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The Life of Yamanouchi Yôdô and his Role in
the Overthrow of the Tokugawa Bakufu

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ABSTRACT

During the last years of the Bakufu, under the leadership of daimyô Yamanouchi Yôdô, the domain of Tosa played an important role in the events that culminated in the fall of the Shôgun. Tosa policy over this period reflected Yamanouchi commitment to the Tokugawa, and to their policy of *sakoku* (national isolation). Yôdô, however, was also aware of Japan's vulnerability to colonization in the face of western military superiority. His political vision was founded on limiting foreign influence within Japan, while simultaneously building up military and economic potential. This strength would enable Japan to repudiate the humiliating treaties signed in 1858, and redefine herself as a strong, sovereign nation.

Yôdô worked to stabilise Japanese government by uniting Court and daimyô under the Bakufu's aegis, but by mid 1867 it was clear that this process was failing and that civil war was imminent. Fearing the consequences of domestic disintegration and hoping to revive the Yamanouchi position as well as that of his Tokugawa overlords, in September of 1867 Yôdô and his advisors presented Shôgun Tokugawa Yoshinobu with a proposal for *taisei-hôkan* (a return of authority to the throne). This urged a superficial abdication on the Shôgun which would serve to mollify extremists, while maintaining the essence of his position and preserving intact the Tokugawa's traditional prerequisites.

Despite representing a widely acceptable compromise solution, the concept of rule by consensus which constituted *taisei-hôkan* was too ambitious to be successfully applied to a Japan still steeped in feudalism. Moreover, the absence of specific clauses regarding the post-abdication status of the Shôgun and the Tokugawa clan, allowed for a fatally broad interpretation. Thus, rather than lay the foundations for a Tokugawa revival, the abdication actually allowed the anti-Bakufu party to manoeuvre Yoshinobu into a position of extreme disadvantage. In this sense Yôdô and Tosa inadvertently provided anti-Bakufu interests with the legitimate grounds to overthrow the Tokugawa hegemony by force.

Chapters 1 and 2 examine Yôdô's early rise to national prominence, concentrating on his activities within Tosa, and on his association with the *kôbu-gattai* movement. Chapter 3 is concerned primarily with the creation of the *taisei-hôkan* proposal and Yôdô's role in this process. Chapter 4 considers the personal and political implications of Yôdô's failure to prevent the fall of the Shôgun. The thesis then concludes with a summary of the main points, considering the political and ideological obstacles that Yôdô faced, and evaluating the overall significance of his contribution to Japanese history.

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am indebted to my supervisor Dr. Fumio Kakubayashi who was initially kind enough to accept my topic for candidature, and who subsequently has guided me through the mass of related resources and literature, to a stage where I am now able to present the thesis for examination.

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I should like to add a special note of thanks to Mr. Peter Tuffley of Christchurch, whose knowledge of the period and constant advice and support have been invaluable to me.

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NOTES ON DATINGS, NAMES AND PRINCIPLES OF TRANSLATION

1. Dating

In searching the literature in Japanese and English I have become aware of intercalary differences between writers who use the Gregorian calendar, and writers who report events in the pre-Meiji dating system. In this thesis, for ease of reading, dates follow the latter system but are expressed in western calendar terms. Thus, *Meiji gan-nen ni-gatsu futsuka*, is given as February 2, 1868.

2. Names

The standard pattern of presenting Japanese names in the traditional manner (the family name preceding given names) has been followed here. Researching the etymology of titles and the myriad of adopted, given and nick-names, can be extremely problematic for the student of Japanese. During the Bakumatsu-Meiji period the leading figures often went by a variety of titles (Yôdô himself had at least ten different cognomens) with individuals discarding old forms, adopting ancient titles and often completely changing their names to suit the new era, and this is an added barrier for the researcher working with primary sources.

In this study I have striven to confirm all my translations with advice from native Japanese, however, for any faulty interpretations or undiscovered misreading I offer apologies in advance.

3. Authography

I have adopted the circumflex to symbolise the long vowel sounds regularly found in Japanese. Italics are used to introduce specialised expressions, however, words in common usage in the English language such as samurai, Meiji and Shôgun, are not italicised.

Introduction

Broadly stated, the aim of this thesis is to follow the path of Yamanouchi Yôdô's personal and public life, describing the events that he was involved in and analysing his actions from the perspectives of personal experience and the wider framework of his role in national affairs.

The thesis will look closely at the development of relationships between Yôdô (Tosa) and the Bakufu, Court and anti-Bakufu party respectively. The nature of the changes that occurred within the Tosa leadership structure also receives attention. By observing the erosion of the traditional bonds that existed between Yôdô and his retainers, an understanding of the way in which daimyô-led domains began to change from a semi-autonomous feudal tradition, to the beginnings of a centrally administered prefectural system, can be attained. Although the study is very individually focused, it is hoped that by analysing Yôdô against the backdrop of his times, position and heritage, this will enable the emergence of a clearer picture of the forces and influences that shaped the period.

Chapter 1 gives an overview of the domestic and international state of affairs that existed in Japan from the late 1840's to the emergence of Yôdô from confinement in 1862, subsequent to the assassination of Ii Naosuke two years before. Special attention will be paid to Yôdô's rise to a position of influence in the political world of Bakumatsu (1853-1868) Japan. This chapter will also discuss such issues as the nature of the bonds that existed between the Tokugawa and the Tosa Yamanouchi family; the events surrounding Yôdô's succession to the daimyôship; and the nature of his political and economic reforms within Tosa for the period ending with the assassination of Yoshida Tôyô in 1862.

Chapter 2 is concerned with the main events that occurred in the period that commenced with Yôdô's release in 1862 - after two year's house arrest - and concluded with the accession of Tokugawa Yoshinobu¹ to the Shôgunal position in December 1866. The significance of developments such as the unsuccessful loyalist uprisings of 1864, the failed Bakufu punitive expedition against Chôshû in 1866, and the subsequent creation of an anti-Bakufu, Satsuma-Chôshû league, will be considered. Related to this, the power struggles between Bakufu, daimyô *kôbu-gattai* (unity of Court and Bakufu) and loyalist factions which became sharply defined at this time will also be discussed. Tosa in particular was a microcosm of this conflict, and the various actions undertaken by Yôdô vis-a-vis political

¹ In rendering the last Tokugawa Shôgun's given name, authorities vary between Yoshinobu and Keiki - these being variant readings of the name characters. Both renderings are valid. In this thesis, in the interests of consistency, Yoshinobu is used throughout.

forces within his domain reflect very well the problems faced by the ruling samurai class in trying to reconcile divergent ideologies while still maintaining their traditional perquisites.

Chapter 3 is initially occupied with the promulgation of the Tosa *taisei-hōkan* proposals and the issue of identifying Yōdō's motives for initially sponsoring and then continuing to associate himself with the programme. Subsequently, the discussion will analyse the struggle that occurred between pro- and anti-Bakufu forces immediately after the Shōgun's resignation in October, 1867. The rout of the Bakufu forces at Toba-Fushimi in January of 1868 was for Yōdō, an event of great consequence and the significance of the complete failure of his political designs at this time form an integral part of the debate.

During this period a number of different proposals for the future government of Japan were being created by political thinkers and influential politicians. The last section of the chapter will scrutinize some of these proposals with special reference to ideological backgrounds and the nature of the individuals responsible for their conception.

The first part of Chapter 4 concentrates on Yōdō's role in the opening years of the Meiji period, as one of the great lords who actively cooperated with the new central government. The subsequent policies of *hanseki-hōkan* (return of lands and people) and *haihan-chiken* (abolition of the domains and establishment of the prefectures) were two important programmes enacted by the government, and Yōdō's reaction to these measures, which amounted to a destruction of the traditional establishment of which he was a member, are analysed.

The latter part of the chapter depicts the closing years of Yōdō's life; dispossessed by *haihan-chiken* and deprived of his supremacy in Tosa, ravaged by alcoholism and at the nadir in his political fortunes. This chapter relates his descent into hedonism and attempts to ascertain causes for this decline. The nature of his life in retirement and his brief return to moderation, are covered in the last section, before closing with the sudden onset of severe illness and his subsequent death in April, 1872.

The conclusion recapitulates the outstanding events and achievements of Yōdō's life, considering the efficacy of his policies and the overall significance of his political contribution to the subsequent development of post-Bakumatsu Japanese history. In final summation, Yōdō's blueprint for the future Japan, and the strengths and weaknesses of this vision are discussed and evaluated.

Chapter 1. Background

The first task of this chapter is to provide a very general overview of the state of affairs that existed in late Tokugawa Japan prior to the arrival of Commodore Perry's expedition in 1853. The second task is to consider the consequences of Perry's arrival, and the ramifications of his compelling the Bakufu to make concessions to ending the *sakoku* period of isolation, and commence trade. This will set in context the remainder of the chapter which will examine Yôdô's initial rise to prominence and the nature of his political career until 1862, when he re-emerged on the national scene after his confinement during the Ansei Purges.

Tokugawa Japan, 1800 to 1853

Japanese society in 1853 was still made up of the four estates *shi-nô-kô-shô* (samurai, farmer, artisan, merchant) that had been a feature of the Tokugawa system from the beginning of the 17th Century. The upheavals of the Bakumatsu period (1853-1868) can be considered to be primarily an expression of the struggle that occurred between elements within the samurai class, exacerbated by pressure from the international community, however, several other internal domestic factors did prove very significant in influencing the nature and direction of events. Moreover, many of these phenomena were longstanding and had been present in Japan from well before the advent of direct foreign intervention in the fifties. Some of these outstanding factors were as follows.

Firstly, it is important to consider the nature of the Bakufu itself. Although it was accepted that the Bakufu's mandate to rule came from the Emperor, it was also tacitly understood that the Court was purely a ceremonial institution, and that with regard to politics, the Shôgun was the executive arm of the imperial will.² The theocratic and legal principle that the Shôgun received his legitimacy directly from the Emperor had always existed; however, successful Tokugawa rule and the passing of time had ensured that in practice Tokugawa rule became dynastic. The Bakufu's duty to the Court had long been subordinated to its over-riding priority of maintaining the superior position of the Tokugawa family and the power perquisites of the *fudai* daimyô.

The political system set up by the Tokugawa to maintain this preeminence, and ensure the compliance and passivity of the powerful non-vassal domains, is commonly referred to as *bakuhan-seido* (literally meaning, 'the Bakufu-domain system'). Essential features of the system were as follows.

² Sansom 1990, p. 235.

The 260 or so daimyô of Japan were divided into three classes: *fudai* (vassals of the Tokugawa) *shimpan* (related families) and *tozama* (non vassals). Almost all offices of government were exercised by the *fudai* daimyô, to the exclusion of the other two types. Compliance with the Tokugawa will was achieved by the permanent compulsory presence in Edo of daimyô families, and by the regular issuance of commands for the daimyô to carry out expensive and time-consuming repairs within their domains, with the intent of preventing the lords from amassing sufficient funds to make any ideas of insurrection a reality.

The Bakufu, which possessed lands amounting to roughly one quarter of the country, regulated national affairs through the top echelon of officialdom *rôjû* (senior councillors), and especially in the later years, by maintaining magistrates for foreign affairs at crucial places such as Kanagawa, Hakodate and Nagasaki.³ Internal government within the Tokugawa territories was carried out by *metsuke* (inspectors), *bugyô* (magistrates), and *gundai* (administrators), and this situation was usually mirrored in the domains by a similar scaled-down system of administration. Thus in Yamanouchi Yôdô's fief of Tosa, although some titles were different (ie. *karô* instead of *rôjû*), the political system was fundamentally the same.

Most mechanisms of the *bakuhan-seido* were intended to control the stronger lords and although successful for a very long period, they eventually resulted in several damaging consequences. Restricting the military and political role of the great daimyô and their upper samurai retainers considerably diminished the defensive capacity of the country as a whole and ensured that knowledge of international affairs would be extremely limited. The same prohibitions also provoked resentment within the *shimpan* and *tozama* lords towards a Bakufu that had created and upheld these policies. This ensured that when the foreign powers began to clamour for the opening of Japan in the mid 1800's not only was there no effective military support available in the domains; but it also led to the outer lords grasping the opportunity to participate in national politics afforded them by the Bakufu's embarrassment in 1853.

The dissatisfaction of the great lords at their exclusion from national government was reproduced in the middle and lower samurai classes, which were similarly resentful at being denied a voice in government at the domain level.⁴ The middle samurai usually held minor administrative positions in the domains, with little or no voice in the formulation of higher

³ Totman, 1980, p. 17.

⁴ Ibid. p. 17. Totman refers to the "ins and outs" of Tokugawa politics, meaning the divergence between the *fudai* lords on the one hand, and the *tozama* and *shimpan* lords on the other; as well as the disparity of influence that existed between upper and middle-lower samurai within the domains.

policy. Lower samurai such as *ashigaru* and *gōshi* were almost without exception excluded from both office and influence. High appointment and powers of decision making were the birthright of the upper samurai elite, whom the middle and lower samurai commonly perceived as being anachronistic and inefficient. With limited opportunities for advancement from lower samurai status, it was only the options of appointment by ability (regardless of birth or station) or the enforcement of change by violent means, that held out any prospects of betterment.⁵

The Tosa that we will be subsequently examining in greater detail can thus be seen as a microcosm of the wider political environment that prevailed throughout Japan at this time. The Yamanouchi family, although possessing favoured vassal status at the outset of the Tokugawa era, were enfeoffed with Tosa as *tozama* daimyō, with all the incumbent restrictions of the previously described system. Just as the Yamanouchi ruling family were among the ‘outs’ in the arena of national political affairs, so decision making within the domain hierarchy was monopolized by the ‘ins’ (ie upper rank samurai) and denied to the middle and lower ranks. This disparity in power distribution on the national level between daimyō classes, and at a domain level between samurai classes, was to have significant repercussions within Tosa as the political situation developed, and although these issues will be investigated in more depth later, at this initial stage it is very useful to be aware of inequalities in influence and rank as significant sources of the resentment and friction that led to major upheavals in domain and national politics.

Another significant development in the period leading up to 1853 was the beginning of a shift in perception regarding the status of the Emperor and *kuge* (nobles). Although the imperial institution had for a long time been purely ceremonial in nature, a re-examination of the relationship between Court and Bakufu (particularly by Confucianists and by advocates of western learning discontented with the strictures of the seclusion policy⁶), began to occur in the first half of the 19th century. The increasing vigour of the movement to restore the prestige of the Emperor that emerged after 1800 ensured that the position of Emperor was beginning to take on real political, ideological and spiritual proportions. Concurrently this enforced a re-evaluation of the *kuge* as influential factors in national politics due to their access to the imperial person and participation in the creation of imperial policy.

Changes had also been occurring in the life of towns and cities. Although they were less explicitly involved than the rural classes in the events leading to the Meiji revolution, the role of the artisan and mercantile classes, in

⁵ Smith 1973, p. 97.

⁶ Jansen 1971, pp.16-17.

developing industry, financing the activities of the samurai and forcing change upon the feudal economy of the early Tokugawa period, may have been equally significant. The financial system of Japan of the 1840's was already far more sophisticated than the feudal barter trade system that had characterised earlier Tokugawa history. Urban commercial centres were prospering, with economic pressure on the samurai by the mercantile classes forcing a certain amount of social concession and inter-class mobility.

From a general economic perspective in Japan at this time, although the outward form of a system based on rice as a measure of value was maintained by the Bakufu, a cash economy had been developing for some time. A feature of the fiscal state from the 17th century onwards was that of wealthy merchants extending loans at crippling interest to the increasingly impoverished samurai. In particular, the costs related to *sankin-kôtai* (spending alternate years in Edo and maintaining a household there) in many cases consumed up to eighty percent of daimyô financial resources, and the prospects for lower samurai were often even harsher.⁷ In many cases the debt resulting from the discrepancy between stipend and expenditure forced samurai families to compromise their social position by intermarriage with the sons and daughters of moneylenders and merchants. This had the effect of blurring social divisions, somewhat enhancing the status of the merchant community and also engendering interclass mobility. By the end of the Tokugawa period mercantile power was firmly established, with large banking and trading organisations in Edo and Ôsaka.⁸ Product monopolies and industrial collectivism were also occurring regardless of attempts by the Bakufu and domain governments to prevent this. Thus, the social and economic fabric of feudal Japan was coming under strain just at the time when pressure against the seclusion policy, both from within and without, was increasing.

Another significant factor, was the series of reforms carried out by the senior *rôjû*, Mizuno Tadakuni, during the period 1841-1843. Known as the Tempô Reforms (after the era name given to the period in which they occurred) this programme consisted of a package of regulations against ostentatious display and excessive spending by the samurai class, combined with measures to bring down food and commodity prices and decrease the power of the merchant guilds. Such measures had become the Bakufu's traditional approach to combating fiscal discomfort since the mid-18th century reforms of Shôgun Tokugawa Yoshimune.⁹

Mizuno's programme, in part a response to the increasing indebtedness of a

⁷ Beasley 1972, p. 47.

⁸ Hanley & Yamamura 1977, pp. 329-30.

⁹ Beasley 1972, p. 64.

samurai class impoverished by borrowing from financiers to subsidise the cost of residence in Edo, was probably also intended to remedy the problems manifested by the 1837 Ôsaka insurrection led by government official Ôshio Heihachirô. Directed against profiteering merchants and the Bakufu officialdom that maintained them, the Ôshio uprising emphasised the rural sector's¹⁰ pre-occupation with a return to *nôhonshugi* (agricultural purism) and pointed to the coming rise of loyalist-imperial ideology.

Peasant unrest, endemic during the early part of the 19th century (nearly 400 incidents have been recorded for the period between 1813 and 1868¹¹), and aggravated by a severe famine which swept through Japan from 1832-1838, was largely unaddressed by Mizuno's reforms. Indeed, the continuation of major peasant risings, in the Bakufu territory of Ômi in 1842 (and the great peasant uprisings of 1847 and 1853¹²) after the commencement of Mizuno's measures and resulting from attempts to increase taxation in the region, indicates that the Tempô reforms had failed to ameliorate the plight of the poorer rural community

Mizuno's policies, resulting in samurai seeking loans illicitly, and in a breakdown in the socio-commercial infrastructure of Edo itself, received wide condemnation. He had not recognized that political centralization rather than merchant greed was the cause of rising costs and that acts such as the suppression of commercial guilds could only exacerbate the economic situation, especially while the ruinous custom of *sankin-kôtai* remained intact.

Similar programmes with varying results were attempted by domains throughout Japan. In Tosa the reform program instituted in 1842 foundered on strong conservative opposition. In other domains, however, programmes were more successful. Varying approaches, such as Satsuma's expansion of technology and industry, Mito's reinforcement of domain monopolies, Chôshû's relaxing of cuts in samurai stipends and curtailment of merchant monopolies, were characterized by commensurate economies in administration and increased efforts to improve efficiency in production. And for many domains, the reforms paid great long-term dividends, in decreases in rural dissent and reduction of domain deficits.

For the Bakufu the Tempô reforms in total were largely a failure. In the long term, they failed to resolve issues such as samurai debt, rising prices, and the place in Japanese society of merchant and financial institutions. More significantly, the primary objective of increasing the Bakufu's

¹⁰ Ibid. p. 57. Ôshio had close links to the upper strata of the agricultural community.

¹¹ Ibid. p.57.

¹² Hanley & Yamamura 1977, p. 143.

financial reserves was unattained. The Bakufu entered the last years of the Tokugawa era and faced the internal and external crises of the Bakumatsu period in a weakened financial state, with no programme in place for improving its economic or social woes apart from the practice of increasing taxation, with the attendant perils of civil unrest.

From this brief discussion of some of the internal developments in Japan up to the arrival of Perry in 1853, it may now be appropriate to consider the significance of the American mission and the effects of the external intrusions that began to bear increasingly upon Japan in the wake, as it were, of Perry's Black Ships.

The Consequences of Perry's Arrival

1853 was a watershed year both in the political history of Japan and in the early period of Yôdô's political career. Compared with the complex situation that developed after Perry's arrival, the political entity that was Japan before the Black Ships was that of an isolated nation largely unchanged from its historical antecedents. Agrarian discontent was increasing, but historically in the cyclical tradition, protest of some form had always existed, and if treated with the usual remedies of reform and oppression might reasonably be expected to subside in due time.

Tokugawa hegemony was fundamentally still very powerful, retaining considerable political and economic control throughout most of the country. Perry's expedition however changed the situation completely. The immense strength of the flotilla exposed the military weakness of the Bakufu, opening the Shôgunate to charges of negligence in its prime duty of *Sei-i* (which in this case meant expelling the foreigners), providing justification for anti-Bakufu protests and the *raison d'être* for an indignant loyalist movement. This gave those harbouring dissatisfaction with the prevailing political system a vehicle by which to advance their ambitions.

Perry was sent to Japan primarily for reasons of commercial benefit to the United States.¹³ The discovery of gold had opened up the North American west coast and the burgeoning whaling trade was necessitating the establishment of fuelling and refitting stations throughout the Pacific. The advent of steam powered shipping and the real possibility of trade with China had attracted economic and political interest within the USA just at the time when the Japanese policy of seclusion and non-succouring of castaways was receiving criticism from many of the other powerful western nations.

¹³ Wiley 1990, pp. 78-84.

Prior to Perry's arrival in 1853 several international incidents had occurred, heightening the sense of external pressure being felt by the Bakufu, with perhaps the most significant development being the despatch of a letter in 1844 from the King of Holland to the Shôgun, warning him of the consequences of continuing with the policy of isolation and international non-cooperation. Especially pointed were warnings regarding the aggressive Anglo-French colonising activities in China and South East Asia. Before Perry's arrival several other expeditions had attempted unsuccessfully to negotiate their way to trade agreements with the Japanese (the French and English had sent naval missions to Okinawa and the Russians to Nagasaki). Needless to say most of these overtures were either declined or disregarded until Perry arrived; when the American demands, convincingly backed up by a powerful flotilla including two steamships, forced the Bakufu to enter negotiations and ultimately capitulate. The subsequent train of events that culminated in the fall of the Bakufu, may be said to be a consequence of this capitulation.

Considering the foregoing discussion it can be seen that the social and political environment of Japan at the time of Yôdô's rise to political eminence was far from uncomplicated. The existence of contradictions inherent in a duality of sovereigns (although the relationship between Shôgun and Emperor was defended by the Bakufu as being unambiguous) was exposed by the neo-confucianist ideologies, which in turn would later breed a strident and committed body of activists dedicated to the resurrection of the imperial institution. Thus the image of a conservative regime, unable to achieve either domestic stability or economic reform and under huge foreign pressure to concede trading rights within Japan (concessions which were contrary to the very principles underpinning its existence), forms the dominant impression of Japan at this time.

Against this background, we may now turn to Yamanouchi Yôdô's early political and personal history.

Yôdô's Early Days

Yamanouchi Yôdô (his formal name was Toyoshige) was born in Kôchi City Tosa, in 1827, the son of a cadet house of the main Yamanouchi branch. His father Toyoakira, was head of the *minami-yashiki* (south mansion) branch, and the younger brother of the 12th daimyô Toyosuke. His mother being a concubine of common birth, Yôdô, although a legitimate son, would not normally have been in the line of succession. Certainly prior to 1848 it appears that he led the aimless life of an unemployed noble, his days taken up with poetry, horsemanship, drinking parties and the art of the sword. He appears to have developed quite a

reputation as a dilettante, and even upon his elevation to daimyô these facets of his nature would never be totally extinguished.¹⁴

In July of 1848, the 13th daimyô Toyoteru who succeeded a still hale father Toyosuke in 1843, died of sudden illness at the relatively young age of thirty-four. Within a few weeks his younger brother Toyoatsu also died from illness while travelling to Edo for his formal investiture as 14th daimyô.¹⁵ Toyosuke now supported the candidature of another of his legitimate sons; this, however, was forbidden by the Bakufu, and in December of the same year, Yôdô, supported by the majority of the domain administration, found himself appointed lord of Tosa.

Although his elevation had been extremely rapid, it had been no straightforward transfer of power. Yôdô's succession resulted firstly from machination on the part of several senior domain retainers (they did not publicly disclose the news of Toyoatsu's death until their preparations to present another candidate had been completed) and secondly from the intervention of several powerful figures such as Shimazu Nariakira of Satsuma, Kuroda Narihiro of Chikuzen-Fukuoka, and Date Munenari of Uwajima.

The Yamanouchi family had received the Tosa fiefdom from Tokugawa Ieyasu as a reward for services rendered at the battle of Sekigahara by the minor Owari (Aichi prefecture) vassal, Yamanouchi Kazutoyo. The previous daimyô, Chôsogabe Motochika had been an adherent of the forces opposing the Tokugawa and had been executed after his defeat and dispossession. Tosa was therefore in the curiously ambivalent position of being recognized by the Bakufu as a *tozama* domain; yet having the peculiar status of being ruled by a family with deep ties of obligation to the Tokugawa.¹⁶ The implications of this for the situation at the time of Yôdô's accession were that it would have been historically within the Shôgun's rights to have ignored the wishes of relatives and senior retainers, and after disposing of the remaining incumbents either reallocated the fief to another candidate or simply chosen to include the entire territory in the *tenryô* (lands ruled directly by the Bakufu). That this did not happen proves the efficacy of actions taken by the domain officials, the influence of the western daimyô, and the magnanimity of the *Tairô* (Regent) Abe Masahiro towards the Yamanouchi family.

Furthermore, one does not have to seek far for *tozama* daimyô motivation to intervene on behalf of Yôdô's candidature. At this point in Japanese history, with the Bakufu bureaucracy increasingly unable to resolve rising

¹⁴ Shimamoto 1993, pp. 6-7.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 8-15.

¹⁶ Hirao 1961, p. 8.

problems of fiscal insolvency and domestic unrest, discontent was being expressed more and more openly by representatives of all three, *shimpan*, *fudai* and *tozama* daimyô classes. The prospects of losing a potential ally, and of the Bakufu being further strengthened by the addition of the 240,000 koku of Tosa, must have been alarming to say the least.

A pattern of family alliances made Yôdô's position rather complicated. He was firstly bound by his family's debt of gratitude to the Tokugawa, and the goodwill demonstrated by Abe and the Bakufu at the time of his succession ensured that his consciousness of this tie became even stronger. However, the Yamanouchi clan also had a similar tradition of loyalty to Kyôto, rooted in their historical affiliation for the *Nangaku* principles of Emperor respect. *Nangaku* had been introduced at the time of Nonaka Kenzan's political activity in 1663, and since then had continued to have a principle place in the scholarly and ideological tradition of the Yamanouchi family and Tosa.¹⁷

In 1850 he married the adopted daughter of Sanjô Sanetsumu, a high ranking courtier who had served as *Sadaijin* (Minister of the Left in the imperial Court) and who was father to Sanjô Sanetomi, a figure later to become extremely influential in the restoration of imperial rule. Thus his ties to both Court and Bakufu were significant on both a personal and historical basis. However, as we have seen, the assistance he received at the beginning of his career meant that he was also indebted to the *tozama* daimyô who had assisted him to his position. All this ensured that, unlike the Môri of Chôshû or the Shimazu of Satsuma, he did not have the luxury of undivided loyalties, and this split position vis-a-vis Court-Bakufu relations was to be an especially significant factor in national politics in the final days of the Bakufu in late 1867.

While descriptions of his appearance in his younger days are scarce, a well known account of Yôdô in his later years is given us by Ernest Satow, the young English diplomat who had an interview with Yôdô in August of 1867. Satow was favourably impressed by the Tosa ex-daimyô, albeit critical of his alcoholism, and described him in the following fashion:

“Yodo was a tall man, slightly pock-marked, with bad teeth, and a hurried manner of getting out his words. He certainly looked very ill and over-indulgence in sake would quite account for that. From some of the remarks he made, I gathered that he was free from prejudice and not by any means conservative in his political notions.”¹⁸

¹⁷ Yamamoto 1994, pp. 16-17. Yôdô's attempts to make sizeable financial contributions to the Court in 1855 are further evidence of his feelings of respect for the Emperor

¹⁸ Satow 1968, p. 270.

Significantly Satow also refers to Yôdô as an old man. This may reflect the physical effects of the intemperance for which he was widely renowned. Apart from pure enjoyment, another reason for indulgence in alcohol may possibly have been to anaesthetise the very painful condition of oral cavities (affecting consumption of food, digestion and vocal ability) from which he suffered from an early age.

Various self titled as *Geikaisaikô* (“tipsy lord of the whaling coast”) and *Suiyôbijnrôshujin* (“lord of the tower of women and wine”) he certainly had an affinity for sensual pleasures; however, the origins of Yôdô, his favoured sobriquet, point to a gravity and resolution that form another important aspect of this complex personality. It is reported that Yôdô showed the highly respected senior Mito retainer Fujita Tôko a piece of calligraphy wherein he had combined two characters *nin* and *dô* to form a personal title denoting the concepts of censure and self discipline. Fujita is recorded as stating that upon seeing the work, he recommended that the first character be changed to the *yô* of Yôdô thereby emphasising external openness and service as opposed to the introspection inherent in *nin*.¹⁹

Another incident that tells us something of Yôdô’s personality and strength of character is as follows. It is said that, upon introduction to *Tairô* Abe Masahiro in mid-1854, and after initially pledging his utmost efforts for the good of the realm, Yôdô lowered his voice and uttered an unsolicited warning that, ‘he was different from the typical stupid daimyô and not to take him too lightly.’ This provides a useful cameo into the complex and vivid personality that make up the individual under investigation.²⁰ Here is a son of a branch house of the vassal Yamanouchi family who against all probability has just succeeded to power, confronting the executive head of the Tokugawa government and in this very first interview giving notice that he has no intention of merely following orders or acting as a dupe for the Bakufu. Moreover the Yamanouchi with an *omotedaka* (reported rice production) of 242,000 koku were not among the wealthiest and powerful of the domains.²¹ This incident certainly hints at his independence and the turbulent path which would consequently characterise his personal and political life.

Yôdô and Tosa Policy, 1849-1862

The period between his accession and 1853 and the arrival of Perry in Edo Bay appears to have been one of relative inactivity for Yôdô. Watched over by the conservative forces of the retired daimyô Toyosuke and prevented from adopting a more independent position, he continued the unproductive

¹⁹ Hiraio 1961, p. 4.

²⁰ *Ibid.* p. 33.

²¹ Beasley (1972) ranks Tosa 17th in land assessment in his introductory note on the main domains.

life of leisure and political inaction that he had led before becoming daimyô.

Perry's arrival, bringing American demands for an opening of the country, had proved an insurmountable dilemma for the Bakufu administration of Abe Masahiro. Perry had left Japanese waters with the promise of a reply to his requests when he returned the following spring and the Bakufu now reached the unprecedented decision, in the intervening period, to seek the advice of the Court and leading daimyô. This event proved to be the starting point for all Yôdô's subsequent political activity. On August 21, 1853 Tosa responded to the Bakufu urging simultaneous refusal of the American requests and, via commerce with approved nations such as Holland, modernization of the national defence capacity. However, as Jansen notes,²² Yôdô's *jô* position was tempered with a realistic understanding that the Bakufu could make little real resistance and that concessions while undesirable, and as far as possible to be limited, were unavoidable.

The replies that came back from the various domains did not amount to the positive gesture of support the Bakufu had been hoping for. Spearheaded by the influential Mito daimyô Tokugawa Nariaki, the majority of domains recommended refusal of the demands (noticable exceptions being Ii Naosuke of Hikone and Shimazu Nariakira of Satsuma). Fearful of the consequences of a negative reply, the Bakufu prevaricated. Vigorous efforts were now made to strengthen coastal defenses in the event the situation should deteriorate to conflict; as part of this interim programme Yôdô and Tosa troops took part in the building of shore batteries at Hamakawa near Shinagawa, simultaneously beginning several similar defence constructions at strategic positions on the Tosa coast in September 1853.

This atmosphere of tension and hasty military preparation continued throughout Japan until the reappearance of Perry in Uraga on January 15, 1854 and renewal of his demands for the signing of a trade and amity treaty brought matters to a head. Three months of prolonged negotiation finally resulted in a capitulation by the Bakufu and the signing of a treaty between the USA and Japan at Kanagawa on March 3.

Within Japan there was widespread anger over the Bakufu's inability to defy the unwanted overtures of the western nations (treaties were swiftly signed with Great Britain, France, Russia and Holland). Moreover, as well as losing the confidence of a large sector of Japan's political community, the decision to canvass daimyô opinion concerning the appropriate reply to the American demands had created a precedent for *tozama* and *shimpan*

²² Jansen 1971, pp. 67-69.

daimyô to lay claim to a role in the making of national policy - a precedent that was to have far-reaching consequences. Significantly, the reputation of the Tosa memorandum against the signing of the treaties had propelled Yôdô into a position of strength from which he found himself able to commence an extensive programme of domain reform.

On September 8, 1853, he announced the recommencement of *hansei-kaikaku* (the programme of domain reorganisation and coastal defense improvements) initiated by his predecessor Toyoteru in 1842, at the time of the Tempô era reforms. The Tempô reforms had aroused great suspicion on the part of the *mombatsu* (high ranking relatives of the ruling family) conservative element that their stipends and traditional liberty to raise loans were being severely threatened. Toyoteru's advisors, who had been derisively labelled the *okozegumi* (good luck party), accused of holding Christian and unsamurai commercial beliefs, and who, eventually succumbing to the intensity of the reactionary party, had been either gaoled or forced to halt their reforms in the face of resistance by the establishment.

To achieve his objectives Yôdô took into his service an influential survivor of the Tempô reform party, who although subordinate would eventually become as strongly identified with the changes that subsequently occurred in Tosa, as Yôdô himself. Yoshida Tôyô (popularly known as Genkichi) was a scholar of mid-samurai background who had established a reputation as a teacher, and proponent of western ideas and technology. Tôyô had served as district and shipping magistrate under the previous reformist regime headed by Mabuchi Kahei. However, with the victory of conservatism and the failure of the Tempô reforms, along with Mabuchi, Yoshida had been discredited and discarded, left to study the Chinese classics and western learning until the promotion of Yôdô to domain lord, altered his situation dramatically.

One of the first acts by Yoshida, newly appointed to *ômetsuke* (great inspector) on July 27, was to write the memorandum of August 21, that set the tone for resistance to foreign pressure in the years to come. In late September, assisted by Kominami Goroemon - a fellow disciple of Mabuchi in the Tempô period - and with Yôdô's approval, the first steps towards internal organisational reform were taken. Among the policies now enacted were, *gumbu-zôsetsu* (an increase in the number and authority of the *gumbu* district offices) and *mimpei-seido* (the establishment of a non-samurai peasant militia which received regular military training at these same facilities). The power of the conservative *karô* (senior domain councillor) was also commensurately diminished and Yôdô and Yoshida hastened this erosion by the steady introduction of new 'men of talent' into positions of responsibility within the executive.²³

²³ Hiraio 1961, p. 29. Yoshida's clique became known as the *shin* (new) *okozegumi* at this time.

Jansen suggests that the Tosa Ansei reforms, circa 1854-1858 were largely concerned with the military strengthening of the domain and that it was only the signing of the Harris treaty in 1858, enabling a slight relaxation of the vigilance against foreign attack, which allowed the later shift in emphasis from military to economic reform.²⁴ Moreover, as in Toyoteru's time, resistance to reform from the *mombatsu* establishment, ensured that any changes within the domain would be inherently difficult to implement. Thus the initial concentration on military strengthening may have served two purposes, being firstly an indisputably necessary defence measure and secondly providing a trial run for the Yôdô/Yoshida administration, which would precede the less popular package of educational, industrial and economic reforms of the 1860's.

Other developments during this period included: construction of a foundry for casting cannon and other ordnance, begun in late 1853; the despatch in 1854 of a group of specialists to study weapon-making in Kagoshima; the building and successful launching of a small, steam-powered ship in August 1855.²⁵ Tosa was fortunate at this time to receive the assistance in many of the above activities of the former fisherman, Nakahama Manjirô. Nakahama who had been for ten years a refugee-castaway in the United States, eventually returned to Japan rising to the rank of *hatamoto* in the Bakufu hierarchy and also becoming an invaluable source of information about western technology, in his birthplace Tosa.

After initiating these various reform programmes, Yôdô travelled to Edo for his *sankin-kôtai*, period of attendance upon the Shôgun. Preceded by Yoshida and Kominami he arrived there on April 3, 1854 (the first friendship and trade treaty between Japan and the United States of America having already been signed at Kanagawa on the same day of the previous month). It was at this time that he first made the acquaintance of such leading figures as Abe Masahiro, the Mito daimyô Tokugawa Nariakira and his influential retainer Fujita Tokô, and the *shimpan* daimyô of Echizen-Fukui, Matsudaira Yoshinaga (Shungaku). In the light of his relative political inexperience this was probably a very formative and instructive period for him; in particular, the strong bonds formed with Shungaku were to become highly significant during the course of events in the subsequent fifteen years.

In the late summer of 1854, as the process of reform within Tosa and building of connections in Edo gathered momentum for Yôdô, the services of Yoshida were lost to him in a bizarre clash that occurred between

²⁴ Jansen 1971, p.74.

²⁵ Fukuchi 1994, p.60.

Yoshida and a high ranking relative of the Yamanouchi family.²⁶ Yoshida allegedly struck the *hatamoto* Bakufu retainer for repeatedly touching his head and taking liberties with his (Yoshida's) person. Regardless of circumstances, violence to one's social superior could not be condoned, and Yôdô was obliged to dismiss Yoshida from his positions and send him back to Kôchi in disgrace. However, although Yôdô was now deprived of Yoshida's political guidance and assistance, the majority of their projected reforms had either been implemented or were planned and about to be commenced. Consequently, until his reinstatement in 1858, Tôyô returned to his former role of *shijuku* teacher, schooling talented young samurai in his philosophies and in the process preparing such men as Itagaki Taisuke, Gotô Shôjirô (Yoshida's nephew), Fukuoka Kôtei and Koyama Kunikiyo for their later participation in domain and national politics.

During the course of the negotiations in 1854 that resulted in the thirteen clause friendship and trade treaty, rumours of violence and disturbances by Perry's sailors residing at Shimoda south of Edo, became rife in the capital. In April, Yôdô despatched retainers on an investigative mission to Shimoda where he immediately discovered that, contrary to rumour, relations between the foreign sailors and local Japanese were far from hostile, and if anything amicable and cooperative. Domain officials Shimomoto Takebei and Teshima Yasuke were subsequently despatched to Hakodate in 1857, returning to report the necessity of maintaining the international port there and the economic possibilities of land development in the Hokkaidô interior. Similarly, a mission to Nagasaki in 1859 by Shimomoto and Iwasaki Yatarô (a disciple of Yoshida's, later to be influential in setting up a Tosa trade station in Nagasaki in the 1860's and in the expansion of private industrialism in Meiji Japan), reported on the current state of affairs, and the very real possibility of partaking in the trading opportunities presented by Japan's oldest point of contact with the outside world. All these missions, in particular the mission to Nagasaki, demonstrate the farsightedness of Yôdô's vision for the future, a vision which would be realized in the 1860's by the establishment of Tosa trading stations in Nagasaki and Ôsaka as outlets for export commodities and revenue providers to enable the economic and military revival of Tosa as a power in national affairs.

In the absence of Yoshida, Yôdô may have been temporarily at a loss as regards the formulation of a Tosa strategy for participation in national affairs. However, in the autumn of 1857 he was approached by Matsudaira Shungaku and his retainer Hashimoto Sanai, concerning the possibility of the Tosa lord's adding his support to the emerging movement to secure the Shôgunal succession for the Hitotsubashi domain daimyô Tokugawa Yoshinobu.

²⁶ *Ibid.* p. 62

Yôdô found this proposition attractive on several counts. Firstly, he was an admirer of Yoshinobu's father, the Mito daimyô Tokugawa Nariaki, who along with Shungaku and Shimazu Nariakira of Satsuma was an important sponsor of Yoshinobu's candidature. Secondly, Yôdô and the other members of what became known as the *Hitotsubashi-tô* believed that with Shungaku appointed Regent he would be able to secure Yoshinobu's succession to the ailing Iesada. This would then enable urgent reforms such as: providing a greater role in national affairs for all daimyô; the alleviation of crippling financial expenses in Edo; and the creation of a stable national policy on foreign relations, which would in turn restore a modicum of calm to the country. Thirdly was the friendship that had developed between Yôdô and Shungaku. Just as they shared interests in traditional pursuits such as classical Confucian studies, so too were they kindred spirits in their desires to accrue new knowledge from the West, reform the establishment, and gain a greater role for *tozama* and *shimpan* daimyô. Another act which probably helped cement their relationship was Shungaku's recommendation in 1858 of an official pardon for Yoshida.²⁷ This was a welcome development for Yôdô who, with the approval of the injured party, issued an official pardon in December. In Tosa reform once again gathered speed, as Yoshida recovered all his previously held powers in the domain executive.

Arrayed against the *Hitotsubashi-tô*, the *Nanki-tô* party, primarily composed of *fudai* daimyô and headed by Ii Naosuke, supported the candidature of Tokugawa Yoshitomi from the Kii domain. The blood connection of Yoshitomi to Iesada was closer than that of Yoshinobu and, bitterly resenting the intrusion of the outer lords into their traditional sphere of authority, the *fudai* daimyô used this advantage to thwart the designs of their rivals. Issues of birthright apart, the *fudai* daimyo also realised that an inexperienced teenager would be much easier to manipulate than the talented and experienced Yoshinobu. Intense lobbying now occurred as both parties made covert approaches to the Court for a ratification of the foreign trade treaties,²⁸ each hoping for a successful outcome that would enable initially the election of their respective candidates for *Tairô* and consequently, control over the issue of Shôgun succession and domination of the Bakufu.

The Court, under pressure from both parties and in the unfamiliar position of being called upon to play a significant role in national affairs, prevaricated. The influential nobles appear to have been intending to achieve a compromise solution by intimating that the succession was to go to the older, more capable Yoshinobu, simultaneously extending a

²⁷ *Ibid.* p. 63.

²⁸ Hiraio 1961, p.52. The Hitotsubashi party's confidential request for imperial ratification of the treaties was drawn up by Yôdô but delivered by Hashimoto Sanai in Yôdô's name.

recognition of Edo's final authority in the matter of negotiations and treaty ratification.²⁹ However, Emperor Kōmei intervened to prevent the Bakufu realizing the latter goal, and the form of the communication regarding the Shōgunal successor was so diluted as to be virtually meaningless. The Court's equivocating actions probably worsened the situation as the lack of a clear endorsement of a candidate merely confused the issue and hardened Ii Naosuke's resolve to act quickly so as to enforce the Bakufu's traditional mandate to rule.

Yōdō's *kuge* connections by marriage were also employed in a campaign of Court persuasion, and appeals for assistance to his father-in-law, the influential Sanjō Sanetsumu. Similarly, Shimazu Nariakira of Satsuma was applying pressure on his Kyōto connections via his relation the courtier Konoe Tadahiro. However, all was for naught. With the prospect of the *Rōjū* Hotta Masayoshi transferring allegiance to the Hitotsubashi camp becoming daily more likely, Ii decided to take matters into his own hands. After making suggestions that Matsudaira Shungaku should be considered as a candidate for Regent, Hotta was politically ostracised by the *fudai* faction and eventually dismissed from his position of influence on the *rōjū* council. In the light of such developments, Ii and his supporters could afford to wait no longer and on April 23, 1858, he was appointed by the Bakufu council to the position of *Tairō*.

The Ansei Purges

The immediate consequence of the *fudai* victory was the dashing of the hopes of the Hitotsubashi party; the outcome of their failure to attain their political ends at this time turning out to be very severe indeed. Ii's choice of the Kii candidature was immediately ratified by a court concerned about the consequences of noncompliance, and following this, without the permission of the Emperor, he authorised his commissioners to sign the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, on June 19, 1858. The main contents of this treaty were: an agreement to open six more ports to foreign trade within the next twelve months; the setting of duty on foreign goods at between 5% and 20%; and the establishment of consulates in Edo.³⁰

Although Ii's actions in ratifying the treaty were precipitate, it is arguable whether he had any other option in the face of the threat of foreign aggression and Court procrastination. It must also be remembered that the reemergence of the Court as a force in politics was a very recent event and that until 1853 national polity had been the sole responsibility of the Bakufu. Ii may have considered the Emperor's involvement an unwarranted

²⁹ Beasley 1972, p.135.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

intrusion, prompting his attempts to turn the clock back and as far as possible re-assert Bakufu authority throughout the realm. Whatever the case, his actions were widely condemned, and the necessities of political survival, now required the immediate containment of his powerful adversaries in the Hitotsubashi party and elsewhere.

The purges of 1858-60 were drastically damaging for the leaders and supporters of the Hitotsubashi party. Subsequent to sweeping changes in the membership of the *rôjû* council on June 23, 1858, Mito Nariaki, and Matsudaira Shungaku were ordered into house arrest on July 5. Tokugawa Yoshinobu was at the same time forbidden access to Edo castle. With the Shôgun Iesada's death on the following day, and the accession of Yoshitomi as Iemochi, Ii's preparations for the suppression of all opposition to his rule were well under way. In an added blow to the Hitotsubashi party, Shimazu Nariakira died unexpectedly on July 15 as he was preparing to depart Kagoshima to travel to Kyôto with the purpose of persuading the Emperor to apply pressure on the Bakufu to relax its sanctions.³¹

Yôdô, although a substantial member of the Hitotsubashi faction was not initially a prime target of Ii's disciplinary programme. It was the nature of his reply to the Bakufu's command to Tosa to strengthen Ôsaka's defences, that prompted Ii to adopt punitive measures towards the Tosa daimyô. Yôdô made Tosa participation in the programme contingent on nine conditions, among which, provision for the burning of Ôsaka to deny it as a usable base to foreign invasion forces, and relaxation of *sankin-kôtai*, were especially controversial.³² Moreover, all were presented with an underlying attitude of deference to the Court and disrespect to the Ii regime.

Ii informed the Hitotsubashi supporter Date Munenari (daimyô of Uwajima) that his retirement from public life was expected, and to avoid the ire of the other *tozama* lords, Ii directed Date to pass on similar instructions to Yôdô. The Tosa daimyô received this information on October 6, and submitted to the Bakufu a formal request to retire on November 19, 1858. The acceptance of this application and the appointment of his successor Toyonori as the new daimyô were simultaneously announced on February 26 of the following year. Yôdô's further request to return to Tosa was declined due to the prior presence in Kôchi already of the *Inkyo* (retired daimyô) Toyosuke. On September 4, 1859, Yôdô transferred his household from the Edo domain headquarters in Kajibashi, to the alternative residence of Samezu in Shinagawa. Further to this, on October 11, Yôdô was ordered into strict confinement because

³¹ Hirao 1961, p. 64.

³² *Ibid* p. 66.

of his continued attempts to conduct secret communication with members of the Sanjô family in Kyôto.

From his position of close confinement, Yôdô now observed the wholesale destruction of the Hitotsubashi party, with key Bakufu councillors being imprisoned or forced to resign and activists from the domains supporting the Hitotsubashi party being executed or sentenced to commit suicide. On top of this political reverse, during his confinement Yôdô was to experience further tragedy of a personal as well as political nature. His father Toyokira and father in law Sanjô Sanetsumu both died at this time and on July 10, 1860, his beloved son Ikutaro aged fourteen, also died.

Since his return to office in December 1858, Yoshida had continued to extend the previously mentioned programme of reforms that had been begun in Tosa in 1854. However, as Yôdô's association with the Hitotsubashi party deepened and as his relations with the Bakufu worsened a concerned Yoshida travelled to Edo in October of 1859, in an effort to retrieve his lord's political position.³³ Eventually, unable to achieve anything other than moral support for his lord, Yoshida acted to limit repercussions that the defeat of the Hitotsubashi party might have on Tosa as one of the incriminated domains associated with the movement. Several high ranking retainers (and notably Yoshida's colleague Kominami Gorozaemon), were recalled to Tosa and either placed under arrest or demoted. Thus by moving first to punish the collaborators, Yoshida successfully avoided the severe penalties incurred by such men as Yoshida Shôin of Chôshû, Hashimoto Sanai of Echizen and Saigô Takamori of Satsuma.³⁴

Yôdô's retirement as daimyô in February 1859, and the inexperience of his successor Toyonori, meant that the responsibility of domain leadership fell largely upon Yoshida's shoulders. Having received Yôdô's prior approval, he now embarked upon a new series of reforms that were slightly less concerned with matters of defense, and were more constitutional and economic in nature. Two documents, entitled *Kainan Ritsuryô* and *Kainan Seiten*, laid out details of proposed reforms which included the following measures. Firstly, administration and domain law was updated and defined. Secondly, the complicated samurai ranking system was simplified to the five main grades of, *karô*, *chûrô*, *umamawari*, *koshôgumi*, and *rusuigumi*. Thirdly, the *Kôjûkan* (domain school for upper samurai students) was expanded with the creation of the *Bunbukan* (school for lower samurai). Fourthly the number of domain militia was set at 10,000. These were based on the five district offices, each possessing two thousand recruits divided into twenty battalions of one hundred men each, battalion commands open

³³ Fukuchi 1994, p. 62.

³⁴ *Ibid.* p. 63.

to application from *gôshi* and five-man unit commands being available for commoners of ability. Thus via these openings for the lower classes to participate in military activity, as well as the admission of lower samurai to the domain schools, the first basic reforms in social rank and privilege were now undertaken.³⁵ Lastly, in the economic arena, great efforts were made to revive the financial situation and raise domain revenue, to meet the demands on the domain treasury related to post-1854 military spending, and the cost of repairing damages that resulted from a large earthquake in 1857. This was largely initiated by encouraging increased production of commodities such as sugar, wood, charcoal and paper, by raising taxes on imports and the creation of further monopolies, and by promoting the export of domain products through the international port of Nagasaki.

On March 3, 1860 there occurred another watershed event of the Bakumatsu period; the ambush and murder of Ii Naosuke outside the Sakurada (Cherry Fields) gate of the Shôgunal castle. Ii's death must have been welcome to Yôdô, who was consumed with hatred for this man who had injured him and demoted and executed so many of his colleagues and their retainers. The following poem written after hearing the news of Ii's assassination gives us some indication of the extent of his emotion.³⁶

The dragon that fell at the cherry blossom gate
His scales scattered, flutter in the flying snow
The snow now red with a river of foul blood
The red shame of his ancestors, no courage now
He will not enter paradise, just a hell of
Pigs and dogs in the pale ocean of eternity

The killing of the *Tairô* by Mito and Satsuma *shishi* (men of spirit) had the effect of unleashing a wave of terror in which high ranking Bakufu officials were now targeted as the objects of *tenchû* (heavenly retribution). This violence occurred for several reasons. Firstly it was retribution for the Ii government's unpopular actions in ratifying the trade agreements without receiving imperial consent. Secondly it was an expression of dissatisfaction at the impertinence of the marriage between imperial Princess Kazunomiya and the Shôgun Iemochi, proposed by Ii's successor, Andô Nobumasa.³⁷ Thirdly, the very severity of the purges may have been an invitation to the *shishi* to adopt similarly violent measures in instigating the backlash which now occurred. Regardless of the atmosphere of violence and assassination, for the Hitotsubashi party, the event of Ii's demise signalled their imminent freedom from confinement and the possibility of a political revival.

³⁵ *Ibid.* p. 65.

³⁶ Hirao 1961, p. 73.

³⁷ Beasley 1972, p. 108.

On June 18, 1860, *sakayaki* (shaving of the head in penitence) and permission for Yôdô to walk in the imperial palace were granted by the Bakufu. September 4 saw the spirit of the confinement order waived (similar qualified pardons were extended to Shungaku and Yoshinobu at the same time), although written communication and the entertaining of visitors was still prohibited, as was any move to return to Tosa.³⁸ Andô Nobumasa, was attacked and fatally injured on January 15, 1862, in an expression of resentment against the Kazunomiya marriage, and demonstrating the increasing confidence of the *shishi* to act with impunity in the absence of the determination that had characterized Ii Naosuke's personal rule. Another significant development that occurred as a result of the Kazunomiya proposal was the application of pressure on the Court by Shimazu Hisamitsu (Nariakira's half brother and father of the new Satsuma daimyô Tadayoshi), the new power in Satsuma. In early 1862, Hisamitsu, with the support of his advisor Ôkubo Toshimichi, called for the appointment of Shungaku and Yoshinobu to positions of responsibility in the Bakufu administration, backing it up with a strong military presence in Kyôto. This pressure on the Court and Bakufu resulted finally in all restrictions on the freedom of the members of the Hitotsubashi party, including Yôdô, being completely lifted on April 25, 1862.

Meanwhile in Yôdô's continued absence, Yoshida Tôyô's programme of political and economic reforms had provoked intense reaction from a variety of political backgrounds in Tosa. Briefly, he was opposed by three main groups. The first was the conservative *mombatsu* faction comprised of senior domain retainers and members of the Yamanouchi family led by the ex-daimyô Toyotsuke and Koyagi Gohei. This party was traditionally opposed to any moves that might threaten their privileges; the introduction of commoners into the domain military in particular being offensive to them as a betrayal of samurai values. The second faction was the *shôya-gôshi* rural leadership which stood to lose most due to Yoshida's economic reforms such as increased monopolies, higher taxes paid to the domain authorities, and the development of new markets outside the domain leading to less direct local control. The third party were the Tosa loyalists. This was in effect an alliance between the lower samurai, who were calling for action against the foreigners and promotion of men by ability, and those ideologically oriented *gôshi* and *shôya* who were both sympathetic to the lower samurai demands and receptive to any anti-Yoshida platform that might curb the reforms that were intruding on their economic prerogatives.

The loyalists were led by the *gôshi*, Takechi Zuizan. Takechi was an extremely talented fencing instructor who, in 1856 had been sponsored by Yôdô to continue his study in Edo, in an attempt to foster the revival of

³⁸ Hirao 1961, p. 80.

martial arts in the domain.³⁹ Returning to Tosa in 1857, he further established his growing reputation as a teacher, simultaneously promoting the loyalist philosophies he had been influenced by while in Edo. Under Takechi's leadership, the Tosa loyalists were increasingly angered by domain inaction against what they saw to be Bakufu disrespect (Ii's act of signing the treaties, despite the lack of imperial approval) and what Jansen describes as Yoshida's condescending refusal to take seriously Takechi's proposals for a Tosa role in the planned loyalist national uprising.⁴⁰ After several attempts at persuasion, Takechi finally decided to take action against Yoshida when it appeared that the opportunity to lead Tosa *shishi* to Kyôto provided by the daimyô Toyonori's *sankin-kôtai* was to be lost by the administration head's reluctance to risk having Toyonori detained by the Bakufu as well as Yôdô. The support of the conservatives was probably an influential factor in convincing Takechi to remove Yoshida. The *mombatsu* opposition to Yoshida had been longstanding and although they were reluctant to assault him themselves, they intimated to Takechi that the repercussions of removing such an unpopular first minister would be very slight, particularly as the new administration would largely comprise members of their own faction.⁴¹ Thus following these developments, on April 8, 1862 Yoshida was ambushed and killed by members of the loyalist party while returning home from giving a lecture to Toyonori at Kôchi castle.

The ramifications of this murder, which occurred only two weeks before Yôdô's complete pardon and release, were deep and far reaching. For Yôdô it meant the permanent loss of a faithful and talented advisor. Equally so it was damaging for Tosa as it deprived the domain of an immense reforming presence not to mention an organisational and scholastic resource. Moreover, for the loyalists the benefits of removing Yoshida proved to be dubious at best. They eventually incurred the wrath of a Yôdô restored to his former position of domain primacy. Moreover, the reforms initiated by Yoshida were only temporarily halted to be re-continued later by Gotô Shôjirô and other Yoshida disciples. The alliance the loyalists formed with the conservatives also proved to be purely superficial; the incompatibility of two such disparate political factions being far greater than the binding power that was achieved in the shared dislike of one individual. In the void created by Yoshida's death, the conservatives, with the exception of high ranked Kominami Gorozaemon and Hirai Zennojô, occupied all positions of authority in the domain and the lowly ranked loyalists found themselves almost as excluded from power as before.⁴²

³⁹ Jansen 1971, p.90. Takechi Zuizan was alternatively known as Hanpeita.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* p. 114.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* p. 119.

⁴² *Ibid.* p. 121.

The almost simultaneous death of Yoshida Tôyô and Yôdô's reemergence onto the national political stage, form a natural frontier which brings to a close the first chapter of the thesis. However, before proceeding to the second chapter it will be useful to recapitulate the main points in a few brief paragraphs.

Summary

Nationally, as 1862 drew to a close it could be seen that the power of the Bakufu was greatly diminished. It had been shown up militarily by the vastly superior technology of the foreign powers, and a precedent had been created in allowing the voice of *shimpan* and *tozama* lords to be heard in discussion of national affairs. Dismay at the outer lords' success in achieving national influence via the Court and Emperor, spurred attempts by *fudai* daimyô to reassert the absolute rule that had existed prior to the 1850's, but this had ended in the assassination of Ii Naosuke and rehabilitation of the Hitotsubashi party.

A victory of some sorts had been achieved in the struggle to bring about a more consultative government; however, the costs had been significant. Firstly, many men of talent had been lost.⁴³ Secondly, there had been a widespread loss of confidence in the Bakufu's ability to rule properly, which occurred as a reaction to the severity of the purges and the inability of the Bakufu to either drive out the foreigner or suppress the political violence that was occurring increasingly within Japan. This weakness of the Bakufu can be said to have been epitomized by the apparent ease with which Ii Naosuke was assassinated. Thus the revival of the Hitotsubashi party had been achieved not by negotiation, but as a result of *shishi* violence and the threat of military force (Satsuma and Hisamitsu), in a trend that was to have great ramifications in following years.

These events were mirrored by developments within Tosa, where reform of military capability had been given urgent priority. A *tozama* domain, Tosa had supported the push for a greater voice in national affairs, and Tosa loyalists had also overthrown a chief minister. Yoshida Tôyô's policies had however, reflected his need to protect Yôdô by keeping Tosa out of national affairs. Moreover, he had continued domain reforms with the knowledge and approval of the ex-daimyô Yôdô. Unfortunately, Yoshida's refusal to become involved in national politics was interpreted by the loyalists as acquiescence in the Bakufu's opening of Japan, justifying his removal in the name of *sonnô* (honour the Emperor).

⁴³ Ibid p. 60. Talents such as the scholar Umeda Umpin, Echizen's Hashimoto Sanai, Chôshû's Yoshida Shôin, and Mito's Ajima Tatewaki were executed. Others such as Saigô Takamori being banished, imprisoned and demoted. However, another significant result of the purges was the uniting in anti-Bakufu activity and suffering, regardless of domain affiliation, of samurai from all over the country.

Yôdô had gained much useful political experience in the period prior to his confinement, and suffered greatly as a result of the purges. He had lost his position as domain lord and for the time being the Tosa conservatives and loyalists were in an extremely strong position. The following chapter will now describe the struggle that occurred between the *shishi* and the opposing *kôbu-gattai* movement.

Chapter 2. *Kôbu-gattai* and the Loyalists

The first half of this chapter will examine the relationship between *kôbu-gattai* and the reinstated supporters of the Hitotsubashi party. Following this, the friction that subsequently developed between *kôbu-gattai* and loyalists, leading to the downfall of the *shishi*, will be considered, both nationally and within Tosa.

The second half of the chapter will concentrate on the difficulties that developed for the Bakufu, associated with attempts to discipline a defiant Chôshû, and will consider the position adopted by Yôdô with reference to these problems. Ending at the chronological point provided by Yoshinobu's Shôgunal accession, the chapter will conclude by describing the growth of the anti-Bakufu alliance between the great western *tozama* domains that came into being in 1866.

Kôbu-gattai

Fundamentally, *kôbu-gattai* was the political manifestation of an attempt to reconcile the rule of the Shôgun with the ancient principle of the primacy of the Emperor. However, rival versions of *kôbu-gattai* came into being, reflecting the political affiliations of the various groups or persons which championed the cause of this ambiguous policy. As espoused by the *tozama* and *shimpan* lords, the concept meant a greater role for all daimyô in national affairs (with a concomitant diminishment of Tokugawa influence), and an improvement in status and prestige for the Court. This version of *kôbu-gattai* held little appeal for the *fudai* houses that dominated the Bakufu. They saw an unprecedented concession of power to the wider daimyô community and Court as undermining their own position and contrary to the historical principal of *fudai* pre-eminence in government.

The Bakufu did, however, have its own version of *kôbu-gattai* as symbolized by the Kazunomiya marriage proposal of early 1860.⁴⁴ Based on the principle of establishing unity at home prior to dealing with the foreigners, domestic stability would firstly be achieved by the Kazunomiya marriage and a temporary relaxation of *jôi*, to be followed after eight to ten years by the treaties being renegotiated or cancelled, and *jôi* enforced.

The Court's vision of *kôbu-gattai* was different again, centering on the immediate expulsion of foreigners, cancellation of the trade treaties and the maintenance of isolation with an increased voice in political matters for the Court. Initially opposed to the Kazunomiya proposition, Emperor Kômei, influenced by the courtier Iwakura Tomomi's arguments and having

⁴⁴ Beasley 1972, p. 175.

received the aforementioned vague Bakufu assurances of “expulsion of the barbarian,” capitulated, giving his approval to the marriage in September, 1860.⁴⁵

To the loyalists however, the Bakufu and Court programme of *kôbu-gattai* minus *jôî* was unacceptable. They were rapidly becoming disenchanted with a Bakufu that appeared to be abandoning the traditional policy of isolation, at the same time as ‘strong-arming’ the Emperor concerning the Kazunomiya marriage. Allowing the Shôgunate to maintain its power and privileges, in spite of its failure to fulfil the age old duty of the *Sei-i-tai-shôgun* (Barbarian-subduing generalissimo) was anathema to the *shishi* and Beasley⁴⁶ states their position very succinctly in the following paragraph:

“The Shôgun and the lords, controlling as they did the military forces that would eventually be needed against the West, must be driven from their supine passivity and put into a position of having to act, whether they wanted to or not, the loyalists claimed and there must therefore be risings and plots and attacks on foreigners calculated to provoke a confrontation. Here was the argument that was to provide the rationale for terrorism in the 1860’s.”

The loyalists were to have their illusions about the great lords’ political application of *kôbu-gattai*, shattered as well. In April 1862, after hearing of the alliance between Satsuma loyalists and the new daimyô’s father, Shimazu Hisamitsu, loyalists from a wide variety of domains gathered in Kyôto, in the belief that Hisamitsu’s leading of troops to Kyôto was part of a plan for a general uprising against the Bakufu. On April 13, *shishi* gathered at the Teradaya Inn in Fushimi, to discuss the details of the uprising. That same night they were however assaulted and dispersed by Satsuma troops under orders from Hisamitsu. The Satsuma leader had come to Kyôto, not to be involved in a loyalist anti-Bakufu insurrection, but rather to apply pressure on the Court to acquiesce in his demands for a political reinstatement of members of the Hitotsubashi party, and in particular of Yoshinobu and Matsudaira Shungaku.⁴⁷

Thus, *kôbu-gattai*, in the forms presented by the Bakufu and Hisamitsu’s Satsuma, had proven to be antagonistic to the principles of the loyalist movement. The *shishi* temporarily subdued, on June 7, 1862, Hisamitsu arrived in strength in Edo, escorting the Emperor’s envoy to the Bakufu, Ôhara Shigenori.

⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 175. Iwakura Tomomi believed that in the face of the threat of foreign invasion, the duty of Kyôto was to avoid a crisis by calming the domestic situation. This could be best achieved by consenting to the Kazunomiya marriage and receiving in return, a voice in foreign affairs.

⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 151.

⁴⁷ Hirao 1961, p. 77.

The imperial memorandum delivered by Ôhara consisted of three main policy demands: firstly, a formal Shôgunal procession to Kyôto for the purpose of discussions with the Court and establishment of a stable national polity; secondly, the appointment of a council with one *tairô* representative from each of the five great coastal domains; thirdly the appointment of Yoshinobu and Shungaku respectively as *Kôken* (Guardian of the Shôgun) and *Seijisôsai* (Supreme Political Director).⁴⁸ These demands were transparently an implementation of Hisamitsu's personal vision of *kôbu-gattai*, and the *fudai* dominated Bakufu was naturally reluctant to make concessions, especially as they appeared to be a result of Satsuma manipulation of the imperial will. However, under the very real threat of violence offered by Ôkubo Toshimichi,⁴⁹ the *rôjû* council capitulated, agreeing to the first and third demands of the imperial memorandum.

The proposal for a Shôgunal procession to Kyôto was approved in principle and Tokugawa Yoshinobu and Matsudaira Shungaku were respectively appointed Guardian and Supreme Councillor in early July. Though the request for five lords to be given powers as *tairô* for defence of the coastal regions, was turned down,⁵⁰ several other reforms were now carried out, largely through the offices of the new *Seijisôsai*, Matsudaira Shungaku. These included pardons and amnesties for victims of the Ansei purges, punishment of Ii's family and supporters, changes in the *sankin-kôtai* system, and the replacement of Hikone as Kyôto protector, by the Aizu domain of Matsudaira Katamori. His goals achieved, on August 20, 1862, Hisamitsu joined the exodus of daimyô households out of Edo that was one immediate result of the relaxation of *sankin-kôtai*.⁵¹ This relocation reflected a growing shift in the relative prestige of the Emperor and Shôgun, a shift that was to be hastened by the unprecedented visit of the Shôgun to Kyôto, providing yet another example of the decay in Edo's position vis-a-vis the Court.

In the light of the forementioned developments concerning Hisamitsu's *kôbu-gattai* activities, it is now an opportune moment to describe Yôdô's actions upon his release from confinement in April 1862.

⁴⁸ Yoshimura 1991, pp 46-47. The five great domains of the *enkai-go-ka-koku* policy were Satsuma, Chôshû, Tosa, Sendai and Kaga.

⁴⁹ Môri 1994, p. 47.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* p. 46. This would not have greatly concerned Hisamitsu because this clause was the work of Iwakura Tomomi and had the express objective of supplying a council of lords who could provide some form of limitation of Satsuma influence.

⁵¹ Due to the Namamugi incident which occurred during Hisamitsu's return to Kyôto, that lord's ability to play a role in affairs in Kyôto was vastly diminished. On his return to Kyôto Hisamitsu saw the rise in influence of Chôshû, and Tosa *shishi* but with the threat of war with England looming, he was forced to return to Kagoshima removing what must have been a major concern for the loyalists.

Yôdô's activities for the three month period between his pardon on April 25, and his first interview with the Shôgun Iemochi on August 15 are a little unclear; however, it is probable that much of this time was spent in communication with Shungaku and Yoshinobu discussing the Ôhara proposals, and possibly considering his course of action with regard to developments in Tosa. On August 11, he left his Samezu residence and returned to the Tosa Edo headquarters at Kajibashi. Unlike Shungaku and Yoshinobu he had not been restored to his former position as daimyô (probably due to the difference in station between two great *shimpan* lords and a lesser *tozama* daimyô⁵²), however, after an initial interview with the Shôgun on August 15, he was subsequently appointed to the *Goyôbeya* (high office within the Bakufu executive). An extraordinary appointment for a retired *tozama* lord, this was a supporting advisory role to the Political Director Matsudaira Shungaku and reflected his increasing influence.⁵³

Yôdô's abilities were similarly required by the Court and in September he received an imperial order to travel to Kyôto for the purpose of helping to formulate details of another memorandum to be presented to the Bakufu in an imperial mission led by the nobles Sanjô Sanetomi and Anegakôji Kintomo. However, having been involved in the reforms recently instituted by Shungaku, Yôdô may have felt that the time was not right to become too closely embroiled in Court politics, (he would also have been aware of the atmosphere of rising violence and irrational loyalism which was pervading the capital at this time) and hence applied for and subsequently received, imperial permission releasing him from duty in Kyôto.⁵⁴

Kyôto & Edo in late 1862

In the absence of the Satsuma military, the situation in Kyôto had changed again and the imperial memorandum that was now being prepared prior to its delivery in Edo, reflected this shift. Loyalist influence at Court had revived and in particular, Chôshû and Tosa *shishi* were demanding the closing of ports and expulsion of foreigners. Within Chôshû, on July 6, 1862 an internal coup had seen the overthrow of Nagai Uta's policy of unity between Court and Bakufu, with a victory for the loyalists represented by Yoshida Shôin disciples Kido Kôin and Kusaka Genzui. The loyalists now established the absolute pre-eminence within the domain of the slogan of, "Emperor respect and expulsion of foreigners"⁵⁵ - this new political position quickly translating into added pressure on the Court.

⁵² Yoshimura (1991, p. 44.) also suggests that Yôdô, who was increasingly becoming prey to sickness, may have preferred the flexible status he now attained to that of the arduous role of domain lord.

⁵³ *Ibid.* p. 44.

⁵⁴ Hirao 1961, p. 46.

⁵⁵ Ikeda 1977, p. 183.

Tosa loyalists were also in ascendancy in Kyôto. As we have seen, the result of Yoshida Tôyô's death in April 1862, was a consolidation of power in the hands of the domain conservatives. Although the loyalist leader Takechi Zuizan, had been striving to persuade the domain executive to allow the young daimyô Toyonori to travel to Kyôto to take a greater part in the affairs of the nation, the conservatives were solidly against Toyonori becoming politically involved at such an unsettled time. However having cooperated in Yoshida's assassination, they also had good reason to fear the strength of the convictions of the loyalists, and eventually they succumbed to the pressure of Yamanouchi relative Sanjô Sanetomi's calls added to Takechi's demands, approving the daimyô's travel to Kyôto in late July.⁵⁶

Toyonori accompanied by Takechi and a large following of loyalists (and some few conservatives) arrived in the capital in August and Takechi immediately began to capitalize on his influence with the young daimyô by applying pressure on the Court. Chôshû *shishi* were similarly manipulating the Môri daimyô until eventually in an atmosphere of extreme loyalism the topmost echelons of Court power had been seized by nobles such as Sanjô supported by the belligerent *shishi*.⁵⁷ Thus, although retaining the trappings of Bakufu administration, Kyôto had fundamentally become a loyalist power enclave. By the time the embassy headed by Sanjô Sanetomi and Anegakôji Kintomo, departed for Edo on October 12, 1862, escorted by Yamanouchi Toyonori and five hundred domain troops, the object of the mission had hardened to a straightforward demand for expulsion of the foreigners and the establishment of an autonomous imperial army.⁵⁸

These demands of the imperial mission were highly troubling to the Bakufu. Yoshinobu wanted to refuse the demands on the grounds that an implementation of *jô-i* with the associated rejection of the trade treaties and expulsion of foreigners, would mean a loss of all credibility for the Bakufu and immediate and disastrous conflict with the West. Moreover he expressed a willingness to travel to Kyôto for the purpose of expressing this opinion to the Emperor.⁵⁹ Matsudaira Shungaku, on the other hand, while "personally regarding the opening of the country as necessary and desirable"⁶⁰ believed that in the current atmosphere, the greater peril lay in refusing the imperial order, as this would lay the Bakufu open to charges of neglecting its duty and invite a sudden and violent reaction by the loyalists.

⁵⁶ Jansen 1971, p.123.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* p. 132.

⁵⁸ Hirao 1961, p. 89.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* p. 85.

⁶⁰ Beasley 1972, p. 192.

The imperial mission arrived in Shinagawa on October 26, to be escorted to Edo the following day by Matsudaira Shungaku and the Shōgunal representative; however, due to the Shōgun's suffering an attack of measles, an audience was not granted the imperial messengers until November 27. Despite the poor physical condition of the Shōgun the real reason for such a long delay was probably the debate that was occurring between Shungaku's party, which wished to accede to the majority of the imperial demands, and the Yoshinobu-Bakufu group which still held out against capitulating to the demand for *jōi*.

This problem was finally resolved by Yamanouchi Yōdō's resolute mediation and his suggestion of a compromise solution. Yōdō shared Shungaku's view that the imperial demands must be honoured; however, being also very conscious of the threat posed by the western powers, he pressed Yoshinobu and the Bakufu to accept the interim measure of agreeing to close the ports, but not until after the Shōgunal visit to Kyōto and without specifying a date. This approach, described by Totman as verbal *jōi*,⁶¹ would allow the strengthening of the *kokutai* (national polity), the eventual expulsion of the foreigners, and a maintenance of the status quo while also increasing daimyō input into national affairs. On December 5, although the request for establishment of an independent imperial force was declined, the Shōgun formally accepted the Court decree proclaiming closure of the ports, under the proviso that no firm date would be set as yet. The imperial envoys then left Edo on December 7, having achieved the Bakufu's promise to implement *jōi*.

On December 1, 1862, during his time in Edo as escort to the imperial mission, Tosa daimyō Yamanouchi Toyonori became engaged to the adopted daughter of the Chōshū daimyō Mōri Yoshichika. This union, deepening the connection between the two ruling families, may have been a result of the cooperation between Yōdō and the Mōri heir Sadahiro that succeeded in bringing about the compromise *jōi* proposition.⁶² However, the ceremonial alliance was also probably a calculated move on the part of the loyalists who controlled Tosa and Chōshū actions in Edo and Kyōto at this time, aimed at creating an even stronger link between their two domains from which to expand the principles of *sonnō-jōi*.

⁶¹ Totman 1980, p.37. Totman states that Yōdō after warning of a Court repudiation of the Bakufu if the ports were not opened, suggested a compromise position of 'verbal' *jōi* fillibustering to Yoshinobu (who adopted the policy).

⁶² Ibid. p. 38.

The Decline of Loyalism

Despite the outward display of unity between Tosa and Chôshû, several incidents now occurred that began to place a strain on the newly created alliance.

The first sign of friction surfaced during an evening of entertainment between Chôshû and Tosa in Edo on November, 5. In the course of the evening, following the liberal consumption of a deal of alcohol, Yôdô had a scholarly confrontation with the Chôshû loyalist Kusaka Genzui. The interaction was mainly of a bantering nature but a comment made subsequently by another loyalist, Sufu Masanosuke, appears to have greatly offended Yôdô and his followers, even though the evening ended without incident. Sometime afterwards a gift of first class sake called Nippon-damashii or 'the spirit of Japan' from the Môri family to Yôdô, prompted his comment that the gift was, "a reflection of Chôshû's sarcasm; and that perhaps Tosa should 'deliver *jôî*' to the Chôshû camp in return."⁶³

The second more serious incident again involved Sufu Masanosuke and occurred on November 12, when Yôdô received advice that Chôshû *shishi* were planning to assassinate the English Ambassador and attack the foreign settlements in Yokohama. Yôdô immediately sent a caution to the Môri headquarters, also notifying Matsudaira Shungaku of developments. Thus the danger was averted but a curious incident highlights the negative light in which Yôdô was coming to be seen by the Chôshû *shishi*. Tosa representatives were at the scene of the withdrawal of the activists when suddenly, a rather inebriated Sufu Masanosuke appeared on horseback shouting "the Lord Yôdô makes mockery of Emperor respect and expelling of foreigners."⁶⁴ Tosa's demand for the offending party's arrest the following day, was deflected by an official apology by the Chôshû leadership and Sufu's reported demotion and banishment, (although his continued presence in Edo under a false name was covertly permitted).

Although the attack had been prevented due to Yôdô's vigilance, the incident had revealed a growing division between Yôdô's upper-samurai retainers and the Tosa loyalists, some of whom had been preparing to participate in the attack on the foreigners.⁶⁵ Moreover, despite the foiling of this plot, it was soon followed by the same group's assault on and successful burning of the new English legation under construction at Shinagawa.

⁶³ Hirao 1961, pp. 91-92.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* p. 94.

⁶⁵ Yamamoto 1994, p. 79. Hirose Kenta and other Tosa *shishi* had intended to participate in the Yokohama attacks.

Despite the deterioration in relations with Chôshû *shishi*, within the Tosa loyalist camp, Yôdô was still construed as sympathetic to their cause. In late December 1862 Yôdô, who during his confinement in Edo, had been an object of admiration for Tosa loyalists, was embarrassed by the presence of a group of unruly *shishi* who had come to Edo ostensibly on the grounds that the ex-daimyô was in danger from Bakufu conservatives.⁶⁶ Grasping the opportunity to participate in national affairs, a party of fifty, mainly *gôshi*, headed by the *shôya* Nakaoka Shintarô, arrived in Edo where they immediately began strong loyalist demonstrations. So vehement were these activities that Yôdô was eventually forced to take the extreme measure of forming a special bodyguard of upper samurai to contend with the dangerous and unwanted intrusions of the Tosa *shishi*.⁶⁷

It was however, clear that in the current political environment, any severe measures against the loyalists would invite disastrous consequences. Yôdô therefore limited his actions to creating the *umamawari* defence unit, and maintaining an appearance of general approval of the loyalists. This appearance went so far as to include Nakaoka Shintarô in a group sent to attract the services of the intellectual Sakuma Shôzan from Matsushiro domain in Nagano. The death of Yoshida had been a great set-back to Yôdô's domestic reform agenda and his place was to have been taken by Shôzan; however, Yôdô's negotiations to secure the scholar's services were complicated by the business of preparing his household to travel to Kyôto for the purpose of participating in a daimyô council discussing the details of the coming Shôgunal procession to Kyôto.

Communication between Tosa and Matsushiro officials continued, however just as negotiations appeared to be concluding satisfactorily, Matsushiro declined the invitation. This was probably because western Japan and Tosa was potentially too dangerous for a 'Yoshida-like' aficionado of European learning and *kaikoku*, and perhaps also because Matsushiro wished to retain for itself, the services of the nationally renowned Shôzan.⁶⁸

Yôdô, now in a position of influence due to his appointment to the supporting role for *Seijisôsai* Matsudaira Shungaku, was ordered by Court and Bakufu to travel to Kyôto to take part in a conference to discuss the

⁶⁶ Jansen 1971, pp.135-6.

⁶⁷ Ibid. p. 144. The group of upper samurai was headed by Itagaki Taisuke and was specifically formed to suppress the activities of the Tosa *shishi* in Edo and latterly Kyôto. This emphasised the division by class between the lower classed loyalists and upper samurai retainers of Yôdô's entourage that had begun to occur with the involvement of Hirose Kenta and other Tosa loyalists in the cancelled attack on the foreign settlement at Yokohama.

⁶⁸ Hirao 1961, p. 99. Matsushiro domain fears proved well founded when in 1864, Sakuma Shôzan was murdered in Kyôto.

details of the imminent Shôgunal procession to Kyôto and he arrived in the capital on January 25, accompanied by his retainers and loyalist 'tail'.⁶⁹

Discussions between Yôdô, Tokugawa Yoshinobu, Shungaku, and the Kyôto Protector, Aizu daimyô Matsudaira Katamori, began the following day (Shimazu Hisamitsu, still embroiled in the consequences of the Namamugi affair did not attend the conference, sending in his place his advisors Ôkubo Toshimichi and Yoshii Tomonori). The intentions of the daimyô *kôbu-gattai* party centered on establishing firm grounds for the Bakufu to continue to govern the country and the delaying of setting a date for the execution of the expulsion of foreigners order.⁷⁰ However, Court demands for an immediate expulsion presented by Sanjô and Anegakôji and backed up by pressure from Chôshû and threats in the form of political assassinations, could not be refused. In two well known incidents the Confucianist scholar Ikeuchi Daigaku had been killed when returning from a dinner at Yôdô's residence in Ôsaka (where he stayed several days before arriving in Kyôto) and the severed head of a village headman allegedly sympathetic to Bakufu 'plots' was thrown into the Kawaramachi Tosa headquarters in Kyôto.⁷¹ These and other violent attacks were perpetrated with the direct intent of threatening Yôdô and others who continued to attempt to seek imperial approval for policies of cooperation with the foreigners. Also in the eyes of the loyalists, a union of Bakufu and Court equated to a continuation of the subordination of the Emperor to the 'usurper' Iemochi.

The Shôgun and his retainers arrived in Kyôto on March 4, and in audience, were advised by Yôdô and Shungaku of the political reality that two rulers could not exist in one kingdom, and that an imperial re-affirmation of the Shôgun's continued role was of immediate and vital importance.⁷² In the face of the threat of resignation of the Shôgun and *Seijisôsai* the Court granted official recognition of the Bakufu's mandate, contingent on the condition that Bakufu officials ceremonially pledge themselves to a policy of *jôi*.

Yôdô and Shungaku were anticipating the March 14 arrival in Kyôto of Shimazu Hisamitsu⁷³, who was strongly against a futile enactment of the expulsion order. Hisamitsu was, however, angered by Bakufu concessions such as the agreement to create an imperial military force and the setting of the expulsion date for twenty days after the Shôgun left Kyôto, as well as

⁶⁹ Hirao 1961, p. 102.

⁷⁰ Beasley 1972, p.193.

⁷¹ Hirao 1961, p. 102.

⁷² *Ibid.* pp. 104. Hirao stresses despair at the political situation, as the motivation for Matsudaira Shungaku's suggestion that he and the Shôgun should resign.

⁷³ *Ibid.* p. 105.

the meddling of the *shishi* in Court affairs. The Satsuma Regent saw also that his adversary, Chôshû was in complete ascendancy in Kyôto and that until his domestic problems were solved, he had neither the strength nor opportunity to resolve the situation in a fashion advantageous to him. *Kôbu-gattai* hopes of a Satsuma-led reconciliation of Bakufu, Court and daimyô were thus stymied by Shimazu's precipitous return to Kagoshima on the 19th, almost immediately after his arrival in Kyôto.⁷⁴

Following Shimazu's exit, Shungaku abruptly left Kyôto on the 21st, to be subsequently chastised for negligence by the Bakufu and stripped of his position as *Seijisôsai*. Yôdô, citing Toyonori's youth and the need to improve coastal defenses as an excuse, also left Kyôto on March 26, arriving back in Kôchi on April 12, after an absence of seven years. With the departure of Uwajima's Date Munenari this now left the sole member of the daimyô/*kôbu-gattai* party remaining in Kyôto, Tokugawa Yoshinobu bereft of support and under huge pressure from the loyalists to enact *jôi*. Yoshinobu resisted to the end and even the announcement of May 10, as the date for expulsion, was in his understanding only the date for commencing negotiations for foreigners to leave Japan, not a deadline for departure.⁷⁵ However, regardless of Yoshinobu's interpretation of the order, for the loyalists, the Bakufu was now committed to a specific date for expulsion and this and the withdrawal from the capital of almost all the influential lords, spelled the temporary failure of *kôbu-gattai*.

After his arrival in Kyôto, Yôdô had managed to curb the influence of Takechi Zuizan on the young Toyonori, however, the legacy of the prominence of Takechi and other Tosa loyalists in producing the current atmosphere of militant loyalism remained, and to the ex-daimyô, this probably represented an unacceptable intrusion into the management of Tosa and the nation's affairs. Upon his return to Kôchi, Yôdô was therefore faced with the problem of re-establishing his position as de-facto ruler in Tosa, as a prerequisite to consolidating his position as a leading force in national politics.

In the interim four major political groupings had developed within Tosa: firstly, the progressives, followers of Yoshida Tôyô headed by Gotô Shôjirô and Fukuoka Kôtei; secondly, the *Kimmô-tô* loyalist party headed by Takechi Zuizan; thirdly, the upper-samurai *jôi* party of Kominami Gorozaemon and Itagaki (Inui) Taisuke; and lastly, the reactionary conservative party led by ex-daimyô Yamanouchi Toyosuke, and Koyagi Gohei. The removal of Yoshida Tôyô by the loyalists and conservatives had left that uneasy alliance as the strongest political presence.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.* p. 105.

⁷⁵ Beasley 1972, p.195. The Bakufu originally referred to *kyozetsu* or the 'withdrawal' of foreigners, however this was later replaced by *jôi* with its accompanying sentiments of violence and forceful eviction.

In seeking to reassert his power in Tosa, Yôdô faced several major problems. He could not attack the conservatives of his own class now running the domain, as they were merely exercising their natural and traditional rights. Fortunately he controlled the movements of the young daimyô and as an influential voice in national affairs, could hope to gradually re-assume total control of the domain by exercise of his political influence and position as guardian. He was, however, faced with the immediate need to suppress the loyalist movement, restraining or destroying the extremism of its leaders; or have his own position undermined by lack of confidence. He also needed to rebuild a domain executive that would be pro-reform and faithful to his policies, and was fortunate here in that the Yoshida progressives were at hand to assist in this process. Thus in the early months of 1863, in the sphere of domestic matters, he occupied himself principally by investigating the conditions surrounding Yoshida's assassination and preparing to implement punitive measures against the *Kinnô-tô*.⁷⁶

While Yôdô was in Kyôto, Takechi Zuizan had been presenting the Tosa lord with memorials calling for the promotion of (loyalist) men of ability within the domain administration, and demanding that imperial needs take precedence over Bakufu directives (ie. Tosa troops should be stationed in Kyôto rather than Ôsaka). Yôdô now used these demands to commence his programme of suppression of the Tosa *shishi*. Firstly he despatched three leading loyalists; Masaki Sôrô, Hirose Kenta, and Hirai Shûjirô back to Tosa, outwardly to take up positions of influence within the domain government, yet actually to arrive back to a Tosa which excluded them totally from any role within the decision making process. Next, he appointed Takechi Zuizan to the position of director of the Tosa Kyôto residence, thus cutting him off from opportunities to meet and intrigue with other loyalists.⁷⁷

The relationship between Takechi Zuizan and Yôdô is certainly deserving of attention. As we have seen, Yôdô had been a major patron of Takechi from early on when he sponsored the lowly *gôshi* to the highest levels of fencing training in Edo. While their political ideologies were hugely disparate, Takechi seems to have genuinely believed that Yôdô was committed to an imperial restoration and had demonstrated this faith on several occasions.⁷⁸ Yôdô for his part although aware of Takechi's complicity in Yoshida's murder,⁷⁹ seems to have been somewhat

⁷⁶ Jansen 1971, p. 148.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.* p.147.

⁷⁸ Yamamoto 1994, p. 79. It was Takechi who informed Yôdô of the plan to attack the foreign settlements in Yokohama and who persuaded Hirose Kenta not to take part against his lord's will.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.* p.84. Yôdô's initial anger on hearing of Yoshida's death was lessened by the mediation of his

ambivalent in his attitude to the leader of the Tosa loyalists. This fluctuated between maintaining discipline among his Tosa retinue via the (previously mentioned) bodyguard which was constituted to control the loyalists, and ‘humouring’ Takechi with promotions to *rusuigumi* (December 1862) and *umamawari* (March 1863).

This could suggest a high degree of favour for Takechi, however, it is more likely that what it really indicates is the lengths to which Yôdô and his staff had to go in order to restrain the radical activities of this influential and dangerous loyalist. Despite Yôdô’s increasing position of influence in the affairs of the nation, in the perilous environment of loyalist extremism, any overt actions against Takechi would have invited a violent reaction from the *shishi* and *shishi*-controlled Court. The ex-daimyô was still not strong enough within either Tosa or Kyôto to withstand the possible consequences and thus resorted to the policy of keeping Takechi too busy to ‘get into trouble’.⁸⁰ This ploy may have been specifically adopted to dazzle Takechi, (who was very conscious of his lowly origins) with social elevations, at the same time as utilizing him in a pacifying role for other extremists who made up the rank and file of the *Kinnô-tô*.

It is difficult to exactly determine the true nature of the relationship that existed between Yôdô and Takechi; however, from the feudal perspective of lord and vassal, it is clear that whatever their political affiliation, individuals or groups who repeatedly violated the mores of feudal etiquette had to be punished for their impertinence, and more importantly, had to be publicly seen to be punished.

A development now occurred that allowed Yôdô to commence his disciplinary campaign, by acting initially against the three *shishi* he had previously ordered back to Tosa; Masaki, Hirose and Hirai. It had come to Yôdô’s attention that these men had in secret, extracted a rescript for loyalist reform from the Prince of the Blood Nakagawa-no-Miya, addressed to the former daimyô Toyosuke, urging him to make reforms along loyalist lines.⁸¹ Yôdô outwardly furious at both the disrespect shown to a member of the imperial family and the clandestine nature of the plotting, may have been secretly pleased by the opportunity this gave him to begin actions against the loyalists. On June 8, despite Takechi’s pleas for leniency, the three *shishi* were ordered to commit suicide.

The repercussions of this sentence were significant. Fearing a similar fate, many Tosa *shishi* fled to Kyôto where they subsequently combined with loyalists from other domains, creating the Kyôto *Kinnô-tô*. However,

younger brother who was sympathetic to the cause of the loyalists.

⁸⁰ Fukuchi (1994, pp 69-70) suggests that Takechi was directly responsible for Yoshida’s death.

⁸¹ Yamamoto 1994, p. 81.

despite the ominous signs, Takechi Zuizan and other leaders chose to remain and try to redeem their disintegrating position. Hitherto, in the atmosphere of loyalist ascendancy that had prevailed throughout most of Japan, Takechi had been virtually untouchable. Now, the arrest and sentencing of his followers for the crime of imperial disrespect, and the slow erosion of the loyalist position that now began to occur in the second half of 1863, meant that the *Kimmô-tô* leader began to appear much more vulnerable.

Throughout 1863, until as late as August 18, loyalism in Kyôto remained at an unabated high. Influentially dominant in Court circles, Chôshû intent on faithfully fulfilling the requirements of *jôï*, had begun attacks on foreign shipping in the straits of Shimonoseki on May 10, 1863.⁸² This aggression coupled with Satsuma's continued refusal to capitulate to English demands for an indemnity for the Namamugi incident, particularly exacerbated relations between England and both Satsuma and Chôshû. The Bakufu found itself now to be simultaneously the target of ultimata from the foreign powers; and of recrimination from the Court and from Chôshû, who in obeying the imperial edict to expel foreigners, were able to claim the higher moral ground. Needless to say relations with the recalcitrant Satsuma, which refused to give up the guilty parties or pay any kind of indemnity, were strained as well.

In June, a messenger arrived in Kôchi from the Môri family, calling for Tosa's assistance in the drive to expel foreigners from Japan.⁸³ Yôdô's refusal to be drawn into any attacks on foreigners or foreign shipping provoked a stream of petitions from Takechi demanding that Yôdô fulfil the spirit of the imperial decree. Much as he may have wished to silence this vociferous retainer, nationally, loyalism as a force was far from spent and although the Tosa loyalists' position had worsened somewhat with the disgrace and suicide of their three comrades, the threat of a charge of disobeying the imperial will was still a powerful check to Yôdô's taking action against Takechi.

Circumstances changed drastically however, on August 13, with the announcement of *Yamato-gyôkô*. This was an imperial progression to the Shintô shrine at Ise, intended to signal the commencement of the mission to drive out the foreigners. Although the announcement had received imperial approval, this was very much due to pressure from Chôshû and the loyalist nobles allied to that domain who were in positions of influence at Court.⁸⁴

⁸² Môri 1994, p. 64. After the attacks on western shipping commenced, in June Dutch and American warships proceeded to bombard the Chôshû coast handing out a great deal more damage than had been inflicted on international shipping. Thus the impracticality of *jôï* was effectively demonstrated.

⁸³ Jansen 1971, p. 148.

⁸⁴ Beasley 1972, p.216.

The decree was probably issued with the intention of forcing the Bakufu to choose between assisting in the expulsion of foreigners or risk being labelled enemies of the Court. Largely the work of Tosa *shishi* Yoshimura Toratarô and led by the courtier Nakayama Tadamitsu, the Yamato uprising that followed was nothing short of a disaster for the loyalist party. On August 17, *shishi* attacked a Bakufu administration office in Yamato (present day Nara) killing five officials and then proclaiming the area to be under direct control of the Court.⁸⁵

This action now provoked a sharp reply from the *kôbu-gattai* camp. On August 18, with the approval of the chief ministers of the Court; Aizu troops of the Kyôto protector Matsudaira Katamori with Satsuma assistance, overpowered the Chôshû forces on guard in the imperial palace, forcing them out in disarray and enabling the issuance of an imperial order cancelling the Yamato uprising.⁸⁶ The Chôshû forces (and twenty one influential anti-Bakufu courtiers headed by Sanjô Sanetomi) then retreated from Kyôto leaving the capital solidly in the hands of the triumphant *kôbu-gattai* party. The seventy *shishi* who had taken part in the Yamato uprising were now dispersed by troops from local domains, Yoshimura Toratarô committing suicide and the remainder either being killed, arrested or fleeing to take refuge in Chôshû. Nakayama, Sanjô and the other loyalist nobles (but not Anegakôji Kintomo who had been assassinated in Kyôto earlier in the year) also retreated from the capital, eventually fleeing via Yamaguchi to Dazaifu in Kyûshû.

The defeat of the loyalists signalled by the Kyôto coup d'état of August 18, also proved to be the death knell for the Tosa *Kimmô-tô* party. Further fueling his lord's displeasure, in an audience on August 29, Takechi went so far as to lecture Yôdô on the limitations of the Yamanouchi family debt of obligation to the Tokugawa.⁸⁷ This impertinence combined with the atmosphere of general indignation against the *shishi* (many of the activists involved in the Yamato uprising had been of Tosa origin) which was sweeping the country, may have provided the final impetus for Yôdô's subsequent acts of issuing a declaration of *kaigenrei* (martial law) and ordering the arrest of the ringleaders, on September 21. As well as Takechi Zuizan, *gôshi* and *shôya* leaders, Shimamura Masayoshi, Ôbata Magojiro, Ôbata Magozaburô and Kawano Masuya were all arrested, to be subsequently executed or imprisoned. Kominami Gorozaemon, the only upper samurai and domain official to have openly supported the loyalists, was also formally stripped of his office of *ômetsuke*. Takechi himself,

⁸⁵ Hirao 1961, p. 109.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.* p. 109. A similarly unsuccessful uprising was staged in Ikuno in October, but with the revival of the *kôbu-gattai* movement it was easily quashed, resulting only in the death of several more influential *shishi*.

⁸⁷ Yamamoto 1994, p. 83.

remained in varying degrees of custody until he was finally ordered to commit suicide, three years later on May 11, 1865.

Takechi and the *Kinnô-tô* had, literally, fatally misjudged Yôdô. The Tosa loyalist movement does not seem to have been merely some romantic, idealist crusade, but rather a body of men deeply committed to a platform of respect for the imperial institution and working for national and regional reform. Yôdô's punishment of the three *shishi* accused of disrespect does not seem to have alienated the Tosa loyalists, probably because they conceded the seriousness of the charges and were thus unable to successfully dispute the sentence.

Despite Yôdô's association with the *kôbu-gattai* movement his record of loyalty to the Court was exemplary, and there is no evidence of resentment against him among the *shishi*. The many precedents of political killings such as Ii Naosuke and Yoshida Tôyô among others, suggest that had the loyalists possessed serious doubts about Yôdô's political intentions, they might have had few qualms in assassinating him as well. Therefore we can surmise that Yôdô admirably concealed his programme of punishment, and that the version of *jôï* which he presented to Takechi and his followers must have reassured them that he was against opening the country and desirous of an improvement in the status of the Court and in the position within the feudal strata of men of ability from within the loyalist ranks.

Yôdô was able to negotiate the dual reefs of *shishi* extremism and *mombatsu* conservatism and reassert himself as de-facto head of the Tosa domain. Indeed, as Jansen suggests,⁸⁸ it was the very existence of the difference in class between the *shishi* and upper samurai that allowed him to do this. Within his service he utilised the establishment's disapproval of the radicals as a weapon of containment. However, simultaneously, he protected himself by maintaining relationships with influential *gôshi* such as Takechi, continuing to command the respect of a majority of the *shishi* throughout most of the period of loyalist dominance. With regard to the lack of resistance displayed by many of the loyalists when finally assaulted by the domain establishment, Jansen cites codes of tradition and obedience as factors in the condemned loyalists' compliance as well as a wish to be seen to 'die well'. But, with regard to the leader, Takechi Zuizan, one cannot help wondering if a mistaken faith in Yôdô's support for loyalist policies was not also a strong contributing factor.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Jansen 1971, p. 151.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* p. 151.

The Daimyô in Kyôto, December 1863

In the vacuum created by the withdrawal of Chôshû, leading daimyô once again travelled to Kyôto for discussions with Court and Bakufu. These centered primarily on the question of a second Shôgunal procession to Kyôto, and the outstanding issue of how to best go about closing the ports (Yokohama in particular) and enact *jô-i* in accordance with the agreement reached earlier in the year. Due to the improvement in the political situation brought about by the overthrow of the loyalists, the Bakufu eventually capitulated to the Court's demand for the Shôgun to come to Kyôto (he eventually arrived on January 15, 1864). Concerning the expulsion order, the device of sending a mission overseas to negotiate closing the ports was settled on as a delaying tactic, that would both ease the pressure on the Bakufu and placate the Court.⁹⁰

Yôdô, preoccupied in the months immediately after the Kyôto coup with his purge of the Tosa loyalists, in September pleaded ill health as an excuse not to travel to Kyôto; permission to remain in Kôchi was duly granted. Within the next two months however, he received further urgent requests to come to Kyôto not only from Hisamitsu and Shungaku, but from the Court as well. Finally bowing to the pressure, he left Tosa on December 21 on the recently purchased domain steamship Nankaimaru arriving in Kyôto on the 27th of the same month.

A meeting between the daimyô and Court was held on December 30, with the Court stressing its desire for the great lords to participate more fully as councillors in imperial policy deliberations. Yôdô, as one of the great lords now found himself formally appointed to the position of *sanyô* (imperial councillor).⁹¹ After the Shôgun's arrival on January 15, further meetings were conducted between the (*kôbu-gattai*) *sanyô*-daimyô, and the Court and Bakufu. However, these meetings were marred by discord involving Yôdô, who came into conflict with the newly appointed *Seijisô-sai*, Matsudaira Naokatsu, at a meeting on January 25. It is probable that Yôdô had been drinking heavily and expressed his views a little too strongly in support of Date, Shimazu and Matsudaira Shungaku; that the Bakufu chastise Chôshû in the sternest manner and immediately repudiate its position on the closing of the port of Yokohama.⁹²

Yôdô's unruly conduct is evidenced by notes in Date's diary, and in letters of this time from Shungaku to Yoshinobu. It appears that Yôdô was beginning to despair of the lack of severity concerning Chôshû, and on

⁹⁰ Totman 1980, p.89.

⁹¹ Hirao 1961, p. 115. This was an appointment he may not have wished to accept as it promised to further complicate his problem of conflicting loyalties between Bakufu and Court.

⁹² Totman 1980, p.102.

March 9, in a letter to Shungaku written after his abrupt return to Kôchi on March 4, he expresses himself as follows:

“Ascribing my condition to illness, in the strongest of terms I request leave of absence. I am deeply conscious of the consequences of my actions in returning west so rapidly. It is no longer my intention to participate in the affairs of state; rather, hereafter to dwell in pastoral surroundings, subject to non worldly, simple influences.”⁹³

Although preparations for a punitive expedition against Chôshû had been commenced, they had come to halt in late February, due to divisions within the *kôbu-gattai* movement and the reluctance of the militarily capable Matsudaira Katamori to take the main part.⁹⁴ Thus despite Yôdô’s florid prose, the underlying message is actually that until a stricter and more united stance was adopted towards Chôshû, Tosa cooperation in national affairs would no longer be forthcoming.

In Tosa, Yôdô was now involved in the suppression of a *shishi* uprising at Noneyama in July 1864. This was organised by Kiyooka Michinosuke (a loyalist disciple of Takechi Zuizan) and twenty three other *shishi*, who published a manifesto setting out their political grievances and staged a public demonstration to apply pressure on domain authorities to release Takechi. Dispersed by domain forces, the majority of the loyalists were apprehended trying to escape into Awa (Tokushima) domain, after which they were forcibly returned to the Tosa authorities and publicly executed in a field by the banks of the Naharikawa river in Kôchi on September 5.⁹⁵

In other regions discontent flared. Despite an atmosphere of cooperation in Kyôto between Shôgun and Emperor, and the revival of the Bakufu position, achieved in March by the reappointment of Katamori as *Shugo* (Protector) and the appointment of Tokugawa Yoshinobu as imperial commander, this period of respite for the ruling regime was brief. Between March and August of 1864, the Kantô rebellion of Mito *jôi* activists occurred in the heart of the Bakufu dominions. This disastrous event had dire long-term consequences for both Mito, which disintegrated as an effective operational entity, and the Bakufu leadership whose ill-handling irrevocably alienated what had been formerly one of their staunchest allies.⁹⁶

⁹³ Hiraio 1961, p. 117.

⁹⁴ Totman 1980, p.106. Katamori swiftly ‘contracted’ a grave illness which prevented him from taking part in the punitive expedition and which effectively lead to a cancellation of the planned action.

⁹⁵ Hiraio 1961, p. 118.

⁹⁶ Totman 1980, p.121. Totman suggests that the savagery of the counter-measures permanently alienated the Mito samurai who might otherwise have been supportive of the Bakufu in its later crises. Material

The prospect of a Kantô-Kansai *jô*i axis loomed ominously for the Bakufu as pressure on Chôshû leadership by militant loyalists resulted in a bloody attempt to re-take control of Kyôto, on July 17. However, the threat receded after the attack was repulsed by Aizu and Satsuma forces (large areas of Kyôto being simultaneously destroyed by fire) and resulted in the issuance of an imperial order to Yoshinobu to punish Chôshû and the radicals controlling that domain, who had caused such damage to the imperial capital.

The Suppression of Chôshû

Weakened by western naval action (in retaliation for the closing of the straits of Shimonoseki in May 1863) that had destroyed their shore batteries, and finding itself outgunned and facing the possibility of a Bakufu offensive on two fronts, Chôshû capitulated. Conservatives now briefly regained control of the domain and submitted to Court and Bakufu disciplinary directives. Penalties imposed included the execution of officials responsible for radical domain policies, destruction of some key installations, and the expulsion of Sanjô Sanetomi and other nobles. These were acts that the loyalists within Chôshû undoubtedly interpreted as being perpetrated by the Bakufu (or by a Court being manipulated by 'wicked' Bakufu officials) and for which the Bakufu, was ultimately responsible. The great irony is that the vindictive penalties inflicted on Chôshû seem to have been the work of the Court, rather than the Bakufu.⁹⁷

The proclamation of Chôshû as an enemy of the Court had implications affecting the Yamanouchi-Môri relationship. On August 20, Yôdô refused to see the Chôshû messenger sent to Tosa to canvass support against the Bakufu, and two days later, the daimyô Toyonori (probably at Yôdô's prompting) forced his Môri bride to leave Kôchi castle and reside separately at the residence of a senior family retainer. Yôdô then wrote to Date Munenari in a letter dated 29 August, informing the Uwajima lord of his decision to forbid the Môri envoy to enter Kôchi, and enquiring as to what Date's answer would be when the messenger arrived in Uwajima.

The subjugation of Chôshû and prospects of a corresponding boost to Tokugawa prestige provided a fertile environment for the emergence of several new developments. The previously unthinkable possibility of a cooperative opposition to the Tokugawa regime by Chôshû and Satsuma may have had its beginnings in actions by Satsuma's Saigô Takamori (then

costs also were huge in terms of the expense of the expedition, and destruction of life and property.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.* p.132. Totman notes that, compared with Court calls for the severest of sanctions, Edo officials seem to have been quite mild in their judgement of Chôshû.

seconded to duty with the leader of the expedition, Owari daimyô Tokugawa Yoshikatsu) campaigning for the halting of military proceedings against Chôshû. Certainly within Chôshû it created a deep resentment of the Bakufu and engendered a commitment to resistance based on the new western-style military units. Mobilizing the manpower of the domain ultimately exposed the class dilemma of the traditional warrior's unsuiteness for service in disciplined organisations and the need to conscript non-samurai levies into the traditional preserve of the warrior class.⁹⁸

The expedition ended in the same half-hearted fashion in which it had begun.⁹⁹ Bakufu orders for the detainment in Edo of the Môri daimyô and heir, and for the immediate surrendering of the seven nobles as a condition for the withdrawal of its forces, reached Yoshikatsu after he had already signed a much more lenient settlement. Consequently the expedition ended in an unsatisfactory kind of stalemate that failed to remove the militant loyalist infrastructure in Chôshû and instead strengthened a determination among that domain's loyalists to continue resisting Bakufu aggression, which they chose to interpret as an untrue portrayal of the real wishes of the Court.

As we have seen, official reaction in Tosa was a repudiation of the Môri connection, but perhaps more significantly, at a lower level, actions by the two ex-Tosa *rônin* Sakamoto Ryôma and Nakaoka Shintarô, in establishing the beginnings of a Satsuma-Chôshû reconciliation and later of a secret tripartite league (including Tosa), were very soon to have profound consequences.

Under the leadership of Takasugi Shinsaku the Chôshû loyalists overcame the conservatives in early 1865, retook control of the domain and commenced a policy of non-compliance with Bakufu demands and the purchasing of foreign weaponry through renewed trade at Shimonoseki.

The beginning of 1865 saw a general resurgence of conservatism throughout the country, except in Chôshû. Although that domain remained defiant, and the Bakufu's inability to enforce its punitive measures an ongoing concern, the reintroduction of *sankin-kôtai* and other archaic customs led the way for many domains to similarly attempt conservative reform and take measures to stamp out radical loyalism. This was reflected within Tosa on May 15, by Yoshida Tôyô's acolyte, Gotô Shôjirô, announcing the official decree ordering the loyalist leader Takechi Zuizan to commit suicide. Also in keeping with this conservative revival, the Tosa

⁹⁸ Beasley 1972, p.227. Takasugi Shinsaku's *kiheitai* was actually formed in the summer of 1863.

⁹⁹ Totman 1980, p. 133. Most of the great daimyô did not wish the expedition to go ahead, and the commander Yoshikatsu actually tried to refuse his appointment.

daimyô Toyonori was ordered to secure the defences of Ôsaka (under pressure to resolve the Chôshû issue the Shôgun had moved to Ôsaka on May 25 intending it to be a base for operations against the rebel domain) and maintain troops there in a supporting position for the second expedition against Chôshû that was officially sanctioned by the Court on Sept 19.

However, support for a second expedition was lukewarm, ominously so in Satsuma whose participation was essential for the success of the expedition in terms of military and material assistance. Preparations therefore moved slowly and moreover, during the course of August-September it rapidly became apparent, despite Chôshû's stalling tactics, that it had no intention of yielding to the Bakufu's orders.¹⁰⁰ Activity came to a temporary halt prior to the commencement of hostilities, due to the diversion provided by foreign demands for a resolution of the promise of either a cash indemnity, or the opening of more ports in compensation for Chôshû's attacks on foreign shipping in 1863. These issues were finally resolved in October, after foreign threats of invasion in Ôsaka and stubborn resistance by the Court to all requests for compromise had forced the Bakufu to yet again use the threat of a Shôgunal resignation as the tool to achieve imperial concessions to the foreigners demands.

The threat of foreign intervention averted for the time being, the focus returned to the Chôshû dilemma. Totman sums up the problem the Bakufu faced:

“Their purpose (the Bakufu leadership) - to present demands sufficiently harsh to prove Edo's supremacy but sufficiently lenient to be accepted peacefully by Chôshû - was impossible of realization given the Chôshû attitude.”¹⁰¹

Despite several compromises in the Bakufu's position, Chôshû remained obdurate. The issue ultimately reduced to the fact that Bakufu prestige could not be maintained without at least a token submission by Chôshû, and by May 1866 it was finally clear to the commander of the second expedition, Ogasawara Naomichi, that military force was the only option.

Yôdô, observing developments from Tosa, was deeply concerned by the procrastination with regard to Chôshû. He seems to have been in favour of a swift implementation of all the demands made on Chôshû by the Bakufu, including those made subsequent to Yoshikatsu's settlement of November-December 1864. In a letter to Matsudaira Shungaku, dated February 8, 1866, Yôdô expressed his worries in the following fashion:

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.* p. 156.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.* p. 171.

“With regard to the treatment of Chôshû, it seems that no reduction of their territory or any similiar retributory actions are to be implemented. Indeed it appears as if the Môri family is to be allowed to continue in their unrepentant attitude. The Bakufu is as a cloud in a high wind, and the *tozama* lords grow more and more impudent. I grieve for the the state of the country.”¹⁰²

Yôdô now despatched Gotô Shôjirô and Ogasawara Tadahachi, (as noted before, the followers of Yoshida Tôyô were steadily gaining a greater voice in domain affairs) to Kagoshima on February 15, 1866. Yôdô knew that Satsuma assistance in subduing Chôshû was the key to the success of the expedition and it was with the express purpose of ‘sounding out’ Shimazu Hisamitsu that he sent the two retainers to Kagoshima. They received an audience with Hisamitsu on the 23rd conveying Yôdô’s formal requests for assistance in improving the situation of the imperial institution and receiving Hisamitsu’s reply in kind. However, the Tosa mission swiftly discovered that within Satsuma, criticism of a Bakufu increasingly unable to manage the affairs of the country, was growing. This boded ill for prospects of Satsuma assistance in the Chôshû expedition and Yôdô’s May 20, letter to Shungaku written after the envoys’ return, warns of the consequences of a continuation of the current weak Bakufu policy:

“Even though Chôshû pride has bowed to Bakufu pressure on this occasion, I cannot help seeing the rise of a new Chôshû in the future.”¹⁰³

It is probable that Ogasawara and Gotô were privy to the councils of influential retainers such as Saigô Takamori and Ôkubo Toshimichi, and sensed the anti-Bakufu mood that was permeating all levels of the Satsuma organization. Yôdô’s interpretation was probably also determined by a Satsuma-influenced Court order to the Bakufu to cancel the Edo extradition orders for the Môri daimyô and heir, and nobles in exile in Chôshû, issued on March 2.

Except for the execution of three senior Chôshû officials, most of the conditions of the November-December agreement reached between Chôshû and Yoshikatsu after the first expedition, had not been carried out. Because of disunity within the Bakufu, and foreign pressure on it to open up more ports and cities, Chôshû was able to ignore demands for submission with relative impunity, especially with a highly organised Chôshû military growing ever more confident, morale high and a state of near-total mobilization swelling the ranks of the irregular units.

¹⁰² Hiraio 1961, p. 123.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.* p. 123.

The 1866 Second Punitive Expedition against Chôshû

The second Chôshû expedition was an unmitigated disaster for the Bakufu. Despite a distaste for the whole matter on the part of almost all of the daimyô, the Bakufu forces eventually attacked on three fronts at Aki (north of Iwakuni), Iwami (Japan sea coast north of Hagi) and Kokura (south of Shimonoseki).

In the space of a month from early June to mid-July 1866, Bakufu forces were roundly defeated on all fronts with Chôshû actually making large territorial gains in Iwami and Kyûshû. While this was occurring, Yôdô had been prevaricating to avoid the onerous task of serving in such an ill fated campaign. Ogasawara Nagamichi, chief of military operations on the Kyûshû front was an old friend of Yôdô's and he approached Yôdô in the months leading up to the outbreak of war asking for his help in logistic planning and probably hoping to solicit Tosa material support and approval for the venture. Yôdô declined his request, replying in Chinese classical verse as eloquently as ever:

“I have no appetite for notoriety, nor wish to demean myself by acting merely as a rouser for the warriors of Kyûshû.”¹⁰⁴

Tosa troops remained stationed in Ôsaka, but took no part in the fighting. The closest Yôdô and Tosa came to participation was this passive presence in Ôsaka and the lending of the steamship Shanghai to the fellow Shikoku domain of Matsuyama for troop transportation. Despite repeated calls for his assistance, Yôdô remained in Kôchi, despairing of the situation and unwilling to become embroiled in a conflict brought on largely by Bakufu ineptitude.¹⁰⁵

On July 20, 1866 the Shôgun Iemochi, nominal leader of the Chôshû expedition, died suddenly at his residence in Ôsaka. This was opportunistically seized upon by Tokugawa Yoshinobu, recently appointed *Kinri-shuei-sôtoku* (Grand Protector of the Imperial Territories) and acting as titular head of the Bakufu armies, as an avenue whereby the defeated Bakufu forces could be extracted from a hopeless position. Although conflict continued until the end of October the last significant actions ended on July 30, with the departure of Kumamoto troops from the Kokura theatre.¹⁰⁶ Most ominously, the June-July defeat of the *seitô-gun* (Bakufu

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.* p. 125.

¹⁰⁵ Beasley 1972, p. 256. The majority of the lords were reluctant to participate in punishing Chôshû because Katsu Kaishû's pro-domain faction had been eclipsed by Oguri Tadamasa's party which was advocating a harsher policy towards the lords. Thus assisting the Bakufu to suppress Chôshû appeared not to be in the domains' best interests.

¹⁰⁶ Totman 1980, p. 235.

punitive forces) meant that Bakufu jurisdiction west of Hiroshima was to all intents and purposes defunct. However the consequences of the Bakufu's drubbing went even deeper. Apart from demonstrating that the Bakufu was a 'paper tiger' the fundamental fact that for the first time in almost three centuries Japan lacked a strong, central leadership was now clearly visible. The uncertainty this vacuum provoked would contribute more and more to the policy of fence-sitting which came into being among the daimyô and was later to have profound consequences for Yôdô (and other leaders) when they attempted to involve the lords in great councils for discussion of state matters.

The Satsuma-Chôshû Alliance

Prior to and during the period of hostilities, a rapprochement between Satsuma, and Chôshû had been developing. Simply put, this was founded on the Satsuma realization that a total destruction of Chôshû would leave Satsuma at the mercy of the Tokugawa. Moreover, the first Chôshû expedition had shown that a diminution of Tokugawa prerogatives and power-sharing with the outer lords was not being seriously considered. Therefore during the first half of 1866 (largely through the efforts of Sakamoto Ryôma acting for Satsuma, and Nakaoka Shintarô acting for Chôshû), as a second expedition began to appear more and more likely, negotiations between the two domains were initiated. The exiled nobles, who had been sheltered by Chôshû and were now receiving Satsuma protection in Dazaifu in Fukuoka, were also important factors in bringing about the alliance. Formal cooperation finally came into being in an agreement signed between the two domains in February 1866. The main points of the accord were a Satsuma promise of moral and material support for Chôshû in the event of a fresh outbreak of hostilities, armed intervention by Satsuma should the Bakufu attempt to dislodge it from its position as guardian in Kyôto, and a general agreement to work together for an imperial restoration.¹⁰⁷

Around the same time a major change occurred in the politics of the courtier Iwakura Tomomi. Iwakura had been an outspoken exponent of *kôbu-gattai*, who had fallen into Court disfavour over his sponsorship of the plan to wed the imperial Princess Kazunomiya to the Shôgun Iemochi. However, with the emergence of Chôshû as victor in the summer of 1866 and the weaknesses of the Bakufu blatantly exposed, at this significant point he now abandoned *kôbu-gattai* for the new policy of *ôsei-fukko* (return to imperial rule), finding backers for his plans in the expanding Satsuma-Chôshû alliance. In late 1866 he tried to convince the Emperor to issue a rescript ordering the opening of a general daimyô council to discuss the central issues of the *ôsei-fukko* programme, and more importantly the

¹⁰⁷ Jansen 1971, p. 221.

possibility of an abolition of the Shōgunate. However, this was frustrated by the prior issuing of an imperial decree approving Tokugawa Yoshinobu's plans, similarly for a daimyō conference, but with a very different agenda.

The Last Shōgun

The formal appointment of Tokugawa Yoshinobu to the Shōgunal title on December 5, 1866 provides one of the great enigmas of the Bakumatsu period. Although under tremendous pressure to accept, evidence suggests that he strongly wished to decline the appointment.¹⁰⁸ The important question as to why Yoshinobu agreed to accept the position of Shōgun remains in itself a worthwhile topic for study. A sense of responsibility to the Tokugawa legacy and tradition, and the strength of opinion in his favour among advocates of a continuation of the Tokugawa hegemony may well have been strong motivators. However, these influences were counterbalanced by the man's innate urbanity and modern perspective that realized the logic of national unification under the imperial aegis, with the Tokugawa as merely the highest ranked clan in a new body politic.

With the temporary rebuff of the *ōsei-fukko* movement and the success of Yoshinobu's appeal to the Court, Yōdō was one of twenty four daimyō chosen to meet with Yoshinobu for consultation on various affairs of state. On September 15, 1866 an envoy from the Court arrived in Kōchi with an imperial directive to travel to the capital. At the same time, Yoshinobu also issued personal requests to Yōdō, Nabeshima of Hizen (Saga), Nagaoka of Higo (Kumamoto), and Shimazu Hisamitsu to come to Kyōto. What Yōdō's reactions to these requests were can be surmised by the contents of a letter he dispatched to Date Munenari explaining his actions:

"I have just received a messenger from *Ko-mon-ko* (Tokugawa Yoshinobu) who has written directly, asking me to come to Kyōto. This is another of many such directives which I fear I can no longer refuse. However, going to Kyōto is wearisome and not being able to offer a viewpoint on national affairs ensures that my presence will be meaningless. Furthermore, it would be unforgivable to again injure our lord's cherished reputation, so I intend to firstly send a messenger to Kyōto to closely observe the situation, allowing me to decide whether or not to go."¹⁰⁹

Although the letter outwardly portrays Yōdō's respect for Yoshinobu and his fears of sullyng the Shōgun-elect's reputation (probably referring to

¹⁰⁸ Shibusawa (1968, p 258) discusses Yoshinobu's belief in *ōsei-fukko* and stresses that from the outset, Yoshinobu wished to dissolve the Bakufu. He also suggests that Yoshinobu only accepted the position of Shōgun, because Hara Ichinoshin warned of the likelihood of disaster in the realm, if Yoshinobu refused.

¹⁰⁹ Hiraō 1961, p. 127.

Yôdô's fears of a repetition of his indecorous behaviour at Kyôto in early 1864), it is also a classic example of daimyô filibustering. Yôdô is indicating, regardless of the courtesies, that until the political situation had clarified to a far greater degree, he would be very reluctant to risk personal involvement or commit Tosa to a position in national affairs that might prove disadvantageous in the long term.

Yôdô also received a message from Shungaku at the same time similarly imploring his presence in Kyôto and proposing that Yoshinobu should seriously consider an abolition of the position of Shôgun. He also urged the cessation of hostilities with Chôshû and the convening of a daimyô conference to establish a political body that would govern in consultation with the Court.¹¹⁰ In the spirit of the above letter to Date Munenari, Yôdô consequently sent courteous replies to Shungaku, Yoshinobu and the Court, declining their invitations by pleading 'grave illness' (fast becoming the daimyô trademark for political fence-sitting) and giving the need for recuperation as a mitigating factor.

Even after the wholesale defeats in Aki and Iwami signalled the inability of the Bakufu to overpower Chôshû, Yoshinobu still entertained thoughts of continuing the struggle using the charisma of a new strong leadership to rekindle the flagging vassals' spirits.¹¹¹ However, the final debacle at Kokura eventually transformed a determination to punish into recognition of the impossibility of doing so. Despite his strong wish to deal firmly with the Chôshû rebels, under strong pressure from Shungaku, Yoshinobu now attempted to stabilize the political position by sending senior Bakufu official Katsu Kaishû on a peace mission to Chôshû and by calling the lords to Kyôto for a daimyô council. However, these moves by Yoshinobu towards gathering a consensus for government and approval for his political reform programme ended in complete failure.

Of the twenty-four leading domains whose presence Yoshinobu requested in Kyôto, almost all had either pleaded illness or disregarded the order (Yôdô's had been formally excused from coming to Kyôto in a Court directive issued on November 1), the few that did attend retired promptly on realizing the extent of the 'no-show'. The lords realized the futility of a renewed attack on Chôshû and wished no part in such an adventure. Furthermore, past daimyô councils called by the *kôbu-gattai* party had only ever resulted in political confusion. The defeat of the Bakufu demonstrated that they could adopt a position of non-participation with little fear of retribution, and consequently that was the position they took. With regard to overtures to the victorious Chôshû, that domain saw no need to surrender the lands it had taken or compromise on its calls for a

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 128.

¹¹¹ Totman 1980, p. 258.

restructuring of government, and negotiations ended in impasse. Yoshinobu was therefore forced to commence his political agenda, the *Keiō* reforms, without the approval of the great lords and with the problem of Chōshū remaining totally unsolved.

In November, Yōdō despatched two domain officials, *Sansei* (councillor) Fukuoka Kōtei and *Ōmetsuke* Gotō Shōjirō, as his emissaries to Kyōto, where they arrived on November 15. Unbeknown to Yōdō however, these men now proceeded to meet in secret with Satsuma *ōsei-fukko* proponents Komatsu Tatewaki, Saigō Takamori and Yoshii Kōsuke, as well as Tosa's Nakaoka Shintarō, and with them now began to discuss the possibility of a return of authority to the Emperor, and the political reconstruction of Japan on lines very different lines to the policy of *kōbu-gattai* which was rapidly becoming politically defunct.

Developments within Tosa

The last task of Chapter 2 will be to retrace our footsteps a little, to consider the rise to influence of the followers of Yoshida disciples. Led by Gotō Shōjirō, this group spearheaded developments within Tosa, that represented a continuation of the reform programme begun in the 1850's by Yoshida and Yōdō, and then in late 1867, proceeded to propel Tosa policies into national affairs at the very highest level.

The Yoshida reforms of the domain economy and administration had been originally begun with the aim of creating progressive government and a healthy exchequer from which to promote Tosa's interests. Borrowing and debt financing continued to be a feature of domain economic policy until well into the late 1850's (in 1858, the domain's deficit in silver for the year was approximately 1300 *kan*. 1 *kan* = 3.75kg); however, as the reforms put in place by Yoshida took effect, an economic revival began. The establishment of new industries such as the production of mushrooms, camphor, paper, sugar, soya beans, sake, and increased yields of rice, so transformed domain finances, that by 1861, a yearly net profit of 2200 *kan* was being reported. Timber, rape seed, and marine products such as whale fat and dried bonito - all these new ventures led to a surplus in the treasury. These new sources of finance enabled Yoshida's replacement Gotō Shōjirō, to purchase western armaments and begin building the fleet of steam ships that constituted the basis for the powerful interest that Tosa was beginning to have in naval and mercantile matters.¹¹²

¹¹² Hirotani 1994, pp. 174-180. Under the direction of Yōdō, a steam powered vessel was produced and sailed for the first time on August 18, 1855, in Uruga harbour, Kōchi.

The death of Takechi Zuizan and the exile of *shishi* throughout the realm, signalled the final failure of the Tosa *Kinnôtô*. In the aftermath of its demise and with Yôdô's approval, Yoshida protégés Gotô Shôjirô and Iwasaki Yatarô were now able to realise many of the radical monopolistic projects that had previously been too controversial at the emotive heights of *shishi* activism. Reflecting the rise in power of the *shin-okozegumi* group, just as Takechi's star was on the wane, so Gotô's was on the rise with promotions to *dai-kansatsu* (great inspector) in late 1863, and *sansei* in 1865.

The newly promoted Gotô was given ultimate responsibility for the management of the *Kaiseikan* (construction of which was begun in October 1865 despite a great deal of conservative opposition). The *Kaiseikan* was a facility intended to unify all the current and future industries that were to make up the basis of a modern Tosa economy. It was designed to foster western sciences such as medicine, naval studies and navigation, geology, and accounting. It was also intended to serve as a commercial centre for the importation of western technology (in particular modern weaponry). Development offices for forestry, whaling, engineering, finance, and industry, were established and staffed with specialists.¹¹³

Mombatsu opposition to the *Kaiseikan* was founded on the premise that the exorbitant cost of the building would not justify the returns and that it was wrong for members of the samurai class to become involved in commercial activity.¹¹⁴ Although the *Kaiseikan* symbolized Yôdô's intention to implement *fukoku-kyôhei* (wealthy country, strong army) in Tosa, as he was no longer the daimyô, he was to some extent obliged to justify his actions to the domain in general. Therefore, in support of the facility, Yôdô published a memorandum laying out his philosophy and justifications. The introduction of which is paraphrased as follows:

“We stand in the southern seas as vassals of the Emperor while the curious hover. On the perimeter of great changes currently sweeping the world, to safely tread in the path of our times, to acustom and reassure the populace, not to follow the ‘reasonable’ way of conservatism: this is the most promising position that we can take. And this approach is really the only avenue open to us. As publicly announced, for the purpose of a strong army and wealthy country the *Kaiseikan* will be constructed, not for the simple objective of optimizing financial gain but for the creation of a base for a wealthy nationhood and to achieve a strong military.”¹¹⁵

¹¹³ Hirao 1961, p. 134.

¹¹⁴ Jansen 1971, p. 247.

¹¹⁵ Hirao 1961, p. 132.

The memorandum finishes by emphasising the need to strengthen Tosa so as to be able to loyally sustain samurai values and the position of the Court and Emperor, thus cleverly playing the loyalist hand as a defense against criticism from the conservatives. Construction was eventually completed in February 1866, and in July, Gotô, Iwasaki Yatarô and Nakahama Manjirô¹¹⁶ set up the *Tosa Shôkai* (Tosa trading office) in Nagasaki. The Nagasaki office was opened in November 1866 under Iwasaki's management (a branch also being opened later in Ôsaka), and through these two offices Tosa was able to generate funds and purchase the steamships that in turn helped to increase the industrial and technological capacity of the domain.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, a simplification of the traditional domain military structures had occurred at the time of the Ansei reforms 1854-1858. However, despite the formation of the *mimpei-tai* citizen corps, the effectiveness of these citizen levies had been hindered by lack of adequate training and modern equipment. In 1864, a programme of training in western weaponry at the *Bunbukan* was announced and a specialist rifle unit was established the following year.¹¹⁷ Unlike military reform in Chôshû however, Tosa's innovations were not dictated by an urgent need for manpower and therefore, although training and technique were improved, controversial issues such as rank and social order were largely avoided. By organising units along traditional lines and merely attaching new names, it was possible to ensure that contact between men of different classes largely did not occur. In this fashion, *ashigaru* and *gôshi* forces were respectively formed into the *eishô-tai* and *shishô-tai* (units armed with rifles), while the upper samurai *umamawari*, *koshôgumi* and *rusuigumi* were separately remodelled as the *zenei-tai*, *chûei-tai*, and *goei-tai* rifle units.

Although lower samurai (and *mimpei-tai*) were clearly distinguished in this way from elite upper samurai units, and while peasant, merchant, and artisan classes were still largely excluded from military activities, the promotion of the lower samurai to rifle-bearing status appears to have been a large step forward in the progression within Tosa towards an army far less grounded in distinctions of caste and birth.¹¹⁸

Another important contemporary development for Tosa was the reconciliation in 1866 of Sakamoto Ryôma and Nakaoka Shintarô with the Tosa leadership. This eventually led to the amalgamation of Sakamoto's shipping company the *Kaien-tai* with the Tosa navy, and the creation of the *Rikuen-tai* (Kyôto based Tosa *shishi* unit) under Nakaoka in late 1867.

¹¹⁶ See page 15.

¹¹⁷ Hirao 1961, p. 142.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 144.

Both men had become influential in loyalist circles and after meetings in 1866 between Sakamoto and Gotô in Nagasaki, and Itagaki Taisuke and Nakaoka in Kyôto, Yôdô, persuaded of the future usefulness of the two exiles, issued full pardons for both of them. Sakamoto's knowledge of naval matters had grown through contact with the Bakufu naval expert Katsu Kaishû and via his experiences running his own shipping company. Thus at the very moment when Yôdô and Gotô were looking to expand Tosa naval capacity, the return of Sakamoto and Nakaoka was an unexpected windfall.

Summary

While the collapse of the Chôshû attempt to take control of Kyôto in 1864 had been a fatal blow to the loyalism of the *shishi* extremists, the non-productive record of repeated daimyô councils had equally demonstrated the unworkable nature of the alternative policy - *kôbu-gattai*. Moreover, with the failure of the latter, a despairing Satsuma had become amenable to the hitherto unthinkable prospect of an alliance with Chôshû, the fruits of which were an agreement to work together to bring about an imperial restoration. This was not yet a solid anti-Bakufu coalition, yet the possibility of such a development was inherent in the creation of the agreement.

Within Tosa, Yôdô and the Yoshida moderates were firmly back in control. However, far from enjoying the safer domestic political environment achieved by the overthrow of the loyalists and supported by improvements in the domain exchequer, the perilous political situation that prevailed in the country merely revealed the need for even greater efforts in the programme of improving the overall military potential of the domain.

Thus, by the beginning of 1867, it can be seen that several significant changes had occurred in the political situation. The all powerful Bakufu had been decisively trounced by a single domain, sending the message throughout Japan, that not only was it (the Bakufu) unable to defy foreign intrusions, but that it was demonstrably unable to punish domestic insubordination. Despite these setbacks, Yoshinobu, a new and energetic leader of the Tokugawa had emerged, quelling calls for an abolition of the Shôgunal position and pointing to the renewed possibility of a Bakufu revival.

Chapter 3. The Creation of the Tosa Proposal

This chapter will be chiefly concerned with the development throughout 1867 of the anti-Bakufu coalition, and the nature of Tosa's relationship with it. An important point of focus will be the circumstances surrounding the formulation of the *taisei-hôkan* proposal submitted by Yôdô and Gotô, together with the question of why Tosa persevered with the proposal in the face of the increasingly hardline approach to dealing with the Tokugawa displayed by the leading members of the anti-Bakufu coalition.

The chapter will also discuss the conflicts that occurred between pro- and anti-Bakufu factions following the Shôgun's resignation in October 1867, especially within the context of the imperial audiences where most of these struggles took place. These conflicts involved Yôdô closely, and resulted in a strategic and political failure for the Tokugawa, that was hugely consequential in the light of the military developments that occurred over New Year 1868. The chapter will conclude with the reverse suffered by the Bakufu forces at Toba-Fushimi, and an analysis of how this defeat came about and the part Tosa played in achieving it.

The Second Daimyô Meeting in Kyôto, May 1867

On February 16, 1867, Saigô Takamori arrived in Kôchi, presenting Yôdô with Satsuma proposals for a daimyô conference in Kyôto again involving the lords of Tosa, Satsuma, Uwajima, and Echizen. The business of the conference was to be imperial restitution; and Yôdô's consequent reply is an indication of just how far his position had now altered:

“Unlike the Shimazu, this house (the Tosa Yamanouchi family) has a special relationship with the Tokugawa. However, given the current political climate, we can no longer afford the luxury of clinging to this tradition. If the establishment of imperial rule is urgently necessary, then, we will extend our energy in cooperation.”¹¹⁹

A further order urging Yôdô's presence in Kyôto arrived from the Court on February 24, to which Yôdô replied that he would endeavour to arrive by mid March. His departure was delayed however, by arguments between the *mombatsu* (who were convinced that to comply with a Court order extracted by Satsuma was not to the advantage of Tosa), and the surviving Tosa loyalists (who hoped for strong support for imperial restoration in the Satsuma actions). After several postponements Yôdô finally departed on March 28.

¹¹⁹ Ibid. p. 152.

He arrived in Kyôto on May 1, the last of the four great lords to do so, and discussions began in earnest on the 6th. The lords met with *Kampaku* Nijô Nariaki at Nijô castle, and debate commenced with the issue of outstanding *gisô* (Court-Bakufu liaison councillor) appointments. As this process provided opportunity for the various factions to gain access to the Court and Emperor, the appointment of sympathetic counsellors was obviously a matter of prime concern for all parties. During the next few days three main factions emerged. Yôdô and Shungaku represented *kôbu-gattai* moderation, Shimazu and Date represented anti-Bakufu interests, and Yoshinobu and Bakufu retainers represented Edo-Tokugawa interests.

The eventual selection of Sanjô Sanenaru (Yôdô's and Shungaku's candidate) and the non-election of Bakufu and Satsuma candidates demonstrated the irreconcilability of the participants, and subsequent developments were characterized by an increasingly acrimonious atmosphere.¹²⁰ Divisions between Satsuma and the Shôgun were further revealed when the four lords met with Yoshinobu on May 14. The real Satsuma agenda to embarrass the Bakufu by denying imperial ratification for opening of the ports and cities was swiftly revealed as Shimazu insisted on pardons for the Môri and a rapprochement with Chôshû as the most pressing item on the political agenda. Knowing that agreeing to resolve the Chôshû problem first and delaying ratification of the international treaties would lead to a disastrous confrontation with the foreign powers, Yoshinobu vehemently resisted these demands.

Eventually, Matsudaira Shungaku proposed a compromise settlement whereby both issues would be tackled simultaneously. This was very much in Yoshinobu's favour; however, reinforced by Satsuma retainers Komatsu Tatewaki and Ôkubo Toshimichi, Date and Shimazu remained committed to their original demands for a resolution of the Chôshû problem prior to considering the issue of opening Hyôgo and other strategic venues. Despite this opposition, Yoshinobu seized Shungaku's proposal, using it to apply pressure on the Court, and on the evening of May 24 he finally received an imperial order approving the opening of Hyôgo.

Yoshinobu's actions provoked a swift reaction from the four lords. In a joint statement submitted to the Court on the 26th, they denounced Yoshinobu's actions as unilateral, non-consultative and an untrue representation of the result of their meetings.¹²¹ Moreover, the Bakufu

¹²⁰ Miyaji (1991, p. 109) suggests that the Court appointments were actually very favourable to the Satsuma *tôbaku* party as all appointees were actively anti-Bakufu. The courtier Sanjô (Saga) Sanenaru should not be confused with the loyalist Sanjô Sanetomi, at this time still officially banished in Kyûshû.

¹²¹ Jansen (1971, pp. 293) writes of Yôdô's resentment at Hisamitsu's "change of heart on the compromise solution" and goes on to describe the increasing incidence of disagreement between the two.

seems to have arbitrarily decided to disregard the agreement to extend magnanimity to Chôshû (ratified by the Court at the same time as the opening of Hyôgo). This action appears to have driven Hisamitsu firmly into the anti-Bakufu camp, and can only have further alienated Yôdô and Shungaku and eroded their faith in the reliability of the Shôgun.¹²²

Yôdô had once again experienced the familiar position of political impasse in Kyôto. In mid to late May he made formal application for permission to retire to Kôchi on grounds of ill health. The oral disease from which he suffered leaves us uncertain as to whether this was a reality or merely a pretext. However, the rapid withdrawal from Kyôto was probably motivated largely by despair at the disintegration of relations between Yoshinobu and Hisamitsu and by the knowledge that this was increasing the possibility of conflict between Satsuma and the Tokugawa. Furthermore, evidence of a hardening of the Satsuma position had also been reflected in a transformation that had been occurring within his own staff.

During the course of the preceding weeks Tosa officials had been meeting unofficially with Satsuma *tôbaku* ("destroy the Bakufu") activists, and Yôdô was now coming to realize the extent of this influence on his retainers, particularly the formerly steadfast Ogasawara Tadahachi. To curtail this trend, on May 9 Yôdô ordered Ogasawara back to Tosa. Shortly after he departed however, ex-Tosa *rônin* Itagaki Taisuke, arrived in Kyôto. Itagaki had formerly been one of Yôdô's retainers but, dissatisfied with the policy of *kôbu-gattai*, he had gone to Edo to participate in loyalist activity and study cavalry tactics. His purpose in returning to Kyôto on May 15 was probably largely to further the cause of the *tôbaku* movement.

Itagaki, Nakaoka and other Tosa men met with Komatsu, Saigô and Yoshii on May 21. The result was the creation of a secret bipartite pledge between the Tosa and Satsuma representatives to work together for the downfall of the Bakufu. In an interview with Yôdô on the following day, Itagaki attempted to convince the Tosa lord of the need to join the Satsuma-Chôshû alliance. Itagaki asserted that the fall of the Bakufu was imminent and that Tosa risked being left out of consequent power sharing unless it played a significant part in the overthrowing of the Bakufu.¹²³

¹²² Miyaji 1991, p. 108. Yoshinobu's success in persuading the Court to approve the opening of Hyôgo, actually weakened him internally as it committed him to a policy of lenience towards Chôshû. His subsequent inflexibility towards Chôshû offended the Court (which dismissed several of Yoshinobu's most trusted advisors), and justified Chôshû's mobilization at Nishinomiya later in the year.

¹²³ Hirao 1961, p. 163

Yôdô, still hoping that the *kôbu-gattai* policy might prevail, was probably unimpressed by such a belligerent stance. However, Gotô Shôjirô (who arrived in Kyôto on June 13) more fully recognized the danger to Tosa of an unequivocal commitment to the Bakufu. He also knew that the *tôbaku* faction's preparations for conflict were far more advanced than those of the Bakufu. For these reasons, in the Satsuma-Tosa meetings which followed, and in the June 26 tabling of a document outlining the pledge to be signed between the two domains, he played an active part. Fears of alienating Satsuma and Chôshû probably providing the rationale for his participating in this process without Yôdô's knowledge or permission.

The *kôgi-seitai-ron* proposal (for government reform) was constituted of seven clauses, the main thrust of which was for a return of political power to the Court; demotion of the Shôgun to ordinary daimyô status; and establishment of a representative political system. Gotô, mindful of Yôdô's position, had wished to discuss the details of the agreement with his lord, and to that end had obtained an undertaking from Satsuma that military action would not be undertaken until the possibility of Yôdô's approaching the Shôgun with a proposition to resign voluntarily had been explored.¹²⁴ Yôdô however, had already left Kyôto on May 29 after receiving imperial permission to return to Kôchi, and leaving instructions to his retainers in Kyôto to refrain from political fraternising. His departure inspired the following lines, attributed to the radicals in his camp who remained in Kyôto and continued the struggle while the 'fairweather' daimyô ran home, tail between his legs:

"In the bridge of the fifth ward that I saw last night, I observed in a circle, the tail of an oak."¹²⁵

The tail of the oak refers to the Yamanouchi family oak-leaf crest (which is of course in ignominious retreat) and the meter mocks Yôdô in his own poetic manner of delivery. It also supports suggestions of a contemporary consensus that Yôdô's familiar habit of retreating to Kôchi was one of the reasons for the failure of the conference. Moreover, this explicit criticism of a great lord (and Yôdô had been among the most respected of the daimyô) could perhaps be said to symbolize in verse a shift in the samurai perception of the hierarchy of loyalties; from traditionally strong obligations to daimyô and domain, to the concept of ultimate duty being owed to the Emperor.

Back in Kôchi, Yôdô was now faced with the problem of what to do with Itagaki Taisuke. Itagaki had been receiving direct requests from Chôshû and sympathetic loyalists to bring Tosa troops to Kyôto to support the

¹²⁴ Jansen 1971, p. 302.

¹²⁵ Takano 1994, p. 118.

violent overthrow of the Bakufu. Unwilling to leave him free to pursue this path, yet apprehensive of his following in the Tosa military, Yôdô decided to neutralise Itagaki by promoting him. Itagaki was consequently appointed *ômetsuke* on June 13, and *shioki-yaku* (assistant to the commissioners general) on July 24, in an attempt to employ him gainfully at the same time as keeping him under close surveillance. In August the despatching of a Bakufu mission to the United States seemed to serve as the ideal opportunity to be rid of this troublesome retainer, but Itagaki saw through the ruse to neutralize him politically and foiled it by resigning his appointments forthwith. Tension continued to increase between the pro-Itagaki military and the *mombatsu*; however, on October 10, Itagaki found himself appointed *daitai-shirei* (regimental commander), from which position he now proceeded to ensure that commands in the Tosa military increasingly went to loyalist samurai of his own anti-Bakufu persuasion.¹²⁶

Meanwhile in Kyôto, Gotô Shôjirô, having failed to meet with Yôdô, canvassed support with Shimazu Hisamitsu and Date Munenari for the preliminary draft of the *taisei-hôkan* proposal, and, having met with their approval, returned to Kôchi on July 8 with the objective of recruiting Yôdô to the task of presenting the petition to the Shôgun. Yôdô's reaction to the proposition was immediately favourable:

“The main focus of the *kôbu-gattai* policy is after all the unification of political power. With the Shôgunate in its current state, how could the Bakufu possibly refuse the appeal for return of political power. For this purpose I will definitely lend my cooperation.”¹²⁷

It was, as attested by Jansen, “the way to save the Tokugawa house, and it offered him a perfect way of reconciling his obligations to that house with his personal interest in averting a war in which Tosa would be torn between obligation and advantage.”¹²⁸ Yôdô's motives for approving the abdication proposal deserve closer attention. Firstly, the proposal allowed him to reconcile the conflicting dictates of clan loyalty and of political realism. Yamanouchi obligation to the Tokugawa had prevented Yôdô from participating in any moves that would threaten his suzerain's position. Hitherto, Yôdô's *kôbu-gattai* policies had all been characterized by calls for the inclusion of domains and Court in a Bakufu-led government; the Tosa proposals reversed this position yet still allowed the Tokugawa to retain their lands and prestige as well as an important voice in the new

¹²⁶ Shibusawa (1968, p. 41) suggests that prior to receiving the promotion to military chief in Tosa, Itagaki was planning to desert Tosa with as many as three hundred *shishi* who would travel to Kyôto to serve the Emperor. Shibusawa also suggests that this fact was unknown to the Tosa administration (probably including Yôdô) who would surely have reacted strongly had they been aware of it.

¹²⁷ Hirao 1961, p.173.

¹²⁸ Jansen 1971, p. 303.

imperial government. Moreover, were Yoshinobu to accept the proposal this would be greatly to Tosa's advantage as it would provide the domain with a justification for joining the winning side (the anti-Bakufu coalition) in the event of the outbreak of hostilities. Yôdô may have been conscious of his retainers' fears of alienating the powerful western domains, and the proposals constituted a fine balance of serving the demands of family honour at the same time as maintaining relations with the anti-Bakufu domains. Subsequently on July 13 Gotô, Teramura Sazen and Manabe Eisaburô, were selected by Yôdô to prepare the format of the document which would in turn then be submitted to the Shôgun.

At this stage, events took an unlikely turn. In Nagasaki two English sailors had been murdered, allegedly by persons from Tosa. Although this had not been comprehensively proven, the English Minister Harry Parkes despatched his interpreter Ernest Satow to Kôchi to impress upon Tosa the consequences of non-cooperation. Satow after discussion soon realized that the probability of Tosa involvement was minimal and proceeded to correct the bad impression created by his superior. The young English diplomat was favourably impressed by Yôdô and Gotô, and spent some time informing them of the make-up of the English constitution and electoral system. No records remain of the exact content of the conversation but that it influenced the thinking of the Tosa leadership is evidenced in the subsequently formulated Tosa *kôbu-gattai* proposals to establish an English style constitutional government, retaining the Shôgun as first minister, and thereby avoiding the disaster of a civil war.¹²⁹

The preparation of the Tosa document was delayed at least a month by the Nagasaki incident; but eventually, on August 20, Yôdô and Toyonori ordered all high ranked retainers to the Sandatei residence where the following pronouncement regarding the progress on the appeal was made:

“At this present time in this nation if narrow conservatism is continued then the realm will be in mortal jeopardy. In great consternation extraordinary decisions are being taken therefore, to expedite programmes of reform. The first and most imperative is that the political destiny of the country must become the prerogative of the Japanese Emperor. Relations with foreign countries should be administered according to the laws of all nations. Armies must be provisioned, schools established, and the able be promoted regardless of social status. The greatest purpose seems to be thus. On this occasion Gotô Shôjirô and Teramura Sazen have been appointed as envoys and will be despatched to deliver these proposals, to await favourable reaction and then facilitate the adoption of these measures.”¹³⁰

¹²⁹ Koike 1994, p.112.

¹³⁰ Hirao 1961, p.174.

The only reservations Yôdô now had were with regard to the demands being made by Satsuma, Chôshû and Itagaki for a Tosa military presence in Kyôto. Yôdô was suspicious of the loyalties of the troop commanders and loathe to lend support to the possibility of a military coercion of the Shôgun's resignation.¹³¹ Meanwhile in Kyôto, the Satsuma-Chôshû *buryoku-tôbaku* (forceful overthrow of the Bakufu) party was escalating its efforts to gain Court approval for armed insurgence against government forces.

Although Saigô had indicated that his party would refrain from military measures until possibilities for a peaceful settlement had been exhausted, resentment against the Bakufu continued to mount. The civil and military reforms initiated by Yoshinobu in late 1866 had attempted to lay the foundations for a conscript army and streamlined bureaucracy; however, these reforms had created resentment at inroads into samurai privilege, and a perception by those troops dismissed from service that the Bakufu was culpably yielding to foreign encroachments. These discontents came to a head in the murder of Shôgunal advisor Hara Ichinoshin on August 15. Capitalising on this event, *tôbaku* radicals increased their activities in the hope of further damaging the Bakufu's ability to maintain its position. Yôdô received urgent communication from counsellor Fukuoka Kôtei in Kyôto on August 21, warning him that the chances of a peaceful settlement were diminishing with each passing day.

After the amicable conclusion to the Nagasaki affair, Gotô was finally free to give all his attention to the matter of the presentation of the resignation-restoration appeal. He arrived in Kyôto on September 3, to find that the situation was swiftly moving towards conflict. *Buryoku-tôbaku* advocates, apprehensive at rumoured promises of French financial and military assistance to the Bakufu by Minister Leon Roches¹³² and incensed by Tosa's apparent procrastination and lack of military cooperation, were now preparing to act regardless of Tosa intentions. September 18-20 saw the signing of an agreement between Satsuma's Ôkubo Toshimichi and the Chôshû leadership for a joint mobilization at Sandashiri in Yamaguchi later that month, and this pact was strengthened by the subsequent promise of military and provisional aid from neighbouring Hiroshima.

Desperately wishing to revive the Tosa position, Gotô met immediately with Saigô and Hiroshima *karô* Tsuji Shôsô, and on October 1 he eventually received their reluctant agreement to cooperate with the appeal proposition. The following day, Gotô and Fukuoka visited senior Bakufu

¹³¹ Shibusawa 1968, p 42. Gotô and other senior advisors had requested two battalions be sent to Kyôto, probably as a token concession to Satsuma and Chôshû, and to Itagaki's demands for military participation.

¹³² Totman (1980, p. 332) gives details of French assistance.

councillor Itakura Katsukiyo and presented him with the eight-clause *taisei-hōkan* memorial signed by Yōdō and his senior officials. The main contents of the proposal were as follows:

1. Authority should be wielded by the Court through a council in Kyōto.
2. The council should be composed of an upper chamber of lords and a lower chamber of vassals.
3. Schools of learning and technology should be established.
4. Foreign relations should be conducted by imperial ministers in consultation with the domains.
5. An imperial and national army should be set up.
6. A reform of civil administration must be carried out.
7. Ancient and inappropriate customs must be phased out.
8. Ministers must work impartially for the common good.¹³³

A copy was also presented to the Court via *Kampaku* Nijō Nariaki the following day. After favourable reception from junior Bakufu councillor Nagai Naomune, notification was received on October 12, of the decision by the Bakufu-Shōgunal representatives (in Kyōto) to acquiesce to the proposal.

Yoshinobu's decision to resign seems to have been taken sometime around October 9. On the 13th, he ordered the representatives of forty domains to attend him at Nijō castle, where he circulated the resignation announcement. On the 14th, he applied to the Court to have his resignation approved, and subsequently on the 15th received notice of the Emperor's acceptance of his resignation.¹³⁴ The details of Yōdō's proposal were probably acceptable to Yoshinobu because an upper and lower chamber system provided an ideal formula for satisfying the demands of both the daimyō and their ambitious samurai retainers. Moreover, as stated earlier, Yōdō and Gotō had probably intimated to Yoshinobu that the position of first minister would be his in the political system that would be set up after the peaceful return of rule to the Court.¹³⁵ This would have also reassured Yoshinobu of a continued role for the Tokugawa in government, and a continuation of his family's prestige and power.

¹³³ Jansen 1971, pp.316-317.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.* p. 331.

¹³⁵ Hirao 1961, p.192. Gotō sent Tanaka Kōsuke and Nagaoka Kenkichi to discuss constitutional issues with Ernest Satow, on October 20. Subject to this information Gotō and Sakamoto Ryōma decided to recommend the position of *Naidaijin* to Yoshinobu, with Sanjō Sanetomi as *Kampaku*.

Yoshinobu and the Tosa Proposal

At this point it may be pertinent to consider Yoshinobu's reasons for agreeing to abdicate as Shôgun and what his personal interpretation of the *taisei-hôkan* proposal may have been.

As we have noted earlier, Yoshinobu, who had been a very reluctant Shôgun candidate, had seriously considered returning authority to the Court. In 1866-1867 his administration initiated civil and military reforms, discussion of governmental restructuring also occurring simultaneously. In the spring of 1866 Ôkubo Ichiô (an influential advisor to Yoshinobu) proposed to the Bakufu in Edo the introduction of a two-chamber representative body and electoral style of government. This was followed by similar propositions from Yokoi Shônân of Kumamoto and Akamatsu Shosaburô of Ueda.¹³⁶ This suggests that Yoshinobu and his liberal supporters were actively searching for a solution to the Bakufu's increasingly untenable position of being vilified for making concessions to the foreigners, accused of ignoring the wishes of the Court, and unable to discipline mutinous elements within the country.

Totman states that Yoshinobu's repeated refusals of the Shôgun title demonstrates that he had never really wanted to be Shôgun and explains his swift acceptance of the Tosa proposals. Totman also puts forward the absence of a strong pro-Bakufu party in Ôsaka at the time of Yoshinobu's decision to abdicate, the apparent lack of any clauses threatening the Tokugawa family, and prospects of improved relations with the Court, as prime motives for the resignation.¹³⁷ In his book *The Last Shôgun*, the writer Shiba Ryûtarô paints a convincing picture of a Yoshinobu deeply fatalistic concerning the Bakufu's chances of survival. Shiba suggests that Yoshinobu had seen that the anti-Bakufu movement was unstoppable, and that he was 'fearful to a fault' of giving offence to the Court and thus being declared an enemy.¹³⁸ He also presents a Yoshinobu awed by the sheer talent of Satsuma men such as Saigô and Ôkubo, suggesting that it was only his unwillingness to allow the confiscation of his family's territory which led to the outbreak of conflict in New Year 1868, although pressure on him to quell the western domains from hawks within the Shôgun party, and his inability to control this faction, were probably also contributory factors.

¹³⁶ Shibusawa 1968, pp 38-41 This is a very interesting passage as it documents the initial awakening among Japanese leaders of an awareness of western democratic political systems. Moreover, although the word *Taikun* was a colloquial reference to the Shôgun, in the context of this letter to Matsudaira Shungaku, it probably refers to a position similar to Prime Minister.

¹³⁷ Totman 1980, p. 383.

¹³⁸ Shiba 1987, pp. 206-207. Although Shiba's work is fiction, it is widely respected for the sound historical research and analysis on which it is based.

It is interesting to note however, that an alternative to the conventional explanation exists, suggesting that contrary to the suggestions of Totman Shiba, and others, Yoshinobu still intended to retain political power, even after the defeats at Toba-Fushimi.

Research presented by Akira Tanaka is based on the evidence of instructions given by Yoshinobu to his retainers Nishi Amane and Tsuda Mamichi, before and after the battles of New Year 1868, to prepare for the transformation of the Bakufu into a parliamentary system.¹³⁹ Tanaka contends that Yoshinobu intended to maintain Tokugawa political ascendancy by unifying Court, domains and Bakufu, under the imperial aegis; however, the Emperor was to be merely a figurehead, while Yoshinobu retained political power as *Taikun* (supreme secular ruler). Tanaka suggests that Yoshinobu envisaged himself as a sort of leader of the upper house in a British style parliament, retaining the power to dissolve the lower body at any time.¹⁴⁰ Tanaka also cites comments made by the Emperor Meiji in the latter part of his life, expressing feelings of guilt at his complicity in robbing the Shōgun of his historical birthright, as further evidence of an expectation on Yoshinobu's part that he would remain the political leader of Japan despite his abdication as Shōgun.¹⁴¹

According to Tanaka, in later years Yoshinobu concealed the actuality of his commitment to maintaining Tokugawa ascendancy. Describing the stance of denial that Yoshinobu adopted in the Meiji years, Tanaka writes as follows:

“In later years Yoshinobu denied possessing any political ambitions at the time of the Meiji revolution. It is more accurate however, to state that Yoshinobu's hopes (through the framework of *taisei-hōkan*) of realizing a unified government of the Tokugawa under his leadership, existed in direct proportion to the vehemence with which he later denied having any interest in political schemes.”¹⁴²

The secrecy¹⁴³ that surrounded Yoshinobu's (alleged) plans to head a future parliamentary government may be explained by the draconian nature of measures intended to severely restrict the influence of Emperor and Court. Tanaka alleges the existence of the *hai-tei-setsu* (plan to abolish the imperial system), a programme of reactionary and highly repressive

¹³⁹ Tanaka 1992, pp 72-88

¹⁴⁰ Tanaka 1975, p 337.

¹⁴¹ Tanaka 1992, pp. 72-88.

¹⁴² Tanaka 1975, pp.337-344.

¹⁴³ Miyaji 1991, p. 107. A confidential letter from Nakane Yukie (Matsudaira Shungaku's chief advisor) to Yoshinobu's retainer Hara Ichinoshin in late 1867, specifically mentions plans for a parliament and house of commons (parliament and commons are transliterated into Chinese characters) indicating a discussion of democratic institutions possibly occurring between Yoshinobu and Shungaku.

measures. In this proposal, the Emperor was to have a purely religious and ceremonial function and both Emperor and nobles were to be forbidden to leave Yamashiro (the territory surrounding the Kyôto basin traditionally denominated as the imperial domain¹⁴⁴) without first receiving specific permission.

Other features are described by Tanaka as follows. A national government was to be based in Ôsaka. Complementary to this, a legislative body composed of an upper and lower chamber would elect the candidates for the heads of the six various ministries that would constitute the government. The *Taikun*, as head of the upper chamber (comprised of all daimyô of 10,000 koku or more) would have the power to dissolve the lower chamber (comprised of one representative from each of the domains) with the special power of veto in both chambers, should final consensus not be reached. He would also select the six ministers from the candidates offered by the election process of the two chambers. In Edo, a separate government would manage the Tokugawa territories, and as stated previously, the Court was to be strictly policed and confined to the immediate Kyôto area.¹⁴⁵

Given the commitment of Shungaku and Yôdô to a rehabilitation of the imperial institution and their record of support for *ôsei-fukko*, it is not difficult to understand why they were not consulted concerning the contents of the programme. The harsh suppression of the Court would have constituted a massive affront to loyalists and the anti-Bakufu faction. The Bakufu itself stood to lose all power outside the actual Tokugawa territory, and the *fudai* houses would probably have strongly resisted the ideas incorporated into the *Taikun* system. Indeed, if Tanaka's theories are correct, the *Taikun* system represents a very flawed understanding of the contemporary political situation on the part of Yoshinobu and his advisors.

Whatever post-restoration ambitions Yoshinobu may or may not have actually had, his denials do not necessarily refute Tanaka's argument. In the pro-imperial atmosphere of Meiji Japan, had the full extent of Yoshinobu's political ambitions been divulged, he would have become vulnerable to treason charges inviting the possibility of extremely harsh retribution. This may be the reason why mention is never made of the proposed *Taikun* system in the official biography of Yoshinobu by Shibusawa Eiichi, who categorically denies the existence of any such contemporary political designs. Whatever the truth, Tanaka's theories are certainly worthy of

¹⁴⁴ Sometimes referred to as *Kinri-goryô*. The threat of imperial excursions outside this territory (such as occurred during the Yamato uprisings of 1863, and after Harry Parkes' travels so close to the sacred city in 1867) was a constant concern for the Bakufu and the Kyôto Bakufu position of *Kinri-shuei-sôtoku* was as much gaoler, as protector.

¹⁴⁵ Tanaka 1975, pp.338-40.

consideration and provide an interesting and thought provoking alternative to the traditional portrayals of the last Shôgun as either a compliant nonentity or some kind of introspective and defeatist intellectual.

Yoshinobu's resignation now engendered a slight disunion in the *tôbaku* camp between Ôkubo, Saigô and Chôshû advocates of force on the one hand, and the moderates in the Satsuma, Hiroshima camp on the other. Hiroshima's Tsuji Shosô felt that with Yoshinobu's resignation, *ôsei-fukko* aims had been achieved, while Satsuma's Komatsu Tatewaki is recorded as assuring Itakura that "although international and the larger affairs of state would become the responsibility of the imperial Court, all other official matters would for the time being remain as before."¹⁴⁶ As well as this, had Sakamoto Ryôma and Nakaoka Shintarô lived, the success of the Tosa proposal may have signalled the beginnings of fundamental differences in opinion between Sakamoto (who had supported Gotô's campaign for non-violent political change) and Nakaoka who believed that only the complete destruction of the Bakufu would allow the return of imperial rule.

By the end of August, Satsuma had fundamentally despaired of the Tosa resignation proposals and, in the face of Yôdô's refusal to countenance a Tosa troop contribution, had agreed to Chôshû's demands for a September mobilization in Kyôto. Gotô and Fukuoka had been aware of this danger for some time and had been urging Yôdô to expedite presentation of the petition as swiftly as possible.

The reality is, however, that the timing of the acceptance of the petition itself can be seen as very damaging to the Bakufu. Yoshinobu formally relinquished his mandate to rule at exactly the moment when the growth of the anti-Bakufu coalition had reached its peak. Satsuma had already mobilized and Chôshû had completed plans for a sizeable movement of troops into the Kansai. Had the abdication come before the fruition of the Satsuma-Chôshû alliance and before the influx of large numbers of *tôbaku* troops into Nishinomiya and Kyôto, then Yoshinobu might have had time to manipulate the Court in his favour and, more importantly, formally receive back the authority which he had surrendered in good faith. This in turn would have endorsed his position as the legitimate defender of the Court and provided greater motivation for Bakufu troops, if and when the time came to initiate military action.

Alternatively, had the abdication been delayed, then this might have resulted in premature action by an outlawed Chôshû and a Satsuma in rebellion against the Court's legal defender, the Bakufu. As it was, the abdication gave the Court the opportunity in December to capitulate to anti-Bakufu pressure and announce full pardons for the Môri daimyô and

¹⁴⁶ Hiraô 1961, p.189

his heir. More importantly, in early January with the violent clash between Bakufu and *tôbaku* forces, the Court gained the freedom to authorise the suppression of the Tokugawa family as being merely a clan in rebellion. Thus, assuming that Yoshinobu probably never intended any more than a token abdication of his powers, unfortunate timing of the abdication and a misjudgement of the political atmosphere can be seen to be crucial factors in the subsequent Tokugawa collapse.

The role of the courtier Iwakura Tomomi now becomes crucial in the unfolding of events after Yoshinobu's abdication. In September, despairing of the Bakufu and committed to an imperial restoration, Iwakura had been reconciled with Sanjô Sanetomi at Dazaifu in Kûyshû. Since then, although still in disgrace over his involvement in the Kazunomiya marriage, he had become a staunch advocate of the adoption of violent measures to topple the Bakufu.¹⁴⁷ On October 8, a secret agreement between Satsuma, Chôshû, Hiroshima and the Court was signed, with Iwakura playing a large part in the successful coordination of the various parties that made up the *buryoku-tôbaku* faction. Court pardons for the Chôshû lords Môri Takachika and Motonori were issued on October 13. More ominously, a secret accord was reached on October 14 between the Court and its new allies to cooperate in indicting the Bakufu for political negligence, and in the military overthrow of the Tokugawa regime.

In Tosa, on November 13, Gotô Shôjirô was promoted to *karô* with an increase in stipend from 150 to 1500 koku. This reflected the high esteem in which he was held by Yôdô and was a reward for his success with the *taisei-hôkan* proposal, as well as increasing his prestige at the negotiations in Kyôto. Gotô and Yôdô also pushed ahead with domain reforms that reflected the philosophy of the Tosa Proposal. On the 15th, Yôdô delivered an address to assembled retainers informing them of the future direction of the domain; the main points being: a commitment to reorganising domain administration along western style constitutional government lines, amnesty for members of the *Kinnô-tô* who remained in captivity, and an undertaking that restructuring of the military organisation would be initiated without delay.¹⁴⁸

In the current unsettled political environment, further military reform in particular was indeed an urgent consideration. The *tôbaku* sympathiser Itagaki Taisuke, whose loyalist following was now supreme in the Tosa forces, refused to release his hold on the military (even resigning his position as councillor on the 20th to ensure that his efforts could not be

¹⁴⁷ Shibusawa 1968, p 43. Shibusawa's notes on Iwakura tell us that his *tôbaku* conversion was quite late; effected only after a reconciliation with Sanjô Sanetomi. Until his April 1867 meeting with Nakaoka Shintarô, his reputation was that of a *daikan* (treacherous Bakufu supporter).

¹⁴⁸ Hirao 1961, p.195.

sidetracked by bureaucratic duties) and continued to make preparations for what he saw as the inevitable opening of hostilities against the Bakufu; his influence among the radicals in the military remained undiminished. However, *sabaku* (pro-Bakufu) opposition to reform was stiffening, together with resentment at the influence of Gotô and Itagaki.

The conservatives, known variously as the *renchigumi* or 'band of thirty', accused Gotô of acting disloyally towards the Bakufu and presented the domain office with petitions for the adoption of strong measures against him and Itagaki. Subsequently, in an attempt to quiet protest by arguing the soundness of the new measures, Yôdô and Toyonori addressed the conservatives in audiences on November 17 and 19. However, the respite gained was purely temporary, and a state of tension between radicals, moderates and conservatives continued in Tosa until well into the following year.

Throughout the country events were moving rapidly towards a conclusion. On November 15, Sakamoto Ryôma and Nakaoka Shintarô were murdered in their Kyôto lodgings. Allegedly committed by Bakufu *rônin* units, much mystery surrounds these murders as the guilty parties were never actually apprehended. Theories exist suggesting that they may have been killed because of Sakamoto's pro-Yoshinobu political position. The *taisei-hôkan* document was largely conceived by Sakamoto and allegedly included an important role for the Shôgun in the future government. If Sakamoto had come to be seen as an influential player on the side of the Shôgun, this may have provided a motive for the anti-Bakufu faction to want him dead.¹⁴⁹ Conjecture aside, blame for the murders seem to have been publicly attributed to the Bakufu patrol units and can have only fanned the fury of the *tôbaku* rank and file.

On November 23, 3,000 Satsuma troops arrived in Kyôto and by the 27th, Chôshû and Hiroshima had also assembled considerable forces at Nishinomiya, ready to go on the offensive at a moment's notice. Arriving back in Kyôto on the 21st, Gotô heard the rumours of war that were rife in the imperial capital and at once realized the impending danger of the military concentration. After meeting with Matsudaira Shungaku, and with the approval of the Bakufu's Nagai Naomune; he persuaded the lords of Hiroshima, Owari and Kumamoto, to create a proposal for a council of daimyô to gather to discuss the creation of a national assembly. Following this on November 28, he (Gotô), Fukuoka Kôtei and Kôyama Kunikiyo visited Saigô Takamori and received approval for their plans. However, it appears that Saigô was playing a double hand.

¹⁴⁹ Jansen (1971, p. 315) suggests that Sakamoto was considering Yoshinobu as first minister in a new regime and also that Sakamoto's proposed new government excluded the militant radicals.

Coup d'État and the Failure of the Tosa Proposal

By late November, the Tosa proposal can be seen to have failed in its primary objective of reconciling all parties in the cause of imperial restoration. Consultative government based on the daimyô council proposed by Gotô, Yôdô and Matsudaira Shungaku did not come about because, by the end of November, only sixteen of the 250 lords summoned to Kyôto had arrived. Daimyô scepticism brought about by a history of failed *kôbu-gattai* meetings and the patent inability of the Bakufu to chastise non-attenders had ensured that hopes for widespread participation in such a council had been doomed from the outset. Furthermore the widespread disinclination of domains to become involved in national affairs at such an unstable juncture, would have been strengthened by the increasing number of troops crowding into Kyôto.

While domain abstention played a large part in the failure of the Tosa proposal, the determination of the *tôbaku* party ensured that a peaceful outcome was never really going to be possible. Since mid- 1867 Saigô and his confederates had been committed to an overthrow of the Tokugawa, and denying Yoshinobu a position in a future regime was obviously essential to the success of this policy. The nature of the Tosa proposal was so obviously inclusive of the Shôgun that it confirmed their suspicions that, even after his abdication, very little would change politically. Thus while outwardly cooperating with Gotô, on December 1, Saigô, Ôkubo, Iwakura and Kido Kôin of Chôshû received secret Court approval of their plans for an *ôsei-fukko* coup d'état to replace the Tokugawa regime with an imperial government. Saigô and Ôkubo visited Gotô on December 2, to inform him of the coup d'état and the official Court ratification of their actions.

There now ensued a curious struggle between Gotô and the Satsuma-Chôshû alliance over the deadline for implementation of the radical measures that made up the contents of the coup d'état. These measure included: abolition of the Bakufu; dissolution of *gisô*, *densô*, *kampaku* and *sesshô* offices; and the creation of a representative body comprised of nobles and domain officials. Realizing that the proposed changes threatened the possibility of peacefully transforming the Bakufu, and still seeking to make the daimyô council a reality, Gotô, with the assistance of courtier Nakayama Tadayasu, managed to have the deadline extended to December 9. This would hopefully allow time for Yôdô to come to Kyôto and use his Court influence to counteract the activities of the *tôbaku* party.

Informed of the crisis, Yôdô hastened to Kyôto arriving on December 8. He was immediately visited by Fukuoka and Gotô who briefed him on events that would occur the following day. Yôdô promptly sent Fukuoka to Iwakura to entreat him to delay his activities. At the same time he sent

Kôyama to the imperial palace to warn Shungaku, while Yôdô himself travelled to Nijô castle for the purpose of alerting influential Bakufu official Nagai Naomune of the threat posed to the Tokugawa.

Despite Tosa's efforts, conditions continued to worsen for the Bakufu. On the morning of December 8, Iwakura privately assembled representatives of Satsuma, Owari, Echizen, Hiroshima and Tosa at his residence and gave secret instructions for the coup d'état. In the afternoon of the same day the Court formally reinstated numerous *tôbaku* personages previously banned from political presence in Kyôto. This included an exoneration of Iwakura and full pardons for Sanjô Sanetomi (and the other nobles exiled in Dazaifu) and the two Môri lords. Finally, on the morning of the 9th, joint forces from five domains took control of the essential entry and exit points into the imperial palace, displacing Bakufu and Aizu-Kuwana domain units.

The implications of Tosa retainers cooperating with Iwakura's commands are interesting in the wider perspective. Although Yôdô, the de-facto domain head, was exerting himself to maintain the survival of Yoshinobu, simultaneously Tosa forces were being used by the *tôbaku* party to expel Tokugawa forces from their posts at the imperial palace. This inconsistency demonstrates the strength of the Court-*tôbaku* alliance and increasing Bakufu impotency in the face of this unity. Moreover, once Iwakura's order to expel Bakufu forces from the palace had received imperial ratification then (regardless of personal loyalties to Yôdô and the Yamanouchi) any resistance on the part of Tosa retainers called on to participate in the coup, would be tantamount to rebellion against the imperial authority.

Accompanied by Gotô, Fukuoka, and Kôyama, Yôdô arrived for imperial audience at noon on same day; however, in what appears to have been an enormous misjudgement, as well as not attending the meeting on the previous day, Yoshinobu and his supporters also failed to make an appearance at this most crucial conference. Regardless of any debate as to whether Yoshinobu wished to retain his position as secular ruler of Japan, it is almost universally accepted that, as head of the Tokugawa family, Yoshinobu was committed to safeguarding the interests of his clan. It is therefore very difficult to understand why neither he nor his supporters attended this meeting, the agenda of which was rumoured to be extremely injurious to the prerogatives of the Tokugawa family.¹⁵⁰

¹⁵⁰ Totman (1980, p 399) criticises Yoshinobu sharply and suggests that by his inertia and naive wish for a non-violent resolution he effectively abdicated power from this point onwards. Yoshinobu's inaction is doubly perplexing when one considers the energy and intelligence with which he instigated the Keiô reforms of 1866-7.

The depth of Yoshinobu's lethargy is attested to by Satow who gives a description of his despondent appearance around this time.¹⁵¹ However, despite his alleged illness, the significance of this inactivity in allowing his influence at Court to be destroyed cannot be stressed enough. Furthermore, in complying with the order to demote Katamori, and banish Aizu, considering the historical importance of control of the gates into the imperial palace, he could be accused of ingenuousness.

Yôdô and Shungaku were still hoping to negotiate a favourable outcome for the Shôgunal party, but the events of December 9 forestalled this. Rising early, Iwakura gathered his supporters and received an imperial decree preventing the twenty most influential *kôbu-gattai* party nobles from approaching the Court. In this way, the pro-Bakufu party was effectively cut off from avenues of appeal to Emperor. Iwakura simultaneously tabled requests for the formal dismissal of the Shôgun, the Protector Matsudaira Katamori, and the Deputy Protector Matsudaira Sadaaki. He also urged the immediate promulgation of a new three-tier political hierarchy with appointments favourable to the *tôbaku* arranged as follows.

As *Sôsai* (Chief Minister), Prince Arisugawa-no-Miya-Taruhito. As *Gijô* (Senior Councillors), Prince Ninnaji-no-Miya-Sumihito and Prince Yamashina-no-Miya-Akira; Nakayama Tadayasu, Sanjô Sanenaru, Nakami Kadotsuneyuki, Tokugawa Yoshikatsu, Matsudaira Shungaku, Asano Shigekoto, Yamanouchi Yôdô and Shimazu Tadayoshi. *Sanyô* (Councillors) included Iwakura and other Court nobles as well as three representatives each from all the five main domains. Saigô, Ôkubo, Kido and Gotô were all appointed councillors of the realm, and thus realizing the first steps towards an oligarchy that embraced mid- and lower-samurai representation.¹⁵² Although he himself had been included as one of the great ministers in this proposed political system, Yôdô's concerns regarding the subsequent treatment of Yoshinobu and the Tokugawa remained unabated. On the same evening the Emperor held a further meeting announcing his approval of the day's business but the discussion soon condensed down to the issue of the ex-Shôgun. Yôdô, perceiving that proceedings were becoming increasingly vindictive, protested against suggestions that Yoshinobu's loyalty was suspect:

"Today's council is as usual marked by the exceedingly sly nature of the behaviour of the participants. At this initial moment in the process of returning the realm to the Emperor, the movement of military forces is too say the least, injudicious and increases the danger of civil war."¹⁵³

¹⁵¹ Satow 1968, p. 303.

¹⁵² Hiraô 1961, p.206.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.* p.209.

This was a disapproving swipe at a small group of nobles who were influencing the adolescent Emperor and usurping his powers for their own ambitions. Iwakura came back with a defence of the Emperor's powers of judgement and a vehement condemnation of Yôdô as showing impertinence in the imperial presence. He then proceeded to call for a confiscation of Tokugawa lands, accusing Yoshinobu of political incompetence and criminal irresponsibility. He also suggested that Yoshinobu's future chances of being appointed minister depended on the extent to which he reflected thoroughly on his failings, and upon a consequent display of 'good behaviour'.

Yôdô and Shungaku as the only pro-Tokugawa lords at the meeting, protested against these proclamations; however, threatened with violent assault by Saigô and Ôkubo, they finally capitulated. In this atmosphere of belligerence, compounded by Yoshinobu's absence, the council finally ended late in the evening with an imperial ratification of all Iwakura's proposals. This one evening had been a signal disaster for the Tokugawa and a great blow to the last efforts of the *kôbu-gattai* party.

Yôdô refrained from appearing at Court the following day, instead composing a memorandum condemning the actions that were taking place and calling again for the immediate creation of a representative council, and the cessation of clandestine persuasion of the Court by a few nobles and the militant western domains. This document, submitted on the 12th, was largely ignored. Preparations for physically ousting the Tokugawa were too far advanced and the *tôbaku* party were in too favourable a position now to heed calls for moderation.

Since the coup of the 9th, Tokugawa forces had been concentrated in Nijô Castle and, as the political situation continued to deteriorate, Bakufu and domain retainers alike were increasingly calling for an attack on the *tôbaku* forces. Moreover, when the decision of the Court to confiscate Tokugawa territory became known, Aizu and Kuwana troops in particular became outraged and it was only with great difficulty that Yoshinobu was able to prevent them from an all-out assault on Satsuma. On the night of the 12th Yoshinobu left Kyôto and travelled to Ôsaka, where his troops followed him the next day.¹⁵⁴

It is difficult to establish a clear picture of Yoshinobu's intentions at this time. He had allowed himself to be outmanoeuvred in the political sphere and yet his actions in retaining a strong military option (although he obeyed orders to repatriate Katamori and Sadaaki, Aizu and Kuwana troops only

¹⁵⁴ Shiba (1987, pp. 214- 215) presents Yoshinobu as using the subterfuge of a counter-attack from Ôsaka, as a means of getting Aizu and Kuwana troops out of Kyôto.

retreated to Ôsaka), remain inconsistent with this political complacency.¹⁵⁵

Events in December certainly developed extremely rapidly and Yoshinobu may not have been fully aware of the threat they posed to the Tokugawa. A rather naive belief in the integrity of the imperial institution (and possibly fear for his personal safety) may be the reason behind Yoshinobu's absence at Court at the time of the coup d'état. Moreover, he could not have anticipated the full animosity of the Court or appreciated the depth of the *tôbaku* influence on the young Emperor, expecting instead a cordial relationship similar to that which he had had with the Emperor Kômei.¹⁵⁶

At Court, the aftermath of the fateful meeting on December 9, saw a bitter division of opinion. Iwakura would only recognise Yoshinobu as *Zen-Naidaijin* (former, Lord keeper of the Privy Seal), demanding a reduction in Tokugawa territory and cancelling of the Shôgunal title. Yôdô and Matsudaira Shungaku opposed the unilateral confiscation of Tokugawa territory, calling instead for a contribution of land by all domains to the new imperial government.¹⁵⁷

Tokugawa Yoshikatsu and Matsudaira Shungaku, acting as intermediaries, commuted between Kyôto and Ôsaka with little result until December 26, when the new three-tier imperial council approved the *kôbu-gattai* compromise proposals, and December 28 when Yôdô and Shungaku were notified that Yoshinobu had also agreed to accept their compromise proposal.¹⁵⁸ However, just as the *kôbu-gattai* lords seemed on the verge of success, news of the burning of Edo Castle by Satsuma *rônin* and the retaliatory Bakufu attack on the Sanda Satsuma residence in Edo, reached Kyôto, and the Iwakura faction now profited greatly from this timely development. Their new condition that Yoshinobu first disperse his forces before travelling unaccompanied to Kyôto for further discussion, had the effect (probably as deliberately intended) of provoking the Bakufu into the position of aggressor. This deliberate intransigence, combined with the fury that the Satsuma assault on Edo Castle had aroused in Yoshinobu's troops, ensured that a violent conflict was now all but inevitable.

¹⁵⁵ Totman (1980, pp 402) suggests that *Rôju* Itakura Kunikiyo and Yoshinobu were merely retaining their military presence in absence of a concrete plan. Tanaka's *Taikun* theory may provide the answer to this conundrum.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.* p.412. Yoshinobu had been requested by the Court to continue his duties even after abdication and an indignant letter on Dec 17 indicates that he may have been unaware of the coup d'état plans.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.* p 407. Totman suggests that the land surrender scheme was created by Ôsaka Bakufu officials rather than Yôdô and Shungaku who later championed it as a workable proposition.

¹⁵⁸ Naramoto 1990, p.445. This would have meant an implementation of *ôsei-fukko* in name only, with Yoshinobu and the great daimyô retaining the balance of power.

Yôdô now submitted another memorandum attempting to find a peaceful solution to the whole matter, stressing that the repatriation of the Aizu and Kuwana forces was merely a side issue and that discussion should take place immediately, with Bakufu officials being invited to Kyôto.¹⁵⁹ These proposals were ignored, the Iwakura party stubbornly sticking to its position that until Aizu and Kuwana had withdrawn, Yoshinobu could only be regarded as acting contrary to the wishes of the Emperor.

Tôbaku preparations for military action, were pushed ahead even more energetically. Although Yôdô and Gotô tried to resist, Tosa troops were now ordered to duty in the *kangun* (imperial army) and the force of the imperial decree brooked no opposition. On December 20 Tosa forces were deployed in a defensive stance on the outskirts of Kyôto. The disregard for his wish to have no part in a military action against the Tokugawa must have been galling for Yôdô, who can have been under no illusion that the real objective of the Satsuma-Chôshû expansion eastwards from Kyôto towards the towns of Toba and Fushimi was to prevent the Bakufu from reasserting its influence at Court, and to provoke its ill-equipped troops into a military misadventure.

Yoshinobu appears to have finally surrendered to the hawks in his own camp in the last days of December, issuing a notice of punitive action against the recalcitrant Satsuma on the 1st (the orders of march were distributed on the 30th) and 8,500 Bakufu and allied forces (only a portion of his military strength¹⁶⁰) began moving towards Kyôto on January 3. At a meeting at the palace on the same day, with news of the Shôgun's advance causing great consternation, loyalist forces were directed to prevent this progress using whatever means should be required. Yôdô, who was attending this conference, is reported to have made the following comment in great agitation at what he must have seen as the irreversible final steps towards conflict:

“I cannot believe you intend to make this man an enemy of the Court! Even though I hold the heavy responsibility of this office of senior councillor, it is most unsatisfactory that I have received no information regarding these vital developments.”¹⁶¹

After this outburst Yôdô withdrew from the meeting, announcing his intention to resign as senior councillor. The damage had been done, however, and the *chôteki-hatsu* (proscription as an enemy of the Court) against Yoshinobu issued on January 3, coupled with the appointment of Princes of the Blood to positions in the loyalist forces, was subsequently

¹⁵⁹ Naramoto 1990, p.445.

¹⁶⁰ Totman 1980, pp. 418-420.

¹⁶¹ Hirao 1961, p.217.

used to enormous advantage in establishing the legal and moral status of the Satsuma-Chôshû troops as the Emperor's true defenders.¹⁶²

After departing the imperial audience on the 3rd, Yôdô returned to the Tosa residence where, at five o'clock on the same day, gunfire could be heard coming from the direction of Toba-Fushimi. All non-violent avenues of persuasion having failed by this stage, Yôdô resigned himself to the familiar role of awaiting the outcome of a chain of events outside of his control. He did however, issue a stern directive to his followers that the ensuing conflict was a private dispute between Satsuma-Chôshû and Aizu-Kuwana and that on no account were Tosa troops to become involved in the fighting.¹⁶³

Karô Fukuo Shigenobu conveyed the message to the 200-man Tosa force, stationed in Fushimi since receiving the deployment orders of the 28th of the previous month. The troops' reaction to these instructions (Tosa forces played a crucial role in the conflict on the 3rd, despite Yôdô's orders) are deserving of attention as they manifest a sea-change in samurai loyalties. Almost to a man, company commanders were followers of the loyalist Itagaki Taisuke and they promptly declared themselves loyal to the Emperor regardless of the position their lord had chosen to take. Yamanouchi wishes were thus ignored as Tosa troops proceeded to play a critical part in the day's fighting and proving Yôdô's concerns over maintaining a military presence in Kyôto to have been well-founded. From the Toba-Fushimi fight in January 1868, to the very close of the *Boshin Sensô* (War of Restoration), in May of the following year, Tosa loyalists commandeered the domain military machine, nullifying the wishes of both Yôdô and the Tosa conservatives for non-involvement.

Yoshinobu's Capitulation

The Bakufu appears to have been unprepared for the strength of the resistance by Satsuma and Chôshû; furthermore, the poor use of a numerical advantage and the slipshod nature of the advance raises questions about the competence of the military leadership. Moreover Bakufu financial insolvency had led to rumblings of dissatisfaction among troops who in some cases had not been paid for months. Despite improvements in organisation that had been occurring as a result of the Keiô reforms, frontline morale appears to have been extremely low among the Bakufu levies. This lack of confidence and skilled leadership ensured

¹⁶² Totman 1980, p. 424. Prince Ninaji-no-Miya Yoshiaki joined the fight at Toba on the 4th, signalling imperial recognition and approval of the *tôbaku* alliance.

¹⁶³ Hiraio 1961, p.217.

that over the course of the four days Jan 3-Jan 7, Bakufu forces were utterly defeated in their purpose of reaching Kyôto via Toba and Fushimi, instead being driven back in disarray to their headquarters in Ôsaka.¹⁶⁴

A predominantly military justification for Yoshinobu's ultimate surrender should not be adopted too swiftly. It can be argued that in conventional terms, military options were by no means exhausted after Toba-Fushimi. Aizu and Kuwana, although having suffered high casualties, were willing to continue the fight. Bakufu troops could perhaps have been reorganised and expanded. Losses had been heavy but sizeable forces remained available in the Kantô and (as demonstrated by resistance in the north-east later in the year) given positive leadership, counterattack still remained an option. Moreover Tokugawa-Bakufu armies had historically been slow starters and the possibility of further military aid from the French still existed.

The defeats of the New Year were certainly a factor in Yoshinobu's capitulation but emphasis must be laid upon the political mishap of the loss of control of the Court which culminated in the Iwakura-Satsuma coup d'état of early December. The reality was not simply a matter of the strength of the opposing forces. With the loss of the ex-Shôgun's legal mandate, the all-important political and moral initiative had been surrendered to the *tôbaku* forces and given Yoshinobu's tradition of deference to the Court, the implications of the original act of abdication are extremely significant.

The ex-Shôgun fled Ôsaka on the night of January 8, arriving back in Edo on the 12th. Regardless of whether he may initially have retained some hopes of resurrecting the political and military situation, in the face of imperial proscription, the decision to surrender unconditionally was soon reached. On January 17 via the Tosa domain agent in Edo Yoshinobu requested Yôdô to approach the Court on his behalf with a plea for reconciliation. However, Yôdô was no longer free to continue championing his Tokugawa liege. His request to resign as Senior Councillor had not only been refused, on January 8, Yôdô had formally sworn allegiance to the Emperor, being appointed *Naikoku-jimu-sôsai* (Minister of Internal Affairs) on the announcement of the new government on January 17.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁴ Totman 1980, p. 422. In a detailed analysis of the conflicts of January 1868 during which the comprehensive defeat of Bakufu forces was realized, Totman cites infantry battalions with unloaded rifles and vanguards of city patrol units armed only with pikes, as evidence of the Bakufu's unreadiness. Moreover he suggests that the Bakufu forces that fought at Toba-Fushimi represented a very minimal portion of the strength which a proper concentration could have achieved.

¹⁶⁵ Yoshimura 1991, p 51. On Jan 17, when Yôdô was appointed Minister of Internal affairs he attempted to decline due to ill health (and possibly to actively demonstrate his disapproval of *tôbaku* methods).

Tosa was simultaneously ordered to punish the Shikoku domains of Matsuyama and Takamatsu for assisting the Bakufu at the time of the New Year conflicts. Yôdô's tradition of continued loyalty to the Tokugawa, if unchecked, might have proven a dangerous example to other as yet non-aligned domains, but with the implementation of the foregoing measures it was irredeemably extinguished. Although Tosa did present Yoshinobu's appeal to the Court on the 25th (perhaps in a last display of sympathy for its former overlord) military superiority and the absence of any united Tokugawa resistance ensured that the Court could safely ignore the plight of the ex-Shôgun as the overthrow of the Bakufu entered its final stages.

Summary

The *kôbu-gattai* lords seem to have misread the determination of the *tôbaku* party and the depth of its influence within the imperial institution. Yôdô in particular underestimated the abilities of the *tôbaku* nobles,¹⁶⁶ and events proved that Iwakura and Sanjô with the backing of Saigô, Ôkubo and Kido, were more than mere political dabblers.

Unlike his *tôbaku* opponents, Yôdô's political style was to react to events rather than precipitate them. In 1863-1864 he had displayed great dexterity in avoiding the suspicions of the Tosa loyalist party even while he was preparing their downfall and the entrapment of their leader. The situation that prevailed at the end of 1867, however, was different. Yôdô's efforts on behalf of Yoshinobu were not fully supported by the Shôgunal party and, the struggle being at a national rather than domain level, the opposition he faced was of a much higher calibre. All important control of the Court called for decisive and unequivocal action, (as well as guile and lack of scruple) over the months of October, November and December 1867, and this was supplied not by Yôdô and *kôbu-gattai* but by Iwakura Tomomi, backed up by the uncompromising force of Saigô and his confederates.

Prior to 1867, Yôdô's policy had been directed at strengthening Tosa and achieving a greater degree of domainal participation in national politics. From 1865 onwards however, the deterioration of the Bakufu and rise of the *tôbaku* coalition engendered a shift in his policy to a position reflecting concern for the safety of his Tokugawa benefactors, and this policy applied to national affairs was manifested in the *taisei-hôkan* proposal.

¹⁶⁶ Shimamoto 1993, p.306. In later years Yôdô is recorded as giving a condescending description of a younger Iwakura "lending his residence to Kyôto gamblers to gain money for food and drink." This indicates a tendency to dismiss all Court officials as incompetent buffoons; prejudices displayed very early on by both Yôdô and Yoshida Tôyô.

The proposal failed to achieve Yôdô's objective of ensuring the continuity of the Tokugawa hegemony for several reasons. First, a successful implementation required the immediate cooperation of the domains in operating a form of consensus politics, and this was never forthcoming. Second, the Shôgun's decision to resign occurred at a very opportune moment for the faction working for the overthrow of the Tokugawa. Because of the abdication Yoshinobu's enemies who had already demonstrated the ability to defeat him militarily, now also gained the means to dispossess him legally. Third, the untimely demise of Emperor Kômei was extremely damaging to Yoshinobu. Pro-Bakufu nobles were denied access to the young Emperor and an imperial government exclusive of the Bakufu rule was simultaneously advocated. Kômei had been in favour of a continuation of the status quo, but Emperor Meiji, surrounded by nobles favouring the Satsuma-Chôshû sponsored coup d'état, was firmly under the influence of the *tôbaku* camp. Fourth, Bakufu insolvency (compounded by the failure to raise a large foreign loan that had been promised by the French Minister Leon Roches), was a significant factor, initially in bringing about Yoshinobu's acquiescence to the Tosa Proposal and subsequently in ensuring that financial resources needed to mount an effective resistance to the *tôbaku* alliance were lacking.

Lastly, Yoshinobu's personal qualities must be considered. His excessive respect for the Court, at a time when struggle for imperial influence was at a peak, weakened the pro-Bakufu position considerably. The unclear nature of his intentions after abdicating, and his lack of leadership in the period prior to the outbreak of hostilities, also illustrate a fatal weakness when compared with the determination displayed by his opponents.

Chapter 4. Abolition of the Domains and the Last Years

This chapter is initially concerned with Yôdô's relationship with the Meiji government and in particular considers his position with regard to the political activity which culminated in *hanseki-hôkan* (return of lands and people). Yôdô was conspicuous for the part he played in establishing the credentials of the new imperial government; however, as revolutionary legislation began the first steps in dismantling the feudal system, he found himself threatened (as a member of the anachronistic daimyô class) by the very process of governmental reform in which he had played such a prominent part.

The remainder of the chapter depicts the closing years of Yôdô's life, relates his descent into hedonism and attempts to attribute causes for his decline. The nature of his life in retirement, and his brief return to physical moderation, are covered in the last section, before closing with the sudden onset of severe illness and his consequent death in April, 1872 at the comparatively young age of 46.

The Implications of Bakufu Defeat for Yôdô and Tosa

The defeats of the New Year and the imperial proscription of Yoshinobu signalled that continued support of the Tokugawa would mean a similar fate for domains that remained loyal to the Bakufu. Until early January, Yôdô managed to adhere to the Tokugawa while simultaneously maintaining his status of respect at Court; however, his pledge of allegiance to the Emperor made formally at Court on January 8 ensured that a compromise position of dual loyalties was no longer possible. He was forced to choose between Bakufu and Emperor and, unlike the Tosa conservatives, was not willing to accept the consequences of continuing to support the Tokugawa in the face of proscription by the Court. Despite the Yamanouchi family obligation, Yôdô was not prepared to sacrifice his domain for its sake.¹⁶⁷

Yôdô's request to be permitted to resign as *gijô* made after the conflict began on January 3, requires some attention. He probably made the offer in protest against what he saw as an unlawful and violent agenda being pursued against Yoshinobu. By resigning he could palliate his feelings of having betrayed Yoshinobu, and if the resignation was accepted this would allow him to maintain his integrity and give him an opportunity to observe

¹⁶⁷ Yôdô probably realised also that a continued defence of the Shôgun would not be accepted by the Tosa military and could have had the effect of splitting the domain in a devastating civil war.

developments in the military and political situation. An imperial refusal of his resignation would morally validate his remaining closely involved in national affairs because it would be at the express wish of the Emperor.

The deep shame Yôdô felt at his inability to prevent the dispossession of the Shôgun is widely attested and argues against any notions that the resignation was a blackmailing attempt to resurrect Tosa's flagging position vis-a-vis Satsuma and Chôshû. Certainly Yôdô's continuation in high office following the downfall of the Bakufu illustrates a successful shift from Tokugawa vassal to *ôsei-fukko* proponent, but it does not reveal the extent of the personal injury he suffered in the course of achieving that transition.

Moreover, despite his personal anguish, Yôdô realized that Tosa's position was extremely vulnerable, and the need to protect the interests of his domain must have been an influential factor. His physical ailments were also serious, and sheer exhaustion may have prompted his resignation. However, regardless of his wishes in the wake of the Shôgun's fall, his appeal was not approved and he found himself required to continue as before.

As a member of the Hitotsubashi party, in the late 1850's Yôdô had experienced a severe political reverse at the hands of Ii Naosuke; however his part in that failure to determine the Shôgunal succession had been secondary to that of Tokugawa Nariaki and Shimazu Nariakira; moreover, he had been younger and in far better physical condition. His role in the developments of winter 1867-1868 being more significant, the consequences for Yôdô of this defeat were much greater. Recovery after the Ansei purges had been possible due to his lesser role, but the damage to honour and ambition that occurred as a result of his failure as senior *kôbugattai* spokesman in December of 1867 was deep and lasting.

The deterioration in Yôdô's physical condition, aggravated by his political reversals, seems to have been extremely severe. Surgeon William Willis of the English Legation, who attended the Tosa lord in April 1868, diagnosed lumbago, chest pains, inflammation of the gums and extreme fatigue exacerbated by alcoholism; all indicating a physical manifestation of the huge psychological stress he had been experiencing.¹⁶⁸ Ill-health, disillusion and bitterness seem to distinguish the post-restoration Yôdô from his earlier self, and the cumulative effects of his two political defeats combined with increasing illness, probably ensured the impossibility of his continuing as a leading political presence.

¹⁶⁸ Shimamoto 1993, p.303.

On February 3, the imperial campaign against Edo was announced with Prince Arisugawa-no-Miya Taruhito being appointed as titular commander. Tokugawa allies west of Edo were easily induced to submit in the absence of any sign of resistance by Yoshinobu. On April 4, after negotiations between Bakufu representative Katsu Kaishû and deputy commander of the imperial forces Saigô Takamori had resulted in agreed terms for the ex-Shôgun's complete capitulation and confinement in Mito, Edo Castle was surrendered to the imperial troops. After the failure of a minor uprising in Ueno near Tokyo, and the suppression of various pockets of resistance among the domains of the north-east, on July 22, the fall of the Aizu headquarters at Wakamatsu Castle signalled the end of hostilities in Honshû.¹⁶⁹

On February 15, while undergoing treatment in Kyôto by the English Doctor Willis, Yôdô received information that ten French marines, apparently engaged in navigational soundings, had been killed by Tosa troops patrolling the city of Sakai. International outcry over the killing of so many foreigners was immediately levelled at the domain leadership. On February 20 Yôdô accepted complete responsibility for the tragedy, submitting resignations from all his political posts. His offer to resign as *gijô* was again declined, although his resignation as *Naikoku-jimu-sôsai* was accepted. Subsequently, twenty Tosa men were sentenced to commit suicide (although ten received a last minute reprieve), Tosa being compelled to make formal apology and pay \$150,000 in compensation to the families of the deceased.

March 14 saw the presentation to the Emperor of the Charter Oath, a somewhat vague document that was intended to be the ideological basis for subsequent developments in representative government. Drawn up by Tosa's Fukuoka Kôtei, Echizen's Yuri Kimimasa and Chôshû's Kido Kôin, the charter must have been for Yôdô a bitterly ironical realization of *kôbu-gattai*. Although it signalled the beginnings of power-sharing between daimyô, Court and lower samurai, it also excluded the now defunct Shôgun, and formalised the achievements of *tôbaku* faction which now ruled Japan as the imperial government.

On April 8, the *seitaisho* decree replaced the previous three tier (*sôsai*, *gijô*, *sanyô*) eight bureau government, with a system divided into the *Gyôseikan* executive branch, and the legislative branch, which came to be known as the *Dajôkan*. The legislative body was composed of an upper

¹⁶⁹ Naramoto 1990, p. 488. Elements of the army and navy fled to Hakodate in Hokkaido, temporarily establishing a separate government under Enomoto Takeaki (formerly deputy commander of the Bakufu navy), but this ended in unconditional surrender in May 1869. The initial impetus for this continued resistance appears to have been anger at the paucity of the estate (700,000 koku) awarded to Tayasu Kamenosuke, the Court nominated successor to Yoshinobu as head of the Tokugawa family.

and lower chamber, and the executive body supervised the country's affairs through the offices of five new national departments. Yôdô, originally earmarked as *Keihôkan-Chiji* (Minister of Criminal Justice) was passed over due to the Sakai affair and his convalescent state, the post going instead to the courtier Ôhara Shigetomi.

On April 14, after being advised by Dr. Willis to take a change of air, Yôdô left the cold of Kyôto to continue his recuperation in Ôsaka. Yôdô's long-standing request to resign as senior councillor was accepted on May 25, and for the first time in many years he found himself totally free of the burdens of national office. Written around this time, the following poem to Matsudaira Shungaku is rather dark and hints at Yôdô's need for spiritual as well as physical convalescence.

A wild crane, I enter Miyako castle
 In that older place emotions stir
 My soul has solace, free of burden
 Eastern peaks coloured eyebrow black
 Wrens cry to the click of prayerballs
 Conversing at the tombs of old friends
 Fame's quest forbidden, I am humble now ¹⁷⁰

Despite having finally separated himself from the burdens of public office, and for all the poem's fatalistic sentiments, Yôdô probably knew that his chances of remaining inactive were minimal. At such a time of national unrest, retirement from public life was not an option open to influential lords like himself, and consequently he returned to Kyôto on May 27, quickly becoming involved again in both national and domain politics.

Suppression of the Tosa Conservatives

In spite of his ill health during the first four months of 1868, Yôdô and his retainers were aware that in Tosa, the *mombatsu's* criticism of domain policy and conservative distaste for participation in military actions against the Bakufu, had been increasing.¹⁷¹ The improvement in Yôdô's health which occurred in late May now coincided with the publication in Tosa on May 24 of the following pronouncement:

¹⁷⁰ Hirao 1961, p.228.

¹⁷¹ Jansen 1971, p. 121. On January 13, Yamanouchi Toyofuku, an influential member of a branch house of the Yamanouchi family committed suicide in protest at the supine role played by the Tosa Yamanouchi in the overthrow of the Tokugawa. Yamanouchi branch houses tended to be conservative and there is a possibility that plans to support the Tokugawa existed between Toyofuku and the Tosa *mombatsu* headed by conservative Koyagi Gohei.

“Cherishing the old regime above all else demonstrates an inability to break with outdated notions of obligation. This equates to a desire to rule the realm and contravenes the wish of Yoshinobu who made one error of judgement at Fushimi. The recent mobilization of troops is in faithful obedience to the imperial command, and it is our duty to suppress the Emperor’s opponents and ensure his safety and security. This duty will allow no recourse to discussion. Treading the path of the great matters of today and serving the needs of the Emperor we do not have the time to slowly accustom ourselves to these changes. Protests against this policy by mistaken individuals will be dealt with should the occasion arise.”¹⁷²

This memorandum (probably issued under instruction from Yôdô in Kyôto) was a stern warning to pro-Bakufu elements. Tosa was now fully committed to the imperial cause and any future support for the Tokugawa would be severely punished. This represented a major about-face in Yôdô’s policy; in January, Tosa troops had been forbidden to take part in the hostilities against the Bakufu forces. Nonaka Tauchi, commander of the *kochô-tai* (an elite samurai military unit) protested to Yôdô that the order was a cynical expedient that sacrificed domain honour, and that Tosa should not defer to the whims of Satsuma and Chôshû. But Yôdô was now inextricably tied to the imperial cause. On May 27 Nonaka was ordered to commit suicide for refusing to lead his troops against the Tokugawa, and the head of the dissenting conservatives, Koyagi Gohei, and his followers were also punished with varying degrees of severity.¹⁷³

Concurrently with the suppression of the Tosa conservatives, Yôdô’s career in national politics now recommenced. Summoned to Court on June 3 he was presented with an imperial gift cup, promoted to second rank, with the title of *gon-chûnagon*, and restored to his former position as *gijô*. Then on December 21 he was further honoured with an imperial endowment and the Tayasu (Hakozaki) Palace in Edo, as reward for services rendered during the restoration.¹⁷⁴

By now the Emperor’s new position as titular head of the country was becoming increasingly secure, eventually enabling him to announce a formal progress to Edo, which was renamed Tôkyô (eastern imperial city) and declared the new capital on July 17, 1868. He arrived there on October 13, returning to Kyôto for the last time in December before finally establishing his permanent household in Tôkyô on March 28, 1869.

¹⁷² Hirao 1961, p.223.

¹⁷³ Shimamoto 1993, p.298.

¹⁷⁴ Yôdô proceeded to distribute one fifth of the monetary endowment to the needy of the district, and when he finally moved into the Tayasu palace, with typical largesse he opened his new residence for three days’ free food and drink to comers of all classes.

Yôdô and the Meiji Government

Yôdô, who left Kyôto for Tôkyô on September 23 (having been directed there to assist with preparations for the imperial progress) was subsequently the subject of a series of bureaucratic appointments. Before departing for Tôkyô, on September 19 he had been appointed *Gijitai-Saishuchôsho-Sôsai* (Minister of Statutory Agendas), and thereafter appointments followed in rapid succession: December 13, *Gakkô-Chiji* (Minister of Education); April 17, 1869, *Seidoryô-Sôsai* (Minister of Government Systems). On April 20 and May 7 respectively he resigned as *Gakkô-Chiji* and *Seidoryô-Sôsai*. On May 7, he was appointed *Jôkyokugichô* (President of the Upper Chamber) and on the 17th he was reappointed *Gakkô-Chiji*. On July 9, he resigned as *Gakkô-Chiji* for the second time.

The above series of appointments and re-appointments are significant for several reasons. The new regime needed to achieve legitimacy as a government. If Yôdô and other leading daimyô could be persuaded to accept important positions in the bureaucracy, their participation would amount to a tacit recognition of the government by the great domains. Despite the Shôgun's voluntary resignation, and the defeat of pro-Tokugawa elements in Honshû, resistance in Hokkaidô was continuing, and for the time being, the possibility of a counter-revolution (led by Tokugawa conservatives fearful of threats to the existing social order) was a very real concern to the new government. Thus the example of great daimyô working with the new regime would be a powerful dissuader for domains considering renewing support for the Tokugawa. Daimyô participation in government was initially vital for the new regime in achieving a popular consensus among the domains. This consensus would then allow the government time to consolidate and proceed with the dismantling of antiquated political institutions.

However, Yôdô's appointments were not only a reflection of this desire of the government to secure the participation and support of the leading daimyô.¹⁷⁵ They also represent the value placed on his experience and abilities. Yôdô's excellence as a reformer, in particular with regard to education, was well known. In Tosa he had reformed the domain school for samurai as well as establishing a centre of learning where talented commoners were able to study. In the field of economic and governmental reform his organisational ability was also well proven, having transformed Tosa's finances from a situation of fiscal deficit into efficient profitability.

¹⁷⁵ Hirao 1961, p.233. Yôdô was well aware of and accepted as a sign of the changing times, the steady increase in the number of men of ability possessing knowledge of the West, in positions of influence, at the expense of daimyô, courtiers and upper-samurai domain retainers.

However, the brief duration of all his political appointments suggest that Yôdô the independent and autocratic feudal lord may not have made a very good bureaucrat. The vast amount of work involved in restructuring the imperial state required dedicated individuals who were both familiar with western institutions and compliant with the edicts of the Meiji leaders. To Yôdô, the implications of serving as an official may have been not only incompatible with his position as a great lord, but considering his poor state of health, he may have also been physically incapable of functioning in such a disciplined and arduous atmosphere.

The Return of Lands and People

After the fall of the Shôgunate, the closing years of Yôdô's life were distinguished by the dismantling of the feudal system. It may now be timely to consider his association with the movement to abolish the domainal system and with the individuals who were instrumental in carrying it out.

It seems unlikely that Yôdô held a strong view on reform of the domains; however, in the *Saga Sanenaru Nikki* (the diary of Sanjô Sanenaru) the sentence, "Yôdô daimyô wo yamuru ron ari," suggests that Yôdô approved the plan to return lands and people to the Emperor.¹⁷⁶ There is no reason to believe that this is not a faithful record of his position, which supports the notion that Yôdô was in favour of some kind of a restructuring of the daimyô-domain system.

The *hanseki-hôkan* (surrender of daimyô registers of lands and people to the Emperor) proposal fundamentally stated that government by the Bakufu had been negligent and that the lands and people formerly administered by the daimyô were being returned to the Emperor, for him to "give back what should be given back, and take away what should be taken away."¹⁷⁷ The concept came about because reformers such as Chôshû's Kido Kôin (and Itô Hirobumi who had observed modern political systems at work first-hand in Europe) had come to believe that the existence of semi-independent feudal territories was incompatible with the establishment of a strong imperial nation. The *hōken-seido* (feudal system) which had failed to sustain the policy of isolation was also now being attacked by loyalist Confucians as a form of government that departed from imperial traditions that had existed prior to the advent of Shôgunal rule. Thus in early 1867, Iwakura was looking back to the ancient province system when he called for a reunification of the country under the imperial banner.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.* pp.231.

¹⁷⁷ Naramoto 1990, p. 496.

¹⁷⁸ Beasley 1972, p.304.

Although it appears to have initially aroused the displeasure of Shimazu Hisamitsu and Date Munenari, consent for the submission of the *hanseki-hôkan* proposal was swiftly obtained from their respective lords by Kido, Ôkubo Toshimichi, Ôkuma Shigenobu of Hizen (Saga) and Gotô and Itagaki of Tosa. Subsequently, the memorandum was presented at Court in the name of the four domains, receiving imperial approval on January 20, 1869.

All nobles were re-classified as *kazoku* (aristocracy) with the various samurai orders simplified as *shizoku* and *sotsu* (upper and lower military classes). The daimyô were dismissed and re-appointed as domain governors, retaining one tenth of their previous income and receiving the title of domain ruler. However, real power was now to be wielded by officials approved by the central government. Facilitating this, all domain government positions from *daisanji* (senior councillor) and *shôsanzji* (junior councillor) down, were standardised to the bureaucratic system of the central government. Later in the year regulations were also promulgated reducing samurai stipends and severely restricting the size of the forces that domains were allowed to maintain.

The ease with which this was accomplished was probably due to the ambiguous nature of the memorandum itself, which may have encouraged the daimyô to believe that restructuring did not constitute a threat and that the future was 'business as usual,' albeit with a shift in allegiance from the Bakufu to the imperial government. On the other hand, the four daimyô signatories were not typical of their class. Politically astute, they would have been conscious of their retainers' control of the imperial mandate, and observing deep changes in the traditional modus-operandi probably knew (or had been made aware) that the only way they could protect their prerogatives was by making immediate concessions.

This is probably a fair representation of Yôdô's position. Of all the great daimyô, after the Tokugawa defeat in the New Year none seems to have been so profoundly altered in his political viewpoint as Yôdô. His sponsorship of *hanseki-hôkan* reflects the recognition that fundamental reforms in land administration were vital to ensure a smooth reconstitution of the imperial order, and this is completely in keeping with his new position as a dedicated imperialist. Furthermore, Yôdô and his retainers probably participated in *hanseki-hôkan* in order to limit a monopoly of power by Chôshû and Satsuma and to pursue the old *kôbu-gattai* vision of consultative government. Also, while he may have possessed fears for the status quo, the indeterminate nature of the memorandum ensured that Yôdô could not know for certain that acquiescing in *hanseki-hôkan* would lead to a destruction of the existing order.

Finally, the fact that Yôdô's position as prime authority in Tosa had begun to diminish (as Itagaki Taisuke's prestige increased), also suggests that even had he wished to (and there is no evidence to suggest that he did), Yôdô's ability to resist the implementation of *hanseki-hôkan* was probably very limited. In addition, physical exhaustion brought on by alcoholism and illness, and the depression caused by political defeat, make his acquiescence even more understandable.

There seems to be no evidence to suggest that *hanseki-hôkan* was a goal that had been long cherished by imperial restorationists. It was a development that could only have come about in the aftermath of an imperial restoration; and not only had this been impossible prior to 1868, but the kind of social-revolutionary foresight that it would imply was only just beginning to emerge in 1869.¹⁷⁹ Indeed it was the foreign emergency exposing the weakness of feudalism that ushered social change in through the back door in Japan; not some philanthropic campaign by reformers. Most of the Meiji politicians were innately conservative and any concessions made in the direction of equalizing the human condition were probably just by-products of the ultimate objective of building an economically and militarily stronger nation.¹⁸⁰

Yôdô's relations with the individuals who now held power in the name of the imperial government varied greatly. The coup d'état of December 1867 and the subsequent events of the New Year, ensured Yôdô's lasting resentment of Iwakura (and Sanjô), with little evidence to suggest that Yôdô ever warmed to Satsuma's Ôkubo Toshimichi (whom he probably saw as Iwakura's ally and just as deeply implicated in the events that led to the overthrow of the Tokugawa). However, despite Saigô Takamori's part in the coup, it appears that Yôdô maintained contact with him, and the Tosa lord's subsequent disapproval of the *Danjôdai* (Board of Censors) appears to have met with approval from the traditionalist Saigô.¹⁸¹

Yôdô maintained a friendly relationship with Kido Kôin although due to differences in their politics and social status they did not meet until Kido was formally invited to the Tosa residence in Nishibori on April 2, 1868.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁹ Jansen 1986, p.3. Kido is reported in later years as declaring his ignorance of the political possibilities inherent in the Charter Oath.

¹⁸⁰ Kido 1983, pp.20,193. Kido's diaries indicate that *hanseki-hôkan* was still only a concept as late as September 9, 1868 and that it was implemented, not from any intrinsic distaste for the existing order, but to ensure a stable political base against the threat of colonial expansion and the possible emergence of a new Shôgun candidate.

¹⁸¹ After Yôdô's death, Saigô is recorded as expressing that "Yôdô's opposition to the *Danjôdai* and its puritanical intrusions was both correct and enlightened in retrospect."

¹⁸² Kido 1983, pp.20,193. If this is true it is exceptional as both Kido and Yôdô were at Court throughout Nov-Dec and must have been aware of their mutual importance in their respective factions. There are

Gotô, who also had a significant post in the new regime, had always been Yôdô's favourite, and his influence in persuading Yôdô to cooperate with the Meiji government cannot have been insignificant. With regard to the other leading Tosa man, Itagaki Taisuke, it appears that Yôdô failed to recognize the strong force in contemporary politics that he had become, seeing only the dutiful retainer of earlier days. Nethertheless, despite Yôdô's decline and his own personal advancement, Itagaki maintained his respect and admiration for the ex-daimyô's immense political contribution.

In summation, Yôdô appears to have approved of the government's assertion that the Emperor possessed the right to determine the fate of the daimyô and the people and territories which they administered. He may have seen that the memorandum was the first step towards the abolition of the domains and he may have supported that ultimate goal, but it should not be forgotten that *hanseki-hôkan* was initially a daimyô gesture of cooperation with the Court, not a renunciation of their rights. In 1869 the central government was still not secure enough to threaten the daimyô-governors' rights of hereditary succession nor did it yet have the force necessary to compel the daimyô to surrender their domains in totality. Thus the threat to the traditional order - which in retrospect seems obvious - may not have been noticed at that time.

Yôdô and the *Danjôdai*

Since Yôdô had supported most of the new regime's political innovations, his protests against the internal election of senior officials, and the establishment of the *Danjôdai* in May 1869 requires some scrutiny.

Despite its infancy the new government was burdened with excessive officialdom. To improve efficiency, and to demonstrate Japan's increasing political maturity, an election of public officials (perhaps modelled on the American senate system) was proposed by Ôkubo, Iwakura and their colleagues who then successfully petitioned the Court for permission to conduct such a process. Consequently, on May 13 the top administrative positions were cut in number to ten; four courtiers, five samurai representatives, and one daimyô being elected to the highest executive. On the following day all positions from the third rank up including ministers and vice-ministers were decided by confidential ballot.

consequently, regular entries in the diaries anecdoting the cordial relationship between Kido, Saigô and Yôdô. On occasions there is also evidence of disagreement; however, this seems to be the exception, and Kido and Yôdô in particular seem to have met regularly on social occasions and spent a lot of time drinking and writing verse together.

As well as Itagaki's and Gotô's promotion to *sanyô*, Yôdô's re-appointment to *Gakkô-Chiji* was one result of this election, but it received a most unfavourable reception from the Tosa lord. Yôdô believed that the appointing of officials to serve in the government was the imperial prerogative and that public elections usurped that right. This viewpoint is of course entirely consistent with his public position as member of the daimyô class and his personal respect for the imperial institution, (just as improvement of public governance was consistent with the reform activities of the Meiji oligarchy).

The *Danjôdai* was established to police the behaviour of top governmental officials and ensure obedience to the directives of the Meiji government. However, a hidden *raison d'être* for the *Danjôdai* may have been to provide a court of morals in which a 'degenerate' aristocracy could be exposed and consequently denied a role in government; this process in turn helping to achieve the ultimate goal of promotion by ability, rather than birth. Through the *Jinjikan* (Board of Religion), Shintôism was concurrently being exploited as a means of encouraging nationalism and imperial reverence, and the creation of the *Danjôdai* may have been an integral part of this quasi-spiritual campaign. Yôdô's reasons for opposing the creation of this institution are transparent and he expressed his discontent to Saigô in the following manner:

"Let us look at the realities of the situation. If an institution such as the *Danjôdai* had been established at the time of the unification of the nation under Toyotomi Hideyoshi, then we can immediately discount the contributions of Hachisuga Goroku (a valued retainer of Hideyoshi's, notorious for his libertine lifestyle). Indeed the *Tairô* himself was guilty of occasional embezzlement. At this initial founding stage, a petty attention to details is unworthy, and if our public morals are going to be so policed then there will be no option but to take the head of this proliferate, Yôdô."¹⁸³

Subsequently, the threat to daimyô prerogative inherent in the establishment of the *Danjôdai* was challenged by Yôdô in a series of communications to the *Dajôkan* in May 1869.

"Regardless of my position as daimyô, I will continue to carouse and consort with women....I intend to meet a friend in Yanagibashi tonight, hire the services of five geisha, and proceed to thoroughly enjoy myself."¹⁸⁴

This reply was not only a public proclamation of his intention to continue with his habitual pastimes; it was also a demonstration of his categorical opposition to the existence of such an intrusive institution.

¹⁸³ Hirao 1961, p.237.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

The implementation of *hanseki-hôkan* signalled Yôdô's final departure from the main stage of Meiji politics and this was formalized in July 1869 with his investiture as *Jakô-No-Ma* (Master of the Musk Chamber). A high palace honour traditionally given to nobles who had retired from active duties at Court, the appointment was probably a recognition of the Tosa lord's political contribution and complete withdrawal from national politics.¹⁸⁵

Due to their positions as councillors in the national government, Itagaki and Gotô had also assumed de-facto control of affairs in Tosa, finally ending the long period of Yôdô's political ascendancy. Moreover, the situation was changed to such an extent that Itagaki was, albeit respectfully, now able to rebuke Yôdô directly for misuse of domain funds, something that he would never have presumed to do in earlier days.

The altercation with the *Danjôdai* in May and his Court appointment in July, seems to have cemented Yôdô's decision to cut his ties with the political world. Subsequently in the absence of the pressures of public responsibility, the 'Yanagibashi' period in his life which followed (named after his favourite Tokyo pleasure-quarter) was remarkable for Yôdô's singleminded pursuit of physical gratification, and these indulgences appear to have reached epic proportions before financial straits finally enforced a respite in 1871.

In the environment of Yanagibashi, sobriquets such as, "Kôchi-takanabe-jôgôgashima" (the island of Kôchi and Miyazaki, the lords who nurture women) evidenced the amoristic propensities of Yôdô and his literary drinking companion Akitsuki Taneki, the ex-daimyô of Miyazaki. The notoriety of their escapades was such that it again roused the ire of the *Danjôdai*, which on July 4 issued a stern reprimand to Yôdô, only failing to dismiss him from his rank and positions due to his record of great service to the country. Akitsuki, however, was sacked from his government posts for improper behaviour and for disregard of previous admonitions.

The Transformation of Power in Tosa

Although Yamanouchi Toyonori remained domain Governor, Tosa authority was now firmly in the hands of Itagaki in Kôchi and Gotô in Tôkyô. Assisted by councillors Koyama Kunikiyo and Fukuoka Kôtei, in early 1870 Itagaki and Gotô embarked on a series of revolutionary social reforms. They inaugurated a Shikoku representative council in Kompira (present day Kagawa prefecture) to establish a basis for continued peace amongst neighbouring domains. French advisors were engaged to train the

¹⁸⁵ Yoshimura 1991, pp 87-9.

military for the conflict widely seen as inevitable between Satsuma and Chôshû, and following the edicts of the central government, they began to reorganize the population into *kazoku* and *shizoku*. However, it was the widescale recruitment of commoners into the military and the submission to the government of proposals calling for the introduction of a more egalitarian society which set developments in Tosa apart as truly radical.¹⁸⁶

As well as implementing these programmes, other pressing concerns (particularly for Gotô in Tôkyô) were the damage to domain prestige caused by Yôdô's public excesses, and their impact on the costs of maintaining the domain establishment in Tôkyô. With inflation in Tosa causing suffering and hardship, huge expenditure in Tôkyô was becoming increasingly difficult to justify. Unable to persuade Yôdô of the need for restraint, on March 6, Gotô wrote to Itagaki entreating him to come to Tôkyô to assist him in curbing their lord's behaviour and to expedite his return to normality.¹⁸⁷

In a subsequent meeting with Yôdô at the Hakozaki residence, Itagaki remonstrated on the anger Yôdô's actions were causing among the great numbers of *ex-tôbaku shishi* now gathered in Tôkyô. He accused Yôdô of neglecting the interests of Tosa, threatening that a continuation of the ex-daimyô's indiscretions would result in his own resignation and pleading with Yôdô to return to the 'excellent' man that he once had been. For Itagaki, probably due to the reticence of a retainer to take his lord to task for enjoying traditional daimyô prerogatives, discussing this matter was apparently particularly discomfiting. Although aware of the disastrous state of the domain exchequer, he was very much the traditional samurai who despised issues of credit and debt, and the task of censuring his lord over his use of money was probably singularly unappealing.¹⁸⁸

Yôdô appears to have acquiesced in Itagaki's and Gotô's remonstrations and despite his continuing to drink and socialize, the constant hemorrhaging of funds seems to have come to a halt around this time. It should be emphasised that in the past Yôdô had never been profligate with domain finances and thus the financial excesses of his period of decline can perhaps be regarded as a temporary aberration. Receiving approving comments on his re-found parsimony, Yôdô is recorded as wryly stating:

"From the oldest days I have never heard tell of a daimyô living within his means.... I would like to try to begin this new fashion, you could even call

¹⁸⁶ These proposals were a forerunner to the *jiyûminken-undô* (movement for freedom of human rights), with which Itagaki (in particular) became closely associated in later years.

¹⁸⁷ In July, Gotô was threatened with dismissal by the *Danjôdai* and this may have been a public censuring for his failure (as Yôdô's chief advisor) to curtail the Tosa lord's high profile wasting of public funds.

¹⁸⁸ Yoshimura 1991, p 89.

it one way of following the new ways and continuing the struggle to dismantle the old social systems.”¹⁸⁹

The reforms implemented in Tosa by Itagaki and Gotô probably gave the central government an unpleasant shock. Popular emancipation carried too far, too soon, could provoke the samurai classes into a widespread anti-government rebellion.¹⁹⁰ Indeed, the announcement of *haihan-chiken* in 1871, enabling a governmental concentration of power at the expense of the regions may have been largely motivated by the need to hinder the development of dangerously liberal trends such as those occurring in Tosa.

From Domains to Prefectures

The chief motivation for carrying out *haihan-chiken* to enable the central government to proceed with its unifying efforts. *Hanseki-hôkan* had been accompanied by the introduction in ex-Bakufu territories of *fu* and *ken* (cities and prefectures) government. The compromise policy of *fu-han-ken-sanchi-itchi* attempted to maintain three different layers of government, but actually resulted in dissolution of the temporary unity achieved in the aftermath of the restoration. Regional military spending increased as the domains came to believe that a rapid modernisation in their forces was the only guarantee of self-defence.

The uprising in Chôshû in the winter of 1869-1870 (which came about due to the disbanding of the irregular units and discontent at the cutting of samurai stipends), further demonstrated that, regardless of the political affiliation of the protesters, the government urgently needed an army to allow it to enforce its will in the event of any domestic or foreign crises. Moreover the creation of such a force would have the added advantages of restoring confidence in the government and making domain military strengthening both unnecessary and illegal.

The political environment which witnessed the renewal of assaults on the domains in 1871 was far more favourable than that which greeted *hanseki-hôkan* in 1869. Foreign criticism of the feudal system was mounting and direct attacks by Harry Parkes in the form of calls for a policy of unification, (which would create a safer environment for foreigners) were proving significant. Demands by individual samurai for a clarification of the ambiguous nature of their loyalty ties to the ex-daimyô governors were proving pressing (many of the domains also faced major troubles over cuts

¹⁸⁹ Shimamoto 1993, p.312.

¹⁹⁰ The cancelling of interclass distinctions such as the right to wear swords, the abolition of stipends and the creation of a conscript army would eventually provide the material for the breakdown in relations within the Meiji oligarchy that lead to the samurai uprisings of the 1870's.

in samurai stipends) while the high fiscal demands from central government meant that many domains were now asking to be incorporated into the prefectural system already established in the ex-Bakufu territories.¹⁹¹

In a memorandum in late 1870 Iwakura had proposed that the domains be transformed into prefectures on the grounds that a strengthening of the nation and the ending of internal division justified such a unifying action. In particular, Ôkubo Toshimichi was a strong supporter of this view and during the first half of 1871 he worked prodigiously on Kido and Saigô to gain their cooperation in persuading their respective domains to collaborate in “*ichi dai kimitsu no jiken*” (a highly confidential matter).¹⁹² Subsequently, in January 1871 Saigô, Kido and Ôkubo travelled to Tosa for discussions with Itagaki Taisuke resulting in the inclusion of a Tosa contingent in the three-domain levy of troops that went to create the *shimpei* (imperial army).

In June the arrival of the regional levies made the imperial army a reality and the government now possessed the necessary strength to suppress any resistance to the abolition of the domains. Despite Kido’s brief opposition (it appears he did not initially approve of the drastic nature of the measures), an imperial announcement on July 14 replaced the 241 domains with three metropolises and thirty two prefectures. Furthermore, with the publication of the *haihan-chiken* order, all ex-daimyô and their households were now ordered to immediately re-locate to Tôkyô.¹⁹³

Although the announcement created great outcry, the laws were passed unopposed and a unified protest did not eventuate. This lack of opposition was partly due to the disincentive to resist provided by the new imperial army, and partly because the daimyô themselves were mollified by a promotion to the hereditary peerage as well as retaining a sizeable portion of their incomes. Combined with the weakened state of many domains due to war and insolvency, these factors probably convinced the majority of parties that resistance would be both futile and self-destructive.

Yôdô’s dissolute existence continued into 1871 and his lavish reputation among the female courtesan-entertainers continued to grow. His legal wife Naohime had died in 1868 and two courtesans, O-ai and O-koi, whom he met in November of the same year, seem to have subsequently, captured his affections. O-ai in particular is reported to have taken charge of the domestic running of his household and was to remain an influential

¹⁹¹ Beasley 1972, p. 345.

¹⁹² Mōri 1994, p. 171. This is almost certainly referring to plans to totally abolish the domains.

¹⁹³ While the publication of this decree did not mean that regional autonomy automatically ceased to exist (and Satsuma in particular remained very jealous of its independence) it legitimized all the subsequent governmental measures which contributed to the destruction of the feudal society.

companion until the very end of his life.¹⁹⁴ O-ai's importance to Yôdô is reflected in the *rakuseki*, legal purchase of her contract (which he arranged for her) effectively freeing her, and in their subsequent co-habitation together as common-law man and wife.

The announcement of *haihan-chiken* put a definitive stop to Yôdô's excessive lifestyle. Domain funds hitherto virtually at his personal disposal were now no longer available, and his only income was the *fuchi* (rice stipend) for ex-daimyô, which was a mere fraction of his former resources. Furthermore, not only did his state of retirement prevent any effective protest against the abolition of the domains¹⁹⁵ (and decrease in income), but the damage to his prestige in both Tosa and Tôkyô caused by his libertine lifestyle probably ensured that support for such protest would have been minimal. Thus the only avenue he had now for expressing discontent was the occasional tête-à-tête with Kido or Matsudaira Shungaku when they met in the ceremonial world of imperial Tôkyô.

Yôdô's official residence remained the Hakozaki Tayasu Palace until July of 1871 when in compliance with *haihan-chiken*, ex-daimyô Toyonori relocated his household to Tôkyô. The Kajibashi domain headquarters had been requisitioned by the central government the previous year and Yôdô was forced to arrange other accommodation. However, although his official address was Hakozaki, he had actually been residing since October 1870 (with O-ai and other favourite concubines) under a pseudonym in a residence in Hashiba in the Asakusa district. Therefore the move from Hakozaki may not have distressed him as much as the loss of his grand style and abundant income. The fact that, despite the privations of *haihan-chiken*, he still maintained a friendship with Kido Kôin (who was one of the prime architects of the abolition order) suggests that he may not have been greatly antipathetic to the actions of the government.

The excessive drinking and carousing that had begun in late 1869, seems to have come to a halt by mid 1871. Some spiritual and physical quietude had been attained and the licentious period, at the height of which he was rumoured to be drinking at least three *shô* per day (one *shô* = 1.8 litres) although it burned out the last of Yôdô's physical strength, seems also to have assuaged the distress caused by his defeat in the world of national politics. Now, writing, art and his companions, became the centre of Yôdô's existence in the Ayasesôdô (the name he gave to his villa in Hashiba) and the period is remarkable for the amount of poetry he wrote at this time.

¹⁹⁴ Yoshimura 1991, p 90. Yôdô's first meeting with O-ai recorded in Sasaki Takayuki's diary.

¹⁹⁵ Môri (1994, p. 173.) suggests that Itagaki himself was not privy to the confidential debate that immediately preceded the enactment of *haihan-chiken* and therefore it is almost certain that Yôdô would have had no part in the planning or enactment of the final abolition order.

Not only was Hashiba familiar territory for O-ai but it was also an area where many other famous political figures had their Tōkyō residences. Moreover, considering the acrimonious atmosphere that characterised his contact with family and relatives in Tosa, Yōdō was probably quite content to remain in diminished circumstances in Tōkyō. Accused of ignoring the interests of his family during the days of his political supremacy, Yōdō's alleged misconduct was now repaid by his being effectively disowned by a Yamanouchi family disgusted at his conduct and at his complicity in the overthrow of the Tokugawa. Thus by living in Tōkyō, Yōdō could remove himself from family recrimination and enjoy the company of like-minded friends who would understand and uncritically accept his idiosyncratic lifestyle.¹⁹⁶

Yōdō spent the summer of 1871 in Hakone accompanied by O-ai and the two artist brothers Aramoto. His reasons for leaving Tōkyō were ostensibly for recuperation but it may be that Yōdō, sensing the approach of his early death, wished for one last opportunity to indulge his aesthetic nature in a creative grand tour. The purpose of the journey seems to have been to create a series of travel sketches which would be interposed with the poems Yōdō composed along the way. Unfortunately the rapid onset of illness and his subsequent death prevented the realization of this project.

Returning to Tōkyō, Yōdō spent the rest of the year quietly in residence at Hashiba. On the evening of January 28, after finishing his bath, he suddenly collapsed from a severe stroke which resulted in partial paralysis and impairment of speech. Although he recovered consciousness he continued to experience extreme pain in his upper right body and difficulty in speaking.

The German physician Hoffmann was engaged as chief medical supervisor, and was subsequently joined by several of the Emperor's personal medical advisors. Yōdō's condition wavered temporarily between improvement and relapse; however the electro-therapy Hoffmann employed appears to have cured the outward symptoms of speech disability and paralysis and it was announced on March 7, that Yōdō had made a complete recovery. This optimistic prognosis was probably based on Yōdō's return to lucidity; the underlying problem of severe cirrhosis caused by chronic and systematic alcoholism were not so easily remedied.

Wishing to combine celebration of his recovery and of the new spring season, several of Yōdō's closest friends arranged a dinner in his honour in the Ryōgoku district. Yōdō attended this event in his usual manner, continuing to drink copious quantities despite repeated requests to abstain. Yōdō's need for alcohol was an addiction, and although he probably knew

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.* p.157.

that continued consumption would be fatal, he persisted, insisting that an existence without 'sake' would be worthless anyway.

Warnings from doctors and friends were all in vain. Although he continued to lead an invalid's existence, his continued drinking prevented any chance of a fuller recovery. Thus at forty-six years of age, on June 21 1872 he suffered another stroke, lapsed into unconsciousness, and died at eight in the evening.

On June 22, the Emperor despatched a special emissary to convey official condolences, and further honoured Yôdô posthumously with a promotion to first rank in the imperial grade system. On the night of the 27th the body was moved from Hachiba to Hakozaki, and what nowadays would be called a state funeral was held the following day. Troops from the imperial forces were paraded in salutation and the route from Hakozaki to his burial place in Shimofusayama cemetery (in present day Shinagawa ward) was packed with mourners from all classes.

Summary

The fall of the Tokugawa and failure of *kôbu-gattai* effectively sealed the fate of the daimyô and domainal system. Yôdô probably realised this early on in 1868 and his subsequent actions reflect a coming to terms with the demands of the new political order. Influence had passed from the daimyô to their retainers and this change was equally reflected in the regions and at a national level.

The first half of 1868 saw Yôdô simultaneously renouncing all ties to the Tokugawa and ensuring that this policy was absolutely obeyed within Tosa. He took up residence in Tôkyô in October. Subsequently, a series of political reshufflings saw him repeatedly appointed to purely figurehead positions. This may have heightened his consciousness of the diminishing importance of daimyô in the new government and probably prompted his complete retirement from politics in late 1869.

This said, Yôdô's support in January 1869 for *hanseki-hôkan* was an important part of the process of achieving the breakthrough that allowed the Meiji politicians to begin their modernization of Japanese society. Yôdô's approval of the proposal to return the lands and people to the Emperor was probably not an approval in principle only, but also an endorsement of the idea that a swift unification and strengthening of the country was imperative. It also demonstrates a recognition that the traditional domain system was entirely unsuited to modern government.

Yôdô's retirement from Japanese politics and his altercations with the Board of Censors in July 1869 ushered in the final phase in his life. His scandalous behaviour was at times an embarrassment to the influential retainers whom he had helped propel to national prominence, and the last years of his life were marred by this loss of prestige and his worsening health. However it was Yôdô's correct interpretation of the political future and his foresight in selecting worthy successors in Gotô and Itagaki which spared Tosa the cost of involvement in the civil insurrections of the 70's, as well as preparing Tosa for the painful developments which eventually saw the end of the domain system and the first steps towards the creation of a modern state.

Conclusions

In evaluating the significance of Yôdô's contribution to the development of post-Tokugawa Japan it will be helpful, firstly, to reconsider the nature of Yôdô's policy objectives for domestic and national politics; secondly, to assess the relative success or failure of these policies; and thirdly, to ascertain the extent to which these policies influenced the course of history in Japan after the Meiji Revolution.

With regard to policy, Yôdô's political life can be separated broadly into four chronological divisions.

The first period begins with his investiture as daimyô of Tosa in 1849 and ends with his imprisonment as a result of the Ansei Purges. It is initially distinguished by the 1853 publication of Tosa's call for a repudiation of American treaty demands, in answer to the Bakufu's request for domain opinion. This and the military strengthening begun in Tosa at the same time established Yôdô's reputation as a vigorous exponent of *jôi*; however, his sponsorship of promotion by ability and his subsequent efforts to employ western technology in the interests of his domain also reveal a pragmatic and flexible side to his character. By the mid-1850's Yôdô had realised that the establishment of contact with the West was unavoidable, and had softened his political stance accordingly. He was, however, still opposed to a total opening of the country, and consequently it was his affiliation to the Hitotsubashi party, with its agenda of resistance to foreign demands and of greater daimyô and Court participation in government, which brought him into direct conflict with the *fudai* powers, and with *Tairô* Ii Naosuke.

In the struggle for power between the *shimpan-tozama* (Hitotsubashi), and *fudai* (Nanki) parties, the tradition of *fudai* control of the ruling Bakufu council was probably a crucial factor in the victory of the latter. Thus, implication in the Hitotsubashi alliance marked Yôdô's first severe reverse in national politics, and resulted in his being dismissed as daimyô and ordered into political retirement.

Despite his 1859-1862 confinement, reform continued within Tosa during this period. In the wake of the military and administrative reforms of the mid-50's preparations for economic restructuring had been begun by Yôdô's new chief minister, Yoshida Tôyô. Moreover, the precedent of Tosa exerting itself in national affairs had been set, and not (as might have been expected) as a Bakufu supporter, but rather as its critic and opponent.

The second period commences with Yôdô's liberation in April 1862. It is distinguished by the emergence of a *kôbu-gattai* party, intent on establishing a three-way division of power between Bakufu, Court and

daimyô, yet rendered increasingly disunited by the divergent nature of its members' wishes concerning the conduct of foreign policy. Opposing *kôbu-gattai*, the remnants of Ii's *fudai* faction remained; however, they were greatly diminished by the disgrace and counter-purges which were the consequences of his death. Stronger opposition existed in the *shishi*-led *jôi* movement and its extreme demands for an imperial restoration and immediate expulsion of foreigners. In the wake of the Ansei Purges, the *fudai* faction found itself forced to make concessions, one of which was the appointment of Yôdô as assistant to Matsudaira Shungaku, the new Supreme Political Director.

Although the appointments of Yoshinobu and Shungaku (both *shimpan* lords) to positions of power within the Bakufu were extraordinary, Yôdô's appointment as the first *tozama* lord admitted to office within the Bakufu in over two hundred years is even more significant. Indeed it is this concession to the *tozama* which above all indicates the huge loss of confidence that marked the Bakufu in the years following Ii's death.

Following this development Yôdô now found himself increasingly embarrassed by the activities of the loyalists within his domain. The extremism of the *Kinnô-tô* under Takechi Zuizan was offensive to Yôdô's feudal sensibilities and demanded punishment. The right opportunity occurred in late 1864, after the loyalists were defeated in their attempted coup in the name of the Emperor. The strategies Yôdô employed in 'taming' the Tosa loyalists, and the sense of timing displayed in waiting for Satsuma to take the first dangerous step in suppressing the loyalists, are indications both of the difficulties he faced, and the excellence of his political judgement.

Coming into 1865, Yôdô's policies still reflect a wish to achieve a version of *kôbu-gattai* with Court and daimyô as subordinate partners in a union with the Bakufu. However, indecisiveness in Bakufu policy towards Chôshû after the first expedition in 1864, and the absolute defeat of government forces by that domain in 1866, doomed Yôdô's policy of insisting on the retention of Shôgunal primacy in government. The failure of the *kôbu-gattai* lords' conference in March of 1866 could be said to mark the end of this second period.

The third period is remarkable for what is probably Yôdô's most famous achievement - *taisei-hôkan*. In Kôchi, on July 8, Yôdô approved Gotô Shôjirô's proposals for a Shôgunal resignation and revolutionary reorganisation of the country under the symbolic aegis of the Emperor. This willingness to countenance a demotion in the status of the Tokugawa represents a sea-change in Yôdô's policy. The restoration of the Emperor would enable all the objectives of the *kôbu-gattai* party to be achieved, and

would simultaneously mean the survival of the Tokugawa family as first power in the land. This final hope of achieving a stable union of all the traditional symbols of power was dashed by the *tôbaku* coup in December; and by Yoshinobu's decision to stake his fate on a military gamble in early New Year 1868.

The fourth and final period which commences with Yôdô's oath of allegiance to the Emperor in early January 1868, is distinguished by his complete conversion to imperialism and ruthless destruction of the Tosa conservatives. Despite the growing influence of Itagaki Taisuke, Yôdô retained at least the appearance of supremacy in Tosa, until August 1869. His political career then came to a close with *hanseki-hôkan* and the contemporaneous dispute with the Meiji government's new, Board of Censors.

In assessing the efficacy of Yôdô's policies, it would perhaps be fair to state that he achieved almost universal success with his programme of reform in Tosa. However, with regard to national politics, his sponsorship of *kôbu-gattai* and *taisei-hôkan* resulted respectively in two significant reverses; the Ansei Purges, and the coup d'état of December 1867. With reference to the former it may not have been quite the defeat it appears. The Purges seem to represent a major setback for the *tozama* and *shimpan* lords but it can be suggested that they made possible the political innovations subsequently carried out by the surviving Hitotsubashi members. Blame for the fait-accompli that *kaikoku* had, to a significant degree become, was attributed not to Yoshinobu and Shungaku, but rather to the Bakufu which had supported Ii Naosuke and his successor Andô Nobumasa. Thus the Purges could be said to have offered the 'outer' lords a way to power and the opportunity to initiate wide-ranging political reforms.

For Yôdô, confinement and loss of daimyô status at the time of the Ansei Purges do not appear to have severely damaged his subsequent career. As with Yoshinobu and Shungaku his temporary defeat led eventually to high office and influence within the Bakufu as well as considerably increasing his prestige nationally and within Tosa. Moreover his reputation as a staunch loyalist thereafter proved extremely valuable in the emotive atmosphere of *shishi* extremism.

Furthermore, the Ansei Purges did not prevent Yôdô from continuing with his domestic reform programme. From 1854 until the late 1860's, under Yôdô's direction, great progress was made in areas such as: defence and administration; promotion of talent; simplification of complicated status systems; domain trading and commercial activity; education for the non-military classes; and the beginnings of emancipation in the form of

enlistments of members of the lower classes in domain forces. In all these areas, despite national turmoil and a rigorous local conservative opposition, Yôdô and his followers achieved great success.

Taisei-hôkan represented a failure for Yôdô inasmuch as it did not allow him to preserve the Tokugawa hegemony as his family obligations required. However, he was faced not only with a formidable opposition composed of such talents as Iwakura, Saigô, Ôkubo and Kido, but also with the fact that the institution that he was trying to save had been patently proved unequal to its essential task of maintaining domestic order and national independence. The Tokugawa regime had had its chances to assert its rule and had failed, and it must have been obvious to almost all parties that only a major and fundamental change in the traditional status quo would save Japan from either internecine disintegration or colonization from without.

From the alternative perspective of national unification, the *taisei-hôkan* proposal certainly served the country very well indeed. By persuading the Shôgun to abdicate, it brought on the conditions whereby a resolution of the political dilemma that Japan faced (two rulers in one land) became possible. The words of Nakaoka Shintarô, “the Tokugawa who had won the country on horseback would have to be defeated on horseback”¹⁹⁷ reflect his belief that the only way to bring about real political change in Japan, was by first destroying the power base of the Tokugawa. All indications are that this could not be done peacefully; moreover, without the abdication achieved by Yôdô and Tosa’s intervention, the inevitable military conflict may have been postponed to a much later stage when greater technological sophistication and better preparation on both sides would have resulted in a longer, bloodier and possibly inconclusive war - with the further danger that a weakened and disunited Japan might fall prey to western colonialism.

In 1868, Yôdô’s disregarding of Yamanouchi ties to the Tokugawa and full acquiescence in the directives of the imperialist *tôbaku* faction, should be recognized as practical and realistic. Moreover, despite the subjugation of his family’s pride, it was a very successful policy in that it managed to preserve intact Tosa’s influential position in the developing polity. And his subsequent gradual entrusting of domain affairs to Gotô and Itagaki represents not only a smooth and uneventful transfer of power from feudal lord to government officials, but also a vindication of his policy of fostering and promoting talented individuals rather than relying on traditional avenues of status or kinship.

Despite Yôdô’s record of reform, it is perhaps timely to remember that the dominant motive for political change during the Bakumatsu period was not

¹⁹⁷ Jansen 1971, p.298.

to create a new social order, but to build a strong country able to withstand the threat of western colonialism. Ironically, however, to preserve Japanese sovereignty, it was necessary, not only to abolish certain political and social institutions, but to be seen to do so in the eyes of foreign observers. For the former reason, Yôdô was committed to modernization, and a relaxation of the rigid, *shi-nô-kô-shô* caste system.¹⁹⁸ However, Yôdô was neither a social emancipator in the modern sense of the word nor was he pro-western. His personal philosophy (which could be described as a kind of ‘resilient capitulation’ to western culture) reflects a distaste for the new fashions that were beginning to gain popularity,¹⁹⁹ and the sense that he was witnessing that disintegration of feudal Japanese society and the end of an era.

Finally, in ascertaining the influence Yôdô’s policies had on the consequent course of Japanese history, his ultimate contribution could be said to be twofold.

Firstly he provided one of a few successful examples of how an enlightened domain government could achieve economic and social revival. At the same time he introduced a systematized approach to the study of western technology and learning while also fostering the concept of cross-class education. Moreover many of the individuals whom he selected to carry out his reforming policy, remained on in Meiji politics as especially strong advocates of human rights and representative government.

The second element of Yôdô’s contributions was the role he played in national politics acting as a third voice mediating between the pro- and anti-Bakufu factions. Due to Tosa’s relatively minor military and economic potential, and because of the Yamanouchi’s peculiarly difficult position of being obligated to both Court and Tokugawa, Yôdô was prevented from taking a clear stand on either side. However, it was just this ambiguity that bred in Tosa the need to look for alternative forms of government not centered on traditional prerogative or military primacy. Consequently, the *taisei-hôkan* proposal represents Tosa’s research into constitutional institutions and its desire for a peaceful reconciliation of all parties in an imperial government inclusive of the Tokugawa. Thus it is perhaps for this encouragement of his retainers to find and develop a more modern and more representative form of government, that Yôdô will be most lastingly remembered.

¹⁹⁸ Yoshimura (1990, p. 100.) relates that Yôdô forced his entire female entourage to modernise their hair and dress styles in an effort to breakdown barriers between the conservative aristocracy and the common populace.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 99. Unlike many of his contemporaries, Yôdô (who portrayed himself as the last of the daimyô) never wore western clothing of any form, shunning it as a kind of pollution of the Japanese tradition and spirit.

Glossary

- Bakufu.* The government of the Tokugawa Shôgun.
- Bakuhan-seido.* The Bakufu-domain, Tokugawa political system.
- Bakumatsu.* Last years of the Tokugawa Bakufu, 1853 -1868.
- Boshin Sensô.* The War of Restoration. Jan 1868 - June 1869.
- Bunbukan.* Tosa domain school for lower samurai.
- Bugyô.* A magistrate. (In Tosa, Commissioners General).
- Buryoku-tôbaku.* Late 1860's movement to militarily destroy the Bakufu.
- Chiji.* Governor (of a prefecture), or Minister (of a department).
- Chôteki-hatsu.* Proscription of an individual or group by the Emperor.
- Daimyô.* Feudal Lord of 10,000 koku or more who was not a sub-vassal.
- Dajôkan.* The executive council of the early Meiji government.
- Fukoku-kyôhei.* "Wealthy country, strong army." Policy of strengthening the country by adopting western technology.
- Gijô.* Senior imperial councillor.
- Gisô.* Court-Bakufu liaison officer.
- Gon-chûnagon.* Associate Minister in the imperial Court.
- Goyôbeya.* Office in the Shôgun's direct administrative department.
- Gundai.* Regional administrator.
- Gumbuzôsetsu.* Increase in the number of domainal district offices in Tosa.
- Haihan-chiken.* Abolition of domains and establishment of prefectures.
- Hai-tei-setsu.* A plan to abolish the Emperor; ascribed to Yoshinobu.
- Hanseki-hôkan.* Return of the registers of lands and people to the Emperor.
- Hatamoto.* Shôgunal retainers of between 100 and 10,000 koku.
- Hitotsubashi-tô.* The party that sponsored Tokugawa Yoshinobu's Shôgunal candidature in 1858.
- Jôi.* "Expel the Barbarian." Loyalist policy of the late 1850's.
- Kaien-tai.* Sakamoto Ryôma's, marine trading company.
- Kaikoku.* "Open the country." Pre-1858 pro-western political position.
- Kainan-ritsuryô.* Document setting out Tosa statutory law reforms.
- Kainan-seiten.* Document setting out Tosa administrative reforms.
- Kaiseikan.* Tosa centre for economic and technological development.
- Kampaku.* The title of the Regent for an adult Emperor.
- Kangun.* Troops fighting the Bakufu in the war of restoration.
- Karô.* Elder. Senior domain advisor.
- Kazoku.* Early Meiji nobility. Composed of courtiers and daimyô.
- Kinnô-tô.* Tosa loyalist party founded by Takechi Zuizan.
- Kinri-Shuei-Sôtoku.* "Grand protector of the imperial territories".
- Kôbu-gattai.* 1860's "Unity of Court and Bakufu," movement.
- Kôgi-seitai-ron.* Tosa plans for a government of popular representation.
- Kôjûkan.* Tosa domain school for upper samurai.

<i>Kôken.</i>	Office of Shôgunal guardian.
<i>Koku.</i>	The measure for rice. 4.96 U.S. bushels or 180 litres.
<i>Metsuke.</i>	The office of domain (or Bakufu) administrative inspector.
<i>Mimpei-seido.</i>	Tosa, peasant militia training system of the 1850's.
<i>Mombatsu.</i>	Members and high retainers of domainal ruling-families.
<i>Nai-daijin.</i>	Lord Keeper of the Privy, in the imperial Court.
<i>Nangaku.</i>	A Confucianism founded on principles of Emperor respect.
<i>Nankitô.</i>	The party that sponsored the 1858, Kii Shôgunal candidate.
<i>Nôhon-shugi.</i>	Ancient agricultural purism as the basis for an economy as opposed to modern commercialism.
<i>Okoze-gumi.</i>	The Tosa, Tempô reformist party of Mabuchi Kahei.
<i>Ôsei-fukko.</i>	Restoration of the imperial rule.
<i>Rikuen-tai.</i>	Nakaoka Shintarô's Kyôtô based, loyalist military unit.
<i>Rôjû.</i>	Senior Bakufu Councillors appointed from fudai daimyô.
<i>Rônin.</i>	A lordless samurai.
<i>Sabaku.</i>	Expression given to Bakufu supporters.
<i>Sakayaki.</i>	The Buddhist custom of shaving the tonsure in penance.
<i>Sakoku.</i>	Pre-1858, policy of exclusion. Anti-western.
<i>Sangi.</i>	Councillors in the Meiji Government.
<i>Sanji.</i>	Domain councillors, <i>dai</i> , <i>shô</i> (senior and junior).
<i>Sankin-kôtai.</i>	A system whereby daimyô resided alternately in their domains and in Edo, with their families remaining permanently in Edo as hostages.
<i>Sanyô.</i>	1. Pre-1868; imperial councillor. 2. A junior councillor in the Meiji government.
<i>Seiji-Sôsai.</i>	Office of Supreme Political Director.
<i>Seiken-henjô.</i>	Movement to return political rule to the Emperor.
<i>Seito-gun.</i>	Bakufu troops in the 1866 Chôshû punitive expedition.
<i>Seitaisho.</i>	Bicameral governmental system established in 1868.
<i>Sesshô.</i>	Title of the Regent for a juvenile Emperor.
<i>Shi-juku.</i>	Private school for children of samurai background.
<i>Shi-nô-kô-shô.</i>	The four classes; warriors, farmers, artisans and merchants.
<i>Shioki-yaku.</i>	Tosa, Assistants to the Commissioners General. (Provost).
<i>Shizoku.</i>	Early Meiji gentry. Reorganized, simplified samurai class.
<i>Shugo.</i>	Military Governor of Kyôtô. Post created in 1862.
<i>Shôgun.</i>	Abbreviation of <i>Sei-i-tai-shôgun</i> , "Barbarian-subduing-great-generalissimo," the Emperor's ruling deputy.
<i>Sonnô-jôi.</i>	"Honour the Emperor, expel the barbarian". Loyalist slogan.
<i>Sotsu.</i>	Early Meiji term referring to lower samurai.
<i>Tenchû.</i>	"Heavenly retribution," campaign of loyalist terrorism.
<i>Tenryô.</i>	Lands administered directly by the Tokugawa Bakufu.
<i>Tôbaku.</i>	Movement of the late 1860's to overthrow the Bakufu.
<i>Taikun.</i>	Lit, "Great lord." Used colloquially to refer to the Shôgun.
<i>Taisei-hôkan.</i>	Proposal by the domain of Tosa, for a Shôgunal abdication and restoration of government in the imperial name.

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