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**INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD IN
THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT:**

**A GROUNDED THEORY OF THE NEW ZEALAND
EXPERIENCE**

A THESIS PRESENTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
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Disclaimer

The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the New Zealand Defence Force.

Abstract

The past decade has seen the New Zealand Defence Force operate in a diverse range of land-environment missions. From the low-risk efforts bringing support to civil authorities in the Solomon Islands, through peacekeeping operations in Timor Leste, to the contribution to the counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan; New Zealand forces are experiencing the complexities of the irregular nature of the contemporary operating environment (COE). While accolades are forthcoming for New Zealand's contribution, some operational difficulties, particularly in intelligence exist. A key problem that needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency is the utility and understanding of the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process in the COE. The reason is clear - Countering Irregular Threats (CIT) will be the main form of activity for at least the next decade with complex missions predicted to be the regular, contemporary form of military operations for New Zealand out to 2020.

This thesis discusses the perception of the IPB by 17 participants from the New Zealand Defence Force. The participants included personnel who deployed on operational missions as well as training staff. By analysing their experiences the grounded theory *just getting by* emerged as a research-based explanation of the New Zealand approach. *Just getting by* consists of six categories: ambivalence, short of expectations, recognising the need to adapt, risk, professional optimism and satisficing. The theory concluded that difficulties in applying the traditional IPB in the COE were the result of three key elements. First, most of the training was perceived as still grounded in the Cold War era conventional environment. Second, the small Intelligence Corps was considered overstretched and barely holding on as an effective military force. Third, the doctrine of intelligence-led operations appeared to be ignored, causing much angst and frustration. The overall feeling was the IPB was not operating as expected, however in lieu of any other process it was suffice. *Just getting by* provides an opportunity for the New Zealand Defence Force to consider modifications to optimise the current process.

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I would like to sincerely thank the 17 participants whom gave freely of their time to share with me their very personal thoughts. Each was forthright, open and extraordinarily frank about their experiences and perspectives of the research topic. In some cases I felt the participants were quite grateful to have an opportunity to tell their story. The result was a rich collection of narratives and insights, of which this thesis presents the analysed material. While the full transcripts are not offered in this thesis I am very appreciative that all of the participants have allowed their interviews to be lodged on public record. This is an extremely generous decision, for I expect future researchers will find

valuable data within the transcripts. I am therefore hopeful that this thesis does justice to the contribution of the participants.

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Josh Wineera

Palmerston North, April 2011

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ABCA	ABCA Armies Programme, America, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand
CA	Chief of Army
CIT	Countering Irregular Threats
CN	Chief of Navy
COMJFNZ	Commander Joint Forces New Zealand
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COE	Contemporary Operating Environment
CRIB	The operational code name for the New Zealand Defence Force mission comprising the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan
CTC	Collective Training Centre
EARLLS	Electronic Activity Reporting Lessons Learned System
FM 2-0	US Army Field Manual: Intelligence (2010)
FM 3-0	US Army Field Manual: Operations (2008)
FM 3-24	US Army Field Manual: Counterinsurgency (2006)
FM 34-130	US Army Field Manual: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (1994)
FM 100-5	US Army Field Manual: Operations (1993)
GYRO	The operational codename of the New Zealand Defence Force mission to Timor Leste
HQ NZDF	Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force
HQ JFNZ	Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand
IPB	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
J1	Joint Personnel Branch
J2	Joint Intelligence Branch
JNCO	Junior Non-Commissioned Officer
LTDG	Land Training and Doctrine Group
MAP	Military Appreciation Process
MDMP	Military Decision Making Process
MNF-I	Multi-National Forces - Iraq
NZ P86	New Zealand Army Publication: Staff Officers Handbook

NZDDP-D	New Zealand Defence Force Publication: Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine
NZDDP-3.0	Joint Operations
NZIC	New Zealand Intelligence Corps
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
RATA	The operational code name of the New Zealand Defence Force mission to the Solomon Islands
SMIS	School of Military Intelligence and Security
SNCO	Senior Non-Commissioned Officer
TEWT	Tactical Exercise Without Troops

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