Emotions & Judgments
A critique of Solomon

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ABSTRACT

The idea that we are passive victims of our emotions, that they are wild and uncontrollable things which just happen to (or "in") us is very common. Robert Solomon thinks that this idea stems from a faulty philosophical analysis: the analysis that emotions are a kind of "feeling" or physiological happening. On this analysis, "feelings" and occurrences are externally caused; as such they are non-rational and involuntary, the types of things that we cannot be held responsible for. In his seminal article "Emotions and Choice," Solomon opposes this view. He wants to show that we can be held accountable for our emotions, even praised or blamed for having them. To achieve this end, he shows that emotions are rational events, and hence are importantly conceptual events. Taken to its logical conclusion, Solomon proposes that emotions **are** judgments. That explains, in a way in which the traditional view can't explain, why emotions are subject to rational control and conscious manipulation, and therefore why we can rightly be held accountable for them.

In this thesis I agree with Solomon that the intentionality of emotions cannot be accounted for by a "Components" model. What I don't agree with is that emotions are inferior judgments. If emotions really are a species of judgment (and I see no reason why the reverse might not be true, that judgments are a kind of emotion), then Solomon has given no adequate reason for his implicit view that emotions are inferior judgments. When we look more closely at Soloman's view of judgments, we see that he wobbles between a non-componential and a componential analysis. Since it is his thesis that emotions are importantly non-componential, and that emotions are judgments, this wobbliness jeopardises Soloman's entire philosophical project.

After examining the second half of "Emotions and Choice", I conclude that Soloman's strongest reason for thinking emotions are inferior judgments

really has nothing to do with the nature of judgments at all. It is because[iii] he is covertly, and maybe unwittingly, holding a view of emotions as self-deceptions.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1

INTRODUCTION

> "Struck by jealousy", "driven by anger", "plagued by remorse", "paralysed by fear", "felled by shame", like "the prick of Cupid's arrow", are all symptomatic metaphors betraying a faulty philosophical analysis."[1]

A prevailing view of emotions is that they are wild and uncontrollable, and that their occurrence is unintentional and involuntary. In everyday discourse, we speak of being "swept away" by emotions. We talk of those who let their emotions "get the best of them", of times when we are "under the influence" of our emotion. When we speak in these terms, we are expressing a view of the emotions as being **beyond** rationality.

This is possibly a legacy of the Freudian view of emotions which made them out to be overwhelmingly potent, non-rational forces which lurked below or beyond the rational mind. As such, emotions were not thought to readily submit either to rational analysis or to conscious manipulation. In opposition to such powerful forces, man's conscious ego, his rational self, was seen as a frail and fragile opponent.

This picture of emotions as "happening to (or "in") us" has consequences for our understanding of accountability and individual responsibility. Although we are generally required to attempt to control emotional expression (to "get a

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[1] p251 "Emotions and Choice," Robert Soloman, 1980 in "Explaining Emotions" by Amelie Rorty

grip" on ourselves or "stop feeling sorry" for ourselves), our emotions are traditionally conceptualized as resisting our attempts to do so. If emotions are "occurrences" which we but helplessly observe, then rational analysis and conscious manipulation of them is severely challenged. And so is our responsibility for them, for we cannot be held accountable for things which merely happen to us. This is the view that Robert Soloman is objecting to in his article "Emotions and Choice".

A second reason Soloman has for writing "Emotions and Choice" is a reaction against the now classic account of the intentionality of emotions suggested by Anthony Kenny in his **Action, Emotion and Will**. Kenny proposes that emotions are a species of "feelings," and then is forced to face the problem of how such feelings can be "about" the things emotions are so obviously about. (In contradistinction from other feelings which are only occurrences, Kenny wants to construct a story of "aboutness," by assuming that emotions are a sort of a compound involving a "cognitive" component tacked on to a "feeling" component.) Unwittingly, then Kenny has thereby affirmed the traditional split between cognition and emotion. And this split between reason and emotion is what Soloman vehemently opposes.

In attacking Kenny's analysis of intentional feelings, Soloman attacks the notion that "feelings" and physiology could be "components" in an intentional relation. In the first place, Soloman tries to show how "feelings" are the wrong sorts of items to be "about" anything. In the second place, he tries to show that an intentional relation i.e. a conceptual relation, **cannot** involve two separate or separable components. Instead the intentional act and the intentional object must be "essentially correlated." Importantly, this improved account of "intentional" as involving the "essential correlation" of emotion and object, means that emotions must partake in conceptual relations in a way that mere occurrences, feelings or facts do not.

To account for the fact that emotions are intentional in this new improved sense, Soloman rejects Kenny's claim that emotions are a species of feelings

and insists that emotions are a species of judgments. He is capitalising on the fact that if emotions and their objects are "essentially correlated" then we necessarily have some input into those objects. They are not externally caused objects. In a very real sense, we create them. This makes Soloman think that emotions can be rational in the same way in which judgments can be rational. He is thinking that we make judgments, and that this provides an exact parallel for our making our emotions.

Unfortunately, Soloman has classed emotions as an inferior kind of judgment. Although he does not actually come out and say as much, his view of emotions is made very plain through his use of disparaging descriptions for emotions. They are as "myopic," "blind," "hasty," "rash" and the like. In addition to his argument for emotions being rational, in the sense of being non-occurrences, Soloman wants at the same time, to affirm the picture of emotions as irrational, i.e. as being "counter-productive and embarrassing to us, detours away from our aspirations and obstacles blocking our ambitions"[2]. He is unaware that this picture of emotions as inferior judgments, must be underscored by a "components" picture of judgments. This fact jeopardises his whole attempt to advance on Kenny. Kenny, after all, had a "components" picture of emotions, and this, according to Soloman was supposed to be his Big Mistake.

The above is an account mostly of the first half of "Emotions and Choice." In the second half of Soloman's article, something very different is happening. We begin to see what is driving this picture of emotions as inferior judgments. It is his picture of emotions as "irrational. " Emotions are supposed to be typically irrational, because they are "ready candidates for self-deception." Emotions are "devious," in the sense that they hide our true, self-serving, motivations. By his examples and his theory, it now seems that Soloman agrees with Freud after all, that the true wellspring of human motivations is a seething caldron of irrational, bestial impulses, and that such

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[2] p 264 " Emotions and Choice" (1980)

motivations often operate "deviously", i.e. outside of conscious control. Soloman agrees with Freud about these "irrational motivations," only he disagrees with Freud that such motivations are non-rational (in the sense of being caused occurrences). They are really rational, according to Soloman, in the sense of being "ours" (our cognitions, our creations).

Two consequences of this view of emotions as rational, are important to Soloman. Firstly, it allows him to think that it always makes sense, at least (as it does not for headaches, heart attacks, and hormones) to praise or blame a person for having the emotion itself. Secondly, it makes him think that emotions are accessible to our other judgments (not inaccessible to our opinions, as occurrences are). This fact can be explained by emotions themselves being judgments. Emotions, then are subject to rational control and conscious manipulation and this means that we can be held responsible for them.

Philosophically speaking, the identification of emotions as "rational" (as opposed to non-rational) is very significant. But even more important, Soloman thinks that holding this "correct" philosophical analysis will make a difference as to how we behave around our emotions, in our daily practice. Realizing philosophically that emotions are ours (our cognitions) will mean, realizing practically, that we are all the while choosing our emotions. This realization is supposed to be a self-confirming hypothesis: it will **make** emotions our choices.

In Chapter 6, I try to show how heavily Soloman is influenced by a picture of emotions as being typically irrational, devious, malicious, or uncivilized. At this point, Soloman's similarities to Freud are far more apparent than his dissimilarities. Soloman has a different explanation to Freud, for why such (unacceptable) emotions "dissolve" on contact with the conscious mind. Freud's explanation for this phenomenon was a causal one: what occurred when previously unconscious material emerged into consciousness is a kind of "catharsis of repressed emotional air bubbles". Soloman's explanation is

that emotions are "defused" by bringing them to conscious awareness because they are conceptual items and must partake in conceptual relations (such as the "pragmatic paradoxes" that have long been celebrated regarding judgments in general.) This mechanism aside, however, Soloman presents a remarkably similar picture to the Freudian one, in the sense that he has tagged emotions as unavailable to consciousness (at least he has tagged the "real" purpose of the emotion as unavailable). Indeed, not only are they unavailable to consciousness, but they are deliberately i.e.(maliciously) unavailable to consciousness, and it is supposed to be a characteristic of them that they are so unavailable! This makes me wonder whether Soloman, in adopting a story of emotions as self-deceptions, hasn't created more of a Freudian monster than he has destroyed. I would like to have explored this idea further, however, all that I was able to do in Chapter 6 was demonstrate how deeply influential this picture of the self-deception of emotions was on Soloman.

As a psychotherapist, I think Soloman's view of emotions as self-deceptive is a very strange one. It is an extremely negative view of emotions and I think that his recommendations for how we are to regard our emotions are unworkable, even destructive. Certainly to take the attitude that it always makes sense to ask "what is motivating that emotion?" would be therapeutic suicide, when what that question really means is "what kind of deviousness is operating here?" I hope very briefly in chapter 9 to indicate why I think this is wrong and present my own view of emotions as rich and valuable sources of self-disclosure.

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KENNY'S CONTRIBUTION

2.1

Kenny thinks that someone who holds the traditional (Cartesian and Humean) view of the emotions cannot give an adequate account of the emotion:object relation. The Cartesians seem to have looked on the relation between mental events, and between mental events and physical events, as a causal one. Kenny attributes to Descartes[3] the view that the relation of emotion to object is the simple one of effect to cause - to be the object of an emotion is just to be its cause. Kenny, however, wants to claim that there is a general distinction between the object of an emotion and its cause. He thinks that on the whole, objects of emotions and causes of emotions form two mutually exclusive classes.[4] This is most obviously so, he says, in the case of forward-looking emotions, such as hope and dread, where the object of something is clearly in the future and cannot be the cause of the emotion which belongs in the present.[5] Thus he accuses Descartes of misrepresenting intentionality by treating the relation between a passion and its object as a contingent one of effect to cause.[6] Part of his attack here, is

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[3] Probably wrongly. See Emotion and Object pages 30, 34,40, where Wilson disputes Kenny's interpretation of Descartes, and pp16 -17, where Wilson calls the view that the emotion:object relation was the effect;cause relation the "naive view", and comments that "surely no philosopher can have held it".

[4] See Action, Emotion, and Will pp 71-75, 187

[5] Kenny acknowledges that Descartes himself noticed these cases and gave an ad hoc explanation of them (AEW p 72) but implies that to admit that the object of an emotion differs from its cause contradicts the Cartesian theory of objects. However this would only be true if Descartes held the naive view that to be an object of an emotion is just to be its cause.

on the Cartesian view that behaviour could be explained in terms of a prior `ghostly' mental event which caused the behaviour in question. On this account a mental state is distinguished as a pain or a feeling of fear, according to a certain introspectible quality. This introspectible quality is what it is, without any regard to public phenomena such as behaviour or cause.

Though Hume had systematically distinguished between the cause of an emotion and the object of an emotion, his exposition of pride[7] indicates that he also regards a passion as a private mental event, which is but one event in a causal chain. An item was to be the object of an emotion, if it figured in the causal history of that emotion in the appropriate way. Thus, while Hume had a theory which did not conflate the object of an emotion with the cause of an emotion, he nevertheless made the Cartesian "error"[8] of regarding the emotion:object connection to be a causal (and therefore contingent) connection. Kenny regarded this to be a radical misclassification of kinds.

Emphasising the intentionality of the relationship between an emotion and its object, Kenny attempted to show that an emotion must be essentially (i.e. non-contingently) connected to its object and therefore it could not be causally (i.e.contingently) connected to its object.

Kenny's anti-causal argument involved four related theses:

(i) All or most emotions are related to objects.

(ii) Objects must be distinguished from causes.

(iii) There are logical restrictions on the kinds of objects that motions can take.

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[6] AEW, p 14 However, Kenny may have overlooked the fact that there can be more than one relation between two items. He may think that there is always some relation which is the relation between two items. Some of his formulations might lead him to conclude not just that the emotion:object relation cannot be analysed in causal terms, but that an emotion cannot be causally related to its object. (See E & O pp 30 -31)

[7] See AEW p 23-28

[8] Wilson remarks that "Descartes says nothing general about the emotion:object connection at all" (p 40), so once again we have cause to doubt that Kenny has accurately appraised the Cartesian position.

(iv) Because any emotion and its object are non-contingently related, they cannot be contingently related, and hence cannot be causally related.

Kenny gives no general arguments in support of his thesis (i) that all emotions have objects. (He is probably taking it as a commonplace, already shown by the work of Brentano). His own support of (i) is largely carried by thesis (iii,) in which he claims that a particular emotion can only be a case of pride, or fear, or envy, if it has a certain kind of object. Here is his argument:

> In fact, each of the emotions is appropriate - logically, and not just morally appropriate - only to certain restricted objects. One cannot be afraid of just anything, nor happy about anything whatsoever...What is not possible is to be grateful for, or proud of, something which one regards as an evil unmixed with good. Again, it is possible to be envious of one's own fruit trees; but only if one mistakenly believes that the land on which they stand is part of one's neighbour's property....What is not possible is to envy something which one believes to belong to oneself."[9]

Kenny thinks that the fact of logical restrictions on the type of object which each emotion can have, shows that the connection between an emotion and its object has to be a necessary one and therefore that Hume was wrong to treat the emotion: object relation as a contingent one.[10]

Now that I have outlined Kenny's views up to thesis (iv), I have provided some background for what will be the major work of this chapter: a critical

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[9] AEW pp192-913

[10] Wilson however has pointed out that Kenny may have overlooked the fact that there can be more than one relation between two items. p 31

appraisal of Kenny' contribution. Kenny made several serious errors which I will deal with under separate sections.

2.2

Kenny thinks that emotions are items of the same general type as sensations and perceptions. They are all kinds of feelings, where it seems, anything is a feeling if we use the term `feel' in reporting it. Kenny then sets about locating the distinctions between emotions, sensations and perceptions. He quickly enables us to see through the prima facie similarity between emotions and perceptions by pointing out that

> To feel anger may be to feel angry, but to feel a lump is not to feel lumpish. Feeling fear does not differ from feeling afraid, but feeling the earth is not at all the same a feeling earthy.[11]

The distinction he has drawn between those reports of feelings in which the direct object is replaceable by an adjective, and those in which it corresponds to a that-clause, enables Kenny to see through the prima facie similarity between perceptions and emotions. But he cannot use this method to distinguish between sensations and emotions in this way, since to feel hungry (a sensation) is to feel that one is hungry in a similar way in which to feel afraid is to feel that one is afraid.

In his chapter on "Feelings" Kenny takes time to explore the similarities and differences between "feelings of all kinds,whether perceptions, sensations, or emotions".[12] He discovers that duration, intensity and blending are properties shared by all three, and that sensations share with emotions the property of being linked with specific forms of behaviour. None the less, he says,

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[11] AEW P 53

[12] AEW P 56

emotions do differ from sensations. His first argument for this is that emotions are not localized as pain, hunger and thirst are.

> "If I have a painful sensation in my toe, then I feel a pain in my toe; but if I have a craven sensation in my stomach, this does not mean that I feel fear in my stomach"[13]

I think he is wrong. In my experience as a psychotherapist, people do localise emotions, though they seldom offer that as a fact in their expression. If asked "Where do you feel the fear?" or "How do you recognise your fear?" they will point to localized areas. Kenny himself thinks that this criteria is only somewhat true, as he acknowledges that we localise emotions in the features of others. We say, for example, "I saw the horror in his eyes" and "you could see the delight written on his face". Now if it is true that we can recognise localization of emotions in others, why not recognise them in ourselves?

Another respect in which Kenny thinks emotions differ from sensations is that emotions have a characteristic history.

> "By a fluke, Jack may have a bout of rheumatism which starts at the same time as, lasts as long as, and waxes and wanes in time with, a love-affair of Jill's. But any pattern is accidental to a sensation, while some pattern is essential to an emotion."Is it possible to fall in love at first sight?" is not the same sort of question as "Is it possible to be seasick as soon as one steps afloat?"[14]

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[13] AEW P 58

[14] AEW p 60

Kenny does not elaborate this claim further or give any support of it. But this is what I think he might mean by it. A person can become dizzy from standing up, but they can also become dizzy from many other things e.g. from sitting down (if they have an ear infection). But they couldn't fall in love at first sight without it being the first time they saw someone.

Anyway, Kenny does not appear to regard either localization or characteristic history as carrying the important difference between a sensation and an emotion. He goes on immediately to say:

> "The most important difference between a sensation and an emotion is that emotions, unlike sensations, are essentially directed to objects. It is possible to be hungry without being hungry for anything in particular, as it is not possible to be ashamed without being ashamed of anything in particular. It is possible to be in pain without knowing what is hurting one, as it is not possible to be delighted without knowing what is delighting one. It is not in general possible to ascribe a piece of behaviour or a sensation to a particular emotional state without at the same time ascribing an object to the emotion."[15]

This is a less persuasive view than it may look at first. Let me explain why, using Wilson. Wilson discerns two possible points being made here.

(1) Kenny may mean that the most important difference between emotions and sensations is that the former are essentially directed to objects, whereas the latter, even if they are directed to objects, are not essentially directed to

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[15] AEW p 60

them.

(2) Alternatively, the "most important difference" might be meant to be just that emotions have objects and sensations do not.

Both of these possiblities give Wilson a feeling of uneasiness, in particular the way in which Kenny seems to treat his most important fact (whichever interpretation you take of it) as an isolated fact about emotions and sensations.

Wilson's uneasiness is expressed most clearly in relation to (1):

> But it can't be an isolated fact about emotions that they are essentially directed to objects. If it were, we would have to be able to say of an emotion E and a sensation S:"It happens that S has an object, but it differs from E in that it doesn't have to have an object. This is impossible: modal properties can't exist in isolation."[16]

Wilson has given a pretty bald claim here, and gives nothing to justify it, apart from an unreferenced acknowledgement to J. F. Bennett. The claim is this. If modal properties could exist in isolation, that would mean that something could be categorised by its difference in this (modal) property and in no other property, and that would be impossible. Let us try to figure out why this particular objection might be plausible. A thought experiment will help.

We need a way of distinguishing between categories that only use the criteria of "may" and "must". Suppose there is a property which items called Xs may have, but which items called Ys must have. Imagine also that this is the only

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[16] Emotion & Object p 37.

difference, or the only important difference between Xs and Ys[17]; we can't turn to other distinguishing features in order to decide what type of item we have before us. Let us imagine for our thought experiment that you are blindfolded, and that you are given the task of deciding whether what is in front of you is a tractor or an aeroplane, and you've got to decide this on the basis of what you can feel. Let us suppose that nothing else is available to you than the two categories of things you can feel. These two categories are;`things with tyres' and `things without tyres'. You are to decide on the sole basis of the felt presence of "tyres" whether the things before you are tractors or aeroplanes. If you don't feel any "tyres," you can say with confidence that this can't be a tractor, since tractors "must" have tyres. Things without tyres must be aeroplanes. But now consider the second category, namely, "things with tyres." This must be a mixed category, since tractors which must have tyres belong here, and so do aeroplanes which may have tyres or may not (if they're ski planes or float planes, for example). You are blindfolded, and it is now your job to decide, of those items with tyres, which items must have tyres (i.e. have them essentially) and which items only have tyres contingently. We have items which have tyres and no other knowledge to go by. You are blindfolded, so nothing else than the feel of "tyres" counts. The only categories available to you for feeling are "having a tyre" and "not having a tyre," and there's no problem about that. But how are you going to decide whether this "tyre" belongs to a thing which necessarily has tyres (and thus is a tractor) or whether it belongs to something which can but doesn't have to have a "tyre" (and thus is an aeroplane). The only categories available to you for feeling are "having a tyre" and "not having a tyre." There's no way that you can feel "necessarily having a tyre" - that's not available to the sense organ. The only fact available to your sense organ is having a tyre, or not having a tyre. All you can do is discover "tyre". Necessarily having versus contingently having is quite unavailable to any sense organ. Hence on finding a "tyre", that doesn't give you enough to put the item before you into a classification of X versus Y, of `plane' versus

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[17] This parallels Kenny's Centrality Thesis - referred to later in this chapter.

`tractor'. In order to do that, we have to know some other things about it.

I assume that this must be Wilson's objection to Kenny's treating modal properties as an isolated fact about emotions and sensations. In saying that the most important difference between a sensation and an emotion is that emotions, unlike sensations, are essentially directed to objects, and in treating this as an isolated fact about emotions and sensations, Kenny has provided no way of distinguishing between a [sensation-feeling which happens to have object q] and an [emotion which necessarily has object q] for much the same reason that, blindfolded, we couldn't distinguish between [planes] which happen to have a tyre and [tractors] which necessarily have wheels, in the case where both do possess a tyre.

Soloman's attack on what he calls the "components" analysis of emotions, may be directed at the same target:

> As soon as one distinguishes between the "feeling" of emotion and its object, as Kenny does, for example, there is no way to understand either how emotions intend their objects or how their objects define emotions.[18]

There are two versions of this objection possible. The first version is not, I think, the right one. The second is. The first version, given in the main text of "Emotions and Choice" is is against the "components" argument which Soloman attributes to Kenny.[19] "Thus" Soloman says, "we are tempted to distinguish two components of my being angry; my feeling of anger and what I am angry about." The important feature here, is that these two items are separate components. This, he says, is a mistake for two reasons:

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[18] This "cryptic suggestion" is made on p 274 of "Emotions and Choice". Apparently Soloman has defended it in detail in his "Emotions' Mysterious Objects" Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour (1979). As I have not have access to it, I can only guess at his reasons here.

[19] See bottom p 273 for reference to Kenny.

(1) it requires that feelings have directions, but feelings do not in fact have directions

(2) it makes the relationship between my being angry and what I am angry about into a contingent relationship, when "I am angry" requires that there must be more information available.

Basically what's happening in (1) and (2) is that Soloman is using intentionality to drive the knife between emotions on the one hand and sensations, feelings and experiences on the other. On the "components" model, the criterion for identifying a feeling, or sensation is the recognition of the special qualities of the experience itself, and this is contrasted with the intentionality of emotion. But for Kenny sensations, feelings, and experiences are not internal impressions or purely private mental events - they too are non-contingently connected to their manifestations in behaviour. As Kenny defines them, feelings do indeed have directions, and feelings of anger in particular, are non-contingently directed towards their objects. Then Kenny's analysis of emotions might be thought to be different from a "componential" analysis, since (1) and (2) do not prevail.

But there is also the possiblity that Soloman has a similar objection to the "isolation" argument referred to by Wilson. This second version would go something like this: Kenny makes "emotions" a species of "feelings" (i.e. sensations). But sensations don't have to have objects, hence sensation-types must have a contingent relation to their objects. If so, then the object of a sensation feeling has to be separable from the sensation feeling itself. Otherwise it wouldn't be that a sensation may have an object, it would be that a sensation must have an object. On the other hand, if the emotion: object relation is to be one of essential connection, then the object of the emotion feeling must not be separable from the emotion feeling. Thus if there was but one object, the same object for both sensation feeling and emotion feeling, then the intentional object has to be separable for sensation feelings and yet

enter into essential relations with emotion feelings. It is just as it was supposed to be with tyres before: they have one kind of relation to tractors - tractors must have them, and a completely different kind of relation to aeroplanes - aeroplanes may have them. For sensations, however we can't get that to work: Indeed, Kenny doesn't even give us an example to try it out on. While it might be possible for an object to be in two relations at the same time[20] (tyres can do this), Soloman's criticism might be that Kenny has left us with no way of understanding this.

The must-ness or the may-ness of having an object is too bald a fact to be useful to us. Even if it were true, it's being true would be bound up with other features of the emotions which differentiate them from sensations, just as having to have a tyre or not having to have a tyre is tied up with other features of the craft, e.g. its function. Not being given anything about emotions but this isolated modal fact about them, that they necessarily have objects as opposed to contingently having objects, gives us "no way to understand either how emotions intend their objects or how their objects define emotions".

2.3

Kenny's arguments showing that emotions must have objects whereas sensations needn't have, supported his saying that it is non-contingent that every emotion (or almost every emotion)[21] has its object. Basically his argument is this: that if all emotions must have objects, it follows that the relation of an emotion to its object is not a causal one. His second major error occurs here, that in establishing a thesis about the modality of the connection between emotions and objects, Kenny mistakenly regarded

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[20] Though it is unlikely that Kenny himself could have allowed this possibility.

[21] Kenny did deal with the problem of what he calls "objectless emotions" (p 60) such as pointless depression and undirected fears, but his argument is that the meaning of the words `depression' and `fear' are parasitic upon cases in which being depressed or being afraid has an object. In this way he can maintain his thesis that emotions as a type, must have objects.

himself as providing a thesis about the nature of the emotion:object relation. Kenny thought he could say something about the nature of the emotion:object relation on the basis of the modal fact that emotions necessarily have objects. He hasn't in fact been able to say anything at all about the emotion:object connection on the basis of emotions being esssentially connected to objects. Wilson[22] shows how Kenny's error probably occurred - through an elementary mistake in logic, an "invalid modal shift". Consider the following;

1. necessarily, any E is related to an O
2. therefore any E is, necessarily, related to an O
3. therefore any E is necessarily-related to an O

A necessary proposition is one that can be shown to be true without reference to the facts - it is true a priori.The "invalid modal shift" is the shift in position of "necessarily", from the front in the accepted premise:

"necessarily, any E is related to an O"

to the back in the false conclusion:

"any E is necessarily-related to an O"

where the word "necessarily" has become incorporated into a contingent statement - one whose truth or falsity can only be determined by reference to the facts.

Imagine how the exact parallel shift would look, if we were to move from "If I have just written a novel, necessarily there is a subject X who is what my novel is about"[23] to "If I have just written a novel, the subject of my novel has

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[22] Emotion & Object Chap. 111

[23] I am grateful to my supervisor for providing this example from "A Companion to Plato's Dialogues", where it seems that Plato made a similar mistake in logical accounting.

necessary rather than contingent existence". This, by the way, would make my subject immortal...

Going from (1) to (3) is attempting to pull out a description of the relationship between X and Y from the necessity that there be a relationship between X and Y, and that won't work. This is illustrated neatly by an example Wilson gives. If it were valid that we could move by logical steps from a statement of necessity to a statement about existence, then the following contradiction could be arrived at,

1. necessarily, any cause is related to an effect.
2. therefore any cause is, necessarily, related to an effect.
3. therefore any cause is necessarily-related to an effect.

This would mean that any cause couldn't be causally related to its effect.

Kenny thinks that in providing the thesis that it is non-contingent that every emotion has its object, and by noting that all causal connections are contingent ones, he is justified in saying that therefore the emotion:object relation is not a contingent one. But in order to counter a thesis about the emotion:object relation, one has to have a thesis about the emotion:object relation. Kenny thinks he does, but once we correct for his invalid modal shift, we see that in fact he doesn't. His modality thesis alone, doesn't support a causal thesis, or an anti-causal thesis. It implies nothing about the nature of the emotion:object relation.

And if it turns out to be correct that there is an essential connection between each emotion and its object, then that connection is what still needs to be explained.

2.4

There is a third major error of obscurity in Kenny's account, which Soloman expresses as;

> And finally, pointing out that some emotions clearly have "inexistent" objects (e.g. objects concerning the future) he disastrously concludes that objects of all emotions must be understood in "a special non-causal sense" Kenny rightly insists on the distinction between objects of emotions and their causes, but he gives no adequate analysis of "a special non-causal sense". Thus he provokes one recent critic to accuse him of rendering the connection between emotion and object, and the notion of "object" itself, both "otiose" and "mysterious".[24]

I am unable to find the exact reference for "a special non-causal sense" in Kenny's text, but we can nevertheless make sense of Soloman's criticism here if we take a look at how Kenny gets from the premise "some emotions have inexistent objects" to the conclusion "the relation between an emotion and its object is non-causal".

Kenny wants to allow that there can be objectless emotion-instances, e.g. instances of pointless depression, or undirected fears. But he says that for an emotion-type, instances of that type lacking objects are necessarily exceptional, parasitic upon instances of that type with objects. For example, a man may be paralysed by a conviction of impending doom, even though he can give no account of what it is that he dreads. But if the words "I am afraid" regularly occurred to him divorced from all such context, they would gradually

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[24] "Emotions and Choice" p 272

lose their meaning. Wilson calls this the Centrality Thesis: that for a type of phenomenon to be a type of emotion, the central instances of that type must have objects. Talk of non-contingency is still in place here, for if what he says is correct it is not contingent that the central instances of any emotion-type have objects. But why should Kenny regard this premise as leading him to conclude anything about the nature of the relation between central examples emotion-types and their objects? Why should he think that it has anything to say about whether the relation is `specially causal' or `specially non-causal'? It must be that the invalid modal shift has reappeared, this time in a new guise about emotion-types as opposed to emotion-instances. Now, it looks like

1. necessarily, any E-type is related to an O
2. therefore any E-type is, necessarily, related to an O
3. therefore any E-type is necessarily-related to an O

The Centrality Thesis by itself will not support any anti-causal claim. What the Centrality Thesis says is that it is not contingent that the central instances of any emotion-type have objects. But, again, this says nothing about the nature of the connection in those cases where objects do exist.

Now it is easy to understand Soloman's irritation with the words "special non-causal sense". Even if Kenny's argument were valid, we don't really understand the conclusion. If he has told us anything, he has told us that that's the kind of relation an emotion can have to its object - "a special non-causal" relation. But then the word "special" obscures any account of what the relation is. What kind of a non-causal relation is suitably a "special" non-causal relation? Still nothing useful has been said about the nature of the relation, and that's what Kenny is supposed to be addressing.

2.5

The previous three objections are decisive. But there is one place in Action, Emotion and Will where Kenny cashes out what the nature of "special non-causal relationship" might be. This is where he talks not of a non-contingent relation but of a conceptual relation:

> There is a conceptual connection also between a feeling and its object, whereas the physiological processes studied by psychologists lack intentionality.[25]

And again, speaking about the relations of love and shame to their objects, Kenny says;

> These connections are not contingent: a man who was unaware of them would not possess the concept of the emotions in question.[26]

If we understand this to mean that there are connections between concepts, then we may have an anti-causal argument which looks like this; if there is a certain kind of connection between the concept of an A and the concept of a B, As cannot be causally connected to Bs.

This just may be a valid argument, especially if it is modified in the following way:[27] if two items are causally related, then it must be possible in some sense to describe or identify either item without making use of the fact that it is related to the other.

Kenny has comes close to acknowledging this when he quotes Ryle as saying:

> Now if this cause-effect story is to be the true one,

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[25] AEW p.38
[26] AEW p 100

> it must be possible to identify the effect independently of the cause. We must be able to say "This is the same kind of twinge as a I felt yesterday, without making any appeal to what the twinge is a twinge of as a criterion of identity.[28]

Kenny may have here a promising anti-causal argument. However, these are relatively isolated references. Kenny doesn't use the conceptual argument consistently, and doesn't unpack it very much. Soloman is going to pick it up eventually and specify the nature of the intentional relation, not as a non-contingent relation, but as a conceptual relation.

Wilson has spelled out the coneptual anti-causal argument along the following lines. If one event X causes another event Y, then there must be descriptions of X and Y which occur in a true causal law. But it seems to follow from a Humean account of causation that it is not analytic that any event answering to the first description is followed by an event answering to the second description. Hence it should be logically possible that one should have existed and not the other. On the other hand, if such independent descriptions of the two events were not able to be given, this would cast doubt on the distinctness of the two events, and doubt upon any relation between them being causal.

Wilson thinks that philosophers who speak of non-contingent relations should reformulate their position using the genuine contrast between situations which can be described as consisting of two causally connected items, and situations where there are not two distinct items at all. We will see Soloman take up just this suggestion.

This helps us to see that perhaps Kenny stumbled upon a special non-causal sense of a relation after all. However it took Wilson, and later Soloman, to

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[27] I am grateful for Wilson's exposition of this argument. E & 0 p.26
[28] AE&W p 80

flesh it out.

Kenny's main contribution was to argue that there is an intentional relation between an emotion and its object which does not obtain between a sensation and its object. He fleshed this intentional relation out in terms of the modal operator of necessity, and I have shown how those arguments didn't work. But if you start to press intentionality not as necessity but as a conceptual relation, it may work. Kenny's big mistake was to choose a modal operator to tell us what intentionality meant. Soloman and others have rightly criticised that, and have followed instead what Kenny let travel quickly across his page about the relation between an emotion and its object being a conceptual relation.

3

"EMOTIONS AND CHOICE"

Emotions as Occurrences

3.1

Kenny's contribution was to highlight the intentionality of the emotion:object relation. To varying degrees he indicated that this was a conceptual and an essential relation, but neither positions were well argued. In addition he failed to provide an analysis of the emotion:object connection. For Kenny to say merely that this is a formal connection doesn't tell us what the nature of that connection is. It is Soloman's project to address these gaps, and in particular to give us an analysis of the object:emotion connection such that the truth of "emotions are essentially connected to objects" makes good sense in relation to other features of emotions - features which also separate them from sensations and occurrences.

Soloman claims that emotions are a species of judgements. He believes this explains, as no "feeling" analysis could, how it is that emotions are about the world in a "non-causal" sense, and why so many authors have felt compelled to insist on the "formal" connection between emotion and object. His project does something more than merely claim that emotions are a species of judgment. It answers the question of responsibility for emotions. Soloman says that if it makes sense to talk about making judgments, and if emotions are judgments, then we are responsible for them[29].

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[29] This sequence of thinking is laid out on pages 276 -277 of E & C.

Now this is a counter-intuitive conclusion for him to have generated. In fact it seems so plainly mistaken as a fact about real-life experience, that it will be especially important to examine the philosophical merit of the work which generates such a conclusion.

My experience of coming to grips with Soloman's rather flamboyant and complex article, is that it is best understood by looking at it from several different angles. After a year of grappling with this article in an attempt to find Soloman's definitive argument, I have come to see that it won't fall neatly into "the" essential argument, or even "the" essential methodological approach. Perhaps even seeing that it can't be approached in this way, will become an important part of the critique of this article. Methodologically, I have had to take several cuts at this article, each cut revealing a different aspect of its depth, and in setting them out here I have not been concerned that some cuts may not be commensurate with others; if it happens that that there is a lack of homogeneity of ideas in this article then we can ask whether or not the complexity is a fatal one, and this would certainly provide interesting comment.

In the following passages Soloman sets out the general outline for his essay on "Emotions and Choice".

> "...emotions are typically considered occurrences that happen to (or "in") us: emotions are taken to be the hallmark of the irrational and the disruptive....
>
> Traditionally, emotions have been taken to be feelings or sensations. More recently, but also traditionally, emotions have been taken to be physiological disturbances....

> ...an emotion is neither a sensation nor a physiological occurrence, nor "an occurrence" of any other kind. "Struck by jealousy," "driven by anger," "plagued by remorse," "paralysed by fear," "felled by shame," like "the prick of Cupid's arrow," are all symptomatic metaphors betraying a faulty philosophical analysis."[30]

Let us think about what Soloman is doing in relation to "the traditional view" in these passages. The traditional view of emotions says "Keep a cool head, hold emotions at bay! Do not let your passions interfere with your judgement". As a result, we usually conceive of emotions as a supernumary mental faculty, an unsolicited, nature-ordained accompaniment to our rational thinking which we can do little about. Soloman wants us to think of these usual ways of talking about emotions as "symptomatic" of a "faulty philosophical analysis". He thinks we have adopted a metaphor for understanding emotions which systematically misguides us. The metaphor casts emotions as a type of occurrences, either as "feelings" or as "sensations".

Soloman will argue that an emotion can't be an "occurrence" because an occurrence is non-rational. It is "dumb", inert; it just is. "Burps" or "flushes" along with other sorts of occurrences are what they are regardless of context. Soloman thinks taking "feelings" as a paradigm case for emotions is misleading in that "feelings", like occurrences, do not have the right sorts of complexity of emotions. The kind of character occurrences have is logically disconnected with intelligent behaviour. Occurrences are not modifiable under changed circumstances, so there can be no point talking about the appropriateness or inappropriateness of them. One couldn't hold someone responsible for "feelings" anymore than one could praise or blame someone for a "hiccup" or a "flush." Both just happen to have the character they have.

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[30] E. & C. p 251

This is why Soloman wants to show that "feelings" and "physiological disturbances" are entirely the wrong sort of metaphor for an emotion.

By emphasising the word "occurrences", Soloman is drawing our attention to the traditional view of emotions as non-rational; and this is the view he wants to subvert. It is to be replaced by the view that emotions are rational, that emotions are like judgments, and that like judgments we choose them. On his new view of emotions, it will make sense to praise of blame a person for having them.

3.2

The traditional view of emotions has been called the "Dumb View" of emotion (Spelman 1982)[31]. It was held by early Positivists who assumed that an adequate account of emotion required analytically separating emotion from both reason and sense perception. The view is now regarded by Cognitivists as positing an artificial split between emotion and thought, between reason and emotion. Despite their disagreement with the "Dumb View", however, Cognitivists often inadvertently hold it, and Soloman thinks that Kenny too still holds it. He also seems to think the ordinary person in the street holds it, hence his attack on the "symptomatic metaphors" of "driven by anger," "paralyzed by fear" "felled by shame".

What does Soloman have to say in defense of his thesis that "feelings are bad metaphor for emotions"? The main idea that carries the weight here is this:

> ...feelings are occurrences and cannot have a "direction".[32]

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[31] Alison Jaggar makes reference to this concept in "Love and Knowledge"

[32] E& C p 252

"Feelings don't have directions, but emotions do". It is not perfectly clear what it means for an entity to have "direction". Soloman has already indicated that something has "direction" if it is "about" something, but that doesn't seem to be a lot of help. How shall we understand "direction"? Perhaps what Soloman could be meaning here is that feelings and occurrences are "caused", whereas emotions are not caused; they are "directed" to their objects.

Let's cash this out as meaning "direction" in an almost literal sense, and draw some diagrams to illustrate what Soloman might be meaning. Diagram one would show a simple cause:effect relation, with "cause" on the left hand side pointing to its effect (a "feeling") on the right.

(1a)

cause "feeling"

Then our second diagram could show an emotion having an "object" instead of a "cause". Our emotion entity is on the left hand side pointing out towards the "object" of this emotion.

(2a)

emotion object

The emotion's "pointing outwards" towards its object, would be the emotion's "direction". Then we have two separate diagrams, showing that a "feeling" has to be caused, whereas an emotion can only be directed outwards towards its object. But this can't be quite right, because Soloman also wants

to provide an account of emotions in which emotions too can be caused. Consider;

> "There is nothing in our analysis which is not compatible with an all-embracing causal theory."[33]

And, furthermore, he seems to want to adopt a hard core scientific sense of "cause";

> "The cause of an emotion is an occurrence (state-of-affairs, etc) of a type that stands in a law-like connection with emotions of that type. The object of an emotion is simply "what that emotion is about"."

So maybe the picture isn't quite as simple as we've been thinking[34]. We have to add "cause" into our emotion diagram and see what role it is playing here. The question now becomes, how does Soloman relax causation so that emotions can be doubly determined (i.e. by "cause" and by "object"),while feelings can't be? Where does he put "cause" firstly, in relation to emotion, and secondly, in relation to "object"? He can't have "cause" in the same place on the diagram as "object", since the cause of an emotion is sometimes different from the object of that emotion[35]. We'll assume that "cause" is, like the cause of "feeling" to be placed to the left of "emotion." And we'll have "cause" pointing towards its effect (i.e. the emotion) similarly to how "cause" pointed toward "feeling" in our diagram representing "feeling."

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[33] E & C Footnote 3

[34] Understanding the force of "intentional" as non-causal, was after-all, Kenny's mistake, according to Soloman. Wilson has shown us that describing a relationship as "intentional" doesn't exclude the possibility of its having been caused. So we won't find Soloman following in Kenny's footsteps here.

[35] And Soloman would say, "the cause must in every case be distinguished from what my emotion is "about" (its "object"). The cause is always an actual event (or state of affairs, etc). The object of my emotion is always an intentional object." p 256 E&C

(2b)

cause emotion

But now there is an important difference. "Feelings" don't have objects. If we want to speak of their "objects," then those objects are no more than traces of their causes. Emotions are very different. Even when they have got causes, they don't have that kind of object (traces of those causes). Emotions have a "direction" towards their object, whereas "feelings" have at most only a kind of "pointing back". We can show this on our diagram by showing the "direction" of an emotion as an arrow going in the opposite direction to what we would expect if it was to be a mere effect of its cause.

(2c)

cause emotion object

Now that we have improved our original diagrams to account for Soloman's causal story (in which emotions can be doubly determined) let us take a look at what Soloman does next:

> "...feelings are occurrences and cannot have a "direction". They can be caused, but to say that I am angry "about" John's having stolen my car is very different from saying his stealing my car caused me to be angry. John's act might cause me to be angry "about" something else, e.g. my failure to renew my insurance. It might be false that John stole my car, though I believe that he did. Then it is false that John's stealing my car caused me to be

> angry, but still true that what I am angry "about" is John's stealing the car. One might suggest that it is not the alleged fact of John's stealing my car that is in question, but rather my belief that he did. But what I am angry "about" is clearly not that I believe that John stole my car, but rather that John stole my car."[36]

It seems that Soloman is setting up something like our improved diagram here. But now let us make some further small adjustments. Soloman has said in the previous passage, that the cause (which we have put on the left hand side of our diagram) must be an "actual state of affairs". He could have allowed that the cause be a desire or a "belief", but he makes it very clear that a "cause" must be an objective fact. Thus he says in the quote that "It might be false that John stole my car, though I believe that he did. Then it is false that John's stealing my car caused me to be angry." So, we have on the left hand side of diagram (1), an "actual state of affairs" pointing towards a "feeling" or a sensation. Now we could think that there is a kind of pointing back, in the sense that a feeling is a trace of what is on the left hand side. It might not be a literal tracing, but nevertheless, it is a tracing, and this tracing should allow us to go back and identify the cause. We could think that there is a kind of pointing back in this "tracing" function.



(1b)

cause

actual state of affairs

"feeling"

According to Soloman, (1b) would be the diagram for "feeling" but not the diagram for emotion, because the kind of "direction" that an emotion has is

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[36] E & C p252

not a kind of a "tracing". If we are constructing a diagram for "emotion" then, it's not going to show any pointing back. As Soloman says,"John's act might cause me to be angry "about" something else e.g. my failure to renew my insurance."



(2d)

actual state of affairs — emotion — object

What our emotion entity is pointing to may be something completely different from the objective state of affairs, which caused it[37].

The most important point that Soloman is making here is that if emotions were "feelings" then emotions would point back to their cause in the sense of being a tracing of it. A "feeling" has to be a tracing of its cause, but an object is in a funny sort of a way, independent of the cause of the emotion. It can have whatever character it has, regardless of the cause. Emotions do have a relation to something other than their cause, they have to have that extra relation of being "about." Without this extra relation, our responses would be entirely determined by the cause of the emotion. John might take the car, but his taking the car might cause me to be angry "about" something else. On this analysis, then, an emotion may be caused, but the effect of the cause (being angry about....) is not pre-determined. The "directedness" of the emotion is not a "pointing" back to the cause in any literal sense. In fact, according to Soloman, there's no pointing backward at all. All the pointing (i.e. the "directedness" of the emotion) is a pointing forwards towards what the emotion is "about".

An emotion arrow points towards an object as experienced, meaning that

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[37] In fact, Soloman says that it must be different, but we won't go into that point here.

that object has no ontological committment, according to Soloman[38]. It is not an actual "state of affairs" ("it is not the alleged "fact" of stealing my car that is in question"), nor is the object a transitory mental state (such as "a "belief" that John stole my car"). Certainly, the "existence" or "inexistence" of the object does not impinge on whether they are or aren't the subject of my emotion.

Having reviewed these aspects, we can now attempt to summarise what Soloman means by " feelings don't have directions but emotions do". We can say that "feelings" have to be the way they are because of their external circumstances. Their objects, if they can be considered to have any, are literal traces of those "states of affairs." Emotions are not so constrained by their external circumstances, but are "directed" from within. Their "objects" are not "inexistent," transitory beliefs, they are more permanent inter-subjective entities. But they are objects as experienced, and this gives them the status of being ontologically innocent. Emotions are "directed" to such objects, "feelings," which are mere effects of their causes, are not.

3.3

We have been exploring Soloman's main objection to the metaphor: "emotions are a type of feelings." Let's see what other objections he has.

> "Emotions typically involve feelings. Perhaps they essentially involve feelings. But feelings are never sufficient to differentiate and identity emotions, and an emotion is never simply a feeling, not even a feeling plus anything. Moreover,it is clear that one can have an emotion without feeling anything. One

[38] See p 273 E & c

> can be angry without feeling angry: one can be angry for three days or five years and not feel anything identifiable as a feeling of anger continuously through that prolonged period. One might add that one must have a disposition to feel angry, and to this, there is no objection, so long as being angry is not thought to mean "having a disposition to feel angry."[39]

What is wrong with the "emotions are feelings" metaphor here? Well, identifying emotions with feelings would make it impossible to postulate that a person might not be aware of her emotional state, because feelings are by definition a matter of conscious awareness[40]. We can't be aware of a "pang", without feeling a "pang". It is clear, says Soloman, that emotions are not like feelings in this sense. We can have emotions over long periods of time without being aware of feeling anything. We can love someone over a period of time without needing to have continual awareness of loving feelings. We can be angry for a period of time, without feeling angry each moment of that period. If emotions were feelings then these commonplace facts could not be accommodated.

The above passage continues as follows: although we can be angry without feeling angry, the opposite is not the case: we cannot feel angry without being angry.

> "But I do know that it does not even make sense to say that one feels angry if one is not angry. And this might seem obvious on the traditional view that anger is a feeling (for then being angry is nothing but having the feeling of anger). But on our

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[39] E & C p 254

[40] This point is made by Alison Jaggar in "Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology"

> account, anger is not a feeling, nor does it involve any identifiable feeling (which is not to deny that one does feel angry - that is flushed, excited, etc., when he is angry). One can identify his feeling angry only if he is angry"[41]

It is possible to know that one "feels angry" only if one is angry. This might seem "mysterious", if we have adopted the traditional view of emotions, because then we will have come to believe that there really are introspectible elements called "feelings". And we will have come to believe that we could distinguish our being "afraid of something" from our being "angry about something" without there being any identifiable context in which we could understand ourselves to be "fearful of..." or "angry "about..."". Once we have been influenced by the traditional view, we expect to be able to tell, purely on the basis of the phenomenal quality of the "flush", and without any recourse to what it is a "flush" of, that it is a "flush of anger" rather than a "flush of embarassment".

Soloman hasn't expanded his objection to this point here, but we could usefully do so. We might think that trying to distinguish a "flush of anxiety" from a "flush of excitement" without recourse to context, might be like trying to tell, on the basis of the quality of our "flush," what the object of that temperature was. Our guesses, if they were to have any accuracy, would involve some extraordinary restrictions of context.

To appreciate this point, consider Kenny's[42] illustration of the problem when he entertains the idea that pleasure might be a sensation. It goes something like this. Imagine that one had enjoyed listening to the first performance of a new overture. How would one tell on the basis of one's "glows" or "tingles" that what one had enjoyed was listening to the overture and not, say, sitting

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[41] E & C p 254

[42] A E & W p 129. In the footnote on this page, Kenny acknowledges that his argument is a development of one used by Ryle in Dilemmas.

in row G of the dress circle? One could have a hypothesis that it was the overture that had produced the pleasurable sensations. But in order to find out, one would have to listen to the overture again, sitting in row F of the stalls, and introspect carefully to see if the same "glows" and "tingles" occurred again. This is obviously absurd. We do accept a Theatre problem for sensations[43]. We don't for emotions, because emotions are not occurrences.

Soloman intends to avoid the Theatre problem, precisely by using the sets of distinctions he is making between "feelings" and "emotions." The Theatre problem arises in the first place because of the Positivist analysis which requires a separation between emotion and thought. Once emotion is separated analytically from thought, it is supposedly possible to identify "enjoying", apart from whatever might be the object of that enjoyment. Then the problem arises of how the gap between enjoying and the object of that enjoyment is to be closed. Kenny's Theatre problem illustrates this very point.

But Soloman won't have to solve this problem. By insisting that emotions are "directed" and "feelings" are not, he avoids the Theatre problem by requiring emotions to come already linked to their objects, because that's exactly what it means to be "directed". Hence there arises no problem of how to close the gap between "emotion" and "object", since no gap exists. In Soloman's scheme one does not identify one's emotion, and then, following inductive reasoning, try to figure out what it might be directed to. By requiring "emotions" to come already attached to their object, no such problem of a gap arises. The "object" is simply already there in the emotion, so there will be no need to carry out a piece of inductive research, in order to find out whether it was the performance that one enjoyed, or sitting in row G of the dress circle. True enough, there might be some occasions where we can't

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[43] The Theatre problem is a way of getting at an incorrect account of all of our psychic life. It may not even be a correct account of sensation - the Occurrence view is the Sense Data view, and we never were able to get the Sense Data view off the ground. At least we can say here; Emotions aren't like this.

figure out whether we are enjoying A or B, but we settle that in ordinary ways, e.g. by context, not by looking at some phenomenological character.

3.4

As well as these Brentano-like moves, Soloman goes further to make some rather more counter-intuitive claims:

> "It is true that I often feel something when I become angry. It is also true that I feel something after I cease to be angry. I am angry at John for stealing my car. Then I discover that John did not steal my car: I cease (immediately) to be angry. Yet the feeling remains: it is the same feeling I had while I was angry (flushing etc). The feeling subsides more slowly than the anger. But the feeling, even if it is the same feeling that I had while I was angry, is not a feeling of anger. Now it's just a feeling. Sometimes one claims to feel angry but not be angry. But here, I would argue that the correct description is rather that one does not know exactly what one is angry "about" (though one is surely angry "about" something); or perhaps one is angry but does not believe he ought to be. One [still] cannot feel angry without being angry"[44]

This is a difficult passage. Perhaps Soloman is trying to say something shocking here. It certainly does sound a bit odd: "I cease immediately to be angry, but now the feelings I have, which are the same feelings I had when I was angry, are "just feelings"." For the time being let's forget about the first odd thing - ceasing immediately to be angry - except insofar as it gives us a

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[44] E & C p 255

clue as to why Soloman might have said the second odd thing.

We need to reconsider the following phrases;

> "..I cease immediately to be angry. Yet the feeling remains: **it is the same feeling I had while I was angry** (flushing, etc.)"
>
> **" The feeling subsides more slowly than the anger."**
>
> "But the feeling, **even if it is the same feeling I had while I was angry**, is not a feeling of anger. Now it is just a feeling."

Now it's looking like we have two things: "feeling" and "being angry", and in addition to those two things, we have some naming ritual such that "feeling" receives a different name according to whether or not it is hooked up to "being angry". When it is hooked up to "being angry" it is called "feeling angry", and when it stands alone, though it is the same feeling as it was when it was hooked up to "being angry", is now just called "just feeling".

This doesn't sound right. Depending on the context you are supposed to be able to have an "angry feeling" which is directed, and a "just feeling" which isn't directed (it's just a "flush"). When I cease to be angry, I do have the same feeling, but now I stop putting it with anger. All that seems decidedly odd. It would only be possible if I forgot the context and I forgot why I was angry before. But that possibility seems implausible - I am supposed to recatalogue, but at the same time I am supposed to entirely forget the old category. Soloman is supposing that I can be flushed with anger, and then I can be "simply flushed" after I cease to be angry. This would be understandable perhaps if I didn't notice my flush all along - then my flush

has never had a meaningful context. But if I do notice my flush, then it seems odd that I shouldn't seize to put it together with the anger, but instead should stick it in a new pigeonhole - "just feelings."

My flush is now suddenly without a meaningful context. It is not unimaginable to think that I might now be suprised by the appearance of them. I might be disturbed by "here is a flush!" in the same way that I might be surprised by a burp. Because "angry feelings" have suddenly become meaningless occurrences, and this certainly doesn't seem right.

3.5

There are even stronger reasons why "before I was feeling angry, now suddenly, it's "just a feeling"" is a very odd thing to say. But first, let us make sure that we have given Soloman a fair hearing. Let's suppose that he might be saying something like "What a name stands for depends on its context. And these two "feeling" names refer to the same item, but describe that item in a different context." A classic example of two names referring to the same item is:

the evening star is the same as the morning star

Soloman could be saying that "angry feelings" and "just feelings" are really just different names for the same items, "flushes" etc, but they describe the flushes from a different context. Let's try to elaborate this suggestion using the above common example. By saying, "Now we'll call these items "angry feelings," and now, in this other context, we'll call them "just feelings". Soloman might be saying something like: "When the planet is at this part of the orbit it's called the evening star, and when it's at this part of the orbit, it's called the morning star.

Now we have a pretty good idea how to back up the above statement. We have a way of independently checking the background, so that it's not an odd thing to say about Venus, because we can track Venus. The problem is this. We don't have any idea how to independently check Soloman's statement. Someone could protest "Oh no, there are different feelings involved in the true context." Someone else could insist " Not at all, they are identically the same feelings in both contexts". How could we decide? If feelings had a reality independent of linguistic context, we might be able to track them separately from their name, but they don't, and this is what makes this particular interpretation, an odd thing to say.

Let's try another approach to understanding what Soloman could be saying. Suppose there are some seats on an aeroplane. We rip one out, take it home, and put it in the living room in front of the T.V.. Now it's not a seat, it's a chair. A seat has to be one item among many such items, on a plane or a train or a bus, all arranged in rows etc. This thing can't be a "seat" on its own. It has to belong in a certain context, and that context just changed. So we've ripped it out of an aeroplane, and we've put it in the lounge. It's no longer a "seat," it's a "chair." But what must we be saying when we want to say "it's just a chair"? It has not become a "just" anything, because being a chair also depends on its context. "Chairs" are what we have in the house, in front of tables and desks, and so on. Move the dining room chair into a church hall, and it changes again.

We need to change our analogy. "Just feeling" has to be an occurrence, and it has to be a mere occurrence. So we can't take chairs and seats to be analagous to "feelings" in Soloman's example, because they depend on context. The correct analogy isn't "Now it's a seat..."now it's a chair", it's "now it's a seat...."now it's a "chunk of matter". So we've got the seat on an aeroplane, we rip it out and take it home, put it in front of the T.V., now "it's just a chunk of matter". It suddenly became a just a "chunk of matter" the moment we took it out of the aeroplane. The correct parallel with "feelings" isn't "Now I'm feeling angry..."now I'm feeling relieved". It's "now I'm feeling

angry"..."now I just have hot flushes."

This too is a very odd thing to say, because it assumes that we can speak with confidence of what happens outside all context. In one context this item is a "seat," in another it's a "chair". These descriptions fit only by virtue of context. How are we to know what to make of something in no context at all? Soloman confidently assumes that he knows what happens outside of all context. What we say in context-bound situation doesn't give us anything to say in contextless situations - if there are such beasts, and probably there aren't. This is an especially ruinous thing for Soloman to say because his intentionality arguments depend so strongly on context.

In addition, Soloman says that this something which is known outside of all context, is comparable to, indeed it is the very same, as what we have in context. I took out seat no. 32 and this is the "same as" chunk of matter no.32. Neither of those, however, will give you "it's just a chunk of matter." Not only are we supposed to step right outside of context, and know what happens, we are supposed to make comparisons with items whose description relies on that context. I think we have to assume that this can't be what Soloman wants to say either.

Let's try again. Imagine you are at a card game, and I say "Just play a card, any card will do". Then you could play any card - a Jack, a Queen ... any card would do because my instruction "Just play a card" doesn't refer to which one. It is a general description of a type. It's not the same as any chunk of matter. It's not even the same as a rectangular piece of cardboard ... you could cut one of those out from the back of the phonebook, and I could reasonably object to that. A card is a game member, it's just a non-specified game member. Perhaps this is the sort of thing Soloman is meaning when he uses the phrase "just a feeling". Let's try out "just a card" in the form of an equivalence statement. Then we have:

"Just a card" is the same as a "Queen"

Again, this sounds very odd indeed. But now suppose that I've had the card in my hand all the time. "Just a card" and a "Queen" both refer to the same rectangular piece of cardboard I've had in my hand all along. It's simply that the game has changed. In the previous game, the card was acting as a Queen, now in the next game, you must just consider it "a card". Then the "Queen" is the same as "just a card": they are both names for the piece of cardboard I've had in my hand all along. This is the "feeling" I've had all along, though in that circumstance, it was an "angry feeling." Those circumstances have changed, and now it's "just a feeling." This is looking a little better.

Let's consider some more. Then, it was a "Queen," now it's an unspecified "card." But what is the nature of the "it" here? Please remind me, what is the "same" about the "Queen" and the unspecified "card"? Well, it's temporally the same card. How do I know that? "Because it's this piece of cardboard I've had in my hand all along". But this implies an identity between the piece of cardboard you used to have in your hand, and the piece of cardboard you have in your hand now. It has to be the same card. Whereas in the card game you have a separate background to check against (the feel of your card in your hand as you changed the game being played,) there are important reasons why Soloman can't assume such separateness for "angry feelings." These reasons deserve a section of their own.

3.6

It should not be possible compare an "angry feeling" and a "just feeling" because an "angry feeling" is not supposed to be a quality which is extractable in the way that items like pieces of cardboard are extractable. To illustrate this point, we'll need some help from Ryle. Consider his exposition on the possiblity of comparing the feeling of "agreeableness" with the

enjoyment of the conversation:

> "In the way in which a sensation or feeling is a predecessor, a concomitant, or a successor of other happenings, enjoyment is not a predecessor, concomitant or successor of anything. My foot may hurt, continuously or intermittently, both while the shoe is on and after it is removed. The pressure on the sore toe and the pain it gives can be separately clocked. But when I enjoy or dislike a conversation, there is not, besides the easily clockable stretches of the conversation, something else, stretches of which might be separately clocked, some continuous or introspectible phenomenon which is the agreeableness or the disagreeableness of the conversation to me. I might indeed enjoy the first five minutes and the last three minutes of the conversation, detest one intermediate stage of it and not care one way or another about another stage. But **if asked to compare in retrospect the durations of my enjoyings and dislikings with the durations of the stretches of the conversation which I had enjoyed or disliked, I should not be able to think of two things whose durations were to be compared.** Nor can my pleasure in contributing and listening to the conversation be some collateral activity or experience which might conceivably clamour for a part of my interest or attention, in the way in which a tickle might distract my attention from the butterfly....we cannot ask how long was the interval between seeing the point of a joke and enjoying it - and not because, like some thunder-claps which are

> heard at the same moment as the lightning is seen, the seeing and the enjoying of the joke were synchronous happenings, but because **there were not two happenings to be synchronous or separate.....**"[45]

We might think that Soloman is saying something like this about "angry feelings". My enjoyings and my dislikings are not separate happenings, the durations of which could be compared with what I have been enjoying or disliking. Neither could my angry feelings be distinct items from my "being angry" whose durations could be contrasted with the duration of my "being angry". If I have been angry about John taking the car, there need not have been something else in progress, additional to my being angry, i.e. some special sensation or feeling engendered in me by "that John took the car", which also angers me. Just as my pleasure is not some collateral activity like a "tickle" which can conceivably clamour for a part of my interest, neither are my angry feelings some separate activity. They are the special quality of the activity called "being angry". And when the activity of "being angry" ends, the special quality of that activity, namely "angry feelings", must die with it. To this point, Soloman could be following Ryle's example exactly.

But now consider that when one stops enjoying the conversation, no feeling of agreeableness remains. In this example at least, Ryle is not faced with a problem of there being "feelings" which hang on after the enjoyment stops. Not so for Soloman's example of being angry with John for stealing the car. Such hot emotions as anger present the possibility that once one stops having reason to be angry, some things like "hot flushes" embarassingly linger on. I say "embarassingly" not because one might be embarassed at having wrongly believed John to have stolen the car (which one indeed might find embarassing), but "embarassing" for the proposed theory. What is a philosopher like Soloman to do with the "hot flushes" etc. which supposedly

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[45] p 56 "Dilemmas"

are the same hot flushes as before, but now according to the chosen analysis, can no longer be what they were before it was discovered that John didn't steal the car? Since the activity of being angry has supposedly ended, these embarassingly lingerering creatures can no longer apparently be regarded as the special qualities of that activity which has died. So what are they now?

At first blush, it seems that Soloman's position is similar to Ryle's in that he cannot regard "feeling angry" as a separately clockable thing from "being angry". Now, it is pretty clear that Soloman is clocking separately "being angry" and "flushes", but that's allright according to Ryle's view, because a "flush" is somewhat like a "tickle", in that it is the sort of thing which can clamour for one's attention when one is either enjoying a conversation or being angry.

But there is something else worth taking note of. Not only does Soloman want to say "now the hot flush is "just a feeling"", but he also wants to say "Now it's the same feeling": it's the same feeling I had when I was "being angry", but now I'm not angry. Quite apart from the ordinary problems of how it is that one could compare two "tickles" or two "flushes" over time, how could Soloman compare two feelings and know that "its the same feeling", if one feeling is "just a feeling" and another is the quality of an activity? In our card game example we could say with complete confidence, "it is the same card, but it functions differently in different games". But we can't say that here, because you are not even supposed to be able to pull out "feeling angry" from the activity of "being angry". "Feeling angry" is not an entity like a card, because we can identify the card by what it looks like (it's the one with the picture of the Queen on it) separately from whatever role it has been given by the game that it is participating in. But there's not supposed to be any such equivalent quality in "feeling angry" which could possibly identify it separately from "being angry".

What is the criteria of sameness and difference in Soloman's comparison?

Surely it must be that "feeling angry" and "just feeling" are "the same" if they have the same "flush" - the same phenomenal "feel". But how were we to get that, when "feeling angry" was not supposed to be some collateral phenomenon like a "tickle"? It is not supposed to be just that "feeling angry" dies along with "being angry" because, like Ryle's example of thunder and lightning, "feeling angry" happens to be synchronous with "being angry". This would make "feeling angry" and "being angry", two happenings which could be synchronous or separate, and this would make them distinguishable phenomena, which Soloman clearly doesn't want.

Ryle has said that "if asked to compare in retrospect the durations of my enjoyings and dislikings with the stretches of the conversation which I had enjoyed or disliked, **I should not be able to think of two things whose durations were to be compared**." But if we can't go back and compare two things in retrospect, then how can we go back and compare one present thing (a "just a feeling") with one of those things (i.e. "angry feelings")? Comparing requires me to go back and compare the feeling I had when I was angry with the "just feelings" as they are now. Therefore it requires me to clock "feeling angry" separately from "being angry", because I am supposed to be able to compare "feeling angry" back then with "just feeling" now, to see whether they have the same phenomenal feel.

This would be like waking up from a dream in which you dreamt that you accidentally set off a fire alarm, only to find that that your familiar old alarm clock has woken you. You reason logically, that the alarm in the two experiences must have been the same, but you can in no way compare the sound of the bell, now still ringing, and the sound of the fire alarm in your dream, and not because you've fogotten your dream, but because one is the sound of a fire alarm in your dream and cannot be extracted on its own to be compared to the now ringing bell of the alarm clock[46].

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[46] I was fortunate enough to have had this experience in the week that I was writing this part. I simply could not recall the phenomenal sound of the "fire alarm" to compare it to the bell of the alarm clock.

Such a comparison shouldn't be able to be done if we take seriously Ryle's warning that there are not two happenings to be synchronous or separate. If "feeling angry" and "being angry" are not two happenings, then neither can one of two happenings be available to be compared with a third happening in regard to its phenomenal qualities. "It's the same feeling I had when I was angry, but now it's "just a feeling"" shows clearly that Soloman has not rid himself of a collateral theory[47].

[47] Another name for which is "Components" Analysis! There is another indicator that Soloman has not rid himself of a collateral theory. The point can be made in relation to Soloman's phrasing that "the feeling subsides more slowly than the anger" Now why should the "feeling" subside slowly? More to the point, why should the "feeling" subside at all? "Feelings" are not supposed to be the sorts of entities that could be sensitive to new information. If what I am feeling after I learn that John didn't steal the car is in fact "just a feeling" then what in the causal realm would make it to subside? It is hard to see why such a feeling would exist in the first place, since John actually did not steal the car, there must have been no actual state of affairs, which caused hot flushes, unless it was a high temparature coming on. But then it would have to be a curiously appropriately timed to subside immediately after I learn that John didn't take the car. Only if "just feeling" was covertly referenced to "feeling angry" or to "being angry", would it have a reason to subside.

4

"EMOTIONS AND CHOICE"

The "Components" Analysis

4.1

To this point we have considered Soloman's arguments against the "Dumb View" of emotions. He also presents arguments against Cognitivist accounts of emotions, such as Kenny's. The central idea of Cognitivist accounts is that emotions can be explained as having two "components": an affective or feeling component and a cognition that supposedly tells us what the feelings are "about". It is worth emphasising that the first component of this equation is the phenomenal part, (the "dumb" feeling), the second is the cognitive part. Such accounts identify a vital feature of emotions overlooked by the "Dumb View", namely the intentionality of an emotion. However, they unwittingly perpetuate the Positivist split between emotion and thought.

> "I am angry at John for stealing my car." It is true that I am angry. And it is also true that John stole my car. Thus we are tempted to distinguish two components of my being angry; my feeling of anger and what I am angry about. But this is doubly a mistake.[48]

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[48] E&C p253

4.2

Here is the first reason a "components" analysis is a mistake, according to Soloman.

> It requires that a feeling (of anger) be (contingently) directed at something (at John's having stolen my car). But feelings are occurrences and cannot have a "direction". They [feelings] can be caused, but **to say that I am angry [emotion] "about" John having stolen my car is very different from saying his stealing my car caused me to be angry**[49].....But I am angry "about" something. The relationship between my being angry and what I am angry about is not the contingent relation between a feeling and an object. (Though it is surely contingent that I am angry at John for stealing my car.) **An emotion cannot be identified apart from its object; "I am angry" is incomplete - not only in the weak sense that there is more information available ("Are you angry about anything?") but "I am angry requires that there must be more information available."**[50]

This is what Soloman means:

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[49] The subject of the sentence is "feelings," but then there's talk about emotions. This wobbliness seems to be pervasive. It will be important because it it precisely the components analysis that keeps you from concluding that emotions are directed to objects because emotions consist of feelings directed to objects. Both may be true, but you can't derive the second from the first.

[50] E & C p 252. My bold marking.

The equation:
[an emotion equals a "feeling" plus a cognition]
is much like the equation:
[a house equals walls plus a roof].

A house has two components: the walls and the roof. We have a particular relation between these two components - the relation between them is contingent. The thing that has components is a whole house [an emotion]. We are not talking about a contingent relation between a thing and its components, we are talking about a contingent relation between its components. Kenny's mistake was equivalent to thinking that;

a house necessarily consists of [roof plus walls]

therefore,

a house consists of {[roof] necessarily related to [walls]}

But anybody who gives a [roof plus walls] analysis of a house, or an emotion is going to be forced to agree that the relationship between the [roof] and the [walls] (the "feeling" and the object) is not an essential relation.

It is because of the requirement for a "Components" analysis to have "components" that mix and match, that such analyses are going to force a contingent relation between the two components. If there weren't a contingent relation between "feeling" and "whatever the feeling is about," then you couldn't mix and match the components.

To illustrate this point, consider the classic example of componential analysis we get with John Searle's analysis of "speech acts." In this analysis we have semantic components which stand for the illocutionary "force" of the speech act, and other components which stand for the "propositional content":

Illocutionary Force	Propositional content
I warn you	there is a bull in the field
I tell you	there is a bull in the field
I promise you	there is a bull in the field
I warn you	tea will be cooked before you get home
I tell you	tea will be cooked before you get home
I promise you	tea will be cooked before you get home
...etc	.....etc

A whole "speech act" consists of one of the first components (carrying the illocutionary "force") occurring with one of the second components (carrying the propositional content). It is true that the "force" component has a direction: "I warn you that...," but carrying the direction doesn't force "I warn you that.." to go with "there is a bull in the field." "I warn you that.." might occur with any number of other propositional contents, such as "tea will be cooked before you get home." Similarly "I warn you that..." may be mixed with "there's a bull in the field," but is not forced to go with this item. Speech acts consist of one component which is directed to another component. Searle's componential analysis is designed to let you have mix and match - this is how speech acts are built up. The present point is simply this: if you have mix and match there can be no essential relation between the components, between any item carrying some specific illocutionary force and any other item carrying some specific propositional content.

This fact is also going to force there to be some psychological reality to the semantic components representing "force." Thus it is going to seem possible to prise "warning" off from what it is a warning "about." All of the left hand side; "I warn you..," "I promise you..," etc. are going to have to be regarded as meaningful in their own right, separately from any proposition

they might contingently be occurring with. You have to know what warnings are like in general. Otherwise you couldn't move the item carrying around such force to mix and match.

The same formula is true of a "Components" analysis of emotion such as Kenny's. Let's see how this looks in:

"I am shattered about the accident."

According to the "Components" analysis of emotions, this expression is made up of two components: "I am shattered", and "about the accident." If so, then "I am shattered" has to have some psychological reality outside of its association with "about the accident". This gives some supposed credence to an introspectible phenomenological item named "I am shattered," whose quality is apparently the same whether it is combined with "about the accident" or "by the cat dying." Moreover this introspectible, phenomenological item has to be able to be used as an item in different combinations[51]. It has to be a mix and matchable item. Thus we could use "I am shattered" in "I am shattered about failing the exam," or we could use "I am shattered" in "I am shattered about my cat dying," or we could use "I am shattered" in "I was shattered about being chosen to be M.C."

Let's take a closer look at this isolable component named "I am shattered".

Feature	Intentional Object
I am shattered	about failing the exam
I am shattered	about my cat dying
I am shattered	about being chosen to be MC

[51] We are following here the model of "speech acts" as developed by John Searle in his book "Speech Acts". This contains his proof that speech acts are "components" <u>because</u> you can mix and match them.

What allows all these separate components named "I am shattered" to receive the same name? By what criteria are they being grouped together with each other? The only possible candidates, since we have stripped "I am shattered" of "whatever shattered is "about"" are the subjective ones - the phenomenal ones of duration and intensity[52]. This must be the case, since "feelings" have to be fully prised off from "cognitions" if they are to become mix and matchable items. All that can be left after "cognitions" have been removed are the phenomenal qualities. How else could "shattered" have come to have the same referent, regardless of whether it is combined with "about the exam," "about the accident," or "about becoming M.C."? Only by the prior stripping off of the "cognitive" part, leaving just the "feelings."

True, Kenny and others have usefully drawn attention to "the intentionality of emotions." That is to say that there is some directedness going on, but notice that the Components Analysis gives the directedness to the "feeling" component, just as the Speech Act Theory gives the directedness to the illocutionary force. And that doesn't give directedness to the emotion anymore than it does to the speech act.[53] In spite of the directedness of "I am shattered," in Kenny's "Components" analysis, the relation between "shattered" and "what shattered is supposedly directed at" is still not an essential relation. Again, because "components" have to be items that you can mix and match.

Kenny thought he was saying something important by giving a "directional" analysis of emotions. That emotions consisted of "feelings" and cognitions was supposed to explain their directedness. But if he thought that he could

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[52] "Duration", "intensity" and "blending" are the characteristics sited by Kenny as shared by feelings of all kinds. (p 55 -56 E,A&W)

[53] What I have just given derives the same conclusion as Chapter 5, but stresses that we can't get an essential relation between components, any more than we do between "promising" and "there is a bull in the field." This time the argument is because the components have to be mix and matchable their plainly can't be a necessary relation between a component and any other.

go from "one component is directed towards another component" to a conclusion which says that a whole emotion consisting of those components is directed towards an object, that is a big mistake. Compare the three inferences:

Home = walls + roof
∴ Homes are directed at their roof

Speech act = force + content
∴ Speech acts are directed at their propositional contents

Emotion = feelings + cognitions
∴ Emotions are directed at their cognitions

None of these conclusions are valid. By putting the "aboutness" as having to do with the components, the Components Analysis fails to give an analysis of the directedness of the emotion. Also, because it has to be mix and matchable, a Components Analysis will never give you a necessary relation between components.

The above is one interpretation of what Soloman might be saying in the two important passages quoted earlier. Here is another. Consider;

"I am angry at John for stealing my car"

If we divide this expression into two components each with separate truth values, then the next assumption we are likely to make is that the truth of the compound expression is a function of the truth of its component expressions[54] such that the truth value of each component added to the other component, gives the truth value for the whole. Hence;

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[54] This is Frege's Functionality principle

The truth of:

"I am angry at John for stealing my car"

is equivalent to the truth of

"I am angry"

plus the truth of

"John stole my car"

or $T(X + Y) = T(X) + T(Y)$

Soloman has several problems with this:

(1) An artificial sense of reality is given to the X and the Y. For one thing, X would have to identified independently, if the truth of X is to be identified independently. This leaves X being a kind of "feelings," since emotions are "about" something and cannot be identified separately from what they are "about."

(2) How then could X link up with Y? The only option for a "feeling," since it doesn't have an essential "direction," is for it to have a causal relation with Y. But causal relations we have seen over and again are very different from "about" relations.

(3) If the relation between X and Y were a causal relation, then there would be a truth functional relation between X and Y such that the independent truth of X and the independent truth of Y forces the truth of the conjunction (X and Y.)
Consider the expression "touching the paper with a candle caused the fire." It is true I touched the paper with a candle, and it is true that I have caused a fire, seems to force the truth of "My touching the paper has caused a fire." So here the truth of a compound expression is indeed a function of the truth of its component expressions.

Components of emotion on a Components Analysis, are also conjuncts.

But they are definitely not truth functional ones. In emotion expressions both components might be true (it might be true that "I am angry" and true that "John stole the car"), but the compound might still be quite false (it might be false that I am angry "about" John stealing the car.) In addition, it might be that the compound expression is true, while one of its component expressions is false. For example, it might be false that John stole my car. However if I believe that he did steal my car, then it is true that "I am angry "about" John stealing my car." The conjuncts of emotion expressions just do not follow a truth functional relation. That's the opposite of what a "components" analysis is telling you.

Soloman goes on to make the following three claims;

i) The relation between an emotion and its object is not the contingent relation between a "feeling" and its object.

ii) An emotion cannot be identified apart from its object. I am angry requires more information. (To put it in the truth functional terms I have just been using, if "I am angry" didn't require more information, then Xs would have to be "feelings," and the only relation that "feelings" could have with the world is a causal one. But the relation between X and Y can't be causal, because then the truth of the component expressions would force the truth of the compound expression, and it doesn't).

iii) "Feelings" have no such requirements.

4.3

Let us now consider Soloman's other main reason for thinking that the Components Analysis is a mistake.

"Neither can "what I am angry about" be separated from my being angry. Of course, it makes sense to say that John's having stolen my car is something different from my being angry at him for doing so. But it is not simply the fact that John stole my car that is what I am angry about; nor is it, as I said above, my belief that John stole my car about which I am angry. I am angry about the intentional object "that John stole my car." **Unlike the fact that John stole my car, this intentional object is opaque; I am not angry that John stole a vehicle assembled in Youngstown, Ohio, with 287 h.p., though that is a true description of the fact that John stole my car**. I am not angry that someone 5'7" tall got his fingerprints on my steering column. Sartre attempts to point out this feature of what emotions are "about" by saying that **their object is "transformed"**; D.F.Pears points to this same feature by noting that it is always an "aspect" of the object that is the object of an emotion.

What emotions are "about," as in beliefs, can only be identified under certain descriptions, and those descriptions are determined by the emotion itself. This does not mean that what emotions are about are beliefs - only that emotions share an important conceptual property of beliefs. "Being angry about...." is very much like "believing that...." To be angry is to be angry "about" a peculiar sort of object, one that is distinguished by the fact that it is what I am angry "about." Husserl describes this peculiarity of mental acts in general by insisting that **an**

> **intentional act and an intentional object are "<u>essentially</u> correlated."** For our purposes, the point to be seen is that emotions cannot be discussed in terms of "components" by distinguishing feeling angry and what I am angry about....**In Heideggarian phrase, I am never simply angry, but there is always "my-being-angry-about-...."**[55]

Soloman's first objection to the "Components" model was that emotions can't be identified independently of what they are about. His second objection parallels the first. Neither can the intentional object, i.e. what the emotion is "about," be identified independently from the emotion. Both objections to the "Components" model then operate together to determine that there must be an "essential correlation" between an emotion and its object.

How is this argued? Soloman invites us to consider what is the object of an emotion. My belief that John did something? No, he says. I am not angry at my <u>belief</u> that John stole my car. And I am not angry at the <u>fact</u> that John stole it. The reason I am not angry at the fact that John stole my car, is that facts aren't opaque. All the properties that facts have are listed in God's inventory. But those properties have <u>nothing</u> to do with what I know or don't know about the facts. Facts carry all their properties on their sleeve, they're quite transparent. But when I'm angry about the intentional object "that John stole my car," I'm not angry that John stole something made in Youngstown, Ohio, even though that's one of the properties of my car. So it can't be the full bodied <u>fact</u> that John stole my car, that I'm angry about, but just "that he did." And "that he did" has all and only the properties I know about or am angry about.

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[55] Quote taken from p253 of E&C. My bold marking.

Whatever I am angry about thus has a peculiar sort of character. It doesn't have all the properties of an individual item in God's world, it is identifiable by being just the "aspect" that I am angry about. It is my anger that determines what that aspect is: I am angry "that he stole my car". It is not the leather seated car I am angry about, even if I know it is leather seated.

Sartre attempts to point out this feature of what emotions are about by saying that their object is "transformed." What he means by this is not that a full bodied object is taken into consciousness from the outside and then subjectively altered in some way. He means that there is no neutrally presented data in the first place. All objects of consciousness come already "transformed" by that consciousness. Hence Sartre says about the object of an emotion;

> "It expresses from a definite point of view the human synthetic totality in its entirety. And we need not understand by that that it is the effect of human reality. It is the human reality itself in the form of "emotion".[56]

What emotions are "about" can only be identified under certain descriptions, or by certain "aspects," and those descriptions are determined by the emotion itself. Sartre's passage makes it clear that this is not a "caused by" relation, where the emotion transforms the object. This would make the emotion and the object two independent items. In the case of emotions it is not clear what would even count as an object independently of the type of consciousness, the type of activity that is being performed. There is not a two-stage operation whereby we take in a full bodied object and operate on that, or take an aspect of that. There are no neutrally presented objects to operate on. How we see things is already an expression of our own consciousness. If we have an intentional object, say

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[56] p 17 "The Emotions," Sartre

"that Jack stole the car", then that object already has been shaped by our anger.

A further illustration of this point can be seen in the failure of substitutivity of co-referential expressions in emotion expression (this is what Soloman means by calling the objects of emotions "opaque"). I can't substitute "a vehicle with 287 h.p." for "my car" and preserve the truth conditions of my emotion expression. Likewise, I might be angry at John, and John might be Brian's brother, but I cannot be angry at Brian's brother if I do not know or am not caring about that aspect, i.e.that John is Brian's brother. I can substitute in causal expressions, because the Ys in causal relations are two independent items. And those kinds of full bodied items have all the properties in God's inventory. They have such properties "in themselves," outside of any contribution made by consciousness. That is why we can freely substitute co-referential expressions in causal relations. The truth value of "John caused me to wreak the car" is not changed if instead of refering to John by his own name, I refer to him by his status as "Brian's brother." The truth or falsity of the expression remains the same whether or not I know that John is Brian's brother.

In summary, we can't substitute for Y in [X-about-Y] and maintain the same truth conditions, because Y never was extractable from [X-about-Y]. For the same reason, neither can we extract the X from the Y. Neither Y nor X is a meaningful unit in isolation. They are only meaningful in the context of [X-about-Y]. If [X-about-Y] is the right formula, then X cannot be logically detached, because it drags the .. -about-Y with it. Likewise in reverse. If [X-about-Y] is the right formula, then Y cannot be logically detached, because it drags the X-about-Y with it. (Or at least the [X-about-Y] is determinative of what X is, because it can't be detached from the Y.)

This must be what Husserl means when he says that an intentional act and an intentional object are "essentially correlated." An intentional act and an intentional object are internally related. Neither the act nor the object are a

meaningful unit in isolation from the other. They only have meaning in the context of their belonging to a relational state of affairs.

That is why emotions can't be discussed in terms of "components". Each so called "component" is identifiable only in the context of a relational state of affairs. "I am angry" requires that there must be more information available, and "what I am angry about" cannot be separated from my being angry. It is the character of essential relations that both members of the pair have an equal footing in the relational state of affairs.

The important contrast here is between situations where two items are causally connected, and situations where there are not really two items at all. "Essential correlation" describes a situation where there are not two (separable) items at all. The fact that we are not talking about a situation where there are two items, is often obscured by the fact that we frequently distinguish between "emotion" and "object." Then we forget the intimate connection between them, and fall into the mistake of thinking that there are two things which are being referred to. But according to what has just been learned, we shouldn't think that we could extract two components from "my being angry about something," anymore than we could extract two components from "my red jersey." We can abstract the concept "red" and use the concept in different mix and matchable combinations, but the red in my red jersey, isn't a component in any useful sense. My emotion and its object, like the red in my red jersey, are bound together in an "indissoluble synthesis".

Furthermore we shouldn't think that "emotion" and "object" are two things whose origins are separate. It is impossible to say "which started first," the "red" or "my red jersey." Such paired members as "red" and "my jersey," "emotion" and its "object" are "codependently originated."[57] The very mind of the inquiring subject and the objects of mind are equally codependent on

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[57] I owe this concept to writings on the thoughts of a Buddhist philosopher called Nagarjuna, spoken of by Varela (1990) p 291-

the other. We are developing a picture of a "fundamental circularity" between emotion and object, and we must remember to retain this picture, against the temptations of the grammatical struture of an emotion sentence and the traditional analysis of distinct elements which incline us to think in terms of two or more "component" items.

In summary, Soloman's correction is a thoroughgoing root and branch rejection of the "components" analysis. It is a rejection that "feelings" have an object and it is a rejection that "feelings" directed to objects are the proper "components". He is saying that emotions are the things that have objects. Furthermore, the object and the emotion can't be separated in the way in which "feelings" and objects can be separated. The idea of "components" makes us think that the Xs and Ys are separable items, and this obscures the fact that Xs and Ys are internally related to one another. The true logical form of the emotion:object connection is not

[X R Y]

because that would make X and Y independent items, and R a causal relation. The true logical form is

[X-about-Y].

This means that [X-about-Y] functions in identifying X, and also [X-about-Y] functions in identifying Y. We have looked at how we never have emotions as independent **X**s, we always have [**X**-about-Y]. And now we've looked at the opacity of intentional objects, we have learned that we can't have objects as independent **Y**s, we always have [X-about-**Y**].

4.4

> In Heideggerian phrase, I am never simply angry, but there is always "my-being-angry-about..."[58]

There is a layering of Soloman's argument here. It goes something like this. What is the explanation for intentional objects being opaque? (And for emotions always being "about" something[59])? It is because the intentional act and its intentional object are "essentially connected." What are the situations in which "essential connectedness" occurs? They are situations of acts-in-context. They are situations of persons being-in-the-world. Examples of such acts might be; making a boat, running a race, laughing at a joke, solving a problem, exploring a country, unravelling a mystery. The interesting feature about such situations is that they are total given events. One didn't have to build them up out from components, because they already started out as a mode of being-in-the-world. If we wanted to explain the feature of "essential connectedness" between emotions and their objects, we would say just this, that is arises out of the fact that "having an emotion" describes a mode of being-in-the-world.

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[58] p 253 E & C

[59] Soloman has devoted a much earlier passage (p 252) saying that emotions are always "about" something. he finishes this passage with; "In fact, Heidegger has suggested that all emotions are ultimately "about" the world and never simply "about" something in particular."

5

"EMOTIONS AND CHOICE"

Emotions as Judgments

5.1

Emotions as a species of judgments.
This section will put the need for making emotions a species of judgment into the wider context of Soloman's project of showing that Kenny was wrong in making emotions a species of "feelings." It will also evaluate Soloman's arguments for claiming that emotions are a species of judgments.

Most of "Emotions and Choice" so far has been about establishing that emotions are "intentional," showing what the intentionality of emotions means, and how it doesn't mean what Kenny thought it did. In particular one thing it doesn't mean is that "emotions are a species of feelings." Soloman has drawn attention to the "aboutness" of emotions, in order to draw a striking contrast with the non-directionality of "feelings" and with physiology. It is the heart of Soloman's argument that "feelings" and physiology do not play an essential role in the constitution of emotions. (Remember that Kenny did made two mistakes according to Soloman: thinking that feelings were intentional, and identifying the wrong feature - modality - as intentionality.) It is emotions which are essentially "about" the world. "Feelings" are not.

Emotions being importantly a part of the class of intentional things, allows Soloman to draw the following comparisons:

..emotions are interestingly similar to beliefs and

judgments..[60]

...emotions are very much like actions..[61]

...emotions are rational and purposive rather than irrational and disruptive..[62]

...emotions share an important conceptual property with beliefs..[63]

But "emotions are intentional" puts emotions in a much bigger class than Soloman has listed. For example we can add to Soloman's list that emotions are now importantly similar to desiring, deciding, supposing, intending, and also to performing[64], using etc. all of which are essentially "about" something and inseparable from the objects which they are "about."

Now we can see that if this is all there is to Soloman's argument that emotions are a species of judgment, then the form of that argument is as follows;

(1) X,Y,Z are all alike in being intentional in some special sense.
(2) ∴ Xs should be analyzed on the model of Zs rather than vice versa.

Plainly (2) does not follow from (1). From (1), it would be equally plausible to conclude that judgments are a species of emotions. This is not even unlikely.

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[60] E & C p257

[61] E & C p256

[62] E & C p 250

[63] E & C p 253

[64] Because "performing" and "using" are as much "about" the world any item which has a "that....." clause.

Researchers such as Antonio Damasio[65] have shown that objective reasoning is indeed a fragile instrument without the guiding presence of emotion. It is also possible, not merely that judgments are a species of emotion, as that argument would show, but also that judgments are a species of action (such as Austin shows.) This will make us interested in what extra arguments Soloman presents to say that emotions are a species of judgments. (1) and (2) above, show that Soloman has to have an extra argument over and above the argument that emotions are intentional. The onus is on him to show that we have something other than (1), in order to derive (2). When we actually look at the extra arguments that Soloman presents, we will see that they aren't very strong.

Soloman's first argument Soloman for saying that emotions are a species of judgments is that the object of an emotion is "affective" or normative. This is not simply to say that the object of an emotion is opaque in the sense of involving moral norms.

> ...what an emotion is "about" is not simply a fact; nor is it even a fact under certain descriptions. The object of an emotion is itself "affective" or normative. It is not an object about which one makes a judgment but is rather defined, in part by that normative judgment.[66]

What that asserts is that the object of my anger, "that Jack took my car," is defined in part by an affective or normative judgment which goes something like "and he's not supposed to do that!"

Errol Bedford has made a similar point when he compares "expecting" (an intentional act) with "hoping" (another intentional act). Hoping for and

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[65] In "Descartes' Error", 1994

[66] E & C p 257

expecting an event express different degrees of confidence that the event will happen. In addition, says Bedford, "I hope that..." implies an assessment of whatever is referred to in the clause that follows, namely that whatever you hope for is something good; you don't hope for something bad. This is why he thinks that "hoping" is taken to be an emotion, when "expecting" is not. Both Soloman and Bedford seem to think that most emotions make such a normative claim, in fact that it is a peculiar feature of emotions that they do. Hence Soloman says;

> The idea that an emotion is a normative judgment, perhaps even a moral judgment, wreaks havoc with several long cherished philosophical theses. Against those romantics and contemporary bourgeois therapists who would argue that emotions simply are and must be accepted without judgment, it appears that emotions themselves are already judgments. And against several generations of moral philosophers who would distinguish between morality based upon principle and morality based upon emotion or "sentiment," it appears that every "sentiment" every emotion is already a matter of judgment, often moral judgment. An ethics of sentiment differs from ethics of principle only in the fact that its judgments are allowed to go unchallenged: it is an ethics of prejudice while the latter is typically an ethics of dogma.[67]

The idea here seems to be that the "affective" aspect of emotional expressions is expressed not so much in the content "that John took my car" but in their moral tone, which if it were expressed in language, would be

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[67] p257 E&C

expressed in such language as "this is not the way things should be done!" Soloman is accusing therapists and others of not challenging the morally descriptive component of an emotion expression because they think that such statements are purely descriptive and have no normative aspect at all.

You could challenge an emotion expression on grounds of accuracy. Somebody might say they are discouraged, and you might challenge them that you think what they appear to be is "angry." But that's not the interesting challenge for Soloman. There's no normative challenge here. Soloman is saying that there's another sort of challenge that we can and do make that's not captured by that analysis. Namely, that John has taken the car, and "that's not the way things should be done!" or "it was wrong for John to have done that!"

Soloman seems to think that the normative judgments of emotions are like bigoted[68] judgments. If they were to occur anywhere outside of an emotional context they would be judged negatively according to their dogmatic form, and he thinks that we ought to be able to judge the "it should be done" or "it's just not do-able" form of emotional expressions.

We might feel sympathetic to Soloman's reasoning here, but our special task is to decide whether this argument gives sufficient warrant to emotions being analyzed on the model of judgments rather than vice versa, when both emotions and judgments belong in the class of the intentional. Soloman's argument to this point is that emotions are a species of judgments, because emotions are based on judgments (bigoted ones). However intuitively appealing this might seem, we can mount an equivalent argument for saying the opposite.

For example, we could paraphrase Alfred North Whitehead as saying that

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[68] "Emotions are hasty and typically dogmatic judgments" p 270

the desire for certainty [the desire for judgment] is an emotional one. There is no peculiarly logical or scientific reason for wanting certainty. Supposing Whitehead is right, we now have two equally valid claims:

(a) the need for an emotion is a judgmental one.
(b) the need for a judgment is an emotional one.

I haven't provided a knock-down argument here, but neither was Soloman's normative idea his best argument for "emotions are a species of judgments". Let's now turn to some stronger ones.

Soloman's second argument for saying that emotions are a species of judgments is that we make judgments and likewise we create emotions. This leads Soloman to think that "judgments" should be the paradigm case for the class of intentional actions. To understand this choice of paradigm case, we have to appreciate what realm is acting as contrast here. "Feelings," were the obvious paradigm case for physiological occurrences, because such introspectible phenomena as "duration," "intensity," and "blending," which feelings are supposed to possess, duplicated the world of matter. They were the mental counterparts to the pressures, impacts, frictions and attractions of mechanical theory[69]. "Feelings" were the paradigm case for things which just happened "in" or "to" us.

One can imagine Soloman thinking "Now what features are most characteristic of the intentional class?" He has talked a lot about the central features of "directionality" and "aboutness." Now he's thinking that it's not merely that intentionality is constituted by its "aboutness," but that the central feature of the class of intentional acts and their objects, is that we create them. That they are not things which are defined by the external environment, they are not "happenings" or "occurrences." That the only things that can have intentional relations are things we create. Intentional

[69] As Ryle has clearly demonstrated in "Dilemmas," Chap IV and "Concept of Mind" Chap 1

actions really are ours. And what is the model for things we create, or things we take responsibility for creating? Judgments. Judgments which involve our "cognition," our "responsibility," and our "reasons". Soloman must be thinking this essential characteristic makes judgments suitable to be the paradigm case for the class of intentional actions.

Also, emotions, as intentional actions, would belong to the family of "judgments" rather than to the family of "feelings." Instead of being things that merely happen to or in us, emotions would be the kind of action we can take responsibility for. That would be their nature. Thus Soloman argues that

> ..making judgments is something I do...[70]

> If emotions are judgments....it is clear how our emotions are in a sense our doing, and how we can be responsible for them..[71]

Once again, this is not an overwhelmingly convincing argument. We could produce a parallel argument that "actions" are the suitable paradigm case for the realm of the intentional. It might go something like this. Acts-in-context, like running a race, unravelling a mystery, exploring a country, are all essentially constituted by "aboutness," since they are events which necessarily take place in-the-world. We might claim that the central feature of the class of intentional acts is that they are all real world events, and that it is the total event which defines their relevant qualities, not the other way around. Then emotions would belong to the family of "actions" which are real-in-the-world events, rather than "feelings" which are mere component qualities of those events. Since we can produce an equally plausible parallel argument to Soloman's argument that says that "judgments" should be the

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[70] E & C p 262

[71] E & C p 261

paradigm case for the class of the intentional, I don't think that we can be totally convinced that emotions are a species of judgments.

Soloman has a third argument. This argument claims that only if emotions are judgments can we account for the "pragmatic" paradoxes.

> If emotions are judgments, then the sorts of "pragmatic" paradoxes that have long been celebrated regarding judgments in general will apply to emotions also. "I am angry about X, but not X" raises the same problem as "P, but I do not believe P."[72]

Thus Soloman argues that judgments analyses (but not feelings analyses) are sufficient to account for the existence of pragmatic paradoxes. This does have the superficial appearance of being an argument for emotions being a sub-species of judgments. In fact, however, it succeeds in showing no more than that emotions are better analysed as intentional rather than as physiological. When we look closer, every intentional action, and not just emotions and judgment, turns out to be subject to the "pragmatic" paradoxes. "I am sitting an exam, but there is no exam," "I am intending to study, but don't believe it is possible to study," "I am deciding on a holiday, but I can't go on holiday" "I'm desiring to pass the exam, but I'm not allowed to sit the exam," "I'm supposing that Janet will marry Fred, but Janet can't marry Fred because he's dead," are all equally absurd. The pragmatic paradoxes simply do not pick out judgments and emotions as being especially similar. It would seem that all of the class of intentional acts at least can have this feature.

Soloman's argument about the pragmatic paradoxes relies on the interesting fact that if the second clause of "I am angry about X, and X must be true," weren't an implicit judgment in "I am angry about X," then "I am angry about

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[72] E & C p 259

X, and X isn't true," wouldn't be problematic. This makes good intuitive sense. But he wants, on the basis of this interesting fact, to be saying something extra about the special closeness of the relationship between emotions and judgments.

But now that we have seen that the pragmatic paradoxes apply to all the intentional class and not especially to emotions and judgments, we can say that if the interesting fact of implicit judgment is true of emotions, then the same is also true of the whole class of intentional acts. All (or most) intentional acts, say something about the world, and in so doing make an (implicit) judgment about the facts. This means that whatever judgment we might make about emotions in this regard, we should also be prepared to make of "supposing," "desiring," "intending," "acting," "hoping" etc. - and this severely weakens Soloman's argument. He wants, by virtue of emotions' implicit judgments to hold us responsible for, to judge us for, to praise or blame us for our emotions. But if this is what he wants, he has no stronger reason to do that, than he does for praising or blaming us for "believing," "supposing," "desiring," "intending" and all the rest of the class of intentional actions. And we don't normally (certainly not on the mere basis that such actions make implicit judgments or assumptions about what is available in the world), consider it reasonable to praise or blame people for having beliefs, suppositions and the like.

We have now evaluated three separate arguments Soloman has for saying that emotions are a species of judgments. They are:

(a) The objects of emotions are "normative," therefore they are constituted by judgments.

(b) The responsibility for emotions and judgments (as opposed to "feelings") is ours.

(c) Only if emotions are judgments can we account for the pragmatic paradoxes to which emotions are subject.

We have asked ourselves whether these arguments give any special reason for believing that emotions should be modelled on judgments, rather than

judgments being modelled on emotions, or emotions being modelled on something else entirely (from the intentional realm.) Our finding has been that Soloman has given no convincing reasons for the claim that emotions should be a subspecies of judgments. We can conclude that it is certainly not as clear as it ought to be that Soloman has made a good case for modelling emotions on judgments rather than anything else.

5.2

Judgments - a "components" analysis

Given that Soloman does model emotions on judgments, and especially since he thinks emotions carry an implied normative judgment, we had better look fairly closely at the nature of this implied normative judgment. We will want to pay particular attention to whether or not Soloman gets himself entangled in a "components" view of judgments. Since he wants to make emotions a species of judgments, he'd better not have married a non-componential view of an emotion to a components analysis of judgments. That is he can't have both a "components" view of judgments with a radical (i.e. non-componential) view of emotions, if emotions are supposed to be judgments.

What kind of judgments are implicit in the emotion? If they are "components" judgments, then we won't be able to get at those judgments without doing a "components" analysis of emotions together with their (components) judgments. Philosophers like Errol Bedford, for example, have had no qualms about defining the normative judgment in say, "A hopes that G.S.T. will be raised"; the normative judgment is the "assessment of whatever is referred to in the clause that follows [the emotion word.]"[73] Soloman, however, can't approach things in this way without engendering the "components" model, since the object of an emotion expression isn't supposed to be an extractable, substitutible item like a propositional claim. It

[73] "Emotions" p 293

remains to be seen whether Soloman can borrow some of the same intuitions as Bedford about normative claims in emotions, and still avoid the Positivist assumptions of a metaphysics of distinct components. Bedford doesn't have a problem with this. Now let's see if Soloman does.

To this end, we will first review what it would mean for an expression to carry an implicit judgment in the "components" tradition. We will then look at what an implicit judgment in a non-componential sense might be.

The Components Tradition has

(A) emotion "components:

I fear.....the cat is sick

The first component is usually referred to as a "propositional attitude". The second component is a proposition which that propositional attitude is towards.

And there is understood to be a systematic relationship between emotions and "propositional attitudes"[74], which says that by specifying what it is that I fear in propositional form, I automatically cause the blanks in a number of other sentence forms to be filled in. For example, by the action of specifying what I fear, i.e. that the cat is sick, I have also specified

(B) the judgment components:

(i) I believe it is possible that ..... the cat is sick
(ii) It would be bad if.....the cat is sick

This particular way of analysing the relationship between emotions and

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[74] See Gordon, in "The Structure of Emotions"

propositional attitudes carries certain assumptions which are very different from a "radical" (non- componential) view. Typically the following holds in a "components" analysis:

(1) The claim which a proposition makes ("the cat is sick") is supposed to continue to be a meaningful item, when taken in isolation from the "propositional attitude" component ("I fear...," "I believe it is possible..," "It would be bad if.....").

(2) The claim which a proposition makes ("the cat is sick") is supposed to be able to be checked against actual or possible fact. The need for checking against the "facts" arises as a consequence of the prior separation of the person from their world.

(3) When I express my fear that the cat is sick in language, I am supposed to be understood to be "signing" two sorts of declarations simultaneously. One, is factual, and says "X is true." ("The cat is sick"). The other is normative and says "X is good or bad" ("It is bad for a cat to be sick".)

(4) According to the correctness of these two declarations, the emotion compound "I fear that the cat is sick" is judged "appropriate" or "inappropriate."

(5) What is implied by (1) to (4) above, is that the main task of emoting is to recover accurately the "facts" and to express correctly the accepted normative attitudes to those "facts."

(6) This interprets the role of an emotion as something like a "signing" action. On the propositional analysis of emotion, when I am fearful or angry I am effectively signing something which says: "Those are the facts" and "I endorse that normative judgment".

(7) What next becomes important is the assessment of our "signing" practices. On the Components analysis, we judge agents for how hasitily the documents are signed. We tend to base this on a [defunct] model of natural science, where the scientist stands before things neutrally, and postpones drawing a conclusion until all the "facts" are in.

(8) Accordingly, it is praiseworthy for the agent to deliberately and self-consciously go about collecting "evidence" on the world to see whether what they might "sign" or what they might "endorse" is an accurate representation of it (i.e. the world.) We are praised for the extent to which we can "flee" our subjectivity, and this is a consequence of the general untrustworthiness of that subjectivity. There is a tension between our subjective experience and the "facts" shown by the concern that we might let our subjectivity interfere with the "facts." We are praised for not letting that happen.

Soloman is committed to denying all of points (1) to (8) above. This is by virtue of his endorsing a radical non-componential view of emotions. We will remember that such a view of emotions says that there is an essential correlation between what is perceived (the intentional object) and the emotion. There are no neutrally perceived "facts," and this gives the rationale for our being responsible for our emotions (and their objects.) Although Soloman is deeply committed to a radical non-componential view of emotions, at <u>times</u> we are going to find that he actually endorses points (1-8) above. It will be important to find those times and determine see whether this wobbling between a non-componential model and components model is a trivial mistake he occasionally falls into, or is an integral part of his diagnosis.

5.3

<u>Judgments - a non-componential analysis.</u>

I will use this section to sketch what a purely non-componential view of judgments would look like. In section 5.4 I will then investigate how consistent Soloman is between the two options.

If a "components" picture of judgment presents judgment as an action like "signing" a document, then a non-componential picture of judgment could be like perceptually guided action. Non-componential judging would be more like "flying a kite" than signing a piece of paper. When we fly a kite, we make continuous self-modifications most of which are bodily performances rather than "thoughts." The operation of kite-flying doesn't happen through the visual or cognitive extraction of features as specific (extractable) judgments or specific (extractable) judgment-components, but rather by the flow of visual guidance in action. The kite and the kite flyer are intermingled in the action of kite-flying. There is a new whole. When the eye and the hand follow and guide a kite in flight, it is impossible to say which started first in the exchange of stimuli and responses. We are not going to find somewhere hidden beneath the situation, a list of judgments in propositional form. True, in the action of kite-flying, we do judge, and our judging could be said to be implicit in this action. But if that's the case, then "implicitly judge" carries a very different flavour here from a "components" judgment. The judgments in kite-flying are not the sorts of judgments we can dig out.

If that's what a non-componential judgment would be, then that would tell you when the word "implicit" has changed its meaning. With kite-flying it's a kind of "know-how," and it's not in propositional form. Likewise, I have an implicit knowledge of where the clutch is, but I couldn't tell you in propositional language. It's my foot that "knows" it. In a funny way, my foot can tell you where the clutch pedal is - it will find it spot on every time - but that's not going to give you an analysis like the componential one above.

You wouldn't want to express "know-how" as a list of discrete propositions. What we do is go through the activity of judging, but there's nothing extractable in that, there's no list. One important difference is that in the activity of non-componential judging, we don't stand outside the flow of action, and make the same judgments. I is by being intermingled in the action thatjudgments are made. We don't for example, stand outside the kite

flying or the car driving, and still find that we have access to the judgments involved in negotiating with kite that gust of wind, or turning with bicycle that sharp corner. The "know-how" (i.e. the implicit judgments) aren't there outside of the activity. Negotiating a gust of wind is something we do in the activity. Likewise, riding your bicycle round the corner - you know you've got to bend sideways a little here, more now, less again here. And your body knows how to do that. It knows how to do that. You didn't have a check-list and you wouldn't make the same judgments negotiating with car or from standing on the kerb-side looking on at the kerb. Indeed you couldn't say where the judgment stops and the behaviour begins. You had to be bound together with the bicycle and the corner, or the car and the corner in order to make them. The judgments to be made are not pre-established in somebody's head, they are fully within the action. This means that non-componential judgment is always, in some measure, indeterminate.

Now let's try an example in the realm of emotions. In the laboratory setting, when presented with test questions, Damasio's[75] emotionless patients scored highly on every decision making area involving personal or social matters. Their cognitive abilities were undoubtedly well above average. They did well, so long as they were not inside the personal and social "world." However these patients failed abysmally to make and maintain social relationships in real-life settings. In real-life settings judgments can be indeterminate. They may not be extractable, if they're in the flow of action. These are the kinds of judgment that you have to be able to sense. And you have to be able to update your sensing continuously as the action-in-the-world progresses. Though these patients were paragons of rationality in the laboratory setting where judgments were purely cognitive and pre-specified, Damasio found that in real-life situations their rationality was impaired. They had no ability to sense their situation through the body's sensory system and therefore they had no continuous update on the real state of body and person. For these patients, trying to negotiate the personal and social world

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[75] See Chapter 3 of "Descartes' Error"

without emotions must be like trying to ride a bicycle without proprioception. Damasio's finding's certainly support that emotion judgments aren't the laboratory (cognitive) kind of judging, they're the (embodied) enacted kind.

Let us consider how "purposiveness" fits into this picture. We have just said that on a non-componential picture, judgments are not "about" the kite. There is no standing back out of the flow of action to make such judgments. Now we can say that on a non-componential view, there is no standing back out of the flow of action to decide purposes either. Judgments are not "about" the kite, and neither is purposiveness "behind" the action. The non-componential kind of purposes and judgments can be described as existing only in action. The judgments in flying a kite or the purposiveness of an emotion are not extra mental events, but are qualities of those activities, "co-intended" in them. Being sensitive to the pull of the string, you judge the tension of the string. My loosening the string expresses my purposiveness. The purposiveness may be indeterminate. It may not be able to be expressed in propositional truth-functional form. My pulling on the string now, bringing the kite towards me, expreses an up-dated purpose. This purpose is not "true" and it's not "false." There's nothing so determinate here that could be given the labels "true" or "false." What is more important is that my action in flying the kite, is viable [i.e. capable of maintaining life - in this case the continued flight of the kite]. The purpose as expressed is viable, or not. If it is not viable, the kite falls out of the sky.

We have said that the componential kind of judging is like an action of "signing" a document (a list of propositions or truths). In "signing," it is clear that the actor is separate and distinct from what is being acted on. In non-componential judging, by contrast, we must see the agent and the environment as bound together in a certain sort of reciprocal specification. In "signing" there is an independent environment which one seeks to represent truthfully. In non-componential judging, there is a bringing-forth-of-a-world through sensorimotor enactment. Whereas a components view would have

the agent acting on the kite in distinct itemisable steps, a non-components view would regard the action-of-flying-the-kite as an ongoing interpretation that emerges from the physical enactment of the activity itself. As opposed to the action of "signing," this second (non-componential) kind of activity is better represented as "bodying it forth[76]."

5.4

Soloman's "judgments", componential or non-componential?

If we are looking for "components" or "non-components" flavours in Soloman's writing, we don't have to go far to find examples of both.

Example: Consider the following passage

> ..my anger-at-John-for-stealing-my-car is inseparable from my judgment that John in so doing wronged me.[77]

"My anger is inseparable from my judgment" sounds just like the claim "my emotion is inseparable from its object" where the situation described is one of "essential correlation." We will remember that this is the heart of what it means to have a non-componential analysis.

Example. But now consider Soloman's reply to Bergmann. Bergmann [in reviewing Soloman's "The Passions"] had challenged his claim that "emotions are judgments" in the following way;

> In what is clearly his core chapter Solomon asserts: "I cannot be angry if I do not believe that someone has wronged or offended me....My

[76] A strange term indeed, but one that I think does the job very well. It initially comes from Martin Buber in "I and Thou."

[77] p 257 -258 E & C

anger **is** that set of judgments. Similarly, my embarrassment **is** my judgment to the effect that I am in an exceedingly awkward situation. My shame **is** my judgment to the effect that I am responsible for an untoward situation or incident. My sadness, my sorrow, and my grief **are** judgments of various severity to the effect that I have suffered a loss."

A first comment would be that it is plainly possible to make any of these judgments and yet not have the relevant emotion. Surely we all have often said: "He insulted me to my face, but I did not get angry." Some people even have to admit that they were incapable of becoming angry in that situation. And the same is, of course, true for embarrassment and shame, or for sadness, grief, and sorrow. In all these examples, and many more, I can judge that my situation is awkward, or that I have been deprived of something, and we all know that I can go on to say that I, in spite of that, felt absolutely no emotion. This possibility constitutes my first general objection to the most central part of Soloman's position: many of the judgments that he insists **are** an emotion, are routinely made by us when the emotion is absent - and therefore the two cannot be the same thing.[78]

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[78] p203-204 Journal of Philosophy, LXXV, 5
Notice that this isn't the fallacious argument:
If you are angry, then you believe that you have been wronged. You believe that you have been wronged, then you must be angry. Then that's a fallacy. He has to have X = Y.
Bergmann does really mean that emotions **are** judgments. If you have an emotion, you have a judgment. The "are" I have made bold in Bergmann's text is important. Suppose the argument was in the "if you are angry, then...." form. Then it would be fallacious. The only non-fallacious form would have to have an = sign.

Soloman's reply to Bergmann in the appendix of the revised "Emotions and Choice," gives a good example of his wobbliness between the components and non-componential view of judgment. Consider:

> In my more recent work, I prefer to talk more in terms of emotions setting up "scenarios," within which our experiences and our actions are endowed with personal meaning. Each emotion, so characterized, is a specifiable set of judgments constituting a specific scenario.....In the context of "Emotions and Choice," the scenario analysis provides a far more complete portrait of emotional experience than the bald claim, "emotions are judgments."
>
> With these additions, it is possible to map out a refutation of the most common objection to my theory, which is that it is possible to make a judgment, the same judgment that I claim to be constitutive of an emotion, and not have that emotion. If that is true, then emotions cannot be judgments. But an emotion is never a single judgment but a system of judgments, and although one might well make one or several judgments of the system without having the emotion, my claim is that one cannot make **all** of them and not have the emotion. To make all essential judgments is to create the relevant scenario and take one's part in it....Finally, to have an emotion requires not only a specifiable set of judgments but certain desires as well. One might make a judgment - or even much of a set

> of judgments - in an impersonal and uninvolved way, without caring one way or the other. But an emotional (set of) judgments(s) is necessarily personal and involved.[79]

A scenario, Solomon says, must be understood as a "way of experiencing a situation" and not as the situation itself i.e. it must be "lived." The relevant judgments must be "personally involved." This sounds non-componential. On the other hand, an emotion is to be a "specifiable set" of judgments. This sounds componential.

Here lies an important contradiction. Either "being lived" must mean that "it personally matters" is just one judgment on the (specific) set of judgments that must be signed, or "being lived" must mean that I, the person having the emotion, am the one who is "bodying it forth". If the former, then having an emotion is the rather souless activity of being a story teller who is willing to sign: "this story is mine". The scenario is pre-given, we just have to bestow our signature on it. If the latter, then there are no fixed meanings, no fixed ("set") scenarios. All participants in an emotion, e.g. in "love," bring with them totally different worlds and are continually shaping these worlds and reciprocally being shaped by them. The "scenario," if there is one, emerges as an outcome of "bodying it forth." I cannot "body forth" a fixed set of judgments. This is a contradiction in terms, and shows how Solomon is wobbling between a componential and a non-componential analysis.

Example.Return now to Soloman's text, and let us examine another way in which Solomon is wobbling between a componential and a non-componential analysis.

> ..making judgments is something I **do**,
> not something that happens to me and not

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[79] p. 275 - 276 E & C.

> something I simply cause...
>
> I can determine the kinds of judgments I will tend to make. I can do the same for my emotions.[80]

The phrases; "not something I simply do," and "the kinds of judgments I will tend to make," prevent us from immediately reading the above kind of judgment as a pure example of a componential "signing" operation. Nevertheless, the claim that "emotions and judgments are things we make and do" does have a componential flavour. "Making" and "doing" can sometimes be thought of as unidirectional acts carried out on a neutral world. This would be as much a componential picture, as the picture we had in "feelings" analyses, of a world impacting on a cognitive system in (the opposite) unidirectional way. It is possible that when Solomon declares that "making judgments is something I do" he is influenced at this point by the picture of an agent projecting their judgments on a neutral world. This would be a componential picture, so it will be important to see if he is holding it.

Example. We can see in the following passage, that Solomon is indeed being influenced by this components picture:

> ..being in a state, like God's maintenance of the Universe as well as his creation of it, requires devoted activity..[81]

Our normal conception of God creating the universe is that he **simply** made it. Of all pictures, the picture of God making the world is a picture of him operating upon the world in a uni-directional way. Our mythology is that God came first before the world. If that's the image Solomon wants for judgments, then it is a traditional components one. God is a world-independent agent

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[80] p 262 E & C.

[81] p 279 E & C

who projects his reality onto the surrounding neutral environment. We couldn't get any further away from a non-componential analysis, in which agent and world are bound in an indissoluble synthesis. In such a synthesis it is impossible to say which came first, the agent or the world. This is not our view of God, and therefore if our "making" and "doing" of emotions is to be based on the image of God's creating and maintaining the universe, we can say that, here at least, Solomon is holding a "components" view.

5.5

The Supposed "Inferiority" of Emotions

The preceding section has provided some examples of Solomon wobbling between a componential and a non-componential view of judgments. I will next show that this wobbliness matters. Why is it going to matter? Well, it's going to matter because Solomon has a real stake in the following view:

Emotions are inferior judgments[82]

Solomon gives three expressions of this view, the first two of which I will consider in this chapter. These passages are:

> An emotion is a **necessarily hasty** judgment in response to a difficult situation....
>
> ... what distinguishes emotions from ordinary judgments is their **lack of "cool,"** their seeming **urgency**, even after weeks of simmering and stewing. There are no cold emotions, no cool anger, no deliberate love.

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[82] I cannot find an exact reference for this, however I believe that it is clearly apparent that this is his view. Different expressions of this view follow in my text.

> ...emotions are short term responses....
> ... emotions are "blind"; more accurately, they are **myopic**. Emotions serve purposes and are rational; but because the purposes emotions serve are often short-sighted, they appear to be nonpurposive and irrational on a larger view.[83]

Why then does Solomon think that emotions are inferior judgments? These are essentially two different reasons:

(1) Emotions are non-reflective and prior to deliberation. They are "necessarily hasty" judgments.

(2) Emotions are "myopic," "blind," "shortsighted".

These are bad reasons. Moreover they are poorly argued for. I shall try to construct Soloman's argument(s) for each.

5.5(i)

First argument: Solomon appears to have made the following series of moves in generating reason (1):

(A) Emotions are non-componential.

(B) Judgments are componential.

(C) Assessed by those componential criteria, emotions, being non-componential, fail to pass that criteria.

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[83] p265 E & C

∴ Emotions must be inferior judgments, on that componential criteria.

What this tells us, is only that non-componential emotions are "inferior" judgments, according to the criteria of what it means to be a "good" componential judgment. Once we made it plain that our criteria for "goodness" is componential, we will not be surprised that necessarily non-componential emotions fail miserably! And emotions, remember, necessarily are non-componential.

Even if the set of moves were an adequate one, we could still produce a parallel set of moves to show that componential judgments are "inferior" non-componential emotions, according to what it means to be a good non-componential emotion. That is, we could easily do the A,B,C,D argument in reverse. And there would be some insight in that parallel argument. We have only to remember Damasio's emotionless men. Recall how their capacity for intellectually reasoned judgment failed them miserably when they were required to "body it forth" in the personal and social world. In such a case, we take a person with componential judgments and assess them according to how well they perform with regard to non-componential emotions.

Second Argument. There were two things that Kenny didn't explain which Soloman's account of emotion was supposed to explain. Namely:

(1) Kenny did not provide any way of understanding how it might be possible for a "feeling" to be intentional.

(2) Kenny told us nothing about the kind of relation an emotion can have to its object.

(1) was supposed to have been addressed by his attack on the componential story: emotions (rather than feelings) were already "about" something, in a non-mediated sense. (2) was addressed by the picture of the intentional as being a "conceptual" relation (rather than modal). So one thing Solomon

wants to do is improve on Kenny. But now there is another thing he wants to do, introduce degrees of "deliberation" into the story. Deliberation, as Solomon uses it, involves standing back out the flow of action and contemplating, from a neutral standpoint, what is over and against one. There is an obvious tension between these two goals. Solomon wants to improve on Kenny by using a non-componential analysis of emotions, while leaving "deliberation" as a thoroughly componential notion. Solomon wants to have his cake and eat it both; "Good" judgments are to be well deliberated ones. Emotions are to be poorly deliberated, "hasty" judgments. But emotions must at the same time be non-componential judgments. If they are not, then Solomon hasn't provided an improvement on Kenny's story.And for non-componential such as we "body forth" in flying a kite - the componential notions "deliberate" and "hasty" and "good" as opposed to "viable" and "non-viable" are simply out of place.

Third argument: Solomon demonstrates the rationality of emotions by use of a conceptual argument. Emotions are rational in the sense of not being non-rational. That is, they are not simple occurrences, because the relation between an emotion and the object of an emotion is an essential relation (non-mediated) while the only relation available to occurrences and their "objects" is the contingent relation of causation. He also indicates that emotions can often be irrational in a second sense, according to whether they succeed or fail to satisfy certain purposes or functions[84]. In this second sense, he asks:

> ...if emotions are rational and purposive, why is it that emotions are so often counterproductive and embarrassing to us, detours away from our aspirations and obstacles blocking our ambitions? Why do emotions so often appear as disruptions to our lives, threats to our successes, aberrations

[84] See his distinctions on p 278, E & C.

in our rational behaviour?[85]

His reply is that emotions are not irrational in the first sense of being non-rational (i.e. simple occurrences); but they are "hasty" (i.e. not deliberated on carefully enough). In other words, they are irrational in the second sense. What this means is that emotions are supposed to be both rational, (as opposed to non-rational) and irrational (not achieving their goals), at the same time. This is all right if we are careful to distinguish the two senses of "rational". But instantly Solomon wobbles between two sense of "deliberation". In one sense emotions are non-deliberate precisely because they are not occurrences and have an essential, non-mediated, relation to their object. In another sense emotions are non-deliberate because they judge too quickly, without fully deliberating on every matter concerned. Confusing these two, the very same same feature which makes emotions rational (in the first sense of "rational"), i.e. their lack of deliberation, is now supposed to demonstrate their "irrationality" (in the second sense) as well. It's a dreadful muddle.

Non-deliberation is supposed to be a wonderful thing showing
the specific way in which emotions are "about" the world. But now their non-deliberation is supposed to show that they are inferior. What really counts I suggest, is Soloman's covert picture of emotions as componential judgments.

Fourth argument. Solomon also argues that emotions are "myopic" and "short-term responses" which are "often in conflict with, rather than a means towards the fulfillment of long-term purposes". But this too is a bad reason for Solomon to regard emotions as inferior judgments.

Let us look at a couple of examples:

I may be **angry with John** [short-term non-

[85] p 264 E & C

> componential emotion] because I feel I have been wronged, but this may be inconsistent with **my desire to keep a close unblemished friendship with John** [long-term componential judgment].
>
> I may **love Mary** [short-term componential emotion], but this may be totally inconsistent with **my intention to preserve my marriage** [long-term componential judgment][86].

For ease of discussion, let's call the "short-term responses" **A** types, and the "long-term commitments" **B** types.

The first thing I want to say about this argument is that Soloman's argument can be put like this: Damasio's emotionless patient, Elliot, showed absolutely normal ability with **B** type judgments which were presented to him in the laboratory setting. Elliot responded no differently from how any of us in the laboratory would have. His ethical judgments followed principles that all the other participants shared. He could achieve normalcy in this area, because such judgments are extractable from the flow of action. After all, we want to be able to hold them in a fixed way over a long period of time. Long-term, B-type, responses are fixed responses. It was to everybody's great surprise that Elliot did so well with the presented ethical dilemmas in the laboratory setting. Because his real-life performance was "a catalogue of violations in the domains covered by the problems".[87] This is not too surprising.

In (non-componential) emotions, there is no standing back out of the flow of action to decide on a fixed purpose. That is because non-componential judgments are not pre-fixed judgments that are imposed upon a neutral world. If pre-fixed were the kind of judgment they are (such as could be

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[86] p.267 E & C

made in a laboratory), then they have no usefulness in a non-componential story (as Elliot in Damasio's account has shows). Non-componential judgments are short-term,A-type, responses. Remember the judgments and purposese in kite flying? They are not extractable mental events. They are in-environment enactments. When I bring forth a world through sensorimotor enactment, I do not bring forth a long-term world. I "body forth" a world in each moment. My purposes in each moment may well bear some similarity to my purposes in previous moments, but the judging, where there is some, is not of a "fixed" and "extractible" kind. There is nothing to "sign" our name to which would be like "my intention to preserve my marriage." In non-componential judging, fidelity may well be practiced, but then it is operated, rather than signed.

All in all, then, Soloman is getting the supposed "inferiority" of emotions from the wrong place, i.e. from their non-componentiality. It was supposed to be that the non-componentiality of emotions was a good thing. (After all, it solved the problems which Kenny didn't solve). But now,non-componentiality is supposed to show that emotions are inferior. What it really shows is that Soloman hasn't shed the "Components" picture.

5.6

Soloman wants to improve on Kenny's story, and essentially he does this by introducing the notions of "essential correlation" and "my-being-angry-about-....". But he also wants to have degrees of "deliberation" and he wants to have "short-term versus long-term" in the story. He has "deliberated" judgments versus "hasty" judgments, and "myopic" judgments versus "long-term" judgments. "Hasty" and "myopic" require standing back from the world, but not long enough. The terms "hasty" and "myopic," as terms of disparagement, only make sense from the position of standing

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[87] p 46. Damasio (1994)

back. He wants to have both this "standing back" picture (which is componential) and a non-componential view of emotions. But he never manages to resolve the tension between the two. That is shown in his wobbliness, and that is why his wobbliness matters so much.

6

"EMOTIONS AND CHOICE"

Emotions and "Evidence"

We have just been looking at several two reasons why emotions are supposed to be "inferior" judgments and at what consequences there are when we arrive at this conclusion via a componential picture of judgment. Now we are going to discover an even more important reason Soloman has for thinking that emotions are "inferior" judgments.

Our enquiry begins with looking at the interesting matter of "evidence." Soloman says that we should "open ourselves to argument, persuasion and evidence" on our emotions.[88] What does he mean by "evidence"? Why does he think openiong ourselves to evidence is worth doing? Well, he thinks it is worth doing, because if we follow up the various stories that he has to give about "evidence," we end up with a story which we certainly didn't expect. The evidence that we are looking for is "evidence" of self-deception! Why would that be worth looking for? It seems that Soloman thinks that emotions are fundamentally flawed in that they are "ready candidates for self-deception"[89] They are ready candidates because we think of them as "unintentional" when, in fact, they are purposive and intentional. Once we gain "evidence" of their causes and purposes, then our emotions will be automatically undermined. This is because their operative force, their raison d'etre, lies in their ability to conceal those very causes and purposes. We will explore this picture.

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[88] pg 270 E & C
[89] pg 278 E & C

Let us begin by examining the notion of "evidence" more closely. to collect "evidence" on one's intentional object, if that is what one is supposed to do, is a very strange sort of project. It is certainly a strange thing to be doing when that "object" is supposed already to be connected (essentially so) to the emotion. Knowledge of the "something" to which our intendings were directed was supposed to be direct and unmediated, so how is it that we are now supposed to require further "evidence" of that "something"? This is Gilbert Ryle's point in the following passage:

> Pleasure and distaste do not require diagnosis in the ways in which sensations may well require it. The fact that I have come to like some things and dislike others has an explanation and of this explanation I may or may not be ignorant. But when I have just been amused by some particular joke, the question "What gave me that pleasure?" does not await an answer. For of course I already know that it was that joke, if it was that joke that had amused me.[90]

If I have been amused by a joke, or frightened by the earthquake, there is always a "something" which I can identify which is the object of my attitude. So why does Soloman want to look for more "evidence"?

What Soloman is claiming is that there is a "something" to which each emotion is directed, and that that "something" is immediately given. But it is <u>also</u> his claim that a person can be <u>mistaken</u> about the true object of their pleasure, amusement or emotion. Soloman does not expect that the question "what gave me pleasure?" would <u>await</u> an answer (the subject identifies the "something" without mediation). He thinks that the answer given is given as if absolutely assured, when the subject may be mistaken. Perhaps <u>this</u> is why a person might need "evidence," in order to correct his

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[90] p 59 in "Dilemmas"

mistake. Consider the following passage:

> It is possible and not unusual that I should misidentify - sometimes in a gross way - what I am angry about, or whom I love, or why I am sad. I may identify the object of my anger as John's having stolen my car, but I am really angry at John for writing a harsh review of my book. I may think that I love Mary, when I really love my mother. And I may think that I love Mary, when I'm really angry about the harsh review of my book. The problem of "unconscious emotions" would take us far beyond our current argument. For now, it should suffice for us to insist that the difference between identification of the cause of an emotion and its object is not a difference between direct and indirect knowledge - as traditionally conceived - or a difference between corrigible and incorrigible identification. The cause of an emotion is an occurrence (state of affairs etc.) of a type that stands in a lawlike connection with emotions of that type. The object of an emotion is simply "what the emotion is about," whether or not it is also the cause, whether or not it is even the case, **and whether or not the subject himself knows it to be the object of his emotion.**[91]

The resolute certainty of Ryle's reply, "It's <u>that</u>, that amuses me," tells Soloman merely that this subject knows of <u>an</u> object. But the apparent clearness of the subject in knowing her object, does not tell Soloman that

the object held with such certainty is correctly identified. On this view then, a person needs "evidence" in order to know that the object of her emotion is correct.

Let's start with the claim at the centre of the above quote, that Freuds patient Dorian doesn't really love Mary, as he thinks he does, he "really" loves his mother.[92] How is that to be looked at in terms of "evidence"? I will present three possible stories for what this might mean.

In a first story what it might mean is replacement. In this story, "Mary" has become wrongly attached to Dorian's love. Dorian's love should have been attached to "his mother," but through some mechanism, e.g. "displacement," Dorian's love has became attached to "Mary" instead. When we put the right heads on the right bodies, so to speak, we see that Dorian "really" loves his "mother." His mother is the correct object for his love. This story requires Dorian's love to be something like a Freudian "excitation." Both the "love" and the "object" have to be mix and matchable items. Remember "speech acts" from Chapter Four? We can keep the "force" component (the "love" part) and swap the propositional part around, so that the love is no longer about "Mary", it's now about "mother". That's how Dorian got the wrong "object" in the first place (by mixing them up). And that's how he's supposed the get the correct object back (by unmixing them). Well, this might be what Freud means by "Dorian really loves his mother", but it can't be what Soloman means. Soloman has already rejected this picture for emotions, on the grounds that "love" would then have to be an introspectible item, distinguishable independently from its object. He has also rejected this picture on the grounds that as an intentional object, "Mary" is opaque (it's not "Jenny's cousin" that Dorian loves). The intentional object "Mary" is picked out by "love". That's why we couldn't have "mix and match" in the realm of emotions. So this can't be what Soloman means to suggest, and anyway it wouldn't be the most

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[91] See his short discussion of "unconscious emotions" on pg 257 E & C

[92] We get one reference to the claim in the above quote by Soloman. The claim is more

interesting thing to notice when he says of Dorian that he "really" loves his mother.

Let's look at a Second Story. This is a non-componential story which says that when Dorian finds out that he is mistaken in loving Mary, he is to find himself loving his mother instead. In this story he is to replace [E-O] with [E-O*]. This at least, would not be a mix and match story. Each emotion E would remain essentially connected to its object O. Now we might think that Soloman is behaving as if finding out that the real cause of his loving Mary is his love of his mother, will produce a different object "O" in [E-O]. Then we have a situation where "he really loves his mother" can be translated as "the true cause of his [loving-X] is his [loving -Y]." But this can't be right either, because finding out the cause of an emotion in an intentional story doesn't have to influence the object O. The whole purpose in marking off the intentional realm from the causal, was to deny that you got any sort of reliable prediction of the object from the cause. Remember the example about Jack and the car: Jack's stealing my car didn't have to make me angry about Jack stealing my car, it might make me angry with myself for failing to renew my insurance. The example showed that the object of an emotion had to be separate from the cause and is, in a funny way, "impervious" to it. In the same sense, finding out that his love of his mother caused him to love Mary, need not make Dorian any the less loving of Mary. In an intentional story, it is always possible for O* to cause [E-O], where object O is different from cause O*. O* being the cause does not entail [E-O*]. O* leaves open, what the object of the emotion [E-X] will be. So this second story can't tell us what Soloman means by Dorian "really" loving his mother either.

These first two stories are about getting the "object" right O, in a some simple sense. Story Three is more about getting the conditions for "seeing" O, right. I will examine this story carefully, as I think it is very influential in Soloman's text, and I will want to explore just how it is operating there. This

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clearly specified as being about one of Freud's patients on pg 273.

story is not primarily about getting the object right, it is about achieving the right conditions for truthfulness and reasoned judgment. It is assumed that once these conditions are right, then Dorian will see immediately who he "really" loves. It's a story about how we get to blow the dust away so that the picture can be seen clearly. The "dust" is the concealment process. In this case, what Dorian's unconscious is concealing from his conscious awareness, are one or both of the following:

(1) Dorian's operative desire, i.e. his love of his mother. (This is a shameful desire).

(2) The operation of that desire, i.e. how he comes to "love" Mary, by acting "as if" it were true, and how he by actively avoids situations in which he might get evidence or otherwise which would persuade him out of his belief that he "in fact" loves her.

If the "dust" has been allowed to settle in the first place, it is because Dorian must not know exactly what he's doing. His desire for his mother is shameful and must be kept out of consciousness. If he does allow himself to become conscious of his mother-love, then it will be impossible for him to remain ignorant of how it is operating strategically to take Mary as proxy for his mother. Dorian must not know that he's taking Mary as proxy, because that would undermine his belief that he loves Mary. So a third concealment is occuring:

(3) Dorian must not know of (1) or (2) above. He must not know of the existence of his love of his mother, or if he does know of this love, then he must not know how that love is operating strategically to conceal itself.

This Third Story is Soloman's story.[93] Let's examine how Soloman's call to

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[93] It may be Freud's story too, with some modifications in emphasis, but that's not so important here.

> ....open ourselves to argument, persuasion and evidence[94]

is made plausible by this Third Story about emotions and self-deception.

Consider the following passages from Soloman's text:

> Once one becomes aware of the **cause** of his emotion as opposed to its intended object, he can indeed "defuse" his emotion.[95]

> ... my recognition of the true **cause** of my emotion amounts to a denial of the judgment which is my emotion.[96]

> To recognise the **purpose** for which a judgment is made is to undermine the judgment.[97]

> We can now add to this list of conceptual inabilities the inability of one to suspect the **purpose** of his emotion.[98]

I've laid these passages all out together so that we can see the striking similarity between Soloman's claims about cause and emotion, and hisclaims about purpose and emotion. I will come back to these similarities, but first let's take a look at Soloman's example of how his theory about cause and emotion is working.

Here's one passage:

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[94] P 270 E & C
[95] p 260 E & C
[96] p 261 E & C
[97] p 268 E & C

> If I am angry **about** John's stealing my car (the object of my anger), then I cannot believe that the **sufficient cause** of my anger is anything other than John's stealing my car. **You** can attribute my unjust anger to lack of sleep. **I** cannot. If I attribute my anger to lack of sleep, I cannot be angry at all.....I can only be angry so long as I believe that what has caused me to be angry is what I am angry about. Where the cause is different from what I am angry about, I cannot know that it is.[99]

Now what strikes me about this, is that it is Story Two. Story two assumes that the "real" emotion is the [E-O] where object O is the cause of that emotion.

And we've already noted how Story Two contravenes the principles of Soloman's intentional story. Remember that the intentional realm gets marked off from the causal realm by the denial that you get any sort of reliable prediction of the object from the cause. If so, then Soloman cannot now say that it would be impossible for me to be angry about X if I know that Y was the cause of my anger. Finding out that it was Jack's stealing the car that caused me to be angry, doesn't make it impossible for me to continue to be angry with myself for failing to renew my insurance. Story Two simply doesn't work for Soloman, and it is suprising that he has included it here. His conclusion that "Where the cause is different from what I am angry about, I cannot know that it is" is wrong.

What I am more interested in here, however, is how I think Soloman has arrived at such conclusions by being influenced by Story Three. This will tell us why he's making the Story Two mistake. Let's now turn to the complete example which is given in an earlier passage.

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[98] p 266 E & C
[99] p 259-260 E & C

> But sometimes the cause for an emotion is **not** what the emotion is "about." The cause of my anger might be too little sleep and too much coffee....If I claim to be angry because of a harsh review of my book, pointing out that I have not become angry at previous harsh reviews of my book is sufficient to show that the cause of my becoming angry is not (my reading of) the review of my book, but it is not sufficient to show that I am not angry "about" the harsh review....It is possible and not unusual that I should misidentify - sometimes in a gross way - what I am angry about, or whom I love, or why I am sad.[100]

Now we see more clearly that Soloman is actually operating out of Story Three - a story about self-deception. He might be thinking that at least two features of his normal cognitive agency were concealed on the day that he mistakenly thought he was angry about the bad review. In particular, the following features might have been operative on that day;

(1) There was maybe a concealment operation going on which took the guise of "being angry at a bad review."

(2) The operative condition was "really" his miserable physical state, which was a result of his "lack of sleep" and "overdose of coffee."

Soloman expects us to accept that the action of his "friend" in pointing out that he has not previously become angry at "bad" reviews of his book, is sufficient to damage the concealment operation. We are supposed to think that in discovering that the sufficient cause of his anger is his lack of sleep

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[100] p 256-257 E & C

and overdose of coffee, Soloman cannot still be angry at the bad review. But this conclusion is clearly overstated. It is possible that he can be overtired and overdosed with coffee, and still be angry for the first time in his life about a bad review. Opening himself to his friend's persuasion that this is the first time he has been angry about a bad review, does not compel Soloman to "dissolve" his anger. It is possible that he just had the worst review of his life. If we are compelled to dissolve our emotion on discovering the sufficient cause of that emotion, then this would be for a different reason. In truth the reason is that Soloman is assuming the general deceptiveness of emotions. Deceptive desires have to conceal their own origins, because they get their operative force by concealment. So if we blow their cover in some way, then this will automatically undermine whatever appearances were standing in as proxy. Soloman must be thinking that if he can discover thatthe true source of his bad temper - his lack of sleep and his overdose off coffee,then he will realise he is not "really" angry at the bad review.

Unfortunately, the story of Soloman and the coffee overdose is rather naive in that, self-deception relies upon the existence of a divided mind. I have no objections to such a concept, but we have to remember that agents only banish those contents from conscious awareness which they judge to be entirely unacceptable to them. They banish those contents which they are either deeply ashamed of or which they are severely terrified by. It is extremely unlikely that any situation that has warranted such a dramatic division of the self in the first place could be so easily accessed as in Soloman's example. Either things get sent to the reservoir of the unconscious because they are so bad, and then they are not accessible to gentle reminders, or else they are accessible to gentle reminders, in which case they are usually not serious enough to be banished.

Let's take a look at how Soloman's theory about purpose and emotion is working. It is very similar to the one about cause and emotion.

> ..if they [believers] were to think seriously that their belief [in God] was held **to serve a purpose rather than because it was true**, we would have to conclude that they did not believe at all.[101]

> One cannot judge that he has been wronged and at the same time recognize that he has judged that **he has been wronged only in order to**...[102]

I have highlighted certain parts of the text to draw attention to the mechanisms by which Soloman achieves his conclusion that "we cannot know our purposes and still have the emotion". The mechanism is one which restricts the situations talked about, to self-deceptive ones. Believing in God in order to achieve a purpose rather than because it was true, and judging that he has been wronged only in order to... are both descriptions of the operation of a concealment process. If the examples weren't being restricted to instances of self-deception, then it simply wouldn't be so that I cannot know the purpose of my emotion and have that emotion. We can purposefully intend to love someone, and still love them. That's what a marriage contract is about. We know that purpose and still love the person we are marrying. Likewise, a belief in God is something that we may intend, as well as at the same time actually believe. The restricted context (of self-deception) is what is at work here to make purpose and emotion contraries. We see that the story Soloman gives about "evidence," that "to recognise the purpose for which a judgment is made is to undermine the judgment," relies for its success on the extra assumption that purposes are concealed purposes. This is Story Three.

Now it is true enough that Soloman does make the admission that:

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[101] p 267 E & C
[102] p 268 E & C. This passage ends with an ellipsis (i.e. I have quoted it in full).

Emotions are ready candidates for self-deception.[103]

But I think we must assume from the way the story about "evidence" is going, that there is a much more solid claim implicit in these moves - that emotions are not merely candidates for but are typically self-deceptive. I will explore this more fully towards the end of this chapter.

When Soloman limits the latitude for belief by specifying

> "their belief in God was held to serve a purpose,
> **rather than it was true**"
>
> "..recognised that he has judged that he has
> been wronged **only in order to**..."

he is confining his interest to situations of concealment, in which something is acting as proxy for something else. On the other hand, his conclusions about cause and emotion, and about purpose and emotion are not so restricted. They come out looking like they are supposed to be about emotions in general. It might well be that Soloman does think the self-deceptive situation applies to emotions in general. He certainly thinks that our picture of emotion as just "happening to (or in) us" conceals the truth that we "choose" our emotions. Could he be thinking that emotions are concealed judgments? This would explain also why Soloman portrays emotions as "inferior" judgments. It is quite plausible that concealed judgments would have to count as inferior judgments. This would be particularly true if "judgments" were componential judgments, since the purpose of componential judgments is to accurately represent the world. Their purpose is to portray the "truth" about the world,while the purpose of concealment is, by definition, to hide the truth. Here then, we can see another reason why Soloman might be thinking that emotions are inferior judgments.

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[103] P 276 E & C

Let me take this a little more slowly. Translate what we've just learned about cause and emotion, and about purpose and emotion, into the general format for Story Three. Then what we get is:

(1) There is a concealment operation going on which takes the guise of "emotions" which happen to (or in) us. The wish to believe in the object of the emotion is the expression of a complex strategy devised by (2).

(2) The operative condition is either a judgment we make or another desire, whose existence we would be ashamed to admit, and must use (1) as a means of achieving its object.

(3) We must not know that we are concealing anything, i.e. we must not know thatwe are entertaining a desire we would be ashamed to admit.

I offer the following passages in support of my theory about Soloman's true analysis of emotions being Story Three.

The first passage explains emotions in terms of (1) above: that there is a concealment operation going on. Soloman thinks that what is concealed in having an emotion is that we have them "in-order-to" achieve something. He thinks that this is "intentional" purpose is concealed by an emotional strategy which is maliciously designed to make our actions appear "unintentional". Thus Soloman suggests, there is a striking resemblance between the actions of "forgetting" and "losing," and having emotions such that the "in-order-to" function is concealed by a strategy which makes them appear "unintentional". It is worth noting that sometimes, we merely lose or forget things, but Soloman's interest here is in the self-deception of "forgetting" and "losing," when "forgetting and losing" are examples of motivated irrationality:

One must consider apparently "unintentional"

actions, to which emotions bear a striking resemblance. Some act types allow only for intentional acts.....Others allow for only unintentional acts, for example forgetting, slipping, stumbling, losing.... Yet Freud demonstrated that such "unintentional" actions function in a remarkable accordance with a subject's overall purposes and intentions. Freud surely doesn't want to say that these simply **appear** intentional...but rather that they are truly intentional, the difference being, in his terms, the "inaccessibility" of the intention to the subject.The status of such actions remains a matter of controversy, but we feel reasonably confident that most philosophers and most everybody else would agree that such "actions" are indeed actions and can be demonstrated in at least some cases to be done for a purpose; yet the subject cannot state their purpose. And once again, the "cannot" is not a **logical** "cannot", since a man who knows that he is losing his wedding ring in order to show his opinion of his marriage is making a gesture, not losing his ring. And a man who knows he is forgetting to call his office in order to avoid extra work is not forgetting but refusing to call his office. Thus we can see in what senses such actions [forgetting and losing] may appear to be both intentional and "unintentional." They are intentional insofar as they clearly fit into the purposes and intentions of the subject; they appear to be unintentional in so far as they cannot be stated as purposive or intentional by the subject. Similarly, anger is purposive and

> intentional insofar as it can be clearly shown to fit into the structure of the subject's purposes and intentions; it appears to be "unintentional" and thus differs from many straightforward actions, in that these purposes and intentions **cannot be known by the subject** at the time. Emotions, when they are purposive and intentional, are essentially devious.[104]

Two comments need to be made immediately. Firstly,Soloman is being disingenous in restricting his claim to "emotions, when they are purposive and irrational, are essentially devious." It is not true that finding out the cause of an emotion "dissolves" that emotion, unless emotions had already an irrational purpose. Only irrational purposes are undermined by coming into the light of conscious reasoning. But Soloman is relying on emotions to be generally purposive and irrational in order for his arguments about "evidence" to work. I think he has a much bigger stake in emotions being purposive than he's prepared to say here.

Secondly, Soloman's remark that emotions "cannot be stated as purposive or intentional by the subject" looks like a conclusion that has been derived from neutral fact. But in the immediately following piece of text

> I "cannot" know the purposes for my emotions

the "cannot" must refer to a concealment process because even Soloman admits it is not a logical impossibility that I know my own purposes and still have my emotion. Hence

> I "cannot" know the purposes for my emotions

isn't a neutral fact because the sense of that "cannot" is not a logical

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[104] p 268 E & C

"cannot". Rather I cannot know their purposes because if I do the emotion "will no longer be concealed." So to derive

"therefore emotions are devious"

from

"I cannot know the purposes of my emotion"

is illegitimate. Soloman cannot make "emotions are devious" the conclusion of some argument when emotions being devious has already been stuck in as one of the premises.

To further explore the presence of Story Three in Soloman's text, the following examples describe the second concealment operation(2) earlier.That is, they describe a situation where the operative desire is a malicious desire we would be ashamed to have. Example (2) is an example of a self-deceptive judgment,[105] as opposed to an emotion, but I will present it here because it is typical of the kind of example Soloman tends to give:

Example 1:

> The husband, in this case, has **used** his anger to manipulate his wife [Joanie]. He has become angry "about" the shirts **in order to** get his wife's mind off the party and in order to stop her irritating reminders. His anger is not a disruption of his activities...but a part of it, its winning strategy. The best explanation of his anger is ...that he got angry at his wife **in order** to continue watching television and in order to insure that his refusal to go to the party would be successful.[106]

Example 2:

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[105] Soloman thinks that judgements as well as emotions "cannot" know their purposes.
[106] P 264 E & C

> If I judge, calmly and deliberately, without a hint of that urgency and intensity that characterizes anger, that John has wronged me by stealing my car again... I may be rationalizing an opportunity to take out John's wife. In fact, I may even say to myself, "since he has wronged me so, I feel justified in taking out his wife.....judgments, no matter how calm and deliberate, when they are made for some purpose..., cannot be recognized as having been made for that purpose.[107]

In each of the above examples, and in others that Soloman gives, we are told of situations where there is a conflict between two desires in the agent. One of the desires is a malicious desire to believe that someone one dislikes has done something disgraceful. Then it is usual that this malicious desire has been forced into the unconscious by the agent's desire to think well of himself. These are of course, examples of Story Three.

The following passages describe the third concealment operation (3) earlier. If the concealment of (1) and (2) is to operate, we must not know what we are doing. The first passage tells us why, in Soloman's opinion, malicious judgments and desires are forced into the unconscious reservoir in the first place. It is because the agent wants to think well of himself:

> In "Emotions and Choice," I insist that emotions can be accounted for in terms of "in order to" type explanations. This is suggested by the fact that desires are part of emotions. What I do not do in that essay, but attempt in the book, is to provide an overall theory about the function of emotions. In a phrase, it is the <u>maximization</u> of

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[107] p 267 E & C

> self-esteem. The concept of self-esteem serves two very different purposes in my theory: First, it is part of my characterization of emotions as judgments that they be personally involved judgments, and this can be further elaborated in terms of self-esteem. Second, I offer an empirical hypothesis about the motivation of emotions - emotions serve self-esteem.[108]

The next passage I shall quote does not state but assumes (3).That is, it assumes that for concealment of (1) and (2) we must not know that we are engaged in some concealing. A summary of what we have learned to this point may help us understand what is to come.

When we are having an emotion we are certain that we really do love X, are angry with Y, are sad about P, and so on, but we are commonly mistaken about the objects of our emotions and we can even be mistaken about the emotions themselves. An example of the latter is that I might think that I love Mary, when I am really angry about the harsh review of my book. We are frequently mistaken about our emotions, because emotions are ready candidates for self-deception. For many philosophers they are ready candidates for self-deception because it is thought that emotions are occurrences which merely happen to (or in) us. On this view, emotions are "unintentional" acts. According to Soloman, this view is wrong. Emotions arequite purposive and intentional; they can be fully accounted for by in-order-to type explanations. However, we are not usually aware of these purposes. We are not usued to asking ourselves what are our motivations for being angry, sad, or loving, Soloman says, for the very reason that if we knew we were angry with Jack in-order-to feel justified in taking out his wife, then we wouldn't be able to maintain such favourable self-esteem. So we deceive ourselves in order to think well of ourselves. In addition, if we were to find out that this self-deception was going on, then we wouldn't be able

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[108] p 277 (Appendix to E & C)

to still be angry with Jack. Our anger would just "dissolve." It would dissolve because we cannot continue to believe we have been wronged by Jack, once we discover that it is only our wanting to be angry with Jack which is the cause of our belief that Jack has done something wrong. Believing something for a purpose rather than because it is true, undermines the belief.

In the text that I am about to present, Soloman is thinking that if we realise what is really going on in (3),then the wishful judgments and beliefs that constitute the emotion; "that Mary is a magnificent woman," "that Jack has wronged me," or "that I have had a bad review," will be rightly seen as chosen, by us in order to protect our self esteem, rather than truthful to the facts.

> If emotions are judgments or actions, we can be held responsible for them. We cannot simply have an emotion or stop having an emotion, but we can open ourselves to argument, persuasion and evidence. We can force ourselves to be self-relfective, to make just those judgments regarding the causes and purposes of our emotions, and also to make the judgment that we are all the while **choosing** our emotions, which will "defuse" our emotions. This is not to opt for a life without emotions: it is to argue for a conception of emotions which will make clear that emotions are our choice. In a sense, our thesis here is self-confirming: to think of our emotions as chosen is to **make** them our choices.[109]

Soloman is making a clever move here. Emotions will no doubt go on trying

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[109] p 270 E & C

to deceive me. But if I deliberately regard all emotions as chosen, then at least the truth of their being chosen by me to serve in-order-to type functions, is no longer masked from me,That is, if I regard things as chosen when those things are chosen (for all that they have the appearance of not being chosen), then I will no longer be deceived. Once again, it is "self-deception" that is running the show (though this time, it is about how to avoid self-deception).

In following up the notion of "evidence" in Soloman's text, we have come across a story we certainly didn't expect. This has taken us far from the notions of "intentionality" and "componentiality" which seemed to dominate the first half of "Emotions and Choice". Now, it seems, that the real heart of Soloman's project is "self-deception". Soloman does not bring this out very clearly, and he may not even know it to be so, but with Story Three underlies all.

7

ANOTHER VIEW

Soloman has occupied himself with the supposed self-deceptiveness of emotions. In this chapter I don't wish to deny that in our attempt to grasp at a positive identity for ourselves we sometimes engage strategies of avoidance and denial. However, I don't think that these strategies account for all of the emotional repertoire as Soloman seems to. Given that, I will myself address the problem of avoidance and denial because I wish to present some therapeutic wisdom, on the basis of my psychotherapeutic experience, which will provide a rough outline of why I think Soloman has got his therapy of emotions very wrong.

By regarding emotions as self-deceptions Soloman has set up a boundary line between himself (as the rational self who is deceived) and his emotions (who are the "irrational"deceivers). That "emotion's purposes cannot be known by me" puts emotions as not-self. Not in the sense of being not-cognitive, but in the sense of being not able to be known. The practical effects of dividing the soul along these lines are remarkably similar to a Freudian division of the soul. In fact this division seems to me a more powerfully influential part of Soloman's scheme than the unifying theme of reason and emotions both belonging in the class of non-occurrences. It is more influential because the practical effect of regarding emotions as "deceivers" and ourselves as the "deceived" is to ensure the continuation of a split between consciousness and emotions. Let's put the Freudian story and the Soloman story side by side so that we can recognise, not their difference, but their similarity:

In the Freudian story:

(1) The opposing parts are: rational self versus instinctive desire
(2) The victorious in battle is: instinct

In Soloman's story:
(1) The opposing parts are:
rational (deceived) self versus emotions (the deceivers)
(2) The victorious in battle is: rationality
Notice the similarity between these stories. The boundary line is being drawn in the same place; between the rational self and emotion!

Now there might be an immediate objection to my saying that Soloman has emotions as "not-self". After all,this objection says emotions are "ours". But what is "mine", is not-self. This is easier to see if we compare Soloman's "emotions are ours" story with another story which says: Emotions are "us", or alternately, Emotions are self-disclosures, In the second story, emotions and rational self are <u>together</u> behind the boundary line.

Now come back to (1) and (2) above. Notice that both Freud and Soloman have created a boundary line between emotions and the rational self. (It's just that they name the opposing sides differently, but not very differently). This boundary line, by defining two opponents, has guaranteed a battle line between emotions and conscious self. Next, pitting the strength of one opponent against another, one side is declared frail, the other powerful. As well, the common story says that when both opponents meet, their is only room for one to be victorious. In this story self and not self cannot be described as companions, sheltering behind the same line. If they meet, one party must be "dissolved".only there is a different rationale for this. The Freudian story says that when previously unconscious desires emerge into consciousness, there is a kind of a catharsis of emotional air bubbles. Soloman's emotions however are "defused" by bringing them into rational deliberation, because they are conceptual items and must partake in paradoxes of belief.

Now let's take a step back and think about this split that sometimes occurs between consciousness and emotion. (Notice that to say a split sometimes occurs and not always occurs, is to tell a different kind of story). Let's thinks about how this division is created in the first place. We are not born with such a division. Like any other baby, we are born with a rich and expansive openness to the world and to our own experience. Our attitude was one of unconditional openness - we were curious, awake, completely responsive to our environment.

The division, if there is one, was created in the first place by the subject's need to block out some aspect of experience that threatened to overwhelm them. Then in Dorian's case, it was his love of his mother that was too much too handle. Perhaps it was too much too handle because as a small boy he had been fantastically in love with his mother, but his father had found that too much to handle. Then Dorian had had to sacrifice his experience of his mother-love in order to survive as a loved son of his father.

Dorian's disowning of his experience, his banishing of his mother-love to the unconsious reservoir, was created in the first place by conditions of non-acceptance and un-safety. It wasn't safe for a boy of three to be despised by his father. The division in his soul, which was a mechanism for survival, is not now healed by acquiring new judgments such as "Though I think I love Mary, I must "really" love my mother". Healing occurs by reversing the condition that led to the split in the first place i.e. by reversing the lack of safety and unacceptance of emotional experience and expression. This occurs not by non-acceptance and distrust of the kind recommended by Soloman when he suggests that it always makes sense to ask the question: What is motivating that emotion? (meaning, What kind of deviousness is operating here?)

If our aim is to "dissolve" and "abandon" our emotions, as Soloman's certainly seems to be, this can only come from an attitude of non-

acceptance of emotions. Or why would one want to "abandon" them? The division in the soul is increased by such distrust and non-acceptance.

The only way to promote healing of the split is to welcome emotions, to invite them in, stand alongside them, not suspiciously regarding them as "devious" interruptions to our rational lives, but welcome them as parts of ourselves. Only then do we walk the razor's edge of having both conscious awareness and emotion.

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