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Appendix D

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# The Terrorist Cell: A Systematic and Comparative Analysis of Interconnectedness between the PIRA, ETA and Hamas Cellular Systems

A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

In

Defence and Strategic Studies

at Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand.

David T.H. Osborne

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This thesis adheres to the Massey University policy on research practices as set out in MOPPS 3.3.4.



*The guerrilla fights the war of the flea, and his military  
enemy suffers the dog's disadvantages: too much to defend;  
too small, ubiquitous, and agile an enemy to come to grips with.  
If the war continues long enough – this is the theory – the dog  
succumbs to exhaustion and anaemia without ever having found  
anything on which to close his jaws or to rake with his claws.*

*The War of the Flea, Robert Taber*

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

Throughout history, terrorism has provided the conduit through which the ideological or religious zealot can make a statement in order to become the focus of their intended audience. This statement manifests itself as violent acts affecting the emotional state of the audience who maybe forced to recall their cultural and religious origins<sup>1</sup>. Terrorism, in this sense, acts as a strategy to inspire the people's conscience into effecting political change<sup>2</sup>. This strategy compensates for the terrorists weaker political and economic resources and underscores a manner of acting conducive to the doctrine of asymmetry. Eaton's description of asymmetry states,

In the realm of military affairs and national security asymmetry is acting, organising and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one's own advantages, exploit an opponents weakness, attain the initiative, or gain greater freedom of action<sup>3</sup>.

The asymmetric context bounds terrorism, not within the international rules of war, but within the objectives and re-defined cultural values of the terrorist<sup>4</sup>. Objectives and values transform into acts of indiscriminate violence against innocents, signalling the terrorist's *raison d'être*, to cause fear. Hence, the nature of terrorism makes its study even more significant.

The study of terrorism, while multidisciplinary in nature, lacks cohesion between its various disciplines. The tertiary faculties of social sciences and humanities house the principle disciplines that study terrorism. However, terrorism studied

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<sup>1</sup> Dingley, J and Kirk-Smith, M., 'Symbolism and Sacrifice in Terrorism', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 13:1 (2002), p. 123.

<sup>2</sup> Taber, R., *The War of the Flea: Guerilla Warfare Theory and Practice*, St Albans, UK: Paladin Frogmore, 1965, p. 19.

<sup>3</sup> Eaton, J., 'The Beauty of Asymmetry: An Examination of the Context and Practice of Asymmetric and Unconventional Warfare from a Western/Centrist Perspective', *Defence Studies*, 2:1 (2002), pp. 51-82, p. 51.

<sup>4</sup> Taber, p. 19.

within the asymmetric context, which includes political, civilian, paramilitary and military responses suggests the discipline of Defence and Strategic studies may offer a practical conduit to consolidate the various disciplines<sup>5</sup>. The areas of ethics, definition, motivations and justifications, internal structures and operations, counter-terrorism and the future of terrorism are the more prolific of topics in existing literature. While analyses of terrorist organisations might suggest organisational and operational similarities, few authors have attempted to delve deeper to corroborate their claims. The ultimate objective of this thesis is to help fill a perceived knowledge vacuum in comparative studies of terrorist organisations and cellular systems in particular.

This thesis systematically and comparatively analyses the cellular systems of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), Spanish ETA and Palestinian Hamas terrorist organisations to identify interconnectedness between their cells, organisational formations and operational patterns<sup>6</sup>. Essentially, the decomposition of each cellular system into constituent components produces the necessary data to detect interconnectedness and facilitate their reconstruction into a single generic product. The resulting generic model will assist in identifying predictors to enable forecasting of cellular systems and intends to offer a basis for the digital profiling of cellular systems. Chapter 2 will next examine the literature reviewed for this research and the methodology used to analyse the data extracted.

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<sup>5</sup> This statement does not intend to devalue the contribution of other disciplines to the field of terrorism. Rather, it proposes that the discipline of Defence and Strategic studies is well suited to encompass the theories and findings of these disciplines and codify those deemed functional for practical use.

<sup>6</sup> Taber identifies terrorism as urban guerrillaism. While some of these organisations might be regarded as guerrilla organisations, such as the PIRA, this research proposes by primarily deploying cellular systems and employing terrorism (as per this researches definition) these organisations can be regarded a step down from the organisational and operational characteristics of guerrilla organisations. However, this research in utilising the term 'terrorist organisation' acknowledges the common causal links between terrorist and guerrilla, many of which are identified in this thesis.

Source: Taber, p. 29, 90.

## Chapter 2

### Literature Review and Methodology

The literature review consisted of the following four tasks: first, to establish an historical framework for the terrorist cellular system; second, to identify behavioural and organisational theories relative to the cellular system; third, to establish the method of data analysis; and fourth, to extract data relevant to the analysis of the PIRA, ETA and Hamas terrorist organisations.

#### Literature Review for Historical Organisational Structures

Over the last century, the history of terrorism has been characterised by Laqueur in *A History of Terrorism* as changing in character, identified by changing methods, aims and the character of people<sup>1</sup>. Laqueur divides the history of terrorism into two periods. The first period dates from approximately 1879 and is characterised by the systemic use of terror<sup>2</sup>. This includes the earliest and most well known practitioners, the Sicarii (66-73) and Assassin's (1090-1275).

The Sicarii were a highly organised Jewish religious sect with a nationalist anti-roman ideology<sup>3</sup> who, through assassination and other means, inspired three popular uprisings against Rome<sup>4</sup>. In contrast, the Assassin's were a Shi'a based religious organisation which, according to the *International Encyclopedia of Terrorism*, were a terror cult dedicated to spreading the views of *Ismaili Islam*<sup>5</sup> through assassinations and martyrdom<sup>6</sup>. However, the French revolution (1793-1794) signifies the first period of terrorism from which the first

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<sup>1</sup> Laqueur, W., *A History of Terrorism*, New Brunswick, USA: Transaction Publishers, 2001, p. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Laqueur, p. 11.

<sup>3</sup> Laqueur, p. 7.

<sup>4</sup> Rapoport, D., 'Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions', *The American Political Science Review*, 78 (1984), pp. 658-677, p. 669.

<sup>5</sup> Morgan, D., 'The Assassins: A Terror Cult' in *International Encyclopedia of Terrorism*, London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1997, pp. 40-41, p. 40.

<sup>6</sup> Rapoport, p. 665.



definition of terrorism originates. In 1798, the *Dictionnaire of the Academie Francaise* defined terrorism as *Systeme, regime de la terreur* (Reign of Terror)<sup>7</sup>. In summary, terror during this first period was applied more as the rule rather than the exception and, in this sense, exponents of terror had little requirement for specialised organisational formations, such as the terrorist cell. In contrast, the period following the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century Russian revolutionaries introduced specialised organisational structures to carry out systematic campaigns of terror for political reasons<sup>8</sup>.

Rapoport, in *Assassination and Terrorism*, evaluates the importance of the Russian revolutionary movement between 1878 and 1881, and its use of terrorism to engender political change<sup>9</sup>. The formation of *Narodnaya Volya* (the will of the people), in 1879, represents the first terrorist organisation in Russia<sup>10</sup>, and arguably the world to organise along cellular lines. The *International Encyclopedia of Terrorism* traces *Narodnaya Volya*'s beginnings to the Anarchism of Mikhail Bakunin whose extremist views were committed to the total destruction of the Russian Tsarist regime<sup>11</sup>. Bakunin, while in exile, developed links with Sergei Nechayev who returned to Russia in 1869 and set up the non-violent *Narodnaya Rasprava* (the People's reckoning)<sup>12</sup>. The government suppression of this and other organisations caused Nechayev to turn to terrorism. Rapoport describes Nechayev's organisational plan and reproduces his Revolutionary Catechism<sup>13</sup> providing an insight into the early systematic organisational foundations of terrorist movements.

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<sup>7</sup> Laqueur, p. 6.

<sup>8</sup> Laqueur, p. 11.

<sup>9</sup> Rapoport, D., *Assassination and Terrorism*, Toronto, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1971, p. 44.

<sup>10</sup> Otte, T., 'Russian Anarchist Terror' in *International Encyclopedia of Terrorism*, London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1997, pp. 56-57, p. 56.

<sup>11</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> Rapoport, *Assassination and Terrorism*, pp. 79-84.

Nechayev's Revolutionary Catechism comprises an organisational structure and tactics for a theoretical terrorist movement founded on instigating a revolution to destroy the state, including its roots, traditions and entire social order<sup>14</sup>. He recognised that 'propaganda of the deed' or bold dramatic action would establish a movement's status<sup>15</sup>. The action he describes is part of a strategy '...to attack the masses, the very people he wants to liberate, but to attack them in such a way that it is the government which appears to be their enemy.'<sup>16</sup> Nechayev's cellular system represented the vehicle to achieve this objective and is summarised as follows:

- The movement must be organised into cells of several members of lesser ranks underneath the command and control of a cell leader. The cells are arranged in a hierarchical top down structure with links maintained between cells from above and below by a member belonging to both cells<sup>17</sup>.
- Solidarity within the cell is crucial to providing the strength necessary to complete objectives<sup>18</sup>. Nechayev assigns revolutionary capital to each member of the cell based on commitment. In this sense, the cell leader is not expendable but cell members are<sup>19</sup>.
- The leadership provides general direction allowing the cell to operate with flexibility and initiative<sup>20</sup>. Leadership identifies various categories of human targets, such as those targeted for death or exploitation<sup>21</sup>. Actions by cells are decided in terms of their ultimate long-term success for the revolution<sup>22</sup>.
- A candidate's recruitment is achieved through common agreement within the organisation, which ultimately rests on the candidate's commitment<sup>23</sup>. The member once recruited must be isolated from the existing social order to develop the commitment necessary to destroy the classes of people the movement rejects<sup>24</sup>.

*Narodnaya Volya* employed Nechayev's suggestions but with limited success. Von Borcke comments in his article *Violence and Terror in Russian*

<sup>14</sup> Rapoport, *Assassination and Terrorism*, p. 23.

<sup>15</sup> Rapoport, *Assassination and Terrorism*, p. 47.

<sup>16</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> Rapoport, *Assassination and Terrorism*, p. 52.

<sup>18</sup> Rapoport, *Assassination and Terrorism*, p. 80.

<sup>19</sup> Rapoport, *Assassination and Terrorism*, p. 81.

<sup>20</sup> Rapoport, *Assassination and Terrorism*, p. 52.

<sup>21</sup> Rapoport, *Assassination and Terrorism*, pp. 82-83.

<sup>22</sup> Rapoport, *Assassination and Terrorism*, p. 81.

<sup>23</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> Rapoport, *Assassination and Terrorism*, p. 79.

*Revolutionary Populism: The Narodnaya Volya 1879 – 83*, following eight attempts on the Tsar the government responded with a strategy of selective repression or mass arrests to isolate the revolutionaries<sup>25</sup>. The *Narodnaya Volya* finally succeeded in assassinating Tsar Alexander II but negative public reaction resulted in the collapse of *Narodnaya Volya*<sup>26</sup>. The failure of *Narodnaya Volya* reveals the tremendous gap between revolutionary theory and practice. For example, Von Borcke comments that *Narodnaya Volya*'s lack of popular support denied it of safe houses and finances<sup>27</sup>. To better understand why such a gap exists, the literature review moves on from developing a historical framework to developing an organisational and behavioural framework.

## Literature Review for Theories of Organisation and Behaviour

Heberle's 1951 book *Social Movements: An Introduction to Political Sociology* and Crossley's 2002 book *Making Sense of Social Movements* each respectively contribute to the understanding of social movements and their social networks. Heberle underlines the importance of solidarity as a source of group identity in order to bring about changes to the social order<sup>28</sup>. Moreover, Heberle identifies constitutive ideas as symbolising the justification for the movement and the deliberate vagueness of these ideas combined with clarity of objectives in order to unite its members<sup>29</sup>.

Crossley theorises on the importance of social networks in movement formation and subsequent mobilisation. Social networks provide effective avenues for

<sup>25</sup> Von Borcke, A., 'Violence and Terror in Russian Revolutionary Populism: The Narodnaya Volya, 1879-83' in Mommsen and Hirshfeld (eds), *Social Protest, Violence and Terror in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Europe*, London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1982, pp. 48-62, p. 53.

<sup>26</sup> Otte, p. 57.

<sup>27</sup> Von Borcke comments that three assassination attempts on the Tsar cost the organisation 30,000 to 40,000 rubbles.

Source: Von Borcke, p. 58.

<sup>28</sup> Heberle, R., *Social Movement: An Introduction to Political Sociology*, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts Inc, 1951, p. 7.

<sup>29</sup> Heberle, p. 24.

recruitment with existing bonds of solidarity making them more amenable to mobilisation<sup>30</sup>. For example, churches produce social networks that mobilise through intense social interactions such as the singing of hymns<sup>31</sup>. Continuing mobilisation is via a feedback loop. Each act commits the member to increasingly more risky and costly acts resulting in increasing network integration, ideological affirmation and commitment to their new identity<sup>32</sup>. Both Heberle and Crossley's analysis are evident in Tarrow's 1994 book, *Power in Movement*, which provides a key behavioural thesis applicable to terrorist organisations.

Tarrow describes a behavioural theory for social movements based on cultural, organisational and personal sources. Movements comprise four empirical properties: collective challenge through direct action<sup>33</sup>; common purpose comprising of common claims against opponents<sup>34</sup>; solidarity through recognition of common interest<sup>35</sup>; and sustaining collective action, which Tarrow theorises as taking advantage of political opportunities<sup>36</sup>. For example, changes in state strength or forms of repression allow the movement to exploit the vulnerability through collective action<sup>37</sup>. These opportunities quickly close but, while open, collective actions such as violent acts affect short and long-term consequences.

In the short-term, 'Movements that continue to repeat the same actions run the risk of losing support and being ignored...'<sup>38</sup> If the movement responds by radicalisation they run the risk of splintering whereas following the path of

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<sup>30</sup> Crossley, N., *Making Sense of Social Movements*, Buckingham: Open University Press, 2002, p. 94.

<sup>31</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> Crossley, p. 119.

<sup>33</sup> Tarrow, S., *Power in Movement*, Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 4.

<sup>34</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> Tarrow, p. 5.

<sup>36</sup> Tarrow, p. 99.

<sup>37</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>38</sup> Tarrow, p. 116.

convention runs the risk of being compromised. In the long-term, the movement absorbs innovations that work, such as controlled violence, to avoid government repression and build solidarity<sup>39</sup>. Movements respond to these political opportunities through collective actions.

Collective actions combine challenging actions that threaten a cost, threaten uncertainty and engender solidarity<sup>40</sup>. In this sense, violence reduces uncertainty giving the state a mandate for repression<sup>41</sup>. However, innovations such as controlled violence reduce this effect to some degree. To mobilize the movement's supporters to collective action the movement's leader uses cultural or constructed symbols<sup>42</sup>.

The interaction between leader and supporters frames the movement and orientates it '...towards action, fashioned at the intersection between target populations' culture and their own values and goals.'<sup>43</sup> To be effective, the leader must overcome competition, adapt a balance to retain both militants and non-violent supporters, and present views as the members would see them<sup>44</sup>. Moreover, the movement's strategy must be orientated towards generating issues in such a way they are broadcasted. The media outlets in this sense act as a diffuse mechanism to gather consensus<sup>45</sup>. For the leader to mobilize supporters for collective action at times of political opportunity an effective organisational formation must frame the movement.

Tarrow argues, 'The most effective forms of organisation are based on autonomous and interdependent social networks linked by loosely coordinating

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<sup>39</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>40</sup> Tarrow, p. 102.

<sup>41</sup> Tarrow, p. 104.

<sup>42</sup> Tarrow, p. 122.

<sup>43</sup> Tarrow, p. 123.

<sup>44</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> Tarrow, p. 126.

mobilizing structures.'<sup>46</sup> The organisational model consists of the following three mechanisms:

- A formal organisation that identifies goals and the means to implement them
- The form which collective action takes
- Connective mobilizing structures that link leaders to supporters<sup>47</sup>

Organisational models need to be '...sufficiently robust to stand-up to opponents but flexible enough to change with new circumstances.'<sup>48</sup> Flexible systems, such as innovations in collective action, produce opportunities to increase the survivability of the movement. Social relays link the leaders to the sources of mobilisation at the base.

The social relay's key feature is allowing partial or total autonomy at the base providing for a decentralised model of control<sup>49</sup>. Even though, decentralisation discourages coordination, it strengthens links of solidarity through social networks composed of a collective identity encouraging collective action and longevity. Ultimately, Tarrow states, 'Sustaining a movement is the result of a delicate balance between suffocating the power in movement by providing too much organisation and leaving it to spin off uselessly away through the tyranny of decentralization.'<sup>50</sup> Consequently, organisations must continually fine-tune their apparatus to maintain support, such as adjusting tactics. Conflicts that do occur are often characterised by leadership disputes triggered for various reasons, such as ideological schisms, resulting in alternative centres of power forming<sup>51</sup>.

Tarrow examines cultural, organisational and individual sources of the power of movement to support a theory of collective action based on political opportunity. In contrast to the behavioural approach, Crenshaw offers instrumental and

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<sup>46</sup> Tarrow, p. 136.

<sup>47</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>48</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>49</sup> Tarrow, p. 149.

<sup>50</sup> Tarrow, p. 190.

<sup>51</sup> Tarrow, p. 155.

organisational theories in her 1985 paper *Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organisational Approaches*.

Crenshaw offers two contrasting theories. The Instrumental approach ascribes the environment as the instrument to guide intentions<sup>52</sup>. The terrorist's intentions rely on the availability of resources to determine the intensity of the engagement and ideological or religious beliefs to identify the opportunity and availability of symbolic targets<sup>53</sup>. Intentional violence in this sense is a means to a political end<sup>54</sup>. Crenshaw contrasts this approach with an organisational thesis originally published in her 1985 paper, *An Organizational Approach to Political Terrorism*<sup>55</sup>.

Terrorism, in the organisational sense derives not from the environment but from a business-like organisational formation and behaviour, whose primary concern is its survival<sup>56</sup>. Survival is determined through the interaction of long-term politics and short-term incentives<sup>57</sup>. Internal politics lay out objectives that appeal to supporters long-term. However, short-term incentives, such as short-lived issues, ultimately sustain the organisation engendering solidarity and hence, cohesion of the organisational model<sup>58</sup>. For example, a terrorist cell threatened by infiltration would relegate ideological aspirations in favour of ensuring group survival by isolating itself thereby increasing solidarity<sup>59</sup>. The organisational model is organised along the five following themes:

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<sup>52</sup> Crenshaw, M., 'Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organisational Approaches', *Inside Terrorist Organisations*, ed. Rapoport, D., London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001, pp. 13-31, p. 13.

<sup>53</sup> Crenshaw, p. 15.

<sup>54</sup> Crenshaw, p. 13.

<sup>55</sup> Crenshaw, M., 'An Organizational Approach to Political Terrorism', *Orbis*, 29:3 (1985), pp. 465-489.

<sup>56</sup> Crenshaw, p. 22.

<sup>57</sup> Crenshaw, p. 21

<sup>58</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> *ibid.*

- There must be a demand for the organisation
- The organisation must operate with a sense of entrepreneurship as incentives are manipulated to ensure group efficacy
- The organisation operates with a sense of efficiency, by continually assessing the organisation against others and probing for state weaknesses
- The organisation has capable leaders
- The organisation has access to immediate resources<sup>60</sup>

Sensitivity to members is particularly vital in this model correlating directly to organisational survivability<sup>61</sup>. Subsequently, outlets are constructed to voice dissent and provide avenues for voluntary exit<sup>62</sup>.

Leaders attempt to counter voice and exit by constructing solidarity through social relations, by expressing collective goals, by using ideology or religion to foster loyalty and sometimes by applying coercion, such as the irreversibility of initiation costs<sup>63</sup>. The formation of the organisation is crucial in this respect and as Crenshaw points out '...centralized, secretive, and compartmentalized organisations are less likely to be the least tolerant of dissent.'<sup>64</sup>

Crenshaw focuses on the formation of organisations, their business-like structures and the incentives that sustain them. In contrast, Tarrow examines the movement that underlies the organisation and the political opportunities that sustain it. However, both Crenshaw and Tarrow acknowledge the importance of: skilled leaders, decentralisation through cellular autonomy, solidarity through social networks, incentives through ideology or religion, and flexibility in organisational formation. While there are some differences between the two theories, each contains useful concepts for understanding underlying organisational models when analysing particular cell formations, operational patterns and their interaction with counter-terrorism measures. Both the historical and organisational frameworks outline precepts with which to

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<sup>60</sup> Crenshaw, p. 22.

<sup>61</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>62</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>63</sup> Crenshaw, p. 23.

<sup>64</sup> *ibid.*



determine a compatible research methodology. The next section reviews literature relevant to the research methodology employed in this thesis in addition to presenting a primitive test case to demonstrate its applicability.

## Literature Review for Systems Decomposition and Localisation

The 2002 Rand study *Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism* by Davis and Jenkins undertakes a system based decomposition process to uncover influences that help mitigate terrorist acts employed by the al-Qaeda terrorist organisation<sup>65</sup>. This study provided the stimulus for employing the decomposition and localisation process of analysis in this study.

Bechtel and Richardson's 1993 book *Discovering Complexity: Decomposition and Localization as Strategies in Scientific Research* and the 1968 textbook *Principle of Systems* by Jay Forrester represent key literature sources for this studies research methodology. Forrester defines a system as:

...a grouping of parts that operates together for a common purpose. An automobile is a system of components that work together to provide transportation. An autopilot and an airplane form a system for flying at a specified altitude. A warehouse and loading platform is a system for delivering goods to trucks<sup>66</sup>.

Bechtel and Richardson identify and describe both integrated and self-regulating systems as comprising feedback mechanisms that adapt to changing environments integral to the functioning of the system as a whole<sup>67</sup>. Forrester defines feedback mechanisms as influences caused by past behaviours that result in either negative or positive actions<sup>68</sup>. These feedback loops may be single or coupled<sup>69</sup>. For example, a positive single feedback loop might be

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<sup>65</sup> Davis, P and Jenkins, B., *Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component of the War on al Qaeda*, Rand Corporation, 2002, retrieved 10 March May 2003, from [www.rand.com](http://www.rand.com)

<sup>66</sup> Forrester, J., *Principles of Systems*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Wright-Allen Press Inc, 1968, p. 1-1.

<sup>67</sup> Bechtel, W and Richardson, R., *Discovering Complexity: Decomposition and Localization as Strategies in Scientific Research*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 23-26.

<sup>68</sup> Forrester, p. 1-5.

described as follows: new terrorists are located and trained by existing terrorists; the larger the terrorist organisation the more terrorists that can train new terrorists; consequently, the terrorist training rate depends directly on the number of salesman terrorists<sup>70</sup>. By coupling a growth modification process to this feedback loop comprising another feedback loop made up of a recruitment filtering process, such as identifying situational and character markers, it becomes a coupled feedback loop. To achieve this level of understanding within a cellular system requires using the decomposition and localisation process of analysis.

Bechtel and Richardson describe decomposition as the subdivision of an activity so that it becomes manageable and intelligible<sup>71</sup>. It assumes that one activity of the whole system is the product of a set of subordinate functions or components<sup>72</sup>. Direct localisation identifies these components and then carries out analysis on the link between the behaviour of the system and the influence of the components<sup>73</sup>. The process for analysing components is to identify what they are and what they do<sup>74</sup>. Bechtel and Richardson assign components to a higher locus of control and their constituent parts to lower loci of control<sup>75</sup>. In essence, these component parts are responsible for what the system does. Using Bechtel and Richardson's description of decomposition and localisation the cell represents a system within the greater system of the terrorist organisation that carries out activities, which determine the cells effectiveness.

Cell effectiveness is, *the qualitative capability of a terrorist cell to operate as part of a much larger terrorist organisation*. To determine cell effectiveness requires identifying the influences that alter a particular qualitative capability of

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<sup>69</sup> Forrester, p. 1-5.

<sup>70</sup> Example modified from Forrester's salesman example.

Source: Forrester, p. 2-3.

<sup>71</sup> Bechtel and Richardson, p. 23.

<sup>72</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>73</sup> Bechtel and Richardson, p. 24.

<sup>74</sup> Bechtel and Richardson, p. 18.

<sup>75</sup> Bechtel and Richardson, p. 64.

the cell. The qualitative capability of a cell represents its cell capital whose primary constituent components are:

1. Compartmentalization
2. Commitment
3. Leadership
4. Organisational formation:
  - 4.1. Popular support
  - 4.2. Recruitment
  - 4.3. Training
5. Operational Patterns:
  - 5.1. Logistics
  - 5.2. Intelligence
  - 5.3. Attacks
6. Counter-Terrorism measures

These components derive from the historical and organisational frameworks, and from the test case described later. Moreover, Taber's authoritative work *The War of the Flea Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice*, Guevara's *Guerrilla Warfare*, Asprey's two volume set *War in the Shadows* and Kiesler's *The Psychology of Commitment: Experiments Linking Behaviour to Belief* lend crucial guerrilla and psychological theories amenable to understanding these components. Taber in particular summarises important guerrilla theorists including Che Guevara, Mao Tse-tung and Vo Nguyen Giap, whereas Kiesler provides an extensive research monograph focusing on commitment.

To identify influences affecting the components of cell capital requires taking a terrorist organisation, collating its data into common component groups and constituent parts, summarising this data showing key influences and then extrapolating these influences into a decomposition table. The decomposition table derives from Tarrow's interpretation of movements matched to cell capital as shown below:

- Solidarity includes:
  - Compartmentalization
- Collective action includes:
  - Commitment
- Mobilising actions includes:
  - Leadership
  - Organisational formation
  - Operational patterns
  - Counter-Terrorism measures

Each influence is applied to the constituent parts of the 10 components of cell capital and a decision based on existing facts determines if the cellular capital increases or decreases. Ultimately the decomposition table will identify intra and inter-component links within the cell providing for an accurate translation into decomposition diagrams.

To develop decomposition diagrams using a systematic decomposition and localisation, a snapshot of the organisation is taken and the cellular system broken down into its components and their constituent parts. For example, the Davis and Jenkins Rand study broke down the al-Qaeda terrorist organisation into three parts. First, the classes of actor influencing the parts; second, influences resulting from terrorist actions and deterrent feedbacks; and finally, the lifecycle of a terrorist identifying feedback loops<sup>76</sup>.

Systems decomposition offers two advantages. First, a systems approach can uncover competing or different influences that act upon particular processes making the analysis more thorough. Second, a systems approach can expose vulnerabilities at the lowest levels of the target analysis. In order to liken systems decomposition to the objectives of this thesis and to examine this method's utility a simple decomposition was completed.


Figures 1,2 and 3 describe a system's decomposition of the Uruguayan Tupamaros, a nationalist-socialist organisation who during the early 1970s used

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<sup>76</sup> Davis and Jenkins, pp. 14-20.

the cellular system with such great effectiveness they nearly toppled the government<sup>77</sup>. The Tupamaros' clear organisational formation and precise application of the cell has engendered some European terrorist organisations<sup>78</sup>, such as the PIRA<sup>79</sup>, to copy their organisational model. Since the mid 1970s, the Tupamaros have become an organisational benchmark for various terrorist organisations.

Figure 1 shows the major actors and their classes within the Tupamaros organisation. It represents the divisions of labour within the Tupamaros system. The actors are its leaders in the executive committee, the covert foot soldiers represented by a cell leader, periphery members and overt supporters. In order to think about the cell as a system (see Figure 2) a decomposition of major actors lets one contrast actors with one another and consequently better identify the influences each actor has on the constituent components and parts of cell effectiveness.



**Figure 1: Actors in the Tupamaros Cellular System**

Source: adapted from Porzecanski, A., *Uruguay's Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla*, New York: Praeger, 1973.


Figure 2 shows the effectiveness of a Tupamaros cell by identifying various influences. There are six colour-coded quadrants representing the components of cell capital. White delimits compartmentalization, blue delimits leadership, green delimits commitment, gold delimits organisational formation, plum delimits

<sup>77</sup> Calvert, P., 'Terrorism in Uruguay' in *International Encyclopedia of Terrorism*, London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1997, pp. 468-472, p. 468.

<sup>78</sup> Laqueur, p. 176.

<sup>79</sup> Gearty, C., *Terror*, London: Faber, 1991, p. 118.


operational patterns and grey delimits counter-terrorism measures. An arrow from one item to another indicates either a positive (no sign) or a negative influence (- sign) on the second item. For example, in the bottom right hand corner as targeting becomes increasingly controlled by leadership the terror becomes more selective which consequently increases the effectiveness of the cell. Selective terror protects the organisation from unnecessary civilian casualties guaranteeing continued support from overt supporters. In contrast, as selective terror increases the government response to terror increases, causing an over response increasing the counter-terrorism threat and hence, reducing cell effectiveness. Overall, counter-terrorism measures tend to decrease cell effectiveness, logistics and intelligence increase cell effectiveness, a clear ideology increases commitment and recruitment and compartmentalization shows there is somewhat of a trade-off between limiting infiltration and reducing coordination between cells. Each of these six areas defines the boundary for this system.



**Figure 2: Systematic Perspective of the Tupamaro Cell**

Source: adapted from Porzecanski, A., *Uruguay's Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla*, New York: Praeger, 1973.

Figure 3 shows the lifecycle of a Tupamaro terrorist. It is recognised that not every terrorist's lifecycle may fit into this particular lifecycle pattern however, by showing the parts of the lifecycle as feedback loops the cell as a system may be better understood when considering counter-terrorism and compartmentalization issues.



**Figure 3: Lifecycle of a Tupamaro**

Source: adapted from Porzecanski, A., *Uruguay's Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla*, New York: Praeger, 1973.

The techniques of systems decomposition can identify influences and determine links between organisational formation, operational patterns and counter-terrorism measures. Figure 2 becomes a crucial step when identifying the interconnectedness between terrorist cells with Figures 1 and 3 acting as supporting structures. This methodology uncovers similarities and differences between terrorist organisations. For example, Tupamaro cellular patterns are highly autonomous which reduces the counter-terrorism threat but disrupts the organisational capacity to coordinate cells. However, these diagrams while demonstrating the efficacy of the method lack the complexity of the organisations in this research. Subsequently, some diagrammatic optimising will be necessary to clearly show each component of cellular capital. For a systems



decomposition to be effective, the data input into this process requires wide ranging searches for data relating to the components of cellular capital.

### Literature Reviews for the PIRA, ETA and Hamas

The following literature reviews extract data relevant for determining cell effectiveness using as a basis for analysis the components of cellular capital. Each review consists of broad sweeps across open literature sources examining key pieces of literature, supporting books and articles, and when necessary completing interviews.

The PIRA, without a doubt, represents the most widely written terrorist organisation in this study. This literature review takes a snapshot of the PIRA cellular system for 1985. General key sources are Urban's 1992 book *Big Boys Rules: The Secret Struggle Against the IRA*, Coogan's 1987 book *The IRA* and O'Brien's 1993 book *The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Fein 1985 to Today*. Urban maintains a security force perspective, whereas both O'Brien and Coogan examine the conflict from the PIRA perspective. Both Urban and O'Brien reference key statistics used in this research. There are three key sources for understanding compartmentalization and commitment within PIRA cells.

A 1991 ethnographical study of Irish terrorism by Feldman, *Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland* identifies links between solidarity and British counter-terrorism measures. Dingley and Kirk-Smith's 2002 article *Symbolism and Sacrifice in Terrorism* analyse Irish Nationalism with an emphasis on Catholicism. Wright's 1990 book *Terrorist Propaganda: The Red Army Faction and The Provisional IRA 1968 – 1986* discusses the use of propaganda to engender solidarity and cohesion. There are three key sources for understanding operational patterns and counter-terrorism measures.

Greer's 1995 book *Supergrasses: A Study in Anti-Terrorist Law Enforcement in Northern Ireland* discusses the widespread use of informers and supporting legislative structure. Geraghty's 2000 book *The Irish War: The Hidden Conflict Between the IRA and British Intelligence* discusses innovation and technology within the PIRA. O'Day's (ed) 1987 book *Dimensions of Irish Terrorism* provides various articles ranging from violence and its effect on the community, Irish security force casualties and intelligence, and psychological warfare operations. Of particular importance to the overall review are reprints of internal documents.

The PIRA terrorist handbook the *Green Book* found in Dillon's *The Dirty War* and the leaked 1979 British Army intelligence document *Northern Ireland: Future Terrorist Trends* found in Cronin's *Irish Nationalism* each respectively provides insights into internal PIRA operations and how the British security forces viewed the PIRA threat. The vast wealth of books on the PIRA is indicative of its cultural origins and age of the organisation. In contrast, the literature reviews of the ETA and Hamas are hampered by various cultural constraints, particularly language barriers.

The data extracted for the ETA literature review takes a snapshot of ETA's cellular system for 1984. Clark's 1984 book *The Basque Insurgents ETA, 1952 – 1980* provides a detailed analysis of the Basque movement and is the key source of research for the ETA. However, some statistics and deductions made by Clark are open to dispute and therefore require some critical analysis to interpret. Subsequently, statistics dating back to 1974 on the Spanish Ministry of Interior's Internet website provide an alternative source for comparison. In addition, four additional key sources are referenced to support Clark's analysis.

Irvin's 1999 comparative study of Sinn Fein and Herri Batasuna activists *Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country* provides useful statistics and paths to membership of ETA's political wing. Sullivan's 1988 book *ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euskadi 1890-*

1986 provides a detailed description of ETA strategy. Alexander, Swetnam and Levine's 2001 book *ETA: Profile of a Terrorist Group* provides an organisational analysis of the ETA primarily constructed from media reports. Mata's translated 2002 article *A Long History at the Limits of legality Batasuna: The Strategy of Insurrection* provides a Spanish interpretation of ETA's strategy. There are three key sources for understanding compartmentalization and commitment within ETA cells.

Zulaika's 1988 ethnographical study *Basque Violence Metaphor and Sacrament* of the Basque village Itzair and its local ETA cell describe the traditions and rituals that pervade Basque terrorism. Khatami's 1997 article *Between Class and Nation: Ideology and Radical Basque Ethnonationalism* discusses the ETA's working class origins and its popular Basque support base. Mees 2001 article *Between Votes and Bullets: Conflicting Ethnic Identities in the Basque Country* references Tarrow's theory of social movements and discusses both Basque nationalism and social networks in villages and small towns. There are two key sources for understanding Spanish counter-terrorism measures.

Woodworth's 2001 book *Dirty War, Clean Hands: ETA, the Gal and Spanish Democracy* provides a detailed examination of the Spanish governments use of state directed terrorism to combat the ETA during the pre and post Franco periods. Vercher's 1988 Ph D thesis *British and Spanish Measures to Deal with Terrorism: A Comparative Study with some Reference to the EEC Framework* provides a comprehensive comparative study, discussing the Spanish governments legislative approach to countering terrorism.

The data extracted for the Hamas literature review takes a snapshot of Hamas' cellular system for 2001. Mishal and Sela's 1996 book *The Palestinian Hamas, Vision Violence, and Coexistence* is the key source of research for Hamas. This book is premised on Tarrow's interpretation of movements and provides an inside look at Hamas' organisation and decision making processes. Statistical

data is extracted from the International Centre for Terrorisms (ICT) Internet website. Data used to support Mishal and Sela's analysis comes from three additional key sources.

Hroub's 2000 book *Hamas* provides a political emphasis from an Arab perspective in its analysis of Hamas, although it lacks the level of organisational discussion inherent in Mishal and Sela's analysis. Alexander's 2002 book *Palestinian Religious Terrorism: Hamas and Islamic Jihad* provides an analytical description of Hamas, although its descriptions tend to be brief and sometimes dubious. In addition, Eshel's 2002 article *Hamas Resists Pressure as Israel Targets Arafat* reviews Hamas' organisational structure, presence in the Gaza Strip and financial support. There are four key sources for understanding compartmentalization and commitment within Hamas cells.

Litvak's 1996 paper *The Islamization of Palestinian Identity: The Case of Hamas* emphasises the importance of Islam in providing a national identity and how, along with nationalism, it is used to engender Palestinian patriotism. Schbley's 2002 article *Defining Religious Terrorism: A Causal and Anthological Profile* presents a study of Shi'a terrorists identifying various psychological characteristics which provide some correlation to the Sunni militants of Hamas. In addition, two articles, the first by Butler in 2001, *Suicide Bombers Dignity, Despair, and the Need for Hope: An Interview with Eyad El Sarraj Mishal*, the second by Moghadam in 2003, *Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects* each produce an analysis of the mentality and indoctrination process of Hamas suicide bombers. There is one key source for understanding Israeli counter-terrorism measures, however various supporting sources are also referenced.

Katz's 1999 book *The Hunt for the Engineer: How Israeli Agents Tracked the Hamas Master Bomber* provides a thorough examination of the Hamas bomb maker Yehiya Ayyash and Israeli efforts to track him down. While emphasising

Israeli counter-terrorism measures, this book also provides key information on commitment, organisational formations and operational patterns. To supplement the lack of counter-terrorism literature, over 20 articles from *Jane's Intelligence Review* and *Jane's Foreign Report* have been reviewed. Many of these articles have provided key information on Israeli intelligence and counter-terrorism strategies. The next section discusses the processes involved in inputting the data extracted from these literature reviews into the systems decomposition and localisation methodology.

## Methodology

The methodology for this thesis employs a process of systematically analysing cellular systems of the PIRA, ETA and Hamas terrorist organisations. In order to do this effectively a roadmap described below details the problem, prescribes the boundaries of this research and documents an incremental approach for its analysis.

## Statement of the Problem

The intent of this thesis is to analyse the terrorist cellular system within the context of the larger terrorist organisation. Research will identify common cellular formations, operational patterns and counter-terrorism measures between terrorist organisations. The consolidation of these factors form key informational components. These components contain generic features that represent reliable predictors of cellular activity and hence, may contribute in some way to fine-tuning intelligence production activities. In preference to focusing on the senior leadership structures of terrorist organisations, a focus on terrorist cellular structures will take priority. The principle objectives of this study are:

- 1 To identify cellular interconnectedness between the PIRA, ETA and Hamas terrorist organisations
- 2 To determine if cellular profiling is feasible using cellular interconnectedness
- 3 To determine the effectiveness of the systems methodology of analysis used in this study

In order to achieve these objectives this thesis asks the following research questions:

1. To what extent do common factors influence the cells organisational formation?
2. To what extent do common organisational formations link to common operational patterns?
3. To what extent do common counter-terrorism measures act to counter common operational patterns?
4. To what extent can common organisational formations and operational patterns act as effective predictors in countering terrorist activities?
5. How effective is the systems approach in decomposing the terrorist cell?

In order to address these key questions, the scope of terrorist organisations to be analysed and the restrictions placed on their analysis requires defining.

## Boundaries and Limitations

Boundaries and limitations establish the viability of the organisations encompassed within this study as candidates for the systems method of decomposition and localisation.

The following organisational requirements ensure the organisations chosen are, at a minimum, terrorist organisations per this thesis' definition of terrorism<sup>60</sup> and maintain sophisticated and viably decomposable infrastructures:

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<sup>60</sup> Some might regard the organisations in this study as freedom fighters and the term terrorism negative in its use, however the intent of this thesis is not to debate this issue but to analyse cellular systems. The term terrorism as applied within the context of this thesis is recognised as containing state characterisations with accompanying bias and subsequently accounted for to ensure objectivity during analysis.

1. Trans-national operations, whether logistical or offensive, have been carried out by the terrorist organisation
2. The terrorist organisation must use a cellular organisational structure

The following research requirements ensure the analysis encompasses both ideological and religious based organisations and they have extensive literature sources for research:

1. This study will examine terrorist organisations in Europe and the Middle East each originating from separate countries
2. At least three key literature sources available for each terrorist organisation

However, many important aspects of terrorism remain outside the scope of this thesis. The leadership structure, political branches and historical aspects of terrorist organisations represent subject areas described in summary terms in preference to retaining the primary focus on the terrorist cell. Unless political and legal solutions to terrorism represent standalone counter-terrorism solutions, their examination will be restricted. For example, the Spanish government's policy of repentant terrorists is a standalone counter-terrorism measure because it was instrumental in dismantling several ETA cells. However, supporting political and legal structures in relation to the counter-terrorism measures they buttress, such as the British supergrass system, remain relevant to this research. These boundaries and limitations, which encompass the PIRA, ETA and Hamas terrorist organisations, enable the application of the following methodology with a high degree of efficacy.

## Research Methodology

The method in this study consists principally of a descriptive exploratory analysis of the relevant literature. The literature consists of primarily non-government sources, however, any government documents referenced are sourced from the public arena. Moreover, specialised intelligence periodicals including Jane's Intelligence Review and other publications specialising in conflict and terrorism, international security and international relations are also referenced. To facilitate an adequate systematic and comparative analysis within an imposed time-period and content limit requires that only facts relevant to the objectives of this study will be considered. It is believed this will not detract from the clarity and quality of the result.

The vast wealth of terrorist literature has acted as a handicap to those who study terrorism. Many books and articles have tended to rehash information in similar ways without providing any new perspectives on the data available. The clandestine nature of terrorism's key actors namely, the terrorists and security forces, restrict the availability of information resulting in some speculation in particular areas, such as counter-terrorism measures. Ultimately, some information is not available. To produce reliable information for this study requires reviewing as many resources as possible to clarify any conflicting versions of facts that may present. Where a fact is relevant to this study and the source is suspect, such as statistics based on media reports, it will be indicated as such within this study. In addition to suspect sources, the consideration of facts must also allow for bias.

Many works of terrorism literature originate from the west, from both government and non-government sources. This presents the following two key problems: inherent bias, and public and private stakes. Inherent bias occurs when culturally derived values are applied in contexts that generally involve complex cultural issues between various parties. This may result in a loss of objectivity limiting the quality of the information. For example, terrorism as a



concept is considered highly immoral by the west, yet socio-political orientations may vary the degree this viewpoint translates into the written word. Hence, the manifestation of this bias in the form of sympathy or exaggeration clouds objectiveness within the cultural context. In order to address inherent bias the best solution is to actively understand the writer's motivations for presenting the information and the ranges of bibliographic sources referenced and, when necessary, use corroborating evidence to verify facts.

Subjects that afford the highest level of public importance, such as terrorism, inherently attract various private and public stakes. Public stakes resulting from bureaucratic and legislative changes, for example the 2002 creation of the United States Homeland Security Department, may result in more bureaucratic red tape and more extraneous information being produced attaching these interests to terrorism. Moreover, these public organisations develop their own cultures whose very survival is dependent on stopping terrorist acts. The clandestine nature of government operations may subsequently result in a loss of transparency ultimately clouding sources of terrorism data.

In a similar sense, some private interests may develop with similar motivations but with a greater emphasis on survival and in this respect offer opinions that imbue it with the government. For example, as government and media sources use academic institutions as sources of advice and commentary, academics have an increasing potential to view personal prestige and business interests ahead of the free exchange of ideas and advancement of terrorism as a discipline in its own right. Inevitably, little can be done regarding the manipulation or withholding of information by public and private interests, consequently the best solution is to realise that it exists and by examining the context in which the information is presented be able to distinguish speculative and ameliorating information from verifiable facts.

Once data collation is complete, the three terrorist organisations in this study will each be analysed using a systems decomposition and localisation process to produce visual representations. Refer back to Figures one, two and three for a simple example of this process. Snapshots of each organisation according to the previously mentioned literature reviews are as follows: IRA (1985), ETA (1984) and Hamas (2001)<sup>81</sup>.

Once the decomposition of the three terrorist organisations' cellular systems is completed, a four-step analysis process will occur. This approach will comprehensively identify elements of cellular interconnectedness that cross time, spatial and cultural spaces. First, a comparative analysis between the PIRA, ETA and Hamas cellular systems identifies common actors and constituent parts for each component of cellular capital. Second, generic feedback loops for the components of cellular capital are developed using the identified common constituent parts and actors. These generic feedback loops represent cellular interconnectedness. Third, the generic feedback loops are attached to one another according to their organisational or operational orientation in order to construct two central pictures of cellular interconnectedness. For example, the component recruitment is attached to popular support as part of organisational formation. Finally, both the organisational and operational feedback loops are integrated to represent the big picture of cellular interconnectedness from which predictors may be determined and the utility of cellular profiling assessed. This methodology is organised into eight chapters.

Chapter 1 presents a descriptive theme of terrorism for this study and identifies vacuums within the existing terrorism literature that this thesis hopes to contribute. Chapter 2 examines the literature reviews and methodology of the

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<sup>81</sup> These snapshot dates are approximations. The range of data available results in slippage within approximately plus or minus five years of each date. However, the integrity of each analysis has been maintained by ensuring cellular formations, operations and counter-terrorism measures retain consistency in relation to the snapshot date.

research. The literature reviews consists of examining: historical and theoretical aspects of terrorist cells, movements and organisations; the systems decomposition and localisation method of data analysis; and the key sources of data used to anchor the subsequent data analysis. The methodology outlines the scope of this research and discusses the steps involved in evaluating the data. Chapters three to five display and explain analysed and consolidated data using the systems decomposition and localisation methodology for the PIRA, ETA and Hamas organisations respectively. Chapter 6 utilises the analysis from the previous three chapters to construct comparative tables from which generic patterns can be established. Chapter 7 assesses the previously determined generic patterns to identify cellular interconnectedness between organisational formation, operational patterns and counter-terrorism measures. It then consolidates cellular interconnectedness into an overall structure to identify predictors to assist in cellular profiling and additionally, assess the efficacy of the systems decomposition and localisation method of data analysis. Finally, Chapter 8 summarises the entire thesis.

## Summary

The methodology comprises three deconstructions and a comparative analysis, followed by, reconstructing interconnected values into models using the common cellular qualities identified. This process depends on the integrity of the extracted data to identify causal relationships between the constituent parts of each component. Subsequently, the literature reviews are crucial for justifying the utility of this research. Chapter 3 will initiate the first of a series of three deconstructions by decomposing and localising the PIRA cellular system.

## Chapter 3

### The Cellular System of the PIRA

This chapter deconstructs a snapshot taken of the PIRA cellular system from 1985 to assess cellular effectiveness. To do this, a contextual history detailing the environment in which the cell operates will identify strategic, operational and cultural inflections followed by localising each component of cellular capital. In addition, the intent of this chapter is to formulate data for later analysis.

#### The Contextual History of the PIRA

The arrival of British forces in Northern Ireland during 1969 in response to sectarian violence sparked a split in the Irish Republican Army (IRA) from which the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) emerged. Between 1969 and 1985, evolving British counter-terrorism policies and PIRA strategies perpetuated the Irish conflict. Figure 4 summarises some of the most significant milestones from which will be constructed a relative historical framework.

The PIRA's primary area of operations comprises the six Northern Ireland counties of, Londonderry, Antrim, Down, Armagh, Fermanagh and Tyrone, and the five border counties of the sovereign Southern Republic of Ireland made up of Donegal, Leitrim, Monaghan, Louth and Cavan<sup>1</sup>. Additionally the remaining 21 counties in the Southern Republic acted in various supporting roles. In 1981, Northern Ireland had a population of approximately 1.5 million composed of 40 percent Catholic and 57 percent Protestant<sup>2</sup>. The conflict has been concentrated in Belfast, which in 1987 made up 20 percent (228,000) of the entire Northern Ireland electorate<sup>3</sup>. Nationalists are concentrated in Belfast

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<sup>1</sup> O'Brien, B., *The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Fein 1985 to Today*, Dublin: The O'Brien Press, 1993, p. 108.

<sup>2</sup> 'Northern Ireland Demographics', retrieved 10<sup>th</sup> August 2003, from <http://www.geocities.com/pdmi/demog.html>

<sup>3</sup> Irvin, C., *Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Part in Ireland and the Basque Country*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999, p. 190.

West making up 89 percent (53,177) of the local electorate, whereas Unionists dominate the other three Belfast electorates<sup>4</sup>. Between 1969 and 1989, both Belfast North and West sustained 38 percent (1,088) of all Northern Ireland casualties (2,763)<sup>5</sup>.




Figure 4: PIRA Contextual History, 1969-1985

<sup>4</sup> ibid.

<sup>5</sup> ibid.

Britain's initial counter-terrorism strategy in Northern Ireland originated from earlier counterinsurgency strategies employed from Malaya to Dhofar between the late 1930s and early 1970s. These strategies focused on 'Hearts and Minds' to win popular support predicated on possessing accurate and timely intelligence to defeat the insurgents. However, the British organisational structure described by Newsinger as, '...an integrated repressive apparatus combining police, army and civil administration...' <sup>6</sup>, caused varying degrees of alienation among the population. As a result, coercive measures including in-depth interrogation methods and internments inevitably surfaced in the Northern Ireland conflict <sup>7</sup>.

A toned down British counterinsurgency strategy emerged in Northern Ireland as the role of the British Army deteriorated from peacekeeping to counterinsurgency. Between 1970 and 1973 house-to-house searches <sup>8</sup>, internments and interrogations in-depth <sup>9</sup> alienated the Catholic community. However, these measures also provided foundation intelligence for future development. The ensuing spiralling escalation of violence forced Westminster's intervention in March 1972. These events initiated a transition from a military led counterinsurgency strategy to a police led criminalisation strategy.

The criminalisation of the Northern Ireland conflict from 1973 onwards reflected a political shift from a foreign colonial flavour to one prosecuted in a highly

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<sup>6</sup> Newsinger, J., *British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland*, New York: Palgrave, 2002, p. 121.

<sup>7</sup> Sluka, J., 'For God and Ulster: The Culture of Terror and Loyalist Death Squads in Northern Ireland' in Sluka, J (ed.), *Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror*, Philadelphia, USA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000, pp. 127-157, p.134.

<sup>8</sup> Between 1971 and 1984, 325,000 Catholic houses were searched.

Source: Vercher, A., 'British and Spanish Measures to Deal with Terrorism: A Comparative Study with Some Reference to the EEC Framework', PhD Thesis, Cambridge University, 1988, p. 69.

<sup>9</sup> In 1971, 12 out of 342 PIRA suspects arrested underwent interrogation in depth. This usually involved physical and mental pressure being applied.

Source: Charters, D., 'Intelligence and Psychological Warfare Operations in Northern Ireland' in O'Day, A (ed.), *Dimensions of Irish Terrorism*, New York: G.K. Hall, 1987, pp 377-382., p. 379.

visible democratic environment led with a variant of the Italian legal system of *pentiti*<sup>10</sup>. This strategy acted to normalise the conflict as a criminal rather than political issue with the aim of containing<sup>11</sup> and isolating the PIRA. The Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act 1973 (NIEPA) introduced the Diplock courts as a replacement for internment. Greer states, 'The net effect of the Act was to create a confession based prosecution process centred on single-judge non-jury courts serviced by extensive police and army powers.'<sup>12</sup> The Diplock courts were instrumental in prosecuting the supergrass trials between 1981 and 1986.

The supergrass trials were the result of a well-defined strategy<sup>13</sup> utilising the State's modified capacity to detain and interrogate to gather intelligence<sup>14</sup>. Greer comments that supergrasses allowed '...the carefully cultivated results of sophisticated police-intelligence-gathering systems to be presented in court for the purpose of convicting large numbers of suspected terrorists...'<sup>15</sup> From November 1981 to November 1983, 600 arrests were made using evidence supplied by 18 PIRA and seven Loyalist supergrasses<sup>16</sup>. Eventually, the fairness of the Diplock courts came under increasing scrutiny as numerous appeals eroded the credibility of the British Criminal Justice System (CJS) within the Catholic community. In response to the State's evolution of counter-terrorism strategies, the PIRA evolved both operationally and strategically.

The PIRA began as a traditionalist Republican movement after breaking away from the radical and socialist IRA in 1969. Their objectives were in the short-

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<sup>10</sup> The system of the repentant terrorist was premised on the terrorist being given leniency by authorities in return for confessing and renouncing his crimes, and providing information. This system or variants of said system were used to dismantle the Red Brigade, fight the Mafia in Italy and used by the Spanish government to combat the ETA.  
Source: Vercher, p. 276 and 295.

<sup>11</sup> Containment of the PIRA implies consistently employing successful interdiction operations against the PIRA ensuring the level of violence never spirals out of control.

<sup>12</sup> Greer, S., *Supergrasses: A Study in Anti-Terrorist Law Enforcement in Northern Ireland*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 38.

<sup>13</sup> Vercher, p. 115.

<sup>14</sup> Vercher, p. 117.

<sup>15</sup> Greer, p. 12.

<sup>16</sup> Irvin, C., *Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Part in Ireland and the Basque Country*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999, p. 185.

term to remove the British presence from Northern Ireland and in the long-term achieve self-determination for a unified Ireland. According to Cronin, the traditionalist has the strongest nationalist strand and is often identified with both the Catholics and Gaelic language<sup>17</sup>. In contrast, radical republicanism has the weakest nationalist strand stressing there can be no change without social revolution<sup>18</sup>. Physical-force nationalism<sup>19</sup> is entrenched in the traditionalist concept, but less so in the radical concept<sup>20</sup>. Subsequently, nationalism maintained these general characteristics throughout the armed struggle<sup>21</sup>.

From 1970 – 1976, the PIRA was organised along the lines of a traditional army structure but aligned along community lines to facilitate contact with the community for cohesion. A Brigade consisted of three battalions, each battalion comprised of three companies with each company allocated a specific geographical area<sup>22</sup>. For example, the Belfast Brigade's three battalions covered the Upper Falls, Lower Falls and the rest of the city<sup>23</sup>. However, large numbers of volunteers associated to this structure, estimated at 1,000 during the 1970s<sup>24</sup>, and a lax security environment<sup>25</sup> resulted in high attrition rates. These problems forced an organisational re-evaluation during the mid to late 1970s.

The PIRA integrated the cellular system into its organisational structure between 1976 and 1977. Ivor Bell, an imprisoned PIRA officer, devised it using examples of Latin American organisations, such as the Uruguayan

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<sup>17</sup> Cronin, S., *Irish Nationalism*, Dublin: The Academy Press, 1980, p. 3.

<sup>18</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> The Republican traditionalist evolved from the Republicanism of the United Irishmen, a product of both the American and French revolutions and referred to by Cronin as physical-force nationalism with socially conservative characteristics.

Source: Cronin, p. 3.

<sup>20</sup> Cronin, p. 4.

<sup>21</sup> O'Brien, p. 122.

<sup>22</sup> Wright, J., *Terrorist Propaganda: The Red Army Faction and The Provisional IRA 1968 - 1986*, New York: St Martin's Press, 1990, p. 153.

<sup>23</sup> Wright, p. 153.

<sup>24</sup> Bishop, P and Mallie, E., *The Provisional IRA*, London: Corgi, 1987, p. 308.

<sup>25</sup> O'Ballance, E., 'IRA Leadership Problems' in Wilkinson, P (ed.), *British Perspectives of Terrorism*, London: Allen & Unwin, 1981, pp. 73-82, p. 78.



Tupamaros<sup>26</sup>. This re-organisation replaced companies with cells resulting in volunteer membership dropping to approximately 250 by the mid-1980s<sup>27</sup>. This system was supplemented by the PIRA's official handbook known as the 'Greenbook', which described the movements constitution and operational framework to which each volunteer was expected to adhere<sup>28</sup>. The long war strategy immediately followed the PIRA's re-organisation<sup>29</sup>.

The long war strategy de-emphasised occupying liberated areas in favour of provoking the British into overreaction using mobile strike cells<sup>30</sup>. Moreover, this strategy addressed the need for greater integration between the PIRA and its political wing Sinn Féin, this link legitimised by Danny Morrison in the 1981 *Ard Fheis* (Sinn Féin Annual Conference): 'But will anyone here object if with a ballot paper in this hand and an Armalite in this hand we take power in Ireland?'<sup>31</sup>

The historical framework ending in 1985 offsets the British criminalisation strategy against the PIRA's long war strategy. Moreover, this framework identifies the PIRA's use of the cellular system as an issue of long-term survivability as implied by its strategy. The next three sections will use this framework to assist in the deconstruction of the PIRA cellular system. See appendix A for research definitions associated to these three sub-sections.

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<sup>26</sup> Gearty, C., *Terror*, London: Faber, 1991, p. 118.

<sup>27</sup> Bishop and Mallie, p. 308.

<sup>28</sup> Dillon, M., *The Dirty War*, London: Arrow Books, 1991, p. 482.

<sup>29</sup> Urban, M., *Big Boys Rules: The Secret Struggle Against the IRA*, London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1992, p. 25.

<sup>30</sup> Murray, R., 'Killings of Local Security Forces in Northern Ireland 1969-1981' in O'Day, A (ed.), *Dimensions of Irish Terrorism*, New York: G.K. Hall, 1984, pp 105-146., p. 135.

<sup>31</sup> O'Brien, p. 127.

## The Main Actors of the PIRA

During 1985, the PIRA organisational structure reflected a five-tier construct (see Figure 5) heavily influenced by its previous military style structure<sup>32</sup>. This section will first examine the organisational structure of the PIRA cell and second, the actors that influence it<sup>33</sup>.

The PIRA's cells are organised into company cells and Active Service Units (ASU)<sup>34</sup>. Company cells are designated two primary functions. First, they act as local enforcement within the Catholic community, which includes policing and punishment roles<sup>35</sup>. Second, company cells carry out supporting logistical roles. These roles include planning tasks, such as purchasing and fetching weapons, providing intelligence and organising getaway cars. They also include attack phase tasks such as acting as lookouts and post attack phase tasks such as forensic cleanup<sup>36</sup>. In contrast, ASUs operated primarily in attack roles.

The standard Active Service Unit (ASU) comprises one third of a battalion of a three-battalion brigade<sup>37</sup>. Adams, Morgan and Bambridge suggest there were 12 ASUs in Ulster, two in the South and one operating in Europe, organised into 15 battalions in six Brigades located in Belfast, Londonderry, Donegal, Armagh, Dublin and the counties of Tyrone and Fermanagh<sup>38</sup>. The ASU in most cases consisted of three to five volunteers with a designated ASU commander and

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<sup>32</sup> The PIRA actually maintains six tiers. Above the Army Council sits the Army Executive, however it is not included in this analysis because it is considered too high in the chain of command to influence PIRA cells directly.

<sup>33</sup> Loyalist groups are not considered in this analysis. These groups and the sectarian violence they perpetrated would have no doubt acted as recruiting sergeants for the PIRA. However, their influence on PIRA cells is difficult to determine with some speculation regarding their proxy use by security forces. However, within the context of the PIRA and security forces, they are considered a much lesser threat and subsequently it is believed leaving them out of this analysis will not detract from the quality of this chapter.

<sup>34</sup> Bishop and Mallie, p. 314.

<sup>35</sup> Adams, J, Morgan, R and Bambridge, A., *Ambush: The War Between the SAS and the IRA*, London: Pan Books, 1988, p. 30.

<sup>36</sup> Adams, Morgan and Bambridge, p. 30.

<sup>37</sup> Wright, p. 153.

<sup>38</sup> Adams, Morgan and Bambridge, p. 30.

adjutant<sup>39</sup>. Within each ASU, volunteers were designated specific roles based on learned skills or operational requirements, for example snipers and lookouts. In addition to providing command and control responsibilities (C<sup>2</sup>) the ASU commander moreover, acted as a liaison to the battalion commander who coordinated operational tasking and support services for the ASU<sup>40</sup>.

The battalion commander had a high degree of responsibility for the ASU. His military administration was composed of a Quartermaster for managing weapons supplies, an intelligence officer for planning operations and a paymaster for allocating running costs<sup>41</sup>. The battalion commander operated with a high level of autonomy in raising funds and planning operations, without needing to notify higher echelons<sup>42</sup>. Nevertheless, the battalion commander still reported to Northern command for operational tasking as required.

The Northern command operated in what O'Brien terms the war zone<sup>43</sup>, which included the six counties of Northern Ireland and five border counties of the Southern Republic. Its structure was similar to the battalion structure, which included a brigade commander, adjutant, quartermaster, intelligence officer and paymaster<sup>44</sup>. However, by 1980 it had incorporated an internal security section in an attempt to stem the flow of informers<sup>45</sup>. The Northern command met regularly and authorised local operations. The Southern command operated in the 21 counties of the South employing a single brigade in a 'quartermaster role' maintaining arms dumps, weapons supply lines and sometimes intelligence collection<sup>46</sup>. One tier above the Northern and Southern commands is a seven member Army council operating from the South.

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<sup>39</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>40</sup> Urban, p. 30.

<sup>41</sup> Coogan, T, *The IRA*, London: Fontana/Collins, 1987, p. 578-580.

<sup>42</sup> Bishop and Mallie, p. 247.

<sup>43</sup> O'Brien, p. 158.

<sup>44</sup> Bishop and Mallie, p. 247.

<sup>45</sup> Bishop and Mallie, p. 321.

<sup>46</sup> O'Brien, p. 158.

The Army council administered regulations to ensure the Army operated as efficiently as possible<sup>47</sup>. Its primary purpose was to propagate or sanction particular operations and develop foreign relationships<sup>48</sup>. The Army council had an appointed Chief of Staff supported by a General Head Quarters staff (GHQ) consisting of 12 volunteers<sup>49</sup> which included eight departments including quartermasters, engineering, publicity, operation's, finance, intelligence, security and training<sup>50</sup>. Moreover, GHQ would put ASUs together for special operations<sup>51</sup>. In contrast to the organisational construct, PIRA prisoners were particularly influential as a visible symbol of British repression in contrast to the secrecy of the cellular system<sup>52</sup>.

Wright comments that prisoners and martyrs hold a prestigious place in Republican ideology contributing to a rich history of Republican persecution<sup>53</sup>. They epitomise Irish Nationalism, by speaking Gaelic, organising militarily and carrying out highly visible protests, including hunger strikes, which Sluka equates to the Celtic tradition of martyrdom<sup>54</sup>. The PIRA prisoners projected valuable propaganda appeal primarily to encourage popular support and new recruits<sup>55</sup>. Subsequently, prisoners are arguably part of the PIRA's organisational construct, but external to its C<sup>2</sup> element. In contrast to the prisoner's symbolism and visibility, both periphery members and popular supporters acted in varying supporting roles.

Periphery members of the PIRA, such as prisoners' families, represent extensions of company cells offering indirect support such as renting houses for

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<sup>47</sup> Dillon, p. 485.

<sup>48</sup> Bishop and Mallie, p. 308.

<sup>49</sup> Adams, Morgan and Bambridge, p. 29.

<sup>50</sup> O'Brien, p. 158.

<sup>51</sup> O'Brien, p. 159.

<sup>52</sup> Irvin, p. 147.

<sup>53</sup> Wright, p. 166.

<sup>54</sup> Sluka, p. 42.

<sup>55</sup> Sluka, p. 44.

use as safe houses or even offering intelligence<sup>56</sup>. Periphery members provide valuable support services, which principally influence logistics and intelligence.

Most terrorist organisations strive for popular support and attempt to maximise it through their strategies<sup>57</sup>. The PIRA is particularly dependent on securing a deep support base to insulate itself against counter-terrorism measures and sustain itself long-term. The armed struggle becomes critical as a means to manipulate the supporter's commitment. The degrees of commitment may vary and extend to carrying out disruptive indirect action, such as disturbing the forensic evidence of a crime scene. Therefore, popular support becomes a barometer for the success of the strategy. Consequently, popular support primarily influences leadership and recruitment. While popular support is crucial for the PIRA's armed struggle, the PIRA's association to Sinn Fein provides an alternative organisation to retain members.

Sinn Fein while expressing support for the PIRA's armed struggle offers an alternative para-political strategy of activism to Irish Republicanism. Essentially, Sinn Fein provides an additional exit route for volunteers who have outlived their usefulness as combatants. O'Ballance comments that the PIRA practice is not to retain a volunteer against his will since it is recognised that terrorism is a young man's game<sup>58</sup>. According to Irvin's study of Sinn Fein activists at least 38 percent from the interview sample originated from the PIRA<sup>59</sup>. Consequently, Sinn Fein mainly influences the lifecycle of the volunteer (see Figure 12).

The organisational construct, prisoners, periphery members and popular supporters represent major actors influencing an ASU. Sinn Fein is a minor actor being somewhat less influential but remaining vital in the overall cellular system. These actors represent the major sources of dynamic influences

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
<sup>56</sup> Irvin, p. 189.

<sup>57</sup> Irvin, p. 45.

<sup>58</sup> O'Ballance, p. 74.

<sup>59</sup> Irvin, p. 145.

shaping the PIRA organisation. The following six sections further project the influence of each actor as each component of cell effectiveness is localised.



**Figure 5: Actors influencing the PIRA Cellular System**

## Compartmentalization and Discipline

This section primarily examines solidarity and how it shapes internal compartmentalization (see Figure 6). In addition, both operational and territorial compartmentalization are each addressed when examining communications discipline. These factors assist in shaping the cells secrecy, which contributes to cell effectiveness. Within an ASU, solidarity has the following primary bonding characteristics: experience of repression and discrimination, symbolism and the armed struggle.

The ASU comprises working class volunteers who have experienced state repression first hand, including detention, violence or discriminatory unemployment<sup>60</sup>. Irvin's profile of Sinn Fein activists '...suggests that youth and

<sup>60</sup> Irvin, p. 152.

its correlate, a reduced fear of social sanction, along with personal experiences of discrimination based on ethnic identification and prior experience of state repression are significant factors in motivating an individuals participation in militant nationalist organisations.<sup>61</sup> Irvin identifies the level of despair as a determinant in the type of activist recruited<sup>62</sup>. Essentially, PIRA volunteers will have each experienced a common degree of repression and discrimination in contrast to that experienced by Sinn Fein activists. In addition to prior experiences, funerals and martyrs strengthen solidarity between volunteers.

Funerals are set piece acts of solidarity that confirm the status of the Republican movement in the community<sup>63</sup>. The images of the mask and gun, displays of the Republican flag, the military salute to a fallen comrade are all part of a solidarity building process turning the fallen comrade into a martyr and consequently a common symbol of the armed struggle. The funeral of Bobby Sands, the first Republican to die in the 1981 Long Kesh hunger strikes attracted approximately 100,000 people and as commented by Urban his sacrifice '...appealed to the Irish people's deep respect for martyrdom, Sands had won near universal acclaim among Republicans.'<sup>64</sup> In contrast, the armed struggle provides environmental conditions derived from attacks and threats to strengthen solidarity.

The armed struggle influences solidarity in two major ways. First, a successful operation increases the morale within the ASU inculcating the volunteers with increasing professionalism<sup>65</sup>. Second, security pressures isolate the ASU reducing the influence of external propaganda sources and sympathisers heightening the common interest shared by the volunteers<sup>66</sup>. Security force casualties averaging 33 per year between 1980 and 1985 implies some

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<sup>61</sup> Irvin, p. 141.

<sup>62</sup> Irvin, p. 187.

<sup>63</sup> Urban, p. 82.

<sup>64</sup> Urban, p. 132.

<sup>65</sup> Gearty, p. 120.

<sup>66</sup> Irvin, p. 45.

consistency in operational success<sup>67</sup>. Moreover, high profile attacks such as the 1984 assassination attempt on Prime Minister Thatcher have symbolic connotations, which elevate the power of the organisation. In this sense, the threshold for operational success is reduced to a single successful high profile attack countering numerous other frustrations. However, while environmental conditions are somewhat amenable to strengthening solidarity, communications discipline represents an unpredictable cultural influence.

The 'need to know' philosophy determined the extent of volunteer discipline<sup>68</sup>. The communications discipline of the volunteer while regulated, remained somewhat nebulous in practice. The 'Greenbook' states in General Order No. 5, Part 5: 'Volunteers who engage in loose talk shall be dismissed.'<sup>69</sup> Furthermore, 'Code of Conduct' prerequisites for acceptable behaviour include warnings regarding drinking and its detrimental effect on security<sup>70</sup>. However, the ASUs enforced separation from sympathisers in many ways did not appeal to the cultural aspects of the large Catholic matriarchal families<sup>71</sup> and Irish way of life. Moreover, the PIRA practice of swapping volunteers between ASUs, such as intelligence officers, generated operational weaknesses<sup>72</sup>. This practice while possibly used to supplant skills weaknesses was also likely used to ensure secrecy. The 1981-1986 supergrass trials reflected these weaknesses. For example, in 1983 the testimony of Christopher Black, a low-level volunteer of the Belfast Brigade, convicted 35 alleged volunteers<sup>73</sup>. Although, 18 convictions were later repealed<sup>74</sup> the fact remains a low-level volunteer was still able to name more people than just those in his ASU<sup>75</sup>.

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<sup>67</sup> O'Brien, Table of Fatalities in Northern Ireland from 1960 to September 1993.

<sup>68</sup> See Appendix A on Commitment, for a definition of the 'need to know' philosophy.

<sup>69</sup> Dillon, p. 487.

<sup>70</sup> Dillon, p. 493.

<sup>71</sup> O'Ballance, p. 80.

<sup>72</sup> Adams, Morgan and Bambridge, p. 30 and O'Brien, p. 159.

<sup>73</sup> Urban, p. 134.

<sup>74</sup> Greer, p. 282.

<sup>75</sup> The roles of some of those convicted included, the commander and second in command of Blacks ASU, two quartermasters, an operations officer and finance officer for the Belfast Brigade, and a recruiting officer.

Source: Greer, p. 72.



## Feedback Influences and Assessment


The following summarises the feedback influences for compartmentalization:

1. Leadership flexibility helps avoid schisms which reinforces solidarity
2. Leadership allowed a high degree of low-level selective targeting to avoid schisms and to re-enforce the volunteer's mentality, which following successful attacks generated pride and reinforced solidarity
3. Commitment increases solidarity through the ineffective over reaction of security forces
4. Recruitment filtering reinforced solidarity through common experience
5. Indoctrination and irrevocable acts during training produced high initiation and exit costs, resulting in greater isolation, which increased solidarity
6. Effective operational intelligence, abundant weaponry and tactical variety increased attack effectiveness, which reinforced solidarity
7. Effective counter-terrorism measures increased the isolation of cells, which increased solidarity

Republican martyrs, levels of despair and environmental conditions combined to generate solidarity. However, communications discipline within both a cultural and operational context suggests a degree of weakness in compartmentalization. To some extent, the low-level autonomy assigned to ASUs in exchange for constraints on voice alleviated this problem, however this solution may also act to accentuate the problem<sup>76</sup>. Overall, compartmentalization positively influences cell effectiveness to a moderate degree.

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<sup>76</sup> The balance between too much control and too little is both a cultural and operational issue, which requires more research to determine if the PIRA had the correct balance to counter disciplinary digressions.



**Figure 6: PIRA Systems Decomposition of Compartmentalization**

## Leadership and Schisms

This section will primarily examine the leadership's role in determining decentralisation of control (see Figure 7). In addition, selective targeting is examined as a manifestation of the organisation's strategy and subsequently, the survivability of the ASU. These factors focus on leadership influences that shape cell formation and operation, which helps determine cell effectiveness.

The PIRA's five-tier leadership structure suggests a high degree of decentralisation of control. Leadership centralisation determines leadership stability and subsequently, the manifestation of ideology into strategy resulting in devolution of operational control. Leadership stability is essentially dependent on leadership proximity to the war-zone and its composition.

The core leadership of the PIRA are located in Dublin<sup>77</sup> in the Southern Republic of Ireland and remain somewhat insulated from the conflict. The PIRA is essentially a working-class<sup>78</sup> organisation from which experienced intellectuals have risen to positions of command<sup>79</sup>. According to Cronin, the PIRA leadership from 1969 – 1979 represented physical-force traditionalists but from 1979 onwards, they developed an increasingly radical flavour<sup>80</sup>. Consequently, the composition and proximity of leadership to the war-zone developed a high degree of leadership stability. However, the PIRA's multi-tier leadership structure and its external proximity to the war-zone necessitated the fine-tuning of the organisational construct.

Essentially, decentralising control acts to fine-tune the organisational construct. The multi-tier leadership structure in this sense allows greater flexibility in manipulating the degree of control assigned to lower levels. Subsequently, decentralisation of control is transmitted from the Dublin based Army Council by codifying ideology into strategy.

The PIRA's strategy connects abstract beliefs from its Nationalist ideology with concrete actions. The resulting long war strategy strives to maximise popular support by causing the state to overreact through short-term tactics of provocation. It sets geographical boundaries and targeting direction. The assignment of geographical areas of operation designates areas as either war or supply zones. For example, Belfast is a war zone whereas coastal counties, such as Donegal, represented supply zones<sup>81</sup>. Targeting direction reflected the strategic emphasis on attrition to sustain long-term commitment, which required the organisation to maintain popular support while absorbing counter-terrorism

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<sup>77</sup> The executive committee and Army council are both located in Dublin.

<sup>78</sup> Cronin, p. 342.

<sup>79</sup> Urban, p. 32.

<sup>80</sup> Physical force traditionalists tend to be Catholics, often Gaelic and socially conservative and use the United Irishman as justification for physical force.

Source: Cronin, pp. 3-4.

<sup>81</sup> O'Brien, p. 145.

responses. Consequently, leadership centralisation, primarily its proximity to the war-zone, and the long war strategy emphasising attrition, are crucial factors in determining the degree of control decentralised to ASUs.

The decentralisation of control correlates to the maintenance of organisational cohesion and flexibility. The PIRA while allowing for exit via retirement or entry into Sinn Féin uses autonomy in the selective targeting of low profile targets from the battalion down as a trade-off for averting schisms<sup>82</sup>. General order No. 14 allows the volunteer to resign from the organisation as long as the volunteer does not join other militant organisations<sup>83</sup>. Moreover, General orders No. 10 and 13 in the 'Greenbook' restrict volunteers from speaking out regarding the organisation<sup>84</sup>. In this sense, the control assigned to selective targeting acts as a barometer for the cohesion and flexibility of an ASU.

Tactical limitations placed on targeting direction incorporate personal safety and long-term survivability of the organisation into targeting determination. Primarily, this is a reflection of what Crenshaw views as a necessary sensitivity to the members of the organisation correlating directly to survivability<sup>85</sup>. Cronin states, 'Irish Terrorists have usually been careful to preserve their personal safety, and the strength of the organisation during the next 5 years is likely to remain such that the leadership will wish to avoid action that could put large numbers of its men at risk.'<sup>86</sup> The tactical doctrine of the PIRA, particularly its use of standoff weapons such as mortars and remotely detonated explosives, implies risk mitigation<sup>87</sup>. Within this context, targeting can be categorised into high, low and symbolic levels of profiling.

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<sup>82</sup> Bell, J. Bowyer., *IRA tactics and Targets*, Dublin, Ireland: Poolberg, 1990, p. 48.

<sup>83</sup> Dillon, p. 489.

<sup>84</sup> Dillon, p. 488.

<sup>85</sup> Crenshaw, M., 'Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organisational Approaches' in Rapport, D (ed.), *Inside Terrorist Organisations*, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001, pp. 13-31, p. 22.

<sup>86</sup> Cronin, p. 347.

<sup>87</sup> Cronin, p. 350.

High profile targeting transmits the PIRA's ideological message, demonstrates its commitment and intends to guarantee a disproportionate response. High profile targeting is an indication of the targets recognition, not their power<sup>88</sup>. Therefore, high profile targets are also symbolic. High profile targeting included judicial, military and political targets in addition to informers, which the PIRA leadership considered treasonous<sup>89</sup>. The Army Council and Northern Command authorised high profile targeting, with planning usually more sophisticated vis-à-vis low profile targets, for example the planning for the assassination attempt on Prime Minister Thatcher during September 1984 started in 1982<sup>90</sup>.

Low profile targeting through the systematic targeting of security forces maintained the PIRA's strategic tempo and visibility. Bell recognises this category of targeting as managing the IRA in the short -term for the long-term<sup>91</sup>. The targeting of local security forces was an element of selective targeting recognised from 1976 onwards<sup>92</sup>. For example, during 1983, five British Army, 10 Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) and 18 Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) members were killed<sup>93</sup>. The autonomy assigned to the battalion level selection of low profile targets contributed to the survivability of local ASUs. For example, ASUs tended to target off-duty UDR soldiers either in rural or Catholic areas who besides being regarded a security threat<sup>94</sup>, were moreover softer targets vis-à-vis four man armed UDR patrols<sup>95</sup>.

Symbolic targeting projects a message of power to specific audiences. The propaganda value of PIRA symbolic targeting highlights that its normal posture shows restraint rather than weakness<sup>96</sup>. The Army Council and Northern

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<sup>88</sup> Bell, p. 37.

<sup>89</sup> Dillon, p. 487.

<sup>90</sup> Bishop and Mallie, p. 338.

<sup>91</sup> Bell, p. 112.

<sup>92</sup> Bishop and Mallie, p. 258.

<sup>93</sup> Urban, p. 188.

<sup>94</sup> Murray, p. 138.

<sup>95</sup> In contrast to UDR soldiers, RUC two man patrols were more vulnerable until the start of joint Army/RUC patrolling.

<sup>96</sup> Cronin, p. 348.

command authorise symbolic targeting, which is a combination of choosing a target based on association or location and/or the weaponry employed. For example, a lumberyard might be targeted for supplying wood to contractors who are repairing damage caused by PIRA bombings<sup>97</sup>. Symbolic targets also included the British and European mainland. Pluchinsky comments overseas attacks on British servicemen intended to '...keep Ireland on their minds so that it haunts them and they do something about not wanting to go back.'<sup>98</sup> Moreover, symbolic weaponry, such as high-calibre weapons, either contributed significantly to the success of an attack or acted as props for choreographed operations. For example, high-calibre machine guns while displayed were never utilised by the PIRA mainly because of the risk to the local population<sup>99</sup>. While leadership are extremely influential in managing strategy, they were also crucial for developing foreign relationships.

Leadership dictated the formation and maintenance of foreign relationships. The United States connection provided an early network of supporters, which continued at least into the late 1980s, principally through PIRA logistics cells working with U.S supporters of Irish descent<sup>100</sup>. During the early 1970s, the IRA used the Basque terrorist organisation ETA to orchestrate links with Middle Eastern contacts for the purpose of obtaining arms and financial funding.<sup>101</sup> The Libyan connection was the most lucrative of these contacts<sup>102</sup>. Moreover, contacts with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation provided additional sources of weapons and exchange of ideas<sup>103</sup>.

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<sup>97</sup> Bell, p. 39.

<sup>98</sup> Pluchinsky, D., 'Political Terrorism in Western Europe: Some Themes and Variations' in Alexander, Y and Myers, K (eds), *Terrorism in Europe*, London: Croom Helm, 1982, pp. 40-78, p. 50.

<sup>99</sup> Cronin, p. 351.

<sup>100</sup> Stoney, J., 'Irish Terrorism Investigations' in O'Day, A (ed.), *Dimensions of Irish Terrorism*, New York: G.K. Hall, 1987, pp 371-376, p. 372.

<sup>101</sup> Dillon, p. 431.

<sup>102</sup> O'Brien, p. 162.

<sup>103</sup> Cronin, p. 341.

## Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the secondary influences for leadership:

1. Local leaders can more accurately assess local conditions by using popular support as a barometer

In summary, leadership ensures the long-term stability of the organisation by orchestrating security force overreaction through short-term actions, which reflect the sensitivities of both popular supporters and volunteers. Management of short-term actions requires maintaining strategic consistency using a mix of selective targeting dependent on the decentralisation of control and construction of foreign relationships. Overall, leadership positively influences cell effectiveness to a high degree.




Figure 7: PIRA Systems Decomposition of Leadership

## Commitment and the British Threat

This section primarily examines the ideology of the PIRA and to what extent it translates into commitment (see Figure 8). In this analysis, the volunteer's self-concept of the British threat represents a central motivating factor of cell effectiveness.

In 1980, the objectives of the PIRA were primarily to remove the British presence from Ireland and create a socialist, self-determining and unified Republic of Ireland<sup>104</sup>. Justifications for these objectives derived from a continuing legacy of repression and discrimination of the Catholic community by the British.

General order No 8. Part 4 of the 'Greenbook' states, 'At all times Volunteers must make it clear that the policy of the army is to drive the British Forces of occupation out of Ireland.'<sup>105</sup> The British presence in Northern Ireland is symbolised as the central antagonist behind the ongoing discrimination of Irish Catholics<sup>106</sup>. The British have been regularly associated with the historical repression of the Republican or Catholic community dating back at least to the Anglo-Irish war (1919-1921) from which the Irish Republican Army (IRA) emerged<sup>107</sup>. The British connection has been interpreted as disadvantaging the Catholic community through brute force while concurrently favouring the Protestant community<sup>108</sup>. In this sense, the armed struggle is simply considered the last resort<sup>109</sup>. Internments and interrogations, and perceived security force shoot-to-kill policies during the early 1980s reinforce this perception and give credibility to the oppressed state of the Catholic community<sup>110</sup>. Consequently, this objective is considered the first step towards Irish unification. Associated with the Irish legacy of British repression are Republican prisoners and martyrs

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<sup>104</sup> Cronin, p. 340.

<sup>105</sup> Dillon, p. 488.

<sup>106</sup> Irvin, p. 160.

<sup>107</sup> Wright, p. 220.

<sup>108</sup> Wright, p. 229.

<sup>109</sup> Bell, p. 10.

<sup>110</sup> Wright, p. 233.



whose symbolic value of both persecution and inward looking Celtic nationalism provides a link to Irish Nationalism.

The unification of Ireland is designed to instigate a social transformation into a single Irish people through a socialist framework defending '...civil and religious liberties and equal rights and equal opportunities for all citizens.'<sup>111</sup> Moreover, a further objective is to promote the revival of the Gaelic language. However, the mixed ethno, religious, socialist and nationalist message of unification has been labelled confusing by some authors including Wright who detects incompatibilities. For example, a genuine socialist ideology is incompatible with Roman Catholicism<sup>112</sup>. In this sense there is a degree of propaganda or manipulation associated to the unification message. Whereas, there is an element of ethnic-religious struggle inherent in unification the PIRA tends to distance itself from the ethnic aspect. Irvin suggests ethnicity has been redefined in terms used to characterise class positions<sup>113</sup>. Social class rather than an ethno-religious struggle transmits a clearer message to the Catholic community. Subsequently, the focus of the PIRA remains on removing the British using controllable violence in contrast to the conflict degenerating into a sectarian civil war. The non-sectarian nature of the PIRA is emphasised by the Code of Conduct in the 'Greenbook' which threatens to discipline anyone '...promoting sectarianism or displaying sectarian attitudes...'<sup>114</sup> Consequently, the forces of class and nation drive socialism and nationalism as the basis of unification and self-determination.

The overall message of the nationalist ideology is in destroying the British connection to free the nation<sup>115</sup>. The armed struggle aims particularly at the uncommitted audience, using the ongoing brutality by the British to legitimise violent acts, in which the lesson of Republican history has shown that force

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<sup>111</sup> Dillon, p. 482.

<sup>112</sup> Wright, p. 227.

<sup>113</sup> Irvin, p. 152.

<sup>114</sup> Dillon, p. 495.

<sup>115</sup> Bell, p. 10.

weakens colonizers<sup>116</sup>. The nationalist ideology provides a foundation of core beliefs that pledge the volunteer to particular acts. In particular is the tendency to de-emphasise the emotive religious element within its core belief structure but emphasise it in other situations. Subsequently, ethno-religious manipulation can be regarded as a control feature<sup>117</sup> in which commitment can be manipulated to meet particular short-term goals, for example to create high initiation costs during the indoctrination process. The religious deprivation at the core of the PIRA belief system suggests that the rational calculation that satisfies the volunteer at an emotional level is constrained<sup>118</sup>. For example, the PIRA regard death resulting from active operations as a '...pragmatic inevitability whose efficiency is easy to identify in its contributions to the Republican struggle.'<sup>119</sup> Consequently, pragmatism is the underlying premise of the PIRA ideology.

## Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for commitment:

1. The PIRA's strategic tempo and ineffective overreaction by the security forces reinforced the commitment of the volunteers
2. Decentralisation of control or volition helps justify the act to the volunteer
3. Selective targeting signifies the importance of the act to the volunteer reinforcing commitment
4. The recruitment period of a volunteer incrementally increases commitment using irrevocable acts and indoctrination
5. Tactical variety increases attack effectiveness reinforcing commitment
6. Perceived and actual state abuses strengthens distrust of the British reinforcing commitment

The belief system at the foundation of the PIRA is primarily a nationalist based ideology combined with elements of ethnicity, religion and socialism that are each manipulable to appeal and control the internal membership and external audience. These beliefs are translated into varying degrees of commitment,


<sup>116</sup> Irvin, p. 157.

<sup>117</sup> Dingley, J and Kirk-Smith, M., 'Symbolism and Sacrifice in Terrorism', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 13:1 (2002), pp 102-128, p. 115.

<sup>118</sup> Dingley and Kirk-Smith, p. 117.

<sup>119</sup> Feldman, A., *Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 105.

which can be described by the incremental adjustment of commitment from uncommitted, to supporter and finally to volunteer. Overall, commitment positively influences cell effectiveness to a moderate degree.



**Figure 8: PIRA Systems Decomposition of Commitment**

## Popular Support and Urban Integration

This section will primarily examine the extent of the PIRA's popular support and how this translates into sanctuaries (see Figure 9). In addition, the PIRA's integration of urban social networks is examined as a key factor in generating sanctuaries to maintain cell effectiveness.

The PIRA is an ethno-nationalist organisation depending entirely on a single ethnic group made-up of predominantly Catholic-Republican supporters<sup>120</sup>. This exclusivity allows the cultural interlinking of community and terrorist through social and family networks making it difficult to disentangle one from the

<sup>120</sup> Coogan comments that there were some Protestants in the PIRA but mainly in rural areas. Source: Coogan, p. 604.

other<sup>121</sup>. Support for Sinn Fein is somewhat indicative of support for the PIRA. During the May 1985 National elections Sinn Fein won 11 per-cent of the overall vote and 40 per-cent of the nationalist vote<sup>122</sup>. Moreover, support for Sinn Fein candidates in various elective forums between 1982 and 1985, ranged from approximately 30 to over 50 percent<sup>123</sup>. Subsequently, the Catholic-Republican community contains elements more inclined than others to participate in revolutionary organisations.

Irvin's study of Sinn Fein activists showed, '...the great majority of Sinn Fein members became active in Sinn Fein as a result either of their family background, or their involvement in organisations explicitly opposed to the existing regime or supportive of those engaged in the armed struggle against the state.'<sup>124</sup> Subsequently, variations in family backgrounds can condition the integration of terrorist and community. Ultimately, the degree of integration determines the extent volunteers may use their community as urban camouflage (to hide and blend in with)<sup>125</sup> and the level of causal responsibility attributed to the organisation from targeting miscalculations<sup>126</sup>.

The singling out of the Catholic-Republican community ensures a common understanding and legitimisation of symbolic acts. For example, the 10 Republican martyrs of the 1981 Long Kesh prison hunger strikes correlates with a history of Nationalist hunger strikes between 1920 and 1976<sup>127</sup>. However, the introduction of the cellular system in 1977 restricted volunteer's external interactions entailing what Feldman comments, a dramatic re-organisation of the interface between the PIRA organisation and supporters<sup>128</sup>. The high

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<sup>121</sup> Dingley and Kirk-Smith, p. 106.

<sup>122</sup> Irvin, p. 185.

<sup>123</sup> O'Brien, p. 197.

<sup>124</sup> Irvin, p. 144.

<sup>125</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>126</sup> Dingley and Kirk-Smith, p. 121.

<sup>127</sup> Feldman, p. 232.

<sup>128</sup> Feldman, p. 293.

visibility of Sinn Fein somewhat alleviated this problem<sup>129</sup>, as did an arguable apparent lack of concern for discipline (see the analysis of the compartmentalization component). The level of integration and legitimisation of acts within the Catholic community are vital elements of popular support that determine the availability of sanctuaries.

Sanctuaries reduced the operational need for resources, provided safe havens for training and for engineering new weapons. For example, Belfast's Catholic community experienced a high degree of sectarian and state violence and subsequently offered safe houses, vehicles or intelligence with a low risk of betrayal<sup>130</sup>. Moreover, the Southern Republic<sup>131</sup>, South Armagh and Tyrone became increasingly more important to the PIRA as security improved in urban areas<sup>132</sup>. For example, the Southern Republic, which did not recognise extradition to the North<sup>133</sup>, generated safe havens for training and logistics support<sup>134</sup>. Overall, sanctuaries reduced the pressure on ASU operations, which subsequently increased the life expectancy of volunteers.

## Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for popular support:

1. The semi-autonomous operation of battalion controlled ASUs increases the awareness of the local Catholic community to the PIRA cause
2. Selective high and low profile targeting did not specifically target Catholic or Protestant civilians, which contributed to the maintenance of popular support
3. The PIRA attracted supporters with a broad range of commitment
4. State security abuses reinforced the popularity of the PIRA

In summary, popular support generated within the Catholic-Republican community is representative of the composition of the PIRA and ensuing integration of community and volunteer. The effectiveness of integration and the

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<sup>129</sup> Wright, p. 154.

<sup>130</sup> Cronin, p. 342.

<sup>131</sup> Urban, p. 220.

<sup>132</sup> Urban, p. 34.

<sup>133</sup> Cronin, p. 345.

<sup>134</sup> Wright, p. 220.

legitimisation of the organisation are representative of the available sanctuaries in the Catholic-Republican communities in Belfast and in the South. Even though popular support does vary, this nevertheless indicates the manipulative power of the PIRA strategy. Overall, the PIRA retained a solid core of popular support, which had a positive effect on cell effectiveness to a high degree.

## Recruitment and the Working Class

This section examines the PIRA's recruitment process, particularly its situational and character filtering mechanism (see Figure 9). In addition, the PIRA's attrition rate will be analysed to gain some sense of filtering with regards recruitment rate.

The situational filtering and character marker mechanism identifies recruits with common experiences. The following three main situational and character markers are associated with volunteers: working-class attributes, regular exposure to violence and prior exposure to activism.

Volunteers were overwhelmingly Catholic, generally employable but most likely unemployed and of working-class origins<sup>135</sup>. For example, between 1971 and 1988, Irvin comments that Catholics on average were twice as likely as Protestants to be unemployed<sup>136</sup>. Volunteer's mainly came from areas exposed to the worst of sectarian and state violence: predominantly urban inner city ghettos. Based on prisoner statistics Irvin concluded that many recruits came from Belfast, which is plausible considering the extraordinary amount of violence the city experienced<sup>137</sup>. For example, Irvin shows that the North, South, West and Eastern areas of Belfast between 1969 and 1989 contributed to 48 percent of all Northern Ireland deaths<sup>138</sup>. In 1987 alone, Nationalists made up

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<sup>135</sup> Dingley and Kirk-Smith, pp. 104-105.

<sup>136</sup> Irvin, p. 139.

<sup>137</sup> Irvin, p. 189.

<sup>138</sup> Irvin, p. 190.

89 percent of all deaths in Belfast West<sup>139</sup>. In addition to the omnipresence of violence, the past history of the volunteer would in most cases have had some exposure to activism, whether through family background, civil rights movements, feminist movements or trade unions<sup>140</sup>.

The potential recruit would initiate the recruitment process, using contacts within the close-knit Catholic community to find the local PIRA recruitment officer. This would show willingness considered vital for long-term stability: 'To Force young men and women into the IRA or to compel them to stay against their will was not only inimical to the intense comradeship that bound the Republican Movement together but was considered counterproductive and dangerous.'<sup>141</sup> Following the contact phase, a period of weeks or months occurred before a discouragement phase began<sup>142</sup>. During this phase, recruits attended ideological themed meetings that attempted to dissuade them from joining<sup>143</sup>. Recruits were sworn into the PIRA once they demonstrated an appropriate degree of commitment.

The filtering, contact and discouragement phases of recruitment optimise numbers for entry into the cellular system. The targeting of working-class recruits with technical skills, such as arc welding or lathe operating, ensures compatibility with the level of technology employed<sup>144</sup>. Moreover, the recruits pre-existing relationship with activism and violence reduces the degree of indoctrination required during and post training. Overall, the PIRA appears to avoid mixing social classes in preference to increased solidarity through common experience<sup>145</sup>.

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<sup>139</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>140</sup> Irvin found that 10 percent of the Sinn Fein interview sample had no prior activism.

Source: Irvin, p. 144.

<sup>141</sup> Taylor, P., *Behind the Mask: The IRA and Sinn Fein*, New York: TV Books, 1997, p. 89.

<sup>142</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>143</sup> Only Taylor refers to the discouragement phase in the PIRA recruitment process.

Source: Taylor, p. 89.

<sup>144</sup> Geraghty, T., *The Irish War: The Hidden Conflict Between the IRA and British Intelligence*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2000, p. 197.

<sup>145</sup> Irvin, p. 152.

## Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for recruitment:

1. The use of symbolism, ideology and the British threat increase commitment and move the recruit from supporter to volunteer
2. The PIRA's social integration into Catholic ghettos provides for a constant flow of recruits
3. The security department screens recruits to detect infiltration <sup>146</sup>
4. Attack effectiveness both produces and attracts new recruits
5. The effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures increases the perceived threat to the recruits survivability lowering the recruitment rate (-)

In summary, the effectiveness of the PIRA's recruitment process derives from the PIRA's capacity to sustain its attrition rate. This requires measuring the replacement rate of volunteers exiting the organisation, which is somewhat problematic<sup>147</sup>. Exit through death appears to be less significant versus capture and imprisonment. For example, between 1980 and 1985, volunteer deaths averaged seven per year<sup>148</sup>. However, imprisonments during the same period were much higher due in large part to the supergrass trials. For example, Republican supergrass informers helped convict 66 PIRA volunteers of which 38 convictions remained extant following appeals<sup>149</sup>. Additionally, the re-employing of imprisoned volunteers or ready-to-go-terrorists following a debriefing<sup>150</sup> helped shortcut the recruitment process. However, while attractive, recruiting ready-to-go-terrorists increased the risk of re-employing compromised volunteers. Nevertheless, the sense of efficacy attributed to the recruitment process appears capable of maintaining the PIRA's approximately 250 volunteers<sup>151</sup>. Consequently, recruitment positively influences cell effectiveness to a high degree.

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<sup>146</sup> The screening of recruits was not identified in any of the texts reviewed. Subsequently, this is an assumption based on the known practicality of the PIRA.

<sup>147</sup> The intent of this calculation is to gain some sense of the efficacy of the recruitment process. Available data does not allow a more accurate calculation.

<sup>148</sup> Urban, p. 249.

<sup>149</sup> Greer, p. 287.

<sup>150</sup> Coogan, p. 602.

<sup>151</sup> Bishop and Mallie, p. 308.



## Training and Mentoring

This section will examine the PIRA's informal training processes (see Figure 9). This analysis will show that training reflects operational survivability, which contributes to cell effectiveness.

The training of volunteers intended to instil a code of conduct that collectively would maximise the success of the long war strategy. The implications for an undisciplined cadre are inherent in the following statement by a Sinn Féin activist: 'Elections do have a part to play in our strategy, but only if we ensure that we use them properly. That requires that we develop a disciplined movement guided by well-defined and cohesive revolutionary strategy.'<sup>152</sup>

The volunteer's training primarily consisted of mentoring by senior volunteers. It was the responsibility of the mentor to ensure the new volunteer received instruction from the 'Greenbook'<sup>153</sup>. During this period, lectures on various operational aspects, including resisting interrogations and breaking the forensic link, prepared the volunteer for operations. Moreover, the volunteer completed increasingly complex tasks until adequate skills were developed to upgrade the volunteer to gun carrying status<sup>154</sup>.

The training curriculum derived from debriefings, primarily from ex-prisoners and past ASU operations. For example, new volunteers would be educated in the use of safety devices during interrogations, such as undermining the method of interrogation used by the interrogator<sup>155</sup>. Specialist training seems more haphazard with the training of bomb makers according to Urban, a form of natural selection<sup>156</sup>. For example, between 1969 and 1981 there were 105 deaths linked to bomb making, termed own-goals by the British<sup>157</sup>. During this

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<sup>152</sup> Irvin, p. 161.

<sup>153</sup> Taylor, p. 247.

<sup>154</sup> Coogan, p. 578 and Cronin, p. 342.

<sup>155</sup> Feldman, p. 141.

<sup>156</sup> Urban, p. 33.

<sup>157</sup> O'Brien, p. 157.

period, a process of indoctrination arguably took place building on and manipulating the new volunteer's existing belief system<sup>158</sup>.

The indoctrination process instilled solidarity and commitment within the organisation using symbolic links, particularly a religion and/or a culture under threat. In contrast to the ideological message delivered to popular supporters the message to the volunteer during recruitment phase may have had a greater religious-ethnic and consequently emotive content (see discussion on commitment). Dingley and Kirk-Smith describe this elevated content as equating nation to religion and then nation to sacrifice using concepts of images and symbols with notions of sacrifice<sup>159</sup>. Sacrifice in the volunteer's context is that made by sacrificing ones past life to become a terrorist and isolating oneself from the community by increasing ones dependence on the organisation.

## Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for training:

1. Links with foreign organisations and countries have contributed operational information to the PIRA's knowledgebase
2. Constructed sanctuaries along border areas provided safe havens for informal training
3. The abundant supply and standardisation of weaponry allows training to be simplified and more focused
4. Operational intelligence obtained through debriefings updates training programs

In summary, informal training using indoctrination and irrevocable acts incrementally produces high initiation and exit costs. However, the lack of formal training camps potentially detracts from the effective knowledge-transfer

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<sup>158</sup> There appears little documented on the PIRA process of indoctrination. Mao Tse Tung highlighted its importance by incorporating it into the Guerrilla doctrine of trading time for space and using time to generate will. Subsequently, based on the PIRA's organisational structure, which included an education officer, some form of continuing indoctrination would likely have taken place. Subsequently the description, which follows, is based on the previous discussion of commitment.

Source: Taber, R., *The War of the Flea: Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice*, St Albans, UK: Paladin Frogmore, 1965, p. 47.

<sup>159</sup> Dingley and Kirk-Smith, p. 117.

of tried and tested techniques and specialised skills, such as bomb-making, resulting in a system reliant on the experience of the mentor. Between 1980 and 1985, seven volunteers were killed in accidents, whereas six were executed as informers<sup>160</sup>. However, the low number of volunteers (18)<sup>161</sup> killed by security forces between 1980 and 1985 relative to the estimated total number of volunteers (250)<sup>162</sup> implies that the training process was sufficient to buttress the organisation's attrition rate. While the training process appears to have lacked a formal process of knowledge transfer, the system of mentoring seems to have suited the local security environment. Overall, the training component positively influenced cell effectiveness to a high degree

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<sup>160</sup> Urban, p. 249.

<sup>161</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>162</sup> Urban, p. 32.




Figure 9: PIRA Systems Decomposition of Organisational Formation

## Logistics and Attrition

This section examines the extent of supply sources in the PIRA's logistics apparatus (see Figure 10). This analysis will show that these supply sources ultimately determine the utility of the strategy and capacity of the cell to remain effective long-term.

The PIRA is a low cost organisation, which is essentially indicative of its cellular infrastructure. Its major running costs appear to have been volunteer expenses and costs associated with its logistics infrastructure.

Bishop and Mallie estimated that the Belfast brigade in 1983 cost the organisation £2,500 per week<sup>163</sup>. Unemployed full time members were paid £20 per week, whereas part-time and employed members were not paid<sup>164</sup>. Moreover, considering there were approximately 1,000 PIRA prisoners in 1988<sup>165</sup>, payments to their families would have likely outnumbered those to volunteers<sup>166</sup>. Subsequently, the PIRA's funding and arms purchases benefited from its low cost infrastructure.

The PIRA utilised the following three principle sources for both fund raising and arms purchases: local sources, Irish-American and Middle-Eastern sympathisers. Local sources provided hard cash and employed volunteer's technical expertise to facilitate the engineering of weaponry specific to the security environment. Various legal and illegal sources helped raise funds. In particular, social clubs, private drinking clubs, and fraud and protection rackets provided a regular flow of income<sup>167</sup>. For example, Bishop and Mallie comment that in 1986 the PIRA ran 28 social clubs in which a large club could earn

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<sup>163</sup> Bishop and Mallie, p. 312.

<sup>164</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>165</sup> Adams, Morgan and Bambridge, p. 189.

<sup>166</sup> Values of payments made by the PIRA to support prisoner's families were not established. However, Coogan in discussing PIRA clubs highlights the Prisoner's Defence Fund Club and comments on the welfare of prisoner's relatives.

Source: Coogan, pp. 536-537.

<sup>167</sup> Wright, p. 222.

between £100,000 and £200,000 per annum<sup>168</sup>. Moreover, fraud and protection rackets ranged from elaborate to primitive, such as charging black cab drivers £15 weekly levies<sup>169</sup>, but were also in many cases aimed at de-legitimising the state.

Locally engineered weaponry allowed PIRA hit and run tactics to adapt more effectively to counter-terrorism measures. PIRA innovations principally increased standoff range and the capacity of ASUs to fight in urban conditions. For example, bomb composition and detonation mechanisms progressed from unstable commercial explosives to more stable larger fertiliser based explosives or smaller military based explosives, such as semtex, detonated remotely via impact, command wire, radio control or delayed timers<sup>170</sup>. Moreover, the PIRA arms making factories developed a homemade mortar, which from 1972 – 1996 evolved from a MK-1 to MK-15 model<sup>171</sup>. However, locally engineered weaponry remained dependent on foreign sources for *materiels*, such as semtex.

From 1972 - 1985, sympathisers in North America were the principle weapons sources for the PIRA<sup>172</sup>. North Americans of Irish Descent (NORAIID) were instrumental in supplying large numbers of Armalite (AKM) rifles to the PIRA<sup>173</sup>. Moreover, between 1979 and 1981 NORAIID gave an estimated four million pounds in donations to the PIRA<sup>174</sup>. However, during the early 1980s joint United States and British counter-terrorism operations disrupted the supply chain from the East coast of the United States<sup>175</sup>. This ultimately resulted in the PIRA turning to secondary supply sources in the Middle East.

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<sup>168</sup> Bishop and Mallie, p. 312.

<sup>169</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>170</sup> Geraghty, p. 195.

<sup>171</sup> Geraghty, p. 189.

<sup>172</sup> Cronin, p. 345 and Geraghty, p. 182.

<sup>173</sup> Dillon, p. 430.

<sup>174</sup> O'Ballance, p. 81.

<sup>175</sup> Stoney, p. 374.

Between 1985 and 1987, Libya sent at least four large arms shipments to the PIRA consisting of various weaponry, including semtex and prestige weaponry, such as high calibre machine guns and surface to air missiles<sup>176</sup>. The Libyan supply chain was broken-up in 1987 following the discovery of a large arms shipment on board the *MV Eksund*<sup>177</sup>. The large sea based supply shipments and their inevitable interdiction signified the general difficulty in getting supplies to Ireland<sup>178</sup>. However, from 1977 onwards, many smaller shipments had made their way into Ireland utilising various transportation modes from European and Middle Eastern sources making detection more difficult<sup>179</sup>.

However, the vulnerability of weapons caches to counter-terrorism measures, such as technology and informers, presented the most urgent threat within the logistics apparatus. For example, in 1989 the RUC uncovered up to 27 arms deposits ranging in location from reservoirs, waste dumps and cemeteries to cupboards<sup>180</sup>. Discovered weapons caches essentially allowed the penetration of the organisation via detection and tracking counter-terrorism systems and potentially the identification of the Quartermaster, considered a crucial figure in the organisation<sup>181</sup>. While volunteers employed security measures to detect tampering, there was nevertheless a continuing attrition rate and risk associated with weapons caches.

## Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for logistics:

1. The PIRA's long war strategy established attainable logistical requirements
2. Multiple foreign relationships insulated the logistics network from interdiction
3. The organisation's cellular system reduced overheads
4. Effective counter-terrorism measures reduced the efficacy of large weapons shipments (-)

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<sup>176</sup> Geraghty, p. 182.

<sup>177</sup> O'Brien, p. 162.

<sup>178</sup> O'Brien, p. 144.

<sup>179</sup> Dillon, p. 440.

<sup>180</sup> O'Brien, p. 202.

<sup>181</sup> Dillon, p. 379.

In summary, while large weapons shipments carried greater risks of discovery those that penetrated the state security net significantly contributed to the PIRA's future arsenal. Moreover, smaller weapons shipments appear to have escaped detection. Single large supply shipments allowed weapons to be standardised and the standoff capability of ASU operations improved. Bell comments that by 1989, the PIRA had more arms than volunteers<sup>182</sup> and O'Brien comments that by 1993 over half of the AKMs received were still in PIRA hands<sup>183</sup>. Consequently, the rate of attrition did little to disrupt weapons variety and effectiveness. Overall, the logistics component positively influenced the attack component to a high degree.

## Intelligence and Specialised Cells

This section examines the PIRA's counter-intelligence capability and capacity to produce well-developed operational intelligence (see Figure 10). This analysis will examine intelligence as an integral component in implementing the PIRA's long war strategy and maintaining the long-term effectiveness of the cell.

The PIRA's internal security department was formed in response to the growing problem of informers<sup>184</sup>. By 1985, at which time the supergrass system had reached its ascendancy, internal security had become a vital tool in combating the informer problem<sup>185</sup>. For example, the security department debriefed ex-prisoners to update anti-interrogation techniques<sup>186</sup>. The security department acted much in the same way as police investigators building up a dossier of evidence on the suspect before presenting it to the Northern Command for sanctioning, usually consisting of execution<sup>187</sup>. For example, between 1978 and

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<sup>182</sup> Bell, p. 45.

<sup>183</sup> O'Brien, p. 239.

<sup>184</sup> Greer, p. 41.

<sup>185</sup> Greer, p. 206.

<sup>186</sup> Dillon, p. 407.

<sup>187</sup> Bishop and Mallie, p. 321.



1987, 24 alleged informers were executed<sup>188</sup>. In contrast, operational intelligence generated actionable data for ASU operations.

PIRA operational intelligence comprised of pre and post operational information gathering<sup>189</sup>. The pre-operational gathering of information provided targeting data. ASU intelligence officers had assigned areas of responsibility, which resulted in the intelligence officer becoming a local specialist<sup>190</sup>. For example, low profile targets, such as off-duty UDR soldiers would have their routines observed to detect vulnerabilities, such as meal times<sup>191</sup>. Operational intelligence gathering during an operation would employ ASUs or individual volunteers as lookouts to provide real -time intelligence. For example, volunteers would listen into tactical radios to track the position of British Army patrols<sup>192</sup>. Post operational intelligence debriefings consisted of interviewing volunteers in order to identify what worked and what did not<sup>193</sup>. The intelligence from these debriefings helped improve the effectiveness of logistics, training and attack components. For example, the British deployment of counter frequencies to pre-detonate remote controlled bombs resulted in the PIRA reverting to command wires<sup>194</sup>.

## Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for intelligence:

1. Integration into Catholic society improved the PIRA's intelligence gathering capability

In summary, counter-intelligence appeared to be effective in reducing informer numbers when considering the number of publicised executions. However, in 1983 alone there were three PIRA supergrasses put on trial out of a total of five

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<sup>188</sup> Urban, p. 25.

<sup>189</sup> Coogan, p. 602.

<sup>190</sup> Bishop and Mallie, p. 311.

<sup>191</sup> Murray, p. 121.

<sup>192</sup> Urban, p. 114.

<sup>193</sup> Feldman, p. 45.

<sup>194</sup> Geraghty, p. 210.

supergrass trials<sup>195</sup>. Rather than reducing the informer threat, the security department in reality could only contain it to some extent. In contrast, operational intelligence ensured past mistakes acted to increase the efficacy of future PIRA operations. Moreover, the integration of intelligence into all phases of the operation increased the survivability of the volunteer and attack effectiveness of the ASU. Overall, the intelligence component positively influenced the attack component to a high degree.

## Attacks and Caution

This section primarily examines the doctrine of the PIRA to give some sense of attack effectiveness (see Figure 10). This analysis will identify the tactical variety that the ASU employs, which is a crucial determinant in mitigating risk and sustaining cell effectiveness.

The PIRA's long war strategy maintains the following two key themes: to cause overreaction through selective targeting and attrition through the maintenance of attack tempo. In order to meet these objectives the following three common attack patterns provide a sense of the PIRA's doctrine:

- Hit and run tactics
- Stand-off range
- Firepower superiority

Hit and run tactics consist of approach, attack and escape phases utilising caution, surprise and sometimes coordination between ASUs to ensure a rapid engagement and exit. This precept applies during close-in assassinations of off-duty UDR soldiers or on-duty RUC officers<sup>196</sup>. Caution was critical during the approach phase, considered by Geraghty to be the most vulnerable period for

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<sup>195</sup> Greer, p. 287.

<sup>196</sup> Murray, p. 121.

the ASU due to the threat of counter-terrorism measures<sup>197</sup>. The ASU commander if in doubt would abort the operation during this phase<sup>198</sup>.

Time, place and kind of target determined hit and run tactics, ranging from assassinations to complex ambushes. For example, the Warrenpoint ambush of Second Battalion, the Parachute Regiment on 27 August 1979 killing 18 soldiers, consisted of three attack components. First, an ASU remotely detonated a bomb on the road, second, snipers from a second ASU fired on the remaining troops forcing them to seek cover in the gateway of the Narrow Waters castle, and third, a second bomb was detonated in the castle gateway<sup>199</sup>. The first bomb acted as a 'come on bomb' to lure more troops to the scene increasing the number of casualties when the second bomb was detonated<sup>200</sup>.

The escape phase was the dominant feature of an ASU operation. It consisted of pre-planned run backs to terminuses or safe houses. Feldman states, 'The runback consists of the network of alleyways, double-entry buildings, street systems, and highways that permit the evasion of police/army patrols, checkpoints, and antagonistic paramilitary units.'<sup>201</sup> The crucial features of runbacks were the use of timing and terrain to insulate the volunteers from the attack scene<sup>202</sup>. The safe house or washhouses provided locations to remove forensic evidence and to carry out intelligence debriefings<sup>203</sup>. In contrast, the manipulation of standoff range removes the risk associated with the exit phase.

The manipulation of standoff range determines the engagement range, which correlates to the degree of threat and resources allocated to the operation.

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<sup>197</sup> Geraghty, p. 159.

<sup>198</sup> Cronin, p. 350.

<sup>199</sup> Coogan, p. 583 and Urban, p. 86.

<sup>200</sup> Geraghty, p. 208.

<sup>201</sup> Feldman, p. 42.

<sup>202</sup> Feldman, p. 44.

<sup>203</sup> Feldman, p. 45.

During 1987, the RUC logged 27 PIRA bombings and 24 shootings<sup>204</sup>. Mortar attacks, and bombings that utilise wire, remote control or mercury-tilt detonation devices were the PIRA's preferred methods of attack<sup>205</sup>. The *Northern Ireland: Future Terrorist Trends Report 1978-1983* produced by the British Army stated that explosive components were cheap, available and avoided suspicion when purchasing them, and were stable, impervious to weather, quick and simple to lay and required a minimum demand of skill<sup>206</sup>. For example, the October 1984 bombing of the Grand Hotel during the Conservative Party's national conference resulted from an ASU over a two-day period wiring a sixth floor room with explosives and then setting a timer for 24 days in the future<sup>207</sup>. As standoff range increases for an operation the threat to the volunteer and requirement for resources decreases. However, firepower superiority can mitigate the risks of close-in engagements.

Firepower superiority mitigates the security force threat<sup>208</sup>. Superior firepower was particularly critical when carrying out close-in operations such as assassinations or ambushes against British, UDR or UDC patrols. Combinations of weaponry, such as explosives and sniping rifles were essential in attaining firepower superiority. However, selective targeting and combinations of hit and run tactics also incorporates surprise and initiative contributing to mitigating the security force threat.

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<sup>204</sup> RUC logged shootings in 1987 were a combination of military, alleged informers, alleged criminals and loyalist paramilitary targets.

Source: O'Brien, p. 156.

<sup>205</sup> Geraghty, p. 195.

<sup>206</sup> Cronin, p. 353.

<sup>207</sup> The bomb exploded at 2:54am on 12 October 1984 killing five people.

Source: Bishop and Mallie, p. 338.

<sup>208</sup> Murray, p. 121.

## Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for attacks:

1. A moderate degree of compartmentalization (secrecy) increased attack effectiveness
2. The safety of the volunteer is inherent in selective targeting, which increases long-term attack effectiveness
3. Decentralisation of control allows the act to be justified by the volunteer
4. Popular support provides varying degrees of supplemental support to PIRA operations
5. Informal training provides volunteers with attack and survivability skills based on the experience of mentors
6. Counter-Terrorism measures sometimes disrupted PIRA attacks reducing attack effectiveness (-)

In summary, the success of an attack qualifies its repeated use as a traditional tactic. The PIRA's traditional tactics consisted of shooting assassinations, command-wire and remote controlled bombings, mortar attacks and car bombs. Non-traditional tactics while successful require more resources and/or engender greater risks. These tactics included coordinated ambushes, long-term time controlled bombings and involuntary suicide bombings<sup>209</sup>. Subsequently, the tactics employed by the PIRA suggest a high degree of tactical variety. Overall, attack effectiveness positively influenced cell effectiveness to a high degree.

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<sup>209</sup> Involuntary suicide attacks consisted of driver-coerced car bombs, which usually involved the taking hostage of family members.  
Source: Cronin, p. 354.




Figure 10: PIRA Systems Decomposition of Operational Patterns

## Counter-Terrorism Measures and Informers

This section will describe the central counter-terrorism measures used by the British and Irish Security Forces<sup>210</sup> (see Figure 11). This analysis will develop a counter-terrorism framework in order to show the effectiveness of legislative measures and intelligence gathering mechanisms used in disrupting the effectiveness of ASUs.

The British strategy of criminalisation acted to contain and isolate the PIRA using pre-emptive tactics anchored by timely intelligence. Legislation and the Criminal Justice System prescribed the legal power to achieve these objectives<sup>211</sup>. Information gathering operated within a self-supporting and centralised organisational structure composed of a trinity of intelligence assets employing informers, detention and interrogation, and technology to generate timely intelligence.

The intelligence gathering mechanisms in Northern Ireland were centralised and operationally integrated. Centralisation of intelligence allowed the coordination of intelligence collection and interdiction, reducing duplication<sup>212</sup>. Lisbon centrally coordinated Regional Tasking and Coordination Group's (TCG), each commanded by an Special Branch (SB) officer orchestrating a synergy of British and Irish intelligence, surveillance and ambushing activities<sup>213</sup>.

British counter-terrorism forces were composed of the following detachments: the Force Reconnaissance Unit (FRU) who managed informers; 14-intelligence company who carried out surveillance; the Special Air Service (SAS) for rapid reaction and interdiction<sup>214</sup>; and MI5 agents for technical surveillance<sup>215</sup>. Irish

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<sup>210</sup> Shoot-to-kill actions by the security services are not included in this analysis because they are somewhat controversial particularly as to whether government ordered shoot-to-kill policies existed and subsequently, whether they were a verifiable part of the British counterterrorism strategy.

<sup>211</sup> Vercher, p. 55.

<sup>212</sup> Greer, p. 41.

<sup>213</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>214</sup> Geraghty, p. 136.

counter-terrorism forces were composed of the following: SB who managed informers<sup>216</sup>; detachments of the SAS trained RUC Mobile Support Units; and MI5 trained RUC E4 surveillance units<sup>217</sup>. Intelligence collection heavily depended on the extensiveness and effectiveness of informer networks.

According to Urban, informers have provided the bulk of information during the Irish conflict<sup>218</sup>. However, because there were no effective guidelines for running informers in Northern Ireland<sup>219</sup> they were often held accountable through the level of loyalty they developed with their case handler<sup>220</sup>. The lack of controls appears to have been central in developing extensive informer networks, especially by SB<sup>221</sup>. For example, Vercher comments that this practice was uncontrolled and uncontrollable because of the transactional nature of the informer system, in which immunity or leniency in sentencing was adjudicated on the quality of evidence given<sup>222</sup>. Consequently, the system encouraged a degree of misinformation by relying on the relationship between informer and case-handler and thorough profiling of potential informers before recruitment.

The process of detention and interrogation was instrumental in recruiting informers<sup>223</sup>. Under sections 11, 12 and 14 of the 1973 NIEPA suspected terrorists could be detained from 4 to 72 hours by the various security branches and then potentially held for a further five days<sup>224</sup>. For example, before 1983 arrests averaged 55 per month, however by 1986 this had fallen to 71 arrests per year, of which 82 percent were discharged without conviction<sup>225</sup>. Informer

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<sup>215</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>216</sup> Geraghty, p. 131.

<sup>217</sup> Dillon, p. 398.

<sup>218</sup> Urban, p. 137.

<sup>219</sup> Geraghty, p. 157.

<sup>220</sup> Greer, p. 26.

<sup>221</sup> Geraghty, p. 142.

<sup>222</sup> Vercher, p. 95.

<sup>223</sup> Urban, p. 101.

<sup>224</sup> The decision to hold a suspect for longer than 72 hours required a judicial decision.

Source: Vercher, p. 56.

<sup>225</sup> Vercher, p. 66.



recruitment practices amounted to profiling, such as investigating socio-economic backgrounds, and were aggressive to enable the severing of strong community ties<sup>226</sup>. For example, a 1980 survey of Catholics identified 35 percent of respondents had pressure placed on them to become informers using combinations of money, the offer of a job or threats<sup>227</sup>. It appears recruitment techniques did not necessarily target lucrative information sources, such as Quartermasters, but instead depended on the potential informer's credibility. While informers produced timely and specific information, interrogations were part of a large and ongoing mainstream data gathering mechanism.

The interrogation centres at Castlereagh RUC station Belfast and Gough Army Barracks in Armagh were used essentially as bulk data collection centres for building up dossiers of suspected terrorists and to recruit informers<sup>228</sup>. Interrogation in the Irish context '...is perhaps best defined as prolonged and persistent questioning in which the suspect's right to silence is implicitly if not formally denied.'<sup>229</sup> Pressured interrogations acted to extract confessions. According to Urban, the occurrences of physical coercion became less frequent following the 1979 Bennett report, which had detailed security force indiscretions<sup>230</sup>. However, a 1983 study referenced by Feldman shows of the 75 percent charged based on confessions half had confessed in the first three hours of interrogation and a further quarter within six hours<sup>231</sup>. Feldman states, 'We need only correlate the declining productivity of prolonged interrogation with the police's certitude that violence generated quick confessions in order to confirm that violence must be an accepted and regular practice at the interrogation centres.'<sup>232</sup> In contrast to pressured interrogations, the skilful use

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<sup>226</sup> Urban, p. 101.

<sup>227</sup> Greer, p. 256.

<sup>228</sup> Feldman, p. 113.

<sup>229</sup> Feldman, p. 111.

<sup>230</sup> Urban, p. 93.

<sup>231</sup> Feldman, p. 113.

<sup>232</sup> Feldman, p. 114.

of less severe techniques remained the mainstream method of interrogation to gather information in bulk.

Less severe interrogation methods, gathered information in bulk and identified potential informers. The interrogator, using isolation and disorientation, manipulated the suspect's social situation to create stress, tension and the possibility of ostracism within the Catholic community upon release<sup>233</sup>. According to Vercher, bulk arrests and interrogations allowed the build-up of dossiers regardless of criminal links. He states, 'It has been said that a police policy of random information gathering is being applied in order to identify the "target" criminal type before the crime has been committed, which involves the use of techniques of surveillance to control "stereotyped" people, not necessarily those persons who are directly suspected of a crime.'<sup>234</sup> Moreover, data collection via interrogation had the potential to generate myths in the community, softening future suspects<sup>235</sup>. Overall, bulk data collection generated significant amounts of data, which through technology translated into timely intelligence.

Technology was integrated into the overall intelligence gathering mechanism as a means to access and gather intelligence in real-time. Computers managed intelligence data and provided rapid access to computerised vehicle and dossier information on suspected and actual terrorists<sup>236</sup>. 'Vengeful', the vehicle enquiry system allowed instant checks on registration numbers<sup>237</sup>. 'Crucible', the personal enquiry system allowed access to dossier information and surveillance data<sup>238</sup>. For example, 'Crucible' stored banking information, associates of

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<sup>233</sup> Charters, p. 379.

<sup>234</sup> Vercher, p. 91.

<sup>235</sup> Feldman, p. 114.

<sup>236</sup> Dillon, p. 415.

<sup>237</sup> The PIRA employed techniques to counter 'Vengeful', such as replicating cars from area's that would not arouse suspicion, however this practice was not sustainable.

Source: Urban, p. 115.

<sup>238</sup> Greer, p. 40.

terrorists and terrorist profiles indicating degree of competence<sup>239</sup>. These systems were extremely valuable in predicting imminent operations by cross-referencing traffic movements, particularly cross-border traffic with surveillance and personal information on individual terrorists<sup>240</sup>.

Covert tracking and detection systems provided surveillance information. Tracking systems included the use of radio devices to monitor the movements of objects whereas detection systems used microphones, miniature cameras or larger photo platforms to identify terrorists. For example, the tracking of weapons or 'jarking' consisted of placing a micro tracking device and/or microphone into the butt end of a weapon<sup>241</sup>. Thermal imagers and infrared photography primarily mounted on aerial platforms were extremely effective in identifying weapons caches as well as disrupting operations during approach and exit phases<sup>242</sup>. Both infra-red and thermal imagers could detect recently fired weapons and thermal-imagers, in particular, were effective in detecting recent digging associated with weapons caches<sup>243</sup>. However, the PIRA incorporated various counter-surveillance techniques, including the frequent changing of cars and using cemeteries as weapons caches<sup>244</sup>.

### Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for counter-terrorism measures:

1. Poor communications discipline sometimes compromised the secrecy of the ASU
2. The PIRA's strategy incorporated a degree of cautiousness mitigating the risk associated to ASU operations (-)
3. Selective targeting of security forces engenders both revenge and urgency within the security forces

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<sup>239</sup> Dillon, p. 415.

<sup>240</sup> Dillon, p. 407.

<sup>241</sup> The effectiveness of 'jarking' is questionable considering the radio range and limited battery life of the device.

Source: Urban, p. 119.


<sup>242</sup> Geraghty, p. 159.

<sup>243</sup> Dillon, p. 411.

<sup>244</sup> Dillon, p. 412.

4. A desire to survive sometimes reduced the commitment of the volunteer increasing the vulnerability of the volunteer being compromised
5. Support from the Catholic community allowed the PIRA to blend in with the surrounding community (-)
6. The recruitment filtering process deterred potential infiltrators (-)
7. Fewer operatives reduce the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures (-)
8. Multiple supply lines reduced the effectiveness of interdiction (-)
9. The PIRA's security department acted to counter informers (+)
10. Effective intelligence and tactical variety combined with volunteer cautiousness mitigated the attack risk (-)

In summary, the Criminal Justice System sanctioned aggressive intelligence gathering utilising informers, data collection using detention and interrogation, and technology. While these techniques somewhat alienated the Catholic community, they ultimately were successful in generating intelligence. Of particular importance are the centralisation of information gathering, the sophistication of the informer recruitment and handling process and the myths, paranoia and suspicion generated by interrogations and technology. Consequently, sustained pressure on ASUs required a constant reassessing of operational procedures to remain effective. Overall, counter-terrorism measures have a negative influence on cell effectiveness to a high degree.




**Figure 11: PIRA Systems Decomposition of Counter-Terrorism Measures**

## Lifecycle of a Volunteer

The lifecycle of a volunteer (see Figure 12) identifies the various interactions of components of cell capital and resulting feedback loops. The most significant feedbacks occur during recruitment and following attacks. During recruitment the stability and commitment of the recruit is tested using situational and character filtering and discouragement meetings. Recruitment filtering correlates to growth modification removing those least committed to the life of a volunteer. Following the mentoring process, attacks and ongoing training form a primary feedback loop. Each attack sustains collective challenge and collective action. Following each attack, informal training reinforces both

common interest and common purpose. Counter-Terrorism measures provide the dominant means of exit.



**Figure 12: Lifecycle of a PIRA Volunteer**

## Summary

This chapter has shown that the PIRA's cellular components maintained a moderate to high degree of overall cell effectiveness. These results depict an aggressive intelligence collection security environment in which the formation and operation of ASUs required high degrees of compartmentalization formulated on maintaining communications discipline to offset informer threats. The functionality of compartmentalization was facilitated by the cell's reliance on decentralization of control to counter schisms, the British threat to generate commitment, social integration to engender popular support and caution during attacks. In the next chapter, a similar analysis of the ETA will be conducted.

## Chapter 4

### The Cellular System of ETA

This chapter deconstructs a snapshot taken of the ETA cellular system from 1984 to assess cellular effectiveness. To do this, a contextual history detailing the environment in which the cell operates will identify strategic, operational and cultural inflections followed by localising each component of cellular capital. In addition, the intent of this chapter is to formulate data for later analysis.

#### The Contextual History of ETA

The ETA (Basque Homeland and Liberty) was formed 31 July 1959 in response to extensive Basque repression by the Franco regime<sup>1</sup>. Between 1973 and 1984, both Spanish counter-terrorism policies and ETA attacks perpetuated the Basque conflict. Figure 13 summarizes some of the most significant milestones, from which will be constructed a relative historical framework.

*Euzkadi* (Basque Country) represents ETA's primary area of operations. Spain controls seven territories comprising Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, Alva and Navarra whereas France controls three territories comprising Labourd, Basse Navarre and Soule. The Spanish territories represent 86 percent of the total territory and accommodate seven percent of the Spanish population or approximately three million people<sup>2</sup>. The highly industrialised territories of Vizcaya and Guipuzocoa maintain the greatest percentages of Basque speakers<sup>3</sup>. Moreover, Guipuzocoa

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
<sup>1</sup> Clark, R., *The Basque Insurgents ETA, 1952 – 1980*, Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1984, p. 26.

<sup>2</sup> Anderson, W., *The ETA: Spains Basque Terrorists*, New York: The Rosen Publishing Group Inc, 2003, p. 6

<sup>3</sup> Vizcaya and Guipuzocoa comprise 13 and 44 percent respectively of Basque speakers. Source: Clark, p. 11.



maintains 68 percent of the Basque population<sup>4</sup>. Between 1960 and 1975, the Spanish Basque Country experienced massive immigration with the population increasing by 44 percent<sup>5</sup>. Consequently, Franco's dictatorship from 1936 – 1975 has represented a significant influence in shaping Basque perceptions during the post-Franco years.



**Figure 13: ETA Contextual History, 1973-1984**

<sup>4</sup> Clark, p. 11.

<sup>5</sup> Zirakzadeh, C., 'A Rebellious People: Basques, Protests, and Politics', (renamed Spain) in Whittaker, D (ed.), *The Terrorism Reader*, London: Routledge, 2001, pp. 125-138, p. 128.



Following General Francisco Franco's ascendancy to power in a 1936 coup and ensuing Spanish civil war (1936-1939), Franco introduced ultra-right unification policies<sup>6</sup>, which became instrumental in the suppression of non-Castilian minorities. The Basque language and public shows of Basque identity were outlawed and subsequently enforced using repressive measures, which increased in intensity following the start of ETA's armed struggle in 1967. From 1968 – 1975, the Basque people experienced a build-up in security forces and multiple states of suspension<sup>7</sup>. For example, a three-month state of exception during November 1975 resulted in detentions, torture, abuses of the judicial system and repetitive fines causing economic hardship<sup>8</sup>. Consequently, Franco's ultra-right rule turned its institutions into political surrogates, particularly police and military leadership<sup>9</sup>.

Following Franco's death and Spain's transition to Democracy, ETA violence rather than falling, increased by 93 percent<sup>10</sup>. In response to ETA's increasing attacks, counter-terrorism measures fluctuated between dirty wars, legislation and public shows of force. Woodworth defines the principle of Dirty War as the operation of terrorist surrogates by government officials under the umbrella of plausible deniability<sup>11</sup>. During both the Navarro and Suarez governments, ultra-right groups including members of the military and police carried out the first

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<sup>6</sup> Franco pursued ultra-right policies within a framework of militarism, Catholicism, Falangism (Spanish-Fascist movement founded in 1933), capitalism and an uncrowned monarchy to guarantee supremacy.

Source: Vercher, A., 'British and Spanish Measures to Deal With Terrorism: A Comparative Study with Some Reference to the EEC Framework', PhD Thesis, Cambridge University, 1988, p. 194.

<sup>7</sup> States of suspension resulted in suspending Basque constitutional rights for two to six month periods.

Source: Clark, p. 241

<sup>8</sup> Vercher, p. 223.

<sup>9</sup> Woodworth, P., *Dirty War, Clean Hands: ETA, the Gal and Spanish Democracy*, Crosses Green Cork, Ireland: Cork University Press, 2001, p. 47.

<sup>10</sup> Zirakzadeh, p. 126.

<sup>11</sup> Woodworth, p. 46.

Dirty War against ETA leaders in France and their associates in Spain<sup>12</sup>. Since 1962, ETA leaders had used Southern France as a sanctuary<sup>13</sup>. The second dirty war followed in 1982 under Felipe Gonzalez's Socialist government, enacted through the *Grupos Antiterroristas de liberacion* (GAL) proxy organisation.

The 1975 Prevention of Terrorism Act activated various terrorism laws dictating police and judicial action, essentially criminalizing the conflict<sup>14</sup>. Additional organic laws reinforced Spanish strategy between 1980 and 1984, underscored by the introduction of the Italian system of *pentiti*: the system of the Repentant Terrorists in 1981<sup>15</sup>. Additionally, the Spanish government launched Plan ZEN (Special Northern Zone) in 1983<sup>16</sup> increasing security force numbers intensifying the climate of occupation<sup>17</sup>. In contrast to the Spanish evolution from ultra-right policies to criminalizing the conflict, the ETA were influenced by schisms and organisational splits, which as Clark states, '...emerged each time radicalised, more intransigent and more deeply committed to armed struggle.' <sup>18</sup>

Between 1967 and 1978, ETA's ideology evolved into a mix of Socialism and ethno-nationalism causing multiple schisms and organisational splits<sup>19</sup>. Throughout these splits, the nationalist discourse remained separatist<sup>20</sup>. The Patriotic Socialist Coordinating Council (KAS) created in 1975 produced the following minimum conditions for ETA's abandonment of violence: the right of self-determination; to assert territorial integrity for all Basque provinces in Spain;

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<sup>12</sup> Attacks by ultra-rights used cover names such as counter-terrorism ETA (ATE) an inversion of ETA.

Source: Woodworth, p. 48.

<sup>13</sup> Clark, p. 37.

<sup>14</sup> Jimenez, F., 'Spain: The Terrorist Challenge and the Government's Response' in Schmid, A and Crelinsten, R (eds), *Western Responses to Terrorism*, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1993, pp. 110-130, p. 117.

<sup>15</sup> Vercher, p. 276.

<sup>16</sup> Woodworth, p. 68.

<sup>17</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> Clark, p. 35.

<sup>19</sup> Clark, p. 36.

<sup>20</sup> Mees, L., 'Between Votes and Bullets: Conflicting Ethnic Identities in the Basque Country', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 24:5 (2001), pp. 798-827, p. 807.

the institutional predominance of the Basque language; amnesty for all political prisoners; and the withdraw of all Spanish security services<sup>21</sup>. Franco's denial of individual identity ultimately resulted in the armed struggle linking the ETA as defender of Basque rights. Subsequently, the ETA cellular system became an effective means to pursue the armed struggle.

The ETA cell (*comando*) developed during a period of organisational perturbations spanning from 1962 – 1971. The *comando* has its roots in the social institutions of Basque village culture<sup>22</sup>, particularly the cellular grouping of *cuadrillas* comprising male groups of four to six men who had maintained close relationships since childhood<sup>23</sup>. Cellular groupings were integrated into the ETA beginning from the First Assembly meeting of the executive in 1962 and subsequently refined during later assemblies. Full-time members (*liberados*) were introduced in 1964, 3-5 member *comandos* introduced in 1965 followed by assigning *comandos* to village clusters between 1966 and 1967<sup>24</sup>. These events established the cell as the key-operating core of the ETA. In addition to this early period of organisational formation, ETA introduced a new strategy.

From 1965 – 1984, the ETA employed the spiral theory of 'action-repression-action'<sup>25</sup>. This strategy originated from a third world guerrilla strategy of revolutionary warfare and states,

...when popular protest against injustices met with oppression, the revolutionary forces should act to punish the oppressor. The occupying forces would then retaliate with indiscriminate violence, since they would not know who the revolutionaries were, causing the population to respond with increased protests and support for the resistance in an upward spiral of resistance to the dictatorship<sup>26</sup>.

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<sup>21</sup> Zirakzadeh, p. 126.

<sup>22</sup> Clark, p. 209.

<sup>23</sup> Clark, p. 162.

<sup>24</sup> Clark, p. 208.

<sup>25</sup> Alexander, Y., Swetnam, M. and Levine, H., *ETA: Profile of a Terrorist Group*, New York: Transnational Publishers, 2001, p. 6.

<sup>26</sup> Sullivan, J., *ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euskadi 1890-1986*, London: Routledge, 1988, p. 43.

Essentially, for every police reaction, ETA would provoke an even greater response during which time a parallel system of administration would gradually supersede governmental processes and eventually lead to revolution<sup>27</sup>. The 1974 assassination of Franco's successor Prime Minister Carrero Blanco, while representative of this strategy, however acted to accelerate ETA's most definitive split in its history<sup>28</sup>.

In 1974, internal divisions over the role of the armed struggle caused the ETA to split into ETA (m) (military) and ETA (p-m) (political-military)<sup>29</sup>. However, ETA (m) superseded ETA (p-m)<sup>30</sup>, which eventually disbanded in 1983<sup>31</sup>. Additionally, in 1978 ETA's political wing *Herri Batasuna* (HB) formed from an amalgamation of four left-wing Basque parties becoming the mouthpiece for ETA and a magnet for radicalism at the local level<sup>32</sup>.

The historical framework ending in 1984 offsets Spain's criminalization strategy against ETA's escalation strategy. Moreover, this framework identifies Basque social networks as integral to ETA's cellular system. The next three sections will use this framework to assist in the deconstruction of the ETA cellular system. Moreover, unless otherwise specified ETA refers to ETA (m). However, in some cases statistics supplied by Clark do not differentiate between ETA (m) and ETA (p-m). Subsequently, the reader must be aware that ETA (p-m) was less active militarily vis-à-vis ETA (m)<sup>33</sup>. See appendix A for research definitions associated to the next three sections.

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<sup>27</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> Clark, p. 78.

<sup>29</sup> ETA (p-m) envisioned the arrival of a more democratic system and elected to subordinate the armed struggle in favour of mass organisation.

Source: Clark, p. 80.

<sup>30</sup> Clark, p. 81.

<sup>31</sup> Woodworth, p. 64.

<sup>32</sup> Clark, p. 109.

<sup>33</sup> Clark, p. 128.

## The Main Actors of ETA

During 1984, ETA's organisational structure reflected a two-tier construct (see Figure 14) networked together by a comprehensive courier network. This section will first, examine the organisational structure of the ETA *comando* and second, the actors that influence it.

The ETA *comando* was organised according to four specialised structures subordinated to the military apparatus and controlled by commanders that sat on the executive committee. *Comando* specialisations consisted of logistics, communications, intelligence and attack roles. The first three cell structures consisted mostly of part-time members (*legales*) who traditionally did not participate in armed actions and were generally unknown to the security forces.

Intelligence cell roles (*Informativo*) comprised of information collection and development, which included tactical considerations and best method, time and place considerations for future targets<sup>34</sup>.

Logistics or support cell roles (*apoyo*) comprised of bomb making, document forging, providing transportation and safe houses, and raising finances<sup>35</sup>. Moreover, cross-border cells transported *materiels* between Southern France and Spain<sup>36</sup>.

Communication cells can be categorised as couriers and drop points. The courier or link (*enlace*) was an intermediary that transported messages or weapons both hierarchically and horizontally. Vertical communications existed between the leadership, drop-points and *comando* leaders<sup>37</sup>. Horizontal communications existed between *comando* leaders and drop-points. The drop-points or mailboxes (*buzons*) could be another courier or physical locations,

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<sup>34</sup> Alexander, Swetnam and Levine, p. 8.

<sup>35</sup> Anderson, p. 45.

<sup>36</sup> Alexander, Swetnam and Levine, p. 8.

<sup>37</sup> Clark, p. 231.

such as bars or cinemas<sup>38</sup>. The sensitivity of the courier package determined the kind of courier used. For example, carrying revolutionary taxes to the leadership would have a different level of priority vis-à-vis a package of explosives transported to a *comando liberado*.

The attack *comando* comprised three to five fulltime (*liberados*) members (herein *etarras*) overseen by a commander who sat on the executive committee. The commander of the *liberados* had several personal staff to assist with managing the *comandos*, which included assistants responsible for finance, cross-border operations, operations management and finally logistical support and training<sup>39</sup>. Each *liberado* had a Basque codename or *nom de guerre* and generally had a police record<sup>40</sup>. The *comando* carried out armed actions mostly operating on intelligence provided by the leadership<sup>41</sup>.

*Comandos liberados* appear traditionally assigned to clusters of villages<sup>42</sup>. By referring to attack-victim distribution indexes provided by Clark, *comandos* operated from Guipuzcoa, Vizcaya, Madrid, Alava and finally Navarra<sup>43</sup>. Attacks tend to cluster around municipalities and townships<sup>44</sup>. According to Clark, the main distribution of *comandos* appears localised between west-central Vizcaya and the southeast and south central of Guipuzcoa<sup>45</sup>. These facts imply *comandos* operated regionally.

The executive committee operated with a staff of seven men allocated to the following specific departments<sup>46</sup>: *comandos liberados*, *comandos legales*,

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<sup>38</sup> Clark, p. 211.

<sup>39</sup> Clark, p. 213.

<sup>40</sup> Clark, p. 209.

<sup>41</sup> Zulaika, J., *Basque Violence Metaphor and Sacrament*, Nevada, U.S.A: University of Nevada Press, 1988, p. 69.

<sup>42</sup> Clark, p. 209.

<sup>43</sup> Clark, p. 186.

<sup>44</sup> Clark, p. 189.

<sup>45</sup> Clark, p. 190.

<sup>46</sup> Clark, p. 212.

intelligence, propaganda, political dissemination and international operations<sup>47</sup>. The political department was responsible for the ideological training of new recruits and to ensure armed operations followed party lines<sup>48</sup>. The propaganda department, while responsible for press releases also conducted the continued ideological training of *etarras*<sup>49</sup>. The international operations department was responsible for establishing and maintaining foreign relationships<sup>50</sup>. In contrast to the organisational construct, popular support provides a crucial indicator of ETA's activities and subsequent support received by ETA *comandos*.

Most terrorist organisations strive for popular support and attempt to maximise it through their strategy<sup>51</sup>. The ETA is particularly dependent on securing a broad and increasing support base to insulate itself against counter-terrorism measures and achieve the end goals of its escalation strategy. Therefore, the level of popular support becomes a barometer for the success of the strategy. For example, non-members may demonstrate support by providing safe houses or even acting as low-level couriers<sup>52</sup>. Consequently, popular support primarily influences leadership and recruitment. In contrast, ETA prisoners have a symbolic influence.

ETA's political prisoners are the most visible symbol of state repression<sup>53</sup>. Between October 1978 and May 1981 350 *etarras* were tried and found guilty of 428 criminal acts and sentenced to an average of 3.4 years per person<sup>54</sup>. Mata characterises both ETA's political prisoners and the *Kale borroka*<sup>55</sup> or military

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<sup>47</sup> Clark, p. 213.

<sup>48</sup> Clark, p. 214.

<sup>49</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>50</sup> Clark, p. 215.

<sup>51</sup> Irvin, C., *Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Part in Ireland and the Basque Country*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999, p. 45.

<sup>52</sup> Anderson, p. 42.

<sup>53</sup> Irvin, p. 147.

<sup>54</sup> Clark, p. 259.

<sup>55</sup> *Kale borroka* is a Basque phrase meaning 'path of combat'. This translation however interprets it as ETA's military wing.

wing as being among '...the attitudes, beliefs and characteristics which give cohesion to this radical setting and which can characterize its members [ETA]...' <sup>56</sup> Prisoners can be considered part of the ETA strategy to target other movements in order to maximise popular support. However, as Sullivan comments an increasing prison population may also reduce the morale of *etarras* <sup>57</sup>. Nevertheless, prisoners provide propaganda value primarily to encourage popular support. In contrast, ETA's political wing *Herri Batsauna* (HB) influences the survivability of *etarras*.

HB while expressing support for ETA's ideology and armed struggle offers an alternative organisation and parapolitical strategy of activism <sup>58</sup>. Essentially, HB provides an additional exit route for *etarras* who have outlived their usefulness as combatants. According to Irvin's study of HB activists, at least 20 percent originated from ETA <sup>59</sup>. Consequently, HB mainly influences the lifecycle of the *etarra* (see Figure 21).

Popular support and the organisational construct constitute major actors influencing the ETA *comando*. HB and the ETA prisoners are minor actors being somewhat less influential but remaining vital actors in the overall cellular system. These actors represent major sources of dynamic influences shaping the ETA organisation. The following six sections further project the influence of each actor as each component of cell effectiveness is localised.

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Source: Mata, J., 'A Long History at the Limits of legality Batasuna: The Strategy of Insurrection', *El Pais*, 18<sup>th</sup> August (2002) retrieved October 2002, from the archives of El Pais Digital [www.elpais.es](http://www.elpais.es), translated by Brian Hamly on 1 May 2003

<sup>56</sup> Mata, Internet.

<sup>57</sup> Sullivan, p. 279.

<sup>58</sup> Khatami, S., 'Between Class and Nation: Ideology and Radical Basque Ethnonationalism', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 20:4 (1997), pp. 395-417, p. 402.

<sup>59</sup> Irvin, p. 145.






Figure 14: Actors influencing the ETA Cellular System

## Compartmentalization and Tradition

This section primarily examines solidarity and how it shapes internal compartmentalization (see Figure 15). In addition, both operational and territorial compartmentalization are each addressed when examining communications discipline. These factors assist in shaping the cells secrecy, which contributes to cell effectiveness. Within a *comando*, solidarity has the following primary bonding characteristics: village traditions, symbolism and the *ekintza* (ordeal by fire).

The social traditions of Basque villages are ideally suited for the formation of *comandos*. The *cuadrilla* is a village tradition consisting of groups of four to six boys whose friendship continues through to adulthood. Clark comments that during their teenage years the *cuadrilla* becomes more organised, and as they enter adulthood, the men may develop ‘...stronger ties to the *cuadrilla* than to their own families.’<sup>60</sup> For example, Zulaika’s ethnographical study of the Basque village Itziar and its local ETA *comando* described the *etarras* as

<sup>60</sup> Clark, p. 162.

childhood friends that participated in similar recreational activities eventually joining activist organisations before entering the ETA<sup>61</sup>.

Prior activism is a common factor among many *etarras*. Irvin identifies various pathways before joining HB, the most significant being protests in support of amnesty for ETA prisoners<sup>62</sup>. However, exposure to violence, discrimination and political motivations additionally influenced the common experience. For example, amongst members of the Itzair *comando*, the idealism of the Catholic Church, such as equality and justice, had been linked with Marxism producing the political motivation to join ETA<sup>63</sup>. In addition to village institutions, public funerals for slain ETA leaders became mainstay events for developing solidarity.

The ETA's use of funerals produced enormous propaganda value for both supporters and *etarras*. An example is the funeral of senior ETA leader Mikel Goikoetxea Elorriaga following his assassination by the GAL. It was designed as political theatre including chants, speeches and symbolic acts such as his widow holding the ETA's serpent and axe aloft<sup>64</sup>. Woodworth states, 'The liberation language of individual and social transformation was blinding with the language of militant resurrection, an apocalyptic ideological cocktail of intoxicating potency to many young Basques.'<sup>65</sup> This political ritualisation as Woodworth comments energises the combat with ritual power<sup>66</sup>.

The ritual element of combat for the *etarra* is *ekintza*, defined as the '...ordeal by fire in which you test your personality.' The *ekintza* develops as an armed

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<sup>61</sup> Zulaika, p. 62.

<sup>62</sup> Irvin, p. 145.

<sup>63</sup> Zulaika, p. 63.

<sup>64</sup> The serpent indicates cunning and the axe indicates strength.

Source: Woodworth, p. 98.

<sup>65</sup> Woodworth, p. 98.

<sup>66</sup> *ibid.*

action constantly challenging the *etarra*, causing satisfaction, producing courage and likened to acquiring a warrior identity<sup>67</sup>. Zulaika states that the '..."ordeal by fire" that the *ekintza* implies became the backdrop against which everything was measured.'<sup>68</sup> A successful *ekintza* produced positive reinforcement within the *comando*. Achieving this end was particularly dependent on the discipline of the *etarra*.

The 'need to know' philosophy determined the extent of *etarra* discipline. Clark comments that the *etarras* knew maybe one or two other *etarras* outside of the *comando*<sup>69</sup>. This is indicative of individual attacks being widely spread over time. For example, the Itzair *comando* carried out six killings between 1975 and 1980<sup>70</sup>. The isolation of the *comando* intensified the internal and external ideological behaviour sustaining the solidarity of the *comando* over long periods<sup>71</sup>. For example, the Itzair *comando* learnt more about the ETA while under police interrogation than at any other time<sup>72</sup>. Consequently, long-term social bonds suggest a high degree of discipline within the *comando liberados*. However, statistics for dismantled *comandos* would indicate some disciplinary weakness did occur, particularly among *comandos legales*.

The Spanish Ministry of Interior lists 30 *comandos*<sup>73</sup> of mainly *comando legales* dismantled by the *Guardia Civil* between 1978 and 1984<sup>74</sup>. Analysis by Clark of

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<sup>67</sup> Zulaika, p. 68.

<sup>68</sup> The *ekintza* could produce a degree of unconsciousness to the point of psychological fearlessness, which could turn life in the ETA into a source of *juerga* (fun time).

Source: Zulaika, pp. 67-68.

<sup>69</sup> Clark, p. 210.

<sup>70</sup> Zulaika, p. xvii.

<sup>71</sup> Irvin, p. 45.

<sup>72</sup> Zulaika, p. 69.

<sup>73</sup> Spanish Civil Guard Statistics – Dismantled *Comandos* Statistics retrieved 1 August 2003, from <http://www.guardiacivil.org/terrorismo/estadisticas3.asp>

<sup>74</sup> *Guardia Civil* Figures are different from Clarks. Clark uses a 1981 police report to suggest that over 400 *comandos* were broken-up between 1978 and 1980.

Source: Clark, p. 210.

However, this Figure appears quite inflated. By estimating four *etarras* per *comando*, Clark's statistics would approximate some 1,600 *etarra* prisoners by the end of 1980. Spanish statistics indicate that at the end of 1980 only 477 *etarras* were imprisoned or approximately 100 or so cells.

214 arrest records between January 1979 and June 1980, shows that 56.5 percent of those arrested were *liberados*<sup>75</sup>. Additionally, Trevino comments in his study of Basque security forces that many of those arrested tended to be *legales*<sup>76</sup> whereas Clark quotes from a press report '...that there were as many support comandos or cells as there were *liberados*...' <sup>77</sup> Moreover, arrest rates of between 23 and 178 Basques per month between 1978 and 1984 suggest a potentially significant attrition rate<sup>78</sup>. While increased numbers of *legales* increased their chances of capture, their weakness for arrest also suggests a reduced degree of discipline vis-à-vis *comando liberados*.

## Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for compartmentalization:

1. Leadership flexibility sustains the *comandos ekintza*, which reinforces solidarity
2. Leadership partly controlled low-level selective targeting to reinforce the *etarras* commitment, which following successful attacks generated pride and increased solidarity
3. Commitment increases solidarity caused by the ineffective over reaction of security forces
4. The ETA's high degree of integration into the Basque community produced a broad popular support base increasing attack effectiveness and reinforcing solidarity
5. Recruitment filtering reinforced solidarity through common experience
6. Conscience raising and the development of the *ekintza* during training produced high initiation and exit costs, increasing isolation which increased solidarity
7. Effective operational intelligence, abundant weaponry and tactical variety increased attack effectiveness, which reinforced solidarity
8. Successful counter-terrorism measures increased the isolation of cells, which increased solidarity

The compartmentalization of an ETA *comando* infers both a strong tradition and ritual based element in forming solidarity. Feedback influences reinforce these

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Source: Spanish Civil Guard Statistics – Detained ETA Member Statistics retrieved 1 August 2003, from <http://www.guardiacivil.org/terrorismo/estadisticas5.asp>

<sup>75</sup> Clark, p. 212.

<sup>76</sup> Trevino, J., 'Spain's Internal Security: The Basque Autonomous Police Force' in Alexander, Y and Myers, K (eds), *Terrorism in Europe*, London: Croom Helm, 1982, pp. 141-153, p. 143.

<sup>77</sup> Clark, p. 212.

<sup>78</sup> Clark, p. 263.

contributory parts, primarily using control, attack effectiveness and counter-terrorism measures to accommodate the particular patterns of each *comando*. The discipline of the *comandos legales* appears to be a weakness, however it is difficult to assess whether their high attrition rate is a fault of culture and/or counter-terrorism measures. Overall, the ETA *comando* supports a high degree of secrecy and therefore positively influences cell effectiveness to a high degree.




Figure 15: ETA Systems Decomposition of Compartmentalization

## Leadership and Political Efficacy

This section will primarily examine the leadership's role in determining decentralisation of control (see Figure 16). In addition, selective targeting is examined as a manifestation of the organisations strategy and subsequently the survivability of the ETA *comando*. These factors focus on leadership influences that shape cell formation and operation, which help determine cell effectiveness.

The two-tier leadership structure of ETA suggests a high degree of leadership centralisation. Leadership centralisation determines leadership stability and subsequently, the manifestation of ideology into strategy resulting in decentralisation of operational control. Leadership stability is essentially dependent on leadership proximity to the war-zone and composition.

From 1974 onwards, the ETA's sanctuary in Southern France was under threat<sup>79</sup>. In 1974 the ETA were banned in France, by 1977 Basques sheltering in Southern France had lost political refugee status<sup>80</sup> and by 1984 *etarras* could be extradited to Spain<sup>81</sup>. However, during this period, the French targeted Basque refugees in general rather than the ETA leadership in particular<sup>82</sup>. Consequently, during 1984 French security forces did little to disrupt ETA's leadership activities<sup>83</sup>.

Clark's assessment of ETA's 1980 executive committee indicates a common theme of national radicalism developed during the period of Franco, with many

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<sup>79</sup> The exact locations of the ETA leadership are unknown, however Clark suggests they were located in and around the four French Basque towns of St-Jean-de-Luz, Hendaye, Bayonne and Biarritz.

Source: Clark, p. 215.

<sup>80</sup> Clark, p. 216.

<sup>81</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>82</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>83</sup> Clark comments that in 1981 the French government and the ETA had an uneasy and unofficial truce reliant on the extent of ETA's activities.

Source: Clark, p. 218.

having prior active participation in ETA attacks<sup>84</sup>. Moreover, ETA's ideological splits and several reorganisations would have ensured a high degree of ideological consistency. Consequently, the proximity of leadership to the war-zone and its composition resulted in a high degree of leadership stability. However, the leadership's operational control from Southern France was reflected in its two-tier control structure.

The executive committee, rather than decentralising control through multiple layers of leadership instead developed an extensive network of couriers allowing the fine-tuning of strategy. The ETA's two-tier leadership structure produced less flexibility in manipulating the degree of control allocated to lower levels vis-à-vis a multi-tier layer. Subsequently, the ETA's leadership structure is less dependent on ideological stability to maintain subsequent layers of leadership. In this sense, while Southern France codifies ideology into strategy, over time the strategy can be adapted to changing political conditions or needs.

The ETA's strategy connects abstract beliefs from its ethno-nationalist ideology with concrete actions. The resulting 'action-repression-action' strategy strives to maximise popular support through escalation by encouraging state overreaction. It sets geographical boundaries and targeting direction.

The French Basque territories are allocated as the support zone providing rest and recuperation areas and are used to coordinate all operational activities, including logistics, training, information gathering and attack authorisations<sup>85</sup>. Based on attack statistics the Spanish Basque territories, particularly Guipuzcoa, and the Spanish capital Madrid represent ETA's primary war-zones<sup>86</sup>.

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<sup>84</sup> At least five of the seven leaders had participated in previous attacks.

Source: Clark, p. 212.

<sup>85</sup> Woodworth, p. 68.

<sup>86</sup> Clark, p. 186.

Political efficacy determines targeting direction. The aim of political efficacy is to maximise ETA's supporter base by winning new and maintaining existing support. Targeting direction places limits on the tactics used which puts emphasis on short-term objectives, protecting resources and feeding the ideology within the *comando* to sustain long-term commitment. This strategy puts pressure on the organisations capacity to absorb counter-terrorism measures. Sullivan comments that the gulf between strategic theory and resources made escalation impossible<sup>87</sup>.

The attempt to escalate the ETA campaign between 1981 and 1982, '...exacerbated extremism within the armed forces and police.'<sup>88</sup> Irvin states, '...the leadership's ability to recruit members depends on the application of the strategy: if it loses credibility, both the leadership and the organisation are vulnerable to defectors.'<sup>89</sup> Subsequently, security force overreaction including employing right wing elements (GAL), interrogation and particularly, the policy of repentant terrorists countered ETA's escalation strategy. Consequently, leadership centralisation, primarily its proximity to the areas of operation, and the 'action-repression-action' strategy emphasising escalation, are crucial factors in determining the degree of control devolved to ETA *comandos*.

The decentralisation of control correlates to the maintenance of organisational cohesion and flexibility. While the *comando* could choose the target, authorisation from leadership was required before carrying out the operation<sup>90</sup>. Moreover, the *comando* was dependent on the apparatus in Southern France for logistics support<sup>91</sup>. Zulaika comments that the Itzair *comando* once it had earned its own status ignored any intermediary and preferred direct contact with ETA leadership: 'The cell would choose objectives on its own initiative and

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<sup>87</sup> Sullivan, p. 70.

<sup>88</sup> During 1980, the ETA killed 32 *Guardia Civil*.  
Source: Woodworth, p. 63.

<sup>89</sup> Irvin, p. 23.

<sup>90</sup> Zulaika, p. 69.

<sup>91</sup> Clark, p. 232.



simply ask permission to carry them out; a phone call was sufficient for that.<sup>92</sup> An inference from this example is that direct contact with the ETA leadership was dependent on the *comandos* practical needs and the pattern it developed within ETA<sup>93</sup>. The ETA leadership structure appears rather flexible in this respect. However, a degree of coercion also defined the boundaries of control.

Clark comments that most *etarras* could expect to serve three years on active service before exiting the organisation<sup>94</sup>. The acceptance of government programs such as social reinsertion, was however, not considered a harmless means of exit. Accepting social reinsertion represented a betrayal of ETA's revolutionary ideology and a failure of the revolutionary conscience, especially when committed by leaders<sup>95</sup>. Overall, the use of decentralisation of control ensures cohesion, however it also overlaps somewhat with selective targeting and the survivability of the cell.

Political efficacy within the context of selective targeting refers to the maximising of support under the parasol of an escalating conflict. Irvin quotes an HB activist explaining the essence of political efficacy: 'Our strength, but also our dilemma is that many [people] turn out for our marches because they support ETA. So ETA needs us, and we need ETA. But we need an ETA that is very, very careful in its operations.'<sup>96</sup> The doctrine of ETA favours political efficacy through surgical strikes, such as assassinations and selective targeting, which can be categorised into high, low and symbolic levels of profiling.

High profile targeting transmits ETA's ideological message, demonstrates its commitment and intends to guarantee a disproportionate response. The targets chosen are representative of their high profile links to the Spanish government, crucial roles within the security forces, or perceived betrayal of the ETA. High

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<sup>92</sup> Zulaika, p. 69.

<sup>93</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>94</sup> Clark, p. 165.

<sup>95</sup> Woodworth, p. 104.

<sup>96</sup> Irvin, p. 164.

profile targets generally included higher military echelons<sup>97</sup>, local politicians and members of the judiciary<sup>98</sup>. Moreover, informers were targeted for betraying the ideological position of the organisation<sup>99</sup>. The leadership designates high profile targets with attacks planned in detail, and sometimes well in advance. For example, the planning for the assassination of Spanish Prime Minister Carrero Blanco on 20 December 1974 began in 1972<sup>100</sup>.

Low profile targeting through the systematic targeting of security forces maintains ETA's strategic tempo and visibility. The typical assassination according to Zirakzadeh is rank-and-file policemen<sup>101</sup>. Trevino adds: 'ETA labels them visible tools of "repression"...these attacks are becoming not only more numerous but also more and more systematic.'<sup>102</sup> Brotons and Esposito note that of the 796 persons killed by the ETA between 1968 and 1999, 46 percent were police<sup>103</sup>. The next highest were civilians at 37 percent<sup>104</sup>. Regular Basque civilians<sup>105</sup> were not generally targeted however the indiscriminate nature of bombings would likely have contributed to the civilian death toll<sup>106</sup>.

Symbolic targeting projects a message of power to specific audiences. The propaganda value of symbolic targeting concentrated on discouraging and sometimes exploiting Basque affiliations with the Spanish. Of particular symbolic value were Basque businessmen and *etarras* who accepted social-reinsertion.

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<sup>97</sup> Clark, p. 137.

<sup>98</sup> Anderson, W., *The ETA: Spain's Basque Terrorists*, New York: The Rosen Publishing Group Inc, 2003, p. 47.

<sup>99</sup> Clark, p. 137.

<sup>100</sup> Clark, p. 70.

<sup>101</sup> Zirakzadeh, p. 134.

<sup>102</sup> Trevino, p. 143.

<sup>103</sup> Brotons, A and Esposito, C., 'Spain' in Alexander, Y (ed.), *Combating Terrorism*, London: Croom Helm, 1982, pp. 163-186, p. 175.

<sup>104</sup> Brotons and Esposito, p. 175.

<sup>105</sup> Targeting of civilians linked to the Spanish occupation, including families of the security forces, still occurred, as this was believed conducive to security force overreaction.

Source: Sullivan, p. 259.

<sup>106</sup> Woodworth, p. 117.

Basque businessmen provide a lucrative financial source through either kidnappings or by paying revolutionary taxes<sup>107</sup>. They equated to collaborators, who through association, contributed to the suppression of the Basque culture<sup>108</sup>. For example, between 1978 and 1980 the ETA attacked nine businessmen for failing to pay revolutionary taxes<sup>109</sup>. However, ETA's reliance on revolutionary taxes and kidnappings is contingent on a ready supply of businessmen, requiring careful targeting to ensure businessmen remain in the Basque region<sup>110</sup>. In contrast, terrorists who accepted social reinsertion were an immediate threat to the ideological foundations of the organisation<sup>111</sup>.

In 1986, 107 ETA (m) members<sup>112</sup> benefited from the policy of social-reinsertion. ETA described those who accepted social reinsertion as losing their revolutionary conscience and displaying individual egotism<sup>113</sup>. Essentially, this form of targeting demonstrates ETA's ideological commitment as well as dissuading *etarras* from this form of exit. While leadership are extremely influential in managing strategy during the selective targeting process, they were also necessary in developing foreign relationships.

The ETA's multiple contacts with foreign terrorist organisations and sympathetic countries allowed for the exchange of ideas, training and attachment to supply sources. Alexander, Swetnam and Levine point to ETA contacts with numerous other terrorist organisations<sup>114</sup>. For example, the Uruguayan Tupamaros taught *etarras* kidnapping techniques<sup>115</sup>. Moreover, Clark comments that the ETA has received training from various countries, such as Algeria, who have taught bomb-making skills to *etarras*<sup>116</sup>. However, ETA's foreign network, while of

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<sup>107</sup> Zirakzadeh, p. 133.

<sup>108</sup> Khatami, p. 397.

<sup>109</sup> Clark, p. 228.

<sup>110</sup> Alexander, Swetnam and Levine, p. 30.

<sup>111</sup> Vercher, p. 297.

<sup>112</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>113</sup> Woodworth, p. 104.

<sup>114</sup> Alexander, Swetnam and Levine, p. 23.

<sup>115</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>116</sup> *ibid.*

importance for the exchange of ideas, does not appear as essential for its logistics network. Clark states, 'The weapons traditionally employed by ETA's commandos are relatively easy to master, and its doubtful that etarras really had to go all the way to Algeria to learn how to fire a Sten sub machinegun.'<sup>117</sup> ETA's sanctuary in Southern France and its proximity to the rest of Europe tended to counter the need for an extensive network of foreign supporters.

## Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for leadership:


1. Leaders can use popular support as a barometer to assess local conditions
2. Counter-Terrorism measures disrupted French based leadership activities (-)

In summary, ETA's leadership orchestrates escalation through short-term actions by carefully controlling the political efficacy of attacks. It achieves control through a strong courier network and a mix of selective targeting authorised by leadership but dependent on assigning control based on accommodating the patterns of different *comandos*. While ETA's strategy was detrimental to its long-term goals, its influence at lower-levels appears to have done little to degrade cell effectiveness in the short-term<sup>118</sup>. Overall, leadership positively influences cell effectiveness to a high degree.

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<sup>117</sup> Clark, p. 234.

<sup>118</sup> The ETA still carried out 194 acts during 1984. However, more research is required to ultimately determine the influence the failing ETA strategy and GAL threat had on ETA *comandos*.



**Figure 16: ETA Systems Decomposition of Leadership**

## Commitment and Ekintza

This section primarily examines the ideology of the ETA and to what extent it translates into commitment (see Figure 17). In this analysis, the *etarras* self-concept of *ekintza* represents a central motivating factor of cell effectiveness.

The ETA through its discourse emphasises the importance of developing a revolutionary conscience to provide justifications for objectives and commitment to different degrees of action. The 1976 Seventh Assembly linked the social and nationalist struggle to the revolutionary ETA declaring it the vanguard organisation for the defence of Basque rights and hence, fight for Basque self-determination<sup>119</sup>. Justifications for these objectives develop through the

<sup>119</sup> Irvin, p. 151.

continuing legacy of repression, the threat to Basque culture, ideological dogmatism and the *ekintza*.

Mees comments that Basque society developed from a history in which being a nationalist has always been a way of life and from which the separatist discourse has never disappeared<sup>120</sup>. By instigating a culture of violence in the Basque Country Franco produced an adversarial state in which ETA's response was morally justifiable. For example, Franco's decision to build nuclear power plants in Basque country was an affront to Basque sovereignty resulting in symbolic ETA attacks on the Lemoniz power station from 1977 – 1982<sup>121</sup>. Spanish repression resulted in ETA's supporters declaring hatred against all Spanish state representatives, the self-identification of being Basque and anti-Spanish, a hatred for the security forces and the rejection of all non-ETA leadership<sup>122</sup>. Ultimately Spanish repression translates into the failure of external rule, whether by totalitarian or representative democracy. Sullivan states, 'The criteria for being recognised as Basque becomes allegiance to nationalism itself.'<sup>123</sup> Consequently, the Basques intrinsic affiliation to nationalism only encourages its beliefs as a race apart from the Castilian majority.

The ethnicity of the Basque people forms the basis of ETA's ideology. The use of the Basque language has been a valuable political symbol within this context. Irvin states, 'It is, in essence, a struggle for the survival of a culture whose most distinguishing features, its language, has been threatened with extinction for both economic, demographic and political reasons.'<sup>124</sup> Irvin's study of HB activists identified 40 percent of the interview sample as Basque speakers, which demonstrated the significant role ethnicity played in the nationalist

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<sup>120</sup> Mees, pp. 805-807.

<sup>121</sup> Irvin, p. 146.

<sup>122</sup> Mata, Internet.

<sup>123</sup> Sullivan, p. 273.

<sup>124</sup> Irvin, p. 203.

struggle<sup>125</sup>. Subsequently, ETA's discourse has seemingly progressed to socialism in order to link its ideology to unequal rights and the criticism of urban and commercial society<sup>126</sup>. Consequently, continuing repression results in an anti-repressive and anti-Spanish revolutionary conscience perpetuated by the surrounding social conditions. Moreover, ideological dogmatism strengthens the development of revolutionary conscience.

ETA's ideological dogmatism, perpetuated by surrounding social conditions, continues to validate its strategy<sup>127</sup>. Woodworth comments: 'The core members of ETA were convinced that any compromise on full independence was tantamount to betrayal, or even collaboration with "genocide"'.<sup>128</sup> In addition, Irvin claims that the majority of core HB activists seek purely nationalist objectives<sup>129</sup>. Ideological dogmatism makes the ETA an intransigent organisation to negotiate with, which legitimises the strategy of the armed struggle<sup>130</sup>. Moreover, symbolism such as the organisation's militaristic language, associated myths and martyrs continue to demonstrate the organisations commitment and dogmatic affirmation to its social and ethno-nationalist ideology<sup>131</sup>. Ultimately dogmatism ensures message clarity and legitimisation in the long-term, however, its failure to adapt to changing political conditions may reduce organisational flexibility resulting in outdated exit and voice constructs<sup>132</sup>. While revolutionary conscience and symbolism provide justification for acts the concept of *ekintza* through acts carried out against, Spanish security forces determined the backdrop for which everything, including commitment, was measured.

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<sup>125</sup> Irvin, p. 137.

<sup>126</sup> Zirakzadeh, p. 133.

<sup>127</sup> Khatami, p. 412.

<sup>128</sup> Genocide in this sense refers to preventing the Basque language from dying out.

Source: Woodworth, p. 51.

<sup>129</sup> Irvin, p. 168.

<sup>130</sup> Khatami, p. 397.

<sup>131</sup> Mata, Internet.

<sup>132</sup> Crenshaw, M., 'Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organisational Approaches' in Rapoport, D (ed.), *Inside Terrorist Organisations*, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001, pp. 13-31, p. 22.

Making *ekintza* was a readiness to act out commitment as far as possible<sup>133</sup>. In this sense, it is a ritual, converting words and intentions into reality. According to Zulaika, it ‘...was never a conquered state of behaviour but a no-mans land which gave one courage to either jump forward or shrink back.’<sup>134</sup> For example, while risks were high, features displayed within the Itzair *comando* consisted of unconsciousness and sometimes, fearless action<sup>135</sup>. Commitment became an attitude of *bizitza jokatu* (to bet one’s life) and a duty rather than a sacrifice<sup>136</sup>. The resulting self-concept of *ekintza* could provide the self-justification for all manner of attacks. For example, the Itzair *comando* kidnapped and killed a Basque industrialist who was a friend of the kidnappers<sup>137</sup>. The *ekintza* symbolises the ultimate commitment or complete life surrender to the ETA<sup>138</sup>.

## Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for commitment:

1. ETA’s strategic tempo and resulting ineffective overreaction by the security forces reinforced the commitment of *etarras*
2. Decentralisation of control or volition helps justify the act to the *etarra*
3. Selective targeting signifies the importance of the act to the *etarra* reinforcing commitment
4. The recruitment period of a volunteer incrementally increases commitment through conscience raising and *ekintzas*
5. Tactical variety increases attack effectiveness reinforcing commitment
6. The Spanish counter-terrorism policy of social-reinsertion undermined the ideology of the ETA (-)

The overall emphasis of ETA’s ethno-nationalist ideology is to inculcate social conditions with a revolutionary context. The ethnic element forms the basis for this ideology. However, the ritual of *ekintza* adds a powerful dimension of commitment allowing most acts to be made meaningful to the self, especially when carried out in the intimate surrounds of one’s local village<sup>139</sup>. These

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<sup>133</sup> Zulaika, p. 39.

<sup>134</sup> Zulaika, p. 68.

<sup>135</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>136</sup> Zulaika, p. 185.

<sup>137</sup> Zulaika, p. 87.

<sup>138</sup> Zulaika, p. 185.

<sup>139</sup> Zulaika, p. 97.



beliefs are translated into varying degrees of commitment, which can be described as an incremental adjustment of commitment from uncommitted, to supporter and finally to *etarra*. Overall, commitment positively influences cell effectiveness to a high degree.




Figure 17: ETA Systems Decomposition of Commitment

## Popular Support and Village Integration

This section will primarily examine the extent of ETA's popular support and how this translates into sanctuaries (see Figure 18). In addition, ETA's integration of village social networks will be shown as a key factor in generating sanctuaries to maintain cell effectiveness.

The ETA is an ethno-nationalist organisation that depends mostly on a single ethnic group. The composition of the supporter base is both ethnic and immigrant Basque spread across various social strata, including working, lower and middle classes<sup>140</sup>. To broaden its supporter base the ETA has used the tactic of 'the accumulation of strength' or infiltration of various sector organisations.

Single-issue organisations such as labour movements, student groups or anti-military organisations once infiltrated add to the accumulation of conflicts. Mata states, 'The role that they should play, according to the guidelines emanating from their source, is that relating to their particular field or sector of action, with the possibility of interchanging and multiplying the militancy among the various groups.'<sup>141</sup> By infiltrating these organisations, ETA also prevents the emergence of competitors. Basque support for ETA is primarily concentrated in Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa the later providing ETA's core support <sup>142</sup>.

Survey results indicate ETA has a supporter base of between 12 and 15 percent<sup>143</sup>. Clark's collation of six surveys between 1975 and 1982 indicates from three to six percent of adults (56,900 – 97,000) represents a hardcore that advocates violence<sup>144</sup>. Two surveys, one in 1979 and another in 1981 indicate a

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<sup>140</sup> Clark, p. 184.

<sup>141</sup> Mata, Internet.

<sup>142</sup> Clark, p. 192.

<sup>143</sup> Clark, p. 182 and Woodworth, P., 'Why Do They Kill? The Basque Conflict in Spain', *World Policy Journal*, Spring (2001), pp. 1-12, p. 7.

<sup>144</sup> Clark, p. 170.

hardcore of 12 percent or 195,000 adults who strongly favour independence<sup>145</sup>. Moreover, surveys carried out between 1978 and 1981 to determine attitudes towards the ETA identified between 13 and 50 percent held positive images of the ETA<sup>146</sup>. Clark comments that, '...the image of ETA held by rank-and-file citizens is quite susceptible to public perception of current events and thus is quite volatile.'<sup>147</sup> Consequently, ETA's integration of Basque communities can quickly confuse ETA's message and directly influence access to sanctuaries.

Sanctuaries reduce the operational need for resources, provide rest and recuperation zones, and safe havens for training. The ETA maintains sanctuaries in Southern France and within the network of villages in Basque country. Southern France provided a huge logistical and operational advantage for the ETA dictated by relations between the ETA, French and Spanish governments. In contrast, the dynamics of local sanctuaries in the Basque country correlated directly to ETA's integration into the local community<sup>148</sup>.

Clark states that ETA had '... embedded itself organisationally in the everyday life of the Basque village.'<sup>149</sup> The concentration of ETA representation in smaller communities increased the level of social control among the intimate social and cultural networks enabling higher levels of sectarian thinking<sup>150</sup>. In this sense, local Basques understood the *etarra* sacrifice but targeting miscalculations still widened the gap between moderate and radical Basques during the 1980s<sup>151</sup>. For example, the targeting of Basque Nationalist party (PNV) members for revolutionary taxes confused and polarized the Basque community<sup>152</sup>. However, Clark comments that within the village environment almost everyone

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<sup>145</sup> Clark, p. 173.

<sup>146</sup> Clark, p. 177.

<sup>147</sup> Clark, p. 176.

<sup>148</sup> Irvin, p. 39.

<sup>149</sup> Clark, p. 161.

<sup>150</sup> Mees, p. 821.

<sup>151</sup> Mees, p. 810.

<sup>152</sup> Sullivan, p. 244.

knows who the *etarras* are, except the security services<sup>153</sup>. In this sense, there is a protective shield surrounding the ETA within the village environment<sup>154</sup>. Subsequently, ETA's high degree of integration into Basque social networks according to Clark produced sympathetic households in nearly every village in both Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa<sup>155</sup>.

## Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for popular support:

1. The interaction between ETA's *comandos* and the Basque community, underpinned by village traditions increases ETA's social integration, which increases sympathy to ETA's cause
2. Selective high and low profile targeting resulted in security force overreaction contributing to the maintenance of popular support
3. Symbolic targeting contributed to polarising elements of the Basque community in opposition to ETA's armed struggle (-)
4. A majority of ETA's supporters tended to remain uncommitted towards the ETA's armed struggle but still approved of its aims
5. Repressive counter-terrorism measures increased support for ETA's aims but not necessarily its methods

In summary, ETA's popular support comprises intimate Basque social networks within Basque villages and towns. Penetration of social networks ensured a somewhat effective integration of community and *etarra*, and in most cases enhanced the understanding of tactical acts and errors. The depth of ETA's integration is representative of available sanctuaries in the Basque communities of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa. While overall ETA support remained stagnant counteracting its strategy of escalation, *comandos* retained an adequate supporter base to operate covertly. Overall, popular support positively influences cell effectiveness to a moderate degree.

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<sup>153</sup> Clark, R., 'Patterns in the Lives of ETA Members', *Terrorism: An International Journal*, 6:3 (1983), pp. 423-454, p. 454.

<sup>154</sup> Vercher, p. 226.

<sup>155</sup> Clark, p. 229.

## Recruitment and the Cuadrilla

This section examines ETA's recruitment process, particularly its situational and character filtering mechanism (see Figure 18). In addition, ETA's attrition rate will be analysed to gain some sense of filtering with regards recruitment rate.

The situational filtering and character identification mechanism identifies recruits with common experiences. The following three main situational and character markers are associated with *etarras*: ethnicity, prior activism and prior experience of repression.

Clark's analysis of political prisoners between 1978 and 1980 shows that most *etarras* were employed or students, working to lower middle-class with one or two Basque parents and came from predominantly Basque towns of 2,000 – 50,000 people<sup>156</sup>. For example, Clark comments the relatively isolated Goierri region of Guipuzcoa with its high ethnic Basque content is fertile recruiting ground for ETA<sup>157</sup>. Having one or two Basque parents heightened or radicalised nationalistic tendencies. For example, Irvin comments that 100 percent of HB activists who espoused nationalist goals had nationalist family backgrounds<sup>158</sup>. Moreover, bilingual Basque country schools instilled strong nationalist pride, which according to Trevino acted more as '..."centres of subversion" than of learning.'<sup>159</sup> Subsequently, the intimate and relatively isolated Basque villages and towns maintained well-established social networks with strong bonds of loyalty<sup>160</sup>. Clark comments:

For young Basque men have already spent as much as a decade in which the dominant social factor was a small group of intimate friends bound in tight cohesion against strangers from the outside [*cuadrilla*]. In this important respect (as in others), the culture of small Basque towns is ideal for the implantation of a clandestine political organisation formed around the secret cell concept.<sup>161</sup>

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<sup>156</sup> Clark, p. 146-150.

<sup>157</sup> Clark, p. 198.

<sup>158</sup> Irvin, p. 155.

<sup>159</sup> Trevino, p. 153.

<sup>160</sup> Mees, p. 105.

<sup>161</sup> Clark, *Patterns in the Lives of ETA Members*, p. 449.

The tradition of the *cuadrilla* flourished in this environment along with nationalism, which when combined with ETA precursor organisations provided a reservoir of future *etarras*.

Irvin's study of HB activists shows a broad range of prior political experiences. This includes an involvement in protests in support of prisoner amnesties, trade unions, precursor organisations to HB and/or participation in antinuclear campaigns<sup>162</sup>. For example, a precursor to joining the ETA in the early 1970s was through the *Herri Gaztedi* youth organisation, which according to Zulaika '...offered a platform to raise political consciousness. The beneficiary was ETA.'<sup>163</sup> Moreover, Clark comments that '...potential *etarras* resist for months or even years before yielding the call to join.'<sup>164</sup> In this sense, prior activism combined with state suppression played a key role in deciding to join the ETA<sup>165</sup>.

Irvin shows that one in five HB activists interviewed had been detained and approximately half of all activists had experienced state repression, including physical or verbal harassment and/or a relative or friend arrested, imprisoned, wounded or killed<sup>166</sup>. Moreover, Irvin comments that in 1985 state violence had afflicted at least sixteen percent of all Basques (238,000)<sup>167</sup>. Trevino states, 'It has been said that ETA's best recruiting aids are the police tactics and the resentment they create among the Basques.'<sup>168</sup> Between 1982 and 1986 the GAL, the repression of political prisoners and the use of torture generated incentives for joining ETA<sup>169</sup>.

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<sup>162</sup> Irvin, p. 145.

<sup>163</sup> Zulaika, p. 61.

<sup>164</sup> Clark, *Patterns in the Lives of ETA Members*, p. 436.

<sup>165</sup> Clark, *Patterns in the Lives of ETA Members*, p. 440.

<sup>166</sup> Irvin, p. 142.

<sup>167</sup> Irvin, p. 36.

<sup>168</sup> Trevino, p. 153.

<sup>169</sup> Irvin, p. 193.

The contact phase of joining would usually consist of an ETA member approaching the prospective recruit. However, the Itzair *comando* used the leader of their youth movement to arrange an appointment with the ETA<sup>170</sup>. Following contact, a discouragement phase ensues testing the commitment of the recruits using political conversations and debates, allowing time for background checks<sup>171</sup>. At this early stage, ETA recruits would be limited to contact with their ETA sponsor and only fed information on a need to know basis<sup>172</sup>. Conscience raising, including political discussions, and simple operations, such as delivering pamphlets to a drop point, dominated this phase. Moreover, as the complexity of operations increased the notion of *ekintza* gradually developed<sup>173</sup>. For example, Zulaika describes the Itzair *comandos* first *ekintza* as stealing dynamite together. Subsequently, the solidarity within the trainee cell grew in this fashion<sup>174</sup>. After approximately a one-year recruitment process, the candidates would become full members<sup>175</sup>.

In 1981, Clark estimated the size of the ETA at approximately 300 *etarras*<sup>176</sup>. The recruitment mechanism brings into the organisation existing patterns of nationalism and solidarity, and a broad range of technical skills. For example, a *comando* broken up in 1980 comprised a carpenter, construction worker, labourer, industrial machinist and office worker. All were in their late twenty's, two were married and most lived in their hometowns<sup>177</sup>. In addition to matching individuals to the organisation, the ETA also matched the *cuadrilla* to the *comando*.

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<sup>170</sup> Zulaika, p. 63.

<sup>171</sup> Alexander, Swetnam and Levine, p. 11.

<sup>172</sup> Anderson, p. 46.

<sup>173</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>174</sup> Zulaika, p. 68.

<sup>175</sup> Anderson, p. 46.

<sup>176</sup> Clark, p. 223.

<sup>177</sup> Clark, p. 210.

## Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for recruitment:

1. The use of symbolism, ideology and tradition build the *etarras* revolutionary conscience and increase their commitment
2. ETA's social integration into Basque villages and towns provides reservoirs for recruitment
3. Counter intelligence screens recruits to detect infiltration
4. Attack effectiveness both produces and attracts new recruits
5. The effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures increases the perceived threat to the recruit's survivability lowering the recruitment rate (-)

In summary, the effectiveness of ETA's recruitment process derives from ETA's capacity to sustain its attrition rate. This requires measuring the replacement rate of *etarras* exiting the organisation, which is somewhat problematic<sup>178</sup>. According to Spanish Ministry of Interior Figures, between 1980 and 1984 interred *etarras* averaged 543 per annum<sup>179</sup>. The average attrition rate of *etarra* captures was 24 *etarras* per annum, however between 1983 and 1984 the number of detainees increased by 184 or 47 percent<sup>180</sup>. Bearing in mind the high average prisoner population, the long process of recruitment and the sudden increase in prisoners in 1984 one could argue the attrition rate would have been hard-pressed to maintain ETA's 300 membership. While the filtering process of recruitment was very effective in shaping recruits, the process took too long and failed to adapt to the intensive counter-terrorism environment. With fewer members, services degrade, popular support suffers and *comandos* become stretched to maintain effectiveness. Consequently, recruitment negatively influenced cell effectiveness to a low degree.

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<sup>178</sup> Official Figures relating to *etarras* killed have not been found (language barrier may be an issue), nor have those retiring from the organisation. Moreover, to determine whether ETA prisoners are all full members of the ETA remains problematic.

<sup>179</sup> Spanish Civil Guard Statistics – Detained ETA Member Statistics retrieved 1 August 2003, from <http://www.guardiacivil.org/terrorismo/estadisticas5.asp>

<sup>180</sup> Spanish Civil Guard Statistics – Dismantled *Comandos* Statistics retrieved 1 August 2003, from <http://www.guardiacivil.org/terrorismo/estadisticas3.asp>



## Training and Southern France

This section will examine ETA's formal and ongoing informal training processes (see Figure 18). This analysis will show that training reflects operational survivability, which contributes to cell effectiveness.

The new *etarra* attended a formal two-week training course in Southern France<sup>181</sup>. Southern France acted as ETA's primary training location, although *etarras* sometimes attended overseas camps for training in an effort to learn new skills and ideas for assimilation into the organisation<sup>182</sup>. For example, ETA apparently learned the system of revolutionary taxes from the Irish Republican Army (IRA)<sup>183</sup>.

ETA's training course would teach various weapons skills and present lectures on subjects such as interrogation, kidnapping, assassination techniques and presumably communications security<sup>184</sup>. The latter derives from the difficulty ETA members had in articulating thoughts during public appearances, an indication of their wariness for 'easy talk'<sup>185</sup>. The complexity of ETA operations gives some sense of the standard of training received. For example, the favourite weapons of *etarras* were explosive devices and automatic weapons<sup>186</sup>, whereas the least favourite appears to have been pistols<sup>187</sup>. Automatic weapons and bombings both made up for the lack of marksmanship required of pistols<sup>188</sup>. Upon the completion of training, *etarras* would return to village life and await further direction<sup>189</sup>. The ritual of *ekintza* appears to have been crucial for ongoing informal training.

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<sup>181</sup> Clark, p. 223.

<sup>182</sup> Alexander, Swetnam and Levine, p. 23.

<sup>183</sup> Clark, p. 228.

<sup>184</sup> Clark, p. 223 and Woodworth, p. 78.

<sup>185</sup> Zulaika, p. 202.

<sup>186</sup> Clark, p. 129.

<sup>187</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>188</sup> Clark, p. 130.

<sup>189</sup> Clark, p. 223.

The *ekintza* provides the backdrop for gaining experience<sup>190</sup>. Essentially, as *ekintza* operations gradually increased in seriousness and complexity the *etarra* would learn from both mistakes and successes. For example, the Itzair *comando* described by Zulaika initially started stealing dynamite and progressed to kidnappings and killings<sup>191</sup>. Statistics from the Spanish Ministry of Interior indicate that during 1984 12 *comandos* were broken up<sup>192</sup>. Of the 12, two were *comandos liberado*, the remainder a mix of intelligence and support *comandos*<sup>193</sup>. This imbalance suggests but in no way confirms the effectiveness of the *ekintza* as an informal training process.

## Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for training:

1. Links with foreign organisations and countries have contributed operational information to the ETA's knowledgebase
2. Commitment (*ekintza*) is developed during the continued informal training of *etarras*
3. The Southern France sanctuary is crucial for training
4. An abundant supply of various kinds of weaponry reduces the need for skilled weapons operators

In summary, training incrementally produces higher initiation and exit costs. The perpetuating process of irrevocable acts increases ones dependency on the organisation further isolating the volunteer from the community. Consequently, the training component positively influenced cell effectiveness to a high degree.


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<sup>190</sup> This is somewhat speculative, however Clark does mention ongoing indoctrination and Zulaika's description of *ekintza* can be interpreted as a framework that encourages improvement. Moreover, Mao Tse Tung advocated using guerrilla hostilities as the university of war and in this sense the *ekintza* could equate to on-the-job training. Source: Asprey, R., *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History*, vol. 1, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975, p. 361.

<sup>191</sup> Zulaika, p. 68.

<sup>192</sup> Spanish Civil Guard Statistics – Dismantled *Comandos* Statistics, Internet.

<sup>193</sup> *ibid.*



**Figure 18: ETA Systems Decomposition of Organisational Formation**

## Logistics and Escalation

This section examines the extent of supply sources in ETA's logistics apparatus (see Figure 19). This analysis will show that these supply sources ultimately determine the utility of the strategy and capacity of the cell to remain effective long-term.

The ETA is a low cost organisation, which is essentially indicative of its cellular infrastructure the size of which Clark estimates at approximately 300 *etarras*<sup>194</sup>. The major running costs for ETA appears to have been expenses for *liberados* and costs associated with its logistics infrastructure. However, determining the costs associated to full-time members is problematic.

Clark's 1978 – 1980 study of arrest records and case studies of 81 *etarras* identified 95 percent as being students or employed<sup>195</sup>. Recruiting practices tended to favour employed Basques. For example, Irvin's study of HB activists showed that 21 percent were unemployed before joining HB, which mirrored the existing Basque unemployment rate<sup>196</sup>. A similar mirroring of Basque society arguably applies to the ETA. A mixture of employed and unemployed *etarras* suggests that being a *liberado* did not necessarily mean being full-time, which is further supported by Clark's estimate that *comandos* only attacked once in every eight months<sup>197</sup>. Therefore, it can be argued while *liberados* made up approximately 50 percent of ETA, not all were full-time and in this context, the relative expense of full-time *liberados* would likely have been low.

The ETA utilised local and European sources for both fund raising and weaponry purchases. Local sources provided hard cash and weaponry. The ETA's principle means for raising cash and weaponry was through robberies and theft, kidnappings and revolutionary taxes.

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<sup>194</sup> Clark, p. 223.

<sup>195</sup> Clark, p. 146-150.

<sup>196</sup> Irvin, p. 135.

<sup>197</sup> Clark, Patterns in the Lives of ETA Members, p. 446.

Criminal acts were ETA's predominant method of financing. During 1978, 50 bank robberies netted U.S four million dollars<sup>198</sup>. Kidnappings were also successful, netting in 1978 at least a quarter of a million U.S dollars<sup>199</sup>. Its one off capacity to raise large sums can be appreciated from a 1981 kidnapping in Madrid, which netted US \$3.29 million dollars <sup>200</sup>. However, levying revolutionary taxes<sup>201</sup> on Basque businessmen, ranging from industrialists to shopkeepers operated with long-term success<sup>202</sup>. By the end of 1978, the ETA had levied the revolutionary tax on approximately 800 wealthy Basques of which most paid<sup>203</sup>. Failure to pay revolutionary taxes usually resulted in ETA attacks. For example, between 1978 and 1980, ETA targeted at least nine businessmen<sup>204</sup>. In contrast to local funding, the European continent acted as ETA's principle source of weaponry.

Both European black-market sources and theft from outside Spain were used extensively to acquire a multitude of rifles, pistols and explosives. This included the 9mm Uzi, Sten Mark II, M-16, Belgian FAL and Browning 9mm pistol as well as GOMA-2<sup>205</sup> commercial explosives<sup>206</sup>. Both Paris and Brussels were the focal points for many transactions<sup>207</sup>. According to Clark, the *comandos* were equipped with approximately 3.5 weapons per *comando*<sup>208</sup>. For example, a five-man *comando* broken up in 1980 had one Sten gun, four 9mm pistols, two revolvers, ammo, grenades, explosives and detonators <sup>209</sup>. Once weapons

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<sup>198</sup> Clark, p. 227.

<sup>199</sup> Clark, p. 227.

<sup>200</sup> Alexander, p. 34.

<sup>201</sup> A process of identifying targets for extortion was meticulously carried out followed by sending out a primary letter demanding payment of from US\$12,000 – US \$25,000 per annum. A second letter would follow if payment was not received and subsequently if that was ignored, property could be destroyed or threats to the target or targets family carried out.

Source: Clark, p. 228.

<sup>202</sup> Woodworth, p. 105.

<sup>203</sup> Clark, p. 228.

<sup>204</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>205</sup> Trevino, p. 153.

<sup>206</sup> Clark, p. 225.

<sup>207</sup> Clark, p. 224.

<sup>208</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>209</sup> Clark, p. 210.

arrived in Spanish Basque country, they disappeared amongst the extensive network of supporters and safe house's<sup>210</sup>.

Trevino states, 'Failures by the police to locate the large caches may be due to ETA's extremely tight internal security and the use of well concealed safe houses, possibly in Southern France.'<sup>211</sup> The sanctuary in Southern France provided an extensive area to hide weapons caches. For example, a Spanish intelligence operation uncovered weaponry among other items in a French based furniture store<sup>212</sup>. The Southern France sanctuary and ETA's extensive courier and supporter network without a doubt shielded the organisation from the Spanish interdiction of supply chains.

## Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for logistics:

1. A reliance on high risk primary financial sources and a lack of extensive secondary supply sources arguably slowed organisational regeneration (-)
2. Symbolic targeting of Basque businessmen encouraged the payment of revolutionary taxes
3. Sanctuaries shielded supply chains from interdiction
4. The organisation's cellular system kept running costs to a minimum
5. Counter-Terrorism measures were ineffective at interdicting supply chains

In summary, a reliance on high-risk primary financial sources and a lack of secondary financial sources likely acted against the regenerative capacity of the ETA in the context of its escalation strategy. In this sense, the ETA could do little more than tread water. However, these logistical weaknesses did not have a significant impact on the *comandos* who remained adequately supplied and were somewhat financially independent. Overall, logistics positively influenced the attack component to a moderate degree.

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<sup>210</sup> Clark, p. 229.

<sup>211</sup> Trevino, p. 153.

<sup>212</sup> Brotons and Esposito, 168.

## Intelligence and Specialised Cells

This section examines ETA's counter-intelligence capability and capacity to produce well-developed operational intelligence (see Figure 19). This analysis will examine intelligence as an integral component in implementing ETA's 'action-repression-action' strategy and maintaining the long-term effectiveness of the cell.

Even though ETA's counter-intelligence capacity remains relatively undocumented<sup>213</sup>, counter-intelligence activities appear focused on eliminating informers. For example, Clark shows that between 1975 and 1980 out of the 287 persons killed by the ETA approximately 16 were alleged informers<sup>214</sup>. Moreover, both Zirakzadeh<sup>215</sup> and Vercher<sup>216</sup> comment on the ruthlessness and infiltration of the ETA intelligence network throughout all levels of Basque society and the ensuing difficulty security forces had in recruiting informers. For example, Zulaika describes ex-ETA members being involved in '...intimidating and castigating alleged police informers...' <sup>217</sup> In each of these cases the pervasiveness of the ETA in Basque society is omnipresent<sup>218</sup>. In contrast, ETA's specialised intelligence *comandos* gathered operational intelligence in support of the *comandos liberado*<sup>219</sup>.

The intelligence *comandos* primary task was to gather targeting data. This might involve monitoring a target for several weeks gathering photos, collecting blueprints and personal information, such as routines. These techniques apply particularly to the assassination of Prime Minister Carrero Blanco on 20

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<sup>213</sup> The apparent lack of data concerning ETA's counter-intelligence capacity may be due to the language barrier. However, this is a weak area for all organisations in this study, which suggests it is not well studied.

<sup>214</sup> Clark, p. 137.

<sup>215</sup> Zirakzadeh, p. 134.

<sup>216</sup> Vercher, p. 308.

<sup>217</sup> Zulaika, p. 85.

<sup>218</sup> The lack of any counter-intelligence apparatus suggests sympathisers, intelligence cells and *comandos liberado* most likely identified informers.

<sup>219</sup> Clark, p. 232.

December 1974, whose routine was monitored for several months before the intelligence *comando* discovered a consistent and reliable pattern of behaviour<sup>220</sup>. Moreover, Clark comments on a captured intelligence *comando* which had monitored the routine of a former mayor, gathered information on airports, several electric power plant installations and on two national policemen<sup>221</sup>. This voracious gathering of targeting information is systematic of using specialised intelligence *comandos*.

## Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for intelligence:

1. Integration into Basque society contributed to ETA's intelligence gathering capability

In summary, the ETA's counter-intelligence network appears to have been effective in detecting and dealing with informers. In contrast, the use of specialised intelligence *comandos* ensured a high level of proficiency in the development of operational intelligence. Their specialised experience in the detection of vulnerabilities and identification of best method approach, attack and escape phases would have contributed significantly to the attack effectiveness of *comandos liberados*. Overall, intelligence positively influenced the attack component to a high degree.

## Attacks and Surgical Strikes

This section will primarily examine the doctrine of ETA to give some sense of attack effectiveness (see Figure 19). This analysis will identify the tactical variety employed by the ETA *comando*, which is a crucial determinant in mitigating risk and sustaining cell effectiveness.

ETA's 'action-repression-action' strategy maintains the following two key themes: to cause overreaction through selective targeting and escalation

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<sup>220</sup> Anderson, p. 26.

<sup>221</sup> Clark, Patterns in the Lives of ETA Members, p. 444.



through increasingly provocative acts. In order to meet these objectives the following three common attack patterns provide a sense of ETA's doctrine <sup>222</sup>:

- Hit and run tactics
- The manipulation of stand-off range
- Firepower superiority

Hit and run tactics consists of approach, attack and escape phases utilising caution and surprise to ensure a rapid engagement and exit. This precept applies for close-in assassinations or ambushes of *Guardia Civil* officers and higher echelons of military personnel. For example, Clark shows that between 1975 and 1980 pistols and automatic weapons accounted for 30 percent of all ETA victims<sup>223</sup>. For the same period, 68 percent of those killed were law enforcement or military personnel<sup>224</sup>. During the approach phase the need for caution while paramount was somewhat negated by the ETA's level of integration into Basque society.

Time, place and kind of target determined hit and run tactics, which ranged from assassinations to simple ambushes. Targets included individual or groups of *Guardia Civil* officers. For example, between 1975 and 1980, 50 percent of those killed were individuals followed by 38 percent comprising groups of two to five people<sup>225</sup>. At least half of all attacks tended to focus on times and places when the target was in transit or on breaks in public or urban areas<sup>226</sup>. The attack phase emphasised surgical precision using either pistols or automatic weapons. Vercher summarises the assassination process as follows:

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<sup>222</sup> These common attack patterns are based on attacks using examples from the literature reviewed.

<sup>223</sup> Clark, p. 129.

<sup>224</sup> Clark, p. 135.

<sup>225</sup> Clark, p. 131.

<sup>226</sup> Woodworth, p. 63 and Clark, p. 130.

Most killings occur in broad daylight in the streets. On other occasions the terrorists calmly walk into a bar or cafeteria serving policemen on break from their duties. Often without even bothering to conceal their identities, the terrorists single out their targets and 'execute' them in front of scores of onlookers, yet, when police investigations try to ascertain the facts, witnesses are almost impossible to find.<sup>227</sup>

Consequently, the need for caution while heightened appears somewhat reduced by the vulnerability and public location of the target(s).

The escape phase made use of ETA's extensive supporter network within the Basque villages and towns. However, the extent of this network is dependent on the surrounding social conditions at the time<sup>228</sup>. For example, following the kidnapping of a local well-known Basque industrialist by the Itzair *comando* and his subsequent execution ordered by ETA leadership, outrage among the Basque community forced the *comando* to either go completely underground or into exile<sup>229</sup>. In contrast, the manipulation of standoff range can somewhat mitigate this risk.

The manipulation of standoff range determines the engagement range, which correlates to the degree of threat and resources allocated to the operation. ETA kidnappings and bombings present opposite extremes of the engagement range spectrum. Approximately 10 percent of all ETA attacks between 1975 and 1980 were kidnappings<sup>230</sup>. Overall, ETA kidnapped 77 people between 1972 and 1997<sup>231</sup>. Kidnappings contain inherent risk and resource issues including political fallout and threats to the hostage takers, which both increase over time<sup>232</sup>. However, ETA's systematic use of kidnapping since 1970 has somewhat negated these disadvantages. In contrast, bombings correlate directly to threat and resource reduction.

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<sup>227</sup> Vercher, p. 226.

<sup>228</sup> Zirakzadeh, p. 137.

<sup>229</sup> Zulaika, p. 88.

<sup>230</sup> ETA (pm) is credited with 60 percent of total kidnappings (24) between 1975 and 1980.

Source: Clark, p. 128.

<sup>231</sup> Brotons and Esposito, p. 409, 14n.

<sup>232</sup> Zirakzadeh, 2001, p. 349.

Between 1975 and 1980, ETA bombings accounted for 45 percent of all ETA victims<sup>233</sup>. ETA's methods for bombings comprise explosive devices placed in mail, transportation, public places and infrastructure. For example, between 1977 and 1982, the ETA employed 269 bombings against the Lemoniz nuclear power plant<sup>234</sup>. Car bombings appear to be ETA's preferred means of surgical strike. According to Alexander, Swetnam and Levine between 1968 and 2001 ETA have initiated 141 car bomb attacks<sup>235</sup>. Car bombings have a high-end standoff capability with controllable attack radii amenable to escalating attacks vis-à-vis ambushes. Consequently, as operational standoff range increases the threat to *etarras* and requirements for resources decrease. However, firepower superiority can mitigate the risks of close-in engagement ranges.

Firepower superiority mitigates the security force threat. The selective targeting process, which in 87 percent of cases targeted from one to five persons, reduced the chances *comandos* would be overwhelmed by superior firepower<sup>236</sup>. Combinations of sub-machine guns, rifles and grenades ensured firepower superiority against *guardia civil* and *policia* patrol officers<sup>237</sup>. However, selective targeting and combinations of hit and run tactics also allowed surprise and initiative contributing to mitigating the security force threat.

## Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for attacks:

1. A high degree of compartmentalization (secrecy) increased attack effectiveness
2. The safety of the *etarra* is inherent in selective targeting, which increases long-term attack effectiveness
3. The *ekintza* justifies the act as a personal duty or commitment
4. Basque popular support provides supplemental operational support and produces an operational environment less dependant on deception
5. Training provides *etarras* with attack and survivability skills specific to ETA's doctrine increasing attack effectiveness

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<sup>233</sup> Clark, p. 129.

<sup>234</sup> Alexander, p. 30.


<sup>235</sup> Alexander, Swetnam and Levine, p. 25.

<sup>236</sup> Clark, p. 131.

<sup>237</sup> Alexander, Swetnam and Levine, p. 25.

6. Counter-Terrorism measures disrupted ETA leadership and possibly made some tactics more problematic to execute decreasing attack effectiveness (-)

In summary, the success of an attack qualifies its repeated use as a traditional tactic. ETA's traditional tactics consisted of shooting assassinations, kidnappings and bombings, especially car bombings. Non-traditional tactics while successful require greater resources and/or engender greater risks. These tactics have consisted of coordinated ambushes and assaults on infrastructure. Subsequently, the tactics employed by ETA suggest a high degree of tactical variety. Overall, attack effectiveness positively influenced cell effectiveness to a high degree.



**Figure 19: ETA Systems Decomposition of Operational Patterns**

## Counter-Terrorism Measures and Repentant Terrorists

This section will describe the central counter-terrorism measures used by Spain's Security Forces (see Figure 20). This analysis will develop Spain's counter-terrorism framework in order to show the effectiveness of legislative measures and intelligence gathering mechanisms used in disrupting the effectiveness of ETA *comandos*.

The Spanish counter-terrorism strategy, designated plan ZEN (Special Northern Zone), instigated the intensification of the security climate in Basque country<sup>238</sup>. Plan ZEN employed a three-pronged strategy supported by robust counter-terrorism laws isolating and attacking ETA's leadership, members and ideology. The three approaches comprised using state directed terrorism to compromise the French sanctuary, employing mass arrests to dismantle Spanish based *comandos* and introducing divisive techniques of ideological dissuasion using innovative legal measures. Plan ZEN initially toughened up the counter-terrorism laws<sup>239</sup>.

Significant counter-terrorism laws included organic law 11/1980 and 9/1984. Law 11/1980 suspended particular constitutional guarantees, such as warrant based searches, and introduced *Habeas Corpus* or the right to be detained *incommunicado* (in-communication) for a total of 10 days<sup>240</sup>. In 1981, a system of amnesty for terrorists introduced the policy of social reinsertion<sup>241</sup>. Subsequently, Organic law 9/1984 completed the legal framework by introducing the accomplice evidence system allowing for leniency in sentencing in exchange for information<sup>242</sup>. Operating within this legal framework was a counter-terrorism organisational structure comprising urban and rural police working along side a specialised counter-terrorism unit.

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<sup>238</sup> Woodworth, p. 68.

<sup>239</sup> Anderson, p. 37.

<sup>240</sup> *Incommunicado* means cut off from all external sources while incarcerated.

Source: Vercher, p. 229.

<sup>241</sup> Woodworth, p. 64.

<sup>242</sup> Vercher, p. 285.

Under the political direction of the Spanish Minister of the Interior<sup>243</sup>, the Spanish police forces were responsible for directing government strategy against the ETA<sup>244</sup>. The security forces comprise four principal services<sup>245</sup> including: the *Guardia Civil*, the *Policia* (National Police), the *Conesca* Group and the Spanish Intelligence service.

The *Guardia Civil* was a well-armed<sup>246</sup> paramilitary civil guard police force that specialised in counter-terrorism in areas with populations fewer than 20,000<sup>247</sup>. They operated special rural counter-terrorism groups, the *Grupo Anti-terrorista Rural* (GAR)<sup>248</sup> and a special intervention group, the *Unidad Especial de Intervencion* (GEI) for crisis prevention, such as kidnapping cases<sup>249</sup>. During the 1970s and 1980s, there were approximately 12,000 *Guardia* in the Basque Provinces<sup>250</sup>. In contrast, the *Policia* patrolled the larger cities<sup>251</sup> and operated under regional headquarters each with its own intelligence division.

The *Conesca* group was formed in 1978 to gather intelligence on terrorist organisations<sup>252</sup>. *Conesca* used police records, surveillance and detainees to generate clues on persons associated to the ETA<sup>253</sup>. Clark comments they were committed to building informer networks<sup>254</sup>. The *Centro Superior de Informacion*

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<sup>243</sup> Jimenez, p. 125.

<sup>244</sup> Woodworth, p. 12.

<sup>245</sup> The Basque Autonomous police force formed in mid-1982. While an active deterrent it was however primarily symbolic during this early period with an emphasis on service to the ethnic Basque community. Its role contributed to isolating the ETA from its popular support base. Source: Macdonald, I., 'The Police System of Spain' in Roach, J and Thomanek, J (eds), *Police and Public Order in Europe*, London: Croom Helm, 1985, pp. 215-254., p. 245.

<sup>246</sup> The *Guardia* were well-armed carrying 9mm pistols with units carrying 7.62mm rifles and 9 mm sub-machineguns.

Source: Macdonald, p. 237.

<sup>247</sup> Macdonald, p. 234.

<sup>248</sup> Jimenez, p. 126.

<sup>249</sup> Clark, p. 266.

<sup>250</sup> Clark, p. 263.

<sup>251</sup> Trevino, p. 152.

<sup>252</sup> Clark, p. 265.

<sup>253</sup> Vercher, p. 242.

<sup>254</sup> Press accounts indicate that between September and December 1978 *Conesca* uncovered 46 ETA cells.

Source: Clark, p. 266.

*de la Defensa* (CESID - Higher Defence Intelligence Centre) was mandated foreign intelligence, counter-espionage and internal defence<sup>255</sup>. In 1986, they were involved in uncovering an ETA nerve centre in France, after selling and then tracking two wired Russian missiles to a furniture store in Hendaya, France<sup>256</sup>. However, the overall extent of CESID activities remains unclear.

*Conesea*, the *Guardia* and *Policia* generated intelligence through informer networks, grassroots patrolling and interrogations. In 1980, the police presence in the Basque country comprised 17 percent of the entire Spanish security forces<sup>257</sup>. Trevino indicates that the ratio of police per capita was a low 600 to 1<sup>258</sup> and suggests that the police tended to be more reactive when arresting members of the ETA and searching for weapons caches<sup>259</sup>. MacDonald suggests intelligence issues, such as the Basque language and inter-service rivalry hindered terrorist investigations<sup>260</sup>. In this sense, it can be tentatively argued that the security forces were ineffective as a cohesive counter-terrorism force at the national level, however they had some success at dismantling *comandos* at local levels, particularly using an aggressive investigative process.

Detention was part of the investigation process used to gain information and/or a confession. In Spain, the investigation process is a preliminary step carried out by the police and judiciary (a judge) so that a summary of facts can be prepared to commit the suspect to trial<sup>261</sup>. Suspects were detained for up to ten days, however in reality detainees were sometimes held for months or years<sup>262</sup>.

Detention was a process combined with interrogation that in addition to gaining confessions inevitably produced intelligence. The aggressiveness of this

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<sup>255</sup> Macdonald, p. 242.

<sup>256</sup> Brotons and Esposito, p. 168.

<sup>257</sup> Irvin, p. 194.

<sup>258</sup> Trevino, p. 152.

<sup>259</sup> Trevino, p. 143.

<sup>260</sup> Macdonald, p. 249.

<sup>261</sup> Vercher, p. 329.

<sup>262</sup> Vercher, p. 475, 34n.



process is systematic of the uncooperative Basque community<sup>263</sup>. Vercher comments that between 1980 and 1983 of the 1,612 out of 3,604 detainees held for over 72 hours, two thirds were charged with offences relating to the ETA<sup>264</sup>. Moreover, Irvin shows that between 1980 and 1985 there were an average of 1,547 arrests per annum<sup>265</sup> or 128 arrests per month, which peaked in 1984<sup>266</sup>. Vercher comments that the consequence of prolonged detention is torture and in 1986, 25 *Guardia* and *Policia* were convicted of varying degrees of torture<sup>267</sup>. In contrast to the inevitable fallout from interrogations, the system of repentant terrorists was highly divisive and a threat to the ETA. Both social re-insertion and the accomplice evidence system encapsulated this counter-terrorism measure.

Social reinsertion allowed for the reintegration of imprisoned or exiled terrorists based on the renunciation<sup>268</sup> of all terrorist activities<sup>269</sup>. Between 1983 and 1984, 119 former ETA (p-m) members benefited from social reinsertion, as did 107 former ETA (m) terrorists in 1986<sup>270</sup>. According to Vercher, the success of this system was in not attempting to target the strong traditional links embedded in the lives of active terrorists but rather in targeting links weakened through exile or imprisonment<sup>271</sup>. This system threatened ETA's revolutionary conscience, which is evident in executions of former members who accepted social reinsertion and ETA's attempted assassination of the policies author<sup>272</sup>. Woodworth states, 'ETA (m) regarded this policy as a dangerously seductive

<sup>263</sup> Vercher, p. 226.

<sup>264</sup> Vercher, p. 229.

<sup>265</sup> It should be noted that Vercher's Figures seem to be lower than Irvin's by approximately 2,000 arrests. From 1980 – 1983 Irvin lists 5,858 arrests whereas Vercher indicates 3,604 detainees. The difference could be to do with definition between what constitutes an arrest and what constitutes a detainee.

<sup>266</sup> Irvin, p. 194.

<sup>267</sup> Vercher, p. 234.

<sup>268</sup> According to the law, renunciation is not a psychological or mental change but rather a voluntary disassociation from political violence.

Source: Vercher, p. 291.

<sup>269</sup> Woodworth, p. 64.

<sup>270</sup> Vercher, p. 297.

<sup>271</sup> Vercher, p. 298.

<sup>272</sup> Interestingly, the author of social reinsertion was the brother of the Minister of Interior. Source: Woodworth, p. 133.

blueprint for betrayal.<sup>273</sup> In contrast, the accomplice evidence system, similar in many ways to the British supergrass system, was not as successful.

The accomplice evidence system offered active terrorists, in exchange for information and the renunciation of political violence, lenient sentences or pardons<sup>274</sup>. According to Vercher, this policy appeared less successful than social reinsertion considering only one supergrass case has ever been documented<sup>275</sup>. The imbalance of information given by *etarras* in different hierarchical positions resulted in inconsistencies in the leniency received, which in most cases was slight<sup>276</sup>. However, the security forces did utilise informers<sup>277</sup>. For example, Woodworth quotes the Head of Police Intelligence as stating: 'Interior pays police informers for the surveillance of *etarras* in the South of France.'<sup>278</sup> The deficiencies of this system correlate to the practicalities of recruiting informers within the Spanish strategy. Basque traditions made this a difficult proposition, hence one could argue informers while valuable did not drive real-time intelligence gathering, which arguably reflects the reactive nature of the police. However, the intelligence developed from informers most likely contributed to larger-scale operations, such as the state directed terrorism campaign in Southern France.

A campaign of state directed terrorism operated in Southern France between 1983 and 1987 killing 27 individuals, most of who were members of the ETA leadership apparatus<sup>279</sup>. The *Grupos Antiterroristas de liberacion* (GAL) organisation comprised foreign mercenaries as part of a covert campaign run by senior members of the Spanish government. According to Woodworth, the

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<sup>273</sup> Woodworth, p. 133.

<sup>274</sup> Vercher, p. 285.

<sup>275</sup> One supposed supergrass was a Ramon Arranza.

Source: Vercher, p. 499, 66n.

<sup>276</sup> Vercher, p. 292.

<sup>277</sup> According to Vercher, the government were paying informers the equivalent of 75 to 100 pounds per week.

Source: Vercher, p. 504, 129n.

<sup>278</sup> Woodworth, p. 162.

<sup>279</sup> Woodworth, 'Why Do They Kill? The Basque Conflict in Spain', p. 7.

GAL's agenda was to put the ETA leadership under siege and encourage France to act against the ETA<sup>280</sup>. Targeting included senior leaders, members and associates of the ETA. For example, Santiago Brouard the president of HASI (Popular Revolutionary Socialist Party) and spokesman for ETA was assassinated on 20 November 1984 and subsequently martyred<sup>281</sup>. Woodworth states, 'In the 1980s ETA would get no better recruiting sergeant than the GAL.'<sup>282</sup>

## Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for counter-terrorism measures:

1. Territorial and operational compartmentalization localised the information extracted during interrogations reducing counter-terrorism measures (-)
2. ETA's strategy resulted in Spain's multi-pronged overreaction which exceeded its capacity to regenerate
3. Leadership centralisation in Southern France made it vulnerable to targeting
4. Selective targeting of security forces engenders both revenge and urgency within the security forces
5. The strong bonds of the *ekintza* reduced the capability of counter-terrorism measures to disrupt active *etarra* links with one another (-)
6. ETA's degree of integration into Basque villages and towns reduced the effectiveness of security force infiltration (-)
7. ETA's one-year recruitment process deterred potential infiltrators (-)
8. Fewer operatives decrease the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures (-)
9. The location and composition of ETA's supply chains makes interdiction problematic (-)
10. Counter-intelligence mitigates the effectiveness of informers (-)
11. Highly developed intelligence and tactical variety mitigate attack risk (-)

In summary, Plan ZEN utilised a broad strategy, which implemented forceful counter-terrorism measures to break *etarra* links with one another, the leadership and ideology. While state directed terrorism and interrogation somewhat reinforced *etarra* links the effectiveness of the counter-terrorism measures in concert appears to have suppressed cell effectiveness in various capacities. Subsequently, cell effectiveness while partly degraded by the direct


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<sup>280</sup> Woodworth, p. 82.

<sup>281</sup> Woodworth, p. 130.

<sup>282</sup> Woodworth, p. 91.

interdiction of ETA operations is also degraded through the disruption of *etarra* links. Overall, counter-terrorism measures have a negative influence on cell effectiveness to a high degree.



**Figure 20: ETA Systems Decomposition of Counter-Terrorism Measures**

## Lifecycle of an Etarra

The lifecycle of an *etarra* (see Figure 21) identifies the various interactions of components of cell capital and resulting feedback loops. The most significant feedbacks occur during recruitment and following attacks. During recruitment, the commitment of the recruit is tested using situational and character filtering, and a series of *ekintza*'s and conscience raising exercises. Recruitment filtering correlates to growth modification filtering out those least committed to the life of an *etarra*. Following formal training, attacks and informal training form a primary feedback loop. Each attack sustains collective challenge and collective action. Following each attack, the operative's interaction with informal training reinforces both common interest and purpose. Counter-Terrorism measures provide the dominant means of exit.




Figure 21: Lifecycle of an Etarra

## Summary

This chapter has shown that ETA's cellular components maintained a moderate degree of overall cell effectiveness. These results depict a multi-targeted security strategy in which the formation and operation of ETA *comandos* required high degrees of compartmentalization formulated on Basque traditions to offset ideological threats. The functionality of compartmentalization was facilitated by the cells reliance on Basque traditions for recruitment and commitment, high degrees of village integration to engender popular support, decentralization of control to manage cells and surgical strikes. However, the mismanagement of the recruitment process and logistical weaknesses undermined ETA's overall strategy, which to some degree degraded cell effectiveness. In Chapter 5 a similar analysis of Hamas will be conducted.

## Chapter 5

### The Cellular System of Hamas

This chapter deconstructs a snapshot taken of the Hamas cellular system from 2001 to assess cellular effectiveness. To do this, a contextual history detailing the environment in which the cell operates will identify strategic, operational and cultural inflections followed by localising each component of cellular capital. In addition, the intent of this chapter is to formulate data for later analysis. There is some controversy over the definition of Palestinian people, however for this research they can be considered as any Arab with roots in historical Israel, regardless of religion<sup>1</sup>. Additionally, references to the second Intifada throughout this chapter refers to the date range September 2000 to September 2003.

#### The Contextual History of Hamas

During December 1987, Hamas (the Islamic Resistance Movement) used favourable political conditions to launch itself as both a reformist<sup>2</sup> and combatant Islamic Palestinian nationalist movement. The ensuing first and second *Intifadas* (uprising) produced evolutions in Israeli counter-terrorism policies and Hamas strategy, which have perpetuated the Palestinian conflict from 1987 – 2001. Figure 22 summarises some of the most significant milestones, from which will be constructed a relative historical framework.

Hamas' primary areas of operation comprise of Israel Proper (herein Israel), and the Israeli administered areas of East Jerusalem and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), consisting of the West Bank and Gaza strip. In mid-2001 both the West Bank and Gaza supported approximately 2.1 and 1.1

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<sup>1</sup> 'Palestinian' retrieved 10 June 2003, from <http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestinian>

<sup>2</sup> Mishal and Sela describe reformist in the Islamic sense as a long-term, bottom-up incremental process of social reforms combining both education and preaching with militancy.

Source: Mishal, S. and Sela, A., *The Palestinian Hamas, Vision Violence, and Coexistence*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000, p. 29.

million Palestinians respectively<sup>3</sup>. The Gaza Strip is a key focus of unrest composed of a predominantly young Islamic population densely packed into an area of 365 square kilometres<sup>4</sup>. Co-located within this area are eight even more densely populated refugee camps accounting for approximately 400,000 people<sup>5</sup>. For example, the Jabaliya camp has 90,000 people living in a three-square kilometre area<sup>6</sup>. However, the West Bank is operationally just as important considering its proximity to Israel and Jordan. The Palestinian Diaspora comprises approximately 3.8 million Palestinians residing in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan with one third of this number residing in refugee camps<sup>7</sup>. Statistics indicate that since the start of the second *Intifada* Hamas has carried out approximately 61 attacks of which 39 percent occurred in Israel, 30 percent in the West Bank, 16 percent in Jerusalem and 14 percent in Gaza<sup>8</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics - General Statistics retrieved 1 August 2003, from [http://www.pchrgaza.org/Intifada/General\\_stat.htm](http://www.pchrgaza.org/Intifada/General_stat.htm)

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> See Appendix B, 1<sup>st</sup> Search.






Figure 22: Hamas Contextual History, 1987-2001

The first *Intifada* began on 8 December 1987. Essentially a 20-year Israeli occupation, a decline in the Palestinian economic situation and a new generation of Palestinian's un-cowed by previous Arab defeats ignited a revolutionary uprising<sup>9</sup>. The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) responded with mass arrests, detentions, assassinations<sup>10</sup>, punitive measures and deportations<sup>11</sup>. Between December 1987 and December 1988, 311 Palestinians were killed, at least 50,000 arrested and 526 homes demolished<sup>12</sup>. The signing of the Oslo accords in September 1993 essentially terminated the first *Intifada* granting Palestinians semi-autonomous rule (Palestinian Authority est. 25 May 1994 - PA)<sup>13</sup>. Oslo included the IDF redeployment from the Gaza - Jericho regions in exchange for the establishment of a Palestinian police force<sup>14</sup>. The Cairo agreement followed in May 1994 committing the PA to the prevention of terrorist attacks from its controlled areas<sup>15</sup>. Inevitably, these territorial adjustments had a significant effect on Israel's counter-terrorism strategy.

Israel insulates its population from terrorism by projecting its counter-terrorism strategy into the OPT. Essentially, it remains a military led defensive strategy with offensive tactics favouring pre-emption while relying on HUMINT sources. Before the inception of the PA, the Israeli Security Forces (ISF) operated approximately 5,000 collaborators in the OPT, which following the Gaza redeployment the PA purged many<sup>16</sup>. Moreover, Usher comments that the '...emergence of an increasingly authoritarian PA has contributed to a process of depoliticization of Palestinian society in which many of its most able members have "collectively withdrawn", reverting to individualistic or clan based (rather

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<sup>9</sup> Hroub, K., *Hamas*, Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000, p. 36.

<sup>10</sup> Abu Jihad, Arafat's number two and believed to be controlling the first *Intifada* was assassinated by Israeli Security Forces.

Source: Bregman, A., *A History of Israel*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 261.

<sup>11</sup> Bregman, p. 218.

<sup>12</sup> Bregman, p. 220.

<sup>13</sup> Bregman, p. 250.

<sup>14</sup> Usher, G., 'The Politics of Internal Security: The PA's New Intelligence Services', *Journal of Palestinian Studies*, 25:2 (1996), pp. 21-34, p. 22.

<sup>15</sup> Mishal and Sela, p. 70.

<sup>16</sup> Usher, p. 25.

than political) solutions for their needs and aspirations.<sup>17</sup> Subsequently, Israel's capacity to project its strategy has required adapting to the re-configuration of territory and subsequent changes in social networks.

The second *Intifada*, dubbed the *al-Aksa Intifada* in late 2000 resulted in an upsurge of violence out of which Ariel Sharon came to power in February 2001. Bregman comments in 2001 alone there were 1,794 terrorist attacks in Israel and the OPT causing 208 Israeli deaths and swinging public opinion away from a viable peace agreement with the Palestinians<sup>18</sup>. Overall, while Israel's national strategy is broadly defensive, within the narrower counter-terrorism context it is offensive with a character somewhere between the extremes of full military force and border policing<sup>19</sup>. Subsequently, Hamas' organisation has had to adapt rapidly to the intensive security environment in the OPT.

Hamas was co-founded by Sheikh Ahmad Yassin around 11 December 1987 on the back of the militant group Muslim Brotherhood (est. 1928 - MB), which supported the formation and association of Hamas to the first *Intifada*<sup>20</sup>. The MB had emerged from Egypt as a Sunni reformist and communal Islamic movement seeking to create the ideal Islamic state using a passive grass roots approach<sup>21</sup>. Hamas signified a shift to political and national action from a communal stance<sup>22</sup>. Between 1987 and 1993, Hamas went through various organisational and operational changes in reaction to the changing security environment.

The outlawing of Hamas in 1989 and the following imprisonment of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin forced a shift in Hamas' leadership structure from one run by a

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<sup>17</sup> Usher, p. 32.

<sup>18</sup> Bregman, p. 285.

<sup>19</sup> Usher, p. 28.

<sup>20</sup> Hroub, p. 40.

<sup>21</sup> Mishal and Sela, p. 120.

<sup>22</sup> Mishal and Sela, p. 37.

supreme leader and visionary, to one run by liberal professionals<sup>23</sup>. During November 1992, Hamas announced it had entered into a strategic relationship with Iran<sup>24</sup>. Israeli security officers had previously described Hamas as: 'A surprisingly unprofessional bunch, they had no training, and acted without specific instructions.'<sup>25</sup> Iran provided funds, weapons and training and most importantly, direction in building covert intangible networks<sup>26</sup>. Israel's crackdown on Hamas in 1992 resulted in the exile of some 415 leaders from December 1992 to December 1993. This event highlighted the importance of using external control measures to maintain operational compartmentalization<sup>27</sup>. Consequently, Hamas' top leadership transferred to Jordan and Syria necessitating the re-structuring of Hamas' military wing.

Salah Shahadeh, a co-founder of Hamas, was instrumental in establishing Hamas' initial *al-Qassam* military wing using compartmentalised cells, each allocated to particular territorial zones and reporting to a supreme command<sup>28</sup>. Hamas' former MB members were already familiar with cellular systems, including the concept of compartmentalization following their deployment before the first *Intifada*<sup>29</sup>. During 1992 the *al-Qassam* elements transitioned from a guerrilla based operational structure of six man units into the *Martyr Izzidin al-Qassam* Brigades (herein *al-Qassam* Brigades) of operational cells regionally assigned and controlled by local battalion commanders<sup>30</sup>. While events in 1992 acted as catalysts for relocation and re-organisation, from 1993 onwards Hamas' military strategy escalated.

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<sup>23</sup> Katz, S., *The Hunt for the Engineer: How Israeli Agents Tracked the Hamas Master Bomber*, New York: Fromm International, 1999, p. 51.

<sup>24</sup> O'Ballance, E., *Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism, 1979-95: The Iranian Connection*, London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997, p. 166.

<sup>25</sup> O'Ballance, p. 167.

<sup>26</sup> Katz, p. 52.

<sup>27</sup> Eshel, D., 'Hamas Resists Pressure as Israel Targets Arafat', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 14:1 (2002), pp 12-15, p. 13.

<sup>28</sup> Eshel, p. 14.

<sup>29</sup> Hroub, p. 35.

<sup>30</sup> Katz, p. 56.

The first suicide attack by Hamas in April 1993 signalled the use of a Hizbullah based strategy adopted in Lebanon during the early 1980s against Israel and the United States led multinational force<sup>31</sup>. Suicide bombings and other forms of attack targeted Israeli settlers and security personnel until February 1994 when a right-wing Israeli settler entered the Abraham Mosque in Hebron killing and wounding numerous worshippers<sup>32</sup>. Hebron provided the political opportunity to escalate Hamas' strategy through the sanctioned targeting of all Israeli citizens<sup>33</sup>. Rather than describing this shift as a tit-for-tat policy, it represented a re-alignment towards its end goal of liberating Palestine through attacks that exhausted and weakened Israel<sup>34</sup>, and de-legitimised the PA leadership<sup>35</sup>. Hroub describes this as a strategy of force, however it is more accurate to describe it as a strategy of attrition considering Hamas' strategic goal<sup>36</sup>.

The historical framework ending in 2001 offsets an Israeli offensive strategy against Hamas' strategy of attrition. Moreover, this framework identifies Hamas' adoption of the cellular system as being indicative of long-term survivability as a requirement of its strategy. The next three sections will use this framework to assist in the deconstruction of the Hamas cellular system. See Appendix A for research definitions associated with the following three sections.

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<sup>31</sup> Mishal and Sela, p. 66.

<sup>32</sup> O'Ballance, p. 174.

<sup>33</sup> Hroub, p. 246.

<sup>34</sup> Hroub, p. 247.

<sup>35</sup> Mishal and Sela, p. 140.

<sup>36</sup> Hroub, p. 80.

## The Main Actors of Hamas

In 2001, Hamas' organisational structure reflected a four-tier construct (see Figure 23) with regionally divided parallel leadership frameworks. This section will first examine the organisational structure of the Hamas cell and second, the actors that influence it.

The cells of the al-Qassam Brigades are territorially compartmentalised within the OPT and Jerusalem. These regions may shift in and out of activity, however Eshel lists the following active regions as of 2002. The West Bank regions are: Samaria, which includes Jenin, Nablus, Tubas and additionally Tul Qarem and Qalkiliya in the Northern West Bank; Jerusalem, which includes Ramallah and Jericho; and Hebron, which includes Bethlehem. Gaza sector operations comprise Gaza South, Gaza North, Khan Yhunis and Rafa <sup>37</sup>. The Hamas cell is organised into four specific structures, internal security cells, strike cells, support cells and martyrdom cells<sup>38</sup>.

Hamas' internal security cells (*majid*) operate under their own regional command apparatus. *Majid* cells comprise of between two and three operatives designated with multiple internal security roles including, collecting intelligence on informers and enforcing Islamic moral codes of conduct<sup>39</sup>. Moreover, they may also act as couriers between the various layers of leadership<sup>40</sup>.

Regional strike cells comprise of four to five members, each with a commander and usually an executive officer<sup>41</sup>. Strike cells operate in attack roles and

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<sup>37</sup> Eshel, p. 14.

<sup>38</sup> Mishal and Sela, Hroub, and Eshel each provide details of Hamas' internal structure. However, information on Hamas cells lacks clarity regarding actual operational interactions. Consequently, a degree of interpretation is incorporated into this analysis.

<sup>39</sup> Alexander, Y., *Palestinian Religious Terrorism: Hamas and Islamic Jihad*, Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc, 2002, p. 12.

<sup>40</sup> Mishal and Sela, p. 158.

<sup>41</sup> Katz, p. 116.

sometimes intelligence roles<sup>42</sup>. For example, attacks that require infiltration into Israel may require separate intelligence cells to gather information whereas the regional strike cell may collect information for local attacks.

Both logistics and operational intelligence cells have had very little written regarding their structure and operation. However, Hamas' use of cross-border and under-border supply chains, weapons labs and its various attacks in Israel, indicates the existence of specialised cells, which are most likely small cells of between two and three operatives<sup>43</sup>. Moreover, Eshel differentiates between regional and functional cells as well as describing a logistics component in the regional leadership structure<sup>44</sup>. However, Mishal and Sela comment that local activists are '...encouraged to accept broader responsibilities and commitments than those prescribed by their role descriptions.'<sup>45</sup> Subsequently, this implies that some specialised cells<sup>46</sup> may shift in and out of other roles as and when needed. For example, an IDF report describes the capture of a two-man East Jerusalem Hamas intelligence cell, which in addition to collecting intelligence had also planted explosives<sup>47</sup>.

Martyrdom cells come together for each attack and comprise of two elements under the control of a cell commander. The support element consists of two to three members and the *shaheed al hay* (living martyr) element consists of from one to three<sup>48</sup> trained living martyrs<sup>49</sup>. The support element provides the

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<sup>42</sup> Katz, p. 56.

<sup>43</sup> The small size of logistics and intelligence cells would indicate their specialised nature and defensive orientation vis-à-vis strike cells.

<sup>44</sup> Eshel, p. 14.

<sup>45</sup> Mishal and Sela, p. 160.

<sup>46</sup> There is no indication in the literary sources that logistics cells shifted into strike roles.

<sup>47</sup> Israel Defence Force (IDF) Incident Reports, 'Security Forces Capture Terrorist Cell Involved in Massive Terrorist Attacks in Jerusalem' retrieved 2 September 2003, from <http://www.idf.il/newsite/english/pigua1.stm>

<sup>48</sup> The number of living martyr's is an estimate based on events extracted from the ICT Internet database. Moreover, the ICT database does not differentiate between mainstream shootings and martyrdom shootings. However, one can make the argument that some of these infiltration and shooting operations of Israeli settlements were most likely martyrdom operations

weaponry, organises transportation, fake paperwork and disguises<sup>50</sup> and disbands following the operation<sup>51</sup>.

Hamas' internal leadership comprises parallel and identical regional commands informally subordinated to either Gaza or West Bank head quarters (herein Gaza-West Bank headquarters) and informally subordinated to the external leadership<sup>52</sup>. Regional headquarters are composed of committees, including security, logistics, public relations, welfare and recruitment<sup>53</sup>.

The regional military command informally affiliates itself to the other committees to safeguard its secrecy<sup>54</sup>. The military command directs the regional al-Qassam brigade and is composed of a battalion or regional commander who has overall responsibility for the strike and martyrdom cells. Eshel lists four regional commands including the Northern West Bank or Samaria, Jerusalem, Hebron and those in Gaza<sup>55</sup>. Eshel also indicates the existence of a Palestinian operational command layer between the external and the Gaza-West Bank leadership<sup>56</sup>. However, its role remains too unclear to expand on further<sup>57</sup>.

Hamas' external leadership is a formal hierarchical structure organised into a political bureau or executive body of from 10 – 12 members and an informal

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considering the modus operandi of the attacks, such as no apparent exit strategies, and some being single shooter events (see Appendix B for a summary of ICT events).

<sup>49</sup> Moghadam, A., 'Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organisational Aspects', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 26:2 (2003), pp. 65-92, p. 85.

<sup>50</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> Eshel, p. 14 and Mishal and Sela, Appendix 1 and Katz, p. 35.

<sup>53</sup> Eshel, p. 14.

<sup>54</sup> Mishal and Sela, Appendix 1.

<sup>55</sup> Eshel, p. 15.

<sup>56</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>57</sup> Eshel gives no indication of the Palestinian Operation commands purpose, although its position indicates a coordinating role. Due to the lack of information, it has been left out of this analysis in favour of a link directly between the Gaza-West Bank and external leadership.



advisory council of approximately 12 members<sup>58</sup>. The advisory council acts as the supreme religious legislative authority providing '...normative backing and moral justification for Hamas' political conduct and major decisions.'<sup>59</sup> A chairman oversees the executive, which manages various committees including, foreign affairs, finance, propaganda, internal security and military affairs<sup>60</sup>. The leadership operates from both Jordan and Syria<sup>61</sup>. In contrast to Hamas' organisational construct, popular support acts to support the Hamas cell.

Most terrorist organisations strive for popular support and attempt to maximise it through their strategy<sup>62</sup>. However, Hamas is only dependent on securing a strong Palestinian support base to insulate its military apparatus against PA and Israeli counter-terrorism measures in order to maintain its attrition strategy. The armed struggle becomes critical in this sense as a means to generate support. Popular support then becomes a barometer of prevailing conditions acting as an indicator in calculating political opportunity for particular acts. Consequently, popular support primarily influences leadership and recruitment. While popular support remains a crucial target audience for Hamas, Palestinian prisoners provide symbolic encouragement and informal leadership.

Palestinian prisoners play both a symbolic and organisational role in cell effectiveness. The Israeli human rights organisation *B'tselem* estimated that on 3 October 2002 2,755 Palestinians were being detained by the IDF and 1,306 were imprisoned by the Israeli Prison Service<sup>63</sup>. Palestinian prisoners are a visible symbol of Israeli repression, commonly associated to torture, unfair trials

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<sup>58</sup> Katz, p. 51.

<sup>59</sup> Mishal and Sela, p. 161.

<sup>60</sup> Mishal and Sela, Appendix 1.

<sup>61</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>62</sup> Irvin, C., *Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Part in Ireland and the Basque Country*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999, p. 45.

<sup>63</sup> Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics – Arrests, Imprisonment and Torture Statistics retrieved 1 August 2003, from [http://www.pchrgaza.org/Intifada/Arrests\\_torture\\_stat.htm](http://www.pchrgaza.org/Intifada/Arrests_torture_stat.htm)

and long periods of detention without arrest (administrative detention)<sup>64</sup>. Hamas has shown solidarity by establishing prisoner committees '... established to support prisoners' families financially, paying for detainee's legal defence, and transferring "canteen money" to jails.'<sup>65</sup> Mishal and Sela also identify imprisoned Hamas leaders as forming an internal HQ by using their personal acquaintances with local militants to exert influence<sup>66</sup>. However, how effective this link remains is unknown. Consequently, prisoners mainly act as propaganda influencing popular support. While prisoners are useful for their symbolic value, spiritual leaders offer Hamas operatives religious justification for their actions.

Spiritual leaders provide religious and ideological justification for many of Hamas' activities. They influence Hamas operatives in the following three ways. First, spiritual leaders dispense their ideological message through public prayers and sermons<sup>67</sup>. Second, Islamic clerics issue *fatwas*<sup>68</sup> to rule on religiously inspired acts such as martyrdom operations<sup>69</sup>. Third, some have become symbols of the Palestinian struggle, such as Hamas' spiritual leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin<sup>70</sup>. Consequently, spiritual leaders are highly influential in managing commitment. The influence of a spiritual leader such as Yassin becomes a significant draw in an operating environment with various ideological flavours.

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<sup>64</sup> Amnesty International USA, 'Israel and the Occupied Territories', (1999) retrieved 3 May 2003, from [http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/israel\\_and\\_occupied\\_territories/document.do?id=22C55s99DEBDDC5F802568E400729F04](http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/israel_and_occupied_territories/document.do?id=22C55s99DEBDDC5F802568E400729F04)

<sup>65</sup> Mishal and Sela, p. 158.

<sup>66</sup> Mishal and Sela, Appendix 1.

<sup>67</sup> Neusse, A., *Muslim Palestine: The Ideology of Hamas*, Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1998, p. 176.

<sup>68</sup> A *fatwa* is a 'Decision of a religious scholar on a matter of Islamic law.'

Source: Armstrong, K., *Islam: A Short History*, New York: Random House Inc, 2000, p. 200.

<sup>69</sup> Mishal and Sela, p. 77.

<sup>70</sup> Eshel, p. 15.

The large array of rejectionist organisations operating in and around the OPT provides varying degrees of competition for popular support and recruits. There are a myriad of organisations militarily active including, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Fatah-Intifada and the Lebanese based Hizbullah<sup>71</sup>. Each has various ideological tints and some have strategic relationships with one another. For example, Fatah-Intifada and PIJ have relationships with Hizbullah and Hamas<sup>72</sup>. The interaction between these organisations presents exit opportunities for Hamas members. For example, Hamas discovered Hizbullah recruiting Hamas recruits sent to Hizbullah training camps in Lebanon<sup>73</sup>. Consequently, competing and strategically aligned rejectionist organisations influence the lifecycle of the Hamas operative (see Figure 30).

Popular support, spiritual leadership and the organisational construct represent major actors of the Hamas cell. Other rejectionist organisations and prisoners are minor actors being somewhat less influential but remain vital actors of the overall cellular system. These actors represent the major sources of dynamic influences shaping the Hamas organisation. The following six sections further project the influence of each actor as each component of cell effectiveness is localised.


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<sup>71</sup> In addition, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLP-GC) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) also operate in the OPT.

Source: Strindberg, A., 'Intifada Revives Rejectionist Factions', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 14:7 (2002), pp 24-26, p. 24.

<sup>72</sup> Strindberg, p. 24.

<sup>73</sup> Gambill, G., 'Sponsoring Terrorism: Syria and Hamas', *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin*, 4:10 (2002) retrieved 1 May 2003, from [http://www.meib.org/articles/0210\\_s1.htm](http://www.meib.org/articles/0210_s1.htm)



**Figure 23: Actors influencing the Hamas Cellular System**

## Compartmentalization and Islam

This section primarily examines solidarity and how it shapes internal compartmentalization (see Figure 24). In addition, both operational and territorial compartmentalization are each addressed when examining communications discipline. These factors assist in shaping the cells secrecy, which contributes to cell effectiveness. Within a Hamas cell, solidarity has the following primary bonding characteristics: prior experiences of repression and violence, symbolism and the Islamic institution.

Hamas membership comprises a broad social class of Palestinians who have experienced varying degrees of Israeli repression and PA civic violations. Refugee camps and urban slums in particular have become centres of impoverishment with both high population densities and rates of unemployment<sup>74</sup>. For example, following the start of the second *Intifada*, the

<sup>74</sup> Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics – Closures, Unemployment and Poverty Statistics retrieved 1 August 2003, from [http://www.pchrgaza.org/Intifada/Closures\\_stat.htm](http://www.pchrgaza.org/Intifada/Closures_stat.htm)

unemployment rate in Gaza rose to 50 percent due to Israeli security closures<sup>75</sup>. Clashes with the ISF, which have resulted in approximately 8,177 Palestinians casualties, have further exacerbated economic pressure<sup>76</sup>. Moreover, civic violations carried out by PA security forces including mass arrests, illegal abductions, detentions and torture further amplify Israeli mistreatment<sup>77</sup>. The systemic extent that repression and violence develop common prior experiences is in contrast to the systematic and orchestrated symbolism generated by Hamas.

Prisoners, funerals and acts of martyrdom are each used as symbols of identity and defiance in the armed struggle. Martyrs symbolise self-sacrifice and acts of revenge against the systematic humiliation of the Palestinian people developing inspiration and unity through glorification, such as the common depiction of martyrs on posters<sup>78</sup>. The martyrdom operation, the martyr and funeral each act to embolden Hamas supporters and operatives<sup>79</sup>. Funerals orchestrated to inject both patriotism and defiance into its participants symbolise both the Palestinian and Islamic identity using symbolic props, such as the Palestinian flag<sup>80</sup>. While symbolism energises the solidarity of Hamas operatives, Islam adds a constant source of common interest.

Islam, as an institution, lies in a single god and unified *ummah* (community) governed by justice and equity.<sup>81</sup> It defines a broad range of cultural ideals including ritual, worship and social norms centred on five pillars incumbent on

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<sup>75</sup> Moghadam, p. 75.

<sup>76</sup> Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics – Killing and Injury Statistics retrieved 1 August 2003, from [http://www.pchrgaza.org/Intifada/Killings\\_stat.htm](http://www.pchrgaza.org/Intifada/Killings_stat.htm)

<sup>77</sup> Usher, p. 32.

<sup>78</sup> Dolnik, A and Bhattacharjee, A., 'Hamas: Suicide Bombings, Rockets, or WMD?', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 14:3 (2002), pp 109-128, p. 115.

<sup>79</sup> Hroub, p. 247.

<sup>80</sup> Litvak, M., *The Islamization of Palestinian Identity: The Case of Hamas*, Tel Aviv, Israel: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1996, p. 10.

<sup>81</sup> Armstrong, p. 8.

all believers, consisting of faith, prayer, almsgiving, fasting and pilgrimage<sup>82</sup>. Neusse states, 'Qutb<sup>83</sup>] and the Hamas-activists both view Islam as a distinct historical totality that permeates and rules every dimension of life.'<sup>84</sup> In this sense, Hamas' traditionalist<sup>85</sup> discourse has unified its members producing a common identity, which preaches the principle of *jihad* as a sense of duty devolved upon individual Muslims<sup>86</sup>. Subsequently, common interest is continually reinforced through the five pillars of Islam. These strong social bonds within the Hamas cell seem to suggest a high degree of discipline.

The 'need to know' philosophy determined the extent of the operative's discipline<sup>87</sup>. Figures extracted from IDF<sup>88</sup> and International Centre for Terrorism (ICT)<sup>89</sup> reports identify no more than six Hamas cells dismantled since the start

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<sup>82</sup> Esposito, J. L., *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 35.

<sup>83</sup> Qutb refers to Sayyid Qutb, an important MB theorist who preached a revolutionary top down approach to Islamic reform using the basis of a holy war to achieve these ends rather than the reformist and militant bottom-up approach used by Hamas.

Source: Mishal and Sela, p. 29.

<sup>84</sup> Neusse, p. 87.

<sup>85</sup> The traditionalist discourse is a product of the Islamist movement, which intends to renew the comprehension of Islam by leaning towards its more conservative aspects. The traditionalist framework more easily fits in with the uneducated fringe whose priority tends to be following a religious code. Subsequently, the unifying expression *Allah Akhbar* (God is greatest) signifies both defiance and rejection to Islamist followers.

Source: Burgat, F and Dowell, W., *The Islamic Movement in North Africa*, Austin, Texas: Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Texas at Austin, 1997, pp. 9 -19.

<sup>86</sup> Mishal and Sela, p. 50.

<sup>87</sup> See Appendix A Commitment, for a definition of the 'need to know' philosophy.

<sup>88</sup> The IDF chronology of counter-terrorism operations in the OPT, between 2002 and 2003 indicates approximately 250 Hamas operatives were arrested or killed. The security reports from which these Figures are derived are inconsistent in presentation and lack detail. For example, the roles of most Hamas operatives that are captured are not identified. The capture of a Hamas supporter that works for the welfare apparatus will have a different impact to one who operates in logistics. Moreover, other Figures such as numbers of thwarted attacks appear to link the capture of one Hamas supporter to one attack, which is rather dubious.

Source: Israel Defence Force (IDF) Incident Reports retrieved 2 September 2003, from <http://www.idf.il/newsite/english/dailyevents.stm>

<sup>89</sup> ICT reports for counter-terrorism operations and targeted killings between January 2001 and August 2003 shows approximately 100 Hamas operatives were arrested or killed. The discrepancy with IDF Figures is difficult to quantify (see previous note), however ICT Figures are verified with multiple sources and consequently are used in preference to IDF Figures. Source: International Centre for Terrorism (ICT) Database retrieved 1 September 2003, from [http://www.ict.org.il/casualties\\_project/incidentsearch.cfm](http://www.ict.org.il/casualties_project/incidentsearch.cfm)

of the second *Intifada*<sup>90</sup>. Additionally, ICT Figures show most arrests or fatalities involved leaders identified through intelligence sources, whereas militants were identified through both intercepts and intelligence sources with generally no more than two militants at a time being engaged<sup>91</sup>. Katz comments that the arrest and interrogation of one cell member would only lead to the arrest of the other cell members essentially because they maintained operations within their own enclosed community<sup>92</sup>. Both Katz and Moghadam comment that martyrdom missions in particular utilise strict communications discipline in which each member of the martyrdom cell only interacts with the cell commander<sup>93</sup>. Moreover, low-levels of coercion and Hamas' communications infrastructure reinforce communications discipline.

*Majd* cells act as clear and present deterrents by tracking down and punishing informers. Schbley comments that, '...the culting process of religious terrorism restricts or discourages cell elements' unchaperoned contact with outsiders in order to sustain their indoctrination and maintain their commitment.'<sup>94</sup> In addition, Hamas has instituted a full range of communication methods passing encrypted messages using couriers, multiple drop points and pre-programmed cellular phones, all of which territorially and operationally insulate cell members<sup>95</sup>. Overall, the targeting of operatives rather than whole cells and an entrenched 'need to know' philosophy within the cellular system suggests effective communications discipline at lower levels. Subsequently, when

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<sup>90</sup> While this Figure appears low, the structure of Hamas' cellular system interacting with Israeli counter-terrorism measures tends to favour this causal result. For example, Hamas' tendency for martyrdom attacks reduces the visibility of the cell and only exposes the attack elements at the time of the attack. In other cases, it suggests cell members remained dispersed until it becomes a necessity to re-form. Overall, this would tend to favour leaders and individual militants being targeted by Israeli counter-terrorism measures.

<sup>91</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>92</sup> Katz, p. 35.

<sup>93</sup> Moghadam, p. 86 and Katz, p. 200.

<sup>94</sup> Schbley, A., 'Defining Religious Terrorism: A Causal and Anthological Profile', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 26:2 (2003), pp. 105-134, p. 119.

<sup>95</sup> Eshel, D., 'Israel Hones Intelligence Operations to Counter Intifada', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, October (2002) retrieved 1 May 2003, from <http://jir.janes.com/docs/frp/search.jsp>

considering Israeli success in targeting Hamas leadership the efficacy of the 'need to know' philosophy becomes arguably weaker at higher levels.


## Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for compartmentalization:

1. Leadership flexibility achieved through consultation sustains the *jihad* within Hamas cells, which reinforces solidarity
2. Internal leadership allowed the semi-autonomous operation of Hamas cells following the leadership's target selection. The decentralisation of control for operational purposes generated pride and reinforced solidarity following successful attacks
3. Ineffective over reaction by security forces increases commitment, which increases solidarity
4. Hamas' integration into the Palestinian community produced pockets of popular support, which increased attack effectiveness and reinforced solidarity
5. Recruitment filtering reinforces solidarity through common experience
6. The effectiveness of *majd* cells in disrupting Israeli informer networks helped enforce communications discipline
7. Effective operational intelligence, abundant weaponry and tactical variety increased attack effectiveness, which reinforced solidarity
8. Israeli counter-terrorism measures increased the isolation of cells, which increased solidarity

The compartmentalization of a Hamas cell suggests a well-founded solidarity and entrenched communications discipline reinforced by feedback influences which, primarily through counter-terrorism measures, attack effectiveness and decentralisation of control, adjusts to the changing security environment. Any disciplinary weakness appears somewhat confined to the leadership apparatus. Consequently, the Hamas cell supports a high degree of secrecy and therefore positively influences cell effectiveness to a high degree.





**Figure 24: Hamas Systems Decomposition of Compartmentalization**

## Leadership and Hamas Strongholds

This section primarily examines the leadership's role in determining decentralisation of control (see Figure 25). In addition, selective targeting is examined as a manifestation of the organisation's strategy and subsequently, the survivability of the Hamas cell. These factors focus on leadership influences that shape cell formation and operation, both of which help determine cell effectiveness.

Hamas' four-tier leadership structure suggests a moderate degree of decentralisation of control. Leadership centralisation determines stability and subsequently, the manifestation of ideology into strategy influencing the decentralisation of operational control. Essentially, leadership stability is dependent on leadership proximity to the war-zone and composition.

Hamas' external leadership structure is split between Damascus and Amman<sup>96</sup>. Secondary offices crucial to Hamas operation's are maintained in Tehran and Beirut. Syrian and to a lesser extent Jordanian sponsorship<sup>97</sup> since the mid 1990s allow bases geographically proximate to the OPT, permitting strategic planning and command and control (C<sup>2</sup>) of military and logistical activities to be administered<sup>98</sup>. However, Hamas' external executive committee does not culturally reflect Hamas internally<sup>99</sup>.

Many of Hamas' external leaders are relatively young, liberal professionals with advanced degrees, recruited from outside the organisation<sup>100</sup>. Subsequently, they have deviated to some degree from Yassin's original approach of Islamic revelation to a more revolutionary top-down approach of Islamic reform<sup>101</sup>. Moreover, this difference has been somewhat amplified by their detachment from Palestinian suffering and subsequent difficulty in judging the mood of the Palestinian people<sup>102</sup>. Consequently, both the proximity of external leadership to the OPT and its composition have contributed to a degree of leadership instability leading to some factionalisation<sup>103</sup>. In this sense, Hamas' tier leadership structure has amplified external leadership C<sup>2</sup> issues and the management of strategy.

The Hamas strategy connects abstract beliefs from its religious-nationalist ideology with concrete actions, which influence the continuing degree of decentralisation of control. Hamas' attrition strategy uses controlled violence to

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<sup>96</sup> Alexander, p. 11.

<sup>97</sup> Jordanian sponsorship has been steadily declining since Hamas offices were ordered closed in 1999.

Source: 'Jordan Strikes at Hamas', *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin*, 1:9 (1999) retrieved 1 May 2003, from [http://www.meib.org/articles/9909\\_me2.htm](http://www.meib.org/articles/9909_me2.htm)

<sup>98</sup> Gambill, Internet.

<sup>99</sup> Neusse, p. 22.

<sup>100</sup> Mishal and Sela, p. 161.

<sup>101</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>102</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>103</sup> 'Hamas Divided Against Self', *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin*, 1:6 (1999) retrieved 1 May 2003, from [http://www.meib.org/articles/9906\\_me2.htm](http://www.meib.org/articles/9906_me2.htm)

balance Israeli overreaction with maximising its own popular support base. Controlled violence is determined by the geographical boundaries and targeting direction of the strategy.

Concentrations of Hamas support produce areas of operation, which provide safe havens to house various levels of headquarters for coordinating military operations<sup>104</sup>. However, the boundaries of these areas do not inherently overlap with all areas of operation, such as those in Jerusalem and Israel. Subsequently, the strategic designation of geographical boundaries can influence targeting direction.

Targeting direction sets the tempo of attacks (strategic tempo) using a blend of religious and nationalist influences, which influences the use of rational calculation<sup>105</sup>. Hamas' predilection for controlled violence necessitates a cost benefit analysis regarding targeting decisions<sup>106</sup>. This analysis assesses public mood, political opportunity and the adverse consequences of particular attacks, such as martyrdom operations<sup>107</sup>. For example, the Islamic concept of *sabr* (self-restraint and patience) is used to justify strategic tempo and policy adjustments<sup>108</sup>. Consequently, leadership centralisation, primarily its proximity to the war-zone, and the attrition strategy emphasising controlled violence, are crucial factors for determining the decentralisation of control.

The decentralisation of control correlates to the maintenance of organisational cohesion and flexibility. Mishal and Sela, Gambil, and Kristianasen each

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<sup>104</sup> For example, Gaza refugee camps are considered blind spots for the ISFs because of their violent, overcrowded and economically depressed states and intimate social networks. Source: 'Israel Turns to the Gaza Strip', *Jane's Foreign Report*, October 24 (2002) retrieved 1 May 2003, from <http://frp.janes.com/docs/frp/search.jsp>

<sup>105</sup> Dolnik and Bhattacharjee, p. 125.

<sup>106</sup> O'Brien, K and Lev, I., 'Information Operations and Counterterrorism', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, September (2002) retrieved 1 May 2003, from <http://jir.janes.com/docs/frp/search.jsp>

<sup>107</sup> Dolnik and Bhattacharjee, p. 115.

<sup>108</sup> Mishal and Sela, p. 64.

comment respectively on Hamas' unclear chain of command<sup>109</sup>, the difference in external leadership control between the West Bank and Gaza<sup>110</sup> and regional enclaves of self-rule<sup>111</sup>. These comments suggest a '...diminished ability of Hamas' senior leaders to maintain control over the rank and file...'112. Mishal and Sela list seven leadership directives used to address these issues, which are summarised as follows:

- Local members are encouraged to accept broader responsibilities
- Decisions are driven more by interaction among peers
- Increased horizontal interaction between peers, which includes information gathering and communicating across different local positions
- Commitment to tasks is devolved to the individual rather than the loyalty of the leadership<sup>113</sup>

A significant theme of these characteristics is the consultative nature in which control is applied, which within a climate of regional isolation has heightened the status of local Hamas members<sup>114</sup>. In addition, family and traditional ties and proximity to Mosques<sup>115</sup> combined with a regular turnover of internal leaders<sup>116</sup> has widened the gap between external and internal leadership resulting in local power centres forming<sup>117</sup>. Consequently, local initiatives have sometimes contradicted external leadership direction to ensure local control<sup>118</sup>. However, this trend to local power centres tends to be tactical rather than ideological<sup>119</sup>.

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<sup>109</sup> Mishal and Sela, p. 82.

<sup>110</sup> Gambill, Internet.

<sup>111</sup> Kristianasen, W., 'Challenge and Counterchallenge: Hamas's Response to Oslo', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 28:3 (1999), pp. 19-36, p. 23.

<sup>112</sup> Mishal and Sela, p. 159.

<sup>113</sup> Mishal and Sela, p. 160.

<sup>114</sup> Mishal and Sela, p. 159.

<sup>115</sup> Mishal and Sela, p. 152.

<sup>116</sup> Between January 2001 and August 2003 at least 34 leaders including cell commanders, battalion commanders and senior leaders of the Gaza-West Bank headquarters have been captured or killed by the Israeli Security Forces.

Source: See Appendix B, 3<sup>rd</sup> Search.

<sup>117</sup> Kristianasen, p. 24.

<sup>118</sup> Mishal and Sela, p. 159.

<sup>119</sup> Mishal and Sela, p. 160.

Hamas' internal regional command structures, including the Gaza-West Bank headquarters and their subordinate regional or sector headquarters are the key constructs of power centres, which ultimately decide the decentralisation of control to Hamas cells. Katz comments that, in the case of Martyrdom operations, Damascus transmitted encrypted orders directly to specific regional West Bank headquarters, which then selected an appropriate Hamas cell for the operation<sup>120</sup>. Regional headquarters would, if requested, provide extra logistical supplies such as explosives<sup>121</sup>. Moreover, Katz comments that Ayyash 'the engineer', a battalion commander, would not activate martyrdom operations on his own initiative but '...was permanently at a traffic stop waiting for either the red or green light.' Once given the green light the battalion commander controlled the details of each attack<sup>122</sup>. Therefore, Hamas cells received attack orders and would then act semi-autonomously barring any need for extra logistical support<sup>123</sup>.

Overall, the high degree of operational control devolved to the regional headquarters is summarised as strategic guidance with tactical independence. However, a lesser degree of operational control devolved from regional headquarters to Hamas cells reflects the construct of regional power centres. Logistical coercion and consultations between commanders maintain each layer of control<sup>124</sup>. Overall, external leadership as Gambill comments retains supreme

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<sup>120</sup> Katz, p. 200.

<sup>121</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>122</sup> Kushner, H., 'Suicide Bombers: Business as Usual', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 19:4 (1996), pp. 329-337, p. 334.

<sup>123</sup> There is some reference to Hamas cells operating rogue, however the tactics of Hamas, such as infiltrations, ambushes, rocket attacks and martyrdom operations require specific logistical support which arguably subordinates them to regional and Gaza-West Bank headquarters.

Source: Mishal and Sela, p. 159.

<sup>124</sup> The following summarises Hamas' process of decentralisation of control: Hamas' devolution of control proceeds through three layers of a four-tier leadership structure. The first layer exists between the external and Gaza-West Bank internal leadership. The second layer exists between the Gaza-West Bank leadership and their associated regional commanders. The third layer exists between regional and cell commanders. The devolution of control is premised on attack authorisations. For example, martyrdom operations require authorisation by at least the Gaza-West Bank internal commanders and consultation with external leadership. Mainstream

power through the 'power of the purse', a crucial gambit in securing subordinate control<sup>125</sup>.

Hamas' multiple state sponsors, sympathisers and relationships with foreign and local organisations allow for the exchange of ideas, training, recruitment and attachment to supply sources. However, the forte of Hamas' external leadership is in raising funds from abroad using an extensive network of representatives. For example, representatives maintain links in the United States, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and many other Arab countries<sup>126</sup>. Overall, decentralisation of control generates cohesion, however it also overlaps somewhat with selective targeting and the survivability of the cell.

Targeting limitations govern targeting selection but implicit in the cost-benefit analysis of selection is the attacks ability to compel *jihad* within and outside the organisation. Within this framework, targeting can be categorised into high, low and symbolic levels of profiling.

High profile targeting transmits Hamas' ideological message, demonstrates its commitment and intends to guarantee a disproportionate response. Hamas' high profile targets are groups of Israeli citizens and individual informers. The most precious asset of Israel is its citizens and attacks upon them influence Israeli government programs such as immigration<sup>127</sup>. Since the start of the second *Intifada* Hamas has inflicted approximately 343 Israeli fatalities through direct targeting, with the majority either Israeli citizens or settlers<sup>128</sup>. Martyrdom bombings are responsible for approximately 80 percent of these fatalities<sup>129</sup>. In

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attacks, such as local ambushes, are authorised by regional commanders. The local Hamas cell has some attack autonomy based on regional authorisation for the attack. Both logistical coercion and consultations between commanders maintain these layers.

<sup>125</sup> Gambill, Internet.

<sup>126</sup> Alexander, p. 9.

<sup>127</sup> Hroub, p. 247.

<sup>128</sup> See Appendix B, 1<sup>st</sup> Search.

<sup>129</sup> *ibid*.

contrast, informer complicity in ISF operations, such as targeted killings, produce fear and uncertainty within the organisation threatening its cohesion<sup>130</sup>. A recent study by Radlauer shows that 32 of the 1,900 Palestinian deaths since the start of the second *Intifada* are suspected Palestinian informers<sup>131</sup>.

Low profile targeting through the systematic targeting of Israeli settlers maintains Hamas' strategic tempo and public visibility<sup>132</sup>. Of the 343 Israeli fatalities attributed to Hamas approximately 16 percent were killed in the OPT suggesting settler targets<sup>133</sup>. The nineteen Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip contribute .6 percent (6,900) of the Gaza population whereas in the West Bank, approximately 180 Israeli settlements contribute some ten percent (208,000) to the West Bank population<sup>134</sup>. These targets are the most readily available for Hamas operatives and symbolise short-term objectives that Palestinians can relate too, such as impeding Zionist expansion<sup>135</sup>.

Symbolic targeting projects a message of power to specific audiences. Martyrdom operations targeting Israeli social, leisure and educational facilities, such as malls and nightclubs, send messages of commitment, power and vulnerability to Hamas' Israeli audience and provide inspiration and legitimisation of its cause to its Palestinian audience<sup>136</sup>. Qassam-2<sup>137</sup> rocket attacks on Israeli cities demonstrate Hamas' restrained capabilities through its

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<sup>130</sup> Blanche, E., 'Israel Uses Intifada Informers to Abet Assassination Campaigns', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, December (2001) retrieved 1 May 2003, from <http://jir.janes.com/docs/frp/search.jsp>

<sup>131</sup> Further breakdowns of informers by rejectionist organisation were not provided.

<sup>132</sup> While there are approximately three Israeli soldiers for every four settlers in Gaza, they appear rarely targeted directly. Those that are killed in most cases have initiated action against Hamas. Consequently, they are not included as a low-priority target. Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics - Settlement Statistics retrieved 1 August 2003, from [http://www.pchrgaza.org/Intifada/Settlements\\_stat.htm](http://www.pchrgaza.org/Intifada/Settlements_stat.htm)

<sup>133</sup> Israeli Defence Force (IDF) Official Statistics retrieved 2 September 2003, from [http://www.idf.il/english/news/jump\\_2\\_eng\\_300900.stm](http://www.idf.il/english/news/jump_2_eng_300900.stm)

<sup>134</sup> Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics - Settlement Statistics, Internet.

<sup>135</sup> Hroub, p. 249.

<sup>136</sup> Dolnik and Bhattacharjee, p. 115.

<sup>137</sup> Qassam-II statistics: Range 10-12 Km, 4-6 Kg explosive charge  
Source: Dolnik and Bhattacharjee, p. 116.

long-range threat potential and the organisations ability to innovate technically<sup>138</sup>. Moreover, these attacks also increase Hamas' prestige among the competing rejectionist organisations. Ultimately, symbolic targeting somewhat remedies the diminishing returns of using the same tactics<sup>139</sup>.

## Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for leadership:

1. Local leaders can more accurately assess local conditions by using popular support as a barometer
2. Targeted killings of internal leadership disrupts Hamas both psychologically and operationally (-)

In summary, the internal leadership takes a pragmatic approach whereas the external leadership sets the tone for Hamas strategy to control the violence<sup>140</sup>. Islamic concepts and Hamas' nationalist discourse control the strategy and allow the adjustment of ideological dogma, and incorporate limitations and rationalisations into selective targeting. While counter-terrorism measures disrupt internal leadership to some degree, the organisation's horizontal and regional partitions insulate the various regional power centres from one another. Overall, leadership positively influences cell effectiveness to a high degree.


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<sup>138</sup> Dolnik and Bhattacharjee, p. 117.

<sup>139</sup> Dolnik and Bhattacharjee, p. 114.

<sup>140</sup> Gambill, Internet.





**Figure 25: Hamas Systems Decomposition of Leadership**

## Commitment and Jihad

This section primarily examines the ideology of Hamas and to what extent it translates into commitment (see Figure 26). In this analysis, Hamas' interpretation of *jihad* represents a central motivating factor of cell effectiveness.

Hamas recognises the importance of controlling the use of symbolic rewards to provide justifications for objectives and engender commitment to varying degrees of action<sup>141</sup>. Most rejectionist organisations operating in the OPT maintain the following objectives: the ending of Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and West Bank, an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its

<sup>141</sup> Mishal and Sela, p. 153.

capital and an equitable solution to the Palestinian refugee problem<sup>142</sup>. Hamas to justify these objectives and appeal to a broader audience, incorporates a nationalist discourse into its core Islamic ideology, which defines it as a Palestinian rather than Islamic movement<sup>143</sup>. However, to validate this belief structure, Hamas assimilates many ideas through the Islamisation of the conflict.

Islamisation contextualises ideas in purely Islamic thought<sup>144</sup>. Subsequently, Hamas has been able to incorporate modern western concepts, such as political pluralism, into its discourse using historical manipulation. For example, the role of the Ottoman empire perceived by Arab nationalist historiography as responsible for Arab decline is recast as responsible for the restoration of Islamic political unity and as protection from western encroachment<sup>145</sup>. The theme of foreign conquest persists through the Islamisation of the *Intifada*, which is depicted as a *jihad* and as a last link in a long chain of holy wars for the sake of Islam<sup>146</sup>. By drawing on Islamised images and events from the past Hamas presents a means to understand the religious character of the conflict<sup>147</sup>.

Islamisation is an essential concept viewing Islam as a historical totality that has institutionalised everyday lives producing a natural Islamic identity. The Islamic identity is as Litvak comments, re-contextualised in the struggle against colonisation or the struggle between Islam and Judaism<sup>148</sup>. Subsequently, Hamas' appeal to Palestinian patriotism is extolled as part of the Islamic belief system. Within this religious framework Hamas' interpretation of *jihad* has acted as a clear conduit for its members to express their ideological fervour.

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<sup>142</sup> Strindberg, p. 26.

<sup>143</sup> Litvak, p. 7.

<sup>144</sup> Litvak, p. 4.

<sup>145</sup> Litvak, p. 16.

<sup>146</sup> Litvak, p. 17.

<sup>147</sup> Mishal and Sela, p. 52.

<sup>148</sup> Litvak, p. 4.

The *jihad* is a popular discourse of Hamas' co-founder and spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmad Yassin. Yassin states, 'There is a misconception in the world of the meaning of the word jihad; it comes from juhud and it means effort...I can be a teacher and be practicing jihad, I can be a builder and be practising jihad and I can be a fighter...therefore everything in life is jihad.'<sup>149</sup> In this interpretation of *jihad*, it is a duty devolved upon individual Muslims and consequently, as Yassin continues, '...those who are convinced of his cause – fight with him, those who are not convinced do not. The announcement of jihad is a personal choice.'<sup>150</sup> Hamas preaches *jihad* as a strategy of self-defence in which the defender represents the countries liberator and freedom fighter<sup>151</sup>. The practise of *jihad* therefore equates to varying degrees of commitment, with martyrs symbolising the ultimate sacrifice.

The symbolism associated to martyrs is a visceral symbol in contrast to the secrecy assumed by the cellular system. Klein comments that the Palestinian concept of the martyr is deeply interwoven in its '...ideological framework, which has sustained the Palestinian struggle for national liberation.'<sup>152</sup> For example, Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam's<sup>153</sup> death in 1935 while opposing British and Zionist forces is indicative of the Palestinian martyr signifying political self-sacrifice<sup>154</sup>. However, Klein comments the determination of a martyr is ultimately not decided through self-sacrifice but on the animation of the martyr as a heroic nationalist, which is decided by the personal relationships in which the martyr was embedded<sup>155</sup>. The cellular system limits this interaction.

<sup>149</sup> Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, interviewed by Mariam Shahin, December 2001 retrieved 5 May 2003, from <http://library.massey.ac.nz/findit/databases/databasesaz.htm> (Military and Government Collection)

<sup>150</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>151</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>152</sup> Jean-Klein, I., 'Palestinian Militancy, Martyrdom and Nationalist Communities in the West Bank during the Intifada' in Pettigrew, J (ed.), *Martyrdom and Political Resistance: Essays from Asia and Europe*, Amsterdam, The Netherlands: VU University Press, 1997, pp. 85-110, p. 102.

<sup>153</sup> Hamas' military apparatus is named after Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam, which is significant in its symbolism.

<sup>154</sup> Neusse, p. 85.

<sup>155</sup> Jean-Klein, p. 106.

Consequently, a martyrdom operation provides an event witnessed by the community<sup>156</sup>. The martyr through his act effectively authenticates the community's victimisation, humiliation and resistance to the occupation.

Hamas' nationalist discourse taps into the psyche of humiliation experienced by the Palestinian people using the spectre of Zionist expansion to make clear the hostility and racism of Judaism. Moghadam states, 'Videotapes of suicide bombers, as well as statements of volunteers, living martyrs, or families of suicide bombers clearly suggest that many Palestinians perceive a deep injustice done to them by a "Zionist entity" that deprived Palestinians of their land and continues to deny them a worthy experience on what they regard to be Palestinian soil.'<sup>157</sup> Palestine in this sense represents a *waqf* or inalienable religious endowment validated using Islamisation<sup>158</sup>. Moreover, Palestinian territory represents Palestinian survival as a national identity and becomes an imperative to defend<sup>159</sup>. Consequently, Israeli punitive measures, such as the destruction of houses, become increasingly symbolic and further acts to strengthen commitment.

The aim of Hamas' religious-nationalist ideology is to use symbolic rewards to commit the Palestinian people to its flavour of *jihad*. For example, martyrdom represents '...a transition that will put him [or her] alongside the other heroes of Islam and next to Allah.'<sup>160</sup> Alternatively, the reward may be spiritual satisfaction and fulfilment as a substitute for the inability to self-actualise<sup>161</sup>. The

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<sup>156</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>157</sup> Moghadam, p. 74.

<sup>158</sup> Litvak, p. 12.

<sup>159</sup> Neusse, p. 19.

<sup>160</sup> Kushner, p. 331.

<sup>161</sup> Humanistic psychologists describe the concept of self-actualization as being when people are motivated to grow personally and become all they are capable of becoming. This concept originates from Carl Rogers 1951 'Theory of Self' which among other things suggests, '...we have an ideal self which is the person we would like to be. For most of us there is a gap between the self-concept and the ideal self but we can live with it. For some people, however, the gap between the self-concept and the ideal self is so large that they become very unhappy and may need help.'

manipulability of Hamas' religious core suggests commitment can be broadly re-defined to take advantage of political opportunities. Consequently, the dedication of the Hamas operative extends to martyrdom manifested through political self-sacrifice in most cases<sup>162</sup>.

## Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for commitment:


1. Hamas' strategic tempo and the resulting ineffective overreaction by security forces reinforces the commitment of operatives
2. Decentralisation of control or volition helps justify the act to the operative
3. Selective targeting signifies the importance of the act to the operative reinforcing commitment
4. Hamas manipulates ideology to validate changes in official dogma to sustain popular support while operating within a fluid political environment
5. The process of recruitment determines whether the recruit's level of commitment (*jihad*) correlates to the level of sacrifice expected by the organisation
6. Hamas recruits utilise training processes to gradually increase and/or maintain their level of commitment
7. Tactical variety increases attack effectiveness reinforcing commitment
8. Israeli repressive measures reflect negatively upon the integrity of the Israeli civil and military institutions reinforcing Hamas' belief system

Hamas' belief system is a flexible religious-nationalist ideology. *Jihad* translates the belief system into varying degrees of commitment, which acts to incrementally adjust commitment from uncommitted, to supporter and finally to operative. In addition to *jihad*, strategy and decentralisation of control act to justify various degrees of commitment with the most extreme demonstrations manifesting as martyrdom. Overall, commitment positively influences cell effectiveness to a high degree.

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Source: 'Personality Theories' retrieved 10 May 2003, from [http://www.henley-cov.ac.uk/public/xfiles/general/progarea/Humanities/psychology/webct/gcse/crsnotes/Personality\\_theories.doc](http://www.henley-cov.ac.uk/public/xfiles/general/progarea/Humanities/psychology/webct/gcse/crsnotes/Personality_theories.doc)

<sup>162</sup> Some martyrs may immolate themselves for economic or even pathological reasons. No system of recruitment is foolproof.



**Figure 26: Hamas Systems Decomposition of Commitment**

## Popular Support and Da'wa

This section will primarily examine the extent of Hamas' popular support and how this translates into sanctuaries (see Figure 27). In addition, Hamas' welfare institutions are examined as key factors in generating sanctuaries to maintain cell effectiveness.

Hamas is a religious-nationalist organisation that depends mostly on a single ethnic Arab group and a grass roots social welfare system to generate popular support. Hamas presents itself as a movement for all Palestinian people spread across various social strata from the poor to the middle classes<sup>163</sup>.

<sup>163</sup> Litvak, p. 18.

Hamas uses the concept of *da'wa* or the Islamisation of grass roots Palestinian society, to build home-based local economies through educational and social programs, as a platform to advance its ideology<sup>164</sup>. The grass roots approach targets the poor and weak through funding, education, free medical and social institutions, such as youth clubs<sup>165</sup>. This approach allows Hamas to access vulnerable Palestinian kinship networks<sup>166</sup>. Subsequently, the impoverishment associated with the Gaza Strip has made it the heartland of popular support for Hamas<sup>167</sup>.

Hamas popular support tends to run in cycles. During Hamas' unofficial participation in the 1996 elections it garnered 12 percent of the Palestinian vote. Polls since 1996 have indicated Hamas support varies between 13<sup>168</sup> and 20<sup>169</sup> percent in the OPT or from 400,000 to 640,000 Palestinians<sup>170</sup>. Hamas supporters are Palestinian Islamists who according to Shikaki do not favour the re-interpretation of Islamic law to accomodate contemporary changes<sup>171</sup>. Shikaki states, 'They have no consistant demographic characteristic, even though disproportionately more support for them is found among illiterates and the most educated youth.'<sup>172</sup> However, during 2002 elections at Universities in the OPT Hamas garnered 70 percent support<sup>173</sup>, which is unsurprising considering as Shikaki states, 'Palestinian students like most Arab students tend to be more radical, defending ideals rather than compromises.'<sup>174</sup> Support for Martyrdom operations has ranged from between 20 percent in 1996 to 80

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<sup>164</sup> Mishal and Sela, p. 60.

<sup>165</sup> Alexander, p. 11.

<sup>166</sup> Mishal and Sela, p. 21.

<sup>167</sup> 'Israel Turns to the Gaza Strip', *Jane's Foreign Report*, October (2002) retrieved 1 May 2003, from <http://frp.janes.com/docs/frp/search.jsp>

<sup>168</sup> Kristianasen, p. 34, 25n.

<sup>169</sup> Kushner, p. 332.

<sup>170</sup> Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics - General Statistics, Internet.

<sup>171</sup> Shikaki, K., 'Peace Now or Hamas Later', *Foreign Affairs*, 77:4 (1998), pp. 29-43, p. 32.

<sup>172</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>173</sup> Eshel, *Hamas Resists*, p. 15.

<sup>174</sup> Shikaki, p. 32.

percent approval in 2002<sup>175</sup>. Dolnik and Bhattacharjee note the average rate is between 35 and 40 percent<sup>176</sup>. Shikaki comments that from 1994 to 1996 opposition to terrorism increased in line with increased suicide bombings, however the Oslo peace process during this period had a significant influence on how Palestinians interpreted these attacks<sup>177</sup>. Consequently, while suicide bombings may influence Hamas' support, its integration into the Palestinian community has been sufficient to generate Hamas sanctuaries.

Sanctuaries reduce the operational need for resources, provide rest and recuperation zones, and safe havens for training. Hamas' predilection for grass roots reformation managed through its regional network of commands have predisposed the organisation to developing concentrations of support throughout both Gaza and the West Bank. For example, Katz comments on Bir Naballah in the Gaza Strip being a Hamas stronghold with relation to safe houses<sup>178</sup>. The regional assignment of Hamas' military apparatus gives some sense of these strongholds (see previous discussion on actors). However, a stronghold's construction rather than applying to entire neighbourhoods, districts, refugee camps, villages and towns, can arguably be applied more specifically to the social networks spreading out from sympathetic institutions such as Mosques<sup>179</sup>. In addition to internal sanctuaries, an external safe haven operates in the Beqa Valley of Syrian controlled Eastern Lebanon providing Hamas operatives access to Hizbullah and PFLP-GC training camps<sup>180</sup>.

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<sup>175</sup> Dickey, C, Ephron, D, Barry, J, Hosenball, M and Isikoff, M., 'Inside Suicide Inc.', *Newsweek*, April 15 (2002) retrieved 2 May 2003, from <http://library.massey.ac.nz/findit/databases/databasesaz.htm> (Military and Government Collection)

<sup>176</sup> Dolnik and Bhattacharjee, p. 114.

<sup>177</sup> Shikaki, p. 35.

<sup>178</sup> Katz, p. 135.

<sup>179</sup> Mishal and Sela, p. 20.

<sup>180</sup> Ehrlich, R., 'State-Sponsored Terrorism: Terrorism as a Preferred Instrument of Syrian Policy' in *ICT Papers on Terrorism*, Herzliya, Israel: The International Policy Institute for Counter-terrorism, 2002, pp. 33-45, p. 40.



## Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for popular support:

1. Selective targeting increases the prestige of Hamas
2. The unpredictability of martyrdom attacks results in some degree of instability among Hamas' supporter base (-)
3. Hamas' translation of ideology into political, military and social policies sustains but does not tend to increase popular support
4. Logistics is fundamentally crucial to the funding of the *da'wa*
5. Hamas' success at carrying out attacks increases its prestige amongst competing influences for popular support
6. Repressive counter-terrorism measures ensures continued support for Hamas

In summary, the composition of Hamas is a reflection of the popular support generated from tapping into vulnerable local social networks through its welfare institutions. This encourages the effective integration of community and operative, and improves the understanding of selective targeting. The effectiveness of this integration and the legitimisation of the organisation are representative of the availability of sanctuaries and Hamas strongholds. While the tendency of Hamas support tends towards stagnancy, it retains a core support base for Hamas cells to operate effectively. Consequently, popular support positively influences cell effectiveness to a moderate degree.

## Recruitment and Martyrdom

This section examines Hamas' recruitment process, particularly its situational and character filtering mechanism (see Figure 27). In addition, Hamas' attrition rate will be analysed to gain some sense of filtering with regards recruitment rate.

The situational filtering and character identification mechanism identifies recruits with common experiences. The majority of Hamas operatives are Sunni Muslims of Arab descent<sup>181</sup>. They displayed the following three main situational and character markers; Palestinian nationalism, impoverishment and an affinity

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<sup>181</sup> Mishal and Sela, p. 169.

with martyrdom.

Associated with Palestinian nationalism is humiliation symbolised by repression, an inability to self-actualise and ideological radicalism. The violence experienced by Palestinians from childhood through to adulthood, either verbal or physical at roadblocks, checkpoints or through protests develops a common background of repression<sup>182</sup>. Protests in particular are omnipresent in the OPT.

Since the start of the second *Intifada* of the 1,900 Palestinian fatalities, most have been male (95 percent) non-combatant fatalities (16 percent) concentrated among teenagers and young adults between 11 and 29 years of age<sup>183</sup>. Radlauer comments these deaths result from '...an active Palestinian indoctrination campaign glorifying "martyrdom" – effectively encouraging boys and young men to confront Israeli forces and risk death even when there is no real likelihood of causing material harm to Israelis.'<sup>184</sup> While Radlauer's comments are arguable<sup>185</sup>, they nevertheless suggest a protest cycle beginning from a young age, which further accentuates exposure to repression. In contrast, the inability to self-actualise and ideological radicalism are self-apparent within tertiary institutions and professional organisations.

Hamas receives strong support from University students, as well as from professionals, including lawyers and engineers<sup>186</sup>. Schbley identified most Shi'a religious terrorists did not come from impoverished origins but '...are by-products of migration of middle and lower middle-class college bound high achievers into economically stagnant urban slums.'<sup>187</sup> Therefore, students and

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<sup>182</sup> Moghadam, p. 74.

<sup>183</sup> Radlauer, D., 'The al-Aqsa Intifada – An Engineered Tragedy' retrieved 1 August 2003, from <http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articleDet.cfm?articleid=440>

<sup>184</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>185</sup> Radlauer's comments are arguable because it is difficult to confirm any formal indoctrination campaign for young males by any rejectionist organisation. However, these activities do suggest the beginnings of a martyrdom complex for young Palestinian males.

<sup>186</sup> Mishal and Sela, p. 23.

<sup>187</sup> Schbley, p. 119.

professionals in the OPT become ideal recruitment candidates. For example, Alexander comments on Hamas' penchant to recruit from Universities, especially students in their twenties completing studies in electronics or chemistry<sup>188</sup>. Universities in Syria, Yemen, Sudan and other Arab countries have also become recruiting centres for Hamas, which suggests that the ideological radicalism of these environments makes ideal recruitment incubators<sup>189</sup>. While Palestinian nationalism generates recruits from broad backgrounds and locations, impoverishment in the OPT ensures a steady stream of recruits.

The numbers of refugee camps and urban slums in the OPT integrated with Hamas' welfare institutions facilitate recruitment conduits. Both high unemployment rates and levels of poverty<sup>190</sup> increase disillusionment, which according to Schbley increases their affinity to fundamentalism<sup>191</sup>. Invariably, Israeli closures that quarantine areas of the OPT, ultimately become incubators for recruitment. Consequently, the denser, violent, more economically distressed and religious nature of Gaza makes it a centre for Hamas recruitment<sup>192</sup>. In addition, refugee camps located in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon act as recruitment incubators<sup>193</sup>. While impoverished areas become attractive locations for recruitment, a pre-requisite for Hamas recruits is an affinity for martyrdom.

Schbley comments that religious terrorists are risk takers and have an affinity for martyrdom<sup>194</sup>. Hamas recruits willingly join the organisation; tend to be

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<sup>188</sup> Alexander, p. 11.

<sup>189</sup> Ehrlich, p. 40.

<sup>190</sup> In Gaza, 81 percent of Palestinians live below the international poverty line of two dollars per day.

Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics – Closures, Unemployment and Poverty Statistics, Internet.

<sup>191</sup> Schbley, p. 120.

<sup>192</sup> Katz, p. 65.

<sup>193</sup> Alexander, p. 11.

<sup>194</sup> Schbley, p. 120.

educated and militant with varying degrees of zealousness<sup>195</sup>. Education and zealousness appear as two crucial identifying features, which determine whether the candidate trains as a living martyr or mainstream Hamas operative.

Potential martyrs are selected from outside the organisation on an as needed basis<sup>196</sup>. Hamas recruiters look for devout Muslims with the mental capacity to carry out the act<sup>197</sup>. For example, Kushner comments that the subject of dying for Allah is raised to potential martyrs and the reactions observed<sup>198</sup>. Schbley's study indicates Shi'as with a high school education and high-degree of zealousness are the most willing to commit martyrdom<sup>199</sup>. Schbley identifies religious terrorists with a college education as possessing the least affinity for martyrdom<sup>200</sup>. Additionally, they may lack psychiatric disorders, which Schbley suggests may be a causal factor in the transition between zealousness and self-immolation<sup>201</sup>. The overall recruitment process comprises two-phases involving filtering and contact.

Regional recruiters identify Hamas candidates using particular situational and character markers as either potential martyrs or mainstream Hamas recruits<sup>202</sup>. Background checks screen the recruit for Israeli connections before he proceeds to either martyrdom or mainstream supervised training<sup>203</sup>. The filtering and contact phases of recruitment optimises numbers in order to manage the recruitment rate. Eshel estimates there are approximately 150 Hamas operatives active in the Gaza Strip<sup>204</sup>. A similar number seems likely in the West

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<sup>195</sup> Schbley, p. 119.

<sup>196</sup> Moghadam, p. 68.

<sup>197</sup> Moghadam, p. 83.

<sup>198</sup> Kushner, p. 333.

<sup>199</sup> Schbley, p. 114.

<sup>200</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>201</sup> Schbley, p. 120.

<sup>202</sup> Mishai and Sela, p. 78.

<sup>203</sup> Katz, p. 35.

<sup>204</sup> Eshel, *Hamas Resists*, p. 14.

Bank<sup>205</sup>. Consequently, the broad situational targeting of Palestinian recruits brings into Hamas' military apparatus a range of organisational and technical skills, and varying levels of zealotry representing an extreme and broad collective unit of Palestinian society, which shares basic knowledge and values that self-identifies with the disenfranchised Palestinian society.

## Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for recruitment:

1. Symbolic targeting increases Hamas' prestige
2. The recruit's affiliation to martyrdom is an indication of the recruits degree of commitment (*jihad*)
3. Hamas' social integration into impoverished areas generates a constant flow of recruits
4. *Majd* cells provide background security checks on new recruits
5. Tactical variety increases attack effectiveness producing and attracting recruits
6. The recruit's affiliation with martyrdom negates survivability issues associated with counter-terrorism measures increasing the recruitment rate

In summary, the effectiveness of Hamas' recruitment process derives from its capacity to sustain its attrition rate. This requires measuring the replacement rate of volunteers exiting the organisation, which is somewhat problematic to calculate<sup>206</sup>. However, exit through death appears to be more common versus capture and imprisonment. Of 35 Hamas targeted counter-terrorism operations documented by ICT between 2000 and 2003, approximately 48 Hamas operatives were killed and seven captured<sup>207</sup>. Moreover, of approximately 30 Hamas initiated non-suicide attacks for the same period there were approximately 18 Hamas fatalities<sup>208</sup>. These casualties represent in most cases mainstream Hamas operatives versus martyrs but lack detained, imprisoned

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<sup>205</sup> Numbers of Hamas operatives in the West Bank were not readily available. However, the West Bank's division into eight regional zones would require at least eight five person cells, then a similar number for logistical purposes and additional Hamas operatives to staff the regional leadership positions. Consequently, the number of West Bank operatives would at a minimum number 100.

<sup>206</sup> The intent of this calculation is to gain some sense of the efficacy of the recruitment process. Available data does not allow a more accurate calculation.

<sup>207</sup> See Appendix B, 2<sup>nd</sup> Search.

<sup>208</sup> See Appendix B, 1<sup>st</sup> Search.

and retired Hamas operatives<sup>209</sup>. However, recognising the expediency of Hamas' two-phase recruitment process and its capacity to generate recruits one can sense that its attrition rate is sustainable. Consequently, recruitment positively influences cell effectiveness to a high degree.

## Training and the Beqa Valley

This section will examine Hamas' formal and ongoing informal training processes (see Figure 27). In addition, attack success rate will be used to assess the effectiveness of these processes. This analysis will show that training reflects operational survivability, which contributes to cell effectiveness.

Formal training for Hamas recruits consists of separate training programs for mainstream and martyrdom recruits. Mainstream recruits have predominantly utilised Hizbullah and PFLP-GC training camps in the Syrian controlled Beqa valley of Eastern Lebanon<sup>210</sup>. These camps are easily accessible to Hamas recruits recruited in Syria and Lebanon but require Hamas trainees from the OPT to infiltrate into Syria through Jordan<sup>211</sup>. Individual training programs are set up for Hamas trainees<sup>212</sup> teaching tactics, explosives manufacture, communications and counter-intelligence activities<sup>213</sup>. However, it is arguable whether all mainstream Hamas recruits need to undergo this formal training process.

Hamas carries out informal training, including the teaching of bomb-making skills. For example, Katz comments that Ayyash 'the engineer' taught Hamas

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<sup>209</sup> The only Figures that could be found of Hamas captures were from IDF reports and as previously mentioned these Figures are somewhat dubious and most likely represent supporters outside of the military apparatus.

<sup>210</sup> Ehrlich, p. 40.

<sup>211</sup> Gambill, Internet.

<sup>212</sup> Mishal and Sela, p. 158.

<sup>213</sup> Ehrlich, p. 40.

operatives bomb-making and target selection skills<sup>214</sup>. In addition, the continued ideological indoctrination of operatives is likely sustained through regular prayer, via the attendance at local Mosques whose sermons reflect the mood on the street. In contrast to mainstream recruits, the grooming of martyrdom recruits takes place through intensive local training programs.

Formal martyrdom training programs consist of repeating cycles of religious and anti-Israeli indoctrination combined with tasks that continually test the trainee's commitment. This cycle continues over several weeks or months depending on the urgency of the attack<sup>215</sup>. During this process, a spiritual trainer oversees the trainee's progress<sup>216</sup>. According to Moghadam, classes involve three distinct phases: the glorification of martyrdom by emphasising the benefits of the afterlife; the assignment of tasks to test commitment, such as delivering weapons; and a process of cleansing, such as fasting<sup>217</sup>. By using religious justifications, peer pressure and points of no return, the act is justified and the trainee psychologically prepared for the eventual operation<sup>218</sup>. Moreover, trainees receive operational skills training, including counter-forensic techniques, infiltration and target acquisition<sup>219</sup>. For example, Blanche comments on suicide bombers removing labels from clothes and scraping skin from their fingertips<sup>220</sup>.

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<sup>214</sup> Katz, p. 186.

<sup>215</sup> Moghadam, p. 84.

<sup>216</sup> Butler, L., 'Suicide Bombers Dignity, Despair, and the Need for Hope: An Interview with Eyad El Sarraj, *Journal of Palestinian Studies*, 31:4 (2001), pp. 71-76, p. 333.

<sup>217</sup> Moghadam, p. 84.

<sup>218</sup> Moghadam, p. 85.

<sup>219</sup> Katz, p. 186.

<sup>220</sup> Blanche, Internet.

## Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for training:

1. Foreign relationships have added to Hamas' knowledgebase
2. Commitment (*jihad*) is developed during the formal training of living martyrs and continued informal training of mainstream Hamas recruits
3. Sanctuaries located within Hamas strongholds and in the Beqa valley are crucial for training

In summary, training produces high initiation and exit costs. The process of training living-martyrs and mainstream operatives gradually abdicates responsibility for the act from the organisation to the individual. While it is relatively difficult to determine the effectiveness of Hamas training, ICT reports show approximately 25 percent of Hamas' operations were intercepted between January 2001 and August 2003<sup>221</sup>. Of these, just one living martyr was shown as intercepted from at least 31 martyrdom operations<sup>222</sup>. Moreover, 12 bombmaking accidents were indicated for the same period<sup>223</sup>. The apparent skill of bomb makers and the success of Hamas operations in general suggests both formal and informal training have contributed to a technically and operationally proficient organisation. Overall, the training component positively influenced cell effectiveness to a high degree.

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<sup>221</sup> See Appendix B, 2<sup>nd</sup> Search.

<sup>222</sup> This Figure might be low however considering the nature of suicide bombers, capturing them is problematic. This Figure was based on data retrieved from the 2<sup>nd</sup> Search in Appendix B.

<sup>223</sup> See Appendix B, 4<sup>th</sup> Search.






Figure 27: Hamas Decomposition of Organisational Formation

## Logistics and Attrition

This section examines the extent of supply sources in Hamas' logistics apparatus (see Figure 28). This analysis will show that these supply sources ultimately determine the utility of the strategy and capacity of the cell to remain effective long-term.

Hamas is a high-cost organisation that essentially reflects an internal infrastructure based on social institutions with supply networks supported by a local terrorism industry. Hamas' budget is estimated at between US \$30 million<sup>224</sup> and US \$70 million annually<sup>225</sup>. Eshel comments that between 80 and 90 percent of funding is invested in social services, with the remaining 10 to 20 percent expended on military services, including recruitment<sup>226</sup>.

Funding for the military apparatus sustains the logistical network, including costs associated with maintaining weapons factories and smuggling routes. Eshel comments that the al-Aqsa Brigade's outlay for setting up a weapons factory was approximately US \$100,000 with monthly running costs estimated at US \$15,000 per month<sup>227</sup>. There is some indication such factories supply other rejectionist organisations<sup>228</sup>. These costs arguably translate to Hamas weapons factories producing anything from suicide belts to Qassam-2 rockets<sup>229</sup>. In addition to home-built weaponry, weapons are routinely smuggled into Gaza through tunnels.

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<sup>224</sup> Dolnik and Bhattacharjee, p. 125.

<sup>225</sup> Kushner, p. 333.

<sup>226</sup> Eshel, D., 'The Battle for Jenin', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, July (2002) retrieved 1 May 2003, from <http://jir.janes.com/docs/frp/search.jsp>

<sup>227</sup> Eshel, D., 'The rise and fall of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, June (2002) retrieved 1 May 2003, from <http://jir.janes.com/docs/frp/search.jsp>

<sup>228</sup> Eshel, The Battle for Jenin, Internet.

<sup>229</sup> Dolnik and Bhattacharjee comment that suicide belts can be built for approximately US \$150 each, which makes the cost-effectiveness per casualty quite effective.

Source: Dolnik and Bhattacharjee, p. 113.

An IDF report details the businesslike nature of these tunnels, usually run by syndicates or families, built underneath houses and charging by the person or weapon for their use. For example, to smuggle a person between Egypt and Gaza costs US \$1,000<sup>230</sup>. To maintain Hamas' cost intensive infrastructure Hamas employs multiple external sources for both fund raising and weaponry purchases.

Most Hamas funding derives from non-governmental organisations, such as Islamic charities, and state sponsored donations. Dolnik and Bhattacharjee comment that of Hamas' annual US \$30 million budget 40 percent of donations originate from Arab nations, 20 percent from the OPT, 10 percent from Iran, 10-15 percent from the U.S and 15 – 20 percent from other countries.<sup>231</sup> Charity is an obligatory pillar of Islam allowing funding to be sourced worldwide. For example, principle state sponsors include Syria and Iran with others including Jordan and Saudi Arabia mentioned, but less extensively<sup>232</sup>.

Internal weapons factories and external sources are the principal sources of weaponry for Hamas. IDF reports describe uncovered weapons factories and smaller labs producing mortar bombs, Qassam rockets, Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG) and explosives<sup>233</sup>. Hamas or its weapons suppliers are technically innovative. For example, martyrdom bombs have ranged from bombs carried in duffle bags to backpacks to explosive belts with switches concealed in pockets and trouser legs. Moreover, Hamas locally produces explosives, such as triacetone triperoxide (TATP) used in the first generation of

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<sup>230</sup> Israeli Defence Force (IDF) Incident Reports, 'I.D.F Forces Uncover 2 Tunnels Used for Weapons Smuggling' retrieved 2 September 2003, from <http://www.idf.il/newsite/english/036.stm>

<sup>231</sup> Dolnik and Bhattacharjee, p. 125.

<sup>232</sup> Front companies transfer money using the internet, traditional banking methods, couriers or the *Hawala* system into local West Bank and Gaza bank accounts.

Source: Eshel, The Battle for Jenin, Internet.

<sup>233</sup> Israeli Defence Force (IDF) Incident Reports retrieved 2 September 2003, from <http://www.idf.il/newsite/english/dailyevents.stm>

martyrdom bombs<sup>234</sup>. However, it is somewhat unstable. For example, Jackson comments that 37 per-cent of all fatalities from homemade explosives are the bomb-makers themselves<sup>235</sup>. This problem is somewhat rectified by importing explosives, such as C-4, RDX and Semtex<sup>236</sup>. Consequently, imported weaponry remains a crucial factor in Hamas' armed struggle.

Weapons are mostly imported from bordering countries and state sponsors, such as Syria and Iran. The Gaza Strip and West Bank each have their own smuggling characteristics, with Gaza utilising underground tunnels on the Egyptian border and sea routes<sup>237</sup>. Moreover, within the OPT innovative solutions are necessary to transport and store weapons, for example the transporting of suicide belts in paint cans or storage of weaponry in washing machines and Mosques<sup>238</sup>. The recent Israeli West Bank Operation 'Defensive Shield' (28/03/02-17/04/02) to dismantle terrorist infrastructures gives some sense of available weaponry. The operation uncovered nearly 2,000 Kalshnikov rifles, 23 weapons labs, six mortars, 93 heavy machine guns, 49 RPGs, nightvision equipment and various other rifles and pistols<sup>239</sup>. Overall, Hamas is well financed and well supplied.

## Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for logistics:

1. Hamas' attrition strategy establishes attainable logistical requirements
2. Various foreign relationships have to some degree insulated supply chains from interdiction
3. The military apparatus' cellular system reduces overhead

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<sup>234</sup> Eshel, The rise and fall, Internet.

<sup>235</sup> Jackson, B., 'Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment Informed by Lessons from Private Sector Technology Adoption', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 24:3 (2001), pp. 183-213, p. 198.

<sup>236</sup> Eshel, The Rise and Fall, Internet.

<sup>237</sup> Gambill, Internet.

<sup>238</sup> Israel Defence Force (IDF) Incident Reports, Internet.

<sup>239</sup> Israel Defence Force (IDF) Official Statistics retrieved 2 September 2003, from [http://www.idf.il/english/news/jump\\_2\\_eng\\_300900.stm](http://www.idf.il/english/news/jump_2_eng_300900.stm)

4. The attrition rate of internal supply chains by the ISF disrupts Hamas' logistics apparatus (-)

In summary, the ISF interdiction of supply chains keeps sustained pressure on Hamas' internal logistics apparatus. However, Hamas' internal self-sufficiency via weapons factories, multiple land and sea supply chains and extensive foreign relationships provide a sufficient replacement rate to sustain its strategy. The abundance of arms uncovered during Operation 'Defensive Shield' reflects this state. Overall, the logistics component positively influenced the attack component to a high degree.

### Intelligence and Dual-Use Cells

This section examines Hamas' counter-intelligence capability and capacity to produce well-developed operational intelligence (see Figure 28). This analysis will examine intelligence as an integral component in implementing Hamas' attrition strategy and maintaining the long-term effectiveness of the cell.

The *majd* counter-intelligence apparatus is a continuance of the MB's security section formed in 1983<sup>240</sup>. It operates within Hamas under its own command apparatus, gathering information on suspected informers in addition to performing religious policing duties<sup>241</sup>. During the first *Intifada*, at which time Israel had an extensive informer network in the OPT; Blanche comments that 900 out of approximately 2,000 Palestinians killed were executed as suspected informers<sup>242</sup>. In contrast, operational intelligence gathering is performed by both dual-role and specialised Hamas cells.

The highly policed and monitored environs of the OPT, Jerusalem and Israel render attack preparations highly problematic. Attack rehearsal's are risky in the

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<sup>240</sup> Munazzamar al-jihad wal-da'wa -The organisation of *Jihad* and *Da'wa*.

Source: Hroub, p. 40.

<sup>241</sup> Mishal and Sela, p. 156.

<sup>242</sup> Blanche, Internet.

OPT and in the case of attacks into Israel, virtually impossible<sup>243</sup>. Subsequently, as Eshel states, ' Hamas preparatory intelligence is also highly developed and careful surveillance of selected objectives is conducted prior to sending suicide squads to their designated targets.'<sup>244</sup> Katz also comments on the use of Palestinian menial labourers working in Israeli cities or settlements for information gathering. For example, within Israel these intelligence cells might gather information on the web of neighbourhood buses, documenting security strengths and weaknesses<sup>245</sup>. In contrast, information gathering in the OPT is regional and carried out most likely by strike cells with a familiarity of local terrain<sup>246</sup>.

## Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for intelligence:

1. Integration into Palestinian society improved Hamas' intelligence gathering capability

In summary, *majd* cells provide a protective counter-terrorism screen. Their effectiveness during the first *Intifada* somewhat suggests their efficacy<sup>247</sup>. In contrast, the use of dual-role strike cells in intelligence roles as well as the use of specialised intelligence cells produces highly developed operational intelligence. The highly successful infiltration rate into Israel and settlements by Hamas operatives is typical of Hamas' proficient intelligence gathering capability<sup>248</sup>. Overall, intelligence positively influenced the attack component to a high degree.

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<sup>243</sup> Moghadam, p. 86.

<sup>244</sup> Eshel, *Hamas Resists*, p. 14.

<sup>245</sup> Katz, p. 149.

<sup>246</sup> Eshel, *Israel Hones*, Internet.

<sup>247</sup> Additional information could not be found regarding the counter-intelligence aspect of the Hamas apparatus to comment further.

<sup>248</sup> See Appendix B, 1<sup>st</sup> Search.

## Attacks and Martyrdom

This section will primarily examine the doctrine of Hamas to give some sense of attack effectiveness (see Figure 28). This analysis will identify the tactical variety that the Hamas cell employs, which is a crucial determinant in mitigating risk and sustaining cell effectiveness.

Hamas' attrition strategy maintains the following key themes: to cause overreaction through selective targeting and to magnify the actual sense of individual insecurity. In order to meet these objectives the following three common attack patterns provide a sense of Hamas' doctrine<sup>249</sup>:

- Hit and run, and disengagement tactics
- The manipulation of stand-off range
- Firepower superiority

Hit and run tactics consists of approach, attack and escape phases utilising caution and surprise to ensure a rapid engagement and exit. IDF statistics show shootings, drive-by-shootings, shootings at vehicles from an ambush and shootings at towns and villages have accounted for approximately 30 percent of all Israeli fatalities since the start of the second *Intifada*<sup>250</sup>. Martyrdom bombings represent approximately 57 percent of the remaining fatalities<sup>251</sup>. ICT statistics show that between September 2000 and September 2003 approximately 20 percent of all Hamas attacks were classified as ambushes and another 16 percent as infiltrations<sup>252</sup>. During the approach phase the need for caution is paramount in view of the security force presence in the OPT.

Hit and run operations use local familiarity with terrain for infiltration and evasion purposes, and surprise in time and location to carry out ambushes on vehicles

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<sup>249</sup> These common attack patterns are based on attacks extracted from ICT reports. See Appendix B for an analysis of these attacks.

<sup>250</sup> Israel Defence Force (IDF) Official Statistics, Internet.

<sup>251</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>252</sup> See Appendix B, 1<sup>st</sup> Search.

and infiltration of settlements<sup>253</sup>. The topography and demographic conditions of both the West bank and Gaza Strip tend to favour cellular based operations, especially when contemplating approach routes and runbacks<sup>254</sup>. The use of remote controlled roadside charges to disable vehicles followed by armed attacks, shooting ambushes on vehicles while in transit and the infiltration of settlements are regularly used tactics by rejectionist organisations in the OPT<sup>255</sup>. Hit and run tactics exploit the weaknesses of the security forces within the strike cell's area of operation, however economy in attack authorisations is a crucial operational control feature to ensure strategic maintenance.

Disengagement by Hamas strike cells is recognition by commanders of the sustained threat conditions imposed by Israeli counter-terrorism measures. Katz describes disengagement as a tactic to buy time, cache weapons and gather intelligence<sup>256</sup>. Disengagement economises the exposure of Hamas cells to continuing threats and allows certain logistical activities to keep up with the strategic tempo. Ultimately, this tactic prolongs the longevity of the strike cells.

The manipulation of standoff range determines the engagement range, which correlates to the degree of threat and resources allocated to the operation. Hamas predominantly uses close-in tactics of which martyrdom operations have accounted for at least 50 percent of all attacks<sup>257</sup>. These are high risk, low resource operations dependent on highly developed intelligence to mitigate risk during the approach and attack phases. Crucial during the approach phase is the infiltration of the target, such as an Israeli settlement or city.

Infiltration requires the living-martyr not draw attention. Disguises, including dressing as religious Jews or IDF soldiers are common means of urban

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<sup>253</sup> Eshel, Israel Hones, Internet.

<sup>254</sup> Eshel, Israel Hones, Internet.

<sup>255</sup> Israeli Defence Force (IDF) Official Statistics, Internet.

<sup>256</sup> Katz, p. 128.

<sup>257</sup> See Appendix B, 1<sup>st</sup> Search.



camouflage<sup>258</sup>. In addition, a by-product from the living-martyr's psychological training is an outward appearance described by Schbley as Serene Disengagement (SD). Schbley describes indicators of SD as, '...a faint smile, distant look, lack of eye contact with the interviewers, submissive body posture, slow reaction, and what appears to be contentment or inner peace.'<sup>259</sup> This appearance removes suspicion from the living martyr during the infiltration phase of the operation.

The attack phase consists of target acquisition, then execution. During this phase the living martyr is completely autonomous so that if '...they meet unexpected protective measures on the initially designated target they can change locations in favour of a less well defended point.'<sup>260</sup> Martyrdom operations have favoured targeting transport, businesses and entertainment facilities with approximately 60 percent of attacks occurring at bus stops or on buses<sup>261</sup>. In contrast to martyrdom attacks, rocket attacks on Israeli cities and settlements dominate high-end standoff range tactics<sup>262</sup>. However, these tactics, which also includes some time-controlled bombings, account for only nine percent of all Hamas attacks<sup>263</sup>.

Firepower superiority contributes to mitigating the security force and settler threat. Attack weaponry has included various combinations of RPGs, grenades, Kalashnikov rifles and pistols<sup>264</sup>. However, selective targeting and combinations of hit and run tactics also allows surprise and initiative contributing to mitigating responses by armed settlers or off-duty military personnel.

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<sup>258</sup> Katz, p. 198.

<sup>259</sup> Schbley, p. 117.

<sup>260</sup> Eshel, D., 'Israel Refines its Pre-emptive Approach to Counterterrorism', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, September (2002) retrieved 1 May 2003, from <http://jir.janes.com/docs/frp/search.jsp>

<sup>261</sup> See Appendix B, 1<sup>st</sup> Search.

<sup>262</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>263</sup> *ibid.*


<sup>264</sup> Based on the examination of Hamas attack data in Appendix B, 1<sup>st</sup> Search.

## Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for attacks:

1. A high degree of compartmentalization (secretly) increased attack effectiveness
2. The safety of the Hamas operative is inherent in the targeting of civilians and in keeping with its attrition strategy, which increases long-term attack effectiveness
3. The *jihad* justifies the act as a personal duty
4. Palestinian popular support provides varying degrees of operational support
5. Training provides Hamas operatives with survivability skills applicable to Hamas' doctrine increasing attack effectiveness
6. The sustained pressure of Israeli counter-terrorism measures increases the complexity of Hamas operations reducing the number of attacks and/or increasing their reliance on martyrdom tactics (-)

In summary, the success of an attack qualifies its repeated use as a traditional tactic. These offensive tactics consist of combinations of infiltrations, ambushes and martyrdom attacks, in addition to defensive tactics, such as disengagement. Non-traditional tactics tend to carry an increased risk, require more resources and in some cases offer poor exposure. These tactics have consisted of rocket attacks, stand-alone bombings and vehicular hit and run attacks. However, counter-terrorism measures have increased the complexity of Hamas operations, which can arguably explain Hamas' predilection for martyrdom operations. Subsequently, the tactics employed by Hamas suggest a moderate degree of tactical variety with a high degree of attack effectiveness. Overall, attack effectiveness positively influenced cell effectiveness to a high degree.



**Figure 28: Hamas Systems Decomposition of Operational Patterns**

## Counter-Terrorism and HUMINT

This section will describe the central counter-terrorism measures used by Israel's Security Forces (see Figure 29). This analysis will develop Israel's counter-terrorism framework in order to show the effectiveness of intelligence gathering mechanisms used in disrupting the effectiveness of Hamas cells.

Israel's military led offensive counter-terrorism strategy uses a doctrine of pre-emption anchored by timely and highly accurate intelligence. Control of counter-terrorism measures exists at legal, political and military levels. Legislation and supreme court control provides a framework to sanction particular counter-terrorism measures, including administrative detentions<sup>265</sup> and interrogations. Israel uses multiple coordinated information gathering mechanisms to produce timely and accurate intelligence.

Information gathering comprises several essential intelligence assets including, HUMINT sources, Interrogation, Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and forensics. Israel's policy of targeted killings is a measure of the efficacy of these methods. In order to coordinate Israel's internal intelligence gathering mechanisms they have been centralised around the four following security force agencies<sup>266</sup>: the Israeli Security Agency (ISA), IDF military intelligence (*Aman*), IDF Field Intelligence Corp (FIC) and the National Police and Border Guard units.

The lead intelligence agency in the Palestinian conflict is the ISA also known as Shin Bet (*Sherut ha-Bitachon ha-Klali*). This agency provides internal security

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<sup>265</sup> State of Israel Ministry of Justice, 'The Legal Framework for the Use of Administrative Detention as a Means of Combating Terrorism' retrieved 2 August 2003, from <http://www.dci-pal.org/publications/a01/section2.pdf>

<sup>266</sup> There is little confirmed data regarding Israeli's intelligence agencies and how they operate. Consequently, this research, attempts to give some sense of their effectiveness using documented counter-terrorism operations.

and intelligence within Israel and the OPT<sup>267</sup>. Israeli Defence Force intelligence (*Aman*) comprises military research and military collection departments. Military research is responsible for national intelligence estimates, such as targeting<sup>268</sup>. Military collection operates ELINT and SIGINT sources, collected by an Air force intelligence branch (*Shaldag – Kingfisher*)<sup>269</sup>. The FIC is the IDF's main intelligence gathering department and has several specialised units, including the *Mista'arvim* formations, which carry out deep insertion operations in coordination with Shin Bet or the IDF<sup>270</sup>, and the GHQ reconnaissance unit (*Sayeret Matkal*), which is a specialised IDF counter-terrorism force<sup>271</sup>.

The National Police and Border Guard units provide both an overt patrol presence and additionally operate covert units. The Border Guard operates the *Yamam*, a minority recruited counter-terrorism unit<sup>272</sup>. The National Police operate the *Matilan*, which specialises in surveillance around the perimeter of Jerusalem<sup>273</sup>. While each agency has unique intelligence-gathering capabilities, HUMINT sources remain Israel's primary intelligence gathering method.

Human Intelligence Sources are key actors in Israeli counter-terrorism actions. Yakob Perry the former Shin Bet chief stated: 'There is no substitute for a human source who can supply advance alert of indications, and there probably never will be.'<sup>274</sup> Israel's dependence on informers is crucial within an environment where capturing terrorists is problematic. Recruitment of potential informers involves identifying vulnerabilities and then employing coercion using threats or incentives, such as prison terms or Israeli work permits<sup>275</sup>. Considering the difficulty associated with recruiting from within Hamas,

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<sup>267</sup> Eshel, Israel Hones, Internet.

<sup>268</sup> Eshel, Israel Refines, Internet.

<sup>269</sup> Eshel, Israel Hones, Internet.

<sup>270</sup> Eshel, Israel Refines, Internet.

<sup>271</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>272</sup> Katz, p. 58.

<sup>273</sup> Eshel, Israel Refines, Internet.

<sup>274</sup> Eshel, Israel Hones, Internet.

<sup>275</sup> Blanche, Internet.

informers may include members of the operatives kinship network<sup>276</sup>. For example, a family relation willingly assisted in the assassination of Ayyash 'the engineer' by supplying his cellular phone to Shin Bet, who then proceeded to wire it with explosives<sup>277</sup>. While Shin Bet appears the predominant operator of informer networks, the IDF have relied on interrogations for real-time intelligence.

Both administrative detentions and interrogations are crucial for providing ongoing and real-time intelligence. Israel's Administrative Detention Order<sup>278</sup> provides the legal framework for IDF commanders to issue six-month detention orders for Palestinians considered a threat to Israeli security<sup>279</sup>.

Israeli interrogations take place in detention centres or in the field as 'on the spot' interrogations<sup>280</sup>. Israeli legislation allows, in special circumstances, the application of physical pressure<sup>281</sup>. Alexander regards these circumstances as 'ticking bomb' cases when recovering information is crucial in forestalling an imminent attack<sup>282</sup>. In contrast, 'on the spot' interrogations are crucial during planned area incursions into the OPT. Operation 'Determined Path' during June 2002 was supported by ISA insertion teams extracting real-time intelligence gathered from 'on the spot' interrogations<sup>283</sup>. Each area searched employed interrogations to gather intelligence allowing new areas to be targeted, resulting

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<sup>276</sup> The penetration of kinship networks by the intelligence services is a deduction made in light of the solidarity that exists among cell members.

<sup>277</sup> Katz, p. 250.

<sup>278</sup> The Administrative Detention Order (temporary provisions) 1988 operates in Israeli administered areas and the Emergency Powers (Detention) Law of 1979 operates in Israel. Source: State of Israel Ministry of Justice, Internet.

<sup>279</sup> State of Israel Ministry of Justice, Internet.

<sup>280</sup> Eshel, Israel Hones, Internet.

<sup>281</sup> Eshel, Israel Hones, Internet.

<sup>282</sup> Gazit, S., 'Israel' in Alexander, Y (ed.), *Combating Terrorism*, London: Croom Helm, 1982, pp. 227-259. p. 241.

<sup>283</sup> Eshel, Israel Refines, Internet.

in rolling area quarantines<sup>284</sup>. In addition, smaller incursions appear to be a standard tactic to plant various ELINT sources.

Electronic Intelligence and Signals Intelligence sources supplement, corroborate and sometimes supercede HUMINT sources. Short-term insertion missions of up to 72 hours into refugee camps allow listening and tracking ELINT devices to be planted. For example, a 2002 article in *Janes Foreign Report* comments that most intelligence in the Gaza strip comes from monitoring devices<sup>285</sup>. In addition, airborne surveillance platforms, such as Unmanned Airborne Vehicles (UAVs), have provided real-time intelligence through visual displays. For example, Operation 'Determined Path' employed UAVs at both Brigade and Battalion levels<sup>286</sup>. SIGINT devices in contrast allow the intercept of phone and fax communications<sup>287</sup>. The psychological effect of these measures almost certainly increase the paranoia and pressure on Hamas operatives. In contrast, forensic science provides a key role as a response to successful terrorist attacks by identifying organisations, terrorists and terrorist patterns<sup>288</sup>.

Israeli forensics have assisted in terrorist investigations through explosives and weapons identification, DNA examinations, fingerprint recovery and identification, document analysis and serial number restoration<sup>289</sup>. Almog and Levinson sight the case of an Israeli laboratory being the first to identify traces of the explosive TATP and describe its homemade characteristics and sensitivity to handling<sup>290</sup>. Moreover, the Israeli Police's 'open evidence' files,

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<sup>284</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>285</sup> 'An Eavesdroppers Paradise', *Jane's Foreign Report*, March (2002) retrieved 1 May 2003, from <http://frp.janes.com/docs/frp/search.jsp>

<sup>286</sup> Eshel, Israel Refines, Internet.

<sup>287</sup> SIGINT sources may be circumvented through a return to human couriers or the adoption of new technologies, such as disposable cellular phones.

<sup>288</sup> Almog, J and Levinson, J., 'Forensic Science Plays a Key Role in the Fight Against Terrorism', *The Police Chief*, 67:October (2000), pp. 131-136, p. 131.

<sup>289</sup> Almog and Levinson, p. 134.

<sup>290</sup> *ibid.*

provide a central repository for forensic information, which then enables information comparison<sup>291</sup>. The combination of multiple intelligence sources provides Israel with the capability to execute rapid and surgical counter-terrorism strikes.

Janes Foreign Report in a 2001 article comments that approximately 30 Palestinian leaders have been assassinated through targeted killings<sup>292</sup>. This as Eshel comments suggests effective infiltration into Hamas controlled areas<sup>293</sup>. ICT reports show that approximately 31 helicopter<sup>294</sup>, bombing and shooting assassinations against Hamas operatives occurred between September 2000 and September 2003<sup>295</sup>. During these operations approximately 67 percent of those targeted were commanders, while the remaining were bomb-makers and low-level militants<sup>296</sup>. Israeli selective and surgical targeting through the coordinated use of real-time intelligence suggests a high degree of counter-terrorism sophistication. Targeted killings represent a disruptive capability that is extremely influential, both psychologically and operationally on Hamas operatives<sup>297</sup>.

## Feedback Influences and Assessment

The following summarises the feedback influences for counter-terrorism measures:

1. Territorial and operational compartmentalization mitigate the information gained through counter-terrorism measures (-)
2. The horizontal dispersion of leadership reduces the efficacy of Israeli counter-terrorism measures (-)
3. Hamas' attrition strategy is inherently cautious mitigating the risk associated to cell operations (-)

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<sup>291</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>292</sup> 'Israel's Hit List', *Jane's Foreign Report*, September (2001) retrieved 1 May 2003, from <http://frp.janes.com/docs/frp/search.jsp>

<sup>293</sup> Eshel, *Hamas Resists*, p. 15.

<sup>294</sup> The majority of fatalities have been caused by helicopter strikes.

<sup>295</sup> See Appendix B, 3<sup>rd</sup> Search.


<sup>296</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>297</sup> Moghadam, p. 84.



4. Selective targeting of Israeli civilians engenders both revenge and urgency within the security forces
5. The operatives' affiliation to martyrdom makes problematic their capture and recruitment of well-placed informers (-)
6. Hamas' popular support connected through close-knit social networks makes problematic the recruitment of well-placed informers (-)
7. Hamas' recruitment filtering process deters potential infiltrators (-)
8. Fewer operatives decrease the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures (-)
9. Multiple supply lines reduce the effectiveness of IDF interdiction (-)
10. Counter-intelligence mitigates the effectiveness of HUMINT sources (-)
11. Highly developed intelligence and tactical variety mitigate attack risk (-)


In summary, Israel's offensive strategy employs a military operated counter-terrorism doctrine of pre-emption, which at various political, legal and military levels sanctions aggressive intelligence collection measures. HUMINT sources, interrogation, ELINT and SIGINT, and forensics allow for the surgical interdiction of specific Hamas operatives. Crucial in this process are: the centralisation of information gathering supplemented by real-time response capabilities; the sophistication of the informer recruitment and handling process; and the myths, paranoia and suspicion generated from technologies. The ensuing psychological effects that these counter-terrorism produce ensure Hamas must organise and operate in a highly conservative manner. Overall, counter-terrorism measures have a negative influence on cell effectiveness to a high degree.



**Figure 29: Hamas Systems Decomposition of Counter-Terrorism Measures**

## Lifecycle of a Hamas Operative

The lifecycle of a Hamas operative (see Figure 30) identifies the various interactions of components of cell capital and resulting feedback loops. The most significant feedbacks occur during recruitment, leading up to attacks and following attacks. The situational and character filtering process during recruitment filters out those least committed to the life of a Hamas operative. Martyrdom recruits then go through a repeating cycle of ideological indoctrination and irrevocable acts before proceeding to the final act. In contrast, the mainstream Hamas recruit enters a primary feedback loop comprised of attacks and informal training. Each attack sustains collective challenge and collective action. Following each attack, the operative's interaction with informal training reinforces both common interest and purpose. Counter-Terrorism measures provide the dominant means of exit.



**Figure 30: Lifecycle of a Hamas Operative**

## Summary

This chapter has shown that Hamas' cellular components maintained a high degree of overall cell effectiveness. These results depict a high-risk security environment in which the formation and operation of Hamas cells requires high levels of compartmentalization formulated on Islamic precepts to offset asymmetric weaknesses. The functionality of compartmentalization was facilitated by the cells reliance on *jihad*, recruits requiring an affinity with

martyrdom to generate commitment, welfare institutions to engender popular support and decentralization of control to manage supporter strongholds and martyrdom attacks. For an overview of chapters three to five see Appendix C. Chapter 6 will use the actors, feedback and lifecycle diagrams developed in chapters three to five to establish generic feedback loops detailing the interconnectedness between PIRA, ETA and Hamas cells.

## Chapter 6

### Comparative Analysis

The comparative analysis identifies interconnected actors, components and parts from the PIRA, ETA and Hamas' decomposition and localisation models developed in chapters three to five. This analysis further develops common relationships on which theoretical precepts are applied. These theoretical applications are justified in Chapter 7. Table 1 summarises the key themes of each component from which the patterns of interconnectedness are incorporated into each component's analysis to generate generic feedback loops.

**Table 1: Summary of Components and Interconnectedness**

Components	PIRA	ETA	Hamas	Interconnectedness
Compartmentalization	Discipline	Tradition	Islam	Secrecy
Leadership	Schisms	Political Efficacy	Hamas Strongholds	Decentralisation of Control
Commitment	British Threat	<i>Ekinza</i>	<i>Jihad</i>	Martyrdom
Popular Support	Urban Integration	Village Integration	<i>De'wa</i>	Network Integration
Recruitment	Working Class	<i>Cuadrilla</i>	Affinity with Martyrdom	Recruitment Incubators
Training	Mentoring	Southern France	Beqa Valley	Sanctuaries
Logistics	Attrition	Escalation	Attrition	Strategy
Intelligence	Specialised Cells	Specialised Cells	Dual-Use Cells	Developed Intelligence
Attacks	Caution	Surgical Strikes	Martyrdom	Doctrine
Counter-Terrorism	Informers	Repentant Terrorists	HUMINT	Real-Time Intelligence

### Actors

Table 2 identifies common attributes between the principal actors of each terrorist organisation. Leadership identifies geographic proximity as a common denominator between organisations. Each organisation locates some degree of senior leadership in foreign countries. For example, the Army Council and General Headquarters of the PIRA were located in the Irish Republic and the ETA's Executive Committee was located in Southern France. ETA's lack of an

internal leadership apparatus is significant causing some differences with the PIRA and Hamas regarding the decentralisation of control to appear later.

**Table 2: Comparative Analysis of Actors**

<b>Actors</b>	<b>PIRA</b>	<b>ETA</b>	<b>Hamas</b>
<b>Leadership</b>	External-Internal	External	External-internal
<b>Cells</b>	Territorial (Compartmentalization) Internal Composition Dual Roles: Intelligence-Strike Specialist Roles: Logistics, Counter-intelligence	Territorial (Compartmentalization) Internal Composition Dual Roles: Intelligence-Strike Specialist Roles: Logistics, Counter-intelligence, Courier	Territorial (Compartmentalization) Internal Composition Dual Roles: Intelligence-Strike Specialist Roles: Logistics, Counter-intelligence
<b>Other Characters</b>	Popular Support Prisoners Political Parties	Popular Support Prisoners Political Parties	Popular Support Prisoners Other Rejectionist Organisations Spiritual Leaders

Each of the organisation's active cells was assigned within territorial areas of operation and designated with either dual or specialist roles. The geography of the war zone determined territorial areas of operation. For example, the PIRA's Active Service Units (ASU) were assigned to urban areas and Hamas cells were assigned to regional zones. The theoretical constraints of compartmentalization isolated the cell within a territorial zone, restraining horizontal communications and operations between cells in different territorial zones. However, the integrity of these constraints remains difficult to quantify<sup>1</sup>. Cells within these territorial zones operated with similar organisational structures.

Each cell contained from two to six members depending on their designation. Generally, strike cells contained from four to six members, whereas supporting cells from two to three. Each cell operates with a cell commander and usually an adjutant, either of which communicates with the next higher tier of leadership<sup>2</sup>, although some horizontal communications between cells may occur within the cell's territorial zone.

<sup>1</sup> Within Hamas and the ETA, the principle of territorial compartmentalization was likely adhered due to the wider regional spread of cells. However, the PIRA's concentration of operations in urban areas, such as Belfast, suggests some overlap of cell operations may have occurred.

<sup>2</sup> The PIRA and Hamas each utilised a battalion or regional leadership layer, whereas the ETA allowed cells to communicate directly with higher-level leaders.

Each cell was designated with either a dual-role or a specialist capability. Dual-role cells commonly apply to strike cells that operate in both strike and intelligence roles, although Hamas' martyrdom cells operated in strike, intelligence and logistical roles. Nevertheless, dual-role cells tended to remain confined to their territorial zone. However, Hamas' intelligence cells have also operated in strike roles within high intensity security environments, such as Jerusalem<sup>3</sup>. In contrast, the designation of specialist cells, particularly logistics and counter-intelligence cells, is indicative of their crucial roles within the security environment.

Specialised cells rarely shift roles; however some cells, such as Hamas' *majd* counter-intelligence cells, may sometimes operate with a broad range of duties<sup>4</sup>. ETA in contrast, predominantly favoured the single use functionality of specialist cells, such as intelligence cells. However, each organisation's designation and use of specialist cells was in response to local conditions. For example, ETA's robust courier network helped correct for its lack of internal leadership whereas the PIRA and Hamas' overall use of logistics and counter-intelligence cells were in response to the security environment<sup>5</sup>. In addition to leadership and cells, the cellular system is to varying degrees dependent on other actors.

Each cell shares some degree of reliance on popular support, prisoners and secondary organisations. Popular support is critical to all three organisations in which a cell's formation and patterns are highly dependent, such as in

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<sup>3</sup> IDF reports indicate an attack on the Hebrew University in East Jerusalem during 2002 utilised a 2-man intelligence cell to carry out the intelligence for the operation as well as planting a bomb in the schools cafeteria.

Source: Israeli Defence Force (IDF) Incident Reports, 'Security Forces Capture Terrorist Cell Involved in Massive Terrorist Attacks in Jerusalem' retrieved 2 September 2003, from <http://www.idf.il/newsite/english/pigua1.stm>

<sup>4</sup> Hamas' *majd* cells carried out three duties; internal security, Islamic policing and couriership. Subsequently, there may have been specialised *majd* cells allocated to either or combinations of these tasks.

<sup>5</sup> The logistics and counter-intelligence cells in responding to the security environment act within their own mini-conflicts acquiring counter counter-terrorism measures unique to their specialisations.



recruitment and operational support. Prisoners are similarly important, acting as symbols of state repression and sacrifice for both supporters and cell members. Secondary organisations provide cell members with extra exit options, either via political parties or competing terrorist organisations. For example, the ETA allowed exit to its affiliated political party, whereas Hamas arguably tolerated exit to competing organisations<sup>6</sup>.

The similarity of actors between the PIRA, ETA and Hamas suggests organisational interconnectedness. The next section will integrate these actors into common feedback mechanisms determined by comparing and analysing each component of cellular capital.

### Compartmentalization and Secrecy

This comparative analysis of compartmentalization summarises the contributory and feedback parts and components of secrecy and those factors highlighted in Table 3.

**Table 3: Comparative Feedback Analysis of Compartmentalization**

<b>Feedback Influences</b>	<b>PIRA</b>	<b>ETA</b>	<b>Hamas</b>
<b>Control</b>	X	X	X
<b>Selective Targeting</b>	High Profile Low Profile	High Profile Low Profile	High Profile Low Profile Symbolic
<b>Commitment</b>	X	X	X
<b>Popular Support</b>		X	X
<b>Recruitment</b>	X	X	X
<b>Training</b>	X	X	
<b>Intelligence</b>			Counter-Intelligence
<b>Attack Effectiveness</b>	X	X	X
<b>Counter-Terrorism</b>	Informers Interrogation Technology	System of Repentant Terrorists Interrogation State Directed Terrorism	HUMINT Interrogation Technology Targeted Killings

<sup>6</sup> How often Hamas members have deserted the organisation is undocumented. However, Hroub notes Hamas' tolerance for pluralism suggesting Hamas member's viewpoints and beliefs were allowed to be expressed, which could subsequently lead to deserting the organisation for another.

Source: Hroub, K., *Hamas*, Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000, p. 214.

Secrecy equates to internal, territorial and operational security and is dependent on solidarity and discipline. The varying degrees of communications discipline conditioned by the 'need to know' philosophy<sup>7</sup> either within or between cells contributed to the efficacy of counter-terrorism measures, especially Human Intelligence (HUMINT) sources. The following gives a sense of each organisation's disciplinary weakness:

- The PIRA experienced both volunteer's indiscretions, which are arguably culturally derived, and organisational weaknesses, such as roving volunteers between cells
- The ETA experienced disciplinary issues arguably within *comandos legales*
- Hamas experienced disciplinary issues, arguably originating from the kinship networks of its operatives

In contrast to communications discipline, solidarity is a collective behaviour which, as it develops, can arguably negate ill discipline in defence of one's cell comrades<sup>8</sup>. The following common feedback influences highlight the significance of solidarity in compartmentalization:

1. The variable influences of leadership control correspond to leadership flexibility with respect to the semi-autonomous operation of cells. For example, Hamas employed consultative interactions between external leadership, internal leadership and operatives to maintain *jihad* within cells. The degree of leadership flexibility contributed to the commitment of cell members increasing solidarity<sup>9</sup>.

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<sup>7</sup> See Appendix A on 'Commitment' for a definition of the 'need to know' philosophy.

<sup>8</sup> Crenshaw, M., 'Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organisational Approaches' in Rapport, D (ed.), *Inside Terrorist Organisations*, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001, pp. 13-31, p. 21.

<sup>9</sup> Tarrow, S., *Power in Movement*, Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 149.

2. Semi-autonomous cells contributed to the selective high and low targeting choices made by leadership. Organisational variances in target selection included:

- The PIRA's internal leadership allowing ASUs to operate semi-autonomously during low profile targeting operations
- The ETA leadership allowing *comandos* to pick low profile targets and then attack them following leadership authorisation
- Hamas' internal leadership providing target selection and final authorisation for all operations by Hamas cells

The degree of interaction between cells and leadership during target selection partly determines the cell's survivability. This contributes to the subsequent success of either a high or low profile attack. Successful operations generate professionalism, which increases solidarity between cell members<sup>10</sup>.

3. Commitment is reinforced by the ineffective over-reaction of security forces in response to specific selective targeting. This results in cell members' actions becoming more extreme in defence of previous commitments. Specific selective targeting includes:

- The PIRA's low profile targeting of security forces
- The ETA's high and low profile targeting of security forces
- Hamas' high and low profile targeting of Israeli citizens

Consequently, the longer a cell is left to operate the more confident it becomes therefore as a cell becomes more confident, solidarity increases between cell members<sup>11</sup>.

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<sup>10</sup> Crossley, N., *Making Sense of Social Movements*, Buckingham: Open University Press, 2002, p. 119.

<sup>11</sup> Kiesler, C., *The Psychology of Commitment: Experiments Linking Behaviour to Belief*, New York: Academic Press Inc, 1971, p. 88.

4. By targeting particular ethnicities for recruitment and then localising the ethnic group by employing particular situational and character markers, recruited cell members comprise common prior experiences. This includes:

- The PIRA targeting members of the Catholic working-class with prior exposure to activism and violence
- The ETA targeting the Basque ethnic and immigrant community with common village traditions and generally prior exposure to activism and/or violence
- Hamas targeting Palestinians with prior exposure to varying degrees and combinations of activism, violence, poverty and discrimination

Common prior experiences within the cell reinforce mutual interest and increase solidarity<sup>12</sup>.

5. Attack effectiveness consisting of prior knowledge of past attack success, an abundant supply of effective weaponry and well-developed intelligence, contributes to increasing operational success. Each organisation employed traditional tactics, which increased attack success. These tactics included:

- The PIRA's use of shooting assassinations, command-wire and remote controlled bombings, mortar attacks and car bombings
- ETA's use of shooting assassinations, kidnappings, car bombings and mainstream bombings
- Hamas' use of shooting infiltrations, ambushes, martyrdom attacks and disengagements

Consistent operational success reduces associated pressures related to survivability, thereby increasing solidarity<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>12</sup> Heberle, R., *Social Movement: An Introduction to Political Sociology*, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts Inc, 1951, p. 7.

<sup>13</sup> Crossley, p. 119.

6. Some counter-terrorism measures had psychological after-effects producing paranoia and suspicion within the cell, resulting in increased pressure. These psychological measures included:

- The British/Irish use of informers and technology
- The Spanish use of the system of repentant terrorists and state directed terrorism
- The Israeli use of HUMINT sources, technology and targeted killings

Increased pressure from counter-terrorism measures deters cell members from overt displays within their supporter communities, resulting in increased isolation and subsequently increased solidarity within the cell<sup>14</sup>.

Of particular interest in Figure 31 are the modification feedback loops within commitment and counter-terrorism in which high and low profile targeting, decentralisation of control and communications discipline may vary between cellular systems. Subsequently, the development of solidarity is unique to each cell, primarily in response to the effectiveness of psychological counter-terrorism measures and communications discipline. Consequently, secrecy within and between any two cells is always different.

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<sup>14</sup> Crenshaw, p. 21




Figure 31: Generic Feedback Loop for Compartmentalization

## Leadership and Decentralisation of Control

This comparative analysis of leadership summarises the contributory, output and feedback parts and components of strategy, leadership centralisation and those factors highlighted in Table 4.

Table 4: Comparative Feedback Analysis of Leadership

Feedback Influences	PIRA	ETA	Hamas
Popular Support	X	X	X
Counter-Terrorism		State Directed Terrorism	Targeted Killings

Leadership centralisation and the organisation's strategy determines the degree of decentralisation of control, targeting and strategic tempo. Leadership centralisation, particularly its proximity to the war zone, determines the capability of leadership to make realistic assessments for the political timing of attacks and subsequently the degree of control decentralised. The following summarises each organisation's process of decentralisation:

- The PIRA external leadership managed an attrition strategy employing a moderate strategic tempo with internal leadership assigning a high degree of decentralisation to territorially designated cells

- The ETA external leadership managed an escalation strategy, employing a high strategic tempo and assigning a moderate degree of decentralisation to territorially designated cells
- Hamas' external leadership managed an attrition strategy employing a moderate strategic tempo with internal leadership assigning a high degree of decentralisation to territorially designated cells

Leadership uses popular support as a barometer to assess the existing environment and the efficacy of its strategy. The following common feedback influence of popular support highlights its significance as a key determinant in decentralising control:


1. Popular support acts as a barometer for the legitimacy of the acts carried out by cells and is ultimately an indicator of the efficacy of the organisation's strategy. The proximity of the leadership to the war zone determines its ability to interpret the pulse of the people. For example, ETA's lack of internal leadership somewhat contributed to a stagnant support base because of targeting miscalculations and a failure to take advantage of political opportunities<sup>15</sup>. The measure of popular support dictates strategic targeting and tempo, and the degree of control decentralised to cells<sup>16</sup>.

Figure 32 shows how control is decentralised to the cell based on the leadership's proximity to the war-zone and the strategy's effectiveness. The modification feedback loop of popular support highlights how the strategy is adjusted according to the level of support, proximity of leadership and understanding of the internal environment. Either too much or too little control is a reflection of leadership's lack of understanding of the internal environment.

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<sup>15</sup> It is acknowledged that all organisations suffered from targeting miscalculations. However, ETA's strategy was dependent on escalation, for which political timing would have had to be crucial. Moreover, the organisation's reliance on revolutionary taxes and the confusion its enforcement could cause among supporters is another reason why internal leadership would have better served this organisation.

<sup>16</sup> Tarrow, p. 123.



**Figure 32: Generic Feedback Loop for Leadership**

Less obvious in Figure 32 is the transactional approach of decentralisation of control afforded by leadership centralisation. In addition to being a strategic necessity, decentralisation of control ensures cohesion between internal or external leadership and cells. Essentially, the transaction of decentralisation of control, allows the cell some freedom of action in exchange for avoiding ideological and/or operational schisms. A controlling feature of this transaction is the coercive relationship formed between leadership and cells based on logistical dependence. In all organisations researched, the cell, following leadership authorisation, was able to varying degrees select targets, plan the attack and operate autonomously during the attack phase. Subsequently, the dual-use capability of a cell can additionally act as an indicator for decentralisation of control.

### Commitment and Martyrdom

This comparative analysis of commitment summarises the contributory and feedback parts, and components of ideology, symbolism and those factors highlighted in Table 5.



Table 5: Comparative Feedback Analysis of Commitment

Feedback Influences	PIRA	ETA	Hamas
Strategy	Long-War	Action-Repression-Action	Attrition
Control	X	X	X
Selective Targeting	X	X	X
Popular Support			X
Recruitment	X	X	X
Training			X
Attack Effectiveness	X	X	X
Counter-Terrorism	Informers Interrogation	Repentant Terrorist Interrogation State Directed Terrorism	Interrogation Targeted Killings

Both the terrorist organisation's ideology and its use of symbolism provide fundamentals for ongoing ideological reinforcement and translation into commitment. Common in each ideology is the concept of martyrdom, which is expressed in the following ways:

- The PIRA utilises a history of Republican hunger-strikers
- The ETA utilises the Basque tradition of the *ekintza* (trial by fire)
- Hamas utilises the Islamic concept of *jihad* (individual duty)

The varying degrees of commitment that cell members exhibit is reinforced, weakened or strengthened by common feedback influences associated with the armed struggle. These influences primarily manifest as strategic tempo, volition, the importance of the act and irrevocable acts to influence commitment:

1. Ineffective over-reaction by security forces results in the cell members actions becoming more extreme in defence of previous commitments. For example, the ETA's strategically high tempo of attacks ensured overreaction by security forces. Consequently, the longer a cell operates the more effective it becomes<sup>17</sup>.
2. The degree of decentralisation of control determines to what extent the cell member infers his actions are his own. The degree of autonomy

<sup>17</sup> Kiesler, p. 88.

assigned to each organisation's cellular system is best summarised as follows<sup>18</sup>:

- PIRA ASUs operated with full autonomy at battalion level, which authorised low-profile selective targeting
- ETA *comandos* operated with full autonomy following leadership authorisation for an operation
- Hamas cells operated with full autonomy at the regional level, which authorised low-profile selective targeting

Ultimately, volition, particularly during the attack phase, increases the survivability of the cell, reducing pressure on cell members. This acts to preserve the stability of the collective interest of the cell members, which influences commitment<sup>19</sup>.

3. Selective targeting comprising complexity of the act or choice of target signifies the importance of the act to the cell member. Some examples follow:

- The PIRA's assassination attempt against Prime Minister Thatcher
- The ETA's assassination of Prime Minister Carrero Blanco
- Hamas attacks against Israel

High profile targeting demonstrates the commitment of the leadership, whereas symbolic attacks demonstrate the restrained power of the organisation. In either case, the belief system and commitment of the cell members are reinforced by the effort required of each attack<sup>20</sup>.

4. By joining the terrorist organisation, recruits acknowledge its strategy appeals to their beliefs. Consequently, their level of commitment correlates to the sacrifice expected from the organisation. The recruit has

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<sup>18</sup> To determine the exact level of cell autonomy is problematic. However, none of the cells operated independently of its immediate command structure. In this respect, there is a regional autonomy for particular targeting, however cell autonomy effectively only operates during some phases of the planning, such as intelligence gathering and during the attack.

<sup>19</sup> Kiesler, p. 158.

<sup>20</sup> Kiesler, p. 172.

over a specified recruitment and/or training period moved from supporter to member, increasing their level of commitment<sup>21</sup>.

5. Attack effectiveness comprising tactical variety helps increase the consistency and success of attacks which, through their explicitness and irrevocability reinforce the cell member's non-conformity. Consequently, as one's resistance to conforming increases, one's commitment increases<sup>22</sup>.
6. The variable influences of counter-terrorism measures comprising perceived abuses or attacks on the terrorist's belief system result in the integrity of either government institutions or the terrorist organisation being compromised. Some examples follow:
  - The British supergrass system reflected negatively upon the integrity of the British legal system
  - The Spanish policy of the repentant terrorists acted to successfully challenge the ETAs revolutionary conscience
  - The Israeli use of targeted killings reflects negatively upon the integrity of Israeli civil and military institutions

Counter-Terrorism measures increased distrust by either reinforcing or weakening the volunteers' belief system resulting in a reassessment of commitment<sup>23</sup>.

Figure 33 shows how the degree of volition as determined by decentralisation of control affects attack effectiveness. Selective targeting incorporates both the importance of the attack by its degree of complexity and strategic tempo representing the cells longevity. The success of an attack produces an irrevocable act, which reinforces one's belief system. Ideology can be influenced either by counter-terrorism measures and/or through symbolism resulting in the degree of control assigned the cell member being too little or too

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<sup>21</sup> Crossley, p. 119.

<sup>22</sup> Kiesler, p. 16.

<sup>23</sup> Kiesler, p. 31.

great<sup>24</sup>. Overall, the commitment feedback loop tends to be either positive or negative premised on the strength of ones belief system.




Figure 33: Generic Feedback Loop for Commitment

## Popular Support and Network Integration

This comparative analysis of popular support summarises the contributory, output and feedback parts and components of ethnicity, sanctuary and those factors highlighted in Table 6.

Table 6: Comparative Feedback Analysis of Popular Support

Feedback Influences	PIRA	ETA	Hamas
Compartmentalization		X	
Control	X		
Selective Targeting	X	X	X
Commitment	X	X	X
Logistics			X
Attack Effectiveness			X
Counter-Terrorism	Interrogation	Interrogation State Directed Terrorism	Interrogation Targeted Killings

The ethnicity of the supporter base provides a common national or cultural affiliation to the terrorist organisation with which to appeal. Of common significance is the degree to which each organisation is able to integrate into the

<sup>24</sup> Effectively, as one's belief system is challenged the leadership in response may have to re-evaluate their original decentralisation of control transaction otherwise, attack effectiveness may suffer.

targeted community. The degree of integration dictates the extent to which cell members are able to utilise their local surroundings as urban camouflage and receive support and understanding for their actions. For example, the ETA infiltrated Basque villages and Hamas formed strongholds in refugee camps. The degree of integration is reflected in the sanctuaries made available by popular supporters, which can be influenced by the manipulative capability of the organisation, achieved mainly through selective targeting. The following feedback influences show how variations in support are a measure of the effectiveness of the organisations strategy:

1. Selective targeting incorporating targeting choices with their subsequent consequences while designed to maximise popular support may also polarise the community. The following lists the varying effects of selective targeting:

- The PIRA consistently targeted security service personnel. Over reaction by security services harmed the British image as indicated by support for Sinn Fein during the May 1985 national elections during which it won 11 per-cent of the overall vote and 40 per-cent of the nationalist vote<sup>25</sup>
- ETA's symbolic targeting of Basque businessmen for revolutionary taxes, including shopkeepers associated to the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), polarised ETA popular support
- Hamas' low profile targeting and symbolic attacks increased its prestige against a backdrop of several competing rejectionist organisations

Subsequently, how selective targeting is received is indicative of the bands of popular support the organisation receives, which indicates the range of commitment supporter's exercise<sup>26</sup>.

2. Commitment comprising the persuasiveness of the organisation's ideology and associated symbolism provided the progressive movement

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<sup>25</sup> Irvin, C., *Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Part in Ireland and the Basque Country*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999, p. 185.

<sup>26</sup> Tarrow, p. 123.

of the uncommitted agent to varying degrees of committed supporter<sup>27</sup>.

The range of support for each organisation is as follows:

- Nationalist support for Sinn Fein candidates in various elective forums ranged from 30 to over 50 percent between 1982 and 1985<sup>28</sup>
- Ethno-nationalist support shown for HB averaged between 12 and 15 percent of which from 1975 to 1982 three to six percent advocated hardcore violence<sup>29</sup>
- Since 1996 Hamas support has varied between 13<sup>30</sup> and 20<sup>31</sup> percent

A variation in support can be interpreted as an indication of commitment. High levels of commitment were most concentrated within the cell. Lesser levels of commitment by supporters outside the cell increased the vulnerability of their belief system to manipulation. In this sense, ebbs and flows in response to the armed struggle sustain various degrees of commitment<sup>32</sup>.

3. Abuses resulting from counter-terrorism measures such as interrogation reinforce the organisation's belief system. These abuses reduce trust in the government, alienating those parts of the supporter community most exposed to counter-terrorism measures<sup>33</sup>.

Figure 34 shows how common ethnicity helps ensure common interest and common purpose producing some degree of commitment. Subsequently, commitment is affected by selective targeting the extent of which is indicative of the sanctuaries provided by supporters. The degree of support within these sanctuaries determines the form counter-terrorism measures take, which

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<sup>27</sup> Wright, J., *Terrorist Propaganda: The Red Army Faction and The Provisional IRA 1968 - 1986*, New York: St Martin's Press, 1990, p. 166.

<sup>28</sup> O'Brien, B., *The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Fein 1985 to Today*, Dublin: The O'Brien Press, 1993, p. 197.

<sup>29</sup> Clark, R., *The Basque Insurgents ETA, 1952 - 1980*, Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1984, p. 170.


<sup>30</sup> Kristianasen, W., 'Challenge and Counterchallenge: Hamas' Response to Oslo', [electronic version], *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 28:3 (1999).

<sup>31</sup> Kushner, H., 'Suicide Bombers: Business as Usual', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 19:4 (1996), pp. 329-337, p. 332.

<sup>32</sup> Kiesler, p. 31.

<sup>33</sup> Kiesler, p. 88.

subsequently influences the degree of commitment of the supporter. Overall, popular support is either a positive or negative feedback loop premised on the supporters and states reaction to selective targeting.



**Figure 34: Generic Feedback Loop for Popular Support**

## Recruitment and Recruitment Incubators

This comparative analysis of recruitment summarises the contributory, output and feedback parts and components of situational filtering and character markers, number of recruits and those factors highlighted in Table 7.

**Table 7: Comparative Feedback Analysis of Recruitment**

Feedback Influences	PIRA	ETA	Hamas
Selective Targeting			Symbolic
Commitment	X	X	X
Popular Support	X	X	X
Intelligence	Counter-Intelligence	Counter-Intelligence	Counter-Intelligence
Attack Effectiveness	X	X	X
Counter-Terrorism	Interrogation	Interrogation State Directed Terrorism	Interrogation Targeted Killings

Situational and character filtering targets recruits with similar common experiences. In particular, each organisation tends to recruit from areas resembling recruitment incubators, this includes:

- The PIRA recruiting from urban ghettos
- The ETA recruiting from Basque villages
- Hamas recruiting from refugee camps or educational institutions

Recruitment incubators allow for the easier identification of character markers, such as class, race or religious disposition. Subsequently, the filtering process localises the characteristics of recruits to meet the operational needs of the

cellular system. The following common feedback influences show how recruitment is perpetuated by the armed struggle:

1. The recruitment process recognises the recruit's degree of commitment as correlating to the sacrifice expected by the organisation and the role they will eventually play, this includes:
  - The PIRA utilising a combination of indoctrination and irrevocable acts to progress the recruit from supporter to volunteer
  - The ETA utilising indoctrination and the development of the *ekintza* to build the recruit's revolutionary conscience
  - Hamas' use of *jihad* as a determinant for joining and subsequently entry into either a mainstream or martyrdom role

The organisation's process of situational and character filtering defines the minimum and maximum levels of commitment required for joining the organisation<sup>34</sup>.

2. Each organisation has integrated into local supporter communities. For example, Hamas' integration into Palestinian communities through its welfare institutions tapped into an endless flow of recruits<sup>35</sup>. An al-Qassam commander of Hamas states, 'It is easy for us to sweep the streets for boys who want to do a martyrdom operation. Fending of the crowds who demand revenge and retaliation and insisting on a human bomb operation – that becomes our biggest problem.'<sup>36</sup> The organisation's degree of integration into its popular support base determines the recruitment rate and subsequently its capacity to counter its attrition rate.

3. Counter-intelligence comprising a security check during recruitment is an organisational procedure to defend the structural integrity of the

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<sup>34</sup> Tarrow, pp. 4-5.

<sup>35</sup> Kushner, p. 332.

<sup>36</sup> Moghadam, A., 'Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 26:2 (2003), pp. 65-92, p. 71.



organisation from infiltration by security forces.

4. Attack effectiveness pulls violence and repressive counter-terrorism measures to particular urban areas such as ghettos where the organisation's support is strongest. This increases despair and subsequently attracts more recruits. Moreover, successful attacks mobilise youth into joining for prestige reasons. The success of attacks is a crucial factor in the recruitment rate<sup>37</sup>.
5. The varying influences of counter-terrorism measures vary the recruitment rate. Both the PIRA and ETA can be regarded as having a recruitment level inversely related to the level of threat. Dingley and Kirk-Smith comment that the recruit's environment is likely to induce introspection and self-defence mechanisms<sup>38</sup>. Consistently effective security force operations reduce perceptions of survivability. Hence, an increasing level of threat might correlate to a drop in recruits<sup>39</sup>. In contrast, the martyrdom character among Hamas recruits is potentially heightened following Israeli responses, subsequently increasing the recruitment rate<sup>40</sup>. Ultimately, the more effective counter-terrorism measures become the more commitment becomes a determinant of recruitment rate.

Figure 35 shows how situational and character filtering help identify the recruit's level of commitment, which determines the recruitment rate. The maintenance of recruitment rate is reliant on attack effectiveness, which attracts popular support through prestige and security force overreaction. However, if counter-terrorism measures are sufficiently effective they may weaken commitment

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<sup>37</sup> Tarrow, p. 116.

<sup>38</sup> Dingley, J and Kirk-Smith, M., 'Symbolism and Sacrifice in Terrorism', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 13:1 (2002), pp 102-128, p. 105.

<sup>39</sup> Urban, M., *Big Boys Rules: The Secret Struggle Against the IRA*, London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1992, p. 29.

<sup>40</sup> This observation is based on Research Analysis in Chapter 5 'Recruitment'.

reducing the number of recruits. Overall, the recruitment feedback loop is a growth modification process, which manages the organisations membership.




Figure 35: Generic Feedback Loop for Recruitment

## Training and Sanctuaries

This comparative analysis of training summarises the contributory and feedback parts and components of informal training and those factors highlighted in Table 8.

Table 8: Comparative Feedback Analysis of Training

Feedback Influences	PIRA	ETA	Hamas
Foreign Relationships	X	X	X
Commitment		<i>Ekintza</i>	<i>Jihad</i>
Sanctuary	X	X	X
Logistics	X	X	
Intelligence	Operational Intelligence		

Informal training appears to be the foremost method of information transfer within each terrorist organisation<sup>41</sup>. In particular, this applies to continuing indoctrination and learning various specialist skills, such as explosives manufacture and bomb construction. Informal training contributes to the production of high initiation costs<sup>42</sup>. The PIRAs mentoring of volunteers, ETAs ongoing indoctrination classes and Hamas' mentoring of bomb makers are each examples of this common training process. The following common feedback

<sup>41</sup> Formal training has been left out as little could be found regarding this kind of training during the PIRA training process.


<sup>42</sup> Crenshaw, p. 23.

influences show how training is a relatively unchecked process of organisational formation:

1. Relationships with foreign terrorist organisations and state sponsors provide forums to exchange ideas and access new skills. For example, Hamas learnt from Hizbullah the effectiveness of martyrdom attacks. Foreign relationships have been particularly valuable in the transfer of technical information, such as explosives manufacture and bomb construction. Once transferred, these are infused into the organisation's knowledgebase.
2. Sanctuaries provide safe-havens for varying levels of training and have included:
  - PIRA constructed sanctuaries along the border areas with the Southern Republic providing locations for temporary training camps
  - ETAs Southern France sanctuary providing a safe-haven for ETA cells to carry out one to two week training courses
  - The Syrian controlled Beqa valley, Iran and Syria each providing safe-havens for Hamas training

The availability of internal or external sanctuaries indicates the need for informal training within the organisation.

Figure 36 shows how the level of informal training is contingent on the availability of internal and external sanctuaries. The feedback modification loop of foreign relationships infuses new knowledge into the ongoing training process. Overall, informal training is a continuing process intermixed with cellular operations, regardless of whether it is the primary (PIRA) or secondary (ETA and Hamas) method of training.



**Figure 36: Generic Feedback Loop for Training**

## Logistics and Strategy

This comparative analysis of logistics summarises the contributory, output and feedback parts and components of organisational costs, weaponry and financial sources, weapons variety and effectiveness and those factors highlighted in Table 9.

**Table 9: Comparative Feedback Analysis of Logistics**

<b>Feedback Influences</b>	<b>PIRA</b>	<b>ETA</b>	<b>Hamas</b>
<b>Strategy</b>	Long-War	Action-Repression-Action	Attrition
<b>Selective Targeting</b>		Symbolic	
<b>Foreign Relationships</b>	X		X
<b>Sanctuary</b>		X	
<b>Number of Members</b>	X	X	X
<b>Counter-Terrorism</b>	Informers Interrogation Technology	Interrogation	HUMINT Interrogation Technology


The common parts of low organisational costs associated with the military apparatus and, weaponry and financial sources to some degree determine the regenerative capacity of the organisation in the context of its strategy<sup>43</sup>. For example, the PIRA maintained a cache of weaponry in excess of that needed to sustain its attrition strategy, which partly reduced reliance on weaponry supply sources. Each organisation's capacity for logistical regeneration determined its weapons variety and effectiveness and subsequently, partly determined the tactics employed, for example, rifle accuracy for hit and run tactics. The

<sup>43</sup> Tarrow, p. 136.

following common feedback influences show how logistics shapes the cells operational patterns:

1. In order for an organisation's strategy to succeed the organisation at a minimum, must be able to absorb counter-terrorism measures and regenerate. Both the PIRA and Hamas sustained strategic tempo by utilising built-up weapons caches and multiple supply sources. However, the ETA was unable to sustain strategic tempo and absorb counter-terrorism measures partly because of its limited and risk averse supply sources such as revolutionary taxes.
2. The number of cell members within the cellular system predisposes it to monetary efficacy requiring less *materials* and supporting services. Each organisation appears to support no more than 300 cell members with limited expenses associated to their operation. For example, the PIRA's major costs were volunteer's expenses and its logistics infrastructure. In contrast, payments to prisoner's families would most likely have exceeded volunteer expenses. In contrast to the overall expenses of the organisation, the maintenance of the military apparatus and its constituent cells can be arguably regarded a small percentage of its overall expenditure.
3. The counter-terrorism rate of supply chain interdiction places extra pressure on the organisation's logistics network. For example, Hamas' network of underground tunnels on the Gaza-Egypt border are regularly interdicted by Israeli security forces forcing the organisation to resort to secondary supply sources such as in-house weapons construction. This increases pressure on specialist logistics cells forcing their rapid adaptation to the changing counter-terrorism environment.

Figure 37 shows the high priority assigned to logistics owing to the employment of specialised logistics cells to maintain and manage the logistics network. Supply chains adjust to organisational costs and disruption resulting from counter-terrorism measures. The resulting supply source availability determines weapons variety and effectiveness, which either meets or fails to meet the needs of the strategy. Subsequently, the available weaponry influences the cell's capability to carry out attacks as dictated by the strategy. These attacks in turn determine the level of supply sources required. Overall, this feedback loop either positively or negatively influences the strategy, and the weapons flow to cells. Moreover, specialised logistics cells reduce the disruption to other cells by localising the effects of counter-terrorism measures.



**Figure 37: Generic Feedback Loop for Logistics**

## Intelligence and Developed Intelligence

This comparative analysis of intelligence summarises the contributory, output and feedback parts and components of counter and operational intelligence, attacks and those factors highlighted in Table 10.

**Table 10: Comparative Feedback Analysis of Intelligence**

<b>Feedback Influences</b>	<b>PIRA</b>	<b>ETA</b>	<b>Hamas</b>
<b>Popular Support</b>	X	X	X

Both counter-intelligence and operational intelligence utilise common organisational structures and to some extent operational patterns. Counter-intelligence employs specialised cells that in most cases operate under separate apparatus and whose principal role is to track down informers<sup>44</sup>. In contrast, both specialist intelligence cells and dual-role strike cells gather operational intelligence<sup>45</sup>. Intelligence employed before, during and after attack processes limits the exposure of the cell to counter-terrorism measures such as forensic techniques. For cells to produce highly developed intelligence the capacity of cell members to use the operational environment as urban camouflage is crucial. The following common feedback influences show how intelligence is reliant on popular support:

1. The terrorist organisation's integration into its area of operations contributes to the effectiveness of both counter and operational intelligence<sup>46</sup>. The PIRA and ETA were highly integrated into their popular support bases within their areas of operations allowing for effective intelligence collection. However, Hamas' area of operations extended to areas outside of its popular support base, including Israel proper, resulting in operational intelligence gathering requiring specialised intelligence cells.


Figure 38 shows the generic feedback loop for intelligence. The organisation's degree of integration into a war-zone determines whether specialised or dual-

<sup>44</sup> While Hamas and PIRA counter-terrorism cells were primarily involved in tracking down informers, little could be found regarding the organisational construct of internal security within the ETA.

<sup>45</sup> Hamas appears to have been the only organisation to use intelligence cells in strike roles.

<sup>46</sup> Taber, R., *The War of the Flea: Guerilla Warfare Theory and Practice*, St Albans, UK: Paladin Frogmore, 1965, p. 22.

use cells are employed to gather operational intelligence. Specialised intelligence cells are proficient at infiltration into areas outside of the organisation's popular support base, reducing the pressure on strike cells to carry out intelligence collection. However, territorially assigned dual-use cells familiar with the local terrain may extend outside of their popular support base, for example ETA cells operating in Madrid. In either case, attacks contribute to operational changes providing for improved future counter and operational intelligence. Overall, this feedback loop can positively or negatively influence the intelligence flow to strike cells which either meets or fails to meet the requirements of the strategy.



**Figure 38: Generic Feedback Loop for Intelligence**

## Attacks and Doctrine

This comparative analysis of attacks summarises the contributory, output and feedback parts and components of doctrine, weapons variety and effectiveness, intelligence and those factors highlighted in Table 11.



**Table 11: Comparative Feedback Analysis of Attacks**

<b>Feedback Influences</b>	<b>PIRA</b>	<b>ETA</b>	<b>Hamas</b>
<b>Compartmentalization</b>	X	X	X
<b>Selective Targeting</b>	X	X	X
<b>Commitment</b>	X	X	X
<b>Popular Support</b>	X	X	X
<b>Training</b>	Informal	Informal	Informal
<b>Counter-Terrorism</b>	Informers Interrogation Technology	Interrogation State Directed Terrorism	HUMINT Interrogation Technology Targeted Killings

Each organisation combines weapons variety and effectiveness, intelligence and doctrine to generate tactical variety<sup>47</sup>. Doctrine forms a link between logistics, intelligence and attacks. Doctrine includes combinations of hit and run tactics, managing standoff range and employing superior firepower<sup>48</sup>. Tactical variety mixes traditional and non-traditional tactics to maintain support and attract attention. Subsequently, selective targeting becomes an integral part of tactical variety. The following common feedback influences show how attacks result from the culmination of organisational formation and operational patterns:

1. Compartmentalization determines the cell's degree of isolation from terrorist and social networks, which influences its internal and external ideological behaviour<sup>49</sup>. The resulting degree of secrecy influences the stability of the collective interest of the cell, which contributes to attack effectiveness.
2. Selective targeting is sensitive to the safety of the cell member and the organisations constituent membership size. The strategies of the PIRA,

<sup>47</sup> Tarrow, p. 116.

<sup>48</sup> These concepts correlate to guerrilla warfare, particularly those espoused by Sun Tzu and Mao Tse Tung incorporating the trading of space for time, the importance of evasion and ensuring attacks are not telegraphed.

Source: Taber, p. 47, 135, 136.

<sup>49</sup> Crenshaw, p. 21.

ETA and Hamas contain targeting limitations and decision-making processes for targeting selections, which consider the integrity of the organisational structure. For example, Hamas incorporates a cost-benefit analysis into its targeting selection process. Consequently, selective targeting correlates mostly to the long-term survivability of the cell<sup>50</sup>.

3. Commitment comprising symbolism, such as exposure to martyrdom, volition through the decentralisation of control, tradition, such as the ETAs *ekintza*, or religion, such as Hamas' use of *jihad*, turns the operation into a personal duty during which time the cell member infers his actions are his own. This personal belief justifies the act to some degree, altering the pressure on the cell member and influencing the attack effectiveness of the cell<sup>51</sup>.
4. The organisation's supporter base gives direct and indirect assistance to operations. Popular support provides varying degrees of operational support, ranging from the offering of safe houses to disturbing or destroying the forensic evidence of a crime scene. Supporters reduce the need for resources and according to the degree of support can reduce the pressure on the cell member thereby influencing the attack effectiveness of the cell<sup>52</sup>.
5. The programmes taught through informal training methods contribute to the continued survivability of the cell member and efficacy of the cell. For example, each organisation had both in-house mentoring programmes for bomb-making<sup>53</sup> and ideological indoctrination programmes.

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<sup>50</sup> Hamas martyrdom cells are an exception, in which the value of the attack outweighs the permanence of the cell.

<sup>51</sup> Tarrow, p. 122.

<sup>52</sup> Taber, p. 22.

<sup>53</sup> While ETA literature lacks specific information about ETA bomb makers, their sanctuary in Southern France would have theoretically made the training of bomb makers a less urgent priority as an ongoing training program.

Subsequently, the organisation's strategy and doctrine, such as the effective use of standoff range, influences informal training programmes.

6. Sustained counter-terrorism measures are a common factor between the British/Irish, Spanish and Israeli security services. Each organisation's counter-terrorism strategy caused the following varying degrees of disruption:

- The supergrass trials disrupted the operational capability of the PIRA resulting in increased cautiousness and the diversion of resources to counter the informer problem<sup>54</sup>
- The disruption of ETA's leadership operations in Southern France, detention and interrogation arguably contributed to a decline in ETA actions from 277 in 1978 to 192 in 1984<sup>55</sup>. Moreover, the low ratio of police per capita (600:1) suggests close in attacks might have become more problematic<sup>56</sup>
- Israeli counter-terrorism measures arguably increase the complexity of Hamas' mainstream operations resulting in missions being aborted or interdicted<sup>57</sup>. Subsequently, the low cost, reduced complexity<sup>58</sup> and almost guaranteed success of martyrdom missions acts as a less complex alternative<sup>59</sup>

Sustained and successful counter-terrorism measures are reflected in adjustments to the cell's operational procedures<sup>60</sup>. The ability of the cell to rapidly adapt to new threats, for example by producing highly developed intelligence, and the security services' capacity to respond

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<sup>54</sup> Urban, p. 135.

<sup>55</sup> Spanish Civil Guard Statistics – ETA Assassination Statistics retrieved 1 August 2003, from <http://www.guardiacivil.org/terrorismo/estadisticas6.asp>

<sup>56</sup> Trevino, J., 'Spain's Internal Security: The Basque Autonomous Police Force' in Alexander, Y and Myers, K (eds), *Terrorism in Europe*, London: Croom Helm, 1982, pp. 141-153., p. 152.

<sup>57</sup> ICT statistics show counter-terrorism measures interdicted approximately eight Hamas operations, while some 27 infiltration and ambush operations were successful between January 2001 and August 2003. However, for the same period ICT statistics indicate just one living martyr was interdicted by counter-terrorism measures, while at least 31 martyrdom bombings were carried out.

Source: Appendix B, 1<sup>st</sup> Search.

<sup>58</sup> Martyrdom operations generally do not require escape phases.

<sup>59</sup> This argument is difficult to substantiate without more definite statistics.

<sup>60</sup> This is reflected in the contextual histories of the research analysis, Chapters 3 to 5 'History'. Moreover, changes to the cells operational patterns might reflect the cell's survivability or an increase in the intensity of tactics used. Ultimately, operational procedures reflect whatever works to maintain militants and non-violent supporters.

Source: Crenshaw, p. 21 and Tarrow, p. 116.



## Counter-Terrorism Measures and Real-Time Intelligence

This comparative analysis of counter-terrorism measures summarises the contributory, output and feedback parts and components of counter-terrorism strategy and organisation, informers, interrogation, technology and the feedback parts and components highlighted in Table 12. Many of these feedback influences have been previously discussed, therefore summaries of each component or part will instead be provided. Moreover, developing a generic feedback loop for this section remains outside the scope of this research<sup>61</sup>. However, the reduced analysis in this section will still serve to provide material for the final two chapters.

**Table 12: Comparative Feedback Analysis of Counter-Terrorism Measures**

<b>Feedback Influences</b>	<b>PIRA</b>	<b>ETA</b>	<b>Hamas</b>
<b>Compartmentalization</b>	X	X	X
<b>Strategy</b>	Long-War	Action-Repression-Action	Attrition
<b>Leadership Centralisation</b>		X	X
<b>Selective Targeting</b>	High Profile Low Profile Symbolic	High Profile Low Profile	High Profile Low Profile Symbolic
<b>Commitment</b>	X	X	X
<b>Popular Support</b>	X	X	X
<b>Recruitment</b>	X	X	X
<b>Number of Members</b>	X	X	X
<b>Logistics</b>	X	X	X
<b>Intelligence</b>	Counter-intelligence	Counter-intelligence	Counter-intelligence
<b>Attacks</b>	X	X	X

The British/Irish, Spanish and Israeli counter-terrorism forces assessed in this study each followed a strategy and organisational structure orientated towards various degrees of intelligence collection directed towards pre-emption and disruption, underpinned by specialised legislation. While each strategy contains philosophical differences premised on either a criminal or military orientation, they each retain the common organisational feature of centralising intelligence

<sup>61</sup> A generic feedback loop for counter-terrorism would show cellular components as feedback influences against the counter-terrorism component, which would ultimately determine the effectiveness of a particular counter-terrorism measure. This is in contrast to the cell's components in which counter-terrorism measures are shown as feedback influences affecting cell effectiveness. The intent of this research is orientated towards the latter not the former.

collection in order to optimise data collection for more rapid responses. Each security force organisation has favoured HUMINT sources as well as mass arrest, detention and interrogation techniques as primary sources of intelligence collection. Technology, utilising ELINT, SIGINT and Information Technology have provided secondary means of collection and analysis for both the British and Israeli security forces and arguably the Spanish<sup>62</sup>. Subsequently, components and parts of the cellular system influence these common counter-terrorism measures to varying degrees either reducing or increasing their effectiveness. These influences result from:

- Varying degrees of compartmentalization or secrecy influencing the effectiveness of HUMINT sources
- The terrorist organisation's strategy carrying inherent degrees of risk to cell members during operations varying the effectiveness of technological sources
- The constant selective targeting of security forces or civilians producing varying degrees of revenge motivated overreaction <sup>63</sup>
- Commitment from high initiation costs, exit costs and varying degrees of martyrdom varying the effectiveness of developing HUMINT sources and interrogation
- The terrorist organisation's popular support reducing the effectiveness of HUMINT sources forcing a greater dependency on technology and interrogation
- The recruitment process of each organisation decreasing the risk of infiltration by HUMINT sources
- The size constraints of the cellular system decreasing the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures
- A multiplicity of logistics sources and supply chains reducing the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures
- Counter-intelligence cells decreasing the effectiveness of HUMINT sources
- Varying degrees of risk mitigation during attacks decreasing the effectiveness of technology and HUMINT sources

These feedback components and parts indicate the common complexities each security force confronts. Compartmentalization, the organisation's strategy and leadership proximity are feedback influences that are more amenable to variability and consequently open to security force targeting. However, more relevant to this research is the variability of the component

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<sup>62</sup> There is little doubt that Spanish security forces utilised these technologies but little data, besides some mention of information technology use, was found on their usage.

<sup>63</sup> Vercher, A., 'British and Spanish Measures to Deal with Terrorism: A Comparative Study with Some Reference to the EEC Framework', PhD Thesis, Cambridge University, 1988, p. 240.

compartmentalization and the common output parts of HUMINT, interrogation and technology.

## Lifecycle of a Terrorist

Table 13 identifies common feedback loops of the PIRA, ETA and Hamas member from entry to exit. Both the recruitment and attack feedback mechanisms identify feed-back loops already discussed. Each, however, highlights the practicalities of growth modification during recruitment and the development of commitment following each attack cycle. While exit is not technically a feedback mechanism, it emphasises the degree counter-terrorism influences promote a common means of exit from each organisation, which acts as a further incentive to remain with the cell.

**Table 13: Comparative Feedback Analysis of the Terrorist lifecycle**

<b>Feedback Mechanisms</b>	<b>PIRA</b>	<b>ETA</b>	<b>Hamas</b>
Recruitment	Growth Modification	Growth Modification	Growth Modification
Training			Indoctrination
Attack	Commitment	Commitment	Commitment
Exit	Capture Death Retirement Secondary Organisation Informer	Capture Death Retirement Secondary Organisation Informer/Repentant Terrorist	Capture Death or Martyrdom Retirement Secondary Organisation Informer

## Summary

This chapter has extensively developed comparative data, primarily using feedback loops, to show the interconnected actors, components and parts of the PIRA, ETA and Hamas cellular systems. The feedback loops are composed of entry points through which each feedback mechanism is energised and from which subsequent causal links dictate variability. Initial causal links represented by entry points are comprised, in most cases<sup>64</sup>, of external actors components or parts influencing a key component or part of the loop. For example, recruitment establishes compartmentalised initial solidarity. However,

<sup>64</sup> The training feedback mechanism is influenced initially and in an ongoing capacity by the availability of sanctuaries.

subsequent causal links introduce ongoing counter-influences indicating the importance of organisational and operational flexibility and ensuing capacity to fine-tune these mechanisms. For example, the capacity to influence counter-terrorism measures in the compartmentalisation loop determines ongoing solidarity. Overall, this comparative analysis gives some sense of the extent the cellular system crosses time, space and cultures. Data from this comparative analysis will be used next to address the research questions in Chapter 7.



## Chapter 7

### Assessment of Cellular Interconnectedness

This chapter will apply the comparative analysis from Chapter 6 to three of the five research questions assessing the interconnectedness of cells. This will involve reconstructing the cell, beginning with the common constituents of the cell's formation, followed by its common operational patterns and concluding with common counter-terrorism measures<sup>1</sup>. These results will allow the final two research questions, the first assessing the predictive capability of this analysis and the second, assessing the effectiveness of the systems method of analysis to be answered.

#### Organisational Formation and Popular Support

The first research question asked, 'To what extent do common factors influence the cells organisational formation?' Figure 40 shows four inter-linked feedback loops for leadership, popular support, recruitment and training extracted from Chapter 6, which together form a generic construct representing the common factors influencing the formation of a cell. Each plug-in shows the location of links to Figure 41 (discussed in the next section). To answer this question requires examining: the joining links between the feedback loops; the repeated components of commitment and counter-terrorism; and the growth-modification feedback loop of recruitment.

Linking components and parts join feedback loops into concurrent and semi-dependent processes of cellular formation. Popular support acts as the focus for this development linking to the feedback loops of leadership via commitment, training via sanctuary and recruitment via counter-terrorism measures.

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<sup>1</sup> To link together the generic feedback loops from Chapter 6 has required some minor adaptations. The intent has been to ensure the actors, components or parts original causal link has not been lost during this process however, new causal links have been produced when connecting each generic diagram.

The linking component of commitment manages the commitment of existing supporters and rate of shift of uncommitted agents to supporters. Common ethnicity<sup>2</sup> and the terrorist strategy<sup>3</sup>, specifically the efficacy of selective targeting and strategic tempo, both influence commitment. Popular support behaves as a barometer for the efficacy of the strategy<sup>4</sup> and subsequently the degree of control decentralised to cells by the leadership<sup>5</sup>. Moreover, the proximity of the external leadership to the war-zone<sup>6</sup>, and the organisational designation of cells<sup>7</sup>, further influences the decentralisation of control. The resulting decentralisation of control effects the management of strategy<sup>8</sup> and subsequently, the degree of commitment and availability of sanctuaries provided by popular supporters<sup>9</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> Common ethnicity generates common interest, especially within ethno-nationalist movements. Source: Irvin, C., *Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999, p. 40.

<sup>3</sup> Strategy refers to psychological incentives including volition allocated to the subject, importance of the act to the subject, explicitness and degree of irrevocability of the act and the number of acts performed by the subject.

Source: Kiesler, C., *The Psychology of Commitment: Experiments Linking Behaviour to Belief*, New York: Academic Press Inc, 1971, p. 158, 172, 16, 88.

<sup>4</sup> Movements need to maintain collective action in order to respond to political opportunities. Therefore, actions must appeal to supporters or the movement will lose their support.

Source: Tarrow, S., *Power in Movement*, Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 116.

<sup>5</sup> Decentralisation combines collective actions that engender solidarity. Strategies such as controlled violence help maximise collective actions.

Source: Tarrow, p. 104.

<sup>6</sup> The leadership's proximity to the war zone determines the necessary organisational constructs for it to remain effective.

Source: Tarrow, p. 123.

<sup>7</sup> A dual-use cell means the cell has both strike and intelligence roles. A specialised cell means either intelligence or logistics cells. The extent a cell is dualuse is an indication of organisational flexibility. The designation of cells represents a specific organisational construct determining the extent the apparatus might be fine-tuned and hence the degree of control that might therefore be decentralised.

Source: Tarrow, p. 190.

<sup>8</sup> Managing the movement's strategy reflects Tarrow's position that sustaining movements is a delicate balance of power control.

Source: Tarrow, p. 190.

<sup>9</sup> Irvin determined that the degree of integration between terrorist organisation and community determines the extent of available sanctuaries.

Source: Irvin, p. 39.

Sanctuaries, in-addition to providing operational support for cells, influence the organisation's dependency on informal training programs<sup>10</sup>. Moreover, information transfers from foreign supporters modify the quality of informal training. Subsequently, the location, nature and number of sanctuaries provided by supporters influences the form counter-terrorism measures take<sup>11</sup>. For example, the greater the degrees of support, the more intrusive counter-terrorism measures, such as house-to-house searches become. Ultimately, counter-terrorism measures may reinforce or shift commitment<sup>12</sup>. Subsequently, counter-terrorism measures also influence the growth-modification feedback loop of recruitment<sup>13</sup>.

Counter-Terrorism, as a linking component with recruitment, may provoke the shift of the agent's commitment from supporter to member. This shift is a key objective of terrorist strategy<sup>14</sup> which, by utilising situational and character filtering to localise common experiences and counter-intelligence measures to validate recruits, controls the number of supporters recruited and subsequently the cell's attack effectiveness<sup>15</sup>. Attack effectiveness offers both physical and

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<sup>10</sup> Essentially, if formal training programmes are possible there is less of a dependency on informal training programs. The PIRA's dependence on mentoring programs suggests a security environment that deterred new volunteers from attending foreign or local regular training programmes.

Source: Dr Jeff Sluka, interviewed 23 September 2003.

<sup>11</sup> This approach by the security forces signifies the difficulties in distinguishing terrorist from community. This study has shown that supporting legislative and legal measures are particularly important in increasing the freedom of the security forces to operate within supporter environments.

Source: Dingley, J and Kirk-Smith, M., 'Symbolism and Sacrifice in Terrorism', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 13:1 (2002), pp 102-128, p. 106.

<sup>12</sup> Various authors support the link between counter-terrorism measures and the recruitment of terrorists. For example, Woodworth identifies GAL assassinations of ETA members as acting as a recruiting sergeant for the ETA.

Source: Woodworth, P., *Dirty War, Clean Hands: ETA, the Gal and Spanish Democracy*, Crosses Green Cork, Ireland: Cork University Press, 2001, p. 91.

<sup>13</sup> Forrester, J., *Principles of Systems*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Wright-Allen Press, Inc, 1968, p. 2-3.

<sup>14</sup> Wright, J., *Terrorist Propaganda: The Red Army Faction and The Provisional IRA 1968 - 1986*, New York: St Martin's Press, 1990, p. 166.

<sup>15</sup> The link between counter-terrorism and the controlling nature of the recruitment process reflects Tarrow's position that organisations must be robust and flexible to adapt to changing circumstances.

Source: Tarrow, p. 136.

psychological incentives or disincentives for joining in response to the reaction of state security forces<sup>16</sup>.

The variability of both commitment and counter-terrorism measures contributes to the rate of shift from uncommitted to supporter and from supporter to member status. The extent of variability is determined by the fine-tuning of strategy in response to security force overreaction<sup>17</sup>. Establishing this balance corresponds to the viability of the organisation's growth-modification mechanism maintaining its attrition rate. For example, ETA's 'action-repression-action' strategy incorporated a high strategic tempo in order to escalate the conflict. The ETA recruited Basque natives and immigrants with high levels of commitment<sup>18</sup>. While seemingly causing a high rate of shift from uncommitted agent to varying degrees of supporter, the resulting security force overreaction overwhelmed the growth-modification mechanism of recruitment. ETA's growth-modification threshold of commitment failed to address the extent of security force overreaction resulting in a failure to convert enough supporters to members to counter its attrition rate<sup>19</sup>. The next section will evaluate the common factors of organisational formation as part of the common operational patterns of the cell.

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<sup>16</sup> Both the terrorist's action and security force response generate issues in such a way they are broadcast appealing one way or another to militants and non-violent supporters.

Source: Tarrow, p. 126.


<sup>17</sup> Fine-tuning strategy correlates to the processes of selective targeting and decentralisation of control recorded in the research analysis. These processes embody the fine balancing act required in retaining militants and non-violent supporters while at the same time, preserving the long-term viability of the movement.

Source: Tarrow, p. 155.

<sup>18</sup> ETA tended to favour recruiting from Basque villages by embedding itself in local social networks and then exploiting existing traditions.

Source: Clark, R., *The Basque Insurgents ETA, 1952 – 1980*, Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1984, pp. 161-162.

<sup>19</sup> This example is based on the ETA analysis carried out in Chapter 4. See Appendix C for a summary.



## Operational Patterns and the Attack Feedback Loop

The second research question asked, 'To what extent do common organisational formations link to common operational patterns?' Figure 41 shows five interconnected feedback loops extracted from Chapter 6, which together represent the common operational patterns of a cell. Essential to answering this question is the attack feedback loop and its components of compartmentalization and commitment, and the extent components, parts and plug-ins from Figure 40 interact with Figure 41.

The attack feedback loop is the focus of the cell's operational patterns<sup>20</sup>. Varying degrees of compartmentalization ultimately decide the cell's operational patterns and the effectiveness of the plug-ins into cellular formation. For example, poor secrecy may result in a higher attrition rate increasing pressure on recruitment. In order to function, compartmentalization is effectively dependent on both solidarity and tactical variety, the latter derived from intelligence and logistics. This, in turn, influences the translation of ideology into commitment and resulting attack effectiveness.

The capacity of an organisation to generate intelligence and provide a ready supply and variety of effective weaponry determine to what extent doctrine translates into tactical variety<sup>21</sup>. The intelligence feedback loop for doctrine manages intelligence development. The capacity to collate well-developed intelligence is dependent on geography and the level of popular support within it<sup>22</sup>. Subsequently, the designations of specialised intelligence and dual-use

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<sup>20</sup> The focal nature of the attack feedback loop is representative of the incentives generated through social networks via intense social interactions necessary to sustain mobilisation. Source: Crossley, N., *Making Sense of Social Movements*, Buckingham: Open University Press, 2002, p. 119.

<sup>21</sup> Tarrow indicates the importance of not repeating the same actions and of fine-tuning the organisation such as tactics to maintain support. Research analysis has highlighted the link between strategy, intelligence and logistics as a means to generate various tactics. Source: Tarrow, p. 116, 190.

<sup>22</sup> Sun Tzu made this connection in *The Art of War*. Taber states, 'The secrets of success are, first, superior intelligence, and, second, terrain. Guerrillas, representing a popular cause, have the tremendous advantage of an intelligence service that encompasses virtually the entire

cells, whether for counter or operational intelligence purposes, determine the security, nature and tempo of attacks<sup>23</sup>. For example, Hamas utilised dual-use strike and intelligence cells in the Occupied Territories where its supporter base is concentrated<sup>24</sup>. However, in Israel Proper, Hamas has utilised specialised intelligence cells allowing the build-up of targeting intelligence, which enables variation in strategic tempo<sup>25</sup>. Following attacks, intelligence collection adjusts to the cellular systems operational strengths and weaknesses<sup>26</sup>.

The logistics feedback loop for doctrine manages and maintains logistics<sup>27</sup>. The variety and number of supply sources, whether financial or weapon, determines weapons variety and effectiveness. Supply sources are not only a prerequisite for strategic tempo but additionally must meet the costs of the military apparatus and their rate of interdiction. These feedbacks determine the minimum number

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population. The population hides them, and at the same time it reveals, from day to day and hour to hour, the disposition and strength of the enemy.'

Source: Taber, R., *The War of the Flea: Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice*, St Albans, UK: Paladin Frogmore, 1965, p. 136.

<sup>23</sup> The link between geography and the designation of cells was made during the research analysis. The link is much clearer with Hamas who operate in up to four regions, with each region containing unique security environments of varying threat levels. Subsequently, specialised intelligence cells allow for a greater variety of targeting. However, this relationship is complex and not always consistent especially when considering the terrorist strategy. Overall, this relationship correlates with Tarrow's needed flexibility in organisational structures to maintain support.

Source: Tarrow, p. 136.

<sup>24</sup> In the case of Hamas, intelligence cells appeared to become less specialised and more dual-use as the security threat decreased such as in Gaza operations. See Chapter 5 on 'Intelligence and Dual-Use Cells'.

<sup>25</sup> Israeli Defence Force (IDF) Incident Reports, 'Security Forces Capture Terrorist Cell Involved in Massive Terrorist Attacks in Jerusalem' retrieved 2 September 2003, from <http://www.idf.il/newsite/english/pigua1.stm>

<sup>26</sup> While only implicitly stated for the PIRA, the idea that an organisation learns from its mistakes is inherent in the mapped contextual histories of the organisations analysed in this study. See Chapters 3 to 5 on 'Contextual Histories'.

Source: Feldman, A., *Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 45.

<sup>27</sup> Crenshaw remarks that one aspect of the organisational model is access to immediate resources.

Source: Crenshaw, M., 'Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organisational Approaches' in Rapoport, D (ed.), *Inside Terrorist Organisations*, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001, pp. 13-31, p. 21.

of supply sources to effectively implement the organisation's doctrine<sup>28</sup>. The designation of specialised logistics cells mitigates associated risks to these supply sources through their job specific knowledge and operational compartmentalization of cell members<sup>29</sup>. For example, the PIRA's company cells managed the internal engineering of weaponry in addition to both local and international cross-border supply chains<sup>30</sup>. Both intelligence and logistics feedback loops subsequently influence the cell's operational compartmentalization.

The cell's internal, territorial and operational security modified by external threats and internal solidarity determines compartmentalization within the attack feedback loop. External security threats result from the efficacy of the territorial assignment of cells<sup>31</sup> and the degree of popular support received and how both translate to urban camouflage<sup>32</sup>. For example, ETA *comandos* were allocated to clusters of Basque villages that ETA had embedded itself<sup>33</sup>. In contrast, the extent of a cell's internal solidarity is determined by a separate feedbackloop.

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<sup>28</sup> The analysis of each organisation's strategy and doctrine linked the concepts of long-war, escalation and attrition and their correlation with supply chains. See Chapters 3 to 5 on 'Logistics'.

<sup>29</sup> Operational compartmentalization (see appendix A compartmentalization) applies primarily to logistics cells, as there is some dual-role activity among intelligence and strike cells within Hamas. The link between specialised cells and risk mitigation correlates to the research analysis, particularly the difficulty in interdicting supply chains. Moreover, ETA's high incidence of logistical cells being dismantled suggests they act to divert attention away from core strike cells. In one sense, this form of organisational flexibility increases the survivability of the movement.

Source: Tarrow, p. 136.

<sup>30</sup> Adams, J, Morgan, R and Bambridge, A., *Ambush: The War Between the SAS and the IRA*, London: Pan Books, 1988, p. 30.

<sup>31</sup> The territorial organisation of cells correlates to the terrain's capacity to maintain numbers. Che Guevara recognised this same link in guerrilla warfare believing that once the organisation's nucleus exceeds 150 it should be divided and actions begun again in separate regions. Within the guerrilla context, both security and spreading the rebellion are reasons for this organisational construct. This resonates somewhat within the terrorism context.

Source: Taber, pp. 138-139.

<sup>32</sup> Urban camouflage defines the capacity of terrorists to operate within local supporter communities and at the same time remain anonymous to the security services. The research analysis identified urban camouflage corresponding to attack profiles such as assassinations or suicide bombings. See Chapters 3 to 5 on 'Attacks'.

<sup>33</sup> Clark, p. 161, 207.



Solidarity is based on common experience resulting from the filtering process of recruitment<sup>34</sup>. Commitment is modified by the degree of solidarity in the cell, which is further influenced by the cell member's perceived survivability resulting from selective targeting, and volition as determined by decentralisation of control<sup>35</sup>. Attack effectiveness may further alter one's existing belief of perceived survivability resulting from prior attack experiences<sup>36</sup>. The psychological effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures may offset this belief<sup>37</sup>. Additionally, communications discipline within and between cells may enhance or reduce counter-terrorism effectiveness<sup>38</sup>. However, as the counter-terrorism threat increases, the isolation of the cell increases, increasing solidarity<sup>39</sup>. For example, an increased psychological threat of informers may result in the cell's actions becoming extreme in defence of previous commitments<sup>40</sup>. Subsequently, the cell's degree of isolation is reflected in its commitment within the attack feedback loop.

Commitment reflects the perceived survivability of cell members and the translation of ideology into commitment, primarily to justify the act<sup>41</sup>. Moreover these factors are somewhat influenced by the isolation of the cell derived from

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<sup>34</sup> Tarrow, p. 5.

<sup>35</sup> Kiesler, p. 158, 172, 16, 88.

<sup>36</sup> Each act commits the member to increasingly more risky acts.

Source: Crossley, p. 119.

<sup>37</sup> Psychological effectiveness in this sense might be regarded as increased paranoia and suspicion. Research analysis showed that informers and technology in particular increased psychological fears. See Chapters 3 to 5 on 'Counter-Terrorism'.

<sup>38</sup> The research analysis identified varying degrees of poor communications discipline in each organisation, which engendered some counter-terrorism success. Porzecanski's definition of compartmentalization indicates its essential contribution to secrecy.

Source: Porzecanski, A., *Uruguay's Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla*, New York: Praeger, 1973, p. 33.

<sup>39</sup> Crenshaw, p. 21.

<sup>40</sup> Kiesler, p. 88.

<sup>41</sup> The constitutive ambiguity of ideas and accompanying clarity of objectives helps unite members. Research analysis showed each organisation had elements of ambiguity and clarity in its ideology, which translated into varying degrees of commitment. See Chapters 3 to 5 on 'Commitment'.

Source: Heberle, R., *Social Movement: An Introduction to Political Sociology*, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts Inc, 1951, p. 24.

compartmentalization<sup>42</sup>. Ongoing informal training allows cell members to have their belief system reinforced through indoctrination<sup>43</sup>. For example, Hamas' ideological core of Islam, which incorporates as one of its pillars, prayer, acts as informal indoctrination<sup>44</sup>. Moreover, internal knowledge transfers through mentoring programmes such as bomb making increases the perceived survivability of cell members<sup>45</sup>. However, the translation of ideology into commitment applies psychological precepts, which require a separate feedback loop.

Psychological precepts help determine the extent ideology translates into commitment. The precepts enacted through volition, the complexity of the act, the act's irrevocability, the strategic tempo of attacks and symbolism translates one's belief system into varying degrees of commitment<sup>46</sup>. Decentralisation of control commands the greatest importance in this cycle. Using a transactional process orchestrated by leadership determines the degree the cell member infers the action is his own<sup>47</sup>. For example, Hamas' training of living martyrs is a cycle of incrementally devolving control to the living martyr through indoctrination, symbolism and the importance of the act<sup>48</sup>. Consequently, control acts as a plug-in to the leadership's decentralisation of control feedback loop in

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<sup>42</sup> Isolating the cell as a means to heighten commitment has historical precedence being documented in Sergei Nechayev's late 19<sup>th</sup> century Revolutionary Catechism. Source: Rapoport, D., *Assassination and Terrorism*, Toronto, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1971, p. 79.

<sup>43</sup> Continued indoctrination increases ones commitment making one's beliefs and past actions more resistant to attacks.

Source: Trigg, R., *Reason and Commitment*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1973, p. 44.

<sup>44</sup> Sermons that reflect the mood on the street will invariably influence the cell member's belief system.

<sup>45</sup> Mentoring programs appear quite effective in acting to transfer ideology and experience within the organisations studied. However, while the link exists it remains difficult to substantiate its effectiveness. See Chapters 3 to 5 on 'Training'.

<sup>46</sup> Kiesler, p. 31.

<sup>47</sup> Research analysis traced the transactional nature of decentralisation of control to all organisations. Both Tarrow and Crenshaw acknowledge the formation of the organisational model as crucial to ensuring collective action and avoiding internal conflicts. Source: Tarrow, p. 155 and Crenshaw, p. 22.

<sup>48</sup> Moghadam, A., 'Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 26:2 (2003), pp. 65-92, p. 83.

Figure 40. The resulting degree of generated commitment contributes to attack effectiveness.

Attack effectiveness is not only the culmination of the attack feedback cycle but additionally acts as a plug-in for the recruitment growth-modification feedback loop in Figure 40. Attack effectiveness, in this sense, has a dual role, ultimately determining the recruitment rate through its attack success and attrition rate<sup>49</sup>. Ultimately, the attack feedback loop lies at the heart of the cell's organisational formation and operational patterns.

Common organisational components and parts extend to all operational feedback loops; however, their greatest contribution is to the attack feedback loop. Compartmentalization is dependent on the territorial designation of specialist or dual-use cells, recruitment and popular support to secure, segregate, communalise and camouflage cell members within their area of operations<sup>50</sup>. Moreover, informal training (survivability and indoctrination) and recruitment (common experience) each influences commitment, which generally enhances cell member's justifications for their activities. Ultimately, the feedback influences generated from attack effectiveness can reverberate back to popular support through the recruitment plug-in, which might affect commitment through the leadership's decentralisation of control plugin<sup>51</sup>.

While the attack feedback loop lies at the heart of cell effectiveness, compartmentalization represents its centre of gravity dictating the overall attack

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<sup>49</sup> Research analysis identified the various factors that attract recruits including recruitment's sensitive link to attack effectiveness. Moreover, Irvin notes that violence is considered a rational act as long as it can mobilise support for its objectives, which supports a strategy incorporating the expected fatalities of its members.

Source: Irvin, p. 37.

<sup>50</sup> These elements reflect the efficacy of the organisational formation that frames the movement.

Source: Tarrow, p. 135.

<sup>51</sup> The feedback from attack effectiveness identifies the interaction between leadership and supporters, and the fine-tuning required to retain both militant and non-violent supporters.

Source: Tarrow, p. 123.

cycle<sup>52</sup>. This somewhat resonates when analysing counter-terrorism measures in the next section.

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<sup>52</sup> The term centre of gravity underlines the crucial role compartmentalization plays within cellular systems compared to the remaining components of cellular capital.




Figure 41: Generic Operational Patterns of a Cell

## Counter-Terrorism and Compartmentalization

The third research question asked, 'To what extent do common counter-terrorism measures act to counter common operational patterns?' Common counter-terrorism measures, including HUMINT sources, detention and interrogation, and technology influence, to varying degrees, four of the five feedback loops shown in Figure 41. Each influence is described as follows:

1. Counter-Terrorism measures interdict supply sources to varying degrees in the logistics feedback loop<sup>53</sup>.
2. Counter-Terrorism measures offset by the territorial organisation of cells and offset or assisted by popular support are used to disrupt the territorial and operational compartmentalization of cells in the attack feedback loop<sup>54</sup>.
3. Counter-Terrorism measures, which target communications discipline, psychologically disrupt the cell member's solidarity in the compartmentalization feedback loop<sup>55</sup>.
4. Counter-Terrorism measures resulting in overreaction such as mass arrest, detention and interrogation psychologically strengthen or weaken the cell member's ideology in the commitment feedback loop<sup>56</sup>.

These common counter-terrorism measures ultimately end-up hindering or assisting the attack feedback loop.

The attack feedback loop is influenced both physically and psychologically by common counter-terrorism measures primarily influencing compartmentalization and secondarily, influencing commitment. The first three occurrences of the above counter-terrorism components influence compartmentalization via

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<sup>53</sup> These attacks influence the flexibility of the organisation and its capacity to adapt to changing circumstances.

Source: Tarrow, p. 136.

<sup>54</sup> These attacks influence the volition of members reducing the psychological effect of carrying out acts affecting the attack cycle.

Source: Kiesler, p. 158.

<sup>55</sup> These attacks disrupt and question the members' belief system.

Source: Kiesler, p. 31.

<sup>56</sup> Kiesler, p. 88.

planned acts, such as HUMINT sources. In the fourth occurrence, the terrorist organisation influences commitment by orchestrating security force overreaction<sup>57</sup>. Subsequently, counter-terrorism measures act to produce psychological disruptors, such as ideological weakening or increased paranoia and suspicion, resulting in pressure applied to the internal integrity of the cell. In addition, threats also act as physical disruptors against both territorial and operational compartmentalization, such as the interdiction of supply chains, resulting in pressure applied to the external integrity of the cell.

The extent to which common counter-terrorism measures are employed to counter routine operational patterns is determined by the internal and/or external targeting of the cell with planned and/or orchestrated counter-terrorism measures. The next section further optimises cellular interconnectedness in order to identify predictors that might assist in cellular profiling.

## Cellular Predictors

The fourth research question asked, 'To what extent can common organisational formations and operational patterns act as effective predictors in countering terrorist activities?' To answer this question, predictors are constructed from key feedback mechanisms. Figure 42 shows a summary of the generic feedback mechanisms identified in Figures 40 and 41. The cell's organisational formation (top left hand corner in Figure 42) includes popular support, leadership and recruitment feedback mechanisms. The remaining feedback mechanisms represent the cell's operational patterns. The flow lines identify both attacks and popular support as key feedback loops.

Compartmentalization represents the centre of gravity in Figure 42. Its key role results from internal and external threats to cellular integrity, which ultimately

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<sup>57</sup> The research analysis found overreaction a common objective of each strategy. Overreaction has historical precedence being documented in Sergei Nechayev's late 19<sup>th</sup> century Revolutionary Catechism, as a strategic objective to attack the people in such a way that it appears the government is the enemy.  
Source: Rapoport, p. 47.

determines the continuing commitment and subsequent attack effectiveness of the cell. In a sense, the attack loop is the heart of the cell, whereas compartmentalization is the crucial muscle controlling its heartbeat. Two examples are provided in Figure 42 to highlight this analogy. The following predictors based on the analysis in the previous sections and chapters, gives a sense of the usefulness for using interconnectedness as a source for cellular profiling:

#### Feedback Loop: Compartmentalization

Predictors: Supporter strongholds, specialised cells, solidarity and communications discipline

Rule: The cell's external security comprises territorial and operational compartmentalization offset by the effectiveness of physical counter-terrorism measures.

Rule: The cell's internal security comprises internal compartmentalisation offset by the effectiveness of psychological counter-terrorism measures.

Forecast: Constituents of the cell's overall compartmentalization including, supporter strongholds, specialised cells, solidarity and communications discipline can be used to construct attack profiles such as the approach and exit phases of attacks and can contribute to the construction of psychological counter-terrorism measures.

#### Feedback Loop: Commitment

Predictors: Proximity of leadership, strategy and symbolism

Rule: The cell's commitment is mainly established from its degree of decentralisation of control, frequency and complexity of attacks, the cell's length of operation and degree of symbolism it is exposed too.

Forecast: Constituents of the cell's commitment including proximity of leadership, strategy and symbolism can contribute to the construction of psychological counter-terrorism measures.

#### Feedback Loop: Leadership

Predictor: Proximity of Leadership

Rule: The management of the terrorist strategy as established by the proximity of the leadership to the war zone and degree of popular support determines the decentralisation of control to cells. The number of leadership tiers and existence or lack thereof of internal leadership can indicate the degree of decentralisation. The degree of decentralisation identifies the type of information flowing through various tiers of the organisation, identifies when the cell acts independently and offers an insight into the transactional nature of control between the leadership and cell.

Forecast: Constituents of the cell's control including leadership proximity help identify vulnerable links in the transactional process of decentralisation of control. These links facilitate directing counter-terrorism measures more accurately to intercept, disrupt and distort information flows.



Feedback Loop: Popular support

Predictor: Sanctuaries

Rule: The composition and degree of popular support determines the location, kind and availability of sanctuaries. For example, religious institutions provide numerous sanctuaries deep inside local communities. The location of sanctuaries can indicate the degree of informal training vis-à-vis formal training and the level of operational support.

Forecast: Constituents of the cell's popular support including sanctuaries help develop profiles of supporter strongholds from where attacks might originate from or exit too.

Feedback Loop: Recruitment

Predictor: Recruitment Rate

Rule: The recruitment rate reflects variations in the effectiveness of terrorist attacks and counter-terrorism measures.

Forecast: Constituents of the cell's recruitment rate which includes measurements of attrition rate, popular support and attack frequency can be used as indicators for the time and scale of the recruitment process, from which can be reasoned the degree of filtering, commitment and overall adaptability of the process to counter-terrorism measures.

Feedback Loop: Intelligence and logistics

Predictor: Specialised Cells

Rule: The distribution of popular support within the war-zone can indicate the use of dual-use strike/intelligence cells or specialised intelligence cells. For example, areas with little or any popular support may utilise specialised intelligence cells.

Rule: The complexity of the logistics network, including security, number and type of supply chains determines the kind of attacks, tempo of the strategy and attrition rate.

Forecast: Identifying specialised intelligence and logistics cells can indicate the adaptability of the strategy, the extent of tactical variety and degree of operational compartmentalization.

The above forecasts represent calculated deductions based on common organisational and operational patterns. Completed forecasts assist in building cellular profiles comprising formation, operational patterns as well as identifying and quantifying appropriate counter-terrorism measures for targeting both internal and external cellular areas. For example, a hypothetical and generic framework for the counter-terrorism of cells might contain a specialised, pre-emptive, surgical and carefully balanced combination of multi-pronged disruptive measures attacking the cell's internal (psychological) and external (physical) compartmentalization (cohesion). However, the efficacy of these predictors relies on the accuracy of the source data, which will be addressed next when answering the final research question.




Figure 42: Generic Model of Primary Feedback Mechanisms for Cell Effectiveness

## Systems Decomposition and Localisation

The fifth and final research question asked, 'How effective is the systems approach in decomposing the terrorist cell?' The systems method of decomposition and localisation provides a means to deconstruct and identify the interaction between the components and parts within a larger system. Horgan and Taylor state, 'Security services, policy makers and analysts often have little conceptual understanding of how the factors that contribute to terrorism impinge on the individual terrorist and terrorist organisation.'<sup>58</sup> In addition, Horgan and Taylor comment that using a systematic and psychological approach to understand the factors involving the constituent parts of a terrorist organisation, offers greater utility than the profiling of individual terrorists<sup>59</sup>. These comments acknowledge the context the systems method engenders. This method when applied to the terrorist organisation defined as a system, composed of sub-systems, each made-up of components and parts, constitutes profiling with the individual contexts making up the whole<sup>60</sup>. However, as with individual terrorists, profiling of terrorist organisations is to some extent reliant on deductions<sup>61</sup>. Subsequently, the accuracy of the data input into this method determines the usefulness of cellular profiling.

There is little doubt the data applied in this method has varying degrees of value and accuracy, whether the collection sources derive from people, objects, emanations or records<sup>62</sup>. However, the systems method utilises a form of

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<sup>58</sup> Horgan, J and Taylor, M., 'The Making of a Terrorist', *Janes Intelligence Review*, 13:12 (2001), pp.16-18, p. 16.

<sup>59</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>60</sup> The research analysis has shown that each component and part of the cellular system encompasses a unique context that integrates with surrounding contexts to make up a system-wide context. Davis and Jenkins substantiate this analysis by systematically profiling counter-terrorism measures using al-Qaeda attack profiles.

Source: Davis, P and Jenkins, B., *Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism: A component of the War on al Qaeda*, Rand Corporation, 2002 retrieved 1 May, 2003, from [www.rand.com](http://www.rand.com)

<sup>61</sup> Horgan and Taylor, p. 17.

<sup>62</sup> Objects refer to interpreting physical characteristics, which includes imaging intelligence. Emanations refer to detectable phenomena, which include signals intelligence, measurement and signatures intelligence.

Source: Krizan, L., *Joint Military College: Intelligence Essentials for Everyone*, Occasional Paper Number Six, June 1999, p. 23.

scientific reasoning described by Krizan as a combination of induction processes, using relationships to produce a hypothesis, and deduction applying particular rules to test it, which minimise inaccuracies<sup>63</sup>. Additionally, decomposition and localisation models may be tested using various methods, including overtaxing the system by feeding data into it, altering properties or stimulating particular components within the system<sup>64</sup>. While decomposition may not always be successful, Bechtel and Richardson state, 'The failure of decomposition is often more enlightening than its success.'<sup>65</sup> Consequently, the profiling of terrorist cells has particular utility within the analysis process of the intelligence cycle as a tool for forecasting<sup>66</sup>.

The modelling of terrorist cells using the data analysis method of decomposition and localisation is well suited to computer data modelling. Cellular profiles represent blueprints of the partial and abstract representations of causal mechanisms used to determine cell effectiveness or the quantification of cellular capital<sup>67</sup>. Subsequently, predictors represent rules allowing the modelling of cell profiles which, when applied by the intelligence analyst, provide a conceptual analysis of the factors that impinge on a particular cell within a larger terrorist organisation. For example, by understanding the formation of cells their integration potential into supporter communities may be better forecast. Krizan comments, the intelligence analyst at the very least should account for as many pertinent variables as possible<sup>68</sup>. In this sense, cellular profiling works as a catalyst to uncover practical and useable variables.

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<sup>63</sup> Krizan, p. 32.

<sup>64</sup> Bechtel, W and Richardson, R., *Discovering Complexity: Decomposition and Localization as Strategies in Scientific Research*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 19.

<sup>65</sup> Bechtel and Richardson, p. 24.

<sup>66</sup> Krizan, p. 29.

<sup>67</sup> Cell capital includes the components of compartmentalization, leadership, commitment, popular support, recruitment, training, logistics, intelligence, attacks and counter-terrorism measures.

<sup>68</sup> Krizan, p. 29.

## Assessment of Cellular Interconnectedness

This chapter, in evaluating the research questions, has identified cellular interconnectedness, its potential for cellular profiling and the value of the systems method of analysis. This research shows there are five crucial areas of interconnectedness within and between the organisational formation and operational patterns of cellular systems. Attacks and popular support represent core macro-level feedback mechanisms whereas compartmentalization, recruitment and commitment represent secondary micro-level feedback mechanisms. These macro and micro level designations stress the interdependence between organisational formation and operational patterns using core and secondary mechanisms as conduits to dictate the viability of the cellular system.

The attack cycle generates variability in the form of reactions, which resonate through the mechanisms of organisational formation, operational patterns and resulting counter-terrorism responses. Variability in this sense is a reflection of popular support. In particular, the attack cycle affects the commitment of existing members and movement of uncommitted agent to supporter and supporter to member. Subsequently, the attack cycle is the heart of the cellular system and reflects the organisations macro-level flexibility and capacity to fine-tune its strategy. Whereas variability is crucial to the attack cycle, the flexibility of compartmentalisation is crucial to its integrity.

Compartmentalization is a flexible condition based on organisational formation altered by operational patterns and the ongoing efficacy of the physical and psychological disruptors originating from counter-terrorism measures. Its capacity to influence commitment in reaction to threats signals its anchoring role in the attack cycle. Compartmentalization in this sense is the micro-level centre of gravity for the cellular system. Consequently, defining interconnectedness as comprising of interdependence, variability and flexibility within the generic model indicates the complexity and uniqueness of cellular systems.

The identification of interdependence, variability and flexibility within the generic model is crucial to ensuring the utility of the generic model for cellular profiling. To ensure the accuracy of calculated deductions in producing forecasts these features of interconnectedness suggest a generic model that in addition to utilising rule and systems based causal relationship tests must also provide for a level of specificity below the layer of generic modelling. Subsequently, the level of specificity as represented by pillars of cellular capital interacting with a generic layer provides a valid schematic for cellular profiling.

This chapter has found that the generic constructs used in identifying cellular interconnectedness are applicable to cellular profiling and subsequently justify the systems decomposition and localisation method of analysis. Overall, these results validate the computer modelling proposed by this analysis. Chapter 8 will conclude this research by summarising the entire thesis.

## Chapter 8

### Conclusions

The objectives of this thesis comprised identifying cellular interconnectedness between the PIRA, ETA and Hamas cellular systems and thereafter incorporating the results into generic models to determine their utility for cellular profiling. This process warranted a low-level system based analysis focused on evaluating common causal relationships between cellular systems. In order to accomplish these objectives the following research questions were posed:

1. To what extent do common factors influence the cells organisational formation?
2. To what extent do common organisational formations link to common operational patterns?
3. To what extent do common counter-terrorism measures act to counter common operational patterns?
4. To what extent can common organisational formations and operational patterns act as effective predictors in countering terrorist activities?
5. How effective is the systems approach in decomposing the terrorist cell?

### Developing a Framework and Roadmap

Chapters 1 and 2 established a framework and roadmap with which to pursue the analysis of cellular systems. Chapter 1 introduced an unorthodox concept of terrorism in which it was reduced to a level appropriate for analysing cellular systems. Terrorism was framed as utilising asymmetric war fighting concepts encompassing fear as a means to stimulate people's conscience into redefining cultural values and objectives to effect political change. The nature of this framework addressing the re-definition of cultural norms contrasted the importance of the study of terrorism with shortcomings comprising the splintering of multidisciplinary studies resulting in their perceived lack of practical utility. It was recorded that this thesis intended to use the discipline of Defence and Strategic studies to consolidate the various disciplines by

addressing a perceived knowledge vacuum in comparative studies of terrorism. Subsequently, Chapter 1 introduced this thesis' systematic and comparative study of the PIRA, ETA and Hamas cellular systems to accomplish this objective.

Chapter 2 introduced an historical and theoretical framework, established a method of data analysis to analyse cellular systems and discussed key literature sources used to generate the pool of data for this analysis. The historical review identified the period of the Russian revolutionary movement from 1878 to 1881 as instrumental in developing one of the first organisational constructs for a cellular system. Sergi Nechayev's Revolutionary Catechism comprised an early blueprint for cellular systems designating the optimum size and links between cells, the importance of solidarity within the cell, early concepts of decentralisation of control and the importance of isolating cells to increase member commitment. Moreover, early counter-terrorism measures were identified including the use of selective repression such as mass arrests to isolate revolutionaries. Following the development of the historical framework, contemporary behavioural and organisational theories were used to identify rules with which to validate this analysis.

Behavioural and organisational theories identified key precepts for use in analysing cellular systems. The properties of these theories encompassed collective challenge, common purpose, solidarity and collective action. The main behavioural precepts judged relevant to cellular systems included the following:

- Solidarity is crucial as a source of group identity
- Social networks are crucial to movement formation and mobilisation, through existing bonds of solidarity
- In the short-term, movements that continue to repeat the same actions run the risk of losing support
- Continued mobilisation is premised on increasingly more risky acts



- Controlled violence reduces uncertainty, engenders solidarity and mobilises supporters
- The relationship between leadership and supporters frames the movement and orientates the organisation's strategy to maintain militant and non-violent supporters
- The organisational model should be robust and flexible enough to stand-up to changing circumstances
- Decentralisation of control acts as a social relay to connect the leadership with the base of the organisation strengthening solidarity and sustaining the movement long-term

The main organisational precepts judged relevant to cellular systems included the following:

- The organisation's survival is determined by long-term objectives and short-term incentives that engender solidarity
- Constructed outlets for voluntary exit and voicing dissent demonstrate the leadership's sensitivity to members and correlates directly to the organisation's survivability
- Incentives are employed to ensure group efficacy
- The organisation must have access to immediate resources

The historical and theoretical framework contributed to the development of the methodology, data identification and justification of claims during later analysis steps.

The benchmarking of the systems decomposition and localisation method of analysis was used along with the historical and theoretical frameworks to identify the qualitative components (cellular capital) of a cellular system. Chapter 2 records that cell effectiveness is, *the qualitative capability of a terrorist cell to operate as part of a much larger terrorist organisation*. The

qualitative components of cellular capital were determined to be compartmentalization, leadership, commitment, organisational formation (including popular support, recruitment and training), operational patterns (including logistics, intelligence and attacks) and counter-terrorism measures. These components became core areas for the cellular deconstruction cycle of each terrorist organisation in which components' constituent parts and feedback relationships could be diagrammatically represented centred on the activities of cell effectiveness.

### Deconstructing Cellular Systems

Chapters 3 to 5 employed snapshots of the PIRA (1985), ETA (1984) and Hamas (2001) terrorist organizations to deconstruct their cellular systems and develop data for a later comparative analysis in Chapter 6. The date range of snapshots is significant as are the varying locations of the terrorist organizations in order to establish interconnectedness across time, space and culture. Each deconstruction comprised a data analysis, which determined diagrammatic representations of the organization's contextual history, the actors influencing the cellular system, the cellular system's components and the lifecycle of a cell member.

Chapter 3 evaluated the cellular system of the PIRA. This analysis determined that PIRA cells operated within an aggressive intelligence-gathering environment encompassing informers, detention and interrogation, and technology to generate real-time intelligence. Subsequently, cellular systems emphasized high degrees of communications discipline to maintain compartmentalization. This was reinforced by the following components of cellular capital:

- Leadership decentralization of control to mitigate schisms
- Using the British threat to reinforce commitment

- High degrees of urban integration, a process of recruitment favouring the working class and a mentoring system of training
- Sufficient logistics, highly developed intelligence and caution during attacks

Generally, the PIRA cellular system operated with a moderate to high degree of overall cell effectiveness; however, it displayed some weaknesses in operational patterns, particularly communications discipline, which sometimes compromised compartmentalization reducing cell effectiveness.

Chapter 4 evaluated the cellular system of the ETA, which introduced an added level of complexity in the form of particular Basque traditions adopted by ETA's cellular system. This analysis determined ETA cells operated within a multi-pronged security environment targeting ETA's leadership, cell members and ideology with a system of repentant terrorists, informers, detention and interrogation, and state directed terrorism. Subsequently, ETA's cellular system employed high degrees of compartmentalization formulated on Basque traditions to maintain solidarity. This was reinforced by the following components of cellular capital:

- Leadership decentralization of control to ensure the political efficacy of its strategy
- Using the Basque concept of *ekintza* (trial by fire) to reinforce commitment
- High degrees of village integration, a process of recruitment favouring intimate Basque social networks (*cuadrilla*) and a formal system of training
- Sufficient logistics, highly developed intelligence and surgical strikes

Chapter 4 records ETA's cellular systems operated with a moderate degree of cell effectiveness. The ETA demonstrated disparities within organisational formation. In particular, recruitment rate failed to increase popular support and generate logistical growth to sustain its strategy of escalation, reducing cell effectiveness.

Chapter 5 evaluated the cellular system of Hamas, which incorporated religious inflections into its cellular system making this analysis the most complex. Hamas' security environment is depicted as high-risk in that high degrees of compartmentalization are sustained by incorporating Islamic concepts to counteract Israel's use of informers, technology, targeted killings, detention and interrogations. High degrees of compartmentalization are reinforced by the following components of cellular capital:

- Leadership's decentralization of control to ensure cohesion among urban strongholds
- Using the Islamic concept of *jihad* (individual duty) to reinforce commitment
- High degrees of urban integration with welfare institutions (*da'wa*), a process of recruitment favouring recruits with an affinity to martyrdom and a formal system of training
- Sufficient logistics, highly developed intelligence and martyrdom strikes

Chapter 5 records Hamas with a high degree of cell effectiveness representing the most effective cellular system in the analysis cycle. Overall, the survival of each cellular system was shown to be the result of psychological and physical defence mechanisms deployed to insulate the cell when triggered by counter-terrorism measures. Subsequently, the cellular system was deemed a holistic formation in which identifying interconnectedness represented the first step in developing generic representations to better understand its causal relationships.

### Identifying Interconnectedness

Chapter 6 comparatively analysed the data produced from the prior cellular deconstructions to identify and diagrammatically represent interconnected actors, components and parts of cellular capital, and common feedback loops of the terrorist lifecycle.

Interconnected actors comprised common influences that interact with the cellular system. This analysis established the following common actors:

- External leadership providing strategic direction
- Leadership's territorial compartmentalization of cells such as urban, village or regional assignments of cells
- Leadership's assigning of dual-role or specialised cells utilising combined intelligence and strike cells or specialized logistics or intelligence cells
- Popular support providing urban camouflage
- Prisoners offering symbolic support
- Secondary organisations acting as voluntary or competing exit paths

Interconnected components and parts comprised those common constituent parts and influences within the cellular system. Generic feedback diagrams representing interconnectedness were generated for each component of cell capital by linking feedback influences and parts together. The following components of interconnectedness were established:

- Secrecy as a function of compartmentalization equated to internal, territorial and operational security dependent on solidarity and communications discipline. Overall, the variability of discipline and the development of solidarity established that secrecy is always different between any two cells.
- Decentralisation of control as a function of leadership was determined by leadership's proximity to the war-zone, popular support and strategy. The transactional process of allowing some freedom of the cell in exchange for ameliorating ideological and operational schisms engendered cohesion.

- Martyrdom as a function of commitment represents the degree to which psychological precepts correlate to strategy, decentralisation of control and ideology in the form of targeting complexity and importance, strategic tempo, volition and symbolism.
- Network integration as a function of popular support is determined by ethnicity and the degree the cell integrates into the community. Overall, the variability of popular support reflects the reaction of the state to the selective targeting instigated through the cellular system.
- Recruitment incubators as a function of recruitment were established as focal points for situational and character filtering in order to facilitate common interest. The overall feedback mechanism operates as a growth modification process to manage the organisations membership.
- The availability of internal and external sanctuaries as a function of training determines the level of informal training carried out by an organisation. Informal training represents the foremost method of information transfer within each terrorist organisation.
- Strategy as a function of logistics correlates the financial, weaponry and cost requirements of the organisation with the regenerative capacity of the organisation in the form of available supply sources. The logistical capacity of the organisation contributes to the tactics employed by the organisation.
- Both the organisation's degree of integration within the war-zone and the use of specialised counter and operational intelligence cells determine the development of intelligence. The intelligence capacity of the organisation contributes to the tactics employed by the organisation.
- Doctrine as a function of attacks forms a link between logistics, intelligence and tactical variety. The influences of counter-terrorism, compartmentalization and commitment determine the cell's internal and external security, and ultimately its attack effectiveness.

- Real-time intelligence as a function of counter-terrorism equates to measures incorporating Human Intelligence Sources, technology, detention and interrogation operating within a centralised intelligence environment to ensure rapid responses. These processes are directed towards pre-empting and disrupting terrorist organisations.

Chapter 6 established that elements of each terrorist lifecycle comprised common feedback loops. Recruitment's growth modification mechanism and the commitment generated within the attack cycle were each identified as the primary feedback loops in terrorist lifecycles. It was significant that most available exits, including death, capture, retirement, secondary organisations and working as an informer, highlighted counter-terrorism influences indicating a further incentive to retain membership. The generic representations of interconnectedness recorded in Chapter 6 subsequently became the pieces necessary for reconstituting the cellular system as a generic model.

## Constructing a Generic Cellular System

Having established cellular interconnectedness, Chapter 7 addressed the research questions by reconstructing the cellular system as a series of generic models comprising organisational formation, operational patterns and an overall structure.

The first research question set out above identified the significance of popular support as the core component of the cell's organisational formation. Its links with commitment, leadership and recruitment identified pathways from uncommitted agent to supporter and supporter to member. The variability of both commitment and counter-terrorism measures acted as spoiling forces in the shift of uncommitted agents and supporters and subsequently the viability of the organisation's recruitment mechanism. The extent of variability was somewhat mollified by fine-tuning strategy in response to counter-terrorism measures. Subsequently, both counter-terrorism as a function of recruitment

and decentralisation of control as a function of leadership were identified as links into the attack cycle of operational patterns. The next research question established relationships between organisational formation and operational patterns.

The second research question identified the attack feedback loop as the focus of the cell's operational patterns and compartmentalization as its centre of gravity. It linked together intelligence, logistics, attacks, compartmentalisation and commitment. The attack feedback loop was shown to be the heart of this process with attack effectiveness generating links with both:

1. The recruitment mechanism through its interaction with counter-terrorism measures.
2. The decentralisation of control mechanism through its interaction with leadership and commitment.

Attack effectiveness in each case engenders variable reactions, which resonate into the cell's organisational formation indicating the fine-tuning required of strategy to maintain both militant and non-violent supporters. Compartmentalization was shown to be the centre of gravity for the attack cycle linking with: logistics and intelligence, which helped develop solidarity; counter-terrorism measures, which generated external/internal threats influencing the cell's isolation; and commitment, which was influenced by the cell's isolation. Organisational influences were established as follows:

- Logistics and intelligence utilised both dual-use and specialised cells
- Compartmentalisation was dependent on territorially assigned dual-use or specialised cells
- Popular support as a function of compartmentalization contributed to the cell's security
- Recruitment as a function of compartmentalization engendered solidarity through common interest



- Informal training as a function of commitment engendered survivability and justifications
- Recruitment as a function of commitment engendered common interest

Subsequently, compartmentalization dictated the overall attack cycle through its flexibility and external links that influenced organisational formation and internal organisational links that influenced operational patterns. The next research question examined the influence of common counter-terrorism measures on the attack feedback loop.

The third research question established Human Intelligence Sources (HUMINT), detention and interrogation, and technology as common counter-terrorism measures. These measures were seen to influence logistics, compartmentalisation and commitment producing both psychological and physical disruptors resulting in pressures being applied to the internal and/or external integrity of the cell. It was determined that counter-terrorism measures mostly influenced compartmentalisation. However, the form that counter-terrorism measures influenced the cellular system was particularly contingent on the terrorist organisations capacity to use its strategy to instigate security force overreaction.

Essentially, Chapter 7 records that the first three research questions established a generic cellular system comprising the interactions between the cellular system's organisational formation and operational patterns, and security-force counter-terrorism measures. It determined interconnectedness comprised interdependence, variability and flexibility, which was crucial in answering the next research question evaluating the utility of the generic model.

## Predictors and Cellular Profiling

Of the key research questions set out in Chapter 2 and shown above, the most important is whether the generic cellular system can be translated into predictors and subsequently employed for profiling cellular systems and developing specialised counter-terrorism measures. In order to achieve this transformation the two generic models of organisational formation and operational patterns were merged into an overall generic model comprising key feedback mechanisms centred on the attack cycle. These feedback mechanisms were identified as follows:

- Compartmentalization Maintenance and Management
- Leadership Decentralisation of control and Management
- Commitment Maintenance and Management
- Popular Support Maintenance and Management
- Recruitment Growth Modification and Management
- Intelligence Development and Management
- Logistics Maintenance and Management

Compartmentalization was identified as the centre of gravity from which cellular integrity was determined. Forecasts were established using rules derived from predictors developed in the preceding analysis. The forecasts recorded in Chapter 7 demonstrated utility in profiling cellular systems comprising attack profiles, profiles of supporter strongholds, recruitment profiles, strategic adaptability, tactical variety and degree of operational compartmentalisation. Moreover, these forecasts were shown to have some utility in developing psychological counter-terrorism measures and physical counter-terrorism measures to disrupt information flows. However, in respect of this application, it was recorded that forecasts comprised calculated deductions in accordance with the accuracy of the data employed for developing predictors. The final research question, in evaluating the systems method of decomposition, addressed this issue.

## The Effectiveness of Decomposition and Localisation

The final research question evaluated the efficacy of the systems method of decomposition and localisation. This analysis established that in deconstructing target systems individual contexts were identified providing a greater understanding of the parts that make up the whole. However, this approach remains reliant on deductions or scientific reasoning based on the accuracy of the data employed. As such applying rules such as the behavioural theories described earlier helps to test the data and their relationships. In this respect, this method builds a blueprint suitable for the data modelling of causal mechanisms within cellular systems represented by the quantification of cellular capital. It is apparent this method of analysis subsequently develops a schematic from which practical and useable variables can be produced but meanwhile remains reliant on additional research to certify the robustness of the generic model developed in this thesis.

## Research Recommendations and Conclusion

It is recommended that further research to strengthen the generic model of cellular profiling concentrate on the following four forms of data collection and/or analysis:

1. Additional research using ethnographical studies of terrorist organisations must be encouraged. Ethnographic studies provide models with causal relationships apt for integration into the overall generic model.
2. The generic model must assimilate global terrorist cells, such as al-Qaeda and Hizbollah cells, to ensure the generic model is adjusted for global structures.
3. The generic model must consider the differences between the studied terrorist organisations in order that specific profiles, such as ideological differences, are developed underneath the generic model.
4. The collection of additional raw data using comparative studies of supporters utilising multi-disciplinary qualitative and quantitative surveys should be encouraged to enhance the understanding of cell formation. In addition, the components of training and intelligence require additional studies to enhance the understanding of operational patterns.

Future research must retain objectivity, which is vital to ensure the integrity of the generic model. Moreover, access to and alliances between tertiary institutions within the interested geographical areas, is crucial to carrying out survey-orientated fieldwork. Subsequently, the generic modelling of cells represents a foundation with which to build a system for profiling terrorist organisations.

The generic modelling of cells has established that cellular interconnectedness does exist and includes core features that cross time, space and cultures. However, terrorist cells maintain causal relationships that are unique to their place which require a complex range of influences to generate and sustain. These causal relationships result from generated influences particular to the local environment, originating from interactions between the terrorist, government and its citizens. Therefore, while cells may follow similar core patterns, they can never quite be the 'same' and in this sense represent inimitable formations. The solution to this predicament is to ensure the generic model incorporates specificity into the overall concept by retrieving differences between terrorist organisations identified through the systems method of decomposition and localisation, and following comparative analysis. Essentially, the final product comprising a top generic layer and lower layer of specificity aligned with the pillars of cellular capital will represent a model more amenable to intelligence forecasting and the development of less pervasive counter-terrorism measures. Consequently, it is hoped that the generic framework developed during this study provides a foundation for other researchers to study cellular systems and further explore its potential for computer modelling to assist counter-terrorism operations.

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## Appendix A: Research Definitions

### Cell Capital: Compartmentalization

Compartmentalization: As a concept of terrorism, compartmentalization is best sub-categorised as territorial, operational and internal. Porzecanski defines compartmentalization in both the territorial and operational sense as the minimization of contact between terrorist cells, usually only through cell leaders and in which only the necessary information is supplied for the cell to remain operational<sup>1</sup>. Cells minimise contact to those assigned to their area of operations (territorial) and within their own cell specialisation (operational), for example logistics or strike cells. Internal compartmentalization refers to the minimisation of contact between cell members as determined by the 'need to know' philosophy. All three aspects of compartmentalization determine the cells operational security.

Solidarity: Tarrow states that solidarity is group recognition through a common interest<sup>2</sup>.

Communications Discipline: The 'need to know' philosophy ensures that select individuals communicate information or intelligence sensitive to the security of the organisation in a timely and discrete manner to recipients per operational necessity.

### Cell Capital: Leadership

Leadership: Tarrow describes leadership as the use of symbols, whether cultural or constructed such as embellishment, the redefinition or offsetting of grievances with solutions in order to mobilize the movement's supporters<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Porzecanski, A., *Uruguay's Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla*, New York: Praeger, 1973, p. 33.

<sup>2</sup> Tarrow, S., *Power in Movement*, Cambridge, U.K; Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 5.

<sup>3</sup> Tarrow, p. 122.

Strategy: The Clauswitzian definition of strategy states, '...the use of engagements for the object of the war.'<sup>4</sup> Clauswitz's definition is used to define terrorist strategy within the context of this research.

Decentralisation of Control: Tarrow states, 'Sustaining a movement is the result of a delicate balance between suffocating the power in movement by providing too much organisation and leaving it to spin off uselessly away through the tyranny of decentralization.'<sup>5</sup> Consequently, devolving varying degrees of control to subordinate layers is a means to sustain the balance of power in the organisation between leadership and cells.

### Cell Capital: Commitment

Kiesler's 1971 psychological study of commitment provides the basis for a definition of commitment in this study. Commitment is the '...pledging or binding of the individual to behavioural acts'<sup>6</sup>. It presupposes certain beliefs and involves a personal dedication to the actions implied<sup>7</sup>. The organisations strategy connects abstract beliefs with concrete actions. The greater ones commitment the more resistant ones abstract beliefs and past behaviour are to attacks<sup>8</sup>. Within this context, the following increases the degree of commitment:

- The degree of volition, particularly choice, given to the subject (the greater the freedom to act the more likely the subject is to infer his actions are his own, reducing pressure on the subject and increasing ones commitment)<sup>9</sup>
- The importance of the act for the subject (the greater the effort the greater ones commitment)<sup>10</sup>
- The explicitness and degree of irrevocability of the act (The more public or unambiguous the act the greater ones resistance to conform, and hence the greater ones commitment)<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Gray, C., *Explorations in Strategy*, Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1996, p. 4.

<sup>5</sup> Tarrow, p. 190.

<sup>6</sup> Kiesler, C., *The Psychology of Commitment: Experiments Linking Behaviour to Belief*, New York: Academic Press Inc, 1971, p. 30.

<sup>7</sup> Trigg, R., *Reason and Commitment*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1973, p. 44.

<sup>8</sup> Kiesler, p. 31.

<sup>9</sup> Kiesler, p. 158.

<sup>10</sup> Kiesler, p. 172.

<sup>11</sup> Kiesler, p. 16.

- The number of acts performed by the subject (attacks on the subject of inadequate strength drives the subject to more extreme behaviours in defence of his previous commitment. Consequently, as his attacks increase his commitment increases)<sup>12</sup>

Ultimately, terrorists who are able to attribute meaning to the act make subsequent acts self-supporting<sup>13</sup>. However, this component more than any other operates in a state of flux in response to feedback influences. Hence, it is the hardest to judge.

Ideology: An ideology details beliefs that are prescriptive and a product of social conflict that ‘...emerges when a section of society feels or perceives that its needs are not being met by the prevailing outlook.’<sup>14</sup> Its objective is to be a persuasive catalyst directing ‘...the progressive movement of an actor from the uncommitted audience to the sympathetic audience and then to the active audience.’<sup>15</sup> Its persuasiveness to make people act is a measure of its symbolic value to provide a substitute for unfulfilled needs.

### Cell Capital: Organisational Formation

This represents the non-operational components of the organisation from which the cell is formed. It comprises three components including, popular support, recruitment and training.

Popular Support: Collective groups that each maintains varying degrees of commitment in support of the movement’s ideology and/or strategy. Taber comments that the population is the key to the entire struggle, ‘...it is his

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<sup>12</sup> Kiesler, p. 88.

<sup>13</sup> Dingley, J and Kirk-Smith, M., ‘Symbolism and Sacrifice in Terrorism’, *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 13:1 (2002), pp 102-128, p. 107.

<sup>14</sup> Wright, J., *Terrorist Propaganda: The Red Army Faction and The Provisional IRA 1968 - 1986*, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1990, p. 35.

<sup>15</sup> Wright, p. 166.

camouflage, his quartermaster, his recruiting office, his communications network, and his efficient, all-seeing intelligence service.' <sup>16</sup>

Recruitment: The recruitment filtering process is a mechanism to determine the commitment of potential recruits. It is a situational process that measures a level of despair and an internal process used to make character judgements. Generally, once the potential recruits experience with the protest cycle comes to an end he must then decide which organisation's strategy appeals the most<sup>17</sup>. For example, Irvin notes that militarists tend to be the most ethnic and suffer greatest from a loss of self-identity and self-worth whether from discrimination or other abuses; hence, they favour the armed struggle<sup>18</sup>. In this sense, Irvin uses the following rationalization for joining a terrorist organisation: 'Are the costs of an action likely to exceed the costs experienced with inaction? If anticipated costs are not expected to exceed the costs incurred normally, then the costs of participation roughly equal the costs of non-participation, and since the benefits of change clearly outweigh the benefits of inaction, rebellious collective action is undertaken.'<sup>19</sup>

Training: The initial and ongoing acquisition of terrorist skills and process of indoctrination in order that the terrorist may adequately sustain the tactics required of the strategy. Training may be formal, through distinct training programs carried out once only or informal, through ongoing programs such as mentoring.

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<sup>16</sup> Taber, R., *The War of the Flea: Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice*, St Albans, UK: Paladin Frogmore, 1965, p. 22.

<sup>17</sup> Irvin, C., *Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Part in Ireland and the Basque Country*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999, p. 187.

<sup>18</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> Irvin, p. 37.

## Cell Capital: Operational Patterns

Operational patterns represent the operational component of the organisation from which components participate or contribute to tactical operations. It consists of three components including logistics, intelligence and attacks.

Logistics: Within the context of terrorist organisations logistics can be defined as the detailed co-ordination of resources through supply interfaces. The supply interface comprises external and internal primary and secondary supply chains linking external suppliers with logistics cells and linking internal supplies with active cells.

Intelligence: Krizan defines intelligence as:

...being more than information. It is knowledge that has been specifically prepared for a customer's unique circumstances. The word knowledge highlights the need for human involvement. Intelligence collection systems produce data, not intelligence: only the human mind can provide that special touch that makes sense of data for different customer's requirements. The special processing that partially defines intelligence is the continual collection, verification, and analysis of information that allows us to understand the problem or situation in actionable terms and then tailor a product in the context of the customer's circumstances. If any of these essential attributes is missing, then the product remains information rather than intelligence.<sup>20</sup>

Regardless of the commercial connotations in this definition, it makes the important distinction between information and intelligence and the need for human involvement in order to produce an actionable result. In this sense, this definition is applicable to intelligence gathering mechanisms within both terrorist and counter-terrorism organisations.

Attacks: This represents the doctrine and tactics of the terrorist organisation or as Gray simply states, guidance on how to fight and what the forces actually do<sup>21</sup>. Tarrow states, 'Movements that continue to repeat the same actions run

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<sup>20</sup> Krizan, L., *Joint Military College: Intelligence Essentials for Everyone: Occasional Paper Number Six*, Joint Military Intelligence College, Washington, DC, June 1999, p. 7.

<sup>21</sup> Gray, p. 5.

the risk of losing support and being ignored...'<sup>22</sup> Both intelligence and weapons variety and effectiveness significantly predetermine the tactics employed or tactical variety. In this sense, tactical variety reduces the risk associated to repeating same actions, consequently increasing attack effectiveness. In order, to judge tactical variety the doctrine and tactics of the terrorist organisation must be determined.

### Cell Capital: Counter-terrorism Measures

The term counter-terrorism is often interchanged with anti-terrorism. It is therefore problematic to find consistent definitions of either term. The United States Federal Emergency Management Authority (FEMA) uses the following definition:

Antiterrorism refers to defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of people and property to terrorist acts, while counterterrorism includes offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Thus, antiterrorism is an element of hazard mitigation, while counterterrorism falls within the scope of preparedness, response and recovery.<sup>23</sup>

However, both definitions involve information-gathering techniques that may be utilized for both defensive and offensive measures, for example anti-terrorism measures that introduces legislation allowing *Habeas Corpus* (the power to detain) or counter-terrorism measures that use technologies to track suspected terrorists. Simply, both counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism measures may produce actionable data. To avoid confusion this research will only utilize the term counter-terrorism, however it is recognized some measures may be considered anti-terrorism measures.

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<sup>22</sup> Tarrow, p. 116.

<sup>23</sup> Federal Emergency Management Authority, 'Anti-terrorism', (2003), retrieved 12<sup>th</sup> September 2003, from <http://www.fema.gov/fima/antiterrorism/>

## Appendix B: Analysis of ICT Reports

Data extracted on 1<sup>st</sup> September 2003, from  
[http://www.ict.org.il/casualties\\_project/incidentsearch.cfm](http://www.ict.org.il/casualties_project/incidentsearch.cfm)

The following search results comprised events each of which consisted of an event summary followed by an event narrative. These reports are sourced from the Jerusalem Post, Israel Radio, *Ha'aretz*, Israel's Foreign Ministry Website, ICT associates, *Btselem*, Reuters, the Los Angeles Times and Israel's Ministry of Defence.

### 1) 1<sup>st</sup> Search: Terror Attack, Hamas, All, All, All, 27/09/2000– 01/09/2003

Summary of results based on researcher's analysis:  
Total of 61 attacks

- Suicides – 50% (31)
  - Approximately 18 (60%) attacks on buses or at bus stops
- Ambushes – 20 % (12)
- Infiltrations/Shooting – 16 % (10)
  - Approximately 60 % believed to be suicide attacks based on single shooter attacks, however cannot be proven
- Other – 14 % (8)
  - Rocket attacks (50%), bombings, abductions and vehicle attacks)
  
- West Bank attacks – 30% (18)
- Gaza Strip attacks – 14% (9)
- Jerusalem attacks – 16% (10)
- Israel Proper attacks – 39% (24)
- Hamas Fatalities – 18 (non-suicide)
  
- Total Israeli Fatalities – 343
- Israeli Fatalities/Suicides – 271 (80%)

### 2) 2<sup>nd</sup> Search: Counter Terror Operation/Interception, Hamas, All, All, All, 27/09/2000 – 01/09/2003

Summary of results based on researcher's analysis:  
Total of 35 operations (does not include targeted killings)

- Operations based on intelligence – 75% (26)
- Intercepts of Hamas operatives – 25% (9)
- Operations, Leaders Targeted – 37% (13)
- Operations, Militants Targeted – 57% (20)



- Hamas Fatalities – 48
- Hamas Captured – 7

3) 3<sup>rd</sup> Search: Targeted Killings, Hamas, All, All, All, 27/09/2000 – 01/09/2003

Summary of results based on researcher's analysis:  
Total of 31 operations

- Operations, leadership – 67% (21)
- Operations, other – 32% (10)
  - Bomb makers, militants with unidentifiable positions in Hamas

4) 4<sup>th</sup> Search: Work Accidents, Hamas, All, All, All, 27/09/2000 – 01/09/2003

Summary of results based on researcher's analysis:  
Total of 12 incidents (accidental explosions during the making of a bomb)

## Appendix C: Summary of Cell Effectiveness

Figure 43 represents a summary of cell effectiveness from Chapters 3 to 5. It shows the components of cell capital along the x-axis, beginning with compartmentalization and ending at counter-terrorism. The x-axis measures the degree of component effectiveness along the y-axis, with high, moderate and low degrees numerically represented in both the positive and negative spectrums. Hamas represents the highest overall degree of cell effectiveness and ETA represents the lowest. The individual patterns of each cellular system become obvious in this chart.

The ETA showed weakness in forming cells, particularly with popular support and logistics each contributing to some weakness in recruitment. In contrast, the PIRA displays some weakness in operational patterns, particularly within compartmentalization, which tentatively suggests some connection to a weakened commitment. However, what is overwhelmingly significant is that although counter-terrorism measures were extremely effective overall, the cellular system provides an insulating operational framework within which the cell thrives.

Essentially, counter-terrorism measures acting against particular components trigger the psychological and physical defence mechanisms within this framework, which react to insulate the cell. Weaknesses within the framework are counteracted by strengths elsewhere, resulting in the cells overall cohesion. Subsequently, cell effectiveness can be considered holistic in which its overall framework is greater than the sum of its components. Therefore, to compromise the cellular system it must be treated as a whole in order to identify a centre of gravity, which if compromised ultimately disables the entire system. The determination and discussion of interconnectedness in Chapters 6 and 7 supports this proposition.




Figure 43: Summary of Cell Effectiveness