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To cognize X is to be X

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Abstract:

When I cognize a substance do I thereby enter into a special relationship with this substance? It is tempting to say that I do. When I stone-cognize, for example, I seem to be related to the stone in a special way. But how do I best characterize this relationship? Do I cognize the stone directly? Is it given to me *as it exists* in the paddock? Can I be *mistaken* about this stone? Many philosophers are reluctant to say that the stone is available to me directly. They find that paddock-stones (and the like) are not the sort of things which comfortably (*reliably*) accrue to souls or minds. They bruit some third thing. This third thing stands between the cognizer and the mediate cognizeable. Aristotle, for example, suggests that when I stone-cognize it is not the stone itself in my soul, but rather *the form* of the stone. He proposes a sufficient condition for cognition which exploits immaterial form (thus): *to cognize X is to have the form of X (devoid of its matter component) accrue to the soul*. This model purports to uniquely characterize a cognitive episode. We vet the model. And, reaching aporia - given the rather blunt metaphysical resources endorsed by the Stagirite - ask for refinement. Thomas Aquinas superadds to the model. His cognitive sentences invoke *esse intentionale* forms. For Aquinas world items come in two flavours: natural and intentional. A natural stone is answered by the lapidary object sitting in the paddock. An intentional stone, however, is the stone which accrues to my soul whenever I cognize the lapidary object. Are the two stones stones? Yes, but clearly one of the stones *is* a stone in some nonstandard way. Does this not undermine the special connection? We next discuss *early-modern* empiricism. John Locke's surrogates are mental *ideas*. STONE* flags a Lockean idea. But it is not a simple. It should properly reduce to the likes of, say, ROUND* and WHITE*. Ontological problems however, linger. Is ROUND* *round* (WHITE* *white*)? Yes (and no). But how can a mental item *be round*? We ask *the idea* to reveal something of its simple cause. And move forward to a reasonably contemporary strain of empiricism, *viz.*, sense-datum theory. This theory identifies immediate cognitive objects with *appearances*. I never cognize substances directly. I only cognize sense-data. I cannot be mistaken about these items. They are single-property logical objects. Theory, under close analysis, terminates in monism. Which result, we proffer, illuminates the paradoxical nature of cognitive surrogacy. Cognizeables must *be* their mother objects in a way which undermines *standard* reality. Cognition seems inextricably linked with predication.

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This thesis is dedicated to the memory of Linley Webster Hall (1919-2000), who soliloquized prudently, administered Bordeaux admixtures to metatheoretical bouquets, & played patience late into the night.

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A Note on Method:

This study is a philosophical investigation; it is not, primary, an exegesis of doctrine. Texts will be treated with respect, but any doctrinal points they arouse are likely to be of secondary interest. Sundry interpretations will never pretend to be uncontroversial, final or exhaustive. Iconoclasm (likewise) is a chore. We have no time for it. When a passage cries out for theoretical emulsification, analysis will not be content to settle for quasi-technical *solutions**. Sometimes explanations will be permitted to end early (yes). Sometimes not. Much of the discussion, as it turns out, involves a choice between candidate simples. These simples may pretend to *comprise* a cognitive model. Costive vernacular tests vet the models. They must convince the layman. Once the general *problem* is made clear, it will be plain whether a model satisfies.

And what is the general problem?

Straightforward.

We want a non-circular model of cognition. One which explicates cognitive content. One which flags a sufficient condition of cognition. Prospective models are ventilated and scrutinized. Context must be won, but not to the extent that our explicanda are masked. Scholarly consensus vitiates philosophical fertility. It is denied entry into the study. Conceptual rigor operates, but not at the expense of philosophical narrative. We keep reminding ourselves of the problem in the vernacular. Oftentimes the predicament we find ourselves in is less than elegant. How do I shew myself that I understand a process which I perform day in day out? Is it enough to say that certain operations are primitive? Can the recondite co-exist with the banal? Forget about doctrine. What sorts of solutions are being proposed. Are they any good?

* Can I provide an example of a quasi-technical solution in this context? Yes. Consider an exegesis that disagrees with *our* interpretation of the Aristotelian cognitive model. *We* find that Aristotle's model treats of form transactions between substances: men and stones, for example. Imagine that the following objection to this interpretation were raised. Aristotle's cognitive model properly runs between *parts of cognizers* (sense-organs, say) and *special* objects. These special objects, it may be suggested, include accidents like *colour* and *shape*. What will be our rebuttal to this contrary interpretation? Straightforward. We will say that it makes no difference to our problem. No matter the exact nature of the subjects and the objects. Pick out an eyeball (an olfactory gland) and an accidental form. What is philosophically important is the cognitive *relation*. Identifying quasi-technical items as *relata* does nothing but postpone the problem. What is cognition? Variations upon nomenclatures will not make this question disappear. Nor will ostending ears, glial cells, lattice surfaces and *special objects*.

A Note on Primary Materials:

A glance at the Primary Materials section of the bibliography (p. 128) will show that a variety of translations of the original texts of Aristotle & Thomas Aquinas have been cited, consulted, pilfered and admired. In the case of the Aristotelian translations where & when it is deemed helpful to compare translations the relevant texts have been made salient in the analysis. In the case of two translations of Aquinas' work (*A Commentary on Aristotle's de Anima & On Being & Essence*) I have given the passage & then supplied the translator's name (*Pasnau & Bobik*, respectively). It was thought that this style of reference would avoid confusion thanks to the pungency of the authors' monikers. Whenever the Greek or the Latin is given the autonomous text can be tracked down in the Primary Materials. Only in the Blackfriars editions of the *Summa Theologiae* are the original Latin & the English translation supplied by the publisher. References to Locke's *Essay* are given (in arabic numerals) as follows: Book, Chapter, Section. All passages are drawn directly from Nidditch's edition (Clarendon, 1975).

*To cognize X is to be X: predication, surrogacy, & the adoption of a truly sufficient ontic stance**. A study in the metaphysics of various empiricist accounts of cognition. A tradition which includes Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, John Locke and (among others) Charles Dunbar Broad.

* This thesis is presented by myself, Mark Webster Hall, to partially fulfill the requirements of a Master of Arts degree in Philosophy at Massey University, completed May 2003.

To sense red(ly) is to sense in a certain way; it is not to be related to a certain object. Similarly, I suggest, to be red is to be a certain way; it is not to be related to a certain object (Van Cleve, p. 584).

Suppose one said "The barber cuts hair only indirectly, because he uses his hand." .. you ask "What would it be like to cut hair directly?" (Rhees, p. 13)

'No' is, in general, a better answer than 'Yes' (O'Brien, p. 26).

a1: Introduction.

Aristotle famously claimed that if an eye were an animal then sight would be its soul (*de Anima* 412b17). The analogy works by zeroing in on the most characteristic activity of a putative organism and then flagging that activity as the feature *by virtue of which* the organism is alive. A reductionist account of the organism fails, according to the Stagirite, if it does not capture this relationship between the entity and its living acts, its living ends.

A successful account of the human animal must likewise pinpoint the relationship between what the organism is and what the organism does. More properly, the account must emphasize the full moiety of existence and activity, treating the two aspects as a necessary match.

It is important to note that the living eye draws 'sight' as its soul, and not 'seeing'. Equally, were we to draft a list of activities that we deemed most characteristic of man we would have to flag such as features *by virtue of which* an individual man were alive. This flagging (of 'sight' and not 'seeing') implicates the activity in a causal chain of being. The activity in its proper inflection keeps the man alive, turning 'does' into 'is'. Reciprocally, the existence promotes the activity itself; remaining in being the eye is able to activate sight. Thus we might endorse the activity of cognizing (and then flag it as 'cognition')¹. Which we, in fact, do.

¹ Hereby we propose a conflation which will prove heuristically advantageous. Cognition will, in this

Given modern prejudices a propos the soul some of the activities Aristotle would endorse might strike us as inappropriate (some as obscene). Aristotle would not hesitate to endorse locomotion as a characteristic feature of human life. Nor would he be reluctant to include the digesting of pap and the cranky expense of copulation. All candidates, the Stagirite would claim, are conducive to human flourishing². Let us not give in to prejudice by refusing to entertain mundane happenings as psychic³ events. For one thing that is not what we are doing. We are merely following the pattern laid down by the analogy of the living eye.

Were *X*-ings and *Y*-ings characteristic activities of man then we would be authorized to endorse *X*-ion and *Y*-ion as features *by virtue of which* an individual man were alive. This is not the same as saying that were *X*-ing a characteristic feature of man then *X*-ion would be a psychic activity. In following the pattern we are saying that were *X*-ing and *Y*-ing and *Z*-ing characteristic human activities (and activities *X*, *Y* and *Z* as a tripton)

study, flag both thinking and perceiving. If we agree to this then the device points at something like a seamless activity which may (later) provide the raw material for multigrade claims of knowledge. It will become apparent, however, that most of our attention is cast upon the perceptual pole of any cognitive continuum. Favoured paradigms of cognition will (thus) be simple episodes of a man's eyes, say, latching onto table, horse, stone. Abstract thought, as such, will receive little attention. For textual support for this gentle conflation I point to Saint Thomas (thus): "*In habentibus autem cognitioname, sic determinatur unumquodque ad proprium esse naturale per formam naturalem quod tamen est receptivum specierum aliarum rerum. Sicut sensus recipit species omnium sensibilium, et intellectus omnium intelligibilem, ut sic anima hominis sit omnia quodammodo secundum sensum et intellectam* [Things that know are each fixed in their natural being in such a way as to receive forms from other things. Sense receives sense forms, the understanding receives intellectual forms, so that by sense and understanding the soul of man is in a certain manner everything] (*Summa Theologica* 1a, q.80, art. 1 *responsio*)". The point being that both cognitive *objects* of sense and intellect share common nature with the cognitive products (sensation *and* intellection). At least this is the claim. Moiety of content, if you will, is the pivot of all our cognitive models. Its extension - as well as its strength and weaknesses - will become clearer as we go on.

² If I don't eat, then I die. My eating pap promotes my life. Few would deny this. But many might deny this: that the life-promoting features of my pap-eating should lead me to entertain pap-eating as a part of my soul. Michael Frede identifies this broad entertainment as Aristotelian: given a list of activities - defecating through snoring through pondering - "Aristotle refuses to divide this list into two parts, a list of, as we might say, physical doings and a list of mental doings. He refuses to assume that the soul is the proper subject of the latter, that it has, as it were, a life of its own constituted by these mental doings, whereas the animate object is merely the subject of the physical doings (Nussbaum & Rorty, p. 96/7)".

³ "No ordinary English term is broad enough [to answer to the Greek conception of *psyche*], and the cognate 'psychic' rings all the wrong bells (Caston 1997, p. 319)."

completed the set) then *X-ion* and *Y-ion* and *Z-ion* would be the human soul. If we could read off, say, copulation and locomotion and cognition as an amalgam, then, certainly, this would follow the pattern. We would have provisional result. Copulation + locomotion + cognition would be the human soul. But even if such an amalgammization were viable the ploy would not be kosher. We want to flag, say, locomotion and cognition as features *by virtue of which* a man is alive. And we want to say that this flagging picks out the unique relationship between a man's activity and a man's existence. This unique relationship between activity and existence is what the notion of the soul flags. And that is all we want to do. We do not want to ennoble some activities by endorsing them as psychic and debase others by leaving them out. We want to ditch our prejudices concerning putative psychic entities and episodes. We want to treat of the Aristotelian notion of soul as a provisionally useful designation of a unique relationship. We have pointed out that the unique relationship is that between what an organism does and what an organism is. We do not want to draw conclusions as to whether the unique relationship deserves hypostasis or no. Conclusions will have to wait. We have enough, I suggest, to be going on with.

a2: Endorsing cognition as a characteristically human activity. Examining the Aristotelian account of cognition. Picking out the key metaphysical furnitures which fund this account.

What exactly *do* we have to be going on with? Thanks to an analysis of the living eye analogy we have an *aperçu* into both Aristotelian method and Aristotelian ontology. Thanks to a treatment of a supple philosophical ploy (the generating of candidate definitions of *psuche*) we have thrown up a number of possibilities a propos the uniquely characteristic features of living man: notably, copulating, locomoting and cognizing. These candidate activities have not been fully endorsed as *characteristically* human. Allow that we provisionally endorse the last of them (and save face). Allow that we provisionally endorse the activity of cognizing. Do we agree that cognizing is a viable candidate? Candidate for what? Candidate for an act that sustains human life, promotes human flourishing. Yes, we do. Such agreement kicks off the research programme. In treating of Aristotelian accounts of cognition we invite the Stagirite to bolster a rudimentary account of *psuche* with more established

and theoretically primitive philosophical principles and objects⁴. The treatment of the accounts must attend to theoretical coherence and consistency, and to plausibility and productivity in the field. Let us begin. What sort of account does Aristotle propose? What sort of philosophical resources does Aristotle draw upon to fund cognitive theory?

The Aristotelian account of cognition as presented in *de Anima* appears, *prima facie*, to ask that a bold and abstract relation hold between cognizer and cognizable. The theory exploits a potentiality/actuality split which, in turn, works off a matter/form ontological divide. It is virtually impossible to attend to the cognitive transaction without delving into these abstractions. The principles given above are so regularly evoked that they must be given some consideration at an early stage of the inquiry lest the whole explication drift off into fug. A number of examples will suffice to establish the general tone of the proposed transaction (thus):

... what has the power of sensation is potentially like what the perceived object is actually; that is, while at the beginning of the process of its being acted upon the two interacting factors are dissimilar, at the end the one acted upon is assimilated to the other and is identical in quality with it [*to d'aisthetikon dunamei estin oion to aistheton ede entelecheia, kathaper eiretai. paschei men oun ouch homoion on, peponthos d'omoiotai kai estin oion ekeino*] (dA 418a3-6).

What can be touched are distinctive qualities of body *as* body; by such differences I mean those which characterize the elements, viz. hot cold, dry moist, of which we have spoken earlier .. The organ for the perception of these is that of touch - that part of the body in which primarily the sense of touch resides. This is that part which is potentially such as its object is actually: for all sense-perception is a process of being so affected; so that that which makes something such as it itself actually is makes the other such because the other is already potentially such [*aptai men oun eisin ai diaphorai tou somatos e soma. lego de diaphoras ai ta stoicheia diorizousi, thermon psuchron, xeron hugron, peri on eirekamen proteron en tois peri ton stoicheion. to de aistheterion auton to haptikon, kai en ho he kaloumene aphe huparchei aisthesis proto, to dunamei toiouton esti morion. to gar aisthanesthai paschein ti estin. hoste to poioun, oion auto energeia, toiouton ekeino poiei, dunamei on*] (dA 423b27-424a2).

The closing sentence of this latter passage is perchance the most blatant

⁴ The business of the primitiveness of a philosophical object will become more salient as our examination of theory progresses. An example of a primitive object might be a soul, might be a sense-organ, a form, an aggregate of all three. Such examples have yet to be touted, yet to be tested. At this stage let us take 'primitive' to mean simple, unanalysable. Alas, we cannot take simple to mean theoretically transparent, straightforward.

exploitation of the potentiality/actuality split (and the most general). We are informed that all sense-perception can be suitably characterized as a process in which an *X* is affected by a *Y* in a particular fashion. In a particularly abstruse and strange fashion. The clause in question requires a second reading. The process is that in which an *X* is affected by a *Y* "so that that which makes something such as it itself actually is/ makes the other such because the other is already potentially such ["/" mine]". I don't know that a second reading draws blood. Let us compare Ross' translation of the clause (which we have just provided) with Ackrill's. Ackrill's translation of the clause is the more limpid. Thus: "(the process is that in which an *X* is affected by a *Y* such that) that which acts makes that part, which is potentially as it is, such as it is itself actually". A translation of the translation is called for. Let us first of all identify the protagonists in the putative cognitive transaction.

What is *X* in this case? What is *Y* in this case? *X* in this case is that which is being affected. That which is being affected is that which is perceiving. That which is perceiving is in this case the sense-organ of touch. *X* is the sense-organ of touch. *Y* is that which affects (in this case) the sense-organ of touch. A candidate protagonist for *Y* in this case would be, I proffer, some sort of material object. Let us suggest that in this case *Y* is a rock. Suitably populated our putative cognitive transaction is inflected thus:

"The process of (touching) (a rock) is that in which the sense-organ of (touch) is affected by (a rock) such that (the rock) makes that sense-organ of (touch), which is potentially as (the rock) is, such as (the rock) is itself actually."

Successful inflection of a translation of a translation? We have mustered, it seems, some sort of schema with which to work with the proposed cognitive transaction. We can begin to see what sort of transaction is being proposed. The schema certainly allows of a variety of inflections. After all, we can swap the sense-organ of touch for the sense-organ of sight and exchange the rock for a battleship and win a novel inflection. We could win any number of inflections for the schema and map them according to a singular method. And it is this method which we are interested in here. And it is the philosophical flavour of this method which is rather strange. What can it mean for the sense-organ of touch to be affected by a rock such that the sense-organ of touch becomes potentially as the rock is actually? What can it mean for the sense-organ of sight to become potentially what the battleship is actually (as a direct result of their standing on respective sides of a sense-perception

transaction)? Further, a sense-organ standing to an actual battleship as a potential battleship would seem (in accordance with this schema) to constitute a successful sense-perception. So authorized by such a schema an obstinate commentator may read it that being a potential battleship implied candidacy for sense-organ status. Which result would, at the very least, permit of a weird identification test for putative sense-organhood. Can we imagine the following conversation? Avuncular taxonomist: "I'm looking for instances of ocularity". Sanguine and heterodox expansionist: "Have you considered potential battleships?" Can we allow of such bizarre implications? Well, there is nothing *clearly* pathological about such extensions of the criterion. Until we have treated comprehensively of the Aristotelian notion of what it is to be *potentially X* and what it is to be *actually X* it would be charitable to suspend judgement. I submit that we need to tackle two questions (in order that we generate the suspense). Question 1: What philosophical work is the potentiality/actuality split being asked to do in the Aristotelian account of the cognitive transaction? Question 2: Does the p/a split do that work (whatever it is) plausibly and efficaciously?

a3: Investigating the theoretical role of the p/a split. Explicating the problem of cognitive content. Evading routine aporemata. Inflecting the cognitive schema with the hope of discriminating between candidates.

The philosophical work that Aristotle expects the p/a split to do concerns the need to explicate cognitive content. Cognitive content can best be understood by comparing the situation of a candidate cognizer (with respect to a particular cognitive transaction) with the situation of a candidate non-cognizer. For there seems to be something *special* about the relationship between a cognizer and a cognizable, something that is absent when we consider the relationship between, say, two, cognizables (two, say, material objects)⁵. We may resort to an example. As an example of a candidate cognizable let us nominate a man. As a candidate cognitive

⁵ 'Special' is deliberately vague. The philosophical heritage of the problem of intentionality is such that we chose to begin this project without explicit reference to her bloated contours. That when I see a cow I may go on to develop propositional attitudes to that cow is not contested. That I may think about that cow when she has departed from this glebe, that I may exploit such thoughts to refer to absent animal: likewise uncontested. We chose to nurture a simpleton's understanding of the perceptual relationship between cow and I. This will abate. It will be vitiated by a highly procedural, professional approach to aboutness and intentional inexistence.

transaction let us propose that same involves a man seeing of a rock. What would constitute a plausible candidate non-cognizer? A candidate non-cognizer would be perchance another rock. Let us set up a candidate non-cognitive episode in which one rock falls upon (and settles next to) another. Now in one case, it is proposed, we have generated a cognition (man seeing of rock). In the second case (rock falling upon rock, becoming juxtaposed thereupon to second rock) no cognition has occurred. Why do the two cases differ? Why does the first rock not cognize the second rock? Why do we allow ourselves to say that a man is prone to rock-cognizing but that a rock is not so prone? The philosophical explication of cognitive content attempts to answer this discrepancy. The discrepancy may seem too banal to deserve of attention. The discrepancy is *so* banal that it deserves of special attention⁶. In accounting for the discrepancy we are required to explicate *fully* the transaction of cognition (beyond stipulating that men cognize and rocks do not).

Aristotle is well aware of the requirement. How does Aristotle propose to generate an account of cognitive content? The Stagirite edges his way forward (and back) in a fascinatingly aporematic passage. We observe the peripateia next:

Can what cannot smell be said to be affected by smells or what cannot see by colours, and so on [*aporeseie d'an tis ei pathoi an ti hup'osmes to adunaton osphranthenai, e hupo chromatōs to me dunamenon idein*]? It might be said that a smell is just what can be smelt, and if it produces any effect it can only be so as to make something smell it, and it might be argued that what cannot smell cannot be affected by smells and further that what can smell can be affected by it only in so far as it has in it the power to smell (similarly with the proper objects of all the other senses). Indeed that this *is* so is made quite evident as follows. Light or darkness, sounds and smells leave *bodies* quite unaffected; what does affect bodies is not these but the bodies which are their vehicles, eg. what splits the trunk of a tree is not the sound of the thunder but the air which accompanies thunder. Yes, but, it may be objected, bodies are affected by what is tangible and by flavours. If not, by what are things that are without soul affected, ie. altered in quality? [*ei gar me, hupo tinos an paschoi ta apsucha kai alloioito;*] Must we not, then, admit that the objects of the other senses also may affect them? Is not the true account this, that all bodies *are* capable of being affected by smells and sounds, but that some on being acted upon, having no boundaries of their own, disintegrate, as in the instance of air, which does become odorous, showing that *some* effect is produced on it by what is odorous? But smelling is more than such an affection by what is odorous - *what* more? (*dA* 424b4-18)

⁶ We are alert to the *volume* of rival banalities (Wittgenstein 1998, p.161e).

What indeed? The problem survives the interrogation. If smelling is no more than being affected by what is odorous, and if all bodies are affected in some way by what is odorous, then all bodies can be said to register smells. But we do not say that tables smell pumpkin soup, rotten meat. But we *do* say that men, dogs, cats smell pumpkin soup, rotten meat. Smelling, therefore, is more than a body's being affected by what is odorous. *What* more? If we confine the problem by imposing strict conditions a propos the candidate bodies prone to being so affected, then we evade scrupulous solution. To say that men, dogs and cats can smell pumpkin soup (rotten meat) because they are men, dogs and cats, and that rocks, suitcases and trees cannot smell pumpkin soup (rotten meat) because they are not men, dogs and cats is just too stolid a resource. A slightly more plastic response might be to propose that men are affected by odours in a very particular way and to propose that suitcases are not affected by odours in that very particular way. Aporia infringes again, however, once this response wins the riposte "In *what* very particular way?" The very particular way is, of course, noneother than the very *cognitive* way. And the cognitive way is to all intents and purposes our explicandum. It is fruitless to point towards cognitive ways and ask that they explicate cognitive contents. We want of a more formal and fertile explication. Fortunately Aristotle has a more philosophically useful approach to explication. His answer to "*What* more? (and sister query "In *what* particular way?") involves the exploitation of the potentiality/actuality split. We have already mustered a schema (formula) approximating same. Let us revisit the inflected formula of the cognitive transaction (as won above):

"The process of (touching) (a rock) is that in which the sense-organ of (touch) is affected by (a rock) such that (the rock) makes the sense-organ of (touch), which is potentially as (the rock) is, such as (the rock) is itself actually."

Now this formula is *not* set up to preclude certain entities (rocks, suitcases, trees) from cognizing. The only trouble likely to be found when running this formula with, say, a suitcase, smelling, say, an orchid, would be the rather egregiously philosophical ploy of attributing a sense-organ to a suitcase. Attributing a sense-organ to a suitcase would seem to be absurd regardless of whether we have been successful or not in explicating the business of cognition. And we do not wish to achieve absurdity so easily. The problem for the formula as it stands is that it is already set up to favour the most likely candidate cognizers (men, dogs, etc.). This is not what we wish for here. We wish to procure a method of explicating both

1, the ability of men and dogs to cognize, and 2, the inability of suitcases, rocks and trees to do likewise. The formula, with this in mind, should not advantage either group prior to a trial. The formula, with this notion of non-advantage in mind, should not recognize that there are such groups, such groups as candidate cognizers and candidate non-cognizers. The formula should treat of all candidates as likely candidate cognizers and as likely candidate non-cognizers. The inflecting of the formula should discriminate between the candidates in exactly this respect. At the end of each run we should be able to say whether the candidate was prone to cognize or not so prone. How can we fix the formula so that it is neutral in this regard?

The first thing we should do is eliminate mention of sense-organs. If we leave in mention of sense-organs then we have already decided which candidates will pass the cognition test and which will fail (prior to running of same). This is contraindicated. Do we have textual support for eliminating mention of sense-organs? We do. Our textual support comes with the following quotation:

The sense and its organ are the same in fact, but their essence is not the same. What perceives is, of course, a spatial magnitude, but we must not admit that either the having the power to perceive or the sense itself is a magnitude; what they are is a certain ratio or power *in* a magnitude [*aistheterion de proton en o e toiaute dunamis. esti men oun tauton, to d'ainai eteron. megethos men gar an ti ein to aisthanomenon, ou men to ge aisthetiko einai oud' he aisthesis megethos estin, alla logos tis kai dunamis ekeinou*] (dA 424a25-29).

The conflation of the organ with the faculty helps us, I submit, to properly inflect our formula. The suggestion here is that the organ and the faculty can be considered as a unity. For the purposes of the exposition of doctrine we will take this to be a profitable stipulation. And we will squeeze something else into the conflation, namely the candidate cognizer. In time, I predict, we will want to treat of a reasonable complex molecular cognitive episode. Such an episode will involve a number of the senses and it will involve (in turn) the owner of same. The proposal is that we treat of the candidate cognizers as that which cognizes. This does not seem too grandiose a proposal⁷. It is not necessary that we take candidate

⁷ It is important to know why this proposal is not grandiose. The matter turns on the heuristic slant of *our* project. We choose to focus on the relationship between candidate cognizer and candidate cognizeable. What each actually *is* is of secondary importance. Whether cognitive subject is eyeball, eyelash, glial cell or homunculus is philosophically uninteresting. A cognitive object might be a table, a

cognizer and cognitive-faculty (in turn) to be numerically the same though differing in essence. For the time being the flavour of the philosophical description can be underdetermined. All we wish for is that the candidate cognizer *go into* the formula. We wish that the candidate (whether the candidate be man, dog, orchid .. suitcase) go (neatly) into the left hand side of the formula. Allow that the candidate so (neatly) go. For such dispensation will generate a novel (freshly inhabited) inflection. Next we scrutinize candidates.

a4: The cognitive formula is inflected and doubletested. A series of atomic transactions is generated and evaluated. The onus is on the formula to discriminate between candidates.

Grant that our first candidate (cognizer/non-cognizer) be a woman. Grant that our first candidate cognitive transaction be that of a woman following with her gaze the path of a Japanese songbird (the uguisi) as it alights upon a plum tree. For simplicity's sake we will not make the candidate cognitive transaction too molecular a transaction. For simplicity's sake we will stipulate that the woman be prone (or not be so prone) to *see* the songbird in its path (or not be so to *see*)⁸. The formula

coloured patch, an open-textured grid. Likewise uninteresting. What is the cognitive *relation*? How can we generate a non-circular model for cognition? This is what matters. The expansion of the organ of sense to the sensing *being* beckons no more than a naturalizing of the philosophical idiom. We can treat cases *as if* they involved men and tables. Our desideratum, however, is a cognitive formula which would embrace a wide range of candidate subjects and objects. It should bolster our pretheoretical intuitions as to which candidates *fit* into a cognitive formula. The intuitions should not short-circuit the analysis.

⁸ For "to see" read *also* "to cognize". Read also "to see *thereby* to cognize". And at this point it might be plain that the proposed elimination of sense-organs is makeshift and bogus. For what is it to see without an eye *seeing*? Granted. But bear with the examination. Our desideratum (here) is a plausible cognition without necessarily identifying a *specified* role for the sense-organ of sight. We want to extract the eye and generalize to the cognition. The fruitfulness of this extraction-generalization will be reviewed (perchance costively). The hope is that our heuristic errors will provoke helpful theoretical complaint. I should like, however, to ventilate an argument *in favour* of a less parochial approach to a sense-organ's *necessarily* being involved in a cognition. An argument? More an invitation to an argument, in fact - it is raised by Friedrich Waismann (thus): "... suppose it was discovered that, in certain rare and strange circumstances, people can see with their eyes shut? Can I not imagine that, say, by rubbing my eyelids with a certain mixture, they suddenly become transparent like glass? Wouldn't you at least *understand* what I mean? Couldn't you, for instance, follow such a story from the Arabian Nights? Certainly; but what if I now ask you, 'How can you even *imagine* such a thing, considering that it is self-contradictory? How can you give *sense* to these words?' It seems that you ought not to understand them. On the other hand, is it not quite easy to imagine such a situation? In calling your attention to such, if only fictitious cases, my object is to make you see to what extent non-linguistic, experiential factors come into play here. Indeed, you may think up even more fanciful situations in which a person may be said to see, for instance, with his skin. ... In fact, after you have vividly imagined a number of such possibilities, you may

thus wins new inflection:

"The process of (seeing) (a Japanese songbird/ alight upon a plum tree) is that in which (a woman) is affected by (a Japanese songbird) such that (the Japanese songbird) makes that (woman), which is potentially as (the Japanese songbird) is, such as (the Japanese songbird) is itself actually."

Picturesque epiphany! Indeed. We can be pleased with our new inflection (aesthetically). Can we be pleased with our new inflection philosophically? This is not so clear. The notion that a woman be a potential Japanese songbird is no less abstruse a notion than the notion that an eye be a potential battleship. We have vowed, nonetheless, to suspend our judgement with respect to the abstruseness of the p/a split's being crossed. Judgement so suspended we move on and ask the next question: Does the freshly inflected formula identify the woman as a cognizer (as one who has *seen* a Japanese songbird alight upon a plum tree)?⁹ Well, the formula only explicitly identifies a successful cognizer *if* the notion of a woman being a potential uguisi secures plausibility. We *can* make sense of the woman seeing the Japanese songbird at this juncture, but only if we can either explicate or jettison the machinery of potentiality/actuality. If we jettison the machinery, then we must exploit our pretheoretical intuitions concerning the likelihood of women seeing Japanese songbirds (in conditions Q through P^{10}). These pretheoretical

feel that there is *no point* in arguing from the use of language only; instead you may be prepared to say 'Of course, it is *experience* which teaches that I cannot see without eyes'. Yet at the same time you can't help being worried by this account, because you feel that it would be most unnatural to say that 'When I see you, my eyes are open' is an empirical statement in just the same sense in which, 'When I write, I hold a fountain pen in my hand', is. In this situation you may feel a strong need to use some such expression as this. The first statement, you will perhaps say, *if* it is empirical, is at any rate *less empirical, more a priori, or less contingent and more necessary* than the second; again you may say that the first statement is *very nearly, or almost analytic*, whereas its opposite, i.e. the statement 'I need not have my eyes open when I see you' or 'I can see you though my eyes are shut' comes *very close* to a contradiction without being one [Waismann, 1968. pps. 164-4].

⁹ Of course, we cannot expect successful *empirical* verdict because the case-study is an abstract thought-experiment. There is no plum tree, no Japanese songbird. What we seek is a grammatically satisfying result. *After the model*, can we say that perception has occurred if the woman has been affected by the uguisi such that she was (at the moment of perceptive success) an uguisi? Yes or no?

¹⁰ Reasonably optimum *Japanese-songbird-seeing* conditions: decent light, opaque backdrop, minimum glare, sober candidate perceivers.

intuitions are the ones that the formula was supposed to circumvent (and *explicate*). Allow (then) that we abandon the formula. Not so fast.

The hope was that the freshly inflected formula would help distinguish between episodes of cognition (affect *plus* cognitive content) and episodes of affect (alone). The hope was that the staging of candidate cognitive episodes with the augmentation of the p/a split would help explicate cognitive content. Part of that explication would involve discriminating between candidates. The new formula should be able to discriminate between genuine cognizers and all others. As we have only run one test we cannot properly evaluate the results. We must be able to compare the results of each test (in turn), compare them with our pretheoretical intuitions. We have run one test which our intuitions told us would have been a credible instance of the cognitive transaction (had we ditched the abstruse philosophical machinery constituting doctrine). Permit that we now stage a test in which the expectations of success are weighted in the other direction. Permit that we run an inflection of the formula our intuitions tell us *should not* yield a genuine cognitive episode. Permission granted. Bring on the suitcase (keep the Japanese songbird). Our masque is shorn of a woman, seeded of an object (thus):

"The process (of seeing a Japanese songbird/ alight upon a plum tree) is that in which (a suitcase) is affected by (a Japanese songbird) such that (the Japanese songbird) makes that (suitcase), which is potentially as (the Japanese songbird) is, such as (the Japanese songbird) is itself actually."

Our pretheoretical intuitions suggested that the piece of luggage should not be endorsed as a successful cognizer. Has the formula concurred with these intuitions and eliminated the suitcase from the cognitive inquiry? Unfortunately not. We can only deny the suitcase a successful cognitive episode if we can deny that a suitcase can be a potential Japanese songbird. We lack the necessary criterion with which to deny that a piece of luggage can be a potential *uguisu*. We are in the same position with respect to the crossing of the p/a split as we were when we interrogated eyes and battleships, women and Japanese songbirds. This is disappointing. The formula has been unable to discriminate between candidate cognizers and candidate non-cognizers. Without clarifying the business of a candidate cognizer becoming (in some way) a potential cognizable we are stuck at *aporia*. The exploitation of the p/a split hinders explication of cognitive content unless we can successfully explicate the proposed philosophical machineries. Does Aristotle make any moves to clarify the relevant machineries?