group were completely destroyed, with 63 suffering major damage and 79% of households lacking water access after the cyclone.

[408] The position of village headman is locally termed 'Turaga Ni Koro'. Only a Fijian can occupy this position the appointment of the village headman follows through the ancestral line to identify who is next in line to take up the position.

[409]Although the JTF was originally going to depart at the end of the 30 day State of Emergency (21 March), the NZDF deployment was extended at short notice by both Governments following the extension of the State of Emergency. Confusion surrounded this decision, as it appeared to be announced after Defence Minister Gerry Brownlee travelled to Fiji. This visit was on 22 March, where the New Zealand Minister visited Vanuabalavu with the Fijian Prime Minister Bainimarama.

meant GoF, MFAT, OGA and other civilian representatives operated alongside the NZDF for a longer period than expected.

Perceptions of the NZDF's civil-military coordination at the tactical level

Due to the complexity of coordination at the tactical level, the perspectives of stakeholders are grouped according to their sector. This provides a greater depth of analysis, as it highlights how literature portrayed the perspectives of; 1) New Zealand civilian actors, 2) international and local humanitarian stakeholders, 3) the GoF and 4) the affected population.

Coordination with New Zealand civilian actors

Published literature reported that coordination was good

Overall, the majority of published sources portrayed the NZDF-New Zealand civilian coordination at the tactical level as 'very good.' The Minister of Defence reported there was "*close cooperation and seamless integration*" between these actors (Brownlee, 2015). NZMAT teams reflected on how "*smoothly*" the deployment ran (NZMAT, 2016, p.12). USAR and NDRF reports further concluded that coordination efforts made a "*significant contribution*" to the WoG and overall disaster response (NDRF, 2016b, p.7, FENZ, 2016, p.21).

The greater number of civilian reports meant these views were collated from OGA and NDRF sources, as well as NZDF. Most views, however, tended to focus on the outcomes and benefits of NZDF support, rather than describing the quality of coordination itself.

NZDF sources suggested NZDF-New Zealand civilian coordination had improved

One key difference was the NZDF perspective that these coordination efforts had improved upon that seen in Vanuatu (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.4). Pre-deployment NZDF-MFAT coordination was, for instance, considered a "*vast improvement*" (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.8).[410] Personnel deployed in both responses reported this was because they had a greater understanding of HADR and civilian actors, following the TC Pam response (Baguioro, 2016, p.9). This led officials to conclude the applied NZDF coordination model should be replicated in future responses.

Similar issues were identified in the HQ JFNZ synopsis

With respect to the HQ JFNZ synopsis, NZDF perspectives were almost identical for both the TC Pam and Winston responses. MFAT LOs were reportedly "*easy to work with*" and relationships with OGAs were "*good,*" once deployed (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.7-8).[411] The same obstacles to

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[410] This resulted in stores being loaded onto RNZN assets in advance of their departure date.
[411] As previously stated the Lessons Learned Synopsis identifies coordination issues which occurred in both the TC Pam and Winston responses, this issue was therefore observed in both WoG responses.

coordination were also identified, along with recurring challenges such as the rotation of MFAT LOs and a civilian lack of understanding about the NZDF (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.8).[412]

The only new challenge concerned 'command and control' issues between the NZDF and OGAs. This concerned a lack of clarity around the command structure when the USAR team was integrated with the Army Engineering Task Unit (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.10-11). While the report suggested the *"cross-over of tasks and skills"* contributed to coordination issues, little analysis surrounded how the identified obstacles impacted coordination or the HADR provided (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.10).[413]

Unpublished civilian reports contained more analysis of coordination issues

In contrast to published literature and NZDF sources, internal civilian reports contained a greater critique of the NZDF's civil-military coordination. The draft FENZ review stated that some USAR representatives had *"struggled at times to work under the arrangement set in place with NZDF"* (FENZ, 2016, p.12-13). These frustrations also led to an incident between NZDF and USAR personnel, which was serious enough to deploy a senior fire service commander to Fiji, to resolve the issue (FENZ, 2016, p.12). The report concluded:

> *"Although the logic of embedding NZDF and [USAR teams] together made sense, both agencies' lack of understanding of each other's specific missions, policies procedures and practices, and specific skills brought to the missions created some confusion and frustration"* (FENZ, 2016, p.21-22).

These views suggest NZDF-OGA coordination was being impeded by significant obstacles, which were only briefly alluded to in the HQ JFNZ report.

Within NDRF and FENZ reports, similar obstacles to civil-military coordination were also described. These included a lack of understanding,[414] information sharing and collection issues,[415] poor communication[416] and different operational styles[417] (FENZ, 2016, p.12-13, 22,

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[412] Obstacles included communication issues, conflicting priorities and confusion over command and control. Communication issues concerned the Canterbury, as the ship lacked an unclassified IT network capable of operating in a Combined Inter Agency Task Group. This meant OGA's couldn't view data or utilise the system due to classification issues. Organisational culture issues were alluded to, as NZDF personnel perceived that OGA priorities were prioritised ahead of the NZDF's. The document also noted that some OGA representatives did not appear to appreciate the importance of attending the daily NZDF coordination meetings on Canterbury. A lack of clarity was also observed from civilian actors, surrounding NZDF operations and processes.

[413] NZDF recommendations included the need for a definitive command and control structure, to ensure a coordinated WoG approach. It was stated that the issue of integrating USAR and New Zealand Army teams was *"being addressed by USAR."*

[414] The FENZ review noted a lack of clarity surrounding the command and control structure was when USAR was working with the NZDF. It also reported that NZDF personnel did not understand who was in overall command of USAR.

[415] The NDRF report recommended that MFAT and the NZDF seek arrangements with host governments for the free circulation of surveillance data, to ensure their use as part of damage assessment and relief planning by NDRF and other nongovernment disaster responders. The FENZ report also identified collection of information between the NZDF and AOGs as an area for improvement, to smooth the collection of data and save duplication of effort. The report also noted that *"cultural briefings*

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NDRF, 2016b, p.4, 8-9). Some had negative impacts on HADR, such as some stakeholders feeling they were unable to make use of the NZDF assets offered (NDRF, 2016b, p.11).[418] The NDRF report also noted that without data about the NZDF's HADR and costs, it was impossible to:

> *"fully assess the effectiveness of the government response, and whether,*
> *from a purely humanitarian perspective, the deployment of [NZDF] assets*
> *was warranted"* (NDRF, 2016b, p.9).[419]

The fact that some of these perspectives and obstacles were not described in the HQ JFNZ lessons learned synopsis or shared with the NZDF highlights an important contribution this study makes to the literature.[420] This also reinforces the importance of collecting stakeholder feedback, to ensure actors are aware of issues and can improve their future HADR responses.

Coordination with international and local humanitarian actors

UN and INGO perspectives were positive

At the tactical level, few sources specifically described examples or analyses of NZDF-humanitarian coordination. The majority of perspectives were, therefore, published by UN or larger INGOs, which reflected on coordination with foreign militaries in general. These reports focused on the benefits of NZDF logistical support and transportation for humanitarian agencies, which made an "*enormous contribution to relief and early recovery*" in the TC Winston response (UNICEF, 2016).

There were no published perspectives of local humanitarians

In particular, the perspectives of locally-based humanitarians were lacking. For example, while the Tongan Red Cross Society and Fijian branch of the Adventist Development and Relief

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were a "waste of time and way off the mark of what was required" as they did not cover the importance of establishing communication with the chief in the village and being invited to help.
[416] The FENZ report highlighted a lack of communication surrounding agreed upon processes, protocol and command and control. NDRF members also reported difficulty making contact with the New Zealand High Commission, and reported that there did not appear to be a point of contact for NGO's in the response.
[417] USAR and NZDF building compliance and health and safety requirements were different, which made it difficult for NZDF to manage the quality control of construction and repairs. USAR handovers were also challenging as some teams arrived just as others departed. This meant the new commander was unable to be fully briefed by the departing team.
[418] While NDRF members "*roundly welcomed*" the NZDF's offer of transportation into Fiji, few were able to take advantage of this due to a lack of prepositioned stock in New Zealand in the initial response. This led to recommendations that NZDF assets be made available for transporting humanitarian personnel as well as aid, in future responses.
[419] Some humanitarian representatives believed NZDF assets were "*excess to humanitarian requirements*" at times. These observations also led to recommendations that the cost of NZDF relief activities be publicised, along with whether this was drawn from the New Zealand Aid program budget. This was deemed "*vitally important*" as stakeholders questioned whether the same tasks could have been completed by the NDRF or other civilian actors at a lower cost. This would have enabled actors to spend more financial support on relief and the affected population.
[420] The draft version of the 'Cyclone Winston USAR Deployment and NCC activation review' has not been shared with the NZDF and other agencies as it reportedly contained some inaccuracies, which have not been resolved within FENZ.

Agency (ADRA) provided HADR on Vanuabalavu at the same time as the NZDF, neither reflected on any interaction with the military (Humanitarian Response, 2016, GoT, 2016).[421]

While they were not local stakeholders, New Zealand-based agencies reported a lack of interaction between the NZDF and humanitarians in Fiji. They also observed that NZDF personnel in the field displayed an absence of awareness around "*humanitarian principles and good practice tools generally, and civ-mil guidelines for humanitarian assistance specifically*" (NDRF, 2016b, p.9).

These perspectives and the lack of local humanitarian perspectives highlight substantial gaps in the literature. These concern how locally-based humanitarian stakeholders viewed the NZDF's coordination efforts and the extent to which actors interacted in the field.

CIMIC teams were not optimally utilised

Although the HQ JFNZ synopsis did not reflect on the efforts of CIMIC team, this unit's internal report concluded that CIMIC capabilities were not optimally used in Fiji (NZDF, 2017c, p.4, 6).[422] This related to the team's location and tasks, which limited their ability to provide CIMIC support and planning advice (NZDF, 2017c, p.3-4).[423] It also meant CIMIC personnel did not facilitate communication between the NZDF and humanitarians, as occurred in Vanuatu.

These outcomes were linked to a lack of information flow in theatre and a "*limited understanding about the employment of CIMIC and its capability*" across the NZDF (NZDF, 2017c, p.5). The application of the new DJIATF model was also a factor, as DJIATF LOs somewhat replaced the roles of CIMIC planner liaisons (NZDF, 2017c, p.5).[424]

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[421] The Tongan Red Cross deployed on the Tongan Navy vessels, which provided assistance to Vanuabalavu for three weeks. They supported initial assessments, distributed relief supplies to the needy and *"[supported] the New Zealand relief team.*" ADRA conduced some HADR assessments and distribution, as staff were already conducting a climate change program.

[422] CIMIC teams were ideally supposed to be employed in the following activities: key leadership engagements, liaison with the host nation, local disaster management personnel, NGOs and OGAs, and national and other foreign militaries for support of allocation and planning, insertion, rapid village assessment, collation and dissemination of data, production of normality indicators, mission appreciation and planning, collation and dissemination of data, production of normality indicators.

[423] As discussed above, teams were gathered information on the mainland to complete a Measures of Effectiveness study for the NZDF. Communication issues included: a lack of information flow in the field, the unit being unable to access DIXIS (military computer network), and physical communication issues which resulted in the team utilising cell phones and had a non-wifi capable laptop. As a result of these challenges the report recommended further training for CIMIC staff, building greater understanding and coordination between the DJIATF and CIMIC teams. Practical solutions included developing and disseminating SOP's which explain CIMIC capability. It also suggested that CIMIC personnel deploy immediately for HADR, both on the ground and within the local NDMO to "*develop relationships*" and commence early communication and coordination with other civilian actors and NGO's.

[424] Within the DJIATF, Air and Maritime LOs began performing CIMIC planner tasks prior to the CIMIC teams arrived in Fiji.

These views suggest that despite NZDF officials concluding that the Force's civil-military models were successful and should be replicated in future HADR, confusion still surrounded the roles and responsibilities of CIMIC and DJIATF personnel.[425]

Coordination with the Government of Fiji

Coordination was perceived positively by State stakeholders

All published sources produced by the NZDF, GoF, GoNZ and Fijian media described NZDF-GoF coordination as positive as well-received by State officials. A key theme related to how NZDF support had practically benefitted Fiji, New Zealand and the affected population (Fiji Sun, 2016a, HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.6, NZDF, 2016c). For example, the Minister for Disaster Management commented it was "*hard to imagine how [Fiji] would have coped with demands for relief without New Zealand's assistance*" (Baguioro, 2016, p.9).

NZDF coordination efforts also reportedly strengthened stakeholder and bilateral relations between countries. NZDF-RFMF cooperation and previous relationship ties were considered central to these outcomes (NZDF, 2016d, Powles and Sousa-Santos, 2016).[426]

The cooperation between the RFMF and NZDF enhanced efforts

The RFMF Rear Admiral also reported that military-to-military cooperation aided the NZDF's efforts as these actors were "*complementing each other very well*" through using the RFMF's local knowledge and the NZDF's technical expertise and equipment (Baguioro, 2016, p.9). NZDF personnel also reflected how coordination with GoF LOs helped the JTF determine priorities and tasks (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12). These perspectives led NZDF sources to conclude NZDF-GoF coordination was to a "*high level*" and was a marked improvement upon civil-military coordination efforts in Vanuatu (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.4).

Similar coordination issues were identified with host nation officials

The HQ JFNZ synopsis, however, identified the same obstacles to coordination as were observed in the 2015 response. These included concerns that host nation officials may have channelled support to their own areas of interest first (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12). The similarity between these two responses raises a number of questions. These concern why the same

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[425] This will be discussed in greater length in the discussion within Chapter Six.
[426] RFMF personnel noted that it was "*great working with [NZDF personnel] again,*" particularly as it had been eleven years since the NZDF had officially deployed to Fiji. This period refers to the GoNZ's decision not to encourage engagement between the NZDF and RFMF, post 2006 military coup. The NZDF and RFMF only renewed their engagement after the Fijian 2014 elections, just prior to the cyclone.

obstacles persisted, despite the perspective that NZDF-host nation coordination had improved.[427]

Coordination with the affected population

All published literature expressed the affected population's gratitude

As with the above sectors, all published literature reported that the affected population viewed NZDF coordination and HADR efforts as good. Sources consistently portrayed NZDF-affected population relations as warm and friendly. For example, one NZDF representative described the population's reaction to the military as "*very humbling,*" with many communities "*thanking [the NZDF] just for turning up*" (Navy Today, 2016, p.6). Approximately 90% of perspectives were, however, either directly or indirectly linked to NZDF or GoNZ sources.[428] This meant few actual community perspectives existed in the literature.

Concerning actual affected population quotes and perspectives, the majority focused on the positive outcomes of NZDF HADR (Baguioro, 2016, Sauvakacolo, 2016, Dateline Pacific, 2016a, Radio New Zealand, 2016e).[429] For example, some communities stated it would have taken them "*more than a month to clean up*" without the NZDF's help (NZDF, 2016d). Officials confirmed these benefits, with one NZDF representative reflecting,

> *"The biggest impact that we have had ashore [in the Lau Island Group] was helping with clean up, in particular the local school, so that it could be opened for the following Monday"* (Navy Today, 2016, p.5).

Coordination was reportedly improved by GoF LOs and previous HADR experience

While most perspectives were outcomes-focused, some NZDF sources described why they felt NZDF-community coordination was positive. One NZDF officer felt this was due to pre-disaster training exercises, which meant personnel were "*well-versed*" in HADR and civil-military coordination situations (NZDF, 2016e).[430] The NZDF's use of chiefs and local guides was also viewed as beneficial, as it facilitated communication with outer island communities (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12). It also made it easier for NZDF personnel to extract information and determine

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[427] This will be discussed in greater detail by interviewed stakeholders in the following chapter.

[428] For example, many Pacific and Fijian media outlets quoted NZDF or GoNZ personnel and their views of the population. The perspectives of the affected population were also drawn from NZDF or GoNZ press releases.

[429] Actual community perspectives also reflected this gratitude. Pacific and New Zealand media reported that communities found NZDF personnel hard-working and their assistance timely and appropriate.

[430] The examples provided were Exercise Tropic Twilight and Southern Katipo 2015. Tropic Twilight is an annual exercise in the Pacific which tests the NZDF's ability to work with militaries and governments from the region in a HADR context.

Exercise *Southern Katipo* is the NZDFs major military exercise. It is held *every two years* and provides the NZDF an opportunity to work with MFAT, OGAs, defence and some humanitarian partners.

priorities, as chiefs were reportedly *"more aware"* of their community's needs (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12).

Reoccurring coordination challenges

While published material did not identify any obstacles to coordination, the HQ JFNZ synopsis reported the same issues which were encountered in the TC Pam response. These included different perspectives on priorities, language and cultural barriers (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12).[431] These obstacles were, however, reportedly mitigated by using local officials and chiefs, who *"[broke] down language and social barriers"* (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12).

The fact that identical obstacles to NZDF-affected population coordination were identified in both case studies raises a number of questions. Some relate to why these obstacles may be reoccurring. Others concern why Fijian communities were perceived as non-communicative and appeared to have different priorities from the NZDF.[432] The absence of population perspectives on these factors also points to a weakness in literature, reinforcing the need for interviews.

Some coordination issues were alluded to by community representatives

While obstacles were not openly discussed by communities, some articles alluded to relevant issues. For example, a housewife also recounted her initial impressions of the NZDF as follows:

> *"I saw the helicopter arrive this morning and a Fijian soldier told me it was the New Zealand military. That's good because the Fiji Government needs international help to rebuild everything… We lost everything… our house and everything in it, our little farm… So we are grateful that New Zealand and other countries are helping us"* (Radio New Zealand, 2016i).

While this perspective expresses gratitude, it also indicates a lack of communication between communities and the NZDF. This is because the individual was unaware of the military's arrival or that it would focus on public infrastructure. This reinforces the need for interviews, to better understand population views and their perceived obstacles.

Further, while humanitarians reported the NZDF had done an *"impressive job of immediate response in the major settlements on [Vanuabalavu],"* they noted that smaller communities on the island remained *"in very poor shape"* and appeared not to have received assistance

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[431] The report stated that local islanders *"may not operate in the same way or have different priorities to the GoNZ."* It also noted that some locals were hesitant to give information to the NZDF, until they realised the military was there to help. As a result NZDF lessons learned reports suggested that patience needed to be exercised with local population, particularly when determining priorities in HADR support.

[432] Community representatives and other stakeholders will comment on these obstacles in greater detail in the interview findings within Chapter Three.

(Richards, 2016). These views are concerning, as they may suggest assistance was not provided in accordance with the humanitarian principles.

The perspectives above highlight some gaps in the literature which raise questions about the NZDF's coordination, and particularly how obstacles may have impacted the HADR provided. As with the other gaps identified in TC Winston literature, interviewees will provide further clarification on these points in the following chapter.

Part Two findings

The sections above explored the NZDF's civil-military coordination at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. These efforts were, in general, portrayed as 'excellent' and 'beneficial' within the literature. Many sources also reported an observed improvement upon the TC Pam response.

As with the previous case study, the consistency within these reports is substantial. Examination of their content and sources, however, reveals limitations. Few sources, for example, explained why stakeholders held these views or evidenced these perspectives. While relatively more reports were produced by non-State sources, a scarcity of analysis meant most perspectives were still drawn from NZDF or GoNZ sources.

Minimal analysis of obstacles to coordination and how these impacted actors' assistance was also uncovered.[433] The HQ JFNZ synopsis and other sources also reported almost exactly the same obstacles to coordination, as occurred in the TC Pam response. Yet few sources provided details of these or examples of how these impacted HADR.

Two discrepancies are also evident within these literature findings. The first is that while most NZDF and GoNZ sources reported that the NZDF's civil-military coordination efforts had improved and enhanced actors' HADR, other sources reported the same obstacles impeded coordination.[434] The other is that internal reports and those produced by civilian and humanitarian actors were often more critical than those portrayed by State stakeholders. These findings indicate that published literature did not describe all obstacles to coordination or stakeholder perspectives accurately.

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[433] The TC Winston lessons learned report, for example, only briefly mentioned civil-military coordination issues and referred to foreign militaries as a collective. Foreign military assistance was only mentioned in four sections of the TC Winston report, which was 123 pages long. These were sections: 4.2.3 (internal cluster coordination), 4.2.4 (role of the military), 4.2.6 (logistics), and 4.3 (information management & assessment).

[434] The HQ JFNZ lessons learned synopsis, for example, identified many of the same obstacles to coordination, including a lack of understanding, communication challenges and concerns relating to politics and interests.

Chapter Four summary

In the chapter above TC Winston literature was examined. This explored how sources portrayed the overall HADR response, the NZDF's civil-military coordination efforts and how these were perceived by stakeholders. In general, the literature suggests that the NZDF's coordination efforts were viewed positively by a broad range of actors in the response. Yet despite the prevalence of these reports, several inconsistencies were evident when published and unpublished stakeholder perspectives were compared.

As with the previous case study, crucial gaps were identified in the literature. In particular, a lack of clarity surrounded how domestic factors and the militarisation of the TC Winston response impacted the NZDF's civil-military coordination. Another gap concerned how the identified obstacles to coordination may have impacted the HADR provided.

Considering the major role the NZDF played in the TC Winston response, this lack of data is concerning. These gaps also reinforce the need to interview stakeholders, to provide more robust answers to the questions posed in this study. These interview findings are the subject of the following chapter.

Chapter Five: Acting First, Asking Later

In the previous chapter, TC Winston literature findings were examined. These suggested that most stakeholders perceived the NZDF's civil-military coordination efforts as 'positive' and 'effective.' In comparison, this chapter explores how thirty-three interviewed stakeholders viewed the NZDF's coordination, in the same response.[435] This provides more in-depth data, which aims to address the gaps identified in the literature.

The chapter structure is identical to Chapter Three. Findings are reported in three parts, with each focused on a separate research question. [436] Part One examines how interviewees perceived the NZDF's civil-military coordination in the TC Winston response. Part Two discusses the four key obstacles to coordination, which were identified by participants. Part Three then explores the impact these obstacles were reported to have had on HADR.

Part One: TC Winston stakeholder perceptions

Interviewee perspectives are examined in the four sections below. These report how participants described the NZDF's coordination with; i) New Zealand civilian actors, ii) international and local humanitarian actors, iii) the GoF, and iv) the affected population.

In each section, the general impressions of interviewees are summarised, along with their reasoning for holding these views. Both positive and negative stakeholder perceptions are reported, while a more detailed examination of obstacles and their impacts is reserved and reported in Parts Two and Three respectively. At times, perspectives varied significantly between participants. These contrasts are highlighted where possible, along with participants' justification for their views. [437]

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[435] All interviews were completed in New Zealand and Fiji between June and September 2017. Two GoF officials failed to confirm their involvement in the study or declined their involvement post interview. This meant GoF perspectives were collated from five rather than seven stakeholders, which reduced the total number of participants to thirty three.

[436] The three research questions are: 1) how did stakeholders perceive the NZDF's civil-military coordination in past Pacific disaster relief responses? 2) What, if any, were the obstacles to the NZDF's civil-military coordination in past responses? 3) How might identified obstacles have impacted the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief provided by actors?

[437] Interviewees did not always detail why they held certain perspectives, but these are reported, where possible.

i. Coordination with New Zealand civilian actors

Improvement was noted compared to previous civil-military coordination efforts

Coordination between the NZDF and MFAT, USAR, NZMAT and New Zealand humanitarian agencies was viewed as positive by over 70% of interviewees from these agencies. Seven participants reported these coordination efforts were an improvement upon that in previous responses.[438]

Most believed this improvement was the result of pre-disaster interaction and increased understanding between those deployed in both responses.[439] One OGA representative reflected,

> *"Fiji was bigger and better because it was based on the growth that we'd made in Vanuatu… it was a lot more integrated… And it flowed a lot better because it was based on knowledge of capabilities and relationships."[440]*

All New Zealand participants reported that civil-military coordination increased the overall effectiveness of the WoG response. Many concluded this because of NZDF logistical support, which enabled civilian stakeholders to provide HADR more rapidly in isolated areas.

The DJIATF model and its leadership improved coordination

Many interviewees believed coordination was positive and improved by the application of the new DJIATF model.[441] This outcome was connected to the personality traits of DJIATF leadership and LOs, who were described as professional, friendly and as having excellent interpersonal skills. Participants also reflected on the benefits of deploying the same DJIATF leadership in both responses.[442] This enabled military and civilian representatives to build trust, relationships and understanding between responses.

Although these factors reportedly enhanced civil-military coordination, they also led some to suggest this improvement was "*personality-driven.*"[443] This concerned some interviewees who noted that NZDF staff often change posting every two years, which meant this progress and experience might be lost.[444]

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[438] Interview: 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 50, 51.
[439] Interview: 36, 37, 50, 51. Positive examples of pre-disaster civil-military interaction included exercises, table top and post disaster discussions.
[440] Interview: 51.
[441] Interview: 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 50, 51.
[442] Interview: 36, 37.
[443] Interview: 40.
[444] Interview: 38, 39, 40, 50, 51, 53, 55.

Command and control issues

Despite these positive views, stakeholders reported several command and control issues which they felt impeded coordination.[445] While all NZDF interviewees felt military personnel had respected MFAT's role as the lead agency, civilian stakeholders reported this had not always occurred on the Canterbury or in the field.[446] One OGA stakeholder commented,

> *"It appeared to me that the NZDF thought that they were the lead agency. Whereas… MFAT should have been lead agency and should have been treated as lead."[447]*

One GoNZ official also reflected on this tension and believed some MFAT staff were viewed as a "*necessary evil*" by certain NZDF personnel.[448] This frustrated MFAT LOs and undermined their leadership and coordination of the WoG response.

In contrast to these perspectives, some NZDF representatives suggested the military reluctantly took charge in HADR scenarios.[449] They reflected that MFAT LOs were rotated every two weeks, or less, on the Canterbury. This meant NZDF personnel were "*re-teaching the situation and reforming those [NZDF-MFAT] relationships every time.*"[450] One NZDF representative believed this had a natural outcome, stating that "*although MFAT has 'technical lead,' NZDF ends up leading the relationships… at the tactical and most of the integration levels*."[451]

NZDF-OGA coordination was challenging in the field

While NZDF-OGA coordination was generally perceived positively, some interviewees felt this was impeded by a lack of understanding, 'command and control' and organisational culture issues.[452] These were particularly observed at the tactical level when NZDF and OGA representatives worked alongside one another on the Canterbury and in the outer islands.

In some examples, OGA representatives felt they were excluded from the NZDF planning process or were not listened to because they were civilians.[453] Others reported they were

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445 Interview: 41, 42, 38, 52, 53.
446 Interview: 38, 52, 53.
447 Interview: 52.
448 Interview: 38. The interviewee suggested that although Navy personnel had respected officials, this was not the case with some New Zealand Army personnel.
449 Interview: 39, 40, 41.
450Interview: 39.
451 Interview: 39.
452 Interview: 38, 39, 41, 52, 53.
453 Interview: 52, 53. Some believed this was linked to command and control issues and the NZDF's organisational culture.

"*made to feel that we [civilian representatives] were under [NZDF] command.*"[454] This frustrated civilian representatives, some of who had extensive HADR experience.

Interviewees reported it was this tension which led to the incident between NZDF and USAR officers, which were deployed in the field together.[455] This ultimately led USAR and NZDF teams to operate independently, as they felt civil-military coordination was too challenging.

Closer civil-military coordination and more interaction desired

Nine interviewees linked the above coordination challenges to a lack of understanding and previous interaction between NZDF and civilian representatives.[456] This led some to conclude that "*below the very senior decision-making level [NZDF-New Zealand civilian coordination] was a bit 'ad hoc'.*"[457] As a result, 90% of New Zealand participants recommended more pre-disaster interaction to improve future civil-military coordination efforts.[458]

Although some of the recommended measures were being applied, nine stakeholders expressed frustration over how training and exercises did not appear to be improving civil-military coordination.[459] A range of explanations were given for this, including staff rotation in the NZDF and civilian agencies, a lack of direct interaction in exercises and efforts to improve civil-military coordination not always being supported by civilian or military leadership.

ii. Coordination with international and local humanitarian actors

Minimal coordination was reported

Forty-five percent of all participants reported there had been little or no contact between the NZDF and humanitarian actors in the TC Winston response. This figure included all humanitarian interviewees, five of which reported communication and information sharing had been poor between the NZDF and their agencies.[460] One INGO representative commented,

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[454] Interview: 52.
[455] Interview: 41, 42, 52, 53. Frustration reportedly led to one USAR team choosing to identify their own tasking without coordinating or reporting to NZDF personnel first.
[456] Interview: 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44, 51, 52, 58.
[457] Interview: 38.
[458] Interview: 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56. Suggestions included more frequent civil-military exercises, training opportunities and integrated courses in New Zealand and the Pacific. Interviewees also recommended that New Zealand civilian representatives spend more time on NZDF assets in-between cyclone seasons, as this would increase their understanding of military procedures and culture.
[459] Interview: 38, 39, 40, 42, 45, 51, 52, 53, 55.
[460] Interview: 43, 44, 45, 46, 49.

"We didn't know the full scope of what [the NZDF] were able to provide…
That was my experience through TC Winston… [Military support] wasn't
made available specifically for everybody to utilise."[461]

These factors meant many humanitarians did not understand how they could coordinate with the NZDF in the field, or even if this was possible.

While a general lack of interaction was reported, coordination which did occur was viewed positively by humanitarian interviewees.[462] Examples often related to the offer of NZDF logistical support, which meant humanitarians could transport relief supplies to isolated areas.

One INGO interviewee even reported that the NZDF was "*in touch with the culture and basics of civilian operations in the Pacific,*" which made coordination easier.[463] This was reportedly due to the NZDF's previous HADR experience, the higher level of interaction it had with New Zealand civilian humanitarians and factors relating to its characteristics and culture.[464]

Stakeholders reported that different reasons were behind the lack of interaction

Interviewee perspectives varied over why a lack of NZDF-humanitarian coordination occurred, although these tended to align with the sector participants represented. For example, three of the four NZDF representatives believed humanitarian actors did not want to coordinate with the NZDF or only did so for pragmatic reasons.[465]This contrasted with the views of all humanitarian interviewees, who expressed the desire to utilise logistical support or coordinate more closely with the NZDF.

Only three interviewees commented that their agencies avoided direct interaction with the NZDF. This did not, however, eliminate civil-military coordination but meant agencies used mechanisms to facilitate this. Only one humanitarian reported this choice was due to the humanitarian principles, as they felt their organisation's neutrality would have been undermined by contact with the NZDF.[466] Their concerns related to the political context and tensions between New Zealand and Fiji.

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[461] Interview: 43.

[462] Interview: 43, 44, 47, 49. Only two of the stakeholders interviewed confident that their supplies had been transported by the NZDF. This was because the Fijian NDMO had not kept records of which military had transported relief supplies and where goods had been delivered. The other two interacted with the NZDF in the field in an ad hoc manner.

[463] Interview: 48.

[464] Factors included the small size of the NZDF which made it mobile, with less levels of hierarchy and the ability to build personal relationships between individuals.

[465] Interview: 39, 40, 42. One of these commented: "*Some of those NGOs leverage off us quite well and are really easy to work with and they very clear about… what they want from us. Other times they want nothing to do from us… until they end up in trouble*" (Interview: 39).

[466] Interview: 43. The stakeholders was concerned that the political context of TC Winston meant they needed to be careful when cooperating with the NZDF, in case this compromised the GoF's or local actors' willingness to work with them. They

In contrast, two interviewees stated their agencies had chosen not to assist in the Lau group because the NZDF was based there.[467] Reasons included the belief that the military was already meeting needs, that their organisation would receive less visibility alongside the NZDF, and that the military's culture and organisational style would make coordination more challenging.[468]

Domestic factors impeding coordination

Over 80% of humanitarian stakeholders also felt the lack of NZDF-humanitarian coordination stemmed from a separation between these actors. One INGO reflected on their experience, they stated,

> *"[The NZDF's] work in Fiji was mainly directly with the Government, so we felt that we were left out of that… civil-military engagement."[469]*

Some interviewees believed this was the result of domestic factors such as the national disaster management structure, or RFMF and ex-military officials taking charge of the NDMO.[470] Others felt the GoV had made decisions which intentionally isolated international humanitarian actors and reduced their ability to coordinate with the NZDF. One stakeholder even reported that some humanitarian agencies were ordered by the GoF not to work in the Lau region, alongside the NZDF.[471]

As a result, some humanitarian stakeholders felt the success of civil-military coordination depended on certain personalities.[472] This meant humanitarian representatives who had pre-established relationships with MFAT, NDMO and GoF officials were successful in their coordination efforts with the NZDF, while others were not.

Challenges with the humanitarian coordination structure

In contrast, seven non-humanitarian participants believed that poor civil-military coordination was the result of international humanitarian coordination mechanisms not integrating well with the National Cluster System.[473] Interviewees, however, disagreed over whether humanitarian or national stakeholders were responsible for this separation. Most locally-based participants

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commented: "*The first two weeks it was quite sensitive because I completely understood the nature of relationship between the militaries of Australia, New Zealand and Fiji. So… I tried as much for us not to be involved in that level of politics… we avoided being in direct contact with any of the militaries… [cooperating with the NZDF] may have worked a little bit against our favour in terms of the Fiji Government. We might have been seen as an outsider interfering with national responses.*"

[467] Interview: 46, 49.

[468] This will be discussed in greater detail in Part Two under the organisational culture section.

[469] Interview: 43.

[470] Interview: 43, 44, 48, 49. Domestic factors and their impact on civil-military coordination and the assistance provided are discussed in greater detail in Part Two.

[471] Interview: 48.

[472] Interview: 37, 49, 50, 51, 53, 59. One INGO official commented: "*From the PHT to MFAT it was actually quite personality-based… it's not an official line that exists. If I don't happen to call, they might not call me*" (Interview 49).

[473] Interview: 36, 38, 40, 50, 51, 59, 65.

believed foreign humanitarians were at fault. One GoF official described humanitarian-military coordination as "*very ad hoc*" and stated the whole humanitarian system needed to be fixed.[474]

Other interviewees reported the humanitarian coordination structure was rejected by the GoF, which opted to use national structures and the 'future operations cell' instead.[475] One NZDF participant reflected,

> "There WAS no UN cluster system. [The GoF] went 'No we are not doing that. We are running the show and these are our priorities… I think it worked really well in that environment, if I'm honest. Whereas the down side to that is they probably alienated a lot of aid agencies."[476]

iii. Coordination with the Government of Fiji

Coordination was viewed as positive due to State approaches

All GoF participants described the NZDF's coordination with NDMO, RFMF, GoF and Ministry representatives as 'good' or 'excellent.' One GoF interviewee even stated the NZDF's coordination was "*much better done,*" in comparison to their impressions of the Vanuatu response.[477] Another reported the NZDF was easier to coordinate with, compared to other militaries.[478]

Interviewees provided several reasons for these positive views. NZDF and GoF participants felt NZDF-GoF coordination was good, due to the approach taken by the NZDF and DJIATF.[479] This was described as flexible, friendly and respectful of the GoF's authority and pace. Seven interviewees reported this approach resulted in the NZDF having greater autonomy and coordination with the GoF.[480] One NZDF representative reflected,

> "By the end of the two-and-a-bit months that we were there [the NZDF] were operating in a more permissive environment than everyone else because we were trusted... Our ability to get information into and out of NDMO was

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[474] Interview: 59.
[475] Interview: 39, 49.
[476] Interview: 39.
[477] Interview: 60.
[478] Interview: 59. The GoF official commented: "*First of all [New Zealand] acknowledge the Fiji Government, they don't say 'this is our foreign aid programme, we're going to do A,B,C, and D… the Australian [Defence Force] would get… bureaucratic about it, they'd all have to write about it and go back and discuss it with Canberra and debate it… and then if you wanted to enter a vessel… you had to fill out six forms… whereas the New Zealanders were very fast. They were very nimble*."
[479] Interview: 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 58, 59, 60.
[480] Interview: 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 59, 60. Participants commented that the NZDF's approach had also benefitted the GoF, as it gave Fijian authorities more control and visibility over NZDF operations.

vastly superior to [the ADF]. And that was because of the individuals and the interpersonal relationships that we had developed by taking a 'kiwi' approach to it."[481]

Many participants linked this positive coordination to national oversight and the management structure applied by the GoF.[482] Interviewees reported that many GoF and NDMO officials were ex-military or serving RFMF members, which meant the GoF "*ran [the disaster response] as a military operation.*"[483] NZDF, GoF and GoNZ interviewees felt this enhanced NZDF-GoF coordination in the NDMO, as both sides were culturally similar and familiar with military processes, terminology and operations.[484] One GoNZ participant reflected this meant it was "*easy*" for the NZDF to embed themselves in the NDMO and "*add value without being too pushy and overwhelming the local system*."[485]

Differences in culture

In contrast to these views, some participants reported coordination challenges, which were linked to differences in culture and organisational structure.[486] One NZDF interviewee described these as follows:

> *"Cultural barriers… there were natural rub points… [Fijian Government] centralised a lot of that decision-making, [while the NZDF] tend to decentralise… It frustrates us that we can't sometimes get decisions… and I think it probably frustrates the Fijian military and their government sector… that [the NZDF] are so pushy and everything seems to be 100% time-critical."*[487]

Tension was often related to the NZDF's prioritisation of speed, which conflicted with the GoF and RFMF's more 'easy going' culture and decision-making.[488]

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[481] Individuals referred to this approach as the 'New Zealand' or 'kiwi' approach. When the participant was asked to define this term, they stated: "*So the kiwi approach was to be like, "okay you guys are the boss, we will be a tool for you, let us know what you want us to provide and we will do everything we can." Whereas the less kiwi approach was to do a traditional military approach…So I think the kiwi approach was defined by our ability to be alongside the people we were supporting rather than to press on them, how things were going to be.*" Interview 39.

[482] Interview: 36, 37, 39, 40, 46, 48, 50, 59, 60.

[483] Interview: 36.

[484] Interview: 36, 37, 39, 40, 42, 51, 53, 59, 60.

[485] Interview: 37.

[486] Interview: 37, 38, 39, 42, 46, 51, 59, 61.

[487] Interview: 39.

[488] Interview: 37, 38, 39, 42, 51, 59, 61.

Contrasting perspectives on the impact of politics and interests

Although over 70% of all participants discussed either the 2006 coup or political tensions between New Zealand and Fiji. Interviewees were divided over whether these factors had positive or negative impacts on NZDF-GoF coordination. On one hand, all GoF, GoNZ and NZDF participants reported that political tensions did not negatively impact coordination efforts. Some even believed these factors resulted in a larger and more effective NZDF response, as the GoNZ was trying to rebuild trust and relationships.[489]

On the other hand, thirteen civilian interviewees believed historic tensions and politics negatively impacted NZDF-GoF coordination.[490] Many believed the GoF was suspicious of the GoNZ's support or perceived it as either condescending or motivated by diplomatic interests.[491] This reportedly undermined coordination and trust. It also reportedly delayed decision-making around the use of NZDF assets. One INGO representative observed,

> *"For me, it was just purely suspicion from the host country [Fiji]. Being*
> *suspicious of the motives of the militaries of New Zealand and Australia…*
> *that delayed a lot of the decisions made on where to respond."[492]*

Some believed these factors led to RFMF personnel being tasked to observe NZDF personnel and take control over the distribution of NZDF-transported supplies.[493] These measures, however, had negative impacts on HADR, as will be discussed in Part Three.

iv. Coordination with the affected population

Perceptions were tied to outcomes

Overall, stakeholders' believed relations and coordination between the NZDF and the affected population had been extremely positive. May interviewees discussed the extreme circumstances communities were in before the NZDF's arrival and believed the population would have welcomed any assistance offered. Three stakeholders also felt the mere presence

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[489] Interview: 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 57, 60, 61. Some stakeholders felt this resulted in the New Zealand Government investing more effort and financial support into the NZDF response, which resulted in a larger and more effective NZDF response.

[490] Interview: 43, 46, 48, 50, 52, 53, 55, 56, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70.

[491] Interview: 43, 44, 46, 50, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70.

[492] Interview: 43.

[493] Interview: 44, 46, 47, 48, 55, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70. Some participants did however report that some RFMF personnel had been disciplined after the disaster, as a consequence of this behaviour.

of the NZDF lifted the spirits of the affected individuals around them.[494] One local humanitarian worker commented,

> "People would sit all day long and begin to stare into space. Because there was no houses, EVERYTHING was gone. And when [the NZDF] came in and started doing the work with them, that's when restoration began. Psychologically, they sort of came back to their senses."[495]

All of the community representatives expressed deep gratitude for the assistance provided by the NZDF. Many described NZDF personnel as hard-working and believed personnel completed tasks that local actors had neither the resources nor capability to finish in such a short time frame.[496] Stakeholders also provided examples of the depth of feeling outer island communities had for the NZDF.[497] In one case this saw the affected population putting on a concert and feast to thank the NZDF before departure, despite their food shortages and needs.

Contrasting views over the level of communication

Stakeholder perspectives varied considerably over how communication and coordination had been between the NZDF and the affected population. For example, 80% of all NZDF, GoNZ and GoF interviewees believed the NZDF's communication with the affected population had been good in the TC Winston response. Many felt this was because the RFMF, local chiefs and LOs facilitated communication, which reduced language and cultural barriers.[498] One NZDF interviewee also believed the population were "*on the whole really receptive*" to personnel because locals already had a familiarity and respect for militaries because of the RFMF.[499]

In contrast, six community representatives reported that communication was poor or non-existent between the NZDF and affected individuals.[500] One community representative reflected,

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[494] Interview: 44, 46, 47. Some felt this inspired communities to begin rebuilding their lives and contributed to their recovery process.

[495] Interview: 47.

[496] Interviews: 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69 and 70. Representatives commented on tasks such as: repairs to schools, medical centres, and either fixing or installing generators and water sources. Participants also commented that the Canterbury's desalination plants had provided communities with much needed fresh water when their own sources were contaminated.

[497] Interview: 41, 46, 47, 57, 64, 68, 69, 70. Some described how locals spray-painted messages of thanks to the NZDF after they provided assistance in villages. Others recounted the emotional farewell locals gave the NZDF on its departure from the Lau Island Group. This saw the affected population putting on a concert and feast to thank the NZDF for its help, despite their food shortages and needs.

[498] Interview: 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 57, 59, 60, 61.

[499] Interview: 39.

[500] Interview: 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70. The majority reported that communities were not briefed on what needs the NZDF was tasked to meet and were not consulted prior to the commencement of tasks.

"[The NZDF] just came right in, no briefing no nothing, just the government officials accompanying them... We just found out along the way... But nothing was told to us what they were going to do, until later later on, way way later."[501]

Some noted NZDF personnel would often only say 'hello' to villagers and then go straight to work. This led some to question whether the NZDF were ordered not to interact.

Many community representatives and humanitarians linked this to the NZDF communicating predominantly with a small number of village headmen or local authorities.[502] This meant information was not always passed on to villagers and the priority needs of communities were not always communicated to the NZDF.

Contrasting views over how culture impacted coordination

Perspectives also varied over how cultural factors impacted coordination. Ten interviewees felt aspects of the NZDF culture made coordination with the population easier.[503] Some of these, including community representatives, reported that NZDF personnel were more friendly, approachable and empathetic than some personnel in the RFMF or other militaries.[504] Others suggested coordination was enhanced by having personnel had Pacific Island or Maori heritage, which made the NZDF more culturally sensitive.[505]

In contrast, many locally-based interviewees highlighted examples where NZDF personnel demonstrated a lack of cultural understanding.[506] When asked about obstacles to coordination one community representative exclaimed, "*language, culture barriers, politics, EVERYTHING. Because [NZDF personnel are] from a different country.*"[507] These factors reportedly led some personnel to act in a culturally inappropriate manner, which embarrassed or frustrated affected individuals.[508]

Interviewees also believed cultural factors impeded communication between the NZDF and the population. Some reported community leaders were too embarrassed to make requests of the

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[501] Interview: 69.
[502] Interview: 44, 45, 47, 49, 47, 67, 69, 70.
[503] Interview: 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 46, 48, 51, 64, 68.
[504] Interview: 39, 40, 46, 48, 59, 65, 69, 70.
[505] Interview: 39, 40, 46, 60.
[506] Interview: 44, 51, 61, 67, 68, 69, 70.
[507] Interview: 69.
[508] Interview: 44, 61, 69, 70. Examples included church premises not being treated respectfully, females wearing short shorts and personnel sunbathing on beaches. This was considered culturally inappropriate as most communities were religious, chose not to work on Sundays and dressed conservatively. Interviewees also clarified that women were usually required to wear 'sulu' [long skirts] when walking through villages, although affected populations understood that appropriateness could be compromised in an emergency response.

NZDF or communicate priority needs.[509] Others believed communities were too afraid to disagree with or critique the NZDF's assistance.[510] One representative reflected,

> *"Some [village elders] I think, disagreed with the [NZDF's] proposed plan… they think if they disagree with some of the proposed plan, the New Zealand Government will withdraw with the plan… withdraw the money."[511]*

In some cases, this led community representatives to accept NZDF assistance that was not always seen as suitable or appropriate for communities.[512]

Communities desired greater levels of interaction and accountability

These observations led five community representatives to suggest the NZDF should either directly consult the population or develop a system where communities and females, in particular, could provide the NZDF with feedback.[513] One participant commented,

> *"The only thing for [the NZDF] to improve is for us to get together and talk… explain about this and that… No female came to us… I think there would be a lot of [needs] we would bring up to them, like clothes for our children."[514]*

Part One findings

The sections above examined the perceptions of TC Winston stakeholders and presented key findings. One of these is that the majority of participants felt the NZDF's civil-military coordination efforts were good and had improved, in comparison to the TC Pam HADR response. Interviewees gave several reasons for their positive views, which included the NZDF's characteristics and culture, previous interaction between actors and coordination mechanisms, such as the DJIATF.

Other more unique aspects included the militarisation of the response and the relative freedom NZDF personnel were given in the field and NEOC. Some participants believed these factors enhanced the NZDF's civil-military coordination efforts, in part due to the relative culture and organisational similarities between the GoF, RFMF and NZDF.

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[509] Interview: 68, 70.
[510] Interview: 69, 70.
[511] Interview: 70.
[512] Interview: 67, 68, 69, 70. This issue and its impact on the affected population will be discussed in greater detail in Part Three.
[513] Interview: 66, 67, 68, 69, 70. Suggestions included having male and female NZDF representatives that communities could speak to about issues, the NZDF holding community meetings to discuss needs and collaborating more with locals prior to commencing tasks.
[514] Interview: 66.

In contrast to these views, interviewees also reported minimal or ad hoc coordination between sectors.[515] Some participants also felt there had been suspicion and tensions between State actors, which impeded coordination efforts.

These perspectives portrayed a more critical view of the NZDF's coordination than was expressed in the literature. Yet over 90% of all interviewees verbalised the desire to coordinate more closely with the NZDF and enhance civil-military coordination in future responses.

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[515] This was reported between the NZDF, humanitarian agencies and affected population.

Part Two: Obstacles to Coordination

This section reports the four key obstacles to the NZDF's civil-military coordination, as collated from interview data. An overview of these obstacles is presented in Table 3.[516]

Key obstacle	%	Sub-themes and coordination issues
i. Domestic Factors	88%	− Sovereignty and national oversight introduced protocol and processes, which constrained civil-military coordination. − Politics and personal interests impacted trust and relationships. − Lack of integration between national and international coordination structures. − National legislation was not updated or applied, which led to changes in structure and confusion.
ii. Poor Communication	82%	− Between the NZDF and New Zealand civilian actors, humanitarian agencies and the affected population. − The lack of an all-informed network on Canterbury, unclassified email system and constraints due to security restrictions. − The use of terminology by NZDF and civilian actors. − Cultural misunderstandings and language barriers.
iii. Lack of Understanding	67%	Regarding: − The capabilities and roles of the NZDF. − The Fijian culture and context, HADR operations and the humanitarian principles (exhibited by NZDF personnel). − How the NZDF and civilian actors could communicate and coordinate NZDF capabilities.
iv. Organisational Culture	52%	− Clashes in priorities, culture and organisational structure (between NZDF and civilian actors). − High staff rotation (MFAT within country and NZDF/DJIATF staff within postings).

Table 6: Obstacles to the NZDF's Civil-Military Coordination in the TC Winston response

Due to the complexity of these obstacles and the number of sub-themes, a more thorough analysis of these is included in Appendix Five. This presents participant views and examples of the obstacles and sub-themes described in the table above.

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[516] The column on the far left details the thematic obstacle to coordination. The second column reports the percentage of interviewees who identified or provided examples of challenges associated with this obstacle. The third column describes sub-themes and barriers to coordination, which were identified by multiple interviewees. Some participants did not use specific terms to describe obstacles. Examples of coordination issues were therefore coded by the researcher, depending on their subject matter and theme.

Part Two findings

When triangulated, interviewee data revealed four thematic obstacles to the NZDF's civil-military coordination. These were: domestic factors, poor communication, lack of understanding, and organisational culture. This order is identical to that which emerged from TC Pam interview findings, which strengthens the validity and generalisability of these findings.

The statistics behind these figures also evidence remarkable consistency across sectors and that a high proportion of participants were aware of these obstacles. For example, 64% of all interviewees discussed three or more obstacles in their interviews.[517] This figure includes those from the NZDF and GoNZ sector. Most barriers to coordination were also discussed by participants from all five sectors, while nine interviewees reported all four obstacles.[518]

As with the previous case study, interviewees identified numerous sub-themes, which were not discussed in the literature. It was also reported that some of these barriers had significant negative impacts on civil-military coordination.[519] Participants also linked obstacles to each other, further suggesting these are interconnected and influence one another.[520]

The majority of interviewees also expressed their desire to openly discuss obstacles, to improve future civil-military coordination efforts. Some also raised concerns that post-disaster and lessons learned reports did not appear to discuss key obstacles, particularly actors' politics and interests. These views, and the fact that most participants reported obstacles which were not identified in the literature, suggest that published material may not have accurately reflected the perspectives of stakeholders.

Part Three: How the Obstacles to Coordination Impacted HADR

Within interviews, participants identified four main impacts which resulted from the obstacles identified above. These are detailed below and include; i) HADR was delayed or not delivered, ii) assistance was not always suitable for the affected population or context, iii) population needs were not met in accordance with humanitarian principles.

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[517] As discussed in the methodology section of the introduction, two GoF interviewees either did not respond to requests or chose not to give permission for their interview data to be used in this study. This reduced the total number of participants to 33, as opposed to the original 35 who were interviewed.

[518] Interview: 36, 37, 38, 42, 49, 51, 52 & 55. At least one participant from each sector discussed each of the thematic obstacles, except the 'organisational culture' obstacle. This was not discussed by any of the GoF participants.

[519] Domestic factors were, for example, the most frequently discussed obstacles to coordination, despite little mention or in-depth analyses of these in the literature or NZDF reports.

[520] For example poor communication and lack of understanding were linked by over half of all participants, either directly or indirectly.

i. HADR was delayed or not delivered

Twenty-two interviewees discussed examples where they felt assistance provided by the NZDF or other civilian actors had been delayed or was not delivered because of obstacles to civil-military coordination.[521]

Many of these were related to delays in decision-making, particularly over the identification of tasks for the NZDF and the use of its assets. Some participants believed delays were a result of national factors, which meant the NZDF's planning and assistance were delayed while waiting for the GoF to identify tasks it could undertake.[522] One NZDF representative described this as a frustration and a "*real challenge*," which at times meant the NZDF was two days from finishing a task without having others lined up.[523]

Other interviewees believed the NZDF's culture and hierarchy contributed to this outcome.[524] One GoNZ official felt NZDF personnel were not always encouraged to show initiative, they observed,

> "*in general, [NZDF personnel] are waiting for tasking and orders and in an emergency.*"[525]

The NZDF's procedures around the use of assets also reportedly delayed the provision of assistance at times. For example, one OGA representative described the process of getting building supplies off the Canterbury as "*convoluted,*" which delayed the delivery of these ashore and their use in the response.[526]

Humanitarian interviewees also reported they struggled to meet the NZDF's requirements and timeframes to utilise assets.[527] One New Zealand humanitarian reflected,

> "*If [the NZDF] were able to predict for twenty-four to forty-eight hours in advance, the likely routines and space available… obviously more time. I know that there were a number of movements that were next to nothing on*

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[521] Interview: 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 59, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70.
[522] Interview: 43, 44, 46, 50, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70. Some stakeholders believed these delays were the result of politics or the GoF's suspicions about the assistance offered by New Zealand. Others felt the GoF's centralised structure contributed to these delays, as it meant only a small number of RFMF or GoF officials were in charge of decision-making.
[523] Interview: 39.
[524] Interview: 38.
[525] Interview: 38.
[526] Interview: 52. The interviewee commented: "*So an amazing vehicle like the Canterbury is sitting offshore with millions of dollars' worth of building supplies sitting in it, but to actually get them off there and onto shore and then onto a building is a very convoluted process. Which doesn't really fit in with time critical needs*."
[527] Interview: 48, 49, 55. Humanitarian stakeholders in particular felt it was unrealistic to expect actors to be ready at short notice in the Fijian HADR context.

the aircraft, and with a bit more time we could probably make better use of the assets."[528]

At times, this meant the HADR of humanitarian agencies was either delayed or not delivered to the affected population.

ii.   Assistance was not always suitable for the affected population or context

Participants discussed several instances where the NZDF's assistance had not always suited the disaster context or affected population.[529]

Some examples related to NZDF assets or the supplies it transported not being considered suitable for the outer islands.[530] This was believed to be the result of a lack of communication between the NZDF, GoF and the affected population, as well as the NZDF's lack of understanding about the area of operations. One GoF official believed this was also partly due to the NZDF not receiving accurate assessments from the GoF when it first arrived.[531] This meant the NZDF duplicated HADR which had already been distributed, in at least two instances.

Other interviewees believed the NZDF had not always provided gender-specific assistance.[532] Some felt that because the NZDF had deployed without a gender advisor, the needs of widows, women and children were not always communicated to the NZDF or adequately met. One local humanitarian reflected,

> *"Basically [the NZDF are] not doing gendered analysis. You're not asking-'what do men need, what do women need?'... You're then not providing the correct provisions... it's not protection with dignity.[533]*

Community representatives also highlighted examples where tasks were completed by the NZDF in a way considered unsuitable by the population. Some felt this occurred because community leaders were afraid to question or critique the NZDF's plans or assistance, even

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[528] Interview: 55.
[529] Interview: 39, 45, 46, 59, 61, 67, 69, 70.
[530] Interview: 39, 42, 59, 61. Stakeholders observed that the supplies transported by the NZDF weren't always suitable. One example involved the tents transported. One GoF official commented that they were "*not for the climate, not durability, not acceptability from cultural perspective. Too hot and crowded, just not set up for Fiji situation.*" (Interview: 59). Others noted the NH90 helicopters could not transport a lot of HADR supplies out to the Lau Island group as they were not yet able to land or refuel on the Canterbury while at sea. Others noted that the NZDF's larger vehicles were less suited to the smaller, outer island roads.
[531] Interview: 61.
[532] Interview: 45, 46, 69.
[533] Interview: 45.

when communities felt it was inappropriate.[534] One example involved the NZDF reconstructing damaged teachers' accommodation on government land.[535] The demolition of these houses was however initiated by the NZDF without the knowledge of the families who lived in them. The houses were then rebuilt in an area the teachers felt was inappropriate, as these were too closely situated for the large families which would reside in them.[536]

Some negative impacts will have negative long-term impacts on communities

In another example, a lack of consultation with the affected population had negative long term consequences for communities. This occurred when the NZDF dug a rubbish pit in a village to dispose of waste and building materials.[537] Although well-intentioned, the pit was unknowingly dug in the location of a vegetable garden, which was feeding school children and two nearby communities.

This further strained food security and was later a health risk for communities when mosquitos began breeding in the pit after the rainy season.[538] Community representatives also acknowledged that locals wanted to use the materials discarded by the NZDF to rebuild their homes, as many could not afford transportation costs or to buy new materials. At the time interviews were completed, some families in areas the NZDF operated in were still living in tents, as they lacked the finances to rebuild.

iii. Population needs were not met in accordance with the humanitarian principles

Sixteen stakeholders believed a lack of communication and coordination between the NZDF and civilian actors resulted in a 'gap' where the affected population's needs were not met.[539] Many felt this was because the NZDF focused on public infrastructure, while needs such as

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[534] Interview: 69, 70.

[535] Interview: 67. The teachers who lived on the school grounds had large and often young families. Although the houses were well-made, they were built close together and directly behind the principal's office, while they would have preferred to be further away from the school compound for privacy.

[536] The houses were rebuilt closely together and near the Principles office, which was considered inappropriate as Fijian families were often large and would have preferred more privacy. The community representative who provided the example felt the teachers would have offered the NZDF advice on their plan, if they had been asked.

[537] Interview: 67. The community representative stated that villagers were too embarrassed to tell the NZDF that this had occurred. They also mentioned that the "waste" the NZDF placed in the rubbish pit was actually wanted by community members to rebuild their houses, as it was very expensive to transport any building material to the outer islands. This meant members of the affected community went into the pit after the NZDF departed to re-salvage materials. Many of these individuals could not afford to buy materials after the cyclone and by the end of 2017 when interviews were conducted, were still living in tents while waiting for GoF supplies to turn up.

[538] Community representatives stated that they did not have the heavy machinery which was needed to fill in the pit on the isolated island. Post-interview discussions with the NZDF would confirm that discussions had taken place between MFAT and local representatives over the pit not being filled in, suggesting this may have been an issue stemming from miscommunication or Government oversight.

[539] Interview: 38, 40, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 55, 56, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70.

psychosocial care, protection, private housing and the distribution of non-food items were not adequately addressed. One local humanitarian commented,

> "The psychological impact of TC Winston on these people, that particular area was not well looked after because the military didn't focus on that… that went missing, that 'soft [needs]' gap… And [the affected population] won't tell you this but the things that happened to women and children in the shelters is kept well hidden."[540]

This report suggests not only that some priority humanitarian needs were not met, but that many of these were not reported to authorities or NZDF personnel.

Assistance was not always focused in areas of need

Nine interviewees, including over half of all community representatives, felt a lack of communication between the NZDF and the affected population contributed to this outcome.[541] This reportedly meant the NZDF focused more of its assistance on certain islands and villages, while other areas received less HADR or "*missed out*" on supplies.[542] Some community representatives felt this meant NZDF personnel were not aware of the population's priority needs.[543] One commented,

> "If [the NZDF] come to the people, they see what the communities really want. It's like… first-things-first. I think repairing of schools and renovations of teachers quarters are maybe the third or the fourth things that needed to be done…. Like in the village, there are a few widows with no houses… build a small shelter just for them. Just to give them hope… That's what I think."[544]

While most of these reports were made by locally-based stakeholders, some New Zealand participants also linked negative HADR outcomes to barriers to civil-military coordination. For example, one GoNZ interviewee noted,

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[540] Interview: 46. Reports produced by humanitarian agencies post TC Winston also suggest sexual violence and assaults increased significantly during the response. This was because large numbers of people were gathered in evacuation centres and the vulnerability of individuals increased. See page 26-27: OXFAM. 2018. *Down by the River: Addressing the Rights, Needs and Strengths of Fijian Sexual and Gender Minorities in Disaster Risk Reduction and Humanitarian Response*. And: LIVE AND LEARN & CARE. 2016. *Rapid Gender Analysis Tropical Cyclone Winston: Fiji, March 2016*.

[541] Interview: 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 66, 67, 69, 70. Many felt the needs of women, widows and the very poor were not communicated to the NZDF.

[542] Interview: 38, 47, 69, 70. One humanitarian interviewee commented: *"[Supplies] were delivered, but probably people missed out… Like I said a very small population. Something to brush up on… having constant feedback from the local community. I'm pretty sure that the village headman would have given [the NZDF] the feedback but it's the people in the village who knows"* (Interview: 47).

[543] Although community representatives were grateful for the assistance provided many highlighted that their priority needs were: water, food, shelter and private housing. They also felt vulnerable members of communities had greater needs than the general population.

[544] Interview: 70.

"I don't have a good view of how efficient things were… but my sense is that things were 'not very efficient' and some of the supplies went to places [when] they could have been prioritised to other areas."[545]

While some NZDF, GoNZ and GoF participants challenged these reports, many of the participants reporting the aforementioned issues believed State representatives would not be willing to discuss these in an interview.

Some participants were aware stakeholders were trying to manipulate the NZDF's HADR

Eleven interviewees also either raised suspicion or confirmed that unfair distribution had occurred in the vicinity of the NZDF or with supplies it had transported.[546] Although all believed the NZDF were unaware of this, stakeholders reported that this occurred when food and non-food items were given to local authorities for distribution.[547] One community representative reflected on their own experience as follows,

"[Aid] wasn't shared fairly… I mean the villages NEED it… there were the very poor… who still live in… the old earth Fijian bure… They were the ones devastated, like they needed more help. The help was given more to these rich people… And these people, the rich were not giving out."[548]

Some participants believed this meant the most vulnerable sectors of the population, such as widows and those living in poverty, received less assistance.[549] One locally-based participant expressed embarrassment and shame at this, commenting that aid was "*not used in the right way….That's taxpayer's money.*"[550]

Many negative impacts were not discussed in media or reports

Seven interviewees reflected that the impacts of obstacles to coordination were not reported in the media, lessons learned reports or to the NZDF. [551] Some felt this was due to actors protecting their interests.[552] This included one local humanitarian, who stated,

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[545] Interview: 38.
[546] Interview: 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 55, 65, 68, 69, 70.
[547] Examples included local officials, village headmen or RFMF personnel taking food or relief supplies themselves or giving these to family, friends or villages which they favoured. Generators, tents, food and other supplies which were transported by the NZDF were also reportedly not distributed in accordance with the humanitarian principles or were removed after the NZDF departed. Stakeholders believed these supplies were distributed according to personal interests or in areas which were aligned with certain political parties.
[548] Interview: 65. The Fijian traditional wooden house is known as "bure," they are usually made out of wood and straw.
[549] Interview: 45, 48, 65, 69, 70.
[550] In order to protect the confidentiality of this stakeholder the interviewee number had not been listed and identifying details have been removed.
[551] Interview: 44, 46, 48, 65, 67, 69, 70.

"[The lessons learned report is] not the REAL THING, you have to be here, you have to collect data… you have to experience it in order to get the actual picture. Because… people will always want to say things to impress… But… you have to be here at a certain amount of time in order to get the real stories."[553]

Other stakeholders believed problems were not discussed for cultural reasons or because individuals were afraid there would be negative repercussions if they spoke out.[554] This led some interviewees to highlight the importance of ensuring accountability and observing international humanitarian standards during Pacific HADR responses.[555]

Part Three findings

In the sections above, interviewees discussed several negative impacts they believed obstacles to civil-military coordination had on HADR. The three major impacts included assistance being delayed or not delivered, being unsuitable for the affected population or context, and population needs not being met in accordance with the humanitarian principles. Evaluation of these reports reveals many interviewees believed multiple obstacles contributed to these negative impacts. This draws further attention to the interconnected and dynamic nature of obstacles to coordination.

As in TC Pam interview findings, concerns were raised by participants who felt the priority needs of communities were not being met. Unfair distribution was also believed to have disproportionately affected the most vulnerable sectors of the population. While not all interviewees attributed these outcomes to the NZDF, many linked them to a lack of civil-military coordination or poor communication between the NZDF and stakeholders. Collectively, these findings suggest some stakeholders did not adhere to their international obligations, in the TC Winston response.

Finally, over 60% of interviewees expressed hesitancy about critiquing the NZDF, GoNZ or GoF's response. Many displayed this through body language or opted not to provide certain details.

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[552] This included politicians and States wanting to be viewed positively on the domestic and international stage. Others felt humanitarian actors or the SPC were either unaware of these issues or did not publish them for fear this would reflect badly on them or they would no longer be able to provide assistance in future responses.
[553] Interview: 44.
[554] These included communities not wanting to share details with foreigners or not reporting issues to protect community members or maintain harmony among individuals.
[555] Recommendations included: holding public meetings to identify priority needs, collaborating with CDC's or trusted locals, having male and female NZDF LOs that communities could speak with, and having NZDF personnel observe or conduct aid distribution. Interviewees believed communities could self-identify trusted teachers, nurses, aid post workers and respected females they would want to speak with NZDF personnel.

Those who openly discussed their concerns revealed a number of different reasons behind their hesitancy.[556] These views reinforce the importance of participant confidentiality in this study.

Chapter Five summary

In the chapter above, TC Winston interviewee findings were examined. These explored how the thirty-three interviewed stakeholders perceived the NZDF's civil-military coordination efforts, obstacles to coordination and the impacts these had on HADR. Findings confirm that stakeholders believed the NZDF's civil-military coordination efforts were positive and had improved upon that seen in TC Pam.

Interviewee data, however, provided a better understanding of why stakeholders and different sectors held these perspectives. In addition to the pragmatic reasons described in the literature, participants provided similar justification for their views, to TC Pam stakeholders.[557] Contextual factors also included the culture and organisational similarities between the NZDF and the GoF and RFMF officials controlling the response.

Findings also reveal a discrepancy between the perspectives reported in the literature and those of interviewed stakeholders from the same sectors. For example, participants suggested there had been minimal or ad hoc coordination with some sectors.[558] Interviewees also identified sub-themes and barriers to coordination, which were not discussed in the literature. Some of these had serious negative impacts on the NZDF's civil-military coordination and actors' HADR.[559] The most concerning of these reports suggests that humanitarian needs were not being met, unfair distribution occurred and these impacted vulnerable sectors of the population most. A high proportion of interviewees also expressed hesitancy about critiquing NZDF, GoNZ and GoF's HADR efforts, due to fears about negative repercussions.

These findings raise a number of concerns, including the fact that the NZDF or GoNZ may not have been aware of stakeholder views, all obstacles to coordination or how these were impacting actors' assistance. The hesitancy stakeholders have about sharing feedback also raises concerns about the accuracy of post-disaster reports and how useful these will be for stakeholders wishing to identify areas for improvement.

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[556] Community representatives, for example, discussed their fears that the GoNZ, GoV or NZDF might withdraw support, either during the TC Winston response or in the future, if stakeholders provided constructive criticism. In contrast, humanitarian representatives raised concerns that funding or the approval to operate in future HADR responses might be withdrawn or impeded.

[557] Reasons for these views These included the NZDF's characteristics and culture, previous interaction and coordination mechanisms, such as the DJIATF.

[558] This was observed between the NZDF, humanitarian agencies and affected populations.

[559] These impacts included assistance being delayed or not delivered; being unsuitable for the affected population or context; and population needs not being met in accordance with humanitarian need.

Chapter Six: Making Sense of Chaos

In the previous four chapters, findings from the literature and interviews were presented separately. These focused on the TC Pam and TC Winston HADR responses and how stakeholders perceived the NZDF's civil-military coordination. This chapter presents findings and conclusions, which have been drawn from a comparative analysis of both case studies.[560]

Findings are presented in four parts. The first three answer the research questions posed in this thesis. Part One reports how stakeholders perceived the NZDF's civil-military coordination in past Pacific HADR responses. This section compares stakeholder perspectives which were drawn from the literature, with those of the sixty-eight interviewees. Part Two discusses obstacles to the NZDF's civil-military coordination which were identified in both case studies. Part Three explores how these obstacles impacted the HADR provided by actors. The implications of these findings are also discussed, along with their relevance to stakeholders and previous literature.

In Part Four, a new model is proposed by the researcher. This model summarises the findings in this thesis and explains how human and contextual factors interact with civil-military coordination mechanisms to produce outcomes and stakeholder perceptions. It is hoped this model will help stakeholders better understand the complexities of civil-military coordination in Pacific HADR and improve future coordination efforts.

To provide greater clarification and depth of analysis, the term 'stakeholder/s' is used in the sections below to describe perceptions drawn from both the literature and interview findings. The terms 'interviewee/s' or 'participant/s' are used when referring specifically to the views of interviewed stakeholders.[561]

Part One: How did stakeholders perceive the NZDF's civil-military coordination in past Pacific disaster relief responses?

Three major conclusions emerged from the comparative analysis of stakeholder perspectives. The first is that, in general, the NZDF's civil-military coordination efforts were viewed favourably by stakeholders. While this is encouraging for the NZDF and GoNZ, an examination of interviewee perspectives reveals that most views are related to the positive outcomes of

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[560] Chapters Two and Four presented findings drawn from the literature and how it portrayed stakeholders' perceptions of NZDF's civil-military coordination efforts, obstacles to coordination and how these may have impacted the assistance provided. In contrast, chapters Three and Five answered the same three research questions, instead using data collated from sixty eight semi-structured interviews.

[561] Where terms may be confused, the researcher clarifies where statements are only drawn from the literature.

coordination, rather than focusing on the actual quality of civil-military coordination. Interviewees also often spoke in relative terms, viewing the NZDF's civil-military coordination as good or the best, when compared to coordination with other foreign militaries. These findings have important implications for the NZDF and other foreign militaries engaged in Pacific HADR.

The second major finding is that stakeholder perceptions of the NZDF's civil-military coordination were portrayed more favourably in the literature than by interviewees. Across all four civilian sectors, participants were more critical of the civil-military coordination efforts than the literature indicated. Interviewees also reported significant tensions which were not detailed in the literature, most of which related to 'command and control' or 'civilian leadership' issues. The reasons behind this discrepancy in perspectives will be discussed in greater detail below.

The third key finding is that stakeholder perspectives varied considerably, concerning the effectiveness of existing civil-military coordination mechanisms. Stakeholders also reported that the coordination mechanisms in past responses had positive and negative impacts on the NZDF's civil-military coordination. These findings suggest the NZDF and other HADR stakeholders may want to re-examine how civil-military coordination models are applied and function in Pacific HADR, to improve future disaster responses.

Each of these key findings and their implications are discussed below, with supporting data provided in Appendix Six.

i) Stakeholders generally viewed the NZDF's civil-military coordination efforts as positive in past responses

Most stakeholders used words like 'good' or 'great,' when describing the NZDF's civil-military coordination efforts in the TC Pam and Winston responses. These positive perceptions were expressed in the literature, by the majority of participants from all five stakeholder sectors and across both case studies. This consistency suggests that, in general, the NZDF's civil-military coordination efforts were viewed favourably by the stakeholders involved in past Pacific HADR responses. The triangulation of data across two HADR responses and between stakeholder sectors further strengthens the validity of this finding.

Stakeholders provided a number of key reasons why they felt the NZDF's civil-military coordination efforts had been positive. These included the practical and financial benefits of NZDF coordination and HADR, pre-disaster interaction between the NZDF and stakeholders, and the characteristics, culture and identity of the NZDF.

Of these reasons, the most frequently raised were the practical or financial benefits of the NZDF's involvement in HADR. These factors included the military's ability to arrive rapidly, provide extensive logistical support at no cost to stakeholders and a large, hard-working taskforce to meet humanitarian needs more effectively. The significant geographic, logistical and resource challenges in Pacific HADR responses also led many participants to argue that stakeholders needed NZDF support to rapidly meet needs in the wake of Category 5 cyclones. For example, one OGA participant recalled their reaction to a humanitarian who criticised their coordination with the NZDF. They reflected,

> *"One of the comments said to me was – 'well you're just defence force in different uniform then.' And I said – 'well, no. We are a government-led response and therefore [the NZDF] are the ones that get us IN to do what we're doing...' So we could be considered as... aligning ourselves with the devil in the way of [the NZDF], but in a practical sense... without the assets... and some of the logistical capability [the NZDF have], how would we HONESTLY get to these places in a timely fashion, if at all?"*[562]

Similar justifications for coordinating with the NZDF were provided by Pacific-based interviewees and several from the humanitarian sector.

The benefits of civil-military coordination also led many participants to conclude the NZDF and foreign militaries were 'here to stay' in Pacific HADR. Most believed this was a good thing, provided the military and stakeholders continue to try and improve their coordination efforts and HADR capabilities. These positive views and the fact that over 70% of humanitarian interviewees indicated they wanted to coordinate with the NZDF and desired closer coordination in future Pacific HADR responses are a new contribution to the literature. These findings also differ from most international studies, which conclude that humanitarian stakeholders are hesitant to coordinate with militaries (Byman *et al.*, 2000, Abiew, 2003, 2012).

On examination, many of these positive stakeholder views were, however, focused on the *outcomes* of coordination, rather than the actual *quality* of civil-military coordination. This flaw in reasoning is concerning as, for example, the fact that the NZDF provided logistical support quickly in the TC Pam response and delivered large quantities of aid did not necessarily mean the civil-military coordination behind this outcome was to a high level. In fact, several interviewees reported challenges associated with the speed of response and the civil-military coordination behind HADR efforts. Stakeholder perspectives which are based on this line of reasoning reinforce concerns raised by authors such as Egnell, who suggests many analyses of civil-military coordination have "*weak historical, empirical and theoretical foundations*" (2013,

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[562] Interview: 17.

p.238). This finding raises questions about the reliability of previous conclusions drawn about civil-military coordination in the Pacific, particularly if these did not differentiate between stakeholders reflecting on outcomes, instead of the coordination being examined.

When reflecting on why they felt coordination had been positive, many interviewees believed previous interaction between the NZDF and civilian stakeholders had improved civil-military coordination. Pre-disaster interaction between the NZDF, MFAT and OGAs, for example, reportedly enhanced coordination at the strategic level. [563] Some participants also felt NZDF-humanitarian interaction in previous responses and a civil-military workshop were a catalyst for positive coordination.[564] While this interaction only occurred between a small number of NZDF, GoNZ and humanitarian representatives, interviewees felt this face-to-face engagement helped build relationships, understanding and trust, which mitigated barriers to coordination.

The link between the level of engagement with the NZDF and positive coordination led the majority of participants to recommend increasing civil-military interaction between the NZDF and other stakeholders, prior to HADR deployments. These findings suggest that 'Janowitzean' or 'integrated' coordination models which encourage interaction between military and civilian actors may be the most suitable for the NZDF and Pacific (Egnell, 2006).

Other factors, including the NZDF's characteristics, identity and cultural traits, were believed to have made it easier for civilians to coordinate with the military.[565] The force's relatively small size and condensed command structure were linked to increased flexibility. Interviewees felt these factors and the delegation of decision-making in the field enabled personnel to be less rigid and hierarchy-focused, compared to other militaries. New Zealand and the defence force's reputation in the region also heightened the likelihood of coordination, as one local humanitarian interviewee commented,

> "The Pacific is not a warzone and so the military that are coming are
> neighbours. Especially New Zealand, [the NZDF] is seen across the Pacific as a
> friend of Pacific islanders."[566]

Some participants also felt having Maori and Pacific Island personnel in the NZDF had aided coordination efforts and shaped the military's culture in positive ways. These factors were seen as making NZDF personnel relatively more flexible, friendly and approachable by Pacific and civilian stakeholders.

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[563] Interview: 17. Stakeholders provided the examples of good pre-disaster interaction. These included joint-planning, Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) and MFAT representatives taking part in the 2013 Southern Katipo Exercise.
[564] The civil-military course took place in New Zealand . It was attended by NZDF, humanitarian and Pacific-based NDMO staff and reportedly increased understanding about each other's institutions, as well as humanitarian and Pacific HADR systems.
[565] Participants from all five sectors in both case studies reported that these factors made civil-military coordination easier with the NZDF.
[566] Interview: 46.

Cultural and national influences were also seen as contributing to the 'kiwi' or 'can-do' attitude displayed by NZDF personnel. Interviewee descriptions of the NZDF's identity and culture are similar to those of international stakeholders within Morris's (2017) and Greener's (2017) studies.[567] These findings also support contemporary civil-military relations theories which conclude that culture, identity and environmental factors have significant impacts on stakeholders' relationships and their effectiveness in operations (Schiff, 1995, Bland, 1999, Jepperson *et al.*, 1996).

Several participants stated the NZDF's characteristics, identity and culture meant the force was easier to coordinate with or better at civil-military coordination than the other deployed foreign militaries. This was linked to the NZDF's cultural orientation, processes and approach, which were more closely aligned with Pacific and civilian culture, as well as the norms guiding HADR. Pacific-based interviewees, however, emphasised that cultural similarities and having Maori or Pacific Island personnel in the NZDF does not necessarily eliminate cultural misunderstandings or result in good coordination. While these perspectives are generally encouraging for the NZDF, they raise concerns about the other foreign militaries in these responses.[568] Further research into how foreign militaries are perceived and could improve their civil-military coordination would, therefore, be valuable for future Pacific HADR responses.

The perceptions above represent a new contribution to academic literature. Concerning civil-military relations theories, they tend to support Moskos and Downes' (2000) proposition that the NZDF is a postmodern military, which is changing culturally due to domestic and international pressures. They also indicate, along similar lines to Hajjar's (2014) research on the US military, that the NZDF's restructuring, civilianisation and increasingly integrated NZ Inc. responses may be helping to enhance the military's coordination with civilian stakeholders.

Finally, these positive views of the NZDF and stakeholders' willingness to coordinate reveal a unique opportunity for the GoNZ and Pacific region. This widespread interest should be capitalised on to increase pre-disaster interaction and improve civil-military coordination in future responses.

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[567] Morris and Greener examined the NZDF's identity and culture in peacekeeping and combat environments. Their findings are described in Chapter One, section iv of Part One. This section examines cultural and structural change in the NZDF.
[568] While interviewees did not always clarify which foreign militaries they had coordination issues with, four participants named the ADF as being particularly difficult to work with.

ii) Stakeholder perceptions of the NZDF's civil-military coordination were portrayed more favourably in the literature than by interviewees

Although stakeholders described NZDF coordination efforts as positive, interviewees expressed a more critical view of civil-military coordination, compared to perspectives in the literature. This was evident across all four of the civilian sectors examined.

Participants also described a greater number of coordination challenges than were reported in post-disaster literature. Crucial unreported issues included 'ad hoc' coordination, a lack of interaction between the NZDF and civilian sectors and NZDF personnel not listening to or disrespecting civilian stakeholders. Again, these issues were raised by interviewees from all four civilian sectors and impacted coordination at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The fact that the more critical views of stakeholders were not reported in the literature is significant, as it may mean the NZDF and GoNZ are unaware of crucial coordination issues or how civilian stakeholders actually perceive the NZDFs civil-military coordination efforts.

Interestingly, most negative experiences of civil-military coordination were linked to 'command and control' issues or tensions over 'civilian control.' For example, these issues arose when USAR and NZDF personnel were deployed in integrated teams for the first time in Fiji. When describing why they felt tensions escalated into an incident, an OGA interviewee reflected,

> *"I've had the incident displayed to me verbally by [OGA representatives] and also NZDF people… it appears to be one guy who got a little ahead of himself in self-importance, matching up with another guy who wasn't going to have a bar of having his people belittled."*[569]

Coordination in this integrated team was considered so challenging that senior officers decided USAR and NZDF teams should instead operate independently. This tension and the critical views of stakeholders were, however, not published in post-operation reports. The only allusion to the incident was in an internal NZDF report which stated it was "*unclear who was in overall command*" when USAR and NZDF personnel operated together (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.10). While the internal FENZ report contained greater information on the incident, the report was not published or shared with stakeholders as it reportedly contained inaccuracies. [570] The omission of this incident is concerning, considering the significance of the event and the opportunity it presents to improve future civil-military interaction.

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[569] Interview: 52.
[570] The draft version of the 'Cyclone Winston USAR Deployment and NCC activation review' was obtained via OIA. The report incorporated feedback from MFAT, NZDF, USAR, FENZ personnel.

'Command and control' issues and tensions over MFATs leadership were also described by interviewees in both responses. One GoNZ interviewee described an example of these issues and NZDF personnel not recognising MFAT leadership in Fiji. They stated,

> *"[MFAT] were trying to utilise NZDF resources in an efficient and appropriate way to service the affected communities. Having [NZDF personnel] say 'oh yes… I'll take that into consideration' … but then not following through… because they have really only focused on their [internal] tasking… is not helpful to the overall objective of the exercise."*[571]

NZDF interviewees also expressed frustration at the frequent rotation of MFAT LOs on the Canterbury. This turnaround undermined civil-military coordination efforts, MFAT LOs situational awareness and their ability to lead. These perspectives contrast with post-disaster reports, which only described NZDF-MFAT relations in a positive manner (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.8). These findings demonstrate that command and control arrangements could be managed better in future WoG responses.

A lack of local or civilian control and concerns that NZDF personnel had taken too much control over operations, were also raised by Pacific-based and affected Government interviewees. For example, some GoV participants felt NZDF personnel had been disrespectful or taken inappropriate control over the national response, by overriding local procedures. This occurred when the first NZDF Hercules attempted to land without having provided local officials with the information they had requested. Further highlighting the impact these negative impressions can have, this incident nearly resulted in the Hercules being denied entry into Vanuatu, which could have jeopardised the WoG HADR response.

These stakeholder perspectives highlight the challenge of maintaining a military which is both effective and subordinate to civilian rule. This tension relates to the foundational 'civil-military problematique,' first described by Feaver (1996). Notably, this balance appears even more complicated in the context of Pacific HADR, where the NZDF is subject to multiple civilian authorities. These findings suggest that despite the relative success of the NZDF's integrated or 'Janowitzean' approach, issues surrounding civilian control still need to be addressed. It would, therefore, be valuable to explore how the GoNZ, affected governments and NZDF can better maintain this balance. This would ensure the NZDF continues to be welcomed in Pacific HADR.

Why were stakeholder perspectives less critical in the literature?

The significant difference between the perspectives of interviewees and those reported in the literature begs the question of why this occurred. The data and comparative analysis in this

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[571] Interview: 38.

thesis suggest there were three main factors behind this discrepancy. These factors were: 1) publication bias, 2) weaknesses in methodology and data collection, and 3) stakeholders' being unwilling to critique State actors.

An examination of literature sources revealed the majority of stakeholder views on the NZDF's civil-military coordination were published by GoNZ and NZDF sources.[572] This included over 80% of TC Pam literature and 70% of TC Winston literature. The second-largest source of these perspectives came from UN or INGO reports. In contrast, the views of affected government officials, communities and local civilian stakeholders were scarce or absent from the literature. Published literature was, therefore, biased toward the views of a small number of stakeholders and did accurately reflect how others perceived the NZDF's civil-military coordination. This is concerning, as locally-based stakeholders were those most likely to be operating in the field, affected by the disaster and to have an in-depth understanding of the context.

In addition, GoNZ, NZDF and INGO interviewees tended to express more positive views of the NZDF's civil-military coordination. They reported fewer issues than those from other sectors and were more likely to feel obstacles had not significantly impacted coordination. In comparison, the perspectives of affected government officials, communities and locally-based civilian stakeholders tended to be more critical and concerned about the impact of coordination issues. This provides another reason why published literature was more likely to portray positive views of coordination.

Of further concern, one-third of interviewees believed stakeholders did not voice their more critical view of civil-military coordination due to vested interests.[573] Several interviewees commented that the reports published by States, the UN and SPC tended not to report serious coordination issues or the resulting negative impacts. One humanitarian representative reflected on this as follows,

> *"Deployments come with a lot of fanfare… each of the governments throughout post-TC-Winston had a lot of public relations about the humanitarian service delivery. But unfortunately, as in any conflict or crisis situation, IF there are problems, they don't get told. They don't get PUBLICISED. So we don't know [if there were civil-military coordination problems]. It wasn't being published."*[574]

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[572] While some NZDF and GoNZ sources reported how other civilian stakeholders perceived the NZDF's coordination, 100% of these perspectives were positive.

[573] Interviewees alluded to the significant time and finances the GoNZ, NZDF and UN agencies have invested in coordination mechanisms. Others referred to the fact that INGOs rely on GoNZ or UN funding to undertake Pacific HADR. Stakeholders are also more likely to gain visibility, funding and international approval, when their coordination and HADR efforts are successful.

[574] Interview: 45.

Methodological weaknesses were also evident in the literature. Lessons learned reports contained a minimal analysis of civil-military coordination or focused on the outcomes of coordination rather than assessing how this functioned. Data collection was also, understandably, challenging during both HADR responses. Few community representatives were also able to contribute to post-disaster reports. These issues are similar to those identified in the literature review. It would, therefore, be valuable to explore how future lessons learned workshops and reports could encourage greater openness and participation by stakeholders.

Finally, several interviewees reported that stakeholders chose not to discuss coordination issues or provide the NZDF with constructive criticism. Some felt their views would not be listened to by State actors or would be contested. Others feared there would be negative repercussions, such as the reduction or withdrawal of GoNZ funds or NZDF support. Many Pacific-based interviewees were also worried the NZDF's logistical support would be withdrawn or the military might not deploy the next time their country had a disaster if they critiqued the NZDF's response.

Participants from affected countries and other Pacific nations were, in particular, uncomfortable critiquing the NZDF. For example, some interviewees commented they would be too shy or embarrassed to give the NZDF negative feedback. Others did not want to disrespect the NZDF after all the military had done to help. Some Pacific-based participants felt these responses were a reflection of their culture and the region's colonial history. For example, a community representative explained this as follows,

> "It is more cultural. When [Ni-Vanuatu] see a white person they say 'Aah, he or she's coming to do something [important] so I might as well stay away from him or her.'"[575]

These cultural and historical factors made it more difficult for locally- islanders to openly question or critique the NZDF. This presents a challenge for the GoNZ and NZDF, as feedback from Pacific Islanders is needed to improve future coordination efforts.

These interviewee perspectives are similar to those recorded by Anderson and colleagues in their 2012 international study. This research discovered that aid recipients often begin interviews by citing positive experiences and expressing gratitude, but follow with a deeper analysis and critique of aid and how this could be improved. This more balanced analysis is only possible when participants feel they can trust the interviewers and there will not be repercussions for their honesty. These concerns emphasise the value of cultural sensitivity and conducting an independent study as an 'insider researcher.'

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[575] Interview: 34.

Collectively, these findings highlight a challenge for the GoNZ and NZDF as collected feedback may not be an accurate reflection of stakeholder perspectives. This validates Greener's concerns that NZDF personnel who seek direct feedback from stakeholders during operations might create an environment where *"certain views might be more or less likely to be expressed"* (2017, p.99). The NZDF and GoNZ may, therefore, wish to re-examine how data is collected for lessons learned reports and encourage stakeholders to express their more critical views of coordination, alongside their positive feedback.

iii) The mechanisms used in past HADR responses had both positive and negative impacts on the NZDF's civil-military coordination

The comparative analysis of stakeholder perspectives also revealed substantial differences in opinion, concerning the effectiveness of civil-military coordination mechanisms. In general, stakeholders defended the mechanisms established by their own sectors, while critiquing those created by other actors. The sections below focus on the mechanisms established by the GoNZ and NZDF. While outside the scope of this thesis, stakeholders' views on the mechanisms of affected governments, the UN and international actors are reported in Appendix Six.

The DJIATF model

In both responses, stakeholders reported that the DJIATF enhanced the NZDF's civil-military coordination. Participants from the NZDF, GoNZ, OGAs and other New Zealand civilian agencies were especially complimentary of the DJIATF's Commander and Chief of Staff. These senior officers were deployed for both TC responses and were considered crucial by interviewees, due to their personalities, professionalism and interpersonal skills.

DJIATF staff and LOs also mitigated some obstacles to civil-military coordination within the New Zealand High Commissions and NEOCs. This progress was achieved through increased interaction, understanding and relationship-building with New Zealand stakeholders, as well as those in the Vanuatu and Fijian NEOCs. Several interviewees also reported a noticeable improvement in the NZDF's civil-military coordination between the TC Pam and Winston responses, which they accounted to the DJIATF. The fact that this improvement was linked to specific DJIATF personnel does, however, raise questions about how this progress can best be maintained when new staff transition into the DJIATF and LO roles.

While these findings reveal the new DJIATF model has been a successful civil-military coordination mechanism, a number of areas for improvement emerged. At times, HQ JFNZ requirements from Wellington constrained the DJIATF. These measures impeded the unit's flexibility, reconnaissance efforts and effectiveness in the field. MFAT and HQ JFNZ's leadership

over the unit also meant the DJIATF was not well-positioned to mitigate politics and interests, which many interviewees identified as obstacles to civil-military coordination.

The DJIATF's location in New Zealand High Commissions and NEOCs also meant it largely benefitted WoG and affected government stakeholders by improving coordination at the strategic level. In contrast, DJIATF personnel had little interaction with other civilian stakeholders and minimal time in the field. This exposes a limitation to the model, as the benefits of the DJIATF are not being transferred to civil-military coordination at the operational and tactical level, where the NZDF's assistance is being delivered.

CIMIC teams

Remarkably, there were only a few references to NZDF CIMIC teams in the literature and no in-depth analyses of how these cooperated with civilians. Interviewees from both TC responses, however, reported a significant lack of understanding about the CIMIC team's role and responsibilities. This included reports that NZDF and GoNZ leadership lacked an understanding of how the CIMIC model should be used in Pacific HADR.

This lack of understanding led to CIMIC teams being used in an ad hoc manner, with variable results. In Vanuatu, CIMIC personnel were deployed at the tactical level, ahead of the JTF and in the outer islands. Interviewees in this response believed CIMIC personnel enhanced civil-military coordination, as they established relationships and communicated with NGOs, chiefs and communities ahead of the JTF. In contrast, CIMIC personnel in Fiji were underutilised or considered ineffective, as the unit was used for manual labour and as an information-gathering unit on the mainland. Coordination efforts were also complicated by a lack of distinction between the DJIATF and CIMIC mechanisms, which appeared to have overlapping responsibilities in both TC responses.

This lack of understanding and the misapplication of CIMIC teams were believed to have reduced the overall effectiveness and suitability of the NZDF's HADR. One NZDF interviewee reflected on this, stating,

> *"[The NZDF] were responding to direction to deliver things as opposed to assessing the need and then delivering whatever was required. It was CIMIC on the back foot, rather than the front foot… Or HADR on the back foot, as opposed to the front foot."*[576]

These findings mirror those of international studies, which conclude that CIMIC models are often applied in an ad hoc manner by militaries, particularly in non-combat contexts (Haugevik

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[576] Interview: 6.

and de Carvalho, 2007, Soeters *et al.*, 2014, Smith, 2015). These interviewee reflections about CIMIC are remarkably similar to those collected in Jacobs-Garrod's (2010) research. While her thesis examined NZDF peacekeeping deployments before 2010, it also found that NZDF and NGO personnel lacked an understanding of the force's CIMIC doctrine and protocol, which negatively impacted operations.[577]

The fact that the same issues are emerging about CIMIC nearly a decade later, indicates the NZDF still needs to develop its own Civil-Military Affairs doctrine for non-combat operations. This doctrine should clarify the distinct roles and responsibilities of the DJIATF and CIMIC models and how these will function in Pacific HADR and other non-combat operations. Openly sharing this document would also increase CIMIC knowledge among stakeholders and NZDF personnel. This would help achieve GoNZ priorities by enhancing NZDF interoperability and HADR capabilities in the coming decades (NZDF, 2011).[578]

The FRANZ arrangement

Stakeholder perspectives varied considerably concerning the FRANZ arrangement and its impact on coordination. The rapid deployment and major role of FRANZ militaries were viewed positively by GoNZ, NZDF and some affected government representatives. This was because it gave these governments significant control over military tasks and overall response coordination. In contrast, humanitarian and affected government participants felt the NZDF's rapid response was, at times, detrimental to coordination. This was because it placed extra strain on national structures and, some believed, enabled these to be undermined by FRANZ stakeholders. The NZDF's rapid response was also linked to assets and aid not always being suitable for the Pacific HADR context. Local stakeholders felt this could have been avoided by greater communication, information sharing and planning before the NZDF's departed.

Many interviewees suggested that FRANZ nations and the NZDF's rapid deployment to Vanuatu and Fiji were motivated by political interests and the desire for visibility. Participants considered this distasteful, with several seeing this as an affront to the humanitarian principles. Some GoV participants also felt FRANZ and NZDF efforts to maintain control frustrated national coordination efforts and led some officials to resist or hesitate using FRANZ support.

These stakeholder perspectives reinforce Vachette's (2013) work, which argues that Pacific Island countries are uneasy about ex-colonial nations overpowering local leadership. They also raise fresh concerns about State sovereignty and affected nations rejecting HADR, as discussed by Barber (2009) and Seekins (2009). The fact that local authorities nearly denied the first NZDF

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[577] The author investigated the NZDF's coordination with NGOs in the Bosnia, East Timor and Afghanistan.
[578] The GoNZ's aims were publicised in the 2010 and 2016 Defence White Papers, as well as the Future 35 Strategy, which describes the NZDF's capability outlook to 2035.

Hercules entry into Vanuatu demonstrates this scenario is not unrealistic in the Pacific.[579] This stresses the importance of FRANZ partners seeking the approval of affected governments before deployment, as well as respecting national processes and coordination structures.

The fact that Pacific Island nations want to develop a regional civil-military response structure is, however, encouraging for Pacific HADR. This presents an opportunity to re-examine and improve existing regional mechanisms. This change could be mutually beneficial for Pacific nations, the NZDF and FRANZ stakeholders, particularly if it establishes greater clarification around control arrangements, how FRANZ militaries deploy and which assets are most suitable.

Part Two: What, if any, were the obstacles to the NZDF's civil-military coordination in past responses?

This research revealed that four thematic obstacles impeded the NZDF's civil-military coordination in the TC Pam and Winston HADR responses. In order of significance these were: 1) domestic factors, 2) poor communication, 3) lack of understanding, and 4) organisational culture. While aspects of these obstacles were discussed in the literature, interviewee data provided a greater depth of understanding about how these impacted stakeholders.

Notably, the same thematic obstacles were identified in both case studies, in the identical order of significance. All obstacles were also discussed by a high proportion of the sixty-eight participants. Domestic factors were, for instance, described by 83% of TC Pam interviewees and 88% from the TC Winston response, poor communication (66% and 82%), lack of understanding (66% and 67%), and organisational culture (54% and 52%). This high rate of identification and consistency across case studies strengthens the validity of these findings and suggests they may be generalisable to future Pacific HADR responses.

The thematic obstacles were also described and encountered by a broad range of stakeholders, including the NZDF, GoNZ, affected governments, humanitarian agencies, civilian institutions and the affected population. This demonstrates that obstacles to civil-military coordination are widespread and reoccurring in Pacific HADR. Considering this pattern, an increased effort to mitigate these obstacles in future responses would be beneficial for multiple stakeholders.

Domestic factors impeded coordination

Interestingly, the most frequently discussed obstacles in both case studies were domestic or contextual factors. These related to complex issues, such as State sovereignty, tensions between civilian and military control, national and international actors, as well as politics and

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[579] This incident was described above in section ii.

interests. This finding presents a new contribution to academic literature, as the impact of these factors on civil-military coordination has not been deeply analysed in the Pacific region.

Interviewees stated these obstacles were commonly encountered in Pacific HADR responses. Domestic factors were often linked to affected governments taking on the challenging task of coordinating a large international response and meeting extensive humanitarian needs, with limited human and financial resources. Participants also confirmed that in Vanuatu and Fiji, limited resources made national coordination structures and actors vulnerable to being overpowered by foreign stakeholders and militaries. This led to tension and confusion among stakeholders, which significantly impeded civil-military coordination.

Many interviewees also believed domestic and contextual factors, such as the region's colonial history, previous negative experiences with FRANZ partners and the perception that States were assisting for political or national interests, negatively impacted civil-military coordination.[580] These factors appeared to have two common reactions in HADR responses. In some instances, Pacific-based stakeholders, the affected population and officials chose not to openly disagree or question the plans of foreign authorities. In other instances, these stakeholders resisted foreign advice and assistance, to maintain their autonomy and respect. Both of these outcomes, however, undermined coordination efforts. This was because the NZDF and foreign stakeholders did not receive critical feedback and local insight on their efforts. Pacific-based leadership also missed out on valuable NZDF assistance or opportunities to coordinate, when they overruled others' recommendations.

Barber's (2015) analysis of the TC Pam response contained similar conclusions about how domestic and cultural factors impeded humanitarian coordination. The report explained,

> *"In Vanuatu as throughout Asia Pacific, and much of the world, government authorities expect to be respected. The importance of ensuring that no one 'loses face' is ingrained in the national psyche, as is what is referred to locally as the 'bigman syndrome' – the expectation by men in senior positions that they will be accorded a degree of deference"* (Barber, 2015, p.19).

The concerns and suspicions of affected governments also had negative impacts on civil-military coordination. This occurred when the GoV and GoF interpreted the NZDF's initiative or rapid response as overwhelming, disrespectful or a challenge to State sovereignty. This led affected governments to try and exert more national control over the NZDF and international HADR response. While post-disaster reports and publications often concluded that the affected governments' coordination measures had been effective, most participants felt the controls

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[580] As discussed in the introduction, both Vanuatu and Fiji were colonised by FRANZ nations and are relatively new States, having gained their independence in 1980 and 1970 respectively.

introduced by the GoV and GoF negatively impacted the NZDF's civil-military coordination. This was because a small number of officials were put in charge of approving tasks for the NZDF to undertake. National processes and gathering data were also challenging and time-consuming. Interviewees observed this overwhelmed local officials and created logistical and coordination bottlenecks. It also meant other civilian and humanitarian stakeholders had little contact with the NZDF and frequently did not know how to contact or utilise the force's assets.

While domestic factors and their impact on civil-military coordination have not been explored in the Pacific, these findings are similar to authors' concerns about civilian control, State sovereignty and disaster politics, which were detailed in Chapter One (Feaver, 1996, Katoch, 2006, Pelling and Dill, 2010). The fact that national political systems, corruption and international pressures were perceived to have negatively impacted civil-military coordination also reinforces the work of Pelling and Dill (2010). These findings highlight that the NZDF, FRANZ militaries and other foreign stakeholders need to be more aware of domestic and cultural factors in the context of Pacific HADR to improve coordination efforts. This is particularly so for the NZDF, as the military's organisational culture and approach to HADR are driven towards rapid decision-making, which can be interpreted as disrespectful by stakeholders in the Pacific.

Poor communication, lack of understanding and organisational culture issues

Thesis findings also confirm the broad civil-military obstacles other militaries encounter internationally are also impeding the NZDF in the Pacific. Poor communication, a lack of understanding and organisational culture issues are, for example, identified as barriers in numerous peacekeeping and complex operations (Beauregard, 1998, Mockaitis, 2004, Scheltinga *et al.*, 2005, Rietjens *et al.*, 2009, Pramanik, 2015, Arancibia, 2016). This commonality counters previous arguments that civil-military coordination is less contentious or easier in non-combat contexts (Ferris, 2012, Metcalfe *et al.*, 2012). Instead, it appears that operating in a peaceful or HADR context does not mitigate these obstacles, even when stakeholders support the NZDF's involvement and feel civil-military coordination is appropriate.

The fact that this study examined the NZDF's coordination with a variety of civilian stakeholders revealed that these three thematic obstacles affected stakeholders in different ways. This was evidenced by the variation of sub-thematic obstacles reported by different sectors. For example, within the category of 'poor communication' GoNZ and New Zealand civilian interviewees in both responses felt the HMNZS Canterbury's communication systems were not well-suited for HADR or civilian use, which impeded information sharing and coordination. Community representatives, in contrast, felt that communicating with the NZDF through a small number of LOs and local authorities led to poor communication.

Interesting findings also emerged about how a lack of understanding and organisational culture differences impeded the NZDF's coordination with different stakeholders. There was a noticeable divide between Pacific-based participants, who noted cultural offences or misunderstandings made by NZDF personnel, and New Zealand or foreign interviewees, who believed NZDF personnel were relatively culturally sensitive.[581] Interviewed NZDF personnel also seemed unaware of cultural misunderstandings which others reported. These findings are similar to Rubinstein and colleagues (2008) study, which discovered that US military personnel often lacked an understanding of local culture and were unaware when their actions were perceived as disrespectful. These findings reveal that while NZDF personnel may be considered more culturally aware than other foreign military personnel in the region, there is still room for improvement in this area.

The organisational culture differences which interviewees discussed were also similar to those reported in previous studies (Gourlay, 2000, Abiew, 2003, Franke, 2006). These related to the differences between the NZDF's more structured, time and task-focused culture, with that of the civilian stakeholders. Pacific-based participants also tended to report a greater number of cultural clashes which impeded coordination. This reinforces Lanier's (2000) theory, which argues that 'cold-climate' cultures, like New Zealand, are likely to clash with 'hot-climate' cultures, such as those in the Pacific.[582] NZDF's internal military culture also likely amplified these differences. These factors also explain why the literature, which was largely written by individuals from the NZDF, GoNZ or 'cold-climate' cultures, tended not to report cultural issues.

The identified obstacles were dynamic, complex and interconnected

The analysis also revealed that the four thematic obstacles to coordination were complex and interconnected. This was evidenced by participants describing multiple obstacles behind one instance of poor coordination. Over half of all interviewees, for example, linked an example they gave of poor civil-military coordination to a combination of a lack of understanding, communication and differences in culture.[583] This emphasises the complexity of civil-military

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[581] Examples of NZDF causing offence are given in Annex Four and Five. These include NZDF personnel not showing appropriate respect for church premises, dressing in a culturally inappropriate manner and not being aware of customs on the outer islands.
[582] These differences include 'relationship vs. task orientated cultures', 'direct vs. indirect communication,' 'individualism vs. group identity' and 'different concepts of time and planning.' Examples of these were reported by interviewees within both the Vanuatu and Fiji responses.
[583] For example, the following describes the factors mentioned by a GoV interviewee, when reflecting on the NZDF's initial Hercules flight into Vanuatu. First, they described a lack of communication between the NZDF, GoNZ and GoV, which meant the military had not provided the affected government with the information they requested. Second, they felt a lack of understanding about each other's processes compounded the issue. Finally, cultural misunderstandings meant the public servant interpreted the NZDF's speed of departure and failure to provide information as an act of disrespect and an attempt to bully officials into accepting foreign assistance. These are examples of the three thematic obstacles; poor communication, lack of understanding and organisational culture issues.

coordination and, like Rietjens (2014) work, reveals that the field of civil-military coordination is incredibly complicated, multifaceted and challenging to research. The relationship between these obstacles does, however, present an opportunity for stakeholders, as addressing one obstacle to coordination is likely to help mitigate multiple coordination issues.

A more detailed description of these sub-thematic obstacles is included in Appendix Four and Five. These obstacles are often specific to the Pacific region, the NZDF or a certain civilian sector, revealing that within the broader thematic issues[584] unique obstacles are impeding civil-military coordination in Pacific HADR. This indicates a localized or regional approach to improving civil-military coordination would be more suitable than a one-size-fits-all approach. Foreign stakeholders should also be wary of applying coordination mechanisms designed for other regions and contexts, as these may not be suited to Pacific HADR or its stakeholders.

Why were obstacles to coordination reoccurring?

The fact that studies by Jacobs-Garrod (2010) and Jones (2011) identified similar impediments to the NZDF's civil-military coordination in previous deployments, indicates these obstacles have been impeding NZDF coordination for nearly a decade. This raises questions about why these obstacles are longstanding and reoccurred in both TC responses, despite the GoNZ's intentions to improve the NZDF's interoperability and HADR capabilities.

Interviewees provided several reasons why they felt civil-military coordination issues were reoccurring. The most prevalent reason was a general lack of interaction between the NZDF and civilian stakeholders. This impeded individuals' ability to build relationships, trust and understanding, which they felt would help mitigate obstacles. Participants also stressed how important relationship-building and trust between stakeholders are in the Pacific region. Many Pacific-based participants suggested the NZDF and GoNZ would benefit from more interaction and deployments in the Pacific, to deepen relationships and cultural understanding.

The fact that NZDF personnel change roles and postings every two to three years was also seen as impeding relationship-building and coordination, as well as the turnover of civilian representatives in HADR roles. One OGA representative reflected,

> *"That's the age-old 'three-years-then-the-defence-force-change-seats,' just when you think you're getting to something. The worst part can be... if everybody changes from the [civil-military coordination] team in that three years and puts a whole new team in, then there is no relationship handover and you need somewhere in that space, that. It's very difficult."*[585]

[584] These being poor communication, lack of understanding and organisational culture issues.
[585] Interview: 51.

This rotation of staff meant HADR and civil-military coordination experience was gained by a small number of NZDF personnel, but this was not transferred to institutional knowledge or progress over time. Byman (2000) identified similar factors behind the US military's sporadic progress with the relief community, highlighting the need to develop greater civil-military coordination knowledge defence-wide.

A final reason why interviewees felt civil-military obstacles were reoccurring was that current training, exercises and coordination mechanisms did not always help mitigate these obstacles. Participants reported that exercises, such as Southern Katipo, failed to include key civilian stakeholders, did not realistically depict the Pacific HADR context and, at times, involved minimal civil-military interaction. Others indicated a greater need to practice in the Pacific and coordinate at the operational and planning levels. One NZDF interviewee reflected,

> *"Humanitarian exercises are in my opinion a waste of... not a waste of time [smile]... that was only a 'personal opinion'... exercises are very difficult to replicate for a land force. It's mainly just clearing roads delivering purifying water... That sort of stuff can be done at the tactical level anytime... It's the PLANNING EXERCISES which are the issue. So humanitarian exercises at the OPERATIONAL planning [level], like a Command Post Exercise or CPEX, would be more beneficial than a physical tactical humanitarian exercise."*[586]

These views reinforce Fogarty's (2014) study findings, which emphasised the need for more multi-agency training and realism in NZDF military exercises. They also imply an examination into how stakeholders are currently attempting to mitigate obstacles, would be valuable.

Interviewees, including some NZDF participants, also felt military and civilian leadership did not always encourage efforts to improve interoperability. Those deployed at the operational and tactical levels felt that, at times, leadership was unaware of their attempts to improve civil-military coordination or did not support these.[587] This was linked to a lack of time, resources and interest in improving something many believe is already functioning well. These perspectives highlight the need for the GoNZ and Pacific Island governments to take a strong leadership role by reinvigorating efforts to improve civil-military coordination in Pacific HADR.

Over 90% of all interviewees, however, felt that more collective training and exercising would help mitigate the identified obstacles to coordination. One OGA representative commented,

> *"The more opportunities we get to do that [civil-military] training and working together and [building] understanding... that's the way forward...*

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[586] Interview: 5.
[587] Post-interview discussions with NZDF personnel revealed there were a number of on-going initiatives to increase pre-disaster interaction between military personnel, OGAs and MFAT. These were, however, not well known.

Exercising is expensive... and [New Zealand has] four and a half million, for goodness sake we ought to be able to co-align more of our training opportunities."[588]

Considering the widespread desire to enhance coordination and establish new civil-military mechanisms in the Pacific, all stakeholders would benefit from taking advantage of this existing momentum. In particular, these findings present a valuable opportunity for the GoNZ and NZDF to dialogue with Pacific Island Governments, civilian and humanitarian stakeholders about how future coordination efforts can be improved together.

Part Three: How do stakeholders believe obstacles to civil-military coordination impacted the HADR provided by actors?

Having gained a greater understanding of stakeholder perspectives and the obstacles encountered in the TC Pam and Winston responses, the sections below answer the final research question examined in this thesis. This reports how the aforementioned obstacles to civil-military coordination impacted the HADR actors provided.

Interviewees from the TC Pam and Winston responses provided remarkably similar examples of how domestic factors, poor communication, lack of understanding and organisational culture issues impacted HADR. Examples included assistance being delayed, not delivered or not being suitable for the affected population or context in Vanuatu and Fiji.[589] Most of these impacts were not discussed in the literature or lessons learned reports. This is concerning, as it means stakeholders may not be aware of how substantially their HADR is being affected by obstacles to civil-military coordination.

Some interviewees felt that, at times, NZDF assistance was initiated 'too fast' and without asking affected governments or communities what their needs or priorities were. Pacific-based participants also questioned the suitability of some of the assets, equipment and aid transported by the NZDF to the islands. The difficulty of balancing rapid deployment with the need for suitable equipment and aid was discussed by NZDF participants. A number identified this balance as an area where the NZDF could improve. One NZDF representative, for example, suggested that the Canterbury deployed with 60% of what was needed in the TC Pam response, whereas a forty-eight-hour delay may have provided a better outcome for the population.[590]

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[588] Interview: 16.
[589] Specific examples are described in Part Three of Chapter Three (focused on TC Pam) and Five (TC Winston).
[590] Interview: 5.

These observations led interviewees to call for greater communication between MFAT, the NZDF and stakeholders in the affected country before the NZDF deploys. This would help clarify the priority needs of the population and the environment the NZDF was deploying into. Interviewees also felt this would result in a more efficient use of the GoNZ's HADR funds.

Findings also revealed that affected populations encountered similar negative outcomes in Vanuatu and Fiji. Interviewees, including multiple community representatives, reported that the 'soft' or priority humanitarian needs of affected communities were not always met by the NZDF and other stakeholders.[591] Fifteen participants also reported that aid delivered by the NZDF was unfairly distributed in communities and certain islands or communities received more assistance than others.[592] Many felt this was the result of local actors manipulating the NZDF's assistance for their own interests. The poorest and most vulnerable sectors of affected populations were also considered those most impacted by poor coordination. These sectors included widows, single mothers, orphans and those with disabilities. These findings reinforce concerns raised in the TC Pam (GoV, 2015c) and TC Winston (GoF, 2016) Post Disaster Needs Assessments, which identified these sectors of the population as priorities for HADR.

The similarity between these findings and those of aid recipients in Anderson and colleagues (2012) study suggests key messages in the book 'Time to Listen' are also relevant in the Pacific HADR context.[593] For example, while all community representatives were humbled by the NZDF's response and expressed their gratitude, community expectations were not always met. At times this left some disappointed about the assistance the NZDF provided. These outcomes mirror the feelings of many aid recipients the world over. They also reveal a need for the GoNZ and NZDF to listen more effectively to aid recipients, to discuss and better address community expectations and needs.

While multiple obstacles to civil-military coordination contributed to the outcomes reported in this study, many interviewees felt domestic factors such as personal interests and domestic politics were the most significant drivers behind the unfair distribution of assistance. In fact, fifteen interviewees from the TC Pam response and eleven from TC Winston raised suspicions or confirmed that NZDF aid had been manipulated in the post-disaster environment. One community representative affected by the TC Pam response clarified,

> *"There was unfair distribution in [X] bay with the goods [left by the NZDF]… I know what comes in and out… There wasn't fair distribution… due to local politics, people give to their supporters… People don't speak out about*

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[591] 'Soft' needs were described as psychosocial care and the need for protection after disasters.
[592] Interview: 2, 5, 6, 9, 14, 16, 18, 21, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35.
[593] The book 'Time to Listen: Hearing People on the Receiving End of International Aid,' collated findings from over 6,000 interviews, across different contexts and continents. These authors concluded that people's experiences with international aid were remarkably consistent.

*unequal distribution even if they're asked because they're afraid it will get
back to them and that the leaders and politicians will not favour them in the
future."[594]*

The fact that these negative outcomes were reported by a high proportion of interviewees in both responses strengthens the validity of these findings. The given examples further demonstrate that the NZDF's HADR was not always provided in accordance with the humanitarian imperative or principles in Vanuatu and Fiji. Ultimately, this means the NZDF was not fulfilling its international humanitarian obligations, according to the guidelines and humanitarian laws New Zealand is a signatory to. There is, therefore, a need to improve the civil-military coordination conducted in Pacific HADR. Progress is crucial, both to ensure the needs of affected populations are met, and that assistance is given in alignment with international and humanitarian law.

When examining the impacts of poor civil-military coordination, negative outcomes appeared to be amplified by four main factors. These were: 1) the way NZDF tasks were identified and allocated, 2) a lack of interaction between the NZDF and humanitarians, 3) a lack of stakeholder accountability in HADR responses, and 4) a shortage of HADR funds. These are discussed below as areas for improvement, along with recommendations on how they might be addressed.

1. **NZDF task identification**

With respect to NZDF task identification and allocation, these were approved by the affected Government and MFAT representatives in both TC responses. As a result, the NZDF predominantly cleared debris and completed repairs to public infrastructure or buildings in the initial response. Affected community members, however, identified their highest priorities as food, water, shelter and psychosocial support while the NZDF undertook tasks in their vicinity. This meant the NZDF was often not focused on community priorities and these needs went unmet at the time. In some cases, these needs were not addressed at all or remained unmet for months after the cyclone. For example, many dwellings remained unrepaired or were patched with tarpaulins when conducting interviews for this research, which was up to two years after the disaster.

Community representatives also felt they were not always able to communicate their needs to the NZDF. Interviewees noted that the NZDF did not deploy gender advisors in either the TC Pam or Winston response. Humanitarian and community representatives felt this contributed to a lack of communication and understanding between the NZDF, affected populations and females in communities. This meant the needs of widows, women and children were not always communicated to the NZDF or, consequently, met. The outcomes of these obstacles to

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[594] Interview 35. Identifying details removed to protect participant's confidentiality.

coordination are particularly concerning, as PDNAs reported that widows, women and children were disproportionately affected by these disasters (GoV, 2015c, GoF, 2016).

2. Lack of interaction between the NZDF and humanitarians

The general lack of NZDF-humanitarian interaction in the field was also seen as contributing to the lack of communication and understanding, which negatively impacted the HADR delivered. Some humanitarian interviewees presumed the NZDF would not focus on the 'soft' needs of the population, such as psychological care, either due to a lack of awareness about these needs or military tasks being assigned by governments. Others mistakenly believed the NZDF was addressing humanitarian needs in their vicinity or was coordinating with NGOs to meet these.

Participants gave different explanations for the lack of interaction and coordination between the NZDF and humanitarian stakeholders on the ground. Some humanitarians reported they did not have the logistical capacity or funds to travel to the outer islands where the NZDF was based. Others reported they wanted to coordinate with the NZDF but did not know where the military was based, even when on the same island. A small proportion of interviewees in each response also felt affected governments had deliberately orchestrated the military-humanitarian separation, either for practical or political purposes.

These perspectives do, however, indicate that principles within the Oslo Guidelines which encourage separation between militaries and civilian stakeholders may be inappropriate for the Pacific context.[595] The NZDF, for example, did provide 'indirect assistance' to the population and was tasked to undertake 'infrastructure support,' as is recommended in the Oslo Guidelines (UN OCHA, 2007).[596] Adherence to these guidelines in Vanuatu and Fiji did not, however, lead to the humanitarian needs of communities being met.

Collectively, these findings highlight a need to re-evaluate how the roles and responsibilities of military, humanitarian and civilian stakeholders are allocated in Pacific HADR. Several NZDF and humanitarian participants discussed the need to rethink how HADR is provided, to better meet humanitarian needs. Many felt outcomes would improve if militaries and civilian actors focused on their strengths and worked together to meet needs.

The creation of Memorandums of Understanding between stakeholders and the NZDF was recommended by some to better facilitate coordination. Others recommended the NZDF deploy with a civil-military advisor or transport civilians to the outer islands with the military.

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[595] The Oslo Guidelines were discussed in Chapter one, in the section discussing civil-military coordination mechanisms.
[596] According to the Oslo Guidelines- 'Direct Assistance' is the face-to-face distribution of goods and services, while 'Indirect Assistance' is at least one step removed from the population. 'Infrastructure Support,' in comparison, involves providing general services, such as road repair, airspace management and power generation that facilitate relief, but are not necessarily visible to or solely for the benefit of the affected population.

These solutions aimed to let the NZDF continue to focus on infrastructure and debris clearance, while civilian and humanitarian stakeholders focus on the soft needs in its vicinity.

3. A lack of stakeholder accountability in Pacific HADR

Another factor which contributed to the negative outcomes reported was a lack of stakeholder accountability over the HADR delivered. In both the TC Pam and Winston responses, aid distribution was principally controlled by national, provincial or village authorities. National actors also often lacked functional information management and reporting systems to record how, where and the quantity of ai distributed by stakeholders. These factors left HADR vulnerable to manipulation.

Of the NZDF participants who discussed negative HADR outcomes, many felt at a loss about what they could do to counter the impacts of politics and interests in Pacific HADR. These challenges were discussed by one NZDF interviewee who reflected on the Vanuatu response,

> *"Navigating that chiefly system… [it] is obviously male-dominated and very difficult to understand…. The other thing too is that… politicians are very, very corrupt. So they will favour certain parts of delivering aid… to where their family is… So there is a lot of that going on… they are trying to favour themselves… I think actually towards the end [of the response] personnel did hear that some of the aid was not getting out to the people… they didn't hear that it wasn't going to the women and children SPECIFICALLY, but it is something we need to be very concerned with. But there is a balance... That is their culture. How do we go and impose ourselves?"*[597]

These perspectives reveal the difficult position NZDF and other foreign military staff can be placed in on deployment. This particularly relates to the tension between respecting Government and domestic leadership, and the obligation to meet international and humanitarian obligations.

While placing the affected nation in control of the response is in line with international law, such as UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182, many interviewees reflected on how this made foreign assistance vulnerable to the impacts of domestic politics and personal interests (UN General Assembly, 1991, Annex 1.4).[598] Some participants even reported that the manipulation of aid in Pacific HADR responses was now so widespread, that it was no longer reported. One INGO interviewee commented,

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[597] Interview: 5.
[598] This resolution states that the affected State should maintain primary responsibility for the *"initiation, organisation, coordination, and implementation of humanitarian assistance within its territory."*

"[Unfair distribution] used to be a problem when I was [in my previous humanitarian role]… it would make the papers immediately. But now it's so common! It's like- 'Yeah yeah, it's fine' - It's becoming acceptable you know? These malpractices are happening… because… the disaster law is not being followed by the very people who have been placed there to run the operations. So if these guys are taking advantage of the disaster law and disaster plan, anything else that happens after that wouldn't surprise me."[599]

These findings raise serious concerns for future Pacific HADR responses, as they suggest systemic obstacles are impeding coordination and the fair distribution of assistance. They also confirm, as Pelling and Dill's (2010) findings did elsewhere, that factors like 'disaster politics' are negatively impacting HADR and civil-military coordination in the Pacific region.

To confront these challenges, stakeholders will need to collaborate and introduce measures to ensure greater accountability in Pacific HADR. The complexity of these obstacles and their impacts suggests measures will be more effective if New Zealand and Pacific Island Governments work together with stakeholders, in an environment where feedback can be received openly and respectfully, with the collective goal to improve civil-military coordination and actors' assistance. These outcomes are in the interest of all stakeholders, who will benefit directly and indirectly from international obligations and humanitarian needs being met.

4. Funding was insufficient to meet all humanitarian needs

Finally, in both the TC Pam and Winston responses the post-disaster needs of these countries significantly outweighed the funds available. This meant it was not possible to adequately address all of the identified needs, regardless of stakeholder efforts. Authorities also had to prioritise some needs over others, often with limited information at their disposal in the initial response. These factors placed affected governments and assisting stakeholders in an unenviable position. They also contributed to the civil-military coordination issues and negative HADR outcomes reported in this thesis.

This overall shortage of funds points to an underlying issue in the Pacific. This concerns the increasing intensity and frequency of disasters, funding shortages and the long-term impacts on island GDP are trapping nations in a near-constant cycle of poverty and recovery. Climate change is also only likely to amplify these challenges in the future. This cycle and its wider impact on the region are likely to negatively affect all stakeholders. There is, therefore, a crucial need for stakeholders to work together and coordinate effectively, to either dampen or prevent this cycle from continuing in the future.

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[599] Interview: 48.

How can we improve civil-military coordination and its outcomes?

Unfortunately, the evidence given in this study demonstrates that the NZDF and other stakeholders have not fulfilled all their international obligations in past HADR responses. These obligations are those detailed in Chapter One, within Government policy documents, UN Resolutions and the humanitarian laws New Zealand is a signatory to.

This conclusion is concerning, particularly as GoNZ and NZDF policies clarify that all representatives deployed in an NZ Inc. response will act in accordance with their humanitarian obligations. MFAT's (2012b) 'Policy and Strategies for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Risk Reduction,' for instance, emphasises that personnel will "*respect national government authority*," "*respond to requests for humanitarian assistance based on assessed needs*," and "*focus on vulnerable people*." Findings in this research, however, indicate there is room for improvement in each of these areas. These areas will be described below, along with recommendations on how these could be addressed.

Areas for improvement

In both case studies, interviewees observed that the NZDF's HADR was not provided in accordance with the humanitarian imperative or principles. This was because the NZDF was not always focused on the greatest humanitarian needs or acting to "*alleviate human suffering amongst those least able to withstand the stress caused by disaster*" (ICRC, 1994, Sect 1). This means that despite many stakeholders viewing the NZDF's civil-military coordination efforts favourably, there remains a need to improve the force's HADR and coordination to ensure a better outcome for those affected by disasters.

In this thesis, interviewees described scenarios where the NZDF was either directly or indirectly linked to negative HADR outcomes. Several reports concerned the transportation of aid which was unfairly distributed by locally-based actors, often in the military's vicinity. Many NZDF participants, however, described how personnel were trying their best to "*listen to what's needed and [] apply fair and unbiased aid wherever we can*."[600] Some even reflected on the barriers they were facing, which made it difficult to provide HADR according to the principles above. For example, one NZDF interviewee reflected,

> "*By following those [Oslo] guidelines, of that All- of-Government approach - and MFAT basically set the tasks - [NZDF personnel] ARE remaining unbiased. We are only doing our government's bidding… which I can see 'potentially' on the outside, could also be seen as being biased… But we allow the NDMO to set the priorities… and we go out and try to meet them…. I do one-hundred*

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[600] Interview: 40.

*percent [believe NZDF can be impartial and neutral]… If I went and told my
guys that they can't consider the work they're doing humanitarian, they
would have a FIT. And I don't think it's right and I don't think… those [Oslo]
guidelines are set up to really take into account how people on the ground
FEEL, who are actually helping to deliver all this aid.*[601]

These reflections highlight the challenges military personnel can face when operating in a HADR
environment under civilian control. They also demonstrate the desire NZDF personnel have to
provide HADR in a fair and unbiased manner.

It would, therefore, be beneficial for the GoNZ and NZDF to prepare their representatives for
the real-time challenges identified in this research. Training should include how personnel
would respond to challenging HADR scenarios and report any issues they come across.
Exercises would also be more beneficial if they were HADR-specific and incorporated real
scenarios, such as those reported in this study. Ideally, this training would leave personnel
equipped to respond to circumstances where they suspect stakeholders are not adhering to
their international obligations, HADR is not being distributed fairly or priority humanitarian
needs are not being met.

Applying a 'Women, Peace and Security' approach

Findings in this research also confirmed that UNSCR 1325 obligations were not being met by the
NZDF in Pacific HADR. Gender advisors were not utilised by the military in either deployment
and the NZDF's HADR did not appear to apply the recommendations made in the GoNZ's (2015)
'National Action Plan' for UNSCR 1325. This validates humanitarian concerns that some
stakeholders were not addressing gender-related issues in their HADR responses (CARE
International, 2017, Oxfam, 2018).

Reports that the ADF's civil-military coordination was enhanced by deploying with gender
advisors suggest the NZDF might also benefit from this and adopting a UNSCR 1325
approach.[602] It is further encouraging that NZDF guidance documents published after interviews
were completed state that the NZDF will ensure "*all relevant aspects relating to [Women, Peace
and Security] are considered during planning and implemented during any HADR activity*" (HQ
JFNZ, 2019a, p.12). This inclusion of gender during planning and implementation is likely to
enhance future coordination efforts. Particularly considering community representatives and

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[601] Interview: 40.
[602] Post-interview discussions with NZDF representatives confirmed that gender advisors were not deployed in either response,
but this will be trained and utilised in future Pacific HADR responses.

humanitarian interviewees in the Vanuatu and Fijian responses felt women's perspectives and needs were not accounted for in NZDF decision-making processes.[603]

Listening to and reporting negative outcomes in lessons learned reports

In general, post-disaster literature did not discuss the negative impacts of obstacles to civil-military coordination or only alluded to these. For instance, the HQ JFNZ lessons learned synopsis stated that there may have been a "*tendency for local officials to channel support to their own areas of interest first,*" but provided no further detail on how this impacted the NZDF's HADR or the affected population (HQ JFNZ, 2016, p.12). In contrast, over 80% of participants discussed how coordination issues negatively impacted HADR.[604] These challenges and outcomes need to be acknowledged if they are to be better addressed in the next response.

Several participants expressed frustration about the lack of accuracy or practical relevance of lessons learned reports. For example, one GoF participant stated,

> "*We had a lessons learned [report] done… it's not very helpful at all… I started looking at those things and thinking, they were so VAGUE… Because [the SPC] didn't have the perspective… do you know why? Because THEY weren't coordinating, they weren't part of it, they were outside and then SPC were asked to do… the lessons learned.*"[605]

This frustration evidences a hunger in the Pacific HADR community for accurate, practical and helpful lessons learned reports. It is therefore recommended that the GoNZ, NZDF and Pacific stakeholders renew efforts to produce reports which can help stakeholders improve their coordination and HADR. This includes ensuring that feedback is gathered and analysed and accurately reported by the most appropriate stakeholders.

These findings also indicate a need for more openness in asking for and listening to stakeholders' feedback. Areas for improvement need to be acknowledged and published in lessons learned reports so that all stakeholders can learn and improve their future responses. In this research, many interviewees were concerned about receiving negative repercussions for their honesty. This barrier to progress indicates the GoNZ and NZDF will need to reassure stakeholders and communities that their feedback will be received respectfully and considered as valuable, as it is vital for improvement. Using a neutral and trusted third party to collect

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[603] The fact that sexual violence against women was reported in these responses, but interviewees suggested would not be openly discussed by community representatives, also highlights the value of gender advisors.

[604] All of the interviewed humanitarians and 93% of the community representatives described at least one negative impact civil-military coordination obstacles had on the HADR provided.

[605] Interview: 59.

feedback, or providing a way stakeholders could remain confidential would help alleviate concerns and build trust in this area.

Part Four: a new model to explain civil-military coordination factors and their outcomes

The complexity of findings in this thesis reinforces the idea that the field of civil-military coordination is "*too complex to be approached with explicit conceptual frames or standard instruments*" Rietjens (2014, p.129). This challenge and the desire to use these new findings to improve civil-military coordination led the researcher to develop a diagram (see Figure 8). This model aims to help stakeholders better understand the complexities of civil-military coordination and how perspectives, obstacles and mechanisms interact to produce outcomes. The diagram could also be used as a construct within which past civil-military coordination efforts can be evaluated and future challenges anticipated, before deployment.


Figure 9: Diagram explaining the interaction between civil-military coordination variables

Within the diagram, the first column on the left depicts how human factors, such as 'quality of communication,' 'levels of understanding' and 'trust between actors,' are interconnected. The arrows connecting these factors indicate that these factors impact each other, as well as

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coordination. Depending on which stakeholders are attempting to coordinate, these variables can either impede or promote civil-military coordination.

The second column illustrates how 'contextual factors' internally (within a WoG response) and externally (in the broader deployment context) are impacted by human factors and each other. Organisational culture and national identity are examples of internal factors, while external factors include the culture of the affected nation, domestic factors and the deployment environment. These internal and external factors are also interconnected, impacting upon each other and either promoting or impeding the coordination between stakeholders.

Column three depicts how internal and external civil-military coordination is often facilitated through mechanisms. While these aim to mitigate obstacles to coordination and improve interoperability, each mechanism has its own strengths and weaknesses, which impact stakeholders' coordination and its outcomes. Within the findings above, mechanisms such as the DJIATF, CIMIC teams and the FRANZ arrangement were examined and had varied success in facilitating the NZDF's coordination. The most successful mechanisms will be those which enhance the quality of communication, level of understanding and trust between stakeholders, while mitigating the negative impacts of internal and external factors in a civil-military scenario.

The final column represents the outcomes of civil-military coordination. This encompasses the results of all combined factors, these being the practical outcomes and impacts of the civil-military coordination, as well as stakeholder perceptions of this coordination. In this research, outcomes included the assistance provided by the NZDF and stakeholders, whether, or not, humanitarian needs were met and the impact this had on affected communities.

A practical application of the model

To demonstrate how this diagram can help stakeholders enhance their coordination efforts, it will be applied retrospectively to a scenario in this study.[606] This will break down the factors which impacted civil-military coordination and led to its outcomes, allowing stakeholders to identify areas to improve on in future responses. Another use of the model would be applying it to a hypothetical scenario or a planned civil-military deployment before departure. This application would attempt to anticipate weaknesses in coordination, contextual factors which might impede coordination and how mechanisms could be improved. Both uses of the model aim to improve the outcomes, impacts and perceptions of civil-military coordination.

The example applied is a civil-military coordination scenario which occurred in TC Winston, where the NZDF were tasked to build housing for teachers in a small community. The

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[606] The model could also be applied in a hypothetical scenario by stakeholders, such as Samoa, to attempt to anticipate possible weaknesses in coordination or strengths to capitalize on, in a future response context.

coordination of this task and its outcomes were reflected on by a community representative in the prologue of this thesis.[607]

When the diagram is applied to these events, the strengths and weaknesses of the NZDF's approach emerge. For example, while the community had a high level of trust in the NZDF, the quality of communication and levels of understanding between the NZDF and the community was described as poor (column one of the diagram).[608] The community representative noted that affected individuals were not consulted about the location or design of the buildings.

It was also observed that NZDF personnel appeared to have little understanding of external contextual factors (column two). These factors included an understanding of the Fijian culture, the size and social structure of families and the island environment, which negatively impacted outcomes. Internal contextual factors also played into the scenario, such as WoG leadership lacking an understanding of NZDF CIMIC teams and their role, which lead to these teams and gender advisors not being deployed with the larger force.

As a result, CIMIC teams and gender advisors were not used as civil-military coordination mechanisms (column three) in the field. Instead, coordination was facilitated through a small number of MFAT LOs and NZDF leadership, who discussed their plans with local authorities. This meant some community perspectives, particularly those of women, were not shared with the NZDF. Members of the affected community also felt they could not speak up, as they did not know who to talk to and did not want to disrespect the NZDF by critiquing their plans.

These interacting factors ultimately led to several negative outcomes (column four). While the community was grateful for the NZDF's efforts, the houses built were too small for large Fijian families, too close together and not in an appropriate location. If asked, the community also would have preferred the NZDF to repair or build housing for the most vulnerable, rather than the government-funded teachers' housing. These outcomes led to the perception that the NZDF had not focused on the community's priority needs or their most vulnerable. These views are reinforced by the fact that many vulnerable individuals continued to live under tarpaulins or in damaged buildings up to two years later, when this research was conducted.

An additional outcome of the lack of communication and understanding in this scenario was that the NZDF accidentally dug a rubbish pit in the one remaining village vegetable garden and left this unfilled. This negatively impacted the community's food supply and led to health repercussions when the pit pooled water and became a breeding ground for virus-carrying

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[607] These are described on page ii to iv, within the prologue. They concern events within the TC Winston response.
[608] 'Poor communication' included the lack of discussion with teachers or the community before tasks were commenced.

mosquitoes.[609] The building materials discarded by the NZDF were also retrieved from this pit by the most impoverished in the village, who needed these to rebuild their houses.[610]

To improve the civil-military coordination and outcomes described in this scenario, stakeholders could use this breakdown of human factors, contextual factors and mechanisms to identify areas for improvement. The above analysis has, for example, revealed that levels of communication and understanding could be improved between the NZDF and affected population, along with the mechanisms used to facilitate NZDF-community discussion and feedback. Other past deployments and challenging scenarios could also be examined, focusing on the coordination between different stakeholders and in contexts other than HADR. It is hoped this model will help simplify the complexity of civil-military coordination and give stakeholders a way to identify and mitigate obstacles, to provide better outcomes for all.

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[609] Dengue fever and Zika virus are spread via day-biting mosquitos. There are no preventive vaccines or antiviral treatment. Dengue fever causes a feverish illness, headache, and severe muscle pains, which require medical care. Danger signs include prolonged vomiting, blood in the vomit, and a blotchy rash. Zika Virus symptoms include mild fever, headache, muscle and joint pain, nausea, vomiting, and general malaise. The virus can also be transmitted from a pregnant woman to her foetus.
[610] This was because many families had little left after the cyclone and could not afford the high cost of transporting building materials to their isolated island.

Conclusion: Moving forward together

In the introduction of this thesis, the crucial need for this research was explored. Within the Pacific region, the frequency and intensity of natural disasters are increasing, along with the scale of humanitarian needs left behind. Yet despite the major involvement of the NZDF and other foreign militaries in these HADR responses, no independent research had examined the NZDF's civil-military coordination or its outcomes in this context.

The lack of robust, empirical research into civil-military coordination, Pacific HADR and the NZDF's interoperability, was explored in Chapter One. Perhaps most concerning was that few studies examined how stakeholders and, in particular, affected populations perceived the NZDF's civil-military coordination efforts and assistance. Most conclusions were also drawn from post-disaster literature, such as lessons learned reports, which contained a minimal analysis of obstacles to coordination or their impact on HADR. These methodological weaknesses presented a major problem, as stakeholders must first be aware of civil-military coordination issues and obstacles, to mitigate these and improve upon past HADR responses.

To address these gaps in the literature, this thesis sought to answer three research questions. These were: 1) how did stakeholders perceive the NZDF's civil-military coordination efforts in past Pacific HADR responses? 2) What, if any, were the obstacles to the NZDF's civil-military coordination in past Pacific HADR responses? And 3) how do stakeholders believe obstacles to civil-military coordination impacted the HADR provided?

To answer these questions a comparative case study was undertaken on the NZDF's civil-military coordination efforts in the 2015 TC Pam response, in Vanuatu, and the 2016 TC Winston response, in Fiji. Data were triangulated from literature and semi-structured interviews with stakeholders. This design aimed to better understand why discrepancies existed among stakeholder perspectives. It also enabled the views of five key HADR sectors to be contrasted and compared, providing a greater depth of analysis.[611] This meant we could examine how: i) the GoNZ and NZDF, ii) New Zealand civilian stakeholders, iii) international and local humanitarian actors, iv) affected governments, and v) affected populations each distinctly perceived the NZDF's civil-military coordination.

In Chapters Two and Four an overview of each response was presented, alongside how the literature portrayed the NZDF's civil-military coordination. In both case studies, most sources portrayed stakeholder perspectives of the NZDF's civil-military coordination in a positive light. Significant gaps, however, emerged from the literature, particularly concerning how obstacles

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[611] These sectors were: i) the GoNZ and NZDF, ii) New Zealand civilian actors, iii) INGOs, NGOs, UN agencies and local humanitarian actors, iv) affected governments, and v) affected populations.

were actually impacting civil-military coordination and the assistance provided. Stakeholder perspectives in the literature were also predominantly drawn from NZDF and GoNZ sources, while the vital views of the affected population, local and New Zealand humanitarian stakeholders were minimal or absent. The interview findings in Chapters Three and Five shed light on these gaps and provided a broader range of stakeholder perspectives. These chapters reported more critical views of the NZDF's coordination efforts, along with in-depth explanations of obstacles and how these negatively impacted stakeholders' HADR.

Chapter Six then presented answers to the research questions, drawn from a comparative analysis of both case studies. These conclusions made many new additions to the literature and provided a deeper and more complex understanding of the NZDF's civil-military coordination in Pacific HADR. While stakeholder perspectives about the NZDF were generally positive, significant unreported tensions over 'command and control' and 'civilian control' were identified between the NZDF and civilian stakeholders. Humanitarian stakeholders and affected communities, in particular, reported challenges when trying to coordinate with the NZDF. This meant that stakeholder perspectives in published literature had not accurately represented the views of all of those involved in HADR responses. The GoNZ and NZDF are, therefore, likely unaware of how their coordination and assistance is perceived by these key stakeholders.

Domestic factors, poor communication, lack of understanding and organisational culture were revealed to be the four thematic obstacles which were impeding the NZDF's civil-military coordination. These obstacles were reported by a high proportion of stakeholders and were reoccurring, complex and interconnected. This reoccurring nature presents a challenge and an opportunity for the NZDF's future Pacific HADR, as it gives the military four obstacles to focus on mitigating in future responses. The interconnection between these obstacles can also be seen as an advantage for the NZDF, as reducing the impacts of one obstacle is likely to have a positive effect on the others and the HADR outcomes they impact.

The findings in this thesis also evidenced, for the first time, that obstacles to civil-military coordination were contributing to negative impacts on stakeholders' HADR and affected communities. The most concerning reports included that 'soft' or priority humanitarian needs were not being met by the NZDF, the mismanagement of HADR and unfair aid distribution. This evidence demonstrates that the NZDF and other stakeholders did not meet all their international legal and humanitarian obligations in these Pacific HADR responses.

Many interviewees, however, acknowledged the difficult position NZDF personnel were placed in, operating under both Government and local direction, while trying to fulfil their humanitarian obligations. These tensions indicate the 'civil-military problematique' is just as relevant in the field of Pacific HADR. This is the challenge of ensuring that militaries are subordinate to civilian rule, while remaining effective. In the context of Pacific HADR, this

means findings a way the NZDF can be led by government authorities while adhering to international and humanitarian obligations and meeting humanitarian needs.

These conclusions highlighted several areas for improvement, which the GoNZ and NZDF could focus on to enhance future their civil-military coordination and HADR responses. These included personnel being trained to respond to the real-life challenges and dilemmas identified in this research, the adoption of a 'Women, Peace and Security' approach to Pacific HADR and the publication of detailed lessons learned reports which draw on stakeholder feedback. Above all this requires the GoNZ and NZDF to build trust with stakeholders, while asking for and listening to feedback which will help improve Pacific HADR.

To help stakeholders identify areas for improvement a new civil-military model was also presented by the researcher. This diagram summarises thesis findings and aims to help stakeholders better understand how perspectives, obstacles and mechanisms interact to produce positive and negative outcomes in civil-military coordination. The model can be used to evaluate past civil-military coordination efforts or anticipate future challenges in other contexts and with different stakeholders. It is hoped this new contribution to the field of civil-military coordination will provide a practical way for stakeholders to view, analyse and enhance their coordination efforts.

This thesis set out to gain a deeper understanding of the NZDF's civil-military coordination and uncovered new perspectives and findings which could enhance the way we do Pacific HADR. Encouragingly, stakeholders from all sectors expressed a genuine desire to improve future civil-military coordination efforts and meet humanitarian needs. This drive presents an encouraging opportunity for the NZDF and GoNZ to work together with stakeholders to achieve these aims. This progress is in the interests of all stakeholders, as enhancing coordination, better utilising funds and meeting the needs of affected populations are in all of our interests.

Appendix One: Interview guide

1. **Introduce yourself and thank participant for their willingness to participate.**
2. **Re-brief.**

   As a requirement of my degree, I'm conducting a research project on civil-military coordination and specifically the New Zealand Defence Force and its role in disaster relief operations in: Cyclone Pam (Vanuatu: 2015), and Cyclone Winston (Fiji: 2016).

   The aim of this research is to identify obstacles which may be impeding civil-military coordination in relief operations and how future relief responses might be improved. All information gathered is confidential and your identity will not be made public without your consent. To ensure this, pseudonyms will be used in any published material and your personal details will be obscured after interviews are transcribed, unless you would prefer to speak in your public role/under your own name.

3. **Check that they have read the Information Sheet/completed Consent Form.**

   If you choose to take part in this study, your involvement in this project will include an audio recorded interview. The interview is expected to take about 45 minutes. As a follow-up to this investigation, you will be asked to read a written transcript of the interview to ensure the information is correct and that you are happy for this information to be used. If this is impractical you may give your verbal consent for the transcript to be used.

   Participation is voluntary and can withdraw at any stage. If you withdraw, I will remove any information provided up until the interview transcript is approved. Do you prefer to speak under your official title/name in this project? Options range from use of name to confidentiality.

4. **Ask if they have any further questions.**

Semi-Structured Interview: Key subject areas

Opening question: In your view/in your experience/from your observations/reflecting on the response in Vanuatu or Fiji… could you describe your role in the disaster relief effort in Vanuatu/Fiji and any interaction you had with the New Zealand Military (or civilian actors) during the relief effort? What was your overall impression of the NZDF (or civilian actors)?

1. Inter-agency relations: how would you describe the relationship between you/your org. and the NZDF (or civilian actors) throughout the effort? Do you feel you/your organisation trusted the NZDF (or civilian actors)?

2. Humanitarian principles and understanding: are you aware of the NZDF's humanitarian principles and processes? Do you think these were adhered to? Are you familiar with the Civil-military (Oslo) guidelines? If so, do you think these were adhered to? If not, do you believe the NZDF was used as a last resort?

3. Information management: did you receive any information from the NZDF (or civilian actors), e.g. written documents, assessments or photography? How was the information flow/sharing during the effort?

4. Flexibility: how flexible was the NZDF/military personnel you had contact with in the effort? Do you feel the organisation and personnel adapted well in the relief effort?

5. Communication: how did you feel communication was between the NZDF (or civilian actors) and you/your organisation during the response?

6. Disaster Politics: Do you feel politics may have impacted civil-military coordination or the assistance provided? If so how?

7. Obstacles to civil-military coordination: in your experience what were the obstacles to civil-military coordination in disaster relief? Could you provide examples?

8. Effectiveness of NZDF assistance: how effective do you think NZDF assistance was? Timeliness, Appropriateness, Efficiency, Absorptive capacity, Coordination, Costs

9. Lessons learned: Did you/your organisation/community conduct lessons learned in real time or following the event? How do you personally think disaster relief could be improved in the future?

10. Do you have anything further you would like to add/comment on? Are there any questions I haven't asked, such as…? Were there any questions you were hesitant to answer?

Semi-Structured Interview guide: Ni-Vanuatu

Tangkiu tumas from we yu save rere blong interview ia about experience blo yu long taem blong cyclone Pam long hao we givhan e bin kam.

Opening kwesten: Yu save talem wannem nao wok blong yu long taem we givhan e bin kam afta long cyclone Pam mo tu wannem wei nao yu bin wok tugeta wetem Niu Zilan soldia long taem blong givhan ia?
Wannem nao tingting blong yu about Niu Zilan soldia?

1. Inter-agency relations: Inta-agency rileisen: wannem nao yu save talem about frensip blong kampany/komunity wetem Niu Zilan soldia tru aot long taem we oli traem givhan?
Yu ting se kampani/ komunity e bin trastem Niu Zilan Soldia?

2. Humaniterian loa mo andastanding: Yu kat save long Niu Zilan solidia humaneterian loa mo hao we I wok? Yu ting se oli been wok folem ol loa ia? Yu kat gudfala save about ol wei blo usum soldia mo ol givhan blo civil denfens long taem blong givhan long disasta (wetem ol rul blong hao blong mekem I happen) Spos yes, yu ting se oli bin folem loa ia? Spos no, yu beliv se Niu Zilan soldia oli bin useful nomo from se e nomo kat nara givhan mo tu yu ting se e bin kat nara kauntri we e bin save tekem ples blong Niu Zilan soldia long side blo givhan olsem?

3. Infomesen manejmen: Yu bin resivim eni infomesen e kam lo Niu Zilan soldia olsem written dokiumen, assemen or photo? Hao nao infomesen e flow or hao hao noa oli serem infomesen long taem blong givhan?

4. Rere blong Jenis: hao rere nao ol Niu Zilan soldia yu wok wetem oli jenis blo saveh wok wetem yu long taem blong givhan?

5. Komunikesen: wannem nao tingting blong yu about komunikesen bitwin Niu Zilan soldia wetem yu/kampany/ komunity long taem blong givhan?

6. Disasta politik: Yu ting seh politik e bin kat sam control long hao Niu Zilan e bin wok wetem yu/kampany/komuniti long taem blong givhan? Yu ting ting form politik e bin afectem hao weh oli bin givhan? Spos yes, hao?

7. Obstacles to civil-military coordination: in your experience what were the obstacles to the New Zealand Military's coordination with you/your community/non-military actors in disaster relief? Could you provide examples?
Samting we e blokem civil-soldia givhan: Long experience wan nem nao ol samting weh I stoppem Niu Zilan soldia blong givhan long yu/kampany/komuniti long taem blong disasta givhan? Yu saveh talem sam fasin we e sowem?

8. Gudhan blong NZDF assistance: Wannem tingting blong yu long gudhan blong Niu Zilan Solidia? Long side blong timing, wok stret, wok enaf, amaun blong wok wetem cost?

9. Wannem yu lanem: Yu/kampani/komuniti I bin lanem lessen long taem ia after long disasta? Hao nao long tinting blong yu yu ting se olgeta long disasta givhan bae oli nid blong impruv lem long future?

10. Yu kat nara samting moa weh yu wantem talem? Ikat nara kwesten weh mino askem? Ikat any kwesten we mi askem we yu bin fraet blong ansarem?

-I don't understand
Mi no andastanem

-Can you give me another example of that?
Yu save givim wan nara fasin weh e sowem?

-Could you elaborate?
Yu saveh talem smol mo blong mi save?

-Could you be more specific?
Yu save talem wanem stret?

-How does this compare with your experience elsewhere?
Hao nao emia e kompea wetem experience blo yu lo wan nara ples?

-Thank you very much for sharing your experiences with me.
Tangkiu tumas blo save serem experience blong yu wetem mi

Fijian Semi-Structured Interview guide: Na Taro ni Vakadidike

Vinaka sara vakalevu na nomuni lomasoli mo ni vakaitavi e na veitarotarogi qo.
<u>Dola ni taro</u>: Na cava beka na I tavi o ni vakacolati kina e na veivuke ni Cagilaba o Winston.? Ni a bau cakacaka vata kei iratou na mataivalu ni Niu Siladi ? Na cava na nomuni nanuma baleti iratou na mataivalu ni Niu Siladi e na veivuke eratou mai vakayacora vei ira na vakaleqai e na ravuravu ni cagilaba o Winston.

1. <u>Veimaliwai vakamatacakacaka</u>: E a vakacava tu na veimaliwai se na cakacaka vata ni nomudou tabana kei na mataivalu ni Niusiladi e na veivuke ni cagilaba o Winston.? O ni bu vakila ni o ni bau rawa ni nuitaki iratou na mataivalu ni Niusiladi.

2. <u>Yavutu ni veiqaravi/ veivuke</u> : O ni bau kila na lawa se na yavutu ka vauca na nodratou veiqaravi na mataivalu ni Niusiladi? E a ratou bau vakamuria Vinaka na nodratou yavutu na mataivalu ni Niusiladi? Ni sa bau rogoca se wilika na ka e vakatokai na Oslo guidelines (Na lawa virikotori ka vauca na kena vakayagataki na nona I yaya e dua na mataivalu ka via veivuke vei ira e ra vakaleqai). E a bau vakamuri Vinaka na Oslo Guidelines se sega? Ke sega, o ni vakabauta, ni mataivalu ni Niusiladi e otioti beka ni vanua e kerei kina na veivike se so tale beka na matanitu e ra via veivuke mai.

3. <u>Vakayagataki ni tukutuku</u>: E ratou bau veitaratara mai vei kemudou na mataivalu ni Niusiladi (vola tukutuku, veitaba) . E bau rawarawa na kena veiwaseitaki na I tukutuku e na gauna ni vaiqaravi vei ira na vakaleqai e na cagilaba o Winston.

4. E a vakacava na rawarawa ni veiqaravi vata kei na mataivlau ni Niusiladi. Ni bau vakila beka ni a rawarawa vei iratou nodratou mai veiqaravi I Viti.

5. <u>Veiwasei tukutuku</u>: E a vakacava tu na kena vakadewataki na I tukutuku mai vei iratou na mataivalu ni Niusiladi ki vei kemudou.

6. <u>E vakacava na politiki</u>: e vukea beka se vakabera na kena qaravi nai tavi ni veivuke mai vei iratou na mataivalu ni Niusiladi.

7. Na cava beka e a vakalatilati e na nodratou cakacaka vata na mataivalu ni Niusiladi kei na veitabana vakacakacaka e Viti?

8. E vakacava sara tu mada na yaga ni nodratou veivuke na mataivalu ni Niu Siladi vakabibi ena kena: vakaoti totolo, -kei na veiganiti, -monataki, -vakailavotaki -

9. I) Na lesoni a vulici rawa ni sa mai cava na veiqararvi ni oti na cagilaba? i) E so beka na malumalumu e a laurai e na veiqaravi qoka?

10. E so tale naka ni via tukuna se dua na taro? E dua beka na taro au a taroga e a dredre nomuni sauma? – Au sega ni taura rawa - Ni rawa ni vakatautauvata qo kei na dua na ka sa yaco oti? - Ni rawa ni vakamacalataka?

Appendix Two: Research information sheets

When Disaster Strikes: New Zealand's Civil-Military Coordination
in Pacific Disaster Relief Operations

Hello, halo (*Bislama*) and bula (*Fijian*),

My name is Kendra Roddis, I am a postgraduate student from the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University and am completing a research project on civil-military coordination within Pacific disaster relief. My Master's thesis focuses on the New Zealand Defence Force's assistance in Vanuatu (Cyclone Pam: 2015) and Fiji (Cyclone Winston: 2016) and aims to identify how coordination and military assistance could be improved in future relief efforts within the Pacific. This research is being supported by the New Zealand Defence Force, Ministry of Defence and High Commission in both Vanuatu and Fiji.

I am incredibly passionate about this topic as an ex-New Zealand Defence Force Officer who was deployed in the 2010 disaster relief effort in Haiti, has since worked in the humanitarian field and grew up in the Cook Islands. These experiences gave me an in-depth understanding of the challenges of disaster relief and the view that we must listen and learn from one another to improve future responses.

As part of my research I am hoping to interview a range of those involved in the Cyclone Pam and Winston relief efforts to hear about their experiences with the New Zealand Defence Force and how they think coordination or assistance in future relief efforts could be improved. Interviews would be about 45 minutes with all identities and information kept confidential (further information enclosed below).

Please let me know if you would be willing to take part in this research. With the frequency and intensity of natural disasters increasing in the Pacific I hope that collectively we can improve both the New Zealand Defence Force's assistance and future relief efforts.

Thank you for your consideration and I hope to talk with you soon.

Sincerely,
Kendra Roddis

**When Disaster Strikes: New Zealand's Civil-Military Coordination
in Pacific Disaster Relief Operations**

INFORMATION SHEET

My name is Kendra Roddis and I am the principal investigator of a Master's research project being completed with the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University. This research investigates civil-military coordination within Pacific disaster relief efforts and focuses on the New Zealand Defence Force's (NZDF's) involvement in the Cyclone Pam (Vanuatu: 2015) and Cyclone Winston (Fiji: 2016) responses.

As part of this research I wish to interview key individuals who would be willing to share their perspective and experiences surrounding these relief efforts. As an identified candidate, you are invited to participate in this research.

Research Objectives

The objectives of this research are to: 1) identify obstacles which may be impeding the NZDF's coordination with civilian actors in relief operations, 2) identify how civil-military coordination may be impacting the assistance provided to the affected community, and 3) produce recommendations on how future relief responses might be improved.

Participant Inclusion

This study will involve a minimum of 40 interviewees, with at least ten participants selected from each of the following sectors: 1) the NZDF and New Zealand Government, 2) New Zealand civilian relief actors, 3) international civilian relief actors, and 4) representatives from the affected communities. This sample size is designed to report a broad range of views and experiences from within relief efforts. Potential participants will be identified by snowball referral and a desk based review, to identify those working with or alongside the NZDF.

Project Procedures

Interviews are likely to take about 45 minutes and will be semi-structured. These will be audio recorded or hand written and conducted by myself in either in a public location or office. Should face-to-face interviews be impractical these may be undertaken via telephone or Skype.

You may be assured of the confidentiality of data gathered in this research: a consent form will be completed prior to the interview, which ensures that your identity will not be made public without your prior consent. To ensure anonymity and confidentiality, pseudonyms and identifying numbers will be used in any published material instead of names, unless you prefer to speak in your public role.

You will receive a copy of the transcribed interview to check for accuracy and you may delete any part of the interview before you agree to its use in this study. You may choose to receive a copy of your recorded interview and/or a summary of the project findings by contacting the researcher via the email or telephone number at the bottom of this sheet. You will be asked to complete an authority for the release of transcript data once you have had the opportunity to review, edit or amend the transcript.

All interview recordings will be deleted at the conclusion of this study (25 Feb 2018). Hard copies of transcribed interviews will be stored securely both electronically and in a locked filing cabinet before being destroyed after a period of five years. Only the researcher, supervisor and transcriber will have access to recordings and transcripts.

Participant Rights

You are under no obligation to accept this invitation. If you decide to participate, you have the right to:
- decline to answer any particular question;
- withdraw from the study at any time;
- ask for the recorder to be turned off at any time during the interview;
- ask any questions about the study at any time during participation;
- provide information on the understanding that your name will not be used unless you give permission to the researcher;
- be given access to a summary of the project findings when it is concluded.

Your Next Step

If you agree to participate in this study, you need any more information or have any questions about participating in this research please contact me before 25 May 2019 on:
[section removed]
If you have any additional questions about this project or you are concerned about the conduct of this research please contact my academic supervisor Dr Anna Powles- Massey University
[section removed]

This project has been evaluated by peer review and judged to be low risk. Consequently, it has not been reviewed by one of the University's Human Ethics Committees. The researcher(s) named above are responsible for the ethical conduct of this research.
If you have any concerns about the conduct of this research that you wish to raise with someone other than the researcher(s), please contact Dr Brian Finch, Director, Research Ethics, email humanethics@massey.ac.nz

Taem Disasta E Straek: Civil-Military Coordination Long Pacific Disasta Riliv Operasen

INFOMESEN SIT

Nem blong mi Kendra Roddis mo mi mi prinsipol investiketa blong wan Master's resej projek weh bae komplit wetem center blo difens mo sekiuriti stati, long Massey University.
Risej ia emi blong investiketem civil-soldia givgivhan long pasifik disaster givhan mo tu focus long Niu Zilan defens fos weh involve long taem blong Cyclone Pam (Vanuatu 2015) wetem Cyclone Winston (Fiji: 2016) long taem blong givhan.

Olsem part blong resej ia mi wantem interview ol main man weh oli likem blong serem tingting wetem experience blong olgeta long taem blong givhan ia. Olsem wan kanditet, mifla invitem yu blong tek-part long resej ia.

Resej Objektiv

Objektiv blong resej ia emi blong: 1) Finem aot ol samting weh e save blokem mo tu spos weh e bin save mekem ol samting e tekem taem or stopem Niu Zilan defens fos wetem ol man blong help long taem blong kivhan, 2) Finem hao ol civil-soldia givhan e bin afektem ol givhan weh e bin kam long komunity, mo tu 3) kivim tingting lo hao nao bae givhan long future e save kam kut.

Man Weh E Tek-Part

Stati ia bae e involvem 40 or moa man blong interview, wetem samples 10 lo each sekta: 1) Long Niu Zilan defens fos wetem gavman, 2) Niu Zilan Civilian givhan sekta, 3) intanasonal civil givhan wokman, 4) representetiv blong ol komuniti weh cyclone e afektem olgeta. Size blong report ia e plan blong serem bifala tingting long lukluk mo experience long taem blong kivhan. Aot long ol man weh bae oli tek-part bae oli jusum sam long olgeta dipen long ripot blong olgeta blong mekem wan kutfala riten repot blong finem aot olgeta weh oli wok wetem Niu Zilan fos.

Wei Blong Mekem Projek

Interview ia bae tekem samples 45 minit mo bae folem lelepet wan plan blong kwesten weh I rere finis. Ol interview ia bae oli rikotem voice or bae oli raetem, weh bae mi wan mi mekem long wan pablik ples or long ofis blong mi. Ol interview ia bae oli saveh mekem tru long telefon or long skype (video call).

Yu saveh trastem seh ol infomesen weh mi kolektem e tabu blong nara man e saveh tajem : Bae mi kivim wan pepa long yu bifo interview ia weh bae protektem infomesen abaot yu bae e no ko long pablik spos weh yu no wantem. Blo protektem identity blong yu olsem ol nem blong yu bae mi yusum ol saen or namba nomo blo riplesem nem blong yu anles yu wantem.

Bae yu risivim wan kopi blong interview blong jekem bakaken mo yu saveh karem aot eni part blong interview bifo bae oli save yusum long stati ia. Yu saveh askem blong risivim wan kopi blong ol rekot blong interview or wannem nao resej e finem tru long kontak blong reseja ia tru long email or long telefon namba lo bottom blong pepa ia.

Bae mifla jas askem blong yu komplitim wan form blong rilisim ol infomesen afta weh yu kat Janis blong lukluk blo jenisim sam samting long infomesen weh yu bin kivim.

Evri interview rekoting ia bae oli dilitim long en blong resej ia (25May 2019). Ol kopi nm weh oli pritim long pepa wetem ol interview weh oli writem long pepa bae oli kipim kut long pepa wetm long komputa file finis bae oli jas distroyem afta long 5 yias taem. Bae resejer, supavaesa, transcriba nomo bae oli kat akses long ol rekoting wetem ol riten infomesen.

Right Blong Man Weh E Tek-Part

Yu kat raet blong no akseptem invetesen ia. Spos yu wantem tek-part, yuk at raet blong:
- No ansarem wan kwesten weh yu no wantem ansarem;
- Kamaot long sesej ia long eni taem;
- Askem blong bae oli ofem rekota long eni taem long interview;
- Askem eni kwestem abaot resej ia eni taem long taem blong resej ia;
- Kivim infomesen seh yu no wantem blong bae oli yusum nem blong yu long resej ia,bae oli yusum nomo spos yu kivim raet long reseja;
- Bae yu kat akses long ripot blong wanem nao oli bin finem tru aot long resej ia taem weh e finis.

Neks Step Blong Yu

Spos yu akri blong tek-part long stati ia, spos yu wantem eni moa infomesen or kat eni kwesten aboat tek-part long resej ia, plis kontaktem me bifo 25 May 2019.
Spos yuk at eni nara kwesten abaot projek ia or wari abaot rison blong resej ia plis contaketem akatemik supavaesa Dr Anna Powles- Massy University
Projek ia bae mifla tokboat wetem ol wokman fren wetem bae mifla tokboat wetem low risk. Bae wan long ol university's Human Ethic Commitiess bae no lukluk tru long projek ia. Ol reseja ia nomo bae oli blamem spos eni sam I no stret or ko kut.

Spos you kat eni wari long resej ia weh yu wantem tokbaot wetem naraman mo no wetem reseja, plis kontaktem contact Dr Brian Finch, Director, Research Ethics, email humanethics@massey.ac.nz

When Disaster Strikes: New Zealand's Civil-Military Coordination
in Pacific Disaster Relief Operations

Na yacaqu o Kedra Roddis. Au cakava tiko na noqu Masters ena tabana ni Defence and Security Studies ena Massey University. E tiki tiko ni noqu vuli meu na vakayacora e dua na vakadidike kau sa digitaka na ulutaga e volai toka qori e cake.

Na vakadidike qo e vakatabakidua kina veivuke ni mataivalu ni Niu Siladi ena cagilaba o Winston in Viti ena 2016 kei na cagilaba o Pam I Vanuatu ena 2015.

E tiki tiko ni vakadidike qo meu na vakatarogi ira eso era loma soli mera wasea na nodra a vakaitavi ena vakatorocake taki na bula ni laba oti na cagi

Nai Naki ni Vakadidike

1) me laurai na veikabeka e vakalatilati kina nodrau cakacaka vata na I mataivalu ni Niu Siladi kei na veitabana e Viti ka ra vakaitavi ena veiqaravi ni oti na cagilaba.

2) me laurai na veikabeka e vakadredretaka se vakaberabera taka na nodra vukei na lewe ni vanua

3) me laurai na veigaunisala e rawa ni vakatorocake taka se vakavinakataka na veiqaravi ena gauna e dau yaco kina na leqa

I ra na Vakaitavi

Na vakadidike qo ena gadrevi tiko kina e lewe 40 mai na tabana ni 1) Matanitu kei na Mataivalu ni Niu Siladi, 2) o ira na cakacaka vaka matanitu ni Niu Siladi ena 3) na mata ni veivuke mai na veivanua tani tale eso, 4) nodra mata o ira era ravuti ena cagilaba.

Tuvatuva ni Vakadidike

Na veitarotarogi ena via taura toka e 45 na miniti. Au na katona, ka au na vola talega vaka i vola. Au via yalataka niu na qarauna vinaka na maroroi ni tukutuku koni na solia tiko. Ena sega ni vakayagataki na yacamuni dina vakavosara ke o ni veivakadonui kina.
Ena soli vei kemuni e dua nai lavelave ni saumi taro mo ni rawa ni vakadeuca ke dua na ka o ni na via veisautaka bera ni tabaki nai tukutuku.

Kevaka o ni gadreva me dua talega na nomuni lavelave ni vakadidike, mo ni qai veitaratara ga mai ena naba ni talevoni se na email e koto qori era.
O ni na kerea tale tikoga moni na solia na nomuni veivakadonui ni oti na veitarotarogi.

Nomuni Dodonu
E tiko vei kemuni na dodonu:
• ke ni sega ni via sauma e dua na taro
• vakasuka mai na vakadidike oqo
• kerea me kua ni katoni vakalivaliva
• taroga e dua ga na taro oni via taroga me baleta na vakadidike

Kevaka oni vakadonuya moni na vakaitavi ena vakadidike se oni na gadreva eso tale na vakamacala, kerea moni qai veitaratara mai ni se bera na 25 ni May 2018 ena:

Ke mani dua tale na taro se tiki ni vakadidike qo oni gadreva me vakamatatataki, ni qai veitaratara kei na noqu qasenivuli Dr Anna Powles- Massey University.

Appendix Three: Consent forms

MASSEY
UNIVERSITY
TE KUNENGA KI PŪREHUROA

UNIVERSITY OF NEW ZEALAND

When Disaster Strikes: **New Zealand's Civil-Military Coordination
in Pacific Disaster Relief Operations**

PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM - INDIVIDUAL

I have read the Information Sheet and have had the details of the study explained to me. My questions have been answered to my satisfaction, and I understand that I may ask further questions at any time.

I agree/do not agree to the interview being sound recorded.

I agree/do not agree to my official title or name being used in connection with my interview.

I wish/do not wish to have my recordings returned to me.

I understand that my privacy will be protected and that all information will remain confidential unless I have given prior consent.

I agree to participate in this study under the conditions set out in the Information Sheet.

Signature: .... Date: ....

Contact email/number:

Full Name - printed ....

Taem Disasta E Straek: Civil-Military Coordination Long Pacific Disasta Riliv Operasen

PARTICIPEN TEK-PART FOM

Mi bin ritim finis infomasen sit ya mo tu oli been explenem lo mi ditel blo study ya. Mi ansarem kwesten ia lo stret stret tingting blo mi, mo tu mi andastan seh bae oli save askem mi sam mo kwesten long enitaem.

Mi akri/ no akri se interview by oli saun rekotem.

Mi akri/ no akri se bae oli yusum title or nem blong mi lo interview ya

Mi wantem/ no wantem se bae ol rekoting blong mi bae mas kambak lo mi.

Mi andastan se oli protektem privacy blong mi mo tu ol infomasen oli tabu mo mi nomo mi save kivim raet blong hu bae save yusum.

Mi akri blo tek-part lo stati ya anta lo ol rule weh infomasen sit ya e talem.

Saen:
....

Date:
....

Full Nem - printed
....

Na I vola ni nomuni veivakadonui mo ni vakatarogi

Au sa wilika oti na I vola ni vakamacala ka sa vakamatatataki tale ga vei au na vakadiddike e mai caka. Au vakadinata tale ga ni sa saumi Vinaka na veitaro au a taroga kau kila tale ga ni na rawa ni u na taro tale ke dua tale na ka au via kila.

Au vakadonuya/sega ni vakadonuya na kena katoni vakalivaliva na noqu na saumi taro.

Au vakadonuya/sega ni vakadonuya na kena vakayagataki na yacaqu kei na noqu I tutu vakacakacaka e na noqu na vakatarogi qo.

Au vinakata/ sega ni vinakata me na vakau mai vei au e dua na I lavelave ni veitarotarogi qo

E sa vakadeitaki vei au ni na maroroi Vinaka na itukutuku au na solia ka na sega ni na vakaveitaliataki

Au sa vakadonuya meu na vakaitavi e na vakadidike qo, ka na vakamuri Vinaka na I tuvatuva sa virikotori e nai vola ni vakamacala.

Signature: .... **Date:** ....

Yacamuni ....

***When Disaster Strikes*: New Zealand's Civil-Military Coordination
in Pacific Disaster Relief Operations**

TRANSCRIBER'S CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT

I…………………………………………………………………………………………………… (Full Name - printed)
agree to transcribe the recordings provided to me.

I agree to keep confidential all the information provided to me.

I will not make any copies of the transcripts or keep any record of them, other than those
required for the project.

Signature: …………………………………………………………………………………… **Date:** …………………………………………

Appendix Four: Obstacles to the NZDF's coordination in TC Pam - Interviewee findings

Domestic factors

Sovereignty and national oversight

A large proportion of stakeholders discussed examples where they felt domestic factors had negatively impacted the NZDF's civil-military coordination. Challenges concerning *sovereignty* or *national oversight* were, for example, described by nineteen stakeholders.[612] These related to the GoV's desire to protect its sovereignty and leadership over the response, which some felt had been undermined by international actors or militaries taking too much control.[613]

Many believed this led the GoV to apply a strong centralised approach, protocol and restrictions, which impeded actors' ability to coordinate with the NZDF.[614] Humanitarian actors in particular reported they received little information from the GoV on how they could coordinate with the NZDF and some stated they were restricted from operating in the same areas.[615] One interviewee commented,

> "[Humanitarian actors] were not given permission to go out into regions [where the NZDF was]… to provide support… and they were very frustrated by that and didn't understand why the Government [of Vanuatu] made that decision."[616]

National capacity

Nineteen interviewees also believed challenges surrounding Vanuatu's *national capacity* negatively impacted civil-military coordination efforts.[617] Many felt national coordination mechanisms such as the NDMO and NEOC were overwhelmed or overtaken by incoming international actors.[618] One GoV reflected on these challenges as a long term issue which needed to be addressed. They stated,

> "It's not so much necessarily the New Zealand Military that failed, but the system generally… in fairness to the NDMO what they really need is just one

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[612] Interview: 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 14, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 25, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33.
[613] Interview: 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 22, 23, 28.
[614] Interview: 1, 4, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 22, 23, 25.
[615] Interview: 1, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14.
[616] Interview: 1.
[617] Interview: 1, 3, 4, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 31.
[618] Interview: 1, 4, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 22, 23, 25, 27.

> *group coming in to help 'em [with coordination]. And that's going to be true*
> *for the next twenty years."[619]*

The centralisation of the national system also placed further strain on the small number of local individuals who were in charge of decision-making and coordination. One participant described this as a "*flood channelling through a pinhole,*" which led to bottlenecks in the system.[620] This impeded decision-making surrounding the use of NZDF assets, the approval of tasks the military would undertake and communication between the NZDF and civilian actors.

Politics and interests

Challenges surrounding *politics* or *interests* were also highlighted by seventeen stakeholders.[621] These were perceived to have negatively impacted the NZDF's coordination with civilian actors in a range of ways. For example, NZDF-GoV coordination was believed to have been undermined by suspicions about actor motivations. On one hand this related to concerns that the GoV or local officials might be manipulating or directing NZDF assistance according to personal interest, not humanitarian need.[622] On the other hand, GoV officials were concerned that NZDF assistance was being used to gain visibility or was being dictated by GoNZ interests.[623] One GoV interviewee highlighted this was less about the NZDF response and more about the politics behind the deployment, they commented,

> *"I don't think the military people were distrusted, I think there was an*
> *element of distrust about the political decision making around the military*
> *deployments."[624]*

Stakeholders also felt the lack of interaction between the NZDF and humanitarian actors was in part due to actor interests and politics. Surprisingly, this had little to do with humanitarian actors' adherence to the humanitarian principles, as only one humanitarian interviewee confirmed that their agency had avoided direct contact with the NZDF for this reason.[625] Stakeholders instead believed the GoV's suspicions about humanitarian actors and their interests led it to isolate these actors, which contributed to the lack of information humanitarians received about the NZDF and the resulting lack of coordination.[626]

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[619] Interview: 23.
[620] Interview: 4.
[621] Interview: 2, 5, 6, 9, 14, 16, 18, 21, 22, 25, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35.
[622] Interview: 2, 5, 6, 9, 14, 16, 18, 21, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35.
[623] Interview: 22, 25.
[624] Interview: 25.
[625] Interview: 8. While the decision not to directly interact with militaries was motivated by the agency's adherence to the humanitarian principles, the interviewee highlighted this had not prevented them from coordinating with the NZDF. This was because they opted to use UN coordination mechanisms to facilitate.
[626] Interview: 1, 3, 4, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16.

Domestic politics and personal interests were also reported to have reduced interaction and communication between the NZDF and the affected population. In one example a community representative recounted how Ni-Vanuatu were told that the NZDF was assisting certain communities at the behest of a political official. They stated,

> *"[The official's associates] were frightening people. The people had things they wanted to talk about or raise [with the NZDF] but at the same time… the people have their own self conscience… 'Oh I didn't vote for him. So if I took this from [New Zealand] I'm cheating.'"[627]*

As a result, members of the affected community who had not supported this candidate believed they would not or did not deserve NZDF support. This not only reduced interaction between the NZDF and the population but also lowered community expectations around assistance.

Poor communication

Physical communication issues

A wide variety of communication issues were reported to have impeded coordination between civilian stakeholders and the NZDF in the TC Pam response. Some challenges, such as physical communication issues caused by power outages and a lack of cell phone reception, were reported by over half of all stakeholders. These reduced actors' abilities to contact the NDMO to receive information about the NZDF, as well as communicate with the Canterbury and personnel while they were operating in the islands.

This particularly impacted humanitarian actors, 70% of which reported that communication and information sharing between their sector and the NZDF was poor in the response.[628] This meant organisations had little awareness of where the NZDF was operating, how their agencies could utilise NZDF assets or coordinate with personnel. For example, one local humanitarian who was working on an island prior to the NZDF's arrival commented,

> *"Nobody told me the New Zealand army was coming. [The NZDF] came in and asked if anybody was coordinating on the island."[629]*

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[627] Interview: 33.
[628] Interview: 8, 10, 11, 12, 13.
[629] Interview: 10.

Another reported that their organisation distributed over 70% of their relief supplies before they heard the NZDF was operating in the same area.[630] This ultimately meant their organisation could have spent more money on aid, had they been able to use NZDF assets and reduce their transportation costs.

Terminology

With respect to the NZDF's coordination with the GoNZ, MFAT and OGA's, terminology issues were frequently reported.[631] One GoNZ representative believed this was the greatest challenge they had encountered with the NZDF, which led to misunderstandings and confusion at times. They commented,

> *"The translation of NZDF speak, all of the acronyms… you know AC this and AC that. Good GRIEF! [Interviewee smiles]... Just ease us into it a bit more. Going full-on military right from the start was perhaps a bit too much."[632]*

Communication and information sharing on HMNZS Canterbury

Significant communication issues were also reported on the Canterbury.[633] Seven interviewees highlighted that the vessel lacked an unclassified, civilian-friendly communication system.[634] This meant that some MFAT and OGA representatives were unable to use the email system due to security restrictions. One OGA representative reflected,

> *"Com's was one of the things we found particularly difficult… from the ship [Canterbury] and off… When civilians want to send stuff to other places it's just a hopeless thing. That's been recognised."[635]*

Issues with the vessel's data band also meant both NZDF and civilian actors were at times unable to send reports and documents to actors in Port Vila and New Zealand.[636] At times this impeded actors' ability to plan and provide assistance, such as when DJIATF staff were unable to send the Canterbury blueprints of local facilities to repair.[637]

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[630] Interview: 9.
[631] Interview: 2, 4, 7, 17, 22.
[632] Interview: 4.
[633] Interview: 1, 5, 6, 8, 16, 17, 25.
[634] Interview: 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 16, 17. NZDF representatives stated in their 2017 interviews that an investigation was underway to provide an unclassified system to use in HADR.
[635] Interview: 16.
[636] Interview: 4, 6, 7.
[637] Interview: 4.

Poor communication with the affected population

As discussed in Part One above, over 70% of community representatives felt there was poor communication between the NZDF and affected population.[638] The majority of these reported they were not informed of the NZDF's arrival, which needs the military would address, or how the affected population could communicate with NZDF personnel.[639] Many also believed this lack of communication meant NZDF personnel had not understood or focused on the priority needs of affected communities.[640]

Reasons behind this poor communication included language and cultural barriers, as well as the NZDF predominantly coordinating with only a small number of representatives in affected areas.[641] In some cases stakeholders believed communication issues also related to NZDF personnel lacking an understanding of the local context, culture and how communities should be approached. One GoV official described an example where this occurred, they recounted,

> *"[The NZDF soldier] had a list of things he wanted to say to the [outer island] communities… [a local] had to translate them into Bislama for him because… someone had said… 'Well it's no good turning up and talking to them in English, they won't understand what you're saying.' And [the NZDF soldier] was like 'well… I don't know what to do about that.'* [642]

Lack of understanding

A total of twenty-three stakeholders described a lack of understanding as an obstacle to the NZDF's coordination. Fifteen of these reported that civilians lacked an understanding of the NZDF's capabilities, roles, assets and operations.[643] This was reported to have been exhibited by the GoV, NDMO, MFAT, OGAs, humanitarian actors and the affected population.

At times this meant civilian actors made requests of the NZDF which were seen as unfeasible or required military personnel to work long hours or overnight to achieve these.[644] In one example a New Zealand humanitarian actor demanded the use of an NZDF asset "*straight away*" to

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[638] Interview: 29, 30, 31, 33, 34.
[639] Interview: 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34. Although some interviewees felt the NZDF should have announced their intentions on arrival, others believed this should have been the GoV's responsibility.
[640] Interview: 29, 30, 33, 34.
[641] Interview: 2, 3, 4, 7 8 22, 25, 27, 30, 33, 34.
[642] Interview: 25. Name removed to preserve confidentiality.
[643] Interview: 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, , 20.
[644] Interview: 5, 7, 15. Civilian demands were reportedly unfeasible at times. They also resulted in NZDF personnel working long hours and sometimes overnight to achieve tasks.

transport relief supplies, which was not possible due to military procedures and limitations.[645] The NZDF interviewee reflected,

> *"It was just a lack of knowledge. Yes we've got equipment and we've got resources in country, but they are just not at the disposal [of any civilian]... like a taxi service. You can't just ring them up [smile]."[646]*

This lack of understanding led almost half of all civilian stakeholders to feel their ability to utilise NZDF assets or support had at some period been delayed or impeded.[647]

A similar number of stakeholders felt the NZDF lacked knowledge about civilian concepts.[648] These included the capabilities and roles of civilian actors, humanitarian principles and structures, HADR, as well as local culture, context and systems. Although most interviewees believed this was a defence-wide issue, four stakeholders observed a lack of understanding about these concepts was particularly evident among the NZDF's junior ranks.[649] This was also acknowledged by one NZDF representative, who stated,

> *"Certain people at the high level have... understanding [in the NZDF]. It is probably that some of the lower level ones that don't. Captain equivalents don't really have that understanding [of how military and civilian organisations come together]."[650]*

Local and humanitarian stakeholders in particular felt the NZDF's assistance and ability to coordinate with their sectors would improve if the military had a greater understanding of the coordination structures and protocol they operated by.[651] One New Zealand humanitarian participant commented,

> *"If the [NZDF] are going to get involved, there needs to be a much greater awareness of humanitarian principles at rank-and-file sort of level... an awareness of not just the principles, but also the [humanitarian] ways of working, the clusters and coordination... and things like the core humanitarian standards, Sphere [Standards] and those kind of guidelines, and 'how do you interpret those?'"[652]*

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[645] Interview: 5.
[646] Interview: 5.
[647] Interview: 2, 3, 4, 8, 9,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20, 22 , 25.
[648] Interview: 3, 5, 6, 8, 11, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 25.
[649] Interview: 5, 6, 18, 20.
[650] Interview: 5.
[651] Interview: 2, 8, 9, 11, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 25, 28.
[652] Interview: 20. The *Sphere Standards* were launched in 1997. They are an agreement among humanitarian actors, INGOs, NGOs and donor institutions to improve the quality of assistance provided to people affected by disasters and the

Lack of understanding about Oslo Guidelines

Among interviewees, there was also a widespread lack of understanding about the Oslo and APC-MADRO Guidelines. Only nine of the thirty-five TC Pam participants reported having heard of these Guidelines or the principle of 'last resort.' These figures were low among all sectors, with only one GoNZ, one INGO and three New Zealand civilian interviewees reporting an awareness of the Oslo Guidelines.[653]

All three NZDF participants, however, demonstrated a basic to thorough understanding of the UN Guidelines.[654] The operational and strategic roles of these personnel, however, may have skewed these figures to a higher proportion than might be expected among more junior ranks.

In total, only four participants felt these guidelines and the principle of 'last resort' was appropriate in the context of Pacific HADR.[655] Interviewees also expressed confusion about how the principle of 'last resort' should be interpreted, due to a perceived lack of resources in the Pacific region and Vanuatu response.

Lack of understanding about military models

A general lack of understanding was also reported about NZDF CIMIC teams. This particularly concerned the role and capabilities of CIMIC teams, as well as how these integrated with the new DJIATF model and local structures.[656] This was reflected on by one NZDF interviewee, who observed,

> *"There was not a clear understanding of what CIMIC could provide in terms of liaison and assessment... there's very little... integration I suppose, or at least demonstration of that [CIMIC] capability... the CIMIC teams didn't come with a 'how-to' so [NZDF personnel and civilians] didn't know what to do."[657]*

This lack of understanding was believed to have contributed to weak linkages and a lack of communication between CIMIC teams, the DJIATF and NDMO. It was also reported that some actors perceived CIMIC teams as "*unnecessary*" in the HADR response.[658] This largely reduced the role of CIMIC teams to conducting assessments in the outer islands and coordinating in an ad hoc manner with local actors and NGOs.

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accountability of the humanitarian system in their disaster. These standards are set out in the Sphere Handbook which is designed for disaster response but may be applicable in natural disasters and armed conflict.
[653] Interview: 14, 16, 18, 19, 26.
[654] Interview: 4, 5, 6, 7.
[655] Interview: 6, 14, 19, 20.
[656] Interview: 2, 3, 4, 6, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 24.
[657] Interview: 6.
[658] Interview: 6.

Organisational culture

Structure, protocol and hierarchy

Of the nineteen stakeholders who discussed *organisational culture* issues, 90% discussed how the NZDF's structure, protocol or hierarchy made civil-military coordination more challenging.[659] Many highlighted the innate differences between military and civilian cultures, which had significant impacts on how each approached HADR. One GoNZ official reflected,

> *"I think there will always be some differences between civilian and military responses… simply because of their different structures and operational rules… you know a military response is going to be more rigid just because of the chain of command approach and the hierarchical approach... But it had been causing some frustration."[660]*

Procedures and restrictions placed on the NZDF

A common theme behind frustration was that civilians felt the NZDF's procedures and decision-making processes were at times slow or unsuited to the HADR context. Both GoV and OGA stakeholders described the lengthy processes and procedures the NZDF undertook prior to deploying assets in the outer islands.[661] Civilian and humanitarian actors also found the NZDF's procedures for utilising assets challenging.[662] This meant that despite the extra cost, some humanitarian actors opted use civilian transport over the NZDF, as it was easier.[663]

NZDF personnel were also reportedly frustrated by some of the restrictions placed on personnel in Vanuatu.[664] This included daily input from HQ JFNZ and requirements which at times limited flexibility and the coordination efforts of the DJIATF and JTF. One NZDF interviewee described an example of this, they reflected,

> *"[HQJFNZ] was putting these restrictions on [the DJIATF], even though they had said their [transportation] options were very limited… and basically not allowing them the freedom to operate effectively. Which meant the reconnaissance into [Epi] island was shortened, wasn't as effective."[665]*

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659 Interview: 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 34.
660 Interview: 1.
661 Interview: 9, 11, 14, 17, 21, 22, 24, 25, 28.
662 Interview: 17, 20, 21, 22.
663 Interview: 21.
664 Interview: 5, 6.
665 Interview: 5.

Culture clashes with local actors

Significant organisational culture issues were also reported between the NZDF and Vanuatu-based actors such as the GoV, public servants, affected population and local humanitarian representatives.[666] Many felt this was because the Melanesian or Ni-Vanuatu culture clashed with the NZDF's more rigid structure and prioritisation of speed, which led to frustration on both sides.[667] One OGA reflected,

> *"Within Defence Force it's fairly structured and rigid... When you have to go back into some degree of horse trading with a civilian who is a Pacific Islander and [they say]… 'Do you know it's a SUNDAY and I don't want to do it today?'... [NZDF personnel] might go back into the office and beat [their] head against a computer, but that's ok… I do think the challenges that [personnel] come across were generally well managed… even if they were slightly torturous."[668]*

Some GoV officials also linked organisational culture issues with the command and control issues they encountered with the NZDF.[669] When reflecting on their experience with the NZDF one GoV representative stated,

> *"It's so difficult to work with the [New Zealand] military because they have a different protocol, command, they don't expect a civilian to give them directions."[670]*

This contributed to the tension which almost led to the first NZDF Hercules aircraft being denied entry into the country. It also created frustration and delays over use of NZDF assets and the identification of tasks, with one official reporting that it was three days before the GoV was able to utilise NZDF assets in the initial response.[671]

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[666] Interview: 8, 11, 14, 15, 16, 20, 22, 24, 25, 34.
[667] Interview: 11, 22, 24, 25, 28.
[668] Interview: 15.
[669] Interview: 22, 23, 25.
[670] Interview: 22.
[671] Interview: 22.

Appendix Five: Obstacles to the NZDF's coordination in TC Winston - Interviewee findings

Domestic factors

Sovereignty and national oversight

Twenty four stakeholders highlighted challenges which stemmed from the GoF's *national oversight* or the desire to protect its *sovereignty*.[672] Many observed that the GoF took an authoritative approach to the response, as well as over foreign militaries and international assistance.[673] This was seen as a consequence of the TC Pam response, where the GoF felt national systems had been undermined by foreign actors.[674]

National coordination structures and the protocol introduced by the GoF were however believed to have impeded the NZDF's coordination with other civilian sectors. International humanitarian stakeholders in particular felt GoV decisions led to a separation between the NZDF and themselves, which reduced their interaction.[675] One INGO representative reflected on why this occurred, they stated,

> *"The political wheel I guess that's trying to establish itself because of the sovereignty of the country that's being affected… [The Government is] trying to shoosh off everybody that's not involved from the international bit. So it becomes very muddy very quickly as far as coordination is concerned."[676]*

Politics and interests

Thirteen stakeholders provided examples of how *politics or interests* negatively impacted the NZDF's civil-military coordination.[677] Some related to previous political tensions between the GoNZ and GoF, which arose after the 2006 coup and sanctions New Zealand had placed on Fiji. Interviewees felt these led the GoF to be suspicious of NZDF support and intentions, which delayed decision-making around the use of assets and identification of tasks.[678] Some also

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[672] Interview: 36, 38, 39, 41, 42, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 63, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70.
[673] Interview: 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 59, 60.
[674] Stakeholders reflected on the fact that the GoF did not want to be undermined by international stakeholders and regional actors, as they perceived the GoV had been in the TC Pam response.
[675] Interview: 43, 44, 48, 49. Domestic factors and their impact on civil-military coordination and the assistance provided are discussed in greater detail in Part Two.
[676] Interview: 48.
[677] Interview: 43, 46, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 55, 56, 61, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70.
[678] Interview: 39, 40, 42, 43, 46, 50, 64. One example of a GoF decision with these impacts was the extension of the NZDF deployment at twenty four hours' notice. NZDF interviewees confirmed this negatively impacted the morale of personnel and their families back in New Zealand, as well as the military's assistance in the Lau region. This was because the Canterbury had

believed these delays were a demonstration of political power by the GoF, either to demonstrate independence or as retribution for past sanctions.[679]

These previous political tensions also led some humanitarian stakeholders to avoid direct contact with the NZDF. One INGO representative stated,

> *"The first two weeks it was quite sensitive because I completely understood the nature of relationship between the militaries of Australia, New Zealand and Fiji. So… I tried as much for us not to be involved in that level of politics… we avoided being in direct contact with any of the militaries… [cooperating with the NZDF] may have worked a little bit against our favour in terms of the Fiji Government. We might have been seen as an outsider interfering with national responses."[680]*

Stakeholders also believed a range of political factors and interests were behind the lack of humanitarian presence in the Lau Island group and therefore civil-military coordination with the NZDF.[681] Some felt humanitarian actors chose not to go to the Lau group due to their interests, either because of transportation costs or the fact they might receive less visibility alongside the NZDF.[682] Others believed the island group was denied humanitarian support because of the political rivalry between the current Prime Minister Bainimarama and the former Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase.[683] This was because Qarase was ousted by Bainimarama in 2006 and at the time of TC Winston continued to maintain domestic support and a leadership position in the Lau Island group.[684] One humanitarian stakeholder reported that some agencies were ordered not to go to the Lau island group, they reflected on the consequences of this,

> *"The political stuff… denied other humanitarian actors… that were ready to… support the general operations and in this case give the New Zealand Defence Force officers a hand in the Lau group. Denied them the opportunity to do*

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already embarked all her supplies to depart Fiji at the time the extension was announced. The NZDF had also planned to complete tasks which only took a few weeks, while greater notice would likely have increased the effectiveness of assistance, as well as its long-term impact.

[679] Interview: 46. One local humanitarian reflected, "*You know politics. You know Fiji always likes to show that it has some independence. So while the people are suffering, New Zealand can suffer one day more… it seemed to me that that [delays] happened but I'm not sure.*"

[680] Interview: 43.

[681] Interview: 48, 59, 65, 68.

[682] Interview: 46, 49.

[683] Interview: 48, 65, 68. Ex-Prime Minister Qarase was ousted by the RFMF during the 2006 coup. Prime Minister Bainimarama was one of the lead instigators in the coup and took the position of Prime Minister in the takeover. The Bainimarama government then accused and convicted Qarase of corruption. Some stakeholders felt the Lau group was denied the same level of assistance as other parts of Fiji because there was less domestic political support for the current Government in the region.

[684]

that. Therefore denying the people that were affected by the disaster the chance to be helped in accordance to the way that they are used."[685]

Poor communication

A high proportion of stakeholders in each civilian sector reported that communication or information sharing issues had impeded their ability to coordinate with the NZDF. This included 86% of community representatives, 80% of New Zealand civilians, 70% of humanitarian stakeholders and 60% of GoF officials.

Communication issues related to changes in national structure

A number of the communication and information-sharing issues identified were believed to have stemmed from national structures.[686] One GoF representative acknowledged that Fijian officials generally "*don't really give information unless it's a need-to basis*" and that some of those in charge of coordination in the NDMO were "*not very communicative.*"[687] Other interviewees reported there was a "*big gap in terms of record keeping and planning,*" which meant the data reported in Suva did not always reflect what was occurring on the outer islands.[688] As a result, many stakeholders felt the NZDF and civilian actors had not always received adequate information to coordinate or about the communities they were trying to assist.[689]

Humanitarian actors in particular felt changes in national coordination structure and the application of the future operations cell reduced their communication with the NZDF.[690] When asked about the level of communication they had with the NZDF, one local humanitarian replied-

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[685] Interview: 48.
[686] Interview: 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70. Examples included NDMO, GoF, RFMF and local leadership facilitating communication poorly.
[687] Interview: 59.
[688] Interview: 38.
[689] Interview: 36, 38, 39, 42, 43, 44, 46, 48, 50, 51, 55, 56, 57, 59, 61, 65, 69, 70. Stakeholders perceived that a lack of data surrounding the transport of supplies was however an issue which stemmed from the national coordination system. The Cyclone Winston PDNA highlighted this as an area for improvement, as relief distribution was only tracked as far as the Fiji Procurement Office warehouses. This meant the NEOC had no evidence that relief items provided to the divisions through the government system had reached the targeted communities. See page 114: GOF. 2016. *Post-Disaster Needs Assessment: Tropical Cyclone Winston, February 20, 2016*.
[690] Interview: 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49.

> *"Zero. There WAS no communication…. the New Zealand military, their
> coordination is with the Fiji military it has nothing to do with the civil and so
> there is a complete disconnection."*[691]

In consequence, some humanitarian agencies reported that they did not know how to utilise assets or coordinate with the NZDF.[692] Others commented they had not received information about where the NZDF was operating or which community needs they were meeting.[693]

Terminology use

With respect to the NZDF's coordination with New Zealand civilian actors, terminology issues were often reported.[694] Although most felt these were fairly easily overcome, they were reported to have led to some misunderstandings and delays in the initial response. This was reflected on by one OGA interviewee, who recounted,

> *"I think it took me about two days to understand the terminology, acronyms
> [laughter]… Defence have got a big string of acronyms and a language that
> other [relief actors] don't understand… their briefings are the same…There
> was a lot of jargon and each person had a position… and there was a lack of
> understanding of what they actually did."*[695]

Communication and information sharing on HMNZS Canterbury

Eight stakeholders also discussed communication issues on the Canterbury.[696] Some of these related to NZDF security processes, which meant some MFAT or OGA representatives were not allowed to use the NZDF email system or enter the operations and planning room on the Canterbury.[697] Others related to a lack of internet connectivity and bandwidth on NZDF ships, especially in the outer islands. One GoNZ official discussed how this delayed decision-making and the approval of tasks. They stated,

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[691] Interview: 46.

[692] Interview: 43, 44, 45.

[693] Interview: 43, 44, 45. Stakeholders perceived that a lack of data surrounding the transport of supplies was however an issue which stemmed from the national coordination system. This was discussed previously in Section I.

[694] Interview: 37, 38, 51, 52, 53.

[695] Interview: 53.

[696] Interview: 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 51, 52, 53.

[697] Interview: 39, 52, 53. It was reported that some OGA representatives were not allowed to enter the Operations room despite requesting permission and having Government Security Clearances. These spaces and the NZDF email system were reportedly restricted to only military personnel due to security requirements.

"In terms of the IT facilities on board the Canterbury… that was REALLY frustrating because of internet connections and so on, it took twice as long as it should have taken and all these sorts of issues."[698]

This not only impeded NZDF-New Zealand civilian coordination between the Suva High Commission and the outer islands, but also communication to strategic leadership based in New Zealand.

Lack of understanding

Of the twenty two stakeholders who identified a lack of understanding as an obstacle, thirteen discussed examples where civilians lacked knowledge about the NZDF's role, capabilities, assets and operations.[699] Interviewees believed this was demonstrated by representatives from MFAT, OGAs, humanitarian agencies, the GoF, NDMO and the affected population.

In some cases high proportions of civilian stakeholders acknowledged this lack of understanding. This included over half of all humanitarian and GoF interviewees, with one local humanitarian representative reflecting,

"I don't know how the New Zealand military or even the Fiji military is wired… How they respond to that kind of assistance, or their relationship to the government and how they respond in those times of need. I have no idea at ALL how they work."[700]

Stakeholders believed this lack of understanding frustrated both civilian and NZDF representatives.[701] This occurred when civilian actors felt they were unable to coordinate with the NZDF effectively or utilise assets, which reduced their ability to assist the affected population. In contrast, NZDF representatives reported this led actors to make inappropriate or unrealistic demands of the NZDF.[702] This reduced the JTF's effectiveness in achieving its own tasks and at times required military personnel to work long hours.

Eighteen interviewees also felt that some NZDF personnel lacked an understanding of civilian concepts and structures.[703] These concerned the capabilities and roles of civilian actors, HADR operations and coordination structures, the humanitarian principles, Fijian culture and political

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[698] Interview: 37.
[699] Interview: 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 55, 58.
[700] Interview: 44.
[701] Interview: 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 55.
[702] Interview: 39, 41, 42.
[703] Interview: 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 57, 58, 68, 69.

context. Although a general lack of understanding of these concepts was reported by most stakeholders, some felt this was more prevalent among the NZDF's junior ranks.[704] A number of interviewees connected this to a lack of HADR specific training and experience. This was acknowledged by one NZDF representative, who reflected,

> *"So save for the actual [DJIATF] headquarters... I don't think anyone did [have humanitarian training]. Yeah not a good understanding of… how humanitarian assistance works, how the cluster forms, what their reporting network and requirements are, what [the NZDF's] inject to them could or should have been."*[705]

Many stakeholders believed the NZDF's lack of understanding reduced the effectiveness of its assistance and ability to coordinate with civilian actors.[706] Local humanitarian stakeholders in particular felt the NZDF was not aware of organisations that wanted to coordinate with it and could have provided the military with local expertise, connections or helped it meet needs.[707] Some were also concerned that the NZDF had not deployed with a gender advisor and believed personnel were not aware they were legally obligated to have one under UN SCR 1325.[708] They felt this limited interaction with women in communities and worried this resulted in widows, women and children not having their needs communicated or adequately met by the NZDF.

Lack of understanding about Oslo Guidelines

While a slightly higher proportion of TC Winston participants were aware of the Oslo and APC-MADRO Guidelines, compared to the previous case study, this only totalled twelve of the thirty-three interviewees. These figures were spread among all sectors, with only two GoNZ, four INGO, three New Zealand civilian and one GoF interviewee reporting an understanding of these Guidelines or the principle of 'last resort.'[709]

Half of the NZDF participants reported a basic to thorough understanding of these Guidelines.[710] This lower ratio, compared to the previous case study, may reflect the broader

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[704] Interview: 38, 40, 52. One GoNZ official observed, "*After a certain rank and experience level… there's a lack of understanding of how the actors should interact or their roles, and I think that could be more clearly explained to NZDF people who are deployed in this situation. As in- 'these are the actors that you will come across, this is their role, and this is what is appropriate'- you know?*"(Interview: 38).

[705] Interview: 39.

[706] Interview: 38, 39, 40, 44, 45, 46, 47, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55. This particularly concerned the military's coordination and communication with the affected population. A frequent example was the NZDF communicating almost exclusively with local male leadership.

[707] Interview: 44, 45, 46.

[708] Interview: 45, 69. On discussion with NZDF representatives it appeared they believed UN SCR 1325 had not been ratified by the GoNZ prior to deployment. This was, however, not the case according to New Zealand's National Action Plan for UNSCR 1325 and the NZDF's CONPLAN 102.

[709] Interview: 36, 37, 45, 46, 48, 49, 51, 52, 55.

[710] Interview: 40, 41.

spectrum of personnel interviewed. This was because some personnel represented those operating at the tactical level.

Only six participants felt the Oslo guidelines were appropriate in the context of Pacific HADR, following an explanation of the principle of 'last resort.'[711] Among those reporting an understanding of this principle, participants interpreted 'last resort' differently. For example, some considered the NZDF was used as a last resort in the TC Winston response, due to a perceived lack of logistical support. Others did not, believing there were other civilian options available and the NZDF's departure was too fast to have investigated these.[712]

Lack of understanding about military models

A general lack of understanding was also observed around the application of the DJIATF and CIMIC models and how these integrated with civilian and local systems.[713] Some NZDF interviewees believed this was due to a broader lack of understanding about how CIMIC should be structured and employed by the NZDF. One commented,

> *"CIMIC is 100% the thing that [the NZDF] do wrong… For every one of our allied nations the nine shop… is CIMIC. For [the NZDF] it's finance… All partner nations have understood the importance that CIMIC plays… We haven't done that yet… the problem is the understanding of what CIMIC is, what it does and what it brings to you is really lacking."[714]*

This lack of understanding was believed to have contributed to CIMIC teams being used ineffectively in the response. This was reflected on by one NZDF interviewee who perceived that the military *"deployed CIMIC too late and in too few numbers to Fiji to be effective."[715]*

Organisational culture

Structure, protocol and hierarchy

Of the stakeholders who identified organisational culture as an obstacle to coordination, the majority described issues connected to the NZDF's structure, hierarchy or procedures.[716] Many discussed the inherent differences between military and civilian cultures, which often led these

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[711] Interview: 6, 14, 19, 20.
[712] Interview: 55.
[713] Interview: 36, 38, 39, 40.
[714] Interview: 40.
[715] Interview: 40.
[716] Interview: 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 45, 47, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55.

actors to have contrasting priorities and approaches. Interviewee perspectives varied over how these organisational culture differences could be mitigated or even if this was possible or desirable.[717] One GoNZ official reflected,

> "The military is not like [civilian organisations], it's very structured and hierarchical… Siloized… more machine-like and less organic… [Figuring] out how you are a little bit more organic [in HADR] would be really good… whether it's possible or not I'm not sure."[718]

Procedures and restrictions placed on the NZDF

Within interviews a number of civilian stakeholders expressed frustration over the NZDF's decision-making structure or procedures.[719] These were perceived as convoluted or slow, which some felt were unsuitable in the HADR context, where needs and tasks were time-critical.[720] Examples related to the processes which needed to be followed before military assets could be utilised or supplies transported. Others felt the NZDF's two to three day planning cycle was restrictive, as information was being received and needed to be acted on at less than twenty four hours' notice.[721] One OGA participant described how this impacted civil-military coordination and their response. They stated,

> "We struggled a little bit with the culture of the NZDF… it was … hard to get decisions made, hard to get goals achieved at a quick time frame, which is needed in a humanitarian response… when you've got people who are only in a country for [a short period] and want to get the maximum amount of work done, that's pretty hard to manage."[722]

One GoNZ official believed the military's hierarchical structure meant the NZDF was "*flexible on a macro-level but not on a micro-level*".[723] They felt this resulted in personnel at the lower ranks not being encouraged to show initiative, which reduced their ability to coordinate with civilian actors and the effectiveness of assistance.

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[717] Most raised concerns about the negative impacts this might have on actors' current capabilities, or even if change was possible. NZDF and civilian participants felt that changing the NZDF's culture to suit HADR would likely impact the military's capabilities and approach to other tasks. Approximately 50% of stakeholders suggested that changing the culture to be more effective in HADR would be good, others felt this was either too difficult or would negatively impact the Force.

[718] Interview: 36.

[719] Interview: 36, 38, 52, 53, 55.

[720] Interview: 38, 52, 53, 55.

[721] The planning cycle refers to how militaries allocate and undertake tasks or missions. This meant the NZDF was trying to plan HADR tasks three days ahead of time, to increase efficiency.

[722] Interview: 52.

[723] Interview: 38.

Culture clashes with New Zealand civilian actors

Although five NZDF and GoNZ interviewees felt organisational differences had minimal or no impact on civil-military coordination, 70% of other New Zealand stakeholders disagreed.[724] Five stakeholders reported significant tensions between NZDF personnel and those from OGAs such as USAR.[725] This was believed to be the result of contrasting leadership styles, views on 'command and control' and the fact that the NZDF and USAR had similar skillsets but different operational paces and priorities.[726]

A number of the issues encountered were believed to have stemmed from the NZDF's hierarchical structure. Stakeholders felt this led to some civilian representatives being excluded, ignored or disrespected by some personnel as their authority was not recognised.[727] An example of this was described by one OGA representative, they recounted,

> *"The NZDF has the rank orientated structure which led to conflict scenarios which could have escalated… an example was a representative at the time held [a high rank in an OGA], which was the same as Lieutenant Colonel… and one day he went to do a visit … and put his uniform on. And the way he was treated [by NZDF personnel] was SIGNIFICANTLY different* [laughter].*"[728]*

This frustrated civilian representatives and was believed to have contributed to some choosing to operate independently of the NZDF when they felt their personnel were not being respected.[729] Some stakeholders believed this reduced the effectiveness of the response, as civilian actors had significant HADR experience and skills which could have been used more effectively in cooperation with the NZDF.

Culture clashes with humanitarian actors

Stakeholders felt this obstacle particularly undermined NZDF-humanitarian coordination.[730] This occurred because humanitarians were intimidated by the NZDF's culture, structure or found military procedures confusing or challenging. In some cases these cultural differences led

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[724] Interview: 36, 37, 39, 40, 41.
[725] Interview: 41, 42, 50, 52, 53. Stakeholders commented that USAR were used to making a rapid assessment and repairing large numbers of dwellings to a basic standard, while the NZDF wanted to make a long-term impact and aimed to produce work at a high standard in accordance with safety guidelines.
[726] Interview: 38, 42, 52, 53.
[727] Interview: 38, 52, 53.
[728] Interview: 53. Aspects of quote altered to ensure participant confidentiality.
[729] Interview: 41, 42, 52, 53. Frustration reportedly led to one USAR team choosing to identify their own tasking without coordinating or reporting to NZDF personnel first.
[730] Interview: 39, 40, 44, 46, 49, 56.

humanitarian organisations to avoid coordinating with the NZDF or use civilian transportation instead, as they felt this was easier.[731] This scenario was described by one local humanitarian, who described their first impression of the NZDF as follows,

> *"You know it scares us… you know these guys are very efficient you hear them talk and when they do their briefing* [laughter] *… after the meeting I said [to the other humanitarians] 'aye guys, let's just stay out of Koro, stay out of Vanuabalavu' it's easier, you don't have to mess with these guys."[732]*

In hindsight stakeholders would however perceive the lack of NZDF-humanitarian coordination in the Lau group had negative impacts on the affected population.[733] This was because they felt the NZDF had not been trained to meet the soft needs of individuals, which meant these were not adequately met in some communities.[734]

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[731] Interview: 46, 49, 56.

[732] Interview: 46.

[733] Interview: 46, 49, 56.

[734] This was because the NZDF had repaired infrastructure and cleared debris, while soft needs such as psychosocial care, protection, private shelter and the equal distribution of food and Non-Food Items had not been addressed well.

Appendix Six: Comparative Analysis findings

Research Question One: How did stakeholders perceive the NZDF's civil-military coordination in past Pacific disaster relief responses?

The pragmatic reasons behind coordination

Many stakeholders reported that the NZDF's logistical support was the most valuable capability offered by the military. Interviewees felt this was due to the geographical challenges faced in the Vanuatu and Fijian archipelagos. The lack of national resources and logistical capacity in these HADR responses also reportedly compounded transportation issues. These practical benefits led many Pacific-based interviewees to consider the NZDF's involvement in HADR and coordination with civilians 'appropriate' in past responses.

These logistical and resource challenges also led several participants to argue that civilian stakeholders needed NZDF or foreign military support to rapidly meet the humanitarian needs created by Category 5 cyclones.[735] For example, one OGA participant recalled their reaction to a humanitarian who criticised their coordination with the NZDF. They reflected,

> *"One of the comments said to me was – 'well you're just defence force in different uniform then.' And I said – 'well, no. We are a government-led response and therefore [the NZDF] are the ones that get us IN to do what we're doing...' So we could be considered as… aligning ourselves with the devil in the way of [the NZDF], but in a practical sense. But without the assets… and some of the logistical capability [the NZDF have], how would we HONESTLY get to these places in a timely fashion, if at all?"[736]*

Similar justifications for coordinating with the NZDF were provided by many Pacific-based interviewees, including many from the humanitarian sector.

These pragmatic perspectives mean NZDF involvement in HADR is likely here to stay

In particular, affected government and Pacific-based humanitarian interviewees reflected on the financial benefits of coordinating with the NZDF. This concerned NZDF support being offered at no cost to HADR stakeholders, which was crucial considering logistical and funding shortfalls in the region. One humanitarian reflected on why this meant the NZDF was likely to be increasingly involved in future Pacific HADR responses. They stated,

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[735] The majority of interviewees from the following sectors displayed these perspectives: 1) the GoNZ and NZDF, 2) New Zealand civilian agencies, 3) affected Governments and 4) affected populations.
[736] Interview: 17.

"For one thing. Boys love toys. Lots of these Pacific Island leaders are men, and when these men see the green planes and ships coming they say 'of course! Come, come, come.' They will always appreciate the assistance coming from [New Zealand and Australia]."[737]

These and other pragmatic reasons, led many participants to conclude the NZDF and other foreign militaries were likely 'here to stay' in Pacific HADR. Most believed this was a good thing, provided that the military and other stakeholders continued to try and improve their coordination efforts and HADR capabilities.

The NZDF's pre-disaster interaction enhanced coordination

In both responses, participants noted that previous engagement between the NZDF and stakeholders made their coordination efforts easier. The force's pre-disaster interaction with MFAT and OGAs, for example, reportedly enhanced coordination at the strategic level. [738] The use the same DJIATF personnel in both responses also reportedly improved coordination between the NZDF, New Zealand civilian actors, humanitarians and affected governments. This was because face-to-face engagement enabled representatives to build relationships, understanding and trust, which interviewees felt mitigated barriers to coordination.

Humanitarian participants also reported that previous NZDF-humanitarian interaction had been a catalyst for positive coordination. For example, participants in the 2015 and 2016 responses reflected on a civil-military workshop.[739] This was attended by NZDF, humanitarian and Pacific-based NDMO staff and reportedly increased understanding about each other's institutions, as well as humanitarian and Pacific HADR systems.

In contrast, high proportions of the NZDF and civilian participants involved in the TC Pam and Winston responses reported they had minimal or no contact with each other prior to the disaster. These interviewees believed this reduced their understanding and ability to coordinate effectively. This also led the majority of these participants to recommend increasing civil-military interaction between stakeholders, prior to HADR deployments.

These perspectives indicate there is a link between pre-disaster engagement and the NZDF's positive civil-military coordination efforts. These findings support arguments made in previous studies, which suggest 'Janowitzean' or 'integrated' coordination models are more effective, as they encourage interaction between military and civilian actors (Egnell, 2006).

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[737] Interview: 48.

[738] Interview: 17. Stakeholders provided the examples of good pre-disaster interaction. These included joint-planning, Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) and MFAT representatives taking part in the 2013 Southern Katipo Exercise.

[739] Explain the civil-military course

The characteristics, culture and identity of the NZDF aided coordination efforts

The NZDF's characteristics, cultural traits and identity were also frequently discussed by stakeholders, as factors which made civil-military coordination easier.[740] With respect to characteristics, most interviewees reflected on the NZDF relatively small size. This was believed to enhance the military's flexibility and ability to build individual relationships with certain stakeholders. Participants also felt the NZDF's condensed command structure meant personnel were less rigid and hierarchy-focused than those in other militaries.

Concerning the NZDF's culture and identity, some participants linked the NZDF's relative flexibility and friendliness to its ethnic makeup. They connected this to the large proportion of Maori and Pacific Island personnel within the force. New Zealand's national identity and culture were also commonly discussed factors. For example, one local humanitarian interviewee from Fiji commented,

> *"The Pacific is not a warzone and so the military that are coming are neighbours. Especially New Zealand, [the NZDF] is seen across the Pacific as a friend of Pacific islanders."*[741]

Some participants also reported these cultural and national factors led personnel to adopt a 'kiwi' or 'can-do attitude' in Pacific HADR contexts, which civilians found easier to work with.

Civilian stakeholders felt the NZDF was easier to coordinate with than other militaries

Due to these reasons, many participants stated that the NZDF was easier to coordinate with or better at civil-military coordination than the other foreign militaries deployed in these case studies. This may be because interviewees felt the NZDF's cultural orientation, processes and approach were more closely aligned with their own Pacific or civilian cultures, as well as the norms guiding HADR.

While these perceptions may be encouraging for the NZDF, they raise some concerns for other foreign militaries, which were described less favourably by interviewees.[742] This reinforces the need for further research, particularly to better understand how stakeholders view the civil-military coordination effort of other militaries in Pacific HADR.

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[740] While some of these were identified in the literature, most were expressed by interviewees. Participants from all five sectors in both case studies reported that these factors made civil-military coordination easier with the NZDF.

[741] Interview: 46.

[742] While most interviewees simply stated that that NZDF was the easiest of the foreign militaries to coordinate with, others named the ADF as particularly challenging to work with.

Stakeholder perceptions of the NZDF's civil-military coordination were portrayed more favourably in the literature, than by interviewees

Civilian stakeholders believed the NZDF's organisational culture compounded tensions

Several civilians connected the reportedly inappropriate behaviour of NZDF personnel to the military's organisational culture. This meant personnel prioritised the rapid completion of HADR tasks, over showing respect for civilian leadership or their perspectives.

Participants also noted that NZDF personnel were rank-orientated, which meant some personnel dismissed civilian opinions. For example, one OGA interviewee reflected on an incident which happened in Fiji. They recounted,

> *"Potentially there [were] opinions in the room not being listened to... an example was, at the time, [an OGA representative with a high rank] which was the same as Lieutenant Colonel... went to do a visit... and put their... uniform [with rank slides] on. And the way they were treated [by NZDF personnel] was significantly different* [participant laughs]."[743]

Some Participants believed NZDF personnel thought they were more experienced, better trained for emergencies or more capable of leading operations than civilians. These views were, however, contested by participants, who reported that some of the deployed civilian representatives had decades of experience in national and international HADR responses.

Some coordination issues were compounded by leadership and procedural requirements

In contrast, NZDF interviewees contributed civil-military tensions to other factors. Some reported frustration at the rapid rotation of MAFT staff. This reduced the situational awareness of MFAT LOs, as well as their ability to establish relationships and effectively lead WoG stakeholders at the tactical level. Some MFAT staff were also observed to be inexperienced or unsuited to the roles they were allocated. These views suggest it may be beneficial for MFAT to re-evaluate the rotation and selection of staff in future HADR responses.

NZDF participants also reported that security or procedural requirements constrained their ability to coordinate with civilians. Many of these were given by strategic-level civilian or military staff, which reportedly lacked an understanding of the HADR or Pacific context. One NZDF representative reflected on an example of this in the TC Pam response. They reflected,

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[743] Interview: 53.

> *"[Personnel] were getting constant phone calls from HQ JFNZ… getting direction of how to operate… I remember a phone call between [X and Y][744]… I had to ask the rest of the staff [overhearing the conversation] to leave… [X's] knuckles went white [with] frustration. You had [X] ringing [Y] telling him that he can't use different assets and… the plan [X] has got, [Y] doesn't like. That is the old STRATEGIC SCREWDRIVER coming right from the top. It frustrated them because they were sent there to do a specific role, and yet they were being controlled by Wellington."[745]*

These frustrations are similar to those reported by other foreign military staff. For example, Miller and Barbera's (2014) research revealed misunderstandings and poor communication between US military units and political actors, which impeded coordination.

A small number of civilian interviewees also supported these perceptions. One OGA representative reflected,

> *"I think that where [coordination] falls apart perhaps is just people understanding what the operational capability is of each agency…. at the strategic group, you've got a lot of people who have probably never been out the door, policy wise, business analysts you know, managers and directors who have probably never been in [a NZDF] asset of any shape or form, or deployed into a [Pacific Island] country."[746]*

The interviewee perspectives above highlight that civil-military coordination issues are occurring at multiple levels. This is because they are occurring between national and international stakeholders, as well as internally, between the NZDF and New Zealand stakeholders at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

The mechanisms used in past HADR responses had positive and negative impacts on the NZDF's civil-military coordination

National coordination mechanisms

In both responses, national legislation placed the affected government in charge of coordination, but failed to detail how foreign military assistance would be facilitated. Interviewees reported that this left many non-State stakeholders confused about how to

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[744]Names and ranks were removed to preserve stakeholder confidentiality.
[745] Interview 5.
[746] Interview: 17.

communicate with the NZDF or utilise the military's logistical support. These findings are concerning, as coordination and speed are particularly crucial in the initial phase of HADR.

New mechanisms were perceived positively by State actors, but not other stakeholders

Due to the factors above, affected governments established their own civil-military coordination mechanisms.[747] These were perceived positively by most NZDF, GoNZ and affected government interviewees, as they gave State actors more control over the NZDF. In contrast, the use of government LOs, chiefs and village headmen as facilitators limited non-State stakeholders' actual interaction and communication with the NZDF.

This arrangement, however, led to a separation between civilian actors and NZDF personnel. This led most civilian participants, with the exception of UN and large INGO representatives, to feel they were 'out of the loop.' One INGO representative reflected the success of their coordination efforts largely came down to knowing High Commission staff in country.

The need to establish civil-military coordination mechanisms in the Pacific

These findings suggest civil-military coordination mechanisms are encountering similar issues to those reported in previous Pacific HADR studies. For example, these have discussed a general lack of clarity in legislation and policies to regulate coordination, as well as increase the local capacity of NDMOs (Soldateschi, 2011, IFRC, 2016, Connors and Ayobi, 2016). They also emphasise the importance of establishing effective civil-military coordination mechanisms in the Pacific, before disasters occur.

These factors highlight the need for further research into how 'localisation' can actually be achieved in the Pacific, while ensuring all stakeholders are able to take part in or benefit from civil-military coordination.

International and regional coordination mechanisms

Issues connected to humanitarian coordination

Stakeholders reported several coordination issues associated with the humanitarian coordination systems applied in the TC Pam and Winston responses. Some reported that the GoV and GoF were reluctant to use UN structures, such as the cluster system and CMCoord officers. This was reportedly because these were considered foreign, inappropriate for the Pacific HADR context or took control away from national actors.

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[747] These contained many similarities, such as military LOs being embedded in NEOCs and government LOs travelling with the NZDF on the Canterbury.

Interviewees in both case studies described why they felt humanitarian coordination models had negatively impacted the NZDF's civil-military coordination efforts. Some felt these mechanisms led to a separation between military and civilian stakeholders. Others felt they resulted in national and international coordination structures operating independently in Vanuatu and Fiji, which impeded local and humanitarian agencies ability to coordinate with the NZDF.

Local actors resisted foreign models

Pacific-based interviewees also reported that affected governments and actors were often suspicious of and resistant to foreign control over HADR responses. One INGO participant reflected on this, they stated,

> "When the two disasters happened the [affected] governments quickly just shut the door on international assistance. Including the UN coming to play their role…. And it is typical of … how the Pacific handles its business when shit hits the fan. It just shuts itself off, chases everybody out and then tries to deal with the whole thing itself… It closed out the international arm for, I think two weeks, and the international planning is happening in total isolation from the national one and the two were never sitting together until the recovery stage I think, when both countries asked for money."[748]

Several interviewees suggested this separation between national and international structures and actors negatively impacted actors' ability to coordinate with the NZDF.

There was minimal understanding about guidelines

In addition, less than one third of all interviewees had an understanding of the UN Oslo or APC-MADRO Guidelines. Similar figures were reported in both case studies, although the proportion of participants who did report some understanding was higher among the NZDF and GoNZ sector. [749] These low proportions, particularly considering participants were selected for their expertise in Pacific HADR, suggests the Oslo and APC-MADRO guidelines are generally not understood or applied by stakeholders.

Following an explanation of these guidelines, most participants expressed concerns about their relevance and appropriateness in Pacific contexts. This was due to the specific geographical and

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[748] Interview: 14.

[749] Only nine participants reported an understanding of the Oslo guidelines in the TC Pam response and twelve in the TC Winston response. In total the following numbers of participants were aware of the Guidelines in each sector: NZDF and GoNZ (8), International and local humanitarian actors (6), New Zealand Civilian (6), affected governments (2) and affected populations (0). Many interpreted the concept of last resort differently. Some reported the NZDF was used as a last resort due to the lack of logistical support in the region, others felt it was not, but that the concept itself was inappropriate for the Pacific region.

logistical challenges faced in Pacific HADR. These reasons led many to feel the early deployment of foreign militaries and high levels of civil-military coordination were appropriate. In contrast, only 15% of all interviewees believed the Oslo Guidelines and the principle of 'last resort' were suitable. One New Zealand humanitarian explained their reasoning, commenting,

> *"The whole thing of 'last resort.' That clearly is NOT the case in the Pacific and the use of military assets is growing… I think that is problematic…. it makes too many assumptions… There's too much of a… you know, 'everybody loves a kiwi' type thinking. And while [the NZDF] are largely very well respected, I think it's an assumption rather than a tested law… I have heard many times that… we use military as a 'first resort' because they are the only ones that have assets available. Which is clearly untrue… there are various civilian C130's and heavy lift capability in the region. Although it is possibly more EXPEDIENT to use the defence force."*[750]

These findings provide the first analysis of how the Oslo guidelines are viewed by Pacific-based stakeholders. They also reinforce the concerns of Wolf (2017) and Lacey-Hall (2015), including that local actors and affected governments can be resistant to UN mechanisms. Metcalf (2012) and Bollettino's (2016) studies also revealed that the Oslo Guidelines were often misunderstood or not adhered to by actors. Stakeholders may, therefore, want to examine the application of existing guidelines in Pacific HADR and consider developing regional memorandums to regulate civil-military coordination.

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[750] Interview: 56.

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