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Environmental Ethics:
A Comparison Between the Views of John Locke
And
Contemporary Maori Views

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Abstract

The current trend, in the study of environmental ethics is to criticise the traditional Western anthropocentric attitude towards nature and by comparison praise the views of various indigenous peoples throughout the world. The Western views are labelled as a form of shallow ecology whilst those of the indigenous people are seen as much deeper. Given that there appears to be at least a *prima facie* difference between the two groups I will nevertheless show that there are some interesting similarities. This thesis will compare the views of one indigenous group namely, the Maori people of New Zealand with the views of John Locke who has been referred to as the great modern theorist of anthropocentrism.

Using an alternative reading of Locke's texts I endeavor to show that there is a surprising coalescence of Lockean and Maori thought which indicates that we are not limited to alternative, healthier views about the environment to traditions which exist alongside the more dominant Western tradition. Instead, we find similar views in strands of the dominant tradition as well – even though these strands have not themselves been dominant.

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Chapter I

Introduction

In the study of environmental ethics the trend, in recent years, has been to criticise the traditional Western, anthropocentric attitude towards nature. As Robin Attfield points out, 'our ecological problems have been blamed on the Judaeo-Christian doctrine of creation.'¹ Lynn White, in particular, in his influential paper claims that because of the adoption of Biblical belief regarding the non-sacredness of the natural world it is the tendency for Western societies to exploit rather than care for nature.² Hence, many environmentalists have looked towards some of the views held by indigenous peoples in various parts of the world and now believe that many important ecological lessons can be learnt by studying their beliefs and attitudes towards nature. The traditional Western viewpoint has been labelled as a form of shallow environmentalism, allowing few rights for anything other than human life. In contrast the indigenous peoples are seen as respecting all things. Thus, the claim is made that the latter's ecological views are deeper than those of Western views.

In his book, People of the Land, John Patterson believes that the people of European culture can learn especially from cultures that do not share European ideas about mastery over the earth. In particular he claims that the Maori people of New Zealand 'present an environmental philosophy in which it is possible to live a rich and rewarding life without plundering the planet.'³ In what appears to be a contrast John Locke, in his influential account of natural rights in *The Second Treatise of*

¹Robin Attfield, *Environmental Philosophy: Principles and Prospects* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publ. Ltd. 1994) p.13.

²Lynn White, 'The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis', *Science*, 155, 3767, 10 March 1967, 1203-7.

³John Patterson, *People of the Land*. (unpublished manuscript, 1998) p.6.

Government, expounded the idea that individuals have certain rights in virtue not of any political or economic status but simply by being human. Locke is often placed at the head of a tradition that is associated with indifference to the environment rather than a caring ecological friendliness. Typical of this view is that of Eric Katz, who says: 'Locke argued for the human evaluation of the natural world. Thus, Locke was the great modern theorist of anthropocentrism. For Locke, nature was valuable solely as it was used as property by human beings.'⁴

Given that there appears to be at least a *prima facie* difference between the fundamental Maori environmental ethic which claims to afford rights to all of nature, and the Lockean/Western ethic which places its emphasis upon human rights, I will endeavour to show that there are nevertheless some surprising similarities between these viewpoints. In doing so, I will oppose the notion that the traditional Western viewpoint has little or nothing to offer environmental ethics over the views of indigenous cultures and in particular the Maori. In what, I believe, is a new area of research I will, in the first chapter, attempt to show the similarities and differences between these two viewpoints. To do this comparison I will be reading Locke in a different way than has been done traditionally. To interpret Locke in a non-traditional way, I realise, will require some defence. My defence begins in the second chapter and comprises an explanation of what I believe is a traditional reading of Locke. Following that is my criticism of the 'traditional view' and then in the third chapter I will defend an alternative view of Locke which has begun to appear in contemporary literature, and which is required to justify my position. I shall begin by exploring what I consider to be the fundamental views of the Maori people relating to the environment and then compare them to the views of John Locke.

Before embarking on this task it should be pointed out that this thesis is not primarily concerned with what appears to be empirical evidence that shows either party to be at fault. For example, it is often claimed that the environment is in a poor

⁴ Eric Katz, *Nature as Subject*, (Roman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 1997) p.224.

condition because of the way the West has treated it. My primary concern is not how peoples have treated the environment, but rather what treatment is advocated in their writings and beliefs. It seems clear to me that the West has not treated the environment in a friendly way and it cannot be denied that the land of New Zealand, for example, paid a terrible price when colonised by the Europeans. Seventy percent of the forests were destroyed by the settlers and their descendants, many species of birds were driven to extinction, and in places soil erosion resulted which was the worst of its kind in the world.⁵ However, prior to colonisation, the Maori people themselves depleted various species of terrestrial and maritime fauna and destroyed large areas of forest by overburning, and their hunting of the moa to extinction is commonly acknowledged. As Tipene O'Regan, a distinguished Maori leader and chairman of the Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board, has stated:

I'm not going to suggest to you today that this [environmental damage of the South Island] is all the fault of the perfidious Pakeha [European] culture, because I shudder to think what my own tupuna [ancestors] would have done had they had bulldozers... If our old people had had the skills and greater power to destroy the landscape they would have played a full and vigorous part in doing it in proportion to their numbers.⁶

And as Roy W. Perrett points out in his article on indigenous rights and environmental justice:

Not only is it dubious that traditional indigenous subsistence practices really were always environmentally exemplary, it is also obvious that nowadays many indigenous peoples are not insisting on land rights so that they can return to these practices. Rather, as economically disadvantaged groups, they seek the freedom to develop their lands in ways that often conflict with the ideals of the environmentalist movement.⁷

O'Regan appears to agree with a view like Perrett's when he makes a similar point in regard to the modern Maori:

⁵John Halkett, *Native Forests of New Zealand*, (Wellington: GP Books 1991), chapters 5-8.

⁶In Edward M.K. Douglas, (ed.), *Waiora, Waimaori, Waikino, Waimate, Waitai: Maori Perceptions of Water and the Environment* (Hamilton Centre for Maori Studies and Research, University of Waikato, 1984), p. 9.

⁷Roy W. Perrett, 'Indigenous Rights and Environmental Justice' *Environmental Ethics*, 20, (1998), p. 380.

Maori people want the trappings of twentieth century life, such as electric stoves in our *whare kai* [kitchens]. Maori people want to go into the twenty-first century in the same dynamic, vigorous way with which we adapted to the potato, and turned that to our own purposes, in the same way that we adapted to steel chisels. We are looking at many new technologies.⁸

Just because the European pioneers in New Zealand caused extensive damage to the land and these pioneers were presumably of Lockean background or belief it does not necessarily follow that all, or even any, Lockean doctrines regarding the environment are faulty. Similarly, it does not necessarily follow that the Maori environmental ethic is faulty just because of the damage to the environment that was done by these people. Rather, it may be that in either case the beliefs may form a sound environmental policy but such a policy has simply not been adhered to by its followers and thus mistreatment of the environment has ensued. So as previously mentioned my concern is primarily to discuss 'what Locke or what this people believe' rather than 'what Locke and this people actually do.'

I will begin by exploring, what seems to be, the relevant concepts that are held by the Maori people that form the fundamental base of their environmental ethic. These fundamental Maori beliefs regarding the environment appear to be based upon the following notions:

- 1) That there is *mana* and *take* over the land.
- 2) That all things should be respected because they are descended from the gods and are thereby naturally sacred or *tapu*.
- 3) That there is a responsibility to future generations because of kinship or *whakapapa*.
- 4) That there exists an interdependence of all things because everything contains *mauri* or a 'life force.'

As I discuss each of these four Maori concepts, I will endeavour to find similarities in the Lockean tradition.

⁸Douglas, p. 15.

Mana, Take, and the Ownership of Land

Before being able to discuss *mana* in regard to land we need to understand what *mana* is. According to Patterson the Maori word has lost some of its meaning as it has been borrowed into the English language. One important difference is that in English it is only a noun whereas in Maori it can also be an adjective, meaning 'effectual', or a verb, meaning 'to be effectual, to take effect'.⁹ Typically the English understanding of *mana* is: 'authority, prestige, power or influence' whereas the Maori understanding of the word may also contain words such as control, psychic force, vested with effective authority, or having influence. However, it should be remembered, as with any translation, that there may not be any English words that adequately describe such a thing as *mana*.

It may appear that when *mana* is translated as power, influence or authority then '*mana* over the land' (*whenua*) should represent some form of power or authority over the land. The question we may then want to raise is: is this just another way of speaking of ownership? Patterson however is quick to point out that *mana whenua* is not the same as land ownership as conceived of by the Europeans.

Indeed Maori experts declare that ownership of land is not a Maori concept. Thus Judge Eddie Durie: 'One did not own the land. One belonged *to* the land.' For all of that though, *mana whenua* has many of the connotations of land ownership, central to which is the idea of some special status or standing in some specific land.¹⁰

In order to try and find differences or similarities between the Maori concept of *mana whenua* and the Lockean idea of land ownership a fruitful approach may be to look at how *mana whenua* is achieved and then compare this to how land can, according to Locke, become owned.

In regard to *mana* and land rights Norman Smith pointed out long ago that

None of the earlier authorities recognised *mana* as conferring an interest in land as of right and by virtue of the *mana* alone. On the contrary, they were of the opinion that *mana* was personal and that if unaccompanied by a right founded upon one of the recognised *take*[principle rights] gave the person

⁹Patterson, p. 100.

¹⁰Patterson, p. 11.

having the *mana* no interest.¹¹

Even earlier judges Mackay and Scannell in the Porangahau Appellate Court case about 1889 decided that the claim from *mana* alone cannot be recognised as it conferred no proprietary rights according to Maori custom,

it being a recognised fact that the chief of a tribe had no absolute right over the territory of the various *hapus* [subtribe or clan] to whom it belonged, nor could he dispose of any land but his own. The term *mana* as applied to land is one of recent use and is liable to misconception as to its real meaning. It certainly does not mean a chief's manorial right as no such right ever existed amongst the Natives.¹²

It seems that according to ancient custom *mana* is not sufficient on its own to give a Maori a right to land. What appears to be of particular significance to our comparison with the European notion of land ownership, is the concept of principal rights or *take*, which when held in conjunction with *mana* gives a tribe claims over the land. Indeed, Kawheru seems to support this view for he only speaks of the various *take* as right-giving and makes no mention of *mana* as giving a right to land.¹³ Although Walker explains *take* as 'reason' or 'cause'¹⁴ it is more often understood by Maori scholars to be a right. Douglas, for example, describes how customary title may be achieved through a list of rights.¹⁵ These principal rights or *take* are generally accepted as the following:

- 1) Discovery or *take kite* (such as when the first canoes arrived)
- 2) Ancestry or *take tupuna*.
- 3) Conquest or *take raupatu*.
- 4) Gift or *take tuku*.¹⁶

Discovery was how the Maori people originally established title to their land.

¹¹Norman Smith, *Native Custom Affecting Land*, (Wellington, The Maori Purposes Fund Board, 1942), p. 80.

¹²Smith, p. 81.

¹³Hugh Kawheru, *Maori Land Tenure*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977)

¹⁴Ranginui Walker. *Nga Tau Tohetohe: Years of Anger*, (Oxford: Penguin Books, 1987), p. 239.

¹⁵Douglas Sinclair. 'Land: Maori View and European Response' in *Te Ao Hurihuri: Aspects of Maoritanga*, Michael King (ed.) (Auckland: Reed Publ.1992), pp. 66-69.

¹⁶Kawheru, *Maori Land Tenure*, pp. 55-58.

The nature of their title seems to have grown out of the ideas they brought with them as to the value of land and also the need, as their numbers grew, to divide amongst themselves the tribal lands. Whilst Locke does not appear specifically to mention discovery as a ground for ownership he does speak about the concept of enclosing previously unowned land and of mixing one's labour with the land to gain title. I hope to show that this 'mixing of one's labour' has underlying similarities with the Maori title through discovery and occupation.

According to Locke, prior to cultivation, land is 'waste' provided by God for use. 'Tis very clear,' he says 'that God,... *has given the Earth to the Children of Men*, given it to Mankind in common.'¹⁷ However, as Yolton points out:

The main concern (both in bulk and in importance) of the chapter on property in the second treatise, about which so much has been written, is with explaining how private property arises prior to and without express Compact of all the Commoners.¹⁸

Locke's problem then is how can the concept of private property emerge from that which is in common. Locke justifies his position by saying that,

God who hath given the World to men in common, hath also given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of Life and convenience....yet being given for the use of Men, there must of necessity be a means *to appropriate* them some way or other before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial to any particular Man.¹⁹

God gave the world to men in common; but since it was given to them for their benefit it cannot be supposed that it was meant to remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to be used by the industrious and rational, and labour was to be their title to it. Locke believes that he can establish a connection between external possessions and the human self by claiming that every man has a property in his own person. From this it follows that the labour of his body is his, and as a consequence the fruits

¹⁷John Locke, *The Second Treatise of Government: An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government*. Peter Laslett, (ed.) (Cambridge at the University Press, 1960) , Ch. V:25.

¹⁸John W. Yolton, *Locke and the Compass of Human Understanding: A Selective Commentary on the 'Essay'*, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 187.

¹⁹Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch V:26.

of his labour also. 'Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his *Labour* with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his *Property*.²⁰ Thus, by mixing their labour with the earth persons come to have property: cultivated, and thus improved, pieces of land. The earth remains the property of God, but the labourer has a property in his improvement of it. However, as Nozick points out,

This gives rise to many questions. What are the boundaries of what labour is mixed with? If a private astronaut clears a place on Mars, has he mixed his labour with (so that he comes to own) the whole planet, the whole uninhabited universe, or just a particular plot? Which plot does an act bring under ownership?²¹

Furthermore why should the mixing of labour with something make one the owner of it? Presumably because one comes to own a previously unowned thing by mixing what is yours (your labour) with it. But as Nozick states why isn't mixing what I own a way of losing what I own rather than gaining what I don't? If I own a can of tomato juice and spill it into the sea so that its molecules mingle evenly throughout the sea, do I come to own the sea, or have I just lost my can of tomato juice?²²

Nozick's criticism only holds if we understand Locke to mean that property rights in an unowned object originate through someone's mixing their labour with it. Indeed this appears to be how Nozick reads Locke on this point. However, as Tully notes:

It does not seem to be Locke's view that a person mixes his labour with a preexisting object which persists through the activity of labouring. Rather, he sees the labourer as making an object out of the material provided by God and so having a property in this product, in a manner similar to the way in which God makes the world out of the prior material He created.²³

Hence, according to Tully, labour transforms the God-given earthly possessions which are provided *for* use into man-made objects *of* use. As Locke says 'there must

²⁰Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. V:27.

²¹Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), p.174.

²²Nozick, p.175.

²³James Tully, *A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries*, (Cambridge University Press, 1980) p. 116-7.

of necessity be a means *to appropriate* them some way or other before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial to any particular Man.²⁴ Furthermore, pouring juice into the sea would, according to Nozick's interpretation, presumably give ownership but it is not comparable with gathering acorns for one's support. Neither does Nozick seem to account for the limits that Locke places upon appropriation. One person owning the sea as in Nozick's example hardly allows for 'enough and as good' for the next person. Nor, it seems, should one person be able to use the whole sea for their own preservation because for Locke this would be considered a waste, or at least an under utilisation of natural resources which arise from the common stock.

It could also be asked why Locke uses labour as the means to appropriation and not something else? Labour is a command from God for 'God, when he gave the World in common to all Mankind, commanded Man also to labour, and the penury of his condition required it of him.'²⁵ It may appear that this only gives mankind a duty to labour, not a right to the fruits of their labour. However, God also commands us to preserve our lives and such preservation can only be achieved by appropriation. Therefore, the right to what we appropriate is necessary to doing our duty and hence is also the will of God.

However, it could be pointed out that the Maori notion of discovery as a means of gaining title is certainly not the same as Locke's idea of 'mixing labour.' However, for the Maori one way to gain *mana* is by enhancing the value of something. As Patterson notes:

When the weaver Erenora Puketapu-Hetet says that she tries to respect the *mauri* of her weaving materials by giving them another dimension such as beauty, we notice that she is advocating that we enhance the *value* of the natural materials we use.²⁶

This appears to be similar to Locke who claims that it is our labour that increases the value of a thing. Although he speaks primarily of land his theory could be applied

²⁴ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. V: 26.

²⁵ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. V: 32.

²⁶ Patterson, p. 70.

equally to other things including, as in the example above, flax for weaving. Locke says:

For 'tis *Labour* indeed that *puts the difference of value* on every thing; and let any one consider, what the difference is between an Acre of Land planted with Tobacco, or Sugar, sown with Wheat or Barley; and an Acre of the same Land lying in common, without any Husbandry upon it, and he will find that the improvement of *labour* makes the far greater part of *the value*.²⁷

Furthermore, there is an important, and I believe significant, common element that runs throughout both the Maori and Lockean ideas of rights to property namely, occupation.

In order to gain the right to land it would not be enough for a Maori tribe to just discover the land; they would also have to occupy it. Without keeping their fires burning, that is protecting their rights by regularly performing acts such as fishing, hunting and cultivating, and protecting against intruders, they would lose their claim to the land.²⁸ This principle of 'keeping the home fires burning' seems to be close to Locke's view in relation to labour in that property must be *used* by the owner, else it returns to being in common and may be taken by another.²⁹ Remember, the earth was given to mankind in common with no one having exclusive rights over any of it, but all having an equal right and duty to appropriate what each needed. Fairness dictates that persons do not take what they cannot or do not use, for such appropriation denies others the opportunity to use those goods. In regard to Locke's personal views on idleness and the importance of continued use of land John A. Simmons, in his book on the Lockean theory of rights, states:

Lady Masham tells us that Locke's personal attitudes matched his philosophical convictions about waste: 'Waste of any kind he could not bear to see ... nor would he, if he could help it, let anything be destroyed which could serve for the nourishment, maintenance, or allowable pleasure of any creature.' We know from the same source that Locke abhorred idleness. The idle holding (or destruction) of what could be used by others, then, whether the goods spoil or not, will be morally objectionable. Land of course, doesn't 'spoil' in any literal sense when it lies unused; the grass may or may not rot on

²⁷Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. V:40.

²⁸Sinclair, p.69.

²⁹Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. V:38.

the ground (depending on the climate and the kind of grass). But land can be *wasted* (e.g., by the idle rich) by lying unused.³⁰

Furthermore, in regard to ownership, Simmons notes, that this principle regarding occupation highlights that property rights in Locke cannot amount to absolute rights over a thing, for Locke clearly accepts limits on our use of property.³¹ So even if a person owns property it doesn't mean that they are able to do whatever they wish to that property, in particular they cannot let it go to waste. This may have implications for the protection of the environment, for it places restrictions upon what even the owner of property is permitted to do.

Closely linked to this claim through discovery is the second method of land acquisition: a right to land by descent. Such a claim or right through ancestors is commonly known as *take tupuna*.³² Provided an ancestor can be traced, and a family war has not occurred, then a claim may be made on the land owned by that ancestor. In fact it doesn't matter how distant the relationship, they all, so long as they can trace their origin to the same ancestor, claim an equal right to the lands owned by that ancestor.³³ A similar strand however can also be found in Locke. In regard to inheritance James Tully points out that Locke acknowledges an almost universal consent to the institution of inheritance.³⁴ Parents have a natural and positive duty to provide support for their children and children in turn have a right in the goods that are owned by the parents. For Locke the right of a property is not an individual right but a common right enjoyed by all the family, and if necessary the whole kinship unit. 'The reason for this unique familialisation of property is to preserve mankind by preserving its basic unit: the family.'³⁵

It seems then that even the father and owner does not have the right to dispose

³⁰A. John Simmons, *A Lockean Theory of Rights*, (Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 286-7.

³¹Simmons, p. 230.

³²Peter Buck, *The Coming of the Maori*, (NZ. Whitcoulls Ltd, 1949) p.380.

³³Smith, p. 64.

³⁴James Tully, *A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries*, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 133.

³⁵Tully, p. 133.

of his property as he wishes for, as previously mentioned, it is not wholly his property over which he has absolute rights. Inheritance comes about when parents cease to use what belongs to the family in common. Thus, a possession completely becomes the children's when, upon death, the parents have no further use for it. In the advent of there being no heirs then the property returns to its original status, that of being held in common. It appears then that both the Maori and Locke allow for legitimate transfer of property through inheritance.

The third *take*, or right to land, is achieved by conquest, *take raupatu*. A title by conquest came about after subjecting and driving off the conquered tribe. Raiding parties, even if successful, were insufficient to support a title by *take raupatu*. As in the other cases of *take* the land must be occupied by the conquering tribe, and this at the exclusion of the vanquished. In the case of absolute conquest many of the vanquished would become slaves of the victorious tribe. They may be permitted to occupy their former lands, but only as serfs. As the right to land taken by conquest relied upon the victorious tribe occupying the land, it followed that their rights would only last as long as they themselves were able to resist attack by the defeated or some other tribe.³⁶ In the least drastic example of defeat in battle, the loser was allowed to exist in hiding in his tribal domain. He could reappear after the enemy had left and substantiate his title with the claim: 'My fire has ever been kept alight upon my land.' This would not have carried much weight with the conquerors but may have been counted as valid by other tribes.³⁷ When the Waikato tribes invaded Taranaki they supposedly drove the Atiawa out of the territory. Later, however, when the Waikato tribes claimed ownership of the Taranaki territory by right of conquest, it was shown that some families of the Atiawa had remained on the land and had 'kept their fires burning' thus preventing their tribal rights of ownership from being extinguished.³⁸

Whilst in Maoridom conquest was seen as a legitimate method of gaining title

³⁶Buck, p.381.

³⁷Kawharu, p.56.

³⁸Buck, 381.

or rights to the land, in the Lockean tradition we find no support of this type of claim.

In fact Locke says:

That the *Aggressor*, who puts himself into the state of War with another, and *unjustly invades* another Man's right, *can*, by such an unjust War, *never* come to *have a right over the Conquered*, will be easily agreed by all Men, who will not think, that Robbers and Pyrates have a Right of Empire over whomsoever they have Force enough to master; or that Men are bound by promises, which unlawful Force extorts from them.³⁹

Locke also states that it makes no difference who the aggressor is. 'The Injury and the Crime is equal, whether committed by the wearer of a Crown, or some petty Villain.'⁴⁰ In speaking about parties involved in an unjust war Locke concludes that 'he that *Conquers in an unjust War*, can thereby *have no Title to the Subjection and Obedience of the Conquered*.'⁴¹ Thus, it follows that '*the Conquering people are not*, I hope, to be *Slaves by Conquest*, and wear their Laurels only to show they are Sacrifices of their Leader's Triumph.'⁴²

Initially it would appear that Locke's view regarding right of land by conquest is in stark contrast with that of the Maori. However it could be argued that, for the Maori, all battles fought may indeed be considered justified, perhaps because of some grievance, past or present, with another tribe. Furthermore, it is not at all clear that the Maori view their opponents in war the same way as Europeans. For Locke, an opponent in a just war would be called an enemy, generally understood to be the opposite of a friend. However, the closest word in the Maori language to enemy is '*hoariri*' which is comprised of '*hoa*' - meaning friend, and '*riri*' - meaning anger. The implication here may be that for the Maori wars are seen as disagreements (generally over land) with their one time friends. For Locke then, only some wars are

³⁹Locke, *Second Treatise* XVI: 176.

⁴⁰Locke, *Second Treatise* XVI: 176.

⁴¹Locke, *Second Treatise* XVI: 176.

⁴²Locke, *Second Treatise* XVI: 177.

justified namely, those which involve defence of property and freedom. However, for the Maori, using this interpretation, all wars may be justified because all wars can be traced or attributed to a past or present grievance with their neighbour. If this is the case then both Locke and Maori would agree that only wars which are just are acceptable.

The final *take* which can give a legitimate claim to rights to land is the gift or *take tuku*. In order to constitute a *take tuku* the donor must have sufficient right to make it, the gift must be widely known and publicly assented to. Gifts may have been made for various reasons including that of buying protection from another larger tribe. It is often assumed that for Locke labour is the only means of gaining legitimate title to individual ownership. However, Locke also allows for property to be gifted particularly if it would avoid spoilage and waste. If a person didn't use their property then 'If he gave away a part to any body else, so that it perished not uselessly in his Possession, these he also made use of.'⁴³ Little needs to be said inasmuch as gifting is a legitimate means of transferring title and rights to land both in Locke and Maori custom.

I have discussed the various *take* that, once established, afford the Maori people *mana* in the land and compared these to similar notions found in Locke. However, according to Patterson the Maori 'philosophy of *mana* can be further developed if we distinguish two contrasting ways in which *mana* can be obtained, a "soft" way, through co-operative actions and interactions, and a "hard" way, through competitive actions and interactions.'⁴⁴ In Maori philosophy there is an underlying idea that opposites such as these are interdependent and should be kept in balance. So whilst there is a place for gaining *mana* through competition as is recorded by the

⁴³Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. V: 46.

warlike deeds of the mythological heroes there is also a need for the opposite where *mana* is gained through our co-operative interaction with nature.

We can gain environmental *mana* - what Maori might call *mana whenua* or *mana* in the land - by following the creative way of soft *mana* rather than the destructive way of hard *mana* in our interactions with all creatures. And by doing so we can enhance their standing as well as our own.⁴⁵

Whilst Locke himself does not appear to have anything that corresponds to these two ways, the Christian tradition of which he was a part does contain what could be seen as two ways of approaching environmental ethics. Both ways turn on our interpretation of the Bible. What we may call the hard way comes from an interpretation of Genesis 1:28 which says that humans are created in the image of God, given dominion over the earth and over everything that moves upon the earth. Furthermore, humans are commanded to be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish and subdue the earth. The implication is that humans are above other creatures and that their special status encourages domination of all others.

The soft way, or what is commonly called the stewardship interpretation, is that to have been created in the image of God confers upon humans not only special rights and privileges but also special responsibilities and duties towards others. Included in these responsibilities is the duty to look after the earth which God loves and has entrusted to human care. Adam, as a representative of the human race, is charged to dress and keep the Garden of Eden. Furthermore, God seemed to favour an environment that was creative for he commanded all creatures to multiply and fill the earth. Thus, any destruction would appear to go against God's plan or design. Whilst the result of this interpretation is not exactly the same as the Maori notion of the two ways that *mana* can be achieved there appears, nevertheless, to be enough relevant similarities to allow such a comparison to be made.

Another difference, of perhaps greater significance, not yet mentioned between Locke and Maori thought is the importance of the individual and the

⁴⁴Patterson, p. 110.

⁴⁵Patterson, p. 113.

collective. Speaking of Locke, Tim Hayward notes, 'he begins from a position where human beings are related first and foremost to their natural conditions of existence and only secondarily to one another.'⁴⁶ Thus, humans live together according to the dictates of reason which compels them to respect their reciprocal rights; and for which purpose government is instituted. They have a natural right to self preservation and a right not to be interfered with by others. In this way Locke ascribes the view of humans as individual bearers of inalienable rights.

As we have seen, Smith is of the opinion that *mana* is personal. This interpretation was probably influenced by the desire to transmute the native customary title of land into one recognisable according to British law. Other Maori views, however, place a greater emphasis upon collective *mana*. Maori writer Ranginui Walker claims that:

The sovereignty of the land was vested in the tribe under the *mana* of the chief. Thus for an individual to dispose of his land there had to be an agreement by the tribe and the chief as sovereign. Nor could the chief dispose of land without the agreement of the individual owner and tribe.⁴⁷

Peter Buck concurs that land was tribal land, with plots designated for individual use,⁴⁸ and according to Johansen this collective, or communal aspect of *mana* permeates all the people to their innermost hearts.⁴⁹ He further states that:

The chief's *mana* is not only the *mana* of the kinship group but that of the country as well... So the *mana* of the country is as a matter of course part of that of the kinship group as well, and as the latter stands in a similar determinative relationship to the country as the chief to the kinship group, the Maori may, of course, with equal right say that the *mana* of the country is with the kinship group without being guilty of any inconsistency.⁵⁰

An alternative to individual or collective *mana* is proposed by Patterson in that communities and individuals are seen as so interdependent that one could not

⁴⁶Tim Hayward. *Ecological Thought: An Introduction*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publ. Ltd. 1994), p.130.

⁴⁷Walker. *Nga Tau Tohetohe*, p. 44.

⁴⁸Buck. p. 376.

⁴⁹J. Prytz Johansen, *The Maori and His Religion: In its Non-Ritualistic Aspects*, (Kobenhavn: Ejnar Munksgaard, 1954), p. 93.

⁵⁰Johansen. p. 93.

dominate the other.⁵¹ This means that *mana* flows both ways; the chief's *mana* is dependent upon the people and the people's *mana* is enhanced by the *mana* of the chief. Furthermore, through kinship, 'other creatures are not seen as ultimately cut off from humans, they are not really seen as "other", and they are certainly not seen as evil.'⁵² Each creature has *mana* or standing in the land in its own right and yet is bound to the rest of nature as part of a collective. Thus, whatever is done takes into account not just humans but all of the members of the community which, for the Maori, includes trees, animals, birds, and fish etc.

The notion that all creatures are included in the Maori community would certainly afford them intrinsic rights. This point is missing in Locke who views all things in relation to their value to humans. However, although the Maori consider the animals as their kin it appears to offer the animals little protection from being harmed or consumed. Now it could be argued that individual animals are consumed but as a species they are afforded some protection as members of the community. Yet could it not be argued that, as in other cultures, species are protected just so there will be an ongoing food source for humans? If this is the case then it seems that this does not afford any intrinsic value to the animals but rather they are only given instrumental value, and this is not greatly different from Locke's view. In what follows it is shown how the Maori could respond to this charge by appealing to the notions of kinship, *mauri* and *tapu*.

Respect for all Things.

In the Maori world-view, *tangata whenua* afford respect for all creatures within their lands. According to Patterson, 'part of the authority and power of *mana whenua* is the ability to see to the well-being of all creatures.'⁵³ Initially this may appear to be an ideal basis for a deep environmental ethic. However, as Patterson himself points out it

⁵¹Patterson. p.109.

⁵²Patterson, p. 29.

⁵³Patterson, p.20.

is only applicable in the lands in which one has *mana whenua*. In this respect *tangata whenua* may not have any environmental responsibility outside of their own lands. Nevertheless even though lacking in universality it seems, at least, an adequate starting point. Furthermore, aside from this special link that the Maori share with the creatures in their *particular* lands, according to Maori thought, we are related to *all* creatures and thus responsible for their welfare. 'This means that all of us are responsible for the well-being of all creatures, in precisely the ways that kin are responsible for one another, independently of any *mana whenua* we may have in any particular place.'⁵⁴ Such a linking of all creatures through kinship forms a good basis for Maori environmental philosophy.

The roots of this belief in kinship Patterson attributes to the ancient *whakapapa* or genealogical tables going back to Ranginui and Papa-tuanuku, Sky and Earth. After Tane-mahuta, one of the sons of Rangi and Papa, had separated Ranginui and Papa-tuanuku, another son, Tawhiri, representing winds and storms, turned upon Tane, Tangaroa (sea god), and Rongo and Haumia (gods of cultivated and uncultivated food). Only Tu the war god was able to pacify Tawhiri, but in his anger at the other four who had left him to withstand Tawhiri on his own, he felt a wish to injure Tane. Next, Tu took revenge on Tangaroa and similarly on Rongo and Haumia. Having defeated his four brothers of the earth and sea, their offspring were now his food. Unable to defeat Tawhiri he remains an enemy of Tu today. Tu, as the god of war, is man but only the spirit and not the body, for man was not yet made, there being no woman. It was Tane who was to put this right not Tu.⁵⁵ Although there are different stories as to how Tane finally acquired a human woman the most common is that he made one for himself from the soil and breathed into her mouth, thus giving her life.⁵⁶

⁵⁴Patterson, p.20.

⁵⁵Anthony Alpers, *Maori Myths and Legends*, (Auckland: Longman Paul Ltd. 1964), pp.22-23.

⁵⁶Some traditions state that he first made a human male, named Tiki, but more often we are told that he first looked for a female.

Even though these myths give a grounding for kinship it may seem that rather than giving a feeling of love and care (*manaaki*) for our kin these stories could be interpreted to portray an alternative view. A view that fosters competition rather than cooperation. It appears that the spirit of man, at least, is in a constant battle with his other brothers that represent nature and its elements. Furthermore, the only creation of Tane's that has life breathed into it is that of a human which suggests a distinct separation between human life and the rest of nature.

Another, different interpretation may, however, do greater justice to these myths. As is common in many of the creation myths throughout the world order is seen to arise out of apparent chaos. If these Maori myths are viewed in this way we may develop a different appreciation. Out of the chaos and warring between the brothers we find that a balance and harmony arises between them and a respect for each other. This interpretation is similar to Walker's. 'Although Tu emerged superior, he was a god made in man's image and likeness, he was neither vanquished nor victorious over Tawhiri. The elements wage continuous war against man, who in turn has to maintain constant vigilance.'⁵⁷ Thus, too should all things enjoy a mutual respect: the elements, nature, forests and plant life, the sea as depicted in these myths.

Patterson also points out, there are other narratives which suggest that kin should protect and care for each other. The motive behind Tane's action of separating his parents, Earth and Sky, is so that he and his brothers can flourish. Furthermore, he does not leave his parents like this, he covers his mother with trees and his father he decorates with stars. From this story Patterson concludes that:

Here is a graphic example of the idea that we should protect our kin, even when great harm has been done. And it involves more than protection: the action of decorating the sky with stars illustrates a creative, supportive and caring relation between kin, which is part of what is meant by *whanaungatanga*. Even when we are forced to do harm to our kin, if there is scope for recompense and for enhancing their lives we are expected to do this.⁵⁸

⁵⁷Ranginui Walker, 'The Relevance of Maori Myth and Tradition', *Te Ao Hurihuri: Aspects of Maoritanga*, p. 172.

⁵⁸Patterson, p.23.

If we accept that this idea of kinship is prevalent in Maori thought it would indeed be a fundamental factor for an environmental ethic that was non-anthropocentric. This point seems to be crucial because the criticism of the traditional Lockean viewpoint is that it is centred only around humankind. Thus, other things are only valued for their use to humans and are thereby considered to have little if any intrinsic value.

In Maori thought, all things have a natural sacredness or *tapu* because they are descended from the gods or *atua*. This, according to Patterson, gives the Maori another way to afford respect and intrinsic value to all creatures. He does this by accounting for the *tapu* of the natural world in terms of *mana*. He says that:

the tactic is to make use of a link between *tapu* on the one hand and *mana* plus *atua* on the other hand, and then come to see the *atua* as being so intimately linked with the natural world that the *mana* of the *atua* can be seen as the *mana* of the natural world itself. That way, respect for the natural world is very like saying that it has standing, that it is entitled to a place in the world.⁵⁹

All creatures and even plants and inanimate objects can, according to Maori myth, trace their descent from one or other of the *atua*. For example a tree has as its ancestor Tane-Mahuta so that tree carries with it the *mana* of Tane. Furthermore, as Patterson says, the relation between a creature and its *atua* is not seen as two distinct entities, thus the tree is not seen only as a descendent of Tane, but also as Tane.⁶⁰ Regarding all of nature with *tapu*, and seeing the creatures as personifications of *atua*, gives nature an intrinsic value. Hence, when any act that may be considered harmful (such as felling a tree) needs be undertaken it must be done with great care and with the use of the appropriate rituals.

It would be difficult to find anything in Locke's writing that states that humans are on an equal footing with the rest of nature. In fact, in his introduction to the *Essay concerning Human Understanding* Locke states that, 'it is the *understanding* that sets Man above the rest of sensible beings, and gives him all the

⁵⁹Patterson, p.54.

⁶⁰Patterson, p.55.

Advantage and Dominion, which he has over them.’⁶¹ The importance that Locke gives to the understanding and reason is associated with his overall conception of man’s place in the universe. In *The First Treatise* Locke says:

God, I say, having made Man and the World thus, spoke to him, (that is) directed him by his Senses and Reason, as he did the inferior Animals by their Sense and Instinct, which he had placed in them to that purpose, to the use of those things, which were serviceable for his Subsistence, and given him as means of his Preservation.⁶²

In the same paragraph Locke goes on to say that planted in man, by God, is a strong desire towards self-preservation. This desire, along with reason, which is the voice of God in him, gives man the right to the use of creatures, and it is by reason that man discovers which animals are serviceable to him.

According to Parry, Locke shared the widespread conception of the world as ordered in a hierarchy of beings and species. ‘This belief in “a Great Chain of Being” was, in one or other of its varied forms, central to the world view of most philosophers, theologians and men of learning and imagination until the late eighteenth century.’⁶³ The beings in the universe were placed in a hierarchy from God through the angels down to man, and from man down to the animals and then the smallest of creatures. God and the angels, as the highest, form the ranks of purely intelligible species whilst the lower animals form that of sentient beings. Man is placed somewhere in between. He is the only earthly creature to share intelligence with God and the angels and hence the lowest of the beings with reason. On the other hand he is unlike God in that he shares the physical character of the animals which places him the highest in the order of sentient beings. This, we assume, is why Locke justifies his claim that man has dominion and advantage over the rest of the sentient beings.

It is often claimed that this view, when applied to the environment, leads to an

⁶¹John Locke. *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Edited by Peter H. Nidditch, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), (I, Ch. I:I), p.43.

⁶²John Locke, ‘The First Treatise on Government’, in Peter Laslett’s *John Locke: Two Treatises of Government*, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1960), Ch. IX:86.

⁶³Geraint Parry, *John Locke*, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), p.20.

anthropocentric attitude; allowing humans to do whatever they wish providing it benefits their own species. This approach has found further justification in the Judaeo/Christian scriptures where Adam is apparently given dominion over all the earth. Locke, however, makes it clear in the beginning of the *Second Treatise on Government* that Adam's dominion is misunderstood.

That *Adam* had not either by natural Right of Fatherhood, or by positive Donation from God, any such Authority over his Children, or Dominion over the World, as is pretended. That if he had, his Heirs, yet, had no Right to it.⁶⁴

Locke's justification for this position comes from his attack in *The First Treatise on Government* on Robert Filmer's notion of the divine right of kings. Locke's primary intention is to show that God did not give Adam 'Monarchical power over those of his own species.'⁶⁵ In regard to other creatures Locke says that 'whatever dominion he [Adam] had thereby, it was not a private dominion, but a dominion in common with the rest of mankind.'⁶⁶ Even though in Locke there is the notion of a linking together of all creatures through the 'great chain of being' and by virtue of all things being created by God, it appears that humankind is nevertheless considered to be at the centre. Is there anything that can be said in Locke's defence?

In *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* Locke advocates that children are to be taught to refrain from any cruelty to animals. He says:

One thing I have frequently observed in children, that when they have got possession of any poor creature they are apt to use it ill: they often *torment* and treat very roughly young birds, butterflies, and such other poor animals which fall into their hands, and that with a seeming kind of pleasure. This I think should be watched in them, and if they incline to any such *cruelty*, they should be taught the contrary usage. For the custom of tormenting and killing of beasts will, by degrees, harden their minds even towards men; and they who delight in the suffering and destruction of inferior creatures will not be apt to be very compassionate or benign to those of their own kind.... Children should from the beginning be bred up in the abhorrence of *killing* or tormenting any living creature and be taught not to *spoil* or destroy anything, unless it be for the preservation or advantage of some other that is nobler.... And indeed, I think people should be accustomed from their cradles to be

⁶⁴Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. I:1-2.

⁶⁵Locke, *First Treatise*, Ch.IV:28.

⁶⁶Locke, *First Treatise*, Ch. IV:29.

tender to all sensible creatures, and to spoil or *waste* nothing at all.⁶⁷

The main reason Locke gives against cruelty to animals is that it may 'harden their [children's] minds even towards men.' Although this is again an anthropocentric view with cruelty being refrained from ultimately for the benefit of humans it may nevertheless be enough to deliver an ethic towards all creatures that is equally as friendly as those of the Maori. Locke's argument, simply put, looks like this:

- 1) The practice of cruelty to creatures will harden a person's mind
- 2) Those persons with hardened minds will not be compassionate to their own kind
- 3) Persons should be compassionate to their own kind (from the Bible)

Therefore,

- 4) Persons should refrain from the practice of cruelty to all creatures.

Whether Locke's assumptions are true the argument itself is valid. Furthermore, Locke adds that in addition to avoiding cruelty to creatures, children should also be 'taught not to *spoil* or destroy anything.' This suggests that our concern and 'tenderness' should reach out not just to the creatures, but extend to all things that are part of creation. If this is the case Locke then appears to have the basis for an environmental ethic that delivers the same end result as that of Maori belief. Additionally, as Robin Attfield points out, Locke's teachings were influential:

The humanitarian movement, which successfully altered attitudes and practice in matters of slavery, punishment, working conditions and also the treatment of animals, originated in the eighteenth century, though it had its seventeenth century precursors. In matters of animal welfare the movement was fostered in its early stages by Christian moralists such as Locke, Wollaston, Balguy and Hutcheson.⁶⁸

Furthermore, Locke also seems to imply that we should avoid cruelty so that we may develop good characters, thus advocating a form of virtue ethical theory. A parallel may be drawn here with Maori environmental ethics which have a strong emphasis upon virtue ethics due to the narratives of historical heroes and gods. According to

⁶⁷John Locke, *Some Thoughts Concerning Education, and Of the Conduct of the Understanding*, Ruth W. Grant and Nathan Tarcov (eds.) Hackett Publishing Co.1996, pp. 90-91.

⁶⁸Attfield, pp.48-49.

Patterson 'the traditional narratives that encode central Maori environmental virtues are *tribal* traditions.'⁶⁹ Although it must be conceded that Locke does not afford intrinsic rights to all creatures and things, unlike the Maori which can claim to do so through kinship and *tapu*, it should be noted that even the Maori belief which is able to link all things together still allows harm to be done. As Patterson says, 'even when we are forced to do harm to our kin, if there is scope for enhancing their lives we are expected to do this.'⁷⁰ There seems then to be little difference to the final results that are motivated by either this statement or that of Locke's which says that harm may only be done for the preservation of that which is nobler. As Patterson points out, the Maori have a world view in which the relations between humans and non-humans can be seen differently from the views more familiar to Europeans.⁷¹ However, although the roots of the Maori belief differ from that of Locke's it can be seen that ultimately neither beliefs allow for cruelty and mistreatment unless considered necessary for a higher end.

Any environmental ethic that places greater moral weighting upon human benefit is generally considered to be anthropocentric. It seems to me that both the Maori, who enhance their own lives at the expense of other species, and Locke who allows harm to be done to animals for the preservation of humans fall into this category. W.H. Murdy in speaking of anthropocentrism says:

To be anthropocentric is to affirm that mankind is to be valued more highly than other things in nature – by man. By the same logic, spiders are to be valued more highly than other things in nature – by spiders. It is proper for men to be anthropocentric and for spiders to be arachnocentric. This goes for all other living species.⁷²

Traditionally anthropocentrism has often been seen as the root of the ecological crisis. However, it seems incorrect to infer that it is wrong for humans to exploit nature for

⁶⁹John Patterson, 'Maori Environmental Virtues', *Environmental Ethics*, 16 (1994) p. 397.

⁷⁰Patterson, p.23.

⁷¹Patterson, p.21.

⁷² W.H. Murdy, 'Anthropocentrism: A Modern View,' In *Environmental Ethics: Divergence and Convergence*. Compiled by Susan J. Armstrong and Richard G. Botzler (McGraw-Hill Inc 1993) p.303.

our proper ends, when such ends are our support, sustenance or preservation. It appears that we must exploit nature to some degree in order to survive. Again as Murdy points out:

The problem lies in our difficulty to distinguish between "proper ends," which are progressive and promote human values, and "improper ends," which are retrogressive and destructive of human values.⁷³

We can accept that wanton destruction of the environment is not a proper end for humans when such destruction occurs through greed. But what about 'our destruction of bacteria in order that we may remain healthy, or our destruction of plant and animal life, in order that we might be nourished?'⁷⁴

To afford value to things based upon their worth to human life is to regard them as having instrumental rather than intrinsic value. However, as knowledge of our dependence upon the rest of nature increases we are placing greater instrumental value on a wider variety of things in nature. Continued growth of knowledge may lead to an awareness that no event in nature is without some effect on the whole of which we are a part and therefore we should value all items in nature. Thus we may conclude that an anthropocentric view of nature need not necessarily lead to mistreatment of the environment. When we recognise our dependence upon nature more things, whilst not intrinsically so, nevertheless become of value to us and deserving of our care and protection.

Responsibility to Future Generations

As previously discussed the Maori people hold strong views regarding the notion of kinship, which extends beyond our own species to all things. Patterson says, 'In a society that takes kinship seriously, what an individual is free to do is bound up with the needs and activities of a range of kinship groups.'⁷⁵ But, as he also points out, 'The picture is further complicated, from a European point of view, by the fact that

⁷³ Murdy, p. 303.

⁷⁴ Murdy, p. 303.

⁷⁵ Patterson, p.39.

the kin-group includes ancestors and future generations.⁷⁶ This linking to future generations through kinship extends not just to humans, but to all things and has implications environmentally. The question of whether we should be concerned about future generations is solved within this framework. If kinship extends to the future then it is assumed that the unborn have a similar standing to those who are living. If this is the case then all decisions regarding the environment must take into account those generations yet to be born.

Although Locke doesn't appear to have the notion of kinship in the same way as that of the Maori, he nevertheless does allow for consideration of future generations, albeit that such consideration is directed ultimately towards humans. However, it should be pointed out that this was, for Locke, not really an issue for he assumed that there would be an abundance of resources available for the future use of humankind:

No Man's labour could subdue, or appropriate all: nor could his Enjoyment consume more than a small part; so that it was impossible for any Man, this way, to intrench upon the right of another, or acquire, to himself, a Property, to the Prejudice of his Neighbour, who would still have room, for as good, and as large a Possession (after the other had taken out his) as before it was appropriated.⁷⁷

Whether the property consisted of acorns, fish from the sea, water from a well or land that has been worked, for Locke the law of nature imposes certain limitations on the amount that may be legitimately taken. In regards to appropriation Locke realised that there seems to be nothing to stop a person engrossing as much as he will.⁷⁸ To stop this he first points out that it would be contrary to another person's rights, and so cannot be permitted:

Nor was this *appropriation* of any parcel of *Land*, by improving it, any prejudice to any other Man, since there was still enough, and as good left; and more than the yet unprovided could use.⁷⁹

⁷⁶Patterson, p.41.

⁷⁷Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. V:36.

⁷⁸Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. V:31.

⁷⁹Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. V:33.

Second, no person may take more than he needs so that it produces waste:

God has given us all things richly, 1 Tim. vi. 17. is the Voice of Reason confirmed by Inspiration. But how far has he given it us? To *enjoy*. As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils; so much he may by his labour fix a Property in. Whatever is beyond this is more than his share, and belongs to others.⁸⁰

Hence, the rights of others were protected by two facts. First, that God had given us all things richly so that there was enough for everyone and second, that man's needs were limited for he could consume only a small part for his enjoyment. Since 'Nothing was made by God for Man to spoil or destroy' then the responsibility must lie with humans to 'keep within the *bounds*, set by reason.'⁸¹ Since it is humans that are endowed, by God, with reason, then it is a charge from God, to man, to judge between good and evil and ensure that available resources are used carefully and wisely for the benefit of all. As Parry comments, 'Men are thus able to employ their faculty of reason to seek out any relevant information which will enable them to make a correct decision as to their ultimate happiness.'⁸²

It could be argued that one idea of reason is that of rational self interest, but for Locke 'self interest' is not the action of a rational, reasonable being and hence is not the action of a human. As Schouls points out:

Since "reason" covers individual knowledge of the principles of natural law, individual knowledge that these principles are binding for action if action is to qualify as human action, and individual acceptance of the normative nature of these principles, reason itself becomes a definition of individuality.⁸³

Furthermore, each individual is prevented from acting only out of self interest because each man recognises that the other possesses the same quality (reason) which he himself possesses. As Schouls says:

The recognition of reason in the other guarantees that the other is left inviolate by all individuals acting reasonably, that is, by all human beings. In other words, the common bond 'binds' only once individuals act rationally and

⁸⁰Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. V:31.

⁸¹Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. V:31.

⁸²Parry, p. 24.

⁸³Schouls, pp. 205-206.

recognise reason in one another.⁸⁴

In Locke there seems to be little to indicate any belief in such an all encompassing notion of kinship as there is in Maori belief. However, he does speak about the right of inheritance possessed by children. Locke's discussion on inheritance is, of course, important to his critique of Filmer who, as previously mentioned, claims that Adam's authority descends to kings. However, in doing so Locke creates a little confusion. At times Locke says that a father's property is his own to deal with as he wishes, with free alienation allowing bequest to have priority over inheritance. Yet in other instances he emphasises the rights of children and wives. Simmons notes that:

It is not, however, at all obvious that free alienation is central in this way to Locke's theory of property. There are many things one clearly may not do with one's property in Locke - harm oneself or others, deny the needy, and so on. Such limits should make us wonder about free bequest.⁸⁵

Tully supports the view that inheritance and the rights of dependants have priority over paternal prerogative. He argues that for Locke,

it is a common right enjoyed by all the family and, if necessary, by the whole kinship unit. The reason for this unique familialisation of property is to preserve mankind by preserving its basic unit: the family. Locke destroys the very foundation of individual rights: that a proprietor is the patriarchal head of a family.⁸⁶

If we accept this interpretation of Locke then we can see that Locke does afford rights to future generations. In fact these familial rights are considered to be of such importance that they outweigh the rights of an individual patriarch to dispose of his property as he wishes. However, it will be noted that kinship for Locke is much narrower than kinship within the Maori tradition. For Locke it only extends through the human race, and then only within your own lineage, whereas for the Maori it extends to all creatures. Does this make any difference to our concern over providing a healthy balanced environment for future generations? Will our concern for future

⁸⁴Schouls, p. 206.

⁸⁵A. John Simmons. p.205.

⁸⁶James Tulley. p. 133.

generations, if based upon the belief that we will have kin there, be altered whether we have a wide view of kinship, as do the Maori, or if, like Locke, we have a narrower perspective? Would I be any less concerned if the future lives of my children and their children were at stake than if my cousins and other more distant relatives were also to be included in my deliberations? I believe not and even though Locke would only include the human element in his deliberations, whereas the Maori would include not just human descendants but also all things for all things are their kin, this would make no difference to the outcome.

How would each belief system deal with a dilemma posed today, the result of which would have implications in the future? For example, suppose a decision has to be made now which would determine the future outcome between say the death of a human descendant or the extinction of an endangered species. For Locke, it appears that he would always afford protection of a human over a non-human, unless the protection of a non-human brought about greater benefits for humans. If, for example, Locke knew that the felling of the forests would endanger human life then the forests would be given great consideration because of their value to humans.

The Maori, however, would include in their deliberations both the human element and the endangered species, for they are both their kin. Thus, the outcome of their decision may not be so clear, and even if it was the same as Locke's it would not apparently be without due consideration for those encompassed by their wide view of kinship. However, it is not clear that the Maori would favour the saving of the endangered species. On the one hand they appear to afford all creatures intrinsic value through kinship, *tapu* and *mauri*, and yet allow the killing of animals for human benefit and preservation. It seems to me then that whilst it must be admitted that Locke only has what we could call a narrow kinship, it is not clear that it will afford any less of a guarantee to the protection of the environment for future generations than the wider Maori kinship. If the Maori claimed that the endangered species were given equal consideration with humans then the outcome would be clearer.

The Interdependence of All Things

Patterson points out that another reason why the Maori say we should respect the natural world is because each creature has a *mauri* or life force, and that this life force joins all beings - humans, gods, plants and animals, mountains and rivers and seas - into one interdependent whole, each depending for its well-being upon the health of each other part and of the whole itself.⁸⁷ J. Prytz Johansen describes *mauri* as a concentration of life, a centre from where it acts and wells out. This life may be either *mana* concentrated in an object or it may be life experienced as concentrated in a point in man.⁸⁸

Patterson further notes that *mauri* is still an important and real part of a traditional Maori world and cites an example of how a Maori leader, commenting upon a proposal to cease discharging sewage into the Manawatu river, states that this discharge has brought about an imbalance of the *mauri* of the river.⁸⁹ Orbell gives a slightly different interpretation of *mauri*. She says that a person, a people, a *pa* or house or *waka*, a river or forest, a food resource of any kind - any entity of value - possesses this life force.⁹⁰ The additional feature she mentions here is that a repository of this life force is something that is *valued*. If this reading of *mauri* is used then the implication is that only those things that are of value to humans e.g. house or *waka* contain *mauri*. If only humans are the valuers then it seems that only things that are valued by humans are able to contain *mauri*. However, Orbell's interpretation doesn't seem to fit very well with the Maori view that the trees and other creatures are kin and are further considered to be persons with the morally relevant features of humans. If this is the case then it may be that for the Maori a valuer does not have to be human. Which interpretation of the word *mauri* is correct is difficult to determine for variations occur amongst different tribes and as previously mentioned translation to

⁸⁷Patterson, p.64.

⁸⁸Johansen, p.237.

⁸⁹Patterson, p.65.

⁹⁰Margaret Orbell, *Maori Myth and Legend*, Christchurch: Canterbury University Press, 1995), p.117.

English is problematic. However, if we accept the view that all things, regardless of their value to man, contain *mauri* then this, as Patterson says, would join all things into one interdependent whole.

If we apply this sort of principle to all of our interactions with the natural environment, the results are radical. The idea of respect for *mauri* fleshes out as the idea that we should respect the essence or character of each creature and of each habitat. This applies to the foods we eat, to the timber, steel and concrete we use to make buildings and roads and cars, to the chemicals we extract to fuel those cars and to make plastics and pesticides.⁹¹

What, if anything, is there in Locke to suggest an interdependence of all things? Locke's anthropocentrism suggests that things only have value as a result of humans valuing them. However, this anthropocentric view is problematic, for it allows something that has not yet been valued suddenly to become valuable as soon as a human views it favourably. Thus something can suddenly change from being valueless to valuable just because of human approval. Furthermore, there may well exist things of which we have no knowledge and yet may still be of value, unidentified species for example. It seems peculiar to say that they are of no value just because they have not yet been discovered. It may be argued that any particular species of plant or animal might prove useful in the future. Alastair Gunn calls this the "rare herb" theory. Gunn claims that the elimination of any natural entity is morally wrong because it closes down the options for any possible positive use.⁹² Whilst we may be able to accept that 'all things are able to be valued by humans,' it seems unlikely that we would want to hold the much stronger notion that 'all things are *already* valued by humans.' The latter assumes that if there was anything of value in the universe, then humans have already discovered it, and that seems implausible. For example, an endangered species that we are about to eliminate might be the cure for cancer or aids.

Eric Katz cites Paul and Anne Ehrlich's argument which is a similar argument

⁹¹ Patterson, p.71.

⁹² Alastair Gunn, 'Why Should We Care About Rare Species?' *Environmental Ethics* 2 (1980) pp. 17-37.

to Gunn's but their argument is put forward by way of a metaphor.⁹³ The Ehrlichs tell a parable of an airline passenger watching as a mechanic removes some of the rivets from the wing of the plane he is boarding. When asked what he is doing, the mechanic replies that due to budget restraints, the airline is cutting down on the number of rivets used on each plane; some of the rivets are being removed and used on other planes. The mechanic quickly adds that the procedure is not dangerous, since no planes have yet been lost. The point of the parable is that although elimination of individual species might not be directly harmful to human welfare, the accumulated elimination of many species probably will be. It is thus in the interests of humanity to remove as few 'rivets' as possible even when initially they appear to be of little importance.

In Maori tradition the interdependence of all things comes about through *mauri* (life-force) and *whakapapa*. Is there a notion that is similar to be found in Locke? The 'Great Chain of Being' which links all things from God to the lowest of creatures delivers the conclusion that all beings in the chain are dependent upon God but not necessarily upon each other. However, in explaining to Stillingfleet what he means by essences, Locke said they are 'in everything that internal constitution, or frame...which God in his wisdom and good pleasure thinks fit to give to every particular creature.'⁹⁴ According to Locke all natural things have a real but unknown constitution; this 'essence' serves us to distinguish one thing from another.⁹⁵ Furthermore these essences are the very being of the thing itself, the foundation from which all its properties flow.⁹⁶ Thus, when we speak of the essence of something we are normally referring to the intrinsic nature of that thing.

An important point that Locke makes is that we cannot know the inner constitution of things so as to be able to define them on this basis. When confronted

⁹³ Paul and Anne Ehrlich, 'Extinction' (New York: Ballantine, 1981), pp. xi-xiv in Eric Katz, *Nature as Subject*, (Roman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 1997), pp. 151-52.

⁹⁴ As cited in Yolton, p.27.

⁹⁵ Locke, *Essay*, Bk. III, Ch. III:17.

⁹⁶ Locke, *Essay*, Bk. III, Ch. III:18.

by an object what we are presented with are a number of sensible qualities, but they give us no clue as to the underlying structure that produces them. Bearing in mind that we do not have access to a thing's inner constitution or as Locke calls it its *real* essence Locke says that we define things by reference to its nominal essence. R.S. Woolhouse defines the *real* essence of a given type as 'whatever it is about things of that type which gives them the properties and characteristics of that type,'⁹⁷ whereas a thing's nominal essence is 'the collection of qualities we decide to give it, and without which, we decide, it cannot be what it is.'⁹⁸ Locke does not mean that it is an arbitrary decision on our part, for we are guided by the regular conjunctions of qualities that nature provides us with. However, nature does not dictate to us. The '*boundaries of the Species, whereby Men sort them, are made by Men.*'⁹⁹ As Jenkins notes:

These boundaries are in turn determined by our interests and the purpose or function we see the object as having. These interests and purposes will vary from one time to another and from one person to another. Hence the boundaries themselves will change. This in conjunction with the fact that we often dispute whether an object belongs to one class or another, is good evidence for the claim that nature does not absolutely dictate our definitions for us.¹⁰⁰

It appears then that Locke does hold that there is something in everything that comes from God. However, in addition to not being equal in quantity this something differs between species and types for it is given to every *particular* creature. These essences then are dissimilar to the notion of *mauri* in that a life force flows through and is *common* to all things in the latter whereas Locke's essences are not of one kind and are different in each particular thing. Does Locke have anything in his theory that could have something that is common to all things?

J. L. Mackie¹⁰¹ puts forward an interesting interpretation of Lockean substance and essence which gives an account of something subsisting in things which is also common to all things. According to Mackie, Locke sometimes suggests

⁹⁷ R.S. Woolhouse, *Locke*, (The Harvester Press, 1983) p.101.

⁹⁸ John J. Jenkins, *Understanding Locke*, (Edinburgh University Press, 1983) p.180.

⁹⁹ Locke, *Essay*, Bk. III, Ch.VI:37.

¹⁰⁰ Jenkins, *Understanding Locke*, p.181.

¹⁰¹ J.L. Mackie, *Problems From Locke*, (Clarendon Press, Oxford)

that a phrase such as 'this cat' stands primarily for the collection of readily perceivable features. However, these features have no observable connection to each other – the fur does not produce the meow – and since, as Locke says, our ideas of particular substances are made up largely of ideas of powers, it seems reasonable to assume that there are occurrent grounds for these powers, and hence that there is some not immediately detectable internal structure to which all the readily perceivable features and powers are related, and which would causally account for all the perceivable features. Seen this way it is reasonable to use the phrase 'this cat' to stand for not only the perceivable features but for a combination of both the perceivable features and what Mackie calls a central core.

This central core that Mackie postulates could be made up of a combination of instantiated properties, including motions and arrangements of minute parts too small to be perceived as well as other structures and processes not readily perceivable because they are inside the animal. However, on Locke's view these will be made up of primary qualities and if this is the case it cannot form a 'substratum' which is supposed to underlie all properties. In the *Essay* Locke says in regard to the inconceivability of how qualities could subsist alone:

Hence when we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal Substances, as *Horse, Stone, etc.* though the *Idea*, we have of either of them, be but the Complication, or Collection of those several or simple *Ideas* of sensible Qualities, which we use to find united in the thing called *Horse* or *Stone*, yet because we cannot conceive, how they should subsist alone, nor one in another, we suppose them existing in, and supported by some common subject; *which support we denote by the name Substance.*¹⁰²

Qualities in themselves then are universals, thus they need to be attached to something whose nature it is to be particular. Mackie states that 'what we thus need to supplement all the properties is the substratum, which must therefore be something which considered purely in itself has no properties and is not constituted by any combination of properties.'¹⁰³ If Mackie is correct then what he refers to as a central

¹⁰² Locke, *Essay*, Bk. II, Ch. XXIII:4.

¹⁰³ Mackie, *Problems From Locke*, p.77.

core is close to what Locke calls a real essence. The real essence then is the particular internal constitution. The real essence of gold for example will be the way that gold is built up of certain minute particles, water would have a different real essence because it is built up in some other way. The substratum, however, is devoid of properties and distinctions so would presumably be the same in gold and water and anything else. Read in this way we find in Locke the notion of an unseen, non-spatial force that is common to all things and that holds things together. This substance found in Locke's theory appears to be similar to the Maori idea of *mauri*.

It could be argued though that Locke says that it is the real essences that are unknown, but as Mackie points out this is only contingently so. It is possible that we could develop 'Senses acute enough to discern the minute particles of Bodies, and the real Constitution on which their sensible Qualities depend,'¹⁰⁴ or that spirits or angels may be able to 'shape to themselves Organs of Sensation or Perception, as to suit them to their present Design.'¹⁰⁵ But a substratum would be unperceivable in principle: having no features of its own it could not be detected. Mackie further adds:

Since we can equate Locke's real essences with what we should now call the molecular and atomic structure of things, we may say that many real essences that were unknown in Locke's day are now pretty thoroughly known by chemists and physicists; but any substratum that underlies all properties, and fulfils merely the logical functions of the individuation of general features and of holding features together by being that in which they all inhere, must still be as remote as ever from our view.

In addition to this substratum which is common to all things Locke further observes that there is also a close interlocking and interdependence of objects in nature. In the *Essay* he says that normally we are 'wont to consider the substances we meet with, as an entire thing by it self, having all its Qualities in it self, and independent of other things.'¹⁰⁶ However, this way of looking at objects ignores the many relations bodies have to other bodies. Put a piece of gold, Locke says, away from the influence of all other bodies and it will immediately lose its colour and

¹⁰⁴ Locke, *Essay*, Bk. II, Ch. XXIII:11.

¹⁰⁵ Locke, *Essay*, Bk. II, Ch. XXIII:13.

¹⁰⁶ Locke, *Essay*, Bk. IV, Ch. VI:11.

weight, and perhaps malleableness too. Similarly, water of which fluidity is an essential quality would cease to be fluid. "But if inanimate Bodies owe so much of their present state to other Bodies without them...it is yet more so in *Vegetables*, which are nourished, grow and produce leaves.... And if we look a little nearer into the state of *Animals*, we shall find, that their Dependence, as to Life, Motion, and the most considerable Qualities to be observed in them, is so wholly on extrinsecal Causes and Qualities of other Bodies."¹⁰⁷ We can discover some of these dependencies such as the reliance of the greatest part of living creatures on air or the way our life depends upon the sun and the movements of the planets.

For how much the Being and Operation of particular Substances in this our Globe, depend on Causes utterly beyond our view, is impossible for us to determine....and the great Parts and Wheels, as I may so say, of this stupendious Structure of the Universe, may, for ought we know, have such a connexion and dependence in their Influences and Operations one upon another, that, perhaps, Things in this our Mansion, would put on quite some other face, and cease to be what they are.¹⁰⁸

Locke, whilst not holding that all creatures are joined through a life-force, does nevertheless mention essences which are placed by God into all things. Furthermore, if we accept Mackie's interpretation of Locke then there is also an invisible substratum in all things and unlike essences which are different in each thing the substratum is common to all, being without properties. It is also clear that Locke is aware of an interdependence of all things and that such interdependence goes much deeper than we may normally imagine and may be attributed to the universality of the substratum. To the Maori, *mauri* joins all beings and objects into one interdependent whole and similarly for Locke: he too acknowledges the dependence of inanimate objects, plant life, animals and all other creatures upon each other.

In this chapter, I believe, I have shown that although there may initially appear to be significant differences between an indigenous people's view such as the Maori and those of John Locke there are nevertheless some surprising similarities. In

¹⁰⁷Locke, *Essay*, Bk. IV, Ch.VI:11.

¹⁰⁸Locke, *Essay*, Bk. IV, Ch.VI:11.

those instances where there are differences I believe I have also shown that they are differences that make no difference to our treatment of the environment. I appreciate that the reading of Locke that is required to support my views is not the traditional one. In the following chapter I propose to look at this traditional view of Locke and explain why I think it is wrong and why it does not do justice to Locke's intent.

Chapter II

A Traditional Reading of Locke's *Two Treatises on Government*¹

The aim of Locke's political theory, according to Aaron, is apparent: 'to justify the Revolution of 1688 and to help establish the throne of our great restorer, our present King William.'² This aim is achieved through the formulation of two basic political principles: that government must be with the consent of those who are to be governed and that a ruler who has lost the confidence and support of the people loses the right to govern. As Locke himself concludes towards the end of the *Second Treatise*, 'This is so evident ... That it is lawful for the people, in some Cases, to *resist* their King.'³ These principles will entail for Locke a particular view of government and political community.

In the *First Treatise* Locke refutes Filmer's argument supporting the divine right of kings: that the king is the divinely ordained father of his people, and that this relationship between king and subject is similar to that of father and child. In the *Second Treatise* Locke then argues against a theory of government which involves the complete subjection of the governed to the absolute will of the governor which, although implicit in Filmer, is generally attributed to Hobbes.⁴ Locke strives to show that government should be with the consent of the governed and not according to the will of the monarch by establishing a moral basis for the right forcibly to change a

¹ In outlining a traditional reading of Locke's views I have relied upon authors such as Aaron and Mabbot as being representative of early to mid twentieth-century Lockean interpretation. In particular I have cited the work of Macpherson who, although himself not a Lockean, reads Locke critically as being a capitalist.

² Richard I. Aaron. *John Locke*, (Oxford at the Clarendon Press 1971) p.270.

³ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. XIX: 232.

⁴ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Ch. XIII, (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1952.)

ruler in certain extreme circumstances. Tyranny on the part of the king, which Locke defines as the exercise of power beyond right, is an example of such an extreme example. In order to show that a ruler who has lost the trust of the people no longer has a right to govern them and thereby justify the revolution against Charles II Locke needed to appeal to a higher authority than the king's. He does this by introducing his theory of mankind living without superiors in a 'state of nature' that is ordained of God. Such a theory, as we shall see, also implies a corresponding theory of rights that are given by God and thus natural to individuals. These natural rights are, in fact, the basis of the rights guaranteed to them as citizens.

The State of Nature

According to Locke, to understand political power we must first consider the natural state of man.⁵ He held that this natural state is one where men enjoy '*perfect Freedom* to order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the Will of any other man.'⁶ Hence, the natural state of human beings is in this state of nature. Karen Vaughn points out:

The construct of a state of nature was a familiar feature of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century social thought.... While Locke treated the state of nature as a historical reality which could be found even in his time existing in the wilds of America, its main function in his thought is as an analytic device to reveal the essence of government by showing an existence without government.⁷

⁵ When discussing Locke it is sometimes difficult to write without constant reference to the masculine gender as in "man" or "men". In some instances Locke intends a word to represent all persons as in mankind but in others it is intended to apply strictly to men. I will endeavor to be as gender friendly as I can without intruding upon Locke's intent.

⁶ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. II:4.

⁷ Karen Iverson Vaughn, *John Locke: Economist and Social Scientist*, (University of Chicago Press 1980) p.79.

Locke could have appealed to experience or history, or even to showing the public utility of his theory. However, the late seventeenth-century was driven by rationalist arguments and only rationalist arguments were acceptable. As Aaron points out:

...Locke analysed the notion of political society in order to prove rationally that it was from the first a community of free individuals and that it remained so through-out.⁸

In this natural state, without civil government, there is a law of nature which teaches that people are free and equal inasmuch as no individual has the natural right to govern any other, and 'no one ought to harm another in this Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions.'⁹ Locke believes that each person has this law of nature to guide his actions and that the source of this natural law is God and it is made known to humankind through the exercise of reason. Scouls points out that: 'Each man is prevented from subordinating the other to himself because each man recognises that the other possesses the same quality (reason) which he himself possesses.'¹⁰ Locke adds that it is not enough to abstain from subordinating others for 'when his own Preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, *to preserve the rest of Mankind*, and may not unless it be to do Justice on an Offender, take away, or impair the life,... or Goods of another.'¹¹ Hence, unless he offends, man has a right to a life that is free from harm from others, and has further duties not to harm others and to protect his own and other people's lives when there is no conflict between the two. This state of nature is in stark contrast to Hobbes' view that 'during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition

⁸ Aaron, p.271.

⁹ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. II:6.

¹⁰ Peter A. Scouls, *The Imposition of Method: A Study of Descaartes and Locke*, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980) p.206.

¹¹ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch.II:6.

which is called *war*.¹² For Hobbes this common power lies in something external to persons themselves, in the king, whereas for Locke common power arises from something internal, from each person's reason.

A question is now raised, one posed by Locke himself:

If Man in the State of Nature be so free, as has been said; If he be absolute Lord of his own Person and Possessions, equal to the greatest and subject to no Body, why will he part with his Freedom? Why will he give up this Empire, and subject himself to the Dominion and Control of any other Power?¹³

Locke did not appear to believe that the state of nature would be a time of complete peace and tranquillity. He realised that there may be men who would wilfully break the laws of nature. These, he claims, 'live by another Rule, than that of *reason* and common Equity, which is that measure God has set to the actions of Men, for their mutual security.'¹⁴ When such cases arise and man breaks the law of nature, the injured party has an individual right to reparation equivalent to the damage done to him. Furthermore, since all men have equal jurisdiction, if any man has a right to punish then all men have an equal, similar right.¹⁵ For Locke this state was not to be 'endured' for it has great 'inconveniencies.' It is unreasonable that man would be his own judge and executor of the law for 'Self-love will make Men partial to themselves and their Friends'... 'since 'tis easily to be imagined, that he who was so unjust as to do his Brother an Injury, will scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it.'¹⁶ Furthermore, as Mabbott points out:

Locke is here assuming that the injured party will impose the punishment, forgetting his distinction between the right to punish which is general and the right to reparation which belongs to the victim. It might be argued that the right to reparation will be inflated by revenge, and also perhaps that the victim

¹² Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Ch. XII, (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1952.) p.85.

¹³ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. IX:123.

¹⁴ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. II:8.

¹⁵ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. II:7.

¹⁶ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. II:13.

or his friends (who have an equal right with all others to impose punishment) would be the most likely to exercise the right to punish and to exercise it unfairly.¹⁷

Hence, government comes into being to provide an impartial authority to punish offences against the law of nature and, for Locke, these are primarily offences against property. Thus, civil society is formed to provide security for property.

Property

Locke defines property, generally, as being human beings' 'Lives, Liberties, and Estates.'¹⁸ This he confirms when he says: 'By *Property* I must be understood here, as in other places, to mean that Property which Men have in their Persons as well as Goods.'¹⁹ Moreover, he also claims that the nature of property is something 'that *without a Man's own consent it cannot be taken from him.*'²⁰ However, he does not always use the term property in such a broad sense. It appears, throughout the chapter 'Of Property', that the term is used in a narrower and perhaps to us more familiar sense to represent lands and goods.

The right to private property, as one case of the general term, according to Locke, is derived from the right to self preservation. God, as creator, is the first owner and retains a right to everything he has made and initially there is no private property for man. Everything is held in common. It is not that mankind as a community possessed the world, but rather that the resources of the earth were available to each and every person. God has commanded men to survive and gave to all men the earth in common 'for the Support and Comfort of their being.'²¹ If man is to live he must,

¹⁷ J.D. Mabbott, *John Locke*, (The Macmillan Press Ltd. 1973) p. 144.

¹⁸ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. IX:123.

¹⁹ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. XV: 173.

²⁰ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. XVI:193.

²¹ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch V:26.

according to God-given reason, be able to appropriate objects for food and drink. To do this he must remove them from the common stock and gather them for his own use.

In the state of nature each man possesses a property in himself, and this nobody has a right to except himself.²² Further,

The *Labour* of his Body, and the *Work* of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his *Labour* with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his *Property*. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this *labour* something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other Men.²³

According to Waldron,²⁴ 'If there is an argument here, it must go something like this:'

- 1) A man who labours on an object mixes his labour with that object.
- 2) But that man owns the labour which he mixes with the object.
- 3) So the object which has been laboured on contains something which the labourer owns.
- 4) So taking the object out of the labourer's control without his consent is a way of taking his labour from him without his consent; it therefore amounts to a violation of the right referred to in 2).
- 5) Therefore no one may take the object from the labourer without his consent.
- 6) Therefore the object is the labourer's property.²⁵

Locke's theory of property, then, rests on two assumptions: that man has a God-given duty to maintain his life, and that God has provided him with the means to do so –

²² Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch V:27.

²³ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. V:27.

²⁴ Although this is a comparatively recent commentary by Waldron his interpretation of Locke's argument is, I believe, consistent with what I have designated as the 'traditional' reading.

means to which he therefore has rights. Thus, God imposes upon humans the duty of self-preservation which entails the duty to labour as well as the right not to have their lives taken from them. Furthermore, as each individual has a property in himself this in turn gives them the right to the product of their labour, namely property. Hence we can see that every man had a right to property 'within the bounds of the law of nature.'

According to Macpherson, however, Locke's chapter on property, in which Locke shows that the natural right to property can be derived from the natural right to one's life and labour, is usually read as if it were simply the supporting argument of the assertion found at the beginning of the *Treatise*: that every man has a natural right to property 'within the bounds of the Law of Nature.' However, Macpherson, in defending his opinion of Locke as an apologist for capitalism, believes it does something much more important:²⁶

It removes the bounds of the Law of Nature from the natural property right of the individual. Locke's astonishing achievement was to base the property right on natural right and natural law, and then to remove all the natural law limits from the property right.²⁷

Macpherson interprets Locke as saying that nature, initially, puts both a moral and an effective limit on the amount of property anyone can accumulate. This limit is threefold: the spoilage limitation, the sufficiency limitation and the labour limitation. Locke reasons that men will always try to find ways to store their excess produce by trading some goods for others that are able to be used at a future time, thus avoiding spoilage.

²⁵ Jeremy Waldron, *The Right To Private Property*, (Oxford University Press, 1988) p.184

²⁶ The following arguments about the transcending of the limitations on appropriation are taken from Macpherson. Although others share a similar view it is Macpherson who is most explicit on this topic.

If he gave away a part to any body else, so that it perished not uselessly in his Possession, these he also made use of. and if he also bartered away Plumbs that would have rotted in a Week, for Nuts that would last good for his eating a whole Year, he did no injury; he wasted not the common Stock; destroyed no part of the portion of Goods that belonged to others, so long as nothing perished uselessly in his hands.²⁸

In the course of this bartering, one easily tradable commodity that would not be subject to spoilage becomes commonly, by consent, acceptable as money. Although this is an unusual use of the word *consent*, which we generally understand to imply a formal contract, Locke only seems to be suggesting that money came about voluntarily, as an artefact so that man can stay within the bounds that the law of nature has placed upon him. Vaughn gives additional insight to the notion of consent:

Consent not only implies a voluntary act, but also indicates that money is not a “natural” institution, that is, not deducible from natural law, but rather a man-made institution in keeping with natural law.²⁹

After stating that by including the vacant lands of America there may still be enough land in the world for everyone to have as much as he could work and use Locke says:

This I dare boldly affirm, That the same *Rule of Propriety*, (*Viz.*) that every Man should have as much as he could make use of, would hold still in the World without straitning any body, since there is Land enough in the World to suffice double the Inhabitants had not the *Invention of Money*, and the tacit Agreement of Men to put a value on it, introduced (by Consent) larger Possessions, and a Right to them...³⁰

As we have previously seen Macpherson has endeavoured to show that, according to Locke, nature places a moral and effective limit on the accumulation of private property. However, Macpherson maintains this passage from Locke clearly shows that the natural law rule, which, by its specific terms, limited the amount anyone

²⁷ C.B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke*, (Oxford University Press, 1962.) p. 199.

²⁸ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch V:46.

²⁹ Vaughn, p. 93.

³⁰ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. V:36.

could appropriate so that everyone could have as much as he could use does *not* now hold.’³¹ It would hold had money not been introduced. The reason for the rule now being redundant is not because the land has run out; for if we include those parts of the world where money has not been introduced ‘there is enough to suffice double the inhabitants.’ In such places ‘there are still *great Tracts of Ground* to be found which ... *lie waste* ... Tho’ this can scarce happen amongst that part of Mankind, that have consented to the Use of Money.’³² But we find that wherever money has been introduced there ceases to be unappropriated land. Macpherson states that:

The introduction of money by tacit consent has removed the previous natural limitations of rightful appropriation, and in so doing has invalidated the natural provision that everyone should have as much as he could make use of.³³

Macpherson believes the limitations on the appropriation of property are now redundant with the introduction of money and we can now examine how Macpherson justifies that this is the view held by Locke. Macpherson argues that the three initial limitations are transcended with the introduction of money and it is to this we now turn our attention.

The Limitations Transcended

The spoilage limitation that states that a man can appropriate as much as he can use before it spoils is, according to Macpherson, transcended by the introduction of money. Gold and silver do not spoil so a man may accumulate, with the use of money, unlimited amounts without violating the spoilage limitation. Locke says:

...it is plain, that Men have agreed to disproportionate and unequal Possession of the Earth, they having by a tacit and voluntary consent found out a way, how a man may fairly possess more land than he himself can use the product

³¹ Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, p. 203.

³² Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. V:45.

³³ Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, pp. 203-4

of, by receiving in exchange for the overplus, Gold and Silver, which may be hoarded up without injury to anyone, these metalls not spoileing or decaying in the hands of the possessor.³⁴

Locke appears to have no difficulty with this, but Macpherson raises the point that there are certain questions that Locke leaves unanswered, or does not raise but should have raised. Why would anyone want to appropriate more than he could make use of for the support and conveniences of life? Locke had previously shown that before the introduction of money no one would want more. Prior to speaking about the use of money Locke says:

The measure of Property, Nature has well set, by the Extent of Men's *Labour, and the conveniency of Life*: No Man's Labour could subdue, or appropriate all: nor could his Enjoyment consume more than a small part; so that it was impossible for any Man, this way, to intrench upon the right of another, or acquire, to himself, a Property, to the prejudice of his Neighbour, who would still have room, for as good, and as large a Possession (after the other had taken out his) as before it was appropriated.³⁵

If no one would want to appropriate more than they needed before the introduction of money, why should anyone want it after money was introduced? What is the desire of having more than is needed? Initially it appears that Locke may just be referring to the desire for useless hoarding, but since he is thinking throughout of men whose behaviour is rational, the presumption seems to be against such an interpretation. Another possibility is that Locke may simply be saying that since money enlarges trade beyond the barter stage, it enables those who have money to enjoy a greater variety of goods. Money is a commodity; it has a value because it is a commodity which, through common agreement, can be used to exchange for other commodities. However, its purpose is not solely for the use of barter. According to Macpherson, Locke saw money as not just a means of exchange, but as capital. 'And the purpose of capital was not to provide a consumable income for its owners, but to beget further

³⁴ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. V:50.

capital by profitable investment.’³⁶ Thus, money was not introduced to allow a miserly hoarding nor was it to facilitate the bartering of a greater variety of goods, ‘but was a desire to accumulate land and money as capital.’³⁷

The next limitation is that of individual appropriation: that every appropriation must leave as good and enough for others. However, Locke in a revision of the third edition added the following argument:

To which let me add, that he who appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not lessen but increase the common stock of mankind. For the provisions serving to the support of humane life, produced by one acre of inclosed and cultivated land, are (to speak much within the compasse) ten times more, than those, which are yielded by an acre of Land, of an equal richnesse, lyeing wast in common. And therefor he, that incloses Land and has a greater plenty of the conveniencys of life from ten acres, than he could have from an hundred left to Nature, may truly be said, to give ninety acres to Mankind. For his labour now supplys him with provisions out of ten acres, which were but the product of an hundred lying in common.³⁸

Macpherson interprets Locke as saying that although more land can be appropriated than leaves enough and as good, the greater productivity of the appropriated land outweighs the lack of available land for others. Locke assumes that this overall increase will be distributed for the benefit of all, or at least with no loss to those who are left without enough and as good. He says:

There cannot be a clearer demonstration of any thing, than several Nations of the *Americans* are of this, who are rich in Land, and poor in all the Comforts of life; whom Nature having furnished as liberally as any other people, with the materials of Plenty, *i.e.* a fruitful Soil, apt to produce in abundance, what might serve for food, rayment, and delight; yet for want of improving it by labour, have not one hundredth part of the Conveniences we enjoy: And a King of a large and fruitful Territory there feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day Labourer in *England*.³⁹

According to Macpherson, ‘although more land than leaves enough and as good for

³⁵ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. V:36.

³⁶ Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, p. 207.

³⁷ Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, p. 208.

³⁸ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. V:37.

³⁹ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. V:41.

others may be appropriated, the greater productivity of the appropriated land more than makes up for the lack of land available for others.’⁴⁰ However, there may come a time when private appropriation may not allow for there being ‘enough and as good’ *land* left for others, but because of the greater productivity of enclosed land there will be ‘enough and as good’ *living* left for others. And of course, for Locke, it was every man’s basic right to enjoy the fruits of the earth for sustenance which led to the initial right to appropriate land. Macpherson concludes that ‘the initial sufficiency limitation has been transcended. Or, if one prefers, the sufficiency limitation remains valid in principle but now operates differently.’⁴¹ The original rule still holds, for each has a right to preservation and thus a God-given right to appropriate according to his needs. But this right does not now entail a right to as much and as good land because the appropriation of land in excess of what leaves enough and as good is justified both by the tacit consent to the consequences of the introduction of money, and by the assertion that the living standards of those without land, where all is appropriated, are higher than the standards of where it is not widely appropriated.

The third limitation, which we may call the labour limitation, is: that one is allowed to appropriate only that with which he has mixed his labour. As Macpherson points out Locke does not need to show how this limitation is overcome as a consequence of the introduction of money because he already assumes the validity of the wage relationship, by which one man may acquire a title to the labour of another. Fundamental to Locke’s theory of property appropriation is that ‘every Man has a *Property* in his own *Person*. This no Body has any Right to but himself.’⁴² It appears that to Locke a man’s labour is originally so unquestionably his own property that he

⁴⁰ Macpherson, *Possessive Individualism*, p.212.

⁴¹ Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, p.213.

⁴² Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. V:27.

may sell it for wages. Macpherson holds that Locke takes this position, that labour thus sold then becomes the property of the hirer who is thereby entitled to appropriate the fruits of that labour, for granted from the beginning of his labour justification of property and that evidence for Locke's view can be shown on two counts.

First, after Locke gives the argument that there is a natural right to appropriate something from that which is held in common by mixing one's labour with it, and that this right does not depend upon the consent of others, he does not claim that this right is to be established *only* by the labour of one's own person, but can be equally appropriated by the labour of a hireling. Locke states:

Thus the Grass my Horse has bit; the Turfs my Servant has cut; and the Ore I have digg'd in any place where I have a right to them in common with others, become my *Property*, without the assignation or consent of any body. The *labour* that was mine, removing them out of that common state they were in, hath *fixed* my *Property* in them.⁴³

If Locke had not been taking the wage relationship for granted then his inclusion of the servant's labour belonging to the hirer would have been a contradiction of what he was trying to show. Second, when agreement is made by humankind to enter into civil society there are no new rights created; they are just transferred from the powers men had in the state of nature to civil authority. This relationship between natural rights and natural law to civil society, Macpherson believes, displays Locke's presumption that the wage relation was attributed to the state of nature. 'Now since civil society cannot override natural law, and since the appropriation of more land than a man can work by himself, and the purchase of the labour of others, are lawful in civil society, both must have been in accordance with natural law.'⁴⁴ Since the entering into civil society creates no new rights, then both the appropriation of more land than a man can work and the alienation of one's labour, if rightful in civil

⁴³ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. V:28.

society, must have been assumed by Locke also to be a natural right.

In short, with respect to the transcending of the three limitations, Macpherson holds that Locke has shown it is possible, and rightful, for a man to accumulate more land than he can use the produce of before spoilage. And although it is still unlawful to appropriate produce that will spoil before use, it is, nevertheless, lawful to exchange it for an asset that never spoils, for money. Furthermore, the appropriation of land in excess of what leaves 'enough and as good' for others is justified by the tacit consent to the consequences of the introduction of money and by the fact that the living standards of all, including those without land, increase when all land is appropriated and used. In addition, entering into civil society created no new rights and if the alienation of one's labour is a right in civil society then it must also have been a natural right. Thus, the labour limitation does not need to be transcended because Locke never intended it to be part of his theory in the first place.

Locke then, according to Macpherson's interpretation, starts with the assumption of man living in a state of nature with all the fruits of the earth given to mankind in common for their use. However, through the introduction of money, and the removal of the initial limitations, a justification is given for a natural right to unequal and unlimited capitalist appropriation. From this Macpherson concludes that Locke 'provides a moral foundation for bourgeois appropriation.'⁴⁵ This view is not unique to Macpherson. For example, Y.S. Brenner writing as recently as 1991 holds a similar view of Locke when he says: 'His [Locke's] works did more than reconcile traditional ethics with the covetous practices of the bourgeoisie they provided them

⁴⁴ Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, p.218.

⁴⁵ Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, p. 221.

with a moral legitimization.'⁴⁶

Implications for the Environment

As we have already seen Locke, in the *Second Treatise*, says that through 'natural reason ... 'tis very clear, that God ... *has given the Earth to the Children of Men*, given it to Mankind in common.'⁴⁷ Further to this Locke states that according to God and reason given to mankind, humans are commanded to subdue the Earth.⁴⁸ As a devout Christian Locke would have also been familiar with and believed the edict that humankind has dominion over every living thing (Genesis 1:28) and that such dominion appears to be absolute in regard to the Earth and all things non-human. The right to the fruits of the Earth for sustenance follows from God's command that mankind is to survive, and from Locke's doctrine that man has a property in his own person. Thus, according to God's decree, the use of the earth, of animals and of the property a person can obtain in and through these is justified for the preservation of a human life. This traditional view of Locke's theories, as presented by Macpherson, requires a reading of Locke that shows him as a capitalist somewhat similar to the modern use of the word. The term capitalist is taken here to mean one who supports an economic system that is characterised by a free competitive market which incorporates private ownership directed to the accumulation and reinvestment of profit for personal gain or wealth. When this traditional reading, which Macpherson believes shows Locke to be a capitalist, is coupled with the fact that Locke was a sincere Christian then we can understand why he is considered, by some, to be one of the founders of the philosophical movement which underlies the formation of the

⁴⁶ Y.S. Brenner, *The Rise and Fall of Capitalism*, (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1991) p. 59.

⁴⁷ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. V:25.

West's industrial civilisation. Such an industrial civilisation is governed by the premise that human life is to be sustained regardless of the cost to lower life forms and the mistreatment of the environment. Many writers on environmentalism, implicitly or explicitly, connect or relate Christianity, Lockeanism, Capitalism and environmental concerns together. For example Kathleen Squadrito asserts that 'Historically, Christianity and capitalism have been regarded as ideologies responsible for our environmental crisis.'⁴⁹

It appears then that providing the 'rules' of appropriation are followed humans are justified, by God's decree and through reason, to treat all the earth and animals as potential possessions for the benefit of human life. That some of Locke's statements and arguments seem to go against the direction in which I am now leading might be indicated by Squadrito who says 'that Locke's position entails that animals have property rights, for both man and animals pick up food, store it, and then eat.'⁵⁰ However, the right to property is given by God to humans only, for only man has been commanded to labour and thus mix his labour with goods that then become his. If an animal eats fruit it is not that the fruit has become the animal's for both the animal and the fruit belong to mankind either potentially while still "in common" or actually or individually as the result of labour. Thus, once money was introduced and the limitations regarding appropriation were transcended, then man has the right to take as much as he wants for himself and, additionally, he affords no rights to other creatures or the rest of the environment. This is a sketch of what I have designated as the 'traditional' reading of Locke.

It appears that this 'traditional' reading is the view of Locke that has become

⁴⁸ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. V:32.

⁴⁹ Kathleen Squadrito, 'Locke's View of Dominion' *Environmental Ethics*, 1, (1979), p. 255.

prevalent in contemporary environmental ethical debate. As recently as 1997, Eric Katz, in his book *Nature as Subject*, accredits Locke as being the one who 'established the traditional modern world view of the human relationship with the natural environment.'⁵¹ According to Katz that does not place Locke in a favourable light as far as environmental activities are concerned. 'For Locke, nature was valuable solely as it was used as property by human beings. Natural entities were valuable only insofar as they were actually removed from the natural system and became part of human culture.'⁵²

Similar views of Locke's 'harmful' influence are abundant in contemporary literature on the environment. Consider these two examples. Des Jardins claims that 'Those who sought to control and exploit the wilderness in pursuit of personal fortune shared the Lockean assumption that the value of the wilderness is a function of human use.'⁵³ Also, Hargrove, writing about the Anglo-American attitude to the use of land, sees the effect of Locke's thought as detrimental to the environment.

The worst result of Locke's property theory is the amoral or asocial attitude which has evolved out of it. Locke's arguments have encouraged landowners to behave in an antisocial manner and to claim that they have no moral obligation to the land itself, or even to the other people in the community who may be affected by what they do with their land.⁵⁴

Although this 'traditional' (though still contemporary) reading of Locke positions his writings as an important source responsible for the current environmental crisis, I now intend to raise and consider this question: is there a possibility of a different reading of Locke, a reading which would both do justice to a strand of Locke's

⁵⁰ Squadritop. 256.

⁵¹ Eric Katz, *Nature as Subject: Human Obligation and Natural Community*, (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.1997) p.224.

⁵² Eric Katz, p.224.

⁵³ Joseph R. Des Jardins, *Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy*, (Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1997), p.152.

argument suppressed in the traditional reading and yet may be seen as more friendly towards the environment? I think there is. And I believe I can demonstrate this point both from Locke's text and from a number of commentators I have so far left out of the 'traditional' reading. In addition, I believe I can show that this strand of Locke's argument allows for an interesting and perhaps surprising coalescence of Lockean and Maori thought. If I were able to demonstrate this, or at least make this claim plausible, an important insight will have been gained. It is the insight that we are not limited for alternative, healthier views about the environment to traditions which exist alongside the more dominant Western traditions. For we then find similar healthier views in strands of the dominant tradition as well – even though these strands have not themselves been dominant, but instead repressed. Nevertheless such a surprising coalescence of these two streams of thought could be one of mutual reinforcement. To these matters I now turn my attention in the next chapter.

⁵⁴ Eugence C. Hargrove, 'Anglo-American Land Use Attitudes,' in *Environmental Ethics: Divergence and Convergence*, (McGraw-Hill Inc.1993), p. 206.

Chapter III

An Alternative Contemporary Reading

In order to show that Locke's views can be seen as environmentally friendly I will need, in this chapter, first to refute what I have called the traditional view of Locke. In particular I will criticise Macpherson's notion that the limitations on appropriation were transcended with the introduction of money. For Macpherson the idea that Locke intended these limitations to be transcended with the introduction of money is of major importance to his view of Locke as a capitalist. If I can show that Locke did not intend these limitations to be transcended then, I believe, Macpherson's claims will be found to be false and an alternative view of Locke will emerge. It is a view which, interestingly, is being held by more and more contemporary writers and commentators on Locke.

Furthermore, if Locke's limitations on appropriation are preserved, this will go some way towards showing that Locke's views do not allow for greedy misuse of property ownership through appropriation, nor will they allow for wanton destruction or abuse of the environment. But first an attempt must be made to refute Macpherson's claims, and it is to this task that I will now focus.

Critique of Macpherson and the Preservation of the Limitations

According to Locke the 'Law of Nature stands as an Eternal Rule to all Men.'¹ This implies that the law of nature is not just a temporary situation but continues in some way after the introduction of money. As Kristin Shrader-Frechette points out in her article on Locke's limits on land ownership:

One important consequence is that while Locke's two provisos must be

¹ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. XI:135.

reinterpreted, as a result of the tacit consent to money, they are not completely removed, as many Locke scholars appear to have argued. Other authors claim that, because of the introduction of money, the first (as-much-and-as-good) and second (spoilage) provisos still exist for Locke but are rendered inapplicable.²

Rather than intending the provisos to be transcended it appears that Locke believes they will last. After all, Locke never denied the right to preservation or subsistence as a consequence of the introduction of money, and although the introduction of money justifies an 'inequality of Private possessions,'³ he never allowed harm to 'another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions.'⁴

As we have seen, Macpherson holds that Locke's primary achievement was to set up an initial limitation (according to the law of nature) to the amount of property any one person may lawfully own, and then through the introduction of money give a justification for the right to unlimited appropriation. Hence, the original limitations which held in the state of nature are now transcended with the introduction of money causing a transition from a barter economy to a monetary economy. Locke describes the process thus:

And if he also bartered away Plumbs that would have rotted in a Week, For Nuts that would last good for his eating a whole Year, he did no injury; he wasted not the common Stock; destroyed no part of the portion of Goods that belonged to others, so long as nothing perished uselessly in his hands. Again, if he would give his Nuts for a piece of Metal, pleased with its colour; or exchange his Sheep for Shells, or Wool for a sparkling Pebble or Diamond, and keep those by him all his Life, he invaded not the Right of others, he might heap up as much of these durable things as he pleased; the *exceeding of the bounds of his just Property* not lying in the largeness of his Possession, but the perishing of any thing uselessly in it.⁵

Money then, is described by Locke as 'some lasting thing that Men might keep without spoiling, and that by mutual consent Men would take in exchange for the

² Kristin Shrader-Frechette, 'Locke and Limits on Land Ownership' *Journal of History of Ideas* 54 (April 1993) p.213.

³ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. V:50.

⁴ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. II:6.

truly useful, but perishable Supports of Life.’⁶ It is important to notice here that Locke primarily relates money to the goods that are needed for the support of life and not to the amassing of other things. In regard to how Locke viewed these goods James Tully makes an interesting point. He notes that ‘Shells, diamonds and pebbles are grouped together and termed “things”, in opposition to the useful but perishable products which are called “goods”, “good things” or “things really useful.”’⁷ Macpherson, however, arrives at a very different conclusion: he claims that Locke’s motive which emerges with the introduction of money is the ‘desire to accumulate land and money as capital.’⁸

J.W. Yolton disagrees with Macpherson and holds that Locke does not approve of the invention of money. By agreeing to the use of money, men have, Locke says, ‘by a tacit and voluntary consent found out a way, how a man may fairly possess more land than he himself can use the product of.’⁹ According to Yolton, Locke is only describing what happens when money comes into use, not that Locke praises the invention of it.¹⁰ J.W. Gough has a similar objection to Macpherson’s interpretation of Locke. Gough asks:

But was all this really Locke’s primary intention in writing? Doubtless he took for granted the existing capitalist structure of society. We may agree that he wished to provide a rational explanation of how it could have come into existence. But this is not to say that he entirely approved of it, certainly not that his primary aim was to justify it, or that his great achievement was to have thought out an ingenious way of doing so.¹¹

Since money was introduced as some lasting thing that men might keep

⁵ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. V:46.

⁶ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. V:47.

⁷ James Tully, *A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries*, (Cambridge University Press, 1980) p.147.

⁸ Macpherson, *Possessive Individualism*, p. 208.

⁹ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. V:50.

¹⁰ Yolton, *Locke and the Compass of Human Understanding*, p. 193.

without spoiling, then it may be hoarded without breaking the spoilage limitation. The problem with this part of Locke's account, Macpherson explains, is that Locke never provides an adequate reason in the Second Treatise for men to own more than they can use for the conveniences of life. Macpherson believes he finds Locke's reasons for this position in the Considerations of the lowering of interest and raising the value of money. But as Tully points out: aside from this being only a letter of advice and not a theory about the introduction of money, money is not treated here as capital.¹² Vaughn makes a similar point, and even though much of Macpherson's analysis of Locke is the same as her own she finds Macpherson mistaken on this point. She believes Macpherson makes the mistake of thinking that the only purpose of capital for Locke is to beget further capital by profitable investment. Macpherson's source for this is an unattached sheet now in the Bodleian Library, entitled "Trade Essay 1674," and may represent some ideas that Locke had at that time and perhaps intended to use at a later date. But as Vaughn points out:

It should be evident that these few notes cannot on their own be considered the key to Locke's thought to the exclusion of Locke's two major published essays on economics, yet this is exactly what Macpherson is saying when he cites the "Trade" notes as support of his thesis that Locke was interested in the accumulation of capital for its own sake.¹³

Tully agrees that there is no evidence in The Two Treatises to show that money is used as capital; it is simply hoarded. Furthermore, according to Tully, land also is not used as capital, it is possessed only as long as it is used and if unused returns to the common stock. Locke does not even speak of land being exchanged; only the product of it is alienable. Waldron disagrees with this point and argues that Locke's silence cannot be interpreted to mean that Locke did not allow for land to be exchanged.

¹¹ J.W.Gough, *John Locke's Political Philosophy*, (Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1973) p.89.

¹² Tully, *Discourse on Property*, p.149.

Waldron points out that Locke says that land may be bequeathed, given away or rented. If these activities are allowed then why, asks Waldron, should we logically rule out exchange? However, I disagree here with Waldron. If Locke speaks at some length regarding those activities which are permissible why should we infer that other activities not listed or discussed are also acceptable? Is Waldron suggesting that it was an oversight on Locke's part? Surely if Locke included such activities as bequeathing, giving away and renting then he would not have overlooked the act of exchanging. It seems to me that Macpherson's claim that Locke was advocating money and land as capital are very weak when Locke himself does not mention it, or give a reason for wanting more than is needed for the support and conveniences of life. There appears to be no evidence to support Macpherson's claims in Locke's works on economy; the only evidence, which itself is debatable, Macpherson offers he believes to find in a letter of advice, and in a minor unpublished paper. These are shaky grounds for so weighty a doctrine.

The criticism of Macpherson has so far been aimed towards the introduction of money as a means to avoid spoilage. Tully, however, also levels criticism at Macpherson's use of the 'sufficiency argument.' Tully can see no evidence for Macpherson's interpretation that the greater productivity of the appropriated land more than makes up for the lack of land for others.¹⁴ As Tully rightly points out Locke in his 'sufficiency argument' repeatedly states that through increasing productivity, less land is used and thus more land is left for others. Private appropriation will increase the amount left for others, for when land is enclosed and cultivated it gives greater productivity thereby leaving more of what is left for others. For example, when persons appropriate and enclose sections of land then, through

¹³ Vaughn, *John Locke*, pp. 102-103.

their cultivation, they increase the productivity of that land so that there will not be a need for any further appropriation by those persons. If the land had not been cultivated then there would be a need for more land to sustain and supply their conveniences of life, thus a greater demand would ensue for the land that is left, as yet, in common. This is different from Macpherson's claim that Locke substitutes 'sufficiency in making a living' for 'sufficiency in land;' for even though there will not be enough land for all there will nevertheless be enough living.¹⁵ Tully's interpretation seems to be the better of the two here, for Locke claims that even with double the world population appropriation could still take place without prejudice to the rest of mankind.¹⁶ It appears then that Locke intends the sufficiency limitation to hold despite the introduction of money.

Shrader-Frechette also sees this problem with Macpherson's interpretation.

She says:

One problem with Macpherson's interpretation is that he fails to take account of Locke's claim that extensive accumulation ought to benefit others. Macpherson, in other words, takes inadequate account of Locke's utilitarian justification for appropriation beyond need, that is, the benefit of accumulation to society as a whole.¹⁷

Locke believes that it is acceptable to appropriate more than is needed, provided that this appropriation does not disadvantage another and also works for the benefit of all in 'Preserving all Mankind' by distributing the produce of the land, and hence fulfilling the natural law. It follows then that if excessive appropriation takes place without benefiting all then such appropriation cannot be justified.

The third limitation originally only allowed appropriation of that with which

¹⁴ Tully, *Discourse on Property*, p. 149.

¹⁵ Macpherson, *Possessive Individualism*, p. 212.

¹⁶ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. V:36

¹⁷ Schrader-Frechette, 'Locke and Limits on Land Ownership' *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 54 (April 1993) p.217.

one had mixed one's own labour. As we have seen Macpherson believes this limitation does not need to be transcended because Locke presumed that the wage relationship existed in the state of nature, for man has a property in his own person so he is entitled to sell it to another. The labour thus becomes the property of the hirer. Macpherson claims that the right to labour for a wage is an integral feature of capitalist market societies. Therefore in providing a natural foundation for this right Locke 'has erased the moral disability with which unlimited capitalist appropriation had hitherto been handicapped...and by so doing provides a positive moral basis for capitalist society.'¹⁸ Macpherson bases his interpretation on the "turfs" passage which he argues is consistent with the rest of Locke's theory only if we assume that Locke was taking the wage relationship for granted. However, Tully again disagrees with Macpherson. Tully says:

All that Locke assumes in the "turfs" passage is the master-servant relation. It is not only not the wage relationship of capitalism, it is the fetter to the development of capitalism which was not supplanted until the late eighteenth century.¹⁹

Locke describes the '*Master-Servant*' relation in the seventh chapter of the Second Treatise thus:

a free man makes himself a Servant to another, by selling him for a certain time, the Service he undertakes to do, in exchange for Wages he is to receive: And though this commonly puts him into the Family of his Master, and under the ordinary Discipline thereof; yet it gives the Master but a Temporary Power over him, and no greater, than what is contained in the *Contract* between 'em.²⁰

According to Locke '*Master and Servant* are Names as old as history'²¹ and as '*History* gives us but a very little account of Men, *that lived together in the State of*

¹⁸ Macpherson, *Possessive Individualism*, p. 221.

¹⁹ Tully, *Discourse on Property*, p. 136.

²⁰ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. VII:85.

²¹ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. VII:85.

*Nature*²² it would appear that history antedates civil society. Furthermore, as Tully points out, it would seem unusual if Locke did not assume that this arrangement obtains in the state of nature, since Locke mentions many other instituted relations which appear in the state of nature. However, Tully further comments:

‘Natural’ and ‘existing in the state of nature’, it should be noted, are not equivalent. Something is natural to man if a man possesses or may do it without consent, whereas something is conventional if it is based on consent. Man may consent to various sorts of (conventional) practices in the natural state; marriage for example (2.83). ...The master-servant relation is a voluntary relation (2.28.3) in both the state of nature and civil society.²³

Since it is a freeman who offers himself as a servant, there must be a presupposition that the choice *not* to become a servant is open to him. If he has no choice, perhaps, as Macpherson suggests, because all land is appropriated then the master-servant relation cannot arise because the man is not free to choose. Locke makes this point quite clear:

Man can no more justly make use of another’s necessity, to force him to become his Vassal, by with-holding that Relief, God requires him to afford to the wants of his Brother, than he that has more strength can seize upon a weaker, master him to Obedience, and with a Dagger at his Throat offer him Death or Slavery.²⁴

Tully notes that this remarkable condition makes it impossible for the capitalist to appear in Locke’s theory. ‘If a man is driven by necessity to work for another, then the relation is based on force and is, *ipso facto*, a master and vassal arrangement.’²⁵ A person is not allowed to treat another in this way. If such a situation arose then he must feed him instead, for according to Locke ‘*Charity* gives every Man a Title to so much out of another’s Plenty, as will keep him from extream want.’²⁶ In order for the capitalist to emerge there must be an appropriation of all land thus forcing the

²² Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. VIII:101.

²³ Tully, *Discourse on Property*, p.137.

²⁴ Locke, *First Treatise*, Ch. IV:42.

²⁵ Tully, *Discourse on Property*, p.137.

labourer to work for another. Locke as we have seen denies that landholders can force another to work under these conditions.

Tully believes that Macpherson redescribes Locke's master-servant relation as capitalist-worker relation on the basis of a mistaken inference. Macpherson understands Locke as saying that it is 'the natural right of every man to get the means of subsistence by his labour...'²⁷ The right is then described as either through labouring on the land or by selling one's labour to another when there is no unappropriated land available.²⁸ But as Tully notes:

The original right, however, is to the means of subsistence, and labour is only one means, not the means, to complete it....A man may labour for himself or he may work for another, but only if an alternative is available. If it is not, he cannot labour for himself and he cannot be forced to work for another; he is simply given the necessary relief.²⁹

Tully believes that this crucial point is underscored in section eighty-five where Locke contrasts slaves with servants. Slaves are characterised as men who have 'forfeited their Lives, and with it their Liberties, and lost their Estates; and being in the *State of Slavery*, not capable of any property'.³⁰ The person then who is forced to work for another is therefore a vassal and comparable to a slave. Locke is opposed to this '*Despotical*' power and economic relationship where men have no property at all and favours the '*Political*' power 'where Men have Property in their own disposal'.³¹ Thus Tully concludes that: 'The capitalist not only never appears in the *Two Treatises*; there is no place for him to appear'.³²

²⁶ Locke, *First Treatise*, Ch. IV:42.

²⁷ Macpherson, *Possessive Individualism*, p.213.

²⁸ Macpherson, *Possessive Individualism*, p.214.

²⁹ Tully, *Discourse on Property*, pp. 137-8.

³⁰ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch.VII:85.

³¹ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. XV:174.

³² Tully, *Discourse on Property*, p.138.

Labour Mixing and the Workmanship Model

A criticism may be raised in regard to what appears to be basic to Locke's theory of appropriation: Locke believes that appropriation of particular things is obtained by mixing one's labour with them, but we are apparently given no reason *why* it is that labour legitimates appropriation. In his recent book on Lockean rights Gopal Sreenivasan notes that the legitimacy of private property is, for Locke, a single argument with two interdependent parts.³³ One part shows why appropriation does not require anyone else's consent, and as we have seen Locke holds that consent is not required because other's rights are not violated as long as there is enough and as good left for subsequent appropriators. Bearing in mind that consent is not required, the other part of the argument justifies the legitimacy of appropriation. However, this appears to be inadequate because on its own we are still left without an explanation why it is that labour is the means to appropriation. As Sreenivasan points out:

The traditional interpretation ... has Locke taking property in one's person and labour for granted and arguing from there that labour legitimates appropriation because, in labouring, one irretrievably mixes with the object something that one already owns, namely one's labour.³⁴

In this section I will show an alternative interpretation, based upon Tully's "workmanship model," which will give a better explanation for why labour legitimates appropriation.

According to Tully, the primary duty to preserve mankind and the accompanying duty to respect the liberty and goods of another, follows immediately from a special relation between God and man. As Locke says:

For Men being all the Workmanship of one Omnipotent, and infinitely wise Maker; All the Servants of one Sovereign Master, sent into the World by his order and about his business, they are his Property, whose Workmanship they

³³ Gopal Sreenivasan, *The Limits of Lockean Property Rights*, (Oxford University Press, 1995) p.59.

³⁴ Sreenivasan, p. 59.

are made to last during his, not one another's Pleasure.³⁵

The important feature of Tully's model is Locke's self-evident proposition that a maker has a right in and over his workmanship.³⁶ In Tully's words:

Due to the analogy between God and man as makers, anything true of one will be, *ceteris paribus*, true of the other. Since it is the explanation of God's dominion over man and of why man is God's 'property,' it also explains man's dominion over and property in the products of his making.³⁷

In order to make sense of this analogy between God and man, we will need to refer to some of Locke's features in regard to *making* as drawn by Tully from the *Essay*.³⁸ The concept of making belongs to two sorts of cause. A cause is 'that which makes any other thing ... begin to be.'³⁹ The first sort of cause holds 'when the thing is wholly made new, so that no part thereof did ever exist before; ...and this we call *Creation*.'⁴⁰ The second sort of cause holds 'when a thing is made up of Particles, which did all of them before exist.'⁴¹

The process of making, for Locke, is governed by the idea of that thing which the maker brings into being.

For the *Idea*, or Essence, of the several sorts of *artificial* Things, consisting, for the most part, in nothing but the determinate Figure of sensible Parts and sometimes Motion depending thereon, which the Artificer fashions in Matter, such as he finds for his Turn.

As Sreenivasan puts it: a 'maker, that is, effects the material realisation of some idea of his, one which constitutes the essence of the thing made.'⁴² It follows then, as Tully states, that 'there is an analytic relationship between being a maker and

³⁵ Locke, *Second Treatise*, Ch. II:6.

³⁶ Locke, *Essay*, Bk. IV, Ch. III:18.

³⁷ Tully, p.37.

³⁸ For a detailed account of using the *Essay* to assist in the interpretation of the *Two Treatises* see Tully, *Discourse on Property*, pp.5-8.

³⁹ Locke, *Essay*, Bk. II, Ch. XXVI:2.

⁴⁰ Locke, *Essay*, Bk. II, Ch. XXVI:2.

⁴¹ Locke, *Essay*, Bk. II, Ch. XXVI:2.

knowing the description under which what is made is made.’⁴³ Thus, we may conclude that making is an activity or process with an intellectual dimension. The importance of this is that in the Two Treatises Locke holds that it is precisely in respect of his similarity to God as an intellectual creature that man is capable of dominion, that is property. ‘God makes him *in his own Image after his own Likeness*, makes him an intellectual Creature, and so capable of *Dominion*.’⁴⁴ Sreenivasan summarises this point well:

Now, the fact that man’s capacity for making something and his capacity for owning something both depend on his intellectual nature does not itself entail that his ownership of property is founded on this makers right doctrine. However, ... God’s property does arise as a consequence of His making (II, 6; I, 53). Therefore, since man’s capacity for owning property obtains in virtue of his similarity to God, it would seem reasonable to infer that man’s property arises likewise as a consequence of his making.⁴⁵

By postulating this maker’s right doctrine we are now able to explain why man owes his capacity for property to his intellectual similarity to God. For, since it is the making which allows a person rights to property and a requirement to be able to make anything is that one has to have an intellectual nature, then it follows that anyone who lacked such an intellectual nature would be incapable of legitimate appropriation.

A view of Locke now appears to be arising that is quite different from the one depicted by Macpherson. It is a view that could be built upon further to show that Locke adhered to values which are not consistent with exploitation either of human life or any other part of the environment. The traditional reading of Locke is anthropocentric, with humans having dominion over the rest of nature. However, this view does not seem to be representative of Locke as a whole. Squadrito notes that in Locke’s educational writings he does not consider dominion and unlimited

⁴² Sreenivasan, p.64.

⁴³ Tully, p.36.

⁴⁴ Locke, *First Treatise*, Ch. IV:30.

accumulation of property a virtue, but rather the root of evil.⁴⁶ In regard to the desire that children show to possess things Locke says:

They would have *property* and possession, pleasing themselves with the power which that seems to give, and the right they thereby have to dispose of them as they please...and he who thinks that these two roots of almost all the injustice and contention that so disturb human life are not early to be weeded out, and contrary habits introduced, neglects the proper season to lay the foundations of a good and worthy man.⁴⁷

Furthermore, Locke observes that in addition to their love of liberty children 'love something more: and that is *dominion*; and this is the first origin of most vicious habits...' ⁴⁸ Sure, part of Locke's fundamental ideas is that humans have a right, if not a duty, to take and use resources but, as we have seen, only to provide for their sustenance. Additionally, such appropriation, as already noted, has conditions and limits placed upon it which if adhered to would ensure protection of the environment in which we all live. The spoilage argument ensures that there is a productive use of resources with no waste, whilst the sufficiency limitation will ensure that there is enough for all. Hence, individual appropriation is in itself not an evil, for Locke specifically states that such appropriation must not be done to the disadvantage of others. If, through appropriation, misuse of the environment causes harm and is thus a disadvantage to others then Locke would never have approved of it.

In The First Treatise Locke states that God granted dominion over '*every living thing that moveth upon the Earth*'⁴⁹ but such dominion did not appear to come without an implied condition. In the same paragraph Locke goes on to say that God gave this full power or dominion to utilise '*every moving thing*' as food only. That animals are only for sustenance is mentioned by Locke again when he says, 'Every

⁴⁵ Sreenivasan, p.65.

⁴⁶ Squadrito, *Locke's View of Dominion*, p.258.

⁴⁷ Locke, *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, par. 105, p.77.

⁴⁸ Locke, *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, par. 103, p.76.

*moving thing that Liveth, saith God, shall be Meat for you.*⁴⁹ The implication given here is that although dominion is given over animals, abuse or mistreatment is not permitted. Dominion is only to be exercised for the preservation of human life and would thus rule out animals being used or mistreated for any other purpose. Locke reasoned, in opposition to Descartes, that animals can suffer and be harmed, and whilst Locke may not afford rights to animals he does nevertheless seem to impose duties upon humankind concerning the treatment of animals.

Usufructuary Rights

The view of Locke that is emerging is, I suggest, not one of dominion as it is often understood to mean in the book of Genesis, where man is presumably given dominion over all the earth, but rather one of responsible stewardship. Such an interpretation stresses humankind's duties and obligations to all of creation as stewards with a right of temporary possession and use of the earth which, as with all things, Locke believed, ultimately belonged to God. Such rights are often described as usufructuary. Clark Wolf, in his interesting article on Lockean provisos and the interests of future generations, points out that it was sometimes argued, for example, by Filmer, that the subjects of a monarch had only usufructuary rights in the land in which they laboured and that the land was actually the property of the king.⁵¹ Other writers have held that monarchs possess their wealth only in usufruct, the real owners being their subjects. Locke I believe holds a different view. It is the view that all human possession or property is usufructuary inasmuch as the earth and all therein is the property of another, with the implication that resources and property are held in

⁴⁹ Locke, *First Treatise*, Ch. IV:27.

⁵⁰ Locke, *First Treatise*, Ch.IV:39.

trust for an absent owner, in this instance, God. Such usufructuary rights are similar to rights of full ownership but do not include the liberty to destroy but rather the duty to conserve them. As Wolf points out in relation to these rights:

If one's right is usufructuary, then the liberty to modify is limited to the class of modifications that will not put the basic interests of others, including future persons in jeopardy. For example, under some circumstances one might have the right to clear and plow one's land, but not the right to destroy it by covering it with concrete.⁵²

This description of usufructuary rights seems to fit very closely with what I have tried to show is representative of Locke.

Present-Day Implications

Rather than being harmful, private appropriation may in fact be beneficial to the conservation of the environment. When resources are unowned, and thus held in common, conservation of the environment may be frustrated, if not, in some instances, impossible. If what is held in common is under threat of destruction it may appear rational for each individual to get their maximum harvest before the source is completely gone. David Schmidtz provides a good example:

Even today, many resources are still largely held in common. To give one example, the coral reefs of the Philippine and Tongan islands are currently being ravaged by destructive fishing techniques. Where fishermen once used lures and traps, they now pour bleach (i.e., sodium hypochlorite) into the reefs. Partially asphyxiated, the fish float to the surface and become easy prey. Unfortunately, the coral itself suffocates along with the fish, and the dead reef ceases to be a viable habitat. ("Blast-fishing," also widely practised, consists of using dynamite rather than bleach.) What goes through the minds of these fishermen as they reduce some of the most beautiful habitats in the world to rubble? Perhaps some of them think, quite correctly, that if they do not destroy a given reef, it will shortly be destroyed by someone else, so they

⁵¹ Clark Wolf, 'Contemporary Property Rights, Lockean Provisos, and the Interests of Future Generations' *Ethics* 105 (July 1995) p. 811.

⁵² Clark Wolf, 'Contemporary Property Rights, Lockean Provisos, and the Interests of Future Generations' *Ethics* 105 (July 1995) p. 812.

might as well be the ones to catch the fish.⁵³

All parties concerned would be better off if blast or bleach fishing ceased, for then the reefs would continue to provide a sustainable environment for the fish. However, because the reefs are already being destroyed, each individual fisherman has a strong motive to get as much while they still can. And the way that this is done is through drastic fishing techniques such as blast or bleach fishing. Unless a change occurs the reefs will be destroyed and along with them the fish. Thus, to use a Lockean term there will not be 'enough and as good left for others.' Schmidtz argues that the problem arises because no one has private property rights in the reefs and so no one has any special interest in protecting them. Even the Tongan fisherman who did care about their future and wanted to save the reefs for their children continued to dynamite and poison the reefs because so long as the reefs remain in common, they do not have the option of choosing between long-run and short-run gains. Instead, they must choose between short-run gains for themselves and short-run gains for whoever turns up next.⁵⁴

David Johnson, although not speaking about property appropriation touches upon a similar dilemma in his article "The Tragedy of the Oceans." He describes what he calls "the hunter's logic" thus:

Like hunters, fishermen will try and take what they can when they can, before anyone else catches it. A fisherman who tries to conserve the stock by leaving fish in the sea has no reason for thinking that he will gain by his investment: the fish he has spared, or their offspring, will probably be caught by someone else. On the contrary, if he catches more fish now he will be the richer for it. Although there will be fewer fish next year, the cost will not be borne by him alone, but spread over the entire fleet.⁵⁵

⁵³ David Schmidtz, 'When is Original Appropriation Required? *The Monist* 73 (1990) p. 513.

⁵⁴ Schmidtz, p.515.

⁵⁵ David Johnson, 'The Tragedy of the Oceans,' *Economist* 330 (March 19th 1994) p. 24.

It may well be that one viable way to protect what is currently held in common and thus insuring that others, including future generations, will have 'enough and as good' is to institute property rights in them. In this way individual owners will have an incentive to care for and protect their own holdings. Schmidtz concludes that appropriation is not only permissible, but obligatory, for if we want to leave 'enough and as good' for future generations then we must protect them from present-day commons tragedies.⁵⁶

Conclusion

I began this thesis by showing the similarities between the Maori and Lockean views regarding the environment. Although, as I have noted, Locke's views are generally anthropocentric, whereas the Maori seem to allow greater rights to non-humans, it appears that there are nevertheless some surprising similarities. It could be further argued that a human-centred ethic should not make any difference to how we treat the environment - only the motives are changed. In fact it could be said that an anthropocentric view may be of greater value to the environment because there will be a greater motivation towards adhering to its principles. If the greatest motivation for humans to care for the environment arises out of self-preservation then an anthropocentric view may contain more motivational force than a deeper ecological view. As Shrader-Frechette points out:

It is difficult to think of an action which would do irreparable damage to the environment or ecosystem, but which would not also threaten human well-being...If a polluter dumps toxic wastes in a river, this action could be said to be wrong...because the "interests" of the river are violated, but also...because there are human interests in having clean water (e.g. for recreation and for drinking).⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Schmidtz, p. 516.

⁵⁷ K.S. Schrader-Frechette, *Environmental Ethics* (California: Pacific Grove, 1981), p. 17. Cited in J.Baird Callicott, 'The Search for an Environmental Ethic', in Tom Regan (ed.), *Matters of Life and Death: New Introductory Essays in Moral Philosophy*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), p. 327.

Such a belief though relies upon the assumption that it is always rational or right to aim at one's own greatest good. This is of course controversial, for the pursuit of individual good does not necessarily promote the common good. This type of moral viewpoint is also in conflict with the widely held conviction: that moral judgements must be universal, objective and impartial.

It may, however, be possible to build a workable environmental ethic based upon self-preservation, not just of the individual but of the human species. In this case although human life is considered to be at the centre, and thus all deliberations made with only human good in mind, it may nevertheless be enough to ensure environmental friendliness, not directly for the sake of the environment, but because protection of the environment will ensure human comfort, benefit, enjoyment and continuation of human life.

As a concluding note it should be pointed out that the West's treatment of the environment has, undoubtedly, not been friendly. If the fault lies with the beliefs of the West, based upon Locke, then it may be rightly claimed that we have only been following these beliefs and if we had an improved environmental philosophy then all would be well. However, as I hope to have shown, mistreatment of the environment need not originate from traditional Lockean views. Hence, it may well be the case that even if we had a new environmental philosophy, such as that of the Maori, we may still not behave any differently, and the environment would still continue to be plundered. As Passmore already said a generation ago:

What it needs for the most part, is not so much a "new ethic" as a more general adherence to a perfectly familiar ethic. For the major sources of our ecologic disasters – apart from ignorance – are greed and short-sightedness, which amount to much the same thing... There is no novelty in the view that greed is evil; no need of a new ethic to tell us as much.⁵⁸

Therefore, it seems to me that the challenge lies with those propounding alternative philosophies of the environment to produce evidence that their theories will work

⁵⁸ John Passmore, *Man's Responsibility for Nature*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974), p. 71.

better than those we already have. Furthermore, if we can find similarities between the various views, such as those of the Maori and Locke, then we may have a greater appreciation for one another's beliefs and hence less reluctance to adopt them if they will benefit the environment. Our efforts could then perhaps be directed towards putting into practice the various environmental philosophies, rather than fighting over whose doctrine is the right one.

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Chapter 2: Cousins of the Trees

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Chapter 3: Whose World

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Chapter 4: Unity of Life

A version of this paper entitled "Respecting Nature: A Maori Perspective" has appeared in *World Views*, 2 (1998), 69-78.

Chapter 5: Friends and Foes

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