The New Zealand Defence Force as an Agent of Development: The Case of East Timor.

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Figure 1 Map of East Timor

SOURCE: UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION (CARTOGRAPHIC SECTION

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

AIM

This thesis aims to investigate a phenomenon that has become particularly apparent since the end of the 1980's and the end of the cold war. During this period there has been not only an increase in intrastate conflict but also a change in international approaches to dealing with it and its aftermath. While many may be familiar with the existence of aid agencies of various types that make attending to the fallout of these conflicts a central part of their business, it would appear that fewer recognise the increasing role that various military establishments are playing in aspects of relief delivery and reconstruction for which they receive aid donor funding. It has been suggested elsewhere that given the expansion of this role, the military may be seen as a development agent and that as such members of the development community could possibly engage with them more.

This thesis investigates one aspect of the role of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) in East Timor as a case of a military organisation engaged in a major peace operation that has seen it involved in not only security activities normally associated with the military, but also a range of activities, including some that civilian aid agencies working in the same area have also been engaged in.

STRUCTURE

This thesis contains seven chapters and is comprised of two main sections. The first of these sections is comprised of four chapters and provides a background and context to the research. The second section constitutes the case study material and the fieldwork findings. A more detailed breakdown of chapter content is as follows:

Chapter 1 provides an introduction and contains a description of the aims of the thesis along with an outline of the methodology and the data collection methods used.

Chapter 2 describes the origins of the international practice of giving foreign aid and outlines a number of motivations behind this provision and various roles to which aid has been directed including an increasing focus on conflict based emergencies. The changing actors involved in provision of aid will also be identified.

Chapter 3 reviews the literature that pertains more directly to military involvement in aid work. The changing nature of conflict since the cold-war will be outlined as will the response by way of increasing numbers of peacekeeping operations and an evolution in the range of peacekeeping operations undertaken. Several examples of military provision of aid are described and a number of reasons and motivations behind increasing involvement in this work are identified. An outline of the debates both within the military and aid communities that have resulted from increasing military engagement in this area will also be provided and the chapter closes with discussion on the quality of the relationship between aid agencies and the military.

Chapter 4 outlines the increasing interest and importance post conflict reconstruction has attained within the aid community and the increasing attempts of various agencies to configure themselves for work in this area. An outline of the main aspects of post conflict reconstruction is given and is followed by critiques in current approaches to this work.

Chapter 5 provides a description of East Timor, its people and a brief history that outlines the background to the events of 1999 and the intervention of a multinational force of which the NZDF played a substantial role.

Chapter 6 provides an overview of the NZDF with a historical outline of their changing and broadening role over time. The chapter also outlines some of the foreign and defence policy issues that impact on their role and describes previous aid type assistance provided by the force.

Chapter 7 consists of the primary data collected from both East Timor and within New Zealand. It presents a number of aspects of the NZDF role in providing assistance to the community of the Cova Lima district of East Timor. These views include those of NZDF personnel, Non Governmental Organisation representatives, local government officials, donors and New Zealand political party representatives.

Chapter 8 provides a discussion regarding the insights gained from the fieldwork and connects these to the strands and themes identified in previous chapters. The chapter then makes suggestions regarding the future of military involvement in the provision of aid.

METHODOLOGY

This thesis has been developed by the use of existing literature sources and by the gathering of primary data as part of fieldwork in East Timor and subsequent inquiries in New Zealand. The aim of the literature review conducted was to elicit the various major issues that may inform the investigation of military involvement in aid thereby creating a context for the fieldwork.

Primary research was undertaken to create a case study of military involvement in the provision of aid. Yin (1994, p8-9) suggests that the case study is particularly applicable when one is studying contemporary events over which one has no control. He also suggests that the case study allows the use of a full variety of evidence including documents, interviews and observations.

The main components of the primary research involved the use of observation and of semi-structured interviews of key informants within three main groups of people in East Timor. The first of these were members of the New Zealand Defence Force Battalion 6 (BATT 6) deployed as peacekeepers in the Cova Lima district. The second group included representatives of various aid agencies that were operating in the same geographical area as Batt 6. The final main group identified for interview consisted of members of the Cova Lima District Administration. All the above were selected as it was envisaged that they would have a reasonable degree of interface with BATT 6 and therefore have an overview of their involvement in aid and development type work. Another group (local population) were not included in the interview groups due to language problems and difficulties in obtaining an interpreter. While a number of informal discussions did occur with locals these were certainly not interviews and the views they expressed were very general and more along the lines of the New Zealand Peace Keeping Force (NZPKF) being "a nice bunch of people".

Interviews with the BATT 6 personnel were in general conducted within the confines of the main base in Suai. While most were made by appointment due to very busy schedules and long work days, a few were more spontaneous as general conversation gradually became interview. Interviews were conducted in informal settings, often over coffee at the end of day's work thus encouraging a conversational environment.

Interviews with aid agency representatives were with only one exception made by appointment at the convenience of the interviewee. These interviews were again generally very informal and relaxed thus enabling fairly free discussion. Interviews with the District Administration were all arranged by appointment and were more formal affairs being conducted in official time and within administrative offices that were noisy and very busy. These interviews were also punctuated by numerous interruptions as interviewees were distracted by events in the office.

While several interviews were conducted within New Zealand, the greatest element of data collection here was by way of correspondence. In general this took the form of letters to various political party defence spokespeople, to senior NZDF personnel and donor representatives. In general the response to request of information by this means was good.

While it had been anticipated at the outset that interviewee identification may have been accomplished by snowballing, which involves one interviewee suggesting names of others that may be worth interviewing, this technique was not really utilised to any great extent. Rather, identification of key informant interviewees was generally straightforward given relatively clear-cut roles within the organisations approached.

ETHICAL ISSUES

One of the important elements in gaining ethical approval for research is based on the concept of informed consent, whereby the individuals taking part in any study are fully informed about the research and give their consent freely. However in the case of this study, in addition to gaining individual consent it seemed imperative that consent from the NZDF also be obtained. Casey (2001, p135) points out that not all research that involves organisations needs to gain organisational consent. However she provides guidelines in which she suggests that

> (A)n organisation may be regarded as having subject status and may give informed consent when the organisation itself- that is, the activities; structure; technologies of production; behaviours of organising, managing, remunerating , training etc. *specific to that individual organisation* - is the object of study.

With regard to the above, an application was made to the NZDF requesting consent. Consent was duly given bound by the terms of a Deed Pro Forma, which contained conditions over and above those required by the Massey University Ethics Committee. This document laid out a number of conditions that were to be agreed to. Firstly, organisational consent did not remove the need for individual informed consent and that no personnel could be compelled to be interviewed. Secondly, the NZDF retained the right of correction over the completed thesis prior to submission and thirdly, if a survey was to be used it was to be cleared prior to use by the Defence Force.

Another issue that may be seen as having ethical implications for this research endeavour lies in the request for and acceptance of assistance from the NZDF. Several factors lay behind the decision to ask for assistance. The first of these was the paucity of information available about the Cova Lima area in general and with regard to accommodation possibilities (if any) and transport

to the region in particular. The second factor considered was the safety and security aspect of the research. At the time the fieldwork was being planned the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs travel advisory for East Timor advised against all travel to areas adjacent to the border with West Timor which therefore included Cova Lima which abuts the border. In conducting research projects it is generally understood that minimising any potential harm to the researcher is along with minimising risk to participants, a valid and necessary consideration to be made in the planning process.

Another important factor behind the acceptance of assistance was the pragmatic consideration of cost. While this had not initially been perceived as a problem in the initial planning of the research, the existence of a parallel economy in East Timor, driven by the large foreign presence became more apparent. While information was sketchy, inquiries made of several aid workers and aid agencies painted a picture of extremely high prices.

While not committing themselves to providing any assistance, the NZDF did in fact provide me with accommodation during my stay in East Timor and also assisted with some transport arrangements. However none of this assistance was guaranteed prior to my arrival in East Timor. Accommodation costs in Suai were, as predicted, very high with the only accommodation priced at about NZ$ 140 per night. In addition, staying outside the New Zealand Base in Suai and attempting to coordinate access to key informants within the camp would in hindsight have been much more difficult and limiting. As it was it took some time to build up a rapport and trust with the personnel within the camp. For my part I had almost no knowledge and even less experience of anything military and entering that environment seemed far more foreign to me than the East Timorese culture outside. I was subsequently told that a number of personnel within the camp had initially wondered what I was doing there and were a little suspicious as to my motives. Without the time in the camp that being accommodated there allowed I suspect that interviews and discussion

with those in the camp would have been much less relaxed and may therefore have yielded fewer insights.

I was acutely aware of the implications of accepting this assistance when it came to dealing with and interviewing representatives of other organisations such as Non Governmental Organisations and District Administration officers. As part of the consent process prior to commencing interviews it was made clear that although this was independent research I was being accommodated by the NZDF. There was no readily apparent problem with this and a couple of interviewees already appeared to have knowledge of this possibly as a result of seeing me in NZDF vehicles or by word of mouth as Suai is a small town.

I did however manage to create at least a small degree of distance and independence for myself with regard to transport. For NZDF personnel there were limits on the arrangements for travel outside the base and in general lone travel outside the base was prohibited. This obviously had implications for my independent access to outside agencies. After a week I managed to negotiate the use of a bicycle and independent movement outside the base but within a prescribed area known as the "Suai Triangle". This area included all the agency offices I needed to access to. The only other limitation was the requirement that I nominate a return time and a general area of travel.

RESEARCH AREA AND TIMING

The choice of the Cova Lima region of East Timor as the setting for fieldwork was essentially made when the topic of enquiry was decided on. The NZDF was chosen as the case study military force for practical reasons such as shared language, culture and access. East Timor proved to be the largest military operation undertaken by the NZDF for many years and this setting provided a geographically bounded area of operation within which the NZDF's activities could be clearly defined.

The timing of fieldwork was based on several main considerations. The first of these and probably the most important, rested on the knowledge that a rotation of battalions was due to take place in May 2002 and that the New Zealand commitment to East Timor was due to end during November 2002. The month of June 2002 appeared the most suitable as this not only would give the new battalion some time to establish itself, but would also bypass the period immediately after East Timor's independence celebrations when it was considered that many potential participants may be unavailable. Accommodation costs and availability were also suggested as being particularly difficult in the period around the Independence Day. One final consideration was that of transport to East Timor which was fully booked for the fortnight before and after independence. As a result of the above, fieldwork was undertaken in Cova Lima between 3 June and 24 June and in Dili 24 June to 2 July 2002.

CHAPTER TWO

FOREIGN AID

"Since the end of the Cold War, one of the most striking trends has been the way in which relief, development and security have become very difficult to disentangle" (Randel and German, 1996, p19).

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to investigate and outline the trends and changes that have occurred in the provision of foreign aid since the Second World War. These trends include varying motivations for aid provision, a change of focus regarding the actors that use this aid and a change not only in the proportion of aid directed to differing areas but in the amount of aid money generated internationally each year. Foreign aid appears as a well-recognised entity following its more than fifty years of institutional existence, and is familiar to most people by one of the terms it is often interchangeably known by. These variously include foreign aid, development assistance, and development cooperation. For the sake of clarity, the term used in this thesis will as far as possible be confined to the descriptor "aid".

The chapter begins with the origins of the current "aid industry" and then proceeds to an overview of the various mixed motivations that have been behind the provision of aid over the past half-century. The falling levels of aid that occurred through the 1990s will be discussed in terms of a "crisis in aid" and some of the factors contributing to this will be identified, including a greater focus on the provision of relief aid. Following this, the emergence in the late 1990s of ideas that suggest a stronger association between the concepts of development and security, and thus the suggestion of a greater role for aid will be outlined. Finally the

chapter will discuss broad changes in agents through which aid monies have been channelled and aid projects implemented.

ORIGINS OF THE AID INDUSTRY AND FORMS OF AID

A common starting point for discussionof foreign assistance is the immediate period following the Second World War. However many countries were providing assistance to others in one form or another for a long period prior to this. New Zealand as an example was providing some assistance to both the Cook Islands and Nuie from 1901, Western Samoa from 1914 and to Tokelau from 1925 reflecting their status as colonial dependencies (Hoadley, 1991, p.198).

However it was the post Second World War period that was seen as ushering in a more formalised and institutionalised form of aid between the wealthy countries of the North and those of the relatively poorer South. The speech by then USA President Truman was seen as key to the new nature of foreign economic assistance. Point four of this now oft quoted speech suggested that the plight of those living in areas with stagnating economies and experiencing lives of misery could be assisted out of this situation by provision of economic and technical assistance from the USA. The success of the Marshall Plan in the reconstruction of war ravaged Europe was seen as a template or example that could be replicated elsewhere. This approach to the reconstruction of Europe had been based on the transfer of grant and loan type funds to the governments of the countries involved to enable them to rehabilitate their countries. Aid provision to the Third World was thus ushered into formal existence and the project to transform the underdeveloped (as a reflection of the developed) was begun.

Aid has been described as one of the major mechanisms by which the relationships between the rich nations of the North and the poorer nations of the South have been mediated (Grant and Nijman, 1998, p3 ;Theiren, 2000, p21). Aid funding is channelled through two main mechanisms, namely multilateral and bi-lateral aid. Multilateral aid is provided through International Organisations that

include the World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund and the various organs of the United Nations. These organisations may be seen as intermediaries that function to pool funds from donor countries and then disburse these according to their differing organisational criteria that govern the granting of loans. The merits of this system are suggested as lying in the relative independence of the organisation in deciding where assistance is best allocated. This independence is however somewhat reduced in the case of the World Bank with a seemingly skewed voting system within the organisation that favours the larger donors and with the Presidential appointment always accruing to a citizen of the United States (George and Sabelli, 1994, p15-16).

Bilateral aid as the name suggests is based on a relationship between governments in both donor and recipient countries. This type of aid is therefore much more sensitive to the needs and desires of the donor and as such is seen as more malleable in directly serving the donors desires over those of the recipient. Thieren & Lloyd (2000, p32) further suggest that one of the rationales behind giving foreign aid is that states see this as a way of politically raising their international profile. This then further explains the preference donors have for bilateral over multilateral aid, which tends to obscure the country of origin. While much of the discussion that follows is with bilateral aid in mind, some of the changes that have occurred in the aid business may apply to multilateral aid also. This focus on bilateral aid is valid in part because it constitutes by far the largest proportion of aid from almost all donors, with the average being around 70% for all member countries of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Grant and Nijman, 1995, p215-218). In the New Zealand context, bilateral aid for the year 2000 is calculated as constituting 75% of total official development assistance (DEV/ MFAT, 2000, p12).

MOTIVATIONS FOR PROVISION OF AID

Aid has undergone a number of changes that have altered its appearance and focus. While Point Four may have couched the impetus behind the provision of assistance to the countries of the South in moral and humanitarian terms, a number of alternative or additional motives have been apparent in the allocation of aid to the point where:

> (T)he international aid process became a seething pot-pourri of humanitarianism, commercial self-interest, strategic calculation and a bad conscience (Hancock, 1991, p72).

Of course even the assistance to Europe that constituted the Marshall Plan was itself tied up with motives that were not altogether altruistic. For the United States, the successful rebuilding of Europe was seen as having a direct bearing on their well-being. Europe had after all been an important market for US manufactured goods and therefore assisting it to become so again was important (Whitman, 2001, p112). Also of consideration was the increased access to key raw materials and potential markets in the colonies of the European powers, a condition that was included in the agreements reached on implementation of the plan (Hogan, 1987, p26-27). Further advantages to the United States were accrued through control over the direction and purposes that the loans were put to use. This control was put to use in ensuring that Europe would remain a market and not develop into a competitor (Fraser, 1948, p611).

During the Cold War, one of the key motivations for aid provision was the containment of the increasing threat of communism. Political rivalry and competition between the Soviet Union and the United States and its allies continued to build through the 1950s and spheres of influence were increasingly sought among the nations of the Third World. Development assistance became an

important tool of foreign policy for the United States and the West as outlined below:

> "Communist movements are threatening established governments in every corner of the globe. These movements, directed by Moscow, feed on economic and political weakness.... The United States is faced with a worldwide challenge to human freedom. The only way to meet this challenge is by a vast new programme of assistance given directly by the United States itself" (Unpublished memorandum by W. Clayton, United States Assistant Secretary of State, cited in Gardner, 1980, p300).

Examination of aid flows during the Cold War clearly show the politically strategic nature of the placement of aid, with a select group of recipient nations accounting for a majority of US and OECD assistance. Hayter and Watson describe the variability of Development Assistance Committee (DAC) aid in relation to the politics adopted by various recipient countries. Examples include Vietnam, which received $701 million in 1974 and only $151 million in 1980 (of which over $90 million was given by Social-Democratic Sweden). This fall they suggest was a direct result of the communist liberation of Saigon (Hayter and Watson, 1985, p17). Similarly the increasing importance of the Middle East to the USA in the 1970s was reflected in aid flows to Jordan, Egypt and Israel, which became the biggest recipients of USA aid. The 1980s saw aid used by the US as both sanction and inducement in Central America where aid was focussed on countries that opposed leftist regimes. Aid was then subsequently given to Nicaragua and Panama for reconstruction of their countries in the aftermath of their "mismanaged" past (Nijman, 1995, p222). The strategic nature of aid flows appears to have continued in the post Cold War period also with the strategically important successor states to the Soviet Union and other Central European countries receiving new flows of aid despite their relative wealth over other recipients (Browne, 1999, p35).

While the threat of Communist expansion may have been the major force propelling the direction of Overseas Development Assistance it was also accompanied by a desire to maintain colonist-colonial ties. The aid flow statistics for several European countries reflect a strong tendency toward favouring former colonial possessions. British aid flows favoured India, Bangladesh, Kenya and Tanzania thus maintaining a British sphere of influence and protecting these areas against the threat of communism. Similarly, French flows were directed to their former colonies (Narman, 1999, p160). Continuation of this tendency is reinforced by Holdar (1995, p249) in reference to the lack of consensus in the aid policy of the European Union. He describes this policy as a "compromise solution arrived at to accommodate and satisfy the member states different regional interests in the Third World..." and as an "uncoordinated mix of national interests that shows little sign of becoming coherent as a single policy in the near future".

The commercial imperative has also been a major influence on the provision of official foreign aid and has had an impact on the use to which ODA is assigned and additionally to where the aid is granted. Randel & German (1997, p251) suggest that a number of countries are increasingly looking at the returns they are getting from the ODA they give. During the 1950s and 1960s much of the aid money disbursed was directed toward major infrastructural and industrial projects and as such required large amounts of plant and equipment. The practice of tying aid, where procurement of equipment and expertise needed to carry out these projects is restricted to sources within the donor country, has tended to accrue considerable benefit to commercial interests in that country. This issue of tied aid remains current, with increasing calls to expand this form of aid in the United States for example (Nijman, 1995, p223) and continuation of the practice in other donor nations (Randel and German, 1996, p18).

New Zealand Aid

New Zealand has had a recognised and formalised Overseas Development Assistance Program for well over 50 years, and the factors that have influenced aid programmes internationally have had similar effects here. As with most other donors, New Zealand's motivations for giving aid are varied, and include a mix of altruistic and self-interest elements. The nature of New Zealand aid during the Cold-War as a counter to communist threats of expansionism in the region is made clear in a brief history of New Zealand Development Assistance that states "aid was given mainly for political reasons and in part to substitute for costly defence programs by building up dependent areas in order that they be better able to withstand outside pressures" (DEV/ MFAT, 2000, p13).

As an important tool of foreign policy, Hoadley suggests that New Zealand aid has been variously utilised to cultivate goodwill toward New Zealand among recipient Governments; to favourably dispose scholarship students and trainees toward New Zealand when they become the elite in their countries of domicile, to assist in furthering New Zealand trade, to raise New Zealand's international profile and prestige and finally, to "reduce economic need, social strife and political instability, thereby reducing the motives for aggression and enhancing a peaceful international environment" (Hoadley, 1991, p202).

Self-interest is evident when the shifting geographical spread of aid allocation is considered alongside the altering focus of New Zealands strategic environment. While more widely dispersed during the 1950s and 1960s, especially through South-East Asia as part of the Colombo plan (Overton and Roche, 1995, p229), New Zealand aid has, since the 1970s (and the end of the Vietnam war), been heavily concentrated on the South Pacific, coinciding with the increasing importance placed on the Pacific region in foreign policy. Scheyvens and Overton (1995, p198) suggest that the reasons for this aid focus lie in factors such as the proximity of the region, colonial linkages, cultural affinity and strategic priorities

along with the fact that as a small donor, a wider dispersion of assistance may render it ineffective.

The percentage of aid allocated to the South Pacific has remained consistently higher than for any other region since the mid 1970s with the figure for 1979 reaching 69% of total bilateral aid and then climbing to approximately 80% by 1990 (Henderson, 1999, p288). The focus on the Pacific region was recently confirmed when responsibility for administrating New Zealand's aid program was transferred to NZAID, a new semi-autonomous agency. The core geographic focus of the new agency is described as centering (though not solely) on the Pacific.

THE PEACE DIVIDEND AND THE CRISIS IN AID

The period since 1990 has been suffused with a sense of crisis in the business of foreign aid. The decade was characterised by an almost yearly decrease in the amount of aid given by OECD donors as the accompanying graph (Figure 2) clearly demonstrates:



Figure 2. World aid from DAC donors as a percentage of GNP

Source: (Randel and German, 1998, p7).

Following the end of the cold war there had been a hope within development circles that the reduction in tension between the Western and Eastern Blocs would give rise to a "peace dividend" based on the reduction of spending on military hardware, military aid and the maintenance of large standing armies. This "peace dividend" was, it was assumed, going to be made available as a boost to development spending by donors. This anticipated fall in military spending did occur to a relatively large extent, with global military spending in1987 accounting for USD$1 trillion but dropping to under USD$800 billion by 1994. The accumulated savings (or potential "peace dividend') from reduced military expenditure during this period totalled over USD$900 billion or approximately three times the global spending on aid during the same period (Browne, 1999, p36-37). However the expected peace dividend never really materialised for use in development work. Rather, while official donor assistance had been increasing at about 2-3% per year through the 1970s and 80s, a dramatic slowdown and reversal occurred 1990s.

One review of international aid stated in its summary "The reality of aid in 1994 is depressing. With a few exceptions, donors are failing to live up to their commitments on aid volume" (Randel and German, 1994, p7). The report outlines the apparent trend of decreasing commitment to the aid level of 0.7% of GNP set by the United Nations. Pessimistic predictions for the year 1994 were outlined, with predictions for the following year that the majority of DAC donors appeared likely to reduce their levels of assistance. This prediction proved to be correct and further reinforced a belief that a more generalised trend toward falling aid levels was in progress. As the decade progressed this belief became vindicated. The figure of 0.22% of GNP in 1997 represented a fall of 7.1% over the 1996 figure or a reduction of around US$8 billion dollars (Randel and German, 1998, p9). While a small increase in dollar terms occurred in 1999, aid levels were still 12% in real terms below that of 1992 (Randel and German, 1998, p15). While these figures in themselves present a rather negative picture, the situation was if anything worse,

with the former Soviet Union transformed from a major non DAC donor to a DAC recipient (Raffer, 1996, p64).

Aid Fatigue

A number of factors contributing to this decline in DAC aid commitment have been suggested. Firstly it is suggested that policymakers have overestimated an identified fall in support for aid by the public in donor countries and in response have reduced aid allocations. This apparent fall in support for aid has been labelled as aid fatigue, and it appears to consist of a syndrome-like collection of constituent elements.

The first of these is the relatively poor credibility of official development programs among the public of donor countries. Foreign aid has been roundly condemned by critics from diverging poles with the criticism based either on the idea that aid is unnecessary and that the market would do better anyway, or that aid is predominantly self serving and has also contributed to the rise and survival of corrupt and exploitative regimes in the South (Raffer and Singer, 1996, p18). Raffer and Singer (1996, p20) further suggest that public perceptions may also be damaged by reports of environmental or social disasters that ODA has helped finance. Examples here include the large dam projects financed by the World Bank, funding of transmigration projects that force unwilling migration and result in environmental despoilment. Public support may be further damaged based on a suspicion that the development assistance provided is disappearing into a black hole and wasted either by recipient countries that are not competent to use the assistance effectively, or that the donor country is using the assistance for narrow political gain. Constant grim and negative news on development issues in the media would only serve to reinforce this perception (Yankelovich, 1996, p57-58).

A second component of aid fatigue, an increasing concern with domestic problems, is suggested by a number of authors. One published paper concludes that domestic concerns such as increasing unemployment in the United States has contributed to aid fatigue and that there was potential for this to occur throughout Europe as public spending was reduced (ODI, 1994, p3). This is reinforced by Yankelovich (1996, p57), who asserts that along with growing interdependence and globalisation there has arisen a perception by the public in donor countries that domestic problems such as structural unemployment and the growing disparity between rich and poor are becoming more intractable and ingrained. DAC Governments therefore are under mounting pressure from this public sentiment and budget deficits, and are increasingly looking inward to meet domestic needs first. Certainly, budget deficits and recession appear to have an impact on public support for development aid. Economic constraints required as a precondition for monetary union appear to have reduced concerns for issues in the South within the European Economic Community (EEC). This also appears to be the case in Japan where their own economic problems along with those of their neighbours has led to stagnating public support for aid (Smillie, 1998, p24).

However Smillie (1996, p28) also suggests that the loss of public support for official development assistance is not the same as public support for helping people. Opinion polls cited by Smillie appear to display a picture of aid agency fatigue rather than fatigue with aid per se. Further evidence supporting this is given in the form of public financial support for NGOs, which appeared to be stable, or for some of the biggest, increasing in income.

Raffer and Singer (1996, p212) suggest that the fall of the Berlin wall and the departure of the Soviet Union as a threat may have in addition removed containment as one of the most compelling reasons for aid provision. Nijman (1995, p219) agrees with this at least as far as the United States of America is concerned but further suggests that the main official aid agency (USAID) was already suffering declining support. In addition, he posits that new geopolitical

goals such as expanding free-market and democratic communities have superseded those of the Cold War but appear to have done little to increase official aid spending

New Zealand's contribution to aid appears to have begun a trend toward reduction a little sooner than that demonstrated by other donor nations. The Third Labour Government of the mid 1970s saw New Zealand's aid contributions rising from 0.25% of GNP to 0.51% of GNP by 1975 which constituted a yet to be repeated high. From this point a gradual decline occurred as in other donor nations (Henderson, 1999, p289). By 1990 aid registered .21% GNP and placed New Zealand second to bottom of OECD donor countries (McKinnon, 1993, p268). It appears that the main reason behind this fall was a rather rapid deterioration in the trading situation of New Zealand rather than a disillusionment with aid per se. Hoadley suggests that the New Zealand public had a positive attitude toward aid in the late 1980s and cites a survey from 1987 that indicates 81% of respondents as identifying aid as either "fairly important or very important" (Hoadley, 1991, p204).

INCREASING HUMANITARIAN SPENDING.

While official foreign aid assistance levels may have been demonstrating a downward trend through the 1990s, there has been a pronounced upswing in the percentage of this money that has been devoted toward the category of emergency or humanitarian aid. In fact the rise in the allocation has been described as "soaring" by the OECD (Michel, 1996, pA44) and as "dramatic" (Randel and German, 1996, p19). Between 1970 and the mid 1980s, humanitarian aid spending had remained below the US$500 million per year mark. This increased in 1985 to USD$1 billion in response to the crisis in the Sudan and Ethiopia. The next major leap in spending appeared to coincide with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The number of humanitarian emergencies worldwide proliferated and changed in nature and composition. Whereas the

previous decade had seen humanitarian emergencies based primarily either on a natural disaster or on interstate war, the new emergencies were of a different type. These were given a new descriptor, Complex Humanitarian Emergencies (CHE), and were typified by a pattern of common characteristics. These included the coexistence of internal (civil) conflict along with extensive displacement of population, large-scale famine, failing or fragile social, economic and political structures, injury or death of non-combatants and infrastructure collapse.

As emergencies of this type became more frequent and widespread, the amount of aid funding devoted to the category of humanitarian assistance increased markedly as displayed in Figure 3.



Figure 3. Bilateral Humanitarian Assistance as a percentage share of bilateral ODA. Source: Development Initiatives, 2002.

A peak occurred in 1994, with the CHE in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Bilateral humanitarian assistance to these emergencies totalled USD$ 500 million and USD$ 1 billion respectively, and this pushed the percentage of

DAC development assistance devoted to humanitarian emergencies to 9 percent. The Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development report of 1996 reported that it was believed humanitarian spending had peaked in 1994 and was tracking down (Michel, 1996, p97).

This downward trend did continue through 1995-7 but reversed in 1998 and in 1999 reached a new all time high of almost 12% of DAC aid. The most recent figures (2000) suggest a slightly reduced amount for emergency humanitarian events, however the figures suggested remain well above those for the years 1995-1998 (DAC/ OECD, 2000). Figures for New Zealand spending reflect this trend with emergency aid reaching almost 6% of bilateral aid in 1994. This constituted an almost three fold rise from figures ten years previously (Randel and German, 1996, p236). However by 1999 these had dropped back to around 2-2.2% of bilateral aid (DEV/ MFAT, 2000 ;DEV/ MFAT, 1999).

However it is not only official development assistance that shows an increasing trend toward funding humanitarian emergency. Non-Governmental organisations spending and involvement in this area has also been on the increase. Oxfam, one of the largest international NGOs reported in 1995 that emergency or relief spending by the organisation had been steadily increasing over recent years and had reached the point where more than half of the total fund allocation was now directed toward this (Eade, 1995, p799).

In addition, a number of recently formed NGOs, both large and small have collected themselves around the provision of this form of assistance as their primary function (Lewis, 1998, p507), with *Medicine sans Frontiers* as a large well-known example of this. The propensity to work in this area among NGOs appears to be in large part associated with the relative security of funding that it entails. As already outlined, Government funding for emergencies is increasing rapidly in contrast with declining development spending in general. With increasing official financing of NGOs, it may be that emergency work is seen as more secure way of

sourcing funds. Private donors, a major source of funding for NGOs also appear to be more favourably disposed toward supporting emergency assistance work, with Smillie (1996, p28) suggesting that within the public's mind, the main rationale for aid is emergency relief.

The extent of public support for emergency assistance was vividly expressed during the 1980s with the massive popular support that was given to the Live Aid and Band-Aid events that were a response to the famines in Ethiopia. The mass appeal of the initial approach spawned a number of additional projects including Fashion Aid, Visual Aid, School Aid and over thirty others. These rapidly raised far more money than was normally expected from fundraising appeals (Lamaresquier, 1987, p197). The appeal of the immediacy and imagery of emergency like situations was not apparently lost on Bob Geldoff, the very public face of the Band Aid movement. In response to the question of maintaining public support engendered by Band Aid for long-term development he is quoted as saying "It's a problem. Development is boring. I find it boring. How do you make a compressor pump interesting? I can't go on television and talk about deficits and surpluses and irrigation. People would turn off" (Blundy, 1985, p10).

The importance of this is reinforced by German (1996, p110), who suggests that there is no doubt that the public is most responsive to raw need. Raw need also captures audiences where the news media are concerned. It could be said that the media have fuelled this responsiveness. Humanitarian emergencies have often been championed by the media with images of starving children and disaster. The South then becomes characterised as a region of wholesale need and disaster in the publics' eye.

DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY AS MERGING CONCEPTS.

Another feature of the evolving nature of foreign aid, particularly through the 1990's, has been the merging of the concepts of security and development. While the cold war period saw aid policy mediated by competing ideologies and overwhelmingly concerned with the relationships and connections between sovereign states, the post cold war era has, with the demise of alternatives to liberal democracy, seen the focus shift to relationships and tensions within states. Duffield (1998, p10) suggests that during the Cold War, the notion of security was implicitly tied to the ideological struggle of the time, and was thus characterised by military deterrence and by the formation of political blocs often supported by International aid. However with the end of the ideological tensions of the cold war,

> wider security objectives are now more concerned with the regional implications for stability, of such internal matters as poverty, crime, population growth, and so on. Insofar as current approaches to development cooperation also aim to address these conditions, there has been a merging of security and development concerns. Development is now widely regarded as the foundation of stability and, at the same time, stability has become the necessary basis for development. They have become complementary, interchangeable and mutually reinforcing categories.(Duffield, 1998, p9).

Aid has increasingly been credited with an ability to deal with and prevent conflict. Macrae (2001, p34) outlines the decline of aid in the 1990s and suggests that the inability of the aid industry to answer questions as to why it was needed spawned the search for a new aid paradigm. While the root causes of conflict had been debated during the Cold War, the analysis had remained divided between the two ideological blocs with the socialist camp arguing that external factors (colonialism and unfavourable trade terms) were the prime cause and the West focussing on factors internal to the state (poor governance, poor economic policy).

However it was in the context of Western ideological supremacy that the role of aid in relationship to conflict was examined and a consensus formed that suggested that internal factors (underdevelopment) were indeed the root causes of conflict and that "aid has the ability to address the problem of conflict"(p35). Aid then was seen as being able to promote development, reduce poverty, improve education and compensate those that were adversely impacted on by the development process.

Even more impressively aid has been credited with a new role since 11 September 2001. While thoughts of increasing foreign aid levels were for a long time seemingly unpopular in the United States of America, President George Bush Jr. has championed just this as an important ingredient in the "war against terrorism". In words that echo those of Truman in 1949, he states that:

> We must accept a higher, more difficult, more promising call. Developed nations have a duty not only to share our wealth, but also to encourage sources that produce wealth: economic freedom, political liberty, the rule of law and human rights (George Bush cited in Mendelson-Forman, 2002)

The Right Honourable Marion Hobbs as Minister responsible for NZAID has recently reiterated the importance of aid in relation to conflict. She suggests that:

> We give aid because as a developed country and a good international citizen, we should. But to be honest we also have a strong self-interest: New Zealand's security depends on the world being a safer and healthier place. Conflict and terrorism gain footholds where people are poor and desperate. We feel the effects through people-smuggling and terrorist attacks. (Hobbs, 2002)

ACTORS INVOLVED IN THE PROVISION OF AID

The State

Major changes have also become apparent in the channels through which aid is delivered, especially with regard to the actors favoured as agents of development and to whom development aid was distributed. Of course in the first instance, and through the 1950s and 60s, the nation state was the framework around which the development project was to be unfurled (McMichael, 1996, p31). The dominant theoretical basis on which the notion of development was founded was Modernisation, a construct that closely adhered to the historical experience of the West as it had developed, and which held the state as a central pillar on which this success had been built. Development then was seen essentially as a state-led process and as such the state was the legitimate recipient of aid. The recipient state then was charged with the responsibility of implementing the agreed or chosen program or project.

However by the 1970s the role of the state was under attack by the increasing wave of Neoliberal thought and ideology, accompanied by renewed emphasis on liberal democratic theory (Edwards, 1996, p2). The state was perceived with suspicion, and increasingly as a hegemonic and predatory entity. Government agencies were increasingly seen as ineffective and inefficient (Dolan, 1992, p203) to the point that, rather than being effective development agents, they were in fact a barrier to growth. Growth then was increasingly seen as being best achieved through the unfettering of the market and minimising the role of the state. This single prescription was seen as being universally applicable to both the First and Third Worlds.

Alternative Development

The 1970s also saw the rise of a new body of thought in development, the alternative development paradigm. A growing recognition within development circles that the development model pursued during the first United Nations Development decade had been excessively focussed on inanimate (macroeconomic) growth rather than the animate (human growth) gave rise to an increasing dissatisfaction with this approach (Brohman, 1996, p203). This new body of thought suggested that an alternative was necessary to the top-down approach that had hitherto characterised development initiatives.

As an alternative to the state centred model, this new approach was based on several critical platforms that focussed on a people centred approach. Local level development was stressed in contrast to the large national level programs instituted by the state. Here, rather than nationally defined priorities taking precedence, alternative development tended to stress priorities based on local identification. Where the state had pursued development programs and projects that were large scale such as industrial processes and electricity generation, the alternative approach stressed the appropriateness of development activities, favouring small-scale endeavours that were more in tune with the needs of local people, enabled them to participate, and were more easily managed and maintained by these same people.

Alternative development also differed from that attempted by the state in that it focussed more on coherence of development efforts at the individual, family and community levels, thereby distributing the benefits throughout. In contrast the state was seen as focussing its development efforts on a sectoral level with the aims and results of the program often conflicting with, or undermining efforts in another.

Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)

The combination of these factors (the rise of neoliberalism, increased focus on liberal democracy and the alternative development model) appear to have contributed to a trend that favours the allocation of development aid funds to another set of actors on the development scene. Non Governmental Organisations have proliferated since the 1980s in both the North and South. These organisations began to capture attention in the 1970s and became strongly associated with the Alternative development paradigm.

From the early 1970s through to the mid 1990s NGOs became increasingly visible development players in almost every country with their experience, expertise and conception of development being taken more seriously, culminating in NGOs gaining access to the United Nations System, the Bretton Woods Organs and to official Government committees (Tandon, 2000, p322). Brohman (1996, p254) suggests additional reasons for the increased popularity of NGOs among donors. These include a recognition that NGOs are innovative, dedicated and responsive due to their relatively flat organisational structure, but also that contracting out work to NGOs can tend to reduce criticism of official agencies as bloated bureaucracies and being excessively top-down in approach.

Edwards and Hulme (1996, p2) indicate that their popularity with official donors stems from not only their efficiency but also from their ability to act as "vehicles for democratisation and as essential components of a thriving civil society", important ingredients of the New Policy Agenda (neoliberalism and liberal democratic theory). Raffer and Singer (1996, p140) further suggest that the popularity of NGOs is in part due to the rise of poverty reduction as an overriding concern of development organisations. NGOs are perceived as having a more human face, are able to work at the grass roots more easily and tend to include the participation of local people in their work. These factors then are seen as being critical in reducing poverty by being able to reach the poorest of the poor. In

summary then, NGOs appear to exist as "the tidy counterbalance now said to mediate between state and market excesses" (Van Rooy, 2000, p310).

Government funding of NGO activity goes back to the 1970s according to Raffer and Singer (1996, p135), with virtually all Development Assistance Countries (DAC) having some form of funding mechanism for NGO instigated projects by 1979. However the dramatic increase in the flow of funds from official sources that now find their way to NGOs from both multilateral and bilateral sources began in earnest following the cessation of the Cold War. EEC (multilateral) aid to NGOs for example has doubled over the period of the 1990-1995 (Cox, 1997, p38). Bilateral aid from the UK to NGOs leapt by almost 400% in the ten-year period up to 1994/95 and in Australia, the dollar increase over the same period was from A$20 million to A$70 million (Michel, 1996, pA44).

A similar pattern of increased assistance occurred in New Zealand with voluntary agencies now accounting for 8% of total ODA up from 1.7% in 1993-4 (DEV/ MFAT, 2000). These figures demonstrate not only the increase in the flow of funds from official sources to NGOs but also the relative rapidity of the increase. While the extent of increases of funding to NGOs have been variable between donors, there seems a definite trend toward this. The apparent leaders in this allocation of ODA appear to be the Netherlands and Switzerland, with each allocating over 10% and 15% respectively of total ODA in this way as far back as 1993 (Michel, 1996, pA44).

Military Organisations.

More recently however there have been some moves to include a flow of aid money to the military by way of considering bids from them to conduct humanitarian and reconstruction work in Afghanistan (Barry and Jefferys, 2002, p1). Barry and Jefferys also suggest that this appears to be inevitable and a growing trend. Gordon (2001), while acknowledging the *ad hoc* nature of the

relationship, outlines the extent of this in Bosnia where the British Department for International Development (DfID) completed hundreds of small projects (under £ 20,000) in conjunction with the British Ministry of Defence. He also indicates that within the British forces that made up part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisations' Kosovo Force (KFOR), DfID had some form of representation at both Divisional and Brigade level. The inference here suggests the possibility that the military may become more fully recognised by donors as a useful agent through which projects can be implemented.

As will be outlined more fully in chapter 2, the military components involved in these relief and reconstruction situations increasingly appear to have been expanding the nature of their work to include tasks that have traditionally been seen as the preserve of civilian development agencies. This then suggests the need to evaluate the involvement of the military in this apparently new type of work. It has been suggested that perhaps we could look on the military as a development agency, and that the development community should be engaging with them more (Overton, 2000, p151).

The New Zealand Defence Force has been engaged in a peacekeeping role in East Timor since late 1999 and has been involved in a number of areas of activity that may be seen as additional to their commonly perceived security role. It has also apparently received funding from New Zealand Overseas Development Agency to support this type of work suggesting some further recognition of a development potential. This thesis aims to investigate this aspect of their work and to outline some of the issues that pertain to this involvement. In evaluating this work it is hoped to come to some conclusion regarding the applicability of the title "agent of development" to the New Zealand Defence Force deployment in East Timor.

SUMMARY

The provision of aid has been a formalised and institutionalised part of the relationship between the wealthy North and the poorer South for over fifty years. During this period it has served a number of purposes. It has been the driver behind attempts to modernise the Third World, it has served as a tool to enhance ideological supremacy and it has been used to bolster international reputations and standing.

The 1990s saw a decline in the fortune of aid as levels began to decline for various reasons. In addition, the much hoped for peace dividend that was expected to occur as a result of the demise of the Cold War also failed to materialise. At the same time, the portion of this assistance that was being devoted to relief and humanitarian efforts, and in particular emergencies based on conflict began to increase thus leaving relatively less for long term development initiatives. More recently aid has been identified as an important tool in attempts to prevent, end and deal with the consequences of conflict. While until the 1970's the main body through which aid money was channelled was the state, this began to change with shifting notions of development and economic theory. Non-Governmental Organisations gained favour from the late1970's and attracted increasing amounts of official aid funding. More recently, military organisations have been engaging in activities akin to those more associated with aid agencies and in some cases attracting aid money to do this work.

CHAPTER THREE

THE MILITARY AND AID

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to examine and describe the apparently increasing trend toward greater military involvement in the delivery of humanitarian or emergency assistance, and in subsequent post-conflict development work. The chapter will outline the changing nature of conflict since the Cold War and then examine both the increased use of peacekeeping and the broadening of this intervention. An examination of the possible reasons for increasing military interest and involvement will follow, including factors internal and external to the military. Following this, a description of several situations where the military have been involved in humanitarian and reconstruction work will be presented in order to demonstrate the type and extent of this input. The chapter will close with an outline of the debate that has arisen regarding increasing military involvement in what has hitherto been seen as a preserve of civilian agencies. This debate comprises a range of views from both within the military and outside of it.

While this chapter discusses the military in a general sense it is worth keeping in mind the point raised by Connaughton (2001, p14 2) who suggests the existence of "forces for courses" in which for a variety of reasons including training, organisation and equipment, certain military organisations tend to have attributes that may allow them to excel at certain things. He believes that this renders the tendency to treat the military as a monolith rather meaningless.

THE CHANGING NATURE OF CONFLICT.

The 1994 edition of an annually published review of aid was heavily focussed on the apparent trend toward increasing military involvement in the delivery of aid

and went as far as terming this the "militarisation of aid" (Randel and German, 1994, p30). Certainly, by 1994 there was a palpable military presence in the delivery of assistance in the context of an increasing number of conflicts that were breaking out following end of the Cold War. These conflicts appeared to differ in nature to those that had gone before in that they were characterised by their intrastate nature rather than being based on conflict between sovereign states.

Analysts differ on the reasons behind this apparent trend toward internal conflict though this appears to be based more on the degree to which the Cold War was directly responsible. Some suggest that conflicts of this nature were already on the increase prior to the end of the Cold War and that they were in effect masked by the nature of the East - West standoff. They suggest that what has changed is the public awareness of these conflicts now that the Cold War masking has been removed (Ayoub, 1995, cited in Minear & Guillot, 1996, p18).

However others suggest that the end of the Cold War is more directly involved in that it removed a sense of stability or relative balance that had been evident in the stalemate between the two major power blocs. This stalemate had, they believe, tended to suppress many nascent or pre existing ethnic or communal differences and had instead tended to generate conflict by proxy based on wider ideological grounds instead (Minear and Guillot, 1996, p178).

Teagle (1996) further suggests that the increasing international encouragement for democratic governance through the 1980s may have had an impact in unleashing internal dissent and conflict in areas where the perception of local people may have been that domestic efforts toward democratisation were either stagnating or failing. Other contributing factors identified by Teagle include many that would appear to have resulted from the acendancy of neoliberalism and the increasing use of structural adjustment programs. In addition, the end of the Cold War created a number of a number "Cold War orphans". These were formerly strategic countries that had once benefited from generous levels of aid

during the Cold War but suddenly lost this support as their position lost its stra tegic importance (Grant and Nijman, 1995, p217). These factors include serious economic problems, increasing income inequality and rapid exhaustion of valuable natural resources. The resultant hunger, rising migration and unemployment are the factors that guarantee unrest according to Teagle.

Another feature that was becoming increasingly apparent as this new trend toward internal conflict evolved was the nature of the warfare and fighting. While "traditional" war had been waged by recognised and organised military forces of an existing state power either on one side of the conflict or often on both, the "new" war was typically based on a breakdown of the state accompanied by "the breakdown of conventions and organisational forms of traditional interst ate warfare as armed political, social and cultural actors confront each other in a confusing collage of violence" (Gates, 1995, p4).

INCREASING HUMANITARIAN NEED.

Accompanying this changing nature of conflict has been the impact of conflict on the non-combatant civilian populations in the locale. While civilians have always been included in the casualties of war, the extent to which this is the case appears to have dramatically altered. In times of conflict in the past, civilians have often become direct casualties of conflict purely by chance such as by being caught up in the crossfire, or by being in the wrong place at the wrong time. However the new style of conflict appears to increasingly select civilians as the main and legitimate target. In the so-called ethnic clashes of Rwanda and Bosnia it was often the case that civilians were both the perpetrators and the victims of the violence. Figures of civilian casualties as a percentage of total casualties as sustained in World War One suggest a fig ure of 5%. This stands in stark contrast with the conflict situation in the 1990s, where the civilian casualty figure is typically around 95% of the total (Minear and Guillot, 1996, p18).

Targeting of civilians also extends to the use of tactics of terror and of scorched- earth policies as tools of war (Teagle, 1996, p2). These tactics can variously include actions such as systematic rape, forced removal of populations, destruction of infrastructure, damaging production of food supply, despoliation of water sources, torture and executions. Such tactics, while resulting in large-scale civilian casualty, also have the added impact of displacing large numbers of civilians either internally, or as in the case of Rwanda across national borders as well.

This increased level of conflict and the increasing impact of it on populations have tended to characterise and constitute much of the humanitarian need over the past decade. Naturally there have been disasters based on geological or climatic events but these have tended to become eclipsed by the events associated with conflict, or in some cases may even be aggravated by co-existing conflict as in Ethiopia.

EVOLUTION OF PEACEKEEPING

As a result of this new face of warfare and its impact on the civilian population, the depth and breadth of the international response to the subsequent crisis has been forced to increase. However not only have increasing percentages of total aid funding been devoted to this end as outlined in the previous chapter, but new players in the provision of aid have been called on to assist. These humanitarian emergencies based on complicated patterns of conflict have drawn an increasing military response in the form of peacekeeping, and it has generally been under this umbrella that military involvement in assistance with, or delivery of aid has been given.

Traditional peacekeeping during the 1950s and 1960s rarely contained any form of mandate or recognition of a humanitarian role for the peacekeeper.

However peacekeeping has evolved through the decades, with the international community and the UN increasingly recognising that the nature of conflict required a greater range of tools than traditional peacekeeping. Thus, the concept of peacekeeping broadened through the 1990s to include several recognisable variants on the traditional type. These may be defined as

- First Generation (Traditional) Peacekeeping- involves deployment of a UN presence in the form of military, police, and often civilian personnel. The aim is to allow the protagonists involved in the conflict a chance to separate with some confidence of not being attacked. This then allows conditions that are conducive to political settlement. As an entity of the Cold War period and the political constraints associated with it, the focus was on maintaining a status quo. Consent of all parties is necessary and the operation must remain impartial. The military mandate usually includes monitoring of existing peace arrangements.

- Second Generation Peacekeeping- Maintains the impartiality and consent bases of first generation interventions but also includes the possibility of other tasks such as preventative peacekeeping, electoral assistance and the protection of humanitarian supply delivery. This form of peacekeeping came into being following the end of the Cold War, and thus freed of the need to maintain superpower equilibrium, was more able to become actively involved in seeking a resolution through peaceful means. This form, as with first generation peacekeeping is sanctioned under chapter VI of the UN charter.

- Third Generation Peacekeeping or Peace enforcement- differs from peacekeeping in that forces can use measured but sufficient force to either restore peace, or if peacekeepers are threatened. The elements of consent that are needed in the previous forms are not required.

This model is sanctioned under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and is generally utilised in situations where factions in civil conflict refuse to consent to 1st or 2nd generation intervention or, if there is significant humanitarian need for intervention (Duffey, 2000, p120122).

- A further category of peacekeeping that is of more recent advent is peace-building, which may be described as activities designed to "reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war" (Brahimi, 2000). Peace-building is also described as "Action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict - rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife [and tackling the] deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression." (Boutros BoutrosGhali,1992).

The end of the Cold war saw a rapid rise in the number of peacekeeping operations mounted by the United Nations (see table 1). (Macqueen, 1999, p67).

	January 1988	**January 1992**	**December 1994**
Number of active missions	5	11	17
Number of troop contributing countries	26	56	76
Military personnel	9,570	11,495	73,393
Civilian police personnel	35	155	2,130
International civilian personnel	1,516	2,206	2,260
Annual budget ($US Million)	230.4	1,689.6	3,610

Table 1 UN peacekeeping missions 1988-94. Source: Duffey (2000)

Over twenty new peacekeeping operations of considerable size, and a number of smaller missions were undertaken by the United Nations between the late 1980s and 1990s (see Table 1). This constituted a massive increase in commitment when compared to the 45 year period following the formation of the United Nations which had resulted in only 15 peacekeeping missions, with this figure including 3 of very small size

Since the end of the Cold War, humanitarian need has on occasion been deemed so dire that deployment of military forces under United Nations auspices has been authorised expressly for humanitarian purposes and without any real peacekeeping function. Notable examples of this are to be found within the Rwandan and Somalian emergencies.

MILITARY PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE- SOME MOTIVATIONS.

A number of reasons are suggested in the literature to explain this increasing involvement of the military in the actual provision of assistance. Broadly, these can be divided into reasons either external to the military (i.e. outside factors that demand a response) or deliberate (i.e. based on factors and motivations internal to the military). An OECD report suggests several possible external motivations behind the involvement of the military in the provision of this assistance exist (OECD/DAC, 1998).

Political decisions culminating in a directive from government are likely to be the most powerful external factor in motivating, or rather inducing that countries military force to act in support of, or in actual delivery of aid. This decision may occasionally result from a request received from another nation but is ultimately the decision of the home countries' political power whether to deploy the military in support of this. The rationale behind deciding in favour of making such a decision is suggested as lying in the political benefit that may accrue to the state from

involving a national military in the provision of aid. It is suggested that these benefits in part lie in the need to appear to be doing something in the eyes of international and domestic constituencies when faced with desperate need (OECD/DAC, 1998). Military involvement in the provision of humanitarian assistance also appears to offer a visible and valuable image of action where there is in fact either an inability or unwillingness to provide a real political solution. Humanitarian assistance via the military then, can become a front, behind which exists a policy vacuum. However it is also suggested by Barry & Jefferys (2002, p8) that the opposite may on occasion also be true, such as when political and military intervention is implemented in the name of humanitarianism but in reality is driven by political motivations.

It seems true that consciousness of, and sensitivity to humanitarian issues has risen through the 1990s and is having a dramatic impact on politics internationally. Weiss & Collins (2000, p182) suggest that this has resulted in "Greater attention to humanitarian values from policymakers and practitioners (which) of course has not brought utopia, but it has made the world a more liveable place" This increased attention to humanitarian values has also in large part facilitated the use of the more interventionist forms of peacekeeping, where the sovereignty of the state is seen to be subordinate to the human rights of those within its jurisdiction (Downs, 1993, p9).

The 'CNN effect' has been widely written about and has led some to suggest that the ability of the media to report first hand, close up and in real time on these emergencies has a powerful impact on the viewers half a world away. The main premise of the 'CNN effect' is that the news media can form and dictate the policy within a given country by mobilising public opinion. It is suggested that this is much more likely where there is a foreig n policy vacuum or policy confusion as has been characteristic of the post-Cold War period (Robinson, 1999, p309). Several examples of this at work have been identified. These include the plight of the Kurds fleeing the forces of Saddam Hussein in Northe rn Iraq and the United States

of Americas action in Somalia via Operation Restore Hope. In both cases it is suggested that the political response was to a major extent driven by the publics exposure to media coverage of the situations (Shaw, 1993, p88). The use of the military appears to offer a solution in situations where a response is required to assuage the political constituency mobilised by the CNN effect.

An additional external motivation appears to rest in a perception by the military and their political masters that the actors that have traditionally been involved in the provision of humanitarian assistance and reconstruction have limited capacities with which to meet today's humanitarian crises (OECD/DAC, 1998). The nature, size and speed of situations of humanitarian need since the end of the Cold War has stretched and outpaced this capacity, resulting either in deficiencies in the amount or type of equipment available, or indeed to a shortage of agency presence. The gaps in coverage as a r esult then present themselves to the military as unmet need to which they are then forced to respond (Gordon, 2001). This motivation is also identified by Barry and Jefferys (2002, p6), who refer to it as a pull or demand pressure on the military. A recent example of this is currently occurring in Afghanistan where in response to insufficient international funding for reconstruction, the US Army is now having to focus less on security and instead turn its focus to reconstruction (Anon, 2002c, p20).

A further external and circumstantial factor exists in the direct request for assistance from humanitarian or development agents. While some agencies such as the International Council of the Red Cross will generally refuse to consider calling on the military in any situation, some are more willing and able to call on them to provide assistance in a number of areas. These calls for assistance were evident in the situation of Somalia, where a number of NGOs petitioned then United States President George Bush, suggesting that military assistance would assist greatly in the ability to get needed relief through to those in need. This call

apparently contributed to the subsequent decision by the United States to deploy troops in a supportive humanitarian role (Minear and Guillot, 1996, p34).

While the above factors paint a picture of the military becoming involved in humanitarian work almost by dictate of circumstance rather than design, there appears to be another school of thought that suggests that the increasing military involvement in humanitarian and reconstruction work is based on more deliberate organisational motivations or push factors. One element of this school of thought is based on the perception of a reduced need for militaries the size of those existing during the height of the Cold War. The recognition of a reduction in the number of threats to the sovereignty of nation states has had its sequel in the reduction of global spending on military budgets.

Between 1987 and 1994 global military spending fell by nearly 25%, with the worlds' 32 million soldiers (1990) being reduced by 2.2 million in the following three years and predictions made at the time of similar decreases to follow over the next three years (Minear and Guillot, 1996, p23). These changes appear to have occurred in both the second and first worlds. Military expenditures in the United States of America fell from $303 billion in 1990 to $263 billion in 1995, which represents a fall of 25% in inflation adjusted terms. Similar falls have also occurred in the former Warsaw pact nations and in Europe. While Third World military expenditures have not fallen as dramatically, there has none the less been a substantial reduction, possibly in part due to 'demilitarisation by default' as foreign military aid is phased out (Luckham, 1995, p53).

The aforementioned school of thought is based on the premise that increasing involvement in humanitarian work offers the military a new role which may stave off further funding cuts and redundancies thus maintaining the organisation. There have been indications that the search for new roles has also led the military to a much closer relationship with civil law enforcement agencies in

the United States of America in the fight against domestic crime (Andreas and Price, 2001, p33).

There are also supply or push factors that are based on the need to ensure any wider military or peacekeeping operation is a success. Rather than providing humanitarian or development assistance based solely on a perception of need, the driving force behind the assistance given may well be aimed at enhancing operational performance. Assistance given with this end in mind is commonly termed a "winning hearts and minds" exercise or "civil affairs project" These then are generally aimed at;

- Winning the trust and goodwill of the local population thus increasing the security of an area thereby reducing the level of threat to military personnel in the area.
- Maintaining staff morale through involvement in meaningful and helpful work.
- Generating positive publicity and reporting of the operation thereby maintaining domestic public and political support (Barry and Jefferys, 2002, p7).

Activities often included as part of a "hearts and minds" approach include medical care, provision of water and waste disposal, provision of electrical power and construction and repair of schools. These activities are seen as being very worthwhile by military planners in that the returns from them can easily outweigh the effort and cost of the inputs required (Slim, 1997, p123).

Gordon (2001), while reiterating the points made above, appears to suggest that not only are these civil affairs projects useful, but they have become an essential ingredient and occupy a "central role" in security operations. He traces the increasing importance of these in relation to the increasing number of "multifunctional" UN operations and an increased recognition of the need to take

into account various economic, environmental, social, political and humanitarian considerations when planning military operations.

A further motivating factor for military involvement in humanitarian and relief/reconstruction work is the benefit that may accrue to the organisation through being given an opportunity to become operational. For many militaries there may have been relatively few calls on their services and capabilities with an accompanying perception that without this "practice" skill levels may suffer (Macqueen, 1999, p84). The New Zealand Army as an example has had relatively little operational experience outside of peacekeeping since the Vietnam conflict. And in terms of size, the East Timor commitment has been the largest by the New Zealand Army in almost 50 years (Crawford and Harper, 2001, p168). For a number of less-developed countries there also appears to be a financial incentive to involvement in U.N operations. With the UN paying approximately $US 1000 per month per soldier this can become a useful source of foreign exchange given that soldiers pay may only constitute a fraction of this (Weiss and Collins, 2000, p50).

Involvement in humanitarian work may also be seen as a useful attractant whilst recruiting. Slim (Slim, 1997, p125) suggests that the British Army has in the past advertised for recruits by displaying images of soldiers engaged in humanitarian tasks "in an apparent effort to persuade would-be recruits to join up because joining the Army is really like joining an NGO". This element is also identified by Barry and Jefferys (2002, p8).

A final motivation may arise in the form of individuals within a military deployment. For one reason or another these people have offered their services and skills during off-duty time either in support of agencies already involved in provision of assistance, or on occasion have operated with like-minded colleagues in stand alone provision. According to Teagle, this may be construed as the

military having "the goodwill and motivation to engage in these new endeavours" (Teagle, 1996).

MILITARY PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE:SOME EXAMPLES.

The aim of this section is to demonstrate to some extent the nature of the humanitarian and aid work that has been undertaken by military forces in recent times. Of course the military forces of many countries have a vast and long experience in tasks that relate to civil affairs within their countries of origin. They are often used in situations of civil disaster such as earthquake or other natural disaster relief. Within New Zealand the military are often used in search and rescue operations, and on occasion even to rescue farmers stock during severe weather. However the 1990s did usher in the more systematic use of the military as both humanitarian actors and as agents involved in post-conflict reconstruction. It has been suggested that "The role that the military is now taking on during and after conflicts and in many countries undergoing transformation, puts it in many cases at the sharp end of the development process, with a role that encompasses relief, rehabilitation and development (Randel and German, 1994, p32).

The following examples will be drawn from military involvement in operations in Rwanda, Somalia and briefly Bosnia, which are often perceived as failures in the international response to such situations. However, the intention here is not to discuss the relative success or not of these missions. Rather, they merely act as the vehicle by which evolving and increasing military roles may be identified.

Somalia

Somalia increasingly came to world attention through 1991 and 1992 as factional clan-based fighting increased and any semblance of government disappeared. The conflict was initially focussed on Mogadishu, where in a short

period over 14,000 were killed and an estimated 30,000 were wounded, however it quickly spread to encompass most of Southern Somalia (Lewis and Mayall, 1996, p106) which forced many off the land as either internally displaced or refugees. Drought was also having a major impact on agricultural production and the rapidly spreading conflict exacerbated the effects of this as the farmer populations were terrorised and preyed upon by the clan bandits. Thousands left the land to become either internally displaced or refugees in neighbouring countries. It became clear that over 1.5 million people were at risk of starving to death (Macqueen, 1999, p72) and that the aid agencies working to deliver assistance to these were increasingly unable to so. The main reason for this was the interference of the relief effort by the clans and warlords. Heavy duties were placed on incoming aid cargo and looting of the same aid supplies became routine, with the proceeds of this going toward increasing the weapon stocks of the respective factions. Kelly (1997, para 7.10) suggests that in response, many NGOs had employed various armed factional elements as security with the International Committee of the Red Cross reportedly employing 20,000 armed guards. He further suggests that this fuelled the conflict and resulted in the NGOs being seen as only one more element in the mix, and one that could be exploited for political ends.

International attention resulted in the formation of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) to both monitor a ceasefire that had been announced between the clans and to protect the delivery of aid. This was however relatively unsuccessful given the scale of the problem and led to the deployment of well over 28,000 American troops and more than 5000 from other donating countries under the UN sanctioned Unified Task Force (UNITAF) (Lewis, 1996, p111). This operation was given a humanitarian mandate under the UN Security Council Resolution 794 to "establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia."(United Nations Security Council, 1992).

However the large American contingent were heavily constrained by restrictions imposed by the military command on just how far they could go with so-

called civic action programs. Direct provision of assistance by these troops was thus limited. Medical units that had been keen to do public health and immunisation work were thus prevented from doing so, and units that had demonstrated a desire to work in reconstruction were similarly limited. This resulted in much of the reconstruction activity American forces entered into being done with voluntary off-duty work and the use of materials nominally designated as "cast-off" or "discarded" (Kelly, 1997, para 7.23).

However the Australian battalion that was deployed to the Baidoa area was not constrained in this way and Kelly (1997, para 8.3) makes a number of comparisons while indicating the breadth of Civil affairs activity that the Australians became involved in. With a large number of NGOs in the area that the Australian force was responsible for, efforts were made to support their work. This involved the provision of security for both NGO compounds and relief convoys. Assistance was also provided by way of repairs to mechanical equipment and with technical advice and help with setting up and repair of communications equipment. Heavy lifting capability was also utilised by the NGOs to move large machinery and plant.

The Army also began to work in what may be described as community development. Here they facilitated the creation of a local committee of elders with which regular meetings were held to discuss community issues. Community development efforts were also undertaken by way of the formation of a local security force, essentially to fill the role of a police force. To compliment this, the army was also active in the development of the creation of a functioning judiciary through identification of individuals that had been employed in judicial roles prior to the collapse of the state and had not been implicated in the violence.

Reconstruction activities were also undertaken within the Baidoa area. These included renovation of police, prison and judicial facilities and the restoration of water supplies which was achieved through the army coordinating civil contractors and NGOs. Protection of the local waterway through the main town

was also taken by working with UN agencies to exhume thousands of bodies that had been buried along the water-course in shallow graves, the fear being that the rainy season may have led to an outbreak of disease (Kelly, 1997, para 8. 6-8.17).

Rwanda

The crisis in Rwanda of 1994 took place at a time of heightened use of peacekeeping as an international response to humanitarian crises. It has been suggested that the military involvement in this crisis was in fact a "watershed event in the international communities use of military forces in the humanitarian sphere" (Minear and Guillot, 1996, p13). Connaughton (2001, p188) further suggests that the importance of the Rwandan experience lies in the huge leap in understanding that developed between humanitarian actors and the military. The situation to which the international community responded to has been described as genocide based on the politicisation of ethnic divisions and triggered by the shooting down of the plane on which the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi were passengers. This then resulted in a mass exodus of people form Rwanda to surrounding countries, especially Zaire. During this period the outbreak of diseases such as cholera claimed many lives (Minear and Guillot, 1996, p116). Rather than just one UN mandated operation, the Rwanda situation entailed separate initiatives from French (Operation Turquoise), United States (Operation Support Hope) and the U.N. mission (United Nations Mission for Rwanda or UNAMIR).

A Supportive Role

The UNAMIR mission was originally conceived of as a more traditional peacekeeping presence having a prime role in promoting security, assisting with elections, demining and some scope for assisting in the coordination of the humanitarian effort that was commenced following the signing of the Arusha Peace Accords. However genocidal violence broke out following the signing that resulted in many of the aid agencies present in the country either repatriating international

staff or putting their activities completely on hold. During this period UNAMIR was, within the limits of its focus on the security situation, able to act in a supportive role to the agencies that had continued operations to at least some extent.

Minear and Guillot (1996, p82) suggest that this period was characterised by spontaneous cooperation between the mission and aid agencies. They further suggest that even though there was a severe lack of resources and funding, the mission concentrated 25% of its total budget to supporting the agencies. This support took a number of forms and included provision of fuel for generators and military escorts for aid agencies attempting to deliver relief supplies. The mission also negotiated access for agencies to carry out need assessments and provided some limited evacuation when necessary. The UNAMIR mission also contributed to civilian organisation vehicle maintenance and provided additional airlift of humanitarian supplies and people.

Direct Implementation Role

UMAMIR also carried out direct provision in its own right with a British contingent assigned a humanitarian brief. This eventuated into the provision of health assistance, in close cooperation with NGOs, for local people and refugees. Extensive road repairs were also undertaken to allow access by aid delivery vehicles. Local health facilities were repaired and made usable for NGOs, rubbish disposal sites were created and airlift for refugees and humanitarian supplies were supplied.

Other national contingents, while charged with a more military support role, used residual capacity and off-duty time to provide humanitarian assistance- engineers worked on water purification, health facilities catered for refugees and a signals unit worked to improve conditions in a large orphanage.

France sent in forces ostensibly to reinforce the efforts of the overwhelmed UNAMIR, though the mission (Operation Turquoise) was controlled autonomously

and remained a separate entity. Its contribution was mainly security orientated, and through successfully achieving this state in their area of operations they thus allowed space for humanitarian assistance to occur. It also contributed to the humanitarian effort directly by assisting with transport of supplies and information on security and pockets of extreme need. Direct humanitarian assistance was provided in the form of a medical unit with attached operating facilities, hospital and laboratory. Another health input provided immunisation, diagnosed disease and trained local health workers.

The United States contribution originated immediately following television depiction of the unfolding disaster in Rwanda. Operation Support Hope was designed specifically to support the humanitarian effort though it was present for only about five weeks. Major contributions included the provision of potable water equipment and transport facilities for humanitarian supplies and personnel (Minear and Guillot, 1996, p111).

Bosnia

The association between forces deployed in a peacekeeping role and their involvement in humanitarian work has been associated with a number of other missions. In Bosnia during the mid 1990s the military contributed to the distribution of relief supplies that may not have otherwise been delivered (Randel and German, 1994, p32). More recently peacekeepers deployed there have, as part of their brief, been involved with the task of underpinning the work being undertaken to further the civilian reconstruction process (NATO, 2001) and further, to the ambitious goal of building a new Bosnia. One view on this suggests "And it becomes clear that this is going to take a long time. It also becomes clear that if we're ever going to resolve this issue the military, as the most capable instrument inside Bosnia, will probably have to do more." (Public Broadcasting Service, 1999).

Flint (2001, p233) also identifies a certain change of focus within the civil assistance that has been provided by the military forces in Bosnia. This movement he suggests began with the provision of humanitarian relief and then moved a second phase of election and humanitarian support and reconstruction. The third phase he identifies includes involvement in longer–term programs such as repatriation, reconstruction, capital investment and civil institution building.

DEBATES ON MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN AID.

While military involvement in the provision of aid has been increasing since the end of the cold war, there has been debate regarding this trend both within the military and aid communities. The following section traces an outline of these, and includes perspectives of both proponents and opponents from within each camp.

PERSPECTIVES FROM AID AGENCIES

Humanitarian principles

Humanitarian actors and the military are certainly no strangers to each other. Slim (1997, p123-125) suggests that the relationship between modern day humanitarians and the military is nothing new and in a number of cases is as old as the humanitarian organisations themselves. In explaining this relationship he outlines the origins of a number of the better-known humanitarian actors of today. These organisations such as Oxfam, Care and the International Committee of the Red Cross were founded on the field of battle. He further suggests that a number of the personal qualities that are admired within each organisation are similar, these including courage, adventure, endurance, and organisational loyalty. However he also proposes that while there may be some similarities there are also some fundamental differences.

One of these fundamental differences rests firmly in the way the term "humanitarian" is conceived. For humanitarian actors, the term humanitarian implies the application of the foundation principle of impartiality, which in turn is composed of actions such as neutrality and independence. Assistance given under the rubric of humanitarianism then is seen to be given only on the basis of need and is not influenced by the recipients association with religious or political groups or on the basis of race or culture (United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), 1995, p7). Humanitarians view military interventions as being inherently partial as deployment is generally made to meet either military or political goals thus making principled humanitarian action on their part impossible. Further to this, humanitarian agencies see the increasing involvement of the military as potentially influencing the criteria by which the recipients of humanitarian assistance are identified (Barry and Jefferys, 2002, p11).

The issue of coercion and force that is sometimes associated with military involvement in the humanitarian sphere is also a major sticking point for humanitarian agencies, as many see the two as being totally incompatible. This then has ramifications for any potential collaboration between these organisations "in the field". While increasing involvement of the military in humanitarian assistance and aid delivery has often found them working in precisely the same settings as humanitarian agencies and in many cases doing similar tasks, there has been a conscious distancing between many agencies and the military. For a number of these agencies, any form of relationship with military forces is seen as having the potential to impinge on their neutrality and impartiality, especially in the eyes of respective combatants.

For some agencies it is the principle of impartiality that is paramount in their decision to avoid contact. However for others, while principles are important, it may be more practical impacts that are considered when contemplating a closer relationship with the military. While recognising that in some cases the use of

military support can enable humanitarian operations to proceed, some agencies however remain well aware that close association with the military may carry with it certain risks. These risks are generally conceived of in terms of the safety of the agency and its staff where through any apparent association with the military, their impartiality may be drawn into question. This has led to a number of cases where obtaining assistance from, or working with the military has led to aid agency personnel being seen as legitimate targets by groups opposing the political and military operation (Humanitarian Practice Network, 2001, p39).

Comparative advantage, utility and cost.

However the difficulties associated with principles of humanitarian actors are only one of the concerns that have arisen when military involvement in humanitarian work is contemplated. One of these additional concerns centres on the notion of the comparative advantage that the military can claim over that proffered by more traditional aid agencies and relates to the "filling the gaps" motivations as outlined above.

It is commonly perceived that the military's unique contribution and comparative advantage to the provision of aid, and humanitarian assistance in particular lies in their capacity to provide massive airlift services such as those that provided in support of Sarajevo and Rwandan emergencies (Minear and Guillot, 1996, p36). However, while recognising the vital role that military airlift played in saving life in a number of emergencies the OECD suggests that there have been changes within the international aircraft market and that military cargo planes and heavy lift helicopters from the former Soviet Union are now widely available. These are increasingly being made available on a commercial flight basis thus dramatically reducing the militaries comparative advantage in this respect. The report does suggest however that where airlift must be rapidly made available the military may retain some advantage (OECD/DAC, 1998). A similar situation also

appears to exist with regard to the advantage the military appear to possess in engineering capability such as construction of water supplies. Increased capability within the NGO sector would appear to have somewhat eroded the military advantage (OECD/DAC, 1998).

It is suggested that there are a number of areas where the military are at a considerable disadvantage when compared to civilian agencies in the same setting. These may be broadly described as the suitability of the organisation and its response to the to the needs of the local community and its impact on that community. Issues raised here include the advantages the civilian organisations have in getting to know the communities they are working in. The apparent tendency for military units to remain cut off in fenced compounds, from the community they are operating within for security reasons, is viewed in contrast with many civilian agencies who tend to live and operate within the community (Weiss and Collins, 2000, p35). Civilian agencies are then seen as being more able to identify with the community and work with existing local abilities and resources (OECD/DAC, 1998).

A further issue that is seen as putting the military at a disadvantage is the tendency for the solutions offered by civilian agencies to be more appropriate to the situation. Military resources are often seen as being too high tech in nature to the problem they are applied to, and are designed for and more applicable to war fighting (Slim, 1997, p135). One commonly cited example from Rwanda is the provision of military water supply equipment that is designed to supply very high quality water for a small number of people whereas what was really required was adequately treated water for large numbers of refugees.

A similar situation also appears to be the case for military provision of healthcare. Military medical facilities are seen as primarily being configured for attending to the needs of adult male wounded soldiers and need considerable adaptation to be able to meet the needs of large civilian populations that contain

women, the elderly and children. In addition it is pointed out that the supplies tha t military health facilities have do not generally contain the medicines that are often needed such as oral rehydration salts (Barry and Jefferys, 2002, p13).

When the issue of the relative cost of military provision of aid is concerned it appears that most commentators believe that civilian provision is in general the cheaper option. One example of this is the cost of military airlift in Goma which one study suggests was between 4-8 times as costly as comparable civilian operations. The reason for this appears to originate in the safety margin within which the military operate. Rather than being configured for efficiency, military airlift is designed to be failsafe (OECD/DAC, 1998) and therefore operates on below capacity payloads.

Health facilities provided by the military are also seen as being excessively costly in addition to the inappropriateness discussed above. Barrie and Jefferys (2002, p13) outline the relative costs giving the example of medical facilities provided for a refugee camp in Albania by the Austrian army. This facility apparently cost $12 million and with a camp population of between two and three thousand this equated to between four and six thousand dollars per person. A further example is given where 60 people staffed a British field hospital operating during the Rwandan crisis, where a comparable NGO facility may have only one or two staff.

While the military may be seen as the expensive option when compared directly with civilian efforts there are however a number of considerations that may reduce this differential. Of importance here is the idea of the incremental cost of military provision of aid. When a military force is already deployed in a security, peacekeeping or humanitarian role (and the fixed costs are attributed to the defence budget) then the marginal cost of using that force for aid activities may make it far more cost effective. As an example of this, the British Department for International Development has previously used British troops as implementing

agents for projects and has found that the costs charged by the military are competitive with those of NGOs (OECD/DAC, 1998). In addition, a considerable amount of aid work done by the military may be met from defence funds and not charged to development assistance budgets at all therefore allowing them to stretch further.

Some go as far as to suggest that this may in fact be a manifestation of the peace dividend that had excited the development community at the end of the Cold War (Minear and Guillot, 1996, p22), although it would appear that few would have anticipated its appearance in this form. However these additions to the aid budget may be offset when military budgets are increased to allow for aid activities with aid budgets being reduced accordingly.

A further issue, and one that would appear to be difficult to quantify is that of the increased visibility that military involvement tends to bring to a situation. Minear and Guillot (1996, p38) believe that this visibility has in the past contributed to both increased public interest and a concomitant increase in resources available for the situation in question. As a result, spin-offs that would be otherwise be unavailable may occur for other aid organisations such as NGOs.

Security

With the increasing coincidence between conflict and humanitarian need, the issue of security has become a factor that in many cases cannot be ignored. As noted above in the case of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Somalia, even organisations that normally eschew involvement or even association with the military have, on recent occasions had to confront the fact that without security, many operations may be untenable. Lack of security in Somalia led to humanitarian supplies being stolen or hijacked and subsequently being used to support the fighting. Other aid organisations working in situations that have a conflict component report an increase in the number of attacks on their workers

and suggest that the notion of impartiality that has been protective in the past is no longer respected (Bryman, 2001, p107). Therefore a number of aid agencies have recognised the importance of security to both the well -being of their staff and to the project they are working on (Slim, 1995). Unsurprisingly, it is in the area of supportive security that that the military is seen as having its greatest advantage.

However this advantage is tempered by a couple of important factors. The first of these relates to the politically unacceptable situation of military forces sustaining casualties. Where fatalities in the field are sustained, decreased political will may well result from a fear that domestic public support for the operation in question may fall. Such a scenario can result in the precipitant withdrawal of forces as happened in Somalia (Findlay, 1996, p23). This phenomenon of casualty aversion has led to the paradoxical situation of the military, as a political tool, being put in a situation where they are least able to do what they are supposedly best at. As an example, the US force sent to assist in Rwanda was not permitted to leave the security of Kigali airfield even though NGO staff were driving alone through the countryside. Similarly, the Japanese were reluctant to provide assistance within the refugee camps (Minear and Guillot, 1996, p150) These restrictions are described as both unnecessary and a source of embarrassment to the military and also severely limiting their utility (Connaughton, 2001, p37).

Another limitation on the military in attempting to provide security is the mandate they are given to operate under in UN or UN sanctioned missions. Under the specific mandate issued for particular situations, the military are given either greater or lesser powers to use force. Hence UNAMIR forces in Rwanda were legally not able to provide the level of protection they may have been capable of when the situation there deteriorated (Weiss and Collins, 2000, p172).

A final issue that has been identified with increasing military involvement in the provision of aid is that of a perceived difficulty on the military's part to work in a

way that may be described as developmental. In large part this difficulty is seen to result from the recognition that the military are usually deployed for a limited period of time as set by their governments or mandate. Rather than having an "end state" in mind as do most aid organisations, the military have been criticised for having a much greater focus on an "end date", with the result being aid work that is time – limited and therefore more palliative than solution (Flint, 2001, p245). Flint however detects some change in approach, with the Stabilisation Force in Bosnia (SFOR) increasingly talking in terms of "end state" It has been suggested that the approach of most armies when engaged in aid work is akin to charity, where they "do something for people rather than with them, and not to think much about the long-term management implications of what they construct or repair" (Slim, 1997, p137). International troops are also generally not all that well versed in knowledge regarding development so that principles such as popular participation and areas of focus such as community development are not generally of wide currency. Rather the hierarchical nature of military institutions tends to favour a top-down approach, which is seen as a factor that militates against a developmental approach (Weiss and Collins, 2000, p57).

MILITARY VIEWS

Debates regarding increasing military involvement in these non-traditional roles are also evident within military establishments. For some the ability to do this type of work has been greeted with enthusiasm (Bellamy, 2001) and pride as exemplified in the comments of United States General Anthony Zinni when he suggested that "We can still kick ass but we can also feed kids" (Zinni cited in Minear and Guillot, 1996, p37). This apparent enthusiasm is however not shared by others that have strong reservations about the appropriateness and more importantly the impact on the troops of engagement in non-traditional roles. A former U.S. Secretary of Defence has stated that "We field an army, not a Salvation Army" (William Perry, cited in Minear and Guillot, 1996, p37). For some,

this work is seen as having the potential to distract or shift the focus from what they see as the core role of the military, which is to fight wars (Slim, 1997, p138).

Concerns have also been widely voiced about the ongoing impact of these operations to reduce the capacity of soldiers to do their main job, in some cases t o the point where it has been suggested that remedial retraining may need to be given to undo the damage. Weiss and Collins cite a British colonel as suggesting "You have to shake people who come out of peace support operations. They are slow, patient, concerned about proportionate use of force, show consideration...These skills are not suited for warfighting". (Weiss and Collins, 2000, p122). Others suggest that involvement in peacekeeping and humanitarian activities tends to sap morale and has a damaging effect on re-enlistment rates though views suggesting the opposite are also to be found (Wood, 2001).

Suggestions that military organisations should begin specialised training for what is seen as an inevitable increase in demand for this role is also interpreted differently. Many militaries have already begun specialised peacekeeping training that including components that focus especially on civil assistance (Gordon, 2001). However others suggest that this is unnecessary and that the skills possessed by conventionally trained soldiers "still imbued with the warrior ethos" are the most effective peacekeepers and can still effectively engage in civil assistance work (Bellamy, 2001).

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS.

In general, the relationship between the civilian aid and development community and the military has been characterised by a degree of mutual suspicion and dislike, based in part on the factors discussed above, the vastly different structures, and the organisational and cultural differences in the respective groups. Where military organisations tend to favour hierarchy,

discipline, strong leadership and clearly focussed task execution, NGOs are generally more participatory and have a flatter more consensual decision-making structure. UNHCR (UNHCR, 1995, p26) note that military precision and civilian flexibility can often clash on joint operations. NGO reliance on donated funds tends to make them more responsive to donor needs, financial limits and public image. Thus their focus may rapidly change, leading to the military perception of them as lacking direction and leadership.

This relative ignorance of each others position is identified as an impediment or handicap to better relations by Flint, (2001, p246). A number of initiatives that aim to address this difficulty have however been taken. UNHCR has for example published a handbook that is designed to reduce misunderstanding and to better inform the military of the role of humanitarian organisations such as itself. In addition a number of joint conferences and workshops have been held with an aim of dealing with these issues (Wilton Park, 2001).

For Gordon (2001), there is a need for professionalising the provision of civil assistance within military forces. He believes that the professionalisation of Civil Affairs within the British Military is likely to go some way toward mitigating some of the difficulties associated with the relationship with civilian aid organisations. While acknowledging a number of problems likely to be encountered with increased professionalisation, he suggests that this may have the effect of reducing the somewhat ad hoc nature of approaches to assistance to date. He also suggests that professionalisation may reduce programming and project failures as a knowledge base is developed. Rather than this turning militaries into "quasi-humanitarian organisations" he believes it may actually serve to limit the intrusion by the military into areas best attended to by civilian organisations. It may also introduce a group of "interlocutors" that may create greater understanding of the distinction between military and humanitarian activities.

SUMMARY

The 1990s have seen the increasing involvement of various military organisations in the provision of aid and most obviously in the context of the rash of intrastate conflict that has been evident since the end of the Cold War. This chapter has outlined some of the issues that have surrounded this involvement. The nature of the new conflict and its attendant humanitarian impact has been noted and an evolution in peacekeeping as a response discussed. Several examples of military involvement in providing aid have also been outlined. Finally the opinions civilian organisations and the military themselves have been identified in relation to this issue.

This then presents what may be described as a mixed bag of opinion regarding increasing military involvement in assisting civilian populations with relief and reconstruction activities. There appear to be a number of possible motivating forces behind involvement in this work, and as well as some disquiet among the aid community regarding military involvement in aid work there are similar reservations among some in the military. Relationships between the military and other development actors have as a result of the above factors been characteristically poor, though some attempts to mitigate this have been attempted.

CHAPTER 4

AID, CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to outline the response of aid agencies to the increasing occurrence of conflict that became evident through the post Cold-War period. The chapter begins with a description of the two main divisions that have characterised aid and then progresses to an outline of the debate that occurred regarding the relative merits of these two approaches in relation to dealing with the response to conflict and the increasing interest by the development community in working in an area that had hitherto been largely the preserve of relief organisations.

The focus of the chapter then shifts slightly to focus more specifically on the area of post-conflict reconstruction that has become an important foci of the aid response. The nature of institutional approaches to this will be described and some of the tasks of post conflict reconstruction will be outlined. Finally some of the issues and debates regarding current approaches to this area of work will be covered.

DEVELOPMENT AND RELIEF

Development

Definitions of development are, to say the least, multitudinous. They demonstrate a huge variety of often-contradictory descriptions of a single phenomenon, which would at times suggest the discussion was centred on different topics. For Robert Chambers it appears sufficient to describe development as simply entailing a process of "good change" (Chambers, 1997 p.xiv). Others however attempt to describe development in a more detailed

manner. Rist (1997) devotes a full chapter to the problematic issue of definition and others avoid attempting the feat at all. Consensus is rarely reached, suggesting that development as a concept defies description and thus prescription.

While the absolute definition of development may be difficult (impossible) to establish, it is nonetheless useful to have at least a working or partial definition, if only to establish a point of difference with other concepts under discussion. From the way development implementation has been attempted in the past and by looking at various definitions one can at least decipher a common thread that perceives development as a process that takes some time. In addition development is generally seen as something that includes more than just the maintenance of life but includes concepts of sustainability (economically, environmentally, socially) and empowerment of the people concerned (Simon, 1999, p19). Another definition suggests that development is "a normative process of becoming: a series of interconnecting movements leading from poverty and vulnerability to security and well-being" (Duffield, 1994, p38). This definition, and the descriptions above imply that the nature of development is a slow and deliberate process that entails more than just maintenance of life but moves toward achieving a change in the fundamental situation of life.

Humanitarian and relief regime.

Humanitarian or relief assistance was through the 1990s the international community's main response to complex political emergencies. Humanitarianism is once again not easy to define and is often used somewhat interchangeably with the concept of relief aid, the main difference appearing to consist of a particular ethical code that informs humanitarianism. As with development, there is no single definition of humanitarian assistance however Davis (2002, p42) suggests that humanitarian assistance may be seen as embodying the idea that there are universal needs for food, shelter and conditions for dignity. Humanitarian

assistance therefore attempts to meet these needs in a way that is not influenced by political positions or ethnic group but purely on the basis of need. While humanitarianism is based on principles that Davis suggests are unchallengeable (p42) it does have in common with relief aid the idea that its basic aim concerns the provision of such goods and services as are needed to sustain life or relieve suffering.

Examples of relief work include assistance that ranges from tents to tetanus shots and from sustenance to sanctuary. Commonly featured among this work is the provision and distribution of food aid and potable water, the provision of medical assistance especially in the midst of disease outbreaks and the allocation of tarpaulins and the like for construction of emergency shelter following a disaster. Relief then may be broadly described as the provision of a palliative input into a situation of need. What is also important to note however, is that the time frame that informs relief operations is usually comparatively short. This is not to say that relief always occupies only a brief window of time as on occasion it may continue for a considerable period, as the recent history of Ethiopia would testify. But even where this is the case, relief work has appeared to be framed within a short-term outlook.

RELIEF WITH DEVELOPMENT.

While the approach of the international community in dealing with issues of conflict during the early 1990s had essentially been based on the use of relief and humanitarian intervention, the middle of the decade saw those agencies that were associated with development concerns suggesting that a new approach was needed and reasserting the importance of their role.

The mid 1990s saw the emergence of a critique levelled at the excessive reliance on the relief regime in dealing with the upsurge emergencies. Instead it

was suggested that an approach that included developmental elements was more appropriate. This critique of the heavily relief based focus was based on several main elements. Firstly, there was an increasing recognition that emergencies and the response by way of emergency relief could divert funds from local institutions or create new chains of command, which may be less responsive to subsequent development need. There was also a fear that dependence could build on the provision of relief, which could impact on later dev elopment. In short, relief funding could have an undermining effect on later development potential.

Secondly, the linear progression model of relief to development in use was in many cases too simplistic for many situations. The notion of the smooth relief to rehabilitation to development continuum, where the normal process of development was temporarily interrupted by a disaster or conflict but could resume once the disaster had been resolved was increasingly discredited. For many poor people, uncertainty and the risk of crisis was recognised as the norm thus rendering the separation of relief and development as meaningless. This was particularly so for those involved in areas associated with conflict which can become chronic and where uncertainty abounds (Buchanan-Smith, 1994, p3).



Fig 4 The Relief to Development Continuum concept.

Thirdly, criticism was levelled in the form of recognition that pure relief had not only the potential to, but actually had in some cases fuelled war through relief assets being stolen to provide the wherewithal to procure further weapons, to feed or treat combatants, to attract new recruits or merely to deny the goods to those in need but from an opposing faction or party (Weiss, 2000, p133).

Organisations associated more traditionally with development further suggested a legitimate interest and role in conflict and its mitigation based on the recognition that conflict decreases living standards, destroys human, economic and social capital and undoes or cancels decades of development (World Bank, 1999).

While much of the criticism suggested a real concern with the issues noted above, Duffield believes that another motive also had a large part to play. He suggests that the increasing attention being paid to the rise in emergency situations had been accompanied by a concomitant rise in aid flows in their direction. The real basis for the criticism of relief and the suggestion that linkages be made between relief and development in his view lay in an argument about resources. The organisations that had traditionally been associated with development were "fearing for their existence" and had been "forced to argue their centrality in a space that, in the past, was willingly abandoned to relief" (Duffield, 1994, p40).

However the idea that relief and development could be linked seemed a particularly attractive one. It was suggested that if relief were more developmental in approach it could mitigate some of the negative consequences that had been attributed to it and at the same time reduce the dependence on international aid and better empower people to be more resilient when challenged by shocks in the future (Macrae, 2001, p29). Similarly, development approaches could become more attuned to the realities of the environment of conflict. The importance of this was particularly relevant in the case of many emergencies resulting from conflict as

they did not conform to the natural disaster model and time frame that tended to drive emergency efforts (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1994, p11).

This has given rise to an intermediate form of assistance variously known as transition or rehabilitation (see Figure 5). This is seen by many as the "essential bridge between relief and development – a process, once the immediate cause of a disaster has passed, of restoring a country to something approaching or better than its pre-disaster state" (White, 2000, p322). However the concept appears to have suffered from a lack of clarity and it continues to be the subject of a great deal of debate, with different agencies adopting their own interpretations (Green, 1999, p192).



Figure 5. The late 1990s view of the relationship between relief, rehabilitation and development in the stages of post-conflict reconstruction (Adapted from UNDP, 2000)

Suggested approaches to linking relief and development included the need for earlier intervention to preserve livelihoods or to protect development assets

such as livestock. It was also suggested that early intervention might also increase development-relief linking strategies such as investing in infrastructure creation through the use of work for food schemes, where early commencement can engage people before they become too weak to work.

IMPEDIMENTS TO LINKAGE

However while the concept proved very attractive in theory, a number of problems appeared in implementation of linkages between the two forms of assistance on the ground and as a result progress has been slow. Institutional makeup of the myriad of aid agencies and funding arrangements by donors have been identified by Munslow and Brown (1999, p207) as major impediments to a closer linkage.

Institutional Makeup

In large part the difficulties appear to lie in the fact that the aid community remains heavily influenced by the institutional division between organisations that traditionally deal with either relief *or* development. This is generally the case for the International Governmental Organisations such as the U.N. that has organs that deal with development (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and World Food Programme (WFP)) or with humanitarian and relief work such as United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and UNHCR. While some of the larger NGOs may deal with both relief and development, there is however a strong tendency for those organisations to operate separate divisions that tend to specialise in one or the other (Munslow and Brown, 1999, p209).

This separation may be further reinforced by the presence of particular organisational principles. In particular, most humanitarian organisations base their

work on a philosophy and set of guiding principles that set them apart from other aid agencies. These principles, already alluded to in chapter two include:

- Humanity: Human suffering should be relieved wherever it is found. The inherent dignity and other human rights of individuals and groups must be respected and protected.
- Impartiality: Humanitarian assistance should be provided without discrimination. Relief must address the needs of all individuals and groups who are suffering, without regard to nationality, political or ideological beliefs, race, religion, sex or ethnicity. Needs assessments and relief activities should be geared toward priority for the most urgent cases.
- Neutrality: Humanitarian relief should be provided without bias toward or against one or more of the parties to the political, military, religious, ideological or ethnic controversy which has given rise to the suffering. Humanitarian actors must not allow themselves to become allied with a party to a conflict.

  (United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 1995)

More recently the Sphere Project has created what is essentially a voluntary charter for humanitarian organisations, which aims to provide working guidelines based on the above humanitarian principles.

This then creates a bifurcation with certain organisations or branches of organisations having mandates that either "stop at relief or start at development" (Munslow and Brown, 1999, p209). The continuing difficulties associated with this division of speciality have been identified by a report that synthesises and summarises the humanitarian response to a number of international emergencies. This report (ALNAP, 2001) clearly identifies the continuation of "...an unclear division of responsibilities between humanitarian aid and development agencies" which can result in a "grey area" or a gap in provision.

Funding

Traditionally there have also been separate windows of funding for relief work and development activities with donors allocating to each according to their own criteria. Through the 1980s and 1990s conditionality on aid tended to reinforce this separation. This created a situation where development type assistance was reserved for those Governments deemed to have good human rights and governance records and constituted a form of legitimacy to them. For the rest, humanitarian or relief assistance was seen as sufficient as anything more could be seen as legitimising a politically unpalatable regime, or supporting a regime of dubious domestic legitimacy. The example of Sudan is instructive of this where financial assistance has been generally restricted to humanitarian aid as there has been an absence of anything that approximates a legitimate authority (Green and Ahmed, 1999, p194). Collapsing the distinction between relief and development as suggested then could change their distinctive political meanings and connotations contained within each thus giving donors less manoeuvrability with which to send suitable messages.

POST CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

Post conflict reconstruction as with other areas associated with conflict has become a major area of work for the aid community through the 1990s and into the new millennium. The task of reconstruction is seen as encompassing a range of activities that contain aspects of an emergency operation along with the necessity of recognising where interventions fit into long-term development (Cullen, 1998, p4).

Given the often-immense destruction of infrastructure, disruption of life and displacement of people, the nature of the task of reconstruction can often appear to

be all encompassing. While it should be stressed that each instance and locality must be recognised as having unique and particular needs, there appear to be a number of common features also. These tend to be broadly categorised as areas of focus that specific activities can be directed toward. The areas include the issue of physical reconstruction, social rehabilitation, demobilisation, reintegration and resettlement, political rehabilitation, economic rehabilitation, justice and security. While there may be broad agreement on areas to which attention needs to be paid and recognition that they are all mutually reinforcing there is however often considerable debate as to exactly how each should be addressed.

Physical reconstruction

Damage to physical infrastructure has always been a sequelae of conflict and the repair of this damage was a central focus of the first major reconstruction effort in Europe following the second World War. Damage to infrastructure in the modern wars can be extremely systematic and can be almost total. Repair to infrastructure is seen as being an essential ingredient to the restoration of any economic recovery but also has a role as a so-called confidence building measure. In this, reconstruction of infrastructure is seen as being able to remove the visible reminders of the conflict and at the same time act as a tangible sign to those living in the region that progress toward a better life is being made (UNDP,2002). Repair of infrastructure is also seen as having an impact on the ability of the administering authority to provide services and to gain credibility (UNDP, 1999). Rebuilding of infrastructure can range from assistance with rebuilding housing, road networks, essential services such as water and electricity supplies, communication facilities and health and education infrastructure.

Social rehabilitation.

Conflict is recognised as having a particular ability to destroy or disrupt existing social organisations and often replace them with others that are inappropriate following the cessation of conflict. Restoring or strengthening the fabric of society in the post-conflict setting may be seen as one area of activity for outside agencies however the best approach to this appears contentious (Cullen, Mendelson-Forman and Coletta, 1998, p8)

The aftermath of a violent conflict is often characterised by deep divisions in the society ranging from within family groupings through to wider societal divisions. In addition may be the near total disintegration of the institutions of civil society and occasionally their replacement with groups that are totally inappropriate when conflict has ceased. It is the existence of these civil society structures that often are critical to the voices of local people being heard and accounted for by any central authority in the reconstruction planning and process and it is suggested that the process of mending relations and restoring a sense of trust and community between individuals is critical to the whole post-conflict process (War Torn Societies Project (WSP), 1998). However a direct return to the societal framework of old may not necessarily be possible, as the experience of conflict may well have created a situation where some of the pre-conflict norms may have altered. Examples of this that have been encountered include increases in the number of female-headed households or of women who may have participated in new roles during the violence (Green and Ahmed, 1999, p204).

In recognition of the importance of civil society one of the tasks of post-conflict development involves the strengthening of the societal fabric. Approaches to doing this generally involve increasing citizen participation and nurturing of civil society groups. However the danger recognised in this approach lies in identifying which groups to empower as some may have no real interest in a long-term cessation of conflict (Cullen, Mendelson-Forman and Coletta, 1998, p8). The

example of Somalia with its complex of clan and lineage groups is given as a situation where it may be difficult to identify suitable groups to work with. Similarly the Interahamwe, one of the groups involved in the genocide in Rwanda was a legitimate civil society group, but reflected only one set of community attitudes and exemplified the violence and genocide of 1994. Pugh (1998) suggests there is an additional danger in participation being used by outside agencies to empower only organisations and groups that are committed to externally determined aims thus resulting in an externally driven form of social engineering.

Other important components of assisting the rehabilitation of societal fabric include a media capable of allowing a free and fair flow of information, support for previously marginalized groups and a process of reconciliation without which any attempt to reconstruct a society is likely to fail.

Demobilisation, Reintegration and Resettlement.

The demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants is seen as essential as these processes are a necessary precursor to the development of a civil society by reducing the fear and increasing a sense of security. The process generally involves the disarmament of fighters and the dismantling of control and command structures along with strict control of small arms and other weapons. Reintegration however is often challenging as fighters may have few skills other than those they have used in combat and possibilities for employment in post-conflict settings are often small and therefore can depend considerably on improved macroeconomic performance There may often be some scope for the integration of former combatants into reconstituted or reformed security apparatus (eg army, police, customs) however this is unlikely to provide employment for all. Other issues that can complicate the process of demobilisation and require special treatment include the presence of women fighters and child soldiers

The case of demobilisation of forces in Eritrea is cited as a success at least in the short term (Rock, 1999, p132-133). The process was based on voluntarism and involved the provision of payments to the ex-fighters along with provision of food for between six months and one year with both being dependent on the duration of service. In addition the creation of an office for demobilised fighters was set up to provide ongoing practical assistance and psychological counselling.

The repatriation and reintegration of refugees is also a major feature of post-conflict work with many thousands of people often involved either as internally displaced populations or often as international refugees. These international mass movements of people are often seen by host nations as presenting a major security threat in their own right as was the case in Zaire following the genocide in Rwanda. The presence of around 1.8 million Rwandan refugees within their borders gave rise to forced expulsion by the Zairian authorities premised on the belief that they constituted both a security threat and economic burden (Minear and Guillot, 1996, p169). Similar fears were also expressed in late 2001 by countries bordering Afghanistan, which expressed fears of widespread destabilisation, a major economic burden and the possibility that refugee populations could contain "emissaries of different international terrorist organisations among them" (IRIN, 2001).

While repatriation and reintegration of refugees has traditionally been attended to by humanitarian organisations and often seen solely as a matter of getting returnees across the border, this is increasingly recognised as an incomplete approach. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) recognises that without accompanying development programmes that attend to more than just immediate needs, reintegration is likely to be less successful and the resultant poverty and pressure on resources may lead to the undermining of any fragile peace. Tapscott note this in the case of Namibia, where the physical repatriation was a success story but the subsequent reintegration into society and the labour market "proved to be one of the biggest disappointments of

the entire independence process, and may in the long run undermine efforts to forge a more equitable and politically stable society" (Tapscott, 1994, cited in Lewis, 1999,p198)

Reintegration is further complicated by the attitudes of those that remained, with the assistance given solely to refugees creating resentment along with returnee claims over property they once abandoned that was subsequently taken over by those that remained behind (UNHCR, 1993, p112-114).

Governance / Political Rehabilitation

Following conflict it is often the case that a country may either have neither legitimate governing structure in place nor any agreed process by which to determine legitimacy and construct such a structure. It has been suggested that this may be one of the more difficult tasks involved in reconstruction as it is often contested by the conflicting parties or the process is undermined by those that may have a vested interest in continued conflict. Further difficulties may arise where participation by the population is impeded by conflict and often pre-conflict conditioning that has seen deferral to those who demonstrated authority through armed intimidation (Orr, 2002). In some cases it has been deemed necessary to provide interim governance through a transitional authority (such as the UN in Cambodia and more recently United Nations Transitional Authority East Timor (UNTAET) in East Timor) prior to the formation of a locally produced legitimate regime.

The path toward forming a legitimate regime is usually by way of transparent and fair democratic elections though the degree of pressure placed on a country by the donor community to hold these elections can vary considerably. East Timor for example held elections within 3 years of the cessation of the emergency but Rwanda has recently deferred elections again and now has them scheduled for 2003, fully nine years after the current government came to power (Uvin, 2001,

p180). For some though, this concentration on elections is insufficient and is designed to do nothing more than allow the international community to leave once a legitimate government has been installed (Orr, 2002). Orr suggests that this "minimalist "approach to governance has led to "crucial reverses" in Cambodia, Haiti and Angola to name but a few, and that a more comprehensive approach is required that will provide support long after the first election.

Economic Rehabilitation.

Both macro and microeconomic rehabilitation are areas of involvement for those involved in reconstruction. At the microeconomic level creating conditions and materials for the reconstruction of livelihoods is often needed and may involve issues such as land entitlements and the provision of start-up provision of seed and tools and small scale finance options.

Macroeconomic features are also distorted by conflict and its lead up. There may be a bloated military and an overburdened civil bureaucracy (if one exists) and extremely limited or non-existent base from which to collect tax, which in any case could damage economic recovery. In general, macroeconomic reconstruction advice and policy from donors has been based on increasing production of tradable goods over subsistence and the move toward trade liberalisation though the degree and speed to which this is pursued is by no means universally agreed.(Green and Ahmed, 1999, p199).

Justice

Justice and the rule of law appears to be widely recognised as an essential ingredient in the process of reconstruction, with the potential for increases of lawlessness, corruption and criminal activity often accompanying the post-conflict period (Flournoy and Pan, 2002). However the organs of justice are also seen as being essential for the process of reconciliation of wrongs committed during the

conflict as in South Africa (The Truth and Reconciliation Commission model) and Rwanda in the form of a national judiciary. However judicial and legal systems and the infrastructure that support them are often damaged and previous judicial and court staff may be present in insufficient numbers or may have been politically appointed, which raises issues of impartiality and competence (Uvin, 2001, p183).

The role of those assisting in post-conflict reconstruction has ranged from the provision of international police to provide a training base and mentoring system for the local force (or as in East Timor to perform executive police functions until the formation of a local equivalent) and assistance with the training/ upskilling of the local judiciary and the implementation of interim legal codes. Repairs to infrastructure e.g. prisons, courthouses and police stations are also often needed.

Security

While acknowledging the linkages and interconnections that exist between the various aspects of post-conflict reconstruction Feil (2002) suggests that these are all dependent on the existence of a security base. Moreover he suggests that it is often the existence of a security vacuum that precipitates an outside intervention in the first place. The security tasks that are often under taken in the post-conflict situation can vary considerably, with the degree of outside intervention depending on the presence, capacity and legitimacy of local security institutions. In some cases these may need only assistance in carrying out this role. In other cases there may be need for outside forces to provide the full compliment of security tools until local institutions have been trained and put in place as in East Timor. Broader security consists of the means by which to protect the general population and key infrastructure and assets. To meet this may entail the provision of customs, border patrol / immigration organisations along with the demobilisation of combatants (discussed above) and the reconstitution of a military force.

AID AGENCIES AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

Evidence of the increasing interest within the aid community in what has become commonly known as Post Conflict Reconstruction, may be seen in the attempts of many of the large agencies to configure themselves more appropriately to meet the needs of Post-Conflict situations. Many aid organisations have attempted to emphasise their strengths as they may relate to post-conflict work. Those that have traditionally operated in a development mode are seeking ways to work more effectively in conflict and post-conflict settings. UNDP suggests that for "humanitarian and financial reasons (donors being drawn to high profile emergency situations) UNDP found it could not stay on the sidelines even during the humanitarian phase of post conflict assistance" (UNDP Evaluation Office, 2000). As a result the organisation instigated a review of its role in conflict and post-conflict situations with a view to the future and a repositioning of the organisation. The review recommended that UNDP should "recognise post-conflict assistance as part of its mission and mandate" and formulate a policy statement on its role (UNDP Evaluation Office, 2000). Similarly those more associated with relief work (e.g. UNHCR, Inter-Agency Standing Committee on Humanitarian Affairs or IASC) are seeking more developmental approaches to their work according to several authorities (Macrae, 2001, p46; White and Cliffe, 2000, p318).

Post-conflict units have also been set up by a number of agencies that have been traditionally concerned with development. The World Bank, (traditionally known as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) for example established a post-conflict unit in 1995-96 to coordinate operational support across the Banks various organs in the "grey area" between relief and development, and to "put the R back into IBRD" (World Bank, 2002). Similarly the United States of America's aid agency USAID, has established an Office of Transition Initiatives with the aim of filling the gap between relief and development in post-conflict situations in recognition of the time sensitive nature of this environment (USAID(a))

These units see themselves as a crucible that seeks "to merge several development cultures including conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance, human rights monitoring, and traditional development" (Cullen, Mendelson-Forman and Coletta, 1998, p4). Uvin (2001, p 178) suggests that this represents the inclusion of a number of areas of engagement such as justice and security, governance and reconciliation, that were until very recently entirely off the radar for development. Cullen Mendelson-Forman and Coletta (1998, p5) go a little further to suggest "many organisations in the post-Cold War period are calling it (post-conflict development) a new form of development assistance".

Maynard, in apparent reference to the creation of post -conflict units goes as far as suggesting the existence of a specialist post- conflict community, albeit a comparatively young one (Maynard, 2000). The rate of creation of units of this type was alluded to by the World Bank when it identified 10 new units between October 1997 and April 1998 alone, and has referred to the existence of "a universe of post-conflict units" (Cullen Mendelson-Forman and Coletta, 1998, p13).

Pugh also recognises the growth of interest in the specialist post-conflict area and suggests that the international response to dealing with the fallout of internal conflicts has spawned an industry that may be seen as similar to the aid industry and that has "attracted both crusading zeal and hubris in about equal measure"(Pugh, 1998).

However a number of problems have been identified in current approaches to post-conflict reconstruction. While there may have been an upswing of interest in the area of rehabilitation over recent years, it has been suggested that there remains little understanding of the needs of conflict-affected areas and how they should be assisted in the process of rebuilding. It is further suggested that part of the reason for this originates in the model on which such efforts are currently based, which stems from experience in dealing with natural disasters, and with the rehabilitation experience of Western Europe (Munslow and Brown, 1999, p209;

Green and Ahmed, 1999, p190). Complex emergencies are certainly different to natural disasters according to Duffield who suggests that they "have a singular ability to erode or destroy the cultural, civil, political and economic integrity of established societies" and that "(t)hey are different to natural disasters and deserve to be understood and responded to as such"(Duffield, 1994, p38). According to Green and Ahmed (1999, p190), the main issue involved in reconstruction following natural disaster is generally that of providing some form of stop-gap measures to meet basic needs and a focus on physical infrastructure repair, with the main question to be asked being how to reconstruct around a base of already existing communities and political and legal institutions. However with the socially and institutionally corrosive effects of conflict to contend with, the question becomes not so much a case of how to reconstruct but indeed what to reconstruct.

Pugh (1998), while bemoaning the relative paucity of reconstruction funding allocated to "soft programmes" of a social nature, situates this criticism within the observation that reconstruction funding overall continues to be relegated to a position of relative insignificance within aid budgets when compared with the development and humanitarian streams. An apparent illustration of this is occurring in the current efforts to reconstruct Afghanistan This process appears to have run into difficulties due to the fact that the majority (around 80%) of the funding provided by donors so far has been for humanitarian work and 'very little for reconstruction'. As a result, the American Secretary of Defence is reported as saying that the centre of attention for the American forces in the country will now be focussed less on security issues, and will instead shift to doing civil work (Anon, 2002c, p30). The focus on funding for relief efforts rather than development in Afghanistan was also revealed in a recent conference presentation. It was suggested that the grey area between relief and development was a major ongoing issue with funding from donors strongly favouring relief as they harboured concerns regarding the capacity of the new Afghan government and ongoing security issues (Emmott, 2002).

Pugh (1998) also notes the problems associated with the number of agencies that have input into the reconstruction process (see Figure 6). He recognises that each agency has its own constituency and that some divergence in approach is understandable or even helpful where agencies are playing to different strengths, but there is a point at which the objectives pursued by different agencies can conflict and become contradictory rather than complimentary.



Fig. 6 The complex of agencies responding to emergencies.
Source:(OECD/ DAC, 1999)

Uvin (2001, p185) also recognises this and suggests that even where donor principles may be individually commendable, they may conflict with others on the ground. Examples given from Rwanda include conflict between the aims of short-term security efforts and human rights, the easing of suffering and political stability and between formal justice and reconciliation. It is also suggested that '(e)veryone pretends that unsavoury choices do not exist and that all good things go together' (p185). This is echoed by Munslow and Brown (1999, p216) who identify the differing principles and mission statements of actors that lead to the often-contradictory nature of approaches made. They also suggest that there is far too much focus on the inputs that are being provided to the neglect of the outputs, which further leads to "complexities and contradictions between means and ends".

White and Cliffe (2000, p338) recognise that agencies cannot be all things to all people and accept that some degree of specialisation is inevitable. The answer they and others suggest to the above difficulties appears to lie in some form of inter-agency coordination achieved through various systems and "fora" (Green and Ahmed, 1999, p197; Trivedy, 2001, p85). Others also suggest the need for coordination, and identify the need for a lead or coordinating agency to be appointed to oversee the process of reconstruction in any given situation (UNDP Evaluation Office, 2000 ; Cullen Mendelson-Forman and Coletta, 1998, p16).

Finally, along with increasing development agency interest and involvement in dealing with conflict has come a recognition that the development literature and development theorists have hitherto neglected to incorporate the existence of conflict into its analytical frameworks.

SUMMARY

While the traditional international approach to dealing with conflict in the early 1990s was heavily based on an emergency response this came under challenge as relief provision came under criticism based primarily on the recognition that it was purely palliative, could be used to fuel and assist conflict and could undermine subsequent attempts at development by creating dependency. An approach that merged relief and developmental elements was suggested and became widely accepted despite a number of difficulties. Post –conflict reconstruction has become an important part of the international communities interface with conflict and has seen relief agencies and those more usually associated with development reconfiguring and emphasising their role in this area of work. However problems are identified, with the main focus of funding remaining on relief aspects and a confusing array of organisations with differing mandates and strengths engaging in reconstruction. Greater coordination and cooperation is suggested by many as a way forward.

CHAPTER 5

EAST TIMOR

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to provide a background and context to the presence of the New Zealand Army in East Timor. The first section of the chapter will focus on outlining some of the characteristics of the country including its geography and people. A section that traces the history of East Timor starting from colonisation by the Portuguese through to the events of 1999 will follow. The emphasis of this chapter will however be on the events of the past thirty years, which are more directly germane to the current situation. This will provide a background and outline the causative factors that led to the political and humanitarian crisis of 1999 that culminated in an international response. This response incorporated the provision of peacekeeping troops by a coalition of the willing that included New Zealand representation.

DESCRIPTION

Geography

The island of Timor lies within the Timor Sea at the eastern end of the Sunda Archipelago at a distance of about 400 km north of Australia (Ramos-Horta, 1987, p17). East Timor occupies the eastern half of the island and also includes the enclave of Oecusse and the islands of Atauro and Jaco. The portion of the island that makes up East Timor is 265 Km in length and at its broadest point reaches 92 km. In total the land area covers around 18,900 square kilometres and is geographically diverse. The central portion of the island of Timor is dominated by a mountainous spine that runs East to West. This spine is rather more pronounced in East Timor than in the Indonesian West and it reaches a peak of close to 3000

metres (Tata Mai Lau) about half way along its length. Many lesser peaks along this central divide reach lesser but still impressive altitudes of over 2000 metres (Dunn, 1983, p1).

This central mountainous spine gives way to both northern and southern coastal plains. These plains differ significantly with the northern being regularly bisected by rocky mountainous spurs, which continue to the sea and end in bluffs and cliff faces. This plain becomes increasingly arid during the dry season. The Southern plain is more continuous though fairly regularly interrupted by river systems, which while almost completely devoid of water in the dry season, quickly become raging torrents as the rain falls on the steep central slopes.

Climate and vegetation

The island experiences rather distinct wet and dry seasons however the impact of these is modified considerably by the geographical diversity. The wet season generally commences around November and continues on until April. The remainder of the year is generally dry, with only scant rainfall on the southern plain and virtually none in the north and centre. Temperatures are also extremely variable. The coastal plain averages between 19° and 31° degrees centigrade however in the mountainous central portion temperatures can drop to as low a 4° C during July and August. This variation can occur in dramatic fashion within a drive of two hours duration. Where the coastal plain may be hot (35° C) and humid a drive into the hills can surprise, with temperatures dropping perceptibly as altitude is gained and necessitating warm clothing, and sleeping bags at night to cope with the mist, low cloud and drizzle (personal experience).

Vegetation over this geographically diverse landscape demonstrates equal variety. This is a direct result of the uneven nature of rainfall that tends to be rather heavier in the south than the north. Hence the southern plain differs consider ably

from that of the north by being far more green and lush for most of the year with tropical jungle and agricultural land predominant on the flat. Dominating the lower slopes of the hills are Acacia and Eucalypt species that can appear somewhat reminiscent of Australia. The higher slopes and the crests of the central spine are dominated by montane vegetation, cloud forest and grassy savannah land. The drier northern plain is generally more sparsely covered and tends to be characterised by scrubby, gnarled trees and shrubs (Dunn, 1983, p2).

The people and population

The population of East Timor has been described as being formed of a complex pattern of different cultures and that these are representative of the populations that make up the region extending from the Philippines through to Australia and from islands to the east of Papua New Guinea through to the Malagasy Republic (now Madagascar) (Forman, 1977). Genetic tests also confirm a diversity with Melanesian, Australoid and Malay influences detected (Inbaraj, 1995, p3). As one would expect, this mix has resulted in a complexity of linguistic forms with more than 30 languages spoken. However Tetum has tended to become the most widespread of these being at least understood almost everywhere and thus becoming what may be seen as a national language (Cox and Carey, 1995, p13).

Population size appears to have been somewhat unreliable since recordings of this began for a number of reasons and therefore maybe seen as indicative rather than accurate. Figures available from official Portuguese records suggested a population of about 609,000 in 1970. This was estimated to have risen to over 650, 000 by 1974 though Dunn (1983, p3) suggests that Catholic Church figures indicated the true count may have been some five per cent higher. Population data, although somewhat inaccurate, have been used as one indicator of the impact the colonist Portuguese, and more importantly the invading and occupying

Indonesian forces had on the East Timorese. The New Internationalist (1994, p18) for example suggests that with an expected normal increase in population, the 1980 figure should have been 754,000 but in reality was only 555,000. Similarly the Free East Timor Coalition in New Zealand reports figures based on Catholic Church data that suggests the mid 1980's had seen a loss of approximately 200,000 people (Free East Timor Coalition, 1999b). The current population (mid 2001) of East Timor is reported by the World Bank (2002a) as 825,000.

The religion of the vast majority of East Timorese is now Roman Catholic, however the portion of the population that was designated as Catholic in 1970 was estimated by the church to amount to no more than one third, or about 180,000 people. The remainder continued on with traditional animist beliefs. This however underwent a huge change when under the Pancasila framework of Indonesian nationalism, all East Timorese were obliged to nominate a religion. So by 1990, the percentage of the population that were nominally Catholic leapt to over 80 percent (Carey, 1995, p10).

COLONIALISM

The Portuguese claimed East Timor as a colony in 1701, however the relationship had been based on the trade in sandalwood from much earlier, with the first recorded contact dating from 1514. However the Dutch as the colonising power of the adjoining Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) also had an interest in Timor and had waged war on the Portuguese influence in Timor, steadily asserting a presence in the Western portion of the island and culminating in a watershed battle in 1749. This battle known locally as the battle of Penfui led to the demarcation of Dutch and Portuguese spheres of influence in Timor and in effect laid down the territorial division that presently divides the independent East Timor from the Indonesian controlled western portion of the island(Taylor, 1999, p5).

This border was formalised in a series of treaties, a process that was finally completed in 1914 (Krieger, 1997, pxix).

Portuguese influence on the interior of the territory remained rather minimal through the 1700's and 1800's. Effective control appeared as elusive in East Timor as in Portugal's African colonies as demonstrated by regular violent attacks on Portuguese military and administrative outposts thus reducing any real influence to the coastal areas. However by the end of the 19th century Portugal's declining position in an increasingly wealthy and industrialising Europe led to a more concerted effort to maximise the potential of the colonial possessions. Through the late 1800's there was a move to institute the production and extraction of surplus from subsistence cropping practice. With the use of forced labour to construct roading and the adoption of a head tax, a more formal system of cash cropping was eventually introduced. Crops such as coffee and copra were thus introduced (Taylor, 1999, p11).

However open revolt continued to make any meaningful administration difficult and a vigorous effort was made to quell any insurrection. This program of "pacification" was prosecuted over a period of twelve years and and resulted in large-scale human suffering (Taylor, 1999, p11). While the cash cropping had demonstrated increasing yields this appears to have done little to improve the lot of the East Timorese, and by the outbreak of World War 1 the colony was described as the most backward in all South- East Asia and the conditions within noted with contempt by the few visitors that ventured to it (Dunn, 1983, p20).

With the overt resistance that had been previously been displayed toward the Portuguese minimised, the Portuguese embarked on a process of consolidating their control over the Timorese. The traditional patterns of kinship that led to political alliances had been identified as a powerful unifying force and network by which resistance was maintained. To undermine and sideline this pattern every effort was made to introduce an alternative political system that was ultimately

controlled by the Portuguese. However, rather than substituting and displacing the traditional system a situation arose that led to the two systems running parallel in an "uneasy truce"(Taylor, 1999, p12).

The end of World War I saw Portugal continuing its administration though the nature of this changed following the military coup that brought Salazar to power in Lisbon. His Estado Novo program brought with it a number of "civilising" elements that were to impact on East Timor. Firstly, the administration of colonial possessions was brought more centrally to Lisbon and secondly the introduction of newly formed classes categorised native East Timorese into either assimilated and non-assimilated. *Assimilados* were granted rights as Portuguese citizens such as the ability to vote. While the number of Timorese that were conferred this status was only about 0.25 percent by 1975, they were according to Carey (1995, p2) an important factor in the later resistance against Indonesian invasion. The Catholic Church also became involved in the process as they were seen as a civilising influence. Thus the church took over responsibility for the provision of education that emphasised the values of the colonial power.

However the Japanese invasion of World War Two put all processes on hold and forced many Portuguese to flee the territory. The occupation by Japan resulted in resistance by around four hundred Australian troops ably assisted by a large portion of the East Timorese population. This resistance continued for over a year before the Allied force eventually was forced to retreat, and is credited with having a significant impact on slowing the Japanese advance on Australia. The East Timorese however were to pay a heavy price at the hands of the Japanese for their part in assisting the Allies. Many also died as result of Allied bombing raids aimed at dislodging the Japanese. By the time of the Japanese surrender over 60,000 East Timorese had died as a result of the war. Dili was almost completely destroyed, as were most of the towns and villages of any size (Jardine and Chomsky, 1999, p22).

The Portuguese returned with the fall of Japan, and reasserted their colonial rule, maintaining tight control over all spheres of life. They commenced repairs of some of the damaged infrastructure using forced labour, but the war had reduced Portugal s wealth considerably and East Timor was considered of low priority. Through the 1960's and early 70's East Timor remained as a backwater with Portugal struggling to maintain control over her more valuable African colonies. However some improvement in educational facilities and moves toward increasing Timorese presence in administration and military spheres had occurred.

Indonesia

Meanwhile, in the Dutch East Indies there was upheaval as calls for independence became increasingly strident toward the end of World War 2 and resulted in Indonesia being unilaterally declared independent in 1945. The Dutch refused to accept this and attempted to militarily force their authority on the region post-war. In 1949 the Dutch were forced to recognise the independence with encouragement from the USA who had trade interests to pursue with an independent Indonesia. Melding the cultural and religious diversity of the new Indonesia preoccupied the efforts of the new administration and anti colonialist sentiment seems to have characterised the regime (Taylor, 1999, p20).

Nineteen Sixty five saw a coup effectively wrest control from the Sukarno regime and place it in the hands of the military with General Suharto at the helm. This heralded a pervasive military presence in all facets of daily life and a centralised rule by military elite. However these events seemed of little consequence to East Timor and reassurances were given that Indonesia had no expansionist plans in their direction.

Colonial Crisis

The Portuguese regime, embroiled in the struggle with its African colonies was toppled by coup in the "carnation revolution" of April 1974. Decolonisation of Portuguese colonies was suddenly on the agenda though East Timor was almost singularly unprepared for such an event due to lack of political dialogue and structure which had been enforced under Portuguese rule (Ramos-Horta, 1987, p28).

However, from within the ranks of the Timorese elite and the *assimilados* the seeds of political parties began to form and grow. Three positions on the way forward were suggested and respective parties were formed to further their respective position. The first to form was the Democratic Union of Timorese (UDT), which initially opted for maintaining ties with Portugal but with a progressively increasing autonomy (Jolliffe, 1978, p62). Unsurprisingly this position was the one that those most loyal to Portugal (and those that had much to lose by their departure) felt comfortable.

The Popular Democratic Association of Timorese (APODETI) on the other hand was firmly in favour of integration with Indonesia though at its peak it could boast only a relatively small support base made up of what Ramos-Horta (1987, p32) describes as "corrupt incompetents and marginals". APODETI was soon strongly backed by the Indonesian Military Intelligence Service and began receiving financial assistance from Indonesia.

The Social Democratic Association of Timor (ASDT) was the only grouping to consistently espouse a belief that independence for East Timor was the only real option. Initially the party appealed to students and the young but popularity soon spread to include much of the rural population as well. A coalition was formed with UDT when the latter became more disposed to independence, a position reached

when it became increasingly clear that Portugal intended to complete decolonisation by 1975 and that Indonesia was pushing for integration.

A number of reasons are suggested in the literature for the increased Indonesian interest in East Timor as the 1970s progressed. Dunn (1983, p103) suggests that the Indonesian Governments of both Sukarno, and at least initially under Suharto, had no real interest in East Timor as it was seen as having no real strategic importance, that Portuguese authority over the territory presented no difficulty and that issues in other areas of the archipelago were of more immediate concern. However interest in the future of East Timor began to increase as international opinion against continued colonialism gained momentum and hardened, thus threatening Portuguese control of its territory. This was combined with increasing Indonesian fears of communist destabilisation based on an increasingly powerful Vietnam and by increasing domestic internal dissent and unrest. (Dunn, 1983, p110).

Thus the prospect of an independent East Timor and its implications for Indonesian security became more real and integrationist sentiment rose. Firstly there were fears that there was potential for communist elements to influence a small independent nation. Secondly, there were also concerns in the military that any independence of East Timor may have implications for some of the unstable areas within eastern Indonesia such as West Papua. The official position on East Timor however remained as before, a recognition of Portuguese sovereignty and a policy of non interference. (Dunn, 1983, p110)

One further reason put forward by the Indonesians in favour of integration was that of a common heritage and thus integration could be seen as almost a natural event. However for many of the Timorese the prospect of integration was untenable as a number of major differences were perceived that differentiated them from the remainder of Indonesia, namely cultural origins and colonial histories (Dunn, 1983, p3).

The Carnation revolution caught all by surprise and rapidly increased the integrationist movements activity. The possibility of an independent East Timor could not be ignored and the Indonesian military intelligence began a covert campaign aimed at subsequent integration. This included dissemination of information that identified the increasingly popular ASDT party as being increasingly influenced by communist elements. Later suggestions were made that FRETILIN had been influenced by Marxist and Lenninist ideas, however Ramos Horta (1987, p36) suggests that this never really went further than theoretical discussions. Considerable financial support was also given to the APODETI party as the sole integrationist champion in the hope that their influence would grow and eventually prevail. Indonesian destabilisation also split the UDT/FRETILIN coalition through feeding false information to the UDT leadership that suggested that FRETILIN was about to take over full control with the help of Vietnamese fighters and Chinese weapon consignments (Jardine and Chomsky, 1999, p29). This resulted in a brief civil war involving the two factions with the FRETILIN forces eventually victorious and unilaterally declaring Independence on November 28, 1975.

INVASION

The anticipated Indonesian invasion commenced on 7 December and heralded a 24 year-long occupation characterised by brutality and impoverishment. The Indonesian forces that invaded numbered in the thousands and a wave of public executions, raping and looting began with the main concentration of this initially in Dili. It is estimated that over 60,000 Timorese died in the first two months of the invasion (Jardine and Chomsky, 1999, p35) and many more were displaced as they fled from the invading Indonesians (Taudevin, 1999, p42). The military forces of FRETILIN, while expelled from the cities and main towns took up the fight from the outskirts and over the next few months effectively limited the Indonesian advances to the main urban areas. This situation continued for the

next few years, with the guerrilla tactics of FRETILIN being difficult for the Indonesian military to break such was the popular support for it, both in physical and emotional terms. Despite the intense intimidation of the population through execution and slaughter, sometimes of whole villages, the support for FRETILIN continued (Greenlees and Garran, 2001, p18).

A new phase of the Indonesian campaign began and was characterised by a process of encirclement and annihilation in which thousands of troops encircled a particular population. They were then subjected to execution, torture and forced removal to refugee camps. This main aim of this exercise was to disrupt the society and thus removing the support base for FRETILIN (Gama, 1995, p100). A further variation of this was the "final solution" of 1981 when up to 80,000 Timorese men under the control of Indonesian troops formed a "fence of legs" in which the local recruits were forced to move in formation over wide swathes of land and thus flush out the FRETILIN guerrillas (Taylor, 1999, p117).

This major destabilisation also allowed for a program of "resocialising" of the population. This involved the prohibition of all aspects of Timorese culture including the use of the Portuguese language, and inculcation of Indonesian culture and values through forced learning of *Pancasila* (the Indonesian National Ideology) and Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian National language) within the school system (Carey, 1995, p10; Dunn, 1995, p68). The political structure was also revamped soon after the invasion with the appointment of a carefully contrived "Popular Representative Assembly" that among other things called on President Suharto to accept a petition on behalf of the East Timorese, calling for the integration of East Timor with Indonesia (Dunn, 1983, p298).

To enhance and maintain control over the Timorese, a system of intelligence gathering was instituted. The aim was to establish an informant within each extended family thereby both gathering information and creating an atmosphere of fear. Taylor suggests that this was never fully successful but did have enough

impact to result in a population that was living in terror and where family conversation became limited to only the mundane aspects of living (Taylor, 1999, p110).

FRETILIN resistance continued through the 1980s and into the mid 1990s with occasional major attacks on Indonesian forces, though it appears to have been weakened as the occupation wore on. While the FRETILIN forces were subdued they were however never completely beaten. In addition, opposition to occupation also remained strong in the psyche of the Timorese population despite the best efforts of Indonesia (Jardine and Chomsky, 1999, p70).

DEVELOPMENT BY INDONESIA

Under the control of the Indonesians considerable financial resources were put into East Timor over the period of occupation. However exactly what this meant for the majority of the Timorese population appears debatable. Dunn suggests that while the economic state of East Timor had improved by the mid 1990s the vast majority of the benefits were accruing to only a small section of society that was heavily dominated by Indonesians (Dunn, 1995, p68).

One of the prime reasons the investments in the area failed to benefit those most in need was the focus early on in the occupation, to revitalise only the sectors of the economy that the Indonesians could benefit from. Many of the potentially or actually profitable businesses were removed from local involvement and were instead controlled by the military in either a direct fashion, or as hidden owners. One such front for the military was a company called P.T. Denok, which came to dominate the economy of East Timor.

The East Timorese coffee industry provides an important example of this. Coffee had been one of the most valuable exports from East Timor in Portuguese

times but production had declined following the invasion. However it was one of the sectors of the economy that was soon revitalised. P. T Denok engineered and maintained a monopolistic stranglehold on the production and sale of coffee. Coffee planters and growers were paid little for their produce and were forced by threat of jailing or crop confiscation to sell it to P.T. Denok. Similar examples exist for the sandalwood, marble and sugar industries. The merger of P.T. Denok with another company owned and operated by senior military figures diversified their interests into real estate, civil engineering, freight movement, tourism and entertainment businesses. Cox and Carey (1995, p45) suggest that in reality, this hegemony constituted a "commercial fiefdom of the Indonesian Army".

Pembangunan or "development" was also used as a tool of protection against any International criticism that was directed toward Indonesia. Claims were made that the East Timorese had seen more development activity under Indonesia's tutelage than in the previous 400 years of Portuguese control. Indeed Cox and Carey (1995, p45) suggest that "(E)ven the army has got in on the act, involving its soldiers in local development schemes...with security now (post 1989) taking second place to welfare". However while the quantity of development work may have increased, it has been concluded by observers that much of development was not really directed toward benefiting the Timorese population. Instead it was undertaken for other reasons, such as for the benefit of the military and furthering the ongoing security operation. Examples of this include the focus of the first development plan where roading took up nearly half the budget whereas the supposed main objectives of the plan - health, education and culture, were given only a relatively paltry seven per cent. In addition, most of the roading was concentrated in the areas where the fighting was still occurring, thus facilitating access for the Indonesian forces (Cox and Carey, 1995, p46).

The problem of large-scale joblessness amongst East Timorese has also been seen as another failing of the Indonesian development process. This is a problem that was compounded by large-scale immigration from Indonesia under

transmigration programs and where there was a tendency to employ newly arrived Indonesian transmigrants over East Timorese applicants for many jobs (Carey, 1995, p14).

INTERNATIONAL REACTION.

International reaction to the events surrounding the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, the Indonesian invasion and the period of occupation appear to be characterised by a discrepancy between public positions being announced and those that were held officially and privately.

The Portuguese reaction to the events of the mid 1970s seems to have been somewhat polarised around two main alternatives for the future of East Timor, of which independence was not one. The Portuguese administration in East Timor apparently saw independence for such a small and impoverished territory as being a non-viable option. While some appeared to favour a form of continued Portuguese control, the majority opinion supported integration with Indonesia as being more realistic for such a poor territory (Dunn, 1995, p61).

Decolonisation began in 1974 and was accompanied by some upskilling of Timorese educational and administrative capacity. However the Portuguese military presence was rapidly removed in what Ramos- Horta describes as an element in a policy to smooth the progress of Indonesian take-over (Ramos-Horta, 1987, p48). He further suggests that Portuguese inaction such as failing to involve the United Nations, an absence of diplomatic representations to other countries and engaging in negotiations with Indonesia that excluded East Timorese representation, further facilitated the eventual invasion, and subsequent integration into Indonesia (RamosHorta, 1987, p57).

The approach taken by other Western governments to the question of East Timor and the decolonisation period could only be described as complicity with the Indonesian position. In many cases the primacy of realism over idealism in the stances taken by a number of countries is readily apparent in the cold war manoeuvrings. Australia, keen to keep relations with Indonesia on a positive footing appears to have been supportive of the integrationist approach with the then Prime Minister Whitlam making it plain in 1972 that the main foreign policy aim of his Government was to build up the relationship with Indonesia. Obvious economic interests were at stake with the Timor gap oilfields as a prime example (Jardine and Chomsky, 1999, p46).

The United States similarly acquiesced to the Indonesian invasion and it seems clear that it had prior knowledge of the invasion though at least publicly this was not recognised. The then US Secretary of State Henry Kissenger is said to have endorsed the plan for invasion asking only that it be done quickly, neatly and without the use of any US supplied weaponry or equipment. He was subsequently to have been disappointed on all counts (Schwarz, 1999, p204)

Much of the American position would appear to have its roots in the recent losses and withdrawal it had experienced against the forces of communism in Vietnam. The Soeharto regime as a staunch anti-communist force in the region was valued and the US appeared unwilling to alienate Jakarta on this count. The Indonesian portrayal of FRETILIN as either communist or at least sympathetic to the ideology it was no doubt a further factor in determining the US position (Ramos-Horta, 1987, p88) with Kissinger suggesting that he saw the invasion as an action of self defence against "a communist government in the middle of Indonesia" Henry Kissinger cited in Isaacson, 1992, p681). Additionally, there was the issue of continued American access to the Straits of Wetar between Timor and Indonesia. This is one of the few deep routes between the Pacific and Indian Oceans that allows the undetected passage of submarines (Schwarz, 1999, p207).

It has been suggested that the response by New Zealand to the invasion was tempered by security concerns, and the need to remain in line with its closest allies of the time, the USA and Australia (Chapman, 2001, p51). However it is also the case that its approach was heavily "subsumed by cold war considerations and a desire to pursue constructive ties with Indonesia"(Smith, 2000, p12). New Zealand had been steadily expanding its relationship with Indonesia from the time of the fall of the increasingly anti-western Sukarno regime and the installation of the pro-western Soeharto Government. Indonesia had become a "country of concentration" for New Zealand based on a number of basic attributes. Indonesia was:

> "One of the most populous and most richly endowed countries in the world, Indonesia was New Zealand's nearest neighbour after Australia and Western Samoa. It stood astride New Zealand's communication with Asia, it was a key country in the area strategically, and its size and potential strength made it a likely leader in Asian regional groupings"(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1975, p23)

This increasingly close relationship had resulted in a number of high-level visits between the two countries including both the New Zealand Prime Minister in 1970 and the Indonesian President in 1972. And while New Zealand had been providing Overseas Development Assistance to Indonesia for some time, this began to increase. From $1 million in 1970 this had increased to over $4 million by 1975, thus constituting a greater amount than to any other country. It would also appear that the importance of Indonesia as a trading partner and market was not lost sight of, with funding fo r Indonesian trade missions to visit New Zealand being provided. Some military exchanges also began to take place with New Zealand officers attending courses at the Indonesian Staff Command School and reciprocal course attendance in New Zealand by Indonesian military personnel. A defence attaché was attached to the embassy in Jakarta thus demonstrating the importance placed on defence co-operation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1975, p24)

As with the United States and Australia, some evidence that New Zealand also had prior knowledge of the invasion has been revealed recently in documents released by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. They appear to confirm that New Zealand took a similar stance to that of Australia and the USA in order to maintain its relationship with Indonesia. These documents also appear to concede that the Government had both a public and private view on events, with the private view apparently consistent with ideas of integration as the most desirable outcome (NZPA, 2002).

In the interim years Australia was singled out for criticism as the only country to recognise the integration of East Timor into Indonesia. However while not publicly stating recognition of integration, many others in the international community have, despite United Nations rulings on the illegality of the Indonesian action, accepted it as a fait accompli (MacLennan, 1994), thus conferring *dejure* recognition. Certainly the New Zealand Governments' actions in voting on UN resolutions was less than damning with an Algerian sponsored resolution that "strongly deplored" the Indonesian invasion being passed, but with New Zealand abstaining on the vote because it felt that: "strongly deplore" was in fact too strong and that regret would be more appropriate, that East Timor was not a state but was a self governing territory and that the draft concentrated too much on the military aspect and not sufficiently on the factors that led to the failure of the decolonisation process and was therefore unbalanced.(Hoadley, 1976, p7). By 1976 the New Zealand government had adopted a stance whereby;

"In New Zealand's dealings with East Timor, the Government will continue to deal with the authorities that are in defacto control of the territory. Earlier this meant Portugal; before 17 July it meant the Provisional Government of East Timor;now it means Indonesia. This, in the view of the Government, is the most sensible and practical way of coming to terms with the realities of the present situation". (Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Holyoake, in response to

parliamentary question 27 October 1976, cited in (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1976, p24).

Throughout the 1980s and for much of the 1990s the stance on East Timor was fairly consistent with the Government content to be somewhat critical of the human rights situation in the territory but not extending this to a call for Indonesian withdrawal. This response is noted in contrast to that of the Government in the UN over the Falklands Islands crisis of 1982, where the New Zealand representative stated that "the right to decide their own destiny belongs to the Falkland Islanders no less than it does to other people. It is a right to which they have been forcibly deprived; it is a right which must be restored to them" (Harland cited in Alley, 1999, p309).

Similar inconsistencies in position have also been noted by Chapman (Chapman, 2001, p27) with regard for New Zealand's support for resolutions on South Africa, Namibia and Southern Rhodesia. The only minor change that occurred in the Government policy was the withdrawal of the view that the invasion was "irreversible" despite a public opinion poll in 1995 showing that only nine per cent of respondents were in favour of the New Zealand position on East Timor (Free East Timor Coalition, 1999a). De facto recognition of Indonesia's claim to East Timor may also be inferred from the wording included in a number of international treaties, where reference is made to the extent of Indonesian sovereign territory as including East Timor. Along with many other countries, New Zealand was also party to such agreements (Krieger, 1997, p293).

While New Zealand Government attitudes may not have been overly condemnatory of the Indonesian position, civil society in New Zealand was. A sometimes-vocal East Timor Solidarity lobby had formed in New Zealand as in Australia and in many other countries. The East Timor Independence Committee and the East Timor Independence Centre documented many human rights abuses in Timor and lobbied Government over its stance on Indonesia (Alley, 1999, p309).

In addition a number Church groups, aid agencies (CORSO, Oxfam) and human rights groups (Amnesty International, Lawyers Against Torture and Oppression) also gave support and in 1991 considerable networking was taking place. By 1997 the Free East Timor Coalition was formed by interested parties to continue with the work of lobbying, organising demonstrations and organising speaking tours (Free East Timor Coalition, 1999). In addition, some currently serving Members in the New Zealand Parliament were active in campaigning for an independent East Timor as part of their involvement in the Labour Socialist Youth Movement (Goff, 1978, p21).

CHANGING ATTITUDES

A number of important events over the years following the invasion had a definite, if seemingly incremental impact on international opinion to the continued Indonesian occupation of East Timor. Naturally the end of cold war had a major impact on the geopolitical situation with foreign policy no longer being seen through that prism. According to Dr Keith Suter, this negated the need for Indonesia as a barricade against communism and thereby made it easier for others to criticise their human rights record in East Timor. This was done in 1993 when the USA and a number of other countries supported a United Nations human rights Commission resolution that damned the human rights record of Indonesia (Suter, 1995). Suter also describes the strong international stance adopted against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as sitting both obviously and uneasily alongside continued occupation of East Timor. And if official attitudes were starting to change then those of the publics of many countries were also in response to the increased activity of East Timor freedom groups and the media in the wake of the Santa Cruz massacre.

The Santa Cruz Massacre.

The Santa Cruz massacre of 1991 occurred following the memorial service held for a young East Timorese man killed by the Indonesian military. The memorial turned into a pro independence rally no doubt spurred on by the presence of a United Nations Human Rights representative in Dili at the time. The military response was deadly, claiming over one hundred lives though the final figure has been disputed (Schwarz, 1999, p214) and appears difficult to accurately confirm. The media coverage of the massacre brought the issue of East Timor once again to the fore and with it the spawning of solidarity groups in many countries.

The "minimisation" by many Western states of the atrocities committed by the Indonesians could not once again be attempted with photographic evidence in public circulation. This public reaction appears to have been at the forefront of a change in political stance. A number of countries suspended aid programmes, the UN once more became engaged, and a UN commission to investigate the situation in East Timor won support from the US in a blow to the Indonesians. It seemed that with the passing of the cold war, perceptions of the danger of a communist East Timor had also passed (Cox and Carey, 1995, p53), and with it an almost unqualified support for the Indonesian position. Further international profile was gained for East Timor with the joint award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Bishop Belo (Outspoken Head of the Catholic Church in East Timor) and Jose Ramos-Horta (Chief diplomat of the resistance) in 1996 (Jardine and Chomsky, 1999, p68).

The referendum

By the middle of 1997 the Asian financial crisis began to have an impact on much of South-east Asia. Indonesia was hit extremely hard by this and requested emergency international financial assistance to deal with deteriorating domestic

conditions of burgeoning unemployment and food shortages. With a demonstrated inability to deal with this crisis, the Suharto regime was increasingly faced with internal calls for political change by thousands of demonstrators in an Indonesian version of "people power". This eventually culminated in the resignation of Suharto on May 21, 1998. Some political space opened despite the replacement of Suharto by the chosen B.J. Habibie as a caretaker figure. With separatist sentiment on the rise in several provinces, Habibie made an offer of autonomy for East Timor. However the East Timor Independence movement rejected this. January 1999 saw the offer of a popular consultation (in reality a referendum) to allow the East Timorese decide themselves between remaining with Indonesia and independence. One motive for this offer has been described as lying in Habibie's desire to differentiate himself from Suharto, and having a momentous event associated with his temporary Presidency. Others suggest that the motive lay in a need to gain international goodwill, with a further school of opinion believing that Habibie and Foreign Minister Alatas had been worn down by frustration and irritation (Schwarz, 1999, p422). The date decided for the "consultation" was August 30 1999 and the United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was charged with organising the ballot. Security however was to be left to the TNI (Taylor, 1999, pxviii).

There appears to have been considerable dissent within the ranks of the military to Habibie's approach and attempts to subvert it were made through the use of militia. Militia were apparently nothing new in East Timor but they were certainly revitalized in response to the announcement of the popular consultation. It has been widely reported that this increase in militia activity was strongly associated with the TNI who are said to have assisted with training and equipping them (Smith, 2000, p16). Many of the new militia recruits were from outside East Timor though additional recruits for the militia were gained through intimidation and threat of local Timorese (van Klinken, 2000, p28).

From early in 1999 militia groups embarked on a process of intimidation in order to dampen support for independence and to convey the picture to outsiders that East Timor was racked with civil conflict. Taylor (1999, pxxii) outlines the increasing activity of the militia over the period leading up to the referendum, which was delayed twice as a result. Threats of major violence and destruction should the vote for independence prevail were also made by the militia, foreshadowing what was to come.

Voting on August the 30th 1999 resulted in a decisive pro independence result, which was announced on September 4th. As predicted, the threatened violence soon began, with groups of militia rampaging in a campaign of violence and destruction. The UNAMET staff were increasingly threatened and eventually left East Timor on September the 9th. Rather than the TNI providing security for the ballot as agreed, there appears to be ample evidence of their complicity and active participation in the rampage. In addition to the violence and destruction, there was a huge displacement of people, either as internally displaced who escaped from the villages to the hills (300,000), or as those who were forcibly removed by Integrationist elements to paramilitary camps in West Timor (150,000) in what has been termed "political cleansing"(Taylor, 1999, pxxiiv).

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

International responses to events in East Timor were to begin with confined to concerted calls for the TNI and the Indonesian police to take control and end the militia rampage. As early as September the 2nd the suggestion of a regional force to provide support and prevent the descent into chaos was made by the New Zealand Foreign Affairs minister but this was not acted on (Taylor, 1999, pxxix). Over the days following notification of the referendum results, these calls became more demanding and forceful with the World Bank and the IMF threatening to hold back on much needed financial assistance. The US President along with many

other international leaders demanded Indonesia rapidly restore order and calm to the situation (Dickens, 2001, p218).

The Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) meeting in Auckland was to provide a forum for the member countries to discuss the events in East Timor. An extra meeting was convened to discuss the Timor issue and an agreement emerged from this that international intervention was required. Dickens (2001, p216) points out that this position was agreed to by Indonesia's ASEAN partners such as Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore and therefore left Indonesia with little room to manoeuvre on the international stage. While peacekeeping intervention was initially rejected by Indonesia the extent of international opinion coupled with the financial implications of ignoring this eventually led to the call by Habibie for international assistance. The UN Security Council rapidly authorised an intervention under chapter VII of the charter, and a coalition of the willing was assembled to provide the military forces required.

Potential for such a deployment had already been anticipated in both Australia and New Zealand with interim planning beginning by the New Zealand Defence Force as early as March 1999. The New Zealand Minister of Defence was subsequently provided with a briefing paper outlining the size of the commitment New Zealand could be expected to provide and by the middle of May much of the initial planning work had been done. June saw the production of a Military Strategic Estimate that in addition to outlining the preferred strategic option for the NZDF, set out a national strategy which focussed on the continued representation of New Zealand's standing as a good international citizen. (Crawford and Harper, 2001, p23).

Planning continued through the months leading up to the referendum and in early September the government put the NZDF on short notice to commit troops. With the APEC decision that an international force should be deployed and the subsequent agreement of the Indonesians to invite such a force the New Zealand

Parliament agreed to deployment of a force that would contribute to the initial International Force East Timor (INTERFET) and a subsequent peace support operation. The paper upon which this decision was made also outlined that this force was to be larger than initially envisaged due to the threat level and scale of the breakdown of order. The increased size of the force would also allow them to stand as a separate entity in an area of importance to New Zealand (Crawford and Harper, 2001, p52).

Deployment

Australia took responsibility for leading the INTERFET force, which was made up of contributions from Australia, New Zealand and British forces along with US logistics and intelligence input. This was bolstered by the arrival of Thai, South Korean and Philippine forces over the following weeks (Dickens, 2001, p21). The UN Security Council mandate under which INTERFET operated essentially constituted a peacemaking rather than peacekeeping function and specifically included the roles of "restoring peace and security in East Timor, protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks;" and "within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations" (United Nations Security Council, 1999). Deployment took place on the 20th September, initially with Special Forces personnel, but soon followed up by regular forces. The New Zealanders (Victor company) patrolled in Dili for the next two weeks before following special forces to Suai, the capital of the Covalima region. They rapidly secured the area of the town and set up base in the region that was to become the New Zealand area of operations for the next three years.

United Nations Transitional Administration East Timor

While the INTERFET forces had been formed as a coalition of the wi lling with United Nations backing, this changed after a period of five weeks with the

formation of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). UNTAET was established as a result of UN Security Resolution 1272. According to Gorjão it was entrusted with responsibility for administering the territory including legislative and executive authority, the provision of security, maintenance of law and order, building an effective administration, delivery of relief, rehabilitation and development assistance and capacity building of the East Timorese aimed at eventual self government (Gorjão, 2002, p314). The extent of UNTAET's control has been suggested as occasioning the first real example of the UN exercising sovereign authority in a fledgling nation in the history of the organisation (Chopra, 2000, p27).

While the UNTAET mission had a number of advantages other similar missions by way of a secure environment and a welcoming population it still had a number of difficulties that engendered considerable frustration among the East Timorese. These frustrations included a lack of participation by local people and a slow pace of improvement in the day to day life in the country (Chopra, 2000, p28). In an assessment of the legacy of UNTAET, Gorjão suggests that it was far from a complete success and should have accomplished more in the way of "capacity building for self-government", development of social and civil services and in laying the foundation for "sustainable development"(Gorjão, 2002, p323). In recognition of the outstanding issues that remained following independence and the end of UNTAET a new mission (United Nations Mission In Support of East Timor or UNMISET) was commenced following independence to give ongoing but reducing assistance to the newly independent country.

SUMMARY

This chapter has provided a background to the presence of the New Zealand Defence Force in East Timor from late 1999. The background has outlined the colonial past of East Timor, the invasion by Indonesian forces and the subsequent

annexation of the country as another Indonesian province. The nature of the International reaction to this action has been described including a degree of tacit support for the Indonesian action. However changing official attitudes are also described resulting from increasing public pressure and changing geopolitical realities. These resulted in the referendum of 1999, the results of which sparked the destruction, death and mayhem of August and September of that year. The chapter also outlines the international response to this violence by way of military intervention (INTERFET) and the subsequent United Nations controlled Transitional Authority that oversaw the administration of East Timor for over two years during which New Zealand peacekeepers maintained a presence in the Covalima region.

CHAPTER 6

THE NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE: BRIEF HISTORY, EVOLVING ROLES AND THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT.

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to provide a brief background to the New Zealand Defence Force, the various roles it has performed and the policy environment within which it works. The chapter begins with a brief historical overview of the early defence arrangements of New Zealand and the origins of the present day New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF). This period is characterised by what may be described as traditional military activity. The focus then shifts to the changing foci of both foreign, and by association, defence policy over the past 30 years or so. This has led to both a greater regional focus within the Defence Force and at the same time a continuation of support and involvement in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Through both of these areas of engagement the NZDF has been involved in activities that may be described as departing from that of traditional military focus and some of these will be outlined. The most recent defence review will also be discussed with regard to possible indications for the future activities of the NZDF.

As background to this chapter it may be useful to point out that the Defence Force of New Zealand has seldom been used in the direct defence of New Zealand other than for a brief period during the Second World War. Unlike many other states, New Zealand is separated from any potential military threat by a huge expanse of ocean over which mounting a direct attack would prove extremely difficult. The question then becomes one of the purposes of the defence force if not for traditional defence and security. It has been suggested that the Defence Force is generally configured to support foreign policy goals rather than direct

security needs, support of the United Nations and other collective security activity, and partnership with Australia (Rolfe, 1999a, p27).

EARLY DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS

The first military forces to be seen in New Zealand other than the Maori have been identified as the marines on Captain Cooks voyage to New Zealand. Prior to the inclusion of New Zealand into the British Empire in 1840 the country was denied full military support by Britain. Certainly there were occasional raids by troops garrisoned in New South Wales but only in response to specific situations such as disputes with the local Maori (Barber, 1984, p12). Considered as insufficient by many it was therefore deemed necessary to make some self-reliant provision for defence. These arrangements generally focussed on the local formation of a volunteer force that could provide some internal security of the local population in its area. The Kororareka Association was one such arrangement and was charged with the duty of protection of property and people north of Auckland (Rolfe, 1999a, p1).

With the inclusion of New Zealand into the Empire, the Royal Navy as the pre-eminent sea power provided the main line of protection for the colony. British troops also landed and were stationed in New Zealand from shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi and their numbers rose markedly as the decade progressed in response to the deteriorating internal secur ity situation as skirmishes with Maori became more frequent (Taylor, 1996, p12). In 1845 a law was passed that compelled all able-bodied men between age 18-40 to be ready for training and duty if called upon. The rationale for the raising of this force was to act in support of the main British fighting force allowing them to fight rather than concern themselves with re-supply and garrison duty (Barber, 1984, p20). Taylor (1996, p15) suggests that this requirement in effect constituted the birth of what we now know as the New Zealand Army.

The 1862 Colonial Defence Act provided for a more formal and regular force that was made up of 500 mounted cavalry however this was disbanded as the worst of the fighting of the Maori Wars (1860-72) had died down. With the British Government increasing the pressure for the colony to once again become more self reliant for its defence, this force was replaced in 1868 by the Armed Constabulary. It was charged with among other things the responsibility for the pursuit of Maori leader Te Kooti and patrolling areas particularly prone to trouble. They also appear to have done a considerable amount of what may be described as nation-building work. According to Barber (1984, p46), the Government of the day saw them as a useful workforce for duties that included the construction of roads, bridges, telegraph lines and the construction of small towns around garrison sites in addition to their core role. Taupo was once a garrison post and further activities attributable to the Armed Constabulary lie nearby in the form of Napier to Taupo highway (Taylor, 1996, p28).

OUTWARD ORIENTATION- COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Fears of a Russian attack on New Zealand in the late 1800's redirected concerns away from possible resurgence of Maori uprisings toward awareness of vulnerability and the realisation that the might of Britain could not be universally relied upon. Military reform ensued and a regular force was established, initially supported by volunteer groups but eventually by a conscripted territorial force trained and directed by an expanded regular force though this did not occur until 1909.

The first overseas deployment of New Zealand forces was to the Boer war of 1899 and it is here that it was seen that New Zealand forces had a role in contributing toward the wider goal of defence of the Empire rather than merely home defence. The security of New Zealand was seen at the time as inseparable from that of the Empire and the notion that the security of Britain meant security for

New Zealand. It was to be from this point on that the configuration of forces was directed toward the main role of fighting overseas, (Rolfe, 1999a, p4) and to this end were trained to be able to fit in and fight alongside other Imperial forces.

The First World War

The First World War saw New Zealand troops depart in defence of the Empire. This saw an attempt to take control of the Dardanelles at Gallipoli, a disastrous event but which is often seen as the point at which some form of national identity was forged (Church and Society Commission, 1972, p8). The New Zealand contribution to the First World War was about 100,000 men. Of these some 18,000 were killed and over 40,000 wounded. This was from a population in the country at the time of only 1 million people and proportionally constituted the greatest casualty rate of any country involved (Taylor, 1996, p58).

The interwar period saw a decline in support for the military based on several factors. These included a belief among some that the First World War had truly been the war to end all wars. A strong pacifist movement had also arisen, and this had some support in the newly elected Labour Government. These factors combined with the economic situation during the depression of the 1930's eventually led to governmental cost-cutting and the cessation of compulsory military training. The numbers within the Territorial Force fell dramatically from 17,000 to 3,700 (Rolfe, 1999a, p9).

The Second World War

Preparation for the Second World War did not begin in earnest until 1939, though war had appeared as an increasingly likely prospect. It also commenced with the Army numbers at low ebb, and while volunteers appear to have flooded in, the difficulty was that they all needed to be trained. Following an all too brief training, the first of these were sent to the Middle East. Subsequent divisions were

committed to both the desert campaign and to the defence of Britain. Considerable effort was made to avoid a situation where control of the force would be removed from the New Zealand commander and thus subsumed into the British effort as had occurred in the First World War. Some success was achieved in doing this and a more readily identifiable New Zealand presence appears to have been made giving New Zealanders a greater sense of nationhood (Harland, 1992, p14). The Japanese advance through the Pacific also saw a response with New Zealand contingents being deployed to Tonga, New Caledonia, Fiji, Norfolk islands (Taylor, 1996, p77) and to operations in the Solomon Islands (Rolfe, 1999a, p12).

THE POST–SECOND WORLD WAR PERIOD

Since the end of the Second World War there have been a number of recognisable time zones in the defence policy and strategic outlook of New Zealand (see Table 2).

Late 1940s: Continuation of the British Commonwealth security system.
Early 1950s: Formation of new alliances e.g. SEATO, ANZUS. Beginning of New Zealand Defence Force involvement with United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.
Late 1950s to mid 1970s: Commitments in South-East Asia.
Early 1970s to early 1980s: Increasing interest in the Pacific (in Particular the South-West Pacific region and increased military training co-operation with the United States).
Mid 1980s: The breaking of ties with the USA, closer ties with Australia, a stronger South Pacific focus and greater involvement in peacekeeping.

Table 2 New Zealand defence and strategic time zones.
Adapted from Rolfe (1993, p2)

Until the Second World War the relationship between New Zealand and the rest of the world had been in effect mediated and controlled by its status as a colony of Britain and later a Dominion. However this was a situation that was quite acceptable to many and therefore "With such an all- providing Mother Country it is hardly surprising that New Zealand... was in no such hurry as Australia or Canada to free itself from Britain's apron strings" (Harland, 1992, p14). Britain after all had promised to provide protection.

The War had changed some things however in that it was the United States of America (USA) that had intervened to stop the Japanese advance through the Pacific rather than Britain. As a result, the fostering of a closer relationship with America began to be seen as an important consideration. So by the end of 1945 the foreign policy of New Zealand firmly coalesced around three central points. These included recognition of USA supremacy in the Pacific, a strong loyalty to Britain and the Commonwealth as a basis of security for New Zealand and a commitment to the idea of collective security that had been evident in support for the League of Nations which was now encapsulated by support for the United Nations (Wood, 1977, p91)

DEFENCE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

With New Zealand's defence focus still firmly tied up in ideas of national security as part of the wider Commonwealth, troops were committed to the Middle East in support of the Commonwealth efforts to maintain the Suez Canal. However the awareness of the creeping threat of communism in Asia concentrated minds at least to some extent on the issues of Asian and Pacific security. With the obvious power of the USA in the Pacific it was therefore seen as essential that relations with America be considered when contemplating peace and security in the Pacific. This became all the more pressing, as the fear of a Japanese resurgence was still strong. The USA was initially disinterested in the formulation of a formal

arrangement with Australia and New Zealand however the Korean War changed views toward the desirability of a Pacific treaty and by 1951 had agreed to the basis of the ANZUS Treaty, which was signed on 1 September 1951 (McKinnon, 1993, p115-17).

This was to be the first treaty signed to by New Zealand that did not include the British. The British took some umbrage at their exclusion and saw it as a sign of increasing independenence in the pursuit of foreign policy. However to the New Zealanders it was seen more as covering an eventuality that in no real sense removed the commitment to the Commonwealth, which was still seen as the cornerstone of national defence (McGibbon, 1977, p27). However to Stenson this did represent a broadening of defence focus. Where prior to the 1950s the efforts of New Zealand were directed toward securing the British Empire he suggests that the new focus could be conceived as the defence of the "Free World." (Stenson, 1977, p179).

During the mid-1950s New Zealand Defence Forces utilised in the Middle East in support of the British led efforts to maintain the Suez canal route were no longer seen as meeting security needs and additionally the prospect of global war had receded to be replaced with the more likely scenario of regional conflict in Asia. The problem of communism sweeping through Asia as envisaged in the domino theory was a major threat and the New Zealand Defence strategy shifted to the containment of this, first with the committal of troops to the United Nations Army of the Korean war and then later to support the Commonwealth effort to protect Malaya from communist penetration (Rolfe, 1999a, p14). While this constituted a change in region (from the Middle Eas t to Asia), it also represented a continuation in the policy of "forward defence" that had characterised the defence policy of New Zealand since early times. The basis of this lay in the recognition that New Zealand was never likely to be able to defend itself against any powerful force. Hence it was far preferable to fight when necessary in concert with

association with its powerful allies, in places remote from the shores of New Zealand.

A United States of America orientation

Increasingly New Zealand was confronted with what became known as the "Anzac dilemma", where the American policy on an issue differed from that taken by the British, for example over the recognition of Communist China. New Zealand was therefore put into a position of having to choose between the two positions.

This reality became more acute when simultaneous conflict commenced in both Malaya (Indonesian aggression) and in Vietnam. This in essence constituted a situation where New Zealand with limited resources had little choice but to commit itself to supporting both the Commonwealth effort in Malaya and the USA Forces in Vietnam. To have neglected the Commonwealth had potential implications for New Zealand's trade position with its biggest market. On the other hand to have neglected the USA request for assistance was seen by many as having the potential to damage the greatly prized ANZUS relationship that would be to New Zealand's detriment. In the end support was offered to both in the hope that both would remain active in the Asian and Western Pacific regions (McKinnon, 1993, p156). New Zealand provided an infantry battalion to Malaysia during the Confrontation and initially supplied a non-combat engineering unit to Vietnam, however this was later supplemented by an artillery battery and a number of other sub-units to Vietnam in support of the USA position (McKinnon, 1993, p156).

By the late 1960s it became clear that the British had every intention of withdrawing from East of the Suez. Eventually Britain announced intentions to withdraw from its bases in Malaysia and Singapore by 1971. The USA was also becoming engaged in a staged withdrawal of forces from Vietnam, a process that continued until 1974. This then destroyed the concept of "forward defence" that

had been important in the basis of both Australian and New Zealand defence planning.

The withdrawal of the British from Asia rendered the ANZUS treaty more valuable than it had previously been and heralded an increasingly close arrangement between New Zealand and the USA. This was additionally reinforced by the inclusion of Britain into the European Community, which shocked the New Zealand economy and ultimately led to New Zealand adopting a more internationalist approach to foreign affairs (Alley, 1999, p297).

The 1970s then may be seen as a decade during which the lot of New Zealand as far as alliance or treaty defence relationships were increasingly thrown in with the USA and Australians under ANZUS. For the NZDF this entailed training exercises and procurement of equipment from within the Australian and American umbrella. However a number of changes were occurring with regard to the way New Zealand perceived its defence needs. As Rolfe suggests, from the 1960s the focus of defence planning increasingly concentrated more on regional concerns with the Asia Pacific becoming central (Rolfe, 1993, p6).

From about this time it may be useful to consider New Zealand's defence policy as being conceived in terms of concentric circles spreading out from New Zealand with three broad divisions that define the focus of the New Zealand Defence Force. This basic pattern according to Rolf has been consistent in defence policy for some decades (Rolfe, 1999a, p31). The broad divisions then consist of :

- Defending New Zealand against low level threats such as incursions into its Exclusive Economic Zone and terrorism.
- Contributing to regional security which includes maintaining key defence relationships with Australia and the FPDA.
- Being a good global citizen by participation in global security efforts, especially peacekeeping.

INCREASING REGIONAL FOCUS.

Whereas the focus of New Zealand defence in its early years was both directed toward forward defence in areas distant from the shores of the country and bound closely to various alliance arrangements this began to change noticeably from the 1960s. Along with support for United Nations Peacekeeping efforts, New Zealand's focus on defence began to look more closely at its relationship with the more immediate region namely Asia-Pacific and later, the South Pacific both in foreign and defence policy terms.

Asia in a regional defence policy.

Increased focus on Southeast Asia appears to have been largely premised on the perception of the threatened spread of communism in the re gion. Troops from New Zealand were stationed in Malaya and also in Singapore as part of the Commonwealth defence of those territories. While New Zealand's presence in Asia may have considerably reduced in the wake of the British withdrawal from "east of the Suez" that progressively occurred through the late 1960s and early 1970s, remnants remained with the prime example being the New Zealand Singapore presence. This force was maintained in Singapore until 1989, in what was seen as an increasingly anachronistic situation given changes in the strategic situation as evidenced by the much earlier withdrawal by Australian forces. While practical issues such as a lack of facilities to which a repatriation could be made seemed to be at the base of the continued presence it is also suggested that the presence was acceptable to the Singaporean leadership, it facilitated the Five Power defence arrangements and was to some extent consistent with the desire to maintain good relations with Southeast Asia (McGibbon, 1999, p116).

The Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) has through the 1990s been the main route through which New Zealand regional security arrangements have

been pursued in the Asian arm of the Asia Pacific region. The FPDA has its origins in a British, Singaporean, Malaysian, Australian and New Zealand agreement of 1971 and while not a treaty in the strict sense of the word remains a close agreement among the parties and allows for joint exercises and regular meetings at senior levels within the Defence Forces (Rolfe, 1999a, p72).

The South Pacific

Harland (Harland, 1992, p10) suggests that until the 1960s the South Pacific region did not really register with the majority of New Zealanders and quotes the Crown Prince of Tonga in 1962 as suggesting that New Zealanders behaved as if they lived in the North Sea rather than in the South Pacific. However as events in the Pacific and within the wider scope of New Zealand's foreign and security policy arena unfolded the Pacific has taken on a greater significance.

Through the 1960s the push toward decolonisation that was occurring in Africa and Asia and that was supported by the UN agencies was also having its impact in the Pacific (Hoadley, 1992, p19). New Zealand's responsibility for the administration of Western Samoa which had begun in 1914 following the expulsion of the Germans was brought to an end in 1962 when it was granted independence. This occurred in such a way as to provide no concerns for its future stability, and that independent Western Samoa would be well disposed toward New Zealand unlike the events that had been associated with decolonisation in Africa (McKinnon, 1993, p255).

In the following eight years the vast majority of South Pacific colonies were to become independent, the Cook Islands in 1965 (in free association with New Zealand), Nauru in 1968 and Fiji and Tonga in 1970. This gave not only a new feel to the politics of the Pacific but also gave New Zealand a greater sense of responsibility for the newly independent Pacific states (McKinnon, 1993, p257).

This was particularly so as Britain had been making it increasingly clear since the early 1960s that it was expecting more assistance from New Zealand and by 1970 was active in the process of relinquishing both presence and responsibility in the region. The Guam doctrine (1969) of the United States which promoted the concept of self-reliance among its allies also appears to have been of influence in promoting a greater sense of regional focus by New Zealand (McKinnon, 1993, p170)

For New Zealand this increased responsibility was, it seems, clearly recognised. The then Minister of Island Affairs Duncan McIntyre suggested that the stability of the Pacific Islands was central to the interests of New Zealand's political and commercial interests through the maintenance of lines of communication through the Pacific. The then Prime Minister added that New Zealand had indicated its intention to offer assistance to the Pacific Islands in any way that would be helpful (McKinnon, 1993, p257). Further to this, Ross (1993, p60-61) suggests that New Zealand had finally woken up to the idea that the geographic area closest to them had potential to become either a security concern or even a security problem

Another important element in the increasing recognition of the Pacific is identified as lying in the degree of Pacific Island immigration to New Zealand that was occurring during the 1960s. This immigration was in large part driven by New Zealand manufacturing industries in New Zealand that had been active in bringing in workers from the Cook Islands and Niue to fill increasing numbers of vacant positions. By the mid 1980s the extent of this immigration and the subsequent natural increase in the population of Pacific Islanders, particularly in Auckland had made them into a potentially influential electoral bloc, to the point that the Pacific Islands were increasingly included in the foreign policy stances of political parties (Harland, 1992, p54).

The issue of increased aid to the South Pacific also demonstrated the increasing importance of the region in New Zealand's foreign policy stance. Prime Minister Kirk justified the emphasis on the South Pacific in the allocation of aid clear in 1973 when he suggested "New Zealanders will see the importance of an emphasis on helping out with problems on our own doorstep" (Kirk, quoted in McKinnon, 1993, p267).

Following the wind-up of the South East Asian Treaty Organisation, in 1977, defence planning of both Australia and New Zealand took a shift away from a focus on wider Southeast Asia toward a closer regional focus. Australia began directing more attention to its Northern border and New Zealand to the South Pacific with major reviews of defence resulting from the change of focus (New Zealand Defence Reviews of 1978 and 1983) and greater defence cooperation between New Zealand and Australia (McGibbon, 1999, p116).

However a real commitment to a regional focus occurred following the Fourth Labour Government's actions regarding nuclear issues that resulted in the cessation of visits by US naval visits, the suspension of the ANZUS treaty in 1986 and the enactment of the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act (1987). The effective end of ANZUS then precipitated a need to reassess defence policy and more importantly to find a new role for the military in order to head off those that doubted New Zealand's need for armed forces at all. In addition to a continued support for involvement in peacekeeping, the 1987 Defence Review endorsed the importance of the relationship with Australia and was strongly supportive of a mainly South Pacific focus, a focus that has been described by some as constituting isolationism (McGibbon, 1999, p127).

A number of incidents occurred in the Pacific in the period leading up to the review, and these may have given some credence and substance to the wisdom of this focus. During the late 1970s the issue of independence of the New Hebrides (now Vanuatu) had been heating up with separatist movements springing up in

several areas of the territory. Similarly the issue of independence of New Caledonia had produced widespread violence and damage as the Kanaky separatists clashed with loyalist elements. Subsequent events could be seen as further legitimising an increased focus on the Pacific, with riots in Port Vila, Vanuatu, military coups in Fiji and the emergence of the Bougainville secession conflict (McKinnon, 1999, p149).

The election of a National led government which remained in power for the majority of the 1990s saw the publication of a Defence White Paper in 1991.This was touted as heralding a more internationalist approach to defence planning, however Henderson (1991, p93) observes that in reality this paper "differs very little" from the 1987 Labour Government approach in that regional concerns remain dominant and that the favoured strategy was "to protect the sovereignty and advance the well-being of New Zealand by maintaining a level of armed forces sufficient to deal with small contingencies affecting New Zealand and its region, and capable of contributing to collective efforts where our wider interests are involved" (The Defence of New Zealand (1991, p51) cited in Henderson, 1991, p93).

NEW ZEALAND AND THE UNITED NATIONS

In International relations, realist theory suggests that a fundamental aspect of international politics rests in the ability to manipulate and coerce other states, and that this ability is largely dependent on the power that differing states possess. Power is seen as bei ng closely related to size and therefore the largest (and most powerful) states have the most say in international relations. For small states, there is a tendency to look for security through association with other larger and more influential parties as discussed in an earlier part of this chapter. Another aspect of small statehood lies in the collective power and voice that comes through association and membership in international organisations (Henderson, 1991a,

p10). This may then explain New Zealand's strong support first for the League of Nations and then its post World War Two successor, the United Nations

New Zealand has, for example, served on the Security Council in the past and has regularly made its voice heard on issues important to it. McKinnon (1993, p12) suggests that as a small country that trades globally, we have a vested interest in the work of the UN to foster peace and security. In addition the UN provides the collective security that New Zealand has always sought as part of the Empire, Commonwealth or under the ANZUS pact.

One of the major contributions New Zealand has made toward supporting the UN has been the provision of peacekeeping forces. From July 1950 on, New Zealand has been a regular provider of these forces under the banner of "good international citizenship." Though it appears that involvement in peacekeeping was initially seen as a peripheral role for the New Zealand military it appears to have become more central and important to their work (Crawford, 1996, p8). With the increasing demand on this aspect of the UN's work since the end of the Cold War, New Zealand has demonstrated a continuing commitment and willingness to provide military personnel (see appendix 1).

Peacekeeping may arguably be seen in itself as a non-traditional military role, which Hensley (1993, p141) suggests is essentially foreign policy ends sought with defence means. He gives the example of New Zealand's involvement in both Bosnia and Somalia as clear examples of New Zealand military involvement with no real defence interests in either region. The motivation lies in the pursuit of wider humanitarian and international goals. This is alluded to further by McGibbon who has suggested that peacekeeping is undertaken "in pursuit of the governments foreign policy objective of demonstrating New Zealand's commitment to promoting peace in troubled areas of the world" (McGibbon, 2002, p163).

THE NZDF: AID AND DEVELOPMENT ROLES

In meeting the Defence Policy requirements of both commitment to UN peacekeeping and to the regional security focus the New Zealand Defence Force has been involved in a number of areas of activity, that whilst achieving a broad security role, may also be seen as having a development potential. Much of the work of this type appears to have been carried out in the South Pacific, possibly in recognition that for many Island leaders, security relates not so much to traditional defence, but more to political and economic security that depends on raising standards of living in order to dissolve social and ethnic tensions (Hoadley, 1992, p22).

Thai Road Project

However one notable project was carried out in Asia that does represent an example of the use of the Army as an agent of foreign policy and in a non-traditional role. It is also of some significance as one senior army engineer described it as "probably the largest aid project that the army has been involved in" (Personal communication with interviewee 004). This project was implemented through the Colombo plan at the height of the Cold War and was seen as having a role to play in stabilising the area to the north of Malaysia and Singapore, both important in the forward defence concept, against communist influence (McGibbon, 2002, p135).

Work was carried out over the period of 1966-1971 on a counterpart basis and in total the New Zealand Army contributed all but 4 of the 95 New Zealanders involved. This contribution appears to have consisted mainly of technical personnel utilising their skills as engineers. The New Zealand contribution also included the donation of a number of heavy and light vehicles, however equally important was the capacity building component where "A reservoir of technical

skills in a number of fields will enable the Thai staff to carry on with further projects when the New Zealand Staff leave" and "the project in itself has been an excellent exercise in international goodwill"(Government of Thailand, 1971, p27). Those servicemen that were involved in the project have recently been recognised for their work with a new medal being struck in their honour (Minister of Defence, 2003).

South Pacific

McGibbon (McGibbon, 2002) has recently documented the work done by the Corps of Royal New Zealand Engineers over the past 100 years and reveals some of what may be described as non-traditional work done by this element of the army and suggests that the work may be divided into categories of reconstruction and development (p158). The following descriptions draw heavily on this useful and insightful publication.

Hurricane and Cyclone relief work by the New Zealand has been carried out in many parts of the Pacific, with a major effort being related to the operation that followed Hurricane Bebe in Fiji. Army engineers were involved in reconstruction efforts from 1971 through to 1973 with a school reconstruction programme followed by a house reconstruction project that involved significant capacity building of local inhabitants thereby enabling them to complete the task.

Further relief work (housing reconst ruction) was carried out in Fiji during 1980 and again in 1985 following Hurricanes Eric and Nigel. Hurricane relief has also been carried out in Tonga (1982) and in Rarotonga in 1987. Cyclone Ofa (1990) also saw relief work carried out by the engineers in Western Samoa, Tonga, the Cook Islands and Tokelau, with work carried out in the latter being one of the largest of its type embarked on by the Army (McGibbon, 2002, p160). The medical expertise of the Army has also been used in Pacific relief work, most notably in the wake of the tsunami that swept parts of Papua New Guinea in 1998 (NZDF, 2002), but also more recently during exercise Tropic Dawn in Vanuatu where an army

medical clinic provided treatment for local people and a training component for local health care providers.

In the development category identified by McGibbon, the Army has been engaged in a number of civil assistance programs. McGibbon notes this work as beginning in 1963 in Tokelau with a reef gapping project that lasted two years. At the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Army engineers carried out further work on these reef gaps in 1983 (NZ Army, 1986, p10). Reef gapping work was also conducted in the late 1970s in Tuvalu and 1971 saw the start of a water project (reservoir and reticulation) lasting 19 months in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. Water supply work was also carried out in Fiji (1975) and Tonga in 1978-9 along with roading and reef gapping in the same location during the early 1980s and again in 1993-95 (p161-2.)

The Army engineers were also used as implementers for projects on behalf of the Ministry of Maori and Island Affairs when they conducted harbour extension work in the Cook Islands that required a 30 person team working over a period of 14 months. Aid work was also carried out by the engineers in the Solomon Islands during 1980 where a 60 strong team worked for six months on areas such as water supply, roading and bridge work. A long-standing arrangement with Vanuatu (since 1987) has seen both road and construction work done (p162). Some additional work of a "humanitarian nature " is also carried out in conjunction with the Mutual Assistance Program (MAP), which began in 1973. The main aim of the MAP is to provide a mutually beneficial framework within which New Zealand provides some small assistance to the military (officer training, trade training) of partner countries and in return gets training and exercise possibilities in return. The program often benefits the wider community by building needed infrastructure or assisting local capacity to do the job (McGibbon, 2000, p346).

Resource Protection

The New Zealand Defence Force has also contributed to the South Pacific region by way of resource protection. A 1990 report on New Zealand's relationship with the South Pacific suggested that one of the most immediate and continuing threats to the Island nations of the region was poaching and illegal extraction of their marine resources (South Pacific Policy Review Group, 1990, p208). Since 1981 the NZDF has expanded its surveillance of the New Zealand Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to that of much of the South Pacific including Tonga, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Western Samoa, the Solomons, Vanuatu and Kiribati. It is suggested that with increasing pressure on fisheries stocks within New Zealand and the Pacific Forum EEZ it is evident that resource protection will become an increasingly important role for the NZDF (McGibbon, 2000, p449).

Peacekeeping

While peacekeeping in itself may be seen as having foreign policy as opposed to defence ends, and therefore to some extent be seen as a non-traditional military role, it is within the framework of New Zealand's peacekeeping activities that other aspects of work that have development potential and focus are more clearly seen. These roles appear to have increased within the New Zealand Defence Force since the late 1980s, a pattern that exhibits some consistency with that demonstrated by other participating peacekeeping nations e.g in the Balkins.

Mine clearance

One of the areas that may fit into this category is that of humanitarian demining- an area that New Zealand forces have had considerable experience in and are highly regarded for. The scourge of landmines not only limits the cultivatable land area, but also destroys the productive capacity of thousands of people through injury and death. It also has a major impact on the ability of the UN

to conduct humanitarian, peacekeeping and post-conflict work (Rae, 1995, p9). This aspect of peacekeeping was first carried out to a major extent in Pakistan where New Zealand Army de-mining instructors were involved with training Afghan refugees in both mine awareness and clearance techniques from early 1989 through to the end of 1991. Similar roles have been carried out in Cambodia, where New Zealand Army personnel were integral to the development of the UN de-mining program and have continued to provide assistance and personnel to the Cambodian Mine Action Centre. De-mining expertise has additionally been uti lised in Mozambique and Angola.

Bosnia

The Bosnian peacekeeping effort by New Zealand was the largest prior to the East Timor commitment and saw New Zealand soldiers involved in activities that ranged from reconstruction of damaged or destroyed housing and schools and running of medical clinics for local people through to playing a role in the development of a unified local administration. This administration covered both a Muslim and a Croat town and was the first occurrence of this in central Bosnia. Critical to achieving this was the friendly and professional nature of the New Zealanders (Crawford, 1996, p67).

Bougainville

The New Zealand Defence Force, working closely with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has also been engaged in a non-UN, regionally based attempt to bring about a peace settlement to the conflict on Bougainville between the Papua New Guinea Defence Force and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army. The first initiative in 1990 saw the Defence Force (Navy) provide vessels fo r peace talks which however subsequently failed. A further initiative saw a regional peacekeeping force named the South Pacific Peacekeeping Force secure the

venue for the 1994 peace talks, however this was only in existence for a short period (Crawford, 1996, p38).

More recently there have been further talks with a subsequent agreement and truce being signed in 1997. In support of this, another regional initiative, the Truce Monitoring Group, was created. This has seen members of the New Zealand Defence Force working with those from Australia, Vanuatu and Fiji as unarmed Truce Monitors. The New Zealand contingent has been involved in some reconstruction work and has also worked with local youth in a New Zealand Overseas Development Assistance funded training program akin to the Limited Service Volunteer Program run in New Zealand (Ojala, 2000, p78).

UN Humanitarian Missions

The NZDF has also assisted in UN peacekeeping missions that have had a large humanitarian element to them, most notably Rwanda and Somalia. However the New Zealand contributions to these operations, rather than being involved widely with local populations, appear to have been concentrated on the valuable task of providing transport facilities to maintain a supply chain and administrative staff. However some medical assistance appears to have been given around Mogadishu by Royal New Zealand Air Force personnel assisting in various clinics (Crawford, 1996, p70).

DEFENCE POLICY 2000

The 1999 general Election saw a Labour/Alliance Government elected and with it a change in defence policy which was strongly based on the Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000 report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee which was released in 1999 (Clark, 2001a). The Government Defence Statement released in 2001 was aimed at building "A Modern, Sustainable

Defence Force Matched to New Zealand's Needs" The 2001 defence statement made it clear that to build a defence force suited to New Zealand's needs (and Budget) would necessitate a reduction in the "breadth of military capabilities" and would instead concentrate resources in producing "sufficient depth in high priority areas" (Ministry of Defence, 2001) and suggested a number of controversial changes to current defence arrangements, particularly the decision to divest the Air force of its Skyhawk strike capability.

A number of decisions were also outlined that have implications for the role of the defence force and its main area of focus The general impression to be gained from the policy is that the primary role of the NZDF will be to assist in peacekeeping operations and other operations within New Zealand and the South Pacific. A statement from the Prime Minister reinforces this, in that they will "Give priority for the armed forces to New Zealand and South Pacific operations such as disaster relief, resource protection, suitable ODA delivery such as engineering and health projects, and to UN peacekeeping or non-military peace support" (Clark, 2001, p22).

A number of critics of the defence policy highlight the strong focus on the South Pacific and peacekeeping including the then opposition defence spokesperson Max Bradford who concluded that the new Governments focus was informed by a different view of the world, one that focussed on the South Pacific and on peacekeeping (Bradford, 2001, p11).

In identifying the risk of instability in the Melanesian arc (see Appendix 2) that includes Fiji, the Solomon Islands, Bougainville and Papua New Guinea and East Timor, Ayson (2000, p397) suggests that there is potential for some coherence to build between the narrower regional focus and the more internationalist tool of peacekeeping. The instability that is prevalent in these areas is based more on domestic political tensions than on interstate conflict and suggests that this makes them amenable to the peace operations so much favoured by New Zealand. He

also suggests that this is likely to broaden the narrow South Pacific focus somewhat as the arc acts as a bridge between the Pacific and the rear reaches of South-east Asia

While East Timor and Bougainville may not be the model for all the Defence Force will do in the future as argued by a number of defence analysts (e.g. Rolfe, 1999, p10), the potential for instability in the region has been widely identified. The new defence policy with its focus on the South Pacific and on Peacekeeping appears to have the potential to allow the New Zealand Defence force to make contributions with a development focus similar to those outlined above.

Of further interest in recent defence and security background documents is the explicit recognition of security entailing more than defence capabilities. The New Zealand's Foreign and Security Policy Challenges document clearly states that "Defence capabilities are only one element in a broader approach to international security" and goes on to list a number of alternative avenues through which this may be enhanced (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2000). This is backed up by the Defence Beyond 2000 Report that appears to question the disparity between the amounts of funding for the defence force when compared with that devoted to New Zealand's ODA program. The report suggests that:

> "It is remarkable, in view of the uniquely benign strategic situation of New Zealand and the South Pacific (for which we have assumed special developmental responsibilities), that the balance in our case is so heavily weighted towards defence expenditure. New Zealand's ratio is in fact higher than the ratio for 15 of our 20 DAC partners... We see scope for widening the terms of reference of the External Relations Ministerial Team that was announced on 21 June 1999 to include coordination, not only of agencies carrying out operations offshore in areas such as education, immigration, and trade and investment promotion, but also development aid and defence.

> We recommend examination of the balance between the allocation of resources to all the various aspects of the conduct of foreign relations, looking at the interdependencies and in terms of a strategic approach to the management of whole-of-Government priorities" (Recommendation 22). (Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Select Committee, 2000)

In light of this suggestion the role of aid and development in the pursuit of security is made clear. In addition there seems to be increasing recognition of, and the potential for some synergy to be obtained through the "interdependencies" of development aid and defence. That the defence force be involved in the delivery of aid, at least to some extent is alluded to in the statement by the Prime Minister cited above. If nothing else this at least signals a continuation of the development type work carried out by the NZDF in the South Pacific and within peacekeeping missions.

Some further recognition of this is contained in the Defence Portfolio briefing papers presented to the newly elected government of 2002. These suggest that there is an increased likelihood that military capabilities will be required in the South Pacific for "maritime patrol, disaster relief, peace support and reconstruction, especially with Australia broadening its focus to other areas of the world" (Ministry of Defence/ New Zealand Defence Force, 2002).

PUBLIC OPINION.

Public opinion regarding defence within the New Zealand population has demonstrated a degree of indifference according to Rolfe (1993, p40), with no great defence constituency being obvious. Factors involved in this indifference appear to have their origins in New Zealand's relative distance from threat (Rolfe, 1993, p20). However public support for the armed forces does appear to be strengthening after being somewhat damaged by involvement in the Vietnam

conflict. In large part this support appears to have been engendered by the increased involvement of New Zealand forces in UN peacekeeping missions since the late 1980s. Rolfe suggests that support for NZDF involvement in UN peace operations was at 80 per cent in 1996 and remained similar in 1997. The Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000 report recognises a similar sentiment among the public of New Zealand (Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Select Committee, 2000).

There has also been an increased understanding that "involvement in such operations, which enjoy wide public and political support can raise the profile of the NZDF"(Crawford, 2000, p420). Goff (2000, p14) reinforces this with the observation that the engagement in the latest operation (East Timor) has gained wide public support despite the loss of defence personnel lives and the price tag of $50 Million per year. Moreover he suggests that converts have been made among those on the left of the political spectrum, who now support significant additional defence spending to ensure New Zealand has a combat ready force that can engage in operations of this nature.

DEFENCE FORCE NUMBERS

Consistent with trends in many other nations as alluded to in chapter 3, the NZDF has experienced a degree of downsizing since 1990 and the end of the Cold War. One clearly visible sign of this is the reducing level of NZDF employed personnel over this period as outlined in Figure 7 below.



Fig.7 New Zealand Defence Force Personnel Total by Year
Source: Directorate of Strategic Human Resource Requirements, New Zealand Defence Force.

SUMMARY

This chapter has described the early origins of the current NZDF and the various roles that they have performed as a tool of Government. It may be seen that over this period a change from traditional activities distant from the shores of New Zealand have given way to a greater focus on more immediate environs, especially the South Pacific, and on Peacekeeping. And while early NZDF activity may be described as comprising traditional military functions the chapter has also described additional activities that have broadened their role to include a number of new areas of engagement particularly within the peacekeeping and South Pacific foci.

These roles have included a number of engineering projects through the Pacific Islands, hurricane and cyclone relief, healthcare and through the Mutual Assistance Program capacity building to the defence establishments of the region. In addition a program of maritime surveillance has enabled a degree of protection for the valuable fisheries resources of small Pacific Island States. The chapter has also outlined the ongoing role of the NZDF in peacekeeping and within this an increasing element of assistance to civilian populations including assistance with mine clearance, reconstruction and local administration.

The broad policy environment has also been covered and has identified an apparent continued trend toward a broad role for the NZDF identified in recent documents that at least signal a continuance of current roles.

CHAPTER 6

THE NZDF IN EAST TIMOR

Introduction

This chapter provides a detailed examination of the civil assistance provided by the NZDF to the population of the Cova Lima district of East Timor. To a great extent this examination is based on primary data collected by way of interview, conversation supplemented by examination of documents. The chapter commences with a brief overview of the region and the extent of the New Zealand commitment to East Timor. The chapter then moves on the to provide detail of the extent and range of assistance provided, and includes description of a degree of evolution in approach. The focus then moves to a description of that part of the NZDF in Cova Lima that had overall responsibility for the organisation and coordination of this work. The motivation for engagement in civil assistance work is then examined followed by identification of a range of views held by NZDF personnel regarding their involvement in this area. Attributes and constraints that impact on NZDF involvement in civil assistance work are also identified. The chapter then provides views from several actors outside the NZDF including aid agencies, local administration and donor organisations. A full list of interviewees is included as Appendix 3. The concluding section includes a range of views from representatives of New Zealand political parties on this aspect of the NZDFs' work in East Timor.

THE NZDF IN COVA LIMA.

The New Zealand Defence Force has had a presence in the Cova Lima region of East Timor since the arrival of Victor Company in October 1999 as part of the INTERFET force. This was increased to a Battalion sized force (about 500 personnel) shortly afterwards. In all there have been 6 Battalion groups deployed

to East Timor, with each serving for a period of six months. Sub-units from Canada, Ireland, Nepal, Fiji and Singapore have assisted these battalions. The final battalion group (BATT 6) remained in East Timor until December 2002 during which there was a staged handover to Singaporean and Thai forces. However a New Zealand presence will be maintained in the Metinaro area, continuing the task of providing small arms training for the new East Timor Defence Force that contains a number of demobilised FRETLIN fighters.

The Cova Lima region is one of 13 provinces in East Timor and during the Indonesian occupation was heavily contested by the FRETLIN and ABRI/TNI forces. The area was also one that was a backwater as far as development goes and was described to me by one senior Army Officer as something like the equivalent of an "East Timorese Otara" (Interview 006) or possibly more accurately by the former New Zealand Consul in Dili as "equivalent to the East Cape region of New Zealand."

Nevertheless, during Indonesian times the region did have an organised health system, a functioning education system and local administrative system. Utilities were also provided. Electricity was widely available in the area with large generators in Suai providing power to the town and surrounds and smaller generators servicing smaller settlements such as Zumulai, and Tilomar in the interior. Water supplies were also provided to the main Suai area via a supply pipe to supplement the well-drawn water.

However the militia rampage following the announcement of the results of the referendum resulted in massive destruction to these facilities. Several sources in Suai including NGO, local administration and Army personnel suggested that Cova Lima had been among the most heavily damaged areas in East Timor. According to reports from the first New Zealand soldiers arriving in the area, virtually every building had been rendered unusable through a combination of stripping of roofing iron and intentional fire damage (Crawford and Harper, 2001, p

92). Water supplies to most areas, including Suai had been destroyed (Cova Lima District Administration, 2002, p35) with much of the piping removed to West Timor and the sources being intentionally contaminated, particularly in the case of wells. In addition, the agricultural base of the district was also heavily damaged, with livestock either stolen and removed to West Timor, or gratuitously slaughtered.

MAIN ROLE OF THE NZDF IS SECURITY.

It rapidly became clear that there was little doubt within the NZDF of their main role within the broader UNTAET/UNMISET peace operation. In virtually every interview with NZDF personnel, when the question of their role was raised, the fact that the NZDF was there primarily in a security role was mentioned. This role is seen as paramount and everything is aimed at fulfilling it. With New Zealand being allocated the Cova Lima region, the task of establishing security was seen as being more complicated and difficult than in many other sectors. This is because the region shares the border with Indonesian West Timor and thus there was potential for militia incursions across the border. This danger was borne out in 2000 by the killing of one New Zealand soldier and shortly afterward the killing of one Nepalese peacekeeper and the wounding of three others, who were attached to the New Zealand Battalion.

However there was common agreement expressed among those interviewed in Battalion 6 that the security threat, while still being of concern, was certainly reduced. It was suggested that as time had moved on and the threat to security had been reduced, there had been an increasing amount of what one senior officer (Interview 006) in Battalion 6 described as "redundant capacity". While earlier Battalion deployments had been more heavily focussed on the militia threat, he suggested that "from about Batt. 4 on there has been more redundant capacity and that it is this that has been utilised to assist community". However he also made it very clear that were the security situation to deteriorate to any major extent, the

civil assistance work as it stood, would markedly reduce until the situation had reverted to its previous state. This view was reiterated in conversation with a number of personnel both within and outside the Civil/Military Affairs (CMA) cell.

ROLES PERFORMED BY THE NZDF IN ASSISTING THE COMMUNITY.

Over the three year duration of deployment in the Cova Lima region the New Zealand forces have supplied assistance of a number of types to the local community. The civil assistance work carried out by the earlier Battalions had certainly made important contributions to the community but had been somewhat constrained by the more difficult security situation that was evident during their time there. The following provides a brief description of some of the varied types of assistance supplied to the Cova Lima population.

Delivery of Humanitarian assistance.

Humanitarian work, more characteristic of the earlier Battalion forces, involved activities such as delivery of urgently needed supplies such as food to communities throughout the region. The New Zealand Battalions also provided emergency surgical and medical healthcare for around 450 East Timorese by October 2000 in their specially designed hospital facility (Crawford and Harper, 2001, p162). This special hospital facility was repatriated to New Zealand in mid-2001 when the Slovakian surgical facility began operations in Suai. However New Zealand Defence Force personnel continued to assist in the provision of transport of local people for emergency treatment for some time after this.

Assistance in the repatriation process.

One of the characteristics of Post Conflict situations is the process of repatriation of those displaced by events. While repatriation is mainly the

responsibility of the UNHCR, the NZDF has provided assistance in the past with the joint creation of information packs for returnees (Hayward, 2002), health screening, assisting with the immunisation of those returning from West Timor in addition to providing weapon screening and security oversight for these events. I managed to witness only one repatriation event that involved about 40 East Timorese returning from West Timor. NZDF involvement appeared limited to a general security overview and support which involved looking for any wanted militia secreted in the group and provision of guards to protect the group overnight.

Renovation of infrastructure.

This has been an ongoing area of activity for the various Battalion groupings and appears to have constituted the majority of the projects that they have been involved in and funded. It has involved work in several main sectors including renovation and re-roofing of schools, repair of water supplies and wells and some partial reinstatement of electricity. Work was also done to assist a health initiative run by local nuns to begin operation by completing a clinic building with toilet facilities and installing an electricity supply for them (Interview 005). There has also been a large amount of road repair and construction. The road network remains tenuous to say the least, especially during the wet season. This is more to do with the generally poor construction and rough terrain as opposed to intentional damage caused by militia, according to one NZDF officer. It appears that most of the roading work undertaken is with a military need in mind. However "if a road is to be built and there is a choice of routes, then the route that offers the most to the local population is the one that is most likely to be completed" (Interview 006).

Allocation of donated goods.

Various groups and individuals in New Zealand have donated many goods over the three years of deployment and New Zealand soldiers have been one of the main routes for distribution of these. Items that have been disseminated

through the Cova Lima region include a number of bicycles, school supplies, (Crawford and Harper, 2001, pX11) various tools and agricultural impliments and clothing, some of which I saw being distributed while there.

Dissemination of information.

The NZDF has provided an ongoing flow of information to the Cova Lima community on a series of topics and via different means. The Battalion groups have published two newspapers, one for adults (the Cova Lima Guardian) and one for children and young teenagers (the Young Crocodile). Both newspapers are published fortnightly in both Tetum and English. (see Appendix 4 for sample copy of Cova Lima Guardian). They have also constructed a series of public information boards in the villages and have spoken at church and public meetings.

Topics that have been covered include the electoral process and the main tenets of democracy, which was described to me by a number of NZDF personnel as being only marginally understood by the majority of the population of Cova Lima. Other general topics that have been covered include health issues, the law, and civil rights. Additional messages that are conveyed include those relating particularly to the Cova Lima region, as it was suggested to me by personnel associated with the paper that local issues are generally not attended to by the few other media in East Timor.

The Young Crocodile is published for children and young people and is aimed at giving them a forum to discuss their aspirations and hopes for the future. Those associated with the papers that I spoke to, suggested that while it wasn't "top line journalism" and that some of the stories "may have seemed a little contrived," it was nonetheless seen as valuable to convey some positive messages regarding democracy and leadership to the community. In addition, some of the positive events and developments in the region (eg returnee resettlement, successful small businesses, reopened schools) were highlighted as a confidence building measure

Plate 1. NZDF engineers maintaining roads in Cova Lima. (Photo NZDF)

Plate 2. NZDF personnel discussing water supply renovation with local village head.

Plate 3. Young journalist group assisted by NZDF personnel.

Plate 4. NZDF medical personnel in capacity building exercise with local health workers (Photo NZDF)

by demonstrating that some progress was being made. Another important aspect of NZDF information provision has been its function as a counter to destabilising rumour and speculation that was widespread in the community.

Lobbying/ Advocacy.

There had also been a degree of advocating and lobbying by the Army on behalf of the Cova Lima community. One interviewee from Batt 5 suggested that they had engaged in a process whereby they "lobbied, advocated and terrorised whoever they could in Dili to get people to do some work in Cova Lima" (Interview 023). This included approaches to NGOs and UN organisations such as UNDP. This appears to have been continued during the Batt 6 deployment as there were plans to host the "Massey Mafia", a group of ex Massey University students that are now government officials with a view to facilitating "clear communication channels between local and central government"(NZBATT6, 2002). Advocacy by the Army on a local level is also detectable in the Cova Lima Guardian paper where local issues have been highlighted and brought to the attention of the district administration (Anon, 2002a; Anon, 2002b).

Coordination of other development actors.

In recognition of the "ad hoc" and di sjointed nature of development effort and "the lack of any linkage or overarching sense of why we are doing this" (023) among the various agencies, the NZDF has also attempted to provide some form of coordination among the NGO actors in the development arena. Toward this end they instigated an NGO forum in 2001 and suggested that the Army could be of some assistance to them and "that the sum of a joint effort is better than this stove-piping that is going on and maybe we can share ideas and work together on some projects, each with our own focus" (Interview 023). The Battalions role changed as they progressively withdrew from running this forum to becoming observers only

(Hayward, 2002). However this initiative was no longer in operation by the time I conducted my fieldwork and appeared to have faltered toward the end of the BATT 5 deployment.

EVOLUTION IN PROVISION OF CIVIL ASSISTANCE

While many of the activities engaged in may have been akin to a charity approach (us doing something for you) in an effort to win over the local population there was a change in approach underway by the time I conducted my fieldwork in Cova Lima. This added dimension was documented in a NZBATT 6 spreadsheet that suggests that main principle behind the provision of assistance to the community now lies in the form of "Capacity Building" with an accompanying vision that aims to "(F)acilitate the development of sustainable initiatives identified by the Realisation Issues and Projects Report that are owned by the tangata whenua of the Cova Lima District". The main thrust was to provide people and organisations within Cova Lima with skill sets that will assist in the future development of the district. The desired end state of the work is described by the same document as laying a "(F)oundation for sustainable realisation projects established and progressing after NZBATT withdrawal"(NZBATT6, 2002).

Capacity building was described to me as a new development that had its origins in the experiences and evaluation of the situation in Cova Lima as recognised by the previous Battalion group (NZBATT5), and was encapsulated in the Realisation issues document produced by them (Interview 018-019). However a further motivating force behind the change of approach was described by a senior NZBATT6 officer (Interview 006) as resulting from the change of the UN mission from UNTAET with its wide powers of administration, to UNMISET where the role was altered in recognition of independence, to support of the new Government. CMA officers (Interview 018-019) from Battalion 6 stated that since

independence they were especially "mindful to put everything (all civil assistance) through the relevant Government officer".

He (Interview 006) suggested however that in reality it appeared that there was little in the way of capacity to support in Cova Lima, and that the experience of the Portuguese colonisation and the Indonesian occupation had done little to build capacity for administration in the local population. He further suggested that capacity building was in part designed to plug some identifiable gaps in the recently published Cova Lima Development plan.

This change in focus to capacity building was seen as having an impact on all the various project types that were being implemented as well as initiating some new projects. Examples that were given to me included the infrastructure projects (water and sanitation, renovating schools) where local people were increasingly being trained and encouraged to do the work themselves under the supervision of NZDF personnel. Capacity building efforts had also been directed towards the local and district administration in the form of seemingly simple things such as the processes involved in running meetings and in the process of project identification and subsequent application for funding from donors. An agricultural assistance program had also recently been commenced, that included a capacity building element (machinery use and maintenance, cultivation of new crops) along with distribution of more tangible items such as donated hand tools and seed.

NZDF medical staff also identified a change in their focus from direct provision of care to locals, to one of capacity building and strengthening of local healthcare facilities through teaching. Efforts were also being made toward capacity building of the local East Timor Police Service officers with a New Zealand Army officer with a policing background teaching on a daily basis. Several other areas including assistance to judiciary were also being planned but it appeared that these had not yet begun during my visit (further details of Capacity building projects are included in Appendix 5). This approach was consistent with that

advocated by the UNMISET PKFHQ which suggests that "community activities to impart capacity building skills will be the key activities in maintaining the trust of the local people" and that "CMA activities will now focus mainly on imparting skills and knowledge" (United Nations Mission In Support of East Timor Headquarters Peacekeeping Force (UNMISET HQ PKF, 2002).

Capacity building also appears to have been influenced by the desire of the Army to avoid leaving a void or vacuum behind when they departed. This was seen in terms of a situation whereby a vacuum had the potential to be filled by destabilising elements. One officer from Battalion 5 suggested that while they had sought to be relevant to the situation while in Cova Lima, he thought that it was important that they avoided building a community dependence on their help, and to ensure that by the time they left they had made themselves irrelevant (Interview 023). This point was also made in an interview in the *Listener* regarding the role of the New Zealand Defence Force in East Timor (Jolliffe, 2002, p30).

Avoiding dependency, the desire to become irrelevant on departure and supporting official structures became apparent when the approach to health provision was explained to me. Where earlier Battalions had often provided care directly to local people there had been recognition more recently that this may have been weakening the official structures that had been put in place. There had thus been a change in approach and a conscious effort made not to supplant these. It was suggested by interviewee 023 that this meant being "quite firm with the companies out in the hills" and telling them that local people had to use the local system because people were going to get sick and die anyway after the Battalion left. Getting people used to using the local system was more useful in the long run as they learned to take more responsibility and it built the local system up rather than undermining it.

ORGANISATION.

The main architecture through which assistance to the civilian population was conducted was the Civil-Military Affairs section of the Battalion. As a dedicated unit, the CMA section was first put into operation during the second Battalions deployment. Prior to this there had apparently been no specialist grouping through which the relationship with the community was conducted (Crawford and Harper, 2001, p141). During the time I spent with the Battalion 6 in Suai the CMA cell consisted of a core group based at the main NZ Battalion Forward Operating Base (FOB) at Suai, and a series of CMA detachments based at the outlying NZ bases such as Fohorem, Belulik Letan etc.

The CMA cell at the FOB consisted of a Senior Liaison Officer (SLO) in an overseeing and reporting role, a project officer, an NGO liaison officer and several support staff. This appears to be a similar set-up to the configuration during the Battalion 5 deployment and in total the CMA team, including those in the outlying bases, comes to around thirty personnel. The role of the CMA detachments involves a considerable amount of travel within the areas they have been assigned. During this they gather information on areas of need or difficulty in the various communities and relay this back to the main CMA cell. They are also responsible for the delivery of items (eg school supplies, clothing, books) donated by various groups in New Zealand and for delivery of the newsletter published by the Battalion.

The NGO liaison officer has the important task of acting as a conduit between other development actors in the area such as both international and local NGOs but also liases with senior officers in the local administration centre such as the District Administrator, his deputy and the Development Officer in an attempt to coordinate activities. Both the liaison officer and the project officer also have a role in finding sources of funding for these endeavours. This team acts as a coordinating group for possible and actual projects. A process is put into action

when information regarding need is identified. This identification is generally made by CMA staff in outlying areas, or, in the case of Suai itself, by the CMA cell. I was also told that a number of projects had been suggested by personnel that had brought ideas from previous experiences (Interview 017).

CMA staff suggested that the main criteria considered in the project proposal process consists of coming to some conclusion regarding whether the resources are available, be this in terms of money, materials or personnel and whether it is feasible in terms of time. The issue of location was also seen as important as according to one officer (Interview 006) there was a need to be seen as being even handed and impartial and therefore attempts were made to avoid focussing projects on one locale at the expense of another.

MOTIVATION

There appear to be several elements involved in providing the motivation to engage in this type of activity. The first of these relates to the need for the NZDF to create a positive impression in the eyes of the population of the area in which they are serving. This clearly relates to and equates to the "hearts and minds" approach where building a good relationship with the community within which a force is operating is seen as being a valuable, if not critical element in the success of the mission. A senior officer in NZBATT6 (Interview 006) confirmed this when he stated that originally, CMA work was indeed aimed "purely at building good relations with the community". However he also suggested that this approach had changed substantially from the time of NZBATT5.

While maintaining a good relationship with the community was still seen as an essential and central role for CMA, an additional element was identified as providing further motivation. This element was recognition that the threats to security were not only present from outside the border of East Timor, but that there

were also potential threats from inside. Development was described by one senior officer in NZBATT6 as a necessary component of a wider or more comprehensive view of what constitutes security. He observed that "the NZDF has encouraged the use of indirect pathways toward the achievement of security. No longer do we rely on the single military show of force to achieve this. Development may be one of these indirect pathways to security"(Interview 006) and suggested that this lay behind a lot of the "development" work attempted.

Wider security may be seen in contrast to the more minimalist role that peacekeepers may be seen to have in the eye of the public. This perceived role appears to consist of the use of military hardware and weaponry and the interposition of a "physical" military presence between protagonists. The rationale behind this wider notion of security appears to hinge on the belief that if the local people (of the Cova Lima district) have a stake in their community, and if the life they now have, or can see the potential of having in the foreseeable future is improved, then they will be less likely to be influenced by elements within the community that may have a vested interest in stirring up trouble (Interview 015, 017). With a better future at risk, support for these elements is likely to be reduced. A discussion with another NZDF officer in Battalion 6 suggested that this could be equated with the notion of ultimate victory suggested by Sun Tsu in his historical treatise on war. For him, the ultimate victory was one that did not involve conquering ones opponent by means of engagement in battle. The acme of brilliance instead was demonstrated by conquering an enemy without having to fight at all. This was also discussed in terms of "winning the war but losing the peace". Development then could be seen as a way of increasing the effectiveness of the primary security role of the military through building up the resilience of the community.

Another motivating element for engagement in aid work was the personal desire to get in and help. While not strictly an interview, a discussion with one CMA officer suggested the appeal of the work as lying in the desire to do some

good over and above the provision of security. The soldier involved had been deployed in East Timor on a previous occasion and had spent this time doing patrols on the border. For him, the chance to get out and mix with the locals and to find out what they needed assistance with was in a sense a way of "completing a job" that comprised both the hard military aspect with the natural desire to help directly.

However this was not the case for all involved in this type of work. One officer in particular suggested in conversation that he was happy to do the work but that in reality he "(didn't) give a shit about these people really, and the sense of satisfaction I get out of doing the job is from following my orders to the best of my ability". However this was the only response of its type, and given the high regard the officer and the standard of the work he oversaw was held, there appeared to be little doubt that despite personal motivation, the physical outcomes achieved were of high quality.

While this thesis focuses on the role of the New Zealand Defence Force in East Timor it must be pointed out here that it appears virtually all peacekeeping units present in East Timor were involved in pursuing civil affairs projects in one way or another. The full extent of this had not been apparant to me earlier but became clear following my discovery of a Civil-Military Affairs conference being held in Dili during the few days I spent there. While it was not possible for me to attend the conference for security reasons I was lucky enough to get a copy of the PowerPoint presentations contributed by each participating peacekeeping force. This collection of presentations also includes some input from the Peacekeeping Force Headquarters (PKFHQ) and access to subsequent documentation from the UN appears to confirm that to some extent at least, the "development" work done by the various PKF forces in East Timor is encouraged by PKFHQ.

The overall tenor of these documents suggested that PKFHQ tends to outline certain broad approaches or emphases that then become the template on which

the various forces plan their civil assistance work. However it was strongly suggested to me by one New Zealand Army Officer that even though all the PKF elements were doing some of this type of work, there was considerable variation in the way this was done, with NZDF recognised as doing a particularly good job. This will be discussed in more detail in a subsequent section.

"IT'S NOT OUR JOB BUT WE'RE QUITE GOOD AT IT."

Within the NZDF there were a range of views expressed regarding involvement in the civil assistance side of their work. One interviewee (Interview 003), a senior officer that served with an earlier Battalion, was adamant about security as the focus of the NZDF and stressed the need to have strict limitations on the aspects of work that the NZDF may be approached to give assistance on. With three pillars (humanitarian, security and political) to the international response in East Timor he felt that it was crucial not to stray too far from security into any of the others. However he did suggest that it was a valid role for the NZDF to set in place "preconditions such as creating a conducive environment for aid money to flow into, and if part of the preconditions means we can give a helping hand then all well and good". However the CMA efforts could not be seen as anything other than a military component of providing security. He also suggested that rather than seeing the NZDF as an agent of development he would prefer instead to see it described as an enabler or facilitator of development

However another senior officer (Interview 023) from a later Battalion suggested that it was a legitimate, even necessary role for the NZDF to play and stated that "if we don't do it who will, and that is the big question?" This statement was followed by description of the relatively small NGO presence and of the poverty of the UN agencies impact in the district. This officer also described a situation regarding some initial reservations at Defence Headquarters in New Zealand. These were described as being not so much as to whether the Battalion

force should be doing this work per se, but more to do with the extent of it at the expense of resources devoted to the primary role of patrolling the border. However 023 suggested that following some evaluation of the situation on the ground, this reservation seemed to have diminished somewhat.

In interviews with officers from the CMA cell (Interview 017,018,019), civil assistance work was identified as a legitimate area for the NZDF to be engaged in (as a wider interpretation of security) and they most definitely saw it as development work. One went further and suggested that the NZDF should probably be doing more of it (Interview 017). However they stated that the general attitudes of some others in the battalion toward the civil assistance work and toward the CMA cell was somewhat ambivalent. It was suggested to me that in general, the "operational side of things (traditional military operations) tend to see us as bit of an adjunct or as a nice to have rather than necessity". Conversations with some more junior staff from the regular force seemed to bear this out with a notable degree of ignorance regarding the role of CMA and some indifference toward the work.

CONSTRAINTS.

Interviews with NZDF personnel identified several factors that were recognised as having a limiting or constraining impact on the development work that the force was attempting to do.

Funding.

This was identified as a major constraining factor by virtually all NZDF interviewees. While the NZDF was funded for its basic presence and organisational maintenance, for many of the ingredients of civil assistance work it was reliant on being able to obtain funding from outside the organization. This

appears to have particularly been the case in relation to the more physical inputs such roofing and piping. It appeared that without this external funding, there would be little in the way of school re-roofing or water supply reinstatement done. To gain funding for this work, one interviewee (023) suggested "we were whores when it came to getting money and would take from anywhere and anyone".

Several of sources of funding were utilised by the NZDF for civil assistance work. There were a number of donations from charitable organisations in New Zealand including the Manning and Dransfield Foundations. However the main sources of funding were the British Mission (the British Representative in East Timor) and NZAID/ Head of Mission Fund administered by the New Zealand Representative in East Timor (Interview 017, 018, 023). Requested detail of NZAID/Head of Mission funding is presented as received in Appendix 3, but appears to cover only some of the more recent funding. However the previous New Zealand representative in Dili suggested to me that the true extent of funding from this source has in fact been considerably greater, with figures of "several hundred thousand dollars" being mentioned (Personal Communication Dr Jonathan Austin, May 2002).

Duration of deployment/ loss of institutional knowledge.

The CMA team in existence at the time of my fieldwork had been operating for several weeks but a number of the key officers were only on three-month deployments as opposed to the six m onths that was more usual. These positions were then to be refilled by new officers. When asked whether this discontinuity and that of the changeover of the battalions posed a difficulty for civil assistance work there were a range of opinions expressed. For most, the changeover was seen as a constraining factor and that there was a loss of institutional knowledge between battalions despite attempts to mitigate this. One officer interviewed (Interview 018) suggested that there was a tendency for each battalion to bring its own style and to want to stamp its own authority on the deployment. A degree of

independence given to battalion command structures also tended to give rise to slightly different interpretations of the situation in the area of operatio n being made and that this could result in changes in direction.

Others interviewed (Interview 018-019) however put the regular changeover of staff in a different light by suggesting each changeover was in fact an evaluation point that allowed a new perspective and interpretation of the approach. On a more practical level they suggested that that after six months "everyone was running on the smell of an oily rag and that new legs were needed". They believed this could equally apply to the NGOs in the area and suggested that many international staff "were by their own admission getting complacent and were dying to leave".

A further factor related to this and noticeable in the final deployment was the recognition that a definite date for return to New Ze aland had been set by the New Zealand Government thus putting pressure on the type of projects that could be attempted and the extent to which capacity could be built. In acknowledgment of this the capacity building spreadsheet stated that a "sense of urgency" was an underlying theme. One CMA officer (Interview 018) suggested that in recognition of the time factor, they were in reality aiming only at taking only small steps toward building capacity.

Experience and training.

That civil assistance of this nature and of this extent was new to the NZDF was suggested by interviewee 023. In response to the question as to whether the NZDF had any real experience in this work he said he believed it did not. He believed that while the NZDF may have had some experience with civil assistance work in Bosnia, there were important differences with the situation in East Timor, not least being the much larger size of the operation and the greater commitment of personnel. He further suggested that in his opinion there had been no real

lessons learned at an organisational level from Bosnian experience so that the Timor experience was essentially new.

Almost without exception the interviews conducted with those involved in CMA activities felt that the pre deployment training had left them particularly unprepared for the nature of the work. Interviewee 019 stated that the lack of specific training was "a weakness and we are having to make it up as we go along in terms of how we operate and the skills we need". This was confirmed in an interview with 003, who stated that training really only consisted of a routine security approach. For a number of those interviewed, the difficulties associated with language were seen as particularly important and should have been dealt with more thoroughly prior to deployment, as interface with the East Timorese was central to their work.

Another CMA officer (Interview 015) also suggested that training for CMA was virtually nil but was equally concerned that too little importance and thought had been put into the selection of personnel. He was convinced that there should be a focus on providing more mature staff with some life experience and the inclusion of some female staff to increase the interface with women in the villages.

The lack of training and experience in this work was recognised as "a bit of a problem" by one of the senior officers in Batt 5 in that there was a degree of trial and error in their approach, however he did suggest in mitigation that the NZDF had "taken a pragmatic approach" and "just looked at the problems logically and come up with ideas". He also noted that a "lessons learned" process was underway and believed that the considerable learning that had been done would be used in the future (Interview 023).

ATTRIBUTES

A number of attributes within the organisation were identified in discussion/interview with NZDF personnel. These were seen as having a positive impact on the ability of the organisation to engage in civil assistance work

Skill sets within territorial force

The diversity and depth of skills within the NZDF were seen as having a major impact on the breadth of engagement in assisting the community. Within the regular force there is a strong engineering element that has had experience of civil assistance work in the Pacific and also a strong medical contingent. Also present were legal skills that it was hoped would be used in building capacity in the local court. In addition the Territorial Force members were seen by a number of interviewees as having skills outside of those of normal military training and thus had a particularly valuable role to play. Several of those in the CMA cell were from the territorial force and brought relevant skills from their civilian work (eg project management) that proved valuable to not only the CMA operation but also in capacity building of local administration. Others that were not part of CMA itself also had skills that were used in pursuit of civil assistance work. Examples of this include police skills that were used in capacity building of the local police force, teaching skills and techniques passed on to teachers and farming or agricultural skills passed on to those working the land.

An example of the latter was beginning during the period of fieldwork where an agricultural initiative was being progressed by a couple of territorial soldiers with agricultural backgrounds. A large amount of agricultural machinery in the area had broken down and was idle, as there appeared to be no one with the skills to repair it. These officers also investigated the discovery of a large amount of agricultural machinery at the rear of the District Administrators compound. This machinery had been donated to the area by the Government of another country and had bæn left

sitting out in the weather for up to two years, as nobody knew what it was for or how to use it. Much of it was still in the rapidly deteriorating packing cases and the machinery was starting to rust. Assistance was also given by way of the provision of new seed types for the local farmers. This was driven through one of the soldiers contacting friends back in New Zealand who, in conjunction with a service group arranged for the purchase of seed and also called for donations of hand implements, which were in very short supply (see also Myers, 2002).

Efficiency and like to see jobs completed.

Another enhancing attribute identified was the tendency of the NZDF, and the military in general to achieve goals with some rapidity. The need for speed was noted in comments made in reply to a question regarding consultation. Extensive consultation was described as too time consuming and "could take a bloody month or more" (Interview 019). This was one of the reasons for consultation only with local leaders because "you have to get in with people that are totally in the know, and then go for it"(Interview 018). One senior Batt 6 officer also suggested that the NZDF "like(s) to see conclusions to things" and that "we are implementers, we are very good at determining timelines and sticking to them" (Interview 006). This was reinforced in other interviews where comments such as "you've got to get moving quickly and you might not be right every time, but you've got to be implementers" (Interview 023).

Size of organization- a big footprint.

The Battalion force in Cova Lima was identified as the largest single organisation within the district and this, combined with the geographical coverage, logistical, information and transport capabilities were seen as having a positive impact on their ability to engage in civil assistance efforts. While those directly involved in the Civil Military Affairs work may have numbered only around thirty, the remainder of the force was also involved in feeding back relevant information. The

size of the force also appears to have been useful when advocating the needs of Cova Lima to those in Dili, "where we probably had more weight behind us than the local District Administrator"(Interview 023).

Ability to relate to the locals.

The characteristics of the personnel in the NZDF, those that are part of being a New Zealander were a topic that came up in virtually every conversation that touched upon the topic of enhancing attributes. It was suggested that these characteristics enable the New Zealand soldiers to get closer to the East Timorese in Cova Lima. The more identifiable elements include having a strong Maori element in the NZDF thus sensitising personnel to the existence and value of differing cultural perspectives. The issue of getting out into the community rather than staying behind security fences was also raised on several occasions. Here the New Zealand approach to force protection was seen as offering a closer relationship to the locals than some other military forces in the PKF. This was described as a willingness for the New Zealanders to "share the risk" with local people (Interview 006, 015, 023). This was exemplified by activities in support of Operation Apito Hono, where individual soldiers lived with the locals, ate local food and worked alongside them in their fields in outlying villages for two to four weeks and thereby learned of their problems and gained their trust.

Accountability, efficiency and value for money.

NZDF accountability and trustworthiness were also identified as being important factors in explaining donors' willingness to contribute to NZDF-instigated projects. NZDF interviewees suggested that projects completed by the NZDF were usually done in the time specified and that internal procedures of reporting and accounting ensured that donors could see where their money went. In addition, the NZDF is required to meet a high standard of workmanship in infrastructure and construction work (roughly equivalent to that done in New Zealand) under the

Armed Forces Disciplinary Act where gross negligence, i.e. "a poorly constructed school falling down" (Interview 016), would be an offence. That the organisation did not have to worry about finding funding for its existence in Cova Lima was seen as an additional advantage that enabled the NZDF to be very cost effective.

RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER DEVELOPMENT ACTORS

The relationship between the NZDF and other development actors in the area was described as being much better than in other similar operations, with the experience of Bosnia cited as an example of a poor relationship. This interviewee (Interview 003) believed that the more positive relationship in East Timor stemmed from a degree of cultural affinity with NGO staff being heavily peppered with New Zealanders and Australians.

However in general there was a relatively poor opinion of NGOs amongst NZDF personnel, though this appeared to be one that was more generic and not necessarily based on the East Timor experience. The opinion expressed on a number of occasions generally situated NGOs as being rather more concerned with their public profile, needed to be seen doing things and were generally more interested in moving on to where the international focus was most acute, rather than finishing a job. In addition, the personnel of some were described as "wishy-washy liberals" (Interview 023), that at times avoided making hard decisions and were out of their depth.

For those that had some relationship and contact with the NGOs in Suai there was an impression that the NGOs saw them as "almost irrelevant" and were tarred with the brush that paints the military as " only wanting to destroy things" (Interview 107). The perception held by some in the NZDF that NGOs dislike the military was revealed in an account of the inaugural meeting of NGO Forum. In an address to

the group it was suggested by one officer that "I know that you hate us, think we are a bunch of fascists...(but) we can give you some assistance" (Interview 023)

IMPRESSIONS FROM OTHER DEVELOPMENT ACTORS.

Other development actors including NGOs, church representatives and local government officials expressed a range of views regarding the NZDF's civil assistance work. As described in the introductory chapter there were some difficulties associated with locating some of these actors for interview. The most comprehensive accounts were provided by staff of two of the international NGOs (interviews 013, 021 and 104), whom had been in Suai for some time. Staff of other agencies had been in the area for only a relatively brief period. However all had at least offered some perspective.

One definite area of agreement among all the interviewees was that the New Zealand Battalion groups had overall been a force for good in Cova Lima and that without the secure environment that they had created, little of the work the interviewees were engaged in would be possible. For all of the international NGOs interviewed this was the biggest and most valuable contribution made by the NZBatt force. It was also suggested that it was for the security they created, rather than for the civil assistance work done, that the people in the district held them in such high regard (Interview 013).

When asked whether they considered the civil assistance work the NZDF had been engaged in could be described as development, there was a degree of disagreement that seemed to be based on differing definitions of the term. One interviewee (021) who had been in the Cova Lima district for over a year but had recently been brought back to Dili, explained that she did not really see it as development work because it did not consider the process by which the end result was achieved. She described development as being as much about this process,

which includes things such as participation and capacity building, as it was about output, which she believes the NZDF concentrates on. She suggested that during her time in Suai the NZDF was indeed doing useful work with a great deal of commitment but that it was not really bringing the people along with it. She also suggested that locals might describe it as development but that they would not necessarily understand the difference between good work and development.

She also discussed a number of situations, and in particular a cholera outbreak in Zumalai, where the NZDF had wanted to work in with her organisation and others. She suggested that they constantly had to slow the NZDF officer involved down and tell him that rather than doing the work himself, he should go through the official channel (Health Department) in order to build local capacity. The comment was also made that the NZDF had a lot of very useful skills and that it was disappointing that these had not been used to benefit the community to a greater extent.

When I suggested to her that capacity building was now a focus for civil assistance provided by the NZDF she appeared somewhat surprised but suggested that this was great and that "for any organisation, especially an army, that kind of paradigm shift is quite a big one". However she did wonder to what extent this capacity building could really be implemented given an organisational culture so steeped in achieving outputs at speed, and more particularly in the limited time frame left for the New Zealand force.

Another interview with an NGO representative (Interview 010) revealed a somewhat negative attitude toward the military in general and a relatively scant knowledge of what the NZDF in particular had been doing in their civil work. In general the interviewee who had been in Suai/Cova Lima on and off for about a year suggested that he tried to maintain a distance from the military as he felt any relationship had the potential to impinge on the independence of his operation. However he did point to the information that was provided by the NZDF at the NGO

forum when it was operating. This he suggested was useful in terms of highlighting some areas of need in the community and also in updating the security situation.

He was also suspicious of the motives for the involvement of the NZDF in civil assistance work and believed that it amounted to little more than "putting a human face on the military" in order to get support from the home constituency and to boost New Zealand's image. However he suggested that the role the military played in assisting with infrastructure repair was very important with regard to the economic recovery of the region and as a form of local communication. It was also identified as an essential element in assisting development agencies to do their job. He suggested that the area of community development was not an area for the military to get involved in, as they did not possess the expertise. Rather, their area of comparative advantage lay in the provision of security and infrastructure repair. This was also the way the community perceived them in his opinion, with it being "a matter of role perception and role conflict. People see them as a security force and an infrastructure repairer". The role of the military to interviewee 010 was analogous to the lower level of Maslows hierarchy of needs, where completion of the lower levels are necessary before the upper levels are attempted. Given this analogy he said that he could not really see the NZDF as an agent of development but rather as a facilitator. He added that now the security situation was under control even this role of facilitation was somewhat diminished.

Interviewee 013 had only been in Cova Lima for about four months and had by her own admission very little to do with the New Zealand Battalion. In response to the question of whether or not the NZDF do development work, she suggested that she was "sure that they think they do" but that she saw it more as one aspect of development only. To her the neglect of participation was an important failing in the approach taken by the NZDF, which in her eyes involved participation "in a narrow sense of people agreeing to a plan concocted by the NZDF". Another difficulty identified by 013 was "gender blindness" resulting from the military being

"stuck in a 1960s way of looking at things". A lack of participation and this "gender blindness" made it impossible in her view to accurately identify need.

The relationship between her organisation and the New Zealand Battalion was seen as "O.K.". However she did feel that on occasion the NZDF made problems for her and the way her organisation was perceived in the community. This had occurred in a number of cases when the NZDF had asked various communities what they needed, and then said that they would pass the message on to the NGO that was working in the area. "This raises community expectation and then puts pressure on us to respond". If her organisation couldn't (not funded to do it) or wouldn't (due to prioritisation) meet this need their name became "dirt" in that community.

Another NGO representative (Interview 020) with some military background suggested that the NZDF was particularly good at short term work such as infrastructure due to its efficiency and output driven nature that seeks to meet an objective by the shortest possible route. However these same organisational characteristics, severely limit their utility in areas such as capacity building. Another constraint identified by 020 lies in the fact that there is no real understanding of development principles or indeed any training toward this. Instead, their approach was described as "laymans development, where they believe they are doing the right thing- a sort of common-sense approach that takes problems at face value". An additional point raised in relation to this identified a situation where the NZDF was now essentially competing with NGOs for funding. In his consideration, "money spent through an organisation that follows sound development principles must be a better bet". However 020 suggested that with the right people, some development training, and an awareness of the principles associated with it, the work the NZDF did could be more developmental.

One further point raised in three of the interviews w ith NGOs (interviews 012, 014,021) suggested that the duration of deployment for the various battalions could

be an issue regarding continuity. They also suggested that this had an impact on the potential for coordination as they constantly had to build a rapport with changing personnel.

Local Administration

Local administration in general had a positive view of the work done by the NZDF and saw them as being different from development NGOs in the area only in that they had the added role of security. One senior administration representative (Interview 011) suggested that the most valuable contribution over and above the security they had created was their work in infrastructure, which had been conducted to a high quality. In recognition of the development role they were playing the NZDF therefore had been consulted on, and provided input into the Cova Lima Development Plan. He also noted an increasing trend toward consultation within the NZDF, with considerable effort being expended to assist local leaders (Posto and Suco) to attend development meetings. He saw this as important as working in with the local administration and local people would enable a more accurate identification of need.

However he did suggest that there was some way to go with coordination and somewhat angrily gave two examples from that week. One of these involved the NZDF's organisation of a young journalists training course when there was one already running as a local initiative. The second situation centred on the identification of an irrigation problem by the NZDF. This had been written up in the Cova Lima Guardian, with the article mentioning the frustration that local people were feeling at the inaction of the local administration The Development Officer spoken to suggested that he and his staff had felt very much undermined, especially as they had already applied for and received funding to commence work on the job and that now it would appear that they were only doing it after prompting by the NZDF.

Another more senior administrator (Interview 007) was more reluctant to talk but did suggest that the civil assistance work done by the NZDF had been "profitable for the local people" and had filled some of the infrastructure gaps left by other organisations (e.g. had put roofs on schools missed by UNICEF). He had also been happy to provide them with funding to transport needed goods between Dili and Suai and suggested that in a number of areas they were the only organisation with the capacity to do certain jobs.

Several donors and donor organisation representatives' were also spoken to regarding their decision to use the NZDF as an implementing agent. Two of these (Interview 024, 025) had provided goods from New Zealand for distribution in the Cova Lima district and had chosen the NZDF for pragmatic reasons (cost free option) and because the NZDF "were the identifiable representatives of our community in East Timor" and based on personal experience in Cova Lima "the NZDF have a close relationship with the community and have demonstrated a will to do this kind of work" and "have the logistical ability to do the job (delivery to outlying areas)" (Interview 025). The representative of 024 suggested that the NZDF had been pleased to do it and was told "it was great PR" for the organisation. However he was unsure whether this had meant PR for the NZDF in East Timor, in New Zealand, or possibly even both.

Two officials (current and former) that represented the New Zealand Government in East Timor explained their views on the civil work that the NZDF had been engaged in and some of the reasons that New Zealand Official Development Assistance funding had been allocated to the NZDF. The former representative (interview 026), who had been in East Timor for two years said that he had noted an evolution in the way the NZDF had approached its civil assistance work and believed that this had resulted from the progressively more secure environment in Cova Lima and an increased recognition that security threats from within East Timor could be mitigated in part by providing development. He was generally of the view that the NZDF could not normally be seen as a cost-effective

deliverer of aid due to the high maintenance cost of having a force in the field. However he suggested that in the case of the New Zealand force in Cova Lima, where the force was already in place the marginal cost of the NZDF implementing projects did make them cost-effective.

Another reason for using the NZDF was the recognition that they were a trustworthy and accountable organisation that was working in a remote and devastated part of the country. Mention was also made of the role of the Territorials within the CMA team which was seen as "bringing useful skills for development work" and because of their civilian background, "a recognition of the need for accountability and paper trails, which made administration easier". In addition he stated that it had been widely recognised that the New Zealand Battalion groups were better at this work than other PKF forces in East Timor. He believed this stemmed from the Maori influence in the force. It was this that had enabled them to get a progressively better grasp on the community and their needs. He suggested that while it was recognised that using the NZDF may well have positively raised New Zealand's profile, this was a minor consideration and that "they really just wanted an agent that will do the job well in a poor area that was devastated more than most".

However he noted several constraints on their work including the loss of impetus as deployments changed and the "rather uneven approaches to community engagement in the various areas resulting in variable community buy-in to projects and initiatives". This latter point he believes was the result of little or no training in this type of work. A further constraint appeared in infrastructure projects where there appeared to be a tendency toward meeting military standards rather than less rigorous local ones which tended to increase the cost a bit.

The second official (Interview 022) broadly reiterated most of the observations made by the first. However she did place more emphasis on the "clear identification of New Zealand as a donor" as an issue in considering the use of the

NZDF as an implementer. She also suggested that the speed at which the NZDF could move from identification through to implementation of infrastructure projects was valuable in meeting the aims of the East Timor National Development Plan which stipulated the need for a combination of quick wins/ runs on the board (to project a sense of achievement) and more sustainable development. Subsequent correspondence from 022 also suggests that the NZDF has improved its consultation over time, where "NZDF personnel have identified these issues, through many hours of consultation with local communities" and that "projects have been sifted through a comprehensive project evaluation...which includes assessments of sustainability and community ownership".

POLITICAL VIEWS

Contact was also made with the Defence or Foreign Affairs spokespeople from the main political parties in order to elicit views from another perspective. Only one reply (Green Party) was obviously in favour of NZDF involvement in this work, with the respondent suggesting that this was one of the good outcomes of the deployment and that there should be some sort of specific peacekeeping training to enable this aspect to be improved. The Minister of Foreign Affairs (Rt. Hon.Phil Goff) suggested that the development work that had been undertaken by the NZDF "has been quite remarkable given their limited training and background in the field of development".

Other replies were more equivocal, with one suggesting only that using the NZDF as a regular implementer of aid would in general be "neither cost effective, nor appropriate" given their primary responsibility of providing appropriately trained personnel for more conventional military roles (Alliance Party). The Minister of Defence (Rt. Hon. Mark Burton) similarly suggested that "The NZDF does not undertake as its primary purpose humanitarian activities" and that "all New Zealand defence activities are governed by the outputs and outcomes in the "Purchase

Agreement between the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Defence Force...None of these outputs cover reconstruction or humanitarian activities". Rather, it was suggested that these activities where they occur, may be seen as "by-products of operations or other community activities carried on by the soldiers or units of their own volition". Intimation was also made of the general disposition of New Zealand Service personnel as family and community orientated with a natural desire to want to help "where and when they can.

However the Chief of Defence Force (personal communication 11 November 2002) appears to attach rather more importance to this type of work and states that "development work in East Timor is indeed a recognised role of the New Zealand Defence Force" and that the work "falls under Output class D9: Land Combat Support Services". He further states that "the development work in which the NZDF is involved in East Timor and elsewhere is an important part of The Government's Defence Policy Framework" which includes development assistance as one of the elements in "promoting comprehensive security". In summary he suggests that:

> "The presence of the New Zealand battalion is a highly visible demonstration of New Zealand's support for East Timor's security, reconstruction and development. Development work is known to improve relations between the community and the defence force as well as contributing to the stability of the state in question, it is thus an important element of building regional security".

Also provided was a "full list" of the civil support work undertaken by the New Zealand Battalion that interestingly includes only the infrastructure projects and makes no mention of the capacity building focus that was apparently central in the BATT6 approach.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will commence with an examination of some of the main points raised from the fieldwork before focussing on a broader view of the trend toward military involvement in providing aid and assistance to civilian populations, an area that appears as an increasingly important aspect of work for the aid community.

MERGING OF DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY

From the fieldwork findings it is clear that the NZDF sees itself first and foremost as having security as their primary role and that everything they do is aimed at achieving this. It appears that the original conception of providing assistance to the community was based on the notion of "winning the hearts and minds" of the local community thus making the security task of the NZDF easier.

However while this activity was still important, the broader concept of security as seen by the NZDF at the time of the fieldwork was described as encompassing considerably more than patrolling the border and having soldiers behind the bushes. There was a clear recognition of a linkage between assisting the community to reconstruct, move beyond the devastation to their infrastructure and to make steps toward a better future, and the creation of a more sustainable security situation.

While the approach to "winning hearts and minds" is generally associated with an "us doing something for you" charity approach, the NZDF approach had broadened considerably. While still including elements of charity (provision of

handouts of sweets, clothing etc) that were presumably aimed in part at "winning hearts and minds" it had progressed (to the surprise of some in the NGO community) to the more intangible capacity building, that according to some, is often seen as a higher level of development work. While some of this broadening in approach appears due to an element of direction from the PKF headquarters to all peacekeeping units there also appears to have been an important process of learning within the NZDF (as evidenced in the impetus provided by the Realisation Document).

While the use of development by aid agencies may be an end in itself, it is possible that the assistance given by the NZDF, while ostensibly provided as a means with which to improve their security task, may still contribute toward bettering the community within which it is given. After all, a school with a new roof or a water supply reinstated may appear as a valuable asset to those that have been deprived of this for some time regardless of the aim of the organisation providing the assistance. For the local administration at least, the view of the NZDF was as part security organisation and part aid actor. The District Administrator in particular appeared to have little difficulty in describing their work in the same breath as that of the NGOs working in the district, suggesting that the motivation behind the work was not an issue. It may be then that even though development to NZDF is merely a tool, or a means toward achieving their own goals, that it is nonetheless a form of development.

FILLING A GAP

An additional factor suggested by the literature as motivating military forces into the provision of assistance is the perception that in certain cases the civilian aid response may be lacking. There certainly appears to have been a large element of gap filling by the NZDF, in recognition that the local administration was limited in terms of funding and capacity to instigate much development work, and

that aid agencies were relatively few in number in Cova Lima when compared with areas proximal to Dili. This may be seen as havig necessitated a more active role by the NZDF in the direct provision of assistance, particularly in light of the connection drawn between security and development. If greater assistance from outside agencies had been forthcoming for Cova Lima it may be speculated that the NZDF may have been less engaged in its civil assistance efforts.

RESOURCES AND CAPACITY.

Fieldwork findings suggest that personnel within military organisations contain a number of skill sets that may be particularly useful in providing assistance to civilian populations. In the case of the New Zealand Defence Force in Cova Lima, skills in planning, engineering, the law and health were usefully supplemented by Territorial Force personnel with experience and knowledge in a wide range of fields more commonly associated with civilian life such as farming/agriculture, teaching, small business and policing. These were all utilised in assisting the community and appear to be congruent with many of the needs present in post-conflict settings.

RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER ACTORS.

A number of the findings from the fieldwork are in congruence with those suggested in the literature. Of particular note were the seemingly preconceived positions of both NGO and military personnel. Mutual suspicion of each other, and each others motives, was clearly evident in a number of interviews and appears to have had some impact on the relationship between the two. In general the NZDF personnel appeared to see the NGOs as rather ineffectual and NGOs saw the NZDF approach as too heavily top down. It also appeared that these preconceived positions were at least in part due to a relative ignorance of the way each group operates and the constraints within which they conduct their work.

RELIEF, RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

Nominating the NZDF as an agent of development may not strictly be the most accurate description of their work in civil assistance in the case of East Timor, if using the traditional divisions of relief and development. To a large extent it would appear that the majority of their work conformed more to the tasks of reconstruction than either the classic relief or development approaches. Involvement in these areas appears to have been limited based largely on time. In the case of relief work, activity was limited by the need to focus military resources on the overtly hostile environment within which they were working in the early stages of deployment. With regard to development work, the limited duration of deployment appears to have limited any military activity in this longer-term project. However reconstruction work that typically inhabits the ground between these areas of aid activity has been an area of activity for the NZDF. With conflict and reconstruction now coming to occupy a more central position in the consideration of aid agencies and donors, and even being suggested as constituting a new form of development by some, the title of development agent may in fact not be too far from the mark.

THE FUTURE

The current state of instability and conflict around the globe does not suggest any real reduction of the use of military organisations, be it as peacekeepers or some other form of sanctioned force. Indicators also suggest a continuation of the trend toward military involvement in providing assistance to communities they are working in. The example provided by the NZDF in Cova Lima suggests that military organisations may see a legitimate role for themselves in the provision of various types of aid to communities they are working within, and that they can demonstrate considerable utility in meeting a variety of identified needs. With the

unstable nature of some areas of the South Pacific, which is a primary focus for both aid and defence communities, it seems at least possible that a contingency something like that of East Timor may be repeated at some stage even closer to home.

However, military involvement in providing aid to communities raises a number of issues. As deployment of soldiers is a political decision and based on various political considerations it appears that where political or strategic interest in a given situation is not perceived, then intervention is unlikely. This then suggests that the military may be a somewhat selective development partner as it will not necessarily respond to development needs per se, but only when they relate to issues of security or conflict. The variation in opinion demonstrated to some extent in the views expressed by New Zealand political figures, suggests that changing political philosophies of a governing administration may similarly result in uneven approaches in the extent to which military organisations are able engage in aid work.

Similarly, the trend toward use of military organisations to provide aid and development assistance also appears to raise the possibility of an increase in the politicisation of aid. While aid through multilateral organisations and increasing use of NGO's may be seen as having reduced the overt political direction of aid, the use of national military forces would appear to be a move in the opposite direction, with attendant geopolitical and national interests taking precedence over other measures of need.

The increasing identification of aid as a tool for use in fostering greater regional security, and the recognition among aid agencies that post conflict reconstruction as an important and valid area of work, appears to suggest that both military and aid agencies will be sharing a mutual interest in similar situations. However it appears that this common interest does not really translate into a mutually beneficial relationship on the ground, with both relief agencies and those

more usually associated with development being somewhat critical of military forays into this work. Similarly there appears to be a rather *ad-hoc* quality to the relationship between donors and the military that may be seen as necessitating a recurrent reinvention of that relationship each time situations presenting similar features arise.

Another important consideration appears to lie in the message that engaging the military in aid work may send to the population of a new country. Whether it is healthy or not to have the military being seen as a driver of development or reconstruction in a society may be debatable. It may be argued that this is not a suitable template on which to base a new nation such as East Timor, which has had prior experience of military based development. However, as in the case of Cova Lima, where there is a gap in provision of assistance by agencies normally associated with aid and development, someone has to do the job in their absence.

With military intervention in internal conflict by way of peacekeeping showing no real signs of trending downwards, it would appear that greater cognisance of the role that the military have been playing may be warranted by donors and other aid agencies. The reality of many of these situations will be that aid and development agencies will be working alongside the military and that synergies between the two may be possible. While military organisations may have different motivations for assisting the communities they are working in, the means by which they are hoping to attain the ends to which they are working would not in many cases appear to be greatly different to those that aid agencies may employ. Lack of engagement to some greater extent would seem to be missing an opportunity toward more effective assistance to communities in need.

Finally, the example of the NZDF in East Timor is but one case of military involvement in the provision of aid to a community. This is an area of aid provision that appears somewhat under researched and in which further investigation of

other military organisations activity is needed if the phenomenon is to be more fully understood.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

New Zealand Defence Force UN and Peacekeeping Missions

YEAR	MISSION
1950– 1957	Korea
1951– 1976	UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)
1954-	UN Truce Supervision Organisation: Middle East (UNTSO)
1956-1967	UN Emergency Force (UNEF)
1958	UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)
1960-1964	UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC)
1963	UN Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM
1973-1979	Second UN Emergency Force (UNEF II)
1974	UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF)
1978	UN Interim Force in Lebanon
1988-1991	UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)
1989-1990	UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG)
1989-1990	UN Mine Clearance Training Team: Pakistan and Afghanistan (UNMCTT)
1990-1991	Gulf War
1991-	UN Operations in Cambodia (UNTAC)
1991-	UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II, III)
1991-	Special Commission: Iraq (UNSCOM)
1992-1996	UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR)
1992	UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM)
1993	Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF)

1993-1994	UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II)
1994	Rwanda (under the control of the UN High Commissioner For Refugees
1994	South Pacific Peacekeeping Force Bougainville (SPPKF)
1994-1995	UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)
1994	UN Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)
1995-1996	Multinational Interception Force: Arabian/Persian Gulf (MIF)
1995	UN Headquarters, New York
1996-	Implementation Force (IFOR) Stabilization Force (SFOR)
1996-	UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP)
1996-	UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES)
1996-	UN Preventative Deployment, Macedonia (UNPREDEP)
1998	Persian Gulf area in support of UN/US operations to enforce UNSCOM operations against Iraq
1997	Truce Monitoring Group Bougainville (TMG)
1999-2002	International Force East Timor (INTERFET), UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET), UN Mission in Support in East Timor (UNMISET)

Adapted from Rolfe, 1999, p80-81)

APPENDIX 2



The Melanesian Arc of Instability. Fiji, Bougainville, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea. Some such as Ayson (2000) suggest the extension of the arc to include East Timor (Adapted from South Pacific Policy Review Group (1990)).

APPENDIX 3

List of Interviewees and place of interview

001	NZDF OFFICER, NEW ZEALAND.
002	NZDF OFFICER, NEW ZEALAND.
003	NZDF OFFICER, NEW ZEALAND.
004	NZDF OFFICER, NEW ZEALAND.
005	REPRESENTATIVE OF ROMAN CATHOLIC ORGANISATION, SUAI.
006	NZDF OFFICER, SUAI.
007	DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION REPRESENTATIVE, SUAI.
008	NZDF SOLDIER, SUAI.
009	NZDF INTERPRETER, SUAI.
010	NGO REPRESENTATIVE, SUAI.
011	DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION REPRESENTATIVE, SUAI.
012	NGO REPRESENTATIVE, SUAI.
013	NGO REPRESENTATIVE, SUAI.
014	NGO REPRESENTATIVE, SUAI.
015	NZDF OFFICER, SUAI.
016	NZDF OFFICER, SUAI.
017	NZDF OFFICER, SUAI.
018	NZDF OFFICER, SUAI.
019	NZDF OFFICER, SUAI.
020	NGO REPRESENTATIVE, DILI.
021	NGO REPRESENTATIVE, DILI.
022	DONOR REPRESENTATIVE, DILI.
023	NZDF OFFICER, NEW ZEALAND.
024	NEW ZEALAND GOODS DONOR, NEW ZEALAND.
025	NEW ZEALAND GOODS DONOR., NEW ZEALAND.
026	DONOR REPRESENTATIVE, DILI.

APPENDIX 4

COVA LIMA GUARDIAN

Volume 3, Issue 14 23 June 2002

SRSG ATTENDS CEREMONY AT EAST TIMOR POLICE TRAINING COLLEGE

Special Representative of the Secretary-General Kamalesh Sharma officially assumed his duties heading the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) on 21 May, following which he has been calling on a wide range of government officials in Dili.

Since arriving in East Timor, Sharma has held meetings with President Xanana Gusmao, Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, Parliament Speaker Francisco "Lu-Olo" Guterres, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Jose Ramos-Horta, Minister for Internal Administration Rogerio Lobato, Minister of Justice Ana Pessoa, and Minister of Finance Madalena Boavida, among others.

The SRSG, who prior to assuming his post in East Timor, was the Permanent Representative of India to the UN in New York, will soon begin meeting with the diplomatic corps and UN agency representatives based in Dili, as well as visiting East Timor's districts.

Sharma attended a ceremony in Dili marking the handover of the East Timor Police Training College.

"On this occasion of the first handovers to the East Timor Police Service, I congratulate all UNPOL, ETPS trainers and staff who have been working at the Police Training College over the past two years," the SRSG said.

"This is the beginning of the exciting and challenging [handover] process, and marks a large step along the path of full responsibility for executive policing. The existence of an independent, democratic police service to maintain and enforce law and order is one of the fundamental pillars of any state," Sharma added.

The UNMISET mandate, passed by the UN Security Council on 17 May, stipulates that the mission will provide assistance to core administrative structures critical to the viability and political stability of East Timor.

The mission will also provide interim law enforcement and public security, and to the maintenance of the new country's external and internal security.

The resolution states that UNMISET will initially comprise 1,250 civilian police and an initial military troop strength of 5,000, including 120 military observers. The civilian component includes focal points for gender and HIV/AIDS, a Civilian Support Group of up to 100 personnel fulfilling core functions, a Serious Crimes Unit and a Human Rights Unit.

Organisation

In a democracy people are responsible for organising events, meetings or other activities.
How does it work??

The Process	Example
• An event is to be organised.	• *Independence Day will be celebrated 8—11 May 2002 in Cova Lima District.*
• 3 months prior to the event the leader holds a meeting with local leaders, UNPol, NGO's to form a sub committee begin organising it.	• *The DA forms a sub committee to organise the celebration in Feburary 2002. He appoints the DDA chairman of the committee.*
• The leader of the sub committee arranges a time and venue for the first meeting. He confirms this arrangement with all sub committee members.	• *The DDA plans a meeting and advises members of time and place. Representatives of each sub-district, ETPS/UNPol, NGO's are to attend.*
• The sub committee meets within two weeks to formulate a plan. Each person is given responsibility for different aspects of the event. They arrange the next meeting. The chairman of the sub committee briefs the leader after each meeting to review their progress.	• *They meet mid Feb 02 and allocate tasks. Transport, equipment, food, accommodation, activities, finance, communication, health. They discuss likely activities and venue. DDA briefs DA on what happens at every meeting.*
• Each member works on their responsibility with agencies (like UNPol and NGO's) to make initial plans. They meet with them and prepare to brief the sub committee at the next meeting.	• *All members consult their villages for wanted events. E.g. Member responsible for Transport meets with UNHCR and IOM and ETPS/UNPol. ETPS/UNPol sort out traffic and crowd control issues. Members with other responsibilities meet with agencies.*
• The next meeting of the sub committee is held, each member back briefs on the progress they have made . They discuss outstanding issues. They arrange the next meeting.	• *All members report on activities wanted by village members. Committee puts tentative program together and books venue. E.g. Member responsible for Transport indicates that UNHCR will provide transport. Other members report back.*
• Meeting continue with arrangements being made and finalised. About 1 month prior to the event all plans are confirmed. The committee now should meet weekly to finalise details.	• *At subsequent meetings problems come up and are either solved at the meeting or a person is directed to sort it out before the next meeting. The program is now in place with timings promulgated through DAC meeting and Cova Lima Guardian. Transport and accommodation arranged. Crowd control, traffic, food all confirmed.*
• The week prior to the event all arrangements are confirmed, any final problems that come up are solved.	• *E.g. UNHCR has handed responsibility of vehicles to IOM. IOM needs to be contacted to confirm that they will take over from UNHCR.*
• Day before event the venue is set up.	• *Soccer field at Rambo corner is set up and ready for event. Rubbish has been removed and grass has been cut.*
• Day of the event, it is run efficiently and cleaned up afterwards.	• *The person allocated to run the celebration does his job. DDA oversees all activities this day, (including clean up afterwards). All other members are responsible for their area of expertise.*
• Committee meets after event	• *DDA thanks all members and ties up any financial or other matters. Reports back to DA*

Alkatiri tells Jakarta to 'forget' assets in Dili

East Timor's new Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri has told Indonesia to drop its claim for assets left behind in its former territory.
He also denied that he is hostile to Jakarta.
In an interview published yesterday by Tempo magazine, Mr Alkatiri said Indonesia was well aware of East Timor's stance on assets, forget the past and start with a clean slate.

Mr Alkatiri said: ``We will forget all and Indonesia will forget all as well.

``We will start again from zero".
``We did not invite anyone to come here and build all those roads and buildings," he added.
Mr Alkatiri, who took office after the former Indonesian province became independent on May 20, said although that many believed him to be anti-Indonesia, he said that this was not the case.
``They do not know that more of my relatives are in Indonesia rather than in Timor.
``That is a reality. I am not anti-Indonesia," he said.
He described the issues of East Timorese refugees in Indonesia and the delineation of the land and sea border as the most urgent matters to be settled.

BE SAFE!
ONLY WEAR CIVILIAN CLOTHING!
Wearing camouflage or military clothing is dangerous - You could be mistaken in East Timor as being Militia!

These girls can not hide their excitement at the opening of the Aitous School recently.

PKF, INDONESIAN MILITARY COOPERATE OVER BOARDER

The United Nations Peacekeeping Force (PKF) in East Timor and the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) recently discussed a new formal arrangement for cooperation and coordination during UNMISET's mandate.
PKF Force Commander Lt. Gen. Winai Phattiyakul led a delegation to central Bali, Indonesia, to meet with TNI Regional Commander Maj. Gen. William da Costa. A draft Military Technical Arrangement was tabled at the meeting, and border-related issues such as smuggling and refugee returns were also discussed.
The Military Technical Arrangement, expected to be signed next month, would supercede a similar arrangement between TNI and the recently disbanded UNTAET.
The arrangements are designed to facilitate tactical coordination and cooperation between the two forces, particularly along the borderline that
currently separates East Timor and Indonesian West Timor



East Timor celebrate 'their own' Defence Force & Police Service

FDTL Soldier

All East Timorese should be proud that after such a short time as an independent country, you now have your own Defense Force and Police service. The primary role of the East Timor Defence Force (Falintle–FDTL) is to protect the population from threats by opposing countries and members of large groups within East Timor who may work to undermine the Government or aspects of Law and Order.

The East Timor Police Service (ETPS) are responsible for maintaining law and order in East Timor. If someone commits a crime, for example threatening to hurt you, then you should contact the Police as soon as possible, so that they can investigate. When they catch the person, the Police can arrest them and take them to Court to stand trial. Like law Police Services all over the world, the ETPS require information from citizens to assist in solving crimes.

Sub Inspector Rosito Amaral of the ETPS

The Police are also responsible for controlling road traffic, and can also help the community in an emergency.

The PKF, East Timor Defence Force and Police Service are the only sanctioned defense and law enforcement agencies working in this country. Any other personnel presenting themselves as an alternative to these three agencies are <u>illegal</u> and should be reported to either the PKF, Falintle–FDTL or ETPS.

Parents and caregivers must not punish their children with too much force.

PROTECT YOUR WATER WELL AND YOUR HEALTH

To protect your health it is important to have a safe source of water. Many families in the Cova Lima area get their water from wells. To keep the water in the wells free from things which make people sick it is best to have a protected 'well head' like the one in the picture.

It has:

- A fence to keep out animals. For a fence to work properly the gate must be closed after people have walked through,
- A concrete base sloping away from the well with a raised wall around then well opening. This is to stop things like animal droppings being knocked or washed into the well.
- A cover over the top of the well with a pump and covered inspection port. The lid of the inspection port must be kept on so things that make the water unsafe can not enter the well. The top of the well must be kept free of dirt and animal droppings so the water is good.

If a well has a pump, water containers should not be put down into the well. This is because a dirty container can make the well water bad to drink. Remember that bad water can make people very sick or even kill them.

Before you collect water from the well, wash your hands with soap so they are clean. Dirty hands can also make water bad.

Other things to practice are:

- Do not put your well close to your toilet, or your toilet close to your well.
- Do not put your well close to places where people are buried.
- Do not let animals get into, or close, to your well

Remember safe water makes healthy people.



UN HANDS OVER CONTROL OF PUBLIC RADIO AND TV

The UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) handed over control of East Timor's public radio and television to the newly independent nation's government. About US$500,000 in assets – including TV and radio transmitters, TV cameras and studio equipment – and management of broadcasting staff has officially come under government control, said Mario Zamorano, outgoing director of the UN Office of Communications and Public Information (OCPI) in East Timor.

"You, the Timorese, have been through so many challenges," Zamorano said during a handover ceremony attended by OCPI staff. "We are absolutely sure you will have an excellent public television and public radio. ... I wish you all the best."

Recently passed legislation in East Timor calls for the establishment of a Public Broadcasting Service, led by an independent board of directors, to run public television and radio. In the interim, Prime Minister Marí Alkatiri has appointed Inspector General Mariano Lopes, a former broadcast journalist, to serve as head of television and radio.

"Today is a new era for East Timor," Lopes said during the ceremony. "It's going to be hard, not easy... It's time to show that we can do it by ourselves.

Before we could always use the excuse that it was someone else (in control).

Now it is our responsibility. We must be ready to move forward."

300% Increase in a local business

Cabinetmaker, Mr Dominggos Lorenso, of Suai, is a very happy man. He has been building cabinets and other furniture in his small workshop for many years, but has recently reported a large increase in the demand for his goods. Due to the increased demand for his furniture, Mr Lorenso has had to employ two extra carpenters since January this year.

This demand, and the desire to keep his customers happy finds Mr Lorenso frequently working in his workshop from 7:00am until 10pm most days of the week.

The increased productivity in this business is also very good for Suai, Mr Lorenso buys the timber and other building materials from other local suppliers, thus in his own small way, boosting the local economy. It is through this style of free enterprise and hard work, that will help boost the local and national economy as well as improving Mr Lorenso and his family's way of life.

PROVIDING FOR YOUR GRANDCHILDREN, CARE FOR THE FORESTS

Forests provide many of the resources for East Timor Communities; they provide fuel for the cooking fires, provide materials for the building and repairing of houses, many vegetables, fruits and nuts are found in the forests. There are also pigs, bats, birds and other wildlife that live in the forest, which are important food sources. Traditional medicines are collected from the plants and trees in the forests. If forests are cleared for crops, cut down for timber or burnt, then these resources of food, materials, and medicines are lost forever. If they are looked after and managed properly by the community then the resources will continue to be available for the people of East Timor

To protect these resources for the grandchildren and their children it is important that people contact the District Forestry Officer if they want to cut down trees, or clear forest land for crops. Government regulations require a permit for the cutting of trees and logging activity in most cases. There are severe penalties for people who cut trees without permits. Contact the District Forestry Officer who can help you in forestry activites and can issue permits for cutting of trees.

When collecting plants or cutting down trees in the forest it is important to not take all of the plants or cut all of the trees. If some plants or trees are left then they will multiply and there will be more when people return in the future, if all are taken then there will be nothing. This has happened to Sandalwood, there has been too much cutting of Sandalwood and very little is left.

Sandalwood is very valuable and it is nearly all gone. The Government and People have to protect what is left so that it can multiply and provide for the future. The Police and Forestry Department are working very hard to prevent the last trees from being stolen and sold to other countries. To help look after the remaining trees, stop people cutting and report any cutting or logging to the Police or Forestry Department. To provide for your grandchildren, help increase the number of sandalwood trees that are left in the forest by collecting their seeds and plant them in gardens and when the seeds germinate into seedlings take the small trees and plant them in the forests or gardens. Then there will be many trees for your grandchildren who can use these trees to provide for their families.

For more information contact:
Fernandino Vieira Da Costa,
District Forestry Officer
Cova Lima.
Ph 0418760142
Or
Matthew Hall
Forestry Adviser
Cova Lima
Ph 0407515703

The forestry office is in the IEC Building at UNTMISET Suai

Frustration in Camenasa

Like many other villages in Cova Lima, Camenasa is a happy, busy village, welcoming back those refugees that fled to West Timor, and above all, trying to improve the life for everyone there. Children are attending school and looking forward to a bright future in their new country. Many are looking to the future in ways that will help themselves, family and country, by aspiring to be Teachers, Ministers, and Doctors.

Like the children, this village is also growing. Unfortunately, the food supply isn't.

In 1995 a flood damaged the irrigation system, which provided the only steady supply of water to the crop fields. These fields in turn provide a plentiful supply of food for the villagers. Back then the villagers were harvesting three crop yields each year, providing ample food for each family, with the excess being sold at the local markets. The profit from the sales was then used to purchase other goods for the families. The frustration for the families in Camenasa today is that seven years after the flood, they are still waiting for the irrigation system to be repaired. Although the need for the weir and irrigation gate has been presented to the District Administration, the villagers are still awaiting action. With little else to do in the village but tend their fields, it is important that the food supply can not only sustain the growing population, but just as importantly, grow to meet future developmental needs of the village.

Mr Fortunato on the weir

Mr Fortunato, who operates the Camenasa rice husker, said he would normally help 20 families each day husk their rice. He charges approximately US$ .30c for a 10kg bag which covers the cost of fuel and running costs. Mr Fortunato confirmed that when the irrigation system was operating correctly, the local villagers were rotating their crops allowing three harvesting's a year. The preferred crops in this area were rice, corn and maize.



Residents of Camenasa 'husking' their rice.

With the dry season approaching, and with no indication of work commencing on the repair of the irrigation system, at this stage, there is little for the villagers of Camenasa to do but wait. While the people of Camenasa understand the limitations with Government funding they do not give up hope. Hope, that those people responsible for the maintenance and repair of Government property, repair this necessary irrigation system very soon. This will allow the village of Camenasa to grow and develop in the same way that East Timor needs to grow; by working hard today in order to ensure a healthy future and plentiful life for all.

NZBATT6 Capacity Building Projects Spread sheet as @ 19 Jun 02	ANNEX C TO CS OPS JUN 02

Vision – Facilitate the development of sustainable initiatives identified by the Realisation Issues and Projects Report that are owned and driven by the tangata whenua of the Cova Lima District.

End state – Foundation for sustainable realization projects established and progressing after NZBATT withdrawal.

Underlying themes =1. Successful skills set transference.
2. Self-sustainability.
3. Sense of urgency.
4. Consultation.
5. Consensual agreement.

Serial	Realisation Project	Goal	End State	Project Manager	Portfolio Minister Responsible	• Comment	• Deadline/Intermediate goals
1.	Public Administration	Facilitate the access of central government support and funding through the successful hosting of four NZ educated Cabinet Ministers.	Clear communication channels between local and central government.		Ministry of Internal Administration (Rank 6) *Rogerio Tiago Lobato* *Vice Minister - Aicha Bassarewan ((w)Rank 20)* *Vice Minister – Ilda Maria da Conceicao ((w)Rank 21)*	• Planning initiated pending confirmation of DA's position. • Generation of invites to Ministers by CO and Consul-General	• 1 Sep 02
2.	Public Administration	A demographic 'snap shot' of Cova Lima as at 2002.	Develop a population tool for historical records and future use.		Ministry of Internal Administration (Rank 6) *Rogerio Tiago Lobato* *Vice Minister - Aicha Bassarewan ((w)Rank 20)* Vice Minister – Ilda Maria da Conceicao ((w)Rank 21	•	• Determine what is achievable and what agency – 30 Jun • Determining scope of the demographic study – 21 Jul • Data collection – 31 Aug • Analysis of data – 30 Sep • Completed data received – 31 Oct
[redacted]							
4.	Judiciary	.			Ministry of Justice (Rank 3) *Ana Pessoa (w)* *Vice Minister – Domingo Sarmento (rank 18)* *Vice Minister – Manuel Abrantes (rank 19)*	•	•

Serial	Realisation Project	Goal	End State	Project Manager	Portfolio Minister Responsible	• Comment	• Deadline/Intermediate goals
5.	Access to legal information	Contribute to legal knowledge of community.	Transfer of legal information.		Ministry of Justice (Rank 3) *Ana Pessoa* *Vice Minister – Domingo Sarmento (rank 18)* *Vice Minister – Manuel Abrantes (rank 19)*	•	• CLG article on rule of law – 14 June • CLG article on criminal procedure – 14 July • CLG article on rights of child – 14 August • CLG article on human rights – 14 September
6.	Law and Order	Assist in development of Cova Lima courthouse.	Transfer of skills on running a court.		Ministry of Internal Administration (Rank 6) *Rogerio Tiago Lobato* *Vice Minister - Aicha Bassarewan ((w)Rank 20)* *Vice Minister – Ilda Maria da Conceicao ((w)Rank 21*	•	• Confirm court opening • Confirm happy to receive assistance • Develop court staff • Mentor duty solicitors
7.	Law and Order	Assist the ETPS/UNPOL with legal issues.	Transference of skills of a legal nature.		Ministry of Internal Administration (Rank 6) *Rogerio Tiago Lobato* *Vice Minister - Aicha Bassarewan ((w)Rank 20)* *Vice Minister – Ilda Maria da Conceicao ((w)Rank 21*	•	• Liaise with UNPOL – 21 June • Criminal procedure lesson – 21 July • Seminar on file papers – 21 August • Mentoring file – 21 Sept
8.	Law and Order	Provide practical policing instruction for ETPS.	Ability of ETPS to perform primary police duties with confidence.		Ministry of Internal Administration (Rank 6) *Rogerio Tiago Lobato* *Vice Minister - Aicha Bassarewan ((w)Rank 20)* Vice Minister – Ilda Maria da Conceicao ((w)Rank 21	• Utilise NZBATT MP elements and those pers with NZ policing experience.	• 1 Sep 02
9.	Education	ECE development.	Communicate the ECE concepts to the Suai/Cova Lima community.		Ministry of Education, Culture, Youth and Sports (Rank 8) *Armindo Maia* *Vice Minister – Virgilio Smith (Rank 25)*	•	• Building – tba • Infrastructure – tba • ECE workshop – 30 Sep • Teacher trg – 30 Sep • HA stores – 30 Sep
10.	Education	Establish a core group of EM people who can teach instructional techniques.	Transference of instructional techniques		Ministry of Education, Culture, Youth and Sports (Rank 8) *Armindo Maia* *Vice Minister – Virgilio Smith (Rank 25)*	• May need to re-evaluate milestones and re-jig timeframes.	• Planning and development - 11 Jun • Id key factors – 30 Jun • Id tgt audience – 6 Jul • Conduct wkshps – 20 Aug
11.	Development of Employment related skills	Project Management skills transference to local community.	Fundamental project management skills are transferred to		Secretary of Work, Solidarity ((Retirement, Civil Defense) Rank 11) *Arsenio Paixao Bano*	• Work through DDA and DDO	•

Serial	Realisation Project	Goal	End State	Project Manager	Portfolio Minister Responsible	• Comment	• Deadline/Intermediate goals
			key stakeholders located in the local communities.				
12.	Youth development	Facilitate the development of a youth programme within Cova Lima district.	Youth leaders conduct their own youth programmes within Cova Lima district.		Ministry of Education, Culture, Youth and Sports (Rank 8) *Armindo Maia* *Vice Minister – Virgilio Smith (Rank 25)*	• Six week train the trainer youth programme facilitators.	• Initial planning – 7 Jun • Programme development – 14 Jun • Initial session – 21 Jun • Programme continuation – 28 Jun • Final session – 26 Jul • Facilitation of future training - ongoing
[redacted]							
14.	Health Services/Prevention	Initiate the establishment of a Cova Lima wide, integrated and respected health service, which is capable of providing timely and appropriate care.			Ministry of Health (Rank 9) *Rui de Araujo* *Vice Minister – Luis Lobato (Rank 22)*	• USGET recon of hospital completed. Pending approval of project through their higher. • Scope water for Hospital • Scope radios • Scope transport • Scope medical equipment • Scope generators • Scope solar powered water pumps • Nurse training • Public health awareness • USGET med teams	• 1 Sep 02
15.	Sanitation and Water	CMA dets to facilitate the marry up with the village Surcos and the Postos with the Australian Aid project – Community Water Supply, Sanitation Programme.	Water and sanitation issues identified be correctly dealt with through consultation with CWSSP and the villagers without NZBATT involvement by Sep 02.		Ministry of Transportation, Communication, and Public Works/Infrastructure (Rank 5) *Ovidio de Jesus Amaral* *Vice Minister – Cesar Vital Moreira* Secretary of Electricity and Waters (Rank 23) *Egidio de Jesus*	•	• Need milestones
[redacted]							

Serial	Realisation Project	Goal	End State	Project Manager	Portfolio Minister Responsible	• Comment	• Deadline/Intermediate goals
[redacted]							
19.	Power service	Assist with re-commissioning of Suai Power Station.			Ministry of Transportation, Communication, and Public Works/Infrastructure (Rank 5) *Ovidio de Jesus Amaral* *Vice Minister – Cesar Vital Moreira (Rank 17)* Secretary of Electricity and Waters (Rank 23) *Egidio de Jesus*	•	•
[redacted]							
21.	Agriculture (Horticulture and Fishing)	Lift the individual and collective framer's performance in an ongoing self-sustainable way.			Ministry of Agriculture, Fishing and forests (Rank 7) *Estanislau Aleixo da Silva*	• Machinery has been identified. • Repair and maintenance undergoing.	• Approach NZ service clubs to provide finance and specific task organised help: ie hand tools etc • approach NZ firms for donations of seeds, chemicals. • Id and source new crop and vegetable varieties for consumption and sale. • Id long term goals that require support form other institutions ie: introduction of mechanization, a parts and service facility that will be able to maintain any introduced machinery.

Serial	Realisation Project	Goal	End State	Project Manager	Portfolio Minister Responsible	• Comment	• Deadline/Intermediate goals
							• Improving infrastructure within villages. • Irrigation channel entrances. • Farm produce storage facilities. •
22.	Forestry	Assist with the establishment of a forestry based enterprise	Have a Nursery established and running		Ministry of Agriculture, Fishing and forests (Rank 7) *Estanislau Aleixo da Silva*	• Recon forests. • Arial photography. • GPS forest locations.	•
23.	Media and Communications	Establish a locally controlled print media serivice to residents in the Cova Lima district.	Locally controlled print media service operating.		Ministry of Transportation, Communication, and Public Works/Infrastructure (Rank 5) *Ovidio de Jesus Amaral* *Vice Minister – Cesar Vital Moreira (Rank 17)*	• Needs to be self supporting. Provide advertising and newsletter facility. • **Tie into Henry Mall**	• Initial planning – 7 Jun • Preparatory lessons – 1 Jul • Confirm key appointment issues – 1 Aug • Relocate – 2 Sep • Installation of equipment – 23 Sep • Combined production – 23 Sep • Tacit handover – 21 Oct • Independence - 21 Oct • Handover – 1 Nov
24.	Civil Society organisations	Identify constitution suitable for the Cova Lima cup to include competition rules.	Produce constitution and competition rules.		Ministry of Internal Administration (Rank 6) *Rogerio Tiago Lobato* *Vice Minister - Aicha Bassarewan ((w)Rank 20)* Vice Minister – Ilda Maria da Conceicao ((w)Rank 21	• To be translated.	•
25.	Civil Society organisations	Transfer project management skills and working template.	Transfer of basic facilitation skills. Transfer of basic conflict resolution skills.		Ministry of Internal Administration (Rank 6) *Rogerio Tiago Lobato* *Vice Minister - Aicha Bassarewan ((w)Rank 20)* Vice Minister – Ilda Maria da Conceicao ((w)Rank 21	• Will conduct one facilitation workshop and one conflict resolution workshop with Timor Aid Researchers. Also provide Mentoring for researchers during the consultation phase.	• Workshop – 26 Jun 02

Note 1: This is not a NZBATT6 initiative. GONZ gift to GOEM on Independence managed by NZVSA. NZBATT6 to have minimal involvement.

Note 2: This project requires further consideration as to viability.

Note 3: This project could be grown into an internet Café, photocopying, fax facility.

Appendix 6

NZDF-NZAID SUPPORTED PROJECTS

Organisation	Project	Location	Status	$NZAID
NZ Batt 5	Belulik Leten school roofing project	Cova Lima	Approved	US$4,600
NZ Batt 6	Sukubilaran School	Cova Lima	Completed	US$14,700
NZ Batt 6	Atios School	Cova Lima	Completed	US$23,750
NZ Batt 6	Suai power station	Cova Lima	Completed	US$2,250
NZ Batt 6	Belulik Letan water points	Cova Lima	Completed	US$3,500
NZ Batt 6	Fohorem marketplace	Cova Lima	Underway	US$30,277
NZ Batt 6	Belulik Letan School dormitories	Cova Lima	Underway	US$18,106
NZ Batt 6	Baer School	Cova Lima	Underway	US$15,405
NZ Batt 6	Atios water points	Cova Lima	Underway	US$4,000

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NZBATT6	Fatuk Metan teachers house, community noticeboards and school playground	Cova Lima	Completed	US$6,014
NZNCE	Bebonuk Orphanage support	Dili	Completed	US$1,500
NZNCE	Bebonuk Orphanage support– further support	Dili	Completed	US$500

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