'FOR GOD, COUNTRY AND FAMILY'

POPULIST MORALISM AND THE NEW ZEALAND MORAL RIGHT

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is a study of the discourse of the moral right in New
Zealand. It critiques the prevailing analysis on the Left, that such a
phenomenon can be explained as an effect of class relations. Rather,
the moral right must be examined as a form of hegemonic politics
working on the terrain of the sex/gender and sexuality systems. The
thesis discusses both the conditions that gave rise to the moral right,
and the form and content of its discourse. It is argued that the moral
right can be understood through the concept of populist moralism. On
the basis of this interpretation of the moral right I put forward some
suggestions on how the Left should respond to this movement.

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INTRODUCTION

The central problem of the thesis is concerned with understanding the development and significance of the moral right in New Zealand. My thesis is situated within the field of cultural studies that is currently being developed in New Zealand and overseas. It is a self-conscious effort to pick up on Wood's (1982b) call for an indigenous cultural studies to adopt an explicit political role in academic work. Wood commented on the challenge presented to the Left with the conflict that surrounded the Springbok Tour of 1981. He argued that in the main, commentators on the Tour from the Left, reduced the issue to an effect of class relations. From this reductionist position the Left was unable to engage in a political response that could adequately deal with the underlying issues. Wood argues that the Tour called for an indigenous cultural studies to adopt a political role in coming to grips with the problem. In 1986, the Left is again faced with a problem that does not easily fit into a class analysis. In 1985 there emerged a vocal and public moral right that organised itself around the Coalition of Concerned Citizens (the CCC) firstly in response to the Homosexual Law Reform Bill, but more importantly as a movement to challenge what they see as a slackening in the country's 'morality'. This movement needs a fresh and critical approach from the Left. On the whole responses to the moral right have either seen it as the importation of the Moral Majority from the United

States to New Zealand, or have stressed that the moral right is an action of the ruling class to divide the working class and thereby maintain the dominant ideology. I believe that both of these responses fail to understand what is really at stake in the current struggle over 'morality'. In summary then, the purpose of the thesis is to understand the moral right in New Zealand. I argue that it is only possible to do this adequately through a political approach that is based on the cultural studies problematic. From this basis I then provide some strategic insights that the Left should use in its struggle against the moral right.

This chapter is divided into five sections. The first deals with definitions of Left and Right that are used in the thesis. The second provides a working definition of the moral right in New Zealand and a description of the organisations that I identify as part of this movement. The third section situates the thesis within the cultural studies problematic. Fourthly I provide a rationale for the use of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe as the main theoretical impetus for the thesis. Finally a chapter outline of the thesis is given.

1. Some Definitions: the Moral Right and the Left

Bennett, King and Nugent (1977) discuss in some detail the problems associated with the use of the terms Left and Right. They maintain that in particular the term right-wing 'is even more

chameleon-like than most social science concepts, often blanketing more than it reveals' (Bennett, King and Nugent,1977:3). This often results from its use as a derogatory term used with little analytical precision and concern for what might be the defining features of right-wing ideology. Bennett, King and Nugent (1977) offer three descriptive criteria that are useful in distinguishing the 'Left' from the 'Right' in the political spectrum. Firstly where the Left sees classes and class struggle as the moving force of history the Right gives this role to the nation or cultural or geographical unit. Therefore the Right articulates nationalist and patriotic ideologies. Secondly, the Left favours egalitarianism, while the Right is elitist and believes in hierarchies, leaders and often militarism. Finally, the Left appeals to reason and rationality in humans while the Right sees people as creatures of passion and therefore makes appeals often based on emotionally charged and seemingly irrational grounds. While these provide some guidelines for a definition of the two political poles, I would want to make some additional claims and provisos. Wilczynski gives the following description of 'the Left'.

> In capitalist countries the Left is identified today with:
> 1. political, economic and social reforms in favour of greater equality and popular participation;
> 2. substantial state intervention in the economy, including nationalisation;
> 3. the provision of generous social welfare by the state;
> 4. the separation of the church from the state and the latter's involvement in education;
> 5. internationalism, as distinct from nationalism; and
> 6. the acceptance of violence as a legitimate means of achieving political objectives (Wilczynski,1981:311).   [1]

While the Left has traditionally been seen as incorporating 'socialist' movements, I would add many of the new political movements that have risen since the end of World War Two. Therefore, my definition of the Left includes feminism, gay liberation, Maori activism, the ecological and peace movements where these movements are also anti-capitalist in nature.

Now that Left and Right have been distinguished, another problem arises with the necessity to distinguish between right-wing ideology in general and its more extreme or radical forms. The moral right may be defined as a section of what has been called variously, the 'new right', the 'radical right' or the 'extreme right'. These terms are often used interchangably, although some writers favour the use of the term 'new right' for the 'new' economic right (for example Sawer, 1981), while the 'radical' or 'extreme' right refers to right-wing groups that have the notions of 'nation' and/or 'race' as central concepts (Spoonley:1981,1984). Other writers favour using the 'new right' as a blanket term to describe all the racist, moral and economic right-wing groups that have emerged since the 1960s. Sawer maintains that the new right is made up of a variety of groups including free market devotees, libertarians, political philosophers, moral conservatives, religious fundamentalists and biological determinists. A uniting belief of these different groups is that state intervention is responsible for contemporary economic problems and the invasion of individual rights. It should be noted at this point that within this 'new right' there are two main threads. One is neo-conservative and the other libertarian.

> Conservatism is concerned with the preservation of the authority of traditional institutions and values and the preservation of authority as such. Society is viewed as a plurality of authorities rather than an aggregate of individuals, and it is the existence of authority in the social order which is the bulwark against centralising political power. Libertarianism on the other hand is about "back-lash politics", the politics of resentment, and the desire to pull down cherished institutions such as the welfare state. The libertarians want radical change rather than continuity (Sawer,1981:ix).

The moral right is part of the neo-conservative 'new right'. It is concerned with maintaining the authority of the family and traditional ideas about gender and sexual relations. Although those on the moral right will often talk about individual rights and liberties, these are always set within the context of the family. The welfare state is not seen as a necessarily bad thing except where it is seen to destabilise family relations and undermine conservative notions about the relationship between men and women, and children and their parents. With these points in mind it is possible to define in more detail the parameters of the moral right. Power makes a comment about the 'new right' in America that I believe provides a baseline for a definition of the moral right in New Zealand.

> The new right is not a monolithic organisation, but a loose grouping of political single-issue, and religious organisations with somewhat divergent interests. In recent years...these groups were able to forge a fairly high level of unity, which focussed in particular on reproductive, sexual and "family" issues. This unity is anti-feminist at heart (Power,1984:34).

To this description I would add that the unity is also profoundly sexually conservative at heart. Using this description, it is possible to map out what I consider to be that 'loose-grouping' of organisations which constitutes the moral right in New Zealand. Here, as in the United States, the moral right consists of a number of different interest groups, religious organisations, and churches. Many of these groups are 'single-issue' organisations, while others have broader terms of reference that encompass a number of related issues. However although there is diversity in organisational base, membership, strategy and goals amongst the groups there is one overarching ideological element that gives them a unity. The overall defining feature of the moral right is concern with the family. This institution is constantly invoked as being in a precarious position and therefore in desperate need of preservation and protection from the destabilising influences of 'permissive' society.

2. The Moral Right in New Zealand

In New Zealand there are at least 22 organisations that I am aware of, plus a number of fundamentalist churches, that I define as being part of the moral right and active in 1986. That is they have as their main interest issues that are commonly (and mistakenly) called 'private' issues dealing with morality. These include sex education, contraception, abortion, homosexuality, pornography, and sexual permissiveness. Some of the organisations that I have identified on

the moral right are presented in the following table [2].

TABLE ONE

Main Interest Groups Active on the Moral Right

NAME AND YEAR ESTABLISHED	MAIN AND SECONDARY INTERESTS
Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child (SPUC) — 1970	Abortion [sex education, the UN Convention, Homosexual Law Reform Bill]
Society for the Promotion of Community Standards (SPCS) — 1970	Pornography, abortion, sex education, Homosexual Law Reform
Family Rights Association (FRA) — 1973	'Family' [includes sex education Homosexual Law Reform Bill, abortion, tax reform, U.N. Convention]
Women for Life (formerly Feminists for Life) — 1974	Abortion [the U.N. Convention, affirmative action]
Concerned Parents Association (CPA) — 1974	Sex education and educational issues [Homosexual Law Reform Bill, U.N. Convention]
Integrity Centre — 1977	Abortion, U.N. Convention, tax reform, Homosexual Law Reform

Table One continued

New Zealand Organisation on
Moral Education (formerly
Community Organisation on
Moral Education)
(NZOME) *
- 1978

Sex education [pornography,
Homosexual Law Reform Bill]

Kiwi Forum (formerly Working
Women's Council Inc)
- 1980

Working Women's Charter, U.N.
Convention, affirmative action,
Bill of Rights, Homosexual Law
Reform, abortion etc

Credo
- 1981

Monitors media on various
'moral' issues

Christian Alternative
Movement (CAM)

Aims to promote Christian M.P.s

Christians for Life
- 1984

Abortion

Coalition of Concerned
Citizens (CCC)
- 1985

All 'moral' issues. Campaigns
to date Homosexual Law Reform
Bill, Education Amendment Bill,
Bill of Rights. Aims to
co-ordinate activity of moral
right.

* The NZOME is refered to throughout the thesis by its more familiar
name of COME.

This table lists the most important and unambiguously morally
conservative groups active on the moral right. Although some of them
like SPUC and Christians for Life have a more narrow focus (on the
issue of abortion), all of the groups have been involved in some way in
action against broader issues such as the Homosexual Law Reform Bill
and the Bill of Rights. The membership of all the individual groups is

not known (or is unavailable), but where membership details are known they vary from about 150 for the Christchurch based Christians for Life to the claimed 25,000 of the SPCS (this includes the membership of groups affiliated to the SPCS). The CPA does not release its membership numbers but it claims to have distributed 24,000 copies of its June 1985 newsletter. FRA has a membership of 2,500 and COME of 550.

In addition to the main groups listed above there are a number of smaller organisations that are also active on the moral right. Here can be included Pro-life Action Group, Right-to-Life, Prolife, and Pregnancy Counselling Services (all mainly concerned with abortion politics), and Exodus and Homosexuals Anonymous (two Christian groups that 'minister' to homosexuals). As well as these groups can be added the coalitions that have been formed around specific issues. The United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (hereafter the Convention) was the catalyst for a number of coalitions opposed to its ratification. These included the Coalition of Concerned New Zealanders, Coalition of Concerned Christians, Coalition against the Convention and the Council for a Free New Zealand. The last group was organised by the New Zealand League of Rights, which does not have a specific focus on 'moral' issues, but has recently taken more interest in them. The League has also been involved in the campaign against the Homosexual Law Reform Bill [3]. While the moral right is a relatively new phenomenon, many of its concerns have been expressed in the past in New Zealand. Some of the traditional conservative groups, such as the

Country Women's Institute and the Women's Christian Temperance Movement, have for a long time been active in promoting traditional sexual and moral values.

Several fundamentalist churches can be clearly linked to the moral right by their doctrine and philosophy and the support they have given to many of the moral right's platforms. Here the most important ones are the Assembly of God (the largest pentecostal group in New Zealand), Reform Church, Apostolic Church, Mormons, Full Gospel Mission, Salvation Army, Jehovah Witnesses, and Open Door Mission. All of these churches have as central tenets the sanctity of marriage and the family, and the preservation of traditional moral and sexual values. For instance the Apostolic Church claims that

> The social and moral health of the nation is intrinsically connected with the quality of its family life. Therefore the Church is committed to protecting and enriching the family unit. The ideals of chastity before marriage are upheld and divorce and remarriage in the Church is possible only in the event of the moral death (as defined in Scripture) of the original marriage (Donovan,1985:18).

Similarly the Mormons believe in the eternal nature of the family unit and 'the impropriety of premarital sex, complete fidelity in marriage etc' (ibid:46). The Reform Church of North Shore is particularly active on the moral right. It publishes a monthly newsletter called The Issacharian Report edited by Reverend Richard Flinn. The Report includes a comprehensive tape and book catalogue, and articles that have recently focussed on the Homosexual Law Reform Bill and the Bill of Rights. The Salvation Army has traditionally kept a low profile on

'political' issues, but with the Homosexual Law Reform Bill the church was one of the major organising forces behind the petition against the Bill. In addition to these fundamentalist churches a number of mainstream churches have reactionary forces in them which also uphold the traditional family and conservative moral values. For instance the pages of The Tablet (a weekly Catholic newspaper) reflect a conservative element that is in opposition to feminism and many of its platforms – recent examples include opposition to ratification of the Convention and the establishment of the Ministry of Women's Affairs.

The most significant unifying feature among all these groups is their discourse and use of the family as an important ideological principle. There are many formal and informal links between the groups and individuals on the moral right. However, while these are not the direct focus of this thesis, they can be traced through other sources (see Ansley,1985; Gordon,1985; Pardon,1985 and Dawson,1985).

3. Why Cultural Studies?

Because the thesis is situated within the problematic [4] of cultural studies it adopts an explicit political role. All thesis work is of course political in that certain assumptions are made concerning the nature of knowledge and the use it should be put to. Most thesis work, and indeed most research in New Zealand is framed within the liberal model. Maharey (1985) typifies the New Zealand research scene

as being characterised by 'liberal stasis'. That is there is a wide variety of theoretical positions that in the main do not engage with each another, nor do they advance the terms of the debate, but rather tolerance of different approaches is encouraged. Wood (1982b) discusses in more detail how this state of affairs developed in New Zealand (pp21-25). He describes the 'disarray' of New Zealand sociology in the following way.

> The developing local sociology, faced with a burgeoning number of intellectual "options", settled upon an overly fractured departmental multiplicity. This entails presenting students with as many sociologies as possible implying that they are all of equal value and between which one simply has to "choose" on the basis of some pre-existing (i.e. non-sociological) "commitment" (ibid:22)

Following his rejection of the liberal stasis in academic sociology, Wood eschews the literature review. He characterises it as an ideological practice because it attempts to solve the theoretical disarray of intellectual work by 'lodging a vote' for one approach and in the process merely acting to preserve intact that disarray (ibid:33). In a similar way I reject the traditional literature review, not because it is pointless to know what has been said about a problem, but because I do not believe that a survey of what has been written will advance an understanding of the problem. The weakness of this approach is that it does not allow intellectuals to 'think forwards' from their own entrenched positions (Maharey,1985:45-46). This thesis abandons such a position and instead asserts a socialist and feminist theoretical and political position that 'cares' about the object of the research and the use to which it could be put. While I have not reviewed all the literature on the subject of the moral right,

I have selected for discussion a number of left-wing comments on the movement that provides me with a more 'theory-focussed' way into analysing the moral right.

Acknowledging the political nature of the thesis is only one component of its insertion within the cultural studies problematic. It is necessary at this point to discuss what is entailed in a cultural studies approach [5]. Firstly it should be noted that cultural studies is not simply another 'approach' to be added to others, but is indeed a 'means of achieving some integration of the cultural problematic' (Wood,1982b:21). In this way cultural studies is not a discipline but rather is concerned with addressing a particular problem 'area'. That problem is one of 'culture'. Culture is defined more widely than the everyday use of the term which denotes those activities involving the arts, literature, theatre, ballet, 'high' forms of leisure and so on. Rather culture may be taken to mean,

> the production of forms of consciousness - ideas, feelings, desires, moral preferences, knowledges, forms of consciousness of self (Johnson,1980:11, quoted in Maharey,1985:46).

From this definition it is clear that the study of the moral right is indeed a study of part of New Zealand's culture. The moral right is intimately concerned with both producing and representing new forms of consciousness and moral preferences. It is a movement that explicitly works on people's ideas, feelings, and desires in the areas of sexuality and gender relations. Following from this definition of culture and an insertion of the moral right within this problematic,

the task of cultural studies can be outlined more concretely 'to specify the social and historical forms of consciousness and, more analytically, the processes or circuits through which they are produced' (Johnson,1980:12, quoted in Maharey, ibid). Both of these tasks are vital if a full understanding of the political significance of the moral right is to be gained. It is necessary to identify both the conditions on which the moral right arose and made itself 'known', and secondly the processes through which consciousness of itself and a problem in 'morality' are produced. Maharey points out that these two concerns, 'conditions and experience', represent 'the ever present dualism of social thought — most usually stated as structure and agency...The key concerns...represent the two major lines of thinking within cultural studies; culturalism and structuralism' (Maharey,1985:47). One of the major tasks of cultural studies has been the attempt to resolve this dualism. This theoretical problem is not examined here (for a discussion of the issues involved see Maharey 1981,1985; and Wood 1982b).

Therefore what the thesis attempts to provide, a single approach that can deal with both the conditions of existence of the moral right, and the forms of consciousness that it evokes. I believe that the work of Laclau and Mouffe (although they do not work explicitly from a cultural studies problematic) provides the theoretical sophistication that can work on the dialectic between practices and their conditions of existence. Their contribution is discussed briefly in the following section and in more detail in chapter two.

4. The Moral Right as a New Political Movement

The major theoretical impetus for the thesis comes from the work of Laclau and Mouffe. Their rejection of all forms of economism and class reductionism in Marxist theory, and the development of a discourse-theoretical approach, enables me to analyse the moral right from a perspective that emphasises the primacy of political factors in social and cultural determination. Laclau and Mouffe start from the position that there is a 'crisis' in Marxism and that left-wing thought is therefore at a crossroads. The crisis has been precipitated by the rise of new political movements since the second world war and the problem that this poses for the Left.

> What is now in crisis is a whole conception of socialism which rests upon the ontological centrality of the working class, upon the role of the Revolution, with a capital "r", as the founding moment in the transition from one type of society to another, and upon the illusory prospect of a perfectly unitary and homogenous collective will that will render pointless the moment of politics. The plural and multifarious character of contemporary social struggles has finally dissolved the last foundation for that political imaginary. Peopled with "universal" subjects and conceptually built around History in the singular, it has postulated "society" as an intelligible structure that could be intellectually mastered on the basis of certain class positions and reconstituted, as a rational, transparent order, through a founding act of the dissolution of that Jacobin imaginary (Laclau and Mouffe,1985:2).

This crisis is the result of the change in terrain on which socialist political struggle is taking place. The terrain has been changed by the emergence since the end of the second world war of new contradictions and political subjects which do not fit neatly into

traditional Marxist analysis which is centred so firmly on class relations. The emergence of new political subjects such as women, national, ethnic, and sexual minorities, anti-nuclear, anti-institutional and ecological movements has profoundly disturbed the traditional Marxist conception of classes as being the moving forces of society. In addition Laclau and Mouffe point out that a major theoretical obstacle facing Marxism today is

> the one arising from the conception that there are "laws of development" in history, operating in a pre-determined direction and guaranteeing a priori the arrival of socialism. According to such a perspective, political struggle is not seen as being constitutive of the social order, but as being a mere 'superstructure' of an inexorable economic process (Laclau and Mouffe,1981:17).

This is a considerable problem and one which has been analysed with varying degrees of success. Laclau and Mouffe maintain however that there are two contradictory discoures in Marxist thought. One strain of thought emphasises the ideas quoted above, and the other affirms the primacy of the political. Laclau and Mouffe discuss the tension between these two strains (1981,1985) and argue that the development of Gramsci's concept of hegemony provides a way into analysing in some detail how politics can be constitutive of social life. With the development in the late sixties of new antagonisms becoming more pronounced and the new political subjects and movements that these gave rise to, Marxist theorists were faced even more concretely with exploring movements that were not located in the relations of production and who define the enemy 'not by its function of exploitation but by wielding a certain power' (1985:21). Feminist,

radical black and gay liberation theory tried to take an understanding of these antagonisms beyond a reliance on class, but for the most part socialist thought remained trapped within these limits. The origins of these new antagonisms cannot be found in a place in the relations of production but rather are located in the by-products of industrialism – technocratisation and bureaucratisation. These processes have effects at all levels of society and they are responsible for many of the new political movements, including, I believe, the moral right. In more specific terms the emergence of new political subjects is to be found

> in the context of the commodification and bureaucratisation
> of social relations on the one hand, and the reformulation
> of liberal-democratic ideology – resulting from the
> expansion of struggles for equality – on the other (Laclau
> and Mouffe,1985:163).

A particularly relevant development that may account for the rise of the moral right, is the intervention of the state into more and more of the relations of civil society. In particular the bureaucratisation that has accompanied this move has been a major source of inequality and conflict. 'In all domains in which the state has intervened, a politicisation of social relations is at the base of numerous new antagonisms' (ibid:162). The moral right is clearly a response to this move, as it sees the involvement of the state, especially in areas that are part of the 'private' sphere of life, as an imposition that takes away the rights of parents and threatens the family and therefore must be strenuously resisted. The changes over time in what has been considered part of the 'public' and 'private' sphere reveals the actual

political character of social relations and 'the fact that these are
always the result of modes of institution that give them their form and
meaning' (ibid). However there is an ambiguity in this as the form of
state intervention is almost inevitably bureaucratic and the creation
of 'public' spaces does not necessarily imply a democratisation of
practices but imposes only new forms of state power. This is obviously
a point of conflict between the Right and the Left. While most
sections of the Left usually see state welfare and education measures
as positive intiatives that move away from an individual responsibility
towards a collective one, the moral right has tended to regard these
measures as intrusive on both individual rights and familial
responsibilities. In effect both of these positions are correct to
some extent. However where the moral right suggests solutions based on
authoritarian notions, the Left must base its solution on 'an extension
of democratic and popular control over politics and the economy and not
on a reinforcement of the authoritarian mechanisms of the state'
(Laclau and Mouffe,1981:17).

In conclusion this thesis examines the rise of the moral right in
contemporary New Zealand and attempts by the Left to make sense of this
phenomenon. For the most part the Left has failed to analyse the moral
right successfully because the theory has not been adequate to the
task. I believe that an understanding of the moral right is gained
through a cultural studies problematic that seeks to identify both the
conditions of existence of the moral right and its discourse. The
moral right can most usefully be understood as a new political movement
that has resulted from the increase in antagonisms since the Second

World War, and the consequent processes of technocratisation, bureaucratisation and industrialisation. The method for my research can be found in Appendix Two.

5. Chapter Outline

Chapter one examines four different approaches that the Left in New Zealand has used in attempting to come to an understanding of the moral right. I have characterised these approaches as the tendency to see the moral right as; (i) a ruling class force; (ii) a manifestation of petty bourgeois interests; (iii) the outcome of a 'mass psychology of fascism'; or (iv) a form of moral imperialism by the United States. Each of these approaches is taken in turn and examined for its weaknesses. I conclude the chapter by asserting that the analyses discussed are inadequate explanations of the moral right because of the problems associated with the way in which ideology, power, subjectivity, and 'private' issues are theorised.

Chapter two addresses the problems identified in chapter one and sets out a framework for analysing the moral right that uses as a central concept 'hegemony' as developd by Laclau and Mouffe. The concepts of sex/gender and sexuality systems are discussed as they relate to the terrain on which the moral right works. Finally I outline the concept of populist moralism which I argue provides the analytical tool to explain the moral right.

In chapter three, the conditions for the development of the moral right are mapped out. I examine the sex/gender and sexuality systems as they existed after the second world war and discuss how the conditions and contradictions of this period provided the grounds on which a liberal challenge developed in the sixties and which has since seen the emergence of the moral right.

Chapter four discusses populist moralism as it developed around the particular debate over sex education. It is argued in this chapter that 'the family' provides the articulating principle for the moral right in its discourse on sex education.

The final chapter attempts to provide some ideas about what the Left can do in its struggle against the moral right. The chapter first of all sets out the senses in which the moral right does pose a threat to socialist and feminist ideals of democracy, equality and justice. I then critique the Campaign for Tolerance and 'class struggle' approaches to the moral right. The final section discusses how the Left should address the problem of populist moralism through the strategy of a 'war of position'. In particular I map out some radical approaches to the problems of sexuality and the family.

NOTES

1. The final point about the desirability of violence as a means of achieving socialism is one that receives a good deal of debate on the Left. I would not include it as an essential component of a definition of the Left.

2. A full list of all the organisations and churches that are considered to be part of the moral right is given in Appendix One.

3. Jane Kelsey writes about the League, 'Whilst the League has not channelled much of its own energy directly against the feminist movement, it has provided active and ideological support for those who have been in the forefront of such attacks. By the very fact of its basic commitment to "British heritage and tradition and to fundamental Christianity", it is of course committed to perpetuating the white patriarchal state which that embodies. More actively, though, its bookshop stocks right-wing propaganda on abortion, sex education, homosexuality, religion in schools, and provides a vehicle for its distribution. Members of anti-feminist pressure groups such as the CPA, are also known "supporters" of the League' (Kelsey,1982:69).

4. A problematic may be defined as 'a definite theoretical structure, a field of concepts, which organises a particular science or individual text by making it possible to ask some kinds of questions and by suppressing others' (Johnson,1979:20 quoted in

Wood,1982b:64).

5. This section is based on Maharey's recent article 'Filling the
    Hole: An Approach to Cultural Studies Research' (1985) and Wood's
    thesis <u>Smashing the Audience</u> (1982b).

CHAPTER ONE

'The Growing Might of the Moral Right'

What has the Left Got to Say?

Since the 1970s the Left has been trying to make sense of the development of a new political movement in New Zealand. The emergence of the moral right can be seen as early as 1970 with the establishment of SPUC and SPCS. These organisations were greeted as merely a conservative backlash to the proposed liberalisation of abortion laws and the sexual 'permissiveness' that had developed over the sixties. It was not until about 1980 that the Left began to see, not just a number of morally conservative groups, but the genesis of a movement that was becoming increasingly vocal. From this date the Left started to analyse in more depth the possible significance of a moral right, but it was not until 1984 and the events of that and the following year, that the concept of a moral right came into the consciousness of most New Zealanders and began to be treated with a degree of seriousness by the media. With the election of the Labour government in July of 1984 a number of the Labour Party's policies were acted on and the moral right reacted with a show of force by forming a number of

coalitions and strengthening the informal network that already existed between different groups. The first major battle was over the Convention. The Council for a Free New Zealand was established at this time by the League of Rights to stop the ratification of the Convention, as was the Council of Concerned New Zealanders. The Women's Forums in late 1984 saw a massive mobilisation of Christian women who opposed much of Labour's policy because of its 'anti-family' bias. In 1985 the Homosexual Law Reform Bill was seen by many on the moral right as 'the last straw' in the growing tide of permissiveness and in September the CCC was established amidst a bitter campaign to oppose it. These events provided the Left with a challenge both in analysis and strategy. Prior to 1984 there had been little serious analysis of the moral right in New Zealand. Paul Spoonley's analysis of the extreme right (in its racist form), some feminist discussion of anti-feminism and various other minor commentaries were the extent of the debate on the topic. With the developments of 1984 and 1985 not only the Left but liberal forces in New Zealand have begun to see the moral right as a very real threat to some of New Zealander's most cherished notions about freedom of expression, democracy and morality.

This chapter is concerned with analysing the different approaches that the Left has taken in its attempts to understand the development of right-wing ideology in New Zealand. It concentrates on socialist rather than feminist analyses because unlike the male Left, feminists have always stressed the political nature of the 'private' issues (such as pornography, abortion, sexuality etc) that form the platform for the moral right. Feminists have seen the development of right-wing groups

as representing a move towards conservative political action on what is traditionally thought of as 'private' issues. While feminists have recognised these issues as important sites of political struggle, feminist appraisals of moves made by the moral right have unfortunately tended to be limited to descriptive accounts. These have highlighted the anti-feminist nature of moral conservatism but have in general failed to examine in more detail their nature and significance. With the rise of the moral right, the Left has been confronted with trying to defend against attacks on what was previously considered outside the realm of 'real' politics. I believe that this neglect of seemingly 'private' issues is one of the reasons why the Left has responded so poorly to the problem of the moral right.

I have identified four main approaches to the study of the moral right in New Zealand from the Left. These can be characterised as (i) the orthodox Marxist position that the right wing is merely the ruling class in disguise; (ii) the neo-Marxist theory that right wing organisations are the manifestation of petty bourgeois interests; (iii) the application of Reichian theory that maintains the moral right is an outcome of the mass psychology of fascism; and (iv) the idea that the moral right in New Zealand has been imported from the United States and is a form of moral imperialism.

1. The Moral Right as the Ruling Class in Disguise

(i) Orthodox socialist analysis

The main approach of the orthodox Left to the problem of the moral right has been to reduce it to an effect of class. A clear example of this kind of approach can be found in the writings of the Socialist Action League (SAL) and of David Bedggood. The SAL, in discussing the right wing campaign against the Homosexual Law Reform Bill, maintain that the right wing offensive can be explained as a reflection of the deepening class polarisation that is happening in New Zealand. 'At the heart of this polarisation is the fundamental class conflict between working people and the ruling capitalist class which exploits them' (Morgan,1985b:4). The mobilisation of right wing forces is seen in the context of an assault on all democratic rights (including those of women, ethnic minorities and the working class) and is an attempt to halt social progress. The move to take away democratic rights 'goes hand-in-hand with the capitalist anti-worker austerity offensive and imperialism's drive towards war'(ibid:8). Although the SAL does not claim that the capitalist ruling class is directly responsible for right wing actions, nonetheless they believe it is the ruling class who will benefit from a successful right wing campaign (Morgan,1985a:3). The anti-homosexual campaign is therefore interpreted as a tactic of the ruling class to use prejudice against the working class in an attempt to divide them as a class and stop them from seeing the issue for what it 'really is...the cutting edge of the class struggle' (Morgan,1985b:8).

> Fundamentally, the political struggle to advance the civil
> rights of gay men and lesbians, like the fight for women's
> equality and against racism and national oppression, is a
> reflection of the struggle of class against class (ibid:9).

This statement epitomises the idea that struggles around gender, race,
sexuality and nationality are 'civil rights' issues which are only
significant inasmuch as they can be attributed in the final instance to
class struggle. From this position, the SAL maintains that the best
means to fight right wing forces, and to win the campaign for the
Homosexual Law Reform Bill, is to use unions,

> because they are the only mass institutions specifically
> created to represent the interests of working people
> against the employers, and are potentially the most
> powerful social instruments that exist (ibid).

On the question of the 'moral' basis of the right wing campaign, the
SAL comments that 'the right wingers have not picked on the issue of
homosexual law reform to launch an offensive because of deeply-held
moral principles' (Morgan,1985a:4). Rather they argue that this is
purely a tactical move made by the ruling class because they believe
they can win on this issue and therefore on a number of other
anti-democratic issues (e.g. voluntary unionism, women's rights to
abortion, etc). In a separate discussion on the anti-abortion
movement, Morgan claims that right wing forces, which 'simply provide
cover for the capitalist ruling class's own offensive against women's
equality' (Morgan,1985c:3) are seeking to maintain and increase the
economic benefits they gain from women's inequality. This argument
rests on the claim that the root of women's inequality is to be found

in their position as <u>class</u> subjects within capitalist society. Furthermore the right wing campaign against abortion is seen as an attempt to turn back the growing support for women's rights and again to 'divide and demoralise the working class, to try and prevent us from uniting in common defence of our rights and living standards' (ibid).

Bedggood makes a number of related claims in his comment on the Tania Harris anti-union march of 1981. While he speculates that the demonstration of right wing feeling is 'a stepping-up of the "mass psychology of fascism" as growing numbers of workers become more and more anxious about their economic security and seek to find a political scapegoat in the trade unions' (Bedggood,1981:3), his position is more closely aligned to that of the SAL than to Reich. He acknowledges that the anti-union feelings of the march are found not only in the traditional enemies of the labour movement, but in all classes in New Zealand. What is significant about the large working class support for the march — which he characterises as being 'drawn from the most vociferous petty-bourgeois section of the white-collar working class' (ibid) — is that it is the result of workers being influenced by capitalist propaganda. He claims that the working class, through the labour movement, has restricted itself to working on the 'reformist' plane of parliamentary politics and industrial relations. This has made it possible for the ruling class to create and foster feelings of 'national interest'. Because of the manipulation of the workers by the capitalists, the labour movement he argues is dominated by the same job psychology that the Queen St march displayed. This propaganda inculcates nationalist, sexist and racist values, and thereby prepares

the way for fascism. As a strategy against right wing actions Bedggood suggests that workers must reject capitalist propaganda and see it for what it is - a means to keep the working class divided. The task is to show workers that unions are not to blame for the crisis, which is rather the result of 'an inevitable tendency of capitalism itself' (ibid:4). In this way he claims the struggle will be seen for what it really is - a class struggle. This realisation should then lead to a situation where it will be possible to eliminate both racism and sexism because workers will see it is not in their 'real interests' as class subjects to maintain these ideologies of oppression.

In an earlier discussion Bedggood maintains that a socialist unity that can combat 'fascist' tendencies in New Zealand must be based upon a 'united front' (Bedggood,1980:20). Bedggood uses Trotsky's distinction between 'united' and 'popular' fronts. He rejects a popular front because it is characterised by an alliance of communist, left, radical and labour parties that work within the terms of parliamentary democracy, and the Communist Party is held back from calling for a socialist revolution on its own terms. In contrast a united front refers to an alliance of a Communist Party with any other party for the purpose of defending the working class from defeat by Fascists. The united front works on a Communist programme that rejects reformist measures such as parliamentary socialism. Because it is able to work on a purely communist platform it is said to be able to demonstrate its ability to lead the working class and show by this practice that it is the agent of revolution. Following this logic Bedggood is able to state definitively that,

the only socialist unity that will work as an historical
alternative to Fascism in the 1980s is that based on a
united front. This tactic becomes the means of both the
defence of the working class and the building of a real
"left" in this country (ibid).

(ii) <u>Critique</u>

There are four main points in the arguments of the SAL and

Bedggood that I would take issue with. The first two (shared by both)

are (i) that the right wing offensive is an outcome of class struggle

and (ii) that ideologies of racism, nationalism, sexism, etc are merely

the reflection of capitalist propaganda and the dominant ideology. The

other two points concern the SAL's tendency to regard struggles around

gender, 'race', and sexual orientation as having a 'civil rights'

status, and finally to see the 'moral' terms of struggle as only a

camouflage for class issues.

On the first point, both the SAL and Bedggood employ an orthodox

position that maintains all progressive struggles in capitalist society

are ultimately reducible to class. This class reductionist position

holds to the view that ideology and politics can be conceptualised as

being determined by the position of agents within the relations of

production (Laclau and Mouffe,1982:191). In terms of the specific

development of the moral right in New Zealand this is clearly a

problematic position. Class reductionism has been criticised within

Marxist theory by feminists who claim women's oppression cannot be

accounted for only through the logic of capitalism and classes; by

Black theorists who maintain that racism is not simply a product of class factors, and by theorists influenced by Antonio Gramsci who stressed that there are other contradictions in society besides those organised around class. One of the most thorough-going critiques of the class reductionism of most Marxist theory has been made by Ernesto Laclau and Chantel Mouffe (1982,1985). Mouffe argues that the persistence of Marxist theories in articulating a class reductionist position is the result of their

> lack of understanding of the nature of ideology and of the way in which we are constituted as subjects. The prevailing conception - which manifests the general problematic of class reductionism - has been that all subjects are class subjects; that each class has a paradigmatic class ideology; and that each ideological element has a necessary class belonging (Mouffe in Laclau and Mouffe,1982:94).

The SAL reflects this shortcoming in their theorisation of the moral right. Taking the first point of class reductionism that maintains all subjects are class subjects it can be said that this neglects the fact that people enter into many kinds of social relations and not just those arising from their position in the relations of production. Individuals also live out their lives as members of an ethnic group, as gendered beings, as having a particular sexual orientation etc. Each of these social facts has an autonomy of its own that is not only secondary to class.

The second and third points of class reductionism that Mouffe outlines above reflect the problems of much Marxist theorisation of ideology. Bedggood's work illustrates the problems of theorising

ideology in a reductionist way. Wood claims that Bedggood's work is based on the premise that the effect of the domination of bourgeois ideology is to

> produce in working class individuals a conservative
> psychology...[which is] a particular configuration of
> character traits that cohere to form an "authoritarian
> personality" (Wood,1982a:17).

The thrust of Bedggood's argument is that the working class has been totally dominated by bourgeois culture. Bedggood explains this through the two ideological procedures of (i) 'reflection' (i.e there is shown to be a direct relationship between bourgeois values of achievement, individualism etc, and capitalist social relations), and (ii) 'transference' (i.e. the working class is seen to have no consciousness of its own because the apparatuses of the state simply impose on them its bourgeois values). In this way Bedggood asserts that the working class has been duped into believing the 'dominant ideology' and they are therefore the victims of 'false consciousness'. The notion of a false consciousness is rejected by Mouffe in a discussion of Althusser where she claims that;

> The conception, which presupposes an original subject who
> could have a consciousness (true or false) of his/her
> precise position in the social process, rests upon an
> empiricist notion of knowledge as 'vision' which Althusser
> has frequently criticised. Against this, Althusser
> proposes a problematic of ideology as a practice producing
> subjects (Mouffe,1981:168-9).

Wood also accepts Althusser's critique and argues in contrast to Bedggood's conceptualisation of ideology, that theories must,

> restore the notion of 'hegemony', frequently used (gesturally) by Bedggood, to its proper and more useful meaning. It does not refer to the smooth, uninterrupted expression of ideological domination by cultural appartuses of the bourgeoisie. Ideology is neither psychological, moralistic nor reducible to conspiracy — it is a complex of structured practices. Hegemony refers to the continual struggle and securing of ideological domination by the ruling class alliance. It establishes equilibrium, not equivalence (Wood,1982a:19).

In light of these points it is therefore meaningless to suppose that a class has a necessary and corresponding ideology, and that every ideological element is a reflection of a class base. That each ideological element has a necessary class belonging may be refuted by considering an ideology such as nationalism. Such an ideological system has been used by both Mao in China and Hitler in Germany. An attempt to explain nationalism therefore cannot be done from a class reductionist framework (Jones,1978:58).

> This conception necessarily leads to seeing ideological struggle as a confrontation between two closed ideological systems completely opposed one to the other, in which victory consists in the total destruction of 'bourgeois ideology'. There is no space here for a process of transformation of ideological elements, of differential articulation through which new political subjects are created. Nor is there any space to understand the importance of determinants of consciousness which are not reducible to class position (Mouffe in Laclau and Mouffe,1982:94).

This non-class-reductionist formulation of 'the subject' and ideology is necessary for an analysis of the moral right. The thesis is concerned with interpreting the struggle over morality not simply as a confrontation between two opposed systems, but rather as one where a new political movement and subjects were created.

The final two points are related to the failure of the Left to take seriously the political status of so-called moral and private issues. The claim by the SAL that the fight against the Homosexual Law Reform Bill is not really a 'moral' issue, is a reflection of its tendency to see political issues only in terms of class. This position not only neglects the extent to which there are deeply entrenched and firmly believed ideas about the 'moral perversity' of homosexuality, sex outside of marriage, and feminism, but it also reflects the fact that the SAL sees 'private' issues (such as what people do in their bedroom) as being not really political. I have argued elsewhere (Ryan,1986) that it is the moral right that has realised the significance of 'private' and 'moral' issues in defining the just society.

> Numerous right-wing groups are mobilising on issues such as abortion, contraception, "sexual permissiveness" and homosexuality. They have effectively responded to, and challenged, people's ideas about sexuality and they are increasingly the ones setting the agenda for sexual politics. There are important lessons for the Left to learn from the Right's recognition of these "moral" matters. It is vital that socialists recapture "private" and "moral" terrain as political and central for the struggle for socialism. If we leave issues of sexuality to the Patricia Bartletts of our society, we do so at our peril. Not only will the well-organised Right gain more ground but socialism will have failed to create a vocal, visible and viable sexual politics (Ryan,1986:95).

The failure of the Left to capture this ground is also reflected in its tendency, exemplified by the SAL, to see struggles around women and sexual minorities as being characterised by 'civil rights' issues. While they hold to the position that right wing campaigns against women and homosexuals are ultimately reducible to class, the SAL believes that a strategy to meet the immediate demands of these groups can be found in an approach emphasising 'civil rights'. I have criticised this approach because of the tendency (in the case of gay rights as an example) to accommodate homosexual politics

> by merely adding "gay rights" to a political agenda that is already composed of other issues. The main priority is still considered to be change in the economic sphere and class relations...Even if at times homosexuality as an issue moves up the list of priorities, this has done nothing to redefine socialism as a project which seeks to transform all social relations, including sexual relations (ibid:101).

In contrast to the civil rights approach I believe it is necessary to advance a strategy that works on many levels. While law reform in the areas of abortion, homosexuality and other specific sites of sexual and gender relations are indeed necessary, what is more important is a strategy that completely reconceptualises the significance of sexual and gender relations in organising social life. Some of the relevant issues will be discussed in more detail in chapter five.

2. The New Right as a Manifestion of Petty Bourgeois Interests

(i) The extreme right and the petty bourgeoisie

Spoonley has been writing since 1978 on the development of the extreme right wing in New Zealand. In his article 'New Zealand First! the Extreme Right and Politics in New Zealand, 1961-1981' (1981) Spoonley provides an interesting descriptive account of the extreme right's activities, particularly focussing on the decade 1971 to 1981. Although he does not provide a detailed explanation for the rise of extreme right wing groups, he suggests that a cause may be found in,

> the relationship between growth in support for extremist beliefs and groups, and major social and economic dislocation...In the first ten years covered by the survey, twelve of the fifty groups in the main listing were formed. In comparison with the affluent years of the 1960s, the 1970s have witnessed a continuing recession and correspondingly, the number of groups has increased. Nearly four-fifths (38) of the groups appeared in the decade from 1971 to 1981. Further, the numbers supporting the extreme right have apparently increased. (Spoonley,1981:121).

Spoonley has gone on to develop his argument in more recent work on the extreme right wing group - the League of Rights. Although he does not examine in detail the empirical questions of the class base of the League of Rights, Spoonley does speculate on the processes that produce such groups. Following the early work of Laclau (1977) he claims there are other struggles within capitalism besides those centred on class. Following Gramsci's theory, contradictions around gender, 'race', nationality etc are considered to be represented through

popular-democratic struggles. Although they are accorded a degree of autonomous effectivity, popular-democratic struggles are still ultimately seen as being overdetermined by the class contradiction. Spoonley accepts Laclau's early argument that;

> the position of certain groups, notably the petty bourgeois, outside the major relations of production results in a concern with the relations of domination and a struggle that is expressed at the ideological and political level...the radical right can be identified as one expression of petty bourgeois interests because they offer a world view that is based on ideological concerns ("race") as opposed to one that is class-based (Spoonley,1984:73).

Spoonley explains why it is the petty bourgeoisie hold these views by saying that this class is separated from the dominant relations of production. The petty bourgeoisie therefore poses the contradiction between its class location and the dominant ruling class;

> not in terms of the relations of production but at the level of political and ideological relations which constitute the system of domination. Thus they conceive of this struggle as a popular-democratic struggle, not as a class struggle...the organisational form and ideological position of the radical right corresponds to the specific class needs of the petty bourgeoisie. In this sense, these groups represent one manifestation of the political interests of this particular class (ibid:73-4).

(ii) Critique

Spoonley's argument recognises that certain fractions of the petty bourgeoisie express their political interests through an ideological position that relies on popular-democratic struggles rather than class concerns. Ultimately however the argument is reductionist because it

claims there is a correspondence between a class position and a certain political position. This argument is subject to the same criticisms made above about the misrecognition by Marxists of the nature of ideology and the constitution of subjects. The belief that popular-democratic struggles such as those of the extreme right are overdetermined by class struggle is the result of maintaining that ultimately it is the relations of production that are determinant over ideological and political relations. This position is criticised by Laclau and Mouffe who, when arguing against the dangers of the economism that characterises Marxist theory, maintain that there is no 'last instance' of the economic sphere. Instead this level is also seen as a site of struggle and its movements are determined by political considerations in the same way that the state, education, and other sites of struggle are determined. This point is taken up in detail in chapter two.

3. The Moral Right and 'The Mass Psychology of Fascism'

(i) The authoritarian personality and fascism

Claims have been made by various sections of the Left, that right wing reaction, particularly in relation to issues of sexuality, can be accounted for by Reich's theory of 'the mass psychology of fascism'. In his book of the same name Reich (1970) argues that fascism arises not from a political programme but rather from a personality structure

that is possessed by individuals brought up within an authoritarian state and/or family. His theory has not been widely used by the Left in New Zealand but it has enough of a presence to deserve some discussion here. I examine three applications of Reich's theory to right wing phenomena in New Zealand. Firstly, M. Reid (1978) has raised the thesis to explain the role of the family in contemporary New Zealand society and the rise of certain right wing groups; Christine Dann (1981) argues that certain tendencies in the sex education debate can be attributed to an emerging fascism; and Bruce Jesson (1985) speculates that the virulent opposition to the Homosexual Law Reform Bill may be related to a connection between the authoritarian personality and sexual repression.

Christine Dann in a discussion of right wing activites on the sex education debate uses an analysis drawn from Reich's book The Mass Psychology of Fascism. Dann maintains that the right wing campaign of COME and various other groups who are against sex education repreesents the development of 'Fascist sex education in New Zealand' (Dann,1981:9). She argues that when the economic boom of the 1960s and early 1970s and the radical movements of the same period eventually gave way to the economic and political crises of the 1970's, a situation developed where personal freedoms came under increased attack from both the state and various right wing groups. The development of the moral right at this time was a response to the fact that 'political, economic and sexual repression are intimately and organically linked' (Dann,1981:9). Dann maintains that this necessary link between the three forms of repression led to a situation where the

right began making the connection between sex and politics and started organising itself on that basis. Following Reich, Dann maintains that the basis of the moral right reaction in New Zealand to the political and economic conditions is

> a psychological structure which is common to all persons brought up within an authoritarian patriarchal family within an authoritarian (or even a liberal) capitalist state (ibid:10).

When this psychological structure interacts with a worsening economic climate the conditions then exist for the development of fascism. In the terms of this analysis Dann argues that the anti-sex education movement represents the movement towards classic fascism with its ploy of repressing information on sexuality.

Reid comments on the role that the New Zealand family plays in upholding the capitalist and patriarchal system. The author states that one of the major roles of the family is to reproduce 'authoritarian character structures within children who pass through it' (Reid,1978:13). Reid explains the rise of reactionary groups in New Zealand through their understanding of the relationship between the family in its authoritarian form and the state.

> Groups like the Save Our Homes Campaign, the Concerned Parents Association, the Society for the Promotion of Community Standards, the home grown version of the National Front and others are in the vanguard of the right wing reaction to the present crisis (ibid).

Reid maintains that these groups use the family as a means of maintaining the authoritarian state by using the mass psychology of fascism. Right wing movements are said to be based on

> mythologising reality. They conceal the class nature of society and look for solutions in both strong leadership and self denial. Such sexual repression creates the conditions which allows for the enslavement and manipulation of the masses (ibid:14).

The family is upheld because it is seen to fulfill the important functions of consumption, transmitting values and creating authoritarian personality structures within children.

Bruce Jesson also uses Reich's theory in an attempt to analyse one component of the moral right's current campaign. He maintains that the fierce opposition to the Homosexual Law Reform Bill may be explained by the link that exists between authoritarian personalities and sexual repression. The mass appeal of the anti-homosexual campaign is therefore due to the 'basic traits of bigotry and irrationality in our popular culture' (Jesson,1985:34). Jesson believes it is primarily the male who is seeking to suppress 'at a social level, a phenomenon that is rigidly controlled in his own nature' (ibid:35).

(ii) Critique

There are a number of problems associated with both Reich's theory and the attempt to apply it to New Zealand conditions. Firstly I will examine some minor points before discussing in more detail the problems

that arise from typifying the control of sexuality as 'sexual repression'.

A common assumption that Dann, Reid and Jesson make is that it is possible to apply Reich's theory to contemporary New Zealand. This implies that the social conditions that were present in Nazi Germany are also to be found in New Zealand during the seventies and eighties. While the development of social forces in New Zealand at this time, certainly involved a movement towards right wing ideologies and organisation around a conservative moralist position, it is far removed from fascism understood in its classical sense as a result of monopoly capitalism organising social life in a totalitarian way and emphasising ideologies of nationalism, authoritarianism and militarism (Bottomore,1983:162). Neither Dann nor Jesson produces evidence to support the claim that there does in fact exist within New Zealanders a psychological structure that can be appealed to through a 'mass psychology of fascism'. Dann's claim that most 'of us' (presumably Pakeha New Zealanders) were brought up in an authoritarian patriarchal family, needs substantiating. A problem with the theory itself is the claim that personality structures can be responsible for the development of broad social movements. Clearly it is not reasonable to explain the development of a social and historical phenomenon such as fascism through the psychology of individuals. Reich claims that fascism is simply 'the basic emotional attitude of man in authoritarian society' (Reich, 1970:XIII, cited in Laclau,1977:84); fascism is therefore explained in terms of individuals and their personality. In effect 'Behaviour is reduced to psychology' (Wood,1982a:19) and all the

concrete social and cultural determinants that shape behaviour are reduced to individual factors. Laclau criticises this position because it means that an understanding of fascism as a political movement is then

> removed from any concrete conjuncture and comes to be something like that condensation and expression of man's age-old repression accentuated by a particular political and social crisis, which has enabled impulses normally sublimated to have a free rein (Laclau,1977:86).

These points aside, the most important problem with Reich's theory and its use to explain right wing phenomena in New Zealand is the reliance on an explanation of sexuality through the concept of sexual repression. Reich developed his theory in an attempt to explain the existence of authoritarianism in states that were characterised by at least some measure of democratic rights. He tried to answer the question of why fascism enjoyed 'active support or at least passive acceptance amongst social groups whose interest, according to a marxist calculus, were opposed to such a regime' by linking the socially necessary process of accumulation to repressive sexuality (Cook,1983:89). The implication of Reich's theory, and one which sexual libertarians (especially during the sixties) grasped, was that unfettered sexual expression was the way to negate fascism. The idea that sexual repression is what is at the heart of fascist tendencies, and indeed much of Western society, has been challenged by Foucault (1978) who claims that on the contrary 'we can not stop talking about sex. We have constituted sex as a "problem of truth" which we study and discuss relentlessly' (Dann,1985:79). Sexuality has been the area

perhaps most resistant to the challenge against essentialism. Weeks speculates that this could be 'precisely because its power seems to derive from our natural being' (Weeks,1981a:90). Sexuality is seen to be so connected with our bodies that it seems to be 'obviously' a natural phenomenon, that can either be 'repressed' or allowed free expression. Rubin describes sexual essentialism as,

> the idea that sex is a natural force that exists prior to social life and shapes institutions. Sexual essentialism is embedded in the folk wisdoms of Western societies, which consider sex to be eternally unchanging, asocial, and transhistorical. Dominated for over a century by medicine, psychiatry, and psychology, the academic study of sex has reproduced essentialism. These fields classify sex as a property of individuals. It may reside in their hormones or psyches. It may be construed as physiological or psychological. But within these ethnoscientific categories, sexuality has no history and no significant determinants (Rubin,1984:275-6).

The concept of sex essentialism has been criticised through the recent work of interactionist, psychoanalytic and discursive theories. Weeks (1981a) summarises three points that the different approaches agree on in their challenge of essentialism. First of all the idea of sex as an 'autonomous realm, a natural force with specific effects, a rebellious energy which the social controls' is rejected; secondly sexual definition is recognised as being located in social sources; and finally the notion that the history of sexuality can be described through the concept of repression is rejected (ibid:93). What is of particular significance for an explanation of the moral right is that rejection of 'repression' as an explanation of sexuality. Weeks quotes Zinner's interpretation of Foucault here.

> [There are] four major arguments against the repression
> hypothesis. (1) it is based on an outmoded model of power;
> (2) it leads to a narrow construction of the family's
> function; (3) it is class specific and applies
> historically to bourgeois sexuality; and (4) it often
> results in a one-sided conception of how authority
> interacts with sexuality - a negative rather than a
> positive conception (Zinner,1978:215-16 in Weeks,ibid).

The rejection of sexual repression and essentialism has a significance beyond a critique of Reich's work and the application of it to conditions in New Zealand. It also has implications for the analysis of the discourse and control of sexuality. This theme will be taken up in more detail in chapter two.

4. The Moral Right and United States Moral Imperialism

(i) The 'Moral Majority' in New Zealand?

With the establishment of the national and regional Coalitions of Concerned Citizens, and the intense campaign against the Homosexual Law Reform Bill, many political commentators have drawn parallels between the moral right in New Zealand and the Moral Majority in the United States. Newspaper editorials around the country warned of the links being forged between American and New Zealand morals groups. Mike Steel states definitively that,

Moral majority, fuelled by overseas right wing groups and
tapping existing New Zealand organisations, has
arrived...it is modelled on the powerful American Moral
Majority and aims to copy the sweeping success of its
United States counterpart in replacing politicians who
oppose its moral stance (Steel,1986:3).

Not only are links seen between the Moral Majority and the moral right

in New Zealand, but these are often interpreted as a form of

imperialism by United States moralists. In its introduction to an

issue of Infact on the moral right the authors claim that,

The Coalition of Concerned Citizens draws its inspiration
from movements within the United States of America...These
are to be understood primarily in terms of American
religious phenomena exported to the rest of the world as an
integral part of United States global policy
(Infact,Sept/Oct 1985:1).

Alison Laurie (1985) also claims that recent organisation around the

Homosexual Law Reform Bill is a form of moral imperialism by the United

States. The visits to New Zealand by United States moral right

organisers Lou Sheldon and Jack Swann are taken to be attempts by the

United States to build a movement that will,

destabilise and eventually...remove the Labour Government.
They will support "Christian" and conservative candidates
throughout the country at the next elections, in order to
defeat all targetted liberals, as they have done so
successfully in the United States. They will also be putting
pressure on MPs as their organisation becomes more powerful.
A new Government (possibly even the conservative rump of a
Labour one) will be expected to reverse the anti-nuclear
decision, and to play ball on any other legislation which the
moral right sees as essential for it to build and retain
political control (Laurie,1985:8).

(ii) Critique

Although this position is not well developed on the Left, it is popular amongst journalists and could prove attractive to those fond of an approach emphasising the imperialist nature of capitalism. Since the United States is seen as the world capitalist and imperialist force par excellence by many on the Left, it would not be stretching the imagination of orthodox Marxists too wildly to see involvement by some American moralists in New Zealand campaigns as United States moral imperialism.

A major problem with this approach is that it uses the Moral Majority (which is only one right wing group organising on 'moral' issues in the States) as a symbol that can also explain what is happening in New Zealand. While I think Laurie is correct in her statement that the moral right will be trying to extend their influence through the parliamentary process, it is a mistake to say the movement is the result of a form of United States imperialism. Not only does this ignore the growing strength of an indigenous movement in New Zealand, but it overemphasises the similarites between the two movements. As Spoonley (1985) has pointed out there are also many important differences. The moral right in the States have access to 1300 radio stations and 40 television stations. Evangelical and fundamentalist churches combine the medium of the electronic churches with sophisticated direct-mailing campaigns. These mass media resources are simply not as readily available to the moral right in New Zealand and they have yet to develop direct mailing techniques to the

level of sophistication achieved in the United States. The
fundamentalist Christian link, while growing in New Zealand, is nowhere
as strong as it is in the States. Spoonley however goes on to claim
that while 'the moral right are not about to disappear...their use of a
narrow form of Christianity is unlikely to attract many outside the
established but relatively small fundamentalist Christian community in
New Zealand' (1985). This seems to me to ignore both the attempts and
partial success of the moral right in capturing 'middle New Zealand'
particularly around single-issue campaigns such as the Homosexual Law
Reform Bill. A reliance by some authors on seeing the moral right as
merely part of United States imperialism, means that the specific
nature and signigicance of the New Zealand moral right could be missed.
While it is undoubtedly true that the moral right here is listening to
the advice and expertise of certain American campaigners, it is more
important to focus on the actual campaigns and ideology of the moral
right as it is developing in New Zealand. A conspiracy theory of the
movement may be comforting to some, but it does not allow us to get to
grips with the reality of the moral right as it exists here.

5. Summary and Conclusion

This chapter has examined four different approaches that the Left
in New Zealand has made in its attempts to make some sense of the moral
right. The inability of the analyses I have discussed above to
satisfactorily explain the moral right in New Zealand can be attributed

to inadequate theorisations of the subject, ideology and the political character of 'private' issues, and a tendency to attribute the control of sexuality to the mechanism of 'repression'. In contrast to these class reductionist and sex essentialist notions I will develop a theoretical framework based around the concept of hegemony as it is developed by Laclau and Mouffe.

Although most of the analysis undertaken by the Left of the moral right in New Zealand has been flawed, there is some recognition that the problem being posed for the Left is more complicated than 'class struggle'. In a speech given to Socialist Action in September 1985, Anne Taylor analyses the movement against the Homosexual Law Reform Bill.

> Right wing groups have learnt a valuable lesson from the Left in that they have identified a common enemy and united to fight it. They see everything as an attack on the nuclear family, whether it be Homosexuality, Lesbianism, Abortion, Feminism, sex education or contraception...As I see it homosexuality for them is not a matter of sodomy and biblical teaching but part of a potential threat to their precious nuclear family which if it is broken down, then causes the whole societal power structure to be broken down (Taylor,1985:10-11).

I believe it is by recognising the part played by 'the family' as an important ideological principle that the key to understanding the moral right is found. The rest of the thesis therefore explores the role played by 'the family' in the discourse of the moral right.

CHAPTER TWO

Populist Moralism

Towards a theorisation of the moral right

The previous chapter discussed four main approaches that the Left has used in trying to analyse the emergence of the moral right in New Zealand. I have argued that the shortcomings of these analyses can be attributed to inadequacies in the theorisation of power, subjectivity, ideology and ideological struggle, a lack of understanding of the political nature of 'private' issues and a reliance on explaining sexuality through the notion of 'repression'. I believe these problems can be overcome through developing a framework of analysis that draws on the concept of hegemony. In this chapter I will examine;

(i)   how hegemony can address and resolve the problems surrounding the theorisation of subjectivity, ideology and power;

(ii)   the development of the concepts of the sex/gender and sexuality systems, and their contribution to an understanding of the terrain that the moral right is working on; and

(iii) a concrete analysis of the new right that is framed around the concept of hegemony. Here Stuart Hall's explanation of Thatcherism, through his concept of authoritarian populism, will be examined to see how a conjunctural discourse analysis has been attempted. I will then tease out the implications of his concept 'populist moralism', as I develop it, in relation to the sex/gender and sexuality systems.

1. Hegemony

(i) Hegemony and the rejection of economism

As I stated in chapter one, Laclau and Mouffe are responsible for a thorough reworking of Marxist theory. They attempt to banish from it all vestiges of economism, in both of its senses. The first sense is that of 'epiphenomenalism' which holds that there is a distinction between the base and superstructure such that superstructures are seen to play a role in society only as 'epiphenomena' of the underlying economic structure. While most Marxists would now reject this view, and would argue that superstructures possess an effectivity of their own, many would still maintain that the economy is determinant in the 'last instance'. However, Laclau and Mouffe believe that this position reflects a limited and mechanistic notion of the economy. Rather than conceiving of the economic sphere as following its own irreducible laws of development, the economy should be seen as the terrain of

ideological and political struggle in much the same way as the state, education and other sites.

> "the economy" is in fact the terrain of a proliferation of discourses. We have discourses of authority, technical discourses, discourses of accountancy, discourses of information. Even categories such as profit can no longer be accepted as unequivocal. For instance, a multinational corporation today develops complex political and economic strategies within which the search for profit certainly plays a fundamental role, but does so within a whole policy of investment which can often require sacrificing immediate profits to wider strategic aims. The functioning of the economy itself is a political functioning, and cannot be understood in terms of a single logic. What we need today - and considerable advances have been made in this direction - is a non-economistic understanding of the economy, one which introduces the primacy of politics at the level of the "infrastructure itself" (Laclau in Laclau and Mouffe,1982:92).

If we abandon the idea that it is the economy that is ultimately determinant, it follows that power cannot be said to derive from a single place in the relations of production. The relations of forces between classes and other groups is not the necessary outcome of the relations of production, but rather arises from the overdetermination of effects derived from the insertion of social groups within the whole social conjuncture. Laclau and Mouffe use Althusser's original explanation of overdetermination and extend it to assert;

> that the social constitutes itself as a symbolic order. The symbolic - i.e., overdetermined - character of social relations therefore implies they lack an ultimate literality which would reduce them to necessary moments of an immanent law. There are not two planes, one of essences and the other of appearances, since there is no possibility of fixing an <u>ultimate</u> literal sense for which the symbolic would be a second and derived plane of signification. Society and social agents lack any essence, and their regularities merely consist of the relative and precarious

forms of fixation which accompany the establishment of a
certain order (Laclau and Mouffe,1985:97-8).

This is a crucial and central tenet of the discourse-theoretical approach. From this position it is possible to assert that no one underlying principle that exists in a social formation can determine a priori how contradictions will be resolved. Rather the structuring of society through a process of political activity and struggle determines what contradictions will emerge, and how they will be resolved. This is not to say that anything can arise because of some undefined political will. Rather, historical conditions and existing discourses will set the grounds on which a struggle may take place. This discourse-theoretical approach merely denies the existence of a privileged subject or level of society that 'in itself' can determine a social pattern.

The other form of economism that Marxism has traditionally relied on is class reductionism. As stated in chapter one this form of reductionism relies on the notion that sujectivity can only be understood through class, that each class has its own paradigmatic ideology and that all ideology is necessarily class ideology. A rejection of this position is vital if the complexities of social life are to be explained adequately. This is where the concept of hegemony is so useful. Gramsci defined hegemony as 'political, moral and intellectual leadership'. Mouffe points out that there are two parts to this formulation.

> There is first of all the most strictly political aspect
> which consists of the capacity of a fundamental class to
> articulate the interests of other groups to its own
> interests, thereby becoming the leading element of a
> collective will. And then there is the aspect of
> intellectual and moral leadership which indicates the
> ideological conditions which must be fulfilled for such a
> collective will to become possible, the ways in which it is
> 'cemented' (Mouffe,1981:172).

Taking the first point, although Mouffe speaks of a fundamental 'class' in this quote, she later rejects that it is necessarily a class that must play this role. Any social group that can articulate to itself the interests of other groups can play a hegemonic role. There is no predetermined class character of hegemony because by its very nature it must be the outcome of a process of political and ideological struggle. Subjects are not pre-constituted prior to the struggle for political power but are themselves created through the process of hegemony. We can take as an example the subject position - anti-feminist woman. As a particular subject she did not exist until the advent of an identifiable feminist movement. The existence of feminism as a discourse created a situation where certain women, threatened by these ideas, constituted themselves as anti-feminist women and so created a new subject position. This does not imply that these women simply created a position for themselves out of thin air. Rather they worked on a terrain created through feminism and other existing discourses which they used to buttress their position, e.g. fundamentalist Christianity. This conceptualisation of subject positions provides a powerful critique of Spoonley's explanation for the rise of extreme right wing ideology discussed in chapter one. Rather than seeing the ideology as merely a reflection of

petty bourgeois interests it is necessary to examine the specific conditions and struggles that give rise to an ideological formation. There can be no privileging class subjects because they are merely one of the 'vast plurality of subjects...hegemony must be seen in terms of the discursive articulation of different subjects' (Jessop,1982:198-9).

Mouffe's second point is particularly important in relation to a critique of the tendency within a class reductionist position to explain ideological domination through the imposition of the dominant group's ideology on subordinated groups. The process of domination is in fact much more complicated than this and depends on the ability of a group to win the consent of subordinated groups. This is done by combining elements of competing world-views into an ideological system that partially absorbs and neutralises their antagonisms. In order to understand an ideological system, such as extreme right wing ideology or the moral right in New Zealand, it is not important to locate what class or group lies behind it, but rather the system should be broken down into its elements and the element that provides the organising principle of the whole should be located. The key to understanding is therefore the <u>organisation</u> of ideology rather than some notion of an underlying class or other subject position which is creating ideology in its own interests. Jones gives the example of Mary Whitehouse, the British 'morals' campaigner. '[Her success] lies in her ability to call to mind a whole conception of social and political life through continually evolving the motifs of one of the elements of that system, the family' (Jones,1978:58).

(ii) Hegemony and discourse

Laclau and Mouffe have developed a theorisation of hegemony that argues, amongst other things, that all social relations are structured through discourse. This is a controversial and complex argument that need not be explored here [1]. What is of interest however, is the way in which hegemony and discourse are conceptualised. 'Discourse' can be understood as 'the ensemble of the phenomena in and through which social production of meaning takes place, an ensemble which constitutes a society as such' (Laclau,1980:87). Laclau gives the following example.

> When we kick a ball in a football game the meaning of this
> act differs completely from kicking the same ball
> elsewhere. Even if the physical act is the same, it enters
> into two different discursive sequences dominated by
> different systems of rules...There is no social practice
> that is not a discursive practice. Economism thought on
> the contrary, that social life was the result of
> ineluctable laws of the same type as physical, natural laws
> (Laclau and Mouffe,1982:96-7).

Discourse is the collection of signifying practices. It is more than simply linguistic practice and rhetoric. Rather discourse is the 'meaningful relationship among elements and not one mediated by either logical necessity or a natural causality'(Laclau and Mouffe,1982:100). Jones talks about ideological systems, i.e. discourse, in the following way:

> An ideological system is a combination of a series of
> distinct elements or components. Each of these elements
> will specify a particular form in which it conceives the
> organisation of social life. One element will specify, for

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example, what form the family should take, what form of
sexual relations are permissable within it and what forms
of domination and subordination are involved. Another
element will specify what form political activity is
organised in, what forms of behaviour will be recognised as
having political effects, and will entail the dismissal of
certain forms of behaviour as not being political. Another
element, yet again, may specify what forms of behaviour
will be recognised as bringing religious salvation, what
forms of social behaviour are compatible with such
salvation, what is not religious but, for example, mad
(Jones,1978:58).

From this understanding of discourse, determination is seen not in
relation to some 'material' or non-discursive condition, but rather can
be read off from the specific effectivity of a particular political and
discursive process. To suppose that material conditions are
extra-discursive and outside of social and political determination does
not help to explain their effectivity. Indeed Mouffe claims that 'The
effectivity of material conditions has been accepted as an ultimate
mystery, a postulate no less dogmatic than the existence of God' (in
Laclau and Mouffe,1982:99). Laclau and Mouffe argue that what holds
discourse together is the practice of articulation. This is an
important and central concept in understanding the way in which
discourse works. Articulation is the organisation of ideological
elements that gives them a new form of unity which is contingent and
external to the original ideological fragments (Laclau and
Mouffe,1985:94). Articulation is therefore the practice that links
different positions and elements and constructs 'nodal points' around
which meaning is partially fixed. As a practice, articulation
establishes a new relation among elements of an ideological system
which is more than the sum of its parts.

thus ideas such as "people", "motherhood", "competition",
"equality", and "citizenship" acquire different
connotations according to their articulation with other
elements to form a specific discourse (Jessop,1982:196).

The theoretical construction of the articulatory practice is composed
of two steps. Firstly the elements that may possibly enter into the
relation of articulation must be specified, and secondly the
'relational moment' of articulation must be specified (Laclau and
Mouffe,1985:96). It is in this context that hegemony emerges.
'Hegemony is not an external relation between pre-constituted social
agents, but the very process of discursive constitution of those
agents' (Mouffe in Laclau and Mouffe,1982:99). In discourse every
element is reduced to a moment of the discursive totality. That is,
components of an ideological system (elements) take on a new meaning
from the articulatory principle and are accordingly transformed
(becoming moments). This is a result of the overdetermined nature of
social relations.

While the discussion above on hegemony is very general, Laclau and
Mouffe do refer more specifically to two basic modes of political
discourse which may under certain circumstances secure hegemony. They
maintain that hegemony can be secured through either a discourse of
difference or a discourse of equivalence. An understanding of the
concept of equivalence is essential here. Equivalence in terms of
discourse means that a second meaning is created which subverts the
first. Differences between subjects and positions are cancelled out
because they express something that is identical to them all. Laclau
and Mouffe give the example of a colonised country. The presence of

the dominant power is made evident every day through a variety of things such as differences of dress, language, skin colour, customs etc. What makes each of these contents equivalent to the others is their common difference from the colonised people (Laclau and Mouffe,1985:127). Equivalence is important in both types of discourse. With a discourse of difference equivalences are negated.

> hegemony depends on the neutralisation of ideologically constituted antagonisms through their reinterpretation as differences within a national-popular collective will. This involves the pluralisation of differences which must be negotiated and compromised within a broad consensual framework established through the dominant discourse concerning the parameters of the 'national-popular' collective will (Jessop,1982:197).

In this way antagonisms are made to appear like mere differences that can be intergrated within a discourse. An example of this type of discourse is Disraeli's 'One Nation'. In this, Disraeli originally began with an ideological conception of two nations, i.e. the division of society into the two extremes of wealth and poverty. In order for Disraeli to change this conceptualisation, 'it was necessary to break up the system of equivalences which made up the popular revolutionary subjectivity, stretching from republicanism to a varied ensemble of social and political demands' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985:130). The dichotomy between the two positions is neutralised by asserting that the difference is not antagonistic, but a natural and inevitable fact of life. Another example of rupturing the chain of equivalences is to partially absorb demands and turn them into positive differences within the system.

In the same manner, antagonism is eliminated in the
discourse of trade unionism. Capitalists and workers are
considered as different but equally legitimate social
categories, the legitimacy of whose respective demands
should be founded on other differences such as the rate of
profit of enterprises, the rate of inflation, the rate of
interest and so on (Laclau,1980:92).

In this way contradictions between subjects which are seen as being

negative are transformed into positive differences, i.e. antagonisms

disappear, and differences are accepted without acknowledging the

conflict of interests inherent in them. This form of discourse has

integrative tendencies. This means that various subordinate subject

positions that could have been interpellated as the 'people' in

confrontation with the power bloc are disarticulated and are instead

interpreted as subjects possessing democratic positionalities.

Integration and consensus is achieved and hegemony constructed around

this discourse can be characterised as one of 'transformism' where

antagonisms are transformed into differences. The logic of the

discourse of difference is to expand and increase the complexity of

political space.

The other form of hegemonic articulation relies on a discourse of

equivalence which involves;

the constitution of a system of equivalences among
different positions and subjects by either (a) a common
polarity which is juxtaposed in an irreducible dualism to
another pole, and defined as superior to it or (b) a common
antagonism to an internal and/or external enemy which must
be defeated as a condition of advancement of each
particular position or subject. This involves the
polarisation of the different positions or subjects
constituted in and through discourse and the interpellation
of the two poles as either contrary and unequal or as

contradictory and antagonistic (Jessop,1982:197).

Examples of (a) are apartheid and patriarchy, and of (b) Chartism, Fascism, Maoism and Jacobinism. Laclau and Mouffe give the following example of a discourse of equivalence by discussing millennarian movements.

> Here the world divides, through a system of paratactical equivalences, into two camps: peasant culture representing the identity of the movement, and urban culture incarnating evil. The second is the negative reverse of the first. A maximum separation has been reached and no element in the system of equivalences enters into relations other than those of opposition to the elements of the other system. There are not one but two societies (Laclau and Mouffe,1985:130).

This is an opposite example to the previous one of Disraeli, where two nations become one through the interpretation of antagonisms as mere differences. In contrast to the logic of difference, the logic of equivalence is one of the simplification of political space (ibid). During periods of unstable social relations any system of differences is likely to be less successful and there will be an increase in the points of antagonism. The proliferation of antagonisms makes more difficult the construction of a system of differences and more likely the establishment of chains of equivalence (ibid:131). A popular positionality is created through a discourse of equivalence by dividing society between the dominant and the dominated, and presenting itself as articulating all of society around one fundamental antagonism. What is of particular interest to an analysis of the moral right is the second type of discourse of equivalence. While both types divide the

political space into two antagonistic camps and produce subjectivities of a 'popular' position, a populist rupture is said to be created when the antagonistic relation is articulated 'not as the pole of an irreducible dualism but as the dynamic point of a confrontation' (Laclau,1980:91). It is this process which characterises the moral right in New Zealand. It should be noted that populist ruptures can be of either the Left or Right. Both Maoism and Fascism are populist because their discourses divided 'the ideological field into two contradictory systems of equivalences' (ibid:93).

It should be stressed that these two forms of discursive articulation are not necessarily hegemonic in form unless the following two conditions are met. The first condition is the presence of antagonistic articulatory practices that confront one another. For practices to be antagonistic they must constitute a situation where the presence of one practice prevents the possibility of the full realisation of the other. An example of an antagonism is that between a peasant and a landowner, where the landowner can expel the peasant from the land. This practice effectively stops the peasant from fulfilling his/her being in this subject position. Secondly the frontiers that separate the antagonistic practices must be unstable.

> Only the presence of a vast area of floating elements and the possibility of their articulation to opposite camps...is what constitutes the terrain permitting us to define a practice as hegemonic (Laclau and Mouffe,1985:136).

(iii) The historic bloc and war of position

The significance of the conceptualisation of hegemony given above is that it rejects the reduction of concrete situations to the moment of an abstract logic derived from 'necessary' relations of production. Instead society must be examined in all its conjunctural and political specificity. Any unity that may exist in a social formation is only that which is given through the political struggle that results from relations amongst social forces (Laclau and Mouffe,1981:20).

This new problematic has two main consequences. Firstly it means that the distinction traditionally maintained between the base and superstructure must be replaced by the notion of an historic bloc. This concept fuses the base and superstructure into a new unity which is said to be organic, i.e. the unity depends on the articulatory practice of the social force that has been able to secure hegemony. Although the historic bloc describes the way in which different social forces are related to each other, it should not be reduced to merely a political alliance, since within the historic bloc there is a complex construction of sub-blocs, e.g. the agrarain bloc, the industrial bloc etc (Showstack Sasson,1980:121). Laclau and Mouffe argue that any social and political space which is unified through articulation around antagonisms represents a historic bloc or what they call a 'hegemonic formation' [2]. This is not the specific logic of a single political force but constitutes 'regularity in dispersion' [3]. This supposes that the differential positions within a historic bloc constitute a

configuration which takes their meaning from the articulatory practice which is able to signify it as a totality (Laclau and Mouffe,1985:105). To the extent that the state can establish itself as the organiser of this historic bloc, an integral state can be said to exist - i.e. it is the political articulation of the social whole.

The second consequence of hegemony as a concept is that the terrain of politics is expanded and it comes to encompass the whole field of social relations. No longer is it possible for power to be located only within a special place in social relations, for instance the relations of production and the state. Rather, power is seen to be constitutive of the whole ensemble of social relations. With this enlarged conception of politics the question of strategy moves away from seizing power towards the idea of a 'war of position'. The war of position can be seen as the link between hegemony (and this concept's attack on economism) and a discussion of strategy (Showstack Sasson,1980:193). It is based on the knowledge that because the integral state involves political articulations of the whole ensemble of social relations, there is therefore no level in society where power is not exercised, and where resistance may not be applied. It is also premissed on the existence of frontiers across which elements of an ideological system can move and be rearticulated to different discourses. This strategy is 'multidimensional' and maintains that the transformation of society can only be achieved through a series of ruptures through which the configuration of relations of forces must be changed (Laclau and Mouffe,1981). It should be noted that the war of position does not imply that political and social space is divided into

two camps. This may be an effect of a hegemonic articulation but it is not necessarily so. Where there is a plurality of political spaces it is possible to speak of democratic struggles, and where discourses construct a division of political space into two opposed fields we have popular struggles. However Laclau and Mouffe maintain that 'the fundamental concept is that of "democratic struggle", and that popular struggles are merely specific conjunctures resulting from the multiplication of equivalence effects among democratic struggles' (Laclau and Mouffe,1985:137).

2. The Terrain of the Sex/Gender and Sexuality Systems

An analysis of the moral right must be able to say on what terrain the struggle is taking place. While it is clear for example that Thatcherism, as a discourse of the right, operates on the field of parliamentary politics and the state, most discussion of the moral right has failed to specify the location of its discourse. However the concept of a sex/gender system, first developed by Gayle Rubin, is a useful way to approach the problem. This concept refers to 'the set of arrangements by which a society transforms biological sexuality into products of human activity' (Rubin,1975:159). It is a system which determines the social categories that males and females fill. It is the 'ensemble of social practices, of institutions and discourses which produce women as a category' (Laclau and Mouffe,1985:118). The significant point is that the system always orders the categories in a

hierarchy of power relations, although the exact nature of the heirarchy and system will vary from culture to culture, and at different historical conjunctures. The existence of a sex/gender system is accepted by all feminist theorists and needs no more elaboration here. In concrete terms we can take the sex/gender system to include discourses on the following: regulation of family relations, marriage, parenting, and gender identity.

However, although Rubin originally claimed that the sex/gender system organised sexual desire and other aspects of sexuality she has since rejected this position. Rubin now maintains that there is a separate sexual system which is responsible for constructing social arrangements that organise sexual activity.

> Sex is a vector of oppression. The system of sexual oppression cuts across other modes of social inequality, sorting out individuals and groups according to its own intrinsic dynamic. It is not reducible to, or understandable in terms of class, race, ethnicity or gender. Wealth, white skin, male gender, and ethnic privileges can mitigate the effects of sexual stratification. A rich, white male pervert will generally be less effected than a poor, black, female pervert. But even the most privileged are not immune to sexual oppression. (Rubin,1984:293).

While the development of the sexual system has undoubtedly taken place in the context of gender relations, Rubin maintains that it is necessary to separate the two systems analytically in order to more accurately understand their distinct social existence (ibid:308).

> Like gender, sexuality is political. It is organised into
> systems of power, which reward and encourage some
> individuals and activities, while punishing and suppressing
> others. Like the capitalist organisation of labour and its
> distribution of rewards and powers, the moderation of the
> sexual system has been the object of political struggle
> since it emerged and as it has evolved (ibid:309).

The sexuality system consists of discourses about sexual identity,
homosexuality, other 'perverse' sexualities, and the regulation of
fertility and children's sexuality. The specification of the two
systems enables us to see so-called 'private' issues such as the
family, marriage and sexual relations as possessing an undeniable
political nature. This has been one of the major contributions of
feminist theory to the understanding of social relations. Feminism has
penetrated the boundary between 'public' and 'private' and can reveal
for political analysis the areas of life that society has 'consigned to
a sacred "privacy" - marriage, the family, childrearing, maternity;
sex, of whatever variety; personal, "private" relations, especially
between women and men, wherever they occur' (Petchesky,1981:223).

With the acknowledgement that a system organising sexuality does
exist, it is necessary to delineate how it works. Much of the analysis
of sexuality has worked on the assumption that the history of sexuality
is a history of its repression. In contrast to this position, work
that is based on a discourse-theoretical framework (in particular that
developed by Foucault) maintains that the history of sexuality is the
history of sexual discourses. Sexuality is organised not through the
one mechanism of repression but rather through different processes of
definition and regulation, which may in particular circumstances be

characterised by repression. Regulation of sexuality is organised through the creation of sexual categories e.g. homosexual, paedophile, transvestite etc (Weeks,1981a:93). Foucault has identified four 'strategic unities' that link together a variety of practices which form the discursive structure that controls sex. These are the identification of women's bodies with sex; a 'pedagogisation of children's sex' - sex that is seen as both natural and dangerous and must be carefully monitored; a socialisation of procreative behaviour where fertility becomes a matter for public policy; and a psychiatrisation of perverse pleasures which dichotomises the pursuit of normal and pathological forms of sexuality (Cook,1983:95). The four subjects that emerge from these are the hysterical woman, the masturbating child, the Malthusian couple and the perverse adult. 'The thrust of these discursive creations is control, control not through denial or prohibition, but through production, through imposing a grid of definition on the possibilites of the body' (Weeks,1981a:100). What is instructive here is that regulation of sexuality must be understood through the creation of sexual categories. In order to understand the sexual system and categorisation it is necessary to explore the various practices which create the terrain in which behaviour is constructed. Historically this is done in a number of ways - through legal regulation, the medicalisation of sexual deviance and the various media representations of conflicts over sexuality. The sexual system, like other sections of society, is subject to debates over definition and arrangement of sexual behaviour. Regulation of sexuality through sex laws, psychiatrisation of perversions, religious ideology and the various sanctions associated with these practices often come into

conflict with each other and the various subjects they 'work' on.
Jeffrey Weeks has identified the 'moral panic' as a significant sex
conflict.

> The moral panic crystallises widespread fears and
> anxieties, and often deals with them not by seeking the
> real causes of the problems and conditions which they
> demonstrate but by displacing them onto "Folk Devils" in an
> identified social group (often the "immoral" or
> "degenerate"). Sexuality has had a peculiar centrality in
> such panics, and sexual "deviants" have been omnipresent
> scapegoats (Weeks,1981b:14).

Moral panics condense diffuse attitudes about sex onto a 'political
moment' which calls for political action and ultimately brings about
wider social change. Because these panics are usually centred around
those at the bottom of the sexual hierarchy they lack the power to
defend themselves, especially as the stigma against them renders them
morally indefensible. Moral panics are said to have consequences on
two levels.

> The target population suffers most, but everyone is
> affected by the social and legal changes. Moral panics
> rarely alleviate any real problem, because they are aimed
> at chimeras and signifiers. They draw on the pre-existing
> discursive structure which invents victims in order to
> justify treating 'vices' as crime. The criminalisation of
> innocuous behaviours such as homosexuality, prostitution,
> obscenity or recreational drug use, is rationalised by
> portraying them as menaces to health and safety, women and
> children, national security, the family or civilisation
> itself (Rubin,1984:297).

3. <u>Authoritarian Populism, Anti-feminism and Populist Moralism</u>

A concrete application of Gramscian Marxism and the work of Laclau and Mouffe can be found in Stuart Hall's analysis of Thatcherism in Great Britain [4]. It will be useful here to examine Hall's use of the theory, and his develoment of a concept, authoritarian populism, to make sense of the complex components of Thatcherism. Although Hall is working with a phenomenon that is not situated on either the sex/gender nor sexuality systems, but rather the field of parliamentary politics (although it does of course have some implications for these other areas), it will be instructive to see <u>how</u> he uses the theory to make sense of a particular conjuncture. The second part of this section picks up on Hall's brief mention of populist moralism. I will argue that this concept, when situated within the sex/gender and sexuality systems, can help to explain the moral right as a phenomenon. Thirdly this section outlines some of the feminist analyses of anti-feminism.

(i) <u>Authoritarian populism</u>

The significance of Hall's theorisation of Thatcherism is that it is primarily an account of 'hegemonic politics' (Hall,1985:116) and that it is 'of necessity somewhat "descriptive"...[it is an] attempt to conceptualise what Marx himself said of "the concrete": that is the "product of many determinations"' (ibid:118). The development of the concept authoritarian populism is an attempt to explain a specific conjuncture, bound by time and place, and concrete in its reference to the Thatcher government of Britain, and the social relations that form

a part of that conjuncture. There are two parts to Hall's analysis, which conform to Laclau's point that in analysing a discourse it is important to distinguish between the genesis (i.e. conditions that give rise to it), and the way in which the discourse is 'cemented' together (Laclau,1977:158).

Hall starts with an examination of the crisis that is occurring within a certain conjuncture. By conjuncture Hall is not referring to a 'slice of time',(it is not a 'period' but a 'moment'), that has seen the fusion of different 'currents and circumstances'. It can only be defined by the accumulation and condensation of various contradictions and antagonisms (Hall,1981:165). Hall sees the swing to the right in Great Britain as the response to an organic crisis. It is a movement to create a new balance of forces, to form a new 'historic bloc', i.e. a new 'settlement' framed within certain limits (Hall,1983b:23). The conditions for the crisis are found in the structural industrial and economic weaknesses that emerged in Britain after the post-war boom; world-wide capitalist recession; and the political polarisation that occurred in the 60's around the Vietnam war, immigration policies, feminism etc (ibid:24). Labour responded to this crisis by attempting to stabilise it through the use of a form of politics emphasising 'corporate consensus'. However the balance in the relations of forces was coming under increasing pressure both from within and without Britain, and was moving towards an authoritarian pole. This analysis illustrates that the new right had definite conditions of existence — they were a response to a crisis. However it should be remembered that the new right were only one particular response. It is possible that a

socialist solution could have resulted if the political struggle had been constructed differently. While the new right has emerged in these circumstances its success is not automatically guaranteed by the dictates of history. Rather, the new right should be seen as engaging in a struggle for hegemony. The contradictions within the post-war settlement of social democracy can be seen as providing the terrain on which the new right acted.

The second part of Hall's analysis is concerned with the discourse of Thatcherism itself - how does the new right articulate an ideological ensemble (which Hall calls authoritarian populism) that is able to capture popular support? There are two main dimensions to the political and ideological constitution of authoritarian populism. Firstly the new right was successful in neutralising the contradiction between the 'people' and the state/power bloc.The new right employed a strategy of anti-statism that did not in fact refuse to work through the state but rather ideologically represented itself as anti-statist in order to secure a populist mobilisation (Hall,1985:117). Thatcherism was in this way able to win a measure of popular consent to itself. It can be seen to be

> a historical bloc seeking hegemony [so] as to harness to
> its support some popular discontents, neutralise the
> opposing forces, disaggregate the opposition and really
> incorporate some strategic elements of popular opinion into
> its own hegemonic project (ibid:118).

The second component of authoritarian populism examined is the actual mechanism of ideological transformation. It should be stressed

that authoritarian populism does not merely dupe 'unsuspecting folks' but it has a rational core in that it does address 'real problems, real and lived experiences, real contradictions' (Hall, 1983b:39). The discourse of Thatcherism worked on 'the ground of already constituted social practices and lived ideologies'. It was able to win space there by continually reworking elements of ideology that have secured over time a place in traditional and popular thought. At the same time, authoritarian populism changed the field on which struggle took place by

> changing the place, the position, the relative weight of the condensations within any one discourse and constructing them according to an alternative logic. What shifts them is not "thoughts" but a particular practice of class struggle: ideological and political class struggle. What makes these representations popular is that they have purchase on practice, they shape it, they are written into its materiality (ibid).

What constitutes Thatcherism as a danger is its ability to change the nature of the terrain on which the struggle takes place, and to constitute itself as the new point of balance in the relations of political and social forces.

(ii) Populist moralism

Hall mentions in passing a 'populist moralism' that has helped sustain the construction of 'law and order' as an issue within the Thatcherite discourse. While he does not fully specify this concept I believe it can be used to encapsulate the development and nature of the moral right in New Zealand. Hall says of populist moralism that

> it is where the great syntax of "good" versus "evil", of
> civilised and uncivilised standards, of the choice between
> anarchy and order, constantly divides the world up and
> classifies it into its appointed stations (Hall,1983b:38).

Hall believes that the 'law and order' crusade manages to gain a grasp
on popular morality because of its play on issues of 'values' and
'morals' - things which are seen to be 'outside' the political arena.
It has also been able to make sense of people's concrete experiences of
crime and theft and 'since it promulgates no other remedies for their
underlying causes, it welds people to that "need for authority" which
has been so significant for the right in the construction of consent to
its authoritarian programme' (ibid). I believe that this
conceptualisation of populist moralism has some purchase on the
practice and discourse of the moral right in New Zealand. If we
consider the discourse that is constructed on the terrain of the
sex/gender and sexuality systems it is possible to see an attempt by
certain 'morals' groups to develop and maintain a populist moralism.

(iii) Anti-feminism

Feminist analysis of anti-feminism makes some interesting points
that help to reveal the nature of moral conservatism. There are two
strands. Firstly there is a purely descriptive account of the ideology
of the moral right, located as it is on both the sex/gender and
sexuality systems, and secondly there is an analysis that seeks to
explain why the moral right has risen in a particular conjuncture.
Taking the first point it is clear that an 'anti-feminist backlash' has

been identified overseas since about 1975, while in New Zealand 1980
saw the first real concern with anti-feminism.   An awareness of the
anti-abortion lobby was the first indication that there were organised
moves being make by an increasing number of individuals and
organisations, to curtail what was seen by feminists as one of the most
important rights for women.   Since 1981 there has been increasing
analysis of anti-feminism by feminists, particularly in Britain, the
United States and Australia [5].   An important realisation has been
that debates over so-called single issues, such as abortion are really
concerned with the construction of a wider sexual morality
(English,1981:16). Petchesky also notes that the abortion issue
'resonates many social and political meanings – about the family,
sexuality, the position of women – that go far beyond the status of the
fetus' (Petchesky,1981:220).   The message of the moral right is
anti-feminist in that it calls for women to stay in the home and
maintain their roles as wives and mothers. But the message is also
sexually conservative.   It is vehemently anti-homosexual   and
anti-sexual freedom. In fact the morally conservative ideology is a
call for sex to be kept in the family between married men and women,
and preferably for the purpose of procreation. Petchesky also points
to the theme of privatisation in the ideology of the moral right.

> What is particularly important here is the ideology of the
> "private sphere" and its relation to both the family and
> state's rights.   The new right in its "pro-family" program
> invokes deep fears of loss of control over what   is
> considered most "private", most "personal" (ibid:222).

As well as specifying the components of the anti-feminist message, feminists have also speculated on the reason for the rise of the moral right. Irene Webley (1983) analyses the group Women Who Want to be Women in Australia, and argues that the development of this anti-feminist organisation (amongst others) is not simply a reaction to the feminist movement as such.

> The immediate cause of their growth was the election of state and federal Labour governments with a commitment to a women's rights and a determination to use their legislative power and administrative authority to promote equal opportunity in Australian society (Webley,1983:7).

Miriam David (1983) believes that this is also the case in the United States and Great Britain where the shift towards a 'new moral economy' is explained by the breakdown in political consensus about matters such as relations between the sexes and sexual behaviour, and can be linked to the state's involvement in equal opportunity legislation in areas of economic and social life that were traditionally seen as private.

> In providing welfare and social services the state stands accused of stripping men of their rights and responsibilities...The state has become the New Right's scapegoat for society's ills. People have been mollycoddled for too long, cushioned from facing up to the reality of life (David and Wells,1984:26).

4. <u>Drawing It Together - Populist Moralism and the Moral Right</u>

In light of the comments made in this chapter, it is now possible to outline a theoretical framework for analysing the moral right in New Zealand. The first point made was the rejection of class reductionism. Rather than accepting the privileged site of class as an explanatory factor, it was suggested that the concept- of hegemony could more appropriately be used to explain the moral right. Here, discourse as the collection of signifying practices, was taken to be an important factor in the building of hegemony. Two basic modes of hegemonic discourse were discussed and it was suggested that the moral right can be seen to be using a populist discourse of equivalence. The concepts of historic bloc and war of position were introduced as analytic tools to explain the unity that can be said to exist in a specific conjuncture, and it was noted that power does not rest only in the state and classes, but is constitutive of <u>all</u> social relations. These ideas lead to the conclusion that a strategy of change must incorporate a 'war of position' rather than the more orthodox notion of seizing power at the level of the state. The second section outlined the concepts of the sex/gender and sexuality systems as the terrain on which the moral right organises its discourse. In particular the workings of the sexuality system were discussed in some detail. The final section examined Hall's development of authoritarian populism as an example of a conjunctural analysis of right-wing ideology. His concept of populist moralism, and feminist analyses of anti-feminism were discussed to gain some understanding of the moral right as a phenomenon.

In summary, the parameters of 'populist moralism' as developed in this chapter are as follows. Firstly it is populist in that it divides political space into two antagonistic camps that articulates the poles as meeting in a point of confrontation where an 'enemy' must be overcome so that the force of 'good' may triumph. Secondly, populist moralism works on the terrain of the sex/gender and sexuality systems i.e. it is concerned with discourse about men's and women's role in society, and the regulation of sexual behaviour. Thirdly it has a grasp of the lived experiences of many people and is able to work on popular ideologies and fears about sexuality, gender, roles etc. Finally populist moralism can be seen to have developed out of a particular crisis and changes in the balance of relations in a field of political and social forces. There are two steps to delineating the concept of populist moralism. I accept Laclau's position that it is necessary to distinguish between the conditions and constraints that give rise to a social movement, and the construction of the discourse itself - i.e. the ideas and practices that are actually employed (Laclau, 1977: 158). This position is also reflected in Maharey's (1985) claim that it is necessary to distinguish between 'conditions' and 'experience'. Accordingly chapter three discusses the ensemble of social and political relations that the moral right are trying to make sense of, and chapter four discusses exactly how the discourse of populist moralism is articulated around 'the family'.

NOTES

1. There has been much debate among Marxists on the extent to which
   discourse can explain all facets of social life and determination.
   Jessop (1982) and Jessop, Bonnett, Bromley and Ling (1984,1985)
   have argued against accepting the position developed by Laclau and
   Mouffe that all social relations can be explained through the
   working of discourse. Some feminist theorists have also argued
   that discourse theory overstates the case for discourse as an
   explanatory device for women's oppression (See Barrett,1980 and
   Weir and Wilson,1984). Notwithstanding these critiques, the thesis
   accepts the arguments of Laclau and Mouffe and works completely
   within the assumptions of their theory.

2. For the purposes of the thesis I retain the use of the term
   'historic bloc'.

3. Regularity in dispersion is a concept formulated by Foucault. He
   rejects four hypotheses concerning the unifying principle of a
   discursive formation – 'reference to the same object, a common
   style in the production of statements, constancy of the concepts
   and reference to a common theme' (Laclau and Mouffe,1985:105).

4. Although Hall does not accept in full the premise of discourse
   theory that discourse can explain all patterns of social relations
   (Hall,1985), his approach is instructive because he works from the
   basis that hegemony provides the theoretical insight with which to

examine certain forms of social life.

5. For several different approaches see Eisenstein (1981a,b), Gordon and Hunter (1977), McVey (1983), Freeman (1983), Breines, Cerullo and Stacey (1978), Pratt (1981) and Ruth (1983).

CHAPTER THREE

Setting the Scene for the Development of Populist Moralism

This chapter and the following one examine the discourse of the moral right in New Zealand. What is of concern in chapter three is the conjuncture built around the sex/gender and sexuality systems that existed after World War Two until the end of the fifties. This period represents not just a 'slice of time' but a 'moment' that in certain ways condenses a number of contradictions and currents. During the sixties this conjuncture was characterised by a 'crisis' in the commonly held ideas about sexuality, family life and the relationship between men and women. In reaction to this crisis the early seventies saw the rise of various morally conservative groups that could be said to form part of the present new post-liberal conjuncture that I maintain characterises contemporary New Zealand. To typify this period as 'post-liberal' is not to say that liberalism has lost all its force of argument and purchase on practice, but it is now being heavily critiqued and attacked by the moral right fighting a war of position to establish a new hegemony on the sex/gender and sexuality systems. The project of this new movement is to create a new balance of forces that rejects liberal and feminist morality and asserts instead a movement

back to morality and order based on an authoritarian patriarchal family.

1. Sex/Gender, Sexuality and Hegemony: New Zealand in the 1950s

After World War Two, New Zealand was engaged in reconstruction of social life that in certain ways retained many of the hegemonic patterns that had existed prior to the war. However the period after the war also marked the beginning of a time when this hegemony was beginning to be questioned. While, I believe, this historic bloc was relatively stable throughout the fifties contradictions, particularly in women's lives, led to a situation which in the sixties saw the breakdown of consensus in some areas that previously had been relatively stable. The state after the war and during the 1950s can be seen to constitute an 'integral state' in that it managed to be the organiser of popular attitudes about sex/gender and sexuality. Following the prescriptions made in chapter two about the organisation of ideology it is not important to identify a social group behind the hegemony but rather the ideological principle that articulates the whole must be located. I believe it is possible to see a discourse of difference working on both the sex/gender and sexuality systems, and that 'the family' is the articulating principle.

(i) The sex/gender system

In New Zealand the sex/gender system can be said to have been firmly established, and a hegemonic position maintained, since the nineteenth century. A 'way into' looking at this system is provided by Helen Cook's (1985a,b,c) discussion of the post-war period and its impact on women, and by looking briefly at the debates during the 1950s over the desirability or otherwise of co-educational schools. This debate is merely one example of the negotiation over gender relations that resulted from women's increased participation in the paid workforce during and after the war.

While World War Two disrupted the sex/gender system to some extent, and produced changes in women's relation to work and the home, it can be said with some truth that the ideology of separate spheres that existed before the war was still strongly in place afterwards. When the war ended many women who were employed in the paid workforce were expected to give up their jobs to returning soldiers.

> ..while the war offered women new opportunities it still served to accentuate the separation of the male and female worlds. After the war, the two spheres were expected to coalesce in the post war reconstruction of New Zealand society; ideas were encapsulated so graphically and sentimentally by the media that they reinforced the post war rush towards marriage, family and home (Cook,1985c:47).

Helen Cook identifies a period of adjustment and reconstruction immediately after the war which during the 1950s submerged 'into a decade of new consumerism, a certain acceptance of family roles and a continued endeavour to forget the past' (ibid). Dann agrees with this

assessment and sees the 'post World War Two goal [being] full-time, unpaid housewifery for all women' (Dann,1985:68).

Cook (1985a,b,c) describes the ideology surrounding women's role as wife and mother after the war and during the 1950s. She maintains that the 50s were a time of strong consensus on 'values and accepted rules of behaviour' (Cook,1985a:88). This was the result of the relative prosperity that existed after the war until the mid 1960s. The ideology of women's role at this time was developed against the backdrop of political and moral unease which derived from the 'Red Menace'. Women were expected to provide the emotional and familial stability that would protect their children from harm (ibid). The vague threat that was perceived from communism overseas also 'provided an ideal environment for the promotion of a social consensus based on unified values' (ibid). There was a concerted campaign to maintain order and harmony in New Zealand and the home in order to keep at bay the danger of communism, and it was women as caregivers that provided the lynchpin for security. Ideology surrounding the family was firmly based on the idea of separate spheres, with the male as breadwinner, and woman as homemaker. Government policy of the time saw the establishment of 'normal' family life as the best basis for future economic and social recovery as well as the emotional well-being of the 'returned' men. Accordingly postwar services for the family such as the Marriage Guidance Council established in 1948 and the Parents Centres in 1950, were designed to 'shore up and strengthen the stability of the "traditional" family unit which was to underpin happiness and successful childrearing' (Cook,1985b:50).

However the post-war shortage of housing and consumer items prevented realisation of the myth of the happy family and often contributed to marital breakdown. Therefore a major concern of the time was about the increasing experience of marital conflict. Discussion of divorce went further than seeing it as an individual solution to a problem but rather 'focused on the threat it posed to both the moral and structural fabric of the family' (ibid:65). With the general liberalising of divorce laws society collectively saw divorce as a sore in its midst and accordingly this encouraged the development of propaganda promoting responsible marriage. Concerns immediately after the war turned from protest at reconstruction towards less strident, less collective, and less broadly based political issues, towards the personal politics of family life. Women writing at the time saw that they had a unique role in the family which should be encouraged and reinforced while at the same time there should be some freedom to pursue activities other than domestic ones (ibid:91). The contradictions and tensions between these two ideas were eventually to lead to the development of a feminist movement by the late sixties.

Many of the points raised above are reflected in the popular culture of this time. In examining the New Zealand Women's Weekly and the Listener, Cook found that these magazines 'put the intimacies and conflict of marriage relationship under a microscope' (Cook,1985b:51). Cook argues that it was during this period that the concept of marriage as a career for women arose. 'The new woman could put her skills into the efficient management of home and family which would bring all the rewards of a career' (ibid:54). In this way some of the conflicts that

women felt in being pushed back into the home could be managed in a way that upheld traditional ideas about women's role.

After the war a debate over whether New Zealand secondary schools should be co-educational or single-sex, provides an interesting insight into the wider issue of the 'proper' relationship that should exist between the sexes. The debate was not just of interest to those in the educational sphere but touched the lives of many parents who were concerned with the education that their children should receive, and Letters to the Editor often covered this subject. By examining the debate over single-sex vs co-educational schools in Blenheim in 1958, it is possible to identify some general points that were at issue in the wider debate over gender relations [1]. In summary, those who favoured single-sex schools did so for two main reasons. Firstly for 'the academic superiority, better discipline, and greater pride and loyalty in single-sex schools' (Battersby, 1983:34). Secondly and more importantly for my argument was the concern with the relations between the sexes. A letter to the Marlborough Express in 1958 summarises well some of the concerns of parents.

> First I find more loyalty there than in a mixed school.
> Sex-loyalty is a natural instinct, and the loyalty of girls
> to other girls, and to women teachers, who are their
> examples, is an important part of character-building.
> Secondly, there is not the same temptation in separate
> schools to"show off", so that self consciousness is more
> easily overcome, and there is more self-sacrifice to duty.
> Thirdly, there is no doubt that, in a mixed school, girls
> become aware too early of their charms for the opposite
> sex, and this tends to take their minds off their work
> (April 9, 1958; quoted in Battersby,ibid).

Here the differences between the sexes are emphasised. The argument for co-education schools, while obviously in contradiction to that against it, in fact had at its heart many of the same concerns, i.e. that children should learn about the proper relationship between the sexes. One writer at the time put it like this.

> A sudden and artificial segregation of the sexes at about eleven or twelve years of age is no preparation for life, neither is it natural. The adolescent should have constantly impressed upon "it" that there are some members of the opposite sex who are mentally more alert, some who are equally equipped and some who are less adequately equipped. In day to day contact, both the boys and the girls must learn that there is a point of view peculiar to the other sex and a way of approaching and doing things which is different. A knowledge of these things is essential to a balanced adult life and a segregation of the sexes at this stage is not preparation for subsequent life in industry or society (The Marlborough Express, March 27, 1958; quoted in Battersby, 1983:42).

Co-education was also favoured by the Chairperson of the NZCER because from his observation of nurses and students he believed 'that those from mixed schools were better adjusted than those from single sex schools...The mixed schools became a focal point for the interests of the family' (NZPPTA, 1955:6). Here, as in the previous quote, the focus is on fitting girls and boys into their proper roles in family, work and broader society. It was also argued however that co-educational schools were 'in line with the development of equal rights for women' and that 'single-sex schools grew from the long-held belief in the inferiority of women...The belief that women were not equal to men was not yet out of our system' (The Marlborough Express, June 19, 1958; quoted in Battersby, 1983:48). There are two strands that are important in the debate. Firstly, although there is disagreement over whether

single-sex or co-educational schools are better for children, arguments for both are based on ensuring that girls and boys learn to grow up with the appropriate gender roles. The disagreement is over which type of school does this better. The other theme that emerges from the debate emphasises 'equal rights for women'. This is a reflection of the minor but growing concern for issues of gender equality that emerged after the war.

What we can observe on the sex/gender system is the operation of a discourse of difference. Any antagonism that exists between men and women has been negated and transformed into a 'difference' between the sexes that is a natural outcome of their different biological make-up. After the war, the forced movement of women out of the paid workforce, certainly presented the opportunity for the recognition of antagonisms between men and women, but this was curtailed through the creation of discourse that emphasised that for the national good (economically and politically - i.e. in defence against the 'Red Menace') women should stay at home and provide the environment that would foster a rapid reconstruction of New Zealand society. Here, discourse has been organised within the parameters of the 'national-popular will'. Although there was an increasing recognition of 'equality for women', this concern was secondary to the broader needs of soceity.

(ii) The sexuality system

The particular nature of the sexuality system can be observed through the laws concerned with the regulation of sex, the discourse on sex education and the various 'moral panics' and popular culture that surrounded different aspects of sex. This section examines the discourse on sex education and the 'moral panic' that surrounded the Mazengarb Report of 1954 and allows for an analysis of the discourse surrounding homosexuality, children's and women's sexuality and 'normal' sex.

Discourse on sex education is an excellent site to observe the workings of the sexuality system. During the 1950s the consensus on sex education was that it was properly the domain of the family to educate children about sexuality. There was considered to be no place in the primary school for sex education. While it was acknowledged that some sex education was desirable in secondary schools, this was to be primarily concerned with details of reproduction. The rationale given for sex education was the necessity to reduce the venereal disease, illegitimacy, and divorce rates. Historically sex education in New Zealand has been regarded as part of the general field of health education (Thomas,1970:60). Thomas identifies three features of this sex education - it has a strong biological emphasis, attitudes to sex education are conservative and parents are seen as the most important agents. In 1953 the national Parent-Teachers Association called for the Department of Health to publish a series of pamphlets on sex education. These were published in 1955 and included the following

titles:

- 'Sex and the Parent'

- 'Sex and the Young Child'

- 'Sex, the Adolescent and Parent: the Parents' Role'

- 'Sex and the Adolescent Boy'

- 'Sex and the Adolescent Girl'

These received mixed reaction from the public (ibid:78) but on the whole they were widely accepted and constantly requested and used. An examination of one of these pamphlets Sex and the Adolescent Boy indicates the ideas prevalent at the time about sex and its place in New Zealand society. Firstly heterosexuality is assumed as being the only 'natural' expression of sexuality - 'all normal boys become interested in [girls] sooner or later' (Department of Health,1955:1). Secondly the reason for sexual intercourse is given as reproduction. 'It's natural aim is the creation of children' (ibid:5). Male genitals 'were created so that at the proper time the male can make a child begin to grow within the body of the female' (ibid:2). There is no mention of sex being a valid source of pleasure in itself. Where sex is 'indulged in for the sensations of the moment' it is a 'disappointing' experience and creates many problems (ibid:5). Thirdly sex is seen as a 'natural' desire that is often difficult to control. Desire should be contained within the context of a loving relationship, for it is only within marriage that the ideal conditions exist to raise children. Sexual intercourse is not just an interaction between two people but involves 'the whole of society' (ibid:6). The failure to control desire 'may have unpleasant consequences' (ibid:1-2). 'Anything that stimulates sexual desire in the unmarried, makes it more

difficult to control, and makes it interfere more than it need with the enjoyment of life' (ibid:7). This provides the rationale for dissuading the practice of masturbation. The pamphlet finishes with the statement that 'These are the important things about sex' (ibid:8).

Here again we see the operation of a discourse of difference that is organised around the principle of the family. Healthy normal sex is seen in relation to the heterosexual monogamous married couple, and all sexual activity that falls outside of this is seen as deviant. While the construction and maintenance of hegemony around sexuality was secure throughout most of the 1950s there were a series of 'moral panics' that indicate many of the attitudes, fears and anxieties that were prevalent at this time about sexuality. By examining the panic surrounding the Mazengarb Report of 1954 it is possible to outline the 'broad consensual framework' that organised the sexuality system. The events that precipitated the Report were the sensational newspaper reports of July 1954 about the 'proceedings in the Magistrates Court at Lower Hutt against youths charged with indecent assault upon, or carnal knowledge of, girls under 16 years of age' (Special Committee on Moral Delinquency in Children and Adolescents,1954:7). While these events were the main reason for the establishment of the Committee, the Report also notes that press statements had appeared earlier in the year that indicated juvenile deliquency in general had more than doubled in recent years. Shortly after the Hutt Valley incidents, the media's attention turned to a murder in Hagley Park, Christchurch.

On 23 August, 1954, Pauline Parker and Janet Hulme stood
trial for murder in Christchurch. Both 16 year old
defendents, like some of the young women arrested in the
Hutt, allegedly revelled in having defied conventional
standards. They admitted to battering Parker's mother to
death with a brick inserted into a stocking (Openshaw and
Shuker,1985:18).

The murder was seen as a result of the breakdown in morality and in the

words of the Mazengarb Report the young women were reported as being

'abnormally homosexual in behaviour' (Special Committee:8). Glazebrook

reports that the media 'eagerly published reports of the events...[and]

groups such as women's organisations and the Churches, which had been

worried for years about the breakdown of society, felt that all their

worst fears had been realised' (Glazebrook,1978:1). The Mazengarb

Committee were of the opinion that there was a change in sexual

behaviour and that in particular there 'is the attitude of mind of some

young people to sexual indulgence with one another, their planning and

organisation of it and their assumption that when they consent together

they are not doing anything wrong' (Special Committee:9). The new

pattern that the report identified had six main components. These were

a concern that younger groups of children were engaging in sexual

activity; that girls were becoming more 'precocious' and taking an

initiating role in sexual behaviour; that illegal sexual activity was

being organised in a way that previously was not happening; that past

'offenders' were reoffending; that children's mental attitude was

changing and that they were showing knowledge of sex which was 'well in

advance of their age' (ibid:19); and that there was an increase in

homosexuality. All these factors were seen as creating a very serious

situation that had to be changed. The Report for the most part was

well received, and resulted in three pieces of legislation which aimed
to prevent further occurences of 'delinquency'. These acts were the
Child Welfare Amendment Act which enabled the labelling of children as
delinquents if they indulged in sexual intercourse as outlined in the
Act; the Indecent Publications Amendment Act which extended the
definition of 'indecent' as defined by the 1910 Act; and the Police
Offences Amendment Act which restricted the sale of contraceptives to
individuals over the age of sixteen. A further step taken by the
government was to send a copy of the Mazengarb report to every home in
New Zealand where there were children receiving the family benefit
(Glazebrook, 1978:3).

The Committee of Inquiry and other commentators at the time could
not isolate one major 'cause' for the increase in delinquency, however
in their discussion of various influences, (including 'visual and
auditory factors'), the school, community and the home it is possible
to identify two main themes. Firstly sexual 'misbehaviour' was said to
have a cause in the predisposition of individuals. Emotional
'maladjustment' and therefore individual psycho-pathology was seen as
the cause of sex problems. In this way the category of 'sex deviant'
is created. Secondly the family was considered to be the source of
this sexual deviance if it is somehow 'abnormal' i.e. if mothers are
not looking after children as they should. These conclusions are
entirely consistent with the prevalent view about the place of women in
the family, the concern that children's sexuality should be kept in
check and the idea that homosexuality has no place in society because
it does not fit into the family. The moral panic signalled the

widespread concern with keeping sex in its place – the family – and with ensuring that deviant sexuality did not have the legal or moral sanctions of society.

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2. Why the Breakdown in Moral Consensus? The 60s and 70s

This section examines the breaking up of the consensus that had existed about morality, sexuality and gender relations during the period following the war. Firstly I outline some of the changes in the state and social relations that led to a liberalisation of attitudes on some issues, and provided the conditions on which progressive social movements could organise themselves. The second part of the section discusses the reasons and form of reaction that arose in response to the 'liberal/permissive moment' of the sixties and seventies.

(i) The 'liberal/permissive moment'

The consensus that existed within New Zealand society about the relations between the sexes and sexuality was beginning to breakdown as early as the late fifties, although dissent did not take an active political form until the late sixties. Dunstall describes the period from 1945 in the following way.

> Unsurpassed prosperity and social tranquility characterised the two decades from 1945. From the late 1950s there were signs of rebellion among adolescents; by the early 1960s youth culture had been commercialised; from the mid-1960s

it was politicised as counter culture. The late 1960s
brought recession and participation in the Vietnam war, new
forms of urban protest sprang up, the most enduring of
which in the 1970s were a Maori cultural resurgence and a
new feminist movement (Dunstall,1981:397).

The late sixties saw a constellation of changes at different
levels that provided the conditions on which a 'crisis', not only in
the economy but also in morals was recognised and responded to. As
pointed out in chapter two a period of unstable social relations is
likely to disrupt the historic bloc based on a discourse of difference,
and lead to an increase in the points of antagonism. With a
proliferation of antagonisms, there is more likely to be a challenge to
the hegemony in the form of discourses of equivalence. The changes
that occured during the sixties and early seventies can be seen as
representing just such an increase in the points of antagonism. These
developments led to a proliferation in chains of equivalence. As noted
in the introduction, the emergence of new political subjects after the
war is an outcome of two social processes. Firstly there is the
increasing bureaucratisation of social relations and involvement of the
state in 'private' areas, and secondly there is a 'reformulation' of
liberal ideology. Both of these factors can be seen to contribute to
the development of progressive social movements in the sixties and the
populist discourse of the moral right that arose in the early
seventies.

The sixties and early seventies can be said to form a
liberal/progressive moment in that there was a fusion in a number of
currents, circumstances and antagonisms. Perhaps one of the most

significant factors was the continuing development of the welfare state and its increasing influence and involvement in the traditionally private areas of social life. In Britain, Weeks claims that the development of the welfare state after the Second World War was an important contributor to a reassessment of the field of sexuality and gender relations (1981b:232). This is equally true of the situation in New Zealand. One of the outcomes of post-war welfarism was an increased level of affluence in the general population. Although the welfare state did nothing to alter the basic imbalance between the classes, it did provide the opportunity for growing numbers of middle-class and young people to consume more goods and services, and to create sub-cultures and leisure activities that were concerned with sexual and personal 'freedom'. For women the introduction of the pill, as an effective form of contraception, enabled them to be more free from childbearing and rearing. With this freedom came an increase in participation in the paid workforce, and this eventually led to a challenge to traditional sex roles. Marriages were increasingly entered into for 'the pursuit of individual happiness' (Novitz,1978:77 - my emphasis).

During this period the state's activity in the areas of marriage and the family, began to reflect a move away from control of these issues for the 'public good' towards the more liberal notion of 'individual consent'. So while the state in effect retained control of many 'private' issues, ideologically it began to represent this control in terms of individual rights. In 1963 and 1968 the Matrimonial Proceedings Acts were guided by the principle that the state had a

responsibility to the couple involved, to dissolve a marriage if it was not working (Koopman-Boyden and Scott,1984:132). This was a move away from the more traditional religious conception of marriage that had prevailed previously (Lloyd,1978:140) and the idea of marriage as a social contract that involved the state became more central. In 1973 the Domestic Purposes Benefit (DPB) was made statutory and all solo parents became eligible for it. It has been pointed out that the DPB;

> raised important questions concerning dependency and stimulated debate over the interrelationships between public policy and familial behaviour. The state was accused of creating a growing population of solo parents who were dependent on the state through the liberalisation of divorce laws and the creation of the benefit (Koopman-Boyden and Scott,1984:133-4).

Another more general change occuring at this time that had its effect on the sex/gender and sexuality systems, was the growing secularisation of society. Secularisation as a trend has been happening since the end of World War Two, especially since the sixties. This phenomenon involves an increase in religious pluralism; loss of the public role for religion as a major social legitimator and the corresponding privatisation of religion; demystification and a decline in adherence to the traditional religious organisations (Hill,1982:173). With the increasing secularisation, religions' traditional hold on morality was loosened and more liberal notions of morality based on individual freedom and choice came to be accepted.

The effect of these changes discussed above was to disrupt the hegemonic discourse of difference that had previously asserted and

upheld the traditional differences between men and women, and had stipulated a form of sexual conduct that maintained social order. In place of this discourse, new political subjects and movements emerged who did not ignore the antagonisms that existed between men and women, and between the sexual 'majority' and deviants, but rather created a discourse that articulated these 'differences' as significant areas of conflict. The three major movements organising on the sex/gender and sexuality systems were the feminist, sexual liberation and gay rights movements. Each of these movements represented a break from the traditional discourse on sex and gender.

The 'second wave' of feminism 'arrived' in 1965 with the American radio series 'The Potential of Women'. Following this, a lecture series on 'The Changing Role of Women' was held in Wellington in 1966 and was the springboard for the establishment of the Society for Research on Women (SROW). Although there had been some individual feminist writing prior to this time, the late sixties and early seventies saw the development of an organised and collective political movement. The late sixties saw the arrival of a new women's magazine, Thursday, which was aimed at the 'new' woman 'who was said to be bored by the traditional preoccupation of women's magazines with royalty, recipes and romance' (Dann,1985:3). In the political sphere, 1969 was a turning point with the establishment of the Independent Women's Party and a concern among women in the Left who began to see themselves as a separate political force independent from their male comrades. The early seventies saw the establishment of several women's liberation groups in various parts of the country, the setting up of a national

feminist magazine (Broadsheet) and a variety of political activities mainly centred around abortion and contraception. Feminism's fundamental challenge was to the traditional view of the 'natural' differences between men and women. Instead of accepting these differences, the movement argued that men hold power over women and that this is the fundamental organising principle of society. Rather than accepting the family as the natural place for the sexes to carry out their biologically ordained role, feminists launched a major critique of that institution as the main source of women's oppression.

In a similar way the so-called 'sexual revolution' of the sixties marked a rejection of traditional ideas about the place of sex within the family between the married couple. Traditional sexual morality was being questioned and the fruits of it 'guilt...pretense and hypocracy' were being rejected (Rosenburg,1960:8). This 'revolution' consisted of abandoning the various controls that existed around sex. Therefore extra-marital, pre-marital, non-monogamous, and casual sex were celebrated as the epitome of sexual 'liberation'.

Related to the sexual revolution was the establishment of a gay rights movement that also identified the family as a primary site of the oppression of homosexuals. As early as 1964 the homosexual rights movement began with the formation of a legal subcommittee in the Dorian Society. That year also saw the New Zealand Howard League for Penal Reform urge the Minister of Justice (the Hon. J.R. Hanan) to introduce legislation which would decriminalise sex between consenting adult men. The Auckland branch of the National Council of Women endorsed the remit

presented to it by the Howard League (O'Halloran, 1964:12). In 1967 the New Zealand Homosexual Law Reform Society (NZHLRS) was established with the objective of reforming the Crimes Act relating to male homosexuality along the lines of the new British law. The group took its first political action in 1968 with the presentation to Parliament of a petition calling for a repeal of those sections of the Crimes Act which made homosexuality illegal. The petition was returned from the Petitions Committee with no recommendation. The NZHLRS began to apply more pressure by encouraging public support which eventually resulted in support coming from some of the churches. Following the increased publicity and political awareness of many homosexuals, and inspired by the growth of gay liberation groups overseas, the first gay liberation group was established in 1972 in Auckland, and then in Christchurch and Wellington. The early seventies were a period of intense radical political activity by homosexual groups and at this time gay liberation had a relatively high public profile. National conferences were held annually and Gay Pride weeks which included public meetings, rallies and marches, kept the movement in the public eye. A submission published by the Auckland Gay Liberation group described the aims of the gay liberation movement at this time in the following way.

> We aim to replace the feelings of shame and guilt all gays have been taught to feel about their sexual orientation by this anti-gay society with a feeling of pride and dignity. We aim to get as many gays as possible involved in the struggle for our full civil and human rights. We aim to educate gays, and the rest of the public in the truth about homosexuals and homosexuality and expose the prejudice against us for what it is - an irrational prejudice - like racism, based on ignorance and fear. We aim to build our movement and spread our ideas amongst gays and straights alike (Auckland Gay Liberation, 1975:23).

A bill introduced to Parliament in 1975 to liberalise the law on homosexuality was lost and some groups within the gay movement demoralised by the defeat went into recess that year (Young,1985:9). However in 1976 many groups began to rebuild and in June 1977 established the National Gay Rights Coalition. This development saw a more assertive open style of campaigning.

From the late sixties the state made some moves to take up the demands of feminism. While the actions that were taken were undoubtedly of only the most minor liberal nature, they were seen by certain sections of society as being the beginnings of a take-over of the state by a radical, revolutionary feminist movement. In 1967 the government established the National Advisory Council on Employment for Women (NACEW) under the auspices of the Labour Department. In 1969 the committee recommended that a Commission of Inquiry be set up to investigate the best way to implement equal pay in the private sector and a commission was finally established in 1971. The report released by the Commission resulted in the Equal Pay Act 1972. In 1973 a Select Committee on Women's Rights was set up and in 1975 it released its report The Role of Women in New Zealand Society. The United Nations International Women's Year in 1975, that began the decade for women, was the spur for several state sponsored conferences and the establishment of the Committee on Women. The Education and Equality of the Sexes Conference in 1975 resulted in the establishment of the National Advisory Committee on Women and Education (NACWE). The following year saw the Conference for Women in Social and Economic

Development, and in 1977 the government sponsored the Women and Health Conference.

In addition to incorporating some of the demands of the new political movements, the state was also beginning to assert more interest in the area of sex education. In the past, the Health Department in consultation and co-operation with various bodies such as the Marriage Guidance Council and Parent Teacher Associations had been involved in voluntary evening classes for children and their parents on sex education. However when the state began to articulate a position which stressed that sex education should be included in the curriculum, objections began to be raised to the interference in 'private' family issues. In 1973 the Ross committee made its report on health and social education with a particular focus on sex eduction. It was recommended that programmes in human development, sexuality and relationships should be provided in schools from infant classes to Form seven. This marked a decisive moment for conservative groups who objected to the interference of the state in an area they believed should be reserved for control by the family.

In conclusion then, this section has attempted to map out the conditions that led to the establishment of the moral right in the early seventies. The rise of new progressive movements and developments in religion and the state all helped to create a situation that threw into 'crisis' many taken-for-granted assumptions about the world, and in particular the organisation of gender and sexual relations. It has been suggested that secularisation can only be

enjoyed

> by those who have the economic and social power to do so.
> For those who do not have such power, secularisation is
> often experienced as an alienating and dehumanising force
> in their lives, cutting them off from their cultural
> identity and depriving them of the ideological resources of
> the past (Stuart,1982:88).

This process may indeed have been one of the spurs for the growth in fundamentalist Christianity whose ideology forms an integral part of the moral right discourse. In particular, churches that espouse a millenial ideology such as Church of the Latter Day Saints and the Jehovah Witnesses, and fundamentalist Pentecostalism have shown a dramatic increase over the past 15 years. Between 1976 and 1981 membership of the traditional mainstream churches declined by 7.27% while membership of Pentecostal churches rose by 127.3% (Vodanovich,1985:70). While it is not possible to discuss in detail the likely causes for the growth in religious fundamentalism it can be speculated that one reason may be attributed to the expansion of activities by the state into areas of life previously regarded as private and outside of its authority. These areas concerned with family, sexual and personal morality were traditionally the property of religion. Advances into these areas by the state are seen by many as an illegitimate intrusion into private life. In response to this intrusion a number of churches with a fundamentalist and evangelical emphasis have arisen in an attempt to win back to God and the family control of these contentious issues.

> The label of "Christian" provides a powerful unifying
> symbol that can override denominational differences...In
> addition, because of its fundamentalist and therefore
> "traditional" stance on morality the movement attracts
> support from the more conservative elements of the general
> population (ibid:69).

There are a number of currents then, that converged during the sixties and early seventies. Changes in some of the mainstream churches towards a more liberal interpretation of the Bible, and increase in the participation of women in the paid workforce, more freeedom for women from childrearing, the state's intervention in private areas and the development of progressive movements, all led to a situation that undermined the traditional moral framework, and generated for some people a 'sense of moral collapse' (Weeks,1981b:260). In response to this crisis a morally conservative movement began to crystallise in the early seventies.

(ii) The reaction

The events outlined in the section above and the broad changes in sexual morality and gender relations that accompanied them provided the conditions on which a reaction and response has come from various morally conservative groups in New Zealand. The breakdown of consensus over sexual values and gender roles which typified the late sixties and seventies, was seen by various groups as having only negative effects. It is in response to the liberal challenge to traditional morality that a new moral movement began in the early seventies. The various progressive movements were seen as constituting a 'crisis in authority' and therefore had to be defended against. The increasing tendency for

the state to involve itself in 'private' issues and to incorporate some

of the demands of the progressive movements was seen as even more of a

threat to traditional ideas about sex and gender. In the British

context Weeks has commented that 'permissiveness' became a political

metaphor that marked a social and political divide. Opponents of the

movement used the phrase to weld together complex changes into a

'potent symbolic unity'. By erecting this symbol of moral and sexual

relaxation

> of loose moral standards, of disrespect for all that was
> traditional and "good", it became easier in the 1970s to
> recreate a sense of crisis around social changes and the
> beginnings of a mass support for authoritarian moral
> solutions (Weeks,1981b:249).

This is clearly what also happened in New Zealand.

The first signs of the new morally conservative movements came in

1970 with the establishment of SPUC and SPCS. The early seventies also

saw the setting up of the FRA in 1973, the CPA in 1974, Feminists for

Life (now called Women for Life) in 1974. All these groups expressed

concern at the growing permissiveness and immorality of New Zealand

society and the increasing involvement of the state in 'private'

issues. Essentially there was a reaction to the perceived dominance of

liberal ideas about sexuality and gender relations. Conservative

groups saw any liberalisation as being an attack on a lifestyle they

wished to defend and maintain.

The immediate reason for the establishment of the SPCS in November 1970 was the failure of a petition presented to parliament by Patricia Bartlett. The petition called for amendments to the Cinematograph Films Act 1961 and the Crimes Act 1961 that would make illegal nudity and homosexual scenes in films and stage shows. However the broader concern of the group was 'the downward developments which are occuring in television, book and film censorship, advertising and other areas which influence the Community attitudes' (SPCS, n.d.). The FRA was established in 1973 for similar reasons and it was specifically interested in providing a 'union' for the family. The Association believed the family was coming under increasing attack in society. In its information leaflet the FRA gives the following reasons 'Why it was started...'

> Marriage and family life are under <u>consistent attack</u> in the modern world. Marriages are breaking up at a record rate. <u>The State seeks to usurp the rights of parents</u> in the fields of education and health. Many parents have lost confidence in their role and if a new baby is being expected they feel they must apologise to society at large. This Association seeks to reassure parents that the work they have undertaken is of inestimable value to the community. As the late President Kennedy said, children are the nations's most valuable asset and its main hope for the future (FRA,n.d., i. — my emphasis)

In an earlier leaflet the Association lists the following 'Threats to the family...'

> All families are suffering at present, infidelity and divorce are very common. Marriages are breaking down at a record rate. When love dies hatred emerges and the children are exposed to suffering and neglect. Parents often see their children's lives being ruined by drugs, alcoholism and promiscuity, swept along by an overwhelming

flood of pornography and evil. Pressure groups claim that marrige is outmoded. De facto relationships are accepted by society and are treated generously by the Government. Normal sexuality is almost submerged by demands for recognition of homosexuality and other perversions. Illegitimacy and venereal disease have reached epidemic proportions. Social anarchy threatens. Some deny parents the fundamental freedom to determine how many children they want to have, whether this is ten or none. Innocent children are abandoned and in some schools only a minority of the pupils have two parents. Irresponsible adults imagine they have the right to label certain children 'unwanted' and beat them (battered babies) or even kill them (in abortion). (FRA,n.d., ii)

In response to these 'cataclysmic' events the FRA developed the following principle aims and objectives.

1. To foster love, justice and high ideals in marriage.

2. To uphold monogamous, heterosexual, permanent marriage as a state instituted by God.

3. To encourage appreciation of the dignity and nobility of parenthood.

4. To protect the family from attacks on its integrity and status, and from legislation which might affect it adversely.

5. To remain independent of any political party, any religious body, or any organisation whose main aim is to encourage population control, homosexuality, euthanasia, divorce, contraception, sterilisation or abortion. (ibid)

Several events in the field of sex education led to the setting up of the CPA in 1974. The two immediate concerns were the publication of the Ross Report in 1973 and the circulation to schools of the contraceptive comic 'Too Great a Risk'. There was also alarm expressed at

> an undue emphasis on social education in New Zealand state
> schools, at the expense of the "basic three R's".
> Furthermore, the association has frequently spoken out on
> the controversial questions of feminist influence within
> the educational bureacracy and sex role stereotyping in the
> schools (Openshaw,1983:32).

A strong thrust of the CPA from its beginning has been to push for stronger parental authority with regard to children's education (particularly sex education) and access to contraceptives and abortion. The aims of the association are based around the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states,

> "Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education
> that shall be given to their children" (Article 26(3)).

> "The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of
> Society and is entitled to protection by Society and the
> State" (Article 16(3)).

What follows in the rest of this section are just some of the activities on the moral right at the end of the seventies. What is of significance is the perceived threat that these conservative groups saw in the liberal ideology, increase in state involvement in 'private' issues and the growth of progressive movements that sought to 'subvert' the family.

In 1975 the Labour government responding to an increase and polarisation in public opinion about abortion, set up a Royal Commission to inquire into contraception, sterilisation and abortion in New Zealand. The events that precipitated the Commission were those surrounding the opening of the Auckland Medical Aid Centre (AMAC) in

May 1974, which began carrying out abortions according to its interpretation of the Crimes Act. The high public profile that the Centre took became the focus of a major campaign by SPUC to have it shut down. Although the SPUC campaign was not successful, it did succeed in having a doctor charged with performing illegal abortion, although he was later acquited. Dr G Wall (MP) introduced a Bill into parliament in October 1974 that attempted to close AMAC by restricting all abortions to public hospitals. The dissatisfaction of many of the anti-abortion groups and parliamentarians over these events led to them pressing for an inquiry into the whole area of contraception, sterilisation and abortion. Accordingly in June 1975 the Royal Commission was established. The Commission received submissions from over 900 groups and individuals many of whom had conservative views of the issue. The legislation that was drafted from the Report and finally passed in 1977 was seen by those on the moral right as permissive and an attack on parental authority. The SPCS commented that the effect of the Bill was 'to remove parent's rights and supervision over their children's sexual welfare' (SPCS,Nov 1977:1). The erosion of parents rights was then linked to the breakdown in the New Zealand family (ibid).

In September 1977 the Integrity Centre was established in Christchurch [2]. According to Neville Rush, the Centre's Director, the reason for the Integrity campaign 'was simply...the growing influence of Secular Humanism and Socialism to destroy our Cultural Heritage and our traditional values and way of life' (Rush,1985). The aims of the Centre are:

1. to encourage the better marketing of the virtues (in
contrast to the well marketed vices),
2. a call to all community interest groups for closer
cooperation and combined operations to increase our
positive impact on society.
3. to produce literature in particular on skills, in
communication and the knowledge of the values of virtues.
4. to provide a central city base of operation.
5. to develop a nationwide programme to promote family
life. (Integrity,n.d.)

In 1977 the 'Save Our Home's' campaign was begun and a convention was held to coincide with the United Women's Convention. The advertisement for the convention stated it was 'For Women. About Women'. The Convention and campaign were seen as a response to

the biggest concern of our times - the breakdown of family
life...The concept of the family as a unit of love,
security and training for children is under attack. We
cannot sit back. We must act now.

The advertisement criticised the 'trendy call of liberation and equality' which is designed to 'belittle the dedicated wife and mother'. A paper presented at the convention stated 'when it comes to the governmental arrangement of the family there is not equality, the husband is the head of the home. The husband is to be the provider and protector' (quoted by Reid,1978:14).

Perhaps one of the most bitterly contested issues of the late seventies was the publication in 1977 of the Johnson Report (Department of Education,1977). The CPA mounted a major campaign against the report and many groups on the moral right mobilised against it. In

1978 the Council of Moral Education (COME) was formed by members of the FRA and SPCS in response to the Report and the Council was joined by SPUC the following year. Although the initial impact of the group was minor, COME has consistently lobbied government about sex education, and recently it has published a book to accompany its audio-visual programme on values education (Elliot-Hogg and Christie,1985).

In 1979 SPCS expressed its concern at the Family Proceedings Bill 1978. The society urged its members to write submissions to the Statutes Revision Committee and letters to MPs to stop the Bill. The reasons given for opposition to the Bill are contained in a fact sheet published by the SPCS (SPCS,n.d.).

> The Bill makes radical changes to marriages and to the duties within marriage. After the Bill is passed, all future (and present) marriages will be quite different from marriage as presently understood. Where parties have been living apart for six months (even if living apart in the same house) and one of them had applied for marriage guidance or counselling at least two years previously, the Court shall find that the marriage has been irretrievably broken down and make an order for the dissolution – it affords no protection for the innocent party who wishes to hold the marriage together for the sake of the children, who loves the spouse etc. The guilty or bored partner can walk out of the marriage.
>
> In every marriage when this Bill is passed NO HUSBAND WILL HAVE A DUTY TO MAINTAIN HIS WIFE except where she is looking after a young child etc. This means when a young couple marry, the husband can spend all his wages on himself and will have no obligation to provide for his wife except when a young child is involved. It appears when the child is of school age, the wife is expected to go out to work.
>
> A husband can be convicted of rape in respect of intercourse with his wife if at the time he and his wife are living apart. This will be a deterent to the reconciliation of the estranged partners (original emphasis).

The groups mentioned above represent the main force behind the moral right during the seventies. There were however a number of other groups who were active during this period. An organisation called Family 75 made a submission in 1975 to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion. Its position was conservative and upheld the view that the maintenance of the traditional family was the only way to overcome sexual permissiveness and the dangers of feminism. In 1974 the Educational Development Association (EDA) was established out of the dissatisfaction that many participants in the Educational Development Conference felt with the bureaucratic handling of information from the discussions. Although its main stated aim is to increase the parental involvement in educational decision-making, its position on many issues is morally conservative.

3. The Consolidation of the Moral Right in the Eighties

(i) The early eighties

The activity of conservative groups in the seventies was in many ways piecemeal. Although COME had attempted to represent a range of groups active on sex education it did not really succeed in creating a united front with common aims and a clear means of achieving them. It was not until the eighties that these morally conservative groups can be seen to begin to form a consolidated moral right. In many ways the

Working Womens Charter (WWC) provided a nucleus around which many different groups could coordinate and organise activity against the 'growing tide of permissiveness' and quest for a 'uni-sex' society. The Charter was first publicly floated in 1975 at a seminar in Dunedin by Sonja Davies. The first branch of the Working Women's Council was established later in the year and in 1978 the Charter was introduced to the Federation of Labour (FOL) conference. After the Charter was accepted by the FOL at its 1980 conference various conservative groups mounted a campaign against it. Sonja Davies writing about this time reports that,

> pamphlets were produced and widely circulated claiming that the Charter was a Communist document introduced in New Zealand by the SAL; that it recommended the dumping of children in childcare for 24 hours a day like battery hens, and that abortion would escalate and family life be destroyed (Davies,1984:302).

A major campaign against the Charter was carried out in Dunedin where a group of anti-feminist women set up the Working Women's Council (Inc) in opposition to the original Working Women's Council. This group, now known as Kiwi Forum, has since been involved in campaigns against the Convention and affirmative action. The Charter was also opposed by SPCS, FRA, CPA and COME. FRA held a conference in 1980 and one of the things to come out of it was a Family Charter that was intended as a document to counter the WWC [3]. SPUC also opposed the Charter on the grounds that it called for abortion on demand and because it was backed by the Workers Communist League and other socialist organasations who had as goals the destruction of the family and 'the system of private enterprise as we know it' (Pryor,1980).

In 1983 various groups began to organise around the theme of restoring parental authority. Although this had always been a theme within the moral right, it was with an increased perception of the state's intervention in areas that encroached on 'parental rights' that many groups were prompted to take up the issue. In their November 1983 newletter the FRA announced its project to give authority back to parents by proposing various amendments to the Guardianship Act 1977 and the Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion Act 1977. Their March newsletter had reported that the Association had made submissions to the National Council of Women and government on the In Vitro Fertilisation and Artificial Insemination by Donor programmes, because they claimed that these presented a 'travesty of real marriage'. The Integrity Centre also began a similar campaign at this time. They organised a 'Petition to Strengthen Parental Authority' that was intended to increase the authority of parents over their children rather than allowing continued state interference. The petition called for the repeal or amendment of all legislation which limited or removed the authority of parents over children. In particular the areas of education, moral and religious training, instruction about contraception, sterilisation and abortion and sex were singled out as requiring the approval of parents before other people may educate children. According to the Integrity Centre the petition received 30,000 signatures and therefore they claimed it supported their belief that there is a 'growing wave of public opinion...against the liberal attitudes of humanism that is turning our children into vulgar, violent hooligans and sex experimenters before they are even out of High School' (Rush,1984). Part of the Integrity campaign was the Family

Support Project. The objectives of the project were to: encourage the role of motherhood and fatherhood, improve communication skills between family members, emphasise the importance of the family unit, create a greater sense of responsibility in parents for their children, show the social evils that appear when the parental role is neglected, encourage more responsible authority and liability of parents over their children and to create in children a greater respect for their parents and for authority. These objectives were to be achieved through the use of brochures, posters, displays, speakers and a proposed audio-visual display. This incorporated a Parent Pack of material under the title 'Teach Your Children Well' which included pamphlets on anarchy, comunication, sex, chastity, honesty, marriage, self respect and loyalty.

In 1983 the Family Planning Association (FPA) released its Sex Education Kit for trial in secondary schools. Many conservative groups reacted strongly against the kit on the grounds that contraceptive knowledge is emphasised and traditional morality downplayed (FRA,Dec 1984). Objections were made to illustrations in the kit which were considered to be too explicit, offensive, crude and tasteless (SPCS,Sept 1984; CPA,July 1984). In summary, it can be said that the different activities of the moral right at this time were organised around the antagonism seen between 'parents' and the permissive state and society. The solution to the crisis was seen in building up again the authority of the family and the rights of parents to determine their children's lives.

(ii) 1984 and Beyond — The Coalition of Concerned Citizens

The points made by the moral right and discussed above were the continued focus for activity during the mid-eighties. However a consolidation of the movement occured as different groups came increasingly to see that there was a common enemy and that united, they could attack, in a more systematic way, that foe. A major catalyst for this consolidation was the election of a Labour government in July 1984. Many of the platforms of the Labour party were seen as being in direct opposition to the ideas of the moral right. Alarm was expressed at the proposed ratification of the Convention [4], the Women's Forums, the establishment of the Ministry of Women's Affairs and the introduction of the Education Amendment Bill (1985). The intention of the Minister of Education to introduce sex education into schools was seen as a major reason for a more concerted effort on the part of the various groups to work together against the common enemy. In March 1985 the introduction of the Homosexual Law Reform Bill was the crisis point that saw a massive effort to stop the Bill through a petition against it. Bruce Ansley sees the petition leading to the coalition as

> a gathering-point for people troubled by a changing social
> and economic landscape, a platform for conservatives to
> hurl rocks at the agents of change; the Vietnam war
> protestors, feminists, greenies, the entire candelabra of
> the "permissive society" (Ansley,1985:17).

Indeed Barry Reed, the CCC's press officer, claimed that 'Homosexuals came along at the very wrong psychological moment' (quoted in ibid:16). The aim of the national Coalition is to form a united front to fight

the enemy through disseminating information and acting as a catalyst to motivate and spearhead action on moral issues (Coalition Courier, no.1:4) [5]. Taking each of the events in turn, I will briefly outline why they were considered to be such a threat to moral people.

The Homosexual Law Reform Bill was met with outrage by the moral right [6]. It was seen as having only evil consequences that would ultimately destroy the stability of the family and therefore the whole of society. Support for homosexuality is seen as promoting its practice and 'as such practices increase, normal heterosexual marriage and nurture of children must obviously decrease. We submit that this is not in the best interests of society and future generations' (CPA submission 1985:1). There is a particular concern among many groups at the effect that passing the Bill could have in schools, where homosexuality could be taught as a valid life option. The CPA sees that giving lesbianism 'legal status' would be particularly dangerous for society.

> We see this as being potentially disasterous to normal family life and the stability of society. The lesbian wing of the feminist movement is extremely vocal and active in promoting social change and recognition of their lifestyle (CPA submission,1985:7).

Again the state's involvement in this area of life is challenged.

> At best, the State's servants are only a reflection of a cross-section of society, and are no better nor worse than the parents whose functions they seek to replace. If the Homosexual Law Reform Bill is passed, a further complication will arise in that homosexuals and lesbians will then have the right to be employed in all the various

childcare, educational, protecting, and counselling
professions, which assert that they are superior to the
parents whose children come under their influence or
control (ibid).

Credo also recognised the wider implications of the Bill but

couched it in highly conspiratorial terms and labelled the campaign as

'an infamous minefield of deception and intrigue; part of a vast,

meticulously-orchestrated plan to revolutionise Western society

economically, politically and culturally' (Credo,May 1985:1). In

particular the Homosexual Law Reform Bill is linked to socialist

programmes.

One is not surprised to hear that the Homosexual Law Reform
Bill is part of the Socialist Action League's plan to
dismantle the nuclear family because, as they say, it helps
to perpetuate the values of a "white, patriarchal
capitalist class system" (ibid:3).

Objections to the establishment of the Ministry of Women's Affairs

were mainly made on the grounds that it did not appear to support,

the traditional family unit of working father, full-time
home-making mother, and children cared for and supervised
by their natural parents. The upsurge of working mothers
is the period when an all-time high rate of divorce, solo
mothers, street kids, children on drugs and glue sniffing
has occured (SPCS,March 1985:2).

The Women's Forums of 1984 provided women on the moral right with an

opportunity to organise themselves against Labour's policy of equality

for women. While they were not effective in stopping the

implementation of the policies these women did manage a high degree of

mobilisation on the issue and it is this feat that is significant. After the forums Marilyn Pryor compiled a document incorporating reports from anti-feminist women from all over the country (Pryor,1985). These women see themselves as being united in a struggle against the potent evil of feminism, and the sense of common purpose is a major strength for their movement.

The establishment of the Coalition of Concerned Citizens (CCC) in 1985 marks the most important turning point for the moral right. Members of the CCC see themselves as a force for good opposing the evil inherent in the Homosexual Law Reform Bill and other progressive trends. Credo states

> ..the Coalition simply represents a reuniting of Church and other community groups which in turn represent the fundamental concerns and beliefs of the broad middle ground of society. This reuniting is seen by them as a vital need, with society having been systematically fragmented and its people denied adequate leadership and the power to participate in the wider decision-making process (Credo,Sept 1985:3 - original emphasis).

In summary then the eighties were an important consolidating time for the moral right. The movement has been steadily building in numbers since the early seventies, but it was as a consequence of the introduction of a Labour government, seen to be implementing 'radical' policies that questioned traditional gender and sexual relations, that the moral right has formed some sort of organic unity.

4. Summary and Conclusion - Towards Populist Moralism

This chapter has examined the conditions on which the moral right has developed in New Zealand. It was argued that after the war the sex/gender and sexuality systems were marked by a discourse of difference that maintained men and women have separate spheres and that sex was to be confined to the family. During the sixties and seventies the consensus that had existed about these matters was broken up by the development of new progressive movements, liberalisation of state activity in some areas and the growing secularisation of society. The conjuncture at this time can be said to constitute a 'liberal/progressive' moment. The 'crisis' in morality that conservatives read off from this situation provided the impetus to develop a new moral right. This new political movement responded to the crisis by identifying an 'enemy' that had to be defeated if morality and authority were to reign once again. The following newspaper advertisement from Credo (at the end of this chapter) illustrates the concerns of many groups on the moral right. It is interesting that Credo identifies itself as part of the 'new oppressed'. In many ways this is not a false claim and reflects real fears of people who are concerned about an increasing bureaucratisation of life and interference of the state into personal and private areas of life. However the terms in which the 'crisis' are couched are chaotic, cataclysmic and conspiratorial. Barbara Faithfull of Credo writes

> We are conscious of the existence of a little publicised
> but nonetheless very real international political movement
> for revolutionary social change by peaceful means.
> Moreover, we see this movement as already having
> devastating repercussions on New Zealand society
> (Faithfull,1984).

These repercussions include a decline in Western democracy, Western cultural heritage (particularly with regard to undermining family stability and authority), a decline in moral values and consequent rise in 'alien, atheistic, anti-authority, Humanistic ideology' (ibid) and the practice of all kinds of perverse sex. With the conditions of existence for the moral right now established, the following chapter examines the discourse of the moral right around the nodal point of sex education.

NOTES

1. See Battersby, 1983 for a full discussion of this case study.

2. See Appendix 3 for information leaflet on Integrity Centre.

3. See Appendix 4 for a copy of the Family Charter.

4. See Appendix 5 for information sheet against the Convention.

5. See Appendix 6 for the CCC's 'Official Statement of Position'.

6. See Appendix 7 for an advertisement against the Homosexual Law Reform Bill.

CHAPTER FOUR

Sex Education and Populist Moralism

Starting from Hall's formulation of populist moralism as the
division of the world into two parts - one 'good' and the other 'evil',
and the points made in chapter three about the conflict the moral right
sees between the state and progressive forces, and 'moral' people, it
is possible to fill out in more detail how the moral right 'cements'
together its discourse. This chapter will identify what articulating
principle is used by the moral right to make sense of the crisis it
sees in morality. It will delineate the discourse of equivalence that
is constructed on the sex/gender and sexuality systems. There is no
attempt made to critique the factual basis for the arguments of the
moral right, rather I am only concerned here with how they articulate
their position on matters of sexual and gender relations as they relate
to sex education. Going back to chapter two, it is necessary to look
again at the concepts of the articulating principle and the discourse
of equivalence. If we take articulation to be that practice which
creates a new form of unity amongst fragments of an ideological system,
it is necessary to firstly identify what ideological elements enter
into the relation of articulation and secondly to specify the

'relational moment' of articulation around certain nodal points that
'partially fix meaning'. In terms of the moral right it is clear that
the movement has picked up elements of a liberal discourse on sexuality
and gender relations, and rearticulated these away from the concept of
'liberalism' towards a solution based on an authoritarian definition of
the family. Where liberal discourse speaks of individual rights and
'doing your own thing', populist moralism emphasises responsibilities
harnessed to the family.

The moral right uses this concept of 'the family' as a principle
around which certain equivalences are constructed. Returning again to
the definition set up in chapter two, a discourse of equivalence
involves the creation of a system of equivalents among different
subjects by constructing a common antagonism among subjects to an
internal enemy. Different subjects are constructed into polar
opposites through discourse and the two poles are interpellated as
contradictory and antagonistic. What is more, a discourse of this type
constructs subjectivity based around a popular positionality, i.e. the
world is divided into the dominant and the dominated, and all of
society is articulated around one fundamental antagonism. In the case
of the moral right the antagonism is between 'moral' people and the
'immoral' (the state and various other subversives). The immoral
section of society must be defeated if 'morality' is to reign. The
moral right sees itself as signifying 'the good' while feminism, gay
liberation and the 'liberal' state are the reverse of this. There are
no points of contact seen between these two camps, so a maximum
separation is maintained between them. No ideological element in the

discourse of the moral right is allowed into a relation with the 'evil' society, except that of pure opposition. Furthermore, the moral right is able to create a popular movement because populist moralism does have a grasp on elements of traditional popular morality. It is able to work on people's conceptions of 'values' and 'morals' which are seemingly outside the sphere of politics and which are able to make sense of their concrete experience of family life and relationships. Populist moralism can be seen as having changed certain of the parameters and elements on which struggle around 'morality' has taken place. Where previously liberalism had articulated a position on morality constructed around notions of individual choice, the moral right have turned the debate back onto the family. The moral right has responded to real issues and problems that have been identified on the sex/gender and sexuality systems. This has partly been a response to the failure of liberalism to articulate a position on gender and sexual relations that made good sense to people. That many people do feel anxiety over sexual relationships, emotional security and family life is evident and can be seen in the extent of the moral right's increasing support among 'middle New Zealand'. What the moral right has done is to suggest a solution to these insecurities based around the articulating principle of the 'family'. The aim of this chapter is to examine how the moral right constructs a populist moralism around the nodal point of sex education. In particular I will discuss the 'confrontation' between the people and the powerbloc, and the ideology constructed on both the sex/gender and sexuality systems. The following sections illustrate the points I have made above.

1. 'A Dynamic Point of Confrontation':   Parents vs the State

The discourse of the moral right is clearly populist in nature because it makes a distinction between the people, in particular 'parents', and the state, which is seen as interfering in the private sphere of the family. Much of the debate over sex education has been concerned with the state's involvement in teaching this subject through the public school system. The involvement of the state in sex education is rejected because it is seen as part of a wider trend, incorporating the introduction of 'new' English, social, health and peace education, and other subjects that involve socialisation at the expense of basic factual instruction. Martin Viney, spokesperson for the CPA, comments that 'the state through compulsory education, has forcibly taken over from parents much of the upbringing of their children' (Viney,1985:27). He says that many parents are worried about the state providing sex education

> when in many cases ten years of its efforts have failed to produce the ability to read and write adequately (ibid).
>
> The state has already set the norms for what we can earn, how much of it we may keep, what we may charge and whom we may employ: are we now going to let it set the norms for our sex lives as well? (CPA,Dec 1984:1).
>
> In the area of health education the CPA believes that the state is saying 'to ALL children (not just the neglected ones): "Your parents are not bringing you up properly so we are going to take over "(CPA,Oct/Nov 1983:7).

The rights of parents to educate their children about sex are staunchly defended by members of the moral right. They see state intervention in certain areas of the education system as taking away those rights and

thereby diminishing the authority that belongs to parents. 'The new Health Syllabus is a direct intrusion into many private and personal family matters which are no legitimate concern of the schools' (CPA,April/May 1985:1). The involvement of the state in these areas is seen as undermining parental authority. The Integrity Centre states the dichotomy like this - 'Do you believe in parental authority and traditional family life or state control of our children's upbringing?' (Integrity Centre, Newsflash, 1983/84). In 1985 the CPA claimed that a 'crisis point' had been reached for parents.

> Never before has it been so difficult for parents to bring up and protect their children. A flood of new Bills and regulations currently under consideration could result in there being even fewer laws upholding parents rights and supporting them in vital areas of child upbringing - education, health, morals, discipline. Some of the proposed changes could decrease parental control of their children's actions enabling children to consent to activities that are harmful to them: there will be increased powers for "professionals" to investigate and intrude into private family life (CPA,April/May 1985:1).

The Ross Report (1973), Johnson Report (1977), Draft Health Syllabus and the Education Amendment Act (1985) are all seen as trespassing on the rights of parents. In 1983 the CPA warned that documents recently published advocated

> virtually the complete take-over by the state of the upbringing of children in New Zealand. Under the guise of promoting a healthy lifestyle, it is proposed to mould children's attitudes, morals and values concerning just about every facet of life - how they view themselves, relate to other people, develop sexual morality, set goals for the future. And it would all be done in a manner which undermines traditional morality and opposes Christianity (CPA,Oct/Nov 1983:7).

The major concern expressed was that schools would 'abandon their traditional teaching role, and become agents of social change, bringing about different attitudes and behaviour of future citizens'(ibid). The danger of this action is that the schools could come under the control of 'permissive forces'. State involvement in sex education is not the only area that the moral right objects to. The Children and Young Persons Amendment Bill is also deplored as a 'state snooping system' that 'gives the state the powers to override parents' rights to the control and custody of their children' (CPA,April/May 1985:12).

> As politicians and social engineers take more and more of the upbringing of children out of parents hands and enforce humanistic programmes on school pupils, a massive revolt by parents may be the only action that will bring them to their senses (ibid:3).

In this quote we see not only the opposition between the state and parents on issues such as sex education, but this opposition is seen in terms of a confrontation between two forces - one of 'good' and the other of 'evil'. 'Parents' are continually evoked as the 'good' pole, while the state and permissive forces represent evil. Furthermore, the confrontation is seen in terms of 'parents' taking major action. The Integrity Centre, CPA, FRA, COME and SPCS all promote parent activism through the use of petitions, joining school committees and other boards of control.

The introduction of 'permissive' sex education is seen as

> an intrusion into education, an encroachment authorised and promoted by a small group of people who are this moment authorising and leading a historic shift to break down children's natural modesty, distort their perspective, undermine their home taught values and habituate them from their first year of schooling in genital thinking (Elliot-Hogg,1985:22).

> I don't think it's a coincidence that you see the feminists, the pro-abortionists, the contraceptionists and the homosexuals all wanting sex and human development relationships programmes in schools. Of course I feel convinced that they see this as a way of introducing their own thinking into the minds of children (Viney in Shallcrass,1983:54).

Here several groups are identified as pursuing sex education in the schools - and of being the enemy. The CPA lists them as the Family Planning Association, the Radical Feminist movement, Homosexual groups, ALRANZ, and promoters of indecent publications (CPA,April 1977:2). More recently these groups were restated as the enemy in stronger terms, as being part of 'a political revolution comprising the Women's Rights Movement, the abortion controversy, population control and the multi-million dollar world-wide contraceptive industry, the pornography industry and the tidal wave of militant homosexuality' (CPA,Dec 1980:11 - my emphasis). In particular, feminists are seen as having the support of the state, and moves into health education are seen as being an 'implementation of the feminist plan' (CPA,Dec 1984:1). Bids by feminists to remove sex-role stereotyping are seen to 'enjoy the active cooperation of the Department of Education in this exercise' (CPA,Oct/Nov 1981:10). The state's complicity with feminism is also seen in the ratification of the U.N. Convention, and is interpreted as a bid by feminists to gain power.

> Given the attitude of some New Zealand feminists, it would
> be dangerously naive to hope that they would not use the
> Convention as a lever with which to force through
> legislation to change society to conform to their ideas
> (CPA, July 1984:4).

Feminists are seen as being concerned only with the acquisition of power. The 'stepping stones' to power are listed as: (i) complete control of the function of reproduction through contraception, sterilisation and abortion; (ii) freedom from the restraints of full-time childrearing; and (iii) destruction of what they see as the repressive patriarchal family system (CPA, Dec 1984:3). The moral right sees both feminists and other organisations (such as gay rights groups) as targetting the family and trying to subvert it by changing the roles of men and women within it. The CPA says 'Why should it be any business of the government, or the feminists, if people want to base their behaviour on stereotyped sex roles' (ibid).

In summary what we see here is the construction of a confrontation between (i) the state and progressive movements, and (ii) 'moral' people. Subject positions are interpellated around this fundamental antagonism and the poles of 'moral' and 'immoral' people are created. Not only is this dichotomy recognised, it is also maintained by the moral right that it forms the basic antagonism that exists in society. While 'parents' are seen as representing the good pole, feminists, homosexuals and liberals of all sorts are interpreted as 'evil'. The Integrity Centre's Family Support poster illustrates in a graphic form the division that the moral right constructs between 'vice' and 'virtue'.

2. The Sex/Gender System - The Feminist Woman vs The Homemaker

Populist moralism, uses on the sex/gender (as on the sexuality) system the articulating principle of the family to tie together its ideas about the 'proper' relationship between the sexes. Its first step is to take various elements from liberal and feminist discourse about sexism and transform these into an anti-feminist ideology that has a unity through evoking the notion of the family.

One of the major themes that comes out of conservative writing on sex education is the rejection of liberal and feminist ideas about the kind of relationship that should exist between men and women. It is said that the danger of allowing sex education into schools is that it interferes with the 'normal' development of sex roles and sexual identity. The introduction of non-sexist readers

> could mean that boys and girls might develop with no clear idea of what their role should be. How can children be expected to learn about proper family structure and relationships if their ideas on sex roles are being confused by "non-sexist" text books (CPA,Dec 1975:7).

It is believed that when traditional sex roles are broken down child abuse, sexual abuse and rape occur. These are seen as aspects of the 'chaos' that develops when individuals step outside 'god-ordained' order.

God's order is that, within marriage, a man has
responsibility for the care and the protection of his wife:
together they have the responsibility for the care,
protection, upbringing and education of their children.
The system breaks down when the State intervenes in family
responsibilities and when men do not give women in general
and their wives in particular, the respect and protection
they need_and deserve: this results in the exploitation of
women by men and abuse of children by adults.
As men respect women and value them in their roles of
wives, mothers and homemakers (one of the most important
functions in society), and as women respect and value men
in their role as leaders and protectors, and as they both
respect and value their children as mankind's future, so
the problems of child abuse, rape and sexual violence will
diminish (CPA,Oct/Nov 1983:2).

Here can be seen the antagonism that is created between feminist women

and 'homemakers'. There is seen to be no common ground existing

between these two subject positions and the feminist is interpreted as

the enemy. Not only is the relationship between these two positions

seen as being antagonistic (i.e. the presence of feminism prevents the

full realisation of the 'homemaker' role) it is interpreted as being

part of a feminist power struggle.

If women are to have the power, then men must be persuaded
to give it up. What better way than to so change the ideas
in society of what men's roles are that they no longer
believe that they should be in control (ibid:4).

For the first time in history, women are now able, thanks
to scientific advances, to separate their reproductive and
maternal roles from their sexual behaviour, and like men,
avoid responsibility for the conceptions which are the
normal result of sexual relationships. Herein lies
tremendous power, both political and financial (CPA,Dec
1980:1).

These are particularly clear statements that the moral right does not want women to gain the power that has been traditionally held by men. Power is seen as a negative thing that can only be properly controlled when it is situated in the hands of the male in a patriarchal family. When traditional sex roles are rejected and women neglect their maternal role, dire consequences are seen for society.

> If a woman does not have children to care for she is free to exercise power. Another aspect of the bid for power is access to money, both through paid employment, and in the form of Bank loans and mortgages. Power through the laws. The effect of ratifying this pro-feminist Convention and of accepting the Labour Party policy on women, means that New Zealand is officially adopting the doctrine of woman-power, whatever the cost to our freedoms, our future, our faith and our children (ibid).

In opposition to the feminist power grab the moral right evokes the family - a 'natural' institution that through its form regulates the proper role for women. It is as wife and mother that the woman is responsible for the whole moral character and fibre of society. The traditional role of woman as wife and mother is seen as a natural expression of her biological make-up. By constructing gender roles in terms of biology, they are seen as being outside of politics and therefore beyond 'experimentation'. The moral right believes that differences between men and women are biologically determined.

> Girls begin to talk earlier, read sooner, learn foreign languages more easily, and because of greater skin sensitivity in the finger tips are more proficient in fine work (motor performance). Boys show earlier visual superiority, are clumsier regarding fine manipulations but are better at activities calling for total body coordination (CPA,April 1980:5).

On the basis of this idea the moral right believes that it is natural that men and women are not equally suited to all jobs. To try and make boys or girls act or think in a way that is at variance with their biologically-determined patterns is said to cause untold psychological harm (ibid). It also results in the chaos of child rape etc that was mentioned above.

Although the moral right denies any shared grounds with feminism, there are points of contact between the two ideologies. One of the reasons why the moral right believes women should remain in the home supported by their husbands is that they are protected to a certain extent from exploitation by outside influences.

> Once they have been persuaded to abandon their traditional role (made possible by fertility control) women are more vulnerable to exploitation by employers, political groups and trade unions, by governments who are only too ready to tax their wages, and commercial interests who want to influence the disposal of what extra purchasing power the government allows them to retain. In many ways, the "freedom" a woman gains by abandoning her role as mother and home-maker is in fact illusory (CPA,Dec 1980:10).

Here we see that some ideas of the moral right do find a resonance in the reality of people's lives. One of the central tenets of feminism is the point that women are exploited in the workforce. However where the moral right differs from a feminist analysis is that they acknowledge this reality only in terms of how it effects women as wives and mothers in a patriarchal, authoritarian family. It is not 'woman' as autonomous individual that the moral right is concerned with, but

'woman' as the provider of services to her husband and children.

3. <u>The Sexuality System - Perverts vs the Married Couple</u>

This section examines how the moral right has constructed a discourse of equivalence on the sexuality system organised again around the articulating principle of the family. What is at stake here is the antagonism between 'good' and 'bad' sexual practices - between 'perverts' and the married couple.

Using the point made in chapter two that sexuality must be understood not from the viewpoint of 'repression' but rather as a discursive structure, it is important to examine how sexuality is organised through the processes of regulation and definition. Weeks (1981a) maintains that regulation is organised through the creation of sexual categories and it is possible to see this at work through the discourse of the moral right. There is a concern with what Foucault (1978) has called the four 'strategic unities'. These are outlined in the following sections. Firstly there is a concern about children's sexuality, secondly the sexuality of females is considered of a more fragile order than that of males; thirdly there is a concern with 'perverse' sex, and fourthly there is a concern about the regulation of fertility. In addition to these four unities there are the underlying notions that sex is an innate drive that is in need of control, and that there is a category of 'normal' sex which forms the 'good' pole in

the continuum of sexual relations.

(i) Latency and children's sexuality

The existence of a latency period in which children have no interest in, and should not be encouraged in thinking about sex, is said to provide evidence that sex education should not be given at school - particularly at primary and intermediate school. Patricia Bartlett quotes an American psychiatrist on the matter.

> William McGrath...says "there is a phase of personality development called the latency period during which the healthy child is not interested in sex, from about the age of five until puberty. This latency period serves a very important biological purpose. It affords the child an opportunity to develop his own resources, physically and mentally...Premature interest in sex is unnatural and will arrest or distort the development of the personality. Sex education should not be foisted on children and should not begin in primary school. Anyone who would deliberately arouse the child's curiousity or stimulate his unready mind to troubled sex preoccupations ought to have a millstone tied around his neck and be cast into the sea" (Bartlett,1985:2).

The CPA also recognises the existence of the latency period and uses the work of McGrath, Rhoda Lorand, Melvin Anchell and other psychiatrists who use the theory. The time of latency is seen as being essential to create men and women of 'a higher civilisation'. The danger of introducing sex education during this period is that 'natural curiosity and desire to learn are stunted. Educators should be aware that overt sexual activity makes a child ineducable' (CPA,April 1978 supplement:2). Education about the changes at puberty, which is included in the draft health syllabus is feared because it is believed

that it will destroy the natural modesty children have about their body. The CPA claims it will have two effects.

> 1. By breaking down a child's reserve and forcing exposure to the group of private emotions and concerns the child becomes more susceptible not only to group pressure or ridicule, but to subtle direction of his thinking by the teacher.

> 2. Destroying modesty about the sexual parts of the body and encouraging the child to talk about these things in a group is the first step in conditioning the child towards a more liberal attitude towards sexual matters in general. If talking about sex organs and functions in public is encouraged the logical next steps are talking about intercourse, and then experiencing it (CPA,Nov/Dec 1985:9).

Education about sex is objected to because it is thought it will encourage children to engage in sexual activity. 'Overseas information shows that extension of sex education exacerbates the problems of sexual misbehaviour and leads to unwanted pregnancies and abortion incidents for schoolgirls' (SPCS, submission 1985:1). Sex education is seen as being an intrusion that takes away parents' rights to 'protect the innocence of their children in what ought to be the most joyful years of their young lives' (Marilyn Pryor,n.d). Sex education given by schools is also seen as driving a wedge between parent and child in this most intimate area of a child's upbringing' (SPCS,June 1985:1).

In COME's Values Education Programme (Elliot-Hogg and Christie,1985) the authors warn against sexual activity for the young. They give the following example to illustrate the pressures that are often placed on young people to have sex.

> Gayle is the girl in the blue jumper. She's the last girl
> in the group to lose her virginity. She did it because she
> felt she wasn't as accepted by the others. Now she's one
> of the girls (Elliot-Hogg and Christie,1985:103).

Here again we see that the moral right does recognise and work on popular concerns that people have about the vulnerability of children. In the quote above the moral right recognises that there is a problem when young people are pressured into sex (although there is also a tendency to see all sexual relations between young people as being somehow 'forced' on the female who is naturally reticent in such matters). However where feminists would see the problem in terms of the unequal relations between men and women in our society, the reasons given by the moral right why people should not engage in sex before marriage are conservative in nature.

> Why not have sex before you are married?...For one thing,
> you could spend about 40 years of your life married to one
> partner. Its a bit like buying a car. We spend a lot of
> time checking out one we might buy, and we're more wary of
> a used one than a new one, especially if the second-hand
> one has not been treated with respect. It's much the same
> with choosing a marriage partner (ibid).

In summary then, sex education is feared because it will destroy the natural innocence of children, and once this has been done the way is open for them to develop sexual relationships that are outside the family. There is also a concern that by educating children in sex at school it will remove authority from parents. Greenwood and Young have stated that 'Children are synonymous with the family and decisions about them must therefore be made by the family' (Greenwood and Young,1976:55).

(ii) Female sexuality

The rigid division between the sexes that was noted in the section above on the sex/gender system is carried through to the sexuality system. Here, female sexuality is considered to be of a more delicate and more crucial nature than that of the male. It is more delicate, because women in general are seen as the 'weaker' sex. At the same time control of female sexuality is seen as more crucial because women are portrayed as being the moral guardians of the family. If women engage in illicit sex this can only weaken the stability of the family which in turn disrupts the whole basis of society.

The 'natural' modesty of girls is frequently invoked as a reason why sex education should not be given to them.

> Removal of a girl's sense of modesty is the first step in her participating in casual sex. Commonsense and common decency dictate that only a woman should talk about such matters to girls, preferably not in a group (CPA,Oct/Nov 1983:9).

Dr Dunn (a Catholic gynaecologist and obstetrician – founding President of FRA, and member of SPUC and SPCS) goes on to describe in some detail the differences between males and females in their attitudes and reaction to sex.

> Her instincts are somewhat different from those of the man. Sexuality for her is not mainly sensation, unless she is a nymphomaniac. She _gives_ herself, her beauty, her femininity, her mystery. And what an incomparable

> gift – unless it is secondhand! She has the background
> potentiality for fertility and motherhood, and for this she
> needs fidelity, permanence and security. Only marriage can
> give this to her, and that is the last thing he wants. The
> predatory male must eventually discard her and she is left,
> sometimes literally holding the baby. She is physically
> unable to compete with the male, she cannot stand the pace
> (Dunn, 1983:6).

Here female sexuality is placed in the context of the family and indeed

it is said to provide the stabilising influence for the male. Female

sexuality is at once the cause of male infidelity, also (when

controlled) the safeguard against improper sex. In discussing 'dating'

Elliot-Hogg and Christie (1985) advise that girls should pay particular

attention to the way they dress because it

> sends all kinds of signals out to the guys. A girl's light
> T-shirt, an open blouse or clinging jeans are all that is
> needed to arouse a male. Dress modestly if you don't want
> to turn the guy on and end up in a pressure situation that
> is too hard to handle (ibid:108-9).

It does not matter so much what a boy wears because girls are 'more

affected by the personality of the man than by his physical appearance'

(ibid:109).

In their Values Education Programme Elliot-Hogg and Christie give

the following example to illustrate the pressures that are often placed

on young women to have sex.

> This is Andy and Joan. Andy is a sixth former. Joan is in
> the third form. Joan has a lot of status and mana among
> her friends because she's got a Sixth Form boyfriend.
> She's keen to keep him. She's recently had sex with Andy.
> Not because she really wanted to, but she was frightened

that if she didn't he would drop her (Elliot-Hogg and Christie,1985:102).

This example reflects a concern for protecting female sexuality that feminists would share. In order to maintain the status Joan has among her peers, and the relationship she has with Andy, she is placed in a position that in reality offers only limited choices. This is the result of the complex power relationships that exist between women and men in our society where it is considered important for women to be seen to have male contact and patronage. The moral right however does not make this connection but rather presents a conservative solution by rejecting sexual activity before marriage.

> The younger the girl begins to be sexually active, the more likely she is to develop cancer of the cervix and cancer of the womb. This is not scaremongering; it's hard scientific fact (ibid:104).

All these points illustrate the distinction that is made between male and female sexuality. Women are not only considered to be the moral backbone of the family, in certain respects they _are_ the family. Their sexuality is tied so firmly to marriage and childbearing that to step outside these limits is to cease to be a 'real woman'.

(iii) Perverse sex

Sexual categorisation has been a particularly effective method of regulating and defining the boundaries of 'perverse' and 'normal' sexual activity. One of the reasons given by the moral right against

sex education is the 'worsening of the moral climate and social problems' in those countries that have it. Sweden is frequently given as the example par excellence of the pitfalls of introducing compulsory sex education. High rates of abortion, divorce and venereal disease are cited as proof that sex education has failed and is unnecessary and dangerous (Faithfull, n.d.; Bartlett, 1985).

> Higher moral standards, respect for authority and self-discipline together with respect for family life are not the results which other countries experienced following the introduction of sex education as a mandatory part of their curriculum (CPA, April 1977:7).

Some of the writers go so far as to see a conspiracy in plans for sex education in New Zealand, and link it to a 'vast plan for social change being conducted not only in New Zealand but also throughout the Western world' (Faithfull, n.d.:1). It is believed that an alien belief system is being introduced to New Zealand through sex education programmes,

> People of Western nations, then, nurtured in a culture based upon the traditional God-centred Judeo-Christian belief are slowly and systematically being won over to the man-centred, atheistic, anti-authority philosophy of Secular Humanism (ibid).
>
> Perverted and promiscuous sexual behaviour has never brought lasting happiness. Instead, we find venereal disease, gonorrhoea, oral diseases, infertility, cancer of the cervix, AIDS, and many social problems are a direct result of misguided sexual behaviour (Bartlett, 1985:4).
>
> [Sex education] has led directly to increased promiscuity and teenage abortions, as any sensible parent could have predicted (FRA, April 1983:2).

Here the moral right creates a series of equivalences between sex education, promiscuity, permissive societies (such as Sweden), anti-authority and ultimately the breakdown in society. In addition the possible involvement of homosexuals and homosexuality in sex education is vigorously rejected by the moral right. They see any political action on the part of homosexuals, including the Homosexual Law Reform Bill as 'part of a political homosexual movement undermining the stability of society and the traditional family. As is so often the case children in schools are the prime target' (CPA April/May 1985:4). The Homosexual Law Reform Bill is seen to represent

> a watershed in the struggle between the forces of good and evil, traditional morality and humanistic liberalism in New Zealand. The outcome will in large measure determine the moral, spiritual and social direction New Zealand takes in the immediate future. Quite apart from the appalling public health consequences of legalising sodomy, the implications of giving rights to homosexual teachers constitute a moral and educational dilemma for nearly every parent of schoolchildren in the country (CPA,Sept 1985:1).

Homosexuality is rejected because it attacks the 'normal' heterosexual marriage relationship. It is feared that homosexuals teaching in schools will adversely effect children. '"Sexual preference" of course could well include a predilection for sex with school-age children' (CPA,Oct/Nov 1981:11) and further 'the known tendency of homosexuals to seek converts makes children taught by them very susceptible to their influence' (ibid) Nancy Campbell claims the right for her children to be taught by heterosexual teachers,

not by male or female homosexuals, who have given themselves over to evil lusts. I don't believe that I should have to send my children to school to be influenced by perverse and unnatural influences. I don't believe that we should have to accept homosexuals in such influential occupations as the teaching profession (Campbell,1985:19).

Here, the moral right sets up an equivalence between sex education as a practice, and the 'disgusting' practices and lifestyle of homosexuals.

(v) Regulation of fertility

Contraceptive education is dismissed because it would encourage sexual experimentation outside of marriage. This is also linked to the view that once women are freed from their childbearing role it is possible for them to gain power from men.

The subtle but real tendency in the contraceptive approach to sex education is to downgrade men, women and children but especially women, turning the beginnings of human life into a sport, women into a receptacle or plaything or chattle, man into an exploiter, and human society into an animal kingdom where rule is by the ruthless (Elliot-Hogg and Christie,1985:105).

Dunn also claims that when women demand contraception, sterilisation and abortion

they are silently cheered along by a group of grinning males. If female fertility can be abolished it will be open season for sex all the year round. Women need their fertility even if they don't use it (Dunn,1983:8).

There is some sense in these arguments. Fertility control has not been developed with the needs of women in mind. Rather it reflects the prevailing balance of forces in patriarchal social relations. The chief concern with the availability and education about contraception is taken wider than the individual.

> The amazingly rapid spread of modern contraception has had implications for the whole of society...through contraception sex has become available for everyone, and within the context of marriage, childbearing, which in all past ages was of the essence, has been denigrated even abolished (ibid:75).

Here the concern is that sex should not be for 'everyone'. Fertility is seen as important because it ensures that rigid control can be placed on sexual practices. Where the availability of contraception is limited protection for women is obviously found to some extent within the known security and confines of the family.

(v) Sex in the family and the universal sex drive

The comments made in parts i-iv above can be related to broader prescriptions about sex. From the perspective of the moral right, sex is portrayed as a strong drive that needs to be controlled. This is in fact not too dissimilar from the liberal position on sexuality. It illustrates the unstable frontiers that enable elements of one ideological system to be incorporatated into another. This process increases the ability of the moral right to attract a broader base of support to its hegemonic project. By constructing sexuality as innate, the moral right is able to win support for its ideas through the

seeming strength of the 'forces of nature'. In COME's Values Education

Programme the commonalities between mammals and humans are stressed.

'There are the same instinctive procedures of courtship leading up to

the same urge to mate' (Elliot-Hogg and Christie,1985:40). While these

similarities are seen to exist, differences between animals and humans

are attributed to the USD (Unique Spiritual Dimension). The factors

that differentiate animals from humans are love and control which are

said to be most apparent in family relationships. Love is seen as a

part of family life that naturally gets stronger through the years thus

providing a rationale for prescriptions against divorce. The issue of

control is said to apply to all instincts including the Universal Sex

Drive (USD again). While in the realm of animals

> sex is no more than the instinctive outworking of body
> chemistry...man has the ability to think about what he
> ought to do, he can make choices accordingly, and he can
> control his actions. This is important, because the
> Universal Sex Drive is as powerful as a jet plane, and just
> as much in need of control (ibid:41).

The issue of control is seen as being very important. Humans have the

controls of 'unselfishness, sharing, duty'. Where these controls are

used sex is seen as being creative and beautiful - it is in its correct

place. But where it is used in the wrong place it is seen as being

destructive and ugly. Elliot-Hogg and Christie give the following

example to make their point.

> Fire in a fireplace is beautiful, creating warmth and
> cosiness and cheerfulness. But in the wrong place it is
> destructive and ugly, destroying shelter and safety and
> valuable property, and even destroying warmth itself,
> leaving only a mess. In the same way, acid in a battery is

a wonderful thing, creating the electric power which helps
to drive a motorcar and give it light. But when battery
acid is splashed or spilt on the skin or on clothes, it
simply destroys, and leaves ugliness (ibid).

Sex is said to properly belong within the family. When it is outside

this area it results in 'indecency, pornography, fornication, rape,

prostitution, venereal disease, adultery, sexual perversion, wrecked

marriages, broken homes and lonely children' (ibid:42). So here the

family is used to tie the so-called 'strong urges of nature' to the

needs of society. The 'natural' aspect of sex is also seen in the

comment made by the SPCS that

For thousands of years the world has gone on, and
procreation has taken place without children being given
explicit instruction in groups situations, about sexual
relations (SPCS,1985:4).

One would think listening to the so-called experts that sex
was not a God given instinct or appetite, but something
acquired through hours of study (Bartlett,1985:1).

These ideas about the control of sex are tied very firmly into the type

of sex education which children should receive. This in turn is linked

to the notion of the authoritarian family.

One of the central concerns of the moral right is that parental

authority is being undermined by the introduction of sex education.

It must be remembered that the school or the teachers are
in fact effectively state servants and you've got to be
very careful, where do you draw the line in the state under
its employees taking over the responsibilities which should
rightfully be those of the individual (Viney in
Shallcrass,1983:53).

> The society contends that sex education must include the vital aspects of ethical considerations and self control and must stress the importance of chastity before marriage, and home, marriage and family relationships and fidelity within marriage in the sex education syllabus (SPCS,1985:3).

> True sex education must include the presentation to the young of chastity as the norm, of sexual activity as confined to marriage and of the ideal of fidelity (FRA,April 1983:2).

The crux of sex education is seen to be in the context of the family. Heterosexual, monogamous, procreative sex is the norm against which all other forms of sexual activity are measured. 'The basis for Family Life Education to be that without exception sexual activity is only sanctioned within marriage' (CPA,1976:15). The moral right believes it is very important that a specific definition of the family be upheld. The CPA rejects the definition of the family used by the Department of Education which states it is

> a group of people which may include the very young and the elderly, who live in close association which produces interdependence and a moral obligation to support one another (CPA submission 1985:4).

This definition is considered iandequate because it does not refer to 'mother, father, husband, wife, marriage or even men and women, and clearly encompasses homosexual and lesbian relationships' (ibid).

There is some disagreement within the moral right on the place for sex education. Perhaps the largest lobby represented by the CPA maintains that there is no place in the school for class instruction in

sex. On the other hand COME advocates sex education at school based on traditional morality. While there is a difference of opinion over how sex education should be handled, there is agreement on the content of it, and the necessity to uphold parental authority [1].

> I support parent and child evenings when parent and child together are shown films on reproduction in the context of marriage and hear an address by a doctor or nurse, with the opportunity for questions. At such evenings the parent's duty and responsibility for handing on the facts of life are not ursurped or undermined (Bartlett,1985:2).

The traditional morality that is advocated is seen as being a permanent and changeless part of life. The assertion of this position implies a rejection of liberal sexual and moral attitudes. There are always 'some basic and universal values which are cornerstones of every community...these cornerstones or bedrock or family or commonsense values are common values that are and will permanently be people's values' (Elliot-Hogg,1985:6-7). These values are universal in that 'they are to be found in varying degrees in every society on earth' ((Elliot-Hogg,1983:8). The standards for morality are to be found in the Ten Commandments, the parables and the Sermon on the Mount. Dunn asserts a similar position and claims that

> man is exactly the same now as always, and marriage has essentially been the same from the beginning...I am certain that marriage as outlined here is the unchanging ideal for Europeans or Orientals, Muslims or Christians, the poor or the most sophisticated, dull people or intellectuals (Dunn,1983:3).

In conclusion there is an interesting and important ambiguity to be seen in the moral right's discourse on the nature of sexual relations. Not only is sex seen as being natural, it is also seen as being in need of control. Where liberal discourse would interpret this 'naturalness' as deserving 'free expression' the moral right have taken the same idea and tied it to the authoritarian project for control. Not only is sex seen as being natural and tied to the family, but the family itself is 'seen as naturally given and as socially and morally desirable' (Barrett and McIntosh,1982:26). So at the same time the family is said to be both a biological unit and to be imbued with 'a unique social and moral force, since it is seen as the embodiment of general human values rather than the conventions of a particular society' (ibid:27).

4. Conclusion - Populist Moralism and the New Zealand Moral Right

It is time now to draw together the various threads discussed above and to indicate what the components of populist moralism are in New Zealand at this conjuncture. Firstly there is the division of social space into two antagonistic camps. On the one hand are the 'moral' people who are in confrontation with the immoral state and various subversive groups. In particular feminists are identified as the major force against the family. Secondly populist moralism operates around a number of nodal points, one of which - sex education - has been examined for its attempt to fix meaning about sexual and gender relations to the notion of the family. This is done

through setting up a number of equivalents. The following list
describes those equivalents.

   SEX EDUCATION

= sexual permissiveness

= distortion of gender roles and identity

= breakdown in family life

= breakdown in authority

= breakdown in society.

The moral right recognising these links is attempting to create a new
'moral' hegemony articulated around the idea of the family.

Another of the important components of populist moralism is the
tendency to articulate to itself the interests of different social
groups. The beliefs of fundamentalist Christians, based as they are on
a 'literal' interpretation of the Bible, have provided a strong basis
for the development of populist moralism. Vodanovich describes the
ideology of fundamentalism as starting from the Biblical account of
creation.

> It is the story of the imposition of order on chaos. God
> created the world and all within it. The natural order is
> His work and part of His design and the divine and natural
> orders are fused. The world is a battleground between good
> and evil since Satan,...exists in the world. As God is
> equated with the creation of order so the opposite, anarchy
> and chaos is seen as the work of Satan. This means that
> conflict and disorder have a moral evaluation
> (Vodanovich,1985:74).

Human nature since the 'Fall' is not innately good but requires control and restraint and God's grace for salvation. These concerns are clearly reflected and reproduced in the discourse of the moral right. Although much of the discourse is influenced by this fundamental Christianity, it is not necessary to believe in the teachings of the Bible to be convinced that the family is indeed in crisis and that sexual permissiveness has run amok. The moral right has been able to point out to people the problems associated with liberal ideology. Patricia Bartlett comments that

> Sex education, fashionable today with its rejection of absolute values in favour of "Subjectivism", contains Chisholm's ideology in toto. Phrases like "there are no rights and wrongs" and "normal is what you are" are commonplace (Bartlett, 1985:1).

The moral right have worked on the fears and insecurities that exist around sexual and gender relations and have tied these to 'the family'. They have tried to appeal to the widest possible range of people by making the distinction between parents and the power bloc (consisting of the state and 'permissive' forces). The use of the term 'moral people' has also enabled them to appeal to a wide range of 'middle' New Zealand who would of course see themselves as being anything except immoral. By opposing these people to 'perverts' the moral right has been able to secure to its project many people who would not ordinarily join such a movement. The main way that the moral right has done this is through its constant invoking a particular definition of the family as a sacred institution that is being threatened by immoral and destructive forces in society.

The family has proved to be such a successful articulating principle for the moral right because it has a resonance in everybody's lives. The family means all things to all people. It is a space where people feel comfortable, where they are assured of a place - even if it is one prescribed by sexual, age and gender relations. The moral right recognises the power that the idea of the family has in people's lives. It is a concept that has secured over time a place in traditional and popular thought and its strength lies in what Betty Freidan has called its ability to be

> "the symbol of that last area where one had any hope of control over one's destiny, of meeting one's most basic human needs, of nourishing that core of personhood threatened by vast impersonal institutions and uncontrollable corporate bureaucracies" (Freidan, 1981, quoted in Barrett and McIntosh, 1982: 16-17).

With these points in mind, it could be asked to what extent does populist moralism constitute 'hegemony'? While it is clear that the moral right is not dominant in New Zealand, it is also equally clear that is seeks to impose its view of the world onto society, and in this sense can be seen to represent a hegemonic project. By incorporating some of the same concerns of feminism (for instance about pornography and women's exploitation in the workforce) the movement has been able to expand the base of this support and build towards hegemony. Also, the discourse of the moral right is involved in hegemonic politics to the extent that antagonistic articulatory practices confront one another (moral society and the family vs immorality and permissiveness), and the frontiers between these practices are unstable (i.e. the family could also be articulated to a socialist and feminist

project based on equality rather than authority). The strategy of the moral right is based on a 'war of position'. This process involves working on a number of levels. The extent to which populist moralism has secured its hegemonic project and presents a threat to equality and democracy is examined in more detail in chapter five.

NOTES

1. See Appendix 8 for the CPA 'Code of Practice for Sex and Family Life'. This code is also accepted by COME and various other organisations.

CHAPTER FIVE

'What Is To Be Done' About The Moral Right?

This chapter examines 'what is to be done' about the moral right in New Zealand. If the discourse of the moral right is seen as opposed to the liberal discourse on sexual and gender relations, and if both of these discourses are seen as inadequate, then it is necessary to delineate what a Left approach to the problem of morality would look like. This chapter is an attempt to formulate some possible responses that could be made by the Left to the moral right in the light of the analysis I have developed in the previous chapters. It is clear that orthodox Marxist reactions that advocate class struggle through traditional working class organisations, will not help us to combat the moral right. If the struggle is, as I have argued, one over hegemony on a particular terrain, then the Left must construct a strategy that works on the sex/gender and sexuality systems and that contests the moral right using hegemonic politics and a war of position. In particular the Left must address itself to the way in which the moral right has used 'the family' as a solution to the 'crisis' in morality. Where the moral right has constructed a set of equivalences around the family, anti-feminism, and sexual conservatism, the Left must struggle

to create a different system of equivalents that does not oppose liberalism and morality but rather constructs social differences on a democratic basis. This must not be done through only negative demands and calls to smash the family, but rather through a process that builds a viable project that can answer people's insecurities and uncertainties about family life, gender relations and sexuality.

In order to address these issues the chapter is divided into three sections. Section one examines the extent to which the moral right does pose a threat to the Left and principles of democracy and equality in the areas of sexual and gender relations. The second section returns to some of the issues raised in chapter one and looks at various strategies suggested by the Left to confront the moral right. The pitfalls in their suggestions will be exposed. Rather than answering the moral right with 'class struggle' or 'tolerance for minorities' it is necessary to understand the struggle over sex/gender and sexuality that was outlined in chapter four and be able to respond with socialist, feminist and radical solutions. It is to this task that I turn in the final section. It represents an attempt to address in some detail how the Left might adequately respond to the moral right if it is to be understood as a manifestation of populist moralism. How is the Left to suggest solutions that make not 'common' but 'good' sense in people's lives? [1]. What is to be the content of these solutions?

1. Is the Moral Right a Threat?

There are several possible answers to this question depending on the theoretical perspective with which the moral right is examined. Many commentators on the Left simply see the moral right as a manifestation of the crisis in capitalism and as such they maintain it poses a threat no different from that already posed by the existing capitalist relations. From this viewpoint the activities of the moral right may be seen as an intensification of certain of capitalism's tendencies but they are nonetheless regarded as being of the same nature and order. However, if the problem is reconceptualised away from a 'crisis of capitalism' towards the idea of populist moralism, then the moral right can be seen to pose a particular kind of danger in our society. I believe there are three levels to the threat posed by the moral right. Firstly, there is the level of organisation and the success of the moral right in partially achieving some of its goals in particular issues. Secondly, the moral right has been able to change in some significant ways the discourse which surrounds the family, feminism and sexuality. Finally there is the potential for the moral right to expand its definition of morality beyond the issues of gender and sexuality towards issues such as nuclear weapons, ANZUS and the Bill of Rights, and in this way to widen their appeal.

(i) Underline: Organisational and campaign success

At the organisational level the moral right has been able to set up a network of contacts and a system of coalitions (CCC) at the regional and national levels. This is an important accomplishment because it represents the ability to feed information, ideas and tactics on different issues throughout the whole country. While the exact strength and success of this network has yet to be seen at work for a long enough period of time, it is a significant development that the Left could well learn from. The moral right has, through the CCC linked a number of religious organisations, single-issue groups, fundamentalist and traditional churches and interested individuals. Whether or not the CCC can match the sophistication of America's Moral Majority in networking and targetting likely supporters has yet to be seen. At the time of writing the national CCC has distributed two newsletters, published a book called The Social Effects of Homosexuality in New Zealand (1985), and been involved with CAM in a campaign against Labour Education Minister, Russell Marshall.

The moral right has also been expanding its activities into a number of new areas. Groups such as the Homosexuals Anonymous Group and the Exodus Homosexual Support Group have been set up to 'minister' to homosexuals and their friends and relatives. While these groups attract a limited number of people, they do provide a 'service' that may appeal to some homosexuals confused about their sexual orientation. The SPUC run Pregnancy Counselling Service is also undergoing a period of expansion and has grown from one branch in 1983 when it was

established, to 20 centres in December 1985. The service saw 2312 women in 1985, 1500 of whom were looking for abortions and, according to Nina Barry-Martin, the national co-director, about 1000 of these women were persuaded to continue with their pregnancies (Challenge Weekly,Dec 1985). Perhaps one of the most obvious of the achievements of the moral right has been its ability to affect in a fairly direct way the ability of some women to obtain abortions. 'Right to Life' groups have been increasing in numbers since 1980 and include among their number groups that are prepared to take 'direct action' against what they see as being the 'slaughter of innocents'. Arson in two abortion clinics cannot be definitively linked to anti-abortion groups, but has been seen as related to anti-abortion sentiment. More 'out front' tactics are used by anti-abortion campaigners at abortion -clinics by harassing women who want a termination. At Christchurch there has been harassment not only of women seeking abortions, but also of doctors who perform them. The harassment has reached such a level that staff at Christchurch hospital, while willing to work at Lyndhurst (the abortion clinic), will only do so if there is no risk of direct harassment from anti-abortionists or pressure from members of the hospital board (Brown,1985:4). The anti-abortion lobby is particularly strong in Christchurch, with active branches of SPUC, Christians for Life, Right to Life and Pro-Life Action Group, all campaigning on the issue. Examples of some of the direct harassment techniques used by these groups include letters circulated to local certifying consultants stating that members of Right to Life would publicise the names of doctors granting abortions and set up vigils outside their surgeries; one doctor had his surgery painted with anti-abortion slogans and

concrete dumped on his lawn; and another had her home and workplace picketed, and a leaflet campaign directed against her in the local community. The leaflets claimed that the community had in its midst a neighbour who 'indulges in brutal killing of helpless unborn babies' (ibid:5). These are only two examples of a number of similar incidents being organised by the active anti-abortion groups in Christchurch. It has been claimed that 'abortions have virtually come to a standstill in Christchurch' (Infact,Sept/Oct 1985:10). In the long run these activities may be the least successful of tactics for anti-abortionists, but they have achieved a short-term goal of reducing the numbers of abortions obtained in Christchurch. The anti-abortion lobby is also currently stepping up its campaign at the level of policy and intends to work for the introduction of new legislation to Parliament in 1986 to make it even more difficult for women to obtain abortions.

The recent development from a section of the moral right to form a political party based on 'born-again' Christian principles is an illustration of the broadening of the moral right's political activity. The party to be launched in mid 1986 will only accept born-again Christians within its ranks. It has the support of the Christian Alternative Movement which is based in Christchurch. In its second newsletter last month CAM urged Christians to join political parties, school committees, hospital boards and local councils. '"If we had a Christian hospital board we could never have this abortion clinic problem for example" it states' (Steel,1986:1). The tactic of getting conservatives onto school committees and other boards of control, is

one that is recommended by many groups on the moral right. In particular the CPA has had some success in getting its members onto primary school committees and secondary school boards. In this way they hope to stop the implementation of sex education programmes or control its content.

(ii) Changing the way we think about sex, gender and the family

Notwithstanding the organisational success of the moral right as outlined above, the movement has had little actual success in stopping some of the measures they oppose, or implementing the kind of programmes that they want. In the sex education area for example, although the implementation of sex education in schools has been strongly resisted by conservative groups since the early 1970s, they were unable to stop the passage of the Education Amendment Bill in 1985. The petition against the Homosexual Law Reform Bill with its 800,000 signatures was returned from the petitions committee with a recommendation that no action be taken on it. Campaigns against pornography by the SPCS have in general been notably unsuccessful. The campaign against the Working Women's Charter was unsuccessful as was the opposition to the ratification of the UN Convention and the establishment of the Ministry of Women's Affairs. Although these are significant failures on the part of the moral right the movement has been able to make some important changes in the way that New Zealanders think about certain issues. To the extent that the moral right can evoke the idea of the family and protecting it, the movement has been able to capture support from a wide section of the community. Although

the petition against the Homosexual Law Reform Bill did not stop the Bill reaching its third reading, the sheer size of the petition is indicative of a large body of anti-homosexual feeling. While it has been pointed out by the Left that many of the signatures were false, even if up to half of them were invalid, 400,000 people against homosexual law reform is a large proportion of the population. That those involved in organisations on the moral right could gain that level of support for their campaign reflects not only a latent fear and hatred of homosexuals but the success of a campaign based around the preservation of family life. Another small example of the ability of the moral right to spread its ideas about 'the family' is illustrated in the recent resignation of Waiheke Island's recreation officer in January 1986. The recreation officer resigned after facing a vote of no confidence at the county council and being the subject of a petition with over 700 signatures. The officer was responsible for sending out information about incest and human and children's rights to 20 young women who had requested it. A petition organised by a local mother claimed that the material was anti-men and anti-family and that the work of the recreation scheme was undermining the family unit (Evening Standard, 13/1/86).

In light of these comments perhaps the most important threat that the moral right poses is not the achievement of any one campaign, but rather the ability to win popular support through addressing real problems and fears that people have about their lives. Not only does the moral right recognise security within 'the family' as an important issue for people but they suggest solutions that do make

'sense'...although of course it is 'common sense' rather than 'good sense'. This is an important point, and one that the Left has failed to take seriously enough. Although it might be possible for those on the Left to ridicule many of the ideas of the moral right, they do have a resonance in everyday life, and it is this, before rhetoric that wins the hearts and minds of people to a vision of a just world. On the sex/gender and sexuality systems the success of populist moralism has been its ability to move debate away from a liberal position towards morally conservative ideas based around the family. Whereas liberal discourse stresses individual rights in sexual and gender relations, the moral right has moved the discourse onto the level of emphasising responsibility within and to the family.

(iii) The potential of the moral right

The two levels of 'danger' discussed above are at least able to be seen with some clarity. What is less certain however is the future of the moral right. Some commentators believe that it will simply disappear as New Zealanders come to their senses and see the extreme nature of the ideas. However this position rests on the assumption that New Zealanders are a 'moderate' people, not prone to extreme beliefs of either the left or right. It also misrecognises the extent to which populist moralism has a base in popular and traditional inventories in this country. It is dangerous to speculate too wildly about a possible future for the moral right, but based on an understanding of what has gone before, it is possible, I believe, to make some tentative comments on the potential of the moral right to

broaden its ideological base.

Perhaps the most important danger that the moral right presents is the potential to articulate not only morally conservative ideas around the family but also pro-nuclear policies. Indeed one of the things that the moral right is doing is broadening what is understood by a 'moral' issue. While it might seem appropriate to call homosexual law reform and abortion, moral issues, a few years ago child-care and affirmative action would not have come under this label, as they do now. The moral right is also organising around 'race' as an issue, particularly in relation to teaching taha Maori in schools. There is also a good deal of sympathy among some organisations (e.g. CPA and CCC) for the ideas of Geoff MacDonald in his book Shadows over New Zealand [2]. Already the CCC and the CPA among others are making claims that anti-nuclear legislation and pulling out of ANZUS are 'morally' wrong. These positions are not only being talked about on the moral right but are being taken up by politicians and others who would not normally place themselves as part of that movement. It is the strength of populist moralism that has seen Jim McLay call Labour's policy on nuclear ships 'morally indefensible' (Evening Standard, 13/1/86).

2. Why 'Class Struggle' and Tolerance are not Enough

Now that it has been established that the moral right does pose a threat in a real way to some of the principles of democracy and equality that the Left believes are important, it is necessary to examine what sort of strategies have been suggested. In this section I examine the orthodox socialist solution of 'the class struggle' and secondly the liberal solution implied in the Campaign for Tolerance and (liberal) socialist civil rights strategies.

(i) Class struggle

The most orthodox socialist position currently proposed in New Zealand is that the moral right is merely a reflection of the balance of forces amongst classes and therefore should be attacked through the process of class struggle. This position implies a number of things. It assumes that the agent of change will be the working class and moreover that working class organisations such as the unions provide an adequate base from which to attack the moral right. In chapter one this position was rejected because it privileges class agents without recognising that the very direction of 'class struggle' and identification of a political problem relies on a political balance of forces that is decided in the whole field of hegemonic politics. To assume that unions, which have as their main focus the relationship between capital and labour in the workplace, are the privileged site of struggle against morally conservative ideas on homosexuality and abortion etc, is at once politically naive and dangerous. While the

struggle around these issues undoubtedly has a place within unions, they are certainly not the only or even most important site of struggle.

Because of the SAL's reliance on class they believe that the traditional political arm of the working class, the unions, should be the means through which a campaign is waged against the right wing forces. This approach is flawed because it works from the position that the struggle is a class one and therefore should be pitted against 'the bosses'. Laclau and Mouffe point out the problem with this classist position which works from the position

> that the working class represents the privileged agent in which the fundamental impulse of social change resides — without perceiving that the very orientation of the working class depends upon a political balance of forces and the radicalisation of a plurality of democratic struggles which are decided in good part outside the class itself (Laclau and Mouffe,1985:177 — original emphasis).

Because the SAL wrongly identifies who the moral right are their strategy of fighting through the unions is misguided. Many unions have not responded well to the Homosexual Law Reform Bill because they do not want to divide an already weakened movement. The FOL was reluctant to give time to the Homosexual Law Reform Bill at its annual conference in 1985 because it did not consider it a 'real' political issue [3]. Because the SAL only recognises people as class subjects it misses the fact that individuals are also constituted with other subjectivities, i.e. we are women, men, lesbians, heterosexual, gay, bisexual, Maori, Greek, Pakeha etc. By ignoring these important sites of subjectivity

the SAL fails to identify the much broader front on which the struggle must be waged. The SAL believes that the various right wing campaigns that are waged (i.e abortion, anti-homosexual, and the more general anti-feminist moves) are relatively discrete struggles that only have a unity in that they are all being used by the ruling class to weaken the working class. Although the SAL does recognise that defence of 'the family' is central to many right wing arguments, they fail to see that it is this principle that unites diverse groups and is being used to create a movement of the moral right.

Bedggood (1980) suggests that morally conservative groups, conceptualised as being part of a wider fascist movement, can be defeated through a 'united front' of socialist parties and organisations. This type of unity rejects 'reformist' solutions such as parliamentary socialism and it depends for its success on the overthrow of capitalist structures in their totality. A premise of the 'class struggle' approach to 'revolution' is the belief that once capitalism is destroyed all other forms of inequality will disappear, if not immediately then certainly as a consequence of the natural unfolding of socialism. This enables Bedggood to claim that if only workers could be made to see that sexism and racism are capitalist tools of oppression then they would reject them as being inimical to workers real interests. Here again subjectivity is constructed only on class grounds and an assumption is made that workers have certain underlying interests outside of political society.

(ii) Tolerance and civil rights campaigns

While most socialists would see the Campaign for Tolerance as being a liberal rather than a socialist approach to the problem of the moral right, there are points of contact between the Tolerance campaign and the tendency for sections of the Left to see issues of abortion, homosexuality and other platforms debated by the moral right as involving civil rights.

The Campaign for Tolerance was established in September 1985 in response to the campaign against the Homosexual Law Reform Bill and the establishment of the CCC. The December 1985 letter asking for support begins,

> New Zealanders have never liked being told what to think.
> Whether you think of yourself as a conservative, a liberal
> or more middle of the road, you will value our democratic
> traditions including the right to act as you think best, so
> long as your actions do not damage the rights or freedoms
> of others. Now the time has come to show how much we value
> those freedoms.

The campaign's main objective is to 'promote, through education and the distribution of factual material, the values of tolerance, understanding and respect for all' (Tolerance fact sheet, n.d.). Tolerance aims to 'safeguard individual liberty against those who would use money and political pressure to force all New Zealanders into their mould'. The campaign is clearly situated within the liberal problematic of protecting individual rights and defending the rights of all groups (including the moral right) to express their views.

> Tolerance means we will tolerate them, too, and support
> their right to hold their beliefs and lead their lives the
> way they want. But we will oppose their wish to make their
> ways become our ways (Goodman, 1985).

Tolerance believes that by presenting factual information on issues this will be sufficient to hold back the tide of bigotry and 'holy terror that haunts our liberal-democratic traditions'. It is an attempt to counter the growth of moral conservatism not through battles, but through a 'calm' campaign (ibid) This ignores the fact that 'values of tolerance, understanding and respect for all' are not a matter of education, but rather of culture and hegemony. Tolerance will not succeed in its aims because it does not address the issues as posed by the moral right. The campaign is in fact the very epitome of what the moral right objects to and has been campaigning against for the last 15 years. By standing in opposition to the moral right the Campaign for Tolerance cannot argue <u>over</u> the issues of homosexuality, abortion etc. By asserting the liberal right to freedom of belief they cannot challenge the ideas and practices that the moral right presents not as an option among many, but as <u>the</u> answer. The main similarity between the Campaign for Tolerance and civil rights strategy is that both campaigns maintain a distinction between 'private' and 'public' spheres. Taking the example of homosexual law reform, the liberal approach emphasises the rights of individuals to do what they like in the 'privacy of their bedroom'. Homosexuality is seen as something that should not effect anybody else except the homosexual. This is part of the tendency to see all sexual relations as being 'private' in nature. The problem with this approach is often pointed out by

feminists – that domestic violence and rape do occur in the 'private' sphere of the bedroom and no one would defend 'rights' in this area. I believe that this issue marks a major problem within much socialist thought that accords 'sexual' politics less status and urgency than problems located at the level of the economy and state.

3. A Moral Left?

In response to my identification of the levels where the moral right does pose a threat to society, and the inadequacies of the strategies suggested by the Left, I will now outline what I believe to be a way of dealing with the moral right. If it is accepted that the biggest danger that the moral right poses is in its ability to change the way we think about and organise certain practices on the sex/gender and sexuality systems, then the first thing the Left must do is address itself to these problems in a way that meets the challenge of the moral right. Firstly, I discuss how the Left might engage in a war of position against populist moralism. Secondly, the problem that the sexuality system poses for the Left is examined in more detail, and the content of a radical theory and politics is discussed. Finally 'the family' is discussed.

(i) <u>The war of position on populist moralism</u>

In contrast to the orthodox socialist and liberal positions outlined above, I believe that the Left must engage in a war of position. Laclau and Mouffe state well the political significance of this process.

> The concept of a "war of position" implies precisely the <u>process</u> character of every radical transformation — the revolutionary act is simply, an internal moment of this process. The multiplication of political spaces and the preventing of the concentration of power in one point are, then, preconditions of every truly democratic transformation of society (Laclau and Mouffe,1985:178).

Taking this point further it can be said that for the Left to construct a hegemonic project it must not present its demands solely as negative ones that are purely subversive, but rather they must be linked to a 'viable project for the reconstruction of specific areas of society' (ibid:189). The failure to do this has hindered the Left's ability to challenge the moral right. Rather than presenting a 'strategy of opposition' which the Left has tended to do, a 'strategy of construction of a new order' must be undertaken.

One of the things that must be addressed by the Left is the ability of the moral right to divide society into two antagonistic camps, in which the Left and radical ideas about sex and gender represents the evil pole. What has to be broken down is the idea that 'morality' can only be defined in relation to some concept of a normative authoritarian family. Instead of constructing discourse

about morality as a battle between two opposing and mutually exclusive
positions, the Left must construct a space to struggle over morality
where feminism and sexual 'freedom' are not seen in opposition to
morality and the family. Where the moral right has constructed a set
of equivalents that unite diverse subject positions around preservation
of the family and rejection of feminism and sexual freedom, the Left
must reestablish a set of equivalents based on principles of democracy
and equality. Whereas the moral right wishes to construct a world
based around the authoritarian family, the Left must construct a
project that 'expands the chains of equivalents between different
struggles against oppression' (Laclau and Mouffe,1985:176). This means
recognising that some of the claims of the moral right do have a basis
in the experience of many people. For instance it is true that the
state has encroached on individual lives often to the detriment of
freedom. It is also true that the family does embody many values and
functions that the Left would also want to uphold.

One of the problems with traditional socialist strategies is that
power is only located at the level of relations of production and in
the state. However it is necessary to assert, as stated in chapter
two, that power is exercised at all levels of society and must
therefore be fought at all levels. Laclau and Mouffe maintain that
mobilisation must therefore be on a 'plurality of planes'. In a sense
the moral right has already recognised and used this point to its
advantage. The moral right works on the various levels of political
parties, in churches, school committees, hospital boards, the media,
lobbying and interest groups. Although the moral right maintains a

distinction between the 'private' and the 'political' public spheres, by its practices that valorise private activities the moral right accords them with a significance often missed by those on the Left. It is vital therefore that the Left turns its attention towards struggling on the same levels with the moral right. While the state is undeniably an important site of power, 'moral politics' are also played out in every other level of society and must be addressed there.

(ii) What about sex?

This section addresses what the Left could sensibly say and do about sex. It is an area that both socialists and feminists have dealt with in a confused fashion, although there are some notable exceptions to this (e.g. Weeks, 1981a,b; Foucault, 1978 and Rubin, 1984). Feminists have long argued that sex is a matter of politics rather than nature and biology.

> The contemporary women's movement, insisting at every turn that "the personal is political" can truly be said to have established "sexual politics" as a significant area of struggle (Barrett, 1980:42-3).

However, while Barrett is correct to claim that feminism has established sexual politics as a site of struggle, it would be less accurate to suggest that feminism as a theory is able to address the issues in all their complexity. Dann (1985) claims that the feminist analysis of sex has very often remained within the same limits that Foucault pointed out are characteristic of the hegemony on sexuality. This should not be all that surprising given the degree to which

ideology about sex is so deeply rooted in our culture. However Dann makes the valid point that we should be aware of the tendency to think within these same categories of oppression and 'consider to what extent they constitute a strait jacket on our thought' (Dann,1985:81). Rubin is even more sceptical of feminism's ability to produce a theory and practice that can adequately deal with the issues surrounding sexuality. With the rise of the feminist anti-pornography movement, the sexual conservatism inherent in some forms of feminism has reproduced many of the negative ideological formations of sexuality e.g. the censuring of promiscuity, transsexuality etc. Rubin challenges

> the assumption that feminism is or should be the privileged site of a theory of sexuality. Feminism is the theory of gender oppression. To automatically assume that this makes it the theory of sexual oppression is to fail to distinguish between gender on the one hand, and erotic desire, on the other (Rubin,1984:307).

What is needed is a theory that rejects the essentialism inherent in most discourse on sexuality, and which addresses issues of democracy and equality. Rubin claims that the problem with most ideologies on sexuality (including much feminist discourse) is the tendency to deny the validity of a benign sexual variation. Most thought about sex holds the notion that there is a single ideal for sexuality. Rather than denying the actual existence and validity of sexual variation it is necessary to develop a pluralistic, democratic morality that judges acts of sex 'by the way partners treat one another, the level of mutual consideration, the presence or absence of coercion, and the quantity and quality of the pleasure they provide' (ibid:283). It should

constantly be pointed out that the world is not going to fall apart if

women engage in sexual relations with each other or some men like to

wear dresses.   Of course these practises may challenge the traditional

family cherished by the moral right, but it is this narrow and

oppressive form of living arrangement that must be abolished, not

'families' as such.

It is appropriate at this point to comment in particular about sex

education. While the Left might want to maintain that having sex

education classes in school is a good idea, there has been little

critical analysis of what should be included in the subject and what

assumptions such a subject should be based on. Joseph Diorio claims

that the literature on sex education is characterised by 'theoretical

barrenness' and 'copulation domination' (Diorio,1984).

> Sex education very largely has been conceptualised as a
> curricular tool useful in coping with a variety of problems
> arising from the real or imagined sexual behaviours of the
> population (ibid:1).

Furthermore this instrumental approach to the subject has the following

consequences.

> Any curriculum field which is tied closely to a set of
> social problems easily can come under the control of those
> problems, not just in the sense that study within that
> field is justified as a source of practical solutions, but
> in the more fundamental sense that the nature of the field
> itself comes to be defined in terms of the problems which
> it is expected to alleviate (ibid).

Perhaps the main assumption behind the call for sex education is that all that is needed to decrease venereal disease and teenage pregnancies is to make sexually active and potentially active teenagers aware of information about sex and from there to encourage them to change their attitudes and behaviour. What this position is blind to is the pre-existing structuring of the sexuality system. Diorio discusses in some detail the implication of equating sex with copulation. These points can be summarised as a preoccupation with teenage pregnancy; a misrecognition of sexual activity as only involving heterosexual copulation; and an assumption that 'petting' leads to copulation as if the former is a less 'real' form of sex than the latter.

It is important to consider the extent to which liberal, socialist and feminist calls for sex education are very often trapped within the definition of social problems associated with sexual activities, i.e. there is a concern with venereal disease and teenage pregnancy which sex education is somehow supposed to 'fix'. By defining sex education in this way the field becomes dominated with the concerns of contraceptive knowledge and 'copulation'. The moral right has grasped these two points to show that sex education is not only a danger in itself but it contributes to the problems it is supposedly meant to address. They also point out the necessity for some kind of 'values' to be transmitted along with sex information. Too often liberal values have stressed 'doing your own thing' without linking this to broader considerations of personal and social power. A radical theory and practice of sexuality and sex education must be concerned with values, morality, the family and responsibility. To fall back onto the liberal

notion of individual responsiblity is to fail to take up the challenge presented by the moral right.

(iii) What about the family?

Michele Barrett and Mary McIntosh examine in some detail the 'problem' of the 'anti-social family'. They claim that neither socialists nor feminists have 'developed the political consensus on the family that we would need in order to pursue a struggle with the right' (Barrett and McIntosh,1982:17-18). They are of the same opinion as I am that 'the family' should not be seen as the 'artificial solution' to 'false needs'. Rather, investment in the family by individuals and the moral right should be interpreted as 'an easily comprehended indeed highly rational choice, given the material and ideological privilege accorded to it in our society' (ibid:21). Indeed, in a comment on anti-feminist women at the Women's Forums, Helen Watson points out that the appeal of the authoritarian family is in large part the result of feminism's failures. 'Feminism has not convinced [these women] that a feminist society would meet their needs. The Churches have persuaded them a benevolent patriarchy will' (Watson,1985:14). As pointed out in chapter four the moral right has not picked on the family for purely spurious reasons. It is an institution that does provide a good deal of emotional security for many people. However what is highly problematic about seeing the family as a 'solution' to certain social problems is that this ignores the fact that in many cases it is the family as it is currently organised which contributes and causes many of these problems. It is worth quoting in length what Barrett and

McIntosh have to say about this.

> The world around the family is not a pre-existing harsh
> climate against which the family offers protection and
> warmth. It is as if the family had drawn comfort and
> security into itself and left the outside world bereft. As
> a bastion against a bleak society it has made that society
> bleak. It is indeed a major agency for caring, but in
> monopolising care it has made it harder to undertake other
> forms of care. It is indeed a unit of sharing, but in
> demanding sharing within it has made other relations tend
> to become more mercenary. It is indeed a place of
> intimacy, but in privileging the intimacy of close kin it
> has made the outside world cold and friendless, and made it
> harder to sustain relations of security and trust except
> with kin. Caring, sharing and loving would be more
> wide-spread if the family did not claim them for its own
> (ibid:80).

The tendency to present as a solution to modern sexual problems, the
confinement of sex in the marriage bond, ignores the fact that

> it is precisely the oppressive and unbalanced nature of the
> family that creates the kind of sexuality that exists
> outside it. Confining sex within marriage is not the
> answer to the problems; at the social level it is itself
> the cause of the problem (ibid:76).

So here we have presented the two sides of the same coin. The family
is both oppressive _and_ a site of 'caring, sharing and loving'. The
Left's strategy of opposing the moral right's conception of the family
with their claim that it is oppressive does not address the complex
issues involved here. What the Left must do instead is acknowledge the
importance of the family (in its various forms - and not just the
'morally' acceptable nuclear family) and work to place it not in
opposition to feminism or socialism, but to articulate it to principles
of democracy and equality. Again Barrett and McIntosh encapsulate many

of the points I would make here. They point out that the socialist critique of the family has often isolated socialists from the organised working class which has often expressed support for the family. Similarly feminists arguing that the family is an institution embodying male control, have faced resistance from many women who see women's liberation as 'anti-family' and 'anti-men'. What do these comments mean then, in what we must do about the family?

> In the long term we are pursuing a major social transformation that will displace the family as the sole and privileged provider of moral and material support and spread these good things more widely through the community. In the short term, though, we cannot demand the immediate abolition of an institution that does meet real needs as well as being ultimately anti-social. A good example of this contradiction is the problem of ending the dependence of women on their husbands. Should we argue that men should no longer support their wives, that pension schemes should not provide for widows, that divorced women have no right to support from their ex-husbands? In the long term undoubtedly we should. But in the present situation, if women cannot escape the responsibility for housekeeping and caring for children and, even if they do work outside the home, can seldom earn as much as men, then any proposals we make must not be ones that would leave such women without the little shred of compensation that they now have. Nevertheless, we must work towards ending women's dependence: personal dependence is only a partial compensation, an unsatisfactory one, and one not available to all (ibid:133).

In summary then, what are the components of a Left strategy to combat the moral right? Firstly, it would involve building alliances of different progressive political movements to challenge the moral right. Since the working class cannot be the privileged agent of struggle here, a movement must be built on a series of alliances that somehow allows the individual movements their autonomy and creates united and popular fronts on different issues [4]. This means struggling on all

fronts to rearticulate elements of the right-wing ideology (that ties morality to the family) towards a democratic solution based on justice and equality. Here it is necessary to see sexual relations in terms of a democratic pluralistic morality that does not oppose 'the family' to 'deviant' forms of sexuality. Rather 'benign sexual variation' should be acknowledged as posing no danger to the family's ability to satisfy needs for emotional security, affection, sexual love, and parenthood. What is more the Left must develop and articulate a discourse about gender and sexual relations that neither completely rejects the family as oppressive, nor embraces it as the appropriate authoritarian solution to problems of morality. Rather, principles of equality, justice and democracy must guide any struggle over morality.

4. Conclusion

The overall aim of this thesis has been to respond to Wood's (1982b) call for the development of an indigenous cultural studies that adopts an explicit political role in academic work. I believe this aim has been achieved. I have discussed the various approaches taken by those on the Left in New Zealand in trying to understand the moral right. The thesis has shown that these analyses, weakened by class reductionism, have fundamentally misrecognised what is at stake in the activity of the moral right. Instead of trying to force the moral right into the class mould, I have argued that this movement is to be best understood as a manifestation of populist moralism. This concept

has at its heart the political question of how 'moral hegemony' is secured in our society. From an understanding of the concept of populist moralism it was possible for me to make some comments about a broad strategy the Left could use in attacking the moral right. While they have been of a general nature I believe these underlying principles should inform a Left political struggle.

NOTES

1. This distinction is based on Gramsci's use of the terms. Common sense refers to largely unconscious and generally held assumptions about the world, while good sense is practical and actually useful knowledge (Maharey and O'Brien,1986:6).

2. In this book McDonald discusses issues surrounding defence, Maori land rights and multiculturalism. He argues that struggles for land rights by indigenous people are part of a wider plan to advance international socialism.

3. See the report in <u>Socialist Action</u>, May 24 1985 p3,11 for a discussion of the debate over the Homosexual Law Reform Bill.

4. These comments are not meant to imply that the working class has no place in the socialist war of position. Rather, I am merely

questioning its _a priori_ right to be the organising agent in certain struggles. There will certainly be some occasions when the working class and class struggle will be the dominant and privileged notions.

APPENDIX ONE

List of Interest Groups, Churches and Religious Organisations

active on the Moral Right, 1986

The lists below are not exhaustive, but they do include the major and
many smaller organisations and churches involved in the moral right.

Interest Groups

Concerned Parents Association

Credo

Christians for Life

Christian Alternative Movement

Coalition of Concerned Citizens

Country Women's Institute

Exodus

Family Rights Association

Homosexual Anonymous Support Group

Integrity Centre

Kiwi Forum (ex-Working Women's Council Inc)

New Zealand League of Rights

New Zealand Organisation on Moral Education (formerly
Community Organisation on Moral Education)

Society for the Promotion of Community Standards

Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child

Parents Council - Educational Development Association

Pregnancy Counselling Service

Pro-Life

Pro-Life Action Group

Right-to-Life

Women's Christian Temperance Union

Women for Life (formerly Feminists for Life)

Churches, and Religious Organisations and Publications

Assembly of God

Apostolic Church

Brethren

Catholic Women's League

Challenge Weekly

Church of Christ in New Zealand

Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints (Mormons)

Full Gospel Mission

Intercessors for New Zealand

Jehovah Witnesses

Living Word Church

New Life Centre

Open Door Mission

Salvation Army

The Tablet

Radio Rhema

Worldwide Church of God

Youth With a Mission

It also should be noted that many of the traditional churches have fundamentalist and conservative sections that actively work within the moral right.

APPENDIX TWO

Methodological Considerations

The thesis is concerned with a 'conjunctural analysis' of the moral right in New Zealand. Hall states that

> A conjuncture is not a slice of time, but can only be defined by the accumulation/condensation of contradictions, the fusion or merger of "different currents and circumstances" (Hall, 1981:165).

The task of the thesis therefore was to analyse the particular fusion of 'currents and contradictions' that gave rise to the moral right in New Zealand. The problem as framed in the thesis has been concerned with three things. Firstly, I was concerned with the prevailing analysis by the Left of the moral right as a phenomenon. Secondly, the conditions on which the discourse of the moral right developed was examined, and thirdly the organisation of that discourse was 'unpacked'.

Taking the first issue, an analysis of the Left's response to the moral right was examined by searching various left-wing journals and newspapers for comment on the moral right. The sources used were: Monthly Review, The Republican, New Outlook, Lesbians in Print, Broadsheet, Socialist Action and Pink Triangle. Not all the material that I located was included in the analysis, but a selection was made

on the basis of the source's representativeness of a particular theoretical view.

Secondly it was necessary to discuss the nature of the sex/gender and sexuality systems from the end of the Second World War to the early seventies. This formed the material of chapter three. There were two periods of interest identified. The first is from the end of the war to the early sixties. It is a period marked by a relative consensus and hegemony on issues of gender and sexuality. I began examining the period through looking at the research that had previously been done on this topic. Unfortunately, research of this nature is very thin on the ground in New Zealand and I have relied on the work of Helen Cook (1985a,b,c) for a discussion of the sex/gender system during the fifties. In addition to her work I picked one of the debates of those years (about the desirability of co-educational schools) to examine in more detail one of the concrete concerns of the time about gender relations. On the sexuality system, I analysed the discourse on sex education and discussed the 'moral panic' surrounding the Mazengarb Report. This enabled me to make comments about the nature of the hegemony that existed about sexual relations. The second period examined was that from the early sixties to the seventies. These years represented a time of 'crisis' in terms of the traditional ideas about sexuality and gender relations. The crisis has been mapped out through discussing changes that occured in the state and the rise of various progressive movements. Again, I have relied on secondary sources for much of my data. The theoretical considerations of the thesis supplied the framework with which I made selections as to what was relevant

information.

The third concern in the thesis was with analysing the discourse of the moral right. I could have examined a number of different 'sites of struggle' (e.g. the Homosexual Law Reform Bill, pornography or abortion) to analyse the discourse. I chose to look at sex education as a nodal point because in many ways it encapsulates all the different concerns of the moral right about gender and sexual relations. It is a topic that has occupied morally conservative groups since the early seventies and it will continue to be an important site as the full implications of the Education Amendment Act 1985 are worked out in the classroom. The nature of the discourse of the moral right has been examined through analysing newsletters, publications and correspondence from various morally conservative organisations. Primary sources used are listed in the bibliography. In using quotes from these sources I have tried to select the most clear and representative statement of a particular ideological view. For every quote used there are numerous similar quotes from different organisations that could also have been included. Where there are differences of viewpoint between groups, these have been pointed out. The quotes selected formed the basis for an analysis of the ideological system underlying the moral right.

YOUR CHILDREN ARE THE FUTURE -NOW!

Every day we read about, see and experience areas of society gone wrong - drug abuse, broken homes, violence and corruption. The 20th Century is taking its toll on the young, the weak and the innocent - and very little seems to be getting done to slow down this ever-worsening trend which is eroding the moral base of our society.

But here is a group of concerned individuals who believe that something can and will be done about the situation. Introducing the New Zealand Integrity Centre. A group existing to act as a focal point for morality improving activity and to co-ordinate the already existing positive inputs into society.

The New Zealand Integrity Centre is not a group with a cross to bear. We do not, and will not preach down to people. More, by acting as a focal point to positive inputs and via mass media communication in the right areas, we can stimulate thought, and perhaps change, in sensitive areas of social unrest.

The New Zealand Integrity Centre realises that the pressures on the individual manifested in drug abuse, alcoholism and child abuse are unfortunately all reflections of mankind's progression towards an unacceptably fast moving and confusing way of life. We believe that society must now take stock of itself and ask where it is going, before we arrive, and before it is too late to do anything about it.

WHO BELONGS TO THE NEW ZEALAND INTEGRITY CENTRE?

The New Zealand Integrity Centre is a non profit-making organisation. An application is before the Department for incorporation as a charitable trust. The Centre's activities are guided by a group comprised of Christchurch business people, members of local government, service clubs and government departments.

In addition, over the past two years, the New Zealand Integrity Centre has been gathering both moral and financial support from the community. We are fortunate enough to have a most influential group of patrons.

Some of our Patrons

Mayor of Lower Hutt

Bishop of Nelson

Former City Councillor

Mayor of Christchurch

Former Minister of Social Welfare

Mayor of Hamilton

Retired Secondary Inspector

Former President, N.Z. Federation of Labour.

Editor of the Tablet

Editor of the Challenge

M.P., (Eastern Hutt).

Former Mayor of Rangiora

Mayor of Dunedin

Mayor of Blenheim

APPENDIX FOUR

THE FAMILY CHARTER

We call on society and the Government to support these principles as the basis for a sound family life.

I   The Family
1 The family, defined as the legally married husband and wife, and children (if any) is the fundamental unit of society. It must be preserved at all cost

II   Marriage
2. Marriage is instituted primarily by God, not by the State or society. It must therefore comply with His laws. It is monogamous, heterosexual and permanent There is no "alternative" form of marriage. No official recognition should be given to homosexual or de facto unions. We recognise that dependent wives and children of such unions often need special support
3. The husband and wife have equal status but different roles. The children also have rights. They should not be regarded as being in competition with one another. With true love each works for the benefit of the others
4. The main virtues that govern married life are love, justice, fidelity and chastity. These are the ideals that should be presented to the young

III   Sexuality
5. Normal sexual activity within marriage is part of God's plan. It fosters love encourages spiritual development and brings new lives into existence
6. Any departure from normal sexuality is a deviation from God's design. The advocates of homosexuality and other abnormal sexual practices should not be allowed access to schools.

IV   Contraception, sterilisation, abortion
7. Abortion is an attack on the most defenceless member of society, the unborn child. Greater efforts should be made to combat abortion and the factors that lead up to it.
8. Individual marriages exercise their freedom of choice in matters of contraception and sterilisation, but public funds should not be used to provide free contraceptive, sterilisation and abortion services. The taxpayer should not be expected to subsidize premarital and extramarital affairs
9. Legislation which permits these services to be provided to children under the age of 16 without the knowledge or approval of the parents is a subversion of parental authority.

V   Divorce
10. Divorce harms the children, the parents and the status of marriage in society. Legislation should aim at reducing the incidence of divorce rather than facilitating it.

VI   Pornography
11. Pornography is insulting not only to women but also to men and children It is destructive of healthy sexual relations and it fosters violence in society Greater efforts should be made to eliminate it

VII   Health services
12. The family's access to health care should be made easier and less expensive by inflation-proofing all medical benefits, particularly the General Medical Services benefit. (This originally paid for 80% of the average general practitioner's fee.) Freedom of choice should be available to all patients, especially in the area of maternity services. A State monopoly of health care should be avoided.

VIII   Housing
13. It should be possible for families to own their own homes in conditions of basic comfort at reasonable rates of mortgage repayments

IX   Education
14. Parents are the primary educators of their children. Teachers should recognize that their authority is only a delegated one and they should respect parental wishes in the presentation and content of sensitive subjects such as religion, history, sociology, politics and sexuality

X   Finance
15. The average father's income should be sufficient to support his family His wife should not be forced to go out to work and risk neglect of the children The basic wage should be adjusted to help families with dependent children by low taxation; full tax deductions for all medical, dental, educational and home mortgage expenses; a maternity allowance, an inflation-indexed Family Benefit

WHY OPPOSE THE U.N. CONVENTION ON WOMEN?
Because
it is . . .

A THREAT TO OUR FREEDOM

FREEDOM to organise our family structure as we choose.

FREEDOM to bring up and educate our children according to our conscience and religious beliefs.

FREEDOM to choose our associates and employees.

FREEDOM from State control over every detail or our lives.

FREEDOM from the dictates of the feminist movement.

DID YOU KNOW THAT THE FEMINIST AIM IS TO DESTROY THE FAMILY?

"WE SEE THE FAMILY AS THE CENTRAL INSTITUTION WHICH MAINTAINS THE OPPRESSION OF WOMEN AS A SEX IN TODAY'S SOCIETY" (Socialist Action League's submission to Parliament, 1974).

DID YOU KNOW THAT THE CONVENTION ON WOMEN ....

CALLS for a change in the roles of men and women in ALL families ....

EXPECTS parents to share the upbringing of their children with the State ....

DEMANDS that schools indoctrinate children to adopt feminist attitudes to sex roles, by censoring textbooks and changing teaching methods ....

REQUIRES a nationwide network of childcare centres in order to get mothers out of the home ....

SEES maternity as a "social function" not as a private matter between husband and wife ....

UNDERMINES the traditional practices concerning the roles and relationships of men and women ....

PROMOTES "affirmative action" which is really DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MEN, who may well have families to support ....

MAKES employers of pregnant women provide special measures to protect their pregnancies, and give them paid maternity leave ....

INSISTS that all girls have access to contraceptive instruction, no matter what their age or whether their parents object ....

WOULD lead to the banning of single sex sporting clubs and events ....

DEMANDS health care services related to family planning, that could mean a big increase in abortions and abortion facilities ....

SUBJECTS New Zealand to the scrutiny of a Supervisory Committee dominated by representatives of totalitarian regimes, many of which use torture and one of which (China) practises compulsory abortion ....

THE CONVENTION sets in motion avalanche of State controls and changes in every sphere of life, designed to bring about the feminist goal

TARGET - THE FAMILY

DON'T BE DECIEVED by claims that there will be no changes in New Zealand if the Government ratifies the Convention: the feminists know just why they are pushing for it.

WHEN THE STATE INTERFERES - FREE CHOICE DISAPPEARS

New Zealand does not need this Convention: no-one has yet been able to point to any positive benefit to New Zealand of ratifying it. The claimed benefits to overseas women of New Zealand's ratification are wishful thinking.

This Convention is NOT just a women's issue - it vitally affects every MAN, WOMAN and CHILD in New Zealand. Why should the Government only listen to feminist dominated women's groups?

WHY ANOTHER PETITION?

Won't it just get buried in Parliament?

This one is DIFFERENT - because it is going direct to the Governor General as representative of the Queen.

Her Majesty acknowledges Almighty God as the source of her authority: our Parliament is part of that chain of authority. New Zealand and its Parliament are answerable to the Queen under God, not the United Nations, which is an atheistic organisation.

BY ACCEPTING UNITED NATIONS' AUTHORITY AND SURVEILLANCE

WE ARE COMPROMISING OUR ALLEGIANCE TO THE CROWN

We do not need to be judged by United Nations standards, which involve a loss of personal freedom and an increase in government control. U.N. Covenants do not even recognise the right to own private property!

Because of feminist influence in the Government, we are petitioning His Excellency the Governor General to instruct his Ministers that the Royal Assent will not be given to ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all forms of discriminiation against women.

The Governor General's reserve power to do this is a safeguard for society when Parliament or the Government refuses to take account of the will of the people.

The Crown is our ultimate protection against a takeover by the forces of totalitarianism.

*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *

SAYING "NO" TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON WOMEN IS

SAYING "YES" TO FREEDOM UNDER GOD AND THE QUEEN

*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *

APPENDIX SIX

Official Statement of Position — CCC

The Steering committee for the Coalition of Concerned Citizens (N.Z.) met on Friday the 13th of September and it was decided that:

1. A Coalition of Concerned Citizens be established to co-ordinate the views and resources of persons and organisations interested in protecting and maintaining traditional values aimed at promoting the interest of the family unit, the individual, and integrity in Government.

2. The Coalition is a service organisation to facilitate the functions, and efforts of groups and individuals who pursue such objects.

3. The Coalition has no prior commitment to any one group, church, political party or organisation. It seeks to work with all persons who share the same objects.

4. The Coalition by its very nature recognises the autonomy of affiliates and supporters. It maintains however the right and the responsibility of all New Zealanders to defend the interests of the Family, the Individual and our traditional form of government.

5. The Coalition does not support violence against people or property.

6. The Coalition will support individuals in positions of public office to the extent that they endeavour to protect, promote or stand for the traditional values of the Family and worth of the Individual.

7. The Coalition is an indigenous body controlled by New Zealanders and is not beholden to any overseas bodies financially or otherwise.

APPENDIX EIGHT

CODE OF PRACTICE FOR SEX AND FAMILY LIFE EDUCATION

1. Sex education be given on the understanding that responsible sexual activity is only expressed within the context of marriage.

2. Family Life Education be based on the following definition of the "family";-

   "A man and woman who are legally married, together with their natural and legally adopted children: their extended family consists of those related to them by blood or marriage, including relatives defined in Schedule 2 of the Marriage Act 1955".

3. Teachers or visiting speakers not to teach, discuss or give out printed material which instructs children of unlawful, unnatural, perverse or deviant sexual practices.

4. Any act which would constitute an offence against public decency were it to be carried out in public, should not be performed, demonstrated or exhibited in pictorial form to or in front of children in schools.

5. Coarse, indecent or obscene terminology to be avoided at all times in schools: the language used by all teachers and visiting speakers should be dignified in accordance with the principles and guidelines above.

6. All materials to be used for sex education should be available for prior inspection and approval by parents.

7. Any kind of pornographic or indecent book, slides, video cassettes, recordings, photographs, pictures or other representations should be excluded from all teaching, discussion or instruction in school.

8. No discussion, teaching or instruction in the use of contraceptives should be given to any child of any age in schools wthout the prior consent of the child's parents. There should be no implication in such instruction, teaching or discussion, that it is anticipated that schoolchildren are likely to be involved in any kind of unlawful sexual intercourse.

9. Respect for infant life before and after birth should be an ideal set before schoolchildren throughout all sex instruction and education on human reproduction and development.

10. Alternative lessons to be provided for children whose parents do not wish them to have sex and contraceptive education in accordance with the above Code.

The Code of Practice set out above precludes the giving of any form of sex instruction by:-

   (a) Those who desire to promote attitudes and activities which do not accord with these principles and guidelines.

   (b) Those who act, directly or indirectly, for or on behalf of persons or bodies gaining a financial advantage from the advertisement, sale or distribution of contraceptive materials and/or abortion services.

   (c) Those who are members or supporters of, or sympathise with, groups campaigning for the acceptance of paedophilia and/or homosexual or

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