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**THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY WITHIN OFFICIAL
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE:
POLICIES, PARAMETERS AND PROCEDURES**

A THESIS PRESENTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

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This thesis has been completed as private study undertaken by the author. Except where explicitly stated and cited, the views expressed in this thesis are the author's own and do not reflect the views or policy of the New Zealand Defence Force, the New Zealand Government, or any agency thereof.

ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the relationship between development, Official Development Assistance (ODA) and the military in order to determine both the nature and effects of that relationship, and how the involvement of the military within ODA can be conducted in the most appropriate manner to support development. This study was conducted with regard to the current links between security and development within international relations and concerns that ODA is being drawn from a primarily development role to one that more explicitly supports national foreign and security policy ends instead. This issue is explored by defining development, ODA and the military as separate variables and then employing a grounded theory approach to develop an understanding of the relationship between them. The results of the study show that the involvement of the military within ODA and development may occur throughout the full range of operational contexts in which the military may be employed and can encompass activities throughout the scope of the functions of development. This involvement can in turn create a range of positive and negative impacts upon the conduct of ODA and development as the military serves to moderate the direction and strength of the relationship between the two. From this, the role of the military within ODA is identified as potentially an enabling, implementing and coordinating agency – primarily during times of crisis and conflict. The study then relates this role back to the wider context through considering the management of the military's role and identifying the policies, parameters and procedures that may help to ensure that this role is conducted in the most appropriate manner for development.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

3D	defence, development and diplomacy
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
CERP	commander's emergency response program
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIMIC	civil-military cooperation
CMO	civil-military operations
CSO	civil society organisation
CSP	country strategy paper
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
EU	European Union
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IDA	International Development Association
IDEA	Integrated Development Entrepreneurial Advice
IGO	international governmental organisation
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JIMP	joint, interagency, multinational and public
MASD	military assistance, security and development
MDG	millennium development goals
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	non government organisation
NZAID	New Zealand Agency for International Development
NZDF	New Zealand Defence Force
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSO	peace support operation
QIP	quick impact project
RAMSI	Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands
RRD	relief-rehabilitation-development
SFOR	Stabilisation Force
SWOT	Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USNS	United States Naval Ship

PREFACE

My interest in the relationship between the military and aid was first sparked when, as a United Nations Military Observer in Angola, the team site that I was attached to was tasked to monitor and report on both the conditions of displaced person camps and the conduct of aid agency food distribution in our Area of Operations. My next involvement occurred in Dili, Timor Leste, in October 2001 when as a staff officer on Headquarters Dili Command (and an extramural development studies student) I attended the inaugural meeting of the Dili Reconstruction Committee and witnessed the interaction between military and civil personnel, and between the various intervention agencies and the prospective recipients. The conduct of development assistance by the International Force East Timor was a key line of operations with certain nations deploying specialist civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and/or humanitarian assistance capabilities into the theatre of operations, and others retasking units as required, while the tremendous interest by the international community was reflected in the large number of aid and development agencies present. As a staff officer on a formation level headquarters it was readily apparent that comprehensive peace support operations of this type did require effective coordination and cooperation between military and civil agencies.

In 2001 I was deployed as a CIMIC projects officer with a Multinational Division Headquarters in Bosnia i Herzegovina with responsibility for the Division's conduct of DFID, CIDA and certain EU development programmes and projects. These activities differed markedly from the imperatives of immediate assistance that occurred during my time in Timor Leste as the NATO mission in Bosnia had by and large moved to a rehabilitation and development focus. The relatively established nature of the mission in Bosnia at that time was also reflected in an acceptance of the military's role in the development arena by the military forces that I worked with. This was to some extents in contrast to my experiences in the Solomon Islands in 2003 when, as the Deputy Commander of the military forces in the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), I witnessed some of the tensions that can develop between military

and civil actors and, in particular, a resistance by certain elements of the military to the conduct of these non-core roles. RAMSI was also notable for its focus as a Whole of Government approach that would address a wide range of factors to assist a failing state. My next deployment after the Solomon Islands also included the Comprehensive or Whole of Government approach. In 2007 I worked as a plans officer on the ISAF Headquarters in Afghanistan where I had to opportunity to observe the work of the Force's CIMIC staffs and participate in coordinated strategic planning with other agencies.

The key realisation from these experiences is that the military is being employed in a variety of missions and roles that differ from the traditional focus on conventional operations and that, as a result of their association with a variety of actors and processes in the development field, they may have the potential to achieve a wide range of effects or, conversely, negatively affect the conduct of activities by others. Furthermore, as the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) in RAMSI did complete tasks on behalf of the New Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID), it was apparent that the military could (and did) interact with a state's ODA. These were some of the main reasons why I selected this topic for further study and, to some extent, should explain the reflexivity that may be present within the research process itself.

Vern Bennett
Wellington
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The aim of this thesis is to explore the relationship between development, Official Development Assistance (ODA) and the military as evidenced by the practices of Northern donor states. This will inform the wider debate about the process and conduct of development in the modern world where the policy and security concerns of states may affect the outcomes of international development. This will be achieved by developing a general theory of the relationship between development, ODA and the military; and then analysing the effects of that relationship for the purpose of supporting the effective and appropriate conduct of development.

The thesis maintains a development focus as it examines one major effect upon the current conduct of development, through the agencies of ODA and the military, rather than a political or security focus that examines those agencies as ends in themselves. However, the concepts inherent in ODA and the military are examined in detail in order to realise the purposes, capabilities and motivations that result from their operation as elements of foreign policy, international relations, and security. This provides the basis for developing a greater understanding of their relationship with the concept of development.

The relevance of this research is founded upon the convergence of security and development within international relations, which has witnessed the greater involvement of the security aspects of national policy (as expressed through the strategic purposes of ODA and the employment of the military) within the domain of development. This increased involvement has the potential to influence the conduct of development through a wide spectrum of consequences - an influence that could extend far beyond the immediate focus of conflict management, humanitarian assistance and emergency relief to encompass more traditional aspects of development policy. The central question for this research, therefore, is 'what is the role of the military within official development assistance?'

The level of analysis for this thesis is maintained at the macro level in order to develop a holistic view of the relationship between the three variables of development, ODA and the military. This provides an understanding of how the nature of this relationship may affect development aims and goals. Although it would be possible to employ a functional level of analysis, such as by examining the functions of humanitarian assistance or disaster relief, this would constrain the study and be unlikely to realise the full scope of the relationship between the three variables as it would not incorporate the range of capabilities that each can provide within the wider security-development framework. In a similar vein, a detailed case study of the relationship in one practical situation would be affected by factors specific to that situation and, although it may be fertile ground for practical research and evaluation, it would not inform the overall nature of the relationship between the variables and how they could be applied to effectively support development in an appropriate manner across all situational contexts that may be encountered.

The mode of analysis employed in this thesis is one that acknowledges the practical effects of the convergence of development and security within international relations, and the role that military forces currently play in the provision of ODA within the wider development milieu. The premise for the thesis does not assume that it is appropriate for the military to be involved in development: instead it takes a pragmatic view of the current involvement of the military within ODA in order to determine how that involvement can be best managed to support development; rather than focusing upon a more idealistic debate of the moral or paradigmatic concerns surrounding that involvement.

This pragmatic approach is reflected in the units of analysis that define the three variables within the context of the state as the referent object. Although the role of the state is contested within current theoretical debate, it remains the central organising principle for the exercise of the instruments of power inherent in both ODA and the military, and in the conduct of development activities within recipient areas. This referent object also serves as a base for the further analysis of the variables in international, supra-national, or sub-national arenas. A further

element of this pragmatic approach is the use of a donor focus when considering the individual variables and the relationship between them. Although the focus on the Northern donor states may appear to be ethnocentric and reflect a potential limitation of the study by not examining the military-ODA-development relationship as evidenced by developing and underdeveloped nations, it does reflect that it is the donor states that primarily conduct ODA and whose military forces are the most involved in this role.

The organisation of this study is based upon the examination of the central research question within these analytical parameters. Chapter One introduces the study and establishes the research within the wider context of development and security. The conduct of the research process is described in Chapter Two, which establishes the methodology employed within this thesis as it determines the relationship between development, ODA and the military through the generative techniques of the grounded theory approach. This theory is developed in Chapters Three – Six. Chapter Three establishes the concept of development and determines the parameters in which it can be measured as a dependent variable, affected by the actions or influence of ODA and the military. Chapter Four develops a construct of ODA as an independent variable; describing its relationship with development and assessing the effects that it has. This establishes a theoretical baseline as a means to assess the influence of the military upon that relationship. The military's potential to affect this relationship is developed in Chapter Five through its description as a further independent variable.

The nature and extent of the military's influence upon the relationship between ODA and development is developed as a general theory in Chapter Six that describes the role of the military within ODA. This theory is then applied to the current linkage between development and security in international relations to determine how the involvement of the military can best be managed to support the appropriate conduct of development. The results of the research, its relevance within the wider spectrum of development and security, and possible further avenues for inquiry are reviewed in the concluding chapter, Chapter Seven. This structure enables the thesis to fulfil its aim and determine the relationship

between development, ODA and the military in a manner that also assists the wider purpose of supporting the effective and appropriate conduct of development within its modern context and circumstances.

The context for this study is then found within the convergence between development and security within international relations. The form and implications of this convergence is examined in the following sections by describing the context for modern development, the variety of purposes that it may fulfil within the wider international forum, and the developing understanding of the terms security and development. This establishes the factors that shape modern development, the manner of its linkages with security within international relations, and some of the effects that result. These effects, and the issues that they represent, form the key issues to be addressed through the remainder of this study.

THE CONTEXT FOR MODERN DEVELOPMENT

At the same time the apparently rising instability, terrorism and criminality in the marginalized regions and failing nation-states in various parts of the world have precipitated the emergence (even before 11 September 2001) of a renewed emphasis on the connection between security and development, viewing poverty and underdevelopment as a threat to global order. This shift is embodied in the growing links between strategies of conflict resolution, social reconstruction and foreign aid policies. While the USA and other OECD governments have been engaged in the post-cold war state-building efforts that this reorientation represents, this task is also being shifted to new or reconfigured networks that combine national governments, military establishments, myriad private companies and contractors, and NGOs.

Mark T. Berger (2006, p. 20)

The conduct of development has changed markedly within the past two decades as shifts within the bedrock of international relations have created new motivations for, and aspirations within, the development process. These factors have changed the way in which development is viewed within global affairs as it is now seen as having a more symbiotic relationship with emerging concepts of

security. This has in turn resulted in new conceptions of security and development, as the practice and conduct of each merges through new forms, methods and objectives that have established the conditions for a wider range of effects upon development itself.

The theory and practice of development in the post-Cold War period has been influenced by the changing dynamics of international relations, the impact of globalisation and the increasing occurrence of conflict (Berger, 2006, p. 7; Hopp & Klocke-Lesch, 2004/2005, p. 2). These factors have had major consequences as they changed the role of the state as a cause, recipient and agent of development. Some of these changes resulted from the increased vulnerability of certain underdeveloped states with the removal of the geopolitical imperative for foreign assistance that had maintained their integrity and functioning during the Cold War. The nascent vulnerability of these states was then exacerbated by the pervasive impact of globalisation, with new risks arising from both the marginalisation caused by factors of relative (un)development and poverty, and the empowerment of transnational and sub-national groups (Evans, 2004, p. 28; Murshed, 2004, pp. 67-71). These effects were manifested by the fragmentation of the states along nationalistic, ethnic and religious lines (Baylis, 2005, p. 316), which in turn led to an increasing number of conflicts – particularly civil war.

The World Bank has identified some of the key effects of these civil wars as the manner in which they retard and reverse developmental achievements, the manner by which they adversely affect the functioning of other states in the region, and their negative effects on wider global society (Collier et al., 2003, pp. 13-41). It is in further recognition of the manner by which civil wars become self-perpetuating (Collier et al., 2003, p. 53) that the role of the state as a driver of development has changed through the emergence of the concepts of ‘fragile’ and ‘failed’ states.

A failed (or collapsed) state is one that lacks the institutions to effectively maintain the identity, security and legitimacy of the state itself while a fragile state is one that is in danger of this collapse (Francois & Sud, 2006, pp. 142-144). As these concepts are related along a continuum (Francois & Sud, 2006, p.

143), evolving development practice now extends from the support of national governments, as was the norm during the Cold War (Natsios, 2006, p. 135), to providing assistance to a wider range of social and sub- or trans-state groups within these fragmented states. However, the ability of modern development policy to respond to these dynamics in the post-Cold War period has also been enhanced as the traditional forms of interstate assistance have been complemented by the increased capacity of International Organisations (such as the United Nations), the emergence of stronger forms of supra-national organisations (such as the European Union and other regional organisations), and the ability of aid agencies to operate in a more diverse range of locations (Duffield, 2001, p. 31).

The key result of this changing role of the state within development, however, is expressed in the manner by which the effects of under-, mis- or failed development affect the functioning and viability of other states. In this regard post-Cold War conceptions of development have become linked to security (King & Murray, 2001, p. 585). The conflict inherent within failed states, and the transnational threats posed by elements that operate within them, have led to the determination that development and security are mutually dependent (CIDSE, 2006, p. 9; European Council, 2003, p. 2; Faust & Messner, 2005, p. 426; Natsios, 2005, pp. 18-19). This in turn has led to a convergence between development and security (Duffield, 2001, p. 16) – one that has created new forms and methods for their achievement.

The concept of security has become more inclusive in the post-Cold War period as it recognises a wider range of threats and possible actions. The traditional view of security was founded upon the key function of the state to maintain its territorial integrity and sovereignty, particularly through the use of the military instrument of national power (CIDSE, 2006, p. 10; King & Murray, 2001, p. 588). Recently, security has become a contested concept as critical theories recognise a diversity of threats to marginalized societies (Baylis, 2005, p. 300; Sheehan, 2005, p. 153). This is expressed through the concept of human security that establishes people, not states, as the referent object (Henk, 2005, p. 96) and seeks to address a range of threats that include conflict, disaster, deprivation and

inequality (Henk, 2005, p. 93; King & Murray, 2001, pp. 603-604; UNDP, 1994, p. 2). As a result, modern conceptions of security have a greater awareness of the requirement to include development issues; with underdevelopment now recognised as a primary security concern (CIDSE, 2006, p. 11; Duffield, 2001, p. 7).

Development policy has also evolved as a result of a change of focus in the post-Cold War period. In a similar vein to the influence of human security in the security paradigms, a focus on human development has seen a shift from the initial focus on state-based economic development to one that incorporates concepts of sustainable human development, which also establishes people as the referent object (CIDSE, 2006, p. 10; UNDP, 1994, p. 19). Although modern development techniques include the principles of participation and empowerment, the wider policy initiatives focus upon achieving structural stability within the host societies (DAC/OECD, 1997, p. 2; Hopp & Kloeke-Lesch, 2004/2005, p. 3). This in turn led to a focus upon governance and capacity building - particularly through the development of liberal democracies - as the framework for further development activities (Burnell & Morrissey, 2004, p. xvi). Although the reliance on Western models has been criticised (Barcham, 2005, p. 5), these developments have encompassed a wider range of aid and development assistance through the collaborative effort of international, multilateral, supra national, national and sub-national actors¹ in concert with the central role of the developing countries themselves in ensuring their own development (DAC/OECD, 1997, p. 2). This has created an increased level of complexity for the operationalisation of conjoint security and development policies.

One measure of this complexity is the desire of civil society to ensure that development maintains its integrity and that its goals are not blurred with those of security (CIDSE, 2006, p. 9). However, the effective link between development and security has been expressed in the policies of a number of agencies – most particularly the current security strategies of the United States of

¹ This effect is noted by Natsios (2005, p. 20) with regard to the range of development partners that USAID now engages.

America and the European Union. Although these strategies express different views of the relationship between realist and critical based theories, such as their relative application of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power (Hoadley, 2006, p. 11), they do indicate that a range of civil and military instruments will be required to overcome current threats (Faust & Messner, 2005, p. 45; Natsios, 2006, p. 135). The wider expression of this realisation has created what Duffield refers to as “innovative strategic complexes” (Duffield, 2001, p. 45) that are able to employ their strengths and capabilities through new methods and policies to achieve wider security and development aims.

The methods and policies that the international community² employs to achieve their development and security aims are based upon their ability to act and the ends that they desire to achieve. The international community has developed an enhanced ability to act since the end of the Cold War, largely as a result of the less constrained geopolitical environment. In addition to traditional forms of assistance and support, the international community has also conducted a range of interventions when the host state or society lacks the capacity to support wider development and/or security aims (as may occur in fragile or failed states). These interventions exhibit a tremendous scope, being either permissive or non-permissive nature; relying upon various forms of conditionalities or coercion; and ranging from simplistic single-function support through to complex multifunctional, multiagency and multilateral operations³. Although the conduct of such interventions occur in a contested theoretical environment, including criticisms of selectivity and concerns of abuse by stronger nations (Sheehan, 2005, p. 166), they have become a primary manifestation of the links between development and security in the modern world.

The strongest causal factor in the conduct of security/development interventions in the immediate post-Cold War period was the relative failure of traditional mechanisms to address the increasing incidence of conflict. Subsequent

² The term ‘international community’ is used here to depict both sovereign states and the various political, regional and international groupings that they establish in order to promote common interests within international relations (such as the UN).

³ These forms are evident in the range of humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations conducted over the past two decades.

responses by the international community were more intrusive in nature, being characterised by greater interactions between the military and civil components of peacekeeping, enforcement or stabilisation missions (Duffield, 2001, pp. 57-58). In this regard, the international community has developed a range of policies designed to manage the impact and effect of conflict prior, during and after its occurrence. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is one body that developed such a response as, in 1997, it promulgated a policy that indicates the range of activities required to prevent or mitigate the effects of conflict and thereby support both developmental and security aims (DAC/OECD, 1997). A key theme of the OECD policy is the requirement for interagency cooperation (between multilateral, regional, bilateral and non-governmental agencies) and an approach that incorporates all of the appropriate policy areas (security, political, economic and development) to prevent violent conflict by developing structural stability in the host country(ies) (DAC/OECD, 1997, p. 4).

The practical expression of these policies for the conduct of security and development interventions is found in those approaches that most explicitly seek to develop a failed state in order to maintain its own stability and, therefore, the security of the wider regional and global environments. These techniques are variously termed as 'nation-building', 'state-building' or 'nation-forming'. They attempt to stabilise the state with respect to both internal and external influences and, although as a term they devolve from security and foreign policy, the manner by which they transcend traditional methods emphasises their role in development policy (Hopp & Kloeke-Lesch, 2004/2005, pp. 2-3). However, it is a slow process, best achieved through internal forces while requiring considerable external assistance in terms of political will and resources (Francois & Sud, 2006, p. 153; Ottaway, 2002, p. 16). Therefore it would be more effective to conduct these interventions before failure has occurred (European Council, 2003, p. 11; UNDP, 1994, p. 3), such as by extending assistance across a wider spectrum than conflict management to encompass a broader form of support to fragile or threatened states. This in turn represents an even greater relationship between the fields of development and security.

SHAPING MODERN DEVELOPMENT

The context for modern development is greatly affected by the links that it has with the other elements of international relations, particularly security. Although the security agenda within modern development exists in concert with other agendas, such as poverty-reduction and environmental sustainability (Faust & Messner, 2005, pp. 429-431), it may greatly influence the resourcing and conduct of development activities. This is apparent when considering both the interactions between the actors involved in enacting development policy, and the relative degree of independence of that policy from other agendas. As a result, the outcomes of modern development are shaped by the actors involved and the ends to which development policy is applied.

One characteristic of the conduct of development in the post-Cold War period is the greater range and number of actors that have become involved. The links with security have greatly influenced this as the resolution of complex emergencies, or the provision of assistance to failed/fragile states, has required the concerted application of a number of functions in order to achieve the overall aim - these functions including those of military security, police law and order, multiagency humanitarian assistance, civil reconstruction and the development of civil capacity (European Council, 2003, p. 7). The Centre for Defence Studies at Kings College, London has identified five major communities that need to be coordinated in conducting these activities (NGOs, donor governments, multilateral organisations, military establishments and the corporate sector) (Duffield, 2001, p. 52) – each of which consist of a number of subordinate agencies with their own purposes, aims and agendas. In addition to this range of external actors, modern development policy also needs to consider the role of partners in recipient countries, which now extend beyond the traditional focus of governments to include local NGOs and functions of civil society (Natsios, 2006, p. 135). This has greatly increased the range and scope of participants within the development process, engendering new relationships and operating principles between them in order to support the conduct of development itself.

The interaction of these various communities has created new dynamics in the relationships between development policymakers, planners and actors. Although the notion of 'partnership' has gained a certain prominence within the development milieu, and NGOs in particular have established a greater formalisation in their relationships with the other communities (Duffield, 2001, p. 54), there remains a tension between the practice of partnership and the influence that each agency wishes to achieve (Burnell & Morrissey, 2004, p. xvi). This occurs as the various actors may approach the development situation with greatly differing focuses, motivations and intentions that need to be pragmatically aligned before effective partnership can be achieved (as evidenced by the relationship between traditional development organisations and military peacekeeping forces in conflict management situations (CIDSE, 2006, pp. 13-14)). A more particular concern, however, is the manner by which these actors may also compete for space within the crowded development environment – with agencies being concerned to maintain both their own operating independence and neutrality, and their access to sources of funding and recognition. These dynamics, and the presence of a greater number of agencies in a congested development space, have led to the requirement to establish a greater degree of coordination - not only between the agencies themselves, but also between their efforts over time (Collier et al., 2003, p. 7; Duffield, 2001, p. 12; Hopp & Kloke-Lesch, 2004/2005, p. 11).

The ability of the respective communities to establish this coordination has also changed markedly in the post-Cold War period. In the first instance some agencies have sought to establish new roles within the new dynamics in order to maintain their viability and influence; an effect that Duffield has noted with those agencies that have positioned themselves within the various forms of conflict management (Duffield, 2001, pp. 120, 189). A second effect is the manner in which international organisations, particularly the United Nations, have taken responsibility for the coordination of activities within the development milieu through the establishment of specialist coordinating agencies (such as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA]) and the creation of 'lead agency' roles to coordinate the international response to complex emergencies. However, perhaps the largest effect of the developing

linkage between development and security is the evolving role of the state – an evolution that has the potential to shape the manner and conduct of development within a wide range of circumstances.

The influence of the state within the development-security environment is founded upon its role as a donor, as a provider of military forces, as a major organising framework for the corporate sector, and as a financier for multilateral organisations. In this regard states have the potential to exert a pervasive influence throughout the development-security environment as both policy setters and agents. However, not all states have this influence, as it is primarily the developed states that have the capacity to exercise the instruments of national power in this manner; a factor that is reflected in the domination that donor governments have of the humanitarian and aid agendas (Burnell & Morrissey, 2004, p. xvii; Duffield, 2001, p. 82). It should also be recognised that these states are not disinterested players in the international arena for, whereas international organisations may be able to maintain an altruistic approach to development, states have to satisfy the needs of their internal constituencies. In this regard, the actions of states are political in nature and seek primarily to advance their own interests: in the development and security environment this is manifested through expression of national power through the instruments of official development assistance (ODA) and the military.

Although international development traces its immediate roots back to the inauguration of the Marshall Plan after the Second World War, neither that Plan nor the provision of foreign aid in the following decades were conducted solely for idealistic or altruistic purposes. A key motivation for donor nations was to support their political, ideological and commercial interests (Hull, 2003, p. 13; UNDP, 1994, p. 69). Although current definitions of ODA extend beyond the initial economic focus of foreign aid to include a wider range of resource transference and other assistance (Burnell & Morrissey, 2004, p. xiv), the conduct of ODA activities within a wider security framework does maintain a political focus. This is particularly apparent as donor nations have sought to establish a greater coherence between their development and security policies, leading to an increased collaboration between the development and military

communities (CIDSE, 2006, p. 18; Natsios, 2005, pp. 6-7). However, as the primary focus of military forces is towards security (Cheeseman & Elliott, 2004, pp. 286-287), this has raised questions as to the proper degree of involvement of the military within the development process (CIDSE, 2006, p. 14) - especially as military activities and assistance can appear to be antithetical to traditional conceptions of development. Security factors may then influence the policy and conduct of development as the increasing politicisation of aid and development has caused concerns about the subordination of development and raised the issue of the appropriateness of development activities conducted within the security context.

The interplay between security and development, and the political motivation of the state as a major participant in this environment, has the potential to greatly affect the conduct of the wider development process. Duffield (2001, pp. 89-92) notes the effect of the politicisation of development as it loses its operational neutrality while Natsios (2006, p. 137) further recognises the integral role of politics in the planning and conduct of development assistance. Although such politicisation may exist in all activities conducted by states, the effect of the security focus within development is quite noticeable given the initial, naïve, post-Cold War anticipation of development based upon need rather than geopolitical concerns. Not only has development been employed in concert with other activities to resolve conflict situations but, in some respects, a major effect of the current war on terror is the way in which security has captured the development agenda with development becoming a specific technique employed by donor nations to meet security concerns (Tujan, Gaughran, & Mollett, 2004, pp. 54-56). This has led to the reversion in development practice of it being provided for geopolitical purposes, sometimes in contravention of the development ideals of the mid-1990s, as development and military assistance is now provided to nations that do not meet previous development criteria (such as by having poor human rights records) (CIDSE, 2006, p. 19; Tujan et al., 2004, p. 64). In this regard, the efficacy and purpose of the development process appears to have been compromised to a large degree by the focus on security.

The politicisation of aid and development is also expressed in the manner by which the immediacy of security concerns can form the basis for intervention, rather than the pursuit of a more considered development process that focuses upon the sustainability of its effect. Although it has been stated that short-term security concerns should not override long-term development ones (Faust & Messner, 2005, p. 429), Menocal (2005, p. 726) notes the tensions that exist within donor policy between the great commitments of resources and political will required to conduct nation-building, or the reconstruction of failed states, and the desire to transfer responsibility to the host society or state. In a politically contested environment when intervening states have to satisfy the demands of both internal constituencies and external actors, the potential exists that the donor nations may conduct sufficient activities to indicate a successful intervention prior to a timely withdrawal without actually creating the conditions for a sustainable peace (Menocal & Kilpatrick, 2005, p. 771). In this regard states may be subject to an 'intervention horizon' beyond which they find it difficult to remain engaged as the focus and priorities of their constituencies change. This effect is reflected in concerns about the subordination of development where development policy is integrated and subordinated to security concerns or the provision of military aid, with the erosion of long-term development budgets in favour of financing short-term emergency relief and/or military/security activities (CIDSE, 2006, pp. 4-5; Tujan et al., 2004, p. 59; UNDP, 1994, p. 79).

This influence of security upon development raises the issue of the appropriateness of the development activities conducted under such circumstances. At the policy level this may be found in the manner by which states employ their ODA to support wider national and security objectives and the influence that this holds over the fulfilment of other development agendas. At the level of implementation this issue can be tangibly expressed through the increasing participation of the military in the humanitarian or development sphere, either as a corollary effect of its primary security focus or as a humanitarian/development task agency in its own right. In these circumstances the employment of military forces has the potential to greatly affect the efforts of NGOs and other development agencies - either in the negative context as a threat to their ability to function effectively, or in a positive manner through the

conduct of coordinated and collaborative actions across the wider spectrum of development assistance and activities. However, as ODA is an integral part of the international development process, and the use of military forces is a necessary component of many security-development interventions (Ottaway, 2002, p. 18), the actual issue may not be whether the military should be involved in the development process. Instead, and with regard to the pragmatic realities of current policies and situations, it may be more pertinent to realise that the military is involved and then determine how the parameters and forms of that involvement should be managed in a manner most appropriate to the conduct of development itself.

RESOLVING THE ISSUE

The convergence of security and development within post-Cold War international relations occurred through international efforts to resolve the effects of complex emergencies before developing a wider purview with regard to fragile and failed states. A key effect of this convergence is the way in which it has linked the concept of development, the conduct of ODA and the characteristics of the military. Development remains an intrinsic goal in its own right but has been recognised as a method by which wider security concerns may be achieved while, conversely, security may also be seen as condition for development. ODA has therefore gained a new importance for contributing states as it represents a key method by which they can shape the conduct of development activities to support security objectives, as well as maintain their focus on wider development issues. Furthermore, as ODA is a key mechanism by which donor states mobilise resources for development, it also serves as an enabling factor for the involvement of the military in development activities. This occurs as there is greater synergy between development and security within national and regional strategies, and the consequent employment of military forces in both spheres.

The involvement of the military within ODA, and with development in general, has raised concerns that the efficacy of the development process could be compromised or subordinated by inappropriate policies and activities, and whether the outcomes are appropriate to the purpose of development itself. The International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity has recognised these concerns in asking where the boundaries should be drawn between security and development policies (CIDSE, 2006, p. 13). However, this approach indicates a clear separation between development and security and may not appropriately reflect the complex interdependent nature of their relationship within international relations. Instead, a more complete understanding of the situation may be gained by bringing the various communities involved within development, both military and civil, together in order to develop a better understanding and collaborative or coordinated effectiveness (European Council, 2003, p. 13; Henk, 2005, p. 97; Natsios, 2005, p. 19). In this regard, it is appropriate to view the current security / development nexus through a development lens that not only acknowledges the pragmatic motivations of the involvement of states within the wider development function, but also seeks to determine how this involvement may be conducted to satisfy the interests and requirements of development itself. This approach would address the practical problem of the efficacy and appropriateness of the military within the wider context of ODA as a means of exploring how the involvement of the military within ODA can be conducted in the most appropriate manner for development – in effect, can an equilibrium be found between the motivations and requirements of each element or are there tensions that will remain and need to be managed?

CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY

PURPOSE OF RESEARCH

The practical problem that has been identified within the convergence of security and development informs a further line of inquiry and critical research. Murray and Overton (Murray & Overton, 2003, p. 21) define the purpose of critical research as being to “uncover non-explicit processes and relations” so that they can be communicated to appropriate agencies for subsequent action. As a thesis serves to conduct this critical research through the exploration of a central question and its relationships (Walsh, 2005, p. 142), the practical problem needs to be expressed in terms that can establish the basis for the inquiry conducted within the thesis. Booth, Colomb and Williams (W. C. Booth, Colomb, & Williams, 2003, pp. 58-60) have established a framework for accomplishing this through a cyclical model where a practical problem motivates a research question that in turn defines the research problem, which then finds a research answer to help solve the initial practical problem. Applying this framework, the practical problem of the efficacy and appropriateness of the military within the wider context of ODA establishes the research question of ‘*what is the role of the military within ODA?*’ As the exploration of this central question includes the implicit assumption that the involvement of the military within ODA will have some form of effect upon development, that being a noted consequence of the convergence of development and security, the research question then establishes the research problem of ‘*how should the relationship between the military, ODA and development be managed?*’ The purpose of the research, and the desired outcome to resolve the issues framed by the research problem, then forms the basis of the research answer. This relates back to the context of the practical problem and establishes, ‘*how the involvement of the military within ODA can be conducted in the most appropriate manner for development.*’ This methodology provides a clear causal chain for the conduct of the research and maintains a clear focus on the outcomes that should be achieved.

The establishment of the research problem in this way provides the foundation for developing a theoretical approach to solve the practical problem. Walsh notes that the ultimate aim of academic research is the testing or generation of a theory (Walsh, 2005, p. 93). Theory-testing in this regard is based upon positivist approaches that start with the theory and verify it by testing a hypothesis; while in theory generation research questions take the place of hypotheses as observations are analysed and placed in context (Robson, 2002, pp. 61-62, 65). As a theory describes the relations between theoretical constructs and observable variables (Judd, Smith, & Kidder, 1991, p. 21), the research problem established above meets Walsh's conditions of starting the research process by providing the mechanism through which the nature and underlying causes of the relationships that it identifies will be examined through a clearly identified central question (Walsh, 2005, p. 171). This occurs as the problem has indicated the constructs to be examined within the theory – namely, the military, ODA and development – but does not presuppose an existing theory or hypothesis that describes the relationship between them. Therefore, the basis of the research conducted within this thesis is the generation of a theory that describes the relationship between the military, ODA and development in order to answer the research question of the role of the military within ODA.

Judd, Smith and Kidder (1991, p. 42) note that a theory consists of three main elements: the abstract concepts that form the constructs; variables as the concrete representations of those constructs; and the operational definitions that provide the means for measuring the variables. In this regard, the three concepts of the military, ODA and development form the central part of the thesis as the relationship between them guides subsequent research questions and analysis. The nature of this relationship is determined by the relative position and influence of the variables that are developed to represent each construct – these being positions of dependence, independence, and moderation or mediation.

In the simplest terms a theory measures the cause and effect relationship between an independent variable (the causal construct) and a dependent variable (the affected construct) (Judd et al., 1991, p. 28). In this regard ODA, as a series of

interventions conducted to support development, would be the independent variable while development would be the dependent variable. However, the presence of a third variable has the capacity to affect the initial cause and effect relationship either in terms of the magnitude of that effect (moderation) or as a mechanism that produces the effect (mediation) (Judd, Kenny, & McClelland, 2001, p. 115). This variable is represented here by the military and its effect upon the relationship between ODA and development. What needs to be determined, therefore, is whether the military exists within the development-security context as an independent variable that affects the direction and strength of the relationship between ODA and development (fulfilling Baron and Kenny's (1986, p. 1174) requirements for a moderator variable) or if it represents the 'generative mechanism' through which ODA is able to influence development within that context (fulfilling the requirements for a mediator variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986, p. 1173)). Indeed, as the same variable may serve in both capacities (Judd et al., 2001, p. 115) it is possible that the military has an even more complex relationship with ODA and development depending upon specific situations or circumstances. A further measure of this complexity may become apparent if the situation exists when the provision of security represented by the military becomes a higher priority for development, and ODA is subsequently relegated to a moderating or mediating role for the independent variable of the military.

Determining the actual relationship between these various constructs and variables then becomes the purpose of the research. Both Babbie and Robson note that research can be conducted to fulfil a number of purposes - including those of exploration, description and explanation - while Babbie further notes that most studies have elements of all three purposes (Babbie, 2001, pp. 91-94; Robson, 2002, pp. 59-60). Indeed all three purposes will be present to some degree in this thesis, as the satisfaction of the research problem requires new insights to be developed (through exploration), described through theory generation, and then explained in terms of the research answer. However, as the central focus of this thesis is the generation of a theory that describes the relationship between the three constructs of the military, ODA and development, the main purpose of the study is descriptive. This in turn requires a research

design that is best able to realise the nature and causes of the relationship between these three constructs as they are represented by variables and measured by appropriate operational definitions.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The design of the research process selects and employs appropriate methods to satisfy the purpose of the research. This design links the conduct of data collection, analysis and interpretation with the requirements of the research problem through the research questions (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Lowe, 2002, p. 43; Walsh, 2005, p. 89; Yin, 2003, p. 19). As such, the key influences on the design are the type of research to be conducted and the methods to be employed. As this thesis examines relationships that are applied within social processes (of politics, security and development), it adopts a social constructivist approach in order to make sense of these relationships through people's understanding and interpretation (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002, p. 34; Robson, 2002, p. 27). In this regard the relationship between the military, ODA and development is internalised within the research process rather than being maintained as a separate objective entity subject to the hypothesising and reduction inherent in positivist approaches (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002, pp. 28-29).

This constructivist approach emphasises qualitative methods for data collection, analysis and interpretation, as they are best suited to explore social constructions and support theory generation (Brockington & Sullivan, 2003, p. 57).

Furthermore, as qualitative research is associated with holistic perspectives and emergent research designs (Denscombe, 2003, pp. 232-234) it provides the means for incorporating a wide range of experience within the scope of the study, and the selection of the most appropriate qualitative and/or quantitative research techniques for each stage of the study itself. The qualitative approach also helps to establish the parameters for the research as its holistic perspective supports a macro level of analysis that examines the full spectrum of relationships between the three constructs in order to develop a more complete understanding of the

nature of these relationships. This approach enables the thesis to realise a greater degree of understanding about the role of the military within ODA than would occur through a more constrained focus on one function of the relationship (such as the functions of humanitarian assistance or disaster relief) or one specific example of the relationship (as may occur through a detailed case study of one security-development interaction). The effect of this approach on the design of the research process is to establish units of analysis that can support the wider perspective inherent in the macro level - such as the policy making levels of organisations and states where the relationship between the military, ODA and development is enacted. These units then establish the key components of the constructs that will be conceptualised and represented through the appropriate variables.

The research strategies and methods employed to examine these constructs and variables are themselves influenced by the physical parameters of the research. The key factors affecting this thesis include the limitations imposed by the researcher's full time employment and the relative time available to conduct the research, the use of the English language as the research medium, and the researcher's previous experience as a practitioner and researcher within this area of inquiry⁴. These factors have the aggregate effect of greatly limiting the conduct of fieldwork in developing countries or foreign centres of development policy-making, precluding the conduct of lengthy quantitative or ethnographic methods of data collection, limiting the sources of data to those that are published in English, and requiring that potential researcher bias be acknowledged and mitigated through the research design. Therefore, these factors have the potential to affect the scope, reliability and validity of the study itself and the research design needs to select appropriate strategies, methods and techniques to overcome these potential limitations and ensure the reliability and validity of the data collection, analysis and interpretation conducted.

⁴ At the time of the research the researcher was a member of the NZDF and had previously fulfilled roles in military support to bilateral reconstruction programmes and conducted research on the role of humanitarian assistance within Peace Support Operations.

The adoption of constructivist and qualitative approaches to the study helped to overcome these potential limitations as they acknowledged the role of researcher influence and reflexivity upon the research process. A number of methods within a multi-method approach were used that balanced the strengths and weaknesses of different techniques in order to provide internal corroboration within the study, incorporate a wider range of perspectives, and enhance the validity of the research through the triangulation of data sources and methods used (Denscombe, 2003, pp. 132-133; Easterby-Smith et al., 2002, p. 41; Robson, 2002, pp. 370-371). As in many respects this was an emergent design, depending upon the actual data sources that became available, it required the adoption of what Robson describes as a 'flexible design' research strategy that can adapt its forms and methods as the research is conducted but still retains the rigorous data collection methods and layered analysis required in order to maintain the validity of the research product (Robson, 2002, pp. 89, 166). Robson notes three flexible design research strategies – case study, ethnographic study, and grounded theory study. As the case study and ethnographic strategies would be constrained by the aforementioned philosophical and practical parameters to the research, this supports the adoption of the grounded theory approach for theory-generation within this thesis.

The use of a grounded theory research strategy supports the intent of a flexible research design as it is an emergent process of discovery and analysis. In its pure form, grounded theory is an inductive process of theory generation that analyses raw data in a purposive manner to derive theories from the patterns, themes and categories that are observed (Babbie, 2001, p. 284; Robson, 2002, pp. 190-193). These categories form the basis for subsequent analysis and interpretation as they are refined through a process of theoretical sampling, and progressively analysed through a range of interrelated coding techniques - with the results being constantly compared to emergent ideas as the basis for theory development (Denscombe, 2003, pp. 117-120; Robson, 2002, pp. 190-193). This form of theory development employs a range of data collection techniques, facilitating a multi-method approach as it has no fixed agenda but instead responds to the data that is gained and relates this back to the research questions. As a result, grounded theory eschews literature reviews and expects the researcher to

commence the study without fixed ideas on the topic itself (Denscombe, 2003, p. 115) - emphasising the validity of the approach as the results are derived from the data and not external references. The grounded theory approach, therefore, is one that does not support the pre-identification of theoretical constructs or acknowledge a role for the researcher in influencing the research process itself.

However, the purely inductive nature of grounded theory has been challenged and its basic nature has diversified since it was initially developed (Heath & Cowley, 2004, p. 142; Robson, 2002, p. 495). Not only have there been calls for the method to accept a wider range of contexts and not focus so purely on empirical data (Denscombe, 2003, p. 124) but the initial developers of the method, Glaser and Strauss, have come to emphasise different functions within the process – with Strauss proposing a more substantial role for deduction within the process itself (Heath & Cowley, 2004, pp. 144-145). These developments have created the opportunity for the grounded theory approach to be applied in a number of different contexts and forms, with the modern tendency being for researchers to adapt the process to their own purposes (Denscombe, 2003, p. 109). In this regard, it is possible to employ a grounded theory approach as a basis for theory generation in concert with elements of reflexivity and deductive techniques – adapting the grounded theory approach to the particular circumstances of the research rather than being constrained by the doctrinal aspects of the methodology itself⁵.

The adaptation of the grounded theory approach is a suitable research design for this thesis because, although the intention was to develop a theory based upon the emergent relationships realised through the analysis of data, the researcher already had a degree of familiarity with the topic being examined (due to previous employment and research within this field) and the analysis had been shaped in part by the identification of three central constructs as the basic framework of the research activity. This had the effect of establishing the context within which subsequent data collection and analysis would inform a theory of

⁵ This is an approach that Heath and Cowley (2004, p. 149) recognise as they advise that the “novice researcher should set aside the ‘doing it right anxiety’, adhere to the principle of constant comparison, theoretical sampling and emergence, and discover which approach helps them best achieve the balance between interpretation and data that produces a grounded theory.”

the relationship between the military, ODA and development. However, the emergent and inductive focus of the grounded approach was maintained as the research did not presuppose the nature of the relationship between the three main constructs. In this way the analysis was grounded upon the data that was collected as the basis of the development, and subsequent interpretation, of the theory itself. Therefore, although elements of conceptualisation and reflexivity established the initial framework for the research, the key elements of this research were based upon the nature and types of data that were collected and analysed.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

The research design inherent in the flexible grounded theory approach relies upon the quality of the data that can be collected and subsequently analysed. The types and scope of the data collected for this study were founded upon the requirement to conceptualise the three main elements of the theory – development, ODA and the military – and then analyse the relationship between them. This was reflected in the structure of the study; the purpose, types and sources of data employed; and the analytical techniques used.

The conduct of theory generation through a grounded theory approach established the structure of the study and framed the conduct of the data collection and analysis. The structure was based on the conceptualisation of the three constructs (development, ODA, and the military), and the subsequent analysis of the relationship between them. The conceptualisation, in the first instance, described the abstract concepts that form each of the constructs prior to defining them in concrete or realisable terms as theoretical variables and then establishing the operational definitions as a means for measuring the relationship between them. As each variable was established it was then described in terms of its relationship with the previous variable(s). This then established the foundation for the further analysis of those relationships as a means to answer the research question and inform the wider research answer.

This structure framed the collection of data for the study as the data was collected to fulfil two purposes: to establish the theoretical concepts underpinning the study; and to support the analysis of the nature and effects of the relationships between them. The focus for the data collection differed depending upon the stage and purpose of each element of the study. In the first instance the data collection was representative in nature to describe the elements of each of the concepts and to develop appropriate operational definitions to measure the relationship between them. This in turn led to purposive data collection to support the examination of key elements of these relationships as a greater focus was applied to the form and effects of the interaction between the theoretical concepts.

A range of primary and secondary data was collected in order to fulfil these purposes and to provide for the greater reliability and validity of the research product itself. The representative collection was based upon secondary data as it examined the broader context of the concepts themselves. However, as a result of the macro level of analysis and the sequencing of the interviews early within the research process, the primary data gained from the interviews served to support the representative focus of this data collection by helping to identify the key themes and issues that subsequent purposive data collection would focus on. This served as a bridge to the further purposive collection of secondary forms of data to facilitate the more detailed examination of the identified categories, themes and issues that had been developed. These types of data were collected from a variety of primary, secondary and tertiary data sources⁶ that supported the development of a greater breadth of understanding during the research process, and increased the validity and reliability of the research product itself through techniques of triangulation and constant comparison.

⁶ Booth, Colomb and Williams (2003, p. 76) define the three data **sources** as: primary – raw data; secondary – research reports based upon primary sources; and tertiary – books and articles based upon secondary sources. It should be noted that these sources of data differ from the two **types** of data (primary and secondary) as noted by Walsh, amongst others (Walsh, 2005, p. 98).

The actual sources of the data were based upon the key actors and stakeholders⁷ within the development process and the experiences and opinions that they expressed through published works, various documentary evidence, and personal viewpoints. The method of data collection was based upon the types of data being collected. The majority of the data collected was drawn from secondary and tertiary sources and was collected in an indirect manner through library, database and Internet searches based upon keyword searches, purposive examination of stakeholder websites and the examination of citations in published sources. This data included media articles, published reports, descriptions of experiences within the security / development environment, and broader descriptions and analysis contained in journal articles and books. The primary data was gained in a direct manner through the conduct of a small number of personal interviews conducted with members of CSOs and the New Zealand public service⁸. These interviews were conducted in person and were semi-structured in nature in order to both allow the participant to develop ideas and more completely relate their experience, and enable the researcher the flexibility to pursue emergent information in a more purposive manner than would have been possible in a structured format⁹. As the researcher's occupation and previous experience within this field had the potential to introduce various forms of interviewer and subject bias within the interviews themselves, the data collection was conducted in a manner approved by the Massey University Human Ethics Committee (Southern B Application - 06/11) with the researcher disclosing his previous experience and current occupation to the interviewees. Not only did this have the effect of making the interview participants fully aware of the purpose and aims of the research, and thereby reduce potential bias, but initial scoping interviews were used as a chance to identify potential biases with

⁷ The categories of these actors and stakeholders were established in Chapter 1 as NGOs, donor governments, multilateral organisations, military establishments and the corporate sector. The sources used for this study were drawn from the first four categories (with donor governments being represented by their official development agencies), while the corporate sector was replaced by academia as a key source of information and analysis upon the issue being examined.

⁸ A further description of the interviews conducted is contained at page 151 of this study.

⁹ Most of the interviews were conducted with a single participant. However, one interview was conducted with two participants at the same time – although this could have potentially limited the veracity of the views that they presented, in this case it proved to be an effective technique as the two participants were able to 'bounce' ideas off each other and therefore provide more complete information.

participant feedback being incorporated into the actual conduct of the research interviews themselves.

It was also recognised at the start of the research design that the researcher's prior knowledge of the topic may potentially shape the analysis to be conducted. Although it may be unrealistic to state that this effect can be totally reduced in a qualitative study, it was actively mitigated by the selection of the grounded theory approach as the basis for the research design. This established a 'first principles' focus on analysing the relationship between the central constructs, based upon the evidence gained through the data collection activities themselves. This analysis was also supported by the use of a wide range of data sources to reduce the effects of a selective bias within the data collected. These measures assisted in overcoming potential researcher bias by removing any preconceptions and focusing the analysis squarely on the data itself.

The data collected in this way was analysed through the use of a number of methods and techniques. The conceptualisation of each of the constructs was developed through the critical analysis of secondary data types and the preparation of appropriate models to identify and explain the key elements of each concept as a basis for subsequent data collection and examination. This analysis also established the key categories of sustainability and legitimacy that indicated the parameters of the relationship between the three main concepts as the basis for subsequent analysis and comparison. That was conducted through critical and content analysis of the data collected, the use of template approaches (with particular relation to the models developed during conceptualisation), and further comparative analysis to support conclusions based upon the wider patterns and themes that were identified. The results of this analysis were compared throughout the process to previous results, with further purposive data collection supporting the conduct of additional analysis through the technique of constant comparison. This in turn enabled the development of a theoretical model to explain the relationship between the central constructs and support the interpretation of this theory in the wider context of both modern development and the current links between security and development within international relations. As a result, the conduct of the data collection and analysis within an

emergent and grounded research design supports the wider purpose of the research itself; the process of this research commencing with the conceptualisation of development as a dependent variable of, and a basis for comparison for, the influence of both ODA and the military within the wider relationship between these three concepts.

CHAPTER THREE: DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

The links between security and development within international relations can be characterised by a number of elements. These include the evolving role of the state, the empowerment of a wide range of actors in a globalised world system, a confluence of concerns among key actors, patterns of relative marginalisation, and the changing conceptions of the terms ‘development’ and ‘security’ themselves. One key result of these elements, and the situations that they either create or represent, is that certain states are now willing to act in a more pervasive manner in order to fulfil their objectives or safeguard their interests in the international arena. This is evident within the convergence between development and security as state-supported development mechanisms (such as ODA) also function as manifestations of national power in order to meet national ends. This factor is further expressed in the manner that the military instruments of national power are drawn into the relationship between ODA and development: not purely as mechanisms of their basic security function but as one element of comprehensive or multifunctional approaches to the satisfaction of national and international aims.

A key consideration in realising the role of the military within ODA is the development of a clear representation of International Development. The conceptualisation of the concept of Development provides the base for analysis of the functioning of ODA and the influence or impact that the military has upon it. Development, in this regard, acts as a dependent variable in the construction of a theoretical explanation of the relationship between the military, ODA and development. The focus for this chapter is to establish the construct of development as both a theoretical variable and an operational definition to enable the comparison and measurement of the effects of ODA and the military within this realm of international relations. However, it is recognised that the scale and complexity of international development precludes a full and definitive

description within the parameters of this study. To that end, the purpose of this chapter is to establish a representative model of development as a means to describe the influence of both ODA and the military, and an operational definition as a means to assess the impact of that influence.

This purpose is met by developing the concept of development as a particular construct that describes not only what development is but also what it consists of and how it functions. This construct is then applied to develop a model that represents the conduct of the development process and which will also serve as a basis for describing the nature and effects of the wider relationship with ODA and the military. Finally an operational definition that will support the analysis and assessment of the influence of both ODA and the military upon development is established through a representation of the spectrum in which development activities occur, and the principles of sustainability and legitimacy that underpin the theme of appropriate development. This process provides the foundation and context for exploring the wider relationship between development, ODA and the military.

THE CONCEPT OF DEVELOPMENT

‘Development’ has been called the central organizing concept of our time.

Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton (2000 [1995], p. 27)

The passing of the Cold War has drawn an important symbolic line between the past and the present. Development policy need not attempt anything significantly new; the fact that former constraints are said to have disappeared is sufficient to cast existing efforts in a new light.”

Mark Duffield (2001, p. 119)

Development is a contested concept within international relations as it embodies a multiplicity of interests, aspects and activities. Its dominant characteristic as a concept is its dynamic nature as it constantly evolves to incorporate new circumstances, imperatives and ideologies. This has the effect that it cannot be viewed as a homogenous or exact construct but should instead be viewed in

various contexts subject to a range of factors and influences within the wider spectrum of international relations. As such, development exhibits the characteristics of the organic metaphor of growth and change, it functions as an open system that interacts with a wider environment, and it exists as a dependent variable – the function of which can be determined by the factors and influences within that wider environment. To that end, the construct of development is one that reflects the cumulative accreditation of knowledge and experience and is applied within the precepts of the modern international forum.

ESTABLISHING THE CONSTRUCT

Modern development draws its antecedents from the Westphalian system of states (Hettne, 2001, p. 24), being variously portrayed as an extension of colonial notions of trusteeship (Cowen & Shenton, 2000 [1995], pp. 28-29; Nustad, 2001, p. 481) and a relative status of economic, political and social advancement (Hettne, 2001, pp. 27-28). As an aspect of international relations, development has responded to the dominant ideological influences within global affairs and come to reflect various capitalist, socialist and alternative methodologies in the post-war and post-colonial period since 1945¹⁰. The key effect of this was that, at the end of the Cold War, the theory and conduct of development was a cumulative expression of a diverse range of factors – describing various forms of intervention and/or trusteeship, and being dominated by grand theories of overall effects (Brohman, 1996, p. 324). Moreover, the fundamental assumptions underlying the conduct of development were also being challenged by post-modern critiques that queried the form, viability and validity of the concept itself (Desai & Potter, 2002b, p. 1; Hettne, 2002, p. 9). These critiques not only reflected the maturation and examination of development as a concept but, as they encompassed a wider scope of referent objects and range of activities, they also facilitated its adaptation to the new context of post-Cold War international relations.

¹⁰ These methodologies were expressed through a range of classical, dependency and alternative theories and approaches that emphasised different fundamental rationales and referent objects for development (Potter, 2002, p. 62; Willis, 2005, p. 27).

The evolution of the concept of development in the post-Cold War period was shaped by a new pervasiveness in international relations with an increasing role in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction (Duffield, 2002, p. 765; Menocal & Kilpatrick, 2005, p. 725), a mainstream focus on the sustainability of action and effect (C. Thomas, 2005, p. 659), the empowerment of new forms of intervention or assistance¹¹, and the further (partial) incorporation of both alternative and orthodox views within the conduct of mainstream approaches which incorporates a range of scales and levels (C. Thomas, 2005, pp. 659-661). As a result, development has been expressed in a variety of forms that influence its practice and conduct – conceptions that reflect particular sets of social and political values (C. Thomas, 2005, p. 649). Development in this context can be variously seen as an objective (Willis, 2005, p. 200), a concern with inequality or relative freedom (Hettne, 2002, p. 11; Sen, 1999, p. xii), a normative concept in that it says what *should be* (Seers, 2000 [1979], p. 190), an area of study (Schuurman, 2000, p. 7), and/or a field of human endeavour and social change (A. Thomas, 2000, p. 29). However, these elements only describe aspects of the wider concept of development. The construct of development extends beyond these simple representations to address the base characteristics of the phenomenon itself – particularly the form in which it is enacted as a dynamic element of international relations.

This construct incorporates two key aspects: as a *relative state* and as a *process of change*. The relative state occurs as development is not a set objective to be achieved but is a comparative measure of the economic, technological and social status of various states or societies¹². In this regard, previous representations of *undeveloped* have been superseded by relative measures of *underdeveloped* or *developing*. This shows that this aspect of development exists as a continuum where states may move along a relative measure (in either direction); and one which, due to the relentless drive for human advancement, is not a fixed relationship as the concept of *developed* continually moves and there is no

¹¹ Such as the development frameworks established under the consensual authority of the United Nations and the relative post-Cold War willingness of the international community to conduct political interventions for humanitarian purposes.

¹² This reflects orthodox and/or neo-liberal viewpoints. Alternative viewpoints would describe this relative state as being between where a state/society is and where it wants to be.

absolute measure or standard to cap the continuum (Speigel & Wehling, 1999, p. 330).

The second facet of development is as a process of change that incorporates a wide range of participants (Makuwira, 2006, p. 194): indeed, the very definition of development implies a change from one state to another (Pronk, 2001, p. 627; A. Thomas, 2000, p. 24). This process may be consciously enacted but, at certain stages, it may reach a tipping point where spontaneous changes occur with indirect and ancillary effects¹³ – thereby representing the complex organic metaphors of systemic change rather than the more deterministic mechanical conceptions (O'Brien, 2005, pp. 205-206). However, as development exists across a range of circumstances, and responds to a variety of influences through the increasing interdependence of a globalised world (Willis, 2005, p. 173), it may most accurately be viewed as an open system – one which incorporates a wide variety of inputs and creates outputs (or effects) through an ongoing and evolutionary process of transformation. This system not only adapts to changing circumstances but also exhibits a recursive nature as it learns and builds upon previous iterations of the process – particularly through the functions of policy formulation, strategic planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. However, the actual form of the process of change along a relative scale occurs within the parameters of two major determinants: *intervention* and *politics*.

Modern development is, at its very essence, a form of intervention (Nustad, 2001, pp. 479-480 & 485). This occurs as a range of donors and actors provide the necessary resources (be they physical, financial and/or intellectual) in various forms (ranging from direct assistance to the more sustainable facilitation of self-reliant methods of development) which may cause both direct and indirect change to occur within a target state or society. This factor is particularly apparent within current neo-liberal forms of development activity and conceptions of transformation as a developmental method (Duffield, 2001, p. 82;

¹³ This concept is also inherent within Cowen and Shenton's (2000 [1995], p. 28) discussion of development as an immanent process or an intentional practice. In this regard, development can be consciously enacted through interventions. However, other forms of development may occur as non-directed or consequent activity – the process of immanence. This study focuses upon the intentional aspects of development but in the expectation that immanent effects will occur and form a self-sustaining effect of earlier interventions.

2002, pp. 1066-1067; Willis, 2005, p. 208). Furthermore, development is an inherently political process as it causes changes in relative power and the distribution/utilisation of resources (Hopp & Kloke-Lesch, 2004/2005, p. 11; Leftwich, 2000 [1993], p. 169; O'Brien, 2005, p. 262; Reality of Aid Networks, 2004, p. 7) – a factor that is based upon relative rates and scale of change, and the degree of intervention that causes them. The construct of development that is pertinent to this study, therefore, is one of political and interventionalist processes of change that seek to enact advancements in the host state or society: advancements that are characterised by relative measures of status and capability. However, it is important to recognise that there is no ‘magic bullet’ to achieve development (Sachs, 2005, p. 255) and that it is a dynamic process that requires the flexibility and responsiveness to incorporate varying situations, circumstances or contexts (Brohman, 1996, p. 327; Corbridge, 2000, p. 21). This is represented in the various considerations and characteristics that form the development process itself.

REPRESENTING DEVELOPMENT

The abstract concept of development that was applied to define the preceding construct can be given theoretical viability through the representation of the factors, considerations and influences that comprise the process(es) of change. However, as development is a contested and wide-ranging concept, no single authoritative representation exists and it is necessary to develop a model as the basis for subsequent comparison and analysis with the other variables within this study. As development is a social construct, this reification is conducted through the examination of additional research questions developed for this stage of the study; namely,

- Why is development conducted?
- Who is involved in the conduct of development?
- How is development conducted?
- What are the results of development?

These questions support the creation of a model by breaking the construct of development down into components that can then be reified and examined within context. This is shown at Figure 3.1, which relates the key parameters of the development construct through the main constituent elements and characteristics. In this regard, the representation of development is found through the description of the circumstances within which it occurs, the purposes for which it is conducted, and the various actors and stakeholders who intend to satisfy these conditions through a range of approaches, methods, considerations and forms of action/intervention to achieve desired results. This then establishes the foundation for realising the nature of the interaction between each element as a model to represent development itself.




Figure 3.1: The Key Parameters of the Development Construct

Circumstances

The development process is conducted in order to meet the requirements of a wide variety of circumstances; each of which requires different combinations of actors, approaches and techniques. Although each circumstance is unique (Bond, 2002, p. 32) they cannot be considered in isolation as a range of situations may interact – thereby increasing the complexity of the development task. The uniqueness of each development circumstance, however, is a function of the base

capabilities and potentialities of each developing state or society, and the wider situational context within which the development will occur. As shown at Table 3.1, the base for development is founded upon the state or society's geographic, demographic, economic and socio-political characteristics and capabilities as these determine both the resources, and the ability to utilise them, that will be available for development. This base capacity for development is also modified by the actual situational context in which it will occur as disasters and conflict, the relative robustness and viability of a state and its social systems, and the degree of its integration into the larger world system affect the manner in which a developing state or society can use its base capabilities and the degree of assistance that it may require.

These circumstances provide the causal effects that establish the purpose of the development process. Three broad purposes have been identified through the representation of the relief-rehabilitation-development (RRD) continuum. Although this continuum has been presented as a methodology for conflict management (Cilliers, 2006), and has been criticised as both having limitations in its practical application (Macrae, 2001, p. 155) and portraying an inappropriate linearity within the development process (Elliot, 2003, p. 261), it does have a wider utility within the overall concept of development itself. This occurs as relief and development can help to maintain equilibrium within an underdeveloped population (Duffield, 2006, p. 17) and the continuum can incorporate a wider variety of contexts than just the effects of conflict. In this regard, the purposes established by the RRD continuum can be seen to include the conduct of relief activities that provide succour and safeguard lives in the face of natural or man-made disaster, the conduct of rehabilitation to overcome the effects of those disasters or other instances of failed or fragile development¹⁴, or the enactment of advancements within the host state or society through a wider range of development activities. The continuum, therefore, relates the actual purpose of development endeavours within the bounds of the wider

¹⁴ Duffield (2002, p. 1050) notes the requirement to reconstruct failed and collapsed states as a step to continue development. This would also encompass activities within failing and fragile states (to some extent) and would complement other rehabilitative activities.

construct and it also influences the manner and form in which various actors and stakeholders may become involved.

Table 3.1: Circumstances of Development¹⁵

CIRCUMSTANCE		
<p>The development process is conducted in order to meet the requirements of a wide range of circumstances that encompass the base capacities of the subject state or society and the wider situational context in which the development occurs. The interplay between these capacities and contexts can take positive and negative forms, and establish the developmental purposes and the unique situation for that particular iteration of the development process.</p>		
<p>Base Capacities</p> <p>The characteristics of the developing state or society and their ability to both make best use of them and absorb the risks posed by the various situational contexts</p> <p>Geographic</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Natural capital •Access to resources (including quality and quantity thereof) •Access to development partners, markets, etc •Degree of environmental sustainability <p>Demographic</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Human capital (health, education, nutrition, etc) •Population dynamics (relationships and composition) •Rural, peri-urban and urban composition and relations <p>Economic</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Business capital (machinery, technology) •Physical infrastructure •Service provision <p>Socio-Political</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Political will for development •Distributional issues / social equity / strength of elites •Public institutional capital (judicial, government services, etc) / strength of public institutions •Perceptions of security and scale of military spending 	<p>Situational Contexts</p> <p>Modifying factors that determine the ability of the developing state or society to apply its base capacities</p> <p>Disaster / Conflict (Civil War / Complex Emergency)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Destruction of physical and social infrastructure •Development in reverse – negative effects for base capacities •Increased rates of poverty, hunger and disease •Administrative, social, economic and political decay and collapse •Displacement of population •Increased threat to vulnerable groups •Diversion of budget from long-term development to more immediate relief tasks – opportunity cost of use of resources •Increased competition for resources •Creation of aid dependencies <p>Systemic Viability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Post-colonial / post-communist states which may lack viable public institutions •Failed, failing or fragile states with collapsed or weakening state and social systems •Increased risk of conflict •Increasingly unable to provide for basic requirements of society <p>Integration into World System</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Residual effects of conflict or vulnerability in neighbouring states or societies •Degrees of marginalisation or exclusion •Degree of technology transfer and inclusion •Effect of debt •Political destabilisation through globalisation 	
PURPOSE		
Relief	Rehabilitation	Development
Establish a safe and secure environment	Address root causes of conflict or lack of systemic viability Build capacity to integrate into wider development frameworks	Expand and mobilise base capacities to take advantage of positive situational contexts and achieve desired development outcomes

¹⁵ The following sources were used in the preparation of this table and associated discussion: (Allen, 2000, p. 182; Burkle, 2003, pp. 96-100; Cilliers, 2006, pp. 93-97; Collier et al., 2003, pp. 13-32; Desai & Potter, 2002c, p. 426; Duffield, 2006, p. 20; Gunning, 2005, p. 15; Hettne, 2002, p. 9; Le Veness & Fleckenstein, 2003, p. 376; Priyono, 1995, p. 141; Pronk, 2001, p. 626; Sachs, 2005, pp. 24-245; Seal, 2003, p. 86; C. Thomas, 2005, p. 648; WCED, 1987, p. 7; Weiss, 2005, p. 13; Willis, 2005, pp. 8-11)

Actors and Stakeholders

The actors and stakeholders who participate within the development process do so in order to fulfil a variety of intentions while exhibiting a range of motivations, capabilities and constraints. These intentions represent what the actors and stakeholders aim to achieve through their involvement. However, they can vary greatly due to the large scope of actors and stakeholders that may participate and, particularly, their motivations for doing so (Desai & Potter, 2002d, p. 59). As shown at Table 3.2, each of the various actors and stakeholders purports different objectives and is able to support them through different means and considerations. These in turn affect the subsequent conduct of development as each participant may focus upon achieving effects at different scales (such as macro or micro level), and through different referent objects and/or development practices and principles. The actual effect that each actor or stakeholder may have within the development process, and its ability to achieve its aims and intentions, then becomes a function of the respective role that each plays within the process itself.

The role that each actor or stakeholder plays within the development process depends upon the scale of their involvement and their relative participation. Although the role of each actor or stakeholder may be characterised by a simple dichotomy of ‘developer’ and ‘developing’ or ‘donor’ and ‘beneficiary’, this does not adequately represent the complex interrelationship of interdependent actions and interests that link the various participants. (Indeed, as the various actors and stakeholders may themselves experience a range of benefits from involvement within the development process, a more appropriate term for their roles may be as ‘provider’ or ‘facilitator’ and ‘recipient’.) Therefore the participation of each actor and stakeholder within the process varies depending upon the nature and purpose of each development context, and their relative role within the functions of policy formulation, strategic planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. The dynamics of the relationship between the actors and stakeholders then shapes the actual conduct of the development process as it establishes the approaches that will be followed and the means that will be employed to fulfil them.

Table 3.2: Actors and Stakeholders in Development ¹⁶

Actor / Stakeholder	Characteristics
Nation State	Represent the sovereign functions of internationally recognized nation-states. Great diversity between them with regards to motivations, capabilities and methods. May function as a recipient, provider/facilitator, or intermediary of development. Aim to satisfy national aims and objectives while representing constituent interests. Establish the legislative, judicial and regulatory frameworks for development recipients in accordance with national policies and development strategies. Provide funding, technical advice, technology transfer and institutional knowledge through ODA and other forms. May be constrained by issues of sovereignty and a relatively declining role with regard to other actors and stakeholders (particularly under neo-liberal policy approaches).
International Governmental Organisation (IGO) / Multilateral Organisation	Established by international agreement and comprised of member nation-states. Include a wide variety of organisations (such as the UN and its specialised agencies, Bretton Woods institutions, OECD, EU, South Fund for Development and Humanitarian Assistance, OPEC Fund for International Development). Function as providers/facilitators. Aim to satisfy mandates in accordance with their terms of establishment (economic, altruistic or issue based). Provide funding, technical advice, relevant expertise. Able to engage in a context when individual nation-states may be precluded but may be criticized as being dominated by a small cabal of nation-states. Reliance upon external funding may limit role (particularly for UN agencies).
Civil Society	Developed as a concept since the 1990s to include a range of non- or sub-state actors. Encompass NGOs, community based and grassroots organisations. Able to represent development concerns separate to the government. Primarily focused upon recipients (such as individuals, households and local communities) but larger organisations may serve as an intermediary for development activity.
Non Governmental Organisation (NGO)	Very diverse composition as have expanded greatly in number since the end of the Cold War. Function variously as providers/facilitators or, increasingly, as implementing partners for other agencies. Aims and motivations depend upon composition (as service provider, issue based group, member based group, etc) and scale of activity (international, national or local). Perceived as able to fill void in government activity due to access to grassroots level, duration of involvement, and perceptions of being open, creative and flexible. Establish international networks to strengthen capacity of development partners and have a key presence in advocacy roles. May be limited by reliance upon external funding and accountabilities to donors. Vary greatly in standards and competence.
Academic Organisations	Include a range of university departments, research institutes and think tanks. Function as facilitators of development by increasing the level of knowledge on development and informing its effective conduct. Support policy formulation and advice, the evaluation of development activities, and able to influence a wide range of actors. May be limited by perceived or actual gaps between theory and practice.
Philanthropic Organisations	Include private foundations and key individuals. Function as providers / facilitators for altruistic purposes. Provide funds that can support innovation which may be outside of mainstream approaches. Can mobilize popular interest in development issues.
Commercial Enterprises	Private enterprise can function to extend the impetus created by development activities through foreign direct investment, employment creation, economic growth, etc. May be criticised due to perceived focus on own interests (particularly with regard to multinational corporations).

¹⁶ The following sources were used in the preparation of this table and associated discussion: (Allen, 2000, p. 182; Brohman, 1996, p. 348; Clark, 2000 [1995], pp. 343-344; Desai, 2002, pp. 495-497; Desai & Potter, 2002a, p. 471; Duffield, 2001, p. 54; Edwards & Hulme, 2000 [1996], p. 358; Elliot, 2003, pp. 262-264; Hettne, 2001, p. 32; Leftwich, 2000 [1993], p. 176; Millennium Project, 2005, p. 208-210; OECD, 2005b, p. 98; Schuurman, 2000, pp. 16-18; Terry, 2003, pp. 281-282; A. Thomas & Allen, 2000, pp. 189-196, 199-207 & 210-214; UN, 2002a, p. 2; Weiss, 2005, pp. 3-5 & 17-20; Whitman, 2002, pp. 466-467; Willis, 2005, pp. 25, 36-37, 62, 97-100, 106 & 108).

Approaches to Development

The purposes and intentions established by both the development circumstances and the actors and stakeholders involved provide the outcomes for the conduct of the development process. These outcomes are addressed by the approaches to development that establish the policies which embody the goals and objectives, unifying intents, conceptual frameworks and measurement criteria that guide the conduct of the subsequent activities. To a large extent, the actual policy approaches employed reflect the different socio-economic and geo-political contexts within which they will occur (Potter, 2002, p. 62) – as evidenced by the neo-liberal approaches that have come to dominate international economic and political affairs since the end of the Cold War (C. Thomas, 2005, p. 651) - and encompass different development theories or paradigms. The motivation for these approaches comes from the intentions of the various actors and stakeholders involved and is enacted by the relative power or influence that exists between them (Willis, 2005, p. 25). However, although there are a range of different policy alternatives, and the fundamental tension between the suitability of orthodox and alternative (or top-down and bottom-up) methodologies remains (R. Clarke, 2002, pp. 2-5), the approaches to modern development have come to be represented by more holistic conceptions that accommodate a range of scales, referent objects and methodologies.

This accommodation has occurred through the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) by international consensus as the main objectives for international development¹⁷. Not only does this establish a common higher intent to all development policies (Millennium Project, 2005, p. 2) but other international agreements have also promoted the unifying intents of poverty-alleviation and sustainable development that focus efforts to achieving the MDGs (UN, 2002a, 2002b; UNGA, 2005): this being conducted in concert with an increasing focus on human development, which itself effectively functions as a as a third unifying intent (Jolly, 2002, pp. 19-20). As a result, there is a common framework for the conduct of international development. However, although this

¹⁷ As adopted at the UN Millennium Summit and reaffirmed at the 2005 World Summit (UNGA, 2005, p. 2).

has enabled the range of actors and stakeholders to work towards the same objectives, there is still great diversity within the conduct of development. This occurs as the manner in which each participant translates the objectives into plans of action focuses upon different aspects of the wider development circumstance and embodies differing conceptions of orthodox and alternative theories and approaches. This is expressed through the function of strategic planning as the method by which development policies are enacted.

Methods of Development

The strategies for the conduct of the development process focus upon finding appropriate solutions for unique development situations within the wider context of development outcomes and policy objectives. They determine the focus and method of particular development interventions as they respond to the wider policy approaches - reflecting the circumstances faced, the characteristics of the actors and stakeholders involved, and the various effects sought. This context informs the conduct of development as the strategies establish the scale, scope, sequence and framework of the activities that will be conducted and, as different actors and stakeholders maintain different motivations and capabilities, the strategies also establish the roles, responsibilities and tasks that may coordinate their efforts overall.

The scale of the development activities is derived from the policy approaches followed and may focus at national level (through systemic and top-down approaches), at local levels (through bottom-up methods), or at a range of coordinated levels in between (R. Clarke, 2002, pp. 2-5). This scale is complemented by the scope of the development activities as they address certain elements of the developing state or society through sectoral, cross-sectoral, functional, demographic or geographic focus areas. The actual conduct of the development is further shaped by the sequence of the activities and the effects that are required to build upon previous interventions and establish the conditions for subsequent efforts. The accreditation of these factors then influences the actual method to be employed – be it a programme or project-based methodology. This in turn has the effect of coordinating the participants within

the development process as it establishes the roles that they fulfil, the effects that they are responsible for, and the actual tasks that they are expected to perform. However, it is important to note that the actual conduct of development is not a homogenous process as this description may indicate. Although current methods of development such as Poverty Reduction Strategies and Comprehensive Development Frameworks attempt to establish a wider uniformity and common purpose to the process, and states have agreed to develop their own development plans (UNGA, 2005, p. 4), this intent may be compromised as different actors and stakeholders emphasise different intentions within the development process – particularly in the manner by which they account for the range of considerations that affect the efficacy of the development process.

Considerations

The conduct of current methods of development represent a cumulative process of knowledge and experience (Desai & Potter, 2002d, p. 59; A. Thomas, 2000, p. 24), particularly with regard to the factors that should be considered to ensure that development activities are conducted in an effective and appropriate manner. These considerations affect how the wider frameworks established by the policies and strategies are put into effect, particularly with regard to the scale, scope, sequence and framework of the activities that will be conducted, and the roles and relationships that will be established between the actors and stakeholders. This occurs as the considerations influence the type and manner of the development activities to be conducted; modifying the intent and broad parameters of the methods to be employed.

Although a range of considerations and factors will be pertinent to each specific development circumstance, they will be subject to the principles of sustainable development and human rights which form the measure by which modern development activities are judged¹⁸. The key considerations that shape the conduct of development activities within these principles include the absorptive

¹⁸ Both Sustainable Development and Human Rights are embodied within the values and principles stated by the United Nations General Assembly at the World Summit of 2005 (UNGA, 2005, pp. 1-3).

capacity of the recipient state or society, the degree of acceptance or resistance to the development activities (with particular regard to issues of sovereignty, perceptions of interference, degrees of local ownership, and the motivations of other participants), and the sustainability of the effects (Natsios, 2005, pp. 7-12). These in turn encompass further consideration of gender issues, the treatment of vulnerable groups, and the role of empowerment and participation. The effect of these considerations is that they guide the manner in which the various actors and stakeholders approach the development process, influence the duration and nature of their involvement, and select the appropriate forms of development activities as the mechanisms for the implementation of the relevant policies and strategies.

Forms

The forms of development encompass a wide range of practices and techniques. They may vary greatly as they adapt development activities to differing purposes, contexts, levels, referent objects and implementing agencies. As a result, the forms of development may be described in terms of location, the intended subjects or beneficiaries, the sectors that they focus upon, the specific purposes that they aim to fulfil, or the level at which they are implemented (as shown at Table 3.3). The forms themselves comprise a range of specific actions and techniques that may be implemented within programme and/or project methodologies to build towards the accomplishment of set objectives: in this regard it is not so much the actual actions that define the forms but the purposes for which they are enacted. This can be expressed through the identification of the various functions in development that relate the actions being conducted with the role and purpose of the development activity.

Table 3.3: Forms and Techniques of Development Activity ¹⁹

FORMS OF DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY		
Urban Development Rural Development Gender and Development Grassroots Development Ethno Development	Agricultural Development Industrial Development Trade and Development Eco Development People-Centred Development Regional Development	
TECHNIQUES OF DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY (vary according to scale, form and purpose)		
Financial - Foreign Direct Investment - Grants - Loans - Remuneration - Remittances - Micro Credit - Debt Relief	Technical - Specialist Advice - Education - Training - Technology Transfer	Service Delivery - Welfare - Technical - Legal - Financial - Infrastructure Donation Advocacy Coordination

These functions relate to the base circumstance and purpose of the development process. As shown at Table 3.4, they encompass purposes throughout the continuum of development activity and coordinate subordinate actions and techniques to achieve the wider effects that will satisfy those purposes. In doing so, these functions also relate the conduct of the development activities to the wider aims and goals of the development process - and thereby form one element by which the results of development can be realised in terms of the various achievements and effects that occur.

¹⁹ The following sources were used in the preparation of this table and associated discussion: (Millennium Project, 2005, p. 46; Potter, 2002, p. 62; C. Thomas, 2005; UN, 2002a, pp. 2 & 5; UNGA, 2005, pp. 3-19; Willis, 2005).

Table 3.4: Functions in Development ²⁰

Function	Description	Purpose / Context
Humanitarian Assistance	“Humanitarian assistance is aid to an affected population that seeks, as its primary purpose, to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis-affected population.” (OCHA) Encompasses direct assistance (face to face distribution of goods and services), indirect assistance (the transportation of relief supplies, etc) and infrastructure support (providing general services that facilitate relief).	Relief (natural disaster and/or conflict) May be conducted in consensual or non-consensual environments
Emergency Relief	A facet of Humanitarian Assistance. The distinction is made between the two concepts, however, because whereas Humanitarian Assistance encompasses situations of conflict the provision of Emergency Relief (or Disaster Relief) is conducted in a more politically benign context and may incorporate different actors and stakeholders.	Relief (natural disaster)
Physical Reconstruction	The reconstruction or rehabilitation of physical infrastructure. Includes the rebuilding, repair or maintenance of such assets as lines of communication, power systems, water systems, etc.	Primary purpose of rehabilitation but will occur to support purposes of relief and development as well. May occur as the recovery phase after disaster or conflict or to support the subsequent development of failed/failing/fragile or weak states and societies.
Social Reconstruction	The reconstruction or rehabilitation of social systems and infrastructure. Focuses upon individuals, communities and societies through the conduct of health, education, repatriation, resettlement and employment programmes (among others).	
Governance	Establishing the conditions for further development and meaningful participation through the integrity and viability of public institutions and processes.	Rehabilitation and Development.
Capacity Building	Rehabilitating and developing the full range of a state or society’s base capacities to establish a greater capacity for development.	Rehabilitation and Development.
Economic Development	The utilisation of the state or society’s base capacities to achieve economic growth as one development vector within the overarching concept of sustainable development. Linked to orthodox views of development.	Development.
Social Development	The utilisation of the state or society’s base capacities to improve human well being. Incorporates the Copenhagen Declaration of 1995 and the people-centred focus of alternative views of development within the wider purview of sustainable development.	Development.

Achievements and Effects

The purpose of the development process is to achieve an aim, goal or objective. However, the actual results of the development process are not so clear cut as

²⁰ The following sources were used in the preparation of this table: (Cilliers, 2006; Elliot, 2003, pp. 259-260 & 269; Emmerij, 2002, p. 255; Makinda, 2003, p. 309; Millennium Project, 2005, p. 99; Milliken & Krause, 2002, p. 765; OCHA, 2003, p. 13; C. Thomas, 2005; UN, 2002a, pp. 3 & 5; UNGA, 2005, pp. 2, 9 & 12; World Bank, (Economic Development); 2000, pp. xi-xx; 2004, p. 1).

they may incur a variety of achievements and effects. The achievements that may be realised indicate the degree to which the various aims, goals and objectives have been met; either as intrinsic elements in their own right or as part of a sequential process within a wider programme of activities. The effects relate these achievements to the wider development process. These effects can be viewed as a matrix of the interactions between the different natures, types and impacts that may occur (as shown at Figure 3.2). As such, the combinations of these effects qualify the actual achievements and indicate the relative efficacy of that particular iteration of the development process.




Figure 3.2: Effects of Development

The true import of these achievements and effects within development is not so much that they occur but instead the degree to which they may influence subsequent iterations of the process. This is conducted through the function of monitoring and evaluation that assesses the results of the activity and provides appropriate feedback so that the future activities are conducted in an effective manner. This is not a neutral form of assessment, however, as the definition of 'effectiveness' and the measurement criteria employed are influenced by both the intentions of the various actors and stakeholders involved, and the parameters of the policy approaches followed. Furthermore, the scale and sequence of the development methods employed may require that evaluations are available to help modify the conduct of development within a specific programme rather than allow the completion of a full feedback cycle that encompasses new circumstances and policy determination. Therefore, the monitoring and

evaluation of the results of development indicates a degree of complexity within the process that may not be truly represented by simple linear chains of causal progression. This then forms the base for the representation of development through an integrated and holistic model of the wider development process.

Model of Development

An appropriate model of development is one that represents the relationship between the parameters of the construct with the conception of an open and adaptive (organic) system that characterises that construct. Although the organisation of the previous discussion may indicate that development can be viewed as a sequential process of linear progression from circumstance through to result, this does not appropriately represent the complex and recursive nature of the process. The model presented at Figure 3.3 portrays development as an open system of internal adaptation as it interacts with a wider external environment.




Figure 3.3: Model of Development ²¹

The factors of development represent the inputs to the process; the conduct of development represents the actual transformation that occurs; and the results of the process represent the outputs. However, this model differs from that of linear

²¹ A larger reference copy of this Model is included at Appendix 1.

causation as it identifies that each element and stage of the process may affect those around it – generating new combinations of purpose and activity in terms of scale, scope and/or referent object. The recursive nature of the process is also identified as the model shows how the elements may influence or be influenced by each other without the conduct of a full cyclical loop. This results in the formation of non-directed and consequential relationships within the process itself.

A further factor that adds to the complexity of development is the degree of interaction with the external environment of the international forum. Not only do these external influences establish the inputs and realise the outputs of the development process but, through the opportunity cost of resources and political will, they both influence and are influenced by the conduct of the process itself. In this regard, development is not so much a progression as it is a series of pathways within the wider framework of the development process and international relations. This is the key effect that prevents a single authoritative definition of ‘development’ and defies a positivist approach to what is a dynamic and complex social construct. Any operational definition of development, therefore, should incorporate these elements of dynamism and complexity.

AN OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF DEVELOPMENT

The model of development shown at Figure 3.3 relates the concept of development as a construct of a political and interventionalist process of change to a theoretical variable that represents the elements that constitute that process of change. This model then forms the basis of the operational definition of development as it provides a mechanism to identify the nature and effects of its relationship with other variables as they affect each of the elements within, and the cumulative functioning of, the process itself. However, in order to assess the nature and effects of these relationships they need to be considered within a wider context that evaluates the forms of those relationships and their effect upon development. These measures are inherent in the Spectrum of Development,

which contextualises the relationship between external variables and the development process, and the theme of Appropriate Development, which assesses the effect of those relationships.

SPECTRUM OF DEVELOPMENT

The model of the Spectrum of Development shown at Figure 3.4 complements the preceding model of development as a means of assessing the nature and effects of the relationship between development and other variables by representing the various roles and parameters that each variable may fulfil. The spectrum is based upon the RRD continuum that describes the base purposes of the development process and relates these purposes to the activities conducted within the wider concept. Within the model, the ‘Development Context’ encompasses the circumstances in which development may occur and represents the balance between the immediacy and the duration of the actions within the development process [although this representation is not to scale and the activities represented in the ‘development’ end of the spectrum may occupy a greater proportion of the spectrum than portrayed here.] The ‘Examples of Development Activities’ relate the functions in development to the purposes that they serve, and establish the key considerations of human rights and sustainable development as underpinning all development activities. It can then be used to indicate what types of activities may be conducted in order to fulfil appropriate purposes, which actors and stakeholders may participate, and the points of transition between the purposes and activities – points that may represent degrees of tension within the conduct of the development process itself.




Figure 3.4: Spectrum of Development²²

One possible objection to this model, however, is that it links activities that may not be considered as an element of development *per se*. This would be the case with the inclusion of emergency relief and humanitarian assistance as Ginifer, for one, notes the qualitative difference between development and emergency aid (Ginifer, 1997, p. 4). However, it should be noted that the key difference is the form and immediate purpose of the activities – they do in fact support the holistic concept of development through the parameters of the RRD continuum. In this manner it is appropriate to link these functions and activities within a wider spectrum of development as each contributes to the overall function of the concept. The Spectrum of Development, therefore, has utility in the way in which it does link all related activities to the wider concept – the degree to which the purposes, functions and activities that it presents actually contribute to that wider concept form one element of the appropriateness of development itself.

²² The format for this model of the Spectrum of Development is an application of that used by the New Zealand Defence Force to represent the Spectrum of Operations (NZDF, 2008, p. 5-5) and has been adapted by the author to represent the concept of development. A larger reference copy of this Spectrum is included at Appendix 2.

APPROPRIATE DEVELOPMENT

If development is a contested concept then the description of Appropriate Development is a value-laden term that may depend upon the observer's perspective, paradigms and favoured approaches. However, the conduct of modern development, particularly as it is portrayed by current international consensus, does establish certain criteria and practices that support the wider efficacy of the process. The realisation of these criteria and practices then provides a measure against which the relationship between development and other identified variables can be assessed.

Appropriate development, in this regard, is both sustainable and satisfies the needs of the developing states or societies. The model and spectrum of development that were developed previously in this study provide a representation of the elements of the development process and their relationship to wider purposes and contexts. The fundamental principles to both of these models are those of sustainable development and human rights. These principles support the legitimacy and the sustainability of the development process.

The legitimacy of the development process is derived from its ability to satisfy the needs of the developing state or society. Desai and Potter note that this forms an element of human rights as it encourages participation – a vital prerequisite to developing self-esteem and self-respect (Desai & Potter, 2002b, p. 2). Both Desai and Potter, and a range of other commentators, also note that one aspect of encouraging this participation is to not try to emulate Western models of development that may not relate to the actual developmental imperatives of the developing state or society (Barcham, 2005, p. 5; Desai & Potter, 2002b, pp. 1-2; Seers, 2000 [1979], p. 190; C. Thomas, 2005, p. 658; UNDP, 1994, p. 18). Therefore the development process should focus upon the needs as articulated by the recipients and aim to develop their base capacities rather than just alleviate the symptoms of a particular situational context or perhaps propel them into a world system that they may not be ready for and which may in fact increase aspects of relative marginalisation and/or disempowerment. In this regard development should focus on a broader base than just economic development in

order to prepare a state or society appropriately for subsequent participation in the global system (Duffield, 2006, p. 19). This is a function of the sustainability of the development process itself.

The continuing benefit of the positive effects of a development process is a measure of the sustainability of that process. In the first instance it is a function of the duration of the process as development is not a quick fix (Natsios, 2005, p. 11) but requires a continued and consistent engagement over time to be effective. Furthermore, the legitimacy of the process and the manner in which it develops and incorporates local participation and empowerment will also contribute to the ability of the recipient state or society to continue to realise the benefits of the development process over time – creating a sustained effect. This may be best achieved through sustainable development practices that embody a multifaceted approach through economic, social, political and cultural fields (UNDP, 1994, p. 13) while all such actions should adapt to specific circumstances (Millennium Project, 2005, p. 158) rather than attempt to apply generic methodologies. This in turn entails the coordination of all of the development activities over time to focus upon a common purpose that seeks to bring primary benefit to the recipient's state or society.

The role of the concepts of legitimacy and sustainability in supporting appropriate development is shown in the Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development as presented by a former director of USAID and shown at Figure 3.5. Although these principles were developed in order to inform a military audience, and reflect the current role of development within the United States national security strategy (such as the reference to foreign policy in Principle Four), they do encapsulate the elements of best practice that would support the conduct of appropriate development. In this way, the Nine Principles form one way in which the legitimacy, coordination and sustainability of a development process can be considered and assessed in terms of its appropriateness. This in turn provides one means to realise the effects of the relationship between the variables representing development, ODA and the military.

THE NINE PRINCIPLES OF RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

Principle 1: Ownership

"Build on the leadership, participation, and commitment of a country and its people."

Principle 2: Capacity Building

"Strengthen local institutions, transfer technical skills, and promote appropriate policies."

Principle 3: Sustainability

"Design programs to ensure their impact endures."

Principle 4: Selectivity

"Allocate resources based on need, local commitment, and foreign policy interests."

Principle 5: Assessment

"Conduct careful research, adopt best practices, and design for local conditions."

Principle 6: Results

"Direct resources to achieve clearly defined, measurable, and strategically focused objectives."

Principle 7: Partnership

"Collaborate closely with governments, communities, donors, non-profit organizations, the private sector, international organizations, and universities."

Principle 8: Flexibility

"Adjust to changing conditions, take advantage of opportunities, and maximize efficiency."

Principle 9: Accountability

"Design accountability and transparency into systems and build effective checks and balances to guard against corruption."

Source: Andrew S. Natsios (2006, pp. 7-17)

Figure 3.5: Natsios' Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development

The concept of development has been established through this Chapter as a particular construct that describes the character and function of the term. This construct has further been represented through a model of the development process that provides the means to describe the nature of its relationship with other variables. The influence of these variables can then be assessed with regards to the operational definition established through the Spectrum of Development and the theme of Appropriate Development. However, these

constructs and definitions do not stand alone and need to be considered with regard to other concepts within the wider domain of the convergence between development and security within international relations. In the first instance this occurs through the consideration of a key instrument for that convergence, the concept of ODA as a mechanism to support state foreign relations objectives within the development process.

CHAPTER FOUR: OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

INTRODUCTION

The conduct of Official Development Assistance (ODA) fulfils a key role within the links between security and development in international relations. This occurs as ODA is not only a mechanism of state support to the development process but it also serves as a method by which the policy concerns of donor states may be realised within the framework of International Development. In this regard, ODA not only influences the conduct of development as an intrinsic process in its own right, but it can also shape the wider context in which it occurs as other elements of national capabilities are brought into play. This in turn has the potential to affect the outcomes of the development process, particularly if the mechanisms of state involvement come to be weighted towards national as opposed to developmental concerns.

The focus for this chapter is to describe the relationship between ODA and development as this establishes a theoretical baseline by which to assess the role and impact of the military upon both elements, and upon the relationship between them. This is conducted by first establishing the construct of ODA and then realising the nature and forms of its relationship with development through the conceptual parameters of both the Spectrum and the Model of Development developed in Chapter Three. Assessing the effects of that relationship then establishes the theoretical relationship between the two variables and provides the setting for the subsequent realisation of the role of the military within ODA within the wider realm of development and security.

OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AS A CONSTRUCT

Foreign aid – the transfer of money, goods, technology or technical advice from a donor to a recipient - is an instrument of policy that has been used in foreign relations for centuries.

K.J. Holsti (1995, p. 180)

Official Development Assistance (ODA) is a form of foreign aid through which Northern donor states support and influence development activities and outcomes throughout the parameters of the RRD continuum²³. In some respects ODA can be readily conceived as a theoretical variable with a discrete operational measure as it is formally defined by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and is subject to an established range of practices and criteria. However, the theory and practice of ODA is constantly evolving as it is subject to a variety of influences and contexts; responding to the demands of new factors and processes of implementation. Therefore, in order to fully realise the relationship of ODA with both development and the military, it is necessary to examine it within the context of foreign aid as a mechanism of policy engagement between states within the conduct of development assistance and the wider realm of international relations.

Foreign aid is one feature of the wider forms of development cooperation and international relations between states. It may be conducted bilaterally by both developed and developing states; by associations of states based upon shared economic, geographic, religious and/or developmental criteria (such as the EU, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development and the South Fund for Development and Humanitarian Assistance); or through multilateral agencies / IGOs (such as the UN or the Bretton Woods institutions) that represent the wider interests of member states as determined by their respective mandates. Modern forms of foreign aid gained a place within development consciousness after the

²³ An example of this is reflected in the five core development goals of USAID which include the provision of humanitarian relief, the strengthening of fragile states, and the promotion of transformational development (Natsios, 2005, pp. 5-6)

Second World War with the conduct of the Marshall Plan by the United States to facilitate reconstruction in non-communist Europe and the subsequent expansion of the paradigm to include a range of political interventions around the world (Wedel, 2005, p. 35). The evolution of foreign aid since the 1950s has reflected both the dominant characteristics of international relations – such as being conducted to secure bloc advantage and political influence during the Cold War (Natsios, 2006, p. 132; Tschirgi, 2006, p. 47) - and the evolutions in development theory and practice (Pronk, 2001, p. 612). In this regard, although foreign aid was initially linked to top-down approaches of economic modernisation (Willis, 2005, pp. 45-46), it did expand to incorporate other areas of the development milieu (Emmerij, 2002, pp. 250-251; Tschirgi, 2006, p. 47). This expansion became more notable in the post-Cold War period as the purpose of aid came to encompass wider notions of humanitarianism, state stability and conflict prevention (Natsios, 2006, p. 132).

The provision of foreign aid within these contexts can be seen as having a twofold rationale – the satisfaction of the political interests of the donor states, and the altruistic conduct of assistance to enhance the welfare of developing countries (Gunning, 2005, p. 1). However, although there may be genuine reasons of compassion and concern, the overriding determinant of aid has been the fulfilment of the donor states' political objectives (O'Brien, 2005, pp. 201-203). This occurs as foreign aid is based upon the conduct of enforced taxation within the donor state (Martens, 2005, p. 651) - needing to satisfy the interests of the constituents of that state - and it is expressed through the foreign policies of those states or the policies enacted by the multilateral organisations that they support (Macrae, 2001, p. 170). In this regard, the actual form of aid varies across the different policies of the donor states (Natsios, 2006, p. 137) although it is noted that allocations increase when security is threatened and that current policies are being aligned with a range of other measures to address wider security and conflict management concerns (3rd High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 2008, p. 2; Faust & Messner, 2005, p. 424; Natsios, 2006, p. 131). As a result, the paradigm of foreign aid includes many forms of assistance – reflecting the variety of motivations and capabilities of the donors concerned.

ODA functions within the wider paradigm of foreign aid as one identifiable mechanism of development assistance. Indeed, Peter Burnell states that ODA “is at the heart of foreign aid” (Burnell, 2002, p. 473) – a reflection of how it incorporates a notable proportion of foreign aid finance and is enacted by the developed nations as represented by the 22 member states of the DAC and the EU [which represents the combined interests of many of those states and is the 23rd member of that body] (Burnell, 2002, pp. 473-474). ODA is conducted in concert with other national and international policies, particularly trade policies, as one aspect of how these donors support development within developing countries (Burnell, 2002, p. 476; Gunning, 2005, p. 4; UNDP, 1994, p. 61). The form and purpose of this interaction is established by the construct of ODA as a form of development assistance that encompasses financial flows and technical assistance; is provided to developing countries either directly by official agencies or indirectly through multilateral institutions; aims to promote the economic development and welfare of the recipient countries; and is provided at concessional financial terms (Burnell, 2002, p. 473; Burnell & Morrissey, 2004, p. xiv; DAC/OECD, 2001, p. 1; OECD, 2005b, p. 32). This construct is one that is shaped by DAC guidelines as to the actual form and composition of ODA (DAC/OECD, 2001, pp. 2-3), and which has evolved to take cognisance of new circumstances and tasks - such as the criteria established in 2005 to guide the practical relationship between security and development within ODA expenditure (Klingebiel, 2006, p. 4; OECD, 2005a). However, ODA is not a static construct, and is best realised through its interaction with the development process within the wider contexts of foreign aid, and national and international policies.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

Although there appear to be altruistic motives behind the allocation of some ODA, reflecting the concerns and demands of electorates in Northern countries, much of it is manifestly deployed to promote the political and economic interests and concerns of the donors.

Alan Thomas and Tim Allen (2000, p. 209)

ODA has a pervasive presence throughout the development process. This occurs as it is employed to fulfil purposes throughout the Spectrum of Development and affects the factors, conduct and results of the wider process as portrayed in the Model of Development. This in turn affects the manner in which the various aims of development are realised and the degree to which ODA supports appropriate development or other goals. However, the relationship between ODA and Development exists across a wide range of situations and contexts. The intent, therefore, is not to detail every facet of that relationship but instead to describe the general trends and key characteristics that reflect the nature of this interaction. This then establishes the nature and forms of the relationship between ODA and development as a precursor to assessing the effects of that relationship.

THE FACTORS OF ODA

ODA is conducted throughout the full range of circumstances represented within the Spectrum of Development. This involvement is based upon a variety of intents and purposes, reflecting both altruistic and political aims, and incorporates a wide range of actors and stakeholders. This occurs as it is applied within each development context represented within the Spectrum of Development. Although the overriding focus of ODA within the RRD continuum is on development itself, as exemplified through international agendas for the promotion of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and the alleviation of poverty (described in Chapter Three), it is also employed throughout the wider spectrum of this continuum with regard to such circumstances as conflict resolution, conflict mitigation, disaster recovery, and economic and systemic

restructuring. Consequently, ODA encompasses each of the functions of development as it both mitigates adverse situational contexts and builds base capacities within affected states. The weight of effort applied to each of these circumstances is based upon the purposes and intents to which the ODA is applied.

The purposes and intents of ODA can be addressed on two levels: first, by developing an understanding of why donor nations provide ODA and, second, by identifying the ends that ODA aims to achieve. In the first instance, the intentions for the conduct of ODA as a form of development assistance vary between genuine motives for development to political and economic objectives that enhance the donor's own relative welfare and standing (Gunning, 2005, p. 2; Martens, 2005, p. 652) – the balance between development objectives and other national goals being a political choice to be made by each donor nation (OECD, 2005b, p. 25). This reflects the function of ODA as an element of the donor's political and foreign policies, while such interests may also be reflected in the determination of who ODA is provided to – incorporating considerations of geographic or historical ties, the presence of common attributes and characteristics between the donor and recipient, or the strategic importance of the recipient (Acharaya, de Lima A.T.F., & Moore, 2006, p. 10; Neumayer, 2003, p. 103; UNDP, 1994, pp. 74-75).

In this regard, ODA may be employed to fulfil a range of ends from the more openly altruistic motives to those in support of national economic, security and political interests. It can serve to promote trade, financial investment, and further regional/global integration in a manner that supports the economic prosperity of the recipient and donor (UN, 2002a, p. 10). This is complemented by efforts to maintain international stability and security as ODA can be provided to support a state's internal integrity²⁴, prevent or mitigate the effects of conflict (Reality of Aid Management Committee, 2006, p. 6), fund global security initiatives (Tujan et al., 2004, p. 32), resource nation-building endeavours and promote liberal forms of democracy (as shown by current bi- and multi-lateral aid allocations to

²⁴ This intent being evident in the provision of Australian development assistance to Papua New Guinea (May, 2008, pp. 2, 15).

Iraq and Afghanistan), and, of recent prominence, support strategic partners in countering international terrorism (Reality of Aid Management Committee, 2006, p. 8). Such economic and security motivations may also support political initiatives, such as gaining support for a donor's domestic or foreign policy preferences (OECD, 2005b, pp. 24-25) – one current example being the 'competitive' nature of Chinese and Taiwanese aid policies in the Pacific (Hanson, 2008, p. 6). As such, ODA may be used to fulfil a diverse range of motives depending upon the nature and character of the donors and recipients themselves.

Although ODA is ultimately a relationship between donor and recipient, it is enacted through a variety of agents depending upon the purpose and the circumstance of the aid. The range of development activities conducted to meet relief, rehabilitation and development imperatives, or support wider economic, security and political interests (or, indeed, a combination of all six elements) through the provision of ODA may be "delivered by a wide range of intermediaries including partner government institutions at national, provincial and local levels, multilateral agencies, global funds, NGOs and other civil society institutions, private contracting firms, individual consultants and volunteers." (OECD, 2005b, p. 35) The actual agent employed will depend upon the relative capacity of the recipient, and the purpose and level of the activity being conducted.

Bilateral assistance may be coordinated through the donor's ministry of foreign affairs, a semi-autonomous body within this ministry or through an independent development agency. It offers the donor the ability to directly engage with a recipient and gain due recognition for its involvement (with particular regard to political and economic benefits) and some degree of control over the process (Acharaya et al., 2006, p. 4; Weiss, 2005, p. 3). However, up to 30% of ODA is provided through pooled contributions to multilateral agencies where individual member nations lose their specific identity and the development assistance is conducted at the discretion of the agency itself (OECD, 2005b, pp. 102, 104) (although the donors do have some capacity to influence the agency's agendas). This has the advantages of providing assistance on the basis of need rather than

political interest (Neumayer, 2003, p. 120), mobilising and coordinating a wider range of resources to address global issues (OECD, 2005b, p. 101), enabling smaller donors to participate in contexts when they may lack sufficient resources to conduct an effective bilateral engagement²⁵, and enabling donors to continue to support development activities when bilateral assistance may be inappropriate or infeasible (Martens, 2005, pp. 656-7). Furthermore, in some cases the multilateral agencies rely upon ODA funding and the provision of such funding ensures that they can continue to function in support of the wider development process (A. Thomas & Allen, 2000, pp. 199-204).

The actual provision of the ODA within the recipient society may be conducted through the host nation government, by in-house consultants and contractors, or by international agencies (such as the UNDP and IDA), NGOs and other forms of civil society where recipient government capabilities are lacking or politically constrained. These agencies, especially the NGOs, are seen as having reduced transaction costs and a greater ability to channel aid to where it is most needed - especially as some have developed to fulfil niche functions within certain areas of the Spectrum of Development (such as post-conflict or humanitarian assistance). However, the increased reliance of NGOs upon ODA funding may give the donors a greater element of leverage over their activities and relationships (Boyce, 2002, p. 71; Weiss, 2005, p. 3) and cause other inefficiencies if they come to compete amongst themselves or with other agencies for this source of funding.

The range of actors and stakeholders, and the depth of their involvement within the development process, is a further example of the pervasive nature of ODA's relationship with development. This effect can be further realised through the consideration of the actual activities and functions that ODA conducts, or supports the conduct of, throughout the Spectrum of Development – a relationship that is reflected in the conduct of the development process itself.

²⁵ One example of this was the manner in which New Zealand, although it provided only a small contribution to UN reconstruction efforts in Lebanon, was able to participate in that reconstruction and be recognised as doing so. (Interview [I006] with New Zealand Public Servant.)

ODA AND THE CONDUCT OF DEVELOPMENT

The 2005 OECD report on the practices of DAC member countries notes the degree of dispersion within foreign assistance and how variations in development co-operation programmes may be influenced by degrees of comparative advantage, political or strategic choices, and other interests (be they historical, cultural, geo-political or developmental) (OECD, 2005b, pp. 32, 35). However, it is possible to describe the general characteristics and conduct of ODA through the framework of international regulation and voluntary association that guides and defines these activities as they provide the wider policies and strategies that shape the manner of development conducted under the auspices of ODA.

The policy approaches for the conduct of ODA are based upon the form of engagement between donor and recipient (be it bilateral or multilateral), the intentions that they serve to satisfy, and the wider development objectives that may be achieved. In the first instance, the context for the conduct of ODA within the development process is framed by the adoption of the UN's MDGs as a common objective by donors, recipients and implementers alike; and the adherence to the principles established by the Monterrey Consensus²⁶, Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness²⁷ and Accra Agenda for Action²⁸. These provide the overarching policy frameworks that support current focus areas such as poverty alleviation and Aid for Trade initiatives. However, the actual approaches used by the various donors and implementing multilateral agencies vary within this framework depending upon specific circumstances and donor preferences as agreed preferences for partnerships, consultation, and support for local initiatives may be replaced by donor-led strategies in circumstances when the host-nation capacity is weak (Menocal, 2005, p. 725). Furthermore, the

²⁶ The Monterrey Consensus established the following factors as key elements of ODA effectiveness: harmonisation of procedures, untying aid, enhancing the recipient's absorptive capacity and ownership/participation, and using the aid to leverage additional finance for foreign investment, trade and domestic resources. (UN, 2002a, p. 10)

²⁷ The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness confirmed the following principles: ownership, harmonisation, alignment, managing for results, and mutual accountability. (High Level Forum, 2005, pp. 3-8)

²⁸ The Accra Agenda for Action was conducted as a review of the Paris Declaration and seeks to increase the pace of progress through a focus on strengthening country ownership over development, building more effective and inclusive partnerships for development, and delivering and accounting for development results. (3rd High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 2008)

character and intents of the donor state can also shape the degree to which the policies are enacted as smaller donors may focus more explicitly on certain areas or aspects of the development context, while the larger donors and multilateral agencies can encompass a greater range of development issues. Finally the character of the approach employed is also affected by the bi- or multilateral donor's characteristics and preferences, as each may emphasise different purposes and outcomes in their specific development policies (either as intrinsic policies in their own right or as aspects of wider forms of international relations). Therefore, although there is a common framework established by international consensus for development policies, there is wide scope for different methods to be employed to fulfil them.

The methods employed through ODA encompass a range of strategies, levels and objectives. Current policy approaches seek to promote effective partnerships based upon national ownership (Rich, 2007, p. 3), improve the conduct of development through the harmonisation or coordination of policies and strategies within and amongst donors (as detailed in the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action), or focus the assistance more explicitly upon recipient needs as opposed to donor desires through the adoption of unified strategies and agendas for action (such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers [PRSP] and Country Strategy Papers [CSP]). Although the three most significant instruments of implementing these strategies are through project, programme and sector methodologies (OECD, 2005b, p. 34) there is a greater recognition that the form should move from project to more comprehensive programme or sector wide approaches (Emmerij, 2002, p. 256) in support of country strategies (OECD, 2005b, p. 15). This also shifts attention from the transference of resources to building the recipient's capabilities and capacities (Degnbol-Martinussen, 2002, p. 276). The utility of these efforts can also be enhanced as donors may coordinate their efforts across sectors and functional areas – focusing on one area and complementing the activities of other donors in other areas²⁹. However,

²⁹ An example of this is the Solomon Islands. Ward, Sikua and Banks (2004, p. 65) note that a range of donors (including NZAID and the EU) work closely with the government to introduce a sector wide approach in the education sector. Although AusAID is also noted as one of these donors, it maintains a more specific focus on health and governance (particularly through

although the efforts of bilateral and multilateral actors may be concentrated through interaction with local bureaucracies and government at the national and sectoral levels, they are also more frequently delegating implementation to other agencies (Martens, 2005, pp. 655-6) which will see such actions conducted at provincial and local levels. These delegated efforts are themselves coordinated to accord with sectoral, provincial and national strategies – a measure that supports local ownership, the sustainability of the effect being achieved, and adherence to the wider considerations for the development process.

The framing of International Development, ODA and foreign aid through international agreements and conventions (such as the UN Millennium Declaration, the Monterrey Consensus and the Paris Declaration) also establish the key considerations by which these forms of assistance are provided. In this regard, development assistance needs to facilitate sustainable development and accord with UN conventions on human rights. Not only does this entail adhering to the principles of Monterrey and Paris, but it also requires the active consideration of other factors such as gender, empowerment and the treatment of vulnerable groups. The current practice of conditionality, whereby the continued provision of the assistance is conditional on certain factors to ensure that the assistance is being used effectively and in such a way that meets the donor's intentions in providing it (Killick, 2002, pp. 480-481), is one method by which donors seek to ensure that ODA is both effective and appropriate. It enables donors to maintain a degree of control over the assistance that they provide as they can influence the actions of both implementing agent and recipient through the coercion of ceasing support if their conditions are not met.

This conditionality may be exercised in many forms and conducted at all levels of scale in the interaction between ODA and development. Policy frameworks such as *Good Governance* seek to support the process of democratisation and ensure that assistance is used for appropriate purposes by the partner government (Jenkins, 2002, p. 485). Conditionality may also affect the selection of

supporting the RAMSI mission). In this way the donors complement each other through a focus on separate functions / sectors.

implementing partners and the activities that they conduct³⁰. In many respects these conditions introduce a further element of politics into the relationship between ODA and development as they directly affect the way in which recipients are able to allocate resources and realise benefits (Boyce, 2002, p. 11; Martens, 2005, pp. 646-7; Pronk, 2003, p. 394). This potentiality has led to an increased focus on local development plans and efforts to reduce the fragmentation of aid (3rd High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 2008, pp. 2-3) – measures that should decrease any undue influence of donors on the specific development process in question and which are monitored by formal DAC peer reviews on the manner and conduct of ODA by member states.

The forms of development activity enacted within these policy approaches, methods and considerations encompass purposes throughout the RRD continuum. The DAC has noted that ODA supports a wide range of functional programmes and, although the largest single programme may be emergency and humanitarian assistance (OECD, 2005b, p. 93), the amount allocated to this area is dwarfed by the aggregation of assistance provided to functions within the development range of the spectrum³¹. These purposes also influence the forms and character of the development activities conducted (as described at Table 3.3) as forms such as urban development and ethno development are related to the policy approaches and considerations employed by both donor and recipient. The actual techniques conducted by donors within this framework are primarily based upon the provision of financial grants, debt forgiveness, and support through training and technical advice (whether purely advisory or the provision of a more intimate form of support through attached experts) (OECD, 2005b, p. 35). However, a key factor of this assistance is that less than 10% of bilateral ODA is allocated to basic health, education, water and sanitation (Mehrotra, 2002, p. 531) – the wider macro focus of ODA shapes the range of effects that it has on the development process itself.

³⁰ Such as the US requirement that agencies do not have links to terrorist organisations. (Reality of Aid Management Committee, 2006, p. 11)

³¹ This is shown in the 2007 OECD Development Co-operation report where total net ODA provided to development projects, programmes and technical co-operation is more than double that provided for debt relief and humanitarian assistance (DAC/OECD, 2008a, p. 4).

THE EFFECT OF OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

UPON DEVELOPMENT

Official development assistance (ODA) plays an essential role as a complement to other sources of financing for development, especially in those countries with the least capacity to attract private direct investment. ODA can help a country to reach adequate levels of domestic resource mobilization over an appropriate time horizon, while human capital, productive and export capacities are enhanced. ODA can be critical for improving the environment for private sector activity and can thus pave the way for robust growth. ODA is also a crucial instrument for supporting education, health, public infrastructure development, agriculture and rural development, and to enhance food security.

United Nations (2002a, p. 9)

The effects that ODA can have upon development, and the role that it may play in the development process, are noted in the preceding statement as part of the Monterrey Consensus on Aid. However, it should be acknowledged that this statement was prepared by those with a vested interest in the conduct of ODA and that the effects, role and influence of ODA may not always reach this intent. This occurs as the results of ODA may vary and it has a range of influences throughout the development process. The effects of these influences may be further described with regard to the appropriateness of the development activities conducted, through their legitimacy and sustainability, as a means of establishing a statement of the relationship between ODA and development – this then providing the baseline for subsequent analysis of the role and influence of the military upon that relationship.

The results of ODA as a factor within the development process vary as it is seen as having a mixed range of achievements and effects. On one hand ODA can be seen as having a positive effect upon achieving or supporting development (DAC/OECD, 2008a, pp. 8-9) and that the various interventions do result in the progression of the host state or society. On the other hand, ODA may be seen as having not achieved its aims and intents as an intrinsic element of development. This is said to occur as the results do not equate to the costs incurred (Rich, 2007, pp. 2-3), the practice of conditionality has achieved limited results (Killick, 2002, p. 482), and insufficient elements of the assistance are directly used to alleviate

poverty (A. Thomas & Allen, 2000, p. 209). However, the influence that ODA has within the development process was indicated back in 1994 by the UNDP which noted that there were limitations on aid and assistance, but that development would be poorer without it (UNDP, 1994, pp. 69-70) – a degree of influence that Jeffrey Sachs (2005, p. 246) has come to ascribe to the manner in which ODA helps to break the poverty trap by ‘jump-starting’ economic process and capital accumulation. In this regard, although the perceptions of the achievements and effect of ODA may vary, there is recognition of the influence that it has within the development process itself.

The degree of ODA’s influence within the development process is not a function of its size but rather a result of the role that it fulfils and effects that it has on other factors within the process of transformation and upon wider, external, relationships. ODA only forms about one-fifth of the net resource flows between members of the Development Assistance Committee and multilateral agencies to recipients (Burnell, 2002, p. 476). However, it has a greater role and influence within the development process than this figure would indicate as it serves as both a generative mechanism to increase knowledge and capabilities for development, and as a catalyst for the involvement of other factors within the wider process. As a generative mechanism ODA increases the sum knowledge of development, and wider development capabilities, by facilitating research and development activities into the process (either through funding multilateral agencies that conduct this research or through the research and policy efforts of the various bilateral agencies), and providing a means by which other external influences may become involved within the process (such as agencies and policies that may represent wider economic, political and security agendas). ODA can also complement this effect by functioning as a statement of guarantee and intent that draws in other forms of investment and assistance based upon the recognised commitment of the bi- or multi-lateral donor – this may occur either through the confidence that ODA involvement may give to private financiers or through the enactment of formal donor policies that relate development to wider economic, security and political purposes. This also leads to ODA’s role as a catalyst within the development process as it can progressively enable the agents that it supports, fund the public sector which then draws in other funds

throughout the private sectors in the host nation, and thereby help to establish the conditions for sustainable development (Pronk, 2001, p. 627; 2003, p. 388)³². However, although the application of ODA can cause great changes throughout the development process, the appropriateness of these changes exhibits a range of characteristics that can enhance or inhibit the role of ODA itself.

The import of ODA's influence upon the development process is realised through its affect upon the factors of legitimacy and sustainability that underpin the concept of Appropriate Development developed in Chapter Three. Although adherence to agreed principles for the best practice of development helps to maintain the legitimacy and sustainability of the assistance provided through ODA, there are current concerns that the actual conduct of ODA can retard these principles. The practice of conditionality within a bilateral environment could be seen to compromise the legitimacy of development if it imposes liberal-democratic forms of governance that are inappropriate to local circumstances, supports select groups and elites within the recipient society, or has the effect of emphasising donor needs and intents over those of the recipient. Further risks to the legitimacy of development conducted through ODA also arise through extending the effects of conflict when it is employed to mitigate those effects (Boyce, 2002, p. 8), affecting the neutrality of an intervention through perceived erosion of humanitarian principles (Terry, 2003, p. 296), and restricting the flexibility and space of those NGOs that rely upon official forms of funding (Edwards & Hulme, 2000 [1996], p. 364). These affects on legitimacy are complemented by concerns to the sustainability of the development process. These can be expressed through risks to the continuing benefit and duration of such assistance as a result of high transaction costs (Acharaya et al., 2006, pp. 6-7; OECD, 2005b, p. 35), using too many channels for assistance (Acharaya et al., 2006, p. 6), and factors such as aid fatigue when initial contributions taper off quickly when little apparent progress has been made or interest wanes (such as may occur for post-conflict aid) (Gunning, 2005, p. 1). These effects may be compounded by a focus on forms of assistance that are easier to provide but do not adapt to the circumstance (such as the provision of short-term emergency

³² Although Pronk refers to 'aid' as a catalyst this effect is also ascribed to ODA as it functions within the wider paradigm of foreign aid.

assistance in lieu of a changing need to longer term development) (UNDP, 1994, p. 79), and the constraints placed upon larger development agendas by a narrower focus on areas on crisis (UNDP, 1994, p. 79). In this regard there are a number of current and potential affects upon the fulfilment of appropriate development through the conduct of ODA within the development process. These form part of the relationship between the two constructs and are a criterion for the examination of any third variable within this relationship.

THE THEORETICAL BASELINE BETWEEN OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

The theoretical baseline for the cause and effect relationship between the constructs of ODA and development is one which realises the manner in which ODA affects the development process and the results that are achieved. This is based upon ODA's function as a mechanism of state-support to the development process within the wider parameters of foreign aid, and also as a means by which development initiatives and activities may be aligned with wider donor policies and goals. The dominant characteristic of the relationship between ODA and development is the pervasive influence of ODA throughout the development process. This occurs as ODA may be conducted for various purposes and intents throughout all circumstances and functions represented within the Spectrum of Development and may affect the capabilities, roles and functioning of a wide range of actors and stakeholders in doing so. This influence across the factors of development then extends throughout the conduct and results of the development process, both intrinsically as elements in their own right, and through their relationships with the other stages of the development process and the various external factors that may influence that process as well. The consequences of these causal factors upon development are found within its effects as a generative mechanism and catalyst for development, and the manner in which ODA affects the principles of legitimacy and sustainability inherent within appropriate forms of development.

The function of ODA as both a generative mechanism and a catalyst for development has the potential to greatly increase the range, scale and resilience of international development itself. This occurs as it can draw in and create a common purpose for a wide range of resources and capacities within the development process and have an effect much greater than the physical size of the actual ODA itself may indicate. These effects when combined with the focus of international agreements, regulation and conceptions of best practice make ODA a powerful tool within the process of development, and one that actively supports the conduct of appropriate development throughout the Spectrum of Development through the principles of legitimacy and sustainability. However, the conduct of ODA may also negatively impact both these principles and the wider results of the development process depending upon the purpose and intent of the donors and the policy approaches that they employ. As these factors may be affected by wider economic, political and security agendas, the role of ODA as an intrinsic element of development, and the integrity of the development process itself, may be compromised by the actual or effective subordination of development to these other agendas. Therefore the actual relationship between ODA and development is one in which ODA can have an effect greatly out of proportion to the resources committed – the nature of that effect depending upon the purpose and intent of the donors and the use to which their assistance is put within the wider context of international relations. This is one element of the convergence between security and development within international relations as it brings a further variable into that relationship: that of the military.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE MILITARY

INTRODUCTION

The role of the military within ODA is found in the relationship that exists between development, ODA and the military within the wider context of international relations. Considering the nature and effects of this relationship shows the part that the military plays within the wider process; particularly in the form of its impact upon the links between ODA and development, and its effect upon development itself. Attention to the role of the military also highlights the wider issues of the politicisation and appropriateness of these relationships. This in turn provides insights into how the involvement of the military should be managed or conducted in the most appropriate manner for the purposes of development.

The focus for this chapter is to assess the effect of the military upon the conduct of ODA and development. As a first step, the conceptualisation of the military as a construct complements those established for development and ODA, and provides the theoretical variable and operational definition to describe the relationship between the three concepts. The description of this relationship, with regard to the Model and Spectrum of Development developed in Chapter Three, establishes the range of influences that the military has on development, ODA and the relationship between them. The description of this relationship also supports the identification key forms (or codes) within the categories of Sustainability and Legitimacy as a means for assessing the military's impact upon development and ODA, and within the wider context of development and security. The description of the nature and effects of the relationship between the military, ODA and development in this way then establishes the foundation for the subsequent assessment in Chapter Six of the role of the military within ODA and how this should be managed in the most appropriate manner for the conduct of development itself.

THE MILITARY AS A CONSTRUCT

Perceptions of the threats and opportunities presented by the international situation shape military forces, military missions, and the relationship of the military to society. Similarly, a nation's political culture and shared memories condition both the military and its relation to the broader society.

John Allen Williams (2000, p. 265)

The formal and legally constituted military forces of a state form one tangible expression of that state's national power. Although the primary function of the military is as a physical instrument of a state's security, it also serves as an expression of the state's political will and intent. Therefore an accurate conception of the military is not one that solely captures its physical characteristics, but one which also realises how it functions to manifest the state's political will. In this regard the true measure of the military may not be so much *what* it is but, rather, *how* it is used. This creates a conceptual dynamic between function and effect that may be realised by constructing the role of the military, representing the mechanisms by which it is employed, and establishing the means to assess the effects of this employment within the wider context of international relations.

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY

many countries are adopting smaller, all-volunteer, specialised forces that are preparing not only to fight wars but to conduct peace operations, engage in law enforcement, and undertake humanitarian missions.

Hugh Smith (2004, p. 186)

Military forces are established, maintained and employed in order to fulfil the interests of the state. Although a range of formal and informal actors may employ elements of military force, the military as a concept refers to the formal and legally constituted components of a state's instruments of power (Moskos, 1996, p. 706). The parameters of this concept are influenced by the form of governance within the parent state as democratic states, for example, maintain the doctrine of civil control where the military is subordinate to the civil government (Janowitz, 1964, p. 3). The effects of this doctrine are reflected in the construct of their

military establishments as they determine the purpose of the military forces and provide the necessary resources by which those forces are both maintained and employed. This is a particular characteristic of Western³³ liberal democracies where the maintenance and employment of the military is shaped by the state's political intents and responses to wider geopolitical circumstances as opposed to other states that are either dominated by, or unable to maintain effective and consistent civilian control of, their military establishments.


The changing dynamics of world politics since the end of the Cold War have had a commensurate effect on the way in which Western states maintain and employ their military forces. The decline of the inter-state security imperatives that were a key characteristic of the Cold War led to challenges to the size and composition of military structures through decreasing budgets and the cessation of mass conscription (B. Booth, Kestnbaum, & Segal, 2001, p. 337; Moskos, 2000, p. 18). These changes were complemented by realisations of the wider utility of military forces as geopolitical circumstances enabled them to be employed in a broader range of situations that was previously feasible. This in turn has seen military forces employed more frequently in a wider range of contingencies, with a consequent increase in operational tempos³⁴ due to a smaller asset base (Moskos, 2000, p. 19). As a result, military forces have had to adapt to new resourcing levels and degrees of political support while meeting the demands of increased tempos through a wide range of contexts in which they may be employed.

The key changes for military forces since the end of the Cold War, therefore, are the changes to their resourcing and structures allied to the greater realisation of how they can be applied to meet a number of political objectives across a broad spectrum of operations. These factors are embodied in the model of the Spectrum of Operations as presented by the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) (Figure

³³ The identity of Western nation-states in a military and security context is similar to the identity of Northern donor nation-states in a development and foreign aid (ODA) context in that both embody liberal democratic forms of governance within a capitalist market economy. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, the terms 'Western' and 'Northern' will be treated as synonymous when referring to a class of nation-states within the wider framework of international relations.

³⁴ This term is used within security and defence to describe the rate of effort or frequency of deployment of military forces.

5.1) which shows the range of operations that a military force may be required to complete within various circumstances of peace, conflict and war. The key effect of this spectrum for military forces is that it indicates that they may be required to fulfil a wide range of tasks, sometimes simultaneously, with various degrees of threat and political urgency. This in turn shapes both the physical construct of the military, as they need to maintain a range of capabilities to meet the demands of each type of operation, and the actual operating techniques used as they may operate with different rules of engagement or, more commonly, as part of a wider interagency response to achieve a sustainable political solution to an operational context. The utility of the military forces, therefore, is that while they still embody the core functions of state security they have to be able to meet state interests across a wider spectrum of employment and in concert with other agencies as part of a holistic approach to security and international relations. This construct is one that can be represented in a more tangible form through the forms, structures and modes of employment that constitute the military instrument of national power.



Source: (NZDF, 2008, p. 5-5)

Figure 5.1: NZDF Spectrum of Operations³⁵

³⁵ A larger reference copy of this Spectrum is included at Appendix 3.

MILITARY FORMS, STRUCTURES AND EMPLOYMENT

The physical representation of the modern military is derived from its capacity as an instrument of policy and is a function of both what the force is and the purposes that it fulfils. In this regard the forms, structures and employment of modern military forces represent the blending of the traditional conceptions of the military (as a manifestation of national security paradigms) with the wider impact of post Cold War geopolitical considerations. This has occurred as the legacy of military structures based upon mass industrial warfare has been adapted to accommodate new degrees of resourcing and support – as evidenced by decreases in their physical size, a common shift to all-volunteer forces, new balances between regular and reserve components, and the increasing degree of gender integration (Hancock, 2000; Moskos, 2000, pp. 18-19; R. Smith, 2005, p. 268; Williams, 2000, p. 267). Moskos, Williams and Segal describe these changes as the development of a postmodern military that is in turn characterised by greater interaction with civilian spheres, changes in purpose to include non-traditional missions, and the greater use of military forces in international missions beyond the strict control of the state (Moskos, Williams, & Segal, 2000, pp. 1-2). Williams has developed these concepts even further in the post 9/11 world under the ‘Hybrid’ model that incorporates broader relationships with civilian components as a further shift from the traditional structures (Williams, 2008, p. 202).

These evolving forms have been complemented by changes in military establishments wrought by technological progress and the impact of new paradigms of conflict and security. The rate of technological development has sharply differentiated the capabilities of military forces (A. Ryan, 2004, pp. 66-67), caused changes in the style of operations (Williams, 2000, p. 267), and led to further reductions in size in order to finance this development (Moskos et al., 2000, p. 5). At the same time, military forces have been required to meet operational requirements that extend beyond the traditional conceptions of conventional inter state war. These requirements are exemplified by the operating concept of the *three-block war* (which states that military forces should be able to conduct conflict, security and assistance tasks simultaneously)

(Krulak, 1999), and the developing paradigms of *war amongst the people* (R. Smith, 2005, p. 297) and *fourth generation warfare* (Hammes, 2004, pp. 260-267; Lind, 2004) that realise different circumstances and imperatives for the employment of military capabilities as they move from conventional force-on-force forms of conflict to ones that occur in an ambiguous and asymmetric manner within and among vulnerable populations. The development of these paradigms has led to debate about the structure of military forces, particularly as these structures are still dominated by the influence of the industrial warfare paradigm. However, as argued by General Sir Rupert Smith, for modern military forces to have utility they need to be organised appropriately for each type of operation that they may be required to conduct (R. Smith, 2005, p. 297) - a realisation that is reflected in the development of flexible capability-based forces that can be employed within a wide range of contexts rather than being structured simply for a single operational circumstance.

The substance of these capability-based forces is founded upon the structures that the military maintains and the manner in which it employs them. Although there is no generic structure as such, Western military forces generally include land, maritime and aeronautical components [Army, Navy and Air Force] (R. Smith, 2005, p. 18), although certain nations may possess other services such as an independent Marine Corps or dedicated Special Forces. The personnel, equipment and technologies within these components are organised to fulfil various combat (operational), combat support (supporting) and service support (sustainment) roles, which can then be orchestrated to fulfil a range of functions (as represented at Figure 5.2). However, although these functions may represent what a military force can do, its capabilities are further derived from the level of resourcing that it has, the style of its command and leadership, and the doctrines that it follows³⁶. These capabilities themselves are best expressed through the manner in which the characteristics of military force are applied to each specific context or requirement.

³⁶ This is embodied in the concept of *Fighting Power*, which links the physical components of a military force with the moral components (such as motivation, leadership and management) and the intellectual components (which include the doctrines that the force employs to guide its physical development and the conduct of operations). The three components of Fighting Power have an interdependent relationship that increases the sum capability of the force itself. (NZDF, 2008, pp. 7-1 to 7-10)

	Land Forces	Naval Forces	Air Forces	Space Forces
Combat Functions				
Offensive Combat	x	x	x	
Air Defense	x	x	x	
Missile Defense	x	x	x	x
Airborne Operations	x		x	
Amphibious Operations		x		
Antisubmarine Warfare		x		
Unconventional Warfare	x	x	x	
Counterinsurgency	x	x	x	
Counterterrorism	x	x		
Coastal Security		x		
Internal Security	x			
Combat Support Functions				
Intelligence	x	x	x	x
Communications	x	x	x	x
Psychological Operations	x		x	
Electronic Warfare	x	x	x	
Inflight Refueling			x	
Search and Rescue		x	x	
Service Support Functions				
Airlift (Long Haul)			x	
Sealift (Long Haul)		x		
Spacecraft Launch/Recovery				x
Logistics	x	x	x	
Civil Affairs	x			
Meteorological		x	x	x
Navigation		x	x	x
Nonmilitary Functions				
Humanitarian Assistance	x		x	
Disaster Relief	x		x	
Civic Works	x			

Source: (Collins, 2002, p. 40)

Figure 5.2: Typical Military Functions

The form and structure of modern military forces are realised through a range of characteristics that affect the manner in which they operate. The key characteristics include hierarchical command structures (R. Smith, 2005, p. 8) (which in turn establishes a form of accountability established through centralised discipline, and a mission or task focused style of operation); an expeditionary nature as they maintain the logistic, transportation and communication capabilities to operate over great distances within a range of diverse environments (Seal, 2003, p. 88); and the relative availability of their assets and capabilities for employment (Kelly, 2003, p. 231). However, the specific capabilities and characteristics of each state's military force differ in scale, type and degree as the capacities and intents of each state differs. In this regard, although certain states such as the United States have the political will and resources to maintain forces capable of conducting activities across the full spectrum of operations, others maintain lesser capabilities that may be employed in a more limited manner or as a component of a larger grouping of forces (M. Clarke & Cornish, 2002, pp. 778-779). This differentiation is further reflected in the employment of the forces themselves.

Military forces are employed in various forms depending upon the intentions of their parent state, the specific circumstances in which they operate, and their relative ability to function effectively in those contexts. The framework for the employment of the military is established by the concept of the levels of military operations (NZDF, 2008, p. 3-1) that describes the strategic, operational and tactical coordination of military assets and activities to accomplish a range of military and national aims and objectives. The techniques that military forces employ to achieve these objectives can be conducted through a combination of offensive, defensive, stability and civil support operations (Table 5.1). Elements of these operations will be present in most military activities; the relative weight and balance between them depending upon the threat, the nature of the task and the stage of the campaign itself – particularly as military forces conduct more operations within the bounds of Peace and Conflict as opposed to relatively traditional conceptions of outright war. This then influences how states apply their military instruments for, although some elements of the military resist the relative decline of ‘core’ warfighting functions (Elliott, 2004, p. 27), the increasing focus on stabilisation operations since the end of the Cold War has required military forces to adapt to situations with a greater emphasis on interagency operations and coordination with civil elements as the military instrument no longer necessarily has primacy within the operational environment (Moskos, 2000, p. 17; R. Smith, 2005, pp. 270-271).

Table 5.1: United States Army Categories of Operations³⁷

Type of Operation	Purpose	Primary Tasks
Offensive Operations	To seize the initiative, impose will on the enemy and achieve decisive victory To defeat and destroy an enemy To seize terrain, resources, population centres	Movement to Contact (advance) Attack Exploitation Pursuit
Defensive Operations	To establish the conditions necessary for the force to regain the initiative and defeat the enemy through offensive operations To defeat enemy attack To establish a shield for the protection of stability operations	Mobile Defence Area Defence Retrograde Operations (delay, withdrawal, retirement)
Stability Operations	To support host-nation or interim governments (or as part of an occupation where no government exists) Create the conditions where the other elements of national power are preeminent Maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, either independently or in coordination with other agencies	Civil Security Civil Control Restore Essential Services Support to Governance Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development Includes the provision of humanitarian relief
Civil Support Operations	To assist civil authorities for domestic emergencies and within designated law enforcement and other activities When the scale and scope of the situation exceeds civil capacities and /or capabilities In support of civil agencies	Provide Support in Response to Disaster or Terrorist Attack Support Civil Law Enforcement Provide Other Support as Required

These changing purposes and emphasises of military operations are also reflected in the manner by which states apply their military force. Most states seek to maximise the effectiveness of their military instrument through the synergies of

³⁷ The information for this table is drawn from current United States Army operational level doctrine (United States Army, 2006). This most recent edition of the US Army operational doctrine introduces the term ‘civil support operations’, replacing the previous term of ‘support operations’ with the intent that these tasks are only conducted in the domestic setting. However, previous iterations of this doctrine (United States Army, 2001), and current terminology from other nations, maintains a role for support operations in the external context. Therefore, this study will employ the term ‘stabilisation operations’ to recognise the conduct of both stability and support operations in foreign locations.

employing separate land, air and maritime components as part of an integrated joint force (Ferguson, 2002, pp. 4-5, 8) while the utility of these forces is also reflected in the conduct of effects-based operations that seek to achieve a stated result (or effect) (Ho, 2005, p. 327) as opposed to focusing on the activities that the forces conduct. Furthermore, states have also sought to increase the effectiveness of their forces (and reduce potential political, physical, economic and opportunity costs) by employing them in concert with other military forces in combined, coalition and / or multinational operations (B. Booth et al., 2001, p. 327; R. Smith, 2005, p. 302). This enables participating states to gain the support of a wider international political consensus for their military actions and to most appropriately employ the specific military capabilities and characteristics that they do possess. These modes of employment have in turn shaped the interaction of modern militaries with other aspects of international relations as the specific forms, capabilities and characteristics that they maintain find a wider and more participative role within the wider international framework – particularly with regard to the relationships that they establish, and the effects that they cause.

ASSESSING THE EFFECT OF THE MILITARY

The concept of the military can be represented by the utility of employing these forces in support of state policy. In this regard, although the military can be realised in its primary function as a key manifestation of formal state and international security paradigms, a more accurate conception would incorporate the broader effects that it may incur within modern operating contexts as it can be employed in both primary or supporting roles as instruments of policy – able to conduct participative, cooperative, supportive and/or coercive forms of activity as the situation requires. The military, therefore, has the capacity of affecting not only the achievement of military security objectives but also the aims and intents of other aspects of international policy and action: particularly when these factors intersect or work in conjunction with the security paradigms. This establishes the operational measure of the military as an independent variable that can affect the conduct of, or relationship between, other variables within the realm of international relations.

This conceptualisation of the military as an independent variable facilitates the wider examination of the effects of the current links between security and development within international relations as it establishes a context to measure the effect of security paradigms (as represented by the military) upon the conduct of development. Furthermore, as there is an extant relationship between states and the conduct of development through the concept of ODA, the examination of the relationship between development, ODA and the military provides a mechanism to assess the wider impact of the involvement of national interests and instruments within the conduct of development. This entails the examination of the role of the military as either a mediating or moderating variable to the relationship between ODA and development, and whether circumstances may change the nature of that relationship to create a primacy for the military over ODA (such as may occur through the *securitisation* or *politicisation* of development). This then requires the description of the nature of the relationship between development, ODA and the military as a preliminary activity to assessing the effect of this relationship and determining the role of each of the variables themselves.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MILITARY, ODA AND DEVELOPMENT

The military has had a significant level of involvement within international and national development since the Second World War, whether as primary forms of governance and assistance in the post-war occupations of Germany and Japan (Weiss, 2005, p. 9), as geo-political agents of humanitarian assistance through such events as the Berlin Airlift (Weiss, 2005, p. 9), or as post-colonial agents of change and growth following independence (such as occurred in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines (Pang Malakul na Ayuthaya, 1995; Priyono, 1995; Soriano, 1995)). The modern context of the military's involvement in development, however, has been shaped in a large part by a range of factors, including the developing links between security and development in international relations; the methods in which current forms of ODA can generate economic,

security and political ends through development activities; and the changing conceptions of security that move from traditional forms to those that promote *human security* as the objective. Furthermore, the way in which this relationship plays out is also affected by the circumstances in which it occurs – particularly through differences in the size, scope and capabilities of the various participants. Therefore, it is appropriate to describe the nature of the relationship between the military, ODA and development through the context in which it occurs (as portrayed by the Spectrum of Development) and the process in which it is enacted (as portrayed by the Model of Development) to establish a general understanding of that relationship before assessing its effects.

THE CONTEXT OF THE RELATIONSHIP

The context for the relationship between the military, ODA and development is shaped by the manner in which security is enacted through development or development-type activities, and the manner in which development benefits from security or the conduct of security activities. In its simplest form this context can be represented by the interaction between the aims, purposes and techniques of military activity as represented by the Spectrum of Operations (Figure 5.1 / Appendix 3) and the functions, purposes and activities of the development process as represented by the Spectrum of Development (Figure 3.4 / Appendix 2). The Spectrum of Operations shows the range of military activities and missions that may contribute to wider security aims and effects through the continuum of Peace-Conflict-War. In a similar vein, the Spectrum of Development shows the range of activities that may be conducted throughout the RRD continuum and relates these to the ends that they seek to achieve. However, these two models do not stand separate and distinct from each other as they may be related through national and international policies that see activities conducted in one spectrum having an effect on the process represented by the other (as may occur within nation-building activities). This is one effect of ODA as it relates mechanisms of national power to the development context through the inculcation of wider economic, security and political aims.

Links between the two Spectrums also result from the circumstances in which military forces are employed and the wider ends that such employment is designed to achieve. One key realisation of the range of military operations conducted since the end of the Cold War is that affecting just a military solution only resolves one aspect or symptom of the conflict and that effective interventions support and integrate a wide range of security, governance and development actions (Egnell, 2008, pp. 397-399). Furthermore, this increased integration and the utility of military forces have seen them employed to complete an increasing range of multi-dimensional and multi-functional tasks - particularly as they are more frequently tasked with “facilitating humanitarian relief, social reconstruction and protecting civilians in areas where there is no peace.” (Winslow, 2005, p. 113) In this regard, military forces have come to be increasingly involved with the activities represented by the Spectrum of Development as nations employ them to prevent, mitigate or resolve the effects of conflict. These activities may occur as products of the military mission (through comprehensive approaches to relief and rehabilitation in peace building, peace making, or peace keeping operations) or as deliberate methods towards wider developmental aims of nation-building (as may result from peace enforcement, stabilisation, and/or counter insurgency operations).

The manner in which the military conducts these development-type activities depends in a large part on the nature and scale of the operation and the degree to which the military forces may facilitate, support or conduct those activities. However, military involvement in the Spectrum of Development is not just limited to conflict situations. Another characteristic of military operations in the post-Cold War period has been the greater willingness and utility for employing them outside of traditional security roles – particularly through the support or provision of emergency relief and in wider support of national economic and political aims through peacetime engagement. As such, the military may have a greater range of influence upon development activities throughout the RRD continuum – this involvement being realised through the factors, conduct and results of the development process itself.

THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP

The nature of the relationship between the military, ODA and development is characterised to a large extent by the way in which the military influences the operation of the development process and the manner in which development requirements may affect the activities conducted by military forces. The extent of this influence is based upon the circumstances in which the military is involved, the purposes for that involvement, and the relationships that are enacted with the other actors and stakeholders. This in turns affects the manner in which the military may conduct development-type activities or affect the conduct of those activities by other agencies, and influence the results that are achieved. The range of examples and influences described in this section form the basis for determining the effect of the military within the development process to be described later in this chapter and the subsequent analysis of those effects within Chapter Six to identify the role of the military within ODA.

The Factors that Shape the Military's Involvement

The circumstances for the employment of military capabilities within the RRD continuum extend across a variety of contexts, and types and levels of involvement. The majority of such involvement occurs in situational contexts when the host society or population is extremely vulnerable as a result of disaster or conflict, and there is a degree of urgency or immediacy to the response. Situations such as the Asian Tsunami of 2004, the Pakistan Earthquake of 2005, the deployment of international forces to East Timor in September 1999, and the coalition invasion of Iraq in 2003 were characterised by the destruction or dislocation of physical and social infrastructure, the local administration and systemic capacities being overwhelmed, and increased levels of threat to vulnerable groups³⁸. In these situations the military participated in relief and humanitarian assistance activities designed to provide succour for the host population to help overcome the immediate debilitating effects of the disaster or conflict.

³⁸ Although in the latter case, the intervening forces themselves were in part responsible for the destruction/dislocation of infrastructure and the increased levels of threat to vulnerable groups.

The military's involvement in those relief activities has also been complemented by involvement in rehabilitation; whether as a separate activity or as a logical extension of initial relief support. These efforts help to overcome threats to systemic viability through the rehabilitation and/or reconstruction of a society's systems and base capacities as measures to avert or alleviate the results of conflict and disaster, or to provide support to the institutions of a failing or fragile state³⁹. These measures may also extend along the continuum to encompass the activities within development as militaries are involved in wider and longer-term frameworks for comprehensive peacekeeping or nation-building operations that aim to support the host nation through the full range of capacity building, governance, and economic and social development activities (Dobbins, Jones, Crane, & DeGrasse, 2007, pp. 12-15). Activities conducted within these parameters may be a continued extension of previous relief and rehabilitation, a specific focus on development to support wider security goals, or as separate activities as part of the donor nation's economic and political aims (as may occur through military assistance programmes).

The actual types, levels and degrees of the military involvement within the RRD continuum vary greatly across these situational contexts. The type of military involvement ranges from the formal employment of military capabilities in RRD roles as a specific form of military activity (such as the deployment of a French Military Hospital to East Timor in 1999⁴⁰ or the use of New Zealand Army Engineers for humanitarian reconstruction tasks in Iraq in 2003/2004 (NZDF, 2004, p. 99)); through to occurrences where military capabilities are employed in RRD activities as an incidental activity to their primary role (either by using residual capacities to assist other RRD agencies, such as the provision of transport to NGO refugee movement in Dili in 1999⁴¹, or through the facilitation

³⁹ The international coalition and subsequent UN operations in East Timor from 1999 – 2001 provide a good example of how the focus of development support, and the attendant military involvement, may transition from relief to rehabilitation activities as security is restored and the mission progresses from crisis resolution to rehabilitation.

⁴⁰ The author visited this military hospital on a number of occasions in October-November 1999 when it was providing humanitarian assistance and medical treatment to civilians in Dili.

⁴¹ The author participated in the coordination of the provision of military transport to support NGOs in transporting returned displaced persons from the Dili wharfs to local collection centres in November 1999.

of RRD activities as a corollary to security activities, such as by establishing a secure environment in which other agencies can operate (Klingebiel & Roehder, 2004, p. 13)). The type of military involvement may also form a combination of these formal and informal parameters, and vary depending upon the changing situation or imperatives within the RRD circumstances themselves. The type of this involvement is also influenced by the level or degree of military involvement within the Spectrum of Development as strategic level involvement (such as occurs through the coordination of nation-building or comprehensive security policies) will engender a different range of activities and degree of involvement than will smaller-scale localised actions at the tactical or implementing level. As will be seen with the description of the conduct of the military involvement within ODA / Development, and the subsequent analysis of the effects of that relationship, the level and degree of military activity within the RRD continuum will be shaped in large measure by the purpose and intents for military's employment.

The purpose and intents of employing the military within the RRD continuum are founded upon two levels – the general purposes of the states that employ them, and the specific outcomes sought by the military forces as they are employed within this framework. States may employ their military forces within development contexts in order to fulfil a variety of purposes and intents; whether to support specific RRD initiatives, support other political and policy actions, as a measure to gain influence or standing, or as a combination of these intents. The forces may be employed in order to resolve conflict situations and establish the conditions by which RRD activities may be conducted (such as occurred with NATO peace enforcement operations in Bosnia from 1995, and other humanitarian intervention operations in the 1990s/2000s), or the military may be required to conduct RRD type activities as a corollary to the prosecution of conflict actions (such as the range of humanitarian assistance tasks conducted by UK forces during the securing of Basra and southern Iraq in 2003 (Jackson, 2003, p. 57)). Military forces may also be employed in a purely humanitarian role within conflict situations as states seek to make a contribution to a wider UN

or coalition operation without actually committing combat forces ⁴², or as an economy of force measure in lieu of a larger combat commitment (Reality of Aid Management Committee, 2006, p. 27). The standing nature of the military forces also provide states with the means to make an immediate response to international disasters and crises with a scale and immediacy of response that cannot be matched by civilian agencies – the international response to the 2004 Asian Tsunami as a case in point where military forces provided the first response until civil agencies were in a position to take over. The employment of military forces therefore provide states with a further means by which to contribute to the wider development milieu; whether such involvement is enabled by ODA or instead establishes conditions by which ODA and other forms of development assistance can be provided. However, these macro-level purposes and intents are complemented by what the military may seek to achieve itself.

Military forces may become involved in RRD activities for a wide variety of reasons in addition to the expressed intents of their parent states. The conduct of development-type activities now forms an essential part of military doctrines as essential services, governance and economic development form logical lines of operation within counterinsurgency operations (United States Army, 2006, pp. 5-3 to 5-7) – this effect being expressed through the maintenance of the military components of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). In a wider purview is the conduct of civil-military operations (CMO) or civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) where it is recognised that military forces need to coordinate and cooperate with a wide range of civil authorities to support both military and civil operations before, during and after conflict (Department of Defense, 2001, ppI-7 to I-23; Department of National Defence [Canada], 1999, pp. 97-100; NATO, 2003, pp. 1-1 to 1-6). It is further recognised that the conduct of military activities within the RRD continuum can also assist the conduct of the (primary) military mission during a security intervention (Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance, 2008, p. 15). The actual conduct of RRD activities during other military operations may occur for a range of reasons extending from altruistic motives of force morale (Hull, 2003, p. 43) through to measures

⁴² The Philippines, for example, contributed a 'Humanitarian Task Force' to the INTERFET coalition in East Timor. (A. Ryan, 2000, pp. 52-53)

designed to gain the favour and support of a host population (such an intent being indicated by the term ‘hearts and minds’)⁴³. However, a major requirement for military forces when supporting or conducting RRD activities as a complement to other activities is the need to maintain focus on the primary mission and avoid the effects of scope or mission creep (Klingebiel & Roehder, 2004, p. 10). This is one factor in particular that may affect relations with the other actors and stakeholders involved in the development process.

The relationship between the military and the other actors and stakeholders involved within the development process vary greatly between, and even within, the different contexts in which development takes place. This occurs as each situation is a unique combination of circumstances, required responses, and actor / stakeholder purposes and capabilities. The actual form of the relationships between the military and other actors / stakeholders is framed by a range of related factors. The purposes and intents that underpin the military’s activities may align with those of the other participants, particularly in situations where there is a comprehensive approach to the activities being conducted (such as in East Timor and Kosovo (Klingebiel & Roehder, 2004, p. 7)) or an overwhelming need to be met (such as during the post-Tsunami relief efforts (Huxley, 2005, pp. 124-5)); however there will still be cross purposes and disagreements even in these type of activities which also serves to show how a misalignment in purpose and intent can cause frictions and a lack of effective cooperation. Variations in the participants’ purposes and intentions may also be compounded by the duration and timing of the military’s involvement within the RRD continuum, the level and scale of their involvement, and the actual activities that they conduct, as these factors create different and changing dynamics between the various participants throughout the conduct of the development process. These factors can engender a range of positive and negative influences that then shape the

⁴³ Although the term ‘hearts and minds’ is in large part a legacy from Malaya and Vietnam and has mostly been replaced within Western military doctrines, it is still employed by other commentators or actors within the development process. In this regard it can be seen variously as a reference to a commonly understood concept or as a value-laded term with negative connotations for military involvement in RRD activities. This study will refer to ‘hearts and minds’ where this is raised by other sources as the ideas that underpin it are still found within current doctrines, although the term itself can be limited in meaning and balance.

character and nature of the relationship between the military and other actors / stakeholders.

The nature of the relationship between the military and other actors / stakeholders within the development process is characterised by various degrees of trust and cooperation. Although one feature of the initial post-Cold War forays into military involvement in the RRD continuum was a lack of cooperation between the military and other agencies, a developing understanding has emerged where each agency has a greater understanding of the other and, in many cases, willingness to work together (Moskos, 2000, p. 26). This has led, in parts, to a *relatively* greater degree of acceptance of military involvement within aspects of the RRD continuum, and provided the opportunity for military actions to facilitate or support the conduct of development-type activities. However, the counterpoint to these effects is found in circumstances when the relationship is characterised by competition and mistrust. Competition may occur between the military and other agencies (particularly implementing agencies such as NGOs (Winslow, 2005, p. 173)) in circumstances when both are seeking to occupy the same space in the development context, when their relative roles are not clearly defined or the situation changes, when they have conflicting requirements of each other, or through different aims and goals. This can result in a degree of tension between the respective agencies (Winslow, 2005, p. 113) and, in cases, an unwillingness to work together. However, a key determinant of these factors of competition and cooperation, and the ability of the various actors and stakeholders to work together, is found in the manner in which the military conducts its activities within the development process, and the effects that this may cause.

The Conduct of Military's Involvement

The manner in which the military involvement in development is conducted varies greatly through different situations and circumstances, wider political intents, and the capacities and/or capabilities of each specific military force. The military shares a common characteristic with ODA in that it is also employed to meet wider political and policy goals. These wider intents and desired outcomes

then shape not only what security functions that the military is directed and resourced to achieve but also how it will interact with, and contribute to, development outcomes. This effect can be seen in policy approaches as diverse as nation-building and humanitarian intervention which establish the desired outcomes for the employment of the military within a larger development and political context, and also link military activity to the development principles established and maintained through international regulation and voluntary association [such as the international conventions listed in the previous chapter]. This occurs through the adoption of holistic *Comprehensive* or *Whole of Government* (Gizewski, Rostek, & Leslie, 2008, p. 31) approaches that serve to unite (at least in theory) the various functions and agencies that may be employed to resolve a specific situation or circumstance. These approaches may be enacted by individual nations, international coalitions, or international organisations (such as the UN) – or a combination of all three as nations employ their own whole of government approach within the framework of the comprehensive approach of a wider coalition. They not only establish the parameters and frameworks for the military activities with regard to the desired outcome and the efforts of other agencies, but they also allocate sources of funding and degrees of responsibility, and establish the actual method and strategies used within each context.

The involvement of the military within the spectrum of development can encompass a range of methods and strategies within the development process. These strategies serve to enact the wider policy frameworks and desired outcomes within a specific context. They may include either direct or indirect roles for the military within the RRD continuum and range from situations when the military may be the lead agency for all functions within a certain stage of a mission (such as in the initial stages of a contested peace support operation), when they may be allocated certain direct responsibilities within an overall country plan, to situations when they facilitate the conduct of development activities by other agencies through the provision of residual support or the maintenance of a safe and secure environment that enables them to function effectively (Klingebiel & Roehder, 2004, pp. 12-13). The utilisation of military capabilities in this way may occur at functional or sectoral levels (such as

through initiatives for Security Sector Reform (Dobbins et al., 2007, p. 34)), within set geographical limits (as established through the ISAF concept of Afghanistan Development Zones (Mills, 2006, p. 18)), or in support of certain demographic parameters (such as the support given to the return of displaced persons by NATO forces in Bosnia (Pisani, 2001b)). However, it should be noted that even common strategies can vary greatly in execution. This is affected by the level of military involvement within the coordinating agencies, the type of mission being conducted (such as conflict or peace support operations, or non-conflict civil support), the stage of the mission and the relative imperative for a military response (such imperatives declining as the mission progresses and security is restored / established), and the actual identification of the specific military forces themselves (by type or nationality). This latter point in particular is a characteristic of current coalition and UN operations as independent nations seek to satisfy their own objectives within the wider operational framework, and have great differences in their way of doing things⁴⁴. As a result, although military forces may work to common strategies within the overall policy approaches, the actual form of their involvement varies greatly and includes a diverse range of activities.

The development activities conducted or supported by the military adapt to differing purposes, contexts, levels and referent objects and, as such, can contribute to the forms of development activity listed at Table 3.3. However, as the military is more likely to be included in a wider comprehensive or all of government approach, their role and impact can be better realised by describing the wide range of techniques that military forces may employ. At the upper level the military contribution may include assistance for the coordination of RRD activities through specialist staffs or Cimic functions. These capabilities may also complement or support efforts at regional and sectoral levels. Financial support may occur through military facilitation of ODA grants (as occurred with NATO implementation of DFID Reconciliation and Return Programmes and CIDA Community Improvement Programmes in Bosnia (CIDA, 2009; Ramsden, 2000,

⁴⁴ These issues may be found in considerations of the command status, risk tolerance and rules of engagement of the various coalition forces as these form political constraints that can affect their utility and ability in working toward a common goal (Wood, 2007, pp. 47-48).

pp. 1-2)), the indirect support provided by remuneration through the employment of locally employed civilians on military bases, and the provision of funds to support local industries (such as the use of aid funds through military schemes to facilitate local reconstruction projects in Afghanistan and Iraq⁴⁵). Military forces may also provide situational awareness, security and other forms of support to official development agencies as they operate in an area (such as the support provided by the military elements of PRTs to the civil component (Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance, 2008, p. 13)). Furthermore, the presence of a national military contribution could potentially be the spur for the commitment of national ODA funds to a country in support of wider national objectives.

These financial techniques are complemented by forms of technical support and service delivery. Technical support can be wide ranging from engineer advice on the reconstruction of physical infrastructure or the provision of water during relief operations, to the more long-term nature of the Dutch Integrated Development Entrepreneurial Advice (IDEA) Programme in Bosnia where the Dutch Army recruited business advisors from the Netherlands to support local business development in their area of responsibility (Girault, 2001). This advice can be complemented by education and training initiatives, such as the training centres established and conducted for trades personnel in central Afghanistan by the Australian Defence Force (Frewen, 2008, p. 31). Military forces can also facilitate other initiatives, such as the conduct of elections and mine awareness programmes, through conducting or supporting local education campaigns amongst the wider community⁴⁶. However the largest contribution by military forces, particularly in situations when the host population is especially vulnerable when surviving or recovering from disaster and conflict, is through service delivery.

⁴⁵ One example of this is the Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP) conducted by US forces, although the use of these funds is primarily to conduct reconstruction in order to foster a permissive environment for US forces (Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance, 2008, pp. 15-16).

⁴⁶ The support of elections may be coordinated at the interagency level with military forces throughout a country fulfilling security and information tasks or, as stated in an interview with a member of a New Zealand CSO with experience of working in Cambodia, they may also be conducted as local initiatives in support of UN or other aid workers through role-play and other activities designed to inform the population about the role and conduct of elections. [Interview I001.]

The expeditionary and robust nature of military capabilities means that they can complement or replicate civil capabilities and infrastructure (to a degree) when such infrastructure is lacking. The engineering, logistic, medical and communication functions within military forces also provide ready forms of support for relief and rehabilitation activities; either directly (such as through the provision of military assets to fulfil local needs or the conduct of Quick Impact Projects [QIP] to support local populations and military initiatives (Castagnetti, 2008, pp. 35-36)) or indirectly (through supporting the activities of other development participants or achieving development ends as the result of supporting military activity⁴⁷). Such activities may be conducted as corollaries to military operations or as deliberate activities for military forces in their own right. They may also be conducted throughout both the Spectrum of Development and the Spectrum of Operations, as demonstrated by activities within peace such as the United States Naval Ship (USNS) Mercy's provision of medical clinics and civic assistance throughout the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia in 2008 (Military Sealift Command Public Affairs, 2008) and the construction of Police Stations in the Solomon Islands by the NZDF for NZAID in 2003 (prior to the deterioration of the security situation and commitment of international forces)⁴⁸. The military's ability to conduct the more technical and specialist aspects of development work can also be enhanced through the employment of specialist coordinating staff and Cima personnel who can help to assess and quantify local needs and coordinate wider responses and support. However, these forms of military support do not have to be specialist in nature and sometimes simple trade skills can have a lasting effect (Whitworth, 2004, pp. 18-19)⁴⁹. Nevertheless, no matter the form, the conduct of activities within the development arena by military forces has the potential to affect effective and

⁴⁷ The construction of lines of communication bridges by international forces in Bosnia is an example of this for, although their primary purpose was to facilitate military movement, they also provided civilians the means to move across obstacles as well. These bridges effectively replaced the civil infrastructure that had been destroyed during the conflict.

⁴⁸ This was conducted during Exercise Tropic Twilight when the training component of the exercise was funded by the NZDF but NZAID provided funding for the wood, etc. (Interview [I004] with New Zealand Public Servants.)

⁴⁹ The author witnessed a further example of this effect when serving in Bosnia in 2001 as British Army Platoons commonly donated their time, money and labour to conduct at least one project in a local village during their six month tour.

appropriate development in that arena. This is shown by the interaction between the military and those factors defined in Chapter Three as the considerations for the conduct of the development process.

The involvement of military forces within development activities has the potential for a range of consequences throughout the development process itself. These can be expressed through the key considerations that should be borne in mind when participating within the development process – those that have been developed through the cumulative knowledge and experience of development activities, with a particular focus on the underlying principles of sustainable development and human rights. The presence of military forces can help to increase the host society's absorptive capacity by providing security, fulfilling immediate needs to overcome the effects of conflict or disaster, or (in some cases) a form of market to help achieve greater growth and development. However, military activities can also negatively affect this absorptive capacity as the sheer scale of assistance may overwhelm what the vulnerable society is capable of receiving – particularly in circumstances when development assistance provided through military forces is misaligned to local needs and cannot be supported in a sustainable manner (Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance, 2008, p. 24).

These affects on absorptive capacity may also affect the degree of acceptance or resistance to the military presence and role in development activities as they can create positive or negative conditions. Further forms of acceptance may occur if the host population sees the military as a highly visible symbol of security and development potential. However, the overtly political nature of military forces can cause resistance to the wider development effort as evidenced by the Indonesian Government's reluctance to allow foreign military forces to provide aid in politically sensitive areas after the 2004 Tsunami (Huxley, 2005, pp. 126-7). Such higher level resistance may also occur at local levels if the military is seen to impose development and not provide due support to considerations of local ownership – a noted effect as the military may tend to do development activities rather than build local capacity and involvement (Winslow, 2005, p. 118).

These issues of acceptance and resistance may also affect the motivation and practices of other participants within that specific development context. The military presence in a primarily security role may serve to enable activities to be conducted by other participants; indeed various development practitioners in Afghanistan called for further military forces in 2002-2003 to provide this level of security (O'Brien, 2005, p. 215; Phelan & Wood, 2005, p. 16). However, this very presence may also compromise the perceived (or desired) operational neutrality of those agencies, with the result that they cannot operate effectively. The impact of this effect may also be increased in situations where the military is actively involved in the RRD continuum as forces opposed to the military presence may come to perceive the development / relief agencies as partisan actors and seek to deny or prevent their activities (Egnell, 2008, pp. 410-411). Conversely, the involvement of the military within development activities may create beneficial results for that process, particularly in situations where activities can be coordinated through cooperation and understanding⁵⁰ or when there is sufficient scope available to ensure that roles do not conflict.

The sustainability of the effects resulting from the military's involvement in development is also affected by the manner in which it conducts security and development-type activities. Although the security afforded by the military's presence can support development, a relative decline in security (such as may result from changing threat situations or a precipitous withdrawal) can cause further exploitation of vulnerable groups and the loss of previous development gains⁵¹. Such effects can be compounded if military development activities are inappropriate to the local context (such as building infrastructure where it is not needed, or schools where there is no support infrastructure in place (Task Force

⁵⁰ This effect was demonstrated by the operation of the Czech Battlegroup CIMIC House in Prijedor in 2001 where the military personnel lived amongst the local community, facilitated information sharing, and supported local development initiatives through the disbursement of CIDA and DFID programme funds (Pisani, 2001a). However, the staff at the CIMIC House also helped to coordinate activities amongst all outside agencies in the local area (including the UN and NGOs) and the author participated in two meetings coordinating bids for EU sponsored project funds. These meetings were conducted to ensure that the Czech, UN and NGO activities were coordinated and did not compete against each other.

⁵¹ This effect was shown by the massacre of civilians following the withdrawal of UN military forces from Srebrenica in 1995 and the civil unrest in Timor Leste in 2006, again following the withdrawal of UN forces.

on Nontraditional Security Assistance, 2008, p. 14) or conducted without building local capacity (such as may occur if military construction efforts supplant local construction businesses). The presence of large, relatively affluent, military forces may also create an unsustained false economy through the employment of local workers or contributing to inflation in local marketplaces. The sustainability of the results of the presence of military forces, and their involvement in development activities, is also reflected in the relationship that these forces may have with vulnerable groups, particularly through gender issues and the role of empowerment and participation.

The presence of military forces and their participation within the spectrum of development can engender both positive and negative forms of relations with the vulnerable groups within the host society; often at the same time. The benefits of the military activities may be found in a greater sense of security and confidence amongst the host population while, conversely, the presence of foreign troops (who may also leave soon) may engender feelings of fear, uncertainty and mistrust. Concerns have also been expressed about the influence that a primarily male military population may have on vulnerable societies (particularly ones where there is a major imbalance to females and young children). At the worst, these situations may be expressed through cases of sexual exploitation and abuse⁵², while even more benign interactions may be affected by relative lack of empathy with the host population and a focus on relations with local power elites (who can assist the military with mission success) to the detriment of empowering other local groups (an effect noted with United States CERP funds (Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance, 2008, p. 18)). However, the benefits offered by a military involvement in development-type activities can also greatly assist the recovery and development of those vulnerable groups: such as through military support to interagency policies of supporting the return of displaced populations in Bosnia (noted earlier); or the more intangible wider effects of enabling social and psychological recovery after disaster, conflict or other aspects of underdevelopment through the confidence of increased security.

⁵² Such cases include the assault of local youth by Canadian paratroopers in Somalia (Kelly, 2003, p. 240) and the establishment of local brothels / prostitution by peacekeeping forces in Cambodia (Interview [I001] with New Zealand CSO member).

The effects of the relationships that the military establishes with the development participants through these considerations – indeed, throughout the range of factors and forms of conduct within the development process itself – can vary greatly in form and degree; particularly with regard to the appropriateness of the development activities conducted as measured by their sustainability and legitimacy. This range of effects then has great potential to affect the conduct of the development process itself.

THE EFFECT OF THE MILITARY WITHIN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

It is unreasonable to judge the military in acute emergencies by standards against which civilian agencies, both development and humanitarian, measure up poorly - for example, empowering local communities, avoiding dependence, fostering reconciliation.

Thomas G. Weiss (Weiss, 2005, p. 32)

The preceding discussion has represented the ways and forms in which military forces (as exemplars of security within international relations and actors in their own right) may be involved in, and interact with, the various participants and activities within the development process. Although the military may be involved in development activities within the RRD continuum throughout the range of missions and tasks encompassed within the Spectrum of Operations, it can be seen from this discussion that the majority of such involvement occurs when the military is employed in conflict and post-conflict settings; be they forms of peace support operations or through the conduct of more warlike missions. The types of activities conducted by the military within the RRD framework also shows an emphasis towards relief and reconstruction tasks as opposed to the longer-term nature of discrete development-focused programmes. However, this is a relative measure, and it is too early to limit the consideration of the effect of the military within the development process to these parameters as doing so would ignore the wider context in which the military is employed. The breadth of the military's effects are instead represented through relation to the concept of appropriate development (as expressed by the categories of legitimacy and sustainability, and

defined by the use of axial codes developed from the preceding discussion), and then related to the wider function of development within international relations. This draws together the strands of influence described in the preceding three chapters and provides the basis for a weighted consideration of the military's involvement within the RRD continuum as a method to determine the role of the military within ODA and how such a role may best be managed to support the appropriate conduct of development itself.

The concept of appropriate development applied within this study is based upon the categories of legitimacy and sustainability. The legitimacy of the involvement of the military is based upon the purposes and method of their involvement; factors that are exemplified through the codes of purpose, suitability, acceptance, space and coordination. The factors of coordination also serve as a link to the category of sustainability which is founded upon the results that accrue from the military's involvement, and their potential to provide continuing benefit. The components of this sustainability can be identified through the axial codes of duration, capacity and harmonisation. The consideration of these categories and codes provides the basis for considering the full range of effects of the military throughout development, and the subsequent determination of the key aspects of those effects within the wider realm of international relations.

THE LEGITIMACY OF THE MILITARY'S INVOLVEMENT

Throughout the ups and downs of the period [1990s], many civilian humanitarians argued that military force complicated their lives because, in the short run, it works against the impartiality, neutrality, and consent that have traditionally underpinned their efforts; and in the long run, it addresses none of the structural problems or root causes that had led to the eruption of violence.

Thomas G. Weiss (Weiss, 2005, p. xxix)

The principle of legitimacy within the concept of Appropriate Development is based upon the integrity of the development process itself, and its ability to satisfy the needs of a developing state or society. The effect of the military's involvement within the development process will be shown by the way that they

and other actors / stakeholders interact in pursuit of appropriate development aims. The parameters of this interaction, and the effects that they cause, can be found within the codes of purpose, suitability, acceptance, space and coordination.

The purposes that underpin the military's involvement within the development process have the potential to determine the extent to which such activities satisfy actual needs. At the level of national policy it has been noted that the development agenda is increasingly affected by the security field in the war on terror and that aid, diplomatic and military interventions are deeply influenced by their strategic value in this context (Reality of Aid Management Committee, 2006, p. 7; Tujan et al., 2004, p. 55). Furthermore, although current policy initiatives focus upon the concept of nation-building (particularly with regard to interventions in areas of conflict or fragile/failing states), this is a political and not a development term (Hopp & Kloeke-Lesch, 2004/2005, p. 3). In this regard, the purposes that underlie national political, economic and security aims may cause development activities to be focused on national / donor desires as opposed the actual needs of the recipient societies themselves, or with aid being employed 'to flank military engagement or used as 'force protection' measures' (Phelan & Wood, 2005, p. 28). Such effects would see aid allocated to areas (and in forms) where it is not most appropriately employed, although the influence of security within development may also see assistance provided to hitherto unremarked areas and thereby provide a greater opportunity for the satisfaction of local needs (the increasing aid allocations to, and distribution within, Afghanistan after 2001 and the creation of the PRTs being one such case).

The effect of the donor's purposes may also be expressed through the implementation of development-type activities by the military forces. In this regard, activities sponsored by the military that seek to achieve the outcome of the support and compliance that comes with 'hearts and minds' (such as Quick Impact Projects) are primarily designed to satisfy security and not development objectives (Slim, 1997, p. 136) and may cause negative consequences if they are not sustainable, create false expectations or focus on inappropriate groups. However, this is not to say that the military's involvement within the

development process has a general effect of compromising the suitability of actions conducted within that process as the military has proved adept at providing relief in times of crisis that serves to facilitate further reconstruction and development (such as Tsunami relief efforts in 2004/5), and the coordination of military activities and support through wider comprehensive approaches and country strategy plans can sustain wider development activities and programmes⁵³.

The suitability established by these measures can also be indicated by the degree of acceptance for the military's involvement within the development process. As discussed previously within the conduct of the military's role in development, this acceptance can take positive and negative forms. At its best, this can engender a greater degree of responsiveness and support for the development activities (as may result through a greater faith in the security situation and future prospects) or, as occurred in Cambodia when civic action programmes by the military enhanced the sense of security (Whitworth, 2004, pp. 72-73), gain acceptance and support for security roles and tasks. However, the loss of consent for military operations can cause a consequent effect for civil agencies – particularly when the host population comes to view the military as occupiers or protagonists in a conflict or crisis as may occur in conflict, as opposed to peace support, operations (Menocal & Kilpatrick, 2005, pp. 774-5; Slim, 1997, p. 133). Not only can this cause complications for the wider conduct of development activities but it can also cause a separation in the working relationship between the military and civil actors themselves (Slim, 1997, p. 131).

These consequences also establish in part the space for each development actor to function within the wider process and the relationships that they maintain with each other. In a fully coordinated approach each actor would fill specific and complementary roles that have the effect of ensuring that each has sufficient latitude to conduct their activities in accordance with their purposes and principles (the concept of 'space'). However, the involvement of military forces

⁵³ An example of this would be the cooperation between ISAF and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, as exemplified by the Italian military contingent aiming to support the implementation of the six pillars of this strategy (Castagnetti, 2008, p. 36).

within the development process is seen as having the effect of reducing the space available to other actors, with a consequent reduction in their ability to function most effectively (as exemplified by the principles of independence, neutrality and impartiality) (Duffield, 2006, p. 30). These concerns may arise from the different structures and cultures of the military forces and the aid agencies / NGOs (Slim, 1997, p. 125; Winslow, 2005, p. 114), or a perceived conflict of roles such as where military involvement within PRTs can be seen as blurring the distinction between reconstruction and combat operations and thereby creating confusion and endangering civilian actors (Reality of Aid Management Committee, 2006, pp. 25-27). Tension can also arise when the military is perceived as acting in civil roles (Slim, 1997, p. 135), is co-opting aid groups to support military intents (Katz & Wright, 2004), or failing to meet their primary role of providing security (a criticism of the PRTs in Afghanistan (Bollen, Linssen, & Rietjens, 2006, p. 442; O'Brien, 2005, p. 214)).

Factors such as these can result in an unwillingness of aid agencies to work with the military (Thavis, 2004, p. 6) or cause them to withdraw from the area entirely (such as Medecins sans Frontières's withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan in 2004 (Katz & Wright, 2004)). However, the intrinsic neutrality of aid workers has also been questioned (Bellamy, 2002, p. 34; Phelan & Wood, 2005, p. 21) and, as the military is developing greater knowledge of their roles and requirements within the development milieu, one element for the maintenance of effective space may be found through effective coordination and cooperation between the military and other actors / stakeholders. The military's ability, though, to participate in a coordinated or collaborative approach can be limited at times through the unwillingness of some aid agencies to work with them (particularly when it may appear that they are coming under military control⁵⁴), the reluctance of some elements of the military to work with civilian actors (as noted in the preface), the desire of some aid agencies to maintain a humanitarian or developmental space, or even the constraints placed upon the military by their own force protection requirements which can limit their ability to interact with

⁵⁴ The resistance to working in such a relationship with the military was described by one interviewee as, "If the military are seen to be coordinating it then there can be no humanitarian space because then the NGOs are seen as working for the military. That's the perception." [Interview I001.]

local societies (Winslow, 2005, p. 118). In this way, the coordination of the military's involvement within the development process may come to affect the results that are achieved and the sustainability of the process itself.

THE SUSTAINABILITY OF THE MILITARY'S INVOLVEMENT

Development organizations may be engaged in a country for years and see development as a long-term project, while the military have shorter timescales frequently imposed by national governments or mandates.

Jeremy Ginifer (1997, p. 9)

The sustainability inherent within the concept of Appropriate Development indicates the importance of the continuing benefits from activities conducted within the development process. In large part, the codes found within this category are those that have been developed through the principles of Monterrey, Paris and Accra. However, whereas legitimacy is process-oriented, sustainability is results-oriented. Therefore, of particular concern to the effect that the military's involvement can have within the development process are the results that accrue through the duration of that involvement, the capacity that it addresses, and the harmonisation of efforts in both the short and long-term. Some of the characteristics of sustainability have been discussed earlier in this chapter (through the considerations for the conduct of the military's involvement) – the focus here is to determine the effects of that involvement.

The factors that influence the duration of the military's ability to contribute to a development process include the length of their involvement, the understanding that they can develop, and the manner in which the involvement is maintained. In the first instance, as noted by Ginifer above, military forces generally have a shorter duration of involvement within a development process than civil actors as their governments generally limit the length of their involvement. Not only may their total deployment times be less than development agencies, but the ability of the military forces to plan for a sustained presence can be limited as they rely upon formal direction by their governments to extend their presence – the frequency and (possibly) short-term nature of this review process restricting the amount of detailed long-term planning that can be conducted in conjunction with

other agencies⁵⁵. Furthermore, the military forces have a relatively high cycle rate through an area in comparison to civil agencies as they complete (more common) six to (less common) eighteen month deployments. This limits the relative degree of knowledge that they can develop of an area, their ability to build up relationships with local participants (Last, 2005, p. 101), and can create tensions with NGOs who maintain a longer-term presence or view (Winslow, 2005, p. 120). This relatively transitory presence can therefore limit the ability of the military forces to develop an accurate understanding of local development requirements or the purposes, intents and capabilities of other participants; or to effectively coordinate with them.

The manner in which the military's involvement is maintained can also affect the long-term results of the development process. It has been noted that interventions that have not been designed to be sustainable have created aid dependencies (Desai & Potter, 2002c, p. 425). This is not limited to military interventions in times of conflict or crisis as even activities such as the USNS Mercy's provision of medical clinics in Southeast Asia in 2008 could have the effect of creating false expectations or leaving an unsupported legacy if not tied into a larger long-term plan. Similarly, the military's role as an element of national security and foreign policy can reduce the degree of guaranteed commitment that it can provide to a local development context as it may be re-tasked elsewhere – as evidenced by the shift in focus from the reconstruction of Afghanistan to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Tujan et al., 2004, p. 67). The dependency or expectations that may be created by initial military involvement in these regards can lead to gaps in the RRD effort and consequent ill-will (by both recipients and providers). When linked with the relatively shorter time-scale of military involvement in the development process this creates pressure for the points of transition to be effectively managed to ensure that these gaps and effects do not arise.

⁵⁵ This effect was noted with regard to the frequency with which the commitment of the New Zealand PRT to Afghanistan is renewed (Interview [I004] with a New Zealand Public Servant), with the interviewee stating that a three to five year commitment would be better [than the then (2006) yearly extensions].

A second element of the military's involvement is the manner in which it is funded. This is a particularly contentious issue as agencies compete for funds from donors and military involvement may reduce the amount of funding available to civil agencies – the military's involvement representing an opportunity cost for the funding of other agencies and realisation of other benefits. This effect has been noted as United States ODA has increasingly been applied to support military actions in the RRD continuum (such as through the provision of CERP funds⁵⁶), and the Cimic activities of the German Bundeswehr are not only funded in part by German ODA but they also compete for funding from other sources and come into competition with NGOs (Klingebiel & Roehder, 2004, p. 17). In this regard, although civil organisations claim to be cheaper (Slim, 1997, p. 137), the military may secure funding because of the political designs for their involvement or, if they are already employed in a location for security related roles, the marginal costs of additional involvement in the RRD continuum can be relatively less. The effect of this funding may then have the effect of reducing the scale and benefits of development activities if a full range of long-term civil actors are unable to participate, and it may also result in the precipitate withdrawal of funding for a development context as the military is withdrawn at the end of its mission – either as a form of aid fatigue or if the withdrawal of the military represents a logical opportunity for donors to reallocate funding to other, higher visibility, areas. However, the funding of development activities either conducted or facilitated by the military may represent positive effects if it is coordinated with wider policies and strategies or is conducted when the military provides initial support to a situation before the civil agencies are able to do so. These effects are realised not only through the duration of the military's involvement and the benefits that accrue, but also through the capacity that is developed or addressed in doing so.

One measure of the sustainability of the military's involvement within the development process is the degree to which it addresses the base capacities of the state or society in question. In this regard, do the activities and plans conducted by military forces focus on providing symptomatic relief for the development

⁵⁶ Indeed, by 2005 it was assessed that the United States Department of Defense supplied more than one-fifth of all US ODA (Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance, 2008, p. 33).

circumstance or do they address the fundamental causes of this circumstance? This includes consideration of not only the discussion earlier in the chapter about the sustainability of the military's conduct within the RRD continuum (through such factors as their relationship with vulnerable groups, the continued provision of security, and contributions to inflation) but also the degree to which the military may focus on short-term fixes as opposed to the longer-term focus on enabling the host society to best utilise or develop its geographic, demographic, economic and socio-political resources. This is one key effect of the relatively short-term nature of military employment and the potential results of military activities focusing on gaining an immediate level of support or improvement in the local situation. However, the effective utilisation of military capabilities within integrated plans that address the wider development spectrum (such as by conducting supporting security sector reform or acting to implement parts of other long-term initiatives) does provide the potential for the military's involvement to contribute to a sustainable effect in the long-term. The military's ability to work within these wider plans and with the other agencies who help to control and implement them forms the final element of this consideration of sustainability – harmonisation.

Although this harmonisation of plans and efforts is effected through coordinated action with each agency playing a role within a specific part of the spectrum of development or stage within the development process, the military's ability to achieve this degree of cooperation can be limited by a range of factors. These include the sense of competition that may develop between military and civil agencies, the primacy of the mission for military activities, or the relative inappropriateness of mission-focused military command structures when functioning in an inter-agency environment that may require greater attention to consensus building (Reality of Aid Management Committee, 2006, p. 25). Wider systemic efforts have been made to address any lack of harmony or cooperative effort through current military and inter-agency focuses towards 3D (defence, development and diplomacy), JIMP (joint, interagency, multinational and public) or MASD (military assistance, security and development) structures and doctrines (Dannatt, 2008, p. 60; Gizewski & Rostek, 2007, p. 55; Manwaring, 2006, p. 1). However, although these methodologies are developing in light of

current circumstances, they either maintain or are heavily influenced by a military and/or national policy focus. The effect of these focuses on the ability of the military to work in a harmonised manner with other actors and stakeholders is one element of the wider effects of the military's involvement within the spectrum of development.

THE WIDER EFFECTS OF THE MILITARY'S INVOLVEMENT

The new relationship between development and security policy is not bound to result in the subordination and securitization of development policy.

Stephan Klingebiel (2006, p. 5)

Development cannot be made an appendage to the war on terrorism

Antonio Tujan, Audrey Gaughran and Howard Mollett (2004, p. 54)

The context for the effects of military involvement within ODA and development is found within the wider interplay between security, political and development policies within international relations. In many respects, the involvement of the military within ODA and development serves as an exemplar of the securitisation and/or politicisation of development as it shows how development policy may be amended or subordinated by the involvement of other policy arenas. Although the threats that this may pose to the conduct of development and development policy are readily apparent, they may be balanced by the opportunities that a coherent approach across all policy fields can create. This provides the wider framework for understanding the effects of the military's involvement within development and the role that it may play in supporting development objectives.

Phelan and Wood (2005, p. 9) note that "Aid has always been political." As has been discussed throughout this study, the foreign aid provided by a state does have wider non-developmental purposes, such as supporting other economic, political and security objectives. However, recent initiatives for nation-building and the use of geo-strategic selection criteria for the allocation of aid and development assistance, such as may be conducted through the auspices of the international 'war on terror' (Reality of Aid Management Committee, 2006, p. 7), have had corollary effects in that development is becoming politicised by

other policy objectives or securitised by the emphasis placed on its role in supporting security policies or actors. This has resulted in concerns about the continued integrity of development policy and actions as they may be subordinated to strategic concerns and military interests (Klingebiel, 2006, p. 5), losing their relative degrees of independence and neutrality, and that the key objectives of their policies may be supplanted by measures to support security and political initiatives (Reality of Aid Management Committee, 2006, p. 4; Tujan et al., 2004, p. 62). These effects can find expression in the allocation of funding as it may be focused on security, as opposed to more purely developmental, ends (CIDSE, 2006, p. 14); the criteria by which development interventions are decided and/or facilitated through security and military means (Tujan et al., 2004, p. 55); to a more formal acceptance of the role that development policy can play in satisfying security needs (as shown by the OECD's 'Development co-operation lens on terrorism prevention (DAC/OECD, 2003)).

The counterpoint to these threats to the appropriate conduct of development are the opportunities that linkages with political and security factors may offer. Phelan and Wood (2005, p. 29) note later in their study on civil-military relations that "coherence between aid, politics, trade, diplomacy and military activities [can be an] effective way of achieving long term global security and development." In this regard, the association of development policy with the other fields offers the benefit of greater access to research and development (particularly as bilateral aid agencies, academic departments, and research corporations such as Rand now focus more attention to nation-building and similar endeavours), a greater degree of commitment as donor states apply an interagency approach to a given situation, and the opportunity to conduct more fundraising through the increased profile that comprehensive responses to development contexts may give development and aid agencies. In this regard, the theory and practice of development may gain positive benefits through interacting with counterparts in the political and security arenas.

The key question that arises for development from these issues of politicisation and securitisation is whether it is the recipient state or society that is the actual

referent object of development, or is development more correctly assessed as an element of wider national policies? To this end, does development focus on benefits to the recipient or to the donor? Extant development policy and the concept of Appropriate Development would emphasise the former view while, pragmatically, there is a need to consider the latter as development forms but one stand of national and multilateral policies within international relations. Therefore, the question now becomes, with development as the goal, and mindful of the constraints of other national policies, what is the role of the military within ODA and how can the involvement of the military within ODA be conducted in the most appropriate manner for development?

CHAPTER SIX: THE ROLE AND MANAGEMENT OF THE MILITARY WITHIN ODA

INTRODUCTION

This study has been structured through a theory generation approach to answer the research question of, '*what is the role of the military in ODA*'; and then to relate that answer to the wider effects of the convergence between development and security within international relations. The preceding analysis of development, ODA and the military has established the criteria of each as a separate construct, represented those constructs as operational definitions, and then applied these definitions to describe the nature and effects of the relationships between them. The further analysis of these factors within the wider relationship between development and security then provides the framework to identify the role of the military within ODA and describe how that role could be both managed and conducted in a way that is most appropriate for development itself.

The focus for this chapter is to identify the role of the military and then consider how that role may best be managed within, and applied to, the development process. In the first instance, this is achieved by developing a general theory of the influence of the military upon the causal relationship between ODA and development. This is conducted by re-examining the descriptions of the nature and effects of the relationship between the military, ODA and development provided in Chapter Five, further analysing them with regard to the roles that the military may fulfil, and then assessing the influence that the military in those roles has upon the relationship between ODA and development that was established as a theoretical baseline in Chapter Four. The utility and meaning of this theory is then examined within the wider context of the relationship between development and security to determine both when and how the military may be employed in these roles. This in turn provides the foundation for establishing the policies, parameters and procedures that could be put in place to increase the

potential for the military's roles to be fulfilled in a manner most appropriate for the conduct of development.

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY WITHIN ODA

Effective military intervention in war zones relieves life-threatening suffering by providing emergency assistance and protecting fundamental human rights

Thomas G. Weiss (2005, p. 31)

including the disbursements [of ODA] for a broader range of activities for military aspects of peace operations or for the prevention of terrorism will only dilute the public understanding of the purpose of aid. It would effectively divert scarce ODA resources from poverty eradication

Reality of Aid Management Committee (2006, p. 14)

The preceding quotations indicate the range of opinion that exists when considering the involvement of the military within ODA and development. The actual role of the military within ODA, as a current factor of international relations, is not clear cut but reflects a range of influences and effects. These are based upon the manner in which the military is employed and the influence that this then has upon the relationship between ODA and development. The foundation for determining the parameters of this role comes both from the definition of ODA and development as individual constructs and the description of the relationship between them.

This theoretical baseline establishes the context to examine the ways in which the military interacts with the conduct of ODA through the circumstances in which it occurs (Spectrum of Operations) and the functions that it fulfils (Spectrum of Development). This then provides the means to relate the involvement of the military to the causal relationship between ODA and development, and to determine its influence as a moderating, mediating or independent variable. This provides the theoretical relationship between the military, ODA and development and, as a statement of the role of the military within ODA, provides the means to consider how the military's involvement may be conducted in a manner appropriate for development itself.

RELATING THE CONSTRUCTS

The constructs that have been developed for development, ODA and the military provide the means for assessing the influence that each has on the other. The first step in this process is to re-examine those constructs and the established relationship (baseline) between them as a base for exploring the range of roles that the military may have within this relationship. These roles are developed through analysing the military's involvement within ODA and development through the conceptual parameters of the Spectrum of Operations and the Spectrum of Development. This analysis develops upon the descriptions of the nature and effects of that involvement within Chapter Five and provides the foundation for then assessing the influence that the military has upon the causal relationship between ODA and development.

This study has developed the construct of ODA as, *a form of development assistance that encompasses financial flows and technical assistance; is provided to developing countries either directly by official agencies or indirectly through multilateral institutions; aims to promote the economic development and welfare of the recipient countries; and is provided at concessional financial terms*. This is a specific construct of the wider concept of ODA as it also functions within the broader parameters of foreign aid as a mechanism of policy engagement between nation-states. However, as stated earlier in Chapter Four, ODA is not a static construct and it is best realised through its interaction with the development process. This process has been represented in Chapter Three (Figure 3.3 / Appendix 1) as an open system of internal adaptation that has a recursive nature and interacts with elements of its external environment throughout its inputs, transformative processes and results. The construct that underpins this process within the bounds of this study describes development as, *political and interventionalist processes of change that seek to enact advancements in the host state or society: advancements that are characterised by relative measures of status and capability*. In this regard ODA may be viewed as an independent variable that has a causal effect upon development (as the dependent or affected variable).

The form of the relationship between ODA and development has been developed as a theoretical baseline in Chapter Four after considering the effects of ODA upon development. The key elements of this baseline are the pervasiveness of ODA throughout the development process, the effects that accrue from ODA's function as a generative mechanism and a catalyst for development, and the manner in which ODA affects the principles of legitimacy and sustainability. These elements also provide the basis for measuring the influence of a third variable upon that relationship: in this case that variable is the military.

The military can be defined as a construct as, *the formal and legally constituted forces of a nation-state that form one tangible expression of that state's national power, and, as an instrument of a state's security, it also serves as an expression of the state's political will and intent*. However, this a very narrow definition and the military is better considered with regard to the utility that its structures and capabilities have when employed in a variety of contexts in support of state policy - whether this be as a key manifestation of state and international security paradigms or in support of broader policy actions. In this regard the employment of the military within the context of ODA and development has the potential for a range of influences and effects. These may occur as the military is employed to fulfil policy requirements through both the Spectrum of Operations and the Spectrum of Development.

The Employment of the Military within the Spectrum of Operations

Military forces may be involved with ODA and development to meet a variety of circumstances and fulfil a range of functions. The nature and effects of this relationship have been described in Chapter Five. Although the military may conduct activities in support of national ODA aims and actions throughout the circumstances represented in The Spectrum of Operations (Figure 5.1 / Appendix 3), the form and weighting of this involvement does change depending upon the situation itself. During Operations in Peace the military may form a relatively minor component of a nation's development assistance, such as by implementing construction projects, conducting civic action tasks, or providing skills and trade

training for members of other military forces⁵⁷. However, as the circumstances move from the benign to encompass operations other than war, the role for the military may become greater within specific situational contexts.

Military roles may become more involved as a form of assistance when the operating environment exhibits increasing potential for lethality, moving from peace through to the conduct of operations other than war. Comprehensive security initiatives and the involvement of military forces within Peace Support Operations (PSO) designed to prevent, mitigate or resolve conflict may require the military to develop a greater degree of involvement within the RRD continuum. In these circumstances the military may come into contact with a wide range of actors and stakeholders; either indirectly as they provide a safe and secure environment for other work to take place or provide residual support to RRD activities with capacity not being employed for the security mission; or more directly as they conduct deliberate actions within the RRD continuum itself. The military's involvement with ODA during periods of indirect involvement would be relatively minor and may be limited to such actions as providing transport support to the movement of ODA-supplied stores, and so forth. However, the military may have a greater degree of interaction with ODA as it provides direct forms of support.

The implementation of combined military / national development agency programmes (such as the DFID and CIDA sponsored programmes in Bosnia) or the provision of military-humanitarian assistance capabilities (such as medical facilities in East Timor) can see the military employed in not just implementing ODA programmes but, in certain limited respects, helping to plan and coordinate this implementation. This degree of involvement may increase further if the security situation becomes more warlike (such as during peace enforcement operations) when the military has to take a more active role in guaranteeing the provision of humanitarian assistance and the conduct of reconstruction activities. In this regard, the military may not only become a mechanism that provides the assistance but, in deciding what areas to secure and according priorities for

⁵⁷ This refers to trade training activities such as courses in construction or plumbing rather than the provision of military specific warfighting skills.

protection and support, it can also influence the conduct of ODA sponsored reconstruction activities.

The degree and scale of the military's involvement with ODA can further increase as the development context becomes more hostile and threatening. The upper end of operations other than war (such as counter insurgency) and the conduct of war operations themselves can see the military having a greater degree of influence within ODA as they may formally conduct a range of RRD activities in addition to their security roles. This is a situation that occurs in nation-building operations where military combat and security operations need to be coordinated with the full range of RRD activities in order not to dissipate effort and ODA funds may be provided through mechanisms such as CERP to support military initiatives. Indeed, as the threat increases the military may take an even greater role for the provision of aid and reconstruction, as demonstrated in Colonel John Frewen's (2008) concept of contested-nation building where military security capabilities are essential to the provision of development-type support.

The military forces in this case may establish dedicated civil-military capabilities (such as PRTs or Reconstruction Task Forces), and they may form an active element in the coordination of development strategies at provincial and national levels. Such higher level activity within the host country may be conducted through specialist military staffs and/or may be formally established as a coordination mechanism through comprehensive or Whole of Government approaches. Indeed, in situations of high security threat, the military may have a relatively large influence in the conduct and disbursement of development-type activities throughout the nation as both development and security initiatives form axes in the lines of operation employed by the assisting forces and agencies. This represents a strong link between the Spectrums of Operations and Development and is one area in which the military may come to fulfil roles in the latter.

The Employment of the Military within the Spectrum of Development

The military involvement with ODA and development does not only occur within the circumstances portrayed by the Spectrum of Operations but it can also fulfil the range of functions described throughout the Spectrum of Development (Figure 3.4 / Appendix 2). In this regard, the military's support of the various development functions is neither uniform nor tied to one particular context, but instead depends upon the situation and the tasks at hand.

In the first instance, military forces have developed a strong role in the immediate provision of emergency and disaster relief as they maintain a range of expeditionary capabilities that can be activated quickly to respond to crisis areas. Military forces may provide resources funded by ODA and, through interagency contingency planning, can also influence the policy and strategy for this role. Such capabilities may also be complemented by the provision of humanitarian assistance - a task that military forces recognise as necessary and, although current doctrines emphasise this as a short-term role⁵⁸, one that they plan for as part of a holistic approach to the conduct of other peace support or warlike operations. This may see the military providing succour to a threatened population and combining their efforts with other relief and aid agencies as part of a graduated response – particularly in situations where the military is the first agency that can gain access to a vulnerable population before establishing the conditions for other agencies to take over.

The military capabilities that support the conduct of relief and assistance tasks can also assist with the fulfilment of rehabilitation roles. Military engineering and logistic capabilities provide the ability to reconstruct lines of communication, buildings and other facilities while specialist military capabilities, such as health support services, can provide advice and assistance to help rebuild parts of the social infrastructure. These functions are particularly pertinent as a host society starts to recover from the effects of disaster or conflict. However, as the development context moves further into areas of systemic

⁵⁸ Current NZDF doctrine states that, "The military will hand over full responsibility for the humanitarian task to civilian agencies at the earliest possible opportunity." (NZDF, 2008, p. 8-6)

viability, the characteristics of immediate support come to be replaced by coordinated long-term planning.

The duration of the military's involvement in this context depends upon the circumstances that they are operating in. If they have re-established a safe and secure environment through a PSO then this function may be coordinated by civil agencies as the military conducts minor implementation tasks or leaves the field altogether. In circumstances when the military remains in the operating environment (either to guarantee the peace that has been established or as part of wider more coercive nation-building endeavours) then it needs to develop and apply specialist capabilities to remain relevant. This may be conducted through the provision of additional military capabilities specifically for the purpose of supporting wider reconstruction efforts (being delinked from the force's security role) or the fielding of specialist CIMIC or CMO units and staffs that can actively support the implementation of wider reconstruction measures (such as by acting as an in-country partner for official development agencies or supporting a higher coordination role between agencies).

The military's participation in development activities as the rehabilitation functions move to a more pure development role moves even further away from the application of general military capabilities to an immediate context and may require further specialisation. This is reflected in the establishment of capabilities that can identify, plan and then work to satisfy local development needs and move away from the readily realisable assistance and construction tasks to support the more complex systems of capacity building, governance, and economic and social development. The military's involvement in these functions is shown through the creation of PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq, and such endeavours as the Dutch IDEA programme in Bosnia. In these cases, the military has moved away from being an implementing agency to one that supports development through coordination and facilitation. This in turn indicates the range of levels and the types of involvement that the military may have within ODA.

The Levels and Types of Military Involvement within ODA

The construct of development established in Chapter Three describes the roles that actors and stakeholder may fill; roles of policy formulation, strategic planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. The preceding description of the military's involvement within ODA discusses the forms and parameters of these roles through relation to the Spectrums of Operations and Development. Depending upon the actual context in which they are employed, it can be seen that the military completes a range of activities at the level of implementation on behalf of, or through the mechanism of, ODA. In this regard the military may be seen as an agent of ODA that conducts tasks at local and provincial levels in support of specific conflict mitigation or wider peacetime development strategies.

Determining the effectiveness of these tasks can also be assisted by military support to monitoring and evaluation. The military is well positioned to assist this process through its presence and ability to gain information on the ground, while the conduct of lessons learnt approaches to organisational development have instilled a culture of identification, evaluation and action. However, any unwillingness by recipients and other agencies to work with the military, and the transitory nature of the military presence through frequent force rotations, means that the military's ability to conduct consistent and effective monitoring and evaluation may be limited. It may best be tasked to support other endeavours in this field through the provision of logistics and security or by participating in the coordinated planning of these activities at local, provincial and national levels.

The military may also assist with the strategic planning of ODA initiatives within an affected state or society. This may be conducted directly in conjunction with their nation's ODA agency or by participating in the planning of wider cooperative security / development interventions. It more commonly occurs in situations where development may be contested and where a number of intervening agencies have established a comprehensive approach to coordinated plans; although the military may also help to establish and enact development strategies when the parent nation-state employs security and development as a

combined policy in support of wider political aims. However, as the level of involvement rises from strategy to policy levels there is a relatively decreasing role for the military as other, more specialist, agencies become involved and apply their relatively greater depth of knowledge and experience to the development context. In this regard, the main involvement of the military within ODA appears to be at local through to national levels within a host state or society and to be more active in forms of implementation and strategy rather than policy. However, the actual role of the military within ODA is derived not only from the level and forms of involvement as shown here, but is also a factor of the forms of influence that the military has upon the relationship between ODA and development.

ASSESSING THE INFLUENCE OF THE MILITARY

The range of circumstances and functions in which the military may be involved within ODA, and the forms and levels at which it may occur, provide the basis for determining the military's influence upon the causal relationship between ODA and development. The extent of this influence can be assessed by relating the effect of the military within the development process developed in Chapter Five to the theoretical baseline between ODA and development that was developed in Chapter Four. Considering the military's affect on the elements of that baseline supports the explanation of its role as a variable in the relationship between ODA and development.

The first characteristic of the causal relationship between ODA and development is the pervasiveness of ODA throughout the development process. This is illustrated by the manner in which ODA is applied throughout the Spectrum of Development and how it may affect a wide range of actors and stakeholders in doing so. The military, however, is not employed throughout the full range of contexts that are supported by ODA. In this regard it does not mirror the degree of influence that ODA has throughout the development process and can be seen to have a relatively minor role. However, factors such as the securitisation of development that affect where nations allocate their ODA may draw a greater proportion of ODA resources into security contexts (thereby weakening support

to other countries or policy agendas) and, in the case of smaller donors, establish the commitment of ODA to areas that they had hitherto not supported (with the military deployment effectively leading an ODA intervention). Although donor ODA is provided through a variety of programmes within a developing country, the military can also extend the reach of this ODA in circumstances where their security presence or ability to function in contested environments means that they can operate where other agencies cannot⁵⁹. Conversely, the involvement of the military may limit the effect of ODA if it is seen to be politically motivated and tainted by association with one side of an intervention. The ability of ODA to function effectively in these contexts will in turn be influenced by the effect of military involvement upon ODA's functions as a generative mechanism and catalyst within the development process.

The military's involvement within ODA would appear to have relatively minor affects on the latter's function as a generative mechanism through increasing knowledge and participation throughout the development process. However, in specialised contexts that focus on relief and conflict roles, the military may help to increase the sum pool of knowledge for the conduct of these development interventions, and initiatives such as PRTs and the Dutch IDEA programme can also provide an avenue for other actors to become involved. Furthermore, as the military may act as a statement of a nation-state's commitment to a wider development context as it fills security or combined security and development roles, it may also help to draw in other forms of investment and assistance. Notwithstanding these effects, the positive aspects of the military's involvement may not carry through to ODA's function as a catalyst. Although the military's involvement may provide the opportunity for other agents or actors to become involved, this involvement may also have the effect of reducing their ability to function with the specific development context – a particular effect for humanitarian assistance agencies that perceive a loss of neutrality and space, or who are unable to operate effectively in the face of the increased threats of a

⁵⁹ One example of this is how military forces within SFOR were able to continue implementing a DFID programme in Bosnia even after the DFID project staff had been withdrawn following the NATO bombing of Kosovo in 1999 (Ramsden, 2000, pp. 1-2).

politicised environment. This is an effect that is also apparent in the legitimacy and sustainability of ODA activities that involve the military.

The legitimacy of ODA within the development process is based upon adherence to agreed principles for the best practice of development. The military can support this legitimacy through the conduct of activities that meet the principles of international conventions and regulations, particularly through coordinated efforts with other development practitioners and agencies. However, as described in Chapter Five, the military's involvement in the development process may also compromise this legitimacy. This may be a result of the inherently political nature of military forces, particularly if the security agenda is seen to draw ODA away from areas of primary need and if the military's use of ODA resources is perceived to be conducted for short-term military benefit. The provision of ODA in this regard may be prejudiced by a close association with military actions, or affected by association through the wider development process in the country if other actors and stakeholders come to question the purpose and intents of the assistance itself.

The ability to maintain wider support and acceptance will also affect the sustainability of the development activities conducted through military involvement with ODA. The form, conduct and duration of military activities within the RRD continuum can potentially intersect the very areas where ODA may lack sustained benefits. Providing support to or through the military can create further channels that dissipate the ODA effort or result in a form of aid fatigue as the parent nation reduces or reallocates ODA funds when the military commitment is drawn down. The forms of military assistance themselves may not relate to the actual development requirements, particularly if they are conducted to support security initiatives of focus on the functions that the military can most easily complete (such as providing immediate assistance and reconstruction). The involvement of the military may also directly affect the ability of other actors and stakeholders to provide sustained effects within the development context as they compete for funds and other forms of support. This in turn points to a key function to ensure that ODA and military activities do provide sustainable results – through cooperation and the harmonisation of

efforts. The efforts of both ODA and the military benefit from working in concert with other actors and stakeholders and, if this is accomplished, it can increase the ODA's functioning as a generative mechanism and a catalyst, both separately and in coordination with the military involvement.

The actual function of the military in the relationship between ODA and development is the final element in determining the influence that the military has upon that relationship. As a separate variable it can be seen that the military may be involved within ODA in a number of ways and can have a range of effects upon the causal relationship between ODA and development. However, this influence does not exist in a uniform manner across all of the contexts in which ODA and development have a relationship. Instead, apart from relatively limited involvement as an implementing agency during operations in peace, the role of the military within ODA appears to rest mainly in times of crisis or conflict. During these situations the military may have a marked effect; this effect depending upon the immediacy of the development response (such as in crisis relief) or the level to which development actions are contested (with a particular distinction between forms of peacekeeping and combat operations). The military may therefore be seen as a moderating variable during relief and peace support operations as it can affect the magnitude of the effects between ODA and development but does not cause these effects, particularly in situations where the military's involvement in the RRD continuum is relatively constrained and serves to establish the conditions by which other agencies can take over.

The military's role during conflict and/or nation-building situations, however, can come to exhibit the characteristics of a mediating variable that generates the interaction between ODA and development. This may occur as it is through security policies and the military's actions that ODA is able to become involved, and then remain involved, within the specific state or society. Indeed, in certain contexts (such as the 2003 coalition invasion of Iraq) ODA may serve initially as a means by which the military can engage the local development situation in order to provide greater security and fulfil military ends. However, as the links between ODA and development become more established and extend to other actors and sectors, the military assumes the function of moderation. This

represents a point of balance between development and security as the long-term prospects for security come to rest upon effective and appropriate development, with such military initiatives as PRTs transitioning over time to a development and not a security focus. In this regard, the dominant form of influence for the military upon the relationship between ODA and development is one of moderation within a select range of contexts although the military may assume mediating responsibilities in times when the security imperative has a more immediate focus than the development process. This establishes the frame of reference for the role of the military within ODA as such a role should draw on the level and types of involvement that the military has within ODA and development, and then relate that to the circumstances in which it occurs and the influence that it maintains.

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY

The role of the military is drawn from the relationship between the constructs of development, ODA and the military, and the manner in which the military's involvement in that relationship is expressed through the circumstances in which it occurs, the functions which it fulfils, the forms that it takes, and the degree of influence that it maintains. In its primary function as a state-sponsored mechanism of security within wider international relations, the military can establish and maintain the conditions by which ODA and other development mechanisms can function in threatened or contested environments. This establishes a role as an enabling agency that facilitates the conduct of ODA and development in circumstances in which they may either face large obstacles or otherwise not occur.

The military may offer further support to the conduct of ODA as it can employ its own capabilities to satisfy immediate needs or serve as a conduit through which tangible expressions of ODA (such as funds and resources) can be provided. In this regard the military fulfils a role of implementation, acting as an implementing agency on behalf of, or for, ODA. However, the military's role is not constrained to this level of activity as it can help contribute to the formulation and enactment of comprehensive strategies that support both development and

security outcomes within the host state or society. The military thus functions as a coordinating agency that helps to shape and direct the effects of ODA within the wider development process in those circumstances when it is employed, although this is not a static relationship and there are occasions when the military may serve in a more generative capacity for the conduct of ODA.

The military may complete these functions, and support the conduct of ODA, throughout the scope of the wider development context which encompasses the purposes of relief, rehabilitation and development. However, the majority of the military's involvement occurs in situations when there is a great sense of immediacy or when its involvement within the development process would complement or support its security activities. This involvement is encompassed within the relief and rehabilitation functions that occur during times of crisis and conflict and orients the military's role to these circumstances. Furthermore, as the military's primary function focuses on security, it is not a dedicated development agent. Therefore, the role that it may fulfil within ODA or a specific development context depends upon the decision to employ it in this manner and represents a potential, as opposed to an actual, function.

The role of the military within ODA, therefore, is identified as potentially an enabling, implementing and coordinating agency - primarily during times of crisis and conflict. However, the military has the potential to create a range of positive and negative effects within the development process as it fulfils this role within ODA. Therefore, the utility and function of this role needs to be examined with regard to how it may be conducted in the most appropriate manner for development.

MANAGING THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY WITHIN ODA

While discussing the role of policy objectives in the levels of strategy, David Lonsdale (2008, p. 25) poses the following question with regard to current counter-insurgency operations in Iraq; "How does one use a relatively blunt

military instrument to achieve subtle policy objectives, such as economic and social reconstruction?” Robert Egnell (2008, p. 416) considers this issue in a similar vein when discussing the relative capabilities and limitations of military forces;

In essence, it comes down to a political choice regarding the use of the military instrument. It can be used as a blunt instrument for any type of tasks and without professional expertise in any field, or it can be sharpened to perform a more limited number of tasks with greater professionalism, but at the same time requiring investments in civilian operational capacity to perform tasks beyond the military delimitation.

The issue now becomes do we sharpen the tool, apply it as a blunt instrument or withhold it altogether? The solution is found in the way that we manage the role of the military within ODA. The management of this role is a function of directing tasks, allocating resources, and coordinating effort. However, before this can be conducted we need to develop an understanding of the implications of employing military forces in this field and which agency is best positioned to complete what task.

OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS

The implications of employing military forces within ODA and the development process are realised by an analysis of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT). This analysis identifies what aspects of the relationship between the military, ODA and development should be reinforced and which ones should be countered or overcome. The SWOT analysis for the relationship between the military, ODA and development is shown at Figure 6.1.

<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Strengths</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Speed of response to emerging crises • Wide range of supporting capabilities (engineer, logistic, medical) • Indicate a degree of commitment by donor governments • Conduct of development-type activities in contested environments • Provision of security / establishment of a safe and secure environment 	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Weaknesses</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Possible focus on donor, not recipient, needs • Military actions (such as QIP, CERP) may not meet development aims • Creation of false expectations • Limited duration of military involvement • Isolation caused by force protection • Guaranteed commitment of support • Ad hoc nature of military support • Relative lack of understanding of development process • Competition and lack of understanding between agencies • Role conflict • Organisational stovepiping • Friction from shrinking humanitarian space
<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Opportunities</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • May see hitherto unremarked areas get support • Coordinate, complement or sequence activities for better overall results • Increasing level of awareness of development issues in host state (public information / media) • Maintenance of development programmes when civilian agencies required to withdraw 	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Threats</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aid compromised to support military endeavours • Increasing threat to civil agencies (perceived relationship with military) • Risk to safety of military forces if they deploy with an inappropriate focus on development rather than security • Ineffective transition between forms of support

Figure 6.1: SWOT Analysis of the Relationship between the Military, ODA and Development⁶⁰

Although this is not an exhaustive list of possible implications, and it is relatively easier to identify the negative as opposed to the positive, this analysis shows that there are a range of strengths and opportunities to be realised through military involvement within the development process. However, for these positive attributes to be realised effectively, any system of military involvement needs to be cognisant of, and able to reduce or overcome, the identified weaknesses and threats. A range of options are available to either delimit or incorporate the military role within ODA. These extend from a strict adherence to humanitarian principles and the desired non-involvement of the military within development circumstances (with the military as a means of last resort) (Barry & Jefferys, 2002, pp. 15-17; IASC, 2008, pp. 3-18); through the coordinated comprehensive or Whole of Government approaches outlined earlier in the study; to frameworks for permanent combined structures (Naler, 2006). However, adherence to

⁶⁰ The information for this analysis was derived from the preceding Chapters and the following additional sources: (Barry & Jefferys, 2002, pp. 16, 19; Bollen et al., 2006, 441-444; Egnell, 2008, pp. 404-414; Irish, 2007, p. 68; Rietjens, 2008, pp. 173-199; M. G. Smith & Whelan, 2008, 13, 16; Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance, 2008, pp. xiii, 4, 22, 25)

definitive models of action does not recognise that each context should be judged on its merits, and that different circumstances throughout the Spectrum of Operations and the Spectrum of Development do require different forms of response or engagement. Klingebiel and Roehder (2004, pp. 40-41) note this factor as ‘case-dependence’ when they discuss the application of three possible strategic models for German development policy:

- A Distance Strategy that retains the separate autonomy of development policy and the military.
- A Cooperation Strategy based upon the coherence of overall policy through such concepts of ‘development through security’.
- A Complementary Strategy that aims for goal conformity in a mutually complementary approach.

Klingebiel and Roehder’s (2004, pp. 40-41) subsequent discussion presents the Complementary Strategy as the most appropriate for the interfaces between development and the military with the caveat that the conduct of operations would be case-dependent and apply whichever strategy was most appropriate. This approach could incorporate the range of options to delimit or incorporate the military role presented above, although the selection of the most appropriate option for the particular case would depend upon the comparative advantages and costs of the military and civil agencies involved.

The comparative advantages and costs depend upon the specific circumstance in which a development process occurs. However, when considering these factors it is possible to discern a general scope that will inform case-dependent models. In simple terms the military has a comparative advantage over all other actors and stakeholders in the development process in the conduct of traditional security operations. That after all is the primary purpose of the formal and legally constituted military forces of a state. In a similar vein, specialist development actors and agencies have the advantage within the development process as a result of their organisation, knowledge, experience and purpose. The issue,

however, is to determine the relative comparative advantage where these two roles intersect.

Robert Egnell (2008, p. 412) states that, “the military is not as competent as civilian organisations are in the provision of humanitarian assistance.” However, there are some key advantages that the military can offer to a development process (in addition to the strengths and opportunities listed in Figure 6.1 above). These include the relative speed of response of military forces to crisis areas and their ability to sustain themselves in austere conditions once there (Jennings, Lindley, Tigner, & Williams, 2008, pp. 60-61). The ability to conduct these actions and ensure that they conform to higher intents is provided by the military’s characteristics of standards of discipline, the involuntary mobilisation of resources that ensure their deployment, and the ability of military forces to operate independently (Irish, 2007, pp. 69-70). Furthermore, military forces can operate in non-permissive environments when other agencies cannot or may even be directly targeted by local factions (Frewen, 2008, p. 28; M. Ryan, 2007, p. 59; Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance, 2008, p. xii).

These advantages can be limited by the costs that are incurred – be they actual costs or opportunity costs. Some of these opportunity costs are detailed as *Threats* in Figure 6.1 and show that the military’s involvement may retard or limit the conduct of development. Additional costs may be incurred through the funding of military endeavours within the development process, particularly as it is argued that military organisations are likely to achieve less and at greater cost (Egnell, 2008, p. 415; Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance, 2008, p. 25), and the provision of funds to military forces may mean the lack of funds elsewhere. However, efforts to compare the cost differentials between military and humanitarian organisations directly may be inappropriate as, if a military force is already deployed to an area conducting security operations, then the cost of its involvement in the development process would be a marginal amount over and above the security costs. This is one potential limitation with the relative costs expressed by Siegel (as related in Rietjens, 2008, p. 199) who notes the annual cost of a United States soldier in Afghanistan as approximately US\$215,000, while humanitarians may be one-tenth of this. In this regard, the

relative advantages and costs of military involvement need to be assessed against the tasks that it may be required to complete and the resources required to do so.

The implications of employing military forces within ODA are derived from the opportunities and threats that may present from such employment, the consideration of the appropriate strategy or form of employment to apply within a specific situation or context, and an understanding of the comparative advantages and costs in doing so. These factors form key elements of the consideration underpinning how the role of the military within ODA will be managed in practice. The management of this role is itself founded upon the functions of directing tasks, allocating resources, and coordinating effort.

TASKS, RESOURCES AND COORDINATION

The role of the military within ODA has been identified as an enabling, implementing and coordinating agency - primarily during times of crisis and conflict. This is not to say that military forces could not participate in other circumstances, but periods of crisis and conflict are when they can best use their comparative advantages to outweigh the relative the costs of such employment. The manner in which the military forces may be employed to fulfil this role is based upon the tasks that they may be directed to complete, the resources that they are provided, and how their efforts are coordinated with other agencies and participants. These factors form the scope for managing the relationship between the military, ODA and development and establish the considerations for determining how the involvement of the military within ODA may be conducted in the most appropriate manner for development.

The management of the tasks that the military may be required to accomplish depends upon the context in which the military is employed. In this regard military participation in disaster or emergency relief operations could be sequenced to provide immediate assistance and then hand over to other agencies for longer-term support – in effect representing a form of the distance strategy of separation between agencies and limiting the military's role. However, this strategy may be unlikely to work in peace support or conflict situations where

there is a greater relationship between the functions of security and development. This would require approaches that see military and civilian agencies working closer together and, if the military is to be expected to provide a greater degree of support to development-type activities, then this should be resourced and coordinated appropriately.

The resourcing of the military's role within ODA should be sufficient to ensure that it can complete its tasks while not detracting from its primary function of security or degrading other development initiatives. In the first case, if the military is not sufficiently resourced to maintain security in contested environments it may lack the ability to offer credible support to development activities and may not even be able to establish the necessary conditions for those activities to take place⁶¹. This effect can also carry over into the forms of support provided to development activities as these may represent a drain on scarce resources (particularly engineering and transportation) that can impinge on the security mission and reduce the level of guarantee provided to development tasks. The provision of sufficient resources does not apply only to military capabilities as it has been noted that the effectiveness of PRTs may be compromised by the lack of expert staff, including both American PRTs where the State Department lacks sufficient personnel to support the capability (Jett, 2007, p. 14) and the New Zealand PRT in Afghanistan where NZAID did not provide a permanent representative to support the management of NZAID projects (Dorn, 2006, p. 167). However, the most contentious form of resourcing, and the one that may need the most management, is the provision of funds to support military efforts within the development process.

A major concern with the securitisation of development is that it will draw funds away from other development purposes and that the inclusion of funds for security under the framework of ODA may in fact reduce the total pool of funds available for development. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has responded to this issue by updating its advice on what constitutes ODA in

⁶¹ This concern was expressed during calls by a range of civil aid organizations for an enhanced security presence in Afghanistan in 2003 (Klingebiel & Roehder, 2004, Annex 2).

conjunction with the formal definition of the term. Key elements of this advice (DAC/OECD, 2008b) include:

- Exclusion of Military Aid. Only additional costs incurred for the use of the donor's military forces to deliver humanitarian aid or perform development services are considered as eligible for ODA. The supply of military equipment and services does not qualify as ODA.
- Peacekeeping. ODA may include the net bilateral (marginal) costs of employing the military forces to assist with development functions during UN administered or approved operations. These costs are over and above what are incurred for maintaining the military forces in the home locations and any reimbursement that may be received from the UN. A clear distinction is made between activities that are conducted in support of development and those that are conducted to support military activity.

These guidelines establish clear parameters that ODA funds are not to be used to finance military operations and ensure that any provision of funds to and through the military is focused upon development ends. This does not mean that donor states cannot provide additional funds to the military to resource other activities within development, but that expenditures incurred under the framework of ODA need to be resourced and coordinated within these parameters.

The coordination of the military's role within ODA should focus on those times of crisis and conflict where security and development roles intersect. Robert Egnell (2008, pp. 397-398) has noted that traditionally the civil-military relationship was based upon the idea of separate roles and sequenced interaction but that there is now a clear trend developing to coordinate activities with a coherent strategic purpose. This occurs as current forms of security-development interaction are becoming more complex and there is the need to integrate a wide range of political, legal, military, development, financial and technical tools to ensure the success of the wider activity (Zoellick, 2008, p. 72). As a result, there is no longer a clear or sequenced distinction between military and civil roles and, although there is still the requirement to transfer tasks when the military's

operational phase is complete (Rietjens, 2008, p. 177), there is no single point of transition when this can occur⁶². Indeed, as the security and development situations may variously improve or regress throughout the duration of a mission, it may also be difficult to establish and maintain respective roles between the various agencies.

This lack of role clarity can further complicate the relationship between each of the actors and the method by which any military responsibilities can be passed to civilian agencies. This may in fact become problematic when military forces are required to remain to guarantee security but are no longer required to continue previous forms or levels of support to the development of the host state or society; a situation that may see the military forces trying to retain old responsibilities or seek new roles. Therefore, the coordination of the military role in ODA is an ongoing process that needs to respond to changing situations to promote role clarity and manage the transition of responsibilities against a continued backdrop of civil-military interaction. The management of this coordination will form one of the methods by which the involvement of the military within ODA can be conducted in the most appropriate manner for development.

THE CONDUCT OF THE MILITARY ROLE IN ODA

This study has examined the nature and effects of the relationships between the military, ODA and development to identify the role of the military within ODA. This role has been examined further to determine the implications of employing the military in this way and how such involvement within ODA and development should be managed. However, for the wider purposes of this study to be completed it is necessary to relate the role and management of the military within ODA back to the context in which it occurs – the convergence between development and security within international relations and the practical problem

⁶² This was a particular lesson learnt for American forces employed in post-Tsunami relief in 2004/5 where a particular planning challenge was to transfer tasks and responsibilities without that single point of transition (Daniel, 2006, p. 51).

of the efficacy and appropriateness of the military within the wider context of ODA.

The considerations that underpin the management of the role of the military within ODA have been developed from the implications of employing military forces in this field and comparing the comparative advantages and costs of doing so. In order for the military's involvement within ODA to be conducted in the most appropriate manner for development, these considerations need to be turned into actions that can support or enhance the legitimacy and sustainability of the development process itself. This would provide donor states, military forces and the wider range of civil actors involved within development the basis for effecting appropriate military-civil interactions; interactions that do not just provide security but also promote development as a process and an outcome. This can be achieved by developing appropriate policies, parameters and procedures to frame the role of the military within ODA in the most appropriate manner for development itself.

Policies

The advantage of policy is that it can be designed and conducted well ahead of time and forms the foundation for subsequent actions. The first element of a policy to maximise the benefit of the convergence between security and development is to establish agreed strategies and the common alignment of development and political goals so that development is a partner with, and not subordinate to, security (Centre for European Reform, 2007; Phelan & Wood, 2005, p. 30). This forms the basis of Whole of Government approaches and provides the means to develop greater coordination and understanding through interdepartmental committees (Hameiri, 2008, p. 362). These strategies may then be enacted through common forms of funding (such as the United Kingdom's Conflict Prevention Pools (Phelan & Wood, 2005, p. 33) or the combined consideration and design of military capabilities (as occurred with the development of the Royal New Zealand Navy's Multi-Role Vessel to incorporate specific capabilities to support disaster relief roles [Interview (I004) with New Zealand Public Servants]). These strategies also provide the means by which to

determine further resourcing issues and to interact with other states and international organisations when designing and conducting development-security roles.

The advantages of a coherent policy in this manner include supporting a focus of attention on conflict prevention activities as a better way to ensure development and stability (Zoellick, 2008, p. 72), especially as such initiatives may be unremarked if agencies focus on their own policies. The policy can also sustain a long-term commitment to a specific development circumstance and thereby reduce the chances of aid fatigue or a precipitate reallocation of resources. Furthermore, a common policy may help to reduce the effects of stovepiping, or the dissonance caused by separate bureaucratic cultures. Such strategic coherency and common purpose also establishes the framework for the subordinate parameters and procedures that shape the relationship between the agencies involved.

Parameters

The parameters for the military's role within ODA include the roles, responsibilities and tasks that they will be required to fulfil and the definition of which circumstances in which they will fulfil them. In many respects this may form an operational level of planning under the level of strategic policy and includes such considerations as the process by which the transition from military to civilian responsibility will be managed in those situations when the military has a direct role to play, or how the military will provide indirect support to other agencies as the occasion permits. The establishment of such a framework provides for increased consistency in action and coordination between the military and civil agencies of the donor state. An example of the effectiveness of such actions is the relative success of the New Zealand PRT in Afghanistan as it has an extant Memorandum of Understanding with NZAID, while the American PRTs in Iraq encountered difficulty as there was no such understanding over who would provide security, support and funding (Dorn, 2006, p. 168; Jett, 2007, p. 13). Not only do the establishment of such instruments provide role clarity for a donor state's military but their intent can also be replicated within the

international forum. This may occur through international agreements as to the role and function of military forces in humanitarian work (the IASC guidelines being one such effort) to the operationalisation of policy within mission areas as coalition or UN military forces integrate their efforts with other agencies.

The key parameters for the military's role within ODA are based upon the comparative advantages and costs that military forces have with other agencies and organisations. However, the interaction between civil and military agencies within humanitarian situations can be viewed as generally working best when the military involvement is conducted indirectly and as a supporting effort to other agencies (M. G. Smith & Whelan, 2008, p. 15). Nevertheless, it has been recognised throughout this study that there are situations when the military may be best placed to provide humanitarian and development support; whether this be a function of a contested security situation, the immediacy of requirements or the provision of specialist capabilities that cannot be easily replicated by civilian agencies. The ability of the military to fulfil these functions in a manner most appropriate for development is then determined by the procedures that are put in place.

Procedures

The focus of the procedures that are established to shape the involvement of the military within ODA are to provide for better outcomes for development as a result of this involvement. The aim is to increase the ability of the military forces to conduct activities in an appropriate manner for development and to build mutual confidence between the military and agencies that they will interact with. These procedures can be described in terms of structure, training and the conduct of operations.

Military forces are structured to meet the demands of security operations. When designed to fulfil traditional conceptions of security, such as through the Cold War years, non-core capabilities such as Civil Affairs and CIMIC were frequently allotted to reserve units (R. Smith, 2005, p. 387) to be drawn on as required but not necessarily maintained at a high state of training or

professionalism. However, the increasing involvement of military forces in peace support and stabilisation operations in the last two decades has established a greater requirement for such capabilities. This would entail the establishment of Civil Affairs and CIMIC capabilities as a professional function of standing forces and overcome some of the problems that may be caused by the raising of ad hoc units or capabilities to meet development-type roles without the benefit of specialist training or experience. Although, the military has proven adept at designing specialist structures to support development within contested security environments (such as the Australian Reconstruction Task Force in Afghanistan (Frewen, 2008, p. 28)) the establishment of standing Civil Affairs and CIMIC structures would also provide a conduit for information sharing and confidence building in peace and establish a stronger basis for cooperative action when deployed. In a similar vein, the establishment of interagency structures can also overcome the effects of ad-hocery and provide similar benefits for the wider coordination of civil-military efforts in crisis and conflict situations.

The training procedures in this context should focus upon the ability of the agencies to work together and, where appropriate, provide the military with the skills and knowledge to participate effectively within the development process. This training should not just include elements of the military forces but also include other government departments, NGOs and development practitioners (Gizewski et al., 2008, p. 33). This provides for a greater degree of common understanding and a realisation of each other intents and capabilities, the effects of which could be further increased through the conduct of secondments between the military and relevant government agencies. For the military, their efficacy within the development process can be enhanced by further exposure to the principles and considerations of development and specialist techniques in the identification and implementation of QIP and CERP projects (such as conducted by DFID for the United Kingdom military forces (DFID, 2006)). The aim should not be to turn military personnel into development professionals, however, and much of their ability to support the appropriate conduct of development activities will be determined by actions during operations themselves.

It has been noted that one of the weaknesses of the Dutch PRT in Afghanistan in 2006 was the lack of coordination with local development agencies and recipient organisations while such coordination was noted as a strength for the New Zealand PRT (Dorn, 2006, pp. 167-171; Rietjens, 2008, p. 194). This represents an operational procedure that increases the ability of the military force to support development efforts on the ground. Furthermore, information sharing initiatives such as these can build greater confidence at the tactical level and establish coherent local plans for security and development that will support higher level plans and avoid the inefficiencies of stovepiping. These effects can also be achieved by the provision of development specialists to support the military forces as this will further facilitate liaison with humanitarian and recipient organisations, although care would have to be taken that such support does not blur the distinction between the civilian and military elements. Indeed, the operational procedures should ensure, where possible, that support to development activities is not conducted as a corollary to military necessity and that a distinction is drawn between the two.

These policies, parameters and procedures establish the potential for the military role within ODA to be conducted in the most appropriate manner for development. This occurs as they relate the military's role within ODA through the tasks, resources and coordination that form the means by which this role can be managed, to the wider issues of the convergence between development and security in a practical manner. In this way the conduct of the military's involvement within ODA can help to address concerns about the efficacy and appropriateness of the military within the wider context of ODA and support the wider conduct of security and development policies within international relations.

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

This thesis identifies the role of the military within ODA as potentially an enabling, implementing and coordinating agency – primarily during times of crisis and conflict. This role was developed by exploring the relationship between development, ODA and the military in response to a practical problem identified within the convergence between development and security in international relations; namely that the involvement of the military within ODA in particular, and with development in general, has raised concerns that the efficacy of the development process could be compromised or subordinated by inappropriate policies and activities, and whether the outcomes of such a convergence are appropriate to the purpose of development itself. These concerns were addressed by developing a general theory of the role of the military within ODA and then assessing how that role could be conducted in the most appropriate manner for development. In this way it was determined that, although the management of the military's involvement within the development process would depend upon the actual situation, the potential benefits for development could be increased by developing appropriate policies, parameters and procedures to frame the role of the military within ODA.

THE CONDUCT OF THE RESEARCH

The research conducted through this study aimed to develop further understanding of the convergence between development and security within international relations by addressing a practical problem that had been identified within that relationship. This problem established both the purpose of the research and the logical framework that could be applied to answer it as it framed the research question of, '*what is the role of the military within ODA?*'. Identifying that role also established a related research problem ('*how should the relationship between the military, ODA and development be managed?*'), which in turn led to the examination of the research answer that seeks to satisfy the

practical problem by determining *‘how the involvement of the military within ODA can be conducted in the most appropriate manner for development.’*

Framing the study in this way led to a research design based upon theory generation to develop an understanding of the full range of the relationships between the military, ODA and development.

The theory generation approach was used as it enables a research question to be examined by exploring the relationship between a number of variables – in this case the three concepts of the military, ODA and development. To develop the theory each concept was first described as a particular construct, represented as a variable, and then established as an operational definition. They were then described and analysed in relation to each other through a grounded theory research strategy that provides for the inductive development of general meaning based firmly upon the analysis of the data that is collected. This technique established the basis to show the causal relationships between the constructs as they were derived from the consideration of a broad range of data and then described and assessed against common parameters (such as the model of the development process established in Chapter Three). As this process incorporated a multi-method approach that used modelling and templating, critical and content analysis, and comparative analytical techniques to examine the relationship between each of the variables it helped to support the validity of the study by maintaining a consistent and clear focus to the research itself.

The structure of the research was also designed to support this focus as it maintained a linear sequence, with one variable being developed and compared with its predecessor before moving onto the next, to clearly show the development of the causal relationships between them. Furthermore, the use of the grounded theory approach provided the opportunity to enhance the objectivity and reliability of the study as it focused on the data collected as the source of the description and analysis of the variables. This is one benefit of the grounded theory approach as the focus on data should reduce the effects of any potential researcher bias, such potential being acknowledged early within the study, and ensures that the analysis is conducted in an open and visible manner. This analysis not only identified the role of the military within ODA as the

answer to the research question, but also applied that role to the wider context in which it occurs. This not only provided for the immediate outcomes of the study itself but positions it to have wider relevance within the consideration of the convergence between security and development within international relations.

THE RESULTS OF THE STUDY

The results of this study may be viewed in terms of both the outcomes that were achieved and the wider relevance of the study itself. Both are founded upon the convergence of development and security that is one feature of international relations in the post Cold War world. The new conceptions of security and development that rose during this period occurred as a result of international responses to an increasing incidence of intra-state conflict, the increasing fragility of certain less developed states, and the development of more inclusive concepts of security that variously include states and people as referent objects. At the same time, both development and security policy came to incorporate a greater range of actors and were seen to be mutually supporting as development became viewed as an essential condition for security, and security as a precondition for development. This led to an increasing convergence between development and security within international relations; a convergence that links the concept of development, the conduct of ODA, and the characteristics of the military as states express their national policy within this domain. However, this convergence has also led to concerns that the politicisation or securitisation of development may result in it becoming subordinated to security concerns and whether actions conducted in this manner are appropriate for development itself. The issue, therefore, is to determine how the effects of this convergence can be conducted in a manner most appropriate to development - one that is framed by the question of '*what is the role of the military within ODA?*' This issue is explored through the outcomes of the study.

OUTCOMES OF THE STUDY

The first step to answering that question is to develop an understanding of international development. Development is a contested concept within international relations that has a dynamic nature and should be viewed within the context(s) in which it occurs. As such, it exhibits the characteristics of an organic metaphor of growth and change; functioning as an open system that can be affected by (and in turn may affect) a range of factors and influences.

Development is in this regard both a relative state and a process of change, whether such change is intentional or an immanent activity. However, two major determinants of modern development are *intervention* and *politics*; intervention through forms of external support, and political as it changes power relationships and resource allocation. This establishes the construct of development pertinent to this study as one of political and interventionalist processes of change that seek to enhance advancements in the host state or society: advancements that are characterised by relative measures of status and capability. This construct can be further represented by the process in which it is enacted.

The development process is one that represents the construct of development as an open system of internal adaptation that interacts with a wider external environment. The factors that represent the inputs to this process are based upon the circumstances in which it occurs, and the various purposes and intents of the actors and stakeholders involved. The transformation enacted through the process includes the approaches and methods employed by the various participants, the considerations that are made in doing so, and the actual practices and techniques used. These then provide for the results of the process. The conduct of the development process can also be described in terms of a wider Spectrum of Development, which encompasses the continuum from relief to rehabilitation and development, and assessed in terms of the sustainability of the benefits that it creates and the legitimacy of the process itself - as derived from its ability to satisfy the needs of the developing state or society. Defining the development process in this way forms the measure by which to assess the influence of other variables upon development – variables such as ODA and the military.

The conduct of ODA as a mechanism to support state foreign relations objectives within the development process fulfils a key role within the links between security and development, able to influence the conduct of development in its own right and also shape the wider context in which it occurs. ODA is a form of foreign aid through which northern donor states influence development outcomes and activities throughout the spectrum of development, and a construct that is defined by the Development Assistance Committee as one that encompasses financial flows and technical assistance that aim to promote the economic development and welfare of recipient countries. It may be conducted by donor states, or provided through multilateral organisations, in order to satisfy both national policy objectives and wider development intents. It is framed by international agreements and conventions and may exist in a number of forms, depending upon the specific circumstance in which it is conducted and the intentions of those who provide it.

In this way the results of ODA may vary and it has a range of influences throughout the development process – influences that can help generate further effects or enable other actions to occur, but have both positive and negative effects on the legitimacy and sustainability of the process itself. This establishes a baseline for the relationship between ODA and development that recognises the key characteristic of the pervasiveness of ODA throughout the development process, the effects that accrue from ODA's function as a generative mechanism and catalyst for development, and the manner in which ODA affects the principles of legitimacy and sustainability inherent within the appropriate conduct of development itself. This description of the relationship between ODA and development in this way provides the basis for assessing the influence of a third variable upon the pair – that of the military.

The military is defined in this study as the formally and legally constituted military forces of a state that form one tangible expression of that state's national power while, as an instrument of the state's security, they also serve as an expression of the state's political will and intent. In this regard they may be employed in a wide variety of contexts, ranging from activities in support of peace, through increasing levels of violence and conflict, to war. The military

forces maintain a range of capabilities so that they can meet tasks within this broad range of requirements and have developed greater experience in completing roles short of war since the end of the Cold War. These experiences also occur as a result of the increasing convergence between development and security within international relations with the results that there is an evolving and more complex relationship between the military, ODA and development.

The nature of this relationship is based upon the manner in which it may exist throughout the entire spectrum of activities that military forces may be required to conduct, and the throughout range of contexts in which the development process may occur. In this way, military forces represent a practical example of the convergence between development and security as they may be required to complete security and/or development tasks in support of security and/or development purposes (either separately or concurrently). This may occur through approaches designed to support the donor state's own policies or in conjunction with other states, institutions, actors and stakeholders through comprehensive and Whole of Government policies designed to prevent or mitigate conflict, or to provide succour to populations in times of crisis. The military may provide direct or indirect forms of support to the development process, either separately or in conjunction with ODA. However, the military's primary focus on security and the overtly political nature of the employment of military forces means that such activities can have a range of negative as well as positive effects on the appropriateness of the activities being conducted in support of development. These effects may not only be expressed through the sustainability or legitimacy of the military's involvement within the development process but also with regard to the wider effects of the securitisation and/or politicisation of development if development policy is subordinated to or amended by security or political goals. This in turn may affect the efficacy of the development process and, if development is the goal, asks what the role of the military in ODA is and how such a role should be conducted in the most appropriate manner for development?

The role of the military within ODA is derived from the influence that it has upon the relationship between ODA and development, and whether it modifies

this relationship or acts to generate new relationships. Although the involvement of the military within ODA and development occurs throughout the wider spectrum of operations, the majority of this involvement occurs in situations of crisis and/or conflict. The degree of involvement and the types of activities that the military may conduct within the development process also vary depending upon the situation as they generally provide a greater level and more direct forms of support in circumstances when security is most threatened and other actors have less capability to function. However, the scale of the military's role decreases when security is not as threatened or other agencies have had the time to position suitable capacity to take over development tasks. In this regard, the military's role may be greater during the initial stages of a response to a crisis or conflict but may correspondingly decrease as the degree of immediacy reduces.

The type of role that the military fills also depends upon the level at which it occurs. Depending upon the actual circumstance and wider approaches being adopted, local military forces may serve as facilitators or providers of humanitarian and development assistance while elements further up the command chain may assist with establishing comprehensive national level interagency policies that combine both security and development roles. In this regard the military has the capability to effectively fulfil both implementing and strategic planning roles; roles that are complemented by support to the monitoring and evaluation of ODA activities and programmes. However, as the level rises from strategy to policy there is a relatively decreasing role for the military within ODA as other, more specialist, agencies become involved.

The actual influence that the military has upon the relationship between ODA and development varies within these contexts. Generally, however, the effect of the military on the influence of ODA within development is limited due to the relatively few situations in which it participates. This degree of participation also limits the military's affect on ODA's function as a generative mechanism or catalyst for development throughout the entire spectrum of development, although the military may have marked localised effects within certain crisis or conflict circumstances. However, within those specific contexts the military can have a range of positive and negative effects, although the actual role of the

military within ODA needs to be firmly established and well managed to avoid prejudicing the benefits that ODA aims to achieve.

The role of the military within ODA is therefore defined as potentially an enabling, implementing and coordinating agency – primarily during times of crisis and conflict. This recognises the main circumstances in which the military will be involved with ODA and development, and the types of activities that it may conduct. However, it is necessary to determine how to manage this role in order to ensure that the involvement of the military is conducted in the most appropriate manner for development. This is achieved by recognising that a range of separate, collaborative and complementary strategies may be applied on a case dependent basis that delimits the military's actual role in each particular circumstance. The criteria for deciding upon the strategy to use is based upon the comparative advantages and costs of using the military capabilities and may be expressed in terms of the tasks to be accomplished, the allocation of resources, and the forms of coordination that will be applied. This latter element is an essential part of managing the military's role in ODA as it maintains role clarity between the various actors and stakeholders who may be present and manages the transition from military to civil responsibility in those circumstances when the military has an active role to play. Moreover, the management of the military's role also guides the considerations for conducting this involvement in the most appropriate manner for development itself – considerations that are founded upon the policies, parameters and procedures that may be developed to frame the role of the military within ODA.

The policies should aim to maximise the benefit of the convergence between development and security through agreed strategies and the common alignment of development and political goals so that development is a partner with, and not subordinate to, security. These policies should be established well ahead of when they are needed so that they can inform capability development, funding and help to overcome the effects of bureaucratic cultures and stovepiping. They also create the framework for the parameters of the military role as they consider the limits of this role and the circumstances in which it occurs, and establish mechanisms such as Memorandums of Understanding to facilitate interagency

coordination and provide for role clarity during times of transition. These parameters can be complemented by procedures that are designed to increase the ability of military forces to conduct appropriate activities and build confidence with other agencies. These include increasing the capacity and professionalism of military CIMIC capabilities, designing additional structures as required to overcome the ad hoc nature of some forms of military support to development, conducting cooperative training down to the tactical level, and ensuring that operational procedures are developed to enhance coordination and information sharing. These measures should ensure that development activities are not conducted solely as a corollary to military necessity and, as the policies, parameters and procedures are drawn together, enable the involvement of the military to be conducted in the most appropriate manner for development. This relates the role of the military within ODA back to the wider context of the convergence between development and security within international relations and forms one key part of the relevance of this study.

RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY

This study into the role of the military within ODA and how that role could be conducted in the most appropriate manner for development is based upon the convergence between development and security in international relations. It has developed an understanding of how national policy and the mechanisms of national power may affect the conduct of development at the macro level by developing a general theory that identifies the role of the military within ODA as part of this wider context. However, although the study has taken a pragmatic view in that the involvement of the military within development is a feature of modern international relations, it has maintained a development focus or lens to ensure that development remains the primary consideration of the study. In this regard the study does not look at the involvement of the military in terms of exclusion but instead in terms of effect and better management.

This study differs from other examinations of security and development in that it develops a general theory of the relationship between the military, ODA and development throughout the entire spectrum of where this may occur, rather than

focusing more narrowly on specific case studies of current situations or functional areas. This was conducted by stepping back from the immediacy of such issues of the legitimacy of military PRTs in Afghanistan or the provision of humanitarian assistance by military forces to consider how the military may support the conduct of ODA throughout the entire spectrum of peace, conflict and war, and the range of development functions that it may fulfil in doing so (from relief to rehabilitation to development). This established a wider view of the range of implications within the convergence between development and security and the ability to consider roles that are not apparent in crisis areas or conflict zones. However, this study does relate to other research as it places the results of that research within the wider context and confirms the importance of the military roles during crisis and conflict. It also provides a framework for further examination through the testing and verification of the theory and results that were developed.

The avenues for further research that result from this study include examining the conclusions that have been made to confirm their validity through empirical research. This could be conducted through thematic studies of the functions of development (such as humanitarian assistance or reconstruction) to determine the extent of the military role and the effectiveness of the proposed policies, parameters and procedures. Further study could examine examples of military involvement across the spectrum of development through detailed case studies that seek to understand the interrelationships between the military, ODA and development and develop a greater understanding of the issues of role clarity, transition management, and the appropriate techniques to improve both. These forms of research would have the advantage of building upon the theory generated here.


Other avenues of inquiry would extend the parameters of this research to explore areas that were not covered in detail. This includes examining the role of the military in aid provided by nations other than northern donor states where the capacity for providing aid and the characteristics of the military forces may be different. It would also be beneficial to examine this issue from the recipient point of view at state, provincial and local levels to gain a fuller understanding of

the effects of military involvement upon them and their ability to realise their own development needs.


A final element of examination would be to consider the wider parameters of the security paradigm and not just the military. The security sector in modern comprehensive and Whole of Government approaches comprises more than just the military and may include elements of Police, Customs, Corrections / Prison Service, and the legal and judicial systems. A specific focus on one element (such as the role of the Police within ODA) would be likely to determine very different results to this study and, given the current relationship between NZAID and the New Zealand Police in the South Pacific, would also help to shape future policy and practice. Furthermore, a fuller consideration of all aspects of the security sector would increase the relevance of this study by locating the role of the military within that larger paradigm. Nevertheless, the research conducted within this study fills a unique role in developing a general theory of the role of the military within ODA and relating this theory to the practical improvement of that role itself.

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
APPENDIX ONE: MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT



APPENDIX TWO: SPECTRUM OF DEVELOPMENT



APPENDIX THREE: NZDF SPECTRUM OF OPERATIONS



LIST OF INTERVIEWS

The following personal interviews were conducted as part of the research process. A total of seven interviews were conducted early within the study. One interview was subsequently withdrawn as permission was not received to use it in the final study. Due to both the relatively small sample size and the size of the organisations that the interviewees belong to, it has been decided not to identify those organisations as a further measure in maintaining interviewee confidentiality.

Interview	Participant	Date	Location
I001	Member, Civil Society Organisation	5 October 2006	Wellington, New Zealand
<i>I002</i>	<i>Permission Withdrawn</i>		
I003	Public Servant, New Zealand Government	5 October 2006	Wellington, New Zealand
I004	Public Servants, New Zealand Government (Two participants – joint interview)	6 October 2006	Wellington, New Zealand
I005	Member, Civil Society Organisation	17 October 2006	Wellington, New Zealand
I006	Public Servant, New Zealand Government	25 October 2006	Wellington, New Zealand
I007	Public Servant, New Zealand Government	26 October 2006	Wellington, New Zealand

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