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CLIMBING BACK:

AN ANALYSIS OF THE SUMMARY INSTALMENT ORDER:

THE NEW ZEALAND CONSUMER-DEBTOR REPAYMENT PROGRAM

A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Masterate of Applied Economics at Massey University

KATHRYN REDHEAD 1997

ABSTRACT

The Summary Instalment Order (SIO) court-administered repayment plan was introduced as an experimental response to the problem of overcommitment. Three decades after its institution, this research forms a profile of its applicants, suggests reasons for their financial difficulty, and conducts the first evaluation of this experimental program.

Comparing the profile of the SIO sample with the general population, SIO applicants are younger, have larger families, are more likely to be separated or divorced, and are more likely to reside in rented accommodation. SIO applicants are also mostly beneficiaries or in unskilled employment. Correspondingly, they have lower income and assets compared to the general population. In addition, they are more committed in terms of indebtedness, though less committed in regard to outgoing.

Overcommitment is the reason for SIO application, and inadequate income, current consumption preference, and the occurrence of an unanticipated event provides explanation for overcommitment. In SIO applications, evidence of inadequate income, current consumption preference, and the occurrence of an unanticipated event suggests these have contributed to the overcommitment of SIO applicants.

The SIO was intended to interrupt an indebted individual's passage to bankruptcy and to provide applicants with rehabilitation and a fresh start. Tracing applicants against the National Insolvency Database, 10.8% of applicants continued to bankruptcy in the 4-6 years following their SIO application. Analysis of the demographic and financial profile of applicants continuing to bankruptcy reveals the SIO may not have failed in any particular way. When analyzing reasons for bankruptcy application, however, SIO failure is more apparent. In addition, the high dropout rate, refile, and evidence of applicants unable to repay their debt within the three year term reinforces SIO failure.

Denial of the SIO, inadequate income, current consumption preference, and the occurrence of an unanticipated event are reasons for SIO failure. Recommendations of: acceptance based upon ability to service debt, improved screening, investigation into

compulsory budgeting assistance, and informing applicants regarding repayment progress and costs associated with bankruptcy application, are among suggestions outlined to combat causes of SIO failure. In addition, increased accessibility to the SIO and continued monitoring of the program's effectiveness is recommended.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Ironically, in a thesis concerning the dangers of credit, much credit is due.

First, I am greatly indebted to staff of the Department for Courts and Commercial Affairs throughout New Zealand. Without the sacrifice and hard work of these forthcoming individuals, the research could not have been conducted. Special mention is due to David Cole who ran the computer search against the National Insolvency Database, Joanne Pickford for acting as an intermediary between myself, the Official Assignee, and various Commercial Affairs Divisions, and Wayne Goodall for his overall support of the research.

For their contribution of anecdotal evidence, credit is due to New Zealand Federation of Family Budgeting Services Chairperson, Raewyn Nielsen, and to SIO supervisor, Lynne Wyman. Thank you for your assistance.

The financial support of the New Zealand Treasury and the Massey University Alumni Association is also greatly appreciated. In addition, thanks is due to the Department of Applied and International Economics for their contribution of resources required for this research.

I would also like to acknowledge those who assisted in the harrowing task of searching for a thesis topic. Of these, special mention is due to Ross Judge from the New Zealand Treasury.

Credit is due to Professor Larry Rose for his support and continued enthusiasm. The discarding of the typical formal supervisor-student relationship and the positive (?) *net* effect on my written vocabulary was also most appreciated.

On a more personal note, thank you to:

- ⇒ Saint Albans Presbyterian Church, for its unique character and its love, acceptance, and community.
- ⇒ Kerry Betteridge and Jeanette Head, for being catalysts to a year of incredible personal growth.
- ⇒ Tina Heaven, Roqiah Akramy and Carolyn Studman, for the consistency of their friendship. (Long may it continue!!)
- ⇒ Rachel (Roomy) Bate, whose spirit of mischief lingered in her absence in 1997.
- ⇒ Sue Cassells, for her friendship, support, and the (all-to-rare) prayer times.
- ⇒ Nic Gidden, for his encouragement and prayer.
- ⇒ flatmates, both past and present, for their tremendous love and support.
- ⇒ my family (including Hamish McWilliam), ... words do not do you justice ... I love you.
- ⇒ my God, Father of Jesus Christ; it wasn't luck that was on my side...

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