Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Australian Journal of International Affairs

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/caji20

Different nightmares, shared dreams? Australia and New Zealand's intuitive alliance

Anna Powles & Joanne Wallis

To cite this article: Anna Powles & Joanne Wallis (2024) Different nightmares, shared dreams? Australia and New Zealand's intuitive alliance, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 78:5, 536-560, DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2024.2409977

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2024.2409977

© 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

Published online: 23 Oct 2024.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 232

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Citing articles: 1 View citing articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=caji20

AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
2024, VOL. 78, NO. 5, 536–560
https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2024.2409977

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

OPEN ACCESS Check for updates

Different nightmares, shared dreams? Australia and New Zealand's intuitive alliance

Anna Powles [a] and Joanne Wallis [b]

[a]Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University, Wellington, New Zealand; [b]Department of Politics and International Relations, The University of Adelaide, Adelaide, Australia

ABSTRACT

What does this apparent relegation of the strategic significance of Australia's relationship with New Zealand to a partnership in Australia's 2023 Defence Strategic Review tell us about the status of the Australia-New Zealand alliance? Based on interviews and roundtables with leaders, officials, and academics in both countries in late 2023 and early 2024, we argue that the depth and breadth of Australia and New Zealand's defence, economic, regulatory, and people-to-people cooperation and integration has made their relationship 'intuitive'. That is, Australia and New Zealand's relationship has come to be seen as part of the natural order of things, so that the two countries see each other as a natural, permanent partner, parting company with whom is unthinkable. But we also argue that this may prevent the two neighbours from recognising and responding to tensions. To address this, we examine differences between the two countries' perceptions of themselves, their strategic interests, and their alliance, and find that the management of expectations will continue to generate tensions. While we conclude that these tensions will not fundamentally undermine the relationship, we acknowledge that it has not yet been seriously tested, for example by conflict in East Asia.

KEYWORDS

Australia; New Zealand; Alliance

On 24 April 2023, the eve of ANZAC Day, a hallowed commemoration of the shared sacrifices ANZAC (the adopted nomenclature for the Australia New Zealand Army Corps) soldiers made on the battlefields of Gallipoli during the First World War, the Australian Labor government released the public summary of the Defence Strategic Review (DSR) that it had commissioned shortly after taking office in May 2022. Defence Minister Richard Marles described the DSR as 'the blueprint for defence thinking for decades to come' (Marles 2023). The DSR declared that Australia's approach to its defence policy would be based on 'an enhanced and expanded Alliance [capitalised in original] with the United States' (Commonwealth of Australia 2023, 32). It also reaffirmed the centrepiece of the AUKUS security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US) that had been announced in September 2021 under the

CONTACT Joanne Wallis joanne.wallis@adelaide.edu.au Department of Politics and International Relations, The University of Adelaide, Adelaide, SA 5063, Australia

© 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.

previous Coalition government: the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines (Morrison, Johnson, and Biden 2021). The DSR stated that these submarines are crucial for providing the Royal Australian Navy with the necessary 'enhanced lethality' to adapt to 'the significant changes in Australia's strategic circumstances' (Commonwealth of Australia 2023, 7).

While the public summary of the DSR referred to Australia's military alliance with the US as the 'Alliance' throughout, it referred to Australia's other formal treaty ally, New Zealand, only once. And rather than characterising New Zealand as an ally, the DSR instead described it as 'a key partner for Australia in the Pacific' (Commonwealth of Australia 2023, 46). This was despite both countries being Australian allies under the 1951 *Australia New Zealand United States Treaty* (ANZUS). While acknowledging that there is likely considerably more discussion of New Zealand in the classified version of the DSR, its minimal appearance in the public version is notable.

In this article, we answer this question: what does this apparent relegation of the strategic significance of Australia's relationship with New Zealand to a *partnership* tell us about the status of the Australia–New Zealand *alliance*? Based on interviews and roundtables with leaders, officials, and academics in both countries in late 2023 and early 2024,[1] we argue that the depth and breadth of Australia and New Zealand's defence, economic, regulatory, and people-to-people cooperation and integration have made their relationship 'intuitive' (to quote several officials on both sides of the Tasman). That is, Australia and New Zealand's relationship has come to be seen as part of 'the natural order of things', so that the two countries see each other as 'a natural, permanent partner, parting company with whom is unthinkable' (Suh 2004, 152). Indeed, Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) describes the neighbours as 'natural allies with a strong trans-Tasman sense of family' (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade n.d.-a). New Zealand says that it has 'no better friend and no closer ally' (Ministry of Defence 2016, 32). In his comments following the 2024 Australia–New Zealand Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations (ANZMIN), Marles stated that: 'the character [of the relationship] between Australia and New Zealand is one of family. There's no country in the world with whom we are closer than New Zealand' (Marles 2024).

The intuitive nature of the Australia–New Zealand relationship reflects the 'logic of habit', which is based on 'habitual perceptions and practices that are automatically evoked upon categorising another state as a particular identity' (Hopf 2010, 548). These habits are 'automatic and unreflective' and 'there is not deliberate consideration of even one alternative to what is automatically perceived and practiced' (Hopf 2010, 548). The Australian and New Zealand governments and citizenries take the relationship so much for granted that cooperation, integration, and indeed military support in the event of an armed attack on the other country, has long been assumed to be inevitable. This means that their military alliance is so intuitive that it no longer necessitates specific identification as an alliance commitment.

But, as Hugh White evocatively observed in 2001, while Australia and New Zealand share the 'same bed', they frequently have 'different nightmares' (quoted in James 2001). White's observation captured the dynamic that, although Australia has a relatively high sense of strategic vulnerability, it has a strong economy. New Zealand has typically faced the opposite situation. Therefore, we also argue that the

intuitiveness and tendency of leaders and commentators on both sides of the Tasman to 'romanticise' the alliance (Ayson 2018a), may prevent the two neighbours from recognising and responding to tensions. To address this, we examine differences between the two countries' perceptions of themselves, their strategic interests, and their alliance, and find that the management of expectations (for example, Canberra's frustration with Wellington over perceived under-spending on defence) will continue to generate tensions. While we conclude that these tensions will not fundamentally undermine the relationship and that the two countries ultimately share the same – stated – dreams, we acknowledge that these dreams have not yet been seriously tested, for example by conflict in East Asia. In such a scenario the allies might share both dreams and nightmares, but whether they share an understanding of how to respond might leave them unhappy bedfellows.

Our analysis of the Australia–New Zealand alliance reveals it is an exemplar of the development of military alliances beyond their original relatively limited intent. Indeed, throughout history alliances have tended to be relatively short-lived and focused on a defined threat, such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) which formed in 1955 to contain the spread of communism in the region, and which was disbanded in 1977. But since the Second World War, several alliances have developed and endured well beyond their original purpose. These 'standing' alliances are 'designed for general deterrence' and are therefore 'less likely to be conditional, less likely to mention specific threats, more likely to be explicitly linked to other areas of cooperation, more likely to be connected to a bureaucratic organization, and more likely to endure' (Leeds and Mattes 2007, 197–198). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the most well-examined example, as it has endured since 1949, developed a wide-ranging institutional structure, and given rise to extensive cooperation (Pouliot 2010). Because it has been less thoroughly studied, the Australia–New Zealand alliance can offer new insights into how and why alliances expand and endure to the extent that they become intuitive. This can, in turn, offer insights into what this intuitiveness obscures, and the implications this might have if alliances are tested. The Australia–New Zealand alliance is also unusual because it does not involve a great power, after the US withdrew its security guarantee to New Zealand in 1986 (although, given the asymmetries in the relationship, New Zealand may, at times, view Australia as a 'major power', alongside the US and China (Ayson 2018c)). Therefore, the alliance has the potential to offer valuable insights about why states align that look beyond narrow materialist explanations.

In the same bed: the scope and status of the Australia–New Zealand alliance

The longstanding definition of alliances is that they are 'formal associations of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership' (Snyder 1997). This definition reflects that alliances were historically formed only for short periods and against identified military threats (Snyder 1997). However, since the Second World War, a system of alliances led by the US has challenged this definition. These alliances have continued 'beyond their initial historical contexts', expanded and deepened military cooperation between allies, and, in the case of

NATO, developed formal institutional structures to manage alliance relations (Beeson 2015, 313; Walt 1997). In some cases, the relationship between allies has developed to extend well beyond a traditional military alliance (Snyder 1997). As we demonstrate below, the military alliance between Australia and New Zealand has developed into a far deeper alignment that stretches into the political, economic, and cultural spheres (Morrow 1991), with an 'alliance halo' of 'political and psychological implications that go well beyond' mere security (Snyder 1997, 8).

Australia and New Zealand's relationship was born out of colonial circumstances, the tyranny of distance from major security guarantors (first, the UK and later the US), and shared interests and values (notwithstanding New Zealand's resistance to joining the Australian Federation in 1901). Both states were antipodean outposts of the British Empire: settler-colonies which disenfranchised First Nations Australians and Aotearoa New Zealand Māori in their bid to seek self-determination. External competition for influence in the 19th and 20th centuries drove both to pursue strategic denial in their immediate region. This was evidenced by their dismay that Britain's failure to develop a Monroe Doctrine for the Pacific enabled the US, Germany, and France to extend their influence into the region (Condliffe 1930; Overlack 1998). These dynamics, in various forms, continue. Despite their proximity to the Pacific and Asia, Australia and New Zealand 'belong' to the Western European and Other States Group within the United Nations system, a reflection of their colonial histories rather than their geography or evolving self-perceptions.

Security and defence relationship

While a shared settler-colonial identity was a defining feature of early Australian-New Zealand relations, military cooperation has been an enduring factor. That cooperation was first forged during the New Zealand Wars (1845–1872) (Te Ara n.d.), the Anglo-Boer War, and later as ANZACs on the battlefields of the First World War. This cooperation was formalised in the 1944 Canberra Pact (the Australia–New Zealand Agreement), in which the two countries undertook to cooperate on international matters in response to the Japanese advance through the Pacific during the Second World War (Manatū Taonga 2020). Their military alliance was then formalised in the tripartite 1951 ANZUS treaty to 'strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area' (ANZUS Treaty 1952).

In the 1970s New Zealand politicians referred to the alliance as 'the principal long-term guarantor of our security' and 'the keystone of our collective defence policy' (Jackson and Lamare 1988). However, in 1986 the ANZUS alliance collapsed between the US and New Zealand, when the US withdrew its commitment to assist New Zealand in the event of an attack. This followed the New Zealand Government's refusal to permit the USS Buchanan to dock at a New Zealand port as the US was unable to confirm that the ship was 'unambiguously nuclear-free' (Catalinac 2010) – a policy stance which was later enacted into the 1987 *New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act*. Then US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger characterised the policy as 'an attack on the alliance' (Hensley 2003, 36). When meeting shortly afterwards, Australia and the US re-affirmed their bilateral ties and expressed disappointment that New Zealand's policy had 'caused the

disruption of the alliance relationship between the United States and New Zealand' (Templeton 2006, 621). However, the alliance between Australia and New Zealand remained operational, albeit constrained in some aspects of intelligence sharing that involved American-derived intelligence.

Both Australia and New Zealand are also members of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) alongside Malaysia, Singapore, and the UK. Although the FPDA does not commit its members to provide military assistance to each other, they do agree to consult in the event or threat of an armed attack. Alongside partners the US, UK, and Canada, Australia and New Zealand are also members of the Five Eyes (FVEY) intelligence-sharing arrangement, which evolved during the Cold War as a mechanism for monitoring the Soviet Union and sharing classified intelligence. Often wrongly mistaken for an alliance,[2] the FVEY arrangement does 'emulate significant features of how alliances operate in practice, including active burden-sharing and intra-alliance bargaining' (O'Neill 2017). This has created tensions between FVEY partners, notably over the expansion of the remit to attempt to include coordination of their China policies. For example, in 2021 New Zealand declined to join its four FVEY partners in a joint statement condemning China's human rights record and the treatment of the Uyghur people in Xinjiang. At a joint press conference with then-Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne, then-New Zealand Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta expressed the view that the remit of the FVEY is limited to 'a security and intelligence framework' (Wintour 2021).

After the collapse of the New Zealand-US alliance, Australia and New Zealand formally set out the parameters of their bilateral defence relationship in the 1991 Closer Defence Relations (CDR) Agreement. Defence engagement was later enhanced by the 2011 Review of the Australia–New Zealand Defence Relationship and the 2018 Joint Statement on Closer Defence Relations. In April 2023 the Australian and New Zealand armies announced Plan ANZAC, a bilateral agreement 'designed to increase capacity to operate together' (Department of Defence 2023). This agreement reflected the almost continuous pattern of cooperation between the two countries' defence forces over the last three decades, including in Timor-Leste, Bougainville, Tonga, and Solomon Islands. Indeed, the everyday interactions between Australia and New Zealand defence personnel through operations, exercises, and training are frequently cited by officials from both countries as key to their defence relationship.[3] The two countries share military doctrine and have embedded personnel in each other's Headquarters Joint Operation Command. This depth of engagement provides insights into – and, to some degree, influence over – each other's defence decision-making.

Economic relationship

Economic integration has been cultivated by the 1983 Australia–New Zealand Closer Economic Relations (CER) Trade Agreement, which established substantially free trade and harmonises many trade and investment-related standards. Since it was established, there have been annual CER trade ministers' meetings, 80 instruments have been built up around the CER agreement, and Australia and New Zealand are now deepening economic links via the Single Economic Market agenda. The closeness of the two countries' economic relationship was described by one New Zealand official as 'like no

other',[4] with the impact of Australian trade and investment identified as critical to New Zealand's small and medium enterprises. Indeed, while China took NZ$20.4 billion of New Zealand exports in the year ending in June 2024, Australia was close behind, taking NZ$15.36 billion in the same year (Stats NZ n.d.). And New Zealand is Australia's eighth largest export market, taking A$19.02 billion in 2023 (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade n.d.-b). As New Zealand Prime Minister Chris Luxon mused during a speech in Sydney in August 2024, 'New Zealand adds an economy the size of Western Australia' (Luxon 2024). However, Australia's strict biosecurity laws were identified as a major barrier to New Zealand's trade, particularly relating to apples, and characterised as constituting 'non-tariff barriers'.[5]

Political relationship

Australia and New Zealand exchanged diplomatic representatives in 1943, and government ministers, including prime ministers, and officials have met regularly for decades. Between 1992 and 2020 New Zealand representatives attended the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), the primary forum for consultations between the Australian prime minister, state premiers, territory chief ministers, and the president of the Australian Local Government Association (Banfield and Church n.d.). After COAG was replaced in 2020 by the National Cabinet during the COVID-19 pandemic, New Zealand was excluded. While a review of the National Cabinet mechanism recommended that New Zealand should continue to be involved in relevant meetings of associated bodies, this did not include the high-level National Cabinet meetings (Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 2020). Reflecting Australia's recognition that it was 'important that New Zealand still has an opportunity to engage on trans-Tasman issues' (Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 2020, 15), there has been an effort to formalise the relationship via the first Australia–New Zealand Climate and Finance Ministers' meeting in June 2023 (Chalmers et al. 2023) and the first Australia–New Zealand Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations (ANZMIN) in February 2024 (Marles et al. 2024). Both meetings were notable, as while Australia has 2 + 2 meetings with several other partner countries, New Zealand does not.

While the above steps indicate a recent move to formalise the Australia–New Zealand relationship at the political level, the alliance is not formally institutionalised. The ANZUS Council that the three allies committed to establish in Article VII of the ANZUS Treaty met for the first time in 1952, but was replaced by the AUSMIN (Australia–United States Ministerial Consultations) after the collapse of the alliance between New Zealand and the US. A New Zealand official argued that institutionalisation is unnecessary because the relationship consists of an unspoken architecture across the many pillars of cooperation and integration. In contrast, an Australian official argued that developing more 'scaffolding or architecture' would be helpful for 'new conversations about shared strategic goals', including to bring 'disparate discussions of interoperability together'. Indeed, to deepen the political relationship, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and then New Zealand Prime Minister Chris Hipkins launched the Trans-Tasman Roadmap to 2035 at their 2023 leaders meeting, with the aim of harnessing 'all elements of our respective nations' statecraft to advance our interests' (Trans-

Tasman Roadmap to 2035, 2023). The roadmap identified advancing the trade and economic relationship; collaboration across science, technology, and research; and deepening the relationship across security, law enforcement, disaster response, and intelligence agencies (Trans-Tasman Roadmap to 2035, 2023). However, a preference for informality in New Zealand may in part be due to concerns over the demands that a formalised architecture could place on its already constrained system.

Underpinning the high-level political relationship sits a broad and deep bureaucratic relationship, which reflects the depth of the diplomatic, defence, economic, policing, and people-to-people links. For example, secondees from New Zealand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) are regularly placed in DFAT. While secondments from Australia have ceased, the Australian First Secretary in Wellington spends their first year on secondment in MFAT. Policing cooperation between the two countries is longstanding, with the New Zealand Commissioner of Police invited to many meetings in Australia,[6] and in the Pacific Islands region, as discussed below. Beyond government, many professional bodies – such as those relating to medicine and healthcare, food standards, or accounting – also operate between the two countries, which facilitates shared regulatory frameworks.

People-to-people links

Beyond everyday interactions at the bureaucratic level, people-to-people links between the two countries at all levels of society are strong. These links are facilitated by the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangements, which allow Australians and New Zealanders to live and work in either country without restriction. 586,020 New Zealand-born people now live in Australia (Department of Home Affairs n.d.) (within a population of 26 million), while approximately 70,000 Australian-born people live in New Zealand (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade n.d.-a) (within a population of 4,993,923) (Stats NZ 2023). When Hipkins visited Australia in April 2023 to mark the 50th anniversary of the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangements, Albanese announced changes to make it easier for New Zealanders living in Australia to claim citizenship (McHugh 2023). Compounding this integration is the parallel development of common norms and values in both countries, particularly the influence of 'shared democratic identities' (Wallis and Powles 2021; Williams and Neumann 2000).

However, the size of the New Zealand diaspora in Australia has also been a source of tension, particularly because of section 501 of the Australian *Migration Act*. Section 501 was amended in December 2014 to expand the circumstances in which the Australian Government could cancel or refuse visas on 'character grounds', that is, following criminal convictions or because of factors such as 'undesirable' social associations. Reflecting the size of the diaspora, New Zealand citizens became the largest group of deportees, and people were deported who had lived in Australia since they were children and who had little or no connection with New Zealand. This generated considerable tension, with former New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern accusing Australia of 'testing' the friendship by deporting 'your people and your problems' who were not 'genuine Kiwis' using 'unfair' policies (Remeikis 2020). After discussions with Ardern, in July 2022 the new Australian Labor government agreed to adopt a 'commonsense approach' to 501 deportations that would require greater consideration

of the time a person had spent in Australia (Tibshraeny and Neilson 2022). This was cited by several New Zealand officials as signalling a 'major shift' in the two countries' relationship. However, in June 2024, facing domestic pressure about immigration, the Australian Government shifted the focus of decision-making to 'the safety of the Australian community' and reduced consideration of connections to Australia (Crowley and Lowrey 2024).

Despite the controversy over 501 deportations, public opinion in Australia towards New Zealand is very favourable. For example, the annual Lowy Institute Poll uses its 'feelings thermometer' to measure Australian respondents' 'warmth' towards other countries. In 2024 New Zealand topped the list, with a score of 84 degrees (with 100 degrees indicating a 'very warm, favourable feeling') (Neelam 2024). The poll authors noted that New Zealand had topped the feelings thermometer 'every year it has been included' (Neelam 2024). Notably, apart from a question relating to influence in the Pacific Islands region (Neelam 2024), New Zealand was not covered by any other questions in the 2024 Lowy poll – perhaps indicating that New Zealand was either deemed unimportant in comparison to other countries with which Australia has relations, or that Australians' views of New Zealand are sufficiently uniformly positive that there is little need to survey them. Similarly, Australia has consistently ranked highest in the annual Asia New Zealand Foundation Perceptions Survey. In the latest poll, 82% of respondents agreed Australia was important to New Zealand's future compared with Asia (72%) and North America (56%) (Asia New Zealand Foundation 2024). About 88% of respondents considered Australia to be friendly towards New Zealand (Asia New Zealand Foundation 2024) and, notably, 71% trusted Australia to act in a 'responsible manner', which was considerably higher than their trust in the US (40%) (Asia New Zealand Foundation 2024, 24). There are key differences, however. The Pacific Cooperation Foundation Perceptions Survey found, for example, less trust in Australia's involvement in the Pacific due to the treatment of First Nations peoples (Pacific Cooperation Foundation 2022, 32).

The settler-colonial identities of the two countries remain a defining feature of their relationship. Relations between Māori and First Nations Australians have been documented across literature, art, and culture, as well as cooperative activism and solidarity to address the ongoing impact of colonial rule, such as land removal and disproportionate incarceration and suicide rates (Sezzo 2021). As settler-colonial scholars, we acknowledge the gap in our understanding of how Māori and First Nations Australians perceive the alliance and of the various ways in which they have been co-opted into it (such as through service in the two defence forces (Caso 2022)) and recognise that this is an important area for future research.

Different nightmares: tensions in the Australia–New Zealand alliance

While Australia and New Zealand's relationship is seemingly 'natural' and their alliance intuitive, there are differences between the two allies that, at times, generate tensions. The most important is their different scales and, consequently, self-perceptions. Population is the most obvious difference in scale: Australia has a population of 26 million, while New Zealand has one of almost 5 million. Their economies are also of very different scales: Australia's GDP was US$1.573 trillion (World Economics n.d.-a) and New

Zealand's US$257 billion (World Economics n.d.-b) at the end of 2023. There are 84,865 people in the Australian Defence Force, (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2022) and 15,201 in the New Zealand Defence Force (To Ope Kātua O Aotearoa Defence Force n.d.). These differences in scale have consequences for how the two countries perceive themselves: New Zealand sees itself as a 'principled', 'independent', 'small state' (Ayson 2018b), while Australia 'dreams of being a middle power' and articulates an ambitious role for itself on the regional and international stage (Cotton and Ravenhill 2012; Ungerer 2007; Widmaier 2019). The practical consequences of these differences in scale are well illustrated by comparing cooperation in the Pacific Islands region. For example, the Solomon Islands International Assistance Force (SIAF), which was stood up at the request of the Solomon Islands Government during the Honiara riots in November 2021, and subsequently provided security for the 2023 Pacific Games and the 2024 joint national and provincial elections, was largely comprised of Australian defence and policing personnel. Australia sent 150 police to assist with security for the 2023 Pacific Games, while New Zealand sent 12 (Papua New Guinea sent 108 police and Fiji sent military personnel). These differences in scale also influence how the two countries work together. Officials noted that the comparatively small size of MFAT (1800 people) can make it easier for Australians to get to know their New Zealand counterparts. In contrast, the much larger DFAT (over 6000 people) can be harder to navigate for New Zealanders, particularly as they often have multiple counterparts.

Geography also influences how Australia and New Zealand perceive themselves. Australia occupies a landmass of 7.688 million km^2 and has four frontiers: the Pacific Islands region, Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the Southern Ocean/Antarctica (Strating and Wallis 2024). In contrast, New Zealand occupies a landmass of 268,021 km^2 and has only two frontiers: the Pacific Islands region and the Southern Ocean/Antarctica.[7] Geography also influences demography. Approximately 337,000 people of Pacific heritage live in Australia, constituting 1.3% of the population (Liu and Howes 2023). In contrast, 442,632 Pasifika (New Zealanders of Pacific descent) people live in New Zealand (Stats NZ 2023), constituting almost 9% of the population, which is the fourth largest ethnic group. These differences have consequences for domestic politics and for foreign and defence policy. For example, an increasing number of Pasifika diplomats promote Pacific issues, speak Pacific languages, and instil New Zealand's Pacific identity in its foreign policy. New Zealand's Pasifika population are also reshaping the domestic political landscape – in the Ardern Labour-government, the Labour Pacific Caucus (comprising ministers of Pacific descent) made up 10% of the Cabinet. In the successor Hipkins Labour Government, Samoan-Tongan New Zealander Carmel Sepuloni was the first Pasifika Deputy Prime Minister.

Strategic interests

These differing self-perceptions influence how Australia and New Zealand understand and articulate their strategic interests, which highlights how threat perceptions can evolve during longstanding alliances (Cohen 2023; Rapport 2020). Since 2013, Australia's foreign and defence policy has crystallised around the concept of the 'Indo-Pacific', which identifies Australia's zone of strategic interest as 'connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans

through Southeast Asia' (Department of Defence 2013, 7). The Australian Government has become increasingly explicit in its concern about strategic competition. For example, while the 2017 *Foreign Policy White Paper* cautiously observed that: 'China is challenging America's position' and that 'the stability of the Indo-Pacific region … cannot be assumed' (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2017, 1), the 2020 *Defence Strategic Update* declared that 'major power competition has intensified and the project of high-intensity conflict in the Indo-Pacific, while still unlikely, is less remote than in the past' (Department of Defence 2020, 5). In its 2024 *National Defence Strategy*, the Australian Government expressed concern that 'Australia's strategic environment has continued to deteriorate', characterised by 'the uncertainty and tensions of entrenched and increasing strategic competition between the US and China' (Department of Defence 2024, 11).

New Zealand has typically been more cautious when articulating its threat perception because, largely due to its geographic remoteness, it has had more latitude to balance security and economic concerns by 'coolly calculating which of our relationships will best add to our national stock of safety and prosperity' (Barrington 2019, 3–4). Consequently, New Zealand was initially reluctant to adopt the Indo-Pacific concept (Wallace 2021), and when it later did so, it echoed Southeast Asian approaches that emphasise inclusivity and multilateralism (Capie 2021; King 2018). However, New Zealand has gradually become explicit about its strategic concerns. For example, the 2018 *Strategic and Defence Policy Statement* identified, for the first time, that strategic competition intersecting with other challenges such as climate change 'will disrupt New Zealand's neighbourhood in ways not previously seen' (Ministry of Defence 2018, 17). This was developed further in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade's *Strategic Intentions 2021–2025*, which argued that 'geostrategic competition has sharpened … including in our neighbourhood – the Pacific – and our region – the Indo-Pacific. This competition is squeezing our strategic space and putting pressure on the institutions, rules and norms that reflect our nation's interests and values' (New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Manatu Aorere 2021, 10). In 2023, the Labour government released a set of national security, defence, foreign policy, and intelligence documents that named China as a major threat to the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific as well as to domestic security (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2023; New Zealand Government 2023; Ministry of Defence 2023; New Zealand Security Intelligence Service 2023). This approach has been continued by the National-led government elected in November 2023, which has abandoned quiet diplomacy over, for example, China's espionage activities in New Zealand (Sevastopulo 2024). The 2024 ANZMIN statement also signalled a willingness by New Zealand to move closer to Australia on foreign affairs and defence issues, with the leaders committing their countries to 'deepening their cooperation on security challenges, to sharing information and best practice, and building collective resilience' (Marles et al. 2024).

But while Australia feels strategically insecure, it is relatively economically secure. The impact of attempted economic coercion by China between 2020 and late 2023 (McDonagh 2024; McGregor 2022) was limited to specific sectors (wine, wheat, and beef) and the exports affected amounted to only about 1% of its GDP (Rajah 2023). Australia also successfully began to diversify its trade from China to other markets (Cha 2023). While New Zealand's geography means that it has typically felt strategically secure – as Rob Laurs has commented, New Zealand 'won a geographic lottery' (Laurs 2024) as

'we're located right next door to our best mate – and occasional buffer against the wider world's issues' – its small, trade-dependent economy means that it feels economically insecure. China is an especially important economic partner to New Zealand – as noted above, out of New Zealand's NZ$98.22 billion of exports in the year ending June 2024, China took more than a fifth (NZ$20.4 billion) of them (Stats NZ n.d.). New Zealand is acutely aware that China can buy dairy products from other competitors. As China's ambassador reminded New Zealand in 2022: 'An economic relationship in which China buys nearly a third of the country's exports shouldn't be taken for granted' (Wright 2022).

This meant that, when Australia was subject to economic coercion attempts by China, New Zealand was reluctant to publicly comment (although Mahuta did refer to economic coercion in her inaugural foreign policy speech in 2021) (Mahuta 2021). However, New Zealand did sign, alongside Australia, the US, the UK, Canada, and Japan, a declaration condemning the use of trade-related economic coercion and non-market-oriented policies and practices in 2023 (Governments of Australia et al. 2023).

Therefore, contra the assumption in much of the alliance literature that a junior ally will defer to their great power ally when there are differences in threat perception (Von Hlatky 2013), in alliances between middle powers and smaller states junior allies, even ones that view their ally as a 'major power', have more latitude to adopt different strategic perceptions (Cohen 2023) – or, in the case of Australia and New Zealand, a different tone. Much of the literature also assumes that the allies will terminate their relationship if agreement about relevant threats is not possible (Moller 2022). However, the intuitive nature of the Australia–New Zealand alliance means that they continue to cooperate closely without absolute agreement about their identified strategic interests – or rather, differing strategies to manage interests and threats.

Perceptions of their alliance obligations

The ANZUS treaty is notoriously vague in the obligations that it imposes on the three allies. Article III requires the parties only to 'consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific'. Article IV states that 'Each Party recognises that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes'. And, as the US has withdrawn (although not formally abrogated) its guarantee to New Zealand, both articles only apply to Australia's bilateral alliances with its ANZUS allies.

Yet while ANZUS remains an operative treaty, we found that many New Zealand officials and experts were reluctant to refer to the relationship with Australia as an 'alliance'. Indeed, when the term ANZUS was used in the 2016 Defence White Paper, then New Zealand National Party Prime Minister John Key responded that: 'the defence arrangement we had … with Australia and the United States. It's called ANZUS. And New Zealand suspended its role in ANZUS … So we now run an independent foreign policy' (Key 2016). Key's comment illustrates a point made by Robert Ayson: New Zealand has tended 'to see ANZUS through the prism of the US relationship, obscuring its application to trans-Tasman defence relations' and to instead see the 1991 CDR

agreement as explaining 'New Zealand's *formal* alliance obligations to Australia' (Ayson 2023, 238). However, the current National-led Government appears determined to return ANZUS to the centre of New Zealand's relationship with Australia, with the 2024 ANZMIN joint statement recognising the 'enduring nature of the ANZUS Treaty, which continues to underpin the strategic relationship between the two countries, 72 years after it was signed, and formalises the commitments we have to each other as allies' (Marles et al. 2024). Yet this perception is not universally shared; in response to the ANZMIN former New Zealand Labour Prime Minister Helen Clark and former National opposition leader Don Brash jointly published an opinion piece which argued that New Zealand had 'departed' from the ANZUS alliance (Clarke and Brash 2024). This unusual bipartisan collaboration highlights that, while recent work on alliances has argued that foreign and strategic policy is influenced by partisan differences, particularly in the US (Rathbun 2004), Australia (with reference to the US alliance) (Cohen 2020), and South Korea, (Moller 2022, 119) it is difficult to make generalisations about partisan differences in New Zealand about its alliance with Australia.

While the current New Zealand government is more willing to speak publicly about the ANZUS treaty, the two neighbours understand its implications differently. Indeed, one Australian official argued that, while Australia sees its alliances with New Zealand and the US as an 'insurance policy and way to extend strategic reach', New Zealand instead sees its alliance with Australia as imposing 'burdens, bindings, and constraints on action'. This reflects the logic of the alliance security dilemma (Snyder 1997, 171), which argues that allies face two fears: of entrapment, that is, of being dragged by an ally into a conflict in which a state does not share, or only partially shares, an interest with that ally; or of abandonment, that is, that an ally will either withdraw from an alliance or desert the state in its hour of need (Snyder 1984, 467). Typically, it has been assumed that the great power ally faces the fear of entrapment and junior ally(ies) experience the fear of abandonment. However, Moller has recently argued that 'under a heightened environment junior allies are susceptible to entrapment fears as well' (Moller 2022, 122), which reflects New Zealand's attitude to Australia. Moller argues that junior allies have two intra-alliance bargaining options: 'secure additional military capabilities from its patron; or pursue greater autonomy within the alliance', that is, 'to loosen (but not untie) the binds of dependence linking it to the patron' (Moller 2022, 123). Moller argues that this 'leash loosening' is done with the goal of gaining 'additional oversight and control over the management of the alliance and thereby rectify the internal disparity in decision-making' (Moller 2022, 123), to 'enhance autonomy and independence of action for the junior ally' (Moller 2022, 124).

Much of New Zealand's concern relating to entrapment arises from Australia's alliance with the US. As noted, Australia has moved to considerably enhance its defence relationship with the US (and the UK) under the AUKUS security partnership, which exemplifies the US's move towards a shared policy of 'integrated deterrence' that aims to deter aggression by using all tools of statecraft in cooperation with allies and partners (Vergun 2022). This has generated robust debate about when New Zealand may be entrapped into supporting Australia in the event of conflict in the broader Indo-Pacific, and whether New Zealand should participate in AUKUS pillar II (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2024), which could give it access to valuable defence technology (Downes, this issue), but which could deepen its risk of entrapment.

One New Zealand expert observed that there has been a shift in the New Zealand Government's statements about its 'obligations' to Australia. For example, the 2010 Defence White Paper stated that in the event of a direct threat to Australia, it is 'likely that New Zealand would consider the possible use of military force' (Ministry of Defence 2010, 16). In contrast, the 2016 Defence White Paper stated that: 'While a direct armed attack on Australia is unlikely in the foreseeable future, should it be subject to such an attack, New Zealand would respond immediately' (Ministry of Defence 2016, 32).

In 2023 Robert Ayson analysed three scenarios that would test Zealand's alliance obligations to assist Australia that accorded with the government's 2016 position. Ayson concluded that if Australia was attacked, New Zealand would almost definitely respond, and indeed would be formally required to do so under the ANZUS treaty (Ayson 2023). Ayson also concluded that New Zealand would likely respond if Australian forces were attacked in the Pacific Islands region, given that it is identified as a region of shared concern in both the Canberra Pact and ANZUS treaty, and because of the two countries' shared interests in the region and habits of cooperation there. However, he was more sceptical about whether New Zealand would respond if Australian forces were attacked further afield, such as maritime East Asia, given that this region falls outside the geographic scope of the formal alliance and is one in which New Zealand is less directly engaged (and, indeed, is less capable of being engaged) (Ayson 2023). Missing from Ayson's latter scenario was the possibility that Australia's involvement in an East Asian conflict may lead to attacks against Australia itself, which would then trigger New Zealand's obligations under the ANZUS treaty. New Zealand's reliability as an ally would then come into serious question if it did not respond (Henry 2020).

In New Zealand those who oppose involvement in AUKUS pillar II emphasise the long-standing notion of an independent foreign policy – or 'independence of thought' (Mapp 2016). This is closely interwoven with New Zealand's anti-nuclear stance, which is rooted in the activism of the 1960s and is enshrined in both domestic legislation and international treaties, including the 1986 *South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty* (known as the Rarotonga Treaty) and the 2017 *Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons*. New Zealand's anti-nuclearism is considered 'one of the most sustained examples of the independence with which New Zealand has crafted much of its foreign policy' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade n.d.). Consecutive prime ministers have connected nuclear-free status with New Zealand's independent foreign policy (Mapp 2016). This link has been reiterated in the context of national debates over whether New Zealand should join AUKUS pillar II, with suggestions that doing so would compromise New Zealand's anti-nuclear credibility and undermine New Zealand's independent foreign policy (de Jong and Rata 2023; Fish 2023). In response to Luxon's statement that New Zealand was 'very open' to participating in pillar II, Clark and Brash suggested that Luxon has 'abandoned New Zealand's independent foreign policy' and oriented New Zealand towards being a 'full-fledged military ally of the United States' with the implication that New Zealand will increasingly be dragged into US–China competition, including militarily in the South China Sea (Clark 2024). Much of this criticism stems from the belief that China does not pose a significant threat to New Zealand, which reflects the perception of a benign strategic environment that dominated New Zealand's strategic assessments prior to 2018. Relatedly, some opponents are also concerned that Pacific leaders may not distinguish between New

Zealand's involvement in pillar II of AUKUS, and pillar I, Australia's development of nuclear-powered submarines, which may undermine New Zealand's relationships in the region (de Jong, this issue). Other opponents, such as Robert Patman, argue that AUKUS is not the answer to the multiple threats facing the multilateral system. Patman instead suggests instead that New Zealand should end decades of under-investment in defence by raising defence expenditure to at least 1.7% of GDP and focus on bolstering defence ties with Australia (Patman 2024).

Those that support New Zealand joining AUKUS pillar II argue that doing so is in New Zealand's national interest. Nicholas Khoo argues that it would represent a 'valuable contribution to New Zealand's security, the ANZAC alliance and regional security' and that it is an opportunity to rigorously define what New Zealand's independent foreign policy actually means based on, as Ayson also argues, a consideration of costs, benefits, and responsibilities (Khoo 2024). Reuben Steff argues that, in addition to preventing New Zealand's broader strategic, security, and intelligence ties with Australia and the AUKUS partners from atrophying, there are practical benefits for joining pillar II, including the opportunity to deepen Australia–New Zealand relations by establishing a collaborative framework on high-technologies (Steff 2023).

The debate about AUKUS pillar II exemplifies longstanding debates about the difference in defence spending between the two countries, which has generated a growing gap in defence capability, particularly in critical areas, including technology, equipment sophistication, and capacity (Wallis and Powles 2018). New Zealand is regularly criticised in Australia (and, at times, at home) (Moremon 2023) for its perceived underinvestment in defence capability (Cavanaugh 2020) and for free-riding on Australia (and, in turn, on Australia's alliance with the US), spending far less on defence than it would need to without the alliance (Wallis and Powles 2021). This reflects that burden-sharing is a frequent topic of bargaining between allies (Snyder 1997), and much scholarship has concluded that junior allies are commonly suspected of free-riding on their dominant ally (Olson and Zeckhaser 1966; Gates and Terasawa 1992). It has been argued that dominant allies will accept some free-riding because their junior allies' contributions are nevertheless valuable, although some scholars warn that the perception of free-riding may undermine a dominant ally's willingness to come to their aid unless their treaty guarantees that assistance (Thomas and Neumeyer 2015). Questions about the reliability of a junior ally are also said to limit its ability to 'dictate terms that increase the reliability of the alliance' (Mattes 2012). These concerns are not relevant to the Australia–New Zealand alliance, given that it has become so intuitive that its costs are taken-for-granted (Beeson 2015; Walt 1997).

New Zealand recognised that the gap in defence spending had reduced interoperability between the two countries' defence forces, and in its 2019 Defence Capability Plan stated that the New Zealand Defence Force 'must be able to operate effectively with New Zealand's key security partners, in particular with our ally Australia' (New Zealand Ministry of Defence 2019, 19). In anticipation, New Zealand had purchased four Boeing P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft from the US in 2018. Plan ANZAC is also intended to 'maximis[e] interoperability, progressing to interchangeability' (Australian and New Zealand Armies 2023). More recently there has been a shift to deepen the defence relationship from interoperability to integration; the 2024 ANZMIN joint statement committed the two allies 'to increasing integration between our military

forces, including through common capability, exchanges of senior military officers and increased participation in warfighting exercises' (Marles et al. 2024). In his comments at the ANZMIN press conference, Marles emphasised the goal of 'interchangeability between our two defence forces' (Marles 2024), while New Zealand defence minister Judith Collins spoke about an 'ANZAC model' of shared defence procurement (Collins 2024). There is now discussion of whether the joint acquisition of ANZAC frigates (eight by Australia and two by New Zealand) in the 1990s could act as a model for replacement frigates.

Discussions of joint acquisition raise questions about how New Zealand understands the purpose of its defence acquisition. Reflecting the shift to integration, New Zealand is increasingly choosing to invest in defence capability that complements and augments Australian capability, with Foreign Minister Winston Peters noting that New Zealand and Australia want to 'work more synergistically', with New Zealand contributions able to contribute to a multiplier effect.[8] While one New Zealand academic argued that this approach reflects a deliberate policy of attempting to make the New Zealand Defence Force useful to its partners as a 'tool of New Zealand influence', another expressed concern that this might have encouraged New Zealand to buy military equipment that suits Australia's needs, rather than New Zealand's.

Shared dreams?

While most of the scholarly literature on alliance burden-sharing primarily compares military spending (Mancur and Zeckhauser 1966; Sandler and Forbes 1980), in a world in which security challenges are more complex and diffuse, and traditional military threats are intertwined with, or at least influenced by, non-traditional security challenges, 'it is time to rethink what constitutes a contribution within an alliance, and particularly to think more attentively about the non-military or even non-material 'side payments' (Snyder 1997, 44) that allies can make' (Wallis and Powles 2021, 1054). When analysing the Australia–New Zealand alliance, this dynamic is most evident with respect to their activities in the Pacific Islands, the region in which both are most active, cooperate most extensively, and share similar policies, or 'dreams' (Wallis and Powles 2023).

Both Australia and New Zealand have long recognised the Pacific Islands region's strategic importance, as the islands lie across vital air and sea approaches, with the Japanese advance through the Pacific during the Second World War continuing to haunt Australian defence planning. The ANZUS Treaty identified the 'Pacific Area' as one of shared concern in which Australia, New Zealand, and the US would respond to 'common danger' (article IV). Cooperation in the region is a core principle of the defence relationship, evident in the provision of governance and policing assistance, humanitarian and disaster relief, and maritime surveillance. The two countries have therefore cooperated to undertake direct interventions, beginning with support for the 1997–2005 Bougainville peace process, followed by the 2003–2013 multinational Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), the 2021 deployment under the Australia–Solomon Islands bilateral security treaty, as well as their ongoing cooperation in response to humanitarian and natural disasters. Since 1992 they have also cooperated with France to provide humanitarian and disaster relief under the France, Australia and New Zealand (FRANZ) Arrangement. They also cooperate with the US and France in the Quadrilateral

Defence Coordination Group (the 'Pacific Quad'), to 'promote security and stability through multilateral activities' including: regional surveillance operations on illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing; supporting the work of the Forum Fisheries Agency; transnational crime maritime interdictions; and coordinating maritime security assistance and humanitarian assistance (Ministry of Defence 2019, 20). Australia and New Zealand also participate in the South Pacific Defence Ministers' Meeting (SPDMM) which is increasingly being positioned as the premier ministerial dialogue to discuss defence and security cooperation in the Pacific. Reflecting the depth of their cooperation, during preparation of the DSR Australian officials met with their counterparts from New Zealand to discuss the two countries' cooperation, particularly in the Pacific Islands region. This reflected the focus in the DSR on the Pacific as Australia's strategic 'anchor point', and the DSR's redefinition of Australia's strategic geography to focus on the importance of the maritime domain to Australia.[9] Everyday cooperation between defence and diplomatic officials is strong, with the two countries briefing each other before engaging in activities in the region, including announcements and policy initiatives.

As noted above, differences in scale influence how Australia and New Zealand cooperate in the Pacific Islands region. For example, New Zealand took the lead in facilitating the Bougainville peace process. But because it lacked the capacity (and, over time, the political commitment due to leadership changes in New Zealand) to continue supporting the deployment of truce (later peace) monitoring teams, ultimately Australia funded and provided most of the personnel and logistics for the truce and peace monitoring missions. Similarly, Australia provided most of the personnel, funding, and logistics for the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands; the Combined Joint Task Force that initially deployed consisted of 1379 military personnel from Australia, but only 240 from New Zealand (as well as 121 from Fiji, 83 from PNG, and 35 from Tonga). While New Zealand's comparatively smaller commitment was partly due to its preference for a less muscular approach, it also reflected the gap in relative capabilities between the two countries. Similarly, although New Zealand works alongside Australia in the provision of humanitarian and disaster relief in the region, Australia provides the bulk of support, facilitated over the last decade by its acquisition of massive landing helicopter dock ships.

Yet, as we have argued elsewhere, evaluating only the material contributions of personnel and defence capability the two countries make in the Pacific Islands region overlooks the valuable soft-power contributions of New Zealand (Wallis and Powles 2021). The Bougainville peace process demonstrated the value of New Zealand taking the lead during the early stages, hosting early peace talks and leading the initial truce monitoring mission, which was important given Australia's colonial legacy in Papua New Guinea. The provision of external support to facilitate the initial peace process, and indeed Australia's involvement in it, might not have been possible without New Zealand taking the lead and, critically, incorporating Tikanga Māori (Māori customary practices) in both the initial peace talks and the Truce Monitoring Group. This suggests that measuring free-riding based only, or even primarily, on material contributions does not adequately capture the other ways New Zealand contributes to sharing the alliance burden, such as through its 'soft power', that is, its persuasive tools such as cultural, institutional, and other 'intangible' mechanisms (Nye 2004, 26). This suggests that, while junior allies such as New Zealand 'may be perceived to free-ride in terms of the

conventional military burdens of an alliance, they may contribute to the overall security of alliance members in non-traditional ways' (Wallis and Powles 2021, 1054). This is particularly the case as alliances expand their focus beyond conventional military threats to 'non-traditional security hazards' (Cruz De Castro 2006, 106). Indeed, Australian officials observed that cooperating with New Zealand in the region gives Australia a greater appreciation of what New Zealand has to offer, as it brings a different perspective, a different social licence, and its Pasifika identity.

However, New Zealand's soft power contribution is tempered by its smaller scale. Reflecting geography, demography, and history, New Zealand's largest diplomatic footprint is in Polynesia, which raises questions about whether it pulls its weight elsewhere in the region. For example, New Zealand has only a small high commission in Port Moresby, despite Papua New Guinea – and Melanesia more broadly – being the largest recipient of New Zealand aid. And New Zealand's more limited defence capability also means that it is unable to conduct major humanitarian and disaster relief operations on its own. But New Zealand's smaller scale can, at times, be beneficial, with one Australian official noting that New Zealand is able to engage in 'effective bespoke tailoring' of its activities in the region, including by operating 'smaller and slower'. This highlights that Australia's larger scale is not necessarily always a benefit, particularly if it leads to perceptions that Australia is insufficiently sensitive to the particularities of local contexts.

Conclusion

Therefore, we argue that the apparent downgrading of the strategic significance of Australia's relationship with New Zealand to a *partnership* in the public summary of the DSR demonstrates that the military alliance, bolstered by broad and deep defence, economic, regulatory, and people-to-people integration, is so intuitive that it no longer necessitates specific identification as an alliance commitment. The Australian and New Zealand governments and citizenries take the relationship so much for granted that cooperation, integration, and indeed military support in the event of an armed attack on the other ally, is assumed to be inevitable. While we have identified differences between the two countries' perceptions of themselves, their strategic interests, and their alliance, they ultimately share the same – stated – dreams: 'a peaceful and secure world, where disputes are settled through institutions, and where the sovereignty of all states – including those in our region – is respected, and human rights are promoted and protected' (Marles et al. 2024). However, we acknowledge that these dreams have not yet been seriously tested, for example by conflict in East Asia. In such a scenario the allies might share both dreams and nightmares, but whether they share an understanding of how to respond might leave them unhappy bedfellows.

While Australia and New Zealand's different nightmares are not serious enough to undermine their shared dreams, their alliance needs ongoing maintenance. Several New Zealand officials and experts identified the challenge that New Zealand is 'not always in the forefront of Australia's thinking' as it 'doesn't automatically have Australia's attention'. Some attributed this to New Zealand, at times, assuming that it does not have to invest in alliance maintenance. This was accompanied by a sense that New Zealand has to work hard to make the value that it brings to its relationship with Australia clear, with contributions including 'reliability, trust, family, closeness, most like-minded partner,

shared values'.[10] In many ways, this echoes the dynamics of Australia's efforts to maintain its alliance with, and the attention of, the US. A related risk identified by our interview participants was that the taken-for-granted nature of the alliance can, at times, mean that the two allies do not invest enough in understanding fluctuations in each other's strategic thinking. For example, an Australian expert warned that New Zealand may overestimate how much Australia will be able to do to protect it, as it may overestimate Australia's military power.

Another challenge to the Australia–New Zealand alliance is the proliferation of Australia's strategic partnerships. Over the last decade, Australia has entered into a range of bilateral and minilateral strategic partnerships and arrangements, including the Quad with the US, Japan and India, and AUKUS (Butcher 2024). This reflects Australia's tendency to reach out for relationships to bolster its sense of security, as compared to New Zealand's emphasis on independence. In this context, a New Zealand academic said that the alliance is best characterised as one of 'unity rather than uniformity', according to which New Zealand has cultivated a 'unique and distinct stance' which has meant that the alliance has not impeded its independent foreign policy. But there is the risk that New Zealand's emphasis on independence, and consequently its few comparable strategic partnerships, may mean that it is sidelined both in Australian strategic thinking and from increasingly important minilateral cooperative mechanisms in the Indo-Pacific. Recognition of this dynamic may explain why New Zealand has shown enthusiasm for the 'IP4', dialogue and cooperative partnership between Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea, and NATO, including participating in the annual NATO summits since 2022 (Capie 2024).

Yet none of the challenges we identify are fundamental to the endurance of the Australia–New Zealand alliance, which, as we have argued, is now so intuitive and habitual that it is unthinkable for leaders, officials, and citizens on both sides of the Tasman that the two countries would not militarily support each other and not be deeply integrated. While there are differences between Australia and New Zealand that can generate tensions, the overall conclusion from all our research participants was that these differences can often be a strength. An Australia expert observed that neither country benefits from having an identical partner, but instead, both gain from their 'nuances and differences in policy approach' and their complementary capabilities. This is illustrated by another example from the Pacific Islands region. While the Australian Federal Police is much larger and well-funded than the New Zealand Police, one New Zealand official observed that the differences between the mandates and cultures of the two agencies can mean that they can 'play to each other's strengths', with New Zealand police experienced in community policing and often fluent in Pacific languages, while the Australian Federal Police have the resources and ability to affect systemic changes. Therefore, while eyebrows may have been raised in Wellington when the public summary of the DSR was released, ultimately the Australia–New Zealand alliance remains strong, with their cooperation constituting 'more than the sum of its parts'.

Notes

1. This research was approved by the University of Adelaide Human Research Ethics Committee, approval number: 37755 H-2023. Given the politically sensitive nature of aspects of this

research, and that many interview subjects are current government officials, we have elected – except for two high-level officials and one academic expert commenting on a point specifically related to their work – not to identify interview subjects by name, nor by location or date of interview, to limit the possibility of third-party identification. This project was supported by Australian Research Council Discovery Project DP200101994.
2. We thank Jim Rolfe for this insight.
3. Annette King, pers. comm., 13 November 2023.
4. Annette King, pers. comm., 13 November 2023.
5. Annette King, pers. comm., 13 November 2023.
6. Annette King, pers. comm., 13 November 2023.
7. The New Zealand Government has prioritised the New Zealand Defence Force's ability to operate at the same level across New Zealand's territory, the Southern Ocean and Antarctica, and the Pacific Islands region (Ministry of Defence 2018).
8. Winston Peters, pers. comm., 15 February 2024.
9. Peter Dean, pers. comm., 16 May 2024.
10. Annette King, pers. comm., 13 November 2023.

Disclosure statement

Joanne Wallis is an editor of the Australian Journal of International Affairs. To ensure the probity of the review process, her co-editor Tim Legrand organised the peer review of this article outside the journal's online editorial platform to protect the anonymity of the reviewers.

Funding

This work was supported by Australian Research Council: [Grant Number DP200101994].

Notes on Contributors

Anna Powles is an Associate Professor in the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at Massey University. She is also a Non-Resident Fellow of the National Bureau for Asian Research and an Expert Associate of the National Security College at the Australian National University. Anna has published widely on security in the Pacific and her current research projects analyze defence diplomacy in the Pacific, PMSCs in Asia and the Pacific, and geopolitical trends in the Pacific.

Joanne Wallis is Professor of International Security and Director of the Stretton Institute Security in the Pacific Islands program at the University of Adelaide. She is also a non-resident senior fellow of the Brookings Institution and an Expert Associate of the National Security College at the Australian National University. Joanne is the author or editor of ten books, including *Girt by Sea: Re-Imagining Australia's Security* (with Rebecca Strating), *Pacific Power? Australia's Strategy in the Pacific Islands*, and *Constitution Making during State Building*. She is the chief investigator on several projects analysing security and Australia's strategy in the Pacific Islands.

ORCID

Anna Powles http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6837-4306
Joanne Wallis http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8767-917X

References

ANZUS Treaty. 1952. Accessed April 29, 1952. https://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/wopapub/house/committee/jfadt/usrelations/report/appendixb_pdf.ashx.

Asia New Zealand Foundation. 2024. *New Zealanders' Perceptions of Asia and Asian Peoples*. https://www.datocms-assets.com/125706/1721708246-perceptions-of-asia-2024-download-the-full-report.pdf

Australian and New Zealand Armies. 2023. "Bilateral Service Cooperation Plan: 'PLAN ANZAC." https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/"assets/Uploads/DocumentLibrary/OIA-2023-4699_Plan-ANZAC.pdf.

Australian Bureau of Statistics. 2022. "Services with the Australian Defence Force: Census." June 28, 2022. https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/people-and-communities/service-australian-defence-force-census/latest-release.

Ayson, Robert. 2018a. "When friends disagree: New Zealand and Australia." *The Interpreter*. July 31, 2018. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/when-friends-disagree-new-zealand-australia.

Ayson, Robert. 2018b. "The Ardern Government's Foreign Policy Challenges." *Policy Quarterly* 14 (2): 18–24.

Ayson, Robert. 2018c. "MFAT 75th Anniversary Conference: New Zealand's Relations with Major Power", speech at the MFAT 75th Anniverary Conference, Wellington, October 18, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jD1QG2XOw6Y.

Ayson, Robert. 2023. "New Zealand's Alliance Obligations in a China-Australia war." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 77 (3): 233–257. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2023.2177253

Banfield, Andrew, and Nathan Church. n.d. *Next Steps for National Cabinet*. Canberra: Parliament of Australia. https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook47p/NationalCabinet.

Barrington, Brooke. 2019. "The Case for New Zealand Diplomacy." *New Zealand Review* 44 (1): 2–5.

Beeson, Mark. 2015. "Invasion by Invitation: The Role of Alliances in the Asia–Pacific." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 69 (3): 305–320. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2014.988207

Butcher, Jack D. 2024. "Simply Another Practice among Others? Analysing the Rise of Strategic Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific Region." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 78 (4): 498–519.

Capie, David. 2021. "Ardern Joins the Indo-Pacific Chorus, But Sings New Zealand's Tune." Incline, July 20 2021. https://www.incline.org.nz/home/ardern-joins-the-indo-pacific-chorus-but-sings-new-zealands-tune.

Capie, David. 2024. "Kiwi Crossroads: Navigating New Zealand's Strategic Landscape". *The Asia Chessboard Podcast*, September 17, 2024. https://www.csis.org/podcasts/asia-chessboard/kiwi-crossroads-navigating-new-zealands-strategic-landscape.

Caso, Federica. 2022. "Settler Military Politics: On the Inclusion and Recognition of Indigenous People in the Military." *International Political Sociology* 16 (1): 1–20.

Catalinac, Amy L. 2010. "Why New Zealand Took Itself out of ANZUS: Observing 'Opposition for Autonomy' in Asymmetric Alliances." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6:317–338. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2010.00115.x

Cavanaugh, M. L. 2020. "New Zealand's Dangerous Strategic Apathy in an Uncertain Age." *The Strategist*, February 12, 2020. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/new-zealands-dangerous-strategic-apathy-in-an-uncertain-age/.

Cha, Victor D. 2023. "Collective Resilience: Deterring China's Weaponization of Economic Interdependence." *International Security* 48 (1): 91–124. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00465

Chalmers, Jim, Chris Bowen, Grant Robertson, and James Shaw. 2023. "Inaugural Australia-New Zealand 2 + 2 Climate and Finance Dialogue Joint Statement." June 8, 2023. https://ministers.treasury.gov.au/ministers/jim-chalmers-2022/media-releases/inaugural-australia-new-zealand-22-climate-and-finance.

Clark, Helen. 2024. "Statement on NZ Government Jeopardising NZ's Independent Foreign Policy and Economic Security." July 16, 2024. https://www.helenclarknz.com/my-diary/statement-on-nz-government-jeopardising-nzsindependent-foreign-policy-and-economic-security.

Clarke, Helen, and Don Brash. 2024. We mustn't Abandon Independent Foreign Policy." *New Zealand Herald*, February 13, 2024. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/helen-clark-and-don-

brash-aukus-nz-must-not-abandon-our-independent-foreign-policy/LLYEOE4WH5AY5DTV3D323OXRUU/.
Cohen, Michael D. 2020. "Political Parties, Australia and the U.S. Alliance: 1976–2016." *Asian Security* 16 (3): 323–342. https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2019.1681403
Cohen, Michael D. 2023. "Different Fears, Same Alliance: Multilateralism, Assurance and the Origins of the 1951 United States-New Zealand-Australia Alliance." *Journal of Peace Research* 60 (2): 322–336. https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221077302
Collins, Judith. 2024. "Press conference, Melbourne." February 1, 2024. https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/transcripts/2024-02-01/press-conference-melbourne.
Commonwealth of Australia. 2023. *Defence Strategic Review*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.
Condliffe, J. B. 1930. "New Zealand's Troubles in Western Samoa." *Foreign Affairs* 8 (3): 474–477. https://doi.org/10.2307/20030299
Cotton, James, and John Ravenhill. 2012. *Middle Power Dreaming: Australia in World Affairs 2006-2010*. South Melbourne: Oxford University Press.
Crowley, Tom, and Tom Lowrey. 2024. "Andrew Giles issues Replacement to 'Direction 99' Which he Says Prioritises Community Safety'." *ABC News*, June 7 2024. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-06-07/giles-issues-new-ministerial-direction/103949446.
Cruz De Castro, Renato. 2006. "Twenty-First Century Philippine-American Security Relations: Managing an Alliance in the War of the Third Kind." *Asian Security* 2 (2): 102–121. https://doi.org/10.1080/14799850600710655
de Jong, Marco, and Arama Rata. 2023. "Resist AUKUS – Protect Hawaiki', E-Tangata." April 2, 2023. https://e-tangata.co.nz/comment-and-analysis/resist-aukus-protect-hawaiki/.
Department of Defence. 2013. *Defence White Paper 2013*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.
Department of Defence. 2020. *Defence Strategic Update*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.
Department of Defence. 2023. "Australian and New Zealand armies sign Plan Anzac." April 18, 2023. https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2023-04-18/australian-and-new-zealand-armies-sign-plan-anzac.
Department of Defence. 2024. *National Defence Strategy*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 2017. *Foreign Policy White Paper*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. n.d.-a. "New Zealand Country Brief." https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/new-zealand/new-zealand-country-brief.
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. n.d.-b. "Australia's Trade in Goods and Services by Top 15 Partners". https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/australias-goods-and-services-by-top-15-partners-2023.pdf.
Department of Home Affairs. n.d. "Country profile – New Zealand." https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/research-and-statistics/statistics/country-profiles/profiles/new-zealand#:~:text=At%20the%20end%20of%20June,cent%20of%20Australia's%20total%20population.
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. 2020. "Review of COAG Councils and Ministerial Forums: Report for National Cabinet." https://www.pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/resource/download/final-report-review-coag-councils-ministerial-forums.pdf.
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. 2024. "Aide Memoire – AUKUS Information Paper." https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2024-05/dpmc-roia-oia-2023-24-0687.pdf.
Fish, Tim. 2023. "New Zealand in AUKUS? The political Kiwi conundrum over Pillar 2 membership." *Breaking Defense*, June 2, 2023. http s://breakingdefense.com/2023/06/new-zealand-in-aukus-the-political-kiwi-conundrum-over-pillar-2-membership/.
Gates, William R., and Katsuaki L. Terasawa. 1992. "Commitment, Threat Perceptions, and Expenditures in a Defense Alliance." *International Studies Quarterly* 36 (1): 101–118. https://doi.org/10.2307/2600918
Government, New Zealand. 2023. *New Zealand's National Security Strategy 2023–2028: Secure Together: Tō Tātou Korowai Manaaki*. Wellington: New Zealand Government.

Governments of Australia et al. (Governments of Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States). 2023. "Joint Declaration Against Trade-Related Economic Coercion and Non-Market Policies and Practices." June 9, 2023. https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2023/june/joint-declaration-against-trade-related-economic-coercion-and-non-market-policies-and-practices.

Henry, Iain D. 2020. "What Allies Want: Reconsidering Loyalty, Reliability, and Alliance Interdependence." *International Security* 44 (4): 45–83. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00375

Hensley, Gerald. 2003. "Will New Zealand Ever Re-Join ANZUS?" *Policy* 19 (3): 33–36.

Hopf, Ted. 2010. "The Logic of Habit in International Relations." *European Journal of International Relations* 16 (4): 539–561. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066110363502.

Jackson, Keith, and Jim Lamare. 1988. "Politics, Public Opinion and International Crises: The ANZUS Issue in New Zealand Politics." In *ANZUS in Crisis*, edited by Jacob Bercovitch, 160–190. London: MacMillan Press.

James, Colin. 2001. "Tasman Allies Will Remain So." *The Australian*, September 9, 2001.

Key, John. 2016. "A Conversation with John Key." *Council on Foreign Relations*, 19 September 19, 2016..

Khoo, Nicholas. 2024. "Critics of NZ Joining AUKUS Need to Answer a Crucial Question: What Exactly is an Independent Foreign Policy?" *The Conversation*, March 28, 2024. https://theconversation.com/critics-of-nz-joining-aukus-need-to-answer-a-crucial-question-what-exactly-is-an-independent-foreign-policy-226617.

King, Ben. 2018. "Remarks on the Indo-Pacific." Speech delivered at the MFAT@75 Conference, Wellington, October 18, 2018. https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/media-and-resources/remarks-on-the-indo-pacific-ben-king-deputy-secretary-for-americas-and-asia.

Laurs, Rob. 2024. "In the Same Boat—a Case for Trans-Tasman Strategic Integration." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 78 (4): 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2024.2402994

Leeds, Brett Ashley, and Michaela Mattes. 2007. "Alliance Politics During the Cold War: Aberration, New World Oder, or Continuation of History?" *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 24 (3): 183–199. https://doi.org/10.1080/07388940701473054

Liu, Huiyan, and Stephen Howes. 2023. "Pacific Islanders in Australia: 2021 Census Results." DevPolicy, March 31, 2023. https://devpolicy.org/pacific-islanders-in-australia-census-results-20230331/#:~:text=By%20our%20count%2C%20there%20were,as%20many%20as%20in%202006.

Luxon, Chris. 2024. "Foreign Policy Speech to the Lowy Institute." August 15, 2024. https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/foreign-policy-speech-lowy-institute.

Mahuta, Nanaia. 2021. "Inaugural Foreign Policy Speech to Diplomatic Corps." February 4, 2021. https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/inaugural-foreign-policy-speech-diplomatic-corps.

Manatū Taonga — Ministry for Culture and Heritage. 2020. "New Zealand and Australia sign the Canberra Pact." Updated September 24, 2020. https://nzhistory.govt.nz/nz-and-australia-sign-the-canberra-pact.

Mapp, Wayne. 2016. "An Independent Foreign Policy." *New Zealand International Review* 41 (6): 6–9.

Marles, Richard. 2023. "Address to Defence Industry Dinner." February 27, 2023. https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/speeches/2023-02-27/address-defence-industry-dinner.

Marles, Richard. 2024. "Press conference, Melbourne". February 1, 2024. https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/transcripts/2024-02-01/press-conference-melbourne.

Marles, Richard, Penny Wong, Winston Peters, and Judith Collins. 2024. "Joint statement on Australia-New Zealand Ministerial Consultations (ANZMIN) 2024." February 1, 2024. https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/statements/2024-02-01/joint-statement-australia-new-zealand-ministerial-consultations-anzmin-2024.

Mattes, Michaela. 2012. "Reputation, Symmetry, and Alliance Design." *International Organization* 66 (4): 679–707. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081831200029X

McDonagh, Naoise. 2024. "Hidden Lessons from China's Coercion Campaign against Australia." *Australian Outlook*, February 28, 2024. https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/hidden-lessons-from-chinas-coercion-campaign-against-australia/.

McGregor, Richard. 2022. *Chinese coercion, Australian resilience*. Sydney: Lowy Institute. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/chinese-coercion-australian-resilience.
McHugh, Finn. 2023. "'It is only fair': New Zealanders get direct pathway to Australian citizenship'." *SBS News*, April 22 2023. https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/new-move-gives-new-zealanders-direct-pathway-to-australian-citizenship/e03g9mnn4.
Ministry of Defence. 2010. *Defence White Paper 2010*. Wellington: New Zealand Government.
Ministry of Defence. 2016. *Defence White Paper 2016*. Wellington: New Zealand Government.
Ministry of Defence. 2018. *Strategic Defence Policy Statement*. Wellington: New Zealand Government.
Ministry of Defence. 2019. *Advancing Pacific Partnerships*. Wellington: New Zealand Government.
Ministry of Defence. 2023. *Defence Policy and Strategy Statement 2023*. Wellington: New Zealand Government.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 2023. *Strategic Foreign Policy Assessment: Navigating a Shifting World: Te Whakatere i Tētahi ao Hurihuri*. Wellington: New Zealand Government.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. n.d. "Taking a Nuclear-free Policy to the World." Accessed September 30, 2024. https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/mfat75/taking-a-nuclear-free-policy-to-the-world.
Moller, Sara Bjerg. 2022. "Domestic Politics, Threat Perceptions, and the Alliance Security Dilemma: The Case of South Korea, 1993-2020." *Asian Security* 18 (2): 119–137. https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2021.1984231
Moremon, John. 2023. "The 'Number 8 Sire' Days for NZ's Defence Force Are Over – New Priorities Will Demand Bigger Budgets." *The Conversation*, August 11, 2023. https://theconversation.com/the-number-8-wire-days-for-nzs-defence-force-are-over-new-priorities-will-demand-bigger-budgets-211182.
Morrison, Scott, Boris Johnson, and Joe Biden. 2021. *Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS*. Washington, DC: The White House. Accessed September 15, 2021. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/15/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus/.
Morrow, James D. 1991. "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances." *American Journal of Political Science* 35 (4): 904–933. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111499
Neelam, Ryan. 2024. *Lowy Institute Poll 2024 Report*. Sydney: Lowy Institute. https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/report/2024/global-powers-and-world-leaders/#report.
New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Manatu Aorere. 2021. *Strategic Intentions 2021-2025*. Wellington: New Zealand Government.
New Zealand Ministry of Defence. 2019. *Defence Capability Plan 2019*. Wellington: Government of New Zealand.
New Zealand Security Intelligence Service. 2023. *New Zealand's Security Threat Environment 2023: An Assessment by the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service*. Wellington: New Zealand Government.
Nye, Joseph S. 2004. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs.
Olson, Mancur Jr., and Richard Zeckhauser. 1966. "An Economic Theory of Alliances." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 48 (3): 266–279. https://doi.org/10.2307/1927082
O'Neill, Andrew. 2017. "Australia and the 'Five Eyes' Intelligence Network: The Perils of an Asymmetric Alliance." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 71 (5): 529–543. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2017.1342763
Overlack, Peter. 1998. "'Bless the Queen and Curse the Colonial Office': Australasian Reaction to German Consolidation in the Pacific 1871–99." *The Journal of Pacific History* 33 (2): 133–152. https://doi.org/10.1080/00223349808572866
Pacific Cooperation Foundation. 2022. *New Zealanders' Perceptions of the Pacific, 2022 Report*. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/621421c4d99baa795bd3f6df/t/6391983a02377f72a3b2821b/1670486099531/FINAL+PCF+New+Zealanders+Perceptions+of+the+Pacific+Report+-+Embargoed+5.00pm+Friday+9+December+2022+%281%29.pdf.

Patman, Robert. 2024. "New Zealand eyes joining AUKUS despite China's warnings." *East Asia Forum*, June 7, 2024. https://eastasiaforum.org/2024/06/07/new-zealand-eyes-joining-aukus-despite-chinas-warnings/.
Pouliot, Vincent. 2010. *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO–Russia Diplomacy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rajah, Roland. 2023. "It's no surprise Australia shrugged off China's campaign of trade coercion." *The Interpreter*, July 26, 2023. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/it-s-no-surprise-australia-shrugged-china-s-campaign-trade-coercion.
Rapport, Aaron. 2020. "Threat Perceptions and Hidden Profiles: Revisiting Suez." *Security Studies* 29 (2): 199–230. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2020.1722849
Rathbun, Brian C. 2004. *Partisan Interventions: European Party Politics and Peace Enforcement in the Balkans*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Remeikis, Amy. 2020. "Jacinda Ardern lashes Scott Morrison for 'testing' friendship over deportations to New Zealand." The Guardian, February 28, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/feb/28/jacinda-ardern-lashes-scott-morrison-for-testing-friendship-over-deportations-to-new-zealand.
Sandler, Todd, and John F. Forbes. 1980. "Burden Sharing, Strategy, and the Design of NATO." *Economic Inquiry* 18 (3): 425–444. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1980.tb00588.x
Sevastopulo, Demetri. 2024. "New Zealand prime minister vows to name and shame China over spying." *Financial Times*, July 15, 2024. https://www.ft.com/content/85f96392-5f71-4b21-8365-0847f7c625d2.
Sezzo. 2021. "What Does it Mean to be Māori in Australia?" *Kill Your Darlings*, February 11, 2021. https://www.killyourdarlings.com.au/article/what-does-it-mean-to-be-maori-in-australia/#:~:text=M%C4%81ori%20society%20is%20organised%20around,to%20the%20whenua%20(land).
Snyder, Glenn H. 1984. "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics." *World Politics* 36 (4): 461–495. https://doi.org/10.2307/2010183
Snyder, Glenn H. 1997. *Alliance Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Stats, NZ. 2023. "2023 Census population counts (by ethic group, ages, and Māori descent) and dwelling counts." May 29, 2024. https://www.stats.govt.nz/information-releases/2023-census-population-counts-by-ethnic-group-age-and-maori-descent-and-dwelling-counts/.
Stats, NZ. n.d. "New Zealand International Trade". https://statisticsnz.shinyapps.io/trade_dashboard/.
Steff, Reuben. 2023. "AUKUS + NZ = win-win." The Interpreter, May 1, 2023. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/aukus-nz-win-win.
Strating, Rebecca, and Joanne Wallis. 2024. *Girt by Sea: Re-Imagining Australia's Security*. Melbourne: La Trobe University Press.
Suh, J. J. 2004. "Bound to Last? The U.S.-Korea Alliance and Analytical Eclecticism." In *Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency*, edited by J. J. Suh, P. J. Katzenstein, and A. Carlson, 131–171. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Te Ara. n.d. "Between government forces and some iwi Māori. Story: New Zealand Wars." Te Ara: The Encyclopedia of New Zealand. https://teara.govt.nz/en/new-zealand-wars.
Templeton, Malcolm. 2006. *Standing Upright Here. New Zealand in the Nuclear Age, 1945–1990*. Wellington: Victoria University Press.
Thomas, Plümper, and Eric Neumeyer. 2015. "Free-riding in Alliances: Testing an old Theory with a new Method." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 32 (3): 247–268. https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894214522916
Tibshraeny, Jenée, and Michael Neilson. 2022. "Jacinda Ardern in Australia: Albanese on 501s – Countries to show 'common sense' and work 'as friends'". The New Zealand Herald, July 8, 2022. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/jacinda-ardern-in-australia-albanese-on-501s-countries-to-show-common-sense-and-work-as-friends/TCPOWLFTUYTBBOXPR4XLW3YBRI/#:~:text=Australian%20Prime%20Minister%20Anthony%20Albanese%20has%20announced%20a%20major%20shift,grant%20voting%20rights%20to%20residents.
To Ope Kātua O Aotearoa Defence Force. n.d. "Ā Mātau Tāngata, mō mātou ngā tūranga, Our People, Structure and Leadership." https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/nzdf/who-we-are/our-people-

structure-and-leadership/#:~:text=A%20diverse%20team%20of%2015%2C201,Aotearoa%20New%20Zealand's%20biggest%20organisations.
Trans-Tasman Roadmap to 2035. 2023. Accessed July 26, 2023. https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Trade-agreements/Australia-NZ-CER/Trans-Tasman-Roadmap-to-2035.pdf.
Ungerer, Carl. 2007. "The "Middle Power" Concept in Australian Foreign Policy." *Australian Journal of Politics & History* 53 (4): 538–551. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8497.2007.00473.x
Vergun, David. 2022. "Official Says Integrated Deterrence Key to National Defense Strategy." US Department of Defense, December 6, 2022. https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3237769/official-says-integrated-deterrence-key-to-national-defense-strategy/.
Von Hlatky, Stefanie. 2013. *American Allies in Times of War: The Great Asymmetry*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wallace, Corey. 2021. "Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand's Layering of Strategic Communications (2016-2020)." *Asian Perspective* 45 (3): 587–620. https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2021.0028
Wallis, Joanne, and Anna Powles. 2018. *Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific Islands: Ambiguous Allies?* Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU.
Wallis, Joanne, and Anna Powles. 2021. "Burden-sharing: The US, Australia and New Zealand Alliances in the Pacific Islands." *International Affairs* 97 (4): 1045–1065. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab081
Wallis, Joanne, and Anna Powles. 2023. *Smooth Sailing? Australia, New Zealand and the United States Partnering in -and with- the Pacific Islands*. Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
Walt, Stephen. 1997. "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse." *Survival* 39 (1): 156–179. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396339708442901
Widmaier, Wes. 2019. "Australian Foreign Policy in Political Time: Middle Power Creativity, Misplaced Friendships, and Crises of Leadership." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 73 (2): 143–159. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2019.1570486
Williams, Michael C. and Iver B. Neumann. 2000. "From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity." Millennium: Journal of International Studies 29 (2): 357–387. https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298000290020801
Wintour, Patrick. 2021. "New Zealand's stance on China has deep implications for the Five Eyes alliance." *The Guardian*, April 23, 2021. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/23/new-zealands-stance-on-china-has-deep-implications-for-the-five-eyes-alliance.
World Economics. n.d.-a. "Australia's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). https://www.worldeconomics.com/Country-Size/Australia.aspx#:~:text=World%20Economics%20estimates%20Australia's%20GDP,to%20World%20Economics%20GDP%20data.
World Economics. n.d.-b. "New Zealand GDP." https://www.worldeconomics.com/GrossDomesticProduct/Real-GDP/New%20Zealand.aspx#:~:text=New%20Zealand%20GDP%3A%20%24215%20Billion&text=Real%20GDP%20in%20New%20Zealand,at%20the%20end%20of%202023.
Wright, Stephen. 2022. "China Warns New Zealand against Squandering Trade Ties." *Wall Street Journal*, June 2, 2022. https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-warns-new-zealand-against-squandering-trade-relationship-11654147681.