Mass Atrocities and Military Intervention:
A Ripeness-based Approach to the Decision Moment

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Abstract

Mass atrocities, commonly defined as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, is a problem facing the world. The past, and unfortunately the present, is filled with humanitarian tragedies where violence against civilian populations resulted in mass atrocities. Difficult deliberations occur among external actors on the complex issue of when to intervene with military force to prevent or stop these mass atrocities. Although there is a comprehensive body of intervention literature on the what, why and how, there is a gap in understanding the timing of when to intervene. This question may be better understood when we apply ripeness theory from another discipline that has been used in conflict resolution to understand the conditions of when groups in conflict enter negotiations and begin to find a solution to resolve their conflict. This study builds on ripeness theory to understand the timing and favourable conditions of when to intervene. This research asks: ***What is the applicability of ripeness theory for understanding when to conduct a military intervention to prevent or stop mass atrocities?*** The research uses case studies with process tracing of interventions in Kosovo, East Timor, and Libya to investigate this question. The approach evolves ripeness theory from its traditional use in negotiation to its use in the different context of military intervention. This ripeness-based approach proposes new concepts that work together with established concepts in a framework that develops favouring conditions of when to intervene. This new way of applying ripeness theory yields a useful approach and promising results, but more research needs to be done.

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List of Abbreviations

Abbreviations	Meaning
ACTORD	NATO Activation Order
ACTWARN	NATO Activation Warning
AU	African Union
DFAT	Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APODETI	Timorese Popular Democratic Association
ASDT	Timorese Social Democratic Party
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CAVR	Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation of Timor-Leste
DEPLU	Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs
E10	Non-permanent UNSC Members
ETAN	East Timor Action Network
FALANTIL	Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor
FRETLIN	Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IICK	Independent International Commission on Kosovo
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INTERFET	International Force in East Timor
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KVM	Kosovo Verification Mission
LAS	League of Arab States
LDK	League for a Democratic Kosovo
MEO	Mutually Enticing Opportunity
MHS	Mutually Hurting Stalemate
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC	National Security Council
NTC	National Transitional Council
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
POC	Protection of Civilians
P2	China and Russia
P3	France, United Kingdom, and United States
P5	UN Security Council Permanent Members
RAM	Rational Actor Model
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RWP	Responsibility While Protecting
S5	Soft, stable, self-serving stalemate
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia
UDT	Timorese Democratic Union
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMET	United Nations Assistance Mission East Timor

UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
WO	Way Out
WSOD	World Summit Outcome Document

Chapter 1: Introduction and Thesis Overview

The Arab Spring uprising in Libya began in February 2011 with unarmed protests by citizens dissatisfied with the regime of long-serving Muammar Qaddafi. Protests quickly escalated when Qaddafi's security forces responded with deadly force. The result was a fast-growing internal conflict with mass atrocities committed by a state against its citizens. The United Nations (UN) and other international actors called for an end to the violence. France and the United Kingdom (UK) advocated military action. The Arab League supported a no-fly zone (Arab_League 2011). Yet, the United States (US) was reluctant to intervene. When France and the United Kingdom proposed a draft no-fly zone resolution to the UN Security Council (UNSC), the United States needed to decide on its own course of action: support the resolution, propose another option, or let France and the United Kingdom go it alone (Interview 2018). At the highest levels within the US administration, including President Barack Obama, there was opposition to intervention (Interview 2018). With ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and without clear US national interests at stake, intervention in Libya was a risk.

The turning point came on 15 March 2011 when, prompted by the France-UK proposed UNSC resolution, the debate inside the Obama administration shifted from the efficacy of a no-fly zone to developing a strategy that could actually protect civilians on the ground (Interview 2018). Obama would not participate in a "no-fly zone that won't achieve our objectives" of stopping atrocities (Obama 2020, 657). Obama recollected that "Either we do this right or stop pretending about saving Benghazi just to make ourselves feel better" (Obama 2020, 658). Now the pro-intervention position advocated by UN Ambassador Susan Rice and National Security Council

(NSC) staffer Samantha Power became the impetus behind the US push for intervention both at the United Nations and within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Interview 2018). At the core of the shift was Obama's position that intervention was the right thing to do and allowing other countries to take a leading role in conducting the military intervention was the way forward (Obama 2014). Rice went to the Security Council to negotiate a resolution with the expanded mandate. With US advocacy for military intervention, regional approval, and agreement of France and the United Kingdom it took just two days for the Security Council to approve Resolution 1973 that served as the legal justification for other countries to add their support for the intervention (UNSC 2011d). With attempts at mediation underway and no prospects of resolution, the many sides of the conflict showed no desire to end the fighting, and the Obama administration pressed forward with their strategy for intervention in Libya.

The vignette above is well covered in the memoirs of the actors and available primary source material (Gates 2014, Obama 2020, Power 2019, Sanger 2013). It illustrates one problem and one challenge: the problem of mass atrocities and the challenge of when to intervene to stop those atrocities. The vignette brings up several important elements of intervention: violence against civilians, internal administration debate among intervention advocates and critics, what gets on a crisis agenda, capacity to make a difference, a push for intervention, and leadership to intervene. It also begs other important questions: how does the relationship between conflict groups affect intervention; is there a level of violence that initiates an intervention; what influences other actors to support intervention; what perpetrator characteristics are likely to prompt intervention? As in the decision vignette above, this thesis examines themes of when conditions on the ground, in

national capitals, and in international organizations favour intervention; when actors push to intervene; and the roles of specific actors enabling intervention.

Although the problem of mass atrocities and specifically how to prevent them are important, the objective of this thesis is to investigate when to intervene with military force after prevention by other means has failed to stop atrocities. To some decisionmakers the use of diplomacy and force served as the right way to conduct the intervention in Libya (Daalder and Stavridis 2012); in contrast, to some academic and diplomatic critics, the decision to intervene, the motives of the intervention, and the turmoil it left behind called into question the legitimacy and success of the intervention (Hehir 2013, Kuperman 2013, Puri 2016). Although evaluating success is important (Diehl and Druckman 2010), this thesis focuses not on the success of the intervention, but rather remains focused on the challenge of when to intervene.

Chapter 1 serves as an introduction of the what and why of the challenge of deciding when to intervene to stop the problem of mass atrocities. Key concepts and their definitions are introduced—such as internal conflict, mass atrocities, and military intervention. This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section introduces the problem of mass atrocities and the practice of military intervention. The second section covers the challenge of when to intervene. The third section details the research question and hypotheses for the thesis. Then the fourth section covers thesis significance, aim, objective, and its contribution. The chapter concludes with a thesis roadmap outlining the logic of analysis and chapter contents. As a start, and then moving toward the Libya vignette above, we go back in time and begin to investigate the problem of mass atrocities and the practice of military intervention.

1.1 PROBLEM OF MASS ATROCITIES AND THE PRACTICE OF MILITARY INTERVENTION

Mass violence against civilians or mass atrocities, commonly defined as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, is a problem facing the world. The past is filled with humanitarian tragedies, such as Rwanda or Libya described above, where violence against civilian populations resulted in mass atrocities. The present too faces similar threats to vulnerable groups around the globe, such as in the on-going conflicts in Syria and Myanmar. With the past and the present as evidence, the future will unfortunately hold more of the same. Although prevention of deadly violence through conflict management and resolution measures with diplomatic, economic, institutional, and legal means are crucial to combat the threat of mass atrocities, what happens if prevention efforts fail or are expected to fail? A response to combatting mass atrocities is sometimes the use of military force, either alone or in conjunction with other measures, to intervene to prevent or stop the atrocities. Military force has been used in the past and will most likely be used again in the future.

1.1.1 Looking Back to Act in the Future

Looking back provides some insight on when to intervene in the future. The years following the end of the Cold War brought a decade of internal conflict, crises, and occasionally, intervention. These internal conflicts were "violent or potentially violent political disputes whose origins can be traced primarily to domestic rather than systemic factors, and where armed violence takes place or threatens to take place primarily within the borders of a single state" (Brown 1996, 1). Early in the decade, external intervention in internal conflicts in Northern Iraq (1991), Somalia (1992), Bosnia (1992-1995), Rwanda (1994), and Haiti (1994) served as precursors, with their successes and failures, affecting decisions for military operations later in the decade (Chinkin and Kaldor

2017, Damrosch 1993, Haass 1999). The intervention in Somalia, with "mission creep" from a successful humanitarian relief mission to failure in stopping the ongoing internal conflict, resulted in future decision-making characterized by a reluctance to intervene by the United States and United Nations (Seybolt 2008).

This reluctance of policymakers to intervene was evident in the failure to act during the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The non-intervention was not the failure of one organization or policymaker, but rather was the fault of "many hands" (Wallensteen, Melander, and Möller 2012, 280). In Rwanda, the genocide was "devised, planned, publicly broadcast, and ultimately conducted in view of a UN peacekeeping force" (Suhrke and Jones 2000, 238). Disregarding these early warning indicators indicated both a warning-response gap and reluctance to intervene. Some scholars question the viability of intervention and ask if the Rwandan genocide could have been prevented (Kuperman 2001, Stanton 2004). Kuperman assessed, "The genocide happened much faster, the West learned of it much later, and the requisite intervention would have been much slower than previously claimed" (2001, viii). He concludes that "a realistic intervention could not have prevented the genocide" (Kuperman 2001, viii). Stanton determines that ultimately the lack of response in Rwanda was a political failure (2004). In contrast, from a decisionmaker's perspective, and with the benefit of hindsight, US President Bill Clinton, deeply regrets the decision to not intervene in Rwanda and estimated that perhaps 300,000 lives (one third of the total mass atrocities) could have been saved had the United States intervened (2013). Although the genocide occurred almost thirty years ago, Rwanda clearly fits within the current definition of mass atrocities and serves as a valuable example to further inform on this study (Labonte 2012). Bosnia, importantly the massacre in Srebrenica in 1995, also affected future intervention decisions.

Hence, at the end of the decade, the decision to intervene in Kosovo was shaped by "the memory of Srebrenica reversing the 'Mogadishu effect' in Rwanda" (Evans 2008, 29). The impacts of these precursor events will be seen in the interventions to come.

1.1.2 Intervention, State Sovereignty, and the Responsibility to Protect

As a result of failed interventions in the 1990s, such as Somalia and Rwanda, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was established and developed the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) that evolved into the current doctrine for combating mass atrocities (ICISS 2001). Central to the ICISS was "that the debate about intervention for human protection purposes should focus not on 'the right to intervene' but on 'the responsibility to protect'" (ICISS 2001, 17). This changed the dialogue surrounding intervention of from intervening into another's sovereign territory to the responsibility of a state to protect its own citizens, and if "unwilling or unable" it is the responsibility of the international community to assist (ICISS 2001). The principle of R2P is simple: to protect vulnerable populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. R2P has been referred to as "a new norm for humanitarian protection, one that includes the possibility of military intervention" (Doyle 2016, 673). However, as Bellamy states, "it is the politics that surround it and the challenge of realizing its ambitions in practice that is so difficult" (2015a, 3). Hence, the ICISS Report and R2P's progress toward a norm did not completely answer the challenge of when to intervene with military force.

Further refinement of the R2P concept resulted in the United Nations General Assembly's 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD) (UNGA 2005). The detailed criteria for military intervention outlined in the ICISS report that contained a "just cause threshold and precautionary

principles" was modified in the WSOD to a more ambiguous practice assessed on a "case-by-case-basis" with no specific criteria other than the broad overarching concept of R2P (UNGA 2005, para 138-139). This resistance to articulating criteria for military intervention "comes partly from states that are opposed to the concept, but also from powerful states that support it but do not want the particulars debated in the transnational public sphere" (Johnstone 2011b, 80). Absence of criteria was a compromise thereby ensuring R2P was accepted by the Security Council P5 members (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States) that there not be an automatic implementation, nor incentive to go outside the Security Council as a decision-making body (Foot 2016). The absence of criteria facilitated agreement on R2P; however, it is a limitation to implementing R2P and its military intervention component in practice, hence the need for other alternatives to specific criteria in assessing when and if to intervene.

Although R2P is not the central feature of this thesis, the doctrine does inform on decision-making and subsequent cases of intervention. During the timeframe from the WSOD to the Libya vignette above (2005-2011), other situations utilized R2P-related text in UNSC resolutions to authorize UN missions for crises in Democratic Republic of the Congo (2006), Burundi (2006), Sudan (Darfur) (2006), as well as further R2P-related text supporting Protection of Civilian (POC) resolutions (2006 and 2009) (UNSC 2006a, c, b, 2009). These UNSC resolutions, the WSOD, nor R2P itself added additional law, rather they provided a new doctrine of envisioning intervention for civilian protection purposes (Chinkin and Kaldor 2017). The former UN Secretary General's Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect Jennifer Welsh notes, "On the face of it, we had—and have—all the law we need. What is still lacking, in far too many tragic cases, is the will and capacity to implement existing legal obligations" (Welsh 2016). However, legal

means and the law can only get actors so far in stopping atrocities, as "International law ends at the point where politics and coercion begins" (Orford 2003, 43). So, beyond R2P and international law there must be other ways to address the challenge of when to intervene.

1.2 THE CHALLENGE OF WHEN TO INTERVENE

The practice of intervening with military force for humanitarian reasons has long been an issue of debate amongst academics and policymakers. The question of should an intervention occur and specifically when to intervene has rarely been easy. This decision environment is complex and multifaceted (Mintz and DeRouen 2010). Interventions are "selective" and "there is no viable universal moral rule that can tell statespersons what is the right thing to do in response to particular circumstances" (Brown 2003, 47). Moreover, the deliberations to intervene are "bound up in a complex web of domestic, international, bureaucratic, and other factors" (Byman and Waxman 2002, 177). These actors, factors, and decisions range across all levels, from the local conflict to the national governments and domestic politics, to regional and international organizations. A former US State Department policymaker notes a crucial task is to "see if the decisions from above can be better connected with the realities below" to resolve the conflict situation (Moore 2007, 169). There are also time constraints, where decisions need to be made quickly, combined with the pressure of multiple issues on a decisionmakers' agenda requiring attention. Analysing this complexity is what "policy scientists should do systematically, carefully, and regularly what decision makers do intuitively, hastily, and proximately" to make decisions (Smoke and George 1973, 402).

Importantly, stopping atrocities through "military action is not an event. It is part of a diplomatic process leading up to and following conflict" (Phillips 2014, 194). It is an element of a broader overall strategy normally consisting of mediation and coercion before an intervention and sometimes nation building after the intervention. This process occurs at multiple levels, involving numerous conflict groups and various international actors, with sometimes uncertain information and potential for rapidly changing conflict situations and ongoing negotiations. This indicates conflict resolution processes and associated literature should be involved. It also points to a solution where conflict resolution and military intervention are integrated providing the potential for an improved framework for analysis and decision-making. The literature review in Chapter 2 investigates intervention concepts and decision frameworks to see if there is an alternative way to view the challenge of when to intervene. Although logical discovery through examination of the literature continues in the next chapter, the next three sections let the reader know where this thesis is headed stating the research question and hypotheses, setting out the significance, aim, objective, and contribution of the thesis, and concluding with a brief overview of each chapter.

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESES

As explored in Chapter 2, this study found two gaps in the current literature of (1) when to intervene; and (2) the role of middle powers. Although there is literature on whether to intervene, literature on when to intervene, specifically on intervention timing, is incomplete. Additionally, the middle powers, as actors in the international system has been explored; however, their role in when to intervene is underconceptualized and requires further investigation. The literature review also identifies a theory that has the potential to fill those gaps in our knowledge of intervention.

Ripeness theory (Zartman 1989, 2000) has long been used to explain when conflict groups enter into negotiations. Building on the theory, this research asks:

> ***What is the applicability of ripeness theory for understanding when to conduct a military intervention to prevent or stop mass atrocities?***

Broadly speaking, the research utilizes a ripeness-based approach that conducts a ripeness-focused analysis, both grounded in ripeness theory, to investigate the applicability of the theory from one context to another. The Oxford English Dictionary defines applicability as the "quality of being relevant or appropriate". Hence, applicability in the context of this study is what elements of ripeness theory are relevant or appropriate to military intervention. Additionally, what elements of the current ripeness theory are elastic and may evolve to serve in the context of military intervention. To investigate this question, as developed in Chapter 3, the thesis hypothesizes three common favouring conditions (1) configuration of stalemate, (2) precipitating violence, and (3) power push. The first hypothesizes that the condition of stalemate for intervention is a different configuration than that predicted for the initiation of negotiation or mediation in ripeness theory. The second hypothesizes the existence of precipitating violence, escalating violence that may prompt external actors to intervene. The third hypothesizes an external actor's push to intervene. The thesis also searches for novel favouring conditions throughout the analysis to better understand when to intervene to stop mass atrocities.

1.4 THESIS SIGNIFICANCE, AIM, OBJECTIVE, AND CONTRIBUTION

Sometimes viewing a problem through another lens provides a different perspective and yields an alternative solution. This thesis investigates a problem, lens, and solution: mass atrocities, an established theory used in a different context, and intervention. The significance of this thesis is

viewing the problem of mass atrocities through an alternative lens to focus on intervention. These optics guide the aim of this thesis to conduct a bounded piece of research, done well, that answers the research question and contributes to scholarship. These considerations working together move the investigation toward the objective of determining when to intervene with military force after prevention by other means has failed to stop atrocities. This work uses a theory with explanatory power in one context and applies it to another context with the goal to better understand when to intervene. As revealed in the following chapters, the result of this study adds to the growing body of scholarship that addresses the practice of combating mass atrocities, in this case the challenge of when to employ military force. As this is an evolution, with new concepts, applied in a different context, it is a plausibility probe (George and Bennett 2005, 75). Hence my expectation is to build on existing theory in the direction of intervention. Viewing the intervention cases through a different lens contributes to scholarship by offering the potential of linking conflict resolution and military intervention decision-making, but also a process of thinking through intervention that connects the past with the future and what to do now to better answer the challenge of when to intervene.

1.5 THESIS OVERVIEW

Chapter 2 provides a literature review that examines three categories of literature: military intervention concepts, intervention decision models and frameworks, and intervention actors. The result identifies two gaps in the current literature: (1) when to intervene, specifically intervention timing, and (2) the role of middle powers in when to intervene.

Chapter 3 develops the theoretical and analytical framework, as well as methodology for the thesis. Key concepts and their definitions are detailed—such as ripeness theory, ripe moment, and decision moment. To address the gaps identified in Chapter 2, traditional ripeness theory serves as a theoretical foundation and evolves for use in military intervention along four dimensions: stalemate, opportunity, way out, and leaders. These dimensions are inherent in Zartman's theory, with Haass providing additional insights on the leader's role in ripeness (Haass 1990). Building on Zartman's ripe moment when conditions are ripe to negotiate, the chapter proposes a new evolved concept called the decision moment that occurs when conditions are ripe to intervene. The literature and initial case study analysis indicates there are common intervention characteristics: relationships between escalation, stalemate, and intervention; a violence threshold or trigger for intervention; and external actor agency influencing the decision to intervene. Based on this, as described above, Chapter 3 hypothesizes the existence of three common favouring conditions of the decision moment: configuration of stalemate, precipitating violence, and power push. The chapter also covers the structured, focused comparison and process tracing methods, case selection, case and actor background, data collection and sources, case study format, and describes the analytical framework for comparison of the cases and the middle powers used in Chapter 7.

Chapter 4-6 contain the case study analyses and resulting favouring conditions. Each chapter begins with a periodized case summary, then examines the roles of key actors, and applies ripeness theory to arrive at the favouring conditions of the decision moment. The chapters all utilize a standardized periodization to facilitate comparison later in Chapter 7. The key actors section identifies both key major and middle power actors, as well as organizations or groupings of powers

that influenced the decision moment to intervene. The analysis searches for novel favouring conditions in the four dimensions of ripeness, as well as evidence of the three common favouring conditions.

Chapter 7 brings the results of the case studies together and selects one favouring condition, the power push, and one category of actors, the middle powers, for deeper analysis. The goals of the chapter are to focus on the applicability of ripeness theory in addressing the gap in determining when to intervene, specifically the influence of the power push, as well as further investigating middle powers and the gap in understanding their roles in when to intervene. The chapter begins by comparing ripeness dimensions across all the case studies, in search of analytically significant similarities and differences among the cases. The analysis across all the cases finds the decision moment for military intervention to stop atrocities can occur with a range of favouring conditions: with partial or no stalemate, various thresholds of precipitating violence, adherence to international law or not, and leaders that are known, new, or erratic, either directing or just accepting, the perpetration of atrocities. The chapter then focuses on a deeper analysis comparing similarities and differences of the power push amongst the three cases.

The remaining sections of the chapter takes the power push analysis one step further and investigates a specific category of actors, the middle powers. The chapter examines the middle-power roles of Canada, Germany, Qatar, Sweden, and the United Arab Emirates, as well as continues the analysis of Australia begun in Chapter 5. The key aspect of these sections is investigating middle power dynamics with major powers and organizations in intervention decisions. The analysis across all the cases finds the power dynamics appear not just as a middle

power push, but in two other roles: confirming and restraining. Hence, middle powers push, such as influencing the major powers or promoting intervention themselves. Middle powers also function to confirm support for key actors' intended policy in a region. Finally, middle powers serve a restraining function when they question an intervention opportunity or are reluctant to intervene.

Chapter 8 concludes the thesis with answers to the research question and assesses the hypotheses, major findings on the applicability of ripeness theory in when to intervene and roles of the middle powers, and a discussion of future research opportunities arising from this analysis.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Building on the introduction in Chapter 1, this chapter provides a literature review to explore existing sources and solutions to the problem of mass atrocities and the challenge of when to intervene. A key task in the beginning this project was to situate my experience and academic knowledge within the broader literature of military intervention. That so, curiosity about the various facets of the topic motivated me to read broadly on the what, why, how, when, and who of intervention. Importantly, it also provided time to the reflect on a specific category of the use of military force, namely intervention to stop mass atrocities. During this exploration, the what, why, and how of intervening to stop mass atrocities seemed well developed in the literature, such as what (Bellamy 2015a), why (Doyle 2015), and how (Sewall, Raymond, and Chin 2010) of intervention; however, as my investigation continued, the timing of when to intervene and the who, specifically the roles of certain actors in the intervention, appeared incomplete and underconceptualized. Hence, the review conducts analysis and synthesis to show where a gap exists in the literature and potential areas to address the gap. One further note on the gap, although discovered late in writing up while examining recent literature in the field, a RAND study using a different approach to timing, and published well after this study was underway, notes "the body of evidence surrounding the timing question is limited" (Frederick et al. 2021, 25). This concurs with my analysis that a gap exists.

The literature of military intervention is situated at the nexus of International Relations, within sub-disciplines of decision making, foreign policy analysis, and security studies, and International Law covering the use of force; hence, military intervention is multidisciplinary by nature.

Moreover, as military intervention as viewed in this thesis is part of a broader process to manage and resolve conflict, this literature review investigates concepts, models, frameworks, and actors to see if there is an alternative way to view the challenge of when to intervene and logically makes its way to the intersection of the conflict resolution literature and military intervention literature where linkages may yield potential for an improved framework for analysis and decision making. The review examines three categories of literature: military intervention concepts, intervention decision models and frameworks, and intervention actors. The literature review first provides an analysis of military intervention concepts and an examination of factors in the decision environment. The second section is a review of intervention decision models and frameworks, including existing intervention criteria, as well as interdisciplinary decision models from the fields of public policy and conflict resolution that may have application to intervention decision-making. Third, intervention actors are identified and defined to further investigate their roles later in the thesis. There is rationale for selecting these three categories. The rational for reviewing the first category is the analysis requires a grounding in the concepts of military intervention to combat the problem of mass atrocities, including an understanding of factors in the decision environment. The decision environment is where the decisions are made, as well as factors affecting choice (Mintz and DeRouen 2010). The rationale of the second category is surveying existing models and frameworks, specifically those with the potential to bridge to the decision and conflict environments. The term conflict environment describes where conflict is ongoing and associated contextual characteristics. For the third category, the rationale is to cover external actors that take action in the decision environment that intend to shape the conflict environment. The chapter concludes by identifying the focus areas targeted in this thesis.

2.1 MILITARY INTERVENTION CONCEPTS

Military intervention is one of the tools, alongside preventive diplomacy, coercion, and conflict resolution, to prevent or stop mass atrocities. Intervention "into the jurisdiction of a state by outside forces for humanitarian purposes" may be justified in some situations to stop genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity when a state is unable or unwilling to protect its own population (Scheid 2014, 3). Some call this action simply intervention (Stewart and Knaus 2011), while others call it collective intervention (Damrosch 1993), armed humanitarian intervention (Scheid 2014), foreign military intervention (Levite, Jentleson, and Berman 1992), humanitarian intervention (Chesterman 2001, Holzgrefe and Keohane 2003, Wheeler 2000), humanitarian military intervention (Seybolt 2008), preventive humanitarian intervention (Paris 2014), third-party intervention (Kydd and Straus 2013), or military intervention (Bellamy 2008, Daalder 1996, Doyle 2016). Use of the terminology military intervention in this study is intended to show the focus on military force and is appropriate for use in describing instances of intervention both before the development of R2P, where the term humanitarian intervention was prevalent, and after.

Scholarship and deliberations over military intervention begins well before the 1990's discussed in Chapter 1, reaching back centuries to classical thinkers, such as Hugo Grotius, Immanuel Kant, and John Stuart Mill, across a broad range of intervention themes (Klose 2016, Recchia and Welsh 2013). Understanding and justification of the use of military force has been advanced by Just War theory and a better grasp of the context of new wars (Kaldor 2012, Walzer 1977). Some scholars advocate intervention as early as possible to save lives (Pattison 2012), while others recommend using military force only as a last resort (Walzer 1977). This window of early-as-possible to last-

resort begins to set a range of when to intervene. Another scholar, however, would have the fighting go beyond the last resort, in other words to "give war a chance" and let the conflict progress to where the groups are exhausted or victory achieved by one side (Luttwak 1999). These and many other considerations weigh in intervention decisions.

Although military intervention is an important measure, there are many tools to prevent and stop mass atrocities: peacekeeping missions, multidimensional peacebuilding missions; preventive diplomacy, sometimes creating special envoys or representatives; and sanctions, such as "arms embargoes and individually targeted sanctions" (Wallensteen, Melander, and Möller 2012, 280). They may be used alone or in combination with other tools to combat atrocities. Some research shows that combined actions where "the best hope for sanctions to shorten the duration of civil conflicts is if they are used as part of a comprehensive international response that includes institutional sanctions and military interventions" (Lektzian and Regan 2016, 554). Typically, these other tools are used before military intervention and the military intervention later in the crisis when the non-military tools appear to not be providing the desired results.

This multiple-action approach to preventing and stopping mass atrocities is utilized by R2P's three-pillar framework of protection. These three pillars can be referred to as the "responsibility norm", the "support norm", and the "reaction norm" (Hofmann 2015). Pillar One "is the responsibility of individual states to protect their own populations" from mass atrocities (Welsh 2014, 2). Pillar Two asserts the need for the international community to assist states in fulfilling their responsibility, such as "encouraging states to meet their legal obligations, helping them to build capacity for the prevention of these crimes, or providing extra protection capacity in times

of crisis" (Welsh 2014, 2). Pillar Three identifies that when a state is unwilling or unable to protect its population, "UN Member States have a residual responsibility to respond collectively, in a 'timely and decisive manner' using the full range of political, economic, and military tools" (Welsh 2014, 2, UNGA 2005). This variety of tools is essential, as "An R2P without access to the full range of measures available to the UN Security Council is an R2P incapable of marshalling 'timely and decisive' action to protect populations when, as they often are, peaceful means are inadequate and 'national authorities ... manifestly failing to protect their populations'" (Bellamy 2022a). This framework of protection informs on this study because Pillar One, Two, and non-military Pillar Three actions may affect the timing of using military tools in Pillar Three. For example, the effectiveness of Pillar Three sanctions may affect the likelihood to use military force in Pillar Three.

A focus on military intervention is evident in one of the seminal texts on R2P, Gareth Evans' *"The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All"* (2008). Evans, along with Mohamed Sahnoun, co-led the ICISS that developed the concept of R2P. This text informs on the research topic by discussing relevant decision criteria applicable to military interventions that led to R2P. The criteria can help to understand timing and sequencing applied to military intervention and R2P. He continues to be a staunch advocate and authored a chapter in *The Oxford Handbook for the Responsibility to Protect* titled *"R2P: The Next Ten Years"* (Evans 2016). He reminds us that although the preference for resolving conflict is non-military means, "the reality is that in some R2P situations—classically Rwanda—only coercive military force would have halted the atrocities" (Evans 2016).

There are critics of military intervention used to combat mass atrocities. A counterargument to intervention is that even the option of a military response to mass atrocities affects the practice of prevention and limits the "preventive imagination" of responses to mass atrocities (Conley-Zilkic 2016, 32). The effectiveness of military intervention due to their response times and logistics required to deploy a military force, as well as moral hazard of conflict groups being more aggressive when they have the protection of an intervening force, are also noted by a critic (Kuperman 2001). Bellamy notes a variety of other concerns, including the limits of criteria, with the problem of military intervention (2008). Some scholars find that "the role of international intervention is usually secondary to, or, at least, indirectly linked to, the more significant influence of national and local factors on those endings" (Smith and Jarvis 2017, 7). Those cautions are well noted and highlight some of the many challenges of military intervention, as well as the promise that an improved framework may provide a better understanding of military interventions to combat mass atrocities.

There are other factors in determining when to intervene to stop mass atrocities, beyond the concerns mentioned above. The remainder of the section explores additional thematic concepts relevant to the study, such as legitimacy, legality, domestic support, international support, and regional support, as well as effects of the "shadow of the future" and the past. We begin with legitimacy and its relationship to military intervention and decision making. Legitimacy can be addressed at several levels: the legitimacy of the UN, the legitimacy of military intervention as a principle, and application of military intervention to individual cases. The advent of R2P has allowed some to refer to it as, "a newly legitimate moral minimum of global order" (Doyle 2016, 673). R2P draws on its legitimacy from a number of sources. Newman notes that, "Multilateral

action on R2P…is inherently legitimate because it is conducted through established channels, the most important of which is the UN" (2015, 125). Legitimacy can be viewed as both "input legitimacy" and "output legitimacy" (Newman 2015, 136-138). Recchia examines multilateral approval for humanitarian intervention and finds that although input legitimacy, i.e. the way decisions for military intervention are made in multilateral organizations, is cumbersome, the output legitimacy of a beneficial result far outweighs the challenges of multilateral decision-making; hence, he argues humanitarian intervention should always require approval from the UNSC or regional body (2017). Output legitimacy may be seen as a potential indicator of when to intervene.

In assessing intervention legitimacy Doyle uses John Stuart Mill's classic 1859 text *"A Few Words on Non-Intervention"* to argue which cases non-intervention should be overridden such as "when other moral considerations overbalance non-intervention" (such as in Rwanda, cases of R2P Doctrine, and Libya) or disregarded as in some cases of self-determination (such as East Timor and Kosovo) (2015, 17). To some scholars since the intervention in Kosovo (1999) did not obtain Security Council approval it failed "the test of multilateral legitimacy" (Newman 2015, 128). Some view legality to be inherently part of legitimacy (Pattison 2012, 30). To others they can be separate concepts, such as the Independent International Commission on Kosovo's (IICK) interpretation where the NATO intervention in Kosovo was "illegal but legitimate" (IICK 2000). Interventions are legal if approved by the Security Council under Chapter VII Article 39 or if member states act in self-defence in accordance with Article 51 (Zifcak 2010). However, "the power of the interpretive community to shape SC deliberation and action" may also affect outcomes (Johnstone 2011b, 64). So it is just not the legality or illegality of an action, but the

arguments or "power of deliberation" within the Security Council that can possibly shape the decision to intervene (Johnstone 2011b). In the absence of criteria, other tools are needed to identify on a case-by-case basis when military intervention is warranted.

Military intervention decisions are affected by concerns of what a decision now will do to actions planned or undertaken in the future. This is called the "shadow of the future" that affects future cooperation (Axelrod 2006) and the precedents decisions now may set, as well as the chance of success of the intervention (Regan 2000, 135-136). Actors are concerned that decisions they make now may affect their flexibility on actions they may or may not want to take in the future. There is also a "feedback cycle" where military interventions and operations "affect future political pressures that in turn affects military operations" (Byman and Waxman 2002, 131). In considering the outcome of the conflict Toft finds that military victories in civil wars "result in a higher likelihood of enduring peace" (2010, 13-14).

The past influences the way decisionmakers look at interventions of the future. Jervis (1976) provides insights how decisionmakers learn from history and Neustadt & May (1986) provide practical techniques on the uses of history for improving decision making. The past's influence can be seen in the Clinton Administration where failures in Somalia led to the reluctance to engage in Rwanda and then influenced later interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo (Haass 2003). This is also evident in the outcome of the intervention in Libya and the influence it had on reluctance to intervene in Syria. Bellamy looks further at the termination of state-perpetrated mass killings (2015b). The recent past is also important when one looks at the effectiveness of other actions to

combat mass atrocities (diplomacy, sanctions, etc.) and may be an indicator of likelihood for intervention in the future.

The intervention will need to be sustained over the long term and not necessarily with the optimistic view of the outcome necessary to build initial political will for the intervention. There are many examples of interventions planned for the best-case scenario, where it turned out to be the worst case, such as Iraq (2003). The ICISS Report saw the need for this sustainment and highlights the "responsibility to rebuild" (ICISS 2001). This responsibility to rebuild includes not only infrastructure, but also institutions and building the peace (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). This planning for sustainment needs to begin prior to the intervention with commitments for long-term donor support, a strategy, and effective means for employing forces supporting the intervention (Bellamy 2008). Hence this support could be a valuable indicator of when to intervene and the potential success of the intervention. Linked as well to sustainment is the domestic support for the intervention over the duration of the mission. Domestic political support for the intervention in countries in providing military forces and other support is needed. Even if an intervention is the right thing to do it is hard to accomplish politically if the country's leadership has no or limited domestic political support. This is a function of the domestic population, the media or "CNN effect," as well as efforts of other "intervention entrepreneurs" (Henke 2017).

Broader international support appears to have an impact on likelihood of an intervention, such as when a major power champions a cause: "When no intervention occurs, in spite of a genuine humanitarian emergency, it is often because no major power is making a determined push for intervention (and for multilateral approval) to begin with" (Recchia 2017, 71). Hence, the presence

of a push from a major power actor is a potential factor of when to intervene. More specifically, some see the United States role as a "controller" as important as their "views are typically consulted before policy decisions are taken because of their legitimacy, formal authority, or resources" (Labonte 2012, 14). Hence, "the international community of states will not be persuaded to take robust action if Washington is not persuaded" (Labonte 2012, 14). The reality and perceptions of the United States role in world affairs affects this analysis.

Some interventions have a strong regional component that links to regional organizations, regional issues, and regional threats. As an example of the regional component, shared perceptions of "threats to social order led core ASEAN states to support and participate in intervention in East Timor in 1999 to contain unrest in Indonesia" (Jones 2010, 484). Other examples of regional support are neighbouring countries contributing troops to crisis interventions, such as NATO in the Balkans and the African Union (AU) and sub-regional forces in Africa. This highlights the importance of regional support and may be an indicator of when to intervene. Many of these concepts and considerations integrate and build to various intervention models and frameworks discussed in the next section.

2.2 INTERVENTION MODELS AND FRAMEWORKS

Models and frameworks for understanding military intervention in crises are numerous. Regan proposes a "rational, utility-maximizing decision-making process" in his decision-theoretic model of when foreign powers intervene in civil wars (2000, 39). He looks at "identifying the conditions under which outside intervention into internal conflicts are likely to be successful" (Regan 2000, 133). Grigoryan models intervention as a "game of three-actor, finite horizon, incomplete

information bargaining" (2010, 1149). His analysis show that "if they have to be carried out, interventions must be overwhelming and swift to minimize the risks and consequences of escalation" (Grigoryan 2010, 166). Kydd and Straus develop a quantitative model for third-party intervention to prevent atrocities (2013). Their analysis cautions that a "credible antiatrocities regime strengthens weak actors and lowers the costs of war, which under certain conditions may make war and atrocities more likely" (Kydd and Straus 2013, 683). However, they also note that these negative effects can be overcome "by remaining neutral, by developing a multidimensional intervention repertoire, and by remaining sensitive to the balance of power, international actors can decrease the expected level of atrocities over time" (Kydd and Straus 2013, 683). Binder provides an UNSC-focused model that utilizes fuzzy-set logic to assess the selectivity of Security Council intervention in humanitarian crises since the end of the Cold War (2015, 2017). His research provides insights into multi-lateral decision-making on the Security Council. Walling posits a theory of causal stories where Security Council discourses "compete against alternatives until one becomes predominant" (2013, 22). Henke examines the role of "intervention entrepreneurs" in military intervention decisions (2017). Wolff looks at the relationship between intervention invitations and legitimacy (2018). He finds three invitation types—true, collaborative, and rigged—with true invitations conferring the highest level of legitimacy (Wolff 2018, 52). All these models are useful in further understanding military intervention and can potentially inform theoretically into segments of the framework used in this study.

As discussed in Chapter 1, intervention with R2P is on a case-by-case basis, without a standardized criteria. However, Just War doctrine, humanitarian intervention, and ICISS, among others, all have associated criteria that may be useful if viewed in the proper context. The outcome of this

study is not to determine criterion for intervention; however, when to intervene may exist in and amongst these criteria. Existing criteria are also a place to continue to extract the timing of the when from the whether to intervene. For example, in his typical op-ed style, Thomas Friedman queries the US decision to support intervention in East Timor, "What to do? What criteria do we use when deciding whether to dispatch forces to small, distant corners where some outrage is being committed? I would start with the following four questions: (1) Is there some strategic rationale for U.S. involvement; (2) Can we make a reasonable difference at a reasonable cost; (3) Can we make a sustainable difference at a reasonable cost; (4) Can we walk and chew gum at the same time?" (Friedman 1999). Although the first three questions relate to interests, costs, and sustainment, it is really the offhand last question that indirectly relates to timing and can the United States intervene now when faced with other competing interests, priorities, and demands on military forces. A US diplomat adds several other considerations to Friedman's list in follow-up: How bad are the atrocities and how capable are we to end them, among others (Dinger 2000). An analysis of other existing criteria such as UK Prime Minister Blair's Chicago speech (Freedman 2017), the Framework for a Principled Humanitarian Intervention (IICK 2000), the ICISS criteria regarding R2P (ICISS 2001), A Pragmatic Standard of Humanitarian Intervention (Pape 2012), and RAND studies (Davis 2011), all provide insights on when to intervene.

Beyond military intervention there are other decision models and frameworks that exist within the interdisciplinary decision making, public policy, and conflict resolution literature. A review of other available decision models and frameworks is essential to understanding and developing a theoretical framework for this study. For example, *"Essence of Decision,"* develops three conceptual models to explain or predict behaviour: Rational Actor Model (RAM or Model I),

Organizational Behaviour Model (Model II), Governmental Politics Model (Model III) (Allison and Zelikow 1999). They note it is "essential to have at hand one or more simple but competitive conceptual frameworks to help remind" us "of the distortions and limitations of whatever conceptual framework one employs" (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 8). Other models and frameworks are available in the public policy discipline (Cairney 2012), such as multiple streams analysis (Kingdon 1984). In the discipline of foreign policy analysis, windows of opportunity is a useful model (Doeser and Eidenfalk 2013). In the discipline of conflict resolution there are many useful models: missed opportunities (Zartman 2005b); opportunities missed, opportunities seized (Jentleson 2000); ripeness theory (Zartman 2000); and turning points (Druckman 2001). All these models and frameworks potentially provide useful ways of looking at the problem of intervening with military force to prevent or stop mass atrocities. However, the frameworks are not complete.

2.2.1 A Deeper Look at Conflict Resolution and Ripeness Theory

As discussed in Chapter 1, intervention is an event inside a larger diplomatic or conflict resolution process (Phillips 2014, 194); hence, the search for a solution that acts as a bridge between conflict resolution and intervention. That prompts a search for theories or conceptual models within the conflict resolution literature that specifically address timing or when to conduct a specific conflict resolution measure. One model that provides promise is ripeness theory. Ripeness has been successfully used in negotiation and conflict resolution as a concept identifying when groups decide to begin to negotiate. The American scholar and ripeness proponent I. William Zartman notes that ripeness "does not promise success but only a situation ripe to be activated for the beginning of negotiations" (2015, 205). In these "ripe moments" groups "grab on to proposals that usually have been in the air for a long time and that only now appear attractive" (Zartman

2001, 1). One of the key components in the traditional use of ripeness to identify ripe moments is the mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) "when the parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them (although not necessarily in equal degrees or for the same reasons), they seek a way out" (Zartman 2001, 228). There may also be ripe moments for the possibility of military intervention to prevent or stop mass atrocities. Having been exposed to ripeness in various coursework and eventually crafting a MA thesis utilizing the theory (Nelson 2012), I was intrigued by the possibility of its use in bridging conflict resolution and military intervention to investigate when to intervene. Moreover, the use of an established theory in a different context held promise as a useful addition to the academic literature.

Zartman and Richard Haass, both renowned scholars and experienced practitioners, provide a theoretical and practitioner foundation for this analysis. Zartman's *"Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond,"* is one of many texts where he advanced ripeness theory (2001). His recent works address understanding and responding to genocide (Zartman and Anstey 2012, Zartman 2013), as well as applying R2P within the framework of conflict management and conflict resolution (Zartman 2015). Haass in *"Ripeness and Settlement of International Disputes"* (1988) and *"Conflicts Unending"* (1990) applies ripeness to a number of conflicts. In his text "*Intervention"* Haass discusses whether to intervene and notes "the question of whether to use force can never be divorced from the question of how to use it effectively. If there is no satisfactory answer to the latter question, there can be no commitment to the former" (1999, 68). He also provides both guidance and a caution on ripeness, "Obviously, determinations of ripeness are in and of themselves an exercise of judgment. Each component requires separate assessment. There

is no available formula or equation, but only the careful marshalling of evidence…" (Haass 2003, 254). Research by Clarke and Paul develops a master narrative that includes ripeness as part of their framework for resolving insurgencies through negotiated settlement (2014). The ripeness debate and evolution of the theory continues to this day (Iji and Vukovic 2023). These texts together lay the groundwork of using a ripeness methodology as a lens to view a problem.

Ripeness has been a successful concept and analysis tool in conflict resolution that may provide promise in the similar context of military intervention. Zartman writes extensively on the use of ripeness theory for understanding conflict resolution efforts in Angola (1988), El Salvador (1989), and the former Yugoslavia (1995) (2001). He notes evidence of objective and subjective signs of ripeness and stalemate. Examples of objective signs include "when parties lack the capacity and will to take measures to escalate" such as with Israel and Hamas (2001 and 2012), when losses "rise beyond expectations and anticipated gains" as in Namibia (1986) and South Africa (1990), when "contextual conditions impose hardships on parties" as in Indonesia (2005) and Mozambique (1990), and when "allies of the parties tire of the conflict" as in Northern Ireland (1990s) (Zartman 2015, 133). A subjective sign of ripeness is when official statements acknowledge a stalemate as in Afghanistan (2012) or begin to reduce troops (Zartman 2015, 134). These characteristics can be used as evidence of objective and subjective signs of ripeness for military intervention.

Central to this approach is rearticulating ripeness from its traditional sense in negotiation and conflict resolution to the use of ripeness theory specifically for military intervention to prevent and combat mass atrocities. Besides the ripeness of deliberations inside multilateral organizations considering intervening and within governments that are part of those organizations, ripeness can

also be assessed for the conflict itself. The relationship between the groups in conflict is an element of ripeness for conflict resolution and may also be an indicator of the vulnerability to genocide occurring in the conflict. Indicators and early warning that "leaders and elites are adopting political strategies conducive to conflict" (Gowan 2016) may help to address the "warning-response gap" that is present in many conflict responses (George and Holl 2000, 29-30). Hence, the ripeness of the conflict may be an indicator of both potential for conflict resolution and likelihood of an atrocity occurring. A ripeness framework may act as an early warning indicator of mass atrocities and also help policymakers choose actions to prevent deadly conflict and if and when to intervene.

How may the traditional use of ripeness apply to mass atrocities? One element uses stalemate or MHS from the traditional use of ripeness as its theoretical basis where neither party perceives it can win and they seek other alternatives (Zartman 2001, 228). It is in this space near the stalemate that gives rise to the possibility of a mass atrocity. Groups may proceed from the stalemate to resolving the conflict through negotiation or unfortunately escalating the violence via a mass atrocity act (Donohue 2012). A path or process to mass atrocity violence is required, such as the Identity Trap proposed by Donohue (2012) or theories of genocide within the broader field of political violence surveyed by Straus (2012), or Stanton's view of the eight stages of genocide: classification, symbolization, dehumanization, organization, polarization, preparation, extermination, and denial (2004). These can all be helpful in understanding the process leading to mass atrocities. Leaders with visions of atrocities as a way of winning and the followers that will execute the violence are necessary as well. This combination of unstable stalemate, a process, leadership with followers, and visions of mass atrocities at the end may be a situation ripe for atrocities.

As ripeness has traditionally involved the perceptions and intentions of the parties in conflict, ripeness may in practice better link the situation on the ground to the policymakers' decision process, thereby helping the policymakers to better understand the local dynamics of the conflict. Also, a multi-faceted ripeness framework may help policymakers better understand the complex nature of military intervention. In a survey of 234 national security policymakers Avey and Desch found that "the thing policymakers most want from scholars are frameworks for making sense of the world they have to operate in" (2014, 244). A better understanding garnered through the application of ripeness theory may help make better sense of the world policymakers operate in and lead to better decisions and therefore potentially better outcomes.

However, there are critiques of ripeness theory. Although noted for being "parsimonious, elegant, and grounded in case material" there are claims of deficiencies in the theory (Coleman et al. 2008, 5). Coleman et al investigates these limitations and critiques from the field, summarizing that ripeness is (1) "a passive metaphor" that underemphasizes the nature of active actor involvement; (2) uses "rational cost-benefit assumptions" that excludes other factors; (3) "a state, not a variable" limiting its ability to explain conditions on the ground; (4) "assumes joint states" that affect groups in the conflict; (5) "limited to the individual level" i.e. senior leaders, rather than the roles played by a broader group of actors; and (6) "limited to phases of entry" such as beginning negotiations (2008, 5-7). Some of these concerns are addressed by readiness theory, as a psychological-based derivative of Zartman's theory; however, readiness theory still has ripeness at its core (Pruitt 2005). Another critique of ripeness theory is its lack of predictive capability (O'Kane 2006). Aware of these concerns, ripeness theory provides a solid foundation for the investigation.

As a primer for the development of the theoretical and analytical framework in Chapter 3, some of the basics of traditional ripeness theory are provided here. Zartman's "Push and Pull Factors" (2006) are described first and then Haass' "Four Essentials of Ripeness" (1990). Zartman's Push and the Pull Factors are the MHS, a Way Out, and a Mutually Enticing Opportunity (Zartman 2006, 144-145). First is the MHS: "When parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful for both of them, they seek an alternative policy or a bi-/multilateral way out of the pain and hence out of the conflict or problem." Next is the Way Out (WO): "Parties have to be able to sense that a negotiated solution is possible for the searching and that the other party shares that sense and willingness to search too." Finally, a Mutually Enticing Opportunity (MEO) is a "…vehicle for an agreement, a formula for a settlement, and a prospect of reconciliation that the negotiating parties design during negotiations." One way to visualize this approach is to think of ripeness as a path with the both parties in conflict and unable to escalate to victory, a MHS, at the beginning of the journey, but able to make their way down the ripeness path—the WO—to a solution or MEO. Along the path there may also be additional MEO's that pull or motivate the parties in moving down the path to a solution.

Haass articulates Four Essentials of Ripeness (1990, 27-29): (1) "Parties must conclude that their absence of an agreement does not work in their favor, and that they will be worse off in absolute terms, in relative terms, or both"; (2) "…even if political leaders conclude that an accord is desirable, they must also be able to agree to it"; (3) "…there must be sufficient compromise on both sides to allow leaders to persuade their colleagues and citizens that the national interest was protected"; (4) "…there must be a mutually acceptable approach or process."

2.3 INTERVENTION ACTORS

With intervention as the focus and ripeness as the theory, a range of external actors can be involved in the decision to intervene. These include major powers, the middle powers, and/or the small powers, as well as international and regional organizations, plus smaller groupings of powers such as core or contact groups focused on a specific task. Interventions can be analyzed from the perspectives of any of these actors. An analysis from the perspective of the major powers is essential, as they are the most powerful actors in the international system. The term major power, as well as great power or in some cases superpower, categorize the most powerful states in the international hierarchy (Buzan 2018). The major powers typically consist of the permanent members of the Security Council or P5: China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States (Hurd 2018). This thesis utilizes this P5 group as its definition of major powers. Other actors, such as Brazil, India, and Germany, are sometimes included in this major power group (Karns and Mingst 2010). There have been investigations into the roles of major, middle, and small powers in foreign policy (Cooper 1997, Long 2022). Moreover, intervention from the viewpoint of the major powers has been widely investigated (Haass 1999, Houghton 2013); however, those actors below the major powers, less so (Chalk et al. 2010).

The middle-ranking powers or middle powers role in the intervention decision deserves attention. One rationale for investigating middle powers is to look "at alternative sources of agency in order to more fully capture the evolving complexity in global affairs" (Cooper 1997, 1). Moreover, "an analysis of the conduct of the middle-ranking powers may not only illuminate the international system from an unfamiliar angle but may also present some of its processes in a perspective truer than those frequently associated with either traditional or more novel approaches" (Holbraad 1984,

3-4). Hence, this middle power analysis may add additional insights on when to intervene. For example, traditional middle powers, such as Australia, Canada, Norway, and Sweden, are typically known for their behavior as mediators, bridge-builders, and innovators (Struye_de_Swieland 2019). As the decision to intervene is normally set in the context of broader ongoing mediation, looking at actors that are known for their niche skills of mediation may provide additional insights on the applicability of ripeness theory to intervention.

Not only are the middle powers different from the major powers, but there are also differences within the middle power category, hence there is difficulty agreeing on a standard definition what constitutes a middle power. In spite of no agreed upon definition, Holbraad provides a suitable provisional definition as "states that are weaker than the great powers in the system but significantly stronger than the minor powers and small states with which they normally interact" (Holbraad 1984, 4). Thus, building from this starting point, the definition and selection criteria utilized in this thesis is middle powers are actors involved in the intervention decision that are weaker than the major powers yet more influential than the minor powers and small states involved in the intervention. Although key actors are identified in the case study process, the focus of this thesis is not determining what constitutes a middle power in terms of material or structural characteristics, as there are other studies that investigate this feature. Rather, the thesis utilizes analysis from other research to identify the middle powers. The thesis utilized the analysis by David Cooper to identify middle powers, as well as identify appropriate exceptions (2013). The middle power actors are identified in the key actors' sections of the case studies.

Middle powers have been involved in niche diplomacy in the long-term development of military and humanitarian intervention doctrine. Through niche diplomacy middle power actors "identify and fill niche space on a selective basis through policy ingenuity and execution" (Cooper 1997, 5). For example, the middle powers of Canada and Australia were both instrumental in the ICISS and the development and advocacy of R2P (ICISS 2001). Additionally, the IICK, referenced in Chapter 4, was an initiative of Sweden aimed at gaining better insights and lessons learned from the Kosovo conflict and response (IICK 2000). Brazil too influenced the intervention discourse when they introduced "Responsibility While Protecting" (RWP) following the intervention in Libya in an effort to clarify implementation of R2P (Viotti 2011). All these middle power niche diplomacy initiatives affected intervention doctrine and the ripeness of when to intervene in the future.

However, this thesis is not broadly about middle powers. Rather, it selectively analyses the roles of middle powers as they relate to ripeness, as they relate to when to intervene, and as they relate to the three case studies. This focus on middle power behavior as it relates to intervention decisions is investigated in the case studies and Chapter 7.

CONCLUSION

This chapter conducted a literature review focused on three categories: military intervention concepts, intervention decision models and frameworks, and intervention actors. The result logically makes its way to the intersection of the conflict resolution literature and military intervention literature identifying two gaps in the current literature: (1) when to intervene, specifically in intervention timing; and (2) the role of middle powers in when to intervene. The

literature review also identified ripeness theory that potentially provides a foundation to begin to fill those gaps in our knowledge of intervention. The chapter lays the foundation to build the theoretical and analytical framework constructed in Chapter 3.

Chapter 3: Building a Theoretical Framework and Methodology to Get to the Decision Moment

Realizing that conflict resolution and military intervention are different, but related phenomena, this chapter draws connections between them into a broader theoretical and analytical framework and outlines an appropriate methodology to conduct the analysis. Ripeness theory, as discussed in Chapter 2, provides a departure point for developing a theoretical framework for better understanding military intervention to stop mass atrocities. Just as ripeness theory can be applied as an analytical tool to understand a ripe moment to negotiate, this chapter develops a framework using the "elasticity of the concept of ripeness" to apply the theory in the different context of military intervention and assess the applicability of the theory to recognise when to intervene in mass atrocity situations (Lyons and Khadiagala 2008). The thesis views intervention through a ripeness lens along four dimensions of ripeness: stalemate, opportunity, way out, and leaders. An examination of the events and process leading to the decision to intervene, viewed through this ripeness-focused analysis, yields a set of favouring conditions for military intervention. Thus, the process and the results may provide insights on the applicability of ripeness theory of when to intervene to stop atrocities, as well as decision-making more broadly. These insights begin to fill one of the two gaps identified in the literature review: (1) when to intervene and (2) the role of middle powers. The second gap is examined when we look at middle power actors involved in the intervention in the case studies and Chapter 7.

The aim of the chapter is to develop the theoretical and analytical framework, as well as describe the methodology to apply ripeness theory and measure its associated concepts in determining when to intervene. Central to this framework is the decision moment for military intervention, a new

proposed concept that develops along the four dimensions of ripeness. Within these dimensions are other new concepts, such as precipitating violence and power push, that are developed in the chapter along with the decision moment concept. Building on the introduction of ripeness theory in Chapter 2, this chapter develops a theoretical framework and comparative case analytic framework for the case studies (Chapter 4-6) to process trace and analyse ripeness, as well as introduce the comparative analysis used in Chapter 7. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section takes Zartman's ripeness theory used in negotiation, what this thesis refers to as traditional ripeness theory and evolves the concepts for their use in the context of military intervention. The second section explains why ripeness theory is utilized in this analysis. The third section discusses research design and methodology, to include the structured, focused comparison case study and process tracing. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of the implications from the theoretical and analytical framework.

3.1 STRETCHING AND EVOLVING TO INTERVENTION

This section begins by identifying the components of the decision moment. The decision moment, defined as when conditions are ripe to intervene with military force to prevent or stop mass atrocities, is the confluence of those components that lead to military intervention. The evolution from ripe moment to decision moment starts with ripeness theory, as envisioned by Zartman and Haass (Zartman 1989, 2000, Haass 1990), and then moves on to reframe ripeness in the new context of military intervention to stop atrocities. This evolution, conceptual stretching, or travelling (Sartori 1970), from the ripe moment to the decision moment provides theoretical grounding, as well as the common decision moment term for decision-making analysis throughout the thesis. To aid in the development of these proposed new concepts, as well as their assessment

later in Chapter 8, the thesis uses what Gerring refers to as conceptual utility, or better put, "What makes a concept good?" (1999, 367). His criteria for conceptual formation and adequacy provides eight criterion of good concepts: (1) familiarity, (2) resonance, (3) parsimony, (4) coherence, (5) differentiation, (6) depth, (7) theoretical utility, and (8) field utility (Gerring 1999, 357). He updates this criteria in other scholarship (Gerring and Christenson 2017), but my assessment is the original work is more useful because the terms resonate better with the application of ripeness, especially the criterion of field utility, defined as "how useful is the concept within a field of related instances and attributes" (Gerring 1999, 367).

Importantly, an analysis of both the ripe moment and decision moment, as well as what was happening in the time and space in between, potentially provides a better understanding of what was occurring in conflict on ground, as well as among the international and regional actors. As discussed above, the decision moment consists of a number of components, defined here as favouring conditions, as "a number of conditions that, if present…seem to favor the possibility" of an outcome (George 1993, 122). The search for these favouring conditions is central to the ripeness-focused analysis. Building to the decision moment first begins with the condition of stalemate in a conflict (3.1.1) and then expands the development along the other dimensions of ripeness to opportunity, way out, and leaders. The section concludes with a summary to guide our search for potential favouring conditions of the decision moment.

3.1.1 Stalemate

Stalemate is a central dimension of ripeness theory; thus, a look at the relationship between the perception of stalemate and the decision to intervene bears further investigation. The concept of

stalemate is the same for both negotiation and intervention; thus, although stalemate travels to another context the concept remains the same. The analysis for determining the condition of stalemate is also the same for situations that proceed both to negotiations and to intervention; however, one would expect to find different results. Zartman's theory predicts that when the stalemate is mutually hurting, the groups in conflict proceed towards negotiation. Different results are expected for situations that proceeds to intervention. A situation where one or more conflict groups perceive they can escalate the conflict to victory, would indicate the absence of a MHS and not in a position to initiate negotiations, hence they keep fighting. With mass atrocities present this could be a situation where intervention may be warranted and considered by external actors. Escalating violence may also serve as a prompt for external actors to intervene. An initial review of intervention cases shows that there appears to be instances of escalating violence that influences external actors to intervene. This concept of precipitating violence, defined so because it precipitates the intervention, appears to be a necessary, although not sufficient condition of the decision moment. In other words, there is some violent act or acts that, in part, influence external actors towards intervention.

To investigate these facets of the decision moment this thesis proposes two common favouring conditions. The first hypothesizes that the condition of stalemate for intervention is a different configuration than the MHS predicted for the initiation of negotiation or mediation in traditional ripeness theory. The second hypothesizes the existence of precipitating violence as an element of the decision moment as one of the common favouring conditions for intervention.

With these common favouring conditions in mind, applying ripeness theory to assess stalemate begins by interrogating the primary source evidence for objective signs of stalemate, such as when the "parties lack the capacity and will to take measures to escalate" (Zartman 2015). As such, escalation and de-escalation of violence are central to analysing the condition of stalemate. Another objective sign of stalemate is "when financial and casualty losses rise beyond expectations and anticipated gains" (Zartman 2015). Changes in leadership can also provide an objective sign of stalemate, such as when "more tractable leadership comes to power" (Zartman 2015, 133). Weariness with the conflict, such as offering a referendum or other means to deescalate the conflict, also indicates another sign of stalemate (Zartman 2015). It may take time for the conflict groups to sense stalemate. Zartman notes that a "conflict in course provides objective evidence for the hurting stalemate, whereas a conflict in formation has few hard facts of cost and fear to which to refer" (Zartman 2013). Given more time for an internal conflict to progress may allow the opposing groups to perceive the evidence of stalemate and be open to negotiations; yet, in quick moving conflicts, no perception of stalemate may allow the fighting to continue.

The outcome of the analysis may find there is no stalemate or another form of stalemate between the conflict groups. Although the MHS is the best known form of stalemate, there are others: "S5 situation" (soft, stable, self-serving stalemate), "default impasse" (not stable, nor self-serving, and occurs because the alternative is worse), "staggered stalemate" (where only one side feels stalemated at a time), and a "revisionist blockage" (where one side is ready to negotiate but the other side is committed only to winning) (Zartman 2015, 130-132). Although Zartman uses the term staggered stalemate, this thesis utilizes the term partial stalemate. Staggered implies alternating over time; however, more useful is an assessment of the configuration of stalemate

existing precisely at the ripe moment or decision moment, hence, the partial stalemate terminology provides better clarity and explanatory power in describing the outcome of the analysis conducted in this thesis.

Along with this search for signs of stalemate is also the search for signs of escalation that could be viewed as precipitating violence. Zartman cautions on the difficulty of the task of determining a "sense of threshold or timing, an ability to determine whether a trigger event was a buildup to a larger crisis or merely a flare-up of hostilities" (Zartman 1989, 263). This is a concern in the search for precipitating violence. For this ripeness-based approach, the key is assessing if external actors perceive an episode of escalating violence as significant enough that it affects their decision to intervene and can be deemed precipitating violence.

3.1.2 Opportunity

Whereas the opportunity dimension for negotiations consists of a MEO to resolve the conflict between the conflict groups, for intervention the opportunity is for external actors to stop the atrocities. The intervention could stop the ongoing violence; moreover, it could potentially ripen the conflict with the prospect of eventually achieving a political solution of a durable peace, a pragmatic goal of all interventions. The dimension of opportunity is the specific opportunity that exists in the decision moment, not the process to get there. Initially, the external actors assess their options for action short of military intervention. They condemn the violence and pressure perpetrators to stop the violence and atrocities. When these measures appear not to be effective, they begin to envision intervention opportunities. In whatever opportunity of intervention is envisioned, it is important that it provides the "availability of a military option that promised some

amount of success" (Chivvis 2014, 68). The opportunity provides a way to view beyond obstacles to success that are in the intervener's path. Unlike in the stalemate dimension above, the search in this dimension is for novel favouring conditions, not a hypothesized common favouring condition similar in all the cases investigated. It could refer to the type of intervention, the legitimacy and/or legality of intervention, or some other feature of intervention that needs to be discovered or solved to decide on an intervention.

3.1.3 Way Out

Both Zartman and Haass discuss a way out or a process as they theorize ripeness (Zartman 2000, Haass 1990). The way out may lead to a ripe moment for negotiations and a political solution. Alternatively, the way out may lead to a decision moment for an intervention with the prospect of subsequently getting to a ripe moment that leads to a negotiated settlement. A central feature of the way out appears to be the existence of a push from a key actor or actors in the intervention. This push finds its origin in Zartman's definition of power, "the ability to move a party in an intended direction" (2015, 148). He utilizes the term push factor to explain the mechanics of ripeness and getting to a ripe moment (Zartman 2000, 2006). Although not using this exact terminology, Recchia observes that "When no intervention occurs, in spite of a genuine humanitarian emergency, it is often because no major power is making a determined push for intervention (and for multilateral approval) to begin with" (2017, 71). This thesis uses the concept of the power push that develops from these foundations to characterize an external actor's push to intervene. Building on Zartman's phrasing above (3.1.1), the power push is defined as when an actor has the "capacity and will to take measures" (1) to pressure the perpetrator of atrocities; (2)

advocate for intervention and influence other actors in international and regional organizations; and (3) provide resources or material support, such as forces and/or basing for an intervention.

This thesis hypothesizes the power push as an element of the decision moment as one of the common favouring conditions for intervention. The search for the power push within the way out dimension of ripeness should provide insight on factors affecting the intervention decision moment. However, Zartman cautions that ripeness theory, in its traditional usage, "is not predictive in the sense that it can tell when a ripe moment will appear in a given situation. It is predictive, however, in identifying the elements necessary (even if not sufficient) for the productive inauguration of negotiations" (Zartman 2000, 228). This too may apply to the decision moment in the evolved context of military intervention; hence, the analysis searches for the elements leading to the initiation of the power push and decision moment.

3.1.4 Leaders

Ripeness theory affords a special place for leaders and their perceptions of finding a solution to a negotiation or resolving a conflict. This applies to reframing ripeness in the context of intervention as well. Applying ripeness theory to leaders involves an assessment within the country, among external actors at the international level, and the relationships between the two. Zartman's ripeness construct focuses on the importance of leader perceptions of their conflict situation. Haass too discusses how political leaders must not only agree to a solution, but that there also be room for enough compromise to show that "the national interest was protected" (Haass 1990, 27-28). These two constructs meld when we assess ripeness for intervention. There is also a variation on this theme for authoritarian governments perpetrating atrocities against their own citizens. In most

cases of mass atrocities against civilians, "such violence requires organization from the supreme authority in the land, generally the state" because their continued ability to govern is threatened (Straus 2015, 53). Returning to Haass, the focus in this situation is not only that perceived national interests are protected, but moreover that personal interests are protected and the survival of the regime becomes paramount with leaders perpetrating atrocities as part of a strategy to remain in power.

Thus, the analysis in this dimension looks at leaders of external actors for their specific role in intervention, but also at leaders, more appropriately called perpetrators, that committed atrocities to understand their impact on intervention. Unlike in the stalemate and way out dimension above, the search in this dimension is for novel favouring conditions, not a common favouring condition similar in all the cases investigated. It could refer to the type of leader and specific characteristics that apparently led to the perpetration of mass atrocities.

Hence overall, this thesis hypothesizes three common favouring conditions that bear further investigation: (1) configuration of stalemate as an essential element of ripeness theory; (2) precipitating violence as escalating violence that may prompt external actors to intervene; and (3) the power push that characterizes an external actor's push to intervene. The thesis also searches for novel favouring conditions throughout all the dimensions of ripeness to investigate getting to the decision moment for military intervention to stop mass atrocities. The resulting confluence of all these favouring conditions is the decision moment.

3.2 WHY RIPENESS THEORY?

Now that we have evolved ripeness theory from the ripe moment for negotiation to the decision moment for intervention and developed some hypotheses on what may be discovered, it provides a better-informed position to ask the question, "Why ripeness theory?" Decisions and timing are important in all aspects of life and world affairs. Apart from its theoretical underpinnings developed by Zartman and others, the word "ripe" is a common metaphor used in dialogue and among a raft of other metaphors in International Relations theory. Further investigation of this ripeness metaphor may "provoke new understandings" as it is applied in new ways, such as in this study where it is applied to military intervention (Marks 2011, 1). Haass comments that "ripeness can provide practitioners possessing limited time, energy, and focus with criteria to choose where to best concentrate their resources" to move toward a successful outcome (1988, 249). He later comments, "diplomatic initiatives launched in unripe circumstances are almost certain to fail" (Haass 1990, 139-140). Perhaps other diplomats and policymakers would dispute this certainty, but the term and concept of ripeness is significant to the practice of statecraft. Also significant, is that in both traditional ripeness theory and the ripeness-based approach utilized in this thesis, ripeness is viewed as a causal theory; however, ripeness itself is not a causal mechanism. Rather it is a way of analysing and integrating the causal mechanisms at play to understand the phenomenon under investigation, in this case intervention decisions.

There are contextual similarities between military interventions and conflict resolution as they can exist in the same contextual space, occur sequentially or in parallel, include some of the same actors, and have the same desired outcome of preventing deadly conflict. For example, planning for a military intervention to stop atrocities in a country may occur at the same time as on-going

negotiations or conflict prevention measures. Military intervention may even be viewed as a "ripening" or protection tool within conflict resolution to move the conflict toward termination (Zartman 2015). Hence, these contextual similarities further support using ripeness as a theory to assess when to intervene militarily, as ripeness has proven application in conflict resolution.

Other scholars have critiqued and made contributions by refining ripeness theory (Kleiboer 1994), combining ripeness models (Gunther 2011), applying ripeness in other contexts (Lyons and Khadiagala 2008), and advancing the theory that it fundamentally changes the name, such as readiness theory (Pruitt 2005); however, no one specifically uses ripeness to address the question this research is investigating. On refining ripeness theory, Zartman contends that "the value of these efforts is highlighted by the question: Are they formulating a different concept, adding new terms or precision to the old original concept, or expressing the concept itself in different terms?" (Zartman 2000, 237). This study seeks to contribute to scholarship by using Zartman's original theory as a foundation for a ripeness-based approach to explaining intervention that uses new concepts, such as decision moment, precipitating violence, and power push, in a ripeness-focused analysis to better understand when to intervene with military force to prevent or stop mass atrocities. Although there are critiques to Zartman's theory, the theoretical framework used in this thesis builds from Zartman's foundation and moves in the direction of intervention, rather than build upon another scholar's interpretation of the theory.

Arguably, the reason why ripeness theory has not been applied to military intervention decisions in the past is that the intervention literature and conflict resolution literature reflect two different schools of thought: ending conflict through military means and ending conflict through

negotiations and other measures. There appears to be compartmentalization of theories and models in the two schools. For example, Haass writes on intervention (1999) and on conflict resolution (1990), but does not link the two. This study looks holistically across those schools of thought and bridges those schools by applying ripeness theory to military intervention. Moreover, ripeness may provide an opportunity to better investigate decision-making. Although existing foreign policy decision-making literature is robust (Allison and Zelikow 1999, Gvosdev, Blankshain, and Cooper 2019, Mintz and DeRouen 2010), ripeness theory provides the potential to better link the conflict environment with the decision environment. The theoretical implication of this study is expanding ripeness as an analytical concept to the practice of military intervention, specifically when to use military force to combat mass atrocities. This search for decision moments for the possibility of military intervention may help prevent or stop mass atrocities through a better understanding of the influences in the decision process both at the institutional level and connections to the conflict itself. This study is not to develop a specific intervention criteria or decision-making process, but rather to better understand ripeness as an analytical tool that will be useful to many decision-making processes.

3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Assessing ripeness can be a difficult task. This research utilizes a structured, focused comparison with process tracing (George and Bennett 2005). The method is "structured" with a set of questions applied to all the cases, bounded in time and place by the decision to intervene, and importantly, "focused" through a ripeness lens. This thesis defines a ripeness lens as an analytical tool that applies qualitative methods to a case to give meaning to the metaphorical term ripeness. The emphasis is on "when" and the reasons and evidence surrounding the when. The analysis

acknowledges that the phenomenon under observation may be multi-causal, overdetermined, and equifinal. With the ripeness-focused analysis evidence of the events leading to the decision moment are processed traced to discover the favouring conditions for intervention. The process tracing draws on data from archival research, document analysis, and interviews. The research then uses both longitudinal within-case analysis and lateral cross-case analysis to capture both implicit and explicit themes of when it is ripe for a military intervention.

3.3.1 Designing the Structured, Focused Comparison

Good research begins with good design. Key to the design of this study is to view the decision environment through a ripeness lens that highlights the applicability of ripeness theory to determine when to intervene. First, primary and secondary sources are consulted to initially assess ripeness in each case, evaluate the ripeness framework structure, and prepare for interviews (Froese 2012). Interviews are conducted to inform on the cases, assess applicability, and help operationalize the concept of ripeness applied to military intervention (Blakeley 2012). Then deeper archival research and document analysis provide further data to process trace the intervention decision. Gathering data from multiple sources and methods will allow for triangulation to "comprehensively represent the empirical reality under study" (Kapiszewski, MacLean, and Read 2015, 29). Finally, the cases are compared to draw relevant conclusions.

George and Bennett (2005, 73-88) identify five tasks in designing case study research:

1. Specification of the problem and research objective
2. Developing a research strategy: specification of variables
3. Case selection
4. Describing the variance in variables
5. Formulation of data requirements and general questions

The next paragraphs further expand on the five tasks as they relate to this research.

Specification of the problem and research objective

The decision to intervene is a significant choice faced by policymakers. As discussed in Chapter 2, there is considerable research on what, why, and how of intervention, but there is a gap in the literature as to the when and the who. Although, there is research on the major powers, the role of middle powers and their actions in influencing the decision of when to intervene requires further investigation. Thus, this study's research objective is to determine the applicability of ripeness theory to determine when to intervene, as well as the middle powers' role in that decision. This study also serves as a plausibility probe (George and Bennett 2005, 75) to determine the applicability of the ripeness theory in the practice of military intervention to prevent or stop mass atrocities. Comparing multiple cases in a structured and focused manner "that would discourage reliance on a single historical analogy" is a step in development of a ripeness-based framework to explain intervention (George and Bennett 2005, xi).

Developing a research strategy: specification of variables

A key component of the research strategy is specification of variables: dependent, independent, and intervening (George and Bennett 2005, 79). The dependent variable or the outcome is the intervention decision: when to intervene. In the original research design, the independent (and intervening) variables were identified as legitimacy; legality; the shadow of the future; the past; intervention sustainment capacity; domestic, international, and regional support; and the leadership, conflict perceptions, and resolution relationship of the groups in conflict. Although these variables served as a good starting point and guided the initial literature review, the research

proposal stated they may change during the course of the study based on evolution of the initial ripeness framework. As the research progressed and a narrowing of the scope of the study occurred, it became apparent that the variables could be better aligned with the four dimensions of ripeness. Therefore, as developed above, the thesis investigates three common variables or conditions—stalemate, precipitating violence, and power push—set within the four dimensions of ripeness. These variables follow Bennett and George's suggestion that "case studies should employ variables of theoretical interest for purposes of explanation. These should include variables that provide some leverage for policymakers to enable them to influence outcomes" (2005, 69). The power push meets this requirement, with its characteristic of being able to provide the policymaker with leverage in the decision process.

Case selection

The case selection process is an essential step in achieving the objectives of the study (George and Bennett 2005, 83). Transparency in how the cases were selected is important to allow readers "to judge the evidence presented in the case study" (Gerring and Cojocaru 2016, 417). The criteria utilized for selecting the cases included:

1. Case resulted in an intervention decision.
2. Intervention conducted by a multilateral military force.
3. Intervention implemented to prevent or stop mass atrocities.
4. Intervention authorized by an existing multilateral procedure.

Timeframe for candidate cases was post-Cold War; thus, potentially before the utilization of the term R2P (2001, advent of term in ICISS) or after, if the candidate case included mass atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and/or crimes against humanity. Applying the case selection process resulted in three cases previewed earlier (1.3). First is Kosovo (1999), a case study of intervention with multilateral authorization from a regional organization (NATO).

Second is East Timor (1999), a case study of intervention with host nation consent through coercion and multilateral authorization from the Security Council. Third is Libya (2011) with multilateral authorization from the Security Council. The exact starting points of the case studies varies from case to case but reaches back to the direct antecedents of the decision. The variation in the dependent variable shows decision moment favouring conditions when an intervention occurs with consent, albeit coerced (East Timor), when intervention occurs with regional organization approval, such as NATO (Kosovo), or when intervention occurs with UNSC authorization (Libya). Some shadow cases are also discussed in the analysis to provide context and comparison (Gerring 2017). Although not meeting all the case selection criteria, nor the depth of analysis, of the central cases, these precursor shadow cases provide insights on interventions/non-interventions in Somalia (1992), Rwanda (1994), and Bosnia (1995).

Describing the variance in variables

The case selection criteria described above may raise concerns of selection bias, as all resulted in an intervention. It is important to have variance in the dependent variable. For example, "if we want to know about the factors that lead to a revolution [or intervention] it is necessary to include cases where no revolution [intervention] occurred…since otherwise a statement on the effects of the purported cause is impossible" (Burnham et al. 2008, 91). This logic lends itself to selection of Rwanda or some other non-intervention as a potential case study. However, there is variation in the dependent variable in the cases selected; furthermore, this variation is clear both in the type of multilateral authorization, as well as the mode of intervention (consent and non-consensual). Studying this nexus attempts to determine the favouring conditions of when an intervention is

consensual and when it is non-consensual, or in other words when is it ripe to intervene when there is consent and when is it ripe to intervene when the sovereignty norm is disregarded.

Formulation of data requirements and general questions

A comparative case analytic framework is essential in determining data requirements, framing the questions, conducting the case studies, and comparing the results. This research uses a framework derived from Jentleson (2000, 15-20). Jentleson's framework is based on George's earlier work (George and Smoke 1974) that served as the foundation for his fundamental text on case studies and theory development (George and Bennett 2005). The adapted framework used in this thesis is as follows:

- Case Summary
- Key Actors
- Applying Ripeness and Getting to the Decision Moment
- Conclusions: Implications for Theory, Decision Frameworks, and Lessons Learned

Earlier versions of this framework also included a focus on ripeness indicators and early warning, however, were revised and simplified during the research process. Two sets of questions were originally developed to meet the data requirements for the project: first a set to initially understand the ripeness in each case, then a set for the interview process. Both were based on the initial ripeness framework but tailored to the specific level of analysis of the comparative case analytic framework. Development of an initial ripeness assessment is important prior to the interview phase to understand decision-making as it appears in the historical record before selecting and interviewing key participants. This allowed the time spent during the interviews to be effectively utilized to confirm and further understand the decisions. The ripeness assessment has three components: a timeline of relevant facts in the literature, the explicit events and dialogue involved

in the decision, and the implicit events involved in the decision. These three components analyzed together provided a better understanding of the decision path and the influence of ripeness on the intervention decision. Questions used in the initial ripeness assessment are:

- What is the anatomy of the conflict?
- Who are the key international actors and their positions?
- What are the key prevention and intervention decisions?
- What are the obvious ripe moments and decision moments?
- Are there other ripeness factors that could be added to the ripeness framework?

Crucial to conducting the case study is to focus on the research question as it relates to the specific case: What is the applicability of ripeness theory for understanding when to conduct a military intervention to prevent or stop mass atrocities? Hence, both the framework and content of the case study directly relate to supporting or answering that question through a qualitative social science lens. The case study process began with some "soaking and poking" to understand the background of the case (George and Bennett 2005, 89, Bennett and Checkel 2015). Investigating primary sources, such as newspapers and UN resolutions, provided an important baseline reference. Moreover, secondary sources, such as case studies conducted by other researchers and noting decisions, timing, and other ripeness proxies (terms such as triggers, turning points, windows of opportunity, pivotal events, watershed moments, etc.) were instructive. For example, several Kosovo-related case studies were reviewed during the soaking and poking time (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000, Wheeler 2000, Bellamy 2002, Walling 2013). Reading about policymakers and organizations involved in the decision process was also helpful (Albright 2003, Annan 2012, Hill 2014). Intermixing journalistic history provided additional context as well (Halberstam 2001, Power 2013, Shawcross 2001).

Regarding the use of primary versus secondary sources, it is important to use "different sources to different ends" (Obert 2021, 143). In some areas of the analysis, such as background in the case summaries or as a reference of comparison, the utilization of secondary sources is useful, and in some cases desirable, to benefit from the experience and analysis of scholars in their functional area of expertise. There are also several cautions when reading secondary source material: beware author biases and a "tendency to overestimate the rationality of the policymaking process while underestimating the complexity and the multitude of interests that may be at play" (George and Bennett 2005, 90). Primary sources have their place both alongside secondary sources in the case background, as well as the basis of evidence developing the favouring conditions and decision moments. Although this study applied ripeness theory to previously unutilized primary sources discovered in the research process, it also conducted what James Mahoney calls "targeted primary source research" (Kapiszewski, MacLean, and Read 2015, 168). This technique uses primary source evidence discovered by others; however, it selectively interrogates the evidence through the lens of the current research question for relevance, in this case the applicability of ripeness theory. This overall blend of primary source and secondary source academic, policymaker, historical, and journalistic texts clarified the specifics of the case decision-making process, as well as the broader contextual background of the of the military interventions in the study.

This assessment of events as they unfolded was combined with process tracing the intervention decision. As discussed later (1.4.3), process tracing works by "analyzing events backward through time from the outcome," to understand the case, search for ripeness indicators, ripe moments, and decision moments as a means of assessing the applicability of ripeness theory in the context of military intervention (Bennett and Checkel 2015, 18). The case assessment and process tracing

were initially focused on answering these essential questions described above at a deeper level. Through this initial assessment, several modifications to the original research plan occurred, the most important was reframing the questions around the four dimensions of ripeness and the development of some standardized favouring conditions to better focus the analysis on ripeness. In the beginning, the investigation was asking questions that were too broad and could be refined to better meet the needs of the research objective. The result, based on the analytic framework developed in this chapter, reflects this focus:

1. What is the configuration of stalemate leading to the decision moment?
2. What was the precipitating violence that prompted external actors to take action?
3. What was the opportunity of intervention to stop atrocities?
4. Who were the external actors and what were their means to push for intervention?
5. Who were the central perpetrators/leaders?

Interviews were also conducted to confirm the information in the historical record, gain alternate explanations, and sources for the events. The interviews focused on assessing the applicability of ripeness theory in determining when to use military force to intervene to prevent or stop mass atrocities. The interviewees were current or past decisionmakers, policymakers, UN officials, diplomats, practitioners, and/or academics. In some instances, the interviewees were involved in more than one intervention case covered in the thesis providing not only specifics for a detailed case, but a broader comparative perspective of intervention writ large. Moreover, some of the interviewees had detailed their experience and analysis of the intervention in either academic or practitioner-focused texts. Snowballing was successfully utilized to source interviewees. The interview focus is on events leading up to and including the intervention decision. The interview questions included:

- How is your decision-making style reflected in your national policymaking process?
- Do you see timing or ripeness reflected in policymaking?
- When is it appropriate to intervene in affairs of another state against their will?

- What tools or indicators have/would you use in ripeness to intervene?
- What do you think are the key influences that made it ripe to intervene in (applicable case) at that time?
- How are those influences interrelated?
- Was there a single, key event that influenced (or tipped) the decision-making?
- How did the capacity to sustain the intervention influence the decision-making?
- How did the local dynamics of the conflict influence the decision-making?
- Does your view differ from the traditional narrative of the case?
- How have those views evolved over time? i.e. do you view it differently now than when you were determining the decision/policy change.
- How do those views apply to the ongoing conflict in Syria and Myanmar?
- Are you familiar with or interviewed for any other policy-relevance studies?
- What do you need from academia to better make decisions involving R2P? or…
- What do you need from policymakers to better research the topic of R2P?
- Do you have any recommendations on others I should interview for this study?

The original research plan called for a larger tranche of interviewees; however, although the initial round of interviews for all the cases provided useful data, the results were broader than the ripeness focus of the research. Subsequently, the research focused mainly on primary source archival data to achieve the research objective.

3.3.2 Process Tracing

As process tracing works backwards searching for causal effects, the analysis used in this study works backwards from the decision moment along the four dimensions of ripeness, investigating potential conditions affecting the intervention decision. Process tracing is based firmly in the method established by Alexander George and other scholars (George and Bennett 2005, Bennett and Checkel 2015). The key in this study is that process tracing methodology traces ripeness along the four dimensions of stalemate, opportunity, way out, and leaders. This process investigates, among other factors, escalating and deescalating violence, instances of stalemate, structural aspects, legal developments, initiation of negotiations, external influences, and leader preferences and actions. Of interest, was there a ripe moment that preceded the decision moment indicating a

possibility or actuality of a negotiated solution? Did the solution fail or was not implemented fully allowing the conflict to continue? Or was there no ripe moment and the conflict escalated providing the precipitating violence that initiated external actors' move towards intervention.

3.3.3 Case Study Description and Format

The data discovered by process tracing is now organized in the case study. Each case study is divided into four sections. The first section summarises the case providing a periodized overview of the evolution of the internal conflict and outlines important decisions on prevention and intervention actions. The case summary identifies characteristics shaping the period, as well as the driving forces or particular policies of key actors and the factors shaping the movement towards intervention. An important caveat regarding the case summaries is that they are not intended to be comprehensive, end all, be all, exhaustive case descriptions, as this is already accomplished by other academic, journalistic, and practitioner works. Rather the case summaries provide the required focus and detail to investigate the applicability of ripeness theory to military intervention for the example cases (Kosovo, East Timor, and Libya).

Each case study uses a similar periodization structure to facilitate comparative analysis later in Chapter 7. Period 1 provides relevant background occurring before the case study focus. Period 2 covers relevant characteristics of the political situation and internal conflict before key external actors begin to take action i.e., such as those factors affecting stalemate or no stalemate. Period 3 covers actions by external actors as they begin to implement means to stop violence as it escalates; this period includes measures short of military force. Period 4 covers escalation to precipitating violence leading to the decision moment.

The second section of the case study further details the positions of key international and regional actors shaping the intervention. The third section applies ripeness theory to the case, as explained earlier in this chapter, resulting in favouring conditions for the decision moment to intervene. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of the implications from the application ripeness theory derived from the case. A timeline of events in the decision process to military intervention is included as an annex to the respective chapter.

3.3.4 Comparing the Cases

With each intervention's structured, focused case study complete, the data organized in their respective comparative case analytic frameworks provide a foundation for both a within-case and a cross-case comparison. The within-case comparison is conducted during the process tracing described above. The cross-case analysis is a comparison resulting in the similarities and differences of the favouring conditions, as well as utilizing "comparative intuition" to better understand their explicit and implicit meanings (Boswell, Corbett, and Rhodes 2019). Furthermore, the goal of the comparison is to assess both internal validity within a case and external validity, also known as contingent generalization, among the cases to investigate the ability to apply the findings from this study to a broader set of cases. Zartman describes these "two tests of internal and external validity, respectively: a logical verification to see whether they hold together and make sense, and an empirical verification to see whether they summarize regularities in the data on the ground." (Zartman 2005a, 4). The results of the comparison are presented later in Chapter 7 as the thesis brings the cases together and provides answers to the research question. An assessment of generalization is provided in Chapter 8.

CONCLUSION

This chapter developed new concepts, a theoretical and analytical framework, and described the methodology to apply ripeness theory to better understand when to intervene. Central to this framework are the decision moment, precipitating violence, and power push, that will be used in the following chapters. Although it has taken three chapters to introduce, review the literature, and develop the theoretical framework, this conclusion is really the beginning of the analysis. As Gerring cautions, "beware premature closure" (Gerring 2012, 50). In other words, it takes time and thought to match the right question, the right theory, and the right method; moreover, it also takes time to explain the research process. As the analysis begins, it is also important to point out some themes, assumptions, and cautions that will carry throughout the research. First, this is my thesis, my work, and my responsibility to answer the questions. As put forth in Dunleavy's maxim, "You define the question: you deliver the answer" sets the path, bounds, and challenge for this doctoral thesis (2003, 20). Although it is important at the outset of the investigation to think about what evidence one would expect to find if your argument is true, remaining open to other explanations is also crucial (Bennett and Checkel 2015). One must always be aware of equifinality, where decisions may "involve several explanatory paths, combinations or sequences, leading to the same outcome" (George and Bennett 2005, 20). There may be multiple paths, as well as multiple causes, or multicausality, central to the nature of the decisions. There may be bias, both in research design and in the evidence. There will be blind spots, encountering problems and second-order effects not originally envisioned.

The nature of the problem is complex with a "struggle to isolate variables…conditions are constantly changing and the boundaries are blurred" (Brusset, Coning, and Hughes 2016, 6). There

is a realization that "over time, everything affects everything" (Davis 2011, xvii). The desired outcome are conclusions based on scientific knowledge, as well as other useable knowledge. I use these categories of knowledge in the sense that "when scientific knowledge is not attainable" we should "strive to produce useable knowledge" (George 1997). However, a focus on considering conditions and their potential interdependence, on carefully comparing cases, as well as using Occam's razor to pare the results towards parsimony using good social science will see the research through to the end. This study is not to develop new criteria for intervention, nor is the goal directly policy-relevant, but leans in that direction. It is based in the scholarship of the 1990's thru now but looking to the future. Through it all, the focus on the essence of ripeness, amid all the complexity and multitude of interests, is where the answer to the question will be found.

Chapter 4: Kosovo (1998-1999) NATO Legitimacy and a Major Power Push to Intervene

The March 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo is an important case in the use of military force to prevent or stop mass atrocities. The air campaign represented a transformation in the use of military intervention to protect civilians and was the first use of force by the United States or European allies to "head off a potential genocide" (Power 2013, 448). Recent history shaped the decision to use military force in Kosovo, with inaction in Rwanda (1994), due the fear of a repeat of Mogadishu (1993), and the failure to protect civilians in Srebrenica (1995) all affecting the intervention (Evans 2008, 29). As such, the military operation, influenced by major and middle power actors, concerns of legitimacy and legality, and perpetrators continuing to escalate violence, served as the "terrain on which the rules of the post-Cold War intervention were rewritten" (Thakur 2016, 105). The impacts of these factors on the decision to use military force are revealed in the course of this chapter; moreover, the investigation's results are compared in Chapter 7 to identify similarities and differences with the East Timor and Libya interventions.

The aim of the chapter is to investigate conditions for the intervention decision moment and assess the applicability of ripeness theory in the Kosovo case. As discussed in Chapter 3, a comparative case analytic framework is utilized in to process trace and analyse ripeness. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section summarises the Kosovo case providing an overview of the evolution of the internal conflict and outlines important decisions on prevention and intervention actions. The second section details the positions of key international and regional actors shaping the intervention. The third section applies ripeness theory to the Kosovo case, resulting in favouring conditions for the decision moment to intervene. Finally, the chapter concludes with a

summary of the implications from the application of ripeness theory derived from the Kosovo case. A timeline of events in the decision process to military intervention can be found as an annex to this chapter. For clarity in describing the internal conflict, this chapter adopts the terminology utilized in the IICK Report when referring to ethnic groups in Kosovo, such as Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs in Kosovo, to distinguish them from Albanians and Serbians living in or acting on behalf of their respective sovereign countries (IICK 2000).

4.1 CASE SUMMARY

The mythic defeat of the Serbs by the Ottoman Empire in 1389 at the battle of Polje, a clash of civilizations between Orthodox Christian Serbs and Muslim Turks, is often noted as a causal factor of the internal conflict in Kosovo (Dziedzic and Kishinchand 2005). There are other factors that influenced the conflict, as discussed later (4.1.1), however, the epic battle served as an important element of the narrative that sparked ethnic violence in Kosovo throughout the 1990's. The following case summary describes the relevant background necessary to identify the favouring conditions for intervention. It begins chronologically and describes four periods. The first period (1389-1997) covers Kosovo before the case study timeframe (1998-1999) with relevant pre-1998 context (4.1.1). The second period (January 1998-October 1998) describes the growing internal conflict and an initial political solution among the actors (4.1.2). The third period (November 1998-5 February 1999) explains how external actors began to take measures to stop the violence after a significant escalation (4.1.3). The last period (6 February-24 March 1999) demonstrates why it was time for external actors to intervene to stop atrocities (4.1.4). This summary begins the process of assessing the internal conflict, key actors, and decisions on prevention and intervention that will be analysed through a ripeness lens later in the chapter (4.3).

4.1.1 Pre-1998 Context (Period 1: 1389-1997)

The break-up of Yugoslavia resulted in violence throughout the Balkan region. This period is characterized by (1) an enduring, millennia-old, ethnic conflict; (2) disintegration of Yugoslavia sparked violence in multiple former Yugoslav states; (3) the Kosovar Albanian population's desire for greater autonomy; (4) Serbian unwillingness to relinquish sovereignty of Kosovo; and (5) external actors' varied interests and associated engagement to prevent internal conflict in Kosovo.

Although the antecedents of violence in Kosovo go back millennia to the battle of Polje in 1389, the break-up of the former Yugoslavia in 1991 rekindled violence throughout the Balkans. This Balkan violence is well-covered elsewhere, beginning with the internal conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the beginning of the decade (1991-1995), the West's intervention there in 1995, and the resulting negotiations to end the war in Bosnia (Holbrooke 1999, Daalder 2000, Power 2013, Smith 2010). Events in Bosnia set the stage for the subsequent intervention in Kosovo, as the internal conflicts are inextricably linked through their proximity in the Balkans and Serbia's influence in both conflicts (Wheeler 2000). A Kosovar Albanian leader comments on this linkage and states "it is where it began and where it will end" (Hill 2014, 122). In other words, the Bosnian internal conflict began in Kosovo and regional peace will not occur until the status of Kosovo is resolved. Thus, the status of Kosovo was pivotal not only to the internal conflict within Kosovo, but also played a central role in the broader Balkan conflict following the break-up of the former Yugoslavia and the subsequent negotiations to bring peace to the region.

As "the centrepiece of Serbia's historical narrative," Kosovo was not a republic of its own in the former Yugoslavia, rather a province within Serbia (Hill 2014, 121). Kosovo was granted

autonomy in the 1974 Yugoslav constitution as a province within Serbia (IICK 2000). However, the autonomy was revoked in 1989 by then Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic as a response to the Kosovar Albanians' desire for increased autonomy and a growing Serbian nationalism both within Kosovo and in Serbia proper (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000, 8). This increasing "new wave of nationalism" served to bolster the power of Milosevic and protect the minority ethnic Serbs in Kosovo (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000, IICK 2000). Milosevic's political move of revoking autonomy also fostered a policy "aimed at changing the ethnic composition of Kosovo and creating an apartheid-like society" (IICK 2000, 1). Milosevic's influence on the decision to intervene is investigated later in the case study (4.3.4).

In addition to increased Serbian nationalism there was a growing political awareness among Kosovar Albanians, the ethnic majority in Kosovo. The main Kosovar Albanian political party, League for a Democratic Kosovo (LDK) led by Ibrahim Rugova, grew rapidly in the early-1990s and initially adopted a strategy of non-violence in their quest for greater autonomy (IICK 2000). The LDK's strategy provided parallel programs of limited self-governance to demonstrate to the international community that they could be a viable state worthy of independence (Henriksen 2007, 124). Milosevic allowed this parallel program thus supporting governance and civil society (IICK 2000). The Kosovar Albanians' actions were peaceful at first, then progressively became more violent in response to Serbian acts of repression. One result was the creation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) that first emerged in 1996 claiming responsibility for the 1995 killing of a Serb policeman (IICK 2000). Serbia escalated their fight in 1996-98 against the KLA, as well as committing atrocities against the civilian population to retain control of Kosovo (Thakur 2016, 101). The KLA too escalated their insurgency, benefitting from the 1997 breakdown of the

Albanian state and resulting lawlessness, utilizing KLA fighters trained in camps on the Albanian-Kosovo border and equipped with arms and ammunition looted from Albanian military warehouses (IICK 2000). Internal conflict persisted and both sides continued their attacks.

Throughout this period policymakers faced decisions—and indecision—on how to deal with the looming violence and what to do about Serbian aggression, both in Kosovo and elsewhere in the Balkans. Kosovo, however, was different than Bosnia, as it "was viewed by the international community—rightly or wrongly, but officially—as part of Yugoslavia" (Holbrooke 2000). Although external actors understood Serbia's desire to retain territorial integrity of Kosovo as a normal condition of sovereignty, positions over what was acceptable behaviour within sovereign territory were changing. Key to international engagement in Kosovo was the six-nation Contact Group (4.2.1), originally formed to deal with Bosnia, consisting of France, Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, Russia, and the United States (IICK 2000). The Contact Group's engagement in Kosovo, in this time period and later, both in their cooperation together and in opposition to each other, changed over time "shaped by shifting perceptions of political necessity" (Bellamy 2002, 12). The ability of external actors to work together in this pre-1998 timeframe was crucial as it provided "the most promising window of diplomatic opportunity to resolve the crisis without war" (IICK 2000, 134). Moreover, the lack of a clear plan and support for dealing with growing ethnic violence in Kosovo and the need to maintain Milosevic's support for implementation of the Dayton Accord's made it "doubtful whether there were any opportunities—missed or otherwise—to deal directly with the Kosovo question before the end of the decade" (Zartman 2005b, 165-168).

4.1.2 Growing Violence Led to the Holbrooke-Milosevic Agreement (Period 2: January 1998- October 1998)

Amid escalating violence and coercive diplomacy, an agreement is reached that deescalates the conflict. This period is characterized by (1) continued escalating violence; (2) permanent members of the Security Council unable to agree on a clear way forward to manage the violence; and (3) aided by NATO signalling its intent to use force, diplomacy resulted in the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement reducing Serbian presence in Kosovo.

In late-February 1998, Serbian forces escalated the violence attacking Kosovar Albanian villages in the Drenice/Drenica region (IICK 2000). Human Rights Watch assessed these apparently pre-planned attacks conducted with excessive violence as a "turning point in the Kosovo crisis" (HRW 1998). The growing violence in Kosovo was a grave concern for the United Nations and the Security Council that is charged with maintaining international peace and security. The Security Council should have been the crucial mechanism making decisions on external actions in Kosovo, such as when they passed UNSC Resolution 1160 implementing an arms embargo on 31 March 1998 (UNSC 1998a). However, the perception that "Kosovo was an internal matter for Serbia" plagued many responses to violence in Kosovo (Bellamy 2002, 13). The Security Council's P5 could not agree on a clear way forward to control the mounting violence in Kosovo due to disagreement over humanitarian intervention and differing views of sovereignty, a clash over the two principles of self-determination and territorial integrity. China's "affection for sovereignty" resulted in dissent over a desire to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia (Keating 2013, 194). Russia too supported "the basic principle for a settlement of the situation in Kosovo is that the autonomous region must remain within Serbia on the basis of unswerving

compliance with the principle of the territorial integrity" (Fedotov 1998). Russia's major power influence as a key actor in shaping the intervention in Kosovo will be discussed later (4.2.2).

Combined with these disagreements, the Security Council was also operating in unfamiliar territory. There were UNSC precedents for humanitarian intervention, such as in Somalia and Bosnia. However, for Kosovo, and the similar case of Rwanda, "there was no precedent for a humanitarian intervention against a sovereign state for the treatment of its own citizens" (Walling 2013, 152). This led international actors to attempt multiple strategies of action to modify behaviour in Kosovo. Some were authorized by the Security Council, others not. At first there was a strategy of diplomacy, followed by an arms embargo (UNSCR 1160) (UNSC 1998a), then later calls for a ceasefire and demanding withdrawal of Serbian forces (UNSCR 1199) (UNSC 1998b). Some NATO and US officials advocated a strategy of coercive diplomacy with the threat of air strikes linked to political settlement, similar to that successfully used in 1995 in Bosnia, to resolve the conflict (Albright 2003, Holbrooke 2000, Myers 1998). UK Prime Minister Tony Blair concurred that the only way "Milosevic responds to diplomatic pressure is if that is backed up by the credible threat of the use of military force"; moreover, if diplomacy fails the use of force may be needed in Kosovo (1998). To implement the coercive strategy, NATO "approved a range of contingency plans for the use of military force" on 8 August 1998 (Rubin 1998a).

In the autumn of 1998, violent Serbian reprisals against Kosovar Albanian civilians increased significantly. As a result, the Security Council passed Resolution 1199 on 23 September 1998 demanding all groups "cease hostilities and maintain a ceasefire" and stated steps "toward achieving a political solution" in Kosovo (UNSC 1998b). The tone of Resolution 1199 was

stronger than that of Resolution 1160 and clearly placed "the blame for the violence and refugee crisis at the feet of the Serbs" (Bellamy 2002, 88). The US Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke leveraged his prior dialogue with Milosevic, built negotiating peace in Bosnia and the resulting Dayton Accords, to craft an agreement to manage the situation in Kosovo. This was challenging as Milosevic was "resolutely opposed to all the attempts to internationalize internal problems of another country" (Milosevic 1998). In an effort to stop Serbian violence, NATO signalled its intent to use force and issued an activation warning (ACTWARN) on 24 September 1998 planning a "limited air option and a phased air campaign" (NATO 1998b). Deliberations continued and NATO members solidified their resolve to use force if Milosevic did not comply with the terms of UNSC Resolution 1199 (Albright 1998b). NATO Secretary General Javier Solana commented that the alliance had completed all "the decisions necessary prior to an activation order" and there is "still no compliance on the ground, and time is running out" (1998). Although a fluid situation, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright remarked on 5 October 1998 that in her discussions within the administration, as well as foreign officials, there is "unanimous revulsion" with the situation in Kosovo and as US National Security Adviser Sandy Berger calls it, an "atrocities threshold has been breached" due to Serbian escalation and non-compliance (Albright 1998b). Then on 13 October 1998, NATO voted for intervention and issued activation orders (ACTORD) for "limited air strikes and a phased air campaign" (NATO 1998a). With this coercive pressure, Milosevic agreed to comply with UNSC Resolution 1199, withdraw forces from Kosovo, and engage in talks with the Kosovar Albanians (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000, Perlez 1998). On 24 October 1998, the Security Council passed Resolution 1203 endorsing Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement, condemning violence by any party, demanding all groups comply with Resolutions 1160 and 1199, and welcoming implementation of verification missions both on the ground and in

the air over Kosovo (UNSC 1998c). On 27 October 1998, after Yugoslav special police departed Kosovo, NATO agreed not to launch air strikes (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000). However, the ACTORD was not cancelled but kept ready for later use should the need arise.

4.1.3 Racak Massacre and External Actors Began to Act (Period 3: November 1998-5 February 1999)

A significant escalation motivates international actors. This period is characterized by (1) the establishment of the Kosovo Verification Mission; (2) massacre at Racak invigorates external actors; and (3) a strategy of diplomacy backed up with credible use of force.

The Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement enabled the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to establish the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) on 11 November 1998 to monitor the situation on the ground in Kosovo (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000, Walker 2001). Although the agreement facilitated the exit of some Serbian forces, attacks continued by both KLA and Serbian forces (IICK 2000). Thus, in late 1998, neither side of the internal conflict was "exhausted nor satisfied" (Albright 2003, 390) nor interested in a negotiated solution (Hill 2014, 140); as a result, there was no stop to the violence, as both sides thought they could escalate to win. It was not long before KVM witnessed the gruesome evidence of a significant escalation: the massacre of 45 Kosovar Albanian civilians at Racak on 15 January 1999 (Associated_Press 1999b). Clinton quickly condemned the violence by Serbian security forces (Clinton 1999h). Ambassador William Walker, the American KVM chief, called the killings "an unspeakable atrocity" and "a crime very much against humanity" (Associated_Press 1999b). This event gave momentum to proponents within the Clinton administration for developing and implementing a strategy of continued diplomacy backed by the credible use of force. Albright notes the debate

occurring after Racak as a "watershed" and time "to use diplomacy backed by the threat of NATO force to achieve and implement a political solution" (2003, 394-395). The violent escalation's influence on the decision to intervene is investigated later in the case study (4.3.1). Although in agreement on the use of force in October 1998, NATO allies were now hesitant to use force to undertake or support an intervention, but slowly came to consensus (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000, 72). There were also on-going efforts to work together with Russia to end the conflict, as evidenced by the 26 January 1999 Joint US-Russia statement that called for both sides to cease hostilities and comply with UNSC resolutions (Albright and Ivanov 1999). On 29 January 1999, the Contact Group stated the steps to a political solution and called for a peace conference to be held in Rambouillet, France (Contact_Group 1999). On 30 January 1999, NATO firmly stated the consequences if either side failed to meet Contact Group steps and placed air strike decision-making authority with the NATO secretary-general (NATO 1999).

4.1.4 Another Chance at Rambouillet, then NATO Intervened (Period 4: 6 February-24 March 1999)

Diplomacy continues until intervention begins. This period is characterized by (1) another chance at diplomacy to resolve the conflict; (2) some progress, but no peace agreement at Rambouillet; (3) Kosovar Albanians agreed, and the Serbs rejected the Paris settlement; and (4) intervention begins.

Although NATO had made clear its intention to use military force, if necessary, they also wanted to take every opportunity to give diplomacy a chance. There were three possible outcomes of the Rambouillet negotiations: a way forward to a successfully implemented agreement, if both sides accept; ending support to the Kosovar Albanians, if they refused to accept the proposal; or air

strikes, if Milosevic refused to accept the proposal (Albright 1999). Although they sought to block an external military intervention authorized by the Security Council, Russia shared the desire for a political solution and understood the threat of force may be necessary to achieve a political agreement (Albright 2003, 397). On 6 February 1999, the Rambouillet conference started on a strict timeline to end within seven days (Contact_Group 1999). Milosevic did not attend the conference nor did the Serbian delegation have decision authority and the Kosovar Albanian representatives argued among themselves; hence, Rambouillet was a difficult negotiation (Holbrooke 2000). No agreement was reached at Rambouillet, even with a seven-day extension, and the organizers agreed to reconvene in Paris on 15 March 1999. The negotiations yielded a divided outcome: the Kosovar Albanians signed and the Serbs rejected the settlement (IICK 2000).

Clinton commented on the Rambouillet outcome and way forward on 19 March 1999 stating, "I think that the threshold has been crossed...I do not believe that we ought to have to have thousands more people slaughtered and buried in open soccer fields before we do something." (1999a). Hence, with no agreement on a peaceful solution and unity among NATO members on intervention, the Secretary-General directed air operations on 23 March 1999 (Perlez 1999). NATO commenced air operations on 24 March 1999 (Clines 1999, Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000, 231). The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan commented just hours after the operation began, "It is indeed tragic that diplomacy has failed, but there are times when the use of force may be legitimate in the pursuit of peace" (1999a). The air campaign was expected to last only a few days; however, it took 78 days of bombing to coerce Milosevic to accept NATO's demands.

4.2 KEY ACTORS

With the break-up of the former Yugoslavia in 1991, multiple international actors closely followed the conflicts that ensued, their impact on Kosovo, as well as the potential for a broader regional war. Importantly, as introduced above, four international actors and institutions were crucial to how conflict resolution, as well as the eventual military intervention took place: the six-nation Contact Group; the major powers of Russia and the United States; and NATO, ultimately concerned with violence and instability along its southern border. Thus, the Kosovo intervention was shaped not only by the major powers, but also middle powers, such as Germany and Italy in the Contact Group and NATO. These actors had considerable practice cooperating and competing both internationally and in the region. Their experiences during the war in Bosnia would later affect both the major power and middle power actors' engagement in Kosovo. They interacted in an "unusually contentious process" that resulted in an intervention conducted by airpower alone "mostly by U.S. military forces, although it was NATO that was calling the shots" (Binnendijk and Kugler 2006, 220). This section expands the coverage of these actors, their policies, and relevant geopolitical context leading to the intervention.

4.2.1 Six-nation Contact Group

Key factors that shaped actors' positions are (1) desire for a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Kosovo; (2) broader regional stability; (3) control refugee flows that could impact European economic stability; and (4) prevention of continued conflict that could undermine the progress of the Dayton Accords.

The Contact Group (France, Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, Russia, and the United States) was focused upon the on-going violence in Kosovo and proposed measures to control the conflict. In March 1998, they called for an arms embargo, subsequently authorized by the Security Council (UNSC 1998a). The Contact Group agreed on sanctions on Serbia on 29 April 1998 in an effort to deescalate the internal conflict; dialogue improved and sanctions were not implemented until a renewal of violence in June 1998 (Clinton 1998b). The Contact Group sanctions were, however, without the agreement of Russia. The roles of Russia and the United States are detailed in the following paragraphs (4.2.2, 4.2.3) to further illustrate how the major power actors worked together and opposed each other to shape the subsequent intervention in Kosovo. The next paragraphs detail the way forward, both within the Contact Group and the Security Council, with the influence of the major power Russia.

4.2.2 Russia

Key factors that shaped actor's position are (1) a preference against military intervention in the Balkans; (2) stated intent to veto UNSC authorization of military force; and (3) use of multi-lateral diplomacy to end the conflict in Kosovo.

The major power Russia was an important interlocutor during the internal conflict as "a powerful regional neighbour" (Keating 2013, 194) with its long-standing relations with Serbia (Bohlen 1998). However, using external military force to stop atrocities in Kosovo was counter to Russia's national interests; moreover, they were concerned of others intervening in Russian internal affairs and interventionism in their near abroad (Keating 2013, 194). Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov on 6 October 1998 indicated their opposition and intent to veto any UNSC resolutions

authorizing use of military force (1998). He stated, Russia "would definitely use its right of veto. A military strike will not help normalise the situation but will have the opposite effect" (Ivanov 1998). Despite threats to veto UNSC resolutions, efforts were still on-going to obtain Russia's support to resolve hostilities. Albright met with Ivanov in Moscow in January 1999 and apparently gained agreement on an ultimatum to Milosevic threatening force to resolve the hostilities (Albright and Ivanov 1999, Albright 2003, Gelman 1999). When NATO intervened in March 1999 without UNSC authorization, Russia was "profoundly outraged" and the use of force was unacceptable because "the potential of political and diplomatic methods to yield a settlement in Kosovo has certainly not been exhausted" (Lavrov 1999). Russia perceived this disregard for their position as "deeply insulting" (Giles 2019). Although Russia was important in subsequent negotiations resolving the Kosovo crisis and ending the conflict (Dziedzic and Kishinchand 2005, 28, IICK 2000), the insult significantly affected future relations, as "the split between Russia and the West came in the Balkans" (Stent 2020, 121).

4.2.3 United States

Key factors that shaped actor's position are (1) desire for regional stability; (2) resolution of a decade of Balkan conflict; and (3) continued cohesion and viability of NATO.

An influential member of the Contact Group and important major power in NATO, the United States was committed to both regional stability and resolving the multitude of wars in the Balkans. They had warned Serbia to stop its aggression in Kosovo earlier in the decade, a "Christmas Warning" from President George H.W. Bush in a letter to Milosevic in 1992 indicating that the they were prepared to use force, a warning later repeated in 1993 (Pine 1992). Importantly, this

warning still stood in March 1998 in the escalating Kosovo crisis when US Special Representative for the Balkans Robert Gelbard commented, "U.S. policy has not changed" when queried if the "Christmas Warning" was still in effect (Gelbard 1998). The warning served not only as a threat to Milosevic, but as a guide to US policy.

With hopes for a diplomatic solution and initial reluctance to act militarily in Kosovo following their involvement in Bosnia, the United States was resolute to not to allow the recurrence of earlier Balkan atrocities. Clinton commented on 9 June 1998 that "I am determined to do all I can to stop a repeat of the human carnage in Bosnia and the 'ethnic cleansing.' And I have authorized, and I am supporting, an accelerated planning process for NATO" (1998b). Combined with this desire to stop the conflict, there were also US concerns about the influence of conflict in Bosnia and Kosovo on the "cohesion of the Western alliance and stability in south-eastern Europe" (Albright and Cohen 2008, 56). US Secretary of Defense William Cohen commented on 29 September 1998 at the NATO Defense Ministers' meeting that "the credibility of NATO really is on the line, that one can not continue to prepare for possible military action or indeed threaten military action unless one is prepared to carry it out" (1998b). Hence, the US position was NATO needed to act, at first diplomatically and then later, if required, with military force in the Kosovo internal conflict.

4.2.4 NATO

Key factors that shaped actors' positions are (1) apprehension of NATO's first war; (2) desire for regional stability and manageable refugee flows; (3) after initial hesitation, NATO was ready to act; and (4) agreement that NATO provided a legitimate solution thwarting the threatened Russian veto.

Although initially hesitant, the NATO allies, a treaty-bound combination of major and middle power actors, slowly began to see the use force to as an opportunity to resolve the violence erupting in Kosovo (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000, 72). There was not always agreement among the NATO members on the way forward, such as middle power Germany's initial reluctance to authorized force (Kinkel 1998). The specific roles of these middle powers will be further explored in Chapter 7. The utilization of NATO's regional focus and multilateral makeup proved even more important in the view of Russia's objections to the use of military force in Kosovo. To overcome the challenge of Russia's threatened veto, the decision-making body NATO ultimately provided multilateral legitimacy for the intervention. This intervention decision without UNSC authorization was, as Henriksen calls, "NATO's Gamble" and still provokes questions of legitimacy versus legality to this day (Henriksen 2007).

NATO's decision to use force was made over several discrete phases. On 6 October 1998, Clinton voiced the US position, "NATO is prepared to act if President Milosevic fails to honor the United Nations resolutions. The stakes are high. The time is now to end the violence in Kosovo" (1998a). An agreement to initially use force in Kosovo occurred when the North Atlantic Council issued an ACTORD on 13 October 1998 for limited air strikes and a phased air campaign (NATO 1998a). This served as an important public display of NATO's willingness to use force (Smith 1998). The coercive pressure worked and when Milosevic agreed to comply with UNSC Resolution 1199 the use of force was delayed (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000). Although it was not executed, the ACTORD decision accustomed NATO members to the idea of using force. It was not long before the threat of force would be needed again following the Racak massacre, as Milosevic had still not fully complied with the terms of the agreement in January 1999. Emphasizing the continued threat

of force in the absence of compliance with UNSC Resolution 1199, NATO's Supreme Commander, General Wesley Clark, urged Milosevic to "comply, and do it now" (1999). Renewed dialogue among NATO partners would be necessary to bring force to bear on Milosevic (Holbrooke 2000); however, the activation order stood ready to be implemented following the lack of resolution at the Rambouillet and Paris negotiations.

The struggle within Kosovo was much more than a conflict between Serbia and the Kosovar Albanians. It was a struggle between self-determination and sovereignty and the international actors and institutions that championed those respective values. Although not active conflict on the battlefield, disagreement between former Cold War rivals with their opposing interests resulted in diplomatic conflict in the halls of international institutions. This led to an intervention outside of international law, but one still having multi-lateral legitimacy. With a description of the basics of the case complete, the analysis can now turn to the ripe moment to negotiate and decision moment to intervene.

4.3 APPLYING RIPENESS AND GETTING TO THE DECISION MOMENT

This section applies ripeness theory to the Kosovo case. Building on the analysis of the events and actors above, the application of ripeness shows that there were negotiations that preceded the decision moment to intervene. However, these negotiations did not begin from ripe moments where a stalemate existed, rather they were created with pressure by external actors to negotiate and apparently used as a ploy by conflict actors to gain additional time to achieve violent objectives. With both groups in the internal conflict willing to escalate the violence and external powers advocating military force to stop atrocities, I argue that the decision moment to intervene

coalesced around five favouring conditions: no stalemate, precipitating violence, acceptance of an "illegal but legitimate" intervention, a major power push, and a known Serbian president. This section begins with the application of ripeness theory to assess stalemate in the Kosovo conflict, using the process discussed in Chapter 3. Then the favouring conditions that result from the analysis of stalemate are presented. The application subsequently expands to other dimensions of ripeness (opportunity, way out, and leaders) showing the associated favouring conditions for military intervention to prevent or stop mass atrocities. Finally, the conditions are linked together to explain ripening to the decision moment (4.3.5). The section draws on evidence from interviews, primary source government documents, newspaper articles, press statements, and UN documents, as well as secondary source literature that confirms or contrasts my analysis.

4.3.1 Applying Ripeness to Assess a Stalemate

As discussed in Chapter 3, the presence or absence of a stalemate provides an assessment of the conflict situation, as well as the likelihood of negotiations to find a political solution to the internal conflict in Kosovo. The analysis also offers insights into the potential for escalation or de-escalation of the conflict. Applying ripeness theory to assess stalemate begins, as discussed previously, by interrogating the primary source evidence for objective signs of stalemate, such as when a conflict party's losses exceed their expected gains or "when parties lack the capacity and will to take measures to escalate" (Zartman 2015, 133). The question of stalemate in Kosovo in March 1999, amid negotiations, diplomatic coercive pressure, and planning for military intervention, is fundamental to the decision moment. However, before analysing the stalemate status in March 1999, an appropriate point to initiate the analysis is to look back to violent

escalations in 1998, when NATO was initially considering the decision to use force in Kosovo and the resulting Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement in October 1998 that avoided the use of force (4.1.2).

Throughout 1998, both sides of the internal conflict in Kosovo had the capacity and will to escalate the violence. The KLA forces had the will to escalate, both provoking and counterattacking Serbian forces (IICK 2000), suggesting that they were not at stalemate. Moreover, Serbian forces had a sheer advantage in military power over the KLA and on multiple occasions had demonstrated the capacity, will, and used military force to escalate violence (IICK 2000). This indicates Serbia was not at stalemate in the conflict in Kosovo. However, ongoing negotiations in October 1998 between Holbrooke and Milosevic, combined with NATO's threat to use force, resulted in in a ceasefire agreement and commitment to reduce Serbian forces in Kosovo. Although this entry into negotiations and agreement indicates the possibility of a ripe moment, more likely is the initiation of negotiations was due to pressure from external actors; this analysis correlates with indicators that Serbia was not at stalemate. Milosevic had still not complied in January 1999 and atrocities continued (Clark 1999); hence, it appears Milosevic was using the UN-authorized agreement with Holbrooke to buy additional time and had no intention to honour the agreement in full implementation.

Favouring Condition: No Stalemate

Ongoing violence in early 1999, such as the 19 January Racak attack (Associated_Press 1999b), as well as continuing attacks by the KLA against Serbian forces, showed the capacity and will of both conflict groups to escalate violence and indicated a continued absence of stalemate into March 1999. One US official notes that both sides are "preparing for a wider war, and completely

ignoring every diplomatic effort on the part of the U.S. and the part of the West" (Bacon 1999). The absence of stalemate made the prospects of a negotiated solution unlikely. Although no stalemate and certainly no ripe moment existed, the conflict groups were forced by external actors to negotiate at Rambouillet and Paris. This provided an opening to pressure Serbia at the negotiating table with the threat of military action to achieve a political solution; moreover, if necessary, use military force directly to protect civilians. The Kosovar Albanians eventually agreed to the Rambouillet terms. However, as borne out in the negotiations with Milosevic's representatives, lack of a political agreement resulted in the use of force against Serbia. In sum, even with the threat of force to move Serbian actors towards stalemate and compliance, they believed they could endure NATO attack and escalate to victory.

There is further research and observation that supports this study's conclusions on the lack of stalemate. Ambassador Christopher Hill, a US diplomat that met with both sides of the conflict while shuttling between Belgrade and Pristina prior to the intervention, provides relevant evidence (2014). He notes that in the Fall of 1998 "neither side seemed interested in reaching an agreement with the other" (Hill 2014, 140). Other research comes to similar conclusions. Kuperman assesses that by the end of 1998 there were "no sincere negotiations because each side believed it could prevail through escalation," thus, there was no a stalemate (2008, 17). Henriksen notes that in Kosovo, unlike Bosnia, the groups were not yet experiencing "war exhaustion" and not ready to settle their differences rather continue their violence (2007, 112). These observations agree with my analysis that a stalemate did not exist.

Favouring Condition: Precipitating Violence

The January 1999 killings in the village of Racak (4.1.3) heightened the crisis at NATO and key capitals. Importantly, Racak served as the precipitating violence that shifted US strategy from Holbrooke's view of negotiating a solution to Albright's view of using force to stop Milosevic (Gelman 1999, Sciolino and Bronner 1999). Albright commented that Racak "was a galvanizing event…Despite all the efforts, something as terrible as Racak could happen. It energized all of us to say that this requires a larger plan, and a steady application of military planning for an air campaign" (Albright 2000). There was also a time sensitivity to this precipitating violence and its ability to influence other actors. An adviser to Albright told her, "Whatever threat of force you don't get in the next two weeks you're never getting, at least until the next Racak" (Gelman 1999). The challenge was to quickly renew agreement at NATO to use force. Holbrooke noted that "We had the consensus in October, but it was strained by January, and had to be re-established. This is the point at which I think Prime Minister Blair became most critical again. Blair and the president, working together, jointly made the decision that Racak and the sequence that it set off required a response" (Holbrooke 2000). Hence, these two major powers made the case to NATO that the atrocities at Racak served as precipitating violence and required a NATO response. Taken together, the analysis of this dimension of ripeness shows that escalating violence serves not only as an indicator of lack of stalemate, moreover, it importantly functions as a lever that can sway policymaker's crisis perceptions toward deciding on intervention.

There is further research that supports this study's conclusions on the violence precipitating an intervention. Bellamy assessed it was subsequent violence that had a precipitating effect and the intervention "was triggered by the dramatic increase in Serb oppression and ethnic cleansing in

Kosovo during, and immediately after, the Paris negotiations" (2002, 156). Although the ethnic cleansing occurring immediately after the Paris negotiation certainly bolstered NATO's decision to intervene, I contend Racak served as the precipitating violence. Although our analyses contrast on which event served as the trigger or precipitating violence, both analyses agree on the importance of a precipitating or triggering event activating intervention. Hence, both these explanations indicate precipitating violence is a condition of the decision moment.

4.3.2 Applying Ripeness in Search of an Opportunity

As discussed previously (4.2), external actors initially assessed their options for opportunities to stop atrocities short of military intervention. They condemned the violence and took actions to pressure Milosevic to stop attacks in Kosovo (UNSC 1998a, b). Military intervention, as explained in Chapter 3, could potentially stop the ongoing violence; moreover, it could ripen the conflict with the prospect of eventually achieving a political solution between the Serbs and the Kosovar Albanians. However, before intervention could be a viable opportunity to stop Serbian violence there was an issue: Russia's stated intention to veto any UNSC resolution authorizing military force (Ivanov 1998). Yet the ongoing conflict in Kosovo was clearly a threat to both regional and international peace and security, as identified in existing UNSC resolutions (UNSC 1998a, b, c). Hence, willing external actors would need an opportunity to halt atrocities yet manoeuvre around Russia's objections.

Favouring Condition: Acceptance of an "Illegal but Legitimate" Intervention

NATO then looked for other opportunities to legitimately stop the violence, perhaps without UNSC authorization. Lacking a legal resolution required a decision environment for an

intervention based on multi-lateral legitimacy alone. This acceptance of intervening based on legitimacy alone had formed by October 1998 through NATO's initial decision to use force (NATO 1998a). This decision, states Holbrooke, "brought us to the edge of the use of force" (Holbrooke and Hill 1998). Although the decision and explicit threat was made by NATO, the resulting agreement between Milosevic and Holbrooke was later endorsed by Security Council adding to multi-lateral legitimacy (UNSC 1998c). Moreover, the delay in the use of force from October 1998 to March 1999 provided NATO members time to accept their decision, acclimatize to the use of force, and even though renewed agreement on the use of force was necessary by March 1999, it allowed a sense of legitimacy to develop further. In other words, the view of legitimacy of intervention aligned with the conditions on the ground influencing the decision moment for intervention.

There is further research that supports this study's conclusions on the acceptance of an illegal but legitimate intervention. Johnstone notes that without UNSC approval authorizing an intervention "the best way of characterizing the situation from a legal perspective is that humanitarian necessity was treated as an excuse for violating the law" and the need to focus on the legitimacy of the use of force (2011b, 63). Hence, "the net result was a collective decision (or nondecision) to emphasize the legitimacy of the action, without denying its legality, while putting forward a range of factors—both legal and nonlegal—to justify it" (Johnstone 2011b, 65). The IICK concluded that the intervention was "illegal but legitimate" (2000). The intervention was illegal as it did not have UNSC authorization; however, it was legitimate "because all diplomatic avenues had been exhausted and because the intervention had the effect of liberating the majority population of Kosovo from a long period of oppression under Serbian rule" (IICK 2000, 4). Although this phrase

was coined in the commission's 2000 report, it clearly characterizes the situation in March 1999; hence, the term is used in this thesis to describe a favouring condition for the decision moment as acceptance among NATO members of an "illegal but legitimate" intervention.

4.3.3 Applying Ripeness to Find a Way Out

With military intervention as a legitimate opportunity to halt atrocities, the process to the decision moment was the way out. As discussed in Chapter 3, the way out may lead to a ripe moment for negotiations and a political solution. Alternatively, the way out may lead to a decision moment to intervene utilizing military force, with the prospect of subsequently getting to a ripe moment that leads to a negotiated settlement. With no stalemate and negotiations uncertain to succeed in Kosovo (4.3.1), external actors evaluated the opportunity of military intervention to stop the violence (Sciolino and Bronner 1999). The acceptance of multi-lateral legitimacy enabled the opportunity of intervention; though, it was the growing push by the United States that provided the way out to the decision moment.

Favouring Condition: Major Power Push

Although Kosovo was a NATO intervention first and foremost, the major power push from the United States, a key member state with formidable airpower forces, was central to the conditions for a decision moment for intervention. With Clinton's determination to not allow violence in Kosovo to cause a repeat of the earlier atrocities of Bosnia (Clinton 1998b), the United States pushed the Contact Group to take action, initially with an arms embargo and sanctions (Albright 1998a, c). As discussed previously (4.3.1), the precipitating violence at Racak in January 1999 changed the Clinton administration's strategy from negotiations to advocacy for a military

intervention; moreover, this initiated the major power push by the United States. The major power pushed Serbia and the Kosovar Albanians towards accepting an agreement at Rambouillet and influenced NATO, with its history of credible use of force in Bosnia, to act. Although pushing the groups toward conflict resolution failed at Rambouillet and Paris, US influence within NATO prepared the allies to use force to intervene in Kosovo to stop atrocities.

Key to the power push was US and NATO airpower. Building on the success of airpower in Bosnia to counter Serbian aggression and stop atrocities, NATO utilized the threat of airstrikes to negotiate the Holbrooke-Milosevic Agreement in October 1998. Now airpower stood ready to strike in the event of Milosevic's noncompliance. An airpower-only strategy lowered the risk to intervening military forces; however, operating from high altitudes to stay out of range of Serbian air defences increased the potential for collateral damage. Importantly, a reduced-risk airpower-only strategy combined with claims of a short-duration intervention requiring only days to achieve objectives made for an easier sell both domestically and internationally among NATO allies. What would occur once the airstrikes began was unknown. The US Central Intelligence Agency Director George Tenet warned Milosevic could accelerate ethnic cleansing (Harris 1999). There were also concerns that Serbia may not comply after several days of bombing. Airstrikes had worked in Bosnia after Srebrenica to stop atrocities and bring conflict groups to the negotiating table, so many expected similar results with Milosevic over Kosovo. Clinton had "two models" of what would happen once the airstrikes began: it would be over in several days or it would be longer until damage was unsustainable for Milosevic (1999d). Clinton did not have a viable alternative to airstrikes. With an estimated 75,000 to 200000 troops required to intervene in Kosovo, a ground

force option was difficult (Harris 1999). Thus, overall, an airpower-only strategy proved riper than one that involved ground troops, thereby enabling the major power push.

There is further research that supports this study's conclusions on the importance of a major power push to the intervention in Kosovo. Daalder and O'Hanlon argue the presence of strong US leadership, lack of a powerful spoiler, and a desire to not repeat the mistakes of Bosnia that combined to favour a decision to intervene in Kosovo (2000, 26). Their research identified the likelihood of a long air campaign was low among US and NATO policymakers before the intervention began (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000). However, there were doubts on the effectiveness and duration of an air campaign. Roberts also found that many at NATO and their national capitals believed Milosevic would give in after only a short period of bombing (1999). He calls this the "most extraordinary miscalculation of the whole Kosovo campaign" and attributes it to a "false analogy" with Bosnia, that is not as important to Serbia as Kosovo in their national identity (Roberts 1999, 111). Others note the strengths of a primarily air-only intervention (Byman and Waxman 2000, Allen and Machain 2018).

4.3.4 Applying Ripeness to the Leaders

Applying ripeness theory to leaders involves an assessment of leaders within Kosovo and Serbia, among leaders at the international level, and the relationships between leaders at the international, national, and local levels. This ripeness analysis focuses on the importance of leader perceptions of the conflict situation, external actors' views of the decision dynamics in Belgrade and Brussels and conflict within Kosovo, and their perceptions of solutions to the crisis. Many leaders were important to the decision to intervene in Kosovo: Milosevic for directing the violence in Kosovo; Albright and Blair for being early supporters of intervention; and Clinton for the developing push

to stop the atrocities. Leaders' perspectives influencing a specific favouring condition have been described concurrent with that condition (for example, Clinton in major power push (4.3.3)). This part of the analysis focuses on Milosevic as a central leader and perpetrator affecting ripeness. Key to the analysis is how he was perceived by the outside world and how that perception reinforced assumptions among outside actors. His history in Bosnia and Kosovo showed how he operated. His past behaviour provided indications of what he might do. His known nature made it possible for external actors to understand and predict what he was going to do, or so they thought, as Milosevic surprised many when he did not react to NATO airstrikes as expected.

Favouring Condition: Known Serbian President

International actors thought they understood Milosevic's interests and motivations, having negotiated peace with him in Bosnia. They assumed he would only respond to force and presumed what his reaction would be to the threat and the actual use of force. Albright confirms this assumption when she comments, "unfortunately the only thing he [Milosevic] truly understands is decisive and firm action" (Albright 1998a) and "the language of force" (Albright 1999). Earlier in Bosnia, the Serbs had reacted quickly to NATO bombing and shifted the conflict from the battlefield to the negotiating table. Holbrooke agreed, "I regret to say, but it is obvious that Milosevic only responds to force or the absolute incredible threat of the use of force. This was clear in Bosnia, and it was clear in Kosovo" (Holbrooke 2000). Milosevic confirmed this assumption when he backed down after negotiations and the threat of force in October 1998 (NATO 1998a). Until then, there was a desire to work with Milosevic in resolving conflict in the Balkans, such as in Bosnia through the Dayton Accords. However, by late-1998, with apparent deception, violation, and violence occurring after the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement, he was

viewed as a bad actor to be reckoned with to stop his violence. As external actors' patience was stretched thin, they acknowledged, "He is not simply part of the problem; Milosevic is the problem" (Rubin 1998b).

In March 1999, NATO leaders assumed that Milosevic would concede after several days of bombing; however, although the assumption was incorrect it increased the likelihood of intervention. Since the decision makers believed that the air campaign would be over in a matter of days, there was greater political will to undertake an operation of expected short duration. It was unknown what Milosevic would do in the face of the NATO intervention. US intelligence officials reported a potential Milosevic strategy of increased ethnic cleansing; subsequently, Clinton and NATO allies pressed on with intervene planning (Harris 1999). After Holbrooke provided the ultimatum, Milosevic accelerated a campaign of mass ethnic cleansing with 25,000 fleeing before the air operations began and 460,000 Kosovar Albanian refugees in total (Perlez 1999). Assumptions about a "known" Serbian president and the way he would respond acted to solidify the political will of NATO interveners and increased the likelihood of the intervention and contributed to the decision moment. However, Milosevic's unknowns shaped the events following the decision to intervene and the eventual resolution of the conflict.

There is further research that supports this study's conclusions that Milosevic was central to the decision to intervene. The IICK Report notes that by 1998, due to his involvement in Bosnia and the Dayton Accords, "Milosevic was beginning to be seen as a known quantity" by international actors (2000, 134). However, there is also research that explains international actors' false assumptions regarding how Milosevic would respond to external pressure. Hosmer contends that

Milosevic's viewed events "through a lens of self-interest" and "in terms of how they might affect his personal hold on power"; correspondingly, Milosevic did not accept the Rambouillet agreement terms as they could make him appear weak and affect his control over Serbia (2001, 2). Milosevic was willing to endure attacks, longer than expected by external actors, as he assessed that NATO would not be able to sustain the bombing when faced with European and US concerns of Serbian civilian casualties and pilot losses (Hosmer 2001).

4.3.5 Ripening to the Decision Moment and Intervention

Ripening to the decision moment to intervene required conflict prevention actions prior to the intervention decision, as well as decisions made regarding military intervention. Prevention of further violence was not initially a priority in the Kosovo conflict. This is not surprising as there "is nothing natural about prevention" and deliberate actions need to be implemented to prevent conflict (Zartman 2015, 1). The view that it was "necessary to sacrifice Kosovo's future to 'save' Bosnia" influenced diplomatic and political decisions on effective preventive measures (Bellamy 2002, 65). Importantly, the topic of Kosovo was not included in negotiations surrounding the Dayton Peace Agreement (1995) that ended the war in Bosnia (Phillips 2014). Hence, due to the focus on ending the internal conflict in Bosnia, "there were in fact only scant attempts to prevent the conflict" in Kosovo (Bellamy 2002, 37). The arms embargo, sanctions against Serbia, calling for Serbia to end hostilities, multiple threats of using force, and the KVM all had preventive components, but did not stop mass atrocities. This lack of effective prevention also framed the interventions decisions that followed.

The favouring conditions all contributed to ripening the situation to intervention. No stalemate among the groups in the internal conflict made it likely that further escalation would occur. When the Contact Group's efforts were blocked by Russia, they found workarounds such as sanctions (without Russia) and utilizing NATO's multilateral legitimacy as grounds for intervention. A violent escalation such as Racak would be interpreted by external actors as precipitating violence, moving them toward deciding on intervention. The US major power push, motivated by the desire to not repeat the mistakes of Bosnia and delay action, first pushed the groups to the negotiating table in Rambouilett and Paris, and when last-ditch diplomacy failed, external actors initiated an airpower intervention to stop atrocities. Milosevic, a known leader that would presumably back-down when faced with the credible threat of force, surprised NATO and accelerated ethnic cleansing rather than yielding to airpower; the intervention lasted took 78 days until he finally relented.

This section applied ripeness theory and developed the favouring conditions for intervention in the Kosovo case: no stalemate, precipitating violence, acceptance of an "illegal but legitimate" intervention, a major power push, and a known Serbian president. The favouring conditions ripened the conflict situation to a decision moment to intervene.

CONCLUSION

This case study highlights several implications for theory, decision frameworks, and lessons learned. It provides a first look at evolving ripeness concepts and theory from negotiation to use in military intervention decision-making. Viewing the intervention decision in Kosovo through the ripeness-based approach provides an opportunity to see the various factors at play in arriving

at a decision moment. In Kosovo, the decision moment coalesced around five favouring conditions: no stalemate, precipitating violence, acceptance of an "illegal but legitimate" intervention, a major power push, and a known Serbian president. Previous NATO consensus on the use of force in October 1998 against the known Milosevic acclimatized and prepared the way for intervention. No stalemate among the conflicting groups enabled the precipitating violence of the January 1999 Racak massacre. The major power push in Kosovo, activated by the precipitating violence of Racak, provided a way out to the legitimate intervention opportunity offered by NATO. The decision environment accepted multi-lateral legitimacy in the absence of UNSC authorization. Together they created a decision moment. The power push forced the groups toward agreement and when they could not, NATO intervened.

Importantly, several instances of the applicability of ripeness to military intervention have been identified and will be compared to the results from the other case studies highlighted in the following chapters. The Kosovo intervention and the norms that started from the use of force served as an opportunity "to draw a new line in international affairs, to set a new standard in how we held states responsible for the treatment and protection of the people within their own borders" (Annan 2012, 89). The implications from this will be seen in the next chapter analysing the intervention in East Timor that occurred a short six months later.

KOSOVO INTERVENTION TIMELINE ANNEX

- 31 March 1998 UNSC passes Resolution 1160 (arms embargo)
- 29 April 1998 Contact Group (less Russia) impose sanctions on Serbia
- 23 September 1998 UNSC passes Resolution 1199 (end hostilities by Serb forces)
- 24 September 1998 NATO issues activation warning (ACTWARN) for "limited air option and a phased air campaign"
- 13 October 1998 NATO issues activation orders (ACTORDS) for limited air strikes and a phased air campaign. Milosevic agrees to comply with Resolution 1199.
- 24 October 1998 UNSC passes Resolution 1203 endorsing Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement.
- 27 October 1998 NATO decides not to launch air strikes after Yugoslav special police leave Kosovo
- 11 November 1998 OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission established
- 15 January 1999 Racak massacre
- 26 January 1999 Joint US-Russia statement calls for both sides to cease hostilities
- 29 January 1999 Contact Group states steps to political solution
- 30 January 1999 NATO states consequences if either side fails to meet Contact Group steps
- 6 February 1999 Rambouillet peace negotiations start
- 15 March 1999 Paris peace conference starts
- 23 March 1999 Peace agreement not reached, NATO Secretary-General directs air operations
- 24 March 1999 NATO begins air operations

Chapter 5: East Timor (1999) Middle Power Push and Stalemate Favours Consent

In September 1999, the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET), an Australian-led, UN-authorized, and predominantly regional military force, intervened to protect Timorese civilians from ongoing post-referendum violence. This military response ended the long decade of humanitarian intervention following the conclusion of the Cold War and served as an event in the development of the doctrine of R2P. The East Timor intervention's context contrasts the use of force in Kosovo, examined in Chapter 4, in almost every facet: region, nature of consent, multi-lateral authorization, and use of ground forces versus coercive airpower. With these differences in mind, this chapter will analyse the intervention in East Timor as an example of a successful combination of diplomacy and military force to stop atrocities. The investigation's results are compared with the other cases later in Chapter 7.

The aim of this chapter is to investigate conditions for the intervention decision moment and assess the applicability of ripeness theory in the East Timor case. The chapter uses the same comparative case analytic framework utilized in Chapters 4 and 6 to process trace and analyse ripeness. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section summarises the East Timor case providing an overview of the evolution of the internal conflict and outlines important decisions on prevention and intervention actions. The second section further details the positions of key international and regional actors shaping the intervention. The third section applies ripeness theory to the East Timor case, resulting in favouring conditions for the decision moment to intervene. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of the implications from the application of ripeness theory

derived from the East Timor case. A timeline of events in the decision process to military intervention can be found as an annex to this chapter.

5.1 CASE SUMMARY

The island of Timor, with its abundance of sandalwood and other trade goods, was a Portuguese colony since the sixteenth century. In 1859, the western half became Dutch-ruled West Timor that later gained independence in 1949 along with Indonesia. East Timor's (then called Portuguese Timor) colonial history and events through President Suharto's regime (1967-1998) are well covered elsewhere (Dunn 2003, Fernandes 2011, Greenlees and Garran 2002, Kingsbury 2009). Suharto's authoritarian New Order came to power in 1967 and violently suppressed Indonesia's Communist Party and the people of Papua (Smith 2017). These policies were a glimpse of things to come in East Timor. The following case summary describes the background to identify the favouring conditions for the 1999 military intervention. It begins chronologically and describes four periods. The first period (1974-1998) provides the recent historical context prior to the case study's focus timeframe of 1998-1999. It starts with Timorese self-determination efforts before Indonesia's annexation of Portuguese Timor, as well as some brief detail on the violent occupation that followed (5.1.1). The second period (May 1998-August 1999) introduces a new Indonesian president and a referendum to determine the political future of East Timor (5.1.2). The third period (4-11 September 1999) covers the referendum's violent aftermath (5.1.3). The last period (12-20 September 1999) demonstrates why it was time for external actors to intervene to stop atrocities (5.1.4). This summary begins the process of assessing the evolution of the internal conflict, key actors, and decisions on prevention and intervention that will be analysed through a ripeness lens later in the chapter (5.3).

5.1.1 Pre-1998 Context (Period 1: 1974-1998)

The transition of East Timor from Portuguese colony to a contested Indonesian territory takes place in this timeframe. The period is characterized by (1) Indonesian invasion, annexation, and occupation of East Timor (1975-1999) following Timorese political organization and incomplete Portuguese decolonization; (2) major and regional power support for Indonesia during the Cold War shackled the United Nations which was unable to reverse Indonesia's occupation, nor resolve issues of East Timor's self-determination; and (3) an indefatigable East Timorese resistance that fought back against Indonesia on the ground, brought their case to the international public, and, after 1991, influenced some external actors to oppose occupation and support self-determination.

In 1974, a military coup in Portugal ousted Prime Minister Marcello Caetano, successor to Antonio Salazar's authoritarian Estado Novo regime (1926-1968), in what became known as the Carnation Revolution. The result provided an opportunity for self-determination and formation of political parties in Portugal's colonies. In East Timor, three main parties developed: the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), the Timorese Social Democratic Party (ASDT), and the Timorese Popular Democratic Association (APODETI). Although UDT and ASDT both advocated eventual independence, UDT was initially pro-Portuguese with a slower transition to independence, whereas ASDT favoured immediate independence. The much-smaller APODETI party supported integration with Indonesia. In September 1974, to reflect its growing radical position, ASDT changed its name to the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN). Jakarta was well aware of these political developments and in October 1974 began a covert campaign, Operasi Komodo, to destabilize Portuguese Timor and prepare the colony for integration into Indonesia (Fernandes 2011, Greenlees and Garran 2002, Smith 2015). APODETI, with its pro-

integration views, became known "as a puppet of the Indonesian intelligence forces" (Greenlees and Garran 2002, 4). Thus, the Carnation Revolution in Portugal had set the stage for both conflict and alliances between East Timor's political parties and Indonesia.

In January 1975, FRETLIN and UDT formed a coalition to counter Indonesia's support for APODETI and advocate for an independent East Timor. However, by May 1975, the coalition collapsed due to diverging positions and Indonesian manipulation (Greenlees and Garran 2002). In August 1975, a conflict erupted between the FRETLIN and UDT, the result of Indonesian persuasion that "FRETLIN had been infiltrated by communists and would never deliver independence" (Greenlees and Garran 2002, 9-10). FRETILIN then established an armed wing named FALINTIL (Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor) to fight back against the UDT. Following several months of civil war, the prevailing FRETILIN declared a short-lived independence on 28 November 1975. The next day, UDT and APODETI signed the Balibo Declaration calling for incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia; however, as discovered later, the signatories were coerced by Indonesia to sign (CAVR 2005). In December 1975, Indonesia initiated Operasi Seroja and invaded East Timor, formally annexing the territory in 1976. Throughout these turbulent times, Portugal continued to advocate at the United Nations for Timor's independence, and as described in the next section (5.2.1), was a key actor in diplomacy leading up to the 1999 intervention.

From Indonesia's invasion onward, the United Nations was opposed to the occupation of East Timor. In April 1976, the Security Council called for Indonesia "to withdraw without further delay all its forces from the Territory" (UNSC 1976). Regarding the question of East Timor's

sovereignty, the "UN had never accepted the Indonesian incorporation of the territory as legitimate" further supporting East Timor's right to self-determination (Cotton 2001, 127). Not only were there issues of sovereignty and self-determination at stake, but with reportedly over 100,000 conflict-related deaths during the occupation there were grave concerns about human rights violations (CAVR 2005). Indonesia's actions in East Timor were seen by human rights organizations as one of the "notorious human rights nightmares of the 1980's" yet the Security Council did not to act as it was seen as a "purely internal Indonesian matter" (Traub 2006, 103). This support for Indonesia by Australia, the United States, and United Kingdom happened during a time when strategic demands "created by the Cold War necessitated realpolitik and the concomitant moral compromises" (Menon 2016, 102). In other words, good relations with Indonesia were prioritized over self-determination in East Timor (Simpson 2016). Consequently, Indonesia's occupation of East Timor continued.

The Timorese resistance fought back against the Indonesian occupation. Xanana Gusmão, leader of FALINTIL since 1981 and later first President of Timor-Leste, noted their "strategy was to fight not only in our lands, but also in the hearts and minds of the international public" (Gusmao 2015, 255). FALINTIL's internal armed resistance had weakened by 1988 and Suharto removed travel restrictions that permitted both Indonesians and Timorese, as well as international journalists, to move in and out of East Timor (Greenlees and Garran 2002). International views of human rights violations in East Timor began to change in November 1991 in the aftermath of the Santa Cruz cemetery massacre when Indonesian forces shooting unarmed Timorese mourners at a funeral for a FRETLIN member was caught on film and broadcast around the world (Stahl 1991). Ali Alatas, then Indonesia's Foreign Minister, commented that the event served as "a turning point in our

diplomacy over the East Timor issue" (Alatas 2000). Rather than just a political issue, the status of East Timor became "a human rights problem, a humanitarian problem, a problem the world perceived as the cruel attitude of the Indonesian nation against a small people who want independence" (Alatas 1999a). Demonstrations by East Timorese and Indonesian students in Jakarta, as well as the subsequent assault on journalists covering the story, brought additional attention to Indonesia's oppression in East Timor (Fadyl 1991). In Portugal, not only did the massacre reinvigorate their "sense of historical obligation" to negotiate on East Timor's behalf, it also "ended Indonesia's chances of quietly burying the issue with a minimum of concessions" (Greenlees and Garran 2002, 23). Hence, the opening of East Timor brought greater attention to the Timorese plight.

Importantly, making the most of this opening, the efforts of "an extremely capable Timorese leadership inspired a transnational activist network, thereby internationalizing their political agenda" (Conley-Zilkic 2017, 7). Activist networks in Australia, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Japan, United Kingdom, and the United States, such as the East Timor Action Network (ETAN), provided increased visibility of human rights abuses in East Timor and affected government policy towards Indonesia (Fernandes 2011, Simpson 2016). For example, ETAN's activist efforts on the US Congress were successful in influencing the United States to halt International Military Education and Training for the Republic of Indonesia Armed Forces (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) and sale of some weapon systems (Fernandes 2011, 92). Increased visibility into Indonesia's human rights abuses in East Timor contributed to a broader international outcry condemning states committing atrocities against their populace and influenced international actors to pressure Jakarta to protect Timorese rights, thereby setting conditions for change in East Timor.

5.1.2 A New Indonesian President Offered a Referendum in East Timor (Period 2: May 1998-August 1999)

Suharto's departure opened a window for East Timor's potential self-determination. The period is characterized by (1) a political transition to new Indonesian president open to reform and favouring increased autonomy for East Timor; (2) unexpected offer of a "popular consultation" to determine the future of East Timor; and (3) the United Nations prepares for a referendum in East Timor.

In May 1998, a major Indonesian political transition occurred when long-serving Suharto resigned and B. J. Habibie, his vice president, became the new president. The fall of Suharto, triggered by the ongoing Asian financial crisis and resulting protests, set the conditions for reform by Habibie (Crouch 2010). The new president "seized a brief political opportunity to introduce a slew of far-reaching reforms that Indonesia had long needed but could not carry out under the New Order" of Suharto (Anwar 2010, 99). Although an "unlikely reformer", Habibie understood the necessity of reform in Indonesia (Crouch 2010, 21). His worldview was shaped growing up and being educated in Germany, then through years of international engagement as Indonesia's Minister for Science and Technology. Thus, Habibie was "fully aware of how the international community, notably western countries, viewed New Order Indonesia, particularly in relation to the East Timor problem" (Anwar 2010, 99). A policy of autonomy for East Timor was not a new idea, however, it had not gained traction during the reign of Suharto (Greenlees and Garran 2002). Though, by 1998, with Suharto gone and Habibie in power, there was now an opportunity for reform. In June 1998, Habibie first considered allowing special autonomy for East Timor within Indonesia (Habibie 1998, Solomon 1998). Habibie, along with his advisers, believed that the offer of autonomy would ensure that the province would remain under their control and "forestall East

Timorese demands for independence and prompt Portugal to recognise Indonesia's jurisdiction over the territory" (Anwar 2010, 112). However, the offer of increased autonomy to was not enough for East Timorese political actors, nor did it settle unrest in the province.

In December 1998, Australian Prime Minister John Howard sent a letter (known as the "Howard Letter") to Habibie that suggested East Timor should remain part of Indonesia now, but consideration should be given to its future status (Howard 1998). The letter stated, "It has been a longstanding Australian position that the interests of Australia, Indonesia and East Timor are best served by East Timor remaining part of Indonesia" (Howard 1998). However, the letter also suggested a process that "avoids an early and final decision on the future status of the province" and noted the 1988 Matignon Accords for self-determination of New Caledonia from France as a model (Howard 1998). The colonial comparison to France and New Caledonia initially offended Habibie, who considered it an affront to Indonesia (Greenlees and Garran 2002). The intent of the letter's strategy was not to support independence, but rather recommend a long period of autonomy before self-determination to "convince the East Timorese of the benefits of autonomy within the Indonesian Republic" before choosing a final status (Howard 1998). Australia's relationship with Indonesia will be discussed further in the next section (5.2.4).

Then, just one month later in January 1999, Habibie proposed a referendum to determine the political status of East Timor (Habibie 1999b). Alatas commented on East Timor's future, "If they want their freedom, they are welcome" following Habibie's cabinet meeting when the referendum was announced (1999b). Habibie's declaration "stunned political observers inside and outside Indonesia" (Rabasa and Chalk 2001, 22). Part of the surprise may be explained by reports that

Habibie did not consult the Indonesian military and key cabinet members in the decision process before offering a referendum (Rabasa and Chalk 2001); however, an advisor to Habibie confirms that the policy was coordinated among the key ministers (Anwar 2010). In this time of political transition, with his future as president uncertain, Habibie balanced his reform policies with the concerns of the powerful military and other actors; thus, internal Indonesian domestic politics, in addition to Habibie's desire for reform, appears to have driven this "window of opportunity" for self-determination in East Timor (Martin 2006, Shawcross 2001). Habibie pressed onward with the referendum while he still had the political momentum and necessary authority to shape East Timor's political status.

There are several views why Habibie proposed a referendum that was contrary to the military's support for the status quo position of a continued presence in East Timor. One perspective is that Habibie was tired of Indonesia's diminished reputation in the international community due to its presence in East Timor (Parry 2005). Some DEPLU officials (Department of Foreign Affairs) in Jakarta also believed Indonesia would "be better off rid of East Timor," as involvement there was negatively affecting long-term policy goals, such as democratization and Indonesia's role as a regional power in Southeast Asia (Lloyd 2003). Another assessment is the Howard Letter had an impact that "ultimately helped to change Habibie's thinking on East Timor in a substantive way" providing impetus for a referendum in East Timor (Connery 2010, 23). A Habibie advisor concurs that the letter "undoubtedly triggered new thinking" on ways to solve the East Timor problem (Anwar 2010, 113). With increased international attention on East Timor, Habibie was searching for an East Timor solution.

Just as there were there were varying views on the motives for the referendum, there were also contrasting views on its potential outcome. A close advisor to Habibie states, "Habibie expected the East Timorese to opt for separation from Indonesia, and that he actually welcomed such a prospect" (Anwar 2010). This is consistent with Habibie's public comments (Habibie 1999b). The position also aligns with external observers familiar with East Timor politics: if put to a fair vote, the Timorese would choose independence (Interview 2021). Some analysts, however, contradict this position and argue that both Habibie and his trusted advisors "were so disconnected from the political reality in East Timor that they believed Indonesia would win the vote" (Smith 2017, 110-111). Other analysts confirm this view that Habibie, like many others in Jakarta, believed that East Timor would choose to remain part of Indonesia (Fernandes 2011, Martin 2001). Indonesian sources within East Timor were also confident that the vote would be for integration (Alatas 1999a). Alatas was sceptical of this assessment, "How can you win if you continue intimidating the people? … In front of you they may be afraid…. However, once in the booth, they will go against you" (1999a). Although the impetus and expected outcome of the referendum had contrasting perspectives and remains unclear, Habibie's offer of a referendum had nonetheless set the stage for political change in East Timor.

Planning moved forward for the referendum. The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was actively involved with East Timor through his "good offices" role. Following the 5 May 1999 Agreement between Indonesia and Portugal, Annan put in motion the process to determine the political future of East Timor (UNSG 1999). An informal 25-member Support Group of interested UN member countries formed to help implement agreements (Samuel 2003). Also, as described later (5.2.2), an active Core Group worked behind the scenes to shape East Timor policy and emerged as key

actors in the intervention: Australia, New Zealand, Japan, United Kingdom, and the United States (Eldon 2004, Samuel 2003). On 7 May 1999, the Security Council authorized a resolution to conduct a referendum or "popular consultation" in East Timor (UNSC 1999c). Subsequently, the unarmed United Nations Assistance Mission East Timor (UNAMET) was established by UNSC Resolution 1246 on 11 June 1999 to assist in holding the referendum with a "direct, secret and universal ballot" (UNSC 1999d). The UNAMET mandate for the referendum was extended twice, first to 30 September 1999, then 30 November 1999 (UNSC 1999e, f). The United Nations and concerned states were determined to assist East Timor on its way to self-determination.

Although progressing toward the referendum, there were still security concerns for the safe conduct of a free and fair popular consultation. The Indonesian military, since April 1999 called the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), was reportedly active in forming and arming pro-integration militias in East Timor to disrupt pro-independence activities, thereby threatening the security of the upcoming referendum (DIO 1999c). This was especially troubling as Indonesia agreed to provide security leading up to and during the referendum (UN 1999a). As of 14 July 1999, the UN Secretary-General reported East Timor security "remained serious"; however, Habibie, Alatas, and General Wiranto, the Indonesian Armed Force Commander and Minister for Defence and Security, all gave assurances to improve the situation (UNSG 1998). The referendum, originally planned for 8 August 1999, was ultimately held on 30 August 1999. Although there were instances of intimidation and violence in the lead-up to the vote, the referendum day itself was mostly peaceful (Martin 2001). The duly certified results were announced on 4 September 1999 showing 78.5 per cent voted against the proposed special autonomy offered by Indonesia "expressing their wish to begin a process of transition towards independence" (UNSC 1999a). The political

transition to a new reform-minded Indonesian president, combined with Timorese yearnings for self-determination, enabled conditions for change in East Timor leading to an UN-facilitated referendum. With the Timorese deciding against remaining part of Indonesia, the tumultuous process towards independence began.

5.1.3 Violence Escalated in the Referendum Aftermath (Period 3: 4-11 September 1999)

An unwelcome referendum outcome among pro-integration militias prompts violent backlash against East Timorese. The period is characterized by (1) scorched earth violence against Timorese erupts after the referendum; (2) international actors begin to apply diplomatic pressure to halt the violence; (3) Indonesian authorities place East Timor under martial law to control the ongoing violence; and (4) Security Council investigates the crisis with a diplomatic mission to Jakarta and East Timor.

Systematic violence erupted in East Timor after announcement of the referendum results. UNAMET reported a "scorched earth" policy of violence directed by the TNI with widespread destruction, forced displacement, and selective execution of students, intellectuals, and activists (UNAMET 1999b). This scorched earth tactic, or "bumihangus" as it is known in Indonesian, had been used earlier in the revolution against the colonial Dutch (Greenlees and Garran 2002). According to one UN assessment, more than 1200 were killed and 400,000 displaced by the campaign of violence following the referendum (UNOHCHR 2003). The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation of Timor-Leste (CAVR) assessed 1400-1500 were killed or disappeared during 1999; most of these in April and immediately following the referendum (CAVR 2005). The post-referendum violence was a "carefully controlled…campaign to remove

foreign observers, drive the local population across the border, and provoke a desperate retaliation from the vastly outnumbered" FALINTIL forces (Fernandes 2011, 190). Before the referendum, FALINTIL was under Gusmão's orders to remain in cantonment as part of an effort to pressure the TNI and pro-integration militias to also disarm (Martin 2001). There was concern that if FALINTIL left cantonment and retaliated during the post-referendum violence, the TNI would have reason to "then attack and destroy FALINTIL in conventional warfare" (Fernandes 2011, 190). Violence continued in the aftermath of the referendum. The violent escalation's influence on the decision to intervene is investigated later in the case study (5.3.1).

Alarmed by the on-going violence in East Timor, the United Nations, Portugal, Australia, and the United States, applied diplomatic pressure with threats of economic sanctions, as well as calling for the potential use of a military force to stop the atrocities. The prevention strategy was that "if enough diplomatic pressure was generated, the government targeted would lose its nerve and re-think its policy" (Bell 2000, 172). This "hue-and-cry" strategy of diplomatic pressure was to coerce Indonesia to stop the violence and, if necessary, eventually allow a regional intervention force to enter East Timor (Bell 2000). The pressure exerted by international actors on Indonesia is described later (5.2), as well as the diplomatic and economic measures' impact on the decision to intervene (5.3.2).

On 7 September 1999, Indonesian authorities placed East Timor under martial law (Martinkus 1999). However, the TNI's involvement in the violence was becoming clearer. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson noted, "There is very clear evidence of collusion between elements of the (Indonesian) security forces and the militias to deport East Timorese

forcibly to West Timor and elsewhere" (Robinson 1999). Key to the campaign of violence was "to terrorize the population with the most gruesome abuses of their fundamental rights" (Robinson 1999). The Security Council sent a mission to Jakarta and Dili to investigate the situation (UNSC 1999b). It was evident from the mission's visit to Dili on 11 September 1999 that martial law had "not succeeded in stabilizing the situation" (UNSC 1999b). Moreover, the mission observed further indicators that the violence was being condoned and controlled by the TNI that was responsible for security in the post-referendum phase, according to the 5 May agreement (UNSC 1999b). International actors continued diplomatic and economic measures to exert pressure on Jakarta; however, external measures, nor martial law, appeared effective in bringing the violence in East Timor under control.

5.1.4 INTERFET Intervened to Stop Atrocities (Period 4: 12-20 September 1999)

As the violence mounted, international actors considered military intervention to stop the death and destruction in East Timor. The period is characterized by (1) UN Secretary-General and other international actors press Indonesia for consent to intervene; (2) Australia prepares to lead an intervention; (3) unable to control the violence, Indonesia consents with external pressure to allow foreign military forces to enter East Timor; and (4) Security Council authorises intervention to stop the violence.

With violence continuing, international actors assessed their options and prepared for possible intervention. Before the referendum and during the violent aftermath, Annan was in regular contact with Habibie. Annan explained that "Habibie had convinced me of his desire to see the conflict in East Timor resolved peacefully" but "was neither in control of his own armed forces

operating in the region in collusion with local militias, nor was he being told the truth about the killing and burning they had unleashed" (2012, 82). On behalf of the international community, Annan pressed Habibie to consent to an intervention force, "But I hope it is clear, Mr. President, that it does so out of deference to Indonesia's position as a respected member of the community of States. Regrettably, that position is now being placed in jeopardy by the tragedy that has engulfed the people of East Timor" (1999b). Annan's dialogue continued to apply pressure on Habibie, but time for diplomacy was running out.

Preparations for a potential military intervention continued. A UN peacekeeping force, with its long preparation lead-time, would not be ready for immediate deployment; hence, the force would "need to be a 'coalition of the willing': coordinated and funded by concerned nations, but authorized by the Security Council" (DFAT 2001). Authorization by the Security Council was vital for intervention in East Timor as, "No country suggested following the Kosovo precedent for unauthorized intervention, although sensitivity to the comparison or contrast with Kosovo may have intensified the diplomatic efforts of some governments" (Martin 2001, 104). Multiple countries offered support and troops for a potential intervention. Key international actors, as described in the next section (5.2), utilized debate over East Timor in the Security Council, the timely Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit discussions in Auckland, and diplomatic visits to Jakarta and East Timor to influence the outcome of the strategy that led to Indonesia's consent for the intervention. Following intense diplomacy, as detailed later (5.3.2), an international peacekeeping force was accepted on 12 September 1999 (Habibie 1999d). INTERFET was quickly authorized on 15 September 1999 by UNSC Resolution 1264 (UNSC 1999g). The vote was unanimous, with 15 members in favour of the resolution: Argentina,

Bahrain, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Gabon, Gambia, Malaysia, Namibia, Netherlands, Russian Federation, Slovenia, United Kingdom, and the United States (UNSC 1999j). INTERFET deployed to East Timor on 20 September 1999. The military intervention to protect civilians from atrocities in East Timor had begun, providing a chance for lasting peace and stability.

This case summary provides the background for the rest of the chapter and its ripeness analysis. After a long Indonesian occupation and Timorese insurgency, the opening of access to East Timor in 1988 began to provide visibility into the magnitude of the human rights and humanitarian problem. The resulting reduction in support for Suharto's government, both due to end of the Cold War and the history of human rights abuses, began to affect the regime. Later, the Asian financial crisis and associated protests brought Suharto's reign to an end. These events ushered in a new Indonesian president open to reform. To solve a lingering international and domestic problem, Habibie offered a referendum to decide East Timor's political future. He then must control the violence and destruction that escalated in the referendum's aftermath, a result of Indonesia-supported militia and select military actions in East Timor. Australia, Portugal, and the United States, as well as other concerned international actors in the Core Group, used diplomacy and economic measures to pressure Indonesia to stop the violence. In the end, after external pressure and internal realization that they could not control the violence, Indonesia consented, and an international force intervened to stop atrocities.

5.2 KEY ACTORS

Key international and regional actors shaped how the intervention in East Timor unfolded. Importantly, as introduced above, four international actors and institutions were crucial to how the

referendum, as well as the eventual military intervention took place: middle power Portugal, with its colonial legacy in Timor; the UN Core Group of concerned major and middle powers, with their desire to amplify the measures of the United Nations in resolving the conflict; the major power United States; and the regional and middle power Australia. This section expands the coverage of these key actors, their policies, and relevant geopolitical context leading to the intervention.

Apart from these key actors, there were some actors that viewed the ongoing conflict within East Timor as an internal matter for Indonesia to resolve; notably, this was the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) stance, where non-interference or "security from external interference in any form or manifestation" protected Indonesia more than the Timorese (ASEAN 1967). Complicating the matter, the middle power Indonesia, was not only a regional power, but a powerful core state within ASEAN, with the organization's Secretariat located in Jakarta. Thus ASEAN, as an organization, was not a central actor in initially resolving the internal conflict within East Timor. Subsequently, several member states, such as middle powers Malaysia and Thailand, later provided military forces (5.3.3), as their shared regional perspectives of "threats to social order led core ASEAN states to support and participate in intervention in East Timor" (Jones 2010, 484). Thus, it fell on international actors to be the main drivers of the intervention.

5.2.1 Portugal

The middle power Portugal, with its long colonial legacy in East Timor, was an important actor leading up to the 1999 referendum and intervention. Key factors that shaped Portugal's positions are (1) an enduring commitment to East Timor's self-determination; (2) Portugal's support for the

referendum process; and (3) following post-referendum violence in East Timor, Portugal's desire to re-establish peace and security in East Timor.

Portuguese Timor remained as a colony until August 1975 when the effects of the Carnation Revolution led to Portuguese withdrawal, leaving an administrative presence on the island of Atauro situated offshore the Timorese coast. Portugal remained committed to East Timor's self-determination and independence after Indonesia's 1975 invasion. Even after annexation by Indonesia in 1976, Portugal was still considered East Timor's administering power by the United Nations. However, Portugal's concern for East Timor was often overshadowed by major power support for Indonesia during the Cold War. In 1982, direct talks between Portugal and Indonesia were initiated under the auspices of the Secretary-General to find a solution, albeit with little progress until 1994 when humanitarian access was granted to the territory of East Timor (Lloyd 2003, Martin 2001). Portugal continued to serve as a voice for East Timor amidst the politics of the United Nations and Security Council.

Later, Portugal negotiated with Indonesia and the United Nations to conduct the referendum, resulting in the 5 May 1999 Agreement (UN 1999a). Following the referendum, Portugal supported ending the violence and was "ready to support financially and with human resources any action of the international community that is agreed upon to ensure the re-establishment of peace, security and order in East Timor" (Monteiro 1999). Portuguese President Jorge Sampaio advocated intervention and called on the international community, "which knows how to intervene in cases of serious human rights violations" to act on East Timor (1999). Notably, as leverage to gain US backing for intervention, Portugal's Prime Minister Antonio Guterres threatened removal

of Portuguese assistance for NATO's Kosovo mission, if the United States did not support peacekeeping in East Timor (Greenlees and Garran 2002). Thus, not only was Portugal crucial for the referendum, but they also supported actions to return peace to East Timor following the post-referendum violence.

5.2.2 United Nations' Core Group

A Core Group of interested UN member countries emerged to influence East Timor policy: middle powers Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, plus major powers United Kingdom and United States. Key factors that shaped the Core Group's position are (1) Secretary-General's desire to harness significant states to resolve the internal conflict in East Timor; (2) tacit agreement among Core Group to work together and support Secretary-General's agenda on East Timor policy; and (3) utilization of actors' varying capabilities to implement and fund policy actions.

From Indonesia's 1975 invasion onwards, the United Nations was opposed to the occupation of East Timor. Calls from the Security Council for Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor were clear (UNSC 1976). From a perspective of sovereignty, the United Nations did not accept East Timor's incorporation into Indonesia, yet the Security Council did not act on the human rights issues because the violations were seen as a domestic Indonesian issue (Cotton 2001, Traub 2006). Then 23 years after the invasion of East Timor, at a time when Indonesia was weakened by financial crisis and the major powers were not deadlocked by Cold War rivalries, the Security Council authorized a resolution for a referendum to determine the political status East Timor (UNSC 1999c, Wallensteen 2012). After a long gap, the United Nations appeared ready to act on East Timor.

Crucial to the development of East Timor policy was a Core Group of concerned UN member states. Initiated by the UN Secretariat in late 1998, the Core Group worked to "strengthen the hand of the Secretary General, including by taking national diplomatic action in support of the UN" (Eldon 2004). The Core Group's first success was drafting and passage of UNSC Resolution 1236 (1999) that stressed the "responsibility of the Government of Indonesia to maintain peace and security in East Timor in order to ensure that the consultation is carried out in a fair and peaceful way and in an atmosphere free of intimidation, violence or interference from any side" (UNSC 1999c). Throughout the referendum and the crisis that followed, the Core Group utilized their varying capabilities to implement and fund policy actions.

After the referendum, representatives from Core Group countries spoke out against the on-going violence in East Timor and indicated support for military options. NZ Minister of Foreign Affairs Don McKinnon suggested intervention if the violence escalated (1999b). NZ Permanent Representative to the United Nations Michael Powles stated New Zealand was willing to "contribute to a collective effort to help Indonesia restore order in East Timor" (1999). Alongside the September 1999 Auckland APEC summit, McKinnon chaired the meetings on East Timor and stressed the importance of resolving the internal conflict (McKinnon 1999a). Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the United States, among others, provided forces for INTERFET (DFAT 2001). Australia provided significant forces, whereas the US troop contribution was minor, however, support for INTERFET was a serious commitment for New Zealand as it represented the largest overseas troop deployment since the Korean War (Ayson 2000). Japan used its position as Indonesia's top investor and trade partner to influence Jakarta (Martin 2001). Although not able to participate with military forces due to constitutional constraints, Japan

provided $US100 million to the INTERFET trust fund (Australian_Senate 2000). The roles of the United States and Australia are detailed in the following paragraphs (5.2.3, 5.2.4) to further illustrate how the Core Group facilitated the referendum and influenced the subsequent intervention in East Timor.

5.2.3 United States

The United States is an influential major power actor with a history of involvement with Indonesia. Key factors that shaped the US position are (1) after long-time support for Indonesia during the Cold War, by 1999 resolving human rights and humanitarian issues in East Timor became a priority; (2) willingness to provide diplomatic and economic pressure to end the post-referendum violence; and (3) other global commitments, such as peacekeeping in Kosovo, yielded a policy preference for a regional military solution, with minimal US troops.

The United States had long supported Indonesia during the Cold War. Just prior to the 1975 invasion of East Timor, President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited Jakarta where Suharto informed them of Indonesia's pending military operation. Ford did not object, rather he commented, "We will understand and will not press you on the issue. We understand the problem and the intentions you have" (DoS 1975). As a show of support for Jakarta, the United States later abstained from the 1976 UNSC resolution calling for Indonesia to withdraw its forces from East Timor (UNSC 1976). As the operation was framed as a fight against leftist FALANTIL rebels, this was consistent with US interests of stopping the spread of communism during the Cold War.

However, by 1999, with the Cold War over, the context of the relationship had changed. The United States took a strong stance against Indonesia over East Timor. As a result, the 1999 US strategy of diplomatic and economic pressure suspended military cooperation, threatened economic sanctions, and called for a force to restore stability and security to East Timor (Clinton 1999g). Clinton applied direct pressure on Jakarta elites when he stated publicly "It is now clear that the Indonesian military is aiding and abetting the militia violence" (1999c). In his 12 September 1999 Auckland APEC speech, Clinton "made clear that my willingness to support future economic assistance from the International community will depend on how Indonesia handles the situation from today forward" (1999g). Clinton further cautioned that Indonesia, "must allow an international force to help restore security" and offered US support to a multi-national force (1999g). However, with ongoing military operations in Kosovo and a desire for a regional force to secure East Timor, the United States pledged just a "limited but important function" of command and control, intelligence and airlift (Clinton 1999b). Although the United States provided minimal troops, as investigated later (5.3.2), the diplomatic push and economic threats it delivered were essential in the eventual decision to intervene.

5.2.4 Australia

Australia is a middle power, a regional power, and an important neighbour of Indonesia. Key factors that shaped Australia's position are (1) desire to improve neighbour relations with Indonesia; (2) the strategy for improved relations, although not intending to, may have initiated moves toward East Timorese independence; (3) with a potential crisis underway, Australia prepared for military operations; and (4) Australia intervened to stop atrocities in the violent aftermath of the referendum.

In addition to being a traditional middle power within the international system, Australia is also a regional power and stood as one leg of the Timor "triangle" involving Dili, Jakarta, and Canberra (Wheeler and Dunne 2001, 806). From this position, policymakers in Canberra had to choose between international concerns over Indonesia's occupation of East Timor and its own bilateral relations with a populous and near-geographic neighbour. Australia chose a "Jakarta first" foreign policy where until 1998 "good relations with Indonesia were more important than the self-determination of the Timorese" (Wheeler and Dunne 2001, 808). As a result of this policy, Australia alone in the international system had acknowledged Indonesia's legitimate occupation of East Timor (Martin 2001, Traub 2000).

With a new president in Jakarta, Australia sought to better relations with Indonesia and Habibie. However, at the time, Indonesia's policy in East Timor had a negative effect on the entire Australia-Indonesia relationship (Connery 2010, 18). Australia's strategy for improved relations with Indonesia, however, turned out to be part of the catalyst of East Timor independence by "precipitating Habibie's decision to quickly allow self-determination" (Henry 2014, 53). Thus, inadvertently, "the Howard Letter generated outcomes that it had specifically sought to avoid" (Henry 2014, 53). This was an "unintended consequence of Australian diplomacy" as East Timor's "independence was never the objective of Australian foreign policy" (Henry 2014, 52). Although the policy did not have its intended outcome, Australia continued to engage with Indonesia over East Timor.

When violence broke out in East Timor in the lead-up to the August 1999 referendum, Australia publicly portrayed that it was uncertain of Indonesia's involvement in instigating the attacks.

Alexander Downer, then Australia's Foreign Minister, commented in February 1999 that "It's obviously very hard for us to verify one way or the other," downplaying the Indonesian military's potential involvement while attempting to remain on good terms with Jakarta (1999). However, Australian intelligence privately reported the Indonesian military's links to pro-integration militias, as well as warnings of additional violence (DIO 1999a). Aware of the potential for violence, Howard urged Habibie to uphold Indonesia's security responsibilities during the ballot and consider a UN peacekeeping force to maintain stability (Australian_Cabinet 1999). Although Australia would face criticism later that they did not become involved earlier and provide security that could have prevented the post-referendum violence, Indonesian forces were responsible for security before and during the referendum (UN 1999a). Downer commented after the intervention on the security issue and assessed, "As is now clear, to have pushed the issue with Jakarta would have resulted in the cancellation of the 30 August vote" (2000, 6-7). Nevertheless, aware of the security risks, Howard continued to support the upcoming referendum.

Following the 30 August 1999 referendum, renewed violence ensued, and Australia prepared to serve as a primary force in the pending intervention. Build-up for a referendum-related crisis had been underway for five months (Howard 1999c). During that time, Parliament assessed the potential risks and debated military action (Australian_Parliament 1999). In March 1999, the Australian Defence Forces had moved an extra brigade to Darwin (Cotton 2004, 74); moreover, by late-August 5000 troops were on stand-by for a potential intervention (Cole-Adams 1999). Australia had made clear the conditions for participating in an intervention: UNSC mandate, Indonesian consent, short-term involvement, and a regional force (DFAT 2001). These conditions are not only consistent with international law, but also with "middle power statecraft" of working

through multilateral institutions, rather than alone (Gvosdev, Blankshain, and Cooper 2019, 357). Australia had also engaged with regional countries to "actively recruit" participants for a force to stop the violence in East Timor (Henke 2019, 131). With diplomacy underway and forces ready, Australia continued to build a multilateral coalition.

A key concern for Australia was would the United States come to the coalition's assistance, if needed, should conflict escalate with Indonesia. Although willing to provide diplomatic and economic pressure, the United States was initially not interested in providing troops (Robinson 2011, 189). Australia desired more than this limited support from the United States. Howard asked for the United States to lead the mission, but Clinton declined citing commitments in Kosovo and Australia's proximity to the crisis (Kingsbury 2015). After intervention in the Balkan wars earlier in the decade, the Clinton administration was reluctant to become involved in yet another conflict (Simpson 2016). The Australian government, however, "coveted a US tripwire force presence and the Clinton administration's unwillingness to provide this raised serious concerns among Australian political elites about the alliance" (Cohen and O'Neil 2015, 27). The desire was that "even a small detachment of ground forces could serve as a 'tripwire' for automatic US involvement if military tensions with Indonesia escalated" (Cohen and O'Neil 2015, 41). Eventually, the United States pledged to support the effort with non-combat troops and "a very important commitment to support us [Australia] militarily if we had been drawn into a conflict with Indonesia" (White 2009). With concerns of US support resolved, Australia moved forward preparing for a potential intervention.

Australia's motivation for intervention to stop the killings was "driven by domestic political pressure, concerns about a refugee crisis, and some measure of contrition for its previous policies on East Timor" (Chesterman 2001, 150). Protests over Indonesia's actions in East Timor occurred in Sydney, Melbourne, and elsewhere within Australia providing domestic pressure to stop the atrocities (ABC 1999). Additionally, the Australian Council of Trade Unions took measures that targeted Indonesian financial interests in Australia, such as Garuda, Jakarta's national airline, to increase pressure to stop the violence (ABC 1999). This alignment of the Australian government position with domestic support gave the government the "political space" to pursue the intervention (Connery 2015, 94). Australia's role, as an influence on the decision to intervene, is further investigated later in the case study (5.3.3). The intervention decision led to Australia's "most strategically significant force projection since 1942" (Breen 2008, 133). The intervention influenced future security and defence policy (Chalk 2001), as well as planning frameworks to respond to challenges of state fragility in the region (ADF 2020). INTERFET serves to this day as an important reminder of Australia's regional and international security responsibilities.

Thus, these four international actors and institutions were influential in the decision-making for the 1999 military intervention. Portugal, with its colonial legacy in East Timor, was crucial both for enabling the referendum and influencing other countries, notably the United States, to support the intervention. The other key international actors—Australia, New Zealand, Japan, United Kingdom, and the United States, all members of the United Nation's Core Group—provided essential diplomatic and economic pressure on Indonesia, eventually resulting in Jakarta's consent for military forces to enter East Timor. The middle power Australia served a pivotal role, not only

diplomatically, but leading and providing military forces to INTERFET. With the basics of the East Timor case laid out, the analysis can now turn to applying ripeness.

5.3 APPLYING RIPENESS AND GETTING TO THE DECISION MOMENT

This section applies ripeness theory to the East Timor case. Building on the analysis of events and actors above, the application reveals that there was a ripe moment to negotiate that preceded the decision moment to intervene. As discussed in Chapter 3, an analysis of both these moments, as well as what was happening in the time and space in between, provides a better understanding of what was occurring on the ground in East Timor, in Jakarta, and among the international and regional actors. With the Indonesian military and pro-integration militias willing to escalate the violence in the internal conflict and external actors advocating military force to stop the attacks, I argue that the decision moment to intervene coalesced around five favouring conditions: partial stalemate, precipitating violence, diplomatic and economic pressure, a middle power push, and a new Indonesian president. The section begins with the application of ripeness theory, as discussed in Chapter 3, to assess stalemate in the East Timor internal conflict. The favouring conditions that result from the analysis of stalemate are presented next (5.3.1). The application of the theory expands to other dimensions of ripeness (opportunity, way out, and leaders) arriving at the associated favouring conditions for military intervention to prevent or stop mass atrocities (5.3.2-5.3.4). Finally, the conditions are linked together to explain ripening to the decision moment and consent (5.3.5). The section draws on interviews, primary source unclassified and declassified government documents, newspaper articles, press statements, and UN documents, as well as secondary source literature that confirms or contrasts my analysis.

5.3.1 Applying Ripeness to Assess a Stalemate

The question of stalemate in East Timor prior to the September 1999 intervention was complex and the actors had varying perspectives. As Zartman notes, an important objective sign of stalemate is when "more tractable leadership comes to power" (Zartman 2015, 133). Indonesia's new reform-minded president was such a leader, so the stalemate analysis begins with Habibie. Although he had inherited the East Timor situation from Suharto, Habibie's openness to the possibility of special autonomy in June 1998, as well as the subsequent offer of a referendum in January 1999, suggests he sought other options to resolve the internal conflict and did not want to escalate to a military victory (Habibie 1998, 1999b). A referendum option could provide Habibie a political victory by settling the East Timor issue, without using military means, through either autonomy for the province within Indonesia or independence. Habibie's search for other ways to resolve the internal conflict shows a lack of will to escalate the violence and suggests stalemate. Offering a referendum also indicates a weariness with the conflict, and as discussed in Chapter 3, provides another sign of stalemate. Ashton Calvert, then Secretary of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in 1999, speculated, "There was a sense in which to some people, I think Habibie himself and some of his advisers, they were sort of weary of East Timor..." (Calvert 2010). As a further sign of this weariness, Habibie wanted to put the question of East Timor's status to a vote sooner rather than later; hence, he offered the referendum in January 1999, as opposed to implementing a period of autonomy, then a delayed referendum, as recommended by the Howard Letter (Habibie 1999b, Howard 1998). Habibie also indicated his weariness by stating in February 1999 that "We don't want to be bothered by East Timor's problems anymore. If someone asks me about East Timor, my suggestion is, give them freedom. It is just and fair" (Habibie 1999b). Thus, Habibie appeared open to the possibility of independence and publicly

committed to a peaceful transition by pledging, "If the people of East Timor decide for separation, we will do everything to make it happen in peace" (Habibie 1999c). Another sign of stalemate was the 5 May Agreement between Indonesia, Portugal, and the United Nations that provided a process to the referendum (UN 1999a); entering into these negotiations suggests stalemate, not only of Habibie but also more broadly from an Indonesian government perspective.

Taking these multiple signs together, I assess a stalemate existed from Habibie's perspective. Thus, stalemate was a favouring condition of the ripe moment that led to a negotiated solution to hold a referendum; however, this was not a ripe moment to resolve the conflict, as discussed in the next paragraphs, as the conflict included a larger group of actors, some of which still thought they could escalate to victory. Moreover, that Habibie perceived stalemate and could agree to negotiations for a referendum also opened the possibility that he may later be able to agree to consent to an international intervention force to halt the violence in East Timor. The argument of stalemate favouring consent is developed later in this chapter (5.3.5). The favouring conditions resulting from the application of ripeness derived from stalemate are presented next.

Favouring Condition: Partial Stalemate

Habibie's perception of stalemate was important; however, there were other views of the internal conflict that led to different perceptions of stalemate amongst the other actors. Neither the pro-integration militias, nor the TNI that reportedly controlled the militias, appeared to be at stalemate. They both had the capacity and will to escalate, as evidenced in the violence leading up to the referendum (Associated_Press 1999a, CAVR 2005). The TNI also apparently had a plan for East Timor to remain within Indonesia. On 9 September 1999, Australian intelligence assessed a TNI

strategy where "All necessary force was to be employed, but with maximum deniability, maintaining public adherence to Indonesian commitments under the agreement while privately subverting the process of self-determination in East Timor" (DIO 1999b). The TNI appeared to be implementing the plan. For example, UNAMET's chief in Dili Ian Martin noted how the TNI controlled the violence, "It's interesting how they can switch it off when they really want to" (Martin 1999). Indonesian politician Marzuki Darusman, then chairman of the National Human Rights Commission and deputy leader of the ruling Golkar Party, provides insights on the motivations of the TNI and their militias. He characterized the violence as "an organized effort to turn back the [independence] process, they are prepared to do anything to keep the territory as part of Indonesia" (Darusman 1999). This evidence collectively shows the will and capacity to escalate the violence not only before the referendum, but after as well, confirming absence of stalemate from the perspectives of the TNI and pro-integration militia.

The perception of stalemate of the East Timorese resistance is less certain. José Ramos-Horta, the Nobel Peace Prize winner and exiled spokesperson of the resistance, noted in March 1999 they had "exercised utmost restraint since Mr. Suharto was forced to resign…. But our patience is running out. We keep our options open as to our next course of action if the situation continues to deteriorate" (Ramos-Horta 1999a). The violence in the lead up to the referendum, such as the April 1999 massacre in Liquica, further tested Timorese patience (Associated_Press 1999a). Ramos-Horta predicted on 14 August 1999 that "Full-scale violence before or after the ballot this month is now almost certain" (1999b). He also recommended actions for external actors if there was violence leading to a fraudulent referendum; however, he was silent on FALINTIL's escalation plan (Ramos-Horta 1999b). FALANTIL forces were in cantonment under Gusmão's

orders; consequently, if they left cantonment and "responded to the violence, the situation would have been portrayed as a civil war. That time of doing nothing was the ultimate test of our resistance" (Gusmao 2015). Although FALINTIL had the capacity to escalate, they appeared to have a stronger will to remain in cantonment and let the referendum and aftermath proceed; however, based on available evidence, this is uncertain. Hence, I assess the East Timorese resistance's perception of stalemate as uncertain.

With Habibie at stalemate when he offered the opportunity of a referendum and other groups not at stalemate, the situation is characterized as a partial or staggered stalemate, meaning that only one party felt stalemate at a time (Zartman 2015). This provides an explanation for the escalation to scorched earth violence after the referendum when the outcome of the vote was for independence. A partial stalemate existed where the TNI and pro-integration militias had the capacity and will to escalate and other actors did not; importantly, this partial stalemate had left open the possibility of future violence. This escalation is discussed in greater detail later in the section.

There is further research that supports this study's conclusions on the partial stalemate in East Timor. Salla contended a perception of MHS existed among Indonesian political elites as of 1997 (1997). He noted, "the current military stalemate, along with international diplomatic pressure, negative international opinion, and no evidence that the present generation of East Timorese youths is likely to end its continued campaign of protests, all contribute to the perception of Indonesian political elites that a hurting stalemate" existed (Salla 1997, 453). Our positions agree there was a stalemate; moreover, Habibie inherited this position of stalemate from Suharto.

However, due to the events from 1997-1999 our positions contrast on the nature of the stalemate, as well as the perceptions of the actors. Salla agrees that a stalemate existed from the perspective of Suharto and Jakarta elites in 1997; however, the assessment presented earlier shows in 1999 Habibie was at stalemate, whereas the militias and their TNI leadership, with yet unclear links to Jakarta, were not at stalemate. Additionally, Salla goes on to assess that stalemate existed from the East Timorese perspective due to their realization that they will never again control territory as they had 1975-1978 (1997). This may have been true in 1997, but by the 1999 referendum, as argued earlier, the assessment is less certain that the Timorese resistance, with a surge of international support, were at stalemate. Hence overall, the thesis assesses a partial stalemate.

Additionally, Braithwaite argues a partial stalemate existed. He assessed the TNI and pro-integration militias they trained were not at stalemate (Braithwaite 2012). Braithwaite contended they had the will and capacity to escalate as, "on the Indonesian side, far from fighters approaching a hurting stalemate, many were warming to revenge they had been restrained from unleashing for some time" (Braithwaite 2012, 301). This aligns with the assessment presented in the thesis of absence of stalemate of the TNI and pro-integration militias, as they had the capacity and will to escalate violence before the referendum (Associated_Press 1999a, CAVR 2005). As for FALINTIL, during and after the referendum the forces were in cantonment. Braithwaite assessed that restraining "an explosive desire to fight was even stronger on the FALINTIL side. FALINTIL were frustrated and angry that they were prevented from rushing to the defence of their families and villages by being held in cantonment" (2012, 301). However, they remained in cantonment. In sum, Braithwaite contends the TNI and pro-integration militias were not at stalemate and FALANTIL was at stalemate. The assessment of this thesis is less certain that FALANTIL was at

stalemate. Braithwaite concluded that "it was one-sided slaughter that peacekeepers abated; being one-sided, there was no two-sided hurting stalemate" (2012, 301). Thus overall, our analyses agree that a partial stalemate existed and not a MHS.

Favouring Condition: Precipitating Violence

Although violence was rampant following the referendum, it existed in East Timor long before 1999. For example, violence was prevalent in East Timor following the Portuguese departure and Indonesian invasion in 1975. The CAVR details 102,800 conflict-related deaths, including 18,600 direct killings over the period from 1974 to 1999 (CAVR 2005). Specifically, following the 1999 referendum, more than 1200 were killed and 400,000 displaced in violence (UNOHCHR 2003). International actors denounced the post-referendum violence and destruction. On 10 September 1999 Annan stated, "East Timor is descending into anarchy. The anti-independence militias, who were overwhelmingly defeated at the ballot box, have engaged in an orgy of looting, burning and killing" (1999c). The Portuguese envoy to Jakarta, Ana Gomes, commented on the organized nature of the violence and its desired intent, "It's not an uncontrolled chaos. It is a provoked, planned and orchestrated chaos by military forces. They want to scare the international community—the observers and the journalists—to get them out and massacre the East Timorese" (Gomes 1999). However, despite the anarchy and destruction, many observers defied the threats and continued their mission in East Timor.

Importantly, determined journalists did not leave and reported the violence occurring in East Timor to the world (Landler 1999, Mydans 1999, Murdoch 1999). Consequently, it was not just the actual violence, but rather that it was broadcast and understood outside of East Timor that

influenced and amplified the voices of actors on the world stage and actions of local activists; as a result, there was a broader international outcry condemning states committing atrocities against their populace. For example, representatives of 51 nations expressed their concerns over the situation for almost six hours during 4043rd Meeting of the UN Security Council on 11 September 1999 (UNSC 1999i, h). This is an indicator that tolerance for the atrocities ongoing in East Timor was unacceptable compared to previous bouts of violence, such as Santa Cruz in 1991 or Liquica more recently. These elements acted together as precipitating violence and formed a favouring condition influencing a decision for military intervention.

5.3.2 Applying Ripeness in Search of an Opportunity

Although he inherited the East Timor situation from Suharto, Habibie saw other opportunities to resolve the internal conflict, as the application of ripeness theory to East Timor reveals. The first opportunity was the referendum offered by Habibie and the second was an opportunity for external intervention to stop atrocities in the violent aftermath of the referendum. The first opportunity hoped to give Indonesia improved standing in the international community by offering increased autonomy to East Timor, though not necessarily independence (Habibie 1999b). However, once a referendum was offered it served as an important mechanism on the path to eventual independence (UN 1999a). One challenging aspect of this opportunity was Indonesia and East Timor both had differing visions of the potential outcome of the referendum based on their understanding of the electorate in East Timor. Whereas some officials in Jakarta expected East Timor to vote for integration (Alatas 1999a), the Timorese suspected the opposite would occur (Ramos-Horta 1999b). When the referendum outcome did not turn out as Indonesia expected, the military, and the pro-integration militias they controlled, escalated the violence in an attempt to

maintain East Timor as a part of Indonesia (UNAMET 1999b). A second opportunity would be needed by international actors to control the violence against the Timorese people, such as an international or regional force to prevent or stop the violence. The opportunity of intervention had first presented itself when Howard recommended peacekeepers to Habibie in April 1999; however, Habibie declined (Howard 2000). Howard later suggested international peacekeepers to Habibie on three other occasions (Howard 1999b). This opportunity for international intervention would first require extensive diplomatic and economic pressure before resulting in eventual Indonesian consent.

Favouring Condition: Diplomatic and Economic Pressure to Gain Consent

Pressure on Indonesia to stop the violence began to build in the aftermath of the referendum. A transnational network in the West, in Australia, and within Indonesia itself had laid the groundwork to apply leverage to their governments. The result was a multi-level campaign—local, national, and international—of diplomatic and economic pressure to coerce Indonesia to stop the destruction and killing. At the local level within East Timor, the official UNAMET spokesperson criticized Indonesia on the post-referendum violence, "I draw your attention back to those who are responsible for this violence and those who are responsible for controlling this violence and they are not doing that" (UNAMET 1999a). Indonesia had agreed to provide security for referendum in the 5 May Agreement; unfortunately, the TNI were not stopping the ongoing violence in East Timor.

At the national level, the diplomatic pressure was not only on Habibie, but on other Indonesian elites as well. External military actors applied pressure on Wiranto, a powerful actor in Jakarta

and within the TNI. The United States chose General Henry H. Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to send a strong message. Shelton, who had met Wiranto in the early 1990's, pressured him over the telephone in three separate conversations to end the violence in East Timor (Becker 1999). As part of a coordinated effort, Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander of the US Pacific Command, met with Wiranto on 9 September 1999 to discuss East Timor (DoS 1999). As recounted by the US Ambassador to Jakarta, Blair asked Wiranto "As a friend…to exert control over the situation in East Timor" and emphasized "the international community was willing to help him" (DoS 1999). Blair reiterated the TNI's responsibility for security in East Timor and the need for an external force to assist if the violence was not brought under control (DoS 1999). He further urged Wiranto to "let the international community help Indonesia help itself" (DoS 1999) This military-to-military diplomacy served as another avenue to increase the pressure on Indonesia.

At the international level, Annan pressured Indonesia through his good offices role. Annan remarked at a 10 September 1999 press conference, "The time has clearly come for Indonesia to seek help from the international community in fulfilling its responsibility to bring order and security to the people of East Timor and to allow those who have been displaced to return home in safety" (Annan 1999c). By then, adding to the pressure, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Malaysia had all assured Annan they were willing to be part of an international force to return order to East Timor (Annan 1999c). Annan continued forcefully, "I urge the Indonesian Government to accept their offer of help without further delay. If it refuses to do so, it cannot escape the responsibility of what could amount—according to reports reaching us—to crimes against humanity" (Annan 1999c). On the following day, Annan raised the stakes once more

indicating Indonesia's standing in the international community was at risk (Annan 1999b). Annan's mention of atrocity crimes and Indonesia's reputation had increased the pressure on Habibie.

The multi-country, multi-organization, multi-level approach culminated in speeches and negotiations in the margins of the 1999 Auckland APEC summit. Clinton, before he left for the summit, upped the diplomatic pressure with economic threats (Clinton 1999e). He stated, "Right now, the international financial institutions are not moving forward with substantial new lending to Indonesia. My own willingness to support future assistance will depend very strongly on the way Indonesia handles this situation" (Clinton 1999e). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) followed Clinton's approach and suspended aid to Jakarta. Stanley Fischer, the IMF deputy managing director, commented, "The difficulties in East Timor would make it very difficult for us to continue dispersing to Indonesia" (Fischer 1999). In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, at a time when Indonesia needed external funds, this additional economic pressure from international financial institutions was targeted to influence Habibie and other elites in Jakarta. Although there was no combined statement from the APEC summit, diplomacy had focused international pressure and regional support with Clinton stressing "we stood together against the violence in East Timor" (Clinton 1999f). In the end Habibie consented, stating Indonesia's "readiness to accept international peacekeeping forces through the UN from friendly nations to restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect the people and to implement the result of the direct ballot of 30 August" (Habibie 1999d). Diplomatic and economic pressure had influenced the outcome in the direction of military intervention.

There is further research that supports this study's conclusions on the impact of diplomatic and economic pressure on the intervention. Bell concurs this "hue-and-cry" strategy of diplomatic and economic pressure was responsible for Habibie's consent to intervention (2000). Martin describes the pressure as the "diplomatic crescendo" that resulted in Habibie's consent (2001, 103). He also concedes this was "induced consent" (Martin 2006, 152). Johnstone agrees that the consent "was hardly voluntary and bordered on duress" (2011a, 170). Australia's DFAT assessed the economic pressure from the IMF and the United States was sufficient (2001, 75). Although many actors applied pressure to Indonesia, Dunn argues that the "decisive pressure probably" was applied by Clinton (2003, 359). Notably, the Australian Senate reports that "it was the United States, using leverage that only it could bring into play, that finally persuaded Indonesia to support INTERFET, thus allowing INTERFET to operate in East Timor" (2000, 51). The wide array of diplomatic and economic levers that international actors utilized was crucial in shaping the decision moment toward intervention.

5.3.3 Applying Ripeness to Find a Way Out

With military intervention as the opportunity to halt atrocities, the process to get to the intervention decision, as described in Chapter 3, could be the way out. The United Nations and Core Group had laid the groundwork for the way out at the international level; however, standing up an intervention force was dependent on governments contributing military personnel. Annan commented, "To go in, you must have a force, and Governments must be prepared to go in. We all talk of the United Nations and the international community. The international community is Governments—Governments with the capacity and the will to act. The Governments have made it clear that it will be too dangerous to go in. And they will not do it without—if you wish—the

consent of Indonesia. That is why I believe that Indonesia must be pressured to change its mind and let them come in" (1999c). As the pressure on Indonesia increased, more governments voiced support for intervention; accordingly, INTERFET's force structure provides evidence of regional support for the intervention. Southeast Asian troop-contributing countries for INTERFET included Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, in addition to Australia's large force (DFAT 2001). International and regional actors' support helped make clear the way out for the intervention. Although the United Nations, aided by international and regional actors, was important, leading the way out to the opportunity would come from Australia.

Favouring Condition: Middle Power Push

As discussed in Chapter 2, a major power can influence an intervention decision. Although in this situation, with the major power United States hesitant to commit ground forces, it was the middle power Australia that provided a push for intervention. However, as the Howard Letter points out, providing impetus for independence of East Timor from Indonesia was not Australia's original intention (Howard 1998). Australia carefully watched their neighbour to the north and prepared for military contingencies amid the referendum violence of East Timor. Howard was clear about intervention, "You can't go into the territory of another country without that country's approval," highlighting the importance of consent from Indonesia if Australia was to intervene (Howard 1999a). Howard was trying to balance current and future relations with Indonesia, as they had not yet imposed economic sanctions nor severed military ties, with the imperative to stop the ongoing violence (Howard 1999c). Australia's intervention strategy required a "coalition of the willing" that was "coordinated and funded by concerned nations, but authorized by the Security Council" (DFAT 2001). Thus, middle power Australia worked in coordination with the Security Council

and the Secretary-General. Howard committed to the United Nations to both provide forces and lead an international force (Annan 1999c). On 10 September 1999, Howard indicated Australia's readiness stating, "everyone knows that the best thing that can happen, if the Indonesians won't put their own house in order, is to get a peacekeeping force in there. We are ready now to make our contribution" (Howard 1999c). This government policy to intervene aligned with growing Australian domestic support to stop the violence in East Timor (ABC 1999). The convergence of government policy with domestic support enabled Australia's middle power push to intervene in East Timor.

There is further research that supports this study's conclusions on the importance of Australia's role in the intervention. Martin notes that Australia's military capability, proximity, and willingness lead the operation were critical to the "speed of intervention" in authorization and arrival of INTERFET (2001, 129). Cotton assesses that Australian participation was so significant that without their "role as the lead nation in the coalition, INTERFET would not have proceeded" (2004, 74). Wheeler and Dunne agree on the importance of Australia; however, contend that "the Australian government could not have exerted the kind of regional and global influence needed to win the argument about a peacekeeping force" (2001, 806). Rather it was Australia's engagement together with UNSC pressure, and diplomacy in Jakarta, East Timor, and the APEC summit in Auckland, that all influenced Habibie to request international assistance (Wheeler and Dunne 2001, 822). These analyses concur with the argument in this thesis on the importance of Australia's middle power push in conjunction with the other favouring conditions.

The United States and the United Nations supported Australia's middle power push diplomatically. Although the pressure was significant, in accordance with the power push definition presented in Chapter 3, I do not characterize US actions as a major power push due to the lack of a large US military troop contribution. Rather, the US addition to the favouring conditions is characterized as diplomatic and economic pressure, as previously discussed (5.3.2). In the absence of a push by a major power, the middle power Australia provided a significant power push to influence the decision moment in the direction of military intervention. In the next paragraphs, the analysis continues with the application of ripeness theory to the leaders.

5.3.4 Applying Ripeness to the Leaders

Applying ripeness theory to leaders involves an assessment of leaders within East Timor and Indonesia, among leaders at the international level, and the relationships between leaders at the international, national, and local levels. This ripeness analysis focuses on the importance of leader perceptions of the conflict situation, external actors' views of the decision dynamics in Jakarta and conflict within East Timor, and their insights to solutions for the crisis. Many leaders were important to the decision to intervene in East Timor: Habibie for taking an opportunity to offer autonomy and then a referendum; Howard for nudging Habibie along; and Clinton and Annan, among others, for the diplomatic pressure they were able to leverage to eventually gain Indonesian consent for a military intervention. Annan, Clinton, Howard, and other leaders' perspectives influencing a specific favouring condition have been described concurrent with that condition (for example, Annan and Clinton in diplomatic and economic pressure (5.3.2), and Howard in middle power push (5.3.3)). One leader that deserves more attention is Habibie; thus, this part of the analysis focuses on Habibie as a central leader affecting ripeness. The path to intervention began

with Habibie first offering the referendum and then eventually returned to him to gain consent for an international military force to enter East Timor.

Favouring Condition: A New Indonesian President

Indonesia's new president Habibie was a fundamental favouring condition for intervention. He became president following the fall and ouster of Suharto resulting from the Asian financial crisis and Indonesian domestic protests. Habibie's openness to reform, as discussed in the stalemate analysis (5.3.1), set the stage for a ripe moment in East Timor. A ripe moment for change began to form in June 1998 when Habibie first offered the possibility increased autonomy for East Timor (Habibie 1998, Solomon 1998). The ripe moment fully formed in January 1999 when Habibie offered a referendum with the possibility of independence for East Timor (Alatas 1999b, Habibie 1999b). The ripe moment was important not only for the referendum, but also significant when the scorched earth violence erupted in East Timor, as the conditions of the initial ripe moment may have left open the possibility of negotiating to obtain consent for intervention (5.3.5). In other words, because Habibie was initially supportive of a referendum, he may later be supportive of international military intervention to stop the violence.

Complicating the crisis for Habibie were different views of the conflict situation on the ground in East Timor, at the international level, and in Jakarta. This was a problem for Habibie's leadership, as it indicated not only a communication problem between Jakarta and East Timor, but specifically his ability to control the Indonesian forces in East Timor. This became more apparent when the post-election violence continued even after the Indonesian imposition of martial law in East Timor on 7 September 1999 (UNSC 1999b). At the international level, the view was the Indonesian

forces were “either unable or unwilling to take effective steps to restore security” (Annan 1999c). The Security Council’s September 1999 visit to Dili witnessed the evidence of death, destruction, and displacement in East Timor and the disconnect of information reaching Jakarta; moreover, the delegation assessed that the violence was being controlled by the TNI that was responsible for security in the post-referendum phase (UNSC 1999b). For example, the UN mission’s leader, the United Kingdom’s UN ambassador Sir Jeremy Greenstock, noted, “I don't think anybody here has any doubt that that there has been complicity between elements of the defence forces and the militias. In some areas, there is no difference between them in terms of action and motivation” (Greenstock 1999). The military’s apparent control of the violence was evident to an official traveling with the delegation, "I don't see any reason to think that they are having major difficulties controlling the situation. Look at today and look at election day when everything was brought under control with the snap of a finger. This is such a coordinated and planned campaign—evacuating towns, assassinating moderate leaders, moving huge numbers of people into forced exile—that it could only have come from the top" (UN_Official 1999). Other officials concur that Indonesia controlled and supported of the violence (Clinton 1999c, Martin 1999, Robinson 1999). Furthermore, the CAVR later assessed the violence was “committed in execution of a systematic plan approved, conducted and controlled by Indonesian military commanders up to the highest level” (CAVR 2005, 149). These multiple instances of complicity indicate linkages between the militias and the TNI.

There was a different view from Jakarta. Alatas stated the Indonesian government’s perspective, “The military as an institution, the police as an institution, are not in support of the people burning and killing and looting. These are criminal activities, and we are going to put a stop to it” (Alatas

1999c). To put a stop to the violence, Habibie needed to gain control all the way down to the military and police in East Timor; moreover, Habibie would need support to invite international assistance. One of Habibie's aides, Umar Juoro, commented that "The president has not closed the possibility of inviting an international peacekeeping force" (Juoro 1999). The challenge for Habibie was to convince other elites in Jakarta as, "The military and the foreign ministry are very much against it. Habibie is not strong, so he hopes for international support" to influence powerful actors in the military and foreign ministry (Juoro 1999). As described previously (5.3.2), international support came in the form of pressure from the United Nations and United States.

To exert control Habibie would need support from Wiranto. Besides the pressure on all the Jakarta elites, as discussed previously (5.3.2), Shelton and Blair had specifically engaged with Wiranto to stop the violence (Becker 1999, DoS 1999). Wiranto accompanied the Security Council's 11 September 1999 visit to East Timor. The delegation "had the distinct impression that when the General travelled to Dili along with the Mission and toured the city, he had not been prepared for the extent of the destruction" (UNSC 1999b). One assessment is that there "wasn't a single chain of command" between Jakarta and forces in East Timor, hence neither Wiranto nor Habibie may have been receiving accurate information (Interview 2020), so it is plausible that Wiranto was unaware of the full extent of the destruction. Wiranto began to publicly acknowledge the need for international intervention when he indicated, "We cannot rule out the possibility of accelerating the arrival of the peace-keeping force" (Wiranto 1999). The UN mission noted in their report that "Accurate first-hand information as to the situation on the ground may well have contributed to the change in Government policy" (UNSC 1999b). I assess that during this trip to Dili, Wiranto realized Indonesian forces could not control the violence without external help; thus, this

influenced Wiranto to support Habibie. The delegation's assessment and Wiranto's eyewitness account appears to have moved Habibie's decision towards consent.

There is further research that supports this study's conclusions on the importance of Habibie as key to Indonesia's consent to intervention. The Australian ambassador to Jakarta John McCarthy concurred, "My best guess is no other Indonesian president but Habibie would have acted as he did" (2020). McCarthy assessed an unsettled parliament reduced the likelihood of a military veto, the overwhelming referendum vote in favour of independence, and the timing of the APEC summit prepared the space for the new president to consent to intervention (2020). This observation supports the assessment in this thesis that Habibie's leadership and eventual consent was one of the essential favouring conditions for the intervention. With the analysis of the individual favouring conditions complete, the next paragraphs discuss how the conditions worked together to ripen the decision to intervene.

5.3.5 Ripening to the Decision Moment and Consent

All five favouring conditions contributed to ripening the situation from a ripe moment for a referendum to a decision moment to intervene with consent. As described previously, a ripe moment occurred when Habibie perceived stalemate and offered the opportunity of a referendum for East Timor. The United Nations provided the way out to the referendum by establishing UNAMET, oversight of the electoral process, and the UN Secretary-General's good offices role. Indonesia and East Timor both had different visions of the likelihood of the outcome of the referendum based on their contrasting perceptions of the electorate in East Timor. Some in Jakarta expected the East Timorese to vote for autonomy within Indonesia, not independence. When the

referendum results did not turn out the way Indonesia expected, the TNI—and the pro-integration militias they controlled—escalated the violence in an attempt to maintain East Timor as a part of Indonesia. Alarmed by the scorched earth violence and unable to prevent it by other means, the international community viewed external military intervention as an opportunity to stop the atrocities. The situation ripened through diplomatic and economic pressure, UN process, and Australian leadership; as a result, Indonesia consented.

Consent was important, as intervention with consent provided for broader international support and increased the possibility of more countries contributing troops for the intervention. For example, as discussed earlier (5.2.4), Australia had made consent grounds for leading and contributing forces to the intervention (DFAT 2001, Howard 1999a). One US policymaker assessed that without consent it was unlikely that Australia and other regional countries would have provided troops to intervene nor would the Security Council have given authorization (Schwartz 2004, 152). Also, consent possibly lowered the risk of harm to the intervention force, as the mission would not be seen as an invasion by Indonesia. Although consent lowered the risk of harm, the reaction of rogue TNI elements and pro-integration militias was unknown (Australian_Parliament 1999). Although consent had the benefit of building a broader coalition, intervening in East Timor had inherent dangers and conflict was still possible.

As introduced previously (5.3.1), since Habibie was open to a solution for East Timor through a referendum, he may also be open to a solution to stop the violence through international help or intervention. This is significant, as it appears that stalemate may have favoured consent. It is clear from the sequence of events that stalemate preceded consent; however, stalemate favours consent

needs further clarification. As discussed earlier (5.3.4), amid the post-referendum violence Habibie did not rule out intervention (Juoro 1999), rather he stated it was not the time and the TNI was attempting to bring the situation under control; however, if that does not work "we will say the UN is coming in as a friend" (Habibie 1999a). From this evidence, I assess Habibie to be open to further international support, just as he was open to offer of a referendum when initially at stalemate. Habibie now required time to see if martial law would be effective and then bring Jakarta's strong military actors into agreement with inviting international forces to intervene in East Timor. Hence, Habibie was not unwilling to stop the atrocities, rather unable to stop them. After Wiranto's 11 September 1999 Dili visit to view the destruction and failure of martial law, Habibie had Wiranto's agreement, and it was time for Indonesia to invite international forces. Hence, the initial existence of a partial stalemate later opened the possibility of Indonesian consent for a permissive intervention. Stalemate, in this case, favours consent.

This section applied ripeness theory and developed the favouring conditions for intervention in the East Timor case: partial stalemate, precipitating violence, diplomatic and economic pressure, a middle power push, and a new Indonesian president. The favouring conditions ripened the conflict situation from a ripe moment for a referendum to a decision moment to intervene. The partial stalemate present in the ripe moment had opened the possibility of a subsequent military intervention with consent; hence, in this case, stalemate favours consent. With application of ripeness complete, the following conclusion will summarize the implications of the East Timor case.

CONCLUSION

This chapter analysed getting to the decision moment in the East Timor case and identified five favouring conditions for intervention: partial stalemate, precipitating violence, diplomatic and economic pressure, a middle power push, and a new Indonesian president. The analysis arrays the favouring conditions in three segments. First, a stalemate (5.3.1) perceived by the new Indonesian president led to a political solution where the United Nations provided the way out to a referendum by the establishment of UNAMET and oversight of the electoral process. Second, due to precipitating violence and destruction in East Timor in the aftermath of the referendum (5.3.1), it was unacceptable to international actors to do nothing and let the atrocities continue. Lastly, alarmed by the violence, the United Nations and concerned states used diplomatic and economic pressure (5.3.2) with Australia's middle power push (5.3.3) to obtain Habibie's consent (5.3.4) to intervene to stop atrocities.

The analysis shows three implications: a partial stalemate among the conflicting groups; a ripe moment to negotiate before the decision moment to intervene; and that, in this case, stalemate favoured consent. First, although there was a stalemate it does not mean there would not be violence. It was the nature of the stalemate—a staggered or partial stalemate with all the groups not at stalemate and some groups with the will and capacity to escalate—where violence escalated that precipitated an intervention. Next, the analysis also indicated that there was a ripe moment to negotiate a referendum before there was a decision moment among international actors to intervene. This observation shows the utility of the decision moment concept in explaining the intervention decision and the linkage to ripeness. Moreover, the case is an example of both a ripe moment and decision moment being in play at the same time with ongoing negotiations and

intervention decision-making occurring simultaneously. This highlights applicability of the decision moment as a useful evolution of ripeness theory. Finally, the existence of stalemate for the ripe moment to negotiate a referendum shaped the type of the military action that followed to an intervention with consent. In other words, an initial stalemate opened the possibility of an opportunity of intervention with consent.

This chapter provided examples of the applicability of ripeness theory and adds to our understanding of ripeness applied to military intervention to stop mass atrocities. The findings will be further investigated in Chapter 7, as well as cumulated with the results from the other case studies, suggesting broader implications of ripeness theory for explaining intervention. The next chapter analyses the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya, shaped not only by the fast-moving conflict on the ground and debate in international capitals, but also by humanitarian intervention's decade of evolution since East Timor and resulting new norm of R2P.

EAST TIMOR INTERVENTION TIMELINE ANNEX

- 1974-1975 Civil war between UDT and FRETILIN
- 1975 Indonesia invades East Timor (1974-75 Operation Komodo, then Operation Lotus)
- April 1976 Security Council calls for Indonesian forces to withdraw (UNSC Resolution 389)
- May 1998 Suharto steps down
- June 1998 Habibie considers special autonomy for East Timor within Indonesia
- December 1998 Howard Letter "interests…best served by East Timor remaining part of Indonesia."
- January 1999 Habibie proposes referendum
- April 1999 Howard recommends peacekeeping force; Habibie refuses
- 11 June 1999 UNAMET established (UNSC Resolution 1246)
- 30 August 1999 Referendum or "popular consultation"
- 4 September 1999 Results announced
- 7 September 1999 East Timor under martial law
- 12 September 1999 International peacekeeping force accepted
- 15 September 1999 INTERFET authorized (UNSC Resolution 1264)
- 20 September 1999 INTERFET deploys

Chapter 6: Libya (2011) No Stalemate, UN Legality, and a Major Power Push from the Middle

The Arab Spring uprisings, first in Tunisia (2010) and Egypt (2011), and then in Libya (2011), fanned long-simmering internal conflicts throughout the Middle East and Africa. Some would be resolved peacefully and others, like Libya, quelled only temporarily with the help of external military force. Libya's uprising began with unarmed protests by Libyan citizens dissatisfied Muammar Qaddafi's rule; however, the protests quickly escalated to internal conflict when regime security forces responded to the protests with deadly force. To stop the atrocities in Libya, NATO conducted the first humanitarian military intervention since the concept of R2P garnered broad, although not universal, support in 2005 (UNGA 2005). The intervention gained multilateral legitimacy through the diplomacy of UN member states, importantly France, United Kingdom, and the United States, regional support of the League of Arab States (LAS) (Arab_League 2011), and was authorized by UNSC Resolution 1973 resulting in a legitimate and legal intervention (UNSC 2011d). The lasting outcome of the intervention in Libya is still unclear, but an analysis of the conditions surrounding the decision to intervene can help understand the broader question of when to use military force to prevent and stop mass atrocities.

Building on the previous two chapters, the aim of this chapter is to investigate conditions for the decision moment and to assess the applicability of ripeness theory in the Libya case. The chapter uses the same comparative case analytic framework utilized in Chapter 4 and 5 to process trace and analyse ripeness. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section summarises the Libya case study providing an overview of the evolution of the internal conflict, outlining

important prevention and intervention actions, as well as introducing actors and intervention characteristics for deeper analysis in the next sections. The second section details the positions of the key international and regional actors shaping the intervention. The third section applies ripeness theory to the Libya case; the results are favouring conditions for the decision moment to intervene. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of the implications of ripeness theory derived from the Libya case. A timeline of events in the decision process to military intervention can be found as an annex to the chapter. The case study results will be cumulated with the other cases in Chapter 7.

6.1 CASE SUMMARY

Qaddafi's oppressive reign over Libya (1969-2011) was marked by violence, control, and, later, transformation to foster international acceptance of the regime; these were all accomplished with a determined goal of Qaddafi remaining in power. The background of Qaddafi's rule is well covered elsewhere, so the summary here focuses mainly on the events of 2011 (Chivvis 2014, Mezran and Alunni 2015, Vandewalle 2012). The case summary proceeds to describe the relevant background necessary to identify the favouring conditions for intervention. It begins chronologically and describes four periods. The first period (1969-2011) covers Libya before the revolution with relevant pre-2011 context (6.1.1). The second period (15-21 February 2011) describes the nature of the internal conflict and why a political solution among the actors within Libya was unlikely (6.1.2). The third period (22 February-10 March 2011) explains how external actors began to take measures to stop the violence (6.1.3). The last period (11-19 March 2011) demonstrates why it was time for external actors to intervene to stop atrocities (6.1.4). Section 6.1 begins the process of assessing the evolution of the internal conflict, actors and institutions, and

decisions on prevention and intervention that will be analysed through a ripeness lens in Section 6.3.

6.1.1 Pre-revolution Context (Period 1: 1969-2011)

The key characteristics of this period are (1) Qaddafi's repressive reign and absolute grasp on power in Libya; (2) the regime's use of violence, both within Libya and externally as a sponsor of terrorism; and (3) Qaddafi's transformation and acceptance by the international community.

Qaddafi's long, brutal influence on Libya began in 1969 when he overthrew the Libyan monarchy in a coup (Vandewalle 2012). Thereafter, his regime used violence as a threat and a weapon to "suppress all opposition for more than four decades, eviscerating systematically any expression of organized social, political, or economic interests" (Vandewalle 2012, 203). Hence, civil society was suppressed. Oil revenues facilitated Libya as a rentier or "distributive state" and enabled Qaddafi to keep taxes low, provide social services, yet also fund the regime's security apparatus to maintain his hold on power (Mezran and Alunni 2015, Vandewalle 1998). In addition to a history of recurring violence within Libya towards his own people, Qaddafi also directed terrorism outward against international targets. Notable attacks included the 1986 attack on a West Berlin nightclub that killed a US soldier and wounded 200 people, including 50 US citizens; consequently, the bombing prompted US retaliation with airstrikes during Operation Eldorado Canyon in an effort to stop Qaddafi's support for international terrorism (Weinraub 1986). Libya also committed the 1988 bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland of Pan Am Flight 103 that killed 270 people (McNeil 2001).

In later years, Qaddafi made efforts to reform Libya's sponsorship of terrorism abroad and by 2003 his regime had given up their fledgling Libyan nuclear weapons program as an apparent move to avoid regime-changing results similar to Iraq (Sanger and Miller 2003). Four successive US administrations (Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush) conducted coercive diplomacy that had a part in influencing Qaddafi's transformation (Jentleson and Whytock 2006). Qaddafi's regime altered its behaviour as a state sponsor of terror and in 2006 the United States announced they would restore diplomatic relations with Libya (Brinkley 2006). Although Qaddafi modified the regime's use of violence outside Libya, internally his control over Libya appeared to be absolute.

6.1.2 Protest Turned to Revolt and Political Solution Appeared Unlikely (Period 2: 15-21 February 2011)

Key characteristics of this period are (1) Libya's peaceful protests turn to revolt after regime repression; (2) international actors denounce Qaddafi's attacks on Libyan citizens; (3) Libya's diplomats and other elites begin to defect from the regime; and (4) despite external condemnation, Qaddafi continued attacks on his people.

Many Libyans, especially those outside of Tripoli and other regime strongholds, watching the Arab Spring uprisings in neighbouring countries were not content with Qaddafi's absolute hold on power (Mezran and Alunni 2015). As a result, protests in Libya first appeared on social media after the beginning of political transitions in Tunisia in late 2010 and Egypt early 2011. A long-suppressed Libyan civil society began to emerge. On 15 February 2011, the movement turned from social media to protests in the streets of Benghazi (Vandewalle 2012, Worth 2011). The

Benghazi protest resulted from the imprisonment of a lawyer representing the families of 1200 prisoners killed in Tripoli's Abu Salim prison in 1996 (Fahim 2011). Benghazi protests were more organized than those occurring in Tripoli and other parts of the country (Fahim and Kirkpatrick 2011b). The once-peaceful protests quickly escalated to a "Day of Rage" on 17 February 2011 and the Libyan security forces retaliated against the protesters (Worth 2011). The government attacks escalated the opposition's peaceful protests to revolt against Qaddafi's rule. The growing uprising spread throughout the country, gaining opposition support from diverse groups of internal actors consisting of local activists, defectors (from the military and government), Islamist factions, as well as exiles from abroad (Mezran and Alunni 2015). The escalating violence, as an influence on the decision to intervene, is investigated further later in the case study (6.3.1).

The international community began to take notice and speak out against the ongoing violence. On 18 February 2011, Obama urged the Libyan government to "show restraint in responding to peaceful protests and to respect the rights of their people" (2011e). Obama's condemnation of Qaddafi intensified as the internal conflict progressed; moreover, as discussed later (6.2.3, 6.3.3), the United States emerged as a key actor in shaping the intervention. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, on 21 February 2011, was "outraged" at the ongoing attacks on demonstrators and called on the Libyan authorities to stop the violence (2011d). Libya's diplomats also decried the ongoing atrocities and acknowledged the challenges of finding a political solution; as a result, the Libyan UN mission broke with the regime on 21 February 2011 (Moynihan 2011). Ibrahim Dabbashi, Libya's deputy permanent representative at the United Nations, commented at a press conference, "We state clearly that the Libyan mission is a mission for the Libyan people. It is not for the regime. The regime of Qaddafi has already started the genocide against the Libyan people" (2011).

He stated further that the mission "calls on the international community and right to protect" the Libyan people and facilitate humanitarian aid (Dabbashi 2011). The dire call from the diplomats of Libya, denouncing Qaddafi and calling the attacks genocide, is a telling plea for help to external actors; furthermore, it indicated Dabbashi's hopes for a political solution inside Libya were fleeting.

Qaddafi continued to target civilian protesters and opposition forces fighting against his regime. As discussed earlier (6.1.1), violence was a common tactic he used throughout his reign over Libya (Vandewalle 2012). Qaddafi vowed not to stop the attacks, invoking martyrdom when he stated, "I will fight on to the last drop of my blood" (2011a). With changes in leaders in Egypt to the east and Tunisia to the west, Qaddafi, apparently, was concerned about his regime's survival. His inflammatory language did not bode well for hopes of a political resolution to the internal conflict among the external actors interested in stopping the atrocities. Qaddafi's threats were one more instance of outrage in a long history of "increasingly bizarre, madman behavior" of using violence both inside Libya and in the region (Chollet 2016, 96). Qaddafi's role, as an influence on the decision to intervene, is investigated later in the case study (6.3.4). With the revolt intensifying and the unpredictable Qaddafi ready to fight to the end, the possibility of a political solution between the opposition forces and the regime appeared nowhere in sight.

6.1.3 External Actors Began to Act (Period 3: 22 February-10 March 2011)

Key characteristics of this period are (1) Security Council and international actors take measures to stop the mounting violence; (2) Libyan opposition forces align against the Qaddafi regime and

form the National Transitional Council; and (3) the United Nations attempts to mediate the escalating internal conflict.

After a closed session on 22 February 2011, the Security Council condemned the ongoing attacks by the Government of Libya on civilian peaceful demonstrators and expressed "grave concern" over the growing unrest resulting in the deaths of hundreds of civilians (UNSC 2011a). The Security Council also called on the Government of Libya to meet its responsibility to protect its population (UNSC 2011a). The influence of the doctrine of R2P on the decision to intervene is investigated later in the case study (6.3.2). On 23 February 2011, French President Nicolas Sarkozy went further urging European sanctions for "the suspension of economic, commercial and financial relations with Libya until further notice" (Sarkozy 2011); additionally, France, a key actor in the intervention, was an early advocate for using military force to stop atrocities (6.2.2). The violence continued and atrocities within Libya were mounting; reportedly, an estimated 1000 people had been killed by 25 February 2011 during the internal conflict and the eastern part of the country was under control of opposition forces (Ki-moon 2011e). The situation in Libya had now escalated to a point that the United Nations and other external actors began to act. Considering that the violence in Libya "may amount to crimes against humanity" the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1970 on 26 February 2011 in a move to quell the apparent atrocities (UNSC 2011c). The resolution referred Qaddafi to the International Criminal Court (ICC), enacted an arms embargo, placed a travel ban on Libyan officials, froze the regime's assets, established a new sanctions committee, and provided for humanitarian assistance (UNSC 2011c).

The UN Secretary-General called the unanimous adoption of Resolution 1970 "a vital step and a clear expression of the will of a united community of nations" (Ki-moon 2011b). Although Resolution 1970 was adopted unanimously, there were concerns among UNSC members about what would happen next. Russia supported the resolution; however, Ambassador Vitaly Churkin cautioned that Russia "does not enjoin sanctions, even indirect, for forceful interference in Libya's affairs, which could make the situation worse" (2011a). Russian support for the resolution indicates their satisfaction in being consulted without attempts to circumvent their role in Security Council, as happened in Kosovo; however, Russia was concerned that action in Libya could set a precedent for intervention elsewhere (Interview 2019). Russian, as well as other UN member states, concerns over action in Libya are covered in greater detail later (6.2.4). With the passing of Resolution 1970, the Security Council had now authorized all preventive measures short of a trade embargo and military action.

The disparate Libyan opposition forces began to align behind the goal of becoming free from Qaddafi's oppressive rule and corruption (Mezran and Alunni 2015). On 27 February 2011, the National Transitional Council (NTC) formed representing Libya's opposition groups and local councils; subsequently, on 5 March 2011, the NTC announced that it alone represented Libyan people (NTC 2011). The NTC consisted of thirty members representative of the various regions of Libya and all parts of Libyan society (Bartu 2015). Although the opposition forces, also known as Thuwar, were united in their goal of overthrowing the Qaddafi regime their effort was a "fictitious" or "temporary unity" that obscured ideological differences of the multiple factions (Mezran and Alunni 2015, Vandewalle 2021); unfortunately, those differences and difficulties to find effective governance solutions still plague Libyans today in resolving their on-going civil war

(Walsh 2020). By now, the momentum gained by the "overextended and under-experienced" opposition forces in the early stages of the revolution began to slow (Bartu 2015). As a result, on 6 March 2011, Qaddafi's forces regained the offensive and began to move toward Benghazi and other opposition-held towns in eastern Libya (Fahim and Kirkpatrick 2011a, Theiss 2015). Time was running out for the Libyan opposition as the regime's counter-offensive "left the stronghold of Benghazi vulnerable to Qaddafi's forces and their promised retribution" (Bellamy 2011, 266). The United Nations attempted to mediate the growing internal conflict. On 10 March 2011, the UN Secretary-General appointed Abdel-Elah Al-Khatib as the UN Special Envoy for Libya (Ki-moon 2011c). Al-Khatib hoped that his mediation "on behalf of the international community will succeed in stopping the killings and ending the suffering of the civilian population in addressing their humanitarian needs and in preserving the unity of the Libyan people and the territorial integrity of their homeland" (2011). Al-Khatib planned to be in Tripoli and Benghazi the next week working towards a diplomatic solution. The external actors moved to mediate the growing crisis and implemented measures to control the escalating violence; still, there was no consensus yet among international actors for using military force to stop the atrocities.

6.1.4 Coalition Forces Intervened (Period 4: 11-19 March 2011)

Key characteristics of this period are (1) international measures not effective in stopping the violence; (2) external actors focus on intervention; (3) Security Council authorizes intervention; and (4) air operations begin against Qaddafi's forces.

With the violence continuing and deaths mounting, it appeared that the measures in UNSC Resolution 1970, nor Al-Khatib's mediation would be effective at stopping the atrocities in Libya.

Al-Khatib called for a stop to the violence during a meeting with Libyan Foreign Minister Musa Kusa in Tripoli and was assured that the Libya government would cooperate with the Commission of Inquiry authorized by the UN Human Rights Council (UN_News 2011a). However, with the regime's renewed counteroffensive, attacks against the opposition continued; apparently, Qaddafi's regime "was not interested in a political settlement" (Reike 2015, 341). Additionally, Al-Khatib was prevented by the Libyan government to travel to Benghazi to meet with the NTC, further limiting prospects of a mediated solution to the internal conflict (Al-Khatib 2012). For international actors, with Al-Khatib's efforts blocked and Qaddafi's forces bearing down on Benghazi, it "left little time to try either the new round of mediation proposed by Russia or the more graduated response preferred by some UN officials" (Bellamy 2011, 266).

The dialogue among external actors began to focus on the possibility of military intervention to stop Qaddafi's attacks. Pressure from states in the region continued to build on Qaddafi to end the attacks on civilians, such as when the Arab League called on the Security Council to take military action on 12 March 2011 (Arab_League 2011). The position of the Arab League is further detailed in the next section (6.2.1), as it emerges as a key actor in the intervention. Appeals for international help also appeared from the Libyan opposition forces, such as a request for a no-fly zone that could provide the opposition some protection against Qaddafi's forces. Abdul Hafidh Ghoga, the vice chairman of the NTC, stated, "We feel we have the right to ask for help" (Ghoga 2011). The opposition also made clear their desire for more military force than just a no-fly zone, with requests that international actors target Qaddafi's forces on the ground (Sanger and Shanker 2011). As detailed in the next section (6.2), regional support and calls for help from within Libya aided external actors in making the case for intervention.

With violence continuing and now regional support for intervention, the Security Council passed Resolution 1973 on 17 March 2011 (UNSC 2011d). The resolution allowed coalition forces "…to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory…" (UNSC 2011d, 3) (Paragraph 9 of Resolution 1970 refers to the arms embargo (UNSC 2011c)). The UNSC vote on the resolution was ten in favour (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, France, Gabon, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, South Africa, United Kingdom, and United States), none against, and five abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India, and Russia) (UNSC 2011b). The positions of key actors, also P5 members on the Security Council, authorizing the resolution are described in the next section (6.2). UNSC Resolution 1973 authorized a no-fly zone, enforcement of the arms embargo, banned flights, and clarified the asset freeze and travel restrictions (imposed in Resolution 1970) (UNSC 2011d). The resolution provided both legitimacy and legality for intervening in Libya. Air operations began on 19 March 2011 with coalition forces striking Qaddafi's military in Benghazi (Kirkpatrick, Erlanger, and Bumiller 2011). France and the United Kingdom conducted the initial airstrikes and two days later the United States assumed the coalition lead; subsequently, NATO took control through Operation Unified Protector on 27 March 2011 (Daalder and Stavridis 2012, Stavridis 2014). With regional support and UN authorization, the intervention to stop atrocities in Libya had begun.

6.2 KEY ACTORS

As discussed above, four groups of actors were crucial to shaping the intervention: regional actors, European powers and NATO, the United States, and the abstainers. This section expands the

coverage of these actors, their policies, and relevant geopolitical context leading to the intervention.

6.2.1 Regional Actors

Key factors that shaped actors' positions are (1) dissatisfaction with Qaddafi's interference in regional affairs; (2) Qaddafi's violence against his people necessitated condemnation and measures to stop atrocities; (3) broad regional support implied legitimacy for action in Libya; and (4) extensive, although not unanimous, calls for a no-fly zone over Libya.

Qaddafi's years of meddling in the affairs of other countries, combined with the current escalating violence against his citizens, gave rise to regional voices critical of his actions. The African Union and the Arab League both condemned the ongoing attacks and emerged as important regional actors in negotiations, as well as the eventual intervention to end the internal conflict in Libya. Although both organizations were critical of the Qaddafi regime, the Arab League supported a no-fly zone, whereas the African Union remained insistent on no military intervention and searched for other ways to resolve the internal conflict (African_Union 2011b, Arab_League 2011). Early on, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), with the advocacy of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates acting as middle powers, called for a no-fly zone in Libya and requested that the Arab League discuss the crisis (Shaheen 2011). With this prompt, on 12 March 2011, the Arab League called on the Security Council to "to take the necessary measures to impose immediately a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure…" (Arab_League 2011). The Secretary-General of the Arab League Amr Moussa commented, "Our one goal is to protect the civilian population in Libya after what has

been reported of attacks and casualties in a very bloody situation" (2011). Although opposed to the violence against Libya's people, the Arab League was also committed to Libya's sovereignty. However, they were aware of the potential of foreign involvement if Qaddafi did not stop his attacks. The Arab League emphasized its commitment "to reject all forms of foreign intervention in Libya, and to emphasize that the failure to take necessary actions to end this crisis will lead to foreign intervention in internal Libyan affairs" (Arab_League 2011). In late-February, the African Union condemned the violence against peaceful protesters and called for Libya to protect its citizens (African_Union 2011a). Again on 10 March 2011, they called for Qaddafi to stop the brutality on the Libyan people; however, the African Union affirmed they did not support military intervention of any kind (African_Union 2011b). Later, the African Union developed a roadmap to resolve the internal conflict without the use of military intervention; however, it was not implemented prior to the passage of UNSC Resolution 1973 (African_Union 2011c).

The Arab League, along with support of Gabon, and middle powers Nigeria and South Africa on the Security Council indicated consensus and "the combined Arab and African support gave regional gravitas and legitimacy" to the intervention (Mabera and Spies 2016, 216). Acknowledging regional concerns, UNSC Resolution 1973 also specifically prohibited a "foreign occupation force" in Libya (UNSC 2011d). Furthermore, indicators of "broad-based regional support" were not only the Arab League's request for a no-fly zone and safe areas, but agreement by the NTC, and eventual participation of four key Arab partners in the intervention: the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Jordan and Morocco (Daalder and Stavridis 2011). These initiatives were signs that regional actors supported military intervention to stop atrocities in Libya. Importantly,

as discussed later (6.3.3), indications of regional support also played a role in gaining the push from the United States for intervention.

6.2.2 European Powers and NATO

Key factors that shaped actors' positions are (1) France's internal politics influenced other international actors and early advocacy for the use of force; (2) preventing a repeat of mass atrocities of the 1990's; and (3) NATO's need for legal authorization and regional support.

France and the United Kingdom were important European major powers in the decision to use force in Libya. They were both early advocates of the use of military options to stop atrocities (Erlanger 2011). Sarkozy made initial calls for a no-fly zone over Libya in late-February; five days later, UK Prime Minister David Cameron joined support (Watt and Wintour 2011, Wintour and Watt 2011). Although controlling migration and continuing energy imports were France's main national interests in Libya, the intervention, also known as "Sarkozy's war" within France, served to improve Sarkozy's image for the upcoming 2012 election and bolstered France's international reputation (Chrisafis 2011, Nougayrede 2011, Smith 2011). Even though UK interests only minimally supported intervention in Libya, Cameron did not want a repeat of Srebrenica (1995) during his term; hence, he followed Sarkozy's lead and advocated military options (HM_Government 2010, Wintour and Watt 2011). Cameron and Sarkozy continued their push for the use of force to stop the violence in Libya within both European institutions and at the United Nations. On 10 March 2011, Cameron and Sarkozy further outlined their vision for the way ahead through a joint letter sent to the European Union that urged no-fly zone planning and Qaddafi's removal (Cameron and Sarkozy 2011). This France-UK joint pressure generated

"diplomatic momentum" to intervene (Chivvis 2014, 35). France also engaged with the Libyan opposition when Sarkozy met with NTC representatives in Paris in their attempt to garner Western favour on 10 March 2011; subsequently, France became the first country to recognize the Libyan opposition's legitimacy (Cowell and Erlanger 2011). The NTC and its opposition forces would need the support from the West in its on-going fight against Qaddafi loyalist forces.

Although Sarkozy supported pursuing UNSC authorization, he initially believed military force should not be implemented by NATO, which had an aggressive reputation among Arab states (Cowell and Erlanger 2011). This may have been a way to keep the United States, a significant force within NATO, out of the operation. Influenced by Sarkozy, Cameron investigated the possibility of an Anglo-French operation to stop the violence; yet, as the UK Chief of Defence Staff, General David Richards, later notes, "we could not have done it with the French alone. We needed the Americans alongside of us, particularly in the critical areas of command and control and surveillance/intelligence, and for NATO to take responsibility" (2014, 336).

Following the passage of UNSC Resolution 1970, NATO began some "prudent thinking" about a military response if called on to intervene (Stavridis 2014). Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the NATO Secretary-General, outlined the organization's grounds for action in Libya during the NATO Defense Ministerial on 10 March 2011. He stated, "Firstly, there has to be demonstrable need for NATO action. Secondly, there has to be a clear legal basis. And thirdly, there has to be firm regional support" (Rasmussen 2011). Later, as it became apparent that measures in UNSC Resolution 1970 were not stopping the internal conflict, NATO appeared the appropriate regional organization to carry out the intervention due to its capabilities, location, and like-minded leaders

opposed to Qaddafi's attacks. Realization of NATO's grounds for action were becoming evident: stopping Qaddafi's violent attacks required action; the Security Council could provide a legal basis; and regional actors began to show support for military measures to stop atrocities in Libya. NATO moved ahead with France and the United Kingdom now voicing support for intervention; yet, as discussed in the next sections, Germany was reluctant, and the United States was still warily undecided.

6.2.3 United States

Key factors that shaped the US position are (1) concerns another intervention will adversely impact other ongoing military operations; (2) effectiveness and associated risks of a no-fly zone; (3) non-intervention causing US credibility/reputation damage, when the capacity and stated policy to stop atrocities existed; and (4) potential for destabilizing regional effects, if violence allowed to continue.

Although the Libyan uprising did not threaten US security nor the US economy, it did impact other US interests to respect "universal values at home and around the world" and "international order advanced by US leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity" (United_States 2010). Reflecting this, the 2010 National Security Strategy identified genocide and mass atrocity prevention as a policy priority (United_States 2010). However, there were concerns within the US administration about intervening in an internal conflict in yet another Muslim country that would distract it from other ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (Gates 2011). The challenge was balancing the imperative to act in Libya to protect human rights with other global concerns; as a result, Obama "could be patient and deferential to the Europeans there, because

Libya is a second-tier regional player and of limited strategic value to the United States" (O'Hanlon 2011).

On 18 February 2011, Obama initially called on the Libyan government to "show restraint" in their response to protesters; thereafter, the US administration sought other options to deal with the growing unrest (2011e). On 23 February 2011, Obama condemned the attacks, pledged support for a UNSC resolution, and directed his "administration to prepare the full range of options that we have to respond to this crisis" (2011c). On 25 February 2011, Obama issued an executive order that enacted US sanctions to "target the Qadhafi Government, while protecting the assets that belong to the people of Libya" (2011d). These measures evolved into an atrocity prevention strategy that was "so close to what the [Albright-Cohen] Task Force Report would have posed as the ideal" (Albright and Cohen 2008, Pomper 2018, 26). The internal conflict between Qaddafi's security forces and the opposition continued into March and spurred a growing humanitarian crisis. On 3 March 2011 Obama stated, "Going forward, we will continue to send a clear message: The violence must stop. Muammar Qadhafi has lost the legitimacy to lead, and he must leave. Those who perpetrate violence against the Libyan people will be held accountable. And the aspirations of the Libyan people for freedom, democracy, and dignity must be met" (2011a). Now with calls that Qaddafi must step down, regime change entered the external actors' position regarding the future of Libya.

The debates over Libya policy within the Obama administration are well documented (Gates 2014, Obama 2020, Power 2019, Sanger 2013), hence, only an overview is provided here. US diplomacy with other international actors and the US role in the intervention will be analysed in greater detail

later in the chapter (6.3.3). Internally, the US administration's debate on intervening in Libya was divided between those opposing military intervention and those willing to use force to stop atrocities. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Michael Mullen were staunch opponents of the United States intervening in another conflict and taking focus off ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Gates famously commented in late-February 2011, just weeks before the United States supported the intervention in Libya, that "any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should 'have his head examined,' as General MacArthur so delicately put it" (Gates 2011). Gates was also concerned with the effectiveness and associated risks of a no-fly zone (Sanger and Shanker 2011). On the interventionist side were UN Ambassador Susan Rice, NSC staffer Samantha Power, and later, reluctantly, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The United States' lack of action in during the genocide in Rwanda (1994) significantly impacted their views on intervention (Interview 2018). Rice, who served on the NSC in 1994, reflected on the US decision-making over Rwanda, "There was such a huge disconnect between the logic of each of the decisions we took along the way during the genocide and the moral consequences of the decisions taken collectively" (Rice 2001). She comments, "I swore to myself that if I ever faced such a crisis again, I would come down on the side of dramatic action, going down in flames if that was required" (Rice 2001). Rice's experience with Rwanda in 1994 strongly influenced her support for intervention in Libya in 2011.

Obama was undecided on a way ahead in Libya and "found the idea of waging a new war in a distant country with no strategic importance to the United States to be less than prudent" (2020, 655). However, while initially leery over the efficacy of a no-fly zone and reluctant to commit

forces to yet another war, after consulting with his advisors Obama decided on 15 March 2011 to push for UNSC resolution endorsing intervention. The change of policy was quick, "Within a twenty-four hour period the United States pivoted from scepticism about intervention in Libya to forceful advocacy" (Chesterman 2011). Obama opted for more than just a no-fly zone, rather a strategy that would protect civilians in harm's way; thereafter, he sent Rice to advocate for the resolution at the United Nations. According to Gates, Obama confided that the decision to seek a resolution to use military force "had been a 51-49 call" (2014, 519). After the resolution was approved, Obama shared his logic in pursuing UNSC Resolution 1973: "Left unchecked, we have every reason to believe that Qadhafi would commit atrocities against his people. Many thousands could die. A humanitarian crisis would ensue. The entire region could be destabilized, endangering many of our allies and partners" (2011b). With legitimacy and clear legal authorization, the United States could now press forward supporting the intervention.

6.2.4 The Abstainers

Key factors that shaped actors' positions are (1) an overall wariness over the use of force and potential for unintended consequences; (2) concern intervention may set a precedent for future military operations; and (3) existing differences between China and Russia (P2), and France, the United Kingdom, and the United States (P3) over sovereignty in states' internal affairs.

As discussed earlier (6.1.4), after an initial lack of consensus among UN member states over use of military options in Libya, the Security Council authorized military force with Resolution 1973. Key to the vote were not only those supporting the resolution, but, importantly, those that were wary of intervention, such as China and Russia. Although there were no UNSC members voting

against the resolution, as previously stated, there were five abstentions (Brazil, Germany, India, Russia, and China) (UNSC 2011b). Middle power Brazil condemned attacks in Libya and supported the Arab League's call for a no-fly zone; however, they were wary that the use of force authorized in UNSC Resolution 1973 "may have the unintended effect of exacerbating tensions on the ground and causing more harm than good" (UNSC 2011e). Middle power Germany, although supportive of political transition and the need for Qaddafi to give up power, was concerned with the risks of a military option and did not support the resolution, nor would it provide forces to a military effort (UNSC 2011e). Middle power India was troubled with the deteriorating humanitarian situation; nonetheless, they abstained due to the lack of clarity on the enforcement measures and "relatively little credible information" on what was happening on the ground in Libya (UNSC 2011e).

Major powers Russia and China's positions were significant, as they had the power of veto due to their permanent member status on the Security Council. As discussed earlier (6.1.3), Russia had already expressed their concerns of "forceful interference" in Libya when they voted in support of UNSC Resolution 1970 (Churkin 2011a). Russia abstained from UNSC Resolution 1973 "on the basis of a number of considerations of principle"; although Russia supported protecting Libyan civilians, they were concerned about rules of engagement and that the resolution "could potentially open the door to large-scale military intervention" (Churkin 2011b). President of Russian Dmitry Medvedev did not "consider the resolution in question wrong," rather it reflected Russia's understanding of events in Libya, "but not completely"; hence, they decided to abstain versus veto the resolution (2011). In choosing not to veto intervention in Libya, "Russia briefly stepped away from its habitual stance against interference in internal affairs" (Giles 2019, 47). China served as

President of the Security Council during the crisis in Libya. They too had "serious difficulty with parts of the resolution"; however, China abstained due to the importance of the LAS position on establishment of a no-fly zone and the AU position (Baodong 2011).

The abstentions were representative of a "deeper strategic clash" within the Security Council between the P2 and the P3 (Adams 2016, 776). The clash within the Security Council would also have grave impacts on subsequent international efforts to develop a solution to stop atrocities in the growing internal conflict in Syria. In Libya, however, although the abstainers may not have fully supported the pending military action, they did not interfere, and it was time to intervene. Now that the basics of the case are laid out, the analysis can turn to applying ripeness.

6.3 APPLYING RIPENESS AND GETTING TO THE DECISION MOMENT

This section applies ripeness theory to the Libya case. Building on the analysis of the events and actors above, the application of ripeness reveals that there was no ripe moment to negotiate that preceded the decision moment to intervene. With Libyan groups in the internal conflict willing to escalate the violence and major powers advocating external military force to stop atrocities, I argue that the decision moment to intervene coalesced around five favouring conditions: no stalemate, precipitating violence, initial acceptance of the R2P doctrine, a major powers' push, and a violent and erratic Libyan leader. This section begins with the application of ripeness theory to assess stalemate in the Libya conflict, using the process discussed in Chapter 3. Then the favouring conditions that result from the analysis of stalemate are presented. The application subsequently expands to other dimensions of ripeness (opportunity, way out, and leaders) showing the associated favouring conditions for military intervention to prevent or stop mass atrocities. Finally, the

conditions are linked together to explain ripening to the decision moment (6.3.5). The section draws on evidence from interviews, primary source government documents, newspaper articles, press statements, and UN documents, as well as secondary source literature that confirms or contrasts my analysis.

6.3.1 Applying Ripeness to Assess a Stalemate

The question of stalemate in Libya prior to the 2011 intervention is an apt point to initiate the analysis. The presence or absence of a stalemate provides an understanding of the relationship between the conflicting groups regarding violence, as well as the likelihood of negotiations to find a political solution to the internal conflict in Libya. The analysis also gives insight into the potential for escalation or de-escalation of the conflict. Applying ripeness theory to assess stalemate begins, as discussed in Chapter 3, by interrogating the primary source evidence for objective signs of stalemate, such as the lack of capacity and will to escalate the conflict. Accordingly, Qaddafi had a sheer advantage in military power over the opposition forces and on multiple occasions demonstrated the capacity, will, and actually used military force, an unambiguous indicator of means to escalate violence (Fahim and Kirkpatrick 2011a, Ki-moon 2011e). The escalation is clear when Qaddafi used deadly force against initial protests. The UNHRC found that Qaddafi forces "engaged in excessive use of force against demonstrators in the early days of the protests, leading to significant deaths and injuries" (UNHRC 2014, 6-7). Escalation was also evident later, after 6 March 2011, when Qaddafi's forces regrouped and reinitiated their march toward Benghazi (Fahim and Kirkpatrick 2011a). The evidence suggests Qaddafi had the capacity and will to escalate and thus was not at stalemate.

The opposition forces too had the will to escalate, suggesting that they were not at stalemate. The growing revolt showed the opposition's capacity and will to battle regime forces that indicates a lack of stalemate (Fahim and Kirkpatrick 2011b). However, as Qaddafi's forces regained the offensive after 6 March 2011 and advanced toward the rebel stronghold of Benghazi, the opposition forces may have been approaching a stalemate from their perspective (Fahim and Kirkpatrick 2011a). Under threat from the regime, the opposition sought backing from external actors to help in their fight against Qaddafi (Ghoga 2011); as a result, the opposition subsequently gained international support for a no-fly zone from the Arab League (Arab_League 2011, Bronner and Sanger 2011). The international support moved the opposition away from a position approaching stalemate towards pursuing the fight against Qaddafi. The favouring conditions resulting from the application of ripeness derived from stalemate are presented next.

Favouring Condition: No Stalemate

The situation in Libya at the time of intervention was not ready for a political solution, as there was clearly no stalemate between Qaddafi and the opposition forces. That both groups had the capacity and will to escalate the conflict, as argued previously (6.3.1), supports the nonexistence of stalemate. Additionally, as discussed in Chapter 3, a further indicator of a stalemate is when losses exceed expected gains. Opposition elements had long suffered under Qaddafi's oppressive rule, and they were willing to escalate their rebellion, despite losses, in the hope that they could achieve what other opposition groups achieved during the Arab Spring in neighbouring countries. From his UN mediator's perspective, Al-Khatib reflected that the opposition "were willing to take all of their loss at once" driven by the fear of the people that if they stopped their rebellion now the regime would take retribution on them (2012). Al-Khatib's observation suggests opposition

forces casualty losses were not beyond their expectations and anticipated gains; thus, providing additional evidence the opposition was not at stalemate. In retrospect, Al-Khatib concluded, "a political solution was not possible" between opposition force and the regime (2012). The evidence of the objective signs taken together indicates that there was no stalemate in the internal conflict at the time of the intervention.

As described earlier (6.1.4, 6.2.1), there were attempts to mediate the internal conflict by both the African Union and United Nations (African_Union 2011b, UN_News 2011b). Neither of these approaches was effective prior to the decision to intervene (African_Union 2011c, Al-Khatib 2012). With Qaddafi and those around him believing they could escalate to victory, thus not at stalemate, mediation was difficult. As predicted by ripeness theory, an absence of stalemate hindered measures to resolve the internal conflict. In other words, a lack of stalemate with the conflict groups willing to escalate the violence challenged the ability of the external actors to move the groups toward resolution through ripening the internal conflict. Lack of effective mediation efforts to resolve the internal conflict may also have resulted from doubts that the offers to negotiate actually came from Qaddafi himself and could potentially lead to resolving the conflict (Becker and Shane 2016). In other words, negotiation opportunities were discounted by external actors based on their lack of credibility. The then US Ambassador to Libya, Gene Cretz, noted, "My view is that there was never a serious offer from Qaddafi to step down from power" (2016). Cretz also discounted the ability Qaddafi's advisors to get to a negotiated solution, stating "I firmly believe that none of those characters around him ever had the gumption to raise the issue with him personally" (2016). The United Nations' was aware of the mediation challenges and knew that "our Al-Khatib mediation was going nowhere" (UN_Political_Affairs_Officer 2013).

Consequently, the limited attempts to mediate the conflict in Libya were not successful prior to the intervention.

No perception of stalemate and the resulting lack of successful mediation could also be related to the speed at which the internal conflict escalated. As discussed in Chapter 3, it sometimes takes time for the conflict groups to sense stalemate. The Libyan revolution was a conflict still in formation, with just thirty days from first protests in the streets of Benghazi to intervention authorized in UNSC Resolution 1973. Given more time for the internal conflict to progress may have allowed the opposing groups to perceive the evidence of stalemate and be open to negotiations; yet, up to the decision moment, no stalemate existed.

There is further research that supports this study's conclusions that there was no stalemate in Libya prior to the intervention. Mezran and Alunni note that the "conflict in Libya never reached the mutually hurting stalemate" with "both sides having a blind belief in their invincibility" (2015, 249). In other words, there was no stalemate as both Qaddafi and the opposition believed they could escalate the internal conflict to eventually triumph. Mezran and Alunni assess that a political stalemate occurred among the parties that existed after Qaddafi's death, when the NTC transitioned power to the elected General National Congress in August 2012 (2015). This was a political stalemate, in the sense of stalled progress towards a political solution; importantly, this was a partial stalemate, as not all the actors were at stalemate. With this partial stalemate, internal conflict continued among supporters of the former regime, militants, and militias resulting in a "renewed civil war" (Mezran and Alunni 2015, 277). The internal conflict is still unresolved today. Although the partial stalemate occurred outside of the timeframe of this case study, it identifies

that a stalemate eventually followed the decision moment to intervene, as well as provides another example of ripeness theory used as a tool to analyse the conflict.

Favouring Condition: Precipitating Violence

The ongoing violence during the internal conflict in Libya resulted in mass atrocities and contributed to the decision moment. The violence captured the attention of the media, masses, and was debated on agendas of decisionmakers in capital cities around the globe. Intervention resulted not only from escalation inherent in the ongoing attacks, but Qaddafi's history of violence and threats of further atrocities. Qaddafi's dehumanizing threats, such as calling the protesters "cockroaches," and specifying violent attacks was a telling warning of things to come; moreover, he vowed to fight to the end (Qaddafi 2011a). By 25 February 2011, an estimated 1000 people had already been killed by the attacks (Ki-moon 2011e). On 26 February 2011, the Security Council deplored the "violence against the civilian population made from the highest level of the Libyan government" (UNSC 2011c). The Libyan regime continued their attacks and indicated their intent for the future. In a 16 March 2011 local television broadcast, Saif al-Islam, the son of Qaddafi, signalled the impending threat to Benghazi, "It will all be over in 48 hours" (al-Islam 2011). In a radio address the next day, Qaddafi threatened that his security forces will come, "House by house, room by room. We are coming tonight.... We will find you in your closets. We will have no mercy and no pity" (Qaddafi 2011b). Those detailed threats influenced external actors to towards intervention. Later that day, the Security Council passed Resolution 1973 authorizing the intervention in Libya (UNSC 2011d). Hence, it was not just the attacks that were ongoing, but imminent threats of atrocities to come that served as indicators of potential future escalation. This precipitating violence influenced external actors in deciding when to intervene. Beyond the

favouring condition, this assessment of potential for escalation also suggests that ripeness theory continues to work as an analytic tool in better understanding the conflict.

There is further research that supports this study's conclusions on how the threats and violence precipitated the intervention. Bellamy comments that "Not since Rwanda has a regime so clearly signalled its intent to commit crimes against humanity" (2011, 265). Doyle also notes how Qaddafi's intent influenced external actors and argues "it was the threat of ethnic cleansing and massacres that seems to have justified the action, not the numbers already killed" (2014, 202). Chivvis posits the "growing number and menacing tenor" of Qaddafi's threats "would soon draw the attention of the world, becoming a key factor in the decision to intervene" (2014, 23 - 24). Taken together, this research shows how violent actors can transmit or signal their intentions to commit mass atrocities by the nature, quantity, and rhetoric of the threats they use; moreover, these threats can serve as a factor to influence external actors to intervene.

Conversely, one academic critic casts doubt that the violence and threats were sufficient to initiate an intervention. Kuperman comments that contrary to popular belief the peaceful protesters were indeed not peaceful and carried weapons (2013). He argues the opposition may have provoked the regime attacks that led to intervention in Libya; furthermore, he assesses the provocation accounted for the West intervening on the opposition's behalf (Kuperman 2019). He calls the concept moral hazard, as discussed in Chapter 2, akin to engaging in dangerous acts because you have insurance should things go wrong, i.e. the opposition taking additional risks because they believed external actors would protect them (Kuperman 2019). Kuperman's arguments have merit in retrospect; however, based on the evidence available in March 2011, and pressing time

constraints on policymakers, this thesis assesses the ongoing atrocities and Qaddafi's threats of future attacks sufficient to argue precipitating violence as a favouring condition for intervention.

6.3.2 Applying Ripeness in Search of an Opportunity

In Libya, intervention by external actors provided an opportunity to stop the atrocities. As discussed in Chapter 3, the intervention could stop the ongoing violence; moreover, it could potentially ripen the conflict with the prospect of eventually achieving a durable peace. Initially, the external actors assessed their options for courses of action short of military intervention. They condemned the violence and coerced Qaddafi to resolve the internal conflict by authorizing UNSC Resolution 1970 that enacted almost all available non-military means (UNSC 2011c). Then when the means of Resolution 1970 appeared ineffective, the Security Council authorized the opportunity to stop atrocities by "all necessary measures" including military force (UNSC 2011d). Helping UNSC delegations in their crafting the non-military means, as well as envision the opportunity for intervention, was the structure and terminology provided by the R2P doctrine.

Favouring Condition: Initial Acceptance of the R2P Doctrine

The acceptance of the R2P doctrine among external actors was a factor in gaining international and regional support for intervention in Libya. By 2011, R2P was not a fully established norm, nor was its use without controversy; however, the initial or preliminary acceptance of the doctrine had laid the groundwork for its use during the decision for intervention in Libya. As introduced in Chapter 1, R2P evolved from its roots in the ICISS (2001) to the WSOD (2005) with the doctrine and evolving norm entering international dialogue (ICISS 2001, UNGA 2005). In 2009, the UN Secretary-General published "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect" that outlined the three

pillars of R2P, including the need for a "timely and decisive response" which among other measures included the potential use of military force (Ki-moon 2009). UNSC resolutions utilized R2P-related text after the WSOD and prior to Libya (2005-2011) for crises in Democratic Republic of the Congo (2006), Burundi (2006), Sudan (Darfur) (2006), as well as further R2P-related text POC resolutions (2006 and 2009) (UNSC 2006a, c, b, 2009). Hence, by 2011 R2P terminology was commonplace and there existed an acknowledgement of a responsibility to protect civilians within a state's sovereign borders. Since the contexts of all internal conflicts are different, R2P required implementation on a "case-by-case basis," as elaborated in the WSOD (UNGA 2005); however, R2P provided a common typology of measures of prevention and intervention that could be drawn on in crafting responses for Libya.

When Qaddafi attacked civilians in February 2011 and manifestly failed to protect his citizens, R2P doctrine instructs international actors to first assist and then, possibly, intervene to protect Libyans from the government-perpetrated attacks. On 22 February 2011, the Security Council called on the "Government of Libya to meet its responsibility to protect its population" (UNSC 2011a). The UN Secretary-General, on 23 February 2011, appealed to Qaddafi to end the violence and commented, "I am sure that the international community are considering a broad range of options" to respond to the violence (Ki-moon 2011a). The Secretary-General noted Qaddafi's noncompliance and invoked R2P language stating, "he has not heeded to that…the Government of Libya must meet its responsibility to protect its people" (Ki-moon 2011a). Other diplomats used R2P terminology in their dialogue on the crisis in Libya. Both the UN Secretary-General's Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Francis Deng, as well as the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, spoke out on Libya invoking R2P language to cease

the attacks and reminding perpetrators they will be held accountable for their crimes (Deng and Luck 2011). The R2P doctrine appears to have also influenced Libya's diplomats at the United Nations in their request for assistance from external actors. Dabbashi stated that the mission "calls on the international community and right to protect" the Libyan people and facilitate humanitarian aid (2011). The dire call from the diplomats of Libya was a telling plea for help from the external actors. His mention of the "right to protect" appears a reference to R2P and consideration of international intervention in Libya to stop Qaddafi's attacks. Taken together the evidence suggests R2P's role as a favouring condition.

There is further research that supports this study's conclusions on the acceptance of the of the R2P doctrine in international institutions and impact on the Libya intervention. For example, Bellamy notes, "Where it was once a term of art employed by a handful of like-minded countries, activists, and scholars, but regarded with suspicion by much of the rest of the world, RtoP has become a commonly accepted frame of reference for preventing and responding to mass atrocities" (2011, 263). Conversely, some scholars are sceptical of the linkage between R2P and intervention in Libya. Hehir cautions, "The mere fact that R2P exists and that the P5 sanctioned action against Libya does not mean there is a causal relationship between the two" (2011, 18). Hehir makes a valid point; however, this thesis does not argue that R2P was causal in the intervention, rather it served as a favouring condition that helped policymakers envision intervention as an opportunity to stop atrocities. Hehir also comments "that the term 'responsibility to protect' does not appear in either resolution 1970 or 1973" (2011, 18). My further analysis finds references to the responsibility to protect do appear in both Resolution 1970 and 1973, albeit not as a major grounds

for justifying the intervention, rather utilizing R2P terminology as a common framework for action and reminding the Libyan regime they have a responsibility to protect their citizens.

Another Hehir critique notes "Likewise, President Obama's landmark speech on the 28th March made no mention at all of R2P" (2011, 18). I assess this omission in Obama's Libya's speech does not mean atrocity prevention was not an administration policy priority, rather it results from earlier concerns among US policymakers that R2P may tie their hands to act. During the drafting of the WSOD in 2005, as introduced in Chapter 1, the United States had specifically expressed concerns that the R2P was not an "obligation to intervene under international law" (Bolton 2005); these objections were addressed and incorporated in the final version of the WSOD (UNGA 2005). The Obama administration was also apprehensive and "went to great lengths not to use the term, for fear that it might lock them into some future decision" (Sanger 2013, 346). Although the term was not used in policy, the basic ideals of R2P were evident within the Obama administration. For example, building on the Albright-Cohen Genocide Prevention Task Force recommendations (Albright and Cohen 2008), Obama identified genocide and mass atrocity prevention as a policy priority in the 2010 National Security Strategy (United_States 2010), eventually developing an Atrocity Prevention Board in 2012 to identify early warning of mass atrocities (United_States 2011, Pomper 2018). Therefore, the reluctance to use the R2P term, in the end, did not prevent the United States from focusing on atrocity prevention, nor from acting and providing a major push for intervention in Libya, as argued later in the thesis (6.3.3).

The ripeness analysis suggests a favouring condition where the R2P doctrine helped policymakers craft the opportunity of intervention as a way of stopping the ongoing violence. Hence, the initial

acceptance of the R2P doctrine, enabled, but did not ensure, the intervention in Libya. With these opportunities the next step is a way out or process to get to intervention.

6.3.3 Applying Ripeness to Find a Way Out

With military intervention as the opportunity to halt atrocities, the process to the decision moment was the way out. As discussed in Chapter 3, the way out may lead to a ripe moment for negotiations and a political solution. Alternatively, the way out may lead to a decision moment for an intervention with the prospect of subsequently getting to a ripe moment that leads to a negotiated settlement. With negotiations unlikely to succeed in Libya (6.3.1), external actors moved toward the opportunity of military intervention to stop the violence. The initial acceptance of the R2P doctrine had clarified and enabled the opportunity of intervention; however, it was the growing pushes by the major powers of France, United Kingdom, and the United States that facilitated the way out to the decision moment.

Favouring Condition: Major Power Push

The analysis below provides more detail to the decision vignette in the opening chapter. Several major powers played important roles in the decision moment to intervene in Libya (6.2). As described earlier (6.2.2), France and the United Kingdom were early supporters of using military force to implement a no-fly zone (Cameron and Sarkozy 2011, Erlanger 2011). Although France and the United Kingdom advocated military action, providing clear major power pushes for intervention in Libya, the United States was initially reluctant to intervene once again in a Muslim country without clear national interests at stake (6.2.3). When France and the United Kingdom proposed a draft no-fly zone resolution to the Security Council, the United States needed to decide

on its own course of action (Interview 2018). Hence, the action by France and the United Kingdom prioritized Libya on the US agenda and forced a decision within the Obama administration on a Libya strategy: support the resolution, propose another option, or let the France and the United Kingdom go it alone (Interview 2018). With atrocities mounting, the US administration would need to decide on a path forward on Libya policy in the coming days.

At the highest levels within the administration, including Obama, there was opposition to intervention (Interview 2018). The turning point came on 15 March 2011 when, prompted by the France-UK proposed UNSC resolution, the debate inside the Obama administration shifted from the efficacy of a no-fly zone to developing a strategy that could actually protect civilians on the ground (Interview 2018). Obama would not participate in a "no-fly zone that won't achieve our objectives" of stopping atrocities (Obama 2020, 657). Obama recollected that "Either we do this right or stop pretending about saving Benghazi just to make ourselves feel better" (Obama 2020, 658). Now the pro-intervention position advocated by Rice and Powers (6.2.3) became the impetus behind the US push for intervention both at the United Nations and within NATO (Interview 2018). At the core of the shift was Obama's position that intervention was the right thing to do and allowing other countries to take a leading role in conducting the military intervention was the way forward (Obama 2014). Hence, Obama "plays the key role" in the decision process within the administration (Interview 2018). Obama later reflected on Libya that "we should act as part of an international coalition. But because this is not at the core of our interests, we need to get a UN mandate; we need Europeans and Gulf countries to be actively involved in the coalition; we will apply the military capabilities that are unique to us, but we expect others to carry their weight. And we worked with our defense teams to ensure that we could execute a strategy without putting

boots on the ground and without a long-term military commitment in Libya" (Obama 2016a). As discussed later, this strategy expecting other countries to share the burden of intervention and avoiding long-term US involvement would impact the eventual success of the intervention. The Obama administration pressed forward with their strategy for intervention in Libya.

Rice went to the Security Council to negotiate a resolution with the expanded mandate. With US advocacy for military intervention, regional approval, and agreement of France and the United Kingdom it took just two days for the Security Council to approve Resolution 1973 that served as the legal justification for other countries to add their support for the intervention (UNSC 2011d). As discussed previously (6.1.4 and 6.2.4), the Security Council vote on Resolution 1973 was ten in favour, none against, and five abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India, and Russia) (UNSC 2011e). That no member opposed the resolution was important as ripeness is not only about the way out, but also obstructions along the way. Notably, China and Russia sceptically supported Resolution 1973 for the intervention and abstained from the UNSC vote, not utilizing their P5 veto power (UNSC 2011e). Russia abstained because it did not want to hinder protecting civilians, but it was concerned about forceful military intervention (UNSC 2011e). With no obstructions and UNSC authorization at hand, the final part of the favouring condition was giving Qaddafi one last chance. On 18 March 2011, Obama spoke forcefully that "If Qadhafi does not comply with the resolution, the international community will impose consequences and the resolution will be enforced through military action" (Obama 2011b). Qaddafi did not relent. Thus, with no significant opposition and an unrelenting Qaddafi, the conditions for a major power push were complete. Ripening to a major powers push, therefore, occurred at the international level, with regional support, shaping a decision moment for intervention.

As discussed previously, the United States would not commit to a long-term mission but planned to initially lead and provide key military enablers, then would back off and let others lead. The United States had been working within NATO planning for a potential intervention. Now, the UNSC resolution gave NATO the legal authorization and impetus it needed to act. Someone inside the Obama administration reportedly called the US strategy "leading from behind," suggesting having other countries actively involved in leading the intervention (Obama_advisor 2011). This leading-from-behind strategy allowed the administration to share the risks and costs with others; however, it also reduced the leverage the United States had in obtaining a successful outcome of the intervention. Although there was broad critique of the leading-from-behind strategy, as well as debate as to who made the comment within the administration, it did, to some, reflect Obama's strategy (Rogin 2011). Derek Chollet, another Obama advisor, noted that a better way to characterize the quote would be "leading from behind the scenes" to "let others shoulder more of the out-front burden" (Chollet 2016, 115). Regardless of the source or interpretation of the quote, the major power push clearly influenced the intervention, both publicly and behind the scenes, to shape the military action. Rather than leading from behind, the assessment of this thesis characterizes the strategy as leading from the middle or a major power push from the middle. Obama led where he had to, and let others lead where they wanted, to shape an intervention that was more than a no-fly zone with the aim of protecting Libyan civilians from the regime ground forces committing the violence. Hence, the United States provided a major power push from the middle for a robust intervention.

6.3.4 Applying Ripeness to the Leaders

Applying ripeness theory to leaders involves an assessment of leaders within Libya, among leaders at the international level, and the relationships between leaders at the international, national, and local levels. The ripeness analysis focuses on the importance of leader perceptions of the conflict situation, external actors' views of the decision dynamics in Tripoli and internal conflict within Libya, and their perceptions of solutions to the crisis. Many leaders were important to the decision to intervene in Libya: Qaddafi for making the threats and directing the violence to retain control in Libya; Cameron and Sarkozy for being early supporters of military action; Obama for lending support to the developing push to stop the atrocities; and Medvedev for directing Russia to abstain and not veto Resolution 1973. Leaders' perspectives influencing a specific favouring condition have been described concurrent with that condition (for example, Obama in major power push (6.3.3)). In the Libya case, the analysis here focuses on Qaddafi as a central leader affecting ripeness. Key to the analysis is how external actors viewed Qaddafi outside of Libya. As described earlier (6.1.1), Qaddafi's history showed that he was capable of wielding violence. His current threats gave indications of what he might do. However, his erratic nature made it difficult to understand and predict what he was going to do; consequently, it was pragmatic to err toward the threatened outcome and to assume the worst.

Favouring Condition: A Violent and Erratic Libyan Leader

Qaddafi's violent actions and erratic reputation affected Libya, the region, and farther abroad. As discussed in the case summary (6.1.1), his forty-year reign was filled with control, threats, and violence against his own people. Prior to 2011, Qaddafi's most violent domestic act was in 1996 where his security agents killed 1200 inmates at Abu Salim prison (Fahim 2011). He had

repeatedly angered his neighbours and supported violent terror abroad (McNeil 2001, Weinraub 1986). But then Qaddafi changed course and by 2003 Libya had given up its nuclear weapons program and renounced terrorism; as a result, in 2006 the United States removed Libya from its state sponsor of terrorism list and offered to re-establish diplomatic relations (Brinkley 2006, DoS 2006, Sanger and Miller 2003). Yet, Qaddafi's reversion to violence in response to the 2011 domestic protests indicated his erratic nature. The attacks prompted regional outcry and support for action to stop atrocities in Libya, such as when the Arab League supported measures leading to the intervention (Arab_League 2011). Qaddafi's erratic nature and history of violence also affected the way other external actors viewed his threats against his people. Because of his erratic and violent reputation, international actors had no choice but to take Qaddafi's threats of genocide as real. For example, Obama recalls, "We knew that Qaddafi was moving on Benghazi, and that his history was such that he could carry out a threat to kill tens of thousands of people" (2012). In other words, external actors assumed that Qaddafi would do as he said. The assumption of how the violent and erratic leader would act influenced the decision moment towards intervention.

6.3.5 Ripening to the Decision Moment and Intervention

The favouring conditions all contributed to ripening the situation to intervention. Both sides' losses had not yet exceeded their expected gains and they had the will and capacity to go on fighting (6.3.1). Qaddafi was not ready to give up the power that he had held for so long and the opposition was not ready to give up the hope for change it was observing in other countries undergoing the Arab Spring revolutions. Hence, there was no stalemate in the internal conflict. An absence of stalemate indicated to external actors that the conflict groups within Libya would not resolve the internal conflict themselves. The external actors then had a choice of letting the

conflict play out and the violence continue or intervening in the internal conflict using non-military and/or military means. The initial acceptance of the R2P doctrine helped create a vision of an acceptable opportunity for intervention (6.3.2). With support from both regional middle powers and powerful international actors, a major power push quickly ripened the conditions for intervention (6.3.3).

Although ripe to intervene, it was not ripe to stay engaged in the peacebuilding that must follow. Obama reflected on the intervention, "I absolutely believed that it was the right thing to do.... Had we not intervened, it's likely that Libya would be Syria.... And so there would be more death, more disruption, more destruction" (2014). However, he also cautioned that the United States and "our European partners underestimated the need to come in full force if you're going to do this. Then it's the day after Qaddafi is gone, when everybody is feeling good and everybody is holding up posters saying, 'Thank you, America.' At that moment, there has to be a much more aggressive effort to rebuild societies that didn't have any civic traditions. ... So that's a lesson that I now apply every time I ask the question, 'Should we intervene, militarily? Do we have an answer [for] the day after?'" (Obama 2014). Later, when asked about the worst mistake of his presidency, Obama commented, "Probably failing to plan for the day after what I think was the right thing to do in intervening in Libya." (2016b). Hence, a decision moment does not guarantee a successful intervention. The failure to plan for the continued fighting amongst rival factions and resulting long-term unrest in Libya was one of the unintended consequences of the intervention.

This section applied ripeness theory and developed the favouring conditions for intervention in the Libya case: no stalemate, precipitating violence, initial acceptance of the R2P doctrine, a major

powers push, and a violent and erratic Libyan leader. The favouring conditions ripened the conflict situation to a decision moment to intervene. While ripe to intervene, it was not ripe to for external actors to continue to build Libya back to a fully functioning state. The turmoil that remains in the country over ten years after the intervention serves as a warning to would-be intervenors of the dangers of not following through; consequently, Libya's influence on future interventions is still unclear.

CONCLUSION

The case study highlighted ripeness implications for getting to the decision moment in the Libya case and arrived at the five favouring conditions for intervention: there was no stalemate, precipitating violence of mass atrocities occurred, initial acceptance of the R2P doctrine, a major powers push from France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and the violent and erratic leader Qaddafi. The intervention timeline in Libya was quick: just thirty days from protests and regime retaliation to UN authorization for air operations against Qaddafi's forces. The analysis arrays the favouring conditions in three segments. First, there was no stalemate (6.3.1). The chance that a ripe moment to negotiate would occur before the decision moment to intervene proved to be fleeting; hence, a political solution between Qaddafi and opposition forces appeared unlikely. Second, precipitating violence (6.3.1) made it unacceptable for external actors to do nothing and let the killing continue. The swiftness from the initial revolts to the intervention decision moment limited attempts at mediation; nonetheless, external actors used coercive diplomacy, threats, and sanctions to prevent growing atrocities. Third, it was ripe at the United Nations, regional institutions, and Western capitals to intervene to stop atrocities. The initial acceptance of the R2P doctrine (6.3.2) and a major powers push (6.3.3) completed the opportunity

and way out to intervene in Libya. Several other elements nested within these favouring conditions also influenced the decision: regional condemnation of Qaddafi's violent oppression aided the push for legitimacy (6.2.1); France and the United Kingdom's early advocacy of military intervention prompted US support (6.2.2); and China and Russia's abstention from the vote on Resolution 1973 enabled legal authorization of the intervention from the Security Council (6.2.4). These favouring conditions worked together in creating a decision moment to intervene in Libya.

The chapter adds to our understanding of ripeness theory applied to intervention. The analysis shows three implications. First, ripeness theory continues to work as an analytic tool in assessing the conflict (6.3.1). Second, ripening occurred at the regional and international level, shaping a decision moment for intervention (6.3.3 and 6.3.5). Third, a decision moment does not guarantee a successful intervention (6.3.5). The time was ripe for intervention, but unfortunately it was not ripe for international actors to see the intervention through and fully support peacebuilding to transform Libya into a stable, functioning state. Hence, the case highlights both the success of UN member states to stop atrocities and the failures of inaction when follow-through does not occur after the initial intervention. Libya serves as an important example of the evolution of humanitarian intervention and implementation of R2P as it integrates into the broader military intervention dialogue. Going forward, the next chapter compares and contrasts the conditions for a decision moment from the three case studies to further investigate the favouring conditions of when it is ripe to intervene to prevent or stop mass atrocities.

LIBYA INTERVENTION TIMELINE ANNEX

- 1969 Qaddafi overthrows Libyan monarchy in coup
- 2003 Qaddafi gives up nuclear weapons program
- 2009 Qaddafi normalizes diplomatic relations with US
- 15 February 2011 Revolt turns from social media to protest in the streets
- 17 February 2011 "Day of rage" protests, security forces retaliate, and revolt spreads
- 22 February 2011 Security Council expresses "grave concern" over situation in Libya
- 26 February 2011 Security Council passes Resolution 1970 (arms embargo, travel bans, freezes regime assets, and refers Qaddafi to ICC)
- 5 March 2011 NTC announces it alone represents Libyan people
- 6 March 2011 Qaddafi's forces regain the offensive
- 10 March 2011 NTC travels to Paris to meet with President Sarkozy
- 10 March 2011 Cameron-Sarkozy letter to EU urges no-fly zone planning and Qaddafi removal)
- 10 March 2011 NATO Defense Ministerial
- 15 March 2011 Obama decides to push for Security Council resolution endorsing intervention
- 17 March 2011 Security Council passes Resolution 1973
- 19 March 2011 Air operations begin (French jets strike Qaddafi's military in Benghazi)

Chapter 7: Bringing the Cases Together

As the case studies in Chapters 4-6 have demonstrated, a decision moment for military intervention to stop atrocities can occur with a range of favouring conditions: with partial or no stalemate, various levels or thresholds of precipitating violence, adherence to international law or not, and leaders that are known, new, or erratic, either directing or just accepting, the perpetration of atrocities. This chapter continues the analysis of ripeness and conducts a cross-case comparison of the favouring conditions. As hypothesized, the power push, when an external actor provides a push to intervene, appears as a favouring condition in all the case studies. Key major and middle power actors choose when, where, and how to push. Thus, this chapter also undertakes a deeper investigation of the power push comparing the three cases to further explore this condition of ripeness. As part of this analysis, the chapter investigates the differences between the major and middle power push and concludes with a look at the other roles of middle powers.

The aim of the chapter is to conduct a cross-case comparison of favouring conditions for the intervention decision moment to further assess the applicability of ripeness theory. As discussed in Chapter 3, the structured, focused comparison case studies and their comparative case analytic frameworks utilized in Chapters 4-6 to analyse ripeness provides a foundation for this chapter's cross-case comparison. The analytic framework compares similarities and differences among the cases to draw out additional ripeness insights from the interventions. This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section compares the favouring conditions from the three cases in Chapter 4-6. To narrow the comparative analysis of the favouring conditions, the remaining sections provide a deeper thematic look at the power push on the decision moment. The second section

investigates actors pressuring the atrocity perpetrator, as well as influencing other powers and organizations. The third section compares the similarities and differences between a major power push and a middle power push. The fourth section provides an overview of the middle powers. The fifth section investigates the roles of the middle powers in the interventions. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of the implications from the cross-case comparison.

7.1 BRINGING THE CASES TOGETHER

Comparing the favouring conditions from each of the interventions brings the cases together in a more comprehensive and integrated analysis. The ripeness-focused, cross-case comparison analyzes both the common favouring conditions, specifically stalemate, precipitating violence, and power push conditions developed in Chapter 3, as well as novel case-specific conditions discovered in the analysis. The standardized periodization of the case summaries provides a temporal basis for timing and sequence comparison. As discussed in Chapter 3, whereas the within-case analyses provided internal validity and evidence for the decision moment, the cross-case comparison illustrates the variation in the favouring conditions and potential for external validity or generalization of the conditions to a larger population of interventions. This section first looks at comparing stalemate (7.1.1), then precipitating violence (7.1.2), the opportunity/legitimacy (7.1.3), the power push (7.1.4), the leaders (7.1.5), and finally synthesizes the favouring conditions into a matrix (7.1.6).

7.1.1 Comparing Stalemate

Serving as a fundamental dimension of ripeness, stalemate it is an appropriate point to begin the comparison analysis. The condition of stalemate is central in a ripeness-focused analysis, yet the

most difficult to truly ascertain. This analysis is difficult in retrospect, and, presumably, even harder in real time. As observed in the case studies, interventions occurred with both no stalemate (Kosovo and Libya) and partial stalemate (East Timor). There were conflict groups in all three cases that were willing to escalate the violence, indicating no mutually hurting stalemate existed and, as Zartman theorized (Zartman 2000), the conflicts did not proceed to a ripe moment for negotiation or mediation. As hypothesized the condition of stalemate in the decision moment was a different configuration than that expected in negotiation or mediation. In East Timor, the pro-integration militias and supporting TNI forces willingly escalated the violence, however, Habibie's partial stalemate made prospects of consent a reality, later enabling intervention by INTERFET with Indonesian consent. Conversely, in both Kosovo and Libya, although there were attempts at mediation, it is doubtful there existed a stalemate where the groups sensed their pain and could move forward to an opportunity of resolving the conflict; rather, conflict groups still believed and acted as they could escalate to victory. This is clear in Libya with Qaddafi's rhetoric and his forces' violent actions. It is less clear in Kosovo, especially after the October 1998 Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement, where it appeared mediation resulted in an agreement to withdraw Serbian forces, deescalate the conflict, and engage in talks with Kosovar Albanians. However, there was only limited withdrawal and de-escalation, indicating the agreement was a ploy by Milosevic, with no intent of following through with the terms or resolution of the conflict.

Important here is there was no MHS and as predicted by Zartman's theory, conditions were not ripe for a negotiated solution. External actors' attempts at mediation were a normal measure for resolving the conflict; however, without a true ripe moment based on stalemate to begin mediation in Kosovo and Libya, efforts were of limited value. With prospects of resolving the conflict

through mediation limited or uncertain, it opened the possibility of stopping the violence through intervention. The comparison and synthesis from all the cases results in a partial or no stalemate that permits escalation as a favouring condition.

7.1.2 Comparing Precipitating Violence

The presence of precipitating violence is expected in all cases of intervention as violence activates concerned governments, their domestic constituencies, and multilateral organizations to push to intervene to stop mass atrocities. As hypothesized, that was the situation in this analysis where there was evidence in each case of escalating violence that appeared to be a precursor to intervention, a threshold that once reached led external actors to move forward on intervention. This is not a sufficient condition for intervention; however, it appears necessary. In retrospect, the precipitating violence stands out, but in the moment, it is more difficult to discern, as observed by Zartman (Zartman 1989). Each of the episodes of precipitating violence had different characteristics, hence the identification of a standard threshold is difficult. In Kosovo (4.1.3), the precipitating violence was the "Racak massacre" killing of 45 Kosovar Albanian civilians on 15 January 1999 (Associated_Press 1999b). In East Timor (5.1.3), it was the post-referendum "scorched earth" violence by pro-integration militias directed by the TNI with widespread destruction, forced displacement, and selective executions (UNAMET 1999b). And in Libya (6.1.3), the precipitating event was the "approaching Benghazi" violence and rhetoric of attacks to come (al-Islam 2011, Qaddafi 2011b).

Although all the episodes of precipitating violence included the deaths of innocent civilians, they each had additional characteristics as precipitating violence for intervention. Just two months after

the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement, Racak indicated the breakdown of the agreement due to changes on the ground or Milosevic's deception entering into the agreement. Although the casualties in Racak were not as numerous as the other cases, it was the culmination of the violence and the realization among external actors that Milosevic could not be trusted, and he would continue the violence unless stopped. East Timor's precipitating characteristic was the mass displacement and absolute scorched-earth destruction left in the aftermath of the pro-integration militias running amok. Although Indonesia's leadership spoke in one voice of controlling the violence, its proxy militias acted otherwise. Libya's actions and motives were transparent; moreover, it was not just the attacks that were ongoing but also the openly-broadcast, imminent threats of future escalation and atrocities that served as precipitating violence. So sometimes perpetrators are deceptive in their violence, denying attacks or cause. Perhaps proxy perpetrators commit the atrocities, and the leaders are not informed of the actual level violence. Other times perpetrators are clear in their message of violence. However, the disparate acts of violence precipitated intervention just the same. The comparison and synthesis from all the cases results in precipitating violence affecting external actors as a favouring condition.

7.1.3 Comparing Legitimacy

Several novel favouring conditions arise in the opportunity dimension. Although this grouping of favouring conditions originates from the opportunity dimension of ripeness, it essentially defines the legality and/or legitimacy required for the decision moment to intervene. The three cases taken together exhibit an evolution of the acceptance of legitimacy and legality over time. For example, in Kosovo, intervention without UNSC authorization due to the threat of a looming Russian veto, was deemed "illegal but legitimate" due to humanitarian necessity (3.3.2). In East Timor, just six

months later, only intervening with consent would be acceptable from both the UN perspective and, importantly, Australia that would lead and be a major force provider for the intervention. Consent obtained through multi-lateral diplomatic and economic pressure resulted in an invitation from Indonesia to international actors to intervene to stop the violence (4.3.2). Consent provided legitimacy over and above humanitarian necessity, and then legal authorization through a UNSC resolution. Just over a decade later, after ICISS and the resulting concept of the responsibility to protect, the initial acceptance of the R2P doctrine provided a foundation for intervention in Libya. Although the legal basis in the UN Charter had not changed since Kosovo, its interpretation, the notion of sovereignty, and intervention to protect civilians from mass atrocities had all evolved thus enabling to intervention in Libya. The comparison and synthesis from all the cases results in a legitimate opportunity of intervention to stop atrocities as a favouring condition.

7.1.4 Comparing Power Push

As hypothesized, there were clearly power pushes by key actors in all three interventions: the US major power push in Kosovo and Libya, and the Australian middle power push in East Timor. France and United Kingdom also provided major power pushes in Libya, both as early advocates of the use of military force and later as the United States transitioned to lead from the middle. Similarly, these actors pressured the atrocity perpetrator, pushed for the use of military force, and influenced other powers to decide on intervention. Some major powers pushed back, such as Russia and their threat to veto any use of force in Kosovo, or skeptically, not push at all, as was the case of the abstainers China and Russia in Libya. The power push will be covered in greater detail (7.2-7.3), along with roles of the middle powers (7.4-7.5) in the remainder of the chapter. The main point is that a power push existed in all the interventions with major or middle power

actors pushing for or against intervention. The comparison and synthesis from all the cases results in a major or middle power actor pushing for intervention as a favouring condition.

7.1.5 Comparing Leaders

The case studies show that the leaders involved with perpetrating the mass atrocities were known, new, or erratic, either directing or just accepting, the perpetration of atrocities; that being so, a rather broad set of characteristics. Yet, similar among all the leaders is they had political objectives, most importantly to stay in power. This was apparent with Milosevic and Qaddafi who were unwilling to stop the violence in order to protect their hold on political power. Habibie, although inheriting the East Timor problem, and its effects on Indonesia's regional and international reputation, offered a popular consultation to resolve it, without full control, nor complete knowledge of the situation in East Timor. He wanted to remain in power but was unable to stop the violence instigated by those elements outside his control. In the end, however, it was not whether the leader was known, new, or erratic, but that they did not or could not stop the violence. That the violence continued gave external actors reason to intervene. The comparison and synthesis from all the cases results in perpetrators that were unwilling or unable to stop the atrocities as a favouring condition.

One final point on comparing the favouring conditions is an awareness of potential linkages between cases. Although the cases are separate, they are also connected. They are similar that all are examples of military intervention to stop mass atrocities. They are separate and different that the interventions occurred in different countries, in different regions, and at different times. However, there may be interdependency "in which an event or outcome affects subsequent or other

spatially related events or outcomes" (Obert 2021, 131). This connection between the cases may occur because the same external actors were involved in multiple interventions, or a case sets a precedent that affects the likelihood of future intervention. For example, the major power United States and the middle power Canada participated in all the interventions investigated in this thesis. With both actors, commitment to the NATO mission in Kosovo limited their involvement in East Timor, which in turn shaped Australia's middle power role leading INTERFET. Similarly, the US commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq shaped its role in Libya that encouraged other actors to take the lead in the intervention. This occurs not only from the perspective of a country and its national interests, values, and resources, but also an individual decisionmaker. For example, Clinton's experience with dangers of missions gone wrong in Somalia, inaction in Rwanda halting genocide and subsequent regret, and intervention in Bosnia ending with Dayton success, all affected his decision-making on Kosovo and East Timor. Thus, the experience and lessons actors gain from one case may affect their decisions and practices as they face other subsequent interventions.

7.1.6 A Matrix of Favouring Conditions

Overall, the combined case study results show military intervention to stop atrocities occur with a range of favouring conditions: with or without stalemate; various levels or thresholds of precipitating violence; legitimate, though not always in compliance with international law; and leaders that have varying attributes. Heterogenous conditions are typical of cross-case analysis (Gerring and Christenson 2017); however, the results can be summarized in a matrix of the favouring conditions.

Table 7.1 provides an overview matrix of all cases and favouring conditions.

Case/ Ripeness Dimension	**Kosovo**	**East Timor**	**Libya**
Stalemate	No stalemate Precipitating violence	Partial stalemate Precipitating violence	No stalemate Precipitating violence
Opportunity	Illegal but legitimate	Diplomatic/economic pressure → Consent	Initial acceptance of R2P doctrine
Way Out	Major power push	Middle power push	Major power push
Leaders	Known leader	New leader	Violent, erratic leader

Synthesizing this overview across all the cases yields these favouring conditions for the decision moment:

1. Partial or no stalemate that permits escalation
2. Precipitating violence affecting external actors
3. Legitimate opportunity of intervention to stop atrocities
4. Major and/or middle power actor pushing for intervention
5. Perpetrators/leaders unwilling or unable to stop the atrocities

7.2 THE POWER PUSH: A DEEPER LOOK

As hypothesized in Chapter 3 and discussed above, there was a power push with significant pressure and influence by a major or middle power actor observed in all the cases that preceded and enabled intervention. Thus, a deeper investigation of the power push favouring condition to gain better understanding of how the power push initiates and functions is significant to this analysis. A recap of the power push definition, as developed in Chapter 3, is useful here to structure the analysis and the power push sections of the chapter (7.2-7.3). A power push occurs when an actor has the capacity, will, and takes measures (1) to pressure the perpetrator of atrocities; (2) advocate for intervention and influence other actors in international and regional organizations; and (3) provide resources or material support, such as forces and/or basing for an intervention. The analysis in this section overlays these features on the periodization for a closer examination

and comparison of the timing, phasing, means, and interactions of the conditions of ripeness with the power push to better understand when to intervene. The remainder of this section compares aspects of the power push already presented in case studies; however, with additional analysis and comparison using predominantly primary sources. The section focuses first on when of the power push occurs (7.2.1), then pressuring the atrocity perpetrator (7.2.2), and finally compares influencing other actors and organizations (7.2.3).

7.2.1 The "When" of the Power Push

To help understand the "when" of the power push it is important to first assess pragmatically what is possible in determining when to intervene. As discussed in Chapter 2, some scholars advocate intervention as early as possible to save lives (Pattison 2012), while others recommend using military force only as a last resort (Walzer 1977). The ICISS grappled with this challenge and concluded that not all measures must be tried before intervening, rather "there be reasonable grounds for believing, in all circumstances, that these other less extreme measure would not have worked" (Evans 2008, 144). Predicting the exact moment of intervention within this range of early-as-possible to last-resort is not likely; however, as a power push is somewhat manipulable by the actors, insights from the case studies can inform on the timing of the power push to provide improved clarity on when the decision moment is likely to occur.

First, there appears to be similar factors present in the decision environments of all the cases when the power push initiates: an advocate for the use of military force, the crisis is visible on decisionmakers agenda, there is the capacity to make a difference, and there is leader support at the highest level. For example, policymakers within key actor states advocated the use of force to

stop ongoing violence: Albright in Kosovo, Howard in East Timor, plus Power and Rice in Libya. The crises were on the agendas of national decisionmakers: Kosovo, with its proximity to Bosnia; monitoring the outcome of the Timorese popular consultation; and the surprising, yet welcome to some, movement of the Arab Spring. There was the capacity to make a difference with forces and basing available in NATO's southern flank, Australia, and/or afloat in the surrounding seas. Important too were Clinton, Howard, and Obama within both their governments and on the world stage, with the political will to speak out and make decisions to protect civilians from atrocities. With these factors present and the trigger of precipitating violence, the power push initiated, moving actors and events towards the decision moment.

One additional aspect that deserves mention is the collective role of unarmed civil society groups, activists, lobbyists, and other actors. They constitute part of a broader global civil society (Hehir 2008, Kaldor 2003). These actors form an informal network that supports protection of civilians, may advocate the use of military force, conduct activities that gets the crisis visible on a decisionmaker's agenda, and possibly even influence leaders at the highest level. Although investigated more thoroughly in the East Timor case, the activities of these actors were evident in the Kosovo and Libya cases, as well. Of note, both accepted civil society groups, such as those supported in Kosovo's parallel governance structure, and suppressed civil society groups, as in Libya where they rapidly reawakened during the Arab Spring, appear to have the potential to influence the decision environment factors mentioned in the previous paragraph. These groups serve as part of the transmission linkage between the conflict and decision-making for the power push. However, although acknowledging their significance I have chosen to focus on other aspects and leave a deeper investigation of these networks of actors for other researchers.

It may be helpful now to recast the synthesized favouring conditions in the previous section (7.1.6) in the context of the power push to better understand how ripeness theory informs on when to intervene. Escalating violence and the configuration of stalemate informs external actors on the status of the internal conflict. A condition of partial or no stalemate between the conflict groups indicates a situation unlikely to begin meaningful mediation and proceed to resolution. Military force may be an option to stop atrocities if external actors provide a power push. External actors begin or increase pressure on the perpetrators to stop the violence. If atrocities escalate, precipitating violence, a necessary but not sufficient condition, may occur. Viewed through a ripeness lens, precipitating violence appears to activate the power push in the presence of the advocate, agenda, capacity, and leader factors mentioned above; as a result, external actors then choose when and in what ways they push for intervention. External actors deliberate and search for a legitimate intervention opportunity with possibility of success. With the awareness that mediation may not work, major and/or middle power actors increase pressure on the perpetrators and influence other external actors, both individually and within broader organizations, to support use of military force, thereby providing a way out to intervention. The power push targets perpetrators that are unwilling or unable to stop the atrocities. A perpetrators response, or non-response, to the power push faces a last chance at diplomacy before the decision moment, and if atrocities continue, in the end, intervention. Hence, the decision moment follows the power push with the realization that mediation is not working, pressuring the perpetrators has yet to stop the atrocities, and a legitimate opportunity of intervention exists.

7.2.2 Pressuring the Atrocity Perpetrator

In all the cases, multiple actors pressured the perpetrators to stop committing atrocities. The evidence shows that actors pressure the perpetrators through constructive diplomatic dialogue, shaming rhetoric, as well as other measures including arms embargoes and economic sanctions, as predicted in the literature (Byman and Waxman 2002). Actors sometimes pressure alone, work together with another actor, with members of a contact group, or using a broader regional or international organization. In other words, actors push the perpetrator to stop the atrocities, sometimes through organizations that consolidate and implement a collective response to increase the pressure. The external actions may or may not have the desired result of a successful outcome of atrocities ending. Then external actors must decide on their next actions: to do more of the same, do nothing, or change strategy and intervene.

The next paragraphs compare actions by external actors on the atrocity perpetrator over time. Although grounded in the standardized periodization, the analysis looks at three phases: early actions, before key external actors begin a power push to stop violence (similar to Period 2); main actions, when external actors begin the power push to stop violence with preventive and coercive measures short of military force (Period 3); and approaching the decision moment, when the power push increases as violence escalates, leading to the military intervention decision (Period 4).

Early actions

In the early-actions phase, actors conducted measures that would be considered normal diplomatic engagement, such as naming and shaming a perpetrator; however, actors were still not committed to providing a power push. For example, external actors urged perpetrators to show restraint

(Obama 2011e) and expressed their growing outrage at attacks targeting civilians (Ki-moon 2011d). There were also calls for increased security, ceasefire, and withdrawal (UNSC 1998b, 1999c). Disagreement between the major powers sometimes hinders movement to the next phase. For example, in Kosovo, where although actors did not want a repeat of the atrocities of Bosnia, there was no clear way forward to resolve the conflict. Individual countries or select groupings of actors sometimes enact measures, such as sanctions, without the agreement of other international actors, such as Kosovo Contact Group sanctions without the participation of Russia (Clinton 1998c).

Main actions

The main-actions phase begins with precipitating violence leading to the activation of a power push. External actors begin the power push to stop violence that includes preventive and coercive measures short of military force. Actors implement atrocities monitoring, such as the KVM. Actors further condemn the violence (Clinton 1999h), act in conjunction with other actors, such as the Joint US-Russia statement on Kosovo (Albright and Ivanov 1999), and/or through the Security Council (UNSC 2011a). In some cases, external actors allow perpetrators to attempt to internally control the situation to stop the violence. Momentum develops for coercive strategies, such as diplomatic pressure with threats of economic sanctions or threat of air strikes linked to political settlement (Albright 2003, 394). There are calls for use of military force to stop atrocities (Erlanger 2011). Mediation is initiated and monitored for progress towards success (Ki-moon 2011c). The nature of these measures has grown more comprehensive, with an emphasis on becoming more effective over time. UNSC Resolution 1970 provides an example of full-spectrum measures in this phase: Security Council condemns attacks, perpetrator referred to ICC, arms embargo, travel

ban, perpetrator regime assets frozen, new sanctions committee established, and humanitarian assistance (UNSC 2011c).

Approaching the decision moment

The approaching-the-decision-moment phase is consumed with political-military planning for intervention; however, pressuring the perpetrator continues. Although heading towards a decision moment for intervention, a path leading to a ripe moment for conflict resolution is always desirable, although not always possible. Importantly, one of the last steps before proceeding to the decision moment is to give diplomacy one last chance, as with Rambouillet on Kosovo and pressing Qaddafi on Libya. In East Timor too, diplomacy was given one long last chance, as the intervention would not have happened without consent. Both Milosevic and Qaddafi decided against a diplomatic solution before intervention began; accordingly, at the decision moment the Security Council or NATO authorized the intervention. NATO and UNSC authorization served as well to pressure the perpetrator; moreover, it demonstrated the willingness to follow through on the credible use of force.

Table 7.2 provides an overview of actions pressuring the atrocity perpetrator.

Phase/Period/ Case	**Early Actions:** Characteristics before key external actors begin power push to stop violence [Period 2]	**Main Actions:** Actors begin power push to stop violence: preventive, coercive measures short of military force [Period 3]	**Approaching the Decision Moment:** Power push increases as violence escalates, leading to the intervention decision moment [Period 4]
Kosovo	- Arms embargo (UNSC 1998a)	- Monitoring (KVM) - Condemn violence (Clinton 1999h)	- Another chance at diplomacy - NATO authorizes intervention

	- Calls for a ceasefire and withdrawal (UNSC 1998b). - Contact Group (-Russia) Sanctions - NATO signals intent to use force - Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement	- Momentum for strategy of diplomacy backed by force - Coercion with threat of air strikes linked to political settlement (Albright 2003, 394)	
East Timor	- Indonesia must maintain peace and security (UNSC 1999c) - Calls for security (Australian_Cabinet 1999) - Peacekeeper offer (Howard 1999b)	- Diplomatic pressure with threats of economic sanctions - Patience to allow Indonesia to control situation - Calls for military force to stop atrocities	- Consent sought for intervention force (Annan 1999b) - Pressure applied at APEC Summit (Clinton 1999g) - UNSC authorizes intervention (UNSC 1999g)
Libya	- Perpetrators urged to show restraint (Obama 2011e). - External actors expressed outrage at attacks (Ki-moon 2011d).	- UNSC condemns attacks (UNSC 2011a) - Referred to ICC - Arms embargo - Travel ban - Froze regime assets - Sanction committee - Humanitarian assistance (UNSC 2011c) - UN mediation (Ki-moon 2011c) - Calls for use of military force (Erlanger 2011)	- Other actors call for military action (Arab_League 2011) - Realization mediation not effective at stopping violence - UNSC authorizes all necessary measures to protect civilians (UNSC 2011d)

Hence, during the early actions phase normal diplomatic measures are conducted to prevent atrocities. The main actions phase begins with the precipitating violence and initiates the power push culminating in actions short of military force. The approaching decision moment phase raises the pressure by external actors and proceeds closer to intervention. But in the end, pressuring the perpetrator did not stop the atrocities. In the case of East Timor, however, the pressure did

contribute to gaining consent for intervention. Importantly, the unsuccessful pressuring served as both an indicator and momentum to focus on another element of the power push, to advocate for military force and influence other actors towards intervention. The next section continues the investigation of the power push and the move towards intervention.

7.2.3 Pushing for Intervention and Influencing Other Actors

Although pressuring the perpetrator to stop atrocities continues, with the awareness that pressure is not working and legitimate intervention opportunity exists, the focus now shifts to pushing to intervene and influencing other actors to do the same. The overlap of pressuring the atrocity perpetrators and influencing other powers and organizations continues right up to the decision moment, with the prospect that a path to a ripe moment for conflict resolution will appear. The next paragraphs move on to the second part of the power push definition where actors push, advocate, and serve as a proponent of intervention in international and regional organizations.

Just as no actor is the same, no power push is the same. Moreover, the same actor can vary the characteristics of their power push across multiple interventions. For example, the US position across all three interventions can be characterized by an initial reluctance to intervene. In Kosovo, the United States understood the pending crisis through their involvement in Bosnia; however, the prospect of resolving the conflict through negotiations delayed the US decision to intervene militarily in Kosovo. In East Timor, barely six months later, the United States was then focused on success in Kosovo and reluctant to intervene in East Timor, especially with Australia nearby and fully capable to execute the mission. Just over a decade later in Libya, the United States was engaged in Afghanistan and Iraq, cautious and reluctant to intervene in yet another Muslim

country. However, the United States pushed for intervention in all these cases with varying intensity and leadership. The United States pushed the Contact Group and led NATO in Kosovo, whereas the US strategy in East Timor and Libya were similar, to let other countries lead.

A clear influence on the power push in each of the interventions was the role of the major power Russia. Russia's actions and intentions in the interventions varied: threatened a UNSC veto in Kosovo; uninterested in East Timor; and abstained on Libya UNSC vote. Although Russia threatened to veto any resolution authorizing military force in Kosovo (Ivanov 1998), they joined the other members Security Council (UNSC 1998b) and of the Contact Group calling for an end to hostilities and a peaceful solution (Contact_Group 1999). Other powers pushed back on Russia in the Contact Group, such as Germany, in an effort to gain UNSC authorization for military force; however, external actors would need to accept multilateral authorization from NATO and mitigate the consequences (Albright 2003, 389). Powers pushing for or against an action in the Security Council, NATO, or within a Contact Group is normal dialogue of managing conflict; however, pushing against intervention means the decision takes longer, thus, later to intervene.

7.2.4 Forces and Basing

Closely linked to pushing for intervention is the capacity to act with forces and basing near the intended intervention. This element builds from the capacity to make a difference, as discussed earlier regarding the initiation factors of a power push. In other words, not only do specific forces need to be available but bases to operate from need to be located where the forces can make a difference to stop atrocities. All three interventions had forces and bases nearby. In the case of Kosovo and Libya, US and NATO airpower forces operating from bases in Southern Europe or

afloat in the Adriatic or Mediterranean Sea. On the other side of the world, it meant expanding INTERFET forces in Darwin in the Northern Territories of Australia and forces afloat in the surrounding Timor Sea that could quickly be deployed to East Timor stop the ongoing violence. Each external actor brings a specific complement of forces to stop atrocities. Obama stated the United States "will apply the military capabilities that are unique to us, but we expect others to carry their weight" (Obama 2016a). A decade earlier, Clinton's pledged forces serving a "limited but important function" (Clinton 1999b) with the expectation that regional INTERFET forces would accomplish the mission of stopping atrocities in East Timor.

One final point on the US role in the power push and intervention. The United States appears as a major power actor in all three cases examined. It provided a power push in Kosovo and Libya, as well as diplomatic and economic pressure in the East Timor intervention. This research acknowledges the significance of US involvement and resulting influences on ripeness in getting to the intervention decision moment. This is not to argue that America is the "indispensable nation" as described by Madeleine Albright and others, but in these cases the United States mattered. The cases were not chosen to make this point, rather as significant examples of interventions to stop atrocities. As this could be attributed to case selection bias, it should not be generalized to all interventions. Follow-on research could choose cases with limited US involvement to control for this concern.

7.3 THE POWER PUSH: COMPARING THE MAJOR AND MIDDLE POWER PUSH

Interventions occur when there is a power push by a major or middle power. This section focuses specifically on the differences between the major and middle power push and investigates several

key features of how major and middle power actors are different in shaping the intervention through their power push. As the previous section points out, there are similarities between all power pushes: pressuring the perpetrator, influencing other actors, and providing forces/basing to intervene. As discussed in the case studies, there are also similar factors that influence those actors and their power push to the decision moment: precipitating violence, other actors, reputation, regional stability, legitimacy, and nonproductive negotiations, and, always, their national interests. These all factor into the power push and appear similar among major and middle powers. The difference is not necessarily the reasons or measures, rather the method or way that major powers can operate in the international system compared with middle powers. I argue that the key difference is whereas major powers shape the intervention through their power over and, sometimes, around the international and regional institutions, middle powers must work within the institutions to shape the intervention.

Major powers sometimes act outside of the system of international law, such as in Kosovo where intervention occurred without a UNSC resolution authorizing the intervention and was deemed 'illegal but legitimate'. In Libya, the United States went well beyond the no-fly zone that other actors, such as France and the United Kingdom, were advocating; accordingly, the more robust US strategy proposed use of force to protect civilians on the ground, an example of using their major power influence to shape a broader intervention to protect lives, maintain regional stability, and avert a humanitarian crisis (Obama 2011b). However, in Libya, the United States sought a UNSC resolution to ensure their strategy was not only legitimate but also legal by international law. Obama was sensitive to the need for a UNSC resolution due to discord over Kosovo, as well as the more recent intervention in Iraq (2003), that both occurred without explicit UNSC

authorization. The legal authorization served to quell domestic concerns among allies and broaden potential coalition support to stop atrocities committed by the Qaddafi regime.

Middle powers must act within the international and regional systems, as they require support from major powers and regional actors to accomplish their objectives. For example, middle power Australia needed US diplomatic pressure on Indonesia and wanted US military support for Australia in East Timor. Additionally, whereas both major and middle powers value regional stability, middle powers must also live in the regions where they intervene and consider long-term relations with their neighbors. This is evident in in middle power Australia's decision to intervene in Indonesian-occupied East Timor. Not only must Australia consider its role as a regional power, but also its long-term relationship with its neighbor, populous middle power Indonesia. As such, even though they were contemplating intervention, Australia had not yet severed military relations with Indonesia, nor imposed economic sanctions with an eye on the long-term relationship with its neighbor. Middle powers also accomplish other roles that will be further examined later in the chapter.

7.4 THE MIDDLE POWERS

Beyond Australia's middle power push to intervene in East Timor, there were other middle powers acting in the cases. As introduced in Chapter 2, the middle powers range from Australia and Canada, so-called traditional middle powers, to Germany, a major economic power but a middle power by its foreign and security policy characteristics, to states acting as middle powers, such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, that have not yet attained all the attributes of middle powers. Building on the comparison earlier in the chapter, this section begins analysis of the middle powers

and their impact on the power push favouring condition, the middle power push. The section first justifies the deeper look into the actions of the middle powers (7.4.1) and then summarizes the middle powers involved in the three interventions in a matrix (7.4.2).

7.4.1 Further Investigating Middle Powers

Bringing middle powers into the analysis serves several important functions. First, as middle powers participated in each of the military interventions covered in the cases, including their actions provides a more comprehensive intervention analysis. An examination focused solely on the major powers could lead to incorrect conclusions, such as assuming major power actors can implement intervention policy without considering the constraints and option-shaping role of other actors, such as the middle powers. Second, middle powers may not only influence the actions of a major power but shape the overall course of a military intervention. Arguably, the most influential middle power was Australia in the East Timor intervention covered in Chapter 5, where Australia's middle power push is identified as a favouring condition. Third, middle powers are known for their niche diplomacy, mediation, bridge-building, and innovative practices, thus examples of applicability of ripeness theory may be identified in their behavior and add to the analysis. Finally, middle powers can also serve as a way of mitigating selection bias. In other words, the selected cases show that major powers influenced the interventions; however, by including middle powers the analysis also illustrates the important roles that actors other than the major powers can play in intervention decisions.

7.4.2 A Middle Powers Matrix

As identified in the key actors' sections of the case studies, all three of the cases involved middle powers. The following overview matrix (Table 7.4) provides a summary of key middle power actors and their characteristics, including functional comparison, organizational affiliation, voting preferences, and role as a force and/or basing provider.

Table 7.4 provides a middle power overview.

Case/ Middle Power	**Kosovo**	**East Timor**	**Libya**
Australia: traditional middle power		Core Group Led INTERFET Provided forces Provided basing Key actor	
Brazil		UNSC member (E10) Voted for SCR 1264 Provided forces	UNSC member (E10) Abstained SCR 1973 Authored RWP
Canada: traditional middle power	NATO member UNSC member (E10) Provided forces	APEC member UNSC member (E10) Voted for SCR 1264 Provided forces	NATO member Provided forces
Germany	NATO member Contact Group	Provided forces	NATO member UNSC member (E10) Abstained SCR 1973
India			UNSC member (E10) Abstained SCR 1973
Italy	NATO member Contact Group Provided basing	Provided forces	NATO member Provided basing
Japan		Core Group	
Malaysia		ASEAN member Provided forces	
New Zealand		Core Group Provided forces Forum of Small States	
Nigeria			African Union member UNSC member (E10) Voted for SCR 1973

Portugal	NATO member	Key actor	NATO member
Qatar			Arab League member Provided forces Forum of Small States
South Africa			African Union member UNSC member (E10) Voted for SCR 1973
Sweden		Provided forces	Non-NATO Provided forces
Thailand		ASEAN member Provided forces	
Turkey	NATO member		NATO member
United Arab Emirates			Arab League member Provided forces Forum of Small States

The data for Table 7.4 is cumulated from the key actors' sections of the case studies, as well as research discussed in Chapter 2 identifying and characterizing middle powers (Cooper 1997, Cooper 2013, Patience and Roy 2019, Struye_de_Swieland 2019). Aspects of these middle power characteristics will be examined in the following sections.

7.5 MIDDLE POWER DYNAMICS

The dynamics between the middle and major powers can influence the decision moment. The dynamics can influence a major power push, affect intervention advocacy in international and regional organizations, result in a middle power-led intervention in the absence of a major power push, confirm support for major powers' intervention position, and/or question or restrain major powers' preferences. These dynamics can be categorized as middle powers pushing (7.5.1), middle powers confirming (7.5.2), and middle powers restraining (7.5.3).

7.5.1 Middle Powers Pushing

Throughout the cases there are examples of middle powers pushing, such as pushing within organizations and sub-groups, pushing the major powers, and pushing for intervention itself. This push is evident when middle powers exert their influence within multilateral organizations. For example, the middle power Canada is an active UN member state and held a non-permanent seat (E10) on the Security Council for the 1999-2000 term during the Kosovo and East Timor interventions (UN 1999b). They are also a member of APEC, as well as other multi-lateral forums, such as the G7/8 and G20. During the Kosovo conflict, Canada initially supported pursuing a UNSC resolution to authorize use of force; however, they decided to not pursue a resolution when confronted by representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, and France, who fearing a Russian veto, wanted to preserve the sanctity of the veto for future actions (Fowler 1998). The initial move to pursue UNSC authorization indicates Canada's middle-power preferences to push for a legal multilateral solution, however, willing to align with major powers over concerns of the potential Russian veto.

Canada was also concerned about the internal conflict in East Timor, and correspondingly, the Timorese were interested in Canada's support to help resolve their conflict with Indonesia (Gusmao 1999). Amid the violence in the wake of the August 1999 vote, Canadian diplomats pressed the Security Council on developing contingency plans should the situation worsen (DFAIT 1999). Additionally, to rally support for action on East Timor, Canada proposed an informal Foreign Ministers' side meeting on the crisis at the 1999 Auckland APEC Ministerial Meeting (DFAIT 1999). Although not normally a forum for security issues, 18 APEC Foreign Ministers attended the side meeting and the group was able to gain agreement on the need to continue

pressing Indonesia for access for a peacekeeping force and action from the Security Council (Axworthy 1999). Canada was able use its membership in multilateral APEC and its Security Council position to push for support for East Timor; thus, the measures resulted in further international support, as well as focusing diplomatic pressure on Indonesia to permit intervention to stop the violence.

Middle powers can also assert their influence through membership and active participation in smaller sub-organization steering groups, such as Contact or Core Groups discussed in the case studies, that support resolving a conflict. Middle powers Germany and Italy were members of the Contact Group for Kosovo. Australia, Japan, and New Zealand were members of the Core Group for East Timor. The Libya Contact Group also contained middle powers; however, although active in managing and resolving the conflict, the group formed after the decision to intervene. These groups acted to move issues and resolutions through the Security Council, as well as advocating actions outside UNSC procedure, such as sanctions, when traditional process was blocked, as in the case of Kosovo.

Middle powers may need to push the major powers for support, especially when they are taking the lead in an intervention. This was the situation in the East Timor case where Australia pushed the United States for assistance. Australia wanted assurances that the United States would come to INTERFET's assistance, if needed, should conflict escalate with Indonesia. After military involvement in Bosnia and Kosovo, however, the Clinton administration was reluctant to become involved in another conflict. Australia wanted the United States to provide "a small detachment of ground forces could serve as a 'tripwire' for automatic US involvement if military tensions with

Indonesia escalated" (Cohen and O'Neil 2015, 41). Australia pushed at multiple levels within the government; however, they were told "no troops" from the US Secretary of Defence William Cohen (Cohen 1999b). In the end, the major power United States provided limited forces and a commitment to support middle power Australia if conflict escalated with Indonesia (Clinton 1999b, White 2009). Although only a small contingent of US troops and several helicopters directly supported INTERFET ashore, the 1800 US Marines and sailors offshore on the USS Beleau Wood amphibious assault ship served as an indicator of US commitment (Shenon 1999).

Although Portugal was considered a middle power in the 19th century, it is now integrated within both the European Union and NATO. Portugal leveraged their membership in these multilateral organizations, along with Portuguese military support to influence the United States over intervention in East Timor. In an effort to gain US backing for intervention, Portugal's Prime Minister Antonio Guterres threatened removal of Portuguese assistance for NATO's Kosovo mission, if the United States did not support intervention in East Timor (Gorjao 2001, Greenlees and Garran 2002). Portugal also restricted US military flights from their crucial mid-Atlantic base in the Azores to push for US support to operations in East Timor (Fernandes 2008, Simpson 2016). Portugal's push helped gain major power support for intervention in East Timor.

7.5.2 Middle Powers Confirming

Middle powers can also serve the function of confirming support for a key actor's intended policy in a region. For example, confirmation of Asian and ASEAN support for the Australian-led intervention is suggested by the middle powers Malaysia and Thailand participating in the coalition to stop the violence in East Timor. Thailand was both the second largest troop contributor, and

provided a Thai INTERFET Deputy Commander (DFAT 2001). Likewise, assertive rising middle powers Qatar and UAE influenced the GCC and Arab League to support intervention in Libya. One analysis is the GCC and Arab League's support for intervention "proved to be a diplomatic game-changer" prompting both the United States to pursue and dissuading Chinese and Russian veto of UNSC Resolution 1973 (Bellamy 2011). Qatar and UAE commitment to provide fighter aircraft further confirmed their support (Bumiller and Kirkpatrick 2011). Importantly, these rising middle powers followed through on their commitment of support, significant where only 14 of NATO's 28 members actively participated in the intervention (Myers and Dempsey 2011). The middle power Sweden, a non-NATO member, also made good their commitment to provide fighter aircraft to support the operation in Libya (Myers and Dempsey 2011). Importantly, these middle power initiatives by Thailand, Qatar, and the UAE supporting action in East Timor and Libya confirmed regional support to the key actors, Australia and the United States, for their intended intervention policy thus supporting their power pushes for intervention.

7.5.3 Middle Powers Restraining

Middle powers may serve a restraining function when they question an intervention opportunity or are reluctant to intervene. Being hesitant, hence responsible about the use of force is entwined with the middle power's good "global citizen" role (Patience and Roy 2019). This restraining function stems from the middle powers recent experience, history, national interests, and/or leader preferences; however, this reluctant or restrained behavior may influence the intervention by signaling dissatisfaction with the planned course of action. For example, Germany was leery of intervention in Kosovo without UNSC authorization. In October 1998, the German Foreign Minister showed concern that NATO's decision on Kosovo must not become a "Präzedenzfall" or

precedence (Kinkel 1998). Reservations about NATO's use of force without UNSC authorization and associated concerns of illegality was debated in the German Parliament (Bundestag 1998). Eventually, the ongoing humanitarian dilemma outweighed the legal concerns and Germany supported NATO's intervention in an effort to end the dire Balkan crisis (NATO 1998a). When NATO did not intervene in October 1998, some middle powers indicated the need to negotiate the use of force anew, indicating a restraining role (Cohen 1999a). Some middle power reluctance came from not being consulted nor treated appropriately by the United States (Cohen 1998a). Germany's position, as well as Canada's (7.5.1), indicate middle powers desire for multilateral solutions to problems and working through institutions.

Germany's restraining role did not carry over to East Timor, where debate centered on first obtaining Indonesia's consent and then UN authorization for intervention. Germany had an ongoing activist opposition to East Timor's occupation and although they had supplied arms to Indonesia, they supported stopping the violence in 1999. Hence, when intervention was authorized by the United Nations, Germany supported the intervention and provided forces for INTERFET (UNSC 1999g). However, by 2011, some middle powers that supported earlier interventions were leery of Western military intervention in Libya. Germany, along with the middle powers Brazil and India, abstained from the SC Resolution 1973 vote authorizing intervention in Libya (UNSC 2011d, e). Germany's reluctance was based on concerns that if the measures in UNSC Resolution 1973 "turn out to be ineffective, we see the danger of being drawn into a protracted military conflict that would affect the wider region. We should not enter into a militarily confrontation on the optimistic assumption that quick results with few casualties will be achieved" (Wittig 2011). The

middle powers expressed their hesitations yet worked through multilateral organization and process.

CONCLUSION

This chapter attempted to bring the case studies together to provide a more holistic view of intervention through a ripeness lens. The comparison of the cases showcased not only the similarities and differences among the favouring conditions of the interventions, but also provided clarity and variation in the components, concepts, and usefulness of the decision moment. Several key implications emerge from the chapter. First, the range of favouring conditions for the decision moment discovered in the case studies can be synthesized and summarized as (1) partial or no stalemate that permits escalation; (2) precipitating violence affecting external actors; (3) legitimate opportunity of intervention to stop atrocities; (4) major and/or middle power actor pushing for intervention; (5) perpetrators/leaders unwilling or unable to stop the atrocities. This claim is not generalized among all interventions in the category, as analysis of more cases would be required; however, it does appear to characterize the interventions investigated in this thesis.

Second, the power push seems to be a useful concept in explaining a key actor's role in intervention and informs on when an intervention occurs. Although precipitating violence served as a trigger, there appears to be similar factors present in the decision environments of all the cases when the power push initiates: (1) an advocate for the use of military force; (2) the crisis is visible on decisionmakers agenda; (3) there is the capacity to make a difference; and (4) there is leader support at the highest level.

Third, it highlights that although the major power push is significant, it does not tell the whole story. Middle powers can also affect intervention by influencing a major power push, advocating in regional and international organizations, or even lead an intervention in the absence of a major power push as seen in the role of the middle power Australia in the intervention in East Timor. Hence, middle powers push, but they also confirm support for major powers' strategy or sometimes question or restrain major power actions. These implications for when to intervene will continue in the next chapter as this thesis comes to a conclusion.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

This thesis, like all theses, has been an evolution. Of learning about concepts of ripeness and travelling with them to a different context. Of conducting case studies and investigating examples of intervention. Of determining conditions of when those interventions occurred. Then finally comparing those conditions to gain a broader understanding of the applicability of ripeness theory for understanding when to intervene to stop atrocities. This chapter concludes this evolution and brings the research question back into focus to provide answers, as well as how the research has advanced the ripeness and military intervention literature. This research applied an approach from one discipline to another context and process. It is the first study that has applied traditional ripeness theory to military intervention. This work built on existing theory and proposed new concepts for use in a ripeness-based framework. The research conducted case studies using this new approach, tested hypotheses, and discovered favouring conditions for intervention. The study made progress in closing some gaps using this new approach and comes to several conclusions: ripeness is applicable to intervention and serves as an example of a theory that can travel from one context to another; a ripeness-based approach is useful for understanding when to intervene; and that middle powers have multiple roles in when to intervene, including influencing major powers and intervention itself. These are discussed here in this chapter, along with other significant findings and observations from the previous seven chapters to finish to this research endeavor.

Chapter 8 serves as the conclusion of the thesis providing answers to the research question, an assessment of the ripeness-based approach and the applicability of ripeness theory, and future ideas for scholarship and potential application to policy someday. This end of the qualitative inquiry is

not just the results of process tracing, but the synthesis of a deep look at intervention decisions where each case study argues for five favouring conditions that connect in the comparison chapter for conclusions based on scientific knowledge, as well as other outcomes of useable knowledge. This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section provides the answers to the research question and hypotheses for the thesis. The second section identifies what worked and assesses how the ripeness-based approach has advanced both ripeness theory and explaining military intervention. The third section looks at questions for further research. The chapter ends with some final thoughts. Importantly, as this thesis concludes, I make no claim that that this is the best approach, nor a perfect approach; however, this is an approach based in social science, an approach no one has done before, an approach that bridges conflict resolution and military intervention, and it is my contribution to the academic literature.

8.1 ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTION

Before providing answers, we must first go back to the research question: what is the applicability of ripeness theory for understanding when to conduct a military intervention to prevent or stop mass atrocities? To help investigate this question, the thesis hypothesized three common favouring conditions: (1) configuration of stalemate, (2) precipitating violence, and (3) power push. The first hypothesized that the condition of stalemate for intervention is a different configuration than that predicted for the initiation of negotiation or mediation in ripeness theory. The research found that there was a configuration of partial or no stalemate for the decision moment to intervene, compared to a mutually hurting stalemate that yielded a ripe moment to negotiate predicted by traditional ripeness theory. This outcome suggests a decision moment is more likely with a partial or no stalemate. The second hypothesized the existence of precipitating violence, escalating violence

that may prompt external actors to intervene. The research found that there was precipitating violence in all the cases; however, each of the episodes of precipitating violence had different characteristics making identification of a standard threshold difficult. This outcome suggests a decision moment is more likely with precipitating violence.

The third hypothesized an external actor's push to intervene. The research found that a major or middle power push existed as a favouring condition in all the interventions. In examining the sequence of the precipitating violence and power push, the research also found that precipitating violence appeared to initiate a power push in the presence of similar factors: an advocate for the use of force, on decisionmaker's agenda, capacity to make a difference, and leader support. Based on the case study evidence, the results from these hypothesized common favouring conditions suggest they are broad enough to be generalizable to a larger set of cases; however, before making this claim analysis of additional cases would be prudent.

The thesis also discovered several novel favouring conditions throughout the ripeness-focused analysis that help to better understand when to intervene to stop mass atrocities. First, although Security Council authorization provides a legal intervention, a legitimate opportunity of intervention justified on humanitarian grounds can also serve as a favouring condition. Consent for intervention, as well as the doctrine of R2P, can provide additional legitimacy. And lastly, although perpetrators have various characteristics, the primary aspect for the favouring condition is that perpetrators are unwilling or unable to stop the violence.

In other words, this study found that ripeness tells us that interventions occur when one or more conflict groups can escalate the violence (absence of stalemate) and the violence escalates to a level (precipitating violence) that brings about external actors' involvement (power push) to intervene.

8.2 ASSESSING THE RIPENESS-BASED APPROACH

This section assesses what worked in the ripeness-based approach and how the study advanced ripeness and military intervention literature. Based on the evidence in the case studies I assess that the concepts, analysis, and theory of ripeness are applicable in helping to better understand when to conduct a military intervention to prevent or stop mass atrocities. Providing answers to the research question above and validating its hypotheses are an important measure of applicability for this thesis. A more robust way to determine applicability is to assess what worked in the ripeness-based approach. To further evaluate the degree of what worked, the next several paragraphs assess the new concepts, role of middle powers, the ripeness-focused analysis, and progress towards a ripeness-based framework to explain intervention. The section begins by evaluating what worked, specifically how ripeness concepts functioned, such as the decision moment and power push. Then the section provides the outcome of a ripeness-focused look at the roles of middle powers in intervention. Next the section assesses how the ripeness-based approach and methodology worked in analysing a case in getting to the decision moment. Finally, how elements of the ripeness-based approach worked together to assess how ripeness is advancing from its traditional focus in negotiation toward a ripeness-based framework to explain intervention.

8.2.1 What Worked: New Ripeness Concepts

This thesis proposed three new concepts—the decision moment, precipitating violence, and the power push—and utilized them throughout the ripeness-based approach in the case studies and comparison afterwards. As evidenced by their functionality and explanatory power in the case studies, they all performed as useful concepts within the ripeness-based approach. For example, the decision moment worked as the central point in the ripeness-based framework. The decision moment is a specific event when conditions are ripe to intervene with military force to prevent or stop mass atrocities; moreover, it is the culminating point of all the favouring conditions leading to intervention. Regarding conceptual utility, as discussed in Chapter 3, the decision moment provides an example of useful terminology. The use of a distinct name from the ripe moment enhances the clarity of the decision moment terminology. This naming convention, with the word "moment" in both terms, also provides the decision moment a certain familiarity and resonance gained from the established use of the ripe moment term. The importance of two distinct names is especially discernible when both are in play, i.e., when a ripe moment for negotiation and a decision moment to intervene are both possible outcomes, as when attempts at negotiation and planning for intervention are occurring simultaneously. Understanding the dynamic between the ripe moment and decision moment is also enhanced from a clarity standpoint by each concept having a similar, but distinct name. The decision moment functioning as a useful concept in explaining the mechanics surrounding when to intervene provides evidence of applicability of ripeness theory.

Precipitating violence is also a useful term. Despite the difficulty of identifying a standard threshold and whether an event was a trigger or a flare up, precipitating violence is useful to the

ripeness-based approach. Importantly, as with conflict groups' perceptions of stalemate, it is the external actors' perceptions that precipitating violence has occurred that serves to initiate the power push. The term provides resonance and differentiation among levels of escalation, such as between violence that is merely a flare up and escalation of the intensity to precipitate an intervention.

Similarly, the power push is useful terminology. Regarding parsimony, the power push term succinctly delimits all this: the capacity and will to take measures (1) to pressure the perpetrator of atrocities; (2) advocate for intervention and influence other actors in international and regional organizations; and (3) provide resources or material support, such as forces and/or basing for an intervention. The power push term simply describes in two words what a major or middle power actor can do with their power to push to intervene: push the perpetrator, push for intervention, and provide support. The power push functioning as a useful concept in explaining an actor's role in intervention provides evidence of the applicability of ripeness theory.

Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 3 and observed in the case studies, all these new concepts appear to show field utility within the cases analysed. This field utility of the concepts within a ripeness-based approach provides evidence of applicability of when to intervene; moreover, if investigated in future research, the concepts may have application to intervention writ large. The functioning of the concepts throughout the case studies provides not only evidence of applicability of ripeness theory, but it also contributes conceptually to the ripeness and military intervention literature. I make no claim that these concepts are fully developed; however, they did function as useful elements of the ripeness-based approach utilized in this thesis.

8.2.2 What Worked: Ripeness-focused Look at the Middle Powers

This thesis investigated the middle powers as part of a deeper look at the power push. Viewing the middle powers through a ripeness lens yields an assessment of the ability of middle powers to provide a power push, as well as other roles in intervention. The study found middle powers, like major powers, can pressure an atrocity perpetrator, influence other external actors, and they can take the lead of an intervention. Middle powers typically work within the international system of rules and norms, whereas major powers may at times go outside the system to accomplish their objectives. Besides pushing, middle powers can also act to confirm the position or regional strategy of a major power actor, as well as can sometimes serve to question or restrain another external actor. Including the case in the broader study shows variation in the power push, namely that both major and middle powers can provide a power push. However, although a rich qualitative analysis was conducted of the East Timor case, there is just one example of a middle power leading an intervention in this study. As is a challenge with small-n qualitative research, only one example of the middle power push by Australia makes it difficult to generalize the findings to a broader set of cases. However, with the realization of the small sample size consisting of just one example, the results provide valuable, yet contingent findings of a middle power leading an intervention.

8.2.3 What Worked: Ripeness-focused Analysis

This thesis built upon traditional ripeness theory and developed a ripeness-focused analysis to determine the favouring conditions of when to intervene. That the analysis and methodology functioned effectively in examining a case in getting to the decision moment is also a measure of applicability. First, the ripeness-focused analysis worked providing an understanding of conflict dynamics. This is expected and validates the analytic foundation of the stalemate in traditional

ripeness theory. Whereas the traditional interpretation of ripeness focuses on entering negotiations, this thesis used the same initial analysis to understand the likelihood of deciding on intervention. As discussed previously, a MHS can lead to negotiations, or conversely, a partial or no stalemate may lead to more violence and the need for intervention. Hence, the ripeness-focused analysis provides insight into the potential for escalation and related precipitating violence of the conflict that could lead to intervention. In other words, the ripeness-focused analysis shows the presence or absence of stalemate shapes the decision moment.

The ripeness-focused analysis in the structured, focused comparison case studies discovered and confirmed favouring conditions, such as the common favouring conditions and novel favouring conditions described above that help to better understand when to intervene to stop mass atrocities. The functioning of a ripeness-focused analysis in understanding conflict dynamics and developing favouring conditions for intervention shows applicability of ripeness theory, as well as contributes analytically to the ripeness and military intervention literature.

8.2.4 What Worked: Arriving at the Decision Moment

Whereas the categories above show that individual ripeness concepts worked and how the ripeness-focused analysis functioned, this last category evaluates them as a collective whole. Specifically, how did the new concepts, traditional ripeness concepts, and ripeness-focused analysis work together in getting to the when to intervene, namely arriving at the decision moment. The ability to use both new and established ripeness concepts together within the ripeness-focused analysis shows that the ripeness-based approach effectively builds on traditional ripeness theory in explaining possible paths to the decision moment. For example, in the East Timor case there

was a ripe moment to negotiate that preceded the decision moment to intervene. The ripe moment occurred when Habibie offered the opportunity of a referendum for East Timor. The scorched earth post-referendum violence moved away from a ripe moment for peaceful resolution and then through diplomatic and economic pressure moved in the direction of a decision moment for intervention to resolve the crisis. The decision moment later formed through diplomatic pressure, assisted by UN process, and resulted in Indonesian consent for a way out to intervention. In other words, the external actors were able to ripen the conflict by pressuring the perpetrator to move towards accepting intervention. The relationship of the two moments and ripening between, as illustrated here and in the case study, provides evidence of applicability of ripeness theory as it affords understanding of the potential mechanics of the decision to intervene and arriving at the decision moment. The functioning of a ripeness-based approach in building upon ripeness theory shows applicability of the theory, as well as contributes theoretically to the ripeness and military intervention literature.

A holistic assessment of this ripeness-based approach requires an evaluation of not only what worked, but also a critical perspective of limitations. Although confident in process tracing as a method and the resulting favouring conditions described above and in the case studies, there is nonetheless uncertainty. This uncertainty yields several limitations, as well as potential mitigation; accordingly, the next section follows this mitigation theme and proposes some opportunities of further questions to move the research forward. This research faced limitations of causal complexity and sample size. The limitations are methodological and addressed in the following paragraphs.

Intervention decisions by their nature are complex and this complicates determining the certainty of the factors involved. Decisions may be multicausal, overdetermined, and/or equifinal in arriving at their outcome. There may also be epiphenomena or secondary effects. The decision environment may also include other factors that may not affect the outcome resulting in a null hypothesis. This complexity also affects determining the interaction of the favouring conditions, such as the causal complexity of the interactions of the power push with other favouring conditions and actors. As Ragin notes, "Usually, it is the combined effect of various conditions, their intersection in time and space, that produces a certain outcome" (Ragin 2014, 27). The relevance to this research is that although a conceptual discussion of the potential interactions of various conditions is possible, there is not absolute certainty of the effects. Key here is that although the concepts are useful in discussing the intervention decision, there is some uncertainty in stating precisely how the decision occurs due to multi-causality and equifinality.

Another limitation concerns sample size and potential case selection bias. As discussed previously, with small-n qualitative research it is difficult to generalize the findings to a broader set of cases. For example, the one middle power push from Australia and the involvement of the United States as a major power in all the case studies. However, through comparison and with the realization of the small sample size, the results can provide valuable, yet contingent findings.

A way of managing the certainty of these research claims, as discussed in Chapter 3, is framing and placing these outcomes in terms of favouring conditions whose presence "seem to favor the possibility" of an outcome (George 1993, 122). The favouring conditions do not provide absolute certainty about the configuration of the decision moment; however, the presence of the conditions

do seem to favour the possibility of intervention. Determining favouring conditions viewed through a ripeness lens provides a realistic analysis for this ripeness-based approach.

All said, what has this thesis achieved? This study made progress towards advancing ripeness theory from its traditional focus in negotiation towards a ripeness-based framework to explain intervention. The analysis answered questions triggered in the pursuit of determining ripeness theory's applicability to military intervention decision-making. It proposed new concepts, based on Zartman's original model, to evolve his conflict resolution theory and extend the approach toward military intervention. These new concepts, the decision moment, precipitating violence, and power push, form the core of an evolved ripeness-based approach of understanding intervention. The traditional and new ripeness concepts working together indicates progress towards a better understanding when it is ripe to intervene with military force to prevent or stop mass atrocities. The introduction of the new concepts; measuring the concepts in the case studies; and determining other favouring conditions of when to intervene all build upon ripeness theory and provide a contribution to the ripeness and military intervention literature.

8.3 QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Moving this research forward to explain intervention further provides motivation to ask additional questions to investigate in future studies. A logical path is to first ask questions that look deeper into the other dimensions of ripeness and analyze additional cases. Then broaden the bounds of the research to investigate how the conditions at the decision moment affected the eventual outcome of the intervention. Strengthening the analysis further would be to utilize quantitative

methods or a multi-method analysis to test the ripeness-based framework. The answers from all these questions could build a more robust framework with policy relevance.

To start, questions for future research can investigate three time periods, either individually or collectively as a whole. The periods are: (1) up to the decision moment, the time focus of this thesis; (2) from the decision moment to the end of the intervention as a military operation; and (3) into the future during peacebuilding, where one determines a successful—or unsuccessful—result. The further questions mentioned in the previous paragraph can be asked within each of those periods or bridging segments of them. For example, deeper looks at the other dimensions of ripeness could be conducted in the period up to the decision moment. Perhaps a look at stalemate and the effects on precipitating violence. This would help bolster both the analysis and findings of the condition of stalemate that is central in a ripeness-focused analysis, yet difficult to truly ascertain. Another important question looks across all three time periods. Whereas this thesis did not focus on ultimate success, it would be useful to investigate what ripeness tells us about the eventual outcome of the intervention. A question to ask in this theme would be how the configuration of stalemate at the decision moment impacted the eventual outcome of peacebuilding? Similar questions could be asked across all the dimensions of ripeness.

The qualitative method of ripeness-based, structured, focused comparison case study with process tracing has served this research project well. However, a way of strengthening the ripeness-focused analysis further could be to utilize quantitative methods or a multi-method analysis to test the framework. This method requires first developing a correlates of intervention dataset and then

crafting the quantitative analysis. The quantitative results could be compared with the earlier qualitative results to aid in analysis and building an improved framework.

Other cases could also be investigated. Chapter 1 mentioned possible candidates; moreover, there are cases where international intervention did not occur. An important candidate is Syria. The decade-long internal conflict, stymied efforts to gain UNSC authorization to use force to protect civilians, as well as Russian involvement in Syria would prove a relevant and interesting case. Other scholars have conducted studies of the conflict (Adams 2015, Bellamy 2022b, Borshchevskaya 2022); however, a ripeness-focused analysis of the ongoing Syria case would not only augment the research of this thesis, but build towards providing policy-relevant scholarship. Although the direct focus of this thesis is not policy relevance, and the research was formulated to take an academic approach, the research question, parsed differently, exudes themes with policy relevance: applicability; theory for understanding; when to conduct; military intervention; prevent or stop mass atrocities. Hence, a future step in application of the knowledge developed here is to use the results in policy planning and implementation. For example, developing policy relevant scholarship on how ripeness could be applied in planning for and responding to atrocities. Movement in this direction could be use of a ripeness-based approach in conjunction with the recently released United States Strategy to Anticipate, Prevent, and Respond to Atrocities (United_States 2022). There is still much work to be done and a ripeness-based approach potentially has much to offer to the policy world.

CONCLUSION

The ripeness-based approach analyzed and operationalized in this thesis provides another lens to view the problem of mass atrocities and address the challenge of when to intervene beyond current approaches to deciding military intervention. It offers a framework to think through intervention in a way that connects the past with the future and what to do now to better answer the challenge of when to intervene and provide options to not only stop the violence, but perhaps resolve the conflict. As the scholarship in these eight chapters has shown, this thesis has advanced both the ripeness and military intervention literature conceptually, analytically, and theoretically. The yearslong journey, as well as the time and effort required to answer a seemingly straightforward question was significant. Helpful suggestions from advisors along the way, as well as a personal realization of the need to contain the scope, allowed the creation of this bounded research project, hopefully done well, meeting the aim of the thesis. Choices made to focus on the power push and middle powers excluded the other dimensions of ripeness and actors from a deeper look, but I assess the research overall provided acceptable scope and results. The questions for further research provide a path to continue the exploration of ripeness. But for now, as ripeness made its way from a metaphor to a theory, and back again to a metaphor, there is one more question: is this thesis ripe to conclude? I would say yes.

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