



The impact of the carbon trading pilot program on the financing cost of green bonds

Haojun Yuan, Jing Liao, Martin Young*

School of Accountancy and Finance, Massey University, Palmerston North 4410, New Zealand

ARTICLE INFO

JEL Classification:

G1
G2

Keywords:

Green bonds
Financing costs
Carbon trading

ABSTRACT

We examine the impact of a market-based initiative, the carbon trading pilot program, on the financing cost of green bonds in China. The results indicate that the financing cost of green bonds is significantly lower in regions included in the carbon trading pilot program. This effect is more pronounced in regions with better renewable energy development and a higher level of marketisation. The mechanism analysis suggests that the pilot program promotes corporate green innovation, leading to a lower financing cost of green bonds. The results of this study highlight the beneficial effects of a market-based environmental policy that alleviates green concerns among market participants.

1. Introduction

In response to global climate changes, green bonds, a financing tool designed for facilitating green or low-carbon projects, have gained prominence in green financing (Curley, 2014; Naeem et al., 2021; Tolliver et al., 2019). In December 2015, the China National Development and Reform Commission released the Green Bond Issuance Guidelines, marking the official establishment of the green bond market in China. Since then, the Chinese green bond market has exhibited a clear upward trend as shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, which report the volume of green bond issuance from 2016 to 2022.¹ By 2022, China had become the world's second-largest green bond market (Climate Bonds Initiative and China Central Depository and Clearing Research Centre, 2022).

As the largest carbon emitter in the world (Liu et al., 2016; Shi et al., 2021; Song et al., 2020), China faces an urgent need to reduce carbon emissions. One example of the country's effort to do so is its establishment of a pilot carbon trading market. Since 2013, China has conducted a pilot project for a compliant (mandatory) carbon trading market (hereafter, the carbon trading pilot program) in eight areas: Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, Hubei, Fujian, Guangdong, and Shenzhen (Zhou and Li, 2019). Fig. 3 shows the geographic distribution of the carbon trading pilots and the development of the green bond market, revealing that the issuance volumes of green bonds are higher in the pilot regions compared to other areas. By the end of August 2020, the carbon trading pilot program covered over 20 industries, involving nearly 3000 enterprises.²

With the accelerating development of the Chinese bond market, green bonds have attracted increasing attention from researchers. Green bonds have been recognised as an important means of reducing carbon emissions and simultaneously lowering the financing

* Corresponding author.

E-mail addresses: h.yuan@massey.ac.nz (H. Yuan), j.liao@massey.ac.nz (J. Liao), m.young@massey.ac.nz (M. Young).

¹ Green bonds issued by financial institutions and unlisted firms account for a relatively high proportion throughout this period.

² In August 2020, the cumulative transaction volume of carbon allowances traded in the market exceeded 400 million metric tons, with a total value of approximately 9 billion RMB (Central Government of the People's Republic of China, 2020).




Fig. 1. Green bond issuance volume by bond type.

cost of corporate bonds (Flaherty et al., 2017; Gianfrate and Peri, 2019; Sachs, 2014). The existing literature has investigated the determinants of green bond pricing (Bachelet et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2020a; Qi et al., 2024), the motivations behind green bond issuance (Flammer, 2021; Sangiorgi and Schopohl, 2021), and the promotion effect of green bonds on green innovation (Lin et al., 2022; Wang et al., 2022a; Zhang et al., 2022). However, the impact of the carbon trading pilot program on the financing cost of green bonds has remained understudied.

The existing literature reports conflicting information regarding the possible impact of the carbon trading pilot program on the financing cost of green bonds. The funds required for carbon trading may reduce the amount of short-term cash flows and liquidity of companies included in the carbon trading pilot program. This can cause concerns among investors, which in turn increase the financing cost of corporate bonds (Huang et al., 2024; Lee and Choi, 2021; Lv and Bai, 2021). However, some studies also suggest that the carbon




Fig. 2. Green bond issuance by company listing status.




Fig. 3. Green bond issuance and carbon trading pilot regions.

trading pilot program can reduce the financing cost of corporate bonds (Meng et al., 2022; Zou et al., 2023). Therefore, it is beneficial to study the impact of the carbon trading pilot program on the financing cost of green bonds due to the inconsistent information in the extant literature.

Using a sample of green bonds issued by Chinese corporations, we find that the carbon trading pilot program significantly reduces the financing cost of green bonds by promoting green innovation. Moreover, the impact of the pilot program is more salient in regions with better renewable energy development and a higher level of marketisation. This research suggests that a market-based initiative, the carbon trading pilot program, reduces the financing cost of green bonds.

This paper contributes to the existing literature in various aspects. First, the conclusions of this study are more generalisable and enrich the literature by showing that a market-based mechanism can promote green commitment. Previous studies on the carbon trading pilot program often focus on its influence in a particular industry. For example, Zou et al. (2023) highlight the role of the carbon trading pilot program in reducing the financing cost of corporate bonds issued by high-carbon enterprises. Meng et al. (2022) find that the carbon trading program lowers the cost of long-term debt for manufacturing firms facing significant financing constraints. In contrast, this paper provides a broader perspective on the impact of the carbon trading pilot program on the financing cost of green bonds. Second, this research offers bond-level evidence that the pilot program can reduce the financing cost of bonds by promoting corporate green innovation, which is a critical factor in enhancing corporate sustainability. Third, this research holds considerable significance for policymakers and market participants by providing evidence of the positive effects of market-based environmental policies in addressing green concerns among market participants.

2. Hypotheses development

The carbon trading market has been proven to be an effective market-based initiative for reducing carbon emissions (Hu et al., 2020; Shi et al., 2022; Zhang et al., 2020a). Companies can trade carbon emission allowances freely in a carbon trading market, providing an effective market mechanism to internalise the externalities of environmental pollution. Hu et al. (2020) illustrate that the carbon trading pilot program can reduce energy consumption and carbon emissions by improving market efficiency. Furthermore, the pilot trading effect is more pronounced in cities with higher carbon emissions and stricter environmental supervision (Shi et al., 2022).

In the carbon trading market, emissions that exceed a quota hurt company valuation, which affects the financing cost of bonds (Clarkson et al., 2015). Therefore, the financing cost of bonds increases with carbon emissions intensity (Caragnano et al., 2020) and carbon-related risks (Jung et al., 2018). However, studies also suggest that the carbon trading pilot program can reduce the financing cost of bonds for high carbon-emitting companies by improving corporate transparency and reducing information asymmetry (Meng et al., 2022; Zou et al., 2023).

Liu et al. (2022) find that, in terms of external economic factors, stricter environmental regulations and pollution control have the greatest positive impact on green bond issuance volume, while policy support has no statistically significant impact. Moreover, studies suggest that green bond yield spread is driven by the GDP, the consumer price index (Grishunin et al., 2023), external verification (Fatica et al., 2021) and bond characteristics such as size, maturity (Karpf and Mandel, 2018), rating, and coupon rate (Grishunin et al., 2023). Based on the existing literature, we propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1. (H1): The carbon trading pilot program reduces the financing cost of green bonds.

The number of patents for companies included in the carbon trading pilot program has significantly increased, demonstrating an incentive for these companies to reduce carbon emissions via innovation (Calel and Dechezlepretre, 2014; Ren et al., 2020). In addition, both high carbon trading prices and high price volatility encourage firms to enhance innovation activities (Lv and Bai, 2021). According to the existing literature, green innovation can improve a firm's market value (Kajander et al., 2012) and financial performance (Zhang et al., 2020b). This increases the bond repayment ability of the firm and reduces the financing cost of bonds.³ In summary, the carbon trading pilot program can promote corporate innovation. Based on this analysis, we propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2. (H2): The carbon trading pilot program lowers the financing cost of green bonds by promoting green innovation.

3. Data and methodology

3.1. Sample and data

Since the first green bond in China was issued in 2016, our sample includes all non-perpetual green corporate bonds and green enterprise bonds issued from 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2022 (Su et al., 2023; Wang and Wang, 2024; Zou et al., 2023). The data on the issuance information of green bonds are collected from the CSMAR database. The macro-level data and financial information of issuing companies are obtained from Choice Financial Terminal. We include two types of green bonds, labelled and non-labelled, since both have promoted the development of China's green bonds market (Li et al., 2022; Tang et al., 2023). Labelled green bonds are marked as 'green' at issuance, while non-labelled green bonds refer to those that have not been specifically labelled as 'green' but are invested in green projects and comply with relevant domestic and international green catalogue standards (Li et al., 2022).⁴ Bonds with incomplete or missing financial information are excluded, leaving 887 green bonds in our sample.

3.2. Methodology

Following the existing literature (Hu et al., 2022; Su et al., 2023; Zhang et al., 2021), we employ the ordinary least squares regression model to examine the influence of the carbon trading pilot program on the financing cost of green bonds. To address the unobserved characteristics and time-varying heterogeneity, we include industry and year effects in the baseline regression (Xu et al., 2022).

$$\text{Credit Spread}_{i,t} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{Pilot}_i + \alpha_2 \sum \text{Bond Controls}_{i,t} + \alpha_3 \sum \text{Firm Controls}_{i,t-1} + \alpha_4 \sum \text{Macro Controls}_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where i and t respectively represent bonds and the year of bond issuance. $\text{Credit Spread}_{i,t}$ refers to the yield spread for bond i at issuance. Pilot_i is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bond issuer is in a carbon pilot area and 0 otherwise. Following Flammer (2021) and Hu et al. (2022), $\text{Bond Controls}_{i,t}$ refers to a series of control variables for bond characteristics. Following Wang et al. (2020a), Zhang et al. (2021) and Li, Zhang, and Wang (2022), we also include firm-level ($\text{Firm Controls}_{i,t-1}$) and macro-level ($\text{Macro Controls}_{i,t-1}$) control variables, all lagged by one year. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1 % and 99 % levels. Tables A1 and B1 in the appendices provide the detailed definitions of variables and t -test results for the bonds issued in the pilot and non-pilot areas. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the main variables.

³ A key characteristic of green innovation is its dual externalities – knowledge spillovers and environmental protection – which distinguish it from traditional innovation (Barbieri et al., 2020; Shao & Chen 2022; Tian et al., 2021). Specifically, green innovation activities are more likely to foster knowledge spillovers than non-green activities and can serve as a foundation for future inventions (Barbieri et al., 2020). In addition, green innovation provides positive environmental impacts and benefits to the whole of society, including those that do not bear any costs (Tian et al., 2021). Green innovation has attracted significant attention, prompting many countries to implement various subsidy policies to support its development (Carboni, 2017; Hewitt-Dundas & Roper, 2010; Meuleman & De Maeseneire, 2012), especially in China (Shao & Chen, 2022; Xie et al., 2019). Therefore, we expect that green innovation can serve as a mechanism through which the carbon trading pilot program, a government initiative, can lower the financing cost of green bonds.

⁴ The data on labelled green bonds are obtained from the CSMAR database, and the data on non-labelled green bonds are collected from the China Bond Information Network (CBIN) Green Bond Environmental Benefit Information Database.

Table 1
Summary statistics.

Variable	Obs.	Mean	SD	Min	p25	p50	p75	Max
Panel A: Dependent and independent variables								
<i>Credit Spread</i>	887	0.017	0.012	0.003	0.008	0.013	0.025	0.048
<i>Pilot</i>	887	0.486	0.500	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
Panel B: Bond-level controls								
<i>Labelled</i>	887	0.581	0.494	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
<i>Term</i>	887	6.178	2.650	1.000	5.000	7.000	7.000	15.000
<i>Amount</i>	887	1.158	0.754	0.100	0.600	1.000	1.500	3.500
<i>Rating</i>	887	3.485	0.734	1.000	3.000	4.000	4.000	4.000
<i>Redeemable</i>	887	0.018	0.133	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
<i>Puttable</i>	887	0.382	0.486	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
<i>Market</i>	887	0.569	0.495	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Panel C: Firm-level controls								
<i>Listed</i>	887	0.147	0.354	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
<i>SOE</i>	887	0.948	0.222	0.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
<i>Lnsize</i>	887	16.220	1.992	13.260	14.670	15.821	17.477	20.876
<i>Cash/debt</i>	887	0.019	0.109	-0.281	-0.042	0.017	0.083	0.309
<i>Quick ratio</i>	887	1.389	1.181	0.175	0.682	1.057	1.669	7.768
<i>ROA</i>	887	0.019	0.019	-0.004	0.006	0.012	0.025	0.091
Panel D: Macro-level controls								
<i>M2 growth</i>	887	0.006	0.007	-0.007	0.002	0.006	0.012	0.022
<i>GDP growth</i>	887	0.058	0.059	-0.195	0.031	0.067	0.082	0.201

This table reports the summary statistics of the key variables used in this study. The sample contains 887 bonds issued from 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2022.

4. Empirical analysis

4.1. Baseline regression

Table 2 reports the baseline regression results. Industry and year effects are not controlled for in Column (1), but both effects are included in Column (2). In both columns, the coefficients of *Pilot* are negative and significant at the 1 % level, indicating that the financing cost of green bonds is lower when the issuers are in a carbon trading pilot area; thus, Hypothesis 1 is proved. The results of the control variables are consistent with those from existing studies (Hu et al., 2022; Su et al., 2023; Zhang et al., 2021).

4.2. Entropy-balanced sample estimation

We employ the entropy balancing method to address the possible issues arising from sample selection bias. Entropy balancing reduces the potential biases due to unobserved confounding variables by using a maximum entropy reweighting scheme to adjust inequalities in representation (Hainmueller, 2012). This method reweights covariates' means and variances between firms located in pilot regions and those in non-pilot regions, thus providing a balanced sample for each matching dimension. Panels A and B in Table 3 report the mean, variance, and skewness of the variables before and after entropy balancing, respectively. The results in Panel B show that the potential sample selection bias has been reduced after entropy balancing. Panel C reports the regression results using the entropy-balanced sample, showing that the results are robust when the sample selection bias has been addressed.

4.3. Mechanism analysis

We next conduct a mechanism analysis to test the underlying channel defined in Hypothesis 2 using the following model:

$$Innovation_{i,t} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Pilot_t + \alpha_2 \sum Bond\ Controls_{i,t} + \alpha_3 \sum Firm\ Controls_{i,t-1} + \alpha_4 \sum Macro\ Controls_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (2)$$

where $Innovation_{i,t}$ refers to the level of green innovation of a green bond issuer. This is calculated as the natural logarithm of 1 plus the green patent granted, following the existing literature (Quan et al., 2021). Column (1) in Table 4 shows a significantly positive

Table 2
Carbon pilot program and the financing cost of green bonds.

	(1) Credit Spread	(2) Credit Spread
<i>Pilot</i>	−0.0029*** (−4.392)	−0.0025*** (−4.145)
<i>Labelled</i>	0.0003 (0.544)	0.0002 (0.403)
<i>Term</i>	0.0008*** (6.734)	0.0008*** (7.206)
<i>Amount</i>	−0.0016*** (−3.776)	−0.0019*** (−4.763)
<i>Rating</i>	−0.0056*** (−13.475)	−0.0058*** (−15.203)
<i>Redeemable</i>	−0.0030 (−1.448)	−0.0039** (−2.085)
<i>Puttable</i>	−0.0028*** (−4.481)	−0.0026*** (−4.596)
<i>Market</i>	0.0029*** (4.330)	0.0023*** (3.677)
<i>Listed</i>	0.0050*** (4.575)	0.0036*** (3.645)
<i>SOE</i>	−0.0085*** (−6.257)	−0.0074*** (−5.476)
<i>Lnsize</i>	−0.0015*** (−7.010)	−0.0013*** (−6.559)
<i>Cash/debt</i>	−0.0079*** (−2.677)	−0.0087*** (−3.055)
<i>Quick Ratio</i>	0.0000 (0.065)	0.0002 (0.992)
<i>ROA</i>	−0.0359* (−1.916)	−0.0227 (−1.322)
<i>M2 growth</i>	−0.0383 (−1.009)	−0.0459 (−1.325)
<i>GDP growth</i>	−0.0033 (−0.708)	0.0076 (1.069)
<i>Constant</i>	0.0663*** (17.867)	0.0641*** (14.290)
Industry Effects	No	Yes
Year Effects	No	Yes
Observations	887	853
Adj. R ²	0.548	0.652

This table reports the baseline regression results. *t*-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, respectively.

coefficient of *Pilot* on the mediator (*Innovation*), indicating that the carbon trading pilot program increases green innovation. Column (2) shows a significantly negative coefficient of *Innovation*, indicating that the more green innovation a firm engages in, the lower the financing cost of green bonds. In Column (3), the coefficient of *Pilot* is significantly negative; thus, Hypothesis 2 is verified.

4.4. Cross-sectional variation analysis

We also estimate the influence of renewable energy (RE) development and the level of marketisation on the relationship between the financing cost of green bonds and the pilot program.⁵ Following Wang et al. (2020b), we define the top 25 % of provinces in the RE development as high RE development regions and the rest as low RE development regions. In addition, using the marketisation index proposed by Wang et al. (2022b), we separate the sample into two subsamples, the eastern region and the rest of the country. The results in Table 5 indicate that the coefficient of *Pilot* is significant for issuers in the high RE development provinces and issuers from the eastern part of China. These results suggest that a higher level of marketisation and RE development promote green development,

⁵ According to the existing literature, both renewable energy development and consumption can significantly reduce carbon emissions (Dogan & Seker, 2016; Qi et al., 2014) and promote the achievement of carbon neutrality targets (Dong et al., 2022). Another stream of research indicates that the financing cost of bonds increases with carbon emissions intensity (Caragnano et al., 2020) and carbon-related risks (Jung et al., 2018). Therefore, it is important to examine whether the financing cost of bonds varies with the level of renewable energy development. Furthermore, as a market-based mechanism, the effectiveness of the carbon trading pilot program may be influenced by the level of marketization. Specifically, a higher level of marketization reflects greater efficiency in price discovery (Callon, 2016) and resource allocation (Caliskan & Callon, 2010), making it worthwhile to investigate whether the effect of the carbon trading pilot program is more pronounced in regions with a higher level of marketization.

Table 3
Entropy-balanced sample estimation.

Panel A Entropy balancing: Comparison of means and variance before entropy balancing						
	Treat (n = 431)			Control (n = 456)		
	Mean	Variance	Skewness	Mean	Variance	Skewness
Labelled	0.5592	0.2471	-0.2383	0.6009	0.2404	-0.4120
Term	5.5340	8.9050	1.2920	6.7870	4.4930	0.9703
Amount	1.4040	0.7100	0.8093	0.9243	0.3229	1.4640
Rating	3.7420	0.3638	-2.4920	3.2410	0.5834	-0.4370
Redeemable	0.0139	0.0138	8.2970	0.0219	0.0215	6.5290
Puttable	0.3991	0.2404	0.4122	0.3662	0.2326	0.5553
Market	0.3944	0.2394	0.4320	0.7346	0.1954	-1.0630
Listed	0.2042	0.1629	1.4680	0.0921	0.0838	2.8210
SOE	0.9281	0.0669	-3.3140	0.9671	0.0319	-5.2380
Lnsiz	17.0200	3.7860	0.3464	15.4700	2.9860	1.8040
Cash/debt	0.0507	0.0101	-0.0505	-0.0114	0.0117	-0.0675
Quick Ratio	1.0680	0.8329	2.9080	1.6920	1.7410	2.4800
ROA	0.0240	0.0004	1.2360	0.0135	0.0002	2.6030
M2 growth	0.0061	0.0001	0.2204	0.0063	0.0001	0.1575
GDP growth	0.0527	0.0050	-1.2610	0.0635	0.0019	0.1519
Panel B Entropy balancing: Comparison of means and variance after entropy balancing						
	Treat (n = 431)			Control (n = 456)		
	Mean	Variance	Skewness	Mean	Variance	Skewness
Labelled	0.5592	0.2471	-0.2383	0.5591	0.2470	-0.2383
Term	5.5340	8.9050	1.2920	5.5340	8.9040	1.6320
Amount	1.4040	0.7100	0.8093	1.4040	0.7099	0.9611
Rating	3.7420	0.3638	-2.4920	3.7420	0.3638	-2.1720
Redeemable	0.0139	0.0138	8.2970	0.0139	0.0138	8.2980
Puttable	0.3991	0.2404	0.4122	0.3991	0.2403	0.4122
Market	0.3944	0.2394	0.4320	0.3945	0.2394	0.4319
Listed	0.2042	0.1629	1.4680	0.2042	0.1628	1.4680
SOE	0.9281	0.0669	-3.3140	0.9281	0.0669	-3.3130
Lnsiz	17.0200	3.7860	0.3464	17.0100	3.7860	0.8069
Cash/debt	0.0507	0.0101	-0.0505	0.0507	0.0101	-0.6700
Quick Ratio	1.0680	0.8329	2.9080	1.0680	0.8330	2.5690
ROA	0.0240	0.0004	1.2360	0.0240	0.0004	0.8102
M2 growth	0.0061	0.0001	0.2204	0.0061	0.0001	0.3733
GDP growth	0.0527	0.0050	-1.2610	0.0527	0.0050	0.1295
Panel C: Regression result using the entropy-balanced sample						
	(1)	(2)				
	Credit Spread	Credit Spread				
Pilot	-0.0021**	-0.0018***				
	(-2.289)	(-3.150)				
Constant	0.0097***	0.0457***				
	(5.176)	(8.617)				
Controls	No	Yes				
Industry Effects	Yes	Yes				
Year Effects	Yes	Yes				
Observations	887	887				
Adj. R ²	0.675	0.447				

Panels A and B of this table report the mean, variance and skewness of indicators between issuers located in and out of the carbon pilot regions before and after entropy balancing, respectively. Panel C reports the regression results of using the post-balancing sample. *t*-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, respectively.

resulting in a pronounced effect of the pilot program on the financing cost of green bonds.

5. Conclusion

This study documents that the carbon trading pilot program in China significantly reduces the financing cost of green bonds by promoting green innovation. Moreover, this effect is more pronounced in regions with high RE development and a high level of marketisation. We contribute to the existing literature by providing a deeper understanding of the impact of market-based carbon trading reform on the financing cost of green bonds. The results of this study offer valuable insights for policymakers and investors. First, the empirical evidence enables policymakers to better understand the effectiveness of the carbon trading program. Second, our mechanism analysis suggests that investment in green innovation has a signal effect that can alleviate green concerns among investors and market participants. Third, our results support the argument that the carbon trading pilot program reduces information asymmetry, increases the effectiveness of bond financing, and to some extent, may prevent companies from using green bonds for greenwashing. Moreover, our study highlights the significance of enhancing market infrastructure to foster sustainable development. Future

Table 4
Mediation effect of green innovation.

	(1) <i>Credit Spread</i>	(2) <i>Innovation</i>	(3) <i>Credit Spread</i>
<i>Pilot</i>	-0.0025*** (-4.145)	0.1350*** (3.148)	-0.0024*** (-3.857)
<i>Innovation</i>			-0.0012** (-2.473)
<i>Constant</i>	0.0663*** (17.867)	-0.1760 (-0.360)	0.0639*** (10.550)
<i>Controls</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	853	853	853
Adj. R ²	0.652	0.232	0.654

This table shows the mediation effect of green innovation on the financing cost of green bonds. *Innovation* is the natural logarithm of 1 plus the green patent applications. *t*-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, respectively.

Table 5
Renewable energy development and location of issuers.

	High RE development (1) <i>Credit Spread</i>	Low RE development (2) <i>Credit Spread</i>	Eastern region (3) <i>Credit Spread</i>	Other regions (4) <i>Credit Spread</i>
<i>Pilot</i>	-0.0023** (-2.533)	0.0013 (1.113)	-0.0031*** (-4.321)	0.0014 (1.136)
<i>Constant</i>	0.0377*** (8.884)	0.0828*** (10.210)	0.0452*** (8.148)	0.0827*** (9.934)
<i>Controls</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	491	396	523	347
Adj. R ²	0.606	0.665	0.639	0.661

This table reports the subsample analyses when renewable energy development and the location of the bond issuers are considered. *t*-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, respectively.

research may investigate additional mechanisms through which the market-based environmental schemes can impact corporate green engagement across diverse regulatory and economic contexts.

CRedit authorship contribution statement

Haojun Yuan: Writing – original draft, Validation, Software, Methodology, Investigation, Formal analysis, Data curation. **Jing Liao:** Writing – review & editing, Supervision, Methodology, Conceptualization. **Martin Young:** Writing – review & editing, Supervision, Methodology, Conceptualization.

Appendix A

Table A1
Variable description.

Variable	Definition
<i>Credit Spread</i>	Financing cost of green bonds; calculated as the difference between the yield of a green bond at the time of issuance and the yield of a government bond with the same maturity.
<i>Pilot Labelled</i>	Dummy variable; equals 1 if the bond issuer is located in a carbon pilot area and 0 otherwise.
<i>Term</i>	Dummy variable; equals 1 if the bond is labelled as a green bond and 0 otherwise.
<i>Amount</i>	Bond term.
<i>Rating</i>	Bond issuance amount.
<i>Redeemable</i>	Bond rating; equals 1, 2, 3 or 4 when the bond rating is less than AA, AA, AA+ or AAA, respectively.
<i>Puttable</i>	Dummy variable; equals 1 if the bond is redeemable and 0 otherwise.
<i>Market</i>	Dummy variable; equals 1 if the bond is puttable and 0 otherwise.
	Dummy variable; equals 1 if the bond is issued in more than one market and 0 otherwise.

(continued on next page)

Table A1 (continued)

Variable	Definition
<i>Listed</i>	Dummy variable; equals 1 if the bond issuer is a listed public company and 0 otherwise.
<i>SOE</i>	Dummy variable; equals 1 if the bond issuer is a state-owned enterprise and 0 otherwise.
<i>Lnsiz</i>	Natural logarithm of bond issuer's total assets.
<i>Cash/debt</i>	Bond issuer's cash ratio; calculated as the net cash flows from operating activities divided by total liability.
<i>Quick ratio</i>	Bond issuer's quick ratio; calculated as the sum of monetary capital, trading financial assets, accounts receivable, notes receivable and other receivables, divided by current liability.
<i>ROA</i>	Bond issuer's return on assets ratio; calculated as net income divided by total assets.
<i>M2 growth</i>	Currency supply growth speed; calculated as the current year's money supply minus the previous year's money supply, divided by the previous year's money supply.
<i>GDP growth</i>	Growth of GDP of the city where the bond issuer is located.

Appendix B

Table B1

Comparison between the firms located within and without carbon trading pilot area.

	Without pilot area		Within pilot area		Mean differences	
	Obs.	Mean	Obs.	Mean	Mean	t-Value
<i>Credit Spread</i>	456	0.022	431	0.012	0.011***	15.208
<i>Labelled</i>	456	0.601	431	0.559	0.042	1.258
<i>Term</i>	456	6.787	431	5.534	1.254***	7.244
<i>Amount</i>	456	0.924	431	1.404	-0.480***	-9.999
<i>Rating</i>	456	3.241	431	3.742	-0.501***	-10.806
<i>Redeemable</i>	456	0.022	431	0.014	0.008	0.895
<i>Puttable</i>	456	0.366	431	0.399	-0.033	-1.006
<i>Market</i>	456	0.735	431	0.394	0.340***	10.877
<i>Listed</i>	456	0.092	431	0.204	-0.112***	-4.772
<i>SOE</i>	456	0.967	431	0.928	0.039***	2.627
<i>Lnsiz</i>	456	15.47	431	17.02	-1.546***	-12.526
<i>Cash/debt</i>	456	-0.011	431	0.051	-0.062***	-8.841
<i>Quick ratio</i>	456	1.692	431	1.068	0.625***	8.155
<i>ROA</i>	456	0.014	431	0.024	-0.011***	-8.758
<i>M2 growth</i>	456	0.006	431	0.006	0.000	0.301
<i>GDP growth</i>	456	0.063	431	0.053	0.011***	2.735

This table reports the summary statistics and the differences between firms located within the carbon trading pilot areas and those outside these areas.

Appendix C. Propensity score matching (PSM) approach

To address the endogeneity issue arising from sample selection, we employ the PSM method to create the comparable treatment (bonds issued by firms that are included in the pilot program) and control group (bonds issued by firms that are not included in the pilot program). Given the relatively small sample size of 887 bonds in this study, we perform matching with replacement for both 1-to-2 and 1-to-3 ratios to expand the matched sample. We construct the matching based on a set of bond and issuer indicators. Bond characteristics include bond term, amount, rating, redeemable, puttable and market nature. Issuer characteristics include firm size, state control, listing status, cash to debt ratio, quick ratio and return on assets.

Panel A in [Table C1](#) reports the *t*-test results comparing the bond and issuer characteristics before PSM matching. The treated group consists of the bonds issued by firms that are included in the pilot program while the control group consists of the bonds issued by firms that are not included in the pilot program. The results show that most of the indicators are significantly different before PSM matching. Panel B reports the *t*-test results after the PSM matching, showing that the differences become statistically insignificant. Therefore, the sample selection bias has been reduced after the matching procedure. Panel C provides the regression results using the two matched samples, e.g., 1-to-2 and 1-to-3 matching. The results confirm that the carbon trading pilot program has a significant negative effect on the financing cost of green bonds, which is consistent with the baseline regression results.

Table C1

PSM approach.

Panel A: Summary statistics and <i>t</i> -test of unmatched sample					
Variable	D1=1 (Treated)		D1=0 (Control)		Mean Difference
	Obs.	Mean	Obs.	Mean	

(continued on next page)

Table C1 (continued)

Panel A: Summary statistics and <i>t</i> -test of unmatched sample										
Variable	D1=1 (Treated)		D1=0 (Control)		Mean Difference					
	Obs.	Mean	Obs.	Mean						
<i>Term</i>	420	5.5210	453	6.6950	-6.84***					
<i>Amount</i>	420	1.3970	453	0.9230	9.83***					
<i>Rating</i>	420	3.7380	453	3.2430	10.52***					
<i>Redeemable</i>	420	0.0143	453	0.0221	-0.86					
<i>Puttable</i>	420	0.3830	453	0.3640	0.58					
<i>Market</i>	420	0.3930	453	0.7330	-10.78***					
<i>Non-SOE</i>	420	0.0738	453	0.0397	2.19**					
<i>Lnsize</i>	420	17.0200	453	15.4800	12.37***					
<i>Listed</i>	420	0.2070	453	0.0927	4.82***					
<i>Cash/debt</i>	420	0.0496	453	-0.0131	8.89***					
<i>Quick Ratio</i>	420	1.0730	453	1.6640	-7.95***					
Panel B: Summary statistics and <i>t</i> -test of matched samples										
Variable	1-to-2 Matching				Mean Difference	1-to-3 Matching				
	D2=1 (Treated)		D2=0 (Control)			D2=1 (Treated)		D2=0 (Control)		
	Obs.	Mean	Obs.	Mean		Obs.	Mean	Obs.	Mean	
<i>Term</i>	225	5.612	217	5.664	-0.27	276	5.612	261	5.598	-0.27
<i>Amount</i>	225	1.283	217	1.299	-0.3	276	1.283	261	1.282	-0.3
<i>Rating</i>	225	3.721	217	3.694	0.63	276	3.721	261	3.706	0.63
<i>Redeemable</i>	225	0.015	217	0.010	0.64	276	0.0152	261	0.015	0.64
<i>Puttable</i>	225	0.396	217	0.468	-2.05**	276	0.396	261	0.454	-2.05*
<i>Market</i>	225	0.409	217	0.355	1.54	276	0.409	261	0.360	1.54
<i>Non-SOE</i>	225	0.076	217	0.095	-0.95	276	0.0761	261	0.088	-0.95
<i>Lnsize</i>	225	16.950	217	16.770	1.24	276	16.95	261	16.850	1.24
<i>Listed</i>	225	0.208	217	0.232	-0.82	276	0.208	261	0.252	-0.82
<i>Cash/debt</i>	225	0.044	217	0.039	0.68	276	0.0437	261	0.040	0.68
<i>Quick Ratio</i>	225	1.103	217	1.193	-1.4	276	1.103	261	1.174	-1.4
Panel C: PSM approach analysis										
	1-to-2 Matching		1-to-3 Matching							
	<i>Credit Spread</i>		<i>Credit Spread</i>							
<i>Pilot</i>	-0.0019**		-0.0021**							
	(-2.041)		(-2.293)							
<i>Constant</i>	0.0682***		0.0639***							
	(8.772)		(8.436)							
Observations	410		502							
Adj. R ²	0.638		0.614							
Industry Effect	Yes		Yes							
Year Effect	Yes		Yes							

This table reports the *t*-test results before and after PSM matching and the regression result using the matched samples. Panel A reports the *t*-test results comparing the bond and issuer characteristics before PSM matching. Panel B reports the *t*-test results comparing the bond and issuer characteristics after PSM matching. Panel C reports the regression results using the two matched samples, e.g., 1-to-2 and 1-to-3 matching. *t*-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, respectively.

Appendix D. Additional checks

To avoid errors due to measurement construction, following Tang et al. (2023), we employ an alternative risk-free benchmark to calculate the financing cost of green bonds (*Credit Spread1*). The new benchmark is the YTM of National Development Bonds with comparable maturity issued by the China Development Bank. As a policy bank led by the State Council, its credit rating is essentially equivalent to that of government bonds. Table D1 reports the results after rerunning the baseline model; they are consistent with the baseline results. We also choose the 2018 Environmental Protection Tax reform as a shock to conduct the placebo test and examine whether yield spread is affected by other policies. Fig. D1 reports the results of this analysis and shows that the real regression coefficient is significantly different from the estimated coefficient, indicating that our baseline results are robust.

Table D1
Alternative measure of the financing cost of green bonds.

	(1)	(2)
	<i>Credit Spread1</i>	<i>Credit Spread1</i>
<i>Pilot</i>	-0.0030***	-0.0028***
	(-4.764)	(-4.445)
<i>Constant</i>	0.0652***	0.0641***
	(18.390)	(14.159)
<i>Controls</i>	Yes	Yes

(continued on next page)

Table D1 (continued)

	(1)	(2)
	<i>Credit Spread1</i>	<i>Credit Spread1</i>
Industry Effects	No	Yes
Year Effects	No	Yes
Observations	887	853
adj. R^2	0.548	0.613

This table reports the results of a robustness check using an alternative measure of the financing cost of green bonds. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, respectively.




Fig. D1. Placebo test results for 2018 Environmental Protection Tax reform.

Appendix E. Granger causality test

To test the dynamic relationship between the carbon trading pilot program and innovation, we conduct a Granger causality test based on a vector autoregression model. All time series pass the unit root test (Augmented Dicky–Fuller [ADF] test), and the results are reported in [Table E1](#).

[Table E2](#) reports the main results of the Granger causality test. The first row reports the test for the null hypothesis that the carbon trading pilot program does not Granger cause green innovation. The F-statistic is 2.8031, therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 10 % significance level, indicating the presence of Granger causality. The second row shows the test for the null hypothesis that green innovation does not Granger cause the carbon trading pilot program, with an F-statistic of 0.18052. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected, indicating the absence of Granger causality. Therefore, the results suggest that the carbon trading pilot program Granger-causes green innovation.

Table E1
The Augmented Dicky–Fuller (ADF) test.

	ADF test for unit root	MacKinnon p-value
<i>Pilot</i>	-3.822***	0.0027
<i>Innovation</i>	-5.027***	0.0000

The ADF test reports the unit root test results with the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, respectively.

Table E2
Granger causality tests between green innovation and carbon trading pilot.

Null hypothesis	F-statistic	Test results
Carbon trading pilot does not Granger cause green innovation	2.8031*	Reject
Green innovation does not Granger cause carbon trading pilot	0.1805	Not reject

The values denote the Wald statistics. *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, respectively.

Data availability

Data will be made available on request.

References

- Bachelet, M.J., Becchetti, L., Manfredonia, S., 2019. The green bonds premium puzzle: the role of issuer characteristics and third-party verification. *Sustainability*. 11 (4). Article 1098.
- Barbieri, N., Marzucchi, A., Rizzo, U., 2020. Knowledge sources and impacts on subsequent inventions: do green technologies differ from non-green ones? *Res. Policy*. 49 (2). Article 103901.
- Calel, R., Dechezlepretre, A., 2014. Environmental policy and directed technological change: evidence from the European carbon market. *Rev. Econ. Statist.* 98 (1), 173–191.
- Caliskan, K., Callon, M., 2010. Economization, part 2: a research programme for the study of markets. *Econ. Soc.* 39 (1), 1–32.
- Caragnano, A., Mariani, M., Pizzutilo, F., Zito, M., 2020. Is it worth reducing GHG emissions? Exploring the effect on the cost of debt financing. *J. Environ. Manage* 270. Article 110860.
- Callon, M., 2016. Revisiting marketization: from interface-markets to market-agencements. *Consump. Market. Cult.* 19 (1), 17–37.
- Carboni, O.A., 2017. The effect of public support on investment and R&D: an empirical evaluation on European manufacturing firms. *Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change* 117, 282–295.
- Central Government of the People's Republic of China. (2020, November 3). *The cumulative transaction volume of carbon emission trading pilot exceeded 9 billion yuan*. The Chinese government's website. https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-11/03/content_5556838.htm.
- Clarkson, P.M., Li, Y., Pinnuck, M., Richardson, G.D., 2015. The valuation relevance of greenhouse gas emissions under the European Union carbon emission trading scheme. *Europ. Account. Rev.* 24 (3), 551–580.
- Climate Bonds Initiative, China Central Depository & Clearing Research Centre. (2022, June 1). *China green bond Market Report 2021*. https://www.climatebonds.net/files/reports/cbi_china_sotm_2021_0.pdf.
- Curley, M., 2014. *Finance Policy For Renewable Energy and a Sustainable Environment*. CRC Press.
- Dogan, E., Seker, F., 2016. The influence of real output, renewable and non-renewable energy, trade and financial development on carbon emissions in the top renewable energy countries. *Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev.* 60, 1074–1085.
- Dong, F., Li, Y., Gao, Y., Zhu, J., Qin, C., Zhang, X., 2022. Energy transition and carbon neutrality: exploring the non-linear impact of renewable energy development on carbon emission efficiency in developed countries. *Res., Conserv. Recycl.* 177. Article 106002.
- Fatica, S., Panzica, R., Rancan, M., 2021. The pricing of green bonds: are financial institutions special? *J. Financ. Stabil.* 54. Article 100873.
- Flaherty, M., Gevorkyan, A., Radpour, S., Semmler, W., 2017. Financing climate policies through climate bonds—A three stage model and empirics. *Res. Int. Bus. Finance* 42, 468–479.
- Flammer, C., 2021. Corporate green bonds. *J. financ. econ.* 142 (2), 499–516.
- Gianfrate, G., Peri, M., 2019. The green advantage: exploring the convenience of issuing green bonds. *J. Clean. Prod.* 219, 127–135.
- Grishunin, S., Bukreeva, A., Suloeva, S., Burova, E., 2023. Analysis of yields and their determinants in the European corporate green bond market. *Risks* 11 (1). Article 14.
- Hainmueller, J., 2012. Entropy balancing for causal effects: a multivariate reweighting method to produce balanced samples in observational studies. *Politic. Anal.* 20 (1), 25–46.
- Hewitt-Dundas, N., Roper, S., 2010. Output additionality of public support for innovation: evidence for Irish manufacturing plants. *Eur. Plan. Stud.* 18 (1), 107–122.
- Hu, X., Zhong, A., Cao, Y., 2022. Greenium in the Chinese corporate bond market. *Emerg. Markets Rev.* 53. Article 100946.
- Hu, Y., Ren, S., Wang, Y., Chen, X., 2020. Can carbon emission trading scheme achieve energy conservation and emission reduction? Evidence from the industrial sector in China. *Energy Econ.* 85, 104590. Article.
- Huang, N., He, R., Luo, L., Shen, H., 2024. Carbon emission trading scheme and firm debt financing. *J. Contemp. Account. Econ.* 20 (1), 100384.
- Jung, J., Herbohn, K., Clarkson, P., 2018. Carbon risk, carbon risk awareness and the cost of debt financing. *J. Business Ethics* 150, 1151–1171.
- Kajander, J.K., Sivunen, M., Vimpari, J., Pulkka, L., Junnila, S., 2012. Market value of sustainability business innovations in the construction sector. *Build. Res. Inform.* 40 (6), 665–678.
- Karpf, A., Mandel, A., 2018. The changing value of the 'green' label on the US municipal bond market. *Nat. Clim. Chang.* 8 (2), 161–165.
- Lee, S.Y., Choi, D.K., 2021. Does corporate carbon risk management mitigate the cost of debt capital? Evidence from South Korean climate change policies. *Emerg. Markets Fin. Trade* 57 (7), 2138–2151.
- Li, Q., Zhang, K., Wang, L., 2022. Where's the green bond premium? Evidence from China. *Financ. Res. Lett.* 48. Article 102950.
- Lin, T., Du, M., Ren, S., Lin, T., Du, M., Ren, S., 2022. How do green bonds affect green technology innovation? Firm evidence from China. *Green Fin.* 4, 492–511.
- Liu, L.C., Cao, D., Wei, Y.M., 2016. What drives intersectoral CO2 emissions in China? *J. Clean. Prod.* 133, 1053–1061.
- Liu, S., Qi, H., Wan, Y., 2022. Driving factors behind the development of China's green bond market. *J. Clean. Prod.* 354. Article 131705.
- Lv, M., Bai, M., 2021. Evaluation of China's carbon emission trading policy from corporate innovation. *Financ. Res. Lett.* 39. Article 101565.
- Meng, L., Wang, K., Su, T., He, H., 2022. Carbon emission trading and corporate financing: evidence from China. *Energies (Basel)* 15 (14). Article 5036.
- Meuleman, M., De Maeseneire, W., 2012. Do R&D subsidies affect SMEs' access to external financing? *Res. Policy*. 41 (3), 580–591.
- Naeem, M.A., Nguyen, T.T.H., Nepal, R., Ngo, Q.T., Taghizadeh-Hesary, F., 2021. Asymmetric relationship between green bonds and commodities: evidence from extreme quantile approach. *Financ. Res. Lett.* 43. Article 101983.
- Qi, S., Pang, L., Qi, T., Zhang, X., Pirtea, M.G., 2024. The correlation between the green bond market and carbon trading markets under climate change: evidence from China. *Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change* 203, 123367.
- Qi, T., Zhang, X., Karplus, V.J., 2014. The energy and CO2 emissions impact of renewable energy development in China. *Energy Policy* 68, 60–69.
- Quan, X., Ke, Y., Qian, Y., Zhang, Y., 2021. CEO foreign experience and green innovation: evidence from China. *J. Business Ethics* 182 (2), 535–557.
- Ren, S., Hu, Y., Zheng, J., Wang, Y., 2020. Emissions trading and firm innovation: evidence from a natural experiment in China. *Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change* 155, 119989. Article.
- Sachs, J.D., 2014. Climate change and intergenerational well-being. *Oxford Handb. Macroecon. Global Warm.* 248–259.
- Sangiorgi, I., Schopohl, L., 2021. Explaining green bond issuance using survey evidence: beyond the greenium. *The British Accounting Review*, 101071. Article.
- Shao, Y., Chen, Z., 2022. Can government subsidies promote the green technology innovation transformation? Evidence from Chinese listed companies. *Econ. Anal. Policy* 74, 716–727.
- Shi, B., Li, N., Gao, Q., Li, G., 2022. Market incentives, carbon quota allocation and carbon emission reduction: evidence from China's carbon trading pilot policy. *J. Environ. Manage* 319, 115650. Article.
- Shi, B., Wu, L., Kang, R., 2021. Clean development, energy substitution, and carbon emission: evidence from clean development mechanism (CDM) project implementation in China. *Sustainability*. 13 (2), 860.
- Song, M., Zhu, S., Wang, J., Zhao, J., 2020. Share green growth: regional evaluation of green output performance in China. *Int. J. Prod. Econ.* 219, 152–163.
- Su, T., Shi, Y., Lin, B., 2023. Label or lever? The role of reputable underwriters in Chinese green bond financing. *Financ. Res. Lett.* 53, 103612. Article.
- Tang, Y., Wang, B., Pan, N., Li, Z., 2023. The impact of environmental information disclosure on the cost of green bond: evidence from China. *Energy Econ.* 126, 107008. Article.
- Tian, Y., Song, W., Liu, M., 2021. Assessment of how environmental policy affects urban innovation: evidence from China's low-carbon pilot cities program. *Econ. Anal. Policy*. 71, 41–56.

- Tolliver, C., Keeley, A.R., Managi, S., 2019. Green bonds for the Paris Agreement and sustainable development goals. *Environ. Res. Lett.* 14 (6), 064009.
- Wang, C., Wang, H., 2024. Can the environmental trading enhance corporate green innovation efficiency? *Financ. Res. Lett.* 62, 105251. Article.
- Wang, J., Chen, X., Li, X., Yu, J., Zhong, R., 2020a. The market reaction to green bond issuance: evidence from China. *Pacific-Basin Fin. J.* 60, 101294. Article.
- Wang, T., Liu, X., Wang, H., 2022a. Green bonds, financing constraints, and green innovation. *J. Clean. Prod.* 381, 135134. Article.
- Wang, X., Hu, L., Fan, G., 2022b. Marketization Index of China's Provinces: NERI Report 2021. Social Science Academic Press, China.
- Wang, Y., Zhang, D., Ji, Q., Shi, X., 2020b. Regional renewable energy development in China: a multidimensional assessment. *Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev.* 124, 109797. Article.
- Xie, X., Zhu, Q., Wang, R., 2019. Turning green subsidies into sustainability: how green process innovation improves firms' green image. *Bus. Strategy. Environ.* 28 (7), 1416–1433.
- Xu, G., Lu, N., Tong, Y., 2022. Greenwashing and credit spread: evidence from the Chinese green bond market. *Financ. Res. Lett.* 48, 102927. Article.
- Zhang, J., Yang, G., Ding, X., Qin, J., 2022. Can green bonds empower green technology innovation of enterprises? *Environ. Sci. Pollut. Res.* 1–13.
- Zhang, R., Li, Y., Liu, Y., 2021. Green bond issuance and corporate cost of capital. *Pacific-Basin Fin. J.* 69, 101626. Article.
- Zhang, W., Li, J., Li, G., Guo, S., 2020a. Emission reduction effect and carbon market efficiency of carbon emission trading policy in China. *Energy* 196, 117117. Article.
- Zhang, Y., Xing, C., Wang, Y., 2020b. Does green innovation mitigate financing constraints? Evidence from China's private enterprises. *J. Clean. Prod.* 264, 121698. Article.
- Zhou, K., Li, Y., 2019. Carbon finance and carbon market in China: progress and challenges. *J. Clean. Prod.* 214, 536–549.
- Zou, J., Chen, P., Fu, X., Gong, C., 2023. Does carbon trading affect the bond spread of high-carbon enterprises? - evidence from China. *J. Clean. Prod.* 417, 137882. Article.