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Development of a method for optimal detection of emerging disease incursions

A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
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Abstract

Emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases (ERID) are capable of generating sizable economic loss, and causing loss of life and social instability. To prevent and mitigate the negative impacts of ERID, it is imperative to have a sensitive surveillance system for early disease detection. Furthermore, from the economic perspective, resources are always scarce and have opportunity cost, so investment in surveillance programs has to demonstrate that it can maximize the utility of available resources. The thesis was focused on development and application of a software toolbox, **Human and Animal Disease Response Program (HandiResponse)**, designed for (i) visualizing the disease risk landscape and representing spatial variation in the expected occurrence of a zoonotic disease both quantitatively and visually; (ii) evaluating economic benefit and costs of a single surveillance activity or a multi-component portfolio; (iii) identifying optimal use of resources for surveillance. It comprises four modules: (i) risk map development – HandiMap; (ii) surveillance portfolio development – HandiSurv; (iii) economic impact assessment – HandiEcon and (iv) surveillance optimization – OptiSurv.

The modules developed were tested on a number of data sets from various countries. The experience demonstrated that using satellite-derived data in combination with national statistical data to produce a disease risk map improved spatial prediction of avian influenza H5N1 outbreaks in southern Vietnam. Development of a risk map from satellite data for Crimean Congo Haemorrhagic Fever for Mongolia guided a field surveillance program which provided the first evidence that this disease is present in both animals and people in Mongolia. Finally an invented disease affecting pigs and people was used to investigate the likely consequences of an incursion of such a novel disease into Australia, involving both domestic and feral pigs and transferring to people. Risk-based and classical disease surveillance options were then tested for disease detection, and modelling work confirmed that a portfolio consisting of different options was the most technically and economically appropriate.

HandiResponse is a practical tool that could promote the implementation of risk-based surveillance approaches, and improve both technical and economic efficiency of surveillance programs for infectious diseases, particularly those affecting both people and animals.

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Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Explanation
ACF	Autocorrelation Function
AHP	Analytic Hierarchy Process
ARIMA	Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average
AUC	Area Under Curve
bTB	bovine Tuberculosis
CAC	Codex Alimentarius Commission
CCHF	Crimean Congo Haemorrhagic Fever
COS	Consequence of spread
CV	Coefficient of Variation
CWD	Chronic Wasting Disease
DALY	Disability Adjusted Life Year
DR	Direct Rating
EBL	Enzootic Bovine Leucosis
ELISA	Enzyme-linked Immunosorbent Assay
ERID	Emerging and Re-emerging Infectious Diseases
GARP	Genetic Algorithm for Rule-set Prediction
GIS	Geographic Information System
GLM	Generalized Linear Model
HandiEcon	Human and Animal Disease Economic Module
HandiMap	Human and Animal Disease Mapping Module
HandiResponse	Human and Animal Disease Response Program
HandiSpread	Human and Animal Disease Spread Program
HandiSurv	Human and Animal Disease Surveillance Module
HandiView	Human and Animal Disease View Program
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HPAI	Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
IFA	Indirect Immunofluorescence Assay
IPPC	International Plant Protection Convention
LOS	Likelihood of Spread
MADM	Multi-Attribute Decision Making
MARP	Most at Risk Population
MCDA	Multiple-criteria Decision Analysis
NDVI	Normalized Difference Vegetation Index
OIE	World Organization of Animal Health
OptiSurv	Optimal Surveillance Module
PA	Point Allocation
PACF	Partial Autocorrelation Function
PCR	Polymerase Chain Reaction
POE	Probability of Exposure
PRRS	Porcine Reproductive and Respiratory Syndrome

RBS	Risk-based Surveillance
RDS	Respondent Driven Sampling
ROC	Rank Order Centroid
ROC	Receiver Operating Characteristic
RS	Remote Sensing
SNA	Social Network Analysis
SPS	Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures/Agreement
SSC	Surveillance System Component
TLS	Time Location Sampling
WHO	World Health Organization
WLC	Weighted Linear Combination
WTO	World Trade Organization
WTP	Willingness To Pay