Political Messaging, Parliament, and People
Or, Why Politicians Say the Things They Do the Way They Do:

The Parliamentary Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand in 2013

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Abstract

One of the main things a Member of Parliament (MP) does in their everyday work is talk. They are constantly saying things to try to win over the public's support and make the world they envision real. This thesis is about politicians' statements: why they say the things they say the way they do. Based on behind-the-scenes ethnographic fieldwork in the parliamentary offices of the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand, I explore the difficult strategic work that shapes what opposition MPs say. In order to win over the public support they need to increase their vote, MPs have to communicate effectively in adherence to the rules and codes of political messaging, be good oppositional MPs, and speak and act in ways that fit authentically with their dispositions. I show that, unlike the simple soundbites we see in public from our politicians, the production of statements designed to win support is messy, indeterminate, uncertain, filled with tension and – above all – intensely complex. Drawing on Bourdieu's theory of practice and analysis of the political field, I argue that managing that complexity to make political statements that aim at winning the political stakes and fit the specific situation, MPs must rely on their practical sense: their feel for the game that allows them to anticipate and shape the future state of play from the current situation. Because the language used to describe the world constitutes the social order that makes it real, this thesis examines how the three drivers of modern political communication, the structure of parliament, and the dispositions of individuals preconstrain what politicians can say and therefore the possibilities of the world MPs can aim at creating.

Key Words: Political Communication, Political Strategy, Messaging, Parliament, Opposition, Member of Parliament, Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand, Bourdieu.

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Winning Politics:
Making Statements

> At least outside periods of crisis, the production of politically effective and legitimate forms of perception and expression is the monopoly of the professional, and is thus subjected to the constraints and limitations inherent in the functioning of the political field (Bourdieu 1991:173)
>
> Making sense of the work of our politicians is only possible if you consider all the contradictory strands of their job (Crewe 2015b:211)

Members of Parliament (MPs) are constantly saying things. In public, they make statements in vast quantity and immense variety: On the 6:00 p.m. news, in election slogans, when asking questions for oral answer in the House, in local newspaper advertisements, at public meetings they hold to talk about issues, on Facebook and Twitter, in front of classrooms of school children, in party policy documents, at conferences they are invited to, when speaking on legislation, at petition handovers on the steps of parliament, in op-eds, to rallies of protestors, on popular television shows, to individuals on the street who approach them, and much more. The fact that politicians say things to the media and the public – that they make statements which communicate to an audience – is a taken-for-granted part of politics. Making statements is how members of Parliament do their work and try to win.

This thesis is about that doing: it is about the *production* of political statements by Members of Parliament in the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand. Typically, the public is exposed to neat, clear, simple, professional, and disciplined soundbites, short sentences designed in content and form to get the main point a politician wants to make across to the audience that sees, hears, or reads what they are saying. By the time a politician says something in public, they and their team of advisors have already thought about what they are going to say, how they will say it, and what they want the effect of those words to be. The strategic work that goes into figuring out the best thing to say can be difficult, especially, as this thesis demonstrates, for parties of opposition that are trying to create change like the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand. MPs have to communicate well, be good oppositional MPs, and speak and act in ways that fit authentically with their dispositions to win over the extra belief and support from the public they need to increase their party vote. This thesis is about how complex that is. It shows that unlike the simple soundbites we see in public from politicians, the production of statements is messy, indeterminate, uncertain, filled with tension and – above all – intensely complex. In managing that complexity to make political statements that fit the situation, MPs must rely on their practical sense: their feel for the game that allows them to anticipate and shape the future state of play from what is happening in the moment (Bourdieu 1998:25).

Why Politicians Say Things

Politicians make statements because they are *productive*. People understand the world with language. The words that categorise and give name to the world organise it and create a collective understanding of what the world is and therefore of how it is possible to think and act within that shared social world. Bourdieu, whose Theory of Practice forms the theoretical basis of this thesis, wrote:

> We go out into the social world with categories of perception, principles of vision and division, that are themselves partly the product of the incorporation of social structures. We apply categories to the world – for example, masculine/feminine, high/low, rare/common, distinguished/vulgar – [which are]... categories that are socially constituted and socially acquired (Bourdieu 2005:36).

Those representations that order our world are "practical taxonomies" that form "the structure of shared tastes and aversions, assumptions and expectations, the categories of thought of any social group" that generates what people do in the "mundane activities of everyday life" (Swartz 2013:37; Lane 2005:55). Therefore, the language that we use to describe our world makes our world real by generating practice in it.

Political struggle is not only the competition between parties over who will occupy and wield the power of the government benches, but also the struggle to wield the power to produce the collective representation of the world that makes a political party's vision of the world real. Bourdieu (2005:39; 1991:181) argued that politicians compete for the "double stakes" of the political field, which he named "the monopoly of the use of the objectified instruments of power" and "the monopoly of the elaboration and diffusion of the legitimate principle of di-vision of the social world and, thereby, the mobilization of groups;" or, in other words, the ability "to say what the social world is." He stated that politics was only possible when the representation of the world became contested, writing that: "Politics begins, strictly speaking, with the denunciation of [the] tacit contract of adherence to the established order which defines the original doxa; in other words, political subversion presupposes cognitive subversion, a conversion of the vision of the world" Bourdieu (1991:128-127). Politicians try to win the power of government and the power to represent the world by making the right statements to the public to mobilise their belief in the world that the politician represents with their language.

Reflecting these double stakes, there are two ways for a political party to make its vision real. One is to impose its vision of the world from the government benches by using the objectified instruments of power to give it effect across a whole society. For example, a government may institute a law which categorises criminal action that is enforced by the police and courts. The second way is to win the belief of groups without using instruments of force but by instead exerting symbolic power. Bourdieu (1991:170, emphasis original) defined symbolic power as:

> A power of constituting the given through utterances, of making people see and believe, of confirming or transforming the vision of the world and, thereby, acting on the world and thus the world itself, an almost magical power which enables one to obtain the equivalent through force (whether physical or economic), by virtue of the specific effect of mobilization... [Symbolic power] is defined in and through a given relation between those who exercise power and those who submit to it, i.e. in the very structure of the field in

> which *belief* is produced and reproduced. What creates the power of words and slogans, a power capable of maintaining or subverting the social order, is the belief in the legitimacy of words and those who utter them. And words alone cannot create this belief.

Symbolic power is a properly alchemic relation that only produces belief when, firstly, the politician uses the right language to give name to what they say about the world and, secondly, the public pre-reflexively recognises that the right conditions for the politician to be making the statement legitimately are met by the fact of the politician making the statement in those legitimate conditions (Bourdieu 1991:106, 113). Therefore, the language, its form, and the conditions in which is it used are necessary and important components for producing the public's predisposition to recognise what a politician states is true and thereby make it real in the world.

Language then, makes our world by creating a shared understanding of the world that generates collective actions in it. Using language to change that understanding can create a different world by altering the representation of it in order to produce new ways of thinking and acting. That is what parties who seek change, who have heterodox visions for a different world, aim to do by either imposing new categories using the power of government or winning the belief of people using symbolic power. This thesis is about the complexity of using language to do that.

What Members of Parliament Can Say

Politicians are not free to say whatever they want to try and win support and belief from the public. I mean this in a particularly Bourdieusian sense, whereby the objective structure of a field and agents' internalisation of those structures work in a dialectal relation that is expressed in practice (Bourdieu 1980:52). That means that the structure of the political field shapes what politicians can say, not deterministically but with an effect of inculcated preconstraint that limits while nonetheless affording MPs some freedom too. Bourdieu (2005:30) stated that:

> Agents react to… relations of forces [in a field], to these structures; they construct them, perceive them, form an idea of them, represent them to themselves, and so on. And, while being, therefore, constrained by the forces inscribed in these fields and being determined by these forces as regards their permanent dispositions, they are able to act upon these fields, in ways that are partially preconstrained, but within a margin of freedom.

The result of the preconstraining effect is that, "At least outside periods of crisis, the production of politically effective and legitimate forms of perception and expression is the monopoly of the professional, and is thus subjected to the constraints and limitations inherent in the functioning of the political field" (Bourdieu 1991:173). This thesis explores how three drivers shape the statements that Green Party MPs could make. They are: the dominant logic of messaged statements, being in parliament in opposition, and the individual MPs' dispositions. The next sections give an overview of these three drivers, which are explored in greater depth in Chapters Two, Three, and Four.

The Logic of Messaged Statements

The logic of messaging, part of the field of political communication, is dominant in the political field. Given the importance of language and statements to winning the double stakes of politics, it is no wonder that the field of political communication emerged to analyse, evaluate, commentate, and make guiding codes and rules about what politicians say. The field of political communication makes statements themselves the object of politics: measurable, evaluable, practicable, prescribable things through which politicians create effect and are effective. It rationalises what politicians do in practice: "it aims at increasing the efficiency of this practical mastery by putting at its service rational techniques… at the same time as it tends to legitimate it by giving it the appearance of scientificity" (Bourdieu 1991:177). Experts in political communication have been able to rationalise the practical sense of politicians by exerting their own symbolic power to make their prescriptions for how politics should talk believed, practiced, and thereby realized by politicians.

Modern political communication is dominated by *messaging.* Message is one of the primary communicative forms in the political field, saturating the strategies, dispositions, and practices of the people who inhabit the field as well as those who report and commentate from its fringes. Silverstein (2011b:206), one of anthropology's preeminent scholars on political messaging, wrote that:

> There is a huge establishment of professionals for whom 'message' as communication organizes the very conduct of electoral politics, and certainly the economics thereof. It is the presumed-upon communicative framework in terms of which everything is understood, interpreted, planned and scored.

Messaging is an imprecise concept but it is about the content and form by which politicians communicate to audiences. In the political field, *message* is used to mean "a short, easily understood piece of communication, often no more than a few words, that conveys information" (Lilliker 2006:122). *Messaging* is used interchangeably with message but also refers to a more strategic use of particular language in communication to describe and win support for a particular view. Message and messaging are inseparable, shaping the content and form of what politicians say to an audience. The logic of messaging drives the production of politicians' statements because they believe that messaged political statements will win them elections and make their vision for the world real by producing the effect of belief among the public.

By the time I arrived at their parliamentary offices to do fieldwork in 2013, the effectiveness and use of messaging dominated the way that the Green MPs thought about making statements designed to win over support and belief from the public. The Greens drew particularly on the work of two titan American scientists, George Lakoff (2004) and Drew Westen (2007), who built a following publishing popular books and advising the U.S. Democratic Party about how its politicians should talk to the public to win elections. The two advocate a way of speaking that they say physically reshapes or reinforces peoples' neural pathways so that they materially believe in the party's values, candidates, and policies. Lakoff (2004) and Westen (2007) put forward rationalised arguments that politicians should appeal to the emotional rather than rational brain, prescribing that politicians ought to make statements that framed the issues, were values-based, emotional, and positive, and avoided technical, detailed, and jargon-based policy discussions. Once politicians had worked out the right language to do that, Lakoff (2004) and Westen (2007) stated, they should

then repeat those words universally for long periods of time until the public had been exposed to them enough that they became the primary, common-sense way people thought about politics. By doing that, political parties could win elections and achieve "social change" (Lakoff 2004:xv).

This thesis not only explores *how* the Green Party's MPs did messaging in their everyday parliamentary work, it also establishes that messaged political communication become the way that politicians thought about what they said because of the symbolic power that academic experts exerted and the symbiotic relation among the parliamentary, academic, and journalistic fields. By tracing the history of this effect of belief, I make the case that messaging acts as an orthodoxy – a dominant principle and practice of thought and action in the political field (Bourdieu 1977b:176-177). That orthodoxy allows parties who seek social change, like the Green Party, to state a vision that does not have broad support in a way that more of the public is likely to be pre-reflexively disposed to believe because it conforms to the "politically effective and legitimate forms of perception and expression" that modern political messaging produces (Bourdieu 1991:173). As my research shows, however, Green Party MPs were not wholly comfortable with that orthodoxy as they were concerned that the messaging principles and prescriptions were, perhaps, too dominant in limiting the language they could use to represent and talk about their vision and thus constrain the world that they were attempting to make real.

Being in Parliament in Opposition

Being in parliament in opposition also shaped what the Green MPs said. Crewe and Müller (2006:1) were not making an understatement when they wrote that "parliaments are among the most complex political bodies imaginable." Parliaments are complex because they are sites of more or less highly-codified formalised tradition and dynamic adaptability. "Everything the House does offers it the opportunity to probe and criticise the actions of the Government," wrote McGee (2017:4), New Zealand's preeminent authority on parliamentary practice. The opposition leads that work. Being in opposition means scrutinising and criticising nearly every aspect of the way that the Government seeks to, exercises, or does not exercise its vast and broad powers. Because parliament structures the field MPs inhabit, Green Party MPs 'carved out' (McGee 1994:2) their day-to-day work within its complexity and made statements that fulfilled their traditional opposition role.

As well as the traditional scrutiny function, being in opposition entails two other functions that I explore in this thesis. The first is to reproduce the "regulated consensus of parliament whereby struggle between groups represented in the parliament are "waged according to the rules of the game" (Bourdieu 2014:355). Those rules, sometimes codified in formal rulings while at other times practiced as embodied competencies that act as conditions of entry, regulate what can be said and done in parliament. MPs, by virtue of being there and investing in parliamentary politics, tacitly agree to play by those rules and thus engage in struggle over political issues in conformity with the way parliament operates. By doing that, MPs not only gain political capital, the "acquisition and conversion of a 'good reputation'," but they reproduce the rules of the game (Bourdieu 1991:194). The effect is that Green Party MPs strategically made statements that reproduced the parliament because it not only enabled them to gain credibility as competent politicians but it maintained the structure of the field that they were competing to win governmental power in.

Being in opposition also entails aiming to not be in opposition. Although some Green MPs were sceptical about what they would be able to achieve in government and were concerned about at what cost that power would be won, all the Green Party's MPs wanted to be able to make the world in their vision. They believed that achieving the governmental power needed to make their vision of the world real mattered, that it was important, and that it was a worthwhile pursuit; they were invested in the double stakes of the political field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1991:116). In sum, as a result of being in opposition, Green MPs were disposed toward making statements that fulfilled their traditional role, reproduced the parliament itself, and aimed at being in government.

Figure 1.1: The Green Party Caucus, 2011-2014

Source: (Green Party 2011)

The Individual Dispositions of MPs

This research is about the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand's worldview, strategy, practices, and people during 2013 based on fieldwork in the parliamentary offices of four of its 14 MPs (see Figure 1.1). During that time, I was enmeshed in parliamentary life, following MPs in their daily work. I spent time watching them debate and ask questions in the House, talk with advisors about the best way to message speeches and campaigns, coordinate their portfolio work, record media interviews, present at conferences, work through select committee business, travel to different cities, meet with constituents, and much more. To the greatest extent possible, where the MPs went, so did I. I had an unprecedented level of inside access to a party's parliamentary offices, consisting of 2.5 months each in four MPs' offices between March to December 2013.[1] The deep

[1] No other ethnographer has spent time on the inside of a party's parliamentary office. However, anthropologist Emma Crewe (2017:158, 159) spent 1998-2002 in Britain's House of Lords part time and a further two years between 2011-2013 in the House of Commons. Political Scientist Marc Geddes (2016:66) spent 14 weeks working a select committee to observe their scrutiny activity, totalling around 600 hours. Finally, political scientist Rhodes (2011:8) spent five days each shadowing two Ministers and three permanent secretaries in the British Government, as well as two days each observing the offices of two Ministers and three permanent secretaries, totalling around 420 hours of fieldwork.

knowledge of the Party's empirical reality gained during that time grounds this thesis ethnographically.

I conducted my fieldwork in the offices of four Green Party MPs: Holly Walker, Kennedy Graham, Gareth Hughes, and Catherine Delahunty (see Figure 1.2). Those four MPs, self-selected and approved by Caucus, represented some of the diversity of Green Party's MPs.[2] They are split 50:50 by gender and age. Their list rankings[3] varied: Catherine was ranked fourth, Kennedy fifth, Gareth seventh, and Holly twelfth of 14 members of Parliament. They had a range of experience as MPs: both Catherine and Kennedy entered Parliament in 2008, Gareth entered in 2010 following the resignation of Co-Leader Jeanette Fitzsimons, and Holly was the newest MP of the four, having only entered Parliament one year before I started fieldwork with her. Similarly, the MPs had a range of portfolio responsibilities which, while shuffled during 2013 included: housing, electoral reform, children, open government, youth and students, as well as arts, culture and heritage for Holly; global affairs, climate change, trade and foreign investment, associate finance and economics, constitutional issues, and defence for Kennedy; oceans, energy, mining (offshore), ICT, and libraries and archives for Gareth; and associate education, Treaty of Waitangi, toxics, and mining (onshore) for Catherine (see Appendix A for a full list of Green MP portfolios). These portfolios reflected the MPs' select committee memberships: Holly sat on the Government Administration Select Committee; Kennedy on Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Trade as well as Privileges; Gareth on Business Committee as Green Party Musterer (whip) as well as Local Government and Environment; and Catherine on Education and Science. Overall, the four MPs I spent 2.5 months with each provided a good representation of the Green Party's MPs without Co-Leader responsibilities.

It is not always easy to remember, but politics is done by real people. Fenno Jr. (1996:8, emphasis original), in his work on congressional representatives elected to Capitol Hill, reminded us: "First and foremost… [it is] flesh and blood individuals, real *people* we are talking about when we generalize about the behaviour of politicians." The fact that MPs are real people matters not only to draw attention to their humanity but theoretically too. Bourdieu (1977a, emphasis original), in seeking to explain the relation between structure and agency that generates the way a person thinks and acts, developed the concept habitus:

> Systems of durable, transposable *dispositions*, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively 'regulated' and 'regular' without in any way being the product of obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends of an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and, being all this, collectively orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor.

Habitus is durable; it is resistant to change and also transposable across fields (Webb et al. 2002:6, 38). People who become MPs bring their durable habitus from their lives prior to parliament with them – who they were before parliament shapes who they can become as MPs. But, habitus also adapts: "it is an *open system of dispositions* that is constantly subjected to experiences, and therefore

[2] The Green Party's list also prioritises Māori representation but the MPs I worked directly with were all Pakeha New Zealanders. Green MP Mojo Mathers was also the first "deaf/disabled" MP elected to Parliament entering, like Holly, in 2012 (see Mathers 2012:172).
[3] List rankings are an official hierarchical ordering of a party's candidates and MPs (see Appendix A for all MPs' list rankings during 2013). The Green Party's list is constructed for each election by a formal process including a vetting committee, candidates' conference, initial ranking, vote by all party members, and possible adjustment to reflect ethnic, gender, age, and geographic diversity.

Figure 1.2: The Four Green MPs, in Chronological Order of Fieldwork

Holly Walker

Dr Kennedy Graham

Gareth Hughes

Catherine Delahunty

Source: (compiled from Green Party 2017a; Green Party 2017b)

constantly affected by them" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1991:133, emphasis original). Suddenly entering a new parliamentary field upon election, there is variation in the degree of fit that MPs can achieve in internalising the logic of messaging and the structure of parliament with their historic habitus. Who MPs are as people, the lives they have lived before becoming politicians, shapes how they speak and act within the parliament.

MPs, in their daily work and as their dispositions adapt to the field, become skilled at navigating the complexity of parliament and the political field. They come to understand how it works and develop a capacity for speaking and acting strategically in ways that will advance them toward winning government and making their vision for the world real. Akin to habitus, Bourdieu (1998:25, emphasis original) called that ability a practical sense:

> An acquired system of preferences, of principles of vision and division…, a system of durable cognitive structures… [and] schemes of action which orient the perception of the situation and the appropriate response. The habitus is this kind of practical sense for what is to be done in a given situation – what is called in sport a 'feel' for the game, that is, the art of *anticipating* the future of the game, which is inscribed in the present state of play.

That practical sense is what enables politicians to more or less speak and act in ways that will move them closer to winning the double stakes in parliament. Thus, while collectively shaped by the structures and functioning of the parliamentary field which generates shared strategies and practices, Holly, Kennedy, Gareth, and Catherine had their own individual dispositions too, borne of their lives prior to being elected in parliament. Those individual dispositions shaped what they said as MPs.

Overall, then, this thesis explores how the logic of messaged statements, being in parliament in opposition, and the individual dispositions of Holly, Kennedy, Gareth, and Catherine shaped what they said during 2013. [4] What they said aimed to win over public support, fulfil their traditional opposition role, and also fit authentically with their dispositions. However, practically working out the right thing to say to meet those sometimes-conflicting aims while also responding to the specificity of context and situation the MPs were speaking in could be difficult, and required a good practical sense that enabled them to strategically navigate the complexity in which they were enmeshed.

Context: New Zealand's Political Field and the Green Party's Broad Strategy

Given the importance of context for understanding why politicians say the things they do, this section provides a broad overview of New Zealand's political field in 2013. It draws attention to some of the formal structures of New Zealand's political field, the parties in competition to win or maintain governmental power, and the personalities. In moving through that explanation, the

[4] The reason that I have chosen to use Bourdieu's analytical framework over others such as Gramsci's hegemony and ideology or Foucault's discourse is primarily because this ethnography is grounded in a close reading of the varied practices and views of four individuals as they go about their daily work. Bourdieu's theory allows for a richer reading of individual difference and agency while also acknowledging that they are shaped by the social structures they inhabit. Bourdieu's dialectical relation between structure and agency provides the analytical space to examine the world-making practices of MPs, as shaped by the particular moment in time they are occurring.

purpose is to make sense of the Green Party's strategy for the then-upcoming 2014 General Election of winning enough votes to form a coalition government with the Labour Party, and messaging the political issues and parties for the public.

In New Zealand, political power is held and exerted by government Ministers, especially those in Cabinet (Shaw and Eichbaum 2011:50). Ministers have broad powers to direct "the executive branch of government" by making "significant decisions" and determining "government policy collectively, through the Cabinet decision-making process" (Cabinet Office 2017:2.22, 2.22(c)). Additionally, Ministers hold "financial responsibility" for their departments, and are responsible for determining their "policy direction and the priorities" (Cabinet Office 2017:2.22(e), 2.22(f)). The power of Ministers and executive government is especially concentrated in New Zealand because the executive is drawn from the party or parties which gain confidence and supply of the House of Representatives by holding a majority (Cabinet Office 2017:2.22(h)). Because of that, "the brutal political reality is that a government with a parliamentary majority can pass whatever legislation it wishes" (Shaw and Eichbaum 2011:50). Even where a single party does not constitute a majority government, drawing on supportive parties mean that minority governments have also been overwhelmingly able to pass their legislative agenda through parliament (Shaw and Eichbaum 2011:50). New Zealand's concentration of political power in the Cabinet of executive government means that Ministers have a special ability to impose their vision for the country by using the instruments of governmental power.

In Bourdieu's (1991:189) analysis, based on the French National Assembly, getting into government required a majority of support in an election with the strategic effect that a political party would "not hesitate, so as to broaden its base and attract the clientele of the competing parties, to compromise with the 'purity' of its party line and play more or less consciously on the ambiguities of its programme." However, New Zealand's parliament is not majoritarian, and that produces different strategies. New Zealand's constitutional structure and mixed member proportional (MMP) electoral system means that voters do not directly elect the government; instead, they elect the parliament from which the government is formed (Shaw and Eichbaum 2011:46). Under MMP, each voter[5] gets two votes: one party vote for a political party and another for a local electorate representative.[6] The percentage of party votes that each political party receives allocates its

[5] New Zealand's Parliament also has seven Māori seats which, are elected by voters on the Māori roll. In the 50th Parliament, those electorates were represented by MPs from the Māori Party (three seats), the Labour Party (three seats) and the Mana Party (one seat) (Godfery 2012:267). They are "a unique feature of New Zealand's constitution and political system" and

> provide significant meaning and value for the Māori constituents that vote in the seats and for all New Zealanders in terms of their constitutional significance. The seats provide the only avenue for Māori representatives to first and foremost prioritise a Māori voice in parliament. Moreover, they act as a symbolic reminder within the current constitutional arrangements of the tino rangatiratanga that was reaffirmed to Māori in Te Tiriti o Waitangi (Bargh 2015:300, 309).

Discussion of strategies and practices related to the Māori seats is non-existent in this thesis. The reason for that is because the MPs who work in and contest Māori seats have a different set of values, expectations, practices, and relation to the people in their electorates that what I present here. The MPs I worked with were all Paheka and, while Catherine Delahunty was highly regarded by many for her work alongside Māori communities and advocating for Te Tiriti rights and justice, they did not operate in the same way that Māori representatives do. Therefore, while this research does not detail the workings of Māori MPs and politics, some central sources on Māori parliamentary politics do include Bargh (2010), Katene (2006), Godfery (2016; 2012), and Gershon (2012).

[6] Election of electorate MPs occurs by majority, whereby the candidate who wins the most votes becomes the representative of constituents in the area. The Green Party has not often campaigned to win electorate seats historically because of the low likelihood their candidates would win and competing would end up 'splitting the left vote', making it easier for competing National candidates to win. The only exceptions to this in general elections were in 1999, when Co-Leader at the time Jeanette Fitzsimmons contested

proportion of seats in the House. Within each party's share, seats are allocated firstly to those who have won an electorate seat and then to those from the party's ranked list of candidates. Only parties and representatives who have reached a threshold of either five percent of the party vote or an electorate seat enter Parliament. Under this system, it is possible for a single party to win a majority in the House by winning a majority of party votes; however, that has not yet happened. Instead, either the National or Labour party have won the largest share of votes and had to make up a majority in the House with the agreement and support of other smaller parties. This has resulted in novel configurations to achieve stable confidence and supply, including coalitions, cooperation agreements, and memoranda of understanding between parties.

The configuration of New Zealand's 50th Parliament shows how the power of government can be gained without any party holding a majority of seats. Table 1.1 shows the percentage of party vote, electorate seats, and list seats of the eight parties represented in the House during 2011-2014. Winning 47.31 percent of party votes, the National Party held 59 seats – two fewer than needed to make up a 61-seat majority in the 121-seat House. To achieve confidence and supply, they formed relationships with support partners the Māori Party, ACT, and United Future. That meant National could draw on 64 votes in the House, and allowed it room in the numbers to pass legislation even if at times some of its support partners would not vote in favour of specific bills. In return for their support, MPs from those three parties were given Ministerial or undersecreterial responsibilities, although they did not sit in Cabinet. That meant those minor parties could exert some of the power of government while receiving less than 1.5 percent of the party vote each. The opposition, on the other hand, was made up of the Labour, Green, New Zealand First and Mana parties who, even if they all voted in opposition, only comprised 57 votes. They did not have the voting power to prevent the passage of legislation or the Budget in the Parliament. Thus, although none of the parties who comprised the government in 2011-2014 received a majority of votes or seats, National was able to achieve and maintain the power of government over the opposition by entering into agreement with smaller parties.

Table 1.1: The Election and Constitution of New Zealand's 50th Parliament, 2011-2014

Political Party	Percentage Party Vote	Electorate Seats (n)	List Seats (n)	Total Seats (n)
National	47.31	42	17	59
Labour	27.48	22	12	34
Green	11.06	0	14	14
NZ First	6.59	0	8	8
Māori	1.43	3	0	3
Mana	1.08	1	0	1
ACT	1.07	1	0	1
United Future	0.60	1	0	1

Source: (adapted from Electoral Commission 2017:Table 1)

New Zealand's major parties, National and Labour, both aim to and do win a great share of votes from the 'centre'. In 2011, for example, together those two parties received around 75 percent of

Coromandel and in 2017, when the Greens competed to win Nelson. Fitzsimons won Coromandel but the Party's candidate in Nelson placed third behind the National and Labour candidates.

party votes. Even Labour, who received significantly fewer votes than National, still received around three times as many votes as the next largest party, the Green Party. National and Labour have been the major parties in all of New Zealand's MMP elections and led every government since 1935 under the previous first past the post system. The modern understanding that National and Labour compete for the 'centre' is similar to other parliamentary democracies (Crewe 2015b:81; Rudd and Hayward 2005:89). The logic is that there is a large number of people who have views in the centre of the political spectrum who could vote for either party. They lean neither too far right nor left and will swing support for whichever party represents the centre. Appealing to the centre broadens the scope of who the political party can appeal to. As the leading party of Government in 2013, National was popularly understood to have successfully appealed to and represented centre, 'moderate', 'mainstream', 'everyday' Kiwis, while Labour was understood as needing to 'win them back'. The majoritarian orthodox centre is an important group in New Zealand's politics, represented as, and thus being, a real group over whom elections are waged by the two major parties.

Since 2008, the Green Party has been increasingly represented by academics, journalists, and commentators as gaining support by moving closer to representing orthodox, mainstream, everyday voters (see, for example, O'Brien 2013; Hartshorn-Sanders 2006; Welch 2011; MacDonald 2010). While the Greens had previously been represented as radical, left-wing, activist hippies, that image had changed markedly. The account of Edwards and Lomax (2012:994, 998) exemplifies a typical analysis of the Green Party's change:

> The triumph of the Greens can be attributed, more than anything else, to the significant reinvention of the party over recent years. The Green Party that contested the election was essentially an entirely new and transformed version of the party formed in 1990 and first elected to parliament in 1999. The Greens, originally regarded as a radical, fringe movement of political outsiders and non-politicians, by 2011 had metamorphosed into a much more conventional, moderate and professional party… The Greens repositioned and rebranded themselves as a pragmatic, more moderate party that could appeal to a broader, 'middle New Zealand' constituency… These factors combined to attract a broader, more mainstream constituency.

This representation of the Green Party's move toward the mainstream dominated their representation in the public sphere – it was part of their message to voters. People believed the Greens were shifting at least slightly toward the centre, although opinions differed about whether that was good or bad.

Members of the Green Party's Parliamentary Wing had more complicated views. The Party did not believe centre voters would vote for their vision because they did not share it. Green MP Catherine Delahunty, well known for being in the left pole of the Party, told me:

> I don't agree with Richard Di Natalae, who's the leader of the Greens in Australia [and] for whom I have quite a bit of respect; he said, 'We are the natural home for the progressive mainstream'. See, I don't believe that. One, I don't think the mainstream are progressive and, two, I don't think we are the natural home of progressives. And what we have to do is try and build the progressive vote.

The Greens were aware that, as a Party calling for major and transformative change, they were not a party that represented a broad number of New Zealanders who believed in the heterodoxy they

presented – the critique of orthodoxy which tends "to impose the acceptance of the established order as natural" (Bourdieu 1977b:176-177). The Green Party's Communication Director explained the problem like so:

> If you think about it, we've only got 11 percent of the vote. So 89 percent of New Zealanders are not voting for us… There's still a lot of people out there who are just not attuned to our message at all. And I don't think we should overstate our ability to speak to all those people either.

Winning people over to believing that the changes the Greens wanted to make were right was a long-term task, and there was not a straightforward way to achieve it. Green MP Holly Walker described the dilemma:

> Rather than us change our policies, I'd like to see us lead that attitude shift [in encouraging people to think collectively rather than individualistically again]. But that's a huge ask. And I think people still don't really think like that and it's a real challenge for us as a political party, both in terms of our policies and in terms of how we campaign, to think about how realistic that is. Because within the framework of each election, we have to market ourselves in such a way that we'll appeal to voters. So, it has to work as well as be realistic.

Conscious of that dilemma, the Greens were realistic that getting into government in 2014 would be a challenge not only on the numbers but in creating belief among the public that what they wanted to do was credible and right.

Most importantly, the Green Party did not want to change their vision to the one that they believed centre voters held.[7] The Greens believed their vision was right and would make a better world, and represented the interests of people who had voted for them as well as people who had not but would nonetheless benefit from changes they wanted to make. Many MPs told me that they had 'bottom lines' they would refuse to negotiate and, for some at least, that they would resign from the Party and parliament over rather than compromise. Appealing to centre voters was neither a strategy that the Greens thought would work very well nor one that they wanted to pursue at the expense of their vision. The Green Party did not want to change their vision or positions to broaden their base.

Therefore, instead of seeking a broad majority by changing their policy programme, the Green Party aimed to win a more modest 15 percent of the party vote in 2014, which they said would give them 20 seats in parliament (Green Party 2014a:1). 15 percent would have been an additional four percent compared to their 2011 vote share, requiring around an extra 90,000 votes. To do that, they needed the right messaging on the issues and themselves, and the right numbers in the House.

[7] The Green Party were well-known for this. However, it was seen to be a negative trait by many commentators. For example, Armstrong (2013a:1) characterised them as "fractious, averse to compromise, and prone to be holier than thou." Similarly, Welch (2011:48) characterised an interview with Green Co-leader Metiria Turei negatively, writing: "'Holier-than-thou' wasn't in it. She was holier-than-thousands. In those 10 minutes, she made the Greens seem preachy, patronising and far too principled for their own or anyone else's good."

I discuss issues messaging in Chapter Seven but, during the 50th Parliamentary term, the Greens sought to "politically describe" themselves as having three key characteristics (Green Party messaging guide, emailed to author November 22, 2013). They were:

1. Positive – we propose and support ideas that work, and have achieved change working with both Labour and National
2. Leading – we lead change and set the political agenda on the issues of our time
3. Ready – we are ready to be part of a responsible Government in 2014 (Green Party messaging guide, emailed to author November 22, 2013, emphasis mine).

Those three messages aimed at producing a belief among the public that the Greens were, in fact, positive, leading, and ready. Many of their practices in and outside the House were aimed at showing that they were able to speak and act competently and credibly to reinforce those three characteristics. That way, the public could come to support the Green Party as being able to be trusted in government.

The Green Party's membership had formally agreed that they were "highly unlikely" to form an agreement on confidence and supply with the National Party so, instead, the Greens were firmly positioned as a potential government partner to the Labour Party. Fifteen percent party vote for the Greens in 2014 would be enough for two things. First, if Labour remained steady, it would make the two parties' joint share of the vote similar to National's, meaning that they had a greater chance of being able to form a majority. Second, it would give them enough strength in relation to Labour in a coalition that they would be able to secure several or even a proportional number of high-profile, highly-ranked Cabinet Ministerial positions, as well as significant policy and budgetary concessions. That would give them a limited, but greater than they had ever had in their 17-year history, ability to impose their vision of the world using the power of government. Thus, the Green Party was pursuing a strategy of winning enough votes and being in the right position in relation to the leading major party.

However, the Labour Party was in bad shape in 2013, facing near-constant criticism of their leadership and party disunity since the resignation of three-term Labour Prime Minister Helen Clark following their entry into opposition after losing the 2008 Election. After that election, long-serving MP and Minister Phil Goff took over the leadership but the Party continued its decline during 2008-2011 and lost a further eight seats in the next election. After that election result put Labour 20 percent below National, Goff was then replaced by David Shearer, who held the leadership from December 2011 until mid-year 2013 (see Figure 1.3). He was forced to resign in August 2013 after losing the confidence of his Caucus, as opinion polling did not show Labour regaining public support, and facing questions about his political judgement, crystallised in an infamous incident in which he held two dead fish aloft in the debating chamber while questioning Prime Minister John Key about fishing quotas (3 News 2013:1). Competing under newly-agreed election rules, three sitting MPs – Grant Robertson, Shane Jones, and David Cunliffe – competed to become leader by winning the votes of the Caucus, party members and affiliated unions to become leader. The contest excited the party membership and provided a lot of events for the media to report on. At the end of the process in September, David Cunliffe was elected leader and he remained in place through the 2014 Election. But Cunliffe had not won the support of his Caucus in the contest, which continued to cause strife. Miller (2015:148,149) evaluated that it was "a situation that undermined and eventually destroyed his credibility as leader… what he seemed to lack were sound judgement,

empathy, and an ability to inspire confidence in his leadership." Labour, in 2013, trailed significantly behind National's support, and was looking unable to make the great gains needed before the next election.

Figure 1.3: 2013 Labour Party Leaders, David Shearer and David Cunliffe

Source: (Oxenham 2011; Unknown Photographer 2014)

In that context, the Green Party had to strike a balancing act with regard to the Labour Party in 2013. On the one hand, the Green Party wanted to show voters that, together, the two parties could be a credible, competent, and trustworthy government if they won the election in 2014. For example, after jointly launching an energy sector and supply policy called *NZ Power* together in May, the Green Party evaluated in their *Advisory and Comms Report for Caucus* (emailed to author May 07, 2013) – a report that provides a strategically-oriented political overview and evaluates the effectiveness of the Party's questions for oral answer, media, and social media for periods between Caucus meetings – that: "It ended up well launching with Labour (coincidence is a funny thing sometimes) as it gave us political cover and signalled that we could work as an alternative government, and gave an indication of what a shared policy platform could look like." On the other hand, the Green Party was also competing with Labour over left and left-leaning voters and needed to maintain their Party's distinction to ensure they were representing different interests that could appeal to those voters. For example, following a Labour gain of 1.2 percent and Green loss of 1.6 in a poll after Cunliffe's election and the Labour Party's annual conference, the Greens wrote that prominent Press Gallery journalist Patrick Gower "made much of a small shift in our support to say labour is cannibalising our vote. It'll be interesting to see if that's a trend and it's too early to make that conclusion" (Advisory and Comms Report for Caucus emailed to author November 12, 2013). The main competitive problem for the Green Party, however, was that attention on Labour's leadership in 2013 meant they got less media coverage with which to criticise the government and build their own Party's appeal among the public. That lack of coverage had a double effect whereby

the Greens had fewer opportunities to make statements to the public that built their own support to get into government and less able to decrease National's support to get them out of government.

Figure 1.4: Prime Minister of New Zealand 2008-2016, Rt Hon Sir John Key

Source: (Walter 2009)

The Government of New Zealand in 2013 that the Green MPs were opposing was led by Prime Minister Rt Hon Sir John Key and his National Party (see Figure 1.4). At that time, National had been in power for five years, after defeating Helen Clark's Labour-led Government in 2008. National's entry into government was widely credited to economic uncertainty surrounding the Global Financial Crisis, the Party's 'move to the centre' on policy issues, and positive election campaign, in addition to the personal qualities of John Key, who was widely considered to be likeable, optimistic, and able to connect to a wide range of people (Arseneau 2010:272, 280-281; Joyce 2010:66, 67; Levine and Roberts 2010:26, 32). 2008 was a significant victory for National, as Levine and Roberts (2010:32) summarised: "It was the first time that a New Zealand political party had received more than a million votes… [and] National's share of the party vote was the highest proportion gained by any political party at an MMP election – a substantial popular vote mandate for change."

The National-led Government's first term of 2008-2011 was characterised by a "series of crises… unparalleled in recent memory in New Zealand" (Joyce 2012:20). The Global Financial Crisis worsened, leading to a major $1.6 billion bailout of independent finance company South Canterbury Finance in August 2010; Christchurch suffered a major earthquake on September 04, 2010; Pike River Mine exploded on November 19, 2010, causing the loss of life of 29 miners; a second major and devastating earthquake occurred in Christchurch on February 22, 2011, in which 181 people lost their lives; and, finally, on October 05, 2011, the shipping freighter Rena ran around

on the Astrolabe Reef in Tauranga causing New Zealand's worst oil spill (Johansson 2012:91-92). At the immediate time of these crises, except for the Rena, the Government's response was broadly considered to be well-managed and empathetic. The mainstream judgement was that they had successfully steered the country through those crises, protecting New Zealand's economy and responding well in the immediate aftermath of the Christchurch earthquakes and Pike River Mine explosion. In his first term, John Key's ratings remained consistently "stratospheric," buoyed by his own reputation and likeability as well as that of his senior frontbench Ministers (Johansson 2012:93). Key's leadership and personality easily eclipsed that of struggling Labour leader Phil Goff (Johansson and Levine 2012:32-33).

As appeared inevitable from all polling, National's share of the party vote in the 2011 Election increased by 2.4 percent to reach 47.3 percent, winning the party 59 seats in Parliament (Johansson and Levine 2012:33). It was a strong and visible indication of the New Zealand public's support for John Key and his Government. With that result, the National-led Government of 2011-2014 was confident of the mandate it had from the public to continue with its agenda. However, they also faced criticism on several significant, long-running issues that the public did not wholly support.[8] The first issue was the Government's plan to partially sell state-owned assets like energy company Mighty River Power and national airline Air New Zealand, opposition to which triggered a Citizens Initiated Referendum on the issue. The second was a rolling and complex controversy related to spying on Kim Dotcom, the owner of file-sharing site MegaUpload, by New Zealand's non-domestic intelligence agency, the Government Communications Security Bureau, as well as the subsequent leak of a report into the activities and legal position of the agency. The final was a failure to measure or reduce child poverty. Those three issues were constantly raised in the public sphere by the Green Party, by asking questions to Ministers in the House, speaking about them in the general debate, speaking against related legislation in parliament, issuing press releases, posting on social media, giving media interviews, holding public meetings, and much more. But, although the Greens and others who opposed the Governments' agenda had effectively mobilised parts of New Zealand's public on those issues, they had little practical effect on the Government's popularity or on what they were able to do. Even though it seemed that the opposition were making headway on particular issues, by the end of 2013 when I finished my fieldwork, both the National Party and John Key's popularity ratings "remain[ed] gravity-defying" (Watkins and Small 2013:Para.8).

What explained that disjuncture between the public's broad support of the Government despite their opposition to some leading issues, and the inability of the opposition to decrease the public's support for the Government and increase their own? A large part of the Green Party's answer was the Government's immense power to message for the public, and especially National's ability to message who the Greens were. The problem was often raised in their *Advisory and Comms Reports for Caucus*. For example, the Government's representation of the Labour-Green coalition worried the Greens:

> Key's response to the TVNZ poll (that showed Centre-left neck in neck with National) was interesting in that he called us the "coalition of the unwilling." I think it highlights for us the issue we have been wresting for a while of how and when we present ourselves as a stable coalition Government in waiting that will be effective and visionary. I think we need to start

[8] See Lees-Marshment et al. (2014) for a discussion of the divergence between National's policy and the public's views on particular issues.

> framing our potential Government or National will do it for us but negatively (Advisory and Comms Report for Caucus, emailed to author May 14, 2013).

The 'coalition of the unwilling' messaging worked alongside "National's upping its attacks on [the Greens] as being far-left, and framing [them] as dragging any future coalition in a crazy direction that will be damaging to the economy" (Advisory & Comms Report for Caucus, emailed to author May 07, 2013). National used that negative messaging throughout 2013. For example, John Key gave a widely-reported speech at the National Party's annual conference, saying:

> Under MMP all elections are close elections. And they are not just about National versus Labour, but about the centre-right versus the left. And it's clear for everyone to see that Labour has hitched their wagon to the Greens, lurching the opposition to the far left.
>
> Make no mistake, our opposition comes from the far left of politics. The Greens are leading Labour by the nose, and Labour knows it. It's important that New Zealanders understand what a Green-dominated government would look like. They want to tax you more, rack up more debt and make you work two more years before you can retire… (see NZNats 2013:07:54-08:39min).

I talked to Green MP Gareth Hughes about the Prime Minister's speech the next day. It was a "double-edged sword" for the Greens, he said – 'on the one hand, it makes us look important, and on the other, they have all the authority and resources to make those comments'. In the struggle to do politics by messaging, the person who can exert the symbolic power to make their statements wrap around the public's understanding of the political field makes the political field.

The Greens, in contrast, did not have the same symbolic power to challenge the representation that the National Party was making of them; nor did they have the power to significantly damage the image of John Key or the National Party. In August 2013, the Green Party's Political Director wrote:

> I think we need to start working out the shape of our work for next year by identifying our key priorities and sharpening our focus on them, same for our messaging about ourselves and the Government. We need to work it out and use it relentlessly.
>
> In terms of our policy, proposals, green papers etc. – I think we should take an approach that promotes our values and resonates with the public, and minimises the risk to our image. In defence of risk adversity: I don't think we have [a] problem with people thinking that we don't have enough innovative, challenging, out-there ideas, policy, or people – we have a problem with people thinking we are crazy and can't be trusted in Government.
>
> Where we need to take some risks in our critique work of the Government. I think we had all hoped by now that the tide would be turning on Key and National but [it] is far from clear that this this is the case, so we need to continue our work to undermine National, and in particular John Key as he is still the basis of their success (Advisory & Comms Report for Caucus, emailed to author August 06, 2013).

The Greens, however, were not sure how to represent the Government in a way that would damage National's credibility and popularity among voters:

> Clearly, we will also need to frame the Government negatively – the challenge here is what the best way to do this is – do we frame them as being actively destructive? Or is it that they

> have no plan? Have they forgotten everyday New Zealanders? What approach will have resonance with the people we need to move? (Advisory & Comms Report for Caucus, emailed to author April 09, 2013).

Even though they were able to message particular issues like state asset sales in a way which gained the support of the public, by the end of the year the Greens still had not settled on how they wanted to message the Government. They continued to face a double bind in that they were being messaged negatively by the Government so could not easily gain support, and that they could not negatively message the Government to cause them to lose support.

In summary, the Green Party in 2013 was pursuing a strategy of gaining enough votes to be in the right position to win governmental power in the upcoming 2014 Election. They were aiming for 15 percent of the party vote and to enter into a governing arrangement with the Labour Party. The challenges they faced in achieving that were that their vision for the world had limited appeal among the New Zealand public, their potential partner Labour could not seem to garner the support needed, and the National-led Government was immensely popular, meaning that they had an ability to use governmental and symbolic power to maintain their position and decrease the opposition's ability to win. The Green Party was countering those challenges by stepping up to lead the opposition, messaging issues, and characterising themselves as positive, leading, and ready to govern. By doing that, they hoped to gain the belief and support of an extra 90 thousand people, which would enable them to win the double stakes of politics: the monopolies on the exertion of governmental power and producing the legitimate social order (Bourdieu 1991:128-127).

Why This Thesis Matters: Addressing the Gaps

This ethnography is the first of its kind – the first to make public the inside workings of a political party in parliament. This section explains what we currently know about parliaments and how the parties that operate in them work. I outline the current knowledge of New Zealand's political science and ethnographies of parliaments, pointing to the gaps that this research seeks to address.

The Contribution to New Zealand's Political Field

A key purpose of this thesis is to show the structural and strategic complexity of New Zealand's political environment that MPs navigate in their day-to-day work. In particular, my aim is to show how the codes and rules of modern political communication interact with the more historical structures and strategies of parliament in MP's statements and practices; from the perspective of MPs, those two strands are constantly interacting as they work out what to say in each situation. While New Zealand's field of political science is divided between accounts that explore either parliamentary structures, electoral strategy, or individual politicians, the contribution of this thesis is to join these analyses together to give a more holistic explanation of why MPs say the things they do.

Regarding the former, there is a substantial body of work in New Zealand that provides an institutional overview of how New Zealand's Parliament works. That reflects international

scholarship on parliaments, which Rai (2010:286) describes as "focused on the functions that parliaments perform – deliberative, legislative, legitimising, and symbolic." The most authoritative of these accounts in New Zealand is former Clerk of the House of Representatives[9] David McGee's (2017; 2005; 1994; 1985) volumes on parliamentary practice, now up to its 4th edition. Such is the regard with which *Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand* is held, it is published in full on the New Zealand Parliament's website[10] and MPs refer to its contents when raising or debating points of order with the Speaker. Most academic accounts of parliament in New Zealand have a broader focus than the parliament itself, instead placing chapters on parliament in larger volumes on overall governance, the creation of policy, and wider questions about the motivations of voters and use of internet-based mediums, for example (see Hayward 2015 and Miller 2011). Chapters on parliament generally outline its functions of providing the executive, legislating, scrutinising the government, and representing constituents (Martin 2015; Wood and Rudd 2004; Mulgan 1997). Regarding scrutineering work, political scientists describe question time and the financial cycle, and place special emphasis of the strong role of select committees as well as the ability of the public to submit to them (Wood and Rudd 2004:67-64; Mulgan 1997:67-69).

These institutional accounts of New Zealand's Parliament are important. The parliament is complex and learning the formal rules of its functioning is central to understanding how those codes shape the work of MPs. That is reflected in my early field notes, which are peppered with the processes I was just learning about for the first time: "Unlike Britain and Australia, only someone in the Party needs to be present in the House to cast the party's votes, and proxies can be cast;" "The Whip's chair must always be filled;" "Time in the debating chamber does not always reflect real-world time." The way parliament is structured and traditionally functions provides the shape for how politics works in New Zealand.

However, in most scholarly accounts of parliament, the day-to-day detail, the people, and the political parties tend to be left out in favour of breadth. The effect of this is to remove the political contest itself from accounts of our political governance and, consequently, remove a sense of why politicians engage in parliament at all. There are two ways this occurs. The first is by providing purely descriptive accounts that sketch only the frame of the institution itself before linking to broader theoretical questions about, for example, what representation really is. These accounts lack a sense of how MPs move through such structural frames in political life, how they might adapt them, alter them, reinforce them, and respond to them as they cooperate and compete with others engaged in politics. The second is slightly more complex, but this example of an account of what happens in the debating chamber by Mulgan (2004:118-119) is illustrative:

> The main purpose of parliamentary debates and other business conducted in the Chamber, such as question time, is the pursuit of party advantage by both government and opposition parties. The seating of the House encourages this competitive atmosphere… Almost every word and also every action – body language is an important weapon in a politician's armoury – is designed to make one's opponents look weak or foolish and one's own side strong and responsible. The party leaders are constantly testing each other's competence and confidence. They know that they must maintain the support of their caucus colleagues sitting alongside and behind them. The quality of their parliamentary performance, whether they dominate their opponents or let themselves be dominated, is

[9] McGee was Clerk of the House of Representatives for 22 years, from 1985 to 2007.
[10] See https://www.parliament.nz/en/visit-and-learn/how-parliament-works/parliamentary-practice-in-new-zealand/

> a critical factor affecting their standing in the party, second only, perhaps, to their relative performance on television.

Such accounts take a structural component of New Zealand's Parliament – here, the Chamber's U-shaped seating plan that sees government and opposition sit directly across from each other – and generalises that across all parliamentary business, strategy, parties, people, and time. Analyses like Mulgan's (20014:118-119) are not necessarily incorrect, but neither – as this thesis shows – are they fully correct. Instead of reproducing a view that parliamentary speaking is always strategically consistent, identical whatever the business, centred on party leaders, and never boring or ignored, for example, this thesis seeks to address the strategic and practical variety of speaking in parliament. By linking the structural, strategic, and individual factors that shape what happens in the debating chamber, I open up the analytical space to understand the complex ways that MPs engage in in everyday political struggle in the House.

The exception to more institutional approaches is Skene's (1992:255-258) introduction of the idea that New Zealand's politicians engage in a "continuous election campaign" in parliament. He wrote:

> Parliament represents a forum in which the parties engage in a campaign for popular support through the procedures of the House. The executive must come to the House to govern; the Opposition takes the opportunity to chip away at its support by pointing out its faults… The Opposition could wage its campaign from beyond the chamber, but it is required to demonstrate its respect for, and willingness to use, the standard institutions of governance in order to be seen as a credible alternative. Parliament thus remains the only venue where individuals and groups can legitimately establish their right to exercise power, where rival teams *must* face each other in the public eye if they want to govern (Skene 1992:255, emphasis original).

He identifies several ways in which this affects parliamentary behaviour, including an emphasis on evaluating cross-party and -individual performance, a decreasing emphasis on individual-MP rather than whole-of-party legislative business, and its role in generating much of parliament's most infamous conduct such as interjections and insults (Skene 1992:155-257). Skene (1992:258) concludes that:

> Continuous electioneering encourages MPs to devote their energies to embarrassing the government, and, in doing so, undoubtedly reduces the time given to other parliamentary functions… Each party tries to project a positive image of itself, able and willing to govern, while building a negative impression of its opponent. In the end it is more *the nature of the performance,* rather than the facts of the situation, that determines who is best fit to govern.

While the concept of the 'permanent campaign' has become deeply embedded in political studies' understanding of New Zealand's politics, little further research has been completed about the ways MPs use parliament to win public support. This thesis builds on Skene's (1992) analysis by providing a deeper and more specific account of the way a political party attempts to win support from the House. It also emphasises the way developments outside of parliament, in this case in the field of political communication, have influenced how MPs think about and engage in parliamentary business.

The vast majority of writing about the way parties and politicians seek to win support in New Zealand centres on elections. That is to be expected, of course, because elections are where public

support is transferred to political power. New Zealand also has relatively frequent elections and these provide rich source material for those who study or follow politics and political strategy. Analysis of election campaign strategy in New Zealand abounds in real-time during elections as reporters, bloggers, and individual commenters weigh in on whether the strategies parties appear to enact are working well or not and, sometimes, suggest which alternative strategies should be adopted instead. The most well-known writing on elections in New Zealand are the triennial volumes published by Victoria University Political Scientists Jon Johansson[11] and Stephen Levine each cycle.[12] The edited books provide overviews written by party campaign leaders as well as chapters by journalists, commentators, and others with expertise in particular areas. In general, however, the main trends regarding elections in New Zealand identified in the academic literature are:

- Political parties maximise their vote by moving toward the centre to capture mainstream voters;
- Campaigning is increasingly presidential in style;
- Politicians are permanently engaged in election campaigning;
- Internet-based campaigning is increasingly used by the parties, and increasingly important;
- Modern campaigns increasingly draw on the services of professional experts.

Thus, overall, political strategy in New Zealand is seen to trend toward a mainstream-targeting campaign centred on the party's leader that makes use of both social and web media as well as professional expertise.

Examination of political communications is a central way political scientists analyse New Zealand's elections. New Zealand's academic writing about it has three general themes: it is etically-focused on the communication itself as an object of analysis; if not focused on objects produced by political parties during campaigns, it tends to focus on the media coverage of politics or public engagement in politics; it includes normative evaluations as to the state of democracy in New Zealand (see, for example, Kemp et al. 2016; Comrie 2012; and Hayward and Rudd 2004). That was reflected in the journal *Political Science's* special edition on the 2014 General Election, which Jack Vowles (2015:89) summarised in the introduction as focused on "the ways in which political parties and voters interact through various forms of political communication." However, the four articles of the special edition did not feature consideration of the ways in which political parties sought to interact with voters, instead focusing on how the media covered politics (Boyd and Bahador 2015; Fountaine and Comrie 2015), voters' support for and use of the internet to do politics with a particular focus on the variable support for e-voting (Crothers 2015), and electronic app Vote Compass which was designed for the public to use to gauge their political views and which party they should vote for (Lees-Marshment et al. 2015:95).[13] The only source I could find which referenced parties' processes of creating communication objects was Gibbons' (2004:22) one-page description of how election programmes were made. He identified that, strategically, "parties are aware of the need to appeal

[11] In late-2017, Jon Johansson shifted from academia to take up a position as New Zealand First's Chief of Staff in parliament (see Moir 2017).

[12] Publication of these election books is eventful, in recent years featuring launch speeches by the Prime Minister and a conference at Parliament attended by many of the country's political elite.

[13] Reflecting the slip between political science and political advice which is discussed in chapter two of this thesis, Lees-Marshment et al. (2005:107) instruct that due to a divergence between app users' views and some of their policies, the National Party "need to avoid becoming complacent," and "would do well to take lessons from Vote Compass" where specific policies are "out of line with public sentiment" or "risk being seen as unresponsive to the public."

to different groups, and to show how their policies will deal with current problems" (Gibbons 2004:22). Practically, leaders sought input of the wider party, considered the implications of previous election outcomes, then finalised the programme with other parliamentary and party leaders (Gibbons 2004:22). Programmes were also influenced by overseas campaigns (Gibbons 2004:22). Therefore, there are significant gaps in the literature on political communication in New Zealand regarding how and why communications are formed by political parties, especially outside of election campaigns.

Finally, research about individual politicians is also a focus of New Zealand's political studies field. There are several memoirs and accounts from other prominent New Zealand politicians which can provide insight into the way MPs think about politics and the strategy behind their actions. These include accounts written by politicians such as former Green MP and participant Holly Walker (2017), Bolger (1998), Lange (2005), and Wilson (1989). There are also works written about politicians such as those by Chamberlain (2017) on former Green MP Sue Bradford, Roughan (2017) on John Key, Welch (2009) on Helen Clark, Gustafson (2000) on Muldoon, Wright (1984) on David Lange, and Johansson (2005) on both Muldoon and Lange. While these types of sources can be useful, there are three key reasons they are of limited value to this research. Firstly, Rhodes, 't Hart, and Noordegraaf (2007:1) note that they can be "self-serving and only go some way in helping us understand the perceptions, motives and ideas underpinning elite actions." Secondly, such accounts also narrate events and decisions in hindsight, presenting an often clear and linear story to makes sense of why things happened the way they did rather than capturing often-times messy, uncertain, and indeterminate thinking, actions, and events as they unfold. Thirdly, like all people, politicians are often privately unclear about why they did what they did because they move through their environment with a practical sense that means they do not have to reason to a decision each time they take a course of action or make a statement. This thesis instead reveals what MPs take for granted in their everyday work, capturing the way they move strategically and practically through work on an everyday basis as the action unfolds.

Enabled by Bourdieu's theory of practice, this thesis joins together the structural, strategic, and dispositional factors that shape the practical and everyday work of MPs in New Zealand's Parliament that have historically been divided in scholarship on the subject. The benefit of this is that rather than having to choose among single or reductive causes to offer an explanation, it "takes a holistic approach to understanding institutions… in ways that, at most, predispose people towards certain practices" (Crewe 2010:314, 322). The holistic approach is able to better theoretically reflect the empirical reality that MPs are enmeshed in in their everyday work as they seek to fulfil their traditional parliamentary responsibilities and win support from the public.

Why does such an approach matter for understanding politics? In short, getting to be able to understand that empirical reality requires a different method, and that opens up new perspectives. One thing that the overwhelming majority of accounts named above have in common is that they are etic views of parliament, political strategy, and MPs. They study what is already in the public sphere.[14] However, etic approaches are "inadequate for grasping the complexities and subtleties of everyday life inside government" (Shore 2010:182). Instead, to understand why MPs think and speak the way they do, a researcher needs to 'be there' on the inside of politics to emically

[14] Of course, if the researcher is particularly linked-in to the political sphere, they might include a short anecdote of insider information to provide colour and interest to their accounts.

understand 'the native's point of view' (Shore 2007:182). Or, as Bourdieu (1993:271) put it: "one cannot grasp the most profound logic of the social world unless one becomes situated in the specificity of an empirical reality" through the study of practices. Understanding how the world looks to our politicians helps us to understand why politics happens the way that it does.

One thing all researchers who have conducted ethnographies of MPs have in common is that what they found challenged many of the taken-for-granted, commonsense, and popular views of how politics works. This thesis does that too. What I present in this thesis contrasts with the simple narratives New Zealand tends to have about how politicians speak to us, which are often conflated with how the media covers politics. The analyses are rarely flattering, with politicians and their staff largely characterised as manipulatively spinning if not outright lying as they seek the baubles of office. Those views are reinforced by media coverage which – at least during election campaigns – is increasingly negative and places a primacy on the personalities and machinations of the political game itself (Bahador et al. 2016:201, 215-216). Outside of election campaigns, where the spectacle of question time dominates the public imagination, MPs and Ministers are seen as childish, self-interested, embarrassing, not focused on solutions, and much more. There is public disillusionment with politics, and very low trust in politicians. But, politics and politicians are not always like that. My hope is that rather than feeling disillusioned and mistrustful, readers will finish this thesis with a deeper appreciation for the humanity, genuine effort, and deep concern for our country that our politicians overwhelmingly exhibit in their everyday work.

The Contribution to Ethnographic Understandings of Parliament

Anthropology has always struggled to study up. Nader (1974:291), famously, was the first to call for anthropologists to study up, arguing that we could not properly understand our social world without understanding powerful people: "The consequences of not studying up as well as down are serious in terms of developing adequate theory and description. If one's pivot point is around those who have responsibility by virtue of being delegated power, then the questions change." Even though Nader's call to study up has become a central citation for the discipline, in the 45 years since she made it, anthropologists have continued to largely ignore the worlds of elite actors, including politicians[15] (Gusterson 1997). Auyero and Joseph (2007:1) identified that:

> At a time when few, if any, objects are beyond the reach and scrutiny of ethnographers, it is quite surprising that politics and its main protagonists (state officials, politicians, and activists) remain largely un(der)studied by ethnography's mainstream. It is indeed fair to say that both routine (party, union, NGO) and contentious… politics are far from the top of contemporary ethnography's agenda… It is time to move politics out of the shadows and into the centre of ethnographic attention.

The workings of parliaments remain largely in the shadows for anthropology and, given their central role in producing social structures and beliefs, that collective blind spot does leave a large gap in anthropology's ability to consider why things might be the way they are.

[15] This thesis draws on two strands of ethnographies: Those focused on the lives and work of British MPs, reflecting that New Zealand's Parliament is built on the Westminster tradition as a result of its colonial history, and the way that communication works in the United States' political system, reflecting that Green Party MPs and staff oriented themselves toward what was considered effective there.

My work builds on anthropologist Emma Crewe's (2015b) research in Britain's House of Commons, which details the working lives of MPs. Taking a broad and cross-party approach, Crewe spent 2011-2013 enmeshed in the lives of those who work in Westminster, interviewing a range of people from MPs to Clerks, observing what happened in debates and committees, participating in constituency activities, tracing the development of a legislative clause, examining a range of texts including Hansard and media articles, and more (Crewe 2017:159-161). Her purpose, she wrote, was to "see what parliamentary work looked like from the [backstage] viewpoint of parliamentarians themselves" (Crewe 2015b:1, 9). Crewe (2015b:213-226) found a complex, challenging, and changing world as MPs engaged in a kaleidoscope of varied relationships and sites with different cultures, hierarchies, and representational responsibilities; sought to communicate in the best way despite the tensions that involved; and managed the ambiguities that their working lives entailed. The two most relevant sections of Crewe's work to this thesis focus on how MPs manage complexity and how their speech is influenced in their work.

Crewe's (2015b) ethnography of the House of Commons reveals the complexity and variability of MP work. In relation to opposition work like questions for written answer or the Address in Reply, Crewe (2015b:152) writes that "the rules, conventions and cast for each of these [scrutineering] processes are completely different. From the viewpoint of MPs, adapting to these various sites requires knowledge of the endlessly complex procedural rules and different styles of performance for multiple audiences and demands" (Crewe 2015b:152). That complexity extends to the broader political field MPs operate in, where they "have to cope with being in several imaginary and real places at one time – past and future as well as present, the audience in front of them but also the other audiences mediated through the television or Twitter. They adapt to multiple audiences and deal with conflicts and contradictions between their various roles" (Crewe 2015b:225). Therefore, not only do MPs have to navigate the complex structures and processes of parliament as they act to scrutinise the government, they must also do so in the nexus of criss-crossing and, at times, conflicting temporalities, audiences, and mediums.

Crewe (2015b:153) argues that the way MPs provide a sense of continuity across the "chaotic diversity and dynamism" that makes up parliamentary life is through ritual, rhythm, and riff. The degree of ritualization varies across parliamentary events depending on their social and cultural significance, ranging from the highly-ritualised and symbolically rich opening of parliament, to the less-ritualised and formal closed select committee sessions (Crewe 2015b:154-155). Rhythm, addressed in greater depth in Chapter Four, provides cyclical calendrical continuity across time and space for MPs (Crewe 2015b:154). Finally, MPs use riffs – short linguistic formulations that make sense of ideology and communicate it as policies and argument, each improvised for different audiences – to "give shape to the speech-interactions between politicians – that is, the content of their social performance" (Crewe 2015b:154). Riffs, which may be considered akin to messages in this thesis, are used repeatedly, vary in length, are tailored in form and content to the specific audience and situation, and are congruent with the riffs of others in the party or parliament (Crewe 2015b:153). Their formulaic consistency and practical variability have the effect that, if done well, the politician appears not to be speaking in a riff and provides a sense of consensus among politicians who share riffs (Crewe 2015b:153). Ritual, rhythm, and riff provide the scaffolding through which MPs are able to make ordered sense from the everyday mess of political life.

As well as riffs, in her research, Crewe identifies some other influences that shape the form and content of politicians' speech. She identifies that wider social norms and socialisation exert an effect on MPs in parliament. For example, Crewe (2015a:26, 27) outlines that women MPs can be at a disadvantage in the aggressive "gladiatorial verbal battles" that comprise highly-public events like the Prime Minister's Question Time, as well as the self-promotional aspects of political life, because such speech is not considered appropriate for women who are "socialised into diffidence." In contrast, women MPs can "perform with confidence in deliberative debates, Select Committees and in constituencies" (Crewe 2015a:26). Secondly, in her work in Britain's House of Lords, Crewe points to the importance of self-regulation to shape the form and content of debate among peers. She writes: "Reputation is built on observing the rules and behaving in a manner fit for a peer. The most important quality by far is courtesy, and speakers should show respect to the House, listen carefully to others, not speak for too long, avoid repetition, be dispassionate, serious and thoughtful, and appear to put national interest above that of party, group or individual" (Crewe 2010:315, 2005). It is not only the practice of the peers that produces the polite and restrained speech of the House of Lords; other actors such as the Clerks, who pre-approve the wording of motions, and the Hansard staff, who remove 'controversial' language and add formal titles, all contribute to creating the speech that occurs during the debate.

Crewe's work on politicians' speech highlights that not only should researchers pay attention to the form and content of what MPs say, but that the ways in which those statements are formed should also be examined. In her work, Crewe highlights that there are multiple influences that shape the ways of speaking across the variable situations in which MPs find themselves, including the need to produce a consensus cross-party view, or a socialised requirement for diffidence, an internalised rule-adherence, or, indeed, that other actors produce the speech. That variability requires MPs to have a practical sense of what the appropriate and strategic statements to make in any given situation are. My research builds on this, working first from the question of what the dominant influences generating MPs' speech are and then examining the ways that those influences shape and limit what MPs do and do not say. This examination reveals that the multiple influences of the field of political communication, the parliament, and the individual dispositions of the MPs themselves produce criss-crossing and, at times, conflicting influences for MPs that they must practically manage in their everyday work.

R.A.W. Rhodes, who spearheads advocacy for interpretivism and ethnography in political science, has also completed ethnographic work in the British political system. His most recent ethnography, *Everyday Life in British Government,* focuses on the way political administrators in British departments, including Ministers, understand what they are doing and how that affects their daily work (Rhodes 2011:2). His fieldwork consisted of shadowing two Ministers and three permanent secretaries for five days each as well as being situated in the offices of two Ministers and three permanent secretaries for two days each (Rhodes 2011:8). Overall, he spent 420 hours conducting fieldwork (Rhodes 2011:8). There are two contributions his work makes that I want to highlight here.

Firstly, Rhodes underscores that politicians can draw on multiple, conflicting interpretations to make sense and shape of their work. He identifies that Ministers and others in the government administration interpret their work primarily through the Westminster tradition, but that that model co-exists with managerial and network governance interpretations of government (Rhodes 2011:281). Westminster is the "dominant narrative" and is the model for governmental beliefs and practices that politicians and administrators "inherit" (Rhodes 2011:306-307). Westminster exists

and works because people believe in it, even if Westminster itself has multiple, contestable, and imprecise meanings (Rhodes 2011:307). While Westminster is dominant, Rhodes (2011:17, 281) found that managerialism and network governance "co-exist" in the ways that the "political and administrative elites of central government departments make sense of their worlds" as the latter two have been "grafted onto" the former. However, because the three models are "incommensurable" and "do not fit together," recurring dilemmas are produced – for example, between constitutional bureaucracy and political responsiveness (Rhodes 2011:284). Dilemmas created contradictory demands that political administrators needed to "manage" in their everyday work (Rhodes 2011:284).

Secondly, Rhodes draws attention to stories that "spell out" shared meanings and understandings, and storytelling in political life (Rhodes 2011:188). Used broadly in his ethnographic work, Rhodes paints "the portrait of a storytelling political-administrative elite with beliefs and practices rooted in the Westminster model that uses protocols and rituals to domesticate rude surprises and recurrent dilemmas" (Rhodes 2011:2). Rhodes (2011:289) argues that there are three "characteristics" of storytelling: the language game, performing game, and management game. The first is where the story is identified and constructed – where "questions of what happened and why" are answered to create a "reliable, defensible, accurate, and [organisationally and traditionally] consistent" story (Rhodes 2011:289). Then, secondly, the story is tested, rehearsed, adapted, and performed to wider internal and public audiences (Rhodes 2011:289). Finally, any required action is taken and "business as usual" returns (Rhodes 2011:289). Practicing this model, when dilemmas or rude surprises arise, such events can be managed into domestication again through storytelling.

The picture that Rhodes paints of actors in British departments is of people who strongly believe in the Westminster system but who are also influenced by more recent changes in managerial and governance thinking outside the political system. Not only must the Ministers and public servants adhere to the Westminster system, but they also feel a need to respond with speed, to personalise decision-making responsibility, and more, to meet expectations of those more modern schools of thought. When those different pressures and requirements conflict, politicians and public servants tell stories – to themselves and others – to make sense of what is happening. This research builds on Rhodes' work by examining how MPs respond to the introduction of another modern school of thought, political communication, alongside and into the traditional parliamentary system. Like Rhodes, I find that its increasing dominance in the field can produce tensions for MPs as they attempt to work through the sometimes-conflicting strategic approach that political communication advocates with the daily oppositional parliamentary work and dispositions of individual MPs. However, the Green MPs did not resolve these tensions through internal storytelling as they were irresolvable. Rather, the Greens used their practical sense to navigate the tensions in order to generate the most strategic statement for each situation.

Geddes' (2016) and Stuart's (2008) research both underscore the importance of MPs' understanding of their role and work in shaping their parliamentary actions. Political Scientist Marc Geddes uses Rhodes' interpretivist approach to understand British select committees, drawing attention to six different ways MPs can perform scrutiny on them: "(i) as specialists and advocates; (ii) as lone wolves, (iii) as constituency champions, (iv) as party helpers or safety nets, (v) as learners or (vi) as absentees" (Geddes 2016:3, 82). Such variation in scrutiny activity occurs not only because "the concept of scrutiny is contested" but because "MPs are thrust into a chaotic and unstructured world, and, subsequently, they interpret their role in their own individual ways. In doing so, they create

different parliamentary habits, routines and practices, which means that members push and pull scrutiny in different directions" (Geddes 2016:226, 81-82). "Being an MP," Geddes (2016:109) writes, "is complex and contested, with no right answer."

Stuart's (2008) work examines how interpretations of the parliamentary workplace in New Zealand shape the way MPs manage emotion in it. She identified that there are three repertoires by which MPs "make sense of the emotional labouring aspects of their work" (Stuart 2008:118). They are: (i) the Game, which "draws on imagery of the competitive interaction of a game or contest in which either individuals or teams view for the prize at hand" and which "makes emotion peripheral" (Stuart 2008:100, 119); (i) the Performance, which "draws on imagery of the staged performance… [that] results in an understanding of politics as a world of drama in which sustaining a performance of act is essential to communicate successfully" and which "makes emotion a resource" (Stuart 2008:102, 119); and, (iii) the Crusade, which draws "on the imagery of war and battle… [alongside] fellow warriors, there through mutual commitment to defend a moral cause" and which "makes emotion authentic" (Stuart 2008:104, 119). Stuart argues that MPs must deploy all three repertoires to be an "ideal parliamentarian worker" who exhibits "passionate rationality" (Stuart 2008:106, 143).

The strength of Geddes' and Stuart's work is their focus on the variable interpretations and practices that MPs can use in their parliamentary work. They demonstrate that across the House, there are shared approaches to scrutiny and emotional management that MPs can draw on changeably in their work. Like Crewe and Rhodes, they highlight the intense complexity of the work that MPs undertake across multiple parliamentary activities. However, both Geddes and Stuart speak generally about individual MPs, and their primary material is anonymised to shield the identity of participants. In this research, the character and individuality of the MPs I worked with was central to explaining their dispositions and practices as they undertook their daily work. My work highlights how the specific dispositions of Holly, Kennedy, Gareth, and Catherine shaped both their practical sense and actual practices when making statements, showing that understanding the human specificity of MPs is important for understanding what happens in politics too.

The other anthropologist whose work I draw on in this thesis is Marc Abélès'. In particular, I draw on his analysis of legislating in the French National Assembly, which examined the ritual struggle and exegetic activity representatives engage in to write laws that produce norms which apply across the whole of a society (Abélès 2006; 2008). Those studies are described in more depth in Chapter Four and I draw on them in my analysis of legislating in New Zealand's Parliament in Chapter Five. Abélès has a long history of politically-focused research. His early work concerned local politics and legitimacy in the department of Yonne in France's Burgundy region (Abélès 1991:xi). There, among other things, he found that "what makes local political life so interesting in a country like France is the margin of play between the formal aspects of political activity – membership of a party, the well-ordered antagonism between the main parties – and the whole world of relationships that forms the indispensable and ubiquitous backdrop to that activity" (Abélès 1991:267). He has also focused on understanding the particular culture of the European Union as a transnational organisation (see Shore and Abélès 2004).

Apart from this research, the only other academic to go inside a political party's parliamentary wing is Dr Russel Norman who, by coincidence, was also Co-leader of the Green Party at the time of my research. Norman's (1995; 2001) political science research centred on an examination of the Alliance, a five-Party left wing coalition formed in 1991 that included the Green Party up until 1997.

Both publications were based on the insider knowledge he gained by participating in the Alliance. The first of these, however, *The New Zealand Alliance: A Post-Marxist Interpretation*, is much more etically-focused (Norman 1995). It explores eleven discourses of the Alliance, arguing that it "is a clear example of a post-Marxist counter-hegemonic bloc without a class core" such that the "complex array of discourses and their articulations actually is the Alliance formation" (Norman 1995:63,65). While Norman relied primarily on interview material, meaning that the participant-observation he conducted as part of his research was backgrounded, there are still "few references to [his] own observations" in his Doctoral thesis (Norman 2001:95). Norman (2001) uses that knowledge to argue that there is a positive relationship between internal democracy and external effectiveness. He states that this is "because active members are an important power resource… and internal democracy is important to their motivation for activism" (Norman 2001:4). Being on the inside and doing participant-observation of the Alliance enabled Norman to understand how the Alliance worked internally, thus allowing a deeper analysis than would otherwise be gained from other methodological approaches.

There is no ethnographic research about the New Zealand Green Party, except for the study of the Party's Policy Committee wing I completed for my Master's Degree which examined how the Committee enacted the moral principle of appropriate decision-making in their policy-making process (Bignell 2012). Most research about the Greens takes a comparative approach, either comparing the Greens with other political parties in New Zealand (Mulgan 2004; Rainbow and Sheppard, 1997) or with international Green Parties (Dann 2008; Bale and Bergman 2006a, 2006b; Bale and Dann 2002). Analysis of the Greens and their Alliance years is also found in Miller's (2010; 2006; 2003; 2001) collections on politics and government in New Zealand and, more recently, Hayward's (2015, see Ford 2015) updated volume, but these chapters are also etically-focused and more concerned with understanding the Greens as part of a broader political system. Several other studies also adopt this focus (Wilson 2010; Bale 2003; Trotter 2001) or seek to understand the relationship between the Party's electoral outcomes and voters' values (Carroll et al. 2009). Research about international green parties follows similar trends and is concerned mainly with European Green Parties. One key area of focus is evaluative work on Green Parties' electoral prospects and their performance (Carter 2008; Bluhdorn 2009; Müller-Rommel 2002; Müller-Rommel and Poguntke 2002; Poguntke 1993). A second situates green parties in a wider environmental movement and explores the implications for their politics (Carter 2001; Talshir 2002). Generally, international literature on Green Parties centres on two main narratives: firstly, that Green Parties have longevity and are on the verge of electoral breakthroughs as societies' values shift to ones which align more closely to green parties' (see Birch 2009; Spoon 2009). As noted earlier in this introduction, most recent research on the Green Party has considered their 'rebranding' and what that means for their electoral success (see Ford 2015; O'Brien 2013; Harstshorn-Sanders 2006; Welch 2011; and Macdonald 2010). Less attention, then, has been paid to the "inward-looking face" (Charlot 1989:361) of the New Zealand Greens. Each of these accounts is valuable and tells us something about how the Green Party works, but they do not tell the whole story of the Green Party's logic and, by methodological design, do not consider what does not make it into the public sphere or events as they unfold.

The central contribution of my thesis to ethnographies of parliament is that its site is the inside of one political party, rather than taking a cross-party or whole-of-parliament approach. The key advantage of my approach is that it recognises that the party is the unit which primarily drives what happens in parliament and gets behind the boundaries of party discipline. MPs in New Zealand's

Parliament do not act independently (Skene 1992:248). All MPs elected are members of political parties;[16] it is exceptional that they do not vote en bloc; and they overwhelmingly tend to refrain from breaking unity with their party by 'waka jumping' or resigning. Among the caucuses, "the obligation of collective solidarity is accepted without question" (Mulgan 2004:113). It is the strength of the parties that provides the Executive with political dominance (Wood and Rudd 2004:76). That means that to understand what is happening in New Zealand's politics, one must understand the parties. And to understand the parties, a researcher ought to be on their inside. Just like the change in vantage that results from being on the inside of parliament offers a different view of what is happening, so too does being even further on the inside.

There are three advantages to that view. First, being on the inside of one political party allows a researcher to construct an ethnography that addresses strategy and aim with depth. This provides a sense of what a party stands for, why they engage in politics, and how they work strategically to make what the party stands for supported that cross-party ethnographies cannot. Second, while parliament does structure the field, because the object of study is not necessarily the parliament system, other influences on MPs' statements and practices – whether internal relations within the party, the advice of political staff, or fields outside parliament – come to the fore in explaining their daily work. Finally, it puts both the MPs and their entire parliamentary office staff at the centre of analysis, so that MPs are not understood primarily as independent actors but rather as a group engaged in strategic thinking and acting together as part of their daily work to win in politics.

The vision of the social world is not natural even if it is taken for granted. It must be constantly reproduced by the efforts of politicians and the recognition of the public. The struggle to define our social field is "extremely dynamic" but it is not unconstrained (Lane 2006:57). If the social world is made and remade through language and action, being there in the field that shapes the possibilities and limits of what can be done and said to bring it about is essential for understanding the world we live in. Examining the empirical reality of the Green Party and its MPs to win the double stakes of politics – the power to impose the legitimate vision and division of the social world and to exercise governmental power – is essential for understanding how Aotearoa New Zealand's social world is made.

Outline of Thesis Chapters

This introduction has traversed a lot of areas, from the productive power of language; to the purpose and stakes of the political game, to the three drivers of the logic of messaging, being in parliament in opposition, and individual dispositions that preconstrain what politicians say; to the structural, political, and strategic context of 2013; and, finally, some of the gaps in the current knowledge regarding parliaments and the parties that work in them. Hopefully, this introduction has imbued some sense of the complexity MPs are enmeshed in everyday, operating practically at the nexus of multiple, variable, sometimes conflicting strategies that must respond to the particular context MPs are situated in and responding to. The order of Chapters in this thesis also reflects the ordered chaos that MPs experience in their day-to-day working lives, running from speaking on the second reading of a bill to doing a media interview on a completely different topic to replying to an

[16] The last MP to be elected independently in a general election occurred in 1943; however, Winston Peters won a 1993 Tauranga by-election independently (Miller 2005:195).

email from an advisor about the next steps of a new campaign on a third issue. Life in parliament is both very regular and immensely mutable, and that is captured in the structure of this thesis. This thesis has two loose parts: Chapters Two, Three, and Four discuss the three drivers that preconstrain MPs' statements. Chapters Five through Nine show how those drivers shape everyday practice to produce certain ways of speaking and speech across several areas central to opposition MPs' work.

Chapter Two is about modern political communication. It has three purposes: to outline the objectification and rationalisation of the field of political communication, theorise how the field of political communication works to produce the belief in its own rightness, and to discuss the anthropological understanding of message. It draws particularly on the work of George Lakoff (2004) and Drew Westen (2007), who were highly influential on the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand's own thinking and practices. The Chapter shows that the field of political communication was able to produce a belief that their principles and prescriptions for messaged statements were the "politically effective and legitimate forms of perception and expression," providing the logic for the production of politicians' statements and the basis of the statements that the public is predisposed to believe (Bourdieu 1991:173).

Chapter Three is about the methods and MPs. It outlines how I conducted the research before providing biographies of Holly Walker, Gareth Hughes, Catherine Delahunty, and Kennedy Graham. These biographies provide an insight into their worldviews and dispositions. It shows that even though the MPs understood how politics worked and had the competency to play the game, they often did not feel an authentic "fit" in the political field – they did not always perceive "it immediately as endowed with meaning and interest" or have an immediate "coincidence between disposition and position" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:128). That lack of fit allowed the Green MPs to consider different ways of thinking politically and doing politics.

Chapter Four is about the structure of parliament and what opposition work is. Because much of the daily work of opposition MPs has not been explored in the literature, I take a broad approach in outlining some important parts of what Green MPs do in parliament to provide the context for subsequent Chapters. It also draws attention to the wide-ranging practical skill MPs must acquire and use to do their opposition work well. I make the case that the complexity of parliament is exhibited in the day-to-day strategies and practices that make up opposition work in it as MPs seek to both do their opposition work well and adhere to the principles and prescriptions of messaging.

Chapter Five is about strategic reproduction of parliament. Using the case study of Holly's work on the passage of the Plumbers, Gasfitters, and Drainlayers Amendment Bill 2013, I show how Holly worked to reproduce the parliament as a site of regulated consensus, particularly with regard to the ability of interest groups to express their dissension to the parliament in select committee submissions. I argue that by reproducing the regulated consensus of parliament, Holly was able to build her personal political capital as well as position and represent the Greens as credible, competent, and trustworthy politicians who would not only adhere to Parliament's regulated consensus, but sought to uphold the very process that enabled it to exist.

Chapter Six is about message discipline. The Chapter argues that message discipline is a practice that produces public statements by, firstly, producing a disposition toward self-censorship among MPs that generates the practice of speaking on-message in public and, secondly, by being internally

enforced to prevent off-message statements becoming public. I show that message discipline is not totalising but it is an orthodox practice, and draw on Bourdieu's (1991:172) work to demonstrate how it "produces an effect of censorship."

Chapter Seven explores the Green Party's issues messaging. I outline the strategy and practice of the Party's top-line messaging on social, environmental, and economic issues. The Chapter demonstrates that the Green Party did not seek to broaden their base to win governmental power at the expense of the purity of their vision; rather, they exhibited concern about ensuring that they had the balance right between pursuing government by messaging and maintaining their values.

Chapter Eight explores how messaging is practiced in question time. I show how MPs need to practically master position, disposition, and message to manage question time. To do that, the Green MPs pre-prepared questions before going to the House with the aim that question time would unfold the way they had predicted. Shaping that unfolding in a way that met their aims of holding the Government to account, messaging, and generating media interest required a good practical sense.

Chapter Nine explores MPs' practices aimed at getting media coverage. It shows that making statements in the media is complex, as MPs must manage all the drivers of political statements while responding to and commenting on specific issues. In examining the strategies, styles, and practical parts of media work in the Green Party, I show that MPs must have a good practical skill to make media statements successfully.

Chapter Ten concludes the thesis. I tie the overall argument back together to summarise how the functioning of the political field preconstrains what MPs can say and therefore the vision of the world they can state and make real. I also add some further comments regarding updating Bourdieu's analysis of the political field for proportional and modern politics, and consider further research questions for political anthropologists to consider.

Chapter Two

Modern Political Communication through the Lens of Bourdieu: How Messaging Strategies Shape What Politicians Say

If we don't frame the world, people frame the world for us (Catherine Delahunty)

Like all people, politicians move through their daily lives with a 'feel for the game' that guides and generates what they do and what they say. A feel for the game is an understanding of how it works; "that is, the configuration of practices involving the players in question, its underlying logic, and its cultural goal" (Ortner 2006:5). Politicians, even if not feeling at home in the game, develop a practical sense of what to do in each moment to improve their position and acquire capital as they strive toward winning governmental power and the belief of the public. One of the skills that MPs develop based on that practical sense is their ability to speak effectively to an audience given the specific circumstance in which they are speaking: their role, the audience, the mediator, the issue, the effect they want to generate, how public their words are, the medium by which their words will be disseminated, which words or actions will be singled out for analysis by journalists and commentators, and much more. Politicians who become good communicators develop a masterful skill in their ability to speak to people credibly, competently, and appealingly in order to produce the effect of belief, support, and mobilisation that is based on their practical sense of what is to be done in a given situation.

The modern field of political communication objectifies, codifies, and rationalises politicians' communicative skill and practical sense, producing principles and prescriptions that state how politicians should speak to win over the public. Writing more broadly about bureaucratic, academic, and other institutions that teach how politics works and is done, Bourdieu (1991:177, emphasis original) argued that:

> [Those institutions] select and educate the professional producers of the schemes of thought and expression of the social world – politicians, political journalists, high-ranking civil servants, etc. – at the same time as they codify the *rules* according to which the field of ideological production functions and the corpus of knowledge and practical skills indispensable for them to conform to these rules. The 'political science' taught in the institutions specially designed to fulfil that purpose is the *rationalization* of the competence demanded by the universe of politics and possessed in a practical form by professionals: it aims at increasing the efficiency of this practical mastery by putting at its service rational techniques, such as opinion polls, public relations and political marketing, at the same time as it tends to legitimate it by giving it the appearance of scientificity and by treating political questions as matters for specialists which it is the specialists' responsibility to answer in the name of knowledge and not of class interests.

As part of that broader field of teaching politics, political communication objectifies, codifies, and rationalises the content, form, and effect of what politicians say or do not say and how they say it. Agents in the field of political communication in the broadest sense, from academics to political

pundits to those who make posts on social media, exert a symbolic power that confirms the codes that they produce as the generator of action and effect in the world that is measured by their own codes in a reproductive and reconfirming cycle (Bourdieu 1991:170). That not only masks the very practical skill and sense politicians require to communicate in their daily work – a practical knowledge of what they should do and say in each situation – but it has the effect of shaping the game itself so that politicians, who pay attention to what people say will make them more effective and evaluate their own work on that basis, act on the principles and prescriptions that political communication codifies.

One of Bourdieu's firm propositions was that the representation of the social world is arbitrary and that what appears natural is, in fact, socially constituted; therefore, even though the principles and prescriptions of modern political communication appear to describe the world as it is because of the symbolic power they exert, they are a construction that requires constant reproduction to make real. More simply, the principles of political communication nonetheless act as real, objective phenomena because everyone believes they are. That this is so can be seen by tracing though the history of the field of political communication, marked first by an ability to apply science to political questions, to a belief in the effectiveness of the right communication to change public opinion, to its increasing practical and evaluative entrenchment by players in the political field, to its current form as message.

The purpose of this Chapter is to outline the *objectification and rationalisation of political communication itself,* theorise *how the field of political communication works to produce the belief in its own rightness,* and discuss the *anthropological understanding of message*. I briefly trace the field's development and its main tenets, showing how the academic field has enabled and drives the production of messaging as a dominant form of political communication. Then, I describe the work of Lakoff (2004) and Westen (2007) as well as the Green Party's belief in their principles. Finally, I outline the anthropological understanding of messaging, drawing attention to the work of linguistic anthropologists Michael Lempert and Michael Silverstein (2012) to make the case that it is in fact a messy, indeterminate, and uncertain practice. Overall, this chapter shows that the field of political communication and its principles and prescriptions for messaging dominantly produce the belief that messaged statements are the "politically effective and legitimate forms of perception and expression," provide the logic for the production of politicians' statements and act as the basis of those statements that the public is predisposed to believe (Bourdieu 1991:173).

The Rationalisation of Politicians' Practical Communicative Skill and Sense

Political communication has not always been a field, and its emergence and entrenchment is a particularly American history. While, of course, the practical ability of politicians to make inspiring oratorical speeches has always been admired and political parties have always made campaign slogans with the intention of winning support, this section charts the rise of politicians' words as objects. That history begins in early-20th century U.S., when scholars began to apply scientific methodologies to political questions, paving the way for later studies evaluating the use and effectiveness of political communication designed to change public opinion (Farr 2003:436; Smith 2007:118). Near the turn of the century, during Bill Clinton's 1990s U.S. Presidency, the science of political communication began to be used in a sustained way by politicians in office and formed a

key component of journalistic and popular perceptions of political competency (Lempert and Silverstein 2012:49). In the 2000s, the theory of political communication entered a new, dominant phase as it became the prevailing explanatory principle for the failure of Democratic candidates John Kerry and Al Gore to win the presidency against Republican George W. Bush (Jackson 2011:473). The way they talked to the public and what they said, experts claimed, failed to communicate messages that voters found appealing and would vote for. Democratic academic-consultants like George Lakoff (2004) and Drew Westen (2007) became superstars in the field, using their neuroscientific expertise to diagnose the problems, identify the principles of effective messaging, and prescribe the content and form of words and phrases that Democratic politicians should use to win office again. Barack Obama's 2008 victory, credited to his oratorical skill and message of hope, provided Democratic supporters with the evidence that skill with words mattered and won them elections (Lakoff 2008a; Westen 2008). Obama's victory sealed good political communication as a necessary competency for politicians to be successful in the political game. Moreover, it sealed the diagnostic and prescriptive power of political communication experts so that what they identified as the right way to communicate was believed to be the right way to communicate.

The first stage of the codification and rationalisation of political communication was a deeply significant development which enabled the scientific method to be applied to a broad range of political questions. This new approach, called "modernist empiricism" by Smith (2007:118), overturned the previous academic orthodoxy as U.S. scholars in the early 20th century began to reject what they saw as the grand developmental narratives of the historical and evolutionary approaches to political development and issues that had characterized the previous century. Instead, they sought to apply new quantitative techniques from the sciences, like surveys and measurement, to the study of politics in order to discern "eternal truths" of politics (Smith 2007:119, 128). Scholars employed new methodologies focused on "gathering and summarizing empirical data" which "atomize[d] and compartmentalize[d] the flux of reality" with the ideal of achieving the same 'value-free' descriptions of the world that the natural sciences claimed to (Adcock et al. 2007:9). The new approach was given legitimacy by the publication of influential political scientist Charles Merriman's (1925) *New Aspects of Politics,* which argued for the primacy of the scientific treatment of politics.[17] The application of scientific methodologies to the study of politics, allowing measurement, objectification, and quantitative analysis thus marked the beginnings of its rationalisation by bringing questions of politics under "scientific control" which required specialist knowledge to answer (Farr 2003:434).

The second major milestone was the use and effectiveness of psychological principles to change public opinion via specific forms of political communication in the U.S. during the First World War. Prior to the First World War, the introduction of psychology to political studies had turned attention to "techniques for actual control and training for citizens" (Farr 2003:435). The use of those techniques in practice was driven by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, who needed to convince an unsupportive public that entering the First World War was the right thing for America to do. To that

[17] Merriman's approach was not uncontested. The fierce rivalry between Charles Merriman and Charles Beard became well-known as the 'battle of the two Charlies'. Beard viewed the scientific method as suitable for some questions of politics but not all: politics contained "emotional and intellectual imponderables" for which statistical and logical methods were "useless," especially in the pursuit of social justice and ethics (Smith 2007:131). Beard contested Merriman's view that the scientific method produced unbiased and therefore ethical conclusions, instead arguing for a notion of relativity and the collection of as much data as possible to understand the larger historical narrative of society (Smith 2007:133, 131).

end, he established the Committee for Public Information, which was tasked with changing public opinion to support America's war efforts. Two of the most influential practitioners on that committee were Edward Bernays, later called 'the father of public relations', who published *The Engineering of Consent* in 1947, and Walter Lipmann, who published *Public Opinion* in 1922. Their work on the Committee for Public Information was a success: America entered the War with public support in 1917. Success proved for many that applying psychological techniques to populations could change public opinion on political issues; over time, as methodologies and technologies advanced, political psychology turned to changing the opinions of individuals (Farr 2007:93). While Post-War there was distaste for the use of propaganda, buoyed by the advances in psychology and public opinion it was produced by and enabled, scholars focused on analysing the content and effectiveness of the War's propaganda (Farr 2003:436). The use of propaganda during the War proved that psychology and communication could be used to change what the public thought about issues and their political positions. The subsequent analysis of that effectiveness established the content and forms of communication as objects of study in themselves, able to be identified and codified by experts.

During the middle quarters of the 20th century, the field of political communication become more dominant in elections as the use of experts by campaigns increased and, concurrently, academics turned increasingly to the study of the new object. Sanders (2009) identified several key milestones: in 1928 and 1932 respectively, the Democratic and Republican parties opened public relations offices. Soon thereafter, in 1933, the first political consultancy firm, Campaigns Incorporated, was opened, prescribing the still-central rule that "frequent repetition of a key theme was the key" to being elected (Sanders 2009:13). From 1936, candidates began to use advertising agencies to make themselves more appealing to the public. In 1946, opinion polling began to be used seriously. The advent and spread of television in households during the 1950s and 1960s, intertwining audial and visual statements in mass media for the first time during political advertising and debates, meant the introduction of marketing and polling into the production of statements (Sanders 2009:13). Thus, the use of experts from a range of fields came to be used in service of making politicians speak and appear more appealing to the public so that they would be able to influence public opinion and win election.

During the same period, academics, journalists, and commentators turned to the study and analysis of the new objects of politicians' communication. In doing so, they further codified what politicians and their advisors had been doing in practice. While the political campaigning and consulting "industry was visible enough to attract the attention of academic investigators" by the 1950s, two developments in the 1970s cemented the role of academic analysis in understanding political communication (Powell and Cowart 2003:8). First, in 1974, research confirmed the agenda-setting role of the media in campaigns, a fact which politicians had long had a practical sense of but which was codified and named by the academy (Sanders 2009:13). Sanders (2009:13) wrote that the development "represented a significant moment in political communications research, pointing to the real contribution that researchers might make in understanding its practice." Secondly, in 1978, the *Guardian Weekly* became the first news organisation to use the word "spin," an identification that codified a particular type of communication and became a dominant organising principle for understanding what politicians were doing and saying. Now, 'spin' is everywhere; in the academy, it is an analytic concept used to understand what politicians are doing, with a focus on creating typologies between bad unethical spinning and good routine information spinning, as well as examining they types of activities and statements that fall into each category (see Craig 2016;

Edwards 2016; Hobbs 2016). With the new category of spin, academics, journalists, and commentators could begin to orient and evaluate the actions of politicians around their communicative style. Publicly, however, spin has been viewed nearly exclusively as negative. Seeking to avoid negative perceptions of their speaking, politicians have been keen to distance themselves from it as they instead seek to present an authentic image of being anti-spin or "anti-message" to the public (Silverstein 2011b:214). The dominance of 'spin' as a category of thought, both in the public's understanding of what politicians do and in the academy's understanding that it is a research object, indicate the use and effect of symbolic power to categorise and produce spin itself as giving name to and codify the communicative practices of politicians.

The power of spin as a way of understanding what politicians were doing continued but, in 1992, a new organising principle was introduced: message. Message, at first, was used in relation to what would be termed 'message discipline' today – print media evaluated whether Democratic U.S. Presidential candidate at the time Bill Clinton was 'on message' or 'off message' with regard to his campaign platform (Lempert and Silverstein 2012:49). Referring right back to the rule codified by Campaigns Incorporated in the 1930s that key themes should be repeated, analysts began to evaluate how well Clinton adhered to his key slogans and campaign platform. Reflecting the increasing importance of adherence to political communication's principles as a skill for an effective politician, during Clinton's presidency there was a "dramatic increase" in the political consulting industry, and Clinton's second term of 1997-2001 was "renowned for its unprecedented use of strategic polling and psychologistic brand-development techniques, not just for [his] re-election campaign but also for its guidance in the policies and decision of governance itself" (Lempert and Silverstein 2012:49). During Clinton's two campaigns and Presidential terms, communicative skill increasingly centred on the principle of message and it became a dominant evaluative principle of politicians' credibility and competency.

The Democratic candidates that followed Clinton, Al Gore and John Kerry, were judged to be bad communicators. Their failure to communicate a message that voters could support in an appealing way was one of the main explanations of why they lost the 2000 and 2004 elections respectively. Their losses gave rise to a new genre of analysis, the "handbook" – popularly-targeted books written by Democratic-leaning "activist-intellectuals" who used their scientific expertise to diagnose why the two candidates had lost and prescribe how they should have been communicating instead if they wanted to win (Jackson 2011:473; Lempert and Silverstein 2012:25). This chapter discusses the handbooks of field titans Lakoff (2004) and Westen (2007), but other prominent works of this genre include Brader's (2006) *Campaigning for Hearts and Minds: How Emotional Appeals in Political Ads Work* and Nunberg's (2007) *Talking Right: How Conservatives Turned Liberalism into a Tax-Raising, Latte-Drinking, Sushi-Eating, Volvo-Driving, New York Times-Reading, Body-Piercing, Hollywood-Loving, Left Wing Freak Show*. The handbooks firmly placed communication at the centre of political success and failure. In general, they all began by criticizing the Democratic Party for believing that voters are rational thinkers. Rather, drawing on developments in neuroscience during the 2000s, they stated that people used emotion to reason to a decision (Jackson 2011:480-481). They claimed that most people are fixed in their political views but around one-quarter to one-third – enough to swing an election – are independent reasoners who could be persuaded to vote Democrat if the candidate used the right messages repeatedly. The mistake both Gore and Kerry made, the experts said, was appealing to rationality by using arguments based on facts and figures and talking in-depth about policies rather than creating emotional messages. These handbooks, drawing on all the symbolic capital of the academy and the authors' expertise, and made available to the interested public to

read, produced a mobilised effect of belief, so that politicians and public came to believe that their ability to win in politics pivoted on their ability to win the messaging battle against their opponents.

Having built credibility in popularly-oriented books, the next phase for these activist-intellectuals was the wide dissemination of their way of understanding and evaluating politics among the broad population. Their focus on language was timely, as Obama's oratorical skill and ability to mobilise people throughout the campaign gave the scholars evidence that using language the right way built support. Conversely, they considered times when Obama did not follow their prescriptions as further proof that they were right and that Obama could improve if he listened to their advice. For example, publishing in *Huffington Post* early in the campaign, Lakoff (2008a:Paras.3-4, 12) praised Obama from working from a principled base of American values of "empathy, responsibility, and aspiration" by speaking repeatedly about the "empathy deficit" and the "need for more caring." But, when Obama switched to an issues-based campaign and began to give "deadly dull" speeches about policies that included "lots of numbers," Lakoff (2008a:Paras.1, 2) said that that "policy-wonk" style would not work. Instead, he suggested that to prepare for an upcoming Presidential debate, rather than 'hesitating' and 'trying to give nuanced answers', Obama should "give fast, straight-on, inspiring responses that link his major themes – empathy, responsibility (both social and personal) and aspiration – to the foundational ideals of our country… [he needs to be] the inspiring figure who gives us hope, not the dull policy wonk" (Lakoff 2008a:Paras.21, 34). Likewise, Westen (2008:Para.19), reflecting on Obama's campaign, wrote about his closing speech: "His 30-minute message to the nation on the eve of the election was a model of how to win hearts and minds. It was not a discourse on the fine points of policy, but it was hardly devoid of substance. It was an emotional argument for his presidency – a message that embeds reasons within an emotionally compelling narrative." He concluded that:

> Compelling narratives, carefully crafted one-liners, and pithy phrases are no substitute for carefully thought-out policy positions if you want to govern well. But carefully thought-out policy positions are no substitute for compelling narratives, carefully crafted one-liners, and pithy phrases that capture the essence of your values and vision if you want to govern at all (Westen 2008:Para.23).

These blogs, as well as other publications and interviews like them, evaluated Obama's statements through the lens of messaging frameworks and judged how well Obama had adhered to their prescriptions. Because the evaluations were readily available and published by well-regarded organisations, the public and people in the political field who read the blogs learnt what politicians *should* be saying and could then make their own evaluations of whether politicians were saying that. Politicians and their staff could also evaluate their own speeches, candidate debates and media releases using the same sorts of criteria they had read about in these books and blogs. By being one of the dominant ways that people thought about, practiced, and evaluated political speech, messaging came to be a dominant, effective, and legitimate form of political statement.

The history of the development of modern political communication presented here highlights that it was, and is, a symbiotic creation: the codification and rationalisation of political communication is co-constructed by all players in the political field. Academics have had a key role in this even if they are reluctant to acknowledge that role. Political communication textbooks emphasise the skepticism between academics and practitioners even as they laud the contribution of consultants who write chapters and case studies for them to provide the 'inside story', capitalise on the

understanding that there is difference between the academic representation of how it works and practitioners' representation of how it *really* works (see, for example, Schnur 2007:357; Powell and Cowart 2003:8, 10, 5-6). Craig and Hill's (2011) edited volume, *The Electoral Challenge: Theory Meets Practice*, epitomises this approach: each chapter about online campaigning or political advertising by an academic, for example, features its own response from a professional. Together, academics and practitioners engage in rationalisation by codifying both the theory of how communication works and the best practice by which it is done.

The production of belief is greater and circular because of the symbiosis and movement between the academy and practical politics. Academics also talk to political campaigns, parties, and politicians, and their work is read and considered by politicians eager to improve their effectiveness. Activist-intellectuals like Lakoff (2004) and Westen (2007) provide advice to political parties and candidates in the hopes that the party they support will win (Lempert and Silverstein 2012:25). Even in New Zealand where such explicit support for one party is highly unusual, academics' ideas and work are highly influential as politicians take their university papers, read their work, and sometimes meet with them. Academics frequently appear as political pundits in current affairs shows and op-eds, evaluating the effectiveness and optics of MPs' communications (Higgs 2012:222). In this way, "The field of political communication," write Lempert and Silverstein (2012:24), "invites movement of specialists across the divide of what some think of as 'theory' and 'practice'."

The Influence of Lakoff: Framing

George Lakoff is a titan of political communication; he, perhaps more than anyone, is able to say what good modern political communication is and how it works. He is a prolific author, having written five other books about politics[18] as well as maintaining a blog about political language[19] and several well-used social media accounts. In discussing Lakoff's (2004) work, I draw primarily on his book *Don't Think of an Elephant!* because it was designed to inform readers about how to put his ideas into practice and because it was that book which sat permanently on the desk of the Green Party's Communications Director and which he recommended party activists read. Lakoff is at pains to paint himself as a political outsider, revealing and imparting scientific truths to his audience that they will not find among the political and media establishment, writing that "you will not find what I have to say in the *NY Times*, nor hear it from your favourite political commentators. You will also not hear it from Democratic candidates or party strategists… I am writing it because I think it is right and it is needed, even though it comes from the cognitive and brain sciences, not from the normal political sources" (Lakoff 2016b:Paras.1-2). But Lakoff's ideas, not least due to his own promotional efforts, circulate readily among people in the political sphere, the interested lay public, and academics, including those in anthropology (See Bai's 2005 discussion of Lakoff's influence on the U.S. Democratic Party). This section first outlines Lakoff's work before briefly concluding with a

[18] Lakoff's other books are: *The Little Blue Book: The Essential Guide to Thinking and Talking Democrat* (Lakoff and Wehling 2012), *Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think* (Lakoff 2016a), *Thinking Points: Communicating our American Values and Visions* (Lakoff 2006a), *Whose Freedom? The Battle over America's Most Important Idea* (Lakoff 2006b), and *The Political Mind: Why You Can't Understand 21st Century American Politics with an 18th Century Brain* (Lakoff 2008b). He has also written several other books intended for an academic audience.

[19] See: https://georgelakoff.com/blog/

discussion about how it provides, as Bourdieu (1991:177) would state, only an "appearance of scientificity."

Lakoff (2004:52) is at the extreme materialist end of framing researchers, arguing that "everything we know is physically instantiated in the neural system of our brains." Lakoff's (2004:xv, 52) work posits that each person has a set of neural pathways in their brains which creates a physical mental structure that shapes the way they see the world; he calls that a 'frame'. He wrote:

> You can't see or hear frames. They are a part of what cognitive scientists call the 'cognitive unconscious' – structures in our brains that we cannot consciously access, but know by their consequences: the way we reason and what counts as common sense. We also know frames through language. All words are defined relative to conceptual frames. When you hear a word, its frame (or collection of frames) is activated in your brain (Lakoff 2004:xv).

When a person hears a word, sees an image, or is presented with an idea, a frame is 'evoked', which then implies or infers other things (Lakoff 2004:3, 35, 36). It is a largely unconscious process (Lakoff 2008:3). Certain frames can be 'activated' by choosing what to present to a person. For example, saying "tax relief" implies that tax is a burden that must be alleviated, meaning that lowering taxes is good (Lakoff 2004:3, 42). "Framing is about getting the language that fits your worldview," wrote Lakoff (2004:4).

For Lakoff, metaphor provides the overarching conceptual framework for how neurons are connected in the brain. A large part of Lakoff's (2004) book Don't think of an Elephant! is dedicated to describing how two metaphorical models, moralities, and/or worldviews regarding the nation are used by the U.S. public to understand American national politics: the (conservative) strict father and (progressive) nurturant parent model (see Appendix B for Lakoff's full description of these models). The strict father and nurturant parent models "govern politics," Lakoff argues (Lakoff 2004:20).20

According to Lakoff, every person has those two family metaphors embedded in the neural structure of their brain. He wrote: "We all have both models, either actively or passively… Everyone has both worldviews because both worldviews are widely present in our culture, but people do not necessarily live by one worldview all of the time" (Lakoff 2004:20). People may apply one or the other to different areas of their life (Lakoff 2004:21). He estimates, though, that 35 to 40 percent of people have only one of the models governing their politics, while 20 to 30 percent are in the middle and have both (Lakoff 2004:21). In politics, Lakoff argued, the focus should be on the 20 to 30 percent in the middle, which is a large enough group of people to swing the outcome of elections with their votes by speaking to your values to ignite their neural pathways. "The goal," he wrote,

> is to activate *your* model in the people in the middle. The people who are in the middle have *both* models, used regularly in different parts of their lives. What you want to do is get them to use your model for politics – to activate your worldview and moral system in their political decisions. You do that by talking to people using frames based on your worldview (Lakoff 2004:20, emphasis original).

[20] The Greens did not draw on these models in their work so I have not detailed them as extensively as Lakoff does.

The way to achieve that is to activate the 'progressive' neural structure by getting the person to think about issues that they are already progressive on so that their "synapses will grow stronger, and it will become increasingly likely that the progressive worldview will start binding to more areas" (Lakoff 2008b:74). "To change minds," summarized Lakoff (2008b:78), "you must change brains."

To achieve this, in his chapter Framing 101: How to Take Back Public Discourse, Lakoff (2004:33) identified eleven actions that people could take to stop conservatives winning "on issue after issue after issue." They are:

> *First, recognize what conservatives have done right and where progressives have missed the boat.* It is more than just control of the media, though that is far from trivial. What they have done right is to successfully frame the issues from their perspective. Acknowledge their success and our failures.
>
> *Second, remember 'Don't think of an elephant'.* If you keep using their language and their framing and just argue against it, you lose because you are reinforcing the frame.
>
> *Third, the truth alone will not set you free.* Just speaking truth to power doesn't work. You need to frame the truths effectively from your perspective.
>
> *Fourth, you need to speak from your moral perspective at all times.* Progressive policies follow from progressive values. Get clear on your values and use the language of values. Drop the language of policy-wonks.
>
> *Fifth, understand where conservatives are coming from*. Get their strict father morality and its consequences clear. Know what you are arguing against. Be able to explain why they believe what they believe. Try to predict what they will say.
>
> *Six, think strategically, across issue areas.* Think in terms of large moral goals, not in terms of programs for their own sake.
>
> *Seventh, think about the consequences of proposals*. Form progressive slippery slope initiatives.
>
> *Eighth, remember that voters vote their identity and their values*, which need not coincide with their self-interest.
>
> *Ninth, unite! And cooperate!* Here's how: Remember the six modes of progressive thought: (1) socioeconomic, (2) identity politics, (3) environmentalist, (4) civil libertarian, (5) spiritual, and (6) authoritarian. Notice which of these modes of thought you use most often – where you fall on the spectrum and where the people you talk to fall on the spectrum. Then rise above your own mode of thought and start thinking and talking from shared progressive values.
>
> *Tenth, be proactive, not reactive. Play offense, not defense. Practice framing, every day, on every issue.* Don't just say what you believe. Use your frames, not their frames. Use them because they fit the values you believe in.
>
> *Eleventh, speak to the progressive base in order to activate the nurturant model of 'swing voters'. Don't move to the right*. Rightward movement hurts in two ways. It alienates the progressive base and it helps conservatives by activating their model in swing voters (Lakoff 2004:33-34, emphasis adapted).

Thus, Lakoff's principle for messaging is to frame by value: to use the right language to speak about progressive values.

Lakoff prescribes that the way to strengthen the progressive synapses of voters is to identify the language needed to frame an issue and then use that precise language widely and constantly. He uses the example of the 'culture war' between conservatives and progressives in America to illustrate the dominating excellence of conservative framing:

> Through the work of their think tank intellectuals, their language professionals, their writers and ad agencies, and their media specialists, conservatives have worked a revolution in thought and language over thirty to forty years. Through language they have branded liberals (whose policies are populist) as effeminate elitist, unpatriotic spendthrifts… At the same time they have branded conservatives (whose politics favor the economic elite) as populists – again through language, including body language (Lakoff 2004:88).

That branding worked, he wrote, because "it has long been right-wing strategy to repeat over and over phrases that evoke their frames and define the issues their way. Such repetition makes their language normal, everyday language and their frames normal, everyday ways to think about issues" (Lakoff 2004:50). For Lakoff, to succeed at framing requires choosing the right language and repeating it universally until the correct physical neural pathways an idea, value, or concept as common sense in a population. Doing that materially changes a person's brain so that they think and vote the way the politician wants them to.

Lakoff is very clear that choosing the right frames leads to change. *Don't Think of An Elephant!* opens with the emphatic statement:

> [Frames] shape the goals we seek, the plans we make, the way we act, and what counts as a good or bad outcome of our actions. In politics our frames shape our social policies and the institutions we form to carry out policies. To change our frames is to change all of this. Reframing *is* social change (Lakoff 2004:xv).

Of course, the Green Party did want to create social change. Lakoff's work on frames offered a way for them to think about the words they used to communicate value in their attempt to make statements that aimed to bring about the world they wanted. That promise for success was part of why they sought to apply Lakoff's principles in their everyday work.

But, while Lakoff is emphatic about the role and process of reframing in social change, in fact the causal link between language change and social change is much less clear. Beyond knowing that indeed words *do* shape how people understand their social world,[21] there are many gaps in our current knowledge regarding framing, its ability to produce changes in thinking, and its use by politicians. Proponents of framing, particularly those who do not share the same materialist framework as Lakoff, identify that they do not know:

[21] In anthropology, this is called the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis (Kottak 2016:65-66).

- How to identify or define frames in communication (Carragee and Roefs 2004:106; Chong and Druckman 2007:214; Vliegenthart 2012:944-945);
- Whether there is a causal link between a frame and public opinion (Callaghan and Schnell 2005:13);
- How frames are produced and emerge (Chong and Druckman 2007:117; Provenchar 2016:7);
- What strategies are used in the production of frames (Chong and Druckman 2007:117);
- How frames work in competitive contexts, when more than one frame is available for understanding an issue (Chong and Druckman 2007:113);
- The role of power in the ability of actors to produce and disseminate frames (Carragee and Roefs 2004:219).
- What makes a frame 'strong' and most likely to emerge as the one which is applied to an issue (Chong and Druckman 2007:116-117);
- Why some individuals resist and others accept specific frames (Carragee and Roefs 2004:223);
- Whether increased knowledge about an issue allows a person to reject biased framing (Chong and Druckman 2007:118-119);
- The relation of time to frames, in reference to both how and why frames evolve over time as well as the effects of exposure to certain frames over a long time like an election campaign (Chong and Druckman 2007:118).

Academics who study framing state that one of the reasons that they have not yet understood its dynamics is because of the methods employed and several gaps in their research agenda. Around 50 percent of framing research focuses on content analysis (Provenchar 2016:53). These studies present the frames which exist in the news media and public arena in a way which minimises or does not take into account the dynamics of their creation (Provenchar 2016:50-53). Additionally, studies of framing effects tend to use experimental methods. However, such a method poorly replicates how frames operate in the complex social world (Vliegenthart 2012:945; Provenchar 2016:53). Finally, framing researchers admit that they know little about the strategies elite actors like politicians use to produce frames (Chong and Druckman 2007:117). In fact, only 15.5 percent of studies in the field are focused on the organisational or political arena and, additionally, less than one percent explore the roles of individuals such as a Member of Parliament in the production of frames (Provenchar 2016: 50,51). These are major gaps in understanding and it means that the promise of activist-intellectuals like Lakoff (2004) that repeating certain words will direct a certain way of thinking in a large part of the population is an overextension of our current knowledge. Thus, the prescriptions have only the "appearance of scientificity" without the scientific evidence (Bourdieu 1991:177).

The primary finding of the academic literature regarding politicians' framing is that, in general, they do not have "carte blanche" to frame an issue: the frame they use to present an issue is not immediately applied by the public to understand and take a position (Callaghan and Schnell 2005:6).[22] While Bourdieu would argue that a politician lacks symbolic power, in framing studies the lack of carte blanche is generally attributed to two factors. Firstly, politicians operate in a competitive framing environment, where there are multiple people and organisations trying to present an issue in different ways to generate the public opinion they want to achieve. The result is that "no one theme emerges without a countertheme – whenever one is invoked the other is always present in latent form, ready to be activated with the proper cue" (Gameson 1992:135,

[22] However, some elite actors do have an ability to frame niche issues where there is no other competition vying to present the issue (Callaghan and Schnell 2005:7).

emphasis mine). Secondly, there are several moderating forces which can positively or negatively influence public opinion shifting to support a politician's frame. These include: good election outcomes which provide greater political leverage, "a political actor's status, credibility, and organisational resources," "the level of public information about the issue and the public "mood," events outside politicians' control which can focus and direct public attention, and the power of the media to frame political issues (Callaghan and Schnell 2005:7-11). However, overall, Chong and Druckman (2007:113) evaluate that "little is known about the dynamics of framing in competitive contexts. We need to study further whether competing frames cancel one another and reinforce existing values, push people in conflicting directions, or motivate a more careful evaluation of the applicability of competing frames." Thus, little is known about framing in the political field, where competition among competing frames is intense and power and position are important in whether or not politicians' statements are believed. Certainly, the current state of knowledge is not sufficient to state as emphatically as Lakoff does that reframing creates social change.

Nonetheless, Lakoff's ideas have entered anthropological analyses. Several anthropological accounts of U.S. President Donald Trump's communication uncritically referenced Lakoff's work. In some cases, authors referred briefly to Lakoff's 'strict father' moral model of the conservative mind and worldview (Hall et al. 2016:71, 79) or his assertion that Trump's tweets are a distraction strategy (Hodges 2017b:e214). Other anthropologists, however, draw on Lakoff's work much more substantially. For example, Razfar (2017:Paras.6, 9) used Lakoff's work to support his argument that Trump's success could be attributed to the way he communicated "authenticity, meaning, and shared worldviews" to voters, writing that:

> Populists position themselves as being the 'voice' of the voiceless so they necessarily understand how language is used to create relational affinity, trust, and a deeper sense of authenticity. Cognitive linguist George Lakoff argues that the more liberals attack team Trump's linguistic form, the more committed his followers become. What is said and how it is said doesn't matter as much as where the talk is perceived to be coming from – a place of authenticity or a place of malice.

Trump, Razfar (2017:Para.12) stated, understood how language worked as "code, prosody, semiotics, and ideology to propel Trump, Inc. into the White House." Harkin (2017a:Para.6) too used Lakoff's work to argue that his election ended meritocracy in the U.S., describing that:

> George Lakoff has argued that, while liberals are heirs of the Enlightenment and believe in quantifiable progress, conservatives do not… conservatives view it as an assertion of identity and morality. In particular, he believes that conservatives adopt a patriarchal view of politics, in which men are superior to women, rich are superior to poor, white Christians superior to anyone everyone else. The role of the superior is to mete out just punishment to those who have offended and to reward the faithful. Donald Trump is the embodiment of this metaphor.

Thus, among anthropologists too, Lakoff's framing theories have influenced analyses of political events and politicians' speech.

In summary, cognitive linguist George Lakoff dominates in influencing the way that 'progressive' political parties like the U.S. Democratic Party and the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand think about how they should speak about parties and issues. He advocates for the principle that

politicians should 'frame': that they should use the right progressive values-based language to cognitively frame issues progressively for the audience so that they will be reinforced as common sense. His prescription is to identify the right frame and repeat it over and over again. Despite the scientific evidence for these claims being far from certain, Lakoff's symbolic power – built from his academic credentials, his academic and non-academic publishing record, and reinforced by the success of politicians who began to practice his advice – made his understanding of how political communication worked dominant in the field.

The Influence of Westen: Emotional Appeals

As well as Lakoff's (2004) *Don't Think of an Elephant!* the Green Party's Communications Director named Drew Westen's (2007) *The Political Brain: The Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate of the Nation* as influential to the Party's 2013 communications. It is Westen's only popularly-oriented book, but he publishes academically on a wide range of topics in the psychological field. Like Lakoff, Westen has directly advised U.S. Democratic campaigns and his work is focused on advocating for progressive politics by suggesting parties, candidates, and activists make emotional appeals that create feelings of positivity about the progressive side and feelings of negativity about their opponents. This section briefly describes the broader field of the study of emotion in politics before outlining Westen's (2007) work.

Emotional political communication became rationalised in the 2000s, following technological and scientific advances during the 1990s. Most notably, improvements in functional magnetic resonance imaging that could show brain activity were lauded by neurological and cognitive scientists as providing the evidence they needed to conclude that emotion was crucial to human reasoning. Jackson (2011:480-481, emphasis original) wrote that by the mid-1990s, Damasio's (1994) *Descartes' Error* and Ledoux's (1996) *The Emotional Brain* became highly influential, advancing the view that "emotion is a necessary component of what we would call the reasoning process, and although we may recognize cognitively what is a good or bad decision, we cannot act or develop attitudes until we *feel* something. Emotions are part of what we've inherited from evolution to help us make decisions." From the 2000s, this new conception of the evolution of the brain as an emotional *and* cognitive decision-maker began to be applied to politics as part of the field of political psychology. In this field, political scientists George E. Marcus, Michael MacKuen, Ted Brader, and media technology specialist W. Russell Neuman dominate. They often publish together, exploring the role of emotion in political life.[23] The work of these scholars firmly established that emotions do have an effect on political behaviour and thinking even if, like framing, academics do not know exactly how or why these effects occur (see Neuman et al. 2007:2-5).

Westen's (2007) book begins by explaining how the structure of the human brain contributes to our capacity for both emotion and reason. The amygdala, he writes, is particularly important because it processes and responds to stimuli before it enters a person's conscious thought as part of an "emotion system that is constantly processing emotionally relevant information faster than we can

[23] The most influential book in this regard is Neuman et al.'s (2007a) edited book, *The Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behaviour*. Other notable titles include Marcus et al. (2000) *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgement,* Marcus (2002) *The Sentimental Citizen: Emotion in Democratic Politics*, and Brader (2006) *Campaigning for Hearts and Minds: How Emotional Appeals in Political Ads Work.*

consciously register it" (Westen 2007:58). The amygdala and other older parts of the brain have "dense neural connections" to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex above them. That section of the brain is "involved in emotional experience, social and emotional intelligence, and moral functioning. It also plays a crucial role in linking thought and emotion, particularly in using emotional reactions to guide decision-making" (Westen 2007:61). The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which is involved in conscious decision-making as well, gives humans the "ability to hold information consciously in our mind" and "orchestrates" cost-benefit calculations as well as probabilities (Westen 2007:60). In summarising the importance of these three sections, Westen (2007:68) writes that their ability to work together showed that "the capacity for rational judgement evolved to augment, not replace, evolutionary older motivational systems." Thus, he argues the human brain's primary motivational structures are emotional.

Drawing on those models of the human brain as driven by both older emotional motivations which are augmented by the more recent capacity for rational judgement, Westen argues that politicians need to speak in ways which cater to individuals' emotional systems too. His own research showed the importance of emotion: in a study of peoples' responses to political crises like President Clinton's impeachment, Westen (2007:112) found that rational decision-making predicted only 0.5 to three percent of responses while "upwards of 80 percent of the time, the judgements people reach in political affairs reflect compromise solutions… crafted by competing and collaborating emotional constituencies, largely without the benefit of consciousness" (Westen 2007:112). While humans have the capacity to apply rational judgement in their decision-making, Westen argues that at least in relation to political decision-making, most people have fixed emotional motivations which determines who they support and vote for. Both he and Lakoff are of the view that around 80 percent of the American public have fixed neurological pathways and emotions in support of either the Democratic or Republican parties. Therefore, only around 20 percent of people are, Westen (2007:115) writes, "influenced by something other than their feelings toward the parties" and have "changeable minds." What changes people's minds, Westen asserts, is compelling emotional appeals that create positive feelings about one party, its candidate, and policies, and negative feelings about the opposition's party, candidate, and policies.

Figure 2.1: An Example of Westen's Neural Networks of Association



Source: (Adapted from Westen 2007:90)

For Westen, the biological key to achieving change by eliciting the right positive and negative emotions is to use the swing voters' neurological networks of association. He wrote that networks of association are the neural connections that make up the human brain and bundle "thoughts, feelings, images, and ideas" as well as "memories, sounds, and smells" (Westen 2007:3, 52, 83). One example of a neural network Westen provides is the set of links shown in Figure 2.1. The network works by activating and inhibiting options. For a person with this network listening to a politician's speech about weapons of mass destruction, for example, if the politician begins a sentence by saying the word *Nuclear*, both *Weapons* and *Family* will be 'activated' in the listener's brain while it undertakes a process of 'constraint satisfaction' – "juggling different possibilities outside of awareness until settling on the most sensible solutions in light of the data" (Westen 2007:92) – and proceeds to inhibit the *Family* network as it is the least sensible option. If the politician had been giving a speech about maternity leave or childcare, however, the opposite process of constraint satisfaction would have occurred, resulting in *Nuclear* being inhibited and *Family* activated. "Political persuasion is about networks and narratives," writes Westen (2007:12, emphasis mine). The goal is to activate networks of association that create positive and negative feelings for voters in the right way.

Using those networks of association, Westen identifies four goals that campaigns should achieve to win an election. They should:

1. Use a compelling emotional "master narrative" or "brand;"
2. Manage and maximise positive feelings toward the party's candidate while managing and maximizing negative feelings toward opposing candidates;
3. "Manage feelings" toward the personal characteristics of the candidate so that they are viewed as "trustworthy, competent, empathetic, and capable of strong leadership," while raising "doubts" about whether the opposing candidate possesses those characteristics;
4. "Manage positive and negative emotions toward the candidates' policies and positions." (Westen 2007:136-139).

In this section I will describe only Westen's first and fourth goals as they were the most relevant to the Green Party MPs I worked with who tended to not prioritise candidate-based campaigning, especially outside the election campaign.

The first goal is to create a message for the party. The aim is to "define the party and its principles in a way that is emotionally compelling and tells a coherent story of what its members believe in, and to define the other party and its values in ways that undermine its capacity to resonate emotionally with voters" (Westen 2007:137). The message "should be an extension of the nation and its principles" (Westen 2007:150). Westen considers the message to be the most important factor in winning campaigns because it cements the base support for a party from people who were already predisposed to vote for it while drawing the support of swing voters (Westen 2007:146). There are ten elements that "any compelling master narrative must have," Westen (2007:147) writes:

1. "It should have the structure our brains expect of a narrative so that it can be readily understood, told, and retold.
2. It should have protagonists *and* antagonists, defining both what the party or candidate stands for and what the party or candidate cannot stand for, most centrally, what the antagonists represent.

3. It should be coherent, requiring few leaps of inference or imagination to make its plot line move forward or the intentions of its central actors clear.
4. It should have a clear moral (and generally subordinate morals, which refer to the party's values).
5. It should be vivid and memorable.
6. It should be moving.
7. It should have central elements that are readily visualized or pictured, to maximize its memorability and emotional impact.
8. It should be rich in metaphor, both so that it is emotionally evocative and so that it creates and reinforces its intended analogies.
9. It should take elements of the opposition's story, including its metaphors, and recast them as its own.
10. Finally… it should be a story its framers would want to tell their children – that could be illustrated in a children's book – because it should be so clear, compelling, and central to its members' understanding of right and wrong that they would want their children to internalize the values it embodies."

Once a party had a message that met that ambitious list of elements, they should repeat it universally, over a long period of time if needed (Westen 2007:168, 192). Thus, Westen's prescription is very similar to Lakoff's: choose the right words to describe what the party believes in and repeat them over and over.

Westen, like Lakoff, views the policies and issues themselves as far less important in political life than values and emotion. Westen's (2007:139, 140) fourth goal for political campaigns – to "manage positive and negative emotions toward the candidates' policies and positions" – was a "distant fourth" compared to messaging the party, its candidates, and their opponents. The reason for that low priority, Westen (2007:119-120) argues, is that policies only matter insofar as they "influence voters' emotions" because, when making decisions, voters are affected far more by their feelings toward the party and its candidates than issues. Instead, politicians should focus on activating latent emotions centred on voters' "interests ('is this good for me and [my] family?')" and "values ('is this something that I think is right?')" (Westen 2007:120). In Westen's (2007:121) view, when a party had a position or policy, it should be designed and communicated in such a way that it makes a "strong emotional appeal" by making a voter picture something and activating a value. Thus, Westen makes the case that policies, programmes, and plans should be presented emotionally, rather than with detailed facts, figures and jargon.

With the goal of producing emotional responses about the party and issues, Westen (2007:257) advises that campaigners achieve that by managing an "emotional portfolio." Westen discusses four principles for managing a portfolio. Firstly, ensure that everything elicits an emotional response in voters (Westen 2007:257-263). Secondly, frame messages for emotional impact using, for example, Lakoff's work to choose the right words to put things in or out of public view (Westen 2007:263-269). Thirdly, use "basic level categories" like "woman, dinner, car, [and] bird" to communicate to the public (Westen 2007:269).[24] Regarding values, that means taking 'principled stands' – a stand which was an "emotionally compelling application of a value or ideological principle to a particular issue or problem" in a way that creates an "immediate emotional response" for voters (Westen 2007:270, emphasis mine). Finally, maximise the "neural tracks" a message activates by increasing

[24] Westen notes, however, that there is no evidence to support this principle, writing that "no one… has ever studied the concept of basic-level categories in political persuasion" (Westen 2007:270).

the variety of stimuli, such as using visual images, music, or sound effects to make it "more evocative and memorable" (Westen 2007:273). Thus, managing an emotional portfolio means using the right language and non-verbal cues to elicit feelings in the voting public.

Being able to choose the right words and cues requires two characteristics, Westen argues. The first is "a good gut" – what Bourdieu might call a practical sense – which enables a politician or advisor to know when they had the right emotional appeal (Westen 2007:276). Westen's work does not focus on how to develop that practical sense, instead suggesting innate political gifts such as charisma and the ability to tell a good story. Rather, he focuses on the second characteristic: "A healthy respect for data, and a corresponding humility in the face of data that [does not] support… intuitions" (Westen 2007:277). The Republican Party used data effectively "every step of the way," Westen (2007:278-279) states, praising their use of the "scientific method" to find the best phrases to persuade the public and competitive bidding for political advertisements. He argues emphatically that the right political language and networks of associations should be "routinely" assessed in political campaigns to ensure that the right emotional responses – conscious and unconscious – are being created in the public (Westen 2007:282). By relying on data and scientific method, the rationalisation of the politicians' practical sense of being able to elicit feelings in their audience occurs and becomes the domain of specialists and experts who have the knowledge, resources, funding, and more to track voters' responses in their material neural brain functions.

In summary, psychologist and neuroscientist Drew Westen also had an influence on progressive politicians, including U.S. Democrats and New Zealand Greens. He advocates for the use of emotional appeals in political statements: that politicians should produce positive emotions about themselves, their party, and their issues while producing negative emotions about their opponents' candidates, party, and positions. His prescription is to identify and elicit the right emotional response, and repeat the messaging that achieves it over and over again. The right way to make political statements that contribute to winning election, Westen argues, is to make emotional appeals that define the values the party stands for and to activate those values-based networks of association when talking about issues.

The Green Party's Belief

Reading Lakoff (2004) and Westen's (2007) books, and seeing in Obama's victory that their messaging prescriptions could work to win support from voters, the Green Party put into practice the experts' advice to frame issues and make emotional, values-based, and positive appeals. While the experts' work required some adaptation to fit the New Zealand and Green context, in content there was an easy affinity of message between the Green Party and U.S. Democrats, who the Greens viewed as sharing a similar 'progressive' political agenda; and, in form, there was significant overlap between the experts' prescriptions and the Green Party's practical experience of what had worked to gain them support in the past. By the time I turned up to Parliament in 2013, the messaging principles and prescriptions of Lakoff (2004) and Westen (2007) had become largely inseparably intertwined with the Greens' own practical ability for gaining support, forming part of the taken-for-granted basis of their daily public work while also at times being used reflectively as reference material when developing strategies or specific messaging. Thus, while not totalising either in what the Greens drew from the experts' theories or in their application of them, the Green

Party's belief that Lakoff (2004) and Westen's (2007) messaging work offered a way to win the public's support and votes was a significant driver in the production of their public statements. This section briefly explains the Green Party's view of framing and emotion as discussed with their Communications Director.

The words 'framing' and 'frame' were often used on an everyday basis when the Greens were strategizing about how events could be interpreted or what MPs should be saying about things. When I interviewed the Communications Director, I asked what he understood a frame to be. He replied:

> I think a frame is an emotional first response to something. So, there's an issue and I think most of our minds can wander in different ways and look at it in different ways depending on influences. So, a frame is providing an influence, or a point of analysis to influence people to view a particular subject in a particular way… It's around positioning an issue in the ways that's going to resonate with our voters. Yeah. I think. I don't know. It's hard to define but I think, yeah… accepted norms.

As a party seeking change, the Greens were often challenging the accepted norms that formed common sense, orthodox understandings of the world. What they were often engaged in was 're-framing' the way people thought about both the Party and the issues, the Communications Director said:

> Often, I think, for the Greens it's to view [a subject] in a way that's not necessarily the most obvious, which is why I actually think we often talk about re-framing more than we talk about framing. It's very obvious how to frame the Greens – National does it all the time: 'The Loonies', or, 'They're against all these things'. Whereas we have to frame that as: 'Well, actually we love the environment and we want to protect it, which is why we're against deep sea [oil drilling]. We're not against commerce; we're against commerce that pollutes our environment'.
>
> I also think that re-framing is important because more often than not – I think this is National's inherent economic advantage – is that more often than not people think about issues in the way that they think of them. 'Growth is good'. 'Business is good'. 'People on [welfare] is bad'. So, there are certain things that are now just accepted frames. And so we're usually re-framing.

Framing, for the Greens, was an attempt to talk about issues in a way that would change or shape peoples' views so that they thought about players in the political field or issues in the way the Green Party wanted them to. They found that challenging, though, because the National Party had greater symbolic power than they did to maintain the orthodoxy, to present the world in their view and have the public maintain their belief in it.

The way the Greens believed that they could change people's minds was by creating an emotional response for the audience and speaking to their values to direct them to a new way of seeing the world and to political action. At a meeting I attended, the Political Director described the Greens' communication work in 2013 as centred around creating "emotional impact" and "connecting with the values of mainstream New Zealanders." The Communication Director explained why that mattered in our interview, saying that: "People's connection with our issues is related to very strong

emotional responses to either memories in their own lives or stories that other people have told." That emotional response, particularly the feeling of hope, motivated people to do things:

> Director: It's about giving people a sense of hope. And I think that's really important, 'cause otherwise people won't take action. If the people who we're asking to take action can't build a narrative or a story for why that action might work [then they won't]. Which is often about giving examples of people doing things that have worked.
>
> Jessica: Is that why you try and create that emotion in people, so that then they will be compelled to take action? They will recognise you guys are right? Or, like?
>
> Director: Yeah. I mean, how many people have you heard go, 'Oh my God! I went to that protest because have you seen the statistics around so-and-so?!' I mean, for some people, but those are probably going to be the people who do it anyway… [It's more] like, 'This affects me; I'm having an emotional response to what's going on'. And I think that's common.

The Communications Director, as well as the Green MPs and staff in general, viewed emotion as the way to connect with people on issues that would create action in a way that arguing the facts and figures of an issue would not. That was how they would win the support and belief of the public.

In practice, however, the Green Party MPs found that difficult to do in daily political life where they tended to argue facts and figures when discussing issues, policies, and legislation. The Communications Director contrasted the MPs' typically detail-oriented approach with two successful Co-leader speeches that had connected emotionally and with the values of two groups of New Zealanders the Party did not often see themselves as speaking to:

> Director: I think the most obvious example [of using emotion] was the speech that Metiria gave about her father at the beginning of the parliamentary year which was a very raw and emotional speech about her experience of growing up with her dad, and what it meant for her and her family that her father basically couldn't find work, and what that meant to his life.[25]And she got an amazing response to that speech. Like, the *Dairy Workers Union* invited her to go and speak at their AGM and give the speech! It went pretty far and wide.
>
> And then there was also… Russel's one, the Christmas speech one[26]… I mean, we got feedback that churches played it on Christmas.

[25] Metiria's speech was a part of the Debate on the Prime Minister's Statement that opened the parliamentary year in 2011. Metiria said: "My dad was a kind man, he was a decent man, and he was a peaceful man whether he was in work or out, just like the thousands of New Zealanders who now find themselves out of work. John Key's Government suggests those people are bludgers, but New Zealanders use support when they need it and they move on when they can. That is what I did, that is what my dad tried to do, and that is what thousands of New Zealanders are doing today" (8 February 2011 670 NZPD 16495).

[26] Russel's speech was part of the Address in Reply that closed the Parliamentary year in 2011, a bookend to Metiria's speech about her father that began it. Russel said: "This Christmas we wish for all our babies to have their unquestioning need for love generously met. We wish that all our children be treated with patience and understanding, trust and commitment, and we wish that all our parents have the time, support, and resources necessary to give our children the best start in life. For us here in Parliament, I wish that we have the intelligence and compassion to choose to make things better for those who depend on us to make the right calls. Mahatma Gandhi said this about Jesus Christ: 'I believe that Jesus belongs not solely to Christianity, but to the entire world, to all races and all people'. Gandhi was right: the hopes and values Jesus Christ articulated during the course of his short life are too important to

Interestingly, both speeches got mocked by the Press Gallery at the time, which is typical 'cause there's that kind of cynical thing. But we did actually subsequently talk about that [in the Greens], that we actually needed to talk past the Gallery to middle New Zealand and hopefully they were able to hear enough of those things.

I mean, I think we were trying to do two things. I think we were trying to humanise ourselves 'cause I think partly you could look at the Greens a lot of the time and you could be forgiven for thinking that we're an encyclopaedia. The number of [press] releases that we do, or speeches where they're–

Jessica: [Interrupting] Highly technical.

Director: Yeah, and with loads of numbers and stuff in them where we're fighting the academic fight. And I think the thing is, and I'm pretty sure it's in Lakoff and stuff as well but maybe we accentuate it a little bit more, is actually you have to go back to values, and stories, and people's experiences of what things actually meant. And I think part of the reason we emphasised that was because we know that more than the other parties we are prone to the nerdy, Spock kind of approach to arguing everything.

Therefore, while the Greens knew that framing issues and making emotional, values-based, and positive statements worked to broaden support for what they were saying, putting that into practice in their everyday work was difficult. Still, they believed that messaged statements worked to win support and belief and they aimed to make them, even if they sometimes fell short of that ideal.

Anthropology Joins In

With the exception of Lempert and Silverstein (2012) whose work is discussed in the next section, anthropology has been notably absent from the study of political communication in Western societies. Even the most recent introductory and political anthropology textbooks do not discuss what Western politicians say and the work of the political communication, instead focusing on typologies of political systems, stratification, and nationalism, for example, and the effects of policies (see Coulter and Schumann 2013; Kottak 2016:106, 130; Lavenda and Shultz 2017:104-120; Paley 2008). The few anthropologists who have studied political statements of Western politicians tend to etically analyse the content, meaning, and affect of already-produced statements rather than what shapes their production (see, for example, Wright and Shore 2015). But, anthropology's absence changed with the campaign and election of U.S. President Donald Trump. Academics who had not previously studied elite politicians and the systems in which they work, much less their political communication, put forward analyses examining Trump's communicative style as the singular explanation for his success.[27] This section outlines those recent contributions.

belong only to Christians. They belong to us all, believers and non-believers alike. They live within us; they are embedded in our culture. They are reflected in most of the world's major religions. These are the values that helped lay down the essential nature of what it means to be human, and guide us to live a good life—good to ourselves, good to one another, and good to the world in which we make our livelihoods" (21 December 2011 677 NZPD 42).

[27] The other themes that anthropologists seeking to analyse Trump's success addressed were race, ruralness, the white working class, and populism (see, for example, *Cultural Anthropology's* special series on *The Rise of Trumpism* edited by Bessire and Bond 2017). In

The first of the articles analysing Trump's communication was Hall et al.'s (2016) *The Hands of Donald Trump.* The authors stated emphatically that: "Our argument is precisely that it is the style of Trump – his speech, his gesture, his comedic timing – that brings entertainment value and explains his political success" (Hall et al. 2016:79). Hall et al. (2016:74-75) tell us that they:

> Make sense of Trump's gestural repertoire by viewing it as part of a comedic political style that accrues entertainment value as it opposes the usual [pragmatic] habitus associated with US presidential candidates. When used in coordination with verbal strategies similarly designed to lampoon opponents, Trump's enactments craft essentialized characterizations of identity categories that simultaneously cast their members as problematic citizens… These depictive gestures operate cross-modally to signal to Trump's base that he challenges what is widely viewed as the political establishment's debilitating rhetoric of political correctness. When Trump promises to tell the truth… he aligns himself with opposition to political correctness, with a stance that rejects rhetorical caution regarding minority religions, genders, and ethnicities. Yet, as entertainment, his gestures intensify the force of his words, attracting and holding the attention of the wider public as they dominate the news cycle. When framed against the more restrained style of old school politics, Trump's gestures serve him well, particularly in the mediatized and visually oriented twenty-first-century politics that is celebrity driven.

The authors state that Trump won because his embodiment exhibits "a dense link to entertainment [that] now brings voters along with viewers" (Hall et al. 2016:75).

The problem with such an analysis is that an emphatic, direct linking of cause to effect in political life is rarely possible with any certainty. Hall et al. (2016:75) provide no evidence for their assertion that Trump won because of his entertaining style. Rather, in reading select moments of Trump's public comments, the anthropologists engage in what Lempert (2011:193) called 'recovering' in his analysis of the ways commentators identify who a politician is addressing "through a critical reading of the candidate text: and how the candidate orients themselves toward them." In *The Hands of Donald Trump*, the authors recover a vision of Trump the entertainer through his gestures addressing voters motivated solely by his 'comedic political style' (Hall et al. 2016:79). It is a selective reading, and one which, had they perhaps chosen different moments or different addressees might have resulted in a different recovery. This article highlights the great care anthropologists should take in their analyses to ensure that they are not overstating the relation between a singular cause and a particular effect when talking about politicians' political communication and the public.[28]

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seeking to understand voters' motivations, Bell (2017:e314) identified "apocalyptic politics" as a driver of Tea Party activists' voting for Trump, while Gusterson (2017:209) identified "nationalist populism." Jønsson (2017:9) wrote that people in the religious rural town of Pennsylvania she conducted fieldwork in "came to view themselves as disadvantaged and denied" over the course of Trump's campaign but believed he offered them a "more prosperous life" that would enable them to fulfil their aspirations. In general, those studies criticised the discipline's failure to properly understand the lives of groups who voted for Trump, whether the traditional 'rust belt' working class or the petty bourgeoisie, as Bell (2017) and Gusterson (2017) characterised the groups. Gusterson (2017:213) implored: "If we are to contribute to the analysis of current menacing trends, and to help find a way to reverse them, we need rich, deep, nuanced encounters with the conservative Other, encounters that will require all the skills of reflexivity, relativism, and human critique that our discipline can summon."

[28] I have been very careful about this in my thesis as, while in New Zealand we do have access to broad and longitudinal surveys about peoples' political values and behaviour via the *New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study* and *New Zealand Election Study* that seek to understand why people make the political judgements and actions they do, my work is about the worldview of the Green Party's MPs and parliamentary staff rather than the public's. Therefore, I have not made evaluations about whether the Greens' communication was successful in changing the public's mind, but instead presented the Green Party's view of whether and why they were successful or not.

Similarly, Hodges' (2017a; 2017b:e213-e214, 2017c:e206-e208) writing on Trump's tweets and plausible deniability represent Trump as "entertainer-in-Chief," personifying a "school yard bully" and "American snake oil salesman" who uses repetition, insult, hyperbole, and exaggeration while 'revelling' "at playing the media" with his denials of their interpretation of events to "reinforce an overriding message of his populism: the supposed obsession 'liberal elites' have with reinforcing 'political correctness'." It amounted to "content-free showmanship" centred on a "Trumpian discourse [that] creates its own reality filled with 'alternative facts' that are used to determine what is true" to continually advance a "compelling storyline [where] the precise content of that storyline matters less than the spectacle it creates" (Hodges 2017e:Paras.1, 6, 7). Hodges (2017d:Para.6) argues that Trump used a "discourse of theatre" rather than a "discourse of truth" to make poetic messages that used words "to convey emotion and speak to a politician's general ideological orientation rather than specific policy details." However, this analysis is based on repeating popular tropes and removes the politician from the conditions of his production. It sets Trump apart from anything, understanding his statements and actions without any relation to the structure, systems, shared understandings, or other actors that enable and shape what Trump did. To take one example, while the author is critical of Trump's use of emotion rather than detailed policy discussion, in fact and as the previous sections discuss, the use of emotion to create public support to win an election has long been an aim among Democrats and other progressive parties too. It is a part of how politicians across political divides understand the method of winning and explain why some candidates win and others lose. The strength of anthropology is its ability to contextualise events socially, culturally, and historically. Therefore, while understanding the strategies Trump used to win election is important, it is also important to seek a holistic understanding that takes account of the wider dynamics that generate what happens in politics in exactly the same way we would for any other phenomenon we study.

As these two key examples indicate, analyses of Trump's communication did not take into account the immense complexity, practicality, and unknowability of how politics works in any meaningfully grounded ethnographic sense. Preeminent anthropologist Laura Nader (2017:33) critiqued anthropology's response in a letter to *Anthropology Today*:

> If an American voter is a knee-jerk Democrat or a knee-jerk Republican, it's their business. But if an anthropologist wishes to analyse a US election, knee-jerk is not an option, because context is important to anthropological understanding…
>
> I am moved to say this after reading a number of [*Anthropology Today*] articles published in the June 2017 issue, because there was a paucity of the larger context necessary for understanding the 2016 US presidential election beyond Trump the trickster… [A]nthropologists must do what we do best: provide a more or less holistic context for public understanding of important issues of our day.

Anthropologists are likely to be interested in politics, perhaps from their research interests studying policy issues or communities affected by political decisions, or perhaps from their personal interest in watching campaign events, examining voting predications, volunteering to help a party, or following blogs and social media of commentators. However, it is crucial that anthropologists do not conflate an interest in politics with producing an understanding of the political field grounded in an anthropological perspective. Because anthropologists have understudied the inside worlds of Western political systems, the ways in which politicians do politics, and the ways politicians think

politics works, they have been unable to locate their own thinking in a substantial theoretical or ethnographic field. The outcome was that in analysing the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, anthropologists too joined in the project of codifying and rationalising a view of political communication as no more than contentless comedic style or lies, able to entertain or dupe the public into voting for a bully businessman or entertainer-in-chief, ushering in an age of unprecedented political crisis that would see the catastrophic fall of the entire political system.

As part of the long history of rationalisation of political communication, the way anthropologists have used their symbolic power in these panicked analyses is cause for concern. In total, the picture of politics they paint is of politicians speaking without content, without political or productive power but with merely the ability to allure voters with an entertaining style. Hall et al. (2017:93) epitomised that view, writing that "Trump may be ushering in a depoliticized era bereft of content." Alongside that analysis sit foreboding predictions about what that means for society. Hart (2017:1) wrote that "The West is in the grip of a moral panic – or perhaps political breakdown would be nearer the mark." Harkin (2017b:e204) wrote that: "The political establishment virtually guaranteed self-annihilation. We cannot predict how this will come about: catastrophically, as in the fall of the Third Republic in France in the 1930s, or, one hopes, more peacefully." He continued, "Instead we find that this hybrid political structure, a compromise between democracy and oligarchy both in the Eighteen Century, contained, like all seemingly safe structures, the seeds of its own destruction" (Harkin 2017b:e205). McGranahan (2017:244) asserted: We are in "a new reality… high-octane demagoguery, powered not only by false statements, prejudice, and emotion but also by an authoritarian, egotistical disdain for the truth." We must ask ourselves whether we have done the actual ethnographic work to make these pronouncements accurately and credibly, and what kind of world we are making real when people read our statements and believe them. I wrote in my introduction that my hope for readers is that they finish with a deeper appreciation for the humanity, genuine effort, and deep concern for country and issues that politicians overwhelmingly exhibit in their work; my hope for anthropologists is that they not only find a model for understanding why politicians say the things they do but that they also find some optimism in the care and responsibility with which most politicians do their work.

The Case for Messaging as a Messy, Indeterminate, and Uncertain Practice

The two most prominent anthropologists who have given serious thought to how political communication in modern Western democracies works are Michael Silverstein and Michael Lempert, whose research I have drawn on throughout this thesis.[29] Focused on the messaging of U.S. Presidents and candidates, they continue the American legacy of political communication studies. As linguistic anthropologists, Silverstein and Lempert apply the lens of semiotics to message, which is: "The systematic study of how all phenomena, in implicit as well as explicit events of communication, can be understood as signs of and for things like character, biographical trajectory, and indentifiability of a political figure" (Lempert and Silverstein 2012:26). Their co-

[29] The reason that I have not drawn on anthropology's examinations of political discourse is because this thesis examines the more mundane, everyday aspects of political communication that aim primarily at media coverage rather than set-piece speeches. The reasons for that are threefold: First, speeches which are central to political life were done by the Green Party's co-Leaders rather than the MPs I worked with; second, none of the four MPs sought to cultivate a reputation centered on great oratory; and third, my focus is on the *making* of statements rather than the *saying* of statements – on the logic of their production rather than their performance.

authored book, *Creatures of Politics: Media, Message, and the American Presidency*, brought together their individual papers centred on 'message' or 'brand', divided between Silverstein's (2011a; 2011b; 2011c) interest in the biographical illusion that creates the political persona of a candidate and Lempert's (2011; 2009) work on issues and interdiscursivity. The section details Silverstein and Lempert's contribution to understanding how message works in detail, highlighting the case for the practice of messaging as messy, indeterminate, and uncertain. I also highlight two ways that my research extends the work of Silverstein and Lempert.

As the foundation of their analysis, Silverstein (2011b:205; 2011c:71) argues that the way the public comes "to 'know'" their candidates is "through the art of their words and their surround that creates and maintains a biographical world" in which they seem to and therefore do exist. It works because politicians inhabit long interdiscursive sequences of communication events such as televised debates and the associated post-debate panels of experts which analyse the performances that allow the candidates to develop their messaging. Each event is made up of "message partials" – "calculated bundles of soundbites, slogans, catchy phrases, pictures, gestures, and more – that contribute to the message of the candidates" (Lempert and Silverstein 2012:26; Silverstein 2011b:205).[30] These "semiotic flotsam" become "emblems of identity" which are "potent signs of who-and-what" each candidate "is and can become" (Silverstein 2011c:71; 2011b:205). Emblems of identity

> position people, allowing a public to identify them in a structural space of relative possible social identities, like protagonists and villains in the employments of most of the narratives to which we are otherwise exposed… Such a contrast provides relative places for political figures to stand in… the electorate's and the general public's imaginations, defined thus publicly as personalities by processes they have either controlled or that circumstances – or their opponents – have managed to control (Silverstein 2011c:71).

Thus, each time a politician is visible to the public, "whether directly or through reporters' accounts and commentators' interpretive evaluations," message partials that become emblems of identity contribute to creating the character of a candidate by signifying to the public their social identity in a field of relation with the other candidates (Silverstein 2011b:204; 2011c:70). By being able to make a distinction between characters and being able to imagine the personalities and potentialities of the candidates, voters can come to either identify with that political figure or be repelled by it.

In politics, where the field of candidates is relational and competitive, the goal of message is to be the candidate whose messaging dominates the public's understanding of the characters and their positions. For this reason, Silverstein (2011b:205) identifies, messaging creates both a positive characterological aura for the favoured candidate and negative ones for their opponents. What impresses and wins the messaging competition is "whose positive and negative emblems of identity will come to be used by the public to wrap around each of the competitors as the process moves forward to something like a presidential or similarly structured election" (Silverstein 2011b:205). As an example, Lempert and Silverstein (2012:10-11) discuss Hilary Clinton contrasting herself with a

[30] In his earlier work, Silverstein (2003:12-15) suggests that these partials are not just formed from descriptive language but also from signalling the inhabited identity in non-descriptive ways. These include, for example, features like rhythm, melodiousness, fluency, gesture, and expression, which are difficult to describe (Silverstein 2003:12). Silverstein states that people who study communication should take laborious, detailed records of such things. I did not, however, in my study. When I was doing my fieldwork, I was not expecting to do a thesis on communication, so instead my field notes are focused on detailed descriptions of what was said and done. This is a limitation of my descriptions of message in this thesis.

"subdued seriousness" in opposition to Obama's "rock star" persona during the 2007-2008 Democratic Party primary to negatively message him as "a mere celebrity lightweight, political entertainer of the young." Later, after Obama won the primary campaign, Republican Presidential candidate John McCain continued to use that negative message to characterize Obama as a celebrity with a questionable readiness to assume the leadership role of President (Lempert and Silverstein 2012:11). Because the messaging competition is the primary measurement for political success, evaluated constantly through opinion polling and political commentary for example, it is not "factual and declarative representational uses of language to describe what has been and what is in the world to be dealt with by an aspirant to political office once elected. It is not candidates' positions on issues, the clear 'ought's and 'shall be's of a plan of action in and of their own sake" that matters in politics (Silverstein 2011b:205). Rather, what matters in political contests is whose messaging wins.

The focus of Lempert's (2011, 2009) own work is how candidate brands are constructed interdiscursively between the candidate and the political commentariat. Drawing on the work of Bakhtin, Lempert argues that during events like debates between candidates, a candidate will direct utterances about issues toward implied 'superaddressees': "a virtual participant who is only assumed to be present, like an abstract, (over)hearing public, or indeed, a constituency" (Bakhtin 1986, in Lempert 2011:192). In making a statement, a candidate is not only taking a position on an issue; they are implying an orientation toward a constituency. But, Lempert (2011:193, emphasis original) argues,

> What matters (increasingly?) is not only 'where one stands' (with respect to an Issue) and by implication 'for whom one stands' (with respect to an implied voter linked to that Issue), but how one orients to both. This *how*, a candidate's manners and bearing before The Issues, in speech and bodily hexis, is constructed by commentators through the aid of quick audiovisual replays and splicings that juxtapose things the candidate said and did, inciting evaluation and, of course, commentary.

It is in post-event commentary by the media, opinion writers, and political experts that the superaddressees are 'recovered' "through critical reading of a candidate text" and how the candidate orients themselves toward them (Lempert 2011:193). By recovering the candidate's orientation to the group, the candidate is 'revealed' to have "characterological attributes," such as a lack of conviction for example, and those attributes 'identify' the candidate as a "social type" such as the immoral "flip-flopper" (Lempert 2009:224). Thus, it is the candidate's orientation to their superaddressees and their "manner or style of addressing issues" which "helps make the candidate brand" (Lempert 2011:118). It is, Lempert (2011:198) states, a "relational etiquette imposed on candidates in the presence of The Issues." This relational etiquette, invoked by the commentariat and campaign antagonists, has moral dimensionalities that involve a "sublime of authenticity" (Lempert 2011:188-189).

Lempert uses two main examples to illustrate. The first is 2004's first Presidential debate between incumbent George W. Bush and John Kerry in the United States. Kerry had been criticised as lacking strong leadership characteristics throughout the campaign – a perception which Bush had capitalised on in his negative advertisements. Analysing key interdiscursive moments of Kerry's statements in the debate, such as 'I'll never give a veto to any country over our security', Lempert (2009:233-234) argues that "viewers are presented with copious signs of two attributes: 'conviction'

and 'competence'." The signs of conviction were not evidenced in the literal text of what Kerry said but in the "cotexual and contextual" evidence of a "multi-faceted configuration of signs," like the poetic nature of speech in the debate and the understanding that the presidential debates are contests of character (Lempert 2009:238). The second example is a moment in the 2007 Democratic primary debate where candidate Hillary Clinton was asked why she supported the Governor of New York's stance of giving illegal immigrants driver's licenses. The stance that Clinton gave in response to questions about her positions was interpreted in the post-debate analysis as 'confusing double-talk' which signalled that she would be open to changing if she were to win the primary and run in the presidential race (Lempert 2011:195-196). She was characterized as a flip-flopper because her "manner of facing an issue is read as addressivity, and this addressivity betrays attributes of speaker: lack of conviction" (Lempert 2011:196).

While this process of creating message is often presented as a nebulous but nonetheless straightforward communication act by scholars like Lakoff (2004) and Westen (2007) who work within the rationality of political communication, the ways in which political messages are created and come to dominate the public's understanding is in fact messy, indeterminate, and filled with uncertainty. Lempert (2011) emphasises that there are no fixed rules as to which practice or statement by a politician will or will not be recovered in a certain way by the commentariat. He stated: "There are no well-institutionalized metapragmatic rules-of-use that map form… to effect… and what a given mode of address reveals about speaker is often just as plastic. In brief, key variables of actant structure (who-said-what-to-whom) are left blank and filled in by the commentariat in post-event reportage" (Lempert 2011:198). For example, he wrote that there is no "neat, mechanical rule-of-law for debate behaviour" that would determine that actions such as a long pause or quick change-of-topic will be judged as flip-flopping (Lempert 2011:198). This makes messaging fundamentally messy and uncertain. Lempert and Silverstein (2012:47-48) evoke the messiness like so:

> The space-time of things-that-just-happen-to-happen in determinate spatial or temporal relation to one to another, even in spatiotemporal proximity is, of course, made up of people – even politically engaged people – constantly doing and saying things. There is an uncertain and uncontrolled randomness in all this, a backdrop of great criss-crossing complexity… against which the emergence of an organized, counter-entropic trend, even groundswell, as they say, of political coherence and direction becomes a discernible wonder. Outcomes look, at least in retrospect, inevitable.

Giving shape to the 'backdrop of great criss-crossing complexity' in ways which create a positive, favourable message is the logic that the political field operates on. Politicians and their staff are always looking to influence the ways in which messages are identified for and by the public and become the dominant understanding. They want to have positive messages about themselves wrapped around them, and negative messages wrapped around their opponents. Political communication, as a diagnostic and prescriptive rationalisation of performative statement, promises politicians the ability to do that – even if it does not actually work like that in practice.

This thesis builds on the work of Silverstein and Lempert in two main ways. First, as Lempert and Silverstein (2012:48) identify, what enters the public realm as political communication is an already-formed object that is both a message in itself as well as a component within a field of politics that has coherence as a whole and which, in hindsight, has a trajectory narrated by those who report

and analyse it. Unlike Silverstein and Lempert's analyses, because I took the methodological approach of doing participant-observation, this thesis shows how messaging works prior to its entry to the political sphere as an already-formed object. That allows two extra insights. First, it enables a view of what fails to become public to see which messages MPs and staff think will not work. Second, I was able to capture attempts at controlling the message as it unfolded across time and before they were narrated in hindsight by the MPs and staff, and in the public sphere. Those two extra insights give further weight to the view that the practice of messaging is not only uncertain, indeterminate, and messy once in the public sphere, but the practices of making messages even before they cross that threshold is uncertain, indeterminate, and messy too.

The second extension I make to Silverstein and Lempert's (2012) work is a focus not on candidate messaging but party and issue messaging. Silverstein and Lempert argue that 'the issues' matter not in themselves but insofar as they contribute to defining the message of the candidate and their relation to addressees (Lempert 2011:193). It is true that the issues the Green Party talked about in public contributed to creating the Party's message. For example, there is often discussion about whether the Green Party is becoming too focused on social rather than environmental policy, and what that means for their overall support and for their appeal to people who vote purely on environmental issues. Good examples of that kind of writing include Neal's (2017) opinion piece, *Why Can't the Greens Be More Green?* Or McAuley's (2017) opinion piece, *Green Party, Remember Your Purpose.* However, while the Greens did consider how what they said about the issues would be evaluated with regard to the Party's relation to the public, the also believed in messaging the issues themselves. They believed that speaking about issues using the principles and prescriptions of Lakoff (2004) and Westen (2007) would enable them to message the issues in a way that would win over the public to their position and create action. That approach can be understood as a strategy by the Greens to have their messages about political issues be the ones "used by the public to wrap around" the issue itself. Or, as Bourdieu (1991:170) would characterise it, to make people see and believe their vision of the world.

Conclusion

The purpose of this Chapter has been to outline the *objectification and rationalisation of political communication itself,* theorise *how the field of political communication itself works to produce the belief in its own rightness,* and discuss the *anthropological understanding of message*. The first section outlined the history of the development of the field of political communication and how it rationalised the practical sense and skill of politicians in communicating well in the immense number and variety of situations they work in. I then outlined the particular messaging principles and prescriptions of cognitive linguist George Lakoff (2004) and psychologist and neuroscientist Drew Westen (2007) that politicians should frame the issues and make emotional, values-based, and positive statements to win over the support and belief of the public. I showed that the Green Party had adopted those principles and prescriptions in the way they thought about and evaluated the statements MPs made. Finally, I outlined how anthropology understands political communication in Western societies, primarily the U.S., works by summarising responses to the campaign and election of President Donald Trump and the work of linguistic anthropologists Michael Lempert and Michael Silverstein. These sections built the case that, contrary to the

principles and prescriptions put forward by the experts, messaging is a messy, indeterminate, and uncertain practice.

This chapter builds the first part of my overall argument: that the logic of modern messaging rationalised by the experts acts as a preconstraint on the way that politicians can effectively and legitimately speak in the field of politics and thus constrains the representation of the world MPs can make. Messaging principles and practices act as an orthodoxy, a dominant principle and practice that forms the basis of thought and action in the political field without being wholly taken-for-granted by participants in it. It is believed by politicians to be the effective way to win the support and votes of the public. By adhering to messaging prescriptions, parties of opposition whose positions advocate for change are able to communicate more heterodox positions to the public in orthodox ways that the public will be predisposed to recognise as credible and legitimate, even if they would not necessarily believe the world represented in the statement if it was communicated to them in a different way. The content and form by which politicians give name to the world they envision matters in producing the effect of belief, and orthodox forms and content that name their vision produce a greater predisposition for belief. Thus, parties can retain the purity of their heterodox positions but nonetheless win over the support and belief of the public by communicating them in orthodox ways. It is that slippage which allows opposition politicians to engage in both the political and symbolic struggle in their statements, giving them a way to win power *and* to continue to name the world that they envision and thus seek to make it real.

But, as is outlined in the following ethnographic chapters of this thesis, MPs are concerned about the way that messaging acts as orthodoxy of effective political statement. That is because, first, the dominance of orthodoxy itself results in a limitation and constraint on the possibility and practice of political statement and thus the possibility of speaking and naming in less orthodox or heterodox ways both in and outside the field. Although messaging enables them to compete for the double stakes of the political field, opposition MPs worry about the narrowing of public political discourse as they, along with others in the political and non-political field, increasingly engage in messaging. Because of the dominance of the political field in society, those who participate in it or are adjacent to it invest in the messaging that drives it so that they too are able to play and exert an effect in the field. In totality across society, the production of statements about the world becomes increasingly dominated by message as the political field does too. Second, as opposition MPs and parties themselves become increasingly invested in and disposed toward messaging in order to win the double stakes of the political field, they worry that they may shift too far towards speaking in orthodoxy such that that orthodoxy no longer accurately states their heterodox vision for the world. Thus, in becoming too messaged, they worry that their own vision will no longer be named and therefore will not be able to be made real. Those dual concerns about the way that messaging narrows and constrains their ability to state their vision for the world occupy the minds of MPs as they constantly work to make sure they have the balance between orthodox content and form and heterodox vision right in their public statements while still aiming to win over the public's belief and mobilisation to win the double stakes.

Finally, as an aside, my hope is that this chapter acts as a pause for academics, both from anthropology and the political sciences, to consider the representations of politics that we expound by using our own symbolic power to say how politics works. Especially as academics increasingly leave their ivory towers to create impact by talking in public to the public about politics, they blur the lines between academic research and opinion, commentary, and punditry. Engaging in the

symbolic struggle in public is becoming an increasingly orthodox part of how academics do their jobs, measured and celebrated by universities as well as by academics who enjoy the capital and fame they gain by influencing how the public sees the world. But, consistently, this thesis shows that academic understandings of how politics works, many of which are promoted in the public sphere by the authors, are different to how it actually works. Perhaps more importantly, it also shows that academics play a significant role in the co-creation of the field of politics in and by their statements about how it works and what is effective, both for politicians and in the public's mind. The power to produce the world by representing it is seductive. As Bourdieu (1991:105) wrote, "There is no social agent who does not aspire, as far as his [or her] circumstances permit, to have the power to name and create the world through naming." That power to produce should not be wielded without considered reflection about the world that we create when speaking to others about it.

Chapter Three

Politics is Done by People:
Fieldwork with Four MPs and their Political Lives

Fenno Jr. (1996:8, emphasis original) wrote that: "First and foremost… [it is] flesh and blood individuals, real *people* we are talking about when we generalise about the behaviour of politicians." This Chapter is about the four real people that are at the centre of this thesis: Holly Walker, Kennedy Graham, Gareth Hughes, and Catherine Delahunty. Each of those four people is an individual, with ways of thinking and doing in 2013 shaped by their own lifetime prior to becoming an MP and since their entry and institution into parliament as MPs.

But it is rare that people know their MPs as people. For the most part, as Silverstein (2011b:205; 2011c:71) identifies, the public knows politicians through their message: their biographical illusion, produced of a myriad of partials that creates a "coherent and integral character" across time and among other characters in the political world. But, that public message does not stray too far from who they are: as part of being an "ideal parliamentarian," MPs work to maintain an authenticity between their public performances as MPs and their private selves so that they can position and experience themselves as genuine and authentic (Stuart 2008:113). Consequently, when Gareth described the very different messages of each of the four MPs who made up my fieldwork, he not only named their brand but also hinted at who they were as people:

> We're all so different. I think superficially, Kennedy's known as the academic. The calm, measured older statesman of the Party. Catherine's known as the fiery activist. I think Holly came in with a reputation as The Scholar and then built a brand as The Young Mum. I don't know what my brand was. I think I was maybe a middle-ground; like, a bit of an activist, but not as hard-core as Catherine. A young dad, but people don't know guys for that. And we've all got different approaches to everything, from questions, to speeches, to internal decision-making… But that's the beauty and strength of the Green Party. And I respect all three of them for their contribution and skills.

While the public message hints at the actual person an MP is, this Chapter seeks to provide a more intimate characterisation of who Holly, Kennedy, Gareth, and Catherine are and the shape that gives to their work as MPs.

The particularity of person matters in politics; like the logic of messaging and the structure of the field, the habitus of each MP gives shape to the statements they make in their everyday work. A habitus, Bourdieu (1998:25) defined, is "an acquired system of preferences, of principles of vision and division…, a system of durable cognitive structures… [and] schemes of action which orient the perception of the situation and the appropriate response." A politician's habitus is an inseparable part of their practical sense because it shapes their understanding of how they can shape a yet-to-unfold future from the in-the-moment action and statements they make as they advance toward their goals. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a sense of the perception of the world that Holly, Gareth, Catherine, and Kennedy were working with in 2013, and give an insight into how their views shaped their actions. It shows that even though the MPs understood how politics worked and

had the competency to play the game, they often did not "fit" in the political field – they did not always perceive "it immediately as endowed with meaning and interest" or have an immediate "coincidence between disposition and position" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:128). That lack of fit allowed the Green MPs to consider different ways of thinking politically and doing politics.

Figure 3.1: Fieldwork Calendar

January						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30	31			

February						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28			

March						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	31

April						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30					

May						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

June						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

July						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

August						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30	31	

September						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
30						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29

October						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30	31			

November						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	

December						
M	T	W	T	F	S	S
30	31					1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29

Key:

- Holly, Recess Days
- Holly, House Sitting Days
- Kennedy, Recess Days
- Kennedy, House Sitting Days
- Gareth, Recess Days
- Gareth, House Sitting Days
- Catherine, Recess Days
- Catherine, House Sitting Days
- Unobserved Sitting Days
- Public Holidays

Before introducing each of the MPs, however, this chapter first discusses the production of this research. I outline the general methodological and ethical approach I took, and explain my position in the creation of this research. That detail outlines how the particular knowledge of the four MPs and the Green Party Parliamentary Office's strategies and practices was generated.

Outline of the Fieldwork Site, Methods, and Ethical Considerations

This research is a traditional anthropological ethnography. During my 2013 fieldwork, I was located for 2.5 months each in the offices of Holly, Kennedy, Gareth, and Catherine, totalling ten months of shadowing MPs or, as Crewe (2015b:1) called it, "stalking" (see Figure 3.1 for my fieldwork calendar). Spread across three floors in Bowen House, Wellington, I spent my days either on the parliamentary precinct enmeshed in the Green Party's organisation or travelling with MPs off-precinct. This section describes the composition of the Green Party's Parliamentary Wing where I was located, some of the activities I undertook with the MPs, and the limits and reach of my access, as well as the ethical considerations.

Figure 3.2 shows the organisational structure and roles that make up the Green Party's Parliamentary Wing, with some minor approximation of the time component of advisor and issues assistant roles for simplicity. As the diagram shows, each Green MP had their own office, as all MPs across the House do. The offices of Co-leaders Metiria Turei and Russel Norman had a special status by the fact of being the leaders' offices, conferring extra parliamentary resources like greater funding. MPs did their office work fairly independently. Even though there was coordinated work that the Green MPs did together, MPs only had a small idea of the day-to-day functioning of other offices, and MPs who were not working on similar issues could go for a long time without conducting any close business together apart from at the larger group meetings. For example, although Catherine's and Kennedy's offices were next door to each other, their portfolios were sufficiently different that they did not work together closely. However, MPs also met together regularly to discuss political issues, plan, make decisions, and create a sense of team. Regular meetings included the Tuesday morning Caucus meeting each sitting week; regular *kete* meetings of MPs who shared portfolios in each of the three broad areas of environment, economy, and society; quarterly weekend-long retreats where MPs discussed strategic and sensitive issues together privately; inter-office meetings that coordinated work more closely; and ad hoc meetings late at night or in shared taxis. Thus, while operating independently in day-to-day activities, MPs' work was also shaped by the collective strategies and decisions of the Party and in coordination with other MPs who had related portfolios.

Each MP's Office also had an Executive Assistant. While the job title Executive Assistant (EA) conjures up images of administrative work, EAs had wide-reaching responsibilities and skills beyond that. The EA's role was to get things done (or not done, if that was what the situation called for). They often acted as the MP[31] to officially sign off items that needed it, do non-media communication work for them, and assist in deciding what to do on a day-to-day basis so as to meet the MP's

[31] One EA estimated that they could organise their MP's office in such a way that it would be several months before anyone noticed the MP had gone missing.

Figure 3.2: Structure and Roles of the Green Party's Parliamentary Wing



strategic goals and priorities. They had expert knowledge about how parliament worked. Employed officially by Parliamentary Service rather than the Green Party, they played a significant role in ensuring that the parliament itself ran well: that MPs were in the debating chamber for speeches, that select committee notes were organised so MPs could participate effectively, that budgets were accounted for, that Speaker's Office approval was granted for events, and much more. Some EAs were also responsible for the often-voluminous research in their MP's portfolios which was not assigned to the level of 'strategic priority' that made it the purview of the Media and Advisory Unit. As the outward-looking face of their MP's Office to people and organisations, they were experts at maintaining good relationships. They were adept at preventing and managing crises, often stopping what could become embarrassing mistakes or oversights by MPs and other staff before they became a problem. The EAs worked as a collective to manage, coordinate, and shape what was and was not happening. As one EA characterised it, they "subtly steered decision-making" and acted as "gate keepers" and "risk managers" in a way that few MPs or other staff were aware of. The EAs were essential to the smooth and effective running of every part of the Green Party's parliamentary organisation. One EA told me that the sign of a good EA was that their work was invisible – their MP would never know the work they did because their life happened seamlessly. Consequently, the work of EAs rarely appears in this thesis: their work was done in such a way during 2013 that it appeared not to exist.

The Media and Advisory Unit, shown in blue in Figure 3.2, was comprised of the Parliamentary office's political staff. They were employed by the Greens using the Leaders' office budget, and managed by the Political and Communications Directors. The Political Director was responsible for managing political strategy and work, including legislation, questions for oral answer, and policies that the Party launched. The Communications Director was responsible for managing the communications strategy and work, including press releases, major speeches, and messaging. There was often cross-over between the work they both did and the two Directors sat next to each other in the Unit so that they could easily coordinate. They managed a group of Political and Media Advisors. Advisors carried out research and media promotion work on issues which were priorities for the Green Party. They were loosely grouped into economic, environmental, and social areas. Each of the MPs' portfolios was matched with an advisor, although some portfolios were allocated fewer staff hours than others. Advisors focused on doing scrutiny and messaging by uncovering stories about the Government, its support partners, and their actions or inactions using avenues like Official Information Act 1982 requests, questions for written answer, and talking to concerned people in varied sectors to gain newsworthy information. They then worked to get those stories and the Party's MP spokesperson on the issue into the media primarily by writing press releases and talking to interested journalists. During my research in 2013, the top priorities for research and media work were improving water quality, stopping state asset sales, and reducing inequality. There were additional priorities like campaigning to save endangered Māui dolphins and opposing the Government's agreement with SkyCity Casino to build a conference centre in exchange for greater gambling capacity. Advisors worked fairly closely with MPs depending on the level of consultation each MP wanted, and they appear frequently in this thesis.

There were two other groups in the Green Party's Parliamentary Office, although I had little contact with them during my fieldwork. The first was the Issues Team, managed by the Issues Director in Auckland. It is shown in purple in Figure 3.2. They carried out outreach and campaigning tasks on priority issues which involved, for example, managing the creation and printing of leaflets and

stickers, setting up events, finding guest speakers, and ensuring an audience would attend public meetings or protests. The second group was the Digital Team, shown in orange in Figure 3.2. They were responsible for design work, the Green Party website, and managing the Party's contacts database, among other general ICT work.

As an anthropologist, I was situated directly in the four MPs' offices in this wider organisation. Being there among the action was much more gruelling than I had anticipated. Naïvely in hindsight, I did not anticipate that it would be exhausting at all. That was what surprised Holly the most too when she first became an MP. My field notes for one memorable day with Holly began: "It was a 5:00 a.m. start to a sixteen-hour day." Typically, I was spending from 8:00 a.m. until early or late evening with the MP I was shadowing.[32] I was based in Wellington, but also travelled to Auckland, Christchurch, and Dunedin with the MPs to meet people and organisations in those city centres and observe their public meetings and conferences. The work I observed included internal meetings such as the morning call, catch-ups with advisors to plan campaigns, coordinating with other MPs across areas of interest, *kete* meetings, talking with EAs to plan time, and much more. I also attended meetings with the people and organisations from outside the parliament that make up much of any MP work. They included prominent NGOs, academic experts, company CEOs, schools, community organisations, businesses, constituents who needed help, and more. I also observed parliamentary business, including what happened in the debating chamber, open and closed select committee sessions, training evenings presented by staff of the Office of the Clerk, and cross-party meetings between MPs about legislation and collective events or work. I also went to many public meetings that the Green MPs and staff had organised about their plans to build more housing or stop deep sea oil drilling, for example, as well as others that had been organised by outside people or organisations that the Green MPs had been invited to speak at. There were times spent preparing for interviews and five-minute unscheduled interruptions to the day's activity to record a statement for a radio news bulletin. I spent gaps in the MPs' diary with them in their office, catching up on work or taking a break from the hectic pace. Throughout my fieldwork, I stuck by the MPs as much as I could, watching and writing down what they said and did. Being among the action with the four MPs afforded me unprecedented access to nearly all parts of an MPs' working life.

Sherry Ortner (2010:215) wrote about Hollywood that "it seems like there is always an inside further inside the inside;" the same is true of political parties and parliament. Although this research is unprecedented for its level of access, there were two key spaces I remained largely outside of during my research. The first was that I had extremely limited access to MPs' emails. A vast amount of MP work takes place via email, whether that is being updated with the latest press releases and Green Party statements on issues, figuring out the right words to use in a press release in a back-and-forth with an advisor, approving or disapproving of a position as a Caucus outside the formal Tuesday morning meeting, working to organise the diary with their EA while not in the same room, being contacted by interest groups, and much more. MPs estimated they received more than two hundred emails each day. During fieldwork, I was on an email list called *Green Everyone* that received emails sent to the whole Green Party parliamentary organisation. It included routine office emails which noted who was away that day and coordinated people going out for Friday morning brunch

[32] And, in addition to shadowing the MPs, I had to find time to write my notes, which typically ended up being either late at night or weekends. During the year, I worked out that writing a detailed description of a meeting typically took around triple the meeting's time, if not more. As both my exhaustion and familiarity with how parliament and MPs worked grew throughout the year, my field notes got less and less detailed and I began to skip writing entire days.

together. It also included emails about morning call decisions, copies of the *Advisory & Comms Report* for Caucus, and press releases. That gave me some insight into what was being sent to MPs. The MPs also forwarded me things they thought I would be interested in and Holly recorded a narration of her actions as she sorted and actioned the emails in her inbox so that, given its centrality to her work, I had a rough idea of how at least one MP worked through it. However, by not having access to MPs' emails, some of the background information that led to certain decisions is missing from my work; for example, an explanation of Kennedy's climate change conference papers in Chapter Six does not reference feedback emailed to him about the papers by other MPs and advisors. The second space I did not have access to as a researcher was Caucus meetings. Caucus meetings between MPs, Green Party representatives from the Executive and Policy Committees, and senior staff occur from 10:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. every Tuesday on each sitting week. As part of access negotiations, I agreed not to include Caucus meetings in my research because the MPs wanted to retain a space where they could still have free and frank discussion that would not be made public through the publication of this thesis.

By opportunity rather than conscious plan, I was able to mitigate the blind-spots that the lack of access to those two areas caused in my research by taking up two positions that allowed me to "be where the action" was (Bernard 2006:344) without using that action directly in my research. The first way I was able to do that was to take up a position on Caucus as the Policy Committee Representative, tasked with coordinating MP input into the Party's policy formulation and informing them of the Party's positions on policy so that they could reflect that in their work. I was able to do that because, as a condition of negotiating access to study the Policy Committee's decision-making processes for my Masters research (see Bignell 2012), I had agreed to stay on the Committee for three years. The convenience of my location in parliament and working knowledge of both the Policy Committee and MPs meant that I was elected to sit on Caucus for them. That role allowed me to be in Caucus meetings. Of course, none of the information from those Caucus meetings is used in this thesis; however, I did gain background knowledge of the dynamics between the MPs, the way they thought about politics and issues, and the centrality of advice from senior staff, for example, that does inform my analysis.

The second way I was able to gain background knowledge was by taking on a position with Parliamentary Service as Catherine Delahunty's EA after my fieldwork period had ended. I took up the EA role because, after fieldwork, I was burnt out and wanted a rest[33] and a break from my PhD without completely divorcing myself from it by exiting the field of politics and having to return afresh a year or two later to do my analysis. Taking on a position in the field where my research was situated seemed like a good way to do that. I was willing to take on that role because, firstly, Parliamentary Service was my employer rather than the Green Party and, secondly, it was not a party-political role; there are explicit rules that govern the boundary of what is political or not at parliament, and parliamentary staff are not permitted to seek votes, donations, or membership for their MP's political party for example. Those boundaries meant that I was neither employed by the Green Party nor doing political work for them. Working for Parliamentary Service in Catherine's office gave me a much deeper and more detailed understanding of parliament and MP work that I did not gain from my ten months of fieldwork alone and has resulted in a much more robust and deep analysis. Practically, I managed the boundary between my research and roles on the Policy Committee and for Parliamentary Service by only taking field notes of things that I could use in my

[33] In hindsight, working at parliament during the 2014 election year did not achieve that.

research. That way, when it came time to analyse and interpret my observational data, I could be assured that what I had written down had occurred in my fieldworker role. However, the background knowledge that I gained from the Policy Committee and Executive Assistant roles was invaluable to my analysis in this thesis about why things happened certain ways, how decisions were made, and what MPs were thinking.

Some of the most useful times I spent talking with MPs was during the time between activities or when nothing was planned to fill up the schedule. Fenno Jr (1996:18) characterised this as "travel talk." He wrote: "Much of what an observer learns is learned from the kind of informal, disjointed, meandering, event-stimulated conversations I shall call 'travel talk'. It is a form of conversation more open-ended, more expansive, and more unpredictable than the structured, inhibited interviews conducted in the cocoon of Capitol Hill" (Fenno Jr 1996:18). During those unstructured times, when the MPs had become used to my presence, trusted me, and there was no one else around, we talked more candidly about the frustrations, pressures, and effects of their work. I was sometimes surprised at what the MPs shared. It was information that was, at times, personal and sensitive. Sometimes, it was information that could become damaging if it became public or became public in a way that the Party could not control. Those conversations do not appear in this thesis.

When I presented to the conference of the *Association of Social Anthropologists of Aotearoa New Zealand* (ASAA/NZ) in 2015 about the practical challenges of studying up, I outlined that one of the most difficult parts of studying up in the political field was that there were multiple, criss-crossing, and implicit rules about what information was confidential and what was 'on the record' for my research (Bignell 2015). Crewe (2015b:9) found the same during her research in the British Commons, reporting that her access depended on participants' confidence about her ability to understand and "judge what was secret in the first place." I reported that I had deliberately decided to act conservatively on those confidentiality boundaries to protect the privacy of my participants. I was shocked when one highly-regarded anthropologist came up to me after my talk to tell me that he "hoped" I had kept a separate diary of all the gossip I had heard. I did not. Like Nader (1974:303-304), I believe that is a fundamentally unethical approach to take. Elite actors like politicians – real people, we should never forget – should be treated as participants who have the same rights and protections in our research as any other.

Contrary to the suggestion by another prominent anthropologist at the same conference that I should be highly critical of the MPs I worked with regardless of the harm that could cause them or the Party, anthropologists have a "paramount responsibility" to the welfare of our participants (ASAA/NZ 1992:1). This responsibility is reflected in our *Principles of Professional Responsibility and Ethical Conduct,* which clearly states as its first principle that:

> In their work, anthropologists' paramount responsibility is to their research participants. When there is a conflict of interest, these individuals must come first. Anthropologists must do everything in their power to protect their physical, social, and psychological welfare and to honour their dignity and privacy (ASAA/NZ 1992:1).

Politicians, too, are people. They occupy elite positions in our society and, of course, we should be critical of the ways in which they wield or misuse that power. But, that is not what the Greens were doing when I did fieldwork with them. They simply did not inflict the harm on others that would necessitate me to break our code of ethics. Presenting a sustained analysis of the Green Party's

perspectives and actions does not by necessity require jeopardising the welfare of the people involved, by unnecessarily exposing questionably private information to the public to deliberately or inadvertently inflict harm on their MPs and staff. The critical analysis of the way in which power is sought and wielded in this thesis is robust and representative, but it does not have the salacious insider gossip that I am sure many people would like. I believe I have made the right ethical judgement in choosing to let those candid, blurredly private conversations inform my analysis but not to report them directly.

In fact, once located in the inside of the field, as few anthropologists have been, it becomes much more apparent how much there is to research without producing an exposé. Indeed, because Western politics and politicians' worlds have been so understudied in anthropology, there is much that we can write about and make public before we decide it is in ours and the public's interest[34] to break our participants' trust. It is not only a good thing to be transparent about what we intend to publish with our participants but, importantly in a field where access is so difficult to gain in the first instance, acting trustworthily fulfils our ethical obligation to anthropology to "not jeopardise future research" at our fieldsite by maintaining "integrity and rapport in the field" (ASAA/NZ 1992:3.c). That is one reason I have maintained the confidentiality of some information.

This confidentiality and privacy is all the more important because of the intense public scrutiny MPs are under and because of the impossibility of anonymising them in this thesis. Nader (1974: 303-304) argued that elites should expect research on them to adhere to the same ethical qualities as research on other participants. In fact, she suggested that anthropologists perhaps have an even greater ethical obligation when researching elite actors because the consequences were magnified to such a greater extent than for the typical sites social anthropologists research. She wrote that:

> The ethical problems that are raised in studying up almost always appear to be confused, particularly in discussing ethics of working in one's own society… Confusion results depending on whether one recognizes implicit double standard – is there one ethic for studying up and another for studying down? Or is it… that the consequences of describing what may be systematic inadequacies may be greater for government agencies [politicians, and political parties] than peasant economic systems or for conflict resolution (or just plain conflict) in a small fishing village and that therefore our objects of study should be treated accordingly? (Nader 1974: 303-304).

Preserving anonymity for participants is general anthropological practice and a right they should expect[35] (ASAA/NZ 1992:2.f). The MPs were well aware and agreed before I began my research that there would be no way for me to do that because, for example, by simply naming an issue such as gold-mining it would be easy to look up the MP spokesperson for the issue and identify that it was Catherine. Furthermore, attempts to make the MPs anonymous would have been nonsensical in this research, where the individuals' character, personality, message, and interests are all tied together in their working lives and in my analysis.

[34] I also note that there is no explicit public interest clause in our code of ethics, and no suggestion that the public interest should outweigh principle 1.A: "Where research involves the acquisition of material and information transferred on the assumption of trust between persons, it is axiomatic that the rights, interests, and sensitivities of those persons must be safeguarded" (ASAA/NZ 1992:1.a).

[35] Non-politicians who appear in this thesis have all been made at least semi-anonymous through the use of job titles and pseudonyms rather than real names to indicate who said and did what.

When negotiating my access, the Green Party's Caucus and I agreed to two research processes to manage the risk that the lack of anonymity and opening up the Party's internal world posed. Our agreement was fairly typical of anthropological research. First, we agreed I would provide draft copies to the four MPs I worked with so that they could give me feedback on it, and that I would provide a copy of the thesis to other MPs prior to its publication so they would know in advance what I had written about them. Receiving feedback was a valuable way to ensure that what I had written was representative of how the Green Party worked: no one but Catherine had anything further to add, instead providing brief supportive comments or no feedback at all. As a result of our discussions about my research, Catherine provided two extra paragraphs that detailed her sense of alienation in parliament and her relationship to the Press Gallery, and which I have identified and included for readers. She also asked me several challenging questions regarding, for example, what my research would change and the spaces in which the Greens questioned parliamentary politics, and reflecting on them also developed my thinking. Second, we agreed that the thesis could be embargoed as a last resort to protect against secret or harmful information being published. Both because of my approach to ethics and the fact that the first process would identify any areas of concern prior to publication, I was confident that an embargo would not be needed and I would be able to open up the Green Party's internal world to the public while mitigating the potential harm that could cause. When I was close to finishing, I asked the MPs and Chief of Staff whether would like to embargo and all unreservedly agreed not to, supporting the publication of this thesis.

Anthropology as a discipline does not work without our participants' trust. If anthropologists want to see the world through our participants' eyes, we must act responsibility with the knowledge we are given by our participants. Being trustworthy is particularly important in research with political elites because of the internal-public divide of the political field. The ability to balance maintaining academic integrity and freedom with keeping appropriate secrets is a skill all anthropologists develop but which becomes heightened in politics due to the field's structure and the intense scrutiny of what becomes public. I believe that this research not only balances the need for a robust and free analysis of what the Green Party MPs did and why, but reflects the highest ethical standards that maintain the integrity of myself, my participants, and my discipline. The remainder of this chapter now turns to presenting the biographies of my participants: Holly, Gareth, Catherine, and Kennedy.

Holly Walker: Being an MP and Becoming a Mother

Holly Walker had been in parliament for just over one year when I began fieldwork with her in March 2013. She was not brand new to the political field, however, having worked as an advisor in the Green Party's parliamentary offices before being elected in 2011 at number 12 on the Party's list. 2013 was a transitional year for Holly as she had a baby and, instead of pursuing a political career directed toward being a Minister, found herself struggling to reconcile the demands of political life and motherhood.

Holly credited the development of her political thinking to two events in high school. The first happened after watching videos of the 1981 Springbok Tour, which featured former Green Party Co-leader Rod Donald protesting against South Africa's apartheid policies. Holly told me: "It seemed

like [the protestors] were so passionately committed to an idea of what was right, and prepared to take really strong action in defence of that. And I found it quite inspiring." Holly went home from school that day and told her mother about it, saying to her, "Oh man, [Laughing] I wish we had stuff to protest about like they did!" Holly's mother replied: "Well, there's plenty that you could be protesting about." That response from her mother alerted Holly "to start looking for that stuff" that she should be opposing. The second event was the next year, in her high school economics class. Holly explained that the teacher was outlining conventional economic theory to the students and:

> I wasn't trying to be cheeky, I just *genuinely* couldn't understand what the *point* of a company just continuing to grow was. What was the ultimate point of that? I would say, 'So why?' and he would say, 'So they can make more profit and put it back into the company so it can get bigger'. And I was like, 'But what's the *point*?!' [Laughs]. And he said, 'Oh, you're a very trendy leftie aren't you?!' and I had never thought about myself in those terms at all but I was kind of like 'Yeah! I am a trendy leftie!'.

These two moments in high school began to shape Holly's political identity, prompting her to find instances of injustice that aligned as typically left-wing issues.

Holly once described herself as a "political person," but also recognised that the "activist angle" was not her strength. She "never really committed to a particular political ideology or party" during her university years or early career. At Otago University, she studied English and Politics. She stayed in Dunedin for another year to edit student magazine *Critic*. Holly was then accepted into Massey University's journalism programme and moved to Wellington. She wanted to be a journalist to make a positive contribution to public life, to participate in the role of the fourth estate in "enhancing democracy," and to "make the world a better place." But, she felt "iffy" about the entry interview for the programme because of the interviewers' view of her time in student media, so instead left to take up a role as a part-time Media Advisor at the Green Party's parliamentary office.

Abandoning the journalism programme was the "big decision" which forced Holly to let go of the idea that she could be a "politically neutral" reporter. She tied her political identity to the Green Party, joining it in 2006. "At that point," she told me, "I was ready to pin my political colours to the mast and… I wanted to be able, actually, to say 'This is what I stand for, and this is the Party I support, and… I want to be able to articulate these views'; and they aligned completely with the views of the Green Party so it felt like the right thing to do." She worked as a part time Media Advisor for the Greens for a year. Holly then took up a full-time contract with the Office of Treaty Settlements during 2007 before moving overseas to the University of Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar (see Figure 3.3). For two years there, she completed her Masters in development studies, writing a thesis about Māori development, Māori politics, and policies related to Māori inequality. When she had finished that, Holly moved back to New Zealand with her partner and went straight back into a role as full-time Political and Media Advisor at the Green Party in 2009.

There were big differences between Holly's two periods as an advisor for the Greens. Holly was first an advisor in 2006. In the previous year's General Election, the Green Party had lost 1.7 percent of their vote. That meant the Party lost three seats in parliament as well as the staff and funding that was allocated to each MP. Shortly afterwards, at the end of 2005, Green Party Co-leader Rod Donald suddenly passed away. Holly described the mood resulting from those two losses as "grim," but she also noted that she did not "realise quite how sombre the mood was" because she had no other

point of comparison. “It just felt kind of normal to me,” she said. In 2009, when Holly returned, the mood had changed. A year earlier, the Green Party had increased its share of the party vote to 6.72 percent, which won the Party back the three seats they had lost in 2002. Catherine Delahunty and Kennedy Graham were two of the new Green MPs to fill those seats, alongside Kevin Hague. More MPs meant more resources and more staff. The change in mood and the introduction of a new structure that, for example, combined the media and research advisor roles into the single Political and Media Advisor role generated new practices like message discipline. A new “institutional culture” developed in the Greens, Holly said.

Figure 3.3: Holly Walker at Oxford University

Source: (from Duder 2017)

Working as an advisor gave Holly access to the daily practices of MPs. After seeing what they did, Holly thought that she could do it too. She explained the reasoning to me:

> I watched the MPs and I thought that I could do what they did and that I’d like to. I used to walk around Parliament and think it’d be really cool to be in there. And I guess, you know, whatever those permutations of what I did through the half-decade after I’d finished university were about in some way wanting to use my career to contribute to public discourse in some way. And advising the MPs was one way to do that but actually being an MP would be an even better way to do that! [Chuckles]. And it’s something that I had probably thought about for quite a long time as a potential, you know: ‘Maybe at some

> stage I'll go into politics'. But it seemed like there was an opportunity at that time and so I might as well give it a go.

That was why Holly decided to stand for the Green Party in the 2011 Election.

The 2011 Election was meant to be a practice run for Holly. She wanted to "go through the process" of running an election campaign to learn the skills to do it at "a later date more seriously or higher up the list." But, Holly exclaimed, "If you want it to be a real practice run, you do it as seriously as you can, right?!" She told the Green Party's campaign conference attendees, who have a prominent role in determining the Party's list ranking, that she wanted to be an MP in 2011. Holly was initially ranked at number ten on the list before being placed at number 12 on the final list. Holly described what happened after that:

> When it came out at number ten, I remember going off to have a drink with [my partner] and being like 'Oh my God! This might actually happen!' [Laughs]. And freaking out a bit. But then dropping back to number 12 – remembering that at that time we had nine MPs – thinking, 'Oh well, we'll be lucky to get 12 so I'll probably be just outside'.
>
> So, I went into the campaign expecting that I'd probably be very close but just miss out. But, as you know, as it got closer and the polls got better, but at the time of the actual Election night, it seemed clear to me that I was likely to be elected. But it was over a number of months that I came to that realisation.

Not only did the Green Party win enough votes for Holly to enter Parliament, another two MPs on the list below her were elected. The Green Party jumped from nine to 14 MPs.

Being an MP was very different to advising an MP, Holly found: "I had seen what the MPs did on a daily basis and I had a pretty good idea of what I was letting myself in for. But I think even when you can see it and know it on an intellectual level, it's really different when you're the one doing it yourself." Being an MP presented three main challenges: she felt like she no longer had a personal life; she began to think she should have had more experience; and she felt inauthentic in some of her spokesperson roles. These concerns were reflected in our interviews throughout 2013. We talked about the challenge those feelings presented:

> Holly: I know I'm doing what I'm elected to do and speak in the House on issues that affect people's daily lives but I don't feel like I have a daily life![36] [Laughs]. It's really hard and it does feel *very* removed from how people live their lives… It's a very unreal way of existing. And I don't know, I think over time, you know? I'm still pretty new, I still miss that normal life! Maybe after years and years, you just don't know any different! [Laughs].
>
> Jessica: [Laughs] You'll just have forgotten!
>
> Holly: That's something I think about a lot and I want to talk about to [Green Party Co-leader] Metiria, who's been here for nine years now, is how do you find a way to make this job feel sustainable and maintain a sense of normalcy and real life as well as just the intensity of this job. 'Cause at the moment I

[36] Holly was not alone in this regard. Coffé's (2017:346) research found that half of New Zealand's MPs were very dissatisfied "with their division of time between work and personal life."

> feel like there's no way I'd want to do this for nine years; it's horrible! [Laughs]. So there must be ways to make it more sustainable.

As well as feeling removed from her own and others' lives, Holly began to doubt that she had enough experience in other fields before becoming an MP to be able to do the job as well as other MPs could. I commented that becoming an MP at 29 years old was a big decision. Holly agreed:

> Yeah, and it seems quite weird to me now! [Laughs]. Now that I'm doing it, I'm like 'Oh, why didn't I spend longer doing other stuff?!' [Laughs]. I know that there is a criticism of people like me, and in other parties too, who come into this role; like, they do well at university, they join the party, they become an advisor, they work in the beltway, and then they get on the list, you know? And they have no particular life experience outside of Parliament and they have never run a business, or worked on a farm, or been a teacher, or any of that life experience that would make you have a good understanding in here. And that criticism is really valid I think! [Laughs]. I guess I sort of thought – if I'm being totally honest – if people would ask me that kind of question, I'd think in my head 'Well that's probably true of other people but I'd be really good!' [Laughs].
>
> But actually, strangely, now that I'm here, I think that that is much more important. Which is not to say that I don't think I should be here or that I can't do a good job but I look at the people who I really admire in Parliament all across the House who are very good and a lot of them have done something really meaningful before coming to Parliament, which gives them a really good perspective and insight to bring into this place.

Finally, Holly was not certain she could act as a spokesperson for one of the largest groups she was meant to be representing: youth. She expressed this as a feeling of inauthenticity, saying, "I often feel quite inauthentic because I'm not very young anymore [Laughs] and compared to the audience that you're talking about when you talk about youth, I don't feel like my daily existence and concerns are that connected to those of young people." Holly felt hope that becoming a mother for the first time in 2013 would give her the possibility of speaking for a group legitimately in a way that she could not for youth. She said:

> I feel like if I was to be kind of a quasi-representative for mothers or parents, I'm ready to own that role more than I am to pretend to be 'youth', you know? And I know you don't have to be young to be an effective advocate for youth, or be down with the kids, but I do feel that it doesn't sit naturally with me in the way that it does with Gareth, for example… This feels more like I could *authentically* talk from a perspective of 'mothers' being a mother.

Becoming an MP, then, happened unexpectedly quickly for Holly. But being an MP was much more challenging as she considered the effect it was having on her personal life as well as how she could effectively represent constituents who she did not feel she had the life experience or authentic identity to draw on to make decisions about their lives. Motherhood seemed to promise a way for Holly to fit together her personal identity, experience, and representative role as an MP.

But contrary to her expectations at the beginning of her pregnancy, Holly's personal trajectory during 2013 and 2014 was one of disinvestment as she became a mother for the first time. At the beginning of the year, Holly was fully invested in getting out of opposition and into government. At a university campus event in March, she told a student who was feeling disheartened that the key to staying in politics was that "you have to keep your eye on the prize" of being in government. Being in opposition frustrated Holly because she was not able to "prevent" decisions being made

or influence the policies which were implemented by the Government. Because of that, she wanted to be a Minister. However, by May, a few days before she publicly announced her pregnancy, Holly was wavering about being in Cabinet, saying that:

> If you'd asked me a year ago, or when I was elected, I might've said that I wanted to rise through the ranks as quickly as possible and that, obviously, being a Minister would be where it would be at because you actually can implement all the stuff we've been itching to for years now, and now we'd finally get an opportunity to implement it and how great would it be to be the Minister and actually get to do some stuff!? Which is all true.
>
> But, it will also be really, really hard; *especially* for the first people who do it. And, you know, it feels like this job is intense and there's not a lot of work-life balance and there's a high level of stress, and it would just be exponentially more like that to be a Minister. I can't even imagine how little sleep you'd get and how little you'd get to see your family. And I will have a small child, so it doesn't really appeal to me anymore! [Laughs]. Which is not to say never, but yeah.

By September, Holly had decided she definitely did not want to be a Minister in the next parliamentary term:

> I've been thinking a bit about what kind of role I want to play in the Caucus after the next election and what will be realistic. And, of course, it depends on whether we're in government or not and all that kind of stuff. But I know lots of colleagues are thinking about, you know, would they like to be a Minister? And I think I've reached the conclusion that I'd love to be a Minister one day, but it's not something I'm going to be actively pursuing in the next term.

Instead, she wanted to focus on improving her skills in parliamentary procedure by becoming the Green Party's whip or chairing a select committee.

Holly's disinvestment was reflected in her withdrawal from some of the practices that MPs typically undertake in their daily work. She told me: "I've been through a process of letting go quite a lot, actually consciously, you know? I *don't* bid for questions that much and I *don't* care that much about how much I'm in the media. And I think I probably would if I wasn't pregnant, but I've had a different set of priorities." Holly's disinvestment continued into 2014 when, in June that year, she announced that she would not be seeking re-election in the next Parliament because it was incompatible with her family life (see Walker 2014). It was not disbelief in the ability of governments to bring about change or her desire to see the world made in the Green Party's vision in the stakes of the game that caused Holly to leave the field, but rather a lack of fit between the demands of being an MP and her motherhood.

For Holly, 2013 was about the challenges of reconciling her role as a MP with becoming a mother for the first time. Some of those were structural, requiring her and Party Whip Gareth to negotiate with the Speaker about how some form of maternity leave could be accommodated since parliament had no provision for it, for example. Other parts of the challenge were physical, as her pregnancy and the stressful parliamentary environment left her exhausted. Yet other parts were about negotiating her own changing identity as a mother. And, as Holly has written about since

leaving Parliament, much of the challenge was about her own emotional and mental health.[37] But my fieldwork time with Holly took place from March to mid-May – the months she learnt she was becoming a mother and announced her pregnancy. In the early part of her pregnancy when I was stationed in her office, Holly's working life continued with much the same routine as her previous – and first – year as an MP in parliament, undertaking the same work as the other three MPs in this thesis.

Gareth Hughes: Change, Effectiveness, and Ambition

Gareth entered Parliament in 2010 as its youngest MP at the time, aged 28. He promoted himself as signifying a "generational shift" for both the Parliament and the Green Party (23 February 2010 660 NZPD 9273). By the time I did my fieldwork with him, he had three years' experience and had run an election campaign as an MP. That meant that – in the Green Party Caucus where half of the MPs had only had one year's experience – Gareth was a veteran. While at first Gareth had positioned himself as an MP of change, he was more settled into his MP role by the time I started my fieldwork with him on July 22, 2013, instead preferring to emphasize his experience, effectiveness, and professionalism.

Figure 3.4: Gareth Hughes Growing Up in Gisborne

Source: (Hughes 2016)

[37] Holly has since published an autobiographical book telling the story of her life in politics and as she became a mother, chronicling the intensity of feeling she had lost her voice and her struggle to regain it through writing and other means (Walker 2017).

The riff (Crewe 2015b:153-154) Gareth tells about himself to diverse audiences, from a local government conference to a campus group of students, was that he grew up as a "boy racer, bogan munter from Gisborne" who was more interested in cars and girls than politics (see Figure 3.4). He was the most "un-green" person in his high school. But, in our interview, Gareth seemingly contrarily identified his political career as starting in high school – he harboured a "secret ambition" to become an MP because, he thought, "it'd be pretty interesting, and I thought I'd be good at it, and I could make a difference to peoples' lives." At that age, however, he didn't think it was a real possibility: "I guess I didn't believe in myself enough. But also, coming from a pretty working-class family in Gisborne, it seemed incredibly distant." Gareth was both geographically and socially distant from Wellington's political field and, as a teenager, he found it difficult to see how he would bridge that gap. As the first step towards bridging that gap, he moved to Wellington to study history and religion as well as political science at Victoria University, attending a university well known for producing left wing politicians and party supporters. Gareth became more politically active at university and, after leaving, worked full-time on climate change issues for Greenpeace for many years.

At around the same time as Holly, in 2006, Gareth began work with the Green Party. However, the two's paths did not cross often as Holly worked from parliament while Gareth worked from the Party's Wellington office, as an Issues Assistant on Climate Change for former Green Party Co-leader Jeanette Fitzsimons and as an Issues Assistant on Youth Issues for former Green MP Sue Kedgley. Like Parliament, the mood in the Wellington office was "incredibly low" after the Party's "worst ever" election result and Rod Donald's death. But Gareth enjoyed the work because, despite only having six seats in parliament, the Party had the casting vote on all legislation, he reported. It was "fascinating", he said. Like Holly, working directly for the Green Party's MPs made Gareth think that he could do the work of an MP. "Working up close with the MPs," he said, "I realised 'Actually, it's not a far-flung possibility' and dedicated myself to doing it."

Gareth became an MP because he had started to rethink how to achieve the large-scale, systemic change he believed needed to happen in New Zealand. He said:

> Coming from working at Greenpeace for ten years – this isn't deprecating to Greenpeace – but maybe [I had] a bit of a naïve view on how change happened… The analogy I use is that I spent years banging on the outside and then I thought I'd try and get my hands on the inside. And possibly the story that operated at Greenpeace at the time I was there was: 'If you push hard enough, it will break'. And that works if you're working on a single campaign, [and] you're relentlessly focused. But when you're talking about societal or systemic change, you just can't do that.
>
> …So I think I've maybe just matured a bit more… My core values are the same, but I think maybe I've got a more robust sense of our collective time and place.

Thus, while change did happen from "the bottom up," when Gareth looked "at political history in New Zealand, change could and *often* [had] been driven from Government." He invested in getting into government.

Gareth ran for election in 2008 at number 11 on the Party's list. He was not high enough up the list to win one of the three extra seats the Party gained that year. Instead, those seats went to Kevin Hague, Catherine Delahunty, and Kennedy Graham. Two years later, mid-term, Gareth became an

MP after Green Party Co-leader Jeanette Fitzsimons retired. Jeanette's departure and Gareth's entry signalled a change to a younger generation of politicians, Gareth emphasised in his maiden speech. He said that:

> People keep telling me that [Jeanette's] are big shoes to fill, but I prefer to consider that I have strong shoulders to stand on. Jeanette was a pioneer, and over the last ten years, the Green Party has grown from being the fresh-faced new kid on the block to being a respected, effective, and principled Party. I am now the first Green MP who has not sat in the house with either Rod or Jeanette. The Greens are growing. There are new faces, new energies, and new issues, but the same values (23 February 2010 660 NZPD 9273).

"I represent a generational shift in both this Parliament and the Green Party Caucus," Gareth confidently stated (23 February 2010 660 NZPD 9273).

By 2013, Gareth had moved away from the message that his young age made him an agent of change. He often joked that he was no longer the youngest MP in Parliament, but he was still the youngest-looking. He was also one of the more experienced MPs in the Caucus. Reflecting his greater experience and desire for more responsibility, Gareth took up the role of Green Party Musterer (Whip) for his second term and set his sights on becoming a Minister. Creating change was the reason that Gareth was driven to become a Minister. He told me that he would "absolutely love" to be in that position one day:

> I think there is a lot of merit to being an opposition politician and I'm proud of my achievements and the achievements of my team in opposition. But also my whole political thesis is [about making] a real change for this country, and you can't deliver that from the opposition benches. Yeah, so look, it's one of my career ambitions to do that.

Like the other MPs, Gareth was invested in being in government, believing that pursing that power was worthwhile so that he could create his vision for New Zealand.

As noted at the beginning of this Chapter, Gareth described himself and his personal message as "a bit of an activist but not as hard core as Catherine." His political practices during the time I was with him were centred on campaigning and media work. During the 2.5 months of fieldwork, Gareth's office worked on the following ongoing projects, among others:

- Green Party priority campaign opposing deep sea oil drilling;
- Campaign against ocean-floor phosphate mining of the Chatham Rise;
- Campaign against high software costs in New Zealand compared to international prices;
- Continuing a campaign against shark finning;
- Preparation work for a campaign to support the development of 3D printing in New Zealand;
- Preparation work to draft and campaign on a member's bill about fair pricing for household solar energy users.

Those projects occurred alongside Gareth's daily work as Musterer (Whip), select committee member, and the many other smaller and shorter-term issues he had to respond to in his oceans, energy, offshore mining, and ICT portfolios.

The diversity, volume, and media focus of Gareth's work meant that he gained a reputation as an effective outward-facing MP but was not known for "in-depth thought," as he reported to me. Gareth characterized his approach as "just focused on getting media coverage and getting Green views out there." But Gareth was a thoughtful politician too. During my time with him, Gareth often evaluated his work and performance, questioning whether he was doing things effectively and what his role in the larger political landscape was. "I embrace that I'm a politician," he told me, "I take it seriously and I read professionally to try and be better at being a politician. Yeah, I get frustrated with complacency." He was passionate about history and the context that it provided for the moment in time that he happened to be a politician. Therefore, in 2013, while Gareth did flit from issue to issue and split his focus more than other MPs, in his more private practices he was also deeply reflective about his own work, how effective he was in representing the Party and the people he spoke for, and New Zealand's future in the context of its history.

Gareth was also balancing his large workload with being a father to two young children. He described himself as "pretty one-dimensional: I'm an MP and a I'm a dad, and there's not much time for other stuff." He found doing both roles well hard:

> It is difficult being a dad and an MP because I take the job seriously. I'm passionate about it. I don't want to let people down so I want to be the best MP that I can be. But I also want to be the best dad I can be. So the analogy I use is that this job involves juggling balls and the skill is discerning which are the most important balls to catch, knowing that some are going to fall down and not beating yourself up. It's hard knowing that you're not the world's best dad and you're not the world's best MP.

Gareth, similarly to Holly but to a much lesser extent as he himself acknowledged, found being a parent and working in the political field difficult to reconcile due to competing demands on his time and energy.

Overall, Gareth's work in 2013 was shaped by the experience he had had in the political field as an MP over the previous three years. He was no longer messaging himself as a youthful symbol of change, but wanted to exhibit effectiveness in his campaigning and media work to showcase his political maturity and professionalism in order to position himself as a credible MP who could be a Minister. Gareth took his work seriously and he wanted the public to take him seriously too.

Catherine Delahunty: Hard-Core Radical Left Green

Catherine Delahunty was always clear about what drove her politics: "I come from a hard-core radical left Green view of the world". Her entire life had centred on activist left-wing politics, growing up in the 1960s and 1970s with a mother and father involved in the union movement and the anti-war and anti-nuclear protests that characterised those decades. Although Catherine's political thinking had developed over the years, it had always been centred on three strands: social justice, honouring Te Tiriti o Waitangi, and environmental protection. These guided her approach to her life and work: "I am glad that I came [to Parliament] as an older person because I'm kaupapa[38]-driven and the big picture, that's always been with been with me and it's always there. I'm always

[38] Kaupapa is a Māori concept akin to core values and policy agenda.

thinking about that." Having time and experience doing a range of work with a wide range of Māori and other New Zealanders before entering parliament aged 55 meant that Catherine had already engaged with how to put her values of social justice, Te Tiriti, and environmental protection into practice. She was often described as 'staunch', which led to stereotypes of inflexibility and an inability to compromise. In fact, though, Catherine's experiences in life had taught her how make practical incremental and effective changes without compromising her values.

Catherine's commitment to standing up for social justice had guided her since childhood. She grew up in a family enmeshed in Wellington's small left-wing activist community. In 2016, Catherine wrote that her childhood had cemented in her and others "an unshakeable loyalty to justice" and the knowledge that they "had to stand up, to use [their voice], to change the world" (Delahunty 2016:Paras.17, 21). At age two, she attended her first protest at parliament, pushed along in her pram. Her family regularly marched to the Beehive to protest issues like nuclear weapons, the Vietnam War, and the Springbok Tour (see Figure 3.5). Her experiences as a child taught her about the value of mobilising visibly in protest against issues. This disposition for active mobilisation continued throughout her life, and nearly every week as an MP she was on parliament's forecourt supporting protesters who gathered to voice their opposition to an immense variety of issues.

Figure 3.5: Catherine Delahunty, Third from Left, Protesting at Parliament as a Child

Source: (from Goodall 2017)

However, while she had always focused on social justice, it was not until she quit her degree in History, English, and Anthropology at Victoria University and moved to a commune in the rural province of Coromandel that Catherine developed her positions on Te Tiriti and environmental protection. In the Coromandel, she met two women who defined her life by what they taught her: Betty and Veronica. They taught her about Te Tiriti o Waitangi, and Betty's explanation of the world

in terms of kaitiakitanga[39] and respecting Papatūānuku[40] led Catherine to "base [her] work on trying to acknowledge Te Tiriti and kaupapa Māori." She practiced what she had learnt by protesting goldmining in Coromandel alongside tangata whenua and the environmental activist organisation *Coromandel Watchdog*.

Despite the development of her political thinking and her involvement in opposing mining during her thirties, Catherine evaluated: "I was living a political life, but it was within a narrow framework." By that, Catherine meant she did not have a political awareness and analysis of the structural changes happening in New Zealand during the 1980s as a result of the then-Labour Government's economic deregulation. She provided an anecdote during our interview to explain:

> I was in the Coromandel at that stage, fighting mining companies. So I was buffered from the mainstream effects of ['Rogernomics'][41]... We were used to having no money, and we weren't the rural poor or the urban poor. So we didn't feel the full effects of it down there...
>
> But, at the same time, I remember my friend Veronica... getting up at this meeting and saying, 'The State-Owned Enterprises Act has been gutted so that they can privatise this country. It's the beginning of the end; you've got to realise'. And she just said that to us one night at the big event where we were talking about mining and everyone was like, 'What's she talking about?!' She was talking about what was going to happen; she was heralding that moment, and she was like, 'We've got to fight this!' 'What?' 'Privatisation!' And so it has come to pass... it was really different then; and it's just got worse and worse since then.

Veronica's imperative made Catherine aware of structural changes, even if not of the full impact that the Government's economic agenda would have on the country.

For the next decade, Catherine continued to focus on environmental activism before becoming grounded in social activism once more. She worked for New Zealand's Department of Conservation and then for Greenpeace, where she met her partner while working on rectifying toxic contamination. Both workplaces were "bubbles" which were disconnected from the hardships people faced in their lives, she said. In 1996, Catherine and her partner moved to Gisborne, where Gareth was living, aged 15 at the time. Catherine worked as a beneficiary advocate, helping people negotiate social support with the government department Work and Income New Zealand. It was in that role that she saw the effect of those government policies Veronica had warned her about on peoples' lives:

> I really saw the impact [of the 1984 reforms]. And especially in places like Ruatoria; like, we'd go up there and stand outside the Work and Income office and 50 people would wait for us and be too scared to go in. So I think I knew about it, and I was always very opposed to it, but didn't really feel it until I went to Gisborne and then I saw it. Shocking... Coromandel was a soft life. We didn't have a lot of money but we didn't need a lot of money, you know? It was really different. So... that was one moment. It wasn't the only one, but it was one moment of realisation. Shocking.

[39] Guardianship, particularly of the Earth.
[40] Earth mother and wife of Rangi-nui, the sky father. Papatūānuku and Rangi-nui were split by Tāne, allowing life to begin.
[41] Named after then-Labour Party Minister of Finance Roger Douglas, 'Rogernomics' is the popular name given to the sweeping neoliberal reforms implemented in New Zealand from 1984 onwards.

Throughout Catherine's working and personal life, as her political thinking and work developed, she became more and more committed to her principles and values, especially in the ongoing work to honour the promises of Te Tiriti. She carried those experiences with her into Parliament. Her approach to politics became centred on the daily, lived lives of people and the effect that structural and policy decisions by government had on their ability to lead good lives. In her work, she also centred environmental protection within a Treaty framework, holding the onshore mining portfolio for the Green Party in 2013 alongside Treaty of Waitangi, associate education, and toxics portfolios.

Catherine's belief was that her lifetime of practical experience made her a more effective MP. For her, it was different to thinking theoretically and enabled her work to be grounded in the lives of people she represented. She said:

> I walked in here with a full suite of experiences. It wasn't a *theory*, it was a *reality,* you know? I know how to relate, form relationships based on Te Tiriti. It's not a theory. It's what we do because I've done it, 'cause I've been taught by some awesome people: 'This is how you work'. And you can't substitute doing it. Talking about it and theorising about it doesn't work… it's tokenistic and then you can't know what you don't know. You have to go and put yourself on the line. That's my view.

She told me emphatically that she would not have wanted to become an MP without some of those experiences she had had. Her life before parliament had taught her how to get things done while working with her kaupapa so that, when she was instituted as an MP, she was able to draw on that knowledge and practice in her parliamentary work.

Even though Catherine's commitment to her values meant that she was often negatively characterised in public as staunch and uncompromising, in practice she was able to get policy gains even from opposition because of her ability to negotiate and build relationships with Ministers across the House. She understood how the political game worked, and was able to generate change by working with or against Ministers depending on what the issue or situation required. Her Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Minister for the Environment about cleaning up toxic sites in New Zealand was one example of that. Catherine explained that the MoU was a "strategic decision" to "negotiate" with the Minister rather than run a "campaign" on the issue. She judged that she would not have been able to create the amount of public pressure required to force the Minister to change because the highly "technical details" of toxic chemicals and their management made it too scientifically complicated to run a messaged campaign on, there was a "lack of interest" from the public, and it was "expensive" to clean up toxic sites so required a budget commitment from the Government was required. Those evaluations meant she negotiated with the Minister to get some gains on toxic site clean-up, if not the implementation of her full agenda on the issue. The Communications Director explained how Catherine's practical sense of when and how to compromise and be flexible helped her achieve what she wanted:

> I sat in the meetings with [Minister for the Environment] Nick Smith and things like that and that MoU on toxics wasn't everything that she wanted – far from it – but she knew that it would deliver a clean-up at the Tui Mine, which was better than nothing. And she also knew that by getting that work started and developing a good relationship, that she could get the register of toxic sites, which I think was in some ways the bigger issue, and she did. She's just has been around long enough and worked in enough organisations to know how things work.

Knowing how things work and knowing how to compromise while still "staying true to [her] values" meant Catherine was well-regarded as an effective opposition MP by many people who valued her strategic skill.

Even though Catherine was one of the most adept Green Party MPs at achieving change using the power of government by negotiating with National Party Ministers, Catherine was much more doubtful about how much change Green Ministers in Cabinet would be able to make. Unlike the other three MPs, Catherine did not believe governments could create the transformative social change she wanted; that required public mobilisation. She stated: "I'm *completely* cynical about how much we would change. Governments don't lead. Parliament doesn't lead; it follows. We don't lead change. We just troll along behind; sometimes making it worse, sometimes making it better." But, even though Catherine believed broad and transformative change needed society to change first, the opportunity to 'sometimes make it better' in a much smaller way was what kept her invested in politics.

Government also presented dangers, in Catherine's view, because it could cause the Green Party and its MPs to change what they stood for so they could pursue the ability to use governmental power, which would result in the party compromising its vision and values and losing support from their voters who believed in them. She explained:

Catherine: I don't see the day that the Greens get into government as a big breakthrough; it's just another opportunity for a sell-out! [Laughs]. Or for some positive steps.

I've been part of some positive things since I've been here... you can have these conversations and do good things. Getting into government is a really risky thing for a small party to do, or a medium party as we like to call ourselves. If we're not strong, if we don't have a strong political analysis about what makes us valuable and unique, we'll get eaten alive. I don't see anyone coming up through the left yet that's actually offering that alternative; we're the best there is at the moment.

...There are exciting things that we can do, and there are bottom lines you have to have. It's really important... I mean, the big attraction here is 'Oh my God! Imagine if we could do that!' 'Cause you do these tiny little things like change one line in the [Heritage New Zealand] Pouhere Taonga Act, or get a Disability Commissioner. Like, I'm trying to think of things I've helped achieve...

Jessica: Memorandum of Understanding?

Catherine: And the MoU on toxics, and getting the register [of toxic sites]. All those things, you see, they're little tasters of what power will be like. It's dangerous, but it's exciting. But all the time, I think we need people who are going to go, 'Hang on a minute, where does this leave your values?' All the time. We can't afford to have people who are just like 'Let's just do it, see what happens'.

These 'tasters of power', which had created tangible and positive changes, spurred Catherine on to keep working to achieve change in the political field, both from opposition and possibly from government. But, reflecting her disposition toward not compromising on values that she had developed and practiced throughout her life, working to make people's lives and the environment better, she was not willing to pursue power at the expense of her principles. Catherine was deeply concerned by the balance the Party needed to achieve in maintaining its vision and values while seeking to appeal to more people to increase their votes.

When I finished writing the above description of how Catherine thought and worked politically, I realised that her competency in parliament could be mistaken by readers for fit. I went back to her, in 2017, to ask her to explain how she experienced parliament. She wrote:

> I think previous experiences over many years as an activist were very valuable once I went to parliament. I had a strong analysis of power, which was only reinforced by the way parliament operates. It was useful to know how to build relationships and take opportunities while still maintaining a critical perspective and a sense of accountability to activists outside the privileged domain. I had a deep sense of alienation the entire time and a huge sense of duty to make the most of the resources for the good of the caucus I believed in and the people working so hard for change without resources… Despite these feelings, I managed to achieve changes… I had a total focus on working for change at every opportunity. I also found the rituals and culture of parliament elitist and bizarre. The sense of being an outsider was useful to remind who and why I was there and to help resist the complacency of the protected bubble which is parliament.

The fact that Catherine did not 'fit' into parliament was complicated. On the one hand, her perspectives and dispositions meant she felt alienated from it but, on the other, she was competent and could practice the game well. Although never being entirely comfortable, Catherine was able to use the power that being an MP in New Zealand's parliament afforded her to achieve and advocate for change.

For Catherine, 2013 was a year of continuing to practice her oppositional activism and creating change. She focused on opposing mining, advocating for payment of caregivers providing support to disabled family members, working with a major company to remove the toxic chemical triclosan from their products, campaigning for freedom for West Papua, opposing education reforms, supporting Christchurch schools following the city's major earthquakes, and many Coromandel-based issues. "Every year's different," Catherine said during our interview. No matter what she was working on, however, she continued to be guided by her fundamental values of standing up for social justice, honouring Te Tiriti o Waitangi, and protecting the environment.

Dr Kennedy Graham: Resolutely Diplomatic-Academic

Kennedy was similar to Holly in that his political work did not centre on the protest activism that had characterised Gareth and Catherine's approaches. Rather, his was based on the dispositions he had developed from his history as an academic and diplomat. Many people within the Party's Parliamentary wing were often frustrated with his dispositions, as he refused to accept that he had to play by the logic of the competitive political game that prioritised messaged statements. As shown time and again throughout this thesis, Kennedy had strong dispositions geared toward a

focus on the factual, detailed, rational style of politics that Lakoff (2004) and Westen (2007) discouraged. That set him apart from the many others in the Caucus.

Kennedy's lifelong ambition was to be an All Black. His childhood and teenage years centred around rugby and he still watches nearly every All Blacks game with complete devotion. He was good at rugby growing up, trialling for the Auckland Under-19 Representatives but losing his spot as half back to John Hart, who would later go on to coach the All Blacks. One of the highlights of his rugby career was playing a curtain raiser to a Springbok test match in front of 32 thousand people when he was ten years old: "But I was team kicker and missed five out of five unconverted tries! The crowd thought it was a hoot 'cause I kept missing! [Laughs]." "For better or worse," rugby moulded Kennedy's values from a young age. "The good thing about rugby," he said, "is group identity, and loyalty, and team playing, and playing by the rules, and playing vigorous… it's competitive, it's collegial." These values of loyalty, working together, and a rule-bound collegial competition stayed with Kennedy throughout his working life and presaged the practices and values that made him a successful diplomat.

After finishing high school and missing out on pursuing his All Blacks dream, Kennedy did not know what to do with himself. He had been much more interested in rugby than school work. His parents told him he should be an accountant so he became one. When it came to practicing accountancy during his cadetship, however, he found he "couldn't stand it" because of its value system. He quit and went back to university, where he "shot sideways" to the study of political science. After completing his degree, marrying, and becoming a father for the first time, Kennedy began his career working first for New Zealand's Trade Department and then Foreign Affairs. He returned to academic work as a student soon afterward, 'carving out' the International Relations Honours programme at Victoria University. When he had finished his Honours degree, he had job offers from the University, Treasury, and Foreign Affairs. "It was a tough call," but he chose to join Foreign Affairs because, with a young family, he thought it would be the only way he was going to "see the world."

Just before being posted overseas, however, Kennedy took leave from Foreign Affairs to undertake a Masters in International Relations at Boston's Fletcher School at Tufts University on a Fulbright Scholarship, an experience he described as "hugely formative." At the school, there were

> superb world-leading thinkers teaching you, and Libyans shaking their fist at everybody, and it was fascinating. Fletcher School was a split between… military people coming back, literally coming back from Vietnam, and your liberal American academics, and your international students, and it was fascinating.

Moving to Boston was the first time Kennedy had been overseas – it was an "eye opener" which "exposed" him to the world. Studying overseas with 120 other students from around the world cemented Kennedy's global orientation.

Kennedy's internationalism continued throughout the rest of his career. After completing his Master's degree, he did a summer internship at the United Nations before returning to Foreign Affairs where he had a posting to Canada with accreditation to the Caribbean. Later in his career, he was posted to Thailand with accreditation to Vietnam. He worked from Geneva and New York too.

It was during the 1970s that Kennedy "[laughing] started to take life seriously on behalf of the children" and planet. He spent the decade of mid-1970s to mid-1980s focused on the issue of nuclear weapons (see Figure 3.6). The Kirk Labour Government of 1972-1974 "was all about nuclear disarmament… and the nuclear free zone," as Kennedy put it, before Muldoon's National Government of 1975-1984 "sat on it." Kennedy opposed nuclear weapons but his opposition took a form that fit with his diplomatic-academic habitus. He was a member of the diplomatic delegation which established the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone and was particularly proud of drafting the preamble to that Rarotonga Treaty. He characterised it during our interview: "My protest was not on the harbour… it hasn't been my style to go into the harbour and the streets. I just did a PhD on nuclear weapon-free zones on the side."

Figure 3.6: Kennedy Graham, Aged Around 40, Being Interviewed on UN Television

Source: (Provided to author, April 18, 2018)

During those years, Kennedy was determinedly "not political," primarily because, as a public servant, "you [were] meant to be neutral." He described himself as "an obedient, faithful civil servant as a diplomat and doing the intellectual side of things." Kennedy had always "been conscious of global sustainability, the pressure on the planet, and the need for global sustainability," but he had not been able to act politically on that consciousness while working at Foreign Affairs.

Kennedy left Foreign Affairs in 1988. Around that time, he had been stationed in Geneva to speak for New Zealand in an official capacity to defend the nuclear free policy within a framework of global security. But domestic political changes meant that New Zealand's policy was "suddenly shut down; not for export." Kennedy had two choices: "Either shut up, or change my tune." The "critical moment" for Kennedy occurred when a speech he had drafted for the Foreign Minister to give in Geneva had parts deleted and was edited into a "much more sanitized speech." "Well, I don't want to do that for the rest of my life," thought Kennedy, indicating his deep concern for the ability to think and speak his mind freely. The fact that he was unable to work on and promote the policies of disarmament and global security, which he believed in, caused him to leave Foreign Affairs and instead take up a role leading the NGO Parliamentarians for Global Action, working internationally and with the United Nations in New York.

Kennedy continued with a portfolio of international diplomatic and academic work before returning to New Zealand for personal reasons in 2005. To move back, he took up a fellowship at Canterbury University. The day that he accepted that job offer in his New York office, he joined the Green Party. "It was the first time in my life I was free to join a political party," Kennedy said. He joined the Greens to be able to put his political thinking into practice, telling me:

> I wanted to supplement all this intellectually with some real life, practical, democratic, grass roots, Kiwi politics, which I'd missed, you know? As a diplomat… you don't, and then I was away [from New Zealand].
>
> And I nearly didn't [join], but I thought, 'Well, you owe it, and I've got a bit of breath left in me, and it is essentially the practical application of what I know'. I could just continue to think about it and write about it for the next ten years before we go to the beach, but I wanted to apply it. And, up to a point, I have.

Like Holly, Kennedy did not expect to become an MP when he stood for election:

> I didn't actually necessarily expect to be an MP. I just thought, 'Well, the bottom line is experience with democracy, getting involved in the Green Party, making a contribution. Then, basically, the [local Green Party Branch Convenor] said, 'You're going to be our MP; you're going to be our candidate'… [My wife and I] had to have an email conversation about whether I really wanted to stand; she said, 'Yeah, give it a shot'. And then I didn't have a clue where I'd be on the list. And then I was nine, and they said to me at the time, 'You'll be the cliff hanger'. And they were right. So, I didn't necessarily expect to go in.

Kennedy did get in. He entered Parliament as an MP in 2008, three years after returning to New Zealand and joining a political party for the first time. He entered at age 62, with 40 years of work in the academic and diplomatic fields giving shape to his dispositions and practices.

Kennedy knew that his academic and diplomatic habitus did not often fit with the competitive and adversarial parliamentary field, but he nonetheless thought that his approach to disagreement could be effective in many areas of political work. He explained:

> Diplomacy – you can argue that is an asset or a liability… 'cause I mean, if you're more naturally a pugilist and an activist, then you'll think that is – and it is – papering over differentiation sometimes. I think it's a real art, there's an art in diplomacy as much as politics to know that if you're papering over disagreement that you're not doing it so

> artificially that it's worthless and it'll fragment the moment some pressure goes on it. You've got to make sure that that papering over is reflecting a degree of commonality and decently respecting the differences so that it can take a bit of weight. Especially with negotiations over peace deals and stuff, but here [in Parliament] with negotiations over trade-offs on bills, or legislation, or whatever.
>
> …I think that can make an effective MP. It doesn't necessarily make you an effective opposition activist politician at a rally where you play it up. Now then you have a choice: Do you have two hats?… Say one thing to a public rally and then do another thing here [?].
>
> I'm not great at that. I can't bring myself to do that.

Kennedy's lack of fit with the logic of messaged statements as well as overly adversarial opposition meant that, in many ways, Kennedy was one of the most radical of the Green Party MPs as he constantly questioned and fought against the way that politics was done. Especially where the dispositions he had developed during his lifetime in diplomacy and academia came into conflict with the way politics was done, he found it very difficult. When that happened, "I just fall silent," he told me.

Despite his difficulties with fitting into the field, Kennedy stayed in politics because he believed that governmental power was needed to drive change in New Zealand. Talking about climate policy, he said that:

> Obviously, you have to use the mechanisms of the state when policy time comes if you're sitting around the Cabinet table, which is why I spend a lot of time number-crunching on the [Emissions Trading Scheme]. And climate change. Because if we ever find ourselves there, that's what [the primary issue will] be.
>
> But what will drive you and your judgements, if you can persuade your Cabinet, will be that [pointing to his edited book, *The Planetary Interest*].[42] And then you have the lovely task of selling it to the public and getting buy-in when the farmers are complaining *et cetera, et cetera.* And I mean, if it doesn't kill you, you'll have made a contribution.

Thus, Kennedy was invested parliamentary politics because he knew that he could not achieve the changes in the national climate policy that he wanted without being in government. In government, he could make urgent changes using executive power to make the world in his vision without necessarily having to gain the support of the public and stakeholders first. "The outside possibility of government [was] enough" for him to want to stay in parliament for a third term, he said in 2013.

The lack of fit Kennedy experienced in politics acts as a "breach" ethnographically. Lempert and Silverstein (2012:23) define breaches as "moments when participants in a social system… are thought by others in it to flout conventions and norms, the reactions to which reveal much about what is tacit and taken for granted in that social system." Throughout this thesis, Kennedy's belief that politics should be consensus-based, collaborative, and focused only on the material issues came constantly into conflict with the message-based, media oriented politics that dominated the modern field. Despite that conflict though, for the vast majority of his daily work and, crucially, in

[42] *The Planetary Interest* (Graham 1999) argues for Kennedy's concept of a global interest in decision-making on issues of global significance like disarmament and forestry management rather than the traditional model based on the self-interest of sovereign nation-states.

public where it counted most, Kennedy "fell in line." He understood how politics worked well enough to know that breaking rules – appearing undisciplined, disunited, disorganised, incompetent, and more – served neither his, nor the Party's interests. In the public political space, then, Kennedy's dispositions and practices largely adhered to and reproduced the game, while internally he espoused a much more radical view.

Conclusion

It is important to understand who each of these four MPs are and what their outlook on the world is because their perspectives and dispositions shaped the way they thought and acted in their work as MPs. Who an MP is, then, acts to shape the political statements that each can make. MPs enter the political field with an already-formed habitus that is then reshaped to a greater or lesser extent as MPs become inculcated in the structure and functioning of the political field. MPs do not become absolutely reborn when they are elected; they bring with them embodied dispositions toward protest or diplomacy, toward purity or compromise, toward the issues or messaged statements that were formed earlier in their lives. Those dispositions shape who they can become as MPs.

What is revealed in the biographies of the four MPs in this chapter is that there is variation to the degree to which MPs feel at home in the political field. Catherine and Kennedy, in particular, did not feel a great deal of fit. Both, having come of political age well before the 1990s to 2000s, when messaged political statements began to dominate the field, prioritised their vision for the world itself when thinking politically. They were less willing to compromise on the purity of that vision. They were also, in different ways, uncomfortable in the parliament. Catherine because the privilege afforded those with political power was too alien and far away from people who did not have or want it; Kennedy because the adversarial structure of parliament disposed people toward partisan conflict rather than working for consensus-based solutions both nationally and globally. Both Holly and Gareth experienced much more fit in the political field. Both had come of political age working for the Green Party in media, advisory, and campaigning roles at a time when the way that their vision and values were communicated was increasingly important as the principle and prescriptions of messaging became dominant. Both, of course, believed in the world that the Green Party wanted to make real, but they expressed much less feeling of tension in the logic that the Party was using to get there by making messaged statements. To them, as Holly expressed in her quote in the introduction to this thesis, it was a challenge rather than a fundamental problem with how politics was being done: "Rather than us change our policies, I'd like to see us lead that attitude shift… and it's a real challenge for us as a political party… because within the framework of each election, we have to market ourselves in such a way that we'll appeal to voters." The effect of these different degrees of fit within the political structure and game meant that, internally, as is shown in the ethnographic chapters of this thesis, MPs could draw not only on the logic of messaging and the tradition of opposition to make political statements, but they could draw on other dispositions to say things in different ways too.

What the lack of fit MPs felt did not mean, however, was that they became disinvested or did not play the game to win the double stakes of politics. The MPs in 2013 all practiced politics competently – they understood how politics worked and publicly adhered to the game's rules. All MPs believed that being in government would be worthwhile because it would enable them to bring some of

their vision into reality. The MPs' public adherence to the game is exhibited throughout the ethnographic chapters of this thesis whereby everyone, except for Kennedy and even then only at times and in relatively minor ways, worked to make messaged statements and do oppositional politics well. It was only Holly, struggling to reconcile politics and motherhood, who stepped back from practicing politics in 2013, choosing to prioritise her family and own wellbeing. However, in their everyday work, MPs moved through their parliamentary activities with a feel for the game, knowing how to play it and what to do. The next chapter explores what opposition MPs do in that day-to-day work.

Chapter Four

Opposition Politics:
Some Important Parts of What Green MPs Do

The day-to-day work of MPs is shrouded in mystery. The public sees glimpses occasionally when MPs are interviewed by the media or when they write about what they do. For the most part, though, we only see the public parts of MPs' work. That is partly by the parties' own design, as they seek to tightly control the information and messages that move from the internal to the public sphere. It is also because academia has not exerted great effort in seeking to gain the insider access which is necessary for understanding the daily practices that shape how what we see in public is produced and why things are done that way.

In New Zealand, there are only two academic pieces that discuss the working lives of MPs. Neither addresses the fundamentally political nature of being an MP nor the complexity of the environment and work they participate in. The preeminent study, by Coffé (2017:355), is a time use survey that emphasises that there is "significant variety" in MP activity depending on their gender and tenure. In general, Coffé (2017:345-348) found that:

- MPs have an average working day of 13.3 hours;
- Their workday begins at 8:00 a.m., although most have already done some work activities before then;
- 50 percent of MPs are working at 10:00 p.m. and 30 percent are still working at 11:00 p.m.;
- 61 percent of an MPs' workday is spent at parliament; and
- Many MPs report a dissatisfactory work-life balance.

Selecting from a set of pre-defined activities, MPs identified that they divided their time between meetings (27 percent), sitting in the House (19 percent), communication-related activity (18 percent), travelling (11 percent), select committee (6 percent), free time activity (5 percent), other work (5 percent), social activity (5 percent), and reading or doing research (4 percent) (Coffé 2017:349).[43] While providing a starting point, this is, by design, an oversimplification of the range of work MPs do on a daily basis. For example, many stakeholder meetings I attended with MPs had a research function, or formed the basis of communication-related activity. As another example, there are such marked differences in the purpose and significance of meeting MPs from across parties rather than another from an MPs' own party that it does not make sense to group them together as a commensurate activity. Similarly, Duncan and Gillon's (2015:394-396) section *Working Life of an MP* in their chapter on *Members of Parliament* in New Zealand's foundational political studies textbook does not focus on the actual, real work of MPs or even what MPs would consider to be most important in structuring their work. Instead, the section outlines remuneration and pecuniary interests, parliamentary privilege, standards expected in the House, and sanctions for

[43] Coffé (2017) provided a further breakdown of two of these categories. She detailed that 42 percent of meetings MPs attended were with interest groups, civil society, or stakeholders while 23 percent were with other MPs, most of which were planned in advance but 12.4 percent of which were not (Coffé 2017:347). Communications-related activity consisted of attending to correspondence by email, phone, or letters (72 percent), interviews (12 percent), and social media (4 percent), although Coffé (2017:348) noted that time spent on social media is likely to be underestimated.

MP misbehaviour. While these are, of course, important aspects of how New Zealand's parliamentary system works, none of those topics are major drivers of the work that MPs do. What is more, neither Coffé (2017) or Duncan and Gillon (2015) address the dissimilarities between government backbench and opposition MPs, despite the significant differences in their work. The effect is to remove the politics and purpose of parliamentary work from their analysis, constructing the parliament itself as an arena of undifferentiated equals doing activities without aim or strategy. That approach is inadequate for understanding the work of MPs and the parliament itself.

The New Zealand Parliament is both highly formalised and dynamic within certain limits, and it is that duality which makes it a complex structure. Although exuding a gravitas that appears immutable and steeped in seemingly ancient ritual ceremony, parliament itself is in large part really only that way because MPs reproduce it that way by convention. McGee (1994:2) states:

> The House's role is not defined anywhere; it has been carved out by the members of the House, partly by the legal environment from which the House draws its power, partly by the expectations… of what members of Parliament 'should do', and partly by the initiative of the members themselves in assuming functions that were open to them. Nor is it necessarily the case that the House has exclusive purchase on any of the functions it performs.

By way of illustration: the *Standing Orders* and *Speaker's Directions* that govern parliament together comprise nearly 400 written pages of codified rules that members tend to adhere to but those rules are not fixed – they are frequently challenged by points of order from members, or by the whim of the Speaker, or by a committee of MPs. The result is that MPs work in an institution that inculcates a feeling of its own permanence that tends toward reproduction while in practice also being dynamic and adaptive.

Within the parliamentary structure, MPs have to learn to work in ways that fulfil the traditional role of their position in the parliament and which also enable them to build their own standing within and as a representative of it. For opposition MPs, a central part of being a good MP is fulfilling their traditional function of acting as a scrutineer of the government's work and advocating for their own and their party's vision, values, and positions. That tradition is what MPs think they "should do," as McGee (1994:2) stated, and forms a large part of the ideal model for the work of opposition MPs. Holly characterised the model that the traditional ideal provided:

> My understanding of this job… is all very much rooted in the opposition model. So the day-to-day structure of our work is around: What questions are we asking? What stories can we dig up that make the government look bad? What written questions can we lodge to get information to break a story about something? And that would be very different if we were in government.

Within that broader frame, Holly said, opposition work took place in different 'spheres', each of which was characterised by distinct purposes and activities:

> There's a whole lot of different spheres you're operating in really… So one category is parliamentary procedures… that whole business of parliament. And in some ways, that feels like the core job that we're here to do. Then there is our role as opposition spokespeople, not just within the House but in the wider media sphere… And that's partly parliamentary, sometimes that happens through questions or through Parliamentary

> Library research, but it's not about the running of the House, it's about us in the public sphere. Then there's the sphere of engaging with people, constituents, the community… so that you're being seen to represent people, you're being seen to be active in the community [so that] people feel you're approachable… I s'pose the [fourth] area of work we do is engaging with stakeholders… relevant to the portfolios and engaging with experts on those portfolios and learning from them and so on.

Among that broad set of activities, however, it can be difficult for MPs to define their own sense of the role and themselves in it. Gareth said:

> The harder thing early on was learning what does it mean to be a good MP? And it sounds ridiculous and simple, even though there is no job description. There are certain functions, and you can see what people do, and it's pretty black and white. But… you've kind of got to work out where you are in space and time, and your role in it, and your future role. I think the most effective politicians know that and play to their strengths and weaknesses and all of that. But it's hard to work it out because you've got all this parliamentary stuff to learn, all the internal and external politics to learn. Stopping and thinking about who you are and where you're going is difficult.

The duality of tradition and dynamism that characterises the institution of parliament itself generates a complex role for opposition MPs that is shaped by the traditional role of the parliamentary position they occupy. In being a good MP, opposition MPs not only have to scrutinise the Executive in the House, they have to do so in the wider public sphere and while also engaging with public actors in their representative role. Working out the specifics of how to do that, and who they want to be as they do it, is complex.

The purpose of this chapter is to explain what opposition MPs do. I make the case that the complexity of parliament is exhibited in the day-to-day strategies and practices that make up opposition work in it, as MPs seek to both do their opposition work well and adhere to the principles and prescriptions of messaging. In this Chapter, I highlight some of the key structures, responsibilities, and roles that shape opposition MP work and introduce some of the moments in which MPs can be seen to mesh together that structure and the new logic for messaged statements in their day-to-day work. The sections include: the rhythm of parliament, the morning call, legislation, question time, New Zealand's media landscape, preparing to govern, and the difficulty of being positive and solution-focused while in opposition. Those discussions also provide the context for the following ethnographic chapters in this thesis, and draw attention to the wide-ranging practical skill MPs must acquire and use to do their work well in the "rollercoaster" of parliamentary life, as Catherine characterised it.

The Rhythm of Parliament

Crewe identifies rhythm as the form which gives shape to MPs' working lives across time and space (Crewe 2015b:154). Rhythm is not fixed but it does provide continuity to the varied tasks of MPs' work: "Rhythms allow room for adaptation or can be disrupted and transformed, but in the everyday work of MPs they provide some continuity" (Crewe 2015b:154). The rhythm of MP work is governed by two schedules: the parliamentary calendar, and each MP's office calendar.

New Zealand's Parliament operates on both a triennial and annual cycle. The primary occasion, a general election, is held every three years. After each election, the summoning, election of Speaker and State Opening of Parliament occurs (McGee 2005:141). It is a highly formalised and symbolically rich ceremony that includes the Governor-General's Speech from the Throne (see McGee 2005:138, 141-146 for further detail). Newly elected members of the parliament take an oath or make an affirmation (McGee 2005:135138). Then, the Address in Reply debate occurs, including maiden speeches for new members (McGee 2005:144-145). Because 2013 was mid-term between elections, the year opened with the debate on the Prime Minister's statement on January 29. The next milestone, the "principal parliamentary occasion of the year," is when the Budget is put before the House with the Minister of Finance's statement in May; in 2013, it was presented on May 16 (McGee 2005:477). The presentation of the Budget and its related bills sets off an annual cycle of debate, authorisation, reporting, and review of the Crown's accounts. Continuously, the House and select committees move through their legislative work throughout the year. Finally, the parliamentary year ends as either its business is adjourned over the summer, or the parliament is dissolved and the campaigning period leading to an election begins (McGee 2005:15-16). Although there is some flexibility in the exact timing of parts of this yearly rhythm, in general these major events are fixed and formal ceremonial affairs. They provide the overall structure within which the particular political issues of the time occur.

Figure 4.1: House Calendar 2013

The parliamentary year is divided into sitting weeks when the House is in session, and recess weeks when it has been adjourned until its next sitting (see Figure 4.1 for the 2013 calendar). During recess weeks, MPs do not have to be in Wellington to attend parliament. They undertake a range of activities in recess weeks, including public meetings, meetings with constituents and stakeholders, media interviews, and resting at a variety of locations. During sitting weeks, the House meets at the following times:

Tuesday:	2:00 p.m. –10:00 p.m.
Wednesday:	2:00 p.m. – 10:00 p.m.
Thursday:	2:00 p.m. – 6:00 p.m.

On Tuesdays and Wednesdays, the House breaks for dinner between 6:00 p.m. – 7:30 p.m. The House also has the ability to lengthen its hours by urgency or extension, typically sitting between 9:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. to pass legislation related to Treaty of Waitangi settlements for example. Question time occurs at 2:00 p.m. each day, and the House has a general

debate before members' bills on Wednesdays of alternate weeks. By convention, all MPs attend question time but they need not be in the debating chamber at other times.44 Around these times, party caucuses meet on Tuesday mornings and select committees generally meet on Wednesday and Thursday mornings.

Figure 4.2: Catherine Delahunty's Diary – Thursday November 14, 2013 (Sitting)

Time	Appointment	
7:00 a.m.		
8:00 a.m.		
	Morning planning call	
9:00 a.m.	Catherine and advisor catch up on toxics portfolio, planning a website update	
	Meeting with an education organisation	
10:00 a.m.		
11:00 a.m.	Meeting with a disability carers organisation	
12.00 p.m.	Meeting with an education advocate	
1:00 p.m.	Meeting with an international education academic	
2:00 p.m.	Question time	
3:00 p.m.		
4:00 p.m.	House duty	
5:00 p.m.		
6:00 p.m.	Phone call with Green Party member	
		Catch taxi with two Green MPs
7:00 p.m.	Dinner with Ambassador	
8:00 p.m.		
9:00 p.m.		
10:00 p.m.		

[44] In 2013, the Greens had two MPs on 'House duty' in the chamber to read out the party vote and attend to procedural matters as they arose, in addition to the MP or MPs speaking on the legislation being debated at the time. All other MPs had to be on the parliamentary precinct unless they had leave from Gareth as Musterer (Whip) to go elsewhere. The Green Party could have four MPs off-precinct while retaining their full share of 14 votes in the House. However, because the Green Party's votes were not crucial in determining whether or not bills would pass, Gareth would frequently drop the Green Party's vote to allow more MPs leave. He was especially focused on granting 'pyjama' leave where he could, which would allow MPs to leave parliament before 10:00 p.m. to be at home with their families, recover from illness, or rest.

Working within that weekly rhythm, MPs fill out the rest of their diaries. Or, rather, their Executive Assistants manage their diaries with the greater or lesser involvement of the MP depending on the individual involved. Below is an example of Catherine's diary during a day when the House was sitting (see Figure 4.2). Catherine's diary is fairly typical of a day at parliament: the Green Party meets to decide daily priorities, and then MPs meet on portfolio-related issues with both staff and external parties, go to the debating chamber for House-related activities at the appropriate times, travel, and attend events. Most meetings occur in the MPs' office, but at other times they will go to places around the Wellington region or even outside it if time and leave allow. Empty spaces in the calendar are not idle – MPs spend time in their offices doing administrative tasks, coordinating and strategizing with their staff, updating social media, keeping up with the news and events of the day, and talking to each other.

However, the order of a diary can belie the reality of a day. Catherine described:

> Every day is a rollercoaster. There is the theoretical day in the diary, which you cling to like a drowning person. It's like: 'I've got to do these meetings; I've got to do this'. And then there's the unexpected. And so I don't think it's possible to anticipate what you're going to go in a day; well, not for me… During that kind of [weekly and daily] frame, anything can happen… So I can't particularly plan my day. I have a plan; I stick to the plan; and then I also throw more things on top of that.

As an example, consider the diary of Gareth Hughes below (Figure 4.3). On that day, his Executive Assistant had arranged several meetings in Auckland on the subject of 3D printing, which Gareth was researching to write a policy about. My day began at 5:00 a.m. as I had to commute to the airport to check in at 6:30 a.m. Gareth's day started a bit later as he had accidentally set his alarm for the incorrect time. His wake-up call came from the taxi driver who had arrived outside his house to pick him up. Scrambling, he only just made the flight, boarding at the last minute while I sat on the plane already buckled in worried that I was going to be flying up to Auckland alone. After picking up the rental car in Auckland, I called ahead to Green Party's Auckland office at Gareth's request to let the Issues Assistant know that we were running late because of bad traffic. She would be taking photographs of Gareth during the day to be used in his 3D printing policy paper. The person who answered the phone in the office said that it was fine as the assistant was not there. When we arrived at the office, just on 8:00 a.m., the assistant was still not there. Gareth and I spent a good amount of time sitting in the car outside, with Gareth on the phone trying to find out where she was. Neither of us had had a coffee, and Gareth had had an abrupt start to the morning. It was stressful, and Gareth was frustrated as we would be running late for the first appointment. There were further delays still but, in the end, we picked the assistant up from her house on the way to the first meeting. We were running around 20 minutes late, with the consequence that picking up the 'tour guide' who was to be introducing Gareth to the organisations we visited was postponed until after the first meeting and our late start pushed the other meetings of the day back too. Gareth's Executive Assistant had to call ahead for us to each meeting and apologise. After the final meeting, Gareth also had the opportunity to do a television interview about the overpricing of software and technology, which resulted in his being featured on a high-profile current affairs show. It was raining by that time, and we had not come prepared for bad weather. We had missed breakfast due to the early departure and running late for the morning flight, did not have lunch until 3:00 p.m., or much water throughout the day. By the time we made it back to the airport, both Gareth and I were exhausted after running on adrenaline the whole day. Time in Air New Zealand's

Koru Lounge before the flight, however, offered a respite to catch up on the day's news, emails, administration and, for me, field notes. Getting back to Wellington at 8:00 p.m. and commuting home meant that, in total, 15.5 hours had been spent in busy activity that day, not all of which appeared in Gareth's diary.

Figure 4.3: Gareth Hughes' Dairy – Monday August 12, 2013 (Recess)

Time	Appointment
7:00 a.m.	Flight from Wellington to Auckland
8:00 a.m.	Drive in rental car to Green Party's Auckland Office to meet Issues Assistant
9:00 a.m.	Visit to company that produces 3D printing filament
10:00 a.m.	
11:00 a.m.	Visit to a makerspace to view 3D printing capabilities
12.00 p.m.	Visit to university's 3D printer
1:00 p.m.	
2:00 p.m.	
3:00 p.m.	
4:00 p.m.	
5:00 p.m.	
6:00 p.m.	
7:00 p.m.	Flight from Auckland to Wellington
8:00 p.m.	
9:00 p.m.	
10:00 p.m.	

The effect that the rhythm of parliamentary work has on MPs is not insignificant. It is exhausting, and has a profound effect on MPs' lives outside parliament. As Coffé (2017:348) identified, finding a way to balance their responsibilities as MPs with other parts of their lives, like parenting, was challenging for everyone I talked to.[45] When I asked Holly what the most surprising thing she had found about being an MP was, she said it was the "physical exhaustion," saying that by Thursday morning during a sitting week, "I would just be really physically exhausted in a way that I've never

[45] After coming back from a recess, one MP excitedly exclaimed, "I've had nine sleeps at home!" indicating its rarity.

been in any other job before. So that, things like that which I knew would be a factor but which I just wasn't kind of prepared for." During the periods when parliamentary work was quieter, the MPs often apologised to me when they did not have a day full of meetings, invariably thinking it might be "boring" for me.[46] In truth, the more relaxed and informal approach of days spent catching up on work in the office was often a welcome relief from the hectic intensity that characterised many days.

Kennedy described the rhythm of life as an MP as cyclical:

> You do go through your own, almost seasonal, cycles and political cycles of enthusiasm and energy. I think, you talk to anybody, it's associated with mid-Winter or your own personal twists and turns. So you can be more active for a few months, and then less so for others and retrenching. But, for me, that retrenching is very much, often still you're acquiring knowledge and doing research to get knowledge so that, when the time comes, you can be more effective.

The cyclical rhythm to parliament – triennially, yearly, seasonally, and weekly – shapes the lives of MPs, not only as politicians but as people. Initially structured by the highly formalised rhythms of elections, openings and closings of parliament, and the sitting calendar, MPs then have to carve out and respond to the more adaptive rhythms of their own calendars and lives as they move through their own work toward their political and personal aims.

The Morning Call

Within the broad and formal parliamentary rhythm, political parties and MPs have to work out which few from the wide array of issues that they deal with will take priority on any given day. Whether government or opposition, each side will seek to advance their own agenda while also responding to the other's. In the Green Party, the day's priorities are decided collectively at the morning call. Each day at 8:30 a.m., MPs and both senior and advisory staff gather together, in the Caucus room and by conference call, typically for between 15 to 20 minutes to make those decisions.[47] The House Programme is presented, MPs bid for questions for oral answer slots and agree which win, general debate slots are allocated, press releases are discussed and approved, and upcoming social media is listed. Other notices and discussions that are central to the day's work also occur. The practical sense of Green MPs and their staff in working out what the most strategic immediate action is to shape the future context of the political game is exemplified at the morning call.

The morning call meeting is central to MPs' work because it decides who gets to make statements on what. MPs compete because being able to make priority statements is important for getting the issues they care about onto the political agenda and, the hope is, onto the media's agenda so that

[46] For example, Gareth emailed me about an upcoming week: "I'm sorry I've diaried a boring week to catch up on things, so I hope I don't bore you to death." Of course, the MPs were usually still working these days, just from their office without scheduled meetings. And, as shown by the example of Gareth's 3D printing day on August 12, 2013, having time to catch up on work like reading reports and emails, and other administrative, research, or collegial tasks, was important given how little could be spent doing that on meeting- or travel-heavy days.

[47] A call can last only a few minutes if there are not many decisions to make or discussion to be had; at its lengthiest, a call can last half an hour or more.

a public audience will see, hear, or read what they say. Catherine highlighted the importance of doing so:

> I go in there in the morning and I have a commitment to always trying to bid for a question, so I'm always [bidding]. The first thing I do in the morning is listen to Radio New Zealand to see whether there's anything I need to push if I haven't got a plan from the night before. So, I listen to that. I get to work and I always look at bidding for a question or whether there's any media that I can bid for. And by 8:30, we're in the room doing the bidding process. I take that on very seriously because, I think, if you don't bid, you don't have a chance. So, I try to participate really fully in that. And then the day kind of unfolds from there.
>
> … That's because we're here to have a voice. We're not the government. I have got some solid achievements but getting your voice out there is one of the things you *can* do.

An MP's day will be much busier if they win a bid. At the least, they will be emailing advisory staff throughout the morning; if they will be in the public eye about a more significant topic, they may perhaps ask their Executive Assistant to reschedule most of their day. The morning call produces an order for the Party and its MPs from the variety and variability of daily political life, and defines the issues that MPs should give priority to talking about in public.

The morning call is a competitive meeting. There are always more bids than available places in questions, debates, and press releases, so MPs must decide which the best issues are. Most bids fail. Because the number and variety of issues that the Party could talk about on any given day is so large, the MPs and staff apply a broad set of criteria to work out which they will elevate in importance by making public statements to try to get them on the political agenda. While not codified in a written document, in my experience observing the morning call during 2013, some of the criteria MPs and staff will consider include:

Timeliness:	Is the issue one of recent occurrence that is anticipated to be in the day's upcoming media cycle that day, meaning that journalists could cover the Green Party's statements or has the story already 'run' in the media, making any new statement by the Greens ineffectual?
New Information:	Does the Party have new information to release to the media and public that will be newsworthy and ensure the Party's statements about it are covered?
Cut Through:	Are the Green Party's statements and issues likely to be covered by the media that day given other issues on their agenda and/or other parties, organisations, or people that the media could seek comment from on the story?
National Significance:	Is the issue one that the Party should attempt to get covered in the mass national media, or is it better targeted toward local media or specific interest groups and communities?
Strategic Priority:	Is the issue connected to one of the Party's long-term priority campaigns, and will it continue to raise awareness of or build political pressure for that campaign?

Positioning:	Where will the Greens be publicly positioned as a result of raising the issue or making particular statements about the issue; for example, will they be seen as on the side of consumers or perhaps as lacking differentiation from Labour?
Simplicity:	Can the issue and the Greens' position be explained clearly and succinctly in a soundbite?
Framing:	Can the issue be easily communicated using the Green Party's framing?
Public Engagement:	Is the issue one that the public will care about and mobilise around or are already acting on, or is it an issue with a small, niche audience concerned about a 'beltway' issue?
The Right Thing:	Even if the issue will not result in public engagement and may have negative risks or outcomes for the Party, is it still the right thing for the Party to do?

These ten criteria alone show the complexity of judgements that MPs and their staff engage in each morning in attempting to anticipate how an issue and the Green Party's actions will play out both over the short and long term, with other actors also competing to shape the state of play in a way which favours them and their position in the public arena. These judgements are made through a shared practical sense. While some discussion does occur, often strategic decisions are communicated as overall judgements using phrases like, "That seems risky," "It's a strong question," or, "That sounds like a blog to me." Often no discussion occurs following an MP speaking to their bid and it is simply not included in the straw poll[48] of questions, thus indicating the group has silently decided by omission that the issue is not as strategically favourable as others on the table. The morning call exhibits the practical sense that shapes the public actions and statements of the Green MPs, showcasing a shared understanding of how to act strategically to shape the future state of play.

The morning call of Tuesday July 30, 2013, provides a typical example of the practical sense with which people on the call make decisions. It shows that the morning call not only practically decides who will be speaking publicly and on what that day, but generates a collective responsibility for the decision, provides a foundation for message discipline, creates a loose hierarchy of values that give rise to criteria, and affirms the functioning of the political field.

Tuesday July 30, 2013, was the first sitting day after a two-week recess, and the Greens were expecting it to be a big day. Gareth, as Musterer, led the call through the House Programme for the day (see Figure 4.4). The first order of the day, he said, was a motion on the birth of Prince George. That news received slight groans from some of the MPs and laughter from others. Gareth moved on, noting that the Greens had questions two and seven that day, and that the Party was putting forward a request for an urgent debate to the Speaker about the Government Communications

[48] A straw poll is an informal show of hands to indicate the feeling of voters. It is not binding but, if the results are obvious, it shows there is consensus so the decision can go ahead on that basis.

Security Bureau.[49] After that would be the continuation of the Budget's Appropriations debate, which would take up the rest of the House's sitting time until 10:00 p.m. that night. The 'backup bill' on the Green Party's House Programme was the Resource Management Reform Bill, but the House Advisor told the group that it would not be up for consideration that night; instead, it would likely be before the House the next morning.

Figure 4.4: The Green Party's House Programme for Tuesday July 30, 2013



30 JULY - 1 AUGUST '13 — 1045 TUE 30 JULY OP #140 FINAL

TUESDAY 30 JULY

Time Approx.	ITEM on the Order Paper	MP	Stage	VOTE	CLAS	Minister Committee	Comments	House Duty	Voting Strength
1400-1430	Notice of Motion: birth of Prince George	KG	Slot 3	✓	n/a	PM		1400-1500: All MPs	1400-1500: 14
1430-1530	Question Time	RN ES	Q 2 Q 7	n/a	n/a	PM Adams	Spying Water		
TBC (90m)	Urgent Debate: NZDF monitoring of John Stephenson (Green) Urgent Debate: Parliamentary Service release of Vances' phone records (green)	RN	Slot 1 15m						
1530-1800 (8 hrs)	1. Appropriation (2013/14 Estimates) Bill	GCSB - RN Finance - RN Transport - JAG SkyCity *(EconDev)* - DR Health - KH Education - CD Social Development - JL Housing - HW Environment - ES Climate Change *(Part of Environment)* - KG Energy - GH	8 hours CWH	Mana ✗ Horan ✗	n/a	English	Greens = 11 x 5m speeches See list in House Book of order of votes.	1500-1600: JG + JL 1600-1700: KG + ES 1700-1800: DR + ES	1500-1600: 14 Mana: 1 Horan: 1 1600-1700: 14 Mana: 1 Horan: 1 1700-1800: 14 Mana: 1 Horan: 1
DINNER BREAK 1800-1930	DINNER BREAK 1800-1930	DINNER BREAK 1800-1930	DINNER BREAK 1800-1930	DINNER BREAK 1800-1930	DINNER BREAK 1800-1930				
1930-2200	*1. Appropriation (2013/14 Estimates) Bill contd.*	GCSB - RN Finance - RN Transport - JAG SkyCity *(EconDev)* - DR Health - KH Education - CD Social Development - JL Housing - HW Environment - ES Climate Change *(Part of Environment)* - KG Energy - GH	8 hours CWH	Mana ✗ Horan ✗	n/a	English	Greens = 11 x 5m speeches Speaking Order in House Book	1930-2030: ES + DR 2030-2130: JG + DC 2130-2200: JG	1930-2030: 14 Mana: 1 Horan: 1 2030-2130: 14 Mana: 1 Horan: 1 2130-2200: 14 Mana: 1 Horan: 1
Back-up bill	2. Resource Management Reform Bill	ES DR	CWH	Mana ✗ Horan ✗	Y	Adams	VOTE FULL STRENGTH		

Source: (House Programme emailed to author, July 30, 2013)

The Political Director then addressed the group, advising what the Leader's call[50] had decided should be the topic for question two.[51] She said that the question was about spying and journalists, and would use a reply the Greens had received to a question for written answer that was not yet public as the hook. The question for written answer, the Political Director described, showed that MP and United Future Leader Peter Dunne's emails ("who no one cares about," it was noted) were accessed with emailed approval from Prime Minister John Key's Chief of Staff writing "Go ahead."[52]

[49] Dr Russel Norman put forward two requests for urgent debates that day, both of which were declined (see 30 July 2013 692 12015). The first was about the New Zealand Defence Force "acquiring information about the phone calls of a New Zealand journalist and in identifying the journalist as a 'subversion' threat." The Speaker declined on the basis that it was not a case of recent occurrence or Ministerial responsibility. The second was about the release "of a press gallery journalist's phone records by Parliamentary Service." The Speaker declined, again for the reason that there was no Ministerial responsibility (30 July 2013 692 NZPD 12015).

[50] The Leader's call occurred immediately before the morning call and included the Co-leaders and senior staff. I never attended a Leader's call.

[51] On Tuesdays and Wednesdays, the first of the Green Party's questions was allocated to the Co-leaders to increase their prominence. On Thursdays, the Co-leaders had to bid to win question allocations like the other MPs.

[52] See Van Beynen (2013) and 3 News Online Staff (2013) for an outline of the wide-ranging scandal and timeline. Peter Dunne's parliamentary emails had been accessed as part of the Henry Inquiry, which had been set up to investigate the leak of the Kitteridge Report into the Government Communications Security Bureau to Press Gallery journalist Andrea Vance. The release of Dunne's emails had shown extensive contact between Dunne and Vance, and it was widely implied that he had leaked the report. The issue

She said that the approval took the issue to the Prime Minister's Office. The MPs and staff at the call did not discuss that question – generally, there was little discussion of the Co-leader's questions – and the recommendation to do it was implicitly accepted.

The next decision for the MPs to make was the questioner and topic for the Green Party's second question. There were four bids from MPs for the number seven slot. The first MP to speak to their bid was Eugenie Sage. She circulated printed copies of her proposed primary and supplementary questions around the Caucus table; she had also sent them to the Green-MP email list the previous night. Eugenie explained that her question was about water quality, regarding information that 61 percent of New Zealand's rivers were unsafe for swimming. Holly next bid for a question from her children's portfolio. She said that during the two-week recess, Social Development Minister Paula Bennett had appeared to depart from her previous position that there was not a standard measure for poverty: "It's about that as well as the effects of welfare reforms on children," she said. Gareth also introduced a bid, although he had not written it down. He said to the group that he was not sure whether anyone had seen it but The Guardian had New Zealand's Minister for Conservation on their front page talking about mining (see Readfearn 2013). "Here it is!" said Catherine loudly, waving a printed copy – "I was going to put that forward too!" The Chief of Staff, who lightly facilitated the calls, asked for a summary for those who had not read it. Gareth explained that it was about drilling in New Zealand. "Drilling Middle Earth," stated Catherine, using the phrase The Guardian had. She continued that the story highlighted New Zealand's "mixed messages" and that the world was starting to notice. She summarised: "On the one hand, we're saying we're 100 percent green and then, on the other, drilling holes everywhere."

With the four bids put forward to the group, those at the morning call moved onto deciding which option should win the question. The Chief of Staff began by saying that he liked the last one on mining. The Political Director responded by contending that Eugenie's question about water quality was on a strategic priority for the Green Party and was the most topical as the report it was based on had been released just the day before. It was also noted that the report had received a lot of coverage on social media so journalists would be aware of the story already. Gareth rebutted that The Guardian story was also topical as it had been on the front page just the day before too, which made it "quite newsworthy." The Political Director quipped back that "the water story may be in the print media today." Co-leader Russel Norman spoke in favour of Eugenie's water question too, saying that it was on a strategic priority and had been in the news yesterday.

Having seen that the group was leaning towards Eugenie's question about water quality, Catherine spoke to Gareth, saying that they could draft a mining question together for the next day, because she thought it would still be "topical" one day later as it was an "international story." She added that they would want to question Prime Minister and Minister for Tourism, John Key on it, so they would need to know when he would be present in the House so they could put the question to him in

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that the Green Party wanted to highlight in the question was that the Executive, via the Prime Minister's Chief of Staff, overstepped their boundary in relation the House of Representatives in releasing the details of parliamentary emails. It was an important constitutional principle, but one which the Greens found difficult to explain via soundbite as Dunne was also a Minister in John Key's Government at the time. This meant that they needed to explain both that he had two email addresses and the constitutional structure of New Zealand in order to justify why they believed it was wrong for the Government to provide his emails to the Inquiry. The issue developed throughout the day. Half an hour before Question Time, the Speaker announced that, in addition to providing Vance's security card information to the Henry Inquiry, they had also provided her phone records, raising questions of about freedom of the press. The Speaker issued an apology (see Small 2013).

person. The House Advisor let the meeting know that the Prime Minister would be in the House that day as he was leading the motion on Prince George.

An advisor spoke to the group, saying that if they were going to go with Eugenie's water quality it would need to be linked to the "cultural values" around water in New Zealand because the way the primary question was written on the bid sounded like a 'patsy'.[53] He said that they needed to link it to "why people care about water." Holly asked the group whether she should "make a last push" for her question on child poverty as it was "also in a priority area," it would be the first chance they had to question the Minister about it, and it was a significant departure from the Minister's previous statements on measuring poverty. Her advisor also noted that it was the first chance the Greens had to ask the Minister about recent welfare reforms since they had been introduced.

The Chief of Staff summarised the mood of the room as "leaning towards" water quality, but Eugenie asked for a straw poll. The result of the poll was that Eugenie's bid received five votes, Holly's received two, and the results of the mining question were inconclusive as Catherine interrupted, stating light-heartedly that she did not realise that the poll was between the three options and had put her hand up for the wrong option. Laughing, she and the Chief of Staff agreed that her vote would not have altered the numbers enough to affect the outcome anyway so it did not matter and it was not worth running the straw poll again. The Chief of Staff said that there was a "strong showing" for water and, "if there was no further discussion, that's what [it'd] be." There was no further discussion and Eugenie went on to ask question seven that day. Gareth and Catherine never did ask the Prime Minister about the issues discussed in The Guardian – each day's bidding begins anew the next day and, in subsequent days, it lost again to more topical and higher priority questions.

The morning call operated as it did because of a shared practical sense among staff and MPs that allowed them to make strategic decisions based on a feel for what would work best, rather than a rational, conscious, detailed calculation of each option and its likely outcome. There was not always uncontested agreement, because each individual had a slightly perspective on how the issue would unfold. For the most part, however, the Greens had little trouble reaching agreement on the broad strategic direction for their day's work. They were able to quickly, and often without discussion, decide which issues would enable them to both do their opposition work by scrutinising the Government's actions or inactions and enable them to make messaged statements that aimed to win public support over to them and their Party's positions on the issues.

Legislation and Speaking in the House

For much of the 17 hours the House is in session each regular sitting week it is considering legislation. Parliament is New Zealand's legislature. It makes laws (Shaw and Eichbaum 2011:47). Before becoming an Act of Parliament, New Zealand's law moves through the House in the form of a bill that is scrutinised, debated, and amended by MPs before being passed (Office of the Clerk 2014:32, 37). In the 50th Parliament of 2011-2014, 346 bills were passed by the House (Martin 2015:145). Ninety-three percent of bills passed were Government bills and, during 2013, none of

[53] A patsy question is a pre-scripted question from a backbench MP of the governing party which sets the Minister up to give glowing, favourable replies, showing them and their work in an excellent light.

the government's bills failed their passage to Act. By contrast, two-thirds of members' bills which were put forward by MPs by opposition party MPs failed at their first reading, as the National Party and at least two of its support partners voted against their reading. Of the two opposition members' bills which passed, one passed by party and the other by conscience vote. These numbers indicate the Executive's effective control of the legislature with its parliamentary majority as well as the complexity and difficulty opposition MPs have in attempting to shape New Zealand's law.

A bill passes through the House in six stages. They are:

1. Introduction,
2. First reading,
3. Select committee consideration,
4. Second reading,
5. Committee of the whole House consideration, and
6. Third reading (McGee 2005:341).

At each stage, the member in charge of the bill – usually a Minister – will move that the bill be read. The Speaker will put that motion to the House as a question, MPs will debate it and, once the debate has concluded, the question that the bill be read is put to the House and voting on it occurs. The three readings are preceded by 12 speeches of ten minutes each, divided proportionally among the parties (SO:Appendix A).[54] Similar speeches are made during the committee of the whole House. There is no time limit on that stage; however, MPs are not allowed to make more than four speeches of five minutes each on each Part or provision of the bill (SO:Appendix A). In general, at select committee, MPs take submissions and advice from the public, stakeholders, and officials, scrutinise the bill, recommend amendments, and report back to the House (Martin 2015:146; McGee 2005:351-352). After its third reading, the bill becomes an Act of Parliament only when it receives the Royal assent by, usually, New Zealand's Governor-General (Office of the Clerk 2014:37).[55]

At each stage, a majority vote on the question is required for the bill to pass. There is a formal process by which this occurs. Firstly, a voice vote is taken by the Speaker, whereby MPs either yell out 'Aye!' the bill should pass, or 'Party vote!' whereby the bill should not pass and a party vote should be called. If a bill passes with only Ayes at that stage, it is said to pass 'on the voices'. If a party vote is called for:

(a) the Clerk asks the leader of each party or a member authorised by the leader to cast the party's votes; parties are asked to vote in the order of the size of their parliamentary membership:
(b) a party's votes may be cast for the Ayes or for the Noes or recorded as an abstention, and a party may cast some of its votes in one of the categories and some in another or others…
(c) the total number of votes cast for each party may include only those members present within the parliamentary precincts together with any properly authorised proxy votes:
(d) after votes have been cast by parties, any Independent member and any member who is voting contrary to his or her party's vote may cast a vote; finally any proxy vote for a member who is voting contrary to his or her party may be cast:
(e) the Speaker declares the result to the House (SO 140 (1)).

[54] In the 50th Parliament, the Green Party was allocated one ten-minute speech and one five-minute speech each debate.
[55] The Royal assent has never been refused: "A refusal to assent would be a remarkable – indeed a unique – event in New Zealand's history" (McGee 2005:393).

The other form of voting is personal whereby, if the Speaker has determined "that the subject of a vote is to be treated as a conscience issue, a party vote is not held but rather MPs vote in their own name" (SO 139; SO 142 (1)). Personal voting is rare, used on bills about moral issues like marriage equality, shop trading hours on religious public holidays, and gambling.[56] Rather, for the overwhelming majority of party votes in 2013, the National Party could call on its 59 votes as well as all or a combination of the votes of its support partners: three votes from the Māori Party, one vote from ACT, and one vote from United Future. The opposition comprised the 34 votes of the Labour Party, the Green Party's 14, eight from New Zealand First, and one from Mana. In general, then, the Government could draw from a pool of 64 votes, while the opposition comprised around 57.

The outcome of the legislative process is to make laws. Anthropologist Marc Abélès (2006; 2008) examined the legislative process in the French National Assembly. He stated that the legislative process is important because laws "contain norms will apply to the whole society" (Abélès 2006:26).[57] He found that in making law,

> there is an exegetic activity, a semiotic contest from which the text of the law emerges. Almost simultaneously, there is a ritual struggle. It is the combination of these two modalities, exegesis and semiosis, that simultaneously produce political events (that will be echoed by the media) and a textual production (the law itself that everyone must respect independently of its conditions of production) (Abélès 2008:32; 2006:19).

Exegesis – the detailed examination of the text of the law and its interpretation – takes place primarily in the select committee, while the ritual struggle takes place in the public debates on readings. Abélès (2006:30) defined ritual struggle as "an effective and sometimes violent confrontation of people who incarnate intellectually and physically different elements of civil society" and which "is codified from specific procedures from beginning to end." Thus, the legislative process can be understood as a codified struggle to create and impose a collective representation that will be applied across society. A law, therefore, imposes a vision. Laws are important not only for their practical effect, but also the symbolic effect. In that way, by getting into government and

[56] In 2013 one of the bills that was treated as addressing a conscience issue and thereby subject to personal rather than party vote was the New Zealand International Convention Centre Bill, which gave effect to the controversial agreement between the New Zealand Government and SkyCity Entertainment Group. That agreement saw SkyCity build a convention centre in Auckland in return for concessions including an increase in gambling tables and pokie machines. The Green Party were pleased with that consideration by the Speaker because it meant that they could attempt to publicly pressure MPs, including MPs from the National Party, to vote against the Government's Bill. Co-leader Metiria Turei (2017, quoted in Fox and Small:Para.23-24) stated that: "This legislation is hanging by a thread. It is based on one vote – one vote will make the difference… This is a decision that one MP can make to stop this harm from happening." However, that tactic did not work as the MPs effectively voted in party bloc so that all National Party MPs and its support partners ACT MP John Banks and United Future MP Peter Dunne voted for its passage. The bill passed its third reading with 61 Ayes to 59 Noes (12 November 2013 694 NZPD 14549).

[57] The example Abélès (2008) used to illustrate how these concepts work in practice is the passage of the *pacte civil de solidarité* (PACS) in the 1999 session of the French National Assembly. The PACs was "a form of civil union that [gave] legal status to homosexual couples" (Abélès 2008:165). On one of the committees that Abélès attended, he observed the way in which right wing MPs argued that the word 'agreement' in the law should be changed to 'contract'. The aim was to create an equivalency between the PACS and marriage. However, the Government sought to avoid that because they had promised that the PACS would not alter the meaning of family and marriage. The majority Government won the vote and the word 'agreement' was retained in the text of the law (Abélès 2008:165). Abélès (2006:28) wrote that the exegetic activity over the use of 'agreement' or 'contract' "shows very clearly the importance of textual production as integral to political action… the right wing found in this semiotic contest a sophisticated way of contesting the semantic choices of the government, and above all, its political choices."

being able to exert the dominating power of the Executive over the legislature in New Zealand, the Greens would have the ability to produce laws that made their vision for the world real.

Although legislating has immense power to order and impose norms across society, the Greens were in opposition in 2013 and did not have that power. Instead, their work in the House centred mainly on speaking against Government bills. That quickly became a routine part of their work as they built competency in the debating chamber. But, although routine, MPs I spent my time with felt differently about the solemnity and significance of what they said in the House, especially in relation to the Hansard. The most solemn of the Green MPs I worked with was Kennedy, who went to the chamber with every speech pre-prepared:

> One of the biggest dilemmas for me [is] I watch people, including our own guys, leap up and it becomes almost a rite of passage to be able to get up and talk off the cuff in the House and interact in a fine, robust debating manner with everyone else. And I often ask myself whether that is a *necessary* rite of passage to being a good MP; and I've asked myself that many times. And I always conclude, just at the critical: no, it isn't. Because not – I think – not that I can't do it, I can ad lib in public meetings as well as anyone. But there's a difference, actually, between ad libbing in a public town meeting which is made for that, and what you say in the House, which is on the formal record *forever*. I look up what my great-grandfather said in the 1850s, you know? It's on the record. And you're only given five minutes [or] ten minutes and I reckon, therefore, that every word counts and it's pretty rare that I haven't really prepared something. You can argue, well that's just being over-precious, and over-self-important, and excessively cautious. But I just cannot get rid of the notion that you're on the record forever, you make the best intellectual contribution you can on every item you're responsible for, and then you can ad lib till your heart's content outside.

Catherine, however, had entirely the opposite approach. She said:

> Catherine: Speaking in the House, if you've got something to say, not just for the sake of it but if there's something that needs to be said, then it's a good thing to do… [Earlier,] I wasn't as confident as I am now… Now, I don't write speeches. When I first got in in 2008, I wrote everything that I was going to say in the House. I was really careful. Now I'm just like, [flippantly], 'Oh, I'll get up there! Oh yeah, I'll talk about that!'
>
> Jessica: I know for some of the other MPs, being on the record in the Hansard, for them it's really solemn.
>
> Catherine: Nah! [Laughs]. I'm not very solemn about any of the institutions of Parliament. I think Parliament is arcane, it takes itself too seriously. And being on the record – it's not the Hansard that matters, it's the people. So for me, it's the people out there… And also a lot of the things we say aren't particularly coherent. Hansard would be full of rubbish which all of us had said because we're doing it as a filler, because we're basically being told we need to do our speech for our Party but not all of it's meaningful. Every now and then you do a really good speech. I'm proud if I do a good speech. But it doesn't happen all the time.

The lack of fit Catherine experienced in parliament meant that she found its structures and processes strange. In relation to legislation, that meant although she participated, she did not

experience it as endowed with the solemn meaning Kennedy did. As Catherine's competence and confidence had built over her time as an MP, she no longer felt the need to write every speech before stating it for the record. Holly also had the same experience, although, with only a year's experience at the time I did my fieldwork, she still felt the need to prepare for the highly-watched set pieces like questions for oral answer. She began by explaining what it was like speaking in the House when she was a new MP:

> To begin with, it's partly about just the institution, and the history, and the fact that everything you say is getting recorded in the Hansard. It just feels very significant. That goes after a while. But, for example, getting up to give my maiden speech, I was quite overwhelmed with emotion, which I guess is understandable. Similarly, after asking my first question in question time, my heart was just pounding.
>
> It is easier now, and I feel like some of that significance about the House has fallen away a little bit. But especially, I think question time is like the showpiece of parliament so that's where it feels really important to get it right. Whereas, now, when I'm speaking in other sessions of parliament on some random legislation, I no longer feel nervous at all about that even though I know it's going into the Hansard and it will form a part of the record; it doesn't feel as significant as those kinds of set pieces like question time.

For Holly, like other MPs, building competency and skill in the chamber over time had enabled her to feel more 'at home' there as she developed the ability to do and say the right things when speaking on legislation.

Gareth was perhaps the Green MP who most enjoyed debating in the chamber, and believed writing a good speech was one of his core competencies. Although he considered speaking on legislation a central part of democratic process, he thought the real benefit to debating was in speaking to a wider public audience rather than to the other MPs who were present in the debating chamber for his speeches. He said:

> Gareth: I mostly enjoy it. I find it a great challenge. It's something I do take seriously and put thought into. I guess some of the key lessons I've learnt is that the audience is definitely not inside that chamber. It's the cameras. And sometimes it's beneficial to play to the other 'characters' in the drama, other times it's best just to ignore it.
>
> Depending on the speech I'll do hours of research sometimes; other times, less so. I like to think that I can write a good speech. I think I write better than I deliver. And I read about good speech-making and I love playing with words, so I actually really enjoy that process.
>
> But the best speeches are those moments that come along really rarely where there's a genuine moment in time, and actually it's off the cuff stuff that I've found are the speeches that really resonate with people. So for me, the first time I really got it was over the copyright debate where I just stayed in the House all day under urgency and debated until my voice was raw and *thousands and thousands* of people were watching the videos and it was just this moment which I couldn't have predicted. Yeah, so those special moments.

Jessica: Yeah, and I guess those are the times that you have something you can kind of bounce off in the House… and you can kind of pick that stuff up again.

Gareth: Yep. But I love the debate, you know? It's an important part of our democracy and I feel confident in myself in the House and I think if you lose confidence in there, it's horrible. But when we're confident you can just respond to interjections from National backbenchers and I love getting it heated and banging the table as it were.

For Gareth, speaking in the chamber was a core part of being an opposition MP. It allowed him not only to state the Party's position on the legislation but, more importantly, it enabled him to engage in public debate on the issues by speaking primarily to the audience outside the chamber. Not only did Gareth believe that was a core part of his work, he also believed that he had built skill in being able to write good speeches that would resonate with the people watching.

Procedural explanations of the legislative process are important. The process for voting on bills is one of the most fixed parts of the parliamentary system: to read a bill without following a voting process as outlined in the *Standing Orders* would be unthinkable in the minds of MPs in their everyday legislative work. Procedural outlines objectify and codify the structure in which MPs do their work. But the actual practice of speaking in the House requires a broader set of competencies than just following those rules. They must also come to know, for example, when their slot to speak is up, which audience to tailor their speech to, how serious their tone ought to be for the particular issue, and how much preparation will be required. MPs get plenty of opportunities to develop that skill, as speaking frequently in the House on a wide range of legislation is a core part of the work of opposition.

Question Time and the Speaker

Question time is perhaps the most infamous of parliament's business, characterised popularly by the high theatre and high stakes of adversarial exchange. During the most intense moments, the debating chamber reverberates with the shouting of political questioning and interjection that occurs the U-shaped room as the government and opposition both seek to win and inflict damage on the other side. But, in practice, question time can vary between that heightened drama and the more routine reading of scripts, often from question to question. By the time the first few questions on the most contentious issues of the day have been done, the chamber takes on a much calmer air and the shouting slows. Patsy questions are mostly read semi-monotone and met with disinterested silence. Many MPs I spoke to do not pay full attention to what happens during much of question time, instead focusing on tweeting the proceedings, attending to emails and other business, or simply 'zoning-out'. Question time, like other parliamentary business, is a complex and variable affair.

Generally, question time is seen to be a central part of the House's role in scrutinizing the government. The explanation for question time put forward by most political scientists is that it is a mechanism by which the House can scrutinise Ministers about their responsibilities, management, and performance (Martin 2015:145-146; Ladley 2006:57), hold the government to

account (Ladley 2006:57,67), provide information and transparency, and criticise what the government is doing or not doing (Ladley 2006:57). Question time is thus understood to be a way that the House can fulfil its role of scrutinising and controlling the government (Office of the Clerk 2014:16). However, in the experience of the MPs I worked with, that was not how question time generally worked even if they wished it was.

The way question time formally works as codified in parliament's proceedings is relatively straight-forward. In broad terms, there are twelve primary questions each sitting day and they are allocated proportionally to the parties.[58] Each party also receives an allocation of supplementary questions. Oral questions are lodged between 10:00 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. with the Clerk, who checks that the primary question is in order before accepting it. Being in order means meeting the requirements in Standing Order 377: questions must not refer to what happened at a closed select committee meeting before it is reported or a case in front of the courts, or seek a legal opinion (SO 377 (4), SO 377 (2)). They must also:

> Be concise and not contain–
> (a) statements of facts and names of persons unless they are strictly necessary to render the question intelligible and can be authenticated, or
> (b) arguments, inferences, imputations, epithets, ironical expressions or expressions of opinion, or
> (c) discreditable references to the House or any member of Parliament or any offensive or unparliamentary expression (SO 377 (1)).

Most importantly, questions must relate to matters of Ministerial responsibility (SO 375 (b)). The primary question is given to the Minister so that they have time to prepare before the House begins sitting at 2:00 p.m. During question time, the Speaker calls the primary question and an MP asks it, word-for-word as it was accepted by the Clerk. The Minister replies. The content of replies is broadly matched to the content of questions as outlined in the *Standing Orders*, which states that:

> (1) An answer that seeks to address the question asked must be given if it can be if it can be given consistently with the public interest.
> (2) The reply to any question must be concise and confined to the subject-matter of the question asked, and not contain–
> (a) statements of facts and the names of any persons unless they are strictly necessary to answer the question, or
> (b) arguments, inferences, imputations, epithets or ironical expressions, or
> (c) discernible references to the House or any member of Parliament or any offensive or unparliamentary expression.
> (3) Replies shall not refer to proceedings in committee at meetings closed to the public that have not yet been reported to the House or (subject to Standing Order 112) to a case pending adjudication by a court (SO 383 (1-3)).

After the reply to the primary question, MPs have the opportunity to ask supplementary questions to "elucidate or clarify a matter raised in a question for oral answer or in an answer given to a question" (SO 384 (1)). When the supplementaries have ended, the Speaker calls for the next primary question or, following the final question, the House moves onto other business for the day.

[58] During the 50th Parliament, the Green Party was allocated one or two questions each sitting day.

One of the central actors in question time is the Speaker. The Speaker, in general, remains an understudied position in New Zealand. In fact, the only work I could find that wholly concerned the Speaker and gave an indication of the history of the role, its duties, and 'recent' reforms to the House was written nearly 55 years ago (Algie 1963). Of course, McGee (2017:77-83) provides the preeminent description and discussion of the Speaker's duties, position, and office-holding in recent Parliaments. One of the Speaker's most important roles is to "chair the House, presiding over its deliberations, keeping order and determining points of procedure" (McGee 2005:53). The style and rulings of the Speaker shape the workings of the House. In 2013, when the Rt Hon David Carter replaced Rt Hon Dr Lockwood Smith, there was a significant change that altered how question time worked. Before 2013, Smith had chaired question time with a ruling conventionally known as 'a straight answer for a straight question'. It meant that if an MP asked a Minister a question that was not 'political' in Smith's estimation, the Minister would need to reply in a non-political manner too. Thus, he expected "that genuine questions seeking information should receive answers, while politically slanted questions simply had to be addressed" (Martin 2015:150). Carter, however, revisited the requirements for answering and addressing. In general, he favoured the addressing of questions because it allowed political debate, but he frequently allowed MPs to repeat questions to Ministers by either using their allocated supplementaries or allowing them extras if MPs felt that they had not got an adequate answer (Young 2013:Para.15). For Carter, the debating chamber was a place where "there should be a bit of to and froing, a bit of interjection" (Carter 2017, quoted in Smith and Maoate-Cox 2017:Para.26). That change in the way the House was chaired caused considerable trouble for the opposition.

In general, the Green MPs felt less able to fulfil the traditional opposition role of scrutinising the government and holding it to account if Ministers were only required to address rather than answer straight questions. When I began fieldwork with Holly in March, only three weeks after Carter's first chairing of the House, she was already worried about the change in rule and the effect it was having on the Greens' ability to hold Ministers to account. At the end of the next two sitting weeks, which had been characterised by lengthy points of order debates between the opposition, the Leader of the House, and the Speaker over his rulings, Holly told me: "I think we can probably expect to see more of that opposition posturing through points of order, challenging the rulings of the Speaker, a little bit more disorder coming into the process as a result of the *frustration* that people feel about questions not being answered. So yeah, I think he's doing a terrible job! [Laughs]." By the end of March, the leader of the Labour Party had met with the Speaker, and Green Party Co-leader Russel Norman had written an open letter about the new approach, stating in bold typeface, "The House of Representatives is unable to fulfil its function of holding the Executive to account for their actions – we can't hold the Executive to account if the Speaker does not require Ministers to answer questions" (Young 2013:Paras.10-13; Norman 2013:Para.3).[59] The opposition continued to be frustrated by the new ruling throughout 2013 but, with the Speaker resolute in his approach, they had little choice but to adapt to the new style while continuing to challenge it.

If question time seemed to become less about a straight exchange with the purpose of holding the government to account, it became more about "making a rhetorical point, which the Minister

[59] For his part, Carter viewed his early days as difficult too: "It wasn't an easy transition to go into that Speaker's chair and then spend time trying to get the confidence of the House… then what happened was [the opposition] were testing me, and again if I was opposition I'd do the same to any new Speaker" (Carter 2017, quoted in Smith and Maoate-Cox 2017:Para.31). He also had a more difficult time at the beginning of his tenure because Prime Minister John Key had not consulted the opposition about his nomination as Speaker, which had broken with convention (Smith and Maoate-Cox 2017:Para.29).

ignores, then makes their own rhetorical point," Gareth explained to me. In Gareth's view, question time was less about scrutinising and the exchange of information, as it had been in the past, and more about the ability of MPs and Ministers to make rhetorical political points: to communicate their message. The audience for that message was not the other MPs and Ministers sitting in the House, who could fairly well predict what the other side would be saying and often attempted to avoid entering into exchange on each other's grounds anyway, but the media and public outside the Chamber. MPs and Ministers hoped that what they said during question time would reach the media, commentators, and public.

Question time does present MPs and Ministers with a good opportunity to get their message to a large audience. Question time is high profile: the Press Gallery watches,[60] parliament has its own broadcast channels, a running commentary is produced by Twitter users, film is used on the news, commentators will discern meanings and evaluate significance in op-eds and the weekend political affairs shows, and parties will use what happened in question time as part of their own direct communications. The issues raised, the replies, and the performance of MPs and Ministers shape the public's understanding not only of the issues raised but of the agents and parties themselves as "positive and negative emblems of identity… wrap around each of the competitors as the process moves forward" to the election (Silverstein 2011b:205). It is for that reason Salmond (2007:75) states that question time is "seen by politicians, journalists, and scholars alike as the most important in the permanent election campaign that is waged in Parliament. Thus, the performance of parties in Question Time can be seen as an important indicator of their likely performance in elections." In viewing question time as a key component of electoral success, it becomes so (Silverstein 2011b:205; 2011c:71). Therefore, as is explored further in Chapter Eight, on the one hand question time is about scrutinising the government and holding it to account on the issues, but on the other it is about the opposition's attempts to make messaged statements in their questions and replies that aim to become the dominant understanding of the political field and the issue itself.

Working with the Media

If opposition MPs also want to hold the Government to account in the public sphere and attempt to win support by messaging, then they need to get their statements into the public sphere. One of the main ways they can do that is via the mass media. While political parties in New Zealand have their own avenues for direct communication, they can gain the greatest audience via the news media. To do that, MPs have to work with people in the journalistic field, as Bourdieu (2005:43, 44) characterised it, who are also driven by an "audience ratings mentality" that results in "a permanent competition to appropriate the readership, of course, but also to appropriate what is thought to secure readership, in other words, the earliest access to news, the 'scoop', exclusive information, and also distinctive rarity, 'big names', and so on." In the political field, opposition MPs adapt to the needs of the news media so that they can gain access to coverage, and so that the agenda-setting and framing effects that the media exerts provide a favourable "prism through which the public see" them, their party, and the issues (Wood and Rudd 2004:153; Crewe 2015b:169). Working with

[60] For the first questions, anyway. As the House progresses through the 12 questions and moves to lower-profile issues, MPs, and Ministers, fewer journalists stay to watch. If the Gallery anticipates the government will be under significant pressure, and that there will be an important exchange, more will watch. The Press Gallery sits above the Speaker, with a good vantage point from which they can see and hear all sides of the House.

the media to be able to talk to the public in a way that leads the public's thinking and action orients much of the daily work of opposition MPs.

There are two main drivers identified in the literature that shape the political media environment in New Zealand. The first is the struggle for power between politicians and journalists. Views differ on who has the upper hand, ranging from favouring the gallery journalists who can "exert considerable influence" on politics and a "restraining effect" on politicians in such a small country (Craig 2016:101; Rudd 2016:163), to a "stalemate" (Comrie 2012:126), to favouring the politicians supported by a growing staff responsible for "spinning the government line" (Edwards 2016:57; Edwards 2016:231). Craig (2016:101) writes that the relationship should be understood as more of a "spectrum." The Green Party really could exert very little control over the media. As only one of the three main parties of opposition, there were easy alternatives that the media could go to for the comment they needed for their reports. Therefore, the Greens had to offer something of value to the media like, for example, information that they had uncovered that could be disseminated by the media, or a quick response to requests for comment. Alternatively, they had to be in a position where it would be difficult for the media to cut them out of a story by, for example, leading the opposition response to an issue. The Green Party's media strategies and activities are explored in Chapter Nine.

The second driver is the broader commercialisation of the media. Highly-regarded former Press Gallery journalist Brent Edwards (2016:58) evaluated that New Zealand media were in "crisis" due to new technologies and "gutted" newsrooms with fewer staff who are increasingly facing precarious employment. The result, all the literature judges, has been dire. There has been increasing "tabloidisation" and "opinionated journalism," a "clickbait approach," and an emphasis on "24/7" and "breaking news" (Edwards 2016:55, 62; Rudd 2016:163, 164). In that environment, coverage of political issues and the game "highlights drama, partisanship, negativity, and scandal" (Bahador et al. 2016:201). Nearly everyone agrees that the new style of reporting "poses a risk to democracy" (Edwards 2016:64).

The media landscape in New Zealand has highly concentrated levels of ownership by international standards (Commerce Commission 2017:12). In general, there are five main groups in the media landscape: TVNZ and MediaWorks, who compete for the audience of the 6:00 p.m. news; Fairfax and NZME, who compete for print and digital news readership; and Radio New Zealand (RNZ), who competes with both MediaWorks and NZME for radio listeners. TVNZ and RNZ are both Crown entities, but TVNZ is a self-funding commercial operator (Commerce Commission 2017:20, 21; Comrie and Fountaine 2016:178). Fairfax, NZME, and MediaWorks are all commercial entities.

The primary source of news media for the public is television (Boyd and Bahador 2015:145). TVNZ and MediaWorks both broadcast 6:00 p.m. news bulletins, respectively named *One News* and *3 News* during 2013. The two broadcasters on average command an audience of around 950,000 viewers each night – one fifth of New Zealand's population – although *One News* "consistently" wins the ratings battle "usually by a margin of two to one or more" (Boyd and Bahador 2015:146, 158). The majority of New Zealanders, at least during election campaigns, get information from these major entities (Boyd and Bahador 2015:145). The mass audience that television news shows command means that they are the most coveted by politicians. Typically, the Co-leaders garnered the most television coverage of all Green MPs, mainly because of their status, prominence, and the high profile of the issues on the political agenda that they generally spoke about. That was partly by the

Greens' own design, as they sought to 'bump up' high profile issues from the portfolio spokesperson to the Co-leaders in order to increase public awareness of Metiria Turei and Russel Norman.

The second source of news media for New Zealanders, with around half the audience of television, is newspapers, with their related websites placed third (Boyd and Bahador 2015:145). In New Zealand, both of the largest print media networks – Fairfax and NZME – also run websites that digitise their content.[61] Thus, alongside its largest metropolitan newspapers, Wellington's *Dominion Post* and Christchurch's *The Press*, and its weekly *Sunday Star Times* paper, Fairfax owns and operates digital content provider *stuff.co.nz* (Commerce Commission 2016:no.5). Similarly, NZME, which publishes Auckland's *New Zealand Herald* and *Herald on Sunday,* also owns *nzherald.co.nz* (Commerce Commission 2016:no.6).[62] Fairfax and NZME capture around 90 percent of print newspaper readers and the "overwhelming majority" of digital news consumers (Commerce Commission 2017:12). The print readership of both organisations has been in decline, as people switch to the companies' news websites and social media as supplements to their daily and weekly newspapers or use them as primary news sources (Commerce Commission 2017:21-22). Around 3.7 million New Zealanders visit *stuff.co.nz* and *nzherald.co.nz* monthly, with the effect that Fairfax and NZME have adopted "digital first" strategies whereby the websites are updated first and continuously with only select stories being printed in their newspapers (Commerce Commission 2017:23). Green MPs' statements most frequently appeared in newspaper and web coverage.

Finally, radio placed fourth as a source of news information for New Zealanders, behind television, newspaper, and the internet (Boyd and Bahador 2015:145-146). RNZ's *Morning Report* and evening *Checkpoint* news broadcasts have an important agenda-setting role. RNZ is also responsible for broadcasting Parliament's proceedings over the airwaves (Commerce Commission 2017:21). The two commercial radio stations with a similar focus on news and current affairs are MediaWorks' *RadioLive* and NZME's *NewstalkZB*. All of these radio stations have supplementary websites. I have not been able to find any recent studies which examine the role or impact of radio's political journalism, but it was one of the outlets that non-Co-leader MPs had best access to for their work.

Another important part of New Zealand's media landscape is Māori media. Māori media has a "distinctly Indigenous journalism culture" (Hanusch 2014:958; Rankine et al. 2014:228). Based on Māori *tikanga*[63] and perspectives, Māori news is important for tangata whenua and for Te Tiriti rights (see Hokowhitu and Devada 2013 for a fuller discussion). Alongside *Māori Television*[64] and current affairs shows like *Native Affairs,* there are over twenty iwi radio stations, a number of websites like *e-tangata*, and other news outlets. Māori media did not garner the same attention

[61] Both networks also publish a number of community newspapers, magazines, and additional websites (Commerce Commission 2016:no.s5,6).

[62] Robinson (2012:193) describes the popular understanding that *The Dominion Post,* based in Wellington like Parliament and the central public service, is seen to be directed toward "a more socially liberal, public-sector audience" that favours the Labour Party, while the *New Zealand Herald* is seen to be "inherently biased towards the more right-wing, business-friendly National Party" because its base city, Auckland, "contains the largest number of private sector businesses and wealthy individuals in New Zealand." Her research, based on the 2011 Election campaign period, found that both papers 'favoured' incumbent Prime Minister John Key in their coverage raising "serious questions about the objectivity of print media's visual coverage of New Zealand election campaigns and of the major party leaders" (Robinson 2012:210).

[63] Customary values and practices.

[64] Māori Television is "the first ever state-funded indigenous television network to go free to air in all households" in New Zealand (Hokowhitu and Devada 2013:xvi). As a mass free-to-air channel, "Māori Television shows that news can be and is told differently to mass channels without any sacrifice of accuracy, immediacy or audience interest" (Rankine et al. 2014:228).

from Green Party MPs and staff that mainstream mass media sources did; for example, each weekend, summaries of political affairs television shows, *Q&A* and *The Nation*, were emailed around the organisation so that people knew what had happened, but summaries for Māori Television's equivalent show, *Native Affairs*, were not. Of the MPs I worked with, it was Catherine who worked most frequently with Māori media and current affairs outlets, due to both her commitment to and portfolio work on Te Tiriti o Waitangi.

Figure 4.5: Co-leader Russel Norman Speaking to the Press Gallery on the Bridge

Source: (Green Party 2012)

The most important political journalism group in New Zealand is parliament's Press Gallery (see Figure 4.5). All major news outlets in New Zealand's media landscape and many smaller have journalists in the Press Gallery. It has around 130 accredited members,[65] some of whom have been reporting from parliament for decades (Miller 2015:63, 185). Many political journalists are "household names," well known as characters with humorous, ruthless, measured, or other personality traits (Miller 2015:185). Gallery journalists are the central media prism for reporting and commenting on what happens in politics in New Zealand; because of that, their power to set the agenda and influence the interpretation of events and characters is significant. The Gallery's official "role is to provide specialised coverage and analysis of political and parliamentary news to the public – to look over the shoulders of members of Parliament and those who serve them" (Office of the Speaker 2006:Para.2). They are governed by formal rules set out by the Speaker, and ordered not to "undermine the dignity of Parliament in their work" (Smith 2011:no.4).

Journalists of the Press Gallery see their work as different to regular news coverage because, as RNZ Political Editor Jane Patterson stated to Amelia Langford (2015:Paras.22, 23), "there is a symbiotic relationship between politician and reporter" as they "report on the people [they] have to work with everyday." Journalists rely on politicians for news as much as politicians rely on journalists to disseminate, or not disseminate, information and messages that they want the public to see, read, and hear. In the same way that politicians experienced the rhythms and cycles of parliament, the punctuated peaks and troughs of activity make it an exciting place for Press Gallery journalists too: "You have boring days but you hardly ever have boring weeks and people get addicted to it, to be honest" (Trevett 2015, cited in Langford 2015:Para.19).

Despite the importance of the symbiotic relationship, the Green Party and its MPs did not always have good relationships with the Gallery journalists, the Communications Director explained to me. He did not think that was good because it meant that the Greens had less influence on the stories the Gallery produced:

> What we tried to do was influence as much as possible and I think that was why when I took the job, I really didn't think the fact that we effectively had no relationship with the Press Gallery was tenable…. I sought to go and repair those, or build those relationships directly. And so there was a bunch of things that we did. I would regularly go down [to their offices] for a start and just kind of shoot the breeze; so actually just talk politics, give analysis, do a lot of off-the-record so that people knew you were trustworthy and worthwhile.
>
> We briefed a lot in advance. So, any major announcement, anything we were doing, we'd let people know in advance. Which I think they always respected 'cause it meant they could actually have a think about it before they were just immediately having to file. I think we developed a lot of practices they were appreciative of.

Even if those practices helped to build the ability to influence, real clout with the Gallery came when an MP was able to call a journalist to run a story. The Director said:

[65] Membership in the Gallery provides journalists the key resource of access to politicians, especially with regard to physical proximity. The Press Gallery's offices are located on the parliamentary precinct, meaning that they can easily and quickly meet politicians for comment. Their security cards allow them into many parts of the buildings, more so than MPs who are not granted immediate access to other parties' areas (Office of the Speaker 2006:Paras.3-4). However, journalists are not free to roam as they please, and politicians can avoid 'The Bridge' (see Figure 4.5) gauntlet on their way into the debating chamber by using alternate corridors if they are particularly desperate to avoid giving comment to the press, for example.

> Not everyone can do it but there are certain politicians who have very good relations with the gallery who can just get on the phone and get stories. None of the Greens. Russel, if he'd wanted to, could pick up [the phone] and occasionally I did make him ring people and a lot of journalists would just ring him directly… He would come to me and say, 'Oh, they've got this story. They're wanting comment from us'.
>
> …But the flipside is you actually want to be [in a position] where you can just get on the phone to them. And so [other MPs in Labour]… you just *regularly* see them at Copperfield's.[66] Like, every time you went over, [a prominent Labour MP] would be having coffee with someone from the Gallery. And they really work it. And none of our MPs did that.

But, even though the Communications Director sought to foster relationships, the MPs I worked with were more reluctant. Often when the Director suggested they go and visit Gallery journalists to talk about an event or story, the MPs did not. I only visited the Gallery's offices once during my fieldwork; surprisingly that visit with Kennedy, who – at face value – would be considered the least likely to court the media in that way. The Communications Director did note, too, that in some expert areas, the journalists did turn to the Green Party's spokespeople in preference to other parties' MPs because of their in-depth knowledge about the issues.

MPs are keen for media coverage so that they can present themselves, the party, their issues, and positions to that audience. They consider that part of being a good opposition MP in debating the issues and criticising the Government's agenda in the public sphere, and an essential way to get their messages to a broad public audience. As Chapter Nine explores, opposition attempts to get into the media can have variable outcomes, and making statements for the media requires a good practical sense.

Preparing to Govern

One of the roles that the Green MPs believed they had in opposition was to prepare for being in government. This was reflected in the message of themselves as 'ready' to govern that they wanted to project (Green Party Messaging Guide, emailed to author November 22, 2013:1). Internally, however, the Greens were only in the process of getting ready. During 2013, they had a work programme for thinking through what they would have to change about the Party's operations and priorities if they did win Cabinet positions, and they also focused on obtaining expert knowledge in their portfolio areas to prepare for Ministerial positions.

The Party needed to do preparatory work because they were inexperienced in governing, having never held Ministerial positions before. Holly told me:

> None of us here really, except for [my Executive Assistant] who's worked in a Minister's Office and who will probably be invaluable in [that] situation, really know what happens in the Beehive or have any idea how to most effectively use the official support that you have available to you, and what you can and can't do as Minister, and what to do if you face a

[66] Copperfield's is Parliament's café, open to anyone who works at Parliament.

> department that's resistant to your policy, you know? All of which we'll have to grapple with. But we're inexperienced; we don't know how to do that… So, it will be really different, I think, for… a Minister, a theoretical Green Minister who will suddenly have access to this whole structure and process that Ministers have: the officials, the whole department's doing your beck and call, you know? Which is a very nuanced and political process in itself, and which we have *never* seen.

The work programme was secret, but Holly explained to me that it entailed the Green MPs thinking about what they would do and when they would do it if they were in government: how they would adapt their Caucus processes like consensus decision-making, what the role of backbench MPs would be, and much more.

As well as Caucus as a whole preparing for government, MPs also prepared themselves. For example, planning was a key part of the task Kennedy set himself as an opposition MP. It sat alongside his role in accumulating knowledge. Over a rushed coffee before we went to select committee for the morning, Kennedy and I talked about his purpose as an MP. He said that though people often saw him as a "policy wonk," he saw his role as an opposition MP to "work like a dog" to accumulate as much knowledge as possible by doing as much research as possible. That way, he continued, 'if one did find themselves with more power, then they were ready to work with it'. In our interview, he expanded on his perspective:

> But, for me, that retrenching [during low energy and quieter political cycles] is very much, you're still acquiring knowledge and doing research to get knowledge so that when the time comes you can be more effective. And there's a hell of a lot of opportunism – that's the wrong word. *Chance.* And opportunity and judgement to know when the timing of something is, you know?
>
> Actually, I was saying at the retreat, I was very conscious of Simon Power's valedictory comments: 'Use your time in opposition to get your act together'. And even in terms of legislative ideas, so that if and when the time comes and you're in power, you can hit the ground running and you don't spend your first six months trying to dredge up stuff; you've got it there in opposition.

Therefore, a large proportion of Kennedy's work centred on preparing for government so that he could move swiftly to implementing his policy agenda when the time came rather than having to do background research, thinking, and drafting when in Cabinet.

Gareth felt similarly to Kennedy, characterising opposition as a "double-edged sword" that both gave him space to prepare for government, but frustrating in that he could not do actually make anything he had prepared real:

> It is frustrating when you see bad or dumb stuff happening that you could have stopped in a different position. I am finding it frustrating in the sense that it's *dragging on and on and on…* But also, it's incredibly liberating because you've got time to think, to talk to people. When you're a Minister it's very difficult, I believe, to have open, genuine conversations with people. But I've got that space [in opposition] to really research issues and get my head around it. And you'll want to have a plan when you get there and this is a great time to develop that.

Thus, a key role of opposition for the Greens was preparing the Party's operations, plans, and the MPs' portfolio expertise for government. But that was an internal focus and, in the case of work on their legislative agenda, for example, was largely secret. Therefore, although it was a necessary component of opposition if they wanted to be able to take immediate action once they had Ministerial positions, because that preparation was only internal it did not directly build the public support the party needed.

The Difficulty of Being Positive While in Opposition

To win that support, part of the way the Green Party sought to message themselves in 2013 was as "positive." Creating positive emotions about the party, its MPs, and its policies was a key component of messaging, prescribed by Westen (2007). The Green Party wanted to create positivity by showing that they 'proposed and supported ideas that worked' and 'had achieved change working with both Labour and National parties' (Green Party Messaging Guide, emailed to author November 22, 2013:1). In their daily work, positivity meant not being too negative and identifying the Green Party's solution to what they were attacking the Government about. However, in practice, the Greens found it difficult to balance the role of opposition in scrutinising and criticising the Government with being positive.

Speaking with me in 2015, the Communications Director explained the importance of positivity in creating the appeal the Greens needed to win support and votes:

> The main thing is that the research shows that [positivity is] what people respond to. I think when you've got a really popular Government, an opposition that's just kind of nagging at them tends to reinforce [peoples' positions]. And one of the interesting things we got told after the [2014] Election was that… actually that whole 'Moment of Truth',[67] which was obviously a really big negative attack on the Government, was actually quite a polarising thing and National's support went up around it… So where there are kind of those flash points of conflict with the Government, what it tends to do is actually galvanise the Government's supporters. So it's not necessarily a way to bring them over [to us]… We knew that for the Election, we would have to pivot and that people, in order to peel off National, needed to see something in us that was alluring.

The Greens knew from the 2011 Election that positivity was important for their success in the Party vote, but it was difficult to be positive outside the campaign period. The Communications Director continued:

> We did really well in that Election and I think there was a view that that approach was successful. But, certainly, our actions didn't fit it [in the 2011-2014 Parliamentary term] because we also said we were stepping up to be the opposition. And if you're stepping up

[67] The 'Moment of Truth' was a highly-publicised and much-anticipated public event and livestream five days before the 2014 Election. It was organised by the Internet Mana party and fronted by Kim Dotcom and Party Leader Laila Harré. It "promised revelations about New Zealand's participation in the 'Five Eyes' Alliance, and evidence that the Prime Minister had been lying about the extent to which New Zealanders were subject to mass surveillance" (McMillan 2015:220). It featured appearances by Glen Greenwald, Edward Snowden, and Julian Assange. However, the information presented was both "sensational and bewilderingly complicated" and did not present "conclusive evidence" (McMillan 2015:221, 222). The Moment of Truth "consumed considerable media attention in the last three days of the campaign" and became one of 2014's defining events (McMillan 2015:223).

> to be the opposition, it's almost impossible to do that and be as positive as people said they wanted to be.

Stepping up to be the opposition in 2013 meant that the Greens were 'constantly challenged' in finding the balance between fulfilling the traditional role of scrutinising and criticising the Government and being positive in order to appeal to more voters. The Communications Director reflected on the difficulty of that:

> That was always a constant challenge for us, 'cause of course the thing that makes a story is conflict. And when you're in opposition, you're more often than not responding [to the Government's agenda]. And so assuming you don't agree with the Government, then that kind of thing comes across as negative. And so [laughing] I remember Russel actually once saying to me: 'Do you ever write anything positive!?' And I was like [deflatedly] 'I try'. But it was a constant challenge… a lot of our reactive stuff to the Government was negative and so we needed to create our own events and policy ideas that were more positive and future-focussed.

Thus, MPs and staff at the Greens faced a tension between their traditional opposition role and the positive messaging strategy they wanted to pursue to get into government.

The concern for balance was reflected throughout the year in the *Advisory & Comms Reports for Caucus*. It was the focus of one of the November reports (emailed to author November 05, 2013:1) which included the recommendation that the Greens "Ensure we put up positive alternatives when we make comments opposing or criticising the Government." The author argued that:

> One of several things we can do to combat attacks that we are negative naysayers is to always put up a positive alternative. That means being ready with facts of alternative investment/priorities for projects and examples of better ways to spend the money. We also need to think a bit more before we jump in to oppose something – we do not have to be in every story (Advisory & Comms Report for Caucus, emailed to author November 05, 2013:1).

The next *Report* reinforced that approach by praising an example of a positive story that had worked well for the Party in the public sphere: "During Saturday on Radio New Zealand was coverage of Catherine's bill to protect homeowners from mining under their properties. This was a nice example of a rational, positive Green solution to help people. It's just another illustration of the value of our MPs generating and putting out positive solutions. Let's keep it up" (Advisory & Comms Report for Caucus, emailed to author November 12, 2013:1). But, that was one of the only examples of positivity directly mentioned in the reports.

Time and time again, the Greens reflected on whether they were getting the balance between opposition and positivity right. Particularly at the start of the 2013, when the polls were not moving in the way they wanted, they wrote:

> At this stage and with all the problems National [has] I think we all would have hoped that their support would be ebbing away. The challenge for us is how do we increase our support, and undermine National's brand. It raises some interesting questions – have we got the mix of positive vs negative right? Why is John Key popular, and what can we do

> about it? Is our priority on changing the government or expanding support? (Advisory & Comms Report for Caucus, emailed to author March 26, 2013:1).

And:

> This [drop in our support] could be true or our support could be stagnant, regardless the challenge remains the same – how do we increase our support, and move support away from National to ensure a centre-left Government. Our focus so far this term has been a reasonably negative attack approach of the Government, and despite a long list of negative coverage – ACC, asset sales, GCSB, Sky City, EQC privacy breaches, and war with North Korea – there has been little impact on National's support. So it is worth considering whether now is the right time to move back to a more positive approach which emphasises that we are a constructive, solution-focused party that is committed to making the world a better place (Advisory & Comms Report for Caucus, emailed to author April 09, 2013:1).

Being a 'constructive, solution-focused Party that is committed to making the world a better place' was how the Green Party wanted to be seen; but in their daily practices, where their position as a party of opposition entailed internally preparing for government and publicly being overwhelmingly against the Government's agenda, it was difficult to balance the fulfilment the traditional role of their position with the need to appeal to voters and shift their support to the Greens.

Conclusion

Parliament provides the complex daily structure for the work of MPs. That structure is defined by highly codified and formalized traditions that inculcate a sense of their own permanence in MPs. That permanence provides MPs with the ideal model of what they should be doing as they 'carve out' their role in the parliament (McGee 1994:2). For opposition MPs, that ideal is centred on traditional tasks of scrutinizing, legislating, and advocating for their alternatives. Not only is that what opposition MPs think they ought to do, but the structures and processes of parliament are centred on reproducing and enabling them to do those activities. The parliamentary calendar, for example, sets time for the House to be in session to conduct its business; legislating allocates time in the debate for the parties of opposition to speak to the government's bills; question time delineates a process by which Ministers ought to answer to the scrutiny of the House. MPs in opposition take this work seriously, and it structures their daily work.

Parliament is also a site of dynamic adaptability. That is because structures must be made and remade by everyday practice and, as McGee (1994:2) highlights, MPs have also, over time, taken initiative and new responsibilities when 'carving out' their role. MPs interact with the structures of parliament: adapting them, altering them, reinforcing them, and responding to them as they engage in political contest. MPs also bring new ways of thinking into the traditional parliamentary system (Rhodes 2011:281). This thesis is about the way that the newer logic of messaging interacts with the older traditions of opposition as MPs work out how to win Ministerial positions and public belief. In this chapter, it is possible to see the ways that both messaging and traditional opposition are intertwined in the creation of Green MPs' speech, particularly in way that question time has been co-opted to become a forum for disseminating messages to the media and public, and the imperfect way that the scrutineering activity of opposition conflicts with the belief that positivity is

needed to win the support of the public. As Rhodes (2011:284) found with the Ministers he studied in the British Government, introducing new ways of thinking into traditional systems can create contradictory demands on politicians that they must constantly "manage."

The end of this chapter marks a break in this thesis, between the Chapters outlining the three drivers that preconstrain Green MP communication and the remaining chapters which ethnographically show the shape they give to MPs' speech across legislating, message discipline, messaging issues, questions for oral answer, and gaining media coverage. Chapter Two argued that the field of political communication shaped the way Green MPs thought about and practiced making statements, so that they prioritized making messaged statements that framed the issues; were values-based, emotional, and positive; avoided technical, detailed, and jargon-based policy discussions; and were repeated universally over and over again. Chapter Three outlined the personal dispositions of Holly, Gareth, Kennedy, and Catherine, providing biographies to contextualize how their individual views and approaches shaped their practical work and speech as MPs. Finally, this chapter has detailed some of the complexity of the structure of parliament and the way that MPs work within it, highlighting the tradition of opposition that shapes what the Green MPs do in their everyday work and pointing to some of the ways that tradition has meshed with the introduction of messaging. Navigating these drivers is strategically and practically complex, meaning that making the right statement for the situation requires MPs to have a good practical sense.

Chapter Five

Strategic Reproduction of the Field: Parliament's Regulated Consensus and Passing the Plumbers Bill

Highlight of my political career (Holly on the Plumbers Bill, 2016)

In the previous chapter, I outlined what parliamentary work is for opposition MPs; this chapter builds on that discussion but extends the analysis to understanding one way that the parliamentary field shapes the statements and actions of MPs across the House. The purpose of this chapter is to explore MPs' tendency toward reproducing the traditional structure of parliament in statement and practice. Reproducing the parliament means reproducing it as a site of "regulated consensus" (Bourdieu 2014:355). Bourdieu (2014:355) argued that:

> Parliament is the site of an organized consensus, or rather, the site of a regulated dissension… It is a site where struggles between groups, interest groups, classes if you like, are waged according to the rules of the game, meaning that all conflicts outside these struggles have something semi-criminal about them… Parliament is indeed this site of regulated consensus, or dissension within certain limits, which may rule out both object of dissension and perhaps above all ways of expressing dissension. People who lack the right way of expressing dissension are excluded from legitimate political life.

The tendency[68] toward reproducing a field is not unique to actors in the political field but it takes on extra significance in politics because, since politicians hold the "monopoly of the elaboration and diffusion of the legitimate principle of di-vision of the social world," the "production of ideas about the social world is in fact subordinated to" the reproduction of the parliament itself (Bourdieu 1991:181). The effect is that the "production of politically effective and legitimate forms of perception and expression… is subjected to" the tendency toward reproduction of the parliament (Bourdieu 1991:173).

[68] I have been quite careful to characterise the disposition toward reproduction as a 'tendency' here. That is for two main reasons. First, social structures are not deterministic or totalising: while people are "constrained by the forces inscribed in these fields and being determined by these forces as regards their permanent dispositions, they are able to act upon these fields, in ways that are partially preconstrained, but within a margin of freedom" (Bourdieu 2005:30). MPs do have an ability to act and speak in ways that do not reproduce the Parliament. Second, New Zealand's Parliament was established during the colonisation of indigenous tangata whenua Māori (see Orange 2011). Māori, in Te Tiriti o Waitangi, enabled the British Crown to establish a system of government for its subjects in Aotearoa, but New Zealand's parliament has effectively established rule over all people, including Māori. The often-violent destruction of Māori political systems has meant that parliament now holds a monopoly on the exercise of governmental power in New Zealand, but it does not mean that rule is uncontested. I draw attention to this because, unlike the French National Assembly that Bourdieu grounded his analysis in, the colonisation that enabled New Zealand's parliament to be formed as it is today means that it is not taken-for-granted, unquestioned, or naturalised in a way that produces "deeper than all beliefs" (Bourdieu 1998:81; Bourdieu 1977a:164). Rather, the legitimacy and structure of New Zealand's parliament has been constantly challenged, and its role for and relationship to Māori remains a fraught issue today. MPs, by fact of participating in the parliamentary system, do tacitly accept and participate in that system of domination, but recognition of its ongoing colonial history also allows MPs to make statements that challenge not only the parliament's actions but also the parliament itself.

Through a case study of the passage of the Plumbers, Gasfitters, and Drainlayers Bill 2013, this chapter shows how Holly worked to reproduce the parliament as a site of regulated consensus, particularly with regard to the ability of interest groups to express their views in select committee submissions. In response to the Minister's decision to curtail the public's ability to submit, Holly repeatedly called for the traditional select committee process to be followed in order to allow for submissions. She did that not only because she believed in that process but because reproducing the parliament was the strategic move.

Reproducing the procedures of the House was especially strategic for Green Party MPs, who had historically been seen as too outsider and activist to be trustworthy political players. That meant their opponents had relative ease in messaging them as too irresponsible and inexperienced to hold positions of power in a government. As part of countering that message, the Green Party's work in the House was linked to their 'ready to govern' messaging: in order to win more support from the public, the Greens believed they had to show that they were credible and competent players in the political field who could be seriously considered for government by the public. That was reflected in their *House Strategy* of 2013 (provided to author, 2013). The opening lines of that document stated: "Our performance and presence in the House is important as it helps demonstrate that we are a credible and competent political party. One of our aims from the caucus plan is to appear (and be!) ready for government. Being competent is a key way for us to achieve this." To that aim, the section on techniques in the House, for example, specified their objectives as:

- Signal to other parties, media and beltway that Greens are a professional, competent political party.
- Act creatively and develop tactics for the House that maximise political and media opportunities.
- Demonstrate that we are ready for government.

Likewise, the section on 'honest politics' specified their objectives as:

- Demonstrate our commitment to clean, green, honest politics, which is a key strength of our image.
- Encourage better conduct from all MPs in the House and strengthen our honest politics image.
- Move our system in the direction of a more constructive, transparent, representative, and participatory democracy.

The document also listed specific practices that the MPs should undertake to appear credible and competent, such as improving their knowledge of the Standing Orders, proactively seeking opportunities for urgent debates, and not blocking leave to table documents. For the Greens, appearing and being competent, professional, and honest in the House by adhering to and strengthening New Zealand's parliamentary procedures was a key strategy for building the credibility they needed to say to the public that they were ready to govern.

Being and appearing to be credible and competent in the House is also a way in which MPs can gain political capital. Political capital is derived from having the "specific qualifications which are the condition of the acquisition and conversion of a 'good reputation'" (Bourdieu 1991:194). A good reputation in parliament can be gained by adhering to and showing skill in mastering parliamentary

procedure and adaptation. The fact that political capital can be gained by developing a reputation for reproducing those procedures creates an extra tendency toward reproduction among MPs as they seek to become well-regarded by their peers and the public as credible, serious, and trustworthy political players.

Holly's actions and statements, acting within the structures of parliament, reproduced the parliament itself. Particularly in her speeches, which highlighted the negative effects that the Government's actions would have on the ability of the House to undertake its traditional work, Holly was able to position and represent the Greens as credible, competent, and trustworthy politicians who would not only adhere to the regulated consensus, but sought to uphold the very process that enabled it to exist. Therefore, in the case of the Plumbers, Gasfitters and Drainlayers Bill 2013, it was strategic for her and the Green Party to reproduce the parliament.

The Plumbers, Gasfitters and Drainlayers Amendment Bill 2013

As described in the previous chapter, there are six stages for passing bills through the House of Representatives: introduction, first reading, select committee consideration, second reading, committee of the whole House consideration, and third reading (McGee 2005:341). The Plumbers Bill passed through all those stages to receive the Royal assent on September 13, 2013 (see Table 5.1). However, procedural accounts of passing bills in the House do not capture the messiness, indeterminacy, and uncertainty that can occur. The case study in this chapter provides a deeper view of what happened when the Plumbers Bill proceeded through the House.

Surprisingly to both Holly and I, the innocuously-named Plumbers, Gasfitters and Drainlayers Amendment Bill 2013 ('Plumbers Bill' for short) turned out to be enthralling. It was procedurally interesting as the Government sought to circumvent parliament's usual process to pass it quickly. It was also representationally interesting, as Holly's opposition to the Government's actions gained her support from many in the plumbing industry, a constituency she had never expected to speak for in parliament. Holly explained in her speech on the amendment bill's second reading that:

> I never imagined when I entered Parliament that I would be so engaged by an amendment bill dealing with the regulation of the plumbing, gasfitting, and drainlaying industry. But I guess that is one of the strange and wonderful things about this place: you never know what direction you will be taken in. This bill… has in fact been one of the more complex, more controversial, more challenging and constitutionally interesting bills that I have worked on so far in my time in Parliament. It is certainly the first time I have experienced a hung select committee. So it has been a very interesting experience indeed (16 April 2013 689 NZPD 9410).

In opposition to the Government's actions as it sought to pass this bill quickly, Holly repeatedly made statements that sought to uphold parliament's usual legislative procedures, especially regarding the select committee process. Holly's statements also earned her some political capital as she represented the interests of a new, mobilised group of tradespeople who wanted to make submissions on the bill.

There was a material issue that the Plumbers Bill addressed. The Plumbers, Gasfitters, and Drainlayers Act 1976 had established the Plumbers, Gasfitters, and Drainlayers Board to oversee the industry. The Board had been "continued in existence" in the Plumbers, Gasfitters, and Drainlayers Act 2006, which was passed under a Labour Government. The Board was given the power to discipline licensed plumbers and prosecute unlicensed tradesmen for carrying out work which they were not qualified to do. To do that, the Board collected a disciplinary levy from licensed industry members to carry out disciplinary actions; it also funded the prosecution of unlicensed tradesmen from that pool of levy funds. The problem was that the Act of 2006 (Commentary) "did not specifically allow the board to impose a levy for the prosecution of such people working illegally," as the 2013 amendment bill's introductory statements read. That was widely regarded to be an oversight error that did not reflect Parliament's intention when they passed the 2006 Act.

A group of plumbers decided to mount a challenge to the Board for using their disciplinary fees for illegitimate purposes, in part because they did not think their fees should be used to prosecute unlicensed plumbers and, in another part, because they considered that the Board was undertaking other "dodgy" actions at the time and it was one avenue they could pursue against it, Holly explained.[69] She told me: "Plumbers became upset and irate about the Board and its decision and one way to challenge the Board was to challenge the legality of the fee they were paying." Complaints were made to both the Ombudsman and parliament's Regulations Review Committee. In 2011, the Regulations Review Committee concluded that the Board was not enabled to use the levy to prosecute unlicensed tradespeople. In response, the Board changed the 'disciplinary levy' it had been collecting to an 'offences fee' in order to bring them within the law. But, again, plumbers were unhappy with both the Board and its use of the offences fee, so they challenged by complaining to the Regulations Review Committee for a second time.

The 2013 legislation was initiated because a ruling from the Regulations Review Committee on the plumbers' second challenge was imminent and was expected to find that the use of the offences fee was also illegal. If that ruling was made it would mean that the Board would be unable to collect funds to prosecute unlicensed tradesmen in the future and would need pay back the money it had illegally collected since 2006. The Board said that would leave it bankrupt. With the Regulations Review Committee's ruling imminent, the Minister for Building and Construction, Hon Maurice Williamson, sought to quickly introduce and pass an amendment bill that would retrospectively validate the money the Board had collected since 2006 and fix the mistake in the 2006 Act, allowing the Board to use future funds for prosecuting unlicensed plumbers, gasfitters, and drainlayers. The deadline MPs were given to pass the bill was April 01, 2013. They were warned that if the bill was not passed by that date, the fees would likely be ruled illegal, the Board would be bankrupt, and unlicensed 'cowboy' tradesmen would be free to carry out dangerous work that could result in public harm without being prosecuted.

[69] The Board was the subject of an inquiry by the Auditor-General in 2008-2009 at the request of the Minister responsible at the time due to the high level of complaints from tradespeople about it. The 130-page Inquiry Report found "problems in most functions," including "unclear or non-existent policies, poor communication, poor processes, decisions and policies that were not clearly well-grounded in the legislation, and little awareness of the need to embed basic administrative law disciplines into the Board's everyday work and decision-making" (Controller and Auditor-General 2010:6). A Follow-up Report in late-2013 found that the Board had "addressed" the Auditor-General's recommendations from the 2010 Report and had "moved... onto a more sure administrative and legal footing" (Controller and Auditor-General 2014:3). No further recommendations were made (Controller and Auditor-General 2014:4).

Table 5.1: Timeline of the Progression of the Plumbers Bill

Date	Events
March 11, 2013	The Green Party is first approached by the Minister about supporting a possible bill and its speedy passage through the House. Holly requests a longer select committee process, and an advisor recommends the Party support the bill.
March 12, 2013	Greens receive a copy of the drafted bill and agree a second time to support it. Holly writes to the Minister indicating that the two-week select committee process should be lengthened.
March 14, 2013	Holly discovers the Minister intends to halve the indicated select committee timeframe to a one-week process. She uses Caucus' urgent decision-making process to change the Party's position to oppose the bill in time for its first reading that afternoon. The bill passes its first reading with 97 Ayes to 23 Noes. The Green Party votes Noe.
March 15, 2013	The Ombudsman releases his opinion that the disciplinary levy collected by the Board is unlawful and recommends validation of the fees and a partial refund of the funds collected.
March 19, 2013	The select committee is given a two-week extension to report back on the bill.
March 20, 2013	The Government Administration Committee begins consideration of the Plumbers Bill, hearing advice from the Ministry of Business, Innovation, & Employment, the Board, and two industry bodies. Written correspondence from three interested groups and 23 individuals was also received.
March 22, 2013	Holly completes the Green Party's draft minority view on the bill.
March 27, 2013	The select committee meets again to consider the bill, with Mojo Mathers replacing Holly as the Green Party MP.
April 01, 2013	The Deadline that MPs were initially given by the Minister to pass the bill.
April 04, 2013	The Government Administration Committee reports back to the House, stating that "The committee is unable to agree on whether the bill should be passed."
April 11, 2013	Second reading of the bill begins.
April 16, 2013	Second reading of the bill continues. The bill passes with 61 Ayes to 60 Noes. The Green Party votes Noe.
May 12, 2013	My fieldwork period with Holly ends.
July 04, 2013	Committee stages on the bill begin with the House under urgency. The Committee of the Whole House reports the bill to the House without amendment on July 02, 2013, during the urgency motion.
July 11, 2013	The debate on the bill's third reading beings.
September 05, 2013	The Plumbers Bill passes its third reading with 63 Ayes to 54 Noes. The Green Party votes Noe.
September 13, 2013	The Bill is given the Royal Assent and becomes an Act of Parliament.

The Green Party's Position and the First Reading

Minister Williamson contacted the Green Party about the Plumbers Bill before it had been drafted, which was occasional practice when the Government wanted to urgently pass legislation. Williamson asked the Party to support the bill being written and swiftly progressed through the House. One of the first things the Greens needed to do in response was decide whether to support

or oppose the bill. The *Caucus Legislation Action Sheet* (CLAS), a document written by advisors which contains the Party's information, advice, and recommendations for each specific bill, recommended that Caucus support the Minister's proposal. The CLAS for the Plumbers Bill was written by an advisor with no expertise in the industries affected by it. They were assigned the task of writing the advice because they happened to be the person in the office when Williamson's request reached the Media and Advisory Unit late in the evening. Unaware of the history of the issue, the advisor wrote in the CLAS that "the levy itself is non-controversial." He judged: "The only concern here might be the shortened process; however, there are clear time constraints in force which can justify this requirement." On that advice, the Green Party indicated to Minister Williamson that they would tentatively support the bill, but wanted a longer select committee period than the two weeks the Minister had indicated he would move for.

The next day, after the Greens had received a copy of drafted bill, the CLAS again recommended the Party support it:

> Our recommendation remains to support. Having reviewed the bill, it does have retrospective application which has been an issue for us with other bills. On the flipside if it didn't apply to fees charged in the past the Board (or Government) would have a serious hole in its accounts.
>
> We have also flagged to [Minister] Williamson that we are not comfortable with such a shortened select committee process, but have received no further word from him (Green Party Caucus Legislation Action Sheet, provided to author, 2016:1).

Thus, the Green Party opted to support the legislation and its retrospective application at the outset, seeking to extend the period the bill had at select committee for submissions and scrutiny while justifying the bill's retrospectivity on account of the Board's financial position.

It was the Green Party's discomfort with Minister Williamson's proposed select committee process that caused the Party to change its vote from supporting the passage of the Plumbers Bill to opposing it. The Green Party urgently changed its position on the bill the morning before it was to have its first reading in the House because Holly found out that the Minister intended to halve the two-week period he initially said the Bill would have at select committee before reporting back to the House. The typical timeframe for bills to be scrutinised by select committees is six months, so one week would have been a drastic curtailing of that time. The Greens were expecting a large number of submissions on the bill because it affected so many people, and Holly considered one week far too short a time for working people to have time to consider, write, and speak to a submission. It was also too short for the MPs on the committee to carry out their proper role in considering those submissions and scrutinising the bill, Holly thought.

Holly used her speech during the bill's first reading to criticise the process the Government was using to progress the bill and its retrospective application, which the Greens believed was poor parliamentary procedure and practice (see Appendix C for the Hansard copy of Holly's speech). Holly stated in the debate:

> When we were first approached by the Minister for Building and Construction, Maurice Williamson, about this Plumbers, Gasfitters, and Drainlayers Amendment Bill, the Green Party was prepared to indicate our tentative support for the changes that it made.

> However, we did have substantial concerns about the process, including the constrained period of time for the select committee to consider the bill, and at this point we have to say that those concerns remain and are so substantial that we are unable to support the bill at this time (14 March 2013 688 NZPD 8563).

Further into her seven-minute speech (see Figure 5.1), Holly spoke in more detail about the role of select committees in scrutinising retrospectively-applied legislation, stating:

> I think all members of this House would agree—at least, I certainly hope they would—that legislation with retrospective application should be approached very carefully indeed and with meticulous precision and scrutiny. The Green Party has serious concerns about the process and time frames proposed for this bill, to allow that level of scrutiny to occur. We know that the bill has had to be drafted quite quickly, and although that is no criticism of the drafters, simply a statement of fact, when legislation is drafted very quickly it can often contain errors or omissions. These are picked up, ideally, by the scrutiny applied at the select committee hearing. However, in this case that hardly seems likely, given that the time frame proposed for the select committee to consider this bill is just one week… But for now, suffice it to say that, especially because of its retrospective nature, this bill requires very close scrutiny and it will not get that from a one-week select committee process (14 March 2013 688 NZPD 8563).

Figure 5.1: Holly Speaks on the First Reading of the Plumbers Bill

Source: (Inthehouse.co.nz 2013a:01:40)

Holly returned to the Green Party's concerns with the process in her concluding remarks, stating that the Party did not support the bill because of the process being used to pass it:

> Retrospective legislation should not be entered into lightly. It should be very rare, and when it occurs it should be meticulously drafted and scrutinised. In our view the bill at the moment does not meet this test. The one-week select committee time frame proposed would not allow for the appropriate level of scrutiny for a retrospective piece of legislation and the Green Party therefore cannot support it (14 March 2013 688 NZPD 8563).

Holly's first reading speech, then, argued to retain the standard select committee process so that the House could fulfil its role in scrutinising the legislation text, doing what Abélès (2008:32; 2006:19) called "exegetic activity."

Holly also spoke on the Minister's move for the select committee to report on the bill in one week (see Appendix D). The Minister stated that:

> The shortened select committee report-back period is essential, as the new licensing year commences on 1 April and practitioners are already making licensing payments to the Plumbers, Gasfitters and Drainlayers Board. This legislation will provide practitioners and the board with certainty. May I say that if the Regulations Review Committee does actually disallow the old fees and payments, it could be that the Board would find itself completely insolvent, and there would be no regulatory body controlling the industry. That is why there is a shortened period (14 March 2013 688 NZPD 8563).

Holly countered by reiterating the Green Party's concern about the curtailed select committee, saying that based on her past experience with a bill that had had a three-week select committee process, she could not "imagine how" proper scrutiny could be achieved in one week: It would be "impossible" (14 March 2013 688 NZPD 8563). Holly also noted that it did not leave enough time for those interested in the bill to "prepare, submit, and present" it to the committee (14 March 2013 688 NZPD 8563). However, even though the Greens debated against the bill, most parties in the House supported its first reading so that it was read with 97 Ayes to 23 Noes.[70] Therefore, following the Minister's motion, the bill moved to the select committee stage on March 22, 2013 with just one week to report back to the House (14 March 2013 688 NZPD 8563).

The controversy over the Bill became a national, if relatively minor, story which gained Holly media coverage. However, while we joked that she had seemingly become an unlikely hero for many in the industry as a result of her opposition to the shortened select committee process and the Party's vote against the bill, some of the coverage about the Green Party's position was more ambiguous. On the *New Zealand Herald's* website, her smiling photo appeared prominently under the headline *Fast-Track Plumber Bill Draws Fire* (see Figure 5.2). However, while the image made it appear that Holly was leading opposition to the bill, the paragraph where she featured stated instead the Party's position of supporting the Minister's solution to the issue outlined in the bill due to the Board's financial position: "Green MP Holly Walker said there was a risk that if the offences fee was disallowed, the Board would be forced to refund the money it had collected, leaving it in a 'financially unviable position'" (Bennett 2013:Para.12). It was Labour Party MP Raymond Huo who was quoted regarding process issues, with the article reading:

> Labour's Raymond Huo attacked Mr Williamson's use of retrospective legislation, noting allegations that it was being used to protect the board from legal action and prevent the industry from recovering money illegally taken from it.
>
> "This bill is nothing more than a cynical exercise by the Minister ... to cover his mistakes of the past."

[70] The National, Labour, Māori, ACT, and United Future parties all voted Aye. The Green, New Zealand First, and Mana parties as well as independent MP Brendan Horan voted Noe (14 March 2013 688 NZPD 8563).

> Labour will support the bill to select committee to give interested parties the chance to have their say (Bennett 2013:Paras.13-15).

Labour, rather than the Green Party, provided the main opposition comment on the bill. Nonetheless, Holly was pleased to gain prominent media coverage, including the photograph attached to the story, on one of the country's most-visited news websites.

Figure 5.2: Holly Featuring on New Zealand Herald's Website on the Plumbers Bill

Fast-track plumber bill draws fire

5:30 AM Monday Mar 18, 2013

Building & Construction | House Building | NZ Government

45 0 0

The Government is under fire for fast-tracking legislation which retrospectively legalises the unlawful collection of thousands of dollars in fees from plumbers and gasfitters which was used to chase "cowboys" out of the industry.

But it argues the legislation is necessary. Otherwise industry regulator the Plumbers, Gasfitters and Drainlayers Board would face financial ruin, leaving consumers at the mercy of unregistered and unscrupulous operators.

Green MP Holly Walker said there was a risk that if the offences fee was disallowed. Photo / APNZ

Source: (Bennett 2013)

Adding to the pressure on the Minister to pass the Government's bill, the Ombudsman released his finding that the levy and fee were illegal and should be partially refunded the day after the bill's first reading (McGee 2013:6, 8). The report added weight to the grievances that plumbers felt against the Board, confirming for them that it was being unjust and dishonest. Minister Williamson, however, "dismissed Mr McGee's recommendation" (Bennett 2013:Para.6). Bennett (2013:Para.7) quoted the Minister as saying: "I think the Ombudsman's Office is wrong. The board would be technically insolvent if they had to pay this money back." The Ombudsman's opinion added to the sense of urgency to resolve the situation. Given the expectation that the Regulations Review Committee would make a similar finding soon, the Board's ability to prosecute unlicensed tradesmen was becoming increasingly precarious. MPs needed a solution.

The Bill at Government Administration Select Committee

With their one-week deadline to report back to the House, the Government Administration Select Committee first met to consider the Plumbers Bill on March 20, 2013. I was able to attend the meeting with Holly to see what happened and watch her work with the other MPs. As it was a closed session, I agreed with the MPs on the committee that I would keep its proceedings confidential. However, with the bill's passing, more of the information is in the public domain and published on parliament's website.[71] I also talked to and interviewed Holly about what happened.

At that first meeting, members heard advice from officials of the Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment as well as submissions from the Board and two industry trade organisations – the Master Plumbers, Gasfitters & Drainlayers, and the Plumbers, Gasfitters and Drainlayers Federation NZ. The Board supported the legislation, saying that Parliament's intent in the 2006 Act was that it be able to collect funds to prosecute unlicensed tradespeople and that it was currently in a "position where it [was] required by statue to carry out a prosecutions function but may not be able to gather money to do so" (Pederson 2013:2.1, 4.1, 5.1). That put "at risk an important tool in the Act's scheme for protecting public health and safety" (Pederson 2013:2.1). The two industry representative bodies, however, took a wider approach in considering the Board's performance and how the industry was governed. Master Plumbers, Gasfitters, and Drainlayers (2013:1) stated that they preferred the Board's funding for prosecutions to be changed from a "practitioner based levy to an external funding mechanism," expressing disappointment that that option was not being considered. It also called for transparency in how the fees were used, that they be used solely to fund prosecutions, and that their amount be assessed (Master Plumbers, Gasfitters, and Drainlayers 2013:1). The most oppositional organisation was the Plumbers, Gasfitters and Drainlayers Federation NZ, who had led many of the legal complaints against the Board. They opposed the bill's proposals until there had been proper industry consultation, stating that they would like registered tradespeople to be exempted from paying the Board while a select committee inquiry was held to examine the Board's operations (Plumbers Gasfitters and Drainlayers Federation NZ 2013:9, 66). Their wide-ranging submission was especially damning of the Minister. For example, it stated that the Minister's comments on the precarious financial position of the Board were a "scare tactic by a desperate person" and that they believed "the Bill is nothing more than an attempt by the Minister of Building and Housing to cover the incompetence of the… Board, his own actions, and those of his advisors" (Plumbers Gasfitters and Drainlayers Federation NZ 2013:45, 11). Hearing the select committee submissions, Holly and I learnt the depth of grievance, frustration, and anger many people within the industry felt toward the Board and its activities.

Holly and I talked about the meeting as we walked back through the halls of parliament and the Beehive to her office. The first thing Holly reflected on was how longstanding members of the committee treated her differently because she was a new MP. The other committee members had significant tenures, and some had previously been Ministers.[72] In 2013, two had been in Parliament for eight years each. But, even that was a relatively short time compared to the 20, 27, and 35 years the other three committee members had been in Parliament. Minister Williamson himself, as of

[71] See: https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/bills-and-laws/bills-proposed-laws/document/00DBHOH_BILL12038_1/plumbers-gasfitters-and-drainlayers-amendment-bill

[72] The MPs on the Government Administration Select Committee were: Hon Ruth Dyson (Chairperson), Chris Auchinvole, Kanwaljit Singh Bakshi, Hon Trevor Mallard, Eric Roy, and Holly Walker. Raymond Huo and Mojo Mathers also replaced Trevor Mallard and Holly Walker for some of the business related to the Plumbers Bill (Government Administration Committee 2013:8).

2013, had been in Parliament for 26 years. Holly, then, with only one year's experience, was a relative novice. Additionally, three of the committee members had been in parliament when the continuance Act was passed in 2006, and two were Ministers in the former Labour Government that had passed it. Holly said that she did not know whether I had noticed but at the beginning of the meeting, the other members had informed her about the history of the Act. They often did that, she said, and it could "sometimes be useful" because as a new MP she genuinely did not know the history. At other times, it could be "patronising." With regard the Plumbers Bill, some of the information was useful, but some of it felt patronising in implying that she was not able to understand the issues the bill addressed on her own, she said.

Holly's main concern, however, was about the process. After the select committee meeting, Holly and I talked about why the bill had become so unexpectedly interesting to us. She said: "It's surprising the things that do become really interesting or that you end up feeling strongly about. And I think in this case, for me, it's about the process." She explained what she thought was wrong:

> It seems clear to me that they've been aware that there's a problem both generally with how the Board operates but also specifically with the issue of collecting fees. We've known that there's a problem with that for quite a long time so *I* don't see why this process couldn't have been initiated earlier, have involved a comprehensive consultation with the sector, and have come to Parliament in time to have a full six-month select committee process to allow all of those people who wanted to have their say to be heard, because it seems like there's a lot of grievances already which will only be intensified by parliament rushing through a piece of legislation like this.

To Holly, parliament's usual procedures were essential in ensuring that consultation with interested parties. That was part of ensuring a constructive outcome.

Holly was frustrated that the select committee had decided not to use a two-week extension they had been granted for reporting back to parliament to hear from more submitters.[73] She attributed it to some of the other MPs not wanting to come back to Wellington during recess. They should be 'making the most of the extra time', Holly stated. Instead of following usual process of issuing a call for submissions and hearing from submitters, the committee had instead decided to accept the correspondence it had already received on the bill as submissions. Holly had voted against that at the meeting because she did not agree with it. In voting against the committee's plan, Holly wanted to "make it clear that I was advocating that at least some of them would have a chance to have their say." She wanted to "hear at least some of those individuals [who had written to the committee] so that they would feel like they'd had the opportunity to have their say as well."

Holly identified two issues with allowing written correspondence as a submission but not hearing from submitters. She said:

> I think there are two problems… one is that a general call for submissions didn't go out, so only those people who knew about [the bill] and were motivated to write… who happen to keep up-to-date with parliament will have their correspondence recorded as a submission. *And* we've also elected not to hear any of those submissions in person. And, rightly or wrongly, I think people feel like they're more likely to be heard and their views are more

[73] I am still not sure of the details of exactly when, how, or why this extension was granted except that it would have been given by the Business Committee.

> likely to be taken into account if they get the opportunity to come in and speak in person. Now, I know that some of the members of the committee think that we're just as likely to take their views on board on the strength of their written submissions and, when we're doing our job well, that's true. But I think there is a value in being *seen* to be hearing people and having a public hearing is one way to do that.

Holly's concern about the industry members' ability to have their say on the bill reflected her concern for open and transparent democracy and that scrutiny of bills at select committee should involve the public. Hearing from submitters, in Holly's view, was not only an important part of the public's involvement in parliament's business but an important part of how parliament represented itself to, and was seen by, the public.

Holly wanted an outcome that resolved the grievances in the sector with the agreement of all interested parties, but she wondered if perhaps she was being too idealistic about the possibility of that as she had not been in parliament for very long:

> It's clear there's a lot of dissent in the sector. We spent some time talking about what we will recommend as a committee about this bill because it's very fraught. The issue itself is relatively straightforward, but because of the history in the sector it's going to be very difficult to find a solution people are comfortable with.
>
> … Perhaps that's my naivety as a new MP, thinking that some kind of consensus could be reached among the parties if there was due consultation and process. Maybe the divisions in that sector are just too entrenched. And I think that that's the view that some of the more experienced members on the committee and probably the Minister have taken – that there's no point in doing that, it's too divided, and the best thing to do is just to quickly legislate.

Holly wondered if perhaps her disposition to seek a consensus solution among all parties by using proper and usual processes fitted with parliamentary practice. Observing the actions and hearing what her fellow MPs were saying prompted Holly to doubt her approach to the issue. Thus, while Holly believed in reproducing and strengthening parliamentary process, especially with regard to the public's ability to contribute to decision-making, she was learning that – at least with the Plumbers Bill – her belief and disposition was not reflective of the approach that other MPs were taking.

The next meeting of the select committee took place one week after the first, on March 27, 2013. Green Party MP Mojo Mathers represented the Greens on the committee as Holly was away attending a wedding. I was grateful for that because I had a bad cold and was happy to stay at home sick. I thought about going into parliament to attend the committee anyway but, because it was a closed session again, I felt that without the MP I was shadowing attending it was unlikely I would be allowed to observe. I do not know the detail of the scrutiny or decision-making that took place at that session and neither does Holly. That was reflective of parliamentary life in general for Green MPs, where having fewer MPs than larger parties to cover the same issues, in addition to personal and family commitments, meant that MPs often had to miss parts of parliamentary business to prioritise and attend to other work.

Another week later, on April 04, 2013, the select committee report was sent to Holly. She was, once again, surprised and walked through to her Executive Assistant's office to tell her and I what had

happened. The select committee had reported back that they had not been able to reach a decision. It was the first time Holly had ever heard of that happening. For whatever reason, Holly explained, the Labour Party had decided that they could not support the bill, meaning that votes on the select committee were tied. She was not quite sure of the process when that happened, but her understanding was that it meant that the bill did not proceed because it was like getting voted down in the House. But, 'for whatever reason', Holly repeated to emphasise that she did not know why, Labour had decided that even though they opposed the bill they would let it proceed in the House to be passed. It was highly unusual. I asked Holly whether she thought that Labour did that so that they could tell people they opposed it. "Yeah," replied Holly, "They could've dug their heels in but didn't." Passing the bill would mean they would avoid an "Oh fuck, what do we do now?!" moment if the Regulations Review Committee found that fee was also illegal. I asked Holly whether she thought the bill would be back in the House next week ready to be passed quickly like the Minister wanted. Yes, replied Holly, which would mean that she would need to find someone else to speak on it because she was away. It would probably be Mojo Mathers again, as she had attended the select committee. I asked Holly about whether she, like me, felt annoyed to have missed such an interesting select committee meeting and she answered that she did, especially since that was the one where decisions were made. But, she continued, all she could do was submit the Green Party's minority view for inclusion in the select committee report and brief Mojo about the bill as much as possible for the second reading.

By the time Holly wrote the Green Party's minority view (see Appendix E), she had heard submissions from the four organisations that presented at select committee and received a lot of correspondence from individual plumbers. Hearing those varied perspectives on wider issues in the industry, the issue itself, and the proposed solution meant that Holly had been able to refine the Green Party's position, particularly with regard to whether the Board should have the purpose of prosecuting unlicensed tradespeople at all – a role which the bill presupposed but which was contentious among some in the plumbing industry. Reflecting Holly's greater understanding, the Green Party's minority view outlined that they supported the Board retaining that prosecutorial responsibility and properly legislating for their ability to collect fees for that purpose; however, the Green Party opposed the retrospective application of the bill, instead arguing that it should apply only once enacted for reasons of natural justice and because the Party neither believed the issue warranted such exceptional law-making.

During the bill's progression over those first three weeks, Holly had received correspondence from the public. A lot of the emails and letters were "pleased" "about the Green Party's position, "thanking [her] for standing up to oppose it," said Holly. Equally, though, people were "arguing the toss about whether they should have to pay a similar levy in the future once it is put correctly into law." But she was resolute in the Green Party's position because it seemed "like a natural thing for an industry" to be able to prosecute unlicensed people. "I wouldn't say we're exactly on the same page," concluded Holly regarding the plumbing constituency, "but it's certainly generated quite a lot of correspondence." That correspondence continued for many months after the bill was reported back from select committee.

The select committee process provides an interesting contrast between Holly's speeches, which argued for the standard select committee process to be followed, and Holly's participation in the shortened select committee process. Because the Greens lacked political power in the House, holding only 14 of 121 votes, they could not materially change the outcome of proceedings. That

meant that to continue her role in scrutinising the legislation she had to tacitly endorse the shortened select committee period by practicing according to the alteration to usual process the House had agreed to. Holly still had opportunities to oppose what was happening by, for example, voting against the committee taking correspondence as submissions and submitting a minority view for inclusion in the report, but, lacking political power, there was little she could do to alter the course of the bill's progression.

The Second Reading

It was a very long day in the House when Holly spoke on the second reading of the Plumbers, Gasfitters and Drainlayers Amendment Bill on April 16, 2013, two weeks after the select committee's report was tabled.[74] Question time that day took place between 2:00 p.m. to 3:15 p.m. Then, there was a short break before Holly's House duty slot between 4:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. We then went to a cross-party meeting and ate a quick dinner before going back over to Parliament House for the second reading of the Plumbers Bill between 8:15 p.m. and 9:45 p.m. In total, Holly was in the debating chamber on April 16 for around five hours while I watched from above in the public gallery.

Figure 5.3: Holly Speaks on the Second Reading of the Plumbers Bill

Source: (In theHouse.co.nz 2013b:05:50)

Holly's second reading speech (see Figure 5.3 and Appendix F) continued to focus on opposing the select committee process that had been undertaken and the retrospective nature of the bill. She also put forward the Green Party's solution to the problem, stating that:

> The solution, in the view of the Green Party, is to change the legislation for the future but not for the past. We recognise that if we were to take this course of action, it might require

[74] The second reading had begun the previous week but been interrupted by adjournment.

> the board to refund some or all of the fees and levies that it has collected since 2006. That, indeed, was the recommendation in the findings of the complaint to the Ombudsman. We think it is probably fair enough that it does refund some of those levies and fees that it has collected illegally. However, as the Minister has pointed out, this could potentially put the board under some financial strain and possibly bankrupt it. Well, if that is the case, I would like to ask the Minister what is so bad about going to the Minister of Finance and asking for some Government support to allow the board to refund the illegal levies without going under. After all, it was a Government error in the drafting of the original legislation in the first place that allowed all of this to happen. Yes, admittedly, it was a different Government, but the Crown is the Crown. In this case I think that there is a case for the Crown to take some responsibility and contribute some financial assistance if it is needed (16 April 2013 NZPD 9410).

Once again, the Green Party opposed the bill.

As well as creating a solution for a problem and enabling adversarial debate, the Plumbers Bill offered all sides an opportunity to message the issue, parties, and actors to the public. There is often no clear distinction between adversarial debate and messaging and, indeed, both often have the same purpose and function. For example, the Minister for Building and Construction, Maurice Williamson, began his second reading speech by expressing disappointment with both the Labour and Green parties:

> Can I say how enormously disappointed I am in the Labour Party for having opposed this at the Government Administration Committee and, I assume, for voting against it now.
>
> … I am sorry I have to get into the attack here. I was hoping to work genteelly through this. I was quite keen on trying to take this calmly. I even sent this bill off to a select committee that we did not have a majority on, hoping that Ruth Dyson, who is normally a very good chair, would shepherd this through quite calmly and we would get it through. The Labour Government cocked up. In 2006 it passed a bill that did not allow the Plumbers, Gasfitters and Drainlayers Board to take action against non-licensed practitioners… I am one of the people most ardently opposed to retrospective legislation, except if it is validating what everyone had always thought was the case. Everybody thought the Plumbers, Gasfitters and Drainlayers Board had the right to go after cowboys.
>
> … I am disappointed even in the Greens. During the first reading, Holly Walker said: "Well, we support in principle what the Minister's doing here, but he is doing it too quickly." So I immediately gave the Government Administration Committee more time. I said that, OK, a week is too tough, I understand that. Let us go to a 3-week period where you can hear all the submissions, because this has to be done.
>
> … This is a bill that has to be passed. It is Labour's mess from 2006 that we are cleaning up. I hope that this Parliament will support it (11 April 2013 689 NZPD 9333).

The Minister presented himself as genteel, calm, opposed to retrospective legislation, and understanding of the Green Party's call for a longer select committee period. In contrast, his opponents were disappointing and Labour had mistakenly made the issue he now had to clean up. In response, Labour MP and Chair of the Government Administration Select Committee Hon Ruth Dyson characterised the Minister as a poor leader to the industry by 'barrelling ahead' with the legislation and allowing it to remain divided (11 April 2013 NZPD 9333). Labour Party MP Hon Trevor Mallard also spoke in the second reading debate, stating that the Plumbers Bill was "a case of

retrospective taxation without representation. It is a combination of two of the worst sins that a democracy and a Parliament can do, wrapped up in one tiny little validation bill" (16 April 2013 689 NZPD 9410). Each speaker, Holly included, attempted to have their representation of what was happening with the Plumbers Bill be the real one.

But, as Lempert (2011:198) wrote, there are no institutionalised rules as to exactly which actions and statements are used to recover the meaning of a person or, in this case, how a bill was passed. That makes it difficult for MPs to control the messages that the public audience sees, hears, or reads. It is, however, generally true that mistakes by politicians will be used by the press in both their reporting and their interpretation of what unfolded, as they have a preference for reporting that prioritises drama and scandal (Bahador et al. 2016:201). In line with that, the small amount of coverage from the second reading focused on the Minister's assertion in the speeches before the adjournment that shoddy gasfitting work had caused "an explosion in the Pizza Hut in Nelson that nearly killed people" (11 April 2013 689 NZPD 6333). He used the story as part of an attempt to characterise Labour Party MPs: "It was appalling work, and I am hoping the Labour Opposition is in favour of public safety and does not want practitioners like that to get away scot-free" (11 April 2013 689 NZPD 9333). But the Minister's statements backfired because they were incorrect: the gas explosion had occurred at a fish and chip shop, causing serious injury to its owner and leading "to charges against a gasfitter and his former employer" (Tracey 2013:A4). Pizza Hut called for an apology and for the Hansard to be corrected as they had been contacted by members of the public concerned about the safety of their restaurants (Tracey 2013:A4). When the debate resumed, one of the Labour MPs the Minister had been trying to pressure into supporting his bill corrected him:

> [The Minister] has now caused Pizza Hut nationwide to go into a bit of a tailspin about the safety of its eating houses… I feel the need to raise that as a point because the Minister impugned the reputation of Pizza Hut, and in the course of that I seek to correct that on record and in the public domain. But, more important, he was wrong, and if he is wrong about something like that, he can be wrong about the detail and the purpose of the retrospective legislation that is being put before the House now (16 April 2013 689 NZPD 9410).

The Minister did apologise to Pizza Hut, saying that "it was the only pizza his family ever ordered [and] it was on his mind at the time" of the debate (Tracey 2013:A4). The fact that politicians do not have the power to control media coverage, even though they attempt to shape it as much as possible, is shown time and again throughout this thesis; this example shows that it is not just a concern for Green Party MPs but affects government and other opposition MPs too.

It is unlikely that many more people saw, heard, or watched Holly's second reading speech than the approximately 20 people in the House at the time of her speech and the up to 62 views her speech had online (including several by me for this research). Holly described speaking in the House as often "talking into a void," but the Party still had to fulfil its role in the ritual struggle as a party of opposition by scrutinising the bill that the Government wanted to pass, speaking against it to record their position in the Hansard, and voting on the bill's passage. The unquestioning of the fact that that speaking *had to happen,* even if it was 'to a void', indicates the production of a regulated consensus of parliament; Holly adhered to the ritual struggle even though she and the Greens lacked the political power to change the bill with the Green Party's 14 votes or by mounting a convincing argument in the debate in the House to gain the numbers. Her thinking reflected a

famous saying that Gareth told me was true: "No one makes their mind up on the floor of the House." Despite neither having the numbers nor being able to change any member's mind, the speaking still needs to be done.

The Committee Stage and Third Reading

After the second reading, the urgency to pass the bill dropped away. Even though the Minister had initially indicated to MPs that the deadline to pass the bill was April 01, 2013, when I finished my fieldwork with Holly in mid-May, the bill was still on the Order Paper. In fact, it was not until another three months had passed that the committee stages of the Plumbers Bill took place, under urgency along with 17 other bills the Government wanted to progress. At the morning call of July 03, 2013, Gareth described the House Programme and checked the speaking slots for each bill. Partway through, Gareth asked Holly if the Green Party needed a second speaker in the debate for the Plumbers Bill. Holly replied that no, they did not: "Not if it's in the middle of the night." Holly asked Green Party MP Steffan Browning, who had been the Party's second speaker on the bill's first reading, whether he wanted to do another speech. "I could do a standard rant on it if you thought it was important enough," replied Steffan, but he also had an event off-precinct scheduled that night. They agreed that having a second speech on the bill was not important enough to keep Steffan back in the House, so only Holly was allocated to speak on the committee stage.

It took another day for the bills above the Plumbers Bill in the urgency motion to pass their stages so it was not until the afternoon of Thursday July 04, 2013, that the Committee stage began.[75] When the speeches started, there were only 20 minutes left until the House would break for lunch at 12:40 p.m., but Holly managed to get in before the interruption. Holly used her speech (see Appendix G) to state many of the same points she had outlined in her second reading speech regarding the Green Party's position on the right course of action to resolve the issue. Holly also spent a considerable proportion of her speech lambasting the failure of process she believed had occurred:

Holly Walker:	Well, Mr Chair, this is your favourite bill, no doubt, and mine, and it is one of the most interesting and unusual bills I have had to deal with in my short time in this House. The Green Party opposes the Plumbers, Gasfitters, and Drainlayers Amendment Bill, and we will continue to do so in this Committee stage, for a number of reasons. Probably, actually, chief amongst those is the incredibly poor process that has been followed with regard to this bill. I thought I would begin my contribution by outlining briefly just what that process has been. The bill was introduced in March, as we know, with an incredibly short select committee consideration period of initially just 1 week. It was later extended to 2 weeks, but it was still an incredibly short period of time. That was due to the apparently urgent need to pass this legislation—
Hon Ruth Dyson:	Sorry, when was that?

[75] In the debating chamber, it was still Tuesday 02 July, 2013, as the House remained under urgency.

Holly Walker: Before 1 April, apparently. Very urgent—before 1 April, we needed to pass this legislation. I know that the dates on the walls here are slightly behind today, but they still say 2 July, and 1 April was quite a long time ago. Here we are in the House with the bill at only its Committee stage, yet the Government Administration Committee has done quite heroic efforts, I think, to consider this bill in an incredibly short period of time due to its apparent urgency.

...As we have said, to add insult to that injury, despite the rush and the select committee reporting back in time, that deadline of 1 April came and went with no change, and the bill has been languishing for months since its second reading. It is now July and we are finally having the Committee stage. Despite the fact that we are sitting under urgency, clearly no urgency has actually been accorded to this bill in terms of the priority given to it by the Government after that initial panic of its introduction and short process. Clearly, it could have had months longer at the select committee, it could have had a proper period of scrutiny, it could have had a proper period of submissions, and we could be back here right now in a much different position.

...In terms of the substantive reasons for our opposition, they are very clear. It comes down, really, to the point that retrospective legislation should be extremely rare in this House and that when it occurs, it should be subject to a very high bar. It is not clear at all in this case that that bar has been met.

...The Committee is in quite an interesting position, because it has a select committee report where the select committee said that it was "unable to agree" on whether the bill should pass. That, I think, is indicative of what a mess this whole process around this bill has been (02 July 2013 691 NZPD 11711).

After passing through the Committee stages,[76] the third reading began on July 11, 2013. That debate was interrupted during the fourth speech. It took another two months before the debate was resumed on September 05, 2013. "Unfortunately," Holly lamented during one of our interviews, she was at home sick that day so Green Party Co-leader Metiria Turei spoke for the Party instead (see Appendix H). Despite being home sick, Holly "was a tragic nerd" and watched the debate live on Parliament TV. The bill passed that day despite the Green Party's opposition, with 63 votes in favour and 54 opposed (05 September 2013 698 NZPD 13348).[77]

I had not followed the progress of the bill closely since leaving Holly's office and becoming immersed in Kennedy's climate change conference work. The passing of our favourite bill provided a good opportunity to interview Holly again, so the day after it passed we sat down in her office to talk about what had happened since I had left her office. Holly told me:

[76] Voting in committee is done on amendments to, parts of, and clauses of the bill. Although there was variation among the parties in voting on the Plumbers Bill, the result was that the bill was to be reported to the House for its third reading without amendment (02 July 2013 691 NZPD 11732).

[77] The Ayes were comprised of National, Māori, ACT, and United Future. The Noes were Labour, Green, New Zealand First, Mana, and Independent MP Brendan Horan (05 September 2013 693 NZPD 13348).

> I'm not exactly sure what happened but the urgency associated with it clearly dropped away… the initial urgency was to try and pass the legislation before the Regs Review Committee would make that finding [that the levies and fees were illegal]. And I'm pretty sure that someone had a word with [the Labour Party MP] who was Chair of the Regs Review Committee to say, 'Can you hold fire?' And they did. But then I'm not sure what happened after that because… five months have passed. So having had that crazy process where we had only a week to consider submissions and had to deny all the people who wanted to submit from the right to do so, then the bill has just languished at the bottom of the Order Paper for five months. So pretty poor process all around really.

I asked Holly if it was okay for the Government to speak to the Regulations Review Committee and say 'hold on'. Holly considered:

> I think it was the Chair of the select committee, who's a Labour MP as well, who just because of the urgency and because of the need to deal with the bill probably said, 'Well, let's just see if we can slow it down a little bit'. But yeah, I mean, I don't know. I only know that kind of unofficially. I don't know what happened after but, somehow, the urgency just dropped away.

MPs, behind-the-scenes, had exercised the dynamic adaptability of parliamentary process to diminish the urgency of the bill. Unfortunately, in Holly's view, that adaptability had been exercised at the wrong time and had prevented the many plumbers, gasfitters, and drainlayers with a stake in the outcome of the legislation from having an opportunity to submit and influence MPs' decision-making.

Conclusion

This chapter shows that when the six defined and linear stages of passing a bill are filled in with particular people who are trying to achieve multiple outcomes and manage different groups' interests while working through a particular political issue, it can be a messy, indeterminate, and uncertain process. For the Greens, that was also a result of New Zealand's proportional parliamentary system, which meant they lacked the voting power and positions of power compared to National and Labour that would enable them to have a strong influence on the outcome of bills. However, one of the powers they did have in parliament was to speak in the House, in select committee, and in the media. By seeking to build public support for their positions, they could show people that they were working in their interests and attempt to win their support. Therefore, while the Greens had little power with regard to the legislative process, they could still seek to apply political pressure on others.

In this chapter, it is possible to see how Holly's speech was shaped by the parliament. Some of the structures she adhered to were explicitly codified; for example, in following rules of the *Standing Orders*, Holly's speech was limited to ten minutes at most during the Bill's readings, she did not use unparliamentarily language, and she did not say 'you' during her speeches to avoid bringing the Speaker into the debate. Others were rooted in the tradition of her opposition role as she criticised the Minister for his decision-making around the select committee process, considered the submissions at select committee, and put forward alternative solutions to the problem. Yet others were embodied competencies, the result of her inculcation of the structure, as she changed her

tone of voice to become more adversarial at the appropriate moments, reserved sharing her feelings about the way she felt her select committee peers viewed her inexperience until she was away from their earshot, and remembered to bring her speaking notes to the House with her for speeches.

Holly had to learn to speak this way. While she had done some work to prepare MPs for legislating as an advisor, as discussed in the previous Chapter, she found the experience of actually speaking in the Chamber as an MP very different. At first she had been nervous every time she spoke in the House, feeling the weight and solemnity of the entire parliament and an acute awareness that her words would be recorded for history in the Hansard. Over time, however, as she became inculcated with the structure of parliament – as the rules, traditions, and required competencies became more familiar to her – she felt more at ease while speaking and experienced greater fit.

Holly's speech and actions outlined in this chapter did more than just contribute to the passage of the Plumbers Bill. By making the statements she did, Holly also contributed to reproducing the parliament itself. By arguing for a longer select committee process than was used and for the interests of tradespeople to be represented in that process, Holly was remaking the parliament as a site where political struggles take place within the official way (Bourdieu 2014:355). In this instance, the Minister sought to work outside the usual parliamentary process, and Holly fought to restore it. There seems a contradiction in that: The Greens were in a politically weak position in the House as they did not have the votes or the right position in relation to the Government to affect the outcomes in it, and yet they sought to reproduce the structure that did not afford them political power. However, reproduction is a necessity for parties of opposition if they hope to one day gain and exert the power of government. Because of the fact they invest in winning governmental power, MPs practice in ways that for the most part remake the structure of the game they are playing.

As well as reproducing the structure of the field and game they are playing in, reproducing the parliament conferred two strategic advantages to the Greens in 2013. Firstly, for individual MPs, adhering to and thereby reproducing the rules of the parliament enabled them to develop a reputation for being competent, credible, trustworthy, and serious political players who could be considered for future Ministerial positions. That was a form of personal political capital many MPs sought. Holly, for example, was driven to acquire it because she had a personal and portfolio interest in Electoral Reform and Open Government, was considering taking on more procedure-oriented positions like whip or select committee chair, and felt her select committee peers could act differently toward her as she was still learning those rules. That drive was part of what drove her disposition to speak in adherence to the rules, traditions, and required competencies of parliament.

Secondly, speaking and practicing in a way that reproduced the parliament was strategic for the Green Party as a collective. Previously, they had been characterised in ways that many considered would not be appropriate traits for government Ministers. In 2013, however, they wanted the public to believe they were 'ready to govern'. Their work in the House provided "message partials" – "calculated bundles of soundbites, slogans, catchy phrases, pictures, gestures, and more – that contribute to the message" (Lempert and Silverstein 2012:26; Silverstein 2011b:205). That was why their *House Strategy* emphasised that in the Chamber, MPs should speak and act in ways that showed they were a professional, competent, and honest political party. If their work in the House

was disseminated to an audience, then what they said and did contributed to building a picture of the Greens as part of a credible government in waiting. They believed that would help win them votes in 2014.

This chapter has made the case that one of the ways that the structure of the parliament acts to preconstrain MPs' speech is by inculcating dispositions that produce a tendency toward reproducing the parliament as a site of regulated consensus. For the Green Party, doing that was strategic because it meant that they could play for the stake of winning governmental power, allowed their MPs to gain personal political capital, and provided partials for the message that they were 'ready to govern' with the aim of increasing the party's vote. The next chapter turns to examining the productive and limiting power of message discipline.

Chapter Six

MPs Say Some Things but Not Others: Message Discipline

> When I first started working… the [Communications Director] introduced the 1+3. And that was a real message discipline thing that we didn't have. So, it's really good that he started on this journey, then others have taken it on (Catherine Delahunty)

Message discipline is perhaps the most taken-for-granted practice of political communication and a central part of how the public statements of politicians are produced. Politicians consider message discipline a fundamental cornerstone of how they make public statements. It not only adheres to the prescriptions of communication experts like Lakoff (2004) and Westen (2007) to make universally repeated statements, it links into a deeper, more historical value of party unity. Party unity is highly valued in New Zealand and, as the woes of the Labour Party during 2013 demonstrated, the fortunes of parties suffer when MPs are and appear divided and discontent. Boston and Bullock (2010:351) explain, in relation to multi-party governments but equally applicable to the political parties, that:

> In parliamentary democracies, there are powerful political imperatives for governmental unity: presenting a united public on politically salient matters enables the government to appear convincing, competent, and effective; in contrast, inter-party divisions on important policy matters are likely to undermine the government's public standing and legislative effectiveness… regular, vociferous inter-party disagreements are likely to be electorally damaging.

Therefore, MPs are pushed toward message discipline from two directions: they are told by communication experts that saying the same things repeatedly will win them election, and they understand the rule that a party's MPs saying varied and conflicting things will lose them election. Thus, message discipline is both a productive and limiting practice, ensuring that some statements are said in public but that others are not.

In the course of writing this thesis, I could not find any sources which examined how message discipline is used in the day-to-day work of MPs. That is because in order to understand how message discipline works, a researcher needs to be located behind-the-scenes so that they know what is *not* said in public just as much as what *is* said. The purpose of this chapter is to explain how message discipline worked in the Green Party by exploring what did and did not cross the boundary from the internal sphere to the public.

This chapter shows that message discipline is a practice that produces public statements in two ways. Firstly, it produces a disposition toward self-censorship among MPs that generates the practice of speaking on-message in public. This is the productive part of message discipline. I examine how self-censorship works by discussing the development of message discipline and the

Green Party's 1+3 bullet point structure for public communications that produced limited, unified, and useable statements, as exemplified in Catherine Delahunty's statements on a mining announcement. Secondly, discipline is enforced internally, as MPs who want to make off-message statements are discouraged or prevented from doing so by others before they are able to make them publicly. This is the limiting part of message discipline. I examine the ways in which Kennedy Graham was discouraged from publishing the background papers for a climate change conference under the Green Party's name. As well as showing the productive and limiting effects of message discipline, these sections highlight that while it is an orthodox practice, it is not totalising. Instead, the need for discipline shifts depending on factors like expected press scrutiny, breadth and size of the audience, and who that audience is made up of.

Theoretically, message discipline is the practice that constructs and maintains the boundary between the internal sphere, where MPs' statements are produced, and the public sphere, where the political and symbolic struggle by actually-said utterance takes place. Bourdieu (1991:176-177) argued that the autonomy of the political field from the public is what allows politicians to retain their monopoly on the governmental and symbolic power to give shape to the social world, in part because it enables politicians to constrain the availability of political statements that cross the threshold from the internal sphere to the public. He argued:

> The political field [and the politician acting in it] in fact produces an effect of censorship by limiting the universe of political discourse, and thereby the universe of what is politically thinkable, to the finite space of discourses capable of being produced or reproduced within the limits of the political *problematic*, understood as the space of stances effectively adopted within the field (Bourdieu 1991:172, emphasis original).

Message discipline seeks to ensure for parties that only those statements that work to win over the belief and support of the public to their party and vision are made available to the public. For that reason, message discipline acts to constrain and limit the vision of the world that is stated by politicians.

Message Discipline in the Green Party

The Green Party had not always practiced message discipline but by the time I undertook fieldwork in 2013, its value was cemented in the minds of MPs and staff who saw clear and consistent messages as an essential factor in the Party's post-2008 success (Turei 2012:136-137). Everyone I spoke to credited the previous Communications Director who joined the Party's political staff after the 2008 Election for making the Party disciplined, as Catherine's quote at the start of this chapter reflects. Holly, who was working as an advisor in the Political and Media Unit at that time, told me about the changes the Communications Director made:

> [He] was responsible for a real change in discipline, message discipline. So [Laughs] when I was in the Media Unit, what we used to do was we'd have a call in the morning like we do now, but it would be a call where everyone would have the newspaper out and be flicking through it and be like, 'Oh! There's a story on page three about GE potatoes! We'd better do something'! [Still laughing]. And then we would put a press release out a day late! Possibly not very strategic.

> And… if the MP said, 'I want to do a press release on this', then we did a press release on that. Our job was to do what the MPs told us to do. There was no strategy about what we chose to put our resources into. So, we did *way* too many press releases! And we were known for just *spamming* the Press Gallery with just really pointless stuff! [Laughs] And we still are, but we've gotten much, much, *much* better.

The major disciplinary changes the Director made, Holly explained, were limiting the volume as well as ensuring the appeal and newsworthiness of the Green Party's public communications. She also noted that he ensured communication materials that the Party produced, such as press releases or emails to supporters, were strategic. Strategic, in Holly's account, meant that the communications were designed to appeal to both the press gallery and specific audiences by, for example, focusing on relevant topics and being delivered in a timely manner.

Cementing message discipline as an everyday practice required a change in the disposition of MPs. Holly continued:

> … By the time I started, a lot of this stuff was in place but I think that first year he was here he had quite a battle convincing Caucus to really change the way they'd always done things. There was still a core of the original [1999] MPs in that Caucus of Jeanette, both of the Sues, Keith; I think that's all – those four. Yeah, Nandor was gone by then. But, previously, that iteration of Green MPs right from '99 had evolved a way of doing things which was very much about each of them as individuals. Each of them had a core constituency that they kind of spoke to and it was pretty clear. You know, you could rattle off who each of them represented and they had a lot of autonomy. They were just like, 'Well, this is what I do, this is who I'm speaking to', and off we'd go!
>
> And it's changed from that into, I mean, we still have strong personalities and we do still have MPs in our current caucus who speak particularly to or resonate with particular constituencies, but it's now completely, you know. There's no one left from that time and we have a new institutional culture.

That new institutional culture was apparent in the value that the 2013 cohort of MPs placed on message discipline. None of the MPs I did my fieldwork with had been in parliament before the changes the Communications Director had made were introduced, so they had not developed the individualised practices that Holly identified in the original MPs to such an extent. When seven new MPs entered parliament and the final two of the original 1999 MPs left after the 2011 Election, the strategy of being on-message and tightly disciplined was cemented in the group, who all saw it as a key component of their historic 2011 Election result. Half the Caucus did not know any other way of operating having just entered parliament in part due to their successful communications work. In the minds of MPs and staff, message discipline was a successful strategy for creating appeal and electoral success, reinforcing its value in their minds as a key strategy for increasing their party vote.

Message discipline worked, in the Green Party's view, because it increased the public's exposure to the Green Party's messages. Holly explained:

> There's a limited bandwidth in terms of what the public will hear and want to hear, and *can* process. By the time you filter the message through – you put it out there yourself through whatever mechanism, a journalist covers it, then someone hears it on the radio, or TV, or

> reads it in the paper – it's shrunk, you know? And if you know that what you really want to get across is that, for example, the Green Party is actually credible on economics, and understands economics and finance, and could be trusted to be in government, but you spend most of your time putting out press releases on… [Laughing] civil aviation! [Well,] then you're not going to have the opportunity for people to hear that message that you actually want to get across. So yeah, if you're disciplined about it and you use every opportunity to get across the message that you want to, then there's a greater chance that you'll actually reach the audience you want to.

In this quote, Holly identified that the aim of message discipline was to ensure that the messages which were most advantageous to the Green Party, such as those that built their credibility on economic issues, were covered by the media or disseminated by the Party via its own channels to the public. Therefore, by limiting what the MPs said or wrote and repeating what they did say and write, the Greens believed there was a greater likelihood that the public would be exposed to what the Party wanted them to be exposed to.

The strategy of limiting and repeating key messages was directly tied to the Green Party's belief and experience that the prescriptions of Lakoff (2004) and Westen (2007) in that regard worked. When I asked the Communications Director what the most important thing he had learnt during his time working in parliament for the Green Party was, he replied:

> Director: I think from a message perspective I've learnt the importance and effectiveness of message discipline. Almost regardless of what your strategy is, once you set it, the ability to stick to it has paid dividends for us. But, also, when we are sticking to positive messaging… when we're, generally speaking, coming back to positive messages, future-focused, that kind of stuff, that has generally worked. Yeah, particularly around elections. Harder during the term, but particularly around elections. If you think about it, [the 2011 Election with the platform and slogan] 'Rivers, jobs, kids' are kind of sentient things. Like, they are–
>
> Jessica: [Interrupting] Nouns.
>
> Director: Yeah… and it was like there was that connectedness, that realness, and also the discipline. So, whenever we stray a little bit from the rule book that *we* know, and I know our rule book is very Lakoffian but it's informed by a range of things including our own experience, when we stray from that even slightly we tend not to do so well. So, it's that real discipline, informed by proper messaging thinking. And just taking the time to work that out. I think that's probably the most important thing.

Gareth too, credited the positive content and discipline of messaging as key to the Party's success in appealing to the public. We discussed:

> Jessica: How do you get your values [to be] seen as legitimate policy solutions?
>
> Gareth: Well, it's that best practice stuff. Our Media Director when I was first elected was fantastic at that. [He] really set us on the path to changing our collective brand of what the Green Party stood for but also the way we talked about the issues. I think that made us more appealing to others. So, we need to continue that as best we possibly can in that sense.

Jessica: What are some of the things that he changed about the way you talk about values when he was around?

Gareth: Ahh, maybe it wasn't so much the values but it was, you know, communicating our values. It was not being relentlessly negative. So, every single press release had to finish with, 'The Government can do X, Y, and Z, which will make everything better'; whereas everything would have been negative before. I don't know. There was just more of a tightness in our public communications.

Changing the messaging of values and tightening public communications, then, was seen by the Greens as enabling them to communicate appealing statements in ways that would reach the public and ideally cause them to think about the issues in the way the Green Party wanted. In this way, working in tandem with using the right words, message discipline contributed to the Party's success.

The 1+3 as an Internal Tool of Message Discipline

The most ubiquitous tool used in the production of the Green Party's communication work was the 1+3. The 1+3 was a structure for message discipline in communications which MPs and staff used for each position or issue they spoke about in public. It had two basic purposes: firstly, it standardised the form and content of messaging across multiple mediums for public communications; secondly, it quickly informed MPs of the Party's position and message on an issue so that they could provide a clear and consistent soundbite to the media or an audience if needed. Holly explained:

> If we're going to put out a press release, we have to have a really clear idea of the *one* thing we really want to get across and the three things that support it. And we need to do that before we write the press release so that it's very clear in the structure of it that that's what we're saying. Same when we do any kind of communication.

However, the effect of the 1+3 was not only to shape public statements. As a structure for organising their communications, it also reinforced the disposition among the MPs to self-censor their public statements to adhere to the 1+3 soundbites so that they would practice message discipline.

The short and simple formatting of the 1+3 is designed for use in soundbites. It consists of a '1' top-line priority statement and '+3' supporting statements. For example:

One: The Government has no strategy to help farmers deal with climate change.

1. The Government is ignoring climate change and downgrading measures to tackle it, but it is also failing to future-proof key New Zealand industries.
2. A national strategy is needed to face the challenge of climate change.
3. Agriculture needs government leadership on climate change and farming practices need to change to remain viable.

And:

One: The National Government has trivialised child poverty, and the needs of a quarter of Kiwi kids, by ignoring most recommendations from the Children's Commissioner's Expert Advisory Group on Solutions to Child Poverty.

1. The National Government is in denial, both about the extent of child poverty in New Zealand and about the power it has to do something about it.
2. John Key told Parliament today that he didn't think that setting a target for child poverty was necessary. He must tell New Zealanders what, in all honesty, he thinks is more important than committing to a plan to ensure every child gets a fair go.
3. Giving all children in lower income families a child payment would lift 100,000 children out of poverty. This is the right thing to do.

Once an advisor wrote the 1+3, in conjunction with the Co-leader or portfolio MP, it would be emailed to all MPs so that they knew what the Party's position, message, and language on a particular issue was. They could then reflect that in their public communication.

The Greens had several criteria for what constituted a good 1, which they discussed at a planning day I attended. The MPs and staff agreed that a good 1 should:

- Frame the issue;
- Be a call to action;
- Be a specific ask of the Government;
- Be a unique critique;
- State the Green Party's position on the issue;
- Be positive and/or forward-looking;
- Be inclusive;
- Be succinct.

Most 1s met only a few of those criteria, as can be seen in the two examples above, neither of which contain, for instance, a call to action. The discipline of the 1 was for the MP to return to that statement repeatedly during an interview, if not always word-for-word, so that there was less variation among the soundbites journalists could use in their reporting. The lack of variety and choice worked to increase the likelihood that the Green Party's most important message would be used in coverage and reach the public.

While the 1 contained the most important statement the Party wanted to present to the public, the +3 following points contained supporting explanatory statements. The content of the +3 was flexible but, like the 1, the intent was to make short and simple statements that could be easily used for speaking to and reporting by the media. At a workshop for Party members, the Communications Director outlined his ideal for the +3. He said that the first point should contain facts, figures, comparisons, or examples that provided evidence to support the 1. They needed to be presented as simply as possible, without jargon or technical language that the public would not be able to understand. The effect of that was to make the MP 'look considered' and because stating the concrete evidence could be useful in swaying people to the Green Party's position. The Communications Director emphasised that providing correct evidence helped the Party build credibility and enter the mainstream. The second point, he said, should be a normative statement intended to appeal to the audience's values. Again, he said, that would help sway the public to the Green Party's position. Finally, the Director continued, the third point should be the solution to the problem if that was not already stated in the 1. The intent of the solution was to alter the

representation of the Party in public from 'always against everything' or the 'anti-party' to being positive and solution-focussed. Laughing, the Communications Director told his audience of Party members that that was quite a hard thing to do because they were "quite anti-" a lot: they were "fundamentally opposed to the current trajectory of the National Government." A solution in the final statement also helped the Green Party avoid being positioned negatively as in a fight which the media, focused on conflict, often used as a media frame. Stepping forward and doing a positive thing, rather than being locked in a for-or-against battle was a good thing, the Director concluded. Overall, then, the Communications Director's ideal +3 provided a statement of evidence, a statement of normative public value, and a solution to the problem.

The use of the 1+3 by MPs to provide limited, repetitive statements that produced cohesion across communications platforms was evident in Catherine's response to the Government approving an open cast coal mine on conservation land at Denniston Plateau during 2013. The Denniston Plateau is a unique landscape with a high biodiversity value that the Greens and other environmental advocacy groups believed should be protected from mining. The announcement was made by the Government the day before a law came into effect under which the Minister would have been newly required to ensure public consultation took place before any approval was granted (Mussen 2013:A1). In order to oppose the mine going ahead, the Greens wanted to position themselves as representing the interests of the public, who they believed wanted to protect the conservation estate from mining. They also wanted to pursue a wedge strategy to position the Minister as offside with the public: as knowing that the public valued protecting the land but quickly approving the mine so that the public would not have a chance to mobilise and submit against it.

A 1+3 was issued following the announcement. It read:

> *One: The Government is eroding the conservation estate by allowing Australian owned Bathurst Resources Ltd access to conservation land to build an open cast coal mine.*
> 1. This is a dark day for conservation in New Zealand.
> 2. The Government has been determined to make this project work from the outset, no matter what the environmental cost.
> 3. This decision was made today to avoid public consultation. Changes to the Crown Minerals Act which come into effect tomorrow require public consultation for significant mining proposals on conservation land.

The whole 1+3 was reflected in the press release sent to media the same day. It was titled *Dark Day for Conservation in NZ* and stated the 1 as its first paragraph: "The Government is eroding the conservation estate by allowing Australian owned Bathurst Resources Ltd access to conservation land to build open case coal mine, the Green Party said today" (Delahunty 2013a:1). It then repeated the 1+3's first point. It was written as a quote from Catherine that the media could use word-for-word in their reporting: "'Today is a dark day for conservation', said Green Party mining spokesperson Catherine Delahunty" (Delahunty 2013a:1). Then, the press release returned to the 1:

> Ms Delahunty was responding to Conservation Minister Nick Smith's decision to allow Australian owned Bathurst Resources Ltd to access conservation land on the Denniston Plateau to build an open cast coal mine.

> "This decision is an erosion of the conservation estate. Nothing can make up for ripping open this rare and stunning landscape for coal mining," said Ms Delahunty (Delahunty 2013a:1).

The next paragraph included the Party's high-level 1+3 messaging on environmental issues, 'Love it, protect it', which is discussed further in the next chapter: "Denniston Plateau is conservation land for a reason. Its distinctive landscape and wildlife are worth protecting" (Delahunty 2013a:1). Then, the press release included the third point of the 1+3:

> "The Government has been determined to make this project work from the outset, no matter what the environmental cost.
>
> 'Prime Minister John Key has publically backed Australian owned Bathurst Resources, opening their Wellington headquarters in 2012', said Ms Delahunty.
>
> Ms Delahunty said that this decision was made today to avoid public consultation. Changes to the Crown Minerals Act which come into effect tomorrow require public consultation for significant mining proposals on conservation land (Delahunty 2013a:1).

Finally, the press release ended with a restatement of the overall 'Love it, protect it' messaging as it related to the issue of mining conservation land:

> 'New Zealanders love and want to protect our conservation land. In 2010, forty-thousand people marched down Queen Street to protect our conservation land from mining.
>
> 'The Government knows that New Zealanders want to protect this treasured place so they have denied the public an opportunity to have a say.
>
> 'This mine is not in the interests of New Zealanders. Bathurst's planned open cast coal mine on conservation land will destroy habitat and increase carbon emissions while the profits go offshore' (Delahunty 2013a:1).

Therefore, overall, the press release closely reflected the content of the 1+3. They addressed the substantive issue of the Minister approving the mine in a way which did not enable the public to submit on that decision. They positioned the Minister as offside with public opinion, and the Greens as onside. They also spoke about value, naming the need to protect rare and picturesque landscapes. And, finally, it mattered that it was Catherine making the statements as she had a long history of protesting mining in New Zealand and gave extra credibility to the Green Party's position on the matter.

The public reporting from Catherine's press release and interviews emphasised points two and three: that it was a dark day for conservation and that the Minister had made the decision on that day in order to avoid public consultation. The Green Party's position and messaging on the Minister's decision were repeated consistently across all public platforms, including in interviews Catherine did, in her blog post, and in the Green Party social media. Radio New Zealand reported from the journalist's interview with Catherine that:

> The Green Party says the Conservation Minister is ignoring public process by pushing through an agreement with Bathurst before changes to the Crown Minerals Act require public consultation to come into effect on Friday… Green MP Catherine Delahunty said the

> Government was always going to cut a deal with Bathurst under either law (RNZ 2013:Paras.10, 12).

Other media outlets included statements from Catherine's press release. The *Timaru Herald* (2013:7) even used it as part of their headline: *Dark Day Seen After Denniston Nod*. Both the *Nelson Mail* (2013:2) and *Manawatu Standard* (2013:5) included the line: "Green Party mining spokeswoman Catherine Delahunty described it as a 'dark day for conservation'." The messaging was also reflected in the Green Party's own unmediated communications. Catherine repeated the final point of the +3 on a blog post the next day: "Nick Smith announced his decision under the old Crown Minerals Act and his interpretation of his conservation responsibilities. He made sure he didn't have to run a public consultation process which the new Crown Minerals Act requires for significant applications like this one" (Delahunty 2013b:Para.2). On Facebook, the Green Party posted an infographic (see Figure 6.1) with an accompanying caption that read: "We know Kiwis love and want to protect our conservation land. The Government knows this too – that's why they've signed off Denniston Plateau to become an open cast coal mine today, before law changes come in tomorrow" (Green Party 2013e). Although her press release had contained statements about the conservation value of the Denniston Plateau, statements from other actors involved in the issue, like environmental NGO Forest & Bird, were used in media reports to speak to that instead. This was especially because Forest & Bird were contesting the mine's resource consent at the Environment Court. Because the media already had other organisations who could speak to value, Catherine instead emphasised point three to ensure that her quotes were distinct and would be covered in the media. Across all platforms, then, Catherine and the Green Party repeated the same positions and message both in the media's reporting of their statements and on their on social media channels. At times the message discipline was a repetition of their political position on the issue and Minister's actions; at others, the messaging of the 1+3 was repeated word-for-word.

Figure 6.1: Green Party's Facebook Image on the Decision to Mine Denniston Plateau

Source: (Green Party 2013e)

In summary, the 1+3 is an internal tool that provides a structure for MPs' public communications. It organises their statements into short soundbite quotes that can be used consistently by the 14 MPs across different mediums. Because the 1+3 is a structure, MPs become inculcated with the discipline of adhering to them when speaking to media and the public, as seen in the example of Catherine's statements in response to the Minister's decision to approve mining the Denniston Plateau. That inculcation creates a disposition for self-censorship that drives message discipline.

Maintaining Message Discipline

However, MPs did not always want to be disciplined. Kennedy was one of those MPs. One person I spoke to described message discipline as sitting "very uncomfortably with, primarily, his view of himself and his ability as clearly an intellectual," which left him "incapable of conveying the messages to Green Party supporters and voters, or potential supporters and voters, that were really important." Kennedy knew this too and, in many ways, it made him one of the most radical Green Party MPs, as he constantly questioned the way that rationalised political communication shaped modern political practice. He told me that "any organisation always has a tension between hierarchical control and freedom of thought and conscious thinking. I accept what I can accept but there is a certain line that if it's crossed, I will not change and I'll dig in very firmly." Kennedy questioned what message discipline meant for thinking and talking freely about issues, and questioned it especially so when it impacted his work on a science-based climate change policy that he was developing during 2013, when I was doing fieldwork in his office. This section explores the development and publication of the climate change papers with particular attention to how discipline was used to maintain a boundary between internal and public that allowed some statements to cross the threshold and others not.

In June 2013, Kennedy hosted a parliamentary conference on climate change. He spent the first part of the year preparing two background papers for it. The first background paper – part one – focused on the annual emission budgets that would need to be observed in order to meet the Green Party's policy of a 40 percent reduction in emissions by 2020 and a 90 percent reduction by 2050. The second paper – part two – focused on a sector-by-sector breakdown of how those emission budgets could be met and what the carbon price would need to be in order to reach those targets. Those three issues – the emission budgets, how to meet them, and the required price of carbon – were, and still are, complex policy issues. The background papers reflected that complexity. In their final form, they were around 80 dense pages long. They were filled with detailed graphs and tables, technical jargon, and acronyms (see Figures 6.2 and 6.3). They had many appendices attached. In their content and form, they were the opposite of the Green Party's usual public policy documents, containing no frame that the public could readily use to understand the issues, no simple emotional narrative, no obvious value statements, and no quotes that could be easily pulled out by the media for soundbites. They were, Lakoff (2004) and Westen (2007) would characterise, designed to convince the rational rather than emotional brain. As a result, they lacked an obvious message that MPs would be able to use in their statements to appeal to the public to win support for their policy and opposition to the Government's.

Figure 6.2: Two Pages from a Draft of Part One of Kennedy's Background Papers



Executive Summary

Climate change is acknowledged by the UN's scientific body to be 'incontrovertible', and it is 'highly likely' to be anthropogenic (human-induced through economic activity). A rise in average global temperature at an unprecedented rate is resulting in more frequent and severe storms, floods and drought; plus a rise in sea-level.

The effects of ecosystem disturbance are being felt around the planet already, in food and water stress, ocean acidification, and coral reef decline. Sea-level rise will result in population migration from low-lying islands and delta regions.

Collectively the phenomenon poses a serious threat to social stability and is now on the agenda of the UN Security Council. If climate change becomes 'dangerous' (generally taken to be consequent to exceeding a 2°C rise in average global temperature above the pre-Industrial level), it will pose an unprecedented threat to the quality of human life. The precautionary principle requires an immediate and far-reaching response.

To ensure that temperature rise remains below the 2°C threshold, global emissions must reduce from the current annual level of about 49 Gt. to some 44 Gt. in 2020 and 21 Gt. in 2050. This requires a transformation from the present fossil-fuel to a low-carbon global economy within four decades.

The international community has to date responded slowly and without singular purpose or resolve. After two decades the basic legal framework for action (UN Framework Convention and its Kyoto Protocol) has failed to reduce global emissions. The current trends are projected to result in average temperature rise of 3°C to 6°C by 2100, whose likely effects are described by the World Bank as potentially 'cataclysmic'.

To remain below the 2°C threshold, global emissions will need to peak in the short-term – between 2015 and 2020. The 'transition period' of 2013 to 2020 is thus of critical importance. Developed countries will need to reduce their net national emissions to 25%-40% below 1990 gross emission levels by 2020, and 80%-95% by 2050. Developing countries would need to curb their national emissions substantially below base-line levels by that year.

For the medium-term, a global agreement in which all countries accept legally-binding obligations to curb or reduce national emissions is to be negotiated by 2015, to enter into force in 2020 and cover the period thereafter.

While New Zealand has been active in both the science and diplomacy of climate change, it has not developed an effective national policy.

- Its emissions record (both gross and net) since 1990 has been one of the worst of the developed countries;
- It remains the only one not to have entered a formal pledge for a 2020 reduction target;
- While it will meet its target for Kyoto-1 commitment period (2008-12), this will be through a spike in forestry some 15 years ago that was due to policies unrelated to climate policy.
- Its projected gross emissions for 2020 and 2030 show a continued increase that will no longer be adequately offset by forestry sequestration.
- It has rejected any binding obligation to cut emissions in the Kyoto-2 commitment period (2013-20).

Much of the problem is to be found in the weak and ineffective settings of the NZ Emissions Trading Scheme. To remedy this will require either the introduction of effective settings for the ETS, or its termination in favour of a simpler carbon charge (a tax with revenue recycled for relief and for climate protection purposes).

At Cancun in 2010, the 16th Conference of the Parties (COP 16) adopted a resolution in which all parties agreed that "developed countries should develop low-carbon development strategies or plans". The NZ Government has not responded. New Zealand needs a National Strategy for Climate Protection. This should contain:

- a series of percentage target reductions;
- quantitative 5-year carbon-budgets from 2015 to 2050; and
- a mechanism that rests on both an effective carbon cost per tonne (through market and/or fiscal measures) and associated complementary measures.

The National Responsibility Target for New Zealand should be a 40% reduction by 2020 (including 30% through domestic reduction), being 35.9 Mt., and a 90% reduction by 2050 (including 60% through domestic reduction), being 6.0 Mt. A series of 5-year quantitative carbon budgets to reach those targets is provided in this Part I. Part II of this Paper will explore the mechanism by which this can be achieved.

3

Romania	290.2	123.0	- 57.6	268.7	97.2	- 63.8
Ukraine	929.6	383.2	- 58.8	859.8	345.2	- 59.8

Source: FCCC/SBI/2012/31, pp.14, 15 (16 November 2012)
* Original data presented in Gg. (Gigagrams).

Kyoto 1 Record (2008-12):

Under the Kyoto Protocol, New Zealand negotiated a legally-binding 'national responsibility target' (NRT) for net emissions in the five-year period 2008-12 (Commitment Period 1) equivalent to the annual average of its 1990 (gross emissions) level. Its NRT for CP-1 was therefore 309.5 million tonnes (being five times the 1990 level of 61.9Mt).[37]

The Government must account for that amount for that period, and pay a financial penalty if it cannot.[38] It has been given 309.6 m. Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) and must surrender an equivalent amount at the end of the period to avoid the penalty.

Under Kyoto accounting rules, the Government can meet its NRT in any of the following ways:

1. By keeping its gross emissions for that five-period within the Initial Assigned Amount (309.6 Mt of CO_2-e emitted), and surrendering the 309.6 AAUs it was original given;
2. By exceeding its gross emissions beyond 309.6 Mt, but earning enough removal units (RMUs) through carbon sequestration from forestry that can be added to its AAUs;
3. By exceeding its gross emissions beyond 309.6 Mt, but earning some RMUs that can be added, and also acquiring 'Kyoto-compliant units' through assisting developing countries (CERs) or 'economies-in-transition' (ERUs) and surrendering these as part of the accounting 'true-up';

The most recent projection of New Zealand's emissions record in the 1st Commitment Period of Kyoto is shown in Table 5.

Table 5
NZ Emissions in CP-1 (2008-12): Estimated
(Mt Co_2-e)

Sector	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Total
Energy	34.3	31.6	31.3	31.0	31.7	159.9
Industry & solvents	4.3	4.3	4.8	5.5	4.4	23.3
Agriculture	33.3	33.5	33.7	34.4	35.2	170.1
Waste	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	10.1
Total Gross Emissions	**74.0**	**71.4**	**71.8**	**72.9**	**73.3**	**363.4**
Forestry						
Gross removals	-18.1	-18.2	-18.3	-18.4	-18.4	-91.5
Deforestation	2.8	2.7	2.5	2.8	3.5	14.3
Net Removals from forestry	**-15.3**	**-15.5**	**-15.9**	**-15.6**	**-14.9**	**-77.2**
Estimated Total Net Emissions	**58.8**	**56.0**	**56.0**	**57.2**	**58.4**	**286.3**

Source: New Zealand's Net Position under the Kyoto Protocol (MfE; released 12 April 2013)
[Note: the figures for 2011 & 2012 are projected. Decimals are rounded, and may not total.]

New Zealand will meet its Target for CP-1, though not by reducing its gross emissions – the projected level of gross emissions for CP-1 is 363.4 Mt., about 17.4% above the Initial Assigned Amount (309.6 m.). New Zealand will meet its Target by virtue of carbon sequestration from forestry of 77.2 Mt., allowing its reported net emissions to be 286.3 Mt., some 23.3 Mt. below the original assigned amount.

[37] The figure of 61.9 Mt was the original figure advised to UNFCCC for 1990. It has since been revised downwards (see Pt. II, Table 1).
[38] Canada, facing that prospect, chose to withdraw from Kyoto two weeks before the expiry of CP-1.

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Figure 6.3: Two Pages from a Draft of Part Two of Kennedy's Background Papers



Executive Summary

Part II develops a Climate Plan of Action for 'getting there' – following a pathway to meeting New Zealand's Responsibility Target of 40% off its 1990 level, including a 30% reduction in domestic emissions.

This National Responsibility Target requires New Zealand to reduce its net domestic emissions from 57.2 Mt. in 2011 to 35.7 Mt. in 2020 – a 21.5 Mt. drop within one decade, of which only about half is left. A 30% domestic cut means a quantitative drop in net emissions of 15.5 Mt. while 6.0 million international credits could make up the shortfall.

This ambitious yet necessary goal can only be attained through far-sighted political leadership and resolute collaboration between sectors of the NZ economy. Each sector will need to 'do its fair share' while retaining the right to enjoy inter-sector equity. Economic entities will need to regard the transition to a low-carbon economy as part of a shared global opportunity rather than a singular national burden.

The Plan of Action would be comprised of four parts: a mechanism for transforming the economy, sufficient fiscal capacity for governmental action, public-private sector cooperation, and citizen engagement.

The mechanism would be comprised of two components – an effective cost on carbon and complementary measures by the Crown. The carbon cost is applied to the market by a trading price or a carbon charge, or a combination of both.

- Use of the market through an emissions trading scheme would, to be effective, require the sale of NZ units through auctioning by the Crown, an end to free allocations, a 'one-for-one' surrender obligation for excess emissions, the participation of all sectors of the economy, a limit to the import of international credits, and border tax adjustments to prevent carbon leakage. The current ETS lacks all the above features, and is consequently failing to achieve its stated purpose.
- A carbon charge would simply require a fixed financial charge across all sectors.

Either an ETS (through public auctioning) or a carbon tax would return revenue to the Crown which would be applied to financial relief to households and to complementary measures for emissions reduction purposes.

In reducing its gross emissions and increasing its sequestration, New Zealand will find that, while there is no single magic solution, significant reductions can be achieved across all sectors. An initial carbon cost in 2016 of NZ$30 / tonne (approximately the cost in Australia since July 2012) will provide an incentive across all sectors to commence the transformation to a low-carbon economy. The carbon cost should rise, on a gradual and phased basis to provide transparency and predictability for the private sector, to NZ$50 / t by 2020, and $100 / t. by 2050.

An accompanying suite of complementary measures by the Crown will assist. These would be fiscally-neutral, through public revenue raised by the carbon charge plus a reprioritising of budget allocations, particularly from a reduction in roads expenditure.

A procedural mechanism would be in place to ensure that both commercial and household interests are not unfairly affected by the above measures. This would have regard to those introduced in Australia (the carbon-price claim procedure through the Australia Competition & Consumer Commission) and the UK (the Climate Change Commission). A set of inter-sector equity principles would assist.

A future government could convene a National Climate Protection Forum in which all sectors of the national economy would collaborate to the common end. The experience of the National Land & Water Forum would assist. A National Climate Education Campaign would engage the citizen in popular participation.

There is a responsibility upon government today, as the global climate crisis deepens, to provide political leadership – offering a vision of what is possible and a rationale for the economic transformation, in which a sense of opportunity and hope, rather than dread and despair, can prevail.

3

Table 3
Green ETS Settings (2014-20): Fixed Price & Surrender Obligations

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Price cap (NZ$)		$30	$35	$40	$45	$50
Surrender obligation: LFF, stationery energy, industry	67%	83%	100%			
Agriculture		50%	50%	67%	83%	100%

Appendix A explores how the emission reductions can be reduced by costing carbon in the manner identified above. The cost rise is extended, at the same annual rate of $5, through to 2030, reaching $100 / tonne in 2030.

Complementary Measures

Independent of the cost of carbon, complementary measures can be pursued to reduce gross emissions and increase sequestration. Such measures can be of two kinds:

- Activity taken by the Government, using public funds on public land. They can be undertaken immediately, and the beneficial effect can be more reliably calculated. The primary mechanism, carbon costing, applies largely to the private sector, whose response is less immediate and less reliably calculated.
- Regulatory powers to require certain entities to reduce emissions.

Public measures can take the following forms:

- Stronger minimum energy performance standards (MEPs);
- Fuel economy standards for the national vehicle fleet;
- Mode shifts to public transport;
- Afforestation on Crown land;
- Forest management through pest control on Crown land.

Regulatory measures can take the form of ministerial directives to certain public entities. Some NZ state-owned enterprises emit large volumes of GHG. It is a political question the extent to which their operations should respond to market price-signals or to governmental regulation. This is determined by the extent of ministerial powers over SOEs. These include:

- commenting on the content of draft SCIs (Statements of Corporate Intent) and business plans, including any aspects that may be inconsistent with statutory requirements;
- developing and communicating the Government's ownership policies;
- direct an SOE board to alter certain provisions of its SCI.[10]

Such powers of direction may not encompass the retiring of an asset.[11] But if a minister were to give a direction of government policy to Genesis that the use of fossil fuels and emissions of greenhouse gasses were to be minimised (including being brought within a corporate target by a specified year), this would need to be observed. Beyond this, it is open to any government to introduce amending legislation to the SOE Act to ensure specific moves are undertaken to such ends (just as occurred with the asset swaps between SOEs in 2011).

Complementary measures can be undertaken independent of the cost placed on carbon. **Appendix B** explores the quantitative emission reductions possible through these two means. The total reduction through complementary and regulatory measures from the year 2011 to the year 2020 is estimated at XX Mt.

(i) An Emissions Profile for 2020

Taking into account the effects on emissions of private sector responses (to effective carbon costing) and public sector action (through complementary measures), an emissions profile can be projected for 2020 and 2030. This is set out in Appendix A, Table 6.

[10] State Owned Enterprise Act 1986, sections 6, 13. See also Owner's Expectations Manual (2012), produced by the Crown Ownership Monitoring Unit.
[11] Joseph, P., Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (Lexis Nexis, 2007, p. 336): "Such [Ministerial] functions are limited to holding shares, settling statements of corporate intent and fixing annual dividends, and do not embrace the corporations' operational market activities."

9

Source: (Paper provided to author May 30, 2013)

Kennedy's intent with the two background papers was to explore, develop, and create a climate change policy based on the best scientific evidence and policy advice available. During a meeting with two top scientists on the issue, Kennedy described himself as using his parliamentary conference as a "hook" to "drive into" the detail of climate policy "which, as an MP, you wouldn't otherwise do." It was his chance to "force" himself to do that, he said. Kennedy truly enjoyed the challenge of working out the correct budgets and pricing. In fact, in one instance, we joked together at the challenge he faced, commenting that he was trying to do the work of an entire government Ministry from his much smaller MP office. But, there was urgency to Kennedy's work: he wanted to do the background working in opposition during 2013 to prepare for the possibility of being government in 2014 so that he could move straight to implementing the policy as quickly as possible if the Green Party was in Cabinet. Kennedy's goal with his papers, then, was not to primarily mobilise the public but to prepare for government.

Figure 6.4: Two Pages from *Meeting the Challenge*



Table 3 Required Domestic Reductions to Meet Domestic Net Targets, 2020 & 2050 (Mt Co2-e)

	Net Emissions	Domestic Net Target	Reduction Required
2011	57.2		
2020		41.7	15.5
2050		23.9	33.3

On the basis of the domestic reduction targets, a series of seven 5-year quantitative budgets can be constructed, from 2016 to 2050 (see Table 4). These budgets provide the 'cap' that is required for a true cap-and-trade mechanism to be effective.

Table 4 New Zealand National GHG Budgets: 2016-2050 (Mt CO2-e)

	2016-20	2021-25	2026-30	2031-35	2036-40	2041-45	2046-50	Total
NRT	224	165	140	115	90	65	40	838
Dom. reduction	241	200	185	170	155	140	125	1,215

Note: The budget amounts are calculated as follows:

1. 2013-15: Projected figures taken from MfE projections of 2011;
2. 2016-50 figures are five-year budgets reflecting a straight-line phase-down of emissions based on the Green targets of 2020 and 2050.

The mitigation curve is illustrated as in Figure A.

Figure A National Responsibility Targets, Domestic Reduction Targets & Carbon Budgets NZ Government and Green Models

5

There is no time to lose.

Failure to act with purpose and resolve within the next five years will condemn the next generation to a future of dangerous climate change.

Starting the Transformation

The transformation to a low-carbon economy will take between two and four decades to complete. It will require considerable political skill and societal purpose, but there will be less 'pain' than is generally feared: countries which commence the transformation earlier will benefit the most.

Within that period, a transition period of the first few years will prove to be the most critical. Strengthened settings need to be put in place, the public and private sectors need to develop mutual trust and a single sense of shared purpose, and the people need to 'buy in'. Once this is accomplished, the pathway will become clearer and, with the passage of time, will be seen as self-evident.

There is a responsibility upon government today, as the global climate crisis deepens, to provide political leadership – offering a vision of what is possible and a rationale for the economic transformation, in which a sense of opportunity and hope, rather than dread and despair, can prevail.

Authorised by Kennedy Graham, Parliament Buildings, Wellington

9

Source: (Paper provided to author June 07, 2013)

However, by the time of the conference, both of Kennedy's background papers had been set aside and the policy document published at the conference was very different, adhering to the Green Party's usual disciplined communications content and form (Green Party 2013d; see Figure 6.4). It was shorter. It included columns and a large percentage of white space. It was in colour. Bullet points and grab quotes were used on each page. Tables and graphs had been simplified. The language, especially, was less technical and formal in tone. The document communicated the message clearly and obviously: "There is no time to lose. Failure to act with purpose and resolve within the next five years will condemn the next generation to a future of dangerous climate

change" (see Figure 6.4). The document presented at the conference did not state a lot of what Kennedy had wanted to and it did not have the full complexity of scientific and technical working and language that he preferred. Instead, the policy document was media- and public-ready, disciplined in its content and look so that the Green Party's positions and messages were clear and obvious to even lay readers.

There were several meetings in which Kennedy's background papers were shaped into the conference's official public document. I was not present at all of them, but I did attend one important meeting three weeks before the conference between Kennedy, his two interns, the Chief of Staff, and Daniel, the Political and Media Unit's climate change advisor. That meeting was one of only a few where I saw the codes and rationalisation of political communication and the effects of adhering to its principles explicitly questioned. It highlighted the disjuncture between the usual disciplined practices of the Party's MPs in adhering to those prescriptions, and Kennedy's dispositions that he had built over a lifetime of work in the diplomatic and academic fields toward a scientific, rational, unemotional, intricately argued and caveated style.

It was a challenge taking field notes as well as notes on the content of the papers that would help me understand what the background papers were about but, as the discussion got increasingly exasperated, I realised that what was happening was an important moment and prioritised my field notes. I had not heard an MP and their advisory staff disagreeing during the 2.5 months spent with Holly, questioning – what I would much later realise – the way politics itself was done in 2013. Lempert and Silverstein (2012:23) called such an event 'a breach': "Moments when participants in a social system… are thought by others to flout conventions and norms, the reactions to which reveal much about what is taken for granted in that social system." This next section details the breach.

At the meeting, Kennedy began by describing the papers, which we all had printed out in front of us to work through. Kennedy flicked through the first paper very quickly, explaining numbers in the graphs and tables. It was my first week observing Kennedy and I had no idea what he was talking about a lot of the time, having never contended with the detail of climate policies before. It was a struggle to even learn the basics so that I could keep up. The description ended as Kennedy declared he and the interns were satisfied that their numbers were "accurate" and reported they would move on to preparing the second background paper, part two, the next week.

The first point of discussion by the group concerned modelling. Even though Kennedy considered that the numbers he and the interns had used were accurate, he noted that his papers were significantly limited by the lack of modelling his office was able to fund. He said he would like more financial support to contract some out to ensure their conclusions were correct. However, Daniel, arguing that effective mobilisation happened not because of the numbers that Kennedy was focusing on, expressed concern about the "opportunity cost" of modelling. He said that they would be better off running a climate change campaign to get support from the public on the issue and build pressure that way instead. That would increase the "political will" to implement the changes needed, he argued. Kennedy restated that he needed the modelling to make sure the Green Party's targets were possible, saying that: "You can't have targets if you can't buttress them!" However, a focus on numerical detail, while important to the extent that the numbers were credible, was counter to the Green Party's messaging practices and could not be the main focus of any public document because, as Lakoff (2004) and Westen (2007) diagnosed, detailed arguments over facts and figures did not win support. Therefore, Kennedy's papers were undisciplined – firstly because

they failed to clearly prioritise the main climate change message, and secondly because they focused too much on the detail of governmental policy rather than the need to mobilise the public to build pressure for urgent action.

The papers also had the potential to cause problems with regard to the Green Party's message that they were 'ready to govern' in coalition with the Labour Party. Daniel stated that people would ask about how their climate policy would interact with the NZ Power energy supplier policy the Greens and Labour had jointly announced just over a month earlier in a symbolic press conference. To disrupt that show of unity by announcing an incompatible policy would be a significant repositioning of the cooperative relationship between the two parties. The media and commentators could represent them as antagonistic and question whether they could work well together as a coalition government, likely decreasing public perception that together they had the competency to win and exercise the power of government. "That's going to cause us political problems," summarised Daniel. Kennedy stated his position that if there was an incompatibility between the two policies, then there was a very real "conflict of policy" within the Party's platform, but that "you don't drop climate change" because of that. The Chief of Staff agreed that the policy may have some effect on NZ Power, but Kennedy's climate change policy would not totally wipe out NZ Power's positive outcomes for the general public.

The Chief of Staff moved the conversation on from that subject without reaching a conclusion, saying that what he liked about the papers was that they were something the Greens could take to Labour in post-Election negotiations if they were in a position to be able to form a government in 2014. He said it would mean that Labour would "have to do work on the [Emissions Trading Scheme]" to get up to the same level of research as the Greens, whereas the Greens would already be prepared with the evidence going into the negotiations. He said that another thing he liked about the papers was that they provided a framework for emissions reduction, which the United Nations required and Labour didn't have. Finally, he concluded, it "buries" the Emissions Trading Scheme versus carbon tax debate, which he considered "strategically important when we sit down with Labour" to negotiate climate change policy. These two discussions about the interaction of the background papers with the NZ Power policy and the Green Party's post-election negotiation with Labour show that not only is there a tightly disciplined boundary between the internal and public political spaces, there is also a tight boundary between parties. Because message discipline prevented the papers being published, the issues in this discussion were never raised publicly. Further, because the Greens and Labour were not in a position to form a government post-2014, it is unlikely the issues were raised cross-party. Because they were kept internal, the representation that the Green Party was ready to govern with Labour after 2014 remained available in the public field.

Adhering to the messaging prescriptions of experts like Lakoff (2004) and Westen (2007) drove the production of the Green Party's public statements in 2013, but because the prescriptions are generally high-level principles, the specifics of how best to apply them to each situation or issue could be debated. Kennedy and Daniel disagreed about whether the background papers were messaged in a way that would be clear to the public. Daniel said that the audience for the technical background papers Kennedy had written was small and that "no one" would read them: 'No journalist's going to read it; it doesn't have anything about what it will mean for the person on the street'. Kennedy argued back that the papers underpinned the political message which would reach people. Daniel shook his head while Kennedy talked: it wouldn't. People would read it, Kennedy

continued. There would be three levels of engagement: On the first tier would be people who were cognisant of the issue, like the people who attended his conference, and they would read the background papers, scrutinise them, and then the Greens would "have a year of debate" with them. On the second tier were people like Green Party members who were interested but would probably only read the executive summary. On the third and final tier were people on the street who would pick up the political message.

Not reaching agreement on who would read the papers, Daniel moved on to discussing their entire approach which he believed would be ineffective at winning public support or achieving any political outcome. He and Kennedy disagreed on almost every aspect. Daniel began that the focus of part one was "too detailed" while part two was "too high-level." He argued that they should "think smaller" and use three "small examples" of things that they could do to reach the emission targets. They should "not necessarily join up the dots" into the overall framework, he said. Daniel added that the papers would "not be much use beyond negotiation" with Labour and asked whether they had to be made public at all. He repeated his earlier point that the Greens' 'focus should be on generating public will' for climate change policies so that Labour couldn't say 'the people are not behind it, we can't do it' when they sat down at the negotiating table together post-Election. They needed to make the part two paper "real, so that people can see the benefit to them," and it should contain "small, simple steps to put in place quickly," he said. Then, once they were in government, Daniel continued, they could use the resources they would have access to "to do this work later." He finished by saying that the work was "not consistent with NZ Power" and there could be "real fallout over that." Kennedy replied succinctly. He said he admitted that the background papers were "lacking a media focus," but stated that was because they hadn't "got there yet." "We will," he confidently asserted. The Chief of Staff attempted to find a solution, suggesting that the way forward was to spot the "sellable, understandable opportunities" as they worked through the papers' preparation. They should keep a note of the things that were "easy to pull out" and the information that they could "sell to the public."

Despite the Chief of Staff's attempts, Kennedy and Daniel could not agree on about whether the background papers should be made public and, if they were, in what form. Daniel said that it didn't fit the "positive communications framework"[78] because it was too concrete and not at all glamorous. It was not appealing to a broad range of New Zealanders. Kennedy interrupted Daniel, saying that was not what the conference was about, and that that would "come later." "What's the media goal then?" Daniel asked assertively. Kennedy said that he was not doing a media launch; he would just be distributing the papers at the conference. The length of the papers was a problem, Daniel said, exaggeratedly flicking through them for effect. Sounding frustrated, Kennedy quickly retorted that if they had "dumbed" themselves down since 2010, when he had written a 20-page report for a conference, then he could write a five-page report in a couple of hours. People had read his 20-page report without issue in 2010, he said. Daniel again stated that the only people who would read the background papers were people who were already "engaged" with climate change. We need to "engage" other people, he said.

Moving on, the group talked about the timeline for preparing and publishing the papers in the lead-up to the conference. Kennedy noted that they had a recess and two sitting weeks before the June 07, 2013 conference date, and he wanted the papers to be sent out at the end of the first recess so

[78] Later, when I asked Daniel about what that framework was, he said he probably was not referring to an official, codified framework.

that people had time to read them before attending. That was nine days away. In the meantime, , MPs and staff were busy preparing for the Green Party's annual conference – a major event covered by national media and thus crucial for representing the Party to the public. It was an extremely busy time. In the last week leading up to the conference, he said, they could work on a one-page political messaging document. He stated the two options they had for publishing the papers: one, they could publish them at the conference where they would be open to "Government attacks," criticism of the figures, and the Party would "show [their] hand to Labour;" or, two, they could publish them "in six months' time with more modelling." Either way, Kennedy asserted, the papers needed to become public so that people could scrutinise the figures. The work was "not wasted time."

The meeting ended with a list of commitments to further work, all of which centred on Kennedy making his papers more aligned to the Green Party's usual communications style, messaged appropriately for the media and general public. Firstly, Kennedy would prepare a one-page strategy document for Co-leader Russel Norman, the Political Director, and the Communications Director to encourage them to "buy into it for the conference and beyond," as the Chief of Staff put it, because they were unlikely to support the publication of Kennedy's background papers in their drafted form. Kennedy needed to work on "engaging others" through the executive summaries and part one. And, finally, Kennedy would need to have a plan for direct media communications and social media. Having reached agreement, the group left the tense atmosphere of the meeting abruptly and the room emptied.

One of Kennedy's interns and I went back to our desks located in a room across the hallway from Kennedy's office. Seconds later, Kennedy walked in, laughing incredulously. There "shouldn't be an incompatibility" between the background documents and political messaging he explained to us. He characterised it as the difference between his "research politics" and Daniel's "media politics," which he stated was a real tension between the Media and Advisory Unit and the Caucus. Kennedy exclaimed, "You can do soundbites like that, but eventually you'll be found out!" The papers needed to be published, he stated emphatically, and he would have no problem giving the paper to people on his own – he'd 'give it to Labour if they asked!' – "We're meant to be a nation!" He continued, saying that the "political instinct [was] to over-represent," while the "academic instinct" was to add caveats to everything and state your limitations clearly. The media approach, Kennedy characterised, was to say, "Look at this shiny thing!" He held up his hand in front of him, balled into a fist. He held up his other hand in the same action – "And look at this shiny thing!" It was wrong, he said; it didn't have a framework. "Not joining the dots," I replied, restating Daniel's phrase from the meeting. "I can't believe that! He said that, didn't he?! Don't connect the dots!" Kennedy shook his head in disbelief.

I went back to interview Kennedy in 2015 after finishing my first draft of this Chapter. I realised that I did not know what happened to the background papers after I had left Kennedy's office at the end of my fieldwork with him in 2013, except that they were not made public at the conference as, instead, the disciplined document in Figure X at the start of this section was released. I explained to him that the Chapter was about message discipline and he gave a mischievous grin: "Mmhmm." He was well aware of his reputation for being troublesome in that regard. Kennedy characterised what had happened since. He said:

> Well, they never claimed me!... It has to be said that I'm seen as kind of the intellectual walking around the Savannah and I think everybody's just decided to accept me as I am, and that I can't possibly be changed and turned into a decent politician. And so they gave up on the game and I'm very grateful that they did. Because I happen to think that there are other ways of doing politics and, as long as you're in the business, you should really be free to make your own judgements as to what you're doing. I'll tell you what, I don't think the difficulties in 2013 compare to the difficulties in 2015, quite frankly.

The 2013 papers had quickly become largely defunct as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change altered the value of a key value that had formed the basis of Kennedy's measurements and modelling. Responding to the science moving on, Kennedy "evolved," as he characterised it, to working on his 2015 climate change paper.

Kennedy's 2015 climate change work commissioned research from sector experts in New Zealand's agriculture, forestry, and energy fields to determine how New Zealand could meet a range of moderate to high emissions reductions targets by 2030. The main research paper was titled *Climate Goals for New Zealand in 2030: An Ambitious Domestic Emissions Target within an Appropriate Share of the Global Budget*. It was the same dense, academic style as Kennedy's 2013 background papers, running to a total of 25 pages. I was surprised because that brevity seemed markedly out of character compared to the 80-page 2013 background papers, but Kennedy quickly informed me there were also four annexes that were attached to the main paper, adding a further 62 pages. Even Kennedy admitted they "appeared to be long and turgid." But what the papers showed was important to Kennedy: that New Zealand could meet ambitious targets for emissions reductions.

The research paper and its annexes formed the basis of the 31-page Green Party discussion paper, *Yes We Can! A Plan for Significantly Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions* (Green Party 2015). The paper was fronted by James Shaw, the Green Party's then-recently-elected male Co-leader who had replaced Russel Norman.[79] *Yes We Can!* was to be Shaw's first major policy launch. It was therefore an important moment in messaging him and his personal political character to the public as the launch would be scrutinised by the press and commentariat to recover the meaning of who he was and what his leadership style and political direction would be, as well as what it meant for the Party more broadly (Silverstein 2011b:204; 2011c:70). Kennedy described the differences between his paper and the one that was launched by Shaw in September 2015. He noted that firstly, instead of the ambitious goal of a 70 percent emissions reduction that his paper showed New Zealand could reach, the Green Party's launched paper instead targeted a moderate goal of a 40 percent reduction:

> So out in the real world of what the voters would accept, that was 40 percent. And I didn't dispute it – that 40 percent would be public – and James was new and he wanted to make a splash... So, what [the Party] ended up doing, ironically, was a 'Yes We Can' condensed version of [*Climate Goals for New Zealand in 2030*], with some significant changes. One change was... we actually wouldn't do the agriculture [reductions]. So we fudged the agriculture and we'd say to the Government, 'We'll flag agriculture'. And the second thing was that forestry stuff; we actually had 12 different scenarios of massive reforestation of

[79] In January 2015, Russel Norman announced he would be standing down as male Co-leader and not standing for re-election at the Green Party's AGM in May that year (see Kirk 2015:A11). The four contenders for the role – MPs James Shaw, Kevin Hague, and Gareth Hughes, and Party member Vernon Tava – all campaigned to take over the position, with James winning the Party members' vote.

> different species. So, I ran up against close colleagues about the tectonic interaction between mitigation and biodiversity.

Thus, from Kennedy's research paper, the Greens chose the moderate reduction targets, excluding agricultural emissions in order to present a plan that was acceptable to the public and, ideally, appealing to voters.

However, although the Green Party did not launch Kennedy's 2013 or 2015 papers, he did distribute them to a small number of people himself in his own name rather than the Green Party's. They certainly were not distributed in a way that would reach the mass audience of the 2013 conference or the 2015 launch did via reporting. For example, the *Yes We Can!* launch was covered by The Dominion Post, a Wellington-based newspaper with a circulation of around 100,000 (Dominion Post 2015:A2). Other outlets also covered the launch. Even though Kennedy's papers were not shared widely, I was surprised to hear that he had been allowed to do that at all, commenting during our interview that I had never heard of that happening before and it seemed to go against the Party's collectivity and discipline. He laughed heartily in response:

> Well, what can I say?! Uhh, yeah, it happened.
>
> I mean, I personally think you can say 'Well, isn't that an enlightened thing for the Green Party?' Because I don't think I've brought the Green Party into disrepute and, if anything, I've got people thinking 'He's a wandering intellectual who's of no political consequence'. Well, that's fine, but I have my own answer to that. So, it's fine.

Here, again, Kennedy questioned what politically consequential and effective work and communication was for MPs. His papers lacked discipline in that they did not adhere to any of the messaging principles prescribed by communications experts or seek to appeal to much more than a specialist audience but, in his view, they had been essential. Kennedy's 2015 paper had enabled him to achieve cross-party membership in the Global Legislators Organisation, aimed at advancing "practical action on sustainable development" (Globe International 2017:Para.1). That, in turn, meant he had also been able to secure substantial funding needed to commission major international climate change research. Together with a change of Minister for Climate Change Issues, the signing of the Paris Agreement in 2016, and his own work in forming cross-party support on the issue, Kennedy believed he had contributed to a more "reasoned debate [on climate change] that's objective and academically insightful" in New Zealand.

Conclusion

Party unity and message discipline are both strong values among New Zealand's political parties. When parties are not unified and are undisciplined, perceptions of their competency and ability to govern tend to be viewed poorly. Unity and discipline are seen to drive political success. That was in evidence in the way the Green Party attributed their historic electoral success during 2011 to their clear and repeated key messages and, as those 2011 election candidates became MPs in the 50th Parliament, they carried their belief in the effectiveness of message discipline through with them into the institution. The internal culture of the Greens, Holly identified, had already been shifting to place greater priority on discipline and, when I was doing fieldwork with the Party in

2013, it was central strategy that shaped the way the MPs talked to the public. That belief in its effectiveness predisposed MPs to be disciplined and to self-censor their statements when making public statements.

Disciplined statements are repeated public statements that are limited, simple, consistent, appealing, and unified. They are made that way to increase the likelihood that the Party's most important messages are communicated to an audience. They are ideal as soundbites for use in media interviews or as a component of a Party's direct communications on their own media channels. They can also act as a riff (Crewe 2015b: 153) so that MPs have some freedom to slightly alter the form and content to fit a particular audience and situation. That can be seen, for example, in the way Catherine was able to shift priority among the +3 for the Denniston Plateau mining announcement to make a statement that was distinctive to the environmental NGOs' in order to increase the likelihood that the media could use her quote in reporting. MPs have to use their practical sense to make disciplined statements that respond to the media's needs, audience, and medium.

The Green MPs believed that speaking in a disciplined way was strategic and, for the most part, in practice did speak in a disciplined way; however, message discipline was not totalising either as a belief or practice. That is why, as seen in the example of Kennedy's background papers, there were internal practices that aimed at enforcing discipline, whether a tense discussion about the right approach and language to use or not publishing something under the Party's name. The next Chapter, about issues messaging, also shows that while the Green MPs believed in the effectiveness of message discipline for political success, some were concerned about whether its dominance was generally good for free and variable political discussion. Nonetheless, as New Zealand's political field functions by unity and discipline, all MPs were preconstrained by it and, consequently, their statements were shaped by it. The effect was that even though internally some MPs questioned message discipline, in public their statements and actions reproduced it as the orthodox form and content by which MPs speak.

The fact that message discipline works as described in this Chapter matters because it "produces an effect of censorship" in the political thinking of the public (Bourdieu 1991:172). Message discipline does that "by limiting the universe of political discourse, and thereby the universe of what is politically thinkable, to the finite space of discourses capable of being produced or reproduced within the limits of the political problematic, understood as the space of stances effectively adopted in the field" (Bourdieu 1991:172). The strength of this Chapter is in exploring what *is* said and *not* said by politicians as it unfolds, which has not been studied before. It shows how message discipline, both in its productive and curtailing forms, works to limit the "production of politically effective and legitimate forms of perception and expression" for the public (Bourdieu 1991:173). What it means for the public is that if emotional arguments are promoted by politicians while rational arguments are held back, then the public can only have access to an understanding of the political world and the issues in it with reference to those emotional categories of thought which represent the vision of the world put forward in MPs' statements. There are still alternatives to messaging, like the tradition of opposition and dispositions of individual MPs, that shape the production of MPs' statements. However, the increasing dominance of messaging and the high value New Zealand places on party unity means that there are reduced strategic and practical opportunities for more diverse forms of political statements to make up our 'political problematic'.

Chapter Seven

The Practical Complexity of Messaging the Issues in the Political Field: Society, Environment, and Economy

Bourdieu's analysis of political strategy is centred on his presupposition that parties must win over a majority of voters to win the power of government and be able to impose their vision of the world across a society. Because a political discourse is powerful only to the extent to which it mobilises people, Bourdieu (1991:189) argued that political parties necessarily seek to broaden their positions to win over the majority of voters they need to win governmental power:

> The party aims at winning over to its cause the greatest number of those who resist it… And the party does not hesitate, so as to broaden its base and attract the clientele of the competing parties, to compromise with the 'purity' of its party line and to play more or less consciously on the ambiguities of its program (Bourdieu 1991:189).

That broadening is not uncontested within political parties, however. Bourdieu argued that compromising the purity of the party's vision created a constant internal struggle between two groups:

> On the one hand, those who denounce the compromises necessary to increase the *strength* of the party (and thus of those who dominate it), but to the detriment of its *originality*, in other words, at the cost of abandoning its distinctive and original (in both senses of the word: new and fundamental) positions – those people, that is, who thus advocate a return to basics, to a restoration of the original purity; and, on the other hand, those people who are inclined to seek a strengthening of the party, in other words, a broadening of its clientele, even if this is at the cost of compromises and concessions or even of a methodological interference with everything that is too 'exclusive' in the original stances adopted by the party (Bourdieu 1991:189-190, emphasis original).

But this view is in some ways too simplified for understanding how modern politics works in New Zealand.

Firstly, as I explained in the introduction, under proportional representative electoral systems like New Zealand's MMP it is not absolutely necessary that a political party must win over a majority of voters to hold positions of power in the government. Instead, they may enter government as part of an arrangement by winning enough votes and being in the right position. That reduces the need for smaller parties in New Zealand's political field to win over those thoroughly opposed to them by changing their positions and purity. By seeking to appeal to 15 percent of New Zealand's voters in 2014, an extra 90,000 people compared to the previous election, the Green Party had a greater ability to retain the purity of their vision, values, and positions because they only had to attract an additional four percent of the voters of other parties or new voters.

Secondly, while Bourdieu undertook his analysis during the early-1980s, since then – from the mid-2000s onwards – rationalised political communication became entrenched as a dominant logic and orthodoxy of the political field. The result of the new prescriptions for messaging was that political

parties who seek change and who present a heterodox vision for the world, were offered a way of presenting that vision in an orthodox form which, by adhering to the content and form of messaging, the public would be predisposed to believe. Or, more simply: political parties were able to message their positions that did not have broad support in ways that would be more appealing to a broader group of people.

As well as showing that Bourdieu's analysis of political strategy needs to be updated for the way modern politics works in New Zealand, this Chapter also shows that the practical work of making messaged statements about issues that appeal to the public and which are politically effective is not as simple as adhering to the messaging prescriptions of Lakoff (2004) and Westen (2007). Parties and MPs must also take into account the context and specificity of the political field, considering what other parties and people are doing, what the issue is, what the party's credibility on it is, how well the messaging aligns with the world the party envisions, and much more. The sections in this Chapter on the Greens' high-level messaging for social, environmental, and economic issues discuss how messaging prescriptions interacted with what was happening in the political field in practice and with the Party's own vision and values. Using the Green Party's own evaluations of what was successful and what failed and why, I discuss how their social messaging failed because it was not distinctive to Labour's or relevant to the political agenda; how their environmental messaging was successful because they had the symbolic power to mobilise people; and how their economic messaging used orthodoxy to build credibility and political capital. Overall, this Chapter shows that making political statements could be difficult for the Green Party because when messaging prescriptions were meshed with everyday parliamentary and political work, conflicting practices and strategies sometimes arose.

Society: Good Lives, Fair Futures

The Communications Director judged the Green Party's social messaging to be their least effective. During my fieldwork, it was barely used at all. The Green Party's messaging on inequality aimed to communicate a vision of the world where people had good lives and opportunities. The full 1+3 read:

> *One: Good lives, fair futures:*
> 1. New Zealand should be a great place to grow up safe, happy, and healthy.
> 2. A more equal society is better for everyone.
> 3. If we guarantee essentials like (warm homes, enough food, good schools etc) we guarantee the opportunities (Green Party Messaging Guide emailed to author November 22, 2013, emphasis mine).

After I reminded him what the messaging for social issues was – he had forgotten it as it was so little used – the Communications Director described the origin of 'Good lives, fair futures'. He told me:

> 'Good lives' actually came from the UK. That was a UK Labour thing – that kind of notion about the ability to lead a good life. And it fits a little bit with the Greens too I think 'cause a good life can be a bit broader… kind of in the way that 'richer' was used as having a double

> meaning [in the 2011 Election campaign slogan 'For a richer New Zealand'], 'A good life' can mean both opportunity and also a clean life and stuff as well.
>
> And then 'fair future' was a little bit weird because actually a lot of people were in dire straits in the here and now. I mean, that's where if you just had child poverty, you could just say our top line message would've been to 'End child poverty' or something like that.

While their social messaging was supposed to be about inequality, in fact the Green Party considered their work on child poverty some of their most successful in 2013. That message mismatch meant that there was a practical mismatch between their MPs' campaigning on child poverty and their inequality messaging.

The Green Party's inequality messaging was designed to differentiate the Green Party's vision for the social world from the Labour Party's. While it was important for the Greens to show the public that they and the Labour Party could form a credible and competent coalition government post-2014, they also needed to maintain distinction between the two parties in order to retain and build their own support among the public to increase their percentage of the party vote. The inequality 1+3 messaging was designed to do that:

> [Social issues is] the area where, in a way, we've got the closest overlap with Labour, and I think just trying to find that point of differentiation. And that's where something like 'Good lives, fair futures', even though we never used it, was an attempt to do that. To be not just about redistributional stuff, but also have a kind of notion of what is a good life? What does that mean? We actually want people to have rich societal existences.
>
> One of the things we did talk about, but again we didn't do much work on, was that our differentiation [from Labour] was that kind of 'growing community'. And we tried to do it in our policies. So, things like Home for Life,[80] and school hubs,[81] and stuff like that were very much around that 'community versus state' [framing]. But, again, that didn't come through in our messaging.

Reflective of the overall cooperative-competitive tension in the Green Party's relationship with the Labour Party as they worked toward a potential coalition, the Greens' work on social messaging and issues struggled to find 'a point of differentiation' to maintain and build their own votes while also working together on areas where their visions were congruent.

The problem with the Green Party's inequality social messaging was that it did not match the Party's and other organisations' work on ending child poverty that was prominent in the political agenda during 2013. The Communications Director and I discussed that disjuncture when we talked about the change of messaging following the 2011 Election:

> Director: That was weird. It was always a problem actually, and I think it still is… [The campaign was] 'Kids' at the 2011 Election so, actually, there wasn't any poverty messaging [in 2013]. Where I think we got a little bit confused was after that. At that 2011 Election, it was unambiguously around child

[80] The *Home for Life* policy, launched in January 2013, proposed to allow families who were ineligible for commercial mortgages to make payments to The Crown in return for increasing equity in government-built and owned houses (Green Party 2013b).
[81] The *Schools at the Heart* policy targeted schools in low income areas to provide free after school and holiday childcare, funding for school lunches and nurses in schools, as well as a Coordinator who would work between schools, government organisations, and their communities (Green Party 2014b).

> poverty, not inequality and, as soon as it became [an internal] debate about [whether to focus on] child poverty or inequality, the messaging got a little bit confused as well. My view is that we should have just stuck to child poverty, 'cause I think whilst it doesn't tell the whole story, it was still our best avenue for winning support for the changes that would also address inequality… But yeah, our messaging. It was something weird.
>
> Jessica: 'Good lives, fair futures', which I don't think I heard.
>
> Director: No. I mean, that was the official one, but we never really used it 'cause it didn't really work.

Indicating the degree to which it did not work, in contrast to the environmental messaging, which was used in nearly every press release, the social messaging was only explicitly used in two during 2013. The first, in June 2013, stated: "All children deserve good lives and a fair future, we need to invest in solutions that look after our most vulnerable" (Turei 2013a:1). The second, six months later, stated: "Children need to be at the heart of our Government decisions because they deserve good lives and a fair future" (Logie 2013b:1). Both of those press releases responded to reports about the impact of poverty on children's lives.

The campaign on child poverty was a continuation on the Green Party's 2011 Election platform to bring 100,000 children out of poverty by 2014 (Green Party 2016:2011). Throughout 2013, Green Party MPs continued to speak about alleviating child poverty as part of a wider campaign with other organisations outside parliament who were mobilising around a call for the Government to provide breakfasts and lunches in schools for children in need. The Greens thought that campaign against child poverty was successful. Catherine said: "I think we have got evidence in that child poverty was something we set out to make a political issue. Not by ourselves, because Child Poverty Action Group and those other groups [were alongside us]. But, working with civil society groups, the Greens *have* put child poverty on the agenda. And I think that's a really good thing." Holly, who held the Children portfolio for the Greens, said: "I think we can take some, definitely not all, but some of the credit for the fact that for the last two years, we've been talking about it and putting it on the agenda in every way, and campaigning on it. And now there is a national level of awareness and a national conversation going on about child poverty." The Greens and other actors in the field were leading the political agenda on child poverty issues, seeking to put pressure on the Government and having some success in doing so.

The Green Party emphasised the political pressure that the breadth of public concern about the issue had created in their response to the Government's announcement that it would extend a programme that provided breakfast for children in low decile schools (Bennett 2013:1). Green Party Co-leader Metiria Turei's press release after the announcement began with the statement that: "Today's food in schools announcement is a victory for people power and the next step is to tackle the causes of poverty" (Turei 2013a:1). The rest of the press release continued to emphasise the work of the other actors involved: "I salute all those who have pushed so hard for food in schools to get the Government to finally come to the table and announce this programme… This shows that when people get together with a joint purpose the community can achieve. We want to congratulate Every Child Counts, Hone Harawira, Campbell Live, KidsCan, and all the others whose advocacy has led to this decision by the Government" (Turei 2013a:1). The decision to focus on "people power" was agreed at the morning call that day in order to "take credit off" the Government so that they

did not gain capital from the announcement. Seeking to reinforce their message that they were a positive political party, the Greens also sought to be upbeat about the Government's extension in order to avoid a message partial amounting to, as the Communications Director characterised at the time, "Oh, those negative, grim Greens!" Practically, the mobilisation and political pressure that the child poverty campaign had created meant that that, rather than their top-level inequality messaging, became the focus of the Greens' work on social issues. They needed to respond to the work that other political actors were doing and what was leading the political agenda, strategically judging that they had the greatest opportunity for success by maximising the political pressure they and others had already built on the issue. There was, therefore, a significant mismatch between the Green Party's official high-level messaging of social issues and what the MPs were practically saying and doing during 2013.

The Communications Director's ideal of 'end child poverty' had not been written clearly into a 1+3 structure that could be built word-for-word into politicians' statements, as Lakoff (2004) and Westen (2007) prescribed. Instead, in practice there was a lot of variation in the Green Party's statements on child poverty as they tended to respond to and criticise the Government's inaction. For example, press releases read:

- 'Giving all children in lower income families a child payment would lift 100,000 children out of poverty. This is the right thing to do,' Mrs Turei said (Turei 2013c:1).

- By continuing to deny the extent of child poverty the National Government looks like cruel fools. Just because they have their fingers in their ears and their head in the sand doesn't mean that child poverty will go away (Turei 2013b:1).

- Paula Bennett has to ask herself the question – does she intend to be the Minister that puts more children into poverty or does she want to be the Minister to protect children from poverty? (Logie 2013a:1).

Combined with the disjuncture between their official inequality messaging and their practical work, the Green Party's own lack of clarity on their child poverty messaging meant that they did not universally repeat the same language in all of their communications. While Lakoff (2004) and Westen (2007) would see such practices as ineffective at altering the neural structure of individual members of the public, in fact, combined with the work of other actors on the issue, the Greens considered their campaign to have been successful in building public awareness, support, and pressure on the issue of child poverty, and had even achieved limited change.

Environment: Love It, Protect It

If the Greens thought that their social inequality messaging was their least successful, the taken-for-granted use of their top-level environmental messaging indicated how effective they believed it was. In fact, there was so little discussion of the messaging during my fieldwork that I have very little to write about how successful they believed it was. It saturated their communications on environmental issues, used at nearly every opportunity to state the Party's vision and values for the environment.

The Green Party's 1+3 for environmental issues was grounded in the principle of creating emotion, used to evoke memories and tell stories. It was developed from their own long history of campaigning on environmental issues, and the genuine emotional connection many MPs had to environmental issues. The Greens also linked it to their economic messaging by emphasising the interdependence of New Zealand's environment and economy. The 1+3 read:

> *One: Love it, Protect it.*
> 1. Our kids have a birth right to… swim in a river/fish in the sea/gather *kaimoana*/walk in the forest etc.
> 2. We depend on nature so we need to look after it.
> 3. Our economy depends on the environment; no environment, no economy. We have a 100% pure brand/clean green image; let's make it real (Green Party Messaging Guide, emailed to author November 22, 2013, emphasis mine).

As well as creating an emotional response, the 1+3 was intended to create emotion and cement the Green Party's position and representation as the Party that cared about the environment. The Communications Director said:

> I think we should continue to use [that messaging], and which we try to use as much as possible… it was tying into a raw emotion around 'New Zealanders love our environment and [the Greens are] at the vanguard, or we're at the forefront of protecting it'. And that's our job. We're never going to *not* protect the environment!

On environmental issues there was an easy affinity between what the Green Party stood for, the MPs' own dispositions and historical practices speaking about the environment, and the prescriptions by Westen and Lakoff that politicians should speak with emotion about values in a way that others could respond to. That made the 1+3 very easy for politicians to use.

One of the campaigns which showcased the Green Party's practices of using their environmental messaging to mobilise the public was the 2013 Kiwibid campaign. It was a priority campaign for the Greens that gathered signatures from the public to add to a bid they had prepared to submit to the Government's Block Offer, the competitive process that allocates rights to deep sea oil exploration in offshore New Zealand. The Block Offer usually attracted private sector bids by large oil speculators. Theirs, the Greens said, was "a bid by Kiwis for Kiwis." The Kiwibid reflected the Green Party's position that deep sea oil drilling should be prohibited, saying that if the Kiwibid won they would simply leave the ocean untouched rather than searching for oil. The campaign slogan was 'Protect our beaches', emphasising the danger of oil spill from exploratory drilling.

The campaign was launched at Piha, an iconic New Zealand beach. There, Green Party Co-leader Metiria Turei exemplified the Party's communications strategy to create appeal by both evoking emotion through memory and repeating the words 'love' and 'protect' throughout her opening speech. Standing in front of a large banner that read 'Protect our beaches' (see Figure 7.1), she told the audience:

> My daughter and I have spent many days here, from the time she was just a little wee thing playing in the creek, running along the beach, hiding in the dunes.
>
> One of my most precious memories of this place is watching my little girl, then about three years old, running along the beach with our dogs, a shepherd and a foxy, in great looping

> circles all the way up to Lion Rock. The sun was going down, but it was still warm, a moment of pure love for children and pets and our beautiful treasured places.
>
> Every parent and every child should have such memories, such places to treasure. And that's what we are here to protect.
>
> We intend to protect this beautiful beach and all our beaches from the serious risk of deep sea oil drilling (Speech provided to author, 2013).

By speaking to her positive memories, Metiria sought to connect with the audience by sharing an experience they might have in common or, at the least, could imagine as a good experience that ought to be protected for 'every parent and every child'. The hope was that people would recognise that experience having already shared a similar one, and support the position that beaches needed protecting from deep sea oil drilling.

Figure 7.1: Co-leader Metiria Turei Speaking at the Launch of the Kiwibid Campaign

Source: (Green Party 2013c)

The emotion produced for the campaign was explicitly directed toward taking action. The Green Party sent out 'action packs' to people, asking them to gather signatures for the Kiwibid so that they would have a strong show of numbers to indicate to the Government that the public did not want deep sea oil exploration to happen. The leaflet inside the action pack (see Figure 7.2) was saturated with the environmental messaging of protection, repeating the slogan 'Protect our beaches' in large font three times. Readers were provided a four-step 'easy' action plan that they could carry out to protect beaches.

Figure 7.2: The Front Page of the Kiwibid Leaflet Included in Action Packs for Volunteers

Join the Kiwi Bid to protect our beaches

Right now the Government is receiving bids from oil companies for the right to conduct risky exploratory deep sea drilling in the areas shown on the map. This will be a vast expansion of dangerous deep sea oil drilling.

We are putting in a competing bid. A bid for all of us to protect our waters, not exploit them. A bid by Kiwis for Kiwis: "The Kiwi Bid."

By submitting the Kiwi Bid, we give the Government a clear choice. Pursue risky deep sea oil drilling that profits the oil companies, or accept the bid from thousands of Kiwi's who love our beaches and pristine oceans and want to protect them.

Deep sea oil drilling permits

Protect our beaches, it's easy

1. Sign up at Greens.org.nz/TheKiwiBid

You can sign up online or download a hard copy to sign. We will send you a certificate in recognition of your support. It won't cost you a cent, but could help save our beaches.

2. Tick the box if you want to be more involved

We will keep you informed about our campaign and opportunities for you to take action online and in your community.

3. Share with your friends, whanau and workmates

Ask the people you know, who like you want to protect our beaches and oceans to join the bid as well.

4. Send in your completed forms

Mail your forms to: Gareth Hughes, Freepost Parliament, Wellington.

Protect our beaches

greens.org.nz/StopDeepSeaDrilling

Source: (Action Pack provided to author, 2013)

Four months after its launch, the Kiwibid was submitted with 14 thousand signatures. Gareth, as spokesperson for oceans and offshore mining, was scheduled to hand the Kiwibid over to the Ministry managing the Block Offer to conclude the campaign. The media was attending the handover, so Gareth and staff prepared a speech that could be used by the media in their reporting and reach the public. The afternoon before the launch, Gareth sat down on in his office with his advisor on deep sea oil drilling Betsy, the Communications Director, and the Political Director to edit and practice the speech Betsy had drafted. They had to make sure that the speech said the right things to state the Party's position on the issue, negatively message the Government and its actions, and win over support for the Greens and their vision, all while being cohesive with the 'protect it' top-line message.

Gareth began by reading the five-minute speech aloud to the four of us in the audience. When he finished, the Political Director said that it was good to hear it aloud because, in her view, it sounded too much like a press release. It needed simpler explanations and much more heart in it, she said. The Communications Director agreed, commenting that he was going to say it needed much more heart too. He gave an alternative opening line they could use: "Today we are here because Kiwis care about protecting our beaches." He continued his evaluation, saying that the speech needed to "paint more of a picture" of what could happen if an oil spill occurred. Gareth agreed and said that the other thing that the speech needed was a sense of "urgency" and "momentum." Betsy, who had written the speech, was a trained scientist skilled at understanding and explaining details and processes; she said that she thought people were confused about the issue between permits and marine consents, arguing that the speech needed to be clear about the two-stage process between exploratory and extractive drilling. The Communications Director replied that he did not think it mattered. The speech that Betsy had drafted was "boring" and "technical," he said. Gareth said he wanted the speech to make two points: firstly, that the Greens were "championing" opposition to deep sea oil drilling and, secondly, that he had run a "smart, cheeky, and novel campaign." Thus, Gareth wanted to position the Greens as leading opposition to deep sea drilling and message himself as a smart campaigner. They needed to do that while also moving the audience emotionally.

That conversation was reflected in the speech that Gareth gave while handing over the Kiwibid (see Appendix I for Gareth's full speech). His speech did not mention the two-stage consenting process and, following the advice, focused on painting a picture of what an oil spill was like:

> Today oil companies from around the world will be submitting their bids to explore oil in *our* waters but the Green Party is proudly putting in a competing bid – the Kiwi Bid – from all of us who want to protect our coastlines from catastrophic oil spills.
>
> Watching the Deepwater Horizon oil spill unfold on television highlighted the risk of deep-sea drilling, but it was the Rena that made it tangible.
>
> Watching people in hazmat suits picking up oil, dead birds washing up on the shore along with closed beaches and closed shops wasn't academic anymore, it wasn't something you just saw on TV, oil on New Zealand beaches was real – you could see it, you could touch it, you could smell it.

The speech opened by highlighting the danger of oil spill, using vivid imagery built from Gareth's own experience cleaning up after New Zealand's worst oil spill that had occurred just two years

earlier. The aim was to make the danger real for people so that they would be emotionally moved to feel protective.

The second part of the editing meeting reflected the Communication Director's perspective, explained in Chapter Two, that the Green Party needed to give the public an emotional sense of hope that change was possible in order for them to invest in talking action. Continuing the discussion about Betsy's draft speech, he said that the last section, which talked about how the Government would not listen to the public's opposition to the Block Offer, sounded "defeatist." He said he would rather talk about times when protest had worked in New Zealand, listing successes like protests against mining in Schedule Four protected conservation areas and against nuclear ships in New Zealand's waters. In order to create that sense of hope the 'defeatist' section was changed in Gareth's final speech to reflect the Communications Director's advice: "New Zealand has a proud tradition of protecting our environment. We've said no to nuclear, we've said no to mining in our national parks, and we can draw a line in the sand and say no to risky deep sea drilling and yes to a clean energy future."

Finally, while drafting, the four agreed that they wanted to emphasise that there was a choice for the Government: that the Kiwibid was a "real alternative" to the bids they received from oil companies. It was a positive solution the Green Party was putting forward. The Political Director expressed worry about treating Kiwibid as a real bid because it felt a bit "dishonest," she said. But Gareth and the Communications Director both disagreed, with Gareth repeating a statement that he had given many times to different audiences speaking about it: "We've filled out the forms in triplicate." The four agreed that they did need to put the Green Party's alternative to oil drilling in the speech, highlighting their vision of clean energy. At the handover, that was reflected in Gareth's statement that:

> Our bid puts forward the vision of protecting our waters for all of us, into the future, not taking unnecessary risks with our marine environment, coastline, climate, economy, and our reputation.
>
> We are giving the Government a real choice, a real alternative to consider.
>
> When the Government is looking through the stack of bids from the oil companies they will find ours, backed by thousands of Kiwis who want to protect our waters, not give them away to oil companies.

Adding both the choice and solution fulfilled two purposes. Firstly, it adhered to the Green Party's practice of being positive by showing that the Party had a credible solution to the problem. Secondly, it positioned the National-led Government as choosing the side of the private sector and fossil fuels rather than 'Kiwis' who wanted the Green Party vision to be brought into reality. As a result of the discussion and redrafting, Gareth's speech adhered to the emotion, positivity, and framing that were seen to make effectively appealing statements for the Greens.

The environmental messaging was used in a taken-for-granted way by the Green Party. It was easy for them to link the top-level framing of 'love it, protect it' into their environmental work because there was a match between the language, vision, and positions that the Greens spoke about. For MPs like Gareth, who had a long history campaigning on environmental issues and who genuinely cared about protecting it, that message was also easy to use because it authentically reflected their

own beliefs and dispositions. The Greens believed that their environmental messaging was successful and worked well.

Economy: Smart, Green Economics

The Green Party had worked for many years to change the image of themselves as economically incompetent and dangerous, with – they believed – some success. While that was attributed in large part to the work of Co-leader Russel Norman built such a reputation there was speculation as to which economics-related portfolio he would receive in a Labour-Green coalition (see Davison 2013:A7), the Greens believed that another important part was their messaging for economic issues, which read:

> *One: Smart, Green Economics*
> 1. Our economy depends on our environment.
> 2. Fresh economic leadership for a fair and resilient society.
> 3. Clean, green technology that delivers green jobs (that are good for the environment and good for people) (Green Party Messaging Guide, emailed to author November 22, 2013, emphasis mine).

Figure 7.3: The Green Party's Economic Messaging

Source: (Author's photo, 2016)

During a meeting with a campaign expert from the United Kingdom, staff and MPs discussed the reasoning behind the framing. They pointed to a large poster board used for press conferences

and other events, emblazoned with the main slogan (see Figure 7.3). The Political Director explained that the main aim of it was to get was to get away from the frame that the Green Party was a useless economic manager who should be nowhere near the Government's books. They also wanted to bring the environment and economy together on the same side of the ledger, he said. Holly added that she thought the campaign had been successful because the Greens had gained "credibility" within the "mainstream economic frame" over the past four or five years. They had changed from being seen as "economically crazy" to being seen as having the next Minister of Finance as their Co-leader. The Greens viewed their economic messaging as having been effective at allowing them to speak to mainstream economics with credibility.

However, even though the Greens believed that their messaging on economic issues had been successful in building their credibility among the public, internally there was some discontent with it. The Communications Director told me that:

> We always had big disagreements over 'smart'. What does 'smart' green economy mean? The reason it was chosen was because most people obviously thought the Greens were hopeless on the economy. But smart also, I think, indicates modern. But it can also indicate smarmy or too clever and is slightly alienating 'cause you're also basically telling people that the way the economy is run and the way they're doing business is stupid. And sometimes coupled with a little bit of Russel's arrogance it kind of didn't fit.

'Green' also faced internal questioning because of its ability to appeal. The Director explained to me that MPs thought perhaps the words 'new' or 'fairer' would better represent the Green Party's vision by being more inclusive. He said:

> I think a lot of people wanted a 'new' economy that was 'fairer' and all of those things, but could get a little bit hung up on the emphasis on it being a 'green' economy. And even people like Catherine were like 'Well, what is a green economy?'... There was a perception that when you talk about a green economy, it's just kind of blokes building turbines, and green tech, and stuff like that. Whereas, actually, a 'new' economy opens up the possibility for a bunch of fairer things for women, new jobs, new companies, and new ways of approaching tax, and all that sort of stuff. But it's also potentially a bit more vague. And the benefit of a 'green' economy was that very much people knew what they were getting with us.

While considering the messaging had been successful publicly then, the Greens also considered whether alternative language could be even more successful in representing their full vision for the economy and appealing to the interests of a broader public.

The Green Party's ability to speak credibly about economic issues in 2013 was affected more by their policy positions than their messaging. During October 2012, Green Party Co-leader Russel Norman proposed that New Zealand's Reserve Bank should undertake quantitative easing to lower the value of the New Zealand dollar (see Small 2012 and NBR Staff 2012). Immediately, Prime Minister John Key stated that the proposal was "pretty wacky" and "could create a financial crisis" (Key 2013, cited in Young 2012:Para.1). The Economic Development Minister called it "fanciful economics" (Joyce 2012, cited in Chapman 2012:Paras.13). The National-led Government continued to use the quantitative easing policy to attack the Green Party's economic credibility well into the new year. In 2013, Russel's questions in the House on a range of topics were deflected by Ministers with references to printing money. For example, in response to a question from Russel about the

current account deficit and unemployment rate, the National Party Minister for Finance replied: "The member points to a number of real challenges for the economy… But there is no problem that he has come up with that will be fixed by cranking up the Greens' photocopier and printing money" (13 February 2013 687 NZPD 7778). Two Ministers teamed up to joke at the Greens again as Minister Joyce asked a patsy question to Minister English as a supplementary to questions from Russel about New Zealand's external debt:

> Hon Steven Joyce: Has he considered getting a really big colour photocopier and printing off enough money to pay off New Zealand's international liabilities, on behalf of all New Zealanders, sometime next week?
>
> Mr Speaker: I do not think that is a helpful question, but if the Minister wishes to answer it the Minister can.
>
> Hon Bill English: We have been advised to consider it, but I understand that the whole supply of them has been bought up by the Green Party, in anticipation of its opportunity (20 May 2013 690 NZPD 15074).

Those easy and humorous attacks from the National Ministers produced a clear and negative message that the Green Party was being ridiculous in hoping to manage the economy with an office printer. The relentlessness of the attacks, along with others the National Party was making at the time, meant that the Party's credibility on economic issues, which they had put considerable effort into building over many years, was ebbing away.

Attacks on their economic credibility mattered to the Green Party because they knew that the economy was an important issue for voters:

> The next election could be won or lost on who is perceived to be best placed to run the economy. So, I think it is more important than ever that we try to build our economic credibility and undermine the Government. This could be difficult given the economy is showing signs of getting better (Advisory & Comms report for Caucus, emailed to author May 14, 2013:1).

The National-led Government were perceived by the public to be good economic managers and, because of that, the Government possessed the credibility and power to be able to say that the Green Party's economic policies were 'wacky', 'fanciful', 'ludicrous', and would create a financial crisis, and have that be the representation that wrapped around the public's understanding of the issue and Party.

It was for that reason the Green Party dropped the policy for quantitative easing in June 2013, saying that although it was still the Party's policy they would not implement it if they got into government in 2014. Even though it meant a change in their position that could cost them votes from some people, it did mean that they could rehabilitate the damage that the policy had done to their overall economic credibility. The reversal was a double-edged sword for the Greens:

> Last week saw us… rule out pursuing QE if we get into Government. Most mainstream and right wing commentary of the QE decision was positive. Criticism of the decision came mainly from the Left. I think overall the decision was right and we came out of it ok. It demonstrated that we can both compromise and be pragmatic (lack of both can be seen

> as a negative about us) and it removed the main line of attack of the Government. However, we do need to be careful that we do not give the impression that we will sacrifice our principles and we need to be careful about other issues such as climate change and the environment, where there is a developing meme that we are not taking a strong lead (Advisory & Comms Report for Caucus, emailed to author June 25, 2013:1).

Dropping their quantitative easing position allowed the Greens to regain some of their economic credibility in mainstream commentary, even though it meant being criticised by the left. But even though the specific case of the quantitative easing was resolved, the reminder to the Green Party at the end of the passage above to be careful not to give the impression that the Party will sacrifice their principles exhibits the Party's ever-present concern for ensuring that they were and were seen to be retaining the purity of their vision for their world over pursuing power at any cost.

This section shows how difficult navigating the complexity of the political field is in practice. While the Greens still believed in quantitative easing as a policy, it was costly to the economic credibility they had built over many years as it opened them up to easy and sustained attack by the Government. The Greens believed that the public needed to see them as credible economic managers because that mattered to voters, so they set aside the policy in order to be able to rebuild and maintain an appealing representation of themselves.

At What Cost to Vision and Values?

For Green MPs, working to the logic of messaging to pursue governmental power was complicated. They believed in their vision for the world and wanted to make it real. They wanted the Party to continue to advocate for their vision, values, and positions because they believed they were right and would make a better world. But they also wanted to pursue getting into government so that they would have the power to implement their policies. That meant making their vision for the world more appealing so that they could increase their party vote. To be appealing, they used messaging which preconstrained the ways they could speak about the world they wanted to make. Gareth summarised this problem in our interview: "We face a real tension between trying to be mainstream in our current environment and do these small discrete policies which people think are realistic, but then not *miss* the opportunity once we actually get the chance that we've tied ourselves or painted ourselves into a corner where you can't actually make any real change." Catherine and Kennedy in particular were concerned that doing messaging to gain party votes was changing the way political issues were understood and expressed.

Like the other MPs, Catherine was not invested in getting government at any cost. While Bourdieu (1991:189) argued that political parties do "not hesitate" in compromising or playing on ambiguity to gain governmental power, Catherine certainly hesitated. Catherine looked at political change as a long-term project. Rather than looking just to the 2014 Election, a longer timeframe would allow the Party more time to create belief in their vision rather than compromising it to win votes in the meantime. If they did that, they would be able to implement more of their agenda in government even if it took them longer to get to that position. She explained:

> Catherine: I don't think we're a 15 percent party yet. I don't think–

Jessica: [Interrupting] What do you mean?

Catherine: Well, we're a ten percent party in terms of vote. We're not a 15 percent party. We want to move from a ten percent party to 20 percent via 15, and to do that you have to recognise what that journey is. And it's a long journey. I'd rather we just kept building; and then when we're actually in a position to be a really strong part of a progressive government, that would be good. But I'm old. I'm in a hurry but I'm not in a hurry. It's like 'sell yourself short' – it's a very, very, very familiar political pattern.

Building the progressive vote might mean that the Green Party stayed in opposition for a longer time, but it could also mean that when they got into government they would be able to make the changes needed to bring about their vision of the world because they had not shifted their values too far into the orthodoxy:

> Being in government, I don't care whether we're in government or not. I mean, we're s'posed to care but I just think there are good and bad sides to that. And there's a huge risk. And what I like about the Green Party membership outside of Parliament is that I think they're pretty clear that as frustrating as it is to be in opposition, *because it is so frustrating*, it's also important to do things on the right basis. And we can't sell our values… I don't want us to turn into something I don't recognise. And if that happens because we've got sucked into the importance of power, then it all feels like a bit of a wasted time.

Catherine's concern was 'turning into something she didn't recognise' by changing the Party's values. It was the wrong thing to do in order to get the votes needed for government, she thought. By thinking long-term, past the short triennial election cycle, Catherine believed the Party could maintain the purity of its values by allowing the Greens more time to win over the public's belief. That would mean they could get into government with greater support and power.

Kennedy's concern, too, centred on how much the Green Party's values could change in the pursuit of government. He was concerned about the way the Greens were presenting their vision using messaging but was agnostic about whether that was getting them closer to making the world they wanted. Talking in the context of former Green Party Co-leader Jeanette Fitzsimons's work on environmental principles like limits to growth, he said:

> We don't do that anymore. *We were*, up to a point, when she was there. *Now* what we do is argue the toss. We've basically, in my view, become an environmental party… it's environmental-*ism.* It's clean rivers, it's local, it's controlling dairy, it's mining. Fine. It's almost a green New Zealand Inc. version of the traditional national interest.
>
> And after that, we then take on in a much more pugilistic fashion – and I think there are arguments for and against pugilism in the House – Skycity, GCSB, and so on. I think the arguments for and against that are evenly balanced. I understand the arguments to do it: because Russel comes across as the effective opposition leader. You get votes. You get percentage points. On the other hand… the Greens were not seen as doing that under Jeanette, so.
>
> And I think there's strong equal argumentation. So, I'm a bit conflicted on that and agnostic as to which way the best way to go is [laughing].

Kennedy returned to the discussion later in our interview. We talked:

> Kennedy: Problem in my view is that since 2011, since the Election, you've still got [a lack of organisational transparency and clarity] but it has been exacerbated or intensified by an increased political dimension, part of which is more media-oriented, part of which is more politically spectral… I think that takes us further away from that philosophical clarity that I'm talking about. So I just end up thinking the best thing I can do is to do that work in my own personal relationship to parliament. And to the extent that it can fit around the Caucus table, fine; to the extent it doesn't, I just fall silent. Yeah.
>
> Jessica: Yeah. One thing I've been so surprised at, which I didn't realise before I came down to parliament, was the power of the media. I didn't realise it was so powerful.
>
> Kennedy: Yeah. Well, we allow it. We allow it to be… And to argue the counter-argument for a moment, because I'm aware of the counter-arguments, you can refer to the polls and say, 'Look at our quantum leap, and we haven't slid back, and we're up there'. And I fully acknowledge that, and that takes you a step closer to power and a step closer to junior coalition, and that's unassailable.
>
> Two points: one, it doesn't alter the validity or invalidity of your philosophical concept, this alternative [understanding of the world]. And, secondly, even if you do accept that, and you're into the power game and you want to be there: at what cost? At what cost to more superficial research? At what cost to getting into the gutter? At what cost to just letting the media lead you by the nose? At what cost to getting into superficial arguments, and the trivia, and the adversarial relationships within parliament? Which, as you well know, I'm trying to at least kind of leaven a little bit. So, you know, at what cost?
>
> Now, who's making those judgements in the Green Party? Anybody? Consciously? Possibly. Certainly some people subliminally, and the rest of us just take it.

Kennedy described himself as 'agnostic' because he knew that the Green Party's approach in 2013 was increasing their vote and making it more likely they could be in government. He was invested in that because of the urgency he felt to change New Zealand's climate policy; however, he was concerned about whether they would remain 'trailblazers' in government. Like Catherine, he questioned at what cost to the Party's values the Greens were willing to pursue government.

It was Catherine and Kennedy in particular who voiced these concerns. Part of the reason for that was that they had had long lives in politics before messaging came to dominate the field. Holly and Gareth, on the other hand, had not; being a generation younger, they had become politically conscious during the late-1990s and early-2000s, when the use of techniques of rationalised political communication were becoming firmly established. Catherine described it like so:

> Catherine: I look at me and Ken, we bring a sense of history and longevity that [Holly and Gareth] can't because they're young. And yet we're very, very different.

Superficially [we're] really, really different, but actually at a deeper level, [we're] driven by a sense of history. Like, his is all about the UN: history of the UN, that's what drives him, and the world global consensus. I don't even agree with that, but that's not the point. He's got a value set that comes from that experience. And I have a set of values that comes from mine. It's harder to pin down what the value set is with those younger ones, you know? And that's the difference. It's actually part of the difference that I think is worth exploring [in your analysis], is here's two people whose style is often quite diametrically opposed, but their value sets are, you can find out what they are and they'll put themselves out there and they'll say, 'This is what I believe'. He believes in the United Nations as a global consensus body, and that's how we should run things for peace and sustainability. I believe in green left revolutionary politics. And both those things, we'll stand for those, and so you can predict it. But with Holly, I could never tell where she was going to go on an issue.

Jessica: Do you think that's just an age thing, or do you think there's more to it?

Catherine: No, I think it's not an age thing… I could never tell with both Gareth and Holly, I wouldn't be able to sit at the table and guess where they were going to go. But with us, you can pick it every time. We wouldn't always be in agreement, but you could pick it. And it would have quite a developed philosophical perspective behind it. Whereas I mean with Holly, she didn't want to take sides because she found it painful to take sides. And that's a side. That's taking a side. Not taking a side is taking a side.

…Ken and I would never be driven by [Facebook likes or populism]. Ever. And I'm not saying we're better people, I'm just saying we came out of a time where people really thought about the political traditions, you know?

Of course, the rise of messaging as the dominant logic in politics is not the only explanatory factor for the difference Catherine sees between the generations, but it is a significant one. That new functioning shaped the way the two generations thought about and understood political issues.

Catherine did not use that generational difference to say that she and Kennedy were "better people." Rather, in our interview, she also talked about how she had also censored her public views about the vision she would like to bring about in order to appeal to the public. Because she was invested in the political field, she knew that she had to gain support for the Party in order to get into government. She explained using an example, saying that her vision for the education system would not be held among mainstream New Zealanders: "If I was younger, I could imagine being Minister of Education would be amazing. And I remember people saying to me 'Oh you'd be great!' [Actually], I have a really radical view of education, which would probably be far too scary; but I really want to change the education system." Therefore, although concerned about maintaining her more radical vision for education, Catherine showed that she thought there was some ability to shift to a position that would be less scary and more appealing to the public. She knew that she would be unable to implement her radical vision once in government, because it would not have mandate or support of the public and stakeholders. Catherine shifted her position to one which would be more appealing to the public so as to win their support for the less radical changes she wanted to make.

The quote from Gareth in the opening paragraphs of this section and the lengthier discussion from Catherine and Kennedy highlight that the Green Party were concerned with how the official public representation of the Party and its positions matched with the vision that the MPs saw for the world they wanted to create. As Catherine identified in her position on education policy, while the MPs could internally say and think things which were more radical or heterodox, the public position was the position that produced the Green Party in the minds of the public and it was that public Green Party that the MPs represented. Because voters gave mandate to the public position, that was what the MPs felt they would need to represent in opposition and government. The MPs did not want those official public representations that were the Green Party to stray too far from what the MPs wanted to do or be because that had the possibility of making the Green Party something that they did not want. However, they also needed to gain a larger percentage of votes to have a chance at bringing their vision of the world into practical reality. Publicly, then, they needed to be credible and appealing while also maintaining their values and positions. The MPs I worked with reflected often on whether they had the balance of party purity and appeal right while pursuing governmental power.

Conclusion

Previously, issues messaging has only been considered by anthropologists insofar as enables a recovery of a politician's relation to a voter constituency (Lempert 2011:193), what this Chapter shows is that issues messaging itself matters to both politicians and the issues. Politicians message issues for a range of reasons, including to build pressure on their opponents' stances, increase public support for their positions, increase their appeal, and more. But making messages that work can be difficult. Although the Greens could create high-level messages that presented their vision of the world in the way that Lakoff (2004) and Westen (2007) prescribed, to be effective those messages also had to work practically and strategically in the political field. That perhaps seems obvious to say but, because the production of political issues messaging has not been studied before, it is worth stating explicitly. The Green Party's high-level 1+3 messaging on social, environmental, and economic issues did follow the principles of communications experts: they framed the issues and were values-based, emotional, and positive. They were designed to be repeated across mediums, time, and particular issue in order to provide a simple, consistent, appealing, and unified message for the public about the world the Greens wanted to make. But, even though they adhered to the principles and prescriptions for language, the Greens judged that the messages had variable practical success.

In order to work well, an issues message had to have a congruence between vision, message, issue position, and MP habitus while also making sense in the broader strategic context of the political field. The Green Party's environmental messaging had that. 'Love it, protect it' worked to succinctly communicate the Green Party's vision for the environment across particular issues like deep sea oil drilling, saving Māui dolphins, or New Zealand's best beaches, and the MPs believed in it. Its frequent use also worked strategically to reinforce the Green Party's credibility on environmental issues and emphasise their environmental focus which differentiated them from other contenders in the political field. In contrast, the Green Party's social messaging, while communicating the Green Party's vision for peoples' lives, did not make sense in the broader strategic context of the field because the issue of child poverty was leading the political agenda and the Greens were having

some success in that area by building pressure on the Government to take action. It made strategic sense, given that other political parties, NGOs, and organisations were also campaigning on the issue, to keep pursuing it. It also seemed to be a way to gain public support for changes that would help alleviate poverty more generally, the Communications Director said. That meant that in 2013, the Greens gave up their 'Good lives, fair futures' messaging and their differentiation on social issues in order to respond to what was happening and achieving some success in the political field. Finally, the Green Party's economics messaging was working well in building the Party's reputation in that area, but came under threat in 2013 because the Party's position on quantitative easing allowed the National Party's Ministers and MPs to attack the Greens' credibility. Changing the position was a double-edged sword for the Greens because while it worked to undercut National's messaging, it also meant that they had sacrificed a policy that they aimed to make real and which many Party members supported. Therefore, while the Greens were predisposed by the logic of messaging to think about communicating issues in terms of their high-level messaging, in practice the fact that they were in a complex parliamentary and political environment meant the MPs had to use their messaging variably in order to make the most strategic statements for the particular situation and issue they were responding to.

While messaging issues in the political field was practically complicated, it was also strategically complicated. Bourdieu argued that political parties always seek governmental power and therefore, in the majoritarian electoral system he was writing about, always seek to win over a majority of support by – more or less, depending on the internal strength of the broadening or purist pole in the party – compromising positions, playing on ambiguity, or discarding distinctiveness to produce a wider appeal (Bourdieu 1991:198-190). The Greens, firstly, were hesitant about pursuing power at any cost – they did not want to win government at the compromise of their values and vision for the world or their ability to make them real once they had Ministerial positions. Secondly, they were also hesitant about the promise and dominant use of messaging as the strategy for pursuing government. The promise of political messaging is that a political party can use language in certain ways and not others to create public support for their vision and win government. Catherine and Kennedy, in particular, were sceptical of that and were concerned at what expense to political expression and perception doing politics by messaged statement was done. They were less sure that message discipline and speaking about issues in messaged statements did enable them to speak unambiguously or uncompromisingly about their vision and values, and were wary at what they felt was their increasing inability to do so because of the dominant logic of messaging. The strategic tension MPs identified was a result of the way that the drive toward messaging issues presupposes government-seeking through the pursuit of broader appeal and closes off options for other political strategies and statements.

That concern was particularly raised by Catherine and Kennedy whose political dispositions developed prior to the dominance of messaging in the political field. As I discussed in Chapter Three, the imperfect fit experienced by MPs in the political field opened up spaces for thinking about politics differently. Both Catherine and Kennedy, who were driven by a clear and steadfast adherence to the values they lived, worked, and thought about the world by, placed a priority in doing politics based on principled stands. To them, although messaging claimed to be about communicating values to the public, they were not certain about the supreme value it placed on winning wider support by playing on language while also limiting political expression through message discipline. But, despite those concerns, they also supported messaging and message discipline because practicing them meant that they were more likely to one day be able to exercise

governmental power and make their world real. Therefore, while concerns about messaging were raised internally, in public – where peoples' votes are won or lost – both MPs overwhelmingly adhered to the rules of the game so that they would be able to win it.

Chapter Eight

Messaging from the House:
New Directions for Questions for Oral Answer

In Chapter Four I outlined that the dominant view of question time among political scientists is that it is a mechanism by which the House can scrutinise and criticise Ministers about their responsibilities, management, and performance in order to hold the government to account, as well as allowing a mechanism for the provision of information and transparency (see Martin 2015:145-146 and Ladley 2006:57, 67). That view of the role of question time is accompanied by a view of how politicians practically master question time by thinking quickly on their feet in the heat of exchange in the debating chamber to produce an exciting verbal spar between Minister and opposition MP. Salmond's (2004:80, emphasis original) account exemplifies that view:

> *Asking* questions is… a skill that politicians develop over time. Nuances of subject choice, question wording, timing and delivery can all combine to produce a high-quality and telegenic question that a Minister hates to answer but cannot ignore. With supplementary questions, where most political points are scored, many of these decisions must be taken 'on the fly', taking into account a Minister's answer to the primary question and previous supplementary questions, the content of previous supplementary questions, the mood of the House and the interest or otherwise of the press gallery.

Contrary to that understanding, that is not how question time is done – at least for the opposition. In the Green Party, nearly no decision regarding supplementary questions is made 'on the fly'. MPs take a script for supplementary questions to the House and rarely deviate from it; if they do, they do so only in minor ways. MPs do not tend to take into account the mood of the House or the Press Gallery in the moment of asking questions. Questions are seldom changed on the floor as a result of a Minister's answers because, in the Green Party's view, there are seldom 'answers' given in the first place since the Speaker's ruling that Ministers need only 'address' questions. When question time is understood to be about "making a rhetorical point which the Minister ignores, then makes their own rhetorical point," as Gareth put it, it is not a mechanism that primarily fulfils its traditional role but instead becomes a battle of messaging people, parties, and issues for the public. The script of that battle can be arranged well before the MP and Minister even set foot in the debating chamber for the 2:00 p.m. start each sitting day. This Chapter is about how that works and why it is done that way.

Question time is one of the moments par excellence in which Ministers and MPs can attempt to message each other for the public. The audience that sees, hears, or reads about question time is greater than for the usual parliamentary business that makes up a typical sitting week. Especially in comparison to bills like the Plumbers Bill, question time is an event that receives broad and widespread public exposure. Clips from the day's exchange are used in news reporting, the members' and Ministers' statements and tone are discussed on current affairs shows, political parties use it in their own videos and infographics on their social media pages, and running commentary occurs on Twitter as it happens. That attentive audience means that question time is an important avenue by which Ministers and MPs can do messaging and make political statements

that aim to win over belief and support of the public. A politician, then, directs what they say in question time more to the public than they do to the other 120 politicians seated in the debating chamber.

For parties of opposition, one aim of question time is to message so that their representation becomes the one that wraps around the political field to characterise the MPs, Ministers, parties, and government, as well as the issues themselves. That was reflected in the Green Party's aim for question time: "Make the Government's position look unreasonable or untenable [while] conversely we should appear reasonable and our arguments should be framed in a way that connects us with the public/question watchers." At question time, they sought to 'Get media attention for Green issues, appear competent in the House, and put pressure on the government'. Thus, question time not only offered an opportunity for the Greens to appear competent and credible, and to message the issues, it also offered an opportunity to make the government look incompetent and non-credible to the public while attempting to hold them to account. It also was seen as an important avenue by which they could speak and connect to the public on political issues. In large part, MPs viewed question time as an opportunity to message and what was said during it was, therefore, a symbolic struggle to define the public's understanding of the people, the parties, and the issues.

But, the political field is competitive. The government too engages in messaging during question time. The problem for the Green Party was that they did not have as much symbolic power as the Government to define the field and the issues during 2013. That meant that question time posed a danger because Ministers could use their replies to MPs' questions to negatively message the Greens, damaging public perceptions of their credibility and competency. As a result, the Green Party's statements and practices regarding question time were driven by the need to manage not only their own ability to state messages but also the danger presented by the Government's ability to use question time to message the Green Party and the issues. Their statements during questions in the House were shaped by their need to avoid risk to the Party's message that they were positive, leading, and ready to govern, and to gain the public's support for the Green Party's position by winning the messaging battle against the Government.

The two case studies in this Chapter show that all questions in the Green Party were produced before MPs got to the floor of the House because they favoured managing risk by making question time predictable. The first example shows Holly and her advisors using their practical mastery to script the wording of questions to message the Government as self-interested and holding an indefensible position. Holly and her advisors were able to shape Holly's questions to produce the answers they wanted because they understood the positions, dispositions, and messaging that would generate the Minister's replies. Their mastery is exhibited in the exchange in the House unfolding as they had predicted it would. The second example shows the difficulty of meshing together Kennedy's dispositions with the view that question time is an opportunity to message. Kennedy's dispositions meant that he sought to produce questions that drew out an informational exchange based on the traditional functioning of question time, scrutinising the Government's management by using and seeking agreement on facts, figures, and measurable effects to critique the Minister's actions. The Green Party evaluated that that type of question did not effectively engage in the symbolic struggle because it failed to receive media coverage. Both cases highlight the mastery of position, disposition, and message the opposition requires to manage what happens during question time.

How the Green Party Makes Good Questions

Over the course of their time in parliament, the Green Party had learnt that some types of questions worked better than others for messaging, generating media interest, and holding the government to account. Strategically, they sought to prioritise those kinds of questions because doing so enabled them to lead the opposition in a way that meant they were both making gains in the political field against the Government and appearing to the public as good political players. This section describes the Green Party's practical process and strategy for making good questions.

Practically, the Green Party's work on questions began before the 8:30 a.m. morning call. The preparation time to take a bid to the morning call could vary. For example, an MP and their advisor may have been working on the issue they wished to question the Minister on for 20 days or more using Official Information Act requests, or for the relatively shorter six days using questions for written answer. At other times, a question may have been hurriedly constructed in just a few moments prior to the morning call on the basis of a news report that morning. At the morning call, as described in Chapter Four, MPs bid to win a question slot in a competitive process that determined which questions would be best on the day.

After a bid had won a slot at the morning call, work on the exact wording of the questions began. While an MP often took a draft of their primary and supplementary questions to the morning call, some of which would have been written by or involved the input of advisors, the wording of each draft was closely considered and redrafted if necessary before question time. The first question an MP and advisor worked on was the primary question because it needed to be lodged between 10:00 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. with the Office of the Clerk. If needed, redrafting between MP and advisor could occur in person, over the phone, or by email, depending on the level of discussion required and the MP's preference and schedule. Whatever the method, once the MP had approved the final wording, the advisor would print the primary question on pastel green paper using an official template, an MP would sign the piece of paper, and the paper, along with any evidence for statements of fact contained within the content of the question, were all taken to the Office of the Clerk for lodging.

After the primary question had been prepared to take to the Clerk, work began on the MP's drafted supplementary questions. By 1:15 p.m. the MP and advisor would have finished their redrafting, ready to take their supplementary questions to the 'supps' meeting. At the supps meeting, the Political Director considered and fed back to the MP and advisor about the drafted questions and practiced them verbally with the MP, often roleplaying the part of the Minister. The supps meeting took place in the Caucus room, around the large table. Because the Green Party usually asked two questions each day in 2013, there would be two smaller meetings occurring simultaneously, with each team of MP and advisor grouped together discussing the supplementaries. After finishing work with the Political Director and making any changes, the MP ensured that they had the exact wording of their questions, either in hardcopy or on a tablet, to take to the debating chamber for the 2:00 p.m. start of House business.

Strategically, the Green Party aimed to ask questions for oral answer that held the government to account, enabled them to message, and generated media interest. In an internal document, the

Greens listed eight forms of question that had a greater chance of meeting those aims; they were:

Wedge questions:	Quoting people who are usually on the [Government's] side, or who are a respected authority (OECD, Treasury etc.) is useful for framing the Government as out of touch and in a minority on an issue.
Money, new statistics, or lying:	If we can show that a Minister has been misleading or that they have wasted public money, these usually make good drama at question time. New statistics or reports can be useful for critiquing the [Government] (and can be relatively easy to find).
Gotchas:	Information we have that they don't (or they are relying on the wrong information) and that undermines their position.
Putting them on the spot:	Pulling information out of them that they don't want to be public and which is hard for them to defend.
Putting us into the story of the day:	Putting pressure on the Government when [there is] a hot issue, especially by providing new information or angles, or by providing newsworthy debate/conflict.
Form a series:	It is great when we can build a series of questions that has an ongoing story with different information in each question that build pressure on a Minister or the Government.
New information:	Breaking new information that isn't in the public sphere and that is media worthy. Related to this is creating new angles on existing stories.
Where we think we can help change [Government] policy:	If we are campaigning on an issue where we think we can win then questions can be a useful way to frame the issue and any subsequent change as being driven by us (Paper supplied to author, 2013, formatting mine).

Broadly, those forms of question codified the strategies the Greens had found useful message the Government during question time by providing evidence the Government was out of touch, speaking for only a minority on an issue, misleading, wasteful, holding untenable and indefensible positions, or under pressure.

Those questions were strategic because in the competitive political field the Greens could only impose their representation and positioning of the Government insofar as they could exert symbolic power against the Government's own representations and positioning of itself as, for example, 'good economic managers' who were 'building a brighter future'. Because the National-led Government and its Ministers could exert more symbolic power than the Greens in their statements, the Green Party often used the strategy of revealing new information that it had acquired or giving prominence to others' recent information or findings. Using that strategy would have the effect of giving the media something new that they could include in their news coverage and lend the weight of evidence to the Green Party's assertions. The media coverage garnered by the information they presented often meant that their messaging was included too, as an excerpt

from the questioning was broadcast or written about as part of the story or the MP was interviewed as a result of the questioning. That strategy not only meant that the MPs could question and scrutinise the Government in the House on the basis of new information, but that they could also increase the credibility of the messaging and vision their questions contained as it was reported on the news and gained a public audience.

As well as that broad strategy, the Green Party also had some more specific forms and practices they had found worked well for making effective questions. They were:

- In general, we should know the answer to the question so we don't get surprised;
- Don't ask about reports that we don't have;
- Don't do last-minute questions;
- Double check sources – [especially] any quotes from people;
- Don't rush the [supplementaries] process;
- One topic/narrative (repetition can be an effective way of making a point when they don't have a good answer and/or where we have multiple sources/examples that make the same point);
- Repetition doesn't work when they are not weak on that area;
- Short (generally one-leg questions);
- Open questions (rather than yes/no);
- Make your own argument and don't rely on Caucus/people watching question time having specialist knowledge;
- Process questions often don't work;
- Quotable lines get us cut through in the media (complied from two papers provided to author, 2013).

Like everything else about the Green Party's work regarding question time, these forms and practices are geared toward achieving predictability, clarity of issue and message, and media coverage.

No MP can make up primary questions 'on the fly': primary questions must be read as set before parliament, with the series of twelve printed out on pastel yellow paper and placed on each MPs' desk for their arrival in the Chamber. It was also the case in the Green Party that supplementary questions were rarely made 'on the fly'. All the work that went into deciding their strategy and wording took place before the MP walked over from the Green Party's office in Bowen House to the debating chamber as the bells were ringing. That way, the Greens could be assured that they had designed their questions and hopefully shaped how the Minister could respond in a way that worked toward their aims of holding them to account, messaging, and generating media interest.

Practical Sense and Predictability

This first case study is about the second question for oral answer Holly asked in 2013[82] and the first for which I was able to observe the whole supplementaries processes. It was an important question on a topic that garnered saturation media coverage from her first question they day before, and the issue led the political and media agenda that week. The interest meant that it was strategic for

[82] In 2013, Holly asked a total of four questions. Catherine and Kennedy each asked 10 and Gareth asked 13.

Holly to ask a second follow-up question on the topic to reinforce and build on the negative representation of the Government that was circulating. To do that, however, Holly and her advisors had to use their predictions of how the Minister could respond to their questions in order to make sure that they had the right wording to elicit the replies they wanted with the aim of generating a further round of negative media coverage for the Government.

The topic concerned changes to New Zealand's electoral system. Concurrently with the 2011 Election, the New Zealand public voted in a referendum to retain and review the mixed member proportional (MMP) electoral system (Electoral Commission 2012:6). That result required New Zealand's Electoral Commission to consult with the public about any changes to MMP that should be made and make recommendations regarding those changes to the Minister of Justice (Electoral Referendum Act 2010, s 75). The Electoral Commission received over 4,500 submissions to their independent review (Hayward 2015:211). Near the end of 2012, the Commission presented their report to Minister of Justice, Hon Judith Collins. Among the ten general recommendations was: "The one electorate seat threshold for the allocation of list seats should be abolished" (Electoral Commission 2012:5).

The 'one-seat threshold' or 'coat-tailing' provision is an infamous electoral rule in New Zealand. It means that if an MP wins an electorate seat, they qualify to bring in the proportional share of list MPs to parliament based on their party vote, even if the party itself does not meet the threshold of five percent of the party vote that political parties must meet to win representation if they do not win an electorate seat. That rule had been used strategically by voters in the electorate of Epsom to vote the National Party's support partner ACT into parliament and give them the chance to bring in extra MPs from its party list, even though ACT had not received more than five percent of the vote since the 2002 Election. Clifton (2012:211) described it as an:

> MMP rule wrinkle that National and ACT have been taking advantage of for several elections… [and] has given rise to a little ritual: The National leader meets the ACT candidate for a ceremonial nudge-nudge-wink-wink photo opportunity to signal to Epsom's National voters that National really wants them to vote for the ACT candidate. This is a gimmick, and rightly derided as much by the media.

The 'gimmick' was particularly controversial prior to the 2011 Election, when a conversation between National Party Leader John Key and ACT MP John Banks during such a photo opportunity in Epsom was recorded by cameraman Bradley Ambrose. At the time of the recording, John Key and John Banks had been sitting in front of a café window together where the media would be able to film and photograph them having a cup of tea together. However, Ambrose's microphone had been left on the table where they were sitting, recording the conversation between the two politicians. Ambrose said that the recording was inadvertent, but John Key said that it had been a private conversation and laid a complaint with the police. That led police to searching the offices of several media outlets who had copies of the tape, which the media strongly opposed (see 3news.co.nz Staff 2011). New Zealand First Leader Winston Peters capitalised on the recording, claiming to know what was on the tape and saying that its contents were offensive to older New Zealanders and also contained politically damaging information about internal leadership struggles in the National Party. Coverage of the 'Teapot Tape' saga "dominated" media coverage for ten days in the final stages of the election campaign (Robinson 2012:194).

In that context, the Green Party welcomed the Electoral Commission's recommendation to remove the 'one seat threshold' in their report (Walker 2012:1). Holly, the Green Party's spokesperson on electoral reform, stated in a press release that it would make a "big difference for fairness by making sure that the votes of people in some electorates [were] not given more weight than others" (Walker 2012:1). She reinforced the high level of public participation in the review process: "The level of public engagement so far has been fantastic. I hope that the public continues to engage by submitting their thoughts on the proposals in this paper before 7 September with the principles of fairness, proportionality and diversity in mind" (Walker 2012:1). The Green Party had calculated that legislation required to put the Electoral Commission's recommendations into effect would have needed to have been introduced to the House by late May 2013 to be put into effect for the 2014 Election. So, in mid-May 2013, nine months after issuing her press release welcoming the recommendations, Holly asked Minister of Justice Judith Collins during question time: "Does she intend to bring legislation to the House that will implement the recommendations of the MMP review in time for the 2014 election?"

Everyone was taken by surprise at the Minister's one-word answer: "No" (14 May 2013 690 NZPD 9041). When Holly questioned her further, the Minister replied that the political parties in Parliament had not been able to reach consensus on agreeing to the recommended changes (14 May 2013 690 NZPD 9041). Traditionally, changes to New Zealand's electoral system have always required the consent of all parties (Geddis 2013:15). What made the issue politically charged was that it was the political party to which the Minister belonged and which led the Government, the National Party, which was blocking the consensus of Parliament. That meant the opposition could raise questions about whether the Minister was working too much in the interest of her political party rather than in her Ministerial capacity by not trying hard enough to gain the National Party's consent. The Greens had the opportunity to represent the Government as self-serving and disingenuous, putting its wish to stay in power ahead of what the public wanted. In a press release that afternoon, Holly accused the Government of "putting politics before the public" by opting to "retain a version [of MMP] that best suits their chances of re-election," calling the National Party "undemocratic," and stating that the Minister was 'gerrymandering the system' (Walker 2013:1). She concluded that: "Our electoral system is being held hostage by a few self-interested parties… Instead of putting the long-term interests of the country first, the National Government has prioritised its own interests and undermined the robustness of our electoral system in the future" (Walker 2013:1).

The response to the Minister's surprise announcement that she would not be introducing legislation was "intense" and critical (Hayward 2015:213). New Zealand's leading publications ran opinion pieces decrying the Government's "naked self-interest" and "indefensible" retention of the one seat threshold (Armstrong 2013b:Paras.1, 5). Prominent broadcast journalist Patrick Gower continued his long-running practice of saying that the 'coat-tailing' provision allowed 'dirty deals' between parties, which created a "dodgy back-door entry to Parliament" (Gower 2013c:Para.5). "National has made its election strategy clear," he wrote, "it's once again going to try and grub an electorate victory with an Epsom cup-of-tea deal" (Gower 2013c:Para.1). The commentary was not favourable to the National-led Government and the Greens were pleased that Holly had been able to break the story which received "saturation" coverage in the media (Advisory & Comms report for Caucus 28 May 2013, emailed to author May 28, 2013). The prominence of the story meant that the Green Party had little choice but to continue to pursue it if they wanted to build pressure on the Government and make them look unreasonable, as well as to keep the lead comment and credit

for the story. It was a 'hot' political topic and to abandon it would mean their withdrawal from the political agenda and media coverage of that week, when they were successfully messaging the Government as self-serving and offside with the public.

However, the story was poorly times because the Budget was due to be presented to Parliament in two days, on May 16th. As the "principal Parliamentary event of the year," the presentation of the Budget is a major chance for opposition parties to try and cement negative messages about the Government, especially in relation to their economic management and monetary priorities (McGee 2005:277). That opportunity was significant to the Greens' efforts to try to diminish the resounding symbolic power that the National Party and Government could command regarding economic matters, especially in comparison to the opposition. The Green Party had been preparing lines of attack and stories related to the Budget to pursue as the priority for the week, but the MMP story meant those priority issues had to be set aside. Even though they were reluctant to do so, the Green Party knew that to abandon the leading story of the week, a story that was representing their Party as on the right side of the issue and the Government and National Party on the wrong side, would result in less political gain than switching to their Budget messaging. Their judgement was that not only would they lose the chance to continue to build pressure on the Government but that abandoning a topic that was top of the political and media agenda would demonstrate that they lacked the credibility and competency to know which was the most advantageous political move to make.

Therefore, partially setting aside the Budget week priorities, Holly was allocated the Green Party's second question on May 15, 2013, along with four supplementaries. She was to pursue the line of attack that the Minister was acting in her Party's interest to help their fortunes in the upcoming 2014 Election rather than doing the right thing as Minister and making the changes. Holly's primary question read: "Did she receive a response from the National Party following her request for party views on the Electoral Commission's recommendations; and, if so, what was the response?" (15 May 2013 690 NZPD 9927). Even though I had finished my fieldwork with her, I asked to join Holly for the development of her four supplementary questions that day as it was my first opportunity to see how it worked on a leading issue that would be getting major media coverage.

The first drafting meeting was between Holly and her advisors Kelly and Eve, as they fine-tuned the supplementary questions Holly had taken to the morning call. They gathered around Holly's computer, editing the written questions as they talked. The first issue Holly, Kelly, and Eve discussed was their concern that Minister Collins would say that she did not have Ministerial responsibility for the National Party's position if they took the self-interest attack too far, giving her the opportunity to avoid answering their questions. Kelly and Eve had pre-prepared a point of order to the Speaker in case that happened, as well as an additional supplementary question in case the Speaker upheld the Minister's objection to Holly's question. They were prepared for both eventualities.

They also discussed the strategy that they wanted to use with the line of questioning. They agreed they needed to focus on how the Electoral Commission had based their recommendations on submissions from the public rather than just the number of votes the legislation would need to be passed in the House. That strategy would wedge the Minister's Party's self-interest against the interests of the public who had submitted in favour of changing the one seat threshold. It would wedge the Government's inaction against the public's clear wish. In doing that, the Greens would be able to message themselves as speaking for and representing New Zealanders.

Working their way through the four supplementary questions, Holly, Kelly, and Eve discussed how the Minister would respond to each, fine-tuning the wording to make sure that they would elicit the responses that they wanted. They did this quickly – too quickly for me to write full the conversation down in my field notes:

Holly:	What do you think she'll say?
Kelly:	I think…
Eve:	She could say…
Holly:	If she did say… how do we come back to National not voting for the package [of recommendations] without coming back to Ministerial responsibility?
Kelly:	Narrow [the question] to the coat-tail?
Holly:	But what if…?
Kelly:	She'll probably give an answer with lots of 'bits'.
Holly:	She'll probably also say, "I heard from other parties and it was all over the place and no consensus was possible."
Kelly:	You could use 'Isn't it the fact that…?' to repeat points or statements back to her like Russel does.
Eve:	One of their attacks on us might be…

They also shaped and wrote down the specific wording of the questions for Holly to say in the House; for example, changing 'party' to 'Government' in one question to make sure there was Ministerial responsibility. They agreed that other questions needed to be refined further by the advisors after the meeting had finished.

Their speedy and fluid back-and-forth predicting the exchange in the House showcased their understanding of the game. They drew on their ability to anticipate the possible responses the Minister could make in response to their questions, using their predictions to work out the wording which would be most favourable to them and least favourable to the Government. That required combining their knowledge of parliamentary rules, the range of possible answers, the Minister's dispositions, and more. Their understanding of how Parliament, the Minister, her positions, and messages worked enabled Holly and her advisors to predict with detail how the line of questioning would unfold and, by changing the wording only slightly for each question, worked to shape the Minister's future statements in a way that would be more likely to create a negative representation and get more media coverage.

Continuing to decide on the exact wording, Holly and her advisors considered the four supplementary questions, discussing the consequences of the language they could use as well as the final political point and the flow of the series. Holly and the advisors talked about whether they should use the official language of 'one seat threshold' or the colloquial 'coat-tailing' to describe the rule. Holly decided that they would use 'one seat threshold' because the Minister had previously said that the name 'coat-tailing' was disingenuous, so she could use her reply to argue about the name instead of answering Holly's question more directly. The group agreed that the final question should ask whether or not the Minister would introduce legislation to make the recommended changes to MMP given that, with the Green Party's support, she had the number of votes required to pass it in the House. Kelly summarised the flow of the four questions: "Attack, attack, attack, and then a solution!" "That's how we'd draft a press release!" laughed Eve, "with a more positive end!"

That legislation question was "definitely the closer," they agreed. Finally, they checked the logic of the questions, making sure that each one built on the last and that they would elicit the statements from the Minister they needed her to make in order to continue the pressure and provide new angles for media coverage. "Have we got her saying National is opposing the legislation?" They asked. "We haven't pinned it down to National." "We've inferred it."

Having decided on the form of the questions, the group moved on to deciding what they wanted to table during the question. The first decision was whether they should separate out the documents to table or table them as a group. Separating them out could have more impact because the higher number could seem like there was more evidence against the Minister, and it might give Holly more of a chance to make statements before the Speaker cut her off. Holly and her advisors decided to table only one document: the Green Party's letter to the Minister that stated it would support legislation which implemented the recommendations. The letter of support provided the evidence needed to prove their political point that even if the National Party opposed a bill, the Government would still have enough votes to pass it. Kelly questioned whether the submissions to the Electoral Commission should be tabled to emphasise the public's support for the recommendations as part of their wedge strategy. Holly and Eve agreed together that that would not work because the Speaker would not allow them to table documents which were already available to members. As an alternative, Kelly suggested that the Parliamentary Library could prepare a summary of submissions that could be tabled: "They could do it in an hour!" But, instead, the three agreed that the Green Party letter was the only document they needed because it was "a nice thing to end on," especially with the wording Holly was intending to use to table it.

Finally, Holly, Kelly, and Eve returned to whether they had made their political point clearly enough. They were concerned about whether they had the balance between making sure Collins had Ministerial responsibility for the questions they were asking, and making their political point that responsibility for the lack of consensus rested with the National Party and it was their fault that popular changes to the electoral system were not being made. They agreed that Minister Collins' personality was "quite straight-up," meaning that she would seek to address rather than avoid questions. They predicted that, because of her disposition and frank public character, she would be unlikely to say she did not have responsibility. Holly stated that the primary question had been approved by the Office of the Clerk already so the Minister could not avoid that question, even if she might be able to avoid the supplementaries. The meeting drew to a quick close, with a final note from Kelly that she thought the questions were quite long so they would need to be word-smithed or they could accept their length and just leave them as they were.

An hour later, Holly and Eve met with the Political Director for the supps meeting. The Political Director read through the questions Holly and Eve had printed out for him. "They look good," he said. Then he gave more feedback:

First:	Could you say 'Given that…" rather than "If it's true that the Green Party', because it would be weird asking about the Green Party in a question and might open up the chance of the Minister saying it's not her responsibility?
Second:	Great.
Third:	Holly: "It's the weakest one." Political Director: "It has a political point."
Fourth:	Good.

"It's a great set of questions," the Political Director judged. Holly replied that they could "beef up number three," which she thought was the weakest. They decided to make a wording change to the second supplementary, based on a technical distinction. Instead of saying that the Government was looking to 'form a Government' with the ACT Party and United Future, Holly would instead say 'keep them on board' because those support parties were already in a Government with National.

A key aim of question time for the Greens was to generate good media coverage for themselves, their positions, and messages. Given the media focus and voluminous coverage that Holly's first question on the topic generated, Holly and the Greens looked to maximise their ability to retain their position in the coverage and drive the story forward. That way, through the news and commentary, the public would be able to hear the Green Party's representation that the Minister and the National Party were acting in self-interest rather than in the public's. Holly summarised for the Political Director what she wanted to tell the media and public. The three points she wanted to make were that it was the one seat threshold 'holding things up', that the threshold was "really unpopular," and that the National Party was not agreeing to the changes out of their own self-interest. The Political Director supported those points, adding that he preferred simple statements because they told the story more clearly. Later, Holly and Eve wrote a 1+3 to prepare for a television interview she was doing before question time:

One: If they don't have the numbers, it's because they don't support it, because we said we would.

1. We can only assume they won't implement [the recommendations] as a package because it's politically inconvenient and they need to keep ACT and United Future on board.
2. The only responsible thing for them to do was to adopt that whole package because it's independent, [had a high level of] public engagement, [it was] their own process they set up, and parties in Parliament were always going to disagree.

Holly created this 1+3 as part of practicing message discipline to make to make sure that her question in the House and statements for media interviews had a consistent message. By preparing and making disciplined statements, Holly would be more likely to present well in the media and get the Greens' messages to the audience effectively.

At the end of the supps meeting, Holly, the Political Director, and Eve talked casually about how the topic had unexpectedly led the political agenda that week. It was "funny how all this happened," mused Holly. The Political Director chuckled, agreeing that they thought they were going to be doing Budget questions that week before the MMP story became "massive." They didn't expect the Minister to say she was not going to implement the recommendations, he said. Holly said that she had been thinking about whether Collins had replied no to her question the day before with the deliberate intention of 'dropping it during Budget week' so it would get "buried" in all the Budget news. She knew that there were other Green MPs and staff who were unhappy that they were not focused on the planned priorities, but the timing was because Caucus had told her to bid her question at the morning call and she had won the slot. The Political Director agreed that it was unplanned, but said that it could be used as part of the "meme" they had in the last Parliament's term that the Government did not listen to people and to try and 'make dirt stick to them'. Therefore, even though they were less able to use their specific, prepared Budget week messaging, the Green Party could still capitalise on the opportunity of 'massive' media coverage to message the Government negatively to the public.

In the House, Holly's question went as she and her advisors had predicted. Her exchange with the Minister elicited the responses Holly wanted, with the Minister confirming that the National Party was not supporting the recommendations with the Minister' reply to her primary question: "Yes, this morning I have publicly released a summary of all party responses. As the member will now know, the National Party did not agree with key changes suggested by the Electoral Commission" (15 May 2013 690 NZPD 9927; see Appendix J for the full exchange). The predictability of the exchange contributed to its success for the Green Party, allowing Holly to appear "professional" and "good" in the House, as the advisors judged while watching Holly ask the question live on Parliament TV from the Green Party's office. Overall, they evaluated, it was a "Good follow-up to [the] previous day's question – [the Government] was defensive and it did highlight that it was National that effectively blocked the legislation being introduced" (Advisory & Comms Report for Caucus 28 May 2013, emailed to author May 28, 2013:2). Holly and the Party assessed that they appeared competent and credible, and maintained the pressure on the Government by making them look unreasonable for a second day of media coverage.

This example is typical of the development and production of questions in the Green Party, as MPs and staff use their knowledge of messaging, parliament, and the people in it to predict the outcomes of what they ask in the House. Holly, Kelly, and Eve all knew, for example, the range of replies that the Minister would be able to give their questions and used their ability to judge the future state of play to shape the specific wording of questions which would elicit the responses that would give them the greatest political gain. By making questions in that way, the Greens had gained media coverage on the issue and contributed to messaging the Government as self-serving and acting in self-interest rather than the public's wishes. It was that understanding that wrapped around the media's and commentators' representation, and which circulated in the public sphere.

Working with a Different Practical Sense

As I discussed Chapters Three, Six, and Seven, Kennedy's habitus often did not dispose him toward using the logic of messaging to think about politics and political issues. He often challenged the approach and practice of messaging internally but externally, for the most part, he was disciplined in his communications and said the statements that he, the Party, and its advisors had agreed to. Nonetheless, advisors could struggle to get Kennedy to agree to follow their messaging advice. The production of one of his questions about climate change during July 2013 showcased that, as he and his advisors clashed over technical details he wanted to include in his supplementary questions. This example highlights that Kennedy *did* understand what he should be doing – he understood how to play the game – even if he did not then do entirely as he was meant to.

Kennedy's question concerned New Zealand's Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) as outlined in the Climate Change Response Act 2002 and brought into effect in the country in 2008 "to reduce New Zealand's [Greenhouse Gas] emissions to below business-as-usual levels, and to help meet Kyoto obligations" (Hopkins et al. 2015:570). It introduced a market for greenhouse gases, assigning a price to emissions on the basis of units (Hopkins et al. 2015:570). In the system, emitters purchase units off others who reduce emissions, with the mix of supply and demand of units being a major determinant of the price of each unit. In 2013, New Zealand did not have a cap in its ETS, meaning that there was no "quantitative restriction on the overall number of units (usually corresponding to

a target for emissions reduction of the scheme)" (Richter and Mundaca 2013:424). Not having a restriction on supply decreases the demand shortage, depressing the price of units. In turn, the lower price of units reduces the effectiveness of the ETS in using price pressures to encourage industries to reduce their emissions.

Given that, when the Minister for Climate Change Issues issued an additional thirty million New Zealand Units (NZUs) to the market in mid-2013, Kennedy sought to question him about it in the House to "highlight the farcical state of the ETS at present" (Oral question bid provided to author July 11, 2013; see Figure 8.1). His bid proposed a primary and four supplementary questions focused on the effect that issuing additional NZUs would have on their price and the Minister's responsibility to ensure the proper functioning of the ETS. Kennedy's bid won the Green Party's question number eleven slot that day because it was judged to be a "strong" question, contained new information and had not been covered in the media before, and because climate change was a priority issue for the Greens. Kennedy had missed the morning call that day so I excitedly reported back that he had won the bid. Kennedy simply replied: "That changes my day."

Figure 8.1: Kennedy's Question Bid on the Issuing of NZUs for the Morning Call



Oral Question

ETS & Supply of NZUs

11 July 2013

Purpose: Highlight the farcical state of the ETS at present, and the

Strategic Priority: Yes – climate change

Media take: Could be high, with advance alert.

To Minister for Climate Change Issues

Primary:

How did he meet his obligations under the 2002 Climate Change Response Act, to maintain the proper functioning of the ETS, when he directed the issuing of 30 million additional NZU's?

Supplementary:

1. How many NZUs are currently owned by participants in the ETS right now, and by what factor does this number exceed annual demand for them?
2. Does the Minister believe that issuing 30 million more NZUs will increase the price of NZUs, currently trading at around $2?
3. In issuing 30 million more NZUs last month, how can the Minister claim he is having regard to the proper functioning of the ETS, as required under sect. 68 of the Act, when the overhang of NZUs is one of the reasons the ETS is not functioning properly?
4. Given the stated purpose of the Act is to "enable New Zealand to meet its international obligations under the [1992 Framework] Convention", and given that our ETS is uncapped, allows cheap hot air from Europe, and is oversupplied with NZUs, with the result that both our gross and net emissions continue to rise, is he breaching his ministerial obligations under the Act?

Source: (Oral question bid supplied to author July 11, 2013)

Kennedy had a conference to go to that day which left him little time to work on the questions. Adding to the pressure, both advisors on climate change issues were away sick so it fell to environmental advisor Betsy to help craft the questions on a technical area about which she had relatively little knowledge. Before leaving for the conference, Kennedy rushed around his office pulling out the papers that Betsy would need to understand and work on the question: the Climate Change Response Act 2002, the Directive with the Minister's signature on it that had issued the NZUs ("It's gold," Kennedy said, "be careful with it"), and some other papers. Speaking quickly because he was running late for his taxi, Kennedy explained to Betsy that the Minister for Climate Change Issues had issued a number of NZUs, which meant the extra supply would deflate the price and make the ETS ineffective at curbing emissions. The political point he wanted to make with the question, he said, was that the Minister had not met his obligations under the Climate Change Response Act 2002. He ended by saying he would email her and me a copy of the statement he had prepared for a general debate in the House. At that, he promptly rushed out of the office to the waiting taxi.

Betsy picked up the papers Kennedy had laid out across his office couch to start work on drafting his questions. She invited me to follow her down to the Political and Media Unit to see what happened, an offer I gladly accepted as I had not seen the development of questions for oral answer from an advisor's perspective before. I sat down next to Betsy at her desk in the open plan office. Her first task was to get the primary question to the Office of the Clerk so it could be lodged; once that was done, she would start on the supplementary questions. Everyone could see that it was my first time observing what advisors did; in the open plan office, my presence was obvious. Another advisor walked by Betsy's desk and joked that I was grading her work. Betsy laughed, and I nervously (and badly) joked back that I should get some gold stars to hand out at the end of my fieldwork.

Betsy worked on the primary question with the Political Director who was seated a few desks away. They spoke to each other across the open room as they tested different formulations. The primary question Kennedy had drafted for the morning call (see Figure 8.1) was "wordy" so Betsy wanted to simplify it. After changing it, she said to the Political Director: "I've had a crack at it, flicking it through to you now!" He replied that he had just sent her a version he had had "a crack at." They looked at each other's emails and quickly assessed whether they should add in the date that the Ministerial Directive had been made. They decided against it; the date was "not great," judged the Political Director. It was more than three weeks ago, a long time-lag for questions with new information to be raised in the House and well past its date to typically be considered newsworthy. Leaving the date out disguised that and gave the issue a greater chance of getting into the media.

While working, Betsy explained to me what she thought about when writing primary questions. Firstly, she said, she thought "about what political point [she wanted] to make." Secondly, she needed to make sure that the Minister had responsibility for the issue. That was especially significant for Kennedy's question that day because she had to factor in that a Minister only has responsibility for the Act itself and not what anyone does under the Act. Finally, she finished, any facts needed to be able to be authenticated as true by the Office of the Clerk.

After the wording of the primary question had been emailed to Kennedy for approval, Betsy started work on its authentication and the supplementary questions. She looked up the Climate Change Response Act 2002 online, found the part that was referenced in the primary question, printed it

out, and then highlighted the relevant section. She also found a press release from a New Zealand university which showed that greenhouse gases were regulated by the ETS. Those two sources proved the assertion of facts in Kennedy's primary question. With that complete and with Kennedy not yet having emailed back to approve the primary, Betsy got to work on drafting the supplementary questions. She said she was trying to make them "clearer for the media" and laypeople, reflecting prescriptions for simple statements that avoided technical facts, figures, and jargon as well as the Greens' own experience that simple questions that did not rely on specialist knowledge worked best. The thinking was that Kennedy would not be able to effectively communicate his political point if people had trouble understanding it.

The Political Director spoke across the room, saying he had just received a "literal okay" from Kennedy: Kennedy had given a one-word reply approving the primary. The Political Director light-heartedly said that he thought it might be a grumpy okay, based on its brevity. Eve, another advisor, joined the conversation, cautioning that they should not read into it because it might just be that he was busy. In either case, since the wording had been approved, Betsy printed the question out in the official template on pastel green paper required for the lodging. We walked along the corridor to Co-leader Metiria Turei's office, where she read over the question and put her signature on the paper so that Betsy could take it to the Office of the Clerk.

Back at her desk, Betsy looked back over the question and double-checked her authentication to make sure it was all correct. Noticing a discrepancy, she raised a concern with the Political Director that the Climate Change Act 2002 said that the Minister should "have regard for" the functioning of the ETS, while the primary question she had prepared and had signed off inaccurately read that he had a responsibility "to maintain the proper" functioning of it. The Political Director advised that they should try to get the 'maintain' wording in the question, but have the 'regard' wording as backup if the Clerk did not approve it. Betsy changed the wording in the template, printed out the backup question on pastel green paper, walked the corridor back to Metiria's office, and explained what had happened before Metiria signed the backup.

At 10:00 a.m., we walked through the underground tunnel that connects Bowen House to the rest of the parliamentary precinct to lodge the question in Parliament House. The Clerk's office had a small foyer entrance where we waited with another political party's staff member before being called into a second room where the Clerk was seated at a small, round table. The small table seemed out of proportion with the heavy floor-to-ceiling wooden bookcases filled with matching bound volumes that dominated the room, giving an air of history and gravitas. Betsy gave her piece of paper to the Clerk and two small changes were made to the question: the date was moved from before to after the name of the Act, as was correct form, and 'NZU' was unabbreviated to New Zealand Units. The Green Party's question was ticked off and we left the room. Betsy was pleased that their 'to maintain the proper functioning' wording had been approved, surmising that the Clerk may have been distracted by what the acronym NZU meant.

Kennedy had returned from the conference in time for supps meeting at 1:15 p.m. He, the Political Director, Betsy and I all sat in Kennedy's office to talk about the draft supplementaries Betsy had prepared (see Figure 8.2). There were only three supplementary questions, and they had been heavily edited in comparison to the morning call's bid. Betsy had simplified the technical nature of Kennedy's questions by, for example, removing the reference to an overhang and decreasing the number of clauses in the questions. Betsy had aimed her questions toward the media and public,

who were unlikely to have the same expert knowledge on the functioning of the ETS that Kennedy and the Minister for Climate Change Issues did.

Figure 8.2: Betsy's Drafted Supplementary Questions on the Issuing of NZUs

How did he meet his obligations under the Climate Change Response Act 2002 to maintain the proper functioning of the ETS when he directed the issuing of 30 million additional New Zealand Units?

Supps:
Given that [redacted] estimated that there were 85 million too many NZUs in May, how can he justify the issuing of 30 million additional units in June?

Does the Minister believe that issuing 30 million more NZUs will increase the price of NZUs, currently trading at around $2; if not, how will the additional NZUs incentivise decarbonisation of our economy?

How is having a carbon unit worth around $2 meeting his Ministerial obligations under the Climate Change Response Act, to maintain a functioning ETS, given that our gross and net carbon emissions continue to rise?

Source: (Draft Supplementary Questions provided to author July 11, 2013)

Sitting down to decide on the supplementaries, the first issue Kennedy raised was the question of 'overhang', which is the additional supply of NZUs in the ETS once demand has been met. I was not sure why Kennedy was talking about the definition of overhang as the word was not mentioned in any of Betsy's questions. I later realised that he was working off the supplementaries he had written for his morning call bid (see Figure 8.1) and also questioning the entire foundation of what he was going to be asking the Minister, considering whether there was, in fact, an oversupply of NZUs in the ETS. He explained: there were 80 to 85 million NZUs in circulation, with an annual demand of 15 to 16 million NZUs. Therefore, the economists judged that there was an excess of four to five years demand in the system, which meant a "huge" overhang in the magnitude of four or five times the balanced amount. Conversely, Kennedy continued, NZU traders said there was not an overhang because of a market phenomenon of that saw companies holding their NZUs in reserve rather than selling them. That meant that even though there might be an excess of NZUs, effectively not all of them were in circulation, which meant there was arguably less of an excess. Even though Kennedy's consideration raised an important question about the reality of an excess, it was far too late to alter the entire premise of the question as the primary had been lodged and there were only 45 minutes until question time began. There was not enough time to properly prepare a new line of questioning based on the primary he was going to be asking. Steering to avoid that path, the Political Director clarified: were there "too many" NZUs in the market? Though reluctant to end the discussion of the complex issue, Kennedy concluded that yes, there was an overhang.

Kennedy worked off his own question bid that had been put to the morning call rather than Betsy's new drafts. He read the first supplementary question aloud: "How many NZUs are currently owned by participants in the ETS right now, and by what factor does this number exceed annual demand for them?" He then explained the importance of the question to the Political Director, Betsy, and I. The problem with the ETS, he said, was a "huge amount of lack of transparency" and he would "love to put [that question] to the Minister and get an answer on it." The Political Director disagreed though. The question was "so specific" that the Minister would just "go back to rhetoric" and avoid answering the question. Kennedy replied that if that happened, he would call a point of order on

the Minister, who would be forced to concede he did not know the answer to Kennedy's question; then Kennedy would have him "on record as refusing to address" it. Kennedy, taking a more traditional approach to question time, wanted to get the Minister to officially state the number of NZUs and excess for the public record while the Political Director anticipated the Minister would not provide an answer but instead use the opportunity to message the issue. Given his prediction that the Minister would not give a substantive answer or even a substantive non-answer that the Greens could use for their own agenda, the Political Director suggested that it would be better as a written question rather than an oral one.

Kennedy considered the alternative first supplementary that Betsy had written: "Given that [NZU Trading Company] estimated that there were 85 million too many New Zealand Units in May, how can he justify the issuing of 30 million additional units in June?" The first problem with that was that the Minister could dispute the number of 85 million, Kennedy said, and the second problem was that the number from the trading company was for their paying clients so he was not sure it was for the general public. Again, seeking to avoid a lengthy debate about the intricacies of overhang, the Political Director stated that there was a "general understanding" that there were 85 million NZUs, and said that they could just take out the trading company's name and leave the question as it was.

The disagreements between Kennedy, the Political Director, and Betsy continued. They centred on a difference of opinion about who questions for oral answer should be directed toward. The Political Director said that Kennedy only had three supplementary questions, so he had to "get to the political point." "That is the political point," replied Kennedy: 'there is an oversupply of NZUs'. The Political Director said that Kennedy needed to think about who the audience for his question was, noting that they both already knew they disagreed about who the audience for questions in the House was. They had had that conversation before. The Political Director stated that he thought the audience for questions was the public and the Press Gallery. That reflected the Green Party's strategy to use framing to 'connect' with the public and question watchers, get media attention for green issues, and put pressure on the government by mobilising the public. Kennedy, however, tended to approach question time primarily as a traditional, internally-directed opportunity to hold Ministers to account to the House of Representatives, asking questions which scrutinised the substance of their work and actions rather than seeking to engage too much in the rhetorical messaging struggle that other MPs saw as the new way that question time occurred. Kennedy, seeming frustrated, did not reply to the Political Director's assessment of their disagreement.

The group instead turned to the wording of the questions, and the disagreements continued. Speaking to Betsy's first draft question still, Kennedy requested that "too many NZUs" be changed to "exceeding annual demand" or similar. They also disagreed about whether there should be a "broad statement of fact" that supply "vastly exceeds demand for units" or whether the number should be stated "more explicitly." Kennedy argued for more precision in the question. Betsy instead suggested that Kennedy could just say that the number of oversupplied NZUs was 70 million, worked out by taking away the 15 million annual demand from the 85 million supply. Reflecting the views of Lakoff (2004) and Westen (2007) that facts and figures did not win political arguments and support, the Political Director said he could appreciate Kennedy's view on the need for numbers but that if Kennedy used them in the way that he wanted to, then he would not be making the "political point." Kennedy retorted that he believed he was making the point – it was simple supply and demand economics. The Political Director continued that he was just thinking

about “how to phrase it best” so that the political point was “potent” and “understandable.” In reply, Kennedy said that the media, a ten-year old, an economist, and the Minister should all be able to understand the basic economic principle of supply and demand. Concluding the argument, the Political Director replied that Kennedy knew his views on the matter: that questions should be geared toward the media or “instead, we’re just talking to ourselves.” And, the Political Director continued, the Minister was not going to change his position based on a question in the House. The proper use of question time was to build public support for the Green Party’s vision and dissuade public support for the Government’s not to directly engage the Minister in political argument directly.

They seemed to move on from the argument, agreeing at least that the political point of the question was to show that the Minister for Climate Change Issues was not meeting his obligations under the Climate Change Act 2002 and that he was causing the ETS to be ineffective by issuing more NZUs into the market, even if they did not agree on how to make the point most effectively. Betsy suggested that they could go with a “variation” on the first supplementary she had drafted, using numbers Kennedy was comfortable with. “I can live with that,” Kennedy conceded. He reiterated, though, that it was supply and demand economics that even a ten-year old could understand. That sparked another conversation between Kennedy and the Political Director about making the wording “more potent” and “understandable” or “more precise.” Finally, Kennedy, with an air of frustration and weariness, said that he could see he was not going to win the battle more fully than they had already compromised that day. “I’ve lost,” he surrendered.

After that, the three moved quickly through the rest of the supplementaries with short, sharp replies. Betsy’s second supplementary was “okay,” Kennedy said. Betsy explained that her third supplementary had combined two of Kennedy’s morning bid questions. In an exaggeratedly supplicant tone, Kennedy asked “Permission to state ‘Section 68’?” He wanted to indicate the precise place in the Act that outlined the Minister’s responsibilities. If Kennedy wanted to, he could, replied the Political Director. Kennedy took the opportunity to contrast their approaches to questions, saying that his “instinct is to pack in detail.” “But it can get too much,” interrupted the Political Director, meaning that Kennedy could “lose the general political thread.” When the supplementary questions had been reworked and approved by Kennedy, the meeting drew to a close and the staff left the office. It was not a happy ending but they had at least reached an agreement about what Kennedy would say in the House.

Just before question time began, I caught up with Betsy and she explained what she had been trying to achieve with Kennedy’s supplementary questions. She said she had been trying to make the language in them as simple as possible so that people could understand them. If Kennedy kept them simple, then the Government could just come back with their messages in the reply and it did not really matter because the Greens would have already got their point out in the question. “And you avoid arguing the detail of numbers?” I asked. Yes, replied Betsy. Since a member cannot accuse another of lying in the House, if Kennedy wanted to push back on the Minister over numbers, then he would have to use another supplementary. That would mean wasted supplementary questions arguing details rather than making the political point. Kennedy might change his supplementary questions when asking them anyway, I commented. Betsy laughed: “He might!”

It turned out that I was right: Kennedy did change his questions, but only in a minor fashion. Kennedy did read out the questions as agreed at the supps meeting, but he added two caveats in the second and third supplementaries, which I have underlined in this Hansard excerpt:

> Kennedy: How did he meet his obligations under the Climate Change Response Act 2002 to maintain the proper functioning of the ETS when he directed the issuing of 30 million additional New Zealand Units?
>
> A. Minister: The Minister set this out in the ministerial statement he made accompanying the direction to issue the New Zealand Units, both of which were tabled and gazetted in accordance with the Act: "The proper functioning of the NZ ETS requires the issuance of sufficient NZUs to meet entitlements of post-1989 forestry participants; any entitlements under an allocation plan; and any auctions of NZUs the Crown undertakes."
>
> Kennedy: Given estimates that there is a current supply of some 85 million New Zealand Units while annual demand is around 15 million New Zealand Units, how can he justify issuing 30 million additional units?
>
> A. Minister: I would have thought the Greens were sympathetic to printing off more currency, given that that is their current policy. But the fact of the matter is that I am obliged to ensure the Government has enough New Zealand Units to meet certain legal obligations, so that is what I do.
>
> Kennedy: Does the Minister believe that issuing 30 million more units will increase the price of New Zealand units, which are currently trading around $2; if not, how will the additional units incentivise decarbonisation of our economy, <u>in particular, the disincentive to foresters, which is the rationale that is adduced?</u>
>
> A. Minister: I am not a soothsayer, so I cannot predict what prices will do. The fact of the matter is our emissions trading scheme is working well. What the member asks about is a product of a very low international carbon price. We believe in this country that we want New Zealanders to do their fair share – not to be paying above that.
>
> Kennedy: How is having a carbon unit worth $2, <u>which is actually lower than the international price in Europe,</u> meeting his ministerial obligations under section 68 of the Climate Change Response Act to maintain the proper functioning of the emissions trading scheme, given that our gross and net emissions continue to rise?
>
> A. Minister: The Member clearly was not listening. As I said, we are committed to doing our fair share. That means working at not trying to have policy settings above the international price. Actually, the member is wrong. I think he will find international prices are much lower than he suggested. That is the situation they are in today, but it would be a brave person who tried to bet the bank on what the prices may be even a couple of years into the future (11 July 2013 692 NZPD 11975).

Immediately after watching the question, the Political Director said that it "went alright" but the additions were unnecessary and wordy. Later, the *Advisory & Comms Report for Caucus* (emailed to

author July 30, 2013:2) noted that the "Line of questioning went okay. At times, ad libbed language was unnecessarily academic and made questions harder to follow for media or interested constituents. No media pick-up." Such comment worked to discipline Kennedy in a minor way and remind MPs of key components Green Party's strategy for questions for oral answer: to make political points using short questions with simple, non-specialist language aimed at gaining media coverage and connecting with the public on their issues and messaging.

Conclusion

Question time, in the traditional view of what it ought to achieve, is seen as an opportunity for the opposition to scrutinise Ministers about their responsibilities, management, and performance in order to hold them to account to the House of Representatives, and to ensure Ministers provide information and are transparent (see Martin 2015:145-146 and Ladley 2006:57, 67). That traditional view acts as the ideal of what MPs believe 'should' happen (McGee 1994:2), and that belief as well as the structures of parliament shape how MPs approach question time. In this Chapter, that approach is exemplified by Kennedy during his discussion about his supplementary questions. Kennedy wanted to get the Minister to provide some transparency about the size of the NZU overhang and get him 'on the record' to the House on the issue. He sought to engage on the facts of the matter and aimed to establish agreement on the details, even if not on the political issue. Through both explicit rule and convention, the tradition of question time disposes opposition MPs – in their ideal – to make statements that address issues of Ministerial responsibility by asking what is understood in New Zealand as 'a straight question' that, without resorting to too much politics, scrutinises the work of Government for the House and the public.

But, almost everyone agrees that question time no longer occurs by that pure tradition these days. Instead, it is seen by the Government and opposition as focused less on honest scrutiny or genuine answers and more on overly 'political' questions and answers.[83] In part and as discussed in Chapter Four, the Greens viewed the Speaker's new ruling that Ministers need address rather than answer questions as the cause of that. But, it is also true that because question time is one of the most reported everyday moments of parliamentary business, the Party also came to see it as an important avenue through which they could speak to the media and public. And, if they speaking to those groups rather than the House, then the field of political communication advised that to have the most effect in winning over support for what they were saying, the Green MPs should make messaged statements. That produces a conflict because messaging disposes MPs to speak to frames, values, and emotions rather than the straighter, 'non-political' statements between Minister and MP that the traditional approach to question time idealises and disposes. Just as Rhodes (2011:17, 281) found with the introduction of new governance approaches among Ministers and other administrative staff in Britain then, so too has the introduction of the logic of messaging to New Zealand's question time tradition resulted new ways of understanding the audience, purpose, and practice of question time.

[83] See The Spinoff's compilation of politicians' and others' views about how, given that, question time could be reformed (Group Think 2015).

Faced with that incompatibility but nonetheless needing to do well in question time exchanges, the Greens had to "manage" the "contradictory demands" of the tradition of parliamentary opposition and the new logic of messaging. Most of the time, and indicating the depth of belief that the Greens had in messaging, that management was done with ease. It can be seen, for example, in the way that Holly and her advisors unquestioningly moved between rewording questions to ensure they adhered to parliamentary rules about Ministerial responsibility and ensuring that her line of questioning ended with a positive solution. Most of the time, management occurs implicitly, as MPs and their staff use their understanding of how politics works to shape the range of responses that a Minister could answer given their position, disposition, and message. At other times, as seen in Kennedy's discussions with staff, when different people want to manage the conflict with different outcomes, then more explicit work occurs. Prior to question time even beginning, the conflicting demands between traditional scrutiny and messaging for the public are resolved and the two approaches are meshed together in the script that MPs take with them to the House.

What that meshing means is that the Green MPs used their questions about substantive political issues to also engage in the symbolic struggle of having their messaging about them be the one that was used by the public in their understanding of the world (Silverstein 2011b:205). Because of that, questions that seem 'overly political' in the House should not be interpreted as empty, meaningless, or ineffectual rhetoric even though the popular view is that much of question time is characterised by that kind of talk. Rather, in using particular words to as they attempt to shape the media and public's view on the issues, opposition MPs engage in the world-making struggle through the use of language in the same way they do in the variety of other situations in which they speak.

The difference with question time compared to most other situations in which politicians speak is that their opponents must reply, in some form, to the issues they raise. That ability for the Government to reply is what made question time dangerous for the Greens. As a result of the traditional structure, each time the Greens raised an issue and stated a message about it and the National-led Government, the Government could respond to the issue and state their own message about it and the Greens too. The Government had a greater symbolic power to produce belief in what they stated so the Greens planned, wrote, and asked their questions in ways designed to mitigate the risk the Government's power posed. As shown in this Chapter, the ability to manage risk by wording questions to shape the possible answers a Minister could reply with is a form of practical mastery of "the objective meaning and social effect… by virtue of having mastered the space of actual and especially potential stances or, better, of the principle underlying these stances, namely the space of objective positions in the field and the dispositions of those who occupy them" (Bourdieu 1991:177, 179). To this, in politics these days, can be added mastery of the space of actual and potential messaging, and the principles that underlie it.

Chapter Nine

Speaking to the Public: Getting Media Coverage

The ability of a politician's statement to build support is dependent on the public seeing, hearing, or reading it. The Green Party's parliamentary wing spent a great deal of time, work, and resources trying to gain national media coverage for their statements so that they would reach a large and broad audience. The Green Party's Communications Director explained why, saying: "I think your values and ideas and your ability to convey them in a way that connects with New Zealanders so that they see themselves in those things and their own aspirations in them is *the* most important thing. But you need a channel to get that information to them." For most MPs, trying to get statements into media is a central part of their daily work because it enables them to engage in the messaging competition and state their vision for the world to the public. Catherine told me:

Media's an absolute. Like, if you asked me what my priorities are in a day it's always: 'media comes first'. So, I've got to return calls from media or I've got to get press releases out, or I've got to be pushing for something in the media, or writing a piece for the media. That comes first. And that's because we're here to have a voice. We're not the Government; I have got some solid achievements but really getting your voice out there is one of the things you *can* do. So, media's number one.

Especially for opposition MPs who lack governmental power, using the power of their voice is one of the ways that they can create the change needed to bring about their vision of the world because it is one of the primary avenues by which they can build the broad public support and political pressure that forces a government or others to act. The opportunity to engage in political and symbolic struggle with a large public audience is what makes gaining media coverage a central strategy and practice for opposition MPs trying to win politics.

In his later work, Bourdieu (2014:355-356) stated that the major "elements of political space" were no longer confined to the parliament but had extended to areas like television, political broadcast, and polling. He admitted that it was self-evident to say so but, in the same way that the parliament regulated the limits and forms of debate and dissent, those same rules extended to other spheres where politics plays out publicly (Bourdieu 2014:356). The logic of messaging in particular plays out in the media space, as politicians communicate with the public via the media to win their support. In the media, where disciplined soundbite-length statements are the preeminent form and where statements are unbound from the structures and functions of speaking in the House, messaging flourishes. But, opposition MPs do not only message when they talk to the public via the media. Green MPs also viewed 'using their voice' as a key part of fulfilling their opposition spokesperson role. Their role in the House of holding the Government account extended into the wider public sphere too, where they focused on speaking to the issues and critiquing the work of Government. Thus, in the same way as they did for questions in the House, when speaking to the media the Greens had to manage meshing together the logic of messaging with their traditional oppositional role.

In their portfolio areas, Green MPs spoke to the media about an astounding array of particular events, policies, positions, predictions, legislation, and more as well as about the actions of the Government, local government, businesses, individuals, and more. While the high-level messaging discussed in Chapter Seven could be useful in creating message consistency across time and issue, MPs also had to say something relevant and specific to the topic they were giving a statement about. In making particular statements on particular issues to the public via the media, MPs had to learn how to use the content and form that would have the best chance of being covered prominently, directly, and with a favourable media context to increase the potential audience who would see, hear, or read their words in order to make their statement and themselves appear credible and believable. Therefore, not only did they need to be able to manage the meshing of messaging and traditional opposition, they also needed to be skilled at responding to the particular situation and the media environment. The level skill each MP had in doing that was shaped by their individual dispositions.

For the Green Party, using those skills to get MPs in media and saying the right things was a team effort. As has been indicated throughout this thesis, but is particularly evident in this Chapter, Green MPs were supported in their work by staff in the Media and Advisory Unit, whose work centred on research and communication. The work of party professionals like Political and Media Advisors has been "shrouded in mystery" (Medvic 2000:91). In New Zealand, their work has been "intrinsically covert and surreptitious – they avoid all publicity and observation" (Edwards 2016:225). When investigative reporter Nicky Hager (2014) revealed the unethical practices of the National-led Government's Ministers and staff in *Dirty Politics: How Attack Politics is Poisoning New Zealand,* a justifiably negative view of the work of such professionals dominated in the media and public sphere. This Chapter, in opening up the work of the Green Party's staff to the public, shows what happened in the Greens on a regular day-to-day basis in order to make their activities more transparent and less mysterious, as well as to demonstrate the more ethical and normal work that is carried out from political offices at parliament.

This Chapter explores the complexity and difficulty that faced Green MPs and their team of staff when trying to get good media coverage. I first outline the strategic and practical parts of getting media coverage that Political and Media Advisors carried out in their day to-day-work. That section is followed by a discussion of how Kennedy, Holly, Catherine, and Gareth's dispositions shaped their media styles. Finally, the Chapter provides four ethnographic examples of Gareth Hughes' media work, tracing how particular statements were formed and made in the media. Those four cases show just how variable outcomes in media work can be – from a scandal, to no coverage, to good coverage, to breaking into a leading story – and just how messy, indeterminate, and uncertain the process of MPs' making media statements is.

The Strategic and Practical Parts of Getting Media Coverage

Getting into the media is a team effort in the Green Party, often involving the work of both the MP and their advisor. This section briefly outlines how the Green Party decides which stories to pursue and prioritise, and the practical work that goes into getting media coverage. While the process of making reported media statements is messy, indeterminate, and uncertain, the Greens had

developed strategies and practices that increased the likelihood that their MPs' statements would be covered.

I asked Gareth about which strategies he used to get his message out to the public. He emphasised that a large part of it was simply knowing the game, and especially knowing it from the journalist's point of view. He began by talking about how particular stories were suited for particular channels of communication:

> I think it's horses for courses and, well, whatever the issue is, there are different channels. So, some things are only just Facebook posts; some are in-depth things and nuanced [so] you've got to write down an opinion piece or a blog; other things are just a great one-liner, which if it gets on television is wonderful.
>
> I just think there [are] no great skills. I just sort of regularly consume the media, see what they're covering, how they describe things, and try and think about my job as [if I was] a journalist. 'Cause in a way that's what I'm doing. I'm like the Fourth Estate, you know? Trying to find information, communicate it, 'raise consciousness' – for want of a better word – on particular issues.
>
> And then there are just simple rules. What I've learnt in my career is people very rarely cover public opinions in the sense that I could just say, 'I believe in X', or 'X is doing Y and that's bad'. That's not particularly good. But 'MP writes complaint to X about Y' – it's an action. 'MP visits X' is an action. And that's newsworthy. Also with visuals, that's something I think I put a lot of effort into because it's a cliché but it's true: there's more communicated in a picture than in 1,000 words.

Contrary to his statement that there were "no great skills" in gaining media coverage, Gareth highlighted that, in fact, understanding those rules of the game and responding to what journalists covered is what made him good at getting his stances into the media. Things which he had learnt over his time at parliament, like making sure there were good images to share on film and in print and describing and doing actions rather than simply stating an opinion, had become self-evident.

The Green Party's Communications Director had also come to see the skill he used when working out how best to get the Green MPs into the media as self-evident. He explained to me how he decided what the issues of the day the Greens could comment on were before the 8:30 a.m. morning call:

> It's just you collating your range of sources. So my primary sources, they were, I listened to [RNZ's] *Morning Report*… from the second I got up and had my headphones in on the bus and stuff. The bus was quite good. I like catching the bus [into the office] 'cause I could listen to the radio and clear my emails. And read [the] Stuff and the Herald [websites]. So those kind of morning media sources of what was going on and you could kind of – how would I be able to assess from that what a story of the day was going to be?
>
> You could find angles on it. I don't know. How could I? What would be the criteria? If it was leading. If it was leading across a number of platforms. If it was something the Government was on the back foot on. If there was a scandal associated with it in some way, a Minister had lied or there was, yeah. I mean those would be kind of the key criteria.

The Communications Director had trouble picking out exactly what made a good issue for the Greens to prioritise because he relied on his practical sense of what the Party could capitalise on rather than a formal set of criteria. At the Green Party's AGM, he had told a workshop that it was "intuitive."

The Greens also had to work with the political and news cycle, which they both responded to and attempted to drive. The Communications Director described:

> One of the things we'd often do with [new information we got for stories], particularly if it came in earlier in the week, is we'd map it out and go, "Well, Monday's always really busy with post-Cab, Tuesday is a really busy day and there's lots of issue of the day stuff." So if we were sitting on good information, generally we would release it on a Wednesday or a Thursday. So, certain things kind of had their own pattern. Generally, [we] wouldn't put out anything major on a Friday. And then obviously there was weekend media. But even weekend media we had a good sense of what made good weekend stories.

Driving the media news cycle meant that the Green Party could influence which issues and messages were being covered so that those which were important to the Party, advanced their agenda, and built their support would be covered. They had several strategies for that, including creating their own actions or events which could be reported on, making information they held public, and preparing for the Government's upcoming activities. The Communications Director discussed each of these with me:

> The other source [of stories] was actually what we were doing. So many days we were doing things. It was really easy – we could just say, "Well, this is our primary story we want up today and so we're actually not going to do a lot on other things." There was a lot more of us creating our own stories either through an event, or that we had exclusively pitched, or we had good OIA information that we were going to release in some way. And I was generally pretty good at working with advisors to know that the day before so we'd bring it [to the morning call on the day].
>
> … We really liked to introduce new facts into the media, so we always wanted to be leading it. Where we could lead stories with new information, that was really important.
>
> … The Ministerial Diary would, I would always check just to see whether there was anything there. And then just information from journalists, so often I would – this isn't, they were never really breaching anything – but you kind of just knew there was the Government announcement [coming up], you might not know what but that there was going to be some kind of thing.

It was also true that there were several rolling stories and issues in 2013 that the Green Party was leading, which helped them stay prominent in the media. The Communications Director identified several: GCSB "went on, and on, and on," and several of the Green Party's 'positive stories' like NZ Power, asset sales, and the campaign to protect Māui dolphins also had good coverage. "There were a number of issues which we were able to continue," he said, "and they were issues of the day."

On the day-to-day issues, there were two strategies that helped the Greens gain media coverage. The most critical, according to the Communications Director, was to be the first opposition party to

provide comment. The Greens excelled at that in 2013, in part because the Labour Party did not. He explained:

> The critical [rule] and what was really important was "be first." So that was a big thing. So that [2013] team [of advisors] was very clear that we wanted to get stuff out quickly and, at that point, because Labour was actually also being quite slow, that rapid turnaround of comment when there was a vacuum in opposition content often meant that we got to fill the story. And we got feedback from the Gallery to that effect.

The second important strategy was to 'be Green. That meant ensuring that the Green Party spokesperson said something distinct to what they predicted the Labour Party would say so that the Greens were putting their own values and positions into the public sphere. The Communications Director explained:

> We would often consciously think… 'What would Labour say'? And then, 'So what would we say that's different'? And really *actively* insert – and I think Russel drove this a lot too – 'What is the Green overlay'? 'What is the unique Green position'? And 'Where are our key strengths and how do we emphasise that'?
>
> So, one of the key things, big issues that year was all of that GCSB, and the spying, and all of that. And I think the thing that really differentiated us was just our absolute commitment to human rights, and the right to be free of surveillance and things. Whereas Labour could never be quite so strong on some of that stuff 'cause they were obviously kind of part of the surveillance apparatus.

These two rules – be first and be Green – were part of the Communication Director's six-point list for getting good media coverage. The other rules were: be unique, be available, be solutions-focused, and be accurate.

Practically, MPs did not work alone on media. Its importance to the Green Party was so great that around seven advisory staff worked full-time researching issues that could be used in the House, policy documents, social media, and the media. What each advisor did varied slightly depending on their area of focus and the MPs they worked with, but in general the work I saw them doing during my fieldwork included acting as liaison between journalists and MPs to organise interviews, drafting and issuing over 600 press releases during my fieldwork period, strategizing with MPs about what they should say, bringing topics they had researched to the MPs to publicise, and more. The sections on Gareth's media work show in more detail what individual advisors did to help MPs gain coverage and make the right statements to the media.

These strategies and practices highlight that the Green Party worked to get media by thinking about and responding to the needs of journalists. The Greens aimed to use forms appropriate for the different news mediums, to provide pictures, and to provide new information, for example, because they believed that doing so made it easier for journalists to cover their information and statements on an issue. The Party's strategies and practices also responded to what else was happening in the political field. In order to make sure that it was the Green Party's positions that the public news audience was exposed to, they adopted strategies like delaying seeking coverage for a story they wanted because there was going to be a Government announcement that would take up the media space that week and making sure that their comments were with the media first to increase the likelihood that they were the party providing the oppositions' view on an issue.

Therefore, in attempting to shape what was covered in the news, the Greens took into account the way that the media and political fields worked, developing strategies and practices that worked to get their positions in the news and out to the public audience.

The MPs' Dispositions and Media Styles

Even though the Party had those broad strategies and practices for gaining coverage, the individuality of each MP shaped the way they approached and spoke to the media too. Each of the four MPs I worked with had their own media style based on their own dispositions and the ways that they did or did not adhere to the prescriptions of modern messaging. This section outlines the media styles of the four MPs from the perspective of the Communications Director. It highlights that Kennedy, Holly, Catherine, and Gareth all approached media work and speaking in the media differently.

As noted earlier in this thesis, Kennedy did not actively seek out media coverage; instead, he prioritised his parliamentary and research work. He characterised his politics as a research politics, not a media-driven politics. We talked about his approach several times, especially in relation to his work on climate change. During my first week of fieldwork with him, we discussed that even though he had got Caucus to agree that climate change was one of the Party's priorities and was able to win one in four bids for questions he put forward, with regard to media he thought that it had a long-term range and that it was not tied to any of the immediate issues of the day. He said that that was why it was not prioritised by the Media and Advisory Unit. For that reason, he continued, he preferred working with interns to accumulate knowledge on it rather than "fronting [media] and going down the media track."

Kennedy explained his media strategy more fully to me one day, just as we were about to enter the Press Gallery's offices to publicise his climate change conference. While walking, I commented to him that it did not seem like he did a lot of television interviews. He explained that the way he saw it was that if an interview was important enough, then someone would come and talk to him. But no, he agreed, he did not do a lot of media. That was where he had a lot of arguments with the Unit, he said. We stopped walking right outside the entrance to the Press Gallery's offices, and Kennedy explained that when he was posted to teach young leaders in Jordan, they taught him three styles of leadership: transactional, where 'if you give me something then I'll give you something' (he assigned that style to the "14th floor" where the Unit was located), transformation, and service. He said that the best and most effective kind of leadership was where you worked behind the scenes to change others who could then go out and talk to others for you. That was his approach and that was why he did not actively seek to lead through the media.

Kennedy's reluctance to pursue media was frustrating to the advisors and some of the MPs I talked to because it meant his work tended to reach a small, more specialist audience rather than the broader public the national news reaches. The Communications Director characterised Kennedy's style as attuned to his peers:

> I think Kennedy's style is very true to himself in [that] there's an intellectual honesty about it. But the conversation that I constantly had with him is that in being true to himself, he

> did not convey, he was sort of incapable of conveying the messages to potential Green supporters and voters that were really important. And also, I can't help but think that he was more attuned to the perceptions of those who he respected, so his academic colleagues, than he was kind of the general public. And I just think his background, both as a diplomat then as an academic – and you saw this with others, you know? [Minister for Climate Change Issues] Tim Groser actually was not that dissimilar to Kennedy… They have an ingrained style.

As shown throughout this thesis, Kennedy did not have dispositions attuned to gaining mass media coverage especially as it was directed toward conveying messages in the style of Lakoff (2004) and Westen (2007). Therefore, while he appeared credible and competent to academics, diplomats, scientists, and others, he did not make messaged statements in the way or with the mass exposure that other MPs aimed for. Kennedy knew that his approach differed, but he also believed he was making a valuable contribution to New Zealand's parliamentary politics despite that.

Holly's practices in relation to media work came from a very different set of dispositions to Kennedy's. Before the 2011 Election, when she entered parliament, Holly had worked as an advisor in the Green Party's Unit. That meant that she already knew and was inculcated with dispositions that the Greens believed were more likely to generate media coverage even before she became an MP. Her dispositions stood her in good stead with the Media and Advisory Unit as an MP in 2013. The Communications Director judged:

> She was excellent. I think the only thing I would say with her was that she needed a little bit more of a killer instinct. So, she would always have a really good analysis; she was quite diligent about preparing for interviews. I think she was pretty unflappable, which is really good. But I think she could've been a little bit sterner on the Government.

Holly, the Communications Director thought, was very good at explaining the issues to the public but not as good at criticising the Government over those issues.

In contrast, Catherine could be overly oppositional. The Communications Director evaluated her style, saying:

> She was quite berating in the media [chuckles]. She was a funny one, actually. Like, I think she's very good in the media. I think she immediately knows the right lines. But even she would surprise me because even for someone with such good 'heart', she also could have a bit of a tendency to be technical. But of all of [the MPs], she was the one who if you said, 'Hey, start off by saying 'This is about X' or whatever', she was very good at [then doing] that… I mean, I probably would've done a little bit of stuff about her presentation… probably just try to soften her; she could be a bit machine-gun with her style.

Even though internally Catherine was seen to be a good politician because she worked hard to get coverage and campaign on issues in her portfolios, that effort did not always generate a high ratio of coverage. The Communications Director considered that the reason for that was because she did not have the friendly relationship with the Press Gallery that meant they saw and respected her hard work. He explained:

> Unfortunately, there was just a negative perception of her in the Press Gallery, which was crazy. And whenever [another senior advisor] and I actually challenged people to have a

> think about what she did – I remember this conversation with [a leading journalist] actually – …I was like, 'Have you seen how many member's bills she's actually got up and run campaigns on and nearly won, and she's got an MoU with the Government, and she's dah, dah, dah, dah; she's done all these things'. And he was like, 'Oh yeah, that is quite a lot for one MP'. And I'm like, 'Yeah!' But they never saw her in that way.
>
> I think it's harder for women full stop. I think that there's a male bias in the Gallery and it's kind of like she wasn't the sort of person who would necessarily go and have a drink with them or go and have a laugh with them. And I think that was to her disadvantage in a way because I think if she had a better relationship with the Gallery, I think a lot of that work would've been more respected and noted… I think we could've taken more opportunities for her to go and have a coffee with an advisor and a member of the Gallery to go over an issue.
>
> I mean, but she did you know, [education reporter] she had a really good relationship with, and [Pacific correspondent], and others. So, where she actually worked with specialist reporters in her area, they did respect her because they knew how much she did, yeah.

After I sent a copy of my draft thesis to the MPs for comment, Catherine and I talked on the phone about her relationship to the Press Gallery. She said that a big part of the reason the media did not value her contribution was because she was a radical left-wing woman challenging the status quo which, as a fundamentally conservative organisation, the Gallery did not like to cover.[84] Regarding her experiences, Catherine wrote for inclusion:

> Initially, I found the Press Gallery intimidating and unfriendly as a group although, individually, many of them are not like that. [Former Green Co-leader] Rod Donald introduced me to some senior male journalists before I was an MP but they were never friendly. I think being an older Green woman without much power meant I never interested them. My relationships grew with RNZ journalists as I became an established voice on some portfolios and I developed good relationships with them. I had very good relationships with education journalists, especially from the Herald. I have had very good relationships with Māori media, who have been warm and respectful, and with Radio NZ International on West Papua. A trip by car to Waitangi after a plane was cancelled allowed Paddy Gower and myself to get to know each other and he realised I was not a 'flake', but I have never socialised much with journalists. I think we had mutual respect after eight years, but I think being a left wing radical MP is not fashionable.

Catherine, then, in the Communication Director's evaluation, was an intuitively good speaker when she appeared in the media. The trouble was appearing in the first place given the ways she was shut out.[85] Catherine, however, was able to gain media coverage by becoming a portfolio expert and leading spokesperson on several issues, like education and West Papua, that enabled her to work closely and in a friendly fashion with individual journalists on those areas.

Gareth, on the other hand, was in the media a lot during 2013. He was renowned for it among the Caucus, and that meant he was seen as a good politician in that respect. He described himself as "*constantly* pushing to get headlines and media coverage." After filming a segment for a comedy

[84] Rudd (2016:168) agrees with that account, writing that: "Perhaps the main media effect… is still that of reinforcing the status quo."
[85] Crewe (2015a:29) found similar in the British political system, writing that "Lobby journalists, who are mainly men, are drawn to develop close working relationships with male MPs. They tend to refer to the male MPs as the cerebral, clever, and promising ones, while women are subject to personal jibes and patronising assessments."

television show Gareth told me he would "never turn down an event like that." In fact, he did not think he had ever "turned down a journalist." It was true – when I was in his office, there were very few days where Gareth was not either doing interviews or preparing stories for imminent interviews. The Communications Director thought that Gareth was very good at media, and explained that a combination of Gareth's and Russel's styles would have made his perfect politician:

> I think Gareth is really strong. I think he sounds great on TV. I think he looks good on TV, and in print, and stuff like that.
>
> I think Gareth's big flaw was that I don't think he always studied hard enough and had enough information. That was my nervousness. And sometimes you could hear it in his voice; like, he'd start a sentence really confidently and then he'd kind of peter out by the end… so that was my only concern with him. In the conversations I had with him, he was actually quite well-versed on them…
>
> …Whereas someone like Russel, he was good at staying on message but God, give him an inch and he'd just get into detail that was interesting and stuff but it [was] never going to get quoted! But he was quite good at longer format because he had quite interesting things to say because he was so well read.
>
> And I sometimes wished there had been a little bit more of a balance between him and Gareth where somewhere in the middle of that would've been quite good. Like, Russel's knowledge and Gareth's presentation. 'Cause he had excellent presentation.

Gareth was considered one of the Green Party's best at appearing in the media. He constantly sought media coverage for the issues he cared about and presented well when his statements were reported.

Having discussed the Party's broad media strategies and practices as well as the individual styles of Holly, Kennedy, Gareth, and Catherine, the final half of this Chapter charts four examples of Gareth's media work. It begins with a discussion of the 'Hey Clint' scandal which occurred early in 2013. It then follows with an example of when Gareth gave comment to a journalist that received no media coverage. The third example received national coverage by an appearance on the 6:00 p.m. news. Finally, I follow in-depth the unfolding work behind the Green Party's response to a fast-breaking story. These four stories showcase the variability, complexity, messiness, indeterminacy, and uncertainty of gaining media coverage in the daily work of MPs and their advisors.

'Hey Clint'

Throughout this thesis, I have emphasised that there is a separation between what happens internally in the political field and what crosses the threshold to the public. MPs seek to tightly control that boundary using practices of message discipline in order to ensure that public only sees what they want them to. Occasionally, however, things move unintentionally across that boundary. That was what happened to Gareth in early 2013 when he was filmed on camera asking his advisor for an answer to a question from a 3 News about whether he was pleased that the Labour-Green NZ Power policy had damaged the Government's asset sales programme by decreasing the share price of power companies (see Figure 9.1). "Hey, Clint," he said to get the advisor's attention, "Are

we pleased?" It was a lapse that – as Gareth himself identified – ran as a scandal about how he and his 'spin doctor' were dishonestly trying to hide the fact that they were pleased to have decreased the share price.

Figure 9.1: Gareth Asking, "Hey Clint, Are We Pleased?"

Source: (Gower 2013b:00.13)

The scandal occurred before I began fieldwork with Gareth, but he explained what had happened to me one day when we were walking back to parliament after filming a segment for a television show. He said that he thought the story had been "unfair" because he had been asked the same question by the journalist interviewing him about six times before he'd said 'Hey, Clint'. He had supposed he had been giving an overly "political" response in his previous replies, which might have meant that the journalist could not use the soundbite, so finally he just thought he would ask his advisor. He probably "let his guard down" more than he should have during the interview because of the good relationship he had with the journalist. It was a good lesson not to, he concluded.

The clip was run as a story about how politics really works, revealing what is usually hidden from the public. Patrick Gower (2013a:Paras.13-15), the journalist who ran the story on *3 News,* later wrote that broadcasting the moment "busted spin, in fact, it blew the spin apart. It showed that the Greens, like Labour, are trying to come up with 'lines' to pretend it's not about wrecking the float… But, thanks to Gareth's indiscretion, we could show what they really feel." Gareth, Gower (2013a:Para.17-18) wrote, was 'indiscreet': "It's pretty basic stuff – when the camera's rolling, and you can't answer a crucial question – don't yell out to the spin doctor." Gower (2013a:Para.38) argued that he was showing the public the truth behind the messages, to "tell them what's really going on" in the world of politics they did not get to see.

Once they realised what had happened and that it was going to play out as a scandal, the advisor told the Communications Director what had happened. I asked him how he managed the story after he found out, and the Communications Director told me:

> Well, there was very little we could do… Clint came and told me and I generally took the position with certain things that actually the more you fire them up or tried to turn them into something, the worse it was. I kind of recognised straight away that the story would run. I think I did contact TV3 to find out and they were like "Yes."
>
> And then there was – consoling's not the right word – but basically working it out with Gareth because it was more about how the media went after him afterwards. So it was more about his lines, which was to say that: 'Look, he was well on top of the thing, he just had a bit of a memory blank and called out for Clint. In hindsight, he shouldn't have. But 'the key thing is' and then just back to the policy – 'We've got this policy'. So, it was always bringing it back to the policy. Own up to it and say, 'I should've recalled things. There's no excuse for that but let's not get precious about that, the key thing is this'. I think that was as good as we could really do.
>
> … The strategy was also always to play light on it. It was not to defend it or whatnot, and to be a bit funny about it and show humour.

Gareth sent out a tweet about the story after it had run on the news that night (see Figure 9.2). He thought the tweet was "great, because that managed to fill up the top of the Twitter feeds on it – that was the first thing anyone saw and was like 'Yeah, this guy can take the piss out of himself'. And on Q&A and stuff they were able to comment on how good the tweet was."

Figure 9.2: Gareth's Tweet in Response to 'Hey Clint'

Source: (Hughes 2013b)

The scandal had deeply affected Gareth. The Communications Director described what he saw: "Oh, he was really embarrassed. I think it actually really knocked his confidence. 'Cause he was going great guns up until that and I think he kind of quietened down a bit after that." Gareth explained to me that he felt "depressed" after the scandal, saying that he took a lot of care to have a "professional" public appearance and the 'Hey, Clint' scandal had harmed that: "I really take pride in myself on – I thought I was good at the media and a professional. And to be caught out like that

was pretty embarrassing." Not only was he embarrassed that his personal message had been damaged, Gareth also realised that it had derailed the Green Party's messages on the NZ Power policy. It had become a story about the 'power of spin doctors' rather than the 'win' they'd had on the Mighty River Power share float, he said. Not only that, but the effects of such a catchy scandal were long-lasting:

> Gareth: It was galling. Every time I'd tweet something, people would be like 'Ohh, did Clint write that?'
>
> Jessica: It became sort of a meme, right?
>
> Gareth: Yeah. And I mean it had saliency because there is a perception that MPs are dominated by their advisors… I mean, in one sense it was embarrassing for me, and it was, but in the other sense it was more a commentary on modern politics.

Although references to 'Hey Clint' continued on social media and blogs, Gareth had largely bounced back from the April scandal by the time I was stationed in his office in late July and the pace of his media work had increased once again.

'Hey Clint' was an example of media going badly wrong for Gareth. Not only did it mean that the story he wanted the public to hear about the Green Party's view on how the announcement of the NZ Power policy had affected the Government's asset sales programme got shut out, it became a negative story about how he and the Greens did politics. Gareth was presented as incompetent and parroting lines made up by his advisor. He believed he was able to regain some capital from his tweet in response to the story but, overall, 'Hey Clint' was bad for Gareth and the Greens, and reinforced the belief that politicians disingenuously repeat spun party lines.

No Media Coverage

The overwhelming majority of the time, when the production of media statements by the Greens did not go well for the them, it was not because that work resulted in scandal – it was because their attempts at getting covered were ineffective. That is what this next example shows. Even though Gareth and the Party's staff spent time preparing for and providing an interview, nothing eventuated in the media story.

Gareth's notified the morning call on August 14, 2013, that a 45-minute interview with The Listener – a nationally-distributed current affairs magazine – had been organised for that day on the topic of deep sea oil drilling. After the call had finished, advisor Betsy phoned Gareth in his office from hers two building floors below to say that the Political Director and the Acting Communications Director were "excited" about it. Given that regular television and radio interviews tended to take no more than five to ten minutes, that the journalist wanted to spend so long interviewing Gareth meant that they were likely to feature a significant amount of information and quotes from the Gareth rather than a short soundbite. The Political Director wanted to do a practice run with him, Betsy reported over the phone. "Okay…" responded Gareth, sounding unsure. 'The Political Director will send you an email about it', replied Betsy. After he had hung up, I asked Gareth whether it was

usual to do a practice run of the interview and Gareth answered that it wasn't. A short while later, Betsy phoned back asking what time the interview was. "3:30 p.m." that day, confirmed Gareth.

Later that day, Gareth and I went downstairs to the Media and Advisory Unit to see the Political Director about The Listener interview. Gareth went to Betsy's desk first to say hi and let her know he was there for the meeting. After a brief conversation, because the Political Director was busy talking to another advisor, we went over to her desk and she turned her attention to preparing Gareth for the interview. The Political Director said that it was a "long interview," and it sounded like they wanted to do a "positive story" with him. She asked Gareth what he would be saying. He replied that he would be talking about some of their top-level messaging around deep sea drilling. Emphasising caution, the Political Director repeated that it would be a long interview so the journalist would be asking "hard questions" during that time – he would not just be able to give top-level lines. She said it would be good to be prepared with job numbers, even to have them with him, written down so that he could say: 'This is how many jobs National say mining will create' and that 'their job numbers are overblown'. She continued that it would be a "wide-ranging" interview so that even if he wanted to keep it focused on deep sea oil drilling, the journalist would probably want to ask him about other mining, like on the Denniston Plateau.

The Political Director posed a practice question for Gareth: 'You say shut down the Denniston mine, but what will happen to all of those people out of work and their economy?' Gareth answered that the Greens had a comprehensive economic plan that would get them out of the boom and bust cycle of mining, and said he would also talk about how Australia was preparing for the end of the mining boom. The Political Director said that that was a good reply, but that he should remember to bring it back around to National in the interview, by saying things like they have a "short-term" view on mining and we need the clean, green image for our national brand. Yeah, Gareth said in acknowledgement. The Political Director encouraged Gareth to message the National-led Government negatively.

For a third time, the Political Director repeated that it was a "long" interview, implying that Gareth should be careful not to go off 'interview mode' and be on the record saying something he should not be. She said that if she had been more prepared for their meeting, she would have done more of a run-through with him. Nonetheless, it would be good, she thought. She continued by saying that next time he had a similar in-depth interview booked, it would be good if he let the Unit know earlier because it was one they could have done some "research" for to provide the journalist with new information and to make sure Gareth had the numbers to be credible. She asked whether Gareth had read any of the articles the journalist had published and Gareth said he had not. The Political Director said she would look some up and send through an email with some more advice to Gareth. After that, we all parted ways as Gareth went off to his guitar lesson and I went to write up my field notes.

Just before the 3:30 p.m. interview, Gareth walked into the office laughing at himself. He explained that he had put on his suit for it before remembering that it was a phone interview. "You're ready early for tonight then!" I replied, in reference to a public meeting about deep sea oil drilling Gareth was holding that evening. At 3:30 p.m., Gareth called the journalist and they greeted each other. They exchanged a series of questions so that Gareth could provide on-the-record quotes to be used in the story. He also said he would send through some information on a particular topic that the journalist needed more background on. Finally, to end the conversation, Gareth also gave the

journalist his cell phone number on their request in case there were questions he was needed for later.

Even though the interview questions and answers were routine, the call was much shorter than expected, taking only 10 minutes as opposed to the scheduled 45. Once off the phone, Gareth said: "That was a bit different to what I was expecting," noting the short length of time. Gareth checked with his Executive Assistant, who confirmed that the journalist had asked for the full 45 minutes. In the end, when the story was published, neither Gareth nor the Green Party were mentioned in it at all (Laugesen 2013).

I mentioned in Chapter Four and indicated earlier in this Chapter that the Green Party had to work strategically to get into the media because there were alternatives for journalists to get opposition comment from, whether other political parties like Labour or other organisations such as environmental NGOs. It was regularly the case that the work the Greens did to get into the media resulted in no coverage, either because comment from political parties was not used or another party was quoted instead. However, as this example indicates, the Greens nonetheless pursued media opportunities by dedicating a great deal of MP and staff time and effort into responding to requests from journalists and organisations or by actively seeking coverage themselves. In large part, the opposition's daily work revolves around preparing for, seeking, and making statements for media coverage because, even if that work is ineffectual in gaining coverage, the benefits of receiving it are great because they engage in political and symbolic struggle in view of and with reference to the large and broad audience that see, read, listen to the news and, in doing so, attempt to create large and broad public support for their vision and positions.

Good Media Coverage

Even though the Greens could attempt to shape media stories by responding to journalists' needs and making repeated disciplined soundbites that had a greater likelihood of being covered the Greens wanted them to, they did not have control over the final story that appeared in the news. This example shows the lack of control and uncertainty the Greens experienced when making public statements in the news. It also shows what the Greens consider to be good media coverage: a primetime national story that framed the Green Party's position favourably, which solely featured opposition comment from the Greens, which was also reported in other media outlets, and which was able to be shared on their own social media channels.

Gareth's story regarding Chatham Rise Phosphate mining was already underway when I started fieldwork with him on July 22, 2013. The story was about permits to undertake seabed mining in New Zealand's waters near the Chatham Islands, which the Greens and others argued would be detrimental to the environment. I first heard about it at the morning call of July 29, 2013, when it was reported that since the journalist had recovered from being sick, it would run that night on 3 News' 6:00 p.m. television news broadcast – a coveted prime audience. But, the story did not run that night; nor did it run for several weeks after that. Gareth was later told the story would run on August 15, 2013. In the office-wide email listing the decisions of the morning call, in a rare addition, the phosphate story was listed under 'other media' as: "TV3 on phosphate mining (hopefully)" (Morning Call Actions emailed to author August 15, 2013).

But, the story was not on the news that night either. As it had not run, Gareth was expecting it to be played on a Sunday spot the following August 18, 2013, which commanded the largest audience of the week. In the office on Monday, I asked Gareth whether it had been on the news. "No," replied Gareth, "We got bumped on Wednesday and they said they'd run it on Sunday. I watched the news last night but they still didn't so it's like 'gah!'." He sounded slightly frustrated.

Later that day, Gareth and his advisor Betsy met to catch up on some work together. Near the end, Betsy asked Gareth whether the story had run and he reported that it hadn't. Betsy exaggeratedly rolled her eyes and chuckled. It was the third time the journalist had interviewed Gareth for the story – "I just keep getting older and fatter!" he joked. On Sunday, it had been pushed out for a story about drones monitoring rivers. 'That happened weeks ago!' exclaimed Betsy. She knew because Co-leader Russel Norman and MP Eugenie Sage had been at the launch of the programme. That the mining story was being delayed for so long was a "bit of a joke," Betsy explained to me, because the angle on the story was that it was the first consent issued for phosphate mining and, because the Greens had an exclusive with 3 News on it, they had held off on doing a press release that went to other media outlets. Now, the story had been delayed so long that it was quickly becoming old news, meaning that there had been little public discussion about the mining, let alone reporting on the Green Party's opposition. Not knowing how media organisations worked, I asked: if the reporter wanted to do it, it would be someone else making the decision not to run it, wouldn't it? 'Yeah, it would be her editors', replied Betsy. "All you can do is laugh," concluded Gareth.

Figure 9.3: Images of Gareth Featuring in the Phosphate Mining Story

Source: (Nordqvist 2013:01.42, 01.47, 02.00)

Even though the Greens were expecting the story to be in the news in late July, it did not air until mid-September (see Nordqvist 2013). Although much later than expected, the Green Party was pleased with the story that ran. They were the only political party represented in the interview, meaning that their position and messaging on the issue was largely uncontested and, particularly importantly, was uncontested by the Government. They were mentioned in both the first sentence of the story, framed as unlikely allies of deepwater fishers who also opposed the mining, and provided the concluding comments of the story. Gareth featured in-person during the story (see Figure 9.3), seen professionally and seriously thumbing through papers at his desk and in close-up for his soundbite. Gareth was shown saying: "This is an area that's off limits to bottom trawling and dredging, yet the rules allow a seabed mining company to come along and literally vacuum up the seabed" (Gareth 2013, in Nordqvist 2013:01.55-02.05). The last sentence of the report featured the journalist outlining the third point of Green Party's top-level environmental 1+3 messaging, stating that: "The Greens say if we damage the environment then we damage our reputation, and any supposed economic benefits will be lost" (Nordqvist 2013:02.06-02.12). Thus, the story quoted and outlined the Green Party's opposition on the issue clearly, and linked into their top-level environmental messaging.

Figure 9.4: The Green Party's Facebook Post about the Phosphate Mining Story

Source: (Green Party 2013a)

The story reached a wider audience than the people who had been watching 3 News that night via print news and social media. Not only did the story play on the news, but Gareth the subsequent press release the Greens sent out to all media outlets featured in coverage of the story by the NZ Herald, The Dominion Post, and Waikato Times (Advisory & Comms Report for Caucus 24th September 2013, emailed to author September 24, 2013:4). As well as the wider news coverage, the Green Party shared the story through their own networks. Gareth reported his intention to do a blog on the story to the morning call, which he had phoned into on the conference call line (see Hughes 2013c). "On Chatham Rise?" joked the Political Director, receiving light laughter around the room, in acknowledgement of how frustrating the story had been and how long it had taken to be aired. Gareth, not realising the Political Director was joking because he could not see her expression over the phone, explained to the morning call that the story had been on the news that weekend's Saturday night, noting that they were 'unlikely allies' of the fishing industry which was a surprising alliance for the Greens. The Political Director said she thought that was a good idea given all the "blood, sweat, and tears" that had gone into the story. Later during the meeting, she also double-checked whether the phosphate mining story had been shared on the Green Party's social media pages during the weekend and it was reported to her that it had (see Figure 9.4). The post reached 12,672 people and received 257 likes. It was also shared by 75 people and received 34 comments.

Even though they did not control the timing or framing of the phosphate story, the final version reported on the news was good for the Greens, they considered. It appeared on primetime television, reaching a large and broad audience that increased as other media outlets picked the story up too. Gareth appeared on camera, speaking well and looking professional. The Green Party's position on the issue and their top-level environmental messaging was outlined by the journalist. Their comments also featured among other credible groups like deep sea fishers who opposing the mining. For the Greens, the news story was a success as it enabled their messaging to reach a large public audience, fulfilled their role as opposition to the Government on the issue, and allowed Gareth to appear as a serious and competent MP. As well as the journalist's reporting, Gareth's statements and appearance meant that the Chatham Rise Phosphate story was the type of media that the Greens believed successfully critiqued the issue and communicated the Party's key messages for the public audience and, therefore, likely built support for their positon.

Getting into a Leading Story

Sometimes, big news breaks unexpectedly and the opposition has to identify and respond to it very quickly to get their statements out to the media and public. One of those events occurred on 12 September 2013, a quiet recess week Thursday, when Treasury released documents that showed they had advised the Government against making a $30 million payment to New Zealand Aluminium Smelters' owners Pacific Aluminium and Rio Tinto to keep Tiwai Point Aluminium Smelter open – a payment which the Government had subsequently made in a one-off agreement (see New Zealand Herald 2013). Treasury (2013:4) had advised from "a national welfare perspective" that the payment "should be rejected" as it would be "a significant transfer of value from New Zealanders to [Pacific Aluminium] and Rio Tinto shareholders." However, the Government's agreement with New Zealand Aluminium Smelters occurred in the midst of their state asset sales programme and, in particular, the sale of energy company Meridian Energy. Meridian had an agreement to supply electricity to Tiwai Point Aluminium Smelter, a major contract accounting for

both 40 percent of Meridian's annual revenue and 12 percent of New Zealand's entire electricity use (The New Zealand Herald 2013:Para.12). Losing the contract for Tiwai would have been a major loss for Meridian causing its value to decrease. For that reason, Finance Minister Bill English (quoted in The New Zealand Herald 2013:Para.2) stated that the payment had been made to keep the smelter open for "the stability of the New Zealand electricity market" and for offering "investors more certainty" ahead of the company's sale.

When the Greens found out about Treasury's information release, Gareth and I were in an important select committee meeting. He nodded to me from his seat at the table, indicating that he was leaving, and I got up from my seat among others in the audience to follow him out. We met up outside the select committee doors and he said there had just been a "document dump" on Rio Tinto and that he had to go and find out what it was about before his flight to Tauranga that afternoon for a public meeting he was hosting.

After briefly talking to a journalist about the occurrences in the select committee, Gareth and I rushed up to level 14 of Bowen House and into the Political and Media Unit, where a flurry of activity was taking place. Gareth asked advisor Ben who he should be talking to about the issue, and Ben directed him to Steve, one of the Party's economics advisors. We walked over to Steve's desk and Steve took a minute to finish his conversation with a third advisor before turning to Gareth. Steve explained what was going on to Gareth, and brought up a press release he had already prepared on his computer screen for Gareth to read over. Steve asked Gareth whether he could get on a slightly later plane to Tauranga, stating that it would be good for him to get on the television news. Gareth replied he was not sure. Steve asked whether Gareth could do a 'stand-up' at 2:30 p.m., an interview on the Bridge at parliament to gathered reporters from multiple media outlets. 'I have to leave at 3:00.' explained Gareth; another advisor interjected from across the room, saying he was talking to Gareth's Executive Assistant about changing to a later flight.

Gareth and Steve continued to discuss what the Treasury documents showed. The basic story, explained Steve incredulously, was that Treasury advised National against giving Rio Tinto $30 million, but 'John Key gave Rio Tinto a phone call and made the offer anyway'! Throughout the documents there were numerous mentions of the Government's asset sales programme, which Gareth characterised as showing that they were at the front of National's mind when deciding to give Rio Tinto the money. The Green Party's campaign against the Government's partial state asset sales was one of their priority issues for 2013, so any scandalous story they could link to that would help draw attention to their campaign and build public pressure on the Government.

However, the Green Party also had to avoid taking an unpopular position on the issue so that they would not become a negative part of the story. Together, Gareth and Steve discussed the Green Party's response to a question which Steve thought they would get asked: would the Greens close the smelter? Gareth wanted to say that they would get independent economic advice before making a decision on the issue. The Political Director interrupted, asking Gareth whether his flight was sorted. She said that once it was, she would send out the email to media for the stand-up. Gareth popped out of the room on a phone call to check with his Executive Assistant. One of the advisors let out a loud sigh, and with a mixture of both exasperation and excitement, exclaimed: "Recess Thursdays!"

Steve said he was really hungry and an advisor, Hannah, threw a small portion of almonds over to him. She asked if there was anything else she could do; she was handed the lists of documents in Treasury's release, with the advisors' initials checked off next to each document that had been looked through for newsworthy and politically advantageous information. Hannah asked Steve what she should be looking for; he replied that she should look for any link to asset sales or any advice from Treasury not to hand over the money. Hannah sat back down at her desk and started working through the files. Steve said he was glad that most of the documents were short – they'd nearly finished looking through them all.

Gareth answered another phone call as I stood awkwardly beside Steve's desk, jotting down field notes to capture how the Greens responded to such a big breaking news story. An advisor seated at the next desk, Richard, quietly asked Steve, "What kind of team are we?" Steve looked back, confused, asking what he meant. "For Jess, writing down her notes: what kind of team are we?" replied Richard. "Oh! Hello!" exclaimed Steve, noticing me. "I'd say well-oiled!" said Richard, laughing. I laughed back, feeling awkward at my observer status being made explicit. But Richard was right; the Green Party's advisors were experienced and skilled at responding to breaking news and the actions and announcements of other political players. Although it was rapid and adrenaline-fuelled, the advisors moved fluidly through the work they needed to complete to prepare Gareth for his interview and get the Green Party's position and messaging out to the media as quickly as possible. Richard and Steve kept working as I filled out my notes; Steve found a "golden" quote and put it down the bottom of the press release to make it easy for the media to find and use.

Having returned from his call, Gareth stood at the side of Steve's desk, reading the documents Treasury had released on his phone. Ben asked Gareth if he wanted to read them on a big screen, and Gareth took up the offer. Ben put one of the PDF documents from the release up on his computer, saying it was a good summary. Gareth read through it, making notes as he went. Only 20 minutes had passed since Gareth and I had left the select committee room; it was incredibly fast.

At 2:20 p.m., Gareth reported that he could not make a later flight to Tauranga as none would get him to his public meeting on time. The Political Director asked whether he could still make his flight if they did the media stand-up at 2:45 p.m. "It'll be touch-and-go," responded Gareth. She replied that he would have to book his taxi ready to leave from the front of Parliament so that he could just go straight afterwards. Gareth agreed, noting that he did not have any bags so he could just run onto the plane at the airport. Anna called a journalist to let them know the plan and then said to Gareth that they could go around the Press Gallery. Gareth asked if it was just *3 News* who he would be talking to, and the Political Director responded that it would not be if she sent out an email about the media stand-up. Gareth lamented that he would not have time for lunch, not even a beer before the flight. He went back to reading documents on Ben's computer and I asked him whether he would like me to get him some lunch. He said that would be good, so I quickly popped down to a local bakery with his order to get him something to eat, also taking the opportunity to jot down some more field notes.

When I got back, Gareth, Steve, and I stood around Steve's desk again, looking at the press release and "lines" on the story (see Appendix K for the final press release). The Political Director also came over during the conversation, forming part of the group. Steve evaluated that the only "risk" he could see was the question about whether the Greens would close the smelter, the implication

being that jobs would be lost. Steve's advice to Gareth was to "dead bat" the question and not give a yes or no answer. The conversation went back and forth too quickly for me to capture it in detail in my field notes. There was a palpable sense of urgency to prepare well for the media stand-up. The three considered how to message what had taken place, with Gareth thinking aloud: "What is it? Is it a dodgy deal? Is it a…" They decided the next suggestion – "backroom deal" – worked well, and the Political Director highlighted that the Government "concealed" what happened with regard to Prime Minister John Key calling New Zealand Aluminium Smelters. Responding to a request from a journalist off her phone, the Political Director asked if Gareth would be available for an interview at 5:10 p.m. Gareth replied, 'Yeah, I should be landed by then'. She booked it in with the journalist. Gareth kept practicing his line on whether or not the Green Party would close the smelter, saying that it was a 'complex policy situation'. The three discussed whether there was already a Party position on closing the smelter and Steve confirmed there was not: The 'position was to avoid having a position'. The Political Director said that the jobs were not guaranteed anyway, but Gareth and Steve countered that the Government did actually get some guarantees on job security from the deal. Steve repeated his advice to dead bat the question, but Gareth spoke from his experience being interviewed by the Press Gallery: "Yeah, but they press you." Steve said that they did not "want to give [the media] the opportunity to take a little bit of a quote" from Gareth's reply to a question and frame the Greens negatively.

After the discussion ended, it was time to go to the stand-up. Gareth and I ran up two flights of stairs to his office to quickly grab his bag for Tauranga. "It's a contrast to my last few days!" exclaimed Gareth as we ran. Gareth's Executive Assistant asked how it was going; "Pretty manic!" replied Gareth. He rushed around his office, packing things into his bag. I asked if there was anything I could do and Gareth replied that it would be good if I could hold his bag during the interview. Gareth talked to his Executive Assistant – they were very quickly sorting out other matters, like informing the Social Media Advisor about Gareth's upcoming campaign event against shark finning. Gareth and I nearly ran back down the stairs to the Political and Media Unit to meet Steve before walking equally quickly to the Bridge for the media stand-up.

It all happened very, very quickly. From first rushing away from select committee at 2:00 p.m., there was a real sense of urgency to read all the documents, understand what they showed, pick out the most important points, get a media advisory and press release sent out, get the messaging lines sorted, and move speedily across the parliamentary complex, all before Gareth had to catch his cab and run onto the airplane at 3:00 p.m. It was non-stop. But, for the Green Party, it was worth it to lead the opposition comment against the Government and Prime Minister's actions on an issue related to a priority campaign and one which the Press Gallery seemed primed to treat as scandalous. The Green Party had an opportunity to contribute some damage to the Government's reputation on an important topic.

At the Bridge there was a mix of around six radio and television journalists, their microphones and cameras set up ready to record Gareth. Steve had a voice recorder too, so he could tape Gareth for the Green Party's records as the Political Director had reminded him to do before we left the office. The journalists fired off questions, and Gareth answered each one smoothly, not doing double takes as other single-outlet interviews sometimes allow. The questions covered a broad range of areas, including things like whether the Government should always do what Treasury advised. Gareth answered all the questions, repeating the key lines he had discussed with Steve but tailoring what he said around them to answer each question being asked. The stand-up finished ten minutes

before 3:00 p.m. Gareth took his bag back off me and went to stand next to Steve, talking to a journalist. He then said goodbye before walking back through the doors where we had come from and going down parliament's main staircase to reach his cab. Steve and the journalist were chatting about where exactly in the documents the key quote about the Prime Minister's phone call could be found, and I left to go back up to the office and get myself a late lunch.

Steve caught up with me at the lifts back to Bowen House. I asked whether he was going to have a late night as a result of the breaking news but he reported that he was done. He explained that with breaking news like that, there was normally a big rush and then it died down. More might come out during the week. Right then, the media had not "had a chance to do the analysis yet," so he anticipated there might be more once they had done that. We agreed that the stand-up went well. Steve asked if I had noticed the journalists were "priming" Gareth with the questions: 'They were giving him information in the questions, stuff that we hadn't picked up on' from the documents. Steve mused that Gareth must have had some media training since the last time he had watched him do an interview because he had been saying the "same thing in slightly different ways" throughout. That was a good thing to do, Steve evaluated, because then the journalists "have to pick up what you've said." He gave the example of Gareth repeating a line about John Key "picking up the phone" a lot in response to the media's questions, saying that Gareth must have come up with it on the spot, liked it, and ran with it. "It's good," he evaluated. Steve continued his analysis of the stand-up, expressing surprise that the media did not ask Gareth about shutting down the smelter. I agreed it was surprising, saying that I thought they would have considering how much effort Gareth, Steve, and the Political Director had put into preparing for that question. Steve chuckled, saying that the press must have been "angry [Treasury] took out all the figures," referring to how some information had been held back in the published documents. Leaving Steve on Level 14, I went back to Gareth's office on Level 16, feeling slightly relieved that the afternoon, according to Steve, would be quieter. I spent the afternoon busily writing up the field notes from the day's events while Gareth flew to Tauranga.

When I talked to Gareth about the story later, he also evaluated that it had gone very well:

> I was very stoked 'cause I was leading [Labour Party spokesperson David] Parker on both TV channels and got wide-pick up, and you saw the amount of time I had to prepare for it! So I was pretty stoked and I actually love that sort of high pressure environment… It was kind of like *The West Wing*, you know? You get to storm over and you only get a little bit of time and you've got to think on your feet. But that's what I really love. And I think I'm pretty good at it.

Gareth wanted to acknowledge, however, that is was not just his skill that had made his interview and coverage successful; several Political and Media Advisors had contributed through their work that day too:

> It's about having a complimentary team, 'cause they were able to provide me the info really fast, and the salient points, which is great. And I think I was able to put the political frame on it and talk about 'playing fast-and-loose with money' and 'John Key picked up the phone and because of this was this'. 'Cause I think it's really important for our job, and especially in the Greens, is to try and communicate in a way that people understand. So I think we're a good team in the sense that they're able to find the interesting things and I was able to communicate it in a way which people could understand.

The events of that day show that even when the completely unexpected occurs, the process of responding is highly regular. Gareth and the advisors followed the Green Party's strategy for getting into the media: be the first to provide comment and provide a green perspective on the issue. The hour between finding out about the release of information by Treasury and Gareth leaving for his flight felt like a smooth flow from one overlapping thing to another, even if it was an intense and rapidly flow. Because Gareth and the advisors were well-practiced at their work, operating with a keen practical sense of how to ensure their statements got covered in the media, the events proceeded seamlessly and they led the opposition coverage on the issue.

Conclusion

As well as seeking broad public support for their vision, the Greens in 2013 sought to be understood as reflecting what might be called the belief about the majority public opinion, or the public mood, or the groundswell that makes up what we believe the public as a broad group thinks, in the same way that I discussed in the Introduction occurs for the group of 'moderate', 'mainstream', 'everyday' Kiwis who represent the viewpoint of the political centre. Like the other political parties, the Greens wanted the public – as individual people and a broad category– to be understood as understanding the world way the Greens wanted them to. That way, in the public sphere, where the political agenda becomes coherent and plays out, where political pressure rises and falls, and where political fortunes are won and lost, the Greens would be the ones able to exercise symbolic power by naming what the public believed and having that be understood as what the public believed.

One of the key ways that politicians can do that is by making statements in the media. That is because, firstly, national news media in New Zealand commands a large and broad public audience. By making statements to that audience, the Greens could expose the public to their positions and messages on the issues which meant that they could compete to win the public's belief and support. Secondly, it is because the media themselves exercise a symbolic power that acts as a "prism" by which the public can come to understand politicians, parties, and the issues too (ref). As MPs can speak to the public through the media and as the media shapes and reflects public opinion, media reporting is a central part of creating belief that produces the way the world is. Lempert and Silverstein (2012:47-18) reflected that when they wrote:

> The space-time of things-that-just-happen-to-happen in determinate spatial or temporal relation to one another, even in spatiotemporal proximity is, of course, made up of people – even politically engaged people – constantly doing and saying things. There is an uncontrolled randomness in all this, a backdrop of great, criss-crossing complexity… against which the emergence of an organized counter-entropic trend, even groundswell, as they say, of a political coherence and direction becomes a discernible wonder (Lempert and Silverstein 2012:47-48).

What politicians say in the media and the way their statements are reported by the media is a central channel by which political coherence, direction, and belief is produced.

That is why the Green Party expended such great effort in doing the work of getting into the news and attempting to influence the way the media covered what they said. This Chapter has outlined

much of that work. The Greens, primarily, sought to make it easy and essential for the media to cover what they said, by adapting to and responding the media field's need for quick comment, soundbites, and newsworthy information, and leading opposition to rolling political issues, for example. They also worked out the right statements to make if they did get coverage that would work to communicate the issue to the public with the Green Party's messaging, and used practices like message discipline to make it more likely that the statement they wanted reported would be. However, even if the Greens did all of that, there was no guarantee that the story would run the way they wanted it to. The outcomes of all that daily work were variable, ranging from what they considered excellent saturation coverage, to no coverage at all, to scandalous coverage. Nonetheless, the promise of being able to shape politics and the public through the media meant that the Greens strived daily to be in it.

Doing media well and effectively requires skill because it not only requires an MP to be able to adapt to the needs to the media field to gain and influence coverage but also requires that MPs are able to exercise a good practical sense for saying the right thing in their soundbites. Soundbites are short, usually only one succinct sentence long. They are simple, and they most often state a single idea. In just the few words that characterise a soundbite, politicians have to say something to us that is politically and symbolically effective in that it wins or is understood to be winning the public's support and belief in what they are saying. But, the simplicity and ubiquitousness of the soundbite belies the complexity of its production. To make a good soundbite, a politician must make a statement that fits their own dispositions, fulfils their traditional opposition role, adheres to the principles and prescriptions of messaging, and speaks specifically to the issue that the report is about. This Chapter shows that the only way a politician can do that is by using their practical sense to take account without consciously taking account of all that criss-crossing complexity in which they are enmeshed to say the most strategic thing in the moment. And, as this Chapter also shows, even if politicians do that and make what they consider to be the most strategic statement, there is no guarantee that the media will use it or that it will come to be or come to be understood as the public's belief too.

Conclusion

The Challenge and Complexity of Doing Politics, and the Contribution this Thesis Makes

These days, in Western democracies, political struggle is waged with words. Politicians spend much of their day thinking about making statements, preparing to make statements, and making statements. Their work centres on saying things, and that politicians make statements is taken-for-granted by them and by us. While the statements we see from our politicians are usually neat, clear, simple, professional, disciplined soundbites, the work of making those statements is messy, indeterminate, uncertain, filled with tension, and – above all – intensely complex. In the everyday complexity of the political field, MPs rely on their practical sense – their feel for the game that enables them to anticipate and shape the future state of play – to make statements that aim at winning the double stakes and respond to their particular situation.

In some ways, the answer to this thesis' question – why do MPs say the things they do the way they do? – is unextraordinary. Like all people, the ability of Green Party MPs Holly, Gareth, Kennedy, and Catherine to speak and act in New Zealand's political field was shaped by the way the functioning of the field was inculcated in their dispositions: with a "margin of freedom," the field preconstrained what they could say and do in their everyday political work (Bourdieu 2005:30). The intense complexity of the political field's everyday strategic and practical functioning makes the preconstrained work of saying things well as an MP extraordinarily challenging. This thesis has explored the way three drivers – the logic of messaging, being in parliament in opposition, and the individual dispositions of each MP – worked to shape what the MPs of 2013 said as they aimed to win government and make the world they envisioned real.

What politicians say and the way politicians speak matters because the words they use aim to and do have effect. The vision of the social world is not natural even if it is taken for granted. It must be constantly reproduced by the efforts of politicians and the recognition of the public. The struggle to define our social world is "extremely dynamic" but it is not unconstrained (Lane 2006:57). If we wish to understand a society, then we must examine how the political field and the people in it shape the possibilities and limits of what can be said and done about social world as they make and remake it through language and action. Thus, examining the empirical reality of the Green Party and its MPs' work in the political field to win the double stakes of politics is essential for understanding how Aotearoa New Zealand's social world is made.

Updating Bourdieu

Politicians' statements can create the world they envision in two ways. Politicians can either win office and, with it, the power to exert governmental power that enables them to impose new representations and practices across a society (Bourdieu 1991:181). Or, they can use symbolic power to create belief among the public in the world their words give name to, producing the representations that people apply to the world (Bourdieu 1995:36; Bourdieu 1991:170, 181). Either

way, by imposition or by the mobilisation of belief, the language that politicians use can produce the social order that generates thinking and practice within the world, thereby making that world real. Political struggle occurs when politicians want to create different worlds, defined by different symbolic orders that are expressed through the language that makes them.

Invested in democratic politics, political parties aim to and must win elections. Bourdieu (1991:189) presented the political strategy of parties working to win elections as fairly straightforward, reflecting the structure of the French electoral and parliamentary systems: parties aim to win a majority, and do so by compromising or being ambiguous with their policies, positions, and vision in order to attract the other parties' voters to them. In Bourdieu's view, politicians' primary aim was to win elections so that they could hold the monopoly on governmental power and maintain their position of power over the public; therefore, politicians' speech is directed toward winning elections and staying in government. While there may be some internal dissension about compromising what the party stands for, Bourdieu (1991:181, 189-190) argued that in the minds and actions of politicians, the pursuit of governmental power always took priority over producing "ideas about the social world."

However, proportional electoral systems like New Zealand's Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) elect parliaments and – indirectly – governments differently, and that offers a greater range of strategies for political parties. While parties can aim to win over a majority, they can also enter government without a majority of votes by making arrangements to achieve confidence and supply in agreement with other parties. That is what happens in New Zealand, as no single party has yet achieved a majority in the House under MMP. For a small political party like the Greens, that means that they can pursue government by holding enough votes and being in the right position in relation to other parties. To win Cabinet positions in the 2014 Election, the Greens evaluated that they would need to appeal to only 15 percent of voters, far fewer than the majority required in the French system Bourdieu was writing about. Needing to appeal to enough rather than a majority means that smaller political parties in New Zealand do not face the same pressure for compromise and ambiguity to appeal to a large and broad section of society as might be found in majoritarian systems. Instead, they can broaden just enough to gain the extra votes they seek but not so much as to threaten the purity of their party's vision.

In addition to a proportional electoral system, the ability of parties like the Greens to retain their heterodox vision for the world while still being able to win governmental positions is aided by the rise of political communication, which was not a dominant driver during the 1980s when Bourdieu (1991) was writing. What political communication does, by rationalising the practical communicative skill and sense of politicians, is create a new object – the form and content of the statement itself – that can be analysed, evaluated, and judged (Bourdieu 1991:177). There is an orthodox way of communicating politically, which forms the "politically effective and legitimate forms of perception and expression" (Bourdieu 1991:173). What that practically means for politicians is that they can meet the legitimate conditions for political statements to a greater extent by speaking in ways that adhere to political communication's objectified and rationalised orthodoxy with the effect that the public is more predisposed to recognise what they are saying as right and true (Bourdieu 1991:113). Doing that allowed the Greens to speak their heterodox positions in ways which would nonetheless be appealing to the public, meaning that they could compete in the political and symbolic struggles that define the political field.

The proportionality of New Zealand's electoral system and the rise of political communication as a dominant logic in the political field means that Bourdieu's (1991:181) fundamental analysis that "the production of ideas about the social world is always in fact subordinated to the logic of the conquest of power, which is the logic of mobilization of the greatest number" needs reformulating. Rather, as the ethnographic material of thesis shows, while the Green Party MPs did tend to subordinate statements about the social world to the reproduction of the game, they did not wholly subordinate their ideas, statements, and actions to the pursuit of power. They, firstly, did not have to because they did not seek to win government by appealing to a majority of people. Secondly, they could increase their appeal enough by speaking about their vision in orthodox ways. And, finally, although the Green MPs were invested parliamentary politics, they could also question the social world and the political game itself because they did not always experience neat fit between their dispositions and the field. Because of those three conditions, rather than a totalising subordination of ideas about the social world to the pursuit of power, the Greens were constantly aware and reflective of just what and how far they were compromising to pursue government, constantly working to find the right balance between the purity of their vision and increasing their appeal to win the support more people.

The Contribution to Understanding Political Messaging

In 2013, the Green Party's MPs were aiming at creating belief among the public in their vision for the world and – with the caution about not doing so at any cost – winning office in 2014 by gaining the votes of an extra 90,000 people. The problem was that working toward those two aims can be very different in strategy and practice for small parties in New Zealand's proportional electoral system: to be part of a government, the Greens did not need a majority of support from the public; but, creating the transformed world they wanted would need the public to believe and act on the Greens' representations. Green MPs viewed making that transformative social change as a slow and incremental process without a clear pathway, and a project which cut across the more immediate need to contest and win elections. Holly, quoted in the Introduction, expressed the difficulty like so:

> Rather than us change our policies, I'd like to see us lead that attitude shift [in encouraging people to think collectively rather than individualistically again]. But that's a huge ask. And I think people still don't really think like that and it's a real challenge for us as a political party, both in terms of our policies and in terms of how we campaign, to think about how realistic that is. Because within the framework of each election, we have to market ourselves in such a way that we'll appeal to voters. So, it has to work as well as be realistic.

No one, including the Greens, has a foolproof method for changing the social order; Bourdieu's (Bourdieu 1991:106) use of the word "alchemy" captures the spontaneous, shifting, almost magical production of language, speaker, and believer that produces the collective understanding of the world. Parties like the Greens, who aim to create deep and lasting change in society, do not have a clear pathway for creating the change to the social order they are aiming for. What they do seem closer to having, however, is a method for winning elections by winning the public's support.

Winning election by creating public support is the promise that the messaging experts of political communication seemingly provide: they say that by talking about issues, parties, and people with

certain words and not others, politicians will have the power to materially shape the neural structure of a person's brain in a way that will prompt them to think about the world in the way the politician wants them to and therefore vote for them. Experts like Lakoff (2004) and Westen (2007) make the actual work of doing that neural reshaping seem straightforward. They say:

- Frame the issues;
- Make statements that are values-based, emotional, and positive;
- Avoid technical, detailed, and jargon-based policy discussions that appeal to the rational mind;
- Repeat the same words and phrases universally over and over again.

The claim is that by using the right words repeatedly, politicians can make the world that they talk about the right one in peoples' material minds. And, if they can produce the right number of people with the right neural structure, then they can win election and create social change. The promise of that pathway from talk to winning is seductive for politicians. Enmeshed in a complex world of messiness, indeterminacy, and uncertainty, having a framework for speaking messaged statements creates order, exactness, and certainty for MPs. It appears to allow them to collapse the dual projects of winning over the public's belief in their vision and their need to contest elections within a single statement. And, as this thesis argues, it does seem to work.

But, we do not know for sure that it works for the reasons the experts say it does. The causative effect between language change and social change is far from determined, whether considered from a Bourdieusian, anthropological, framing, or emotion perspective. Rather than focusing on whether the causative effect political communication experts make is true or not, my argument is that doing messaging worked for the Greens because it provided them and others that are in and surround the political field with a set of orthodox rationalised rules and prescriptions for communicating to the public that were considered legitimate and effective. Adhering to the rules of legitimate and effective communication showed that the Green Party was more "conventional, moderate, and professional," "pragmatic," and able to "appeal to a broader, more mainstream constituency" (Edwards and Lomax 2012:994, 998). By meeting expectations about the right way for politicians to talk, the Greens were more readily seen as credible, serious, and trustworthy political players, and the public was more predisposed to find what they said to be believable. Therefore, by providing the rules about the way politicians should talk that, in turn, form the basis of political practice and evaluation, messaging enables politicians who follow the experts' prescriptions appear skilled and credible, and makes what they say more believable and appealing.

Previously, when anthropologists have examined messaging, they have considered it in relation to messaging the character of individual politicians. That reflects that the research on messaging originates in the U.S., where the individual candidates' contest to win the Office of President is central to elections. Linguistic anthropologists Lempert and Silverstein (2012) and, more recently, those who have considered the communication style of President Trump (Hall et al. 2016; Hodges 2017a, 2017b, 2017c) point to the importance of the way politicians talk to groups of the public using words and non-verbal cues to create message partials that can be used to build a knowable picture of the candidate's character and the people they appeal to. The Green Party and its MPs all understood the power of message in creating the public's understanding of political characters that "wrap around" what happens in politics and, for that reason, did consider and attempt to shape their message (Silverstein 2011b:205). Holly, Kennedy, Gareth, and Catherine, for example, did have

identifiable 'brands' that reflected their actual person and that they came to be known publicly for: 'The Scholar and Young Mum', 'The Older Statesman', 'The Generational Change', and 'The Fiery Activist', as Gareth identified. The Green Party MPs, too, spoke and acted in ways designed to provide partials that they were 'Positive, leading, and ready for government'. Those messages mattered in characterising the Party and its MPs as serious, competent, and trustworthy political players who could be Ministers come 2014.

But, by far, what primarily occupied the daily thinking and practice of the Green Party MPs and staff was messaging issues. When considering the work that politicians speaking about political issues does, Lempert (2011:193) argued that positions and policies themselves increasingly do not matter in politics; rather, he writes, what is important is way that positions on issues signify a recovered relation to a group of people. That relation and the associated qualities of the politician that the relation denotes are not produced by the candidate in their statements. Instead, the message is "constructed" by media and commentators in their post-statement reporting and evaluations (Lempert 2011:193). However, my argument is that politicians' statements about the positions and policies themselves *do* matter and *continue to* matter even as message increasingly dominates because the way issues are described is part of the language struggle that characterises the contest between social worlds that occurs in the political field (Bourdieu 1991:128-127). By making a statement about an issue, a politician aims to have the public believe what they are saying about the world is right and true, producing a public belief in the world as they see it that can then generate action in the world (Swartz 2013:37; Lane 2005:55). By speaking about the world by naming positions, policies, values, visions, and more, politicians competitively engage in the world-maintaining and world-making that defines politics. Both the world that politicians give name to and the way that that naming is viewed in the public sphere matters in producing the effect of belief that makes what is stated real.

The challenge for politicians is how to produce belief among the public in what they as opposed to others say about the issues. The principles and prescriptions of Lakoff (2004) and Westen (2007) shaped the Greens' thinking and practices about how to do that. The Greens believed that speaking about issues in messaged statements that framed the issues, were values-based, emotional, and positive would persuade people that the Green Party's view was right and true more than statements that argued rationally using facts and figures, technical information, and detailed discussion. The desire to speak to the public using messaged form and content is seen throughout this thesis. For example, in Chapter Four, I showed that the Greens often reminded themselves that being positive and having solutions for problems motivated people to support the Party's positions where negative attack-based politics did not. They often returned to that idea in their *Advisory and Comms Reports for Caucus* to reinforce a 'knee-jerk positive' approach among the MPs. In Chapter Six, I showed that the content of 1+3s was constructed to provide messaged statements. Ideally, the 1 would frame the issue in the Greens' view and be positive, and the supporting +3 would provide evidence, a normative statement of value, and a positive solution. As a form of speaking, the 1+3 acted as a "riff" (Crewe 2015b:153) which enabled MPs to repeat the Party's position and language about an issue repeatedly to different media outlets and audiences. In Chapter Seven, I showed that the Greens used 1+3s to message their social, environmental, and economic vision for the world, creating the respective slogans 'Good lives, fair futures', 'Love it, protect it', and 'Smart, green economics' that aimed to make the Greens' vision more broadly appealing. Chapters Eight and Nine showed that when the Greens thought about communicating to the public on the political issues of the day, they thought about doing so by considering their messaging, whether by finishing

a set of questions for oral answer with a positive solution or creating a repeatable soundbite to use in interviews. The logic of messaging, then, dominated in the strategic thinking and communicative practices of the Green Party in 2013 as they attempted to win over the public's support to their way of thinking about political issues.

However, while it was dominant, messaging as a way of thinking and speaking was neither totalising nor uncontested for the Greens. Concerns about messaging were expressed particularly by Catherine and Kennedy, who had developed their political dispositions prior to the rise of the political communication we have today. Detailed in Chapter Seven, what concerned Catherine about messaging was the way it assumed the pursuit of governmental power by making party positions more broadly appealing rather than using other methods of creating change, such as forgoing the opportunity of government in order retain purer but less popular values and positions outside it and seeking to put pressure on whoever was in Government to adopt them. She saw a contrast between populism and principles, and viewed messaging as a strategy more closely aligned with the former. Kennedy was concerned about the way that message discipline both curtailed his ability to speak the way he wanted and shaped him to make more messaged statements. Discussed in Chapter Six, message discipline was used to limit the public statements of MPs to those which conformed more closely to the principles and prescriptions of messaging. Kennedy, disposed to make detailed, complex, technical and rational arguments that are the opposite of what messaging calls for, struggled in an environment where the dominant logic made other ways of thinking and speaking the most strategic. However, the concerns that Catherine and Kennedy had were only raised internally, away from the gaze of the media and public where such questioning might be recovered as doubt about their investment in and willingness to play the game. In public, where it mattered most in the pursuit of the political field's double stakes, both MPs made statements that engaged in messaging strategies and practices so that they and the Greens could be considered credible and serious politicians who the public ought to believe in and who might, one day, be Ministers.

The Contribution to Understanding Parliament and Opposition

While dominant, messaging is not the only logic that shapes what MPs say and the way they speak. MPs inhabit the parliament, and it is the institution of parliament that provides the daily purpose and structure of their work. Because of that, MPs' statements are not only preconstrained by the logic of messaging as it works to win them election by increasing public support; they are also preconstrained by the functioning of the parliament and their position in it. That functioning is complex, because "parliaments are among the most complex political bodies imaginable" (Crewe and Müller 2006:1). They are governed by innumerable highly-codified and formal traditions, rituals, rules, and conventions that impart a sense of permanence and gravitas. But, those traditions are often highly adaptable and dynamic because MPs and others act on and within those formalities to shape and remake them anew as society, strategy, people, and sometimes the necessities of everyday politics and issues change. MPs and Ministers who invest and believe in parliamentary politics make statements that are shaped by the parliament and their place in it.

One of the ways that being in parliament shapes what MPs say is that investing in the institution and its stakes predisposes them to make statements that reproduce the parliament itself.

Reproducing the parliament means reproducing it as a site of "regulated consensus" whereby struggles between interest groups are waged "within [the] limits" provided by parliament (Bourdieu 2014:355). One component of those limits concerns the "expression of dissension," whereby political contests have to occur in parliament-appropriate statements and actions (Bourdieu 2014:355). In Chapter Five, which charted the passage of the Plumbers Bill through the House, I showed that Holly made statements that reproduced parliamentary expression and practice as she advocated for the typical select committee process to be followed, adhered to the *Standing Orders*, used the right tone of voice, and more. Green MPs made statements that reproduced parliamentary forms of expression because it was strategic for them. Doing so showed that they were competent and professional MPs who understood and could play by the rules, and therefore would be trustworthy in Ministerial positions. Building a reputation of skill in adhering to and mastering the procedures of the House also gained individual MPs political capital (Bourdieu 1991:194). By making statements that adhere to the expressive limits of parliament, MPs reproduce both those limits and the parliament itself which, in turn, maintains the political game and enables them to play it.

As well as being part of the parliament as a whole, the Green MPs also occupied a specific position in opposition to the Government during 2013. That predisposed the MPs to make statements which fulfilled the tradition of that role. Traditionally and primarily, the opposition's role has been understood as providing check on the government's power. To do that, opposition MPs make statements that scrutinise the Executive, hold it to account to the House of Representatives, and criticise the actions and inactions of Ministers. That is what Green MPs thought they "should do" (McGee 1994:2), and carrying out that democratic function structured their everyday work. The effect is that opposition MPs constantly examine and raise issues, and put forward alternatives that reflect what their party stands for in the parliamentary and public sphere.

That sounds simple enough. But, when filled out with the detail and depth of everyday politics and work, it becomes clear that fulfilling the tradition of opposition is much more complex and variable than we might typically imagine. While it has not been examined academically before, this thesis shows that the Green MPs' daily opposition statements and activities took place in a complex milieu of variable purpose, strategy, setting, timeframe, audience, topic, and more as they attempted to drive or respond to what was on the political agenda. MPs shift disjunctively multiple times throughout their day, from sending out a tweet to comment on a morning news report at the start of their day, to working out with colleagues what the priorities will be for the day, to examining the text of a bill with their select committee peers to write a report, to talking collaboratively about possible policies to the head of a civil sector organisation in a one-on-one meeting, to facing a bright semi-circle of television cameras to provide soundbites on a breaking political story, to organising the detail of their diary and finances with their Executive Assistant, to signing off the wording of campaign leaflets written by their advisor, to talking light-heartedly about family matters or more seriously about a strategic direction with their peers over dinner, before going back to speaking in a debate on a bill in the House and, when done, waiting in the silence of an office for the 10:00 p.m. bells that give permission to leave parliament for the night. Over their 13.3 hour working day (Coffé 2017:345), the immense variety of practical activity and variability of topic MPs engage in means they make statements in immense variety too.

In that variety, MPs shape their statements to reflect what they think will be effective. But, the evaluation of what is effective can change, and that means parliaments change too. While the

longevity, ritual, and traditions of parliaments create a sense of unshifting permanence, one of the ways parliaments alter is if the strategies and practices of the MPs acting and speaking in them change. In New Zealand, as the logic of messaging has entered the parliament and become dominant in the way that MPs think about how they should communicate with the public, MPs have adapted and altered the traditions of the House as they work to talk to the public about the issues in a way that they believe will win our support. New Zealand's MPs have always engaged in a permanent election campaign using the procedures of the House (Skene 1992) and messaging is a continuation of politicians speaking in parliament in ways designed to win political and symbolic support from the public for what they want to do. The way that is done these days means that although opposition MPs' daily working lives are structured by the activities and statements they believe fulfil the tradition of opposition, in tandem, they also attempt to mesh that together with the principles and prescriptions of messaging that they believe will create the public support for what they say.

The way that messaging has entered the parliament is best exemplified during question time. Question time commands attention because of its traditional accountability function and because the adversarial exchange between government and opposition that characterises it reaches a far larger audience than the 121 Ministers and MPs sitting in the debating chamber. That public audience means that Ministers and MPs not only engage in the tradition of informational question and answer but they also engage in messaging the issue for the watching audience. We see that in the way that the Greens tended to use their final supplementary question in a series to advocate for a solution, and the way they sought to communicate their own political messaging in their supplementary questions themselves rather than through the answer a Minister might provide. Thus, while operating in the structure provided by the parliament to scrutinise the government, opposition MPs have adapted their practices and strategies within it to enable them to both question a Minister about an issue they are responsible for and compete to have their point of view be the one that becomes the public's understanding of it.

The meshing of parliament and messaging, however, is messy. There is not always a neat fit between what parliamentary opposition requires and messaging prescribes. That is seen time and again throughout this thesis as, although the Greens believed they needed to message and tried to do so, when the principles and prescriptions of messaging hit up against the complexity, variability, and specificity of the political field, they did not work. Chapter Four showed that the Greens struggled to institute a disposition of being 'kneejerk positive' among the Caucus because making positive statements everyday was at odds with the negative criticism of the Government in the adversarial structure of parliament. And, while messaging calls for values-based, emotional, and positive statements, parliament often calls for issues-based, effect-focused, and detailed consideration, for example. Where messaging advocates repetition of the same statements universally, parliament calls for statements that are varied for the diversity of audience, issue, and situation MPs speak in, and it also calls for MPs to adapt what they are doing and saying to respond to the political agenda. That was particularly in evidence in Chapter Seven, where the Green Party's 1+3 'Good lives, fair futures' messaging on social issues was not used because reducing child poverty was occupying the attention of the public and political field, meaning that it was more strategic for the Greens contribute to putting pressure on the Government to create change on that issue. Messaging is better suited to winning support for elections, while the language of opposition suits parliamentary business. It is in the everyday working out of what to say in politics

that the disjuncture of form and content between those two can create challenges for MPs trying to say the right thing.

In the parliamentary and political field, the Green MPs are enmeshed at the nexus of irresolvable strategic tensions. As discussed in the previous section, they want to create transformative and lasting social change, but they also want to win elections in the shorter-term. They want to get into government, but not at the expense of their vision and values. They want to message in order to create the appeal needed to win elections, but they also want to fulfil the traditional role of parliamentary opposition in their work. Rhodes (2011:2, 289) argued that politicians can resolve the tensions in their work by telling stories to create shared understandings. In fact, this thesis shows that the strategic and practical tensions Green Party MPs faced trying to get into government from the position of opposition were irresolvable. At best, they could manage the balance between each direction, reflecting constantly on whether their messaging was reflective of their positions, whether they were being too restrictive about the way MPs could talk, what the issues they raised would say about the direction and competency of the Party, whether they were making too many adversarial opposition statements, and more. It is only in the actual moment of making a statement that an MP can temporarily resolve those strategic and practical tensions, making a judgement both about what the most strategic path for the particular issue they are immediately speaking about for the Party as it moves in the competitive political and parliamentary field toward the next election.

The Contribution to Understanding MPs and Their Practical Sense

MPs, in the moment of making a statement, have to resolve all the challenges and complexities that make up the political field and its strategies in order to say the right thing the right way for the right situation. My argument is that they can only do that by developing a good practical sense, which is:

> An acquired system of preferences, of principles of vision and division…, a system of durable cognitive structures… [and] schemes of action which orient the perception of the situation and the appropriate response. The habitus is this kind of practical sense for what is to be done in a given situation – what is called in sport a 'feel' for the game, that is, the art of *anticipating* the future of the game, which is inscribed in the present state of play (Bourdieu 1998:25, emphasis original).

MPs, operating in an immensely complex and messy environment cannot consciously and rationally reason to the most strategic statement each time they make one. Often, there is not a single, clear, and absolute answer that can be reasoned to. Instead, they rely on their deep knowledge of the game and how to play it that allows them to preconsciously work out the right move to make as they and others also make statements and act in the field too, shaping the game and their place in it as they aim to win the double stakes of politics (Bourdieu 1991:181).

A practical sense is a learned feel for the game that allows politicians to navigate the messiness, indeterminacy, and uncertainty that characterises making statements in the political field. That was shown in Chapter Nine, which showcased the way the Green Party, the four MPs, and Gareth in particular developed a practical sense for what would work well to gain good media coverage. Developed through engagement with the field over time, they were able to work out, for example,

which would be the leading stories of the day to comment on so that the Green MPs would stand a better chance of being quoted, or which message they could state in a soundbite that the media would find appealing and easy to use in their reports. A practical sense enables an MP to be skilled at gaining coverage because it allows them to anticipate whether their actions and statements will result in media coverage, how they can be reported in the story, and what others might think of what they say. However, even if MPs develop a good practical sense for gaining and being in media coverage, the complexity and competitiveness of the political field as well as the way it interacts and responds to the media field create uncertainty that make it difficult to map action in the present state of play to a particular coverage outcome. Thus, developing the right sense and skill does not necessarily lead to the political and symbolic success an MP and their Party aim for. Even if an MP says the right thing, they may not necessarily be saying anything effective.

While MPs develop their practical sense by acting in the field, they nonetheless enter parliament with a preformed habitus that continues to shape their dispositions and practices as MPs. Who they were shapes who they can become as MPs and the subsequent fit that they can develop in the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:128). The MPs that I worked with for this research did share some experiences and outlooks on life, but they were also distinct people who had lived diverse lives before becoming MPs. None experienced parliament with the perfect fit which makes it wholly and "immediately endowed with [the] meaning and interest," and which makes it unquestionable (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1991:128). It is in those gaps which imperfect fit creates that different ways of thinking and doing politics exists. The space between field and habitus allowed Holly, Kennedy, Gareth, and Catherine to think differently about politics and political issues and, at times and in small ways, to speak and act differently too. The lives and beliefs that individual people bring with them as they become MPs matters in shaping not only who they are in that role, but how politics and parliament work.

For the most part, however, the Green MPs did their work and made statements in ways that conformed to how the political field functioned because they invested and practiced in politics. The structures and strategies of the field, including the preconstraints of messaging, opposition, and their own dispositions, were inculcated in their habitus and practical sense, generating statements that – at least in public – reflected and reproduced the game. Preconstrained in what they could say and how they could say it, the MPs' speaking within those limits meant that they made and remade the "politically effective and legitimate forms of perception and expression" that shaped not only the world they could state and make but the world the public could too (Bourdieu 1991:173).

Some Thoughts About Where Next

Because there have been so few anthropological studies of powerful Western politicians and the fields they operate in, the opportunities for further research are nearly endless. The overwhelming number of studies about politics tell stories about what happens in public because they are etic and examine already-produced available political statements. Those studies are important because, as this thesis argues, it is through MPs' public statements designed to win over people's support and belief that political and symbolic struggles are waged. But, there are other stories to tell if a researcher can get beyond the boundary of message discipline and into the inside of the

political field. Any anthropologist entering the inside of the political field is basically guaranteed to find something new and novel.

This research shows that if we are to understand the contours of political struggle and the possibilities of the world that can be stated by politicians, researchers not only need to examine the statements that MPs make but also the conditions of their production. Bourdieu (1991:173) identified that what can be said about politics and political issues is shaped and preconstrained by how the political field works. But, to understand that working, it is not enough to look only at the products of the field – the things that MPs say and do in public and for the public. Instead, we must understand the world that MPs operate in, through behind-the-scenes study of practice. It is only by grasping the world of politics from the perspective of those that work in it that we can understand the way that the political and symbolic struggles of politics are waged.

Given that, there are two political trends which warrant further anthropological investigation regarding the ways they are preconstraining politicians' statements in an era of dominant rationalised political communication. Firstly, while this thesis has centred on the broad messaging efforts of politicians, especially via mass media channels, politics is increasingly turning toward individualised, tightly-targeted messaging. While that has been a trend since President Clinton began to use demographic data to tailor his political statements (Lempert and Silverstein 2012:49), what is different now is a new individual and lifestyle specificity developed and enabled by recent social and internet-based mediums like Facebook and NationBuilder. While I have not addressed it in this thesis because of length constraints, even among the Green Party in 2013, those technological tools which enabled collection, collation, and analysis of individualised data were important to the Greens for building a deeper sense of the people they were talking to and how they could appeal to them. These technologies are seductive, not only offering a relatively low-cost way to disseminate political statements but because they rationalise the effect of messaging even more. Being able to attach numbers to communication – hard data of likes and shares and views and retweets – enables quantitative measurement that drives political parties to establish their own principles and prescriptions for which combinations of image and language works for their brand and audience. The drive to adapt political statements to fit within the constraints of these new mediums, such as a 280-character limit or the pivot to and then away from video, is likely to continue and dominate thinking and practice in the field. While recognising that, like political communication, they might not be as effective as we popularly think they are or for the reasons we think they are, we ought to consider the way these tools structure and preconstrain political parties and politicians to think and act about to whom they communicate and how they communicate.

Secondly, we ought to consider further the implications of the shifting balance between rationally-oriented and emotionally-oriented messaged political statements in modern politics. There are often complaints that politicians lie, or that journalists print fake news, or scientists routinely produce multiple interpretations of a phenomenon, but more fundamentally there is a question about what the place of objective fact is in our political problematic and therefore of how the public can think politically. This thesis shows that just like conservative parties, progressive political parties have attempted to deemphasise detailed, technical, and jargon-based statements in their work in favour of appealing to values and emotions. As framing, values, and emotion increasingly become the way that politicians and the public think about political issues, there is a question about what that means for the way we understand, evaluate, and hold to account the very material, consequential, and incontestable work that our politicians do in governing our world. Additionally,

as the drive toward emotionally-oriented messaged statements that conform to what political communications experts advise politicians will be effective continues to increase, we ought to think about what other ways of understanding and stating a vision for the world we lose. We must contend with what emotionally-oriented politics is and how it is done; and, most importantly, what possible worlds it can produce.

However, while broad international trends do matter, this thesis also shows that the everyday and particular is central to how politics and parliaments work. Each parliament has its own structures and ways of doing things. In New Zealand, the working of our parliament and MPs is understudied and there are many gaps in the current knowledge which warrant further research. For example, when I sought to place my findings about the Greens in a broader context using political studies research, I found there was either no or little research about the following areas: the role of the Speaker and the way their approach to chairing shapes what happens in the Chamber, the work and strategy of opposition MPs, the views of MPs' and their work with regard to the process of legislating, the prominence and practice of message discipline, or the ways MPs seek and gain media coverage for their work. While there are several widely-renowned structural and process-based accounts of how parliament in New Zealand operates, there is little research about the everyday political work or perspectives of MPs in it. The value of this thesis in beginning to fill some of the gaps listed above is that it shows that the specific practices and views of MPs have a significant effect on the way parliament and politics unfold, illustrating the importance of taking both into account to provide a full and accurate analysis of what is happening and why.

Likewise, just as parliaments each have their own structures and way of doing things, so too does each political party in a parliament. In the small field of ethnographies of parliament, this thesis is unique in focusing on the workings of one political party rather than the cross-party or whole-of-parliament approach that has otherwise been taken. The single-party approach is valuable for understanding New Zealand's politics because it is the political parties that constitute the parliament and government, and because party unity and discipline are very strong. Getting behind the discipline, inside one political party, allows a detailed and deep focus on political strategy and political production in the adversarial parliamentary system that looks beyond parliament, just as political parties do too. It allows a researcher to understand the specific structure and strategies that preconstrain particular parties' production of public statements they believe will win them public support and belief in political struggle. Going inside the unexplored area of other political parties will help to build a broader and comparative picture of the way parties in parliament work.

Finally, at the beginning of this thesis, I wrote that I hoped readers would finish with a new perspective about politicians. It is not my intention to convince readers that our generally disillusioned, mistrustful, cynical views are wrong and that we should instead adopt an overly-flattering, idealised perspective that all politicians all the time are acting and speaking virtuously in the pure interests of their party and constituents as they try to do what is right and make the world a better place. Rather, I want readers to remember Fenno Jr.'s (1996:8, emphasis original) statement that it is "real *people* we are talking about when we generalise about the behaviour of politicians" and to see that generalising too much – whether negatively or positively – means we miss the very complex and challenging messiness that is doing politics and being a politician. There is no simple way to be a politician just as there is no simple way to win politics. Rather, politics is made up of real, individual people doing and saying particular things as they try their best to navigate the messiness, uncertainty, and indeterminacy that they are enmeshed in to create change or keep

things the same. In that criss-crossing complexity, we increasingly narrowly judge our MP's political credibility and competency by their skill in using while appearing not to use messaging as we evaluate what the form and content of their statements says about them, their party, and their prospects. But, let us expect both less and more of our representatives, judging them not only on the skill with which they talk to us but on what they talk to us about, as they do their best and give their greatest effort to making it real. In focusing increasingly on the communicative skill of MPs, we narrow the politically effective and legitimate ways of speaking and, in doing so, risk narrowing the possibilities of the world we can think and create.

Postscript

What Happened in 2014

Despite the Green Party's aim to increase their party vote by four percent – possibly enough to enter government with Labour – the Election of 2014 was remarkable for how little the Parliament changed (see Table 10.1). The biggest percentage changes in party votes between 2011 and 2014 belonged to Labour and New Zealand First, who lost 2.4 percent and gained 2.1 percent respectively. No other political party in Parliament had a change that reached even one percent. Thus, the 50th and 51st Parliaments in New Zealand looked much the same. The Government could draw on a pool of 64 votes, while the opposition of the Greens, Labour, and New Zealand First comprised 57.

Table 11.1: The Election and Composition of New Zealand's 51st Parliament, 2014-2017

Party	Percent of party vote	Electorate seats	List seats	Total seats
National	47.04	41	19	60
Labour	25.13	27	5	32
Green	10.70	0	14	14
NZ First	8.66	0	11	11
Māori	1.32	1	1	2
ACT	0.69	1	0	1
United Future	0.22	1	0	1
Other	6.25	0	0	0
Total	100	71	50	121

Source: (Adapted from Electoral Commission 2014, in Martin 2015:147)

That outcome was not what the Greens had hoped for. Although they were aiming for 15 percent, they won 10.7 percent of the Party vote (Levine 2015:Table 1.1). The support they received was slightly higher than in 2011, as the won the party votes of an additional 9,987 people (Levine 2015:Table 1.1; Johansson and Levine 2012:Table 1.1). However, because New Zealand's electoral system is proportional, their share of party votes remained relatively unchanged (Levine 2015:Table 1.1.). The effect was that their allocation of seats in the House remained static, returning 14 Green Party MPs to Parliament. Thus, neither their position nor power was altered much by the 2014 Election.

The Green Party was unable to form a coalition government with Labour and lost the election to National. Labour had fared even worse than they had in 2011. While the Green Party's seats in Parliament had remained stable, the Labour Party had lost two (Levine 2015: Table 1.1). Combined, the two parties' 46 seats were well short of National's 60. Even if the Greens and Labour had managed to form a tripartite coalition that included New Zealand First's 11 seats, it would still not have been enough to beat National.

The result was that the National Party continued to dominate the political field, easily forming a government with the continued support of the Māori Party, ACT, and United Future. National received nearly double the support of their closest competitor, the Labour Party. Its 60 seats were just one shy of being able to command a majority on its own. With the support of their partners, who all returned to Parliament, National could draw on 64 votes in confidence and supply. Thus, National's dominance in winning its third term so resoundingly was considered an "enviable endorsement" of their governing and Prime Minister John Key's personal qualities (Levine 2015:50-51).

The Green Party's perspective on the campaign and Election were outlined by Co-leader Russel Norman's (2015) chapter, *Stable in the Storm: The Green Campaign,* in New Zealand's 2014 Election book, *Moments of Truth* (Johansson and Levine 2015). The title reflected the Green's ability to retain their share of party votes in an election campaign characterised by uncontrolled events and chaotic surprise. Norman (2015:147) characterised the overall campaign as "tumultuous, with *Dirty Politics*, Kim Dotcom and the Labour leadership issues occupying a lot of airtime." He wrote that while the Greens had put forward a positive and "comprehensive policy platform" that built on their three priorities for a cleaner environment, fairer society, and smarter economy, they were crowded out of media coverage which was focused on the other players and events of the campaign (Norman 2015:147). That curtailed the Greens' ability to use media coverage to share their vision with the broad public and win their support. The Green Party continued their strategy to get media coverage for their positions and issues by trying to make it easy for the media to cover the Greens' statements, Norman (2015:149) wrote, describing their practice of coupling every policy announcement "with an event or a photo opportunity to try and ensure media coverage." But, despite that, "We were told by the Parliamentary Press Gallery that they wouldn't cover our policy launches" (Norman 2015:151).

To counter that, the Green Party turned to their social media, direct media, and ground campaign to reach voters directly (Norman 2015:147). For example, they encouraged sharing or retweeting social media posts and their reach was reflected in an increase of likes on the Party's Facebook page from 38 thousand in April 2014 to 65 thousand at the end of the campaign in September 2014 (Norman 2015:151). Social or direct contact with voters was measured and evaluated where possible, so that individual voters who were voting or open to voting for the Greens received communication designed to mobilise them on Election day. Norman (2015:151-152) viewed those efforts as successful, writing that: "We grew our number of votes and held our percentage. More than one in ten voters voted for us. We largely did it on our own. Our campaign infrastructure held our base in a messy battle when it was a challenge to get into the mainstream media." Thus, the 2014 Election result showed the Greens that their own social and direct media communications, along with an effective ground campaign, were central in mobilising voters to give them their party vote. The lesson for the Greens from the 2014 campaign was that rather than relying on national media coverage to expose voters to their vision, they could turn to "digital and on-the-ground" campaigns to ensure their "message was heard;" or, as Norman ended (2015:152): "We largely did it on our own."

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Appendix A

Green Party MP List Rankings and Portfolios, Mid-Year 2013

Ranking	MP	Portfolios
1	Metiria Turei	Maori Affairs Social Policy Education Justice
2	Russel Norman	Economics Environment
3	Kevin Hague	Health Accident Compensation Corporation Cycling Rainbow Issues Sport and Recreation Alcohol and Other Drugs Older Persons
4	Catherine Delahunty	Associate Education Treaty of Waitangi Toxics Mining (Onshore)
5	Kennedy Graham	Global Affairs Climate Change Trade and Foreign Investment Associate Finance and Economics Constitutional Issues Defence
6	Eugenie Sage	Environment Conservation Water Local Government Christchurch Land Information Resource Management Issues
7	Gareth Hughes	Oceans Energy Mining (Offshore) ICT Libraries and Archives
8	David Clendon	Small Business Corrections and Courts Justice Tertiary Education Research and Technology Police Tourism
9	Jan Logie	Income Support Immigration Women

		Pacific Island Affairs Ethnic Affairs Human Rights Rainbow Overseas Development Aid
10	Steffan Browning	Agriculture Fisheries Organics Genetic Engineering Forestry Biosecurity and Customs Security and Intelligence
11	Denise Roche	Industrial Relations Community and Voluntary Sector Community Economic Development Waste Gambling Auckland State Services
12	Holly Walker	Housing Electoral Reform Children Open Government Arts, Culture, and Heritage Youth/Students
13	Julie Anne Genter	Transport Broadcasting Commerce Associate Finance and Economics Associate Climate Change
14	Mojo Mathers	Food Animal Welfare Disability Issues Consumer Affairs Civil Defence Natural Health

Appendix B

Lakoff's Strict Father and Nurturant Parent Models

Source: Lakoff (2016:65-67, 108-110)

The Strict Father Family is:

A traditional nuclear family, with the father having primary responsibility for supporting and protecting the family as well as the authority to set overall family policy. He teaches children right from wrong by enforcing strict rules for their behavior and enforcing them through punishment. The punishment is typically mild to moderate, but sufficiently painful. It is commonly corporeal punishment – say, with a belt or a stick. He also gains their cooperation by showing love and appreciation when they do follow the rules. But children must never be coddled, lest they become spoiled; a spoiled child will be dependent for life and will not learn proper morals.

The mother has day-to-day responsibility for the care of the house, raising the children, and upholding the father's authority. Children must respect and obey their parents, partly for their own safety and partly because by doing so they build character, that is, self-discipline and self-reliance. Love and nurturance are a vital part of family life, but they should never outweigh parental authority, which is itself an expression of love and nurturance – tough love. Self-discipline, self-reliance, and respect for legitimate authority are the crucial things that a child must learn. A mature adult becomes self-reliant through applying self-discipline in pursuing his self-interest. Only if a child learns self-discipline can he become self-reliant later in life. Survival is a matter of competition, and only through self-discipline can a child learn to compete successfully.

The mature children of the Strict Father have to sink or swim by themselves. They are on their own and have to prove their responsibility and self-reliance. They have attained, through discipline, authority over themselves. They have to, and are competent to, make their own decisions. They have to protect themselves and their families. They know what is good for them better than their parents, who are distant from them. Good parents do not meddle or interfere in their lives. Any parental meddling or interference is strongly resented (Lakoff 2016:65-67).

The Nurturant Parent Model is:

A family of preferably two parents, but perhaps only one. If two, the parents share household responsibilities.

The primal experience behind this model is one of being cared for and cared about, having one's desires for loving interactions met, living as happily as possible, and deriving meaning from mutual interaction and care.

Children develop best through their positive relationships to other, through their contribution to their community, and through the ways in which they realize their potential and find joy in life. Children become responsible, self-disciplines, and self-reliant through being cared for and respected, and through caring for others. Support and protection are part of nurturance, and they require strength and courage on the part of parents. The obedience of children come out of their love and respect for their parents, not out of the fear of punishment.

Open, two-way, mutually respectful communication is crucial. If parents' authority is to be legitimate, they must tell their children why their decisions serve the cause of protection and nurturance. The questioning of parents by children is positive, since children need to learn why their parents do what they do, since children often have good ideas that should be taken seriously, and since all family members should participate in important decisions. Responsible parents, of course, have to make the ultimate decisions and that must be clear.

Protection is a form of caring, and protection from external dangers takes up a significant part of the nurturant parent's attention. The world is filled with evils that can harm a child, and it is the nurturant parent's duty to ward them off. Crime and drugs are, of course, significant, but so are less obvious dangers: cigarettes, cars without seatbelts, dangerous toys, inflammable clothing, pollution, asbestos, lead paint, pesticides in food, diseases, unscrupulous businessmen, and so on. Protection of innocent and helpless children from such evils is a major part of a nurturant parent's job.

The principal goal of nurturance is for children to be fulfilled and happy in their lives and to become nurturant themselves. A fulfilling life is assumed to be, in significant part, a nurturant life, on committed to family and community responsibility. Self-fulfilment and the nurturance of others are seen as inseparable. What children need to learn most is empathy for others, the capacity for nurturance, cooperation, and the maintenance of social ties, which cannot be done without the strength, and self-reliance that come through being cared for and caring. Raising a child to be fulfilled also requires helping that child develop his or her potential for achievement and enjoyment. That requires respecting the child's own values and allowing the child to explore the range of ideas and options that the world offers.

When children are respected, nurtured, and communicated with from birth, they gradually enter into a lifetime relationship of mutual respect, communication, and caring with their parents (Lakoff 2016:108-110).

Appendix C

Holly Walker's Speech on the First Reading of the Plumbers, Gasfitters, and Drainlayers Amendment Bill

Source: 14 March 2013 688 NZPD 8563

HOLLY WALKER (GREEN): When we were first approached by the Minister for Building and Construction, Maurice Williamson, about this Plumbers, Gasfitters, and Drainlayers Amendment Bill, the Green Party was prepared to indicate our tentative support for the changes that it made. However, we did have substantial concerns about the process, including the constrained period of time for the select committee to consider the bill, and at this point we have to say that those concerns remain and are so substantial that we are unable to support the bill at this time.

We know in the Green Party that the grievances and complaints concerning the levies and fees charged by the Plumbers, Gasfitters and Drainlayers Board have been ongoing for some time. As we have heard, in the past that board used to charge a disciplinary levy to all those registered under the Plumbers, Gasfitters, and Drainlayers Act, and this levy was used to fund the board's complaints and disciplinary processes. In 2010, after considering a complaint, the Regulations Review Committee recommended that this levy be disallowed, as it was being used to fund complaints and disciplinary processes against unregistered people as well as those registered under the Act, while only registered people were paying the levy. In response to the report of the Regulations Review Committee, the Plumbers, Gasfitters and Drainlayers Board replaced that levy with an offences fee, which carried essentially the same function. Now, as we know, a second complaint about this offences fee is currently before the Regulations Review Committee, and although that committee is yet to report on this complaint, there is a risk that if the offences fee too is disallowed, then the Plumbers, Gasfitters and Drainlayers Board will be required to refund the moneys it has collected under both the levy and the fee, and that will leave it in a financially unviable position.

When the Act that created the board was passed in 2006 it was arguably and quite likely the intention of Parliament that the board's disciplinary and prosecutorial role would be funded by a levy of this nature paid by those registered under the Act, as is the case in other construction industry boards. However, the Act as it is currently worded seems to fall short of this. [*Interruption*].

I raise a point of order, Mr Speaker. I am finding myself rather distracted by interjections flying between other members of the House. If we could have a stop to that, it would be great.

The ASSISTANT SPEAKER (H V Ross Robertson): Yes, can I just advise the member that interjections from one side to the other are perfectly in order. However, I recognise that because of where the member is sitting—and the member should know this now; she has been here long enough—any interjections from the cross benches can affect the microphone.

HOLLY WALKER: As I was saying, the Act as it is currently worded seems to fall short of what Parliament intended in 2006. So this amendment bill would fix that loophole by retrospectively validating the funds collected through both the levy and the fee, and allow the board to continue to collect in this manner. As I mentioned at the beginning, when approached about this the Green Party was prepared to offer tentative support to allow this bill to be sent to a select committee so that the issues could be traversed. The amendments in this bill are, we believe, potentially sensible and they may settle what has been a long-running dispute between the board and some of its members.

However, I think all members of this House would agree—at least, I certainly hope they would—that legislation with retrospective application should be approached very carefully indeed and with meticulous precision and scrutiny. The Green Party has serious concerns about the process and time frames proposed for this bill, to allow that level of scrutiny to occur. We know that the bill has had to be drafted quite quickly, and although that is no criticism of the drafters, simply a statement of fact, when legislation is drafted very quickly it can often contain errors or omissions. These are picked up, ideally, by the scrutiny applied at the select committee hearing. However, in this case that hardly seems likely, given that the time frame proposed for the select committee to consider this bill is just 1 week. I believe we will have a chance soon to debate this shortened time frame, when the Minister seeks permission from the House for that. But for now, suffice it to say that, especially because of its retrospective nature, this bill requires very close scrutiny and it will not get that from a 1-week select committee process.

Furthermore, as a number of speakers have already noted, the issues and complaints regarding the levies or fees raised by the Plumbers, Gasfitters and Drainlayers Board have been controversial and the source of much strife and division over a number of years. So therefore there are likely to be many individuals affected by this bill, not least the authors of the most recent complaint to the Regulations Review Committee who deserve to be treated with natural justice and due process. The rushed process followed with this bill, I believe, risks creating a new injustice that will only compound the strife and bitterness now so ingrained in this sector. Given that this bill is designed primarily to put a stop to that, we should be very careful about risking compounding the sense of unfairness and injustice in that sector.

It may very well be that we need to fix the messy situation that the board has now found itself in. The Green Party could support fair, thoroughly drafted legislation to achieve this, provided we were satisfied that a proper process has been followed. But we cannot be confident of that at present. We have indicated to the Minister our willingness to support changes, like those proposed in the bill, but our concern is about the time frame as proposed. Retrospective legislation should not be entered into lightly. It should be very rare, and when it occurs it should be meticulously drafted and scrutinised. In our view the bill at the moment does not meet this test. The 1-week select committee time frame proposed would not allow for the appropriate level of scrutiny for a retrospective piece of legislation, and the Green Party therefore cannot support it.

Appendix D

Holly Walker's Response to the Minister's Motion that the Plumbers, Gasfitters, and Drainlayers Amendment Bill be Reported to the House by the Government Administration Committee On or Before 22 March 2013

Source: 14 March 2013 688 NZPD 8563.

HOLLY WALKER (Green): I will take just a brief call in this debate on the shortened process for the Government Administration Committee's consideration of the Plumbers, Gasfitters, and Drainlayers Amendment Bill. As I mentioned in my substantive contribution on the bill, the Green Party is concerned about this shortened select committee process.

Having sat on a select committee dealing with a bill in a shortened 3-week time frame and having found it impossible in that case to do justice to the complex issues or apply the appropriate level of scrutiny to the bill, I cannot imagine how that can be achieved in the 1 week proposed for this bill. In our view, 1 week would be insufficient to adequately deal with any bill through the select committee, let alone one that has retrospective application. In such cases an even greater level of scrutiny should be applied than to a normal bill, and this will be impossible for this bill in 1 week.

Furthermore, we can predict that because of the long-running issues and complaints that prompted this bill, there will be a significant number of affected parties wishing to make submissions and follow the select committee's process. These people deserve the opportunity to do so, because in many cases the changes proposed in this bill will impact directly on their daily lives and their businesses. One week is not sufficient for these stakeholders to prepare, present, and submit on this bill.

So the Green Party remains strongly opposed to this shortened select committee process. Although we understand that there is some rationale for that shortened process, those concerns are very fundamental. However, we will, as always, engage with the bill at the select committee as constructively as possible.

Appendix E

Green Party Minority View on the Plumbers, Gasfitters, and Drainlayers Amendment Bill

Source: Government Administration Committee Report 2013:101–2, 5-7

Green Party members of Parliament are open to finding a solution to the on-going issues that have beset the Plumbers, Gasfitters and Drainlayers Board over the collection of the disciplinary levy and, since 2010, offences fee, for the prosecution of unlicensed practitioners. In our view it is appropriate that the board prosecute unlicensed practitioners and be funded in order to carry out this function. Licensed practitioners stand to gain from the prosecution of unlicensed practitioners because of the benefit to the reputation of their industry, and we therefore have no philosophical objection to the idea of licensed practitioners funding this function through a levy or fee. We note that this funding model is used by a number of construction industry boards including the Chartered Professional Engineers Council, the Engineering Associates Registration Board, and the New Zealand Registered Architects Board.

However, we do accept the concerns of some submitters that the board has not been as transparent as it could be about how the offences fee is spent, and note their concerns that it may not be being used entirely for the purposes of prosecuting unlicensed practitioners. If the fee is collected for this purpose, it should be used only for this purpose, and we recommend that the board be more proactive about disclosing how the levy is spent so that stakeholders can be confident that it is only being used for the purpose for which it is collected.

It is clear that the disciplinary levy and later the offences fee have been collected inappropriately and illegally. While we support legislation to validate the collection of such a fee in future, we are not comfortable with retrospective validation of the funds that have already been collected. Retrospective legislation should be used extremely sparingly because of the precedent it sets, and we are not convinced that it is required in this case. There are also issues of natural justice: a number of complainants have pursued their legitimate concern about the illegal collection of the disciplinary levy and offences fee through every available mechanism, including the Ombudsman, Auditor-General, and Regulations Review Committee, the latter twice. To reach the end of this process and be vindicated, only to have the law changed by Parliament, seems unfair and inappropriate.

Our preference would be to legislate to validate the collection of an offences levy by the board from now on, but not to retrospectively validate its previous collection. We recognise that this may require the board to refund its previous levies and fees, and think this is appropriate. However, noting the concern that this may leave the board in a financially unviable position, we think it would also be appropriate if the Government offered financial support to the board to enable it to refund the illegally collected levies and fees and still continue to operate. Based on estimates by the Ombudsman in its report into a complaint on this matter, this might mean a liability to the Government of around $1 million. While this is a substantial sum, it is probably appropriate that the Government make a financial contribution to enable the board to refund the levies, given that the current situation has arisen in part because the wording of the Plumbers, Gasfitters, and Drainlayers Act 2006 was inadequate to allow for the intended function of the board. We think the refunding of the illegally collected fees and levies would go some way towards restoring confidence in the board amongst the sector, and put the board on a more secure footing in the future.

It is of vital importance that the passage of this legislation does not create new grievances within the plumbing, gasfitting, and drainlaying sector. We think that the retrospective validation of funds, coupled with the extremely short time that the committee has had to consider this bill, is likely to do exactly that. Since this problem has been known for several years, our preference would have been for a robust consultation with the industry, followed by non-retrospective legislation following the normal timeframes for select committee consideration. We remain uncomfortable and concerned with the rushed process and suspect that it will create new issues and grievances which are in nobody's interests. We could have supported a solution that was not retrospective, but given these concerns, we cannot support the bill as currently drafted.

Appendix F

Holly Walker's Speech on the Second Reading of the Plumbers, Gasfitters, and Drainlayers Amendment Bill

Source: 16 April 2013 689 NZPD 9410

HOLLY WALKER (Green): It is interesting. I never imagined when I entered Parliament that I would be so engaged by an amendment bill dealing with the regulation of the plumbing, gasfitting, and drainlaying industry. But I guess that is one of the strange and wonderful things about this place: you never know quite what direction you will be taken in. This bill, the Plumbers, Gasfitters, and Drainlayers Amendment Bill, has in fact been one of the more complex, more controversial, more challenging, and more constitutionally interesting bills that I have worked on so far in my time in Parliament. It is certainly the first time I have experienced a hung select committee. So it has been a very interesting experience indeed.

When this bill was first mooted by the Minister for Building and Construction and he wrote to parties seeking our support, the Green Party indicated that we could tentatively support the legislation. We, like the Minister and other parties in the House, recognised that there probably was a problem with the 2006 Plumbers, Gasfitters, and Drainlayers Act, which, as has been demonstrated by a series of complaints to the Regulations Review Committee, to the Ombudsman, to the Auditor-General, and then again to the Regulations Review Committee, did not allow the Plumbers, Gasfitters and Drainlayers Board to collect the levies and fees, as it had been doing, from its members for the purposes of prosecuting unlicensed practitioners. As the Minister has pointed out, it is clear—well, perhaps it is not clear but there is some indication—that it was the intent of Parliament in 2006, when enacting the legislation, that the board should be able to prosecute unlicensed practitioners. The Green Party agrees in principle that this should be the case.

The board should be able to prosecute unlicensed practitioners. Indeed, it is in the interests of the many law-abiding plumbers and gasfitters that there is the capacity to prosecute unlicensed practitioners, because these so-called cowboys—to use the Minister's terminology—do give their industry a bad name. There is something to be gained for those registered, law-abiding plumbers, gasfitters, and drainlayers by ensuring that those who are not are being prosecuted and dealt with effectively. So the Green Party certainly could support legislation to make it clear that the board has the lawful ability to collect from its members levies and fees for the purposes of discipline and prosecution of licensed and unlicensed practitioners in the future. That we could support, and that we have communicated to the Minister.

I know that there are many in the industry who have grievances with the board and who would not support going even that far—allowing the board to collect these levies in the future. There is, as we have heard from previous speakers, a lot of bad blood in this industry and a lot of mistrust of the board, which is unfortunate but which is not unfounded, historically speaking, based on the actions of the board over a number of years at certain times. However, I do believe that these grievances are largely historical and they could be addressed, as the Hon Ruth Dyson pointed out last week in her contribution to this second reading debate, if the board showed a greater commitment and a greater degree of transparency in how it spends the offences fee, to reassure those with concerns that the fee is actually spent on the purpose for which it is collected, on the prosecution of unlicensed practitioners.

As an advocate of transparency and open governance, I certainly did sympathise with submitters from the Plumbers, Gasfitters, and Drainlayers Federation who showed the Government Administration Committee the efforts that they have been to under the Official Information Act to obtain from the board information about how the levies are spent. They have had no end of difficulty and long delays in getting hold of that information. I think proactive disclosure from the board would go a long way towards addressing some of these concerns. With that caveat—that greater transparency on how the levies are spent is needed—the Green Party could, as I have said, support legislation that gave the board the ability to collect offences fees in the future.

Our concern with the amendment bill currently before the House is its retrospective nature. As a number of speakers have remarked, retrospective legislation is not something that this House should ever take lightly, and we are certainly not persuaded that it is justified in this case. The fact is that the board, whether it thought it was doing it legally or not, has for a number of years been charging illegal fees and levies. People have taken perfectly legitimate complaints about this to every available adjudicator—as I said before, to the Regulations Review Committee, the Ombudsman, the Auditor-General, and again this year the Regulations Review Committee. Every one of those complaints has been upheld, and at each stage the complainants have been vindicated that they have a legitimate complaint. What message do we send from this House about natural justice and due process if at the end of all of those complaints and all of that process we say: "Yes, you're right, actually—we've figured out it is illegal. Thanks for bringing that to our attention. We'll just change the law now, thank you very much."?

You can understand why the complainants are upset that this House is considering the retrospective validation of those illegal levies. In fact, it reminds me of the legislation that the Prime Minister has signalled we should expect soon in this House about the Government Communications Security Bureau to validate years of illegal spying on New Zealand citizens and permanent residents. That is a higher-profile example than the Plumbers, Gasfitters and Drainlayers Board, but the retrospective nature of this Plumbers, Gasfitters, and Drainlayers Amendment Bill is no less distasteful than that example. The fact that people thought it was legal at the time is no excuse for illegal conduct, and people have taken legitimate complaints about the collection of this levy.

The solution, in the view of the Green Party, is to change the legislation for the future but not for the past. We recognise that if we were to take this course of action, it might require the board to refund some or all of the fees and levies that it has collected since 2006. That, indeed, was the recommendation in the findings of the complaint to the Ombudsman. We think it is probably fair enough that it does refund some of those levies and fees that it has collected illegally. However, as the Minister has pointed out, this could potentially put the board under some financial strain and possibly bankrupt it. Well, if that is the case, I would like to ask the Minister what is so bad about going to the Minister of Finance and asking for some Government support to allow the board to refund the illegal levies without going under. After all, it was a Government error in the drafting of the original legislation in the first place that allowed all of this to happen. Yes, admittedly, it was a different Government, but the Crown is the Crown. In this case I think that there is a case for the Crown to take some responsibility and contribute some financial assistance if it is needed.

The best estimate that I could work out, based on the information that was available to us as members of the select committee, was this might mean a liability of something like $1 million. I know $1 million is not an insignificant amount of money, to be sure, but it is certainly an amount that I think the Minister of Finance and the Crown are capable of finding in the Budget and absorbing. That is a solution that the Green Party could have supported—fixing the legislation going forward into the future, but allowing due process to take its course for the collection of the illegal levies and for the existing legitimate complaints.

We do acknowledge that the industry needs a fix, but retrospective validation is not justifiable, and the rushed process at the select committee has not helped. Yes, I acknowledge that the time was extended from 1 week to 3 weeks, but that is still an extremely short time, and there were a large number of people who wished to submit in person who did not have the opportunity to do so. This is a divided, conflicted industry and, unfortunately, it seems absolutely certain to remain so with the passage of this legislation. The Green Party will continue to oppose this bill.

Appendix G

Holly Walker's Speech in Committee on the Plumbers, Gasfitters, and Drainlayers Amendment Bill

Source: 02 July 2013 691 NZPD 11711

HOLLY WALKER (Green): Well, Mr Chair, this is your favourite bill, no doubt, and mine, and it is one of the most interesting and unusual bills I have had to deal with in my short time in this House. The Green Party opposes the Plumbers, Gasfitters, and Drainlayers Amendment Bill, and we will continue to do so in this Committee stage, for a number of reasons. Probably, actually, chief amongst those is the incredibly poor process that has been followed with regard to this bill.

I thought I would begin my contribution by outlining briefly just what that process has been. The bill was introduced in March, as we know, with an incredibly short select committee consideration period of initially just 1 week. It was later extended to 2 weeks, but it was still an incredibly short period of time. That was due to the apparently urgent need to pass this legislation—

Hon Ruth Dyson: Sorry, when was that?

HOLLY WALKER: Before 1 April, apparently. Very urgent—before 1 April, we needed to pass this legislation. I know that the dates on the walls here are slightly behind today, but they still say 2 July, and 1 April was quite a long time ago. Here we are in the House with the bill at only its Committee stage, yet the Government Administration Committee has done quite heroic efforts, I think, to consider this bill in an incredibly short period of time due to its apparent urgency.

Due to that constrained period of time, many submitters were unable to be heard. Many had to have their submissions recorded as correspondence, rather than as submissions, because they were received after the closing date. They had very little notification of the time available in which to make those submissions. Given that we know that what, in part, has given rise to the need for this bill is a large amount of dissatisfaction in the plumbing, gasfitting, and drainlaying sector, the incredibly short time that was applied to the select committee process and the fact that many individual stakeholders who felt that they had a very strong interest in this were not able to make submissions and had very little notice of the bill coming up in the House will have only added to that high level of dissatisfaction in the sector.

As we have said, to add insult to that injury, despite the rush and the select committee reporting back in time, that deadline of 1 April came and went with no change, and the bill has been languishing for months since its second reading. It is now July and we are finally having the Committee stage. Despite the fact that we are sitting under urgency, clearly no urgency has actually been accorded to this bill in terms of the priority given to it by the Government after that initial panic of its introduction and short process. Clearly, it could have had months longer at the select committee, it could have had a proper period of scrutiny, it could have had a proper period of submissions, and we could be back here right now in a much different position.

I want to acknowledge at this point the pressure that such shortened select committee periods place not only on submitters and members of the public but on the select committee staff, on the Parliamentary Counsel Office drafters, and on the officials who advise the committee. It is not actually really the members of the committee who suffer the most—although we often go to considerable efforts to make sure we have read all of the submissions in a short period of time—

but the staff and the advisers, who quietly get on with it and bust a gut behind the scenes to meet these urgent deadlines. In this case, it appears that it was all completely unnecessary, because here we are, months later, with absolutely no priority having been given to the bill since then. So those are the procedural reasons for our opposition to this bill.

In terms of the substantive reasons for our opposition, they are very clear. It comes down, really, to the point that retrospective legislation should be extremely rare in this House and that when it occurs, it should be subject to a very high bar. It is not clear at all in this case that that bar has been met.

As we know, this bill retrospectively validates fees and levies that have been collected in what turns out to have been an unlawful manner since 2006 by the Plumbers, Gasfitters and Drainlayers Board. This unlawful practice has been the subject of complaints to every available adjudicator. The matter has been to the Regulations Review Committee, it has been to the Ombudsman, it has been to the Auditor-General, and it has been back to the Regulations Review Committee, and in every case those complaints were upheld. They were rightful complaints, they had a right to take them, and the adjudicators in every case upheld those complaints. So there is a real issue of natural justice when, after someone's complaint has been upheld by every channel available, Parliament simply legislates to make it go away. It said: "Ah, there is a problem there. Congratulations on taking this complaint. Thank you for bringing it to our attention. We are now going to retrospectively validate this unlawful conduct so that your complaint will go away." That is not acceptable. It is unfair, and it should not be happening in this case.

Even if the Plumbers, Gasfitters and Drainlayers Board believed—and I believe the board to be frank and honest when it says it believed it was acting lawfully. But believing one is acting lawfully is not the same as acting lawfully. Much in the same way as we are seeing at the moment with the Government Communications Security Bureau, believing one is acting lawfully does not make it so. It is offensive to the rule of law for Parliament to come in and say, effectively: "Well, we have to make the law catch up with the practice." It should not be done lightly, and we think it is being done lightly in this case.

We do agree—and this is where we do agree with parts of the bill—that there is a need for legislation to validate the collection of the offences fee by the Plumbers, Gasfitters and Drainlayers Board in the future, because we agree that the board should be able to prosecute non-licensed practitioners when complaints about them are received. Indeed, we think it is in the interests of the whole industry to ensure that that can happen—to ensure that the so-called cowboys are regulated. It has negative consequences for all plumbers and gasfitters when those unregistered, unlicensed practitioners bring their industry into disrepute, and it is a logical, natural thing that the board should be able to prosecute those complaints. So we could absolutely support legislation of this nature if it applied only to how the board collects levies and how it prosecutes complaints in the future. But we cannot support its retrospective application.

The reason we have been given as to why it is so important to apply this law retrospectively is that if the board was required to pay back the unlawfully collected levies and fees, it might be left bankrupt. We can agree that it is not a desirable outcome, obviously, for that to happen. But our question is why should the Government not provide the board with some financial support to ensure that this does not happen? After all, it was poorly drafted legislation in 2006 that led to this problem in the first place. It created the situation where the board thought it was acting lawfully, but it turned out that it was not. Surely, there is some responsibility on the part of the Government, of the Crown, to help put that right, including making a financial contribution to ensure that if the board was required to pay back those fees and levies, there would be some financial support from the Government to enable it to do that without falling over financially.

The best estimate we were able to obtain at the select committee was that in order to do that, we might be talking in the vicinity of $1 million. I know that $1 million is a lot of money, but in the scheme of the Government coffers, it is hardly going to break the bank. It seems like a perfectly reasonable thing to do in this situation, given it was a Government error in the first place, that the Crown should help with some of the financial liability if, indeed, those fees and levies need to be paid back.

Those are the substantive reasons why the Green Party continues to oppose this bill. We have both procedural and substantive reasons for doing so.

The Committee is in quite an interesting position, because it has a select committee report where the select committee said that it was "unable to agree" on whether the bill should pass. That, I think, is indicative of what a mess this whole process around this bill has been.

There was one substantive amendment that the committee could agree on. That was an amendment to clause 5, to insert new subsection 171B(2) to make it clear that although the board could continue to collect the offences fee in future, it could not change the fee, and that in order to change the fee, it would need to replace the fee with an appropriate disciplinary and prosecution levy imposed under section 143. This change, I think, speaks to the need to get the process right for the future collection of fees and levies, and that is why the Green Party can support that one technical amendment to the bill.

But we cannot support the bill as a whole, because of its retrospective nature. We will continue to oppose it in this Committee stage and in the third reading because of both the process and the substance of this rather interesting bill. Tēnā koe.

Appendix H

Metiria Turei's Speech on the Third Reading of the Plumbers, Gasfitters, and Drainlayers Amendment Bill

Source: 05 September 2013 693 NZPD 13348

METIRIA TUREI (Co-Leader—Green): The Green Party will be opposing the Plumbers, Gasfitters, and Drainlayers Amendment Bill because, quite frankly and quite simply, it is just not fair. There are some important issues in this debate, but it is not fair to make this legislation retrospective and therefore allow the Plumbers, Gasfitters and Drainlayers Board to continue to hold on to the fees that have been paid to the board unlawfully for some time.

Like the Minister for Building and Construction and like other parties in the House, we do understand that there is a problem with the Plumbers, Gasfitters, and Drainlayers Act 2006 in that it did not give the proper lawful authority for the Plumbers, Gasfitters and Drainlayers Board to collect the levies and fees that it did for the purpose of prosecuting unlicensed practitioners. It does appear that that 2006 legislation was intended to provide that lawful authority, but it did not, and that is a mistake that does get made from time to time. We also agree that the board should be able to prosecute unlicensed practitioners. It is important for industry standards to have a body that is able to do that, and the fact that there are fees levied for that purpose is not unreasonable either.

So, in principle, we agree with the purpose, the intention, of this legislation, but the difficulty is that although we could have supported a bill that does this for the future, we simply cannot bring ourselves to vote for a bill that makes this power retrospective. We have communicated that with the Minister so he understands what our position is.

There has been, I understand, a long history of grievance and dispute between the members and the board about the payment of those fees and the use of those fees. It is, quite frankly, very poor practice when members who make a financial contribution to this board have to go to the Ombudsman in order to find out how that money is being used and what it is being spent on and to make sure that the purpose for which the money was given is actually being played out. So there is a whole history here around plumbers and gasfitters—the people who are affected by this bill—working very hard to seek a decision that the legislation does not provide lawful authority and to seek a remedy for that.

They have been everywhere that you can go—the Regulations Review Committee twice, the Ombudsman, the Auditor-General. They have spent considerable time bringing this issue to the attention of the legislature, so, quite rightly, the legislature is responding. But it is not fair to say now that those people who have had the burden of paying an unlawful fee, have had the burden of trying to find out—against, it appears, the board's practice—how that fee was being used and what was being paid for, should then continue to lose money as a result of that unlawful action and the poor actions of the board. Why should they now be required by Parliament to give up the money that was unlawfully paid, given that they have spent so much time and effort to bring this to our attention and that it has taken so long to do so?

So, in short, the workers and the families who are affected by this legislation and its retrospective implementation have fought extremely hard to bring this to our attention. They have incurred costs in order to do so. Now that we are about to try to fix the primary problem, we should not demand

that they continue to pay. So on that basis the Green Party does not support this bill. We do not support the retrospective aspects of this legislation. We think that it is unfair to make those demands on those workers and their families. Thank you.

Appendix I

Gareth Hughes' Speech at the Kiwibid Handover

Source: Emailed to author, June 16, 2013

Kia ora

Today oil companies from around the world will be submitting their bids to explore for oil in *our* waters but the Green Party is proudly putting in a competing bid – the Kiwi Bid – from all of us who want to protect our coastlines from catastrophic oil spills.

Watching the Deepwater Horizon oil spill unfold on television highlighted the risk of deep-sea drilling, but it was the Rena that made it tangible.

Watching people in hazmat suits picking up oil, dead birds washing up on the shore along with closed beaches and closed shops wasn't academic anymore, it wasn't something you just saw on TV, oil on New Zealand beaches was real – you could see it, you could touch it, you could smell it.

And at the same time as Kiwis volunteers were cleaning birds and beaches we saw the Government rolling out the red carpet to deep sea oil drillers.

That's why I'm here. The Rena and Deepwater Horizon were warnings yet the Government seeks to do all it can to encourage risky deep sea oil drilling. The Government this year is opening up 189,000 square kilometres for petroleum exploration permits, much of it in deep water.

Deep sea drilling is operating at the frontiers of technology, geography and geology. The Government and industry can't guarantee we won't see a spill, and Maritime New Zealand doesn't have the capacity to respond to a big spill. That's why the Green Party says it's reckless to open up even more of our waters to it. That's why we are submitting the Kiwi Bid.

This bid is our chance to tell the Government there is an alternative to opening up areas for drilling. It's a real bid and our work programme for these permit areas is simple: leave them untouched from risky deep sea drilling. This means that we won't send ships to do seismic testing, nor will we send rigs to drill exploratory deep sea wells risking a spill.

Our bid puts forward the vision of protecting our waters for all of us, into the future, not taking unnecessary risks with our marine environment, coastline, climate, economy and our reputation. We are giving the Government a real choice, a real alternative to consider.

When the Government is looking through the stack of bids from the oil companies they will find ours, backed by thousands of Kiwis who want to protect our waters, not give them away to oil companies.
The Kiwibid was launched four months ago at Piha, an iconic Kiwi beach near where Anardarko, the Texan company that recently paid $4 billion for its role in the Gulf of Mexico disaster, want to drill this summer.

The Kiwibid was first signed by trans-Atlantic rower Rob Hammil and NZ's surf champ Mischa Davis who is here today. Thank you, Mischa, for signing and thanks to the 13,000 other Kiwis who joined you and Rob.

The Kiwi Bid is part of a Green Party campaign to protect our beaches, climate and economy. We've challenged the National Government in Parliament, organised protests in the streets and even ran a best beach competition online where 18,000 Kiwis voted for their favourite beach, turns out its Ohope, which reminds us all what this campaign is all about.
It is a priority campaign for us and one that we are seeing real momentum building. Even though the Government won't give Kiwis a say on permit blocks, removed their say on consenting exploratory drilling applications (the riskiest phase) and took away the right to protest with the Anardarko Amendment - Kiwis will just speak out and protest ever louder and with more passion.

New Zealand has a proud tradition of protecting our environment. We've said no to nuclear, no to mining in our national parks, and we can draw a line in the sand and say no to risky deep sea drilling and yes to a clean energy future.

This is what the Kiwibid is about, giving the Government an alternative. They can choose to accept the oil company's bids or they can choose to accept the Kiwibid to protect the environment we love and build a prosperous clean energy economy.

Appendix J

Holly Walker's Questions for Oral Answer to the Minister for Justice

Source: 15 May 2013 690 NZPD 9927

HOLLY WALKER (Green) to the Minister of Justice**:** Did she receive a response from the National Party following her request for party views on the Electoral Commission's recommendations for changes to MMP; if so, what was that response?

Hon JUDITH COLLINS (Minister of Justice)**:** Yes, this morning I have publicly released a summary of all party responses. As the member will now know, the National Party did not agree with key changes suggested by the Electoral Commission.

Holly Walker: Given the Minister's own stated preference to adopt the recommendations as a package, and the fact that the Green Party had committed to vote for legislation doing that, is the only reason she could not get 61 votes that her own party blocked it?

Hon JUDITH COLLINS: It is wonderful that the member thinks she can read my mind, but I do not think I have ever stated that. I have said that if there should be change, then generally it is better to have all the changes together, unlike under the royal commission response in 1986 from the then Labour Government, when it did nothing on it for many years, and it was a National Government that had to bring it through.

Holly Walker: Is the real reason she will not introduce legislation that the National Government needs the hugely unpopular one-seat threshold in place to keep John Banks and Peter Dunne on side?

Hon JUDITH COLLINS: I think the member does not realise that the member she has just referred to is actually an electorate MP. I know that that is not something that is known of in the Green Party, but, actually, it carries quite a sway in the electorate.

Holly Walker: In her view, is writing one letter to political parties 5 months after the MMP review report came out a genuine attempt to get cross-party agreement, or was that just window dressing, given that her Government never intended to do anything?

Hon JUDITH COLLINS: To the first part of the question, yes.

Hon Lianne Dalziel: What did she mean when she said in her letter to David Shearer "… I hope to progress a collaborative process for considering and responding to the Commission's recommendations.", when in fact she meant "Unless everyone agrees with the National Party, we won't respond to anything."?

Hon JUDITH COLLINS: That is a highly political question, really. The member is trying to—[*Interruption*] And I think it deserves a response. Quite frankly, what it does not mean is that we will put forward only two proposals, which is what that member's party decided to do, which just happened to suit it. And, no, it actually meant that if parties could come back with some form of consensus, then I would be happy to progress it. There is not consensus. It is not going anywhere.

Hon Lianne Dalziel: I seek leave that the Electoral (Adjustment of Thresholds) Amendment Bill, in my name, be introduced and set down for first reading next sitting day.

Mr SPEAKER: Leave is so sought. Is there any objection? There is.

Holly Walker: Does she stand by her statement on Radio New Zealand National this morning that she would prefer to see all the changes implemented together; if so, given that the Green and Labour parties have now both publicly committed to support such legislation, will she now introduce it to the House to implement the changes in time for the next election?

Hon JUDITH COLLINS: Again the member has taken a little bit of what I have said and not the rest of it. If I were supporting change, then, obviously, I would want to see—it is always best to have all of the changes brought forward together. But surely that member can count: Labour and the Greens is not 61.

Holly Walker: I seek leave to table a letter dated 25 March 2013 from the Minister to the Green Party co-leaders seeking feedback on the MMP review's recommendations.

Mr SPEAKER: Leave is sought to table that letter. Is there any objection? There is none.
Document, by leave, laid on the Table of the House.

Holly Walker: I seek leave to table the Green Party's response to that letter, stating that the Green Party would vote for legislation to implement the changes as a package.

Mr SPEAKER: Leave is sought to table the response. Is there any objection? There is none. It can be tabled.

Document, by leave, laid on the Table of the House.

Appendix K

Gareth Hughes' Press Release on Treasury's Advice Against the Payment

Source: Hughes (2013a)

National Was Warned Against Rio Tinto Hand-Out

The National Government was warned Rio Tinto's demands for money should be rejected but National handed over $30 million in a desperate attempt to keep its asset sales programme afloat, Green Party energy spokesperson Gareth Hughes said today.

In papers released today, Treasury advised the Government that "any request by PA [Pacific Aluminium] for Government assistance should be rejected because it would result in a significant transfer of value from New Zealanders to PA and Rio Tinto shareholders".

The papers make clear that Rio Tinto's threats to potentially close the Tiwai smelter were "clearly significant" issues for National's asset sales. Documents reveal that the $30 million payment of public money to Rio Tinto came about following an offer made by Prime Minister John Key over the phone.
"National handed over $30 million of public money to Rio Tinto against official advice in a desperate attempt to save its asset sales agenda," said Mr Hughes.

"The documents clearly show that the Government was very concerned to sort out the Tiwai smelter issue so that its asset sales could continue on schedule. The Government ignored Treasury advice not to give Rio Tinto a hand out and warnings that Ministers should stay clear of the bargaining.

"National's asset sales obsession gave Rio Tinto enormous bargaining power and ultimately resulted in phones calls from the Prime Minister and Finance Minister offering Rio Tinto $30 million of public money to play nice.

"This is no way for a responsible government to administer the public's money. There should have been a robust and transparent process, not a political deal done over the phone.

"We need an independent assessment of the value of the smelter against the value of lower electricity prices to the country; not a government that hands over $30 million for purely political considerations.

"This is becoming a pattern. Again and again the supposed financial geniuses in National find themselves backed into a corner when negotiating with a big corporation, and the public ends up paying the price," said Mr Hughes.

Documents referred to in this release:
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/informationreleases/nzas/pdfs/nzas-2394495.pdf
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/informationreleases/nzas/pdfs/nzas-2448686.pdf
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/informationreleases/nzas/pdfs/nzas-2598711.pdf
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/informationreleases/nzas/pdfs/nzas-2597050.pdf
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/informationreleases/nzas/pdfs/nzas-2596077.pdf ("It has also surprised us that the Meridian timing is also driven by an external matter; the impending float of Mighty River Power")