Troubling political discourses of terrorism: Responding to the call of the other

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Abstract

As a story of a complex interplay of hegemonic power relations that play out as relationships of violence on contested boundaries, the dominant narrative of terrorism may be understood as a discursive site of tension between sameness and difference in the production of a 'unified' political identity. Contingent on a binary relationship between 'self' and 'other', terrorism functions as a particular form of Orientalism (Said, 1978) that produces Western knowledges as the authority over meaning and excludes possibilities for ethical responses (Spivak, 2004). This thesis draws on Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) theory of the political production of discourse and subjectivity to question the conditions of possibility that enable the production of terrorism in discourse. Through an understanding of discourse as socially contingent systems of meaning, the analysis explored how social relationships were constructed in political text, and how, through these hegemonic constructions, it became possible to exclude some from the authority to articulate their experiences and understanding of social relations. Revealing the contingency of relation among multiple discourse, terrorism became necessary to the discursive field that constitutes nationalism through an ongoing antagonism between governance and sovereignty that enabled a rejection of the call of the 'other'. To enable an ethical response and open possibilities for authentic encounters with the 'other', this thesis argues into a space where new meanings and possibilities for social relations are enabled through the generation of 'new' discourses that attend to the spaces between our relational boundaries.



Encounter

(Damian Rangiwananga, 2010)

Acknowledgements

Ehara tāku toa i te toa takitahi, he toa taki tini taku toa.

To engage with an academic piece of work like writing a thesis is a difficult journey. Frustrated with the struggle to move within the limitations of language there were times when I wanted to leap off the path and run in a different direction. I was told that the bulk of the work done wouldn't show in the final document, but I didn't understand what that meant until this point. What isn't readily apparent on these pages is the aroha that went into keeping me on the path.

In another conflict with words I struggle to find the language that can adequately express my gratitude to everyone who has supported and inspired me during this process. We often talk about unconditional love but it's not until we feel in those times of stress that we understand the taonga we have received. So I say a simple thank you to my whānau who have cared for me when I needed to heal and allowed me space when I needed distance. To my daughter and my partner thank you for your compassion and your patience while I was absent in my thoughts and sparing in my affection.

To my friends, my wāhine toa, thank you for listening to me while I rant and rage. Your faith in me has been greater than my own, especially in those moments when I lost sight of my path and questioned my capacity. I thank you.

To my supervisor Dr Leigh Coombes, I name you specifically because if there is anyone who has understood the struggle of my writing back it is you. I am grateful that you were there walking beside me. Thank you for sharing your skills and wisdom, for helping to collect my wandering thoughts, and helping me to believe it was possible.

To my tūpuna wāhine, "He taitai whetu ki te rangi, mau tonu, mau tonu, mau tonu. Ehara au nā tenei ao, engari nā te aroha i wae aku matua. Ko aku kahu, ko te mauri me te wehi o oku tīpuna. Ko aku kupu whakaaro, a ratau tikanga..." (Melbourne, 1982, p. 2). This is my gift to you. E iti noa ana, nā te aroha.

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Introduction

Responding to the call of 'other'

Arguably, the concept of terrorism became well known in New Zealand[1] during the Cold War era of the 1970s and 1980s. Using terrorism as a rhetorical weapon to undermine the political and moral power of political enemies, the Reagan and Thatcher governments constructed discourses of terrorism through propaganda that presented particular political and social movements, such as communism, as terrorist threats to the democratic liberties of the West (Altheide, 2006; Jackson, 2008; Sluka, Chomsky, & Price, 2002; Stohl., 2008). Growing up in the Cold War era I was aware of the 'evils' of terrorism through how they were presented in media. But the first time I remember being confronted with the power and contradictions of terrorism was as a girl while staying with my grandmother. She wasn't how we imagine our grandmothers to be. Standing less than five foot tall one could be forgiven for mistaking her small frame as a container for a small spirit – but that would be a mistake one would only make once. And I think that if the reporter she

[1] As a colonial term New Zealand derives its meaning from imperial assumptions and colonial practice. In contrast, Aotearoa derives its meaning from Māori understandings of the relationship between tangata whenua (the people of the land or Māori) and the land prior to colonisation. Although it has become convention among many writers to privilege the term Aotearoa New Zealand, such use is dependent on assumptions of 'sameness' and bicultural competency. Resonating with imperial aspirations, the idea of New Zealand as a sovereign nation-state united beneath an umbrella of common heritage not only imposes meaning on Aotearoa but also obscures the fact that important differences in meaning exist. Transformed into a site that resonates with assimilation and an intolerance of difference, I tentatively use Aotearoa New Zealand in recognition of a history of relations (with aspirations for shared social power relations), or where appropriate, I prefer to use Aotearoa or New Zealand with the assumption of differing relational contexts and different meanings.

was hurling abuse at was in the same room, he would have been left with no doubts about how she felt about him and his report. The reporter was presenting a story about an IRA bombing, and although I don't remember the details I do remember thinking that terrorism must be something that was really bad – England was fighting it, and so was she.

At the time I was confused about why the report was so offensive to my grandmother though it was clear by her stream of outrage, which ended with a blunt "they'll say whatever suits them", that terrorism wasn't as simple as it was being re-presented in the news. Staunchly proud of her Irish heritage it appeared as if she was responding to a proposition that equated her heritage with terrorism. It seemed absurd; she wasn't part of the IRA and she even agreed that their tactics were a form of 'terrorism', so it didn't make sense that she responded as she did. But she was Irish, and so was I, which meant that there was something threatening about us. Unlike others we supposedly already had a predisposition toward to being 'the terrorist' – or so it seemed.

When my grandmother said 'they' she had something specific in mind. Not necessarily referring to any particular people 'they' symbolised something different from 'us'. I had grown up hearing the 'Irish' jokes so it almost made sense that 'we' had the potential to become 'terrorists'. After all, everyone 'knew' the Irish were crazy and short tempered and prone to irrational actions. But my other grandmother also spoke about another 'they'. Although I understood that it was

different, I recognised this 'they', at least in the recognition that it was spoken into my body, for longer than I could remember.

I was also Māori, and like my grandmother I learnt that 'they' wouldn't tolerate the potentialities of my 'other' differences. As a child my grandmother was beaten across the knuckles with a ruler just for speaking te reo Māori at school. Retelling that story over and over, it was clear that for her being Māori was considered unacceptable in some social relationships and she would 'drum' that into me to make sure I understood the implications well. I embodied the social power relationship that seemed to speak with a singular voice that stretched across time and space with deadly precision; 'they' taught 'us' how to 'overcome' *our* difference and become part of the 'one'. I learned quickly enough to get the ruler only once, but I felt shame and terror when it happened to others. There was something in how it was done that made each crack applicable to 'us' all. Tarred with the same brush[2], 'us' kids marked by similar difference were positioned as disruptive and troublesome, slower to learn and more defiant. Terrorised into compliance I 'played the game' and for a while I conformed to how 'they' told me I should be. Simultaneously I also resisted – when it mattered to me. From my grandmothers, I learned how to resist with a dignity located with my 'otherness'.

[2] As a metaphor that marks a particular group as embodying the same 'faults', "tarred with the same brush" also carries the racial overtones that were taken up in the US.

Whereas my Pākehā grandmother had the privilege of being able to 'pass' easily as part of the 'one' this wasn't possible for me or my Māori grandmother - we had to work on it. Through processes of domination that inscribed our bodies with meanings of 'otherness', we wore the mark of the 'other'; visually imprinted onto our skins the meaning of our difference was like an open book that anyone could 'read' and know our stories. Although I learnt that this mark was a threat to the dominant social relationship that might enable passing, I also learnt through experience that it was a gift that gave me freedom 'they' couldn't experience. Like others, I had the opportunity to walk between worlds, to be in a space where I wasn't completely imprisoned by rules or stereotypes, and although it was painful with each side trying to claim me or disown me, it was a position that I would take up and speak from. Located on the boundaries, neither here nor there, in this space I embodied a borderline position that enabled me the subjective knowing that could gaze back.

Spivak (2004) argues that responding to the call of the 'other' is an ethical relationship that requires a discursive space for the 'other' to exist. It is a call into a relationship on the boundaries that are contested, not to look for a singular answer (the 'one'), but to question its meaning, its possibilities, its goals, its limits. Spivak's idea of a response to the call of the 'other' enabled a questioning of the 'war on terrorism' as a response to terror-ism. Arguing that responses are not made to concrete objects but to abstract concepts that have been made meaningful through the process of response itself, Spivak suggests that the call to respond may be

understood as a social process constituted through the operation of power relations; "a response not only supposes and produces a constructed subject of response, it also constructs its object" (Spivak, 2004, p. 82). In this sense, response frames the social terrain in particular ways that presupposes and marks out specific concepts and practices as important, and while creating social positions through which response is possible and warranted, it also proposes an 'impossibility of response' that delimits who can say what, when and how.

Reading through Spivak I can understand that my grandmother wasn't responding to terrorism as 'a thing' but rather, she responded to how it was made meaningful and how through that process she was constructed as a particular kind of respondent. Over time I realised that how she understood IRA 'terrorism' is probably better described as a form of resistance, but through an impossibility of response she was excluded from alternative ways of knowing and so was her ability to take up a position that enabled her to voice those understandings from within the limited discourses available. Subjected to 'a thing' called terrorism, for my grandmother to take up the position of respondent meant that she would also need to take up the conditions precluded through response. Effectively, this would mean frustrating her own story, history, and subjective knowing and taking up a position consistent with 'they'. Reflecting a pattern I often saw in the responses of my Māori grandmother, my Pākehā grandmother took up an ethical position on the boundaries of exclusion that enabled her to challenge how re-presentations of terrorism and their limits reified a relationship of domination and subordination

that equated her heritage with terrorism. Through discourses of rights to freedom she questioned the meaning of a constructed subject of response by making a 'reasonable' response to the imposition of knowledge of the 'other'. Confusing but effective, this ethical response enabled me to ask to what "do most of these responses respond?" (Spivak, 2004, p. 82) when we live in the contradictions between 'one' and 'other'?

In the relationship of response to the 'other', how is it possible to make sense of terrorism so as not to answer for it, or obey it? How is it possible to make sense of the representations of the 'other' from my histories and the histories of those who went before me and those who come after me because 'my' differences, 'my' so-called terrorist markers were accumulated in the histories of counter-cultures that threatened the 'one' that dominates my socio-political location. Slipping between worlds was not necessarily a freedom anymore. As Morse argues, "[t]he first casualty of the war agenda [against terrorism] was personal privacy...Those who are not mainstream, those whose language, skin colour, religion, history or politics do not fit the mould, are the 'other' New Zealand — not white, not middle-class, not content with the status quo. In this war, to be the 'other' is to be the enemy" (Morse, 2007, p. 10). Being positioned as 'the enemy' was something that I was familiar with, but to be positioned as a potential 'terrorist enemy' was terrifying, and not something that I would necessarily take up willingly.

In 2001 I was confronted by the effects of what was to become repeatedly declared a "war on terrorism" through media representation of a global 'threat'. As I sat watching the media coverage of 9/11 I knew that how the US government responded would matter – located as allies in war and trade it was probable that 'we' would respond in like. Responding to the events *as if* it was terrorism the US government set an agenda that re-constituted 'the social' (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). Dissolving many categorical distinctions that marked previous forms of terrorism while re-producing and solidifying others, terrorism was made real (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985) through a political response against an 'other' and transformed into a tangible reality that could be defined, identified and measured in the social realm. Re-affirming the antagonism between 'us' and 'them', terrorism was produced as 'a thing' that legitimated and reified social practices and relations not previously possible. And as potential victims of terrorism 'we' also became subjected to the hegemonic gaze of the West.

As a student of psychology, I was disturbed with the epistemological assumptions that enabled the discipline to participate in Guantanamo Bay. Regardless of disagreement as to what constitutes 'terrorism'[3] involvement at Guantanamo has been presented as a necessary engagement in the name of national security

[3] Acknowledging the problem of defining terrorism, Victoroff (2005) draws attention to Schmid's (1983) list of 109 academic definitions to illustrate the extent of disagreement. The problem however is that since 9/11 there has been a global surge in research on terrorism which means that this compilation may not reflect the current contestations over meaning. Although it is likely that the number of definitions have risen dramatically since 1983, it is also possible that hegemonic power of global discourses have contributed to more consistency among researchers and academics as to a broad definition of terrorism.

(Summers, 2007). Beginning with an assumption of 'other' and made possible through a body of empirical evidence that qualifies psychology to engage in abstractions of the 'other' (as opposed to the lived experience of 'otherness'), pathologising experts have taken up positions as terrorism experts capable of describing and constructing dominant representations of 'others' (Summers, 2007). Representing a culmination of psychological knowledge to 'know' and have authority over the 'other' the intertwining of psychological and military aspirations has been criticised from within the discipline through a questioning of the meaning of and possibilities for an ethical relationship (Summers, 2007).

Yet despite questions regarding its legitimacy, even across a range of disciplines that emphasise the 'normality' of so-called terrorists, the ongoing search for the psychopathology, the personality, and the behaviours of the 'terrorist' persist within the discipline of psychology (Abrahms, 2008; Frost, 2005; Horgan, 2005; Moghaddam, 2005; Puar & Rai, 2002; Victoroff, 2005; R. M. Young, 2003; Zimbardo, 2000, 2002). In a contest for meaning over ethical relationships, how do we make sense of a 'helping' discipline that enables practitioners to use and exploit psychological knowledge in the search for power (Summers, 2007; Zimbardo, 2006)? What is constituted as evidence and what does it mean to have knowledge of the 'other' without ethical regard for the relationship that reproduces stereotypes on which that knowledge is based; an encounter dependent on stereotypes that typify domination, colonialism and conflict (Said, 1994).

The aim of this thesis is an attempt to write back in response to and against terrorism as 'a thing' by making sense of the processes that make its particular constitution possible. Challenging the social power relations that produce and re-produce the 'reality' of terrorism as lived experience I take my subjective knowing and engage with this writing as a process of political resistance that rejects subjectification beneath an idea of 'terrorism as a thing'.

Chapter 1

Producing terrorism?

As with earlier eras, our present time will be characterised by a handful of events and movements that leave traces in the psyche[4] of future generations, and though there is no certainty, I suspect that terrorism will be one of those momentous events. Indications that our social psyche has already become marked by traces of terrorism are apparent, for example, in the emergence of a globally understood discourse of terrorism that appears as a socially constructed representation of the threat of change to particular Western interests, and how that dynamic has generated a plethora of literature and research that concerns itself with 'knowing' terrorism and the 'terrorist other'. Simultaneously there has been rapid change in technologies that enact dominant representations and control over those representations – it is also possible, that these technologies enable resistance, where access to information (and knowledges) enables participation. This thesis seeks to story terrorism as a contemporary discourse of social power relationships, and trace historical shifts that have produced terrorism as a 'reality' of our everyday experiences.

[4] Within this context, I take Rose's (1996, 1999) use of 'psyche' to mean soul, and employ it as a reference to forms of social and individual identities that are indirectly shaped and governed in particular ways.

Taking social constructionism as a starting place, Zulaika and Douglass (1996) contend that terrorism is a socially constructed myth, inasmuch as myth can be understood as a cultural practice of propaganda (Zulaika, 2003). The knowledge claims produced through propaganda are contingent on 'authority' over meaning in a complex interplay of social power relations that both enables terrorism and limits how terrorism is understood. Given that 'evidence' of the existence and effects of terrorism is readily available through all forms of media, it is necessary to problematise discursive representations through a questioning of how their 'truth' status limits our ability to resist and challenge seemingly 'common-sense' and 'obvious' assumptions about terrorism, dominant in our social relationships. As Zulaika and Douglass (1996) ask, "[i]f all sorts of murders, kidnappings, threats, civil wars, government crimes, killings by secret or underground organizations [sic], paramilitary executions, and so on, were simply called by those names without ever using the word 'terrorism', would there be something missing in the description of the real world?" (pp. 102-103). Hence, one of the problematic effects of the mythology surrounding terrorism is that it produces and re-produces social discourses and practices that constrain our ability to question and confront particular representations of our social realities.

Zulaika and Douglass (1996) suggest that if we are going to comprehend how we 'know' terrorism and how it influences our material realities, it must be understood through historical discourses of knowledge and power. Acknowledging that history is complex and contextually situated, it is impossible to trace every moment in

discourse where what we 'know' about terrorism is realised but it is possible to trace particular conditions of possibility that have enabled the materialisation of terrorism as a force that impacts our lived realities.

A conceptual birth of terrorism

Tracing terrorism to the development of new fields of knowledge and to struggles for power (Blain, 2005) it has been argued that the conceptual birth of terrorism originated with 'La Terreur', or the 'Reign of Terror' (see Achankeng, 2007; Bergesen & Lizardo, 2004; Jaggar, 2005; Sluka, et al., 2002; Tilly, 2004). Occurring at a time of extreme political, social and cultural conflict, the Reign of Terror refers to a particular period of the French revolution of 1789-1799 when the Jacobin regime overthrew the ruling monarchy and implemented a policy of terror, which sanctioned the use of politically motivated violence to subdue opposition resistant to the establishment of a new regime.

According to Blain (2005), the underlying drive of the French Revolution was a new understanding of human nature. Set against the backdrop of the 'Enlightenment'[5] movement, poverty, and economic crisis, France was experiencing a myriad of social and cultural transformations. With shifts in the social terrain, ideas of

[5] "Enlightenment was the era in which a scientific approach came to dominate western thought. It involved a very utopian orientation to the possibilities of knowledge, and the scientific was thought to offer the means to come to understand the whole world and everything in it - and the universe beyond ...the possibilities of scientific study and knowledge accumulation was also applied to humans ...differences between peoples came to be seen as a matter of lesser or greater development, of primitivism versus civilisation, with the European cultures of the Enlightenment being of course, the most developed, the bearers of the universal standards of civilisation" (Bell, 2007).

'rationality' and 'reason' began to develop into an organised system of knowledge that not only offered new ways of understanding life, but provided the conditions necessary for justifying the use of politically motivated violence that facilitated the demise of monarchical power (Blain, 2005).

Unlike its monarchical predecessor, which vested power in the divine and the monarchy, the developing ideology of liberalism situated power *in* 'people'. Underpinned by the assumption of humans as unified, rational, individual subjects, liberal ideologies produced knowledge that not only challenged the virtues of birthright and divine appointment it also constituted a new set of social power relations of domination and subordination of those subjects. As well as enabling an appropriation of 'rights' and 'freedoms' that had previously been reserved for the monarchy and clergy, assumptions of 'rationality' gave weight to the notion of revolution as warranted and necessary. Through representations of the monarchy as oppressive and tyrannical, liberal assumptions of human nature also enabled the construction of political violence as a justifiable 'right' of 'free people', and produced terror as a social movement (Blain, 2005). However, in the continuing struggle for hegemonic domination (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985) the production of terror as a 'liberating' social movement produced a further a problem – the potential for rebellion (Blain, 2005).

Within the context of revolt, political violence became justifiable as a form of resistance by 'free people', however, within the context of establishing a new

regime, terrorism now created a "practical political need to differentiate illegitimate from legitimate forms of political violence" (Blain, 2005, p. 3). In this respect, 'the problem of terrorism' wasn't a problem with 'terrorism' *per se*, but rather, a problem with governing 'free people' (Blain, 2005). While liberal societies were produced through political violence and terrorism, it became problematic; the principles of the underlying knowledge systems that had enabled new understandings of human nature and justified the use of revolutionary violence with the establishment of a modern regime attuned to the social and cultural shifts that had occurred with revolution also created a potential threat of violence "in danger of insurrection" from the people (Blain, 2005, p.3).

Shifting from a system of monarchical power (Foucault, 1995) the idea of humans as 'rational' beings signified the emergence of disciplinary power as a form of social control. Whereas people were once understood as being subject to god and the monarchy, the shift toward disciplinary power meant that citizens were subjected to a new form of social control; the state enacted power on the actions of the body, a process of power that had the legitimacy to impinge on those liberties that were a threat to the new social order.

A 'thing' called terrorism

One of the shifts made possible through the French Revolution was a political merging of 'terror as affect' and 'terror as a social movement' (Blain, 2005; Spivak, 2004), both determinate and abstract. Intertwining a 'natural' experience of

subjective psychological terror with a 'civil' understanding of terror as a 'social movement' enabled the production of terrorism as a 'thing' that was both knowable and reducible; terrorism becomes both a name of a social movement and an effect that marks and produces terrorism as a psychological identity. In this way, terrorism is produced as an object for exercising psychological diagnostics (Spivak, 2003, p. 91).

In the reduction of meaning through processes of definition, terrorism became a determinable quality that could be observed *in* individuals and groups. This shift led to two things – firstly, assumed to be a quality inherent within particular groups and individuals it enabled the construction of researchers (experts) to examine particular communities in search of the 'sources' of terrorism, and secondly, it also enabled the production of political bodies that had the potential to create social policies that could justifiably counter and contain the threat of terrorism; the establishment of a 'global' movement of anti terrorism based on expert knowledge (Spivak, 2003).

The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) for instance, drew on legal imperatives and defined terrorism as "the unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or property to intimidate the government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof..." (Loewenthal, 2003, p. 250). The Committee for Human Rights (2001) focused on a concept of 'shared humanity' and declared that "terrorism constitutes a gross violation of human rights. It is a crime against all of humanity for which

there can be no justification" (cited in Sluka, 2008, p. 175). Zimbardo (2002) took a more procedurally orientated approach, and defined terrorism as "the process of inducing fear in the general population by means of acts that undercut an established sense of trust, stability, and confidence in one's personal world" (p. 7). Although framed differently, embedded within each of these definitions are defining characteristics of terrorism as 'a thing' and a social movement that can be identified, known and countered. Produced through discourses that enable and constrain particular actions, and produce particular subjects (and communities) that enact terror against others, the 'reality' of terrorism is located in its potential to produce and maintain relationships of social power through its status as an object of discourse.

Legislating terrorism

In 2002 the New Zealand Government passed the Terrorism Suppression Act (2002). Created in response to pressure from the United Nations and the US following 9/11, the Act appears to be a logical 'progression' of existing social policies, including pre-existing anti-terrorism legislation[6] (Keenan, 2008a). Effectively declaring 'us' an ally in the war against terrorism the Act not only solidified New Zealand's political and ideological affiliations with international powers, but through the re-production of terrorism as a legally defined entity made it possible for police to take pre-emptive action against suspected 'terrorists' engaging in anti-government activities.

[6] See the International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 1987

Understanding terrorism as 'a thing' that is also a social movement, the Act is perhaps one of the most significant attempts at social regulation in recent history. Through the institutionalisation of terrorism as a legally defined concept, governments have brought terrorism into the lives of its citizens through technologies of social control that move beyond physical force on the body into the realms of psychological coercion. Sanctioning particular ways of being and acting in the world, legislation functions as a mechanism for transmitting and legitimising specific knowledges that enable and regulate social relations without necessarily drawing on force. Through social power relationships citizens are inscribed with social meaning; they come to embody, through social sanctions, the dominant discourses that govern behaviour through an ongoing process of self-surveillance. As an exercise in disciplinary power (Foucault, 1982, 1988) this enables governments to appear as a benign force responsible for protecting and disciplining citizens when citizens can not or will not control their own behaviour *because* citizens are constructed as embodiments of 'rationality' capable of self-governing behaviour.

Enabling a location of responsibility for behaviour within individuals, disciplinary power is a particularly effective form of social control. Underpinned by justifications that assume care and protection of the 'freedoms' of the people, the regulation of social relationships by governments becomes socially and legally sanctioned through consent rather than force (Blain, 2005). As an effect disciplinary power, discourses of 'terrorism' are produced as originating from the

people. In the "war against terrorism" (and the implementation of the Act) there is a contest over the meaning of legitimate political action; political violence by the military and police is sanctioned as protection, whereas political activity against the state is condemned as terrorism.

Having a history embedded within social-political relations "the 'law' itself is not an 'innocent' set of rules existing in a non-political space" (Hill, 2008, p. 40). Produced in response to social and political shifts, legal discourse enabled through the Terrorism Suppression Act (2002) articulates a system of knowledge that becomes a hegemonic force with the potential to control and constitute the social. Answering 'who' represents the subject 'terrorist' is problematic in the social. Like the Terrorism Suppression Act (2002) the FBI definition of terrorism, for example, defines the social through a relationship between the government and its citizens, and authorises a response to an "abstract enemy" (Spivak, 2004, p. 82). In a contest over meaning however, the limitations on the relationship between the government and citizens are 'revealed' through social sanctions that authorise a suspension of the privileges possible through the notion of the social.

Terrorist as activist

On the 15th of October 2007 the New Zealand Police, and therefore the government, produced a response to a 'threat' of potential 'terrorism' that not only constructed a subject of response, it also re-produced its object. Through the power enabled in the Terrorism Suppression Act (2002) the police utilised its

provisions to conduct what were to become known as the 'anti-terrorist raids'[7] in dominant discourse. Operating under the articulation of an 'anti-terrorist' operation aimed at subduing potential terrorist threats, the police conducted paramilitary style dawn raid[8] on particular properties across the country. The raids resulted in the initial arrest of 17 people, and despite the Solicitor General dismissing attempts to lay charges under the Act, lesser charges against the accused were pursued (Keenan, 2008a).

Unlike other notable examples of 'terrorism', the October 15 raids caused substantial division in the psyche of the New Zealand public. On the one hand, the police actions, although 'somewhat excessive', were viewed as justified methods for dealing with 'obvious' and 'known' terrorists. On the other hand, the accused and others who became implicated were viewed as 'victims' of intimidating and inhumane police tactics, which resulted in police themselves becoming viewed as the perpetrators of terrorism (Keenan, 2008a). In a conflict over the meaning of October 15 the Act that was intended to protect society from terrorism enabled an act of terrorism; previous 'truths' of a clear distinction between the terrorist and counter-terrorist would always be ruptured.

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[7] Instead of taking up the dominant term (anti-terrorist raids), this thesis use the term articulated by those effected to mark the raids – 'October 15'

[8] How the raids of October 15 were justified and conducted resonates with the discrimination and brutality of "dawn raids" of the 1970s that had a devastating effects on Pacific Island peoples (de Bres & Campbell, 1976; Wright & Hornblow, 2008).

The implementation of the Act in October 15 was condemned by the United Nations and various human rights organisations and created a social controversy regarding the status of 'human rights'. Founded upon the concept of a shared humanity, the definition of terrorism offered by the Committee for Human Rights (2001) states "terrorism constitutes a gross violation of human rights. It is a crime against all of humanity for which there can be no justification". Bringing together notions of a unified humanity through the authority of 'rights' discourse, the 'meaning' of the October 15 raids became understood as a breach of the rights of citizens, where political violence is used against those who might take up political action against the government. In this way, human rights discourse has the potential to disrupt the arbitrary distinctions that permit the use of politically motivated violence by some but not others.

Keenan (2008a) argues that leading into the October 15 raids there existed a milieu of surveillance and intelligence-gathering operations that had devolved into an 'indistinguishable and inter-mixed practice of policing of ordinary protest and anti-terrorism'. Drawing on field work and intelligence that legitimated a range of social conflicts under the umbrella of terrorism had the effect of disguising legitimate protest on a variety of issues, including genetic engineering and ownership of the seabed and foreshore, and wrapping them into a conceptual framework that produced the 'problem' as a potential threat to state control and established social relations (Keenan, 2008a). That human rights discourse is embedded in the tension between discourse of protest and legal discourse raises questions regarding the

usefulness of rights discourse in the understanding of terrorism as politically motivated violence. However, the potential of rights discourses to disrupt hegemonic assumptions does enable an opening of spaces for alternative representations of political action and engagement with an ethical response to the 'other'.

In the name of terrorism

Regardless of the failure of the October 15 to suppress citizen dissent, what the raids did achieve was to bring into the social psyche the 'reality' of terrorism within its borders. Through enactment of the Act in a show of physical and psychological domination and force in the name of terrorism, a process of inducing fear that undermined a sense of trust (Zimbardo, 2002), political violence became both produced and destabilised in the conflict over social meanings of terrorism.

Among the first to criticise the concept of terrorism, Edward Said (1986) argued that 'terrorism' was inadequate as an analytical tool for understanding the operation of social power relations involved in political violence. Underlying his argument was a claim that "there are few ways of talking about terrorism that are not corrupted by the propaganda war of the past decade, ways that have become, in my opinion, disqualified as instruments of conducting rational, secular inquiry into the causes of human violence" (Said, 1988, p. 53), transforming terrorism into a 'totalising concept'. In other words, for Said the ways we think and talk about

terrorism are dominated by hegemonic discourses that not only produce social practices, but are also dependent on notions of (an)'other' for their meaning.

Chapter 2

East is east and west is west, and never the twain shall meet (Rudyard Kipling).

Reading Orientalism to make sense of terrorism

Coined by Said (1978), Orientalism refers to a socially constructed system of knowledge that arose from the period of enlightenment where science became the technology of power to understand the physical and social world. Dependent on a system of classification, differences between peoples became meaningful through the dynamic of domination, imperialism and colonialism where the discourses of the superiority of the West as 'civilised' produced knowledge of the 'other' as 'primitive'.

A legacy of European domination and colonial rule over the East, Orientalism perpetuated and maintained a particular set of relational boundaries[9] (Said, 1978). Resembling a hegemonic culture seeking to establish authority, Said argued that Orientalism carried traces of a history of conflict and resistance that shaped how we made sense of ourselves and the world. Necessarily political, Orientalism produced and re-produced a domineering and oppressive set of social power relations predicated on relations of binary logic. As a system of epistemological violence functioning as a means of self-identification Orientalism regulated how the

[9] Such as West/East, occident/orient, civilised/primitive.

'West' could make sense of, and frame itself, in relation to the 'other' – whatever the Orient was, the Occident was not. Reading through Orientalism to make sense of 'terrorism', 'terrorism' may be understood as a political culture, produced and re-produced in and through a set of historically contingent and contested discourses of hegemony where the authority to 'know' privileges writing over oral encounters of reciprocal speech; through asymmetrical power relations that produce stereotypes so that any 'authentic' knowledge is excluded through Western authority over meaning.

At the time of writing *Orientalism*, Said had become troubled by the persistence and prevalence of stereotypes related to the 'Orient'.[10] For Said, the problem of stereotyping was not a matter of 'mis-re-presentation', which implies that there is a 'truth' of the 'Orient' that has been falsely re-presented. Rather, the problem with stereotyping was the essentialising binary of 'them' and 'us' enacted through naturalising discourse (Said, 1978). Confining and reducing difference into a 'sensible' set of binary relations, Orientalism assumes that Western knowledge claims could be the authority on the Orient; 'they' could be known. As a discursive strategy, constituting the 'other' through stereotypes necessarily limits the possibility for understandings that can arise from a 'real' encounter with the 'other' that the 'one' already assumes to know. As such, the constitution of a Western

[10] Corresponding roughly with what may be conceptualised as the 'East', for Said (1978) the 'Orient' refers to a set of stereotypical re-presentations of regions dominated by the 'West', including areas of India, Asia and the Middle East, especially Palestine and Israel. And while the discourse of the Orient may have changed since Said's (1978) commentary, the perpetuation of new stereotypes of the 'other' that define diversity and difference suggests that Orientalism is an on-going process.

identity may be understood as being enabled though technologies of power such as stereotyping – as long as the West attempts to define itself in relation to the 'other' the "tradition" of Orientalism is necessary for its authority.

Having the potential to influence how we make sense of ourselves and our world, Said did not view stereotyping as a passive process that merely reflected the 'reality' of the world, but an active process, that not only produced and re-produced the 'Orient' as an object of discourse, but also an associated "style of thought" (Said, 1978, p. 2) that ordered the world according to a system of hierarchal classification (Said, 1978), embedded in asymmetrical power relations that are dominated everywhere and nowhere through hegemonic discourses. 'Declared' through media, and echoed throughout art, literature, and research, 'terrorism' has become patterned in such a way that it is almost immediately identifiable; "synonymous with abnormality, extremism, and the antonym to the West, representing normality, moderation and rationality" (Blain, 2005, p. 14), 'terrorism' has come to re-present something 'they do'.

Questioning how stereotypes are enabled and maintained, Said (1978) actively rejected the 'accuracy' of 'Oriental' stereotypes, however he did not dispute the 'existence' of the 'Orient'. Pointing out for example, that the 'Orient' as a concept that could be thought and talked about, did not pre-date the peoples, cultures or nations considered 'Oriental', and that the sheer expanse of 'the Orient' was too large and too diverse to be encapsulated by a set of generalised assumptions, Said

(1978) proposed that, insomuch as it existed in Western awareness, the 'Orient' re-presented an oppressive and dominating cultural tradition that had been practiced for generations. Made possible through the power of imperialism to expand, colonise and dominate (Said, 1978), he viewed the capacity and tendency to stereotype the 'Orient' as a particular discursive strategy to maintain relations of domination, colonialism and conflict. Producing and re-producing knowledge of 'the Orient', it may be argued that, Orientalism as a culturally specific form of stereotyping (a productive system of knowledge about the 'Orient'), can be understood as resulting from a Western tradition that sought to 'know' and have power over the 'other'. In other words, Orientalism may be understood as representing an historically situated and contextually specific product and producer of Western power.

'Oriental' stereotypes also re-presented Orientalism as something 'they do'. According to 'Orientalist' discourse for instance, the 'Orient' is 'Oriental' because 'Oriental' is the *nature* of 'the Orient' (Said, 1978). Produced as a problem "to be solved or confined or – as the colonial powers openly coveted their territory – taken over" (Said, 1978, p. 207), the notion of an 'Oriental essence' was a productive idea. Once positioned as inferior to the 'essence of the West', it was possible to locate blame for the problem of difference with 'the Orient' and use this idea as justification for 'Western' authority over the 'Orient'. Making it possible for

'Orientalist's',[11] to take up positions as experts on the 'Orient' (Said, 1978) it also rejected possibilities for a human encounter with the 'other' by excluding 'Oriental' people from participating in solutions. Taking up the position of 'expert', through a process of privileging "the schematic authority of the text to the disorientations of direct encounter", the authorisation of the 'reality' of experience takes the place of the actual experience (Said, 2004, p. 390). The problem of 'terrorism' then is produced through discursive rules that enable Western authority over meaning, silencing the voice of the 'other' who the expert assumes to already know.

For example, to assume that 'terrorism' is determinable not only makes assumptions regarding the 'nature' of 'reality' but limits the ability to question *how* we know what we know. How do we know for instance, that 9/11 was an act of 'terrorism', as opposed to an act of 'political resistance'? Similarly, how do we know that the 1985 bombing of the Rainbow Warrior (a Greenpeace protest ship that was preparing to protest French nuclear testing at Moruroa Atoll) by French secret service agents was an incident of state-backed terrorism, rather than an act of sabotage against environmental activists (Robie, 2007)? How we know such things as forms of 'terrorism' is not due to incidents or actions 'speaking for themselves', but rather how such things are 'spoken' into our understandings by 'expert' interpretations.

[11] "Anyone who teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient – and this applies whether the person is an anthropologist, sociologist, historian, or philologist – either in its specific or general aspects, is an Orientalist, and what he or she does is Orientalism" (Said, 1978).

A point to be taken from Said (1978) is that 'experts' are themselves products of contextually specific and historically located relations of knowledge and power. Having a powerful role in determining how we make sense of and give meaning to phenomena, Said (1978) cautions against uncritical acceptance of 'expert' commentaries. If, for instance, 'politically motivated violence against civilians' was to be considered the defining characteristic of 'terrorism', how is it possible for 'experts' to remain suspiciously silent on phenomena that engages in political violence against the 'other', where the war on terrorism by the West, which is not a 'war', is also enacted on civilians (Jackson, 2008; Jaggar, 2005; Sluka, 2008; Weinberg & Eubank, 2008; Wittebols, 1991; Zulaika & Douglass, 1996)? The difference between terrorist and soldier matters, where the soldier may be understood as the body of the political act of terror in the name of the West. It is the superiority of the 'one' in the difference between the 'one' and the 'other' that leads to the perpetuation of "righteous anger and defensiveness against the other" (Said, 1994, p. 376).

In the contest over the authority of meanings, like 'myth', Orientalism can be understood as a cultural practice evidenced through dominant discourses and technologies of power that represent that which can be known. For Said however, traditional meanings of 'myth' can be understood as a technology that gives meaning to and transmits that meaning, but its position as 'story' does not enable it the authority of a determinable 'reality'. Situating Orientalism within the context of a cultural tradition that has authorised a particular world view, the notion of myth

is useful as a concept for understanding the existence of contradictions posed by Orientalism, such as ideas related to the 'reality of the Orient'. The problem however, is that reducing Orientalism to the status of 'myth' denies the 'real' and material effects of 'Orientalist' thought and practices.

Another problem is when myth is positioned in an oppositional position to 'science' it reinforces science as the authority of knowledge systems that enabled the production of Orientalism, the 'truth' of which is based on the assumption of 'reality' supported or falsified through the rationality of science. Re-framing Orientalism through a questioning of the socially constructed reality of rationality as a system of knowledge and power, Said (1978) argued that rationality is itself dependent on mythological assumptions of the 'self' and 'other'. Said (1978) drew attention to how the power to be *in* the 'Orient' not only enabled the 'West' to control and inscribe the 'Orient' with culturally specific meaning, but also established institutions and social policies that had the potential to produce and re-produce that process and the power to maintain it.

Shifting the focus from 'the Orient', as the object of re-presentation, to how the 'Orient' was produced as a 'knowable' object, enables a space for understanding 'terrorism' as being embedded within a history of knowledge and power, as re-presented by the West. Asking how the object 'terrorism' is constituted necessarily questions how terrorism functions to produce and re-produce a particular set of

social power relations which situate power with the 'West', whilst enabling the 'West' to make sense of itself in relation to "other".

Terrorism as a form of Orientalism

> *It is the reality-making power of the discourse itself that most concerns us – its capacity to blend the media's sensational stories, old mythical stereotypes, and a burning sense of moral wrath. Once something that is called "terrorism" – no matter how loosely it is defined – becomes established in the public mind, "counterterrorism" is seemingly the only prudent course of action (Zulaika & Douglass, 1996, p. ix).*

In a similar vein to Said, Zulaika and Douglass (1996) express a concern for how discourses of terrorism produce and re-produce a particular set of social power relations that have the potential to shape and influence our material 'realities'. In their book, "*Terror and taboo: the follies, fables, and faces of terrorism*", Zulaika and Douglass begin by attempting to demonstrate, and disrupt, the 'reality-making' power of discourse, whilst putting the 'reality' of the 'terrorist threat' into question;

> *In 1985, one of the worst years in terrorism history, in the 812 incidents of terrorism worldwide, 23 Americans were killed, or "about one-fourth the number who die each year as a result of being struck by lightening." In April of 1986, a national survey showed that terrorism was the most frequently mentioned problem facing the country, "the number one concern." Between 1974 and 1994 – two decades in which terrorism loomed large as a threat –*

> *more people died in the United States of bee stings. Jenkin's prediction that by the end of the 1980s terrorism incidents might double is belied by the fact that in the United States between 1989 and 1992 there was not a single fatality from terrorism. During this same four-year period, the United States reported approximately 100,000 homicides* (p. 6).[12]

Arguably, since 9/11 the 'reality' of terrorism has been transformed into a problem of epic proportions. Re-presented as a threat to global security, governments from around the world have joined forces in a bid to combat the problem of terrorism. Situating Orientalism within the rubric of Western pursuits that function to reify and give meaning to the 'West', Said (1978) challenged the idea that it was impossible to talk and think about the 'reality' of 'the Orient' outside of its relationships with the 'West'. Similarly, it is proposed that terrorism also functions to reify the 'West', and that discourses of terrorism do not reflect the 'reality' of terrorism, but rather, a particular set of social power relationships. Reading 'terrorism' as a particular form of Orientalism (Morton, 2007), which has been socially constructed through historical and social conditions that inform how we

[12] To offer a more recent account of the 'mythology' related to terrorism post 9/11, in which a total of 2,995 people died, in that same year in the United States 37,862 people died in motor vehicle accidents (http://www-fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/Main/index.aspx). Again in that year, the FBI statistics report that in the United States 13,752 people were murdered. Of those murders, 1,803 were committed by strangers and in 6,136 of the cases the offender is unknown, meaning that 5,813 murders were committed by friends, family, or acquaintances (http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/01cius.htm). Also, at present, the Center for Disease Control estimates that on average 5-20% of U.S. residents get the flu, and of those 200,000 are hospitalised for flu-related complications, with an estimated 36,000 dying from complications (http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/qa/disease.htm). This data suggests the threat of death in our everyday environment is substantially greater than that supposedly presented by 'terrorism' – if the threat of death and destruction is the measure of concern why have we not, for example, waged war against familial homicide or motor vehicle crashes?

make sense of and interact in the world, the 'new' threat of terrorism is realised through a particular event, and produces an identifiable 'other'.

Shifting terrorism from the realm of the intangible to the tangible for example, discourses of terrorism have justified Western intervention in supposed 'terrorist zones', and enabled the establishment of a range of civilising projects re-presented as counter-terrorist initiatives. One example is the development of anti-terrorism legislation (Puar & Rai, 2002; Spivak, 2004) which places restrictions on social movement and participation in the social on the 'body' of the identifiable 'other'. A terrorist identity not only marks certain people as embodying terrorism, but it produces a moral trajectory that defines the conventions of a 'rightful' place in the social order in terms of 'good' and 'evil' (Zulaika & Douglass, 1996) through repeated claims to nationalism.

The relationship between the identifiable 'other' of terrorism and 'good' citizenship requires an understanding of the complexity of the interplay between the 'terrorist' and 'counter-terrorism' (Zulaika, 2003). For example, resonating with images that depict the Orient as 'uncivilised' and 'primitive' terrorists are re-presented as "the new barbarians" (Zulaika & Douglass, 1996, p. 156), and like the problem of the 'Orient', the problem of 'terrorism' is located as a characteristic of the 'other'; dangerous and threatening to the identity of the West.

Media as a technology of power

> *One aspect of the electronic, postmodern world is that there has been a reinforcement of the stereotypes by which the Orient is viewed. Television, the films, and all the media's resources have forced information into more and more standardized molds [sic]. So far as the Orient is concerned, standardization and cultural stereotyping have intensified the hold of the nineteenth-century academic and imaginative demonology of "the mysterious Orient" (Said, 1978, p. 26).*

Zulaika & Douglass (1996, p. ix) problematise the relationship between media and representations of the 'other' through "its capacity to blend the media's sensational stories, old mythical stereotypes, and a burning sense of moral wrath." Returning to the question of how the object of terrorism is constituted through the technologies of the media, the 'war on terrorism' was brought into a global psyche through repeated media coverage of the images of the "debris-choked remains" of the world trade centre, a symbol of "world peace" through trade. For Spivak (2004, pp. 85-86) the twin towers represent the ideology of world trade and military power that was unexamined in the media response and necessarily excluded an ethical relationship with the 'other'. As a starting place, it was represented as a global threat to security, refusing an encounter with the 'other'. If a response necessarily constitutes a subject of response, and also constructs its object, the media response to such an 'event' can be understood as a technology of power.

In his critique of the logic of the West, Said argued that public textual media, (political press releases, speeches, and the reporting of events and so on) are a technology of the transmission of the knowledge of the 'other'. The process of analysing texts (writing, conversations, media) is also a political practice that may enable spaces for an authentic encounter with the 'other' (Said, 1994). How is a dialogue between those who hold the authority of meaning and the communities who are differently affected by that meaning possible? In this sense, it might be possible to question a movement in understanding the global/local effects of the 'war on terror'. How is it possible to legitimise other 'knowledges' to enable space for the enactment of a response that makes social justice a possibility?

Understanding media as a political technology of the production of post-orientalist discourse (inasmuch as I have already argued Orientalism as the dominant form of representation in the discursive constitution of terrorism) in the next chapter I draw on Laclau and Mouffe as theorists of the political production of discourse and subjectivity to ask questions of the politics of domination represented in and through the media, specifically at the boundaries of 'self'/'other' and global/local. Where the twin towers represent the aspirations of the dominance of 'one' global economic order, what are the representations that form the political conditions of possibility for an understanding of terrorism?

Chapter 3 - Methodology

Laclau and Mouffe's theory of the political production of discourse and subjectivity.

For Laclau and Mouffe (1985), the making of political identities requires making sense of the historical transformations of the world in which we live, a process from within the present, its struggles, challenges and dangers, where we must simultaneously 'interrogate the past' to transform the past into a transient and contingent 'reality' rather than the origin of 'truth'. Their theory of the political production of discourse and subjectivity seeks to undermine hegemonic ideologies that posit the values and interests of the state as naturally occurring. In their book *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) draw together and synthesise a range of philosophical and theoretical assumptions into a post-marxist theory of discourse that attempts to bridge the gap between political and social practices and the production of meaning. Departing from traditional assumptions, which posit 'reality' as *the* source of meaning, Laclau and Mouffe propose meaning is socially constructed through discourse. Privileging an understanding that resists assumptions of an essential 'reality', Laclau and Mouffe argue that whatever 'reality' might be it is through discursive constructions that 'reality', in its infinite forms, is produced as meaningful.

Discourse theory

To enable the question of 'how we might know 9/11 was an act of terrorism', discourse theory suggests that there was nothing inherent within the action which necessitated an interpretation of terrorism. Instead, particular sets of historical and social discourses enabled 'terrorism' to be taken up as a meaningful explanation. But why, within a realm of possibilities, was 'terrorism' presented as the 'official version of events', as opposed to other understandings?[13] According to Laclau and Mouffe (1985), discourse involves a hegemonic struggle for cultural domination, and within this struggle a differentiation occurs "between the dominant discourses that achieve authoritative status and subordinate discourses that are marginalized [sic] or even silenced" (Dahlberg, 2007, p. 835). That terrorism emerged as an 'obvious', almost natural explanation, suggests that on some level, hegemony had been achieved.

Discourses shape and frame meaning in ways that necessarily involve exclusion or marginalisation of alternative ways of knowing (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). Delimiting how knowledge is constituted for example, discourses produce and re-produce particular sets of social power relations which carry the potential to privilege some positions in relation to others (Dahlberg, 2007). But because discourses are dependent on knowledge that privileges particular values and interests of the political ideology, they necessarily also constitute social positions of authority over meaning (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985), regulating who can say what, when and how

13 See for instance, Churchill (2001).

(Dahlberg, 2007). Constrained by the boundaries of discourse, not all social positions are open to all agents. Rather than the agent being the origin of meaning, but produced in relation to competing discourses, an agent is necessarily limited within the struggle over meaning.

In this way discourse can be understood as socially contingent, and Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) discourse theory proposes an understanding in which agency is limited to the discursive contexts that produce particular positions as meaningful social relations. As such, rather than examining the 'terrorist' or 'terrorism' as objects of discourse, this thesis focuses on how terrorism is constructed as an on-going conflict that functions as a contemporary discourse of social control, and how discursively constructed antagonisms carry the potential to assign and regulate social positions (and possibilities for agency) within a discursive field.

Discursive field

Understood as 'socially contingent systems of meaning', discourse is defined as 'structured totalities of differences resulting from articulatory practices' (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, pp. 105-114). For Laclau and Mouffe, "every social practice, in one of its dimensions, is articulatory" (1985, p. 113). In this sense, social space is discursive, "every social configuration is *meaningful*" (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987, p. 82). This assumes that because every social configuration is meaningful in relation to other discourses, its meaning is indeterminate. Occurring in what Laclau and Mouffe (1985) describe as a 'field of discursivity', or a space of infinite and

potentially meaningful relations, articulation establishes relationships of difference among elements. For example, establishing a particular set of relations among elements, articulation enables the construction of terrorism as a meaningful object of discourse. Attempting to dominate discursive fields, discourse configures and structures relations into coherent systems of differences (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). Grounding meaning, discourse not only enables us to make sense of relations among objects and determine their meaning, but also enables the fixing of meaning that produce and reproduce hegemonic practices (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Phelan, 2009) that make it possible to understand terrorism as threat to global security.

However, as Laclau and Mouffe (1985) also argue that discourse is infinitely open, terrorism may also be meaningfully constructed as the enemy's propaganda against legitimate struggle but it is through exclusion of other relational possibilities that such constructions are enabled and meaningfully produced. With a surplus of meanings, possibilities that are excluded from discourse linger as a field of discursivity (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. 111) which threaten to subvert discursive constructions. As such any sense we may be able to construct is temporary, or partial. Contingent upon social practices, which shift and flux, meaningful relations can never be fully fixed as this would mean social practices were both stable and resistant to change. "The impossibility of ultimate fixity of meaning implies that there has to be partial fixations ... [C]onstituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre" (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. 112), all discourse, in order to be stable and coherent, is

contingent upon a partial fixation of meaning around privileged discursive points, or 'nodal points' (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). While nodal points tentatively fix meaning, allowing for a coherent structure of relations, it is the relationships with other meanings that bring them into practice.

As there is no such *ding an sich* or 'thing in itself' (Zulaika, 1998), meaning depends on systems of relations. As privileged points of meaning, empty signifiers re-present a discursive centre, which gathers and binds a range of signifiers into a system of discourse. It is the potential of emptiness (both full of and lacking meaning) that makes it possible for it to signify any discourse as a whole. Lacking an external referent, floating signifiers, such as terrorism derive meaning from their relation to other signifiers (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). As a site of contestation in struggles for hegemony, the dynamic relationships among signifiers mean that discourse is political. Split by the contingency of relation, terrorism may be understood as signifying a "fullness of society, (or its opposite, its corruption or non-being) which could be actualised by the most different social forces" (Laclau, 1997, p. 316).

> *The quest for the quintessential distillation by which 'terror' could be encapsulated, diagnosed under laboratory conditions, defined in precise terms, and then finally conquered and extinguished for the benefit of mankind, is of course an academic illusion. Its 'unreality' derives from the referential circularity of terror, its logic of randomness, its semantics of play*

> *and threat, its deceptive use of sign and symbol, and its enormous power for collective representation (Zulaika, 1998, p. 104).*

Predicated on a binary logic of inclusion and exclusion, the coherence of a system is dependent upon boundaries that limit how relations may be constructed. Structuring discourse, 'logic' creates cohesion and stability while also rendering discourses as incomplete and unstable (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. 130). Composed of 'logics' of 'equivalence' and 'difference', discourses are marked by ambivalence and paradox (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Phelan, 2009). Stringing together a range of mutually related signifiers, logics enable the construction of 'chains of equivalence' that produce a sense of 'sameness', whereby a signifier (such as terrorism) may stand in for an entire chain that embodies an ideological relation of sameness; while also producing 'difference' that disrupts the hegemonic potential of equivalences (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Phelan, 2009; Phelan & Shearer, 2009).

Stressing the centrality of conflict in discourse, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) theorise the dynamic relationships among signifiers through the notion of antagonism. Necessarily political, discourse involves "an antagonistic (or contestationary) struggle to establish the taken-for-granted social order" (Dahlberg, 2007, p. 835). Emphasising how meanings are constituted through exclusion and a negative relation with an antagonistic 'other', antagonisms disrupt stability and aspirations of hegemony (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Phelan, 2009). Producing and re-producing sets of relations that exclude and inhibit some from exercising power, antagonisms

represent a simultaneous "condition of possibility and impossibility" (Phelan, 2009, p. 21). Resulting from a temporary, partially fixed hegemony, the construction of an enemy for instance, functions as a tentative consensus unifying forces opposed to it (Laclau, 2003). Constructed through an antagonistic relationship of 'us' versus 'them', positioning the enemy as a threatening 'other', makes it possible for those who are opposed to the enemy to become unified in their opposition regardless of differences that may set them apart within other contexts.

At present we can speak of a unified consensus that positions itself in opposition to terrorism. Re-represented in the idea that 'they' (the terrorists) are a threat to 'us' (the West) because they oppose 'our values, our democracy, our freedom', consensus is constructed around an antagonistic identity of 'us' versus 'them'. In a chain of equivalence, 'us' (the West) are equated with the positive virtues of democracy and freedom that seeks dominance over 'one' global economic order. The ideological effect of such an equivalence is the production of hegemonic discourse that fixes relations between signifiers producing a stable but threatened identity. Forming the terrorist identity as an antagonistic 'they', enables an 'othering' of terrorists which may be used for instance, to justify a pro-active stance that endorses the establishment of civilising projects, such as counter-terrorism.

The problem however, is that "without confrontation there is no identity; social identities require conflict for their constitution ... Only the will of determined social forces give a consistent shape to social relations, and the determination of that will

depends on the violent confrontation between groups " (Laclau, 1997, p. 316). In this way, social identities are embedded in a 'violent' contest over meanings and difference that constitute identity. "If it is the moment of violence as such and not the victory of either of the two poles of confrontation" (Laclau, 1997, p. 317) that terrorism becomes attached to the identity of the 'other'; "it is the reproduction of violence as an end in itself that constitutes the real objective" (ibid). In which case, it is worth asking, who benefits from the relationship between the positioning of the 'other', the constitution of their identity and terrorism discourse? That the boundary between 'self'/'other' be determined as a relationship of violence, a construct of the West acting on the social identity of the 'other', it is also possible for violence to be understood as producing and re-producing the conflict for the sake of stabilising social identities. As such, a victory over terrorism would be counter-productive; it would mean a dissolving of difference, and the end of the West/East relationship maintained through hegemonic power relations of domination, imperialism and colonialism (Said, 1978). Dependent upon this relationship of conflict for its identity, it may be argued then that terrorism is necessary to the values and interests of the West.

There is no determinate, essential significance of terrorism; but through the complex interplay of the struggle over meaning of difference it becomes identifiable through its relationship to the West. The West is, at least in part, dependent upon the construction of terrorism for its identity. Enabled through an antagonistic relationship and re-presented as a 'corruption' of society, discourses of

terrorism function to give form to the West as a 'whole' and 'model' society for a global economy. If it were possible to imagine for a moment that the West was not in conflict with the East, would this mean an economically unified, terrorism free global society had been achieved? Would this enable possibilities for an ethical relationship with the 'other'? Or would the impossibility of unification through the necessary fragmentation of difference require an inward turn for the establishment of new relational boundaries of exclusion? In the logic of the West (Said, 1978) are there possibilities for global unification if a 'fullness' of identity is contingent upon conflict for the creation of boundaries of meaningful difference, as boarders which define and divide?

Where meaning is located in the relational spaces, the boundaries, there is also an overflow of meaning. For Laclau and Mouffe (1985) the surplus of meaning produces boundaries that are infinitely open. Through a contest over the authority of meaning difference is enabled, but the spaces at the boundaries of difference are undecidable. In a relationship of undecidability where meaning is dependent upon the 'other', terrorism can be understood as a 'between' space, a site of tension where meaning is contingent and contested, a political no-man's land where there is no essential difference, only relationships of antagonism in a field of discursivity. And it is here that my resistance to the lived material effects of being located in an essential position as 'terrorist other' that I engage Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) theory of discourse to analyse the 'truth' of 'reality' that is produced through political discourse.

Method

Accepting the assumption that 'reality' is a discursively produced contingency (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985), in as much as terrorism is 'knowable' I take as my starting point that it is 'knowable' through an analysis of discourse and an understanding that discourse is both a product and producer of social power relationships.

Seeking to make explicit the presence of hegemony, and discern how hegemony is implicated in the production of terrorism as a form of social control, this thesis takes 'text' as its object of study. As an articulatory practice (in as much as it is the production of text) media representations of political text is interrogated as a technology of hegemonic practices and processes. Locating media as a site of hegemonic struggle, analysis is concerned with dominant and alternative discourses of terrorism in political re-presentations, as well as relationships of antagonism that produce and maintain ideological domination. In this way textual analysis enables an analysis of the relationships between political and hegemonic discourse in the practices of 'othering' and possibilities for ethical responses.

Predicated on a political practice that may enable spaces for an authentic encounter with the 'other' (Said, 1994) the texts for analysis were chosen as particular articulations of political discourses that effect our lived material realities. Representing contestation over the undecidability of meaning at global and local

levels of the antagonistic relationship between the 'self' and 'other' each challenges and contributes to the construction of terrorism differently.

The first text is George Bush's (2001) presidential address following 9/11. Marking the boundaries between the global and local, and 'self' and 'other', this text represents a dominant discourse of terrorism that gives voice to particular assumptions of how the US envisages global relations through discourses of capitalism and military power. At the local level, discourse is dominated by Pākehā values and interests (Abel, 1997, 2008; Barclay & Liu, 2003; Nairn, Pega, McCreanor, Rankine, & Barnes, 2006; Phelan, 2009; Phelan & Shearer, 2009; Rankine, et al., 2007) that construct the political relationship between 'self' and 'other' as a conflict over the meaning of nationalism. As such, texts by Don Brash and Michael Laws were taken up as re-presentations of how the social is constituted through a dominating cultural frame of the 'one' that seeks to have authority over the 'other'. Resonating with the political position taken up by Bush, both reject ethical responses to the call of the 'other' by reiterating hegemonic discourses that attempt to fix meaning through exclusionary practices grounded upon an ideology of unity through nationalism. If a space is to be opened in which authentic encounters are possible, it becomes necessary to analyse how such political texts contribute to the social divisions that make it possible for terrorism to emerge as a form of social control of the 'other' of whom it speaks.

In contrast to the discourses represented in the other texts, which may also be understood as examples of activism, the next text comes from Valerie Morse (2008) who, as one of those arrested during October 15, took up a position as an anarchist to challenge the hegemony of political discourse. I have included the text by Morse who, in a position of an 'expert' through the experience of being produced as a 'terrorist', writes through a relationship of difference in relation to the dominant position of the 'face of terrorism'.

Viewing texts as fragments of hegemonic political construction enables an analysis of how the social is constituted in and through discourses (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Phelan, 2009). Representing the operation of social power relations, systems of knowledge about how the social can be understood, texts function as technologies for transmitting discourse that is neither neutral nor objective. As a productive site of hegemonic conflict, including the knowledge production that is a technology of the ideology of the state, these texts also enact the particular ideology of any given 'event'.

As a theory for analysing the discursive constructions surrounding terrorism, Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) critical discourse analysis locates the centrality of conflict in the production of meanings. As such, this thesis assumes texts re-present "fragments of the conflict's hegemonic political construction, rather than ... specific texts" (Phelan, p. 224). Media as a technology of power is implicated in the production and re-production of discourse that serve to 'other' alternative social

identities. As an ideological apparatus, media re-produces hegemonic antagonisms. Taking public textual media, such as newspaper articles, speeches, and legislation, as sites where terrorism is constructed in an antagonistic relationship this thesis analyses the moral trajectory that is produced in the movement from a global to a local production of terrorism. It also analyses how the hegemonic constitution of terrorism produces social positions that simultaneously limit agency and possibilities for social participation, by maintaining a focus on the construction of political identities through antagonisms that function to sustain and reify particular ideological assumptions.

This thesis then asks, how do fragments of text produce and re-produce an antagonistic system of knowledge that reifies the superiority of the 'one' to have authority over the construction of the meaning of the difference of 'other'? Understanding terrorism as an empty signifier, this thesis seeks to locate its significance (its ability to fill with meaning) in social practices and attach its meaning in relation to a particular discourse as they simultaneously constitute a particular 'other', in this case, the 'face of terrorism'. If floating signifiers are made meaningful through difference and the effect in discourses of terrorism is to exaggerate and emphasise difference among people, then this analysis seeks to understand how hegemonic power is dependent upon the difference attached to and enabled through meanings of terrorism.

Chapter 4 – Analysis

> *Some speak of an age of terror. I know there are struggles ahead, and dangers to face. But this country will define our times, not be defined by them. As long as the United States of America is determined and strong, this will not be an age of terror; this will be an age of liberty, here and across the world (Bush, 2001).*

One of the more dominant narratives of terrorism was articulated by the Bush administration following the events of September 11 (Bush, 2001). Embedded within a history of hegemonic discourses, including assumptions of peace through an ideological system of global trade through a capitalist economy, the political narrative of the event re-configured boundaries and marked out new antagonistic relationships of allegiance and conflict. Calling on an alliance "awakened to danger and called to defend freedom" (Bush, 2001), the promise "an age of liberty" made space for traditional friends and foes to put aside differences and join together as a global coalition that may be termed 'freedom fighters'. Committed to preventing "an age of terror", the coalition declared a metaphorical war and began the long process of targeting and eradicating "hostile regime[s]" (Bush, 2001) that were constructed as a threat to the interests of the new political alliance. Terrorised and tortured, for some, 'life in a war zone' meant 'life as normal' had ended, but for

others, 'life as normal' continued as usual – 'freedom' had long been 'at war with fear'.

Broadly defined as 'systems of structured totalities of difference' (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985), discourse may be understood as sets of relational totalities that result from, and are contingent upon the social practices through which they are produced. Locating the narrative beginnings of the conflict in a hegemonic struggle that seeks a moral endpoint – the end of systematic terrorisation and the beginning of an 'age of liberty' – analysis situates discourses of terrorism as necessary fragments of an ongoing hegemonic process that extends beyond 'here and now'. Through a discursive transformation of equivalences (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985) the US shifted the interests of the local to the global, and through hegemonic domination over discourses of capitalism and the potential for peace through liberation, this shift to the global realised material effects on the local.

Constructing conflict in an age of terror

Resonating with the ideological coherence of imperialism, discourses of terrorism don't merely describe 'life' but constitute 'life' in particular ways.

> *...enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country ... These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life ... This is not, however, just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is*

> *the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom* (Bush, 2001).

Displacing alternative articulations, produced through a set of culturally available signifiers a previously ambiguous "way of life" is rendered meaningful as a preferred and threatened form of social structure. Through a metaphor of "progress" that depends on notions of "freedom", "tolerance" and "pluralism" as elements in the constitutive logic of "civilisation" the 'reality' of 'life' in the US was discursively re-produced as 'civilised'. Taking up a privileged position that is situated within a history of hegemonic discourses that construct "civilisation" as the ideological endpoint of 'evolution', the US exercised their authority to construct a 'global civilisation' threatened by terrorism. Positioning 'civilisation' as a discursive centre structured meaning in such a way that 'civilisation' represented global unity; ideologically incompatible with notions of 'freedom' and 'tolerance', this shift located the source of terror external to itself.

Dislodging boundaries that would otherwise confine the problem within the geographical borders of North America, discourses of civilisation enabled the creation of an ideological affiliation among nations. Produced as a 'unifying' principle of the West, the effect was the construction of a worldwide relationship of antagonism that meant 'other' (uncivilised) 'ways of life', were necessarily positioned as lacking what are assumed to be universal signifiers of 'cultural progression'; the exclusion of the 'cultural other'.

> *They hate our freedoms -- our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other ...We are in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them ... our mission and our moment ... The advance of human freedom -- the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of every time -- now depends on us (Bush, 2001).*

Resistance to the global hegemony of the West was realised through political discourse as an ideological 'hatred of freedom'. What is at stake is not just "*a* way of life" but *our* way of life. In the 'fight' for power over ideological freedoms, a moral responsibility to defend 'our principles' constitutes 'civilisation' as the foundation of a 'unified' identity. Presupposing universality, 'we' presumably share an identity, principles, responsibilities, and a moral trajectory that is also seemingly inclusive of disagreement. However, framed by the principle of "freedom", 'we' is also constructed as a social identity ascribed with the characteristics of 'choice'; available only to agents who 'choose' to take up a particular identity that adheres to the 'rules' of civilisation. While the principle of freedom may include the potential for resistance, those subjects who take up a position that resist the hegemony of the West are produced as the 'terrorist-enemy', excluding the possibility of resistance that ideology of 'freedom' sought to enable.

Attributing political identities to individual 'choice' has the effect of a partial hegemonic closure that conceals the discursive structuring of social relations that limit agency. Where the West has authority over meaning, the moral trajectory of

'the mission' constructs a privileged position in the social power relations that enables a location of blame; it requires consent to relinquish "freedom" that is not responsive to the aims of democracy. In this context, the "freedom" to take up an identity is limited by hegemonic discourse.

> *Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them ...Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists (Bush, 2001).*

Exercising the power to shift the boundaries between 'us' and 'them' the effect of "either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists" produces a moral trajectory that extends beyond the confines of global and local identities; forcing identification with one position and dis-identification with the other. Every social relation becomes marked by ideological discourses opposed to threat of terrorism.

Nationalism and conflict between governance and sovereignty

The hegemonic struggle for authority over the meaning of democratic freedoms is not a conflict unique to the problem of terrorism. It may be argued that it is precisely because of an ongoing struggle for authority over meaning that it has become possible to produce terrorism as an object of discourse.

> *Terror, unanswered, can not only bring down buildings, it can threaten the stability of legitimate governments. And you know what -- we're not going to*

> *allow it ... the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it... (Bush, 2001).*

Through discourses that mark civilisation as the endpoint of a 'progressive' movement, 'civilised' governments are meaningfully identified as 'stable' (unchanging) and legitimate, while 'other' forms of government are constituted as 'unstable' (uncivilised and temporary) and illegitimate. In the construction of an antagonistic relationship between 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' governments the 'fixing' of meaning (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985) through the notion of 'stability' enables a justification for the spread of civilisation and the imposition of authority over the 'other', and produces non-legitimate governments and peoples as a threat to global stability. Such a threat to stability is constituted as terrorism.

In a political speech that resonates with the conflict over the legitimacy and stability of political identities, Don Brash (2004) produced a set of cultural signifiers into a discourse of 'nationalism' that functioned as an ideological framework for structuring social power relations between government and citizens. Ruptured by 'racial division', the struggle for authority over a 'civilised' state-affiliated identity was made in response to social inequalities that were constructed as 'privileging Māori interests' at the expense of "traditional kiwi values" (Brash, 2004). Producing an antagonistic relationship between a (legitimate and singular) democratic society and a divided nation Brash reproduced the historical antagonism between governance and sovereignty through discourses of racialised division.

> *Is it to be a modern democratic society, embodying the essential notion of one rule for all in a single nation state? Or is it the racially divided nation, with two sets of laws, and two standards of citizenship ...? (Brash, 2004).*

Identifying Te Tiriti o Waitangi (The Treaty of Waitangi) as a foundational document for the establishment and structuring of a unified 'national' identity, as well as source for 'separatism', Brash attempted to reconcile contradictions in 'standards' of citizenship by challenging the authenticity of a legitimate social position for Māori as a cultural and ethnic identity.

> *Although there is, of course, a highly distinctive Maori culture, which many people see as central to their identity ... Our definition of ethnicity is now a matter of subjective self-definition: if you are part Maori and want to identify as Maori you can do so. The Maori ethnic group is a very loose one. There has always been considerable intermarriage between Maori and Pakeha. Anthropologists tell us that by 1900 there were no full-blooded Maori left in the South Island. By 2000, the same was true of the North Island. Today, nearly 70% of 24 to 34 year old New Zealanders who identify as Maori are married to someone who does not ... Many people feel it is somehow impolite to mention these facts. But by ignoring them we create an oppositional picture of race relations in this country, and we overlook the many powerful forces that can promote social cohesion.... There is plenty of evidence that most New Zealanders are happy to see New Zealand develop in this way. In spite of the heightened rhetoric from the publicists of ethnic difference, most people treat their ethnic allegiances fluidly. For many people, aspects other*

> *than their ethnicity matter much more to them – their religion, their profession, their sports club, their gender, and their political allegiance (Brash, 2004).*

Arguing that cultural identity is subjective challenges its status as 'real' and questions the legitimacy of those who are oppositional to the promotion of social cohesion. Drawing on the ideology of unity, Pākehā[14] is assumed to be an authentic social position whose identity does not need qualifying; 'we' are New Zealander's. The authenticity of Māori is presented as a 'loose' and non-cohesive cultural identity in need of some sort of authentication to 'fix' its relational legitimacy. Drawing on markers of 'racial' difference, Māori is constructed as a 'permissible' culture to take up ('if you want to'), and is simultaneously delegitmated through lack of authenticity where 'blood-quantum'[15] is produced as evidence or an "impolite" scientific fact of ethnic legitimacy. This authority to speak for the 'other' through such a 'lack' produces Māori cultural identity as both an important 'artefact' (culture), and inauthentic (ethnicity) as a 'real' political identity. The claim to the authority over the constitution of 'nationalism' is produced through the social power relationships that subjugate the authority over the meaning of cultural

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[14] Pākehā is a Māori term which is often used as a general reference to non-Māori people, although in many contexts it is used specifically as a reference to white colonial settlers from Britain and Europe and their descendents. More recently, Pākehā has also been transformed into a form of ethnicity and culture that locates its heritage within Aotearoa New Zealand and recognises its identity as being constituted in relation to Māori (Bell, 2007). In the context of this thesis however, Pākehā is often used in reference to a particular social position that has traditionally been privileged in discourses of nationalism.

[15] The use of blood-quantum as a legitimate measurement of identity has been actively rejected by many as a form of blatant racism that depends upon scientifically unfounded assumptions of biological determination. See for example, Smedley and Smedley (2005) and Tate and Audette (2001).

identity for the 'other', in all its "fluidity". At the same time, claims to nationalism depend on the relationship with the 'other' through including access to the 'one' through the very 'lack' of cultural legitimacy; it is in this relationship that nationalism, and Pākehā are meaningfully constituted.

The discursive constitution of a national political identity produced through the Orewa speech has been applauded as giving "badly needed" expression to "Pākehā frustration" (Phelan & Shearer, 2009, p. 2) and criticised for producing an antagonistic conflict between Māori and non-Māori at a local level (ibid). It has enabled the articulation of an ongoing "unease" in the relationship between the 'one' and the 'other' that positions Māori as the object of 'frustration'.

> *Brash's Orewa speech and consequent commentary are welcome. They express an unease within the non-Maori community that has been festering for years (Laws, 2004).*

Where Māori are positioned as having produced a political identity that is oppositional to the promotion of social cohesion within the non-Māori 'community' they are also positioned as responsible for, not only entitled to rights, under the obligations of citizenship.

> *Finally, we ask Maori to take some responsibility themselves for what is happening in their own communities. Citizenship brings obligations as well as*

> *rights... Like everybody else, Maori must build their own future with their own hands (Brash, 2004).*

The authority of 'we' to produce the meaning of citizenship also reproduced the authority to produce *the problem* and the responsibility as belonging to Māori. And under the obligations of citizenship, the responsibility that 'they' need to take is to be the 'same' as the 'we'. In an attempt to authorise the meaning of the obligations of citizenship, "to arrest the flow of differences" (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. 112), discourses of nationalism construct a Pākehā centre that is held in place through social power relations of domination and subordination that are contingent on Pākehā privilege to name the boundaries of authentic cultural identity.

Where the responsibility for citizenship includes Māori taking responsibility for those who produce the 'unease' is understood as a requirement to suppress dissidence, it also positions Māori in the global field of discursivity of terrorism; as 'terrorist sympathisers' or 'enablers'.

> *The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics -- a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam", "Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. This group and its leader -- a person named Osama bin Laden -- are linked to many other organizations in*

> *different countries, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (Bush, 2001).*

Producing Muslim people's as responsible for the radical practices of extremism, where Islam represents the source of terrorism, enables blame to be located with the cultural specificity of living as Muslim. In much the same way as this it became the obligation of Muslim people and nations around the world to act against the threat of an expansion of terrorism, similar demands of Māori also function to lay blame and prompt social action. In the global field of discursivity of terrorism, and engaged at a local level where Pākehā have the authority to name the boundaries, a Māori cultural identity requires an ideological commitment to nationalism to access the privilege of authentic social participation.

The obligation to citizenship excludes the 'freedom' of resistance where resistance breaches the boundaries of national identity through claims to an authentic (excessive) ethnicity.

> *The Maori Party has become an apologist for the excesses of its ethnicity. Rather than accept that there are problems within wider Maori society and that they are self-perpetuating the Maori Party way is to excuse and equivocate. To shift any blame. They have become appeasers of infamy. This is primarily due to the philosophy espoused by Harawira that whanau is whanau and that all Maori are whanau. Including child abusers, the murderers and rapists, recidivist crims and gang members. Any normal*

> *society would cut such recalcitrants [sic] adrift and regard them as aberrant ... The belief that whanau know best. Has it made any difference? Has it uplifted Maori? Improved Maori health? Has it arrested the swelling underclass? (Laws, 2009a)*

Where terrorism is understood as a threat to global stability, the cultural specificity of living as Māori also signifies a threat to national stability. Constituting the 'threat' through Māori excess enables the construction of chains of equivalence (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985) whereby an excess of ethnicity stands in for the embodiment of an ideological relation with sameness and simultaneously produces difference that disrupts the hegemony of nationalism. Difference, marked as excess, produces a problem signified by Māori; a racially constituted "underclass" of antisocial "recalcitrants" lacking in the restraints of citizenship. Through this discursive formation, where a surplus of meaning is also its deficit, Māori are inscribed as the source of 'threat' to nationalism.

Protecting sovereignty and suppressing dissent

Protecting sovereignty and suppressing dissent may be understood a dynamic relationship that simultaneously produces and resists notions of difference in an ongoing political conflict between governance and sovereignty. Signifying a struggle for authentication, sovereignty and dissent are dependent on each other for their meaning. Dissent marks the boundary in an antagonistic relationship between sovereignty and governance, producing a site of conflict.

Historically constructed as a threat to the authority of the Crown and the establishment of a 'unified nation', positioning Māori as a problem to be 'fixed' in political discourse is not a new practice. As early as the mid 1800s for example, colonial newspaper articles represented the 'Māori problem' as a form of 'terrorism'[16] that threatened both settlers and the Crown. Following the signing of te Tiriti for instance, the Crown claimed authority over the land (officially naming it New Zealand), and through social power relations that depended on the necessary 'civilisation' of the people, set about structuring the social in the image of Britain. Imposing a social hierarchy modelled on the British 'class system', colonisers inscribed Māori with stereotypical notions of 'other'; sometimes exoticised as 'noble savage', while at other times depicted as threatening and offensive. The overarching effect was the re-production of a set of social power relations that classified Māori and Māori ways of being into a subordinate position in relation to imperial and colonialist aspirations.

[16] An internet search of New Zealand newspaper archives revealed many reports of terrorism. At a time when international newspapers were reporting terrorism in relation to Russia, Irish resistance and Trade Union movements, many New Zealand reports focused on 'Māori terrorism', constructed among other things as resistance to the Queens authority and land confiscation, Māori cultural practices, such as those of tohunga, and also between Māori. Interestingly terrorism was also reported positively in relation to Crown activities, for example advocating that the Constabulary dispel the problem of Te Whiti and Māori resistance by a return to "the old system of harassment and terrorism". However, the contradiction over the meaning of terrorism created uncertainty as expressed through a call to Crown to move away from "military terrorism", or in other instances, attempts to clarify meaning by stating explicitly that Crown policies in relation to Māori were "not terrorism" (cf Anon, 1871; The escaped Maoris: to the editor of the Daily Southern Cross," 1864; Terrorism by Tohunga: an "utter fraud"," 1912; The Tohunga: Maori and European legislative council debate," 1907; Untitled," 1868; Untitled," 1869; Untitled," 1881; VI. The consequences," 1861).

The Crown introduced the Westminster legal system into the governance of the social structure, reproducing imperialist class and race boundaries over its citizens. The implementation of colonial authority over the meaning of land ownership[17] enacted through colonialist legal discourse and control on the 'body' of Māori and understandings of their relationships with the land. Through the institution of 'law' it became possible for the Crown to 'legally' acquire land[18] and the power to suppress resistance. Through what were to become known as the "land wars", where Māori actively sought to protect their sovereignty through enacting dissent, the Crown responded by drawing on the culturally specific authority of the Westminster system to pass a governmental act that legislated Māori dissent as a crime of rebellion. It was through the power exercised by the Crown to pass the Suppression of Rebellion Act (1963) that it became possible to 'legally' suppress actual or perceived Māori resistance.

Excluding Māori from equivalent 'legal' avenues to challenge Crown assumptions of land ownership had the effect of positioning Māori into one of two categories – passive co-operators or criminal dissidents. A particular moment in the history of Parihaka can be understood as a violent contest over the meaning of the boundaries between these political categories. Led by Te Whiti o Rongomai and Tohu Kakahi, Parihaka was a self-sufficient, productive Māori community resting

[17] Through the power of Westminster law in 1862 the Crown created the Native Lands Act. Imposing individual ownership as the legal standard, the Act subordinated Māori practices that privileged collective aspirations and effectively served as a means for separating Māori from their land.

[18] The New Zealand Settlements Act 1863 allowed for 'legal' confiscation of land held by iwi considered to be "in rebellion against the Crown".

upon 800,000 hectares of land the Crown intended to acquire. Embedded in a philosophy of passive resistance, Te Whiti[19] and his people enacted the protection of sovereignty through a strategic act of anarchism against attempted confiscations of land. Against peaceful dissent on the part of Māori protesters, the Crown sent in 1589 Armed Constabularies[20] to destroy the community, including homes, crops, personal property, and lives. Effectively a 'civilising mission' the task of the constabulary was not to simply destroy communities but to reconcile Māori to Pākehā rule by setting an example that would discourage further dissent and encourage the development of a largely self-disciplining society in the name of the 'one' (Hill, 2008).

In an armed attack (perhaps an act of war? terrorism?) against 2200 unarmed and passive 'rebels' many deaths resulted, and led to 636 of Te Whiti's people being arrested and imprisoned in jails in Taranaki and Wellington (Consedine & Consedine, 2001; Sole, 2005; Walker, 2004). Without the power to incarcerate passive resistance to take land for colonial purposes, through discourses that called for 'extreme urgency' to 'a threat to peace' the colonialists enacted the Māori Prisoners Trial Act (1879) in response to such threat. Suspending *habeas corpus*

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[19] Preceding Gandhi by two generations, in 2003 Te Whiti's legacy of passive resistance was acknowledged by an international delegation, including Martin Luther King Jnr, Mahatma Gandhi, and Daisaku Ikeda who recognised Parihaka leaders for their foundational work and sacrifice as fathers of non-violent action (see http://www.parihaka.com/About.aspx); the passive resistance of Te Whiti and his people is recognised and celebrated among iwi and many non-Māori at the annual international peace festival held at Parihaka.

[20] Hill (2008) argues that developing from an historical role as a militarised "instrument of the Crown" whose job was to impose imperial will and colonial practices, contemporary police (both civil and military wings) have taken up the 'civilising mission' of armed constabularies and function as agents of social power that are attributed the task of reconciling citizens to state rule.

(the right to individual freedom against arbitrary state action), a right guaranteed in te Tiriti, this act produced a legal authority that enabled prisoners to be held indefinitely without trial (Consedine & Consedine, 2001; Walker, 2004). Sentenced to hard labour most dissidents were dislocated from their land[21] and shipped to the South Island; where some died from being "locked in caves in Dunedin after work in the belief that they would die of the cold" (Consedine & Consedine, 2001, p. 97). Enacting violence against the 'other' excluded the possibility for an ethical relationship with the 'other' and maintained a social power relationship of domination over the 'other' through the threat of 'torture' (acting on the body of dissent) for future (non-violent) resistance, resonating with contemporary articulatory practices (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985) of terrorism.

Through this discursive formation, the historically contingent chains of equivalence produce terrorism at a site of racial deficit where the deficit represents criminality as a form of terrorism. Depending on history of the superiority of the 'self' as civilised produces knowledge of the 'other' as 'primitive' (Said, 1978), and Māori as 'other' are produced as criminal; the meaning of the 'threat' of violence against citizens is authorised.

> *Wanganui Mayor Michael Laws today slammed the reported comments of Maori Party co-leader Pita Sharples on supporting gangs to combat youth*

[21] In conjunction with the Peace Preservation Bill 1879 and the 1880 West Coast Settlement Act, among others, the Crown forcibly removed Māori from their land and used them as labourers in a prisoner (slave?) workforce. Crimes and sentences included one year of hard labour for refusing to leave their abodes and two years hard labour for attempting to build anything.

> *violence as "yet more liberal appeasement of crims and cons"... "Dr Sharples' remarks are ill-founded, illogical and smack of appeasing crime and criminals. Gangs are petty terrorists and just because the majority may be brown does not excuse their illegal and violent methods" (Laws, 2008).*

In the contest over the meaning of the 'Māori problem', the authority to produce terrorism is in conflict with the knowledge of the voice of the 'other'; where the voice of the other is reduced to 'appeasement'. Knowing the 'other' as criminal dissidents both depends on the legitimacy of Māori cultural identity and the racial deficit that produces difference that disrupts the ideological relation of sameness, reproducing Māori in the 'same' old place, as terrorist.

Bearing traces of these hegemonic practices, the New Zealand Government passed the Foreshore and Seabed Act (2004). Following a number of failed applications by the iwi of Te Tau Ihu to engage in mussel farming[22] and the subsequent Court of Appeal ruling[23] that affirmed Māori rights to claim customary ownership of land (McMeeking, 2009), the government response was to enact the Act to effectively extinguish Māori entitlement and put control of the land into the hands of the Crown (Bargh, 2008; McMeeking, 2009). Under the power of Crown ownership, the Act was constructed as both a 'confirmation' of that ownership (McMeeking, 2009)

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[22] Despite protesting the rejection of applications for marine farming, 'during this same period numerous non-Māori organisations were granted licenses to conduct similar activities' (McMeeking, 2009).

[23] See Ngati Apa v Attorney-General [2003] 3 New Zealand Law Reports 643

and as legal protection[24] necessary for 'peace', 'national-security' and 'enforcement of 'one' law for all' (Bargh, 2008). Exercising the power of governance, the Act functioned to constitute social power relations that simultaneously denied sovereignty and sanctioned nationalism in name of the Crown.

Dominated by ideological assumptions of 'oneness', the media, as a site of hegemonic struggle, produced representations of political discourse at the site of the foreshore and seabed conflict that constituted and maintained privileged Pākeha understandings (Phelan & Shearer, 2009) dependent on discourses of nationalism that constituted a social power relationship of 'one people, one nation'. The representation of the social 'right' to 'beaches'[25] positioned the conflict in opposition to a 'kiwi identity' (Johansson, 2004). Through a relationship of antagonism where the meaning of 'ownership' was contested, the hegemonic struggle for democratic freedoms is challenged through constructing a 'fear' of destabilising nationalism through preventing 'public access to beaches'. Where 'ownership' was produced through a claim to sovereignty, the contest became an 'act of war' against nationalism, a discursive shift in meaning that enabled the formation of the possibility of a relationship that produced new political alliances, 'rupturing' the stability of the nation.

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[24] Assumed to be protected under the concept of the "Queen's Chain" (Storm, 2002)

[25] At the time of going to print the National Government came to an agreement with the Māori Party (in consultation with iwi leaders) to repeal the Foreshore and Seabed Act; though the specific details of the alternative arrangement are not without criticism and are yet to be formally constituted in 'law'. One criticism that has come from the Act party is that the agreement does not guarantee the 'protection' of 'some of New Zealand's famous beaches' (A. Young, 2010).

> *In contravention of international law and despite condemnation by the UN, the Government pressed ahead with the law, with near unanimous support in parliament. The following year the Treasury began to include a line-item in the annual financial accounts for these newly acquired Crown assets. This grotesque confiscation was considered a declaration of war by some Maori. It ruptured the Labor [sic] Party and brought about the formation of the Maori Party. This now presents a significant threat to Labor's [sic] hold on the Maori vote, and more importantly, to their hold on power (Morse, 2008).*

Connecting numerous points of political convergence and divergence over the meaning of nationalism enacted through ongoing state authority to confiscate assets, the response to the Foreshore and Seabed Act (2004) was immediate. At the time the Act was passed, twenty thousand people mobilised through the processes and practices of a hikoi[26] to protest against the Foreshore and Seabed Act. "Demonstrating the power of people to come together around an issue that is seen as vital [a vitality of life]" (Reynolds, 2004, p. 4) the hikoi signified a unifying ideology for dissent that generated a political movement that threatened a long history of hegemonic domination and political stability. Dissenting against what has been described as "a modern day land grab" (Douglas, 2010) by the Crown, the hikoi moved masses of people from iwi across the country to converge on the

[26] Coined by Tariana Turia, who resigned from her ministerial positions with the Labour party in protest of how the foreshore legislation removed customary Māori rights, the "hikoi to the ballot box" was the second major hikoi of Māori in recent history. The first was led by Dame Whina Cooper in 1975. Called "the land march", the original hikoi also protested against land theft by the Crown. Initiating a movement of the masses, the land march sought reparation and compensation for a history of successive governmental policies that stole Māori land (Reynolds, 2004, p. 3) and actively excluded the possibility of Māori 'right' to sovereignty.

grounds of parliament with the explicit intent of seeking a repeal of the foreshore legislation. Although most of the protesters were Māori, many non-Māori also participated in support of Māori rights to defend sovereignty and challenge 'ownership' of the land (Reynolds, 2004, p. 3), while also challenging the political ideologies that enable state control of its citizens[27] and constrain the 'freedom' to disagree.

Reminiscent of previous political injustices, hegemonic domination of systems of knowledge that protected the rights of the 'one', political discourse reproduced an ongoing 'fear' of the threat of 'Māori ownership' through Pākeha control over the meaning of 'ownership. In colonialist social power relationships 'ownership' produces the privilege of individual possession through recourse to legal processes and practices. Inscribing Māori relations with the land as having the same 'lawful' meaning as Pākehā understandings of 'ownership' produces the 'fear' of an imagined loss of access to beaches and resources through the transfer of ownership to the 'other'. If sovereignty is understood as a 'threat' to individual access to resources then passing 'ownership' to the 'other' becomes both understood as the loss of control of the 'one', and threatens the ideology of a unified 'kiwi' identity (Johansson, 2004). What is unacknowledged through dominant political discourse

[27] Non-Māori support for Māori protest can also be historically located: Innes' (2008) discussion of the state restricting Māori possession of guns argues that alliances through dissent have been a part of the history of Aotearoa New Zealand since colonisation began. Questioning what was meant by the right of citizens to bear arms in defence and the exclusion of this right for Māori not aligned with the government, many settlers supported the 'equal' right that "Māori should be allowed exactly the same rights as settlers" (p. 75). Despite a contest over 'equal rights' Innes argues it was the dominant view that excluded Māori that found its way into government policy.

is the already privatised and economic gains enabled before the Foreshore and Seabed Act (2004), and how once in effect, the Act enabled the issuing of licenses for oil and gold mining (Bargh, 2008). Political resistance to the hikoi and Māori sovereignty may be understood as a response to the 'threat' of the stability of ideological assumptions that privilege privatisation (and possibilities for personal gain). Consistent with the economic rationalism produced through political representations of the 'twin towers', it is a loss of the privileges enabled through social power relations of domination and subordination that benefit those that conform to the 'national' identity of 'one' that made it possible for a "new" law to be generated to counter the potential loss.

Resistance to the power of the state, and with the common aim of repealing the Foreshore and Seabed Act (2004), saw multiple and diverse alliances between anarchists and environmentalists, activists and dissidents come together in protest. The social practice of hikoi constituted new arrangements of social relations that blurred the boundaries between 'one' and 'other' enabled a singular understanding of the meaning of the Act to become contested.

In a movement to destabilise the unity of nationhood, an outcome of the hikoi was a powerful call in support of the establishment of the Māori Party – "armed" with a mandate to repeal the Foreshore and Seabed Act (2004). Supported by a diverse arrangement of dissenters each with their own interest in the necessity to repeal the Act, the Māori Party signified a defining moment through a radical shift in the

discursive constitution of the political identity of the 'other', producing a particular difference with the potential to disrupt the hegemony in the chain of equivalences of nationalism.

Breaking traditional political ties between Māori and the New Zealand Labour Party, the ability of dissenters to gain status as a 'legitimate' political entity marked a shift in social relations that changed the governmental political landscape. As a powerful and unified oppositional force, the effect of the formation of new alliances through dissent to nationalism was to disrupt the taken-for-granted allegiances necessary for political stability and undermine the operation of hegemonic power that are dependent on sameness and the excesses of difference. Where political dissent is constituted as a potential threat to 'nationhood', the response from the government may be understood as an attempt to destabilise the unification of the 'other' through realising discourses of 'radicalism' as a 'threat' to stability. The enactment of the Terrorism Suppression Act (2002) against such a threat to stability constitutes the 'danger' of radical Māori as terrorism.

> *Politically, [the dissent emerging from resistance to the Foreshore and Seabed Act] is one of the primary factors behind the raids. In the lead up to the 2008 election, it is crucial that Labour cast radical Maori as a dangerous threat to the stability of New Zealand (Morse, 2008).*

In a history of a responses to the call of the 'other', this response enabled the construction of equivalences that re-produced Māori sovereignty and dissent as a

problem that threatened the stability and security of New Zealand requiring the 'force' of the state to act on the 'body' of rebellion. Through the process and practices of constitutional power the Terrorism Suppression Act (2002) opened a space that made it possible to produce a threat of terrorism and re-produce Māori as terrorists, locating 'them' as a threat to social power relations. In this history of domination and subordination the social body is produced as political, able to be regulated and exercised through disciplinary power and control (Foucault, 1982; 1998a).

> *On October 15 2007, the New Zealand police carried out unprecedented nation-wide raids arresting 17 indigenous rights activists and anarchists and raiding some 60 different locations. The arrests were based on surveillance and interception warrants obtained under the Terrorism Suppression Act. This was the first time that the police used this Act, a law passed immediately after 9/11 and a direct result of it (Morse, 2008).*

The mobilisation of 'the people' to undermine the operation of hegemonic power that excluded Māori authority over the meaning of the right to sovereignty continued to be understood by government as a threat to national stability, and enactment of the Terrorism Suppression Act (2002) clearly positioned dissenters as the 'faces of terrorism' whilst also positioning the state as a 'preserver of life'. Dependent upon the idea of an external threat to 'life' and the necessity to protect citizens, this form of disciplinary power made it possible to produce 'terrorism' as a legally defined exemplar of extreme difference through the Act. Embedded within

the history of producing terrorism as a process of social control, the enactment of state legislation onto bodies has shaped social power relationships and brought terrorism into the 'real' (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). Shifting terrorism from the realm of the intangible to the tangible, once written into law the Act marked particular bodies as potential embodiments of terrorism. While the bodies marked as terrorist masquerade as 'faceless', in as much as terrorism does not necessarily correspond to any particular person or group, the form of the terrorist body is dependent upon what 'good citizenship' is not. Where 'radical' Māori are constituted as dissenters, a threat to national stability, 'they' come to represent the 'face of terror'.

Constructing an ideology for dissent as equivalent to terrorism the contest between governance and sovereignty produced a site of terrorism, and the enactment of the Act targeted the specific body connected with indigenous rights to nationhood. As a site of hegemonic power the media account of the state response to terrorism tended to report the October 15 raids at Ruātoki with a focus on the arrests of "the iconic face of primeval Māori activism, Tame Iti" (Keenan, 2008b, p. 129).

Charged with enforcing the direct control over bodies of dissent the police were mandated to enact the law and take control of what is now understood as a violation of 'order and regulation' (Hill, 2008), resonating with the terrorisation effects on communities that breach the 'norms' of acceptable political protest (Keenan, 2008b). Seeking to stop the momentum of dissent, October 15

demonstrated the ongoing power of the state to control and monitor the movement of particular citizens through the power invested in police. And how the raids were implemented clearly marked particular bodies as 'terrorist' bodies as more or less dangerous through the use of strategies that may be akin to 'torture'.

> *In a spectacular display of force, armed, balaclava-clad police known as the 'armed offenders squad' quite literally invaded the small Tuhoe town of Ruatoki [sic] and blockaded the entire community ... In the process of conducting house raids, they severely traumatized many people, including locking a woman and five children in a shed for six hours while the man of the family was questioned ... In one South Auckland raid, the police held an entire family, including a 12 year old girl, on their knees with hands behind their heads for some 5 hours[28], asking the young woman if she was a terrorist. This was the pattern for raids in the Maori communities. For the non-indigenous arrestees ... the situation was starkly different. In my case, I was not even handcuffed as I was walked to the car. No white neighborhoods [sic] were blockaded, nor were white bystanders stopped and photographed as they went about their daily business that cool Monday morning in October. It was only Maori (Morse, 2008).*

[28] Resonating with images of 'detainees' in orange jumpsuits kneeling in an outdoor pen at the US military base in Guantanamo Bay, the use of torture upon the bodies of suspected 'terrorists' has become particularly contentious since the US decision to exempt itself from abiding by the guaranteed protection of human rights as agreed by international bodies (including the US) and documented in the Geneva Convention. Through the US assertion of 'non-citizenship' (or a suspension of citizenship) and a further claim that 'the global war on terrorism' is metaphorical (i.e. that it is not an officially declared a war) 'detainees' have not received recognition as either 'citizens' or 'soldiers' and marked as "unlawful combatants" have been refused the rights and protections offered by the Geneva Convention – both human rights protections as 'prisoners' and protections entitled by the status of 'prisoners of war' (Buzan, 2006; Churchill, 2006; Denike; Fabiano, 2006; Foot, 2007; Medovoi, 2007; Spivak, 2004).

That the 'stark difference' in 'patterns' between communities was conspicuously absent from reports of October 15 may be understood as racially specific social power relationships where 'white' suspects didn't 'fit' discourses that articulated the 'face of terrorism'. Through a cultural bias that inscribes 'whiteness' with certain privileges, what was present in the political discourse was a hegemonic preference to focus on the cultural specificities of the 'other'. In what has been termed as "credulous" media accounts of October 15 it is Māori dissenters in particular, and the Tūhoe nation specifically, who are constituted as most threatening (Keenan, 2008b, p. 131).

> *We were deemed a threat to 'national security' ... Of the 17 arrested on 15 October, 12 were Maori, many from the Tūhoe iwi (tribe). Tūhoe is known for its long history of resistance to colonization. They never signed the Treaty of Waitangi ... (Morse, 2008).*

While the logic of October 15 appeared to be 'neutral' the differences in the strategies in the implementation of the Act clearly located the 'terrorist face' with characteristics particular to Māori, and localised at the site of Tūhoe rebellion specifically. Necessitating an engagement with 'whiteness' as a discursive force that legitimates the cultural space of the West, Tūhoe resistance to signing the treaty represents a direct challenge to the cultural authority through which the Crown derives its legitimacy, on the boundary of the contest between governance and sovereignty. Exercised epistemologically, 'whiteness' enabled ongoing

practices of racism to produce terrorism, and the emergence of 'face' into 'race', enabled terrorism to be known, and it is unmistakably racialised (Said, 1986).

The authority over 'national' cultural space enabled claims to indigenous sovereignty to be understood as political dissent. Constituted as violating social power relations and constructed as a particularly dangerous threat to 'nationhood' and 'national security' the institutional response to 'terrorism' obscured the 'real' fear; that of the 'other'. Through the use of its power over political dissent, the enactment of the legal response concealed 'whiteness' as a site of political unrest.

> *The institutional racism of the police and justice system came as no surprise to Maori people and particularly to Tuhoe who have been subject to its arbitrary acts for some 160 years. For pakeha throughout the country, it was a wake-up call. Unfortunately, it was less a wake-up call about racism than it was about the growing power of the state against political dissidents. I say it was unfortunate because it is clear from the nearly 10,000 pages of evidence I have now seen, that it is Maori sovereignty that they fear. It is the political force of unified indigeneity that scares the ruling class of New Zealand. For Maori in Aotearoa New Zealand, the 'war on terrorism' and these raids are part of a long history of colonization in Aotearoa New Zealand, and they have not been forgotten (Morse, 2008).*

Necessary to the preservation of a system of hegemony that privileges culturally specific systems of knowledge that embodies an ideological relation of sameness

also produces 'difference'. Where 'the other' is marked by difference, the institutionalisation of racism[29] may be understood as developing through a history of domination, imperialism and colonialism (Said, 1978). As an ideologically supported political force that functions as a socially sanctioned form of domination and subordination, racism in this sense does not necessarily rely on the state to maintain social power relations; it may also be enacted through the power to have authority over the meaning of 'events'.

Abel (2008) challenges assumptions of the 'neutrality' produced through meanings of dissent and argues that the turn toward state control over the rights to political protest decontextualised October 15 in ways that enabled Māori claims to sovereignty be inscribe with hegemonic understandings that are consistent with Pākehā cultural assumptions. Obscured in political representations that had as their centre "the fear of terrorism by 'many New Zealanders', and the fear of State force by local Māori" (Abel, 2008, p. 118), the fear of Māori 'unity' and sovereignty was reconfigured as a problem of increasing state power. Pushing the reality of racism and terrorisation targeted toward Māori to the margins of social importance and re-positioning it as part of a wider concern regarding the power of the state to suppress the democratic 'rights' of 'all' citizens to protest, simultaneously

[29] My use of the term 'racism' draws from the work of bell hooks who argues that racism may be understood as a cultural practice that is maintained through an ideology of white supremacy (cf hooks, 1994). Through this reading of racism I am able to make sense of how even those with 'white' skin, such as Morse, also become subjected to ethnocentrically racist policies that attempt to suppress dissent.

reproduced the historical conditions of racism that enable the ongoing construction of Māori 'activism' as threat to nationalism, and positioned Māori as an enemy.

Grounded in an antagonistic relationship between governance and sovereignty, the 'wake-up call' to the power of the State was partially achieved by masking racism through the arrest of Pākehā activists.

> *I was arrested, I believe, to provide a cloak for the racist nature of the operation. By arresting some pakeha activists, the government could deflect criticism that this was an operation against Maori. I was also arrested because I am associated with the Maori accused in the case, and because as an anarchist I have caused enough problems and embarrassments for the state that they would like to put me out of their misery (Morse, 2008).*

Through the positioning of non-Māori arrestees in alliance with Māori 'activists' particular forms of racism recognisable in the enactment of October 15 became understood as institutional racism where the power of the government was enacted through the police. Where it was recognisable that state intervention acted on the bodies of Māori had the unanticipated effect of generating 'public' sympathy that gave credibility to Māori claims of institutional racism and terrorisation, it also obscured the political issue of the Foreshore and Seabed Act (2004) and its relationship to sovereignty. Through the hegemonic practices of racism, institutional racism was transformed into a conflict over rights to protest that enabled the re-production of political discourses of the 'other' as

embodiments of terrorism. Though the form of terrorism may have changed since 9/11, the ongoing constitution of Māori (and Tūhoe in particular) protest as a threat to the state resonates with the same social power articulated by Bush – it is realised through discourse concealing the 'whiteness' of the 'face of terrorism'. The contemporary discourses of the constitution of terrorism can also be understood as masking the effects of the ongoing practices of racism.

Limiting an authentic encounter

For Said (1994) Western authority over meaning silences the voice of the 'other'. The discursive constitution of terrorism also produces a limit to an authentic encounter with the other through a lack of reciprocal speech.

> *...our society has had enough (Laws, 2009b).*

> *Where does this [Māori grievance industry] all stop (Brash, 2004)?*

Where the authority to 'know' the other is dependent on dominant discourses of nationalism, that 'things have gone too far' sets the boundaries for social relations where the impossibility of an ethical relationship is a social power relation of domination and subordination also authorises the construction of history.

> *...none it seems had any knowledge of the history of the Crown's scorched earth policy, murder, and land theft which prompted fierce resistance by*

Tūhoe more than 100 years ago. The forces of the state have a convenient way of forgetting things that don't suit the current narrative (Morse, 2008).

While continuing to exclude Māori from exercising the authority to name their own experience, cultural domination through the suppression of a shameful history that not only colonised particular bodies and land also colonised knowledge and worked together to both produce and suppress resistance. Producing a 'legitimate' historical narrative where the social power relations appear 'naturally' asymmetrical, colonisation has provided conditions necessary for constructing resistance as dissent.

In 2000 Tariana Turia described our history of colonisation as having similarities with the devastating effects of a "holocaust" (MacDonald, 2003) signifying the struggle in authority over meaning. Vehemently opposed by "concerned members of the public, including members of the Jewish community, MPs from most political parties, and the media" (MacDonald, 2003, p. 387) the comparison was understood as an offensive insult. Through the authority to name, Helen Clark prohibited the use of reference of the "holocaust" in relation to colonisation and Māori history (ibid) within the boundaries of political alliance. The prohibition marking the limits of social power relations between the 'self' and the 'other' was transformed into a moral and political debate regarding the rights of Māori to define their histories within a ongoing system of domination, imperialism and colonisation (Said, 1978). Through the power to authorise legitimate cultural identity, the cultural specificity

of living as Māori, the ongoing practices of colonisation also mean the 'one' maintains the authority to 'write' *the* historical narrative. Rejecting possibilities for an ethical response, domination over social power relationships is dependent on a complex interplay of discourses that leave traces of meaning of racial difference and their effects on the 'other'. That one word – holocaust – could threaten the social narrative re-produces the particular tensions in the social power relations leading into October 15.

Marking the extent to which the embodied threat of the 'other' can be excluded from participating in the social, Morse (2008) draws attention to how the power of a word, terror, can also enable the enactment of social sanctions that function to maintain the social narrative.

> *In the cloud of terrorism hysteria and secret evidence, our lawyers would not even attempt an application for bail ... Once the terror label was used, no judge in the country, or indeed the world, would bail us. We went back to prison that Friday evening and I felt very, very dark (Morse, 2008).*

Fraught with contradiction the possibility of sustaining the authority of nationalism in light of competing discourses is an ongoing process that serves to re-produce Māori as a problem and a threat to nationalism and at the same time questions the legitimacy of Māori cultural identity as a 'real' political identity.

If Maori had the solution to their problem – and it is overwhelmingly their problem – then they would have found it by now... In fact, it is time for Maoridom to cut this subculture adrift. They are not Maori, they are not New Zealanders (Laws, 2007).

A culture of dependence and grievance can only be hugely destructive of the Maori people and, if left unchecked, destructive of our ability to build a prosperous nation of one people, living under one set of laws (Brash, 2004).

What sickness exists within Maoridom that sees more Maori children abused and die each year than any other ethnicity (and by a factor of five), and at the hands of their own whanau? ... These are not human acts. These are sick perversions from a Maori subculture who are daily protected by their ethnicity. These are not simply feral acts – they stretch beyond that. They are evil ... Each week, a new child is admitted to Starship Hospital suffering serious injuries after being bashed, mashed or maimed. They are overwhelmingly brown and they are overwhelmingly Maori. When the perpetrators of this latest outrage are eventually convicted, they will fit the well defined pattern. They will be Maori (Laws, 2007).

I am sure most Maori are as embarrassed by the present situation as most non-Maori are astounded (Brash, 2004).

The discursive constitution of nationalism is necessarily a conflict between governance and sovereignty. The contest over the meaning of nationalism is

contingent upon terrorism and racism for meaning and the authority to have knowledge over the 'other'. In the construction of difference, as threat those marked as 'other' are repeatedly constructed as problematic and are suspended from the privileges of citizenship, including the right to be heard and the right to voice alternative understandings. While serving to reify notions of a stable 'unified' identity through ideologies of nationalism the effect of silencing is a simultaneous re-production of an antagonistic set of social power relations that closes off possibilities for unification and for an authentic encounter with the 'other'.

Discussion

Troubling relationships and opening space for an ethical response to the call of the 'other'

Following the October 15 raids I was at the supermarket where I met a friend who I had known for some years. We chatted for a while, a kind of catching up, and then she mentioned the raids. She expressed her disgust with the police treatment of Māori communities through a particular understanding of terrorism. As she spoke she articulated that the raids themselves looked like terrorism and that the government was beginning to look like a dictatorship. Then she asked me why Māori don't do something about these 'radicals'. In the relationship between us there was a sense of acknowledgement of institutional racism but at the same time she located blame with 'radical' Māori. I knew how to respond from within the limited discourses available. Living the contradictions of the hegemonic discourses that produce social positions , we enacted the particular 'patterns' of a 'safe' encounter for these moments where we had the opportunity to put into practice the politics of our relationships. Because we recognised the constraints this event placed around our relationship – we laughed! In our fragmented encounters we negotiated a friendship that mocked the 'truth' of that particular encounter with what might be understood as cynical humour; our laughter was recognition of a discourse that assumed to 'know' our relationship, and how through the

construction of an assumed common 'enemy' we were positioned as ideologically aligned or diametrically opposed – depending on *how I* responded.

We didn't necessarily understand or experience October 15 in the same way but we didn't need to, we weren't responding to the 'truth' of the events. Through the meaning inscribed on our bodies we were responding to the 'truth' of the possibility of an authentic encounter through the trajectory of a hegemonic discourse (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985) of terrorism and an ideology of nationalism. Although differently effected by the hegemonic production of October 15 we acknowledged the contingency of participation in the social – while she was recognisable as an embodiment of the 'one' with the power to take up a position privileged to 'know' the enemy 'other', I embodied an undecidable position on the boarders of difference, somewhere between 'us' and the 'Māori radicals'. Transformed into a political issue, I couldn't escape the specificity of my position as Māori in the dynamics of hegemonic social power relations; and to some extent neither could she. Already produced as a potential enemy, my authority to 'know' the meaning of October 15 was contingent upon an 'appropriate' response that avoided appearing as 'activist' and affirmed the concerns of the 'one'.

Continually disturbed by hegemonic discourses that construct my difference as problematic, this thesis has sought to trouble political discourses that already assume to 'know' the 'other' to open spaces that enable possibilities for ethical responses (Spivak, 2004) and authentic encounters (Said, 1978). As a political

response to the call of the 'other' the process of opening spaces has necessarily meant tracing historical movements of knowledge production through multiple layers of social transformation implicated in the production of global and local realities that mark our everyday lived experiences – including the seemingly ordinary act of negotiating friendships.

Reading hegemonic practices to 'reveal' how Pākehā values and meanings aligned with ideologies of nationalism have been consistently applied to exclude alternative knowledges, this thesis has attempted to interrupt the political tale told of our social relationships. Identifying the social production of an on-going conflict that excludes possibilities for authentic encounters with the 'other', the political tale of our relationships is told through racialised discourses of 'unity' that necessarily exclude difference. Through the imposition of knowledge that produces and legitimates a relationship of violence that is marked by hegemonic power relations of domination, imperialism and colonialism (Said, 1978), terrorism may be understood as a culturally specific narrative of difference that functions as a contemporary discourse of control over claims to authority.

As a story of a complex interplay of hegemonic power relations that play out as relationships of violence on the boundaries – between constructions of global and local governance, between the state and the enactment of force on political subjects, and the struggle for authentic relationships in conditions that exclude participation of the 'other' – the cultural narrative of terrorism may be understood

as a discursive site of tension between sameness and difference in the production of a 'unified' political identity. Split by the contingency of the relation between governance and sovereignty in the production of nationalism, dominating discourses of terrorism have constituted difference as a dangerous political identity that threatens to corrupt the 'fullness' of society (Laclau, 1997).

One of the effects of terrorism discourse has been to produce a particular meaning and location of difference. In the production of difference the 'other' becomes recognisable through racialised discourses that mark the boundaries of 'terrorist' and enable the emergence of the 'face of terrorism'. Through the enactment of terrorism legislation and socially sanctioned consent, the identification of the 'face of terrorism' privileges the 'sameness' of a stable 'unified' national identity. Constituting political protest as a form of unacceptable dissent to discourses of nationalism, the production of citizenship as 'sameness' re-produces a set of antagonistic social power relations that close off possibilities for 'unification'. Rejecting the possibility for ethical responses, the effect is a suppression of the right to be heard and the right to voice alternative understandings; even to the extent that it constrains possibilities for authentic encounters among friends.

The hegemonic power of discourses of nationalism to regulate the ways we think, talk and enact our social relationships are dependent upon on the totalising concepts (Said, 1978) of terrorism and racism. In responding to the October 15 raids *as if* they were terrorism, the political response against the 'other' re-

produced essentialised binaries of relationships and repeated the social division articulated in "you are with us, or with the terrorists" (Bush, 2001). Through a specific cultural narrative of 'sameness' and 'difference' that became the authority on the meaning of the 'events', Māori understandings of October 15 went unexamined in political discourse reported in the media. Effectively colonising knowledge, the assumption of essential differences between 'self' and 'other' excluded possibilities for an ethical response that may have enabled the admission of alternative meanings and therefore also excluded authentic 'knowledge' in the encounter with the 'other'.

In the contest over meaning between discourses of governance and sovereignty the authority over meaning becomes dependent upon the hegemonic colonisation of knowledge to enable the construction of relational equivalences (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985) as epistemological starting points though which finite potentials are transformed into limited possibilities. As an example, Tuhiwai Smith (1999) argues that the colonisation of knowledge has enabled the construction of methodological limitations on research that not only marks what may be taken as legitimate knowledge but effectively reproduces a set of social relations that enables some to take up positions of power as authoritative experts over the knowledge produced by the 'other'.

Enactment of social power relations that constitute knowledge and who has access to that knowledge has delegitimated Māori authority over meaning. Where the

discourses that produce terrorism have become linked with discourses of activism the hegemonic colonisation of knowledge has enabled a transformation of hikoi to mean 'march'. As a technology of power that constitutes 'proper protest', the media focus on the conduct of a protest 'march' produced breaches of 'proper' protest as defining moments of the hikoi – because some of the protesters rode in on buses and because someone spat at the feet of dignitaries it meant that the protesters did not protest 'properly', and the hikoi was ridiculed as a consequence (Tuhiwai Smith, 2004). Masking the struggle between governance and sovereignty and the resistance produced in response to the Foreshore and Seabed Act (2004), enactment of authority over the meaning of the hikoi had the effect of silencing Māori concerns and suppressing citizen dissent; "Māori people can march all we like because no one has to watch, no one has to listen" (Tuhiwai Smith, 2004, p. 6).

If we construct terrorism as an illegitimate form of politically motivated violence we are necessarily required to enter into a relationship of violence on the boundaries of legitimacy. Through an impossibility of an ethical response, we necessarily enter into social power relations marked by conflict. Within a history of colonialism where knowledge has become colonised by social relations of dominance and subordination positions of resistance are impossible (Said, 1978, 1994). Producing a moral trajectory that advocates domination and subordination of what constitutes knowledge, the endpoint is a call to protect nationalism in the name of stable unified identity. Produced through an antagonistic relationship of 'us' versus 'them', the effect of such a trajectory is an ongoing relationship of (violent) conflict.

In the contest over the authority of meaning where the hegemonic dominance of discourses of nationalism exclude Māori claims to sovereignty and the possibility for an ethical response it becomes necessary to open discursive spaces for the 'other' to exist.

Acknowledging the connection between language and social power relations are contingent and malleable this thesis writes back into a space where new meanings and possibilities for ethical responses and authentic encounters are enabled through the generation of 'new' discourses that are not 'fixed' by hegemonic conflict (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). Noticing such moments in discourse it becomes possible to locate contested boundaries and make 'visible' the complex relationships at "the hyphen" (Jones & Jenkins, 2008) between global/local and 'self'/'other'. The call to respond at the hyphen may be understood as a call for recognition of multiple competing political discourses in a space where relationships of domination and subordination are no longer possible. In recognising how the logic of the West is contingent on binary relations for meaning, relationships characterised by domination and subordination can be challenged; attending to the hyphen opens possibilities for new discourses that enable ethical responses wherein difference does not necessarily mean 'threat'. Opening space at the boundaries necessarily enables counter narratives to Pākehā privilege over the meaning of nationhood and creates the potential for ethical human encounter (Said, 1978).

Creating possibilities for the generation of alternative discourses, attending to the hyphen makes space for the 'other' to exist as the authority over their own meanings and experiences. That the potential for encounter is undefined at the hyphen the possibilities are infinite, so too are possibilities for ethical responses where encounters are personal, authentic and sympathetic (Said, cited in Clifford, 2001; Jones & Jenkins, 2008). Attending to relational possibilities that occur in the hyphen is to rethink the potential of relationship – to "desire it and to ask troubling questions about it" (Jones & Jenkins, 2008, p. 471).

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