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**Understanding the *GULF WAR*:  
Hyperreality, Postmodernity,  
Spectacle**

**A thesis presented in partial fulfilment  
of the requirements for the degree of  
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## ABSTRACT

In attempting to understand the Persian Gulf War of 1991, various descriptive labels have been employed by commentators - the "postmodern war", the "cyberwar", a war of "hyperreality", and a media "spectacle". Such terms are signals of the high degree to which it was felt that this war was somehow indicative of the new age that late modern society in general has entered. This thesis explores and questions such readings of the Gulf War, and the general social thinking which motivates them.

I introduce the thesis with a chapter in which I aim to clarify just what is meant by the terms used to describe these "new times": postmodernity, the society of the spectacle, hyperreality. From these formulations I want to extract and investigate particular aspects in my next four chapters as they relate to the Gulf War. These themes are: illusion and reality; history and fiction; secrecy; and resistance.

In the Gulf War we seemed to have experienced a blurring of the illusion-reality distinction. In this immensely mediated war, expert speculation, computer and video simulations, and movie-like narratives seemed to become more tangible than, and certainly blurred the impact of, the realities taking place on the ground. My argument on this thematic issue is that while the media-creation of the war is fascinating and important, we are in no way justified in shelving distinctions between illusion and reality, as some postmodernists are inclined to do. On the contrary, critical sociologists must remain committed to "exposing" the illusions - projected by the media and the Coalition leaders - that surrounded the foundations on which the war was legitimised and the conduct of the war itself.

Related to this question is the blurring of the history-fiction divide by some theorists of postmodernity. In attacking the "grand narratives" of modernity and in placing a one-sided emphasis on the textuality of history, postmodernist theorists are, I maintain, left without a defence against the history of the victors. Against these accounts and the collapse of historicity in postmodern culture, I reassert the importance of sociological and historical truth, the historicity of the text, and the inescapable need for totalising, structural theory.

Guy Debord's emphasis on secrecy in his latter theoretical work on the society of the spectacle is particularly relevant to the case of the Gulf War. In the Gulf War we find an attempt, through profound military secrecy, to reorganise the

perception of war on the basis of political expediency. The resulting continuous stream of disinformation released left the events shrouded in mystery. Meanwhile, the spectacle of terrorism worked to legitimise intervention and mobilise support from an increasingly marginalised population.

Finally, I consider the question of resistance. For some, the advancing colonization of all spheres of life by the commodity leaves no "outside" from which to mount opposition in late capitalist society. The smothering of anti-war protest by quasi-fascistic euphoria testifies to the impotence of strategies of hyperconformity and the limited progressiveness of mass culture. At the same time, the wavering and even capitulation of numerous leftist intellectuals reflected the waning of utopian vision - an eclipse frequently encapsulated in such shorthand phrases as the "crisis of Marxism" and "the end of history". I relate the muteness of opposition both to the manipulation entailed by the "society of spectacle" and to the doldrums the left is in at present. The implication of my presentation at this point, and the overall thrust of the thesis is that rather than the hopeful liberalism or ironic cosmopolitanism recommended by postmodernism, only a reconstitution of the revolutionary utopian vision can do justice to the intellectual and political challenges posed by such phenomena as the Gulf War and its re-presentations within Western culture.

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# CONTENTS

	Page
Acknowledgements	i
Preface	ii
1. The Notions of Postmodernity, The Society of the Spectacle and Hyperreality.	1
2. Illusion and Reality: The Synthetic War?	24
3. History and Fiction: Does History Matter?	55
4. Generalised Secrecy, Disinformation and the Spectacle of Terrorism.	86
5. Resistance: Late Capitalism and Opposition, the Gulf War and Critique.	109
Notes	131
Bibliography	180

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## PREFACE

As the fifth anniversary of the Persian Gulf War of 1991 draws near, its social consequences remain tangible and troubling. The suffering of the Iraqi population continues as the U.S. administration perseveres in doing everything in its power to make Iraq even more uninhabitable. Throughout the region as a whole, the Gulf War has resulted in pollution, massive losses in revenue and generally degraded living conditions, with the prospects for a better, more prosperous and democratic future extremely unlikely. For the entire third world, the collapse of the state capitalist regimes and then a series of extremely aggressive and destructive interventions by the U.S. (the most important being the Gulf War) look like heralding an end to those Leninist models of third world resistance, revolution, and development that have for some decades prevailed.

If the above encapsulates some part of the features and consequences of the Gulf War, it is also important to say that the war contained and reflected a set of "morbid symptoms" of the age we are living through: spectacular, thoroughly mediated "television events"; a diminished or diminishing ability to critically intervene or resist the onward march of late capitalism; an increasing difficulty (due to our experience of fragmentation) or reluctance to speak of truth with regard to historical events and sociological processes; a waning - with this uncertainty - of utopian vision; and a powerful and extensive secrecy in the conduct of international and domestic affairs. And it is these sorts of things, along with other features of this postmodern, hyperreal, spectacular epoch (that we have supposedly reached), that I intend to investigate in this thesis.

In order to do this I bring together Gulf War material with a number of different facets of the debate on postmodernity, hyperreality, and society as spectacle and assess the accuracy, utility, and implications of such notions. The reason for the intense interest in the postmodernity debate is no doubt connected to the extent to which the theorists involved, like Jean Baudrillard, appear to so accurately describe the times in which we live (the fragmentation, the unreality

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and uncertainty, the "obscenity", the apocalyptic mood). On the other hand though, the tendency of all such theorising (poststructuralist and postmodernist) is to devalue, even to trash notions such as truth, enlightenment and liberation and I will be arguing that such theoretical inclinations are neither rationally convincing nor give grounds for social optimism.

Today modernist certainties, ambitious and totalising schemes, and utopian projections appear unsophisticated, even absurd; and yet, events of such profound irrationality and vulgarity as the Gulf War, not to mention the irrationalities of regular late capitalist existence, force us nevertheless to return again to these apparently old-fashioned notions.

The worth of such a thesis is for me ultimately political and it is with such political and moral goals in mind that I try to counter the "ironic cosmopolitanism" and resignation/acquiescence shown in the face of the current order of things, so often characteristic of postmodernist theory. That an event like the Gulf War reveals the importance of such sociological debates is evident in the commitment I feel compelled not to avoid in my writing. While in undertaking this kind of social investigation there can be no clear separation between "fact" and "value", I do believe that such sociological arguments can be decided upon, not only in principle, but often in substance too. It seems to me beyond doubt that we can know a very substantial amount about the events and processes that make up the causes, conduct, and effects of the Gulf War. Moreover, I want to argue that postmodernist theoretical formulations which seek to completely destroy the distinction between "representations" and "reality", which assert the necessity of giving up on authoritative claims to truth, or which insist on the "prudence" of ditching overarching utopian aspirations, can be shown to be fundamentally flawed. In trying to counter such insufficiencies with the case of the Gulf War in mind, I want to assert the need for skepticism in the face of postmodern irony.

# Chapter 1

## The Notions of Post Modernity, The Society of the Spectacle and Hyper Reality

### 1. Introduction

The Persian Gulf War of 1991 has been variously described as a "cyber war" (Der Derian), a war of "hyper reality" (Baudrillard), a "post modern" war (Cumings) and as a media "spectacle" (Garber et al). The implication is that in its various elements this war reflected an epoch fundamentally different from that in which a properly modern war would occur and be understood. More generally, the sense that we have reached the end of a set of experiences characteristic of modernity and are now exposed to conditions best termed "post modern" is expressed in what Jameson calls an "inverted millenarianism" containing a proliferation of "posts" - "post industrialism", "post modernism", "post Marxism" - and a set of crises - of Marxism, of social democracy, of the Welfare State(1). It is perhaps important not to leap in, enthusiastically delineating breaks and startling discontinuities, or strenuously proclaiming "new times" when, as Callinicos(2) and Smart(3) remind us, such pronouncements are both seductive and a recurring feature of modernity. However, surely - again, as Smart points out - it would be equally misguided to ignore the changes to the world and our perception of it; changes that are evident in explosions of new technology, the development of endlessly differentiated consumer lifestyles, and the constant flow of television and other media images(4). For a number of theorists, the extensively mediated nature of the events of the Gulf War; its unreality as a spectacular light show, video game or made-for-television movie; the apparent collapse, during the conflict, of the boundaries between history and fiction; the opaque manoeuvres during the lead up to and conduct of, the war; and the apparently diminished prospects for resistance to it, illustrate at least some of what is meant by the assorted labels for this "new" era: "fast capitalism", "the society of the

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spectacle", "the consumer society", the mass media society", "post modernity", "hyperreality".

In this chapter I aim to get to grips with some of the above terms and the theorists who weild them with the hope of designating the nature of the age we are living through. Of course, there has been plenty written along these lines and, rather than offering an original angle on such issues, I am aiming for some sort of completeness in this thesis and the laying of a ground work from which to draw elements from in order to apply them to the case of the Gulf War. It follows that the four chapters that come after this one take up various points and frameworks examined briefly here and try to explore in more depth the meanings and implications of such programmes; meanings and implications that, as Norris notes in his *Uncritical Theory*, an important event like the Gulf War can draw out.

## 2. Post Modernism as Art and as Mood

In the late 1950s and early 60s, American intellectuals Irwing Howe and Harry Levin saw post modernism as a phenomena of the United States in the 50s, with a falling away from modernism in the arts(5). In the mid 60s, Leslie Fiedler argued that post modernism signified a new sensibility, with a celebration of immediate experience and a desire to erase the modernist high/low distinction in art(6). However, within the sphere of aesthetics it was with the changes taking place in architecture that the term "post modernism" took hold(7). Such post modern architecture apparently makes a break with the international modern style associated with the leading Bauhaus architects and Le Corbusier(8). We find a rupture from the modern idea that planning and development should focus on large-scale, metropolitan-wide, technologically rational and efficient urban plans based on no-frills architecture(9). Instead, the urban fabric is seen as necessarily fragmented and we find a heterogeneous and playful juxtaposing of different styles from different

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epochs(10), supposedly in contrast to the "prophetic elitism" and authoritarianism of the modernist movement, ie. an "aesthetic populism"(11).

The American Marxist Frederic Jameson provides a totalising(12) theory of post modernism as a cultural dominant encompassing a number of distinct constituent features. We find a new depthlessness in the culture of the image or the simulacrum, with a marginalisation or complete rejection of the hermeneutical model of inside, and outside, of essence and appearance, the Freudian model of latent and manifest content, the existential model of authenticity versus inauthenticity, and the semiotic opposition between signifier and signified(13). For Jameson, such a movement is evident in a comparison of Van Gogh's *Peasant Shoes* with Andy Warhol's *Diamond Dust Shoes*(14). Warhol's work does not speak to us in the same way as Van Gogh's; it is detached and glossy surface with no ulterior motive. Warhol's coke bottles, far from providing a critical comment on mass consumer culture, seem to speak of nothing other than the immediately apparent. As Warhol himself put it, "if you want to know all about Andy Warhol just look at the surface of my paintings and films and me, there I am. There's nothing behind it"(15). And Warhol's obliging attitude toward the world of commodities, dying as a "court painter of German industrialists, Texan entrepreneurs and the Hollywood aristocracy"(16) - in sharp contrast to the modernist obsession with carving out a pure realm unpolluted by the exigencies of a growing commercial culture(17) -, would be viewed by Jameson also as constitutive of post modernism, ie. its shameless accommodation to the market.

This "new depthlessness" is also apparent, for Jameson, in a weakening of historicity, both in our relationship to public history and in the new forms of our private temporality(18). This manifests itself in playful recombinations of historical elements in post modernist artworks, in the blurring of the history-fiction divide, and in the burgeoning of "retro" and nostalgia on the one side

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and the proliferation of science fiction on the other (testaments, for Jameson, to the blockage of historicity).

Jameson speaks of a "waning of affect" that characterises post modern works and is, again, apparent in Warhol's "studies" of Marilyn Monroe or Edie Sedgwick versus a modern work like Munch's *The Scream*. With the post structuralist and post modern "death of the subject", the alienated, miserable, anxiety-ridden subject that Munch's desperate painting speaks of is displaced by a fragmented individual. And this expiration of the bourgeois ego means, for Jameson, the end of style, of the "personal stamp" that the work of art once carried with it.

With the demise of personal style, past dead styles are "cannibalised" in a random and ludic manner. Like parody, post modern pastiche is speech in a dead language, but it is the neutral practice of such mimicry without any of parody's ulterior motives - that is, "blank parody"(19). For instance, a borrowed classicism is evident in David Ligare's *Archilles & the Body of Patroclus* as 3 figures, apparently heroic characters from Greek antiquity, carry a fallen companion. On closer inspection though these figures are contemporary American college jocks removing a drunken friend from a toga party. Here we are greeted with the irony of the citation of heroism in an unheroic age(20).

If, as Bauman claims, the modernists attempted to gain a truer representation of reality - taking inspiration from poetics (the impressionists), relativity theory (the cubists) or psycho analysis (the surrealists), post modern art still holds up a mirror to the world, but this is a plural world open to a multiplicity of interpretations(21). The world represented is just one of many possible versions and the expectation that this representation will propel us closer to any sort of universal truth has dissipated(22).

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But can we make such a confident delineation of the differences between the modern and the post modern in the realm of aesthetics? Modernism, as Harvey points out, was a complex and often contradictory affair: futuristic and nihilistic, revolutionary and conservative, naturalistic and symbolistic, romantic and classical(23), and Perry Anderson sees this complexity as preventing a coherent and useful application of the term "modernism"(24).

For Anderson, the modernism/post modernism debate is one in which one void chases another. However, for many like Callinicos "modernism" is a useful category of analysis and by conceptualising this adequately we can repudiate the notion that post modern art represents a qualitative break from the modernism of the early 20th century(25). Callinicos borrows from Lunn and outlines four aspects of modernism: 1/ an aesthetic self consciousness or self reflexiveness; 2/ simultaneity, juxtaposition, or montage (for example, the films of Eisenstein); 3/ paradox, ambiguity and uncertainty; 4/ "dehumanisation" and the demise of the integrated individual subject or personality. Thus, for Callinicos, the very features often taken as characteristic of post modernity can be found partially or fully blown in modernism. This also seems to be the point of the very combative J G Merquior for whom post modernism is "at most an ultra-modernism - an extremist remake of avant gardist tics" - art has long since been desacrilised and form defetishised and the kulturkritik characteristic of post modernism is not new as "modernism declared war on modernity"(26). Callinicos also points out that modernism was frequently far from elitist(27). There certainly seems to be much validity in the above arguments as is illustrated by the closeness to modernism of many of those writers considered "post modern" - for instance, Nietzsche, Magritte, Bataille (Foucault) or Heidegger, Mallarme and Artaud (Derrida)(28) - and in the confusion surrounding the modern or post modern status of artists such as Borges, Beckett, Joyce and Marquez(29).

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However, Jameson has a very convincing answer to assertions of an essential continuity or identity between the modern and the post modern. Even if the features Jameson claims are post modern can be detected in modernist works (an argument that Jameson will not accept) the claim of a fundamental continuity overlooks (and this is decisive) the social position of the older modernism. This modernism was repudiated by the Victorian and post-Victorian bourgeoisie for whom its forms and ethos were seen as ugly, dissonant, obscure, scandalous, immoral, subversive, antisocial(30). Duchamp lived to lament the manner in which his "fountain" was, with time, reinscribed as a beautiful piece of high art and Bauman claims that today Duchamp's iconoclastic venture looks like an ultimate triumph of modernism - that is, the artistic game whose rules require the most transgressive of gestures to be legitimised by a theory(31). Today, it seems, both the rhetoric of destruction and that of novelty have lost any trace of heroic appeal(32).

The loss of "heroic appeal" and scandal is tied up with the waning of the avant garde and the exhaustion of its creative potential(33). The avant garde - the group of radicals who forced the pace of innovation in art, music and literature - now find that there is nothing to do other than recapitulate the radical gestures of the 1910s and 20s(34) - and nowadays, "drawing [ ] a moustache on the Mona Lisa is no more interesting than the original version of that painting"(35). As Paz says, "modern art is beginning to lose its powers of negation. For some time now, its negations have been ritual repetitions : rebellion has become method, criticism has become rhetoric, transgression has become ceremony. Negation has ceased to be creative"(36). Post modernism, if it is a vanguard, is "cooler" than the older vanguards(37). The avant garde of the first three decades of the century attempted to subvert art's autonomy, its artificial separation from life and its institutionalisation as "high art"(38). It posited, as a major project, art's reintegration with life, captured in the surrealist's enthusiasm for Lautreamont's phrase "poetry must be made by all"(39). This revolutionary impulse has now, it seems, been tamed and

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contained by the museum(40) while highly ironic repetitions of neo-Dadaist type "scandals" no longer scandalise anyone and are incorporated as part of the production and circulation of commodities in general(41). Thus the modernist dream of an integration of art and society "returns as dystopian reality"(42).

The fragmentation and decline of the avant garde as a genuinely critical and adversarial culture is traced by Huyssen to the depoliticisation and realignment with conservative liberalism that the artistic and intellectual world underwent in the 1940s and 50s(43). Post modern art also had to face a technologically and economically fully fledged media culture which had mastered the high art of integrating, diffusing and marketing even the most serious challenges(44). For Perry Anderson, the three decisive coordinates in Europe circa 1914 that were essential in the remarkable flowering of art in the early part of the century : 1/ the codification of a highly formalised academicism in the arts; 2/ the emergence of key technologies or inventions such as the telephone, radio and automobile; and 3/ the imagined proximity of social revolution, disappeared after 1945 with the defeats suffered by the working class (the failure of global revolution and the subsequent isolation and degeneration of the Bolshevik regime in Russia, the rise of fascism and militarism in Europe and the participation of the international working class in the World War) (45). With the failure of revolutionary transformation and the blocking of the negation of the false separation of art and life (that elements of the modernist movement seemed to look forward to), Anderson finds only morbid symptoms except, in part, in areas of the third world where a similar constellation of circumstances make masterpieces such as Gabriel Garcia Marquez's *100 years of Solitude* possible. Godard's cinema is another exception for Anderson and Callinicos(47), made possible by the vigorous renewal of revolutionary hopes in the late 1960s and early 70s (for example, Paris '68, Italy's "hot autumn", and the events in Portugal in the early 70s). The crash of these hopes is, for Callinicos, the main explanation for the extinguishing of the innovative fire of modern art and the rise of post modernism.

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It may be, however, that this demoralisation and pessimism towards art of the contemporary period is a rather conservative, elitist lament. This certainly seems to be Berman's point with his assertion that every age produces its own art(47) and this in part also accounts for Jameson's reluctance to moralise such historical developments and his admission that he is a relatively enthusiastic consumer of post modern cultural forms(48). Also, some may object to the Marxist tendency (Anderson, Callinicos - but also the situationists) of putting art strictly at the service and as a function of revolutionary transformation. However, it seems beyond doubt that the radicalism of much modernist art work has been well and truly absorbed into official and establishment ideology; and that the critical and especially the utopian element has indeed dissipated and left in its wake a corrosive cynicism and inertia. For instance, in analysing the film of our "post modern" age, Sharrett finds an apocalypticism full of elements of decay, crisis, forced irony and catastrophe(49).

For a number of commentators post modern art is imitative of a new, post modern mood. This is often described as apocalyptic - a delirious wavering between ecstasy and decay, boredom and terror(50). The mood of post modern culture, say Kroker and Cook, is marked primarily by panic with an ecstasy of catastrophe and anxiety mixed with a sense of exhaustion and cultural inertia everywhere(51) (Kroker and Cook claim cynicism is the dominant cultural sign), a sense that we have reached the end of history and are now arching back toward a great and fatal implosion(52).

The extensive focus above on art reflects both the degree to which such art fulfils the traditional function by reflecting in a very explicit and accessible way the characteristics of the society in which it is produced(53) and also the extent to which cultural designation and socio-economic periodisation have been run together (for example, in Jameson's account)(54). Jean Francois Lyotard, with his *The Post Modern Condition*, delineated a more general philosophical or

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social condition and also introduced the term "post modern" to a broad public(55).

### 3. Post Modernity

For Lyotard, the post modern "designates the state of our culture following the transformations which, since the end of the 19th century, have altered the game rules for science, literature and the arts"(56). As well as the developments in the arts (described above), Lyotard's "post modern" describes the current condition of knowledge which has three constituent factors : a/ the development of post industrial techniques and technologies which have contributed to the shift of emphasis away from questions concerning the intrinsic value of forms of knowledge, and the ends or goals of human conduct, and towards the production of knowledge as simply a means for optimising the efficiency of the performance of various systems; b/ the regeneration of the capitalist mode of production; c/ the seeds of "delegitimation" that were inherent in the grand narratives of the 19th century. The post modern is also a response to the political implications of the end of avant gardism and the collapse of the grand narratives of emancipation and progress(57).

The idea that art and philosophy reflect changes in the socio-economic structuring of the world - that is, the arrival of a "post industrial society"(58) has often been integral to theories of post modernity. Post modern society is, then, the society of computers, information, scientific knowledge, advanced technology and rapid change where technology and knowledge become the main principles of social organisation(59). The implications of this supposed move to post industrial society are anathema to many Marxists who feel such theories imply a new social formation no longer obeying the laws of capitalism and no longer revolving around industrial production and ubiquitous class struggle(60). That is, the society described by the likes of Daniel Bell as the

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"knowledge society"(61) where a growing "new middle class" largely replaces the working class and cuts away the legs on which Marxist models of revolution stood(62). Debate has also recently centred about the alleged movement from Fordism to post Fordism; a movement that supposedly introduces increasingly flexible forms of production and consumption that add to a volatility and ephemerality of experience and a pluralism of ways of life - what Hassan calls indeterminacy(63) - which relate closely to the theorised experience of post modernity(64).

Lyotard's thesis of the post modern condition of knowledge proposes that it is no longer possible to generate universal solutions or answers to problems regarding contemporary forms of life from within a conventional "modern" problematic(65). There is here a fundamental challenge made to the basic ideas and aspirations of social science going back to the Enlightenment : 1/ the view that our knowledge of society is holistic, cumulative and broadly progressive in character; 2/ that we can obtain rational knowledge of society; 3/ that such knowledge is universal and thus objective; 4/ that this type of knowledge is in some way above other forms such as ideology; 5/ that social scientific knowledge once validated and acted upon can lead to mental liberation and social betterment(66).

Lyotard energetically attacks totalising and universalising theories and methods and stresses the heterogeneity and plurality of discourses(67). It is becoming increasingly difficult to subscribe to the great and therapeutically optimistic metanarratives which once organised our lives(68). These totalising metanarratives have become coercive and normative and they cannot respect the historical specificities of the genuinely heterogeneous(69). The post modern incredulity towards metanarratives is a recognition of the mythical status of "pure" knowledge as a comforting story underwritten by the higher level story line of the metanarrative such as "the creation of wealth", "the dialectics of spirit", "the working out of class struggle" towards an "end of the

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story"(70). Lyotard charts the decay of faith in the last two centuries in the idea of progress: "what kind of thought is able to sublimate Auschwitz in a general process towards a universal emancipation?" (71) However, despite parts of his own work that would appear to indicate the opposite, Lyotard refuses at points to identify the post modern as a historical successor to modernity or as a description of the contemporary zeitgeist (as it has become common for commentators on post modernity to do(72)). The post modern comes both before and after modernism - "A work can become modern only if it is first post modern, post modernism thus understood is not modernism at its end but in the nascent state, and this state is constant"(73).

For Habermas(74) and Callinicos(75), the main contemporary intellectual source of the post modern "incredulity towards metanarratives" is provided by post structuralist philosophy; and certainly both are compatible with the three characteristics identified by Nicholson as constitutive of post modernity: 1/ a rejection of the all-encompassing and frequently teleological theories of human history and social change associated with Enlightenment ideas about reason and progress; 2/ the replacement of the emphasis on the individual subject and the contents of the consciousness of that subject by an emphasis on language as inter subjective; 3/ the linking of claims about social life, human nature and criteria of truth and validity with strategies of power(76). This concern with exposing the mythical foundations of metanarratives and with stressing the heterogeneous, constructed and ephemeral nature of reality pushes both poststructuralism and post modernism in the direction of a micropolitics.

The artwork of surface, image and appearance identified by Jameson would be seen by many (including Jameson) as reflecting a post modern world characterised by a vast assembly of images which are neither causally determined nor leave a lasting trace once they vanish(77): where signifiers have lost their signified and are transformed into images(78). Theories such as those of the "consumer society", the "society of the spectacle", the "media

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society", "hyper reality" and "fast capitalism", concentrate on the remarkable explosion of mass media over the last few decades and often point to the apparent blurring of the real world with images and the effects of time-space compression(79) . Thus post modernity includes for some "a life that looks like a TV serial, a docudrama that ignores your worry about setting apart fantasy from what "really happened". It means attention drawn in all directions at once so that it cannot stop on anything for long and nothing gets a really close look. It means a shopping mall overflowing with goods whose major use is the joy of purchasing them"(80). Before moving on to examine the critiques of consumer capitalism and the theories of the ubiquity of media, spectacles and simulations as theorised by the situationist Guy Debord and the sociologist Jean Baudrillard (whose ideas I will draw heavily on in Chapters 2, 4 and 5) in more detail, I would like to digress very briefly and sketch in the historical context from which these theories and those of post modernity emerged and to connect the main theoretical figures to one another in order to keep in mind the historical and intellectual/theoretical pressures at work in such formulations.

Various French intellectuals agreed that the France of the 1960s was very different from the France of the 1940s and 50s.(81) We find Touraine producing a theory of "post industrial society", Debord speaking of the "society of the spectacle", Lefebvre's "bureaucratic society of controlled consumption", and Lefebvre and Baudrillard's "consumer society"(82). Post war France was a society undergoing rapid "modernisation"(83). The 1950s saw rapid urbanisation with an increased birthrate and urban drift leading to urban congestion and, with a growing industrial economy, a vast increase during the 1960s of numbers into higher education(84). The period from the end of World War II until the mid 1970s was also characterised by sustained economic growth with a rise in the real purchasing power of the average French worker's wage by 170%. In this period expenditure on "leisure activities" quadrupled in real terms and there was also a large increase in the leisure time spent

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abroad(85). Not only were these changing historical and social conditions common to the theorists of post modernity (like Lyotard), the society of the spectacle (Debord), the consumer society (Lefebvre) and hyper reality (Baudrillard), but the milieu from which the formulators of these various theories emerged was rather similar and often interconnected.

Very early in the 1930s and 40s Henri Lefebvre, a sociologist, had been calling for a "critique of everyday life"(86). Lefebvre rejected the inauthentic and alienated life of consumer capitalism and called for a "revolution of everyday life"(87). Lefebvre had had ties with the Dadaists and the Surrealists and, in fact, had come to Hegel and Marx through Andre Breton. The Situationist International (S. I.) developed out of the similar post-surrealist movement, taking on many of the concerns that had characterised that tendency and also directly engaging with Lefebvre until a violent break in 1963(88) . Jean Baudrillard was one of Lefebvre's assistants and was heavily influenced by the S. I. and during the events of May 68 participated in a situationist-style magazine *Utopie*. Lyotard also emerged from a similar milieu having been a member of the radical group Socialisme ou Barbarie until a major split in 1964. During the events of 1968, Lyotard was a member of the Movement du 22 Mars and both this group and Socialisme ou Barbarie were the closest groups theoretically to the S. I.(89) (Debord was for a short time a member of SoB and was part of their team sent to Belgium for a large strike in 1960. After this time, however, Debord's perspectives sharpened and he broke with SoB- importantly, it seems, on the question of the abolition of waged labour(90).) I will now move on to trace the development of, first, the S. I. and Debord and then of Jean Baudrillard as they try to theorise the dynamic changes of the period and the new forms of mass culture, the consumer society, technology, and modernised urbanism(91).

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#### 4. Spectacular Society, the S.I. and Debord

Robertson claims that the spectre of the situationists is haunting the left and that this is evident from the proliferation of references to the S. I. in the last few years(92). Robertson suggests three reasons for this: 1/ that many of the "class of 68" (ie. the "left" of that period) have been exposed to the bankruptcy of their respective ideologies and have had to recognise the currents which had a coherent critique of their positions at the time; and the post-Gramscian realisation that any political work must go beyond the realm of the purely economic or political and must contest dominant power in the social, cultural and intellectual sphere ie. everyday life; 2/ that the latest wave of French intellectuals (Baudrillard, Lyotard, Deleuze and Guattari) have admitted their indebtedness to the S. I.; 3/ the attempted use by punk of the S. I.'s tactics and rhetoric. All this 20 years after the S. I.'s dissolution. There are perhaps also a number of reasons for the lack of attention to the S. I. until now: 1/ Wollen suggests that Debord, like Breton (another immensely important figure), has tended to be ignored because he was also never a professor(93); 2/ the S. I. and Debord's antagonistic stance with regard to the academy, Parisian intellectual life, and the media as well as orthodox conceptions of art and politics(94); 3/ the degree to which non-Leninist strains of communism have been ignored due to their "lack of success"(95). Although the S. I. was populated by many talented individuals, the dominant figure in the S. I.'s history was Guy Debord and my focus will be primarily on him.

Born in 1931 in Paris, Guy Debord joined the Lettrist movement in the early 1950s. The central tenet of the Lettrist movement was that the word had been exhausted as a creative source and that aesthetic production should therefore be based on "a purer and more profound element of versification - the letter"(96). Two currents in the Lettrist movement soon emerged: one, around founder Isidore Isou, concerned with art and aesthetics; the other, around Debord, immersed itself in Dadaist-style "anti-art" and cultural sabotage and it

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was with the latter's disruption of a 1952 press conference for Charlie Chaplin at the Paris Ritz that the break occurred and the Lettrist International was formed(97). The Lettrist International, along with the movement for an imaginalist Bauhaus and the London Psycho geographical Society, formed the S. I. in 1957. The S. I. put out 12 issues of *Internationale Situationniste* until 1969 and were dissolved in 1972(98). Debord characterises the period 1957-62 of the S. I.'s activity as centred around the supersession of art(99). In this period a number of ideas originating in the Lettrist International were elaborated(100). Debord saw as an essential project - and related to the Lefebvre's ideas on everyday life - the construction of situations: "the concrete construction of momentary ambiances of life and their transformation into a superior passional quality"(101). Everyday life was to be reconstructed passionately and imaginatively as opposed to taken as given and passively contemplated(102). Also in this period the S. I. concerned itself with "unitary urbanism", "the drift", "diversion" and "psycho geography"(103).

After 1962, Debord and those around him actively refused and negated the concept of art as a separate, exhibitible enterprise(104). As Raoul Vaneigem pointed out at the 5th conference of the S. I. in 1961 - "it is a question not of elaborating the spectacle of refusal, but rather of refusing the spectacle"(105). For Debord, Dadaism and Surrealism were two currents marking the end of modern art whose failure was the failure of the proletarian movement of the time(106). Dada had wanted to suppress art without realising it, surrealism had wanted to realise art without suppressing it. The point is, for Debord, that the suppression and the realisation of art are inseparable aspects of a single supersession of art. From this point on, the earlier artistic goals and projects were abandoned for a revolutionary programme within a unitary theoretical system(107). This theory, elaborated for the S. I. to use in its struggle against the prevailing conditions of life, was contained in Debord's *The Society of the Spectacle*, first published in 1967 as *La Société du Spectacle*.

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In *The Society of the Spectacle* Debord draws especially from the work of the young Marx and the Lukacs of *History and Class Consciousness* to capture the current age of ubiquitous messages, signs and images, the contemplative, alienated and passive nature of modern life and the boredom and apathetic dissatisfaction that characterise social experience((108); not just, as in much conventional Marxist analysis, in the sphere of production, but also in the sphere outside alienated productive activity(109).

"In societies where modern conditions of production prevail", begins Debord diverting Marx, "all of life presents itself as an immense accumulation of *spectacles*(110). Everything that was directly lived has moved away into a representation." The spectacle, however, is not a collection of images, but "a social relation among people, mediated by images"(111). It is not an abuse of the world of vision but is a *Weltanschauung*(112): what Levin describes simply as *the alienation of late capitalism*(113). The spectacle is the "heart of the unrealism of the real society"(114) and in "all its specific forms, as information or propaganda, as advertisement or direct entertainment consumption", the spectacle is the present model of socially dominant life. The spectacle says simply "that which appears is good, that which is good appears" and it thus demands an attitude of passive acceptance which it has already achieved by its manner of appearance without reply(115).

The spectacle is not, though, the necessary product of technical development seen as natural development(116). The spectacle originates in the loss of the unity of the world and thus "all separate power has been spectacular"(117). The spectacle is "the economy developing for itself", "both the result and the project of the existing mode of production"(118) or, as Debord says in a recent book, "the autocratic reign of the market economy which had acceded to an irresponsible sovereignty, and the totality of new techniques of government which accompanied this reign"(119). Therefore, the society of the spectacle is deeply related to the division of society into classes: "The real unity

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proclaimed by the spectacle masks the class divisions on which the real unity of the capitalist mode of production rests."(120)

The domination of society by "intangible as well as tangible things", the principle on which commodity fetishism is based, reaches its highest point in the spectacle, where the material world is replaced by a selection of images which exist above it, and which come to impose themselves as the most advanced reality possible (121). The spectacle is the moment when the commodity "has attained the total occupation of social life"(122). A series of pseudo-needs are foisted on the spectator by modern consumption and "every single product represents the hope for a dazzling short cut to the promised land of total consumption and is ceremoniously presented as the decisive entity"(123). Thus the "end of history" is continually declared suppressing the thought of history(124).

The bourgeoisie's victory, says Debord, was also the victory of historical, irreversible time in contrast to cyclical time and history as simply the movement of individuals of the ruling class(125). At the same time, however, the bourgeoisie beeps history's use from society and we experience a new immobility within history, a paralysis of history and memory corresponding to spectacular domination(126).

However, it is not the case that the reified, separated and fragmented, topsy turvy world of the spectacle, in which alienation and the commodification of reality are dominant, is immutable. As in Lukacs, the extension of the commodity to the "universal category of society as a whole" not only results in total alienation and reification, but it creates the possibility that the commodity and its world can be understood in their "undistorted essence." (127): "Dialectical thought is not content with looking for the meaning of what is, but rises to a knowledge of the dissolution of all that is and in its movement dissolves all separation"(128). The working class can demonstrate by its own

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class conscious existence, through acts, that this "thought of history" is not forgotten(129). By 1961, the S. I. had taken up the idea (influenced by SoB's positions) that the manner in which the "class of consciousness" would take power would be through self-managing worker's councils(130) in order to abolish the "separation of individuals, the commodity economy and the state"(131). Debord and the S. I. strongly distanced themselves from the Leninist idea of a vanguard as the representative of the working class and they attacked Lukacs for ascribing to the Leninist party everything it was not. The S. I., also in opposition to the Leninist model, insisted on the immediate dissolution of waged labour and the power of the state into the power of the councils(132).

It was these revolutionary positions that the S. I. brought with them to the events of May 1968 in France which marked the zenith of the S. I.'s activity and success and also the beginning of its dissolution(133). Members of the S. I. participated in the occupation committee elected by the general assembly of the Sorbonne University and latter formed a "Council for the Continuation of Occupations" which was finally dissolved on 15th June 1968(134).

In contrast to the revolutionary optimism of *The Society of the Spectacle*, Debord's last theoretical work before his suicide in late 1994 - *Commentaries on the Society of the Spectacle* - is pessimistic and written in a tone of loss and melancholy. For Debord, since *The Society of the Spectacle* the spectacle has gathered strength having "succeeded in raising a whole generation moulded to its laws(135)." We see a merging of his earlier differentiated models of spectacular domination - the diffuse and the concentrated spectacles - into one, "integrated" spectacle that comprises 5 principle features: 1/ incessant technological renewal; 2/ integration of state and economy; 3/ generalised secrecy; 4/ unanswerable lies; 5/ an eternal present(136). Truth has ceased to exist and unanswerable lies have succeeded in eliminating public opinion(137), the end of history means

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contemporary events retreat into a remote and fabulous realm of unverifiable stories, uncheckable statistics, unlikely explanations and untenable reasoning(138). There seems no place left free of the "crushing presence of media discourse and the various forces organised to relay it" and there also seems no possibility of reply to "unanswerable lies"(139). With secrecy now generalised, opaque events, decoys, disinformation and double explanations surround us with continual obscurity and doubt(140). Debord paints us a bleak picture of a world where we are hopelessly deprived of the ability to tell the real from the false, history from fiction, and where every form and dissent is at once disarmed and reabsorbed within the prevailing discourse of the powerful; and in this book Debord moves closer to the position of Jean Baudrillard for whom history has stopped and we have no means of testing pretence against reality in a hyperreal world that is fundamentally obscene, ie. noise and bustle without plot, scenario, director or direction(141).

## 5. Baudrillard and Hyperreality

Jean Baudrillard was born in Reims in 1929 and was a Professor of Sociology at Nanterre from the 1960s until his retirement in 1987(142). In the 1980s and 90s Baudrillard, as the high priest of extreme post modernism, has achieved guru status through the English-speaking world(143). Despite Gane's rejection of the positioning of Baudrillard as a post modern thinker and Baudrillard's own, "I have nothing to do with post modernism"(144), it seems quite obvious that Baudrillard has "everything to do with post modernism"(145). However, his early works were carried out within a neo-Marxist framework with influences from semiological theory(146) and during the May 1968 events Baudrillard was involved in the anarcho-situationist-inspired journal Utopie.

In Baudrillard's first book The System of Objects (1968), we find Freudian and Saussurian themes in a neo-Marxist framework where Baudrillard explores the idea that consumption has become the chief basis of the social order.

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Consumer objects must be analysed by the use of linguistic categories(147) because to become an object of consumption the object must become a sign. Today, every desire, plan, need, and passion is first abstracted as a sign in order to be purchased and consumed(148). Baudrillard elaborates such thoughts further in *The Consumer Society* (1970) where he argues that the expansion of consumption has ushered in a new era(149). Consumption, says Baudrillard, has grasped the whole of life(150). This consumption, being derived primarily from the realm of culture(151), is a system of meaning like language or the kinship system in primitive societies and "in the final analysis, the system of consumption is based on a code of signs (object/signs) and difference, and not as need and pleasure."(152) The indoctrination into consumption is the necessary modern counterpart of the indoctrination into industrial labour(153). In his next book, still roughly within a neo-Marxist framework(154). - *For a critique of the Political-Economy of the Sign* (1972) -, Baudrillard argues for sign value to be added to use and exchange value. Sign value is involved with the expression and mark of style, prestige, luxury, and power through which commodities are displayed in consumption; it is thus linked to fashion and "conspicuous consumption"(155).

Despite the challenges to the Marxist framework contained within his other books, it is in *The Mirror of Production* (1973) that Baudrillard really parts way with Marxism(156). It is Baudrillard's argument that "Marxism no longer furnishes in the long run a real alternative to capitalism"(157). Baudrillard rejects what he sees as Marxism's ahistorical distinction of use value and human need versus exchange value and the commodity form(158). Needs and uses are not outside the order established by capital as Baudrillard claims (incorrectly) that Marxism asserts(159). To more thoroughly historicise the question we must acknowledge the Marxist concept of history as itself historical, the dialectic as dialectical and the concept of production as itself produced. Marx made a radical critique of political economy but still within the form of political economy, we need to clear the field of political economy for a

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critique of symbolic exchange and its theory(160). At this point Baudrillard seems to oppose such "productionist" accounts to ones that theorise and celebrate discharge, waste, sacrifice, prodigality, play and symbolism(161). Here Baudrillard is influenced by the ideas of Mauss and Bataille who posit systems of exchange that rest on quite different principles to the exchange of commodities(162).

As the radicalism of the 1960s diminishes, so Baudrillard's own commitment to a revolutionary politics declines-first, to the revolt of "marginal groups" and then, pushed by the implications of his own theorisations of a total system that appears to absorb all opposition, to a down playing and final erasing of the possibility of struggle, resistance and alternative cultural practices(163). In *Symbolic Exchange and Death* (1976), Baudrillard concludes after a desperate search for the source of opposition that challenges the absorptive capacities of a system with no fixed determinations, a world where anything can be anything else, that *only death* escapes the world of simulacra, models and codes(164).

Baudrillard's book *Seduction* (1979) critiques those theories (such as Marxism or psychoanalysis) that deny the surface "appearance" of things in favour of a hidden structure or essence(165). Against these fraudulent and illusive interpretative discourses that seek to get beyond appearance, Baudrillard opposes seduction which plays on the surface(166). Power is better understood as a form of seduction in which all internal opposition becomes subject to the rigours of the code of exchange and becomes recycled in fashion(167). In *Simulations* (1983), Baudrillard claims that we have passed the turning point when signs may dissimulate something to a *hyperreal* where these signs dissimulate that there is nothing(168). Illusion is no longer possible, because the real is no longer possible; in hyperreality, simulation is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality. As an example of this simulation, Baudrillard suggests that his readers go and organise a fake hold up(169). They will not, says Baudrillard, succeed though: the web of

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artificial signs will be inextricably mixed up with real elements - for example, a police officer will really shoot on sight or a bank customer will die of a heart attack. In fact, all hold ups, hijacks, etc, are now simulations in the sense that they are inscribed in advance in the decoding and orchestration rituals of the media, anticipated in their mode of representation and possible consequences. In this hyperreal world there is a dissolution of life into TV and TV into life(170); thus, for example, the actor Raymond Burr who played Perry Mason on TV received 1000s of letters asking for legal advice(171). The hyperreal is a new era in which media, computers, information, entertainment, and knowledge industries replace industrial production and political-economy as the organising principal of society(172).

Baudrillard, in *Fatal Strategies* (1983), tries to think the social world from the point of view of the object(173). A fatal strategy recognises the supremacy of the object and therefore takes the side of the object and attempts to reproduce its strategies, ruses and rules(174). The media present an excess of information and they do so in a manner that precludes response by the recipient. But the masses have found a way of subverting it: the strategy of silence or passivity to media simulations(175). The masses are bored with the media and passive and may even, says Baudrillard, envelop and absorb the media rather than vice versa(176). Thus his vision of the masses and the media is no longer optimistic (McLuhan) or pessimistic (Debord), but ironic and antagonistic(177). The mass knows that it knows nothing and it does not want to know, the mass knows that it can achieve nothing and it does not want to achieve anything(178). The sad vision of the masses as alienated, repressed or manipulated is passé(179).

## 6. Review of Chapters

In the next 4 chapters I intend to examine the Persian Gulf War as it relates to the theoretical positions I have outlined above. I will take 4 aspects or

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component parts from the various analyses of post modernity, hyper reality, the society of the spectacle and examine, with reference to the Gulf War, the utility and implications of such positions for our understanding of the war. More particularly, Chapter 2 will consider the issue of reality and illusion. It has been asserted that the war was one of simulation, a conflict where reality and image were hard to prise apart, where the theoretical generalisations of Baudrillard and Debord were fulfilled. Chapter 3 will examine the way in which the boundaries between history and fiction appear to be breaking down (especially in post modernist and post structuralist writing); an issue that, again, seemed entirely relevant for the Gulf War. Chapter 4 will examine, more closely, Debord's thesis of generalised secrecy as a major characteristic of the integrated spectacle and the manner in which such secrecy, disinformation and covert action seems to speed the collapse of distinctions between true and false, illusion and reality. Chapter 5 will look at the difficult question of resistance. To what degree is resistance possible in a post modern age? and what implications do the analyses of resistance produced by Baudrillard, Debord and Foucault have for an event such as the Gulf War?

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## Chapter 2

# Illusion and Reality: The Synthetic War?

### 1. Introduction

For Fiske, a key defining condition of our era is the huge degree to which our society is image-saturated(1). In one hour's television viewing we are likely to experience more images than a member of a non-industrial society would in a life time(2). For a number of theorists, the massive accumulation of images around us has meant a tendency for the illusory and the imaginary to gain ascendancy over tangible reality. Some, of a post modernist persuasion, have completely rejected the modernist attempts at sharpening insight through the clear separation of image and reality and argue that, now, the image and the thing blur(3), that reality and illusion can no longer be distinguished. Such notions are captured in Debord's ideas on the "spectacle", Baudrillard's account of "simulation" and "hyperreality", and Agger's excellent term "fast capitalism" (4).

As noted in Chapter 1, for Debord, the spectacle as a whole is not synonymous with an abuse of the world of vision. The spectacle's world is a never ending accumulation of spectacles - advertisements, traffic, sky scrapers, political campaigns, department stores, sports events, art tours, foreign wars, news casts(5). The spectacle does though imply a conceptualisation of the ubiquitous messages, signs, and images which conspire to confuse appearance with reality and throw into question the possibility of distinguishing true experience, authentic desire, and real life from their fabricated, manipulated, and represented manifestations(6): "Where the real world changes into simple images, the simple images become real beings and effective motivations of hypnotic behaviour"(7). The current age, laments Debord quoting Feuerbach, is truly one "which prefers the sign to the thing

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signified, the copy of the original, fancy to reality, the appearance to the essence [ ] so that the highest degree of illusion comes to be the highest degree of sacredness"(8). The excesses of the media, notes Debord, are not the limit of such a concept(9) - however, the mass media occupy a very important place in Debord's notion of the spectacle(10). Marshall McLuhan is denounced as the spectacle's first apologist(11) and media are the most "glaring manifestation" of such a society, and again: "images chosen and constructed by someone else have become the individual's principle connection to the world he (sic) formerly observed for himself"(12). In his later theoretical work - *Commentaries on the Society of the Spectacle* - Debord argues that the crushing presence of media discourse, among other things, has erased the ability of people to talk of realities, to answer the continual barrage of lies or to refer to the authentic (which has been reconstructed as quickly as possible to resemble the false(13)). Again, it is emphasised that this process is inescapably tied up with commodity production and the division of society into classes.

Debord is, though, deeply unhappy about this situation and looks forward to a "return of history" where these illusions and images can be successfully counter posed to truth and reality(14). Baudrillard, on the other hand, seems to revel in the extreme account he gives(15) of this depthless, image-saturated society. For Baudrillard, illusion is no longer possible, because the real is no longer possible(16). We are no longer in the society of the spectacle or the specific types of alienation and repression which this implied(17) and "there's no need now for situationism, Debord, and so on"(18). In the "hyperreal" world where the real is produced according to a model, the real is more real than real and simulations come to constitute reality itself(19). Simulation points at nothing beyond itself, "it is an interior, sealed space, a closed system that can't be transcended or dialectically negated"(20). The ubiquity of media, computers, information, and entertainment are vital in this process and it seems that Baudrillard proposes no other forces than these as implicated in

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the arrival of hyperreality which, say Best and Kellner, means he is putting forward a form of technological determination: the models or codes structure experience and erode distinctions between the model and the real(21). Baudrillard totally rejects the "hermeneutics of suspicion" (ie. depth models of reality used by Marxism or Freudian psychoanalysis), and argues that in this novel realm of history and experience (constituted by media, simulations and "cyberblitz") the boundary between representation and reality implodes (ie. there can be no difference and thus relation between image and reality); individuals are so caught up in the world of commodity signs, media spectacles, representations and simulations that all access to the "real" is worn away(22). The dichotomies between appearance and reality, surface and depth, subject and object collapse into a functionalised, integrated, and self reproducing universe of simulacra(23).

The unreality that both Debord and Baudrillard seek to theorise appeared particularly striking in the case of the Gulf War as is reflected in some of the labels that have been used to describe it - a "media spectacle", a "cyber war", a "hyperreal war", or a "postmodern war" - and the dichotomies of illusion and reality, and appearance and essence that such formulations are concerned with did indeed seem to be thrown into doubt or effaced. In this chapter I will consider the degree to which simulations - "expert" speculation, maps, computer graphics, and movie-like narratives - that appeared during the Gulf War seemed to completely take the place of any consideration of the realities of the conflict. I will then investigate the illusions created as the Coalition fought a "war of images" and, in this section and the one that follows it ("spectacular mobilisation" - where I consider the illusions which formed the foundations upon which the war was justified), I seek to present the realities underlying these preferred images. Despite the difficulties concerning authenticity in a world of pervasive simulation and relentless image production, it is still necessary and legitimate to distinguish essence from appearance and illusion from reality. I suggest that we follow the advice of those theorists who

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urge us to reveal the reality of unreality, which in general terms is the reality of the late capitalist world order.

## **2. Simulations and the War that Didn't Happen**

A couple of days before the G.W., Baudrillard argued in an essay that this war would never happen as it existed purely as a figment of mass media simulation, war game rhetoric and imaginary scenarios(24) . All that is left is an endless sham in which the only thing at stake is the management of "public opinion" which itself is nothing more than a reflex response to the images(25). For Baudrillard, the deterrence of the Cold War has given way to the self deterrence of Western power paralysed by its own strength; all that is left is a battle over the corpse of war(26). Even after the war Baudrillard maintained that it could not have happened: "Everything was unreal: the war, the victory, the defeat and now the subsequent Israeli - Arab negotiations"(27). It is perhaps worth quoting Baudrillard at length on this: "Negotiations are held in much the same spirit [as the G.W.]. It is a kind of machinery, just as the war was a kind of machinery, with its gigantic montage, special effects, etc. It's so blatant that every body can see through it. In short, I don't believe any of that. This war is a good example of a synthetic object. This does not mean that damage and destruction didn't take place. There is violence, but it is not real, it is virtual. There is also violence in the virtual but it's like a simulation model, a parachuted war that does not take place. It is already programmed and takes place as it was programmed [ ] so it was a simulacre of a war, the only consequence of which is a simulacre of negotiation(28)."

Dick Hebdige provided a similar analysis to Baudrillard's (though in gloomier tones) pointing out that the G.W. was the most thoroughly mediated war in history(29). It was often claimed that the G.W. was fought in the full view of world public opinion(30) via television. The war broke out on television and one Downing Street official early in the conflict noted "it is a strange thing, but

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at this stage it was simply a TV War"(31). Apparently, even Bush, Major and Saddam Hussein watched C.N.N.'s continual coverage for information. However, claims that this was a television war are, like many of the images constructed and projected by that medium, an illusion. Hebdige noted that the extent of mediation failed to guarantee comprehensibility and, even less, access to the truth(32) despite a veritable bombardment of images, statistics, briefings and "front line" dispatches(33). In many of the G.W.'s aspects - especially the degree to which it was an invention of the media - Baudrillard's musings about simulation seemed well and truly fulfilled. Because very little of the war was able to be televised (discussed further in Chapter 4), imaginary constructions took the place of visual footage(34) - out came simulations galore: maps, experts, and computer generated graphics(35).

It appeared that each television network attempted to out manoeuvre the others with its newer, more colourful and exciting map complete with aesthetically pleasing characters and keys. In an interesting visual pun of European interference and domination of the region, for instance, A.B.C.'s Pete Jennings walked over a giant in-studio map of the Middle East(36). C.N.N.'s photographic "history" of the G.W. - *War in the Gulf* - is packed with maps and diagrams in full colour on large glossy pages showing us carefully how each plane works, the difference between cluster bombs, dust bombs, smart bombs, air to ground missiles, the workings of the patriot air defence system complete with a simulation of its destruction of a scud missile, how tanks are "killed" and how the various missiles work in such a "kill". The B.B.C. even "illustrated" the cluster bombing of Iraq's airfields with an arms manufacturer's demonstration video(37). The various TV networks began to prepare on computers their own simulations of tanks and soldiers moving across the desert or of the various "kills" described above to play out in front of the TV audience(38). These graphics were often very similar to those of a video game and many of the ubiquitous video games concerned with military combat employ elements of reality such as the names of real high-tech military

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equipment: F-117 A Stealth Fighter, A-10 Tank Killer, F-15 Strike Eagle(39); and the video game player can not only successfully rescue hostages in contrast to real failed attempts, but they can also win historical military conflicts(40). It is not at all hard for the distinctions between war and its game to get lost, as comments by enthusiastic video war game playing American servicemen show. One, following a bombing raid, claimed his unit had "gobbled up" Iraqi divisions "like pac man"(41) while another, having been asked by a journalist if he played the many varieties of video games available in Tel Aviv, answered "Nuh, I'm into the real thing now"(42).

Simulations of war of this kind have a long history. Prussia used "Kriegspiel" before their victory over the Austrians at Sadowa in 1866 and the French in 1870, and Schwarzkopf had learned that the Iraqis had, in the past few years leading up to the Gulf crisis, run computer simulations and war games for the invasions of Kuwait (software courtesy of U.S. companies), and Schwarzkopf himself had programmed "possible conflicts with Iraq on computer almost daily"(43). Even the media conducted war games. For example, Tom Brokaw on N.B.C. news staged a conflict with former United States officials playing George Bush and Saddam Hussein(44). Two brief examples indicate the degree to which war and its simulation may intermingle: when an Iranian airbus was downed by the US Vincennes on 3 July 1988 it was revealed that the radar operator and tactical information coordinator had mistaken it for an F-14 due to the similarity in appearance of the airbus to simulated F-14's in their training(45) and similar instances, euphemistically called "friendly fire", occurred in the G.W. Secondly, the series of high profile marine landing exercises off the Kuwait Coast successfully misled the Iraqis into expecting a sea attack(46). Der Derian also notes the growing sophistication of computer representation - for instance, in developing interactive media - and this will without doubt further serve to promote simulation's impingement on reality(47).

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Speculation about the imminence of the war and lengthy debates (which signified little) as to its advisability, with the onset of war, gave way to still more conjecture by an endless stream of "experts" speculating on strategy and at length elaborating upon imaginary scenarios. Such tactical military observation and "patriotic advice"(48) was often conducted by retired or semi active military and government officials(49) who fought over rival hypothetical scenarios in endless farcical episodes which Nimmo and Hovind compare to the rituals of Japanese Noh theatre(50). Not only did these "experts" play out simulated possibilities (and wild improbabilities), but the debate was itself a simulation of debate and informed comment as round the clock talking heads, briefings and human interest stories conveyed almost no information. In fact, some studies have shown that as a person's hours of television viewing of the Gulf War increased, their understanding of what was going on and the issues declined(51). Such speculation creates a sense of urgency and also a "reality" to which spectators respond(52), and it seems war is transformed into continuous preparation which is continuous pure enactment; thus we have Virilio's *Pure War*: a perpetual state of war with no beginning or end(53).

The representation of the Gulf War was also not too dissimilar from the construction of many Hollywood narratives(54) and some movie channels in the United States ran a series of Eastwood, Norris, Bronson, and Stallone movies to coincide with the real thing(55). In their G.W. coverage the networks employed a frame of popular culture in line with Bush's theme of the battle between good and evil(56), using what Dobkin calls the "quest narrative" which runs something like this: "The world at peace is disrupted by some event ..... that event becomes the evil, is named and, if possible, analysed and understood. It is then attacked by some leader, the hero figure, often a representative of the people"(57)..... after this build up of tension the narrative is moved towards resolution(58). For example, C.B.S deployed the logo "Showdown in the Gulf" for its coverage, applying dramatic titles, graphics, and music and the codes of a western or an action adventure story with such

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enigmatic codes as "will we fight?", "who will win?", "how will the war develop?", thus allowing and demanding a resolution of tension and a restoration of order(59). The similarities between Hollywood narrative and the construction of the G.W. were even picked up by one White House correspondent in a moment of lucidity: "The war had a movie script, happy ending, the good guys won, and a supporting cast of millions felt the future looked a lot better than they had hoped"(60) and various players in the "drama" seemed unaware of the distinction. For example, one returned pilot described anti air craft fire as "exactly like the movies"(61) and General Colin Powell and George Bush continually made use of dialogue that seemed to be appropriated straight from the film *Top Gun* or a Clint Eastwood movie: Powell ... "my forces have lots of tools and I brought them all to the party" or Bush's "line in the sand" and high noon deadline to Saddam Hussein(62).

It often seems debateable as to which provides the reference for which, as movies melt into the real life events and real life events take on all the features of a film script; and the American political scene is often taken as exemplary in this respect. Perhaps the movie actor - President, Ronald Reagan, is the most obvious example here in the confusion (for those watching and it seems for Reagan himself) between the movies and real life(63). Television and movies draw on real life, constructing and reconstructing events so that reality is inverted - for example in movies on the Vietnam war, it is the Vietnamese who are now the aggressors, thus failures become heroic victories(64) and real life is increasingly represented from within the codes, structures, story lines, and dialogues of television and the movies, or real life is reorganised so as to resemble the preferable media image. For instance, during the war, planes taking off on a bombing mission were told to fly in a certain configuration so that they might look good on film(65), and troop movements in the Gulf, Somalia, and Haiti have been similarly choreographed. On the other hand, we have a film like *Iron Eagle II*. *Iron Eagle II* is one of a number of movies made up and around the events of Grenada, Panama, and the G.W. that call for a

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reawakening of United States military power(66). In this film a nuclear threat appears in the Middle East that endangers both America and Russia. A young flying team made up of Americans and Russians is assembled to "kick some hardcore enemy butt" and after the inevitable teething troubles of traded anticapitalist and anticommunist insults a professional respect and jostling camaraderie is reached in order to combat this common enemy. Their high-tech military equipment and superb flying skills are going to somehow enable them to bomb this nuclear plant without contamination to the region, which, being Europeans, they naturally want to avoid. Despite hiccups in the operation, the whole thing goes off amidst powerful explosions and inane macho banter and the future further cementing of American-Russian relations is symbolised in speeches by the President and the head of the central committee of the Russian Communist Party and by the developing relationship between the rebellious young American "Flyboy" and the beautiful female pilot flying for Russia. In its themes, this 1988 film was not only expressive of the direction of international relations at the time, but it foreshadowed in its facets - an Arab "nuclear threat", successful US - Russian co-operation, high-tech weaponry, a "European respect for life" despite the pressures of war, and macho camaraderie - the G.W. Almost too perfectly it seemed that the model had indeed preceded the territory.

Can we any longer distinguish the image of the war from the war itself? Not according to Baudrillard. For Baudrillard, there is no difference between image and reality: the G.W. would be at one with its representation(67). The G.W. is its image on TV, on posters, T-shirts, and in picture books. In the following section I assert just the opposite: that separating the image of the war from the reality is possible and essential. As Holmes notes, what is left now of the G.W. is a set of images and these images, projected everywhere, have become "folk memories of the global village"(68). But these images are not of a war that took place in so far as they are images of a "historically magnificent victory"(69) over a powerful and evil foe bent on destruction and

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regional domination involving high-tech weapons and surgical precision in such a way as to avoid human suffering. I intend to examine two dominating images of the conduct of the war: that of the triumph of high-tech weaponry; and that of a precise military operation aimed only at legitimate targets and undertaken according to humane principles - and to present the reality behind these illusions. I will then move on to attempt a similar critique of the dominant images in the lead up to, and justification of, the war - what I call "spectacular mobilisation".

### **3. The images of the war and the war of images**

In post modernism, says Fiske, the image has broken free from the constraints of both mimesis and representation and it is no longer controlled by either reality or ideology(70). However, I would disagree with this and here I try to show that the ideological construction of images - images that, as Holmes points out, are now part of the consciousness of perhaps half of the world's population(71) - masks the reality. Images here function as a symbolic referent for an action, event, etc, simplifying and mystifying as they condense problems "into a few shots that then displace actual time and space considerations in order to forward the narrative structure" (Dobkin).

One of the dominating images of the G.W. was an on-bomb video of a smart bomb from the Stealth F-117 A's bomber going down the ventilation shaft of a military building and destroying it. Similarly, the video of the bombing of a bridge right on the intersection of the cross hairs was taken as evidence of the "pinpoint accuracy" and the "surgical strikes" that the Coalition was engaging in(72). According to the military, "80% of them [the bombing missions] have been effective" and certain aircraft types and missiles were apparently performing "exceptionally" even "stunningly well"; the lack of clarity here is typical. The media reinforced such claims by parroting the military and the administration repeatedly and describing the "brilliance" of US laser-guided

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bombs, speaking of the "eerie beauty" of the bombing of cities or finding this bombing a "marvel"(73). With all the praise and with all the spectacular visuals as evidence, no one would have expected that 90% of all bombs dropped on Iraq were just ordinary bombs, that at least 10% of smart bombs missed their targets and that, overall, 70% of Coalition bombs missed their targets(74).

Another showcase for high-tech weaponry was provided by the media around the "scud-patriot" duels; duels supposedly symbolising a heroic battle of good against evil as the defensive patriots took out the offensive scuds(75)or, more unconsciously, as a strange phallic jousting between Bush and Hussein. The patriots became the "saviour of the skies" or "scud busters" (Bush) and the sight of patriots "hitting" scuds, said Dan Rather, "take my breath away"(76). Or as N.B.C.'s Couric trumpeted, "Every war supplies a hero above all others and this one has produced the patriot missile"(77). However, despite the claims by Schwarzkopf, Bush and company for 100 percent success rates in these duels, the truth is that the patriots were next to useless. 160 patriots costing \$1.3m each were fired and most destroyed themselves after unsuccessful attempts at engaging scuds or intercepted the scud's discarded fuel tanks(78). Israeli sources estimate that only between 0 - 20 percent of scud warheads were destroyed and M.I.T. scientist Theodore Postal even argues that "when the patriot defence was used, it appears that the damage per scud attack was higher than when there had been no defence"(79). Never mind though, the spectacular "success" of patriots won a billion dollars for the star wars programme and an expected \$5b in foreign sales(80), and New Yorkers celebrated the victory in the Gulf with simulations of the simulated success of patriots destroying scuds over East River(81).

Supposedly in contrast to Iraq, the United States went out of its way to avoid damage to non-combatants and to only bomb military installations(82). The G.W. was presented as a tidy, antiseptic package of high-tech violence where smart bombs landed precisely on cross hairs(83) to "take out" Iraqi military

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power. Thus Micheletti and Debay - in their photographic "history" of the G.W. - claim that destruction of Iraqi command centres, communications, utilities, militarily important facilities and transport continued 24 hours a day(84) - not a single word about anything else that might have been bombed (especially not human beings). Indeed, the images in the various photographic histories of the conflict that have appeared since the G.W. confirm this impression. The C.N.N. production(85) , for instance, in its many large, glossy photos contains one small photograph of a handful of Iraqi corpses (though there is no blood or distinguishable shape that would identify these blanket - covered objects as people). On the other hand, for some reason, there is a photograph at least twice the size of an injured U.S. serviceman amidst the rubble of the U.S. military base after the 1983 suicide bomb attack in Beirut. We find a large photograph of the distraught wife and children of a killed U.S. Marine at his funeral and a large image of a bloody and dazed-looking Israeli woman after a scud attack as well as a picture of an Israeli family huddled together pensively in a small room, wearing gas masks (no mention that the Israelis denied Palestinians gas masks), and much was made by the White House and the media of this "brutal act of terror against innocent civilians"(86).

Kahn points to the irony that while films become increasingly violent and explicitly and horrifically detailed in this violence, the real thing is less and less seen(87). Evocative and disturbing images of Jews again facing gas attacks, of coalition prisoners of war, or of birds covered in oil displaced the realities of Iraqi civilian suffering. Greenpeace estimate the number of Iraqi civilians killed directly by bombing to be up to 15,000, but this and other estimates that argue for a much larger number of casualties have never made it into public discourse the way that knowledge of the workings of patriots and the stories of Iraqi atrocities in Kuwait did. In fact, the only event of this type that really came to notice was the Feb 13 bombing of the bunker at Amirya which killed up to 1,600 most of whom were women and children, leaving Amirya as a town mainly of men(88). The pictures that did come out from that bombing caused

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howls of anger from White House and other Coalition Government officials who claimed it was a military command and control centre. As Martin Fitzwater said "we don't know why civilians were at this location but we do know that Saddam Hussein does not share our values in the sanctity of life", the implication being that Hussein may have put them in harm's way as a propaganda exercise - after all, said General Thomas Kelly, he "pulled the plugs out of incubators in Kuwait"(89).

The argument that Saddam Hussein was clever at constructing dual-function installations was used at Amirya and also in the case of the bombed baby milk factory. Fitzwater again: "they have fake buildings, they have fake weapons, fake production plants .... it's a well known tactic and they have used it throughout the country"(90). So, because of Baghdad's insidious ability to simulate destruction to civilian life, civilian buildings and even bodies, we now could only have access to the truth via the White House and the coalition military. However, other evidence was available. For instance, New Zealand technicians who had visited the plant as recently as May 1990 reported that they had seen it canning milk and did not believe it was used to produce chemical weapons and C.N.N. had file footage of the plant in action producing milk. However, both of these sources were disregarded. After the war a U.N. fact-finding team concluded that "no biological capabilities existed"(91).

Such incidents were euphemistically called "collateral damage", a term designed to cleanse reality of its unpleasant aspects and to mystify. As obfuscation, it succeeded as a Times Mirror Centre for people and the Press Survey showed that 79% of respondents misunderstood the term(92). The "death of language" Orwell identified was evident in other military phrases where American casualties became "KIA's", killing became "attriting", and captured Iraqis were "enemy prisoners of war" rather than straight POW's(93).

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So the destruction of Iraq continued unabated, though, for all intents and purposes, invisible. Attacks were made on civilian vehicles on highways, bedouin tents, hospitals, medical clinics, schools, Mosques, restaurants and markets(94). The crippling of the electrical grid disabled the sewerage systems, water and waste water treatment plants, and the food distribution and health care system. Food warehouses were destroyed, grain silos hit and 100s of farms and farm buildings attacked(95). This, as Noam Chomsky notes, is a form of biological warfare designed to ensure long term suffering and death among civilians(96). Furthermore, the nuclear facility at Tuwaitha near Baghdad and buildings where biological weapons were thought to be cultivated were bombed(97). Such cynical and criminal destruction coupled with the most rigid sanctions ever applied by the U.N. (and continuing today) have caused disaster in Iraq. A U.N. mission to Iraq on the 20th March 1991 began their report "Nothing that we had seen or read had quite prepared us for the particular form of devastation which had befallen the country"(98). Most Iraqis seemed to be in silent shock, there were fuel and food shortages, no water or electricity, and gastroenteritis, malnutrition and dehydration were climbing with the hot season just around the corner(99). In all this, Greenpeace estimate 50,000 civilian deaths April - July 1991, together with 20 - 40,000 deaths during the civil conflicts following the war and 125,000 casualties among Shia and Kurdish refugees(100). Combine this with Iraqi military casualties during the war, and 300,000, or even Weinberg's 400,000(101), Iraqis may have lost their lives from this exercise. What could justify such an atrocity? For Andy Rooney on a 60 Minutes show, this was the greatest war ever, perhaps even for Iraq(102). This desperate logic comes close to that of the U.S. army captain in Vietnam who claimed he had to burn a village in order to save it(103) and this seems a recurring "enabling myth" of the U.S. imperial spectacle (Rogin(104)): both a regeneration (105) and a redemption through violence(106).

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Despite frequent talk of a "great victory", of brilliant battles and heroism, we do not find that any of these actually occurred during the G.W.. When Saddam Hussein announced that his troops were leaving Kuwait on the 26th Feb, the Coalition treated the withdrawal as a military retreat, thus making the Iraqi army legitimate targets. The result has been described by various participants as "a turkey shoot" and like "shooting fish in a barrel"(107). The use of fuel-air explosive bombs, cluster bombs, and Napalm to massacre fleeing Iraqi troops-many of whom were carrying clearly visible white flags, Kuwaiti prisoners or driving red crescent vehicles-resulted in the mass slaughters at Mutlah gap (dubbed "the road to hell") and on a coastal road running North East of Jahrah to the Iraqi border of Umm Quasir(108). Such conventional weapons can wreak levels of destruction and death comparable to low yield tactical nuclear weapons, without the moral and other problems associated with nuclear weapons(109). These massacres were stopped short, probably out of fear of alienating Coalition Arab governments(110), and were very quickly cleaned up as bulldozers scooped uncounted bodies of Iraqi soldiers into mass graves(111). The 10s of 1000s of human beings killed were not represented(112). Instead, what filtered into the mainstream was the odd, still horrific, photograph of a single charred body or a few twisted corpses which implied that these were the few unlucky individuals, the inevitable price of war. But these pictures do not adequately represent the suffering and insane destruction inflicted on the Iraqi people as the scene from an untouched "road to hell" would have.

Not only was the war a triumph of illusion over reality, but so was the mobilisation and prelude to the war: the image of diplomacy, of Iraqi atrocity and of the threats that Iraq posed, as well as the "threat" of Islam.

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#### 4. Spectacular Mobilisation: Non-Diplomacy, Atrocity, Unreal Threats and Orientalism

Throughout the conflict the Coalition was represented as "the exasperated face of reason"(113), its spokespeople being constantly in motion to try and avert a war. However, any reasonable analysis of the events leading up to the war would bring one to conclude that in reality the United States had probably planned a military strike from very early on in the crisis(114). Officially the Bush administration had "gone that extra mile" and had "left no stone unturned" in the search for peace and a negotiated settlement(115). Bush argued that "the war in the Gulf is not a war we wanted. We worked hard to avoid a war. For more than 5 months we ..... tried every diplomatic avenue but time and again, Saddam Hussein rejected the path of diplomacy and peace"(116). For the *L. A. Times*, the George Bush diplomatic style was "on the slow side, on the cautious side, on the consensus side, on the pragmatic side"(117). In reality, Washington moved quickly to block all efforts to resolve the crisis diplomatically(118).

A key tactic in the construction of such an image was to portray Saddam Hussein an utterly intransigent and averse to any dialogue, but this was simply not true. As Heikal notes, in the days Aug 3 - 6 Saddam Hussein had agreed to a mini-summit, had accepted the need for faster withdrawal, had pulled back a token portion of his forces, had sent Washington a secret deal and conveyed assurances to Bush as to his intentions(119). Saddam Hussein's offers to withdraw were uniformly rejected as "unacceptable" or, in the case of the Iraqi offer before the Coalition deadline, as a "cruel hoax". However, many of these conditions appear hardly unreasonable - ie. a statement of the many legitimate Iraqi grievances, a pledge from the United States not to attack withdrawing Iraqi troops, for foreign troops to leave the region, for an agreement to the Palestinian problem and other unresolved issues in the Middle East(120) including the problem of weapons of mass destruction(121). The Coalition response was, as always, to insist it could not "reward aggression" which

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effectively meant "we will not negotiate"(122), or to up the demands by calling for an elimination of Iraq's missile and nuclear facilities and claiming Kuwait should be compensated(123).

According to Margaret Thatcher, the U.S forces "were half way to their destination before the request [from Saudi Arabia] came for them to come" on Aug 7(124) and both Thatcher and Bush had privately rejected the possibility of negotiations. According to Gorbachev, after the September 9 mini-summit with Bush, "The Americans told us that they are ready to fight and they are going to war whatever happens. We can see their point of view"(125) and Thatcher on August 26th felt a peaceful solution to the Gulf Crisis was "most unlikely" as "This man [Saddam Hussein] is a despot and a tyrant" thus making negotiation impossible(126).

Baghdad had agreed that Iraqi troops would pull out of Kuwait if the Summit at Jeddah was successful. However, when Mubarak changed his mind and denounced Iraq, Baghdad cancelled the Summit. When King Hussein asked Mubarak why he had done this, Mubarak replied that he had been "under tremendous pressure"(127), undoubtedly in response to U.S. and Saudi threats and offers to write off debts and organise new loans for Egypt(128). And this was essentially the order of the day as the U.S. bribed and threatened its way to the appropriate condemnations, abstentions and votes for military action. When Yemen would not support the U.S.-sponsored resolution authorising force its ambassador was told that it would be "the most expensive 'no' vote you ever cast" and 3 days later the U.S. cancelled its \$70m aid package to Yemen(129). Assad of Syria's cooperation with the Coalition - partly forced on Damascus by Russia's withdrawal of support - seems to have made it possible for Syria to brutally crush General Aoun in North Lebanon(130). New aid packages were offered to Colombia, Ethiopia and Zaire for their votes and China's post-Tiananmen isolation was ended by their abstention vote (and less than 1 week later the World Bank announced access to \$114b for China in

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economic aid)(131). However, the U.S. and Britain also did very well out of what was essentially a protection racket. The U.S. received \$61b during the G.W. (19b from Germany and Japan alone) while its war costs were only \$35 - 40b(132) and Britain made a tidy \$1b profit from its involvement(133). In all this time and with all this "diplomacy", no attempt had been made to bring Iraq and Kuwait together as demanded by the first U.N. resolution on the conflict, number 660(134).

The efforts at negotiated solution were not helped either by the aggressive and insulting tone taken by Bush(135). Bush backed Saddam Hussein into a corner telling him, for example, that he was going to get his ass kicked(136). And the insulting tone seems to have been calculated to make it difficult for Baghdad to respond positively(137), thus eliciting the reaction the U.S. administration had hoped for. For instance, 5 academics of Arab origin briefed Bush on Saddam Hussein's characteristics and 1 suggested Bush refer to him as "Saddam" to belittle him(138). Similarly, the C.I.A. proposed Bush pronounce Saddam "SAD-dam", as the emphasis changes the meaning from "he who confronts" to "a little boy who cleans out the shoes of old men"(139). In fact, as Kellner notes, military action was the logical solution given the excessively negative portrayal of Saddam Hussein(140) and perhaps this portrayal back-fired to a degree on its authors as Bush's failure to unseat this "evil tyrant" was taken as evidence of an incomplete action, even as a failure of war aims(141). It is no surprise also, that Saddam Hussein, in the face of Bush's vehement rhetoric, felt that withdrawal would be too costly a loss of face, that army/civilian rebellion might result, and/or that the Coalition may well attack anyway(142).

Lastly, diplomacy was shelved for war partly because sanctions were supposedly not working. However, this was also an illusion and was even contradicted by the C.I.A. as late as January 1991 when William Webster told Congress that sanctions were making it ever more difficult for the Iraqi military to operate and were bringing Iraq's economy to a standstill(143). And common

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sense alone suggested that this would be the case given the extremely stringent nature of the sanctions and Iraq's great vulnerability to such sanctions(144).

A string of "atrocities" committed by Iraq were also instrumental in the movement towards war in the Gulf, but such atrocities, like the diplomacy of the Coalition forces, was largely spectacle conveying a sense of urgency and purpose and with little connection to what was actually taking place(145). When Saddam Hussein released western hostages beginning the first week of September(146), Bush's appeals about the "treatment of Americans" "by a brutal dictator" fell flat(147) to be revived with the furore over the parading of captured airmen whom it was claimed, incorrectly, had been beaten and tortured and in response to which Bush threatened war crimes trials(148).

However, the greatest simulation of atrocity was reserved for the events taking place within occupied Kuwait. Kuwait was apparently being "raped" and its people "butchered"(149). Certainly, no one could reasonably deny that Iraq is a brutal dictatorship. Amnesty International have long documented the tortures and murders that the Baath regime has inflicted on the Iraqi population though this has never concerned the U.S. administration. After Amnesty's 1989 report on Iraq - documenting extensive murder and torture - the Bush administration had no response and 6 months later John Kelly said rather blandly "Iraq is an important state with great potential we want to deepen and broaden our relationship"(150). But suddenly the U.S. administration could not emphasise enough the horror it felt over the Iraqi regime's brutality. It is worth quoting Bush at length from his interview with David Frost to capture the tone of the administration denunciations: "Oh David, it was so terrible, it's hard to describe ... The torturing of a handicapped child. The shooting of young boys in front of their parents. The rape of women dragged out of their houses and repeatedly raped and then brought into the hospital as kind of basket cases ... The tying of those being tortured to ceiling fans so they turn and turn. The

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killing of a Kuwaiti and leaving him hanging ... from a crane and so others will see him. Electric shock to the ... private parts of men and women ... broken glass inserted in - jabbed into people I mean, it, - it is primeval. It's almost impossible to rationalise this behaviour with the fact that this is 1990"(151). In fact, what was going on in Kuwait was labelled "genocide"(152).

The PR firm Hill and Knowlton - who help the Indonesian government with its poor "public image" - were given \$10.8m by Citizens for a Free Kuwait (CFK) and took to towns and cities with grisly atrocity stories complete with vaguely documented photographs - some of bloody mannequins - and testimony by "witnesses" and "victims", such as the wife of the Kuwaiti planning minister(153). Very important was the "incubator story" where it was alleged that Iraqi soldiers had removed 312 babies from incubators, stolen the incubators and left the babies to die on hospital floors. Hill and Knowlton sent a "witness" to this "atrocitiy" - "Nayirah" - who, it was later revealed, was the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the U.S. Unfortunately, this lie was corroborated by A. I., and Bush for the first time ever could not cite A. I. enough(154). So that reality might be turned completely upside down, the Human Rights Caucus co-chairman Lantos claimed that "in the 8 year history of the congressional human rights caucus we have never had the degree of ghoulish and nightmarish horror stories coming from totally credible eye witnesses that we have had this time"(155). Bush and Henry Kissinger even made belated condemnations of the 1988 gassing of Iraqi Kurds(156).

Following the "liberation" of Kuwait, it was found that only around 300 Kuwaitis had died during occupation - hardly a genocide - and there was a complete absence of concern from the Bush Administration when a "cleansing of Kuwait" took place and "collaborators" were systematically imprisoned without trial, tortured and killed on the return of the monarchy(157).

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The counterpart, as Scarry notes, of the disappearance of an injurable enemy, as occurred in the war itself, is the magnification of the injury that the powerful enemy can inflict(158). The U.S. administration ostensibly sent in the troops of "Operation Desert Shield" to protect Saudi Arabia from invasion at the Saudi's request (even though they bullied Saudi Arabia until they would let them in)(159) as "Iraq has massed an enormous war machine on the Saudi border"(160). Both Bush and the Saudi ambassador to the U.S., Prince Bandar bin Sultan, told King Fahd that U.S satellite photographs showed that the Kingdom was threatened(161). Thus the administration warned of a "domino effect" as Iraq invaded one after another oil producing Arab states and as James Baker patronisingly put it on November 13, 1990, "To bring it down to the level of the average American citizen, let me say that means jobs" through an "economic recession world wide, caused by the control of 1 nation - 1 dictator, if you will - of the West's economic lifeline"(162). However, Saddam Hussein had insisted from the beginning that he had no intention of invading Saudi Arabia, citing the non-aggression pact he had signed with Fahd(163); invasion would have also stretched his forces very thin, making Iraq vulnerable to attack by Syria, Iran or Turkey(164); and, most importantly, Saudi scouts found no traces of Iraqi troops heading towards the Kingdom(165).

As in the McCarthy era when the inability to find communists only proved their cleverness and deviousness and magnified the threat they posed(166), so with "Saddam's army". The bulk of this mighty army, "the world's 4th largest military power"(167) could not be found(168). The Bush administration doubled the size of Iraqi troops at a time when many were probably being withdrawn and satellite photographs from the Soviet commercial satellite agency Soyuz Karta did not, according to experts, indicate an Iraqi force 1/5th the size that the administration had claimed(169).

Not only were the numbers of the Iraqi army sheer myth, so was the level of technological sophistication of the weaponry (none of the frightening weapons

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Iraq was said to possess emerged during the G.W.(170)) and the competency of the armed forces. Iraq had no secrets - Egypt, Russia, France and the U.S. knew which weapons they had (even down to the near exact amount of uranium(171))-and Mubarak, a former head of the air force, described their pilots as "no good", flying 15 - 20 year old aircraft of which there were not very many(172). But by this time a new and greater threat had been invented.

A November 20 New York Times/CBS poll found that while most Americans did not think oil was a good enough reason to go to war, they would support U.S. intervention to prohibit Iraq from developing a nuclear bomb. Bush had found his winning ticket. Two days later Bush warned of Saddam Hussein's atomic programme(173): "Everyday that passes brings Saddam one step closer to realising his goal of a nuclear weapons arsenal and that's why ... your mission is marked by a real sense of urgency. He has never possessed a weapon he didn't use"(174). Nuclear physicist Michio Kaku notes sarcastically, that Bush and Quayle might have discovered an astounding new law of physics to develop a nuclear bomb that had previously been estimated as at least 5 - 10 years away(175). This "near nuclear dictator", as columnist William Safire called Saddam Hussein, had to be stopped.

Lastly, and very importantly, the mobilisation and justification for war provided by the spectacle of "Islam on the march" and by anti-Arabism can, I think, be seen as a factor of some importance. Bush's dehumanisation of Saddam Hussein contained deep overtones of racism. Such events were a "throw back to another era" and a "dark relic from a dark time" where the "rule of law" gives way to the "rule of the jungle"(176). Schwarzkopf, musing on Iraqi atrocities, argued that they were "not part of the same human race [ ] that the rest of us are"(177). There were 100s of examples of television anchors making Freudian slips and speaking about the "anti Arab" (rather than anti Iraqi) Coalition(178) and the "expert" Edward Luttwak commented after the war on "the kind of governments you have in the Middle East, people running around with towels

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on their heads, thinking the earth is flat, running Mach 2 aircraft"(179). And as terms like "sand niggers" gained popularity, congressmen, airlines and the nuclear industry cashed in on anti Arab sentiment(180). This dehumanisation was also furthered by the image of the Iraqi population almost exclusively as alarming mobs, shouting anti American slogans(181). Bush also appealed to the racist fear of the licentiousness of the man of colour (in a similar way that he had, during his election campaign used rapist Willie Horton). Iraq was "raping" Kuwait, was "penetrating deeply" into Kuwait territory, Saddam Hussein would not "pull out", and there was also the threat of his "big gun"(182).

Edward Said describes "Orientalism" as a way of coming to terms with the Orient based on the Orient's special place in European Western experience(183). More generally, Orientalism is a style of thought based upon the ontological and epistemological distinction made between "the Orient" and "the Occident". Orientalism derives from a particular closeness experienced between Britain and France and the Orient until the end of World War II and since this time it is the U.S. that has dominated the Orient and Orientalism(184). The "Orient", as a knowable entity, emerged beneath the umbrella of Western hegemony since the end of the 18th century in a dialectic of information and control. The Oriental is irrational, depraved (fallen), child like, different. The European is thus rational, virtuous, mature and "normal"(185). For much of its history, says Said, Orientalism carries within it the stamp of a problematic European attitude towards Islam(186). "Islam" is constructed as if it were a simple thing about which judgements could be made concerning the compatibility of, say, Islam and human rights(187). However, Said doubts the utility of this, given the diversity of the Islamic world, and claims that the image of "Islam" in "the West" reveals more about "the West" than it does about "Islam"(188).

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That for most of the middle ages and during the Renaissance in Europe, Islam has been seen as a demonic religion of apostasy, blasphemy and obscurity, that it has always been seen as, firstly, unitary and secondly, as an object to be feared(189), has been reinforced in the electronic post modern world(190). Islam has become synonymous with book burning (the Rushdie affair), enraged "irrational" mobs, fanaticism, martyrdom, barbaric punishment, and bombs and recent opinion polls indicate that with the demise of communism Islam is widely seen in the West as the next major enemy(191).

Thus it was, that during the G.W., much attention was lavished on Saddam Hussein's call for Holy War even though as a secular not religious leader he was in no position to call one(192). "Jihad", as Ahmed notes, has become a dirty word in the media representing the physical threat of a barbaric civilisation(193). For example, Laffin in his book *Holy War* (1988) paints an alarming picture of powerful forces of jihad building to a climax by way of Islam's "will for conquest", as the "greatest political-religious force of the late 20th century"(194).

Similarly, the "Islamic" penchant for terrorism was a spectre continually conjured up during the crisis, with its stereotypes of Islamic and Middle Eastern brutality, primitive behaviour, dishonesty, and blood thirstiness having already been played out in Hollywood movies such as *Iron Eagle*, *Death Before Dishonour*, *Navy Seals*, and *Not Without my Daughter*(195). Saddam Hussein was labelled a "terrorist" and an "eco-terrorist" and there were fears of possible Iraq-sponsored terrorist reprisals around the world. Theorists of terrorism are apt to include, as a separate category, something called "Islamic terrorism"(196) and this is often traced back, sometimes along with the roots of terrorism itself, to the mid 11th century and Hassan i Sabbah and the Assassins who carried out murders and suicide missions against the Seljuk court and the crusaders. The lessons of the assassins, says Taheri, were never forgotten in the Islamic world and this type of fundamentalism has, "like

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Count Dracula", made occasional bloody irruptions into political life(197). Such dubious musings are common not only in pseudo-historical analysis of terrorism, but in a peculiar anthropology common in the media where the mysterious "Arab" or "Islamic" mind is investigated. "Expert" Judith Kipper explained it thus: "we go in a straight line; they zig zag. They can say one thing in the morning, another at night and really mean a third thing"(198). The Shiite Muslim "ideology of martyrdom" might be compared to the "joyful" nature of Christianity(199) or, more recently, amidst the wild and irresponsible speculation in the aftermath of the Oklahoma bombing, a "terrorism expert", Steven Emerson(200), declared on C.N.N. that the bombing must be the work of Islamic or Arab individuals/groups as this sort of destructive random violence was "a Middle Eastern trait". Of course, as Said notes, no one would call Jonestown the result of Christian logic(201) just as no one would call the Oklahoma bombing Christian terrorism. It also pays to remember that Bush and Schwarzkopf's own religious justifications were rather similar to Saddam Hussein's manoeuvres in calling for jihad(202). In sum, the image constructed prior to and fed during the war spectacularly created a barbaric and subhuman foe against whom devastating force could be mounted relatively unproblematically.

## **5. The Reality of Unreality**

It can hardly be doubted that the G.W. did confirm the feeling that we are living in an age of pervasive unreality and this "unreality of reality" - "fast capitalism" "hyper reality", "spectacular society", where image and reality seem to blur, where truth and the imaginary are everywhere and nowhere(203), where "anything can happen but little can be verified"(204) - is something that both Baudrillard and Debord attempt to get to grips with, though their conclusions are poles apart. In a sense, we can agree with Baudrillard's statement that "the G.W. did not take place", though not in the sense that he meant it. Certainly the G.W. of TV news, the G.W. celebrated in victory marches in

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America and Britain, the G.W. of the numerous picture book histories that have appeared fast on the heels of the conflict, the set of images that make up the "folk memories of the global village"(205), did not take place. The real G.W. was one of cynical Realpolitik and non-ending official disinformation, a war of reckless destruction and mass murder - a crime against humanity and our environment. Such a perspective necessarily breaks with the arguments and assumptions of a Baudrillard. Simply put, this break - and the position adhered to by the early Debord - is an emphasis not only on the "unreality of reality" but also on the "reality of unreality"(206).

It is necessary, then, to reject both Baudrillard and those pessimistic musings of the later Debord. Baudrillard considers the growing role of media, simulations, information and massification in society(207) and there is no doubt that all of these are important considerations in the G.W.: the various simulations-for example, of the workings of smart weapons, the maps, the endless imaginary scenarios that were played out, the films with almost indistinguishable scripts from that of the G.W., the enormous concentration of media resources and the weight of ubiquitous media discourse whereby meaning seemed to "implode" into senseless "noise", pure effect without content or meaning (Kellner(208)). But I feel that Baudrillard is fundamentally mistaken in two related ways: firstly, in the assertion that truth and falsity now have no part to play (Norris(209)) and secondly, the lack of an adequate explanation in his work of the unreality of reality.

It has been one of the main tasks of this chapter to sharply separate the various dominating images of the G.W. from the underlying realities and the lies from the truth and I argue that this remains both morally essential and practically possible (though, because of impediments such as extensive secrecy (Chapter 4), not without difficulty). For Baudrillard, the modernist perspectives of Debord are obsolete and we should end our impossible searches for truth, revelation, depth and authenticity(210). The phase of

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critique of the image applied by Debord utilises the metaphor of the mask, which implies a belief that the "good" reflections potentially receivable from the world of the real are being blocked by a deceptive shroud of false or counterfeit appearance(211). The task of critique here is an unmasking, demystification, a digging for insight beneath the world of immediate appearances(212). Debord would continue to distinguish ideology from true knowledge, reality, etc, where for most post modernists, ideology takes on a neutral meaning. Baudrillard breaks with the "hermeneutics of suspicion" and would argue that things are as they appear, there are no mysteries, secrets, or underlying realities, nothing is concealed, repressed or denied(213). "Reality" and "ideology" are lost as the grounding bases for images - the war would be at one with its image(214). But this seems to imply that we are asked to confound truth and lies in the name of this new "hyperreal" age. It is against these implications that Norris battles in his *Uncritical Theory* (1992), but for Merrin, Der Derian, and Bogard, Norris misses the mark.

Merrin accuses Norris of "philosophical charlatanism" and vigorously attempts to uphold Baudrillard's position that the Gulf War did not happen and that it is still not happening(215). Merrin cheerfully admits that Baudrillard was incorrect with his first article that asserted military deterrence had transformed war into permanent suspense-permanent threat of war - and thus the Gulf War would not happen(216). Merrin sees no problem with this and does not ask himself the question as to why Baudrillard could be so far off the mark when numerous other theorists were able to predict catastrophe. Instead, Merrin makes a peculiarly flimsy argument in favour of Baudrillard that the Gulf War did not happen and the proof is that there is no defeat and no victory(217). Saddam Hussein was able to stay in power and crush his opponents while the "allies" (as Merrin calls them) looked on as passive observers(218); and "if Saddam had been defeated and deposed would Clinton's missile assault on Baghdad have been necessary?"(219). Such arguments are easily refuted. This is hardly the first time a power defeated in war has been able to quell internal

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rebellion and Merrin also ignores the extent to which Saddam Hussein's retention of power is useful to the U.S.: in avoiding the can of worms a democratic popular government in the region would be, in boosting arms sales to the region by making Iraq a bogey man and in bolstering the faltering Saudi economy by excluding Iraqi oil exports(220). Furthermore, Clinton's missile attack signals victory, not its absence. That is, the U.S. is free to do whatever it likes unimpeded by international law or even evidence and the standards of logic. And surely we can also see victory for the West in reconstruction projects won in post war Kuwait(221), in the boost the Gulf War gave U.S./Western arms sales, for the military and intelligence communities over talk of reduced budgets and a "peace dividend", and in the extent to which the war strengthened the U.S. administration's ability to define threats as they please and intervene anywhere at will.

Der Derian thinks that Norris is deaf to irony(222) and both he and Bogard see Norris' attack as misguided(223). Bogard argues that a critique of simulated war can only be a critique of its production values, ie. of the illusions, how ineptly or expertly the war operation secrets its operations. Critique is inferior to and powerless against simulation by which it is overwhelmed. This does not mean, says Bogard following Baudrillard, that the war has no effects but that war becomes a pure event. For Baudrillard, any image is as "true" as any other(224) and this is related to the post modern argument that the "real" is not in any way natural and that we are now acknowledging representation as representation, ie. as interpreting and creating its reference rather than offering immediate access to it(225).

Surely though, the recognition of the "real" as a non-natural and historical notion does not entail an end to dichotomies such as illusion and reality which Baudrillard thinks happens and which leaves our critique of lies and illusions with no solid grounds to argue from. Furthermore, why should we agree (especially as it is a claim about how things "really" are) that critique is inferior

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to simulation and the subject to the object(226). Debord, in his early accounts of the society of the spectacle analyses the domination of the intangible world of unreal images over the tangible world of real forces and processes. For Debord, referential reason and its reality principle (a knowable world, existing independent of consciousness) remain intact(227). The "real" here, for Debord, is not some static transhistorical "real", but is the revelation of the social forces behind these appearances(228).

The images constructed of smart bombing, Iraqi atrocities and Coalition reason, and the illusions of the threats that Iraq posed do not deserve to be taken on appearance and the social forces underlying such appearances help us with this. To say, as Baudrillard does, that things are as they appear or that we no longer can separate reality from illusion is not the logical step of acknowledging the way that simulation models can often generate a confusion between the authentic and inauthentic. We are, as Norris notes, not without resources in penetrating the mountains of lies, illusions and false leads we face in speaking of the war. For example, Alex Cockburn of The Nation was able to throw serious doubt as to the veracity of the incubator story long before the regular media would touch such propositions. Similarly, the illusion that sanctions were not working could easily have been challenged on common sense grounds alone. The American stake in oil as well as the desirability of the continued flow of Kuwaiti petrodollars into capital-hungry investment markets in the U.S. and other advanced industrial countries(229); the need for the military - with the decline of communism and talk of a "peace dividend" - to test weapons, gain prestige, and justify the vast resources pumped in and bolster arms sales in the region; as well as the example the G.W. dealt to 3rd world "threats", in a world with no significant deterrent to American muscle flexing(230) all add up to provide some guide to the social forces in play in the images constructed and presented (we must look to history Chapter 3). The social forces Debord identifies as the foundation of the society of the spectacle

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are the consumer society, the culture industry, the capitalist mode of production and coercive violence(231).

The unreality of reality is, then, situated within a framework of advanced capitalism and its structural imperatives of accumulation, growth and profit: this is the reality of unreality, the reality of commodification(232). This is not true of Baudrillard for whom political economy is no longer the organising principle of society and who never specifies the economic forces or social groups behind the processes he describes(233). We are left simply with an empty technological determinism whereby models and codes become the primary determinants of social experience(234). This seems to posit the unreality of reality as a neutral or a disinterested effect of some sort of "progress" in technology or media. But surely it is more sensible to suggest that the manner in which such technology arises and is used is deeply social and historical as Debord does, in this instance, when talking of the cinema: "it is society and not technology that has made cinema what it is"(235). Or as Debord says in *The Society of the Spectacle*: "The spectacle is not the necessary product of technical development seen as *natural* development. The society of the spectacle is on the contrary the form which chooses its own technical content. If the spectacle, taken in the limited sense of "mass media" which are its most glaring superficial manifestations, seems to invade society as mere equipment, this equipment is in no way neutral but is the very means suited to its total self movement [ ]. The concentration of "communication" is thus an accumulation, in the hands of the existing system's administration, of the means which allow it to carry on this particular administration"(236).

Indeed, in trying to understand the unreality of the reality of the G.W., I would suggest that we have no other option but to utilise a framework of class struggle, capitalist accumulation and imperialism, ie. one of the capitalist mode of production. The mass media, the glaring example of this unreality, are certainly not, as terrorism theorist R. Clutterbuck thinks, an instrument sitting in

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the neutral zones between the two enemy camps available for use by whoever picks it up - in Clutterbuck's case, terrorists or the "forces of the free world"(237). The media - despite a degree of relative autonomy - as Herman and Chomsky note serve the ends of the ruling class via a set of "filters" all of which are at work in the media in the case of the G.W.: 1/ the size, concentration, owner wealth and profit orientation of the dominant mass media forms; 2/ advertising as the primary income sources of mass media; 3/ the reliance of the media on Government, business and "experts" funded by these primary sources and agents of power; 4/ "flak"; 5/ anticommunism (or maybe a developing anti Islam or more generally, a suspicion of the third world) as national religion(238). In the G.W. we find a consensus of images correlated with the shared ideological framework(239) and similar material interests between the mainstream media and certain sectors of the ruling class and to these images must be opposed more accurate representations of reality and the deeper social forces that underlie that reality.

The conclusion here would be that, as MacCannell and MacCannell say, Baudrillard - and the latter Debord - is suggestive without eventually getting a strong grip on the problem(240). Baudrillard picks out the absolute extremes of a topsy turvy word and extrapolates these into a science fiction scenario(241) and in the process is left incapacitated by his apocalyptic, one-sided musings.

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## Chapter 3

# History and Fiction: Does History Matter?

### 1. Introduction

History, as Guy Debord notes, is “the totality of events whose consequences would be lastingly apparent” and thus it is “knowledge that should endure and aid in understanding, at least in part, what was to come” (1). A comprehension of our living in history not its aftermath(2) and of the historically-constructed, ever changing nature of the present, ties the historical sense very closely to the critical sense(3). For some, though, this “post modern” age entails the loss of the authority of History with a capital “H”, a decline in the sense of history and a blurring of the most vital distinction in the pursuit of history: that between history and fiction(4). The consequences of such a shift for those hoping to interpret and oppose an event like the Gulf War are profoundly crippling. In this chapter, I examine the challenges post modern theory has posed to the modernist idea of history, with its incredulity towards metanarratives and emphasis on “the textuality of history”. I consider the ramifications of this in the “crisis of history” and the blockage of historicity, evident in contemporary culture. I go on to argue, against such post modernist formulations, that we must emphasise the historicity of the text, that the notion of truth is indispensable in historical analysis, that we must be able to rationally judge one historical account against another, and that the constraints we experience in the real world make a causal hierarchy and the category of totality essential for theoretical enquiry. During the G.W., history was frequently discarded in favour of a concentration on personalities, the war’s consequences disappeared behind a collection of images and when history was introduced, it was by way of completely spurious claims or misleading historical parallels. I conclude by reemphasising that an event like the G.W. shows us that we can and must “keep the record straight” against the manipulation and

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misrepresentation, fabrication and motivated forgetting characteristic of the history of the victors of the historical process.

## **2. Post Structuralism, Post Modernism, the End of the Grand Narratives and the Textuality of History**

Lloyd argues that everywhere now there are rejections of the modernist project of constructing a universal, rational, scientific basis for natural, social and historical knowledge(5). The writing of the history of economies and societies in the West was a product of the 18th century Enlightenment and especially the increasing visibility of the difference in social organisation and material wealth between the European states and those of peoples of the Americas, Africa and Asia(6). A key presumption here was that we were in some way progressing closer to objective truth and this in turn took for granted the reality of the past, truth as correspondence to that reality, a sharp separation between knower and known, between fact and value and, especially, between history and fiction(7). These notions on which such modernist accounts are based have come in for a multi sided onslaught in the "post modern" age, leading to cries of a "crisis of history" and/or a "waning of historicity".

For Lyotard, History with a capital "H" is no longer possible. The "Grand Narrative" claims to be the story that can reveal the meaning of all stories, be it the weakness or progress of mankind(8). The implicit epistemological claim of the Grand Narrative is to put an end to narration by revealing the meaning of narratives. Grand Narratives organise and legitimate the narratives of culture by positing an origin (God) or a telos (universal emancipation) that gives the rule to narratives whilst itself escaping the condition of narration. According to Lyotard, modernity's Grand Narrative is that of a project which works through a rupture with the past that will perform the emancipation of a universal subject of history. This is the story that organises and legitimates knowledge, reason and history in modernist accounts. Thus the Encyclopaedia will free humanity from superstition through Enlightenment, leading to universal knowledge; the

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dialectic of history will reveal the Hegelian transhistorical spirit; Marxism will free the proletariat from bondage, by means of revolution; democracy will reveal human nature, as the people become the subject of a universal history of humanity; or the creation of wealth will free human kind from poverty, through the technological breakthroughs of free market capitalism. These Grand Narratives, says Lyotard, have broken down in the face of events(9), which for him is positive as such a drive to totality, inherent in these Grand Narratives, is coercive and normative and cannot respect the historical specificities of the genuinely heterogeneous(10). In short, History should become histories.

According to Novick, the very central proposition of historical objectivity, that of universalism - that truth was the same for all people, accessible and addressed to all - came under sustained attack in the 1960s and 70s with the articulation of a whole host of particularistic commitments(11). Assertive particularism has important implications not just for academic universalism, but for such basic values as telling the whole truth(12). Strong challenges to universalistic History came and continue to come especially from blacks, women and those of the third world, who challenge the "value free" pretensions of traditional scholarship as masks for maintaining the domination of European or male-centred world views and power relations(13) - that is, what Walter Benjamin called the history of the victors(14).

Post structuralism, like the post modernism of Lyotard, had also expressed an incredulity towards Grand Narratives, a rejection of discursive closure and totalising, and a championing of histories over History (ie. a plurality of competing narratives which are linked to different groups and interests(15)). Foucault sought to replace history's search for "origins" and its accompanying teleological arguments with "genealogy" which "operates on a field of entangled, and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times"(16). The attempt to write the overall history of

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discourses should be abandoned in favour of the genealogy of each discourse's concepts and an examination of the power structures within them(17). We thus move away from erecting foundations, towards an analysis of how individual's actions and texts were made meaningful by underlying discursive regularities(18): in essence, the attempt to account for the constitution of the subject within an historical framework(19).

Foucault wants to discover how different "regimes of truth" operate. For Foucault, scientific truth is not "the reward of free spirits ... nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves", it is "a thing of this world ... produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint and it induces regular effects of power ..."Truth" is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it. A "regime of truth""(20). So truths are discursive constructs that differ across histories and cultures and between different interest groups within the same culture(21). History, then, is not a body of events lying before us in the manner of a landscape, from a fixed standpoint and reported on in the way a geographer might(22); "historical reality" only has meaning from a standpoint within a discourse(23) and the reason for holding a belief about nature is not to be found in its correspondence to the reality of that nature, but in its compatibility and coherence with the concepts and beliefs of the framework of discourse(24).

Foucault, like Lyotard, takes issue with "total history", specifically: that one could reconstitute the overall form of a civilisation or principal of a society; that all the phenomena of a period had a shared significance with underlying laws accounting for their cohesion; that systems of homogeneous relations could be established; that networks of causality could be identified; and that the same form of historicity operates across the boundaries of economic, social, mental, technological or political phenomena(25). Post structuralism asserts that the desire for such full representation is linked to an impossible dream of

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presence(26). No representation can be full; all acts of representation produce an "other" that is marginalised or excluded(27). In this vein are broadly post structuralist approaches that attempt to bring into focus histories usually absent from History(28). Edward Said borrows much of Foucault's analytical framework in his study of "Orientalism"(29). Said denies the existence of a real or true Orient, a real or true Islam and argues that "the real issue is whether indeed there can be a true representation of anything, or whether any and all representations, because they are representations, are embedded first in the language and then in the culture, institutions and political ambience of the represented"(30). Similarly, Prakesh comments on the construction of knowledge of the Third World and refuses to set up "new foundations in history, culture and knowledge", as the privileging of some/certain analytical categories "occludes the histories that lie outside of the themes which are privileged in history": totalising theory must be resisted and all identity acknowledged as provisional(31).

Much importance is given, in some forms of post structuralism and post modernism, to the circulation of "texts". Derrida, for example, emphasises the "textuality" of all life and history(32). That is, "we can have no access to a full and authentic past, a lived material existence, unmediated by the surviving textual traces of the society in question ... traces ... that ... are themselves subject to subsequent textual mediations when they are constructed as the "documents" upon which historians ground their own texts, called "histories""(33). For "pan textualists", history is either a text subject to many readings, or it is an absent presence the nature of which is perceivable only by way of prior textualisations(34). We must acknowledge that the past and history (also "historiography" or, better still, "the writing of history") float free of each other(35). History-as-account - unlike the past - changes with time and is found quite literally on library and other shelves(36). For Hayden White, "history is a text"(37), the past always comes to us as stories and we cannot get out of these stories (narratives) to check if they correspond to the real

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world/the past(38). In this account, White blurs the distinction, within the ubiquitous circulation of texts, of literary from non-literary texts(39) - the most sacred boundary for historians(40). For White, history is preeminently a branch of literature where the historian's poetic consciousness is decisive(41): "The older distinction between fiction and history, in which fiction is conceived as the representation of the imaginable and history as the representation of the actual, must give place to the recognition that we can only know the actual by contrasting it with or likening it to the imaginable"(42).

The process of understanding, says White, can only be tropological in nature and he identifies four master tropes: metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche and irony(43). White claims that each "tropological strategy" has affinities with 1 of 4 modes of emplotment - romance, comedy, tragedy, satire -; 1 of 4 modes of explanation - formalist, organicist, mechanistic, contextualist -; and 1 of 4 ideologies - anarchism, conservatism, liberalism, radicalism(44). Every proper history presupposes a metahistory which is simply the web of commitments that the historian makes in the course of his or her interpretations on the aesthetic, cognitive, and ethical levels just outlined(45).

White admits that the historian deals with events that are in principle observable and have a specific location in time and space, whereas composers of fiction are not in this way restricted(46). However, the similarities between the two are more interesting and significant(47): "The process of fusing events, whether imaginary or real, into a comprehensive totality capable of serving as the object of representation is a poetic process. Here the historian must utilise precisely the same tropological strategies, the same modalities of representing relationships in words, that the poet or novelist uses"(48). The traditional scenario, where history is set strictly against fiction, emerged in the 19th century and was born of the dream of a historical discourse that would consist of nothing but factually accurate statements(49). This notion underestimates the constraints on the fiction writer and

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overestimates those on the historian - both the historian and the novelist make rather than find their story: "this is a work of construction rather than a discovery ... Neither the reality nor the meaning of history is "out there" in the form of a story awaiting only a historian to discern its outline and identify the plot that comprises its meaning"(50). Both the historian and the writer of fiction wish to provide a verbal image of "reality" and both must pass a test of correspondence(51). Such notions are supported by the "post modernist" novelist E.L. Doctorow who says "what's real and what isn't - I used to know, but I have forgotten. The book [Ragtime] gives the reader all sorts of facts - made-up facts, distorted facts - but I happen to think my representation of historical characters is true to the soul of them" - nowadays, "there's only narrative"(52).

"History", says White, is always "History-for"(53). White denies that there is any single correct view of any event or process; and arbitrating between a Marxist, conservative, or liberal conception of the historical process is fruitless, as what counts as evidence is internal to that standpoint; and the best reasons for holding to one of these positions are moral(54). What one historian may emplot as tragedy, another may emplot as a comedy or romance(55) - for instance, no historical event is intrinsically tragic(56). Every history contains within it a philosophy of history(57) and these paradigms, as in Feyerabend, are incommensurable with each other, their truth or falsehood not being decidable on the evidence(58): "it is possible to tell several different stories about the past and there is no way, finally, to check them against the fact of the matter. The criterion for evaluating them is moral or poetic"(59). White, appropriately enough, draws an analogy from aesthetics: we would never expect Cezanne and Constable, on observing the same landscape, to see or paint the same things, so why make such demands in history?(60). Again, like Feyerabend, White sees the outcome of such pluralism as likely to lead to a better life(61). I will come back to evaluate White, post structuralism and post modernism in my section below on "keeping the record straight", now I would

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like to look into a number of issues that are raised by the above accounts for culture and our sense of history.

### **3. The "Crisis of History", Post Modern Culture, History and the Ascendant Right**

The challenges since the 1960s and 70s and up into the 80's seem to have provoked or have been reflected in an apparent "crisis of history". This, according to Kaye(62) and Giroux(63), manifests itself as a devaluation and decline of history in schooling and in the broader culture. Novick claims that the falling apart of confidence from the late 1960's was apparent in history more than in any other discipline, where numerous leading figures in the history faculty (and with growing frequency) expressed distress at the current state of their realm(64). The decline of history in schooling and the academy after the mid 1960s and the findings that, in general, students were rather poorly informed about their national pasts and world history, developed in the 1980s into a recognition by some that there was a broad decline in confidence and optimism regarding the process of social history(65). This is, for Kaye, a rather paradoxical finding given firstly, the bursting onto the scene of the "heritage industry"(66) (considered below) and secondly, the flourishing of a generation of radical historians and a spate of journals associated with them such as *History Workshop*, *Radical America* and *Radical Historical Review*(67).

Giroux attempts to explain this "crisis of history" in terms of a wider crisis of historical consciousness in historical and political terms(68). Such a crisis involves the inability of people to remember those "lessons" of the past that illuminate the developmental preconditions of individual liberty and social freedom; and it is, for Giroux, quite the opposite of a dialectical position in that criticism is "blinded by the rule of social necessity which practices under the banner of alleged "natural laws" and society is inflicted with what Jacoby calls "social amnesia" in its repression of its own past(69). Underlying both the suppression of historical consciousness in the social sphere and the loss of

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interest in history in the sphere of schooling, for Giroux, is the growth of the *culture of positivism*(70). The rise of consumer capitalism has meant that now all spheres of social existence are informed by a newly charged rationality of industrial capitalism. Such a culture of positivism denies its own place in history and presents itself as suprahistorical and supracultural(71). This is similar in effects to what Bhaskar calls the "new realism", brought about by the current good fortune of the right, where history is now what there has been or is elsewhere, but it is no longer here(72): we are left with an eternal present (discussed below). As a result, says Giroux, theory is stripped of its concerns with ends and ethics, and its ends are inextricably linked to those of technical progress with knowledge as objective, facts as strictly opposed to values and a tacit affirmation of "what is"(73).

For Kaye, the crisis of history can be traced to the crisis of the grand governing narratives, which in turn can be traced to the disillusionment that followed postwar optimism(74). As the vision of consensus, (American) exceptionalism, political freedom, and economic and social opportunity collapsed with a series of challenges "from below" from the 1960's - ethnicity, class, gender, civil rights, opposition to the Vietnam War - and as the economic boom and the postwar settlement dissolved into stagflation and decline, a collapse of confidence in the present and the future ensued.

"Post modern" culture is frequently seen as the perfect expression of this ebb in confidence. Jameson argues that just as the historical novel corresponded to the birth in the 18th century of historicity, the sense of history and the possibilities of modern historiography, so the proliferation of science fiction equally corresponds to the waning or blockage of that historicity and especially to its crisis and paralysis, its repression(75). Historicity is, for Jameson, first and foremost the perception of the present as history and today it appears more difficult to achieve than in the 19th century(76) - the heyday for historical consciousness(77) - and this is simultaneously the waning of the lived

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possibility of experiencing history in some active way(78). A post modern work such as Doctorow's Ragtime is far more extreme in its procedure of mixing history with fiction, says Jameson, than fictional works of previous ages(79) and the past as referent, in general, finds itself gradually bracketed and then effaced altogether(80). We are now forced to seek history by way of our own pop images and simulacra of that history, which is now beyond our grasp(81). A good contemporary example of this is Oliver Stone's J.F.K. where Stone mixes the fictional portrayal designed to "reveal" the truth behind Kennedy's assassination, with real black and white archival footage(82). According to Baudrillard, our understanding of history is destroyed by such cinematic treatments and other historical simulations. Thus it is that our understanding of the Vietnam War is now shaped by such films as Coppola's Apocalypse Now or The Deer Hunter(83). TV is today "a veritable history machine(84)" with a constant stream of historical, semi historical and pseudo-historical recreations; and the collapse of boundaries is further illustrated in the rise of the docudrama where "historical" events are dramatised and screened in time to coincide with their real consequences(85). According to Baudrillard, all this leaves us with an all-pervasive "sadness at leaving" resulting from the fact that we are simultaneously unhinged from history and yet surrounded by the ghosts of all we have lost(86). Jameson(87) and Debord(88) claim the result is an eternal present that engulfs the subject and makes genuine historicity increasingly difficult.

The loss of history generates a desire for historicity(89) and the past is "cannibalised" in a play of "random stylistic allusion"(90) and the "post modern" is, for Hewison(91), partly characterised by the growth of nostalgia. Kaye's first paradox is not really a paradox after all, as nostalgia is not history, it does not generally provide for a critical connection of past and present(92). The rise of the "heritage industry" is evident in the proliferation of museums, retro in film and fashion, the opening of historical sites and gallery exhibits and in the various acts passed to preserve historical monuments and buildings - and can

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be linked, according to Kaye, to the general climate of decline outlined above(93). Thus, while future prospects seem to shrink before our eyes, the past is steadily growing, either as tenuous and reactionary revivalism or in the spirit of ironic quotation(94). This nostalgia is not history so much as a sweet sadness accompanied by a past domesticated and made safe(95). For example, Wallace claims that museums convey the idea that the past is something sharply separated from the present: a process of suppression, derogation, trivialisation and marginalisation of history(96). It is also very importantly, as Callinicos notes, history's commodification: the past serving as fuel for the leisure industry(97). Meanwhile, TV swallows its own tail with repeats, revivals and reunions, the time lapse between the event and its nostalgic reprise becoming shorter and shorter(98). The result is of the type of MTV "history" of the 1980s, where dominant staccatoed images of the period are set to the music of that decade in a "definitive" two hour extravaganza(99). With nostalgia and retro, the past is summoned to the rescue of the present and authentic memory is falsified into an enhanced version of itself - a rescued, removed, rebuilt, restored version which, by ignoring the reality of history, imprisons us and renders us "incapable of moving forward because of the absorbing fantasy before us"(100).

The turn to the past that the "Heritage Industry" exemplifies has been a common theme of the ascendant right, and the "crisis of history" formulated by some on the right is a demand for a sharpening and strengthening of "our" history and literature so as to provide "us" with symbols to share and feel part of a common undertaking(101). Here, the crisis is often identified as connected to the rise of adversarial culture or "cultural relativism"(102). Individuals such as Sir Keith Joseph in Britain or William Bennett in America and groups such as AIM and AIA who try to confront the "disinformation or misinformation" spread by "Marxist professors" in American universities, have spent time and energy trying to communicate their historical perspectives and their "lessons from history"(103). They and other intellectuals representing the dominant

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class have attempted to shape and inform collective historical memory, consciousness and imagination by advancing a vision of past, present and possible future that endorses and legitimises the contemporary social order(104).

The control of the present and the control of the past are, as Orwell noted in 1984, closely related and this in part springs from the awareness of the subversive possibilities of unimpeded historical examination(105). The establishment of a single, centralised monarchy in place of the numerous warring feudal states in China under the reign of Ch'in Emperor Shih-huang-ti (246-210BC), led to the notorious "burning of the books": an imperial decree of 213BC ordering the destruction of all histories of the feudal states circulating outside the official archives, to halt the practices of those who, in the words of the Emperor's Grand Councillor, "study the past in order to criticise the present age"(106). Hitler and Stalin's regimes went much further with such methods in order to solidify their own power. Guy Debord, in his latter work, argues that spectacular government now possesses all the means necessary to falsify the whole of production and perception, and is the absolute master of memories(107). The near perfect unity of state and private capital is important in this; and the disappearance of history and of a potential revolutionary force make for a tone of foreboding melancholy in this book: "with the destruction of history, contemporary events retreat into a remote and fabulous realm of unverifiable stories, uncheckable statistics, unlikely explanations and untenable reasoning"(108).

The use and abuse of history has been one of the hallmarks of both the Thatcher and Reagan/Bush regimes as they pursued their goals. Thatcher claimed that the left had waged "a deliberate attack on our heritage and our past" and she sought, during the Falklands War, to paint an inspiring portrait of the past: "The lesson of the Falklands is that Britain has not changed and that this nation has these sterling qualities which shine through our

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history"(109). Meanwhile, conservatives in the United States alluded to a "culture war" taking place in America(110). Ronald Reagan and his Administration's manipulation and "selective tradition" of history sought to shape the terms of debate the way of American imperialism (for example, in his comparison of the contras with America's founding fathers(111)). In such cases, as Walter Benjamin predicted, not "even the dead" are safe from the victors.

#### 4. "Keeping the Record Straight"

I agree with Kaye when he argues that still the most radical aspiration of those studying history is that of "keeping the record straight"(112). The tendency of some post modernist/post structuralist work to eliminate or marginalise the "referent" and to move to a historical plurality means that history is to some extent up for grabs - that is, subject to "strong misreading"(113) by what Raymond Williams calls the "selective tradition" of "significant past"(114), ie. those who have the power to make their interpretations and definitions flood most channels of communication(115). In my next section I will attempt to examine and critique the disappearance, marginalisation and misuse of history during the G.W. and provide an alternative to such interpretations, in this section though, I will attempt to justify such a move.

In response to pan-textualist's arguments concerning the textuality of history, it is necessary to assert the historicity of texts(116). Thus history is not to be reduced to a collection, theory and practice of reading texts, as the text exists as a function or articulation of context, context being the very conditions of textual production and dissemination(117). Texts do not exist in a vacuum. They "remain hostage to available language, available practice, available imagination - and language, practices and imagination all emerge from history understood as structure"(118). The reduction of debate to the "crust" of narrative interpretations and debates that cover the past also, says

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Callinicos(119) and Zagorin(120), obscures the fact that the usual aim of historical writing is to provide an explanation of a phenomenon, event or episode in the past. That is, history is still concerned with truth.

In defending an orientation to truth in historical analysis I will explicate and defend at the same time the theoretical perspective that I find most helpful in analysing the current epoch and, more particularly, the G.W. - ie. to see the war from within the context of colonialism, imperialism, class struggle and capitalist accumulation, that is, a loosely Marxist form of explanation. I believe that it is essential that such a neo-Marxist framework can be defended from the mire of ethical and epistemological relativism by more than just a political desire which functions as cause and justification of itself, ie. a justification must defend itself by recourse to truth and reality(121).

In defending historical truth, it is necessary to affirm such notions as a commitment to the reality of the past, to truth as correspondence to that reality and, especially, to a distinction between history and fiction(122). For Perry Anderson, "the distinction between the true and the false is the ineliminable premise of any rational knowledge and its central site is evidence" which he feels is very much disdained within post structuralism(123). That a discourse itself furnishes the criteria by which its results are judged successful(124), not only dematerialises that truth but also, and very much related, that basis of social reality - discourse - seems to emerge and exist independent of context and of causality(125). As Anderson notes, "language as a system furnishes the formal conditions of possibility of speech, but has no purchase of its actual causes"(126).

The rigid segregation of fact and value demanded by positivists and their treatment of the text as a transparent medium by which direct access to reality is achieved(127) has long since been discarded, but we do not logically discard with these positivist notions the distinctions of truth and falsity(128). Though

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history is necessarily an interpretation of the past constructed in the present on the basis of a selective range of source materials, it is not just another fiction(129). Fictitious, unlike historical narratives, tend to have a beginning, a middle, and an end and a subject on whom the narrative centres. The historian also has many more and much stronger limits on him or her than the creator of fiction. An essential point here is the influence on the writer of history of other historians and interested parties; meaning that any work is subject to continual challenge and criticism whereby evidence is contested and/or alternative explanations are forwarded(130). Furthermore, the historian usually tries to understand the deeper causal forces involved in any event, whereas the fiction writer largely focuses on human intentions and reactions(131).

Despite Jameson's acceptance that history is inaccessible but through textual form, he rejects that we lose history in text: "one does not have to argue the reality of history: necessity, like Dr Johnson's Stone does that for us [ ]. History is what hurts, it is what refuses desire and sets inexorable limits to individual as well as collective praxis.(132)" Eagleton's comments are along similar lines: "it is certainly true that we ourselves may not distinguish between certain sorts of plants which for another culture are uniquely different. But it would be impossible for an anthropologist to stumble upon a society which registered no distinction between water and sulphuric acid, since they would all be long in their graves"(133). Such refutations of White et al's arguments are particularly convincing especially when added to the difficulties faced by such theories in ethical terms.

Zagorin sees theories such as White's as aestheticising history(134) and such aestheticising has dire consequences, usually obnoxious to those proposing them. Both White and Jenkins suggest a range of equally "plausible" accounts of the historical past, where choice is simply ideological or a question of poetics. For Jenkins, in the end, history is theory(135); while White offers as an

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analogy to historical practice and judgement, the incommensurability of Constable and Cezanne. Surely though, as Callinicos argues, it would be an affront to suggest that the Holocaust was a construct of historical imagination or that it is a matter of incommensurability, aesthetics or ideology as to whether we choose an historical representation testifying to the horrors of the Nazi extermination of the Jews over the work by French Holocaust revisionist Robert Faurisson who questions such truths(136). White, on this very issue, appears to back down, admitting that some events come with their form ready made(137) -ie. we cannot after all represent the Holocaust as a comedy. Others such as Jenkins(138) and Bradley(139) would not admit to any extra discursive stones which they might kick now and then as reassurances of the veracity of historical accounts.

Given that I have argued that the use of historical theory should be based on an idea of truth and not on aesthetics or ideology, what reasons might there be for favouring a neo-Marxist form of explanation? After considering this question, I will look at criticisms of the "authoritarian" Marxist tendency to totalise and to effect closure of discourse.

Bhaskar notes that when considering Marx on epistemology we find two interrelated themes: a/ an emphasis on the scientificity and b/ an emphasis on the historicity of the cognitive process(140). For Marxists like Althusser, Marxist theory is distinguished as "scientific" and this is justified by the supposed break Marx makes with ideology; and in Althusser, such explanations have reached extreme heights of pretension and "theoreticism"(141). Marx at points dissociated himself from the term "scientific socialism" and, says Jacoby, unlike the English and French "science", the Hegelian "wissenschaft" is impregnated with history(142). At the other pole from Althusser, Lukacs(143), and following him Debord(144), argue that truth lies in method, theory being practical in so far as it is the intellectual expression of the revolutionary process itself. Knowledge, according to Lukacs, is deeply historical and

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different societies at different historical stages of development will produce different forms of knowledge. It is not the case, though, that any form of knowledge is as good as any other(145). Lukacs ascribed primary importance to "the point of view of the totality", the historical and dialectical understanding of society as a whole(146). Despite the importance of the category of totality and of comprehensiveness, it is necessary to be aware of the tendency of this mode of thought to metaphysical and mystical injunctions concerning "praxis" and the "laws of the dialectic"(147). It is also essential today to be more cautious and realistic in justifying Marxist categories and claiming an exclusive Marxist method.

Bhaskar(148) and Callinicos(149) propose different realist theories of science to justify the choice of one theory over another. Bhaskar attempts to avoid both scientism and historicism(150), acknowledging the extent to which all truth values and criteria of rationality exist within historical time(151), and also insisting that the real object is not theoretically dispensable(152) and that social scientific knowledge aims to generate explanatory hypotheses embedded in research programmes that yield critiques of structures generating falsity and a range of other social ills(153). The criteria for the rational confirmation and rejection of theories in social science - because society does not exist independently of its effects and is an open system - cannot be predictive(154). Instead, theory TA is preferable to TB when TA can explain under its description almost all the phenomena that TB can under its descriptions and some significant phenomena that TB cannot explain(155). Callinicos, on the other hand, draws on Imre Lakatos(156) for whom a progressive/scientific research programme is distinguished from a pseudo scientific/degenerating research programme by: 1/ the fact that a research programme should possess a degree of coherence that involves the mapping out of a definitive programme for future research; and 2/ a research programme should lead to the discovery of novel phenomena at least occasionally(157). I feel that Callinicos' case is not as strong as Bhaskar's(158), but both are fruitful in

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thinking through ways we can legitimately hold onto the idea of a rational choice between theories based on correspondence to reality, ie. how things really were.

A theory of history, for both Callinicos(159) and Bhaskar(160), is not content to register surface appearances of social life, but tries to formulate explanatory concepts designed to uncover the underlying relationships which make that society what it is. In breaking "the tyranny of the present"(161), the historian attempts to reveal the social origins of the present and especially those of structures and relations of power, exploitation and oppression(162). History is thus inescapably structural in discovering the generative mechanisms that causally explain phenomena, and some systems of relations will inevitably possess greater significance than others(163). Historical materialism is in this way indeed "closed" in the sense of rejecting historical explanation based, say, on racial characteristics(164) and I feel that such notions of a causal hierarchy are not at all insupportable.

Not only is the notion of structure and a causal hierarchy in historical theory essential and defensible, but so is the aspiration to totality. Ankersmit claims that the goals of historical work can no longer be "integration, synthesis and totality". Historical work should now be concerned with micro subjects and "historical scraps"(166). Similarly, Foucault and Lyotard, in trying to escape Hegel, repudiate the idea of global, totalised, totalising history(166). Jameson's answer to such critics of totalising is simple and yet, as Callinicos argues, very difficult to counter: that totality is not primarily a theoretical concept but a social reality(167). Capitalism is a world system into which all human activities on the planet are integrated and all such activities are subordinated to the logic of competitive accumulation(168). Given this, Agger is correct in insisting that the world's totality cannot be grasped without the aid of totalising categories like exploitation, domination, hegemony and patriarchy(169). I would now like to

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move on to consider the manner in which history was negated and misused in the G.W.

## 5. History and the Gulf War

In an A.B.C. special programme answering children's questions about the G.W., an item on the history of Iraq was introduced by Peter Jennings with the claim that "Iraq is a country which Indiana Jones would love to visit"(170). This exemplary instance of the blurring of the boundaries between history and fiction was a model for historical assessment during the crisis in the Gulf. History, as in a Hollywood narrative, was frequently sidelined completely and the shallowness of mass media discourse regarding the Gulf Crisis was reflected in the appalling ignorance of the spectators over the crisis and other relevant historical aspects. Amongst heavy viewers of the G.W., 32% thought Kuwait was a democracy, only 10% had heard of the intifada, only 23% were aware of occupations other than Iraq's (less than a third knew Israel was illegally occupying territories in Lebanon), 74% believed that the U.S. had threatened sanctions before Iraq invaded Kuwait and only 13% were aware that Baghdad had been misled as to America's neutrality in the border conflict(171). When radical journalist Christopher Hitchens turned up to a C.N.N. debate on the Gulf Crisis, he found himself pitted against Charlton Heston (another fiction and reality confusion) who, when asked to name one country bordering Iraq, ended up in the Pacific(172). When history was erased, it was so in favour of the movie-like concentration on personality. When history was introduced as relevant, it was so through completely fictional claims resembling Dr al-Ebraheem's of C.F.K., "Kuwait's history in the past 250 years has not witnessed a single incident of violence"(173), or outrageous "historical parallels".

As Morrison notes, "History is made by individuals that act, but if those acts are stripped of any context within which the acts occur, understanding of why

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something happened is left at the level of the individual and explanation over focuses on the personality of the actor"(174). This anti-historicism is deeply embedded not only in international politics, but in Hollywood film tradition and in the deeper tradition of viewing the East(175). Deeply a part of this is what Edelman calls the "language of leadership" whereby a complex and historically dynamic phenomenon is reduced to individual traits and actions: "leadership, then, is a remarkable sign, blurring history, contemporary social, economic and psychological interactions; and personal guilt, while substituting an absorbing narrative in their place"(176). Thus it was that the crisis and the war were personalised around Saddam Hussein and, to a lesser extent, Bush and Schwarzkopf.

To a great degree the focus of events in the Gulf were directed at Saddam Hussein. For instance, more English children (92%) knew who Iraq's military leader was during the crisis than who the prime minister of England was (81%)(177). Saddam Hussein was continually identified with Iraq's armed forces as British air vice Marshall William Wratten showed when he was unable to distinguish them: "the fact of the matter is that he [Saddam Hussein] has not used their air force effectively at all. When he's gotten airborne, he's gotten shot down or he's scooted off to Iran"(178). In fact, as MacArthur argues, "it seemed that Saddam was everywhere, personally meting our punishment, torturing Kuwaitis, and bayoneting and raping women"(179). So thorough was the substitution of Saddam Hussein for Iraq and for history that A.M. Rosenthal of the New York Times had to remind his readers that "not every Iraqi is an evil dreamer of death"(180). Perhaps the limit point of such a restricted focus is a book by a group of psychologists, The Political Psychology of the Gulf War (1993) (edited by Renshon), whose contributors confine themselves to such inadequate questions as "How was Bush able to exercise such skilful leadership within the international community?"(181). Renshon suggests that Saddam Hussein's propensity towards violence and grandiosity stems from the insecurity of childhood deprivation(182), while Post argues that

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"while Hussein is not psychotic, he has a strong paranoid orientation"(183). Post's final, definitive word on Saddam Hussein is that this is a case of "malignant narcissism".

These psychologists also make assessments of the characteristics of George Bush. Bush, says Wayne, has always set importance to being his own man and has generated a number of personal challenges through his life - it is also possible that his overactive thyroid may have been a factor(184). The media often attempted to reduce the battle either to one between the Bush and Hussein - for example, the *Sydney Morning Herald* carried front page caricatures of Bush and Hussein facing off as in a prelude to a boxing bout - or to one between Saddam Hussein and Schwarzkopf. In the short lived media frenzy, Schwarzkopf by the war's beginning was a "certifiable genius with an IQ of 170" who spoke fluent German and French, a contender for Peoples "sexiest man alive" and "Father of the year"(185). Schwarzkopf was also according to his own accounts "a lover of the environment [and] a conservationist"(186) and "in a lot of ways" a "pacifist"(187).

The fact that individuals, especially Saddam Hussein, were concentrated on so heavily meant history disappeared and with the dwindling of context, the invasion could only be seen as inexplicable and as a completely irrational undertaking(188). Saddam Hussein was not and could not be a biographically free-floating individual above political and economic aspirations of party, state and nation(189) and I will now try to briefly sketch a context into which to place the G.W. more useful than that provided by factors such as "malignant narcissism" and "overactive thyroid glands".

The Baathist regime over which Saddam Hussein rules is indeed a brutal one where politics has been replaced by the secret police and where Saddam Hussein appears everywhere - in statues, huge portraits, radio, TV, even watch faces - as omniscient and omnipotent leader(190). But this regime did

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not appear from nowhere and is in many aspects similar to others in the region. From 1555 until the end of World War I Iraq was a part of the Ottoman Empire and was at this time divided into the 3 provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul(191). After World War I, Britain and France carved up the Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire and the British took the mandate for Iraq. Britain's interest in the Middle East at this stage was the protection of links with India, most particularly through the Suez Canal and the Gulf(192) (though, from World War I, oil was becoming a consideration with European governments as the Naval fuel of the future(193)). The promises of independence made to the Arabs for revolt against the Turks were broken by the placing of the Arab states under British and French mandates and this resulted in a large uprising among tribes of the Euphrates which was ruthlessly suppressed at the cost of possibly 10,000 lives(194). To quell this upsurge in nationalism, when the borders of Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia were established in 1921, Iraq's access to the Persian Gulf was restricted and this was designed to maintain British influence in Kuwait(195). Also, to nip such nationalist sentiment in the bud while maintaining British interests without the costs of direct government, the British staged elections where their own choice Faisal (chosen in part as he was an outsider and would be dependent on Britain(196)) obtained a suspiciously large majority of 96.8% after the popular Taleb was kidnapped and sent on an unscheduled "holiday"(197).

King Faisal died in 1932 but the monarchy continued until 1958. The diversity of the country along with the pro-British alliance, the example provided by the Iranian nationalisation of oil in 1951, economic stagnation and the Iraqi government's anti-Nasser propaganda - thoroughly at odds with popular sentiment in the region at the time - meant that the regime of Nuri al Said could only be maintained by police repression and censorship amidst the growing nationalism and anti imperialism after World War II(198). In 1958, a coup led by a group of nationalists toppled the old regime and a republic was established; and after a series of further coups and power struggles, the

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Baathist regime of al-Bakr/Saddam Hussein, whose power was based in the first instance on Sunnis from Takrit(199), emerged dominant in 1968 and it is this regime that still governs Iraq. Saddam Hussein through the support of relatives and allies, through his growing influence in the civilian ranks of the Baath, his control of the new Baath militia and as head of a complex network of security agencies emerged as the major force in the party in the early 1970s and was made president in 1979(200).

The rise of the authoritarian Baath party can be seen in the context of the last feeble attempts of the old colonial powers to reassert their authority in the Suez crisis of 1956 and the Algerian War(201), and the rise of Arab nationalism and calls for social reforms in the direction of greater equality in the 1950s and 60s, embodied at the time in the Nasser regime. Nationalism had also been contributed to by the colonial legacies of administrative centralisation, the emergence of a domestic market and the drive of Western-influenced intellectuals(202). A wide and growing middle class, with the expansion of education and the military (with the last struggles for independence and rising Arab-Israeli conflict(203) and hastened after defeat in 1967), as well as the hazy and flexible appeal of the Baath to state socialism, land reform, and a mystical nationalism and pan-Arabism, meant a triumph for the state itself as the Baathist regime attempted to develop the economy and society on the soviet state capitalist model in order to move, like Russia, from a backward feudal country to a large military-industrial power in a short time(204). The development hoped for by the Baath party was aided by the nationalisation of oil in 1972, by luck just before the price revolution and the huge increases in revenues (from \$575m in 1972 to \$5700m in 1974(205)) that powered the way for industrial development, social reform and a substantial improvement in living conditions through a fairly well developed welfare state(206).

Contrary to illusions generated during the G.W., neither did the Iraq-Kuwait conflict come from nowhere. Iraq had long made (dubious) historical claims

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over Kuwait. As mentioned, the establishment of boundaries deprived Iraq from a reasonable deep water port - while Kuwait received a 310 mile long coastline, Iraq had only 36 miles(207) and everything Iraq had done to prevent itself from becoming land locked had failed(208). In fact, Schofield argues that the most striking aspect of the period from independence to the end of the monarchy was Iraq's inability to reconcile itself with the boundary delimitation it had agreed to under British pressure in 1932(209). Iraq had wanted at least the islands of Warba and Bubiyan to be leased to it, and the expansion of its narrow coastline. And since Iraq had become a republic, there had been periodic reaffirmments of its right to Kuwait, including an attack and short occupation of the Kuwait border post of al Samata(210). As time went on it seemed increasingly unlikely that Kuwait would lease these islands to Iraq, perhaps partly out of fear that Iraq may not return them(211).

Iraq's protracted war with Iran had been a disastrous adventure costing \$500b and leaving Iraq with debts of over \$80b(212) and from August 1988 to early 1990 Iraq had hoped to revive its post war economy and the best way to do this was to increase its oil revenue, but the price of crude oil stayed low(213). Baghdad was deeply angered by Kuwait's, UAE's and Saudi Arabia's continued selling of oil below the agreed on OPEC figure (exceeding quotas by 400,000 barrels a day(214)). Kuwait's interests in this, due to their heavy Western investments - meaning its income was less from the sale of crude oil, than from petrol and other products from crude oil-were diametrically opposed to Iraq's whose annual revenue it claimed declined \$1b for every \$1 price drop in crude oil(215). Iraq also accused Kuwait of stealing oil from the Rumaila oil field to the value of \$2.4b over 10 years by slant drilling. Furthermore, Kuwait had refused again and again to write off Iraq's \$14b debt incurred during the Iraq-Iran war, a war Saddam Hussein claimed had been fought on behalf of all Arabs against the Persians(216).

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Similarly, from the scant media acknowledgements and the reactions of those in the Coalition governments, especially the United States, it would have been easy to think that Saddam Hussein and Iraq had just been discovered. However, the West and especially America has been complicit in the brutality of the Baathist regime, the disastrous Iran-Iraq war, Iraq's military strength and the invasion of Kuwait.

When a group of nationalists including Saddam Hussein and his Baath party seized power in 1963, the CIA assisted them by handing over a list of communists who were then tortured and murdered(217); and the American government also played a dubious role in the Iran-Iraq war. The 8 year Iran-Iraq war was suspiciously convenient for the U.S., and Kissinger admitted that it was the first time that the U.S. had hoped that both sides would lose. Initially, the Americans shared Iraq's alarm concerning the spread of the fundamentalist revolution(218) and engaged in close intelligence sharing with Iraq and, after sending warships in during the war's deadlock, began fighting with Iran. In fact, according to a story in London's *Financial Times*(219), Iraq invaded after U.S. satellite and intelligence data, made available to Baghdad through third party Arab governments, indicated that Iranian forces would swiftly crack. However, as the Iran-Contra affair shows, the U.S. Administration played both sides. In a CIA memo in 1985, William Casey said "our tilt to Iraq was timely when Iraq was against the ropes and the Islamic revolution was on a roll. The time may now have come to tilt back"(220). Also, during this period and after, America and other Western countries aided Iraq by supplying military equipment and dual use technology and the American administration vigorously opposed trade sanctions, with little interest in endless reports documenting the Baathi regime's brutality and use of chemical weapons(221).

And finally, the suspicious manoeuvres of the U.S. administration that seemed to invite Iraq to invade Kuwait. A group of American senators visiting Iraq

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earlier in 1990 carried a letter denouncing Iraq's quest for nuclear and chemical weapons, but transcripts showed how deferential they had been and Bob Dole even reassured Saddam Hussein that a VOA journalist who had criticised Iraq's secret police had been sacked(222). Then there is the reasonably widely reported meeting of Saddam Hussein and US ambassador April Glaspie July 25, 1990 where Glaspie sympathised with Hussein over a "cheap and unjust" profile by ABC's Dianne Sawyer. Glaspie told Saddam Hussein that the U.S. administration had "no opinion" over border disputes and followed this with "James Baker has directed our official spokesman to emphasise this". Glaspie also indicated sympathy within the administration for Baghdad's desire to raise oil prices and, especially notably, said "we studied history at school. They taught us to say freedom or death. I think you know well that we as a people have our experience with the colonialists". This last comment, as Christopher Hitchens notes, implies support for Baghdad against "the colonialists"-ie. the obsolete British colonial border divisions(223). What is more, the idea that an invasion would draw no response from the U.S. was reinforced by others in the administration - by State Department spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler on July 24 and again on July 31 by assistant Secretary of State John Kelly(224). Charles Allen, from his high level C.I.A. post, gave 3 warnings, each more pessimistic, of imminent Iraqi invasion in early July, July 25, and 1 day before the invasion(225). When Allen finally took his warnings to the N.S.C., his staff was slashed and he was directed not to talk to the press(226). Perhaps it is, as Glaspie candidly admitted later, that the U.S. administration did not expect Iraq to take the whole of Kuwait - maybe just Rumaila and the islands of Warba and Bubiyan - but it nonetheless seems essential to remain suspicious as to how far this was incompetence rather than conspiracy(227). In support of the above interpretation we have not only the resources of numerous historians and official documents made available via conflicts between states(228) - an example being the Glaspie - Hussein transcript -, but also the assistance to understanding provided by historical parallels.

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If it is, as some post modernist and post structuralist accounts imply, simply a case of "each their own historian", it certainly cannot be said that each account speaks from the same position of power and those in the dominant class have a much simpler task in bringing their accounts into the public arena and transforming them into common sense. When history was introduced in the G.W. it was usually by way of dreadful and manipulative analogies, while really illuminating historical parallels were suppressed.

Perhaps the favourite analogy of the Gulf Crisis was with the prelude to and the conduct of World War II. Saddam Hussein was suddenly the "new Hitler(229) and this was a very well co-ordinated theme, I study showing 1,770 examples in the U.S. print media linking the Iraqi leader with Hitler(230). Saddam Hussein was responsible for Hitler-like atrocities and it was, said Bush, "Hitler revisited. But remember, when Hitler's war ended, there were the Nuremburg trials"(231) - especially ironic as it was Bush himself who was indicted by war crimes trials for crimes against humanity(232). According to Krauthammer, just like Hitler, Saddam Hussein had accused neighbouring states of a "deliberate policy of aggression" against his country(233) - which, incidentally, is not as absurd as Krauthammer suggests given the secret files found by the Iraqis in Kuwait where it is revealed that the C.I.A. were assisting Kuwait with suggestions for putting economic pressure on Iraq(234). In fact, Saddam Hussein was even worse than Hitler according to Bush who accused Iraqi troops of "outrageous acts of barbarism that even Adolf Hitler never committed"(235). Thus the "lesson of history" from the 1930s was that "appeasement does not work" (and this notion of "appeasement" was also a co-ordinated theme used by the American, British, Australian and Saudi Governments). That Hitler was at the helm of the world's strongest economy, while Iraq could not even produce aluminium tin parts(236), that the appeasement of Germany through 1938 and early 1939 occurred in large part because it was felt that Hitler could be directed against Russia(237), and that Churchill and other Allies were not too worried by the visible brutality of the

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Nazi regime until it became a threat to their interests(238), did not come to public notice. Instead, it was taken as given that "the Allies" (again invoking World War II comparison) would be forced to crush this new threat to world peace and security.

The other important analogy used during the G.W. was with Vietnam. In many ways, as Cumings notes, the G.W. was a war fought to demolish the memory of Vietnam(239). After the ambiguity and humiliation of Vietnam, the G.W. seemed a model of clarity and success - a super efficient war fought with the greatest of resolve against the vilest of villains (Harring(240)). Bush-echoing Rambo's "Are they going to let us win this time?" - asserted that this time it would be different as the U.S. would not have one hand tied behind its back(241). So it was that at the end of the G.W., Bush triumphantly declared "By God, we've kicked the Vietnam Syndrome once and for all"(242). These analogies are sheer abuse of the past. Historical parallels should, it seems, help us shed light on a situation such as the Gulf Crisis, but the parallels used in this case simply mystified and further degraded the events referred to(243).

It seems that if reasonable historical parallels had made it into mainstream public discourse, the real nature of the conflict may have been illuminated. A very prominent example would have been the question of international law. The spokespeople for the various Coalition governments continually invoked the backing of international law and the worst offender was George Bush: "The occupation of Kuwait is illegal under international law"; Iraq is "an outrageous violator of international law"; on economic sanctions, "international law must be enforced"; the taking of hostages was "contrary to international law"(244); and at the end of the conflict Bush declared "This is a victory for the U.N., for all mankind (sic), for the rule of law and for what is right"(245). However, the U.S., in particular, has shown the U.N. and international law nothing but contempt for the past 30 or so years. Since 1967, the U.S. has vetoed 40 resolutions on Israel with regards to illegal occupations and human rights

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violations(246). The 1986 bombing of Libya contravened every international law that applies to the conduct of war(247) and when Nicaragua sued the Reagan Administration in the World Court, Washington rejected the Court's judgement and withdrew from its jurisdiction(248). In the first post Cold War U.N. session 1989-90, the Security Council had 3 resolutions vetoed - all by the U.S. -, 2 condemning America's invasion of Panama and the 3rd condemning Israeli human rights abuses(249). The "flagrant violation of international law" that was the Panama invasion, involved breaches of the U.N. Charter just like the removal of the Emir of Kuwait by Iraq(250).

These and endless other relevant historical parallels were not permitted and this is signified in the flat dismissals of any "linkage" in the Gulf Crisis. In fact, "linkage" became a dirty word. James Baker asserted that "we will not agree to anything that would constitute linkage"(251), but this is simultaneously a refusal to consider history. In reality, Baghdad's connection of its own invasion with Syria's occupation in Lebanon and Israel's in Lebanon, the Golan Heights, the West Bank and Gaza was quite sound. Whereas war was rushed into in the Gulf Crisis, "appeasement" and, more accurately, encouragement was the order of the day when Israel invaded Lebanon, an invasion which caused the deaths of 20,000 people. A number of the Coalition countries and especially the American government are deeply complicit in the invasion and annexation of East Timor and the subsequent genocide of the Timorese. And Coalition members such as Syria, Morocco, and Turkey are all outrageous violators of human rights on a similar level to Iraqi(252).

## **6. Concluding Comments**

But, as Cumings asks, who can remember the G.W.? Almost immediately after its end, this event was nostalgically recycled as pop history - for instance, in the New Zealand current affairs show *Holmes* as slow motion "highlights" set to a Marvin Gaye song, or in the 1991 film *Desert Shield* where a fictitious

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narrative concerning the role of Navy Seals during the conflict is interspersed with footage of "the nation's finest hour"(253). The suffering of the Kurds, created by the Coalition, was "resolved" with a rock concert and then, like the fate of Iraqi Arabs, Shiite insurgents, and Palestinians expelled from Kuwait, forgotten(254). As Debord notes, when the spectacle stops talking about something for 3 days it is as if it did not exist(255). Modern politics thrives on the power of motivated forgetting, a form of social amnesia where suffering and responsibility dissolve to leave nothing but the white male hero(256). Thus Reagan's "I don't recall" during the Irangate hearing or, more revealingly, Bush's response to questions about his previous, racist election campaign: "That's history ... That doesn't mean anything any more"(257).

Finally, I would like to further emphasise two points with regard to the post modern, the G.W., and history. Firstly, with respect to the past's fragmentation into media happening or a series of texts - the textuality of history without the historicity of the text(258). The past is dissolved into a vast collection of images and fragments(259) and we are unable to break "the tyranny of the present"(260) - the past grows dimmer as people follow behind events in confusion(261). We are left with an "eternal present" (Debord) where the history of events and phenomena is effaced and things that once had no history are now, or soon will be, "nothing but history"(262). Divorced from history, the economic, political, and social structures of the present appear to have acquired their present character naturally rather than having been constructed by historically specific interests; and the facts, issues and phenomena that do appear, because they are not examined within the context of the social totality that would give them meaning, appear as ahistorical, isolated and fragmented(263).

Secondly, once we have negotiated the shift from "History to histories" - that is, multiple stories and constructions, how do we get back(264) given a G.W.-like scenario? If we acknowledge history only in its textuality, the truth or falsity of

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certain texts in comparison to others begins to weaken. In the post modern world, the notion of a "referent" is problematised or eliminated(265). However, if it is simply a case of picking and choosing from the plurality of histories offered to us, history seems to be up for grabs(266). When "history" was introduced during the G.W., it was flawed, manipulative or simply falsified. This is the point at which Said's dilemma becomes critical: on the one hand Said argues that there is no real Orient and on the other he savages Orientalists for misrepresenting it(267). Said, for instance, wants to discredit the "spurious scholarship" of certain Zionist texts as these "rewritten histories" are "completely at odds with the realities"(268). Thus it is not the case that the relevance or weight given to a piece of evidence is simply a function of where we are situated as observers(269). Certainly truth and falsity are somewhat provisional(270), but we have the important criteria of correspondence and coherence with which to evaluate evidence. For example, and quite simply, we could explain Iraq's invasion and the subsequent war as a case of the inexplicable actions of a dictator of "malignant narcissistic" character in response to which a democratic, freedom-loving Coalition moves to dislodge Iraq and free Kuwait. However, when we bring to bear evidence - such as Iraq's historical dispute with Kuwait; the various Coalition governments' support/neglect of similar invasions and much worse atrocities; the interests of the American administration in asserting its hegemony in the region, given the United States' declining economic base against a number of rising economies such as those of Germany and Japan(271); and the needs of the military and related industries, in the face of the end of the Cold War, to justify its continued existence - the first account becomes incoherent and somewhat ridiculous. The current relativist and idealist movements in the thought on history make such accounts as the first difficult to dismiss - often in the name of an anti authoritarian urge - at a time when the need for history - ie. the need for truth seeking, separating fact and fiction, myth and reality, revealing the social forces behind the present and exposing the "concrete" as fluid(272) - is essential.

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## **Chapter 4 - Generalised Secrecy, Disinformation and the Spectacle of Terrorism**

### **1. Introduction**

An important factor that promotes the collapse of the boundaries between illusion and reality, history and fiction is "generalised secrecy". Secrecy is, of course, not new: secrecy in interpersonal relationships, trade secrets, secret societies, secrecy and dissimulation in war and spying are all centuries old. However, according to a number of writers there has been an immense increase in secrecy over the last few decades which may even signify a qualitative break: Debord describes a "generalised secrecy", Ponting, a "culture of secrecy", Keane relates a growing lawlessness of Western democracies to secrecy, and Rogin discusses the emergence of the "covert spectacle". In this chapter I will initially define secrecy, reviewing some of the writings on it and suggest a number of possible consequences of such pervasive secrecy. I will then examine, with respect to the G.W., a number of facets of this "culture of secrecy": Firstly, the diminishing access to real space with, in this case, military exclusion and censorship; Secondly, the emergence of a state of continual disinformation and a government strategy that Wise calls "the politics of lying"; Thirdly, I examine secrecy in the G.W. with regard to the environment and the arming of Iraq; and lastly, I investigate the spectacle of terrorism.

Tefft defines secrecy as the concealment of information about events, acts or relationships<sup>(1)</sup>. Secrecy is established to protect information or to conceal knowledge of acts or relationships that outsiders have an interest in. Once information is concealed by individuals or groups they must establish a security system to protect their secrets and this system in turn necessitates the development of espionage operations by outsiders who, to gain access to the

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secrets, must subvert the security system. To counteract the effects of espionage, secret holders not only use counter espionage but also persuasive techniques by which they spread false information (disinformation) to delude outsiders about the true nature of their activities. The secret holders may also divulge some secrets to outside parties, for their own strategic and political reasons and, in turn, outsiders must develop ways to evaluate the information they obtain from such disclosures or from their own espionage work(2).

Secrecy, says Tefft, plays an important role in socio-cultural processes(3). It is involved in the formation, maintenance, modification and dissolution of social structures at all levels of socio-cultural complexity and is important for individual and group relationships. Secrecy is essentially an adaptive strategy used by individuals, groups and organisations to attain certain ends in the course of social interaction; and the most important forms of secrecy - those used by states and private economic rivals - is, as mentioned, not new. The Aztecs, for example, employed agents - disguised as traders, who spoke the language of the region - to collect vital military information for Aztec rulers, and Muslim craft guilds of the 11th and 12th centuries preserved trade secrets(4). However, for Tefft, in the case of both state and private enterprises, the pervasiveness of secrecy has taken an enormous leap forward(5).

This is also true for Guy Debord who sees as one of the constituent features of the new stubbornly resilient "integrated spectacle", the development of a "generalised secrecy". This society, says Debord, is built on secrecy and almost every aspect of international political life and ever more important aspects of internal politics are conducted and displayed in the style of the secret services, with decoys, disinformation and double explanation(6). Almost everything is obscure, ambivalent and opaque; more and more places become inaccessible to public gaze; more people are trained to act in secret; the number of unsolved assassinations rises and rumour and surveillance spring up at every turn. Spectators do not really grasp the reality of secrecy in its

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"inaccessible purity and its functional universality" and this secrecy rules out any chance of them running the world, as they know little or nothing of its principle realities(7). For Debord, the situation is extremely gloomy with "the total victory of secrecy, the general resignation of the populace, the complete loss of logic, the universal progress of venality and cowardice"(8).

A number of other writers have also identified an enormous leap in the extent and role of secrecy in our age - though not all are quite as pessimistic as Debord: Ponting - himself a victim of secrecy provisions over the General Belgrano affair during the Falklands War - calls Britain a "culture of secrecy"(9); Der Derian points to the increasing significance of espionage in international politics, and surveillance in domestic politics(10); Wise identifies a situation in Western governments where state secrecy and disinformation have developed into an extensive "politics of lying"(11); Michel Foucault pointed to the development, in the modern age, of extensive surveillance and normalisation (in contrast to the previous age's practice of punishment of the body), the generalised function of which is the panoptic scheme(12); Knightley sees the "secrecy business" as a self perpetuating and run-amok government within a government(13); Rogin identifies the phenomenon of "covert spectacle" as a recent development within American imperial representation, which wins popular applause and aims to persuade the mass audience of the need for secret planning and accountability, at the expense of an infantilisation of the population(14); and Keane attacks the spread of secrecy, dissimulation and unsupervised corporatist mechanisms not accountable to citizens, media or the rule of law, often in the name of state safety and at the expense of political democracy and freedom of communication(15); while Frankel(16), Wilson(17), and Delbridge and Smith(18) all point to the numerous areas of everyday life - education, energy, product testing, transport, planning, the environment - where secrecy has grown and thrives.

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Within the sphere of the analysis of secrecy, probably the most important and most talked about feature is the growth and existence of intelligence agencies which are now an institutionalised part of government in virtually every modern nation(19). A good deal of the fiction that is read and an outpouring of movies concern themselves with spies, coups, defectors, secret plots and double agents - for example, James Bond films, TV series such as those concerned with Sidney Reilly, or the popular fiction of Tom Clancy or John Le Carrè. In fact, we find in the area of secrecy too, a blurring of the boundaries of fact and fiction as the fictional world of spy novels and films; and the real world of international espionage and domestic security operations are bound so tightly as to be almost indistinguishable. The very origin of the secret services, says Knightley, was based on fantasy(20). Britain's secret intelligence network was extremely patchy in the 19th century and it was only in 1909 that the first intelligence agency was truly established(21). Before the first world war, writers like Le Queux, Erskine Childers and John Buchan acted out their fantasies in spy novels and these fictions were important in the establishment of intelligence services in the atmosphere of mutual mistrust between Britain and Germany(22). For example, Le Queux tried to propel his fantasies into the real world and convince British authorities of the threat posed by spies, while Childers's 1903 novel *Riddle of the Sands* was cited by Churchill as largely responsible for Britain's decision to establish naval bases at Lavigarden, Firth of Forth and Scapa Flow(23). The "threat" posed by Bolshevism furthered the expansion of these secret services and the size, cost and activities of these services remain a closely guarded secret, ie. the extent of secrecy is itself a secret(24).

Knightley claims that the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) - dissolved in 1945 to be replaced by the CIA in 1947 - was also founded on fantasy and experienced an explosive growth 1947-1953 with the "communist threat" in Europe(25). And with the Official Secrecy Act of 1911 and the CIA's contract of employment, the possibility of dissent from within these

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organisations was diminished. These agencies, as Knightley notes, have become a powerful state within a state(27) - for example, J. Edgar Hoover's monitoring of prominent figures of the administration -, are apt to invent threats in order to keep themselves alive and are able to get away with this due to the expedient: "You are wrong because you don't know what really happened and we can never tell you because it's secret"(28).

We can predict that extensive secrecy will have major effects. Secrecy is the enemy of rational-decision making, as errors, inefficiencies and dissenting views are covered up; and secrecy marginalises and infantilises the population(29) by divorcing them from knowledge and control of the events that effect them and enhancing the powers of sections of the ruling class. Wilson lists 5 ways in which secrecy helps those in power(30): 1/ it enables the powerful to maintain a monopoly of power by excluding others from participation, through their lack of information; 2/ it stimulates public confidence, excluding much effective challenge and criticism, covering up mistakes and injustices as well as obscuring the visibility of those responsible; 3/ the control of information is more efficient from the view of the powerful as it enables the powerful to do what they want at a maximum speed and a minimum of inconvenience, thus obscuring alternative courses(31); 4/ secrecy covers up the worst abuses of power - corruption, cruelty and injustice; 5/ secrecy panders to excessive ego - Knightley(32) points out that intelligence agencies are essentially secret clubs for the elite and privileged.

Secrecy was an important factor in the G.W. and it means, as Sifry says, that we may well not know the real reasons for intervention in the Gulf for years, until some future Daniel Ellsberg comes forward or when certain classified documents revealing administration thinking are released(33). In my next section I will investigate military secrecy and censorship in the G.W.

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## **2. Military Secrecy and the Diminishing Access to the Real**

According to Guy Debord, more and more places are becoming inaccessible to public gaze(34) and this certainly held for the G.W. The irony is, as Kahn notes, that while in fictional representations, death, war and destruction are increasingly and horrifically portrayed and whereas (as mentioned in chapter 2) we can see simulations of military battles - in the movies, on TV, in news network reconstructions and in video games -, the real thing is increasingly unobservable and inaccessible(35).

Military secrecy is, of course, not new - for instance, the philosopher of war Sun Tzu (490BC) posited, as a major facet of battle, the concealment of strengths and weaknesses arguing that "All warfare is based on deception" -, but recent conflicts like the Falklands War, Grenada, Panama and especially the G.W., have, in terms of journalistic access to the battle field, mobility on the battle field, and access to official military information(36), and censorship (though often indirect, with delay and other pressures inducing self censorship), represented a new plateau in exclusion, the purpose of which was to manage the image of the war more thoroughly.

The period between the Crimean War in the 1850's and World War I has been seen as the "golden age" of the war correspondent. For instance, journalists watched the charge of the Light Brigade from the heights of Balaclava(37). However, it is also in this period that we find the origins of military censorship when, partly in response to the critical dispatches from the Crimea by William Howard Russell (which were in turn partially responsible for the fall of the government), the new Commander in Chief, Sir William, Codrington, acquired government support for some restraint on the press and a February 25, 1856 general order forbade publication of anything the authorities considered could be of value to the enemy(38).

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The static warfare of the Western front in World War I simplified the control and manipulation of the press and aided the strict delineation of military and civilian space(39). The aim of restrictions in World War I widened not only to deny information to the enemy, but to create and maintain support for the war, with colourful stories of heroism and glory and a covering up of mistakes and losses(40).

According to Lloyd, the limited conflicts of the 1930's restored some of the traditional access and mobility of the war correspondent(41), perhaps the most prominent examples being Ernest Hemingway, André Malraux, and George Orwell's dispatches and accounts of the Spanish Civil War. And although, during World War II, the war correspondent had come to be seen as part of the armed forces, access and mobility were much improved on the First World War and after the Normandy invasion, journalists moved quite freely behind and sometimes in advance of Allied forces(42).

The Vietnam War was quite different, and journalists had access, mobility and co-operation - reporting without censorship and travelling where they liked(43). In fact, the "Vietnam Syndrome" (discussed in Chapter 3) was also important in media reporting during the G.W. There was a feeling that the media had lost the war in Vietnam for the U.S.(44). As General William Westmoreland argued, "the war that Americans saw was almost exclusively violent, miserable or controversial"(45). At its most extreme, the accusation was that the media had "snatched defeat from the jaws of victory", undermining American's national will to continue the fight(46). The implication was also that reporters had got American soldiers killed in Vietnam(47). In reality, neither assumption is correct. The media coverage in the Vietnam War was similar in its jingoism, flag waving patriotism and compliance to the G.W., very little was seen of the dead or wounded, and combat was shown almost exclusively at a distance(48). Similarly, there is no basis to the claim that dispatches had led to American casualties. Journalists almost universally kept within security guidelines and

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of the 10s of 1000s of reports that came out of Vietnam, only 5 or 6 violated these regulations(49).

The Falklands War media management provided a number of lessons for the American Administration in future conflicts. In the Falklands, the military and the Ministry of Defence were able to exercise complete control over journalists allowed with the task force, whilst the government had a monopoly in the dissemination of authoritative news about events in the South Atlantic. During the war, correspondents were given a booklet which instructed them to "help in leading and steadying public opinion"(50) and Lieut Arthur A. Humphries stated that the strategy was to "control access to the fighting, invoke censorship, and rally aid in the form of patriotism at home and in the battle zone"(51). The result was an absence of pictures of the battles for Darwin and Goose Green or many other of the conflict's most significant events(52).

The Pentagon, drawing on the conduct of the Falklands War, had "spectacular success" in the Grenada invasion by creating a media "pool" and then sending it to the island 48 hours after the first wave of troops had gone ashore and, even then, the number of reporters was severely restricted(53). Similarly, for the Panama invasion a pool of 10 journalists representing wire services, TV and radio, newspapers and photo agencies was created and their reports were to be circulated to all media. The media pool arrived in Panama hours after the fighting at the key points of Rio Hato and Patilla had ceased and they were kept well away from the continuing combat at the Commandancia(54). In fact, the "pool" was essentially kept imprisoned at an army base and their principle sources were C.N.N. broadcasts of Pentagon briefings from Washington(55), there were thus no independent eye witness accounts, which meant no reports of killing, destruction and incompetence(56). Despite the cover up, it is estimated that some 4000 Panamanians lost their lives and there have been reports of massive piles of corpses being burned with flame throwers and the remains dumped in mass graves(57).

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The G.W. was also a "war with no witness"(58), with greater restrictions on journalist's movements than any other ground war since World War I(59). The difference though, as Knightley points out, is that on top of the aims of denying information to the enemy and creating and maintaining support for the war, the management of information during the G.W. was carried out with the aim of changing public perception of the nature of war itself(60). That is, an attempted reorganisation of the image of war on the basis of a model - a model based on a clean and efficient military operation, without incompetence and casualties, of spectacular bursts of fire lighting up the night sky and ultra high tech "smart" weaponry.

The intention in the presentation of the G.W. was for a very rapid war, enabling little time for public protest to emerge and controlling access to information that might fuel dissent(61). In order for these aims to be realised, the 1000 or so journalists in Saudi Arabia were subject to a "controlled information environment"(62). To begin with, because of Saudi Arabia's inhospitality to Western journalists (most of whom did not speak Arabic), the media were reliant on the goodwill of the military(63) which, of course, was highly conditional. Initially, major news media representatives had to beg Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the U.S., Prince Bandar, for visas for reporters(64). The only way for a reporter to visit the front line was by qualifying for the "pool" system whereby a handful of reporters represented the entire press corps and shared the story with all(65). These "pools" would only be taken to areas that the military approved of and were at all times accompanied by an escort officer, even when interviewing troops(66). These "pooled" reporters were, on Pentagon instructions, photographed, finger printed and given detailed orders(67) - for example, regarding information and topics that might upset the Saudi monarchy or its subjects(68). Forbidden areas, put in place around two weeks before the outbreak of war, included spontaneous interviews with servicemen and women in the Gulf, filming or

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photographing of soldiers in "agony or severe shock", the transmission of "imagery of patients suffering from severe disfigurement"(69). It was also the case that pool material would be subject to a "security review at the source"(70).

Journalists were thus heavily reliant on the military, not only for protection and friendship, but for information, disclosure and the transportation of dispatches which usually had to be sent through military channels(71). Many reporters in combat units were unable to transmit their stories for days and, in general, this was an indirect censorship by delay which resulted in self censorship(72). Much news copy, film and video spent valuable time lost in the desert. For example, Bill Gannon from Network Star Ledger got the opportunity to be on the cutting edge of the battle, but his best copy did not make it back to the network until March 3, and in an age of instantaneous transmission, where speed is fast becoming the criterion of worth (accuracy falling away in importance), this was too late(73). Incompetence and military resistance meant endless delays whereby journalists might get lost in the desert trying to find fax machines or would drive miles only to find they did not have enough coins for the phone(74).

Because of this reliance on the military, critical reporters were at a disadvantage. In the early days of the Gulf Crisis, Pentagon press officers had warned reporters who asked hard questions that they were seen as "anti military" and that their requests for interviews with senior commanders and visits to the field were in jeopardy(75). For instance, James Le Moyne had his interview with Schwarzkopf cancelled when he wrote a piece quoting soldiers who had criticised Bush and questioned the purpose of the war(76), and Schwarzkopf allowed reporters he liked to evade the pool system. The results were reports such as those by Galloway - favoured very much by Schwarzkopf, who did not have to play by "pool" rules and who got copy back without delay - of "miraculous" performances or "the greatest cavalry charge in history" even

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when, in this case, the division he was with was taking largely undefended sectors of Iraqi lines(77).

Meanwhile, those not pooled were left totally reliant on a series of briefings through the day, culminating in a U.S. briefing in time for European and American newspapers and TV(78). Thus many journalists ended up covering the G.W. from places like the plush-red hotel ballroom or the roof terrace of the Dharhan International Hotel(79). In fact, Baudrillard turned down the chance to go and cover the war for *Les Presses de la Cité*, claiming correctly that those who went saw no more than anyone else(80). Some journalists did reject the pool system and set off by themselves. The problem for these "unilaterals" was, though, the constant threat of arrest and deportation or the loss of passes if they were caught(81) and they tended to suffer severe military harassment(82). And although it was the "unilaterals" who provided a lot of the better footage such as fighting at Khafji or the "liberation" of Kuwait, they were still in no position to be able to answer the question of what was happening on the battlefield(83).

As Der Derian notes, the fundamental difference between war and its game or its simulation is that people die in wars(84), but this distinction suffered erosion in the G.W. People, of course, do realise that human beings die in war, but the "visible brutality" of war does not make for good TV(85) nor for great support for the military operation. Despite the enormous 72,000 sorties, only 1 reporter in the G.W. actually flew on a bombing mission(86). A French TV crew was forced at gun point by Marines to give up video it had shot of a wounded American soldier(87) and a reporter who tried to photograph a dead Iraqi was clubbed with a rifle by a soldier(88). Scott Applewhite, a photographer for the Associated Press, on arriving early at the scene of a bombed U.S. barracks in Dharhan in which 27 G.I's were killed, was handcuffed, beaten and had a camera smashed when he tried to take photographs. He was later told "host nation sensibilities" prevented any pictures(89). No shots were allowed from

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the base where U.S. corpses would return, or stories about medical care for returned service people(90). As for Iraqi casualties, they were displaced, says Scarry, by grotesque puddles of oil towards which spectators could feel disgust and aversion(91). There are big gaps in the records of battles, these areas having been out of bounds and their aftermaths restricted until they were sufficiently "cleaned up" for the camera(92). However, not only were death and destruction restricted, but so were reports of incompetence such as the loss of 50 military vehicles (the reporter Jehl of L.A. Times who reported this was ordered to leave the pool(93)). Similarly, reports of pilots watching pornographic movies before bombing missions and a story where returned pilots were described as "giddy" (to be changed by the military to "proud")(94) were thought too sensitive to be related. French TV crews were barred for a short time after an interview they recorded with French soldiers who claimed they did not know why they were in the Gulf but it may have been for oil(95) and, for some reason, film of Kuwaiti teenagers playing football(96), soldiers arguing, and a soldier with a rag around his head were also off limits(97). What we find, then, with military restrictions on access and censorship, is a concern with political security(98) and military prestige(99) which now manifests itself in a closing off or exclusion from real conflicts and their consequences in favour of a virtual space of computer simulations, military briefings and "expert" conjecture, and fictional portrayal, which means war is in many respects reduced to its synthetic representation.

For Noam Chomsky, using a general rule of thumb that anything the media discusses is unimportant or peripheral, concern over military restriction is a red herring(100). For instance, Chomsky notes that the media were not forced to misreport Saddam Hussein's peace proposals and to tow the Administration line. Similarly, C.N.N. and other networks chose to reject a 30 second commercial by Military Families Support Network because it was "unbalanced"(101). It is true that the major media were exceedingly compliant and all declined to take part in a lawsuit by some of the smaller media outlets

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(such as *The Nation*, *Village Voice*, *Mother Jones* and even *Harpers*!) who were "excluded entirely" from the pools(102). In fact, the major media outlets "excluded entirely" any mention of the suit(103). This lawsuit was finally dismissed because the war was over(104). Broadcastings of programmes during the G.W. on the Iran-Contra affair were cancelled as it showed Bush in a poor light(105); Warren Hinkle of the *S.F. Examiner* was given 3 months leave after he wrote positively of an anti-war march(106); and the B.B.C. even issued a list of 67 songs considered "sensitive", to its smaller stations during the Crisis including "Imagine", "State of Independence", "Sailing" and "Give Peace a Chance"(107). Despite this, it seems that the consequences of the military - administration management of the perception of war (management that, it seems, is supported by a large public(108)) - "a war without witnesses" - are immense for the merging of war and its simulation.

### 3. Disinformation

Taylor opposes the needs of the military (secrecy) to those of the media (publicity) (109) - however, these needs can be quite easily reconciled as the G.W. showed. Publicity need not include truth. On the other side of censorship is disinformation which also involves the exclusion of certain facts and alternative view points(110). It was Schwarzkopf's goal to keep the media busy: "Everytime there is something new for the press to look at, I want them to see it. I want to create opportunities for them so they are kept informed"(111) and, as both Norris(112) and Denton(113) note, the Pentagon released so much almost exclusively trivial information that neither the press nor the public could keep up. The media was used to convey disinformation directed at Iraq, but also at the publics of the Coalition countries - the aim being to disarm opposition to the war. I have covered many of the lies by officials in earlier chapters, but here I will briefly list a few of the so far unmentioned ones. There were reports that Saddam Hussein had had his top air force commanders executed, that helicopter crews were defecting before the

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deadlines, that Iraq had used chemical weapons and that Israel had retaliated, that the Republican Guard had been "decimated" by the first night's bombing and that Saddam Hussein was becoming mentally unbalanced and was reliant on heavy drug dosages to keep him functional(114). Not only had the gap between journalist and soldier been reduced(115), but so had the distinction between government-military effort and the mainstream media, the most blatant example being the ground assault on the open flank to the West, when the media was used to lead the Iraqis into believing the attack would come from another point(116). U.S. officials also leaked information that in 1985 Iraq had made plans to attack Kuwait and eventually gain the Eastern oil fields of Saudi Arabia. There was no evidence for this and, in fact, everything pointed against it but, as Springborg notes, no one was critical enough to question it(117). The point is that although military deception is as old as warfare itself, modern technology and mass media channels make large scale deception more and more possible, and contemporary political economy makes deception, more and more necessary, and when nearly all channels of communication are flooded with such deception, it does raise essential barriers to our ability to tell truth from falsity, illusion from reality(118). Instead of truth, speed became the vital criterion of good media coverage and such a frenzy of often contradictory information can, Taylor notes, erode our capacity to reflect, interpret and sift(119).

Several authors point to an emerging "politics of lying" that has tended to become a recurrent feature of political life. This is, as Keane asserts, most fully developed in the United States where administration is a continuous public relations effort, half of which is image making and the other half of which is the art of making people believe the imagery(120). The growing use of "methods of defactualisation" is a primary means of social control that disempowers and eliminates any sense of history and understanding(121). The administration now provides a range of "services" to the media such as interviews, photo opportunities, background sessions, daily handouts and

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briefings(122); and a large staff work hard at manipulating the images of events, leaking strategic information and planting dubious stories(123).

Edelman notes that "deception has become a P R gambit rather than an ethical lapse"(124), and this is clearly illustrated in the quite widespread media and public indifference to the implausible denials and outrageous lies of Reagan and Bush. It no longer seems to matter how large and ridiculous a lie is, as inconvenient facts and contradictions, even simple logic, now seem incapable of discrediting those in power(125). For instance, we have the spectacle of the Iran-Contra hearings and Reagan's unbelievable denials, or Bush's various lies - for instance, that he never knew of Noriega's drug connections although, at the time Bush was in charge of the C.I.A., this was common knowledge(126). It is almost, as Debord alleges, the case of a wholesale collapse of logic(127), where the most unassailable facts are suddenly discarded and the incredibly unlikely is transformed into a watertight case. It has already been noted that the arguments of Jean Baudrillard - whereby we now exist in a "civilisation without secrets"(128), where nothing is concealed, repressed or denied(129) - do disable us from sorting truth from fiction, facts from lies, important research from banal gossip, or vital information from useless trivia, and it also makes identification of the sources of such illusion difficult (see chapter 2). In contrast to such assertions, and with extensive secrecy everywhere in a society that is perhaps even dictated by the exigencies of such secrecy, attaining truth is a veritable digging or uncovering operation which has to contend with an overwhelming mass of public illusions, disinformation and false leads.

Besides the endless stream of "white propaganda" in the G.W., we also find a mass of "black propaganda". "Black propaganda" gives the appearance of coming from somewhere it is not and in the G.W. "black" broadcasts were transmitted from Coalition-controlled areas in the guise of emanating from disaffected groups in Iraq and Kuwait(130). "Black" radio had, during the

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Second World War, helped speed Germany into chaos, and so it was in the G.W. with Iraq(131). The C.I.A.-run Voice of Free Iraq began broadcasting on New Year's day advocating insurrection among Kurdish and Shia Iraqis against the "Saddam Hussein gang"; and those dissident Iraqis working at the station had been promised military help when the time came(132). However, as Iraq descended into civil war, no help was forthcoming, as Bush asserted that the U.S. could not interfere in Iraq's internal politics(133). According to Peter Galbrath of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on returning from a fact finding mission, Iraq's military had even held off attacking the insurgents until it had a clear signal that the U.S. would not intervene; and American forces even blew up an Iraqi arms dump so as these unknown insurgents could not get access to it(134). The result was, of course, up to 40,000 deaths in the civil war and 10s of 1000s more in the resulting Kurdish exodus(135).

#### **4. Official Secrecy on the Environment and the Clandestine Financing and Arming of Iraq**

The frequently reckless behaviour of the ruling classes coupled with widespread secrecy provisions, makes human and environmental disasters more likely and, in this section, I will examine this in action in the G.W. with regard to the assessment of the environment and of human beings and the case of the largely ignored or undisclosed financial and military support Iraq had received from a number of Coalition countries, especially America.

In October 1990, Saddam Hussein had warned that his troops, if attacked, would set fire to oil wells and light "a sea of oil"(136). And prior to the war, the U.S. administration carried out a secret environmental assessment of the probable effects of the demolition of 100s of Kuwaiti well heads. The predictions of these undisclosed assessments was of major damage to the marine economy, the fishing industry and to desalinisation facilities in four countries, it was also concluded that "the impact on human populations and desert economy systems from such prolonged soot fallout is unknown"(137).

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The secret government report had also predicted smoke clouds covering 20% of the Northern Hemisphere, cooling of the earth's surface similar to a "nuclear winter", the failure of Asian monsoons, and the warming of the Hemisphere due to increased CO<sub>2</sub> production(138). Furthermore, at the beginning of the war the U.S. government issued a gag order on scientists on the subject of the fate of soot that travelled around the world(139). Satellite photographs showing smoke pollution patterns in the region were suppressed, researchers were advised to discontinue war-related research and some physicists were advised not to present certain findings(140). Similarly, in many cases, oil and pollution experts responding to the disaster were denied access to the region(141).

A U.S. Census Bureau demographer - Beth Osborne Daponte - was nearly fired in early 1992 for releasing unclassified estimates of Iraqi war deaths. Her own research notes and figures, which remain extremely conservative, were taken away and never given back(142). Secrecy also shrouds the effects of munitions and fuel used during the Gulf War, as information about their chemical composition is classified(143), and similar mysteries surround "Gulf War Syndrome"(144). According to campaigners, 3,000 U.S. service personnel have died and 120,000 are disabled from Gulf War Syndrome which the Pentagon says does not exist, even though the Defence Department conceded in March 1995 that 1 in 6 Gulf veterans had ailments that could not be diagnosed(145). Among the differing explanations for Gulf War Syndrome(146) is that it is caused by Coalition strikes of 18 chemical, 12 biological and 4 nuclear facilities, which released debris into the atmosphere, and weather patterns carried the debris where it came down on Coalition personnel in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq. Many records have been destroyed or suppressed by the military and a number of those who have spoken out have been harassed. According to declassified Marine Corps battlefield Command Chronologies and After Action Reports, as well as 11 pages of nuclear, biological and chemical incident logs prepared by aids to Schwartzkopf and released in response to a F.O.I. Act by Gulf War veterans, exposure to

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chemical and biological warfare (C.B.W.) occurred from both Iraqi attacks and Coalition bombing of Iraqi facilities. It has been suggested that Iraqi use of C.B.W. may have been covered up because it would be an admission of the military's inability to protect U.S. forces from C.B.W. as well as the embarrassment it would cause for the Government and numerous corporations who co-operated with the Iraqis to produce these weapons(147). Such enigmas remain subject to rumours, official denials and government concealment that make serious assessment problematical.

Just as the damage done to the people and the environment of Iraq and Kuwait, perhaps the whole region, has been obscured by official secrecy, so a context into which to fit the war was at least partially rendered unavailable by the secrecy regarding the economic and military building of Iraq. Both the Reagan and Bush administrations aided and abetted the building of Iraq's military with 771 sales of technology to Iraq between 1985-90(148). This was largely achieved through U.S. arms shipments to Jordan, Egypt and Kuwait with advance Whitehouse knowledge and approval of subsequent transshipment to Iraq(149). The U.S. administration also encouraged other nations to send arms to Iraq and the billions of dollars of shipments from Europe would not have been possible without the approval and acquiescence of the Reagan Administration. In conjunction with this, the U.S. helped Iraq in its war with Iran by putting pressure on a number of countries not to sell arms to Iran(150). Meanwhile, Iraq was able to get 100s of millions of dollars of military equipment directly from the U.S., using a loophole in the arms embargo. Between 1985 - 90 Iraq purchased \$782m in "dual-use" goods(151). For example, Bechtel's 1989 PC1 project was built to manufacture ethylene oxide, a substance with civilian applications, which is also a chemical precursor to mustard gas and, according to a Bechtel official in London, Bechtel had received "direct encouragement" from the U.S. Commerce Department to take the job(152). Even more interesting, given the recent denunciations by officials in the Clinton Administration of Iraq's biological capabilities and the threat this

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poses to the whole world, is evidence that Maryland group, the American Type Culture Collection, sent approximately 20 biological agents to Iraqi scientists and that the Federal Centre for Disease Control sent 3 shipments of West Nile Fever virus to Iraq's Salman Pak bacteriological research station(153). Similarly, any nuclear capability that Iraq had was developed in association with the West especially France; and the U.S. were well aware of this fact despite Bush's lie that "we didn't know that ..... The State Department didn't know it ..... if we had known it, it wouldn't have happened"(154)

## **5. The Spectacle of Terrorism and the National Security state.**

The phenomenon of "terrorism" is also an important issue in the study of secrecy and the G.W.. Saddam Hussein was a "terrorist" for invading Kuwait(155) and an "eco terrorist" for Iraqi troops' release of oil into the Gulf and the firing of oil wells, and there was speculation about what else he may do around the world - for instance, sending teams of saboteurs to set forest fires in Lake Springs in Northern California(156). Mention was also frequently made of Iraq's support of terrorism(157) and in October 1990 Americans ranked terrorist actions among the strongest reasons for support of immediate action in the Persian Gulf(158). However, "terrorism" is sheer spectacle or a simulation(159), and the secrecy around terrorism allows reality to be inverted and military action and surveillance against enemies to be legitimised, while creating fear and loyalty to the state among an increasingly disempowered population.

The notion of "international terrorism" came into common currency at the end of the 1960s and 1970s with the emergence of the ETA, PLO, RAF, IRA, Red Brigades and Angry Brigade, and the conflicts of these forces and the counter terrorism that flowered "in reaction" came to be seen as an epic struggle between good and evil, light and darkness, democracy and totalitarianism, civilisation and anarchy(160). A whole series of studies, books, articles and TV

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programmes appeared through the 1970s and 1980s dealing with this new threat to world order - a veritable "terrorism industry"(161). The range of typologies (eg. Islamic, anarcho-communist, nationalist-separatist(162)), studies of terrorism's historical origins (eg. the Assassins, the French Revolution, the Russian nihilists(163)) and anthropological - psychological explanations (eg. inconsistent mothering (Jonas), faulty vestibular functions of the middle ear (Hubbard))(164) proliferated, and it seemed that terrorism was everywhere.

In the era of Reagan and Bush, the profile of "terrorism" has been raised enormously. According to the official discourse, the U.S. and other democratic countries are especially vulnerable to terrorism(165) and "America" in this period, with its attributes of "love of freedom", "justice" and "nation", emerges as the antithesis of terrorism(166). Dobkin views Reagan's 1981 inaugural address as a sort of starting point signalling both the release of the hostages and the proclamation of counter terrorism as the new cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy, replacing the Carter Administration's supposed focus on human rights(167). Here terrorism was claimed to be ultimately an abuse of human rights and thus George Shultz could assert that Israel was the model for human rights enforcement, as the struggle for human rights was the struggle against terrorism(168). In July 1990 George Bush even dubbed the contemporary period "the age of the terrorist"(169).

However, we are left with a problem: that the "terrorism" of official discourse is largely non-existent. As Merrill notes, most of what the CIA, FBI and NSC produce as "intelligence" on terrorism is concerned with images not real occurrences of violence directed against civilians, as this is overwhelmingly committed by governments(170). For instance, while all "leftist", non-state terrorism from 1968-1982 claimed 334 lives (the RAF, for example, being responsible for just 31 deaths), the Contras murdered over 3000 and death squads in U.S.-backed El Salvador and Guatemala had murdered 10s of

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1000s(171). While the PLO from 1968-1981 were responsible for 282 deaths, the incidents at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Lebanon, allowed by the Israeli army, ended in 1900 - 3500 deaths(172).

The study of terrorism, as Merrill says, thus takes us into a hyperreal world where large scale violence and murder do not even register the slightest notice in the media, public consciousness or policy(173), while tiny and ineffective groups of insurgents are inflated into horrifying monsters that threaten to destroy democracy and freedom. The Bush and Reagan administrations sought to raise public awareness about the peril terrorism posed to National Security - for example, as Oliver North said "it is very important for the American people to understand that this is a dangerous world"(174). Unfortunately no evidence to support this view appeared in reality and William Casey was forced to suppress a 1980 report on terrorism which showed its decline. Instead, numerous fallacious reports were "leaked" or released documenting the threat of international terrorism or which, like Claire Sterling's *The Terror Network*, "revealed" the states behind such terrorism(175). Thus fabrications such as Reagan's claim that terrorism had multiplied 3-4 times from 1968-1983 appeared, or reality was turned upside down - for example, in the sudden uncovering of "Narco terrorism", a veritable "drug war" used to justify the invasion of Panama(176) and legitimise Contra terrorism against Nicaragua, as the Sandanista government, said Reagan, was involved in drug trafficking(177). However, the truth was that it was the Contras who, with CIA complicity, were involved in drug trafficking just as it was American covert operations that created "the drug problem" from scratch in Pakistan and Afghanistan, to name but one such instance(178).

The spectacle of terrorism functions to discredit enemies and legitimise attacks on them, to reinforce the role and need for secrecy, surveillance and the national security culture, and to further disempower, marginalise and gain consent from the population. For example, after the bombing of the La Belle

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disco in West Germany in 1986, the Reagan administration claimed it had evidence that Libya was behind the event and "retaliated" with an air-strike that claimed around 100 lives(179). However, German intelligence had cleared Libya of the bombing and all evidence seems to point to Syria - who had been briefly taken off the list of supporters of international terrorism in 1985 due to its influence in the situation of Western hostages in Beirut(180). Similarly, the Lockerbie bombing - which was most likely the work of the PFLP-GC, sponsored by Iran in retaliation for the 1988 shooting down of an Iranian airbus - has, with Iran and Syria's cooperation in the American sponsored post G.W. "peace process", been blamed on Libya(181). And, more generally, terrorist threats have functioned to make surveillance and covert operations, domestically and abroad, integral to the state(182); and it seems certain that the real threat now is a threat from peace to a self-perpetuating national security state bureaucracy, some of whom have already argued that the collapse of the cold war will necessitate more surveillance and better intelligence in a more dangerous and less predictable world(183). This sort of exigency has often produced bizarre results whereby the distinctions between secret groups in opposition to the status quo and those that seek to uphold it are diminished(184). For example, the Piazza Fontana bombing in 1969 and the subsequent actions of the BRs showed the way that the simulation of oppositional terrorism could produce cohesion and justify increased police surveillance and general powers of detainment(185). In numerous such cases we are left only with a vertigo of interpretation(186), where who is on which side and what purpose is served by a given incident serve as raw material for speculation and conspiracy theory, but, more fundamentally, a growing catalogue of impenetrable enigmas(187).

Der Derian calls terrorism a televisual strategic simulation staged for a fearful captive audience(188) and Gerbner notes that such bombardment with the fear-inducing images of terrorism is itself a form of intimidation and terror(189). Here is another way that secrecy can produce bizarre results, this time among

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the population in the form of what Edward Said calls "pseudo-patriotic narcissism" which is manifested in a moral panic(190), further extending secrecy and marginalisation. A disturbing example of this is reported by Gerbner, where a study by De Boer revealed that 6 or 7 out of 10 respondents in the countries he surveyed favoured placing potential terrorists "under strict surveillance, even though our country might then somewhat resemble a police state"(191).

## 6. Concluding Comments

With the proliferation of secrets, restrictions on access to areas of concern and information, the spread of disinformation and a politics of lying, a sweeping and growing system of surveillance(192) and the hazy spectacle of terrorism, comes a marginalisation of the population, an erosion of democracy and personal freedom and a growing ambiguity regarding the truth and reality(193). "National security" justifies the exclusion of the mass of people from information and decision making in return for an illusory feeling of safety from, say, "terrorism"(194); or a vertigo of interpretation" (Baudrillard) sets in with almost any major political event, where anything might be or become anything else, and surveillance produces a glut of words, images and electronic data that makes a comprehension of the overall picture increasingly difficult(195). When truth does come out, it is often too late and just results in confusion and further cynicism and withdrawal, while investigations usually do little to resolve the problems at the base of such lying and secrecy(196). However, the situation is almost certainly less dismal than Debord asserts in Commentaries - censorship is not perfect and lies are not unanswerable. Alternative accounts still circulate and, despite the large gaps, we may still draw certain firm conclusions about different periods and events(197). Coherence, consistency and context should be of help here although the disempowering, irrational and frequently abhorrent effect of extensive secrecy is a problem that any project concerned with human freedom and truth will have to contend with.

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## **Chapter 5**

# **Resistance: Late Capitalism and Opposition, the Gulf War and Critique**

### **1. Introduction**

It is widely claimed that the "mood" of the post modern age is a destructive, apocalyptic and ironic-reflexive one. It is a disposition that seems to exude cynicism towards totalising aspirations and utopian projections, to the self assured claims of science and to schemes that posit coherent and stable subject identities. It is a sense that dissent is secretly disarmed and recovered into a part of the normal flow of life style choices and commodities or is from scratch complicit in this, and that distance or "outsideness" is now impossible to achieve or has at last been recognised as such. It seems to be a frequently apocalyptic humour; we appear to be riding a juggernaut (Giddens) and our experience is of speed, continual cataclysm, a sense of coming collapse or fateful implosion. With this also comes a spirit of exhaustion: art and politics seem fatigued and there appears to be no where to go, and this exhaustion apparently manifests itself alternately in melancholy and despair, on the one hand, and in a shallow, narcissistic and nihilistic pleasure seeking in an endless present, on the other. In the G.W. we find a number of these propositions seemingly confirmed: we see a disappearance of, or dissipated and tired quality to, dissent, where those resisting the war seemed thoroughly unable to make a dent in the relentless destructiveness of the war machine - this being tied to a general waning of utopian vision and expressed in the current enfeebled intellectual left; we also find a psychotic, media-induced frenzy of G.W. fever among many in the Coalition countries; a widespread manifestation of what Reich would call a mechanistic character or temper - fascistic, militaristic, sadistic and irrational. In the following chapter, I will initially consider the notion of "recuperation". I will then move on to investigate modern versus post modern resistance. Thirdly, I will examine some features

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of post modern exhaustion: the end of history, the collapse of Marxism and its reflection in the fate of left intellectuals. And finally, I will offer some concluding comments on post modernism, Marxism and resistance.

## 2. Recuperation

A number of theorists - Huysen, Jameson, Marcuse, Adorno, Debord - point to the way that advanced capitalism seems to swallow nearly all resistance and opposition(1) - ie. to incorporate or recuperate such dissent within the prevailing structures of power. For Debord, the tendency of the society of the spectacle is to recuperate even the most radical of gestures. Resistance is translated into spectacle and the gesture loses its impact as the vocabulary of revolutionary discourse is taken up and used to support the existing networks of power(2). We find a wealth of examples of this process in culture (understood in the narrow sense). The once radical impressionists have long since become mainstream and Monet's residence was restored with generous donations by such pillars of the establishment as Rockefeller, Nixon and Henry Kissinger(3). The iconoclastic interventions of Dadaism, in trying to destroy art's autonomy and exclusion from life, have lost their critical edge and, in a bitter irony, end up, separated from life, hanging in the museum to be passively contemplated by the consumer of modern art. In general, Duchamp, Ernst, Picasso, Magritte and Dali are now standard, strike us as familiar(4), as high art and also as resources to be drawn on by the advertising and marketing world.

More recently, the absorption of punk into the mainstream market place has "come to stand as a celebrated test case of the problematic of cultural politics" (Ross)(5). Punk, as an intendedly subversive avant garde movement, found its gestures commodified(6) and returned to a wider market as a safe, undisturbing "spectacle of refusal"(7) in the "grunge" phenomenon for example - where "thrash" bands sign lucrative recording deals with major record

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companies and fill sporting stadiums at which the fan can purchase a range of memorabilia and group-related commodities. We also find such a recuperative moment within the more directly transgressive realm of adversarial politics. Jacoby argues that after a century of contact, the critique of the commodity succumbs to the commodity(8), as academics jet to conferences to present competing brands of Marxism, and books that once provoked radical dissent are canonised(9) - such publications, co-opted by the "culture industry", when they are not dismissed as maniacal ravings, are sold profitably as evidence of the system's openness(10). We can even witness something of this "recuperation" in the treatment of the arch-enemies of recuperation - the S.I. The 20th anniversary of May 1968 brought a wave of enthusiasm and publicity, with extensive media coverage including interviews with the "stars" of this distant revolution(11). In this year of nostalgia over the "golden age" of revolution, the works of the S.I. were exhibited at the I.C.A. - its photomontages, diverted paintings and comic strips, posters and texts - and one could purchase post cards with situationist slogans on them. The combination of nostalgic contemplation and the sense of irony that the great distance we seem to have moved from this heroic age makes the slogans, and projects of this period appear marginal, amusing in their naivety, and certainly dissipated of the power in mobilisation they may once have had. Here, as Fiske notes, the implication is that recuperation robs oppositional groups of any oppositional meanings and language to speak with and thus of opposition itself(12). It also acts as a form of containment or a safety valve that shows the system's ability to cope with dissent(13).

For some thinkers, such "recuperation" would be the result of the development of the "culture industry", whereby commodification invades every pore of the social body. Andreas Huyssen argues that there is a correlation between the rise of the modern Western culture industry and the decline of the avant garde(14). Whereas the earlier avant garde was confronted with a culture industry in its infancy, we now face a fully blown (in technological and

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economic terms) media culture able to integrate, diffuse, and market the most serious challenges. The avant garde has now lost its cultural and political explosiveness and is a tool of legitimation(15). The "culture industry" is the result of a reunification of economy and culture, with culture subsumed under the economic. With late capitalism, all older popular cultures are swallowed up and subordinated to, and displayed under, the logic of the commodity(16). Jameson links such recuperation to the expansion of "culture" to the point where everything in our social life has become cultural in some sense(17). The semiautonomous nature of the cultural sphere has been destroyed by the logic of late capitalism which penetrates and colonises enclaves which once offered footholds in "critical effectivity"(18). The sense of absorption is produced by the fact that we can now achieve no distance from this expanded cultural sphere(19).

The increasing commodification of everyday life seems to be a recurring theme in Marxist work from Marx on - for instance, in Lukacs, the Frankfurt School, Debord and Jameson. For Lukacs and the early Debord, this "colonisation" not only meant total reification, but also the possibility of proletarian class consciousness. But in Debord's latter work he dejectedly points to the impossibility of achieving a critical distance and of speaking in a language that is not that of the commodity, and this in turn means that the prospect of proletarian revolution is for the moment erased(20). Fiske notes that for a critique of anything we need to stand outside it(21) and Marxism claims to stand in a space outside of the totality it describes, in a superior, transcendental position(22). However, the argument by some post modernist/post structuralist thinkers would be that this idea of an outside, an autonomous sphere or free site of struggle, is a delusion(23).

McGowan calls Michel Foucault a master of the logic of recuperation where even the actions most apparently oppositional are complicit with the aims of power(24). For Foucault, power is everywhere and is "always already

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there"(25) resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power (one is always "inside" power)(26) and independent knowledge and individuality are rejected: "perhaps we should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge can exist only where power relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands and its interest ..... We should admit rather that power produces knowledge ....., that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations"(27). With Foucault's account of modern "disciplinary society", Grumley(28) and Haber(29) find a virtually seamless system of domination, a monolithic power, outlined in a manner Lentricchia sees as positing "the apparently endless stamina, the perfect flexibility, and the bottomless cunning of capitalism to sustain itself"(30). For instance, given that normalising and disciplinary power is everywhere and that the subject is an effect and vehicle of such power, how is resistance possible? Where does it come from? Why would it arise? And how can resistance be made genuinely subversive, ie. result in purposive transformation(31). As Haber asks, "if the very tools of critique and self creation are themselves always formed within the power structures endemic to a particular time, place, culture, history, then how can we give "style" to our lives which is not just one more effect of normalisation and which is not simply the style made available or allowable by a capitalist, racist, patriarchal regime?"(32)

We are left, in such accounts, with a bleak vision of a totally closed society whereby all critical opposition is quashed or recycled as fashion(33). Given the paralysis this seems to engender and given the fact that it seems fatalistic to wait - as Debord puts it - for history to return, where do we go? Firstly, instead of seeing in recuperation simply an uncanny ability of capitalism to co-opt any dissent in a way that out determines our attempts at intervention, we could recognise, like Goshorn(34) and Fiske(35), that such incorporation may well be

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seen as a mark of the success of that resisting gesture in capturing the public imagination or interpellating a popular audience. Such recuperation, says Fiske, always involves the concession of space and this may be an erosive process that could provide for significant changes in the social system(36). On whichever terms radical dissent reaches the mainstream there will always be those who will be able to use it radically. According to McGowan, the later Foucault of 1978-84 seemed to be groping for an escape from the monolith and he thus shifts to a focus on the subject(37); and a number of post structuralist and post modernist authors, having already theorised a seemingly totally administered society, made attempts to escape these implications with subversions to be found in myth, mental illness, even death. Said goes against his Foucauldian analytic framework in trying to carve out a space for the critic perpetually outside - for example, in his fascination with the condition of exile (both literal and metaphorical); this embodies, as McGowan argues, an untenable individualism with unfortunate political implications(38) which I will consider further on. I will also come back to the implications of exhaustion following from the notion of recuperation in section 4, but now I would like to follow another significant path leading from the above discussion.

### **3. Post Modern and Modern Resistance, Culture and the Gulf War**

As mentioned in a previous chapter, Debord in *Commentaries*, with his notion of the "integrated spectacle", moves closer to the work of Jean Baudrillard. Baudrillard's position had developed from one of cultural revolution based on a situationist-type model, to a micro politics, and finally, to a rejection of both. Kellner sees this as a logical movement due to the tension that previously existed in Baudrillard between oppositional practice and a system that seems to absorb all opposition and preclude struggle, resistance and alternative cultural practices - a world that is totally designed and controlled(39). Similarly, Rojeck argues that at first sight Baudrillard's account seems close to Marcuse's gloomy picture of the way new forces of domination and integration

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tend to eradicate any alternative mode of thought and fixate the modern psyche on consumerism(40). However, it appears that Baudrillard does articulate some form of oppositional practice in his work(41). Baudrillard argues that we no longer need hold a sad vision of the masses (alienated) and a sad vision of the unconscious (repressed) (42), it is no longer possible "to use arguments based on one's own wretchedness, one's inauthenticity, one's misfortune and bad conscience"(43). Neither is it necessary to hold to a negative view of the mass media (Debord) or a happy one (McLuhan)(44). The "masses" are not misled or mystified and power does not manipulate them - they are *indifferent*(45). The absence of a response to mass media is not to be criticised (as Debord might) as one-way communication from the powerful to the powerless, but should be seen as a counter strategy of the masses themselves. Baudrillard attributes to the masses a wiliness which gives them the upper hand; the masses' silence is a ruse against a system which attempts to make them stupid and impotent(46). Silence represents the symbolic death of the masses who are now lifeless objects without responsibility to respond and who make a mockery of whatever autonomy is preserved(47). Here "hyper conformity" is "the resistance of the masses: it is equivalent to sending back to the system its own logic by doubling it, to reflecting, like a mirror, meaning without absorbing it"(48). The masses devour the messages of the media but remain incompletely socialised(49). Thus Baudrillard can conclude that banality, inertia and apoliticism are on the way to becoming revolutionary. Resistance is now resistance to resistance(50).

It is useful here to compare Baudrillard and other post modernist accounts with a modernist, Enlightenment critique of the G.W. and perhaps the most prominent intellectual of this latter tradition is Noam Chomsky. Chomsky, says Boal, is a striking example of the Enlightenment's posture in the face of power(51), diligently countering propaganda and exposing lies and cover ups, all based on a rationalist philosophy of the mind and language(52). Such an attempt is totally rejected by Baudrillard. In Baudrillard's essay *On Our*

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Theatre of Cruelty(53) he denies the utility of trying to restore to the order of factual reality the events concerning the deaths of RAF leaders Baader, Ensslin and Raspe in Stammheim prison. What does it matter if they were killed or took their own lives? The idea of some on the left that proof of their murder would show the state up and would turn people against it is dispatched as "a load of rubbish". Baudrillard seems here to assert that the best response is to not enter into such questions.

For Der Derian, the modernist school of criticism, of which Chomsky is the major example, fought a disastrous war of position during the G.W., constructing ideologically sound bunkers of facts and history while the "new" world order fought in a highly successful war of manoeuvre, out flanking the horrors and ugly truth of war with high speed visuals and a high tech aesthetics of destruction(54). Modernists like Chomsky ignored the phenomenon of cyber war and were easily dismissed as anti-American and utopian. Instead, Der Derian asserts the utility of another late modern tactic against total war: the war on totality itself - that is, the delegitimation of all sovereign truths based on class, nationalist and internationalist metanarratives(55). Der Derian insists that we must find a way to live with and recognise the very necessity of difference and the need to assert heterogeneity and to construct a counter simulation to war and anti-diplomacy(56). This is a game with no end; no winners or losers and only one rule: play in peace(57). In a similar vein, Darnovsky, Kauffman and Robinson in Socialist Review argue that a new post anti-communist American identity is in formation and is therefore open to contestation due to its only partially formed nature(58). We are thus able to challenge it and develop effective counter stories for the anti war movement to tell. I will now outline another post modern perspective on resistance - the ideas of John Fiske - before returning to critique Fiske, Baudrillard and Der Derian with respect to the G.W.

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The modernist Kulturkritik offered by theorists such as Marcuse, Adorno, and Debord, where mass culture is foisted on powerless and passive people by a culture industry that promotes their isolation, powerlessness and false consciousness is rejected by Fiske as misguided(59). The notions of "consumers" or "spectators" implies a passivity that is not found in reality(60) and many modernist's distaste for popular culture stems from an elitist pessimism and cultural aristocratism(61). The socially subordinate are not a cultureless, vulnerable mass that elite humanism and some post modernism implies - they are active and productive(62). In this society, the only resources from which the subordinate can make their subcultures are those provided by the system that subordinates them and this is the art of making do with what the system provides(63). Consumption is productive and should be seen as a tactical raid on the system (rather than an open warfare situation), where the powerless construct their space within and against the powerful's place, their meanings within the language of the powerful(64). Culture is not imposed ready-made on the masses and people do not behave like masses - for instance, Australian Aborigines may read Rambo as a member of the third world in conflict with the white officer class(65) and Madonna may well be read as a reinscription of patriarchal values and an object of voyeuristic pleasure, but also as an agent of empowerment for young women(66). Here the reader is what de Certeau calls a poacher, "stealing" what he or she wants without being caught or subjected to the law of the land(67). There is no need, then, to hold to a romantic and nostalgic idea of mass culture's inauthenticity(68) or to dismiss the sheer pleasure of the mass - for instance, in sporting events -, as this pleasure is subversive, or to have a disdain for tabloid sensationalism which Fiske sees as quite frequently subversive of science's self-importance and elitism(69). Fiske views popular culture as having an overall progressive character.

However, Fiske and de Certeau are, I feel, far too sanguine about the possibilities of resistance and the character of popular culture(70). The G.W.

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was similar in its operation and effects to much popular culture - with its exciting movie-like story, sports-type structure and commentary, its soap opera sidelines and the festivals for the returning troops. The G.W. was for many a thrilling, aesthetically appealing, sexy and morally unproblematic spectacle(71). Once the war began a "lunatic euphoria" (Kellner(72)) swept a number of Coalition countries. As many became 24 hour TV war coach potatoes and armchair generals and strategists(73), a wave of war fever spread with ubiquitous chants of "U.S.A! U.S.A.!" and "Woof! Woof!" and with yellow ribbons and flags everywhere(74). With the remarkable popularity of the war came a whole range of irrational behaviours - for example, many people in America brought gas masks in case of chemical attack by Iraqi terrorists. But even more disturbing was the outbreak of quasi fascistic behaviour in a number of Coalition countries, with racism and militarism omnipresent(75). The dehumanisation of the Iraqis had gone so far that it appeared people were more concerned with the pathetic oil-covered bird life than with bombed Iraqi civilians and many did not want to see more of what was happening on the ground(76). In fact, the highest complaint against TV coverage amongst British viewers was not its bias or lack of trustworthiness, but that it was too repetitive, and 12% of those dissatisfied were so because war coverage disrupted normal programming(77).

The representation of the G.W. worked using similar means to much popular culture in its manipulation, diversion from the real issues, marginalisation, instilling false needs and irrational attitudes. For example, in the representation of the anti war movement, of 2,855 minutes of coverage of the Gulf Crisis only 29 minutes dealt with public opposition to the war(78). When an enormous march against the war in Washington attracted 250,000 or more people C.N.N. estimated it as "well short" of 50,000 and at other large marches protesters were represented as small clusters of marginal people(79), while pro war demonstrations not a 20th of the size were inflated hugely. Thus dissent effectively disappeared and this inability to make resistance heard took its toll

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on the anti war movement. The spectacle of the G.W. was lapped up by people used to partaking in the "horrific nihilism" (Sharrett)(80) of cultural production. Why should we accept as in anyway progressive an information diet that consists of tabloids and endless sport, with Stallone movies and music by Madonna as entertainment? Does playing video games lend power to the powerless more than it instils militarism and desensitisation to the pain of other human beings? And do bizarre and outrageous tabloid stories challenge elitist science as much as they serve as disinformation, diversion and the playing on of fears(81)? Can it be in anyway progressive that while almost no one understood what went on in the Gulf, almost everyone can speak endlessly on sport or on a Hollywood star's indiscretion with a prostitute? Surely not!

Such culture and the response to it is more accurately the reflection of a deep sickness. Kellner(82) and Scarry(83) both point to an infantilised and marginalised population as the cause of the racism, militarism and nationalism of the G.W. which, as with Nazi Germany, is a response to growing powerlessness and insecurity. The G.W. diverted people from their own plight and obscured who was responsible for it(84), with a "2 minutes hate" lasting throughout the crisis. With the American empire in decline and with other Western countries in stagnation and retrenchment, the G.W. provided pseudo community around a "noble" cause and a degraded festival around victory that promoted conformist collective behaviour(85) and allegiance to the state.

The experience of the G.W. flatly contradicts Baudrillard's argument regarding the manipulation by the mass media and also shows that banality, inertia and apoliticism could much more accurately be interpreted as motivated by a sense of despair or defeat(86). As Cook says, playing dead does not subvert the status quo and it is the "masses" who ultimately get caught in the trap of their own inertia and silence(87). In one of Baudrillard's interviews regarding his "novel" on the G.W. he condemns what is happening on the ground - "this

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heap of cowardice and stupidity"(88) - yet with what resources can he make such a judgement? and, furthermore, what, other than refuse to discuss it, can he do to help to stop or prevent such occurrences in the future? Against both Baudrillard and Der Derian, it is necessary to assert the continued utility of unmasking and exposing lies and cover ups, of introducing history into the debate and of pointing to the power interests that underlie events such as the G.W. and the representation of these interests in the mass media. Such a strategy is infinitely more substantial than withdrawing or making vague and rather weak gestures to "counter simulations", "counter stories", or rules of "playing in peace". However, critics of "modernist" resistance strategies who point out the way in which alternative media, despite their radical messages, reproduce the dominant spectacle-spectator relations(89) are correct. We still have communication from the transmitter to the receiver where the few talk at the majority not with them(90).

#### **4. The End of History and the Crisis of Marxism**

Boal, in criticising Chomsky, argues that such an Enlightenment-style attack, under the conditions of the cynical and integrated spectacle, is not any longer a method of resistance(91). The system does not require true believers any more(92) and, in fact, as Sharrett points out with regard to contemporary culture, we are now at a stage of recognising the bankruptcy of, say, capitalism and patriarchy, but validating them anyway(93). This is partly connected with what Sharrett et al find as characteristic of post modern cinema(94): an apocalyptic view of history and human destiny found in TV evangelism, heavy metal and post punk/hip hop culture - in which war is nihilistically desired as having a blast and producing revelation with apocalypse(95). Also, it is connected to the already mentioned "exhaustion" of the present age: the notion that there are now no alternatives left, that art and politics are spent, and that utopia is decisively out of the question. Increasingly, modernist politics and utopian projections are greeted with a world weary irony and

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evermore concepts and ideas derived from such modernist projects are placed within inverted commas(96) in a gesture of ultra reflexivity (or what Sharrett calls more accurately, "forced irony")(97). In this section I will initially outline the influential account Francis Fukuyama gives of the "end of history", I will then investigate the related "crisis of Marxism" and the manner in which this is reflected in the retreat and current weakness of left intellectuals - which, moreover, was clearly illustrated during the G.W.

It is noted by Kellner that Baudrillard has continually referred to an "end of history" that we have supposedly reached(98) and in this he moves close to the American State Department's in-house intellectual(99) Francis Fukuyama. Fukuyama, in trying to restore Hegel to an upright position and restore ideas to the centre of the historical process, laid the ideological and mythical ground work for the articulation of the concept of the "new world order"(100). Fukuyama argues that a remarkable consensus regarding the legitimacy of liberal democracy has emerged and that it constitutes the "end point of mankind's (sic) ideological evolution", the "end of history". We cannot imagine a world better than our own or a future that is not essentially democratic and capitalist(101). History, and with it art and philosophy, ends with the social system that manages to achieve the goal of universal and equal recognition(102). Thus, in an earlier essay, Fukuyama claims that "the egalitarianism of modern America represents the essential achievement of the classless society envisioned by Marx"(103). The post-historical First World will however continue to be forced into realist methods when dealing with societies stuck in history - for instance, the Iraqs and Libyas of the world will continue to invade their neighbours and fight bloody wars(104). Appropriately enough, Fukuyama ends his book with a racist and thoroughly dishonest Cowboy and Indian metaphor(105).

Such works should, it seems, be rather easy to dispatch, given Fukuyama's numerous dubious assumptions and his transparent apologetics for US

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imperialism. However, Fukuyama's work seems to have struck a chord, especially as it has been coincidental with the "collapse of communism" and the bizarre media rapture that surrounded those events(106). In all this we find a number of left intellectuals agreeing with Fukuyama's analyses and retreating from revolutionary positions, and a very deep "crisis of Marxism" - according to some, even Marxism's death.

The "crisis of Marxism" was an expression coined by Thomas Masaryk in 1898(107) and it has been virtually synonymous with Marxism(108). However, the current crisis, in its depth and extent, is something above and beyond previous problems. Central in this crisis has been the downgrading of the working class as the standard bearer of revolt(109); the difficulties and then final collapse of "really existing communism"; the success of the ascendant right in ushering in a "new pessimism" or "austerity consensus"(110) where utopian aspirations are viewed as equivalent to totalitarianism or sadly antiquated idealism(111); and the rise of post modern theorising which threatens Marxism especially in its denial of the possibility of externality of perspective, the refusal of binary oppositions (and thus the dialectic), and its rejection of totalising narratives and utopian projections(112). And the bleak outlook for Marxism is seen by some(113) as symbolised in the various suicides and ignominious demises of several prominent Marxist theorists.

Just as Hegel's optimistic historical scenario collapsed under the weight of an antiquated and authoritarian German state(114), so it is argued Marx's theory is critically weakened by the failures and then the collapse of the "communist" bloc. For Bauman, it was communism that took the precepts of modernity most seriously, with grand designs, unlimited social engineering, huge and bulky technology(115). The collapse of this most thorough attempt to make modernity, work is also the end of modernity and today the old blue prints for the good society "seem embarrassingly unreal and naive"(116). Along with the disillusionment with communism that Stalinism, Hungary 1956 and the Prague

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Spring brought, the events of Paris 1968 also undermined Marxism. The bankruptcy of the conservative P.C.F. was exposed and a number of French Marxist luminaries proved incapable of understanding what was happening or intervening in a useful manner(117). May 1968 disrupted conventional Marxist discourse in its spontaneous and independent movement of people outside the sphere of influence of the parties of the left and the trade unions and with the emergence of the new social movements(118). These heterogeneous uprisings seemed to mark a decisive break with Marxian working class politics(119) and a conception of socialism which was based on the ontological centrality of the working class(120). The reduction of the heterogeneity of "language games" to a fundamental identity - in Marxism's case, class struggle - is an indication of a tendency to terror and totalitarianism that can be found in modernity's metanarratives(121). Instead, post structuralism and post modern analysis champions a loose "micropolitics" and we find this at some point in Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, Negri, Lyotard and Baudrillard(122). The multiple and plural uprisings of May 1968 posed a number of important questions of power and resistance especially to Marxist theory - for example, where was the true locus of power which dominated and repressed? was it the government? police? work place? school? all? none? and what was the force contesting power?(123).

Lyotard, for instance, argues that May 68 showed that the attempt to reduce every manifestation of dissent to a single project tended towards totalitarianism(124). We should celebrate the irreducible diversity of language games with a proliferation of "little narratives" in an open system. "Terror" is defined by Lyotard as anything which would contain or delimit the unbounded nature of the self(125) and the goal of dialogue cannot and must not be consensus - "heterogeneity makes consensus impossible" -, thus Lyotard's ideas of embodying the unrepresentable, searching for difference, heteronomy and multiplicity are summed up in the idea of a "multiplicity of justices"(126). However, Lyotard claims that among the fluid movements of language games -

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in which no position can claim to be more rational, just or humane - we must regulate via a "justice of multiplicity"(127).

Foucault is also sceptical of totalising discourses such as Marxism and of the idea that society as a whole can be transformed(128), that power is anchored primarily in macro structures or ruling classes (ie. power is dispersed, indeterminate, heteromorphous, subjectless and productive(129)), or that the subject of resistance can be located and specified: "there is no single locus of great refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead there is a plurality of resistances"(130). Post Marxists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, drawing on Foucault, make a searching critique of the logic of foundations and the reduction by Marxists of non-class to class identities. The social, say Laclau and Mouffe, is open, it has no essence and every identity or subject position, because of its discursivity, is somewhat precarious(131). We can no longer postulate one foundational moment of rupture and a unique space in which the political is constituted(132) and neither can we confidently and unproblematically talk of "class interests".

This "crisis of Marxism" is especially visible in a widespread retreat and demoralisation of leftist/Marxist intellectuals and this in turn was reflected in many of the weaknesses of the movement against the G.W. When considering the position and role of intellectuals there are, says Eyerman, 2 broad categories within which the intellectual might be viewed: Firstly, those attributing certain personal characteristics to intellectuals(133). For instance, Julien Benda's *La Trahison des Clercs* identified the failure of intellectuals as that of trying to harness reason to political, nationalistic and racial ends whereas the real intellectual stays out and above the fray and serves universal values(134). Secondly, those who look to social structure and function. For instance, Antonio Gramsci saw intellectuals as first and foremost a social category who perform the task of making conscious and visible the fundamental notions of society(135). These can be divided into traditional and

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organic intellectuals and it is organic intellectuals who emerge with social movements and classes(136). As Said notes, Gramsci's notion is far more realistic than Benda's romantic vision(137) and, in line with Gramsci and in the case of the G.W., we might expect to find the organic intellectual working consciously towards articulating and developing the cultural and political capacities of his or her own class(138).

However, with the "crisis of Marxism", we find a number of left intellectuals shrinking from radical and revolutionary positions and often caving into the hegemony of the dominant class. For example, a number of leftists including Kolko, Anderson, Elliot and Halliday have come close to agreeing with Fukuyama that capitalism has taken on socialism and beaten it and that we can no longer conceive of anything but a capitalist future(139). A number of these leftist intellectuals, says Eagleton, have made the long march from Saussure to social democracy and now hold to some form of "post Marxism"(140). Some like Elliot see the proper attitude to take as that of an "intellectual ex-communist" and to "withdraw into a watch tower"(141), while, for Jameson(142) and Debord(143), it is a matter of doing what we can at present and hoping history will return to us. Norris sees this widespread ideological retrenchment as highly evident in the intellectual development of those around the journal Marxism Today where debate now focuses around what extent free market ideology, consumer politics, "post modern" life styles, and the end of ideology can be incorporated into a "new" political programme for these "new times"(144).

And it is in Marxism Today during the G.W. that we find good examples of the malaise of the left at the present time. Fred Halliday points to Marxism Today's safe cover headline for the March 1991 issue - "A Peace the West Can't Win" - and points out, quite correctly, that Eric Hobsbawm appears on the verge of saying "yes, the war should have been fought" (145). Halliday himself had argued that Saddam Hussein could not have been forced out, that

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sanctions were not credible when faced with such a despot and that, overall, arguments *for* the war prevailed "by a slim margin" even "if it is conducted by an unsavoury set of powerful states"(146).

In sum, a number of leftist intellectuals were accepting the official terms of debate and frames of reference. Halliday argued against those opposing the war, that while they called for an end to hostilities, insurrectionaries in Iraq wanted the West to go further(147). I find this argument very unpersuasive. Halliday, it seems, is ignoring the extent to which the Kurds and Shiites were provoked into revolt by the Coalition who never had any intention of aiding the rebels and the argument also seems to leave out of consideration the nature of the hostilities: that they were conducted not against the Iraqi army, but against the whole Iraqi population. Hobsbawn talks of Kuwait being "freed" and "the liberation of Kuwait"(148), while Norman Geras championed the Kuwaiti's need for a "rapid redress" of the denial of their right to self determination. Neither Hobsbawn nor Geras, though, draw attention to the countless other parallel historical instances or that "self determination" for Kuwait - as a dictatorial, undemocratic monarchy with huge wealth imbalances - is virtually meaningless(149). Charles Jenck's article in *Marxism Today* - "Stone, Paper, Scissors" (the cover story of the February 1991 issue) - seems to me to illustrate even more clearly the current extremely weak and defensive position of leftist/progressive intellectuals. In this tract, Jencks shows considerable enthusiasm for the postmodernism world of inter-dependent bodies (as opposed to the egotistical nations of the modern world). According to Jencks, we have a stone, paper, scissors type balance of power with America, the Coalition and the UN as the 3 players. Says Jencks: "Consensus is hard, but as events have shown, not impossible to achieve" (150). However, I feel that the reality of the situation did not warrant such optimism, as egotistical real politik and bullying, not consensus, were the order of the day as the American administration proceeded to do exactly what they wanted.

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The choice by some leftists of imperialism (America) over fascism (Iraq)(151) was reversed by intellectuals such as Alex Callinicos and his S.W.P. who chose Iraq over America; hoping the U.S. would be given a bloody nose(152). However, surely such choices between these "unsavoury states" need not be made and it would not be board members of General Electric or George Bush who would get bloody noses and shattered bodies from a conflict in the Gulf that went against America, but members of the American working class.

Lastly, and related to the above arguments, resistance to the war was weakened by the framework, again borrowed from the ruling class, of nationalism that was articulated by many in the anti war movement, especially in America and England. Many contrasted the money spent on weaponry and intervention in the G.W. with that spent on declining U.S. infrastructure and welfare(153). But most disastrous was the extent to which resistance was based on fears for the lives of U.S. and British military personnel. This can be seen in the slogan "Iraq is Arabic for Vietnam" which firstly, accepts the official terms and parallels - for example, "Kicking the Vietnam syndrome" - and, secondly, grounds opposition to the war predominantly in terms of the cost to "our" lives. The problem with the consideration of "what will it cost us", is most clearly revealed as soon as it is evident (or appears to be the case) that war will not cost "us" anything - in money and/or lives. The second, less direct, but equally fundamental problem is that in using and appropriating patriotic symbols - for example, "peace is patriotic" - we not only push Iraqi suffering into the background(154), but we validate the nationalism around which support for the war is mobilised. Such mobilisation on the grounds of nationalism is thoroughly reactionary and more and more invalidated by the process of globalisation which sees capital organising across and transcending the arbitrary divisions of the nation state ever more completely while, for the most part, workers movements have not been able to do so with such success and are still disastrously susceptible to appeals framed by nationalistic concerns. In this section I have taken a look at the doldrums that the left is presently in

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and the way in which this was reflected in the G.W. In conclusion I would like to look at post modernity, Marxism and the question of resistance.

## **5. Concluding Comments**

Smart claims that Marxist responses to post modernity have been seen as "disturbing and unsatisfactory" with much moral finger wagging(155) (for some Marxists(156), post modernity is just an apologetics for those supporting the status quo or is the excuse given by the disappointed and aging generation of 1968 who now form a new middle class currently experiencing good times rather than "new times"). But I think we could very comfortably reverse the point and focus on the "disturbing and unsatisfactory" nature of post modernist responses to Marxism(157) and to the struggles taking place in the world today.

Harvey believes that while post modern theorising helpfully emphasises difference and complexity, in the end post modernist critique disempowers such voices and, in general, undermines resistance(158). "Difference" becomes a new metanarrative, is universalised and thereby becomes an obstacle to the formation of resistance(159). Both Lyotard and Foucault appear to foreclose on the possibility of community(160). How do we achieve alliances within local struggles and how might an oppositional political movement be developed to form what Gramsci called a "counter hegemonic bloc"?(161). Solidarity is necessary, as Haber points out, for self understanding and empowerment and resistance and change are impossible without it and yet in Foucault, for example, it seems that subjects are never coherent enough to form communities of active resistance and transformation(162). All that seems to be left is fragmentation, subjectivism (without a subject (Anderson)), perpetual conflict and anarchy, without sufficient grounds for resistance (post modern and post structuralist theorists often relying on the audience's implicit understanding of right and wrong(163)) and with only vague gestures as to how the existing order might be transformed(164).

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The message to "respect differences" that comes from Foucault and Lyotard(165) is, says Zavarzadeh and Moton, rather close to liberalism where freedom is little more than freedom of speech and the promotion of a "multi cultural community"(166). For instance, Lyotard finds that the relativistic consequences of his "multiplicity of justices" forces him to institute a principle of universal constraint - a "justice of multiplicities" - that is very difficult for him to justify(167). Is it really useful to describe the terror of Nazi anti Semites or perhaps of the bombing of Iraqi civilians as an invasion of incommensurate language games?(168). In preparing for this "life without truths" it seems that post modernism accepts the current socio-economic formation and ignores the extent to which the primary effects of power still operate within the macrostructures of capital and the state. The current order comes to appear invulnerable to change(169) as a "brute positivity"(170) and it seems that "The age of capital is eternal"(171). For all the post modernist talk of the fluidity and constructed nature of subject positions, after the "post modern carnival" the poor will remain poor(172). There is thus nothing strange or metaphysical about Marxist notions of class interest - for instance, as Eagleton notes, to say that the position of a slave comes readily inscribed with a set of interests is simply to say that anyone who found themselves occupying that position would do well to get out of it(173).

Also relating post modernism to the Western liberal tradition is its abhorrence of holistic thought and its ascription to it of totalitarianism and terror(174). This particular hang up has unfortunate consequences for resistance. Firstly, it hides the extent to which Foucault, Lyotard, and Baudrillard produce theories as totalising as any Marxist(175). Secondly, it is only in the light of some conception of a dominant cultural logic or hegemonic system that resistance, emancipation or difference can be meaningfully identified or measured at all(176). And, finally, as Jameson notes, the objective experience of social reality is that "one isolated cause or issue, one specific form of injustice cannot be fulfilled or corrected without eventually drawing the entire web of

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interrelated social levels together into a totality, which then demands the invention of a politics of social transformation"(177). Therefore, the notion of social totality is essential to socialist politics.

The argument here is that post modern notions of resistance are too fragmented and vague, too lacking in any sense of how social struggles may be able to come together for the purpose of a massive resistance to provide us with any way out of the current world disorder in which capitalism continues to give rise to exploitation, waste and reckless expansion that continues to result in environmental destruction and barbaric wars(178). It is indeed ironic, as both Best and Kellner(179), and Wood(180) note, that in such troubled times when class struggle is so evident, the left is apparently so feeble. This weakness is reflected in the many failings of the movement against the war, but despite the apparent dwindling of radical possibilities and progressive alternatives, the revitalisation of a tradition of revolutionary thought that has thus far known only defeat is essential and, furthermore, likely as Jameson asserts: "Whether the word Marxism disappears or not, in the erasure of the tapes in some new Dark Ages, the thing itself will inevitably reappear"(181).

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## NOTES:

### Chapter One

1. Jameson, 1991: 1
  2. Callinicos, 1989: 11
  3. Smart, 1990: 14
  4. Smart, 1993: 243
  5. Bertens, 1993: 30 - 31
  6. Bertens, 1993: 30 - 31
  7. Laclau, 1993: 329; Crook, 1991: 4
  8. Lucie-Smith, 1990: 109
  9. Harvey, 1989: 66
  10. Docherty, 1993: 16; Harvey, 1989: 66
  11. Jameson, 1991: 2
  12. Some feel that Jameson's totalising theory is an impatient overgeneralisation of debates or trends within certain spheres to all spheres of social historical life (Chabot, 1991: 35)
  13. Jameson, 1991: 12
  14. Jameson, 1991: 8
  15. In Rojeck, 1993: 117
  16. Rojeck, 1993. For Warhol, "Being good in business is the most fascinating kind of art" (Hewison, 1990: 33)
  17. McGowan, 1991: 8
  18. Jameson, 1991: 6
  19. Jameson, 1991: 9/17 - 18
  20. Art of the Western World
  21. Bauman, 1992: 28
  22. Bauman, 1992: 28
  23. Harvey, 1989: 24
  24. Anderson, 1984
  25. Callinicos, 1989: 12
  26. Merquior, 1989: 42 - 46
  27. Callinicos, 1989: 16
  28. Huyssen, 1989: 202
  29. Bertens, 1993: 64
  30. Jameson, 1991: 4
  31. Bauman, 1992: 24
  32. Bauman, 1992: 24
  33. Huyssen, 1993: 221
  34. Huyssen, 1993
  35. Debord and Wolman in Knabb, 1989: 8
  36. in Docherty, 1993: 15
  37. Hassan, 1993: 151
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38. Huyssen, 1986: 163
  39. Huyssen, 1986: 163
  40. Hall and Jaques, 1990: 121
  41. Jameson, 1991: 4
  42. Eagleton, 1985: 61
  43. Huyssen, 1993: 227
  44. Huyssen, 1993: 227
  45. Anderson, 1984
  46. Callinicos, 1989: 71
  47. Berman, 1984
  48. Jameson, 1991: 297/299
  49. Sharrett, 1993
  50. Kroker and Cook, 1988: 11
  51. Kroker and Cook, 1988: 112
  52. Kroker and Cook, 1988: 279. For Kroker and Cook, the painting of Eric Fischl very much embodies this prevailing mood. Fischl paints the ascendant middle class - passive nihilists of consumer culture - surrounded everywhere by impending danger and signs of decomposition (Kroker and Cook, 1988: 11/279). What is described here could be contested. Agger (1992: 169) calls such a mood "New York Times post modernism" and sees it not so much as a properly post modern feature, as it is related to the political cynicism and consumerist individualism of the narcissistic mood described by Christopher Lasch.  
  
A less extreme version which concerns itself with the "ironic cosmopolitanism" (Connor, 1989: 88; Jencks, 1991: 9) and the exhaustion of speech of the present age is that of Umberto Eco who gives an interesting illustration of what he sees as the post modern attitude: A man who is in love with a cultured woman wants to say to her, "I love you madly", but he knows that she knows these words have been written by Barbara Cartland. He may then say "As Barbara Cartland would put it, I love you madly". He thus avoids false innocence and clearly admits that we cannot any longer speak in such earnest, "child like" tones (in Jencks, 1991: 5).
  53. Sharrett, 1993: 1
  54. Hutcheon, 1989: 25
  55. Best and Kellner, 1991: 146; Natoli and Hutcheon, 1993: 2
  56. Smart, 1992: 170 - 175
  57. Smart, 1992: 170 - 175
  58. Callinicos, 1989: 2
  59. Best and Kellner, 1991: 166
  60. Jameson, 1991: 3. For example, Callinicos in *Against Post modernism*
  61. Smart, 1992: 33
  62. For example, Andre Gorz in *Farewell To The Working Class*
  63. Hassan, 1993: 289
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64. Harvey, 1989: 124 - 157
  65. Smart, 1992: 183
  66. McLennan, 1992: 330
  67. Best and Kellner, 1991: 146
  68. Docherty, 1993: 11
  69. Docherty, 1993: 11
  70. McLennan, 1992: 332
  71. Lyotard, 1989: 7
  72. For instance, Hassan
  73. in Readings, 1991: 54
  74. Haber, 1994: 6
  75. Callinicos, 1985: 86
  76. Nicholson, 1992: 82
  77. Jameson, 1991: 18
  78. Jameson, 1985: 120
  79. Harvey, 1989: 240/285/306. Some, like Kroker and Cook (1988: 267), see television as constitutive of post modern culture, society and economy in radical decline. T.V. is not a reflex of society or ideology but is the real world of post modernity. Everything which escapes the real world of T.V. is peripheral to the main tendencies of the contemporary age. Agger (1992: 2) also sees as vital, the late capitalist movement to a televisionisation of public life.
  80. Bauman, 1992: VII
  81. Kellner, 1989; Jameson (1985: 113/124) also argues that at some point following World War 2 a new type of society began to emerge which encompassed new types of consumption, planned obsolescence, an even faster tempo of fashion and styling changes, and a thorough penetration of advertising, TV and the media generally throughout all of society.
  82. Kellner, 1989: 3
  83. Shipway, 1987: 166 - 167
  84. Shipway, 1987: 166 - 167
  85. Shipway, 1987: 166 - 167
  86. Kellner, 1989: 4
  87. Trebitsch, 1991: xxiv - xxvi
  88. The S.I. accused Lefebvre of plagiarising their theses on the Paris Commune.
  89. Plant, 1992: 5
  90. Robertson, 1988: 44; Wollen, 1991.
  91. Best and Kellner, 1991: 17
  92. Robertson, 1988: 39
  93. Wollen, 1991: 35
  94. Plant, 1992: 4/82
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95. For example, Russell Jacoby in the *Dialectic of Defeat*
  96. Robertson, 1988: 40
  97. Robertson, 1988: 40
  98. Plant, 1992: 1/54
  99. in Knabb, 1989: 298
  100. Wollen, 1991: 21
  101. Debord in Knabb, 1989: 17
  102. Debord in Knabb, 1989: 25
  103. Unitary urbanism: "The theory of the combined use of arts and techniques for the integral construction of a milieu in dynamic relation with experiments in behaviour." Drift: "A mode of experimental behaviour linked to the conditions of urban society: a technique of transient passage through varied ambience." Diversion "diversion of pre-existing aesthetic elements. The integration of present or past artistic production into a superior construction of a milieu. In this sense there can be no situationist painting or music, but only a situationist use of these means. In a more primitive sense, diversion within the old cultural spheres is a method of propaganda, a method which testifies to the wearing out and loss of importance of those spheres." Psycho geography: "The study of the specific effects of the geographical environment, consciously organised or not, on the emotions and behaviour of individuals" (in I.S. # 1 in Knabb, 1989: 46 - 46).
  104. Wollen, 1991: 9
  105. Vaneigem in Knabb, 1989: 88
  106. Debord, 1983 # 191
  107. Wollen, 1991: 26
  108. Plant, 1992: 9 - 10
  109. Shipway, 1987: 156
  110. Debord, 1983 # 1
  111. Debord, 1983 # 4
  112. Debord, 1983 # 5
  113. Levin, 1991: 73
  114. Debord, 1983 # 6
  115. Debord, 1983 # 12
  116. Debord, 1983 # 24
  117. Debord, 1983 # 25
  118. Debord, 1983 # 6
  119. Debord, 1990: 2
  120. Debord, 1983 # 72
  121. Debord, 1983 # 31
  122. Debord, 1983 # 42
  123. Debord, 1983 # 69
  124. Debord, 1983 # 72; Plant, 1992
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125. Debord, 1983 # 141
  126. Debord, 1983 # 143/158
  127. Lukacs, 1983: 86
  128. Debord, 1983 # 75
  129. Debord, 1983 # 72
  130. Robertson, 1988: 43
  131. Debord, 1983: 22
  132. Debord, 1983 # 122
  133. Wollen, 1991: 27
  134. See René Vignet's Enrages and Situationists
  135. Debord, 1990: 3/7
  136. Debord, 1990: 12
  137. Debord, 1990: 13
  138. Debord, 1990: 16
  139. Debord, 1990: 13
  140. Debord, 1990: 59 - 60
  141. Bauman, 1992: 151 - 152
  142. Gane, 1993: 1
  143. Best and Kellner, 1991: 113
  144. Zurbrugg, 1994: 227; Kellner, 1994: 10
  145. Zurbrugg, 1994: 227
  146. Best and Kellner, 1991: 113
  147. Poster, 1988: 2
  148. Baudrillard in Poster, 1988: 22
  149. Poster, 1988: 2
  150. Baudrillard, 1988: 33
  151. Kellner, 1989: 16
  152. Baudrillard, 1988: 46
  153. Baudrillard, 1988: 50
  154. Kellner, 1989: 20
  155. Kellner, 1994: 3; Kellner, 1989: 21
  156. Poster, 1988: 4
  157. Baudrillard, 1988: 102
  158. Gane, 1993: 3
  159. Gane, 1993: 3
  160. Baudrillard, 1988: 115
  161. Baudrillard, 1988: 111
  162. Gane, 1993: 3
  163. Kellner, 1989: 46
  164. Poster, 1988: 5
  165. Poster, 1988: 5
  166. Baudrillard, 1988: 149
  167. Gane, 1993: 5
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168. Baudrillard, 1983: 12
  169. Baudrillard, 1983: 39
  170. Baudrillard, 1983: 55
  171. Best and Kellner, 1991: 119
  172. Kellner, 1989: 60
  173. Poster, 1988: 7
  174. Kellner, 1994: 15
  175. Poster, 1988: 7
  176. Kellner, 1989: 16
  177. Baudrillard, 1988: 205
  178. Baudrillard, 1988: 216
  179. Baudrillard, 1988: 217

## Chapter Two

1. Fiske, 1993: 58
  2. Fiske, 1993: 58
  3. Agger, 1990: 1
  4. Agger, 1990: 19
  5. Marcus, 1990: 99
  6. Plant, 1992: 10
  7. Debord, 1983 # 18
  8. Debord, 1983
  9. Debord, 1990: 7
  10. The documentary Debord made with Brigitte Cornand shortly before his death - "The life and Art of Guy Debord" - concentrates very heavily on media representation.
  11. Debord, 1990: 33
  12. Debord, 1990: 27
  13. Debord, 1990: 50. In the first volume of his memoirs, for example, Debord insists that all that remains of the great drink of Europe is the label - the rest has diminished with industrial production.
  14. Plant, 1992; Debord, 1990.
  15. Thompson, 1992: 226.
  16. Baudrillard, 1983: 38
  17. Baudrillard, 1983: 54
  18. Baudrillard, 1993: 170
  19. Best and Kellner, 1991: 120
  20. Bogard, 1994: 315
  21. Best and Kellner, 1991: 119
  22. Kellner, 1989: 60 - 3; Fiske, 1993: 51
  23. Kellner, 1989: 77
  24. Norris, 1992. Raboy and Dagenais (1992: 15) note the speed with which the Gulf War was commodified, with numerous books on the
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market hot on the heels of the Iraqi defeat: Baudrillard was one of the first here.

25. Norris, 1992
26. Baudrillard, 1995: 23-24. Baudrillard, in this first essay - "The Gulf War Will Not Take Place" -, argues that the inner logic of the passage from the virtual to the actual has been transformed into a hyperreal logic of the deterrence of the real by the virtual.
27. Baudrillard, 1993: 8
28. Baudrillard, 1993: 206. In Baudrillard's second essay - "The Gulf War: Is It Really Taking Place?" -, he asks, "Who, apart from the Arab masses [ ], is still capable of believing in it [the war] and becoming inflamed by it?" (Baudrillard, 1995: 32). Baudrillard (1995: 35) claims that the real event, having been played out so many times in the lead up to hostilities, has already been left behind: "Is there still a chance that something which has been meticulously programmed will occur?"

In the final essay in his book on the Gulf War - "The Gulf War Did Not Take Place" -, Baudrillard (1995: 62) claims that since the war was won in advance, "we will never know what it would have been like had it existed". For Baudrillard (1996: 82), the absence of the war is confirmed by the absence of victory and defeat (for example, Saddam Hussein is still in power.

29. Hebdige, 1991: 46
  30. Taylor, 1992: 13
  31. Taylor, 1992: 31
  32. Hebdige, 1991: 46
  33. Norris, 1992: 22
  34. Prince, 1993: 254
  35. Cumings, 1992: 118
  36. MCM - TV
  37. Hebdige, 1991: 46. It is interesting to note the effect that such simulation has. For instance, a story of Saddam Hussein's latest offer for peace may be run alongside visual images of a defiant Saddam Hussein in full polemical flight, conjuring an image of intransigence and irrationality. It is frequently the case that visual footage has no relation to the event it is used to illustrate. Thus we find 3 representations of the Iraqi dictator repeatedly used: 1/ Saddam Hussein with a frightened child - one of those detained in Iraq - which conjured up the spectre of European children being subjected to the menacing whims of an irrational Arab; 2/ A soldier falling to his knees and kissing the Iraqi dictator's hand as he visited his troops, thus evoking "Arab emotionalism"; 3/ Saddam Hussein in his bunker during the bombing, implying that the cowardly Arab was now hiding out (Hayward, 1994: 232).
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38. Der Derian, 1992: 187; MacArthur, 1992: 84
  39. Der Derian, 1992: 185
  40. Der Derian, 1994: 193
  41. Taylor, 1992: 238
  42. Lamborn Wilson, 1992:91
  43. Der Derian, 1992: 184
  44. Der Derian, 1992: 200. In this mock confrontation between Bush and Saddam Hussein, the simulation ended with the Iraqi leader threatening to hang U.S. hostages held in Iraq (Parasiliti, 1994: 253). Another interesting aspect of media simulation was the manner in which the various network anchors would deck themselves out in camouflage despite being nowhere near the fighting. Similarly, the images of reporters in gas masks linger despite the fact that gas was never used.
  45. Der Derian, 1992: 194
  46. Der Derian, 1992: 200
  47. Der Derian, 1994: 195
  48. Kellner, 1992
  49. Niva, 1991: 67
  50. Nimmo and Hovind, 1993: 95. Noh theatre is an extremely formal, meticulously rehearsed and finished theatre form dating from the 14th century (Columbia Encyclopaedia).
  51. Denton, 1993: 32
  52. Dobkin, 1992: 75
  53. Bogard, 1994: 321
  54. Prince, 1993: 254
  55. Der Derian, 1992: 193
  56. Kellner, 1992: 62
  57. Dobkin, 1993: 115
  58. Dobkin, 1993: 115
  59. Dobkin, 1993: 144; Kellner, 1992: 113. The structure of the war was also very close to that of a sporting event, especially American football, and football metaphors were continually used. For example, Schwarzkopf described the military strategy of the land war phase as the "Hail Mary move" and assistant to the president, Richard Haass, said that the Coalition stopped when they did as "we didn't want to be accused of piling on once the whistle has blown" (Mueller, 1994: 161). In fact, the war even coincided with the superbowl weekend Jan 25 - 26.
  60. Cumings, 1992: 118
  61. Kellner, 1992: 135
  62. McCarthy, 1991: 334; Drew, 1991: 182
  63. Rogin (1987: 3 - 5) is very interesting on this note. Reagan, of course, would quote directly from movies without acknowledging it, called his dog "Lassie" by mistake in front of reporters and urged American
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- athletes at the 1984 Olympics to "do it for the Gipper". Vice President under Bush, Dan Quayle, also distinguished himself in this manner, citing Tom Clancy's *Red Storm Rising* as evidence that the U.S. needed an anti satellite capability (Der Derian, 1992: 195) and criticising "Murphy Brown" - the fictional TV character - for "mocking the importance of fathers by bearing a child and calling it 'just another life style choice'". In response, an episode of Murphy Brown had the title character responding to Quayle's attack by tearing into his self righteousness. Interestingly, the confusion continued in the media with commentators on the controversy unable to decide which name to use: "Murphy Brown", "the fictional Ms Brown", "actress Candice Bergen" or "Ms Brown" (Rogin, 1987). It is known that Barbara Bush criticised *The Simpsons* and *The Simpsons'* producers repaid the favour by having the cartoon family burst into the White House bathroom while the first lady was in the bath.
67. Fiske, 1993: 51/59
  68. Holmes, 1991: 194
  69. Sadiq and McCain (1993: 1) who, as staff members of King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, are hardly disinterested observers.
  70. Fiske, 1993:58
  71. Holmes, 1991: 194. Fiske notes that the iconicity of TV increases its power in claiming to represent reality. Dobkin, as an example of the construction of images, takes those of the terrorist attacks at Rome and Vienna airports in 1985. The images, shown again and again, were constructed in such a manner as to convey the random and appallingly irrational character of terrorist violence, though the event in itself did not necessarily inherently bear this meaning (Dobkin, 1992: 63).
  72. Taylor, 1992: 46
  73. Taylor, 1992: 45. And whereas for Peter Jennings of ABC, US laser-guided bombs were "brilliant", scuds were a "horrifying killer" (Parasiliti, 1994: 255).
  74. Kellner, 1992: 33
  75. Taylor, 1992: 68
  76. Kellner, 1992: 158
  77. Kellner, 1992: 176
  78. Kellner, 1992: 179; Yant, 1991: 20
  79. MacArthur, 1992: 162
  80. Kellner, 1992: 179
  81. Cumings, 1992: 127
  82. Taylor, 1992: 29
  83. Fialka, 1992: 1
  84. Micheletti and Debay, 1991.
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85. Allen, Berry and Polmar (eds), 1991
  86. Bickerton and Pearson, 1991: 51
  87. Kahn, 1992: 44
  88. Cainkar, 1991: 340
  89. Taylor, 1992: 196. The especially harrowing pictures from Amiryra were not shown and BDA's president and graphics director of KCRA TV in Sacramento, Judi Decker, explains the logic behind the decision not to screen it: "with AIDs, for example, you don't want to show the victims, because they're very gaunt and horrible looking" - one must keep in mind "there are people at the table eating" (MacArthur, 1992: 81).
  90. Taylor, 1992: 113
  91. Taylor, 1992: 115
  92. Oliver, Mores and Cantor, 1993: 148
  93. Yant, 1991: 21
  94. For example, see the UN mission to Iraq in March or former US attorney General Ramsay Clarke's mission.
  95. Winkler, 1994: 146 - 147. Winkler reports that 4 of 7 water pumping systems were destroyed, the phone system was out, 139 bridges were damaged or destroyed, all irrigation systems were attacked, food warehouses were destroyed and grain silos hit, 100s of farms and farm buildings were attacked and so were 28 civilian hospitals, 52 community health centres, 676 schools and 56 mosques. A UN task force report suggests that the bulk of civilian infrastructural damage was not coincidental or accidental, but was a successful and intentional war campaign to destroy the urban and industrial base of the Iraqi war machine.
  96. Chomsky, 1992: 14
  97. Niva, 1991: 66
  98. Niva, 1991: 70. Conditions were described as "apocalyptic".
  99. Cainkar, 1991: 340. Food prices, in the immediate aftermath of the war, soared 1500 - 2000 % and real wages dropped to 7% of pre war levels. 46,897 children died between January and August 1991 and an international study team described Iraqi children as the "most traumatised children of war ever described" (Al-Khalil, 1993: 204).
  100. Chomsky, 1992: 16. Bush repeatedly urged the Iraqi people to rid themselves of their "evil dictator" in order to stop Coalition destruction of Iraq, but when Kurds and Shiites revolted, Bush and Major did nothing. Major argued "I do not recall asking the Kurds to mount this particular insurrection" and Bush, on holiday at the time, said "I'd rather not discuss it right now" (Gittings, 1991: 124; Heikal, 1993: 407).
  101. Weinberg, 1992: 48. Schwarzkopf himself estimated that the Coalition had killed 100,000 Iraqi soldiers (Greer, 1991: 3). In the Middle East as a whole the UN has estimated that, as a result of the Gulf Crisis, 5
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- million children risk spending their formative years in deprived circumstances (Al-Khalil, 1993: 204).
102. MacArthur, 1992: 105
  103. Edelman, 1988: 75
  104. Rogin, 1994: 237
  105. Auster and Quart, 1988: 99
  106. Rogin, 1994: 237
  107. Al-Khalil, 1993: 35
  108. Taylor, 1992: 249 - 262; Kellner, 1992: 410. To prevent the "nightmare scenario" whereby Iraq's armed forces would be left largely in tact, during the massacres of fleeing Iraqi troops, planes were frantically loaded with anything and were rushed back and forth in a killing frenzy.
  109. Klare, 1991; Cumings, 1992: 125. Levis Strauss (1992) also points to the devastating weapons such as napalm, "the beehive", and "Adam" that were used in the Gulf War and notes that a high percentage of those killed in Iraq were burnt to death.
  110. Heikal, 1993: 405
  111. Brittain, 1991: ix; Symposium, 1993: 242
  112. Parenti, 1993: 163. As Habermas (1994: 6) says, to this day the victims remain shadowy figures.
  113. Morrison, 1992: 82.
  114. Kellner, 1992: 33
  115. Kellner, 1992: 97
  116. Marck and Rubin, 1991: 317
  117. Bennet, 1991: 359
  118. Chomsky, 1991: 307
  119. Heikal, 1993: 317. A transcript of the Wilson - Hussein meeting shows that the Iraqi dictator was not aggressive and intransigent (Kellner, 1992: 24). Also Iraq had submitted its nuclear facilities to inspection by the international Atomic Energy commission and Hussein had said he believed chemical weapons should be brought under UN scrutiny and control. Iraq had offered in April 1990 to destroy their chemical and other non-conventional weapons if Israel did the same (Ridgeway, 1991: 16/104).
  120. Kellner, 1992: 36
  121. Chomsky, 1991: 84
  122. Mueller, 1994: 20; Kellner, 1992: 91
  123. Heikal, 1993: 365
  124. Niva, 1991: 56
  125. Heikal, 1993: 16
  126. Ridgeway, 1991: 62
  127. Yant, 1991: 118
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128. Weinberg, 1992: 51; Cockburn and Cohen, 1991: 21; Kellner, 1992: 31. According to Weinberg, the US cancelled Egypt's \$7b debt to US banks and lending agencies and then pressed the World Bank and IMF to forgive Egypt's \$50b debts to them and urged them to agree to new loans for Egypt.
  129. Kellner, 1992: 102
  130. Ridgeway, 1991: 137
  131. Niva, 1991: 64; Bennis, 1991: 120. Baker offered Moscow economic aid and apparently this entailed a guarantee that the US would not protest Moscow's handling of break away republics; and so it was that the US did not protest Soviet troop's crushing of pro-independence demonstrations in Lithuania. Also, the Bush administration promised to encourage Saudi Arabia to give \$1b in aid (Weinberg, 1992: 49)
  132. Heikal, 1993: 105
  133. Heikal, 1993
  134. Heikal, 1993: 339
  135. Kellner, 1992: 318
  136. Drew, 1991: 188
  137. Heikal, 1993: 337
  138. Heikal, 1993: 337. Bush and Major's pronunciation of "Saddam" also evoked "Satan", "Sodom" and "Sadism" (Kellner, 1992: 66).
  139. Yant, 1991: 53
  140. Kellner, 1992: 103
  141. Mueller, 1994
  142. Heikal, 1993: 340; Owen, 1991: 160
  143. Ridgeway, 1991: 15. On December 5, 1990, Webster told Congress that more than 90% of imports and 97% of exports had been shut off and Iraq would have depleted its foreign exchange revenues by the next spring.
  144. Thakur, 1990: 5
  145. Atrocity stories, of course, have a long history in the mobilisation of populations for war. Recently, Alexander Haig made up a story about the murder of 10,000 Miskito Indians by the Sandinista government, using red cross photos from a 1972 earthquake to illustrate the lie (Symposium, 1993: 90).
  146. Cockburn, 1991: 83
  147. Ridgeway, 1991: 134
  148. Kellner, 1992: 189
  149. Taylor, 1992: 5
  150. Waas, 1991: 95
  151. Wayne, 1993: 41
  152. Mueller, 1994: 20
  153. MacArthur, 1992; 64
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154. MacArthur, 1992: 65 - 67
  155. MacArthur, 1992: 58
  156. Aruri, 1991: 311
  157. Kellner, 1992: 399
  158. Scarry, 1993: 68
  159. Kellner, 1992
  160. Kellner, 1992: 26
  161. Heikal, 1993: 273
  162. Ridgeway, 1991: 135
  163. Heikal, 1993. In Saddam Hussein's meeting with Joseph C. Wilson he emphasised this point again and again.
  164. Cockburn, 1991: 73
  165. Kellner, 1992: 28
  166. Edelman, 1988: 81
  167. Heikal, 1993: 344. The notion that the Iraqi army was the fourth largest power in the world was sheer invention. As Susan Sachs (in Weinberg, 1992: 59) noted, in the military assault on Kuwait the Coalition faced a "phantom enemy".
  168. Kellner, 1992: 17
  169. MacArthur, 1992: 175; Kellner, 1992: 27
  170. Kellner, 1992
  171. Bloom et al, 1994
  172. Heikal, 1993: 22/386
  173. Robicheau, 1994: 344
  174. Ridgeway, 1991: 136
  175. MCM TV/Mulhollin, 1991: 24
  176. Prince, 1993: 244
  177. Bickerton and Pearson, 1991: 168. The examples go on. Schlesinger (1991: 265) muses that US soldiers were being used as "White slaves" in defending the Arabs - ie. appealing to the representation of Arabs as slave traders. At times the war was like a bad Western. A marine corps general announced that the fighter crew that crashed behind Iraqi lines were saved by a rescue helicopter that flew "deep into Indian country" (Obenzinger, 1992: 2).
  178. Raboy and Dagenais, 1992: 15
  179. Cumings, 1992: 106
  180. Mokhiber, 1992: 63; Parenti, 1993: 76. Congressman Mack thought it a "joke" when he said that the difference between an Iraqi woman and a catfish was that one had whiskers and stunk, while the other was a fish. Pan Am banned Arab nationals from flying with them (Mokhiber, 1992: 63) and Dan Rather asked an FBI chief in a live interview "what should our attitude toward Americans of Arab descent be?" (Parasiliti, 1994: 255). The nuclear industry put out a commercial at this time along
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similar lines: "we rely on over 40% of our oil from overseas sources [shots of Khomeini, Qaddafi, Middle East crowds in an angry demonstration, a raised arm waving an AK47] which do you prefer? Nuclear energy or relying on unstable sources? [close up on Saddam Hussein] Nuclear energy. You can count on it" (Parenti, 1993: 76). David Pryce-Jones argued in the Wall Street Journal (August 19, 1991) that although Saddam Hussein's actions seemed a little mad and irrational, we must remember they are Arabs; after all, "Arabs do things differently from us, and always have" (Hayward, 1994: 227).

181. Kellner, 1992: 73
  182. Kellner, 1992: 65
  183. Said, 1978: 1
  184. Said, 1978: 4
  185. Said, 1978: 7/40
  186. Said, 1978: 74
  187. Said, Lectures.
  188. Said, 1981: 4
  189. Said, 1981
  190. Said, 1978: 26; Ahmed, 1992: 11
  191. Ahmed, 1992: 37. For instance, the Secretary-General of Nato, Mr Willy Claes, has argued that Islamic fundamentalism poses just as much of a threat to the West as communism did and that it is hard to see democracy being reconciled with fundamentalism (Herald, 4/5/95).
  192. Taylor, 1992: 82
  193. Ahmed, 1992: 42
  194. Laffin, 1988: 72
  195. Prince, 1993: 239 - 242
  196. Taheri, 1987: 4; Schmid and Jongman, 1988: XII
  197. Taheri, 1987: 32/220
  198. Parenti, 1993: 189. The ignorance of reporting was quite appalling. New York Times correspondent and Israel supporter A M Rosenthal thought Iranians were Arabs. Fouad Ajami described Iraq as a "brittle land ..... with little claim to culture and books and grand ideas" (Parenti, 1993: 189).
  199. Colonel Richard Norton an "expert" in the appalling documentary Sword of Islam which seems created only to arouse fear and ignorance. The documentary opens with the graphics of a large scimitar smashing a revolving world into fragments.
  200. This Steven Emerson has a history of poor judgement, having already got it wrong over the World Trade Centre bombing. With the Oklahoma bombing, a series of "experts" instantly blamed Arabs/Islamic groups and in the aftermath of the bombing 227 hate crimes directed at Arabs or Muslims were reported (Allen, 1995: 20 - 21).
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201. Said, 1981: 8
  202. An example of Bush's own ideas on jihad were demonstrated at the National Religious Broadcasting convention in 1991 when he claimed that the Gulf War had "Everything to do with what religion embodies - the use of force is moral" (in Boal, 1992: 18).
  203. Bogard, 1994: 325
  204. Hebdige, 1991: 46
  205. Holmes, 1991: 194
  206. Best, 1994: 56
  207. Kellner, 1989: 59
  208. Kellner, 1989: 68
  209. Norris, 1992: 122. Baudrillard (1995: 47) believes that only the cynics like Saddam Hussein are correct in their orientation to information, the media, etc. We concern ourselves with the immoral perversion of images, we still believe in the fiction of information and of a right to information; the cynics are not so naive. Baudrillard rejects the analysis of information and the media in terms of good and truthful use of images and signs (Patton, 1995: 12).

Paul Patton, in his introduction to *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place*, defends Baudrillard's analysis of the Gulf War. Patton (1995: 14) agrees with Baudrillard that the endless proliferation of information - for example, speculation on whether the Gulf War resulted because of a trap set for Iraq by the Bush administration - sets limits on the sort of critical analysis attempted by Kellner, ie. an investigation which seeks the truth of such events. On this matter Baudrillard (1995: 66) says: "Resist the probability of any image or information whatever. Be more virtual than events themselves, do not seek to re-establish the truth, we do not have the means, but do not be duped, and to that end re-immers the war and all information in the virtually from whence they came. Turn deterrence back against itself". Finally, Patton (1995: 15) asserts that "even if we did possess the means to establish the truth, what difference would this make? For every book exposing the lies and inhumanity of U.S. policy in the Gulf there are two more which champion it as the defence of democracy and the New World Order."

210. Plant, 1992: 164
  211. Soja, 1993: 119
  212. Soja, 1993: 119
  213. Plant, 1992: 154
  214. Fiske, 1993: 59; Der Derian, 1994: 203
  215. Merrin, 1994: 441
  216. Merrin, 1994: 434
  217. Merrin, 1994: 448
  218. Merrin, 1994: 448
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219. Merrin, 1994: 450
  220. Bennis, 1995: 28
  221. US corporations won over 70% of the initial contracts to rebuild Kuwait (Kellner, 1992: 409).
  222. Der Derian, 1994: 203
  223. Bogard, 1994: 322. This would have to be applied to Edward Said who understands only too well the *reality* of American manoeuvres in the Middle East and who was not amused by Baudrillard's comments on the war: "Good old Baudrillard! For that I think he should be sent there, with a toothbrush and a can of Evian, or whatever it is he drinks" (in Der Derian, 1994: 203).
  224. Fiske, 1993: 59
  225. Hutcheon, 1989: 33
  226. Bogard, 1994: 322
  227. Best, 1994: 56
  228. Best, 1994: 58
  229. Ridgeway, 1991: 161
  230. Kellner, 1992; Cumings, 1992
  231. Best, 1994: 58
  232. Best, 1994: 54
  233. Best and Kellner, 1991: 119
  234. Best and Kellner, 1991; Schoonmaker, 1994: 172. Schoonmaker, in looking at how transborder data flows are used, makes it clear that this form of the code is integrally linked to production and exchange in advanced capitalism. The digital code and other information technologies do not by themselves constitute the basis for a new social order and Schoonmaker (1994: 186/172) opposes Baudrillard's "semiological determinism".
  235. *In Girum Imus Nocte Et Consumimur IGNI*, Debord's last film
  236. Debord, 1983 # 24
  237. Clutterbuck, 1977: 106
  238. Herman and Chomsky (1988). Many writers have criticised this model as too simple and deterministic. For example; Sarlin (1994) calls the book a "lampoon" based on "little factual evidence", which seems an odd thing for such a champion of deconstruction and textuality to say. However, Chomsky's model provides an excellent guide for analysis of the media in the case of the Gulf War where each "filter" could be seen operating very clearly. For example, in the NBC-General Electric link or in the "flak" from the administration over Arnett's mild reports from Baghdad.
  239. Dobkin, 1992: 84
  240. MacCannell and MacCannell, 1993: 130
  241. Kellner, 1989: 203
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**Chapter Three**

1. Debord, 1990: 15
  2. Kaye, 1991: 159
  3. Giroux, 1981: 3
  4. Novick, 1988: 1
  5. Lloyd, 1993: 3
  6. Lloyd, 1993: 14
  7. Novick, 1988: 1
  8. Readings, 1991: 60 - 65
  9. All above in Readings, 1991: 60 - 65. Connor (1989: 30) finds Lyotard very vague about the cause of the decline of the metanarratives and claims his inferred explanations (renewal of the spirit of capitalist free enterprise, a discrediting of the communist alternative and the growth of technologies in science) are unsubstantiated.
  10. Docherty, 1993: 11. Connor (1989: 36), like numerous other theorists, points out that Lyotard himself produces a totalisation - in this case, a vision of the total collapse of the metanarratives.
  11. Novick, 1988: 469
  12. Novick, 1988: 491
  13. Novick, 1988: 491
  14. Thomas, 1991: 189
  15. Jordan and Weedon, 1995: 553
  16. Foucault, 1984: 76
  17. Lloyd, 1993: 33). Foucault wants to rid us of the philosophy of history's transcendental and synthetic ambitions (Dean, 1994: 4). Instead of slotting events into grand systems of explanations, describing linear processes, celebrating great moments and individuals and trying to pinpoint origins, genealogical analysis attempts to preserve the singularity of events, turns away from the spectacular in favour of the discredited and tries to bring in a whole range of phenomena denied history (Smart, 1983: 75). Foucault identifies 2 connected facets of genealogy: descent, which produces a consciousness of complexity, contingency and fragility, where nothing is stable (no constraints, essences or immobile forms); and emergence, whose focus is relations of domination (Smart, 1983: 76).
  18. Barrett, 1991: 132
  19. Foucault, 1980: 117. "One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, that's to say, to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework. And this is what I would call genealogy, that is, a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects, etc., without having to make reference
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- to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history."
20. In Novick, 1988: 355. Foucault thus reveals the "historicity of truth" (Dean, 1994: 34). The object of analysis is not some unvarying "reason" and we move from rationality to rationalities (Dean, 1994: 58). Dean (1994: 117 - 121) argues that we must refuse the "blackmail of the Enlightenment", that is, the notion that if we do not proceed by way of the triad "critique - truth - emancipation" we will fall into irrationality, nihilism, etc.
  21. Jordan and Weedon, 1995: 547
  22. White, 1986: 485
  23. Lloyd, 1993: 24
  24. Lloyd, 1993: 31
  25. Barrett, 1991: 132
  26. Thomas, 1989: 184
  27. Thomas, 1989: 184
  28. Jordan and Weedon, 1995: 364
  29. Said, 1981: 41
  30. In Novick, 1988: 545
  31. O'Hanlon and Washbrook, 1992: 142-8
  32. Novick, 1988: 54
  33. Fish, 1989: 306
  34. White, 1986: 485
  35. Jenkins, 1991: 5
  36. Jenkins, 1991: 7; Stanford, 1994: 3
  37. White, 1989: 217
  38. Jenkins, 1991: 9
  39. Veaser, 1989: IX
  40. Novick, 1988: 599
  41. Novick, 1988: 599
  42. White, 1978: 98
  43. White, 1978: 5
  44. Novick, 1988: 599
  45. White, 1978: 70
  46. Novick, 1988: 600
  47. Novick, 1988: 600
  48. Weinstein, 1990: 17
  49. White, 1978: 123
  50. Novick, 1988: 600
  51. White, 1978: 121
  52. in Weinstein, 1990: 12
  53. White, 1978: 56
  54. Novick, 1988: 601-3
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55. White, 1978: 58
  56. White, 1978: 83
  57. White, 1978: 126
  58. McLennan, 1981: 83
  59. White in Weinstein, 1990: 1
  60. Jenkins, 1991: 56
  61. White, 1978: 50
  62. Kaye, 1991: 4
  63. Giroux, 1981: 37
  64. Novick, 1988: 573
  65. Kaye, 1991: 33/13. With respect to the degree to which the public are poorly informed about history, Parenti (1992: 57) claims Americans are especially ignorant. Opinion surveys indicate large percentages of people do not know the difference between World War I and II and many think that during World War II Germany and Russia were allies. Many had never heard of Hiroshima and few could say anything about the history of aggression against Native Americans and the slavery of Africans.
  66. Kaye, 1991: 19 - 29
  67. Perhaps, though, Jacoby (1987) is correct on this sort of circumstance. Jacoby argues that the left's confinement to university departments and the resulting specialisation has meant that discourse becomes esoteric and any link between intellectuals and a broader public is broken/never established and intellectuals are reduced to talking only to each other via conferences and specialised journals.
  68. Giroux, 1981: 38
  69. Giroux, 1981: 39
  70. Giroux, 1981: 40
  71. Giroux, 1981: 45
  72. Bhaskar, 1989: 10
  73. Giroux, 1981: 51
  74. Kaye, 1991: 60/43
  75. Jameson, 1991: 221
  76. Jameson, 1991: 284
  77. White, 1978: 42
  78. Jameson, 1991: 21
  79. Jameson, 1991: 22
  80. Jameson, 1991: 18
  81. Jameson, 1991: 25
  82. Rogin, 1993: 3
  83. Rojeck, 1993: 116. In such representations reality is turned upside down and American Indians and Vietnamese become the aggressors.
  84. Breitbart, 1986
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85. For example, the O.J. Simpson docudrama was out months before the end of his trial.
  86. Bogard, 1994: 315
  87. Jameson, 1991: 227. For Jameson (1985: 125) our entire contemporary social system has slowly begun to lose its capacity to retain its own past and we have begun to live in a perpetual present without depth, definition or secure identity (Connor, 1989: 44). The present rises before us in an ultra vivid mode of fascination (Foster, 1985:90)
  88. Debord, 1990: 13. Bruno (1993: 244) also points to this in analysing post modern film where he argues the experience of the present becomes powerfully overwhelmingly vivid and material while even quite recent events and figures seem parts of ancient history.
  89. Bruno, 1993: 245
  90. Jameson, 1991: 89. With the eclectic borrowing of styles of postmodernism some see a "return to history", but Foster (1985;16) disputes this, arguing that postmodernism is deeply a historical and that history becomes narcissism.
  91. Hewison, 1987: 138
  92. Kaye, 1991: 62/19
  93. Kaye, 1991: 62
  94. Hewison, 1987: 137
  95. Hewison, 1987: 137
  96. in Kaye, 1991: 71
  97. Callinicos, 1995: 11
  98. Hewison, 1987: 135
  99. Cumings, 1992: 29
  100. Hewison, 1987: 139
  101. Kaye, 1991: 69
  102. Kaye, 1991: 69
  103. Kaye, 1991: 69
  104. Kaye, 1991: 69
  105. Tosh, 1991: 6
  106. Tosh, 1991: 7 - 8
  107. Debord, 1990: 10
  108. Debord, 1990: 16
  109. Kaye, 1991: 101
  110. For instance, the battles over art and censorship in the Reagan and Bush years.
  111. Kaye, 1991: 102
  112. Kaye, 1991: 154
  113. Huyssen, 1993: 229
  114. Kaye, 1991: 70
  115. Kaye, 1991: 70
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116. Fish, 1989: 303
  117. Fox-Genovese, 1989: 216. Sources are, of course, found as well as interpreted (McLennan, 1984: 153).
  118. Fox-Genovese, 1989: 221
  119. Callinicos, 1995: 55
  120. Zagorin, 1990: 271
  121. Bennett, 1987: 66
  122. Novick, 1988: 1
  123. Anderson, 1983: 48
  124. Harland, 1987: 103
  125. Barrett, 1991: 164; Merquior, 1986: 196; Anderson, 1983: 48
  126. Anderson, 1983: 48
  127. Callinicos, 1995: 66
  128. Tosh, 1991: 132
  129. Jordan and Weedon, 1995: 116
  130. Stanford, 1994: 121
  131. Stanford, 1994: 89
  132. in McGowan, 1991: 187
  133. Eagleton, 1991: 204
  134. Zagorin, 1990: 263
  135. Jenkins, 1991: 19
  136. Callinicos, 1995: 66
  137. Callinicos, 1995: 75
  138. Jenkins, 1991: 33/32/19
  139. Bradley in Callinicos, 1995: 95
  140. Bhaskar, 1989: 136
  141. McLennan, 1982: 135
  142. Jacoby, 1981: 21
  143. Lukacs, 1968: 3
  144. Debord, 1983 # 81. Debord sees Marx's work as linked to scientific thought, but beyond science in its understanding of struggle rather than law.
  145. Craib, 1984: 173
  146. Lukacs, 1968: 9/12
  147. McLennan, 1982: 139 - 43
  148. Bhaskar, 1989
  149. Callinicos, 1995; 1982; 1983
  150. Bhaskar, 1989
  151. Bhaskar, 1989: 23
  152. Bhaskar, 1989: 188
  153. Bhaskar, 1989: 188
  154. Bhaskar, 1989: 82
  155. Bhaskar, 1989: 19
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156. Callinicos, 1983: 125
  157. Chalmers, 1978: 79
  158. Some, like Krige (1980: 88/71/79), see Lakatos' theory as making it difficult to rationally eliminate or supersede one system of thought by another. Callinicos' (1982: 207) own example of a progressive problem shift - Tony Cliff's theory of state capitalism - appears more likely to confirm Lakatos' own view that Marxism has never predicted a stunning fact and all its explanations were cooked up after the events to save Marxism from the facts.
  159. Callinicos, 1995: 98
  160. Bhaskar (1989: 112) says that depth investigation is a transcendental condition for any human science and any science at all and that to inquire into the nature of the real grounds for beliefs is the same thing as to inquire into the possibility of rationalisation, self deception, deception of others, counter finality and systemic mystification.
  161. Kaye, 1991: 156
  162. Kaye, 1991: 156
  163. Fox Genovese, 1989: 216; Bhaskar, 1989: 2; McLennan, 1981: 31. If, says Eagleton (1991: 204), there are no causal hierarchies in reality, it is quite possible that the Bolshevik revolution was triggered by Radek's penchant for pork pies. The eclecticism offered by post structuralists does, as McLennan (1984: 148) notes, reek of faint heartedness and abandons the attempt to seek "convergence" in the rational comprehension of the socio historical world.
  164. Eagleton, 1991
  165. Zagorin, 1990: 273
  166. Grumley, 1989: 188
  167. Callinicos, 1995: 209
  168. Callinicos, 1995: 209
  169. Agger, 1990: 215
  170. Bassett, 1991: 8. Jennings, as he strolled over the ABC map of the Middle East, kept saying : "geography is important", but he never talked of the importance of history (Kellner, 1992: 57).
  171. Yant, 1991: 210; Parenti, 1993; 23
  172. Boal, 1992: 18. The shallowness of understanding was not aided by questions such as the following by a CBS anchor to an in-studio "expert" - "in 10 seconds what is an Arab" (Raboy and Dagenais, 1992: 15).
  173. MacArthur, 1992: 57
  174. Morrison, 1992: 68
  175. Prince, 1993: 244
  176. Edelman, 1988: 60
  177. Morrison, 1992: 80
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178. in Krien, 1991: 108
  179. MacArthur, 1992: 64
  180. Rosenthal, 1991: 202
  181. Wayne, 1993: 29
  182. Renshon, 1993: 343
  183. Post, 1993: 53
  184. Wayne, 1993: 31 - 36. Wayne gives as an example of one of these "personal challenges" Bush's diplomatic assignment in China. This ignores how strategic this move was for Bush at the time in making himself useful to the power elite (Weinberg, 1992: 8).
  185. Levis Strauss, 1992: 38
  186. Bickerton and Pearson, 1991: 90
  187. Mueller, 1994: 143. One can only feel a very bitter irony at these last 2 self descriptions by a man who helped direct a vicious and reckless attack on civilians and the environment.
  188. Prince, 1993: 244
  189. Morrison, 1992: 83
  190. Al-Khalil, 1989
  191. Moushabeck, 1991: 26. Although, Baghdad was captured in 1623 by the Safavids, to be regained by the Ottomans in 1639 (Sluglett and Sluglett, 1990: 1). Through this time the social formations of the region were primarily based on trading and the wealth of the civilisation derived from this rather than from the exploitation of the peasantry (Amin, 1978: 21).
  192. Moushabeck, 1991: 27
  193. Sluglett and Sluglett, 1990: 7
  194. Cleveland, 1994. In 1920, Churchill argued that Mesopotamia "could be cheaply policed by aircraft armed with gas bombs, supported by as few as 4,000 British and 10,000 Indian troops" to deal with "Uncivilised tribes" (Greer, 1991: 14).
  195. Booker, 1991: 8
  196. Sluglett and Sluglett, 1990: 11
  197. Knightley, 1991: 13. Thus a landed aristocracy was directly established by imperialism in Iraq and Trans Jordan, thereby buying off the nationalist movement's weakest link (Amin, 1978: 21).
  198. Cleveland, 1994; Sluglett and Sluglett, 1990: 43
  199. Sluglett and Sluglett, 1990: 109
  200. Cleveland, 1994
  201. Hourani, 1991
  202. Harik, 1990. For example, the founders of the Baath party Michel Aflaq, a Greek orthodox Christian from Damascus, and Saladin al Bitar, a Sunni from Damascus, were both educated in France.
  203. Picard, 1990
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204. Al-Khalil, 1989. As Amin (1978; 26) says, the state filled the vacuum left by the inadequacies of class. State capitalism in the region emerged with three sets of measures: 1/ agrarian reform, which replaced the old aristocracy with a class of "kulaks"; 2/ a program of public nationalisation expropriating dominant foreign capital and the associated big local bourgeoisie; 3/ a program of public industrialisation with benefits to the class of "Kulaks" and bureaucracy which is now a state bourgeoisie (Amin, 1978: 83).
  205. Bickerton and Pearson, 1991: 31
  206. Cleveland, 1994. The nationalisation of the IPC in 1972 is seen by Sluglett and Sluglett (1991: 62) as the Baath party's "crowning achievement".
  207. Bahbah, 1991: 50
  208. Heikal, 1993: 30. One prominent Kuwaiti minister described Iraq as a "large garage with a very small door" (Schofield, 1994: 125).
  209. Schofield, 1994: 66
  210. Schofield, 1994: 125
  211. Schofield, 1994. For example, Kuwait built a bridge from the mainland to one of the islands. This was largely symbolic and had no real practical value.
  212. Bahbah, 1991: 52. This war devastated Iraq and Iran economically and 10s of 1000s of lives were lost for no apparent reason. With the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein offered Iran a settlement based on full implementation of resolution 598 (to Iraq's disadvantage) and a restoration of the Algiers Agreement of 1975. This was, as Sluglett and Sluglett (1990: 273) note, an admission that the whole war was utterly meaningless.
  213. Heikal, 1993: 173
  214. Bickerton and Pearson, 1991: 50
  215. Heikal, 1993: 175
  216. Heikal, 1993: 223. In Saddam Hussein's speeches prior to the invasion of Kuwait, he claimed that other Arab states were morally and materially in debt to Iraq for blocking the Eastern gateway to the Arab world from "Khomeini's hordes" (Khalidi, 1991: 60).
  217. Cockburn, 1991: 69
  218. Heikal, 1993: 86
  219. in Hitchens, 1991: 112
  220. Weinberg, 1992: 64
  221. Ridgeway, 1991: 13; MacArthur, 1992: 47. The day before the invasion, the Bush administration approved the sale of US\$6.95m of advanced data transmission devices to Iraq (Yousif, 1991: 64). The British and the U.S. had turned the other way after the gassing of Kurds and Iranians (Afshar, 1991: 48).
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222. The Economist, 1991: 103
223. Hitchens, 1991: 115. Glaspie went for a "vacation" immediately after her talks with Saddam Hussein and two days before the invasion. She was subsequently confined to a desk job at the State Department headquarters and kept away from the press (Weinberg, 1992: 56). When she did testify - denying the accuracy of the Iraqi transcripts of her meeting with the Iraqi leader - conservative William Safire called it "the most embarrassing session that declining body [the Senate Foreign Relations Committee] has had in years" (Greer, 1991: 11).
224. Cainkar, 1991: 354. The extent to which Baghdad had felt it would be allowed to take Kuwait is shown by a message sent to Kuwait through an envoy days before the invasion, where it was declared with "total confidence" that "the U.S. will not do anything" if Iraq invaded (Weinstein, 1992: 63). John L. Kelly, on the day 100,000 Iraqi troops were massed on the Kuwaiti border, stated that economic sanctions against Iraq were unwise and would be "costly to American farmers and businessmen" (Gittings, 1991: 8).
225. Weinberg, 1992: 55
226. Weinberg, 1992: 55
227. Kellner, 1992: 13. There are a number of other factors to consider. Glaspie told the New York Times "we never expected they would take all of Kuwait" (Hitchens, 1991: 116). Schwartzkopf had for months before the invasion been war gaming for possible conflicts with Iraq in the event of an invasion (Yousif, 1991: 52). The coming invasion was no secret to U.S. intelligence or to Arab governments. In an interview, King Hussein lends more weight to the "entrapment" argument, asserting that a few days before the invasion Kuwait reneged on a proposal to pay Iraq \$10b in a fashion designed to humiliate Baghdad. They did so, moreover, says King Hussein, based on a secret U.S. promise to intervene in the event of Iraqi aggression. King Hussein concludes that Saddam Hussein took the bait "thereby stepping into a noose the Allies had prepared for him" (Greer, 1991: 13)
228. Callinicos, 1987
229. Taylor, 1992: 5
230. Kellner, 1992; 63. In a *Der Spiegel* article, Hans-Magnus Enzenburger argued that Saddam Hussein, like Hitler, was a "foe of humanity" whose objective was the extinction of the human race. On a *New Republic* cover photo, Saddam Hussein's moustache was shortened to resemble Hitler's as a "joke", though with no acknowledgment that such a doctoring had been made.
231. Miller and Mylrose, 1991: 95. When deploying U.S. forces in August, Bush likened the Gulf Crisis to "the struggle for freedom in Europe" as there was again "an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbours"
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- (Hill, 1994: 188). On the 30th October, Bush announced that "there is a direct parallel between when Hitler invaded Poland and what has happened in Kuwait" (Bresheeth and Yuval-Davis, 1991).
232. These war crimes trials were organised by former U.S. Attorney General Ramsay Clark. In these trials, Bush and others were found guilty of "crimes against the peace" and "crimes against humanity". However, these tribunals were completely ignored by the mainstream media.
233. Krauthammer, 1991. In an article called "Nightmare from the 30's"
234. Heikal, 1993: 220
235. MacArthur, 1992; 20
236. Scheer, 1991: 492
237. Gordon, 1993: 136
238. Western leaders and the media looked favourably on Hitler and Mussolini as bulwarks against communism. Roosevelt praised the "admirable Italian gentleman" who had destroyed the parliamentary system and attacked the labour movement, and the West hoped Hitler would do to Russia what the Nazis had done to the left in Germany (Chamsky, 1994: 41; Parenti, 1992: 62). Similarly, directly after the war in Europe, the U.S. collaborated with Nazis and fascists in a number of countries for intelligence and strategic purposes.
239. Cumings, 1992: 103. In major news and other media outlets between August 1, 1990 and February 28, 1991 the word "Vietnam" appeared 7,299 times, 3 times more than the second most used term "human shields" (Ottosen, 1992:77).
240. Haring, 1991: 17
241. The "real" Rambo, "Bo" Gritz, is interestingly enough a chubby Christian survivalist and a friend of Neo-Nazi David Duke (Weinberg, 1992: 28). Reagan also liked Rambo movies and, after a hijacking involving the Middle East, said "After seeing Rambo last night, I know what to do next time this happens" (In Parenti, 1992: 178).
242. Taylor, 1991: 1
243. Seager (1991: 227) does though make the point that a useful parallel with Vietnam is the reckless U.S. environmental terrorism engaged in in both wars.
244. Kinsley, 1991: 222
245. Krien, 1991; 237. The Gulf War was itself technically in violation of the U.N. Charter which holds that permanent security council members must all vote for a resolution to be approved (Weinberg, 1992: 50). Resort to force in Foreign policy is prohibited in international law except for in situations of self defence (Falk, 1994: 25). The U.S. tried to justify resolution 678 by reference to article 51 of the Charter allowing for individual or collective self defence, but this only applies "until the security council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
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peace and security" and the security council had done this in implementing sanctions (Springborg, 1991: 46). By allowing the Americans to do what they wanted resolution 678 was also in violation of the purpose of the U.N. Charter (Springborg, 1991: 46-7).

The U.S. ensured U.N. consideration of the crisis was limited to the Security Council and the security council was prevented from meeting by the U.S. during the most intensive period of military action (Ismael and Ismael, 1994: 2). For instance, when third world members of the Security Council sought to convene a meeting after several days of bombing, the U.S. blocked the move for three weeks (Springborg, 1991: 48).

Chapter 8 of the U.N. Charter provides that disputes should be settled by regional arrangements, in this case the Arab League was the appropriate body (Springborg, 1991: 47). The U.S. also violated international law in their undignified exposure of captured troops and in the "clean ups" in which Iraqi corpses were piled unidentified into mass graves (Taylor, 1992: 106).

246. Bennis, 1991: 115. Finkelstein (1991) provides an excellent response to the *New York Times*' August 25, 1990 statement that Saddam Hussein was becoming a war criminal in the "classic Nuremburg sense" having violated "most of the Nuremburg principles" with his "crimes against peace", "war crimes" and "crimes against humanity". Finkelstein's response is: how about doing the unthinkable and applying such criteria to Israel!

- (1) "Crimes against peace" - for example, Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 (an invasion undertaken to destroy the threat of peace).
- (2) "War crimes" - Israel has incessantly taken hostages, killed children and used torture.
- (3) "Crimes against humanity" - murder, deportation, inhuman acts or persecutions, forced confessions, detention without charge and the destruction of property are taken for granted aspects of Israeli behaviour towards Palestinians.

During 15 years prior to the Gulf War, the Security Council has adopted 11 resolutions condemning Israeli aggression (4 more were vetoed by a single U.S. vote). 143 countries supported a December 1982 resolution deploring Israel's invasion of Lebanon (only the U.S. and Israel voting no.) And this is essentially the pattern with U.N. condemnations of Israeli annexations and occupations and human rights abuses as well as proposed embargoes. (Finkelstein, 1991: 25-42). The same is the case since the Gulf War.

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247. Clark, 1993: 72)
  248. Ridgeway, 1991; 131
  249. Chomsky, 1991: 309
  250. Booker, 1991; 25
  251. Yant, 1991: 113
  252. Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke pleaded that we should not shut our eyes "to the rape, murder, summary execution, pillaging and destruction and obliteration of another country by Iraq" (Bickerton and Pearson, 1991: 129). But Hawke, his cabinet and previous Australian governments have aided and appeased the aggression of Indonesia, for one. The U.S. blocked U.N. resolutions condemning the invasion of East Timor and continue to supply arms to Indonesia (Weinstein, 1992: 45). In Morocco 100s of government opponents are tortured or "disappear" every year (Yant, 1991: 101), while Turkey continues to be a terrible violator of U.N. provisions and human rights declarations while continuing to receive U.S. aid. And the U.S. has a long history of creating and supporting a range of barbaric regimes around the world, Haiti being a topical example in this regard.
  253. In this film, the heroes try to prevent Iraq using biological and chemical weapons and we are even treated to real shots of dead Kurds to emphasise the point. Here the Iraqis are a cruel and sadistic people and their casualties are by the way, whereas we are encouraged to feel grief along with the main character over American casualties. More interesting still, is the film *The Heroes of Desert Storm* (1991) (directed by Dan Ohlmeyer) which purports to tell the stories of numerous Gulf War veterans and is introduced by George Bush. In this movie there is an extraordinary amount of mixing of real Gulf War footage and fictional portrayal (many of which are shot to look like news footage). In both of these films, every government line is swallowed and obligingly displayed. Such representation is especially interesting if it is as Parenti (1992: 62) claims that now, movies and TV are the final chapter of history, being the most lasting impression for many of what went on in the past.
  254. Bush made appeals to the Iraqi people to revolt on the 15th and 28th of February and again in March, then only reluctantly intervened and this aid was not what it appeared. Though there were three times as many Kurdish refugees fleeing to Iran as Turkey, Iran received much less aid (Frelick, 1993: 237). And in setting up safe areas and no fly zones, the concerns of Turkey (over their own Kurds) and Saudi Arabia (over the governability of Shiites) were of great importance (Maksoud, 1994: 33; Warrer and Winkler, 1994: 41). Similarly, the U.S. has not provided any comfort for Turkish Kurds who continue to be treated dreadfully. Turkish anti-terror laws in 1992 allowed the confiscation of pro-Kurd
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papers and books about Kurds and the prosecution of lawyers defending someone charged under the new laws, and assassination of Kurdish activists in Turkey is common (Frelick, 1993: 236).

Finally, when the Royal family returned, there began a brutal campaign to "cleanse" Kuwait. The U.S. had tried to portray the Kuwaiti and Saudi monarchies as "moderate" to justify U.S. intervention. However, in Kuwait, for instance, tight censorship and intimidation have dominated for years. For example, a January 9th 1990 decree banned any meeting that discussed "concrete national issues" (Aruri, 1991: 308). London and Washington have no wish for reform in these countries as: 1/ it is easier to deal with single ruling families; 2/ elected governments would reflect Arab and Islamic militancy and might veer away from the West (Hiro, 1991: 411). Since their return, the monarchy in Kuwait has cracked down on pro democracy movements, and death squads took revenge on those accused of collaborating (Weinberg, 1992: 70).

255. Debord, 1990: 20
  256. Rogin, 1994: 235
  257. Rogin, 1994: 250. Similarly, in response to questions of British and American complicity in the building of Iraq, a historian on British TV argued, "we cannot go on raking over history" (Gittings, 1991: 8).
  258. Hassan, 1993: 153
  259. O'Hanlon and Washbrook, 1992: 153
  260. Kaye, 1991; 156
  261. Bennett, 1988: 50
  262. Bogard, 1994: 313
  263. Giroux, 1981: 46
  264. Fish, 1989: 306
  265. Huysen, 1993: 220
  266. Huysen, 1993: 220
  267. Novick, 1988: 563
  268. in McGowan, 1991: 167
  269. Fish, 1989: 306
  270. Lloyd, 1993: 156
  271. Bush told an audience of soldiers, departing for the Gulf that the U.S. was going to war so that "what we say goes" in the Gulf, and Baker repeatedly said the war created a window of opportunity to work towards peace and security in the region (Ismael and Ismael, 1994: 1). The function of solidifying U.S. power in the region was indicated by the U.S. control and definition of "the peace process"; and the lesson to the 3rd World is clear regarding "the ground rules of the new world order" (Baker in Yant, 1991: 103).
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George Kennan, after the Second World War, had spoken of the need to encourage Japan to industrialise, while controlling its oil supplies (thus giving the U.S. "veto power") (Chomsky, 1993: 26). The *Chicago Tribune*, a leading conservative paper, argued that the U.S. now should exploit its "virtual monopoly in the security market ..... as a lever to gain funds and economic concessions" from Germany and Japan (Chomsky, 1991: 27).

Benefits to sectors of the American ruling class are also evident in the share of reconstruction that the U.S. won in post war Kuwait, increased weapons sales to the Middle East, and the boost in prestige given to the U.S. military and intelligence communities amidst suggestions that they should be scaled down with the collapse of the Cold War.

272. Kaye, 1991; Giroux, 1981; Hitchens, 1991: 109

#### Chapter Four

1. Tefft, 1980: 13
  2. Tefft, 1980: 16
  3. Tefft, 1980: 35
  4. Tefft, 1980: 326/57
  5. Tefft, 1980: 326.58
  6. Debord, 1990: 52
  7. Debord, 1990: 60
  8. Debord, 1990: 65
  9. Ponting, 1990: 1
  10. Der Derian, 1992: 45
  11. Wise, 1973
  12. Foucault, 1977: 205-7. Foucault theorises a "disciplinary society" with generalised surveillance spreading through the entire social body (Smart, 1983: 110). Giddens follows Foucault in paying close attention to the importance of surveillance and sees it as one of the major institutional dimensions in modern societies: as a key feature of economic organisation and of the state itself (Giddens, 1987: 160). Dandeker (1990) and Lyon (1994: 3) also provide interesting studies of the spread of the "surveillance society" where we are all the targets of monitoring and possibly objects of suspicion.
  13. Knightley, 1986: 211/4/6
  14. Rogin, 1994: 247/237
  15. Keane, 1992: 16-17
  16. Frankel, 1989
  17. Wilson, 1984
  18. Delbridge and Smith, 1982
  19. Knightley, 1986: 390. Historians, for obvious reasons, have had little to say about the secret services; the secret services, as Ladislav says,
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- "have exerted far greater influence on history than on historians" (in Porter, 1992: VII).
20. Knightley, 1986. Certainly! But they all develop during war from an increased state surveillance. As Lyon (1994: 84) points out, in the 20th century we see the emergence of an age of total war where whole societies and not just armed forces are involved in war efforts, thus intelligence services are not only involved in spying abroad but also in monitoring the population at home. By the end of World War I, says Dandeker (1990: 104), British security services were more preoccupied with domestic subversion than with Germany espionage. The threat of atomic warfare after World War II has allowed the security state to flourish and become entrenched, and these arrangements are frequently highly secret (Lyon, 1994: 84; Dandeker, 1990: 104).
  21. Knightley, 1986
  22. Knightley, 1986. Porter (1992:1) argues that the oldest reference of all to espionage concerned a false alarm, which shows that imagining or inventing spies maybe older than the "profession" itself.
  23. Knightley, 1986: 11/390
  24. Ponting, 1990: 67/16-18
  25. Knightley, 1986: 211. This is also the assertion of Alexander Cockburn (1989: 49-52) who tells some interesting anecdotes on this matter. Cockburn claims Ian Fleming has a lot to answer for: OSS and thus the CIA, but also Reagan and Star Wars. Fleming, the director of British Naval Intelligence during World War II, on a 1941 visit to Washington wrote an imaginary scenario for the establishment of a secret service in a country that had never known one before, for General Donovan (Roosevelt's co-ordinator of information). This impressed Donovan who went on to build the COI which evolved to the OSS and then to the CIA.
- Donovan and Allen Dulles learnt to exploit romantic fantasies of what the secret service should be and they lent assistance after the war to Hollywood producers wanting to make an OSS movie and the spy hype helped the OSS resist bureaucratic extinction and develop into the CIA with such films as OSS, Cloak and Dagger, 13. Rue Madeleine. Time and again, says Cockburn (1989: 52) those in the secret service turned to fiction for their self justifications.
26. Knightley, 1986: 6
  27. Knightley, 1986: 6/211
  28. Knightley, 1986: 6
  29. Wilson, 1984: 4
  30. Wilson, 1984: 18
  31. Rogin, 1994: 230
  32. Knightley, 1986: 8
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33. Sifry, 1991: 27. As I have already mentioned in Chapter 3, a number of commentators on the Gulf War have been tempted to see it as a conspiracy. Samir Amin (1991), for instance, argues that the decision to destroy Iraq's military was taken by the U.S. administration and Israel in May 1990. Such "conspiracy theories" are strengthened by a number of post war revelations. Former CIA officer in the Middle East, Miles Copeland, informed BBC radio that the CIA had known of plans for the invasion as early as April/May 1990, and recently a Kuwaiti military attache in Iraq, Colonel Said Mutar, said that reports arrived in Kuwait as early as April 1990 of a coming Iraqi military operation. On the 25th July he told his government the invasion was planned for August 2nd (at this point, the meeting Mutar was speaking at was stopped by Kuwaiti officials) (Yousif, 1991: 65).
  34. Debord, 1990: 53
  35. Khan, 1992: 44
  36. Lloyd, 1992: 45
  37. Lloyd, 1992: 47
  38. Knightley, 1991: 4
  39. Lloyd, 1992: 47
  40. Knightley, 1991: 4
  41. Lloyd, 1992: 48
  42. Knightley, 1991: 4; Lloyd, 1992: 40
  43. Knightley, 1991: 5
  44. Taylor, 1992: 2
  45. in Denton, 1993: 17
  46. Thayer, 1992: 94
  47. MacArthur, 1992: 189. Even the media accepted this erroneous line. For example, NBC's Tom Brokaw was sympathetic to censorship: "officers remember Vietnam and, in fairness to them, some got burned" so they did not want the press "to cause the same damage again" (Parenti, 1993: 167).
  48. Kellner, 1992; Thayer, 1992: 103
  49. Schanberg, 1991: 370
  50. Knightley, 1991: 5
  51. MacArthur, 1992: 138
  52. Foster, 1992: 159-61
  53. MacArthur, 1992: 32; Adams, 1986: 177
  54. Lloyd, 1992: 52
  55. Lloyd, 1992; MacArthur, 1992: 32
  56. MacArthur, 1992
  57. Weinberg, 1992: 24
  58. Fialka, 1992: 55. Schwartzkopf noted "nobody knew everything that we were doing except for a very few people in Washington and it was even
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- a limited group of people here in this headquarters that knew everything we were doing and we were very successful, I might add" (in Taylor, 1992: X1)
59. Lloyd, 1992: 53
  60. Knightley, 1991: 4
  61. Taylor, 1992: 3
  62. Taylor, 1992: 11
  63. Denton, 1993: 18
  64. MacArthur, 1992: 5
  65. These "pools" were run by the major media outlets. For example, the print pool was at first run by the "sacred 10" (AP, Reuters, UPI, Time, Newsweek and U.S. News and World Report, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, LA Times) (Fialka, 1992: 39).
  66. Schanberg, 1991: 369
  67. Cumings, 1992: 110
  68. Knightley, 1991: 37
  69. Taylor, 1992: 35
  70. MacArthur, 1992: 24
  71. Denton, 1993: 16
  72. Fialka, 1992
  73. Fialka, 1992: 5-23
  74. Fialka, 1992: 5-23
  75. Taylor, 1992: 65
  76. Knightley, 1991: 28
  77. Fialka, 1992: 35
  78. Taylor, 1992: 62
  79. Denton, 1993: 2
  80. Baudrillard, 1993: 188
  81. Taylor, 1992: 59
  82. For example, tape was confiscated from a French TV crew who had witnessed fighting at Khafji, because they were not pool members (Ridgeway, 1991: 220).
  83. Fialka, 1992: 9
  84. Der Derian, 1992: 196
  85. Taylor, 1992: 29
  86. Denton, 1993: 15
  87. Denton, 1993
  88. Yant, 1991: 28
  89. Fialka, 1992: 3. The Alabama National Guard blindfolded and held Time photographer Wesley Boxce for 30 hours, accusing him of spying for the Iraqis (Parasiliti, 1994: 248).
  90. Knightley, 1991: 28
  91. Scarry, 1993: 64
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92. Taylor, 1992: 258
  93. Taylor, 1992: 53
  94. Kellner, 1992: 198
  95. Taylor, 1992: 159
  96. Index on censorship, 1991 issue 4/5
  97. Fialka, 1992: 16
  98. Schanberg, 1991: 371
  99. Adams, 1986: 26
  100. Chomsky on MCM-TV documentary
  101. Yant, 1991: 46
  102. Schanberg, 1991: 374. The Pentagon and Administration also refused to provide speakers to appear on programmes opposite anyone involved in the law suit; as Schanberg notes, a strange irony in programmes designed to discuss press controls by government and military.
  103. Cumings, 1992: 114
  104. Knightley, 1991: 37
  105. Paley, 1991: 72
  106. Paley, 1991: 73
  107. Knightley, 1991: 20
  108. For instance, Kellner (1992: 269) notes that many viewers - 6 out of 10 - would have accepted even more military censorship.
  109. Taylor, 1992: 42
  110. Taylor, 1992: 23
  111. Taylor, 1992: 40
  112. Norris, 1992: 23
  113. Denton, 1993: 35
  114. Kellner, 1992: 202; Taylor, 1992: 43. The petty lies released concerning Saddam Hussein - for example, that he had executed his young male lovers - were of the same order as those used to discredit Noriega. When Noriega's office was ransacked it was claimed that the military had found voodoo instruments, cocaine and a portrait of Hitler. None of this was true. The cocaine was in fact a bag of corn flour and the portrait of Hitler was a *Time* magazine edition on World War II.
  115. For example, one group of journalists were given small American flags and told "you are warriors too".
  116. Dirty Tricks Radio Programme
  117. Springborg, 1994: 47
  118. Dirty Tricks
  119. Taylor, 1992: 10
  120. Keane, 1992: 19
  121. Keane, 1992: 19; Symposium, 1993: 93
  122. Keane, 1992: 19
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123. Parenti, 1993: 182
  124. Edelman, 1988: 57
  125. Raboy and Dagenais, 1992: 8. For example, the 1981 White House disinformation that Gaddafi had assassination teams entering the U.S. with surface-to-air missiles to kill Reagan and other top officials. This obviously concocted story led to a storm of panic concerning these "hit teams" that really never existed (Symposium, 1993: 222).
  126. Rogin , 1994: 232. According to one former CIA analyst, hard evidence of Noriega's involvement of drugs went back to 1971. However, this has subsequently disappeared (Johns and Johnson, 1994: 53). Bush was even caught out lying that he had never met Noriega when a photograph was produced showing the two together (Johns and Johnson, 1994: 39).
  127. Debord,. 1990: 65
  128. Baudrillard, 1983: 21
  129. Plant, 1992: 154
  130. Taylor, 1992: 150
  131. Dirty Tricks
  132. Covert Action Information Bulletin, 1991: 25; Taylor, 1992: 150. The use of the Kurds is no new thing. The Shah and Kissinger met in 1972 and in secret decided to restore the balance in the region and to support the landless, luckless, Kurds, then in revolt in Northern Iraq. Nixon agreed and authorised a covert action budget. The Pike Commission concluded that the aim here was to sap Iraq's strength rather than to help the Kurds; and on the day that Iran and Iraq settled their border dispute in 1975, all U.S. aid was terminated and on the next day Saddam Hussein launched a campaign of destruction in Kurdistan (Hitchens, 1991: 110).
  133. Kellner, 1991
  134. Chomsky, 1992: 16
  135. Chomsky, 1992: 16
  136. Vidal, 1991: 134
  137. Winkler and Warner, 1994: 82
  138. Winkler and Warner, 1994: 85
  139. Winkler and Warner, 1994: 85
  140. Miller, 1994: 94
  141. Sadiq and McCain, 1993
  142. Miller, 1994: 130
  143. Sadiq and McCain, 1993: 160
  144. During Operation Desert Sheild, Bush signed an executive order declaring Iraq's biological warfare threat a "national emergency" thereby allowing FDA regulations to be overruled by the Pentagon and new,
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- untested, experimental anti-germ warfare drugs to be used on humans (Weinberg, 1992: 67).
145. Guardian Weekly, June 25, 1995
  146. Covert Action Quarterly, Summer 1991: 11. Other explanations include the insecticides used by Coalition in tents and uniforms, shots and pills used to protect troops against chemical and biological warfare, airborne oil contaminants, radiation, and the combined effects of such a "toxic cocktail".
  147. Covert Action Quarterly, Summer 1995: 7/55
  148. Weinberg, 1992: 66
  149. Waas, 1991: 87. For example, Robicheau (1994: 322-332) provides a chronology of Western involvement in the arming of Iraq. France had sold fighter aircraft, missiles and nuclear technology and expertise, Britain provided arms making machinery. A Dutch company, KBS, had arranged the purchase of 500 tons of thiodiglycal (a component of Mustard gas) from a Belgian subsidiary of Phillips Petroleum, which was shipped to Baghdad in 1983 (Iraq used gas against the Iranians in December 1983, February 1984, March 1985), and Mercedes Benz had contributed to a project to modify Iraq's Russian made SCUD B Missiles. Most interesting, perhaps, are the allegations about U.S. complicity in Iraq's nuclear programme. In March 1980 when the Carter Administration charged Italy with providing Iraq with sensitive equipment for nuclear technology, the Italian government replied that it had done this 2 years earlier after consultation with the U.S. After the Gulf War, Sam Gejdenson (Dem Connecticut) claimed U.S. exports to Iraq between 1985-90 include 192 instances in which technology with potential nuclear applications was licensed for sale.
  150. The man who took the personal letters to the various governments regarding sales to Iran went on to work as a lobbyist and adviser for the Iraqi regime.
  151. Waas, 1991: 90
  152. CAIB, 1991: 22
  153. Weinberg, 1992: 68
  154. Robicheau, 1994: 352
  155. Gearty, 1991: 4
  156. Ridgeway, 1991: 181. The pictures of oil covered birds, which supposedly confirmed that Saddam Hussein was an "eco-terrorist", were actually taken from an earlier, smaller spill caused by an Iraqi raid on a Saudi refinery (Taylor, 1992: 79).
  157. Kellner, 1992: 115
  158. Dobkin, 1992: 1. For example, 67% favoured military involvement "if terrorists loyal to Iraq kill Americans anywhere", whereas only 43% supported such action "if Iraq refuses to withdraw from Kuwait".
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159. Merrill, 1993: 28
  160. Schlesinger, Murdock, Elliot, 1983: 1
  161. Herman, 1993
  162. Shafritz, Gibbons and Scott, 1991: xii
  163. Gearty, 1991: 15
  164. Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 89
  165. Merrill, 1993: 28. For example, Yossef Bodansky, director of the House of Representatives Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, argued the U.S. was "extremely vulnerable" to terrorist attack (Herald 22/4/95).
  166. Dobkin, 1992: 40
  167. Dobkin, 1992: 5
  168. Merrill, 1993: 33
  169. Dobkin, 1992: 83
  170. Merrill, 1993: 29
  171. Herman, 1993. For example, in the same year that 14 Lybians lost their lives under Gaddafi's regime, 10s of 1000s of Salvadorians were murdered with U.S. assistance. Furthermore, in 1984, while 16 Americans died in terrorist attacks around the world, 17,000 Americans were killed by their own compatriots (Parenti, 1992: 28).
  172. Herman, 1993: 52
  173. Merrill, 1993: 31
  174. Der Derian, 1992: 94
  175. Merrill, 1993: 36. Sterling in her book - some of which is based on C.I.A. disinformation - sees behind the B.R.'s, I.R.A., and Turkish armed groups a worldwide Soviet hidden hand. A secret C.I.A. report in 1981 concluded that this was incorrect but in June 1981 a paper was "leaked" to the press arguing that the U.S.S.R. was indeed the controller of international terrorism, the proof being nothing other than that this was part of Leninist ideology (Merrill, 1993: 36; Dobkin, 1992: 95).
  176. Drugs became a big concern with the American public only after excessive administration publicity. In reality though, whereas illegal drugs kill only 3,500 people annually, the real problems are alcohol and tobacco which kill 100,000 and 300,000 a year respectively (Chomsky, 1993: 83).

Regarding Panama, Noriega had lost his usefulness and was now an annoyance as he refused to allow Panama to be used as a staging area for a Contra invasion of Nicaragua. He was also playing all sides and it was rumoured that he was on the payroll of up to 10 intelligence services around the world (Johns and Johnson, 1994: 30). Furthermore, he refused to deny Cuba access to the Panama Canal. Noriega's trial was marked by extensive secrecy, as publicity could cause "exceptionally grave danger" to national security (Johns and

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- Johnson, 1994: 104). The trial was also full of glaring contradictions, lapses, and testimony by dubious characters and Noriega's bank records were mysteriously "lost" while in D.E.A. custody along with a number of other important documents. Some interesting accusations by Noriega did emerge though: Noriega claimed he was paid \$11m by the Reagan administration to allow the trading of drugs and arms to help the Contras (Johns and Johnson, 1994: 36). Noriega also protested that the C.I.A. had told him to let flights carrying guns and drugs go through Panama (Johns and Johnson, 1994: 111). And recently, Noriega filed a motion for a new trial, asserting that the U.S. government entered into a secret agreement with the Cali drug cartel to secure testimony against him (Guardian Weekly September 10: 1995).
177. Scott and Marshall, 1991
178. Scott and Marshall, 1991. There is a long history of C.I.A. involvement in the Sicilian Mafia, French Corsican underworld, heroin producers of South East Asia's Golden Triangle and marijuana and cocaine dealing of Cuban exiles in Miami. In 1979 the region of the Golden Crescent was not known as a major heroin supplier to the American market and the drug was virtually unknown in Pakistan. By 1984, Afghanistan supplied 50% of the heroin consumed in the U.S. and there were 650,000 addicts in Pakistan. Reports were that heroin was shipped out in some Pakistan army trucks that brought in covert aid to Afghan guerillas. And despite U.S. "concern" over Noriega's drug connections, it is estimated by the D.E.A. that the flow of cocaine quadrupled under the U.S.-installed Endara (Weinberg, 1992: 26). Endara had been the director and secretary of Banco Interoceanico, seen by many as a major front for laundering Columbian drug money, and those Endara appointed to fill the posts of treasury minister, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and Attorney General were former directors of the First International Bank which was used to wash drug money of the Cali Cartel (Scott and Marshall, 1991: 73).
179. Chomsky, (1988). On June 26, 1993, Clinton ordered a missile attack on Iraqi intelligence Headquarters in downtown Baghdad. 7 missiles missed and hit residential areas killing civilians. The attack was apparently in retaliation for an Iraqi attempt to assassinate Bush in April and Washington claimed "certain proof". The media chipped in, calling it "an outrageous crime" (Washington Post) and "an act of war" (New York Times). The accused were on trial under extremely dubious circumstances as the missiles were launched, and Washington quietly conceded they had no hard evidence (Chomsky, 1994: 16-17).
180. Gearty, 1991: 87
181. Weinberg, 1992: 52. Weinberg claims that, in reality, the C.I.A. shares responsibility for this bombing. Pan Am flights were used by Syrian

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- drug King Manzer Al-Kassar who was used by the C.I.A. for information on other Middle East drug traffickers and who was influential in hostage negotiations. The D.E.A. and C.I.A. had arranged that certain cases should get on flights from Frankfurt uninspected and Weinberg claims that Al-Kassar double-crossed the Americans allowing the P.F.L.P. (working on behalf of Iran in response to the shooting down of the Iranian airbus) to swap explosives for drugs.
182. Rogin, 1994: 24. The "terrorist" label, as Dobkin (1992: 101) notes, is a far more inclusive term than "communist".
183. Der Derian, 1992: 65. The existence of a common enemy produced very high levels of social cohesion in the U.S. as Reagan admitted when he said in December 1992, "the end of the communist tyranny has robbed much of the West of its uplifting common purpose" (Socialist Standard, June 1995: 10). This has created a crisis for defence intellectuals and policy makers, as Colin Powell admits: "I'm running out of demons. I'm running out of villains. I'm down to Castro and Kim Il Sung" (Cumings, 1992: 116). And as Jeremy Azrael says "There is a terrible danger that defence intellectuals will have to go whoring. Folks in the service will go looking for threats out there" (in Halliday, Jansen, Schneider, 1992: 66-72). One of these new "threats" seems to be Iran. White House spokesman Mr Mike McCurry argues "Iranian sponsorship of terrorism is a very serious issues that must be addressed" (Herald, 3/5/95). The U.S. has warned of Iran's coming nuclear potential which it may use to control the Gulf, threaten oil interests or create terrorist perils (Herald 8/3/95). Just by chance, all the hype regarding Iran coincided with the Index International Arms Exhibition in the U.A.E. in March where the U.S., U.K. France and Germany competed for business. Middle East specialist Heine Kopietz argued that it was all "hype" and that the "Pentagon is not at all convinced that Iran is aggressive" (Socialist Standard, June 1995: 10).

Bush, in announcing a renewed commitment to "Star Wars", implied a scud threat to the U.S. (Gordon, 1993: 140) and in the aftermath of the bombing at Oklahoma, Clinton looks set to further diminish the realm of freedom of American citizens in the name of national security and anti-terrorism. Clinton's bill gives the F.B.I. greater power to wire tap, revises the McCarran Walter Act and gives the president power to ban fundraising in the U.S. for any group he or she deems dangerous (Nation, July 3, 1995 vol 261(c)). It seems that the F.B.I. have already had their first (suspiciously well choreographed) "triumph" with the arrest of Sheik Omar in October 1995. Omar, a former C.I.A. agent, was arrested after his men were caught trying to plant a bomb. These men claimed that the Egyptian agent who had infiltrated the group was the one who had convinced them to place the bomb. Two of Sheik

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Omar's followers are now in custody for allegedly planning to kill the pope, though it would be wrong to expect any evidence any time soon.

Shortly after the Gulf War began in Britain, 88 Palestinians and Iraqis living there were detained and threatened with deportation, without recourse to judicial process. Many of these people were opponents of terrorism and the Iraqi regime, and Dickson (1991: 45) wonders whether this was not a cynical manoeuvre by security services to convince Britains of the threat they faced, rather than sheer incompetence. Arabs in America also suffered severe harassment by the F.B.I. during the Gulf Crisis.

184. Tefft, 1980; Keane, 1992: 18. B.O.S.S. agent Robin Ramsay commented in 1981 that "British intelligence has a saying that if there is a left wing movement in Britain bigger than a football team our man is the captain or the vice captain, and if not, he is the referee and can send any man off the field and call our man on any time he likes" (Socialist Standard, August 1994).
  185. Plant, 1992: 128; Debord, 1938b; Sanguinetti, 1982. Sanguinetti, for instance, claims that it was the forces of the state that kidnapped and killed Aldo Moro and there is certainly good reason to be extremely suspicious over the state's role in the Moro Affair. A less violent example was the Mossad action in the 1980's where an "Arab terrorist" supposedly sent his girlfriend onto a plane carrying explosives.
  186. Baudrillard, 1983: 31
  187. Der Derian, 1992: 65
  188. Der Derian, 1992: 82
  189. Gerbner, 1992: 106
  190. in Dobkin, 1992: 37
  191. Gerbner, 1992: 106
  192. Der Derian (1992: 30/58) argues that the massive forces of surveillance are now everywhere - in banks, malls, airports, work, even lavatories - and display the classic symptoms of advanced paranoia: hypervigilance, intense distrust, rigid and judgemental thought processes, and projection of one's own repressed beliefs and hostile impulses onto the other.
  193. Keane, 1992; Rogin, 1994. As Porter (1992: 228) says, "Secret service history may be a health hazard. It attacks the mind. After long periods emerged in it everything looks different. Apparently solid objects start quivering and crumbling; fixed points move; spaces appear where there used to be shapes; and shapes start materialising out of nothing at all. There is no firm ground any where: no certainties, no reference points. People turn out to be not what they seemed; institutions do not function as they were supposed to; accepted truths may be deliberate disinformation; spies and moles are everywhere; and the cleverest and
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- most dangerous of them all are those who appear most unlikely and innocent. It is a bewildering world ..."
194. Rogin, 1994: 246-7. The "covert spectacle" is a technique for defining the real, as politics and theatre merge as a vast entertainment eliciting popular applause and underlining the need for secret planning and accountability.
  195. Knightley, 1986: 7
  196. Bennett, 1988: 96. "Irangate" is a good example. The hearings focussed on one arms shipment in 1985 and conveyed the notion that "The system works!"
  197. Black and Morris, 1991: 492

### **Chapter Five**

1. Agger, 1990: 204
  2. Plant, 1992: 28
  3. Art of the Western World
  4. Jameson, 1991: 3
  5. in Goshorn, 1993: 71
  6. Goshorn, 1993: 72
  7. Vaneigem in Knabb, 1989
  8. Jacoby, 1981: 1
  9. Agger, 1990: 21
  10. Agger, 1990: 198
  11. Plant, 1992: 104. The exhibition sponsors included a bank and a brewery (Hewison, 1990: 25).
  12. Fiske, 1989: 18
  13. Fiske, 1989: 18
  14. Huyssen, 1986: 6
  15. Huyssen, 1986: 6
  16. Huyssen, 1986: 15
  17. Jameson, 1991: 48-49. Jameson argues that capital colonises the last part of the mind that was left surviving autonomous from it: the aesthetic (Mann, 1991: 39).
  18. Jameson, 1991: 48-49
  19. Jameson, 1991: 48-49
  20. Debord, 1990: 73
  21. Fiske, 1993: 61
  22. Natoli and Hutcheon, 1993: 300. Mann (1991: 123) argues that Jameson, being a Marxist, cannot abandon the functional necessity of critical autonomy and that in the end his argument boils down to: some sort of critical distance must survive because it must survive.
  23. McGowan, 1991: 13. Mann (1991: 125) says that the problem with regard to resistance is that no one believes in exteriority any longer.
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- For example, artist Hans Haacke's "nothing escapes eventual recuperation" or Godard's "You know, I more or less agree with the situationists; they say that it's all finally integrated; it gets integrated in spectacle, it's all spectacle" (in Knabb, 1989: 385).
24. McGowan, 1991: 126
  25. Haber, 1994: 81
  26. Foucault, 1978: 94. There are, says Foucault (1980: 141-2), no "margins" for those who break with the system to gambol in. Although many see the effect of such musings as "anestheticising", Foucault feels that his position of power does not entail accepting an inescapable form of domination.
  27. in McGowan, 1991: 129
  28. Grumley, 1989: 194
  29. Haber, 1994: 93-102
  30. in McGowan, 1991: 126
  31. Haber, 1994: 93
  32. Haber, 1994: 113
  33. Grumley, 1989: 175
  34. Goshorn, 1993: 71
  35. Fiske, 1989: 18. Baudrillard says that the notion of "recuperation" conjures up a myth of the fall from some ideological Eden: "it presupposes an original purity and delineates the capitalist system as a maleficent instance of perversion, revealing yet another vision" (in Mann, 1991: 14). This notion of "recuperation" is seen as showing too little "reflexivity" thus Baudrillard can again demonstrate his world weariness and offer an excuse for his suspension of political commitment.
  36. Fiske, 1989: 193
  37. McGowan, 1991: 126
  38. McGowan, 1991: 174. Said's desire to be always on the outer is illustrated in his statement "my goal is to bring the Palestinian nation into existence so that I can attack it" (in McGowan, 1991: 174).
  39. Kellner, 1989: 39/83
  40. Rojeck, 1993: 109. In the introduction to *One dimensional Man* (called "The paralysis of criticism: society without opposition"), Marcuse notes that his analysis will vacillate between 2 contradictory hypotheses: 1/ that advanced industrial society is capable of containing qualitative change for the foreseeable future; 2/ that opposing forces also exist. Marcuse's argument is that the first tendency is dominant as he theorises a social and cultural integration of the working class, achieved via growing technical productivity and the expanding conquest of humankind and nature, and integration in the realm of consciousness which produces the "happy consciousness" of a "new conformism"
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- (Marcuse, 1964: 29/56/84). Such an analysis, of course, risks being contradicted soon after articulation, as happened to Marcuse four years later, but the analysis is extremely provocative and useful and I would defend many of his positions against, say, the rather reactionary comments of Merquior (1986:135) who berates this form of kulturkritik for speaking with the voice of assertion rather than argument. Although Merquior may be right to an extent in lambasting Adorno's "dour asceticism" and Marcuse's gloominess in *One Dimensional Man*, his type of point against Marcuse - that he (Marcuse) did not go and ask people if they were happy about the "whole" or its parts (Merquior, 1986: 159) - is a rather cheap and crude appeal to an anti-intellectual empiricist logic. The intuitive and imaginative propositions of "kulturkritik" of this type are fruitful, perhaps essential.
41. Genosko, 1994: 152. Whether this is consistent with the direction of his other work, or is a part he cannot let go of from the time and milieu in which he was intellectually formed is hard to tell. Baudrillard loves to "bourgeois bait" and to be seen as an intellectual terrorist and iconoclast from the "progressive" side - for example, his statement that the counter culturism of the S.I. is "something that has really stayed with me" (Plant, 1992: 166).
  42. Baudrillard, 1985: 217
  43. Baudrillard, 1993: 41
  44. Baudrillard, 1988: 205
  45. Baudrillard, 1983: 12
  46. Cook, 1994: 153
  47. Cook, 1994: 154
  48. in Natoli and Hutcheon, 1993: 306. "To a system whose argument is oppression and repression, the strategic resistance is the liberating claim of subjecthood. But this reflects the system's previous phase, and even if we are still confronted with it, it is no longer the strategic terrain: the system's current argument is the maximisation of the word and the maximal production of meaning. Thus the strategic refusal is that of a refusal of meaning and a refusal of the word - or of the hyper conformist simulation of the very mechanisms of the system, which is a form of refusal and of non-reception". If we try for liberation, and resurrection of the subject of history, we are acting in full accordance with the political logic of the system, our best strategy is one of ironic detachment (in Kroker and Cook, 1988: 177).
  49. Genosko, 1994: 153
  50. Baudrillard, 1983: 40
  51. Boal, 1992: 11
  52. Norris, 1992: 100/109
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53. Baudrillard, 1983: 121. Baudrillard (1983: 12) feels that the argument that the media manipulate the masses is an interpretation that shows contempt.
  54. Der Derian, 1992: 177
  55. Der Derian, 1992: 177
  56. Der Derian, 1992: 198
  57. Der Derian, 1992: 198
  58. 1991: 454
  59. Fiske, 1989: 20
  60. de Certeau, 1988: xi
  61. Jay, 1984: 118; Grumley, 1989: 175; Poster, 1994: 78. For example, Adorno favours Schoenberg and Beckett; and Debord favours Lautreamont, classical Chinese poetry, Shakespeare and surrealist art. See also footnote 40.
  62. Fiske, 1993: 61
  63. Fiske, 1989: 25/15
  64. Fiske, 1989: 34
  65. Fiske, 1993: 63
  66. Fiske, 1989: 122
  67. in Fiske, 1989: 143
  68. Fiske, 1989: 27. Perhaps, but is not Fiske and de Certeau's own work on resistance romantic? We could probably say of them what Jacoby (1987: 214) says of Berman: that he is an "evangelist of the human spirit" who finds signs of renewal, strength and community wherever he turns - where the powerless outsmart power and are able to escape and always create some sort of space for themselves.
  69. Fiske, 1989: 178
  70. See notes 68 and 81
  71. Prince, 1993: 253
  72. Kellner, 1992: 122
  73. Taylor, 1992: 33/11
  74. Kellner, 1992: 243
  75. Kellner, 1992: 421. Ehrenreich (1991) describes the U.S. during the Gulf War as akin to a primitive warrior culture. There were many attacks on Arabs and Muslims in a number of Coalition countries. Between August and December in America, 48 hate crimes were reported and, as Mokhiber (1992: 62) says, for every one reported, probably 100 went unreported. The racism and stereotyping is illustrated in a number of T-Shirts, badges and stickers produced at the time (for example, a shirt with a large, muscular U.S. Marine on it, pointing his gun at a hook nosed, venal looking Arab on the ground and asking "How much is oil now?"). (Kellner, 1992: 248).
  76. Morrison, 1992: 52
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77. Morrison, 1992: 6
  78. Denton, 1993: 31
  79. Parenti, 1993: 108. In the 2855 minutes of Gulf War Crisis coverage, August '90 - January 3, 91, only 29 minutes dealt with public opposition to the military build up (Denton, 1993: 31). On a night when 1,000's of protesters marched from New York's Time Square, to the United Nations, to Washington Square to demand an end to the bombardment, C.B.S.'s Ed Bradley found it "eerie" that "there's no one on the streets of New York" (Flanders, 1991: 164). When the peace movement was mentioned, it was in terms of "decline" and "waning strength" (Cirera, 1991: 283). One study showed that of 878 on-air sources who appeared on news casts, only 1 represented a national peace organisation (Mueller, 1994: 75). San Francisco, for example, was more heavily disrupted than by any political event since 1934. On 19 January, San Francisco witnessed its largest ever demonstration of 200,000 plus (Solnit, 1992: 105) and it was much the same in a number of American cities as well as in London, and there were extensive demonstrations against the war in Syria, Egypt and Morocco, which were not covered by the media.
  80. Sharrett, 1993: 4
  81. I do not want to defend a dystopian view that only conceives of citizens as doped television viewers or implies that the system "works all by itself" (Eagleton, 1991: 42). But the opposite of this - the "more utopian theories of man culture" (Jameson, 1990: 143) - strikes me as every bit unrealistic and patronising. I believe Jameson (1990: 143) is right in calling for some new theory of manipulation as a corrective to those "utopian theories of mass culture", which nonetheless can acknowledge "the experiential moment of mesmerisation of the masses before the television set" (Jameson, 1990: 146)..
  82. Kellner, 1992: 243/255
  83. Scarry, 1993: 59
  84. Coombs, 1993: 280
  85. Kellner, 1992: 255
  86. Cook, 1994: 154
  87. Cook, 1994: 154
  88. Baudrillard, 1993: 181
  89. Bureau of Public Secrets, 1992: 26
  90. Cook, 1996: 112. Such alternative media experiments as Kellner's are, of course, a massive improvement in terms of information and participation. However, as Cook points out, an effective response to the messages of the media is limited to the producers and this is still a narrow range of people.
  91. Boal, 1992: 11
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92. Boal, 1992: 11
  93. Sharrett, 1993: 5
  94. Sharrett, 1993
  95. Ronell, 1992: 49. Hebdige argues that the imagery of contemporary thought reveals a profound despair, with the word "death" confronting us at every turn (Hewison, 1990: 38).
  96. Callinicos, 1995: 205
  97. Sharrett, 1993
  98. Kellner, 1989: 208
  99. Callinicos, 1991
  100. Halliday, Jansen, Schneider, 1992: 68
  101. Fukuyama, 1992: 46
  102. Fukuyama, 1992: 144
  103. Fukuyama, 1989: 9. Fukuyama (1992: 33) also comes up with gems such as "a totalitarian state that permits an extensive private sector is by definition no longer totalitarian". Fukuyama (1992: 217) also describes Turkey as a "liberal democracy".
  104. Fukuyama, 1992: 279
  105. Fukuyama, 1992: 338
  106. Triumphant democracy is epitomised in cultural imagery of Chinese students standing up to tanks in Peking, the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas, the crumbling of the Berlin Wall, and the overthrow of communist rule in Russia, Rumania, Poland, etc (Agger, 1992: 22).
  107. Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 18
  108. Smart, 1993: 35
  109. Poster, 1994: 69
  110. Offe, and Cochrane, 1993: 245
  111. Soja, 1993: 123
  112. Natoli and Hutcheon, 1993: 302
  113. Callinicos, 1982: 23
  114. Grumley, 1989: 38
  115. in Smart, 1992; 218
  116. Bauman in Smart, 1992: 219. "The mere recall of these well-known guidelines of Marxist criticism has something obsolete, even tedious, about it" (Lyotard, 1993: 115).
  117. Norris, 1990: 25
  118. Smart, 1983: 1. Scott (1990) locates the rise of the new social movements narrowly in the May 1968 events in Paris.
  119. Best and Kellner, 1991: 117
  120. Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 1
  121. Docherty, 1990: 213. Docherty believes all leftist movements live haunted by the shadow of the Gulag.
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122. For example, Guattari calls for a "micro politics" that will set loose a whole host of expressions and experimentations (Cook, 1991: 159) and he is faced with a similar problem to Lyotard, in that it is hard for him to exclude or delimit the experimentations of, say, rapists.
  123. Plant, 1993: 107
  124. Haber, 1994: 27
  125. Haber, 1994: 21
  126. Haber, 1994: 16/26. "The real political task today, at least in so far as it is concerned with the cultural .... is to carry forward the resistance that writing offers to established thought, to what has already been done, to what everyone thinks, to what is well known, to what is widely recognised, to what is "readable", to everything which can change its form and make itself acceptable to opinion in general ..... The name most often given to this is post modernism" (Lyotard in Smart, 1988:2).
  127. Haber, 1994: 26
  128. Schatzski, 1993: 44
  129. Best and Kellner, 1991: 48
  130. in Natoli and Hutcheon, 1993: 3053
  131. Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 115/95
  132. Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 152
  133. Eyerman, 1994: 85
  134. Eyerman, 1994: 85
  135. Eyerman, 1994
  136. Eyerman, 1994: 83
  137. Said, Lectures
  138. Eyerman, 1994: 83
  139. Callinicos, 1995: 17; Kaye, 1991: 41. In 1988, Eric Hobsbawn claimed that "Our movements, the classic socialist or communist labour parties, were born in a specific epoch which has now passed" (in Hewison, 1990: 36).
  140. Eagleton, 1991: 203
  141. Callinicos, 1995: 21. For Russell Jacoby (1987), there has been a widespread eclipse of the public intellectual. Jacoby sees as models of this type of independent intellectual - Paul Goodman, Betty Friedan, C. Wright Mills, Lewis Mumford, Murray Bookchin, Gore Vidal, Paul Sweezy, Daniel Bell, Christopher Lasch, Noam Chomsky - and argues that today an influential intellectual like Frederic Jameson is influential in the academy and in specialised academic journals, but is largely detached from a public audience and from pressing political and social events of the time.
  142. in McGowan, 1991: 157. According to McGowan, Jameson notes the difficulty of thinking in anything other than fragments and he sees the immediate task as "pedagogical and didactic". Jameson thus implies that the most important agents are artists and critics and that at present
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- our capacity to act and struggle as individuals and collective subjects is neutralised. Lyotard (1993: 112) argues that "The only interventions we may envisage [today] take form in the publication of papers and collections" and contrasts today's "defensive" praxis with the "militant" praxis of his years with Socialisme ou Barbarie.
143. Debord, 1990
  144. Norris, 1990: 3
  145. Halliday, April 1991: 30
  146. Gilsenam, March 1991: 28
  147. Halliday, April 1991: 30. Halliday (1991: 274) says that he supported sanctions for "some months" but that "time was on Saddam's side". However, the sanctions were only allowed to work for "some months" and even the CIA admitted that these sanctions were working.
  148. Hobsbawn, March 1991
  149. Cockburn and Cohen, 1991: 22-24. For instance, Cockburn and Cohen point out that Geras ignores Israel's occupation of the West Bank and South Africa's responsibility for 10s of 1,000s of deaths in neighbouring countries, which Geras had never called for military action to resolve.
  150. Jencks, 1991: 17
  151. Halliday (1991: 276) says "If you have to make a choice between imperialism and fascism, the former is the lesser of 2 evils."
  152. Samara (1991) is another leftist who supported Iraq during the Gulf War. Samara speaks of Iraq "liberating Kuwait" and argues "The Iraqi people, army and leadership proved that a tiny country is ready and has the courage to resist international bourgeois aggression, albeit at very high costs" (Samara, 1991: 270). This is unconvincing. Iraq's imperialism was exactly "bourgeois aggression" and was not motivated by the aims of liberation. A look at the history of the Baathists and Saddam Hussein forces us to reject the notion that they are enemies of bourgeois aggression or champions of the unrepresented. For example, the Baathist's collaboration with the Shah went back to 1963. With regard to the Palestinians, Saddam Hussein betrayed them in September 1970 when he reneged on a personal promise to Arafat that 15,000 Iraqi soldiers stationed in Jordan would go to their aid if King Hussein attacked them. Furthermore, Saddam Hussein has continuously collaborated with Israel, in the supply of weapons and other provisions to General Aoun in Lebanon and, according to Mubarak, the Iraqi leader had been negotiating secretly with Israel up to the time of the Gulf Crisis through an intermediary at Harvard University (Mubarak also suggested Iraqi links with Mossad and that an Israeli firm had supplied goods to the Iraqi army) (Yousif, 1991: 55-61).
  153. For example, Massa (1991) talks of the increasing U.S. death toll from AID's, the declining life expectancy for Afro-Americans, hospitals nearly collapsing, homelessness and the paradoxical willingness of the US administration to spend \$1b a day in Kuwait.
  154. Elbaum, 1991: 153
  155. Smart, 1992: 198
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156. For example, Callinicos in *Against Post modernism*
  157. For instance, continually taking the line of equating Marx with Lenin and Stalin and thus with the Gulag and totalitarianism. For example, Lyotard (1993: 114): "When the Berlin Wall fell, it [Marxism] failed definitively".
  158. Harvey, 1989: 113/117. Cornel West (1993: 307) says a similar thing - ie. that post modernism "highlights notions of difference, marginality, and otherness in such a way that it further marginalise actual people of difference and otherness". Cornel West sees Lyotard's views as "European navel-gazing".
  159. Haber, 1994: 114
  160. Haber, 1994: 130
  161. Best and Kellner, 1991: 71
  162. Haber, 1994: 43/111
  163. McGowan, 1991: 120
  164. McGowan, 1991: 13/128/21. Both Eagleton (1991) and Callinicos (1991) point to the events in Eastern Europe in 1989 as examples of collective agency acting to transform a social order. As Eagleton (1991: xiii) sarcastically argues in response to postmodernist writers: "No doubt President Ceausescu spent his last moments on earth reminding his executioners that revolution was an outmoded concept, that there were only ever micro-strategies and local deconstructions, and that the idea of a "collective revolutionary subject" was hopelessly passé."
  165. Best and Kellner, 1991: 89
  166. Zavarzadeh and Morton, 1994: 3
  167. Haber, 1991: 32-33
  168. McGowan, 1991: 202
  169. McGowan, 1991: 24
  170. Eagleton, 1985: 61
  171. Daniel Singer in Kaye, 1991: 142/147
  172. Jordan and Weedon, 1995: 547
  173. Eagleton, 1991: 206
  174. McGowan, 1991: 211
  175. O'Hanlon and Washbrook, 1992: 149
  176. Best and Kellner, 1991: 187; O'Hanlon & Washbrook, 1992: 149
  177. Jameson in Callinicos, 1995: 209
  178. Callinicos, 1991: 100-103 in *The Revenge of History*. Callinicos (1991: 57) sees the changes in the "communist" bloc as essentially concentrated versions of the same process that had, during the 1970s and 80s, brought enormous upheavals in the West - reorganisation and restructuring, with recession, and intensified international competition (Callinicos, 1991: 57).
  179. Best and Kellner, 1991: 297
  180. Wood, 1986: 182
  181. Callinicos, 1995: 209
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