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MORAL EDUCATION AND 'EQUAL FREEDOM'

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ABSTRACT

For there to be any point in speaking about "moral education" there must be understanding of what it is to make moral decisions; for moral education is concerned with providing the machinery for decision-making in moral contexts.

The decision-procedure which a person adopts allows him to make consistent and appropriate decisions by providing reasons which justify his moral judgement.

In the first part of this thesis the argument is put forward that as morality is essentially a social phenomenon concerned with the way in which people act towards each other it must indicate what desirable behaviour is. Moral judgements, which determine what desirable behaviour is, are guided by the fact that rational men show some respect for each other as persons and have the capacity to universalise the consequences of their actions or appreciate what would occur if others acted as they do. A reasonable assumption to make in considering basic moral principles seems to be that men prefer not to be interfered with. From this assumption the Principle of Equal Freedom is derived - Each person should attribute equal value to the freedom of others as he does to his own freedom. Now in order to avoid interference where this is possible, there have to be means of establishing what other people might want or how they might act in situations where what one person does could affect what someone else can do. Sometimes we can identify ourselves with others and thus appreciate how they feel about a situation but this is not always possible nor appropriate: We therefore attempt to gauge how another is interpreting a situation, in order to gain knowledge of his thoughts and feelings concerning the situation he finds himself in. To have some knowledge of another's feelings and thoughts about a situation involving conflict of interests is essential to the understanding of the principle of equal freedom, however the principle in itself is insufficient, because people's wants and needs vary according to other values. To operate the principle we have to take cognizance of various other principles which might be derived from it. How each person relates particular values to the principle determines his moral code, which outlines how he justifies moral decisions he makes.

The second part of the thesis begins by establishing that formal education is a process which is concerned with passing on skills, ideas and values which society thinks are worthwhile. The passing on of values and how they can be interpreted as functional in guiding behaviour is the concern of moral education. Procedures to be adopted in moral education must relate to what would be considered as the criteria for success in this kind of teaching for there must be some idea of what is hoped to be achieved. The principle of equal freedom encourages understanding of others and offers a base for the establishment of a consistent decision-procedure for making moral judgements. By introducing material which aids pupils to think about and gain understanding of the life-styles of others it is possible to help to develop the means for justifying the moral judgements which have to be made. The thesis concludes with suggestions as to how the educator might encourage understanding of others without in any way interfering with the notions of moral autonomy and freedom of choice.

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Considerable publicity is currently being given to the need for some form of moral education. Some social groups view the subject with a certain amount of suspicion, arguing that "moral education" is merely a formal justification for advancing the cause of the "permissive society", others see its function as something completely different, perhaps arguing that in fact it has, in varying degrees, been part and parcel of formal education systems in Western countries ever since the inception of public education. Before relevant discussion on this subject can take place however there must be some notion of what "morality" is about.

Essentially morality is a social phenomenon - it is concerned with relationships people have with one another in a variety of contexts: It enables a person to decide for himself how he should act in real or imagined situations where his own interests and those of others are involved, by providing him with reasons for justifying a particular choice of action. Where a person is unsure of how he might go about justifying decisions of a moral nature which he is forced to make, his uncertainty will likely be expressed by confusion, or inconsistency in his choice of action.

It is understandable that where confusion exists in morals, decision-making is hardest. It would be logical for a society which operated a formal education system and where there seemed to exist confusion over the interpretation of some situations involving moral judgements, to feel it pertinent to consider how it might go about incorporating within the formal education system, teaching designed to contribute towards providing machinery for decision-making in moral contexts.

Recognition of a need for some kind of moral education however raises the paradoxical problem of the desired acceptability of actions - in terms of society - and the freedom of the individual; for while it might be considered desirable to teach children moral rules and principles it must also be desirable to teach moral autonomy and freedom of choice if education is to be viewed as a learning process which respects each individual's capacity for rational thought.

Last Century and during the early years of the Twentieth Century moral instruction in Western countries was generally based around the acceptance of Christian ethics and the subsequent indisputability of basic principles entailed by such a position. The desired result was the inculcation of certain moral principles and rules, expressed with clarity and expected to be adhered to in all situations, which provided the means for consistent and appropriate decision-making. In the context of formal education the child's acceptance of a moral code

ultimately based on a religious commitment was generally acknowledged to be the responsibility of institutions outside the school. The expressed secular nature of public education precluded the need for moral instruction to be seen as a formal function of the school except in cases where there might be conflict between accepted Christian morality, and values which that form of morality was not interpreted as implying.

It is a fact of course that today many aspects of Christian ethics remain as guidelines for determining appropriate and acceptable moral behaviour, but their acceptance need not be based on particular religious beliefs nor inconsistent with moral autonomy. Moral education is not synonymous with religious education and thus a secular system of education can be maintained which involves the former. (One might also argue that secular education need not be inconsistent with learning about religious beliefs and ideas as opposed to actually participating in activities of a religious nature). It seems likely that moral education, or at least "instruction"¹ in some form or another is an essential ingredient of formal education for the very nature of the activity implies acceptance of a social order which has pursuits considered worthwhile passing on, and that there are acceptable ways of going about the task of attempting to ensure that appropriate learning takes place.

Currently it seems that educators and society alike are prepared to accept, at least to some extent, that schools should engage in some kind of moral education which helps children to understand the nature of moral decision-making, without getting involved with issues of a sectarian or dogmatic nature. Whether or not this is because Western societies appear to be placing less emphasis on the influence of religious ideals is largely a matter of opinion and as such not directly relevant to the case of moral education. Clearly however, in the more affluent societies, higher standards of living and greater sophistication have lead to some changes in attitudes and values and a consequence of this does appear to have been (on the part of some at least) the expression of a certain amount of confusion regarding situations which we might consider to be appropriately termed "moral" (because of the manner in which they involve other people) and about which decisions have to be made: confusion perhaps best being regarded as actions based on judgements where immediate satisfaction is the sole criterion for the choice of action.

If there is to be argument for including moral education within a school curriculum as an intentional activity, a clearly defined basis must be established for enabling relevant material to be introduced: Further, such a basis must surely be of the least contentious nature possible and attempt to define a procedure which will allow consistent and appropriate decision-making and

yet at the same time not exclude the concepts of autonomy and freedom of choice as they relate to each individual. (It is hoped that arguments developed in the first part of this thesis will provide a possible base for moral education, and that arguments put forward in the second part will indicate how such a base can (and does) relate to the realisation of a comprehensive programme for moral education.)

Some writers in the field of educational theory have drawn distinctions between the terms “education” and “instruction” - the latter term usually referring to the development of a particular skill or skills which are necessary for performing a particular operation successfully, while the former refers to a process which involves relating a variety of ideas and skills to a range of tasks which may be practical or theoretical in nature. The distinction is acknowledged and will generally be adhered to throughout this thesis, although it is felt that the terms can be used to express similar sentiments.

PART ONE

CHAPTER II: THE FIELD OF MORAL ENQUIRY

Questions of morality and basically questions about possible actions and choices which have to be made concerning them. The nature of choices made reflects the type of decision procedure which the individual adopts in moral decision-making, for it is what a person does rather than what he says he does which enables others to recognise how he is interpreting situations where choices of action are involved. His method of justifying his choice of action enables him to make consistent and relevant decisions (for him). Moral attitudes a person has or principles he holds must be reflected in the way he acts:

“The fact is . . . that what we may describe as moral attitudes consist in certain patterns of behaviour and that the expression of a moral judgement is an element in the pattern. The moral judgement expresses the attitude in the sense that it contributes to defining it.”

(Ayer, 1965: p238)

“The reason why actions are in a peculiar way revelatory of moral principles is that the function of moral principles is to guide conduct.”

(Hare, 1952: p1)

Decisions of a moral nature lead to actions which can be justified by the individual. In order to justify a choice of action it must be possible to give reasons for that choice. Reasons which are appropriate and relevant to the action might be arrived at in a variety of ways. Ayer (1965) suggests that a common method of providing reasons is to appeal to some kind of moral principle - e.g. “Human life is sacred” - and attempt to show that it applies to the particular case in question. An alternative method would be to try to establish certain facts concerning the nature and repercussions of a particular act - e.g. “Was the act conducive to happiness, suffering etc” - and then allow these to establish the rightness or wrongness of the act. Similarly Dixon (1968: 28-29) asserts that there are two broad value positions which might be adopted: The Traditional View, which “. . . implies the existence of a body of moral propositions which are objectively, even absolutely, validated and which are to be transmitted to the young . . .” - and the Proceduralist Position which “. . . in an attempt to avoid the assumption of moral homogeneity or moral certainty in such a view and conscious of the alleged dangers of moral subjectivism

commits itself to the teaching of moral procedures rather than substantive moral views.”

R. S. Peters (1969) has suggested that it is the feature of reason-giving which distinguishes moral acts from others, for to assert that something is right, good etc, is to presuppose that there are reasons which can be given to support such assertions. Obviously however, to assert that reasons can be given to justify moral acts is to assert virtually nothing unless there is also some way of knowing the kinds of reasons which are relevant for otherwise, any reasons might be given - e.g. to refute the acceptability of corporal punishment by providing the reason that “it makes one turn blue and blue is a horrible colour” - is not sufficient as it would not be a “proper” reason. What then are proper, appropriate or right reasons? And how are we to know? - For it is apparent that while it seems necessary to assert that reasons for value judgements are required it is also necessary to attack the problem of deciding how reasons are to be classified as acceptable or unacceptable. Peters provides an extremely simple solution.

He argues that there must be general agreement over some fundamental principles - for example ‘fairness’, ‘freedom’, ‘Respect for Persons’, etc - they are “. . . justifiable in a way that others are not . . .” and it is from these that other principles are developed. “A small number of fundamental higher order principles are appealed to for justification of lower order moral rules.” Further, such principles are not to be thought of as based on a consensus for validity: The fact that some people do not understand them is irrelevant - Just as it is the case that some people do not understand scientific laws without in any way affecting their validity, so it is with fundamental moral principles.

Now it may well be that “. . . it is difficult to conceive of a society of men in which some rules did not obtain . . .” and that there must be some hierarchical structure of rules or fundamental principles but the assertion of what these principles are or should be is another matter. Many people would not wish to accept moral pronouncements of a legislative nature and while it may be an empirical fact that persons in a particular group adhere to particular principles on most occasions, this is not the same as there being universally accepted principles which hold in all cases. It may be true that reason-giving distinguishes moral acts from others and that to assert that something is “right”, “good”, etc is to presuppose that there are reasons which can be given to support such assertions but it does not follow that there is any principle which will allow us criteria for saying what sorts of reasons are relevant in a particular case.

However if we are to reject the idea of there being a particular hierarchy of moral principles having universal application, it must also be considered unsatisfactory merely to state that moral

attitudes are reflected in certain patterns of behaviour, for without further amplification it might be argued that such a move would lead to the reduction of a moral judgement, in any given case, merely to an individual's rationale for a particular action. And superficially at least, such a view might be seen as worthless in that it could be interpreted as advocating the equating of any individual moral decision relating to a particular situation, to a moral code. In fact, it is for this reason that present day Soviet philosophers dismiss much of the worth of Twentieth Century trends in metaethics. ". . . Soviet philosophers lump together the views of Ayer, Carnap, Stevenson, and Hare, claiming that all of them reduce moral norms and values to the expression of emotions and to the wishes and tastes of the individual . . ." thereby denying . . . " . . . the existence of any objective criterion of morality (and so take away the necessity of moral education) . . ." (DeGeorge, 1969: p137)

If there is to be denial of the need to consider moral autonomy and freedom of choice of action as desirable objectives for a society to adopt it is a straight-forward matter to prescribe principles and rules which must be complied with. On the other hand, if there is recognition of the desire for moral autonomy and freedom of choice, and at this stage it is assumed there is, formulations of moral principles which prescribe how a person is to act must also acknowledge that their rejection need not be incompatible with the acceptance of some kind of moral code.

The question of moral autonomy inevitably leads to acknowledgement of the possibility of individual points of view in regard to morals, for whatever attitudes are generally held, it must always be possible for an individual to accept a contrary position. This being so, there must be questioning as to what it is that "morality" is about: To express the contention that it involves decisions concerning choices of action where there might be some conflict of interests is hardly sufficient to establish the nature of moral discourse, for individual decisions may vary greatly, even where similar circumstances apply - e.g. an intoxicated man may drive his car on one occasion but not on another. What is required is a method of determining how normative argument is to be applied; of knowing what constitutes the field of moral discourse. If the decision to drive in an intoxicated state is a moral one, it cannot be right both to drive and not to drive.

P. W. Taylor (1961) has approached the problem of individual points of view by arguing that the concept of a normative language can be likened to Wittgenstein's analysis of language - ". . . a normative language may be viewed as a set of social practices defined according to certain rules governing the use of language . . ." (p.279) - the rules being (1) those which govern the use of

words expressing value judgements (and in prescribing), and (2) those which govern the use of words in giving reasons for or against value judgements (and prescriptions). The expression of a particular point of view thus becomes the expression of a certain normative discourse." Thus one could not accept that any reason might be considered appropriate in different cases for what a normative language does entail includes "... rules of relevance ... and what makes a language the language of morals are the rules of relevance that determine which verification sentences go with which normative sentences." So criteria for applying a value word are the standards or rules appealed to in evaluating the object. Now it may be that "... value systems may be made up of different standards and rules arranged in different hierarchies of relative precedence: But as long as their validation is carried out in one universe of discourse (cf. rules of relevance and valid inference) then value systems all belong to one point of view." (p.293)

Taylor's schema offers a sound explanation of how moral language might be considered to be the development of a decision procedure for making consistent moral decisions. However it also seems necessary to say something about the characteristics which initially permit us to assume that we are in fact using a moral language. Taylor's analogy of 'normative language' with Wittgenstein's analysis of language is useful in that it provides pointers to what we might conceive of as characteristics of a moral language. Perhaps it is helpful to suggest that normative statements must have something in common which allows us to recognise them in a similar manner to which - to use Wittgenstein's illustration - we might recognise games: viz In spite of diverse and perhaps conflicting rules, games must have some common features which allow us to call them "games", even though we may have difficulty defining what that something is for there are certain characteristics that all games have, in various proportions - e.g. C_1 C_2 C_3 $C(n)$, where C_1 might be - "There are rules that govern the activity," C_2 - "there is the possibility of winning, " C_3 - "It is a pleasant diversion" and so on. Similarly, perhaps there are certain characteristics which moral judgements have, even if these do not appear as specific as those to be found for games: One might suggest; C_1 ' - "They attempt to guide behaviour," C_2 ' - "In the long run they improve the quality of life for the individual," C_3 ' - "They contribute to increased individual freedom" and so on, and by the rules of relevance, valid inference and by verification sentences, we are able to determine the type of judgements which result from our acceptance of a decision procedure related to a particular set of circumstances. Attention must now be turned to the nature of characteristics and the implications that they contain in regard to theories of

conduct; for if one is not to acknowledge the existence of some kind of theory of conduct (i.e. some kind of theory which places moral judgements into consistent patterns of behaviour and thought) then talk of a structure for moral decision making becomes vacuous. It is perhaps true that when we speak of "games" we often do find many diverse characteristics - several of which when they occur in conjunction enable us to identify an activity as a game - but it seems equally true that as far as moral judgements are concerned, characteristics - because they form the basis of reasons which determine the nature of the judgement - must relate to a theory of conduct.

CHAPTER III: THEORIES OF CONDUCT

UNIVERSALISABILITY AND LIBERALISM

Initially the question of conduct might be approached from either one of two points of view: Firstly - Self-Interest (sometimes referred to as ethical egoism), and Secondly - Universalisability - Acting to others as one would have them act to oneself.

In regard to the first point of view, while the expression of self-interest might appear equivalent to "doing whatever one wishes to do", this need not necessarily be the case, for such a maxim might relate to long-term interest as well as those of a more immediate nature - e.g. Stealing may satisfy an immediate need but the long term consequences of such an action might do far less to promote one's own satisfaction. Again, such a view need not necessarily mean that no individual should help another - for to do so might in fact be to promote one's own long term interest. However it is not possible to defend self-interested behaviour on the basis of a universal principle without leading to inconsistency for the principle becomes internally inconsistent as soon as it is accepted that everyone should maximise his own advantage without regard to anyone else's.

The basic difficulty with Ethical Egoism is that it is a purely individual doctrine and it has already been asserted that morality is essentially a social phenomenon; its concern being with human relationships both in terms of attitudes, ideas and actions. Moral attitudes are not innate¹ - they are developed as a result of the need to communicate with and react to others. It seems then that the development of any moral code must have relevance for one's relationships with others both in terms of actual performance and what we might judge to be desired performance and this leads to the second basic issue in regard to theories of conduct.

Discussion on the holding of moral attitudes or opinions and the manner in which these determine one's behaviour inevitably raises questions concerning the scope or influence of individual opinions in regard to others. This issue poses a central problem for all forms of ethical enquiry - i.e. Are moral utterances to be thought of as individual in character or are they to be thought of as having universal application? Does "I ought to do X" mean only that, or is it also intended to mean "One ought to do X"? If this latter view - the denial of private moral views - is not held one is of course left only with the alternative of ethical egoism which has been rejected as untenable because of inconsistency.

Perhaps the most influential account of the principle of universalisability has been Kant's formulation - "I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law" (Kant - cf. Paton (1965) p.70) - and while such a principle might be attacked because it presupposes that it is possible to universalise all actions, its greatest difficulty is that it assumes that it is always desirable to do so; that moral rules must always apply to everyone at all times where situations are identical, whereas there may be occasions on which one would feel bound to waive particular rules, thus negating the universal nature of those rules. The problem however can be overcome by making qualifications which are also universal - e.g. "It is wrong to take the life of another except where to do so would be vital to the protection of one's own life (or others' lives)."

The question of qualifying rules is necessary to any discussion on universalisability for while one might feel that it is desirable to argue that universalisability is a logical criterion for distinguishing moral judgements from other types of judgements there may be occasions on which, in order to conform with certain ideals, it might be necessary to disregard certain rules - e.g. The pauper responsible for a starving family who steals an unwanted loaf of bread. In such a case it seems that we would be bound to accept a hierarchy of rules in which some took precedence over others, similar to Peters' argument for the existence of fundamental principles. That such a situation may be the case however does not in any way refute the view that moral judgements are universalisable for it is in the nature of a qualification (a universal one) to a rule rather than the expression of a contradiction. Thus, in the case of the pauper, and all cases where identical conditions apply, stealing may be "right".

In support of universalisability, Hare (1963: Part One) argues strongly that as moral judgements have descriptive meaning and that by definition descriptive judgements are universalisable, moral judgements are universalisable.

Although universalisability seems to be an appropriate criterion for distinguishing a moral judgement from other types of judgements it is also true that many people wish to hold liberal views concerning other people's behaviour and moral codes, recognising that people do in fact appraise seemingly identical situations differently, but consistently with their own beliefs. Thus people who are tolerant of others might add a rider to their particular moral code, expressing the sentiment that:

"Everyone ought to do what he thinks he ought to do" - a view sometimes called the "Principle of Moral Non-dogmatism".

It is generally accepted in ethics that "ought" implies "can" - i.e. what one ought to do depends on what one can do (to do what is right or wrong assumes that one knows what is right and what is wrong) - it can never be a person's duty to do what he cannot. Therefore it can only be a man's duty to do what he thinks he ought to do, as opposed to what he "really" ought to do.

But Cohen (1967; p250) argues that such a position - i.e. moral non-dogmatism - is paradoxical, for it is a principle of toleration and toleration of intolerance is self-destructive: For example, to believe that one had the right to speak out against an oppressive regime would also be to acknowledge that the rulers of the regime had the right to deny that right and thus accept that what the oppressors ought to do is deny the same possibility to the agitator. Often it may be possible to qualify principles and thus avoid inconsistency but it also seems likely that there would be some principles which one would not wish to compromise by adding qualifications - for example:

"one ought not to organise or set about committing genocide" - that is, there could be occasions on which the principle of respect for other people's moral views would become insignificant because of the over-riding importance of another principle. For example; A person may hold a principle - "People ought to fight to defend their country", and also hold the principle of moral non-dogmatism - i.e. It is inconsistent to hold both that it is right to fight for one's country and that (for some) it is wrong to fight for one's country, Such inconsistency arising from holding both a principle of moral non-dogmatism and another moral principle on which there is disagreement.

Now while it may seem reasonable to tolerate beliefs which are contrary to one's own it is something quite different to hold a principle which ". . . not merely permits but demands behaviour that, according to other moral notions of the holder of the principle, is wrong." (p.253)

Thus, Cohen argues that as the paradox stands it becomes logically inevitable that there is dogmatism in morals: The proposition "Everyone ought to do what he thinks he ought to do" becoming "Everyone ought to do what I think he ought to do."

It has already been said however that in fact people do often wish to hold liberal attitudes towards the interpretation of moral principles even though it seems that moral non-dogmatism is incompatible with the view that moral principles are universalisable.

“When we hold a moral view, we are prepared to offer a reason why some type of action is right. To say that there is a reason is to say that in every relevantly similar case there would be a reason . . . if we were to add to any moral principle the qualification that anyone disagreeing with it may quite rightly act otherwise and is, in fact, actually obliged to do so, there would be no moral principles left.”

(Grover (1973) p.109)

Sturch (1970) however has argued for the principle of toleration - “Tolerance need not be incompatible with the holding of moral opinions” (p.125) - it is the case that principles of moral non-dogmatism and tolerance are appropriate only when we are uncertain about moral principles. However both moral non-dogmatism and tolerance presuppose that we maintain moral principles: And both tolerance and moral non-dogmatism assume certain levels of moral disagreement. (Moral non-dogmatism of course attempts to eliminate this by implying that dissenters who act on their own principles are in fact doing precisely what they ought to do.) Tolerance is appropriate only when others are doing what we consider to be wrong and yet we refrain from interfering with them and this is different from moral non-dogmatism which holds that dissenters who act on principle are not wrong - and thus would not need to be tolerated. Moral non-dogmatism has been shown to be inconsistent but “. . . tolerance can be justified in a variety of ways and its justification does not depend on our acceptance of moral non-dogmatism . . .” (Grover, (1973) p.110) thus there need not be any inconsistency in liberalism.

¹ Recent research in the field of language acquisition suggests that there might be some reason to suppose that there may be “innate predispositions” which a child brings to the language learning situation - cf. Chomsky (1965), Lenneberg (1964) etc - and perhaps this is an issue which could be applied to the development of basic moral attitudes although in the absence of any research of a behavioural nature in this regard, it must remain as nothing more than idle speculation.

CHAPTER IV: 'RESPECT FOR PERSONS'

"Discussions about the rightness of rules do not take place in a social vacuum. They occur when people are worried about rules because somebody's claims are being neglected or somebody's interests damaged or disregarded."

(Benn & Peters, 1959: p.32)

A consequence of liberalism (or tolerance) is that there must be some respect for the right of others to hold views which may be different from one's own. In accepting liberalism all notices of infallibility must be rejected and this need not be inconsistent with universalisability - that is, universalisability does not presuppose infallibility, for although one might maintain a dogmatic approach to morals, one might still concede that particular principles could be wrongly held if convincing evidence were produced to support a contrary opinion. To accept that others may hold views which are different from one's own is to show some kind of respect for them as individuals capable of rational thought: "For if we are prepared to attend seriously to what another person has to say, whatever his personal or social attributes, we must have at least a minimal respect for him as a source of argument." (Benn & Peters, 1959: p.32) Respect for persons however is more involved than just this for it is implied by the fact that rational beings interact with each other as persons. Indeed, it would seem impossible to deny that as a rational, social being, man must adhere to some notion or principle of respect for others, regardless of how such a principle might manifest itself - to do otherwise would be to deny man the status of "rational being" - cf. extreme cases of slavery.

E.E. Harris (1966: p.124) maintains that as a social being man exhibits a rational capacity, which operates in social situations to result in self-discipline and social co-operation. A rational man, by virtue of his rationality, feels obligated to do what is in the ultimate interests of all, and as a rational being, must have a concept of a person, and therefore respect others and himself as such: A person being "... a self-conscious, self-objectifying, rational being in a sense of which sees 'reason' as a constructive organising principle of thought, not simply as an abstracting instrument of analysis in the service of the passions" - 'Reason', he argues, being the leader and guide of the passions. A "person" then is anyone with at least the potentiality of human rational and moral development, or one to whom such potentiality can be attributed.

P. F. Strawson (1961) has defined a moral situation as “. . . one in which there is reciprocal acknowledgement of one’s rights and duties.” He suggests that while it is likely that there will be occasions when there may be conflict between one’s own interest and the interests of others, we can appeal to “Respect for Persons” on such occasions as a fundamental principle. This view of course is similar to the whole concept of universalisability and indicates that some notion of “Respect for Persons” is entailed by universalisability.

However to establish “Respect for Persons” as a fundamental principle at this juncture would be premature. Certainly universalisability and the assumed function of man as rational activity suggest that there could be reason to suppose that there is something very basic about the concept of “Respect for Persons”, but to introduce it as a fundamental principle without further consideration would be to expose oneself to the criticism that moral systems are non-cognitive for their value assumptions must simply be accepted - i.e. they cannot be rationally justified.

Hare (1952) argues that moral principles cannot be justified by an appeal to fact or to self-evidence, they are justified by reference to the affects of observing them - by their consequences:

“. . . to justify a decision completely, we have to give a complete specification of the way of life of which it is a part . . . If the inquirer still goes on asking ‘But why should I live like that?’ then there is no further answer to give him, because we have already, ex hypothesi, said everything that could be included in this further answer. We can only ask him to make up his mind which way he ought to live; for in the end everything rests upon such a decision of principle. He has to decide whether to accept that way of life or not; if he accepts it, then we can proceed to justify the decisions that are based upon it; if he does not accept it, then let him accept some other, and try to live by it.”

(Hare, 1952: p.69)

In anticipation of the criticism that this reduces ultimate decisions to those which are basically of a purely arbitrary nature, Hare indicates that there is a difference between designating ultimate decisions as ‘rational’ and designating them ‘arbitrary’:

“To describe such ultimate decisions as arbitrary, because ex hypothesi everything which could be used to justify them has already been included in the decision, would be like saying that a complete description of the universe was utterly unfounded, because no complete

further fact could be called upon in corroboration of it. This is not how we use the words “arbitrary” and “unfounded”. Far from being arbitrary, such a decision would be the most well-founded of decisions, because it would be based upon a consideration of everything upon which it could possibly be founded.”

(Hare 1952: p.69)

Thus ultimate decisions are made only after reflection, after giving careful consideration to what, to the best of a person’s knowledge, the facts are, and in the light of what experience teaches are the results of living by one moral principle as compared to another, they are not in the same class as ultimate decisions made impulsively.

* * * * *

It now becomes pertinent to endeavour to establish some kind of principle which requires minimal understanding of the function of man and yet allows us to incorporate the notions of liberalism and respect for persons as part of a theory of conduct, for it is ultimately our notion of a theory of conduct which determines our own moral code.

CHAPTER V: EQUAL FREEDOM

In consideration of the question "Are there any natural rights?" H. L. A. Hart, in an article published in 1955, argued that if there were to be any moral rights at all there would have to be at least one natural right - "The right of all men to be free".

To say that a man is free is that on all occasions, except those on which special conditions consistent with the right to be free apply, any man capable of choice "... (i) has the right to forbearance on the part of all others from the use of coercion or restraint against him save to hinder coercion or restraint and (ii) is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no obligation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons." (Hart, 1955; p.175)

His reasons for describing the equal right of all men to be free as a natural one were; "... (1) The right is one which all men have if they are capable of choice; they have it qua men and not only if they are members of some society or stand in some special relation to each other, (2) This right is not created or conferred by men's voluntary action; other moral rights are ..." - except for those which are "... particular exemplifications of the right of all men to be free." (Hart, 1955: p.176)

The problem with the argument developed however is that it establishes only that moral rights imply the natural right of all men to be free and therefore if there are no moral rights there need not be the natural right of all men to be free, for in essence the argument only asserts that any claim for the existence of moral rights presupposes recognition that interference with another's freedom requires moral justification.

It does seem however that the right of an individual to freedom regarding choice of action in all cases (except where that right itself may be jeopardized in relation to others and where right derived from that right are applicable) need not be expressed only in this form; for freedom of choice in itself might be regarded as desirable whether or not there are moral rights.

At the very last one might say that there are occasions on which all rational men desire non-interference from others and if there are to be occasions on which men's choice of action is not interfered with there must be at least occasions on which men are free to choose what they may do. Now it has already been asserted that a rational man feels obligated to do what is in the ultimate interests of all. He is committed to self-discipline and social co-operation and by adopting universalisability as a criterion for making a moral judgement he must ascribe freedom

of choice not only to his own actions but also to those of others.

Lansing Pollock (1973: p.234) has summarised the argument thus:

1. A person is free when he is not interfered with.
2. Each person values non-interference.
3. Each person values his own freedom.
4. Each person has the same reason for valuing his own freedom, i.e. he does not want others to prevent him from doing what he wants to do.
5. If R is a sufficient condition for making a particular value judgement and R applies to other S's, then we must make the same judgement about other S's.
6. Each person must attribute equal value to the freedom of others.

The purpose of the argument is to “. . . combine the formal requirement of universalisability with a substantive value assumption which each person must accept.” (p.242)

Now as it is the function of man to act rationally (6) above - “Each person must attribute equal value to the freedom of others” - becomes a moral principle - “The Principle of Equal Freedom”.

From the Principle of Equal Freedom particular value systems may be built for it is certainly likely that there will be occasions on which the principle itself will not be able to be consistently applied - e.g. where two people desire a particular object which they cannot both have but which it would be absurd for both to go without when one could have it. On such occasions there must be some method of determining which person, if either, has claim to it, or which should get it if each have equal claims. Initially a value system allows us to rank certain wants ahead of others - e.g. if a husband and a wife each want the car, one to attend a football match and the other to visit a sick relative, it must be possible to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion. However this need not be inconsistent with the principle of equal freedom for “. . . we can consistently maintain that certain kinds of wants differ in value, not because of who has them, but because of the nature of the wants” (p.247) - e.g. a want which relates to momentary pleasure is likely to be less important than one relating to survival.

Social living is made possible by the existence of some framework of moral rules and these should respect the value of each person's freedom. When we are considering the content of a proposed moral rule we must consider: (1) Whether the rule is inimical to social living - If it is it must be rejected as morality would have no point if this was the case, (2) Whether or not it represents the equal value of each person's freedom.

To be in a position to respect the freedom of others, on some occasions at least, we must be able to appreciate their particular wants and/or the manner in which they view particular situations; for to not do so we might, even unintentionally, infringe on their freedom when, by understanding their interpretation of events, this could have been avoided: For example, to fly model aeroplanes at a park adjacent to a church during a Sunday service might unintentionally interfere with another's opportunity for unhindered, corporate worship. By flying the planes a little later, if this were convenient, one could avoid the possibility of interfering with another's freedom. In spite of the trivial nature of this example it does seem to indicate that however we may develop our own value systems there is some obligation on our part to consider, as far as this is possible, how other people may interpret situations and the types of value systems which they might apply on occasions where our interests and theirs are likely to conflict or even come in contact.

Reasons for justifying moral decisions are based on an interpretation of human relationships which involves some understanding of the value each person places on his and others' freedom and the right to non-interference (unless this can be justified on grounds relating to the nature of various wants and values) if the principle of equal freedom is adopted. Further, the principle of equal freedom entails that individuals should be treated as ends in themselves, never as means, for to treat a person as other than an end in himself would be to deny the requirement of universalisability that each person must accept (in adopting the principle of equal freedom). Recognition of the need to treat others as ends in themselves allows us to establish basic rules for personal relationships. Harris (1966), for example, has suggested:

1. Each and every person should be regarded as worthy of sympathetic consideration, and be so treated.
2. No person should be regarded as a possession of another, be used as an instrument or treated as an obstacle to another's satisfaction.
3. Persons are not, and should not be treated as mere expendables in any situation.

In terms of the argument developed so far it is clear that if we are to speak of a person as morally educated (i.e. having established notions of how he believes he and others should behave) we are considering one who has accepted that moral justification entails respect for other people by adherence to the principle of equal freedom. To be in a position to adopt this view of morality a person must be able to formulate ideas about others' behaviour and attitudes - i.e. he must have some understanding of the manner in which they interpret situations and consider how

they should act: Understanding others involves attempting to deduce others' interpretations of, and feelings for a situation. In order to deduce something of the nature of interpretations others are making concerning situations, one has to be able to gain, or attempt to gain, knowledge of a variety of factors regarding the actions (or possible actions) of others. In this respect Wilson (1967, 1970, 1973) has identified what he calls "moral components" - These are required before we can say that a person is morally educated. There are four major moral components, each of which may be sub-divided. The major categories are:

PHIL . . . the degree to which we can identify with other people, which includes, having the concept of a "person" (language-users to whom we can correctly ascribe such terms as "will", "emotion", "intention", "purpose" and "consciousness"); Claiming to use this concept in an overriding, prescriptive and universalised principle: Having feelings which support this principle, either of a "duty-orientated" or "person-orientated" kind.

EMP . . . the awareness or insight into one's own and others' feelings - the ability to know what those feelings are and describe them correctly: Having the concepts of various emotions: being able, in practice, to identify emotions etc in oneself, when the emotions are at a conscious level, and when the emotions are at an unconscious level; Also when these occur in other people both at a conscious level and an unconscious level.

GIG . . . the mastery of factual knowledge: "To make correct moral decisions, PHIL and EMP are not sufficient: One also needs to have reasonable idea of what consequences one's actions will have, and this is not entirely a matter of EMP." (1967) - Knowing facts relevant to moral decisions, knowing sources of facts, Knowing how - ". . . a skill element in dealing with moral situations, as evinced in verbal (and non-verbal) communication with others," (1973) - all these are necessary for mastery of factual knowledge.

KRAT ". . . factors required (a) to use the other components, (b) to translate consequent moral judgement into action." (1970)

(Wilson stresses that these components are not psychological entities - e.g. factors, forces,

mechanisms, innate abilities etc, and when we say that a person has or lacks PHIL, EMP etc we are concerning ourselves with questions of a general form, we are not stating why this is so.)

CHAPTER VI: CHOOSING TO ACT

The formulation of basic moral components which a person must have if he is to be considered morally educated provides an outline of the type of knowledge which is required by him if he is to respect the abilities, thoughts and feelings of others which is, on occasions, entailed by adoption of the principle of equal freedom. The next step is to consider how we might go about obtaining such knowledge - at least in those situations where it will be required of us to do so in order to avoid interfering with or upsetting the thoughts actions etc of others except where to not do so would be to ignore other considerations derived from the basic principle. It is not always easy to simply "identify" with another person or even assume that we have some knowledge of how he is interpreting a situation unless we first make some kind of assessment of how we consider he is interpreting a situation in which he finds himself.

If we are to acknowledge that there are some occasions on which it is necessary for us to consider how another person is interpreting a situation - in order to comply with the principle of equal freedom - we must assume that on occasions at least, individuals have choices of action open to them, for if this were not so and we were always to know how another person would act, the principle of equal freedom would be apointless one for any interference which occurred in another's affairs would be unavoidable on the part of the agent.¹

Now to assume that a person has choices of action open to him is also to assume that choices will be made: Even to not act at all is itself a means of exercising choice. The choice of action he makes will be determined either by what he sees as reasons for acting or by decisions which appear purely arbitrary in nature (i.e. he did not have any reasons for so acting) - e.g. "Why did you kick that stone then?" - "I don't know, I just did."²

Earlier it was argued that the feature of moral judgements which enables us to distinguish them from other acts is that of reason-giving: That is, to use the words "right", "good", "bad", etc is to presuppose that we can give reasons to support the claims we are making. Thus on occasions where moral judgements are involved it must be possible to give an appropriate justification for a choice of action made. When, therefore, we are considering how another person might behave, in a context where a moral judgement is required, we can assume that reasons can be given for choosing one action in preference to another (others), by him, just as in our case we can give reasons for our choice of action.

The question of what it is to say that there are reasons for an action is one which has received

considerable attention by writers to recent editions of several leading philosophical journals - e.g. "Mind", Aristotelian Society Publications, "Philosophical Review", "Australasian Journal of Philosophy", etc. The importance of the problem is that it lies at the heart of all issues dealing with morality. If we can argue that there are reasons³ for an action and that these refer to the act itself we can assert that there is some kind of causal relationship between an act and the reasons for doing that act. On the other hand, if we reject that reasons can be given for acting in a particular way then what he does then we are close to denying the existence of free-will and thus the need for morality - i.e. to assert that I can never give reasons for selecting particular courses of action is to eliminate all notions of choice. Determinism would clearly have far-reaching consequences for morality and as a doctrine applicable to ordinary living must, at the very least, be considered unrealistic, for even if it is asserted that all acts are pre-determined it is straight out not sure that we can always know the consequences of an action in advance (even if it is argued that this is only because we lack all relevant knowledge concerning the act and its consequences.) We do, therefore, make considered choices.

Now there will be times when a reason for us acting in a particular way (or not acting in a particular way) will be the account we take of the consequences our act is likely to have on others, for this is necessary if we are to adhere to a principle which universalises the idea of non-interference. In considering the consequences of our actions for others, there will be some occasions where it will be necessary for us to make predictions about the way other people might behave (or think they should behave) in given situations. It is this issue which must now be our concern - i.e. those occasions when our choice of action is influenced by how we assume others are assessing particular situations.

What then is involved in our attempting to perceive the causes of another's behaviour, or at least, assessing what another might do in a particular set of circumstances? Clearly, elements of prediction are involved, for to avoid interfering with another (where this is possible and desirable) we must be able to have some understanding of how he will decide on a particular course of action. It seems that there are influences of two distinct types which determine how a person will act in a particular situation: (i) Rational Thought - the influence of reason; i.e. the way in which a person cogitates on the various factors involved in making a decision about a course of action: (ii) Feeling States - the influence of emotions experienced at the time of making the decision. Frequently, perhaps in the majority of cases where there are likely to be consequences affecting others, decisions are likely to be made with both rational thought and feelings influencing, in

varying degrees, the ultimate choice of action. (NB. This should not be interpreted as an argument for some kind of contest between “reason” and “passion” where the stronger over-rides the weaker, although there will likely be occasions when feeling states over-ride rational considerations and vice versa.) Of the two the most complex, from the point of view of prediction, is emotional states for there are some problems in endeavouring to establish what it is that determines an emotional state; In this regard an attempt will be made to show that when we are concerning ourselves with the feelings of others we can look for reasons for their emotional states.

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Before considering these two influences which determine the way in which a person acts, there are certain types of actions which do not properly relate to either of these influences but which should not be ignored in our analysis. These are actions which we might describe as “instinctive” or “immediately reflexive”.

Instinctive Actions There are some actions which are carried out by agents which are not in any way premeditated by the agent, involving neither rational thought processes nor emotional states. All such actions seem to relate to basic biological needs - viz a human being's propensity for survival: For example, the ravenous man who tears at unknown food without a thought for the effects it might have on his system, the drowning man who propels himself to a dangling rope even though he has not, apparently, acquired the ability to swim. Initially one might wish to refer to all such actions as the result of an uncontrollable, innate desire for survival. There are also actions however which are not premeditated but which occur as direct and immediate responses to particular stimuli, which are not usually referred to as “instinctive” actions but “reflex” actions for they do not relate to the desire for survival - e.g. the patient's response to the doctor's tap on the knee. Often it is asserted that instinctive behaviour is unlearned behaviour. However it seems that although certain behaviour (which we might sometimes want to call “instinctive” behaviour) may not be imitated nor learned by practice, it may be subject to learning in another way - conditioning. Certainly there are occasions on which people respond to stimuli with actions which appear instinctive even though they may be partly attributable to learned behaviour; behaviour perhaps developed by the influence of rational thought and/or emotional responses to other situations - e.g. the mother who sees her small child about to tug on the cord of an electric

jug may rush to the child and grab her/him without in any way premeditating the act. (In such a situation an adult may respond differently from a small child.) It is possible that we would want to say that the mother's response was "instinctive" and yet agree that at some stage reasoning had to occur regarding the effects of a jug of boiling water landing on the head of a small child. Perhaps we could distinguish between "instinctive" acts and "conditioned responses" - the former being determined by an uncontrollable and innate desire for survival and the latter based on accumulated knowledge relating to certain specific kinds of situations where immediate action is required to prevent dire consequences; Although it remains debatable whether such a distinction is required for the "conditioned responses" we are speaking of are unpremeditated acts which relate to desires for preservation of life, avoidance of injury etc as do "instinctive" actions.

To argue that situations such as these are examples of sudden, impulsive actions where reasons for acting are not even considered is not to argue that we cannot find reasons for them. On many occasions where instinctive acts are involved - e.g. the drowning man who suddenly starts swimming even though he has apparently never learned how - it may be possible to formulate perfectly good reasons for explaining why a person acted as he did, merely by considering the situation in which the action occurred. Perhaps one might also suggest that emotions could have been involved in making the decision to act - e.g. the cause of the drowning man swimming was fear he experienced at the prospect of drowning. Obviously one could get involved in complex argument here but what must not be overlooked is that it is not whether or not reasons could be found or emotions experienced for all types of action but whether or not they always are. The point of isolating instinctive behaviour is that at times people react to situations in such a way as to make others assume that certain responses are automatic and thus know to avoid providing stimuli (or encourage stimuli) which will cause a particular response - e.g. one does not go about punching people in the stomach as one assumes that this will make them double up in pain. Although an agent may not be aware of what he is about to do, there may be occasions on which it is important for observers to predict how a person might act in a situation - predicting behaviour might be vital at times where human life is in danger. Take the example of the drowning man: We might assume in planning a rescue that he will make certain kinds of responses, even though he may not be fully conscious - he will reach to the rope, life belt etc - and his action, in the circumstances which prevail might be purely instinctive. The only way in which we can make an assumption about how a person might behave under conditions of stress is

to understand the relevant factors involved and attempt to predict how he might behave even though his behaviour may not be based on rational thought processes or particular feelings he may have.

Before concluding this section we should perhaps consider briefly another type of action which does not apparently relate to influences of rational thought nor passion (or both); these we might call "aimless actions" - those carried out on a seemingly random basis and of a trivial nature - e.g. kicking stones, clicking a pen, drumming one's fingers on a desk etc. Usually such actions have no significant consequences, although they may; a stone may hit something, drumming fingers may affect another activity requiring the absence of extraneous sound. (That there may be psychological explanations for such activities is not of importance here.) Such actions of course cannot be predicted with any certainty other perhaps than past observations - "If Jones is at a desk he will click his pen and tap his fingers on the desk" . . . While we cannot predict such actions we can usually be fairly sure that if the activity is pointed out to the agent as one which is disturbing to others, he will probably cease it without feeling in any way that he has been interfered with - especially if there are reasons indicating why he should stop it.

¹ Even a person who adopts the determinist viewpoint is unable to predict human behaviour accurately, even if he does explain that this is because he was not in possession of all relevant data when the event was about to occur.

² The fact that no reason is given need not mean that there is no reason to give - in the example above one might perhaps add, ". . . because it was in front of me I suppose . . ." - but that the act was in no way premeditated.

³ When we are speaking of "reasons" another may have for carrying out an action we are using the word fairly loosely for in some contexts when we speak of "reasons" we might equally speak of "motives", "desires", or even "choices" - "You made a good choice" etc.

CHAPTER VII: PREDICTING BEHAVIOUR

THE INFLUENCE OF RATIONAL THOUGHT

Often the way in which a person comes to interpret a situation is determined by rational thought processes - that is, by considering all the information that appears to him to be relevant to making a particular decision and determining from it the best course of action to follow. Reasons which enable him to make his choice may be either 'basic' or 'prudential': Basic reasons being those which relate to particular wants and/or desires (usually of an immediate nature) and relate to conditions relevant to the situation under consideration; Prudential reasons being those which relate to the agent's long term interests. In many respects choosing to act as the result of finding reasons for acting is akin to the notion of problem-solving; one is given a set of circumstances and asked to make a decision regarding them - e.g. determining the best method of retrieving an object that has been lodged in an apparently inaccessible place, deciding whether it is best to visit sick relatives or repair a leaking roof etc. As examples get more complex of course, it is not difficult to presume that emotional factors might become involved, e.g. feelings of frustration at not retrieving the object, one's attachment (or lack of it) to sick relatives etc.

Obviously, on occasions on which we consider it is necessary to attempt to predict what others may do or feel, we will be required to consider the attention they are giving to a particular set of circumstances and assess how they are interpreting relevant information. To attempt to do this it seems that we must take into account a variety of factors, only some of which may be applicable in specific cases. Generally it might be helpful to consider the following:

(i) The Beliefs and Values which an Individual Holds. On many occasions we might have very little idea of many of the specific values a person holds to, but often we can attempt certain assumptions - e.g. we might assume that a man who is a policeman would have respect for another's property, that a vicar or priest would not condone polygamy etc - by considering information about him which we know might be relevant. This factor is very important for to pursue an activity which is likely to affect drastically another's beliefs is something to be avoided unless it can be shown that to do otherwise would be to impose on oneself constraints of an arbitrary nature (taking into account of course that the arbitrary nature of the constraints must be universalisable) or that to do otherwise would be to compromise other principles one held

which were of greater significance for the interpretation of a moral code based on the principle of equal freedom. For example to appear in church in a fig-leaf to obtain money from a friend who had dared one to carry out the act would surely be to interfere with the beliefs of some members of the congregation at least, however to appear in church at the request of the minister conducting the service, to illustrate a point about sin, poverty etc might be considered acceptable even if it did interfere with the beliefs of some members of the congregation.

(ii) Physical factors which may be relevant to a person's reasoning for acting in a particular way. Obviously, where it is appropriate, a person's choice of action will be partly influenced by his own capacity for physical action, the physical capacities of others and physical conditions which relate to the environment which comes under the scope of the situation under consideration. For example, an elderly man who cannot swim very effectively is unlikely to attempt to rescue a drowning child if there are a number of other people on the beach nearer to the potential source of tragedy than he is. Of course he may call out to others but his decision not to attempt the rescue himself would be greatly influenced by his own physical condition, that of others, and his distance from the event in question. For us of course, in the terms of this example, it would be pertinent to recognise the man's predicament and attempt the rescue ourselves or at least offer what assistance we considered ourselves capable of.

(iii) Resources available and how these may be distributed or utilized. Usually the manner in which a person employs resources available in a particular situation will be largely determined by the beliefs and values he holds - e.g. how a man distributes his money will likely depend on what he interprets his and others' needs to be. However before he can be in a position to distribute or utilize resources he must recognise that they are available to him.

(iv) The Influence of Other Opinions. In some situations a person may consider what he would regard to be the reasoning some other person may adopt if he were in that situation, or he may take into account the ideas which he knows another person holds. He may even be influenced by something he has read or something he has heard which seems to him to be relevant to the choice of action he may make.

(v) Lessons from Past Experience. Not all people are likely to assess the consequences of an act in the same way. A factor influencing an assessment of the consequences of an act must be the experience the person concerned has had in making decisions of a similar nature on other occasions.

(vi) Finally, the individual's capacity for rational thought must affect decisions made. Some

people will be very good at assessing what consequences an action they carry out will have, while others may find this very difficult: On occasions we might assume that their difficulty may be ascribed to a lesser capacity for rational thought regarding such matters. This is not to suggest that people can be classified according to their "reasoning ability" but that on some occasions at least, we do make assumptions about how quickly or decisively people make up their minds.

These six factors then seem to be the most basic factors involved when people use reasoning to determine a course of action. Perhaps in some situations we would have to acknowledge the presence of other factors although it seems that most likely considerations have been covered by this analysis. To envisage a situation where it might be necessary for us to attempt to understand the thoughts of another, consider the following example: We are faced with a situation where we can succour two people requiring our help: On the one hand we can offer food to a miserable beggar who is in desperate need of it; on the other hand, further down the road there is a small boy who has fallen off his bike, his wounds are not really serious but they are causing him considerable discomfort. We cannot attend to the needs of both, for the beggar is disappearing down the road and we will have to run after him if we are to give him the food which we have and which he so desperately needs. We notice however that Mr X is about to turn into the street, he has seen neither the beggar nor the small boy. We do know however that he is a voluntary member of the St. John Ambulance Brigade, that he is nearer to the boy than the beggar, that he usually carries a mini-first-aid-kit with him, that he knows others would help the boy if they were in the situation he is in, that he has had previous experience in dealing with situations involving the administration of first-aid and that he has the reasoning ability to relate all these factors: We therefore assume that he will help the distressed boy and after making this assumption immediately run off after the beggar with the food we have. The example illustrates how our assessment of another's thoughts may influence our choice of action. One might suggest that a further influence could be involved in our decision - the feelings we had towards the beggar and the small boy. This might well have been so, but it need not; our decision could have been based solely on an acknowledgement of the needs of the beggar and the small boy and the manner in which we considered Mr X would assess the situation. Of course, in the event, Mr X may not have seen the boy, he might have ignored him or laughed at time etc but obviously we did not feel we were in a position to wait and see what Mr X would do.

Finally it might appear that a very complicated form of analysis is being advocated for assessing the thoughts of others. This need not be so for we only indulge in this kind of

speculation when we are concerned about the consequences of our actions in the terms of what others might do. Assessments need not be in the form of complicated, hypothetical arguments - they can be brief and pertinent assessments of how others might reason in given situations.

CHAPTER VIII: PREDICTING BEHAVIOUR

THE INFLUENCE OF EMOTIONAL STATES

It has been suggested that at times our actions are determined by the way in which we consider others will act. This requires us to predict, as best we are able, the manner in which others view particular situations and thus sometimes involves us in making assessments about their feelings. Actions based on decisions made by a person who is influenced by particular feeling states, are likely to present difficulty for us when it comes to attempting to predict them, for to appraise the influence of an emotional state we must appreciate the circumstances which have given rise to the emotional response and this may prove a complex task. As great difficulty in attempting to predict behaviour is likely to arise when decisions are made involving emotional states, it is important that we clarify exactly what we understand by "emotional states" and that our explication of the term includes a satisfactory analysis of what might be meant by "object of an emotion" and "cause of an emotion", for if we can have an idea of the development of "emotional states" we should be in a position to understand better the influences which may be involved when a person is about to make a decision leading to a possible action.

The term "emotion" may not be the easiest to define precisely, however its meaning clearly revolves around some idea of feeling - The Concise Oxford Dictionary (1960: p.390) defines "emotion" as "... Agitation of mind, feeling; excited mental state." And while it may not be difficult to associate the word "emotion" with "feeling" it is necessary to determine the kinds of feelings to which "emotion" might be used to refer; there is a difference between feeling angry and having the 'flu. Infact, behavioural scientists (Landis and McCleary, 1970) have emphasized the importance of the following distinctive characteristics of emotional states:

1. Subjective feelings of pleasantness or unpleasantness,
2. External reactions - e.g. facial expressions, gestures etc,
3. Internal reactions - e.g. changes in blood pressure, sweating etc.
4. Over-all effects of emotional states on an individual's behaviour.

Thus the emotional state of a person, to an observer, may or may not be immediately or easily apparent. So if we are to be in a position to appreciate the emotional state, or likely emotional state of a person, it seems that on many occasions we will have to go beyond an evaluation of observed characteristics and look for reasons for the occurrence of that observed state be it actual, probable, or possible. Now in order to look for reasons for the occurrence of an emotional state

we must consider the circumstances from which the response originated - or, as some writers have suggested (e.g. A. Kenny), identify the object and cause of the emotion. It is certain that there are occasions on which we could make such an identification - "i was annoyed with Jones because he hit me" - but it is equally certain that on other occasions confusion will arise if we adhere strictly to the object-cause notion for (1) we cannot always identify objects of emotion (in some cases we may even wish to say there aren't any) - "I'm happy because I'm laughing" - and (2) If we do say that there is an object X there are times when we will be confronted with difficulties when we come to distinguish it from the cause - e.g. "I was frightened when I saw the bull". The most significant point however seems to be that when we are considering an emotional state we are in fact concerning ourselves with an individual's particular interpretation of a set of circumstances: Thus to say "Smith was angry when Jones hit him" is of little help in aiding our ability to appreciate Smith's anger unless we assume that Smith considered Jones' action unjustified, of inappropriate severity etc. To appreciate an emotional state then we must not only look for circumstances of origin (objects and/or causes) but explain these in terms of the manner in which they have given rise to beliefs which have determined the emotional response. It seems then that in attempting to appreciate emotional responses we are looking for the reasons which have determined the response.

Before going further at this point it seems necessary to consider examples of the types of occasions on which utterances reporting emotional states might occur¹ and to tie such an analysis in with our argument that reasons rather than causes and objects are necessary for us if we are to attempt to appreciate another's emotional state. Consider the following examples:

1. A reports - "... I experienced a sinking feeling in my stomach."
2. B reports - "... I was angry when Jones disagreed with me."
3. C reports - "... I was so drunk last night that I thought that anything anyone said about me was a real compliment."
4. D reports - "... I feel ecstatic, I don't know why, I just do."

The first example has been provided because of the fact that it appears to describe some kind of physiological function, the second because it appears to be a straight-forward case of an emotional response to a situation, the third because it seems to indicate a situation in which although responses had appeared to have been caused by a remark - i.e. a comment which may have been positive, negative or neutral - they had actually been caused by the fact that C had consumed too much alcohol, and the last because it seems to indicate a situation in which

although responses have occurred there seems to have been no reason for the particular emotion.

Let us consider the report made by A - "... I experienced a sinking feeling in my stomach . . ."

Some writers - for example R. G. Oliver (1973: p.16) - have attempted to equate such feelings with 'sensations' - "... We must attempt to make a clear distinction between 'sensations', which are felt as 'twinges', 'sinkings', 'tickles', 'flushes', and 'throbs', and those events which we call 'emotions'." Kenny (1963: p.55) makes a similar distinction, "... to feel sexual pleasure is not necessarily to feel pleased about anything, but to feel pleasure at a compliment is to feel pleased by it. To feel a pain in one's toe is not necessarily to feel pained by anything, but to feel pain at a friend's treachery is to feel pained about it. In each case we have, on the one hand, a sensation, and on the other an emotion." The straight-forward nature of these examples seems to rest on the uses made of the words "pleasure" and "pain". In the first instance the words are used to refer to physical states whereas on the second occasion on which they are used they refer to psychological states. As it has been established the "emotion" refers to a psychological state - which may or may not be accompanied by internal or external reactions, it seems a legitimate move to class feelings involving physical states in a separate category to those we wish to call "emotions". In making such a move however it should be pointed out that while we may speak of physical states we need not necessarily be associating those states with an actual condition: For instance Oliver (1973: p.17) cites the example of a soldier who might feel his toe itching or burning after he has lost his leg. The feeling he has may or may not relate to a particular emotional state but clearly it, in itself, is not an emotional state. Thus a distinction between "sensations" and "emotions" appears necessary. In accepting such a view however it must be emphasized that there will be cases where the dividing line between "sensation" and "emotion" will be thin indeed, were we not prepared to accept an area of intersection between the two categories. The example (1) indicates this for it must be presumed that the sinking feeling which A experienced was in response to some kind of stimulus - physical or mental - and had that stimulus not occurred A could not have experienced the feeling he did. Furthermore it seems likely A's expression was designed to indicate an emotional state (especially if no physical stimulus was involved) - an emotional state which would become apparent to us were we to know the stimulus which prompted that particular response.

The second statement, that made by B - "... I was angry when Jones disagreed with me . . ." could perhaps be considered as having the paradigmatic form of an emotional statement - viz "B

ϕ d because p". A particular situation has been elucidated - "Jones disagreed with me" - which in turn has led to the reporting of an emotional response. We can understand that an emotional response has occurred and appreciate the reason for that response.

The third statement, C - ". . . I was drunk last night that I thought that anything anyone said about me was a real compliment . . ." differs from the first two in that it provides the account of a situation in which a particular response has been interpreted as having been attributable to different stimuli when considered on different occasions: That is, on the previous night C considered that any remark which was passed about him was cause for him to feel flattered whereas, on reflection, he considered that the reasons for his feeling flattered were not linked to remarks made but to his intoxicated state, thus:

At T¹ - "C ϕ d because p"

At T² - "C ϕ d because q"

The difference occurs according to the interpretation made by the individual concerning the circumstances under consideration, although the emotion remains, viz "feeling flattered". It is in this respect that one feels that distinctions between objects and causes of emotions break down. Kenny for example has used the same example to indicate the distinction between the cause and object of an emotion - Kenny (1963: p.75) ". . . I feel elated because I have just been complimented' suggests that I believe that I have just been complimented; whereas I may feel elated because I am drunk, though I may not know that I am drunk and may boldly contradict anyone who suggests that I am drunk. My compliment is the object, and my being drunk a cause, of my elation." But surely there is something odd about this, for such an argument admits of an emotional reaction - being elated - but suggests that my being elated may have been caused by my being drunk whereas in fact had I not been drunk the compliment may or may not have been sufficient reason for me to respond with elation. In this case, is it sensible to speak of an object and a cause when there may have been no relation between the compliment and my being drunk, as I may have reacted with the same emotional response to a negative comment merely because I was drunk? It seems a far safer bet to refer to this as:

At T¹ - "C ϕ d because p"

At T² - "C ϕ d because q"

(While admitting the possibility of,

At T - "C ϕ d because both p and q")

That is, the reasons for (cause of) my elation was dependent on my interpretation of the events

at T^1 and T^2 but in each case the emotion I felt was the same - elation - although different reasons were given at different times.

Perhaps this example is compounded by the subjective nature of the statement - i.e. If I am drunk I am probably not in a position to evaluate the true merit of a compliment, and when I am sober, I am reflecting on a situation in which my interpretation of events may or may not be accurate because of my condition at the time. Consider the example then using the third person to refer to another's behaviour:

i. "If I compliment x, he will be elated."

ii. "If I compliment x, he will be elated because he is drunk."

Obviously i. is the form (or will be in terms of x),

"x ϕ d because p"

- That is, a stimulus-response situation has been described; e.g. I know that if certain compliments are made about x he will offer profuse thanks, his eyes will light up and he will generally show pleasure. On the other hand, if I compliment x and know that he will be elated because he is drunk, I am claiming to know that if x gets drunk then he will be in a peculiar state whereby when compliments are made to him he will show elation which he would not otherwise show or even feel. Thus my saying that x will be elated in (ii) assumes that when x is drunk he is predisposed, under certain conditions, to displaying/feeling particular emotions, and if we are to separate the object of a person's emotion from its cause according to that person's predisposition we would have to say in (i) x reacted with elation because he was predisposed to do so (cause) when the appropriate object (compliment) was present (occurred). But surely it is in order for x to say "... that remark of yours caused me much happiness . . ." (And in ii. the fact that x is drunk may affect his emotional state but it need not, in itself, cause it.) It might be argued however that there are occasions where it would be relevant to make a distinction between "cause" and "object" of an emotion - perhaps in cases where a person's emotional state occurs as the result of his inter-action with a concrete or living object - e.g. the tennis player who throws away the ball. Again, in cases such as this the distinction is not helpful for it is not the ball which is the object of the emotion (this could be - disgust at inefficiency) rather we might call it a "means of expressing emotion". Thus although we may not wish to accept that "object" and "cause" are synonymous in this context, a clear distinction between the two seems to be of limited value to a person attempting to appreciate another's emotional state - it being better to refer to the reasons for an emotional state. (It should follow from comments made in

consideration of the fourth example that it might be very difficult to know what could actually be meant by the "object" of an emotion - Many writers who do use the term e.g. Kenny, Oliver, in fact acknowledge that there are emotions that do not have "objects". By using "reasons" we have a more comprehensive term covering meanings previously given to "objects" and "causes" of emotions for when we speak of "reasons" we are acknowledging that the emotional response is governed by the peculiar way in which circumstances are interpreted and that because of this a single object may cause different emotions on different occasions.)

Attention will now be turned to the fourth example: D - "... I feel ecstatic, I don't know why, I just do ..." It has already been suggested that this statement seems to indicate a situation in which although an emotional state appears to have occurred there seems to have been no reason for the particular emotion. It might be supposed that the statement made by D is not a denial of there being reasons for his emotional state - but only that he is unable to identify them: If such were the case we might be able to help him but on the other hand he may be absolutely certain that there are no reasons for his emotional state. Now it has been established that while all emotional states are feeling states, not all feeling states arise from emotional responses - i.e. There may be many occasions when a person may regard himself as being "normal" - a neutral feeling state - further it has been suggested that emotions are subjective feelings of pleasantness or unpleasantness: It seems likely therefore that when a person is experiencing emotion he is experiencing a feeling state - e.g. happiness - for which there is a correspondingly opposite - e.g. sorrow. Thus to report an emotional state for which there appears to be no reasons is also to report that one is not in a position to experience the correspondingly opposite state to that originally reported:

"Happiness is all the unhappiness we don't have." At the very least we can say to D "... the reasons for your feeling ecstatic is that there are no reasons for your feeling lugubrious ..." Perhaps it might be thought that D could refute this claim, arguing that indeed he did have reasons for sorrow, but to this we would reply that if such were the case he would not feel ecstatic, or at least that he would not feel ecstatic alone.²

Consideration of the last three reported examples - the first it will be remembered dealt with "sensations" rather than "emotions" - has indicated that a fruitful line of approach concerning the problem of what gives rise to emotions could be to argue that reasons can be found for every emotional state. However to simply assert that reasons can be given is of little value unless we establish some sort of criteria for determining whether or not reasons given are the right ones - or

at least relevant ones, for the subjective nature of the field may preclude the possibility of reasons being "right".

When considering possible reasons for an emotional state it is clear that we are concerning ourselves with the interaction of an individual with his environment. It is thus necessary to reflect on the way in which the individual sees situations which he is confronted with. Dearden (1968: p.81) puts the point thus "... emotions are linked to objects and states of affairs which are seen in a certain evaluative light ..." and he argues that there is a logical relationship between the way in which one sees a situation and the manner in which one evaluates it "... the link between what we feel and the evaluative light in which we see the situation is not just a contingent but a logical one. I logically could not feel certain emotions unless I saw the situation in an appropriate light: Thus "... perception and evaluation are a necessary part of emotion." In a similar move Hirst and Peters (1970: p.49) suggest that the connection between states of mind and feeling is a conceptual one and that the "cognitive core" of an emotion cannot be separated from the feelings which are also involved. (cf also Pitcher, 1965). Thus, if I feel happy it is because I see a situation as reason for rejoicing; if I feel sorrow it is because something or someone has grieved me. It is then, the individual's interpretation of a situation which determines how he reacts emotionally (if he does so at all) - That is, the reasons for an emotional response are based on the manner in which a person interprets (or evaluates) particular circumstances at a given time. But what, it must now be asked, is involved when we speak of a person interpreting, or evaluating a situation in such a way that he reacts with emotion - whether this is observable or not?

Green (1971) makes two important points which suggest an approach which could be fruitful in attempting to answer this question. Firstly, Green considers "belief"³ - he argues that characteristic beliefs are logically involved in having emotion - e.g. A man must believe that another has suffered some undeserved misfortune before he can feel pity for him; - and Secondly, he examines the possibility of relating an emotion to the desire or wish for some form of action to be taken relevant to that emotion.

In regard to the first point, no one would want to deny that in fact certain beliefs often are involved in having particular emotions, although one might wish to question that the relationship is a logical one - i.e. that it exists in all cases. A person might be afraid for instance, even though no danger is anticipated: An elderly lady may fear the presence of a male intruder even though she knows it would be impossible for such an event to occur because all entrances have been secured and burglar alarms installed in every room, and indeed if she were asked if it

would be possible for anyone to enter without her knowledge she may reply with certainty that it would not. After all it is generally acknowledged that there are irrational fears, phobias etc. Could we not say that such fears are based on non-existent situations (perhaps admitted by the subject)? Not really, for in such cases we would want to say that the person is afraid because his behaviour is appropriate to anticipating danger even though he knows there is no danger; If he thought (believed) there was no danger then we couldn't say he was afraid. Our elderly lady could only feel afraid if she believed in the possibility of there being an intruder about even though she was certain all possible entrances had been secured.⁴ An antagonist might concede that in cases such as these, fear has been shown to have been based in imagined situations, but still wish to pursue the problem further, for instance could not a person feel afraid without knowing what he was afraid of? - "I just feel scared, I don't know why." The problem of course has already been provided with a solution: The fact that one feels afraid at the very least indicates that one has not got reason to believe one is absolutely safe. Thus we might conclude that characteristic beliefs are logically involved in having an emotion and that if reasons for an emotional state are to count (be relevant) then they must relate to a belief which is necessarily involved in having that emotion.

Regarding the second point, it is often that we can appreciate the reasons for a person's emotion by considering his behaviour for they have resulted in the desire to respond with some appropriate action. On other occasions it might be quite impossible to do so, although this need not mean that he may wish or desire to express his emotion in a peculiar way. Green (1971) argues:

"... Although a person who has an emotion may fail to engage in purposive behaviour characteristic of the emotion, either because no purposive behaviour is characteristic of the emotion or because of some reason particular to the case, it is reasonable to suppose that the person must nonetheless have some desire or wish for some form of action relevant to the emotion which he has..." (p.27)

(Indeed one might perhaps go further and suggest that there is a sense in which every emotional state involves desire of some kind if it merely be because of the fact that emotions are by definition either unpleasant or pleasant and that if we have a choice we desire pleasant feeling states rather than those which are unpleasant unless of course making such a choice leads to

compromising principles which we might hold: If the reasons for my emotion result in unpleasant feelings I would wish that they had been such that my emotional state be otherwise, while if they result in my having pleasant feelings I would not wish for affairs to be otherwise.)

If the analysis of these two points is accepted as valid, and it seems reasonable to do so, it can be asserted that relevant reasons for an emotional state must be based on the belief a person has regarding a particular set of circumstances and his wish or desire for related action.

We are now in a position to relate our findings to the problem of how we can assess (or anticipate) other people's feelings when they are experiencing emotion. Earlier it was argued that it is more appropriate (at least to an observer) to think of there being reasons for an emotional state than to think in terms of objects and causes. The distinction was made because reasons "justify" emotional states - they answer the question "why"? - whereas "objects" answer the question "what"? and as such are of very limited value in aiding our interpretation of events if they are not themselves the substance of reasons for an emotional state. If I am angry because I have been struck by another, the actual impact of the blow, which may have caused a degree of pain contributing to my anger, would not, in itself, be said to have caused my emotional state, rather it would be that the blow formed the substance of the reasons (the manner in which I interpret the action of my aggressor) for my anger. Of emotions then it must be said that if we are to appreciate how another person may feel(s) we must understand that particular circumstances have led that person to find in them reasons for an emotional response because of the belief and desire that person has regarding them. Now as the reasons for a person's emotion depends on his interpretation of events the only way we can appreciate his feelings is to consider the way in which he is likely to appraise (interpret) situations and

"... the matter of working out how other people appraise a situation ... will depend either on our being able to assume a common set of relevant values and beliefs or on the knowledge we have of the values and beliefs which constitute the other person's form of life ..."

Oliver (1973: p.31)

Obviously there are no hard and fast rules for our knowing how we are to appreciate the manner in which others appraise situations but we must be aware of the fact that others' feelings depend on how they evaluate situations and that their response is determined by their beliefs and desires regarding those circumstances which are summarised by the reasons for their response.

¹ To use examples we must think of reports of emotional states although it is obvious that on many occasions on which a person feels an emotion he will not report it, thus to appreciate it we have to try to find reasons for it.

² It would be possible to argue that an individual could experience pleasant and unpleasant emotions simultaneously - for example, a fighter who has just won a semi-final bout may feel much pleasure in having won his way through to the final and yet at the same time experience fear, for he knows that in the final he will have to face a fighter who will surely beat him soundly, giving him such punishment that he will not recover for months: In a case of this nature of course we would say that the two states are unrelated in that there are different reasons for each of them - i.e. pleasant = winning the semi-final, unpleasant = having to face a superior fighter. Whether we would agree that one may hold these feelings simultaneously is another problem and need not concern us here.

³ The word 'belief' being used in its "widest" sense: i.e. to include occasions when we might equally speak of "... seeing, thinking, assuming, knowing, feeling, suspecting ..."

⁴ Perhaps this introduces an odd account of the knowledge/belief question - i.e. if sure belief is a part of knowledge then we are asserting both belief (in an intruder) and non-belief (knowledge that there cannot be an intruder) on the part of our lady. This issue will be passed over here, although it seems legitimate to point out that in fact people often do have irrational fears - fears that they themselves acknowledge to be irrational at times. In such cases it is probable that we would want to say that although there appeared to be a situation in which a person had conflicting beliefs, in fact they did not occur simultaneously - our old lady might acknowledge her fears to be irrational in the morning when she recounts them to us but during the night she perhaps actually did doubt that entry without her knowledge was impossible.

CHAPTER IX: THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL FREEDOM AND "MORAL CODES"

It has been established that the principle of equal freedom is compatible with acceptance of the function of man as "rational activity" and acknowledgement of the need to see "universalisability" as a theory of conduct. It has also been argued that acceptance of the principle requires us, on occasions, to appraise how other people might act when confronted with circumstances of a particular nature as this may be a reason for determining how we will act (or not act). We make an appraisal by considering how another is interpreting a situation, giving regard to how he might think and feel about the situation in which he finds himself. Nothing specific however has yet been said about how the principle might contribute to the formulation of moral codes. As we have acknowledged that it is desirable to promote freedom of choice and moral autonomy in moral decision-making it seems important to conclude this section by considering briefly what adherence to "equal freedom" entails in regard to other principles or values. The principle in itself is hardly sufficient for it does not allow us to discriminate between those situations where interference to someone may be unavoidable and those in which it could be avoided but to do so would be to compromise other values which one wanted to hold (consistently with "equal freedom"): That is, it does not help us to classify the relative importance of various wants and desires where resources (time, skills etc) available may be limited.

It may have been noted that some examples given earlier have assumed that there are certain values which are held in addition to the principle of equal freedom and yet which at times might appear to be in conflict with it - The example given on page 44 assumes that it is desirable to give aid to those in need whereas by so doing one might actually be considered to be interfering with their freedom.¹

If we are to accept that the principle alone is insufficient we must consider what else is required for the formulation of moral codes, without removing the concepts of freedom of choice and moral autonomy.

Criteria (cf: p.27) for considering the establishment of a moral rule have been given as: (1) Is the rule inimical to social living? - If it is it must be rejected as morality would have no point if this were the case; (2) Does it respect the value of each person's freedom?

It has been shown that if we are to adopt the principle of equal freedom we must have some

respect for others as persons. To do this adequately we must be prepared to consider their beliefs and attitudes towards situations where there might possibly be conflict of interests - even if "respect" is only interpreted as "tolerance". However if we speak of "respect for others", "tolerance", "freedom to pursue activities without interference" (where this does not conflict with the principle in other ways) it seems that we are close to arguing that there are certain rights which people have. If we are to agree that non-interference is the right of all men then it must apply equally to all men and all men must acknowledge it as a basic right. However because resources are often scarce, time is limited, skills are not developed to the same degree in all individuals etc, it is certain that there will be occasions where there will be conflict of interests. It seems therefore that the values that people adopt must take account of these considerations and attempt to ensure that the right to non-interference is infringed upon as infrequently as possible.

Consider the following as possible principles or rules:

1. Respect for the Beliefs, Opinions and "Life Styles" of Others.
2. Honesty and Truth-telling.
3. Fairness - The Sharing of Resources and Respect for Resources allotted to Others.
4. Consideration of the Wants and Needs of Others.

In arguing that these are principles which might legitimately be established from the Principle of Equal Freedom, let us also consider what would apply if they were not accepted as necessary in some form for consistency in acting in accordance with the principle.

1. Respect for the Beliefs, Opinions and "Life Styles Of Others": If we were to disregard the beliefs and opinions of others we could not hold to the principle of equal freedom, for to disregard them would be to assume that when questions arose regarding non-interference the views held by another need not be applicable at all and this would be to deny the requirement of universalisability which has been argued for. Similarly if we define "life-style" as the manner in which a person lives and we were to deny that there was any need to give consideration to how other people live, we would be party to the same inconsistency. Thus it seems legitimate to argue that respect for the beliefs, opinions and life-styles of others must form the basis of principle which is implied by the Principle of Equal freedom. (In times of war, disaster etc restrictions may be made to certain freedoms - e.g. freedom of speech. On such occasions one would either have to argue that restrictions were being maintained to preserve the principle in the long term - a somewhat dubious argument - or that equal freedom was no longer being regarded as a fundamental principle.)

2. Honesty and Truth-telling: If no one ever told the truth or was honest, the world would be comparatively uncomplicated place, just as it would if everyone was always honest and always told the truth. However difficulties arise when we acknowledge that in fact people often do not hold consistently to these notions. If one does not attempt to apply consistent standards of honesty and truth-telling one is complicating prediction of action by misleading another, and if this were universalised (i.e. - On some occasions at least we should go about deliberately misleading others) the Principle of Equal Freedom, while perhaps not being contradicted, becomes virtually useless, for how can we go about attempting to avoid interfering with another if he is misleading us about what he wants, or is going to do?² There are of course occasions when truth-telling is not important and perhaps even occasions where it might be desirable - e.g. an impossible promise a man has required on his death bed - but when what we say affects our own interests and those of others, truth-telling is important for the operation of the Principle of Equal Freedom.
3. Fairness - the sharing of resources and respect for resources allotted to others: Earlier it was suggested that, because of scarcity of resources it may not always be possible for all persons who desire particular objects or the opportunity to pursue certain courses of action, to be able to gain what they desire, in such cases problems of distribution must inevitably occur. If however we are applying a principle of equal freedom we must surely be obliged to see that in such circumstances minimum interference occurs: to do this we must avoid, as far as this

is possible, disputes which might occur over resources or individual desires for particular actions. There must be some way of distributing resources so that as far as possible all people have at least the possibility of sharing in resources or following pursuits which might have to be restricted. (This should not be viewed as arguing for equal shares for all however, for other considerations may be relevant - viz needs; for example, a manual worker may require more food than a "white collar" worker because of the type of work he does, a person who carries responsibility in his job or who brings special skills to it may be rewarded for his expertise etc) - but there must exist some notion of what it is to treat people equally (fairly). Consider what might happen if the converse applied: If there was no concept of fairness or sharing, a person might demand all that he desired for himself even when that which he desired belonged (or had been entrusted to) another, and expect to obtain it. That is, he would have to go about interfering with another's property (affairs) in order to pursue his own ends for to not do so

would be to show respect for the property of others which is a principle based on the right to non-interference: he therefore could not reject notions of fairness and respect for property and consistently hold a principle based on non-interference. (This of course is not to deny that by pursuing a course of bargaining one might encourage a person to change his mind about possession of some object or property, although it does assume that the bargaining procedure adopted will not be one which infringes on another's right to non-interference, which would of course be contrary to the Principle of Equal Freedom.)

4. Consideration of the wants and needs of others: To reject the notion that one should show consideration for others, where conflicting interests are involved, is surely to reject a principle which entails a universalised notion of non-interference: If one were always to ignore what another wanted one could not consistently hold the principle of equal freedom because to do so one would have to reject consideration of the desire of others for non-interference.

Often however by "consideration of others" we mean more than this, for it is sometimes taken to mean that in certain situations - e.g. distress - we are required to act in a relevant manner - e.g. provide succour etc. It is more difficult to establish that this can be drawn for a principle of equal freedom for it is not really consistent with non-interference. It seems however that on such occasions we make the assumptions that our help is required and desired therefore we cannot be said to be interfering: We consider what we would want others to do to us in the situation we find another in and conclude that we should act accordingly - it is a case of accepting universalisability as part of moral decision-making.

Finally it should be emphasized that it has not been intended to show that the four principles outlined above are necessarily derived from the principle of equal freedom. It does seem however that without their acceptance there would be little practical meaning to the principle. It also seems that without these four principles the establishment of a moral code³ derived from acceptance of the principle of equal freedom would be meaningless in practical terms for it would give rise to inconsistent behaviour. From the point of view of society it is principles such as these which enable it to establish the rights each individual has and so develop rules (laws) which must be observed if the ultimate principle of equal freedom is to operate alongside the particular value system (in relation to needs and wants) that society has formulated.

Whatever else one may wish to argue about the principle of equal freedom it does provide a basis on which to establish a moral code: Further it is in fact consistent with the manner in which many people do appear to act on most occasions on which they are confronted with situations where there may be conflict of interests.

¹ On the other hand, to refuse succour might be considered to be contrary to showing respect for the desires and needs of others.

² Of course he may wish to mislead us for he is afraid that if he does not do so his privacy may be interfered with and if he feels this, it is an expression of his concern for his right to non-interference and in this way he may justify his action consistently with the principle of equal freedom provided that he accepts that what he has chosen to do is something he would wish all others in similar situations to his own, to do.

³ The manner in which rules derived from the principle of equal freedom are interpreted as applying to specific situations determines each individual's criteria for making moral judgements - i.e. his moral code.

PART TWO

CHAPTER X: THE CASE FOR MORAL EDUCATION IN SCHOOLS

As soon as a young child enters primary school he is confronted with a variety of rules and norms which indicate to him how he is expected to behave, and there are various sanctions (by no means always imposed by teachers) which ensure that he quickly adapts to the environment he finds himself in. Such rules - e.g. telling the truth, fairness, respect for property etc - have probably been introduced to him during his pre-school experiences and his ability to adapt to the impositions they make on him will partly depend on the extent to which he has encountered the need to conform to rules, norms etc in his early experiences. Rules, together with a variety of norms and mores seem to be part and parcel of school life. However in a society which at least pays "lip service" to the notions of moral autonomy and freedom of choice it is essential that any rules which operate be capable of justification and that the reasons given for their existence be able to be understood and/or disputed if they are found to be of an arbitrary or ineffectual nature. How then is it that schools can justify insistence on conformity in regard to certain types of behaviour? Initially, the simple answer might be given that rules are necessary to maintain order where comparatively large groups of people (children) are congregated for some purpose. However although there may be some validity in such an answer it can hardly be regarded as sufficient for it in turn poses a range of questions of greater significance: viz "Why should people (children) be required to congregate?", "What sort of justification can there be for placing them in a situation where it is necessary to maintain order?", "When they are placed in such situations what are they expected to do?", "Who is entitled to expect things of them?", "If they do not wish to participate are they given the opportunity to opt out?", "If they are not, what sort of justification is given for demanding that they co-operate in the activity?" etc, etc.

Questions such as these are important for it is the answers given that determine what goes on in schools and if we are to attempt to examine the case for moral education in schools we must consider what the purpose of education is.

What is "Education"?

Often it is assumed that "education" refers to something which is confined to schools. David Stenhouse (1972) has pointed out that the term "education" usually identifies with "... the process of instruction and training that goes on in an institution of learning, in a school." (p.35)

He argues that while education has something to do with learning, not all learning is under the control of man, thus when we speak of "education" we are referring to "... that part of learning which in one sense or another is under the control of men, with the degree of control varying according to circumstances." (p.37) Now as circumstances vary so too does the kind of education involved. He suggest that basically there are three kinds of education:

1. Milieu Education - "There is the kind of learning that takes place almost automatically" - e.g. we live in houses, we eat certain foods etc. These are some folkways and mores which society deliberately attempts to maintain in succeeding generations: "... but since the process can be trusted to go on more or less automatically as a by-product of ordinary living, the deliberate element is not always apparent. We call this milieu education . . ." (p.38)

2. Informal Education - There are situations where learning takes place with conscious intent but where the learning is entriely subsidiary to a desired end or activity - e.g. instruction given by a football coach, some learning which takes place in the home etc.

3. Formal Education - "Finally there is formal education in which the intent to teach or train, or both, is clear and where an institution is designed to devote itself primarily to this task." (p.38)

We think of "education" as "... the process or product of a deliberate attempt to fashion experience by the direction and control of learning. Formal education refers to the process as it is carried on in schools." (p.39) (NB At times agencies other than schools may engage in formal education: Again they may reinforce learning which has taken place in schools or they may interfere with it.)

The distinctions between the three kinds of education should not necessarily be considered as relating to certain institutions only - e.g. within the framework of the school one might find instances of each of the three, for the school, while its prime function might be formal education, is also a community which conforms to the folkways and mores of society.

Having acknowledged that "education" need not be thought of as a process which must be confined to schools or other institutions concerned almost exclusively with learning in a formal sense it should be pointed out that for the remainder of this chapter the term will usually be applied to the third category - formal education - as it is this use of the word that gives relevance to arguments which are later to be produced in regard to moral education in schools.

Early attempts to define the field of education were, in the main, confined to descriptive aims and objectives which outlined what schools should be doing rather than considering "education" as a process involving social (and ethical) assumptions which provide answers to the question why

schools should exist to educate at all.

As with other intellectual disciplines of a theoretical nature, certain works in the field of educational theory stand out; many would be relevant to a study such as this were space to permit their consideration, however having regard to the fact that defining "education" is not the central issue of this thesis only three will be mentioned.

Dewey (1916 a, 1916 b) in his various influential publications argued

that (1) Education was life - not merely a preparation for it, (2) Education was growth and as growth growth was considered a continuing process so was education, (3) Education was a continuous reconstruction of accumulated experience, (4) Education was to be considered a social process (and thus the school needed to be a democratic community). Much of the criticism which was levelled at Dewey was centred around argument that his approach to education tended to be more applicable to what we might call "socialization"¹ although it is doubtful whether he actually intended such an interpretation. A more concise and lucid attempt at outlining educational aims was made by Whitehead (1929) with his call for education to be concerned with producing men of "... culture and expert knowledge ..." where "knowledge" was to consist of ideas which might be utilized and tested. This well-known formulation, while rejecting the inculcation of "inert ideas" (dead knowledge), gave approval to the learning of theoretical and cultural ideas which could be thought of as increasing the individual's awareness and understanding of his environment and the world. More recently, R. S. Peters (1965 etc) has argued for the need for "education" to relate to processes which develop desirable states of mind: Being "educated" implies "(a) caring about what is worth-while and (b) being brought to care about it and to possess the relevant knowledge or skill in a way that involves at least minimum understanding and voluntariness ..." He also emphasizes "... the value of what is passed on and the manner in which it is assimilated. (This concerns the cognitive aspect of the content of education)." Thus, for Peters, an educated man "... is not one who merely possesses specialized skills ..." but who "... has developed the capacity to reason, to justify his beliefs and conduct. He knows the reason why of things as that certain things are the case ..." and "... This is not a matter of just being knowledgeable; for the understanding of an educated person transforms how he sees things. It makes a difference to the level of life which he enjoys; for he has a backing for his beliefs and conduct and organizes his experiences in terms of systematic schemes ..." Also, his understanding is not narrowly specialized for not only has he "... breadth

of understanding but (he) is also capable of connecting up . . . different ways of interpreting his experience so that he achieves some kind of cognitive perspective." (Peters, 1973: p.240)

What, however, are we to consider is worthwhile? How is the educator to go about deciding on the content of education in order to achieve what is considered to be its purpose?

Peters (1966: Chapter V) is inclined to the view that there are some pursuits which are qualitatively superior to others - e.g. science, art etc. "The question . . . is whether anything general can be said about the character of such activities and whether any good reason can be given why they should be regarded as more worthwhile than others." (p.147) The educator's task is to select activities which have certain characteristics rather than others. ". . . particular activities can be appraised because of the standards immanent in them rather than because of what they lead to." (p.155) The basic method of determining such activities is to consider their "cognitive concern" - they are serious activities and deal with the explanation, assessment, and illumination of the different facets of life. Activities such as science, philosophy and history have this special sort of "cognitive concern" built into them. "They can be, and to a large extent are, pursued for the sake of values intrinsic to them rather than for the sake of extrinsic ends." (p.160) "The point . . . about activities such as science, philosophy and history is that, although they are like games in that they are disinterested activities which can be pursued at set times and places, they can never be hived off and confined to such times and places. A person who has pursued them systematically develops conceptual schemes and forms of appraisal which transforms everything else that he does." (p.160) Thus, he argues that if a person is to ask the question "Why do this rather than that?" then just because certain activities have this special sort of cognitive concern built into them the answer is simple - "The sorts of inquiries are all, in their different ways, relevant to answering the sort of question he is asking." And again, if a person is to ask the question "Why do this rather than that?" he must be prepared to consider any form of inquiry which might throw light on the question he is asking. And because such activities are involved in asking as well as answering the question they cannot be thought of as purely instrumental for they can be pursued for their own sake. From this argument Peters considers it possible to examine the range of activities which are thought to be worth passing on (apart from their purely utilitarian or vocational value), justifying their inclusion in a school programme according to whether or not they are intrinsically as well as instrumentally desirable.

The argument presents a number of difficulties and various criticisms have been made of it - e.g. P.S. Wilson (1967), J. P. Powell (1970). From a logical point of view it is clearly circular - viz To ask the question "Why do this rather than that?" is to be committed to the worthwhile nature of cognitive activities and believe that reasons can be given as justification, so an appropriate

answer can only be one which is appropriate to the question asked. (We have no indication of how we are to go about deciding the sorts of reasons which might determine an appropriate answer.)

A further problem seems to arise when we are confronted with, on the one hand, the wishes and desires of the individual, and on the other, the wishes and desires of "the public" - for Peters (1967) has claimed that he is attempting to unearth public presuppositions, not personal preferences. But how is one to go about unearthing public presuppositions which are not personal preferences - i.e. Who are "the public"? One is tempted to suspect that justification in the final analysis comes down to a consensus of "right-thinking people". Powell (1970) attacks Peters, claiming that he (Peters) is really concerned with justifying that which he already finds acceptable. He asserts that "... the entire argument purports to be a justification of curriculum activities arrived at independently of what currently feature in the curricula of educational institutions, yet the acceptability of the status quo is assumed throughout the argument." (p.56)

The whole problem of Peters' argument is in many respects similar to that encountered by Dewey, even if arguments presented by the former are somewhat more sophisticated: In the case of Peters there is the problem of trying to justify the worthwhile nature of certain activities independent of what many people may actually desire: In Dewey's case there was the problem of justifying the inclusion of some activities which need not necessarily be part of the socialization process - e.g. art, music. At no stage however did Dewey attempt to establish a transcendental type of argument; Peters has. Dewey clearly appreciated that it would be a pointless exercise to view education as a phenomenon within a social vacuum. Peters' argument highlights the difficulties (perhaps the futility) of justifying intellectual pursuits which have no apparent utilitarian or vocational value, unless cognizance is to be taken of the values society has. When we are considering what education is about we are concerning ourselves with the actual (and ideal) living conditions of society and the relationships members of society have with each other: And in order to do this we must have recourse to all the various ethical positions held by society's members and be able to see them in relation to each other - i.e. we must be able to identify the contribution various principles and rules make to maintaining a social order, or reshaping it.

"... Beliefs, knowledge of facts and general values provide the grounds on which judgements of educational principle are made and it is by reference to these that we give reasons for what we advocate."

P. H. Hirst (1966: p.35)

It thus becomes clear that no system of education can operate without reference to some kind of moral or ethical structure - i.e. value system. The values a society has enable each individual to recognise his role (or roles he could have or aspire to) in society and understand his function. In each society there are of course certain tasks to perform and these often require specific skills which might be referred to as those of a utilitarian or vocational nature. Usually the learning of such skills forms an important part of educational programmes - e.g. girls learning to type, boys learning woodwork (one might include in this category elementary aspects of written language, reading, arithmetic etc). There are too those activities which can enrich the lives of those who participate in them - e.g. art, literature, music - such activities are often included in programmes because it is considered the right of all to at least be introduced to subjects which may or may not be pursued later. With certain activities - e.g. intellectual pursuits - it may be more difficult to establish their universality: Bantock (1965) has suggested that as the sort of education given by a society depends on the particular type of civilization and the stage of social and intellectual development it has reached, it is legitimate to recognise academic education in societies which have reached a stage where people can be released from the more concrete concepts of food-hunting etc for the more abstract mental learning tasks. And from this line of argument he attempts to justify certain forms of learning which may not be appropriate for all members of society.² Whatever curricular decisions are made reflect the way in which society functions and even where changes are advocated they must reflect corresponding changes in society: "... If the past decade has taught us anything, it is that educational reform confined only to the schools and not to society at large is doomed to eventual triviality." (J.S. Bruner, 1972: p.99) If we are to understand the functioning of society there must be some notion of what it is to appreciate how and why the value system in operation works, and what the consequences would be if it did not operate. Some knowledge of the functions of society are gained through the education system and it is in this respect at least that the system introduces and/or expands concepts related to the values which society has. When we consider society's values as they relate to situations, we are concerned with moral education for we are speaking about the way in which people interact: Thus it is that formal "education" implies some form of "moral education" even if this may not be explicit.

¹ 'Socialization' has been described as ". . . the process by which people, who at one time do not define situations in accordance with institutional prescriptions, are brought, at a later time, to do so . . ." (Bredemeier and Stephenson, 1962) The distinction between 'socialization' and 'education' largely revolves around that of behaviour which is acquired in order to conform (socialization) and that which is learned because it provides meaning to life which would not otherwise occur (education). However the meanings of both words vary from context to context.

² The question of intellectual learning poses many practical problems which the educator must face. In advocating the need for intellectual learning the educator has the choice of either attempting to teach all or of making a selection on the basis of some measurable feature of mental ability (assuming random selection is rejected). Clearly it is the case that much of what Peters is advocating will be beyond the grasp of some individuals (e.g. sub-normal children). This is not entirely a direct attack on Peters' theoretical position for it involves empirical questions which may or may not be relevant. It does however suggest that a framework of "worthwhile" activities may have neither universal application nor universal appeal. In such cases there must be some limitation of what is offered; although Peters confuses the issue by arguing that education is to be thought of as having universal application (even if in a limited form) - ". . . It is not a question of some being capable of it and others not. It is a matter, rather, of how far individuals can progress along the same avenues of exploration . . ." - ". . . A quality of life is not the prerogative of an intellectual elite." (Peters 1966: p.178)

CHAPTER XI: MORAL EDUCATION

There are a variety of procedures which may be adopted in setting about the task of education, and usually, if the process is to cover any length of time, a number will be employed by teachers. In certain intellectual pursuits where particular skills are required - e.g. mathematics - there may be occasions on which direct instruction will form the basis of the approach. On other occasions a structured situation may be provided as a base for experimentation - e.g. in science; Guidance may be given to encourage the pupil to evaluate material for himself - e.g. literature, music; Learning may occur as the result of example - e.g. sporting skills which are acquired not as the result of direct instruction; Or learning may occur incidentally to some other activity. Generally, the approach to be adopted will be determined by the nature of the activity itself and the content of the subject area involved. In the field of moral education this becomes particularly difficult for although it is certain that the school is engaged in passing on values it is less clear how this process should (or even does) occur. This is partly due to the fact that consideration of the passing on of values consists of examining teaching which often occurs incidentally. There are certain values, usually applied in the home, which are necessary for the smooth-running of society and which operate in the school situation - e.g. respect for others' property - which may not always be understood and which have to be introduced formally from time to time when situations arise in which such values are either being ignored or confused. On such occasions some form of education, or perhaps merely instruction, may be necessary but this does not arise as a matter of course in the school programme. On the other hand it seems that there could well be a place for organised moral education in some form or another.

Oakshott (1962) considers that the form of moral life which has evolved in the western world involves two distinct ideas: "In the first the moral life is a habit of affection and behaviour" - "In the second, activity is determined, not by habit of behaviour, but by the reflective application of a moral criterion." He argues that neither form taken alone recommends itself convincingly as a likely form of moral life, either in terms of the individual or of society - "... the one is habit, the other all reflection." Clearly there are habits of affection and behaviour that are carried on "... without pause in every moment of our waking life ..." and "... what is begun as imitation continues as selective conformity to a rich variety of customary behaviour." (p.62) - and it would be impossible to engage in educational activity without contributing to this kind of moral

development. There is however more to moral education than behavioural responses determined by given stimuli, the reflective aspect of moral education is more formal and revolves around conscious acts on the part of the teacher.

The formulation of any sort of moral code must involve critical examination of alternative positions if it is to be soundly based. The ability to criticise and evaluate alternative arguments is something which has to be fostered and encouraged rather than acquired by mere instruction: It is not, in itself, a subject nor is it something which can be "just found out" - it must be developed as part of the teaching of accepted content - a person cannot "... be drilled into being critical." (Passmore 1967: p.196) Passmore suggests that being critical is something like what we might call a "character trait" rather than a skill, and that its development depends on example rather than pedagogical skills. To foster the ability to evaluate argument it seems necessary however to suggest that some form of direct moral education is required or at least that the programme of education which operates in society includes not only work which might be considered to be of a vocational/utilitarian nature but also that which aids pupils in understanding and appreciating the functioning of society.

Guidelines for moral education would have to include an analysis of the various norms, mores and laws which operate in society and include consideration of how people arrive at individual moral codes which are not, in most respects, greatly different from others and which generally conform to the customs and laws of society.

J. A. Snook (1973) has suggested that as a starting point for moral education there are three distinctions which should be made, these being:

1. Distinguishing between mores and morality: We can use the word "moral" in two ways - (a) "... to describe any pattern of basic rules adopted by society" - mores: (b) "to express a judgement about the adequacy or legitimacy of the mores" - morality. These distinctions are important for the school has to (i) outline the basic rules of society (moral code) and make pupils aware of them, and (ii) provide them with the means of evaluating them. Both functions are important and should be given equal emphasis for it would be wrong to accentuate tradition - conformity without question - or to stress criticism without reference to tradition.
2. Minimal morality and Personal Ideals: Social life would be impossible without some system of rules. Generally such systems would contain: i. Rules considered to be absolutely necessary, encoded in the legal system of the society - these might be questioned but their abandonment would mean some form of radical change. ii. More trivial rules which constitute etiquette or good

taste. iii Moral rules which determine a society's form of life. (The categories of rules should not be considered in isolation - "The moral domain overlaps the legal but it is not coterminous with it." (p.12) On top of minimal morality we have personal ideals which specify a person's own moral code in terms of his beliefs and life-style, these will likely vary from person to person and while we may not wish to adopt others' ideals we should be aware of their existence and the justification which is given for them.

3. Principles and Rules: Moral rules are particular and require us to act in certain ways whereas principles are general, providing the test for the acceptability of moral rules and the grounds for moral argument. Knowledge of the distinctions made above and the subsequent understanding of the rationale behind moral rules acquired through such knowledge and their relevance to society, is basic to moral education. Snook considers that it is the function of the school, in this field, to provide pupils with the means of making consistent and enlightened decisions: This involves an acknowledgement of moral principles, logical thought and acceptance of relevant empirical evidence. In anticipation of criticism (e.g. Margaret Reid, 1973: p.14) that there may be difficulty in relating what appears to be theoretical knowledge to practical situations, Snook states:

"There is of course much more to moral education than the ability to hold rational discussion about moral issues. A morally educated person must be capable of translating principles into precepts and precepts into action."

(1973: p.14)

CHAPTER XII: ESTABLISHING CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS IN MORAL EDUCATION

In all fields of education the only valid means of ascertaining whether or not a programme has been successful is to carry out some form of evaluation. In certain areas it is a relatively simple task to establish criteria for success - e.g. diagnostic testing in mathematics - while in other areas - e.g. musical appreciation - it may be more difficult to evaluate pupil achievement in terms of a school programme, although it should be possible, even if only by observation, to make some kind of assessment of understanding which has occurred as the result of teaching. When considering moral education, as with other subjects, it is essential that we attempt to formulate criteria for success for evaluation influences, if not determines, the educational procedures which should be employed. If we fail to make clear the criteria for establishing means of ascertaining degrees of success attained it is reasonable to assume that our teaching has lacked conscious aim.

A basic question which faces the educator concerns the term "teaching". What is it to say that we are teaching or offering instruction? Scheffler (1960) has outlined a paradigmatic schema which, he argues, allows important distinctions to be made between (some) uses of the verb "teach" and which may be compared with a corresponding schema for the verb "tell". ("tell" being preferred to other words such as "instruct", "inform", etc as it appears the most appropriate word for purposes of comparison within the framework of the schema.) He isolates three particular contexts in which the verbs can occur, these are of the forms: i. X tells/teaches Y that . . . ii. X tells/teaches Y to . . . iii. X tells/teaches Y how . . . In each case there is a difference in meaning when "teach" is used from cases where "tell" is. The difference is in respect to learning - when we use "teach" we are inferring that some form of learning will take place - although this does not necessarily mean that learning will not take place when we tell something, only that it need not. Now if we consider contexts in which "teach" is used we find that there is a difference between having learned of . . . a particular action - knowing how to do it - and actually doing it: For example a man may know how to pay his debts without actually paying them and similarly, when we speak of citizenship as an educational aim our aim is not merely to teach pupils how to be good citizens but, in particular, to be good citizens. It is when blanks in the schema are replaced by norm stating sentences, rather than statements of fact, that problems of evaluation arise. In the case of facts - for example, how to pay one's debts - evaluation may be

carried out by testing to see whether the relevant material has been retained, but in the case of norm-stating sentences problems arise: Here preference may be given to "active" evaluation - that is, by noting the pupil's subsequent behaviour and establishing from it whether or not he has learned the principle in question - or "non-active" evaluation - by testing to see whether the pupil can recall the principle and perhaps be able to apply it to theoretical situations. Either way however difficulties arise - with the first interpretation (active) there must obviously be practical considerations which would restrict the scope of any evaluation, in fact it would not be possible to observe a person's behaviour after he had completed his schooling and relate all that he did to those principles which it had been supposed he had learnt and even if it were, account would have to be taken of the possibility of all subsequent learning as well as the influence of prior learning which had occurred in places other than the school: With the second interpretation (non-active) there is the difficulty of having to accept criteria for success which are less than those which might be desired - that is, in accepting such criteria there is a denial of the need to evaluate moral instruction in the terms of subsequent behaviour or, using the example cited above, the tests used would be concerned with establishing whether or not the pupil had learned how to be a good citizen rather than whether or not he was a good citizen. This suggests a further factor, particularly in respect of the active interpretation of evaluating moral instruction - The influence of the 'will': That is, if a person's conduct displayed that he had not properly learned a principle it might not be seen as a failure on the part of the teacher but rather a failure on the part of the will of the person to apply his understanding of the principle. However this presents further difficulties, for consideration would have to be given to the question "What is to count as 'will'?" and whether or not the will can be "educated". These issues will be by-passed here with the generalisation that the 'will' might be considered as "the faculty by which a person decides or conceives himself as deciding upon and initiating action."

R. D. Archambault (1963) has pointed out that in considering moral education it must be remembered that what is considered appropriate behaviour at a particular stage of development may not be so at another - that is, less is expected of a small child in this area than would be of an older child. He suggests a schema involving four stages: Firstly, training; Secondly, teaching the rule and the reason for it; Thirdly, teaching the student to reflect on the rule and to provide his own reasons for accepting it; Fourthly, teaching the student to be committed to certain rules and to act in accordance with his convictions. In each case tests for success would be different. In the first case success would be interpreted in terms of the pupil's behaviour, in the second he would be required to reproduce appropriate statements relative to the principle in question, in

the third he would be asked to give reasons for the principle and in the fourth case not only reasons would be required but also evidence that he act in accordance with his convictions. Thus during the early stages of development one could perhaps evaluate moral education in "active" terms but later on "non-active" evaluation would have to take place. To counter the criticism that to accept "non-active" evaluation is to accept "... mere verbalism ... " as a criterion of success rather than actual moral conduct, Archambault argues that problems involving moral judgements could be posed and the answers given assessed in terms of how they fit into an appropriate moral schema (e.g. "Lifeline" programme material, some of Kolberg's test items): If the questions were sufficiently ingenious it would be possible to establish, from the answers given, whether or not understanding of the moral principles had been reached and if the student were capable of providing appropriate solutions to such problems then he would be actively engaged in the formulation, critique and defence of norms. Thus moral education aims at (1) intellectual commitment to norms, (2) reflection and criticism of norms held, (3) inculcation and promotion of a method of objective criticism and evaluation which in itself represents an important form of moral activity.

Now if criteria for success in moral education in schools can be formulated according to the ability of the pupil to reflect on and act on (at least in a theoretical setting) moral principles it becomes necessary to consider the type of procedure that could follow from such criteria.

It has been argued that a most important aspect of evaluating moral education is the ability the pupil demonstrates to examine principles or rules critically - indeed, he should not only be able to evaluate the reasons for a particular principle but also be awake to the possibility that established norms may be better rejected or modified if there are good reasons for doing so. It has been suggested that critical thought can best be developed through certain subjects - e.g. history, science, literature, philosophy - "...to be educated one must be able to participate in the great human traditions of critico-creative thought...." (Passmore, 1967) Such subjects can and do encourage critical thought, they also may introduce issues of a moral nature, either directly or indirectly - for example, a historical study may involve discussion of different or contradictory moral principles, providing an opportunity for pupils to evaluate the principles in question and consider their relevance to society, giving reasons for particular attitudes. Thus it is that successful instruction in many areas of the school curriculum may involve moral education: "...the successful attainment of the objectives of intellectual instruction entails the attainment of skills, attitudes and commitments that are essential to the acquisition of moral conduct."

(Archambault, 1963:p.480) Archambault argues that in this context moral education can take place without the school needing to strive directly to achieve aims that promote moral conduct”....except in so far as this is possible and feasible within the bounds of normal intellectual curriculum study.” While this argument relieves the teacher of the necessity to indulge in direct moral teaching it does present certain difficulties.

Firstly there is the danger that reasoning such as this tends to reduce subjects such as history, literature, to mechanisms for promoting moral behaviour whereas although, because of their very nature, they may help to shape it, this is not their true function.

Secondly there is the problem of individual interpretation: for while society as a group may interpret events in a particular way, an individual may, perhaps without conscious effort, promote values which were not originally intended by society.

Thirdly there is a question of relevance (similar in nature to the second point) - How important is it that pupils - particularly the very young - should understand values which do not relate to situations they are likely to encounter? - that is, certain values which relate to past societies or cultures other than our own. How is the teacher to deal with norms which may be in conflict with our own - that is, those we are trying to establish - and yet which in the particular context they appear seem sound and definitely valid? The obvious answer is that a good programme will enable the child to interpret for himself their relative merit, being able to see reasons for the differences which exist - but just how practical is this? - especially in the primary school. Does it in fact demand skills on the part of the teacher which may sometimes be beyond him in the every-day classroom situation? Of course it is possible to develop critical thinking but to suggest that on every occasion the teacher encounters conflicting principles he should allow pupils to examine them is not only time consuming but also likely to be extremely difficult unless he is to allow the influence of present values to remain behind what he says. For example consider a primary school class in which the following statement occurs - “The sultan had fifty-six wives”- Discussion could become very complex, for this is not just a reference to a matter of custom, it involves many complex issues - viz respect for persons, equal freedom etc and so on. Here a teacher would surely be justified in dismissing the reference by saying, “This is what they do but we know better (differently).” - unless it was positively proposed to grapple with the issues involved - i.e. respect for persons, equal freedom etc. A similar reaction might be expected to a reference to cannibalism.

Fourthly, there is a problem of credibility: If a child is to develop the freedom to make

rational choices according to the way in which he sees reasons as justifying particular moral judgements, is it appropriate to attempt to transfer moral attitudes through curricular areas which need not necessarily be associated with them, even if such teaching is indirect and not dogmatic?

In contrast to the difficulties mentioned above is the rejoinder - "Is it possible to teach anything effectively without calling on established moral principles and behavioural norms at some stage?" Hare (1964) considers that it is not possible to bring up a child without influencing his moral development in some ways, for even to set out deliberately to avoid influencing his moral development in certain ways would be to influence it in others: And even if it were possible would it be desirable? Certainly schools do provide moral education/instruction - for example, honesty, respect for others' property - by reinforcing certain types of behaviour positively while giving negative reinforcement to behaviours considered undesirable. Such instruction is not of a formal nature, it merely occurs in the course of a school day. At other times however a more formal note is introduced - for example; examining topics such as apartheid (rugby tours), nuclear weapons (French tests), religious and economic differences (Northern Ireland) - (all topics which may well be discussed in upper classes in primary schools) in an attempt to illustrate that human problems involving differing groups of people may have different solutions according to the way in which they are approached. Moral education which takes this form is, and has been for some time, a part of accepted teaching procedure in New Zealand schools. There is also another strata to moral education which is receiving increasing attention and that is the direct approach by teaching (and by examples set by the type of community the school is) about the establishment and identification of moral codes.

Two warnings however must be given in regard to moral education in schools: The first relates to there being a distinction between "education" (and/or "instruction") and "indoctrination", the second concerns the role of the teacher as an authority - each has implications for the other.

When we use the word "indoctrination" we are referring to the passing of particular beliefs under certain conditions. To define the term precisely we need to consider four factors: (1) the content of what is being passed on, (2) the method employed, (3) the consequent attitudes of the learner, (4) the intention or aim of the person providing the instruction. (cf. Snook, 1972; also Hare, 1964)

If we consider the question of indoctrination against that of education we find that no distinction can be made on the grounds of content alone, for to do so would be to assume that

there was a “right” content and that the educator was the person who determined what that content was. Again it would be pointless to make the distinction on the grounds of method alone for we do often use non-rational methods in teaching - e.g. drilling multiplication tables, parents discouraging children from lying by non-rational means. The consequences of teaching are also insufficient grounds for establishing the presence of indoctrination, for even if a person cannot give reasons for a particular view it alone does not allow us to conclude that indoctrination has taken place: We cannot identify a man as being indoctrinated merely because he cannot give adequate reasons for the views he holds; he may not wish to, or be unable to express them coherently. Thus we must examine the aim or intention of the person providing the instruction - Is it his intention to inculcate unshaken beliefs in such a manner that the pupil will come to regard the beliefs as being finally and conclusively justified regardless of any contrary evidence or argument? If so the aim of the instruction is to instil beliefs against which no reasons can ever count and this is the most basic feature of indoctrination.

The problem for parents and teachers of course is that there are occasions on which we do wish to instil certain views in children for to not do so - i.e. to allow children to do what they liked when they liked - would be impractical and would deprive them of living normal social lives within society. The paradox of freedom (K. Popper - quoted in Peters, 1966: p186) is that too much freedom leads to too little; The strong impose arbitrary constraints on the weak - in such cases individuals are free only if they are protected by laws and/or public opinion from arbitrary interference, and these have to be learnt and accepted (even if they are not always agreed with by individuals) “...the unpalatable lesson of history is that it takes a constraint to catch a constraint...” (Peters, 1966: p186)

In moral education the teacher at times has to give consideration to fundamental moral principles, regardless of the wishes of the pupil. At times some authority may be needed, for in morality we are dealing with people, not just one individual, and the consequences of an act which contravenes fundamental moral principles may be far reaching even if they do not rebound on its originator - for example the taking of human life might properly be regarded as a fundamental principle (given normal conditions) and as such must be adhered to, there is no room for prior experimentation to see if the principle can be justified. But a distinction must be made between being “in authority” and being “authoritarian”. The latter suggests infallibility, the former does not. For those in authority there must be good reasons for asking a child to do this, or that, and such reasons must be able to be given and understood.

Summary:

The purpose and scope of formal education have been considered. A transcendental argument for establishing worthwhile activities was examined and rejected on logical as well as practical grounds. The discussion did however establish that the content of education, and methods of instruction, must reflect the social order; although in turn it may also contribute towards re-shaping it. Formal education must attempt to influence the quality of life of the person for whom it is considered appropriate. It must take cognizance of society's moral principles, norms and laws in addition to its function of passing on other skills which will ensure effective survival within society. For the educator this introduces questions of an ethical nature concerning the types of values society has - values which ensure the continuance of society as we know it - and how these are to be passed on successfully. Criteria for success in moral education aid us in determining procedures to be employed, according to fundamental principles.

It now remains to identify principles on which moral education might be founded and to develop, in the light of what has just been said, effective and reasonable procedures appropriate to educational programmes founded on such principles.

CHAPTER XIII: THE SEARCH FOR A BASE FOR MORALITY, APPLICABLE TO FORMAL EDUCATION

In the first chapter of this thesis it was asserted that there is often a tendency at present for people to demonstrate confusion over the manner in which they consider they should act. Sometimes confusion is an expression of the absence of knowledge of moral principles (whatever principles there may be), more often it seems, it is the result of lapses in the ability to apply principles (principles which the agent has perhaps acknowledged verbally) in deference to expediency: Ivan Snook (1974) in a brief but compelling article has highlighted the latter attitude in an attack on 'Double Standards over Moral Teaching' -

"Teachers may talk of justice but the pupils live among people who think it quite legitimate to have exclusive schools and private hospitals for the wealthy.

Can teachers advocate equality when a football team from New Zealand is prepared to play against men with whom they are not permitted to socialise fully as sportsmen?

Does compassion make any sense in a world in which millions starve while we build our prosperity upon their poverty?

What can teachers say about honesty in a society which allows large companies to 'freeze out' the small businessman and pay to those who do the hard work a small fraction of what their 'executives' earn?

Is Christian poverty anything more than a joke when people are rated in terms of money and status?

Truthfulness is valued in small children but men-of-the-world are exempt.

Television 'discussions' are not attempts to get at truth; they are gladiatorial displays in which people of differing views lock in mortal combat using whatever arguments support their positions.

A newspaper editor writes a grossly misleading leader on a working party report and readers join in the criticism of a report which clearly they have never read. And they want teachers to talk to children about truthfulness."

(Set 74: number 2)

He goes on to argue that while it is commendable that the recent Educational

Development Conference Report "Improving Learning and Teaching" has come

"... up with the suggestion that the role of the school is to prompt pupils to examine critically the moral code of society so that they might develop a rational moral code of their own..."

there are two problems which have to be faced before such a programme could be implemented: Firstly, the manner in which "... many schools operate is not conducive to the development of a rational moral code ..." and Secondly "... our society does not value rational people because they sometimes criticise the social order ..." His despair however in regard to what schools can actually do in such a situation is not shared by Gribble (1969) who, while recognizing the problems of double standards, feels that the school has a positive part to play:

"When we consider the corrupting influences to which we are exposed - the endless bad films, bad television, bad journalism which imply that kicks come from doing what we know to be wrong and that doing what we know to be right is a grind, the emphasis must be put on the positive and elusive satisfaction to be derived from doing what we know to be right."

(p.142)

If we are to speak about morality and accept that universalisability is a logical criterion for distinguishing moral judgements from other judgements we must surely accept the need for consistency in decisions we make: If there is to be any notion of what is to count as "right" and what as "wrong", we must have some formula which enables us to recognise that if a certain action is wrong (right) in particular circumstances, it will be wrong (right) on every occasion on which it could be followed where those particular circumstances apply. It seems that the situation which has arisen where there is a lack of consistent application of principles is at least partly due to our preoccupation with the notions of moral autonomy and freedom of choice. Now while these notions are certainly laudable in themselves, and we would not want to reject them, there are sometimes occasions when they are appealed to as a method of refuting the validity of universalisability. We are often so willing to accept that it is never desirable to legislate for morality that we adopt a laissez-faire approach not only to the way in which others behave but to the way in which we behave ourselves. In fact we sometimes seem to reject the notion of

universalisability altogether except in so far as we apparently condone egoistical behaviour on all but those occasions where consequences might rebound on us. At least in theory however we do reject egoism, for society does outline ways in which people should behave through the expression of rules and norms. It is not that these rules or norms are imaginary or elusive or that they are all undesirable (they would mean the collapse of society if they were all taken away and surely the majority would not want that) rather it is that there is a complete lack of the need to appreciate consistency as a major element in moral decision-making - at least in terms of what people do (as against what they say they do). The fear of expressing moral principles (i.e. "to do so might remove moral autonomy," etc) seems contagious given the present moral climate and is nowhere more evident than among many educational planners: We often find that those responsible for educational planning are not prepared to state what principles are held nor acknowledge that principles are even required to establish the function of the school in regard to moral education. Unfortunately this does not manifest itself in liberalism or tolerance, which do involve principles of non-interference, but rather in blind continuance of the status quo; thus "moral" decisions come down to ". . . stupid rules about dress and hair length . . ." (Snook, 1974)

There can be precious little value in discussing the types of procedures which might be adopted unless what is put forward can be (and is) related to actual principles. It is pointless to speak about moral education without there being some broad principles which educators have in mind when considering the content of programmes; After all one cannot discuss morality in practical terms (and thus moral education) without having some notion of what it is to make a moral decision or, particularly, without knowing the criteria for establishing what is right and what is wrong. Therefore if an account is to be given which provides guidelines for moral education it must also provide a principle(s) (or at least suggested principles) on which such guidelines might be based; And of course, if the exercise is to have any real meaning the principle(s) provided must relate to the basic values which members of society hold and without which society (in that form) would collapse.

CHAPTER XIV: THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL FREEDOM AND MORAL EDUCATION

The principle of equal freedom has been established as a principle based on the assumed function of man as rational activity and the supposition of each individual's desire for freedom - or, non-interference: And as it has been suggested that moral attitudes entail the requirement of universalisability, each person must attribute equal value to the freedom of others as he does to his own. It is a principle which is not absolute - no principle ever could be - but it does seem to be fundamental to the operation of "society" as we know it.

The principle of equal freedom assumes the ability on the part of each individual to be able to have some knowledge or understanding of how other people perceive certain situations - i.e. those where to not do so might lead to an action which would be in conflict with the principle. Such knowledge is gained by consideration of the conditions which apply in a relevant situation and appraising how the following may influence or determine what a person might do:

1. Instinct - recognition that there are some responses which are apparently in no way premeditated and do not involve rational thought processes but which could influence the behaviour of another.
2. The Influence of Rational Thought: In many situations what a person does will be largely determined by what he considers to be reasons for acting. The reasons he gives (probably only to himself, although he may state them) will likely involve - The Beliefs and Values which he holds; Physical factors which may be Relevant; Resources Available; The Influence of Other Opinions; Lessons from Past Experience; His Capacity for Rational thought. (NB Only some of these may be considered when making particular decisions.)
3. Emotional Dispositions - Occasionally a person's reaction to a situation will be in the form of an emotional response whether this is observable or not; More frequently, emotional dispositions are likely to contribute to a person's interpretation of a situation. In such cases, we look for reasons for the existence of an emotional state by considering factors which might contribute to a situation being perceived in such a way as to give rise to an emotional state.

When we speak of predicting another's behaviour, it might appear that on every occasion we see another person we are expected to cogitate on and analyse the situation he finds himself in. Obviously this is not the case as there are many occasions on which we associate with or come in

the proximity of others, on which it is completely unnecessary for us to consider how they feel or what thoughts or beliefs they hold in any way, and on which it would be ridiculous for us to consider their situation for any reason other than idle curiosity - for example, being a spectator at a well-attended rugby match need not involve us in any way with fellow spectators or players. And when we do speak of understanding others we are not usually (although at times we might) speaking of some kind of rigorous formal analysis, we are generally referring to judgements which are made on the basis of brief diagnoses of reactions to situations. (Sometimes in fact we simply identify ourselves with others; e.g. the remark, "Oh, you poor thing" is often the result of immediate identification with another over a stated or assumed reaction to a situation.) There are however situations where what a person does or how he reacts to a situation affects others (or ourselves), or might affect others, in some way and it is these situations which require prediction regarding the consequences of an action. Generally, situations where the consequences of an action or remark on the part of an agent are likely to cause pain, sorrow or unpleasant feelings in another (cf. interference) are to be avoided unless either the long term interest of the individual who is likely to suffer from the consequences of the action is served - e.g. the teacher who reprimands a pupil for dilatory behaviour - or where to do otherwise would conflict with other rules or principles which ultimately serve the interests of all members of society.

To be in a position to gauge what others may be thinking (at times) is presupposed by acceptance of 'equal freedom'. (It is important however to remember that "understanding, or having knowledge of others" is derived from the fundamental principle of equal freedom, it is not something which is advocated as a principle in itself.) From 'equal freedom' a great number of other moral principles can be, and are, produced: For example, Respect for the Beliefs, Opinions and Life-Styles of Others; Honesty and Truth-telling; Fairness - Sharing Resources and Respect for Property, Consideration of the Wants and Needs of Others.¹

As it would be meaningless to speak of a moral code without the acceptance of some fundamental principles (or principle) and without some form of moral code consistent decision-making would be impossible, the principle of equal freedom is advocated as a starting point for the establishment of moral codes; for it is this principle which seems to be essential to maintain (any?) society.

The principle of equal freedom (and the various moral concepts which follow from it) is not something which "just grows" - it is acquired by children in society over a period of time, being encouraged and fostered on the part of others by conscious efforts - even if there are sometimes

alternative and perhaps conflicting attitudes towards various rules (and emphasis given to them) which may be developed from a notion of equal freedom. Neither is the principle one which is first introduced from which others are later developed - it is rather a rationale for justifying various rules which have evolved within the moral structure of society. No one would (or could) attempt to instil in a child the notion of equal freedom without first allowing him to experience situations in which he comes in contact with others and learns that there are various ways in which he must co-operate with them - e.g. the small child who desires a toy being used by another learns that either he cannot get it or that he must take it by force and later (hopefully) the art of co-operative play. Many of the skills and attitudes are acquired as part of the process of growing up but it is the concept of equal freedom which provides the rationale for these skills and attitudes - e.g. sharing, honesty etc - which in turn provide us with a structure for justifying moral decisions (i.e. our moral code). Parents obviously encourage the development of social living skills (of some kind or another) and foster the need to give consideration to others' wants and feelings on occasions.²

The practical side of accepting the need to consider others is developed and encouraged through a variety of situations and experiences; But actual experiences alone are insufficient. If there is to be a principle based on non-interference, which is universalisable it behoves all men to acknowledge that principle and act in accordance with it. This is the formal aspect of morality - knowing what a principle is and how to apply it. Consistent behaviour is determined by the rationale which is given for rules which social living, as society knows it, implies: By recourse to the principle of equal freedom we can establish a rationale for other rules.

While it might be argued that it is a parent's responsibility to foster the development of (individual) moral codes in his children, it has been shown that the nature of formal education implies some form of moral education/instruction. It follows then that moral education of some kind must feature in programmes which schools operate. Often however this is not made explicit and what moral education does take place is of an indirect nature apart from that which aims at ensuring that certain rules are understood and observed. (By indirect moral education we refer to procedures which aid in the formulation of ideas which relate to various principles or maxims, but which do not always specifically set out to provide such teaching - for example children who are required to read Dickens' "Christmas Carol" may obtain much information which relates to various notions such as love, truth, compassion, charity etc but the intention of the teacher in requiring the reading may only have been to introduce a literary exercise³ or even just material to

develop reading skills.)

However on occasions on which teachers introduce material designed to provide information about other people, it seems reasonable to assume that knowledge of others is important in some way to pupils' development. Now if it is important to learn about other people it seems that there must be assumptions made concerning the existence of underlying principles which relate to how people act towards each other in social situations. And if it is intended also to introduce notions of tolerance and respect for others, there must be implied acceptance of the principle of equal freedom. It becomes then the moral educator's task (in addition to that of parents and certain other social institutions) to provide children with experiences designed to develop understanding of the principle of equal freedom.

A problem in the past (and present) however has been the reluctance of educators to recognise and acknowledge that moral teaching must imply the acceptance of values of some kind and that if understanding is to occur these must be made explicit to pupils at some stage in order that they may examine them for themselves. The school's function then must not only be to provide experiences which develop notions of social living but also to indicate what the principles involved are and what rationale is provided for them. Thus the student obtains knowledge of principles which society holds and is in a position to see how and why he can (and must) make the kind of decisions necessary if he is to participate in society and understand something of the consequences which would occur if he, or other members of society, were not to accept such a procedure for decision-making.⁴

The argument which has been put forward here as a basis for moral education should not be considered as adding anything foreign to education as we know it as present. It is an argument which serves to clarify and justify much instruction that has occurred in the past, perhaps with varying degrees of success, in the hope that such analysis will lead to improved and more thoughtful teaching. What is important is that fundamental principles be stated and related to methods employed and to the consideration of criteria for success. Once the intention of the moral educator has been established, there is hope of greater understanding of the underlying assumptions of society and so of enriching the quality of life for members of society by ensuring that there is knowledge available to them which outlines the way in which society functions (or should function) when underlying principles are universally applied; and that they can understand that such knowledge makes for consistent decision-making, avoiding much of the confusion which at present seems to exist. It may well be that it is a forlorn hope to speak of

such things as “universalisability” and express the belief that all members of society might one day come to accept them (it might not even be a desirable state for them all to do so) but this should not be used as an excuse to dismiss the need for planned moral education in schools. The time has come when recognition of the influence and scope of moral education is not something to be ignored, assumed or blindly accepted but something to be considered as necessary in helping to provide each child with the equipment (structure) with which to make consistent judgements of a moral nature; Judgements which will be acceptable to him and which he can rationally justify to society.

¹ Nothing has yet been said about what Peters (1974) refers to as “virtues of the will” - e.g. courage, integrity etc. But virtuous behaviour can only be spoken of if there is a moral code to which it can relate. Thus the determination of a moral code outlines what virtuous behaviour is.

² Even the parent who sets a bad example provides negative reinforcement of the need to consider others’ behaviour - e.g. the drunken husband who beats his wife, at the very least leads his family to make assumptions about the behaviour of an angry, frustrated, drunken man who has temporarily failed to acknowledge what they have come to regard as necessary principles (even if his inconsistent behaviour becomes so commonplace that it eventually leads them to reject notions of there being any point in accepting universalisability as a criterion for determining a moral judgement because they have lost all faith in others to accept it as a criterion.)

³ This of course raises the question of what a “literary exercise” is; a point that is raised in the next chapter.

⁴ If he finds out later on that some members of society apply principles inconsistently we can at least hope that he will be in a position to see that this is so and recognise it for what it is - being able to see the consequences for society if such behaviour becomes prevalent (as it seems to be at the moment). It is in this way that we can attempt to begin answering the seemingly paradoxical question:

“If . . . community standards of right and wrong are not consistently adhered to, if local by-laws or laws placed on the Statute Book by Parliament are not consistently enforced, what right has the adult community to expect any better standards of conduct on the part of its youth?”

- Report on Character Training
and Citizenship. (1944: p47)

CHAPTER XV: THEORY AND PRACTICE

It is a common complaint of classroom teachers that educational theory often bears little relation to what actually goes on in the classroom and that theoretical ideas put forward often turn out to be absurdly impracticable. Of course it is not always the intention of educational theorists to provide ideas which relate directly to classroom activities for they argue that by presenting ideas about teaching, for consideration, they may, in the long run, improve the quality of teaching by providing teachers with material designed to make them think "in depth" about their teaching.

This chapter has been included because it is felt that there is a need to justify certain procedures which are currently in operation (or are creeping in by means of material disseminated at increasingly regular intervals to schools by the Department of Education) and which should properly be seen as having moralistic overtones even though they are presented under the guise of orthodox subject material. (e.g. Social Studies "Starter Kits")

It has been established that moral education (or instruction) in the field of formal education is inevitable in some form or another for it is necessarily entailed by the school being an institution which reflects (and perhaps helps to shape) the social order. At junior levels such education usually takes the form of the development of certain habits which conform to that kind of moral code which it is felt is essential for the smooth-running of the school in order that that part of the programme devoted to the acquisition of skills - reading, writing, arithmetic etc - may best be implemented. Junior pupils are taught certain moral concepts - e.g. to respect others' property - and to conform to class and school rules of a behavioural nature - e.g. "Do not talk to the teacher when she is speaking to somebody else." In each of these areas reasons can, and should, be given for particular rules but it is not usually appropriate for pupils to examine critically such rules for at this stage of their development they are learning how rules are to be applied and unless one has some notion of what it is to conform to external directives one could never be in a position to evaluate rules in the light of reasons given for their imposition. Whether or not reasons are given (as long as they can be) there remains the practical need for some kind of order where learning situations exist involving moderately large numbers of children - regardless of whether or not the children themselves accept such a need. This is the habit forming aspect of the development of a moral code and is imparted and enforced by a whole range of day to day activities involving

interaction between teachers, pupils, peers, parents and other adults. (Habits formed in this way of course do not only relate to behaviour which occurs in schools - they carry over to behaviour in adult society - e.g. one should not speak out loudly to one's neighbour during a tense and absorbing movie etc).

The development of acceptable habits however is only one aspect of morality. What is more important is the development of certain kinds of concepts which allow us to classify judgements we make - e.g. use of "good", "bad" "ought" etc - for without these concepts we could not properly be said to have the equipment for moral decision - making (other than habit, which cannot really be called moral decision - making).

In a recent study J. B. Edwards (1974) reports an investigation which was "... carried out to ascertain how 700 children aged 7 to 15 ... acquired the ability to define certain moral concepts, how they decided on whether an action was right or wrong, and what influenced the acquisitional process." (p.83) As the investigation relied on questionnaires, often involving supplied answers (i.e. multiple choice) and at times appeared to equate the acquisition of moral concepts with terms which might be simply defined, distinct from them being ideas held according to an individual's particular method of justifying actions or views held, one might have some reservations about the actual validity of this type of study but the conclusions are interesting and should not be ignored. It appears that the older children from the sample considered that they decided for themselves whether an action was right or wrong while younger children relied more on the influence of others. In most cases the major influence in acquiring moral concepts was the child's mother - much more so than peer-groups - while the church was also seen as important. The teacher's contribution was also "highly relevant" - especially during early school years. Edwards saw educational implications of the study as being that teachers should give more attention to the introduction of difficult moral concepts, particularly with younger children, and that concepts gained be able to be applied accurately and relevantly. He considered that there was a need for care to be taken with children's initiation to terms relevant to the development of moral concepts as it could, in the early stages, impede or distort the later acquisitional processes. He therefore regarded the teacher's role as a crucial one. He also felt that there was a case for schools - through moral education - to "... plan to assist pupils to develop a more autonomous, authentic outlook with progressively less reliance on external authorities" (p.93) towards what in the past has been recognised as a basic part of the church's contribution to society.

Within New Zealand there has been increasing demand for schools to recognise and accept

greater responsibility for the personal and social development of their pupils.

“It seems to be assumed in . . . discussions that . . . schools should accept greater responsibility in fields of personal and moral development that were until recently rather more the responsibility of families, churches, and other institutions outside the school.”

- Public Education in New Zealand

(1973: p.11)

In fact, recommendations and submissions have been made to the Education Department, for moral education to be a “. . . deliberately planned part of the curriculum.” (EDC Working Party Report: 1973, Chapter 12, Recommendation 4)

In the publication “Human Development and Relationships in the School Curriculum” (1973) emphasis is given to the need for school curricula to provide pupils with opportunities to develop personal values such as “. . . the urge to enquire, concern for others . . .” and “. . . the desire for self-respect”. The working paper states that “A student’s attitudes and values should be based upon his understanding of his responsibilities and sensitivity to others and his acceptance of all the consequences of all his actions.” (p.13)

(From assertions which have been made concerning the principle of equal freedom throughout this thesis it should be clear that this statement is close to being an interpretation of the principle for to accept responsibilities and sensitivity to others and understand the likely consequences of all of one’s actions is surely to include acceptance of each person’s desire for non-interference.)

How then might one go about developing a programme which encourages concepts necessary for understanding the principle of equal freedom without disrupting established notions of the school’s function?

As has already been pointed out, moral education may take the form of a direct approach - e.g. the discussion of values during the course of a “liberal studies” programme - or be approached through other subjects - e.g. literature, social studies programmes. Some indication has already been given of the manner in which moral education might be approached by the direct method of discussing the development of moral attitudes and codes and the credence people give to them (refer, pp.86-88). This approach is especially applicable to older children and would probably prove most fruitful if, in earlier years, pupils had been exposed to problems and situations concerning human relationships (i.e. the indirect approach). The indirect approach to

moral education - learning about other people - is rapidly ranging over a great many aspects of school curricula and being dealt with in a variety of ways. Consideration will now be given to how the principle of equal freedom relates (or can be related) to what is at present going on in New Zealand schools. (NB Broad subject areas only will be dealt with, and generally, references will be intended to refer to activities in both primary and secondary schools although they may not always be appropriate for junior and infant classes.)

The Development of English Language and Literature:

Various Departmental publications in New Zealand emphasize the need for language acquisition to be regarded as a basic function of human growth. Present research by the National English Syllabus Committee (1974: p.5) is based on the assumptions that (1) Language is a form of human behaviour, (2) The child first explores language through listening and speaking, (3) Language is central to personal growth. And as the aim of education is “. . . To help young people develop fully as individuals and members of society by encouraging the growth of concern for others, the urge to enquire and the desires for self-respect . . .” (p.14) it follows that the language programme must be regarded as central to full human development. The Committee state that along with other objectives the following are consistent with the aims of the language programme and therefore also with general educational aims:

“Extending students’ imaginative and emotional responsiveness. This implies:

- language activities which demand a personal response, sharing of feelings, and sensitivity to the experience of others.
- a wide range of language materials, selected by students as well as teachers, which deal with the interests and needs of (children) in their world.

“Extending the students’ awareness of ideas and values. This implies:

- the exploration of a wide range of ideas and values through every language activity.
- the selection by teachers and students of materials and experiences that could take them from the familiar to the unfamiliar, as well as vice versa.”

(p.14)

These objectives will be partly met by the very nature of language itself as the prime form of communication. By discussion of ideas, activities and feelings each individual is co-operating in efforts to gain information from others which may help to reshape, confirm or extend his present thinking. Apart from insight into the thoughts and feelings of others gained by oral communication, there is the contribution which can be made by the study of literature.

There are various ways of interpreting the function of purpose of the writer who presents work for publication. Clearly there is an intention on his part of impart some kind of information and where he is writing about people, obviously it is intended that the reader gain some kind of information about the characters involved and the situations in which they are presented. Whether this be information for its own sake or information intended to evoke certain feelings or produce certain trains of thought; and whether the author be expressing his own or imaginary beliefs and feelings, are subsidiary issues to the basic intention of providing information about people and their interaction with each other and their environment.

Vast quantities of books are published each year and it would be impossible for anyone to cover more than a fraction of the output in any one year's reading. We therefore select books according to our interests, often taking account of the opinions of others regarding books they have read and recommend to us, because we have come to respect their judgement in such matters. In considering material for inclusion in a school programme some form of selection must take place. Obviously a basic criterion in making a selection is the reading ability of the children involved - books must be appropriate in terms of content and vocabulary. Other criteria are involved however, especially for pupils at the secondary level, and none the least of these is an estimate of quality in terms of information imparted about the thoughts, feelings and actions of the characters for an important criterion in estimating quality in literature is plausibility of character portrayal and this refers mainly to the personal characteristics and attributes of the characters involved. R. G. Oliver (1973) in his concise study - "Knowing the Feelings of Others: A Use of Literature in Moral Education" - points out that

"When critics perform their descriptive and interpretive tasks on those works of literature in which the feelings of characters are important (as in much ethical art), they must often employ the same procedures as those which we employ in everyday life when we wish to know how other people feel." (p.105)

If we are to be in a position to evaluate, and hence appreciate literature it is often argued that we must be able to identify ourselves with the characters at times and be able to interpret how they are reacting in various situations - i.e. we must be able to attempt to know how others think and feel in situations presented. (Without doing so it would be doubtful whether we could even understand much literature, let alone appreciate it).¹

However it is not intended to suggest that literary appreciation become the servant of the moral educator:

"We must strive for a literary balance of material when we are selecting works for literary study in schools . . . and seek out works particularly valuable for the development of this ability . . ." (i.e. knowing the feelings of others) ". . . when the requirements of a literary education warrant it."

Oliver (1973: p.107)

Social Studies:

In New Zealand schools the term “Social Studies” refers to studies concerning the lives of people in this country and other countries - involving studies of present and past civilizations - and how their lives are influenced by a variety of factors including geographical, historical, religious and cultural considerations. During secondary school years where greater specialization occurs, various disciplines incorporated in the general concept of social studies are singled out for more specialized study - e.g. history, geography etc.

“Social Studies emphasises people: how they think, feel and act, how they interact with others, and how they meet their needs and organize their way of life.

“Social Studies should make pupils look at and think about human behaviour realistically, objectively and with sensitivity. It should help us make decisions about our personal and social development, and about our participation in a changing society.”

(Draft Syllabus, 1972 pp1-2)

Components of social studies which are ‘complementary and inseparable’ are seen to be:

Knowledge - “Social Studies develops are ideas about human behaviour.”

Abilities - “Social Studies helps develop certain abilities in pupils.”

“Pupils should gain experience in working out relationships at the personal level.”

Values - “Social Studies deals with values.”

“Pupils should examine, as rationally as possible, the value positions underlying social issues in our every day life. They will have opportunities to consider a range of values, beliefs and social actions as they inquire into some of the possible causes and consequences of behaviour.” (p2)

Social Action - “Social Studies should lead to involvement in society.”

As specific objectives the draft syllabus includes the following:

Pupils are to be helped by social studies to -

- identify their own values.
- recognise how values affect the way they think and act.
- recognise the influences that have shaped their values.
- identify values in their own and othe societies.
- examine their own and others’ values in terms of their consequences.
- recognise that values change and be able to identify some of the causes of change.

- accept that people strive to maintain their values.
- accept that value conflicts exist.
- attempt to resolve conflicts by applying rational procedures.
- show by their actions that they are sensitive to the needs and interests of others and that they respect and accept the idea of individual and cultural difference. (p.5)

The suggestion that basic themes for implementing these objectives should be; Cultural Difference, Interaction, Social Control and Social Change, emphasizes the importance which is placed on the need to attempt to gain knowledge of how other people perceive the world to be. It would seem impossible to implement the requirements of a syllabus such as this without including material which might justifiably be called "Moral Education": Further it seems that understanding of the principle of equal freedom is admirably suited to this interpretation of social studies.

Mathematics and the Sciences:

While one would hardly wish to argue that these subjects could be thought of as in any way being connected with moral education it seems appropriate to reassert the view expressed earlier that subjects which develop critical thought processes form a vital part of a person's education if he is to be considered as having the tools available for rational thought. The enquiring nature of much work in mathematics and science helps pupils to develop logical problem-solving techniques which enable them to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant grounds for justification of a particular position. The development of critical thought is essential to moral education for rational understanding of principles presupposes that reasons can be given for their acceptance, or rejection, and the search for reasons requires the ability to accept only those which are relevant to the principle involved.

The Creative Arts:

The provision of subjects with an aesthetic content in a school programme is generally intended to provide pupils with experiences involving the appreciation of, and participation in creative activities involving both individual and group participation. It is important that lessons in this area are conducted in an atmosphere conducive to the free expression of individual ideas and this demands non-interference of the individual (group) by another (others) except where help, guidance encouragement, etc are required or appropriate. Thus it should be recognised that

respect for the freedom of unhindered participation is to acknowledge an essential requirement for the provision of aesthetic experiences: For example, lessons involving musical appreciation (listening) or group participation (band etc) demand that extraneous noises of a deliberate nature are to be avoided. Acceptance of conditions which generally apply in lessons relating to the creative arts seems to imply some ability to appreciate and accept the need to understand or have knowledge of the feelings and thoughts of others - and these subjects surely provide opportunities for teachers to develop this ability by indirect teaching.

Physical Education and Games:

Obviously co-operative physical education activities and team games involve some ability to predict the behaviour of others and often, as this ability is developed, skill at the game or activity increases in terms of actual performance. While it might not be of great importance to consider the feelings of others in such activities it is nevertheless relevant to note that the ability to predict behaviour is part of the general concept of understanding and having knowledge of others. There are too notions of "sportsmanship", "playing for the team", "respect for opponents" etc which, although they may be cliches, do reflect the importance of relationships with others in team games. As far as individual activity is concerned there is the need - as in the aesthetic field - to appreciate the individual's right to unhindered participation, in the activity.

* * * * *

It should be appreciated that the inclusion of the subject areas mentioned above is not to argue for the need for moral education to be seen as some kind of "deep sea monster" which invades every school activity. In many cases an assertion that it should underline every activity would be absurdly impractical and highly complicate the learning process. It is felt however that the ability to understand and consider others, in some form or another, is implied by the way we have come to regard certain subjects and that present procedures in schools tend to confirm this view.

It would be wrong to infer that moral education might be carried out incidentally to preconceived ideas, by merely considering it an automatic part of work carried on in a collection of unrelated subjects. If moral education is to occur as part of the school programme it must be through some kind of conscious effort which recognises certain principles (specifically the principle of equal freedom) as underlying the purpose and scope of education. Not only should

the subjects of the school curriculum be seen as contributing to a complete and justifiable programme but also the school organisation and form of administration should reflect the type of principles which society has adopted - i.e. its value structure - in a consistent manner: If, for example non-interference is a principle then school policy should reflect it (cf dress, length of hair etc) or explain why it does not.

If schools are to take it upon themselves to state certain fundamental principles (equal freedom) then it can at least be said a starting point is being given for the development of individual moral codes and as consistent decision-making is desirable (it avoids confusion) this must surely be a necessary objective for education and society.

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