

Copyright is owned by the Author of the thesis. Permission is given for a copy to be downloaded by an individual for the purpose of research and private study only. The thesis may not be reproduced elsewhere without the permission of the Author.

# **CYCLONE HOUSING IN UPOLO AND MANIHIKI**

**A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the  
Degree of Master of Philosophy in Development Studies at  
Massey University**

**By Anna Louise Skinner  
2001**



### **Dedication**

To my parents, Ivan and Pat Skinner, for all the love and support they have given me.

To my sons, Ben and Ron Christiansen, for their incredible skills at entertaining themselves; that is, their tolerance and patience.

To my fiancé, Ross Edney, for all his support and tolerance and assistance.

## **Acknowledgements**

I wish to acknowledge and express my gratitude for the tremendous assistance I have received from my supervisor, Dr Donovan Storey. He was able to take my interests and fashion a thesis topic that has been interesting and immensely illuminating. And he has managed (to a large degree!) to steer me away from historical cul-de-sacs I would have been quite happy to get lost in, and keep me on the right course.

I also wish to acknowledge the financial assistance I received from New Zealand Foreign Affairs, which enabled this research project to be undertaken.

And I wish also to express my gratitude to my parents for stepping in when the research finance had not happened quite in time for the special deal on the plane tickets. And for the lovely send off from Wellington. And thank you also to my sister Kathy for being part of that send-off.

I also wish to express my deepest gratitude to the Karaponga family of Tukao, Manihiki, in particular, Sam and Nga, for taking me into their home and including me in their lives and making me feel so welcome. Thank you especially for the lovely food and the lessons in Tivaevae making, and the snorkling. Special thanks to Mehau for giving up her bedroom to me and providing information on gender tasks and pearl farming schedules. And thanks also to Georgina for her empathetic insights on experiencing Manihiki for the first time. And thanks also of course to Vicki Rattal, Sam's sister in Rarotonga, my point of contact, for introducing me to Sam and Nga, and for such a pleasant dinner at her and her husband's place.

Thanks to the people of Manihiki who interrupted their busy lives to help me out in my research. Thank you for your tolerance and assistance, and your insights.

Thank you to the head of the Disaster Management Office of the Cook Islands, Anthony Brown, for your time and for allowing me to take prints from your negatives of the aftermath of Cyclone Martin.

I also owe a particular debt of gratitude to the Building Office Manager of Samoa, Lauvi Parataiso A'atui, who spent so much time with me, explaining the building regulatory system in place in Samoa.

I wish to express my appreciation to the people of Samoa whom I encountered on my research for their unstinting assistance.

Thank you to my partner, Ross, for running the household so ably while I was in the Islands, and for all your sterling efforts at getting the thesis printed.

I also wish to thank my sister, Julian Skinner, for looking after my younger son for a while when I was in the Islands.

Thank you to my friend Peter Christiansen for also putting a week in on the childcare regime while I was away.

Thank you to my sister Trisha Witham, and my brother Chris Skinner for taking an interest.

A special thanks to my dear friend Adriana Cotogni for being at Wellington airport to welcome me home, and for putting up with all my grumbling about how things were going during the rest of the year!

Finally, a large thank you to my sons, Ben and Ron for putting up with a lack of access to the computer in the last run up to completion date.

## **The Table of Contents**

List of Illustrations	Page vi
Introduction	Page 1
Aid	Page 17
Assisted Housing	Page 39
Pre-Colonial Influences	Page 64
New Zealand and Samoa and the Cook Islands	Page 77
Post-Colonial	Page 105
Samoa	Page 132
Manihiki	Page 162
Conclusions	Page 208
Recommendations	Page 215
Bibliography	Page 219
Appendices	Page 234
A. MFAT and the Manihiki Project	Page 235
B. Gender Differentiation of Tasks	Page 237
C. Manihiki Children's Opinions	Page 240
D. Pearl Farming Schedule	Page 242
E. Allocation of Shelters	Page 243
F. Illustration Credits	Page 246

## The List of Illustrations

Pg. 66	Illustration 1:	‘Traditional’ cyclone house in Manihiki.
Pg. 67	Illustration 2:	The structure of the houses in Manihiki, late 19 <sup>th</sup> and early 20 <sup>th</sup> Century.
Pg. 68	Illustration 3:	Portable house in Manihiki, late 19 <sup>th</sup> and early 20 <sup>th</sup> Century.
Pg. 69	Illustration 4:	A Samoan fale tele. Exterior view.
Pg. 70	Illustration 5:	A traditional style oval fale structure.
Pg. 72	Illustration 6:	Lime building, missionary seminary, Avarua, Rarotonga.
Pg. 73	Illustration 7:	‘Before’ and ‘After’ Pictures of the effect of the English Christianity.
Pg. 84	Illustration 8:	1919 Peace Conference decides New Zealand should administer Samoa. ‘Bill’ Massey is Prime Minister of New Zealand. <i>W.Blomfield, Observer, 1919.</i>
Pg. 84	Illustration 9:	Over staffed administration intolerant of local customs. <i>Hill, Auckland Star, 1929.</i>
Pg. 89	Illustration 10:	Severe crackdown on protests by New Zealand. <i>Firth, NZ Samoan Guardian.</i>
Pg. 90	Illustration 11:	Police clashed with procession in Apia, 1929. <i>Firth, NZ Samoan Guardian.</i>
Pg. 101	Illustration 12:	Style of house funded through above scheme.
Pg. 102	Illustration 13:	Style of house funded through above scheme.
Pg. 134	Illustration 14:	The path of Cyclone Val through the South Pacific.
Pg. 134	Illustration 15:	Val over Samoa.
Pg. 145	Illustration 16:	Fales around a central green.

Pg. 145	Illustration 17:	A view of the outskirts of Apia.
Pg. 146	Illustration 18:	A round ended fale: a fale afolau.
Pg. 146	Illustration 19:	A modern fale, rectangular plan, concrete structure.
Pg. 147	Illustration 20:	A recently rebuilt fale, round ended
Pg. 147	Illustration 21:	The structure of this rebuilt fale afolau.
Pg. 148	Illustration 22:	A rural compound.
Pg. 149	Illustration 23:	A bus stop.
Pg. 150	Illustration 24:	An example of a concrete block house
Pg. 150	Illustration 25:	An example of a timber framed house with rusticated weatherboards
Pg. 151	Illustration 26:	On the left, a rectangular plan, hip roof fale, with walled rooms to the rear. On the right, a western style house with a gable end roof, with a deep porch
Pg. 160	Illustration 28:	All of Samoa appears to be under cultivation.
Pg. 162	Illustration 29:	Diagram showing post and beam connections.
Pg. 162	Illustration 30:	A room for rent in an urban compound in Apia.
Pg. 164	Illustration 31:	A fale on the beach, with western mattress
Pg. 164	Illustration 32:	View from fale on the beach
Pg. 166	Illustration 33:	Inside a timber frame, western style house, Apia
Pg. 166	Illustration 34:	Inside a timber frame, western style house,
Pg. 169	Illustration 35:	Map of the Cook Islands

Pg. 170	Illustration 36:	Aerial photo of Manihiki.
Pg. 170	Illustration 37:	Pearl farm buildings on kaa in lagoon, prior to cyclone Martin.
Pg. 172	Illustration 38:	Building Code in place for Cook Islands, timber frame details
Pg. 173	Illustration 39:	Cook Islands Building Code, blockwork details
Pg. 174	Illustration 40:	Little evidence of horizontal reinforcing in remains of block wall.
Pg. 174	Illustration 41:	Evidence of starter bars
Pg. 175	Illustration 42:	Community water shed, with water tanks
Pg. 177	Illustration 43:	Location of houses, Tauhunu, prior to Cyclone Martin.
Pg. 178	Illustration 44:	Location of surviving houses and micro-shelter sites, Tauhunu
Pg. 179	Illustration 45:	Location of houses in Tukao village, prior to Cyclone Martin
Pg. 180	Illustration 46:	Location of surviving houses and shelter sites, Tukao
Pg. 181	Illustration 47:	Houses in Tukao, seaward, just after Cyclone Martin.
Pg. 181	Illustration 48:	Telecom site, Tauhunu.
Pg. 182	Illustration 49:	Aftermath of Cyclone Martin, Tauhunu
Pg. 188	Illustration 50:	One of the original plans considered.
Pg. 189	Illustration 51:	Another early design for the micro-shelter.
Pg. 191	Illustration 52:	The Final micro-shelter design.
Pg. 193	Illustration 53:	Shelter frame.
Pg. 194	Illustration 54:	Shelter, with enlarged windows, separate ablutions block, Telecom in rear

Pg. 195	Illustration 55:	An example of a house made by a couple after Cyclone Martin.
Pg. 195	Illustration 56:	Interior of above
Pg. 196	Illustration 57:	A completed shelter.
Pg. 196	Illustration 58:	Completed shelter, enlarged windows, stairway at one end.
Pg. 199	Illustration 59:	Land holdings in Manihiki.
Pg. 200	Illustration 60:	A traditional fale being built by a couple that missed out on a shelter.
Pg. 200	Illustration 61:	Detail of above.
Pg. 200	Illustration 62:	Notch in beam to key into lower beam.
Pg. 205	Illustration 63:	The splits in a pole.
Pg. 208	Illustration 64:	Tukao, church, shelter, children on house slab.
Pg. 208	Illustration 65:	Volleyball tournament, Tukao churchyard.

## List of Illustrations

Pg. 139	Figure 1:	Table of Remittances.
Pg. 147	Figure 2:	Graph showing number of Cook Islanders living in New Zealand.



# INTRODUCTION

In this introduction, I shall commence with an outline of the scope of my thesis. The parameters of this study shall then be explored by explaining how the different chapters arose. I then address the different meanings attributed to housing. This will be followed by an explanation of what I hoped to achieve on undertaking this study and what my preconceptions were. The theoretical framework within which I conducted my research is then expounded, through an examination of how the approach and the methods I sought to apply originated in the field of development theory. My actual experience in the field pertaining to data collection will then be given with a brief exploration of the research methods involved.

This thesis explores the issue of housing in the South Pacific, through focusing on the housing of Upolo in Samoa and Manihiki in the Cook Islands and the measures of cyclone resistance incorporated in the housing. It was thought that Upolo and Manihiki, having both suffered devastating cyclones in which over 90% of their housing was destroyed, would offer an interesting comparison. And with Samoa having suffered her cyclone some ten years before Manihiki, a reasonable assessment of subsequent progress in rehousing in Samoa could be made. A point of difference between the two was that Samoa only received direct assistance from the New Zealand government in the rebuilding of schools, and none in the rebuilding of housing. However, Manihiki was being funded into structures, albeit officially termed 'shelters', by the government of New Zealand, that are being utilised as housing. Through this thesis I hoped to evaluate the extent of the success of the scheme in Manihiki and the extent of the success of the Samoan people in rehousing themselves.

There are linking themes in this thesis that are evident in each chapter, to varying degrees. The first of these is people's access to housing, which deals with how people manage to obtain housing, the methods having changed through history. People originally assembled housing out of local materials with community assistance, then over the years they became implicated in varying degrees of market involvement with purchased materials involving increased individualisation. The increasing dependence on purchased materials led to many governments becoming involved in assisting their people to purchase and build housing, often with the funding of bilateral aid.

Another theme is that of cyclone resistance in housing. There had been methods of incorporating cyclone resistance in housing in the early styles employed in the islands concerned, prior to European contact. While the initial incorporation of European elements in housing, while often more convenient, were not always increasing the cyclone resistance of the housing, in more recent times, there have been more measures to increase the chances of housing lasting through reasonably sized cyclones, or at least mitigate the negative effects of the method of construction used.

While a thesis is supposed to study exhaustively a single topic, it is necessary to consider issues that impinge on the topic and to which it is linked inseparably, to be able to constructively assess the aspects concerned. The difficulty arises due to the fact that in real life one has to deal with the 'fundamental interconnectedness of all things' (Adams, 1988: 30). For any one issue, there are related issues, and for each of those issues there are others, expanding out like ripples. This situation is aggravated by the increasingly global society we all live in. At some point, one has to decide which concerns are most pertinent to the original topic. The reasons for inclusion and exclusion of issues have to be based on a considered rationale, to avoid arbitrariness in the boundaries of one's thesis. One of the guidelines I used in this decision making process was whether the issue to be covered would give a helpful context for the central topic. In subsequent paragraphs, I give my justifications for the inclusion of each chapter.

However, before explaining the inclusion of each chapter, I feel it is necessary in this instance to explain the rationale behind the ordering of the chapters. The template on how to structure the thesis is to start from a broad, contextual basis and then funnel it down to a narrow focus through the chapters, before widening it out to address the conclusions and recommendations. The end of each chapter should be the starting point of the next, with each chapter increasingly focussed on the central topic. The other logical way to order the chapters is chronologically, but due to the necessity to cover the history of each topic, this was not possible. Indeed, the necessity of covering the background of each topic involves us trawling through the same patch of history several times, albeit with a different focus on the trends and occurrences involved on each pass. In ordering the chapters of this thesis, I have chosen to have

aid first and then the chapter on assisted housing (which in Third World countries often arose from bilateral aid). There is then a natural division between those two chapters that give the global context of the issues involved, and the subsequent chapters that narrow in on the South Pacific region. I thought this was the closest it was possible to get with the issues involved to following the conventions concerned, that is, from a broad approach to a narrow focus and, within that parameter, chronologically.

As this thesis examines an aid project funded by the New Zealand government, I considered it important to explore the whole question of aid – what are the main motivations and concerns? These issues are assessed in the chapter on Aid.

I then addressed the issue of assisted housing in the Third World. This chapter explored how the problem of housing low-income people is addressed, and how these approaches are affected by changes in economic and development theory.

Having established the global context, I then brought the focus onto the South Pacific. I thought it was essential to start by exploring the history behind the current style of housing used within the two cultures concerned to fully understand how their present style of housing has arisen, and as an indication of the willingness of the residents to adapt to different styles. This history needed to examine the type of housing utilised prior to contact with Europeans and the changes in approach to housing adopted since for an appreciation to be gained of any general trends in housing style within these two cultures. These considerations led to the chapter on Pre-Colonial Housing.

Now as the two islands in question received a markedly different response from the New Zealand government, I considered an exploration of the history of the relationship of New Zealand with both to be appropriate. This is covered in the chapter on New Zealand's Relationship with Samoa and the Cook Islands. This attempts to give an indication of the probable motivations of all three players at various times in our mutual histories, up until the time of the independence of Samoa, and the self-government of the Cook Islands.

At that point I thought it helpful to provide a contextual chapter on the situation since independence, including a review of New Zealand's evolution in attitudes and approach to the two islands concerned.

I then discuss in depth the issues pertaining to Samoa's housing situation at present, as revealed to me through reading and personal interviews during my field work there.

A chapter on Manihiki then follows, with a particular focus on the feedback from the locals on how they felt about the project.

Having explored the issues outlined above and having examined the fieldwork involved, I was then able to come up with several assertions and these are discussed in the conclusion chapter. As this is a thesis for the discipline of Development Studies, and as such it is first and foremost concerned with the appropriateness of the assistance received by the people involved, the general tenor of the conclusions reflects this. And as housing is itself a complex concept, being grounded in convenience and technological issues as well as the more esoteric considerations such as how society is ordered, the conclusions are also correspondingly eclectic.

The final chapter, on recommendations, covers what I consider to be the most important lessons to be learnt from the literature review and fieldwork I undertook, and how these can be best implemented in any future housing scheme.

Housing is a multifaceted topic. Housing needs to fulfil the functions of 'shelter, container, status symbol and home' (Rensel, 1995, 7). While most initial studies of housing focused on one particular aspect, such as the architectural or anthropological, a more holistic approach is required to fully assess the adequacy of housing for the residents concerned. Housing has been variously described as having 'ecological and social structural functions', while psychological approaches to the study of housing have examined the role of housing in 'spatial perception and ... territoriality' (ibid:9). Anthropological analysis sought to find corresponding patterns in the layout of a village and perhaps the house itself in a society's perception of the ordering of the cosmos. A particularly intriguing aspect of housing worth exploring is

that while social relations order the form of the housing, the form of the house itself can in turn influence social relations, creating a 'reciprocal dynamic' (ibid:7). This can have a reinforcing effect on those social relations, as could be argued occurs with the openness of the Samoan fale. However, the form of the house can work against traditional societal forms, particularly with housing funded (and designed) by foreign powers, such as the apartments housing young Samoan mothers in Honolulu (Franco and Aga, 1995: 151ff). As well as these more esoteric concerns, the practicalities of life are also important within the whole issue of housing. The impact of the design of housing on the ease of executing daily chores also needs to be kept in mind, particularly as housing tends to be designed by those not always very involved in such chores – men. And the appropriateness of the design of the housing for the climate it is located in needs to be assessed as well. To what extent the housing design utilises local materials can have a very direct effect on the health of the country's economy, as foreign exchange has to be earned for foreign goods.

### **Approach to this Research**

I came to this research seeking to ascertain the housing situation at present in Samoa and the Cook Islands. I was convinced that no one knows better than those who live in such a climate how they can best be accommodated. One of the preconceptions I held on embarking on this research were that the mode of housing construction that has evolved within a particular environment is usually the best for that environment in terms of thermal control, ease of access to materials and aesthetic appropriateness. However, I was also aware that there might be limitations with the materials to hand, which the residents themselves may wish to overcome by availing themselves of imported materials. One of my principle concerns was the potential loss of autonomy of people living in the Pacific might suffer when they spurn traditional methods and materials for housing.

### **Background to Approach and Methods**

To understand my approach to the research involved, it is necessary to present a concise summary of how development theory and attendant research approaches evolved to reach the present situation.



Up until the 1980s, there were two great paradigms of Development theory, Marxist or capitalist. The theoretical parameters of both were well established. Both approaches concentrated on increasing the Gross Domestic Product of the Third World countries within their respective spheres of influence, as that was believed to be the mechanism through which the poor would be assisted. Development analysts argued over which approach ought to be followed, but all agreed that the growth of the industrial sector was the key - with little regard for the long-term environmental or societal effects. As a Soviet official said, "the Western economies are like an express train hurtling at ever increasing speed towards an abyss – but we will overtake you" (McRobie, 1981:7).

It could plausibly be argued that researchers working within these two paradigms were also working within a set hypothesis – that is, that only communism or capitalism is the best way to order society, thus they employed deductive methods of research. They were searching for evidence to reassert the supremacy of their paradigm and the folly of the opposing one rather than searching for truths per se. The paradigm they were working within was an ideology, which could be likened to an article of faith. Thus only a limited range of research methods were available to them as control over the type of responses generated was needed as only certain responses could be admitted within the construct they were working in. As these two paradigms were diametrically opposed to each other, any research conducted within the auspices of either approach was also automatically defensive. This reinforced the choice of methodology employed. This methodology was positivist, rigid and extractive, the perceptions of the researcher often feeding into the design of the research, leading to the reinforcing of stereotypes and preconceptions. Large, statistical, 'objective' (as opposed to empathetic) surveys were employed. Many examples of these surveys can be found in the *Journal of Development*. The advantage of these methods is that they enabled the predominant characteristics or opinions of a given population to be clearly shown, depending on the type of questions asked. Quantitative results also speak more directly to government officials who deal in such data on a daily basis, and appeal to those with a bias towards 'scientific' approaches. A preferential bias towards occupations dealing with numbers and things rather than people also led to greater credence being given to approaches used within such occupations which in turn reinforced the choice of such statistically based methods (Chambers, 1993).

However some questionnaires committed the venial sin of leaping to conclusions not supported by the data gathered which results in ecological fallacies, and development projects that do not address the issues central to the people's lives. There was also an awareness that with questionnaires, the type of information generated was dependant on the type of questions asked by the questioner which led to inherent biases, reflected in which information became available. And as it was outsiders who generated these questionnaires, they were unlikely to know the type of questions that were pertinent to the issue for the interviewees themselves.

There were qualitative studies undertaken through this time period, particularly by anthropologists, who used observation as well as open-ended interviews to gain as thorough knowledge as possible of the people concerned. Unfortunately, it was believed that such studies took literally years to conduct, both to amass the depth of information sought, and to build up sufficient rapport with the people involved to become a confidant. These studies were focused on the examination of the society as it was, rather than on any changes wanted or any dissatisfactions that the people may have been experiencing, which would have acted as signposts to development practitioners.

Meanwhile, people working in the field on development projects in Third World countries until the 1980s were finding little in the development paradigm that was of relevance to the reality they were encountering. More and more evidence accumulated that neither approach was making any significant inroads in improving the lot of the poorest of the poor - the rural poor. This theoretical impasse led to a call to development theorists to focus on ensuring people are able to meet their basic needs, which involved an emphasis on establishing who was most in need (Streeten, 1981a:68). This impasse also led to the research methods that had been employed being called into question as they had not generated pertinent development projects (Edwards, 1989).

The demise of the Cold War, spectacularly and historically represented by the destruction by the people of the Berlin wall in 1989, dampened the ideological fire down in both development theorists' camps. Development theorists were now freed from complying with the rigours of either paradigm and were open to address the real



issue at hand - who were actually needing to be helped, and how. The growing recognition that too many development researchers were guilty of 'developmental tourism' – avoiding remote areas and difficult seasons – went some way to explaining the dearth of useable research (Chambers, 1984). Once research became focused on those most in need, and their genuine needs, without having a paradigm to justify, the resulting data led to a rising respect for the immense coping abilities of the rural poor which in turn led to a call for more grassroots input into the design of development (Chambers, 1994). In combination with this was a growing realisation that to truly achieve genuine progress, the rural poor needed to be politically enabled – empowered. (Freire, 1970). These concerns led to the evolution of a set of approaches now known as 'Development from Below', a sub-set of the new post-development theories. Included within these approaches is a call for appropriate technology, which I shall examine subsequently in greater detail.

Contemporaneous with this new focus on the concerns of the poorest of the poor, was the development of more participatory forms of research and development design, as instigated and promoted by Robert Chambers. This was an attempt to get information from the field on what the rural poor in particular needed to improve their livelihoods. It was hoped that the information thus generated would be more pertinent than information that had been obtained by enormous questionnaires that took many months to process and which tended to reflect the bias of the questioner in their design. Robert Chambers emphasised that "surveys are poor tools for insight into relationships" (Chambers, 1994). The aim of the new approach was to attempt to achieve the empathy gained by the extensive observation research undertaken by anthropologists, but in a far shorter time frame, so the resulting information could be fed promptly into the design of more effective development schemes. These attempts in the field evolved through Rapid Rural Appraisal, which still was extractive, involving the interviewer leading the respondents. The RRA methods involved 'outsiders collecting data, which they then take away to be analysed elsewhere' (Chambers, 1994:957). RRA uses semi-structured interviewing and observation. The RRA methods involved 'outsiders collecting data, which they then take away to be analysed elsewhere' (ibid).

The Rapid Rural Appraisal approach then evolved into the Participatory Rural Appraisal approach which uses a combination of different methods in an effort to get the local people as involved as possible in describing their situation thoroughly enough that possible solutions to their concerns will be indicated to them. These methods involve the researcher in facilitating the process and then stepping back as the local people take the method over. The results of a well-executed Participatory Rural Appraisal session will be available quickly, enabling development efforts to be directed to essential areas (Chambers, 1999). This approach involved attempts to enable the people themselves to 'share, enhance, and analyse their knowledge of life and conditions, to plan and to act' (Chambers, 1994:953). These research methods enabled the local people to conduct the research. The participatory nature of this approach is also thought to lead to a feeling of ownership of the development by the local people, encouraging adoption and maintenance of what is implemented. The methods involved include informal mapping, diagramming, and innovation assessment – scoring and ranking different actions (with seeds, stones, sticks). Robert Chambers stresses the importance of not formalising the range of methods available to PRA – his belief was that at all times the guideline should be one's 'own best judgement'. Chambers stresses the importance for practitioners to 'learn in the field, ... making mistakes, and learning on the run ... necessitating personal commitment, critical awareness and informed improvisation'. Chambers also recommends that researchers live with those they wish to generate information from. Chambers stressed that 'the working rule has become to assume that local people are capable of something until it is proved otherwise' (Chambers, 1994:1445).

Robert Chambers cited Neil Jamieson's 1987 book, *The Paradigmatic Significance of PRA* where Jamieson points out that whether previous researchers were Marxists, Socialists or Capitalists, they shared 'evolutionary, unilineal, universalistic, positivistic and utilitarian assumptions and a fervent belief in progress' (Chambers, 1994a:1448). Neil Jamieson credited PRA with a different view of development, that of 'human evolution as problem solving under pressure, as adaptive change'. Further, the increase in change in all our lives today, leads to the increasing importance of 'accurate and timely feedback' for 'effective adaptive change' (ibid).

However, anthropologists, in particular, have questioned the degree of intimacy claimed by such approaches, due to the contracted time frame involved. However, with the passing of time and the accumulation of case studies involving these methods, it does appear that the information thus generated is indeed honest and useful and often of a surprisingly intimate nature (Chambers, 1994).

Another influence on the thrust of development efforts in the latter part of the twentieth century was the emergence of a demand for 'intermediate technology'. Fritz Schumacher first articulated this concept in his book 'Small is Beautiful'. Although cobbled together and reading like it was written by an economist (it was), the bulk of this book contained sufficiently profound insights for it to have a marked impact on the design of development projects, if not on development theory *per se*. In it Schumacher outlined how the poorest of the poor could not be helped by industrialisation – developing countries just could not afford the investment involved in providing a job in the industrial sector for everyone in the country. He quoted Mahatma Ghandi, "the poor of the world can not be helped by mass production, only by production by the masses". He recommended that technology that enabled the rural poor to maximise their productivity, employing local resources with easily built and maintained tools and machinery, with minimal fuel inputs, were what they really needed. Something better than what they already had yet not as elaborate as those employed in the west, hence; 'intermediate technology'. To this end, together with George McRobie and Julia Porter he set up the Intermediate Technology Group in 1965, which, due to the interest of many NGOs and Third World governments, expanded rapidly. The Group and its offshoots investigated alternative sources of power for the people in the Third World and concentrated on utilising local materials, with many examples of successful designs outlined in George McRobie's book, 'Small is Possible'. There have been critics of the intermediate technology book, with some claiming it confines Third World countries to second-rate technology (Tofler, 1984, cited in McRobie, 1981:63), while others claim intermediate technology is a vehicle for the continuation of neo-colonialism. The former charge is ably countered with the many examples in McRobie's book of the intermediate technology producing items at a lower cost per item than the elaborate technology employed in the West can manage. And Alvin Tofler did not seem to realise that a more apt technology than that available in the West was being sought, rather than a lesser technology –

groundbreaking developments in water and solar powered generators have been developed under the auspices of intermediate technology. And the claim that intermediate technology extends neo-colonialism is refuted with the assertion that as intermediate technology reduces dependence on Western technology and funding it decreases the hold of neo-colonialism (McRobie, 1981:63).

The intermediate technology movement dovetailed neatly with growing concerns in the West about environmental degradation and declining fuel stocks, with intermediate technology's maximising efficient use of renewable resources (including people and animal power) – such as the more efficient wood burning stoves. This push for *Sustainable Development* rather than development at all costs, was another of the post development theories, along with Development from Below (as outlined above) and Gender and Development.

Gender and Development examines how the socially structured roles of men and women in a particular society have impacted on and are in turn impacted upon by the success or otherwise of development efforts. Stemming from Esther Boserup's seminal work on *Women's Role in Development*, published in 1970, researchers focusing on Gender and Development concentrate on women's current role in their society and how they see themselves and where they would like development efforts to be focused. While initially it could be seen to be a transposing of Western feminist ideals onto Third World women, contributions to development theory literature from Third World feminists and the increasingly confident voices of the rural poor women themselves are ensuring Third World women's genuine concerns are beginning to be addressed.

In light of the evolution of development theory outlined above, I choose to locate my approach to this research within Post Development theories, in particular focusing on the 'Development from Below' considerations. For me this involved an emphasis on basic needs, employing appropriate technology and avoiding an urban bias by examining the experiences of rural people. I also wanted to ensure that due emphasis was placed on the women involved, assessing how the socially constructed roles of women and men in this society impacted on my particular subject of housing,

as per the 'Gender and Development' approach. Thus my primary focus in this research was to be people-centred development.

### **My Choice of Approach**

In light of the evolution of development theory outlined above, I chose to locate my approach to this research within Post Development theories, in particular focusing on the 'Development from Below' approaches. For me this involved an emphasis on basic needs, employing appropriate technology and avoiding an urban bias by examining the experiences of rural people. I also wanted to ensure that due emphasis was placed on the women involved, assessing how the socially constructed roles of women and men in this society impacted on my particular subject of housing, as per the 'Gender and Development' approach. Thus my primary focus in this research was to be people-centred development.

## **RESEARCH METHODS**

### **Literature Review**

As my focus was on people-centred development, employing RRA and PRA research methods, I read extensively on the different methods that had been employed under the auspices of RRA and PRA and how they were undertaken.

I then did a literature review on appropriate technology, focusing on how this relates to housing, in particular housing in the tropics. To ensure I was informed as to what indigenous housing had been like traditionally, I read the parts of anthropological books involving a discussion on the local housing.

The literature review then involved examining the history and motivations behind the relationship between New Zealand and Samoa, and New Zealand and the Cook Islands. I found this particularly fascinating as none of my previous education broached the topic.

I then expanded the literature review to cover the topic of aid, and the different schools of thought regarding the best approach to aid, and the likely motivations.



## ACTUAL FIELD EXPERIENCE

While I wanted to follow PRA methods, I was very aware that my research was very much for my own elucidation – that the topic was not necessarily of immediate concern to those I was soliciting information from. I did not want to be more of an inconvenience to the people who I was interviewing than was absolutely unavoidable. I preferred to approach the people available in their homes for my inquiries rather than have people gathered for my purposes. I felt it would have been inappropriate to commandeer such a gathering. However, such reticence, going by the confidences people were prepared to share with me when they were approached, was its own reward. There were also practical concerns involved in organising such a gathering in Samoa as most people worked in the hill plantations during the day, (or in salaried positions in Apia) and in the evening I was unable to travel out to villages as the buses had stopped operating. Also people seemed to gather within their extended families, rather than as a village per se. I set about obtaining my data by approaching the chief's house in a village, having ascertained which that was from whoever was manning the village shop. At the chief's house I would be introduced to the chief's wife as the chief was in the hill plantations working. The chief's wife would then pass me on to her eldest available daughter who was more fluent in English, while the chief's wife went and prepared food for me. Thus, most of the information I gathered was from individual interviews.

In one village on Upolo, a group of young people in their late teens and early twenties did approach me when I rested under a tree in their village while on a walk through. Their mother had been sent them over to me as she seemed unable to face the social obligation herself, as she was evidently too busy, having just returned from shopping. This impromptu group interview generated some interesting comments about their feelings on western versus traditional housing.

In Manihiki, I went from household to household to conduct interviews. While the Manihikians tended to be intensely busy, those building the shelter would pause to talk to me, and some of the work in relation to the pearl farms was undertaken at the shelters – such as preparing lines for the sprats, enabling them to carry on with their work while talking to me. These interviews were generally with both husband and wife, though often as the discussion delved into the construction process involved, the

men would tend to contribute more. Some interviews involved only men, and fewer involved only the women. There were topics I felt it inappropriate to broach – such as their intention to stay in Manihiki, and their household income.

As in Samoa, I had intended to utilise PRA methods in my research in Manihiki, but when there were gatherings of people such as at netball tournaments, I felt very strongly that it would be inappropriate to commandeer everyone's time and attention, so I did not do so. However, at the end of the Tauhunu meeting, I got up and asked for reasons for people wanting shelter – these were quite happily volunteered from the audience. However, when I then drew these up on a ranking chart and asked people from the audience to join me in using coral gravel to rank these, initially no-one joined me. One woman did take pity on me, and came to the front to help, but as her glasses were back at her home, we were unable to progress far. While PRA methods may be of use in other societies, in Manihiki, where people are educated and have spent many years in Western societies, and are inherently more individualistic than many Polynesians, the implicit requirement to 'perform' en masse is not relished. It may have been more successful if I had given out individual ranking sheets, for each person to work on at their own seat, as I had for my Interior Design class in Palmerston North, New Zealand, who not only completed the exercise, but had found it to be helpful.

In Manihiki, I also went to a class at the school in Tauhunu, and again it was enlightening being able to get the views of a different age sector to see where their opinions differed from their parents' age group, and where they concurred.

By the time of the Tukao meeting, I had managed to get around about a third of the households in Tukao and Tuhuna. At the Tukao meeting, one person said that they needed someone to go around the shelters to assess what still needed to be done to finish the shelters, so that the owners could ensure it reached completion, so they could get the rebate on their mortgages. The AC Consultant and employee at the meeting did not have time to do so. I could see the benefit to the Manihikians of having such an evaluation, and as I had been a building inspector in Lower Hutt for three years, I suggested myself for the role, dependant on approval from my lecturers. Having got that approval, I then got Graham to generate a checklist from the plans of

what he definitely wanted completed by the deadline. Armed with that, I then went from shelter to shelter, explaining to the people concerned what I was offering to do, and, with their approval, examined the shelter, and informed them what tasks still needed to be completed. Once I had ascertained from the owners what materials were still needed to complete the job, the AC worker was informed so the owners could be provided with them. I also interviewed the Manihikians on these site visits, where I had not already done so.

I was very conscious that in dealing with a subject such as cyclone housing, the people I was interviewing might well have lost friends and members of their families through the actions of the cyclone. I was intrigued to find that the people of Samoa, although they had been through Cyclone Val almost a decade earlier, were still very reticent about discussing the whole issue of cyclones. The experience of Cyclone Val would appear to have left a 'psychological scar' for many people of Samoa. However, in Manihiki, I found that people were quite prepared to discuss the experience of Cyclone Martin, the aftermath, and expound their own theories on why such devastation occurred, and on the whole rebuilding programme since. Now, it may have been that I happened to arrive in Manihiki when the people there were at the stage of needing to talk through the whole experience, and perhaps with time, they too will wish to suppress their memories of the events. Or the difference in reactions may be due to the differences in the cyclones, Cyclone Val having been uncommonly long in duration. Or it may well be that all the convoluted permutations involved in the aid scheme in Manihiki post-Cyclone in generating much bemusement amongst the residents has proved therapeutic.

## **Conclusion**

That then, is a relatively brief summary as to how I came to take the approach to the research that I have. This introduction has also covered how I found conducting research in actuality. The next chapter will then turn to the vexatious topic of aid.



## **AID CHAPTER**

## **Introduction**

In this chapter, I will explore the practice of aid. I will initially examine the origins of aid and its subsequent evolution. This is followed by a review of the different theories regarding the advisability or not of giving aid to developing countries. This will include an appraisal of the likely intentions of various donors in giving aid. This section will be followed by a review of New Zealand's overall aid programme. I will then look in depth at the portion of New Zealand's aid programme devoted to the South Pacific, in particular, Western Samoa and the Cook Islands.

## **Aid – Definitions and Components**

For this thesis, aid is defined as the transfer of resources from the West to developing countries, either through grants or through concessional loans and including technical advice, but not including any form of military assistance, for the purposes of relief or development. Aid is conferred through different avenues. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as World Vision, Save the Children, and such like, rely on public largess, though they often also receive relatively small government contributions, and with these funds they initiate projects, usually addressing basic needs within developing countries, and usually directly affecting poor people within these countries. The primary impetus for these organisations is humanitarian – though some organisations also have a religious component. While these NGOs are a major source of aid funding for developing countries, due to the focus of the thesis, I will be concentrating on bilateral aid. Bilateral aid describes government-to-government transfers, whereas multilateral aid involves many governments donating to an umbrella organisation, such as various United Nations agencies, which then confers the aid to different projects, within different countries. Donor governments usually prefer bilateral aid to multilateral aid as bilateral aid sets up more obvious lines of obligation, and enables the donor government to have a certain level of leverage over the recipient government (assuming that is what they are seeking).<sup>1</sup> Bilateral aid is also sometimes preferred by the recipient governments over multilateral aid as the recipient government gets to direct where the funds should go, and they get more political mileage out of any resulting improvements (Crocombe,

---

<sup>1</sup> On average, 70% of (Overseas Economic and Corporate Development) OECD aid is bilateral (Grant and Nijman, 1998:4).

1995:121). And some recipient governments also look upon multilateral aid as an affront to their sovereignty (Dorrance, 1992:35).

Multilateral aid comes in two types – the technology assistance type which is rendered by agencies such as the United Nations Education and Science Organisation (UNESCO), and World Health Organisation (WHO), and the type of multilateral organisation which provides capital reserves such as the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank.<sup>2</sup> Where governments do support multilateral aid, some donors prefer it to be the World Bank, as they are able to control the World Bank to a larger extent than they can other multilateral agencies. This control arises as voting rights within the World Bank relate to the size of subscriptions. The United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada and Australia have the major shares of both, so by withholding subscriptions or not allowing access to their capital market, these countries are able to influence World Bank policy.<sup>3</sup> So the World Bank is more similar in methods, and conditions of the major donors than most multilateral agencies (Wall, 1973:140). Developing country governments prefer to source funds from multilateral organisations, (other than the World Bank) as they are not required, whether literally or tacitly, to sign up to a particular political view. Instead of the recipient being exposed to a single, possibly prejudiced donor, multilateral aid uses ‘sound, common and well-known criteria’ (Thompson, 1967:6) and (Wall, 1973:132). Multilateral aid has the aided advantage of being efficiently supervised – with the greater volume of development schemes undertaken, specialisations within the organisation have often developed – for example, in health or education. Another advantage with multilateral aid is that it involves individual donors in international agreements with other wealthy powers, so even if faced with domestic economic straitening, the donor is unlikely to renege on their commitments – whereas they may well do so within bilateral agreements (Wall, 1973:132).

---

<sup>2</sup> The World Bank was established in 1945 – initially involved in Europe, from early 1950s, only involved with developing countries. Only loans for public sector projects. 1956 – subsidiary set up – International Finance Corporation for risk capital for private enterprise in Third World. 1960 – another subsidiary – International Development Association – ‘soft loans’ (Wall, 1973:134–140).

<sup>3</sup> France threatened to stop subscription to the World Bank unless more ex-French African colonies got loans. United States delayed IDA funds between 1970 to 1972 – as the policies were considered inconsistent with United States’ interest (Wall, 1973:140).

One of the issues within aid is whether aid ought to be given in the form of outright grants with no requirement of repayment. Or whether aid ought to be in the form of loans on heavily discounted terms – long repayment periods, reduced interest and interest ‘holidays’ usually collectively referred to as ‘soft loans’. Many donor governments prefer to give aid in the form of loans, as they feel this encourages financial responsibility on the part of the recipient. The concern being that the recipient is more likely to squander monies which do not have to be repaid, and therefore do not require justification to their own electorate. Donors feel they have more control over loans – they are able to make it part of the loan conditions how the money is to be spent, and use the leverage gained through the promise of concessions in the repayment schedule to ensure the objectives wished by the donors are met. Another justification for loans rather than grants used by donor governments is that the donors’ electorate is more willing to support aid in that form. However, this is not the case, as studies have shown that the public perception in most developed countries is that aid is in grant form only. Obviously, given the option, recipient countries prefer outright grants to loans – with the provisos that there is not too much of a ‘political tie’ to the grants. The extensive use of aid in the form of loans, albeit concessionary ones, has significantly contributed to the dire debt situation many Third World countries now face (Wall, 1973:101).

Another issue having to be addressed by development practitioners, and therefore, *ipso facto*, one which also needs to be addressed within the issue of aid, is the vexed question of whether development projects or development programmes ought to be funded. Advocates of both types claim that their type gives the greatest efficiency. Most donor governments prefer the project approach as a project delivers, within a certain time period, a ‘showpiece’, which is available for display to their electorate – such as a hospital or a dam (Hayter, 1971:17). Again, projects are usually preferred by donors, as they feel they are able to retain greater control over the process, as the objectives are able to more easily be outlined at the project’s commencement, so the resulting product can be evaluated against these. However, there are some drawbacks for the donors with projects. The use of expatriate advisors and technicians involves the inclusion of personalities, which, if they do not gel with the local populace, can lead to denigration in opinion of not just them or even them and the project concerned, but may extend to the donor country as well. The other

major drawback with projects as opposed to programmes is that the donor country becomes responsible for the success of the project – whereas with programmes, the recipient country has more ownership, both in reality and in the perception of the local people (Wall, 1973:109).

This examination of aid concentrates on the First World's aid schemes to underdeveloped countries, as New Zealand is a member of the First World – however the socialist countries also had an aid programme. The United Soviet States of Russia (USSR) and East European countries (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) enacted their aid scheme after the West's. However, it was performed on a much smaller scale than that of the First World's, and, of course, far fewer countries were involved as donors. The aid was given primarily in the form of loans, were fully tied to equipment from participating nations in the CMEA, and, after the first few years, focused on a few, close allies – primarily Cuba and Vietnam (Lumsdaine, 1993:42). However, the Third World countries that did receive assistance from communist countries were grateful for it, all the more so as they were more inclined to provide essential components of industrial machinery than the West which had to contend with opposition from business interests. Often machinery or industrial materials were swapped for rice, cotton – this method of repayment was not acceptable in the West, but it was often easier for the recipients. The Soviets were also more likely to fund grand schemes such as sports stadiums. The Third World itself has been involved in assisting fellow developing nations. India has sent rural advisors to African nations under United Nations programmes, who have been invaluable, understanding as they do the constraints and opportunities faced in tropical farming. Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaysia and Nigeria also helped others under the auspices of the Colombo Plan (New Zealand Institute, 1968:81).

## **History of Aid**

### **Origins**

While the concept of aid is as familiar to us as the term 'Third World', both concept and term date from shortly after World War Two. A congressman, an American, one Mr Marshall, recommended to his government that they ought to make grants available to Europe, to assist in the massive rebuilding and reequipping of the

industries there, to enable Europe to return to its pre-war status. While in the initial aftermath of the war, American citizens dug deep to assist their cousins across the Atlantic, contributing generously to the UNRRA, there was rationale as well as altruism behind what became known as the Marshall Plan. American business could see the sense in assisting their major market, Europe, back into a purchasing position.<sup>4</sup> And, with the European empires, there would be opportunity for the Americans to access those resources they lacked themselves, and this was included in the conditions that the European governments had to sign to access the grants.<sup>5</sup> The American government also got to decide on what those funds could be spent on.<sup>6</sup> It was not adverse to protecting American interests where these appeared to clash with what the Europeans required the loans for.<sup>7</sup> It could be claimed that Europe would have taken far longer to reach the economic position it had had prewar without the assistance of the Marshall Plan. However, it could also be claimed that the structure of the Marshall Plan was such that it ensured America would achieve economic ascendancy over Europe – and retain it. And American ‘culture’ was imposed on Europe.<sup>8</sup> Control was imposed on European economies by America.<sup>9</sup> The Marshall plan was a central plank in America’s foreign policy after the war. Political control appears to also have been imposed by America on Europe – Britain began to exclude communists (and fascists) from the public service. And the United States dominated World Bank announced the granting of its first loan to France – a few days after the communists had been excluded from the French government (Fraser, 1948:13). So, even in this initial attempt at foreign financial assistance, there were the seemingly inevitable ulterior motives behind apparently overwhelming generosity. And, it could be argued, this

<sup>4</sup> The wheat the Americans produced after the war was piling up (Fraser, 1948:10).

<sup>5</sup> Materials required by America; rubber, lead, tin, chromate, manganese, uranium, bauxite, oil, cobalt and industrial diamonds (Fraser, 1948:7). Term, number 5: ‘To stimulate the production of specific raw materials, and facilitate the procurement of such materials by the United States for stockpiling purposes’ (Fraser, 1948:6).

<sup>6</sup> For instance, both Turkey and Greece proposed expanding tobacco cultivation, but the Americans said it would not be necessary as Europeans were developing a taste for the tobacco grown in America (Fraser, 1948:11).

<sup>7</sup> Both heavy industry machinery and large farming machinery was denied the Europeans – it was claimed that the machinery was in scarce supply due to the American demand for it, and the latter was also unnecessary, due to the small sizes of European farms. Also, Americans were not supportive of European ship building industry (Fraser, 1948:11).

<sup>8</sup> ‘The principle reason for wanting an economically stable Europe is that it is a prerequisite to the maintenance of the civilisation in which the American way of life is rooted’ (Second page background material in Marshall Plan, cited in Fraser, 1948:5).

<sup>9</sup> 5<sup>th</sup> Term of the Marshall Plan: ‘To deposit in a special account an amount of its own currency equivalent to the amount of aid furnished in grants, to be used only in manner agreed with United States government (Fraser, 1948:6).



pattern, to varying degrees of intensity, has been adhered to in subsequent aid arrangements.

With the success of the Marshall Plan, President Truman announced that America would be extending aid to less economically developed countries, in his inaugural address in January 1949 (Lumsdaine, 1993:45). There had previously been calls from the International Missionary Council in the 1920s and 1930s for developed nations to focus on poorer countries. And the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in its Philadelphia declaration (which went on to become part of its Charter) stressed a need to support poorer countries (ibid). Initially, extending aid as per Truman's address, was an opportunity for America to extend its influence in those countries where the European Empires' control was fading – often those very same countries with those all important industrial resources referred to earlier. But as relationships between the Soviet Union and the United States of America deteriorated, a primary objective with the foreign aid meted out by the Americans was to halt the spread of Socialism, supporting even military dictatorship governments as long as they supported American interests, by suppressing Socialism.<sup>10</sup> By the mid 1950s, most of United States aid was supporting poorer countries on the 'periphery of the Communist bloc' – Greece, Turkey, South Vietnam, Taiwan and South Korea (Wall, 1973:10). This approach involved recipient governments in signing up to open market policies.

America saw this task of financing countries away from the temptation of Socialism as an obligation, a duty - and a burden, and as such they expected the European countries to share in it.<sup>11</sup> Already, as former colonies gained independence, the previous European colonisers had exhibited a feeling of obligation towards their previous wards as evidenced by the continuing financial support given<sup>12</sup> (Wall, 1973:10). However, as European powers waned, 'new' countries such as Canada and Australia (and later still, Japan) began to make a significant impact on the aid community (Wall, 1973:15).

---

<sup>10</sup> Mutual Security Act, 1952 – extension of Cold War containment policy from western to southern Europe and Asia (Wall, 1973:10).

<sup>11</sup> While United States aid never involved as much as 1% of its GNP in aid, nonetheless, by 1970 it was supplying 45% of all foreign aid (Wall, 1973:10 – 11).

<sup>12</sup> Great Britain – 83% of its bilateral aid was to Commonwealth countries – that is, former colonies. And France supported its current and ex-colonies (Wall, 1973:47).

The primary objective of the recipient governments in obtaining aid and a primary rationale for the donors through this period was to develop industry to enable to enable the country concerned economy to achieve the 'take-off' stage (Rostow, 1960:). This was particularly so during the 1960s, when many countries gained independence, and the economic wisdom at the time necessitated borrowing to gear up one's industrial sector, as recommended by the American economist, Mr Rostow. Improved conditions for countries of the Third World were seen as only achievable through concentrating on improving the gross national product (GNP) through cash crops and industry. The 1960s were pronounced by the United Nations to be the Development Decade, on President Kennedy's urging.

### **A Rethink on Focus**

However, by the late 1960s, there began to be growing evidence that even where an increase in GNP had been achieved, this was not necessarily accompanied by indications of an improvement in indicators of human wellbeing, such as infant mortality, literacy rates, life expectancy, which showed the position of the poorest of the poor had worsened over this time period.<sup>13</sup> Increasingly, calls came for aid to fund projects that would meet basic needs – food, water - and the subject of this thesis – shelter.

It was also in the 1970s, with the publication of Esther Boserup's book, *Women in Development*, in 1970, the importance of considering the impacts of aid projects on women, and indeed, the necessity of designing aid projects with the specific intention of assisting women was realised. However, this was a slow evolution in approach – when the existence of women was first brought to the attention of aid project designers, they were seen as a great, untapped source of labour. While this is still the perception of some, subsequent field studies have revealed the large load already being carried by Third World women. They have a triple role of reproduction (domestic duties), production (any craft-work or agriculture geared towards sale) and community worker (efforts to promote social cohesion as well as the construction of community facilities). The realisation that women could

---

<sup>13</sup> Between 1950 and 1975, income per head in developing countries grew by 3% per year (excluding China). 'But at the same time there was increasing dualism...not enough employment generated.' 'Nor were the benefits of growth always widely spread to the lower income groups' (Streeten, 1981:11).



only join in development projects if they were relieved in some way from the time involved in fulfilling their other commitments, led to the design of projects which tried to be more inclusive through being pragmatic and practical in relation to the needs of women. Also, studies which indicated how the welfare of the family was increased when aid was made available to the women of the family rather than the men, led to more and more projects being directed at the women rather than the men.<sup>14</sup> Third World women's burden was increased in the 1990s with the impact of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs – see below), calling on their greater involvement in the care of the sick, and ever decreasing household budgets with reduction in income, coupled with increasing food prices. Women had also for some time been targeted with family planning programmes. These did not address the reasons why women needed large families – to assist them in their work. However, with the Beijing Conference on Women, recognition was given to the connection between increased life choices for women, especially in the form of education, and an accompanying reduction in family size. Thus a commitment was given by many governments to dedicate aid towards assisting women develop, in the interests of the entire country developing.

During the 1980s, more and more calls came for the recipients to have a greater say in the direction of aid spending. However, this was also the decade when, due to the debt crisis, and the subsequent refinancing with stringent conditions by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the West was able to impose its own pattern on the structure of sovereign countries' economies. The subsequent social pressures led to more aid being required to mitigate the consequences. The whole situation arose during the 1970s, when a subset of Third World countries that comprised the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) managed to form a cartel and increased their profits through increased petroleum prices. The increased profits were deposited in Western banks, which then lent out the money rather indiscriminately, ignoring their own conditions, to Third World governments. These funds were often used indiscriminately – in grandiose schemes memorialising a corrupt leader, or in honest attempts to improve conditions as with large hydro-electrical schemes and

---

<sup>14</sup> In a South American country, it was found that aid had to be given at twelve times the rate to the father of a family as to the mother of the family, to see an improvement in the well-being of the family, with increased nutrition, and schooling.

other large schemes, which all too often turned into white elephants. Cavalier lending in the 1970s, followed by a drastic upsurge in interest rates due to the recession in the West from the increase in petrol prices, combined with diminishing terms of trade for primary produce exporters which most developing countries were. These factors led in 1986 to Mexico announcing it would have to default on its loans. This sent shock waves throughout the global banking network – in America, the top seven banks had 65% of their assets tied up in Mexico. Something had to be done urgently. So the IMF arranged concessionary loans for the indebted countries, so the original loan payments could be met. These loans had strict requirements with them – referred to as a Structural Adjustment Programme – which required drastic cuts in government spending, complete opening up of the economy with a floating exchange rate, and the removal of all tariffs. Many governments chose to cut health and education rather than military spending, which caused widespread suffering, which increased many countries reliance on aid (Grant and Nijman, 1998:25). However, precursors of structural adjustment programmes, ‘stabilisation policies’ had been touted by donors for Third World countries as early as the late 1960s – these policies involved reducing government deficits, liberalising regulations against imports and devaluing (Hayter, 1971:155 – 158).

The 1990s were when there was greater realisation of the perilous condition of the world environment. Initially the West responded with calls for the Third World to stop deforestation, and there were grave concerns as to the environmental results of the Third World catching up on the West materially – the increase in CFCs once ‘every Chinese family had a fridge’, the increasing pollutants with increased cars. At the Rio de Janeiro Conference, Third World countries managed to convince the West that it was the load of the practices of the West that was disproportionately the cause of environmental degradation. They also insisted the Third World had a right to develop, and required assistance to do that in the most environmentally sustainable way possible, and that if the West required Third World countries to stop deforestation, then the debt repayment burden would need to be eased. As a result, debt for nature swaps were arranged (where a certain portion of debt is forgiven, if a certain portion of rainforest comes under government protection) – which was a form of aid. Also, many environment projects began to be funded with aid – such as

reforestation efforts. Indeed, environmental aid projects, along with aid projects focused on women, have been accused of being the result of a fad.

The 1990s were also when the former USSR continued to disintegrate (the falling of the Berlin Wall was in 1989). This led to the West having to rethink their entire approach to foreign affairs, with attendant repercussions on aid policy. With the demise in the Cold War, Western countries had to redefine their 'foreign policy and geopolitical codes' (Grant and Nijman, 1998:6). This realignment resulted in some 'Cold War orphans', such as Zaire and Somalia (Grant and Nijman, 1998:7). Some hope that the removal of the spectre of communism on the world stage will lead to a focus on the role of aid in reducing poverty (Grant and Nijman, 1998:11).

Thus, while initially aid was given to encourage the purchase commodities - inputs to improve agriculture and industry, it was then expanded to improve the requisite infrastructure for an industrial society, including transportation and energy sources (primarily hydro-electric). The importance of a transfer in technical knowledge then became increasingly acknowledged. And since then, specific issues have commanded attention – such as women and also the environment.

While the total level of aid significantly increased over the second half of the twentieth century,<sup>15</sup> within the original donor countries (western Europe and America), in real terms, and as a proportion of the GNP of the individual countries, aid declined from the mid 1960s onward.<sup>16</sup>

### **Schools of Thought**

There is now a spectrum of ideas about the advisability of there being aid at all. Interestingly, this dispersion is not along the usual gradations of political hue – people supporting aid are just as likely to be right wing as left wing, and the same goes for people who do not think aid should exist. Theorists seem to arrive at their position on the spectrum according to their perception of the efficacy or otherwise of the practice of aid. The original justification for aid, subscribed to particularly by

---

<sup>15</sup> A total of \$US500 billion by 1992, from \$US4.6 billion per annum in 1960, to \$US58 billion per annum in 1992 (Todaro, 1997, 547).

<sup>16</sup> The average % of GDP of developing nations expended on aid – 1960: 0.5%, down to 0.32% in 1992 (Todaro, 1997:547).

right-wing theorists, was the claim that as economies in the Third World do not have enough funds available for investment in development. They claimed this occurred through insufficient domestic savings and insufficient foreign exchange, due to the low export component of the economy. It was believed that external funds supplied through aid would be able to address this shortfall. The impetus towards assisting initially came from humanitarian concerns, and later, through concern that developing countries may resort to an alternative ideology. This assistance was thought to speed up the evolutionary process from a peasant-based society to an industrial, money-based society, as espoused by theorists such as Rostow. The success of the Marshall Plan after World War Two in Europe was given as evidence of the validity of this claim. However, it has been argued that that viewpoint gave insufficient weight to the fact that the necessary market institutions, and what is more, the 'market habit', had pre-existed in Europe, whereas they did not necessarily exist in the developing countries concerned (Wall, 1973:37). Thus, through the late 1940s, 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, there was a perfectly consistent position available for the more right-wing theorists in their support of aid. During this period, due to the popularity of Keynesian economics, capitalism was thought to require constant involvement by the government of a country in the economy to maintain and stabilise it, and the addition of foreign financial assistance was legitimised.<sup>17</sup> Thus, while aid was, by its nature, extremely interventionist in the conduct of an economy, this was par for the course in capitalist economic theory at the time.

### **Right-wing Support**

Right-wing aid supporters believed the provision of sufficient aid would ensure the retention of developing countries in the capitalist sphere, leading to greater prosperity for all through increased trade. Right wing theorists also believed that aid would provide the economic bridge required when drastic changes were implemented in the recipients' economy, such as stabilisation policies, or liberalisation programmes. An example of this was the aid provided by the United States while Taiwan implemented its massive land reform programme in the early 1950s (Grant and Nijman, 1986:21). Though right wing theorists no longer subscribe to the advisability of land reform.

---

<sup>17</sup> 'Modernist paradigm of development' (Grant and Nijman, 1986:6).

### **Left-wing Support**

The left-wing approach to a justification for aid was linked more to a growth in the 'power of the common man' through the growth of labour in the West, and a belief in all people's right to be able to maximise their life circumstances (Lumsdaine, 1993:45). There was also a growing awareness that the impacts of colonialism had had sufficient detrimental effects on Third World countries' previous economies as to necessitate assistance to enable them to regain lost ground. And advocates of aid also claimed that the higher incomes of the West were at the expense of poor countries (Bauer, 1971:102). Aid was seen as a form of international income redistribution. Aid was also seen by some left-wing economists as a way to assist Third World countries in gearing up their industries, to enable them to produce sufficient commodities to remove them from dependence on the West. This was achieved either directly in the form of concessionary loans for equipment and materials, or indirectly by filling the social welfare obligations of the government while it built up the economy. Support for aid was justified by pointing out the success stories of aid – immunisation programmes and famine relief (Grant and Nijman, 1998:21).

### **The New Right**

From the late 1980s, some right-wing theorists, under the influence of the *laissez faire* economic approach of Freeman and others of the Chicago School of Economics, became more comfortable lambasting the concept of aid, particularly bilateral aid, due to its involving the government in 'tinkering' with the economy. Aid of any origin is considered to be distortionary. While right-wing theorists are not generally so dogmatic as to discount the need for aid in times of crises such as cyclones, flood, droughts and so forth, many would prefer aid was not involved in development. Though there were some who did take a 'sink or swim' approach to the whole question of aid. For they see aid as detrimental to the economies of the Third World – pointing to the reduction in domestic savings that appears to attend the receipt of foreign aid. The claim is made that investment does not rise with aid, but consumption does. Greater weight is given to the lack of investment opportunities in such societies being the cause of low investment and savings – and this is believed to be caused by a lack of clear property rights, political instability, poor economic policies and the government's lack of credibility (Grant and Nijman, 1998:24). Only market discipline should direct investment choices (Grant and Nijman, 1998:25).



Their belief is that if main springs of development are not in a society, no amount of foreign aid will cause material progress to occur (Bauer, 1971:98). Right wing theorists oppose the use of aid for development as it results in a 'culture of dependency', and a 'politicised economic life through detailed government monopolisation of economy' (Adams and Solomon, 1991:154).

### **Left-wing Detractors**

Meanwhile, many left-wing people saw aid as a tool of the old imperialist order, enabling the previous imperialists to retain control over newly independent countries (Wall, 1973:9). Aid programmes were seen in the main as whetting the appetite of people in the developing countries for produce and commodities that could only be obtained in the West, especially through the avenue of tied aid. Aid was seen to be primarily available for projects that would not increase the developing countries' independence from the West. Ex-colonial countries' companies were seen to be subsidised through the provision of aid that supplied the necessary infrastructure and energy supply through the support of transportation networks and hydro electric schemes.<sup>18 19</sup> The prevalence of economic concern might be attributed more to Great Britain, Japan, Australia, Germany, and other Western Europe countries (Wall, 1973:46).<sup>20</sup> Concurrently, major developed countries erect substantial barriers against products from developing countries to whom the donors are giving aid – due to sectional interests in donor countries. Foreign aid reduces political resistance in recipient countries to donors' trade barriers (Bauer, 1971:102). Aid was also perceived as being a way for the United States to restrict the spread of capitalism, even if it entailed enabling undemocratic, militaristic despots to remain in power, to the degradation of the general living conditions of the bulk of the people (Wall, 1973:9). It was seen by some left-wing theorists as necessary for unjust leaders to suffer the political consequences of their policies, without the cushioning of aid. Aid has also been seen as 'inherently debilitating' (Adams and Solomon, 1991: 154). And the feeling amongst left wing theorists was that the focus on aid diverted attention from the basic causes of poverty and how to eradicate them (Bauer, 1971:101).

---

<sup>18</sup> Hydro-electric schemes involved relocation of many people (Adams and Solomon, 1991:20), and loss of fertile soils, leading to a dependence on petro-based fertilisers (Adams and Solomon, 1991:48).

<sup>19</sup> Development and affluence bring about desire for electrical services, not *vice versa* (Adams and Solomon, 1991:123).

<sup>20</sup> British House of Commons Select Committee: 'Commercial consideration alone would suffice to justify participation in the aid effort' (cited in Wall, 1973:47).

## **Pragmatists**

And between the extremes are right wing and left wing theorists of various backgrounds who believe aid can be of use to developing countries, as long as various provisos are met with. For the more right-wing, these provisos include an effort to set up the necessary economic infrastructure and institutions, without which, they believe, Third World economies can not develop – aid or no aid. For the left-wing, far more attention needs to be placed on the welfare of the poor – and how best to reach them, rather than the wealthier who are more practised at grabbing resources to themselves – ‘middle-class capture’ is not an exclusively Western phenomenon. Regardless of the political hue of people, most have instincts of charity and compassion, which is one of the reasons the majority of donors’ populaces are pro-aid (Adams and Solomon, 1991:156).

## **Benefits to Donors**

It has been argued that donors stand to obtain many benefits through providing aid to a country. Political motives behind aid may include placating donors’ populations, especially the more liberal and/or migrant sectors. Aid may be a political attempt to improve relations with recipients, fellow donors and multi-laterals (Grant and Nijman, 1998:6). Large donations are perceived to improve the donor’s national prestige and helps to cultivate great power status (Orr, 1990). Aid has been seen to be used as a diplomatic tool to exert political influence (Grant and Nijman, 1998:6). Aid has often been used in an attempt to gain influence with the recipient government, to obtain access to resources. And countries in strategic positions near trade routes or near countries hostile to the donor are likely to receive contributions to ensure a sympathetic reception of the donor’s entreaties in regard to the donor’s interests.<sup>21</sup> This may include hopes of influencing the vote of the recipient country in various international fora. In other cases aid is preferred by the donor to a trade based negotiation, as the ability to give or withhold aid offers the donor more power and legitimacy in the negotiation, than being a supplicant for resources or access does.<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>21</sup> America gave aid to countries in the Pacific on the understanding that access to the Islands’ ports would be denied to Soviet ships (Crocombe, 1995:114).

<sup>22</sup> A prime example of this is America insisting on perceiving its payments to island nations to fish in their Exclusive Economic Zones as aid, paying it through USAID – even though America would not think of describing the payments she receives from Taiwan for access to American EEC as aid (Crocombe, 1995:114). In 1993, the United States paid 11% of the value of the fish caught, while the

In many cases, aid was used to ensure the metropolis's businesses functioning in the developing countries continued to receive sympathetic treatment. To access aid, countries need to be good credit risks and have guaranteed sources of income, so governments offer incentives to gain contracts with foreign companies, especially heavily rebated electricity.<sup>23</sup> It has been claimed that aid may merely be a 'form of subsidy for international companies paid for by tax payment of the imperialist countries' (Hayter, 1971: 10).

There can also be major advantages to businesses within the donor country, when the aid is tied, that is, there is a requirement attached to the aid that all materials and expertise for the project the grant is funding be purchased in the donor country. Different countries have different rates of tied aid – the Scandinavian countries tie their aid least, the Japanese the most (Crocombe, 1995:125). New Zealand at 1992, spent 70% of its bilateral aid on New Zealand goods and services, though this aid is not officially tied (Crocombe, 1992:70). The use of tied aid can have two major drawbacks for the recipient countries. The first is that as the recipient country is required to purchase (or has purchased for them) from the donor country so they are prevented from shopping around for the best possible deal. Studies have shown that tied aid products are consistently 15 to 20% more expensive than equivalent products from other countries.<sup>24</sup> And tied aid 'experts' have been assessed as being some 25% more expensive, as those on the open market. As the companies in the donor countries are effectively being subsidised by the ODA sector of their government, they are usually unable to compete in the international arena subsequently – becoming more and more reliant on future aid contracts.<sup>25</sup> Yet studies have shown there is no link between tied aid and future purchases by recipient country (Adams and Solomon, 1991:54). And there have been claims made that technology is tried out on Third World countries before it is fully perfected. This was commented on by Mr Agarwal, director of India's Centre for Science and Environment; 'the list of immature

---

Asians paid 4 to 6% - a tacit acknowledgement by the States that they ought to have paid for access during the first ten years of EECs (Crocombe, 1995:114).

<sup>23</sup> Contracts enforced by foreign aid agencies who want loans repaid (for example, the World Bank which by 1990 had paid out \$US 100 billion –with no defaults) include the Kaiser and Reynolds company in Ghana, Amax in Zimbabwe and Alcan in Guinea – contracts for electricity were as low as 10% of the world rates (Adams and Solomon, 1991: 38 - 39).

<sup>24</sup> Canadian tied aid – costs extra 20% (1981) – (Adams and Solomon, 1991:52).

<sup>25</sup> More 23 supplies, for example, General Electric, Westinghouse – accounted for 75% of aid business (Adams and Solomon, 1991: 55).



technologies that developing countries have been pushed and cajoled into buying is long' (Adams and Solomon, 1991:133). Donor owned shipping ties have been shown to be 20% – 50% more expensive than commercially available transportation (Wall, 1973:21). The second problem tied aid presents to aid recipients is that they are unable to seek globally for the most appropriate equipment, and the technical assistance most familiar with their conditions. This has been illustrated by the case of inappropriate dam design in many Third World countries. Western 'experts' did not take into account the very different erosion rates of many Third World rivers – which caused some dams to be filled within fifteen to twenty years – often a third of their expected life span. And improperly designed and maintained irrigation systems are turning 1 ¼ million acres into desert every year (Adams and Solomon, 1991:43). Agricultural techniques developed for one region may cause damage in another (ibid:29).

Another motive for providing aid can be to preserve more resources for one's own citizens in the long run. This can occur where the populations of the assisted country have access to the donor country, which they would be likely to utilise if they are not assisted. This has been argued as a reason behind New Zealand providing so much assistance to the Pacific Islands with which New Zealand is in free association with, such as Niue, the Tokelau and the Cook Islands. Ron Crocombe comments that the costs of aid to those islands is less than providing similar numbers of islanders in New Zealand with the types of services provided here, such as Social Welfare benefits, health care and so on (Crocombe, 1992:70). And this would also go some way to explaining why there is such a differentiation in the level of aid provided to Samoa when compared to those islands, even though New Zealand was very involved in Samoa previously – Samoans do not have open access to New Zealand. Such a stance by the New Zealand government would appear to be supported by Maori according to a study on Maori attitudes to aid that revealed that most Maori felt aid should be given to the Pacific first to prevent Pacific Islanders coming to New Zealand for education, employment or otherwise (ibid:71).

### **Altruistic Motives**

Not all involved in giving aid have dubious motives. It has been argued that 'participants act to rule of thumb, not continuous calculations of self interest'(Grant

and Nijman, 1998:5). The existence of a hegemony – that is, one state dominating our international system politically, economically and culturally - is credited with this consensus in aid action – which currently favours market forces and export-led recovery and good governance (Grant and Nijman, 1998:5). It has been argued that while some aid was given in the hopes of gaining advantages for the donor, the initial impetus to give aid was generated as a result of a genuine wish to improve the lot of people in the Third World (Lumsdaine, 1993:31).<sup>26</sup> In New Zealand, 77% of the people questioned in a survey on aid said morality ought to be the reason for giving aid (Crocombe, 1992:71). The growth in international attitudes in wanting to assist the poor arose through the increasing power of labour in Western countries, which led to increasing welfare measures being enacted for the poorer people in Western countries. This was attended by increasing internationalism as a result of the World Wars and the formation of the League of Nations. These two factors welded together to create a sense of obligation in the West to assist the poor in other countries. Support for this theory is found through examining the donors who donated most (as a percentage of their GNP) – in the main they had extensive social welfare programmes for their own citizens (Lumsdaine, 1993:31). And Lumsdaine asserts that changes made in the tenor of aid since are instigated for the benefit of the recipients, rather than the donors (Lumsdaine, 1993:45). However, others argue those that attribute selfless motives to others are just not aware of ulterior motives behind their actions (Adams and Solomon, 1991:146).

It is my own contention that the reverse can hold true, and on occasion when security concerns are espoused by people instigating aid programmes, this stems more from an astute attempt to loosen government purse strings, than necessarily from a genuine paranoia on behalf of the applicant. I believe an example of this can be found with an NGO involved in the Pacific, the Foundation for peoples of the South Pacific (FSP), which was started in 1965 by Elizabeth Silverstein, an Australian actress married to the Chief Executive of Metro Goldwyn Mayer. FSP focused on small rural projects, and gained a reputation for being pragmatic and successful. Initially this NGO raised funds from rich New Yorkers, then it was a successful candidate for disbursing funds from USAID to the Pacific, commencing in the late 1970s,

---

<sup>26</sup> The number of donations made for donors' motivation has been estimated by David Lumsdaine as a third of total aid given (Lumsdaine, 1993:31).

eventually involving a total of US\$20 million. In 1986, Elizabeth Silverstein addressed a review committee that FSP was 'carrying the banner for USA ... counterpoint to Soviet initiatives'. I believe this was a valiant attempt to ensure continuation of funding, and this view is supported by the way Silverstein promptly reorganised the organisation on the ending of USAID funding, so it carried on being a viable entity, now funded primarily by its Australian, Canadian and British chapters.<sup>27</sup>

### **Benefits for Recipients**

Aid recipients have many reasons for accepting aid. In some cases, natural disaster or war has made urgent economic intervention vital to maximise the chances of survival for the victims. In other cases, the recipient government has an economic development programme that requires foreign assistance to implement it. Or concomitant access to the donor country's markets is sought. Or the recipient country shares the donor country's paranoia of its rival power, and the recipient country wants to show its alignment with the donor country's political shading. In short, 'poor countries seek for aid because of the urgency of their need' (Nyerere, 1974:9). This need is seen as arising from the situation the donors created in the first place – the patterns of exploitation initiated during the period of colonialism, are seen by many in the Third World as continuing beyond independence. '(Aid) is in compensation for continuing exploitation,...on a historical basis and ... inherent injustice involved in the present international trading and monetary systems' (Nyerere, 1974:7) and (Wall, 1973:108). This is seen to arise from the primary produce based economy of most developing nations leading to diminishing terms of trade as 'industrialised nations are able to control the price at which they sell and the price at which they buy. Further, many countries (in the West) protect their agriculture by quota and tariff systems. But when poor countries seek to process their primary commodities before selling them on the world market they find even more restrictions' (Nyerere, 1974:7-8). While internal discrepancies in income can be adjusted with compensatory taxation and benefits, the only mechanism whereby international discrepancies in income can be addressed is through aid (Nyerere, 1974:8) and (Wall, 1973:6). As well as this imbalance in countries' incomes brought about through iniquitous trade, it is also perceived as a duty of the West to assist poorer countries due to our shared humanity

---

<sup>27</sup> Information from Cocombe, 1995:104-105, supposition my own.

(Nyerere, 1974:8). And the way developing nations perceive the West's best interests – how can the West expect to be secure in its prosperity if others are going without? Another perception of the West's self-interest arises from the observation that if one's customers are not destitute, one becomes more prosperous. Aid, it is felt by its recipients, should be given as an expression of partnership. Aid is seen by many in the developing world as achieving genuine advancement for its recipients – 'aid can make a great contribution to development ... a possible catalyst for local development, and a supplement ... to the efforts we are ourselves making for development' (Nyerere, 1974:11). However, this comes with the important proviso that the aid funds the type of development wanted by the recipients – 'aid which works against our social objectives is a new kind of Imperialism' (Nyerere, 1974:7-8). Also; foreign aid should be used 'solely to benefit the recipient peoples' (Adams and Solomon, 1991:161). As to aid allocation, there is a strong belief amongst leaders of developing nations that just as poverty has no ideology, nor should the aid given to conquer it. 'our independence is not for sale' (Nyerere, 1974:12). However, being realists, there is a realisation that preferences develop – and it is accepted that where donor countries have historical and/or geographical links with particular developing nations, their needs will be addressed first. And the rationality behind donors gravitating towards developing countries to whom their resources and skills makes them of most use is also acknowledged (Nyerere, 1974:13).

### **Country Comparisons**

Scandinavians are known for their generosity with overseas development assistance, consistently voting one of the largest proportions of their GDP towards ODA, of most developed countries. They also have the least amount of funding tied to their own products and services. And they appear to be least affected by political or strategic considerations in their allocations of aid. However, the volume of aid received from them by South Pacific countries is rather nominal.<sup>28</sup>

---

<sup>28</sup> While Scandinavian countries have a good reputation for aid without ulterior motives, it has been argued that they, along with Austria, Belgium and Italy primarily give aid to be on side with richer donors – to be seen to be sharing the burden of aid (Wall, 1973:48). However, as disproportionately more of the GDPs of these countries are devoted to aid than the wealthy countries', it would appear that genuine concern for poorer countries is the determinant.

Americans have always been fairly open about their primary objective in the giving of aid – initially the containment of communist influence, and now, with that no longer being a factor, as a stabiliser where the Americans see it is most needed (including ex-Soviet Russia and its old satellite states). However important a plank overseas aid was seen to be in their total foreign policy, the Americans never spent a very large percentage of their GNP on it. While America went through a stage of channelling much of its ODA funding through multilateral conduits and contracting NGOs to deliver its projects as a cost-cutting exercise, it has since reverted to more bilateral payments, as this gives America more leverage with the country concerned. In relation to aid, America moved into the South Pacific when in 1967, the Samoan Prime Minister, Fiamē Mata'afa, on being turned down for aid from America, commented he might the communist countries, which resulted in the supply of American assistance in very short order. The King of Tonga's invitation to the USSR to construct a port also served to concentrate the American's attention on the South Pacific, and for some time United States aid was given to the South Pacific.<sup>29</sup> However such aid while minuscule in terms of America's total aid bill, was also very small of the total aid given to the Pacific – 3% of the total. On the disintegration of the Soviet Union, America, to a large extent, pulled out of the South Pacific – most visibly with the shutting of Pacific offices of USAID. 'The region no longer needs to be wooed and won politically' (Albinski, 1993:14).

Japan is now one of the largest donors in terms of volume of aid received in each country, and she gives aid to more than 140 countries. Japan's primary motives are described as humanitarian and world stability. Throughout history, trading nations have relied on stability to function and maximise profits.<sup>30</sup> While Western countries put the greatest emphasis on gearing up to process a country's resources, including cash cropping (using the resource of land), Japan's own experience of having to build an economy in a relatively resource deficient country, has led her to emphasise the need to develop human resources. This has resulted in a large amount of her aid being devoted to technical training and advice. While overall, some 50% of Japan's aid is in the form of grants rather than loans, in the South Pacific, some 80% of her aid is in

---

<sup>29</sup> As the King of Tonga remarked; "Just mention Russians and they run" (Crocombe, 1995:121).

<sup>30</sup> It was the stability acquired by the conquering of all China, Russia and most of Europe by Ghengis and Kublai Khan which enabled Europeans to trade with Asia, to the benefit of both (Time, Dec 1999).



the form of grants. (Sasaki, 1993:E7.1). This has probably arisen through the precedent of Australia and New Zealand's aid being predominantly in the form of grants to this region.

## **Conclusion**

Through the last half of last century, there were different bodies of opinion regarding the efficacy of aid and the best way to administer it. The effectiveness of aid was impacted on by the motivation of the donor, which would appear to rarely have had only the recipients' best interests at heart. Even where the motivations have been primarily of an altruistic nature, the economic approach of the donor could not but impact on the design of the aid packages provided. And sheer expediency (particularly a consideration where the aid is destined for emergency relief) often appeared to necessitate minimal consultation with the recipients and reliance on the donors' best judgment. The following chapter will deal with assisted housing, which in Third World countries is often funded through bi-lateral aid.

**ASSISTED HOUSING**



## **Introduction**

This chapter focuses on one of the destinations of bilateral aid – the provision of housing. This involves addressing the involvement of governments of the Third World in the provision of housing for their citizens, usually through the mechanism of bilateral aid. This dependence on external funding led to the history of government provided housing in the Third World being bound up with the West's economic and development theories through this time. This financial dependence led to the West having input in the design of not only the policies but the also the design of the housing of the Third World. This design input of the West had a particular impact on women, as discussed in this chapter. This chapter concludes with a discussion on the extent of the West's influence on the take-up of Western materials and technology in the Third World, and also considers whether this take-up is actually predominantly the result of preferences exhibited by individuals in the Third World.

It needs to be stressed that beyond general parameters common to Third World housing policies and practices, 'the issues take on specific features that require historical consideration of the underlying interplay of particular (inter) national and local forces' (van Vliet, 1987:277). Housing projects derived from a model such as Turner, Marxist or Monetarist, are not likely to succeed unless detailed studies are made of locally specific economic, demographic, social, political and cultural aspects (van Vliet, 1987:278).

For many Third World governments, providing shelter for their citizens was not of utmost priority. Traditionally, with the bulk of the population in rural areas, people had been able to provide themselves with adequate shelter – land often being provided by landlords under pre-capitalist arrangements (Gilbert and van Linden, 1987:129). Or, as in Polynesian societies, land was available through inheritance. The people used traditional methods and utilised local materials – producing housing variously termed artisanal, indigenous, vernacular or peasant housing. It has only been with the growth in urban migration, coupled with the westernisation of tastes in housing (Burgess, 1985:297) that the provision of housing became to be perceived as a necessity and an activity for the state. However, many Third World governments

still consider housing to be an unproductive investment, and are more focused on other expenditure, such as the military (van Vliet, 1987:272).

### **Urban Housing**

Most of the literature available on Third World housing focuses on the housing needs of the burgeoning urban populations resulting from migration from rural areas. There is a particular wealth of studies on the experience of such people in South American cities. These experiences are mirrored in those of the people in many urban areas in Pacific Island countries, as evidenced in Suva and Port Moresby. However, this thesis deals with the housing issues of people in Manihiki, and rural people on Upulo, which are village based communities, rather than urban per se. Nevertheless, the many studies based in South America often provide illustrative examples of trends in economic and development theories over the years, and often provided the impetus for these trends. These studies also show the concomitant evolution of Third World governments' involvement in the provision of housing for their citizens, which is pertinent to the topic of this thesis.

### **Squatter Settlements**

The studies in South American countries focused on people who formed large squatter settlements on unutilised land, usually on the periphery of cities. The urban migration occurs as a result of the migrants attempting to improve their opportunities. Most Third World rural areas have 'a higher proportion of very poor people, offer fewer and less adequate services and have more limited opportunities for well-paid work (than urban areas)' (Gilbert and Gugler, 1992:34).<sup>31</sup> Urban-rural disparities are more obvious in countries with some industrial and commercial development (ibid). The migrants usually worked in the informal sector on reaching the cities, and while often earning more than unskilled workers in the formal sector, their irregularity of income precluded them from obtaining housing finance within the orthodox market, leading them to resort to land invasions and squatting (van Vliet, 1987:270). Usually they built a very basic shelter using cheap (and usually impermanent) materials (such as plastic, cardboard, scrap timber) initially. A dwelling erected adjacent to the first one would then be worked on progressively. This dwelling would be built with more

---

<sup>31</sup> Brazil – 1980 – 80% of urban people have piped water, but only 5% of rural people (Gilbert and Gugler, 1992:115).

durable (and more labour intensive) materials – such as corrugated iron, masonry and timber framing.

These large squatter settlements, with their sprawling, shabby appearance, caught the attention of the governments of many Western countries. At this period, during the 1950s and 1960s, the modernisation approach to development held full sway, and the dilapidated appearance of the squatter settlements were not conducive to the aspirations of many emergent nations to join the ‘modern world’. The elites in many Third World countries aspired to housing styles of the West (Angel and Benjamin, 1976:20). Governments and social commentators perceived these squatter settlements to be a health risk, an eyesore and a political embarrassment. Such dwellings were not perceived to be appropriate for a country gearing up to follow western countries’ pattern of industrialisation. Moriss Jupenlatz, a town planner, stated in 1970 that, ‘Squatter society (had) no training in ... city maintenance (leading to) breakdown and collapse’ (Peattie and Aldrete-Haas, 1981:158). While Richard Morse felt the city, a ‘citadel of high culture’ was being invaded by a mass of uncultured people (ibid). Calls came to replace such housing with public housing (Bonilla, 1962, and Pearse, 1961). Third World governments were increasingly facing the ‘double bind’ of not wanting to ‘alienate the powerful, nor being able to evict the many’ (Angel and Benjamin, 1976:21). Increasingly, many Third World governments began to see public housing as a politically plausible way to circumvent that double bind.

### **Public Housing**

Increasing pressure was put on Third World governments during this period by western governments to eradicate ‘slums’ (squatter settlements) and replace them with public housing. At this time, western governments were rehousing their own citizens from older housing stock (such as the nineteenth century terrace housing in Britain) into apartment blocks, which were perceived to be healthier (as they were more modern), and an economical way of housing their growing populations. Ulterior motives have been ascribed to the donor countries in encouraging Third World countries in undertaking state housing schemes, as loans for housing from donor countries were often tied to the donor country’s companies and products being used. For example, USAID encourages Third World countries to take loans to finance

housing programs – and tends to endorse housing plans that include imports from US firms and governments (such as pre-fabricated housing), and prefers US consultants over citizens of the host country (arguing that the former are more competent). There are assertions that the pressure on western countries to promote housing schemes in Third World countries stemmed from interests dominating the capitalist system. This theory attributes those interests with a role in angling for resources to be directed to potentially radical low-income groups to prevent revolution and retain the Third World country within its dependent position in the capitalist sphere. There is also a concern that a primary motive of the western funders in promoting state funded housing is to keep reproduction costs low so the profits of multi-national corporations can be kept high (Portes and Walton, 1981:300). There were often political motivations behind western countries bilateral aid programmes, as discussed in the chapter on aid. An example of this was the United State's attempts to assist people attain basic needs in Latin America during the 1960s that were motivated by attempts to curb unrest after Cuba's revolution (Handelman, 1988:327).

The slum clearances conducted as a prelude to the building of new public housing often resulted in overcrowding in neighbouring slums. This was not rectified by the completion of the public housing as the new units were never able to house as many as the squatter settlements had – in Malaysia, only half those evicted from their 'slum' were rehoused in the resulting public housing (Rondinelli, 1990:154). This occurred as public housing in Third World countries employed very expensive imported technology and materials, so the governments of these countries tried to trim costs. A contributing factor towards the expense of such housing stemmed from the requirements of the Third World countries' own building standards; these were imported in many cases from Western countries, usually from their former colonising powers.<sup>32 33</sup> One of the ways that Third World governments sought to mitigate the expense of such housing was to construct units of a standardised plan and of minimal

---

<sup>32</sup> Turner found that 'modern' housing standards actually bans all low-cost construction, so therefore such official policies were found to be counterproductive (Lomintz, 1977).

<sup>33</sup> Rondinelli concluded that for housing to become affordable, building standards needed to be decreased (Rondinelli, 1990:262).

size. Such restrictions on living space were found to be detrimental to the residents' peace of mind and ability to socialise.<sup>34 35</sup>

Public housing in the form of high-rise apartments was also thought to lead to savings on land by increasing population densities. Savings were also thought to accrue through utilising modern technology. However, several studies have since shown that the same population densities can be achieved with three to four storied buildings as they do not have to be as far apart as high rises to achieve sufficient air and sunshine for the residents (Angel and Benjamin, 1976:20). And a Scottish study has revealed maintenance costs for tall buildings are two and half times as expensive as those for low buildings (ibid). Public housing that attempts to shave costs by using the same unit design repeatedly over a large area has led to a very bland, uniform urban environment in some areas, resulting in a feeling of alienation in the residents, expressed through vandalism (ibid).

Many attempts to defray the cost of housing the very poor actually resulted in capture by the middle classes of government-subsidised housing projects. The requirement that future residents provide a deposit precluded many of the poor, who could not get sufficient monies together, due to the ongoing costs of their existing accommodation and accessing services.<sup>36</sup> Another attempt made by many Third World countries to reduce the costs of providing housing was made through having strict repayment schedules. This was often found to be too onerous for poor people to keep to, particularly as many were reliant on irregular income from informal employment. This difficulty was often compounded by the location of government housing that often necessitated having to pay for transport back to their area of

---

<sup>34</sup> In Ecuador, women chose their self-built split-bamboo houses rather than the brick houses of a World Bank project, that were half the size. The women said it was a nightmare to have to bring up children in such a confined space, particularly given the tropical climate of the city (Moser, 1987, cited in *The Tribune*, 1987:17).

<sup>35</sup> Pressures on land and aspirations to western style homes resulted in minimal courtyard areas, which prevented women's social life, resulting in some cases of psychological depression, neuroses and even suicide among women (*The Tribune*, 1987:16).

<sup>36</sup> In Ecuador, in a Solanda low-income housing project it was found 91% of the female heads-of-households were unable to afford the deposit (*The Tribune*, 1987:12) And a third of all households worldwide are headed by women (*The Tribune*, 1987:7).



employment.<sup>37</sup> This frequently led to poor people selling their homes to middle-class families. As a result, the government ends up subsidising middle-class housing, rather than providing housing for the genuinely poor.

### **Socialist Countries Housing Schemes**

In socialist Third World countries any investment in housing leads to a large (and permanent) outflowing of resources, as socialist ideology sees housing as either an entitlement or a public good, preventing the recouping of the monies expended (van Vliet, 1987:273). Usually in Socialist countries, education and health receive greater priority in allocation of government budgets than housing. However, in some Socialist countries housing is seen as a 'tool of economic policies' and part of an approach to encourage urban and rural development, as shown in Cuba's approach discussed below.

Cuba and Nicaragua are two socialist countries that met the challenge of housing their people as follows. In Cuba, which became a communist government in 1959, the first thing the government did in relation to housing was to prohibit private rentals, with only limited compensation to landlords. The government charged less than 10% of the residents' income in rent, with no rent required from people earning less than US\$25.00 a month. Alternatively, tenants could buy the homes they rented by continuing to pay to the government the rent they had been paying the private landlord and they would own the home outright after five to twenty-five years. By 1972, 75% of Cubans owned homes. Cuba also built state housing for the urban poor, primarily in rural and provincial cities. As these were based on western, 'middle class' designs, being predominantly apartment blocks, far fewer were constructed than had been hoped (Handelman, 1988:339). Nicaragua became communist in 1979. Initially low-rise units were built with communal areas (Williams, 1985), with the government rejecting sites and services programmes as promoting individualism, however, economic necessity and pragmatism won out. By 1982 there were twice as many 'sites and services' sections commissioned as there were units built (Handelman, 1988:339).

---

<sup>37</sup> In India, 700,000 squatters were relocated to the outskirts of a city, into seventeen settlements. In one settlement, 5% of the men, and 27% of the women had lost employment through the shift (The Tribune, 1987:15).



## Basic Needs

By the late 1960s, as outlined in the chapter on aid, people were disenchanted with the lack of equity achieved through slavish adherence to the dictates of modernisation theory through the 1950s and 1960s. This re-examination of the appropriate approach to development led to a call for the emphasis to be placed on improving people's access to basic needs, first and foremost. These basic needs were defined as food, access to safe water, clothing and *shelter*. One of the advocates of basic needs was Paul Streeten. The provision of basic needs was not just a welfare concern, but a contributor to productivity (Streeten, 1981:3). Difficulties in accessing housing was attributed to barriers to their 'acquisition of land or because titles are uncertain or because they lack access to mortgage finance' (Streeten, 1981:42). The provision of basic needs, while able to be measured with discrete, concrete objectives, could entail an evaluation in relation to the level of shelter, education and nutrition of the local population – 'how the poor themselves perceive their deprivation is also relevant' (Streeten, 1981:19). And again, basic needs are perceived from 'the reference group from which the poor take their standards of what comprises the necessities for a decent minimum standard of living' (ibid). Yet it was not Streeten's belief that such a viewpoint originated from envy, but rather from 'an almost biological basic need' to experience a sense of belonging to the wider community, felt most immediately by shared conditions (ibid).

In regards to the provision of shelter, it was evident by this stage that the governments of most Third World countries were unable to provide the bulk of their poor urban population with public houses. As these units were built as per Western standards, which were emulated in many Third World country's codes, they were often inappropriate to the local conditions and the construction technology employed required sophisticated equipment and highly skilled operatives which raised costs (Rondinelli, 1990:262). High interest rates and spiralling building material costs at this time also impacted on the quality and quantity of housing, or excluded an increasingly large proportion of the poorest people from accessing the housing market (Burgess, 1985:277). There were also examples of elitist attitudes in bureaucracies in the allocation of housing, with the poorest missing out, as they were perceived as being unlikely to keep up payments – although empirical research has proved a very

high rate of repayment among such strata. With the notable exception of Singapore and Hong Kong, most Third World governments had not managed to house more than a small fraction of their urban population in public housing (van Vliet, 1987:275).

### **Change in Perception of Poor**

Up until this time, public policy impacting on the poor, including any pertaining to housing, was based on the premise that poor people were the result of a 'culture of poverty' (Lewis, 1966). This belief necessitated the government intervening in poor peoples' lives, and providing housing, as they were perceived as being trapped by apathy, fatalism and a lack of aspirations. 'Poor's own fault they're poor' (Gilbert and Gugler, 1992:118). However, by the late 1960s, there was a growing appreciation in the west of the competence of the poor, the 'rationality of the poor' (ibid).

This was disseminated through the writings of Abrams (1964), Mangin (1967) and Turner (1967, 1969), whose studies amongst poor people in South American countries had led them to that conclusion. 'The rejection of the myth of the culture of poverty led to a change in housing policy' (Gilbert and Gugler, 1992:118). Calls began to be made to support the efforts of the poor to help themselves in their efforts to house themselves (Abrams, 1964, 1965, also Turner, 1965, 1967).<sup>38</sup>

### **Turner and Sites and Services**

John Turner was an anarchist British architect, who stressed the importance of seeing house building as an ongoing process, rather than a discrete activity. He condemned public housing as being too standardised to be able to address the diverse needs of the individuals living in them, or to be able to suit the evolving composition of a family over time. He also perceived public housing as being of 'high quality, high cost' but with dubious use value. He claimed administration costs of public housing schemes could be as much as 20% of the cost of the houses – and designers of the schemes employed middle class ideological concepts. The results, according to Turner, were, 'aesthetically hideous, socially alienating and technologically incompetent architecture' (Burgess, 1987:290). The unsuitability of the end product to

---

<sup>38</sup> The United Nations sponsored conferences on this topic in Pittsburgh, 1966, Columbia 1970, and Vancouver, 1976 (Peattie and Aldrete-Haas, 1981:159).

the user was shown by the large amount of changes made to the units on completion – removing walls, enlarging windows, changing the function of the rooms (Burgess, 1987:296).

Turner legitimised and popularised the squatters' approach to housing themselves – his field work in squatter settlements in South American countries negated previous stereotypes – 'dynamic improvements to dwellings' were described (Turner, 1963, 1965, 1967). Fieldwork undertaken by Mangin in 1967 led to his describing the squatter settlements as a 'process of social reconstruction through popular initiative' (Peattie and Aldrete-Haas, 1981:159). Turner urged Third World governments to give squatters tenure and extend services to them such as water reticulation, sewage removal and electricity provision.

Turner's assertions were seen as a timely solution to the vexatious problem of how to economically house the world's urban poor – or at least those in Third World countries (Nientied and van der Linden, 1988:140). International funders, such as the World Bank, urged Third World governments to adopt a 'sites and services' approach. The espoused objective of the international funders was to slow down urban migration and assist rural development. However, it has been claimed that they were attracted to 'sites and services' and self help projects as they brought slum dwellers into 'the formal housing market, encouraging property ownership and strengthening the market mechanism' (Angel, 1983:17). The projects tended to be set up by the World Bank as pilot schemes to illustrate the necessary procedure to be followed, and provide institutional training to relevant government personnel (World Bank, 1972, as cited in Ward and Macoloo, 1992). The overwhelming majority of such schemes have been funded through international sponsorship, (principally the World Bank and USAID) and the project specifications would appear to be guided by these agencies' criteria – primarily those of uniformity and standardisation (Burgess, 1987:140).

Sites and services projects are cited as being advantageous to Third World governments as they enable governments to establish order over an unplanned area of the city. The projects are also claimed to increase population densities which in turn leads to lower infrastructural and service costs – though an increase in population densities also occurs in self-built settlements, as tenancies are built and let on the

original squatters' land. The efficiencies to be gained under a sites and services scheme were such that those who would 'reject settlements on principle may come to adapt to them out of expediency' (Peattie and Aldrete-Haas, 1981:159).<sup>39</sup>

### **Burgess' Concerns with Sites and Services**

The sites and services approach began to achieve increasing dominance in Third World governments and international funding agencies treatment of the housing issue. However, a neo-Marxist, Rod Burgess argued that state self-help housing could only palliate housing shortages. It would not impact on the capitalist interests dependent on the capitalist mode of production which reinforce the structural inequalities leading to the housing problem in the first place – indeed, his concern was these interests may even profit from the sites and services approach (Burgess, 1985:299). Burgess asserted this occurred through the provision of cheap reproduction costs for labour (lower wages would be required to cover their accommodation costs). He also felt that the sites and services approach were an ideological means to quieten the demands of the poor and reduce the attendant risks of revolt (Burgess, 1985:298). For Burgess, the origins of the housing problem stemmed from the commodity status of housing, the search for profit by various sources of capital tied into the housing process, the inequitable distribution of income, and the transmission of the ideology of private property and consumption (Burgess, 1985:276).

Burgess acknowledged that capitalist relations of production are less fully formed in Third World countries, which tend to be dependent capitalist social formations (on the periphery of the world market) and some pre-capitalist relations (such as bartering) do persist in these countries. However, he argues that they are subordinate to the dominant capitalist relations of production and exchange (Burgess, 1987:141). While self-builders are able to build at often less than half the cost the Government can, he said they have not escaped capitalism – they are merely in another part of it – a petty sphere of circulating capital (Burgess, 1987:56). Thus, while self-built housing is not produced for exchange, it is not outside of the process of commodity formation. The materials the self-builder uses have an intrinsic

---

<sup>39</sup> As in the example from Nicaragua, cited above.

exchange value due to the labour that has gone into making those commercial goods (whether they are tiles, corrugated iron or cement) and when these materials are assembled into housing by the labour of the self-builder value is added to them. Burgess feels this point is overlooked by Turner with his emphasis on the 'use-value' of such housing, arguing that one person's use-value is another person's exchange value (Burgess, 1987:51). Burgess says the distinction is between housing as a '*real* commodity and housing as a *potential* commodity'.

To Burgess, the industrialised housing form, assisted by the state, will always attempt to articulate the petty-commodity form in the way that best suits its own interests (ibid). And Burgess' concern is that the sites and services approach is more likely to provide such interests with a handy conduit than otherwise. An example of this would be the state extending loans for these schemes, as the laws of capitalist development govern the allocation and recovery of the funds (Burgess, 1985:293).

Other ways the state facilitates capitalism penetration is by favouring western processes over traditional or indigenous ones, such as through 'land regularisation, fiscal policies and demands that the costs of installation and consumption should be recovered in full' (Ward and Macoloo, 1992:66). It will always be in the state's best interest, Burgess asserts, to seek to increase the numbers of property owners, as it will result in more people being eligible for taxes, integrated into the property market, with an attendant increase of savings through investments in home improvements (Burgess, 1985:298).

But Burgess' primary point of dispute with the concept of sites and services is that such measures (even if unintentionally) reinforce the status quo of inequality and capitalist dominance. Whereas left alone, the mass of the people would be expected by Burgess to revolt and overthrow the system (Kioe-Sheng, 1981). The city was widely perceived amongst western commentators as having a modernising and soothing influence on political life. This perception enabled governments to potter around with traditional or reformist schemes, avoiding altering structural causes of such poverty as this belief led to the assumption that if people were not overthrowing the government, they were basically content with their lot. However, W.A. Cornelius asserted that the urban poor were too concerned with meeting basic needs to focus on



possible structural causes of their poverty. His assertion was that political leadership had to come from outside the poor – and then only within a supportive political environment (Cornelius 1969, 1973, 1974 as cited in Kusnetzoff, 1975:283).<sup>40</sup> The urban poor tended to attribute any frustrations to non-structural conditions (personal failings, bad luck) or to quasi-structural conditions (such as unemployment and inflation). To achieve structural change, leftist parties would need to attempt a ‘transformation of basic needs into an understanding of the structural origins of poverty and the need for class solidarity’ (Kusnetzoff, 1975:284).

Burgess’ claims have been refuted with some commentators stressing that his interpretations of capitalism are able to explain both the ‘grinding down of the working class by authoritarian governments and the improvement of the conditions for the poor. ‘Nothing is precluded, nothing is explained’ (Gilbert and Ward, 1972 as cited in Murison and Lea, 1979). Burgess’ claim that the new owners become incorporated into the capitalist market needs to be offset, it is claimed, against the radical redistribution of land that occurs with the granting of title to the land the squatter claims (Nientied and van der Linden, 1988:142).

### **Attempts to Improve Sites and Services Schemes**

While this ideological battle was fought out in numerous publications, the potential efficiencies possible through sites and services schemes led to persistent attempts to achieve the best possible outcome with them. Increasingly, people working on the ground were concluding that an improvement in housing would assist the poor, and studies were showing some of these benefits were direct and monetary. Field research, for instance, in Mexico, had revealed that squatters were paying as much for materials for illegal hook ups to services and in payment to water carriers and so on, as they were required to pay to be legally hooked up to services (Ward and Macoloo, 1992:62). It has been asserted that only by ignoring the question of services, could one possibly argue that artisanal houses are superior to housing built under sites and services schemes as sites and services schemes lead to the participants’ houses being materially improved (Gilbert and van Linden, 1987:132). And again, ‘self-help

---

<sup>40</sup> This position was reinforced by research by Porte that revealed that peripheral urban migrants were not politically radical – they even experienced a minor stream of upward mobility, paradoxically through the intervention of leftist organisations.



schemes usually improve material standards' (Berger, 1974, cited in Murison and Lea, 1979:51).

This was because by the beginning of the 1980s it was realised that the argument was of 'little help to the people in slums and squatter settlements' (Mathey, 1992:385).<sup>41</sup> In many countries, a lack of resources, and/or a disinclination on the part of many governments to take responsibility for housing for its citizens, has led to the 'institutionalisation of insecure and inadequate housing and living conditions (Kothari, 1997:6). Increasingly, the verdict was being reached by many commentators that if 'sites and services' schemes did not actually prevent a more 'equitable solution for the poor', then as they were perceived to usually 'improve material standards' they ought to be pursued (Murison and Lea, 1979:51). What schemes already in existence were assessed and improvements sought in subsequent ones (Mathey, 1992:385). Studies by Denis Dwyer in the early 1970s had concluded that Latin America's experience was not easily transferred to Asia, where sanitary improvements were rated higher than improved housing, due to floods and the higher risk of infections (ibid). Where the scheme came about through agitation by the residents themselves some of the anomalies experienced through the schemes were thought to be more easily overcome as the scheme tended to be more decentralised in design and administration. This came about through the project being able to follow the wishes of residents more closely than projects that were imposed on a settlement by the authorities. When squatter settlements are upgraded through a sites and services scheme, the repositioning of the residents, to facilitate the incorporation of roads for access and the laying of services, needed to occur in full consultation with the residents for as satisfactory an outcome as possible (Angel, 1983:5).

One commentator has stressed that government should not be involved directly in the construction process, as has happened in many 'sites and services' schemes – the extent the government became involved in the construction of the units themselves varied greatly from scheme to scheme (Ward, 1976:345). What savings the government could provide with standardisation were usually lost to administration costs (ibid). But the government ought to be supporting the construction process

---

<sup>41</sup> Close to 1.2 billion people survive in housing and living conditions that are unhealthy and precarious, including more than 100 million who are completely homeless (Kothari, 1997:5).

through such measures as providing the owners with access to credit, technical assistance, cheap building materials and prefabricated items (ibid). Another commentator recommended the government enabling small private contractors (the builders of most of the housing in the Third World) access to the sites and services contracts, by breaking the contract up into smaller contracts that these small operators would be able to execute (Rondinelli, 1990:154).<sup>42</sup> Working capital for these small firms, replacing current standards with more appropriate ones, allowing low cost materials and providing craft training are other ways the governments may assist (ibid). At all times the Third World governments should endeavour to avoid 'interfering in the auto-constructive process', though at the same time attempting to stimulate home improvement (Ward, 1976: 345). Pursuing these measures would lead to the government being more of a facilitator and enabler than it's being a provider.

Difficulties with sites and services projects have occurred where the government requires the residents to obtain the full loan for the registration of the land in the resident's name, and for the provision of services. This differs from the squatters' experience with self-build, when the building progresses as the funds become available. The government's requirement for the residents to uplift the total loan initially has caused difficulties for some in meeting the repayments, leading to foreclosure, or forced sale, and the loss of the home (Burgess, 1987:143). ). However, an unnecessary expense for the home-owners occurred when the governments did not allow them to reside in the incomplete structures – necessitating travel and extra accommodation costs, and reducing the time able to be spent building on site (Burgess, 1985:289). The location of the sites and services scheme also had a direct impact on the success of it – when the sites were isolated, it was difficult for the owners to be able to pursue their income generating activities while building their homes.

In most self-help projects, the state designs the house and the settlement (Burgess, 1985:296). This results in the 'separation of the design function from the self-builder' that leads to houses that do not fit the residents' lifestyles and does not utilise local materials (ibid). As stated by Shlomo Angel, 'people have a right to

---

<sup>42</sup> 'Current aid programmes have been estimated to contribute altogether less than 2% in the case of assistance for human settlements' (UNCHS, 1995).

participate in important decisions that affect their lives. Beyond that, people are experts on the subject of their community and possess valuable and useful knowledge that could contribute substantially to good decision making on infrastructure' (Angel, 1983:14).

However, even if sufficient consideration is given to the above concerns, a comparison of different sites and services projects by Rondinelli led him to conclude the only way to ensure such projects remained affordable was if the improvements were incorporated gradually using local materials. And even then this was difficult to achieve where there was high inflation (Rondinelli, 1990:154). Where the schemes were dependant on tied aid, with imported materials, the affordability of the scheme was directly affected.

While sites and services projects of the 1970s and 1980s were three to five times less expensive than public housing, they remained pilot projects run by international funders, not being utilised in an extensive way by Third World governments themselves (Rondinelli, 1990:154). Part of the explanation for this was that while the Third World governments were able to 'visibly help the poor' through sites and services projects without major outlay (Angel, 1983:5), they got larger political benefits from major construction projects (Angel, 1983:16). Other contributing factors to the small uptake of sites and services projects by Third World governments were as follows. There are insufficient professionals able to design and manage the projects, a lack of inexpensive (appropriate) technology, public bureaucracies being unwilling to permit community design and implementation, ineffective information dissemination about what works best and weak financial institutions for obtaining low interest loans (Rondinelli, 1990:154). Inefficient planning by the state and inter-bureaucratic rivalries were also cited as obstacles to a wider adoption of sites and services projects (Burgess, 1985:290).

### **Monetarist Theory and Housing Policy**

Another change in wider development thinking led to a difference in the approach to providing housing for the poor. By the late 1970s, there was a growth in criticism about self-help programmes on ideological, economic and political grounds as outlined above (Ward, 1982). This was coupled with a cooling of enthusiasm of the

World Bank as it became apparent that self-help programmes were not 'meeting the needs of the poorest' (Keare and Pariss, 1982, as cited in Ward and Macoloo, 1992:60). Also the World Bank had become increasingly dominated by the monetarist liberal philosophy. This philosophy had gained ascendancy in economic and political thought by the late 1970s in Britain and the United States. The monetarists emphasised individual responsibility and allowing the market to rule – which in relation to housing translated into reducing subsidies and the direct provision of housing by governments to a minimum (Baken and van der Linden, 1993:4). It was thought that the private sector would raise the supply of cheap housing if governments would promote necessary interventions such as the lessening of standards in materials and construction, and ensuring a supportive tax regime. However, it has been claimed that while deregulation may well lower production costs, if land becomes scarce due to hoarding, lower house prices will not necessarily result (Baken and van der Linden, 1992:13). The emphasis was on putting accountability for housing onto local authorities (which were often also adopting a *laissez faire* philosophy). These measures were thought to potentially lead to greater cost recovery of infrastructure and housing provision (Linn, 1983, Gilbert, 1986). The neo-liberal ideology involved handing basic service delivery systems over to the private sector (USAID, 1988 (internal document, unpublished) as cited in Klak, 1992:92).

This approach to housing was seen to be far too simplistic for the property market, which was thought by some commentators as being the 'least efficient' market of all, with the imperfect knowledge of buyers and sellers and the uniqueness of each site.' It was also claimed that the immobility of the resources, the labyrinth process of transferring property and the monopoly powers of the regulatory authority and mortgage institutions introduces distorting factors into the market. However, it was considered unlikely that the World Bank would be able to have much impact on the bulk of the property transactions in the Third World, which take place outside any legal procedures (Baken and van der Linden, 1992:5).

This change in philosophy for the World Bank and the USAID was to have a profound impact on many Third World countries. This was due to the bail out the World Bank undertook when many Third World countries almost defaulted on payments on their previous loans, enabling the World Bank to require structural

changes to these countries' economies. These requirements were known as Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). Where countries did already have a government organisation devoted to housing, the USAID and the World Bank promoted eliminating it, turning its responsibilities over to the private sector where possible, and preventing a continuance of housing subsidies, including mortgage subsidies (Klak, 1992:104). Failing this, joint venture projects, with both private and public sector components, were recommended.

An example of the monetarist ideology in practice is the USAID policy in Argentina that was focused on privatisation and importation. Privatisation (with its emphasis on market solutions) involved less government spending and less government construction, with fewer subsidies, an expanded reliance on market principles, a greater role for private financiers and construction firms, and more self-help activity at the household level (USAID, 1988, as cited in Klak, 1992:92).

The advocates for the monetarist ideology justify their approach with assertions that the residents themselves gain from investments in housing so they ought to carry the cost of those improvements. Urban shelter programmes, it has been argued, may 'generate substantial net private benefits even in the absence of any indirect benefits' (Kaufmann and Quigley, 1987:265). Pugh argues that the linkages between savings and investment processes are vital – as per his fieldwork in Singapore. This reinforces the argument for shifting responsibility for housing from the public to the private sector. On the individual household level, it is claimed, housing represents 'an income generating function' (van Vliet, 1987:279). In Manila in the early 1980s, research showed that a rented squatter dwelling could command 15% more rent if it had legal tenure than those that did not. And on selling, a squatter dwelling with legal tenure achieved a 25% higher price than dwellings without legal tenure. This was considered to be the risk premium – in case of government eviction (Friedman, Jimenez and Mayo, 1988).

The attainment of value for a property depends on how secure the property was considered to be. 'Security is often as much a state of mind as a reality' (Gilbert and Gugler, 1992:124). Where the land has been bought, even without planning permission or legal title, security follows (Varley, 1985). Where the land is leased, as



in parts of the West Indies (Clarke, 1974, cited in Gilbert and Gugler, 1992:124), and South Africa (Ellis et al, 1977:7 cited in Gilbert and Gugler, 1992:124), security depends on the length of the lease and the cost of rent. In Montego Bay, where the residents can be moved on at short notice, the houses are designed so they can be easily moved to another location (Eyre, 1972:406). Land prices in some Asian and Latin American cities are almost as high as those in London and New York, due to the low risk of the land market so it attracts what capital is available (Gilbert and Gugler, 1992:125).

There is now greater emphasis on the future residents doing the bulk of the work and picking up the tab for their housing. This is sometimes claimed as empowerment through participation. However, financial concerns seem to be the guiding principle. Certainly, in a study by Harms, he found that there was a correlation between economic crisis and the adoption of self-help programmes (Mathey, 1992:384). Through the evolution of development approaches, apart from Turner's valiant attempts to redirect the spotlight onto the needs and wishes of the potential residents themselves, very little attention seems to have been focused on them, with economic and political expediency appearing to hold sway. Yet the central issue of housing and its place in the psyche of the people in Third World countries needs to be examined, and research that has been done in this area fully evaluated, if future housing schemes are to more fully benefit the end user.

It needs to be stressed that beyond general parameters common to Third World housing policies and practices, 'the issues take on specific features that require historical consideration of the underlying interplay of particular (inter) national and local forces' (van Vliet, 1987:277). This is also stressed by Hans Harms, who, while granting individual case studies could be used to 'illustrate a point', advised they should not be used to generate general principles that 'may be repeated elsewhere' (Mathey, 1992:384). Housing projects derived from a model such as Turner, Marxist or Monetarist, are not likely to succeed unless detailed studies are made of locally specific economic, demographic, social, political and cultural aspects prior to the design of the project (van Vliet, 1987:278).



## **Women's Housing Issues**

A particular focus of research needs to be on how housing impacts on women and how best to facilitate their roles within the household, as the layout of houses often hamper women's effectiveness. One third of all households in the world are headed by women. The organisation of domestic space in western countries reflects and reinforces a limited and domestically focused role for women. Too often this has also been imposed on women in Third World countries, through western funded housing schemes. There have been woefully too few evaluation reports done on housing projects that address the concerns of women – only thirteen out of one hundred and twenty six reports (and then only scantily) address women's concerns (van Vliet, 1987:271).

Some examples in which women's needs have not been addressed in the design of housing projects and the attendant results follow. In Tunis, USAID surveys showed pressures on land, insensitivity to women's need for private space and middle class aspirations to European house fashions led to a reduction in the size of the inner courtyard. As women were restricted from going out in public, this reduced their ability to receive visitors and socialise, which in some cases led to serious psychological depression, neuroses and even suicide (International Women's Tribune Centre, 1987:16). In Ecuador, women preferred to live in their self-built bamboo houses rather than in brick houses built in a World Bank project, which were half the size. The women said it was a nightmare to have to raise children in such a confined space, particularly given the tropical climate (Moser, 1987). And in Zambia, houses were laid out on a grid, each with a separate plot to ensure privacy. But this resulted in the women working in isolation, unable to leave their doors unlocked or leave their children playing under the watchful eye of a neighbour (International Women's Tribune Centre, 1987:18).

## **Priority of Housing in Third World**

In the context of housing per se, there appears to be some evidence that the importance of housing has been exaggerated, even for the most tenuously housed. It has even been claimed that there is no convincing evidence that better housing is 'causally related to physical or mental health, employment or life "satisfaction" in any respect' (Burns and Grebler, 1976, cited in Kaufmann and Quigley, 1987:265).

It has even been claimed that there is no convincing evidence that better housing is 'causally related to physical or mental health, employment or life 'satisfaction' in any respect (ibid).

Research has revealed that improved housing is not given a high priority by squatters or even among homeless pavement dwellers (Peattie, 1979). Economic considerations – how to improve their ability to make a livelihood – is considered more important.<sup>43</sup> Pressures on governments from the citizens themselves from demands for improved services (Nietied and van der Linden, 1988:146). The access provided by housing to 'jobs, markets, friends, relatives, schools, medical services, and so on, its cost and the household's ability to afford amenities and consumer durables often receive higher priority than housing quality more narrowly defined' (van Vliet, 1987:273). A study by Fass, in 1987, based in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, has shown that government policies that reduce the cost of food will be the most effective way to improve housing conditions for the very poor (Klak, 1992). Employment generating programmes that increase income enable people to afford housing. Employment generation is promoted with the use of indigenous materials and components in housing (Rondinelli, 1990:264).

There is a varying range of commitment to living in an urban area – people may be psychologically still based on their homeland in a rural area (Nelson, 1976, as cited in Murison and Lea, 1979:51).<sup>44</sup> In Africa and Southern Asia there are still strong rural links, whereas in South America there is a stronger move to urbanisation (Murison and Lea, 1979:51). In Africa most urban people are happy to rent as their rents are low and they do not intend to be permanently urban. However, in Latin America, over 90% of those who rent wish to own (Gilbert and Varley, 1990:91).

---

<sup>43</sup> In Karachi, along Lyari River, there are 2,400 people per hectare who risk demolition of their housing by floods after heavy rain, but secure tenure and a good quality dwelling less important than 'access to income opportunities' (Dwyer, 1975:201, cited in Yap Kioe-Sheng).

<sup>44</sup> In Port Moresby, the sites and services project was not successful as there was a lack of commitment to living in an urban area (Angel, 1983:5).

### **Third World Housing Choices**

In most Third World countries there has been an impetus towards utilising Western materials in housing from virtually first contact with Europeans. The use of industrial materials by people building their own homes nowadays appears to be extensive throughout the world. A study by Michael Bamberger, in 1982, concluded that throughout the world, most self-builders utilise industrial materials in preference to local resources (Mathey, 1992:385). Many in the West have romantic notions regarding the realities of living in traditional housing (Overton, 1999). And certainly, intuition would indicate that the economics of constructing housing from freely available materials has got to be more affordable than having to purchase industrially produced materials – though this has been refuted through a study of the Grameen bank, discussed below. Some people in the West view the adoption of Western style housing and materials as yet more evidence of cultural capture by the West. However, the housing forms and materials adopted by the individuals concerned are, for the most part, the result of rational choices as to what they view as most appropriate for their needs. This is evidenced by the selective nature of the adoption process - for example, louvres are favoured over plate glass in the Pacific Islands (and most tropical regions) due to the amount of ventilation afforded.

A study of the Grameen bank's loan programme for new housing in Bangladesh reveals some of the reasons why people adopted industrially produced materials. With Western cladding, they were able to have a low maintenance, weather resistant home within which they were able to pursue a home-based business, many choosing to raise livestock (usually chickens) within their new homes, others able to trade rice due to the increased storage space (OECD, 1997:58). They were also able to raise their social standing as they could accommodate guests (ibid). And educational achievement was assisted with the ability to accommodate a desk (OECD, 1997:59). Theft was reduced because the walls could no longer be breached. And it was found that the homes funded by these loans had greater structural integrity than the traditionally built ones as many survived the floods of 1987 and 1988. Thus the adoption of more permanent materials had a direct impact on the well being and income generation prospects of the household concerned. The study also refuted the expectation that building with traditional materials was a cheaper option for people in the Third World, at least in the area studied. It was found that paying for the materials

(and often the labour as well) to construct a mud or plant-based wall repeatedly was more expensive than purchasing the longer lasting industrially produced framing and cladding. The same was found for the roof cladding. Thus it made economic sense for these households to invest in more permanent materials, once the income for the initial large outlay was available (ibid).<sup>45</sup>

Thus, people in the Third World have many valid reasons for choosing western materials for their housing. Even the CI roofing<sup>46</sup> is employed in the Bangladesh study above, while appearing initially to be an inappropriate material for the tropics due to its poor thermal resistance properties, is valued by the people there. The CI roofing enables them to dry rice paddies in the heat in the garret, making husking the rice easier, enabling them to earn income, an attribute of greater importance to the residents than thermal comfort.

However, mistakes are often made when western ‘experts’ impose western materials and construction styles on people in the Third World. Western advisers tend not to be sufficiently well versed in the local conditions and the likely ramifications of their choices. Self-builders, however, are not always able to choose the materials they employ on their homes. Where dwellings are not allowed to remain where they are built the state does not allow permanent materials, whereas externally aided upgrading schemes may require the use of permanent materials (Ward and Macoloo, 1992:73). Thus, when evaluating a local people’s choice of building materials, it is important to be aware of whether it was a free choice, or the result of being compelled, whether by regulation or circumstance.

## **Conclusion**

The dependence on Western funding has led to many governments in the Third World countries having to involve the West in the design of their housing schemes. Tied aid has involved the use of industrialised materials. And global media has generated the demand for a Western housing type among the Third World country’s citizens (or their administration) in the first place. However, on the whole, it

---

<sup>45</sup> Some households were able to save 850 to 1,200 Taka annually, through no longer having to rethatch and replace jute walls (OECF, 1997:59).

<sup>46</sup> CI Roofing – fibrecement roofing – similar in appearance to the old style asbestos roofing.

appears that the overall stock of housing in the Third World has improved, particularly if one takes the provision of services into account, though these improvements have not been achieved quickly enough to accommodate the increasing number of potential residents. This chapter has also argued that whereas the adoption of foreign materials appears to indicate cultural imperialism, on closer examination it can be seen that the adoption of these materials is usually the result of conscious choosing on the part of the user. Industrial materials are usually chosen by people in the Third World for the perceived (and usually actual) benefits to be gained through employing these construction materials, the main one being that of convenience. Where, however, housing schemes or funding for housing schemes require the use of particular materials, then the ability to make decisions is taken from the individuals involved, and may well result in construction materials performing in an inferior manner. Where the housing styles of the colonising power have been promoted in the colonised country for a long time, the colonising style becomes integrated with the history of the Third World country. In that sense, continuing utilising elements of that style is as much in deference to the colonised country's history as that of the former coloniser. This is particularly so as the original coloniser's housing style would not have been adopted as is, but modified to accommodate differences in climate and lifestyle.

It is also important to remember that when people in Third World countries choose to utilise industrial materials it is not a case of their reflecting their own culture's housing style out of preference for the housing style of another culture. After all, the people of the Pacific have not stopped using thatched walls to adopt the English sod walls, or the American's log walls, the indigenous housing styles of those cultures. All cultures, including the Europeans had a housing tradition that differed from that employed today. Industrial materials available to construction today are the result of many countries inventions and contributions – they are not the traditional housing materials of any one culture. They have originated globally, and are available for use globally.

The increasingly widespread adoption of industrial materials is not a radical departure in innovation for Third World peoples. All peoples' housing styles appear to have evolved through time, with or without the introduction of new materials and

styles, though such exposure did accentuate the pace of change in most instances. An example of this constant evolution in housing is given in the following chapter, which records the known alterations that have occurred in Samoa and Manihiki through the years immediately prior to European contact and since, and the chapter concludes just prior to colonisation.



**PRE-COLONIAL INFLUENCES ON HOUSING**

In this chapter, the evolution in the housing of the residents of the islands of Upolu and Manihiki, the influences on those changes, and the reasons behind the choices made are expounded. Initially, the traditional housing of the South Pacific, prior to European contact, will be examined, in brief. This will be followed by a more detailed discussion of the housing employed by Samoans and Manihikians after contact with Europeans, and the results of that initial contact with Europeans, the traders and whalers, and in what ways that impacted on the housing, will then be explored. This will be followed by a discussion of what impacts the missionaries had on the housing style and materials employed.

There is a tendency, among Europeans at least, to perceive traditional, indigenous housing to have been a static entity, built for generations in exactly the same form as that encountered by the first Europeans. That is, the housing is perceived as 'homeostatic', whereas actually, the housing was undergoing constant refinement and alterations. These alterations would have come about through innovation and also emulation, as other cultures in neighbouring islands influenced the style adopted.

The types of materials employed in vernacular housing would have necessitated relatively frequent repairs and occasionally total rebuilding, which would have given ample opportunities to adopt new materials and methods. Coconut thatch, for instance, lasts on average ten to twelve years, and 'houses of bamboo often do not last longer than ten years' (Rensel, 1995:4). In the case of cyclone-prone islands such as Upolu and Manihiki, 'frequent cyclones sped the process of destruction and (would have) made the need to rebuild tediously frequent' (Rensel, 1995:11). Cyclones, as well as necessitating rebuilding, often decimated the very substance the housing would be remade from, thus encouraging innovative solutions to be found. An example of this was found in Rotuma, where 'periodic hurricanes that destroyed thatched houses while depleting the supply of sago and coconut palm gave impetus to Rotuman's interest in alternatives' (Rensel, 1995:17). The sheer tediousness of constant rebuilding seemed to have been another factor in the readiness of people in accepting new approaches to building. This can be seen with the adoption by people in New Britain of plaited palm leaves introduced by Samoan and Fijian missionaries

instead of their dried nettle bark, the locals have been described as ‘welcoming the abandonment of their struggle with nettle tree bark’ (Chowning, 1995: 86).

On arriving in Manihiki, Sir Peter Buck detailed the type of housing in use prior to the arrival of the missionaries Aporo and Tairi, of which there were still extant examples. This house type was described as being similar to the Samoan long houses. Thatch made of pandanus leaves were used. A high platform was constructed in these houses, with an opening for a ladder. ‘This upper storey was used as a dormitory and as a storage space, especially for the mature coconuts. In special houses set apart for the tribal gods, the bodies of dead chiefs were laid out on the high platform’. The lower storey was directly on the ground without any raised platform. The ground floor was usually divided by a low fence into an inner rectangular sleeping part and an outer part contiguous to the sides and used as a dining room. Wall screens of plaited coconut leaves were used for side or end walls when required, there being no permanent walls. A low house was also built on Manihiki, without supporting walls as the rafters were dug into the ground. It was built for use in the hurricane season, as it had no side walls, the wind could not get under the roof to blow it away.






FIGURE 16. House without supporting posts (*whare tuku whakararo*), end view of framework: 1, principal rafters; 2, principal ridgepole; 3, purlins; 4, thatch rafters; 5, upper ridgepole.


Illustration 1: Manihiki – ‘traditional’ cyclone house.



House platform (*whata*), or upper story: 1, longitudinal joists (*tarewa*); 2, crossbeams (*vae*); 3, cross pieces forming floor (*papa*); 4, opening (*ngutu whata*, door of platform); 5, ladder (*ara*); 6, longitudinal beams (*hapai*); 7, posts; 8, wall plates; 9, principal rafters.




Roof framework of house: *a*, side view, left end near principal rafter, four thatch rafters and end of fourth purlin cut away to show underlying parts of frame; *b*, end view. 1, supporting posts (*pou*); 2, longitudinal beams (*hapai*); 3, crossbeams (*vae*); 4, wall plate (*kaupapa*); 5, principal rafters (*oka*); 6, main ridgepole (*tauuhuhu*); 7, purlins (*tarawa*); 8, diagonal strut (*toko*) attached to main ridgepole above and to wall plate below, crossing four rafters to which it is also attached; 9, thatch rafters (*whakakaho*); 10, upper ridgepole (*tauuhuhu iti* or *takiri kaho*); 11, eaves rod (*turuturu iti*).



End framework of house: *a*, end view from outside; *b*, section showing mesial rod pushed out from side with inserted chock. 1-4, horizontal purlins; 5, 6, additional purlins; 7, mesial rod; 8, vertical rods; 9, end pair of rafters; 10, side purlins; 11, end crossbeam; 12, lowest side purlins; 13, chock (*pono*); two vertical rods, one on either side of mesial rod, pushed out from side with shorter chocks.

Illustration 2: The houses in Manihiki, late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century.



Portable house (*whare taka*): 1, lower horizontal beam (*hapai*); 2, upright supporting post; 3, upper longitudinal beam (*hapai*); 4, 5, diagonal braces; 6, cross pieces; 7, longitudinal wall plates; 8, end pairs of principal rafters; 9, main ridgepole. (Native terminology as in figure 8.)

Illustration 3: Manihiki - portable house.

Samoans lived in large settlements that placed great emphasis upon village working groups organised by gender, age and rank. The household was the basic unit of production in traditional society, and in most rural communities it still is. Samoan households were (and are) large, often with four generations of close kin and comprised of three or four nuclear families who occupied separate sleeping houses but who fished, gardened, cooked and ate together and co-operated on a wide range of activities. Groups of households formed the village and co-operation at village level was redirected mainly towards ceremonial occasions and labour pools. Labour pools were involved in house building, thatching, clearing bush, cleaning the village and weeding food gardens. Contributions to the labour pool were motivated by both reciprocity and the notion of rendering obligatory service to the village council of chiefs. Co-operative activities in Samoan villages were traditionally to assist in production at household level. Projects were undertaken as target production schemes – accepted with enthusiasm and everyone co-operates until loan repaid or crops harvested, or sum been raised, then enthusiasm wanes, and project begins to founder. Traditional function was to render service to community and chiefs.

In Samoa, the principle houses, the guest houses, were constructed only by carpenters belonging to the guild of carpenters (Grattan, 1948:53 – 54). Only titled males were able to belong to the guild and construct such houses (ibid:161). The family whose house was to be built was required to cut and carry the materials the head carpenter chose, to the house site and the family was also required to construct the scaffolding (ibid:54). Once the middle section of the house was constructed, it was quickly thatched, as the timber employed, breadfruit, was vulnerable to rain (ibid). The ends of the roof were then constructed, and were also quickly thatched. The roof framing members were lashed to each other with sennit, coconut fibre (ibid:36). The family constructed the terrace on which the house was constructed, necessary due to the high level of rainfall, with the chief's terrace, by law, was the highest (Gilson, 1970:11). The head carpenter, the matai tufuga, had to be highly respected, and feasted through the construction process, especially at completion (Grattan, 1948:54). The head of the family concerned also had to show interest in the construction by attending each stage of the building, otherwise the head carpenter would take offence and walk off the site, and no other member of the guild would work on the house (ibid). The head carpenter was paid with fine mats and bark cloth (ibid). The head of the family's prestige depended on the generosity of the payment (Gilson, 1970:11). The thatch was made of narrow leaves, folded over a light rod, about a metre long, and sewn close to rod (Grattan, 1948:58). This section of thatch is termed a lau (ibid).




Illustration 4: A Samoan fale tele. Exterior view. Note palm fronds on thatch.



How closely these rods were attached to the roof varied according to the opinion of the builder as some believed the closer the better, others believed that too close will result in the thatching rotting (ibid:59).<sup>47</sup> Well-made thatch could be expected to last about seven years (ibid:58). The thatch was made by women, and affixed to the roof by men (ibid). Until the thatch consolidated, heavy coconut fronds would be placed on the roof to prevent the thatch being blown off in a breeze or a storm (ibid). Women made the woven coconut frond blinds (ibid). The family's own houses were built by themselves (ibid).

The style of Samoan fale were originally circular, and termed fale tele, but the necessity of showing respect to the head of the household as well as to any head guest, as well as accommodating other guests, necessitated elongating the circular form to an oval. The oval style was termed fale afolau (Gilson, 1970:11). While meeting social needs, the joining of the curved part of the roof to the flat part of the roof was vulnerable to wind uplift (ibid). The round roof type uses central columns to support the roof (ibid). The oval style has a box frame of beams to support the roofs, with posts then supporting the beams (ibid).



<sup>47</sup> Two to four thousand lau are required for a roof, depending on the size of the house and the closeness of the thatching (Grattan, 1948:58-59).

Illustration 5 (previous page):

A traditional style oval fale structure. Note the timber plates either side of the upper connection between framing members. Note also the sinnet tied around the lower connection. And also note the horizontal member's notch to admit the rafter.

The Pacific Island peoples therefore, had a history of housing innovation, and stimulus towards trying anything new. So when contact was initially made with Europeans, the Pacific Islanders were not adverse to adopting new materials and products, particularly where they considered the items to be superior to their own in terms of convenience. The Pacific Islanders were therefore willing to enter into commercial relationships with Europeans to obtain such articles. The trade came about through the provisioning and repairing of European ships, by providing labour as crewmembers and through providing entertainment. While 'prostitution was not an indigenous institution, sexual hospitality was, and combined with the wish to acquire property, soon evolved into commerce' (Campbell, 1989:57).

In some islands, these commercial based interactions were so prevalent that many European commodities were obtained. As early as 1792, the explorer Vancouver noted that Tahitians were already dependant on imported iron, utensils and cloth, the native equivalent already scarce (Campbell, 1989:60). This trade resulted in many migrating to the ports, and some people leaving, never to return. Those that did return had been exposed to the use of industrial materials in housing, and 'different housing styles' (Rensel, 1995:17). This focus on commodity acquisition resulted in many young men and women becoming more individualistic. Chiefs were also using traditional rights to the labour of their people to grow crops for barter with the Europeans. With the increasing contact with Europeans, however, levels of disease increased. In some islands, they recalled the visit of a ship by the epidemic that followed it. The diseases led to a great reduction in populations, both directly and through infertility.






Illustration 6: Lime building, missionary seminary, Avarua, Rarotonga.

Religious conversion of the Hervey group was begun in earnest from the LMS (London Missionary Society) base in Tahiti in the 1820s. Within twenty years, the main ariki had converted, and with them the bulk of the people. The reasons for conversion were in part a wish to stop inter-tribal warfare, which conversion to Christianity was known to accomplish. Also implicit in the Polynesians' view of Christianity were the accompanying material advantages of a Western lifestyle. And it has been argued that the decimation of the population of the Polynesian people from their exposure to the European diseases which they had no immunity to, led to a loss of faith in the old gods, and a willingness to divert loyalties in an effort to obtain salvation elsewhere.

The advent of the missionaries in the South Pacific also had major influences on the styles and materials adopted in housing. The missionaries had both direct and indirect effects on the housing of the Pacific Islands. The direct effects came about as a result of a specific agenda the missionaries had to convert the locals temporally as well as spiritually. This was due to the missionaries linking 'material lifestyle with spiritual orientation' (Rensel, 1995:36). The task, to the missionaries, was not just the conquest of souls, but also the imparting of "civilisation", and the adoption of



European style housing and clothing, as well as European household composition, was seen as indicative of the success of their mission. These attitudes were encapsulated in the ‘before’ and ‘after’ picture, drawn at the time, of the English perception of the Rarotongans prior to the advent of Christianity and subsequently, shown in illustration 7. This emphasis on the adaptation of European styles and materials in housing was not common to all denominations – while Methodists viewed it as central to their mission, Roman Catholics concentrated on the building of churches and schools, leaving the locals to house themselves however they saw fit.<sup>48</sup> This difference in approach has had repercussions that still reverberate today – French ex-colonies tend to have a greater percentage of indigenous housing than English ex-colonies.



*'A village under heathenism – an idyllic'. 'The same village, under Christianity'.  
From Life in the Southern Isles by William Wyatt Gill (1876)  
(Mitchell Library, Sydney photograph)*

Illustration 7: ‘Before’ and ‘After’ pictures of the effect of the English Christianity

<sup>48</sup> ‘Roman Catholicism in Rotumah ... does not raise people socially or morally; their houses and their persons are nearly as filthy as ever they were’ (Methodist Church of Australasia, Letters received, March 1, 1873, as quoted in Rensel, 1995:37).

The indirect influences of the missionaries on housing came about through different factors. One of these was their conversion of former warriors to Christianity, which led to the abolition of warfare, which resulted in different housing forms being used, as defensibility was no longer a primary objective in housing. Also, the absence of warfare enabled people to access housing materials that would previously been beyond their local environs, as in 'the cessation of warfare between villages made it safe to travel to the stands of palm trees to collect material' (Chowning, 1995:85). Another indirect influence from the missionaries was the emphasis on nuclear family formation, rather than separation according to gender. This led to more, smaller homes.

In Manihiki, the two missionaries, Aporo and Tahiri, sailed to Manihiki and Rakahanga in 1849, and, under the auspices of the London Missionary Society, proceeded to convert the inhabitants to Christianity. This had major impacts on the way in which the people led their lives, which in turn impacted on their dwellings. The missionaries petitioned the people to cease travelling between the two islands, due to the occasional loss of life, and the population was split in two and settled permanently on both islands. The religious influence led to the destruction of the maraes. Houses in Manihiki, following the visit of the missionaries Aporo and Tairi, adopted the type of rectangular house used in the southern islands, characterised by the long upright posts erected at the middle of each end to support directly the main ridgepole. The original type of house was gradually displaced, until at the time of Sir Peter Buck's visit in 1927 there was only one example left, on Rakahanga. The missionaries also introduced houses built with lime. While the Manihikians adopted the Rarotongan style, they introduced variations with some of the houses. One of the houses, used as an assembly place, was open below the thatching. The other houses, used for sleeping had the ends and sides walled in, which Sir Peter Buck ascribed to the missionaries' influence (Buck, 1927:81). The walls differ from the Rarotongan houses in that the rods used to fill in the spaces between the posts are attached horizontally rather than vertically. The end thatching is also projected outward at its lower end to form a verandah. A raised platform of lime surrounds the house. A third variation, which is popular in small dwelling houses, consists of carrying the outward projection of the roof to both ends and the two sides forming a wide verandah around all four sides. The overall impression formed by the housing in both villages led to Sir



Peter Buck to comment that they were ‘models of orderly arrangement and cleanliness and are not surpassed in any of the Cook Islands’ (Buck, 1927:10).

There is little indication that there was much trade involvement between Manihikians and Europeans prior to the arrival of the two missionaries in 1849. However, the speed with which the Manihikians took to using fines of money and trade for any transgressions against the moral laws written up by the missionaries (Buck, 1927:9), indicates that their involvement in the cash society was swift. The copra and pearl shell trade developed, and trading firms based in Rarotonga dealt in the produce of the Manihiki and Rakahanga. The Cook Islands were preserved from some of the more exploitative practices of the early European traders (and some of the economic benefits of being a provisioning port) due to the lack of an adequate harbour – Pape’ette (Tahiti) and Apia (Samoa) were preferred. The Cook Islands also lacked the sandalwood that attracted traders to Fiji.<sup>49 50</sup> And in the early 1880s, an Auckland company, Henderson and Macfarlane’s agent, H.B. Sterndale, established a trading station at each of the two settlements at Manihiki (Ross, 1964:170). Increasing incorporation of industrially produced building products in housing, led to increasing requirements for cash. From the end of the nineteenth century onwards there was a reduction in the population of Manihiki, as increasing numbers travelled to Rarotonga to work and earn cash.<sup>51</sup>

While the increasing involvement in trade and the influence of the missionaries increased the pressures on altering the Pacific Islanders’ approach to home building, these changes were not ‘merely a matter of passive acceptance of externally imposed conditions’ (Rensel, 1995:19). The Pacific Islanders exercised choice in selecting amongst the new building materials and building styles they

---

<sup>50</sup> Prayer of Rarotongan Chief, “Great Tangiia, send us a dead sea, send us a propitious gale, to bring the far-famed Cookees to our island, to give us nails and iron, and axes, let us see those out-riggerless canoes’ (Denoon, 1997:141).

<sup>50</sup> Auckland company, Henderson and Macfarlane’s agent H.B. Sterndale, took possession of Suwarrow in 1875 (when it was uninhabited) and planted the island with 35,000 coconut trees and established buildings and wharves. 1881 – Jarvis Island, 1882 – Christmas Island: 30,000 coconut trees. Trading stations at Niue (at that stage part of Hervey Islands) and one at each of the two settlements at Manihiki (Ross, 1964:170).

<sup>51</sup> Between 1906 and 1926, there was a reduction of 115 people in the population of Manihiki, leaving a population of 432 (Buck, 1927:11).



encountered, only adopting those that best fitted their own requirements. Often the option chosen was the one that maximised convenience for the residents.

The vernacular approach to building had the advantage of being easily rebuilt as they usually incorporated lengths of thatch, and panels of woven materials for the walls so were constructed of prefabricated components that could usually be salvaged after reasonably sized cyclones and reused (Rodman, 1995:4). So, while houses built of local materials were often severely damaged, they could be rebuilt quickly – ‘within a few weeks of the cyclone that hit Ambae, everyone had a house again’ (Rodman, 1995:229). However, as the more modern methods and materials of building resulted in housing that was more weather resistant and longer lasting than thatch, requiring less maintenance and repair (Rodman, 1995:228), many Pacific Islanders adopted them. Lime housing, for instance, is generally more resistant to moderate hurricanes than the traditional style. And corrugated iron roofs do not need replacing as often, and enable rainwater to be collected, an important consideration where water is scarce.

## **Conclusion**

Housing in the Pacific Islands, including housing in Samoa and Manihiki, underwent evolution, including prior to contact with Europeans. Once contact was made with Europeans, the Pacific Islanders were prepared to trade to obtain industrially produced housing materials due to their perception of the possible benefits, leading to a change in the focus of their society, with increased involvement in the capitalist system. The missionaries involved the society in further changes, and focused on the style of housing as evidence of true conversion. The people of the Pacific Islands did not adopt styles and materials unless they considered it to meet their own requirements. The next chapter leads on into the colonial period, and includes discussion on the adoption of housing styles and how the housing was funded.

**NEW ZEALAND'S RELATIONSHIP WITH SAMOA  
AND THE COOK ISLANDS**

## **Introduction**

In this chapter, I shall be examining the history behind the relationships between New Zealand and Samoa and between New Zealand and the Cook Islands. By examining the composition of principle motives behind initial contact between the countries concerned, and how these motives have evolved or been replaced by others over time, the source of differences between these two relationships will become apparent. These differences have fed into the different approaches to assistance provided by New Zealand, including that for cyclone housing. So I will commence by examining the main motivations behind New Zealand's early quest for island territories. I shall then illustrate how these aspirations were thwarted and achieved within the parameters of the international affairs of the day. This is followed by a recounting of the subsequent colonial relationship of Samoa and New Zealand, and then that of New Zealand and the Cook Islands.

## **Initial Motivations**

As is usual in cases of self or national interest, it is difficult to differentiate at times between what are presented as motivations, and what are in reality merely justifications. Foreign policy is, and has always been, spurred by a mixture of motives, which feed into and reinforce each other. Thus, while national security may be the concern argued to promote an action, the actual primary reason may be for national prestige – or vice versa. Or a pragmatic intrusion on the affairs of another country may be justified with an altruistic rationale – or vice versa. The motivations are rarely discrete but shade into one another. Most policies are an amalgam of differing concentrations of several motivations. That understood it is helpful to examine the principle impetuses behind the history of New Zealand's interaction with Samoa and the Cook Islands to more fully comprehend the current situation. Closer ties with those islands were sought by New Zealand historically in an attempt to secure national security, to augment national prestige, in the hopes of increasing trade and commerce, and out of a sense of obligation through the concept of Trusteeship and religious affiliations. The missionaries in the islands fostered a sense of 'responsibility for the welfare of the Pacific Islanders' (Corner, 1962:133). Aid to the islands was seen from as early as 1900 as a tool to achieve the aims of enhancing national security and prestige through a closer tying of the islands to New Zealand through obligation; as well as being thought a worthy action in itself.



New Zealand's desire for island territories was fed by a concern for national security due to Britain's navy being on the other side of the world so any incursion by France or Germany or the USA would be difficult to repel if they could operate from a nearby base. All through our history, New Zealand has sought to keep the Pacific secure from threats, and she believed she could best achieve this, if rather obliquely, by sending resources to provide support to the powers whose protection in the Pacific New Zealand required (Pooananga, 1980:44 - 45).

The European people of New Zealand in the nineteenth century, while emotionally, politically and economically focused on Mother England, saw their geographical location as a chance to exercise their own imperial muscle under the auspices of England by expanding its boundaries. Governor Grey aspired to a 'federation of Polynesian peoples under the aegis of New Zealand' (Corner, 1962:136). And Julius Vogel expected New Zealand to be a 'central guiding figure' to the islands of the South Pacific (Vogel, 1878:42). These ambitions were assisted by a legislative error in the Charter and Letters Patent of 1840 which annexed New Zealand, where the limits of the territory were described as being 'between the 34<sup>th</sup> degree 30 minutes north to the 47<sup>th</sup> degree 10 minutes south Latitude" (Ross, 1964:14). The word 'north' had wrongly been supplied where the word 'south' should have been.<sup>52</sup> After the formation of Australia's federation at the turn of the century, the expansion of New Zealand's boundaries in the quest of increased international prestige became even more important. And New Zealand businessmen looked to the South Pacific islands for closer markets.<sup>53</sup> This possibility was especially important for New Zealand prior to the invention of refrigerated shipping. It was believed that annexing islands to Britain would increase accessibility and promote a market for Western goods. This would seem to be borne out by the figures.<sup>54</sup> However, this increase in trade was not always favourable to New Zealand.<sup>55</sup>

---

<sup>52</sup> This mistake was repeated in 1841, 1845 and 1846, before the legislation was corrected. While patently incorrect (the mistake would have included most of Melanesia as well as Polynesia) these documents were referred to twice by Governor Grey in 1853, in an attempt to prevent the expansion of the French in New Caledonia and the New Hebrides (Ross, 1964:50).

<sup>53</sup> New Zealand Businessmen wanted the New Zealand government subsidised steamers to Fiji to be extended to Samoa and Tonga (Ross, 1964:91).

<sup>54</sup> Trebling of Rarotonga's export trade in the first four years after annexation (Ross, 1964:94).

<sup>55</sup> By 1900, the bulk of Fiji imports were from Sydney, whereas the bulk of their exports were to New Zealand (Ross, 1964:94).

It would be simplistic (and rather cynical) to assume that the more obviously self-interested motives were genuine, while the more altruistic motives put forward were mere justifications for the other motives. There had been a long tradition of a belief in bringing other cultures 'up to' the level of Britain through trade and judicious management of other culture's affairs, which the politicians of New Zealand appeared to be alluding to in their petitions to have dominion over South Pacific islands. As early as 1792, John Thomson, in writing to Henry Dundas, Minister in charge of Colonial Affairs in Britain, stressed that New Zealand was a "fine country, from whence (the King of England) might conquer the greatest part of the South Seas Islands and conquest would bring peace, hence improvement and civilisation" (Ross, 1964:2). From the beginning of the nineteenth century, philosophers had advocated the responsibility of European governments to help nurture indigenous peoples towards 'mature', independent statehood. This philosophy was reiterated by the Fabians, and given the label of 'trusteeship' (Cowen and Sherton, 1996). Members of the British Foreign Office believed it to be their duty to safeguard the interests of the Maori, and the annexation of New Zealand in 1840 was in part an attempt to do so, by ensuring any land deals took place through the crown. However, due to insufficient Colonial Office funding behind the rhetoric, early attempts at encouraging development among the Maori were short-lived (Moon, unpublished). The attempts to meet the increasing demands from the burgeoning European population for land ensured Maori steadily lost ground economically as well as literally.

New Zealand politicians appear to have genuinely believed they were the best suited to protect the interests of the populations of the South Pacific islands, both through location, and through their experience in dealing with Maori, also a Polynesian people. New Zealand claimed to want to nurture the islands of the Pacific, as Prime Minister Sir Ward claimed; "we shall be a mother among the Pacific Islands" (Ross, 1964:267). Certainly, while New Zealand was a relatively minor world figure, she was able to command attention for her Pacific neighbour's welfare, and frequently did so. An example of this was Sir Julius Vogel's impassioned remonstrance that tropical peoples, such as South Pacific islanders, should be paid more by temperate nations for their products, as 'civilised man ... continues to exact



labour for less than the comforts which even the slavery system supplied' (Vogel, 1878:45).

The above issues led to constant petitioning by New Zealand of the Colonial Office for the annexation of neighbouring islands <sup>56</sup> (Boyd, 1996, 296). New Zealand was dependant on Britain for the acquisition of territories in the nineteenth century, as, apart from New Zealand being relatively impoverished with a small population, she was still a colony of Britain prior to gaining Dominion status in 1901, therefore could not legally annex other countries.<sup>57</sup> Britain, however, was more concerned with political issues in Europe, and was not prepared to antagonise other European powers over the jurisdiction of islands in the South Pacific. Britain was particularly loath to do so as her experience in administering New Zealand had convinced her of the difficulties and expense involved. Britain was also unconvinced that New Zealand had sufficient resources or the appropriate attitudes to administer other territories<sup>58</sup> Subsequently, the British concentrated their efforts toward ensuring the islands were neutral and in strengthening the authority of chiefs (Gilson, 1980:58).<sup>59</sup>

Thwarted in their attempts to gain additional territories directly, New Zealand politicians set about tying the islands to New Zealand in indirect ways. From very early on, New Zealand politicians recognised the facility of aid in persuading the people of the islands of the benefit of aligning interests with New Zealand. In 1900, the Prime Minister, Richard Seddon, went on a cruise around the Pacific Islands, primarily for reasons of health, though also to assess the situation in the islands. He

---

<sup>56</sup> In 1848, Governor Grey argued British should annex Tonga and Fiji – the British concerned re the expense (Ross, 1964:42).

<sup>57</sup> In 1900, New Zealand's Prime Minister, Joseph Ward said, "Are we then, in this little country of ours, to stand by and allow that Commonwealth (Australia) to rise up, and like a great tree, overshadow us, whilst we go on doing nothing, and let them collar for all time the whole of the islands of the Pacific?!" And the New Zealand Times, in 1900, wrote, 'by a means of political evolution we shall at last reach to that island federation or Dominion of Oceania, which will prove to be the counterpoise and compliment to Australian Commonwealth in the Southern Hemisphere' (Ross, 1967:267).

<sup>58</sup> In response to a petition from New Zealand that Samoa be annexed to her in the 1870s, the Foreign Office commented that New Zealand had enough to deal with internally. New Zealand's record in its treatment of the Maori was part of the reason the Foreign Office was disinclined to annex South Pacific Islands and put New Zealand in direct administration of them.

<sup>59</sup> Where other interests did not conflict, such as protecting England's trade routes or gaining access to products such as phosphate, the Foreign Office preferred to allow Pacific Islanders to administer themselves. For, while Britain shared an 'ideological commitment to Imperial rule as the shared burden of Western superiority over backward peoples' (Howe, 1994:35), it was disinclined to add to its expenses in the South Pacific.



spoke to Island rulers of the practical help New Zealand could give – a money order system to facilitate trade exchanges, lending money for a steamer for trade and communications. He also broached the possibility of experts being provided from New Zealand to assist in improving landing places and wharves. Seddon also claimed to represent the Polynesians of New Zealand (Ross, 1964:262).

## **Samoa**

New Zealand had wanted annexation of Samoa as early as the 1870s due to the perceived German threat (Ross, 1964:102-107). Julius Vogel stressed that it was imperative that Samoa be annexed to Britain, with New Zealand looking after it (ibid). He was primarily hoping to protect New Zealand's strategic interests. But the Colonial Office refused to act as Samoa was further away from New Zealand than Fiji, and New Zealand could barely look after its internal interests - the land wars in New Zealand had taken place in the previous decade (ibid). In the event, the USA just piqued Germany to the post in gaining exclusive access to Pagopago in 1873 (ibid).

The continued posturing of Britain, Germany and the USA over the islands of Samoa, in combination with the apparent inability of the Samoans to choose a paramount chief (with whom the Western powers could deal directly and easily with), led to the 1889 Settlement over Samoa (Ross, 1964:250). This guaranteed Samoans' independence, while preserving the separate rights of Germany, Britain and the USA to access the islands. However, as the war in South Africa led to Britain needing to resolve outstanding issues with the other European powers – Germany in particular - so she could shore up as much support as possible, or at least minimise distractions, in Europe (ibid). On the 14<sup>th</sup> of November 1899, Germany and Britain signed a convention where Britain renounced in favour of Germany, the islands of Upolu and Savai'I, in return for Tonga, Niue and the Solomon Islands. These islands were ceded in part in acknowledgment of the loss of New Zealand's interest in Samoa (ibid). In December, Britain surrendered to the USA, Tutuila and the smaller islands of eastern Samoa New Zealand was bitterly disappointed to have 'her' Samoa settled on other countries. Richard Seddon talked of a "great betrayal" (Boyd, 1996:296). Though

from the point of view of trade, New Zealand did not have a very strong case to argue in relation to Samoa.<sup>60</sup>

The Germans managed Samoa in a very efficient, peaceful way, due in large part to the insight of William Solf, the Governor of Samoa from 1900 to 1911 (Campbell, 1990:164). He believed that Samoa was to remain part of the German empire, developed by German enterprise, but with the benefits to be shared fully with the Samoans (ibid:165). 'Samoa for the Samoans' (ibid:177). Solf used guile and political shrewdness in the manner of the Samoans to ensure peaceable relations retained, and Samoan land and labour protected from capture by the German settlers (ibid:165). His successor continued his policies (ibid). The period of German rule gave Samoa the political cohesion she had not had previously (ibid:177). This greatly enhanced the ability of Samoans to subsequently agitate for independence from foreign domination.

At Britain's request in the First World War, New Zealand seized Western Samoa from the Germans in August 1914, and manned a British military administration. New Zealand's Prime Minister, William Massey, expected Britain would retain control after the war. However, as part of a secret deal to obtain support from Japan in the war, Britain agreed that Japan and Britain's southern dominions should keep the German islands they had seized. It was also thought Australia and New Zealand would be affronted if they were 'deprived of the spoils of war' (Boyd, 1996:297). While the Conference of Versailles had no hesitation in stripping Germany of its former Colonial territories, including the islands of Samoa, the subsequent redistribution of these colonies was derailed by the newly formed League of Nations ruling out annexations in favour of mandates. Massey accepted the mandate for Western Samoa, with some reluctance, as he would have preferred 'freehold to leasehold' (Boyd, 1996:298). Samoa has been described as having been the 'pearl of New Zealand's imperial ambitions' (Corner, 1962:136).

Britain's mandate over Samoa was given to New Zealand to administer. The mandate refers to the duty of 'advanced' countries to develop people 'not yet able to

---

<sup>60</sup> Between 1886 – 1894, three times as much was exported to Germany from Samoa, than to England and Australasia combined (Ross, 1964:175).



stand for themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world', and this duty was perceived as 'a sacred trust of civilisation' (Nelson, 1928:7).



Illustration 8:

**BILL'S MANDATE — THE WAR BABY**  
1919 Peace Conference decides New Zealand should  
administer Samoa. W. Blomfield, Observer, 1919.




Illustration 9:

Over staffed administration intolerant of local customs.  
Hill, Auckland Star, 1929

The Samoan (from his perch): "And I am supposed to descend into this meddlesome muddle."

However, as a 'C' class mandate, Samoa was not expected to be able to attain independence in the foreseeable future. As a small country, New Zealand lacked the population, money and markets to develop island territories. Island affairs were bandied about Initially the Samoan Secretary of External Affairs was in the Prime Minister's Department (Campbell, 1992:170). Separate departments for Island Affairs and External Affairs were not established until 1943. New Zealand was too small for career colonial service, so officials needed to work in Samoa were seconded for three-year terms from New Zealand's Public Service. While it has been argued that few public servants stayed on for a second term or learned the language while they were there (*ibid*), in point of fact, the average tenure was fourteen years. Island Ministers and Resident Commissioners were often army officers or lawyers. Three Maori Ministers had responsibility for the Cook Islands and Niue from 1909 to 1934.<sup>61</sup>

The mandate for Samoa was granted over a people hostile to a New Zealand administration. For while initially the Samoans had had no particular problem with New Zealand's occupation, and, in fact, many Samoan-born men joined the Allied Forces, this spirit of acceptance was eroded with the arrival of the influenza epidemic in 1918. The devastating effect of this epidemic was blamed on the New Zealand interim Administer, Colonel Robert Logan, who failed to quarantine ships that arrived at Apia, including the ship *Talune* from Auckland, which had sick people on board, and is suspected of bringing the disease to Samoa (Kirk, 1996:11). Having allowed the disease in, Logan was accused of insufficient efforts to care for those Samoans who contracted it. Certainly, the influenza killed 8000 Samoans out of a total population of 32,000 to 40,000 – 20% of the total population – in comparison, only 0.5% of people in New Zealand were killed by the disease (Kirk, 1996:11) and (Corner, 1962:138). Logan's management of the disease was contrasted with the example of American Samoa, where the quarantine of ships had led to the avoidance of the disease. Logan also refused offers of medical help from Samoa – purportedly due to a dislike of Americans (Kirk, 1996:11), (Hempenstall and Rutherford, 1984:33). Cultural insensitivity (though possibly necessitated through the scale of the epidemic) was shown with the burying of the corpses hurriedly in mass graves with minimal ceremony (Kirk, 1996:12). The incensed Samoans prepared a petition calling for the

---

<sup>61</sup> Sir James Carroll 1909 – 1912, Sir Maui Pomare 1913 – 1928, Sir Apirana Ngata 1928 – 1934 (Boyd, 1996:298).



transfer of control of Samoa from New Zealand to the United States, and failing that, for direct administration from Britain (Kirk, 1996:12), (Hempenstall and Rutherford, 1984:33). In response to the depth of feeling in Samoa, the New Zealand government did not let Logan return to Samoa after leave in New Zealand in 1919, and replaced him with Colonel Tate (1919 – 1923). This change in Administer, and Tate's initially more co-operative attitude, led to the Samoans deciding to withdraw the petition.

Throughout the administration by New Zealand of Samoa, there was vacillation between a 'hands-off' policy, as articulated through the Taihoa policy, and a more involved approach, stemming from a genuine desire to improve the lot of the Samoans, albeit at times through rather paternalistic methods (Hempenstall and Rutherford, 1984:33) and (Boyd, 1996:229).

New Zealand was rather hampered in administering a colonial possession by her inherent dualism of 'weak liberalism' and a 'desire for colonial prestige', the weak liberalism, it has been argued, preventing decisive action being taken when required (Corner, 1962:139). This contrast in approaches was particularly evident through New Zealand's handling of the economy and welfare of Samoa. Colonel Tate was prepared to get fully involved in the development of Samoa (Hempenstall and Rutherford, 1984:33). In an attempt to have the enacting power necessary to achieve this, New Zealand's administration comprised of an administrator who had executive power and effective legislative power through a Legislative Council which contained a majority of official members over nominated, unofficial members (*ibid*). Yet the government back in New Zealand expected Western Samoa to pay its own way with regard to the local administration and social services (Boyd, 1996, 299). This led to the increase in taxes and excise to meet the costs of the colonial administration (*ibid*). This, especially in view of the comparatively large salaries paid to expatriates in the Samoan administration, led to a growth in resentment in the general Samoan population (*ibid*).

Colonel Tate attempted to promote development with road building, drainage systems, the construction of water supplies, extending hospital services and supplementing the mission schools (Cambell, 1992:181). Contributions of labour and cash were encouraged from the Samoans for expediency and to promote ownership of

the schemes (ibid). Colonel Tate was followed by Major General Richardson from 1923 until 1928, who had a sympathetic interest in the Samoans' affairs, even to the extent of learning their language (ibid). He endeavoured to restore plantations expropriated from the Germans and handed over to the New Zealand government as war reparations.

To prevent Western Samoa from becoming 'a little China in the South Pacific' he had the Chinese indentured labour imported by the Germans repatriated, using instead free Chinese who were recruited for three years. Endeavouring to ensure the Samoans retained control over their own land and the other races were kept under control, New Zealand continued to recognise a separate legal status for Samoans and local Europeans that the Germans had initiated. Chinese and people of mixed ancestry were included with the Europeans. Cohabitation of Samoans and Chinese was prohibited. Local Europeans had separate political representation and were not allowed to meddle in Samoan politics, and were denied access to Samoan land (Boyd, 1996:299). However, these separate racial policies promoted social discrimination and resentment, and led to stereotypical views – Polynesians were considered to be lazy, and Chinese immoral. In an attempt to improve Samoan agriculture, trade and health, Richardson individualised land allotments, remodelled villages, introduced a medical tax, marketed copra and abolished time consuming *malga* (journeys), fine mat exchange and *saofai* (ceremony conferring titles) (Boyd, 1996:302). These policies generated grievances against New Zealand rule (Boyd, 1996, 299 – 302). These radical changes to traditional custom were resisted – leading to Richardson enacting village banishments and the withdrawal of titles (these were traditional punishments – but they had never been used so often) (Nelson, 1928:13) (Boyd, 1996:300). This resulted in bitter resentment amongst the Samoans, and an even greater determination to retain *fa'a Samoa* – the Samoan way of life (Boyd, 1996:300).

Olaf Nelson, an influential Swedish Samoan trader, was considered by Richardson to be too European in outlook to truly represent the concerns of the Samoans, so Richardson refused to listen to him (Cambell, 1992:181). However, Nelson made a personal application to the New Zealand government about the concerns of the Samoans (Nelson, 1928:14). This led to a promise of a visit from the New Zealand Foreign Minister, Mr Nosworthy, to visit Samoa (ibid:15). In



preparation for this, a public meeting was held by Olaf Nelson in Apia, at which a Citizen's Committee was formed, to investigate matters to be discussed with the Minister (ibid:16). However, in response to intercession from Richardson, Mr Nosworthy postponed his trip, and in the interim, Richardson enacted legislation to make association by Europeans with the committee punishable by banishment (ibid:17). This led to the withdrawal of Europeans from the committee which resulted in the movement becoming more radical, leading to the formation of the Mau – which demanded self-government (ibid:17-19).

The eventual visit of Mr Nosworthy resulted in his preaching at the members of the committee, rather than listening to their concerns – this alienated the Samoans from the New Zealand administration even more (ibid:19). And three of the Europeans, including Olaf Nelson, who had formed the Citizen's Committee, were subsequently banished (Kirk, 1996:19).

Meanwhile, the Mau, which was a grass roots organisation that had its own police force and taxes began boycotting European businesses (Cambell, 1992:181). Mass demonstrations and civil disobedience rendered Colonial administration almost impossible (ibid). By 1928, the Mau were virtually the real government of Samoans (ibid).

Richardson was replaced by Colonel Stephen Allen, who also sought to eradicate the Mau. He arrested Tupua Tamasese, one of the highest chiefs, and leader of the Mau, in 1928, and he was sent to prison in New Zealand - which focused the New Zealand public's attention on the situation in Samoa – and he returned to Samoa in June 1929. At this stage things were heating up and several factors pointed to a potential tragedy – not least of which was that police in Samoa were allowed to carry guns, though guns were not carried by police in New Zealand (Kirk, 1996:20). This was a reflection of New Zealand's perception that control had to be strenuously maintained over Samoa – also evidenced by the choosing of Army staff to administer Samoa through the 1920s and 1930s (Hempenstall and Rutherford, 1984:33). Incredible misjudgement was shown by these police in Samoa by their attempting to arrest two Samoans for theft from a large procession to greet one of the exiled founders of the committee. The gathering resisted, and a riot developed. This resulted

in the death of ten people, followed by the death of the Mau leader, Tupua Tamasese, while he had been attempting to calm the crowd. Marines from the cruiser "Dunedin" and police sought members of the Mau but they could not be found, until, eventually, the Mau leaders sought gave themselves up voluntarily.


3



THE SAME POLICY CONTINUES IN SAMOA.

Illustration 10: Severe crackdown by New Zealand on protests. Firth, NZ Samoan Guardian.





BRINGING UP SAMOA.

Illustration 11: Police clashed with procession in Apia, 1929.

Firth, NZ Samoan Guardian.

Allen returned to New Zealand in 1931. Fortunately, his replacement, General Herbut Hart, was a far more relaxed administrator, and this helped to slowly ease tensions in Samoa. The return of Olaf Nelson in 1933, however, led to the Mau becoming active again, and the administration deported him again a year later.

Following the handling of the riot in Apia, the Permanent Mandate's Commission in Geneva was becoming increasingly critical of New Zealand's performance in Samoa (Hempenstall and Rutherford, 1984:33). However, things improved with election of the Labour party in 1935, with Michael Savage as Prime Minister (ibid). This government had an affinity with the notions of Fabianism such as trusteeship. This led to their being sympathetic to the plight of the Samoans. The Labour government promised eventual Samoan self-government (Cambell, 1992:182). Soon after attaining office, they sent a goodwill mission to Samoa in an effort to restore harmony (Hempenstall and Rutherford, 1984:33). They cancelled Nelson's exile and the order declaring the Mau seditious was rescinded. Native tax arrears back to 1929 were written off (ibid). Elections were held to the faipule, of which increased numbers of Samoans were members (ibid). A Samoan became the chief of police (ibid). The increased political autonomy led to the Samoans co-operating with the New Zealand administration, so matters appeared to get back on an even keel, helped by improving export revenues, and improving health statistics (ibid).

Surprisingly, there was a question abroad in New Zealand in the late 1930s of whether Samoa ought to be returned to Germany's jurisdiction. This may have been prompted by the growing realisation (with the attendant guilt) of the negative aspects of New Zealand's record in administering Samoa, particularly compared to the success of the fourteen-year German administration. The issue was examined in a New Zealand Institute of International Affairs publication in 1937, where, rather laudably, the interests of Samoa under Germany or New Zealand were included, along with those of New Zealand and Germany's (New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1937:11). Concerns regarding the likely treatment of the Samoans under the Third Reich were somewhat ameliorated by the German's declaration that they considered Samoans to be honorary Aryans (ibid:10). However, on balance, it was thought that the attainment of political maturity in Samoa, enabling independence, would be more easily achieved under a continuity of mandate (ibid:11). And another concern was if Japan should become an ally of Germany in a future war, she would be able to build up a port in Samoa (ibid:13).

The new Prime Minister of New Zealand, Peter Fraser, who replaced Michael Savage on his death in 1940, believed countries should be able to determine their own form of government. During World War Two, the USA set up a port and airport in Samoa.

The temporary American occupation of the Second World War,<sup>62</sup> had also reawakened the desire for independence, and the withdrawal of the Americans with the attendant downturn in the economy sharpened opposition to the continuance of New Zealand's administration (Kirk, 1996:24). Peter Fraser attempted to improve living standards and education by funding economic development and scholarships from the profits from the Reparation Estates (these were finally returned to Samoa in 1957). Peter Fraser accepted Australian proposals in the 1944 Agreement. This required an advisory regulatory commission in South Pacific to be set up – whose ultimate objective was to 'decolonise island territories in a slow, orderly, peaceful manner', and in the interim, social, political and economic development was to be pursued (Boyd, 1984:301 – 303).

---

<sup>62</sup> One in six of the population of Samoa during the war was an American soldier (Kirk, 1996:24).



After World War Two, world opinion was more firmly in favour of indigenous peoples pursuing their own destiny, administering themselves -gaining genuine independence. The United Nations, initiated after the war, emphasised the rights of countries to self-govern and, as former colonies gained independence, their voice and vote was added to the assembly of the United Nations, so the call for de-colonisation grew. New Zealand was particularly vulnerable to such pressure as it was itself a small, uninfluential nation, and having only recently, in 1947, graduated from dominion to nation status, was prone to accusations of hypocrisy if it hindered other people's independence. However, New Zealand in fact took the offensive on the whole issue of colonies obtaining independence due to Peter Fraser and the Labour Party's view regarding the issue. Peter Fraser was one of the initiators of the United Nations Trusteeship Council. Peter Fraser was the first chair of the council, followed by the prominent New Zealand public servant, Carl Berensden. Samoa was the first country to be placed voluntarily under this system. New Zealand was seen as a gauge of the new system of trusteeship. Peter Fraser aspired to assist Pacific countries to achieve the same living conditions New Zealand enjoyed (Fraser, 1944:67).

The United Nations Charter placed greater emphasis than the League of Nations had on the attainment of 'self-government or independence' according to the 'particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned' (United Nations General Assembly, 1946:121). At this stage the colonial powers of the South Pacific decided to form a commission with representatives of their colonies, that would strive to maximise the welfare of the 'native inhabitants' of those colonies (Advisory Commission for the South Pacific, 1947:126).<sup>63</sup>

The Samoans petitioned the United Nations, acknowledging their improved position under the Trusteeship in comparison to the previous mandate, yet asking for self-government with New Zealand as 'protector and adviser' (Western Samoan Petition, 1947:149). They also sought the rejoining of the 'unnaturally divided'

---

<sup>63</sup> Article four of the South Pacific Commission's Charter involved the requirement for study and recommendations for the development of the economic, social rights and welfare of the inhabitants, particularly in respect of agriculture, communications, transport, fisheries, forestry, industry, labour, marketing, trade, finance, public works, education, health, *housing* and social welfare (South Pacific Commission, 1947:129), (my italics).

Samoa Islands (ibid). In response, New Zealand initiated a representative system of government with an elected majority in the legislature holding the purse strings (Hempenstall and Rutherford, 1984:42). A new Samoa Amendment Act of 1947 'gave increasing (political) responsibilities to the Samoan people' (Holland, 1953:310).<sup>64</sup> New Zealand also requested the Samoan leaders to draft a constitution (Hempenstall and Rutherford, 1984:42). New Zealand encouraged Samoa to design its own future (Cambell, 1992:191). A working party of Samoan leaders drew up constitutional recommendations that were endorsed by a convention representative of Samoan people (Hempenstall and Rutherford, 1984:42). This constitution was largely accepted by New Zealand (ibid). A timetable was produced by New Zealand in 1952, specifying self-government by 1959, full independence by 1962 (Campbell, 1992:191). A second working party developed an independent constitution (Hempenstall and Rutherford, 1984:42). They attempted to adapt the Westminster system to Samoan customs and traditions and Christian principles (ibid).<sup>65</sup> A plebiscite based on universal suffrage was then held in Samoa under United Nations supervision. Samoa became the first independent state of Polynesia on the 1<sup>st</sup> January, 1962 (Boyd, 1996:303 – 304).

Samoa sought independence due to a number of factors. The colonial powers Germany, the USA and Britain wrangling over it and the deals involved would have encouraged a certain amount of cynicism in the Samoan leaders. The radical change in colonial administration over it – from German to New Zealand - discouraged the growth of a mutual sense of loyalty between ruled and ruler. Another factor was that the Samoans were one cultural group, and the traditional rulers were retained, but saw their powers curtailed, leading to their encouragement of any agitation against the colonial administration. Also the emphasis of the colonial administrators on protecting the Samoans from exploitation by other races by keeping them separate from the Europeans and Chinese, led to little intermarrying, and thus minimal

---

<sup>64</sup> This Samoa Amendment Act replaced a New Zealand administration with a Samoan government headed by a High Commissioner, a Council of State with the Fautua, and a Legislative Assembly, elected, for the Samoans, through the hierarchy of Samoan matai (Hempenstall and Rutherford, 1984:42).

<sup>65</sup> The two highest titleholders became joint heads of state and another man became Prime Minister. The matai (elected family heads and titleholders) elected from amongst themselves forty-six members of Samoan Government. Two other members were elected by individual votes (Hempenstall and Rutherford, 1984:42).



integration with the colonial population. A contributing factor to the lack of integration was the sheer numbers of Samoans.

## **The Cook Islands**

The Cook Islands were preserved from some of the more exploitative practices of the early European traders (and some of the economic benefits of being a provisioning port) due to the lack of an adequate harbour – Papeete (Tahiti) and Apia (Samoa) were preferred. The Cook Islands also lacked the sandalwood that attracted traders to Fiji.<sup>66</sup>

Initially New Zealand's primary focus was on obtaining Samoa as a possession. As time went on, and the contesting of the Imperial powers over Samoa made this seem increasingly unlikely, New Zealand looked elsewhere for likely candidates. New Zealand had extensive business interests in the Cook Islands. Rarotonga was a particularly attractive possibility for New Zealand, in part due to its relatively close proximity, and also due to the readiness of its people to take part in a Western economy. Rarotonga was already a Christian country, and had willingly taken part in trade with Europeans for over a hundred years. In 1865, 'the native chiefs and European residents of Rarotonga' (all the European residents were British) petitioned Governor Grey of New Zealand for British protection due to rumours of French westward expansion from the Society Islands (Tahiti). The British Colonial Office refused as no English commercial interests were in the Cook Islands. Subsequent enquires by Lord Clarendon, of the Foreign Office, in Paris, failed to reveal any French designs against Rarotonga (Gilson, 1980:43) (Ross, 1964:66).

By 1874, an Auckland merchant, Mr Sterndale, commissioned by the New Zealand government to report on Rarotonga, was able to write that the villages were laid out in streets, the houses were made of stone and lime, and the people dressed nicely in European fabrics (Gilson, 1980:47). By the late 1870s, a monetary economy was already well established. New Zealanders increased their presence and investment in Rarotonga over the subsequent years. In the early 1880s, the Auckland

---

<sup>66</sup> Prayer of Rarotongan Chief, "Great Tangiia, send us a dead sea, send us a propitious gale, to bring the far-famed Cookees to our island, to give us nails and iron, and axes, let us see those out-riggerless canoes' (Denoon, 1997:141).

firm of Henderson and Macfarlane made extensive investments in several of the Cook Islands.<sup>67</sup> While these company's territorial claims were not legal, internationally, they did strengthen the validity of Britain's future claims to these islands (Ross:1964:171).

When in 1881 there were new rumours of French intervention, there was already sufficient New Zealand commercial interests in Rarotonga to convince the British Foreign Office of the necessity of providing some sort of protection. The British Foreign Office agreed to the appointing of a British Consul for the Hervey Islands (the Southern Group of the Cook Islands), on condition New Zealand paid his wages. In 1885, despite calls for annexation of Rarotonga, Britain disdained to act as she was having difficulties with France in the New Hebrides and did not want to incite France by establishing a British Protectorate so near the Society Islands (Tahiti) at that time (Gilson, 1980:58). In 1885, Britain was laying the Canada-Australasian cable, so she annexed Christmas Island, Tongareva (or Penrhyn) in 1885, and in 1889 annexed Suvarrow, Manihiki, Palmerston and Jarvis (Ross, 1969:171), none of which were considered part of the Cook Island group at that stage.

In 1885, the queen of Rarotonga, Makea Ariki, visited New Zealand with her retinue, and spoke with John Balance the Native Minister, conveying how Rarotonga needed British protection due to fears of German or French intervention. John Balance said that 'people should be allowed to work out their own destiny with as little interference as possible. If the islands were annexed to New Zealand, it should be a stipulation that the right of self-government to the people of Rarotonga and the other islands should be guaranteed' (Ross, 1964:237).

In May 1888, Queen Makea Ariki sent a strongly worded petition to the New Zealand Governor General to secure British protection for Rarotonga, in which she stated they were the same race as the Maori, they had been civilised by the missionaries, and already considered themselves to be British subjects. On 27<sup>th</sup>

---

<sup>67</sup> Auckland company, Henderson and Macfarlane's agent H.B. Sterndale, took possession of Suvarrow in 1875 (when it was uninhabited) and planted the island with 35,000 coconut trees and established buildings and wharves. 1881 – Jarvis Island, 1882 – Christmas Island: 30,000 coconut trees. Trading stations at Niue (at that stage part of Hervey Islands) and one at each of the two settlements at Manihiki (Ross, 1964: 170).



September 1888, a British Protectorate declared over the Southern Group. New Zealand was to administer the Cook Islands on Britain's behalf, and it was New Zealand who appointed the British Resident and paid for his salary (Ross, 1964:240).

The common people of the Cook Islands were the keenest on annexation, as they hoped it would lead to their benefiting from rights to own their own land. The arikis also saw advantages, both material and ideological, to becoming British citizens, as long as they retained power over local decisions. The missionaries were hoping that annexation would lead to stricter liquor laws, the maintenance of law and order. The European traders were hoping an impetus for increased economic<sup>68</sup> development would result (Ross, 1969:25).

The Cook Islands were annexed to New Zealand in 1901. New Zealand attempted to assert her rule over the Cook Islands through utilising their existing political structure, while ensuring that New Zealand had either exclusive rights to formulate legislation, or had rights of veto.<sup>69</sup> Initially, the arikis were happy with the new arrangement, as long as there was no introduction of any democratic or elective principle that might threaten their powers as hereditary holders of office (Ross, 1969:28).

Lieutenant-Colonel W.E. Gudgeon, was the first New Zealand Resident, living in Rarotonga from 1901 to 1909, and he introduced a land court into the Cook Islands to individualise land titles and encourage European settlement and Islander production in July 1902 (Boyd, 1996:300, Ross, 1969:27). Initially New Zealand sought to minimise the amount of income provided to the Cook Islands – the islands, had, after all, been able to supply its own needs previously. While the colonial administration was obviously a new expensive which had not had to be met previously, and as such small subsidies were provided to help the Cook Islands meet the costs of local

---

<sup>69</sup> The Cook and other Islands Government Act – continuation of Federal Government and the Native Councils under new titles: 'Federal Council' and 'Island Council'. All Cook Islands laws and customs that did not contravene Act remained, but Act authorised application of any New Zealand laws (other than liquor ones). Cook Island courts maintained, but New Zealand Supreme and Appeal Courts put in place above them. Makea Ariki 'head of government' but Resident Commissioner chief executive in practise as he put the laws into effect (Ross, 1969:28).

administration, New Zealand hoped to avoid a major outlay.<sup>70</sup> However, with the growing commercialisation of the society, there were increasing calls for improved infrastructure. And when Sir Maui Pomare began his tenure of the department, he stressed it was New Zealand's moral responsibility to develop the Cook Islands 'socially as well as economically' (Ross, 1969:46).<sup>71</sup> This led to an increase in spending on the Cook Islands. In 1936, New Zealand tax laws applied to the Cook Islands, however, many exemptions in the laws ensured it was applied to Europeans in the Cook Islands (ibid).

One of the driving impulses towards New Zealand providing more social services in the Cook Islands was the appalling health conditions there. Diseases such as tuberculosis, dysentery, yaws, filariasis, venereal diseases, eyes, ears and skin infections, and, in the northern group, leprosy, were rampant. Previously, the introduced diseases such as influenza, dysentery, venereal diseases and tuberculosis had led to the population plummeting from 14,000 in 1823 to 8,000 in 1900 (Ross, 1969:48). However, New Zealand did not address these conditions until the second decade of the twentieth century. Then swamps were drained, sanitary facilities were inspected, and people were encouraged to build and occupy traditional native-style houses instead of the poorly-ventilated coral lime buildings of the missionary era (ibid:50). Progress in health was made between 1930 and 1945.<sup>72</sup> However, in the mid-1940s, tuberculosis was still prevalent, due to the housing having deteriorated and overcrowding being common (ibid:52).

There also began to be increased spending by the New Zealand administration in the Cook Islands as the New Zealand administration saw the Cook Islands as being under tutelage until such time as they had learned to govern themselves.

---

<sup>70</sup> Between 1901 and 1912, the Liberals did not spend more than L5,000 in total on the Cook Islands. The Cook Islands Administration was funded from tariffs (not taxes). Between 1903 and 1912 a L5,000 'emergency fund' was built up. The New Zealand government also provided a schooner, subsidised a school, and undertook modest public works (Ross, 1969:46).

<sup>71</sup> As a result, by 1920, New Zealand was spending L7,500 on the Cook Islands *per annum* (Ross, 1969:46).

<sup>72</sup> Infant mortality in the Cook Islands was at 27% of live births in 1948, but this had dropped to 4% by 1965 (Ross, 1969:102).



And it was felt that political progress could not occur until the level of European education achieved by the bulk of the population was higher (Ross, 1969:32). New Zealand used the New Zealand syllabus to 'Europeanise the islanders through formal education' (ibid). New Zealand through individualising land titles, as well as through the education system reduced adherence to collective principles (ibid). This led to the arikis complaining to a New Zealand Parliamentary party visiting in 1920 that their mana was being eroded, as their people were perceiving themselves as being as good as their chiefs and taking no notice of their authority (ibid).<sup>73</sup> However, once it was realised in 1912 that the native population had begun to increase, New Zealand took it for granted that no more land should be leased to Europeans.<sup>74</sup>

New Zealand expected the Cook Islands to trade in an open market, and followed a hands-off policy to commercial relations between European traders (predominantly New Zealanders) and the Rarotongans. European traders got half of space available on ships. New Zealand auctioneers began to buy direct through European traders. When Rarotongan returned servicemen rioted against traders in 1919 and attempted to export fruit themselves, traders claimed the shipping space and would not provide cases. When the growers appealed to the New Zealand administration, they were supplied with cases and shipping space – as a result the growers cleared almost four times as much as they had been receiving from the European traders.<sup>75</sup> While New Zealand put efforts into the Cook Islands developing crops for export, she did not protect the Cook Islands exports to New Zealand. Thus the Cook Islands were left exposed to competition from other exporters, and with the uncertainties of shipping, and inadequate marketing, the Cook Island produce often lost out to competition from Tahiti, Tonga, Fiji, Samoa and Australia (Ross 1969:34).<sup>76</sup> As Unilever Combination had taken control of the world market in copra in 1929, causing a crash in the world price, the Cook Islanders became dependent on revenue earned from exporting fruit instead. Although the price of copra recovered on

---

<sup>73</sup> 1,400 acres of Rarotonga leased to Europeans by 1906, Rarotongans only cultivating 3,000 acres (Ross, 1969:35).

<sup>74</sup> By 1922, total of 1,700 acres leased to Europeans (Ross, 1969:35).

<sup>75</sup> The traders had been giving them 2s6d, but the growers cleared 10s/case when they exported the fruit themselves (Ross, 1969:38).

<sup>76</sup> Between 1908 and 1942, the Cook Islands depended on the Union Steam Ship Company of New Zealand. These ships called on Tahiti first – the Cook Islands only got space left over. Ships slow and not refrigerated (Ross, 1969:38).

the Britain Ministry of Food taking over copra distribution in 1942, too many growers had lost confidence in the crop and had even removed coconut trees to grow fruit trees (Ross, 1969, 43).

With annexation in 1901 the Cook Islanders had officially become New Zealanders and so had free access to New Zealand (Crocombe, 1992:5-6). However, until the 1950s a police clearance was required and sometimes also a clearance from the person's local chief. Most people only came for short visits – for education, to work, to visit friends and family (ibid). It was not until after World War Two that people began migrating to New Zealand to stay for good (ibid). This was in part due to the burgeoning economy of New Zealand during the 1950s and 1960s that provided plenty of employment to new arrivals (ibid). Also, back in the Cook Islands, as the market economy and with it aspirations for more material possessions, as well as the effect of higher education, permeated through the society, more and more people sought paid employment – of which there was a scarcity in the Cook Islands (ibid). Village life was also often found by residents to be too constrictive, prone to disputes and gossip, and young people especially sought to escape such strictures, in the anonymity of a new community (ibid). This anonymity was more likely to be experienced by Cook Islanders in New Zealand than by Samoans, as Cook Islanders had smaller communities already in New Zealand, and were also far more likely to marry non-Cook Islanders (ibid). And terms of overseas employment were considered very prestigious back home in the Cook Islands (ibid).

The northern group of islands, being coral atolls, had rather limited agriculture, and were reliant predominantly on coconuts, fish and some copra. Manihiki and Penrhyn also harvested pearl shell (Ross, 1969:34). These islands were also beyond most shipping lanes, and occasional cyclones 'brought exports to a standstill and made food supplies scarce' (ibid). Manihiki had frequent ship visits due to the pearl shell – however most islands of the northern group had only annual ship visits (Ross, 1969:89). New Zealand funded pearl shell research in the 1950s and early 1960s and this 'proved helpful in determining the length of time the lagoons should be left open for diving' (Ross, 1969:98). However, by the late 1960s, the northern atolls were progressively emptying due to atoll conditions being 'incompatible with twentieth century living' (Ross, 1969:305).



Three Maori New Zealand Ministers were in charge of Cook Island Affairs during the first part of the twentieth century: 1909 – 1934; Sir James Carroll (1909 – 1912), Sir Apirina Ngata (1912 – 1928) and Sir Maui Pomare (1928 – 1934) (Ross, 1969:32).

A comprehensive mission was sent to the Cook Islands in August 1954; Clifton Webb, Minister of Island Territories; Dr Beeby, Director of Education; J.M. Wogan, Director of the tuberculosis division of the Health Department and C.W. Turner, Engineer-in-Chief of the Ministry of Works. 'Wogan noted that tuberculosis was a considerable problem and plans were made for the improvement of housing, since much Cook Island housing was substandard, even by Polynesian standards' (Ross, 1969:78).

In June 1957 the New Zealand government approved a housing improvement scheme. The 'direct subsidy scheme' operated for three years, and under this scheme free roofing material was issued to Cook Islanders who erected new houses or renovated existing ones to approved standards. Simple house plans and construction hints were circulated throughout the group, and by the time the scheme stopped in 1960, 145 houses had received free roofing material to a value of L8,000. Under the Cook Islands Amendment Act of 1958, a loan scheme under the auspices of the 'Housing Improvement Scheme' was enacted. The loans were given for the construction of new houses, the repair or alteration of existing houses and the purchase and improvement of building sites.<sup>77</sup> Under the Cook Islands Amendment Act of 1960, the scheme was extended to cover freehold land as well as leasehold, and a Housing Improvement Board was established to administer the advances from the Housing Improvement Fund. In 1961 the Minister of Island Territories directed the Board to allocate loans of up to L200 more liberally. These measures led to a great demand for the loans. By mid-1965, 1,055 loan applications had been received, and

---

<sup>77</sup> A housing improvement revolving fund of L150,000, taken up at a maximum of L20,000 annually, formed the basis of the scheme. Loans were limited to L2,000, repayable at 5% over fifteen years; there was provision for suspensory loans and 3% loans for low income borrowers (Ross, 1969:100).

748 approved, to a total value of L172,275.<sup>78</sup> The Housing Improvement Scheme also provided finance for the Cook Islands Co-operative and Thrift and Loan Society (whose members were public servants) for relending to its members to cover the erection or repair of houses.<sup>79</sup> The Housing Improvement Society had a marked effect on housing standards, particularly in Rarotonga, and led to the building of new homes in permanent materials (Ross, 1969:100-101).



Illustration 12: Style of house funded through above scheme.

---

<sup>78</sup> As the maximum of L200,000 per annum advanced to the scheme in any one year was insufficient to meet the demand, the Cook Islands Legal Association was empowered to lend the Housing Improvement Fund up to L10,000 in any one year from its own funds (Ross, 1969:101).

<sup>79</sup> This assistance was given between 1958 and 1960, when L5,000 was lent to the society (Ross, 1969:101).





Illustration 13: Basic house funded by scheme, added onto later.

De-colonisation of the Cook Islands started later and proceeded faster than that of Samoa's. The Cook Islands after 1945 became increasingly dependant financially and psychologically on New Zealand. Not all the Cook Islands were represented on the Legislative Council and there was not any real sense of Cook Island identity. There was also a need to increase local revenue, but the Islanders were reluctant to pay more tax.

However, unrest amongst the Cook Island population during World War Two resulted when the broadly based Cook Islands Progressive Association, formed by Albert Henry, attempted to improve wages and returns to fruit growers and shipping (Campbell, 1992:198). This led to industrial action on the Rarotonga waterfront from 1946 until 1948, which was supported by left wing people in New Zealand (ibid). The Cook Islands Progressive Association was then able to organise around the issue of gaining self-government for the Cook Islands, which led to the formation of a political party, the Cook Islands Party (ibid). To address the economic concerns of those involved, in the 1940s, the Fraser Government undertook citrus replanting, provided bigger subsidies for works and services and initiated some local political representation in an advisory Legislative Council and Island Councils (Boyd, 1996:301). But New Zealand was less keen to assist the Cook Islands to



independence. An economic survey in 1955 noted an increasing desire among the Cook Island people to 'approximate a New Zealand standard of living, and more and more were migrating to New Zealand to achieve this' (Ross, 1969:79). In 1956, Doctor Aikman conducted a constitutional survey. He commented that it was 'unlikely that the Cook Islands (would) become a viable economic unit capable of maintaining its indigenous inhabitants at a standard of living which their increasing familiarity with Western standards (would) lead them to expect' (Ross, 1969:84). This was considered to be the case due to the small population, the dispersed nature of the fifteen islands concerned and the dependence of the banana industry on the New Zealand market (Campbell, 1992:198). The Cook Island leaders were also aware of these limitations, so chose to pursue self-government, rather than full independence (ibid).

In 1954, the New Zealand government commissioned an economic survey of the Cook Islands. It stressed the need for Islands to be given more responsibility and more aid. Minister of Island Territories, Clifton Webb, began move towards 'greater autonomy in local affairs through greater self-sufficiency'. Two constitutional surveys were undertaken, however the progress was slow and halting. The lack of secondary education was considered to be an insurmountable difficulty according to the Resident Commissioner, Mr Nevill, and he did not avidly pursue getting members of new Legislative Council to participate in the Executive. The elected members themselves depended on New Zealand officials. In 1962, New Zealand handed over budgetary control of New Zealand subsidies to the Assembly and provided these for three-year terms; to facilitate local initiative, self-help and planned development. Then Mr Dare became Resident Commissioner and this led to the pace of change accelerating. The new Minister of Internal Affairs offered four constitutional alternatives to the Legislative Assembly. The self-government option was chosen. A constitution was hammered out based on the Westminster model and the position of the ariki (high chiefs) was ignored at that stage (Boyd, 1996:305 – 308).

The Cook Islands were de-colonised within the United Nations framework. In 1960 New Zealand voted for the United Nation's Declaration Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. New Zealand exerted pressure on the United Nations to grant the Cook Islands self-government. But the Cook Islands



feared it would weaken ties to New Zealand and lead to the loss of their free entry to New Zealand and a severe reduction in financial aid. Nearly a quarter of the Cook Islands population was living in New Zealand at independence – a special relationship was devised to preserve for all Cook Islanders their New Zealand citizenship and rights of free entry and aid.<sup>80</sup> It has been asserted that the settlement was an uncommonly generous one on New Zealand's part (Cambell, 1992:198). The settlement was said to give the Cook Islands the 'esteem of nationhood without the hazards of independence', yet it also gave the Cook Islands the option of declaring full independence at any point in the future (ibid). While the major difference between full independence and self-government was that with self-government New Zealand would continue to administer Foreign Affairs on behalf of the Cook Islands, in late 1960 the Cook Islands appointed their first external affairs officer. And in the early 1970s an external affairs division was created within the Cook Island Government. In the early 1980s the Cook Islands appointed its own Minister of External Affairs. The Cook Islands have 'joined an increasing range of international organisations, and signed a growing range of international treaties in its own right' (Crocombe, 1992:17). And with every constitutional change, the Cook Islands have widened their own sphere of 'independent action' (ibid). The 1965 elections saw the return of Albert Henry from Auckland – his Cook Islands Party swept the polls. The opportunity to exercise power and responsibility rapidly revived local leadership and initiative.

## Conclusion

While New Zealand had ended the nineteenth century wishing to acquire colonies, the actual experience of having colonies along with changing attitudes towards colonialism, both internationally and domestically, led to a dramatic change in heart. New Zealand actively assisted Samoa in achieving full independence. And while New Zealand did not think the Cook Islands ready for full independence in the 1960s, she supported the Cook Islands in obtaining as much independence as they wished for, even putting in place an agreement to maintain those elements of the Cook Islands relationship with New Zealand that the people of the Cook Islands wanted to retain the most. The next chapter will examine how both the Cook Islands and Samoa fared after independence.

---

<sup>80</sup> In 1992, 70% of Cook Islanders live in New Zealand and Australia (Crocombe, 1992:7).

## **POST-COLONIAL SITUATION**

## **Introduction**

In following on from the previous chapter that focused on the relationship between New Zealand and Samoa and the Cook Islands, this chapter begins with an analysis of the relationship between these countries on independence. New Zealand perceived building a good relationship with her former colonies as being very important, and to facilitate this, New Zealand became very involved in providing aid to both countries, though to varying degrees. This fact leads to an exploration of the history of New Zealand's approach to aid in general in this chapter, and including a segment on the particular importance of disaster relief for these cyclone-vulnerable countries. The circumstances in which Samoa and the Cook Islands found themselves on independence are then examined. These circumstances and New Zealand's commitment to involvement with the two countries, in large part through providing aid, led to and enabled many South Pacific micro-states, including Samoa and the Cook Islands, to adopt a range of strategies to maximise their lifestyles. This chapter concludes with an examination of these factors.

## **New Zealand and her Ex-colonies and Aid**

New Zealand's involvement in giving practical assistance to other countries dates back a century with Richard Seddon's offers to island rulers back in 1900. New Zealand also gave government assistance in response to emergencies such as flood, famines and earthquakes in the first half of that century it was, however, ad hoc (New Zealand Foreign Affairs, 1981:7). Most historians date New Zealand's entry into the international aid arena and the world of planned assistance, from January 1950, at the Commonwealth Ministers' Meeting at Colombo, Ceylon (now known as Sri Lanka). This was where Australia, Ceylon and New Zealand presented proposals involving countries in South and South East Asia being in a mutual support relationship with Commonwealth countries.<sup>81</sup> As New Zealand had a long tradition of private and institutional giving to relieve hunger, disease and distress overseas, the public supported the government in its involvement in aid (Wade, 1962:81). While the

---

<sup>81</sup> England wanted it to be open to non-Commonwealth countries - initially twenty-two nations, sixteen of which were primarily recipients, and six major donors; Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Britain, Japan and the United States. As New Zealand did not make the industrial machinery other donors could offer, she provided untied grants for specific projects, which enabled the country concerned to shop around the international market and purchase the most appropriate, best priced equipment (New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1968:34).



international impetus towards giving other countries aid was initially directed at assisting reconstruction after the Second World War, this changed to assisting countries with low living standards by 1950, and with the commencement of the Colombo Plan, New Zealand joined this trend.

This new focus on international assistance was ascribed to the war having led to recognition of the 'oneness of the world and the direct interdependence of nations' (Wade, 1962:80). Another cause of the international focus was a growing fear of communism, and the realisation that only by giving the 'masses of Asia, Africa, etc, a better life, and a stake in social and political stability' could communism be curbed (ibid). There was also awareness that 'raising the purchasing power of people' would have a beneficial effect on trade. In reference to New Zealand's change in attitude towards the Pacific Islands, one writer commented that New Zealand's 'nineteenth century chauvinism gave way after World War Two to pragmatism and generosity' (Deryk Scarr, 1979:80). From then until 1973, New Zealand had a comprehensive aid programme. There was a 'continuous moral and political pressure, both internally and internationally, on all countries to expand their aid programmes and make them more effective' (R.H. Wade, 1962:81). The Colombo Plan, and its many practical achievements netted for New Zealand a degree of moral prestige (R.H. Wade, 1962:83). The contributions to the Colombo plan averaged about a quarter of the funds devoted to foreign aid annually. Though until Samoa's independence in 1962, and the Cook Islands achieving self-government in 1965, these countries, along with Niue and the Tokelau Islands, were New Zealand territories, and so it would not be strictly accurate to describe monies given to them prior to those dates as aid. And, initially, such financial support was not labelled as aid in the Governments' accounts. However, with the growth in international interest in aid and the focus on what portion of the budget developed countries devoted to aid, New Zealand began to describe support to those island countries as 'aid'.

In 1967, New Zealand had crept up to 0.34%.<sup>82</sup> Increasingly through the late 1960s calls were made by different social commentators to increase New Zealand's ODA vote, and also to focus more on the Pacific. It was felt even with the small

---

<sup>82</sup> In 1964, New Zealand's ODA was 0.25% of her GDP, whereas France spent 2%, and USA and Britain spent 1% each. (Wood, 1967:22)



amounts involved in New Zealand's ODA, significant progress could be achieved – and only New Zealand had the knowledge and understanding to do it (Wood, 1967:22). And at that time, with the breaking up of previous European empires in the Pacific, there was finally an opportunity for New Zealand to have a major role in the Pacific (Brown, 1970:33). There were few other serious contenders for the mantle of major aid donor in the South Pacific – most European powers preferred to focus back on Europe.

In 1973, the New Zealand government re-evaluated her foreign assistance policy, under the leadership of the Prime Minister, Norman Kirk. This led to a greater focus on New Zealand's immediate neighbourhood, with most of an increased level of funding going to islands in the South Pacific, reducing the level of support for Africa and South Asia. (Marshall, 1988:26) (Needs, 1988:11).<sup>83</sup> Ron Crocombe asserts that as the South Pacific Islands gained independence and could 'wield political power in its own right', it made sense to reallocate the bulk of New Zealand's aid to those islands (Crocombe, 1992:72). New Zealand's primary concern in the South Pacific was with her territories – past and present (Marshall, 1988:26). This was the case with every metropolitan power in the Pacific – they gave most to those they had previously had an association with.<sup>84</sup>

The directing of aid to former colonial dependants was seen as a moral imperative – by having been involved in the Pacific Islands, the metropolitan powers 'had irretrievably altered the islands' economies and way of life (Thompson, 1967:7). However, New Zealand, being a major country in the South Pacific, felt it also owed a 'duty of neighbourly assistance' to other islands – especially towards former British colonies, with Britain a world away (ibid). However, it has been argued that the need of the Pacific recipients was not the deciding factor in the growth of aid to the region through the 1970s, or even the burgeoning guilt of the former colonial powers (Sevele, 1987:72). But rather the strategic interests of those powers, and to support

---

<sup>83</sup> 1972 – 1973: New Zealand aid to the South Pacific: \$8.3 million  
1975 – 1976: New Zealand aid to the South Pacific: \$21 million (Needs, 1988:11).

<sup>84</sup> Australia: 84 % of total ODA goes to Papua New Guinea, French territories receives 98.3% of its aid from France. The Pacific Islands Trust Territories receives 98.6% of its aid from USA. New Zealand: 56% of total aid goes to the Cook Islands (Thakur, 1985:24).

this claim the fact that many of the donor economies were contracting, due to the oil crisis, yet the aid was increasing, is offered as evidence (ibid).

This major realignment in New Zealand's primary area of focus from Europe to her immediate neighbours in the Pacific has been attributed to the abandonment by Mother England with her entry into the European Economic Union – an event of psychological significance for New Zealand as well as economic significance. New Zealand's own reluctance to separate from Britain has been perceived as 'anachronistic imperial thinking and an unwillingness to face the responsibilities of independence' – however, New Zealand was economically almost totally dependent on Britain, virtually 'an outlying British farm' (Bennett, 1988:3). As a senior public servant of the time, Carl Berendsen put it; 'We had all the self-government we wanted. We were doing all right without it' (Ross, 1978). These circumstances and sentiments very clearly echo those of the people of the Cook Islands (as well as those in Niue and the Tokelaus). And this goes some way to explaining our empathy for and protectiveness of the Cook Islands when the people wanted to go no further than self-government in 1965.

Thus through a closer relationship with her former colonies, the governing class of New Zealand, aware they were lacking the 'legitimacy of indigeness' were hoping 'to assuage the guilt of a colonial hangover' (Crocombe, 1992:224). New Zealand also needed to be able to interact with her Polynesian neighbours to such as that made by an Asian minister can no longer be applied to New Zealand; "(New Zealand) is some sort of European Noah's Ark adrift on a sea of Asian influence" (Rowling, 1975:13). While Pakeha have come to accept that New Zealand is a Pacific country, they are taking longer to realise that they too are Pacific Islanders. Some Maori commentators suspect that this reticence is a reflection of Pakeha unwillingness to acknowledge the Maori as the true tangata whenua of New Zealand (Ihimaera, 1985:129). Yet it had been argued, more than a decade earlier, that New Zealand is: 'primarily a Pacific Power; if we do not accept the implications of our geographic and historical situation and of the dual racial origin of our people, our foreign policy will not be fully realistic, consistent or effective' (Corner, 1962:132).



For the Maori of New Zealand, they originate from the tropical islands of Polynesia, and their whakapapa outlines the 'right of Maori to their Pacific legacy' (Ihimaera, 1985:129). Even the points of the Maori compass indicated their tropical heritage – north was Tokerau (Tokelau), east was Rawhiti (Tahiti), south was Tonga and west was Nauauru (Nauru) (ibid:132). However, for most people the truth of this did not strike home until the early 1970s. Some Maori commentators have stressed that what ought to be sought in economic matters and international relations is a whanau relationship between all the Pacific Islands including New Zealand (ibid). Genuine awareness of the Pacific nature of New Zealand ought to also involve welcoming fellow Pacific Islanders without restriction to New Zealand, to be at all consistent (ibid). The claim that New Zealand had an obligation to admit any Pacific Islander who wished to settle in New Zealand, as she had those of British descent, to more truly reflect the 'dual origin of our citizens' had been made as early as 1962 (Corner, 1962:151). Certainly any perusal of a world map would indicate New Zealand is a more logical 'overflow' country for the populations of the Cook Islands than for those of the British Isles. The Labour Government felt they would command greater sway in the international arena if they could show they were taking their perceived responsibility for the welfare of the South Pacific nations seriously (Corner, 1962:148). Other commonalities claimed include the economic concerns we all face in being price takers of primary produce, and our isolation from the world markets (Laidlaw, 1985:111).

It has been mooted that New Zealand hoped to extend her sphere of influence, through influencing the Island governments' votes in regional and national forums. As more islands gained independence, New Zealand's horizons widened as new relationships developed, creating a microcosm of Britain's relationship with the Commonwealth countries. It has been argued that it was in New Zealand (and Australia's) interest to have an agreed regional policy in which they want to have a major role in shaping and coordinating it, while preferring to project an image of being equal partners (with the Island leaders) in a consensus. This is difficult, especially where the overall policy involves components against the island's interests. To ease this, New Zealand provides assistance – security related and otherwise – 'weaving a network of mutual obligation and commitment' (Crocombe, 1992:213).

Certainly, initially, on independence, both Samoa and the Cook Islands were content for New Zealand to guide their Foreign Affairs, as they had sought independence for domestic reasons, and were not seeking a different sphere of influence than that of the Commonwealth (Fifteenth Foreign Policy School, 1980:26). And as independence had been achieved through a peaceful process, it was not necessary for the islands concerned to seek other allies to achieve their objectives (ibid). It has been argued that the mechanism through which New Zealand was able to achieve loyalty to her foreign policy objectives is through the micro-states dependence on New Zealand's aid, a dependence resulting from the isolation and lack of resources of most of the micro-states (ibid:28). It has also been argued that the interest many of the South Pacific Islands have in maintaining custom and tradition, and the resolutely Christian nature of these states, reinforces a disinclination to adopt any radical changes in foreign policy (ibid:30). Thus, while New Zealand was a small player on the international scene, in her own backyard many small nations relied on her support. How well New Zealand responded to this need, was an important component in her foreign policy and the conduct of her international affairs.

However, with the ascendancy of Japan and other Asian countries, the Pacific basin grew in importance in geopolitical terms (Fifteenth Foreign Policy School, 1980:28) and the island states began to be courted by these countries, as well as by New Zealand. Although the island states initially, at least, were receptive to such overtures, most islands still looked to their original relationships. However, as a new generation of leaders replaced those that were in place at independence, the sentimental ties of tradition lessened while pragmatism increased (ibid:27). Though the initial leaders were not necessarily partial to the decolonising power. The first two heads of the Cook Islands government, Sir Albert Henry and Sir Thomas Davis, both wanted the Cook Islands to sever the relationship with New Zealand, to be completely independent and autonomous. However, as the people of the Cook Islands including the cabinet ministers, wanted to retain their free access to New Zealand, and via New Zealand, to Australia, the primacy of the relationship with New Zealand was maintained (Crocombe, 1992:17).<sup>85</sup>

---

<sup>85</sup> Cook Island citizens are able to hold New Zealand passports as of right (Crocombe, 1992:17).



It has been argued that the isolation and lack of resources of most of micro-states tied them to dependence on aid which in turn tied them to the donor's foreign policy objectives (Fifteenth Foreign Policy School, 1980:28). It has also been argued that the interest many of the South Pacific Islands have in maintaining custom and tradition, reinforces a disinclination to adopt any radical changes in foreign policy (ibid:30). And since the end of the Cold War, there are no longer any obvious contenders for the role of Australia and New Zealand's in the Pacific – even Japan, though now a major contributor of aid in the region, has a very minimal diplomatic role (ibid). While New Zealand has managed to develop close relationships with Samoa, Niue, the Tokelau and the Cook Islands it has been claimed that there is an element of stewardship remaining that can make the relationship awkward (Laidlaw, 1985:110).

For Prime Minister Norman Kirk, the types of assistance given must have 'choices and priorities that must be theirs alone!' (Marshall, 1988:26). Much of the aid through the 1960s and into the 1970s still dealt with infrastructure – roads in Samoa, schools and hurricane relief centres in Fiji, electricity in Niue, though under the Labour Government, increasing impetus was given to self-sufficiency. New Zealand was greatly assisted in building stronger relationships with its fellow Pacific Islanders by Norman Kirk's 'personal interest in the Pacific and his good rapport with Island leaders' (Marshall, 1988:29). On the death of Norman Kirk in 1974, Wallace Rowling became Prime Minister, and through worsening economic conditions, was able to give less attention to foreign affairs than Kirk, however they were conducted 'diligently and prudently if not inspired' (Wood and Alley, 1979:80).

With the change in government in 1975, and the commencement of the long reign of Robert Muldoon, foreign affairs received greater focus. Muldoon encouraged development of regional bodies in the Pacific, and he himself attended every one of the South Pacific Forum meetings during his tenure. While not many leaders found him very personable, easy to get along with, they respected his forthrightness and dedication (Crocombe, 1983). Sir Robert Muldoon was prepared to attempt to use aid as a political tool, in manipulating political outcomes in the Cook Islands. He kept New Zealand's financial contribution to the Cook Islands constant during his first term in office, which caused it to decline in real terms during those inflationary times,

in an attempt to terminate Sir Albert Henry's term in office, who Muldoon suspected of 'unethical practices' (Crocombe, 1992:172).<sup>86</sup> While occasionally there have been accusations of corruption in some states, which seem to have been well founded in some instances, this is hardly surprising in such small communities where kinship claims are paramount (ibid:219).

Ron Crocombe points to the importance of the relationship between the heads of government in cementing relations between New Zealand and the Cook Islands. Prior to Norman Kirk, the Prime Ministers of New Zealand were cordial to the heads of the Pacific Islands, but it was only with Kirk that these relationships became close, Kirk having great personal interest in the Islands. Kirk was considered a personal friend by many heads of the governments of the Islands. Sir Robert Muldoon, while never achieving the personally close relationships that Kirk did, was keenly interested in the Islands and was considered 'the most responsive and reliable' of any at the Pacific Forums.<sup>87</sup>

The relationship between New Zealand and Samoa was going well until the mid-1970s, when an economic downturn in New Zealand led to a crack down on over-stayers. There were large numbers of over-stayers in New Zealand at the time due to the severe economic pressures in Samoa through the sixties and early seventies, so many people came over on three month work permits, then stayed on (Boyd, 1996:315).<sup>88</sup> This crackdown on over-stayers led to a souring of relations between the governments of New Zealand and Samoa (and that of Tonga), and the returning over-stayers increased pressure on resources in Samoa (ibid). However, the reaction to the situation was relatively subdued due to the reliance of many islands on New Zealand's assistance at the time (ibid) and (Hearn, 1980:1). It has been suggested that it was the over-stayer crackdown that led to many islands seeking out other countries to form close relationships with (ibid). The Prime Minister, Sir Robert Muldoon, attempted to explain New Zealand's position to the island leaders, but insensitive comments by the Ministers of Police and Immigration jettisoned these efforts

---

<sup>86</sup> Sir Robert Muldoon's first term as Prime Minister from 1975 until 1978 (Personal knowledge).

<sup>87</sup> During Muldoon's nine years as Prime Minister, he never missed a single Pacific Forum meeting – the only member to have been able to claim this (Crocombe, 1992:177).

<sup>88</sup> It is estimated that there were between ten and twelve thousand overstayers in New Zealand at the time (Boyd, 1996:316).



(ibid:316). Sir Brian Tallboys went on a five-nation tour of Pacific island states in 1977, in an attempt to improve relations between respective governments (ibid).

In 1982, Mr Lesa sought a Privy Council's ruling on the legality of Samoan's seeking residence in New Zealand (Boyd, 1996:316). Their conclusion was that anyone born in Western Samoa between 1924 and 1948 were British subjects and therefore New Zealand citizens with free entry to New Zealand (ibid). At the time, this involved three fifths of the Samoan population, or one hundred thousand people (ibid). This led to some rather panicked negotiations between representatives of the Samoan and New Zealand governments. A Protocol was added to the original Treaty of Friendship, where all previous convictions against overstaying were quashed, and all Western Samoan citizens resident in New Zealand could become New Zealand citizens (ibid:317).

In December 1986, the new Labour Government of New Zealand relaxed immigration restrictions (Boyd, 1996:317). This led to the arrival of eleven thousand people, so the government abruptly ended the visa-free period on the 17<sup>th</sup> February, 1987 (ibid). By then there were 12,893 visitors – 5,377 Samoans, 4,144 Tongans and 3,372 Fijians (ibid). A large number of these visitors managed to extend their stay to a year (ibid). There continued to be a concern with over-stayers, however there were definite racist overtones with the perception of the problem – in 1986 only a third of the over-stayers in New Zealand were Pacific Islanders, yet they were 86% of those prosecuted (ibid). And the movements of population within the Pacific were more complex than most realised (ibid). By the 1980s New Zealand's gain in population from the South Pacific was heavily outweighed by the emigration of New Zealand born people of Pacific Island extraction to Australia (ibid).

By the end of the 1970s, the concerns of the recipients was being considered more and more, and increasingly the aid programmes were tailored to the recipient countries' requirements and the language used endeavoured to dignify the 'development co-operation' partnership (New Zealand Conference on International Development, 1979). Ever since the early 1970s, the New Zealand government has repeatedly set targets of increased GDP proportion to be allocated to aid – and time

and again has failed to meet those targets.<sup>89</sup> However, the existence of the targets shows at least the intent on the government's part to do more to assist people in other countries – even if economic realities and hard-nosed pragmatism keep winning out over those intentions. The argument always made to justify low levels of ODA assistance – insufficient public support – was somewhat confounded when a survey by the Advisory Committee on External Aid and Development found widespread support for development cooperation, particularly for disaster relief. The depth of New Zealanders' support for aid was shown on a personal level in 1985. Just two weeks after a national Telethon raised two million dollars, during the International Band Aid spectacular, New Zealand pledged the most in relation to their GDP of any country - after Ireland (the birthplace of Sir Bob Geldof, the initiator of the concert).

Economic restructuring of New Zealand, involved a pared down government sector and an attempt to revert to charitable institutions supplying social services rather than the government. Increasing calls for NGOs and the private sector to join in with the government in the provision of ODA. Certainly, the severe budget restrictions on government spending affected the level of ODA during the late 1980s. Again with the advent of the 1990s, the importance of the South Pacific to New Zealand was underlined.<sup>90</sup> Fran Wilde, minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, commented that due to New Zealand's experience at having to produce what the market wants, we were well suited to take on board what our development partners require from us and supply it accordingly (New Zealand's Development Assistance, 1990:14). At least, whatever else New Zealand does or does not achieve in the field of foreign assistance, she has not actually added to the debt burden of the countries concerned, as New Zealand continues the worthy tradition of giving skills, material assets and grants, outright, rather than through concessional loans. Also by not officially tying aid, at least in theory, the recipients have been able to maximise the potential value of the package – however, in practice, New Zealand businesses and

---

<sup>89</sup> In 1990, it was recommended that 0.35% (DAC average in 1990) could be reached in New Zealand in ten years – actual 1999 level: 0.27%.

<sup>90</sup> Fran Wilde, Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time said: 'The South Pacific is where our small amounts of money can have the most impact. It is where we have special constitutional relationships to uphold. ...we can offer practical assistance deriving from the special affinities that exist' (New Zealand's Development Assistance, 1990:11).



products win the majority of contracts.<sup>91</sup> New Zealand's approach to not officially tying aid or expecting its contribution to be repaid appears to have had an impact on the policies of other countries giving aid in the region, as referred to in the chapter on aid.<sup>92</sup>

Many Pacific Island leaders believed New Zealand has an implicit responsibility to assist in attempts at development in those nations – '... most appropriate strategy for New Zealand is to restrict its ODA to the Pacific region only. ... New Zealand's rightful duty to supplement the ongoing processes in the respective Pacific Island countries aiming at improving the quality of life of their populations' (Paeniu, 1990:14). New Zealand has been perceived by Pacific Island people as being a part of the region, not just as an external country with interests in the region. They know New Zealand does not have 'the size, power or the inclination to over-awe them' (Brown, 1970:35).

From the early 1960s, there was a marked disparity in the level of aid New Zealand gave to the Cook Islands when compared to the level given to Samoa.<sup>93</sup> This disparity results from the Cook Islands still being in an association with New Zealand, while Samoa had gained its independence in 1962. The justification being that, with the Cook Islanders and their open access to New Zealand, any resources invested in their health and education was in actuality an internal benefit (to New Zealand) as they may well then migrate to New Zealand. And the Cook Islanders, while New Zealand citizens, lived a life of fewer facilities and conveniences in comparison with those on the mainland. The low level of aid Samoa received was probably a direct consequence of their becoming independent – of all the Pacific Islands, only Tonga (which had always been independent) received less aid than Samoa. However, at a conference on international development in 1967, there was a call for New Zealand to devote more aid to Samoa. By 1992, 70% of New Zealand's aid is bilateral. Most of the aid goes to the people of the Cook Islands, the Tokelaus and Niue, for, while they

---

<sup>91</sup> 1989: 200 contracts of NZODA awarded to New Zealand consultants and firms and thirty New Zealand experts were employed as special advisors (New Zealand's Development Assistance, 1990:14).

<sup>92</sup> While overall, some 50% of Japan's aid is in the form of grants rather than loans, in the South Pacific, some 80% of her aid is in the form of grants. (Sasaki, 1993:E7.1).

<sup>93</sup> In 1965, New Zealand gave the Cook Islands L870,700, while Samoa received L135,000 (Thompson, 1967:14).

are better off than most of the people in the South Pacific, being New Zealand citizens they have first call on New Zealand's aid (Crocombe, 1992:74).

New Zealand devises a separate development aid strategy in consultation with each South Pacific Island country's government it gives aid to. In the Cook Islands, the bulk of the aid goes to health and education (Crocombe, 1992:76). The greatest concern of governments in the Islands often is in winning the next election (Crocombe, 1992:195). Where this is the concern, they want aid directed to marginal islands (*ibid*). The foreign country is open to accusations of interference in the autonomy of the country concerned if they object to their monies going to such causes (*ibid*).

The relationship between New Zealand and many South Pacific island states has been improved through the actions of the New Zealand military forces. They have provided hydrographic surveys, helped create gaps in reefs for ship access, and assisted in rural development schemes and medical schemes (Poananga, 1980:45). They have also painted schools, constructed water supplies and so forth, in return for the use of the island for military exercises (Crocombe, 1992:201). It has been suggested that is 'aid or co-operation by those who favour it and imperialism by those who oppose it' (*ibid*). The respective Island governments have been supportive of such exercises, and the public have also supported it, in part due to the benefits of the public works, and partly due to the change in the usual routine (*ibid*). The New Zealand forces benefit through the field experience, and the ability to obtain training in a tropical region (Poananga, 1980:45). And New Zealand benefits as a whole through the increased familiarity with New Zealand and the good will generated in the islands concerned, through the 'sustainable New Zealand presence in the area' (*ibid*). There is an emphasis on mutual assistance, and military exercises are undertaken between the New Zealand forces and different island state's forces, particularly those of Fiji and Tonga (*ibid*). The military forces of the Pacific Islands come to New Zealand for training, and carpentry is one of the many trades taught (*ibid*:202). This expands the number of people in the islands trained in Western building methods (Crocombe, 1992:201). 'In most situations in which New Zealand forces have been active in the islands the enemy has been nature – cyclones and other disasters' (*ibid*). The island states themselves include economic security and protection of resources in



their definition of “security” (ibid:214).<sup>94</sup> Economic security is a particular concern for the islands due to their smallness, their isolation and their reliance on a few export products (ibid).

## **Disaster Relief**

New Zealand supports South Pacific countries when there are disasters. In the islands, the disasters have always been cyclones. Most of New Zealand’s assistance to the South Pacific in the event of a disaster is through bilateral aid (Crocombe, 1992:79). Only 18% of official aid to NGOs goes to those working in the South Pacific (ibid). Crocombe asserts that this effectively channels aid away from NGOs, and the reason for it is that it enables the New Zealand government ministers to be ‘photographed inspecting the distribution of government aid more appropriately and advantageously than that given via the Red Cross’ (ibid).

As well as bilateral assistance, New Zealand provides assistance in the event of disaster through its armed forces. For instance, with Cyclones Ofa and Peni, the official bilateral assistance came to a total of \$2.7 million, however, for Cyclone Ofa alone, military relief came to \$6 million (Crocombe, 1992:79).<sup>95</sup> This is offered as a justification for not channelling more aid to NGOs in the Pacific, as its argued that with the close proximity of New Zealand to the islands, the navy and air force can give more comprehensive assistance than local voluntary organisations (ibid).

Disaster relief suffers from the difficulty in assessing the level of need prior to sending it over to the islands. There is also a concern in promoting long-term dependency. The island governments become dependant on the disaster relief, and count it as additional to the regular aid programmes (Crocombe, 1992:198). The Cook Island government no longer insures many government assets owing to the availability of international aid following natural disasters – aid which would not be available if the government had used its own funds to insure the assets (Crocombe, 1992:58). Though finding insurance in the first place may be a major hurdle, New Zealand’s own involvement in insurance in the South Pacific reduced during the

---

<sup>94</sup> In 1985, the Commonwealth Consultative Group, established this as the Islanders’ primary concerns (Crocombe, 1992:214).



1980s (ibid). New Zealand Insurance Ltd closed its operations in Tonga and the Cook Islands as the premium pool was considered too small and the risk of hurricanes considered too high (ibid).

Voluntary aid is also a significant component in providing funds for disaster relief. Church organisations contribute substantial amounts to the islands - \$5.7 million in 1989 – although these contributions are paid rather selectively – none to islands north of the equator, with minimal amounts to French territories, and no aid to American territories (Crocombe, 1992:80).

The South Pacific Forum also involves member states in ‘active interest in the security of our Pacific Island neighbours... in the event of both natural disasters and external threats’ (Poananga, 1980:47).

Disaster relief flows have not always been unidirectional. After Cyclone Bola caused widespread damage along the west coast of the North Island of New Zealand in 1988, the people of Rarotonga, numbering at that time some nine thousand people, held a one day collection and managed to send \$50,000 to New Zealand. The government of Nauru has also sent funds to New Zealand after natural disasters. However, most of the time New Zealand is considered to be wealthy enough to be able to address her own concerns (Crocombe, 1992:85). In colloquial terms: ‘big enough and ugly enough’ to solve her own problems.

### **The Islands’ Position**

The first Premier of Samoa, Tupua Tamasese, though the son of the man killed in the back by New Zealand policemen, still wanted close relations to be formed with New Zealand for the good of Samoa (Kirk, 1996:24). New Zealand also wanted this and in 1962, a Treaty of Friendship was signed between Western Samoa and New Zealand, which continued their special relationship. The three-year aid programme in place prior to independence was renegotiated. And scholarships were to be provided for higher education, in-service training, plus grants and loans for agricultural development and capital works. The Treaty also provided for Samoan’s unlimited access to six-month work permits, renewable over five years which could in turn lead to permanent residence followed by citizenship. New Zealand also offered to

help Samoa conduct Foreign Relations for as long as it wished, undertaking to consult with Samoa on defence matters (Boyd, 1996:305).

On gaining independence, South Pacific Islands had to fund their requirements, including the funding of the necessary bureaucracy to run the government, and any development ambitions they may have, through what resources they could access. The traditional approach to assisting colonies to develop economically had involved promoting the agricultural sector, and this had been very much the basis of New Zealand's own approach with both the Cook Islands and Samoa. New Zealand, being a primary producer herself, was particularly wedded to that tactic. On independence, Samoa and the Cook Islands expected to achieve economic independence through agricultural exports. However, shortly after independence and in quick succession, Samoa suffered a steep drop in copra prices (her main export crop at the time), a virus in the banana plantations and a major hurricane 'scuttling plans for economic self-sufficiency for the immediate future' (Brown, 1970:91). The Cook Islands also, having experienced a boom period in her citrus products during the 1960s, was expecting the returns she received from agriculture to continue increasing. However, this market declined due to competition from other countries, including other islands.

The former island territories were tied into the worldwide system by the time of independence, and they wished to retain the more convenient, comfortable, informative aspects of a cash-based Western-style economy, such as electricity, vehicles, media and hospitals. Yet their aspirations had to be funded from a 'slender resource base' (Campbell, 1992:212). And Samoa and the Cook Islands, (though possibly more especially Samoa) wanted to retain their village-based lifestyle, focused on subsistence farming and gathering. With agriculture looking less like the economic salvation that had been hoped for, economists from the IMF, WB and ADB were engaged to advise on possible options (ibid:213).<sup>96</sup> Their advice in the case of both countries was to diversify, and also to pursue tourism (ibid). However, tourism required large investments to provide the transport infrastructure and facilities required, and where foreign investors were used, the assets, and therefore the bulk of

---

<sup>96</sup> IMF (International Monetary Fund), WB (World Bank) and the ADB (Asian Development Bank) (Campbell, 1992:213).



the profits, remained in their hands (ibid). Another conventional option for increasing foreign exchange would have been to enlarge the industrial base of the economy. However this was unlikely to be successful due to the isolation of the islands from major world markets.

In an insightful study on the experience of Niue through the nineteenth century, Judith Barker has shown that just as some headway was being made in developing sufficient crops for export, Niue was subjected to either an enormous hurricane or a severe drought (Barker, 2000:203). This pattern, to a lesser or greater degree, has occurred to a greater or lesser degree, has occurred in other island states, including Samoa and many of the islands of the Cooks. This experience has led to the people concerned being very receptive to avenues of gaining access to income other than agriculture to purchase the components of a commodity based lifestyle they prefer. The necessity for Niueans to completely rebuild their economy along with the housing and general infrastructure every decade or so, along with the injection of large amounts of aid subsequent to the hurricanes, has enabled the people of Niue to completely change their socio-economic form, and they have done so more than once (ibid:202). In the early 1960s, the decimation of the agriculture and built structures caused by severe cyclones in 1959 and 1960 led to the infusion of large amounts of aid and technical assistance from New Zealand, including ten-year low-interest loans to enable the purchase of new housing materials (ibid:198). This introduced the Niueans to a 'new, highly individuated ... social obligation – that of legal debt to the state' (ibid). This locked them into a cash based economy, which was facilitated through employment in the enlarged government bureaucracy funded from the aid received (ibid). The funding by New Zealand of such a bureaucracy has been termed 'welfare-state colonialism' (Bertram and Watters, 1985:508). Many Niueans responded to the devastation of the cyclones by migrating to New Zealand for work – though unusually in the Pacific, more remittances were sent to New Zealand from Niue, than vice versa (Barker, 2000:200). Thus in a short space of time, through the responses of both New Zealand and the Niueans to the aftermath of two severe hurricanes within a year, the elements of a MIRAB economy had been entrenched in the form of Niuean society.



## **MIRAB Economy**

The MIRAB acronym was coined by Geoff Bertram, an economist, and Ray Watters, professor of geography, to describe the pattern of coping strategies employed by most kin groups concerned; Migration, Remittances, Aid and Bureaucracy (Bertram and Watters, 1984:497). Both as households, and through their governments, many South Pacific Islanders utilised this set of approaches. Bertram and Watters underlined that the flexibility and the adaptability necessary to implement these components of MIRAB, has maximised the standard of living possible in micro-states which due to their smallness and isolation would not otherwise be as viable (ibid:511). The lack of specialisation and division in labour enabled subsistence agriculture to provide the necessary 'floor below which real incomes in the Islands will not fall' (ibid). And the incomes generated from paid employment and remittances provide for the purchase of measures to augment a society's previously subsistence-based economy, would be the experience of the effect of repeated hurricanes and drought on the development of agriculture, according to Judith Barker. Previously, however, it has been claimed that the main impetus towards adopting the elements of a MIRAB economy has a radical change in the expectation of an acceptable standard of living (Connell, 1990:3), accompanied by a perceived loss of status for agricultural labour (ibid). Though whether the perceived loss of status for agricultural work is a cause or a symptom of migration would be difficult to ascertain, as Connell has commented, 'migration is both catalyst and consequence challenge' (ibid:2).

## **Migration**

The migration component of the MIRAB family of coping strategies had in the case of Samoa and the Cook Islands commenced in the 1950s, prior to independence, and increased through the 1960s and the early 1970s, and was spurred by the necessity back in the islands for the resultant remittances. The 'pull' factor was New Zealand's burgeoning industrial sector that needed unskilled workers, The 'push' factor was insufficient employment in the island states, due to the limitations on both agricultural and industrial development outlined above, and a desire to improve the standard of living on the islands. The decision to migrate to work was made by the extended family to increase the benefits to the family as a whole, though

the receipt of remittances. This has been called the 'transnational corporations of kin'.<sup>97</sup>

However, the opportunities for access to overseas employment have reduced, due to the increase in population in the relevant age bracket, combined with the 'imposition of limits on emigration to American Samoa and New Zealand (MacPherson, 1994:110). The new immigration policy of New Zealand, initiated in 1986, required prospective emigrants to have requisite skills or capital for investment (and preferably both) (Crocombe, 1992:222). While it was decided that the quota of one thousand one hundred per annum of Samoan immigrants should be retained, the general tightening up of the migration rules reduced the number of Samoan that could migrate to New Zealand (ibid). Previously, spending some time abroad had been a part of the Samoan people's lifecycle, like a 'rite of passage' (MacPherson, 1995:115), and 'one element of the transition to adulthood (Connell, 1990:3), much as OE (overseas experience) had been for New Zealanders. The contraction of the New Zealand economy along with the reduction in permissible emigration from Samoa to New Zealand has been linked to an increase in the suicide rate of young Samoans in Samoa (MacPherson and MacPherson, 1985:87).<sup>98</sup>

Although it is assumed by many people that highly qualified people are the first to leave the Islands, Ron Crocombe points out that in Islands with free access to New Zealand, such as the Cook Islands, Niue and the Tokelaus, this does not occur.<sup>99</sup> He relates this to the greater chance of promotion in a smaller population base. And, while salaries are lower in the islands, for those with access to traditional lands, housing costs are lower and job security is better (Crocombe, 1992:39). Crocombe paraphrases this phenomenon for people with open access to New Zealand as 'more of a brawn drain than a brain drain' (ibid).

There is some dispute among commentators about whether the sending community on the whole benefits from the migrant worker, for while he (or as

---

<sup>97</sup> 'Transnational corporations of kin' is a phrase which is often attributed to Bertram and Watters, but which they themselves attribute to Marcus [1981] and Loomis [1984] (Bertram and Watters, 1984:501).

<sup>98</sup> With New Zealand restructuring in the mid 1980s, Pacific Island people suffered unemployment rates of 30% for females, and 26% for males (Crocombe, 1992:14).

<sup>99</sup> Of Cook Islanders with university degrees, only 28% live abroad (Crocombe, 1992:39).



commonly 'she' nowadays) sends back remittances, the sending community loses the labour of the migrant. This is considered to be particularly an issue as migrants tend to be in the prime of life, leaving the young adults who remain behind with a greater share of the dependants that need to be supported (Connell, 1990:3). In some areas of Samoa, each worker supports 3.1 persons (MacPherson, 1994:110). Where migration is particularly common, such as in Tonga, the Cook Islands and Niue, food production has actually stabilised and in some areas declined, relative to population growth (Connell, 1990:8). This is claimed to have increased reliance on imported foodstuffs, in turn increasing dependence on cash through remittances and it is claimed the community can be trapped in a diminishing circle (ibid). Though again, it would be difficult to establish symptom or cause for an increase in imported foods: whether less demand for subsistence food items due to a preference for imported food has led to a decline in the production of subsistence foods. My own contention would be that with everyone being busier nowadays, imported foods are often preferred due to the ease of preparation. Though, of course, the source of increased demands on time leading to a preference for convenience foods may well generate from the extra demands placed on the remaining population due to the departure of the migrant workers. Though I suspect the demand for convenience foods is actually due to the number of women within Samoa who are now in paid employment.<sup>100</sup> It has been asserted that an increase in consumption of imported foods is due to their being perceived as being a source of prestige (Connell, 1990:8). It is also claimed that the loss of population impacts on the viability of community work group activities, including the construction of housing (ibid).

The ILO (International Labour Organisation) and the SPC (South Pacific Commission) co-authored a report that concluded that migration from Pacific countries has had a 'negative impact on the economic development of those countries' (Bedford, 1985:162). However, a report by the TPS concluded that international migration has an overall positive impact in maintaining the standard of living of these countries, and the TPS report is considered to be the more scientific of the two, according to independent commentators (ibid).

---

<sup>100</sup> Certainly, women in Samoa repeatedly volunteered that women there have too much to do (personal interviews, June, 2000).



It has been claimed that the net effect of migration has been to absorb population increases on the islands (Bertram and Watters, 1984:503). The natural rate of increase is relatively high, and migration has been seen as a 'safety valve' (Connell, 1990:6). While initially most migrants were male, which lowered the birth rate, the ratio of males to females subsequently became more even, which had less impact on the birth rate (Bedford, 1985:162). Where male dominated migration has continued, the burden on females is enormous (Connell, 1990:7).

Permanent migration is often not intended when the migrants leave their island. An example of this is found with a cyclone in Mauke in 1967 which devastated the housing there, leading to many men migrating to New Zealand to earn money to reconstruct the housing (Connell, 1990:75). Many men stayed in New Zealand though, sending the fares for their wives and children (ibid). However, they continued to send remittances back to assist relatives who remained to rebuild housing (ibid).

### **Remittances**

There has also been some variance in opinion regarding what the remittances resulting from migration are used for. For some time many commentators tended to assume that remittances were being used for conspicuous consumption through the purchase of goods that quickly depreciate, including imported foods for feasting. However, when the data on remittances to the Cook Islands for 1981 and 1985 was examined by Loomis, it revealed that, contrary to preconceptions, very little is spent on ceremonies and gifts – 25% is spent on productive spending (small business, planting and fishing), with another 6% in savings (Loomis, 1990:67). Where remittances were spent on housing, it was potentially a productive investment, as the house is often rented out for the bulk of the year (ibid:77). 20% of the migrants in New Zealand owned their own home back in the islands (ibid). A quarter of the homes on Rarotonga and Aitutaki were built by recently returned migrants, or were migrants' holiday homes (ibid). The 1985 study, when it desegregated the data for remittances according to islands – Rarotonga, Aitutaki and Mauke – it was found the island with the least wealthy people, Mauke, received the most in remittances, more than three times what Rarotonga got (ibid:74). In less developed islands, remittances tend to be used on consumption items, while more developed islands use remittances for 'production opportunities' (ibid:76). And contrary to intuitive expectations, the

study also showed that remittances from an individual do not actually decline over time (Loomis, 1990:67). However, there are especially many remittances initially due to debts of the migrant with their sending relatives, which probably arose from the purchase of the migrant's fare (ibid). As the average Cook Island income is a third of the average income of New Zealand incomes, its obvious why the trip is made (ibid:68). By the mid-1980s, over 60% of Cook Islanders lived in New Zealand (Bedford, 1985:157).

The table below, compiled by Ron Crocombe gives some idea of the importance of the level of remittances to the micro-states involved.

**Remittances from New Zealand to other Pacific Islands in 1990.**

<i>Country</i>	<i>NZ\$ million</i>
Samoa	30.25
Tonga	10.00
Cook Islands	6.00
Niue	2.00
Tokelau	1.00
Fiji	1.00
Others	1.00
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>51.25</b>

Figure 1: Table: Crocombe, 1992:83.

Samoa leads the 'league table' on remittances due to its larger population base, in other countries as well as in Samoa. Ron Crocombe also argues that the level of remittances depends on the degree of need back in the islands and how much the remitter expects to return to their homeland to live (ibid:84).

Remittances form 29% of the total GDP of Tonga and 23% of Samoa's. While 44% of Samoa's total remittances originate in New Zealand, and only 30% of



Tonga's, its estimated that the amount of remittances of Tokelau, Niue and the Cook Islands originating in New Zealand is more like 85% (Crocombe, 1992:84).<sup>101</sup>

The Cook Island population in Australia sends a comparatively low amount of money back to the Cook Islands (Loomis, 1990:65). There is a suggestion that that is part of the reason these people go to Australia in the first place, to avoid having to meet 'reciprocal obligations operative in the migrant community in New Zealand'.

Often long-term migrants are nostalgic of the community they left behind, and they need to believe that the society they left behind has not changed, as they have an 'extremely idealised view of an historic Polynesia where they grew up (Connell, 1990:16). These relatively conservative attitudes of migrants often result in their remittances being tagged to traditional purposes – such as the construction of church and community halls, rather than business development (ibid:18). These migrants, even those with skills, tend to work in 'secondary' sector in New Zealand and USA, where they have low wages, poor working conditions and insecure employment (ibid:17). As western economies restructure, reducing the 'secondary' sector, there is less employment available for migrants (ibid). There had been some concern when the total amount of assistance received by the islands in remittances declined through the late 1980s and early 1990s. The restructuring of the New Zealand economy from 1984 on led to the contraction of the industrial sector, where many Pacific Islanders had tended to be concentrated (Crocombe, 1992:84). And decreased government support in New Zealand has led to more expenses being encountered by Pacific Islanders in paying for accommodation and for tertiary education for their children. However, this trend would appear to have been reversed in the late 1990s, as in 1998, Samoa received US\$37 million in remittances, an increase of two percent on the previous year (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1999:30).<sup>102</sup>

---

<sup>101</sup> From 1973 – 1976, New Zealand spent \$NZ 9.9 million on aid to Fiji, Tonga and Samoa, however, the total in remittances and transfers came to \$NZ 16.9 million – and that was just the transactions through the banking system – other monies would have been posted or taken personally on visits (Crocombe, 1992:24).

<sup>102</sup> Thus, while there had been a decline in the late 1980s in real terms in the level of remittances (MacPherson, 1994:112), this trend would appear to have reversed through the 1990s.






FIGURE 7.1 • COOK ISLAND MAORI POPULATION IN NEW ZEALAND  
AND THE COOK ISLANDS 1936-1996

Source: New Zealand and Cook Islands census data, various.

Figure 2: Table in Overton J. and Scheyvens R. (1999:93)

Building materials and second hand cars are also sent back to the islands (ibid). Many construction projects in the islands are for the most part financed by relatives living in New Zealand (ibid). As well as individuals assisting their families back in the islands, there are also some one hundred and eighty Pacific Island organisations; religious, cultural, women, educational and others, who also send funds, services and goods back to the islands, particularly after natural disasters (Crocombe, 1992:83).

Money was also raised for projects in the Cook Islands with tere parties, which are concert parties that travel to New Zealand to hold performances (Loomis, 1990:65).<sup>103</sup> These projects include community halls and churches.<sup>104</sup> And Cook Island church groups and community groups in New Zealand competed to raise money for projects in the Cook Islands. However, these money-making efforts were

<sup>103</sup> In 1983, ~ half a million dollars was raised with tere parties in New Zealand (Loomis, 1990:65).

<sup>104</sup> Such as the concert party from Aitutaki, who raised funds to build the community house on Aitutaki (Crocombe, 1992).

proving an insupportable burden for many Cook Island families in New Zealand, who were having in many cases to meet higher costs of living than their relatives back in the Cook Islands. A committee of church leaders declared a moratorium for five years.

### **Aid**

Though all island states wished to become economically independent, by early 1980s, none of them were. Samoa's imports were four times the cost of her exports. None of the countries were able to make up the shortfall completely from remittances and tourism. In most Pacific island nations, foreign aid makes up a third of the annual income, with some its two thirds. Samoa is managing to get by on one fifth of its annual income coming from aid. And subsistence agriculture is becoming less productive.

### **Bureaucracy**

The bureaucracy of the island governments provided income for the islanders who worked within it. It has been asserted that the receipt of grant aid in itself enabled the island governments to provide extensive social services to its people, leading to a concomitant increase in the bureaucracy of the government (Barker, 2000:198). Prior to the 1990s, the majority of the aid given to the island governments, including those of Samoa and the Cook Islands was for 'budgetary support for local governments' (Bertram and Watters, 1985:508). Between 1964 and 1966, New Zealand paid 75% of the Cook Islands net administration and development costs (Ross, 1969:304). The Cook Islands government had 'inherited a social welfare structure beyond its means to finance locally' (Bertram and Watters, 1985:508). By 1970, the Cook Islands were dependent on New Zealand for 70% of her income (Brown, 1970:92).

The New Zealand budgetary support of these island governments led to 'the erection of social amenities on a scale quite divorced from local productive capacity' (Bertram and Watters, 1986:53). This funding led to an increasing divergence between government expenditure and the earnings of the country, and a corresponding 'surge in commodity imports' (ibid). This increase in spending on imported goods was by the government sector. It has been shown that this leap in imports occurred prior to decolonisation, as New Zealand had set certain standards for public goods such as



health, education and communications, leading to a burgeoning public sector: 'welfare state colonialism' (ibid). This had led to an increase in the community's access to cash. While much has been made of the proportion of the population of various island states employed in the public sector during this period, it must be remembered that to supply a certain minimum of public services, a certain minimum of employees is required.<sup>105</sup> And, obviously, on islands with a very small population, this can lead to a significant percentage.

With the downsizing of New Zealand's own public service from the mid-1980s, and the corresponding emphasis on private enterprise running the economy rather than the government, it was only a matter of time before New Zealand addressed the large government bureaucracies in the Islands largely funded through New Zealand's assistance.<sup>106</sup>

### **Beyond MIRAB**

Most Pacific Island countries did want to become more independent of foreign aid, however most schemes to achieve this involved investment in major infrastructure, which usually involved bilateral aid. The Cook Island government, for instance, wanted an international airport, so income could be generated from tourism, and thus the Cook Island's dependence on New Zealand could be lessened (Brown, 1970:92). It is Ron Crocombe's opinion that there is a possibility that the people of the Cook Islands would want to sever relations with New Zealand in the future if the Cook Islands is able to achieve financial independence. This is feasible, if the black pearl farming and seabed mineral mining is able to be fully exploited, as this would enable the Cook Islands to be more fully financially independent of New Zealand (Crocombe, 1992:172).

Samoa embarked on structural reforms in the 1980s, earlier than most Pacific island states, and through this, was able to weather the Asian economic downturn well (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1999:31). Samoa has a declining trade deficit, down to W\$ 20.7 million for 1998 (ibid). American Samoa provided 47% of Samoa's export

---

<sup>105</sup> An example would be in Niue, where more than 80% of the population were working for wages for the Niuan government, by the mid-1980s (Connell, 1983, cited in Barker, 2000:200).

<sup>106</sup> In 1989, New Zealand Auditor General's Report recommended downsizing of Niue's public service, resulting in streamlining of the government bureaucracy (Barker, 2000:200).



earnings for 1998, and mainland USA was the source of a further 30% (ibid). And tourism has expanded significantly (ibid).

Attempts to overcome dependence on foreign aid have also included efforts to promote regionalism (Campbell, 1992:215). This commenced with the formation of the Pacific Islanders Producer's Association in the 1960s. This involved Samoa, Fiji and Tonga, and this in turn led to the formation of the South Pacific Forum in the 1970s, which was an opportunity for heads of Pacific governments to get together and discuss their shared concerns (ibid: 216). In 1972, the South Pacific Forum formed the South Pacific Bureau of Economic Co-operation (SPEC) (ibid). The SPARTECA trade agreement was also spearheaded through the auspices of the South Pacific Forum, and enabled the South Pacific Islands to have unimpeded access to the markets of New Zealand and Australia, without reciprocal arrangements (ibid). Trade between the islands however remained minimal – in the early 1980s it was only 1% of total trade (ibid: 217). All the new Pacific nations joined extra-regional organisations (ibid: 218).<sup>107</sup>

## Conclusion

This chapter has shown how the relationship of New Zealand has been pivotal to the maintenance of and improvement in the lifestyles of the populations of Samoa and the Cook Islands, enabling them to pursue the strategies within the MIRAB approach to maximising opportunities. It was this relationship with New Zealand that led to the provision of monetary assistance provided by the New Zealand government, and also through employment opportunities in New Zealand. The nature of this relationship has undergone changes in the last decade, as bilateral assistance has been redirected to specific projects, generally geared at encouraging economic self-sufficiency, rather than underwriting the government's expenses. This leads into the following chapter on Samoa, and the ways they have sought to fund and improve their housing.

---

<sup>107</sup> Fiji, Solomons, Paupa New Guinea, Vanuatu, Samoa, Micronesia and the Marshalls have joined the United Nations. All eligible to do so joined the Commonwealth. All South Pacific countries except Nauru and including the French territories became associated with the European community through the Lome Convention. The Asian Development Bank has been joined by the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Paupa New Guinea, the Solomons, Tonga, Vanuatu, and Samoa. And the World Bank and the IMF have been joined by Fiji, Paupa New Guinea, Solomons, Vanuatu, Tonga and Samoa (Cambell, 1992:218).

## **SAMOA**

## **Introduction**

This chapter examines the housing situation of Samoa. It starts with the impact of Cyclone Val on the Samoan people and their housing, as this happened back in 1992. The strategy followed by the Samoan government subsequent to the cyclone is then examined. The concerns of and regarding the Housing Corporation of Samoa are then outlined. This is followed by a description of housing in Upolo. Then the reasons for preferring the Western or traditional housing style are canvassed. Issues specific to women in housing are then addressed. And finally, an illustration of many of the issues of housing for Samoan people is provided with the examination of an urban compound and a rural village.

## **Cyclone Ofa**

Cyclone Ofa struck the Samoan group in February 1990 and buffeted Western Samoa for a period of three days with winds gusting up to 130 miles per hour and moving at a steady speed of 12 knots or 14 miles per hour in a straight south-east path. The wind, rain, huge waves and storm surge (high sea levels) were devastating (Macaulay and Clay, 1996:94). Cyclone Ofa caused massive destruction to tree crops, forestry and economic and social infrastructure. Nine people died; one from exposure, four people were washed away, one was drowned in a flooded river, and two were killed by flying debris (ibid). With considerable Government effort and external assistance, damage from Cyclone Ofa was repaired and the economy picked up during the first three-quarters of 1991.

## **Cyclone Val**

Cyclone Val began on Friday evening, 6<sup>th</sup> December 1991, and lasted for four days, until the early hours on Tuesday, 10<sup>th</sup> December 1991 (National Disaster Council, 1992:2). It was the most destructive cyclone to hit Samoa in a hundred years (ibid). It was extraordinary for its intensity and its irregular path and shifting speed, particularly in the vicinity of the Samoa Group. Cyclone Val generated average sustained winds of 90 knots or 104 miles per hour gusting up to 130 knots or 150 miles per hour over four consecutive days (ibid). As Cyclone Val approached Samoa, it was travelling at 10 knots or 12 miles per hour moving steadily on a southeast course (ibid). But on nearing Savii it slowed to a speed of 5 knots or 6 miles per hour and changed to a southwest course, as it passed over Savai'I (ibid). It then changed



course again, curving northwards and remained stationary for about 6 hours before it finally moved away south east of the Samoa Group (ibid).





Illustration 14: The path of Cyclone Val through the South Pacific



CENTRE OF CYCLONE VAL – LOCAL TIME

- |                   |                   |
|-------------------|-------------------|
| ① 1:00 pm 6-12-91 | ⑤ 1:00 pm 8-12-91 |
| ② 1:00 am 7-12-91 | ⑥ 1:00 am 9-12-91 |
| ③ 1:00 pm 7-12-91 | ⑦ 1:00 pm 9-12-91 |
| ④ 1:00 am 8-12-91 |                   |

Illustration 15: Val over Samoa.

At least twelve people were killed by the cyclone – the first three by electrocution, falling trees, and air borne debris, being roofing iron (World Bank, June, 1992:8).<sup>108</sup> The other nine deaths were caused by collapse of structures (ibid). Further unconfirmed deaths were caused by loss of life at sea (ibid). The number of deaths was remarkably small considering the damage the cyclone caused (ibid). It was estimated that about 90% of all buildings on Savai'i suffered major damage and about 80% on Upolo (National Disaster Council, 1992:18). Of private dwellings, it was estimated that a total of at least 22,860 dwellings of varying constructions, standards and value, that is, approximately 20% of the total housing stock, appeared to have been virtually destroyed and another 50% partially damaged (ibid). The estimated cost of replacement was about WS\$30,000 per house, while the partially destroyed private dwellings averaged out to about WS\$16,000 per house, costing a total of WS\$320 million to replace and reinstate (ibid). Tarpaulins were used to protect buildings from further damage from weather until permanent repairs could be carried out (ibid). There was also extensive crop damage, estimated at 80% of total coconuts destroyed, with 90% of cocoa destroyed and 100% of the bananas (ibid).

While the worst hit area was the eastern end of Savai'i, most houses in Apia had roofs blown off (National Disaster Council, 1992:18). People in the east end of Savi'i had smashed their concrete water tanks so they could get into them and so avoid the corrugated roofing iron which was lethally flying around in the destructive winds (ibid). The people living along that coast had to move inland to mitigate the chances of their being so badly struck by a cyclone again – and the sea had eroded the coast, including the coastal road (Interview with Chief Building Inspector, June 2000). Just after the hurricane, people needed shelter – even the leaves (lau) that were used for thatching had been stripped from the trees (ibid). The Samoan government supplied tarpaulins for the Samoan people rendered homeless to use as shelter (ibid).

The Samoan government assembled and published on the 29<sup>th</sup> February 1992, the National Disaster Report. The conclusions reached included a requirement that the Government should adopt and enforce a building/construction code that will ensure 'durability, continuity and reliability in the quality and operation of physical

---

<sup>108</sup> Flying corrugated iron from roofs and panels of glass from louvres were lethal (MFAT, 1992:1).



infrastructures' (National Disaster Council, 1992:34). It was foreseen by the report that this would require detailed studies to ascertain the most appropriate construction methodologies (ibid). A particular concern was the fatalities incurred by flying building materials: 'it is clear the old methods of fastening are simply not adequate, and the use of specific cyclone-developed products, should be undertaken. The wire tying and stapling of framing members will be of some help' (ibid:15). This was reiterated by the World Bank report produced in June, 1992 – 'all buildings selected for reconstruction or repair should be designed and constructed to an appropriate cyclone resistant standard during future cyclones. ...(it is) considered not economically sustainable, nor practical, to ... maintain low standards of design and construction techniques... application and compliance with sound design and construction principles is now essential for the proper and most cost effective solutions for rehabilitation' (World Bank, June 1992:15).

The Samoan Government requested Australia to commence work on the preparation of a National Standard for Western Samoa. The World Bank report cautioned that the needs and means of lower income households must be taken into account so they can also afford to build houses that will comply with the new standards (World Bank, June 1992:16). One of the primary focuses for the development of the standard was to recommend better methods of attachment, as recommended by the National Disaster Council's Report, to minimise fatalities and damage in future cyclones (ibid:6). Another important consideration to take into account in the design of the standard was the role the high winds, varying in direction, had in leading to the structures being weakened (ibid). Another factor was that the heavy rains led to foundations being weakened by the saturated ground conditions (ibid). These two determinants led to the high incidence of damaged structures (Ibid).

Mitigating factors in lessening the severity of the effects of the cyclone arose from the genuine community spirit of the Samoan people, and the professional and prompt attendance to the situation by the government (World Bank, June 1992:9). 'The community-based way of life in Western Samoa provides excellent material and moral support during crises such as Cyclone Val and this was very effective in providing a buffer against the effects of the damage' (ibid). Praise for the work of the



emergency services and the Public Works Department of Samoa during and after the cyclone was unstinting in the World Bank's report (ibid).

The initial shipments of construction materials to Samoa were directed toward community facilities such as hospitals and the library with subsequent shipments for schools and government buildings (Interview with Building Manager). People then started to rebuild their homes with funds from overseas family members (ibid). Those who had sufficient money to be able to afford to build a European style home did so (ibid). Some people rebuilt with traditional fale (ibid). After nearly one year, most houses had been rebuilt or replaced (ibid).

Previous to Cyclone Val, New Zealand's Overseas Development Assistance to Samoa was involved in direct support for Western Samoa's infrastructure development. For example, co-financing was provided for the development of Apia's water supply. However, to assist in reconstruction in the wake of cyclone Val, commitments were given to assist in the rehabilitation of primary and junior secondary schools (World Bank, June 1992:30). This was a departure from New Zealand's aid program strategy to limit expenditure on infrastructure projects, rather than social goods such as schools, however it was considered this departure was necessitated by the immense scope of the disaster. New Zealand ODA was involved in reconstructing schools that had been damaged in the cyclone throughout Upolu and Savai'i. Project Hammer involved New Zealand trades people who wanted to donate their time to rebuilding schools in Samoa. Many volunteered, as the New Zealand public was aware of the extent of the devastation of Cyclone Val from news reports. The empathy felt by the New Zealanders for those worst affected was shown in a concrete way through the money they pledged in a Telethon for reconstruction in Samoa. However, as previously, the New Zealand Government did not fund directly or assist in the construction of any housing – this was left to the families involved.

### **Building Code**

Previous to Cyclone Val, Samoa was officially using the New Zealand Building Standards (Interview with Chief Building Inspector, June 2000). Yet while the building regulations were in place, they were not rigidly or extensively enforced (ibid). However, the Samoan Government had a major rethink after the devastation

caused by Cyclone Val. The Building Inspectorate Division of the Samoan government set about setting in place relevant and strict requirements in the design of future housing, to mitigate damage in future cyclones. This was accomplished through implementing into law the new Building Standard for Samoa, that the Samoan government had commissioned from the Australian government, which contained requirements on how to incorporate cyclone resistance when building new homes. The Samoan government also produced in book and video format, instructions for people on how to make their existing houses more cyclone resistant, and when constructing new open fale how to incorporate features in the design which would make the completed structure more resistant to cyclones. These were practical, easily achievable measures. An example would be the recommendation to nail crosspieces on the base of the poles, prior to their being placed in the ground, to prevent uplift. Another measure involved tying wire around the connections between the rafter members – this feature is particularly interesting as such a measure is evidenced in particularly old fale which have coconut fibre, sinnet, wound extensively around connections between the roofing members.

This was a particularly helpful approach as it ensured open fale would still be a viable and permissible building form option post Cyclone Val, as the recommendations included in the Building Standard ensured they would have a certain measure of cyclone resistance. And the open fale option in Samoa is a good one, for a variety of reasons. Firstly, is a consideration of aesthetics and tradition – open fale **are** South Pacific, and especially Samoan. Secondly, one of economy – the traditional style fale is far more economical to build than the other predominant housing form in Samoa, the “cyclone housing” which consists of concrete filled concrete blocks, with louvre glass windows. There is also another housing type that looks similar to the “cyclone housing”, but consists of timber framework with rusticated timber weatherboards, and glass louvres. And the other advantage of traditional fale is the appropriateness of the style for the climate – the open fale are far cooler than western style homes.

However, since Cyclone Val, people, even poorer families, are trying to build western style houses as, in their imaginations, they are drawn back to Cyclone Val and Ofa, ‘their **major** concern is the memories they have of the cyclones’ (Interview



with Chief Building Inspector, June 2000). In some rural areas some families put corrugated iron roofing on their small fale (ibid). With the cyclones, the thatch and even the blinds of the traditional fale were whipped away (ibid). Even winds as slight as 15 miles per hour rip lau (thatching) off the roofs (ibid). Roofing iron is preferred as there is no extra work – they do not have to redo the roofing (ibid). The traditional fale is far more beneficial in terms of the interior environment created in the Samoan climate, and the western style house has enclosing walls and a metal roof which gets very hot, for although insulation is now required, it is expensive, so avoided wherever possible (ibid). However, people with memories of cyclones prefer western houses (ibid). So the more Western style housing is considered to be a more practical option in case of cyclone, and is also felt psychologically to be a safer option (ibid). There had not been any cyclones of such a force as cyclone Val and Ofa in living memory (ibid). Individuals who did not used to be bothered by winds of up to fifty miles per hour, since Val and Ofa, find winds of even twenty-five miles an hour a concern (ibid). The cyclones had a major impact on the psyche of the people who experienced them (ibid).

After Cyclone Val the government of Samoa, as well as instigating the new Building Code, also strictly enforced the requirement for a building permit, for all new building work, including housing (Interview with Chief Building Inspector, June 2000). Now extensions, alterations, repairs and reroofing under the law have to have a permit (ibid). The fee for the permit is based on the cost of the works (ibid). Four copies of the plan are required – these are sent to other government departments – lands and environment, health department (in relation to toilets and so on) and the chief fire officer as well as the building inspector (ibid). The building inspector then checks the plans - if the drawings are acceptable, then the permit is issued (ibid).

Initially there was some evasion of the permit system – at that time, the people were not aware of the procedures required, or there was little understanding of the rationale behind the permit system (Interview with Chief Building Inspector, June 2000). Since then, the building inspectorate has run a public awareness programme to convey to members of the public, and particularly the builders themselves, about the permit procedure and the importance of ensuring that the houses do have a permit (ibid). The permit ensures their design has been checked and if necessary changed, to



ensure a certain minimum level of cyclone resistance (ibid). The Chief Building Inspector considers these efforts at increasing public awareness to have been largely successful, as he has noticed a definite reduction in attempts at non-permitted work (ibid). The builders especially are now diligent in the pursuit of permits prior to building (ibid).

The building inspectorate takes a thorough approach to becoming informed of any new construction going on. The chief building inspector has divided the two main islands into zones, which the building inspectors cover in teams. Upolu is divided into six different areas, and the staff are divided into two teams – thus, if team A goes to Area 1, then team B goes to area 6 (Chief Building Inspector, June 2000). The team members go with a list of work in that area that has a permit, so any work being undertaken without a permit can be easily picked up on (ibid). Where such work is spotted, a Notice of Stop Work is issued, and the owner is required to submit plans for a permit (ibid). This approach of dividing the islands into areas and using two teams ensures the two main islands are covered in entirety (ibid). The islands can also thus be frequently searched that any building work undertaken without a permit will not progress beyond the stage of being easily and economically rectified if there is a concern with how it is constructed (ibid). Also, of course, the frequency of these visits is also helpful to builders working under a permit as it gives them greater flexibility in when they are able to organise the pre-pour and pre-lining inspections by the building inspectors (ibid). An indication of the perfect balance the inspectorate manages to strike between diligence and reasonableness is illustrated with the following example. In 1999, a two-storey building was discovered in Apia, where the columns were already up and the ground slab poured before an inspection had been carried out – so the reinforcing had not been inspected (ibid). After negotiation with the owner it was agreed the concrete would be removed from round the base of one column to check the reinforcing (ibid). As that was found to be acceptable, the building was able to proceed (ibid).

One of the difficulties in ensuring the housing built in Samoa is adequately cyclone resistant arises from the Samoan Housing Corporation's practice of not requiring house plans of prospective loan applicants to be approved by the regulatory division of the Building branch prior to the mortgagee uplifting the loan. Thus monies

can be obtained for building to plans that do not necessarily conform to the Building Standards of Samoa. This occurs even though the Building Office has talked to the Housing Corporation and asked them to require their loan applicants to obtain a permit first. This also presupposes that loan monies are required. Through remittances from overseas, and sufficient family members pitching in, loans are not always necessary – though are usually sought in most cases.

For housing already in existence, there is no programme as such to ensure they comply with cyclone resistant measures. They get picked up when permits for additions are applied for and then they can be required to be brought up to the Building Code (Chief Building Inspector, June 2000). And without internal cladding, most of the structure of the house, whether of western design (where based around timber framing) or an open fale, is still visible, so the building inspector can easily see which part requires rectification. Since the time of the Cyclones, the building office has been very diligent in ensuring new houses have permits. And, of course, where the existing house is old enough to have been through Cyclones Ofa and Val, and yet survived, it is likely to be very sturdy indeed.

### **The Housing Corporation of Samoa**

The Housing Corporation of Samoa was established in 1990, under the Housing Corporation Act of 1989, to cater for the ‘desperate needs for some form of accommodation after devastating cyclones’ (HCS, Annual Report, 1997:3). The Housing Corporation was established with a capital of WS\$1million (US \$430,000), with the money to be lent to low income families, to a maximum of US\$14,000. Interest was set slightly below the commercial bank rates, with loans to be advanced for a twenty-year period (Pacific Islands Monthly, July 1990:31). And the Housing Corporation was subsequently funded with a US\$4.7 million loan from National Provident Fund, over fifteen years, with interest only repayments for the first fourteen years. The creation of the Housing Corporation led to awareness of the availability of funds for repairs and renovations for existing homes. And there has been a marked increase in the late 1990s for funds for residential sections (HCS, Annual Report,



1997:3).<sup>109</sup> The Samoa Housing Corporation has found a large demand for its services, which it is able to meet through capital payment from the Government of Samoa, and the repayments on existing mortgages.<sup>110</sup> While the Corporation recorded a decrease in profit from 1996 to 1997, this was expected to improve as repayments were to be collected direct from the Commercial banks, the Treasury Department and employers in the private sector in the future.<sup>111</sup>

Some of the concerns the Housing Corporation had included clients not complying with the original terms and conditions of loan agreements and also some clients accumulating arrears. Some clients were also found to deviate from the original project design. This could result in unfinished houses as the clients ran out of funds to build their enlarged schemes. This in turn resulted in larger loans than the clients could service. Clients who rely on overseas remittances for loan repayments were usually in arrears. Some families receiving remittances were found to use them for consumption, or the proposed remittances were not received from the relatives overseas. While loan disbursements were sometimes made direct to clients to enable them to shop for better bargains, unfortunately this occasionally led to some abuse of the use of funds. Another concern is the limited availability of freehold properties for residential sections. This causes the land prices to inflate beyond most people's means. Given the income constraints, it is difficult for people to borrow for both land and house at the same time. Funding for future lending is uncertain. There is US\$4,530,000 of the Corporation's authorised capital to be paid, and after that they rely on repayments collected to continue operation.

The Housing Corporation lends money without requiring evidence of a permit for the proposed design, or even requiring the submission of a plan – the Housing

---

<sup>109</sup>For 1997 loans approved totalled 254 for US\$3.08 million as compared to 231 for US\$2.7 million in 1996. Average value of loan increased from US\$11,800 in 1996 to US\$12,100 in 1997 (HCS, Annual Report, 1997:3).

<sup>110</sup>In 1997, Samoan Government paid an additional capital payment of US\$500,000, while the Corporation collected US\$2.6million in mortgage repayments and US\$250,000 final payment of an National Provident Fund loan (HCS, Annual Report, 1997:3).

<sup>111</sup>The Corporation recorded a decrease in profit from US\$422,163 in 1996, to US\$354,089 in 1997. Profitability is based on income before interest and has decreased from 63% in 1996 to 55% in 1997. The provision for doubtful debts was calculated as 2% of loan approvals in 1996, whereas in 1997 it was raised to 6% to adequately reflect the extent of the arrears at balance date (HCS, Annual Report, 1997:4).



Corporation just assesses whether the people can manage to repay the loan (Interview with Housing Corporation employee). This is possibly due to the fact that insurance is either unobtainable or prohibitive due to the possibility of cyclones, so the house does not need to obtain a permit to comply with the requirements of an insurer, so Housing Corporation is not likely to benefit from permitted housing. Also, where the house is built on family land it is irrelevant whether the house is sufficiently well built to ensure a good resale value, as a mortgagee sale can not occur on communally owned property. And the mortgagor may also feel protected by the relatively small size of most loan sizes, as where the house is to be built on village land, the costs are substantially lower than when the mortgage has to cover the cost of the land as well. The loan is probably also considered to be more likely to be repaid in the long run, as there are usually many people involved in meeting the repayments, often including contributions through remittances from overseas. But the real reason the Housing Corporation does not require a permit for house designs it lends out on probably stems from a lack of insight into the necessity to ensure the houses comply with the building code.

### **Samoa Housing**

In Samoa, some 81% of the land is held in customary title, and is controlled by heads of extended families (*matai*) (Walsh, 1982). 21% of the population live in and around Apia, and the remaining population live in some three hundred villages ranging in size from two hundred to five hundred people, located mostly along the coast (*ibid*). While traditionally the ideal village arrangement was considered to be concentric, with the most formal area, the open *malae*, at the centre with housing of decreasing formality and importance radiating out from there; most village layouts today are linear, with the housing placed along the road (Franco and Aga, 1995:177). The more formal buildings, along with the *malae*, are along the seaward side of the village, with the family homes to the rear of the chief's house and guest houses, and then further behind them again, the smaller huts and cook houses, and finally the pig pens (*ibid*). This enables the chief and his wife to survey the behaviour of those walking along the road, as well as the *malae*, both of which have strict village

ordinances regarding one's conduct (ibid).<sup>112</sup> In the foothills behind these villages, taro, cocoa, coffee and bananas are cultivated and cattle grazed (Ward and Proctor, 1980:395). 50% of the GDP is from agriculture, and of this 70% comes from subsistence agriculture, in which 70% of the total workforce is involved (Fairburn, 1985:303).

## Fales

As recently as 1970, the circular form of housing, *fale tele*, was the form predominantly used for the 'accommodation of guests and the conduct of village council meetings' and the oval form, the *fale afolau*, was mainly used as a dwelling house (Gilson, 1970:11). Gilson also noted in 1970, the advent in some areas of housing for pastors incorporating a combination of Samoan and European elements, and constructed of imported materials, displacing the traditional *fale afolau* (ibid:14). Now the *fale tele* is very rare, and many *fales* are now on a rectangular plan, with hipped or, occasionally, gabled roofs, while some *fale afolau* are still evident (Personal Observation, June 2000). While there is still a definite place for the traditional *fale*, and most groupings of houses within a village include one, usually in a central position, increasingly these are built in permanent materials, with concrete posts and beams, and corrugated iron roofing (ibid). The chief decides if the *fale* is to be concrete or timber (Personal Interview, June 2000). The chief also decides on the colour of the structure (ibid). And the chief says what colour and pattern is used for the strip of material hung around the top of the wall, though his wife advises and purchases (ibid). The *lino* pattern is also chosen between the chief and his wife (ibid). The chief also chooses the design of the balustrade or low wall (ibid).

---

<sup>112</sup> The young unmarried girls also sleep in the guest house, under the chief and his wife's protection (Franco and Aga, 1995:177)





Illustration 16: Fales around a central green.



Illustration 17: A view of the outskirts of Apia.





Illustration 18: A round ended fale: a fale afofale.



Illustration 19: A modern fale, rectangular plan, concrete structure.





Illustration 20: A recently rebuilt fale, round ended.



Illustration 21: The structure of this rebuilt fale afolau.



There is an immense variety in the appearance of fales. The sides of the concrete terraces the fales were built on were often left smooth and painted, however some have a pattern of blocks or bricks scribed on them (Personal observations, June 2000). Some concrete terrace sides had a giraffe style pattern scribed on them to emulate the pattern made by the local basalt rock when used in walls, however these were painted non-basalt colours (ibid). The posts were made of concrete block, or poured concrete in square pillars, one had fluted concrete pillars, another had concrete posts with bevelled edges and some had brick columns (ibid). The low walls between the posts exhibited even more variation. There were low walls out of precast shaped concrete short pillars, or precast concrete blocks with cut out patterns such as trefoils or crosses (ibid). There were also low walls made out of timber, with plain uprights, or cris-crosses, or double cris-crosses, and even one with triple cris-crosses (ibid). And one timber low wall had trellising (ibid). The colour scheme of these fales usually involved the low part of the columns or posts, to the height of the low wall, in the same colour as that chosen for the low wall (ibid). The roofs are traditional round ended, or when newer; usually gable ended, or hipped, or dutch gabled (ibid).



Illustration 22: A rural compound.





Illustration 23: A bus-stop.

While beautiful colour schemes are employed on many fales, and almost invariably on Western housing, even though now these are often made of concrete, the roofing that is made of corrugated iron is only rarely painted. There seems to be a genuine preference to let the roof rust out and replace it completely. The Chief Building Inspector attributed this tendency to people not being able to afford paint, yet paint is used on the walls. Considering the expense of the corrugated iron, and the fixings required to achieve cyclone resistance, it would seem a worthwhile investment. The colour schemes involved wonderful, clean colours, such as strong greens that were almost lime, as well as blues, browns, yellow, red. In the same village there was a house of pink blocks with light blue mortar, and another with light blue blocks with pink mortar, while yet another house had yellow bricks with light blue mortar. In another village there was a house with white blocks and pink mortar. And another house was painted with yellow bricks and lime mortar, and there was one with blue concrete blocks with white mortar. And one house had light blue weatherboards with strong yellow baseboards, window surrounds and doors. In every case, these colour combinations look fresh and 'right', sitting as they are amongst verdant growth.





Illustration 24: An example of a concrete-block house.



Illustration 25: An example of a timber-framed house with rusticated weatherboards.





Illustration 26: On the left, a rectangular plan, hip roof fale, with walled rooms to the rear. On the right, a western style house with a gable end roof, with a deep porch.

While there are blinds woven of coconut fronds for protection from the frequent rain, most of the time the blinds are tied up out of the way. Material is often used instead of traditional blinds as it is currently the fashion, and also as women are too busy nowadays to make the traditional blinds. As one informant said, ‘open fales are quite secure as everyone can keep an eye on things’ (Personal Interview, June 2000). Living in such open housing results in a marked degree of social control – with nothing able to be hidden, consistently optimum behaviour is required (Franco and Aga, 1995:179). Open houses also result in the sharing of food (ibid) - and conversation. I noticed when visiting in open fales, that the raised level of the fale enabled passing youths to lean on the low wall and take a part in the proceedings, and then as easily continue on their way. Most villages now include walled houses of concrete block or timber frame and rusticated weatherboards.





Illustration 27: All of Samoa appears to be under cultivation.

## Construction

The timber, while a hardwood, can sometimes rot and then has to be replaced (Interview with Carpenter). Where concrete columns are used, the fale columns are poured with two D10 rods protruding from the top of them that are threaded through holes in the beam, and then bent back (ibid). The beams can be either timber or concrete (ibid). Timber beams more commonly sit on a rebate on the top of the columns (ibid). Concrete beams are stronger, but more expensive (ibid). Plywood in layers can be used to build up curved beams (ibid). The kick-outs that can be seen round the edges on roofs are there to shed rain and to provide more head-room on entering a fale, however, they tend to be knocked off in cyclones (ibid). These kick-outs on roofs are less in evidence now, most new fales being built with the roofs high enough above their terraces that they are not needed for head room, and this design change may well have resulted from the tendency of them to be knocked off in cyclones. The **primary** reason behind wanting housing is for shelter from cyclones

(ibid). Whereas previously only the village churches survived, now people want their houses to be strong enough to resist damage in cyclones too (ibid).

Protecting the things in the house are not considered that important, protection of themselves is considered the most important (ibid).




Illustration 28: Post and Beam connections.

The degree of adoption of western housing styles appears to be linked to the proximity of the village to the urban centre, Apia. In 1977, a survey by Sutter of the village Vao, on Savai'i found that 91% of the houses were traditional, whereas half of the village of Nu'u's homes had outer walls and separate rooms. New homes tend to be Palagi in style, though they may incorporate some features from Samoan fale, and they are invariably large, to host many guests when required (ibid). The Western style of housing was often chosen as that style is now the current fashion for visitors, especially for relatives from overseas (Personal Interview, June 2000). While many now felt that the Western housing was safer in cyclones, some recalled that the cyclones found it easy to destroy the Western housing of the time, and felt that the open fales were safer (ibid). They also believed the fales with the rounded ends tend to be stronger than the rectangular ones (ibid).



A group of teenagers, when asked if they preferred to live in a Western house, or an open fale, said they preferred living in a Western house as when they were in an open fale, people could see what they were doing (Group Interview, June 2000). They liked the privacy they could have in a Western house (ibid). When asked about the extra maintenance, they agreed that Western houses take more work, as they need painting, but still, even the boy (the males do the painting) agreed they still preferred the idea of living in a Western house, as the issue of privacy was very important to them (ibid). Many Samoans are familiar with the style of housing in New Zealand, through visiting relatives there, and some have owned houses back in New Zealand prior to retiring to New Zealand. The New Zealand Government provided assistance to Pacific Island immigrants to build, buy or repair their own homes. By 1986, 42% of Pacific Islanders in New Zealand owned their own homes, and they were buying at a faster rate than the national average (Crocombe, 1992:13).<sup>113</sup>



Illustration 29: A room for rent in an urban compound in Apia. Note 'cookhouse' to rear of photo.

<sup>113</sup> In 1986, the national average of home ownership was 73% (Pacific Neighbours, 1992:13).



The current housing stock in Samoa has been described as being in poor condition. Connell and Lea have described the housing situation in Pacific Island towns as 'generally inadequate' with informal settlements (Connell and Lea, 1993,1995, cited in Storey, 1999:162). Bryant has stated that in Samoa the Housing Authority rates were too expensive for the poor, who have had to fall back on building fale on customary land (Bryant, 1993:49, cited in Storey, 1999:162). There are rental properties within urban compounds that are little better than shacks, however, many of the houses in Apia exhibit a dilapidated appearance due to deteriorating paint and the absence of facing boards around the windows and doors or corner boards (Personal Observation, June 2000). Yet this does not translate into deteriorating housing as the timber used in Samoa derives from hardwoods milled in Savaii, which are very resistant to rot (Personal Interview, June 2000). And while sometimes mould grows on timber and the concrete, more commonly on the timber, the housing is generally protected from salt spray, apart from cyclones (ibid). There are many rural houses in New Zealand that have a similar appearance, yet are of far worse condition. Where, however, tenant shacks are made of something like plywood, they are likely to deteriorate. While I was not involved in an extensive survey of urban housing in Apia, I suspect that Bryant's 1993 publication was based on research prior to Cyclone Val in November 1992. The housing that survived Cyclone Val will have been structurally viable, at least, and the housing since built has generally been subjected to rigorously enforced building regulations.

### **Women's Issues**

The traditional style fale had shutters plaited from coconut fronds by women and thatching made by women from a species of cane leaves (lau). However, it was the men who attached this thatch to the roof framing – so one has to phrase very carefully any inquiries as to who makes the roof. The growing preference for corrugated iron roofing and glass louvres has reduced the calls on women to make thatching and shutters. However, this has not necessarily reduced the demands on women's time as now, to afford these manufactured products, there is a greater emphasis on earning cash, through employment or cash crops. By 1980, women's handicrafts had declined to a large extent, and the rising use of cash and imported food in traditional exchanges was seen to reduce the value of mats and tapa cloth. Western medication and changing preferences reduced the demand for coconut oil

and traditional medicines. Fine mats (i.e. toga) were no longer as significant a measure of wealth as in the past and the quality and quantity in circulation continued to decline. As women's sphere of influence declined, men's sphere of agriculture increased. This resulted in a shift of women's work from an autonomous and prestigious domain to a secondary, supplementary and less prestigious one. Mass education and a trend towards western domestic patterns have made childcare, cooking and housework primarily women's tasks, whereas in the past these tasks were mainly undertaken by adolescents and older children (who now attend school). Intrusion by women into the men's sphere resulted in men refusing to assist and criticising. But within non-traditional agricultural ventures there was no discernible opposition, such as ventures involving the production of eggs, dairy and vegetable.



Illustration 30: A fale on the beach, with western mattress.





Illustration 31: View from fale on the beach.

### **Urban Compound**

In Apia I visited an urban compound belonging to a minister and his family. I interviewed his daughter to ascertain their domestic housing arrangements and any concerns they had regarding the issue of housing. The compound consisted of a large rusticated weatherboard house, a smaller, two-roomed rusticated weatherboard house and an open style fale, with a bedroom built on off the rear. There were also several more basic, one-roomed dwellings that were rented out. The minister's brother and his wife and children live in the larger rusticated weatherboard house which has a shop at the front of it on the street that the minister's brother owns, though he shares the profits with the rest of the family sometimes. The smaller rusticated weatherboard house was the home of the minister's sister and her husband and children. And the minister and his wife slept in the bedroom to the rear of the fale, while their daughter and her husband slept on a European bed in the open fale. The minister's daughter has grown up there. Her Grandmother and Grandfather married in his village, but as her Grandfather is a pastor, they had to move into Apia. Her father's church is just down the road. The woman has one uncle in the USA and one in New Zealand. And she also has three Aunt in New Zealand.



The open fale had been rebuilt in April 1999, with money they already had available. Within the lean-to the rear of the fale, alongside the bedroom, is the meal preparation area. The actual cooking is done under a roof outside, with no walls. The minister's mother made the thatching of the rebuilt fale with materials from her original village, however, there was not enough to thatch the entire roof, so the balance of the roof was clad with corrugated iron. Thin nylon packing strips were used to tie the thatching to the roof framing, but also traditional twine was used, which they made themselves out of fibre from coconut shells. Men attached the thatch and the corrugated iron to the roof. The roof is supported by a rectangular section beam that is supported by posts, the tops of which are rebated for the purpose. There was also a dining suite in the open fale and a sofa. They all eat dinner in the open fale. Tarpaulins are used in lieu of the traditional shutters around the perimeter of the fale, and these are rolled up and tied up when it is not raining. If there are mosquitos they burn a mosquito coil, and there is a mosquito net over the bed, hung from wire, and bundled above the wire out of the way during the day. A vinyl floor covering is used on the floor.



Illustration 32: Inside a timber frame, western style house, Apia.





Illustration 33: Inside a timber frame, western style house, Apia.

The Western style houses have glass louvres and corrugated iron. Fine sleeping mats that the minister's mother made are employed on the floor of the Western style house as they are protected from the rain. Tarpaulins are used for the ceiling, with material being used on the walls. Glass louvres are fitted in the windows on three sides of the house, while at the rear of the house the window openings do not have louvres or anything else in them. The rusticated weatherboards have no corner boards or scribes, nor window facings or scribes or plugs. Yet there is no deterioration evident in the boards, and the paint on them is good. The minister's father's carpenter made the chairs inside the house.

They are planning to destroy the baches as the other families who are tenants are very rude, noisy, and often drunk and fighting. And there is a concern that replacing the current tenants could lead to getting people who exhibit even worse behaviour. Getting rid of the tenants would 'make our mind free', according to the minister's daughter. They plan to use the space gained from destroying the baches to plant out a plantation – yams, taro and bananas. They have chooks, but no pigs, as the government does not allow pigs in town, so they had their pigs taken back to their

village, though the minister's daughter is rather aggrieved at how she sees other pigs kept around town. There are also a lot of cats, though these are generally in a bad state. The family plans to add a large house off the food preparation area, in the lean to in the rear of the fale. While the minister's daughter thinks it will be concrete block, but it has to be discussed with the family. The family will pay for it together.

### **Rural Village**

There is a large fale, built of concrete, with square concrete columns with diamond indents cast in for decoration. The floor is of polished concrete, with no vinyl covering. There is a painted hardboard ceiling. There are wires across the fale above head level to support mosquito nets. There are curtains at the spaces between columns, which are knotted to enable views and air circulation. There is a strip of material that runs right around the fale just below the ceiling. There is a small roof supported on posts near the fale where the cooking is done on an open fire. There is a fence made of horizontal rails, with a gate for access, around the cooking fale, to keep the pigs out. Eating occurs in another fale, which is quite high up and is also used for storage of food and which has thatch, with a bent over sheet of corrugated iron for a ridge cap, which is roped together. Washing up occurs there. The chief and his wife sleep separately in a smaller wooden fale, while all the children sleep on mats in the concrete fale. Curtains hang from the wires, and boys sleep on one side of the fale, and girls on the other. Curtains are also hung for changing after baths.

The Chief's daughter prefers the concrete fale to western style housing, as fales provide a larger space. When she forms a separate household (she already has a child) she would like to sleep in an open fale. She would want it to be built of concrete, however, she does not like the look of concrete so she would prefer to have more material, such as wrapped around the columns. The reason she would want to have her own fale made of concrete is because concrete is strong and would stay up for a long time and withstand cyclones. However, in the near future, the chief's daughter plans to move to New Zealand to earn money to send back to her parents so they can build an even stronger fale. While other families in the village have western style housing, as well as fales, the chief and his family, at this stage, live only in fales. They have electricity, with a couple of large fluorescent lights in the concrete fale, and a stereo and a television.



## **Conclusion**

By the time of my research in Samoa in the middle of the year 2000, the housing situation in Samoa seemed credible and creditable. The Chief Building Officer and his team are approaching the task of improving the quality of future housing in a methodical and dedicated manner. The Housing Corporation, while enabling many Samoans to own their home, should be ensuring permits are issued on the designs submitted, to ensure the regulatory process runs more smoothly. While some housing appeared to be in bad repair in Apia itself, closer examination usually revealed it to be sound, just lacking cosmetic care. And in the outer villages on Upolo, the housing was obviously in impressively good condition, with block-work and mortar pointing painted different colours, and evidence of many new roofs.

## **MANIHIKI**

**Introduction**

Manihiki Island is located in the Northern Group of the Cook Islands, approximately 1300km from Rarotonga, and is an enclosed type coral island supporting two villages, Tauhunu and Tukao (AC Consulting Group, May 1998:1). Prior to Cyclone Martin, Manihiki had a population of 668 and was the centre of the Cook Islands black pearl farming industry (ibid).




Illustration 34: Map of the Cook Islands



Many families now living in Manihiki had lived for many years in New Zealand, and returned relatively recently to pursue pearl farming. While others had retired back to their home island, having raised their family in New Zealand. Their reasons for living on Manihiki are the enviable climate and the beautiful scenery, “I love it here, I call it my paradise.” The peace and tranquillity available on the atoll was also commented on. And the opportunities afforded by pearl farming for a more autonomous lifestyle was also noted, ‘Here you are your own boss – in New Zealand you have two bosses – your watch and your other boss!’ The quality of life afforded by living in a small community was also a contributing factor.




Illustration 35: Aerial photo of Manihiki, Tuvalu in elbow of top island, Tauhunu along island on left.




Illustration 36: Pearl farm buildings on kaola in lagoon, prior to cyclone Martin.

## **Housing Quality Prior to Cyclone Martin**

Responsibility for the enforcement of the Building Controls and Standards Act of 1991 in Manihiki rested with the Building Controller and inspectorate staff based within the Public Works Department in Rarotonga. However, as recently as 1999, an independent report of the United Nations and the Applied Geoscience Commission stated that while Rarotonga itself is well served by the inspectorate, they do not have the necessary resources, including staff, to properly inspect building work on the outer islands (UNDP Disaster Management Programme, 1999:6). Also there has been no trade training programme available in the country and while the ILO Trade Training and Testing Programme had been introduced in the 1980s, it was no longer functioning (ibid:7). This is in no way to suggest that any culpability rests with the building inspectorate of the Cook Island Government for the collapse of most of the buildings in Manihiki as a consequence of Cyclone Martin, but rather as a plea for more resources to be directed to the inspectorate being able to pursue their duties in the outer islands, for future building work.

The bulk of the buildings had been built prior to the introduction of the Building Controls and Standards Act, and its unlikely the inspectorate or their predecessors would have been notified of the construction of many of these buildings prior to their being built, as Manihikians have been independent builders for centuries.<sup>114</sup> While the housing on Manihiki built along traditional lines were almost invariably well built, and the Manihikians in general then and now are competent builders, technical information regarding the use of newer materials would appear not to have been available. An example of this would be with the employment of reinforcing rods with the use of self poured concrete blocks where insufficient training had led to the composition of the concrete not reaching adequate strength, and not having enough reinforcing bars through the blocks. Having said that, it is important to realise just how extreme an event Cyclone Martin was – buildings that had existed for well over a century succumbed. And in the final analysis, whether a building survived or not appeared to be more dependant on the luck of where it

---

<sup>114</sup> Those who had dwelt for some time in New Zealand during the 1960s and 1970s would have had such independent notions reinforced rather than otherwise, as New Zealanders during that period engaged in a lot of illegal 'weekend' building work (Personal Observations).



happened to be sited in relation to the fury of the wave surge, than on the method or adequacy of the construction employed. Though it has been noted often that the rounded structures, such as the large community water tanks, came through the cyclone unscathed, so perhaps that should be taken into account in future cyclone-resistant design.





Illustration 37: Building Code in place for Cook Islands, timber frame details.



STRUCTURAL WALLS REINFORCEMENT



MASONRY HOUSE DETAILS

Illustration 38: Cook Islands Building Code, blockwork details.





Illustration 39: Little evidence of horizontal reinforcing in remains of block wall.



Illustration 40: Evidence of starter bars.





Illustration 41: Community water shed, with water tanks.

### **Cyclone Martin**

Cyclone Martin struck Manihiki on 1<sup>st</sup> November 1997, the first day of the official cyclone season. There were warnings, and the pearl farmers worked hard at preparing their oyster lines, and securing their farm buildings against the onslaught. However, the ferocity of the cyclone was not fully anticipated, as evidenced by one pearl farmer who usually removed the cladding on the lower floor of his farm building when a major cyclone was expected, not considering it necessary to do so this time (Personal Interview, July 2000).<sup>115</sup> The cyclone initially passed over Manihiki, resulting in low barometric pressure and wind set up (storm surge) which caused the sea level to rise by approximately two metres (AC Consulting, July 1998:3). This resulted in the shoreline shifting inland by twenty metres leaving the entire island of Tauhunu awash, though several areas of Ngake (the island with Tukao on it) remained above water (ibid). The cyclone then swept back over Manihiki, resulting in

---

<sup>115</sup> The potential severity of the cyclone could hardly be comprehended, considering it destroyed buildings which had existed for over a hundred years – the pastor's house and the Sunday School house, among others – so this cyclone was very much a once in a hundred years event, beyond anyone's experience.




significant storm waves (ibid).<sup>116</sup> The storm surge peaked at above four metres above normal lagoon levels (AC Consulting Group, December 1997:12). The maximum wind speeds did not coincide with the waves passing over the islands and were about 90 knots (AC Consulting, July 1998:3).


At Tauhunu, the cutting in the reef for the wharf led to an increase in the height of storm surge at the village (Interview at Foreign Affairs, March 2000). There was also far less vegetation there, in part to accommodate Telecom's solar panels and satellite receiving dish, and this meant the vegetation was not available to act as baffles to the major wave surge, and thus lessen its impact (ibid) and (personal interviews). This wave surge swept right through the village, across the lagoon and out to sea again between motus on the other side of the lagoon (ibid). It was this major sea surge which led to the loss of lives, including some farmers who had been attempting to secure their farm buildings and equipment, on their kaoas (AC Consulting Group Report, December, 1997:11). Nineteen people drowned – ten bodies were recovered but nine were never found (ibid). This significant loss of life resulted from the density of the population living there (ibid). Most of the people taken away lived within a hundred metres of each other, that area did not have many trees for protection as it was the wharf area, and the waves angled in from each side. Also the Council had had all the tall trees cut down along the road and left them there the day before the cyclone hit as the winds had been quite high (Personal Interview, July 2000). While cutting down trees this is normal procedure prior to a cyclone, the unfortunate timing of the cyclone led to the trees becoming 'battering rams, I think' (ibid).

---

<sup>116</sup> 'There was increased water height. You can get wind set up – but that was not a large factor in Manihiki. The wave action resulted because the depression travelled past the island – so initially the sea built up. The tail of the cyclone then turned round, and then went smack into Manihiki' (Interview at Foreign Affairs, 13<sup>th</sup> March 2000).



L A G O O N



# LEGEND






-  Buildings
-  Jetty
-  H.W.M.
-  Fringing reef
-  Road

Illustration 42:

Location of houses, Tauhunu, prior to Cyclone Martin.




Illustration 43: Location of surviving houses and micro-shelter sites, Tauhunu.






Illustration 44: Location of houses in Tukao village, prior to Cyclone Martin.







Illustration 46: Houses in Tukao, seaward, just after Cyclone Martin.






Illustration 47: Telecom site, Tauhunu.



Illustration 48: Aftermath of Cyclone Martin, Tauhunu



In Tukao there was also a significant wave surge, though not as severe (Interview at Foreign Affairs, March 2000). Far more buildings were destroyed or damaged in Tukao, yet no lives were lost (ibid). The sea level remained at adult chest height in the village through the night, and the people waded through the water in the dark to higher ground, 'we had no idea what we were walking on' (Personal Interview, July 2000). People wondered why one man, a Japanese seeding technician, was carrying a bundle above his head (Personal Interview, July 2000). They found out when next morning he went onto the airstrip and pulled his satellite phone out of the bundle to notify the rest of the world of the devastation that had been wrought (ibid).

The Cook Islands Government contacted the New Zealand government virtually straight away (Interview at Foreign Affairs, 13<sup>th</sup> March, 2000). A Hercules was sent up to look over Manihiki (ibid). A couple of days later an Orion was sent with food and clothing, and NZODA assisted with the evacuation of approximately 440 islanders to Rarotonga, leaving some 230 people, most living in basic temporary conditions (AC Consulting Group, May 1998:1).

In Manihiki, 95% of all buildings on the island and all power, telecommunications and airstrip and boat landings were damaged (AC Consulting Group, May 1998:1). Many families lost most of the possessions they had acquired over their lifetimes. The cost of these losses has been estimated (conservatively) to be \$NZ 14,200,000. Little had been insured, as insurance is not offered for houses and property on the outer islands (ibid). There was significant damage to vegetation (ibid), and a major loss of topsoil (Personal Interview, July 2000).

### **Relief Efforts**

The Cook Islands Government contacted the New Zealand government virtually straight away. A Hercules was sent up to look over Manihiki. A couple of days later an Orion was sent with food and clothing (Foreign Affairs Interview, March 2000), and NZODA assisted with the evacuation of approximately four hundred and forty islanders to Rarotonga, leaving some two hundred and thirty people, most living in basic temporary conditions (AC Consulting Group, May 1998:1).

Initially, a Hercules flight arrived every day, requiring all the able bodied people to unload it, store the goods, then distribute them (Personal Interview, June 2000). This resulted in tremendous stress and fatigue (ibid). The people of Manihiki also had not had time to mourn their friends and relatives (ibid). Stress was being evidenced in the ways parents talked to their children, and in the way spouses talked to one another (ibid). The call went out to be spared one day from the Hercules flights (ibid). Apparently this day off was much appreciated, enabling everyone to relax, and just chat (ibid). One of the Manihikians stresses that its important, once the most immediate necessities have been got to a disaster area, that the people there are given some down time (ibid). This time off enables them to collect themselves (ibid).

This is particularly important for a Polynesian people, for whom the mourning of the departed is so important (ibid). Normally, in Manihiki, the mourning period involves one day with no work whatsoever, followed after the funeral by three days of no community activities (Personal Interview, July 2000). The Manihikians also take part together in pokoru when someone drowns, which involves everyone going down to the spot where they drowned and patting and spashing the water while praying (ibid). They did manage to have a prayer on the beachside after Cyclone Martin. Most research on the psychological impact of disasters stresses the importance of rest for the victims once they are rescued from further harm and fed (Luketina, 1985:14).

The Cook Islands' Government talked to the New Zealand High Commissioner in Rarotonga, requesting a trauma psychologist and one was supplied (Foreign Affairs Interview, March 2000). No study has been done on the emotional impact (Personal Interview, July 2000). The experience of Cyclone Martin was traumatic. Most of the elderly and many of the young men and women of Manihiki now live in Rarotonga and New Zealand. Those that remain have made a definite commitment to living in Manihiki. Some needed to find a rationale for the advent of the cyclone to cope psychologically, and a few even accepted the proposition that it was 'punishment for their sins' (ibid).

Another concern expressed regarding this initial stage with everyone living under tarpaulins, and having to prepare food communally, was the lack of cleaning supplies for washing dishes with and for cleaning up anything that was salvagable



(Personal Interview, June 2000). Fortunately, one of the relatives of a family in Tukao was the secretary of the Cook Islands' Red Cross, Nicki Rattal, so these concerns were communicated and then rectified with subsequent deliveries (ibid).

## **Reconstruction**

It was then decided between the governments of New Zealand and the Cook Islands that the best help New Zealand could offer initially was to send engineers over to assess the situation (Foreign Affairs Interview, March 2000). So an engineering team was sent by New Zealand, comprised of employees of AC Consulting Group (ibid). Simultaneously a United Nations Development Programme disaster assessment team was sent (ibid). The UNDP appraised the total restoration costing US\$12 to US\$14 million (ibid). An AC Consulting Group engineer, Graeme Campbell, came up with a list of options (ibid). These were then passed onto the Cook Islands Government (ibid).

The Cook Island and New Zealand Government's first priority was to ensure the safety of the people (Foreign Affairs Interview, March 2000). As well as concern for the welfare of the residents, there was an awareness of the importance to the Cook Islands' economy of the black pearl farming industry (ibid). Thus, when many individuals on Manihiki indicated that the future security of their property would influence whether they continued to live (and farm) on Manihiki (AC Consulting Group, December 1997:3), it became important that the rehabilitation measures for Manihiki minimised any future loss to property, hence the concept behind the micro-shelters (Foreign Affairs Interview, March 2000). While it was perceived that it was likely that the cyclone shelters would be used as housing, they were presented as cyclone shelters only (ibid).

The farmers had cut the oyster lines to save them (Foreign Affairs, 13<sup>th</sup> March 2000). However, the farming infrastructure was destroyed – the seeding sheds and storage sheds and so on (ibid). The sea surge had a cleansing effect that resulted in a bumper crop of pearls (ibid). The Cook Island Government decided the priorities were: re-establishing power, cleaning up, and providing telecommunications, cyclone shelters, sanitation and water (ibid).

A limited clean-up operation was undertaken. Funding was set aside for the community to undertake the clean up (Foreign Affairs Interview, 13<sup>th</sup> March 2000). Then the Asian Development Bank (ADB) came in with funding for the clean up, so the Cook Island Government engaged a local contractor, Chris Manus' Onu Consulting Group (ibid). Yet when the community dived into the lagoon for rubbish as recently as the end of 1999, they were able to bring up twenty cubic meters of rubbish, including drums of diesel and car batteries (ibid).

### **Shelters**

A community meeting held in Manihiki on the 25<sup>th</sup> November 1997, supported the concept of community shelters by the two communities in Manihiki, and the sites were agreed upon (AC Consulting Group, December 1997:3).

The Cook Islands' Minister of National Disaster Management, the Honourable Tepure Tapaitau, said the highest priority was for the provision of cyclone shelters as soon as practicable (AC Consulting Group, December 1997:3). He specifically advised that provision in cyclone shelters should be made for a potential population of 1000, split evenly between Tauhunu and Tukao (ibid). The construction of shelters should maximise use of local resources (ibid). Village plans should be developed with input from the residents, with land rights resolved in the traditional way (ibid). At the time he did not anticipate a requirement for title survey, or legally binding agreements (ibid).

The Cyclone Management Centres (CMCs) were commenced first (Foreign Affairs Interview, 13<sup>th</sup> March 2000). The AC Consulting Group generated the plans for these and for the micro-shelters (ibid). The construction of the CMCs was put out to open tender. Mainworks (subsidiary of Mainzeal) specialising in smaller, light commercial construction, won the contract (ibid). While the CMCs were envisioned initially as potentially being used as schools, the Cook Island Government decided to repair the existing schools (ibid). It was decided that the CMCs would be able to function as a post office, medical clinic, banks, and for the local police (ibid). The Island Council decided to close off the upper storey to use for special events: weddings, and so on (ibid). The Cyclone Management Centre included a kitchen at one end and storage at other end on the ground floor (ibid).



The CMCs have sliding panels of safety glass, which, when open, create a breezeway (Foreign Affairs Interview, 13<sup>th</sup> March 2000). These windows have top hung wooden shutters that can be pulled down and latched (ibid). Big eaves for shading were included in the design; however, the protruding rafters beyond the eaves were required to be cut off by the Cook Islands Building Authority due to concerns they would be wrenched off in a cyclone (ibid). The timber used in the framing in the CMCs is radiata pine, with the poles being H5, and the framing being H3,<sup>117</sup> including the glue-lam beams (ibid). The shutters are in kwila (ibid). One CMC was built in each of the two villages (ibid).

Both the CMCs and the micro-shelters were designed for wave surge (Foreign Affairs Interview, 13<sup>th</sup> March 2000). They were also designed for sea two meters above normal lagoon height, and wave fronts of approximately two metres high (ibid). The water tank top is at the height of the raised lagoon level (due to siting of micro-shelter) and the upper storey of the micro-shelter's floor is above the potential wave front (ibid). Micro-shelters are also designed for coping with damming of coconut trees against posts (ibid). The engineers adopted the standards of Queensland (ibid). They were designed for a 70 metre per second non-directional wind (ibid).

The initial designs for the micro-shelters were very 'native' in appearance contrary to the style of housing the bulk of the population had lived in prior to Cyclone Martin. The engineers who designed the micro-shelters did not believe there was a building design tradition in Manihiki (Foreign Affairs Interview, 13<sup>th</sup> March 2000). Pre-Martin, the Manihikians lived for the most part in western style housing (Personal Interview, July 2000). These houses consisted of timber frames with fibre-cement panels and no internal cladding (as per Queensland houses), or concrete blockhouses, or lime houses, some over a hundred years old (ibid). Many also had experience owning and building houses in New Zealand. One person said, 'we had sixteen homes in New Zealand, we built our first one. We brought old homes and did

---

<sup>117</sup> H3 and H5 refer to the Hazard level that the timber is likely to be exposed to, and the resultant level of tannalising treatment the timber has received. The tannalising treatment consists of soaking in a mixture of CCA – copper, chrome and arsenic (Personal knowledge).



them up. We improved our family home here, almost New Zealand style, we spent ten thousand dollars on it. Two weeks later – Martin’ (ibid).

There were also open fale-type houses; ares, again very different in approach being single storey with an open structure (ibid). Thus the designs the engineers came up with were very different to the styles of the housing on Manihiki prior to Cyclone Martin. The initial designs were modified after some consultation with the community. For example, while the initial micro-shelters were designed with the shelter in the attic of the roof, the locals required this design to be altered to incorporate short walls in the upper storey, so that there would be headroom in the upper storey.




Illustration 49: One of the original plans considered. Note the two bedrooms.




Illustration 50: Another early design for the micro-shelter. Note the limitations on the size of the upper storey due to the hip roof and the absence of any low walls.



However, the engineers concerned appeared to resist further changes, even where these would not affect the structural integrity of the shelter, such as enlarging the windows, even though the walls were not part of the structural system.

The final design included an ablutions and kitchen block on the ground in a lean-to, which were sacrificial in as much as they could be damaged in a cyclone while the actual micro-shelter remained intact (ibid). A 20,000-litre water tank was included under the slab, as Manihiki has a long dry season (ibid). The water is collected by catchment off the roofs and then hand pumped up to the header tank (ibid). The micro-shelters were in kit set form (ibid). The engineers allowed the ground floor to be built in, on condition that they were 'blow-out' panels – not bolted onto the structure (ibid).

Initially, Foreign Affairs was going to pay for the total cost per micro-shelter of NZ\$23,000 (Foreign Affairs Interview, 13<sup>th</sup> March 2000). Then the Cook Islands Government decided that if the Manihikians were required to pay or take on a mortgage of NZ\$13,000, then the monies thus obtained could be put into an account for any future cyclone relief in the Cook Islands (ibid). The Cook Islands and New Zealand Governments required full price for the shelters to be paid by the shelter owners if the micro-shelters built deviated significantly from the designs (ibid). This was designed to ensure correct construction of the micro-shelters (ibid).

### **Level of Manihikian Input**

The Manihikians were not sufficiently consulted with in the design of the project. They resent this, and point out that they could have provided information that would have saved the project time. It was felt by many that the design of the shelters would have been more appropriate to the needs of the Manihikians, if they had had more input into the design of the micro-shelter. And it was also felt that the design of the project itself, particularly in regards to the time frame involved, could have been more accurately assessed, had the Manihikians been consulted with. Information such as the fact that due to migration, the Manihikians had 'lost over 50% of people after the cyclone – people that remained got into pearl farming' could have been supplied (Personal Interview, July 2000). It was felt that had that occurred, there would have been more money available for more shelters.





### **The Manihikian's Priorities**

The first priority of most of the people that remained or returned to Manihiki was their pearl farms – these produced the income they relied on. The pearl farms are a major time commitment, particularly for those who commenced or enlarged their farms since the cyclone. Also, at this stage, the pearl farmers are reliant on overseas technicians, and have to schedule their activities around their visits. Many felt that insufficient consideration was given to the requirement to get the pearl farming up and running again by the project management. The machinery was gone, yet no-one funded new machinery, or made finance available for the pearl farmers. Many people felt that starting up their farms was their first priority so that their income would be up and running, and they could turn their attention to housing. The requirement to pay towards the shelters also increased the pressure on getting the pearl farms viable again. As one pearl farmer pointed out, there was little point in risking a one hundred thousand dollar pearl farm for the sake of a ten thousand dollar shelter.

Most of the population also have a large commitment to their church – Sundays are strictly observed as a day of rest, and last year the 150 year anniversary of the Cook Island Church was held in Manihiki which involved major organising. One woman happened to be in Rarotonga when Cyclone Martin struck, assisting with the food needed for a church build. Sport is also a commitment for many of the younger adults that remain. And church and sports involvement often leads to fund raising activities.

### **Feelings about Shelters**

Almost without exception, those with a shelter wished to convey their gratitude to New Zealand for them, even where they went on to outline their concerns with the design and quality of materials. The perceived spirit behind the 'gift' was acknowledged repeatedly. One person claimed that the general consensus was that everyone is really pleased with them and really appreciated them (Personal Interview, July 2000). One person commented that their shelter felt secure, and 'when its blowing and raining, upstairs feels as warm as toast' (ibid). People who previously had not possessed a home were particularly happy with the shelter (ibid).

## **Safety of Shelters**

People varied in their opinions regarding the structural viability of the micro-shelters. Some people were not convinced that the shelter would withstand a similar cyclone to Martin. They were concerned due to the way the posts were ‘sitting on top’ (Personal Interview, July 2000). The post foundations involved digging holes down to two metres then pouring a concrete pad. Then a forty-four gallon drum is placed on the bottom pad, and concrete poured in. Another pad is then formed on the top of the column formed. And it is on this upper pad that the post stands on, the post being bevelled to key into the concrete, and with four reinforcing steel rods around it. The boxing for the tank lid then goes around the posts, so the pouring of the lid of the water tank forms part of the foundation of the posts.

Many were concerned at the vulnerability of the gravel and the posts to wave surge. One owner was aware that originally concrete steps were to be built around the shelter, these would have deadened the impact of the waves and protected the gravel. Yet this part of the design was shelved – presumably for reasons of cost.

Another source of concern regarding the safety of the micro-shelters is the way the shelter moves in high winds. Some people were also perturbed at the shelter vibrating when they walked over the floor of the upper storey.

Other people did have faith in the ability of the micro-shelter to withstand a cyclone, and felt reassured that they owned one (Personal Interview, July 2000).





Illustration 52: Shelter frame.

The use of galvanised fixings rather than stainless steel is also the cause of concern. One person was saying how he had seen ‘half inch thick steel rust through, and the bolts are already white from salts’ (Personal Interview, July 2000). The reliance on the fixings, due to the lack of back up structure compounded the concern, and led one person to comment that he does not expect the micro-shelters to last longer than two years (ibid). As someone said, ‘people from other countries may have technological know-how about how to design something, but elements (in the tropics) prove time and time again wrong materials’ (ibid).

Yet many people were reserving judgment until the shelters had undergone another cyclone. And most of those people commented that the shelters will never be subjected to the sort of test that the housing in Manihiki had, in part due to the rarity of such an extreme event, and also due to the requirement that the cyclone shelters be cited in the safe zones. One person asked John Easter whether the shelters had been tested for waves, and was told that they do not know how to test for waves, just for wind. He was also told that in a five hundred to six hundred knot wind the whole shelter will fall over, and then it can be put up again.



## Shelter versus Home

While it was intended that the shelters were to be used only as shelters, the shelter owners were desperate for housing, and too busy with the pearl farms to make other housing. The shelter versus home objectives impacted on people's perception of the adequacy of the plan.



Illustration 53: Shelter, with enlarged windows, separate ablutions block, Telecom in the rear of the photo.

Many people found that by the time they had finished making the structure, they did not have the energy or inclination to go through the process again to make a house, so they decided to just add on to the shelter. For those obliged to use the shelter as a home, the initial uncompromising layout of the lean-to was soon flouted with a more practical layout, with a kitchen area included. There had been a strict requirement for the shower and toilet to be placed in the middle of the lean-to so that there was not enough room for a kitchen. So the Manihikians for the most part placed the shower and toilet to one end of the lean-to.

Some were able to treat the micro-shelter as a shelter rather than a home as their either their house had survived, or they had already built themselves a home by the time the shelter scheme had got off the ground. Others chose not to pursue the



shelter scheme as they did see it as a shelter only and what they wanted was a home, and they felt it would take too much effort and money to turn the shelter into one. Those that had a home as well intended to use the shelter for visiting relatives and friends, or for tourists.



Illustration 54: An example of a house made by a couple after Cyclone Martin.




Illustration 55:





Illustration 56: A completed shelter.

### **Design of the Shelter**

One of the greatest concerns with the design of the shelter was the steepness of the stairway and the concrete floor below. One person's child had already fallen down the stairway. It was also the greatest concern of a classroom of schoolchildren interviewed. The steepness of the stairway is also too much for some older people to manage. The stairway was also open, with no risers, enabling toddlers to climb up through the stairway, even when the shelter owners fenced off the base of the stairway. There were also fears regarding the water tank lid, and children lifting it, though in point of fact there had been some kwila lengths provided to form a grill under the lid, however this had not been explained. And prior to louvres being fitted to the windows, there are fears that children could fall out of them. The actual constructing of the shelter without scaffolding was also potentially dangerous.



Illustration 57: Completed shelter, enlarged windows, stairway at one end.

Other design concerns regarded the major effort involved in building the shelter. The requirement for the entire footprint of the shelter to be dug down to the depth of the piles, then back-filled, was perceived as a ludicrously excessive. A ten by ten metre area of land was required to be cleared, then the area of the building had to be cleared down to bedrock or three metres down if further in from shore. The hole was then supposed to be filled and then compacted. The effort involved put many people off going ahead with obtaining a shelter. Though many decided to use ingenuity and common sense and just dig the postholes.

The positioning of the water tank was also considered absurd, as if the water overflowed, it would drip on the stairs making them dangerously slippery, so many people placed the header tank on the outside of the shelter. This also enabled the shelter owners to hear when the water overflowed onto the lean-to roof.

The requirement of the cladding to be impact resistant ought to have been explained, and cladding options given to people, so they did not have to wear the



expense of a change in cladding themselves. The acceptability of larger windows ought to have been made clear from the beginning, as the cladding was not a structural component of the shelters, while ventilation is of paramount importance in dealing with the heat and the mosquitoes.

Then there were the fiddly bits of the design that could turn into such a nightmare, such as the ‘very small vent at very top it was the hardest thing of the whole shelter to make!’ (Personal Interview, July 2000). And one person turned the shutters inside out so the head of rivets are on inside and will last longer. And another person said how her ‘friend finds her shelter attracts spiders!’ (ibid).

### **Alterations to Shelters**

While some people are putting off changing the shelters until after the final inspection, most people have at the very least increased the amount of windows in the upper storey, and many have also changed the layout of the lean-to from the original plan. A few have placed the stairway to the outside of the shelter. All these measures have been undertaken to render what was designed as a basic shelter, into a livable home, as time and financial commitments preclude most people from being able to build another home. The people who have altered the structure have been adamant that they had no choice, they had to do it to accommodate their families. As one person said, they had to ‘make the lean-to into a large eat-in kitchen as with Polynesian families, a big kitchen is needed to get everyone around the table’ (Personal Interview, July 2000).

While some people were put off acquiring a micro-shelter due to the onerous restrictions on altering it in any way, as presented at the initial meetings. However, in a ‘process of wearing the contractors down – people took things into their own hands’, and made alterations along the way (Personal Interview, July 2000). While the people had signed a contract agreeing that if they changed main the structure, or they would not get a rebate on their mortgage, the lean to and window alterations did not compromise the structure. And the people concerned had got at least tacit permission from the project contractors working on the CMCs. One person who had spent decades in New Zealand as a builder, including assisting rebuilding in the east coast




region after Cyclone Bola, was pretty much given his head. A couple of owners had altered the whole structure, as they were prepared to pay whole price.

The requirement that nothing was to be bolted on was so thoroughly internalised that shelter owners were not planning to bolt on future additions, even beyond the inspection date. This is concerning in the case of upper storey additions attached to the main structure, as that could well result in catastrophic collapse of the addition.

### **Siting of Shelters**

The engineers required the micro-shelters to be spread along the two main islands, and they were to be located in the zones designated as safe, using the surveyed plan that had been surveyed for the project (Foreign Affairs Interview, 13<sup>th</sup> March 2000). This requirement led to some bizarre occurrences, such as the woman who has her house in town and her shelter on her brother's land – well beyond the community shelter (Personal Interview, July 2000). This requirement led to major hold-ups in the construction of the micro-shelters. On Manihiki, one cannot buy and sell land, though it can be leased or gifted (ibid). The land at Manihiki had never been surveyed so who owns what land is based on oral tradition (ibid). This led to many disputes as the boundaries consisted of 'coconut trees – which fell over, and so on' (Personal Interview, July 2000). The Project management left it to the Island Council to sort out the land disputes (ibid).

The Council required that all the neighbours of an applicant had to sign an agreement regarding the land claimed, thus 'if someone didn't like the applicant they neighbours wouldn't sign' (ibid). This requirement led to some people missing out on a micro-shelter completely (ibid). If appropriate, the land dispute could be taken on to Rarotonga's land court, the decisions of which are absolute, however where the dispute is with family members, its unlikely such an avenue would be pursued (ibid).



**Generalised Territorial Domains of the Rakahangan Tribe, Dual Grouping and Matekelnanga.**

Illustration 58: Land holdings in Polynesia are strictly hereditary, and may become customary, so that any changes in previous location lead almost inevitably to disputes.

### Allocation of Shelters

The Island Council was charged with the responsibility of allocating the shelters. Prolonged discussions between the Island Council and the Disaster Management Committee (selected to manage the project) on priority ranking took place. The Island Council drew up lists according to certain criteria (such as whether their original house survived and whether there were dependant children). The shelters were intended to be for the extended family – whereas Manihikians wanted one shelter per couple.





Illustration 59: A traditional whare poa being built by a couple that missed out on a shelter.




Illustration 60: Detail of above. Note half cut for join over supporting post.





Illustration 61: Note notch in beam to key into lower beam. Note forked top of post to hold lower beam.

A potential source of injustice arose from the Island Council's requirement that the potential micro-shelter owners be resident on Manihiki by a certain date. This requirement is understandable given that more Cook Islanders live in New Zealand (for all intensive purposes, effectively permanently) than in the Cook Islands. There is also a large colony of Manihikians living on Rarotonga, some for generations.<sup>118</sup> The population in the wake of the cyclone was rather fluid, with no real way of knowing who would return from Rarotonga and who would not. The deadline, unfortunately, resulted in some people who had lived for many years in Manihiki, but who had been temporarily evacuated in the wake of Cyclone Martin, being unable to claim their micro-shelter. The older people, for instance, who had been removed from Manihiki after Cyclone Martin to New Zealand and Rarotonga were given one month to decide to return to Manihiki, after which their return trip was no longer paid for by NZODA. This resulted in many older people becoming stranded, as they could not face going back to Manihiki so soon after such a traumatic experience, yet they could not afford

<sup>118</sup> Sir Peter Buck commented on the large population of Manihikians on Rarotonga back in 1927, however, some of those families may well have gone onto New Zealand (Buck, 1927).

to travel back subsequently though some would like to come back. There are now very few old people in Manihiki. And 'one young chap missed out on a shelter, even though he got to Manihiki from New Zealand only a day after the deadline, yet a councillor got a shelter some time after the deadline' (Personal Interview, July 2000). 'And an older couple got here just after the qualification date and missed out so are making their own whare poa' (ibid).

As time went on, the cost overruns of the project, purportedly from having to hire labour from New Zealand rather than having it supplied from Rarotonga, and the costs of shipping drastically reduced the number of shelters available (Personal Interview, June 2000). In point of fact, Manu, a Rarotonga-based company had the responsibility to supply the labour and brought in some workers from Rarotonga and Rakahanga on agreed conditions and pay, but it appears these conditions were not met so they broke contract and went home. The Island Council had the responsibility to organise and supervise community labour force, however there was a lack of this that also led to delays (ibid). It is unrealistic for members of the Island Council who may well wish to get re-elected by their people to risk antagonising those same people.

Suddenly, the last shipment of shelters remaining had to be allocated, and by this time many people had given up making one of the lists and made other arrangements for housing their families, paying for other materials to be delivered. Or they had not had it sufficiently explained to them how the loan arrangement would work. So the Councillors were attempting to talk people, anybody, even those not on the first two lists, into accepting a shelter and at this stage the Councillors themselves took shelters, rather than have them go unclaimed. This led to some predictable accusations. Many people commented on every man on the Island Council having a micro-shelter (ibid). There was also a concern that local politics had entered into the selection process, one person saying that he 'suspected political shennagans', as someone who supported a rival party to the one in power on the Island Council did not make the first list, despite fitting the criteria.

These restrictions, and the changing parameters of the project resulted in some inequities, with some people having a house as well as a shelter, while others ended up with neither a surviving house nor a shelter; thus having to make their own



provision, at their own expense. In one area there are only four shelters, yet there are seventy people living there, and it is a long way from the community shelter. The changing parameters also resulted in a perception of a lack of transparency in the selection process. However, others commented that there were now couples that had not had a house prior to Cyclone Martin who now have one.

### **Supply of Materials**

Another major concern with the project was with the way the materials were distributed (Personal Interview, July 2000). The initial shipload contained the micro-shelter 'kit-sets' sorted out into separate bundles (ibid). However, subsequent shipments had all the materials for the micro-shelters – and the CMCs – en masse, requiring sorting out on arrival (ibid). The materials for the micro-shelters were allocated in Tauhunu to the shelter owners and it was then up to the shelter owners to organise transport over to their site and to secure storage (ibid). This requirement was made significantly more difficult by the loss of the barge supplied by NZODA within a week of it landing in Manihiki, by a project carpenter and a labourer from Rarotonga who refused to take advice from the locals on how to load the barge (ibid). Some Manihikians felt the people employed by the project were patronising, having a “‘Boy, bring me this!’ attitude’ (ibid). Many of the Manihikians are adamant that not all the materials made it to Manihiki – while some AC Consulting members are equally adamant that it *did* all get there. One person suspected the person sorting the materials out in New Zealand of selling off some, as the materials were already short as they checked them off the boat, checking the quantities off the plans (ibid). They had been unable to get the community centre carpenters to be at the wharf to witness the check (ibid). We checked against the quantities on the plans. I’d been asking the carpenters working on the centre to come and check the materials – they never came’ (ibid). Regardless, many people claim not to have received all the materials they should have, and have made up the shortfall from their own pocket (ibid).

Once materials had arrived on Manihiki, they were still in danger. The contractors who had to build the CMCs were under a lot of pressure to get them finished in time for the next cyclone season, and they would have been given to understand that the CMCs had first priority. This resulted in much borrowing from the micro-shelter owners – on a sadly permanent basis; ‘(the) contractor started taking



materials from one shelter to another and for the centre. Yet we had been made to sign a sheet saying we had got all the materials' (ibid). Another person had his seventy sacks of cement borrowed by Joe Roberts for the CMC (ibid). The situation would appear to have been very fluid – borrowing went on back and forth, with every expectation that those who had to borrow would be able to repay their neighbours with the next shipment (ibid). Even some of the Manihikians wondered just where some of the materials had ended up (ibid). Suspensions were aroused in many directions. 'Three months before I could finish roof – no nails. They gave nails without rubbers (washers) – my ones I borrowed from my friend – he was one of the first shelter owners' (Personal Interview, July 2000). One person discovered project tools hidden in one of the New Zealand carpenter's bags – though it is unlikely the Rarotongan or New Zealand workers managed to get down on any of the actual building materials, travelling as they did by plane (ibid). While there may well have been a limited amount of pilfering of materials by the Manihikians themselves, occasionally alluded to with comments such as 'Manihikians are opportunists' (ibid), and 'We were short of materials – could be a combination of "walk-about" or incorrect amount to begin with' (ibid). Certainly the temptation to use the materials in other directions must have been very great, as the number one priority for the Manihikians themselves was their farms, so they could earn the money to buy their families food. And while initial proposals for the project included provision for shelters to be built on the pearl farm kaoas, this did not eventuate. And while the Deputy High Commissioner of New Zealand in Rarotonga has said that he sighted shelter timber in church pews, I certainly never saw any evidence of misuse of materials in all the time I was in Manihiki. And considering the Manihikians were being asked to pay for at least part of the cost of the micro-shelters, its understandable they felt entitled to direct the materials to wherever they saw the greatest need – if anybody did indeed do so. The fact that there were more pressing needs for the Manihikians than the micro shelters reflects on the design of the project in the first place and that the true priorities of the Manihikians were not given sufficient weight.

The first shipment of shelters came with complete sets of hand tools (Personal Interview, July 2000). However, subsequent shipments of shelters did not include hand tools (ibid). The intention of the project designers was that the original hand tools would be passed onto subsequent shelter owners (ibid). However, the impression

gained by the Manihikians was that those who received the hand tools owned them (ibid). Because the first lot of shelter owners did not receive all their building materials in the first shipment, they had to continue building once they could access the missing materials on subsequent shipments, so they required the hand tools themselves and were unable to hand them on (ibid). As one man explained: ‘they expected tools to be handed on – but the first lot were told they could keep the tools. So the second and third lot missed out. Some (New Zealand) carpenters up here had tools – we bought three thousand dollars worth off them’ (ibid).

### **Quality of Materials**

The quality of materials also caused some concern. These people were used to living in western style houses, both in Manihiki, and, for many of them, in New Zealand, and their houses had been made of good quality materials. The quality of the shelter timber poles in particular had been brought into question due to the large splits in many of them.



Illustration 62: The splits in a pole.



Certainly the poles appeared to have been insufficiently seasoned prior to being sent to Manihiki from New Zealand. Some of the shelter owners planned to put metal straps around the poles to alleviate the concern generated by the cracks. Some of the cracks in the poles had led to cracks in the concrete, due to the increased diameter of the poles. One person suspected the poles were poor quality to begin with ‘the South Pacific is often a toilet basin for a lot of stuff’ (ibid).

Due to the quality of the materials it is difficult to credit that all the structural timber members, including some beams with structurally compromising knots, were number one framing grade. Yet that is the quality required for structural timber by NZS 3604:1990, the standard in force at the time of the design and acquisition of materials for the shelters. A few people did not expect the timber to last long, as water dripped down beams. And a couple of people pointed out that there was evidence of an insect attacking the timber ‘borer is attacking joists and battens of shelter – quite a few holes in them – looks like a funny bee and it leaves dust piles’ (Personal Interview, July 2000).

The choice of the wall cladding seems to have been unfortunate, resulting in leaks through the joins between the boards. On observing this problem with the cladding of the initial shelters, many subsequent shelter owners have taken measures to alleviate this problem, by caulking the boards, or ship-lapping the boards given, or through paying and organising the delivery of alternative materials, usually fibrolite or plywood (Personal Interviews, July 2000). Some who have used the boards are planning to use something else once the inspection has occurred (ibid). One family found there were many knots in the timber planking on the lean-to, some of which have popped out, leaving holes, and their boards upstairs have cracked yet the rain did not come through (ibid).

Another concern is that, while the corrugated iron is of good quality, only primer paint has been supplied. And it has not been explained to the locals that a top coat of paint will need to be applied after the primer – and it will have to be applied within a month of the primer being applied. As one Manihikian espoused: ‘Primer paint – but I say Galvo 1 should be used as iron has weathered for a year, and because



the primer is flaking off. The people weren't told paint was only a primer. The roof is already corroding. Chap said its zincalume, not galvanised. I got permission to just put a few nails in the iron so I can easily replace the metal' (Personal Interview, July 2000). A major aversion to the number of nails required in the corrugated iron was the difficulties that would result when the iron would have to be replaced – and with the absence of topcoats over the primer, having to replace the corrugated iron in several years is indeed likely.

The siting of some of the micro-shelters along the seacoast, has led to severe exposure to salt spray which is adversely affecting the metal components of the micro-shelters. 'The bolts are good – but in a place like this they are going to rust out. The chicken mesh is already rusty. Could have plastic coated the bolts, or something' (Personal Interview, July 2000).

### **Conduct of Project**

The allocation of shelter materials should have been better managed – it was disingenuous to expect post-cyclone victims to have the necessary cartage and storage facilities to take on the responsibility for their own materials until such time as they were allowed to commence building. There seems to have been a definite shortfall in materials for many individual owners - however that may have come about. The onus ought to have been on the Project managers to ensure that did not occur. They could have taken over the large building by the airport and employed someone to issue materials, as they were needed.

Mainworks commitment to supply technical advice to each shelter owner was not met in many cases, leaving the Manihikians to work out how to build a technically complex building on their own. They were able to construct their buildings mostly through their powers of observation and, in many cases, familiarity with Western building techniques, both in Manihiki and in New Zealand. The focus for the Project workers was the building of the Centres. When encountering difficulties with plan, would have to chase up Project carpenter to get advice, which took days. Yet at least one report claimed far higher levels of assistance rendered than actually occurred. The easier to read 3-D plans do not seem to have been available to many, particularly initially. However, others managed with the assistance they did receive, 'if I found

some parts of the plan difficult to follow, I would go to the Project carpenters and ask them and they'd explain it to me; "Just do it like this". (Using hands to explain).

One person informed me that, 'two reports, quarterly reports, were written by AC and were "somewhat fictitious,"' regarding the extent of the progress made and the amount of assistance the shelter owners had received. The initial report said that 70% of the help was provided on the shelters when only 30% were completed! N. 'put down twenty-eight hours of their time for this shelter – yet they never came near it'.

However, many felt that the power reticulation project 'went beautifully - they had been involved in contract work' (Personal Interview, July 2000). And Anthony Brown, the Chief Building Inspector was also singled out for praise, 'Anthony Brown was very good, just after the cyclone, he enlightened people – telling them to make sure trees are down from around the shelters, and to take care of gas cylinders' (ibid).

There was some concern expressed regarding the level of experience of the builders employed by AC Consulting and flown all the way up from New Zealand. 'I felt that the initial A.C. representative on the project had very little working experience on such a construction. This resulted in delays – for everyone' (Personal Interview, July 2000). 'One of the guys (a New Zealand builder), put a support on one side of the post, he then leaned the ladder against the post – on the same side as the support! And then, with half the village watching, he climbed the ladder and started drilling at the top of the post – and he and the post fell over! Two local carpenters had tried to tell him he'd done it wrong – but he wouldn't listen. Normally their attitude was: "You coconuts keep away before you cause an accident!" We wanted to know if that chap was on a suicide mission! Actually, we were really concerned that he could have hurt himself' (ibid). 'Some of the 'specialists' didn't know what to do – locals showed them' (ibid).





Illustration 63: Tukao, church, shelter, children on house slab.



Illustration 64: Volleyball tournament, Tukao churchyard.

The contractors were supposed to build the first three shelters in each village as samples. However, only one was built and the shelters that were supposed to have



been able to be built in two months took the ‘professionals’ six months. “Learning experience for everyone – for people from elsewhere as well” (Personal Interview, July 2000). The first day construction on the first of these shelters was to commence, the Manihikians turned up to give a hand as well as to watch. However, their offers of assistance (by very many accounts) were spurned very rudely (ibid). And yet amongst those offering to help were some professional builders and an ex-building inspector! (ibid). This led to much resentment, as can be imagined. The hold ups with the shelters also held up the rest of the shelters as the Island Council had decreed that no one could start their shelters until the sample shelters had been built. Where additional floors and/or decks have been or will be added, the shelter-owners have so internalised the Project directive that nothing is to be bolted on to the main shelter structure, that only nails are being used to support floor framing. While the likelihood of another cyclone Martin in our lifetimes (or, more pertinently, in the probable lifetime of the shelters) is remote, the likelihood of floor framing attached to its supporting structure only by nails suffering catastrophic failure is very likely. The Project ought to recommend these additional structures be fixed to the cyclone shelter with stainless steel bolts, with the recommendation that these additional structures be unbolted from the cyclone shelter in the event of another major cyclone.

## **Update**

In the event everyone was given rebates on their mortgages, of varying amounts according to the level of deviation from the plans (Personal Communication, February 2001).

Manihiki pearl farmers were most concerned at the advent of a virus in the oysters in the second half of last year, which was aggravated by a drought, and the virus actually involved a shut down in farming for a few months and the necessity of destroying many infected oysters. However, with the advent of rain over the new year, there was sufficient dilution in the lagoon to enable the oysters to recover, and it was just a couple of weeks ago that the Manihikians received word from consultants that it would be possible to proceed with farming (ibid). The occurrence of this virus underscores the vulnerability of the Manihikians on their atoll with their reliance on a mono-crop, and is one of the reasons their having to assume mortgages for homes that have replaced those they lost in a natural disaster particularly draconian.

## **Conclusion**

There were many concerns with the conduct of the project. A lot of problems stemmed from a lack of consultation regarding the design of the shelter. There were unnecessarily restrictive limitations put on changing the lean-tos, and increasing window sizes, even though this did not impact on the structural integrity of the shelter that was reliant on the posts, beams and roofing members. And it was disingenuous to expect people who had lost their housing and were fully extended working on their farms, **and** were expected to pay for at least part of the cost of the shelter, not to proceed turning the shelter into a home. The project administration was fortunate that the Manihikians are highly literate and able to decipher plans (unlike some of the project workers from New Zealand), and some were experienced in western methods of construction. Another problem stemmed from the initial appraisal of available workforce and the time frame set up. The allocation of the shelters led to severe inequities, and it is not enough to claim that the overall housing stock of Manihiki has increased, as these shelters are not on an open market, and so are not able to be freely traded to those who need them most, due to the hereditary nature of land ownership.

## **CONCLUSIONS**



## **General**

There are many differences between the housing situation in Samoa and Manihiki. The first one is the difference in population, leading to a difference in family and administrative resources available. The passing of time has led to a consolidation of the housing stock in Samoa.

The housing situation in Samoa is well in hand, due to the Government of Samoa prioritising the resourcing of the Building Office, and the sterling efforts of the Chief Building Inspector and his Officers. It would appear that, for the most part, the public awareness programme to educate the public on the importance of plans that comply with the building regulations has been successful.

The project on Manihiki worked in as much as now many families have a dwelling but it would have been a more successful project if sufficient attention had been paid to the following concerns.

The following conclusions were reached after conducting the research involved in doing this thesis.

## **Responsive Design**

Housing design ought to be responsive to the needs of the inhabitants. As shown in the chapter on pre-colonial influences on housing design, there has been a long tradition within Polynesian societies of changing their housing to maximise the fit between their needs and the resources available. More account should have been taken of the extensive involvement of the population of Manihiki in New Zealand, as expounded in the chapter on New Zealand's relations with Samoa and the Cook Islands. Many Manihikians had lived in New Zealand, some for decades, and the resultant preference for 'western' style housing shown in the appearance of the housing prior to the cyclone. Where insufficient account has been taken of the needs of future residents in the design of housing, as the chapter on government housing indicates: the residents often undertake their own alterations. This subjects them to extra effort and expense which could have been avoided had adequate feedback been sought at the design stage.

Any shortcomings in the design of the micro-shelters in Manihiki were dismissed with the assertion they were only intended for shelters and New Zealand did not fund housing. However, it was disingenuous to expect people who had had their housing destroyed, and were having to work intensively to get their pearl farms up and running, not to use the shelters for housing. And, as explained in the chapter on aid, it is incorrect to infer the New Zealand government has not funded housing, as it has done so, as in Rotuma, Fiji where the New Zealand army built them.

In Samoa, housing design has been in the hands of the Samoans themselves, as no one has assisted them in home building. The rise in numbers of western style housing is attributable to increasing contact with western cultures, as well as a result of the continuing quest to increase cyclone resistance in their housing. Most families wish to also have at least one open fale, due to its appropriateness to the climate. Though these appear to be being rebuilt with industrial materials, increasing the rigidity of them each time they are rebuilt, going from milled timber posts and beams through to reinforced concrete posts and beams as funds become available, again in an attempt to increase cyclone resistance.

In Manihiki, the engineers designed the shelters to have laundries rather than kitchens. The windows were also designed too small for sufficient ventilation, for a bearable interior environment, and to minimise mosquito intrusion.

### **Commodification**

Commodification of housing can only be utilised where its appropriate to the society involved. While there is a long tradition of purchasing European products by Polynesian people in the South Pacific as outlined in the chapter on pre-colonial influences on housing, these were sought for reasons of convenience. Improvements to the housing did not add to the monetary value of the homes, due to the land being held by the kin group concerned, so that the houses could never be sold and any monetary investment in them could never be realised. It could be argued that in such circumstances overcapitalisation occurs from the first dollar spent.

The access to employment in New Zealand, though restricted for Samoans, has been an important source for funding for people living in Samoa and the Cook

Islands, as discussed in the chapter on New Zealand's relationship with these countries. This funding has been particularly earmarked for improvements to housing. Again, this is in pursuit of more permanent materials requiring less maintenance, and a perception that some western construction materials may well perform better in cyclones. The fact that these investments occur on kin group land ensures that these investments are never realised in a monetary return – though of course it is argued that the pay off comes through the peace of mind of doing the right thing by one's family.

The chapter on government housing relates how with the rise in the new right, there is increasing emphasis on future residents funding their housing, on the justification that they can realise the investment when they come to sell or rent out their house. Again, this is only justifiably arguable where the society has individualised land title, as occurs in many urban areas, however, where land is held in common by a large kin group, this precludes the houses ever being sold. In Polynesia, the importance placed on land for the kin group has permeated the houses on the land. This has occurred to such an extent that even on Rakahanga, where there is a surplus of housing on some kin groups' land due to migration, and a surfeit of housing on other kin group's, the housing may not be rationalised through relocation.<sup>119</sup>

The chapter in aid expounds how the impetus for residents to fund their own housing arose from the emergence of the new right economists, rather than through any rational outcome of attempting to maximise benefit for the future residents.

In Samoa, investments in housing can be realised to an extent where the housing is built in Apia itself and rented out. However, the presence of tenants on family land is potentially problematical, and one family I spoke with has decided to destroy the tenants' housing and convert the area to gardens. Rental property does not appear to be seen as a worthwhile investment in Samoa, certainly the rental properties in Apia are not well maintained, usually being in need of paint, which contrasts sharply with the well kept housing in the villages.

---

<sup>119</sup> Assuming that the structure of the housing allows such a thing, that is, that it has light cladding, not something like concrete blocks (personal interview).



While in Rarotonga it is quite a common practice for migrants to New Zealand to rent out housing through the year and occupy it in their summer holidays, in Manihiki there were significantly fewer tourists prior to Martin. With the increase in pearl farming, there is now a demand for accommodation from workers who have migrated from Rakahanga and Penryn, however this is more a component of the employment package offered rather than a source of income per se for the owners of the housing.

### **Cyclone Housing**

As explained in the chapter on pre-colonial housing influences, traditional housing incorporated measures to increase cyclone resistance. And the panel structure of the traditional housing ensured it could be promptly rebuilt after a cyclone.

The method of using lime to make housing that was introduced into the South Pacific by the missionaries was able to resist cyclones up to a certain magnitude, yet the roofing was prone to being removed. The adoption of housing made of lime reflected the increasing westernisation of housing styles in the South Pacific.

The chapter on government provided housing shows how attempts to maximise efficiency through the use of uniformity in building elements has led to the residents being precluded from having an input in the design and choice of materials. This can lead to an alienation of the residents themselves from their housing, resulting in a lack of interest in maintaining the house.

Yet it is possible with cyclone resistant housing to erect only the basic structure, the structural frame that resists the cyclones. This allows the residents to choose the type of cladding they wish and also choose the arrangement of windows and doors, permitting variety in appearance, and personal input from the residents in their own homes. This approach was undertaken in Rotuma, Fiji, as discussed in the chapter on aid.

In Samoa, government regulations are focussed on ensuring that the cyclone resistance of the homes built is maximised. Yet these regulations are not prescriptive

to the extent of only allowing one type of housing to be built. The approach has been to investigate how the typical types of housing preferred by Samoans can have their cyclone resistance capability increased. Thus there are regulations pertaining to timber framed housing, and other regulations regarding concrete block housing, and also recommendations on how to render the traditionally styled housing more cyclone resistant. These regulations only pertain to the actual structure of the housing, so variety is able to manifest itself through the layout and fenestration of the housing, and the open fales show great differences in the design of the low walls (not a structural element).

In Manihiki, initially there were very strict requirements governing the layout of the lean-to, and in the size of the windows. The designers of the shelters were engineers therefore it would be difficult for the future residents in many communities to have argued against their design due to the status and knowledge that engineers are perceived to have. However, the people of Manihiki had enough confidence in their own knowledge of the local environment, and their own family's needs, to be able to argue with the requirements, or indeed, go right ahead with alterations they saw as important. And indeed, the alterations made by the Manihikians did not compromise the structural integrity of the structure. The danger of having restrictions in place for cyclone shelters that actually pertained to the efficiency of the project rather than to the structural integrity of the shelters themselves, and flew in the face of practical concerns, was that the necessity to change such elements could have flowed into alterations to elements that *were* integral to the structure. However, fortunately the Manihikians were able to evaluate which components were necessary and which could be altered without undue consequence. And some of the alterations were ingenious, such as the man who used studded aluminium for his louvres, so he did not have to have shutters as well. Such innovation should not be thwarted by unnecessarily restrictive regulations.

### **Equitable Housing Provision**

As explored in the chapter on pre-colonial influences, the traditional style of housing, in theory at least, meant that all had access to housing as it was made of local materials. This did vary according to the level of social control within the society; while the Samoan matai got to ascribe building sites, in Rotuma, for instance,

teenagers could erect their own dwelling as long as it was on land belonging to their kin. And in some cultures the job of construction was reserved for only some people as in Samoa, where this may well have been in part a method of social control in as much as it was another conferrable title. However, it may well also have been a method of ensuring the structures maximised the cyclone resistance achievable within the technology available, as the official carpenters would be well versed in the 'correct manner' of erecting houses, whereas there was potentially less surety of this if unpractised amateurs undertook the building.

The increasing adoption of Western materials, with the attendant differentiation in access to the income to obtain such housing materials, led to a difference in the quality of housing people had, and the chief's paramount position became less obvious from comparing housing.

In government provided housing, as discussed in the chapter concerned, inequity in access to housing can occur through onerous entry requirements, such as a large deposit, or a requirement for evidence of a regular income. These requirements arise from attempts to minimise the expense of the provision of housing to the governments. Populations that have greater political clout and/or have more potential to revolt are more likely to have housing provided, thus those in urban areas are more likely to receive housing assistance than those in rural areas.

The chapter on aid expounds how the motivations behind the provision of government aid are such that the access of the poorest to that aid is not always the primary consideration.

In Samoa, the access to housing is through the allocation of house sites by the matai, and the acquisition of funds to pay for the building of a house through employment and/or remittances from migrants.

## **Conclusion**

Better housing project design could be achieved through focussing more on the people concerned and their best long-term interests.



## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

Below are some recommendations that I have derived from my research. They are various measures which would improve the housing situation in the Cook Islands and Samoa, and some which would be applicable to housing schemes in other countries.

### **Samoa**

The work of the Building Office in Samoa could be eased if the Government made it a requirement of the Housing Corporation of Samoa to only lend monies to people who can show evidence of a building consent having been issued on their proposed building.

The Housing Corporation may well be the logical centre for an education programme on painting corrugated iron – if further research does not reveal that it is better for economic or for convenience reasons not to paint roofs. If the difficulty in getting roofs painted arises from a difficulty in sourcing funding, it may well be a good idea for the Housing Corporation to provide minor loans or even paint vouchers (an opportunity for corporate involvement) for maintenance issues.

The New Zealand government can assist the housing situation by enabling Samoans to more easily work in New Zealand, enabling the flow of remittances to continue, unabated, as these are for the most part invested in housing.

### **Manihiki**

No Manihikian family ought to have to pay the full cost of the shelter due to any omission or deviation from the shelter plans, as they were reliant on Project representatives' advice, which was difficult to obtain, and was in some cases wrong. There were also discrepancies in what people were advised, depending on whom they obtained information from.

Another recommendation would be that the fixings into the posts ought to be replaced at New Zealand's expense with stainless steel fixings. And the necessity of using a topcoat of paint on the corrugated iron roofs needs to be expounded.

The police in the outer islands could be recruited into building surveillance duties. At the very least they could notify anyone who commences any building work of the necessity to obtain a Building Consent. They could also be trained in the things to look for when making inspections of different stages of the building. They could take photos of various stages of the building work and post them to the Building Office in Rarotonga for confirmation of how its progressing. Consents.

## **Future Housing Projects**

### **Responsive Design**

Housing design ought to be responsive to the needs of the inhabitants. There needs to be extensive consultation with the residents. That the primary function of a structure is as a shelter from cyclones should not preclude adaptation to housing. All that the designers need provide is the basic viable structure, allowing the residents to choose their own cladding options, and window sizes and arrangements.

### **Commodification**

Awareness of how the hereditary rather than market nature of land acquisition in the South Pacific impacts on the commodification (that is the realisable value in monetary terms of any investment in housing) impacts on the viability of financing that housing is vital. With this in mind, every effort should be taken to minimise the cost of materials. Utilising local materials, such as milled coconut trees, will achieve this. New Zealand ought to assist South Pacific countries in researching pertinent local products, which may lead to earning export revenue, such as developing coconut fibre insulation.

### **Cyclone Housing**

Thorough research needs to be undertaken on the form of structures that survive cyclones, so that the features that enabled them to do so could be incorporated in future housing.

### **Aid Personnel**

First and foremost, people involved in administering and working in aid projects need to treat the recipients of that aid with the utmost respect. Every aid project involves the formation of relationships between people. It is vital that these are



based on honesty and esteem. It is a privilege to be allowed to invade people's lives and needs to be done with humility and deference.

## **Conclusion**

If sufficient consideration is given to the real needs of the future residents of housing, and opportunities are created for them to have real input into the design of that housing, the chance of that housing being successful are maximised. This basic principle of housing design can also be safely extended to the provision of cyclone housing. Increasing cyclone resistance is a matter of the detailing of joints and the nature of the fixings involved, and window coverings. Within the basic parameters of the structural approach adopted for a particular type of cyclone housing, there is still plenty of scope for residents to impart their own personality through their own choices of materials and so on. While technical advice is vital to ensure that housing structures will survive cyclones there is room for personal input from the future residents, particularly if the designers concerned assume competence on the part of the people they are designing for.

## **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

A.C. Consulting Group (1997) Report to the Tropical Cyclone Martin Recovery Task Force, Cook Island Government, Rarotonga, the Cook Islands. December, 1997.

A.C. Consulting Group (1998) Report to New Zealand Foreign Affairs on Manihiki cyclone shelter project, May, 1998

A.C. Consulting Group (1998) Report to New Zealand Foreign Affairs on Manihiki cyclone shelter project, July, 1998

A.C. Consulting Group (1999) Report to New Zealand Foreign Affairs on Manihiki cyclone shelter project, December, 1998.

Abrams, C. (1964) *Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanising World*. M.I.T., Cambridge, Mass., USA.

Abrams, C. (1965) *The City is the Frontier*. Harper and Row, New York, USA.

Adams, P. and Solomon, L. (1991) *In the Name of Progress: the Underside of Foreign Aid*. Energy Probe Research Foundation, Toronto, Canada.

Adams, R. (1990) *Dirk Gently's Holistic Detective Agency*. Penguin, London.

Advisory Committee on External Aid and Development (1990) *Conference Report: New Zealand's Development Assistance, Volume and Visions for the 1990s*. The Committee, Wellington, New Zealand

Agency for International Development by Evaluation Technologies Inc (1988) *Disaster History: Significant Data on Major Disasters Worldwide, 1900 -Present*. The Office, Washington, D.C., USA

Albinski, H.S. (1993) *The South Pacific: political, economic and military trends*. Brassey's, Washington, USA.

Angel, S. (1983) 'Upgrading Slum Infrastructure', *Third World Planning Review*, Vol 5, No. 1, February, 1983.

Angel, S. and Benjamin, S. (1976) 'Seventeen Reasons Why the Squatter Problem Can't Be Solved', *Ekistics* 242, January 1976.

Baken, R. and van der Linden, J. (1992) *A Critique of World Bank Thinking: Land Delivery for Low Income Groups in Third World Cities*. Avebury, Aldershot, England, 1992.

Baken, R. and van der Linden, J. (1993) "'Getting the Incentives Right" Banking on the Formal Private Sector' (World Bank Critique), *TWPR* 15 (1) 1993.

Bapat, M. and Patel, S. (1993) 'Shelter, Women and Development', *Economic and Political Weekly*, March 13, 1993.



Barker, J. (2000) *Pacific Viewpoint*, 26 (3).

Bauer, P. T. (1971) *Dissent on Development; Studies and Debates in Development Economics*. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London.

Bedford (1985) 'Migration and Development', in *The South Pacific*, ed. Thakur, R.C.

Bennet, B.S. (1988) *New Zealand's Moral Foreign Policy: 1935 – 1939*. New Zealand's Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, New Zealand.

Berger, A. (1978) *The City: Urban Communities and their Problems*. Brown, Dubuque, Iowa.

Bertram and Watters (1985) 'The MIRAB Economy in South Pacific Microstates', in *Pacific Viewpoint*, 26 (3).

Boserup, E. (1970) *Women's Role in Economic Development*. Allen and Unwin, London.

Boyd, M. (1969) 'The Record in Western Samoa to 1945' in *New Zealand's Record in the Pacific Islands in the Twentieth Century*, Longman Paul Ltd, for the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs.

Boyd, M. (1969) 'The Record in Western Samoa since 1945' in *New Zealand's Record in the Pacific Islands in the Twentieth Century*, Longman Paul Ltd, for the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs.

Boyd, E. (1996) 'New Zealand and the South Pacific', in *The Oxford Illustrated History of New Zealand*, ed. Sinclair, K.

Brown, B. M. (1970) *New Zealand in the Pacific*. New Zealand Institute of Public Administration. Wellington, New Zealand.

Bryant, J. (1993) *Urban Poverty and the Environment in the South Pacific*. University of New England.

Buck, P. H. (1927) *The Material Culture of the Cook Islands (Aitutaki)*. New Plymouth, New Zealand.

Buck, P. H. (1932) *Ethnology of Manihiki and Rakahanga*. Bernice P. Bishop, Honolulu, Hawaii.

Buck, P. H. (1944) *Arts and Crafts of the Cook Islands*. The Museum, Honolulu, Hawaii.

Burgess, R. (1977) 'Self-help Housing: A New Imperialist Strategy? A Critique of the Turner School', *Antipode* 9.

- Burgess, R. (1985) 'The Limits of State Self-help Housing Programmes', *Development and Change*, Vol. 16, 271-312
- Burgess, R. (1987) 'A Lot of Noise & No Nuts: A Reply to Alan Gilbert & Jan van der Linden', *Development and Change*, Vol. 18, 137 – 146.
- Burns, L. and Grebler, L. (1977) *The Housing of Nations*. MacMillan, London.
- Campbell, A. (1984) *Island to Island*. Whitcoulls, Christchurch, New Zealand
- Campbell, I. C. (1992) *A History of the Pacific Islands*. Canterbury University Press, Christchurch, New Zealand
- Campbell, M. (1989) *Pacific Ways*. Mills Publications, Lower Hutt, New Zealand.
- Caporaso, J. A. and Levine, D. P. (1992) *Theories of Political Economy*. Cambridge University Press, New York, USA
- Chambers, R. (1984) *Rural Development: Putting the Last First*. Longman; London, New York.
- Chambers, R. (1993) *Challenging the Professions: Frontiers for Rural Development*. Intermediate Technology, London, England.
- Chambers, R. (1994) 'The Origins and Practice of Participatory Rural Appraisal', *World Development*, Vol. 22, No. 7.
- Chambers, R. (1994) 'Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA): Challenges, Potentials and Paradigm', *World Development*, Vol. 22, No. 10.
- Chambers, R. (1995) *Poverty and Livelihoods: Whose Reality Counts?* Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, England.
- Chambers, R. (1997) *Whose Reality Counts? Putting the First Last*. Intermediate Technology, London.
- Chowning, A. (1995) 'Changes in Housing and Residence Patterns in Galilo, New Britain, 1918-1992', in *Home in the Islands*, ed Rensel, J. and Rodman, M., University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu.
- Collins, T. (1991) 'Legalisation of Squatter Settlements in Istanbul, Turkey and Implications for Future Squatter Growth', *The Journal of Architectural and Planning Research* 8:4 (Winter, 1991)
- Connell, J. (1990) *Migration and Development in the South Pacific*. Australia National University, Canberra, Australia.
- Cornelius, W. (1975) *Urbanisation and Inequality: the Political Economy of Urban and Rural Development in Latin America*.

- Corner, F.H. (1962) 'New Zealand's External Aid Programmes' in *New Zealand's External Relations*, ed. Larkin, T.C., New Zealand Institute of Public Administration, Wellington, New Zealand.
- Cowen, M. and Sherton, R. (1996) *Doctrines of Development*. Routledge, London and New York.
- Crocombe, R. (1973) *The New South Pacific*. Reed Education for University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji.
- Crocombe, R. (1976) 'The Pacific Way : an Emerging Identity'. Lotu Pasifika, Suva, Fiji.
- Crocombe, R. (1987) *The South Pacific : an Introduction*. Longman Paul, Auckland, New Zealand for University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji.
- Crocombe, R. (1987) 'The Absent Majority: The Case of Rakahanga', in *Land Tenure in the Atolls*, ed. Crocombe, R. University of South Pacific, Suva, Fiji.
- Crocombe, R. (1992) *Pacific Neighbours: New Zealand's Relationship with Other Pacific Islands*. Pacific Studies, University of Canterbury, University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji.
- Crocombe, R. (1995) *The Pacific Islands and the USA* Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific ; Honolulu, Hawaii
- Crocombe, R. and Crocombe, M. (1968) *The Works of Ta'unga; Records of a Polynesian Traveller in the South Seas, 1833 – 1896*. Australia National University Press, Canberra, Australia.
- Crosbie Walsh, A. (1993) *Development that Works! : Lessons from Asia-Pacific*. Amokura Publications, Palmerston North, New Zealand.
- Davidson, J. W. (1967) *Samoa mo Samoa : the emergence of the independent state of Western Samoa* Oxford University Press, Melbourne ; New York
- Denoon, D. (1997) *The Cambridge history of the Pacific Islanders*. Cambridge University Press, 1997, Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, N.Y., USA
- Doidge, F.W. (1950) *New Zealand Foreign Policy: Statements and Documents*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Government Printer, Wellington, New Zealand.
- Dorrance, J. C. (1992) *The United States and the Pacific Islands*. Praeger, Westport, Conn.
- Eckstein, S. (1990) 'Urbanisation Revisited: Inner-City Slum of Hope and Squatter Settlement of Despair', *World Development*, (1990) Vol. 18, No. 2, pp 165-181.
- Economist Intelligence Unit (1999) *Country Report, Pacific Islands*. The Economist Intelligence Unit, London, England.



- Falu, A. and Curutchet, M. (1991) 'Rehousing the Urban Poor: Looking at Women First', *Environment and Urbanisation* Vol. 3, No. 2, October 1991
- Ferguson, G. (1994) *Building the New Zealand Dream*. Dunmore Press, Palmerston North, New Zealand.
- Field, M. (1984) *Mau : Samoa's struggle against New Zealand oppression* Reed, Wellington, New Zealand
- Fraser, G. (1948) *Martial Plan? : an Analysis of the United States Policy*. New Zealand Fabian Society, Wellington, New Zealand.
- Fraser, P. (1944) *New Zealand Foreign Policy: Statements and Documents*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government Printer, Wellington, New Zealand.
- Freire, P. (1972) *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. Penguin, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England.
- Friedman, J., Jimenez, E. and Mayo, S. (1988) 'The Demand for Tenure Security in Developing Countries', *Journal of Development Economics* 29 (1988) 185-198. North-Holland.
- George, Cho (1995) *Trade, aid, and global interdependence*. Routledge, London; New York.
- Gilbert, A. and Gugler, J. (1992) *Cities, poverty and development: urbanisation in the Third World*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York.
- Gilbert, A. and van der Linden, J. (1987) 'The Limits of a Marxist Theoretical Framework for Explaining State Self-Help Housing', *Development and Change*, Vol. 18 (1987), 129-136
- Gilbert, A. and Varley, A. (1990) 'Renting a Home in a Third World City: Choice or Constraint?' *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Vol. 14, No. 1, March 1990.
- Gill (1984) *From Darkness to Light in Polynesia*, 1894. Reprinted by Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific.
- Gilson, R.P. (1970) *Samoa 1830 – 1900*. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, Australia.
- Gilson, R. P. (1980) *The Cook Islands, 1820-1950*. Ed. Crocombe, R. Victoria University Press, Wellington, New Zealand and Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji.
- Grant, I. (1980) *The Unauthorised Version: A Cartoon History of New Zealand*. Cassell Ltd, Auckland.

- Grant, R. and Nijman, J. (1998) *The Global Crisis in Foreign Aid*. Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, New York, USA
- Grattan, F. (1948) *An Introduction to Samoan Culture*. R. McMillan, Papakura, New Zealand.
- Guaraldo, M. and Rezende, M. (1991) 'What Hope is there for Poor People's Housing in a World of Inequity?' *TWPR*, 13 (1) 1991.
- Hailey, J. M. (1987) *Entrepreneurs and indigenous business in the Pacific*. Pacific Islands Development Program, Honolulu, Hawaii.
- Handelman, H. (1988) 'The Role of the State in Sheltering the Urban Poor', in C. V. Patton (ed.) *Spontaneous Shelter. International Perspectives and Prospects*. Temple University Press, Philadelphia, USA.
- Hawkins, E. K. (1970) *The Principles of Development Aid*. Penguin Harmondsworth, England.
- Hayter, T. (1971) *Aid as Imperialism* Penguin Harmondsworth, England.
- Hayter, T. (1981) *The Creation of World Poverty*. Pluto in association with Third World First, London, England.
- Hearn, T.J. (1981) 'New Zealand and the South Pacific', *The Papers of the Fifteenth Foreign Policy School*, ed. Hearn, T.J. University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand.
- Hempenstall, P. J. and Rutherford, N. (1984) *Protest and Dissent in the Colonial Pacific* Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji.
- Heredia, R. (1993) 'Legislation and Housing', *Economic and Political Weekly* January 16-23, 1993.
- Holland, S.G. (1953) *New Zealand Foreign Policy*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Government Printer, Wellington, New Zealand.
- Howe, K. R. (1984) *Where the Waves Fall : a New South Sea Islands History from First Settlement to Colonial Rule*. George Allen & Unwin, Sydney, Australia
- Howe, K.R, Kiste, R and Lal, B.V. (1994) *Tides of history : the Pacific Islands in the Twentieth Century*. Allen & Unwin, St. Leonards, N.S.W., Australia
- Huggard, S. and Kaufman, R. (1992) *The Politics of Economic Adjustment : International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., USA
- Ihimaera, Witi (1985) 'New Zealand as a Pacific Nation', *New Directions in New Zealand Foreign Policy*, ed. Gold, H. Benton Ross, Auckland, New Zealand.

International Women's Tribune Centre (1987) 'The Tribune: A Woman and Development Quarterly', *International Women's Tribune Centre*, Newsletter 39, Dec 1987.

Islam, S. (1991) *Yen for Development : Japanese Foreign Aid & the Politics of Burden-sharing*. Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York, USA

Jellinek, L. (1991) *The Wheel of Fortune: A History of a Poor Community in Jakarta*. Allen & Unwin, Sydney, Australia.

Jordan, S. and Wagner, F. (1993) 'Meeting Women's Needs and Priorities for Water and Sanitation in Cities', *Environment and Urbanisation*, Vol. 5, No. 2, October 1993.

Kaufmann, D. and Quigley, J. (1987) 'The Consumption Benefits of Investment in Infrastructure', *Journal of Development Economics* 25 (1987) 263-284.

Kioe-Sheng, Y. (1981) *Leases, Land and Local Leaders: An Analysis of a Squatter Settlement Upgrading Programme in Practice*. Femantle University of Australia.

Kirk, A. R. (1996) *Samoa's Fight for Freedom*. Capital Letters Publish., Wellington, New Zealand

Klak, T. (1992) 'Excluding the Poor from Low Income Housing Programs: the Role of State Agencies and USAID in Jamaica', *Antipode* 24:2, 1992, pp 113-130. in *South Pacific Year – 1971: a Report*, south Pacific Year Committee, Wellington.

Kothari, M. (1997) 'The Global Struggle for the Right to a Place to Live', *Development in Practice*, Vol. 7, No. 1, February 1997

Kusnetzoff, F (1975) 'Housing policies or housing politics', (Chile) *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol 17, No. 3, Aug 1975.

Laidlaw (1985) 'New Zealand and the Third World', in *New Directions in New Zealand Foreign Policy*, ed. Gold, H. Benton Ross, Auckland, New Zealand.

Lange, D. (1985) 'The Forth Labour Government: New Directions in New Zealand Foreign Policy', in *New Directions in New Zealand Foreign Policy*, ed. Gold, H. Benton Ross, Auckland, New Zealand.

Larkin, T. C. (1962) *New Zealand's External Relations*. New Zealand Institute of Public Administration, Wellington, New Zealand.

Lealofi IV, T. (1971) 'Western Samoa', in *South Pacific Year – 1971: a Report*, south Pacific Year Committee, Wellington.

Lewis, W.A. (1966) *Development Planning: the Essentials of Economic Policy*. Allen and Unwin, London, England.

Livingston, W. S. and Louis, W. R. (1979) *Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands since the First World War*. University of Texas Press, Austin



- Lomnitz, L. A. (1977) *Networks and Marginality. Life in a Mexican Shanty town.* Academic Press; New York, USA.
- Loomis, T. (1990) 'Cook Island Remittances' in *Migration and Development in the South Pacific*, ed. Connell, J.. Australia National University, Canberra, Australia.
- Lumsdaine, D. H. (1993) *Moral Vision in International Politics : the Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-1989* Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., USA
- MacIntyre (1971) 'New Zealand in the South Pacific', in *South Pacific Year – 1971: a Report*, South Pacific Year Committee, Wellington.
- MacIntyre, W. (1985) 'Labour Experience in Foreign Policy', in *New Directions in New Zealand Foreign Policy*, ed. Gold, H. Benton Ross, Auckland, New Zealand.
- MacPherson, C. (1995) 'A Samoan Solution to the Limitations of Urban Housing in New Zealand', in *Home in the Islands*, ed Rensel, J. and Rodman, M., University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu.
- McRobie, (1981) *Small is Possible.* J.Cape, London.
- Mangin, W. (1970) *Peasants in Cities: Readings in the Anthropology of Urbanisation*, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, USA.
- Maretu, (ca.1802-1880) (1983) *Cannibals and Converts : Radical Change in the Cook Islands.* Translated, annotated and edited by Crocombe, M. Institute of Pacific Studies University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji
- Marshall, R. (1988) *A Matter of Priorities: an evaluation of the Foreign Policy Objectives of the Third Labour Government.* B.A. thesis, Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand.
- Mathey, K. (1992) 'Positions on Self-Help Housing' in K. Mathey (ed.) *Beyond Self-Help Housing.* Manzell, London, 1992.
- Meleisea, M. (1987) *The Making of Modern Samoa :Ttraditional Authority and Colonial Administration in the History of Western Samoa.* Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji
- Meleisea, M. (1992) *Change and Adaptations in Western Samoa* Christchurch, New Zealand
- Meleisea, M. and Schoeffel Meleisea, P. (1987) *Lagaga : A Short History of Western Samoa.* University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1992) *Annual Review 1999.* Wellington, New Zealand.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1999) *Annual Review 1999.* Wellington, New Zealand.

- Moon, P. (unpublished) Doctorate Thesis, Auckland University.
- Munz, P. (1969) *The Feel of truth : essays in New Zealand and Pacific history* A. H. & A. W. Reed for the Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
- Murison, H.S. and Lea, J.P. (1979) 'Self-help & Autonomy in Housing: Theoretical Critics and Empirical Investigators', Housing in Third World Countries.
- Needs, A. P. (1988) *New Zealand Aid and the Development of Class in Tonga*. Dept. of Sociology, Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand.
- Nelson, O. F. (1928) *The truth about Samoa: a Review of Events Leading up to the Present Crisis*. Auckland, New Zealand.
- New Zealand Advisory Committee on External Aid & Development (1993) *The Role of Non-government Organisations in New Zealand's Official Development Assistance Programme*. Advisory Committee on External Aid & Development, Wellington, New Zealand.
- New Zealand Conference on International Development (1979) *Effective Aid for the Eighties*. The Conference Committee, Wellington, New Zealand.
- New Zealand Institute of International Affairs (1937) *Western Samoa, Mandate or German Colony?* Wellington, New Zealand.
- New Zealand Institute of International Affairs (1967) *New Zealand's International Aid; Report of a Conference 1967*. Wellington, New Zealand.
- New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, (1994) *Natural Disasters*. Wellington, New Zealand.
- Nientied, P. and van der Linden, J. (1988) 'Low-income Housing in the Third World', *The Urbanisation of the Third World*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, England.
- Nientied, P. and van der Linden, J. (1988) 'Low-income Housing in the Third World', *The Urbanisation of the Third World*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, England.
- Noponen, H. (1991) 'The Dynamics of the Urban Poor: A Gender Analysis of Panel Data from Madras', *Development and Change* Vol. 22 (1991), 233-260.
- Norwood, H. (1992) *The Administration of Self-Help Housing*. (Malawi) A Report Commissioned by the World Bank.
- Nyerere, J. K. (1974) *Aid and Development : the Recipient's Point of View*. New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, New Zealand.

OECD (1978) *From Marshall Plan to Global Interdependence: New Challenges for the Industrialized Nations*. OECD publications, Paris, France: Washington, D.C., USA.

OECD (1999) *Aid activities in Europe and Oceania, 1997-1998*. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris.

OECD (1997) *Pacific Island Nations in the Age of Globalisation*. FAIR, Japan.

Okpala, D.C.I. (1996) 'The 2<sup>nd</sup> United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II)', *TWPR*, 18 (2) 1996.

Orr, R.M. (1990) *The Emergence of Japan's Foreign Aid Power*. Columbia University Press, New York, USA.

Oushi, M. (1994) 'Shelter for the Urban Poor', *TWPR*, 16 (3) 1994.

Overton, J. and Scheyvens, R. (eds) (1999) *Strategies for Sustainable Development: Experiences from the Pacific*. University of NSW, Sydney, Australia.

Pacific Aviation and Tourism, (1988) 'Pacific aid initiative : a proposal for Japanese assistance to Pacific Island nations', Foundation for Advanced Information and Research, Japan.

Pacific Islands Monthly (1990) July.

Paenui (1990) New Zealand's Development Assistance.

Parsonson, G.S. (1981) in New Zealand and the South Pacific. *The Papers of the Fifteenth Foreign Policy School*, ed. Hearn, T. J. University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand.

Peattie, L. and Aldrete-Haas, J. (1981) 'Marginal' Settlements in Developing Countries', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 1981, 7:157 – 75.

Poananga (1981) in 'New Zealand and the South Pacific', *The Papers of the Fifteenth Foreign Policy School*, ed. Hearn, T.J. University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand.

Portes, A. and Walton, J. (1981) *Labour, class and the International System*. Academic Press, New York.

Powles, G. (1971) 'Introduction', in *South Pacific Year – 1971: a Report*, south Pacific Year Committee, Wellington.

Rensel, J. (1995) 'From Thatch to Cement: Social Implications of Housing Change on Rotuma', in *Home in the Islands*, ed Rensel, J. and Rodman, M., University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu.

Rix, A. (1993) *Japan's foreign aid challenge : policy reform and aid leadership*. Routledge, London ; New York.



- Robie, D. (1985) *The United Nations Development Programme in the South Pacific* NZCTD, Wellington, New Zealand.
- Rodman (1995) 'Prologue' and 'Conclusion', in *Home in the Islands*, ed Rensel, J. and Rodman, M., University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu.
- Rondinelli, D. (1990) 'Housing the Urban Poor in Developing Countries', *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* Vol. 49, No. 2 (April, 1990).
- Rondinelli, D. (1990) 'Housing the Urban Poor in Developing Countries', *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology* Vol. 49, No. 3, July 1990.
- Rongokea, L. (1992) *Tivaevae*. Daphne Brasell Associate Press, Wellington, New Zealand.
- Ross, A. (1964) *New Zealand Aspirations in the Pacific in the Nineteenth Century*. Clarendon Press, Oxford, England.
- Ross, A. (1969) 'Introduction', in *New Zealand's Record in the Pacific Islands in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Ross, A., Longman Paul Ltd for New Zealand Institute of International Affairs.
- Rowe, J. (1971) 'New Zealand's Role in South Pacific Development', in *South Pacific Year – 1971: a Report*, south Pacific Year Committee, Wellington.
- Rowling, W. (1975) *New Zealand Institute of Foreign Affairs*. Wellington, New Zealand.
- Rubinstein, D.H. (1992) *Pacific History: Papers from the 8th Pacific History Association Conference*. University of Guam Press & Micronesian Area Research Center, Mangilao, Guam.
- Sandhu, R.S. (1987) 'Not All Slums Are Alike A Comparison of Squatter Housing in Delhi and Amritsar', *Environment and Behaviour*, Vol. 19, No. 3, May 1987, 398-406
- Scarr, D. (1979) 'Movement and Change in the Pacific Islands' in *Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands since the First World War*, Ed. Livingston, W. and Louis, W., Australian National University Press, Canberra.
- Schumacher, F. (1973) *Small is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if People Mattered*. Blond and Briggs, London.
- Sevele, F. (1987) 'Aid to the Pacific Reviewed', *Class and Culture in the South Pacific*. Centre for Pacific Studies, University of Auckland, and Institute of Pacific Studies, USP, Suva, Fiji.
- Sogge, D., Biekart, K. and Saxby, J. (1996) *Compassion and Calculation : the Business of Private Foreign Aid*. Pluto Press with Transnational Institute, London

South Pacific Commission (1947) *Advisory Commission for the South Pacific*. Department of External Affairs, Wellington, New Zealand.

South Pacific Year Committee (1971) *South Pacific year 1971 : a report on activity*. The Committee, Wellington, New Zealand

Stokke, O. (1995) *Aid and political conditionality*. F. Cass, London, England, Portland, Oregon, USA

Storey, D. (1999) 'Sustainability and the Urban Pacific: The Case of Samoa and Tonga' in *Strategy for Sustainable Development: Experiences from the South Pacific*, ed. Overton, J. and Scheyvens, R.

Streeten, P. (1981) *Development Perspectives*. Macmillan, London, England

Streeten, P. (1981a) *First Things First*. Oxford University Press for World Bank.

Templeton, M. (1980) 'Pacific Regional Institutions, New Zealand and the South Pacific' in *The Papers of the 15<sup>th</sup> Foreign Policy School*, ed. T.J. Hearn. University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand.

Templeton, M. 'Novelty, Gestures and Direction in Foreign Policy' in *New Directions in New Zealand Foreign Policy*, ed. Gold, H. Benton Ross, Auckland, New Zealand.

Templeton, M. (1993) *An Eye, an Ear and a Voice: 50 Years in New Zealand's External Relations, 1943 – 1993*. Ed. Templeton, M. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Wellington, New Zealand.

Thakur, R.C. (1985), in *In Defence of New Zealand: Foreign Policy Choices in the Nuclear Age*. New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, New Zealand.

Thompson, G. (1967) *New Zealand's international aid*. New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, New Zealand.

Tisdell, C.A. (1988) *Foreign Aid, Income Maintenance and Migration for Small Developing Countries in the Pacific: Alternatives facing Donors*. University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand.

Todaro, M. P. (1997) *Economic Development*. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., USA.

Tully, J. (1976) *The Pacific Way*. Shortland Educational Publications, Auckland, New Zealand.

Turner, J.F.C. (1972) *Freedom to Build: Dweller Control of the Housing Process*. Macmillan, New York, USA.

Turner, J.F.C. (1976) *Housing by People: Towards Autonomy in Building Environments*. Marion Boyars, London, England.

- United Nations General Assembly (1946) *Statements and Documents*. New Zealand Foreign Affairs, Wellington, New Zealand.
- United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (1997) *Report on the UNDHA/UNDP Initial Damage Assessment of Manihiki Island after Tropical Cyclone Martin*. 9<sup>th</sup> November, 1997. UNDP, Apia, Samoa.
- van der Linden, J. (1994) 'Where do we go from here?' *TWPR*, 16 (3) 1994.
- van Vliet, W. (1987) 'Housing in the Third World', *Environment and Behaviour*, Vol. 19 No. 3, May 1987, 267-285.
- Vogel, J (1878) *New Zealand and the South Sea Islands*. Edward Stanford, London, England.
- Wade, R.H. (1962) 'New Zealand's External Aid Programmes' in *New Zealand's External Relations*, ed. Larkin, T.C. Larkin. New Zealand Institute of Public Administration, Wellington, New Zealand.
- Wall, D. (1973) *The Charity of Nations; the Political Economy of Foreign Aid*. Macmillan, London, England.
- Ward, P. (1976) 'Intra-Sity Migration to Squatter Settlements in Mexico City', *Geoforum*, Vol. 7, pp 360 – 382.
- Ward, P. (1976) 'The Squatter Settlement as Slum or Housing Solution', (Mexico City) *Land Economics*, 52, 3, Aug. 1976.
- Ward, P. (1982) *Self-help Housing: a Critique*. Mansell, London, England; H. W. Wilson, Bronx, New York, USA.
- Ward, P. and Macoloo, C. (1992) 'Articulation Theory and Self-Help Housing Practice in the 1990s', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* Vol. 16, No. 1, March 1992.
- Western Samoan Petition (1947) *Statements and Documents*. New Zealand Foreign Affairs.
- Wartho, R. and Overton, J. (1999) 'The Pacific Islands in the World' in *Strategy for Sustainable Development: Experiences from the South Pacific*, ed. Overton, J. and Scheyvens, R.
- Wilson, S. (1969) 'Cook Islands Development 1946 – 1965' in *New Zealand's Record in the Pacific Islands in the Twentieth Century*, Longman Paul Ltd, for the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs.
- Wilson, S. (1969) 'The Record in the Cook Islands and Niue 1901 - 1945' in *New Zealand's Record in the Pacific Islands in the Twentieth Century*, Longman Paul Ltd, for the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs.



Wood, F.L.W. (1967) *New Zealand and the Big Powers*. Sir Sidney Holland Memorial Lectures, Wellington, New Zealand.

Wood, F. and Alley, R. (1979) 'New Zealand Foreign Policy' in *Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands since the First World War*, ed. Livingston and Louis, W., Australian National University Press, Canberra.

## **APPENDICES**

## APPENDIX A

### MFAT and the Manihiki Project

# Manihiki bounces back from Cyclone Martin

In just a few hours in November 1997, Tropical Cyclone Martin turned Manihiki Island, the home of the fledgling Cook Islands' black pearl industry, from a palm fringed atoll known for its beauty into a wasteland. Waves as high as 20 metres tore down everything in their path and killed 19 people. Only a dozen of the 136 houses were left intact. Two thirds of the island's population of 700 had to be evacuated by the RNZAF to Rarotonga. Two years on, Manihiki's reconstruction is entering its final phase and cyclone protection is in place. New Zealand has played a central role in the rebuilding programme, as NZODA's Grant Traill explains.

Back in November 1997, the immediate need in Manihiki was for disaster relief: search and rescue operations, food, medical treatment, clothes and trauma psychology. By the end of the year, however, it was time to plan for the rehabilitation of the island – and to try and make sure no future cyclone would be as devastating as Martin had been. The Cook Islands Government decided to build a sizeable, centrally-placed cyclone resistant building in each of Manihiki's two villages, complemented by small shelters widely distributed throughout the island. These would be built on the highest land possible.

Rehabilitation work started with a clean up operation, followed by reconstruction of buildings and replacement of the reticulated electrical power supply. Designs for cyclone resistant buildings were drawn up and modified after discussions with the local community.

It soon became apparent that no one organisation could afford to provide the level of assistance needed to completely rebuild the island on its own. International donors each took a piece of the work to be done. The Asian Development Bank funded the clean up operation, which was carried out by Cook Island contractors. AusAID was closely involved with plans for a new electrical power supply and NZODA took on the task of the rebuilding. Other donors pooled their funds to provide tools and materials to the local communities to assist with all this work.

NZODA began planning work on the large community shelters and the smaller, widely spread family models. As planning progressed, these became known respectively as cyclone management centres and microshelters. The large number of microshelters needed was far beyond the


capacity of NZODA or any other donor to fund. Given that most families wanted to have their own microshelter, it was decided that the best way of keeping costs down was to help families buy a kitset which they could then build or have built themselves.

The Cook Islands Government put in place a loan facility through the Cook Islands Development Bank which required each owner to eventually repay the cost of the shelter – the repayments will form the basis of a disaster reserve fund for the Cook Islands. Families quickly grasped the concept that microshelters would not only provide them protection from future cyclones but could also replace the homes destroyed during Cyclone Martin.

In April 1998 the Cook Islands Government formally asked NZODA to proceed with its plan for reconstruction. A competitive tender process saw Mainworks Ltd commissioned to produce in kitset form in New Zealand both the large and the small shelters.

The shipping of kitsets from New Zealand to isolated Manihiki, 1200km from

*One of the two new cyclone management centres on Manihiki. There is one in each village.  
Photo: MFAT*





Rarotonga, was an immense logistics operation. Tools, plant and equipment also had to be carried in. A barge was purchased to help offload the ships and move heavy machinery between the island's two villages, and the reef channel was enlarged to accommodate it.

NZODA chartered the ship *Forum Tokelau* (gifted some years ago by New Zealand for use as an inter island vessel in Tokelau and operated by the Pacific Forum Line), which made four voyages direct from Auckland to Manihiki with the materials on board.

Construction of the cyclone management centres, which was carried out by New Zealand construction workers with local community assistance, began as soon as the materials arrived. Both centres were available for use by the start of the 1999/2000 cyclone season.

To combat future droughts (a frequent problem in Manihiki) the construction teams built in 20,000 litre water tanks at the foundation level of each centre and microshelter.

While they were on the island the Mainworks tradespeople also gave advice and assistance to villagers on building their own microshelters.


AusAID, which was responsible for restoring the electrical power supply, saw

the advantages of joining forces with NZODA to make use of the shipping charters and Mainworks construction workers on Manihiki. Working with NZODA it built two new powerhouses and laid many kilometres of electrical cabling. This collaboration allowed the construction and electrical projects to proceed in unison and to come on line at virtually the same time.

The local population had to balance the rebuilding effort with work to repair the pearl farms that had all been damaged in the cyclone. The recovery of the pearl farms was quicker than expected, but the balancing act between earning a living and rebuilding homes meant that the construction of the microshelters took longer than anticipated. However, while it would have been quicker and simpler to employ construction workers to build the shelters for the occupants, this would have been contrary to the self help philosophy of the project.

Perhaps life on Manihiki will never be the same again. Always in the back of the minds of the islanders will be the thought of another huge cyclone or sea surge hitting them. But, with the new cyclone management centres and microshelters in place, and valuable building skills learned by the villagers, the island's future looks very much brighter.

*A family-sized cyclone  
microshelter goes up.  
Photo: MFAT*



## APPENDIX B

### Gender Differentiation of Tasks

Tasks	Males, married	Females, married	Males, over 12, unmarried	Females, over 12, unmarried	Males, under 12	Females, under 12
Meal Preparation		***		**		
Serving Meal		**		**		
Clearing Meal	*	*	*	*	*	*
Dishes				*		
Clothes Washing	*			*		
Clothes Hanging		*	*	*		*
Clothes Folding		*		*		*
Food Collection			*			
Food Ordering	*	*				
Food Purchasing	*	*				
Water Collecting	(*)		*			
Sweeping			*	*		
Child/Baby Minding	*	*	*	*	*	*
Handicrafts #		*		*		
House Construction	*	*				
- thatching	(attach thatch)	(thatch making)				
- poles	*		*			
- design	*		*			
Pearl Farming	*	*	*	*		
- sprat collectors						
- chaplets	*	*	*	*		
- diving	*	*				

Tasks	Males, married	Females, married	Males, over 12, unmarried	Females, over 12, unmarried	Males, under 12	Females, under 12
Building of Kaoa	*		*			
Shell Cleaning	*	*	*	*		
Maintenance of Lines	*					
Pegging	* (Tauhunu)	* (Tukao)				
Seeding	*			*		
Harvest Programmes	*	*	*	*		
Cleaning Sprat Collectors	*	*	*	*		
Grading & Marketing	*	*				
Church						
- Services						
- Social						
- Craft		*				
- Cooking						
- Sunday School	*					
- buildings, organising	*	*				



‘The fathers have the headaches, we are just the hands’ (Personal Interview, young woman).

Father does the bookkeeping.

A lot of the youth have gone. Two thirds of the youth and old people are still away.

Tukao Martin	now (July 2000):	150 people,	250 people pre Cyclone
Tauhunu Martin	now (July 2000):	250 people,	450 people pre Cyclone

## APPENDIX C

### Survey of Children, aged eight to eleven in Tauhunu, Manihiki.

#### Reasons for Housing:

- For staying in.
- For putting bags and clothes.
- For living in.
- For watching videos.
- For staying out of the rain.
- To sleep in.
- For staying out of the sun.
- For putting clothes inside.
- Put your stuff inside.
- Bike in house (so it doesn't get rusty).
- Bed inside.
- For sick people.
- Hang bag on a nail.
- Toilet
- Keep house clean.
- Keep babies out of the sun.

#### Bad Things about the Shelter:

- Baby could roll down stairs.
- You could trip on stairs.
- Too tired to walk up stairs.
- Stand on people's property (too small).
- Not as big as a house.
- When you're playing on micro-shelter you could fall down.
- Stairs – tired.
- Worried stairs could fall down.
- Not as safe as a house as only wood, but houses are made of concrete blocks.
- Not enough space for the family, especially if relatives from New Zealand come.
- House is so high.
- T.V. could get damaged.

#### Good Things about the Shelter:

- High – so water could go under.
- It's cold.
- Mats in the house.

## Survey of Whether They Think the Shelter Will Stay Up:

Will Not Stay Up  
12

Will Stay Up  
8

## Survey of Whether They Like the Shelter:

Do not Like it  
13

Do Like it  
12


## How They Feel About the Dispersed Locations of the Shelters

Most of the children did not like how far apart they now lived from each other, as they could no longer easily play with each other.



Very similar to a European child's representation of a house – though without a chimney!

Manihikian children's representation of a house.



Evocative of the Samoan fale.

Samoan Children's representation of a house.



## APPENDIX D

### Schedule of Pearl Farming in Manihiki

Month	Feb	March	April May June	July	August	Sept	October	Nov	Dec	Jan	February	March	April May June
Tasks	Condition shells	harvest < seeding @		cleaning	Condition shells	seeding * harvest )(	cleaning sprat collecting	sprat collecting		cleaning	condition shells	harvest # seeding ◇	

July	August	Sept	October	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	March
cleaning	Condition shells	Seeding {} Harvest @	Cleaning Sprat collecting	Sprat collecting		cleaning	Condition shells	Seeding + Harvest *

1<sup>st</sup> ops (1<sup>st</sup> operations) – from a virgin seeding. These are harvested then reseeded. It is like an operation, it has to be done in a very sterile environment for the oyster to survive.

Within March, April and May, have to juggle when do seeding, harvesting when 1<sup>st</sup> ops. Most do harvesting first.

Most people fly technicians in. At this stage predominantly Japanese technicians. Women fussing over them, some women ‘even wash their clothes’ (Personal Interview). And men make the technicians accommodation.

Cleaning to condition shells occurs four weeks prior to first seeding. After seeding given a rest – three months healing. Catch bag at four weeks taken off – then first cleaning, then every three months after cleaning. Sixteen to eighteen months between seeding and harvesting each shell.

## Appendix E

### Allocation of Shelters

## CLASSIFICATION & ALLOCATION GUIDELINES

### Classification A

#### 1. Families with no home / shelter as a result of Tropical Cyclone Martin

- Couples with children
- Solo parents and the elderly with dependants
- Recipients who are residents of Manihiki prior and during Tropical Cyclone Martin
- Their portion of land have been identified in the low risk area and approved by MIC
- Recipients are in Manihiki when their micro-shelter materials arrive
- They are able to meet their loan arrangements.
- The location of their portion of land complies with Clustering Restriction requirements.

CHILDREN

#### 2. ~~Siblings~~ of deceased victims

- With no home / shelter as a result of Tropical Cyclone Martin
- With no immediate family support in Manihiki
- Residents of Manihiki prior and during Tropical Cyclone Martin
- Their portion of land have been identified in low risk area and approved by MIC
- Recipients are in Manihiki when their micro-shelter materials arrive
- They are able to meet their loan arrangements
- The location of their portion of land complies with the Clustering Restriction requirements

## **Classification B**

### **1. Families with Homes**

- Home is partially damaged
- Furthest away from the Cyclone Management Centre
- Residents of Manihiki prior and during Tropical Cyclone Martin
- Portion of land identified in low risk area and approved by MIC
- Recipients are on Manihiki when their micro-shelter materials arrive
- Able to meet their loan arrangements.
- Location of their portion of land complies with the Clustering Restriction requirements

### **2. Families furthest away from the Cyclone Management Centre**

- With shelter
- Not within close vicinity to more than two micro-shelters
- Residents of Manihiki prior and during Cyclone Martin
- Portion of land identified in low risk area and approved by MIC
- Recipients are on Manihiki when their micro-shelters arrive
- Are able to meet their loan arrangements
- Location of their portion of land complies with the Clustering Restriction requirements



### **Classification C**

Occupants not living on Manihiki prior to Tropical Cyclone Martin  
(Includes the children of residents on Manihiki prior and during Cyclone Martin)

More than one shelter in a group

More than one in a Household/Family

Families who have applied in both Tukao and Tauhunu

### **Classification D**

Full Purchase Price/Possible Refund to Original Application Price.

## APPENDIX F

### ILLUSTRATION CREDITS

Island Hopper Vacations Ltd, Rarotonga, Pamphlet Illustrations: 36,37

NZODA *Cyclone Val*, Wellington Illustrations: 14, 15

Matheson (1998:14) cited in Crocombe, R. (1987:171) Figure 1

Grant, I. (1980:126 & 127) Illustrations: 8, 9, 10, 11

Buck (1927) Illustrations 1, 2, 3

Meleisea (1987:23 & 39) Illustrations: 4 & 5

Gill, W. (1876) Illustration:7

Overton and Scheyvens (1999) Figure 2

Crocombe (1992:83) Illustration 58

AC Consulting Illustrations 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 49, 50, 51

Anthony Brown, Disaster Management Illustrations 47, 48, 49

Cook Island Government Records Illustrations: 37, 38

Author's photos Illustrations: 6, 12, 13,16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 39, 40, 41, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64.